Sitting of 3 November 1938

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
  UNEMPLOYMENT.

    TRADING ESTATES.
    Mr. A. Jenkinsasked the Minister of Labour the number of new industries working on the Treforest estate and the number of persons employed in them?
    The Minister of Labour (Mr. Ernest Brown): On 31st October 26 factories on the Treforest Trading Estate were in production. The number of workpeople employed in these factories was 720.
    Mr. Bateyasked the Minister of Labour whether it is his intention to hold an inquiry into the allegations that at some factories on the Team Valley estate girls are working for very low wages?
    Mr. Brown: There have been discussions recently between two of the firms on the estate and trade unions, and I have no information which suggests that a general inquiry on my part is necessary.
    Mr. Batey: Would it not be wise for the Minister to hold an inquiry to see whether the statements are true or not?
    Mr. Brown: No, Sir, I think not. The last time this question was raised was in March, and assertions were made of extraordinary conditions among batches of cases, and the hon. Member who made that assertion has not sent me one.
    Mr. Batey: The Minister admits now that there are some cases, and surely he can hold an inquiry concerning the factories in which low wages are being paid?
    Mr. Brown: I have not done anything of the kind. I pointed out in my answer that there have been discussions between
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    two of the firms on the estate and trade unions. The hon. Member knows that a large number on these estates are trade board trades.
    Mr. Shinwell: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether trade union officials can obtain access to the estate to consult with the workers?
    Mr. Brown: I do not know that there is any difficulty about that at all. If the hon. Member has any reason for suggesting that, perhaps he will let me know the facts. But at the moment I have heard many assertions, some of which are calculated to stop this good work, and I suggest to the House that hon. Members would be doing a better service by trying to further the creation of new factories than by making these assertions.
    Mr. Lawson: In view of the various charges that have been made of all kinds, does not the right hon. Gentleman think it would be better to have an inquiry in order to settle the question of whether wages are good or very bad?
    Mr. Brown: I never think it wise for a Minister of Labour to enter upon fishing inquiries at all. If we have any facts brought before us, we are always glad to see that justice is done, if we can assist.
    Mr. Logan: On a point of Order. Is it correct for a Minister, when answering a question, to give his own personal opinion as to what is right and what is wrong, or should he answer the question directed to him?
    Mr. Speaker: Ministers are very often asked for their personal opinions.
    Mr. Logan: Is anybody concerned about the personal opinion of the Minister?
    Mr. Bateyasked the Minister of Labour the number of men, 21 years of age or over, who are employed in the factories on the Team Valley and St. Helen's estates in the county of Durham?
    Mr. Brown: 585 men over the age of 18 years were employed in factories on the Team Valley Trading Estate on 3oth September. I am making inquiries about the position at St. Helen's, Auckland, and will write to the hon. Member.
    Mr. Dalton: May I have a copy of that?
    Mr. Brown: Yes, Sir, I should have done that in any case.
    Mr. Batey: I thought that that was my question.
    Mr. Brown: Since the question refers to the hon. Member's division, I shall in common courtesy send him a copy of that answer.

    ISLE OF LEWIS.
    Mr. Malcolm MacMillanasked the Minister of Labour what decision has been arrived at in regard to unemployment insurance of unemployed men on Unemployed Assistance Board allowances in the Isle of Lewis sent from the Employment Exchange to work at peat-cutting for one or two days who have been engaged in other insurable work and of those refusing peat-cutting on the above ground?
    Mr. E. Brown: I assume that the hon. Member has in mind two cases which have occurred in Lewis in which men were decided not to be available for work after they had refused employment as peat cutters. In one case, after work of a different kind had been obtained, the decision was revised. In the other, no appeal was lodged and the decision stands, but, if the man concerned renews his application, the matter will be reconsidered in the light of any fresh facts.
    Mr. MacMillan: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the people who did accept this employment did not receive the unemployment stamps, whereas those who foresaw they would not be covered by unemployment insurance and refused to work as peat cutters were penalised?
    Mr. Brown: That is another point. If the hon. Member desires further information, perhaps he will communicate with me or put down a question.

    WESTERN ISLES.
    Mr. Malcolm MacMillanasked the Minister of Labour whether, in view of the failure of the herring fishing season in the Western Isles resulting from the curing ban of the Herring Industry Board and the consequent hardships, he will make representations to the Unemployment Assistance Board that additional winter allowances be made in this area
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    in view of the failure of the local advisory committee to represent the case of applicants last winter?
    Mr. E. Brown: I am informed by the Unemployment Assistance Board that cases in the Western Isles will be considered for winter additions on their merits with due regard to the conditions peculiar to the area.
    Mr. MacMillan: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that last year, by a general sweeping decision of the local advisory committee, these people were prevented, in spite of the need for additional winter allowances, from having any additional allowances made to them; and that hundreds of cases have come to my notice, at public meetings and some individually, of people who were definitely penalised because of the inhumanity and ignorance of conditions of the local advisory committee?
    Mr. Brown: I cannot accept that at all. These are sweeping assertions. The local advisory committee is dealing with all kinds of people, and as the hon. Member and this House know, the economy of the Western Isles is entirely different from the economy elsewhere, and we must have regard to the advice of the local advisory committee in this matter. On the other hand, applicants, as the hon. Member knows, have the right to appeal.
    Mr. MacMillan: Is not the Minister aware that in almost every part of the country the advisory committees advised that these additional winter allowances be made, and that in this particular area, where the climate is more rigorous in winter time, they are refused out of sheer inhumanity and ignorance?
    Mr. Brown: I think that the hon. Member ought to consult with the local advisory committee.
    Mr. MacMillan: Is it not the duty of the Minister to see that justice is done?

    LIVERPOOL.
    Mr. Kirbyasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that the ratepayers of Liverpool are bearing a heavy financial burden in respect of the maintenance of persons who are considered by the local public assistance committee to be able-bodied unemployed but who are not within the scope of the Unemployment Act, 1934; that Liverpool also

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    has a heavy degree of general unemployment, also a high percentage of persons in receipt of public assistance; and will he, in consultation with the other Departments concerned, arrange to give special additional financial aid to the city at an early date, and give special consideration to Liverpool in the placing of Government contracts and new factories which may be required to meet the needs of the fighting services?
    Mr. E. Brown: I am aware of the unemployment position in the city of Liverpool to which the hon. Member draws attention, and I would remind him that the city is included among the areas to which a preference is given, other things being equal, in the allocation of Government contracts. I can also assure him that the claims of the area in connection with the establishment of new factories required for the Defence Programme have received, and will continue to receive, due consideration. It is, however, not the intention of the Government to undertake any special review of the basis of Exchequer grants to local authorities which were revised as recently as 1937 by the Local Government (Financial Provisions) Act of that year.
    Mr. Kirby: Will the Minister be good enough to convey that answer to the Conservative headquarters in Liverpool?

    WEST HAM.
    Mr. Thorneasked the Minister of Labour the number of unemployed registered in the borough of West Ham for the three months ending June, September, and the nearest available date in October, 1938; the number of persons who received unemployment allowances in transitional payments; the total amount paid; and the amount paid each quarter?
    Mr. E. Brown: I am having the available information extracted, and will circulate a statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

    MINERS (DURHAM).
    Mr. Bateyasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that more coal mines have recently been closed in the county of Durham; and what steps the Government propose to take to provide employment for the men thus thrown out of work?
    Mr. Lawsonasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that large
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    numbers of miners are losing their employment in Durham through the closing of seams and mines; that, in view of the numbers already unemployed in that area, this recent breakdown in employment is causing alarm; and whether the Government are taking any steps in this matter?
    Mr. E. Brown: I am aware that from 12th September to 17th October there was an increase in the number of miners registered as unemployed in Durham but this increase was less than the decrease in the preceding monthly period. As regards the second part of the question, I have nothing to add to the answer which I gave to the hon. Member for Seaham (Mr. Shinwell) on 1st November.
    Mr. Batey: Are we to understand that the Minister does not propose to take any steps to find employment for this decreasing trade?
    Mr. Brown: That would be quite an unjustified supposition.
    Mr. Lawson: The answer of the right hon. Gentleman to the hon. Member does not give any satisfaction at all upon this matter; and do we understand that this continuous unemployment is still to go on and that the Government have no plans at all to meet the situation?
    Mr. Brown: The hon. Member does not understand accurately if he understands that.
    Mr. Lawson: Is the Minister aware that the situation has become worse during the last six weeks, since the publication of the last official figures?
    Mr. Brown: I understand that the disturbing international situation is bound to have an effect. I suggest that the best thing to do is to give full support to the policy of international appeasement in the interests of the export trade.
    Mr. Shinwell: In view of the growing depression in the Durham coal industry, will the Minister consult his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade and see if anything can be done?
    Mr. Brown: I am always in touch with my right hon. Friend, and this situation, as he knows, is constantly in mind. I would remind the hon. Member that a great deal was done for the North-East coast by trade agreements.
    Mr. George Griffiths: Will the Minister also not forget that Yorkshire is suffering from depression?

    PONTEFRACT AREA.
    Mr. T. Smithasked the Minister of Labour the number of persons in receipt of unemployment assistance in the districts covered by the Pontefract area office on the latest available date, and the comparative figures for 1937 and 1936?
    Mr. E. Brown: During the week ended 21st October, 1938, 2,481 payments of unemployment assistance allowances (excluding payments in supplementation of insurance benefit) were made at the Employment Exchanges serving the district covered by the Pontefract area office. The corresponding figures for the weeks ended 22nd October, 1937, and 23rd October, 1936, were 2,679 and 4,269 respectively. It should be noted that owing to the extension of the Unemployment Assistance Scheme at the Second Appointed Day (1st April, 1937), the figure for the week ended 23rd October, 1936, is not strictly comparable with those for the later periods.
    Mr. Smithasked the Minister of Labour the number of wholly unemployed persons registered at Normanton, Castleford, and Pontefract at the present time, and the comparative figures for each of the last three years?
    Mr. Brown: As the reply includes a Table of figures, I will, if I may, circulate a statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Smith: Do the figures show a decrease or an increase?
    Mr. Brown: There arc three tables and every one shows a decrease.
    Following is the statement:

    Table showing the numbers of persons, aged 14 and over, registered as wholly unemployed at the Normanton, Castleford and Pontefract Employment Exchanges at a date in September of the years 1938, 1937, 1936, and 1935:

    Date

    Normanton.

    Castleford.

    Pontefract.

    12th September, 1938

    503

    2,312

    755

    13th September, 1937

    552

    2,063

    749

    21st September, 1936

    783

    3,349

    2,070

    23rd September, 1935

    904

    4,045

    2,477

    BENEFIT AND ASSISTANCE.
    Mr. Stephenasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware of the scales of maintenance arranged for children under the evacuation scheme during the recent crisis; and whether he will consider applying those scales in connection with unemployment insurance and assistance at an early date?
    Mr. E. Brown: I am aware of the scales of payment to which the hon. Member refers. I do not think, however, that the circumstances they were designed to meet are comparable to those in which unemployment benefit and assistance are paid.
    Mr. Stephen: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that children in their own homes require as much maintenance as when they are evacuated?
    Mr. Brown: My hon. Friend must know that that general proposition does not apply in certain cases which depend upon the circumstances in which the evacuation takes place.
    Mr. Stephen: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what are the differences that require this greater expense when the children have been sent to some other place?
    Mr. Brown: I should be glad to go into that on the appropriate occasion, but it would involve very considerable argument between the hon. Member and myself.
    Mr. Stephenasked the Minister of Labour whether he will consider introducing legislation at an early date for the abolition of the means test and the raising of the scales of unemployment benefit and assistance, in view of malnutrition resulting from lack of income having a deleterious effect upon the man-power of this country?
    Mr. Brown: No, Sir. Nor can I accept the suggestion that the hon. Member makes.
    Mr. Stephen: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware from the figures issued by the Secretary of State for War in regard to recruiting statistics that there is very great malnutrition in the country?
    Mr. Brown: It does not follow that that is due to these scales.
    Mr. Stephen: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that many potential recruits for the Army come from the unemployed and that their physical condition can be due to nothing else but the fact that they are not receiving adequate maintenance?
    Mr. Brown: My hon. Friend and I have differences of opinion about that.

    TIN PLATE INDUSTRY.
    Mr. James Griffithsasked the Minister of Labour the number of tin plate and steel sheet workers unemployed in South Wales on the last convenient date; and whether he is taking any steps to deal with the heavy unemployment now prevailing in those industries?
    Mr. E. Brown: At 12th September, 1938, the number of insured persons aged 16-64 registered as unemployed in the tin plate industry in Wales (including Monmouthshire) was 9,971. As regards the second part of the question, I would remind the hon. Member that representatives of the local authorities in the areas most affected by the decline in the tin plate industry are meeting my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade and myself on 18th November in order to place before us, for consideration, concrete suggestions for remedying the position.

    TRAINING CENTRES.
    Mr. Pearsonasked the Minister of Labour whether consideration has been or will be given to the desirability of the Ministry of Labour training centre at Treforest being established as a general industrial training centre equal in scope to the centre at Bristol?
    Mr. E. Brown: I will consider this suggestion, although I am not sure that it would be advantageous. The question of the strength and type of the various training centres covered by the Ministry of Labour training schemes is kept continuously under review, and the House will realise that the success of the centres must mainly depend upon the proportion of successful placings at the end of the period of training.
    Mr. Simmonds: Will the right hon. Gentleman consult with these trading estate authorities and see whether these changes would not induce more industrialists to come?
    Mr. Brown: I have done that. Perhaps my hon. Friend did not follow the last
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    part of my answer. A Government training centre of this type is for the training of men as improvers semi-skilled in the engineering occupations. If there are not enough potential vacancies in the district where the training centre is, the work of the centre must be adversely affected. That is the point at issue. If the time arrives when the trading estate authorities and the Ministry of Labour agree that we can properly do that, I have said already that I will consider the suggestion.

    ENGINEERING INDUSTRY.
    Mr. Kellyasked the Minister of Labour the number of men and women registered as unemployed from the engineering industry at the last date available?
    Mr. E. Brown: As the reply includes a table of figures, I will, if I may, circulate a statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Kelly: Can the right hon. Gentleman give the total number of the men?
    Mr. Brown: I prefer to circulate it, because a total figure is misleading. There are various branches and I have analysed it in that way.
    Mr. Kelly: In view of the reply indicating that there are many unemployed, will the information be conveyed to hon. Members who sit behind the right hon. Gentleman, and who declare that they cannot find engineers when they want them for their various shops?
    Mr. Brown: A general statement of that kind very rarely suits the problem as a whole. It may be possible that at any given time a number may be on the register as unemployed engineers, whereas in particular places there may be a shortage.
    Following is the statement:

    Table showing the numbers of insured men and women aged 18–64 in Great Britain in each of the engineering industry classifications recorded as unemployed at 12th September, 1938:

    —

    Men.

    Women.

    General Engineering, etc

    46,011

    3,697

    Electrical Engineering

    4,417

    1,370

    Marine Engineering

    4,247

    22

    Constructional Engineering

    5,258

    54

    Construction and Repair of Motor Vehicles, Cycles and Aircraft.

    24,737

    2,719

    Total of above

    84,670

    7,862

    STATISTICS.
    Mr. Lawsonasked the Minister of Labour the number of unemployed persons who have been out of work more than three months; and whether the Government have any plans for the reemployment of these workers?
    Mr. E. Brown: Out of a total of 1,650,236 unemployed persons, aged 16-64, in Great Britain who at 12th September, 1938, were applying for unemployment benefit or unemployment allowances, 610,759 had been continuously on the registers of Employment Exchanges for three months or more. Corresponding figures are not available for persons not applying for benefit or allowances. As regards the second part of the question, I have nothing to add to previous replies on this subject.
    Mr. Lawson: As the right hon. Gentleman has said that less than one-third of the whole unemployed have been out of work for three months, is it not necessary that the Government should have some plan for dealing with the matter?
    Mr. Brown: If the hon. Member will look at the past year he will find that in 1932, when there were 2,500,000 unemployed, 1,063,000 had been unemployed more than three months, while in 1933, out of 2,000,000 unemployed, 933,000 had been unemployed more than three months. Therefore, there has been an improvement, but in saying that I do not want the House to think that we are complacent or satisfied.

    CINEMA INDUSTRY (EMPLOYES' CONDITIONS).
    Mr. Dayasked the Minister of Labour particulars of what arrangements he has now made with the cinema proprietors, as a result of and following the inquiry which he commenced some two years back, relative to the hours, wages, and working conditions of the employÉs engaged in the cinema industry; and whether he proposes to take any further action?
    Mr. E. Brown: I am glad to be able to say that since the inquiry began agreements have been concluded in 17 areas and that further negotiations are taking place. I am keeping in close touch with the progress made and discussions are
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    taking place between my Department and the organisations concerned with a view to giving such assistance as is possible.
    Mr. Day: Is it the fact that a number of the employers who pay very bad wages and employ these people for long hours are not members of any association?
    Mr. Brown: Discussions are going on in my Department at this moment. I prefer to do nothing more, but to leave it to the organisations concerned to continue with the discussions, which are being fruitful, giving what help I can.
    Mr. Day: Is it not possible to get the bad employers into line?
    Mr. T. Smith: Could not the Government issue a White Paper showing what progress has been made in these negotiations?
    Mr. Brown: I cannot do that as we are right in the middle of them, and at the moment I think that it is better to go on as we are doing.
    Mr. Day: Will the Minister answer my previous question?

    ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORY, BRIDGEND.
    Mr. E. J. Williamsasked the Minister of Labour the number of persons engaged at the Bridgend arsenal and the number drawn from the Employment Exchanges of Bridgend, Aberkenfig, Maesteg, Pontycymmer, and Ogmore Vale?
    Mr. E. Brown: The number of persons engaged at the Royal Ordnance Factory at Bridgend at 27th October, was 3,238. The number of persons included in that figure who were engaged through the Employment Exchanges mentioned was:

    Bridgend

    …

    …

    647

    Aberkenfig

    …

    …

    288

    Maesteg

    …

    …

    371

    Pontycymmer

    …

    …

    231

    Ogmore Vale

    …

    …

    191

    In addition there were engagements through Exchanges in a somewhat wider area.
    Mr. Williams: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether these figures indicate that all the labour that is now being employed at the Royal Arsenal is recruited from these Employment Exchanges?
    Mr. Brown: I understand that, on the whole, that is so. The hon. Member will understand that he has chosen five Employment Exchanges, and there are a number of other contiguous Exchanges.

    HOLIDAYS WITH PAY.
    Mr. Roland Robinsonasked the Minister of Labour what increase there has been in the granting of holidays with pay this year?
    Mr. E. Brown: It is estimated that the number of wage-earners covered by collective agreements providing for annual holidays with pay which have been made since the beginning of 1938 is about 1,250,000. The total number of wage-earners covered by all the collective agreements now known to be in operation is about 4,000,000. It is not known to what extent holidays with pay have been granted by individual employers in industries in which there are no collective agreements. It is estimated, however, that annual consecutive days of holiday with pay in some form or another are provided for about 8,750,000 people in all. This figure includes such persons as salaried workers, shop assistants and domestic servants.
    Mr. Robinson: Can the right hon. Gentleman say when it is proposed to have further legislation on this subject?
    Mr. Brown: Since the decision was announced to the House, there has been continued increase in the number of agreements, and we shall do our best to further these agreements in the next two years.
    Mr. T. Smith: Does that statement include the mining industry, and, if so, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many of the agreements are not for holidays with pay?
    Mr. Thorne: Are we to understand that this Government is to be in power for another two years?
    Mr. Brown: I hope so, and more than that.
    Mr. Hannah: What Government could take their place?

    SPREAD-OVER HOLIDAYS.
    Mr. R. Robinsonasked the Minister of Labour what action has been taken by
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    his Departmental Committee in connection with the spread-over of holidays?
    Mr. E. Brown: The object of the Inter-Departmental Committee is to serve as a link between the various Departments which are concerned with this matter. The special branch set up in my Department has arranged consultations with organisations of employers and workers, and is collecting information as to the extent of holidays given, the arrangements for settling their dates, the facilities for saving for holidays, the arrangements for holiday accommodation, and other matters. I hope to issue before long a booklet on holiday agreements which I hope will be of service to organisations contemplating the making of such agreements.
    Mr. Malcolm MacMillan: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider the wholesale organisation of a geographical spread-over of holidays in order to include the Highlands and Islands, and their development as a tourist area?
    Mr. Brown: That seems a very long and elegant phrase, and I should like to consider its implications.

    EMERGENCY WORKERS (RE-INSTATEMENT).
    Miss Wardasked the Minister of Labour, whether he is satisfied that all men called up to serve the nation during the crisis have been reinstated in their peace-time employment?
    Mr. E. Brown: I am satisfied that employers in general have a full sense of their responsibility in this matter and have re-instated men who were called up from employment with them. In a relatively small number of cases these men have not returned to their former employment. The Employment Exchanges are paying special attention to cases of this kind, and will continue to do so.
    Miss Ward: May I assume that if particular cases are reported action will be taken, and will my right hon. Friend consider, if there is no adequate excuse, publishing the names of the firms who have not done it?
    Mr. Brown: I do not think there is any need for that. I do not think the House understood anything but this, that the

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    Federation of Employers had been very sympathetic and had given their attention to any individual cases reported.
    Mr. Fleming: Is it a fact that there have been certain cases where employers have refused to take back men who volunteered for service?
    Mr. Brown: I have not heard that, but it sometimes happens that when a man goes back, the job on which he has been working no longer exists.

