Sitting of 5 October 1938

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

  CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
  Mr. Arthur Hendersonasked the Prime Minister whether he will publish the conditions laid down under Article 3 of the Munich Agreement concerning the evacuation of the Sudeten territory?
  The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Butler): When the conditions have been laid down by the International Commission they will no doubt be made public.
  Mr. Wedgwood Benn: Are conditions to be laid down before the evacuation is complete?
  Mr. Butler: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman can leave that matter with perfect safety to the International Commission, who are considering it at the present moment.
  Captain Pluggeasked the Prime Minister whether, to clear up existing obscurities, he proposes to publish any document or other evidence dealing with the position of the Soviet Government in connection with the international crisis over Czechoslovakia?
  Mr. Butler: I have nothing to add to the very clear statement which my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary made on Monday on this point, and I do not consider that any useful purpose would be served by the publication of documents.
  Mr. Cocksasked the Prime Minister whether he will inform the House as to the interpretation put by His Majesty's Government on the word "installations" in paragraph 2 of the Munich Agreement; and what items in the appendix to the Godesberg Memorandum of 23rd September are not included in this term?
  Mr. G. R. Straussasked the Prime Minister what, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, is the definition of "installation" in Article 2 of the Munich Agreement?
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain): It is for the International Commission set up under the Munich Agreement, to interpret what should be included under the heading of "installations." In the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom this term should include only permanent fixtures as distinct from movable objects.
  Mr. Cocks: Do I gather from that reply that in the opinion of the Government the rolling stock of the railways—being movable objects—are not included in installations, and also goods and cattle?
  The Prime Minister: That is so.
  Mr. Thorne: Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the report which appeared in the newspapers last night to the effect that there is already a quarrel between the Commissioners on account of the bad translation?
  Mr. Palingasked the Prime Minister whether the British representative on the international commission has been instructed to insist that the territory left to the Czech Republic shall be economically viable?
  Mr. Butler: The British representative on the International Commission in Berlin will, of course, bear carefully in mind the economic needs of Czechoslovakia.
  Mr. Paling: I asked the definite question whether the British representative had been instructed to insist on this?
  Mr. Butler: He has been instructed to bear that point in mind.
  Mr. Paling: In view of the fact that certain territory has been ceded to Poland since then, and that in that territory there are 7,500,000 tons of hard coal, and that Czechoslovakia will be deprived of coal, may I ask whether attention will be given to that point by our representative on the Commission, and whether he will do his best in order to try to rectify the position?
  Mr. Butler: I am confident that our representative will bear such an important fact in mind.
  Mr. Paling: But has the Minister taken any steps to make representations on this particular feature since the cession of Teschen territory?
  Mr. Butler: I must have notice of that particular question.
  Mr. Leach: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether the territory will also be visible as well as viable?
  Mr. A. Hendersonasked the Prime Minister whether he has any reports from the British Minister at Prague supporting the German charges of Czech terrorism in the Sudetenland?
  Mr. Butler: Reports received from the British observers in Czechoslovakia indicate that such charges have often been greatly exaggerated.
  Mr. G. R. Straussasked the Prime Minister whether the International Commission set up under paragraph 3 of the Munich Agreement is to decide questions remitted to it by a majority vote or, if not, how differences are to be decided?
  Mr. Butler: It is for the International Commission to determine its own procedure, but I trust that it will be able to arrive at decisions by way of discussion and agreement, in which event the question raised by the hon. Member will not arise.
  Mr. Benn: Will the Commission proceed by the method of majority decisions?
  Mr. Butler: I think the Commission must be left to decide its own procedure, as I have described. If the spirit of the Munich Agreement persists I am sure there will be no need for anxiety.
  Mr. Dalton: Is the spirit of Munich indicated by the fact that the Czechs were left outside the door?
  Mr. Butler: That is not the case.
  Mr. Mander: Do I understand that no decision has been taken as to whether the procedure must be unanimous or by a majority?
  Mr. Butler: The hon. Member must understand what I answered in my original reply.
  Mr. Mander: Is it not the case, then, that no decision has been taken as to whether this Commission shall act by a majority or with unanimity, and is it not of the greatest importance that it should be known definitely what the procedure on this point is to be?
  Mr. Butler: I have nothing to add to the terms of my original reply.
  Mr. Bennasked the Prime Minister whether any British military adviser was present at the Munich conference; and whether he was consulted as to the handing over intact of Czech fortifications and munitions to Germany?
  Mr. Butler: The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative, and the second part does not, therefore, arise.
  Mr. Bennasked the Prime Minister why it was decided to hand over the Czech defences intact, in view of the fact that they were constructed under the advice and with the assistance of French engineers, and embodied the latest design included in the Maginot Line?
  The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman is misinformed in assuming that the whole of the Czech defences will be handed over intact. The areas to be occupied by the German troops between 1st and 7th October lie for the most part outside the Czechoslovak defences, and, pending a decision by the International Commission in Berlin, it is not possible to state what proportion of the Czechoslovak defences will come within the further areas to be occupied before 10th October. I understand, moreover, that the evacuation of guns and other movable material, from the Czechoslovak fortifications within the zones coming under German occupation is now under the consideration of the International Commission.
  Miss Rathbone: Do His Majesty's Government intend to make any further grant to the Czech Government in compensation for the fortifications which they have abandoned at the request of His Majesty's Government?
  The Prime Minister: I do not think that point arises out of this question.
  Mr. Bennasked the Prime Minister how many Czech hostages, including children, are held at present by the Germans; and whether the question of

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  their release concurrently with that of Sudeten Germans was discussed at Munich?
  Mr. Edmund Harveyasked the Prime Minister whether any arrangements have been made for the release of the Czechs at present imprisoned or interned in Germany concurrently with the release of Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia; and whether His Majesty's Government Will use their utmost efforts to secure the speedy release of all such prisoners and detenus?
  Miss Rathboneasked the Prime Minister whether he has taken, or proposes to take, any action to secure the release of the Czech political prisoners held in Germany as an equivalent for the release of the Sudeten German prisoners of the Czech Government, as required by the terms of the Munich Agreement; and how many such Czech prisoners there are?
  The Prime Minister: Reports have reached His Majesty's Government to the effect that certain Czech officials in frontier districts have been imprisoned in Germany, and that certain Czech residents in Germany have been held as hostages, but I can give no estimate of the numbers that may be involved. The British representative on the International Commission has been instructed to press for the release of any such prisoners and hostages.
  Mr. Benn: I asked the Prime Minister whether they had been released and whether the question was raised at Munich. Could he tell me whether it was raised at Munich and whether any of them have been released?
  The Prime Minister: It was not discussed at Munich. I cannot say whether any of them have yet been released.
  Mr. Benn: When the Germans were insisting on the release of the Sudetens, did it not occur to the Prime Minister to insist on the release of the Czechs?
  The Prime Minister: I did not know there were any detained.
  Mr. Priceasked the Prime Minister whether the question of the Polish seizure of Czech territory was discussed at Munich?
  Mr. Shinwellasked the Prime Minister whether, when he confirmed his
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  promise of a territorial guarantee at Munich, he knew of the intention of the Polish Government to occupy Czech territory?
  The Prime Minister: The Polish Government's ultimatum demanding the immediate cession of certain territory was only delivered to the Czechoslovak Government on the evening of 30th September. The intention of the Polish Government to occupy Czechoslovak territory was not, therefore, known and could not be discussed by the representatives of the Four Powers at Munich on 29th September.
  Mr. Shinwell: Does that mean that no communication of any kind passed between the Polish Government and His Majesty's Government on the question of the possible occupation of Teschen?
  The Prime Minister: I must have notice of that question, but no communication reached me at Munich.
  Mr. Mander: Could the Prime Minister say whether the division of Ruthenia between Poland and Hungary was discussed at Munich at all?
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir.
  Mr. Priceasked the Prime Minister whether he will ask the Minister in Prague to state the approximate number of refugees who have already arrived in Czechoslovakia from the ceded areas?
  Miss Rathboneasked the Prime Minister whether he has information as to the numbers of refugees who have already fled into the interior of Czechoslovakia before the advance of the Germans; whether he is aware that it may be impossible for the Czechoslovak Government to accept and provide for several hundred thousand Sudeten Germans belonging to the democratic parties; and whether he will consult with the Dominions as to the possibility of receiving some of them?
  Mr. Butler: My Noble Friend has not received any estimate of the number of refugees from the Sudeten areas to the interior of Czechoslovakia, and has asked His Majesty's Minister in Prague for a report. As regards the second and third parts of the question put by the hon. Member for the English Universities (Miss Rathbone), I would refer to an official communiquÉ issued by the Czechoslovak

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  Government on 1st October, stating that the populations of the frontier areas are not allowed to immigrate into the interior of the country and all refugees will be transported back to their place of domicile. The communiquÉ stated that precipitate action was unwise and unnecessary in view of the six months' period of option provided under the Munich Agreement and that it was the duty of every Czechoslovak citizen to remain where he was and vote in the plebiscite. The assumption in the hon. Member's question would, therefore, appear premature.
  Mr. Priceasked the Prime Minister whether, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, Article 8 of the Munich Agreement means that Sudeten Germans who remain Czechoslovak citizens are to be exempt from military service?
  The Prime Minister: Those Sudeten Germans who remain Czechoslovak citizens, after the final delimitation of the new frontiers of the Czechoslovak State has been completed and the arrangements for option and transfer of populations laid down in Article VIII of the Munich Agreement have been executed, will presumably be subject to the same obligations as other citizens of the Republic, including that of any military service that may be obligatory.
  Mr. Shinwellasked the Prime Minister what is the estimated number of Czechs who will be left in the surrendered territory?
  Mr. Butler: It is impossible to make any such estimate until the final determination of the frontiers has been carried out by the International Commission, in accordance with Article VI of the Munich Agreement and until it is known to what extent the right of option, provided for in Article VII, will be exercised.
  Mr. Shinwell: Was no reference made in the conversations between the right hon. Gentleman and the German Chancellor to the need for protection of persons who were likely to remain in Sudeten territory?
  Mr. Butler: I am afraid that question goes beyond the question which I was asked, which was merely whether I could give the estimated number of Czechs who would be left in the territory.
  Mr. Shinwell: Is it not necessary and important to understand the position of those people?
  Mr. Butler: I am afraid I should want notice of that.
  Mr. Shinwellasked the Prime Minister the estimated value of the plants and installations to be handed over to Germany by Czechoslovakia; whether there is any precedent in any Treaty for the surrender of territory, etc., without any corresponding adjustment of the public debt; and what instructions have been given to the British representatives on the International Commission in reference to this matter?
  The Prime Minister: As regards the first part of the question, it is impossible to make any estimate until the final determination of the frontiers has been carried out by the International Commission. A special sub-committee of the Commission has now been set up to deal with economic and financial questions and His Majesty's Representative will bear in mind the desirability of making satisfactory arrangements when the matters referred to by the hon. Member come up for discussion.
  Mr. Shinwell: What was the nature of the instructions to the British representatives on the Commission?
  The Prime Minister: I think that question is answered by the reply which I have given.
  Mr. Palingasked the Secretary of State for War whether he can state approximately the number of new divisions made available for the German army by the cession of the Sudeten territory?
  The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Hore-Belisha): Until the final determination of the frontiers has been carried out by the International Commission in accordance with Article VI of the Munich Agreement, it is impossible to give even an approximate estimate.
  Mr. Paling: Does the right hon. Gentleman mean to tell us that his Intelligence Staff has not informed him of the numbers likely to be added to Hitler's Army because of this transfer? Has not a statement been published that it is likely to be about 400,000?
  Mr. Hore-Belisha: My Intelligence Staff is too intelligent to proceed on such an assumption.
  Mr. Paling: Am I not right in assuming that it is so intelligent that the Prime Minister asked its advice before he went to Germany?
  Mr. Mander: May I ask the Secretary of State whether the number of divisions, whatever it may be, is to be counted for us or against us?
  Mr. A. Hendersonasked the Secretary of State for War whether he can give particulars and the number and size of guns, and the nature, quantity, and value of munitions of war surrendered under the Munich Agreement to the German Government?
  Mr. Hore-Belisha: My Department is informed that the Czechoslovak Government have been unable to estimate, even approximately, the value of guns and other munitions which may ultimately be involved in the transfer of ceded territory, pending delimitation of the new frontier and determination of the amount of, material which can be evacuated.
  Mr. Benn: Does the right hon. Gentleman mean to say that he has not been informed of that by the Prague Government, in view of the fact that an official, or semi-official, statement has been issued pricing these goods at from £25,000,000 to £30,000,000?
  Mr. Hore-Belisha: I mean to say what I said. Of course it is impossible to put a figure upon the amount which will be lost, if any, until the transfer has taken place.
  Sir Archibald Sinclair: What does the right hon. Gentleman mean by "if any"? Does he suggest that the International Commission will try to get some of these guns back? What does he mean by "if any"?
  Mr. Hore-Belisha: I have answered the question in its original form. Until it is known what, if any—and that is the usual phrase—has been transferred, it is impossible to estimate its value.

  PALESTINE.
  Mr. Manderasked the Prime Minister whether he will consider the advisability of making representations to
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  the British allied Governments of Iraq and Egypt with a view to bringing to an end the intrigues against the administration of the British mandate in Palestine at present being carried out in these States?
  Mr. Butler: No, Sir. My Noble Friend is satisfied that the attitude of the Governments of Iraq and Egypt is entirely correct, and that no representations such as the hon. Member suggests are required.
  Mr. Mander: Could not a direct appeal be made to the members of the Four-Power Pact to cease stabbing the British Empire in the back?
  Mr. Butler: The hon. Member's question refers to two specific Governments, and we are satisfied as to them.
  Colonel Wedgwoodasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has any information as to the killing of 21 Jews, including children, at Tiberias; and whether the Jews in Tiberias were protected by police or by troops or were themselves armed?
  The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Malcolm MacDonald): In view of the length of the answer, I will, with the permission of Mr. Speaker and the leave of the House, make a statement at the end of Questions.
  Later—
  Mr. MacDonald: I apologise for the length of the reply, but I think that the House will, perhaps, expect me to take this opportunity to make a general statement about the situation in Palestine.
  As regards the deplorable incident at Tiberias, referred to in the question, I have received particulars from the High Commissioner. In the course of their raid on the town the armed gang murdered 19 Jews, including three women and nine children, and three Jews were wounded. At the time of the raid there were 25 Jewish supernumerary police, about 20 British police and a company of British infantry in the town, which is straggling and open. After the arrival of reinforcements the raiders were finally driven out with casualties.
  Since the House rose at the end of July the following measures have been taken in the interests of general security, In addition to the brigade which arrived

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  in Palestine during September, further reinforcements of two cavalry regiments and one battalion from this country are now under despatch. Also three battalions of British troops, are on their way to Palestine from India and will arrive next week. The British section of the Palestine police has been increased by some hundreds of ex-service men, and further recruitment is now taking place. The operational control of the whole police force has been placed under the General Officer Commanding, and Sir Charles Tegart has returned to Palestine and been appointed to a post on General Haining's staff. Steps have also been taken to redistribute the duties allotted to the Palestinian section of the police. So far as such duties involve the use of arms, or the likelihood of conflict with Arab insurgents, the employment of Jews has been extended and that of Arabs restricted. Despite these measures, and some considerable successes against the terrorist forces, there has been a serious deterioration in the general situation.
  Some days ago I invited the High Commissioner to come to London for the purposes of discussion. He left Jerusalem this morning and will arrive here tomorrow evening. In the meantime the members of the Woodhead Commission have been pressing ahead with the preparation of their report, and I expect to receive this before the end of this month. I can assure the House that when it is received His Majesty's Government will lose no time in considering it and reaching conclusions on policy.
  Colonel Wedgwood: In the first place, are we to understand from the right hon. Gentleman's answer that the Jews who were murdered in Tiberias were unarmed; and had they not been allowed to have arms? Also, has he considered the suggestion that for every Jew murdered in Palestine there should be permits issued for 50 new Jews to go to Palestine, in order that it might be disadvantageous from the Arab point of view to murder any more Jews?
  Mr. MacDonald: The answer to the first part of the question is that the Jews who were murdered in Tiberias, with the exception of two Jewish supernumerary police who were amongst the killed, were private individuals. They were unarmed. But, as the answer showed, there was a
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  very considerable armed force in the town, capable of protecting the inhabitants in any normal circumstances. I regret to state that the success of the terrorist band was owing to the extremely clever and unprecedented way in which they entered the town, not as a band but as a series of individuals disguised, entering apparently for a peaceful avocation; and it was after that entrance of a great many individuals by a subterfuge that the signal was given for attack, and the defence forces were taken for a time unawares. As regards the second part of the question, the whole problem of Jewish immigration is settled according to other principles, and I cannot accept the suggestion the hon. and gallant Member makes.
  Colonel Wedgwood: Were those Jews who were murdered refused permission to have arms? Is there at the present time under sentence of death a Jew who had arms without permission; and cannot this sort of thing be brought to an end by the Jews being allowed to carry arms?
  Mr. MacDonald: I think it is very doubtful whether the individual Jews concerned in Tiberias were refused permission to have arms. But I have explained that there was a force of 25 armed Jewish supernumerary police included among the forces posted at the entrance to the town. With regard to the second part of the question, there was a Jew under arrest who has now been charged with carrying arms, contrary to the order. I am not certain whether he has been tried yet or whether the result of the trial is known.
  Sir A. Sinclair: What was the object of this mysterious raid? Was it to obtain arms, or was it merely promiscuous murder of Jews by Arabs?
  Mr. MacDonald: I think the object, judging by what happened, was simply murder and the destruction of public buildings by fire.
  Mr. Bellenger: May I ask, in connection with the report which the right hon. Gentleman has given us, whether he has any knowledge that the terrorism which is now existing in Palestine is being excited by external foreign propaganda?
  Mr. MacDonald: I have no evidence of that.
  Captain Strickland: Has my right hon. Friend any knowledge as to whether these raiders came over the frontier or whether they were local Arabs?
  Mr. MacDonald: I cannot say about this particular band, but in general they come from within Palestine, and I think that is true of this particular case also.
  Lieut.-Commander Fletcher: Has the right hon. Gentleman any information to show who is the individual organising and directing this Arab terrorism? Is it, for instance, the Grand Mufti, who is at present domiciled in French territory in Syria?
  Mr. MacDonald: I do not think that we have any fresh information on that matter. His Majesty's Government have always taken the view that the Grand Mufti had a great deal of responsibility for what is going on in Palestine to-day.
  Mr. McGovern: May I ask this question, which I have asked previously? As it is the case from evidence that the Jews are not out to murder Arabs and that they have everything to gain by peace, should not the right hon. Gentleman discriminate between those who are sentenced to death in the Jewish community for having arms to defend themselves against these murderous attacks and others who are out plainly for murder; and will he consider arming the entire Jewish population, especially on the borders, in order to protect themselves?
  Mr. MacDonald: The answer to the first part of the question is that it is not a matter for me, but for the General Officer Commanding in Palestine, and I am quite certain he carries out his duties with perfect justice to each side. Both sides must observe the law of the country if there is to be any chance at all of this deplorable state of affairs being brought to an end.
  Colonel Wedgwood: Then change your law.
  Mr. MacDonald: With regard to the second part of the question, it is the policy of the administration to employ Jews in increasing numbers in the work of maintaining order, and the number of Jews who are employed either as regulars or supernumeraries in the police force amounts now to something between 5,000 and 6,000 persons.
  Mr. Macquisten: How can there be justice for a man who is not allowed to defend himself?

  SPAIN.
  Mr. Manderasked the Prime Minister whether an agreement has now been reached between the Committee of British Shipowners Trading to Spain and the National Union of Seamen regarding compensation to be claimed from General Franco for the loss by air attacks on men and ships engaged in Spanish trade; whether a claim has now been put forward; and of what amount?
  Mr. Butler: I am not aware of any agreement between the Committee of British Shipowners Trading to Spain and the National Union of Seamen of the nature referred to by the hon. Member. His Majesty's Government have reserved the right to claim for compensation in all cases where this has appeared justifiable. Discussions with the Burgos authorities on this subject are still proceeding.
  Vice-Admiral Taylor: May I ask whether, among those claims, there are any claims from ships or crews which suffered injury in Spanish territorial waters where, they were told, they proceeded at their own risk?
  Mr. Butler: The distinction has been borne in mind between cases regarded as deliberate and those regarded as not deliberate.
  Mr. Mander: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether any claim has been as yet put in?
  Mr. Butler: I said in my answer that we have reserved the right to claim compensation and we are discussing the position with the Burgos authorities.
  Mr. Shinwell: Has any compensation been paid to the men who suffered?
  Mr. Butler: That is, I think, a matter for the National Maritime Board.
  Mr. Wilfrid Roberts: Did not the Prime Minister make a statement in July that the Franco authorities had accepted the arrangement proposed by the British Government?
  Mr. Butler: It is on that matter that discussion is proceeding.
  Mr. Manderasked the Prime Minister whether the commission for the investigation of air bombardments in Spain asked for permission to examine the Nationalist intelligence reports; the orders issued to the pilots of the various raids; and the pilots' reports on the raids?
  Mr. Butler: So far as I am aware, the Commission did not ask for permission to examine the reports and other documents mentioned by the hon. Member.
  Mr. W. Robertsasked the Prime Minister when it is proposed to despatch the League Commission to supervise the withdrawal of foreign volunteers from the Spanish Government; and what steps are being taken to induce General Franco to agree to a similar withdrawal of the foreign troops in his service?
  Mr. Butler: The Committee appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to constitute, despatch and so far as necessary direct the working of the Commission held its first meeting on 1st October, and I understand that a decision as to the date when the Commission will be despatched to Spain will be taken shortly after consultation with the Spanish Government. As regards the second part of the question, Mr. Hemming, the Secretary of the Non-Intervention Committee, will shortly proceed to Burgos to explain any points of detail and clear up any misconceptions which may have arisen in connection with the Committee's plan and to investigate the exact intentions of the authorities regarding its execution.
  Mr. Roberts: In view of the facts that the Spanish Government now agree to the withdrawal of volunteers serving on their side and that the French frontier still remains closed, can the hon. Gentleman suggest any reason why General Franco should ever agree to the withdrawal of volunteers serving with him?
  Mr. Butler: I canot answer for General Franco.
  Miss Rathboneasked the Prime Minister whether he has information as to the quantities of arms and men that have been sent from Italy and Germany into Spain during the past two months; and when it is proposed that the Non-Intervention Committee shall meet to consider General Franco's refusal to accept its plan for the implementing of nonintervention?
  Mr. Butler: Our information indicates that certain material arrived in the territory under General Franco's control from Italy during this period, and that any additional German aid reaching Spain was of small dimensions. As regards the second part of the question, I cannot accept the interpretation placed by the hon. Member upon General Franco's reply. As I have explained in answer to a question by the hon. Member for North Cumberland (Mr. W. Roberts), Mr. Hemming, the Secretary to the Non-Intervention Committee, is shortly to pay a visit to Burgos and, until his report has been received, it is not possible to say when the Committee will meet.
  Miss Rathbone: Was it not six weeks ago that General Franco's reply was received, and is not such a long delay before an answer is sent likely to give the impression that the Non-Intervention Committee are not so very keen about the plans as they were?
  Mr. Jagger: Is it possible to say how long Mr. Hemming is likely to be in Spain?
  Mr. Butler: No, Sir, not at present. He will have to do the work which has been assigned to him, but we cannot say how long it will take.

  ANGLO-GERMAN DECLARATION.
  Mr. G. R. Straussasked the Prime Minister when the French Government were informed of the Anglo-German declaration of 30th September?
  The Prime Minister: On my return from Munich I addressed a personal message to M. Daladier, the terms of which have been published and which I am circulating in the OFFICIAL REPORT. M. Daladier's reply has since been published, and I will add this also to the OFFICIAL REPORT.
  Mr. Strauss: Is it not very unfortunate to make such an agreement with Herr Hitler without previously consulting with our great ally, France?
  The Prime Minister: I do not gather from M. Daladier's reply that he took that view.
  Mr. Strauss: Whatever M. Daladier's courteous reply was, is not the Prime

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  Minister aware that this agreement caused very grave concern among the French people as a whole?
  Following is the Prime Minister's Message to M. Daladier:
  "On my return to London I wish to express to you, Monsieur le PrÉsident, my grateful appreciation of your loyal and helpful co-operation throughout these recent days of anxiety, and my admiration of the courage and dignity with which you have represented your great country.
  In the declaration which the German Chancellor and I signed yesterday, we have agreed that our respective peoples are united in their desire for peace and for friendly consultation in all differences that may arise.
  Closely united as are the hearts of our peoples, I know that these sentiments are true of your country no less than of my own. I look forward to renewed and continuous cooperation with you in further efforts for the consolidation of European peace through an extension of the good will and confidence which so happily inspires the relations between our two countries."
  Following is M. Daladier's reply:
  "I thank you for your message, which has deeply touched the French nation. The sentiments you express correspond to theirs.
  During this crisis France has felt the tightening of the links of cordial friendship and esteem that unite her to the British nation. Like all my countrymen, I have admired your ardent will to peace, your lofty and firm grasp of the vital interests of our two countries and of the special obligations of France. Our collaboration is not exclusive of any other understanding. I am convinced that it will remain the most dependable proof of peace."

  LIVERPOOL-PRESCOT ROAD (PEDESTRIAN CROSSINGS).
  Mr. Pilkingtonasked the Minister of Transport at what date pedestrian crossings are to be set up in Huyton, on the Liverpool-Prescot road?
  The Minister of Transport (Mr. Burgin): I have approved a scheme for the establishment of nine pedestrian crossings on this road, which has dual carriageways with a central reserved tramway track. The exact siting of the crossings will be settled at a conference of the parties interested which I am about to hold.
  Mr. Pilkington: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that these crossings were recommended very nearly a year ago, and in view of the number of accidents on this road will not the right hon. Gentleman expedite the matter as much as he can?
  Mr. Burgin: Certainly, but it is for the Huyton District Council and the tramway company to agree. If they will not, I will come in and see that they agree.
  Mr. Macquisten: Why are such obsolete things as tramways still allowed to exist?

  WATER SUPPLY.
  Mr. Liddallasked the Minister of Health what is the maximum hardness laid down by his Department as desirable in a domestic water supply; and what towns, having an average water hardness greater than this, have installed water-softening plants for treating the town's supply?
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Mr. Bernays): I am advised that arrangements for the treatment of water must be determined on the facts of each particular case. My Department has not considered it necessary, therefore, to recommend water undertakers to adopt a maximum standard of hardness. In these circumstances, the latter part of the question does not arise.

  CANADA (OIL RESOURCES).
  Captain Pluggeasked the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs what steps are being taken at the present time to develop the oil resources of the Empire by prospecting for and developing oil fields in Canada; and whether any steps are to be taken in the near future to accelerate these activities?
  Mr. MacDonald: I understand that considerable activity has taken place in connection with the development of oilfields in the Turner Valley and in other parts of the Province of Alberta. My hon. and gallant Friend will appreciate that the scope and nature of this activity is a matter for the competent Canadian authorities.

  NEWFOUNDLAND.
  Mr. Gallacherasked the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs what methods are used by the governing Commission in Newfoundland to keep in touch with local opinion, and what measures are being taken to restore representative government to the people of Newfoundland?
  Mr. MacDonald: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given to the hon. Member for Shipley (Mr. Creech Jones) on 10th May, to which I have nothing to add.
  Mr. Gallacher: Is it not time that actual steps were taken to restore the democratic rights of the Newfoundland people and to allow them to make an effort, at any rate, to rebuild their economy?
  Mr. MacDonald: That point is covered in the previous answer to which I have referred.
  Mr. Gallacherasked the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs whether, in view of the fact that over 25 per cent of the population in Newfoundland are in receipt of Government relief of six cents a day or ten cents a week for children, steps are being taken to restore the economic life of the country?
  Mr. MacDonald: The maximum number of persons in receipt of relief at any one time during the present year has never reached 25 per cent. of the population of Newfoundland: and our latest information is that in July it stood at about 14 per cent. The value of relief varies, but is generally higher than is suggested by the hon. Member, and particulars regarding this were given in an answer to a question by the hon. Member for Central Southwark (Mr. Day) on 19th July. It is the constant aim of the Commission of Government to improve the economic conditions of the island; and there is no doubt that substantial progress has been made, in spite of difficulties over which the Commission have no control.
  Mr. Gallacher: Is the Minister aware that my latest information is likely to be more reliable than his, and if I send it to him will he give the matter serious consideration?
  Mr. Gallacherasked the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs what statistics are available of the incidence of tuberculosis and similar diseases in Newfoundland now and at the time of the appointment of the governing Commission?
  Mr. MacDonald: Figures of the death rate from tuberculosis in Newfoundland over a period of years from 1925 were given in reply to a question by the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir J.
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  Wardlaw-Milne) on 13th April last year. A recent survey which has been carried out suggests that the incidence of tuberculosis in the island is about 6,600 cases per 100,000 of the population. The problem is one which is engaging the serious attention of the Newfoundland Government and steps have been taken recently to enlarge the tuberculosis sanatorium and to inaugurate special measures to control and prevent the spread of this disease.
  Mr. Gallacher: While it is desirable to have the sanatorium increased in order to deal with the disease, would it not be much better to make a real effort to restore the economy and the democratic institutions and to allow these people to get a real opportunity of freeing themselves from the disease?
  Mr. Lunn: Is not the general health of the community of Newfoundland seriously affected by the poverty of the people?
  Mr. MacDonald: Yes, Sir, and part of the policy of the Provisional Government has been to improve nutrition in the islands so that health would also improve.

  SCHOOL STRIKE, AUDLEY, STAFFORDSHIRE.
  Colonel Wedgwoodasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education whether he will take steps to bring the Staffordshire county education authority and the parents together under the supervision of the Board with a view to ending the school strike at Audley, which is holding up education in that area?
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education (Mr. Kenneth Lindsay): It is the settled practice of the Board not to intervene directly in disputes between local education authorities and parents arising out of the reorganisation of schools. The Board would be ready, however, on the invitation of the Staffordshire authority, to arrange for the presence of His Majesty's Inspector at any conference which might be convened between the authority and representatives of the parents.
  Colonel Wedgwood: Is the Board prepared to do anything in the matter or not?
  Mr. Lindsay: I think my answer indicates that I hope it is. My answer was that we should be ready to arange, on the invitation of the authority, for the presence of one of our Inspectors.
  Colonel Wedgwood: Thank you.

  NAVAL AND MILITARY PENSIONS AND GRANTS.
  Sir Cooper Rawsonasked the Minister of Pensions whether he will agree to an independent inquiry, free of cost, in the case of Mrs. Gladys Richard, of Hove, widow of the late W. R. Richard, who has been refused a pension on the grounds that their marriage took place after the contraction of the disease alleged by the Ministry to have caused the death of her husband, who was an officer in the Royal Scots, was gassed and twice wounded in the war and was invalided out in 1919, was refused an award for tuberculosis in 1927, but three years later was granted an award of 100 per cent. in view of the delay by the Ministry in discovering the injury to Mr. Richard's head?
  The Minister of Pensions (Mr. Ramsbotham): I am making further inquiries into this case, having regard to the detailed representations which my hon. Friend has addressed to me since he put down his question, and I will communicate the result as early as possible.

  AIR-RAID PRECAUTIONS.
  Mr. Graham Whiteasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department when it is proposed to publish the report of the Anderson Committee on the evacuation of the civil population?
  The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd): It has been decided that this report shall be published without delay.
  Mr. Pilkingtonasked the Home Secretary how many gas masks are now available for the general public?
  Mr. Lloyd: Approximately 40,000,000 have been manufactured, and further large deliveries are being received each week.
  Mr. Pilkington: Is my hon. Friend aware that there is at least one district
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  in this country where there was a very serious deficiency of these gas masks during the recent crisis; and can he give an assurance that such conditions will not occur again?
  Major Colfox: Can my hon. Friend say what will be done with those gas masks which have been issued to the public recently—whether they will be re-collected and stored?
  Mr. Lloyd: With regard to the first supplementary question, as we have 40,000,000, it is obvious that we have not enough for the entire population; but I have said that further large deliveries are being received each week. With regard to the second supplementary question, we are going into that matter very carefully at the present time. A number of complicated questions are involved, which will come up for decision quite shortly.
  Miss Wilkinson: As these gas masks are, we understand, completely harmless, would it not be as well to let the children continue to play with them?
  Mr. R. C. Morrison(by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware of the uncertainty of local authorities, business firms and the general public, as to future action with regard to air-raid precautions, and whether he has any statement to make?
  The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir Samuel Hoare): I recognise the importance of informing local authorities and all concerned about the future development of air-raid precautions. It is clear that these precautions, essential for the safety of the civil population, must be carried out thoroughly and must be extended. I am glad to say that recruiting of personnel is being pressed on by local authorities, for a sound scheme of precautions depends on having the necessary men and women for all the services trained and instructed beforehand. Business firms who had begun their schemes for the protection of their work-people should complete them steadily. As I stated in the House on Monday, my Department is collecting from local authorities material on the lessons of the past weeks, and no time will be lost in considering it and reaching decisions. While emphasising the need for improvements and extensions of our plans, I am

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  sure that the House would wish me to place on record my appreciation of the work carried out by the local authorities and their staffs, by the air-raid precautions personnel, and by all the men and women who came forward to assist in the last few weeks.
  Mr. Morrison: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that a multitude of people volunteered their services last week, and that it will be essential to have some early decision given to the local authorities as to their future action, before the people collected last week are all dispersed so that it is impossible to get them together again?
  Sir S. Hoare: Yes, Sir, I fully appreciate the urgency of the question that the hon. Gentleman has just asked me. I am now pressing the local authorities to give me the data on which one can base conclusions. As soon as I have had the data I will then reach conclusions, and take as early an opportunity as I can of announcing them to the House.

  EXCHANGE EQUALISATION FUND.
  Mr. Whiteasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can make any statement with regard to the present position of the Exchange Equalisation Fund?
  The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Captain Euan Wallace): In accordance with the promise which my right hon. Friend gave during the passage of the Exchange Equalisation Account Act, 1937, a statement of the position of the Account is published twice a year. The last such statement was made on 30th June last, and the next is due at the end of December. My right hon. Friend is not prepared to depart from this arrangement.

  NORTH ATLANTIC SHIPPING ACT, 1934.
  Mr. Dayasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what further proposals have been made to the Government for the purpose of constructing additional tonnage under the provisions of the North Atlantic Shipping Act, 1934; and will he give particulars?
  Captain Wallace: Under Agreements, which have been laid before Parliament,
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  the Treasury has undertaken to advance the whole £9,500,000 authorised by the North Atlantic Shipping Act, 1934, in connection with the construction of the "Queen Mary" and the "Queen Elizabeth" and for the working capital of the company. No question, therefore, arises of additional proposals under the Act.
  Mr. Day: Do we understand from the answer that all the proposals that have been made to the Government for financial assistance under the North Atlantic Shipping Act, 1934, have been dealt with?
  Captain Wallace: £9,500,000 has been sanctioned, and that has been already allotted.

  SCOTLAND.

    OLD AGE PENSIONERS, GREENOCK (PUBLIC ASSISTANCE).
    Mr. Robert Gibsonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland how many old age pensioners in Greenock there were at the last convenient date; how many of these were in receipt of public assistance; how much money was paid by way of public assistance to old age pensioners in Greenock during each of the last three years and how much by way of old age pensions during these years, respectively; and what was the estimated expense to public funds for administrational work connected with the payment of the said public assistance?
    The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Colville): The number of old age pensioners in Greenock in receipt of public assistance on 15th May, 1938, was 760. I regret that the information asked for in the other parts of the question is not available.
    Mr. Gibson: Will the right hon. Gentleman give consideration to the question whether there ought not to be an increase in the amount of the old age pension?
    Mr. Colville: That is a different question.

    HERRING FISHING, RIVER CLYDE.
    Mr. R. Gibsonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he has any statement to make regarding the arrangements operating this autumn for the marketing of herring and the curing of herring caught on the Clyde; and whether

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    he has any statement to make regarding improvements thereon for next season?
    Mr. Colville: The demand for herring taken in the Clyde during the coming months will depend on the quality of the herring and on the total supplies available there and elsewhere in Great Britain. In the view of the Herring Industry Board, with whom I have been in consultation, the ordinary trade channels should be able adequately to deal with the supplies available during the present autumn. As regards curing, as the hon. and learned Member is aware, the amount of curing in the Clyde area is normally very small in relation to the total quantity cured in Great Britain, and the Herring Industry Board have no reason to believe that the facilities are inadequate. If, however, the hon. and learned Member has any suggestions to make regarding improvements in the arrangements for marketing or curing in that area, I shall be glad to arrange for their consideration.

    UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE, GREENOCK.
    Mr. R. Gibsonasked the Minister of Labour how many families in Greenock were in receipt of reduced benefits because some unit of the household was earning a wage at the last available date, and at the corresponding date six months earlier?
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour (Mr. Lennox-Boyd): I have assumed that the hon. and learned Member is referring to unemployment assistance, not unemployment benefit. The only figures available are those on the basis of a sample inquiry made on 3rd December last, when the number of persons on the Unemployment Assistance Board's register in the administrative area of Greenock was approximately 3,000, and it was estimated that in about 450 cases the applicant's household contained wage-earners whose earnings were partly taken into account in assessing the needs of the applicant. These figures do not include persons who, because of substantial household resources, have either not made application or have ceased to apply for allowances. The numbers of persons on the Board's register in this area at 1st April and 30th September were approximately 2,900 and 2,600 respectively.

    OLD AGE PENSIONS.
    Mr. Dayasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury the number of persons in receipt of non-contributory pensions under the Old Age Pension Acts, 1908 to 1924, or the Contributory Pensions Act, including pensions under the Blind Persons Act, 1920, as at the last convenient date?
    Captain Wallace: The number of pensions in payment as at 30th June, 1938, were as follow:

    Pensions in virtue of Section 11 of the Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act,1936

    1,212,957

    Pensions under the Old Age Pensions Act, 1936 (including Blind Pensions)

    595,904

    Total

    1,808,861

    Mr. Day: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether there are any applications by blind persons for pensions which have not as yet been dealt with and are still under consideration?
    Captain Wallace: Not without notice.

    DEFENCE SERVICES (MARRIAGE ALLOWANCES).
    Mr. Dayasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether, in view of the present recruiting campaign for the three Defence Services, and the desirability of making service therein more attractive, he will consider introducing legislation to lower the marriageable age in all three services, thus making a larger number of wives of serving men eligible for marriage allowances and so obviate the wives and children having recourse to public assistance committees to augment the men's own allowances to their families?
    Captain Wallace: I cannot add anything to the reply which I gave to a similar question by the hon. Member on 4th July last.
    Mr. Day: Does not the Financial Secretary think it is a disgrace that the wives and families of these soldiers are on Poor Law relief?

    PRIVATE NOTICE QUESTIONS.
    Mr. Benn: Mr. Speaker, will you allow me now to put a question if I submit it

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    through you, if the Prime Minister is prepared to answer it? I submitted a Private Notice question to you, Sir.
    Mr. Speaker: The question seemed to be a matter better dealt with in debate, and it was certainly submitted to me too late.
    Mr. Benn: Do I understand that the question is ruled out on account of its character, or because it came late in the morning?
    Mr. Speaker: It was ruled out because of its character and because it came too late.
    Mr. Benn: Then, Mr. Speaker, may I submit to you considerations to show that it might be considered a proper question?
    Mr. Speaker: That would be a very dangerous precedent.

    SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE.
    Resolved,
    "That this House do meet to-morrow, at Eleven of the clock; that no Questions shall be taken after Twelve of the clock; and that at Four of the clock Mr. Speaker shall adjourn the House without Question put."—[The Prime Minister.]