    AIR-RAID PRECAUTIONS.
    Mr. Duncanasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he can make a statement on the progress of air-raid precautions schemes in London for the last three months?
    The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd): I suggest that my hon. Friend should await the statement to be made during the Debate.
    Mr. Duncanasked the Home Secretary whether the surveys of basements and cellar accommodation for shelter purposes have been completed; and what are the conclusions arrived at?
    Mr. Lloyd: Progress has been made with the survey in some areas and during the recent emergency shelter accommodation in basements was prepared for considerable numbers. But the matter must be handled more systematically, and I would ask the hon. Member to await the statements that will be made in the course of the Debate.
    Lieut.-Colonel Sir Mervyn Manningham-Buller: May I ask whether a recent committee did not report very adversely on the use of basements and cellars as air-raid shelters?
    Mr. Malcolm MacMillan: Can the hon. Member inform us what alternative accommodation has been provided for the working-class families removed from these cellars and basements in which they have been compelled to live owing to the failure of the Government's housing policy?
    Mr. Shinwell: The hon. Member says that this matter is now being handled systematically. What has he been doing all the time?
    Mr. Duncanasked the Home Secretary how many gas masks have been distributed in London to storage depots, and how many boroughs in London have these depots?
    Mr. Lloyd: Approximately 4,000,000 civilian respirators have been issued to the Metropolitan Boroughs and the City of London. The respirators have been distributed to the public and not kept in local storage depots.
    Mr. Duncan: Now that the emergency is over, and in view of the difficulty in many cases of people being able to keep their respirators in good condition, will local authorities have complete discretion to store these respirators if they wish to do so?
    Mr. Lloyd: We have made that clear.
    Mr. Poole: Is the hon. Member aware that there are areas adjacent to Birmingham in which the people have not yet been measured for their respirators?
    Miss Wardasked the Home Secretary whether in collecting material from local authorities on the lessons of the recent crisis arising out of air-raid precautions, he will also collect material from responsible individuals who are in an independent position to offer criticism and praise?
    Mr. Lloyd: I can assure my hon. Friend that material from which lessons of the recent crisis can be drawn is being collected from all sources. If she is in a position to give me any more material, my right hon. Friend will be glad to receive it and to consider it carefully.
    Miss Ward: Is it the policy of the Home Office to invite specially selected people in areas to offer their observations on the working of air-raid precautions?
    Mr. Lloyd: Normally we expect to get information from local authorities.
    Miss Ward: Will the hon. Member make a point of asking for information from special people in the area? I think it is most important.
    Major-General Sir Alfred Knoxasked the Home Secretary to what firms the contract was given for the supply of gas masks, and in what quantities?
    Mr. Lloyd: Contracts for the manufacture of 45,000,000 civilian respirators

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    have been made. The respirators have not been ordered as complete units, separate contracts having been placed for the facepieces, rubber bands, inlet valves, components of the metal container and the charcoal. The metal containers have been assembled at factories under the supervision of the Home Office. I will send my hon. and gallant Friend a list of the names of the firms and the components supplied by them.
    Mr. McEntee: Will the hon. Member be good enough to publish the list?
    Mr. Lloyd: I will consider publishing the list.
    Mr. Kirbyasked the Home Secretary to what extent the supply of gas masks for the public of Liverpool was, during the recent crisis, found to be inadequate by reason of miscalculation as to the proportion of masks in the various sizes; and what steps have yet been taken to remedy the situation in this regard?
    Mr. Lloyd: Liverpool has reported that as a result of a fitting census which was taken in that city during the week ending the 30th September, there was a surplus of 127,320 large size respirators, 37,321 medium and a deficiency of 84,093 small in the numbers supplied by the Home Office, but that these figures were not final. The deficiency of small respirators will be satisfied when further deliveries from contractors are received. There have been discrepancies in the total numbers reputed to be required by the authority: these were due to the fact that Liverpool had not supplied the particulars of the sizes they required before delivery was made to them, and in these circumstances, the proportions of each size supplied had to be calculated by the Home Office taking as a basis the figures obtained from a fitting census conducted by two local authorities, and information ascertained in the office after fitting certain selected personnel.
    Mr. Kirby: While thanking the hon. Member for his informative reply may I ask when we may expect delivery of these smaller-size masks?
    Mr. Lloyd: Very soon. They are now being turned out at the rate of about 400,000 per week.
    Mr. Macquisten: Have Liverpool people got special heads and faces that they require special gas masks?
    Mr. Watkinsasked the Home Secreary whether his attention has been drawn to foreign methods of defence against aerial gas bombing, which advocate opening doors and windows, as against the Government's recommendations for gas-proofing rooms; and whether he proposes to make any alteration in the instructions recently issued on this matter?
    Mr. Lloyd: The policy, which it is understood has been adopted in one foreign country, of allowing windows to remain open during an air raid, is a precaution against the effects of blast from high explosive bombs and has no reference to gas bombing. The instructions issued by this country about methods of protection against gas remain unaltered. The second part of the question does not, therefore, arise.
    Mr. Watkins: Is there not in this country and abroad a very considerable consensus of expert opinion in opposition to the Home Office policy; and that a gas attack would be preceded by a high explosive attack and in consequence windows would be broken and cracks appear in buildings? Is not the foreign policy, and the policy which I understand has been adopted in Berlin, safer for our population?
    Mr. Lloyd: I do not think it is possible to make a comparison quite as quickly as the hon. Member is disposed to do. In this case much depends on the fact that windows in this country are of the casement type and not sash type.
    Mr. G. Strauss: Have any experiments been made as to whether the effect of blasts is diminished by keeping windows open?
    Mr. Lloyd: It is a fact that windows are less likely to be broken if they are casement windows if they are left open.
    Mr. Gallacher: Is the hon. Member aware that in Scotland a large proportion of the houses will not keep out rain, never mind gas?
    Mr. Watkins: Will consideration be given by the Home Office to the point raised in my question?
    Mr. Lloyd: The technical branch of the Home Office is always investigating these matters.
    Sir Gifford Foxasked the Home Secretary what would be the approximate cost of providing permanent camps for the total number of people whom it might be desirable to evacuate from crowded and industrial areas in the event of war; and whether he proposes to carry out any experiment by the erection of such a camp?
    Mr. Lloyd: As was pointed out in the report of the committee over which my right hon. Friend presided, it is doubtful whether extensive use could be made of camps for very large numbers, but as was stated in reply to a question on Tuesday the arrangements necessary in a long-term policy of evacuation are at present the subject of study and investigation.
    Sir G. Fox: Will the hon. Member have the figures worked out as to what would be the cost of providing camps per 10,000? Will he give the information during the course of the Debate this afternoon?
    Mr. Hall-Caineasked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that during the recent crisis in several cases the price of sandbags supplied for air-raid precautions work was raised to more than six times the normal price; and whether he will take steps to ascertain the names of those who were responsible for such profiteering with a view to preventing it on any similar occasion in the future?
    Mr. Dayasked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been called to the sudden increase in the cost of sandbags and other materials required for air-raid precautions during the recent crisis; and will he consider the appointment of a committee to investigate the cause of same, and for the further purpose of introducing legislation that will protect the public from having to pay similar extortionate prices for materials that may be required in any future emergency?
    Mr. G. Straussasked the Home Secretary what was the extent of the rise which took place in the price of sandbags bought for air-raid protection during the crisis week in September; and whether steps are going to be taken to prevent a similar occurrence in the future?
    Mr. Dingle Footasked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been
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    called to the difficulty experienced by local authorities in obtaining an adequate supply of sandbags for air-raid precautions during the recent crisis and to the complaints of excessive prices for such sandbags; and what steps it is proposed to take to avoid difficulties of this kind in future?
    Mr. Lloyd: Evidence that my right hon. Friend has been able to obtain so far does not support the view that the price of sandbags prepared for air-raid precautions purposes was generally raised. Investigations are still proceeding and if any proved case of profiteering on such sandbags is revealed, appropriate action will be taken. It is to be appreciated that there is little normal trade in this country in sandbags other than for Government requirements. These, including requirements of local authorities for essential A.R.P. purposes, are catered for by standing contracts which secure deliveries at the rate of 2,000,000 sandbags a week, a rate of delivery which was increased during the crisis at unchanged prices. In these conditions, the abnormal demand by miscellaneous buyers during the crisis led to jute bags of all qualities and sizes becoming pressed into service. It is naturally more difficult to form a clear view how far the prices of other jute bags which were pressed into service may have increased. The progressive accumulation of reserve stocks which are part of the existing programme will ease the position but my right hon. Friend is considering the position further in conjunction with my right hon. Friend the Prseident of the Board of Trade.
    Mr. Foot: Is it not a fact that the manufacturers have at all times been ready to supply sandbags at a reasonable price, approved by the Home Office, and would not all these difficulties as to a shortage of sandbags have been avoided if the Home Office had purchased and distributed a sufficient number to the local authorities in time?
    Mr. Day: Will the Minister say what will be the appropriate action which he will take in future?
    Mr. Lloyd: For example, in the case of firms which might be Government contractors, their position would have to be considered.
    Mr. Hall-Caine: Has my right hon. Friend made inquiries of the public authorities which have made complaints on this subject, and if not, will he do so?
    Mr. Lloyd: Yes, Sir. This answer naturally is based on a very large amount of information from the local authorities.
    Mr. G. Strauss: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in the West Riding, the price of sandbags went up from 1½d to 10d., according to the official report of the clerk of the council; that there were similar rises in the prices of other materials, such as pickaxes and timber, for air-raid precautions; and is it not obviously necessary for some drastic steps to be taken to prevent profiteering in all materials connected with air-raid precautions?
    Mr. Lloyd: I have said that this matter was to be taken up with my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade; but I would like to point out to the hon. Member that he has failed to observe the significance of the distinction drawn in my reply between sandbags prepared for air-raid precautions purposes, which are coming forward at the rate of 2,000,000 a week, and more during the crisis, at unchanged prices, and the bags of various kinds, not necessarily sandbags normally prepared in any way for air-raid precautions purposes, but for miscellaneous commercial purposes, which were pressed into service suddenly, although not normally prepared for that purpose at all, and in the case of which it would be more difficult to decide how much the increase was.
    Mr. G. Griffiths: Is it not a fact that Sir Charles McGrath sent a report to the Home Secretary in which he stated definitely that sandbags had risen from 1½d. to 10½d. on the same day, and they were sandbags which could not be got from the Home Office?
    Mr. Foot: Does it not follow from the last reply that the numbers of sandbags purchased and distributed by the Home Office were entirely inadequate to meet the emergency?
    Mr. Lloyd: We are engaged in accumulating a large stock of sandbags. At the time of the emergency there were 80,000,000, but on the programme there are 275,000,000.
    Mr. Griffiths: Has the hon. Gentleman got that report?
    Mr. Lloyd: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. Griffiths: Thank you.
    Mr. McEnteeasked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that the Midland Bank, Limited, has issued instructions to its employÉs not to volunteer for air-raid precautions work; and whether he proposes taking any steps to enable those employÉs who so desire to offer service for this work?
    Mr. Lloyd: I have seen a copy of the circular referred to in which it is stated that there is no objection to any member of the staff offering his services for A.R.P. or similar work on condition that it does not interfere with his attendance and duties at the Bank. The circular further states that owing to the encouragement the Bank is giving to its staff to join the Territorials and other branches of the Defence Forces the staff would, in an emergency, be so seriously depleted that they cannot spare further members for A.R.P. duties during working hours.
    Mr. McEntee: I admit that the question is somewhat misleading, but does not the circular actually say that if they volunteer they must not volunteer for this or any other similar service if it interferes with their business duties? Does it not go on to say that these business hours will be extended, and does it not further say that those who have already volunteered must withdraw the offer they have made if it in any way interferes with their business hours, and does he not really think that that state of affairs ought to he changed?
    Mr. Lloyd: I think that is a matter which would probably be taken up further with the Bank in any more general view of air-raid precautions.
    Mr. Macquisten: Do not banks close at 3 o'clock?
    Mr. R. C. Morrisonasked the Home Secretary whether he will indicate, for the convenience of local authorities and the public, the policy of his Department with regard to trenches dug and partly dug in parks and open spaces during the recent crisis?
    Mr. Lloyd: Perhaps the hon. Member would await the statement to be made during to-day's Debate.
    Mr. Simmondsasked the Home Secretary whether he can give an approximate estimate of the cost, during the

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    recent crisis, of air-raid precautionary measures both to local authorities and to the Exchequer, severally?
    Mr. Lloyd: Returns from all local authorities have not yet been rendered but on the basis of the information available it is estimated that the gross expenditure of local authorities was of the order of £3,300,000. Grant is payable in accordance with the terms of the Act under which the rate of grant varies, but on the average it may be taken that two-thirds of the approved expenditure would be met by grant. In addition further expenditure was incurred by the Exchequer in respect of supplies and equipment to be furnished centrally, but it is not practicable to isolate emergency expenditure from expenditure incurred under the normal programme.
    Mr. Simmonds: Would my hon. Friend have investigation made into the proportion of these amounts which has been permanently lost owing to the temporary expedients employed, so that, in future, a longer range policy may be considered?
    Colonel Nathan: Is the hon. Gentleman able to say how much expenditure is attributable to sums expended quite outside the local authority, for instance in respect of hospital accommodation, and what is the responsibility falling upon the Exchequer in regard to provision for casualties by hospitals not under local authorities?
    Mr. Lloyd: I could not say without notice.
    Mr. Dalton: May I ask whether the Government, in view of all that has occurred, will not make a clean sweep of this and pay the whole thing out of the National Exchequer, and not put it on the rates at all?
    Mr. Lloyd: I am not in a position to make a statement on that now.
    Mr. Edeasked the Home Secretary how many children the Croydon Borough Council were authorised to evacuate in the event of a national emergency; what transport was proposed to be placed at their disposal; and what grant was promised to the council?
    Mr. Lloyd: During the recent crisis, arrangements were made in considerable detail for the removal of school children
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    from the inner areas of Greater London, but the question whether it was practicable to extend such arrangements to outer areas, such as Croydon, had not been finally determined when the crisis ended. The scope of evacuation plans is now under examination with the object of preparing schemes of a more permanent character.
    Mr. Ede: Are we to understand that any expenditure incurred by the Croydon Borough Council in preparing for the evacuation of the children there, will not rank for grant?
    Mr. Lloyd: I could not make any statement on that now.
    Sir Percy Harris: Does the hon. Gentleman realise that many of these outer boroughs, especially East Ham and other places in East London, were in far more danger and were more liable to air attack even than the inner zone of the County of London; and why did the Government ignore these outer areas?
    Mr. Lloyd: The scheme was in process of being extended. It had already been extended to East Ham and Walthamstow, and the question of further areas was being considered.
    Mr. Footasked the Home Secretary the number of sandbags that have been purchased by his Department and distributed to local authorities?
    Mr. Lloyd: The number of sandbags purchased to date is 88,000,000, of which some were required by the Navy, Army and Air Force. The number distributed to local authorities is 66,000,000. Eight millions are now in stock.
    Miss Wilkinson: Will the extra profits on these sandbags be available for some kind of National Defence contribution?
    Mr. Lloyd: I explained earlier that there were no extra profits. There was an increased output.
    Mr. Silvermanasked the Home Secretary whether in view of the fact that a memorandum of his Department advises local authorities to purchase sirens for air-raid precaution purposes exclusively from a particular firm whose name, address, and prices are therein quoted, his Department have withheld, or threatened to withhold, financial assistance for any local authority desiring to purchase sirens from

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    firms other than the firm alone recommended by them; and, as other firms producing sirens, not inferior to those recommended by his Department, are being forced out of business, he will reconsider his policy in this respect?
    Mr. Lloyd: The Home Office circular to which the hon. Member refers names all the instruments which, after long and extensive trials, the Department was able to recommend as suitable for air raid warning purposes in urban areas. Where a local authority inquires regarding the purchase of other instruments, it must be told either, in the case of instruments included in the trials, that they have not proved so efficient as the recommended instruments, or, in the case of instruments not tried, that their relative efficiency is not known; but in no case has approval for purposes of grant been withheld in the case of instruments purchased during the recent emergency. In the absence of trial, my right hon. Friend is not able to accept any untried instrument as being as good as the recommended instruments.
    Mr. Silverman: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that firms other than the firm now recommended were invited to submit a type quite different from that which is recommended now, and that they are being penalised because the type which they were asked to submit is not in accordance with what his Department required? Does he further realise that these firms are capable of producing, and have in fact been producing, comparable instruments to the one which was recommended, while the policy of the Department has been to grant a monopoly of them to Leicester which is comparatively prosperous, and to deprive Lancashire, which needs the work very badly, of this manufacture?
    Mr. Lloyd: There is no question of setting up a monopoly, but there has been some misunderstanding in this case. The firm which, I think, the hon. Gentleman has in mind did not inform the Department that they had a siren of the particular type which afterwards was recommended. As a result, a siren of larger power was tested and proved less efficient than the siren of smaller power. The matter is in process of being straightened out now that we know that there is such an instrument.
    Miss Wilkinson: Was there an adequate supply?
    Mr. Speaker—
    Miss Wilkinson: On a point of Order. On a matter of such importance as this, surely I am entitled to ask that question?
    Mr. Speaker: I must point out to the hon. Lady that there are 137 Questions on the Paper and that there must be some limit put to the number of supplementaries on each question.
    Mr. Silverman: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I will take an early opportunity of raising this matter on the Adjournment.
    Mr. Kellyasked the Home Secretary whether he will place before the House a copy of the letter of instruction given to municipal officers during September in the matter of protection from war?
    The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir Samuel Hoare): In time of war it would be necessary for the Government to take certain action which falls outside the sphere of ordinary local government. The instructions which the hon. Member no doubt has in mind were confidential instructions on such matters. Action was not in fact taken on them, and they have been withdrawn.
    Mr. Kelly: May we now have those instructions laid, so that Members of the House may know what instructions were given over the heads of the muncipal authorities in this country?
    Sir S. Hoare: No. We could not publish confidential instructions, but I propose to deal with this question in the course of the Debate.

    ALIENS.
    Sir Smedley Crookeasked the Home Secretary (1) how many aliens have been permitted to enter, and to remain in, this country since 1st March, 1938, and how many have been refused this permission; and how these figures compare with other European countries;
    (2) how many aliens have been given permission to take up employment or to set up in business for themselves, either professionally or otherwise, in this

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    country since 1st March, 1938; how many aliens have been refused this permission; and how these figures compare with other European countries?
    Sir S. Hoare: As the answer is long and contains a number of figures, I will, with my hon. Friend's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Wedgwood Benn: Has the right hon. Gentleman noticed that the Munich Agreement has greatly intensified this problem?
    Mr. Petherick: Will my right hon. Friend continue to bear in mind in giving these permits the problem of unemployment in this country.
    Sir S. Hoare: I have made a full statement as to my attitude towards this question. I try to hold the balance between them.
    Following is the answer:
    It is not possible to give the information in the form asked for, nor am I able to make comparisons with other European countries.
    During, the period from 1st March, 1938, to 30th November, 1938, 347,291 aliens were given leave to land in this country and 1,154 were refused leave to land. The arrival figures comprise, for the most part, business and holiday visitors who were admitted for short periods of varying duration, and during the same period 341,166 aliens embarked. It is not possible to say how many of those who entered this country may wish to prolong their stay or remain for business purposes. During the same period 13,235 permits for employment were issued by the Ministry of Labour and applications for 2,349 permits were refused; 7,976 of those issued were in respect of domestic service.
    If my hon. Friend has refugees from Austria particularly in mind, a special record is kept of persons admitted to this country as refugees or who, having arrived as ordinary visitors, make application to the Home Office for permission to prolong their stay because they cannot return to their own country on political, religious or racial grounds. The number of such refugees from Austria for the seven months in question is 2,106, including women and children.

    WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION.
    Miss Wardasked the Home Secretary what action has been taken by his Department, in view of the fact that the Secretary for Mines has implemented the recommendations contained in the report on workmen's compensation relating to miners' nystagmus so far as his Department is concerned?
    Sir S. Hoare: The recommendations affecting my Department cannot be implemented without legislation. I understand that they have been discussed among representatives of employers and workpeople in the industry, and I am asking both sides to let me have their considered views on the question of legislating to give effect to the Committee's proposals.
    Miss Ward: When the information is available can we have an assurance that legislation will be introduced?
    Sir S. Hoare: Obviously I cannot give any assurance about next session.
    Mr. Gallacherasked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been drawn to the case of a widow in Fulham who lost her claim for compensation for the death of her husband owing to the clause that limits the period within which a claim can be lodged against a local authority to six months; and, in view of this and similar cases, does he propose to do anything to amend the law in this respect?
    Sir S. Hoare: I have seen newspaper reports of this case. I gather it involves questions as to the relationship between damages and workmen's compensation which will come within the scope of the Royal Commission, and the question of an amendment of the law on this matter must, I think, be deferred for the present.
    Mr. Gallacher: In view of the urgency of this question, would not the Minister consider bringing in some emergency legislation to remove this limitation? Is he aware that one of my own constituents who was in a sad plight wrote to the Lord Advocate and that the Lord Advocate suggested it was necessary that legislation of this kind should be introduced? Will the right hon. Gentleman consult with the Lord Advocate with a view to removing this limitation?
    Sir S. Hoare: Certainly, I will consult with the Lord Advocate, but my impression is that we cannot take this issue out of the issues to be considered by the Royal Commission.
    Mr. Macquisten: Why not repeal the Public Authorities Protection Act, which has enabled public authorities to defraud innumerable people, and leave them to the ordinary law?
    Mr. Speaker: The Minister has answered the question.

    WRESTLING MATCH, LONDON.
    Mr. Hall-Caineasked the Home Secretary whether his attention was called to the announcement of an all-in wrestling match between a man and a woman in the London area which was to have been held on Tuesday, 25th October; and whether he proposes to take any steps to prevent exhibitions of this character in the future?
    Sir S. Hoare: I have seen Press reports of the cancellation of the exhibition to which the hon. Member refers. The London County Council obtained in their General Powers Act of this Session a provision giving them powers of control over public wrestling and as from the 1st January next, when the provision in question will come into operation, it will be competent to them to impose suitable restrictions on such displays or contests in the London area.
    Mr. Poole: What will be the position of provincial towns who are without these powers?
    Sir S. Hoare: I think the hon. Member had better put that question on the Order Paper.

    POLICE (HOUSING).
    Mr. McEnteeasked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that many police houses in county areas are in a very bad condition of repair and that they are insanitary and unhealthy; and will he give early attention to the condition of such houses with a view to making them reasonably habitable and healthy?
    Sir S. Hoare: The primary responsibility in this matter rests with the various county police authorities. From time to
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    time a few cases have been brought to the notice of the Home Office, usually by His Majesty's inspectors of constabulary, of unsatisfactory houses being kept in occupation, and suitable representations have been made to the authorities concerned. As, however, I indicated in my reply of 29th July last to the hon. Member, the police authorities generally are fully alive to the importance of maintaining a proper standard, and much valuable work has been done of recent years by a steadily increasing number of the authorities to improve the police housing conditions in their areas.
    Mr. McEntee: Will the Home Office make some representations to the authorities concerned in view of the fact that, although questions have been put from time to time, there is really no improvement in these houses?
    Sir S. Hoare: I do not think that is the case, but if the hon. Member will sent me any particulars he has, I will consider them.

    PRISONERS (EXPECTANT MOTHERS).
    Mr. McEnteeasked the Home Secretary whether he has considered the representations from the Magistrates Association asking that women and girl prisoners who are about to become mothers should be transferred to hospital outside the prisons for their confinements; and what action he proposes to take in the matter?
    Sir S. Hoare: This suggestion would involve an amendment of the existing law. I am considering the matter in connection with the Bill which I propose to introduce next Session.

    ACCIDENT, WEMBLEY.
    Mr. Thorneasked the Home Secretary whether he can give any information in connection with the accident at the Aspen Laundry, Wembley, on Monday last, when a man was killed by being caught in a machine; and whether the machine was properly protected?
    Sir S. Hoare: I understand that the victim of this accident had climbed up to some unfenced overhead shafting in order to mount a belt, and got carried round the shaft. The action to be taken is under consideration.

    CONTRACEPTIVES.
    Mr. Flemingasked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that contraceptive appliances may be obtained from a slot machine, labeled "Veribest Cigarettes," placed outside a shop doorway in Manchester; and whether any steps will be taken to make such sales illegal?
    Sir S. Hoare: My attention has been drawn to this matter. As regards proposals for legislation, I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister gave on 8th April last to the hon. Member for Finchley (Mr. Crowder).
    Mr. Fleming: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in Manchester this particular type of machine is being used by children of 14 and 15 years of age; and, in those circumstances, does he not think it advisable to call for a report from the chief constable on this matter?
    Sir S. Hoare: I will certainly consider my hon. and learned Friend's suggestion.
    Lieut.-Commander Agnew: Does not my right hon. Friend think that the time has now come for the Government to take some action in this matter, and that legislation should be introduced as soon as possible?

    DEFENCE.
    Mr. Caryasked the Prime Minister whether the Committee of Imperial Defence is now engaged upon a complete review of the whole position in regard to the naval and military security of the British Isles and, in particular, the reexamination of the intrinsic nature of the staff talks which take place between ourselves and the French Government, with a view to any revision which may be deemed necessary to meet new conditions?
    The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir John Simon): The Committee of Imperial Defence keep under constant review the whole position in regard to the naval and military security of the British Isles; and, as the House already knows, a searching examination of every aspect of our defence arrangements is now proceeding in the light of the experience gained during the recent crisis.
    Mr. Cary: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the whole of the German fortifications in the West are to be extended
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    so as to include Aachen and the Saar; and has any consultation taken place with the French Government to counter this move on the part of the German Government, which is in direct contradiction of the great policy of appeasement, in which the three Governments are engaged?
    Sir J. Simon: The hon. Member raises questions of detail on a very important matter and I am afraid I could not deal with them in answer to a supplementary question. As I have already said, every aspect of the defence of this country is under constant consideration by the Committee of Imperial Defence.
    Sir A. Knox: Will this general survey be completed before the next war?

    QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS.
    Mr. Robert Gibson: On a point of Order. I put down a question to be answered by the Prime Minister, and I have received an intimation that it is to be answered by the Secretary of State for Scotland. In that case, the question as it stands on the Paper at present reads inaccurately. May it not be altered so as to read accurately? The question is No. 103.
    Mr. Speaker: I think we had better wait until we get to that question, if it is reached.
    Mr. Gibson: If we do not get to it, may I point out that it will appear inaccurately?
    Mr. Thorne: I take it for granted, Mr. Speaker, that you have taken notice of the many questions to the Prime Minister on the Order Paper? Can you give any reason why they are all put at the end?
    Mr. Speaker: They are Foreign Office questions.

    FACTORY EXPLOSION, LAMBETH.
    Mr. G. Straussasked the Home Secretary whether His Majesty's factory inspectors have now completed their report of the serious accident that occurred in the Eldorado Ice Cream factory, Lambeth; and what action is being taken to prevent the recurrence of such an accident and consequent loss of
    life?
    Sir S. Hoare: This matter was very fully investigated by the Factory Department and the works will be further visited to see that the further precautions contemplated are being carried out. These consist in the main of extensive alterations of the plant designed to obviate the risk of a similar occurrence in future, and as additional precautions the firm are arranging for the staff to be trained in fire drill and for other improvements in the arrangements for evacuating workrooms in the event of an emergency.

    CZECHOSLOVAKIA (REFUGEES).
    Miss Rathboneasked the Home Secretary whether, in view of the fact that the number of Sudeten-German and German refugees of anti-Nazi opinions now in Czechoslovakia, and in danger of being driven back into the hands of their enemies, is estimated by competent authorities as several thousand, he will consider very substantially increasing the number of 350 permits hitherto granted by his Department, to enable such refugees to seek temporary refuge in this country pending a scheme for their permanent settlement?
    Sir S. Hoare: I understand that there are a certain number of refugees of German origin at present in Czechoslovakia who may be finally unable to settle in Czechoslovakia or to return to Germany, but according to information in the possession of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs it would appear that these persons are not in danger of being sent back. Early in October His Majesty's Government authorised the temporary admission into the United Kingdom of 350 persons who were at that time believed to be in immediate danger if they remained where they were on the undertakings which were forthcoming that these persons would be maintained if necessary during their stay in the United Kingdom. His Majesty's Government are willing to admit the families of these persons if similar undertakings are received. The fixing of a number of 350 in advance was an exceptional measure to meet a special situation and does not imply that no further refugees will be admitted into this country. Individual applications will be sympathetically considered, though the extent to which they can be granted mainly depends on the capacity of
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    voluntary organisations to undertake responsibility for their maintenance and establishment in this country without involving a displacement of British labour.
    Miss Rathbone: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that within the last few days representations have been received from several responsible Englishmen in Prague urging the imminent danger to which these refugees are exposed in view of certain anticipated changes in the Czech Government, and will he not consider an early increase in the number of permits, perhaps in consultation with his colleague the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as to whether some financial assistance should not be granted, seeing that this Government has some responsibility in the matter?
    Sir S. Hoare: I can only say that I am prepared to consider cases individually and sympathetically.
    Mr. Benn: When the right hon. Gentleman says that these people are in danger in Prague, in danger from whom? Does he mean the Gestapo?
    Mr. Hicks: Will the right hon. Gentleman be prepared, outside of what has been guaranteed for the maintenance of the refugees when they come into the country, to receive representations as to the Government bearing some financial responsibility in this matter?
    Sir S. Hoare: That is obviously a different question and had better be put down.

  EDUCATION.

    LIVERPOOL (NON-PROVIDED SCHOOLS).
    Mr. Loganasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education whether his attention has been drawn to the official statement, made by the leader of the Liverpool City Council, to the effect that no understanding exists between the council and the Board of Education on the grant question and that no grant from the rates of Liverpool for the building and furnishing of a sectarian school will ever be agreed to; and what further action he intends to take to make the Education Act, 1936, operative in Liverpool?
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education (Mr. Kenneth Lindsay): The answer to the first part of the

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    question is in the affirmative. My Noble Friend has under close consideration the position which has developed in Liverpool, and I am unable to say more at present.
    Mr. Logan: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the policy enunciated up to now is "No religion in the schools," which is contrary to the spirit of the Education Act of 1936, and are the Government prepared to repudiate that kind of statement which has been made in Liverpool and to take action to call a conference to save the ratepayers any further loss of grant in that city?
    Mr. Lindsay: I cannot add anything to the answer that I have already given. I hardly think this is the exact moment for me to make a statement on the subject.
    Mr. Logan: If I ask again in a fortnight's time, will the hon. Gentleman be in a position to give me an answer then?
    Mr. Lindsay: I will try.

    SCHOOL HOLIDAYS.
    Mr. R. Robinsonasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education what steps have been taken by his Department to facilitate the spread-over of school holidays?
    Mr. Lindsay: I am sending my hon. Friend a copy of a memorandum which the Board have addressed to local education authorities on this matter. In accordance with the arrangements there described, children will be able to accompany their parents on their annual holidays should they fall in school term time, without any consequential loss of grant to the authority. Further, the Board have requested the university examining bodies to arrange their certificate examinations in 1940 to take place so far as possible in the first fortnight in June, thereby leaving the rest of that month and July, August and September available for a spread-over of the holidays of pupils taking those examinations.

    UNDULANT FEVER.
    Mr. Liddallasked the Minister of Health what is the number of human cases of undulant fever arising in Great Britain attributable to bovine infection through milk or meat in each of the past
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    10 years; and what measures he has taken to reduce the risk of human infection by the group of Brucella organisms?
    The Minister of Health (Mr. Elliot): Undulant fever is not a generally notifiable disease, and statistics of its incidence are therefore not available. Estimates have, however, been made by responsible investigators that there may be some 400 or 500 cases per annum in this country. The importance of all measures to ensure the cleanliness and safety of milk in order to avoid risk from this and other milk-borne diseases has frequently been emphasised by my Department. Considerable progress in this matter has been made. I have no information to suggest that meat is a source of human infection with this disease.
    Mr. Liddall: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that apart from persons who, by reason of their occupation, are exposed to special risks, there is really no need at all for anyone to have this undulant fever?

    SPANISH SHIP (ATTACK, NORTH SEA).
    Mr. Arthur Henderson(by Private Notice) asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty whether he can make a statement on the firing on the Spanish Steamer "Cantabria" by a Spanish rebel cruiser off Cromer on 2nd November?
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Shakespeare): At about 3.30 p.m. yesterday, a report was received from the steamship "Monkwood" that an auxiliary cruiser flying the flag of General Franco's forces was firing at a Spanish merchant vessel at a position seven miles west of the Cromer Knoll light vessel. Instructions were at once sent out to His Majesty's ships nearest the scene to proceed to the spot with a view both to rendering any assistance to crew of the vessel which was being attacked and to ensuring that the armed auxiliary took no action inside British territorial waters. I understand that of the crew of the vessel, which proved to be the "Cantabria," II were rescued by the steamship "Pattersonian" and five by the Cromer lifeboat, and that the remainder were taken on board the auxiliary cruiser. No violation of British territorial waters occurred.
    Mr. Henderson: In view of the fact that Spanish rebel cruisers are apparently patrolling the North Sea, may I ask the Minister whether steps will be taken to protect merchant shipping, first by preventing the sending of wireless messages to those cruisers from rebel sympathisers in this country, and secondly by strengthening the British Naval patrol in the North Sea?
    Mr. Shakespeare: If there are auxiliary cruisers belonging to General Franco patrolling the North Sea, I do not see how any threat to British ships is involved in that.
    Mr. G. Strauss: Will the hon. Gentleman say whether it was in fact contrary to international law for a cruiser to fire on this tramp steamship, and that the most they were entitled to do was to take it prisoner?
    Mr. Shakespeare: I have no information as to what happened except what I have seen in the Press, but according to Press accounts warning was given by the cruiser.
    Mr. Garro Jones: Can the hon. Gentleman assure the House that no facilities will be given to this or any similar vessel for taking on fuel or supplies from any British port?
    Mr. Shakespeare: That is a hypothetical question.
    Mr. Garro Jones: May I press for an answer? It is not a hypothetical question, and I am asking for the assertion of a principle which it is now time to announce.
    Mr. Shakespeare: I think that question should be put down.
    Mr. Dalton: Would it not be a gross violation of the principle of non-intervention for these rebel vessels to be succoured from British sources of supply?
    Lieut.-Commander Agnew: Is it not a fact that a few months ago a Barcelona Government destroyer was repaired at Falmouth, fitted out with ammunition, and afterwards taken down the river and allowed to go to sea?

    ADDITIONAL BANK HOLIDAY (CHRISTMAS).
    Mr. Hicks(by Private Notice) asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether,
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    in view of the anxiety of traders and workpeople, he has any statement to make as to whether or not it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to propose that Tuesday, 27th December, 1938, should be a public holiday?
    Sir J. Simon: Christmas Day this year falls on a Sunday, and I have recommended that the necessary steps should be taken to declare Tuesday, 27th December, a bank and public holiday this year in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. In Scotland, where, as the House will be aware, the day following Christmas Day is not ordinarily observed as a holiday, the law provides that if Christmas Day falls on a Sunday, then the next following day (Monday, 26th December) is an additional holiday. And when New Year's Day is on a Sunday, as it is next year, the day following (Monday, 2nd January) is a holiday in Scotland.

AIR-RAID DEFENCE.
3.51 p.m.
Mr. Herbert Morrison: I beg to move,
"That this House expresses its grave concern at the admitted unpreparedness to protect the civil population when the country was brought to the brink of war."
In the Debate on Tuesday, when my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition made some references to certain set-backs in British diplomacy in recent times, the Prime Minister resented that expression of opinion and said something about people broadcasting to the world about the deficiencies, or alleged deficiencies, of this country. Judging by subsequent comment, that criticism referred particularly to right hon. Gentlemen who do not belong to the Labour party. This afternoon we shall be engaging in some criticism of Government administration, and I imagine that criticism will be forthcoming from hon. Members on the other side of the House. The Prime Minister is going rather far when he suggests that Members of Parliament should not do their duty, for it is the duty of Members of the House to speak of deficiencies in the administration of the Government. We propose to discharge that duty. Notwithstanding the Prime Minister's contact with politicians who have other ways, we propose to adhere to the principles of the British Constitution and British practice.
In this matter of air-raid precautions I have always taken the view, and I think that the great bulk of other people of all political persuasions have taken the view, that this need not, and, if we can avoid it, it ought not to be, a party political question. It is a matter of public administration, public organisation and of good government nationally and locally, and, provided the job is effectively and efficiently done, we on this side of the House have no desire to make politics out of it. If this afternoon we are critical, it will be not from motives of party political considerations; it will be, so far as I am concerned, and, I think, so far as my hon. Friends are concerned, because as good citizens concerned with the safety and the security of our people we are genuinely and seriously worried about the state of affairs at the time of the recent crisis. I think that that is not exceptional to us. Hon. Members opposite have reason to be worried as well.
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I would impress on them that they also should not make this a matter of party political considerations, and that there is no obligation on them necessarily to support the Government because in the ordinary way they are Government supporters. Every Member of the House, irrespective of his party, has an individual responsibility to his constituents to do his duty in this vital matter, and I hope that hon. Members will do it.
We shall no doubt be told, as, indeed, the Government Amendment indicates, not for the first time, "Let us not worry too much about the past; there is a new Minister and there is to be a new order of things. There are to be changes." But it is the duty of this House to examine the past. It is the duty of Members to express their views upon Government administration and Government policy. I suggest that the appointment of a new Minister is no excuse whatever for sidestepping the grave state of affairs which existed in those critical days of September. An account must be rendered of the Government's stewardship. We must know what they did, and we must know why they did not do things which admittedly ought to have been done. They must face criticism and deal with it, and either admit it and apologise for the facts, or give an adequate explanation why these things happened. Moreover, we must have a very full statement of future Government policy in relation to the important matters which we shall bring to the attention of the House this afternoon.
I do hope that Ministers will not merely say, "Well, do not worry about the past; there is a new Minister who has never been a Minister before, though he has had to do with Ministers before—Ministers of all parties," because we have had that before. There was grave discontent with the War Office and a new War Secretary was appointed. We were told, "Never mind the past, there is a new live lad on the job. He will not hide his head under a bushel. Give him a chance." There was grave criticism of the Air Ministry, and the Government did two things. They solemnly declared that the former Air Minister was a first-class Air Minister, and, at the same time, they said, "Well, even if he is not, which we do not admit, we will have a new Air Minister who is a cheerful, cherubic personality. Give him a chance." So the past was wiped out. We had

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trouble about the co-ordination of the Defence Services, and we had a larger edition of cherubic personality appointed as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. The Government said, "Things may have been wrong in the past, but here is a new man, learned in the law. What more can you want? Give him a chance." He has had it, and I do not know what he has done. There were grave criticisms about agriculture, and the Prime Minister went to Scotland and then came back to England to the Ministry of Health, and a new Minister was appointed, but the hon. Member for Evesham (Mr. De la Bèere) and others see no change in Government policy on agriculture.
I say it is playing the fool with great issues of public policy and it is contemptuously evading responsibility for the Government to earn a record of incompetence and indecision, and then sail out of their troubles by appointing some new victim to administer the imperfect policy for which the Cabinet as a whole must hold responsibility. What we want is not merely a reshuffle of Ministers, and we have not even had that: we really need a revolution in the mentality and competence of the Government as a whole. The Government are there. They have their majority. Cannot the Government find within their party—I am perfectly serious about this—in the ranks of the Ministerialists, better Ministers than they have, because there are really great failures in serious positions, some of them in what is known as the Inner Cabinet itself? Is the Conservative party so short of material and ability that it cannot find the men who can bring really new vigour and new blood, a new determination of administration into the Government, because it really is a necessity in the interests of the good government of this country that it should be done? It is all very well for the Government to weed out Ministers because they cannot say "Yes" to the Prime Minister often enough, and to bring in Lord Runciman, who does not exactly give me a feeling of complete relief and confidence in the Government; and after all, the Government cannot go on absorbing ex-civil servants who possess a good reputation. It would not do; it would be politically wrong, and moreover, I am not sure that there are enough
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civil servants of that kind to go round for the vacancies that ought to be filled. We need new vigour and new determination in the Government and the Prime Minister has a duty to provide it.
I am not sure about the machinery of administration under the new order of things. Certainly we ought to know more about it. There is the Lord Privy Seal, whom we all congratulate on his appointment. Let me say to him that although I confess it was a shock, when I knew him only as a formidable civil servant, to see him blossom forth as a Tory Member of Parliament and then as a Tory Minister. I may assure him, while congratulating him upon this appointment, that provided he does the job with vigour and determination and capacity he will have our encouragement and support, and I am sure he will have the encouragement and co-operation of the local authorities of the country. We must, if necessary, criticise and attack. We have no wish to attack for the sake of attacking in this matter of vital national importance. But I would ask, is the Lord Privy Seal to have powers which are analogous to those of the Minister for Co-Ordination of Defence in relation to the three Defence Services? We ought to know. Is that to be his position? Is he to be in a position of consultation, counsel, advice and encouragement only to the extent of the Minister for Co-Ordination of Defence? Is his position to be analogous to that of Mr. Thomas when he was Lord Privy Seal?
Is the new Minister's constitutional position to be analogous to that of the Minister for Co-Ordination of Defence, in which he will have one or two officers to assist him, but the executive responsibility and the ministerial responsibility will remain in separate Departments? Or is the right hon. Gentleman to be in the position that he can go to the Home Office, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Transport and other Departments that the Prime Minister has mentioned, and have responsibility in the matter; can he go to those Departments and give them orders? Is he executive in that sense? If he is not I can see some difficulties. Although I admit that it may conceivably work, frankly, on the face of it, unless adequate explanations are forthcoming, to appoint a Lord Privy Seal without an executive Department

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and an adequate staff behind him, and to require him to co-ordinate great Departments of State, and to preside also over a committee of Ministers and a committee of civil servants, does not convince me as necessarily an effective piece of governmental machinery. I would like to know more about it.
I do not believe in Cabinet Committees as an instrument of executive government. Cabinet Committees for specific purposes of consultation and elaboration of policy may be right, but I doubt whether you can point to many instances of Cabinet Committees that were successes as organs of executive government. They can talk, but they cannot do things, and it is doing things that we want in this business of air-raid precautions from now onwards. We have a Minister for Co-Ordination of Defence and we now have a Minister for Co-ordination of Air-Raid Precautions. Let me make a suggestion to the Prime Minister. We have a Lord President of the Council whose duties are negligible. Why not, in order to complete the picture, make the Lord President of the Council the Minister for the Co-Ordination of Co-Ordination? I express my gratitude to the Chief Whip who is leaving the House and so promptly carrying out my proposal. Co-ordination is a blessed word in politics, but it is very much overdone, and when you get two co-ordinating Ministers you get to the point when you need someone to co-ordinate them. But co-ordination is as often as not a mere excuse and a mere cover-up for inefficiency in the responsible executive Departments themselves.
Let us examine a little history in relation to air-raid precautions. The business did not start with the Air-Raid Precautions Act of 1937. If I remember rightly, it started in the year 1930 under the Labour Government of that time. Eight years have gone since air-raid precautions had the attention of Ministers. I remember very well with what a shock, when I was Minister of Transport, I heard that I had been appointed to a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to deal with this new subject, which was quite outside my experience, and I remember also that our principal Civil Service adviser was the right hon. Gentleman who is now Lord Privy Seal, and he gave us quite honest and good advice about it. There it was,
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in 1930. Governments must answer for what has happened between 1930 and 1938. Why is it that after eight years of responsibility and examination we were in September, 1938, in the position which I shall proceed to detail to the House? What happened between 1931 and the issuing of the first circular four years later—not only four vital years, but two of them exceedingly dangerous years, for 1933 indicated to everyone with eyes to see that a new Europe was evolving and that a new and dangerous situation in foreign affairs was coming. Not that the Circular of July, 1935, was any good. What happened between 1931 and 1935 and between 1933 and 1938? The answer is that under the present Chancellor of the Exchequer when he was Home Secretary substantially nothing happened with regard to air-raid precautions. That is true; it cannot be specifically denied by the present occupant of the Home Secretaryship nor by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. A new Home Secretary was appointed and he now holds office. He moved, he made the subject a subject of big consideration in the Department, and he deserves all credit for having done so. But he did not do the trick; he did not complete the organisation, although, as I say, he was an enormous improvement on the present Chancellor of the Exchequer when Home Secretary, and that was not difficult.
In the course of my speech I must necessarily refer considerably to my experience in London. I have had that experience and know more about London than other parts of the country. I do not say this merely in order to put London into the middle of the Floor of the House, but simply because I know more about it. In passing let me say that if things were bad in London, which obviously did receive prime consideration on the whole, because it is the capital city, how much worse must they have been in other centres which also needed attention—all the towns on the East Coast, Birmingham, Manchester and other cities. If things were bad in London one can realise how much worse they must have been elsewhere. Indeed, I have read reports of air-raid precautions committees from Birmingham, the Derbyshire County Council, the Bristol Corporation and others, and the Press reports all reveal a very serious state of affairs and