POLICY OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.
3.34 p.m.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir John Simon): I beg to move,
"That this House approves the policy of His Majesty's Government by which war was averted in the recent crisis and supports their efforts to secure a lasting peace."
After the two full days of Debate which we have already had on the Munich Agreement, in the course of which the circumstances and the consequences of this momentous event have been surveyed from many angles, the time has come when the Government must ask the House of Commons for a verdict on the events that have taken place since the House rose, and on the part which His Majesty's Government have played in connection with them. As the House was in Recess urgent action had to be taken, and most important decisions had to be promptly reached without the previous approval of Parliament, and without the opportunity of informing Parliament from day to day. We now invite the House, by its vote, to declare that the action which has been taken in this emergency is approved.
It can only be for history to decide hereafter whether the things that were done at Munich the other day lead, as we all of us everywhere in this House hope they will, to better things, or whether the prognostications of increasing evil will prove to be justified. Nobody can pronounce finally about that now. We are all witnessing, or playing our part in, a drama which is never finished. But the Government are bound to ask here and now in respect of these matters for approval of the course which has been taken so far as it has been at present pursued. It will not have escaped attention that yesterday M. Daladier in the French popular Chamber asked for and received, by a very great majority, the vote of approval. The size of that vote is very significant of the state of French opinion. I read that there were only three abstentions and that the minority, which totalled 75, contained, if I understand rightly, 73 members of the Communist party.
I suppose there is nobody sitting here on this Wednesday afternoon who is not carrying his mind back at this moment to Wednesday a week ago just about this
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hour, and we are all of us reflecting not only on the extreme gravity of these events, but on the speed with which these events have rolled forward. An hon. Friend of mine in this House has expressed the view that it is deplorable that Parliament then demonstrated what he regarded as a most lamentable exhibition of mass hysteria. For my part, I believe that to be an utterly false view. After all, the demonstration which then occurred in this House when the Prime Minister was able to announce at the end of his speech what he did not know when he began, that he had had this invitation from Herr Hitler to go to Munich next morning—the demonstration that then occurred was not of some craven, ignoble, hysterical emotion. This popular Assembly never in its history has more truly represented the sentiments of the people. There was, of course, an overwhelming sense of relief at a respite, but there was more than that. There was a demonstration, an instant demonstration of admiration for the man amongst us who, as everybody knows, has been untiring in his efforts and unyielding in his resolve to snatch from the very jaws of war the prospect of peace.
There was another thing in it. That demonstration, a week ago, of the feeling of the House registered the realisation, so movingly expressed yesterday by the hon. Member for Bridgeton (Mr. Maxton), spread throughout our nation and throughout many nations of the world, that the outbreak of a European war last week would have meant death, mutilation and terror to many millions of human beings. There is nothing lamentable, there is nothing hysterical in giving ex-pression to those feelings. To-day, if there be a contrast in the calmness and deliberation with which we can discuss these grave matters compared with last week, I still claim that I and each one of us who took part in that demonstration from our hearts, each one of us who felt deeply moved last Wednesday, can say now with reference to it what the Prime Minister said on Monday about his whole policy in this matter: "I have nothing to be ashamed of."
I have been reading the last published volume of the life of Marlborough, and I note that the author makes a contrast between the compassion of his hero, his horror at slaughter, and what he described, in a brilliant phrase, as

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"that detachment from human suffering which has often frozen the hearts of great captains."
I am glad that a week ago the House of Commons did not show that detachment. Now that we can discuss the issues with more deliberation, and, it may be, more calmly, allow me to observe, in passing, that if it had not been for the Prime Minister we should not have been able to do so to-day. Allow me to add one further reflection on a cognate aspect of the matter. Many people feel, and I feel, that often in these tremendous diplomatic discussions when we are trying to analyse what should be the course of great States, it is a mistake to personify and individualise the States too much. We say: "Germany is prepared to do this," or "France has undertaken to do that." We must remember that there are many millions of men and women in the world, and one lesson from this crisis, perhaps the greatest lesson of all, is that the masses of people in every country are equally horrified at the prospect of war. The Prime Minister's popularity in Germany is not due to any feeling among Germans that the Fuhrer was gaining territory or achieving his purpose: it was due to the gratitude which ordinary people in that country felt for the Prime Minister who was striving for peace in Europe. [An HON. MEMBER: "Question."]
I do not know whether hon. Members have observed the despatch which was sent to and published by the "Daily Herald" from their well-known correspondent Mr. W. N. Ewer, on one of the days at the end of last week—I think on Saturday. This correspondent was in Munich when these things were happening. I think I heard a voice challenging my observation just now. Let me read some of the passages from the despatch of this newspaper correspondent of the "Daily Herald," who was there witnessing the scene and estimating the situation. He discusses what may be called the tangible results and goes on to say:
"So much for the tangible results. But the intangible results seem to me of every bit as great importance, perhaps of more importance. Most outstanding of these is the effect on the German mind. There is no atmosphere of 'Hitler Victorious'—not even among dyed-in-the-wool-Nazis."
He describes how the people were cheering the Prime Minister in the streets and the taverns and he goes on to say:
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"They were cheering for one thing and one thing only. They were cheering for peace. Nobody who watched them and moved about among them could have any other thought for a moment. And mark this, in Munich, in September, 1938, German men and women, after the signing of an agreement which put an end to a tense situation, flocked to cheer not the German Fuhrer who had won a victory, but the British Prime Minister, who, rightly or wrongly, in their minds symbolises peace."
Mr. Ewer goes on to say:
"I do not know how adequately to emphasise the importance of this. But of this I am entirely sure to my finger tips, that an odd unexpected, entirely uncalculated result of the last three weeks crisis, and of this strange ending to it, has been an expression of public opinion in Germany such as has not been known for five years. It may well turn out that that is going to be vastly more important than the precise date on which this or that zone of the Sudeten land is transferred from Czechoslovakia to German rule."
That is one reflection which I am justified in bringing to the notice of the House. It is the impression of the "Daily Herald" correspondent, a trained observer, on the spot. There are, I think, two other main reflections which the avoidance of the outbreak of war last week bring to the forefront of our minds. They are very grim reflections, but I wish to state the position as I see it. One reflection is this. We are deeply conscious to-day that while war has been avoided Herr Hitler has again achieved the substance of his immediate and declared aim without war. The Prime Minister, with his usual candour, told us that at Berchtesgaden Herr Hitler, in perfectly definite terms, declared that the Sudeten Germans must have the right of self-determination, and that if they could not achieve it by their own efforts he would assist them to do so. He declared categorically that rather than wait he would be prepared to risk a world war. Nobody will underrate the gravity and significance of that fact, the fact that he was prepared to invade Czechoslovakia in order to annex this territory, the fact that the Reich is now acquiring the territory which he demanded, not indeed by invasion or war, but by cession—cession which the French and British pressed the Czechs to make.
The other main reflection which is in all our minds is that while what might have been unlimited war, extending to many countries, was avoided last week, still it is Czechoslovakia which has surrendered territory to the insistent demands of Germany, and the fortitude

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and calmness with which the Czechs have faced that destiny have aroused the admiration of the whole world. But while we feel the full force of these facts and realise what a terrible decision was before the Czechoslovakian Government, sympathy and feeling must not blind us to what the alternative courses before the Czech Government really were. It was a dreadful choice, but it was a choice between ceding, as the French and ourselves advised them to cede, a portion of territory which had been included in this newly-created Czechoslovakian State at the end of the War 20 years ago, and exposing their State to unlimited invasion and possible destruction. I wish to say quite plainly and firmly that the French Government and ourselves did no injury to Czechoslovakia because we brought them to face that alternative. We have only to read Lord Runciman's report in which he says that he believed that cession of territory was inevitable. We know that he struggled against it and worked his hardest to devise plans to avoid it, but that was his conclusion. No one can read his report, temperately phrased as it is, without realising that a settlement without altering the boundaries had ceased to be possible, and feelings which are rightly aroused by this dismemberment must not exclude a consideration of this hard fact.
A great many people outside, who are anxious and concerned, have not studied this question with the closeness with which politicians have had to study it. The truth is that the State of Czechoslovakia was in fact created in its original form after the Peace Treaties in defiance of the principle of self-determination. I confess that I find great difficulty in believing that this famous formula of President Wilson can in all cases be precisely and satisfactorily applied. It appears to me that the formula in its abstract shape is what I may call a very good Liberal formula, but there are, at any rate, many cases in which it is extremely difficult to give it a just application This is due to the fact—it does not seem to be provided for in the formula itself—that you may have in the same place people of opposite attachments, races and views. Indeed, President Wilson did not seem to allow for the fact that birds of a feather do not necessarily flock together. I quite understand that there were difficulties, enormous difficulties, to be met by those who had the
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business of redrawing the boundaries of Europe when they came to apply in some cases the Wilsonian doctrine. As usual the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) in one of his books has put the whole thing in a pungent sentence or two which I will venture to read to the House. He says:
"Bohemia and Moravia contained at least 3,000,000 German-speaking population, often concentrated, usually in the ascendant, a strong competent stock, holding firmly together like the Ulstermen in Ireland."
And then he puts the dilemma:
"To exclude the German-speaking population from the new State of Czechoslovakia was deeply and perhaps fatally to weaken the new State; to include them was to affront the principle of self-determination."
I am not making this reference with the slightest desire to reduce the Debate into a quarrel about self-determination, but because I think it my duty to remind the House most respectfully and hon. Members opposite that this view of the matter is one which the Labour party supported, which those who claimed independence in the Liberal party have constantly had in mind, and which a great number of serious students of no party at all have constantly had in mind. The late Mr. Arthur Henderson wrote a treatise on the peace terms in 1919, and he said:
"Millions of Germans are placed under Czechoslovakian, Polish and Italian rule. This will create irredentist populations as considerable as those which provoked the Serbian agitation before the War.
Serious people who have examined this matter have realised for a long time that what really happened was that a decision was reached by yielding to strategical calculations, and by disregarding President Wilson's principles. I do not think that those who had no responsibility should be too ready to say that a better solution could have been attained at the time; but the decision that was reached was one by which Europe was storing up for herself terrible trouble. Let me make one other reference to one who has passed from us now, an authority which I revere—Mr. Asquith. He was not at the Peace Conference but in the speeches he made during that fateful time he declared:
"Some of the new boundaries in Europe must be regarded as provisional. There must be an opportunity for deliberate review and revision."
Sir Archibald Sinclair: Deliberate."
Sir J. Simon: Yes, and he hoped that the League of Nations might be able to undertake that task.
I do not see my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) in his place at the moment, but what I am saying I do not think will be challenged by him. I have here the actual volume which was presented to those who were at the Peace Conference, on behalf of the new State of Czechoslovakia, containing a Memorandum, with arguments, very elaborate ones in French and German, which they put forward as their case for claiming to include this German fringe. You cannot read the book without seeing what a difficult problem it was. When you contrast what is said here with some of the things in Lord Runciman's Report you are bound to admit that some at least of the expectations have not been completely fulfilled. A part of the book contains promises as to how these Germans would find themselves treated inside the new State. For my part, I agree entirely with what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden), that the disabilities and discriminations from which they have suffered are very far from being the worst that you can find in Europe. But none the less, as Lord Runciman said, they are serious and irritating. Yet I find here in the document presented when the Peace Treaties were being drawn up and the lines of the frontiers were being settled, very comforting assurances:
"The Germans in this area will have in Bohemia exactly the same rights as the Czechs. We should never employ any irritating measures against the German part of the population. The regime would correspond to that of Switzerland."
One must in common fairness admit that Lord Runciman's Report gives a different picture. He says that for a long time, down to the last three or four years, the Sudeten Germans have lived in a situation of hopelesness, and he goes on:
"The rise of Nazi Germany gave them new hope. I regard their turning for help towards their kinsmen and their eventual desire to join the Reich as a natural development in the circumstances."
Therefore, it seems to me that we are brought to this point which has been mentioned once or twice in the Debate, that it is regrettable that it was not possible to secure a peaceful adjustment of
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frontiers before this. References have been very rightly made to Article XIX of the Covenant of the League of Nations, but even so I think it is right to realise how very weak and flimsy Article XIX of the Covenant really was. I think I shall carry with me the view of my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington in saying this: The framers of the Treaties of Peace no doubt were aware that some of the frontiers they had drawn might in turn need to be altered. I am sure they must have realised that. But all they felt they could do was to include in the Covenant of the League Article XIX. What does Article XIX provide? I do not want to belittle it but let me read its terms:
"The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of Treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."
In practice that Article has proved ineffective for any practical result, largely for two reasons: First of all the Article, which says that the Assembly may pass such a resolution, requires that the resolution must be passed unanimously. Every State must be prepared to let the resolution be passed; a single vote against it, even the vote of the State that is going to lose its territory, would mean that the resolution is lost. The requirement of unanimity has in fact operated to fix and crystallise frontiers which undoubtedly ought to have been already altered. That is the first point. The second difficulty is this: Even if you could suppose that the Assembly could get such a resolution carried unanimously, even so the parties, the States concerned, would still have to arrive at their own agreement as to what should be transferred and the way in which it should be transferred before reconsideration can be carried out. Lord Lothian has strongly emphasised in another place the point that the League of Nations is not a super-State which is able to impose its authority on its members. The sovereignty of each State remains. Therefore, what is involved in the peaceful transference of territory without causing trouble is that the sovereign State should voluntarily and without pressure give up an area which it very naturally would desire to keep. I believe that the true view of this matter is this, that the problem of the peaceful adjustment of frontiers where substantial

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territories are involved and antagonisms of race and rival loyalties arise, has never yet received its due solution or consideration. It is a very difficult thing to imagine how it could be done.
Mr. David Grenfell: It cannot be done.
Sir J. Simon: That problem, that issue of the change of frontiers and the transfer of territories, is now in the modern world the chief remaining cause from which wars might arise. Practically every other historic cause has been removed. Religious wars, dynastic wars, wars which have to do with other issues have to a very large extent ceased to be a danger to the world. I am hopeful that even trade wars might be avoided. But this problem of how you are to secure the peaceful alteration of frontiers is a problem which, if it cannot be solved by some method or other, remains a potent cause of possible wars. It has nothing to do with it to say that there have been cases of cessions of territory. Lord Salisbury made an arrangement with Germany by which Heligoland passed to Germany in 1890. That was passed without heat, without raising racial issues that inflamed passions. That has nothing to do with intense rivalries over a frontier which separates people from those they want to join.
I believe that in the work which the Prime Minister had to face this was the real problem which he and the French Government had to tackle during this crisis. And while I admit that the solution that has been obtained is open to all sorts of challenges and criticisms, let us at least recognise what was the real character of the difficulty to be solved and how seldom in the history of the modern world it has been solved without war. It is true that the Agreement at Munich was reached under the pressure of the alternative of instant invasion. That is true, but is that reason enough for rejecting the Agreement and preferring that Europe should be plunged into war? I do not think so.
During the last two days there have been many observations made on many aspects of the Agreement, and I am not going to delay the House at the beginning of this Debate with many details. But there is one very important question which I would like to deal with in a few words. During the Debate on Monday it was raised by my right hon. Friend
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the Member for Warwick and Leamington. He inquired whether the development of the Munich meeting would be the formation of a Four-Power pact. I wish to make an observation on that subject.
If the question is whether we are willing to enter into friendly consultation, in conjunction with France and Italy and Germany, upon the problems of Europe, then I say, "Most emphatically." It has, in fact, been a dominant aim of the policy of the Prime Minister and the Government to see whether it is possible, instead of maintaining an unbridgeable gulf for all purposes between democracies and dictatorships, in the interests of European peace for them and us to live side by side. But if on the other hand the question is whether we are contemplating an exclusive Four-Power pact—I think that that was what my right hon. Friend wanted to be reassured upon—if the question is whether we are contemplating an exclusive Four-Power pact which will attempt, in disregard of other States great and small and without communication to them, to impose its will upon Europe, then I say on behalf of the Government with equal emphasis that that is not and never has been the policy of His Majesty's Government.
As the Home Secretary stated on Monday, it is our hope that Russia will be willing to join in the guarantee of Czechoslovakia. It is most important that she should do so. The Government have no intention whatever of excluding Russia or trying to exclude Russia from any future settlement of Europe. If outstanding differences are to be resolved it must be on the basis of free consultation with all European Powers. My right hon. Friend was quite right when he emphasised the importance of securing the co-operation of the smaller Powers of Europe. They are always valuable allies for peace. Our object is to buttress and strengthen peace in every way we can, and it does not in the least follow, because you have close contacts with France or Germany or Italy, that this precludes close contacts with other nations too.
I wish to deal with one other matter before I close. My right hon. Friend the Member for St. George's, Westminster (Mr. Cooper) in his speech on his resignation referred to the phrase about "peace for our time." My right hon. Friend the Member for Caithness (Sir A. Sinclair)

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challenged, and I think almost derided the Prime Minister's belief that Munich can be a prelude to a larger settlement in Europe. I want to say a word about that. Certainly, there is nothing in the previous steps taken by Nazi Germany or in the text of "Mein Kampf" that justify any confident optimism. That is plain enough. But it is equally wrong to persist doggedly, and without giving new facts their due weight, in the despairing view that as things have been, they remain. If "past hopes were dupes, future fears may be liars," and our business is to support the strenuous efforts that are being made, by the Prime Minister first and foremost, to divert the current which would otherwise threaten to sweep civilisation to destruction.
Now I wish to give this a practical application. What are the new considerations which ought to be weighed? What are the new features which may be said to emerge out of these weeks of crisis? I should like to mention four and invite the House to weigh them. They emerge from the events of the last few days, and I think they are very relevant in forming our judgment. The first is this. For the first time, as far as I know, Herr Hitler has made some concession. It must be a very difficult thing for the head of a totalitarian State to retract. It is like a motor car that has got no reverse gear. Therefore, even minor adjustments have significance. Whatever we may think of the Munich Agreement, it is certainly very different in tone and in substance from the Godesberg document. It is also very different from the Fuhrer's speech, which some of us may have heard—I was fortunate in having a colleague who understands German so well—at the Sportspalast. What did Herr Hitler say in that speech? He said that the Czechoslovak issue was an issue between Dr. Benes and himself, and nobody else. He said that he had said his last word. Germany's wireless propagandists at the time of the Godesberg meeting were claiming the complete dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Not only are the terms of the Munich Agreement, as the Prime Minister pointed out on Monday, widely different from the brutal demand of Godesberg, but they do represent—and it is a great fact that it is so—what the Prime Minister called an orderly and agreed process in stages, containing pro-
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tective provisions and operating under an International Commission, in place of a dictated ultimatum. It is quite right that we should not attach exaggerated or ridiculous importance to these things, but, for my part, I think it shows much greater blindness, and if I may say so, much greater folly, not at least to observe the significance of that difference.
Then there is a second thing which I would ask the House to note, to weigh and to judge. It is very plain that the dictators have clearly realised, and realised by the demeanour of their own populations, well drilled and submissive though those populations may be, that detestation of war is not confined to the democracies. Let us remember the war mentality in Germany during the Great War; if there was war enthusiasm in Germany in 1914, there is no war enthusiasm to-day. Is there not a world of difference between the Berlin that shouted "Gott strafe England" and the Berlin that blesses the name of the Prime Minister of England?
There is a third point, which I will put thus: the British Government, and most of all the head of the British Government, is no longer an abstraction to Nazi Germany. Not all the machinery of Herr Goebbels can prevent the visible presence of the British Prime Minister being known to the German people. He is a personality, he has descended from the skies and has made contact with the Fuhrer. He has done, and has impressed the German people by doing, what no other spokesman of the British democracy in recent years has ever done—he has brought to the German people, for the first time, realisation that there is a man at the head of the British State who is pursuing—and we are pursuing—a positive policy of peace. Anybody who knows anything of the difficulty of penetrating that thick mist of misunderstanding ought in common sense and in common gratitude to acknowledge that that is a most significant thing.
There is a fourth point, the last I will mention, but by no means the least. There has been an awakening on our own side. Our people have been roused as never before to the danger. There is a realisation of the extent of the sacrifice that must be made for Britain. We have tried out our own preparations, and whatever the defects may be, let me say that

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there is no comparison between the speed with which we have been enabled to deal with many matters in the civil sphere and the speed with which we were able to deal with them in 1914. We have seen in practice our shortcomings, and we have found and shown how quickly British citizens can adapt themselves to the needs of a crisis, and how calmly everybody was prepared to meet it. It is not without significance for Germany that no section of this population, through cowardice, indicated that they were prepared for peace at any price and in any circumstances. If the totalitarian States imagined, as they may have done from some things that have been told, that democracy under such a strain as that would not present unity, they have been very promptly disillusioned. It does seem to me—I do not mind for a moment whether everybody here agrees with me or not—that those are considerations which we ought to weigh. They help to support the hopeful view that we may be about to witness some diversion of the current towards destruction. Can we hope that any policy, however conciliatory, can avail unless there is behind it, in the last resort, a brave and determined people such as our people are, with a firm will and with adequate means to enforce it?
I wish to bring this controversy to a simple issue by asking a single question. Here are the Munich terms, undoubtedly in form and in substance a vast improvement on the Godesberg Memorandum, but still containing drastic conditions, very harsh stipulations—the German occupation to begin on 1st October and all stages to end by 10th October. It seems to me that each Member of the House must ask himself whether, if he had been Prime Minister, he would have rejected the Munich terms last Friday and destroyed the last chance of averting war. We may, I think, disregard those self-confident persons, if such there be, who feel sure that if they had been at Munich they would have handled the matter much better than the Prime Minister. The real test is this. We are at peace to-day, with these Munich terms in operation, which were accepted by the French, who were under fixed treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia, though we were not. How many amongst us are there who,
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if we could would undo what was then done, would reject the settlement to which the Prime Minister put his hand on Friday, and instead—because it was the only alternative—would fling the world into the cauldron of immediate war? Why, there are some people who are so confident that war will come in the end that they seem to prefer to have the certainty of it now. That is the creed of utter despair. There are other people who imagine that by loudly threatening war we can escape ever having to fulfil our threat. That is a very dangerous delusion. For my part, I reject both the doctrine of the inevitability of war and the theory of the effectiveness of bluff. I call upon the House to show its confidence in the policy of the Prime Minister. There is a magnificent line of Shelley's, in the closing passage of "Prometheus Unbound," where the poet includes in the list of qualities which may make mankind glorious and good the power:
"to hope till Hope creates
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates."
I believe that the supreme contribution which the Prime Minister's policy has made for the benefit of the world is this: He has never given up hope, and has thereby started a movement which may have an immense development, which we hope and pray may save the world for peace.
Sir Arthur Salter: On a point of Order. There is a point of grammar in the terms of this Motion which is puzzling many hon. Members. I do not know, and I think many people are in doubt, whether this Motion should be read as if there were a comma after the word "Government" and after the word "averted." In other words, are we being asked to approve His Majesty's Government's policy in the recent crisis, which averted war, or, are we being asked to approve of the policy of His Majesty's Government generally, which averted war in the crisis?
The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain): Perhaps I may be allowed on that question to say that my reading of the Motion is the first interpretation which the hon. Member put upon it.
4.32 p.m.
Mr. Arthur Greenwood: I beg to move, in line 1, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
"while profoundly relieved that war has been averted for the time being, cannot approve a policy which has led to the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia under threat of armed force and to the humiliation of our country and its exposure to grave dangers; and realising the intense desire of all peoples for lasting peace, demands an active support of the method of collective security through the League of Nations and the immediate initiation by His Majesty's Government of proposals for the summoning of a world conference to consider the removal of economic and political grievances which imperil peace."
The Debate to-day takes a new turn. On these benches we do not quarrel so much with the grammar of the Motion as with its purport. The right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken has made, as usual, a skilful speech and a speech which may have helped certain hon. Members on the other benches to make up their minds. During the last two days I think we can all see there have been two points on which the House appeared to be agreed. The first was the intense relief which was felt by everybody, everywhere, that the war clouds were temporarily dispersed and the second was the feeling, universal I believe, that Czechoslovakia had had the rawest of raw deals and that she is, in fact, to-day the saviour of peace for the time being. Where there was not unanimity of opinion was on the question of policy—on the policy of recent years and the policy of recent weeks. Doubts as to the wisdom of that policy have been expressed from both sides of the House. It is clear that that feeling is not confined to hon. Members on this side. On the Government benches there are those who view that policy with grave misgiving and are deeply apprehensive as regards the future.
Members on all sides of the House, I believe, expected the Prime Minister on Monday to give some indication of future action. But the right hon. Gentleman who, this afternoon asks for this vote of confidence made the sketchiest of proposals regarding the future policy of this Government. Inevitably his speech on Monday was largely concerned with explanations and with retailing the course of events, but some hon. Members—I believe on benches other than ours—did hope that the right hon. Gentleman would
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have done something to indicate what is to be the policy of the Government to ensure that lasting peace which is referred to in the Motion now before us. I am bound to say, however, and I am not saying it in any narrow party spirit, that the right hon. Gentleman's speech was completely barren of any constructive suggestion. The one concrete proposal which he made—and which indicated a complete absence of any constructive plan and indeed the abandonment of all hope of the victory of reason—was a feverish intensification of rearmament. Such an outlook is bleak and grim.
Many hon. Members during the last two days have dealt with the historical background of the present situation and I do not propose to repeat what has been said. We have arrived at a stage to-day when it is no use crying over spilt blood and tears. The primary questions before us now are these: first, whether the lessons of the immediate past and of the present are to be learned, and, secondly, whether, having regard to the shadows which have brought home to millions of people in recent days the naked terrors of modern armed conflict, the opportunity is to be seized now to end for ever the threat of war. I am less concerned with the mistakes and successes of the past than with the problem of the future, and the lessons of the past—and I choose my words carefully—do not lead us to believe that the promises recently made will necessarily be faithfully kept. I should like to quote the words of a distinguished statesman whose wise counsel and insight the House of Commons would treasure to-day. I refer to the late Sir Austen Chamberlain who, two years ago, spoke prophetic words having a close bearing on the situation to-day. I quote first from a speech made by him on 1st April, 1936:
"What was our attitude going to be if Austrian independence were menaced or withdrawn, either by direct attack from without or by revolution fomented and supported from without such as only little more than a year ago very nearly upset the Government and caused the murder of Doctor Dollfuss? If we meant anything by saying that our policy was founded on the Covenant and that we were going to be true to our engagements, possibilities like that became a matter for the consideration of every British citizen, for at any time we might be called upon to intervene. Austrian independence held the key position. If Austria went, Czechoslovakia was indefensible; all the Balkans became subject to an immense new influence. Here we had

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the old German dream of a Mittel Europa directed from and subordinated to Berlin, stretching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, become a reality with consequences not merely for our country but for our Empire which were incalculable."
Then, in a speech in the House of Commons two years ago, a speech which many hon. Members will recollect, Sir Austen spoke these words:
"I know no parallel instance of a Government professing a desire for peace and friendly relations with another Government which has shown such a studied contempt for friendly overtures. It is an ill omen for these new conversations. The further we advance the further Germany recedes. The more we show our willingness to grant, the higher her demands rise. … Is it not better, above all when you are dealing with a Government with the history of the German Government, to say quite clearly what you mean? I venture to put it to the Committee and the Government that to encourage vague elastic, expansive hopes is not the way to make any negotiations a success. The great thing is to know how far you are prepared to go and to let those with whom you have to deal know that within those limits you will do all you can, and that beyond those limits you will not go. … I have never known negotiations helped by encouraging hopes that cannot be realised, and for my part not only do I think that we have no right to part with our Mandated Territories to anyone except the people themselves when they become fit to rule and defend them, but I say that I cannot take upon my shoulders the gift of putting another human being under a Government which refuses in its own country to its own people the rights of citizenship and makes them serfs."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th July, 1936; cols. 1176–77, Vol. 315.]
Those, I suggest, are words which should cause us to reflect to-day. My last quotation from Sir Austen is from a speech which he made earlier than that—on 11th March, 1936—to the Cambridge University Conservative Association. He said:
"When Germany signed the Locarno Treaty they made a contribution to the appeasement of Europe. That contribution has now been withdrawn without negotiation and without consultation by an act of brute force, tearing up treaties, until once again we are asking ourselves, is any treaty made with Germany more than a scrap of paper?"
I must follow that up by examining some of the statements that have been made responsibly, without heat and after reflection by Herr Hitler. As long ago as 1933, in the Reichstag, he said:
"The German people have no thought of invading any country."
In 1934 he said:
"After the Saar question has been settled the German Government is ready to accept not only the letter but also the spirit of the Locarno Pact."
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In a speech at Munich—this home from which peace has come—in 1934 Herr Hitler said:
"German boundaries have always changed. They will continue to change until all German peoples are united in one."
In May, 1935, in the Reichstag, the German Fuhrer said:
"Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an Anschluss."
On 7th March of the following year he said again:
"We have no territorial demands to make in Europe."
In February of this year he reaffirmed his recognition of Austrian sovereignty already expressed in the Austro-German agreement of July, 1936. In March of this year the Prime Minister told the House of Commons that Germany had given assurances that she had no hostile intentions against Czechoslovakia. On 26th September, in a speech in Berlin, Herr Hitler said:
"And now the last problem which must be solved confronts us. It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is one I will not renounce."
But the Prime Minister has been deceived by more recent promises and statements of Herr Hitler, for when the right hon. Gentleman spoke last Wednesday in the House, referring to his second visit to the German Chancellor, he said:
"Hon. Members will realise the perplexity in which I found myself, faced with this totally unexpected situation. I had been told at Berchtesgaden that if the principle of self-determination were accepted Herr Hitler would discuss with me the ways and means of carrying it out. He told me afterwards that he never for one moment supposed that I should be able to come back and say that the principle was accepted. I do not want hon. Members to think that he was deliberately deceiving me—I do not think so for one moment—but, for me, I expected that when I got back to Godesberg I had only to discuss quietly with him the proposals that I had brought with me; and it was a profound shock to me when I was told at the beginning of the conversation that these proposals were not acceptable, and that they were to be replaced by other proposals of a kind which I had not contemplated at all."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th September, 1938; col. 20, Vol 339.]
Not only so. In the ensuing conversation the right hon. Gentleman was never told anything about a date, and when he received the Note which he undertook to deliver without comment to the Czechoslovak Government the date appeared for

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the first time. I make these quotations, not to rake over the still glowing embers of the past, but because the substance of what I have read must colour the minds of many people in this House to-day. I ask the House to consider whether there is any guarantee that the words of one who has repeatedly broken solemn promises in the past will be kept sacred in the future. If the undertakings given within the past week were assured, if they were to be, in the future, maintained and honoured, a heavy load would be lifted from the heart of mankind. Whether they are so honoured or not depends, in the last resort, on one man, a man deeply committed to a vast and comprehensive policy, a man passionately and sincerely devoted to the realisation of his dreams. If he were now to make some great gesture to give an earnest of his intentions, if he were, shall we say, to withdraw from Spain, if he were to release his political prisoners, whose only crime is that they share the views held by the vast majority of the people of this country, if he were to give practical help and succour to the refugees whom he has uprooted from their own homes, then some people might pause before coming to a final conclusion.
There are those on all sides of the House for whom this is really the crucial question. The right hon. Gentleman having met Herr Hitler face to face, believes in his sincerity, accepts his word. Those of us who have not seen him are bound in our minds to be governed by his failures in the past to keep the most solemn obligations. I know there must be many people in this House who would, if they could, gladly believe the Prime Minister, that we are now dealing with a new German Chancellor, but I feel that many people cannot honestly and sincerely take that view. They have misgivings and apprehensions. If these misgivings were to be realised, what then? How should we, as a nation and Empire, be placed? We should have lost a gallant ally whose recent military defences would be held by Germany. Germany's way would be open to the South and the South-East; Mittel Europa would spring into existence. Already the economic penetration of Central Europe has begun. One need only read a despatch in the "Times" to-day, one need only read a despatch in the "Daily Telegraph," on
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the political side. Central Europe is crumbling now before the power of the German Chancellor.
Then what of Russia? The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer made certain apologetic references to Russia and said they did not want to be very unfriendly, but what has been the history of this crisis? After all, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is an ally of France to the same extent as we are an ally of France. During these difficult days Britain and France have been in the closest consultation, but that is not true of Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If any right hon. Gentleman chooses to challenge me, I shall be very glad to hear his reply. The meetings that have taken place between British and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' representatives have been rare, they have been casual, they have been primarily for an exchange of views, and, except for one occasion at Geneva, on 23rd September, there was not a single consultation which had to do with the steps contemplated by the British and French Governments. If the worst were to come to the worst in these circumstances, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics might by that time have retired from European politics behind her own frontiers, secure in her own independence.
Moreover, the United States of America, through its President, has played a noble part during the present crisis. I believe, myself, that the relations between the Americans and the British people in the face of this insistent challenge to democracy have never been better since the day, over 300 years ago, when Captain John Smith landed in Virginia. I believe the feeling of friendship is deeper now than it was in the last Great War. The United States, ever friendly to the cause of democracy, may in the near future perhaps be driven into a position of moral isolation. The Chancellor of the Exchequer referred to certain smaller nations. The democratic nations of Northern Europe and elsewhere, having already lost faith in the leadership of the great democratic States, may also relapse into a position of moral isolation. In these circumstances, if long nursed and postponed ambitions were then to raise their heads, where would Britain and France stand? I suggest that they would stand in even greater peril

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than they do to-day, or indeed than they ever have done throughout their long history.
The net result of the present settlement, speaking in terms of world policy, is not the fact that we have held off the grim spectre of war for the time being; the net result is that Hitler is now in command of Central Europe and that we have replaced a tottering Mussolini on his pedestal. So far, therefore, from the policy of the Government having secured peace, the new situation, with the victory of Hitler, with the rehabilitation of Signor Mussolini, with the dread possibilities of the future, has placed Britain and such friends as are left to her in dire peril. This is not war-mongering. This is realism. That is the situation which may have to be faced. What then, I ask, is to be done if either Herr Hitler's promises are to be anchored to peace or if there is a prospect of even graver trouble in the future? The Chancellor of the Exchequer to-day tried to define the attitude of the Government towards a Four-Power Pact. Let me say at once that in our view the participants in the recent discussions provide no adequate basis whatever for future negotiations. No Four-Power Pact, with people hanging precariously on the fringe and being consulted from time to time, can provide the safeguards of a constructive peace.
Now I wish to refer to the right hon. Gentleman's excursion into the realms of Shakespearian literature. I forbear to explain what Hotspur was, but I think we had better have a little more of this famous quotation than we have had yet. In act II, scene 3, though there is another passage, which I will not quote, beginning:
"What ho: chamberlain,"
Hotspur is reading a letter, and there is a sentence as follows:
"'The purpose you undertake is dangerous;'—Why, that's certain; 't is dangerous to take a cold, to sleep, to drink: but I tell you, my lord fool, out of this nettle, danger, we pluck this flower, safety."
And then:
"'The purpose you undertake is dangerous; the friends you have named, uncertain; the time itself unsorted; and your whole plot too light for the counterpoise of so great an opposition.'"
I will not quote some rather harsh terms which the right hon. Gentleman might regard as personal to himself, but I will
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read this final quotation. This is a good book to keep by one. Hotspur goes on:
"By the Lord our plot is a good plot, as ever was laid, our friends true and constant: a good plot, good friends, and full of expectation: an excellent plot, very good friends. What a frosty-spirited rogue is this?"
I make no further comment. I let this moral lesson stand by itself. This kind of Four-Power Pact would fling this country and other countries back into the arena of the Balance of Power and would intensify power politics. On these benches we cannot believe that Britain, France, Germany and Italy in concert are capable alone of winning peace. We think that Britain and France would find it an uneven contest. It is difficult to negotiate with men who keep revolvers on the table. The eleventh hour concessions which were made at Munich went far beyond the Anglo-French Memorandum. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has told us they are much better than the Godesberg Memorandum, watered down some-what, but a substantial concession. To that extent they represented a further retreat by Britain and France from the admittedly outrageous demands already made upon Czechoslovakia. What justification is there then for believing that the British and French elements in any future Four-Power discussions will not continue to satisfy the increasing demands made by the totalitarian States, with the growing uncertainty of keeping peace?
I have no doubt that now is the critical time to determine whether the groundwork of permanent peace is or is not to be laid. Just as unilateral disarmament is, in my view, futile, so unilateral rearmament is of no avail against powerful aggressors. No single nation outside the totalitarian States can alone challenge the dictators. To tread the path of peace we must seek first the highroad of collective security. We were nearer a moral peace when Germany and Italy realised that Britain, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would stand together than ever we were before or since. I submit that there is no other way than the path of collective security. A start should be made now. It will need the mobilisation of world opinion among great and small States alike, before another wave of uncertainty and pessimism deluges the peoples of the world, to make peace for ever safe. Now is the moment,

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when the horrors of war are deeply implanted in the minds of everybody in every land.
I should like the Government to answer this specific question. Do the Government, or do they not, intend to take steps to organise collective security for defence against aggressors? I am not saying that that ends our problem. Let it be admitted that there are serious and legitimate political and economic problems which demand solution to-day. I do not believe that these problems can be resolved piecemeal. I do not believe that they can be resolved by hole-and-corner methods. Just as the whole world stood on the brink of the melting-pot of war, so its escape from the possibilities of danger in future depends upon world effort. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a powerful factor in the world situation. The United States, quite rightly reluctant to embroil herself in European complications, has declared that she cannot be indifferent to the existence of large scale war in the world. She is another mighty influence in world affairs. Other nations, smaller in extent and population, who live in fear of aggression or nurse grievances clamouring for solution, or who, living in harmony with their neighbours, hate the deflection of their lives from their normal courses because of unsettlement elsewhere and wish to live in the mainstream of the world's life in peace. These nations also have a contribution to make to the general good. If these considerations are right, then clearly the need is for an immediate world conference in whose hands would rest the future of mankind. Those, if there were any, who did not choose to attend, would be branded as unwilling to conform to the wishes of humanity. Those who attended would clearly be bound by the common decisions of the conference. On that basis, and on no other, can there be the vindication of law and order and the establishment of universal and eternal peace.
5.10 p.m.
Mr. Churchill: If I do not begin this afternoon by paying the usual, and indeed almost invariable, tributes to the Prime Minister for his handling of this crisis, it is certainly not from any lack of personal regard. We have always, over a great many years, had very pleasant relations, and I have deeply understood from per-
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sonal experiences of my own in a similar crisis the stress and strain he has had to bear; but I am sure it is much better to say exactly what we think about public affairs, and this is certainly not the time when it is worth anyone's while to court political popularity. We had a shining example of firmness of character from the late First Lord of the Admiralty two days ago. He showed that firmness of character which is utterly unmoved by currents of opinion, however swift and violent they may be. My hon. Friend the Member for South-West Hull (Mr. Law), to whose compulsive speech the House listened on Monday—which I had not the good fortune to hear, but which I read, and which I am assured by all who heard it revived the memory of his famous father, so cherished in this House, and made us feel that his gifts did not die with him—was quite right in reminding us that the Prime Minister has himself throughout his conduct of these matters shown a robust indifference to cheers or boos and to the alternations of criticism and applause. If that be so, such qualities and elevation of mind should make it possible for the most severe expressions of honest opinion to be interchanged in this House without rupturing personal relations, and for all points of view to receive the fullest possible expression.
Having thus fortified myself by the example of others, I will proceed to emulate them. I will, therefore, begin by saying the most unpopular and most unwelcome thing. I will begin by saying what everybody would like to ignore or forget but which must nevertheless be stated, namely, that we have sustained a total and unmitigated defeat, and that France has suffered even more than we have.
Viscountess Astor: Nonsense.
Mr. Churchill: When the Noble Lady cries "Nonsense," she could not have heard the Chancellor of the Exchequer admit in his illuminating and comprehensive speech just now that Herr Hitler had gained in this particular leap forward in substance all he set out to gain. The utmost my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has been able to secure by all his immense exertions, by all the great efforts and mobilisation which took place in this country, and by all the anguish and strain through which we have passed in this country, the utmost he has been

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able to gain—[HON. MEMBERS: "Is peace."] I thought I might be allowed to make that point in its due place, and I propose to deal with it. The utmost he has been able to gain for Czechoslovakia and in the matters which were in dispute has been that the German dictator, instead of snatching his victuals from the table, has been content to have them served to him course by course.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer said it was the first time Herr Hitler had been made to retract—I think that was the word—in any degree. We really must not waste time, after all this long Debate, upon the difference between the positions reached at Berchtesgaden, at Godesberg and at Munich. They can be very simply epitomised, if the House will permit me to vary the metaphor. £1 was demanded at the pistol's point. When it was given, £2 were demanded at the pistol's point. Finally, the dictator consented to take £1 17s. 6d. and the rest in promises of good will for the future.
Now I come to the point, which was mentioned to me just now from some quarters of the House, about the saving of peace. No one has been a more resolute and uncompromising struggler for peace than the Prime Minister. Everyone knows that. Never has there been such intense and undaunted determination to maintain and to secure peace. That is quite true. Nevertheless, I am not quite clear why there was so much danger of Great Britain or France being involved in a war with Germany at this juncture if, in fact, they were ready all along to sacrifice Czechoslovakia. The terms which the Prime Minister brought back with him—I quite agree at the last moment; everything had got off the rails and nothing but his intervention could have saved the peace, but I am talking of the events of the summer—could easily have been agreed, I believe, through the ordinary diplomatic channels at any time during the summer. And I will say this, that I believe the Czechs, left to themselves and told they were going to get no help from the Western Powers, would have been able to make better terms than they have got—they could hardly have worse—after all this tremendous perturbation.
There never can be any absolute certainty that there will be a fight if one side is determined that it will give way completely. When one reads the Munich
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terms, when one sees what is happening in Czechoslovakia from hour to hour, when one is sure, I will not say of Parliamentary approval but of Parliamentary acquiescence, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer makes a speech which at any rate tries to put in a very powerful and persuasive manner the fact that, after all, it was inevitable and indeed righteous—right—when we saw all this, and everyone on this side of the House, including many Members of the Conservative Party who are supposed to be vigilant and careful guardians of the national interest, it is quite clear that nothing vitally affecting us was at stake, it seems to me that one must ask, What was all the trouble and fuss about?
The resolve was taken by the British and the French Governments. Let me say that it is very important to realise that it is by no means a question which the British Government only have had to decide. I very much admire the manner in which, in the House, all references of a recriminatory nature have been repressed, but it must be realised that this resolve did not emanate particularly from one or other of the Governments but was a resolve for which both must share in common the responsibility. When this resolve was taken and the course was followed—you may say it was wise or unwise, prudent or short-sighted—once it had been decided not to make the defence of Czechoslovakia a matter of war, then there was really no reason, if the matter had been handled during the summer in the ordinary way, to call into being all this formidable apparatus of crisis. I think that point should be considered.
We are asked to vote for this Motion which has been put upon the Paper, and it is certainly a Motion couched in very uncontroversial terms, as, indeed, is the Amendment moved from the Opposition side. I cannot myself express my agreement with the steps which have been taken, and as the Chancellor of the Exchequer has put his side of the case with so much ability I will attempt, if I may be permitted, to put the case from a different angle. I have always held the view that the maintenance of peace depends upon the accumulation of deterrents against the aggressor, coupled with a sincere effort to redress grievances. Herr Hitler's victory, like so many of the famous struggles that have governed the

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fate of the world, was won upon the narrowest of margins. After the seizure of Austria in March we faced this problem in our Debates. I ventured to appeal to the Government to go a little further than the Prime Minister went, and to give a pledge that in conjunction with France and other Powers they would guarantee the security of Czechoslovakia while the Sudeten-Deutsch question was being examined either by a League of Nations Commission or some other impartial body, and I still believe that if that course had been followed events would not have fallen into this disastrous state. I agree very much with my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) when he said on that occasion—I cannot remember his actual words—"Do one thing or the other; either say you will disinterest yourself in the matter altogether or take the step of giving a guarantee which will have the greatest chance of securing protection for that country."
France and Great Britain together, especially if they had maintained a close contact with Russia, which certainly was not done, would have been able in those days in the summer, when they had the prestige, to influence many of the smaller States of Europe, and I believe they could have determined the attitude of Poland. Such a combination, prepared at a time when the German dictator was not deeply and irrevocably committed to his new adventure, would, I believe, have given strength to all those forces in Germany which resisted this departure, this new design. They were varying forces, those of a military character which declared that Germany was not ready to undertake a world war, and all that mass of moderate opinion and popular opinion which dreaded war, and some elements of which still have some influence upon the German Government. Such action would have given strength to all that intense desire for peace which the helpless German masses share with their British and French fellow men, and which, as we have been reminded, found a passionate and rarely permitted vent in the joyous manifestations with which the Prime Minister was acclaimed in Munich.
All these forces, added to the other deterrents which combinations of Powers, great and small, ready to stand firm upon the front of law and for the ordered
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remedy of grievances, would have formed, might well have been effective. Of course you cannot say for certain that they would. [Interruption.] I try to argue fairly with the House. At the same time I do not think it is fair to charge those who wished to see this course followed, and followed consistently and resolutely, with having wished for an immediate war. Between submission and immediate war there was this third alternative, which gave a hope not only of peace but of justice. It is quite true that such a policy in order to succeed demanded that Britain should declare straight out and a long time beforehand that she would, with others, join to defend Czechoslovakia against an unprovoked aggression. His Majesty's Government refused to give that guarantee when it would have saved the situation, yet in the end they gave it when it was too late, and now, for the future, they renew it when they have not the slightest power to make it good.
All is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness. She has suffered in every respect by her association with the Western democracies and with the League of Nations, of which she has always been an obedient servant. She has suffered in particular from her association with France, under whose guidance and policy she has been actuated for so long. The very measures taken by His Majesty's Government in the Anglo-French Agreement to give her the best chance possible, namely, the 50 per cent. clean cut in certain districts instead of a plebiscite, have turned to her detriment, because there is to be a plebiscite too in wide areas, and those other Powers who had claims have also come down upon the helpless victim. Those municipal elections upon whose voting the basis is taken for the 50 per cent. cut were held on issues which had nothing to do with joining Germany. When I saw Herr Henlein over here he assured me that was not the desire of his people. Positive statements were made that it was only a question of home rule, of having a position of their own in the Czechoslovakian State. No one has a right to say that the plebiscite which is to be taken in areas under Saar conditions, and the clean-cut of the 50 per cent. areas—that those two operations together amount in the slightest degree to a verdict of self-determination. It is a fraud and a farce to invoke that name.

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We in this country, as in other Liberal and democratic countries, have a perfect right to exalt the principle of self-determination, but it comes ill out of the mouths of those in totalitarian States who deny even the smallest element of toleration to every section and creed within their bounds. But, however you put it, this particular block of land, this mass of human beings to be handed over, has never expressed the desire to go into the Nazi rule. I do not believe that even now—if their opinion could be asked, they would exercise such an option.
What is the remaining position of Czechoslovakia? Not only are they politically mutilated, but, economically and financially, they are in complete confusion. Their banking, their railway arrangements, are severed and broken, their industries are curtailed, and the movement of their population is most cruel. The Sudeten miners, who are all Czechs and whose families have lived in that area for centuries, must now flee into an area where there are hardly any mines left for them to work. It is a tragedy which has occurred. I did not like to hear the Minister of Transport yesterday talking about Humpty Dumpty. It was the Minister of Transport who was saying that it was a case of Humpty Dumpty that could never be put together again. There must always be the most profound regret and a sense of vexation in British hearts at the treatment and the misfortunes which have overcome the Czechoslovakian Republic. They have not ended here. At any moment there may be a hitch in the programme. At any moment there may be an order for Herr Goebbels to start again his propaganda of calumny and lies; at any moment an incident may be provoked, and now that the fortress line is given away what is there to stop the will of the conqueror? [Interruption.] It is too serious a subject to treat lightly. Obviously, we are not in a position to give them the slightest help at the present time, except what everyone is glad to know has been done, the financial aid which the Government have promptly produced.
I venture to think that in future the Czechoslovak State cannot be maintained as an independent entity. You will find that in a period of time which may be measured by years, but may be measured only by months, Czechoslovakia will be
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engulfed in the Nazi rÉgime. Perhaps they may join it in despair or in revenge. At any rate, that story is over and told. But we cannot consider the abandonment and ruin of Czechoslovakia in the light only of what happened only last month. It is the most grievous consequence which we have yet experienced of what we have done and of what we have left undone in the last five years—five years of futile good intention, five years of eager search for the line of least resistance, five years of uninterrupted retreat of British power, five years of neglect of our air defences. Those are the features which I stand here to declare and which marked an improvident stewardship for which Great Britain and France have dearly to pay. We have been reduced in those five years from a position of security so overwhelming and so unchallengeable that we never cared to think about it. We have been reduced from a position where the very word "war" was considered one which would be used only by persons qualifying for a lunatic asylum. We have been reduced from a position of safety and power—power to do good, power to be generous to a beaten foe, power to make terms with Germany, power to give her proper redress for her grievances, power to stop her arming if we chose, power to take any step in strength or mercy or justice which we thought right—reduced in five years from a position safe and unchallenged to where we stand now.
When I think of the fair hopes of a long peace which still lay before Europe at the beginning of 1933 when Herr Hitler first obtained power, and of all the opportunities of arresting the growth of the Nazi power which have been thrown away, when I think of the immense combinations and resources which have been neglected or squandered, I cannot believe that a parallel exists in the whole course of history. So far as this country is concerned the responsibility must rest with those who have the undisputed control of our political affairs. They neither prevented Germany from rearming, nor did they rearm ourselves in time. They quarrelled with Italy without saving Ethiopia. They exploited and discredited the vast institution of the League of Nations and they neglected to make alliances and combinations which might have repaired previous errors, and thus they left us in the hour of trial without ade-

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quate national defence or effective international security.
In my holiday I thought it was a chance to study the reign of King Ethelred the Unready. The House will remember that that was a period of great misfortune, in which, from the strong position which we had gained under the descendants of King Alfred, we fell very swiftly into chaos. It was the period of Danegeld and of foreign pressure. I must say that the rugged words of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, written 1,000 years ago, seem to me apposite, at least as apposite as those quotations from Shakespeare with which we have been regaled by the last speaker from the Opposition Bench. Here is what the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle said, and I think the words apply very much to our treatment of Germany and our relations with her:
"All these calamities fell upon us because of evil counsel, because tribute was not offered to them at the right time nor yet were they resisted; but when they had done the most evil, then was peace made with them."
That is the wisdom of the past, for all wisdom is not new wisdom.
I have ventured to express those views in justifying myself for not being able to support the Motion which is moved to-night, but I recognise that this great matter of Czechoslovakia, and of British and French duty there, has passed into history. New developments may come along, but we are not here to decide whether any of those steps should be taken or not. They have been taken. They have been taken by those who had a right to take them because they bore the highest executive responsibility under the Crown. Whatever we may think of it, we must regard those steps as belonging to the category of affairs which are settled beyond recall. The past is no more, and one can only draw comfort if one feels that one has done one's best to advise rightly and wisely and in good time. I, therefore, turn to the future, and to our situation as it is to-day. Here, again, I am sure I shall have to say something which will not be at all welcome.
We are in the presence of a disaster of the first magnitude which has befallen Great Britain and France. Do not let us blind ourselves to that. It must now be accepted that all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will make the best
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terms they can with the triumphant Nazi Power. The system of alliances in Central Europe upon which France has relied for her safety has been swept away, and I can see no means by which it can be reconstituted. The road down the Danube Valley to the Black Sea, the resources of corn and oil, the road which leads as far as Turkey, has been opened. In fact, if not in form, it seems to me that all those countries of Middle Europe, all those Danubian countries, will, one after another, be drawn into this vast system of power politics—not only power military politics but power economic politics—radiating from Berlin, and I believe this can be achieved quite smoothly and swiftly and will not necessarily entail the firing of a single shot. If you wish to survey the havoc of the foreign policy of Britain and France, look at what is happening and is recorded each day in the columns of the "Times." Why, I read this morning about Yugoslavia—and I know something about the details of that country—
"The effects of the crisis for Yugoslavia can immediately be traced. Since the elections of 1935, which followed soon after the murder of King Alexander, the Serb and Croat Opposition to the Government of Dr. Stoyadinovitch have been conducting their entire campaign for the next elections under the slogan: 'Back to France, England, and the Little Entente; back to democracy.' The events of the past fortnight have so triumphantly vindicated Dr. Stoyadinovitch's policy …."
—his is a policy of close association with Germany—
"that the Opposition has collapsed practically overnight; the new elections, the date of which was in doubt, are now likely to be held very soon and can result only in an overwhelming victory for Dr. Stoyadinovitch's Government."
Here was a country which, three months ago, would have stood in the line with other countries to arrest what has occurred.
Again, what happened in Warsaw? The British and French Ambassadors visited Colonel Beck, or sought to visit him, the Foreign Minister, in order to ask for some mitigation in the harsh measures being pursued against Czechoslovakia about Teschen. The door was shut in their faces. The French Ambassador was not even granted an audience and the British Ambassador was given a most curt reply by a political director. The whole matter is described in the Polish Press as a

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political indiscretion committed by those two Powers, and we are to-day reading of the success of Colonel Beck's blow. I am not forgetting, I must say, that it is less than 20 years ago since British and French bayonets rescued Poland from the bondage of a century and a half. I think it is indeed a sorry episode in the history of that country, for whose freedom and rights so many of us have had warm and long sympathy.
Those illustrations are typical. You will see, day after day, week after week, entire alienation of those regions. Many of those countries, in fear of the rise of the Nazi Power, have already got politicians, Ministers, Governments, who were pro-German, but there was always an enormous popular movement in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia which looked to the Western democracies and loathed the idea of having this arbitrary rule of the totalitarian system thrust upon them, and hoped that a stand would be made. All that has gone by the board. We are talking about countries which are a long way off and of which, as the Prime Minister might say, we know nothing. [Interruption.] The noble Lady says that that very harmless allusion is—
Viscountess Astor: Rude.
Mr. Churchill: She must very recently have been receiving her finishing course in manners. What will be the position, I want to know, of France and England this year and the year afterwards? What will be the position of that Western front of which we are in full authority the guarantors? The German army at the present time is more numerous than that of France, though not nearly so matured or perfected. Next year it will grow much larger, and its maturity will be more complete. Relieved from all anxiety in the East, and having secured resources which will greatly diminish, if not entirely remove, the deterrent of a naval blockade, the rulers of Nazi Germany will have a free choice open to them in what direction they will turn their eyes. If the Nazi dictator should choose to look westward, as he may, bitterly will France and England regret the loss of that fine army of ancient Bohemia which was estimated last week to require not fewer than 30 German divisions for its destruction.
Can we blind ourselves to the great change which has taken place in the military situation, and to the dangers we have
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to meet? We are in process, I believe, of adding, in four years, four battalions to the British Army. No fewer than two have already been completed. Here at least 30 divisions which must now be taken into consideration upon the French front, besides the 12 that were captured when Austria was engulfed. Many people, no doubt, honestly believe that they are only giving away the interests of Czechoslovakia, whereas I fear we shall find that we have deeply compromised, and perhaps fatally endangered, the safety and even the independence of Great Britain and France. This is not merely a question of giving up the German colonies, as I am sure we shall be asked to do. Nor is it a question only of losing influence in Europe. It goes far deeper than that. You have to consider the character of the Nazi movement and the rule which it implies. The Prime Minister desires to see cordial relations between this country and Germany. There is no difficulty at all in having cordial relations with the German people. Our hearts go out to them. But they have no power. You must have diplomatic and correct relations, but there can never be friendship between the British democracy and the Nazi Power, that Power which spurns Christian ethics, Which cheers its onward course by a barbarous paganism, which vaunts the spirit of aggression and conquest, which derives strength and perverted pleasure from persecution, and uses, as we have seen, with pitiless brutality the threat of murderous force. That Power cannot ever be the trusted friend of the British democracy.
What I find unendurable is the sense of our country falling into the power, into the orbit and influence of Nazi Germany, and of our existence becoming dependent upon their good will or pleasure. It is to prevent that that I have tried my best to urge the maintenance of every bulwark of defence—first the timely creation of an Air Force superior to anything within striking distance of our shores; secondly, the gathering together of the collective strength of many nations; and thirdly, the making of alliances and military conventions, all within the Covenant, in order to gather together forces at any rate to restrain the onward movement of this Power. It has all been in vain. Every position has been successively undermined and abandoned on

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specious and plausible excuses. We do not want to be led upon the high road to becoming a satellite of the German Nazi system of European domination. In a very few years, perhaps in a very few months, we shall be confronted with demands with which we shall no doubt be invited to comply. Those demands may affect the surrender of territory or the surrender of liberty. I foresee and foretell that the policy of submission will carry with it restrictions upon the freedom of speech and debate in Parliament, on public platforms, and discussions in the Press, for it will be said—indeed, I hear it said sometimes now—that we cannot allow the Nazi system of dictatorship to be criticised by ordinary, common English politicians. Then, with a Press under control, in part direct but more potently indirect, with every organ of public opinion doped and chloroformed into acquiescence, we shall be conducted along further stages of our journey.
It is a small matter to introduce into such a Debate as this, but during the week I heard something of the talk of Tadpole and Taper. They were very keen upon having a general election, a sort of, if I may say so, inverted khaki election. I wish the Prime Minister had heard the speech of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Abbey Division of Westminster (Sir S. Herbert) last night. I know that no one is more patient and regular in his attendance than the Prime Minister, and it is marvellous how he is able to sit through so much of our Debates, but it happened that by bad luck he was not here at that moment. I am sure, however, that if he had heard my hon. and gallant Friend's speech he would have felt very much annoyed that such a rumour could even have been circulated. I cannot believe that the Prime Minister, or any Prime Minister possessed of a large working majority, would be capable of such an act of historic, constitutional indecency. I think too highly of him. Of course, if I have misjudged him on the right side, and there is a dissolution on the Munich Agreement, on Anglo-Nazi friendship, on the state of our defences and so forth, everyone will have to fight according to his convictions, and only a prophet could forecast the ultimate result; but, whatever the result, few things could be more fatal to our remaining chances of survival as a great
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Power than that this country should be torn in twain upon this deadly issue of foreign policy at a moment when, whoever the Ministers may be, united effort can alone make us safe.
I have been casting about to see how measures can be taken to protect us from this advance of the Nazi Power, and to secure those forms of life which are so dear to us. What is the sole method that is open? The sole method that is open is for us to regain our old island independence by acquiring that supremacy in the air which we were promised, that security in our air defences which we were assured we had, and thus to make ourselves an island once again. That, in all this grim outlook, shines out as the overwhelming fact. An effort at rearmament the like of which has not been seen ought to be made forthwith, and all the resources of this country and all its united strength should be bent to that task. I was very glad to see that Lord Baldwin yesterday in the House of Lords said that he would mobilise industry to-morrow. But I think it would have been much better if Lord Baldwin has said that 2½ years ago, when everyone demanded a Ministry of Supply. I will venture to say to hon. Gentlemen sitting here behind the Government Bench, hon. Friends of mine, whom I thank for the patience with which they have listened to what I have to say, that they have some responsibility for all this too, because, if they had given one tithe of the cheers they have lavished upon this transaction of Czechoslovakia to the small band of Members who were endeavouring to get timely rearmament set in motion, we should not now be in the position in which we are. Hon. Gentlemen opposite, and hon. Members on the Liberal benches, are not entitled to throw these stones. I remember for two years having to face, not only the Government's deprecation, but their stern disapproval. Lord Baldwin has now given the signal, tardy though it may be; let us at least obey it.
After all, there are no secrets now about what happened in the air and in the mobilisation of our anti-aircraft defences. These matters have been, as my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Abbey Division said, seen by thousands of people. They can form their own opinions of the character of the statements which have been persistently made to us by Ministers on this subject. Who pretends now that there is air parity with

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Germany? Who pretends now that our anti-aircraft defences were adequately manned or armed? We know that the German General Staff are well informed upon these subjects, but the House of Commons has hitherto not taken seriously its duty of requiring to assure itself on these matters. The Home Secretary said the other night that he would welcome investigation. Many things have been done which reflect the greatest credit upon the administration. But the vital matters are what we want to know about. I have asked again and again during these three years for a secret Session where these matters could be thrashed out, or for an investigation by a Select Committee of the House, or for some other method. I ask now that, when we meet again in the autumn, that should be a matter on which the Government should take the House into its confidence, because we have a right to know where we stand and what measures are being taken to secure our position.
I do not grudge our loyal, brave people, who were ready to do their duty no matter what the cost, who never flinched under the strain of last week—I do not grudge them the natural, spontaneous outburst of joy and relief when they learned that the hard ordeal would no longer be required of them at the moment; but they should know the truth. They should know that there has been gross neglect and deficiency in our defences; they should know that we have sustained a defeat without a war, the consequences of which will travel far with us along our road; they should know that we have passed an awful milestone in our history, when the whole equilibrium of Europe has been deranged, and that the terrible words have for the time being been pronounced against the Western democracies:
"Thou art weighed in the balance and found wanting."
And do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be proffered to us year by year unless by a supreme recovery of moral health and martial vigour, we arise again and take our stand for freedom as in the olden time.
5.59 p.m.
Brigadier-General Sir Henry Croft: I am sure the hon. Member for West
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Leicester (Mr. H. Nicolson) will recognise that, in rising this afternoon, I am not moved by any kind of hysteria. In the recent days through which we have passed, I, for one, cannot help thinking that it was very natural that not only all parties in the House of Commons, but the whole of this great nation, should have been moved as never before, except perhaps on one occasion in our lives, by a spirit, not of hysteria, but of very great thankfulness that the world had been spared this disaster. I also want to say, in view of certain criticisms that naturally appeared somewhere, that, from what little I saw, I feel that the air-raid precautions, as far as they went, were really remarkable in the extraordinary response of the people of our country. The calm resolve of the great majority of the British people was something of which we can all be proud. The weaknesses which displayed themselves at that time must make an imperative demand upon this House to see that the lessons are learned and every form of precaution perfected.
It is naturally a matter of great regret to me to have to differ on any matter from my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill). I have had the privilege of working with him on so many causes, I have such immense admiration for his abilities and courage, and I know that he is actuated by the highest patriotic motives, and it is doubly to my regret that I find myself in complete difference with the main viewpoint that he has put this afternoon as to our position in the world. He started his remarkable speech by saying that Great Britain has suffered total and unmitigated defeat. Strangely enough, as far as I can see from the Press of the world, and especially the Press of those small nations which we are always mentioning, Great Britain is hailed as their saviour from a world calamity, and I feel that it is about time that it was stated in this Debate that, after all, it was not as a guarantor, but as a friend that we entered into this matter, and I think we in that act of friendship saved Czechoslovakia from annihilation.
My right hon. Friend spoke of our calling into being all the apparatus of crisis. I cannot help thinking that in the great flow of his oratory he probably regrets having used that phrase. The apparatus of crisis was not called into being; the

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crisis was there. We had to stiffen ourselves in a few hours into taking terrific decisions. Again, he said that we have not the slightest power to make good the pledge which was given to Czechoslovakia—I think he should have added "directly"—except by indirect action. Surely that must also have applied had a pledge been given months ago. I remember we had a long discussion at that time, and I ventured to say that if Britain was to pledge its word to stand by the Czechs, that was a pledge which could not be fulfilled, and must not, therefore, be uttered. I regret that we have now to give this pledge. I have always felt that we have burdens enough in our present commitments, and ought not to go meddling in the distant parts of Central Europe. But, although I have resisted the burden of further commitments, I feel that when Britain and France unitedly gave that advice to Czechoslovakia, to save the peace of the world by acting wisely, we had no alternative but to give that pledge to stand by their State in the days to come.
My right hon. Friend said, surely unfairly, of His Majesty's Government that they had destroyed the League of Nations. When history comes to be written it really must be said that this country, above every other country in the world, has attempted to make the machinery of the League work. I always felt that when it came to the test foreign nations would not be prepared to risk the lives of their nationals to make collective security work. For anybody to say that we did not lead the world is unfair. There are two schools of thought in this country at the present time. They are both entitled to respect. The first say, "We cannot have any conversations or intercourse, and certainly no agreement, with dictators; we differ from them, their form of government and their methods, and therefore we really must ostracise them and send them to Coventry."
Mr. Emrys-Evans: May I ask my hon. and gallant Friend whether he does not draw a certain distinction between dictators? Are we not on very friendly terms with Turkey?
Sir H. Croft: Of course, I am grateful to my hon. Friend; that was not in my mind. It was the two special dictators. The second school of thought in this
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country I think can roughly be described as saying, "We realise that the dictatorial form of Government has now existed in a great many countries for many years, starting with Russia, Turkey, Italy, Hungary, Portugal, Germany and Greece, and I suppose we can say the system is being built up in other countries—[An HON. MEMBER: "Poland."] Poland and Rumania—in fact I suppose we can almost say that if you run your finger across the map the large majority of the people from Vladivostok to Cape Finisterre are under dictatorships." The second school, I think, is of the opinion that there is no evidence of any great uprising of the people in those countries where they are subject to dictatorships, and, since you cannot wait for all this great range of countries to eliminate their firmly-established dictators, if the machinery of civilisation is still to work you have got to understand their mentality, you have got to work with them, and, if possible, you have got to reach agreement. In other words, we have either to talk with dictators whether they are dictators we like or dictators we do not like, or we have to fight them ultimately. You have either to reason with them and understand them or, it seems to me, inevitably war must come. His Majesty's Government decided to avert war by reason and conference, and they succeeded. My right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) had he been in the place of Lord Halifax would—I hope he will correct me if I am wrong—have refused to meet Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini, much less make agreements with them, unless those leaders were ready to show a change of heart.
Mr. Eden: My hon. and gallant Friend has asked me to correct him if he is wrong. I suggest that if he is good enough to look at the papers during the two years I was Foreign Secretary he will see how innumerable were the attempts I made to improve relations with Germany.
Sir H. Croft: I do not dispute that, but I understood that the whole cause of my right hon. Friend's resignation was that until there was a change of heart by Italy he was unwilling to negotiate with that country. That was my impression; I am glad if it is not so. He and my right

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hon. Friend the Member for St. George's (Mr. Cooper) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping have all shown in their speeches, I think, that they were ready to use the deterrent threat of force during the proceedings. I think I am right in saying that each of them would have been prepared to mobilise the Fleet at a very much earlier stage in this controversy. I wonder whether it is wise for this country to depart from the rule which seems to have been clearly laid down in recent years, that unless war was clearly inevitable we at least should not be the country to mobilise. I remember all the discussions over the Great War, as to who was responsible for forcing the pace, and I wonder whether this country would have been well advised to mobilise. We only mobilised when war appeared inevitable. When the Fleet was mobilised it must, of course, have had an influence when the Prime Minister made his last visit to Germany; but I think that had the Prime Minister not made that last effort when all others had despaired, no mobilisation of the Fleet would have saved the world. It is, after all, the fact that the British Fleet can prove to this country still a supreme weapon of defence; but at that moment it could not, as I see it, have affected the issue.
I want to deal with the strategical, tactical situation which confronted France and ourselves. Let there be no doubt in the minds of hon. Gentlemen present, much less in the minds of Germans, that I am fully convinced that at the end of two, four, or perhaps seven years we should have triumphed. The British Fleet, it is true, could have blockaded Germany, and if, unhappily, the Axis had worked and Italy had also been engaged in war, I have no doubt the British Fleet could have brought about the collapse of Italy. I am quite certain of that. But for months the Mediterranean, to say the least, would have been unhealthy as the life-line for British food and reinforcements. After a long time, the British Fleet could have brought Germany to starvation. The British Fleet, the mobilisation of the British Fleet and the action of the British Fleet could not have saved Czechoslovakia.
I come to the air. Air war would have commenced last Saturday night. It could not have driven this country to surrender, of that I am absolutely con-
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vinced, but no one has more powerfully convinced this House than my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) of the fact that the combined British and French Air Force are not so much stronger than that of Germany that we could have won the war in the air. In fact I can never thank him enough, nor can those for whom I speak, for the information he has given to this country, and for what he has done to stimulate our efforts. The warning he gave us made me realise that the struggle in the air, apart from anything else, would be a terriffic one. I do not know whether he has had evidence in recent months that the gap has been filled, but if it has not, unless there was an impelling reason of honour we ought not to have risked going to war. Only those people who are engaged in the science of architecture and want to see London, Paris, Berlin and Prague rebuilt could have contemplated such a war with content! It would have been a war which would have imposed on all peoples involved sufferings which would probably have been unparalleled in the history of the world. But air war, when we had won, as we would have done in the long run, no doubt, after many months of war stimulation when we had perfected our air power—air war could not have saved Czechoslovakia. Those people who have called upon us in such eloquent speeches time and time again, to stand beside the Czechs, must know by now that no power on earth could have transported British and French armies to stand beside the Czechs.
Dr. Haden Guest: What about the transport of Russia?
Sir H. Croft: The hon. Member asks about the transport of Russia, and if the hon. Member desires I will say a word about that in a moment. Having worked out the air ranges and measured the Czech frontiers, and considered the manpower that the Czechs had available, I say that, if the great British nation had encouraged Czechoslovakia to fight we would have encouraged her to allow her country to be reduced to a shambles and a cemetery. Long before French and British power could have exerted its indirect pressure, in my belief Czechoslovakia would have been wiped off the map.
Mr. Harold Nicolson: There is the case of Belgium.
Sir H. Croft: I say to the hon. Gentleman that Czechoslovakia would have suffered far worse than Belgium. God forbid that any country should have such a complete calamity brought upon it for the sake of power politics. The fact remains that there are other considerations, which anyone who has made a study of this question, as I have attempted to do for the last 10 years, must bring into a Debate such as this. Czechoslovakia would have been attacked. The major attack would have been on a front where there would have been 3,500,000 inhabitants welcoming the attacker. Could any man who has commanded troops in that area conceive of anything more difficult in a situation like that? She would have been threatened on her right rear by another hostile element and again in the rear by another disaffected population, with Prague within 15 minutes of flight from three different angles, and with the whole of Czechoslovakia salient much less than a half moon. The man who would have urged the Czechs to fight on behalf of the democratic countries, the man who knew these facts and urged such a course, would indeed have been guilty of a crime. He indeed would have earned the opprobrium of betrayal of the small nations. Thank God our hands were clean of this infamy. We had no commitment to fight on behalf of Czechoslovakia, and to have destroyed their people as pawns in a preventive war would have steeped the democratic nations in dishonour. One word, since I am invited, with regard to Russia. I do not doubt the good faith of Russia. They had a mutual agreement with Czechoslovakia.
Dr. Guest: The same as ours.
Sir H. Croft: No! I think that I am right in saying that there was a mutual pact between Russia and Czechoslovakia. Russia is the great defender of the Slav people, and I have no doubt that Russia would have wished to fulfil that pledge. The only thing I am doubtful about is the Russians' ability to have got there in time, and whether Russia would have been able to get the necessary numbers of troops quickly transported along those 600 miles. I am doubtful. We must remember that at that very moment the commander-in-chief of the Russian forces, General Voroshiloff, is said to be on the Eastern front. There are troubles going on in the Russian army. No one
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knows where General Bleucher really is. With regard to the Russian navy, only a few weeks ago the admirals were eliminated, and the principal officers of the air force have also been eliminated. I am the last person to want in any way to criticise a country which might have come to our common aid at that time, but I confess that I am doubtful if Russia, so far away from home, could have operated successfully, and I do not believe that even she, if she had moved instantly, could have saved the Czech race from destruction.
There remains—and this is the thing which really affects us—the strategic factor, whether by frontal attack, with no possible flank to turn we could pierce the Siegfried line, all those permanent fortifications which the Germans have been building. I was one of those who were in little holes—not in the trenches—at the first battle of Ypres. They were little holes dug by ourselves during the night, and the flower of the Prussian Guard were hurled against that thin line of British troops at that time and they never succeeded in getting through. You were inviting the armies of France, those who have demanded a strong determination to wage war rather than to allow this settlement were inviting the armies of France to hurl themselves against a line in Germany very nearly as strong as the Maginot line, which some think cannot be pierced. We learn from eloquent speeches and remarkable writings of the last five or six years that the power of defence is now so great that it requires three times as many attackers as defenders. Would we have been right, would the Government have been right in saying that we would fight to the last Frenchman and until millions of our men had been thrown against this kind of fortification? That is what you are asking. That is the strategy of it. The Czech would have gone long ago, and you would have to go on.
Captain Sir Derrick Gunston: Would my hon. and gallant Friend be prepared, in order to prevent that, to accept the Godesberg terms?
Sir H. Croft: I do not quite see what that has got to do with it. I can usually understand my hon. and gallant Friend's interruptions, but in this case I confess that I cannot understand him. All terms had broken down. There ere no terms.

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Nobody doubts now that the Germans were going to march on the Saturday night. War would not have been averted. I am merely telling the House that there were those who were prepared to take this country into war when we were not pledged, and were prepared, first to sacrifice Czechoslovakia, and then the French armies. Does anyone in this House, in the British Isles or in the British Empire, think that we could have engaged in a bombing war and merely have blockaded German harbours? We talk of honour! Could we have seen the flower of France perish in attack upon the German frontier? We must have conscripted our nation. For six months we would have been impotent, for we have no Army that counts. After that only a torrent of perfectly trained troops could have broken the German line and dictated terms in Berlin.
There is only one other word that I want to say, and it is with regard to the hon. Gentleman who sits on the official Opposition bench. The Labour party and the Liberal party at the time of the treaty were most emphatic against the whole of this patchwork-quilt of Czechoslovakia. There cannot be any doubt about that. M. Benes, whose position seems to be very precarious, if he has not already resigned, did all he could at that time to persuade his country not to include the important German territories where the population of Germans was overwhelming. He saw the difficulties that were going to come. We have heard of the statement by the late Arthur Henderson, than whom no memory stands higher in foreign affairs in the party above the Gangway. More than that, there is the declaration of the Labour and Socialist International of 1919. I think I am right in saying that that body was regarded at that time as respectable by orthodox Labour in this country. This was their resolution:
"They refuse to recognise any claim of alien nations to sovereignty over such German districts as form a geographical unit in German-speaking districts."
Yet there are some of them who say that we ought have gone to war in order to prevent the wrong being righted which they all demanded so vociferously should be done in 1919.
Mr. Thurtle: Can the hon. and gallant Member quote any member of this party who has said that?
Sir H. Croft: I do not need to quote any member of the party. I quote this resolution from that particular body, and before I quoted it I asked whether it was not regarded as a respectable one.
Mr. Thurtle: The hon. and gallant Member misunderstands me. What I am asking is whether he can quote any member of this party as having said that he would rather go to war than allow these Sudeten Germans to be free.
Sir H. Croft: I am sorry if I have given an opinion which I did not mean to express. Nobody really wanted to go to war, but I think that what the Opposition thought was that we ought to have threatened war.
Mr. Thurtle Mr. Thurtle indicated dissent.
Sir H. Croft: Then we ought not to have issued any form of ultimatum and we ought not to have mobilised the Fleet. I do not think I need pursue further the hon. Member's interruption. In my final words, I must say that I am one of those who cannot believe that it is a moral doctrine to preach the preventive war in these days. There was a time when a country had its small standing army of 10,000 or 15,000 and hired 20,000 or 30,000 assassins to go to war to prevent something else happening; but when you talk nowadays of a preventive war and say, "Let us have a war to-day because it may be much worse five or 10 years hence," you are involving the whole fate of the nation. I agree with what Lord Baldwin said in the House of Lords, that you ought to go on to the last possible moment preventing war and never to wage war because you have a fear that you may not be strong enough to win a war in 10, 15, or 20 years' time.
This country has been very proud of its association with France. Let us keep that association intact. The French people are very quick to resent any attempts upon their honour. The French Chamber last night by a tremendous majority, the Communists being really the only dissenting party, supported the policy which their Government and our Government carried out unitedly through all these tragic days. I am as keen for the honour of my country as any man, and I believe that the escutcheon of England as of France is absolutely clean and that there is not a speck of dust

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upon it. The Prime Minister in the action that he took was engaging upon a noble line of conduct for which the world blesses him, and I am certain that history will acclaim his as one of the greatest names among those who have done much as saviours of the men and women of the world.
6.35 p.m.
Mr. R. Acland: I rise to bear witness from Prague, and as in what I have to say I shall be seeking to tell the House what I saw and heard in Czechoslovakia in these last few days, I do not propose to spend time in arguing any point, although I do not think the hon. and gallant Member for Bournemouth (Sir H. Croft) spoke one sentence which I would not dearly have liked to controvert to the best of my ability. I left Prague by aeroplane yesterday morning, and in expressing my admiration of the Prime Minister for his physical activities I can only express the hope that he did not experience the conditions which I experienced in flying through the storm which swept onwards from our shores on Monday night.
I bear witness to this House of a calm, dignified but sad and disillusioned people. It may be a little bit naive in these days to suggest that anyone sets greater store on spiritual than on material values, but I can only speak of things as I found them in Czechoslovakia, after speaking to Members of Parliament, manufacturers, economists, Army officers, the common soldier, doctors, hospital nurses and air pilots and waiters. I can only say that these people are less dispirited to-day by the loss of their territory than by the desertion of their friends. The hon. and gallant Member said that France ought not to have promised to stand in with Czechoslovakia. The trouble is that they did so promise. They promised it over and over again.
Sir H. Croft: I did not say that they ought not to have done that. What I said was that in my opinion France was right to exercise her pledge in resisting armed force, but that she advised her ally wisely not to allow herself to be exterminated, when she knew that she could not bring arms to her aid.
Mr. Acland: France ought to have known months before what would be the state of affairs. The Czechs thought that
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they had the power to choose whether they would line up with the dictatorships—with the whole theory of dictatorships we in this House are supposed to detest—or whether they would join hands with the democracies. They could have chosen the former course, but they chose the latter. They played the game, but at the last moment they were defeated because the rules were altered by their friends. Yet I would say—and this is the only point on which I find myself at difference with the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) that these people, dispirited as they are, are still determined to play an honourable and independent part in the development of humanity. The only two questions they ask is how they can do it and will they be allowed?
If hon. Members look at the economic map of Czechoslovakia, including the plebiscite areas, they will see the economic mutilation that has been brought about. It is true to say that the economic balance of the country will be shattered. It cannot be denied that great sources of raw material will be taken away and that immense labour will have to be put in by the Czechs to meet the situation. They will have to construct new roads and new railways. They will have to convert every steam engine locomotive from the use of brown coal to the use of black coal. But they are determined to do it. And they can do it if several very rigorous conditions are fulfilled. Every one of these conditions depends upon the action of this country now. They can do it, in the first place, if they get a satisfactory international loan. I say that £10,000,000 is just a joke compared with the needs of the country if its independence is to be preserved. £10,000,000 is approximately the size of the exchange equalisation account which ought to be set up for Czechoslovakia if they are to be saved from the dangers of inflation. In addition to that exchange equalisation account they must have fair trading agreements, and we must use the influence which we believe we possess with Herr Hitler to ensure that he will give them not too intolerably unfair transport rates for five-sixths of their exports which go out through Germany.
While there is so much on the debit side it is pleasant to record something on the credit. There is one thing which no German army can take away from

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Czechoslovakia and that is her international goodwill. Look at any article made in Japan and you will find tucked away in some little corner the words "foreign made," printed on a piece of paper which often comes unstuck, but on every Czechoslovakian article you will find, in the most prominent place: "Made in Czechoslovakia." They will lose some of their factories which send out goods all over the world through that goodwill, but those lost factories will not be able to keep the goodwill. They will no longer be able to claim that their goods are made in Czechoslovakia. Moreover, Czechoslovakia will not lose all her workmen. Those skilled workmen can work in other factories which will retain the Czechoslovakian goodwill. But the factories will have to be built and that will need industrial capital. They ask for British capital for their country. They say: "Come here with your capital; you may own and run our factories, you may build them for us and we will work in them and we will not let you down."
Now I turn from the purely economic to the human side of the problem. The claim is made by His Majesty's Government that this is the triumph of reason and good will and conciliation over force. It was a triumph very quickly won. It was won, I believe, in 13 hours. In such a short space of time some of the details, trivial details perhaps some of them were left to be settled subsequently. But on the way in which those details are settled will depend whether or not Czechoslovakia is to survive as a separate nation. In other words, upon the details which are now being worked out will depend whether we have really achieved anything by all our endeavours or whether we shall simply see the complete execution of the Godesberg demands two or three weeks delayed. If that is all that we achieve, it was not worth doing.
Let me deal with the plebiscite areas. I went to one of the towns in one of the plebiscite areas, Aussig, which may indeed be occupied before the 10th October. Aussig is a town 85 per cent. German. Every name, every notice, is German. I went, too, through the outlying villages; villages in an area where you have alternatively a village 100 per cent. Czech and another 100 per cent. German. Hon. Members may mock at evidence offered as the result of one day's experience. I merely offer the evidence.
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The House must weigh it. Hon. Members will recollect their experiences on the day of the declaration of the poll at the last election, and how on the day of the declaration constituents are to be seen at the street corners in groups discussing the situation. Is there any hon. Member who will not say that from 30 yards distance he can tell for certain whether any particular group is composed of his victorious supporters or of his defeated opponents? There is not one man who could not judge infallibly the category to which any particular group belongs.
When I went to Aussig and to the villages which were alternatively Czech and German I must have seen 5,000 people. I must have seen anything up to 100 groups of people ranging in numbers from two to 50 people in each group. I bear witness that I did not see one face on which I could detect one glint of satisfaction. I did not see one group which did not manifestly belong to the defeated side in the contest. And yesterday morning, flying over occupied territory, which one could see quite clearly for about 500 metres, I noticed this interesting phenomenon, that on the main roads where the German push had gone through with all its propaganda there were some swastikas flying; not a great many, but some; but in little gatherings of houses away from the main roads where the Germans had not yet arrived there were no swastikas at all. You may say that the wicked Czechs would not allow them to own the swastika, but there are ways of decorating a village and showing one's joy, if indeed the village is, in fact, rejoicing. Yet none of these did I see. It may be suggested in relation to the men I saw in Aussig that they could not rejoice because of the tyranny of the wicked Czechs. I saw streets one hundred yards long as full of people coming and going as Victoria Street is in the evening, and there was not one Czech soldier or policeman in the whole length of the street. There were no more soldiers and police put together in that area than there are police alone in London. Surely I should have detected some wink or nod, some happy handshake between two people meeting each other for the first time since the news came through. There was not one. And yet tyranny was the only reason given by Herr Hitler for the hurry to reach a settle-

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ment without deciding all the vital details upon whose determination the very existance of the country may depend.
If the House wants to hear of tyranny I can tell them where to find it. There are grievances and I am not discussing grievances, but the only people who suffered tyranny were the Czech minorities in these Sudeten German areas. I saw a young Czech woman in Prague with the mark of the swastika branded on her chest with a red hot iron, and the doctor who was with me told me that he had treated that morning a baby eight months old who had been branded with the mark of the swastika about the size of a shilling on its face. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said something about the ability of statesmen to detach their minds from human suffering. I hope for the sake of his own peace and quiet that he will be able to detach his mind from that. But as for me, it will be with me until I die. These are—I am going to use the word—the devils to whom you have handed over these decent innocent people without giving them any guarantee of any protection. Without—would the Prime Minister contradict me—without perhaps even giving them a thought. How is the fate of these people going to be settled? Is it going to be settled now by reason or by force?
Let me come to another point. It is almost certain that in fixing the plebiscite areas Germany will jerrymander the arrangements to her own advantage. If a district even with 100 per cent. Czechs is wanted by Germany for its coal or its strategic importance they will see that it is attached to a preponderating larger German area so that the whole area will vote German. I hope that the International Commission will carefully watch so that Germany cannot tinker about with marginal regions upon whose fate will depend whether the economic life of the State remains possible or not. I suppose that upon the Commission the Italian representative will go with the German, and we may hope that the French will go with the Czech, therefore, our representative holds the sole responsibility for seeing that these plebiscite areas are properly drawn up. I hope he will exercise his authority and that if he receives evidence of German intransigence he will publish the fact to the world. The fact that there is no joy in Sudetenland does not alter the
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fact that Sudeten Germans will vote 100 per cent. for Hitler next month. The Czechs have not the money nor the stomach to compete in the kind of election which is going to be waged. I ask whether the question of preventing corrupt, practices is going to be settled by reason or by the rule of force?
What is going to happen after the plebiscite is over? I suppose that the Czech population will go out, and, if so, they will go out with absolutely nothing; not a thing. If the Prime Minister asks me whether his friend Hitler will illegally confiscate their property, I answer of course not. He will go to the farmers and say, "I value your farm at 100,000 kroner. But you are German now and living in Germany, and the law of Germany is that you must pay 50,000 kroner tax to-morrow—in cash! Pay up and you may take your property. But if you fail, get out—with nothing!" Is that question going to be settled by the reasonableness which the Prime Minister wants to introduce into world politics or by force? I say that in the case of 100 per cent. Czech villages in the plebiscite areas Hitler will find himself presented with villages complete with houses, farms, growing crops and animals, but completely empty of human beings. Is he going to pay any compensation for this territory and this equipment? Is that question going to be settled by reason or by force? And may I beg that the British forces which go out there will stay there for a long time—for six months after the plebiscite is completed, and do what they can to help these people to get out with a remnant of their property and, indeed, with their lives.
You will have three classes of people coming out, the Czechs, the German Social Democrats and the Jews, and each of these presents a special problem. Take first the Czechs. They are an asset. They are the people who will have to make the new railways and the new roads and work in the new factories, but while they are building these new roads and factories they will have to be fed and housed. That is where a loan comes in. They will have to be maintained until they can maintain themselves. The German Social Democrats present a much more difficult problem. There is a hideous dilemma which will have to be faced. The Czech Government is faced with the alternative of trying to absorb these people or by

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refusing to take them in, condemning them beyond any possibility of doubt to a hideous death. They have either to accept them, in which case they will be creating a new problem and a new opportunity for Hitler to bully and bludgeon their reduced country; or they must turn them out to die. It is up to us to do something for these miserable and innocent people, and we owe the Czech Government nothing less in morals than that we should transport these German Social-Democrats with their families and possessions across the world and that at our expense we should settle them in Western Canada, exacting from them collectively and individually loyalty to us, so that we, a large Power and not little Czechoslovakia, will have to handle the efforts which Hitler will make wherever these people are to stir up trouble.
Then there are the Jews. Czechoslovakia is going to suffer to-day for her hospitality in the past. At the moment when jobs will be getting harder and harder to find in Prague the number of lawyers and doctors there is likely to be increased by anything up to 50 per cent., and these Jewish-German doctors do not know one word of Czech. If we want to preserve in Europe one island where the hideous misery of anti-Semitism is unknown we must act now. I would ask the doctors of this country, who were rather forward in pressing hon. Members of this House to forbid the influx even so few as 50 alien doctors per year to remember that while they can pursue their practice in peace many of their fellow combatants in the battle of humanity against disease will be driven into bankruptcy and into suicide in Prague, and I invite them or the Government to suggest a scheme whereby this country might take in 500 doctors a year from Czechoslovakia; not necessarily to enter private practice but to try to find some research work which they can do here for the sake of humanity.
Major Stourton: Does the hon. Member realise that every alien brought into this country from Central Europe means the displacement of someone in this country?
Mr. Acland: We are told that the Prime Minister has brought the blessings of peace. Are we going to make no contribution at all to the problems and burdens which these blessings of ours have heaped for this little country in Europe? I ask
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this in the name of morality, and I am ashamed that any argument should be presented in the opposite sense.
Let me now consider the policy of two neighbouring countries. Take the brighter case first, that of Hungary. Hungary was in a dilemma, torn between a desire to behave with comparative decency and a desire to play Hitler's game. Europe may well be grateful for the comparative restraint shown by Hungary. Of Poland there is a different story to tell. The right hon. Member for Epping told the story well. The Chancellor of the Exchequer mentioned four gains which we have won in these days. They were all spiritual gains. I do not ignore the value of spiritual gains, but let us look at some of the material consequences of our action. I think it is a long time since a British Ambassador has been told to go to Hell. Of course it was said in Polish, and very likely the language used was much more expressive, but that is what it meant and nothing else. The "Times" to-day says this:
"Natural resentment at the abrupt methods of enforcing a settlement" [of Poland's claims] "is tempered only by the thought that the demand was inherently just and should have been met long before."
It is easy for the "Times" to say that. They want all their readers to think that a policy of pure reason is being pursued. Poland is pursuing a policy of piracy and nothing else. They are claiming a district called Vitkovice, a suburb of Moravska Ostrava. Moravska Ostrava contains 20 per cent. of Poles. But Vitkovice contains the Vitkovice steel works—one of the largest in Europe. That is why they claim it. They are claiming areas that contain anything down to 15 per cent. of Poles because they happen to contain some of the last remaining coal mines. The British Ambassador might try again to remind the Polish Foreign Secretary that we have left behind the pre-Munich era of force and have entered upon a new era when we settle these matters by reason and negotiation. I should like the Under-Secretary, in the name of responsible journalism, to ask whichever civil servant it is who handles these matters, who has expert knowledge of the situation in the disputed Polish-Czech districts, this straight question, Was or was not the quotation that I have read out from the "Times" a complete travesty of the facts, which must have

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been known to be a travesty of the facts if the writer had any knowledge of the subject whatever? Will he ask that question and give the House to-night the answer that he gets, because I say that the "Times" second leading article today is wilfully misleading the public, with the incidental consequence of assisting the Government on this rather important matter.
Czechoslovakia has to choose very soon between being a little, modest, quiet country with an independent life of its own, or becoming an economic and political vassal of Germany. They want to choose the former, but the choice is really ours to make and to make now and by "now" I very definitely mean to-day rather than to-morrow. It is for that reason that I wish that one of the members of the Inner Cabinet was here, because I believe if Czechoslovakia is to remain independent we will give her a loan, and an exchange equalisation account. We shall have to interest industrial capital in that country, we will face the Germans and secure from them a just deal in working out all the details of the Munich settlement. If that is done I am convinced that Czechoslovakia can be saved as an independent country, and it is an obligation upon us to do it. We ought not to let her be destroyed. But not only morals are at stake. Our strategic position depends on it. If Czechoslovakia is an independent State, the Skoda works will produce heavy industrial goods, and indeed some arms which she will sell to the world, and we may even get some Bren guns for the British Army. Otherwise the whole economic resources of the country will be geared on to and controlled by the German armaments drive. If we trust Hitler, as we say we do, why all this talk about rearmament? If we do not trust him, perhaps we must rearm. If we are to contemplate the certainty of vast new burdens, of breaking down trade union standards, of—I hope—some control over industry, of taking from all the youth of this country the best years of their life to teach them the art of killing and being killed, do not hand over the greatest armament factory in Europe for the sake of not making a loan of—shall I name a figure?—£100,000,000, which would be repaid, because these people have always kept financial faith with those who lent
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them money. I should like to conclude by quoting a conversation that I had with a staff officer. "What have you gained from all this?" he said. I said, "An arbitration treaty with Germany." "God help you," he replied "because that is what we had."
7.6 p.m.
Sir John Wardlaw-Milne: The hon. Member has given us an interesting account of his experiences, and, in the appeal that he has made to the Government and to the people of this country to assist Czechoslovakia, I am sure that he will have the sympathy of every one in the House. My only criticism of his speech is that more than once he referred to our responsibility for the condition in which Czechoslovakia now finds herself. One could not help getting the impression that he wished to impress upon the House that Great Britain alone was responsible for the present condition of that country. A great many of us reject that idea altogether. We are more than sympathetic to Czechoslovakia's situation and more than anxious to help her, but we entirely reject the idea that this country is particularly to blame for the situation.
Mr. Acland: The Czechs, while they have no love for us, distinguish between our responsibility and that of France. They hold that France is far more responsible than we are.
Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne: I am glad to hear the hon. Member say so, but over and over again, as it seemed to me, he referred to our obligation to do this or that, not because we had sympathy for Czechoslovakia and desired to help her, but because we are responsible for the position in which she finds herself. In listening to some of the speeches to-day, particularly that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) and that from the Front Opposition bench in moving the Amendment, I could not help wondering whether every one had in mind the situation in which we should have been to-day had the Prime Minister not been so magnificently successful at Munich. What would have been the occupation of many people in this land to-day if those negotiations had not succeeded? Can anyone estimate the loss of earning power in the paralysis of trade and the loss of income, very often vitally necessary income to the individual? Can anyone estimate the enormous increase of

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unproductive expenditure which the State would alerady have incurred? Above all, let us consider for a moment the fear and horror which would have been widespread in all sections of the community here and in many other countries in Europe. You cannot consider, discuss or criticise what has happened unless you have always in your mind what the conditions would have been if those negotiations had not succeeded. At any rate, it is that view that is uppermost in my mind to-day and it makes me completely convinced that the untiring labours of the Prime Minister, in spite of recurring difficulties and discouragement, will make his great effort for peace one of the most outstanding events of our times.
With every speech that has been made which dealt with the situation of Czechoslovakia and has expressed sympathy with that small country and that brave people, we are all in agreement. But again I cannot help considering what would have been the condition of those people even to-day had the Prime Minister not been successful. It is necessary to consider that, for, whatever might have been the result at the end, months or years hence, of a long and bloody war in Europe, whatever might have been set up in the land that is now Czechoslovakia, the bulk of the people who now inhabit it would have very little interest in its condition at the end of the war.
There can be very little doubt that the grievances of the Sudeten Germans were fostered, promoted, and to some extent magnified, by propaganda from Germany, and that this was done of set purpose. Yet the grievances were real. They were not imaginary. The sad thing is that it is so certain that a few months ago, still more a few years ago, these grievances could have been settled probably without any of the disorganisation that has now taken place.
Miss Rathbone: Is it not probable that that would have taken place if France had not led Czechoslovakia to suppose that she would stand by her and if we had not afterwards persuaded France not to stand by her guarantee? Did not France and we incur some responsibility by that?
Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne: If I understand the hon. Lady correctly, she suggests that it would have been better if France had said at an early stage that she would not
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carry out her guarantee and would leave Czechoslovakia alone. Surely it is rather a curious argument that the stronger Power, Germany, would be less likely to take action if there was no guarantee than if a guarantee existed. I cannot see that it would have been any better for Czechoslovakia—indeed quite the other way.
The situation in Sudetenland had definitely arrived at the stage at which it was no longer possible for these two peoples to live under the same administration. Lord Runciman to whose labours insufficient tribute has I think been paid, would have succeeded if anyone could have succeeded in avoiding the position that he described in his report as being one in which it was impossible for the two peoples to live together. It has been said that the Czechoslovakia of the future will be very much more compact and able to get along much better. I think that may be true. At any rate, it is bound to be a more united community than it has been in the past. But I wish to make clear to the House that I entirely dissociate myself from the statement which has been made over and over again, that because of what has happened we should have a sense of shame. To me, it is clear beyond any doubt that but for the Prime Minister's action, Czechoslovakia would have been invaded, and that probably by to-day, or within a few days or weeks hence, would have ceased altogether to exist as a separate country. Can we believe that if Czechoslovakia had been invaded by Germany, Germany would have been satisfied with a settlement such as has now been achieved? I do not think that could have been expected. We had no undertaking to defend Czechoslovakia, and although we were vitally interested, in view of our guarantee to France, it seems to me that, far from our having a sense of shame, the Czechs ought to be grateful to us and to France for the continuance of their existence as a separate nation. That does not make one any less sympathetic to the feelings of a State which has had to undergo such a drastic operation or cause one to admire any the less the manner in which Czechoslovakia has conducted herself during this terribly trying period.
But I am not sure that I am not more interested in the document which the Prime Minister brought back from Munich and which sets out his own and Herr Hitler's views regarding the future con-