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a very strong feeling both in the Press and among local authorities of both parties that the Government did not rise and has not risen to its responsibilities in this matter.
As I have said, the Government's attention to this matter began in 1930. It was not until 9th July, 1935, that any general Government circular went out to local authorities. That is a period of five years. Yet everyone knew, I knew at that first meeting of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, that the local authorities were inevitably and quite properly to be involved in air-raid precautions. But they were not communicated with by general circular until 9th July, 1935. There was no other general circular on the general problem, apart from specific communications upon specific points, until 23rd February, 1937, and in that circular local authorities were asked to push on with fire-precaution schemes involving very heavy expenditure without any indication of the amount of financial assistance forthcoming. Why should local authorities wait for a settlement of the financial business, it may be asked. The purchase of fire appliances involves an enormous cost. The organisation of auxiliary fire brigades would involve very considerable expenditure.
It is preposterous that the blame should be put on the local authorities when every Minister and every Member of Parliament knows that if you are going in for a new type of administration the first thing is to go to the local authorities about it and to state the financial aspect. But, apart from that, the local authorities had not powers to spend money on some of the subjects required; they could not do it. Therefore, obviously what should have happened was that the local authorities should have been consulted and a financial settlement should have been reached. I am referring now to the date 9th July, 1935. No approach was made to the local authorities until 19th July, 1937, two years after, and then the local authorities' associations were invited to confer with the Home Secretary on the finance of air-raid precautions. Discussions took place, finally an agreement was reached, and the House passed the Bill, but the Bill was not on the Statute Book until December of last year. A year has not passed since the law came into force; merely nine months had
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elapsed between the passage of the Act and the emergence of the crisis in September, 1938. It is a scandal that that Act had not been passed previously in order that the administrative mechanism might have been elaborated and a tidy system of administration evolved. Had that been the case we should not have been in the grave situation in which we found ourselves in September as a consequence of the delays.
The local authorities had not got a statutory responsibility until the beginning of this year. Let not that be forgotten. It is no good sending out circulars which are muddled circulars and with no indication of who is to pay or in what proportions. The real responsibility of the local authorities did not commence before this year. Even so, no effective lead was given to them. They needed aid, counsel and advice, particularly the smaller local authorities. There ought to have been a competent and sufficient staff, a field staff in the country as well as a staff in Whitehall, to assist them, to counsel them, to advise them. The assistance given to them was neither effective nor adequate.
When scorn is poured upon the fact that the local authorities had not sufficient volunteers, let us not underestimate what has been done. The Under-Secretary said the other day that there were now 1,000,000 air-raid precautions volunteers in the country. Getting that number of volunteers in a matter of 10 months is one of the greatest achievements in voluntary recruiting in history. It is a great thing, and it could have been bettered, and it can be bettered. I am sure this business can be done by voluntary effort, provided the volunteers know that both the State and the local authorities are efficient in the discharge of their duties, because that always brings a better response from people asked to do a voluntary job. We find that it is so in political organisations. If there is a local political organisation which is miserably inefficient it does not get voluntary help, and does not deserve to, but where there is a first-class political organisation in a constituency it always succeeds in attracting volunteers. There is nothing like success and efficiency for attracting volunteers.
The wide knowledge that lack of preparations and inefficiency existed had a bad effect both on the numbers and on the moral of the volunteers. But do not let

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us underestimate the importance of raising 1,000,000 air-raid volunteers; and let us not be surprised if all of them had not been trained in time. Consider how long it takes to raise a territorial army and to train it. I admit that the training is a stiffer and a more technical job, but still this work is something like it, and I say that taking the country as a whole a large and very big job was done in a very short time My complaint is that the time ought not to have been so short, that the Act ought to have been passed years before. Then there is the point that some of the volunteers could not have been used because the Home Office equipment was not available. The local authorities at any rate have the defence, which, I suggest, is a legitimate one, that the Act had not been passed before the end of last year. The State has to answer the accusation that it has had the matter under consideration for eight years. We want to know what the Government have been doing ever since 1931. It is now admitted by Conservative newspapers, by newspapers which support the Government, and it is admitted by Ministers, and is a subject of complaint by Conservative local authorities, that things were ineffective and that we were gravely unprepared.
I suggest to the Government that they have under estimated the vital consideration of air-raid precautions in relation to the conduct of diplomacy and defence. We now undertake negotiations with Governments that are a little unorthodox in their diplomatic methods. They have a practice now of, metaphorically, pointing the gun at those with whom they are negotiating. Is not our Government likely to be in an infinitely stronger position in conducting diplomatic negotiations if it knows that its civil population at home feels that the worst effects of any air-craft attack can be avoided as a result of the efficiency of the defence preparations which have been made? It is a vital consideration in the defence of the country; and, moreover, the civil population have a right to expect that the Government will have taken all steps to secure their protection against enemy bombardment and air raids.
The people ought to be able to feel that everything possible has been done for their protection and assistance, and if they do not have that feeling two factors
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will emerge. In the first place the country will be disturbed at this inefficiency, and a country worried about inefficiency is a country that will become demoralised. In the second place the country will be weakened in diplomatic negotiations. Therefore, this matter is not one of secondary importance, but is a matter of as much strategical, diplomatic and national importance as any one of the three Defence Services and the sooner we realise this the better it will be for everybody concerned.
Looking through the Parliamentary statements made by the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary I am appalled at the promises they have made on this matter and the promises they have not kept. I am worried about their souls and their future. I read "The matter is actively under consideration," "It is soon to be published," "We are reaching the last stages," "It is commanding the most serious attention of His Majesty's Government." Take the case of "Advice to Householders," the booklet which was the work of the Under-Secretary. He started talking seriously about that handbook in July, 1936, and it was distributed, I think, round about the time of the crisis itself. It took over two years to produce a handbook which must have been under consideration before July, 1936. It is appalling that that should have been so. The same story runs through every one of the big factors in air-raid precautions.
When the crisis came the Government had been talking about gas masks for a long time; it was, in fact, their favourite subject; one would have thought that gas was the only danger; but even in the case of this pet subject of theirs there were deficiencies in the arrangements in various localities. In some localities there was a deficiency in the numbers of gas masks, some were delivered short of vital parts without which they were no use. Cartons in which the gas masks could be carefully packed were to be supplied, but they were not forthcoming. Some of the mental hospitals under the care of the London County Council have not got gas masks to this day. They were not delivered during the crisis, because the local authorities had not got them. At nine of the mental hospitals no supplies were received, because the local authorities had received an insufficiency of masks from the Home Office to

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meet their demands. My hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale (Mr. Kelly) knows that, because he is chairman of one of them. I had a grumble from him about it, and quite properly. I am not saying that the Home Office did not help us in many ways to get the problem solved, but those particular problems were not solved. The gas masks ought to have been there.
Now I come to the auxiliary fire service. There was a great necessity for that service to be adequately organised well in advance. In the evidence they gave to the Riverdale Committee on 20th February, 1936, the London County Council urged that that should be done, that it was vital. The Home Office circular on fire brigade organisation was sent out on 23rd February, 1937, and in it there was no provision about who was to pay. There cannot be an effective organisation of auxiliary firemen unless the equipment for them is available. Ministers and Members have been going about the country hinting of compulsory service because there was an insufficiency of volunteers, but what is the good of having all the volunteers in the world if there is not the equipment for them to use? Let me give the House some facts, they are dramatic facts, applying to the fire brigade service of the London County Council. The number of appliances needed for London—this is an agreed figure between us and the Home Office—is about 3,000. By 27th September this year the London Fire Brigade had not got 3,000 appliances. The right hon. Gentleman was responsible for supplying these appliances; it was not the business of the Council to find them. How many appliances do Members think we had on 27th September? Ninety-nine, and most of those were delivered without the necessary equipment, which had to be supplied out of the stores of the London Fire Brigade.
At the time of the crisis the professional, full-time, fire brigade could have used all these appliances, leaving none for the 4,000 auxiliaries who were then in training. Those volunteers could have manned at least 300 more appliances than were available. To-day we have in training or trained, I am glad to say, not 4,000 but 13,500 fire auxiliaries, but the brigade even to-day has only 145 auxiliary appliances. With the personnel we have we could utilise 1,300 appliances, but we
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have only 145. What is the good of Conservative Members of this House flirting with the idea of compulsory service when there is not enough material for the volunteers? It is not only that you have not enough material, but that the Auxiliary Fire Service knows that we have not enough, and that their job cannot be done properly. If that condition of things goes on for an indefinite time that fine body of men and women, of whom I am proud and who will, I hope, stick to the job, will become demoralised, and they will start fading away. It is shameful that these volunteers who have come forward to do a very dangerous job should be short of the essential appliances.
Moreover, as to steel helmets. These auxiliary firemen will have to run risks of fire and bombs, and of shrapnel from our own anti-aircraft guns, and if there are any people who need steel helmets they are the auxiliary firemen. These people want to know when they are to get their helmets in proper numbers. They say that what is happening now is not good enough. We have brought the need repeatedly to the attention of the Home Office, but no action was taken until the crisis, when, upon an urgent request, the Home Office offered us—we were glad to have them—3,000 steel helmets if the fire brigade would collect them. We collected them with pleasure, but when we went to collect the 3,000 steel helmets only 2,000 were available. I am sorry to weary the House with these details—[HON. MEMBERS: "Go on!"]—but I feel that I have a duty not only to my city but to my country, and that the House of Commons has a duty to see that this state of affairs is put right.
There was similar trouble about the earmarking of vehicles. The State wanted to earmark vehicles, quite rightly, for a number of things, and we wanted to earmark vehicles for fire brigade and ambulance purposes and certain other things. Everybody wanted to earmark vehicles. What is the way to do it? If everybody wants to earmark vehicles, that is where the function of and the need for co-ordination obviously come in. If we are falling over each other in earmarking there is confusion and trouble. We made representations to the Home Office and had conferences from 3rd March this year onwards, urging that this earmarking must be tackled centrally, and that there

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must be effective distribution of earmarked vehicles among the State and the local authorities, in the national interest. At those conferences the Home Office could offer no hope of an effective central solution, but on 20th September—it is extraordinary the number of communications that went out in September—a circular was issued asking local authorities to earmark vehicles for themselves, pending a central scheme.
In the crisis, the fire brigade had no vehicles except the cars of the volunteers themselves and 60 vans that had been bought by the council for training. You see where we were. We would go to a firm and say: "Earmark your vehicles for use by the London County Council if a crisis comes," and they would answer, "We have done something for the War Office or the Ministry of Transport." We could not say: "Never mind the War Office or the Ministry of Transport," because that would be a wrong thing to do, and we would not do it. Why could we not have had central registration of those vehicles in a proper businesslike way instead of having to compete against each other, and for my officers to be wasting their time going to see people on matters of earmarking when it was no good seeing them, as they were already committed?
I come to the hospitals. The House will agree that they are a vital element in all this business. We had to anticipate the possibility of casualties on a large scale. It was essential that the organisation of hospitals locally and centrally should trace the movements of the patient from the time that he might be damaged in the street, to the first-aid post, through the casualty hospital and to the base hospital. We needed ambulances and stretchers. None of that organisation was impossible. It was infinitely easier than the task which Mr. Thomas was given in 1929, of solving the unemployment problem. It is an administrative matter. There was no supreme difficulty about it. This hospital business was vital in every part of the country, and nowhere more vital than in this great City of London, with its complicated local government system and its numerous authorities, including the voluntary hospital authorities themselves.
How many inquiries does the House think took place, beginning in 1930?
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There were five inquiries of some sort, some so indefinite that I cannot define them at all. I call them committees in my notes, but I think that is not the right name. I ought to call them a series of five consultations since 1930. Four of them petered out. They were not positive enough to die, but somehow they went. I do not know what became of them. The business started with the Ministry of Health and then the Home Office got it during most of the period. Then there was a joint arrangement. Joint arrangements are usually bad administration, and I do not like them. The matter finished where it began, quite properly, with the Ministry of Health, which is the expert authority on hospitals, and where it ought to have been all the time. Four of those inquiries expired without reaching conclusions, and no reasons were given. Much work was consequently wasted by the new committees, with new membership, going over the ground again. Finally, came the report of the Wilson Committee, presented to the Home Secretary and the Minister of Health on 20th July,1938—and you got the crisis in September. That was no time to finish, not the organisation of the hospitals but the plan for the organisation of the hospitals, which was quite a different thing. That was when it finished. Supreme direction was then undertaken by the Ministry of Health.
Fortunately, a good deal of preparation had been going on by the London County Council and we were reasonably advanced and prepared but, you know, we need not have been. We could have sat back with every justification and waited for those inquiries. Fortunately we did not, and we were reasonably ready with medical reserves and food reserves. We were substantially ready for our job. On structural precautions in hospitals the Council was not prepared as well as it should have been, but in that respect it was like other authorities, because technical advice on which to base hospital precautions was not supplied by the Home Office until 17th June, 1938. We had the same story with ambulances. The crisis was acute, but no additional stretchers had been received when the crisis was acute. The supply of them was a Government responsibility and when, under pressure from the Council, the Ministry of Health assumed general ambulance responsibility as well as hospital responsibility, a supply of

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4,000 was secured by the end of the crisis week.
There was administrative confusion in this matter. During the crisis itself and after the Ministry of Health had taken ambulance responsibility from the Home Office, the Home Office issued a circular on 23rd September, 1938, instructing the Metropolitan borough councils to earmark ambulances, although they knew, or should have known, that ambulance organisation was the duty of the London County Council and not of the Metropolitan borough councils, under the Air-Raid Precautions Act and under the regulations made by the Secretary of State. The boroughs were responsible—I think they were all the time but I do not think they ought to have been, because it tied up the ambulance service of the hospital service—for first-aid posts, which ought to have been with the Ministry of Health. They were short of medical supplies and of stretchers. There is a review of a field in which Government policy should have been settled, not months but years before the crisis was upon us.
Now let me turn to two points on which there was no real decision of Government policy at all up to the days of the crisis itself. They were vital points; I would say they were the two most important points in the whole of the air-raid precautions policy. I refer to shelters and to evacuation, which are related to each other administratively and affect everything else you do. What happened on shelters? I say there was no effective work on shelters. There was no decision of any kind and no intention of any kind that every man, woman and child in our country should, as far as practicable, have effective shelter of some kind. I say that the Government ought to make that decision because of their duty to the country, to the people and to themselves in their conduct of foreign affairs, as well as in the whole problem of national defence. Substantially, you ought to have shelter accommodation for the whole of the population. I know that would cost a lot of money, but you will have to spend a lot of money on this business if you are going to do it. The Air Force costs a lot of money and so do the Army and the Navy. This service is as important as any one of those three services.
On 28th March, 1938, the Home Office asked the borough councils to survey all
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basements from the shelter aspect, and on 31st March there was a conference of borough engineers at the Home Office, when the borough representatives stated the impossibility of completing those surveys within the three months suggested by the Home Office. Indeed, the survey of the city of Westminster, a Conservative borough, but, I freely say, certainly not the least efficient of the Metropolitan boroughs in air-raid precaution matters, has only just been completed, nine months after the commencement. But why rely upon basements? There may be some basements that are exceptionally safe, but the East End of London boroughs were asked to survey their basements. They did so as well as they could, but many of those basements, intended to be used for shelter purposes, would be useless. In the East End of London buildings would collapse into the basements if they were hit, but there would also be a good chance of buildings collapsing into the basements from shock, quite apart from direct hits. It is absurd to regard the general run of basements as adequate for the protection of the civil population.
The defence of the Home Office will be, I imagine, that a circular had gone to the local authorities telling them that they could provide shelter accommodation. It was a function of the Metropolitan borough councils and not of the county council—I fancy it may have been also a function of the non-county boroughs and of the county districts in the provinces—to provide shelters. The Home Secretary may say: "I offered them a grant," but the House must face the fact that the provision of adequate shelter accommodation is bound to be a highly expensive proposition. I am not going to run away from that expense, because it is vital that it should be incurred, but to tell a county district, a county borough or a Metropolitan borough to provide shelter accommodation—for that matter, to tell the county borough of West Ham or even the county council to do so—is to ask them to undertake a financial responsibility, and possibly an engineering responsibility, that may be quite beyond their finances, and possibly beyond their technical resources. It is obvious that they could not do it. I told the right hon. Gentleman, in the financial negotiations on the Bill, that he must not expect these local

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authorities to be able to do it. The result was that it was not done, and so at the last minute we began to dig trenches. That is all right, but, if the Home Secretary does not make up his mind what to do with these trenches, they will solve the problem themselves by falling in.
I am not going to scorn trenches, any more than I am going to scorn the respirator. The trench is a very useful form of shelter as long as you do not get a direct hit, and, after all, most people would be in trouble if they got a direct hit. I am not going to scorn the trench provided that it is properly constructed and equipped for its job, but the matter ought never to have been left to the last minute; it could have been done before. There were not enough of them sanctioned. Most boroughs were told to construct up to 10 per cent. of their population. There might have been a further order later on to build more—I want to be quite fair—but the numbers were not adequate. Let it be remembered that numbers of the population are not near an open space, and could not have gone to an open space for trench accommodation. But what was appalling was the prospect that, with an insufficiency of trenches, there would have been vast masses of people scrambling to get into trenches and unable to get in. It would not have been death from bombs, but death by Londoner upon Londoner as a result of the scrambles and congestion that would have arisen. I think the Home Secretary ought to decide what the future of these trenches is going to be. The steel people and the concrete people ought to know what proposals are to be put to the local authorities.
Again, what is going to happen to our parks with these holes still remaining? I suggest that the best thing would be to go on digging them sufficiently deep, put the concrete or steel on, and then put the grass back, so that, if war should come, you would be able to make trenches of them again. But let us have a decision. In this vast field many poor local authorities had to spend during the crisis very substantial sums on trenches and other items as well. I am not speaking for the London County Council now; I reserve all my rights of negotiation; we settled our finances with the right hon. Gentleman as we went along, and I am
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not going to break any bargain that I have reached; but there are poor local authorities who have spent very large sums on trenches and other things during the crisis, and I suggest that, whatever the right hon. Gentleman does in the ordinary way about A.R.P. expenditure, he ought to try and see these local authorities through their crisis expenditure, because it is very serious for them, and, after all, they did not make the crisis.
As regards shelters there is no connected policy. As to sirens, we have been trying to find out about them this afternoon. Let the right hon. Gentleman correct me if I am wrong, but my information is that the sirens were not available. They are something like the aeroplanes; the Department spent such a long time in deciding what is the right type of siren to produce the proper note—[An HON. MEMBER: "And deciding wrongly."]—I will not go into that technicality, but when the emergency came the sirens simply were not available.
The issue of evacuation was a major issue of policy, and statutorily, under the Act of 1937, evacuation was the responsibility of the State. This matter has been knocking about in the House of Commons and has been discussed across the Floor of the House, and the Under-Secretary has been answering questions about evacuation ever since July, 1935. We were told that it was actually under the consideration of the Government. They said, "We are hoping to come to a decision"; "we have plans in preparation"; "we are on the verge"—they were; they were on the verge of a great national tragedy without being ready for it. The House will remember that, when the Bill went through the House, evacuation had to be forced upon the Home Secretary. It became his responsibility. The local authorities have no executive or policy responsibility for evacuation; their only responsibility is for helpful co-operation. In due course a Committee of this House was appointed, over which the right hon. Gentleman who is now Lord Privy Seal presided. The Committee did their work well, and I am sure the House is grateful to them for their labours. Evidently, their report left some gaps which must be filled by technical and administrative arrangements made by the Department.