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duct of European affairs as far as concerns this country and Germany. It is not a treaty or an agreement, but it may well be a paper the production of which forms the turning point in the affairs of Europe and possibly of the world. There appear to me to be two completely separate schools of thought in this country in connection with these matters in the future. There are those who do not trust Herr Hitler, or at any rate believe that it is not worth while trying to work with him. They take the view that he is a gangster. That term has, in fact, been used in the House, although it is not perhaps a term that should ever be used about the head of a State with which we are not at war. I mention it as an example of the type of mind of those who hold that sort of view. They say that Herr Hitler is a gangster, that he has broken his word and broken his pledges several times, and that, therefore, he cannot be trusted. That was the view which was put very strongly from the Front Opposition Bench this afternoon and also, by implication, by my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping. People holding that view say that as we shall have to fight Herr Hitler some time, let us fight him now.
Mr. Silverman: Who said that?
Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne: I did not say anybody used those words, but they represent the idea that has been expressed. [HON. MEMBERS: "By whom?"] If you believe that you cannot treat with this man, that you cannot work with him, the alternative is that you will have to fight him some day. I say at once that those who hold that view are entitled to say that pledges have been broken in the past, but it is only fair that they should remember that Herr Hitler has also made some very definite offers of peace, and has proposed definite pacts with other countries, which have not been accepted, not during the last few weeks or in connection with Czechslovakia, but some time ago. He made an offer to France, for instance, saying that there was no further cause for quarrel between the two peoples, and he has repeated that categorically several times. He offered to make a Western pact between Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain, which would, he said, guarantee peace for a generation. He offered to
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limit the German army to 300,000 men—
Miss Rathbone: And the Chancellor of the Exchequer refused it.
Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne: He also offered a 25 years' non-aggression pact with France and Belgium, this country and Italy to be the guarantors.
Mr. Emrys-Evans: I apologise for interrupting my hon. Friend, but it is most important that we should get this matter straight in our minds. I am sure my hon. Friend read the Blue Book that was issued by His Majesty's Government. It covered a period of two or three years, and contained the documents, the notes sent to the German Government and the German Governments replies. Anybody who has read that Blue Book knows that these things were immediately taken up by the Government and that on every occasion no progress could be made on any terms whatever, since the German Government whittled down their proposals. Although those offers were made, there was no progress in negotiations to draw up instruments.
Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne: I do not think my hon. Friend's description of what happened is absolutely fair. The point I am making, however, is not whether this country could have done more. Many of the pacts were not offered to Great Britain particularly. I am not concerned now with the merits of the pacts which Herr Hitler offered, but merely want to point out that, while the people who hold the view I have described are entitled to say that certain pledges and pacts have been broken by Herr Hitler, it is equally fair to mention the proposals which he has made and which other countries have not taken up.
Mr. Emrys-Evans: It is very important that we should remember the fact that no progress was made in connection with these offers. Replies were made from our side, but there was no response which could be the basis for a treaty. The only treaty that was ever obtained was the Anglo-German Naval Agreement.
Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne: My hon. Friend will not expect me entirely to agree with that view; but surely the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, to begin with, is one of the most important agreements ever made. Moreover, many of the pacts which Herr Hitler offered were not pacts

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between this country and Germany alone, but pacts with which other countries would be concerned, and I wonder very much whether it was Germany alone which was the stumbling block to the carrying out of those proposals for pacts, or whether it is not possible that other countries were responsible as well. However, I do not make a great point of those offers, but merely wish to remind hon. Members that, in considering the pacts which have been broken, these offers should also be remembered. I suggest that, at any rate, it is worth while waiting to see whether the new pledges for the future conduct of international affairs will be kept or not, and also to wait and ascertain whether the agreement made at Munich will be carried out in the letter and spirit in which it was made or whether critics will be able to say again that Herr Hitler has broken his word.
Putting the matter on the very lowest basis, from our point of view, shall we be worse off if we find that Herr Hitler breaks his word six months or a year hence? [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes."] I am not asking that question in connection with other countries. Shall we necessarily be much worse off? If hon. Members who said "Yes" listened to the remarks of my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping and other hon. Members as to the conditions in this country and our ability to fight, I think they will agree that there can be very little doubt that we shall be considerably better off a year or two hence than we are to-day. Germany's rearmament has gone very far; ours still has a long way to go. I am aware that it is easy to say that arguments of this sort are inconsistent with working for peace, but I want this country to press on with its armaments as fast as it can and to a greater extent than before, and at the same time to press for a disarmament convention which would enable us to stop that progress. The two things are not in the least incompatible. It is essential that we should press on with our armaments and it is equally essential that we should press for a disarmament convention in the hope that it can be brought about. As the Prime Minister said a day or two ago, the day of unilateral disarmament for this country is over for ever, but multilateral disarmament is what we all want to see brought about.
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There are one or two other lessons that we can learn from what has happened during the last few weeks. We not only need to press on with our rearmament programme, but until disarmament comes, it is certainly our business to organise our people for civilian defence, so that in the event of another crisis such as that of last week, we shall have less to fear than before and there will be still less chance of any panic. The production of a national register is essential, so that every man and woman in the country will know his or her place for defence. We must make our foreign policy still clearer in the future than in the past, bearing in mind, of course, that we cannot be expected—no country can be—to set out in detail how we shall act in certain hypothetical circumstances. But Europe knows to-day what it did not know a few weeks ago, and it is that, unwilling as this country may be to fight and anxious as we are for peace, there are issues of such vital importance to us and the peoples of the world that we would not hesitate to fight. One of them would be that a Power in Europe should desire world-wide domination or should start to oppress all the Powers in her neighbourhood. I do not suggest that we should play the part of policemen in Europe, but there are conditions in which we would certainly have to fight.
We have another obligation, and that is to learn a serious lesson from the difficulties which have arisen in Czechoslovakia from delays in dealing with minority problems. We have to put our own house in order. Recent European events and particularly the Czechoslovak crisis have overshadowed—perhaps until to-day when we had a rather alarming statement upon it—the subject of conditions in Palestine. We must face the fact that we have given two quite separate pledges in Palestine and that both cannot be carried out and the sooner we say so the better. This is not, of course, the time to discuss Palestine and I only bring forward the subject by way of example, but we must bear in mind that we have problems of our own and that those problems must be dealt with soon. I cannot believe that it is impossible for us to gain the confidence of the Arabs, but at any rate the Government must make up their mind without delay on future policy in Palestine. Again, in India the sooner

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we get on with Federation the better. A further transfer of responsibility with the necessary safeguards. We ought to learn from Czechoslovakia how necessary it is in these matters to move without undue delay. I hope that the contacts which the Prime Minister has made will help materially to bring about a rapid settlement of the terrible civil war in Spain. I cannot believe that in the friendly conversations at Munich that point was not raised. I sincerely hope it was, and that it will be possible to make some advance in the direction I have indicated.
Mr. Speaker: I think it would be unwise to embark on the question of Spain at the present moment, and, in any case, it would not be in order.
Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne: I bow to your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, and I had no intention of embarking on the question of Spain further than to express the hope that the contacts which have been made will bring about an early settlement of that problem. But I believe there will be no real settlement or peace in Europe until we secure an economic settlement. Therefore, it is essential to do all we can to bring about economic co-operation between the nations. Recent advances in the speed of transport, particularly in the air, have resulted in all the old areas and customs boundaries becoming out of date. Many of them to-day are merely obstacles to intercourse between the nations and only by the extension of that intercourse is there any chance of increasing the trade and therefore the prosperity of the nations themselves. Perhaps the House will allow me to make one final statement concerning my own beliefs. I believe we will not get peace in the world until there is a change in the hearts of men. We can all do something to help. The change itself, no doubt, it is not in our power to bring about. We cannot create it; but we must believe that it is the Almighty's plan for humanity. Peace is the ultimate end to which we are all groping—peace and good will among the nations—and if we have not faith that such a plan exists then all our efforts are vain and our very existence is a mockery.
7.35 p.m.
Sir Robert Young: Many of those who have taken part in these Debates have voiced their opinions upon foreign policy.
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I do not profess to understand the workings of all those great questions which bring about such grave discussions as this, and I rise rather for the purpose of putting a point of view which, I think, is shared by many a man-in-the-street. While listening to these Debates I felt that we lived in an era when politicians should try to be statesmen, and statesmen, vested with responsibility, should strive to be miracle-workers in the interests of world peace. What I say to-night will not, I trust, be overcharged with the spirit of uncharitableness against those in high places whose methods of government I detest and condemn. In rising to take part for a short time in the discussion I have no intention of belittling the opinions of those with whom I disagree. I am a Socialist, but my Socialism is transcended by my desire for democratic freedom and liberty. I am a Constitutionalist, yet my constitutionalism is based on the absence of tyranny. Like many other Members of this House I am neither a jingo nor a pacifist. I decline to say, "My country right or wrong" and, at the same time, preach "Peace at any price." Nevertheless I feel that the experience of the past has taught us that peace is essential if the world is to be saved, or rather if its civilisation is to be saved, without an interregnum of European strife and world chaos. War cannot settle problems justly or honestly or permanently in the interests of our common humanity but it is not a remote possibility. Lord Baldwin was prophetic when he said:
"Who in Europe does not know that one more war in the west and the civilisation of the ages will fall with as great a shock as that of Rome?"
That is a terrible prospect and we nearly realised it. I have one other belief. I believe it is the inscrutable will of Providence that strong nations should suffer for every departure from the paths of righteousness. We are suffering to-day for the sins committed after the Armistice of 1918. We are and have been living under war conditions in peace time. That is the ghastly and dangerous result of neglecting and ignoring the opportunities for disarmament which the victorious Allies had after the Great War. If they had used the League of Nations, as they could have done, to assuage the harshness, remove the dangers and solve the problems which the Peace Treaty involved we might to-day have been living under

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conditions of world amity and economic prosperity. We on these benches, Members of the Labour party, have often been charged with being friends of all countries but our own. Those who made that statement were wrong. We are now charged with being the war party. That is equally wrong. We were the friends of other countries and of our own as well, because we did not hesitate to declare that the Peace Treaty was vindictive and that the exclusion of enemy nations from the original membership of the League was political foolishness. In 1919 we declared:
"The Peace Treaty will entail a situation aggravated by territorial rivalries, growing hatreds, desire for revenge, the impossibility of economic reconstitution, national and international lack of equilibrium."
Who can say to-day that our diagnosis of the world condition arising from the Peace Treaty was incomplete or exaggerated? We realise now to our regret that our diagnosis was all too accurate. There must be few among us who do not rejoice that war has been averted, even if it appears that it is only for a short time. While there is life there is hope, and while peace continues, wisdom crieth aloud though it may be only in the streets. The people of this country as in other democratic countries do not want war. They know that the permanent security of a nation does not depend on the strength of its naval and military implements of war. No doubt it may be necessary under existing conditions that we should be able to protect ourselves against the attacks of those who would seek to undermine our liberties, but the world cannot afford to repeat the experiences of 1914–1918. I came to this House from my constituency on Wednesday last with a heavy heart. I expected the worst. I told my wife that I would be late in getting home from the House. I was home early. I told her the glad and good news. Immediately, I saw in her that "hope deferred" which "maketh the heart sick" giving place to an outburst of tears, and in those tears I saw a symbol of the thankfulness of thousands of mothers in our land at the fact that war had been averted and the hope that its dark clouds were being dispelled for ever.
I remember, as many of us do, the experiences of the last War. Perhaps it is a good thing that so many of us remember its beginning, its end, and its consequences. We entered it with hope,
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courage, and faith, enthused with the great ideal that we were going to put an end to militarism for ever. We were told it was going to be a short war. They were optimists who said it. There was the slogan, "Business as usual," and it was said that in six months the war would be over. In the early stages of it I met only one man who seemed to realise how long it would continue, and that was Lord Kitchener. In an interview at the War Office with some colleagues of mine, we were protesting against the regimentation of industry, feeling that the War was going to last only a few months, when he turned to us and said, "Believe me, gentlemen, it will not be over in three years." It lasted four years, and at the end of it a broken world in which every nation, whether belligerent or not, felt the results of its industrial and economic dislocation as well as its moral and spiritual debasement. There has been no real recovery even now from its devastating consequences. Huge mountains of war debts remain, which will not and never can be paid.
When the immediate crisis developed, I went to my constituents and told them that I believed war was imminent, that its roots lay in the post-war settlement after the Armistice, that Czechoslovakia should never have been constructed on its present basis, that its minorities were not irretrievably scattered throughout the length and breadth of the country, but were in dense masses with majorities on its outer borders, that they were alien peoples, irritating and festering thorn wounds in its body politic, and that it was better to cast them off than to resort to internal or external war. As for me, I told them that I would be no party to a war which could be avoided by the delimitation of new frontiers. I said, "If I fight, I prefer to fight for freedom and humanity and not for a stretch of territory." I added that I would like to see the nations guarantee the freedom of Czechoslovakia as a united people. As for the Sudeten Germans, if they as a majority wanted to go to a Nazi hell, then, I said, let them.
It is easy to criticise the processes and progress of diplomatic action after the event. No doubt it is right to criticise, provided the criticisms are aimed at safeguarding us against similar humiliations, dangers, and threatened disasters in the future, but whatever the failures, what-

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ever the mistakes, whatever the follies of the past may have been, who among us does not fervently rejoice that the greatest folly and failure of all, namely, war, has been averted? The mobilisation of the British Navy, of which we are all proud, may have done something in the prevention of immediate war, but I feel that it is largely due to the short-circuiting of diplomatic inertia in order to arrive at speedy and conclusive decisions. Far too long, in my opinion, have illogical statesmen gambled with their peoples' lives by their competition for formulae which settle nothing, but keep national representatives busy in the blind-alley occupations of diplomatic chicanery.
We are not at war. In our thankfulness, let us remember the brave and free people who bear the brunt of our present safety, who have sacrificed much, very much, in the cause of international peace. Their enemies appear to act on the belief that if one does evil, one should do it thoroughly. I suppose that for them the extremity of crime has its delirium of joy. Our responsibility for the position of Czechoslovakia is very great. Let our economic help be very real. Czechoslovakia acted on the advice of its ally and the friends of the ally. Let those friends make up their minds that they will not make any direct pecuniary profit out of their loss and suffering. A country such as ours, which has scattered subsidies with a bounteous hand, should make, in my opinion, if not a free gift, at least a free loan as a tangible and practical expression of our grateful appreciation of what they have done in the cause of peace.
There is one thing more. There is to be a guarantee for the new boundaries of Czechoslovakia. Let us make sure that that political guarantee is a genuine guarantee, equally binding on all the guarantors. If that is honestly done and humanely sponsored, there lies the hope for the future peace of the world. If these four nations are prepared, and mean, to guarantee the safety and security and territory of a small country, why cannot they do it for each other, and if for each other, why cannot they do it for the whole world? The Leader of the Opposition and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bow and Bromley (Mr. Lansbury) made an earnest appeal to the Prime Minister to call a world conference for the purposes of peace. Better still,
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let him lose no time in inducing the statesmen of these four nations who have prevented immediate war against themselves to stop it in Spain and conjointly to call the suggested world conference to devise ways and means for the security of us all. If he would apply his time and attention in that direction, I am perfectly sure that, if he succeeded in getting this world conference called, not only by ourselves but by those four Powers together, that would be a tangible token that we were getting nearer the time when "peace on earth" would be made manifest; and in any case, if we succeeded, our thanks would be far greater than the thanks which he is receiving at this present moment for his action during the past week.
7.55 p.m.
Colonel Sandeman Allen: I feel that I must start what I have to say by paying my tribute of praise, admiration, and thanks to the Prime Minister for the pertinacity, patience, and courage which he showed and by which he brought peace to this country, peace, too, as he said, with honour. I have a letter which appeared in the Press to-day from our colleagues on all sides in the French Parliament, expressing in the highest terms their admiration of our Prime Minister, and I am sure that we all support it. I wish to support to the full the Motion that was so ably moved this afternoon by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In the criticisms that have been levelled against the Government, the right hon. Member for the Hillsborough Division (Mr. Alexander) last night quoted the first chapter of Isaiah and said:
"When you come to make prayers, do not have blood on your hands."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th October, 1938; col. 285, Vol. 339.)
Thanks to the Prime Minister, there is no blood on our hands, and there might easily have been so. The right hon. Gentleman went on to talk about the complete betrayal of Czechoslovakia. A betrayal implies that there has been undertakings which have not been implemented. No such thing has happened so far as this country is concerned. We had no undertakings to protect Czechoslovakia, and therefore there can have been no betrayal. Our consciences are clear, although naturally our hearts are heavy that the people of Czechoslovakia should have been forced to make such gallant and wonderful sacrifices for the

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peace of Europe. The hon. Member for Newton (Sir R. Young), who has just sat down, said that we were suffering for the sins of the past, and I think he will agree that to a certain extent the Czechoslovakian nation are suffering very severely indeed for the sins that they have themselves committed in the past. I would remind hon. Members of a letter from Lord Runciman, which is to be found on page 6 of Command Paper No. 5847, in which he says:
"I consider, therefore, that these frontier districts should at once be transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany and, further, that measures for their peaceful transfer, including the provision of safeguards for the population during the transfer period, should be arranged forthwith by agreement between the two Governments."
That was a week before things got to the very acute stage. What was a war to be about, and what was it to stop? A war, apparently, was to stop what had been recommended to us by Lord Runciman, who has been an observer on the spot. Could anything be more illogical or unjust? No Government could ask the British people to fight for what was illogical and unjust.
The first meeting of our Prime Minister with Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden brought forward these Anglo-French proposals, which more or less embodied the recommendations made by Lord Runciman, the second meeting produced very cruel proposals from Germany, and the third meeting produced an agreement on the methods to be used in carrying out the Anglo-French proposals. That, more or less briefly, deals with the first part of the Motion which has been moved this afternoon, but before I pass from that I must say one word of thanks and congratulations—a thing I never in my life expected to do—to the hon. Member for Bridgeton (Mr. Maxton). I thought his speech yesterday was one of the most magnificent and true speeches ever delivered in this House and that it expressed the feelings of the people of this country to a remarkable extent. I would like to quote one paragraph:
"I could see the terrible degeneration of humanity, and that if we survived we were going to live only if we could make ourselves completely callous to all these horrors. What sort of a new world is to come out of that? What is democracy to get out of that? What sort of new social order is to come out of that?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th October, 1938; col. 194, Vol. 339.]
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That was the position with which we were faced, and I recommend the House to remember that these are very salient facts in dealing with the present situation. I want to address myself to some of the arguments used by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill). One of the points he made was that we should have brought Russia into the negotiations. I am amazed to hear from an elder statesman with the experience of the right hon. Gentleman his obvious acknowledgment of a lack of knowledge of the psychology of the leaders in Germany. To bring Russia into the negotiations would have been to produce a red rag to the bull—with both meanings to red and both meanings to bull. It would have wrecked any negotiations before they began. The second point he made was that there should have been an earlier declaration from Great Britain as to the line we would take in the event of trouble. I am convinced that that would only have encouraged President Benes to be more stubborn. I would like again to remind the House of the letter written by Lord Runciman in which he points out the difficulties that the Czechs were making for the Sudeten Germans, and says:
"I believe these complaints to be in the main justified. Even as late as the time of my mission, I could find no readiness on the part of the Czechoslovak Government to remedy them on anything like an adequate scale."
Mr. Silverman: Is it not the case that Lord Runciman said in that report that the very generosity of the concessions offered by the Czech Government operated against their chances of success with the Sudeten Germans?
Colonel Sandeman Allen: That was in a much later stage of the proceedings. The point I am making is that had the Czechoslovak Government thought at an earlier period that they had the might of Great Britain behind them, they would have become more stubborn and the danger would have been very much greater. That is a thing which we cannot doubt. The right hon. Gentleman went on to make some remarks about opposing any suggestion of an election and said it would be dreadful for this country to be torn in twain at this moment. I do not think his speech was helpful in attaining the end he considered so desirable.
The second part of the Motion that we are discussing deals with the efforts to

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secure a lasting peace and to build up a world peace on existing conditions. It is all very well to say that that can be done through the League of Nations. Would to God that it could be done through the League, but we must consider, if we are to get peace, not only the logic of events, but the psychology of the leaders of other nations. No leader in Germany or in Italy, or in any of the Fascist States, will enter anywhere near the portals of Geneva under the name of the League of Nations. If we are to get peace it is not truckling with the dictators to say we are going to meet them, but we must start with good foundations and not start with the roof of the structure upon which we hope to build a lasting peace. To do that we must continue more forcibly our rearmament programme so that we still have a stronger bargaining power which is respected by Germany. We can, I am convinced, be infinitely stronger than we are at the moment, and the stronger we get the more will Germany be willing to respect us and to meet us in the matters that we want in regard to the reduction of armaments in future. There must be reductions, but it must be multilateral and never again unilateral. An air force cannot win a war. It may be that Germany thought she could bomb us into submission in a very short time, but she does not know the spirit of the British people if she ever dreamt that such a thing could be done. An air force cannot win a war, but the lack of an air force might very well lose a war. For that reason we must increase, improve and further strengthen our air force.
I listened with amazement at the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who has just resigned his seat in the Cabinet. I am going to mention this because I have his permission. I wrote to him saying that I proposed to speak about him this evening, and said,
"If you are not in the House I shall refrain from making any remarks. Some of those remarks may not please you, but I feel I must not consider personal feelings at this time. I am sure you will understand this and bear no, personal malice."
He wrote in reply,
"I must go about 6.45, but that is no reason why you should refrain from speaking."
In his speech the right hon. Gentleman said we should have threatened Herr Hitler and have called his bluff, and used terms of that sort. It is not very long
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ago since my right hon. Friend was head of the important department, the War Office. He left the War Office with no expeditionary force. Had he then stated that he considered that we should have an expeditionary force and be in such a position that we could speak in those terms to dictators if necessary, and had he come to the House and said that such being the case, he could no longer sit in the Cabinet, he could have held his head high and everybody would have respected him far more than they do by his present method of resigning. I feel very strongly on that matter, and I could not sit down without giving expression to my opinion. I hope that the House will give the Prime Minister as big, if not a bigger, majority in the Division on the Motion as the French gave their Prime Minister last night. By doing so they will be expressing the feeling of the men, women and children in this country and outside it.
8.9 p.m.
Sir Stafford Cripps: This Debate is so serious to the future of our country and our civilisation that I feel that everybody who takes part in it must do so with a very deep sense of their responsibility to the people of this country. I trust that that deep sense of responsibility will last until everybody has passed out of the Division Lobby. Indeed, I think it can be said that at the present moment the whole future of civilisation itself may depend upon the course which is followed by the people of this country. I do not intend to enter again upon any analysis of the events of recent days. That analysis has been repeated from many points of view. Right hon. Gentlemen who have addressed the House from this side have expressed the point of view which I hold, and it has been confirmed and reinforced by the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) to-day. I especially want to deal with the speech of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence which was made last night, because I believe that the arguments that he put forward in defence of the Government's action and as regards their future policy are so dangerous and fallacious that it is necessary for someone to attempt a clarification of what he stated as being the opposing points of view in the House at the present time. It is the policies of the future and not the events of the past that will determine the course which our civilisation will

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follow. The right hon. Gentleman said:
"Let us make no mistake, this is an issue joined between two opposing points of view."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th October, 1938; col. 298, Vol. 339.]
That is, two policies. I certainly accept that statement. We are not merely discussing in this Debate the wisdom or folly of some isolated actions by His Majesty's Government, and it is of extreme importance that those who are taking part in the decision at which we shall arrive to-morrow should realise that fact. We are discussing the whole of the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government of which these last events are so far—and I emphasise the words "so far"—the most tragic example. Apparently, judging by the speeches we have heard from the Front Treasury Bench, that policy is to be continued for the future. I admit that in the speech which the right hon. Gentleman made last night it was difficult to ascertain of what that policy consisted. Apparently, as far as I could gather, it is a policy of sweet reasonableness. Those words were repeated again and again by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary as well, but that sweet reasonableness is, be it noted, to be accompanied, on his own and his colleagues' admissions, if it is to have any effect at all, by an overwhelming force. Hence the pressing need which is being explained to us by speaker after speaker for reinforcing, expediting and increasing that vast rearmament programme upon which we are already embarked. Indeed, our new-found dove of peace seems to insist upon sharpening of the claws as the most vital factor.
So this policy comes down to one of talking with sweet reasonableness about each dangerous issue as it arises, but always providing yourself, in the background, with the maximum use of force to support your argument. It sounds, perhaps, a somewhat disingenuous policy and one that, as far as I can see, differs very little from that of the dictators of Europe. It is true they talk in terms of violence and not of sweet reasonableness, but they, too, insist upon backing their conversations with the greatest armed force possible. Indeed in such circumstances it matters very little what is said, for both parties are relying upon the ultimate sanction of the supporting force behind their wills, and that party will win which can either carry its bluff furthest or else can persuade the other
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that it is in possession of an overwhelming force. It was apparently of that that the Prime Minister was persuaded at Munich.
I could understand a policy of peace at any price, a policy of absolute pacifism, which is logical, which talks in terms of sweet reasonableness and willingly abandons the weapons of force because it believes in the power and effectiveness of that reasonableness alone, but I cannot understand the mentality of a Government which in the present circumstances of the world situation thinks that the building up of an isolated force of national armaments and then talking with sweet reasonableness to the dictators whose actions have been so well experienced in the past is going to accomplish the salvation of their own country or the peace of the world. That, as far as I can gather it, sums up the positive policy which is put forward in the Motion which the Government are proposing for the approval of this House.
I should like to add two further criticisms of that policy. First, I should like to ask what have this Government, or the Conservative party, done during their seven years of power—more complete power than in any other period in the history of this country—to apply the method of sweet reasonableness to the solution of those European and world problems which are now vexing civilisation and which brought us very near to the brink of war in the last few days? Japan has not been checked in Manchuria by sweet reasonableness. The invasion of China has not been prevented by the soft words of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Italy has not been checked in Africa. I would remind hon. Members of a remarkable speech made by the present Home Secretary when he resigned his position as Foreign Secretary after the Hoare-Laval agreement. I seem to remember that, standing opposite, he told us how much more honest it would have been not to have led Abyssinia to believe she would get protection from the Great Powers. He seemed to have forgotten that in the negotiations about Czechoslovakia.
Mr. De Chair: Did he not also say in that speech that it was far better to save what we could of Abyssinia from complete extinction than to go ahead and allow her to be obliterated?
Sir S. Cripps: He certainly said that in the pass to which the policy of the Government had brought Abyssinia it was better to save what could be saved, and we see the result of the Government's refusal of his suggestion. Abyssinia was not saved—even that part of it. Germany has not been checked by sweet reasonableness in her aggression in Europe, nor has Spain been saved from the horrors of Fascist invasion by the sweet reasonableness of the arguments put forward on non-intervention. Such a policy in the past, when this Government has been responsible for our foreign policy, has led time after time to the use of violence and to the complete abrogation of every rule of law, decency and honesty in international affairs.
The complaint by the Government, though they alone are not responsible for it, has been not that the cooing of the dove of peace has not been loud enough in the past, but that the talons of the eagle of war have not been long enough. It is not their complaint that their sweet reasonableness has failed but that their show of force was not great enough. They have throughout insisted that it is force and not reasonableness that counts in the ultimate challenge in international matters. All the time they have been afraid to expose their true policy to the people of this country because they knew that the people would not accept it, as Lord Baldwin, in the appallingly frank speech which he made after the last election, admitted to this House. They have spoken of collective security and of the Covenant of the League of Nations but have never believed in the efficacy of either of them. They have encouraged the destruction of those implements because of the complete lack of faith in their efficacy. They have done nothing to reinforce them but have done everything to weaken them in practice.
The Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence claimed that the Government had respected their pledges in the spirit and in the letter. That is not true. They have respected the letter but never respected the spirit. They have uniformly failed, and purposely failed, to give that lead for strengthening those organisations for peace which might have given real effect to them as implements for securing the salvation of this country and other
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democratic countries. Time after time we have been told from the Treasury Bench that they can do no more because others will not do more. That is not leadership; that is the policy of keeping in step with the slowest in the race, and as those slowest nations have always been opposed to the principles of collective security in the Covenant of the League it has resulted in the destruction of that security. The position of the National Government and of this country—the position of weakness to-day—is the result of that long and tragic history of the neglect of the one great weapon of defence for freedom and democracy that had been proposed and created after the last war. They have tried in these last few months to build up the isolated strength of this nation to take the place of the combined strength of a collective group of nations, and in that on their own admission they have failed, because they admit they were compelled to give way to Herr Hitler's demands—unjust, admittedly, though the method was, of carrying out those demands.
The second criticism is that the present Government have never had any constructive policy for peace at all. At best they have tried to prevent war when the danger of war has been imminent, but on every occasion they have succeeded in that objective only by giving way unqualifiedly to the demands of the aggressor. What is required for a sound foreign policy is two things: First of all, the strength to maintain the rule of law internationally and, secondly, and no less important, the courage to initiate a complete reorganisation of the international economic life of the nation, even, I add, at the price of sacrificing some of our own Imperial interests, if need be. I do not, and I never would suggest the handing over of any Imperial possession of this country to any other Imperialist nation. That course offers no solution of the problem. Nazi imperialism will be worse and not better than British Imperialism, but some new method must be devised which will make the world resources that are available to-day available to the starving populations of the world.
Such a method cannot be devised as long as each nation clings desperately to its own possessions and attempts to defend them by the overwhelming force of its own population. Maybe to-day we

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have staved off war by the sacrifice of other people's national interests. That is a comparatively easy way of buying peace. Never has this Government been prepared to throw into the pool of international economic co-operation vital British interests or possessions in any part of the world. Until that preparedness for sacrifice is shown by the people of this country no foundation can ever be laid for the lasting peace of the world. As long as policy is based upon the conception that what Britain has Britain holds, there will be no solution possible of the economic problem of the world, a problem which lies at the very root of the grave dangers of the last few days.
You will not for ever satisfy rival imperialisms by handing over to them the smaller nations of the world. The time will come when the clash will be at your own door. It is surely far better to make a contribution to world peace to-day through the channels of economic co-operation than to engage in the futile attempt to bring about a lasting peace by the vast and wasteful sacrifices demanded of the people in the building up of huge armaments. Sweet reasonableness which consists in giving away the property of others and building up huge armaments to protect what is your own will never solve the problem of peace; yet such is the policy of His Majesty's Government to-day. From such a policy we dissent with all our power.
Let me now deal with what the right hon. Gentleman said about the policy of the Opposition as stated in the Amendment. He likened the statements made by my right hon. Friend in putting the policy forward to the policy contained in extracts read from the speeches of Herr Hitler—rather a cheap and a wholly inaccurate statement, and quite unworthy of any Debate upon a serious topic in this House. It is the sort of statement one might excuse in the Oxford Union but not from the Front Treasury Bench. However, let me examine for a moment his statement and let me first remind the House that for the last four years the Government have paid constant lip-service to the method of collective security. They have never objected to it as a method, and they have appealed again and again to Members on this side of the House to support their armaments programme on the very ground that it was to be used for collective security. Let me quote a
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passage from a speech in this House by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence on 7th March. He said:
"It is perfectly clear that if Great Britain is to play a part in any system of collective security she will want these forces."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th March, 1938; col. 1676, Vol. 332.]
Similar appeals have been made again and again coupled with assertions that our increase in armaments in this country was required to implement our obligations of collective security under the covenants in which we had entered. Now, suddenly, the mask is torn off and the Government's policy is declared to be the exact contrary of collective security, which is likened by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence to Hitler's outpourings in "Mein Kampf." Let me quote again the right hon. Gentleman in order that it might be clear that I am not misrepresenting him. He said:
"The policy pursued or approved by the party opposite could not have been better illustrated than in those passages which a few moments ago the right hon. Gentleman quoted from the speeches or statements of Herr Hitler."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th October, 1938; col. 298, Vol. 339.]
It is the very policy which was declared at the last Election to be the sheet-anchor of the National Government. That remark of the right hon. Gentleman shows, either that he has no conception of what he and his party have been talking about as collective security for the last four years, or else it is a deliberate and dishonest attempt to mislead the people of this country. I apologise to the House for having to make the most elementary explanation of the difference. Collective security is the name which has been given to the method of combining the defence forces of several nations so that they might all be available for the protection or defence of the territory of any particular nation in the even of unprovoked aggression against that country. Whatever has that to do with Herr Hitler's avowed and carefully calculated aggression by armed force on the territory of his neighbours? In order that the right hon. Gentleman may understand the difference, let me give him a simple analogy. In our domestic law, it is not right to seize the goods or property of another. If there is thought to be a claim to them, that claim must be asserted peacefully through the courts of law, and the change of ownership must

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await either the agreement of the parties or the decision of the court; and if any party attempts of his or her own accord to undertake that seizure, then the whole collective force of the nation is used to exert the rule of law against him. Internationally the same rule of law applies.
Mr. Pilkington: In what court?
Sir S. Cripps: It applies in the court of public opinion of the world. The whole principle of the League of Nations, of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, of the arbitration treaties, of which there was one between Germany and Czechoslovakia, is that force shall not be used for the seizure of the property of one nation by another.
Mr. Pilkington: There is no police force put there for that purpose.
Sir S. Cripps: Nor, I imagine, does the hon. Gentleman give up his ideas of justice and morality because there is no policeman in the room. It was because there was no policeman to prevent such a violation of international justice and morality that, after the War, the attempt was made to build up the system of collective security under the Covenant of the League of Nations, and it is the very foundation of honest and just international behaviour. To liken such a system to the brutal depredation of the Fascist dictators is to make a farce of argument. It is, indeed, the one and only way that the human race have so far devised for bringing the rule of law into international life and making it effective for displacing the brutal lawlessness of gangsterism, and I make no apology for using the word. It must, however, at all times be coupled with a readiness to submit complaints for decision either by arbitration or agreement or some other method of international law. That is why, in our Amendment, we combine the action to support collective security with the summoning of a world conference to consider the whole problem of those economic injustices which are still festering in the world. To attempt to say that collective security is the imposition by force of the will of this and other countries upon a neighbour is to misrepresent grossly the truth of the situation. It is a method of restraining, and the only known method of restraining, the forcible change of boundaries, and it has no aggressive purpose, and can have no
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aggressive purpose, behind its operation. To abandon collective security is to welcome lawlessness in the world. That is precisely what the Prime Minister and the Government have done in the past, and that is why they demand a more urgent rearmament to-day, because they realise that, in a world in which they have legitimated lawlessness, they can only rely upon their own armed forces.
The Munich settlement, we have been told again and again, was inevitable, as, we are told, was the destruction of Czechoslovakia, and as will be the destruction of other free States, including, perhaps, eventually, our own, precisely because the Government have abandoned their faith in and their desire for collective security and the rule of law in international affairs. It will not serve as an excuse for that abandonment in the annals of history merely to say that the Government could do nothing in that direction because others were unwilling. They abandoned it because of their own lack of faith in that method of operation. They failed on every occasion to give the lead. The Government have never once offered to make that essential contribution to the economic appeasement of the world without which even collective security is of no value. We have been told that we have entered a new era of international relations. That is true. The last vestige of pretence of support for international law and justice has been cast aside by this Government. We have been reduced to a reliance, not upon what is right and just, but upon the forbearance and the word of Herr Hitler, neither of which is likely to fill Jews, social democrats, Catholics, trade unionists, co-operators, or, I venture to say, any decent man or woman, with any degree of confidence or hope for the future.
There is, however, I believe, an opportunity in what everyone now refers to as the breathing-space. But that opportunity cannot and will not be taken by a Government whose policy is represented by the speeches that we have heard from the Treasury Bench during this Debate. There is, however, I am confident, a great mass—indeed, I am convinced, a majority—of the people of this country who are prepared for a bolder and more courageous bid for world peace at this time of crisis. We on these benches have never flinched from preparedness to put

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out the maximum of national effort provided it was directed to a lasting and truly peaceful solution of world affairs. The nation, I am convinced, is prepared to make a far greater contribution to that peace than it has ever been called upon to make in the past. Let us first set out to protect what remains of law and order and justice in the world by an alliance of those nations which still believe in these great principles of civilisation. A league of such nations, ready to welcome into their midst any and all who will support these foundations of our civilisation, will yet be strong enough to extend that breathing space, while we may get on with the more constructive work of economic readjustment. While we build up this security of defence, we must be prepared to make our contribution, if need be to make a sacrifice, to the cause of peace in that even more vital field of economics.
I cannot to-night elaborate on the methods by which such a policy would be pursued; but this I desire to say, in conclusion, with all the earnestness and power I can command. We can to-day, I believe, in this country, at this hour of crisis, make the greatest and most lasting contribution to world peace, not by building massive armaments to protect and isolate our own vast Imperial possessions, but by working out a new and better system for the co-operative economic development of world resources. Imperial competition, with all its dangers and its hindrances to the achievement of economic justice, is an outworn and dangerous policy, and certain, I believe, to bring us, not to the verge, but to the centre of a most disastrous war. We, still the largest Imperial power in the world, can give a lead in working out at a world conference that new system which will make available to the common people of all nations commodities which now, though so bounteously produced, cannot be obtained by many starving millions. It is along that line that there is hope, and I beg of the people of this country to face that course of action with courage, determination and hopefulness, and to put into power in this country those people who will be prepared to rely for peace not on the word or forbearance of a foreign dictator, but upon the justice and progressiveness of their own constructive economic policy.
8.49 p.m
Mr. Magnay: I am delighted that at the end of three days a voice from the far North is to be heard upon this very serious matter. I cannot help remarking at the very beginning that it is quite easy for Members of the Opposition, who now dwell in safety, to take an entirely different view from what they did a week ago. I can say quite definitely that the north country man and woman in the street is quite convinced that we are indeed fortunate to have such a man as the Prime Minister governing our destinies. You can hear the echo of that voice from the Opposition Benches now, but that is all it is. I have given you the authentic voice of the north, and if they think otherwise let them test it out. If they, as democrats, think that they are right and I am wrong, let them try it out; and I will, at any rate, retire from my seat and test it on this issue if any one of them will do ditto—and I know who will get back. It will be myself.
We have heard a great deal about the man in the street in this rather desultory Debate of the last three days, and I can tell you again what the man in the street really thinks about this matter. [Interruption.] I am grateful for that interruption. I am one of those Members who dwell among their own folk. I have no need to advertise, as I sometimes see done, that "the hon. Member for so-and-so will visit his constituency"—I live there. And the ordinary men and women in the street, who have been very much concerned, have stopped me, and said to me, "We want to talk to you, as a realist and a really informed idealist"—and there could not be a better choice. Then they have usually asked three plain straightforward questions. The first is, "What is Czechoslovakia?" and I have told them that it is a polyglot population created—or, I would rather say, made up—of five different races; and as an elementary illustration, I say "Look at this hand of mine: there are the Germans, there the Czechs, there the Slovaks, there the Hungarians, and there the Poles and Jews." [Interruption.] If hon. Members will listen they will be informed. I say, "It is as plain as my hand. These five different races, with five different languages and five different religions, how could they possibly, racially, culturally, from any point of view, knit together in 20 years?"

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This is exactly what my old, lifelong friend, Arthur Henderson, said would happen. [Interruption.] Really, these flippant comments do not reveal any intelligence—not that I am surprised. The Labour party of that time predicted it precisely, and if anybody will look at the recent publication of Mr. Lloyd George on what happened at Versailles he will see that Mr. Lloyd George was so concerned about this patchwork arrangement which was called a nation that he sent General Smuts to make inquiries, and General Smuts was so concerned that he reported to Mr. Lloyd George, then the Prime Minister of this country. [HON. MEMBERS: "Order"]—the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), who was then Prime Minister of this country—that it was a hopeless proposition. That was confirmed by Lord Mottistone in the House of Lords on Monday. He said, in answer to Lord Snell, that it was not for economic reasons that the Sudeten Germans were put into that conglomeration of discordant communities, but for strategical reasons. When Lord Milner, General Smuts, the Prime Minister and the late Lord Balfour objected to this, Marshal Foch said that we must have that bastion. Those were his very words. Lord Mottistone well known as General Jack Seely and certainly a most courageous and straightforward man, said that we have the right as a nation to hold our heads erect, for we are now only putting right what everybody, except Marshal Foch, then said was a wrong.
This should never have happened. I say without offence, I hope, to anyone, certainly without offence to Dr. Benes, that there is a lot of sentimental tosh talked about Czechoslovakia. It had never been agreed, as I told my friend and inquirer, that the Sudeten Germans should be coalesced into that entity which was never real, national or homogeneous. Where is Czechoslovakia was the next question put to me? My inquirer said, "I have never heard of it before, where is the place?" I said, "Look at the map. There is Germany, with Austria now part of Germany, encircling it for two-thirds of the way, and the rest, like a sausage, going down into Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary." I was asked, "Do you mean to tell me they are proposing to send our lads out there?" On Tyneside—in
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Northumberland and Durham—we raised more men for the Army during the last War than any other district in England. We are proud of the fact. "Do you mean to tell me," I was asked, "that our people are thinking of sending our lads into the backyard of Germany hundreds of miles away, with no point of contact, and that they must march through Germany to get there? We should be stark, staring mad to agree to that." One man said to me, "When I thought that I could give the other fellow a hiding, I chased him into his back lane. I had more sense than to chase him into his backyard, for all his family would be there to fight me." There is sound sense in that.
How could we go to the aid of Czechoslovakia with any possible chance of success? I cannot for the life of me see how any competent authority could advise it, and I have been much comforted by some of the speeches which have been made by military experts, who said that it was quite impossible. It is almost inconceivable that we should have advised anybody to go to the aid of a State which was never a real, separate national entity, to go so far away from our lines of communication and risk the life of our nation. Never forget—at least I do not forget it, and I apologise to the House for saying so elementary a thing—that there are many supposed allies of ours bound to us by treaties who, if we were tied up in a place like that, would leave us alone, and we would have our whole Empire in jeopardy. What would happen in the Mediterranean, in Palestine and in India? I thank God at any rate that we have men who can see these things and will not take such a risk.
Mr. Vyvyan Adams: Does the hon. Member support the new guarantee to the new Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Magnay: I am coming to that. I am much obliged to my hon. Friend. It is a question that I would expect from him, and I thank him for it. The next question I was asked was, "What is the row about?" I said that these Sudeten Germans had never agreed to this arrangement and for 20 years had had to bear it. Read Lord Runciman's report and you will see the reasons given seriatim. The Sudeten Germans could not do anything else but grin and bear it, with what grace they could, but when

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Austria was obtained by Germany all their desires lit up. They became clamant. They could see an end to what they had suffered for 20 years. While I agree with many of the speeches made regarding the grave injustices and the inhumanities of the German people in regard to what they are pleased to call alien races, never let it be forgotten that Germany never had fair play in the Versailles Treaty. It was an unclean peace. She was never allowed to have customs relations with Austria.
Injustices have to be paid for. This is a moral universe, and I know full well that if I do a mean or shabby thing, my sin will find me out. That is the immutable law of God's Universe. The German race have not had fair play and Germany has seethed with discontent because of the injustices inflicted upon her. She has, as any proud race would do, and as we would do, prepared in secret until she has been able to demand justice. The issue is a simple one. The question in this House and in the nation is, Who stands for war or for peace; for the mailed fist, as the late First Lord of the Admiralty said, or for sweet reasonableness, as the Prime Minister said? Lord Baldwin yesterday in another place appealed for national unity. We have got it. The hon. Member for Bridgeton (Mr. Maxton) sounded a clear clarion call to all humane forces in the world of internationalism. The right hon. Member for Bow and Bromley (Mr. Lansbury), who is held in the greatest respect in the Kingdom, and is honest, too honest for a politician, has spoken in favour of peace, and the issue is quite plain.
With respect to those who take a different view—I can imagine their natural fears—I do not think that God Himself worked a miracle a week ago before our very eyes for nothing. I had no need to be told what to pray about when I went straight across to Westminster Abbey. It is a test of living faith whether we stand as a nation, as a people and as a Christian nation, for peace. We have to make a venture for faith. It is a venture which God is asking us to make with Him. I hear hon. Members say that they would not make a bargain with Hitler, and I admit that there are arguments on their side. But it is something more than that. I do not believe that God is dead. I believe this is a new possibility, a new era in international
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relations for men of faith. Last Wednesday I saw a Member of this House almost weeping his eyes out in the Tea Room. He is a Jew. I shall not mention his name, because he would not like that. I asked him what was the matter. I said, "I am surprised at you. Do not you remember what was said to your great leader, that the children of Israel should journey forward." Not until they went forward did the waters of the Red Sea open, and they passed over dry foot. God has invited you and he has invited me to this act of faith. Do not think that I am a prig for saying this. Perhaps I am not good enough to talk like this, but God is calling us to make a venture of faith, to go forward, nothing doubting that He will take care of us as He has taken care of our fathers before us. The destinies of our people and of this great nation, of which I am proud to be a member, are to-day in His hands, and I pray that we, by His grace, may be able to do His holy will.
9.7 p.m.
Mr. Thurtle: I want to claim the attention of the House for a very short time while I make what may be considered a personal statement. The crisis through which we have been passing in the last few weeks brought very sharply to our attention the issues of peace and war, and I want to take this opportunity of saying where I stand on this matter. I am a libertarian and in the last resort I would fight for liberty, but I have always regarded war as the last desperate expedient to which we should resort only if everything else has failed. For that reason I am not going to criticise the Prime Minister for making his approach to Herr Hitler. It may be unpleasant on this side of the House if I say what I honestly feel, but I should like to pay him a tribute for his courage in taking that first long aeroplane flight at the age of 69 for this purpose.
I do not want to be misunderstood, but I can and I will criticise the policy which led to the necessity of the Prime Minister having to go to Berchtesgaden. I agree entirely with the heavy indictment which was made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps) against that policy. The Prime Minister has to accept a large share of responsibility for that policy, but, even so, I am not going to criticise him for doing all he could to avoid the dread

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consequences of that policy. Any man who is faced with the terrible responsibility of involving the people of this country and the people of the world in war is entitled to do everything possible, everything honourably possible, in order to avoid that calamity. I would go further and say that any Prime Minister placed in a position of that kind who did not do everything humanly possible to avert the calamity would be guilty of criminal negligence.
There were risks in his visit. There was the risk, which materialised, that it would be regarded as an act of weakness. There was another risk which has perhaps materialised, namely, that Herr Hitler would be found not to be a person who could be talked to in a reasonable manner. I concede that. But we have been talking in the Labour party, and I have said repeatedly from platforms, that it is worth while taking risks for peace. Therefore, in spite of those risks, I say that the Prime Minister was justified in making his approach. We ought to be honest about these matters. It has been a commonplace of the Labour party many years that war never settles anything. Some years ago I used to go on platform after platform of the No More War Movement to denounce war as a wicked, cruel, wasteful, utterly futile thing. I used to point, as we all did, to the Versailles Treaty, the result of the sacrifices of millions of men and untold wealth, as a proof of that proposition. I believe that to be true, and although to-day I might modify my absolute attitude as it was then, I still feel that there is a great deal of truth in that.
I have never been a complete pacifist. I am not like my right hon. Friend the Member for Bow and Bromley (Mr. Lansbury). Even in my No-More-War days I refused to join the pacifist movement because I always told the people that although I thought war was wicked and futile, there might come a time when there would be some issue for which I should feel it worth while even to incur again the horrors of war. Therefore, I have never been a complete pacifist. If to-day I were confronted with the hateful decision of having to decide in a stark choice between liberty and fighting, then if there were no other way out, I would
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even now be prepared to fight. Unfortunately, the tragedy of this civilised age is that we are being forced on to the horns of that horrible dilemma. We are having to consider more and more whether we are willing in order to maintain peace to surrender our liberty. It is a very horrible choice, and one which in the civilised world we never ought to have to make. There was a time when we could talk about peace and liberty as if these things went hand in hand. Now, we have a position in which these things almost seem to be in direct opposition. There is no doubt that the responsibility for that fact lies in the rise of the Fascist dictatorships.
Even if I were to decide as a libertarian that this particular case of Czechoslovakia was worth fighting about, that would not be the end of my dilemma. We may all say that we would be prepared to fight for liberty, but the unfortunate fact is, that in fighting for liberty you have to surrender for the time being all the liberty you enjoy. Once you become involved in war, and certainly a war waged on the present nation-wide scale, coercion in all forms is bound to come, and in the waging of that war you have to sacrifice your liberty. Experience has taught me, as it has taught all of us, that once you sacrifice your liberty in that way there is no certainty when it will come back to you. Experience has also taught us that you may engage in a war to defend liberty or in a war to defend some small nation from the brutality of a great oppressor, but once you are in that war there is no telling what the issue of it is going to be.
I am making these observations, which I know are all commonplace, only in order to establish the point that war must be the last and not the first resort of people who believe in liberty. We do not want to lose our balance in these matters. In our hatred of tyranny and our passion for liberty we must not forget how horrible and cruel war is and, what is perhaps even more important, how uncertain its results are. There is one other point I want to make. We are here not in our individual capacity but as representatives of the people and, therefore, when it comes to an issue of war and peace, it is not our own view of the relative values of the issue which should count so much as the views of the people we represent.

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That brings me to the Munich Agreement, and I want to be perfectly frank about it. For the sake of my argument I am going to leave aside those matters about which I have spoken, the errors of policy, and so forth, for which the Government are responsible, and which led to the actual position obtaining at Munich when the Prime Minister went there to meet Herr Hitler. Having got to the position at Munich where the question was whether it was to be the Munich Agreement or war, if that issue was put to me, I say the Munich Agreement before war. I say that for this reason. I speak here as representing the feelings of the people I represent. They live in a very vulnerable area, the East End of London. They certainly are not cowards—far from it. They are good English men and women and they hate international bullying. They hate seeing small nations suffer, but I am bound to say that, even so, such is their horror of war, such is their sense of utter helplessness—no air raid shelters for them against the known and unknown terrors which seemed to be coming upon them—that I should be a hypocrite if I denied that when the news came that this agreement was reached they did not heave a deep and general sigh of thankfulness. I would like to ask any of my colleagues who may differ from this attitude, who is going to sit in judgment on them? Who would dare to take the responsibility for seeing death and destruction rained down upon these helpless people if by any means it could be avoided?
So much for what has happened in recent weeks. As I have said, I entirely agree with the case which has been made out by my colleagues as to the culpability of the Government and the Prime Minister in regard to the situation which has arisen and which made the crisis come upon us. I do not qualify that for a moment. That is a matter of the past, and we are much more concerned about the future. In view of the peril we have just passed through, there is a grave obligation on the Government, and, above all, on every Member who supports the Government, to see that they do everything humanly possible to avoid a recurrence of this peril. There may be a difference of opinion about this. Our Amendment, which has been advocated by the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol, lays down the line—I think it is
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a very sensible line—upon which we suggest the nation should try to work for the future in order to safeguard the peace. As my hon. and learned Friend rightly pointed out, much lip-service has been given to the principle of collective security by the Government itself. I do not stand by methods. Means do not matter so much as the end. What we are concerned with is that we want peace with honour and peace with justice, and if the Government do not think it can be done in this way, let them do it in another way, but let them produce the results. In the hands of the Government at the present time lie the happiness and lives of our people, and it may be, the peoples of other countries, too. I want to make this final observation. The crisis which has welled up has made us all think hard, and it has taught us a good many things. One thing of great value which it has made crystal clear to the governments of the world is the fact that there exists in every country what I may describe as a great raw material for peace in the fear and detestation of war which exists in the hearts and minds of all peoples. It is for those who control the destinies of our people to fashion out of that raw material lying to the hand a barrier for humanity which will be a bulwark against all assaults upon it.
9.25 p.m.
Mr. Harold Nicolson: On Monday in this Debate an hon. Member referred to certain criticisms, or certain remarks, I had made on Saturday last and he implied that those criticisms suggested disrespect to this House. I was horrified when I heard this complaint. I do not think there is a single Member of this House who regards its laws, its conventions and its courtesies with such respect, I might even say with such reverence, as I do myself. When I heard that complaint I was horrified, but my horror was increased when the next day I looked up what I had said and had to admit that my remarks were not only ill-considered but most ill-mannered. I crave pardon. I apologise humbly to the House.
But the context in which I made those most lamentable remarks was itself a serious context. I was trying to convince my audience that at that moment of crisis it was very essential to differentiate and to separate our feelings and emotions from our thoughts. I did not deride those emotions: I shared them myself. They

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were emotions primarily of physical relief; of gratitude; they were emotions of admiration. The Prime Minister has received a very great many tributes during the course of this Debate. I am sure he knows that those tributes are sincere. But those emotions are now past; we must face up to the situation as it really is; we must face it with clear and steady eyes without flinching. And I think, if I may say so without any desire to be provocative, that one of the dangers of not facing the situation without flinching is the danger of trying to escape from it by various devious methods. I think there are many ways of escape. I was very distressed to hear my hon. and gallant Friend on the bench behind me just now trying to escape from the realities of the situation by saying it was all the fault of Czechoslovakia. I think it is most unfortunate that we should allow ourselves to indulge in that form of escape. Indeed I would go further. I would say that it is unfortunate that the Prime Minister in his first statement paid no tribute at all to the attitude of Czechoslovakia. It is true that in his second statement he did refer to ex-President Benes with a certain attitude of approval. But that was not only cold comfort; it was comfort that had been kept so long on the ice that it had lost all its flavour.
There are other forms of escape. There is the suggestion that Czechoslovakia was an artificial State, a fantasy of the Peace Conference. The hon. and gallant Members behind me did not call it an artificial State when they were using its armies to fight the Bolshevists. At that time it was not an artificial State: it was "our gallant allies"; and gallant they were. There are other forms of escape, and one was used by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to-day and by certain other speakers, namely, trying to pretend, or to allow people to suppose, that the whole of this issue, the whole crisis through which we have gone, was simply and solely the question of the Sudeten Germans. The Chancellor of the Exchequer to-day made an admirable speech, an admirable forensic speech, a perfect piece of special pleading, on the assumption that the whole problem was whether certain Germans should join certain other Germans. He entirely evaded the fact that the issue has essentially nothing to do with the Sudeten Germans, nothing to
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do with Czechoslovakia; it is essentially the problem whether we who represent the rule of law are the dominant country in Europe or whether Germany is the dominant country in Europe.
My hon. Friend the Member for South-East Essex (Mr. Raikes), on Monday I think it was, accused me of taking a stand on points of procedure. To me it is not a point of procedure that a small country should be crushed by a great and powerful nation. It is not to me a point of procedure that the Government of this country should reverse the whole principles of policy, if I may quote the phrase of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill), "which were handed down to us for 250 years by the ancient architects of our magnitude and our renown." I would answer my hon. Friend the Member for South-East Essex when he taunted me with making a stand on pure matters of procedure and I would ask him to consider the real issue in these terms. What did Herr Hitler want? Herr Hitler wanted three things. First, he wanted the Sudeten Germans to be included in the Reich. The second thing he wanted was the destruction of Czechoslovakia. The third thing he wanted was to assure the world that Germany was now the dominant Power in Europe. We have given him all those three things.
I am not going into details about the difference between Munich and Godesberg, but let us take the thing from Hitler's point of view. The first thing he wanted was Sudeten Germany. I venture to say I know something about that. I know quite a lot about it because I was one of those unfortunate and most abused people who were on the Committee of the Paris Conference which prepared the clauses of the Treaty of St. Germain by which that frontier was laid down. And I can tell hon. Members that it was not done in ignorance; I myself, for example, travelled to the spot to see where a railway station was. And the problem was almost insoluble at that time. When you talk about the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of St. Germain you do not realise the impossible frame of mind of people at that time. It is one of the gravest evils of war that it produces a state of mind which makes it impossible to consider things impartially. It was quite impossible then to induce people to see anything at all. I remember that on

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that very frontier which is now in our minds spending hours of my time with my American opposite number trying to work out a scheme, which we did work out—and a very good scheme—under which the Eger and Asch areas were given to Germany. We worked that out and we went to our chiefs, who both of them said, "But you are mad. You were going to give Germany territory for having made war against us. This was never German territory. Germany will come out of this war with an acquisition of territory in Bohemia." And, of course, it was impossible to get it through.
But I do beg Members of this House when they indulge in these facile gibes at the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of St. Germain to remember that this House was as much to blame as anybody. Those who were Members of this House at that time will remember that when my right hon. Friend—and I shall always call him that—the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) in March, 1919, tried very hard to force on Clemenceau a modification of the Treaty terms and the Treaty of Peace which had then been drafted, he received from this House a telegram saying that he was "spoiling the Germans." I think it was a harmful action on the part of Members of the House to sign that telegram; and I do not think they should be allowed to get away with it, to say that it was all due to the ignorance at Versailles and that they are completely white and innocent in their own absolute irresponsibility for these acts. But, although I know the appalling economic difficulties, although I know how difficult we found it because of transport, markets and communications to cut that thousand year-old frontier, yet in spite of that, and in spite of my sympathy for minorities, I would have accepted the Anglo-French plan, with unutterable sadness it is true, but with resignation. It was not worth a war. Certainly, of Herr Hitler's three points, I would have given him the first.
Then we come to the second point. Why did Herr Hitler want to destroy Czechoslovakia? In the first place, Czechoslovakia was a barrier to his "Drang nach Osten." Secondly, it was an advance post in the case of any Russian attack upon Germany. We know that. Thirdly, it represented to the Little Entente, to all the little Powers, the Baltic States, and even to the smaller
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Powers to the west, the successful democratic State. It was the only successful democratic State that had arisen from the War, and it meant not only a strategical danger to Germany, but a moral and political danger in the sense that it was an example of the perfect democratic State. Whatever may be said to the contrary, that was true. Germany loathed the thought that on her borders was not merely a country which was perfectly organised in the event of war, but a country which was making a success, in spite of its minorities and the artificiality which hon. Members behind me always quote, of democratic institutions in Central Europe. Germany was determined to destroy it. I would have resisted that second point. I should almost have been prepared to go to the point of war to demonstrate, I hope, that it was not possible for one country in Europe, a large country, to crush another country in Europe, a small country, and to find us indifferent. I should have wished to demonstrate that.
I suppose that the Government say, "We have done that—there is the guarantee." That guarantee is the most farcical piece of diplomatic hypocrisy that has ever been perpetrated. Why was the guarantee put in? The House knows very well that it was put in for this reason alone, to cover up the nasty difficulty of having to say to Czechoslovakia that she had to give up her alliance with Russia and her alliance with France. The moment you dictate the foreign policy of a country, it means that that country has to give up its independence, and therefore, in order to make it sound nice, a general neutralised guarantee is given to Czechoslovakia, and under that, of course, the two alliances lapse. For that reason, in its origin, the guarantee was hypocrisy, but in its effects it is equally hypocritical. It is quite unworkable. The right hon. Gentleman the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence said last night, "Oh, but we regard it as a moral obligation." But he does not yet know to what that obligation extends. What is Czechoslovakia? At the very moment the right hon. Gentleman was making his speech, the Poles were advancing further; at that very moment the Hungarians were preparing the actual lines which they were going to occupy; at that very moment messages were passing between Warsaw and Budapest discussing whether or not

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they should take Ruthenia. Guarantee, moral obligation—what does it mean? Are we going to oppose the Poles and the Hungarians? While we were discussing and talking as though this was something that we had given to Czechoslovakia in return for the dreadful blow we have struck her, the Poles—with an action which can only be compared to those ghouls in the Middle Ages who used to strip the wounded on the battlefield—were advancing and refusing to receive our protests; and at that very moment the Hungarians also were advancing. No, I do not regard the guarantee as a possible workable arrangement or as any alleviation of our hypocritical dealings with regard to Czechoslovakia.
I come now to the third point. It is most important to put Hitler's three desires in this gradation, because the whole weight of the Government defence in this matter may be said to be, "Would you fight to prevent No. 1?" It is not No. 1, but Nos. 2 and 3; and No. 3 is the domination of Europe by Germany. That is the essential thing, the thing which we ought to have resisted, the thing which we still ought to resist; the thing which I am now afraid it is now too late to resist. I do not think that every Member of the Government can be quite sincere when he manages to hide from his conscience what this defeat, this humiliating defeat, this terrible Munich retreat, means to the fortunes and future position of this country. I cannot believe that any man who has any real feeling for the authority and independence of this country can regard that Munich capitulation as anything but one of the most disastrous episodes that has ever occurred in our history. By that capitulation we allow Herr Hitler to make it perfectly clear to the whole world, or at least to the whole of Europe, that the dominant Power in Europe to-day is not Great Britain, but is Berlin—or rather the Fuhrerhaus in Munich.
At this very moment, as we are talking here, the countries of Europe, such as Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, which look to us, which looked to us with an almost passionate longing, hoping that we would do something, that we should show some strength and resolution in order to save them from the appalling menace, are probably drawing up trade treaties with
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Germany, thinking that now they have to make their terms. The tiger is showing his teeth,; the cage door is open; the keeper is gone; and they must make their terms. As we are discussing here, Herr Funk, the Reich trade commissioner is speeding in the Orient Express straight to Ankara, not stopping on the way, for he knows that is all right, but going straight to Turkey, and beginning at the far end. He is a wise man. There is a trade treaty being negotiated under threats between Estonia and Germany under which Estonia is to buy only German goods in return for the sale of Estonian goods to Germany. We have given away not merely Czechoslovakia, not merely the Sudeten Germans, but we have given away the whole key to Europe.
I know it may be said that it will take a long time to digest. I do not think so. I think that the digestion of the Third Reich is like that of the iron maid of Nuremberg, absolutely ostrich-like in its character. I think it will take about three months before they have tied that silken noose of trade agreements round every State that either borders on or is influenced by Germany. Within three months they will have put them in such a position that they cannot possibly afford—unless we make an effort which I do not see ourselves capable of making—to resist any German pressure against their putting the whole of their resources at the disposal of Germany.
I do ask the House, if they think that this is some sort of Foreign Office bogy about Germany getting control of South-East Europe, to realise that in a few months the Rhine-Main Canal will have been completed and Germany will be able to offer transport freights across Europe at prices which will cut out any other form of communication or transport. In a few months Germany will be in a position to have the whole trade of Europe in a stranglehold. That is not a bogy. That is not a phantasy. It is an absolute fact and it shows what we have given away at Munich. But the Prime Minister says, "I have this paper"—the paper which he waved when he arrived, as he said, bringing peace with honour. He says, "I have made this arrangement with Hitler." I am not going into the question of whether that bit of paper is valuable or not or of whether Herr Hitler will keep his promise or not. That has already been dealt with very well by hon.

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Members both opposite and on this side of the House.
I only want hon. Members to realise that that paper, which at first was regarded as containing an offer of future peace, now seems to be regarded rather as a little after dinner extravaganza somewhat like the extravaganza when the Kaiser met the Czar of Russia and signed the Treaty of Björkoe. But whether that paper is taken seriously or not in this country, the fact remains that its effect abroad is going to be tremendous. People abroad are going to say, "This is the first time in the history of the British people for 250 years in which openly, avowedly and dramatically they have made friends with the strong as against the weak." For 250 years at least the great foundation of our foreign policy, what Sir Eyre Crowe called "a law of nature," has been to prevent by every means in our power the domination of Europe by any single Power or group of Powers. That principle has necessarily had the corollary that we should always support the small Powers against the strong. By that paper signed lightly, happily perhaps, tragically for certain, in the late hours of the morning, the Prime Minister of Great Britain put his signature to a statement that that policy after 250 years had been abandoned.
The effect of that on the small Powers will be galvanic. I do not mean to say that it is going to affect their public opinion at once because their Press is so frightened of saying anything against Germany; but in what used to be called the Chancelleries of Europe the effect of that announcement will be to cause them to say at once, "We must make terms with Germany." I, therefore, feel that with all the excellent intentions, all the admirable courage and all the lonely dignity which the Prime Minister displayed, he showed a lack of understanding of foreign mentality, and a lack, possibly, of recognition that the great traditions of our policy which had been followed by various parties and various Governments for 250 years are probably based upon something more than the Foreign Office manner.
I know that in these days of realism those of us who try to keep our election pledges are told that we are disloyal to the party. The actual expression used to me was "You must not bat against your own side." As if it were a game
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of cricket that was being played in this most revered Assembly. I know that those of us who try to be consistent are accused of having "one-track" minds, I know that in these days of realism principles are considered as rather eccentric and ideals are identified with hysteria. I know that those of us who believe in the traditions of our policy, who believe in the precepts which we have inherited from our ancestors, who believe that one great function of this country is to maintain moral standards in Europe, to maintain a settled pattern of international relations, not to make friends with people whose conduct is demonstrably evil, not to go out of our way to make friends with them but to set up some sort of standard by which the smaller Powers can test what is good in international conduct and what is not—I know that those who hold such beliefs are accused of possessing the Foreign Office mind. I thank God that I possess the Foreign Office mind. For those reasons I share with my right hon. Friend the Member for St. George's, Westminster (Mr. Cooper) a very profound distrust of the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government.
9.51 p.m.
Mr. Wise: The hon. Member for West Leicester (Mr. H. Nicolson) said that although this Debate had started over the question of Czechoslovakia there was a greater question, namely, when, if ever, we should stand firmly in the path of the dictator. From his statement I gathered that the hon. Member was prepared to fight in order to stop Germany providing cheap transport from the Danube Basin to the North Sea. How he can reconcile that statement even with the Foreign Office manner, is a curious mystery which only he can solve. He also told us that out of Herr Hitler's three points he was prepared to agree to No. 1; that he would not have gone to war over No. 2, but that he would have fought to the last ditch for No. 3. I hope he would have been prepared to assure the relatives of the deceased what a valuable thing No. 3 was. He also said that he was prepared to accept the Anglo-French plan, but he is as well aware as I am, of the differences between the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-French plan, and can he really conscientiously say that those differences are worth a million Englishmen?

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We are debating a very serious and important matter. We have had what has possibly been the most strenuous diplomatic three weeks since the Great War and I believe there is a chance that we are at the beginning of an establishment of friendly relations again in Europe. It was only when listening to the hon. Member for West Leicester that I realised how much alive the spirit of Versailles still is, the spirit of which he to-day is the most eloquent living embodiment, and, unfortunately, being the most eloquent, the most dangerous. The opinions expressed by hon. Members opposite are not one-half as dangerous as those expressed by the hon. Member and they were not so well expressed. Indeed listening to some of the speeches, even from the Front Bench opposite, I felt that the new decorations of the House had tempted them to think that they were in the homely surroundings of Hyde Park particularly when we had violent orations—or rather rants—against every form of government which is slightly unpopular with the party opposite.
We hear them asserting, as I gather they still assert, that when these demands were presented by Herr Hitler for the absorption of the Sudeten areas into Germany, our duty was to have collected together what I believe they call the friends of peace in order to have an enthusiastic war, that we ought to have assembled the Czechs, who, poor souls, would have been massacred out of hand before help could reach them, that we ought to have assembled France who, I think, would reasonably enough have been unwilling to have engaged in a fantastic and impossible attack upon an impregnable citadel, and that we ought to have assembled Russia, who have been kept in such admirable practice by executions in their own country and who would have come on to the field hot from the slaughter of nearly all their own officers, so useful an ally that their transport system now is worse than it was in 1914 and their rolling stock over 20 years old. What other allies, what other friends of peace, were we to assemble? Poland, who is now regaining, by possibly questionable means, what was taken from her by means just as questionable?
Mr. H. Nicolson: It was a perfectly honourably negotiated treaty, between
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Paderewski and ex-President Benes, made in 1920, when there was no war.
Mr. Wise: It was done in 1920, as far as I remember, but the taking of other areas took place when Poland was engaged in a war with Russia. I do not think the Poles can altogether be blamed for getting back a little of their own. Indeed, the whole lesson of these last few weeks has been to show that always nations will try to get their own back when they feel that they have been harshly or unjustly treated. There is no question that the Sudeten Germans have suffered grievances. There is also no question that nobody took any notice of their grievances, nor was any suggestion to redress them made, until the big brother across the border was big enough to enforce their demands I believe that the only way out of this impasse is to do what the Prime Minister is, in fact, doing, namely, to ignore the ideological differences between various countres in Europe and to see whether it is not a little better to endeavour to meet as reasonable beings, to discuss joint problems as reasonable beings, rather than to profess profound love for the German people and indulge in the most virulent abuse of those who control their destinies.
I cannot hold that the Opposition have sufficiently clean hands in this matter to endeavour or dare to embark upon censure of His Majesty's Government. I remember well, not so many years ago, the assistance which they were giving to the strengthening of the hands of this country, when they learned, doubtless from their party managers, that their opposition to rearmament was electorally unpopular, and now they are eating their words with a remarkable recklessness of indigestion. But it was only two years ago that the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps), who demanded this afternoon such magnificently strong action for collective security, was making the admirable and amiable suggestion that his party should do all in their power to stop recruiting for the armed forces. That was his contribution towards the collective system which hon. Members opposite like so much.
I can remember the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition at about the same time saying that in no circumstances were they going to vote in support of the Government's rearmament

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programme, because, I believe the official excuse was, it was not to be used for collective security, but only for the defence of English men, women, and children.
Mr. Attlee: Is the hon. Member professing to quote me? If so, I should like him to quote me correctly.
Mr. Wise: I do not think it is very widely different from what the right hon. Gentleman said.
Hon. Members: Withdraw.
Mr. Wise: I cannot withdraw a statement which I think was perfectly sound, but I am prepared to let the right hon. Gentleman give me his version of what he said.
Mr. Attlee: I ask the hon. Member to do what any hon. Gentleman would do in this House. If he is not prepared to produce that quotation—and I have no recollection of it—he should withdraw it.
Mr. Wise: I cannot produce it to-night, but I will undertake to produce it to the right hon. Gentleman to-morrow morning—the time and date of the quotation. If I cannot find the time and date, I will gladly withdraw what I said. I have already overstayed my time, but I think I have left no doubt in the minds of the House in which Lobby I shall be found.
10.2 p.m.
Mr. D. Grenfell: I would ask the hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Wise) to remember the implications of his suggestion against the Leader of the Opposition, and I would ask him to say to-morrow morning whether he favours the use of British arms only to save the lives of his fellow-countrymen, and whether, in that suggestion, he is prepared to admit that that would cut us out of the possibility of alliances or of joint military action with any other nation in the world. I think he has done a thing which is generally regarded as outside the rules of good Parliamentary conduct in this House, and I hope that to-morrow morning he will be manly enough to admit his fault, because I believe he ought to have apologised to the House.
I do not propose to-night to go into details. It is difficult to find anything really new to say after three days' Debate on this subject, but I feel sure that the
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House will admit that it would have been a great advantage if this Debate had been held before the conferences abroad and if the Government and the House had been brought face to face over the tremendous issues that the recent settlement involved. The House of Commons now knows much more about the results of any conversations or any settlement abroad than it did a month ago, and Members in all parts of the House, I feel sure, would have welcomed the opportunity of hearing what the House thinks and, through the House, what the nation thinks, with regard to the possibilities of making peaceful or other changes in Europe.
I do not dispute for a moment the main claim of the Government, the claim upon which they base their Motion to-day, that the country was relieved very much last week when we found that we were not to be involved in a European war. It is usual—indeed, it goes without exception—that nations, after a long and exhausting war, rejoice at the advent of peace and the cessation of hostilities, but on this occasion there was perhaps a significant change. The nations of Europe showed no exaltation at all at the prospect of war. Neither Germany nor Italy showed any popular exaltation, and there was no rejoicing because the armies were moving. France and Britain faced up to the situation, grimly determined to see it through in the last days, but when it was found that the armies were not to move and that there was to be no European war we found a sign of increasing pacifism. We found a great joy coming into the hearts of men that this bitter experience of war was not to be required of them. We should console ourselves with that manifestation, but I am not quite satisfied that what has been described as "peace for our time" is really a lasting peace or a peace that has any prospect of permanence or lasting satisfaction.
The people of Europe a week ago did not quite appreciate the conditions under which the so-called peace was obtained. They know very much more to-day and there is much heart-searching and much anxiety now regarding the effect of the Agreement at Munich and the various conferences which have taken place. I think that we ought to say this and it ought to come from Members in all parts of the House. We owe the very anxious suspense, the strain and the criminal assault on the world's conscience to those

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who have repudiated and scorned civilised ideals. A terrifying realisation came upon the people a week ago of the purpose of dictatorship. One man decided to mobilise German arms to demand possession of his neighbour's land by force. His will has prevailed. There is no doubt about that. The Chancellor of the Exchequer strongly pronounced that it is Herr Hitler's will which has prevailed in Europe. Nobody else has had the satisfaction of having the smallest real concessions made to him.
Herr Hitler risked a war on the assumption that this country would not engage in hostilities to defend Czechoslovakia. The German people did not want to fight. Germany did not want to fight. There is a story told of the general staff, that they were opposed to taking the field. Hitler told the German generals, "You get on with your job, you get on to the field. I know my job. I know I can get Czechoslovakia without war." It is highly important that we should know the grounds upon which Herr Hitler based that confidence. Something has been said in the Debate about the apparatus of crisis. I say that Herr Hitler developed a crisis, created a situation which led to the present circumstances. I feel sure that we ought to know something about the events before Berchtesgaden, before Godesberg and before Munich. Herr Hitler based his assurance that there would be no conflict with Britain upon communications from this country. He and his emissaries and his friends and his friends' friends have often met and have had conversations, the subject of which has been Czechoslovakia. Have these reports in the American papers no basis, reports in which the Prime Minister himself was involved, about conversations in Germany?
This House should know that meddlesome, mischievous persons, consorting and conspiring against the interests of this country, made a very difficult situation for any official negotiators. The Prime Minister knows well enough that his efforts have been compromised. I feel he must know. When he went to meet Herr Hitler for the first time, did he know that Herr Hitler relied upon British opinion and the British Government not to make too much fuss about Czechoslovakia? Was not that known to
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the Foreign Office? Had the Prime Minister himself conceived the possibility of a compromise on this point before he went to Germany? We have not been told by the Prime Minister where he first derived the idea that this settlement could only be achieved by self-determination. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has examined this term "self-determination" at some length to-day, and he knows quite well that it is only a temporary verbal resurrection to enable Herr Hitler to put his demands in international currency. The idea has always been present in Hitler's mind. It was known to everybody, it was known to the German people and to people all over the world except, as the hon. Member for the Abbey Division of Westminster (Sir S. Herbert) said last night, the Members of the Government on the Front Bench. I myself have been told that Herr Hitler was to get Czechoslovakia with the consent of the British Government. I have been told by German people. It was understood, and they were surprised to find there might be any opposition in this country after what they had been told by Herr Hitler's friends and his friends' friends who have talked this matter over. There was never any doubt about what Herr Hitler wanted. It was not self-determination. That is a formula for which he has the utmost contempt. The result is not self-determination.
The fact is that democracy has suffered a cruel defeat. Czechoslovakia will pay the first bitter instalment of the cost. The next bill will be presented elsewhere. No one knows the dimensions of that bill or to whom it will be addressed. We are only beginning a series of payments and fines because democracy has lost its prestige and lost its authority in the world. Czechoslovakia is being cut up. With the German Army quartered inside that country, the situation is deteriorating hour by hour. Dr. Benes is universally acclaimed as the first gentleman in Europe. This little man, whom I had the pleasure of meeting and speaking to in his own residence in Prague, has in the last three or four weeks borne a burden heavier than that ever borne by any statesman in Europe before. The dignity, the precision of mind, the address, the spirit which he has maintained entitle him to be ranked as one of the greatest men that history has

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known. This little man has now resigned the presidency. He is no longer President of Czechoslovakia, the country for which he has done so much, the country which he has honoured and which has honoured him for many years.
The various Provinces have urged to break away. What will be left of self-determination for Czechoslovakia? There has been no self-determination for Sudeten-Germans. Those Germans, as German as Herr Hitler himself, Germans of pure race and of pure speech, who do not agree with Herr Hitler in politics, have not been conceded the right of self-determination. They are being told already, with the German army in occupation, that there is to be only one political party in Czechoslovakia. There is no self-determination for the Sudeten-Germans. Persecution, intimidation, assault, imprisonment—all these await Sudeten-Germans, to the number of 500,000, who have dared to be Social Democracts and not supporters of the Nazi rÉgime. There is to be no self-determination for the Czechs, those very gallant people who are willing to risk all to avoid being enslaved, a very natural instinct of self-preservation which has been lauded in poetry, in song and in prose in every language in the world. It is a patriotism that prefers death to dishonour.
I am a Welshman and I know patriotism. We have a phrase almost as old, perhaps, as the hills of our native country which I will risk repeating in this House, despite the disabilities of my people under the British rule. That phrase goes:
"Gwell angau na chywilydd."
"Better death than dishonour." That forms part of my language, it is part of my tradition, and I can sympathise with those gallant people who are willing, in the face of overwhelming odds, to stand as men have stood before and shed their blood that the people may be free when they themselves are dead and gone. The willingness to make that sacrifice has been denied to them. They are asked not to indulge in this proud act of self-immolation, but to refrain from exercising this privilege of men for the sake of the peace of Europe, and they are rewarded with a threat of extermination with the certainty almost of the complete dissolution of their collective life. They are to be invaded from the north and from the south unless
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they come to an agreement with those who claim further lands not mentioned in the various agreements.
The Poles on the north and the Hungarians on the south have expressed a desire to have a common frontier. When they come together there will be no intervening Czechoslovakian territory. The Czechs will be there and the Slovaks will be there, but living under foreign rule. That right of self-determination will be denied to them because the guarantees do not come into operation until after the Poles and the Hungarians have had their additional bites of Czech territory. There is no self-determination for anybody. It is a complete betrayal of everybody except those people who have accepted Herr Hitler's doctrines and his power to control their very lives. I do not know what power this International Commission possesses. I wish somebody with the legal knowledge of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequr—perhaps he will pass on his knowledge to the next speaker—would tell us what real power the Commission possesses. Can it defend Czechoslovakia from further invasion or from deliberate internal disruption? When and in what circumstances are the guarantees to operate? Are they military guarantees? Could we be bound, possibly, to guarantee the integrity and the boundaries of a creation of Nazi Germany on the site of old Czechoslovakia? May we be bound to protect Nazi territory under the guarantees agreed upon at Munich?
The Minister of Transport gave us a lesson yesterday in geography. He probably has a very good knowledge of the geography of our own country since he has ridden about in it so much in his car. I do not know whether his geography of Europe is quite as accurate, but we will accept his geography. He told us yesterday that we could not possibly have helped Czechoslovakia because of the geographical situation of the country, its distance from the Baltic and the Adriatic and from the French frontier and the Russian frontier. This is possibly a subject which he knows very well, but how can be reconcile that statement of yesterday with the possibility of our now guaranteeing the Czech frontier? The fortifications have all passed into German hands. There are no guns and no positions, no mountain ranges and no national frontiers of any kind. How can anyone

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guarantee the existence of a frontier or of a territory divided on the lines of the Munich Agreement?
I would like to picture Czechoslovakia as I see it, day by day falling into more disorder. It is not simply that 3,250,000 Sudeten Germans are to be taken over. There are some regions where the percentage of Sudeten Germans is from 80 to 90 of the population, while in the next departments the percentage of Germans may be 60 or 70. In other counties the percentage will be 25 or 30. There will be islands, or an archipelago of islands, of these people, in varying proportions. It is not 3,250,000 Sudeten Germans have gained liberty and have been taken under German rule; an equal number of other people have been taken, against their will, under the duress of a government which they detest and fear in their very bones. Poland and Hungary are to be allowed time, three months or six months, and although there will be negotiations it will not be negotiations between equals. The status of the Czechs has been lost in all negotiations.
Under the Munich Agreement, for which the Prime Minister shares responsibility with the other three persons who signed the Agreement, there may be self-determination for Sudetens and Slovaks, but not for the Czechs. If an area nearly as large as England and Wales, having 54,000 square miles and a population of nearly 15,000,000, is transferred to German control, Germany will be the master and will control the industrial life and organise the transport and the trade. This will be an addition to the number of Germans in the German Reich for practical purposes. We shall hand over to them military resources very substantial, including the most efficient munition factories in Europe. German military resources will be increased by probably 40 per cent. for the next two years by the acquisition of this area, whether directly under German rule or not, with the possibility, before many months have passed over Eastern Europe, of Nazi control over adjoining countries, including Rumania.
I have been twice to Czechoslovakia. I have been to their mines, and have gone underground and talked to the work-people, and I was just as comfortable and happy and contented to speak to those people as if I went down an English, Scottish or Welsh mine. These people are in
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dread of the transfer that is now taking place in their country. But Germany cannot afford for any sentimental reason to refuse to avail herself of this rich prize of the Czechoslovakian coal mines. The best mines in Central Europe will fall into German hands, and her coal production can easily be increased by 30,000,000 tons a year when the transfer has been made. Then there are the ironworks. Germany now manufactures 20,000,000 tons of steel, as against the British production of about 12,000,000 tons, and the German productive capacity in iron and steel will be increased by 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 tons by the transfer of this property. There are also the textile industry, the glass industry and the pottery industry of Czechoslovakia. It is a very highly industrialised country, and its people are people of great industrial skill, very industrious and methodical in their habits. All this goes over to Germany, and these people, who are turned out of power in their own country, will have to live under German rule.
If the Prime Minister can help to prevent the development of the more distressful picture I have in mind, I personally shall be very grateful for intervention on his part, but I do not think he can. The pass has been handed over. Herr Hitler was given the keys of Eastern Europe at Munich, and he will open the door and make his own way, with the Munich Agreement as his passport, right to the Black Sea. These people will endure misery, for what misery can be greater than to be pointed to every day as members of a defeated race, a race looked upon with contempt? These rules may be all right in the Foreign Offices of different countries, but when you come to the point of contact they do not feel so well. The Czechs will suffer because they will be subject to the new tyranny in Europe, to which we have made concessions and submissions which I fear will bring us later face to face with the requirement of more concessions from ourselves than even the Czechs have been compelled to make for the sake of the peace of Europe.
Will hon. Members consider what would Scotland look like with the Clydeside area detached from it, with the people who like there driven out of their own country and compelled to live in the north, in the Grampians or the Western Islands, while the Clydeside and

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Lanark coalfields and shipyards were made available for the use of newcomers and denied to the people of Scotland? What would Wales look like if Glamorgan, Monmouth and Carmarthenshire were taken away, and the Welsh people of those counties told to go and find a livelihood in other parts of the country where the land is poor and insufficient for their sustenance? You cannot paint a picture too gloomy to represent the truth of this matter.
The first lesson I would like the people to learn is the lesson of non-intervention. Why do irresponsible and unrepresentative people meddle in the international affairs of our country? Why should these people presume to express their opinion? They have no authority to represent the mind of our people. I would be saying a foolish thing if I professed to have more patriotism than anybody else, but I resent the idea that there should be any misrepresentation of my country to its detriment. It is a scandal. There is talk about national unity. Can I, with my antecedents, be united with people who have no regard at all for freedom? I found myself with nothing but a good home and good parents. I found myself in a Radical household, with a tradition of freedom and a tradition of right, and I have developed a passion for that freedom. I want to express it in the public life of the country of which I am proud; and I would never contemplate betraying that country, even for my right hand.
I am convinced that the time has come for a larger, wider view of human relations than that expressed in the narrow limits of nationalism. The world has shrunk so small, there have been so many changes, that we must adapt ourselves to the idea of co-operation. We must learn to live with other people in a state of free exchange and free and mutual co-operation. The world in future must be one where national claims are not so strongly emphasised. I am certain Herr Hitler is leading his people to ruin and disaster, because he is assuming that the German people have a prior claim to the earth. There is no prior claim. There is as much history behind each individual and each nation. We are responsible for making the best of the short life available to us. Over and over again have we called attention to the need for adjustments and peaceful change. You cannot
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stop short at a national frontier, and line the frontier with guns and bayonets and say that you have been building protection for the people inside. All that has been changed, and we have to devise a way for all the nations of Europe.
I believe I know what the world needs. It needs co-operation. And no one can make a larger single contribution in this world, with 100 sovereign states, large and small, than the United States of America, with its vast resources, its wonderful industrial equipment, its implements, its wealth, its energy. The United States of America must be brought in. A special invitation should be sent to that country. Russia, with its great experiments, not so successful as we would have liked even with its frequent mistakes and its dictatorial or totalitarian tendencies, which we do not like a bit, cannot be excluded from the community of nations.
We ought to make a special declaration. The Amendment calls upon the Government to take the initiative and to invite these people to look upon Europe as it was last week, as it is to-day, and as it will be, more dangerous still a few months from now. Let us not be too proud to call upon these nations, one and all, to come in and join with us to try and make the world safe for democracy. We stand in perhaps greater danger than any European country. This country cannot feed itself for more than three days a week. We are dependent upon international trade, and upon peace so that trade can be carried on, and we must make our contribution. We have to give and take. I call upon Members on all sides of the House to join with us in this departure to try to achieve security not by our efforts alone, but by the aid of other nations seeking the same solution.
10.37 p.m.
The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Butler): It has often been my lot to follow a speech of the same type of passionate sincerity as that which has been made by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Gower (Mr. Grenfell). In due course I hope to make my contribution to the rebuilding of peace which he has asked us all to do. During this difficult time I have had rather a strange experience in that my duty has taken me abroad to Geneva, where I have been at work the whole of the time. It has been,

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indeed, a strange experience to miss the anxiety and tension, and, finally, the great relief which followed that tension and anxiety. We had our share living in the international atmosphere of Geneva, but I missed something very great through not being in this country. I arrived back in time to see this period of stocktaking or of criticism, and I have tried to understand it from the criticisms in the course of the Debate of the last three days. One cannot have been other than impressed by its depth and feeling. I find that there is a difference of opinion on all sides of the House and that sentiments have been so strong that they have not followed, in particular, the ordinary party channels. We have had speeches from the hon. Member for Shoreditch (Mr. Thurtle), the hon. Member for Barnstaple (Mr. Acland) and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North-West Hull (Sir A. Lambert-Ward), which must have impressed us all, and certainly did not follow the orthodox lines we might have expected. I think the situation is best described in a leading article in to-day's "Daily Telegraph," which thanks the Government for the opportunity that we have here to discuss these matters in Parliament and stresses the value of parliamentary discussion at the present time. These words are used:
"Into the parliamentary channel can be poured the long-pent stream of feeling and reflection which seeks self-expression."
That is what we are experiencing here during this Debate. Do not let us in the course of this Parliamentary criticism lose what was most precious in that time of relief, the signs of national unity in a time of crisis and the unanimity of feeling amongst all classes of the people that war must be avoided if it possibly can be.
I have said that during this difficult time my task has been abroad. One experience I was able to gain there was to appreciate the immense prestige of the Prime Minister and of this country as it stands abroad at the present time. One advantage of being at Geneva is that one is in close touch with the representatives of about 49 nations, and not only there but in messages which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has authorised me to make public, it is clear in what remarkable prestige my right hon. Friend and this country stand to-
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day. Let me take examples from some of the small nations which were quoted by my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) to whom, as he said, we should rightly attach great importance. M. Spaak, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Belgium, in a message to my right hon. Friend said that, speaking on behalf of the whole Belgian nation, he had received innumerable messages from Belgian municipalities and others expressing their admiration and gratitude for the action of the Prime Minister. I can tell the House also that Monsieur Motta, Foreign Affairs Member of the Swiss Federal Council, in more than one conversation with myself asked me to send similar messages to my right hon. Friend.
Take one of the small countries which are said to be rushing precipitately into the arms of Germany—I mean Rumania. Our Minister at Bucharest has reported to us that the whole of the Rumanian Press echoes the public opinion in Rumania expressing unbounded relief at the disappearance of the danger of war, and unstinted admiration and gratitude to the Prime Minister for his indefatigable determination to achieve a peace settlement. Does that show that there is no appreciation from the smaller nations? We know what scenes have occurred in the French Chamber, and we know that tomorrow this House will show to the world its approval of the action of the Prime Minister. We know of the satisfactory effect that has been produced on public opinion in the United States of America, to which the hon. Member opposite referred in his speech. One does get some benefit in living in an international atmosphere in a time of crisis like this.
The issue before us in this Debate is whether he could have achieved any alternative settlement or any alternative result. The right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) asked whether we could not have achieved a different result through diplomatic channels earlier in the year. Let me assure him that those in the Government who have had this terrible responsibility have taken every possible step that was open to them at Prague and Berlin during the whole time in order to try and reach a satisfactory solution. At the critical stage, as everybody knows, a mediator was sent, British observers were sent and, finally, the

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British Prime Minister himself went when events were overtaking him, to save from the wreck the peace that we now enjoy.
It was difficult when examining the pressure of events to foresee any alternative to either war, which thank God we have not got, or a settlement imposed by Germany. I maintain, and I am sure the House will agree with me, that we should have been far worse off under either alternative. I must confess that I was very much moved by the description from Czechoslovakia brought back by the hon. Member for Barnstaple (Mr. Acland). We must all have been impressed by his account. If we study the history of the Thirty Years' War we find that it is in this part of Europe that some of the worst horrors and cruelties in history have taken place, and we must ask ourselves whether the situation would not have been far worse with either of the other alternatives—war or an imposed settlement. They certainly would have been worse, and we must be thankful that, terrible as certain things may be, they are not worse at the present time.
The right hon. Member for Epping referred to the fine army of Bohemia. Where would that Army be now if war had been declared? Its state would have been worse than it is. If we had had war could we have rebuilt the Czech State in exactly the same manner as it was built by the Treaty of Versailles had we been victorious? We must examine some of the writings of the hon. Member for West Leicester (Mr. H. Nicolson), who has been described in this Debate as an eloquent and living embodiment of the Treaty of Versailles. In his book on "Peacemaking," in 1919, he says:
"I am anxious about the future political complexity of the Czech State if they have to digest solid enemy electorates."
That is precisely the trouble which the Czech State has had to undergo. We must realise, I think, that it is extremely difficult, probably certain, that we should not have been able to re-establish the Czech State in exactly the same manner as we saw it before. I should like to pay a tribute to the manner in which the Czechs themselves have got over these undoubted difficulties, but I doubt very much whether any better settlement could have been achieved under the pressure of recent events.
The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton) asked the Home Secretary a
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question about a statement made by Professor Seton Watson to which I should like to give him a full answer. He asked whether a certain communication made by the British Government on 21st September was in the terms as set out by Professor Seton Watson and he gave four points which he said Professor Seton Watson had stated that the message contained. I propose—and I am authorised to do so—to read the telegram sent by my Noble Friend to our Minister at Prague which included our instructions on this occasion, and I hope it will answer his point. It is dated 21st September.
Mr. Dalton: The demarche was made at 2 a.m. on 21st September.
Mr. Butler: This is dated 21st September, 1.20 a.m.:
"You should at once join with your French colleague in pointing out to the Czechoslovak Government that their reply in no way meets the critical situation which the Anglo-French proposals were designed to avert and if adhered to would, when made public, in our opinion, lead to an immediate German invasion. You should urge the Czech Government to withdraw this reply and urgently consider an alternative that takes account of realities. The Anglo-French proposals remain, in our view, the only chance of avoiding an immediate German attack. On the basis of the reply now under consideration I would have no hope of any useful result ensuing for a second visit to Herr Hitler and the Prime Minister would be obliged to cancel the arrangements for it. We therefore beg the Czech Government to consider urgently and seriously before producing a situation for which we could take no responsibility. We should of course have been willing to put the Czech proposal for arbitration before the German Government if we had thought that at this stage there was any chance of its receiving favourable consideration, but we cannot for a moment believe that it would be acceptable now. Nor do we think that the German Government would regard the present proposition as one that is capable of being settled by arbitration as the Czech Government suggest. If on reconsideration the Czech Government feel bound to reject our advice they must of course be free to take any action they think appropriate to meet the situation that may thereafter develop."
In reading that authentic telegram I maintain that we do not recognise the points which were present in Professor Seton Watson's analysis, and in particularly the last two which, he said, the message contained, namely:
"(3) By refusing, Czechoslovakia will also be guilty of destroying Anglo-French solidarity, since in that event Britain will under no circumstances march even if France went to the aid of Czechoslovakia.