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I suggest to the House, however, that that Committee ought never to have been appointed. It was an evasion of ministerial responsibility. There was a statutory responsibility upon the Minister. The Minister was afraid of public opinion, and passed the baby to the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues on that Committee. There is too much of this passing the baby instead of Ministers carrying the responsibility, and there is too much fear of the public when you have a job of work to do. My own experience is that, if you are right in what you are doing, if you are efficient in what you are doing, if you give the public sound reasons for what you are doing, the public are all right. This Committee was a try-out with public opinion. The object was to see, first of all, how Members of Parliament would react to it. Then the Members of Parliament—I do not blame them—sent for a lot of people to tell them what they thought about it, and so you got the reactions of public opinion, or thought so. The months were going, the crisis was coming, delay was taking place. As a matter of fact, the right hon. Gentleman received that report on the edge of the crisis itself, and he did not publish it in the days of the crisis. I think he was right, for, unless he could publish it with a declaration that the Government not only accepted the recommendations of the Committee but had concrete emergency plans ready for operation, the mere publication of the report would have been unwise, and might hace created a public panic in the circumstances of that time. They could not say they were ready; they were not ready; they had no policy of evacuation when the crisis emerged.
We gave advice to the committee about the children. Up to the last minute there was no decision about the children. There was an idea that the children could go out with the adults, or that they must go out with their mothers. It was forgotten that in many cases the mothers would not leave the fathers. There was no policy, and it might have happened that these children would have had to scramble out with the adults, which would have been a terrible thing. Without hesitation I said that it must be the children first, that if the adult population had to be kept back by the Police or the Army, let them be kept back but the children must go first in fairness
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and in an orderly fashion. There ought to have been no doubt about that at all. I made an offer to the right hon. Gentleman in the days of the crisis, knowing the difficulties and knowing that there were no billeting arrangements at the other end for the mass of the children, let alone the adults. We had no responsibility for this; it was the responsibility of the Home Office; but I offered the right hon. Gentleman—it is something new in local government to offer the Government such extensive help—an assistant education officer, a man who had handled the organisation of 37,000 children for the Coronation and 70,000 for the Silver Jubilee, and I offered him every one of the school attendance officers of the London County Council to go to the other end and get the billeting ready. I also offered him 500 London teachers—and they are good stuff, London teachers—to go to the other end to get things ready. The right hon. Gentleman thought he had adequate arrangements of his own, but, with great respect, I am certain that he had not.
Do not let it be thought that I am pettily offended because an offer that I made was not accepted, but I took a great responsibility in making that offer. I took it knowing that my colleagues in London would back me up, and that the school attendance officers and the teachers would back me up. I do not mind the right hon. Gentleman saying that he had a better organisation than I have, but he had not, and it was a pity that what I suggest was our rather handsome offer was not accepted at that time. The fact is that, when the crisis broke, and even some days after the crisis had begun, the Government had no evacuation policy, and would not make use of the machinery for evacuating the children which the London County Council would have been proud to place at their disposal. To this day I do not know what was to happen to the adults, nor am I certain what was going to happen to the children under five, the children of less than school age. When a government has responsibility and power, and when it has known for years that we were living in a dangerous world which might blow up at any moment, it is a matter of the gravest neglect that these things were not done in earlier times.
Profiteering there was, largely locally. I want to be fair. We did not experience it at the County Hall. We have a very

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fine supply organisation, over which my hon. Friend the Member for North Lambeth (Mr. G. R. Strauss) presides, and we did not get bitten. But consider the local authorities in the country, where the Home Office had promised to supply this, that and the other. A lot of it did not come, and the local authorities were told to buy what they could locally. It was then they got stung; it was then that there were profiteers, and I hope the local authorities will publish the name and business of every one of those who took advantage of the need of the country in its hour of distress.
The administrative organisation at the centre was never conceived on right lines, and here I think the former Home Secretary must be held responsible. Obviously, the first thing to do is to make up your mind as to the magnitude of the problem. It was a big problem, and the first thing to be done, therefore, was to start your organisation on a big scale, diminishing it afterwards if necessary. But the Government started the unhappy Wing-Commander Hodsoll, who is famed throughout the land, in some small back room with a table and possibly the part-time services of a typist, and not much more. I have every sympathy with him. Ministers are responsible for their Departments and civil servants cannot answer back—at any rate not while they are civil servants. I have very great sympathy with the beginnings of that organisation and with Wing-Commander Hodsoll. The job could not be done with the staff and personnel at his disposal. Then there were sent to the local authorities some sealed orders regarding the crisis. I do not know anything about them; I have not seen them; but some of my people in the Metropolitan borough councils for which I am not responsible, tell me that the town clerk had sealed orders. As I say, I have not seen them, but the town clerk was not to open them until the crisis began. A bright idea! Really, it was a bright idea, if it were so. Correct me if it be wrong. [HON. MEMBERS: "It is true!"] All right; hon. Members know more about the sealed orders than I do. If these were orders about what the officers should do in a crisis, would it not have been a good idea for them to know what to do before the crisis came? It would be absurd for them to wait until they were blown up before opening the orders.
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Why the need for all this secrecy? Why the need for the clumsy wording that I am told existed on the communication. There is some very bad blood now between at least one mayor and town clerk. There was a town clerk in one borough—I think he was a fool; he shall be nameless, because my relations with foreign powers are friendly. He got the impression that he was king of the borough. The mayor told me that this town clerk had decided to call a meeting of the council and that she said: "Who are you to call a meeting of the council?"—quite rightly: this was a good proletarian woman mayor—and he said, "It is not who I am: it is who I am going to be. "He had no statutory power to call the council and no standing orders' power to call the council, but he went ahead; and the mayor is offended to this day—and is quite right to be offended. It may be that the local authorities are under a misunderstanding. I do not know anything about it, except these allegations that I have had from borough councils in London.
People have told me that the borough councils were to be abolished—that they were to be superseded. I said that I did not know anything about it, and they said, "We have seen it." They have seen a circular that they ought not to have seen. Still, I do not believe it. I think the Home Secretary has told local authorities that there are some things which will have to be done with speed, and that special steps will have to be taken. I do not think that is unreasonable. I have written to the Home Secretary about it, and he will no doubt deal with the matter in his speech. But if there had not been this secrecy, if there had been consultation with local authorities, this could have been squared up without trouble. What you have done is to leave behind a suspicion that you wanted to fascise local authorities: I do not say that that is a fair suspicion; but your clumsiness has left you under a cloud of suspicion that is going to embarrass you—and, as a matter of fact, is embarrassing me. If I am not careful I shall get under suspicion that I was mixed up with it.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton) will deal with anti-aircraft defence. It was inadequate; it was slow in coming out. I made private representations to the Prime

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Minister that in the days in which we were living really the defences ought to be placed. I had a vision of London going through two or three days of bombardment without any defence at all. It might have happened. When they did come out they were a varied assortment of guns. They may have been produced at the maximum rate of supply; but they were a varied collection, and the smart cockney Londoners are describing them as "Hore-Belisha's War Museum." The Territorials were in the same position as the fire brigade. They volunteered and turned out at considerable sacrifice. They not only had not guns, but they had not the necessary ancillary equipment. I heard of one case where they had the ancillary equipment, but not the guns. [Laughter.] Fortunately we can see the humorous side of it now, but it was a wicked business that we should have been in that situation.
The House is entitled to know why this position existed. If there is a reasonable excuse, let us have it. I beg the Home Secretary and the Secretary for War not to evade the issue by saying, "We have a new Lord Privy Seal; let us give him a chance." They are responsible; the Government are responsible. The Prime Minister has been in every one of these Cabinets since 1931, and he carries a very great responsibility. I am sick of Prime Ministers who merely go on with restricted Prime Ministerial functions, and do not realise that they have a responsibility to secure a minimum state of efficiency in the Departments. Heaven knows the Prime Minister has interfered enough with the Foreign Office. He did not interfere enough with the Home Office and the War Office. He ought to have done more. Moreover, there is the future. We want to know what they are going to do about shelters, what they are going to do about evacuation and all these other important matters. We want to know what their policy is, and who is to be responsible for what. I say again that this is not a party business. I am worried, as a good citizen, as every Member of this House ought to be.
Moreover, all this is a test of democracy. I do not believe that democracy cannot be efficient. I have spent a large part of my life in power—in small ways, then in bigger ways. I do not believe that democracy cannot be made efficient.
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Democracy is all right; it depends on who is running democracy. But if we get it into the heads of our people, whether it be a Conservative Government or a Labour Government or any Government, that democratic government must be slow, must be inefficient, must be undecided, must talk for years without doing anything, we are going to bring democracy down. That kind of thing is asking for a revolution of some sort, because if the people are convinced that democracy does not work, they will fall back on something else that they believe will. Some hon. Members may be tempted to believe that they will fall back on a Fascist remedy. Do not be sure; they might fall back on another one. It is to the interest of all of us, to the interest of our country, to the interest of this great Parliamentary institution, that democracy shall be effective, swift, competent in action and responsive to public opinion—watching and listening to public opinion and public criticism. This business is a disgrace, not to democracy as an institution, but to individual men who are responsible for these events and this unreadiness; and I beg the Government, in the interest of the country and in the interest of our constitutional institutions, to be serious about this. I beg the Government to make the administration efficient, so that we can put our hands on our hearts and say that here is a job that is needed to be done, that here is a job that vitally should be done, that here is a job that is being done well, capably, in a fine partnership between the State, the local governments and the individual citizens.
5.12 p.m.
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir Samuel Hoare): I beg to move, in line 1, to leave out from "House," to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
"while taking full note of existing deficiencies in the system of civilian defence, welcomes the decision of His Majesty's Government to entrust the responsibility for the system to a Minister appointed for that purpose, and declares its full approval of the Government's determination to complete with the utmost speed the measures necessary to provide for the country's needs."
I am sure we have all watched with admiration, and some of us with some amusement, the struggle between the right hon. Gentleman's two personalities. He started by telling the House that on no account did he wish to introduce party

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issues into the consideration of this question. Upon the whole, he maintained the line that he had set himself at the beginning of his speech, though from time to time we did see the other personality coming in, and we did see a partisan attack upon the Government of which I am a member. I propose to follow the right hon. Gentleman on the line that he took in the latter part of his speech, and to leave aside the quips and the criticisms which, at the beginning of it, he made against His Majesty's Government. He and I have worked together a good deal in this field of air-raid precautions in the last 12 months; and I say at once that, whatever may be my reply to his criticism and my retorts to him in the course of my speech, I am grateful to him for the help he has given me in dealing with many difficult tasks.
It seems to me that if we are to make a fair survey of what has happened and what is necessary still to be done, we must look at both sides of the account, and we must remember, in particular, the conditions in which we have been working. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to me to give the impression that all these questions were very easy of solution, that all that was necessary was the word of a great administrator like himself, and at once we should find that a panacea had been obtained. How different is the real state of affairs. I do not suppose that this House or any Government has ever been faced with so complicated and so vast a series of problems as is raised by what are now known as air-raid precautions. They cover the whole field of the national life. They do not end with gas masks, shelters and first-aid posts. They really cover almost every one of the national activities and they enter into almost every one of the ordinary activities of the men and women of the country. It seemed to me that the right hon. Gentleman in his criticisms ignored the immense extent and complexity of the problems with which we are dealing this afternoon. He seemed further to ignore the fact that the solution of many of them runs directly counter to the general trend of developments in the national life.
Let me give the House a single instance. One of the basic principles of air-raid precautions is dispersal in its various shapes and forms. A policy of that kind cannot but run directly con
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trary to many of the recent developments of the national life, and it may, if it is unwisely applied, dislocate the civil life of the country in many respects. The second factor that we have to keep in mind is that, whatever the right hon. Gentleman may say about the past, these problems are comparatively new problems. The right hon. Gentleman once again described the delays of the years that are past since he was a Member of the last Labour Government. He dealt very fully with those charges in the Debates on the Air-Raid Precautions Bill last year, and, if I wished to retort, I would say in a single sentence that in those years we did not get a great deal of help from many Members of the right hon. Gentleman's party. Indeed, we had active opposition from some of the Labour councils in the country, and it is further worth remembering—and it is a commentary upon the interest of the right hon. Gentleman and his party in air-raid precautions in the past—that until the Bill of last year there had not been a single day's discussion upon air-raid precautions asked for by the Opposition, and the first air-raids discussion was in connection with the Bill of last year.
Sir Archibald Sinclair: It was on the 27th July, 1937, when we raised this matter.
Sir S. Hoare: I was not referring to the right hon. Gentleman and his group, but to the right hon. Gentleman and his party.
Sir A. Sinclair: The right hon. Gentleman said that the first discussion took place on the Air-Raid Precautions Bill. That is a mistake on the part of the right hon. Gentleman. A long discussion took place on 27th July, 1937.
Sir S. Hoare: If I may modify what I have said, it is that there were five or six years when the two Oppositions asked for one day's discussion on this very important question.
I have stated those two conditions to the House, and hon. Members must take them into account when they come to consider the present position and the criticism that the right hon. Gentleman has just made against the system. The right hon. Gentleman was afraid that I should shift the responsibilities on to my right hon.

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Friend the Lord Privy Seal and take refuge in the fact that a new Minister was in future going to be directly responsible for air-raid precautions in this House. Let me say to the right hon. Gentleman at once that nothing is further from my intention. I stand here to-day to take full responsibility for all the events connected with air-raid precautions for which I have been responsible during the last 12 months, and I propose in the course of my speech—and I hope that it will not be too long—to deal specifically with the right hon. Gentleman's charges and to take the opportunity of saying to hon. Members that the system, for all its defects, has much to be said in its defence, and when it is compared with the air-raid precautions in other countries it will stand comparison with any, except Germany—a very big exception I quite admit—where air-raid precautions were started—and I admit the fact—a considerable time before we embarked upon them.
Let me begin, but not in any attitude of complacency, with one or two definite achievements—what we can claim in recent months. I take, first of all, the question of recruitment. The right hon. Gentleman himself said that it was a very remarkable fact that in peace time and on a voluntary basis we had enlisted more than 1,000,000 men and women. The greater part of these recruits have been recruited during the last six months, and if that fact is taken into account, the recruitment in peace time compares favourably with the recruitment of the Kitchener Army during a period of 12 months. That is a very considerable achievement. [An HON. MEMBER: "On the part of the nation!"]
I come next to the gas masks. I am fully aware that criticisms have been made that we have insisted too much upon the gas masks, and that we have ignored certain other very necessary precautions. I propose to deal with that charge later in my speech, but let me take the example of the gas masks as an instance of very successful organisation. In the course of a few days the Home Office distributed 30,000,000 gas masks. By the time the crisis came the Home Office, which had been responsible for the provision of civilian respirators, had accumulated 40,000,000 civilian respirators in 80 weeks of production. No other country can show a comparable result. That was not the complete programme.
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Manufacture is proceeding steadily, so that there would have been enough respirators for everyone in the country together with some reasonable reserve.
Criticism has been made by the right hon. Gentleman to-day that certain areas did not receive all the respirators they required, and that in some cases the respirators were not all in the appropriate sizes for the population. I would ask the attention of the House to the explanation of this fact. The respirators as they were received from the manufacturers were stored in depots belonging to the Home Office. For technical reasons they were stored unassembled. On 4th April, 1938—I would ask hon. Members' attention to this date—shortly after the Bill became law, the Home Office sent a circular to all local authorities explaining the full programme by which local authorities should take delivery of the respirators in local stores and explaining methods by which they should arrange for all the population inside their area to be fitted so that the appropriate sizes of respirator could be known, and indicating to them how to allot them, with the help of industrial and commercial establishments if local authorities were not able to organise a full warden service for assembling.
I am sorry to say that scarcely any local authorities took action as a result of that circular. The Home Office went on pressing them, and on 6th July a further circular was sent to local authorities urging them once again to arrange to take the delivery of their respirators into local storage by the end of August. I am sorry to say again very few of the local authorities took action. The result was that when the crisis came, through no fault of the Home Office, a very large number of these respirators had not been distributed, nor had the Home Office received the particulars that it required of the sizes that were needed in the various localities. The Home Office, therefore, had to take action on its own initiative, and I am glad to say that within a few days over 38,000,000 respirators had been distributed. I am glad to say, also, that the local authorities at this stage quickly improvised arrangements, but the fact that the local authorities had not made these previous preparations, made it necessary for improvisation and, therefore, we had not got the details of sizes, and so on, that we required if the

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organisation was to run completely smoothly. That is the reason why, in certain cases, the sizes were not always exactly what was required. We had them, for example, in the case of Coventry. They had sent us full particulars for Which we asked, and we had a communication from Coventry saying that their requirements had been met in every detail.
I pass from the respirators to another direction in which, I claim, we can point with some confidence to not unsatisfactory results. I come to the question of trenches—a very important question in the field of air-raid precautions. Let me explain to the House what was the policy of the Home Office and what it was we actually achieved. We had very careful experiments made by the Royal Engineers at Chatham and we had plans made out of suitable trenches and had practices with the engineer personnel at Chatham. As a result of this we drew up a model scheme of trenches which we circulated to London and the principal local authorities elsewhere. In the case of London we made arrangements that each Metropolitan borough should have an efficient contractor attached to that borough for digging the trenches without delay upon the model scheme we had circulated. It may be said that the trench scheme was not based upon the right system. That was not the case. If it was so, it was because the local authorities had not followed the model scheme that we had given them. Where the model scheme was followed trenches were dug with great speed on a proper system. We now propose—this is my answer to one of the right hon. Gentleman's most important criticisms—to inform the local authorities that the trenches, where they had been properly sited, should be completed and should be retained, that they should be covered in, as the right hon. Gentleman suggested, that they should be given a permanent structure, and where we find that as the result of our survey and inquiries of the local authorities the trench systems ought to be further developed, we intend to have them so developed.
I claim that any impartial investigator who looks at the trench system that was, at any rate, begun in the emergency, although it was not in every respect completed, will realise that on the whole it
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did provide very useful shelter for a substantial number of the public. It provided accommodation for about 1,000,000 people. That was no inconsiderable achievement in the time.
Viscount Wolmer: Did they provide accommodation for 1,000,000 people in London?
Sir S. Hoare: No, 1,000,000 for the whole country. I have said that we think the trench system ought to be developed, and we will see that it is developed. In the space of a very few days a great trench system was built based in most cases upon a well thought out plan. Let hon. Members bear that in mind when they reckon up the items on the credit and debit sides of the system of air-raid precautions. I pass now to certain other items of work.
Mr. George Griffiths: Had not an instruction been sent out to local authorities that they must cease making any trenches other than those they have started?
Sir S. Hoare: That was only done as an interim instruction pending final instructions.
Mr. Griffiths: Has any other instruction been sent since?
Sir S. Hoare: It is on the point of going out now. The reason why we did not send it out immediately was that we desired to get the opinions of the principal local authorities before we made final proposals for a permanent policy.
Sir Arthur Salter: As the right hon. Gentleman puts it to the credit side of his account, does his plan include any arrangement to secure that people are directed to the trenches which could receive them? Is he confident that the trenches in the state in which they were at the end of September would not have resulted in more casualties than if they had never been made?
Sir S. Hoare: I have confidence in the plan as far as it goes, but I do not mean to say that further organisation is not needed. So far as London is concerned I have confidence that we could have avoided catastrophies of that kind. But I certainly think that now we are embarking upon a more permanent trench programme it will be necessary to carry that

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side of the organisation a great deal further.
Now I pass from the trenches to the question of shelters other than trenches. The right hon. Gentleman devoted a good deal of his speech, and rightly so, to the very important question of shelters. I say frankly that the experiences of the last 12 months have had considerable effect upon my attitude and the attitude of my advisers towards shelters. A year ago we had not, as we have to-day, the full experiences that have been gathered in Spain. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that we must have in the future a more comprehensive shelter policy than any that has been contemplated in the past, but I do not intend to-day to give more than a very general outline of what is in our minds, because I am very anxious in no way to compromise the position of my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal, who will be dealing with this matter as one of the most important of the issues with which he is concerned. I will give the general framework to the House, but my right hon. Friend obviously must have full liberty of action. In answer to one of the questions put by the right hon. Gentleman opposite I should like to say that my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal will be definitely and directly responsible for air-raid precautions. The Prime Minister stated that in the House the other day. In that respect the right hon. Gentleman will see at once that the Lord Privy Seal's position will differ materially from the position of the Lord Privy Seal in the days to which he referred.
Mr. Dalton: His duties will differ materially from those of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence.
Sir S. Hoare: Yes.
Mr. Simmonds: Will the air-raid precautions still be part of the Home Office organisation, under the right hon. Gentleman?
Sir S. Hoare: I think I had better go no further than to say that my right hon. Friend will be directly responsible for the air-raid precautions for which I have been responsible during the last 12 months. Now I come back to the shelters. It is very easy to say to this or any other Government that underground bomb-
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proof shelters upon a gigantic scale should be built to provide bomb-proof shelter accommodation for the whole of the population. It can be done, so we are told, in a period of some years, and we are also told that it can be done at the expense of such and such a number of hundreds of millions of pounds. I do not emphasise the cost of a proposal of this kind. Assuming that the country could achieve security in that way, I do not think that the money considerations, great as they are, ought to be taken too much into account, but I would ask hon. Members to remember the difficulties in the way of such a programme other than the money difficulties.
My advisers point, quite rightly, to the dislocation of the civil life that would almost inevitably result in peace time from a gigantic programme of this kind. It would undoubtedly mean tremendous dislocation of the civil life of the country. That is the reason why since I have been responsible for air-raid precautions I have refused to accept this building of what might be called underground cities as a panacea for the troubles and dangers with which we are dealing. I have, however, always taken the view that short of a great programme of that kind there is very much that can be done without dislocating the civil life of the country in peace time. Let me say at once that I agree with the right hon. Gentleman's objective. So far as I understood him I have the same objective in mind. I believe that we ought to see that blast-proof accommodation is provided for every man, woman and child in vulnerable areas of the country who cannot provide it for themselves. My right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal will either to-day or on some future occasion develop the outlines of a programme of that kind. Such a programme must inevitably take into account wherever possible the existing accommodation. It must take into account the possibility of even greater shelter where it reasonably can be made available. I mean bomb-proof shelter as well as blast-proof shelter.
It is essential that existing accommodation and existing facilities should everywhere be used wherever possible. It was because of that fact that I attached so much importance some months ago to a survey of existing shelter accommodation, the kind of accommodation that can

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be adapted to the purposes that we have in mind, not the kind of accommodation to which the right hon. Gentleman referred that would simply collapse upon the heads of the men, women and children who were taking refuge in it. I mean real shelter accommodation. I had hoped that the survey would have been completed much more quickly by the local authorities and that we could have made a long step forward on this very important side of our precautions. I am not making any recriminations or trying to shift any responsibility upon the shoulders of anybody else, but for one reason or another the survey took up a much longer time than I expected, and in many parts of the country the local authorities have not yet begun it.
That being so, it is essential that we should greatly expedite this necessary part of the programme. We have already decided to bring into action a body of expert surveyors who will be placed at the disposal of the local authorities, and who we hope will be able to carry through this survey in a short period of time. It has been borne in upon us that with the best will in the world many district and county surveyors have not the time for work of this kind. We hope, with this new body of expert engineers and surveyors placed at the disposal of local authorities, that we shall be able to carry through the survey much more quickly and therefore much more quickly set in hand the programme I have outlined.
I come next to the question the right hon. Gentleman raised about the training of personnel. He made several criticisms, particularly from his experience of London, of the lack of training. I have been very conscious of this lack of training. I do not think there has been a day or week that has passed without my pressing the need of it upon the various local authorities. One of the difficulties which emerged conspicuously in the crisis was the doubt in the minds of men and employers as to whether men who have received air-raid precautions training would be called away for some other war work if war started. It is quite obvious to the Government that we have to clear away these doubts. I am glad to think that one of the principal duties of my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal will be to deal with the very important questions of a national register
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and national service, and I feel sure that as a result of his investigations—I do not think they should take long—we shall find that of the rair-raid precautions recruits a very large number, a number which will surprise many hon. Members, will be required as paid whole-time workers in war time. I do not wish to tie my right hon. Friend down to any particular number, he must judge of the number when he comes to look at the requirements of all the various national activities, but I should say, after such inquiries as I have been able to make, that something like 500,000 men and women will be needed as paid whole-time air-raid precautions workers if we are involved in war. It is a staggeringly large number, but it is my considered view that something in the nature of half a million whole-time men and women will be needed in an emergency of that kind. In any case we intend without further delay to let the country know which of the air-raid precautions recruits will be required in peace time and they will then have removed from their minds a doubt as to whether, having had their training, when an emergency comes they may be taken away to some other job. I must apologive to the House for going through these series of questions, but I am very anxious to avoid the right hon. Gentleman opposite charging me with trying to shift my responsibilities on to my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal.
I come now to the question of evacuation. The right hon. Gentleman criticised us for delay. Let me say to him that evacuation is not so easy an affair as he seemed to suggest and let me also say to the House that as far as I know no other country in the world has worked out an effective scheme of evacuation. [An HON. MEMBER: "France."] No, I claim without fear of contradiction that our scheme, incomplete as it was, was far in advance of any scheme worked out by any other country. Paris was a good scheme on paper—but I do not wish to be drawn into comparisons with the schemes of other countries. I am certainly right in saying that we had worked out a plan of evacuation in much greater detail than anybody else. Further, I do not agree with the right hon. Gentleman when he said that the Home Secretary ought to have acted at once and ought not to have appointed a committee of hon. Members of this House. I do not take that view.

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I take the view that without the help of my right hon. Friend and the committee which assisted him, the conclusions to which I had come last May or last June would not have been accepted with the same unanimity as they have been, but that they would have given rise to controversies of every kind and might, indeed, have prejudiced the operation of the scheme altogether. I took the view that it was much wiser in a case which raised difficult problems affecting every household in the country to appoint a committee. Let me give a single instance, the difficult question whether children should be evacuated with or without their parents. In the Debate on that subject there was a bitter controversy in this House as to which was the better course. It did need the investigation of an impartial body composed of hon. Members from all parties in this House to consider the question and give satisfaction.
It may be asked why we did not publish the report at once when it was received at the beginning of August. I think the right hon. Gentleman has himself given the answer. I consulted the right hon. Gentleman and the chairman of the committee, and they both said that what was important at that time, when the report could not have been published before the middle or the end of August in any case, was that the right course to take at that moment was not to publish the report but to take action upon the report. Accordingly we took action. We accepted the recommendations of the report. We had an urgent meeting of the Ministers concerned, and we at once set in hand preparations for the various schemes. I was rather surprised at the account which the right hon. Gentleman gave of these discussions. I had no idea that there were any of the grave differences between us to which the right hon. Gentleman has alluded this afternoon. I was under the impression that the Home Office and the London County Council were together and I take this opportunity of paying a tribute to Sir George Gater, the clerk to the county council, and the education officers of the council for the invaluable help they gave us.
There was a point of difference, but I do not think it was a point of principle, as to whether it was better when the children were evacuated to districts outside London that the process should be in the hands of the London teachers and the
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London authorities. Our view founded on inquiries we made of surrounding local authorities was that the scheme would work best if it was left to the officials of the Ministry of Health and in particular to the local authorities in the various areas who were going to receive the children. I claim that that is not a difference or principle at all but a difference of detailed administration, and I was certainly under the impression that we worked together to draw up the scheme and that, so far from it being a scheme in which all that was good was suggested by the London County Council and all that was bad was imposed on the London County Council by the Home Office, it was a remarkable effort at co-operation between a Government Department and a great local authority.
Mr. H. Morrison: I did not make the proposal that our officers should go into other districts and usurp the functions of other local authorities. I was willing to lend these officers for use in Whitehall or at distance under the orders of the local authorities concerned, so that we should not usurp any functions. There was no point of difference between us there, but I am still waiting for the right hon. Gentleman's justification of the Under-Secretary's statement in this House on 1st June, when he said that plans for the reception of refugees and their dispersal over the country areas had been worked out and could be rapidly taken further.
Sir S. Hoare: That is not the question which the right hon. Gentleman asked in his speech, but I am ready to answer it. We had a very thorough investigation of the problem from the point of view of transport, and at that time my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary was referring to the transport out of London by the railways and other means of transport of large numbers of refugees and children. On the broad question of evacuation I claim that the plans were laid on a sound foundation, and further that if we had been compelled to bring them into operation they would have worked not unsatisfactorily. There would have been inconvenience, there would have been hardship in some cases, but none the less, not a little due to the efforts of the right hon. Gentleman and his staff, I believe that these 500,000 children from London would all have had a home and a suitable place to which to go. That is not an in

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considerable achievement. I have no sympathy with those who have written to me, as many people have, saying what an outrage it would have been—to use a phrase which has been used in some of these letters—"to have dirty little children from the London schools billeted upon our house." I have no sympathy with correspondents of that kind. I have said to them quite frankly that they seem to be under the impression that in the conditions of modern warfare things are to go on just as usual and that they seem to be quite out of date in their views about London school children. I was a member of the London Education Committee a long time ago, and even then this kind of criticism could have had no basis or foundation.
Sir Archibald Sinclair: Were there many of those protests?
Sir S. Hoare: Quite a number. Now, further details have obviously to be elaborated, and it is my right hon. Friend, who was chairman of the Committee, who will have the responsibility for elaborating them. He will have to consider such questions as to whether he could work into his scheme the use of camps that undoubtedly will be required upon a much greater scale when the system of paid holidays becomes more universal. There will be many questions of that kind, and undoubtedly he will have to take them into account.
I pass from the question of evacuation to another of the right hon. Gentleman's criticisms, his criticism of the Home Office and its machinery. He took the view that the machinery had been much too small, that it had been inadequate for this gigantic job. I agree with him that it has been very difficult to keep pace with the growing extent of the problems that are being thrust upon us. None the less, it is worth mentioning that in the space of the last 12 months the staff of the Home Office dealing with air-raid precautions has been almost trebled. That is evidence of the fact that we have been trying to expand and to keep up with the growing body of work that has been increasing in scope and intensity almost every week.
Mr. Attlee: Will the right hon. Gentleman give the figures, since "trebled" might mean only three people.
Sir S. Hoare: I will give the figures, which are very remarkable. They are as follows: On 1st April, 1935, 14; on 1st April, 1936, 31; on 1st April, 1937, 173; on 1st April, 1938, 224; on 1st September, 1938, 418. I have almost finished the long list of charges on the sheet of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, but I must say a word or two about two more, profiteering—
Mr. G. Griffiths: The secret circular to local authorities.
Sir S. Hoare: That is the other matter. The hon. Member, with his prophetic mind, forestalled the sentence in which I was going to say I would deal with that. With regard to profiteering, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State gave a detailed answer at Question Time about sandbags. We are investigating these charges of profiteering that have been made, and my own very definite view is that if they are substantiated we ought certainly to take action and certainly to see to it that no contractor who has been guilty of an offence of that kind should be eligible in future for Government contracts.
Mr. G. Griffiths: They should not be paid this time either.
Sir S. Hoare: We have already started the investigation. I can also tell the right hon. Gentleman that we have started discussions with the representatives of the trades concerned with a view to seeing that in future nothing of the same kind should happen again. It is fair to say that these were exceptional cases. In London, for instance, the very big work on trenches, work running into hundreds of thousands of pounds, was carried out by the representative organisation of London contractors at prime cost. I commend that fact to the other contractors of the country. Lastly, the right hon. Gentleman asked me—as did the hon. Member opposite—about the secret circular sent to the officers of some of the local authorities. This is a very important question, and I ask hon. Members to give their attention to it. I think they will agree with me that in the conditions of modern warfare, in which the home front is very likely the most important front in the early period of war, it is essential that there should be a chain of command acting as quickly and as efficiently as the

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chain of command would act in one of the Fighting Services. Particularly is that necessary when we think of the way in which the war might develop and in which air raids might spread in a few minutes of time from one area of the country to another. Accordingly, we had in being an organisation under which the central Government would have had representatives in war time in the principal areas, with a staff composed of representatives from the various Government Departments concerned with the home front, for the purpose of seeing that the executive orders of the central Government could be given and carried out with the least possible delay. I think that every hon. Member who considers the problem will agree with me that an organisation of that kind was quite essential. That was the first part of the organisation.
The second part of it was that a circular was sent to the officials of some of the local authorities giving instructions as to how the executive orders should be carried out in war time. There was no question of superseding men and women who were engaged upon very valuable public work. It would have been inevitable, as the right hon. Gentleman opposite himself said, that their work would change in certain respects in the new conditions, but we always contemplated the need of keeping the co-operation of these men as completely and fully as we could in the various areas. We did need these directions for seeing that executive orders should be quickly carried out and should be carried out over areas in some cases bigger than the areas of the particular local authorities. After all, an air raider would not restrict his activities to a single authority, and when we are dealing with a scheme of air-raid precautions in which something like 1,500 air-raid authorities of one kind or another take part, an organisation of this kind is absolutely essential. One of the duties of my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal will be still further to organise that plan, particularly upon the lines of making the transfer as easy as possible from peace-time conditions to conditions of war, in which things are bound to change. No doubt, in the course of his activities, he will have an opportunity of consulting with representatives of the local authorities, such as the right hon. Gentleman's, but as I say, it is the Government's intention to make the
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transfer from peace-time conditions to war conditions as easy and as efficient as possible, and to avoid any friction that might take place at a very critical moment in the country's history. There was nothing more sinister in the proceeding than what I have just described to the House.
Mr. Silverman: Why was the circular secret?
Sir S. Hoare: It was secret for this reason. We thought at the end of the summer every local authority was so fully engaged with its normal air-raid precautions activities that it was unnecessary to bring this new subject to their attention. [Interruption.] We may have been right or we may have been wrong. We have had scarcely any complaints from the local authorities. The only case, as far as I remember, in which we have had a complaint was from Leeds, and my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State had a meeting with the authorities from Leeds, and the position was fully explained to them, as far as I know to their general satisfaction. That is the position, a position which should give rise to none of the sinister suspicions that seem to have been in the minds of one or two hon. Gentlemen opposite.
Vice-Admiral Taylor: Before concluding, will my right hon. Friend inform the House whether it is intended to issue steel helmets to the special constables?
Sir S. Hoare: I think that is so, but I will certainly look into the matter, and give my hon. and gallant Friend the information. Lastly, I find that I have omitted one question upon which the right hon. Gentleman laid particular stress, that of fire appliances in London. I was astonished to hear the right hon. Gentleman make this criticism of the Home Office. I heard it with some regret, for it compels me to draw the attention of the House to certain facts on my side of the balance sheet. The House will be surprised to hear that, while by far the greater majority of the fire authorities in the country have sent in schemes for fire protection against air raids, we had not yet received the scheme of the London County Council. Secondly, during the crisis, the number of recruits to the auxiliary fire brigade in London, one of the right hon. Gentleman's responsibili-

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ties, amounted to only a quarter of the number required.
The right hon. Gentleman may say to me, "We should have had more recruits if we had had the appliances. "Let me tell the House why the London County Council did not have more appliances. We had a number of very excellent appliances of a new type. Every local authority in the country was clamouring for them. The London County Council, for a certain period, would not accept the lighter of these machines, although there were many available, and it is only in quite recent times that they have agreed to accept them. I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that the appliances are now coming forward in very large numbers and I am convinced that in the beginning of next year, if he will fill up the number of his recruits, we shall have all the appliances ready for them. Let me also say to him that one of the ways in which he could help us very much would be to look into the conditions under which many of the auxiliary firemen in London are expected to work. Again, this is one of his responsibilities. I think he will find that in many cases the buildings are very inadequate and I think he will also find that because of the inadequacy of the buildings, some of the recruits whom he has obtained are already beginning to drift away. I do not quote these facts to recriminate against the right hon. Gentleman or the London County Council. I quote them rather to show the complexity of these problems.
Mr. H. Morrison: I cannot altogether follow the right hon. Gentleman's point. I had no knowledge that a scheme was outstanding between the council and the Home Office for fire prevention work. We moved in step with the Home Office and our officers were consulted I know regarding the type of equipment and what the Home Office wanted, but that does not explain the fact that in the case of some of the equipment there was no connecting link between the equipment and the hydrant. I should have thought however that if these things existed it was the duty of the right hon. Gentleman, who sees me about this House and knows where to find me, to tell me about them and if the London County Council had not got the equipment earlier, is that any
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reason why some of the equipment which the right hon. Gentleman now implies was available, could not have been delivered to us when we were ready to take it? Frankly, I do not follow his point.
Sir S. Hoare: The right hon. Gentleman will find that what I have said to the House is accurate in every respect. We have not yet had a complete scheme of fire protection work from the London County Council and I hope that what I have said to-day will expedite such a scheme. When the right hon. Gentleman interrupted me I was about to say that I quoted these facts only to show that these problems are not quite as simple as the right hon. Gentleman himself suggested. Even he, with all his great administrative efficiency, has not been able to complete this plan and he should be a little more careful about making general attacks upon other people whose schemes may not have been in all respects quite perfect.
Be that as it may, I come now to the end of my speech and to my summing up. Does the Home Secretary say to the House to-day that the scheme of air-raid precautions was complete? Certainly not. He is the man, most of all in the House, who is conscious of its many deficiencies, of its many gaps and of the many difficulties with which it is surrounded. How many local authorities could say that their own schemes have been carried out as far as they ought to have been? Some local authorities have done splendidly. It is, however, true to say that other local authorities have done very little. How many private citizens—and after all, the primary responsibility is upon the men and women of the country—can say that they have done all they ought to have done?
I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that by the united effort of these three, namely, the Government, the local authorities and the private citizen we can make as good a system of passive defence as any in the world and I am glad to-day to tell hon. Members on all sides of the House that we are determined to make this system of passive defence effective. We are determined to see that the system of passive defence can play its full part, with a substantial increase of the Air Force and a greatly increased system of anti-aircraft guns, and that as a result of this triple effort we can go far to regain the insular security of this country. I

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ask for the support of hon. Members from all sides of the House in the effort which we are making. I ask them to accept the Amendment which I move, welcoming the appointment of my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal—one of the most efficient administrators in the country—to undertake this responsible body of work and assuring the Government of support in this effort.
6.23 p.m.
Sir Percy Harris: The right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary is deservedly popular as a Member and as a Minister. He is always courteous, civil and approachable. But he will forgive me for saying that he has completely failed to answer the serious indictment of my right hon. Friend the Member for South Hackney (Mr. H. Morrison). In fact, I am alarmed at the weakness of his defence. I hoped, as I listened to the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for South Hackney, that the right hon. Gentleman would have had an adequate answer, but as the right hon. Gentleman's arguments in reply to my right hon. Friend were developed, my alarm increased. My only consolation, and I say so with very great respect to the right hon. Gentleman, is that a new Minister has been appointed to co-operate with him. But I am not yet clear where the responsibility is to lie. It has not been made clear whether the Home Secretary is still to be, if I may use the expression, "top dog." We are very glad to see the right hon. Gentleman the Lord Privy Seal in his new position. I have recollections of very pleasant associations with him. But is he to be responsible to the Cabinet for the whole of the air-raid precautions, or is he to be in a position similar to that of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, or the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department? Are they to be subordinates or are they to have a free hand?
One great weakness, I think, in the Home Secretary's statement was his endeavour, in his opening remarks, to shift some of the responsibility from the Government on to the House of Commons. He suggested that we were to blame because we had not raised this subject in one form or another. But, as a matter of fact, inside the Rules of Order we have taken every opportunity of raising this subject. My right hon.
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Friend the Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Sir A. Sinclair) as long ago as July, 1936, in a Debate on the Defence Estimates, called special attention to the vital importance of adequate anti-aircraft defence. Again, in November, 1936, we moved an Amendment to the Address on the failure of the Government to implement the report of the Royal Commission on the manufacture and production of arms and, again, my right hon. Friend pressed on the Government the importance of dealing adequately with this important matter. In July, 1937, we put down for discussion the salary of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence and my right hon. Friend pointed out that this particular service was the Cinderella of our Defence organisation. I do not know whether there is any particular reason for or explanation of the fact, but it is rather significant that the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence is not here. I do not know whether he is to be supplanted by the Lord Privy Seal, but we always understood that his business was to co-ordinate the various Supply Services and particularly to look after the adequacy of anti-aircraft defences.
The House of Commons cannot be blamed. We have been most generous in voting supplies. Last summer it was very remarkable, and many people noted the fact, how vast sums, imposing terrific burdens on the taxpayers, were passed with practically no debate. The country and the House were so concerned with the seriousness of the problem and the urgency of the need to make adequate provision, that we did not in the ordinary discharge of our duties scrutinise in the usual way either the details of Supply expenditure or the money required to carry on these services. I think the country has a right to ask, first, that it should have value for its money, and, second, that it should have adequate defence. There is a widespread feeling not merely in this House, but throughout the country that last September we were not prepared and that there had been considerable waste. I believe it is time that we had some form of inquiry.
I understand that the Prime Minister did, soon after the critical day, initiate some internal inquiry. I do not know whether the Home Secretary was a member of that committee of inquiry, but

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certainly his answer this afternoon does not inspire great confidence that that inquiry has been adequate to meet the circumstances of the case. Parliament has a right, not to a hole-and-corner inquiry, but to an inquiry on a scale which will satisfy the public and Parliament that the money spent has not been wasted and that there is a proper return for it. Many hon. Members will remember what was known as the Esher Commission, a Royal Commission to inquire into the administration of the South African war, the result of which was not only to bring about revelations of a good deal of waste and extravagance, but to secure a great deal of improvement in the organisation of our defence forces. I recognise that a Royal Commission works slowly, and that the procedure is cumbersome, and experience certainly confirms the belief that as a rule it is a long time before your Minister can get his report.
We on this bench consider that the matter is so urgent that we want to devise some more efficient system of inquiry, and I suggest that a Select Committee of this House would not be a bad way of satisfying the House and the country that during the last few weeks the work of the defence Departments has been done properly and that there has not been a great waste of public money. As a matter of fact, a committee of that kind was appointed during the war, when a much stronger case could have been made against such a course than in a time of appeasement, when we are assured that the danger of war, at any rate for some time, has been removed. The right hon. Gentleman will remember that such a Select Committee was appointed, under the chairmanship of the present Lord Samuel. I was a member of that committee and was on one of the sub-committees that inquired, during the very middle of the war, into the administration of the expenditure particularly of the War Office, and we were able, not only to reveal a great amount of waste, but at the same time to save large sums of money from being wasted. We worked in co-operation with the Departments; such a committee need not necessarily be hostile to the Government.
I say that it is up to the Government and that it is up to the House of Commons to satisfy the public that the suspicions
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that undoubtedly exist are not well-founded, and they will not be so satisfied until there is some such public inquiry. The right hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment on behalf of the Government admits that everything is not well. There is not so much difference between the Motion moved by the right hon. Member for South Hackney and the Amendment moved from the Government Front Bench. The Home Secretary admits the deficiency, and we want to know who is responsible for that deficiency, whether it is due to faults in the Departments, whether there has been exploitation by private interests, and where all these vast sums, which have been spent on a scale unprecedented in the history of this country or of any other country in peace time, have gone. We had some slight reference by my right hon. Friend to the suggestion for a Ministry of Supply, and this is very pertinent to the subject under discussion. The Prime Minister the other day dismissed it in an airy way on the ground that it would interfere with ordinary industry and with our foreign trade. I do not think that that necessarily follows. On the contrary, the right kind of Ministry of Supply would look after the interests of the traders and would see that they were not necessarily subordinated always to the various war Departments. The main job of such a Department would be to see that there were the proper priorities between the various spending Departments.
We have really four sections asking for money for national defence—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and A.R.P. My right hon. Friend was right. Undoubtedly A.R.P. is the Cinderella, the poor relation, the newcomer in the domain of demands for the expenditure of public money, and it is not surprising that when they want, for instance, fire appliances, the A.R.P. authorities find that they cannot get supplies because the Navy, an old Department, with great authority and power, has had first call on the productive capacity of the country. I do not think the nation is satisfied with the present arrangement. I am satisfied that there is competition between the various sections, the various Departments. I do not think my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence adequately fills the bill, and my right hon. Friend the newcomer will have to be a militant, a first-class fighting man, if he