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(4) If the refusal should provoke war France gives official notice that she will not fulfil her treaty obligations."
In dealing with the Amendment which has been moved from the Opposition side, and in particular with the eloquent speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Greenwood) to-day, I notice we are asked to show
"an active support of the method of collective security through the League of Nations, and the immediate initiation by His Majesty's Government of proposals for the summoning of a world conference to consider the removal of economic and political grievances which imperil peace."
My right hon. Friend the Member for Epping said that we have destroyed and dissipated the vast system of the League. I only wish I could have seen my right hon. Friend striding up and down in his inimitable way the lobbies of that splendid new Palace of Peace at Geneva. I did see my hon. Friend the Member for the English Universities (Mr. Harvey), whom I see nodding his head over there. I have been, if I may say so, in the engine room of the League, and those who work there realise that they very seldom see the light of day. I have been studying the machinery of the League at close quarters, and I have found it extremely difficult and extremely hard work. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer showed the great difficulty of using Article XIX at the present time owing to the necessity under the Covenant of the unanimity rule. We have had a striking experience this year. The British delegation proposed that the unanimity rule should be waived in its application to the first paragraph of Article XI. We were unable to get unanimity on that. Two nations voted against us, and II nations abstained, with the result that our proposal to make the machinery of the League more easy of application in time of difficulty fell to the ground in what we thought very regrettable circumstances. That is a practical example of the British Government taking the lead to try to make this machinery work more rapidly in time of danger by suggesting that the unanimity rule should be waived only to this extent that the parties to the dispute should not by their vote be able to block action under that particular section of the Article.
It may be said by hon. Members opposite and in particular by those who
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know the Covenant well that Article XVII might have been used on this occasion if hostilities had broken out. If we examine that we find that under Article XVII the machinery which comes into operation in the event of a crisis is that of Article XVI, and what is the actual position under Article XVI at the present time? We find that the northern nations have said that they cannot regard their obligation to take economic sanctions under Article XVI as automatic. As a result of our discussions at the League on this occasion the whole Assembly unanimously decided to take note of declarations of fact by a series of governments that while the Covenant as a whole remained intact and consultations should be obligatory under this Article, each State reserved its right to judge each particular case on its merits, and to take such action as might seem possible. Thus even the original general obligation under Article XVI is to-day not so easy to operate as it was before. Those are examples of how the machinery of the League to-day is not so easy of immediate and successful application in a crisis of this sort. I have tried to examine it closely and in all sincerity, and with a great admiration for the machinery of the League which I have conceived during the last month, and indeed before. The more I have examined it, the more I have admired it; and the more I examine it, the more I find it is not easy of application at the present time.
In the few minutes that remain, I want to take up the general points raised by the hon. Member for Gower. What struck me at the League was the prestige in which our Government and our Prime Minister are held. What has struck hon. Members who have listened to this Debate is the fact that public opinion in the dictator countries has conceived a profound admiration for our Prime Minister and our country. Our country, therefore, is the country which is in a priceless position for securing the future of peace. I have illustrated the difficulties of achieving peace through the League alone. There are obvious difficulties in securing peace by collaboration with the dictators alone. It would seem madness to try one method without the other. In constructing a peace system, we have to decide whether we are going to ignore the forces which are outside the League or not, and we emphatically do not

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accept the position that we should leave the dictator countries outside in our consideration of the construction of a peace system.
If we are to be successful in this task, it is important that British public opinion should be firmly behind the Prime Minister and the Government in our task. One of the sincere doubts which I have noticed on the benches opposite is whether British democracy is right to associate with Nazi Germany. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping said that never will we have friendship with this Nazi system. I want to examine where that philosophy leads us. I believe we should look for points of resemblance with the systems of foreign countries, and not points of difference. I am ready to make friends with Russia. In fact, I enjoyed very much various conversations with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and other Russian representatives at Geneva. I tried to find points of resemblance. If I am to adopt the philosophy of some hon. Members opposite and of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping, it would be quite impossible for me to become a friend of Russia, because I cannot agree with much in their political system. Therefore, if we pursue the philosophy of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping, that any system which does not share the Christian ethics—the expression of my right hon. Friend—is not worthy of our friendship, we cannot have friendship with Russia any more than with Germany.
It seems to me that we have two choices either to settle our differences with Germany by consultation, or to face the inevitability of a clash between the two systems of democracy and dictatorship. In considering this, I must emphatically give my opinion as one of the younger generation. War settles nothing, and I see no alternative to the policy upon which the Prime Minister has so courageously set himself—the construction of peace, with the aid which I have described. There is no other country which can achieve this, and I ask hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite sincerely to believe that in our efforts to understand, to consult with and, if possible, to get friendship with Germany, we do not abandon by one jot or tittle the democratic beliefs which are the very core of our whole being and system. In
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conclusion, I must gratify the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wakefield by quoting Shakespeare. The right hon. Gentleman will remember the little poem "Under the Greenwood Tree"—
"Here shall he see
No enemy,
But winter and rough weather"
We have the winter before us, and we have a great deal of political rough weather, but in that rough weather, do not let us forget the joint idea of peace which animates us all.
Ordered, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—[Captain Margesson.]
Debate to be resumed To-morrow.
The Orders of the Day were read, and postponed.

EUROPEAN SITUATION.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Captain Margesson.]
11.1 p.m.
Mr. Acland: In the course of my speech—upon which the Under-Secretary has made some remarks for which I thank him—I ventured to ask one specific question which seemed to me important. I think it is important that the country should know what is going on in Poland. One view of what is going on has been given by the "Times" and I would like to know—
Mr. Speaker: It appears to me that the hon. Member is now speaking with reference to the Motion on the Order Paper, the Debate on which has been adjourned. He cannot do so on the Motion for the Adjournment of the House.
Mr. Acland: I would not wish to do anything which is outside the Rules of the House, but before the House adjourns I wish to raise the question whether it is possible to have an answer on that point.
Mr. Speaker: It would not be in order on the Motion for the Adjournment of the House to deal with questions which are covered by the Motion on the Order Paper.
Mr. Wedgwood Benn: Perhaps I might ask this question. Has the Under-Secretary any news as to whether those

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people who were arrested by the Germans have been released in response to the representations made?
Mr. Sandys: I assume, Mr. Speaker, that one is in order in speaking to-night on the Motion for the Adjournment, on the same subject on which it was in order to speak yesterday on the Motion for the Adjournment.
Mr. Speaker: There is a Motion on the Paper which we have been discussing all day and the Debate on which has been adjourned until to-morrow, and that Motion deals with the questions which we were discussing yesterday. It would not be in order, on the Motion for the Adjournment, now to discuss something which is covered by the Motion on the Paper.
Mr. Churchill: I presume, Mr. Speaker, that apart from the topics covered by that Motion, the Debate on the Motion for the Adjournment of the House will enjoy the usual freedom.
Mr. Speaker: If the hon. Member wishes to raise some particular question which is not included in the Motion he can do so.
Mr. Sandys: I propose to deal with some of the points with which the Prime Minister dealt on the Motion for the Adjournment two days ago. I listened with attention and sympathy to the Prime Minister's explanation and his exposition of the differences between the Godesberg Memorandum and—
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is now raising a question which we have been discussing on the Motion on the Paper and will be discussing again to-morrow.
Mr. Benn: Surely the Under-Secretary will give some reply to my question. Questions were raised at Munich as to Sudetens being liberated under the agreement, but nobody asked about the Czech hostages. Surely the Under-Secretary, if he cannot tell me now, will promise to tell us to-morrow. It is a point of honour that those people should be saved.
Mr. Butler: This is a matter which was raised at Question Time. The Prime Minister gave the right hon. Gentleman an answer upon it. Naturally we have set in motion the inquiries which we promised to make, but I cannot answer the right hon. Gentleman to-night because
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I have had no notice of the fact that he proposed to raise the matter at this time. Despite the obvious inconvenience of such an inquiry, in view of the importance of the matter, I shall certainly do my best to expedite a reply, but I can give no guarantee that I can get it to-morrow.
Mr. Churchill: I should like to ask the Under-Secretary what is to happen supposing we separate, as we have decided to do, at four o'clock to-morrow, and he has not got an answer by them. Will there be any method by which this information is to be conveyed? It is an extremely important point. I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman opposite. Here was a case of absolutely no reciprocity. A question was asked about it, and the Government are making the necessary representations. They admit that it is a matter of extreme importance, but we are separating to-morrow. Can the hon. Gentleman hold out to us any hope that he will be in a position to give us information upon this subject to-morrow?
Mr. Butler: I can only repeat that I can give no undertaking as to when the reply will be received, but we shall certainly do our best to expedite it.
Mr. James Griffiths: Has the hon. Gentleman received representations from the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, who feel themselves peculiarly concerned in this situation, because the miners in this area, who were affiliated to the Miners' International, will be involved? The Miners' Federation have made application that they may be permitted to send their representatives there to safeguard, as far as they can, the miners' interests in that area.
Mr. Speaker: The pursuance of these questions is an abuse of the Rules in regard to questions that can be raised on a Motion for the Adjournment.
Mr. Churchill: May I then, because Parliamentary time is very precious and we are here for only a short period—
Mr. Speaker: If the Under-Secretary replies to the right hon. Gentleman, he will be out of order, as he has already exhausted his right to speak.
Mr. Benn: On a point of Order. You have explained that the Under-Secretary has not got the right of reply, having already spoken. But the Minister of

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Transport spoke eloquently earlier, and he is obviously fully seized of the subject. Will he give us any information?
Mr. Churchill: On a point of Order. May I ask your ruling whether in fact I have attempted to intervene at all except by way of interrogation, which is not at all the same as an intervention?
Mr. Speaker: The point is, when does a question develop into an intervention?
11.9 p.m.
Mr. Mander: There is a matter that I wish to raise, concerning certain action taken during the last few days in connection with the showing of films in the cinemas of this country. There was shown, a few evenings ago, a very admirable film of life in Czechoslovakia, with pictures of President Benes and other incidents of that kind. Some of my friends who saw it thought it would not be shown for very long, and they were right, because I understand that influence was brought to bear very soon, and it was cut down, because it presented a picture of Czechoslovakia which was quite different from that which the Government wished the people of this country to believe. Pressure was exercised on the film industry to interfere with it and to cut that out, and it was very drastically cut down. Furthermore, during the last few weeks there was shown on the films an interview and a speech by Mr. Wickham Steed and others, and there also, under pressure which was exercised indirectly through the Foreign Office—according to my information, through a certain foreign Embassy—action was taken to prevent that being shown, because it did not fit in with the views of the Government.
It seems to me a serious thing that the Government and the Foreign Office should be instituting a censorship of films at any
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time. The film industry are entitled to show what they think fit and to give the true facts of the situation without having to colour them and adjust them and cut them according to the views of the Government of the day. I want to protest against what appears to be the introduction of the very methods which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) was referring to not many hours ago—the introduction into this country of interference with the rights of this people to do what they like, to show what they like, to see what they like and to say what they like.
I did not give my hon. Friend any notice of this, but no doubt he is paying attention to what I am saying; and I hope that he will be good enough, in the course of the Debate to-morrow, to state exactly what happened. I hope, too, that we shall have no more of this attempt of the Executive, in their own interests and the interests of their political policy, to interfere with the rights of the citizens of this country.
Mr. Sandys: On a point of Order. I was in possession of the House when you, Sir, gave me your Ruling that I was not to deal with any matters already dealt with in the Debate. I will therefore, with your permission, confine myself to a matter which has nothing to do with the Debate in question.
Mr. Speaker: I ruled the hon. Gentleman out of order when he was speaking before. He cannot intervene in the Debate a second time.
Question, "That this House do now adjourn," put, and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at Twelve Minutes after Eleven o' Clock.

  EGYPT (LIGHTHOUSE SERVICE).
  EGYPT (LIGHTHOUSE SERVICE).
  BRITISH PUBLICITY CO-ORDINA TION.
  BRITISH PUBLICITY CO-ORDINA TION.
  TIN-CONTROL SCHEME.
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  EX-SERVICE MEN (KING'S FUND).
  EX-SERVICE MEN (KING'S FUND).

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
The Lord Clifton (E. Darnley)—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his kinsman.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION (EARL STANHOPE): My Lords, I beg to move, That the House on its adjournment do adjourn for business, other than judicial Business, until the 1st of November, except that if it appears to the satisfaction of the Lord Chancellor that the public interest requires that the House should meet at an earlier time during such adjournment, the Lord Chancellor may give notice to the Peers that he is so satisfied, and thereupon the House shall meet at the time stated in such notice, and shall transact its business as if it had been duly adjourned to that time.
Moved, That the House on its adjournment do adjourn for business, other than Judicial Business, until the 1st of November, except that if it appears to the satisfaction of the Lord Chancellor that the public interest requires that the House should meet at an earlier time during such adjournment, the Lord Chancellor may give notice to the Peers that he is so satisfied, and thereupon the House shall meet at the time stated in such notice, and shall transact its business as if it had been duly adjourned to that time.—(Earl Stanhope.)
LORD SNELL: My Lords, we cannot of course resist this Motion, but before the House passes it we can only express our belief that in times so serious as the present it may be quite inadvisable that Parliament should adjourn for so long a time.
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
Debate again resumed (according to Order).
LORD GAINFORD: My Lords, I should like to preface my remarks by saying what an extreme delight it was to many on these Benches that we should have been able to listen to that most eloquent speech from Earl Baldwin yesterday. I am quite sure I am expressing the wish of every member of this House that the noble Earl may see his way to contribute often to our debates. He probably little recognises how valuable his contributions may be to us, and what assistance they may give to your Lordships' House.
As a Quaker I was reared in a belief in peace principles, and the old Liberal watchwords began with "Peace" as the greatest interest. I only hope that that watchword may still be clung to by the whole of the Liberal Party, because I conceive that nothing could be more important in these days than that we should follow peace principles. In 1914, when Germany invaded Belgium and France, I realised as a member of the then Cabinet, with my colleagues, that there was no alternative but to meet force with force if both honour and the interest of our country, which were at stake, were not to be forgotten. I then resigned my position as President of the Peace Society, but I held then a great belief in those principles of peace, and I still hold it. In the few words which I desire to address to your Lordships I want to advocate those principles so far as I possibly can. At the same time I would make it quite clear that certain circumstances may occur, as they did in 1914, to necessitate meeting aggression with force. I realise the importance and the necessity of our military, naval and air forces being properly equipped and ready for any emergency. I do not believe that we can compete in numbers with some of the other nations, but I think we may exceed them in the quality of our services.
Believing as I do that all international disputes ought to be settled by negotiation and, if necessary, by arbitration, and not by war, I ask what is the result of the settlement which has been reached by the Prime Minister with the help of M. Daladier and other potentates in their meeting at Munich. Civilisation has been saved from an overwhelming disaster too terrible to contemplate, and I desire to express my own personal gratitude to the Prime Minister for what he has done. I do not think I am overstating the matter

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when I say that future generations will regard the Prime Minister's achievement as one of the most magnificent personal deeds recorded in history. Secondly, I think a situation has been created by that settlement which has opened the door to a lasting peace. It has to be followed up step by step, and many difficulties will have to be overcome; but the attention of the world may now be directed not to continuing ever-increasing armaments in rivalry with one another, but to a different attitude, and to a change of thought, which may direct the efforts of peoples to rely upon reason rather than upon war.
I think that the prospects of the Czechs may be summed up in this statement: that they are now to receive a guarantee, at any rate, for their independence and, as I understand has been said by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence in another place yesterday, if there is actual unprovoked aggression. Before I sit down I will ask the noble Earl who is going to reply, exactly whether that limitation is going to remain in those words of the Minister of Defence, or what other information he may be able to give to your Lordships with regard to the proposed treaty for that guarantee. But the Czech Government, while receiving that guarantee in connection with its diminished area, has been saved from a disaster of an overwhelming character and, in the event of war, perhaps from seizure of a much greater extent of territory, and from devastating slaughter of the Czechoslovak inhabitants. I want, if I may, to pay my humble tribute to the Foreign Secretary in these difficult times. I have always been convinced that he himself believed that war was not really inevitable, and that his efforts would be directed to securing peace alongside those of the Prime Minister. I believe he has contributed in no small measure to the efforts of the Prime Minister in the very difficult task he has undertaken and carried through so successfully.
When I look to the causes of the situation, I cannot help feeling that Geneva and the League of Nations have been partly to blame for the situation which has arisen. So long as the League of Nations could be regarded as a means by which disputes might be settled by representation, by help being given in connection with negotiations, where moral
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suasion might be used and conciliatory methods adopted, I believe that the League of Nations would have the support of every nation both in America and in Europe, and would be a virile and very influential body. In my judgment the downfall of the League has been due to a reliance on the use of an international force, which in my opinion could not have been effective in carrying out the decisions of the League. A force of that kind, I think, could never have been properly implemented, and reliance upon force was an objectionable feature in the operations of the League of Nations. I trust that before long, although the path may be difficult, the League of Nations may be recreated on right lines, and that the Government will direct their efforts in that direction.
What are the other outstanding facts which have led to the present situation? The boundaries of Czechoslovakia ought never to have been agreed to at Versailles. The maladministration of the Sudeten area during the last twenty years by the Czechoslovakian Government was to a certain extent oppressive, and although that oppression has been exaggerated in certain quarters, it has become very clear from the Report of Lord Runciman. I do not think, in spite of what the Foreign Secretary said in his opening speech, that his Mission has really been a failure. It has helped to clear the situation, and Lord Runciman has pointed out quite definitely that it was quite impossible for the Sudeten Germans, in the areas where they had a majority, to mix satisfactorily any longer with the Czech population, who were in a minority and who were their oppressors. That seemed to be quite impossible. Therefore something had to be done in order to meet the situation, and the only way to meet it was to secure a rectification of the frontiers. There were two ways of doing that, either by force or by negotiation, and it is a matter of great gratification to this country that through the efforts of the Prime Minister peace has been secured and war has not prevailed. Given these facts, I ask why should the transfer of this territory be regarded as a grave injustice to the Government of Czechoslovakia?
I do not think any good can come by denouncing Herr Hitler as an individual whose policy ought to be in every direction defied. I want the House to realise

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what the people of Germany feel in regard to Herr Hitler. They may not all be behind him in connection with his war attitude and his desire in certain circumstances to use force, but they have realised that during the Nazi period a great improvement has occurred in their country. When the Führer started his work there were 6,000,000 unemployed; to-clay there is not an unemployed person in the whole of Germany. The progress and productivity of the country have been remarkable. Roads have been made so that anybody can travel from one end of the country to the other, and arrangements have been made or are being made so that everyone can have a motor car in order to travel about the country on those roads. In Italy we find exactly the same feeling existing towards Signor Mussolini. He has improved the situation in Italy to an extent which was thought after the War to be quite impossible. Crime has diminished, production has increased, and the unity of the people is much greater than it has ever been before.
It is very little good therefore denouncing Herr Hitler. We may, as we do, deplore the oppression of the Jews and the restrictions on religion, but, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said yesterday, we cannot shoulder all the evils in the world. But when we consider what the settlement has done and is doing and what can be done through that settlement, I have no doubt myself that we ought to accept that settlement with open hands and whole-heartedly. During the periods of the War when I was not in office I spent a good deal of time in France and Italy, where I saw not only the graves of thousands of my countrymen and an enormous number of wounded coming back from the front and in the hospitals, but also the gradual devastation of village and town one after another. I need only allude to those places which occur first to my mind, places like Béthune, La Bassée, Armentières, Bailleul, Albert and many others. It was a gradual devastation but it was complete, and at the end there was not a house left in any of those towns and villages. When you contrast the situation then caused by bomb and shot and shell, and think of what it would be to-day, you have to picture a very different result. Instead of devastation being gradual it would be rapid. A city
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like London might within a week perhaps be destroyed; all our sources of supply for water, for gas and for electricity might be destroyed within the first week. We might have 300,000 casualties, and the damage would be instantaneous. And it would not be only in the City of London; similar devastation would take place in many other towns in the country and in many other countries of Europe.
Well, a week ago we were all considering whether we should have trenches in which we could take refuge, whether gas masks would fit us, what we could do to secure the safety of ourselves and those dear to us, how we were to evacuate the children from our populous places. Then the critics of the Government to-day were moved by exactly those fears which were in the minds of us all, and I feel rather apt to lose patience with some of those critics who are prepared to denounce the Government for the present settlement which has been reached. If you are going to consider the sufferings of the evacuated refugee population from the Sudeten areas, those sufferings fade into insignificance compared with the sufferings which our civil population, let alone our Naval and Military and Air Forces, might suffer in the event of a war. Almost millions of innocent souls would be killed or maimed as the result of a war of that kind; and it does seem to me unfortunate that representatives of the Labour Party and Peers like the noble Lords, Lord Strabolgi and Lord Lloyd, should advocate a policy which would inevitably have led to war and have produced the terrible conditions to which I have referred. It rather reminds me of the little incident of a mouse which ran away from a cat under a cellar door. It found in the cellar a little drop of beer. It drank that beer and so it got a little Dutch courage and stood on its hind quarters and said "Where is that cat?"
LORD STRABOLGI: Is that on March 24 last? I was referring to the Prime Minister's declaration on March 24 as to what we were going to do.
LORD GAINFORD: What the noble Lords refers to I do not know, and in any case that was not in my mind. The attitude of these people in condemning this settlement seems to me also very unfair to the French. We have seen that the French are wholeheartedly behind

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M. Daladier and in the Chamber yesterday supported him by 535 votes to 75 in a vote of confidence. The French are with us in regarding his settlement as the best that could possibly have been made. I feel that many of those who disagree with the views which I have expressed are biased by a political desire to do something against the Government. I am a supporter of the Government as long as they continue to follow peace principles.
Finally, there are two or three questions I should like to ask the noble Earl with reference to the Czechoslovakian situation. I should like to know if the Government are making any representations to the German Government urging reciprocal exchange of prisoners with the Czechs. The Germans have insisted, I understand, on all prisoners on the Czech side being transferred to Germany, and it does seem to 'me there ought to be reciprocity in that direction. I should also like, as I said earlier in my speech, to ask exactly where the guarantee is going to lead us. Is it going to be exercised only, as was stated by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence yesterday, in cases of unprovoked aggression? It seems to me undesirable that we should have to go to war to save a future Czechoslovak Government if, by their own action and undesirable aggression, they have precipitated complications and want us to help them in a situation of that kind. These are the only questions I want to ask the Government, but I wish to say one more word. Whilst I deplore the exhibition of force that the Germans have found it necessary to make on entering into Czechoslovakia, I do hope that they have learned one great lesson—that they will realise that whilst they have secured what they regard as a most laudable object in securing relief to the Sudeten German population, it has been attained without bloodshed, and that peace, progress, happiness, and the binding of nations together for the common good have been made possible. I also hope that they will realise there is something nobler—to remove misunderstanding and secure the settlement of disputes by peaceable effort rather than by resort to arms and to war.
LORD MARLEY: My Lords, it is with some diffidence that I participate in this debate because while nearly all foreign
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affairs debates are extremely difficult—there are so many sides—I doubt if there has ever been a more difficult situation on which to make up our minds. I very much envy those who are completely certain that they are right in whatever policy they support. I feel myself immensely relieved at the fact that there is to be no war. The picture painted by Lord Gainford of the possible horrors of war in the overcrowded cities of the world still further emphasizes and underlines my feeling of relief at the action that has been taken to avoid an outbreak of war. But that feeling is tempered with very great discomfort and humiliation at the cruelty and injustice inflicted upon the democratic State of Czechoslovakia. I cannot agree with Lord Gainford that we can diminish in our minds the importance of the sufferings inflicted by the sort of terms under which the Czechoslovakians have to surrender the whole of their defensive artillery, so that they are left, after years of sacrifice, with no means of defence against attack. That is a matter which it is very hard to forgive. The sufferings of individuals, which are already being made more serious by the attacks on the Jewish and Czech minorities left in the occupied areas and by the number of suicides which are reported in the newspapers, make me feel extremely unhappy and leave me in a state of great mental discomfort at what has happened.
I cannot help thinking that the Republic of Czechoslovakia has been let down by what has occurred. There is a pathetic sentence in Document No. 7 in the White Paper, in which the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia in London says this:
"We rely upon the two great Western democracies, whose wishes we have followed much against our own judgment, to stand by us in our hour of trial."
Nothing we can say or do can be an exaggeration in the expression of our sympathy with Czechoslovakia or in the expression of the material help which we as a wealthy country can still give to Czechoslovakia in the form of loans, or gifts if possible, to enable reconstruction to take place. Let me say that I cannot put any great military value on the guarantee which has been given to Czechoslovakia, because the very difficulties which prevented assistance to her in her strength will be still greater in her weakness and in the consequent increased strength of Germany.

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The quotation from the White Paper leads me to say one word on the admirable documentation of the two White Papers, for which I am perfectly certain the House must feel greatly indebted. I have never known more rapidly produced or more complete documents to enable us to make up our minds as to the rights and wrongs of the situation. Arising out of a study of these documents, I suggest there are two things which are perfectly certain. One is that we are witnessing the victory of force and threats in international affairs. The second is that we are witnessing the misery and the fear of the small nations throughout Europe. They were relying on the democratic Powers to uphold the rule of law in international affairs. I have just returned from several weeks among these small democratic Powers—Holland, Denmark, Latvia, and Lithuania—and everywhere I found an expression, on the one hand, of affection for us and belief in the determination of our country to support International Law and on the other hand, an intense gratitude for the great part which this country plays in the trade of these small democratic or semi-democratic Powers. In many cases we buy more than half of their products, and they do rely on us from an economic as well as a political point of view.
Therefore the debate would be worth while if we can, from these certain facts, as I see them, learn from past mistakes and try to reconstruct the world on somewhat better lines in future. The first lesson I can draw from what has occurred is that it is vitally important that we should attempt to remedy grievances and injustices in times of peace and not wait for the pressure of force in this direction. I think if we analyse what has taken place in the last few years we can see the mistakes that have been made with regard to Germany: for example, the reoccupation of the right bank of the Rhine; the opposition to the Anschluss with Austria. These and other developments might very well have been discussed and arranged for under Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations had we realised the necessity for this sort of action. I supported, for example, the Naval Treaty with Germany, but I felt that it was done in the wrong way by not having a prior consultation with the other democratic Powers when that Treaty
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was signed. I say at once that Labour Governments must share the blame for inaction in this matter in the past.
The second lesson that I personally would suggest is worth our learning is the necessity for resisting in the very earliest stages attacks on the rule of law in international affairs. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, on the vital necessity of standing by France in the protection of the rule of law in international affairs. I would also have had a much closer connection with the work that has been done in this direction by the United States of America. I think we all owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to President Roosevelt for his intervention during the crisis, and for the work of Secretary Cordell Hull in his attempts at economic appeasement as an alternative to this liability to the use of force to remedy injustices. I also think we should have brought into much closer consultation the Soviet Union as one of the most important of the great industrial nations in Europe and in fact in the world. Further, I agree with the suggestion that has been made from a number of quarters in your Lordships' House that it will be far better for us to declare in advance what we are going to do if there is the beginning of an attack on this rule of law in international affairs. I cannot help thinking that there is a great deal to be said for a clear statement beforehand, rather than leaving any doubt in the minds of the potential aggressor nations about what would be our attitude.
A third point that occurs to me is that we should realise the very real danger of the threats of the totalitarian Powers, and the very real danger that these threats of aggression are not in fact finished. I find myself in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Gainford, in his welcome of the speech which we were privileged to hear yesterday from the late Prime Minister, Lord Baldwin. I think his permanent optimism is a very valuable asset in public life, but I think also it ought to be based upon a realisation that the optimism may be a little overoptimistic and that action should be taken to ensure that it is not misplaced. In this connection I think we must realise that the aggressor Powers have not finished. To-day's news tells the almost indecent haste of Germany still further to dismember Czechoslovakia. A German agitation in support of the demands of

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Poland and of Hungary, and a German agitation among the Slovak minority in Czechoslovakia are part of the continued pressure which in the end must result in the elimination of Czechoslovakia as a free State, unless something is done to put a check on this development.
We see the same problem arising in regard to the ultimatum to Lithuania which was the subject of a question in another place yesterday—an ultimatum which, if the report is correct, will end the trade relations that have existed for years between ourselves and Lithuania and which will throw Lithuania into the arms of Germany as another member of the German developments in South-East and Baltic Europe. We had the same report from Yugoslavia of the development of the economic control of South-East Europe, and there are, unhappily, suggestions that we shall see a similar progress in Denmark and in Turkey. I want to say that in my opinion the present crisis is not a crisis only of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia, of course, is underlined in this matter because she is the immediate victim of what has gone on, and because, as has been claimed in a number of quarters, there was an element of real grievance in regard to the frontiers which were drawn by the Treaty of Versailles when the Czechoslovak State was formed. But I think the real issue is the use of force and the threat of war in international affairs.
It requires a moment, I think, to analyse the position which arose between Herr Hitler and our Prime Minister. There have been questions as to whether Herr Hitler really meant a war. We know that a considerable part of the Army in Germany were opposed to any war-like adventure. We know also that the German people want peace and do not want to follow their Leader into any warlike adventure. Moreover, it is, I think, now recognised that Herr Hitler has always based his claim for support in Germany upon his power to get what was wanted by peaceful means and not by war. Once he led the German people into a war he would lose the support of an enormous section of the German public who would feel that they had been let down by his claim to be a leader in the peace direction. And, of course, we do
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know that the economic weakness of Germany made any sort of lengthy war almost impossible. There are these good reasons for supposing that Germany was not really anxious for a war.
I find on reading the speech of Mr. Duff Cooper in another place that he rather suggested an opposite point of view. He said that Europe was full of rumours at a time when he was travelling round the Baltic States. Information, he said, had accumulated from all parts of the world and
"it was quite extraordinary the unanimity with which it pointed to one conclusion and with which all sources suggested that there was one remedy. All information pointed to the fact that Germany was preparing for war at the end of September …"
That means, therefore, that, however much we may have doubted German intentions to fight, the Prime Minister could not be certain that Germany did not in fact intend to carry out her threats. He could not be certain that they were mere bluff. Therefore he had that difficulty to face. On the other hand, what was the British position? Mr. Duff Cooper threw some light on that by his statement that the head of the German State
"had been assured, reassured, and fortified in the opinion that in no case would Great Britain fight."
I cannot help thinking that one of the difficulties facing our Prime Minister was a realisation that the military position of France had been seriously jeopardised by recent developments in Europe. In particular the control which the German and Italian Air Forces were able to maintain along the northern frontier of Spain, the southern frontier of France, must have had a considerable effect on the minds of French Ministers in regard to the safety of the arsenals and military depots which the French had moved to the south in order that they might be free of the danger of attack by German aeroplanes from Germany. Secondly, we know that the agreement reached by M. Laval with Signor Mussolini in 1935, under which the Italians agreed not to hold troops on the Italian frontier, so that more French troops were free to defend the German frontier, had come to an end and there was consequently danger to France from the Italian frontier. Moreover, the German construction of immense fortifications immediately in front of the Maginot line had made it extremely difficult, to say

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the least of it, for the French successfully to attack Germany. The French General Staff has, of course, come to the conclusion now that defence is stronger than attack when you have a Maginot line, and therefore they were hardly likely to reverse that decision and throw away the lives of hundreds of thousands of French soldiers in an attack on an equally strong line facing the French Maginot line.
It seems to me that the Prime Minister, knowing this weakness of France and knowing the difficulty of any real action in the defence of Czechoslovakia if she were attacked, should have called into consultation with the French and the British the other great military Power in Europe, the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union had been brought into consultation with the British and the French, it would, I suggest, enormously have strengthened our hands in this game of partial military bluff, or at any rate this game of military threat against military threat. I am inclined to think that Herr Hitler, knowing the Government's dislike of the Soviet Union, used that dislike in order to secure that our Prime Minister should have to open a discussion when he did not know his opponent's hand whereas Herr Hitler had already seen the weakness of the British hand. In those circumstances I believe the Prime Minister had no option but to do what he did, and I think he deserves tremendous gratitude for acting with the energy, with the flexibility and with the determination which he did in these appallingly difficult circumstances. I think his decision to meet face to face Herr Hitler was an admirable and wise decision. I personally hope that that procedure will be used in the future very much more than in the past as an alternative to the rather out-of-date methods of diplomatic procedure, and above all as an alternative to the methods which in the last five years have been used, methods of abuse with headlines in the newspapers and methods of loud-speaker abuse at huge demonstrations by the leaders of the various countries.
Finally I want to suggest something for the future. I hope that we shall try to use the breathing space which we have been granted as a means of rebuilding what I call the defences of democracy in the world. I would like to see an attempt made to settle in advance the grievances
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and injustices which exist in so many countries all over the world. My noble friend Lord Ponsonby, in his speech yesterday, said:
"We have learned the lesson. The points of dispute between nations must not be allowed to drift on but must be dealt with when matters are comparatively calm."
I hope that we have learned the lesson. I hope that the sort of action that was taken over the refortification of the Dardanelles may be carried much further and used in other international differences of opinion. I would venture to suggest that political and, above all, economic differences could best be settled—naturally the Government are more aware of the possibilities than I as a mere private person can be—by an enlargement of the Four-Power Conference into something much more nearly a world conference, certainly a conference bringing in other European Powers, in particular the Soviet Union. I would like the possibility considered of the United States being asked to preside over such a Conference to consider in a calm atmosphere these grievances and differences of opinion, so that we should be able to remove the causes of injustice and the causes of war during the time that is available.
I would like to see as the first item on the agenda of that conference the question of putting an end to the Spanish dispute. The Spanish dispute is causing far greater difficulties than are generally realised. Some of them I have endeavoured to indicate in these remarks. I would like to see also included in the agenda the question of access to raw materials for all nations and the question of Colonies, referred to in the two White Papers and referred to in the conversations between the Prime Minister and Herr Hitler, because that question could be far better dealt with as part of a general settlement than as a mere subject of dispute between our country and Germany. If something along these lines is done, then, and then only, I feel, shall we have a real justification for that optimism which was referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Baldwin, yesterday—optimism concerning a better state of affairs in the future.
THE EARL OF LYTTON: My Lords, I would not intervene in this debate merely to repeat arguments which have been made by other noble Lords who have preceded me, and I would gladly accept the

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case so ably stated by my noble friend Viscount Cecil last Monday. If I do intervene it is because, like my noble friend Earl Baldwin yesterday, I feel that there are some things which I am obliged to say at this moment. At a moment when everyone around me is expressing only joy and thankfulness, I feel more profoundly depressed, profoundly distressed, than I have ever been before in my life by any public event. My distress is due in some measure to the fact that I find myself obliged to differ on a matter of right and wrong from men whose standards I have hitherto accepted and whose judgment I have always respected: men like my noble friend the Foreign Secretary, my noble friend Earl Baldwin, and the most reverend Primate. I have often differed from them in matters of politics, but never, I think, before on a matter of conscience.
My noble friend the Foreign Secretary, on the first day in opening this debate, said:
"The only reproaches that can wound are the reproaches of a man's own conscience, and he alone can know in what language conscience speaks."
And he added:
"I can only know, for myself, that my mind will be at rest for having taken no decision inconsistent with what on all the facts I felt right."
I agree. Of course I accept without question that the Foreign Secretary and his colleagues in the circumstances took the action which they thought right and best for all concerned, including the Government and people of Czechoslovakia. I do not question for a moment either their sincerity or their honesty. But I would ask my noble friend to believe that I and those who work with me are no less sincere in the opinions which we hold. I owe it just as much to my conscience to say why I differ from him as he owed it to us to defend the policy for which he was responsible.
It is distressing enough to differ from men whom I admire, but my distress is increased by the fact that in debate I and those associated with me are represented as advocates of war because we have criticised a Government which secured the blessing of peace at a moment when everyone except the Prime Minister had lost all hope. I have no objection to being compared to a drunken mouse, as
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I have been this afternoon, because that is a charge which no one is likely to take seriously. But the other charge I know is made by people who seriously and conscientiously believe it. I ought not, I think, as chairman of perhaps the largest peace organisation in this country, to have to repudiate such a charge, but as it has been made it must be answered, and I feel I must try to explain the ground and the nature of the difference between His Majesty's Government and ourselves. I will do it as briefly as I can. I can assure the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack that what I say will be said without anger and, I hope, without bitterness. But as I may have to defend myself and my friends against this charge on other platforms, I feel that I ought to say in this House and in the presence of my noble friends what I shall have to say elsewhere when they are not present.
It is not true, it is simply not true, that, while the Government were working for peace, while the Prime Minister was snatching it, as it were, from the very cannon's mouth, we were urging him to go to war. That was not the difference between my noble friends and myself. The difference between us—and it is fundamental—is a difference on the best method of securing peace. Of course we may be wrong and the Government may be right. That is a matter which, as my noble friend says, must be judged by each man according to his own conscience. But let there be no dispute between us as to the goal towards which we were both working. For the last ten years I have worked with my noble friend Lord Cecil and others for the cause of peace. During those years I have devoted the whole of my life to that cause. I have done everything I could with my friends to try to show to the people of this country the means whereby peace could be secured and maintained. But we always had in our minds a peace which, in the words of Canning, should have a character of dignity, a peace which should be worth preserving, a peace that should be likely to endure.
Before I come to that great issue, there are three questions of detail which I wish to put to the Government. The first relates to the International Commission. We are told that one of the great merits of the Munich settlement was that the limitations of the boundaries of Czecho-

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slovakia and the conditions under which the plebiscites were to be taken were to be settled by an International Commission on which would sit representatives of Germany, Italy, Great Britain, France and Czechoslovakia. But before we can decide what value to attach to this machinery, I should like to ask the Government two things. First of all, where is this Commission going to sit? Secondly, by what procedure is it going to act? Will it act by the decisions of the majority, and will the decisions of the majority prevail?
My second question relates to the Anglo-French guarantee. I adopt the argument which has been used by other noble Lords, that we have shown ourselves prepared to-day to guarantee the defence of a country which, with our connivance, has been rendered incapable of defending itself. I only do not repeat the argument because it has already been stated and I accept it. What I want to ask is this. At what date is this guarantee to come into force? Is it, like the German guarantee, only to come into force when all the boundaries and consequences of the plebiscites have been settled, or is it to come into force now? If, under instigation from Germany, some portion of the Slovak people start claiming their independence, their division from the Czechs, I want to know is your guarantee going to apply to the Czechs or to the Slovaks? Lastly, I want to put this question to the Leader of the House. What arrangements have been made for the adjustment of the Czech National Debt when its territories have been taken away? There were other questions, but they have been raised by other noble Lords, and I have no doubt that the Leader of the House will deal with them when he comes to reply.
I come now to the main issue, to what I have called an issue of conscience, which separates me from my noble friend. The Foreign Secretary told us on Monday that it was necessary to put pressure upon Czechoslovakia to save that country and the world from the horrors of war. I confess I was amazed to hear last night, from the Lord Chancellor, that Czechoslovakia had not been forced to do anything. Whether in fact the pressure which has been put upon her was as cruel in its terms as we were assured by the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, on Monday, or not, I think there can be no one who
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would claim that Czechoslovakia was left quite free to take her decision. It has not been claimed by any other spokesman for the Government. No one has, I think, suggested that pressure was not put upon that country.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD MAUGHAM): Pressure of advice was put upon her, but no other pressure that I know of.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: It was described by the Czechs as intolerable.
THE EARL OF LYTTON: It was pressure which the Czech Government themselves described as an intolerable pressure, and I do not think that anybody for a moment imagines that it was anything else. The Foreign Secretary certainly never denied that pressure had been exercised, but he told us that he was faced with the dreadful alternative of putting this pressure or going to war. So stated, the case is simple. If there were nothing else to do than that, it was a case by which nobody's conscience would be troubled, and when last night we listened to the eloquence of my noble friend Lord Baldwin, your Lordships, I am sure, must have felt, under the spell of his oratory, that his case was unanswerable. My Lords, it is not unanswerable, though I am sorry to say that I have not the tongue of the noble Earl with which to answer him. I wish I had.
Lord Baldwin told us that when the Prime Minister took that great decision to fly to Berchtesgaden, there was nothing else he could have done. I agree, and I share with the whole world the admiration which was felt for his action on that day; but I hoped, and I was not alone in hoping, that he was going to Berchtesgaden to get justice for Czechoslovakia as well as for the Germans. I was disappointed, and the Prime Minister has since explained the situation in which he was placed which made that impossible. But the point is, who was responsible for the situation in which he found himself on that day? What had caused him to be faced with that terrible alternative? Our case is that peace should have been sought, and that peace could have been obtained, by pressure made, of course at the right time, upon the aggressor and not upon the victim of aggression. That

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is our case and if the Government claim, as they are fully entitled to claim, credit for having secured peace by their methods last Friday, they cannot escape responsibility for having brought us to the brink of war by their neglect, their failure to apply our methods at the right time.
They have been in office for the last six years. They received a new lease of of power three years ago by declaring that the League of Nations was the only hope of peace, and was the sheet-anchor of their policy. Ever since they were returned on those promises they have cut themselves adrift from that sheet-anchor, and they have done everything to undermine the power and the influence of the League, which would have been their support at this moment, a support which would have helped them, here and now, to have secured not only peace but justice. I agree, of course, with my noble friend Lord Baldwin, that there are few elements of justice to be found in treaties of peace which are made at the end of a great war, but the Peace of Munich was not made at the end of a great war, and I, for one, believe that peace can only endure and can only flourish in the soil of justice. There is no other soil in which it can permanently grow.
My noble friend the Foreign Secretary, at the end of his eloquent speech on Monday, compared the Prime Minister to the builder of a Church in 1643 who had "done the best things in the worst times." May I respectfully remind him that the times in which he and his colleagues have done the best things, if indeed they are the best things, were of their own making? We have had many debates on foreign affairs in this House. The Government have had many critics—I have sometimes been one of them myself—but they cannot say that we have created those times. They did not follow the advice given to them by any of us. They cannot blame my noble friend Lord Cecil and myself for these times. They cannot put the blame on the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and his little band of brothers. They cannot say it was the fault of Lord Arnold and those who follow him. They did not follow his advice any more than ours, and I feel much more sympathy with the noble Lord today than I have ever done before. They cannot put the blame upon the Socialist
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Party, so stoutly yet so thinly represented in this House.
The Government have had undisputed power for six years and during that time they have deliberately discarded the weapon which would have saved them to-day. In October, 1935, the present Prime Minister, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, said this in a speech:
"old system of alliances and balance of power has gone, and in its place the League is the only instrument"—
I beg your Lordships to mark these words—
"to which we can look to give us security against war. Unless we make a stand"—
mark these words again—
"Unless we make a stand now for the principles of the League we may say goodbye to any hope of freeing ourselves from the horrible thought of the recurrence of war."
That speech was made just before the last General Election. If they were unable in these last difficult days to make a stand for the right things, to put pressure in the right direction, it was because they had abandoned, in the Prime Minister's own words, the only instrument which would have enabled them to do so. My Lords, if you yourselves threw away your only weapon you cannot claim that as justification for the necessity of deserting your friends.
The fact is that the pursuit of peace is a very difficult, a very complicated business. It is much more difficult than the conduct of a war. Like war, peace has to be studied. There is a technique of peace as there is a technique of war, and I cannot feel that the Government during these years of their great power have sufficiently studied that technique. They have never made it clear, either to us or to people in other countries, either what they were ready to concede or what they were determined to defend. They have never prepared this country for the sacrifices which are necessary, and must ever be necessary, in the cause of peace. They have not used the League either for the redress of grievances or for resistance to aggression. Although in the words of their own leader it was their only instrument they have used it neither for appeasement nor for defence. And certainly they have never told anyone until last night, through the lips of the Lord Chancellor, that Czechoslovakia was a State which ought never to have

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been created. If that is true, if that is the opinion of the Government, if it be true also, as they have so often told us, that they are only prepared to fight for British interests, then I ask for what was this country asked to fight last week?
Now it was this failure to have a clear peace policy, a policy made clear not only to our own but to other people, that created that terrible crisis through which we have recently passed. The Government, I say, are alone responsible for finding themselves confronted with what my noble friend called a hideous choice of evils. The Prime Minister did all that anyone could do, more than anyone else would have done, in the circumstances. But the circumstances need never have arisen and should never have been allowed to arise, and I for one can find no satisfaction, no security, no hope for the future in the methods by which we have been extricated from them. The most reverend Primate said on Monday it was the severance between material and spiritual things in public and private life which is the source of most of our troubles. That is just my trouble. The Government have relieved my physical anxieties, but have left me all my spiritual anxieties. They have even increased them, because if we had been saved from the consequences of our own errors it has only been by the unexampled heroism of the Government of Czechoslovakia, who in their own noble words put the peace of the world before the sufferings of their own people.
Let it be conceded at once that there were grievances to be remedied and that it has been a gain to the cause of peace to remove them. But if it be wise and right, as many noble Lords—Lord Noel-Buxton, Lord Allen, Lord Samuel, Lord Gainford and others—have often pointed out to this House, that the German population of Czechoslovakia should be added to the Reich, can those noble Lords, can anyone, defend the methods by which that has been brought about? That is my second point. My first was that we have sought peace in the wrong way, and my second is that when we felt obliged to ask Czechoslovakia to give up its German population why did we not ask Germany to pay for the territory, the factories, the fortifications, which unquestionably belonged to Czechoslovakia? If she had had to take them by war, even
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a war against Czechoslovakia alone, she would have had to pay a heavy price, and a peace with honour should, I think, have required that some compensation should be paid by Germany for the redemption, as she believed, of her German compatriots.
I shall be told no doubt that if we had demanded that, if we had insisted upon it in the name of justice, we could not have secured peace. I do not admit that, if the alternative had been clearly and firmly pointed out. I do not believe that Herr Hitler was any more ready to go to war with Great Britain, France and Russia, in order to do an injustice to Czechoslovakia than we were prepared to go to war with Germany to prevent justice to Czechoslovakian Germans.
LORD NEWTON: Why did he mobilise one and a half million men several months ago?
THE EARL OF LYTTON: Why did we mobilise our Fleet? I do not believe that Herr Hitler would have gone to war—that is, if he had been threatened and, moreover, if the German people had known that a persistence in injustice to Czechoslovakia would involve them in a war with Great Britain, France, and Russia. I may be wrong. If it be true that it was already too late to secure peace with justice, then I say let those defend the settlement who are satisfied in their own conscience that nothing could be done to prevent that situation arising—a situation in which there was no alternative to war but to purchase peace by the coercion of your friends. I am not one of those.
LORD ARNOLD: My Lords, like other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate I wish to pay my tribute to the almost superhuman courage and persistence of the Prime Minister in these last weeks. Not only has he averted war, but I do not think I exaggerate at all when I say that the Prime Minister has clone more for future peace in fourteen days than the League of Nations and all the Chancelleries of Europe have done in nineteen years. The Prime Minister is a realist. He recognised from the beginning of his Premiership that we must be prepared to negotiate with all nations whether we agree with their form of government or not. Take one point that I do not think has been made in this

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debate—and as far as I can I am going to make points which have not been made, though that is not very easy after all the permutations and combinations which have received expression; but I shall do my best.
The Prime Minister, very soon after he came to office, opened up negotiations with Signor Mussolini. As a result of that he led on to the Anglo-Italian Agreement. If that Agreement had not been made, the Munich Conference would never have been held. I do not think that can be denied, and it is a very important consideration. Again the Prime Minister recognises that there can be no permanent peace in Europe—we all know this, but he is acting on it—without a good understanding between Great Britain and Germany. He has already laid the foundations of a good understanding, and if he can continue his policy there is a good prospect that the last War was the last war. But, unfortunately, as has been evidenced in this debate to a degree which distresses me more than I can say, there are still a great many people—I think all the leaders of the Labour Party, but I am happy to think only some of the leaders of the Liberal Party, and also individual members of the Conservative Party like the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, and others—continue bitterly to criticise the Prime Minister and add to his difficulties. The noble Earl, Lord Lytton, was good enough to make kind reference to me, for which I thank him, in his very earnest speech, to which I am sure the House listened with the greatest attention, as it ought to have done. I may therefore appear ungracious if I make my next point, but I must do so. He objected fairly strongly to any suggestion that he or his friends—and he quoted as one of his friends the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil—were not strongly against war. That was what it came to.
THE EARL OF LYTTON: Certainly.
LORD ARNOLD: I would like to read to him some words of the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, in the speech he made in this House on May 18 of this year. He said this:
"The only addition that the Government have made to this policy is that wretched slogan for which I do not think any noble Lords are personally responsible, 'We have
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kept you out of war.' Of all the miserable slogans that the necessities of Party politics have ever invented that is probably the worst—at any rate one of the worst. That is all you can say, 'We have kept you out of war.'"
And he went on later to say:
"That has produced most unfortunate results, in my judgment, on different sections of the population who think that the only thing that matters is to keep out of war …"
If the noble Earl and his friends will say things like that, is it surprising that the ordinary man in the street thinks they are quite willing to go to war? That is the only common-sense conclusion that can be drawn from words like those of the noble Viscount. I could quote from other speeches and statements if I had time, all pointing, in my view, in the same direction, but I leave that.
On Monday the noble Lord, Lord Snell, said that through these times his Party had exercised a responsible restraint for which there is no parallel in the Party controversies of our time. In view of the great respect that I have for the noble Lord all I would say about that is that I do not think that statement can be substantiated. I will, however, further say this, that when I think of the speeches and the conduct of some of the leaders of the Labour Party during this crisis, I am thankful I left the Labour Party.
LORD STRABOLGI: So are we!
LORD ARNOLD: The noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, spoke in the debate on Monday and made a characteristic speech in many ways, including its length. One of the themes of the noble Viscount, and I gather one of the themes of the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, was that recent events have proved the value of collective security. The noble Viscount said that in other words. The truth is precisely the opposite. Let us look at it, because this also bears very closely on the concluding argument of the noble Earl, Lord Lytton. The noble Viscount and others have told us again and again that if the Government would only make it clear to Germany that in the event of war Great Britain would come in, then Herr Hitler would do nothing. We now know that that contention is wrong. The noble Viscount shakes his head, but I can prove it to him to five places of decimals. The Prime Minister in his speech in another place last week emphahsized that we had again and again told Germany what the

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position would be in the event of war. Amongst other steps taken Sir Nevile Henderson was specially sent on a mission to Nuremberg about this matter, and there saw many members of the German Government. As a result the Prime Minister said:
"Our Ambassador reported that there could be no grounds for any doubt in the minds of the German Government as a result of his efforts."
Consider also what the Home Secretary said in another place on Tuesday evening:
"We made our position, privately, as clear as it was possible to make it to Herr Hitler time after time. The Prime Minister himself made it clear to him in the conversations he had with him, and it was obvious from those conversations that Herr Hitler had taken full account of the danger of a world war and that, no doubt owing to the geographical conditions that surround us, he had discounted that risk and was prepared to undertake it."
That was the situation which faced the Prime Minister and the Government. Herr Hitler was determined to help the Sudeten Germans, and declared categorically that rather than wait he would be prepared to risk a world war. What do those words mean? What can they mean? They can only mean one thing and that is this. They mean he was determined to go on, whatever Great Britain or anybody else might do. And that is the reply to the collective security supporters who tell us that if only the democracies would stand firm then there would be no war. Of course the noble Viscount may tell us that he did not believe Herr Hitler would go to war even though, as the noble Lord, Lord Newton, said, there were 1,500,000 under arms and complete mobilisation was to be ordered within twenty-four hours. You may say you do not believe it. Well, the Prime Minister believed it, and M. Daladier believed it, and nearly the whole of the French Chamber to-day believe it. I think it is the only common-sense view that can possibly be taken. I suggest that our Prime Minister and M. Daladier are much more likely to be right in their judgment of this matter than collective security supporters who, unless they go on asserting what they do assert, find their whole doctrine in ruin at their feet. As a matter of fact it is in ruin at their feet.
Personally, I am horrified at the willingness—I had almost said the readiness—of some people in this country to go to war. I am afraid the truth is
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that many people in this country hate Dictators, except Russian, more than they love peace. These people forget the tragedy of Abyssinia for which they were largely responsible, or at any rate in part responsible. Nor will they face the fact that war would not have saved Czechoslovakia. As a matter of fact, if we had gone to war so far as this country is concerned, it would not really have been for Czechoslovakia. Nor would it have been, as many League supporters would have the country believe, because we were determined to resist aggression. If we were determined to resist aggression we would have done it in the case of Abyssinia and in that of China, and we did it in neither. Let us be honest with ourselves as to the reasons which would have taken this country into war if that had happened. As far as the Government are concerned, it would have been mainly because of our commitment with France. That would have been the main reason, because the Government still cling to the idea that we cannot run the risk of France being defeated by Germany. The Government still believe that the security of France is essential to the security of this country. In my humble opinion, that view is mistaken. I have argued this before in your Lordships' House, and, if I may say so, my contentions have never really been replied to.
Now combined with this view that we must always defend France, there is also the conviction held by a large number of people in the country—and it was against this conviction that the noble Earl, Lord Baldwin, argued almost passionately yesterday, in, if I may say so respectfully, that very great speech which he delivered—that war with Germany is bound to come sooner or later and it is better to have it out now. Your Lordships know that if we had gone to war that would have been one of our chief reasons, more especially in view of fear that as time goes on Germany will get bigger and stronger and may, later on, attack Great Britain. Both the noble Earl, Lord Baldwin, and the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, argued most eloquently against the theory of the preventive war, and, personally, I agree with Dean Inge that this idea about the necessity of fighting Germany to prevent her getting bigger is abominable. Dean Inge said that his prayers for victory would stick in his throat, even if somebody near and dear

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to him was forced to fight in such an unholy war.
Leaving morals aside, surely it is wrong to incur present risks of the most appalling nature which might well lead to the end of the British Empire, and, as we have often been told, to the end of civilisation, in order to guard against something which may never happen. For one thing, this theory that war with Germany is bound to come sooner or later assumes that Herr Hitler or someone like him will always be in power in Germany. That is scarcely likely to be the case. In fact, some of the very people who seem to want to go to war have for some time been telling us that Herr Hitler cannot last much longer. This whole theory of the preventive war is not only meeting trouble half way, but is going all the way to meet a trouble which is not likely to materialise.
I think I have shown that Czechoslovakia would not really have been the issue for this country if we had gone into a war, and, similarly, Czechoslovakia would not have been the only issue for Germany if war had come. I think Herr Hitler had made up his mind that unless—and this is most important—Germany was going to get different treatment from what she had had during the last nineteen years, he was prepared to fight for her rights. References have been made in these debates to the injustices done to Germany by the Treaty of Versailles and to the fact that for many years Germany did not have a fair deal. Amongst other grievances, Germany has felt herself encircled with a network of alliances. She looks abroad, and she sees Great Britain with its enormous Empire, she sees France with her enormous Empire, and she finds it intolerable that these two countries, who have got all they want, should seek to cross her path in spheres which she thinks do not really concern them. I am not arguing about the rights or wrongs of that; I am trying to put Germany's attitude, and we really ought to look at things from the point of view of other nations. Now the Prime Minister has done that, and he has met Germany in a different spirit from hitherto, and so there has been no war, though otherwise there would have been war, not only because of Czechoslovakia but because Germany was feeling her general position to be intolerable unless she had different treatment,
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which, fortunately, owing to the Prime Minister, she got.
The Prime Minister has made a good start, but if there is to be permanent peace, things will have to be different in many ways. The noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, yesterday in a part of his speech spoke about economic appeasement, and Great Britain and the British Empire must be prepared to make a contribution to that. It is the great inequality in the distribution of economic wealth and territory throughout the world which is one of the chief causes of international unrest. As a matter of fact six Powers, if I may so call them, the British Empire, France, Russia, the United States, Brazil and China have about two-thirds of the territory of the world, leaving one-third to the other sixty nations, including Italy and Germany, and the British Empire and the United States have about two-thirds of the economic mineral wealth of the world. All I would say further about that to-day is this, that any sacrifices which the "Have" Powers may have to make to the "Have-not" Powers for economic appeasement would be infinitesimal compared with the devastation and horror of another world war. I am afraid that there are some people in this country so prejudiced that they will continue to harass the Government in efforts made for a European settlement. Indeed it is not possible to know what some of these people will be doing next.
Before I sit down—it will only take about two minutes—I wish to call attention, as a matter of public duty—I say that most sincerely—to the extraordinary speech delivered last Saturday by Mr. Harold Nicolson, M.P. That speech, as your Lordships are aware, was commented on by the Parliamentary Correspondent of The Times at considerable length in Monday's issue. Mr. Harold Nicolson is, I believe, the Chairman of the National Labour Party in another place, and he is also well known to wireless audiences. Therefore his speech naturally received some attention. The issue raised by this speech is an important one, because the speech appears—I only say appears—to reflect upon the Civil Service. It may, of course, be that Mr. Nicolson was mistaken in all that he said. If so, the public ought to know. I feel it my duty to raise this matter and to raise it now because this is the only

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opportunity before Parliament adjourns. In view of what Mr. Nicolson said in his speech the rule about not discussing civil servants does not apply. Mr. Nicolson has raised the issue and it ought to be cleared up. I am not criticising the civil servants, though Mr. Nicolson in effect did so.
Mr. Nicolson said that Mr. Chamberlain had been constantly advised by Sir Horace Wilson and that Sir Horace Wilson's advice had never been inconvenient. Mr. Nicolson also said that Mr. Chamberlain had been advised by Sir Horace Wilson instead of by Sir Robert Vansittart, the Diplomatic Adviser, who has been—so Mr. Nicolson tells us—consistently right in all that he has said. Mr. Nicolson added that it was only that Sir Robert Vansittart's advice was inconvenient. How does Mr. Nicolson know these things, if he is right in what he says? How does he get his information? How does he know what Sir Robert Vansittart has said and how does he know what Sir Horace Wilson has said? He must have got this information from somewhere, unless he made all this up, and we must presume that did not happen. I do not think I need say very much more to emphasize the importance of this issue. Surely, Ministers at this time have had heavy enough burdens to bear. It seems to me that it would be monstrous if Ministers were also to have the feeling that it they rejected certain advice from a civil servant, that fact might leak out and come to the knowledge of an opponent of the Government's policy and be used against them.
I submit that this matter ought to be probed to the bottom, not only in the public interest but in the interest of the Civil Service. There is a rule, as all your Lordships know, a very salutary rule, that Cabinet Ministers are under a strict oath not to reveal what happens at Cabinet meetings. What is the good of that if important secrets may perhaps leak out in other ways? As I have indicated, it may of course be—it may very well be, and I think probably is the case—that Mr. Nicolson had no real basis for what he said, and that he was merely repeating club gossip, but I think we ought to know. I think the Government owe it to Parliament to make some statement about this matter, to give us the facts one way or the other, so that the public mind may be reassured.
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: My Lords, we have heard stated from the Cross Benches to-day and yesterday certain things on the subject of honour and justice. Twenty odd years ago I was ordered to go to Czechoslovakia. I did not go, but I sent on an advance party and it was my job to try to get to know something about that country and as to the extent to which we could rely on it. We have heard about honour and justice. I would ask the noble Earl, was it worth going to war in order to keep in Czechoslovakia the Sudeten Germans?
THE EARL OF LYTTON: I never said so.
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: It is as honourable to give way and let them go back to where they belong. I would like also to refer to a maiden speech made on Monday night. Some noble Lords may not have been present, and I would like to ask them with all respect to read that speech of my noble and gallant friend Lord Chatfield. It deals with an aspect of the question that has not been alluded to very much in this debate, but it has a very important bearing on the matter. I would like them especially to read the paragraph in the OFFICIAL REPORT which begins with "No military action could have saved Czechoslovakia" and ends with "That is all the British Navy could have done." I agree with every word in that speech, which I think should be read by all.
I have no right, nor do I desire, to speak on behalf of the Royal Air Force, but after serving with that Force for many years and knowing the spirit of those who are in it, I think I can say that they would have done their duty whatever the decision of the Government, like those in all the Services. I think I can say further that the vast majority of the pilots and mechanics in that Service, when they heard what the Prime Minister had done and what the Foreign Secretary had done, said, "Well done: that means we have more time for reflection." These pilots know when they go into the air in time of war the appalling devastation they cause, sometimes among noncombatants as well as combatants, even though they have every intention of attacking only combatants. I say that even if the agreement made by the Prime Minister is only temporary it does give time to consider, before the employment

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of these air weapons can be brought into play, whether it would not be a good thing to put back the use of these weapons.
I do not want to venture into foreign policy more than to ask, what I feel a large number of people like myself will ask, whether we were really going to war in order to prevent the Sudeten Germans, Hungarians and Poles going over, as one might almost say, to the other side of the street. Another thing I would like to say is that I have never been impressed by the statement that giving up this territory means giving up a strategical frontier. The best frontier surely is found in friendly relations, but from the military point of view the strength of a frontier in these days does not depend on natural obstacles. That was clearly shown in the last War. Fortified lines with no natural obstacles and with every natural disadvantage were held to the end of the war. Nor am I impressed by another criticism made by some people, that it is impossible to maintain economically the Czechoslovak State without holding on to the Sudeten German territory and to the territory demanded by Hungary and Poland. I believe that that argument is not sound.
As I listened yesterday to the speeches made here, and especially to the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, who spoke with such passionate eloquence, I could not help feeling that when all is said and done the man who saved Czechoslovakia was the Prime Minister. There would have been no Czechoslovakia if it had not been for the Prime Minister, and from my knowledge of the people of Czechoslovakia I am not certain in my mind that they do not recognise that. I rather think that they do. That has to be remembered by all who say that honour and justice have gone. There would have been no Czechoslovakia at all if it had not been for the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Government.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, I think it is hardly practicable for us to discuss which foreign policy we should prefer and to discuss it by way of giving advice to the Government. There are really only two Parties in the State who can form a Government and we have to choose between the policy of His Majesty's Government and that put forward by the
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noble Lords opposite. Last summer we heard everything that noble Lords opposite had to say on this subject. We have heard a great deal of it in the last two days. The impression I have derived is that it consists first in a careless and close union with Russia; and I think the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Strabolgi, does the Government an injustice with regard to Russia. I do not know and I do not care whether Russia is a great democracy, as he thinks, or whether it is a dictatorship on Fascist lines, where the savings of individuals amount to over 5,000,000,000 roubles and are daily increasing. I do not even want to consider whether this great democracy can parallel the horrors with which the noble and gallant Lord has entertained us as happening in Germany, when villages of Red Russians—the most singularly attractive, in my opinion, of all the Russian races—are surrounded by soldiers, their food is confiscated, their identity cards are invalidated, and men, women and children are left to starve amid a ring of wolfish eyes. These things do not concern us at all. It is not our business.
Diplomatically one only feels awkward with Russia when she refuses to respect the integrity of other countries and the personality of the Governments which they wish to represent them. That is precisely my objection to the general foreign policy advocated by noble Lords on the Benches opposite. Time and again they have explained that it consists in holding out hands to what they consider to be cognate elements in other countries with whose Governments they are not in sympathy. This is a policy which certainly must lead to disaster. It is an insult not to the Governments alone but also to the peoples they represent, and history shows how fatal that is. It has not helped the Russian Government to-day, it did not help the revolutionary Government of France, and, to go as far back as the Peloponnesian War, it brought down one of the greatest civilisations of the world to the dust. One word by the Leader of the noble Lords opposite will suffice. On at least one occasion last summer, speaking of Italy and of Germany, the noble Lord, Lord Snell, referred to "our enemies." If he had been on the other side of the House and in power, such a word would almost have amounted to a declaration of war. It would certainly have produced a situation similar to that

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of this country in the reign of Queen Elizabeth with the Government of Spain.
We have heard much of the verdict of history, but I really think that the verdict of history would have condemned any Government who were prepared to sacrifice millions of British lives in a kind of Balaclava charge of the nation to prevent an event which had already happened. Quite apart from that, the only weapon we could use against Germany was that of a blockade. When the Berliner Tageblatt announces that the deaths of babies under one year old amount to four hundred a week, our blockade is effective; when the number falls to three hundred and eighty, our blockade is not doing its duty. That is the barometer of war, and I think it is a great thing not to be put in a position where we must do these things to other countries. Lord Snell accuses the British Government of wallowing in our own affairs. What else ought they to wallow in? I wish it were more true. Our Government is not a Sancho Panza, to stretch its arm and say that, after all, it is a fine thing to ride about the world righting wrongs, and to go out and take counsel with its donkey. I agree with Lord Ponsonby: let us right the wrongs at our doors, and learn from the Bible who is our neighbour.
Lord Strabolgi said that it would have been better for the Czechs if we had made it quite clear last summer that we had no interests or commitments in Central Europe. I agree, and I suppose that what the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, said represents one of the penalties of not having done so. But it does not lie with Lord Strabolgi to say that, because the whole of last summer, at every foreign affairs debate, the noble Lords opposite made it abundantly clear that if the Government had wished to do that—I am not saying they did, but if they had wished to do that—the noble Lords opposite and their Party were prepared to raise such a storm of invective, misrepresentation and obloquy in the country that no Government, probably, could have stood against it. After all, what is the position of noble Lords opposite? No Government did more to weaken the military resources of the nation than they did when they were in power. Out of power, when—too late, I am afraid—the National Government became alive to their duty in this direction, that Party obstructed them. The noble Lord who
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speaks for organised Labour—a Party which, by the way, is organised on purely Fascist lines—made it quite clear that, unless their advice were adopted, they would do all in their power to obstruct the Government in fulfilling this essential duty. This is the very course of action which they condemn in Herr Henlein. But Herr Henlein has an excuse which they have not, for the Labour Party, whether they like it or not, are of one blood and are one people with ourselves.
Lord Strabolgi repeated that yesterday, and if we may take it, as I suppose we may, that organised Labour is opposed to the Government in this matter, then I humbly represent to your Lordships that the Government should take steps to ascertain whether that is the case. That is a claim of the Labour Party that no Government should tolerate: that Party leaders, ejected from power by the country, lacking the vast amount of special knowledge which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack indicated to us yesterday, should irresponsibly dictate from behind the scenes the policy of the Government, careless of its success or failure. I have been astonished at the patience of His Majesty's Government in this regard, and I wonder that they have tolerated this pretension. I could say more. The only rational explanation of the conduct of a Party which weakens its country's defences, which inflames the people to war, and which tries to precipitate that war at a moment when we are by no means ready, is that they are willing to face any disaster in order to force a violent revolution. I do not for a moment believe that noble Lords opposite are revolutionaries. I do not for one moment believe that; but that is the only logical explanation of their conduct that I can find.
Now I should like to turn for a moment to the policy of His Majesty's Government, which I support. It is a considered policy. They have more information than I have, and I am quite prepared to follow them. But I do share the distrust expressed in all quarters of the House about the guarantees. The difficulty was put as strongly by the noble Viscount the Foreign Secretary as by anybody else. I think it is rather like guaranteeing the boundaries of a biscuit in a dog's throat because you have patted him once. But I am sure that the noble Viscount has nothing to learn from me

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on this point, and that he is as passionately interested in the security and honour of the country as I am. Guarantees are nasty things, as I have found myself, and I should be grateful for any elucidation which he can give us. Another point which troubles me, and to which the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, referred, is that of the loans. I do not hold any Czech bonds and I am not interested in any way, but I do not see why a country's credit should be impaired and its good name should suffer through an event of this kind out of which we certainly draw some profit. I should be grateful for anything which the noble Viscount could say on this subject.
In conclusion, I would say this. One thing is clear. A man must be woefully ignorant of what is going on in the world not to realise that whether we approve of it or not—and from every quarter of the House there are indications that sections of the House do approve of it—the Prime Minister's action has given him a position in Europe only exceeded by that of the Duke of Wellington a hundred years ago. With that position has come an opportunity for the settlement of outstanding questions which must be exploited to the fullest possible extent. For this purpose it should be made clear to Europe that he has the unanimous support of his own country. From what has passed here, and in another place, it is clear that certain sections of political thought are not behind him, and I think he should take steps to ascertain whether they are backed by any body of opinion in the country; because if he has the unstinted support of his own country, and uses to the full the great gifts which he possesses, he may be able to secure, for many years in future, not merely peace, but more than peace—that sense of security and opportunity without which no single one of us can get the best out of himself in the tasks which lie before him.
LORD AILWYN: My Lords, "we may have cause for thankfulness, but not for pride." These words caught my eye in one of the many letters written to the Press in these recent anxious days, and it occurred to me that they summed up in the fewest possible words one's own feeling on the situation presented to us to-day. War has been averted, with all its attendant horrors and miseries and
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waste of precious lives—for the present. The whole nation responded splendidly, with calm and steadfast resolution, when the call came, in a way in which one knows the nation always will respond if they are assured that the cause is a just one. A great fillip was given to the matter of air raid precautions, plans for evacuation, home defence, and so on; and we have had the outstanding spectacle of real courage, initiative and resource so magnificently displayed by the Prime Minister. Finally, we have had the clear proof of an inherent will and desire for peace among the people of this country and the peoples of the world.
For all this we are profoundly thankful. How about the other side of the picture? A little country is in process of dismemberment—a country that regarded us as their friend—a country in whose beautiful capital I was privileged to walk and with whose people one mingled three short weeks ago. Now, one reads that it is unwise to be an Englishman in Prague to-day. A Czech General returns his British and French decorations because these great countries deserted his people in the hour of their greatest need. Those historic frontiers of Bohemia are no more—frontiers that have stood these thousand years. Was this indeed inevitable? One hears from those who have made a protracted study of those regions that 50 per cent. of Herr Henlein's followers have no desire for union with the Reich, and that tens of thousands of Sudetens look forward with anxiety and fear to their incorporation within the Nazi State. Certain it is that only since the occupation of Austria has this cry for deliverance been heard and the tale of atrocities and torture been told.
Mistakes in administration there may have been, grievous errors of judgment there doubtless were, but can it be doubted whence came the encouragement to these German folk to stir up trouble and manufacture hysterical complaints? The Sudetens and the Czechs have lived side by side, uneasily it may be, through all these hundreds of years. Is it forgotten that before the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire they managed to live together reasonably amicably under a long succession of Czech Kings? It is no new thing, therefore, the Sudetens living under alien rule during these last twenty years. Moreover, we have been told that the treatment of this

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particular minority compared very favourably with that of every other minority in Europe. Was dismemberment, therefore, the only course? We have been told that this country had no obligation towards Czechoslovakia. That claim has been categorically denied by the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, and others, who reminded your Lordships of the fact that as a Member of the League of Nations we are emphatically pledged, by Article 10, to preserve this little country's territorial integrity and political independence. I would wish to add my small voice in upholding that incontrovertible pronouncement of the noble Viscount, and in refuting that other claim.
It is all very well for noble Lords to sneer at and abuse the League of Nations. It is fashionable in these days to pour scorn on Geneva and all its works, but one regrets profoundly such attacks as those we have listened to in the speeches of certain noble Lords. It is so easy to ridicule and point out the many failures; it is so convenient to ignore the few successes. Even if there had been no successes to register on the credit side, I should still strongly disagree with the contention that twenty years is a long enough period fully to test the efficacy and practicability of a new and great ideal. It may well be, and is probably the fact, that the League requires overhauling in some of its machinery and reforming in certain particulars, but I venture to say that it will be a bad day for this country, and the Empire, and for civilisation, when a British Government is to be found that will repudiate the principles and great ideals for which the League stands. Courage is required to rebuild that fabric. Vision and steadfast purpose and unflinching faith are required if the reign of law is to overcome the reign of force. Until that day dawns there can, of course, be no doubt that we must relax no single effort to bring up our defences to the required standard. Until the world recovers from its present madness in thinking that the piling up of armaments is going to avert war, we must continue to spend our substance in this utterly frightful and unprofitable manner. It is the only language, alas! that is really understood by certain leaders in Europe to-day.
I wish I could share the faith that certain noble Lords appear to have in Herr
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Hitler's latest assurances. By what process of thought they are enabled to have confidence in those assertions I am quite unable to discover. We have seen just how much his word has really meant, not once, not twice, not thrice. For my part I have no illusions. For the rest, we have got to realise that we have suffered a severe diplomatic defeat and, with it, can anyone doubt, a grievous loss to our moral prestige. Peace has been achieved for the moment, but one looks in vain for the justice that should have accompanied it. I search and search and am unable to find that justice without which in my opinion this peace cannot be said to be peace with honour.
It is painful for me, a very junior member of your Lordships' House, to be it seems the solitary one who sits on these Benches to strike what must appear to be a discordant note. But if one feels strongly and deeply enough about any principle that appears to be at stake and that conflicts with one's conscience I feel it is one's duty to give expression to those feelings in whatever quarter of the House one may be sitting. I should like to end, if I may, with an expression of heartfelt admiration of and sympathy for the noble Viscount the Foreign Secretary in all his immense labours and deep anxieties (luring these last weeks and months; and, finally, to Czechoslovakia, with a word of respectful tribute to the calm courage and dignity of President Benes, and to the dauntless discipline and resolution of the people of that little country whose agonising trials and sufferings we are silently witnessing to-day.
VISCOUNT ASTOR: My Lords, in the few observations which I shall make I shall try to avoid covering the ground and the points which have been so fully dealt with in the three days' debate. But, like others, I do wish to pay a personal tribute to the Prime Minister and to the Foreign Secretary—to the Prime Minister for his tenacious determination to save peace, to the Foreign Secretary for his calm judgment and selfless loyalty to the Prime Minister, which he showed in an ever-changing and an extraordinarily difficult situation. We are all grateful that we have escaped war, but I think that the debate of the last three days has shown that few can be entirely satisfied with all the happenings of the past. Listening to the debate—and I think I

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have heard most of the speeches—I have been struck by one thing, and that was a certain unreality in the speeches of many noble Lords. Many of the speakers have seemed to think that the only question before the Government and those in a position of authority and responsibility was how to do the right thing in the abstract, as if they were in a Court of Law with pacifist litigants prepared to accept the calm judgment meted out from the bench; whereas in fact the real issue has been how to do the best in the circumstances in which those in responsibility found themselves—circumstances due to happenings not only of the past weeks and months but of the past years, going back even over twenty years.
I noticed that one noble Lord said something to the effect that all countries which loved peace would advance to assist Czechoslovakia. He apparently took it for granted that all were ready for armed advance and that this armed advance on their part would lead to overwhelming success. The basic fact is that recently we have been witnessing power politics, and when you are facing power politics what counts is not heads of population, as some seem to think, because on that basis China would be one of the most powerful countries in the world. What counts when you are in a situation such as this are the numbers of guns and aeroplanes and other forms of arms and armaments which can be mustered; what counts in circumstances such as these are the training and efficiency of man-power and the potential immediate industrial output of the nations that may be at war.
As I say, many of the speakers appear to me to have been speaking in an atmosphere of unreality. The noble and learned Lord who wound up the debate yesterday, when defending the Government and answering some of the Government's critics, said that they, the critics, do not know what the Government have known. I wish it had been possible for us—I am not sure it would not be even a good thing now—to have a secret Session. During the War I was present on more than one occasion in another place when there were secret Sessions. In an emergency such as this information can be given which obviously cannot be given when one is speaking as we are to-day. It is only in a secret Session
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that Ministers could give more facts—perhaps not the complete facts, but more facts—than they can in an open debate in Parliament, and facts which, I am convinced, would have enabled them to increase the support for their actions during the past few days. And another point. It is only in a secret Session that the supporters and the critics can discuss steps to increase our preparedness and so be satisfied that in future we shall be in a stronger position to negotiate. We must all have been struck by the wonderful public response and the public spirit displayed by our people during this hour of trial, and it is because of that that it seems to me unfair to a gallant people such as ours to invite them to face the ordeal of modern war, and all the horrors that accompany modern war, unless we can guarantee that they will have the fullest protection and efficiency. We have a testing time ahead of us, as I see it.
We were told some years ago that you must make the world safe for democracy. It seems to me that our task now is to make democracy safe for the world. The danger facing us, as I see it, is not coming to us from Dictators. I see two dangers. One is that we sink back into lethargy saying, "Thank Heaven we have escaped the horrors of war." And the other danger is that we drop into Party politics, with recriminations and misrepresentations and half-truths. Those, I believe are two real dangers which are facing the country to-day. In a democracy such as ours there are always politicians who are bound to have an eye on the next Election. I have no personal knowledge, but I have no doubt that in every Party today there are astute politicians who are considering how to win the next Election. The question before us is not how to win the next Election, the question which is facing the country is how to safeguard peace and improve our defences.
We listened to the speech of the noble Earl, the late Prime Minister, yesterday. He made a strong appeal, with the full weight of his authority, to mobilise industry. It seems to me that that is vital. We have got to redouble our efforts in making our preparations for defence. It seems to me that success in that effort—increasing our industrial output, and by industrial output I mean the output of armaments—is only possible if we obtain

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the wholehearted support of trade union leaders. It is only possible if we get the active aid of the best captains of industry, and it is only possible if those with privilege and with wealth are ready to make the necessary sacrifices. The future of this country depends upon all our people, especially the young, appreciating that our form of government and civilisation, with its precious heritage of liberty, can only survive if every one feels he has duties to perform for the nation and that the performance of these duties is as important as claiming individual rights.
During the past weeks we have looked into an abyss. According to the papers, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and various Ministers responsible for Defence have invited leaders of the Opposition, of other political Parties, and of the trade unions to meet them in private confidential conference. They have consulted with each other. I have no doubt that if the tragedy of war had come there would have been the most active and willing co-operation between the leaders of all Parties. Is it too much to hope that during the coming months—months of anxiety and also months of hope—our defence preparations can be removed from the arena of Party politics? Is it too much to urge the leaders of all Parties that they should have an agreed defence programme and unite in carrying out this programme in time? If the leaders of the different political Parties are big enough to do this, I am convinced they will get an overwhelming and wonderful response from the people of this country.
THE EARL OF GLASGOW: My Lords, I shall not keep your Lordships more than a few minutes. On November 17 of last year I took part in a foreign affairs debate in your Lordships' House. I said then that the time had come to shake hands with Germany and try to get France to do the same, and that we should trust Herr Hitler, who had never broken any treaty he signed with other countries. All this was very coldly received by your Lordships, and I got more than one rap over the knuckles. Since then the turn of the wheel, as instanced by the Prime Minister's splendid stand for peace, has brought an amicable settlement with Germany within sight. And I cannot depart from that without paying the tribute, which has been so ably paid
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already by many of your Lordships, to the gallant Czech nation which has sacrificed so much for the peace of Europe.
Whatever settlement we may arrive at with Germany, we have got to recognise that events at this moment are moving rapidly towards a situation in which Germany will become the greatest land Power in the world and the master of Europe. I often wonder whether our leaders, under the present system of Parliamentary institutions and immersed as they must be in the things of the moment, are able to look forward and prepare for the future—whether, in fact, they are able to take the long-term view and take measures beforehand to meet the situations which will arise. If they are, then it must be apparent to them that, as the result of the inability of this country and France to stand by Czechoslovakia, the future outlook in Europe is completely changed. France and ourselves will soon be entirely isolated from the rest of Europe. I am not speaking, of course, of the Scandinavian countries. Germany is losing no time. Already feelers have been put forward to Lithuania and Yugoslavia for an all-in trade agreement with Germany, and that means, of course, that no other country will be allowed to trade with these countries. Czechoslovakia and other countries in the Danube basin will, no doubt, follow suit, and naturally will prefer to go with a strong Germany than against her.
That means that British trade will be excluded from all these countries. We know, as history shows, that any country which succeeds in obtaining economic power in Europe shuts out British trade, and that has been one of the chief incentives to British Governments in the past for the keeping of the balance of power and the prevention of the dominance of one country in Europe. I wonder if the Government have taken these points into consideration. Germany, having realised her ambition to be the greatest and the dominating Power in Europe to-day, may possibly decide to launch out for world power. Whatever trust we may have in Herr Hitler, I am not sure I would put the same trust in his successor, and it is quite possible that he will not continue through, at any rate, our lifetime. Are these possible developments in the mind of the Government? If they are, there is

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only one answer and that is to arm and arm. Let us have the greatest Air Force and the greatest Navy in the world. Let us now—for now is the opportunity—register every man and woman in the country in the service of the nation. Then, and only then, can we meet recurring crises with equanimity and command that respect which will ensure us a fair deal and possible security.
LORD GRENFELL: My Lords, I must ask your usual kindness for one who is speaking in your Lordships' House for the first time. I wish to put forward my views as one of the younger members who, having left the Army two years ago, was ready at any moment to be called up during those dark hours which are now past. During those hours I thought over the question very strongly, and I had very mixed feelings. What were we going to fight for? To my mind Czechoslovakia could never have been saved, and the only thing I could feel we were going to fight for was the extermination of Germany. None of us wanted that, and how could we have done it? The last twenty years since the Great War have, to my mind, shown us that in modern warfare neither side wins. It is havoc for years, and it takes many years to recover. We have just started to recover, and are we to be plunged back into another Armageddon? These years have also proved that a beaten nation must either be exterminated or must be helped immediately. Germany was not exterminated, but she was surrounded and was not helped, and from that desperate nation arose Herr Hitler. That is history that I need not go into. Let me turn for one moment to Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia is by no means a beaten nation, but she needs help, and I can only say how delighted I am that the Government are sending them money.
I come to the future. There is one thing I feel very, very strongly. One of those nights before the Prime Minister spoke I was walking through Hyde Park. I saw trenches being dug, and I saw the anti-aircraft guns, and the thought came to me, "So much to do and so little time to do it in." Let us go ahead with air-raid precautions as fast as we possibly can. Never let us send out men to fight in a war unless they realise that their loved ones at home have the possibility of safety. May I suggest one
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thing? There has always been a great difficulty in peace, as I found when I was in the Army, to get people to be gas-minded. They will never believe in the need of it till the great moment perhaps comes when they will need their respirators. I suggest that the Government should broadcast occasionally from the B.B.C. to let our people know the innermost fact of safety. Let the people know what to do with their respirators. And not only that, add to your air-raid precautions a little first-aid instruction. People will not go to a meeting on a wet night, but they will sit indoors and listen to the radio, and will probably take in what is said to them.
May I finish with my very humble tribute to the Prime Minister and the noble Viscount who stood so firmly by him? They say that Atlas carried the world on his shoulders, but I think one may say that our Prime Minister not only carried the world but he carried the whole future of civilisation too on his shoulders. I look forward to the future with a great trust. I will not say as some people have said that war never can be, but I do say that our Prime Minister has opened the way to a great chance and may he go forward with talks and, not only talks but trade agreements, for the one great thing which I think may come in the future is not a belligerent League of Nations but an economic League of Nations.
LORD KENILWORTH: My Lords, in rising to speak, I do so having heard many points of view expressed. Most of those have been personal opinions, and the speakers themselves have touched on the effect of the Prime Minister's and the Government's action in relation to certain classes of the community. Of the speeches the most illuminating and the most important in my view was the wise speech of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, to whom your Lordships should be greatly indebted. I now venture to put before your Lordships' House the view of the plain man who, in the first instance, is full of deep gratitude to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Government for what they have done. This has already been expressed in more eloquent and fitting words than I am capable of using; but your plain man is also thinking of something more. The war to end wars, as he was told, ended nearly twenty years ago. During that period he has noted

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that more agreements and treaties have been concluded than ever before in a similar period; conferences and meetings have taken place; and where does he stand to-day? So far as peace is concerned he is worse off than before the war. In an endeavour to trace the effects of these agreements, treaties and conferences, we find hat most of the evils arise from the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. The former is as good as dead. The latter has brought about misunderstandings and has led to serious disputes between great countries of the world. Is it not time, therefore, to scrap many of these things and start afresh? Cannot understandings or an entente be brought about between great nations and thus lead to a better state of affairs, more particularly in Europe? Why, the plain man asks, should States, say, in South America, be called in to enable European countries better to understand each other? Thus the plain roan. May I hope that from this beginning some better method than spectacular meetings may develop for the benefit of the plain man's home and family. Finally, if peace is to be the aim and object of our endeavours, may he have to listen to fewer warlike speeches, and may it even be that, at the end of twenty years after the Armistice, the Services on that day, having outlived their inception and the character of our devotion, will tend not so much to the glorification of the useless sacrifices of war as to earnest prayers for the maintenance of peace.
LORD NEWTON: My Lords, this debate has continued for three days, and there is naturally nothing new I can add to it except perhaps to congratulate my noble friend behind me (Lord Grenfell) on his first appearance as a speaker here. I congratulate him all the more because he expressed sentiments with which I agree myself, or at E.11 events with some of them. My real object in rising was to offer a very few observations upon some of the speeches that have been made, more particularly on the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, and the noble Earl, Lord Lytton. What I gathered from both those speeches was that underlying their arguments was a convinced belief that Herr Hitler all the time was bluffing. I should describe Herr Hitler as a neurotic enthusiast who is incapable of bluffing. Look what he has done. Months ago he called out something
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like 2,500,000 men. I believe that is more or less the correct figure. You do not do that merely for the look of the thing. Those men have been kept at enormous expense for months and months, and when you tell me they were merely for show and self-glorification I absolutely decline to believe it. It is no good noble Lords of the Opposition bringing forward objections to the Government policy unless they can present an alternative. There is only one alternative and that alternative was going to war.
Let us consider for a moment what would have happened if we had gone to war. What would have happened, obviously, would have been this. Hitler with his million and a half men would have occupied and overrun Czechoslovakia. The French would have moved into the Maginot line and there, presumably, they would have remained, for it would have been extremely difficult for them to advance. The Russians, on their side, would have taken the immobility of the French as an excuse to do nothing themselves. What would have happened to us? The real work would have fallen upon us, because the two other Powers would have come to us and said: "Now it is your duty to blockade Germany." Consider what that means. We should presumably have undertaken the task. With extreme good fortune we might have been able to maintain the blockade over a long period, without losing most of our ships, without falling out with other Powers in the Mediterranean and without being attacked in the Far East, and we might eventually have tired the Germans out. But by that time Europe would have been ruined. It would not have been worth while trying to save Czechoslovakia or anything else. That would have been the result if the policy of war had been adopted.
I confess openly that as I stand here I feel deeply the humiliation of the situation, humiliation which is only mitigated by the fact that it is due to the action of the British Prime Minister that the catastrophe of another world war has been avoided. But you cannot get away from the fact that Herr Hitler has achieved about the greatest triumph in modern history. He has successfully defied and browbeaten both this country and France, and if anybody disputes that statement I would like to ask them what particular object for which he asked he