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is really to stand up for his responsibility against the old, well-established Services, like the Navy and the Army, which have great power and influence among the industries of this country.
In another place the other day a Noble Lord put the responsibility for the deficiencies on the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill), that is to say, for something that he did, not last year or the year before, but 14 years ago. I only wish, incidentally, that the Air Force and the A.R.P. were as efficient as the Navy; I have yet to know that the Navy is one of the Departments that were found wanting in the crisis of last September. However, the right hon. Member for Epping is quite able to look after himself. In 1924, when Germany was disarmed, with a democratic and peaceful State, it was quite right to husband our resources and cut down expenditure on defence, but in 1938 the conditions are quite different; and it shows how weak the Government are, how poor their defence is, that they have to produce arguments of that kind to explain away deficiencies which everybody knows to exist.
Reference has been made to the Evacuation Committee, of which I was a member. That Committee was a very satisfactory Committee. We had an excellent Chairman, and we had the satisfaction of coming to a unanimous conclusion, which is a very rare thing. That Committee was not appointed a year or 18 months ago, but it was left till the last minute before the Minister came and persuaded four very busy men to give their time and to inquire into that very urgent problem. We all knew what was the critical date. Every member of the Committee accepted that the end of September was the time for which we had to make our arrangements, and that is why we sat very often six days a week and why we rushed the report through more quickly than we had desired to do. It was because we wished to have it complete by the end of July. I do not quite agree with my right hon. Friend, though this is only a matter of opinion, that it was wise to hold back the publication of the report. Democracies may have their faults, as they have their virtues. Totalitarian States can get things done by the centralisation of authority, and in my view democracies can only function properly if the people are taken into the con
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fidence of the State and the Government My opinion is that the common people have much cooler heads than many Members of this House.
I was down in the East End of London when the crisis was on and when gas masks were being distributed and parents were being asked to send their children away to the country, and it was remarkable how cool and calm the people were and how sensible they were. Their only criticism was that they were being kept in the dark and did not understand what it was all about, and they did not realise enough what the Government plans were I believe that good would have been done if the report had been published in August, so that it might have been discussed and so that the public would have known exactly what would be required of them if a crisis actually occurred. There is in our report one paragraph which I would like to emphasise. It cannot be emphasised too much, and I am sure the right hon. Gentleman the Lord Privy Seal will agree with me. Evacuation, important as it is—and it is particularly important in the case of London—is no substitute for adequate defence. London, after all, contains one-fifth of the whole population of the country and has areas with as many as 80,000 people to the square mile. It has one in five of the insured workers, of whom 62 per cent. are essential for war services. A concentrated attack on London on a large scale, a knock-out blow as contemplated, I understand, by General Goering—it was published in the Press and broadcast all over the world—while it could do great damage to the buildings and houses, would not end the war, but it would be a terrible blow to our prestige.
The fact that the population is concentrated in one area on great scale makes London undoubtedly an easy target and almost impossible to defend, but, on the other hand, if you have a great concentration of industry and people in one area, you can also concentrate your defences. It is the general opinion that our defences in September of this year, at the critical time, were inadequate and that there were serious shortages of up-to-date modern anti-aircraft guns. We want assurances that this was not so, and we have a right to know whether it is true, as the right hon. Gentleman said and as I have heard from

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many people, that there were guns without equipment and equipment without guns. It is very well for the right hon. Gentleman to admit deficiencies, but I think that is one of the things into which we are entitled to inquire. The right hon. Gentleman was not an outsider but was a member of the inner Cabinet. It has been commonly said outside—I do not say with any justification—that our diplomacy was influenced, not so much by a desire for peace at any price or for appeasement, but because of the weakness of our national defences and particularly our anti-aircraft defences. That may not be so. The right hon. Gentleman may say that to give the facts to Parliament is to give information to the enemy, but if he is able to say that this country is strong and adequately protected, that will strengthen our position and not weaken it, and I think that anyhow, for the morale of the country, we ought to know exactly what the position is.
I want to make one or two constructive suggestions. Reference has been made by my right hon. Friend to the manpower problem, and the Home Secretary referred to the shortage for volunteers for the fire brigade. There was a shortage, I understand, in almost every section, except, I believe, in the antiaircraft defence organisation. I understand my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal is going to reply, and as an old colleague who worked with him harmoniously and happily, I want to make a constructive suggestion. I suggest there are far too many authorities in London. It does not apply so much to the provinces, where there is a unified system of government, but in London there are far too many authorities sharing out the available man-power. First, there is the Territorial Association which looks after the recruiting for the Territorial Army; second, Scotland Yard, which makes an appeal for special constables; third, the London County Council which calls for men for the fire brigade; fourth, the borough councils which ask for air wardens; and then there is to be a fifth authority working as a central bureau for the organisation of evacuation.
I recognise that London is in a difficult position, but if we are to utilise the magnificent voluntary spirit that exists
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and the willingness of the people to do their share in the defence of their own city, we want some better organisation than that. There should be some central bureau. If London were a problem by itself I would be content to trust the organisation to the London County Council. We have there one or two magnificent officers. Sir George Gater would not make a bad London governor under the careful supervision of the committee. He is an ex-general in the Army, and, of course, he is a splendid administrator. If we are to get a satisfactory solution of the London question we must take a larger view and look beyond London. Some of the complaints I got during the crisis were from the outer authorities. There are many authorities outside the county boundary like East and West Ham, Croydon and Richmond, which are in the danger zone, and they too have to find the necessary man-power. It might be advisable to make use of the machinery of the Employment Exchanges for the proper organisation and distribution of the voluntary effort which is available. This is one of the problems which the new Minister will have to face.
We are faced now with two alternative proposals. One is the Amendment of the Government, which, incidentally, is rather uncommon. I suppose there are precedents, but it is unusual for a Minister to move a vote of confidence in his own delinquencies, admitting his faults, and asking to be covered with a white sheet. The other alternative is the moderately framed Motion of the Opposition, which I and my friends will feel bound to support. We are glad to see the new Ministers and we hope they will be a success, but, after all, the real responsibility for the safety and defence of this country is not on this or that Minister. The responsibility is on the shoulders of the Government as a whole, and particularly, as my right hon. Friend said in an interruption, on the Committee of Imperial Defence of which the Prime Minister is chairman.
I will make one other constructive suggestion. I am sorry the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister is prevented from being in his place this afternoon because of indisposition. I am not surprised. The strain and stress of the last few weeks must have been terrific, but I suggest, and I hope my right hon.

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Friend will convey the suggestion to him, that he should get a Foreign Secretary who sits in this House. In suggesting that I am not speaking in disparagement of the Noble Lord in the other House who is the Foreign Secretary. In view of the terrific problem of national defence which we now have to face, the Prime Minister should concentrate his time on his first and primary duty as Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence. That is the real way to co-ordinate our efforts and the real way to see that our efforts and energy are not frittered away in competition between the Departments.
6.51 p.m.
Mr. Mabane: I believe that the feeling in the House and in the country is that there must be blunt speaking on this matter of air-raid precautions. As we look back on the past it is impossible to avoid recognising that until fairly recently there has been a good deal of indifference to this matter and, as has been said before, more than a little opposition from the Labour party.
Mr. H. Morrison: As long ago as 1935 the Labour Party Conference declared that Labour councils should co-operate in air-raid precautions, and at the time of the public declaration in 1935 I encouraged Labour authorities to co-operate. It is ungrateful that such statements should be made, and they are untrue.
Mr. Mabane: I am dealing with facts, and the fact is that in local Labour parties there has been opposition until quite recently. In my constituency the Labour party early this year had not decided whether it was going to co-operate at all. I say that not to make any accusations, but to remind the House of the fact that until recently there has been this considerable indifference and opposition. I have been a critic on this question of air-raid precautions and I shall be a critic to-day, but I have never observed that either the Home Secretary or the Under-Secretary have endeavoured to discourage those who criticise in this House. Rather it seems to me they have gone about the House endeavouring to persuade hon. Members to interest themselves in this matter, fully recognising the fact that they might thereby provoke considerable criticism of themselves. There was good reason for them to do that. This is a new service. The Home Office
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has been necessarily working in the dark and Members of Parliament were the only means whereby the feeling in the country could be communicated to the Home Office. I have always regretted that this additional burden should have been placed on the Home Office. I have felt that with the work normally devolving upon the Home Secretary it was impossible for him to undertake this new task.
If I have a major criticism to make of the Home Secretary and the Under-Secretary, it is that they have not earlier than this declared that the work demanded a new and special department. Now we have a new Minister, and, while we wish him well, I hope that he will take the House fully into his confidence and that the House will not in future be given incomplete information. I say that because of the experience some of us have had in the past and also on account of a speech that was recently made by Mr. Eady, the civil servant in charge of the Air-Raid Precautions Department. I know that it is the tradition of this House not to attack a civil servant, and therefore I do not intend to do so, but I feel that as the speech has been made we are entitled to reply to it and to reveal certain facts. I think that some of us could some time ago have made criticisms as severe as those made by Mr. Eady in his speech, and, moreover, we could have apportioned the blame with a good deal more accuracy, but we refrained from doing so because we wanted to help rather than to hinder.
There has been working in this House for some time a body of private Members who have constituted themselves an air-raid precautions committee. I have never been privileged to sit on a committee that has so concentrated on work rather than on talk. We have had a sub-committee dealing with personnel, and we have endeavoured to secure information from all over the country. We were able to secure the co-operation of local authorities in compiling our information. We were engaged in that work throughout the summer, and towards the end of the summer we had compiled our evidence and completed our report and recommendations. In July we submitted those recommendations in a deputation to the Home Office and asked for a considered reply to them We have not yet received a reply to this day. Instead, we read

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the speech of the 26th made by Mr. Eady. That speech has been quoted in the House and I think I am entitled to quote it again. He said:
"The Home Office had no illusions about the state of preparedness of the country to receive an air raid."
I cannot believe that that is true. I think the Home Office was suffering from illusions in many respects. I remember well the speech made by the Home Secretary on 1st June this year in the Debate on air-raid precautions. That speech gave the impression not merely that recruiting was proceeding admirably, but that in many other directions the preparations were going along as well as could be expected. I want to give a specific example of one figure quoted in the speech. The Home Secretary repeated a figure he had used a week or so before on the wireless to the effect that 400,000 had already volunteered for this service. I challenged that figure then, and I am prepared to challenge it now. It was not a true statement of the position then. It was based on no authority, it was little more than a guess, it was misleading in the sense that it did not split up the figure into the various categories of volunteers, and it did not reveal the fact, which was known to some of us in the House, that far from the total requirements of air wardens being filled to the extent of 40 per cent., if they were filled to the extent of 20 per cent. over the whole country it was putting the figure very high. Was the impression created by that speech of 1st June due to ignorance in the Home Office? I am sorry to say that the conclusion some of us have been bound to reach is that it was.
The experience of many of us who have been closely interested in air-raid precautions has been that in connection with many essential facts we have been better supplied with information than the Home Office itself. I have often asked why information could not be secured from the local authorities as to the number of volunteers enrolled and other matters. I have been told that the local authorities have been too busy to bother with questionnaires of this kind. That is nonsense. Eight of us, working as private Members, were able to secure a great deal of essential information from local authorities representing a population of about 5,000,000 in the space of a fortnight.
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Again, Mr. Eady said that for nine months the Home Office was haunted by the problem of recruiting and in getting the type of man it wanted. Some of us are inclined to ask why, if that was so, no appropriate and obvious steps were taken to secure that recruits should be attracted. Recommendations have been made to the Home Office that seem quite obvious. We recommended, for example, that the hours of enrolment should be hours convenient to the general body of people who wished to enrol, that there should be uniform enrolment forms to be used by the various local authorities.
I have here a collection of enrolment forms that are used by various local authorities and they are as different as can be. They ask different questions, varying from "What size boots do you take?" to "Have you ever been in prison?" We suggested that there should be immediate notification to volunteers who enrolled as to when they were likely to be required for training. We made a specific recommendation that there should be an officer appointed to the Home Office whose duty it would be to control and direct the publicity of enrolment. We suggested that the Home Office might collect the experience of local authorities on this matter and issue a recommendation. We have pressed continuously for the payment of out-of-pocket expenses to the volunteers, and many who took part in the Debates on the Air-Raid Precautions Bill believe that the Government are under a pledge to pay those expenses. For months past in this part of the country men with small incomes who have volunteered have been walking three or four miles after their work to the training centre and back and not getting payment of out-of-pocket expenses. One authority not long ago decided to pay 7s. 6d. as a lump sum on completion of the training. They began paying it but were stopped by the Home Office. They were told everything must be vouched for, and that tram tickets must be presented in order that the expenses might be paid. Even more important, it is essential that, when recruits present themselves, they should be given something to do and someone to train. None of our recommendations have been accepted.
Mr. Eady says further that the people who are known as the governing class of the country have done very little to help

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the local authorities. I have some knowledge of one fairly large city where there were divisional wardens drawn from the class intended to be covered by that phrase who deliberately said, "We will not ask for men like ourselves to come in. We will close down all recruiting for the time being until we have something for them to do" and until there is something for them to do there is little chance of getting the men to be enthusiastic in their work. The Home Office have had suggestions put before them as to how to attract volunteers and, so far as I can judge, they have not been accepted. Mr. Eady also said that local authorities had not been always successful or very intelligent in their appeals regarding air-raid precautions, and that had to be straightened out as one of the lessons of the crisis. What directions had they? They had virtually none in this matter of attracting volunteers. We recommended that an officer should be appointed whose duty it would be to control publicity of enrolment. That has not been done. Why blame local authorities for failing to do something on which they had no directions? If they are to be blamed, let us examine what they have done. We find that with very limited resources they have done a great deal in attracting volunteers.
Let us also examine the kind of experience that they have had in dealing with the Home Office. I will give two examples because they are within my own personal experience. In Leeds in the early part of this year a great new bus station was being built. The local authorities said that for an expenditure of £1,500 they could make a shelter under the bus station which would accommodate very many hundreds of people, and they asked for authority. I am informed that authority was not given, and the bus station is now completed, with no air-raid shelter underneath it. Again, the Home Secretary referred to delay on the part of some local authorities in making preparations to receive masks from the Government stores. In Huddersfield there is a great mill, not occupied, which would be suitable for headquarters for the storage of masks and for training for fire precautions. The local authority wrote on 2nd August asking for authority to take over the mill but received no reply. About 7th October they wrote again that their air-raid precautions officer and his
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chairman were going up to London on the 17th and desired to have an interview to see if the mill could then be taken over. All that happened was that they received next week a postcard acknowledging the letter. On the 15th I was telephoned in despair by the Huddersfield A.R.P. officer and asked to help them. So I had to interrupt my business in the middle of the morning to ring up the Home Office. Within half an hour there was a return message that the appointment would be granted. Why was it necessary for me to intervene? If local authorities are to be criticised, these and other aspects of the situation ought to be put.
Without wanting to criticise anyone in particular my experience, and that of many others who have interested themselves in the matter, is that the Air-Raid Precautions Department has tended to act, as it were, in a water-tight compartment and has been reluctant to receive and even impatient of the assistance that Members of Parliament wish to give them. On this matter more than on any other Members of Parliament can be of great use, because they are the means whereby the trend of feeling in the country can be communicated to the Department in this matter. If we in this House have failed to take a sufficient interest, or have failed to apply sufficient pressure, the responsibility is ours. If there are deficiencies, we shall not escape that responsibility, but we are entitled to put our case.
It is no use talking about the past save to use it as a guide to the future. I feel that the country is now demanding that there should be virtually a revolution in the manner in which we tackle this matter of air-raid precautions and that the revolution must occur at once. I say "at once" because I would remind hon. Members that six weeks have now passed since the week of crisis and, as far as I can gather, during those six weeks none of what some of us consider to be the major difficulties that were revealed have as yet been remedied. As far as I know, the volunteers are still not receiving payment of out-of-pocket expenses. There is no attempt to put them on a contractual basis.
In my view it is difficult to overestimate the importance of air-raid precautions because, if the country feels

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that it is safeguarded in the matter, that fear which may very seriously influence its attitude vis-a-vis the rest of the world in foreign affairs will be removed. I believe that the preparation for civilian defence should no longer be regarded in the same way as we regard our domestic services, that is to say, that a uniform system should be applied over the whole country just as we do in the matter of drains. The country desires that it should be tackled in the way we tackle the problems of defence, and that considerations of strategy and the relative vulnerability of different areas must condition the whole plan. What is appropriate for London is clearly inappropriate for a large provincial city; what is appropriate for a large provincial city is inappropriate for a country town; and what is appropriate for a country town is inappropriate for a village. Yet we know that in the last few months villages in the West of England have been enthusiastically digging air-raid shelters in the middle of village greens.
The problem must be tackled on a strategic basis. It must be looked at as a whole instead of concentrating our efforts, as we have done, in one particular direction—defence against gas. We must consider all methods of defence—bomb-proof shelters, fire-fighting arrangements, evacuation, gas masks, preservation of essential services, provision of first aid and maintenance of communications. Those things must be considered together, in relation to one another, and at the same time. I believe, too, that while local authorities must necessarily remain in many respects the instruments for the execution of the plans, they should no longer be independent authorities, and, as a corollary, should not be called upon to shoulder any financial responsibility. What has happened in the past is that the Home Office has been precluded in most directions from giving instructions to local authorities because a local authority has been able to say, "We will not do that. We shall have to pay for it and we will not undertake the burden of payment." I believe there should be a central authority with complete power to issue instructions as to what is to be done in the matter.
Next, the whole matter of volunteer personnel must be regularised. I believe the volunteers want it. They desire that
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there should be some form of contractural obligation for a good and sufficient reason. Suppose there is an air raid post with a head-warden and his six wardens. Not one of those men knows whether the others will turn up, because they have no obligation to do so. I am certain that the volunteers are ready to accept a form of contractual obligation similar to that undertaken by special constables, and I believe the country would support such a proposal. I believe, too, that there must be regularisation of the method of appointment of divisional wardens, head wardens and so on. How are people who act as divisional and head wardens in the great cities appointed? Perhaps the chairman of the committee or the chief constable knows someone and says "Will you act as divisional warden?" and the man says, "Yes, I will." He may be good, but he has no sort of guarantee that he will remain in that position for any length of time. It is merely the dictum of one man and a dictum which he has no authority to give. There must be proper organisation and devolution of command, otherwise there can be no likelihood that this matter will be effective in time of war. There must also be proper provision for the training of wardens. In the matter of recruiting, we have to recognise that many who have volunteered have put in a great deal of work with much discouragement. In one large city of half a million people there were until the early months of this year no more than 40 gas masks for training purposes, notwithstanding that at the same time there were millions in the Government stores and the wardens were clamouring for them. I believe, too, that the volunteers must be at once reimbursed their out-of-pocket expenses.
I am satisfied that the country and this House would be behind any measures of the character I have suggested. Apart from the considerations I have mentioned, if there has been any reluctance on the part of citizens to volunteer, in my opinion that has been due to the fact that the manner in which air-raid precautions have been handled has tended to affront their common sense. I think that not merely do they want to help, but they want to be told what to do, and that they will do what they are told willingly, providing the schemes which they are asked to assist are both rational and efficient.