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has failed to obtain. It appears to me that he has got everything he wanted, and on the other hand all we have to show—although I admit it is inestimable—is that we have succeeded in temporarily preventing world war.
I have said I feel a considerable amount of humiliation with regard to the position in which we are placed, but there is another feeling which I entertain and which possibly I am the only person here to entertain. My own personal view is that we need never have been mixed up in this dispute at all. I have always thought that the question of Czechoslovakia might well be considered to be outside our scope and there must be many people—though I do not think any of them are here—who hold that opinion. We are fortified in that opinion by what took place, because when Ministers were cross-examined in various ways as to our policy in Czechoslovakia the impression was conveyed—chiefly, I think, by my noble friend Viscount Halifax—that we were not committed. Then the position gradually altered. Under presumably French influence we were drawn more or less into the position of being responsible, and our responsibility has now gone so far that we are undertaking the financial responsibility of relieving Czechoslovakia. Well, I cannot help thinking that we should not have intervened, that we should have said to the French years ago "If you like to make arrangements with your Russian friends, or if you like to make an arrangement with Czechoslovakia in order to complete your iron ring round Germany, do so, but we are not going to take any part in it, and if you get into any trouble at all with Poland or Czechoslovakia you must get out of the difficulty yourselves with the assistance of your Russian friends."
That, I maintain, was the proper position that we ought to have taken up and which apparently we had taken up. But, as I said just now, we have glided into a position of greater responsibility almost than anybody else. I cannot help thinking, looking back at the circumstances, that it would have been better even for Czechoslovakia if we had not intervened at all. I have a certain knowledge of Czechoslovakia. I was in the country, in fact, only a few weeks ago, and every person with whom I talked was under the impression that the question
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would be settled eventually by negotiation. I firmly believe that the disorders which broke out in the part where I was staying at the time were quite unexpected. I believe, as I say, that it would have been better for the Czechs themselves if they had not been championed by ourselves and the French and had been left alone to settle their differences with the Sudetens and the Germans. At all events, whatever the result, it could not have been worse than what they are going through now.
I can only repeat that I view the present situation as one of almost humiliation as far as we are concerned. I listened yesterday to the noble Earl, Lord Baldwin, who I think wound up his eloquent speech by a declaration that he had never been a pessimist. Well, I am afraid I am a pessimist. I cannot look upon the present aspect of things with an optimistic view. It seems to me we have nothing but danger of war and disorders of all kinds in front of us. For my part, the only satisfactory event which has taken place during the momentous two or three weeks which have just elapsed is the fact that a British Prime Minister has been the individual who, by his courage and determination, has saved the world from the unutterable disaster of another world war.
LORD ILIFFE: My Lords, I for one am most grateful to the Prime Minister for the steps he took to avoid war. He was courageous, energetic, persevering. He saved Czechoslovakia from the horrors of war in their territory and he saved us from the catastrophe of a world war. The settlement in my opinion is one which all reasonable men should approve. A member of your Lordships' House, the noble Viscount, Lord Runciman, was appointed as an independent observer and mediator. What did Lord Runciman advise? He said there could be no permanent settlement unless territory was ceded. If we had proposed that on the recommendation of the noble Viscount, and if the Czechoslovak Government had agreed, no one would have questioned our action. Herr Hitler made the same stipulation and threatened war, but though we may resent his action that does not make the ultimate settlement less just and proper. If that is accepted we may still deplore the method of transfer, but method is of small account compared with

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the bigger issue, that is, the actual transfer of territory. The crime of engaging in a world war for so small an issue would never have been forgiven. I personally thank the Prime Minister for his courage. If war had come we should none of us have had a day's happiness for the rest of our lives. Everyone would have been affected, and not least the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans themselves.
As I have said, I believe war was averted because of the action of the Prime Minister. The negotiations which he initiated gave time for the forces of peace to assert themselves. The mobilisation of the Fleet two weeks earlier, in my view, would have brought about war immediately, but during the fortnight's grace which was gained by the Prime Minister the German population became aware of the position. Public opinion amongst the people of Germany began to assert itself. Other peace forces became vocal, and the German Chancellor began to hesitate. He realised that war would be unpopular among the peoples both of Germany and Italy. We mobilised the Fleet at the right moment. It was, in my view, a question of timing. I am grateful to the Prime Minister for giving the German Chancellor an opportunity for reflection. War with all that that entails was averted entirely by the action of Mr. Neville Chamberlain.
LORD REA: My Lords, there have been two points of similarity in practically all the speeches delivered both here and in another place. Firstly, there has been unstinted and thoroughly deserved praise of the Prime Minister for his courage, his initiative and pertinacity in saving us from the imminent danger of war. Secondly, we have had an endless and mostly unprofitable discussion on the events leading up to the crisis, as to which I would only venture to say that history alone, with a knowledge of all the facts, can decide whether recent events amount to a humiliating surrender or to the triumph of common sense. But one thing has been lacking in almost all the speeches, and that is my excuse for troubling your Lordships for a few minutes to-day: that is, a consideration of how we are to meet the new situation that has arisen. There has, of course, been talk—endless talk—of the need for further rearmament and additional preparedness for a future crisis, but these
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are the commonplaces of controversy and, necessary though they may be, carry us no farther towards the solution of the problem we have to face.
Let me put it quite bluntly. If we have to face war again, it must almost inevitably be under less favourable conditions than prevailed last week; for not only have we lost a brave and well-equipped ally, able to hold up a German Army which I have heard estimated at anything from 15 to 30 divisions, but inevitably, as things stand, we shall lack the support of those smaller nations who have hitherto looked to us but must now make such terms as they can with a dominant and apparently victorious neighbour. From that point of view the prospect is bleak indeed, leading only through ever increasing armaments to inevitable war. There is, however, another side of the question to which no one seems to have thought it worth while to draw more than the briefest attention, and which yet seems to indicate the way out. The declaration signed by the Prime Minister and Herr Hitler indicates the possibility of the opening of a new era of discussion and mutual understanding. But far more important is the evidence from last week's events of the overwhelming anxiety of the people of all nations for peace. This has led, for the moment at any rate, to a desire to understand the other person's point of view, and has created a mass of international good will which is of the most inestimable value if it can be, to use a colloquialism, "cashed" at once. But it is of the utmost importance that time should not be allowed for it to cool off.
The Prime Minister no doubt has in mind the settlement of outstanding questions with Germany and Italy, and we wish him well in these negotiations, provided he does not give too much away. I am told that these negotiations have failed in the past because intolerable diplomatic delays have thrown doubt on our good faith, and here at any rate the Prime Minister has shown us the better way. What I want to urge is that such negotiations should spread much further afield. The smaller nations view us with some suspicion, but they too have the will to peace to-day, and by prompt action, coupled with a willingness to make some sacrifice on our part, we can heal many sores. Trade and tariffs are at the

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bottom of much of the trouble, and the van Zeeland Report indicates a line of advance. A Danubian Convention is not an impossibility with the world in its present frame of mind, and we know that the Low Countries and Scandinavia have made efforts to come together, efforts which, sad to relate, were blocked by the intervention of this country. Can we not take an active part in bringing about such reconciliation, which need imply no hostility to either Germany or Italy, if indeed they could not eventually be brought in? And as to Russia, too, if we can deal with totalitarian Germany and Italy, must we confine our civilities to times when we seek her military aid?
But of far the greatest importance is it that we should put ourselves right with the United States of America. That great sister democracy, having gone far to support us, is now puzzled and hesitating. We need to send all the emissaries possible, official and unofficial, to explain our position; and something more tangible is called for if she is not to relapse into her attitude of aloofness and mistrust. We hear that the negotiations for the Anglo-American Tariff Convention are almost completed. Let us push it forward with the utmost speed. And, further, I would urge that a real effort should be made to bring about a definite settlement of the American Debt question, which, like a running sore, threatens to poison all our relations and yet, I am convinced, could be settled on generous terms to us if we had but the courage to face it.
That is the plea I make: that while armaments to an ever more burdensome degree may be a necessary palliative in our present situation, they offer no permanent solution. But the present moment, when the nations of the world have been brought face to face with the terrible reality of imminent war on a modern scale, offers an opportunity, similar to that of 1919 but without the passions then aroused, for real conciliation if only someone has the courage to give a lead. It is said we have lost prestige, but, whether that be so or not, we still have enough left to give a lead to the world; and the plea I make is that we should use it not only to ensure our military security, but also to bring about that appeasement among the nations for which in these recent weeks the whole
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world has shown it is not only ready but eager.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, only a few hours ago there appeared in the Press news of an alleged dispute in the International Commission over the further settlements in Czechoslovakia. If this is so, it is impossible not to foresee further serious disputes in which His Majesty's Government may be engaged. I feel obliged to remember that, as the noble Viscount, the Foreign Secretary, said in his speech two days ago, failing settlement by negotiation the threat of war must on occasion be offered. That threat of war, if it is successful, leads to the forstalling of war and therefore to the maintenance of peace. It is idle to speculate whether or not the threat of war in the hands of the Prime Minister during his recent conversations was as effective as we should like it to have been, but the fact remains that if such a threat is offered and is to be an effective threat, it must be backed by real power to intervene with force of arms at the desired time and place. There must in fact be a continuing security, not to be achieved by tardy or hurried preparations for war and not only to be offered at certain times and places. It must be apparent to those with whom we have occasion to negotiate.
No doubt there will be an opportunity later in the year for a debate on our preparations for national defence, but the pace of events is so hot now that I feel it would be unwise to leave this word unsaid for three weeks or a month. It would be understandable if, in the reaction that was felt by the public on realising that war had been averted, those who had freely given their services felt that the object for which those services had been given had been achieved. It would be likewise understandable if those who are responsible for spending the public funds on preparations for national defence thought they might turn now to economy. I wish I could share those views. I cannot share them. I feel that, much as we should like to relax our preparations now, that relaxation is for the distant future. But the noble Lord who spoke last said that armaments were a commonplace of discussions of this kind, and I agree with him that they are a commonplace, but in the present shape that international negotiations take they are a commonplace which we must never forget. I feel there

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is no justification for any slackening in our preparations for national defence, but that on the contrary it is our duty to press forward with those preparations which have already been made in anticipation of such an emergency and to correct such shortcomings as may have been revealed during the crisis. I trust that His Majesty's Government may see fit to give a clear lead to the public, so that there will not be any relaxing until the settlement has been fully implemented in the way that the Government desire. Only thus shall we strengthen the hands of the Prime Minister and of the Foreign Secretary, to whom we are so grateful for their recent efforts, and to whom we offer every good wish in the efforts which I am sure they will have to make for some time to come.
EARL STANHOPE: My Lords, we have had a very long debate, and I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I take up a certain amount of your time, although, fortunately, a good many of their Lordships who asked questions have gone away and therefore perhaps I need not weary your Lordships who remain by answering the questions of those who are not present. I think the Government have very little cause to complain of the volume of criticism which has been directed at them by the many speakers who have addressed your Lordships. Indeed I think there were only four or possibly five of whom I might say that they were hostile to the policy of the Government. They were Lords Strabolgi, Cecil, Lloyd and Lytton, and possibly also, I should add, Lord Ailwyn. I do not include Lord Snell as having been an entire opponent of the Government's policy. Indeed he said that he approved of what the Prime Minister had done, although he criticised the settlement, which I am prepared to admit none of us really likes. At any rate, I do not look upon him as an opponent, as I do look upon Lord Strabolgi. Nor do I look upon Lord Marley as an opponent, because I think he agreed with most of the things that the Government have done.
The debate has been remarkable in another direction, in that we have had no fewer than four maiden speeches, one from my old chief, Lord Baldwin, another from one with whom I worked for several happy years at the Admiralty, and yet another from Lord Grenfell,
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whom I hope we shall often hear again in this House. I think I was younger than he when I made my maiden speech, and a very trying business it was. Although very often our debates are dull, I think he will find, if he attends our sittings more often, that there is an attraction in them.
Many speakers have expressed deep sympathy with Czechoslovakia and that must be the feeling of all of us. None of us but can feel sympathy for a small and comparatively new nation which finds many miles of territory and many thousands of its citizens passing under the rule of another State. None of us but can admire the dignity, courage and self-control shown by the people and leaders, of that little country; but we must not let sentiment destroy our judgment. The troubles between Germans and Czechs are of no new origin. They were going on many years before the Austro-Hungarian Empire came into existence—
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: About a thousand years I think
EARL STANHOPE: And whoever has been the underdog on those occasions has always had cause, and considerable cause, of complaint about the treatment received from whoever it was who at that time happened to be the ruler. Unfortunately the Peace Treaties of 1919 did nothing to put that right, and no one criticised that fact more severely than did the Labour Party of the day, quite rightly as it has proved. I think all of us, and not least Czechoslovakia, are to blame for not having put that right sooner. It is a matter which we all realised would sooner or later develop into a crisis. Lord Davies yesterday asked why we did not bring the matter before the League of Nations and set up an equity tribunal. I have tried, on several occasions, to deal with Lord Davies, and as he is not here now, I am not going to waste time by trying once more to endeavour to deal with him, except to say that perhaps he and one other in your Lordships' House appear to run in blinkers. Running in blinkers, they only see what is right in front of them and not what is on either side, and therefore, like a horse which runs in blinkers, they are unable to see that there are any other horses on the course. If they would only take the blinkers off, they would realise that we

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are not the only nation which attends the proceedings of the League of Nations, and that although we have done our utmost to bring these matters before the League of Nations, unfortunately there is a law of unanimity which prevails, which makes it quite impossible to do anything of the kind. Lord Cecil knows very well that Article 19 cannot be brought into operation unless there is unanimity.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: I am reluctant to interpose, but as the noble Earl appeals to me I am bound to say that I do not quite agree with that view. It is true that no decision can be arrived at on that or any other matter without unanimity, but there is no reason why Article 19 should not be employed for the purpose of investigation and discussion, and the expression of a strong opinion, which, if strong enough, would probably be of decisive value in any dispute. If I may venture on an autobiographical detail, I urged very strongly that the Chinese unequal treaties should be brought before the League, but the forces of bureaucracy were too strong, I regret to say.
EARL STANHOPE: I am very glad of the correction. Perhaps I am more of a realist than my noble friend. I like to obtain a decision, and you cannot obtain a decision unless you can obtain unanimity on the matter. That is the difficulty which has always been confronting the League. Over and over again nations have said that it is useless to bring matters forward because other nations would oppose, and therefore you stultify the League by having matters brought forward, discussed, and then left on the table. We had a similar matter arising last week, and when Lord Lytton and other Peers take the view that the Government are doing their best to undermine the League, I would point out that if he would read the newspapers or keep his eyes open, he would have realised that even during the crisis representatives of His Majesty's Government have been out there trying to increase the influence of the League and trying to get an alteration of Article but that that was blocked by the fact that two nations refused to accept any vote of that character. We are doing our very best to strengthen the League and the noble Earl on the Cross
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Benches says the Government are doing their best to undermine it. That is the kind of criticism that is made by those who accept any sort of tittle-tattle in the League of Nations Union which they support.
And let me tell them something else which they have accepted which is only tittle-tattle. The noble Viscount opposite quoted a telegram which he said we had sent to the Czechoslovak nation in order to bring pressure to bear on them. It was a telegram which, quite rightly, he described as being such that if we had sent it he would not be prepared to hold up his head. We sent no such telegram. Perhaps your Lordships would like to hear the telegram which we did send. Here it is:
"You should at once join with your French colleague in pointing out to Czech Government that their reply in no way meets the critical situation which Anglo-French proposals were designed to avert, and if adhered to would, when made, public, in our opinion lead to an immediate German invasion. You should urge the Czech Government to withdraw this reply and urgently consider an alternative that takes account of realities. Anglo-French proposals remain in our view only chance of avoiding immediate German attack. On basis of the reply now under consideration I would have no hope of any useful result ensuing from a second visit to Herr Hitler, and Prime Minister would be obliged to cancel arrangement for it. We therefore beg Czech Government to consider urgently and seriously before producing a situation for which we could take no responsibility.
"We should of course have been willing to put Czech proposal for arbitration before the German Government if we had thought that at this stage there was any chance of its receiving favourable consideration. But we cannot for a moment believe that it would be acceptable now, nor do we think the German Government would regard the present proposition as one that is capable of being settled by arbitration as Czech Government suggest.
"If on reconsideration Czech Government feel bound to reject our advice, they must of course be free to take any action that they think appropriate to meet the situation that may thereafter develop.
"Please act immediately on receipt at whatever hour."
Rather a different telegram from that which the noble Viscount accepted as being the one which we had sent ! Is it not obvious that the only pressure that we could bring to bear on the Czech Government was to say that if they took certain action then we should not be prepared to stand behind them? That is

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the only pressure that we could bring, and that is what we did say, but we did not bring the kind of pressure that the noble Viscount suggested, nor did we put it into language such as that which he submitted to this House as being that which was used.
He said that we were hound to go to the support of Czechoslovakia, and so also did the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, yesterday. There was no commitment prior to Munich whatever, other than that which is contained under Article 10 of the Covenant, and he knows far better than I do that if that Article had been used by the nations of the world we should have had to intervene at every single crossing of a frontier which has taken place since the Covenant was inaugurated. In every single small dispute which happened in South America this country would have been compelled to take its part. The noble Viscount shakes his head, but you cannot apply it in one direction and not in another. It has either got to be accepted universally or else the thing becomes a total failure. That is in fact what has happened. I am sorry to say that, except that nations have themselves refused to break Article 10 has not meant that nations have accepted the obligations of the Covenant to undertake the protection of everybody else's frontier wherever somebody else might cross it. We have, of course, accepted amendments to Article 16 and various other Articles of the Covenant, which have been interpretations that have been accepted by all the nations of the world, and so far from trying to undermine the League of Nations, the action which we took last week, I have very little doubt, prevented other nations from leaving the League and reducing still further the membership of what should be an international body composed of all the nations of the world.
I want to get back to the question of Czechoslovakia. It is true that the Sudeten Germans have undoubtedly been less ill-treated than minorities in other countries, but it is also true that those Sudeten Germans have had a great deal to complain of. And indeed that is quite clear from Lord Runciman's Report. I think it was four years ago or more when I myself met Herr Henlein in London, and I asked him about the situation in the Sudeten area then, which he described to me. He told me of the extraordinarily
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low figure which was given as "dole" to those who were out of employment in that country. I forget what it was, but it was a few shillings a month. When I said, "How often does that enable your people to buy meat?" he told me that they had not had meat for several years. I asked him what was his hope of obtaining some improvement in their conditions. He said, "Unless I can obtain some improvement in their conditions I shall be unable to hold them for more than another six months or a year." Well, he held them a great deal longer than that.
But if your Lordships will turn to the Report of Lord Runciman you will get evidence far stronger than anything I can give you. Many of us have paid a tribute to the work which the noble Viscount, Lord Runciman, has done, but no tribute that we can give is, I think, adequate. He took on a thankless job at the request of my noble friend the Secretary of State, who, as I think he then described it, launched him into the Atlantic and left him there to navigate his way alone. And magnificently he has done it. And I at any rate am far more prepared to accept the opinion of Lord Runciman as an independent observer of recent conditions in Czechoslovakia than to accept the opinions of Professor Seton-Watson or anybody else, none of whom, I think, would themselves say that they came in as unprejudiced witnesses.
Let us see what Lord Runciman said. It is on page 6 of the first White Paper:
"I did my best to promote it"—
that is to say, a settlement within the frontiers of the Czechoslovak State—
"I did my best to promote it, and up to a point with some success, but even so not without misgiving as to whether, when agreement was reached, it could ever be carried out without giving rise to a new crop of suspicions, controversies, accusations and counter-accusations. I felt that any such arrangement would have been temporary, not lasting."
Then he goes on to say this:
"Further, it has become self-evident to me that those frontier districts between Czechoslovakia and Germany where the Sudeten population is in an important majority should be given full right of self-determination at once. If some cession is inevitable, as I believe it to be, it is as well that it should be done promptly and without procrastination. There is real danger, even a danger of civil war, in the continuance of a state of uncertainty. Consequently there are very

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real reasons for a policy of immediate and drastic action."
The Cabinet had the advantage of the attendance of Lord Runciman at the meeting which took place the day he returned from Czechoslovakia, and on the day also which saw the return of the Prime Minister from his first conversation at Berchtesgaden. He gave us information of that character, and a good deal more besides; and as a result of the guidance that was given us by Lord Runciman and in view of the facts which were placed before us from many directions, we came to the conclusion that the Government had no alternative whatever but to accept a policy of self-determination. We understood that, rather than a plebiscite, a policy of cession would be preferable to Dr. Benes and the other leaders in Czechoslovakia, and therefore the Anglo-French plan came into existence.
We felt impelled to advise the Czechoslovak Government to accept that plan, and we felt impelled also to urge that, as advised by Lord Runciman, it should be carried through with the utmost possible expedition. The Prime Minister returned to Germany, having attained the acceptance of that principle not only by his own Government here at home but also by the French Government and the Czechoslovak Government. But when he arrived at Godesberg, expecting only to have to settle questions of detail as to how that principle was to be carried into effect, he found, as he told members of another place, that Herr Hitler had not expected him to be able to obtain any such acceptance and had drawn up a plan of his own. It was a very different method from that which the Prime Minister had expected. There was no difference in principle, but there was of course a very great difference in method, and, as the Prime Minister described it, it was not a memorandum which he was asked to send to Czechoslovakia but nothing other than an ultimatum. That was therefore not a plan which we felt we could press the Czechoslovak Government to accept.
War then seemed imminent. As the most reverend Primate told your Lordships, when most of us had really given up hope of peaceful settlement, the Prime Minister, waking up one morning, drafted the two personal messages, one to Herr
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Hitler and the other to Signor Mussolini. Had it not been for the Anglo-Italian Agreement, with the arrangement of which with the Italian Government he had a great deal to do at an earlier date, any approach of course to Signor Mussolini would have been impossible. When Signor Mussolini received that message he acted with the utmost promptitude and despatch, as one would expect, and I think every one of us owes a real debt of gratitude to him for the great promptitude of the action he took in getting hold of Herr Hitler and getting him to arrange that conference. The Foreign Secretary has already pointed out how great was the difference between the arrangement made at Munich and that put forward in the German Memorandum at Godesberg. It followed, indeed, very closely the proposals put forward in the Anglo-French plan of September 19.
Your Lordships will realise that the strain which was put on the Prime Minister through all these proceedings was one such as it is almost impossible for us to realise, whatever his age, and he is no longer very young. It is a strain which I certainly could not have gone through. He talked on the first occasion with Herr Hitler from half-past five to a quarter past eight with only the interpreter present. When your Lordships realise that not only was the future of Czechoslovakia at stake, but also the future of millions of people in different parts of the world, your Lordships will realise that the strain of carrying on that conversation and following the translation of it at the end and of all the critical work he had to do before his departure, and after a long flight, was very heavy. There is nothing I can say, having been a wholehearted supporter of the Prime Minister's policy throughout all this crisis, which I can find adequate to describe my feelings for him. I can only say that the words of my noble friend Lord Baldwin yesterday were more than fully earned, and there is nothing I can add which is enough to cover the debt we owe to him.
But we also owe a debt to another member of the Government which has not been paid in full. My noble friend the Foreign Secretary has not told your Lordships that he worked out a plan to see what was possible in the way of a timetable to arrange the evacuation of the Czechoslovak people from the area which was to be handed over. It had obviously

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to be done in a very quick period, otherwise it would have been rejected by Herr Hitler. That plan, made out in conjunction with the French Government, was the basis of the time-table which formed the foundation of the Munich Agreement. It is thanks to my noble friend here that a practicable proposal was put forward which alone made that Munich Agreement possible. Your Lordships should know that that was due to my noble friend. The agenda was, I believe, largely due to Signor Mussolini, but the time-table that formed the foundation of the plan of retirement was due to my noble friend.
Some of your Lordships have said that if we had only made our position clear very much earlier this crisis would never have arisen. Several others of your Lordships pointed out that, apart from the speech of the Prime Minister in March, repeated again by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in August, the position was made abundantly clear over and over again, not only to Herr Hitler but to the other leading personalities in Germany. Nor is that all. Somewhere about September 12—certainly before the Nuremberg speech—we took certain action with the defensive Forces which we knew was likely to get known in Germany. It did get so known, and it was recognised there as the preliminary steps to mobilisation. It had a very considerable effect, and there can be no question whatever that there was no doubt in the minds of the German people or, at any rate, in the minds of the leaders of the German people that this country would very likely be drawn into a war if Germany chose to invade Czechoslovakia.
The reception which the Prime Minister received from the German people during each of his visits to Germany, increasing each time in intensity, showed that the German people also realised whither they were tending if they were going to go in the direction indicated by their preparations. When the Prime Minister received these tremendous signs of approval—not organised as they are sometimes in that kind of country, including Russia—it was obvious that they welcomed him as a statesman who had come to try to secure peace not only for his own country but for them too. Lord Cecil has said that he is convinced that at the time of the Munich Conference Herr Hitler had no intention of invading Czechoslovakia
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and would have given way. Perhaps I am in a better position to have internal knowledge than my noble friend, and I can assure him that that is not my conviction. I have not the smallest doubt whatever that if agreement had not been reached at Munich—and it was by no means easy to reach—Czechoslovakia would forthwith have been invaded. It is quite clear that the moral support of many nations, not least that of the United States of America, was firmly on our side. Moral support does not win battles. Moral support does not win war.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: That was not the opinion of Napoleon.
EARL STANHOPE: I understand Napoleon said battles are won by the big battalions.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: He said that the imponderables were four-fifths of the cause of victory.
EARL STANHOPE: Possibly, but imponderables were not intended to mean only moral support. I am sorry to disagree with my noble friend.
LORD STRABOLGI: Napoleon said God was on the side of the big battalions, and for that blasphemy he perished. I am trying to assist the noble Earl.
EARL STANHOPE: I am very much obliged to the noble Lord, but I should not like to accept either his guidance or his strategy on military affairs from what I have heard him say in this House. I wonder what Lord Chatfield was thinking when the noble Lord was associating himself with my noble friend on the Cross Benches as being an expert in these matters and as one who, no doubt, would be able to give such guidance as we hope to receive from Lord Chatfield.
If it had become an accepted principle that cession had to take place, and we agreed with Lord Runciman on the point that it was inevitable, it is obvious that it had to be carried out with the utmost promptitude, and, the Secretary of State's plan having been found to be workable, clearly it would have been nothing else than a mad act to declare war because we did not approve of the method. The noble Viscount, Lord Sankey, has asked, "Who has paid the price for peace?" There can be no doubt that by far the greatest part of the price has been paid by Czechoslovakia. Let

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us all acknowledge it; it is a very high price. But when noble Lords say that we sacrificed Czechoslovakia in order to save ourselves, perhaps they would consider what would have happened to Czechoslovakia if in fact we had gone to war.
Lord Mottistone told the House, from his experience at the time of the drawing up of the Versailles Treaty, that these frontiers were fixed because they were necessary for a strategical reason. I think there was another reason. It was that they formed the historical boundaries of Bohemia. Whether Field-Marshal Foch chose them because they were historic or because they were strategic, I do not know, but what I am quite certain of is this. If he had looked at the position Czechoslovakia is in to-day, he would not have chosen those boundaries as the most suitable for them to make their defence upon. It is perfectly true that with the Maginot line made round the western end of Czechoslovakia they had a very strong defence, although I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Trenchard, in saying that a boundary of a mountain range is by no means necessarily the best, particularly when it is a boundary that is held against a nation which is armed with a tremendous weight of artillery. Your positions are extremely conspicuous, and a vast weight of artillery can be brought against you, section by section. A frontier which is strongly defended and which lies on flat ground, on which you can get observations for your gunfire only from the air, is in many ways, according to modern military science, a stronger position than one that is sited on a mountain range.
But quite apart from that, let your Lordships look at the map at the end of the White Papers. So long as Austria remained in existence, the whole of that long strip at the southern side of Czechoslovakia was inhabited by a friendly neighbour which they had no reason to fear. That situation has ceased to exist. Austria has become a part of Germany. When you look at the map to-day, you have to realise that the whole of that southern side of Czechoslovakia is now open to Germany and that is where the German divisions were massed. That southern section of the Czechoslovak front had only begun to be defended since the Anschluss. It had no Maginot
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line, it had no defences which could keep the Germans from making their great attack. It had nothing to prevent their marching through and up the plain into Prague and to their getting absolutely behind the whole of the Maginot line, however strongly it was fortified with guns and all the other war materials.
Nothing could have saved Czechoslovakia. When you get a small country with a small population, the one thing you ought to try and do is to shorten the length of the line that they have to hold. We ourselves saw that in a very minor way in the Great War. I well remember having fought on the Ypres front for many months at various times, and our having at last managed to get to the top of the Passchendaele heights of the Ypres salient. Does any one think those little hills were not an advantage to us compared to sitting in the mud at the bottom of the valley as we had done for years and having spent heaven knows how many thousands of lives to get to the top of those hills? Yet in 1918, when we were short of men, we found it profitable to go out of the salient and back into the muddy grounds below, and we did so because the bottom was necessarily a shorter length of line and released men to go and fight elsewhere. Therefore, when noble Lords talk about sacrificing the Maginot line and therefore weakening Czechoslovakia let them realise that there is another side to that question. With the south open to a German attack as it is, that Maginot line is useless, and by prolonging that great salient you give the Czechs a longer line to hold and you weaken their man power by lengthening the line they have to defend.
Anybody can realise that the situation being what it is to-day, nothing that we could have done could have saved Czechoslovakia, and it was made perfectly clear to the Prime Minister by Herr Hitler that, unless that territory was ceded to him, he would march in and take it, and that the frontier which he would then take would not be an ethnographic frontier such as he will have now but it would have been a military frontier, probably the Moldavian quadrilateral from the eastern end of what was Austria to the eastern end of Northern Germany, right across Czechoslovakia, cutting off the Czech part from the Slovak part. It would have been the end of

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Czechoslovakia. When Lord Newton says we got nothing out of Herr Hitler, I reply that that is what we got out of Herr. Hitler. Had it not been for the Prime Minister and the arrangements he made, Czechoslovakia would have ceased to exist, and so far from losing a frontier fringe around the end of their territory they would have lost at least a third of it, if not more.
I apologise for taking up so much of your Lordships' time. I have said that we had no engagement to defend Czechoslovakia. We undertook the part of a mediator realising full well that whatever settlement was made it would be criticised, but feeling it our duty to do so. I could wish that the support which we received at the beginning of the crisis from the Labour Party opposite would have been still continued. I regret to see that easy criticism of being wise after the event that some members of the Party opposite are now indulging in. There are some, and they are amongst the members of the Labour Party, who think that war with Nazi Germany is inevitable and that if so we had better have it now. I entirely agree with what was said by several noble Lords, particularly, I think, by the noble Earl, Lord Baldwin, that a war to prevent war is perhaps the greatest crime we can commit. I once met a surgeon who said that if only one would submit to an abdominal operation every third year one could be certain of escaping all the various diseases that man might fall heir to, such as cancer and other vile diseases that kill us. I have yet to find any patient prepared to accept an abdominal operation every third year, and the only person I can conceive who would profit from it would be the surgeon. That is equally true in regard to a preventive war. There is more than a probability that the war which you fear in the future may never take place. Does it not occur to people that if they want to destroy Nazi-ism the worst way to do it is to attack it from outside? After all the German people are a patriotic people; nobody disputes that for a moment. Do you imagine that if you attacked Germany every patriotic German would not at once rally to Nazi-ism and that you would make it stronger than it has ever been before? That is not the way in which you are
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going to upset Nazi-ism if that is your desire.
Now I have a number of questions with which I must deal. A good many of them relate to the guarantee which we have given. Frankly I admit that I do not like it. I do not think any of us do. It is a very severe commitment, it is a commitment of a new kind, but it is one we felt we ought to give as being some quid pro quo for the sacrifices we asked Czechoslovakia to make not only for her sake but for ourselves. Of course, as my noble friend the Foreign Secretary said on Monday, a great deal remains to be worked out as to what that actual guarantee shall imply, what it shall contain, with whom it shall be and so on. Therefore I can really add nothing to the statement made last night by my right honourable friend Sir Thomas Inskip in the course of the debate in another place. I will read it to your Lordships if you desire, but you probably already know it. It is an engagement to oppose unprovoked aggression from across the border. Incidentally, as I see it, that does not mean that we shall interfere with what happens inside Czechoslovakia, such as some disagreement between the Czechs and Slovaks, which we earnestly trust may be amicably settled.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: I do not know whether the noble Earl will allow me to ask a question now. Would it apply to an invasion from Hungary? I presume it would.
EARL STANHOPE: I think it certainly would if it was unprovoked aggression. I understand it is already in operation, and I think I am right in saying that would be the case.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: That is what I thought, but I wanted to be quite clear, because there is a little confusion—perhaps that is not the word—a little uncertainty as to whether the guarantee becomes applicable according to the country involved.
EARL STANHOPE: We have no legal liability, but we think we have a moral liability, as was said in another place by my right honourable friend. The noble Lord, Lord Gainford, asked whether we were making application to Germany for reciprocity in the release of prisoners. Yes, we have made representations, but so far as I know' no official answer has

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been received. I have seen it stated in newspapers that they are being released, but I have no official information. The representations made will no doubt be renewed unless the Government receive an answer. The noble Earl, Lord Lytton, asked where the International Commission will sit. In Berlin. Then he asked how decisions would be reached. I understand that the Commission are arranging their own procedure. Therefore I am not at present in a position to say what they will decide. Their procedure will rest in their own hands. There was nothing laid down in the Agreement.
One noble Lord asked what adjustment would be made of the Czech national debt. That, I understand, is a matter which will come before the International Commission, and so also will questions in regard to any payment for public buildings and so on. Of course, noble Lords are aware that the whole of this Agreement had to be arrived at in a matter of hours, and that these questions require not only knowledge of the situation in Czechoslovakia now but of the history of these various institutions many years ago. For instance, I am not prepared to say what Czechoslovakia paid for these public buildings when they took them over at the end of the Great War. All these are matters which will be considered by the International Commission, and difficult a great many of them will be. The noble Lord, Lord Saltoun, I think, asked a question about the preservation of the Czech currency. I understand that the offer of an advance of £10,000,000 is intended very largely to help the Czech currency. That, again, is a matter for the Czech Government to consider. If we can assist them in stabilising their currency, of course we shall be very glad to do so, although obviously I am not in a position to commit the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Government to take any action other than advice, apart from the help already given in making that advance.
The noble Viscount, Lord Astor, asked if we could not have a secret Session of Parliament in which we should be able to give your Lordships and members of another place a great deal of secret information which we could not give to the public. The noble Viscount reminded us that there were one or two secret Sessions in the course of the Great
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War. I remember that very well, because I was able to get leave in order to be here. I do not think we got much information from the Government during the course of those secret Sessions, for the obvious reason that with the very large number of your Lordships and the very large number of members of another place a secret was not likely to be held very long. But it must be remembered that there was then a complete censorship, and therefore we could be fairly certain that no information given would get into enemy hands and be used against us. Now that there is no censorship it is obviously impossible to give secret information.
Now may I turn for a minute or two to the lessons of this crisis? Our understanding or our agreement with France, which some people say has been weakened, has in the opinion of every member of His Majesty's Government, as I am sure my noble friend the Foreign Secretary will agree, been greatly strengthened and solidified by the perils we have both been passing through in the last few weeks. I am quite certain that that is not less the view of the French Ministers who visited this country and of their colleagues in Paris. There is no question that that at any rate is one good side of the crisis. Another good side of the crisis is that we have been able to realise that when a crisis arises or becomes imminent we can count on unanimity in all political Parties. I should like to pay tribute to the noble Lord opposite and his friends, who when the crisis was at its height did their utmost to support the Government, as we knew they would, and did their best to make us a united and powerful nation. I wish that could continue. Personally I have always disliked Party attacks over international and foreign questions. I wish we could bring them to an end.
There is one further thing which we expected and yet which it was a great relief to know. That was the splendid courage and the calm common sense of the ordinary man, woman and child. None of us could fail to be filled with wonder at those people who perhaps for the first time understood what war in the air might mean to them when they saw their children being fitted with gas masks and were wondering what to do with the baby and so on. When we see the courage and splendid resolution of the

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men and women of this country I think we realise once again that we are very far indeed from being a decadent nation, that, if anything, we are better than we were in 1914. And that lesson has not been lost abroad.
I wish the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, and others did not work themselves up into what I hope I shall be forgiven for describing as an ungovernable excitement over any arrangements which we may arrive at with any other nations of Europe and suggest that they are directed against the Comintern or anybody else. We have not the faintest intention of making any arrangement at all with anybody which will be directed against anybody else. What we are endeavouring to do is to effect arrangements with nations in Europe, whatever their form of government, which will enable those nations to live together in peace. We care not at all what the government of some other nations may be, provided that that government is kept to their own people and so long as they do not try to impose that government on others. Therefore my noble friend behind me and the Prime Minister and the whole Government have been working for a very long time to see if we cannot obtain some breaking down of the barriers between the great democracies and the great autocracies. These barriers can only lead to friction, they can only lead to misunderstanding, they may indeed lead, as we saw only a few days ago, to war. Therefore, if we can obtain some agreement and understanding between the different nations of the earth, do not let the noble Lord or anybody else imagine that we are directing it against somebody of whom he may be fond, some nation for which he may have a particular affection. Let him realise that it is in the interest of humanity as a whole, and in the interest of peace as a whole.
A further lesson I should like to mention is that, of course, this crisis has revealed gaps in our defences, both military and civil. Some of those gaps we knew of, some we only discovered when we began to put various machinery to the test—and a great deal of machinery of which your Lordships know very little, and the country outside still less, was actually moving and was ready to come into full use in the course of a very few hours. Well, those gaps and those deficiencies are being put right, and I hope
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your Lordships and the public will be prepared to put your hands still deeper into your pockets when you have to pay for those gaps and those deficiencies to be put right. One lesson which I hope we all learned is that unilateral disarmament will never again be accepted by the people of this country as other than a piece of incredible folly which we shall never repeat. Lord Lloyd seemed to think he was the only person who had argued against it. A good many of us have argued against it for a good many years past. Some of us endangered our political careers by being quite prepared to resign if we did not get what we thought was necessary. It is more than twelve years since I did so, and if the noble and gallant Admiral of the Fleet were here he would certainly corroborate my memory of the occasion when he and I were at the Admiralty and were within twelve hours of going because we did not get all we thought was necessary. That was the time when the defences were cut down.
LORD STRABOLGI: That was under a Conservative Government.
EARL STANHOPE: And we are still trying to make good the deficiencies of the period of what I say was insanity, not only on the part of the Government of this country but also of the people who did not realise the dangers into which the country was drifting. Now as to the future. Some noble Lords have spoken as though we had only obtained a respite. Certainly the sky is not clear, nor is the barometer set fair, and history only can show whether we have obtained a respite or whether, as I believe, we may be approaching a new chapter, or what Lord Ponsonby describes as a new volume, in the history of Europe. It is my belief—indeed, it is more than a hope—that the latter expectation may be the right one. The Prime Minister, when he returned from Munich—and it sounds incredible to those who saw the reception which he received in London, in Whitehall, Downing Street and elsewhere—said that the reception he received in Munich was quite a s great as, if not greater than, that which he received in London. As he came back from that conference, which broke up at, I think, half-past one or two o'clock at night, the streets were full of German citizens, who gave him the most tremendous reception as he returned to his hotel. And why? Did it mean nothing

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that the German people vociferously acclaimed the statesman of a foreign country visiting them in the middle of their country? Why did they do it? They did it because they believed that he was the man who had saved them from going into another great world war. That meant that those people had looked over the edge, as we had all looked over the edge, and had heard the sound of the god of war approaching with what seemed a tread which nothing could turn aside. Does it mean nothing that those people cheered the Prime Minister in Germany, realising the danger from which he had saved them?
Does it mean nothing that Herr Hitler, the man who everybody agrees has a knowledge which is almost uncanny of what the German people wish to be told, will have realised that the German people were vociferously acclaiming the man who had won for them peace? Will the leaders of the Nazi régime feel that they are strengthening the hold of that régime on their people if they go, as they have done in the past, from crisis to crisis until eventually a crisis comes to such a stage that no longer can disaster be averted and war must ensue? Will not those leaders feel that there is something still greater than bringing back a certain number of Germans into the German Reich: a claim that they are the first Government in Germany which has been able to establish a great and lasting peace throughout the greater nations of Europe? Do not noble Lords think that, after the experiences of last week, after the acclaim that was given to the Prime Minister, there is a far greater chance of the leaders in Germany and of the people of Germany leading a peaceful life and pursuing a peaceful policy than has been visible, or indeed credible, during the past five, six or seven years?
Is it of no consequence that the Heads of Government of four great nations were able to meet round a table and resolve a question which had been a festering sore in the centre of Europe for many years past, that we were able to resolve that question by discussion and by agreement, and not by the arbitrament of war? Was it of no consequence that, when each of those four statesmen returned to his own country, each one of them was received with acclamation by his people? No one of them could say
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that he alone had obtained a victory at the expense of somebody else, but each one of those four was able to be acclaimed by his people as having done something, not only for the common good, but for the good of his nation. I have no doubt that noble Lords will say, "Yes, but Czechoslovakia was not there." That is true, and yet, as I have pointed out, if any other solution had been arrived at than the one which has been agreed, Czechoslovakia would still have remained a festering sore, would still have had to face every sort of difficulty, which, as Lord Runciman has shown, could not have gone on without the possibility of civil war, the worst form of war of all. Therefore she too, although it may take some years before she discovers the fact, had every reason to be grateful for the solution that was found at Munich last week.
I believe that those facts which I have mentioned to your Lordships—the acclamation of our Prime Minister in Germany, the agreement of the Heads of those four States, and various other situations which I have tried to describe—augur well for the future. Believing that, I am not going to carry my head one whit less high than I did before this crisis began. On the contrary, this country has once again given a lead to Europe by being able to obtain agreement by discussion instead of by resort to force. So far from the prestige of this country having been severely lowered by what has happened, I think that in most countries of the world that prestige is as high now as it has ever been since the conclusion of the Great War. And I am quite convinced that when countries have had time to think over the matter somewhat further, there will be no country in Europe where our prestige will not be higher than it was before the crisis began.
The policy of His Majesty's Government during the recent crisis and their efforts to secure lasting peace have, I believe, obtained the overwhelming approval of your Lordships' House, and so far as I know, as I said at the beginning of my speech, only five noble Lords really criticised the policy of His Majesty's Government. Did I think otherwise I should have asked your Lordships to consent to a Motion being put down, which we could have discussed and voted upon involving a vote of confidence in the

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Government. If any of those four or five noble Lords that I have named think they have followers, I am quite prepared to put down a Motion on behalf of the Government, and we will discuss and vote upon it to-morrow. Unless I am so challenged, I shall take it that the vast majority of your Lordships' House have approved the policy which His Majesty's Government are pursuing, that you support the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary and the other members of the Government in the endeavours that they are making to secure a just and lasting peace between the nations of the world, and that you believe, as we believe, that the lines which are being followed by the Prime Minister are such as to deserve the support not only of your Lordships' House but of the country as a whole.

THE PEERS' GALLERY IN THE COMMONS.
THE EARL OF GLASGOW: My Lords, I should like to raise a point of order. I wish to refer to incidents which took place in another place last week when the Prime Minister made his great speech. My own experience was that I arrived outside another place at 1.30 p.m. The Prime Minister was to speak at 3 o'clock. As time went on, other Peers arrived, I suppose finally about sixty, who took up their positions in a kind of queue for the limited number of seats in the House of Commons gallery. When the time came to move in there was a rush and a scrum. Really, it was such a scrum that a Peer was knocked down, and in trying to protect him I lost my own place. Surely something can be done about it. I have had experience of queues all over the world, and they are things which ought to be regulated properly. I would suggest that in future we should carry out the marching in in some kind of order. I have merely brought the matter forward in the hope that some suggestion can be made whereby such scenes can be avoided in the future.
EARL STANHOPE: My Lords, I can only imagine that some of your Lordships, when you got into another place, adopted a manner such as you would not have adopted in this House. I do not think I am capable of laying down what should be done in another place,
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because it is outside my purview. I think noble Lords had not so much to complain of on this occasion as perhaps they might have had on others. After all, we did make arrangements for your Lordships to hear the speech within the precincts of this House. I am told that that was appreciated by some noble Lords, although severely criticised by others. I hope that the next time noble Lords go to another place they will set an example to others.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: My Lords, I should like to make a practical suggestion which I think would really meet the point. I have had occasion for a good many years to attend the Budget speech, and I am aware that there is great difficulty in going up to the Peers' Gallery. The difficulty arises from the fact that your Lordships are not allowed to enter the Peers' Gallery of another place before prayers. I understand that that privilege is not accorded to us in another place because, similarly, a like privilege is not accorded to members of another place when they come here. Could not an arrangement be made whereby Peers could be allowed to enter their Gallery before prayers in the House of Commons, a similar concession being given to members of the House of Commons in your Lordships' House? Then, I think, such scenes as that to which the noble Earl has referred would be avoided.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords, I did not go to another place, but there does seem to be a grievance. Could not the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, communicate with the authorities of the other House?
EARL STANHOPE: My Lords, I shall be very glad to go into the matter. The question has taken me by surprise, although I knew there had been difficulty for the Peers using the Peers' Gallery. I will certainly look into the matter.
THE EARL OF GLASGOW: I must apologise for not having given notice. I only desired to ventilate the matter.
EARL STANHOPE: I have already moved the Motion in regard to the Recess, and I now beg to move that the House do now adjourn.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at seventeen minutes past seven o'clock.