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If one wants evidence of that we need look only at the improvisations of the week from 22nd September to 29th September. During that week everybody connected with A.R.P. seemed to acquire a new vigour and a new life. The transformation in that week was nothing short of wonderful, and it was a voluntary, spontaneous and enthusiastic effort. I do not want to blame anybody in particular. We have all got to take our share of the blame and all be responsible, if only for not exercising sufficient pressure upon Ministers. I believe the spirit of that week is still alive, and I am sure that whatever efforts the Government and the new Minister now make to capture that spirit before it dies will have the full approval of the country, just as I am sure that any failure to do so will provoke a degree of criticism such as has not been heard in this House for a long time.
7.17 P.m.
Mr. R. C. Morrison: I do not propose to follow the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr. Mabane) beyond making one comment upon what he said. If I interpreted it aright, one of his constructive proposals was that there should be a supersession in some measure of the local authorities, and I hope the Government will take very little notice of that proposal.
Mr. Mabane: All that I was suggesting was that local authorities should be absolved from the responsibility of undertaking any payment.
Mr. Morrison: With regard to the view of the hon. Member, which I have heard him express on previous occasions, that the payment of tram fares and bus fares to air-raid wardens is an important matter, I should like to say, as chairman of a large borough in a very poor district responsible for between 2,500 and 3,000 air-raid wardens and air-raid workers, that I have never heard anyone ask for tram or bus fares.
Mr. Mabane: Does the hon. Member not recollect that I and others moved an Amendment during the passage of the Bill, and that hon. Members on his side enthusiastically supported it, providing that payment of out-of-pocket expenses should be a matter of right?
Mr. Morrison: I do not want to quarrel with the hon. Member. I rather want to
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say, straight away, that I was a little disappointed with the speech of the Home Secretary this afternoon. Seeing that the crisis has been over for nearly six weeks I was hopeful of hearing that decisions of some kind would be announced, but the only decisions which I could trace in the very excellent speech of the right hon. Gentleman were that local authorities are to be enabled to convert the trenches already dug into permanent trenches, and to cover them over and grow flowers and bulbs on them, and that, as we knew before, the Lord Privy Seai is to take over this air-raid precautions work and that further explorations are going on. I wish to make one or two suggestions and to indicate to the Lord Privy Seal some of the difficulties and handicaps of local authorities during the crisis.
The Home Secretary might have paid a higher tribute than he did to the work of the local authorities in that critical time, because the amount of work they got through under exceptionally difficult circumstances was really marvellous. Anybody who was in a similar position to that in which I was in and knew the chaos and confusion existing in the first day or two, and then saw how local authorities overcame their difficulties and their handicaps, knows that it was an astonishing performance. On the Saturday morning when the crisis developed we got instructions from the Home Office to assemble and distribute gas masks to the 140,000 people living in my district. We had no assembling tables. We got into touch with a firm who, we had been told by the Home Office, supplied assembling tables, but they informed us that it would be three weeks before we could get delivery of them. We knew that it was almost impossible to assemble those 140,000 gas masks unless we could get certain necessary "jigs." Again we got into touch with a firm which had been recommended by the Home Office, but only to learn that it would be a month before they could deliver any jigs to us.
We got over that difficulty in ways which I will not delay the House by detailing. We got over all our difficulties. For one thing we had not got any containers for our gas masks and as a matter of fact in my district we have not yet got them. Further, it has taken the Home Office nearly a month to make up its mind whether the gas masks were to

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be returned, or to be retained by the people who have them. Every time we made an inquiry about respirators for babies and children under four we were told by the Home Office that they were on the way. As the crisis grew more acute we had more and more mothers with babies coming to us to ask, "What about the babies?" and we told the air-raid wardens to tell them what the Home Office had told us, that they were on the way. After the crisis was over we found that they had not even started to manufacture them.
On the Wednesday morning of the crisis, what some newspaper has said will always be known as "Black Wednesday" when the situation was getting worse and people were getting into a panic, I came to the conclusion, as chairman of my local committee, and in consultation with the town clerk, that matters were so serious that we ought to take steps to see about preparing our air-raid precautions headquarters, which were to be underneath the Polytechnic. We gave an official full instructions to have those rooms made ready for our occupation. They were to be the headquarters of the organisation for a population of 140,000. We sent him to get chairs and tables and desks and a thousand and one other things which were needed, and he returned in the afternoon having fulfilled every one of the commissions we gave him. He had the offices ready with one exception—I am sorry the Postmaster-General is not here—and that is that we wanted a telephone with 15 lines installed and the Post Office authorities refused to take any steps to put in the telephone unless we signed a five years' contract to pay £250 a year. From that day to this no steps have been taken. It was not our building, it belonged to the Middlesex County Council, and neither the town clerk nor I was in a position to sign a five years' contract with the Post Office.
While I am on this point I wish to point out that there was no alternative provision, and there is not yet, in the case of the breakdown of telephonic communication, which is almost certain to happen if any number of bombs are dropped. At the time of the crisis it took from half-an-hour to 40 minutes to get a telephone call through in the part of London in which I lived. The congestion was
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very serious. For months and months past a number of Government Departments have been trifling with the question of alternative means of communication. As long ago as last April the hon. Member for Upton (Mr. Gardner) asked the Home Secretary:
"Whether in view of the fact that in the event of air-bombing attacks on towns telephone wires above and below ground would be vulnerable to fracture along their whole length he has considered requiring the provision of means of communication from call points to life defence units and fire brigade stations by the use of short range wireless telegraphy worked from storage batteries."
The answer he received was:
"The possibility of using wireless during air raids as a stand-by for normal means of communication is receiving full consideration.''-[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th April, 1938; col. 18, Vol. 335.]
That was last April. It is still receiving full consideration. I understand that the difficulty is that a number of Departments are concerned—the Post Office, the B.B.C., the Home Office, the Metropolitan Police and others, including the Services Departments, and that there is the question of the wave-lengths to be used. I know that it is a highly technical question and that difficulties may arise about different authorities using different wavelengths, but I ask the Lord Privy Seal to look into this matter. He might get some advice from the United States, where short-wave radio is used by the police and fire brigades almost as freely as the telephone. I hope that he will take the initiative and get the different Government Departments concerned to come to a decision. Local authorities should be allowed to instal short-wave radio as a means of communication, and there should be one authority with power to regulate the wave-lengths used.
Here is an extraordinary matter concerning the Ministry of Health. During this crisis the Ministry of Health was not paritcularly helpful. The local hospitals had no advice or information at all. The voluntary hospital in my constituency was unable to inform the local authority whether it was to be regarded as a base hospital in connection with air-raid precautions; and to condense this, because I am trying to shorten my remarks as much as possible, I want to draw attention to this point. The Home Office said repeatedly that gas-proof rooms were essen

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tial In the middle of the crisis they informed the local authorities that a booklet would be distributed to every house in the United Kingdom, and the principal part of that booklet was occupied with informing householders how to gas-proof rooms. On the very day that booklet was distributed a conference was held at the Ministry of Health and instructions were given to representatives of voluntary hospitals who had been called to the Ministry, and here is one of the instructions:
"As regards gas proofing, gas is no longer considered to be a major risk and it is not thought that any special precautions should be taken."
When the right hon. Gentleman gets down to his tremendous task, would it not be possible for him to get the Metropolitan Police to take a more active part than they have been doing up to now? On several occasions I have received information from the local police officer, but always he has impressed it upon me that he was not supposed to pass on the information, that he was doing it unofficially and out of good heartedness, that he had no responsibility or part in the matter. I suggest to the Lord Privy Seal that immediate steps might be taken to have a responsible police officer co-opted on to each air-raid precautions committee in the Metropolitan area. A multitude of questions come up for discussion before these committees, and if there were a local police officer sitting with us at the table he would be in a position to give us a great deal of information that we have no other means of obtaining and he could be of great assistance. I hope that will only be the beginning of bringing the police into the scheme in a much bigger way. Outside the actual London boundary and when you get into the extra Metropolitan area, you will have a difficulty because local authorities are their own masters. If too bombs were dropped in Wood Green and no bombs were dropped in Tottenham, who is to decide whether the Tottenham, Edmonton and Walthamstow fire brigades and police ought to go to the rescue of the local authority who has had the bombs? I should like the hon. Gentleman to give attention to that question.
I would now say a word about the firemen. We have a large and growing number of auxiliary firemen, I am glad to say. When the first batch of 75 had
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received their training they were ready for their uniforms. I understand that the firemen's uniform will be the same all over the country. We required 75 uniforms and we received instructions from the Home Office that we were to advertise for tenders for them. The Home Office also said that if we did not wish to advertise publicly we could send round to any of the following firms-and they gave us a list of 12 or 14 firms. I said to the town clerk that it surely was not necessary for a local authority wanting only 75 uniforms to send out for tenders, and I suggested that he should ask the Home Office whether there was not some method of obtaining uniforms such as existed in relation to the uniforms of airmen, soldiers and other services. We wrote to the Home Office and asked whether there was not some such scheme of supplying uniforms, but we got a letter back to say that we had to ask for tenders for the 75 uniforms. In a problem of this sort I say that that is ridiculous.
I have a further suggestion to make. We all agree that the young men who are joining the auxiliary fire service are excellent, but their position was not so bad when the summer nights were here and they could get their training done in daylight. Now that it is dark at about four or five o'clock the young men come to the fire station after they have done their day's work and it is not so easy for them to potter about in cold water, drag hoses about and run up and down ladders. They are sticking it very well and I like their spirit, but I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman might consider a suggestion. My district is typical. Could I not go down to the Exployment Exchange and get 400 or 50o young fellows, perhaps builders' labourers, who would be prepared to act as auxiliary firemen, and could not the right hon. Gentleman agree to pay them full wages for a few weeks' work? Why not? We are paying these men for doing nothing. We send some of them away to labour camps for a long period of training. Would it not be just as useful to take some of these young men from the employment Exchange, pay them for full-time work and give them three or four months' training so that they could become really good firemen? They might be better firemen than people who can put in only a couple of evenings a week for two or three hours each. I

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think the suggestion is worth considering. It would have a good effect in restoring some of the self-respect of people who have been out of work for a long time, because they would feel that somebody had a use for them and that they were doing some good in the community.
I have only one or two other points to make. Who defined which were the danger zones? Who was the genius that decided that Tottenham, in the North of London, that I have the honour to represent, was in the danger area and that Enfield, which is the next district and has a small arms factory and a gunpowder works, was not in the danger area? Who was the genius who selected the places to which children should be evacuated? Who was it that suggested, for example, that the Tottenham education authority should send our crippled children to a place only a mile and a half or two miles from the Portsmouth dockyard? I hope we shall have information on this matter.
The evacuation scheme for the children was good, but I should have liked to see a further scheme covering the old-age pensioners. Old-age pensioners were much more affected by the crisis than were the children, and thousands of very old people in London did not sleep a wink during the crisis. It would be good if local authorities were able to hand out travelling vouchers to those old-age pensioners who have friends in the country. That is a fine piece of work that air-raid wardens could be getting on with now. They could take a census of old-age pensioners and get particulars of where they would like to go. If the people responsible for air-raid precautions could be getting rid of the children at one end and the old-age pensioners at the other, we should feel much freer to get on with our other work.
I have listened to the points made about profiteering, and I will tell the House what we have done in a poor Labour borough. To be perfectly candid, we have no direct evidence of profiteering up till now, but we have instructed the borough treasurer that when the accounts come in for what we did during that crisis and if he finds that the materials supplied to the borough council were charged at anything more than the market rates prevailing in the week before the crisis, he has to pay only up to
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those market rates and to hold the rest over. By that simple means we shall be able to keep control over profiteering.
I should be glad if the Home Secretary or the Lord Privy Seal would give us further enlightenment in regard to the mystery of the position of town clerks. I do not want to raise this matter merely for the sake of having an inquest, but there is a mystery about each town clerk in some way superseding everybody and becoming the chief man in the whole district. No doubt there were reasons for the suggestion, but I hope the Home Secretary will say, in regard to the future, that if such a thing happens again local air-raid precautions committees should be allowed to carry on. That would be very reassuring. It is a great discouragement to people who have given much of their time, and even to air-raid precautions officers, to be told that they are to be displaced by the town clerk. Moreover any town clerk will admit that he knows nothing about the matter, and has had no opportunity of special training to fit him to be placed in complete charge of everything without anybody being able to say "Yea" or "Nay" to him. I know one town clerk who was very concerned about this suggestion that the air-raid precautions officer was to be superseded by the town clerk upon the outbreak of hostilities, and he said, "I do not know anything about it." We want to know exactly what is in the mind of the Home Secretary on this matter.
I am sorry to have taken so much time, but I have tried to speak from the angle of one who is in a district and trying to get on with the job. I conclude on the note upon which I started, namely, that what astonished me was the response which we got, the splendid behaviour of the people of London during the whole of this time, the small number of complaints, the way in which officials of the local authorities adjusted themselves rapidly and the amount of good work that was done. I hope that co-operation will continue and will even be increased.
7.40 p.m.
The Lord Privy Seal (Sir John Anderson): I realise quite well that my position at this Box to-night is somewhat anomalous. I believe that when I come to look back I shall also feel that it was somewhat enviable. I have been listening all the evening to criticisms of the

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Government, of which I am a member, in relation to matters with which I am now very closely concerned, being myself immune. I am afraid that this is the last occasion upon which I shall be able to claim such immunity. So far as this Debate has been concerned with a review of the past, there is obviously nothing that I can contribute; but, as might have been expected, most, if not all, of the speeches that have been delivered from this side or that side have been very largely concerned not with the past but with the future. It seems to me to be not inappropriate, in these circumstances, that I should say something. I hope I shall not be expected by anyone to say very much. After two days' experience of office it would be neither seemly nor prudent if I were to develop at length my views upon what ought to be done in the future to render this country of ours safe, so far as civil defence is concerned. I hope, therefore, that my remarks will be taken as in the nature of preliminary observations only, and it will be understood, when I have said that, that I shall not attempt to answer in detail a number of the points which have been put by previous speakers. There may be one or two to which I shall have occasion to refer as I go on.
At this moment, my mind naturally takes me back to an occasion, which I have no doubt all hon. Members except myself have completely forgotten, when a few months ago I addressed this House for the first time from a somewhat less favourable position. I then expressed my firm belief in the potential strength of our democratic system. That was the whole theme of my speech. I little thought that my faith would be put to the test in this personal way so soon. I do not wish to take back one single word of what I said then. I do not by any means underestimate the difficulties of the task that I have undertaken-difficulties of various kinds. There are organisational difficulties-those, for example, which arise from the fact that many Departments, each under a responsible Cabinet Minister, are concerned in the subject-matter of air-raid precautions or civil defence, call it what you will, Departments that it is to be my duty to co-ordinate. There are organisational difficulties, to which some reference has been made in previous speeches this evening, that arise from the
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system of collaboration between local authorities and the central Government on which we have been relying, and, in my opinion, must continue to rely.
There are also difficulties connected with the subject-matter itself. This is not one of those subjects which a body of experts can take away, wrap up in technical language, and get on with the job, knowing that all will be well if they are left to do it in their own way. It is the sort of thing that is everybody's business. That makes it the more easy for everybody to criticise. It is also a matter on which it is uncommonly easy for the people responsible to make mistakes. There are some matters in regard to which it is possible to determine with almost mathematical precision what is the right course to take. With great respect to the right hon. Gentleman opposite, and his remarkable experience of administration, I say that this is not one of those matters. Besides the right course, you may take one of a number of wrong courses. There are many wrong ways of doing the right thing; and, even if you do the right thing in the right way, you may fail, through mistiming or some other miscarriage, to command the support of public opinion, which is an essential ingredient in any solution.
That is exactly where criticism can be of great value, pointing the way of public support. I do not deprecate, and I hope I never shall deprecate, any criticism as long as it is sober and constructive. I have no doubt that as we go on we shall have much criticism, and I hope and believe that in the main it will he of that kind. If I may say so, the speeches to which we have listened this afternoon have been very good examples of that sort of criticism. That has been so uniform a characteristic of the speeches that I can hardly discriminate between one and another; I would only assure the House that, so far as I am concerned, the criticisms to which we have listened this afternoon will be taken seriously into account. I give that personal assurance. Against that kind of criticism, vexatious and mischievous criticism of which, I hope, we may find little either in this House or outside, can be—and I think it is worth while making this point—more than merely annoying or irritating to some individuals; it can obstruct the vital process of building upon a foundation of public confidence. If we succeed in the

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task to which we are putting our hands—and I profoundly agree that it is not a task for Government alone, or for Government and public authorities alone, but a task for the whole people of this country, for everyone who values our institutions and the freedom which is our heritage—if we succeed in that task, I have no doubt that we shall create within the democratic framework a structure more solid, more sure, and more flexible than it would be possible to create under any other system. Let us, however, make no mistake; the inertia which has to be overcome is enormous. But, if my judgment is right, it is the inertia of a flywheel, not of a pile of bricks; it is inertia that can be converted into momentum.
As I have already said I am sure that hon. Members will not expect me to say in any detail what I intend to do. I have no doubt that it will be necessary to make changes in the existing organisation at the centre. That is not a criticism of what has been done in the past, for obviously, after the experiences of the crisis a month ago, we realise far better than we could have done before the magnitude and the urgency of the problems with which we have to deal. But, in making such changes in organisation, I think we have to be very careful to avoid the danger—and in these matters it is always a real danger—of slowing up processes that are already in operation. Perhaps I may give, with all due reservations, just a few examples of the sort of problems to which, as I view the matter, we have to address ourselves at once.
There is evacuation policy, a matter in regard to which I have information that goes beyond what I have derived in my tenure of this office up to date. The evacuation policy which has been recommended in the Report of a Committee over which I had the honour to preside has, as my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary told the House, been accepted by His Majesty's Government. It was not the policy that was put into operation during the crisis. That policy was an improvisation—necessarily an improvisation—based upon the principles advocated by my Committee. So far as I can judge, the experience gained in the preparation of that improvised scheme, and in the preliminary steps that were taken with a view to carrying out an evacuation of school children and of a
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section of the general population of London, has been sufficient to demonstrate beyond any doubt the practicability of a scheme on those lines. But, of course, to produce any satisfactory scheme a long period of detailed preparation on the spot is obviously necessary, My Committee called special attention in their Report to that necessity. I think that, in the task that we must immediately undertake of carrying out the detailed preparation of a scheme of evacuation, we can, as I have said, profit very greatly by the experiences we have just had. It is always wise to turn, if one can, misfortunes to good account, and the crisis of last month may well prove, in this as in other matters, a blessing in disguise.
May I just, in this connection, mention, by way of a modest set-off to what has been said about the attitude of people in the reception areas, in regard to which I think the expression "class prejudice" was used, one incident that came quite accidentally to my own notice? A billeting officer had occasion to go to a lady who was the owner of a large house and the possessor of a reputation for truculence. He went there in fear and trembling, to see if he could secure billets for six children from the East End of London, and this is what this very truculent lady said: "I would rather have six slum children in my house than six deaths on my conscience." Believe me, there are a lot of people like that.
Evacuation policy obviously has to be worked out in detail without delay, and, as the Home Secretary said, we have to develop a shelter policy much more comprehensive than anything that we have yet had. In view of my right hon. Friend's remarks, I will not take up time in developing that subject. Then there is the question—to my mind the vitally important question—of a regional organisation. Obviously we need a regional organisation to take over, if plans that have been prepared in peace ever have to be put into operation in war, under conditions which will make communication with headquarters very difficult, perhaps quite impossible. We need that organisation, and, in my view, we ought to start creating it now. We ought to start creating now something that will form the backbone of the war-time regional organisation, and at the same time will assist in peace-time planning, will serve

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to aid and guide in the preparation and carrying out of the constructional phase of making plans, and will, I hope, perhaps obviate to some degree the delays that are inevitable in the day-to-day relationships between local authorities and Government if they involve reference always to a central organisation in London. That is a problem of organisation that will have to be taken up vigorously without delay. Then there is the general problem of the local authorities. One previous speaker—I think it was the hon. Member for North Tottenham (Mr. R. C. Morrison)—said we had too many local authorities.
Mr. H. Morrison: The hon. Member for South-West Bethnal Green (Sir Percy Harris).
Sir J. Anderson: No, I think the hon. Member for South-West Bethnal Green said that in regard to London, but I thought another speaker made the same remark about the Provinces. Anyway, the question of how best to fit the local authorities into the picture will have to be looked at afresh in the light of recent experience. But I need hardly say that, however relations between local authorities and the Government in this matter may have to be adjusted, whatever form that adjustment takes, the Government and the country cannot possibly do without the interest, the good will and the resources, in personnel and material, that the local authorities command.
Then there is the question to which my hon. Friend the Member for South-West Bethnal Green referred—the problem of Greater London. That is obviously a very important problem. I recall now what the hon. Member for North Tottenham said. He referred to the position of the Metropolitan Police in regard to that general Greater London problem, and I was very glad indeed to note what he said about the possibility of using the police, because I have had official-strictly official—relations with the police—both the Metropolitan and the provincial police—for a very long time and I have always regarded the police of this country as a wonderfully useful and flexible instrument for the work that has to be done. I have seen the police in this country and in other countries and I think the police of this country are hard to beat. In regard to the problem of Greater London I hope
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that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Hackney (Mr. H. Morrison), whose experience of Greater London is universally recognised as being unique, will give me the opportunity at an early date of conferring with him. May I take the occasion here to express my very sincere appreciation of the kindly way in which the right hon. Gentleman referred to me in the course of his speech. I am afraid I gave him the impression at one stage that I was a little ruffled by something he had said. If he will allow me to say so, he was quite wrong. I was not ruffled at all. I thought he spoke in a kindly way and I quite recognise that what he was saying had a tinge of humour. The right hon. Gentleman has led me to regard him as a person who pays considerable regard to facts, and what led me to make some of the preliminary motions of a would-be interrupter was just that I thought he was straying unwittingly from facts. He referred to me as a Tory. He said it had shocked him to find that a civil servant whom he had known in the past had blossomed out—this is not the expression he used, but that is I have no doubt what he meant—as a Tory. I stood for Parliament as a supporter of the National Government and of the principles of the National Government. [An HON. MEMBER: "The same thing."] "The same thing," you say. In my election address I expressly disclaimed any party affiliation. I made it clear that, having for more than 3o years studiously avoided any suspicion of party bias, it would have been quite impossible for me to stand as a party supporter. I venture to say that all my constituents—certainly all those who voted for me, because they must have read my election address—knew perfectly well where I stood. I stand in exactly the same position to-day. I am not, and never have been, a party politician—but I make no complaint at all, because I can think of far greater, far more damaging, aspersions than the matter of party affiliation that might have been cast at me by hon. Members opposite.
I am taking more time than I had intended, but I was giving a brief account of a few of the important tasks to which it seems to me I have to address myself and I must not pass on without a specific reference to a task to which little reference has been made in the Debate hither-

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to—my responsibilities in connection with what has been called national voluntary service. I realise that those responsibilities are far wider than the problem of civilian defence. They involve, in my opinion, the solution of the problem—I have written this down in order to be quite certain I say what I intend to say—of the most effective utilisation of the man-power of the country for the purpose of national defence.
That concludes what I want to say at this stage about the task that lies before me as I see it. I am not trying to give an exhaustive catalogue of the important problems that have to be attacked. I recognise that there are many of great importance to which I have made, and can make in the time at my disposal, no reference. We have already made a beginning in the attack on those problems under the new distribution of responsibilities that has been established, and we shall get on with the task as rapidly as possible. We do not intend to work to any rigid time-table. It will not be a question, as I view the matter, of a six-months' policy or a one-year policy or a two-years' policy. We shall go on as rapidly as we think possible consistent with sound workmanship. The necessary expansion of organisation will involve expense; and, if I may make this point, which I think is of some importance, in determining what expansion in the organisation is necessary we have to take account of the purpose for which that organisation is being called into being. Its ultimate purpose is to meet a state of emergency, and we shall plan badly indeed if our arrangements are such that, if and when the emergency comes—which Heaven forbid—we find ourselves in the position of having to face it with a staff which is already almost exhausted with the labours of preparation. That would be folly indeed, and I will be no party to that.
I realise, of course, that I shall have to carry the Chancellor of the Exchequer with me in this matter. I have not consulted him before saying what I have said. My task is not one which I should be prepared to carry on if I did not feel that adequate facilities would be provided for me by my old friends in the Treasury. I can give the Treasury this assurance here and now, that I shall not support at any time any organisation which is not
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directed to a strictly practical end. It will not be, in my view, any part of my business to put forward schemes formulated in deference, for example, to some theory about national organization—some such theory as that it is good for the people of this country to be organised. I confess that when I contemplate the magnitude of the task that I have undertaken a wave of misgiving sometimes comes over me. It sometimes surges up in the night. I dare say there are other hon. Members in this House who have had from time to time the same kind of feeling. When it comes to me—and it is not, so far as I am concerned, an entirely novel experience—I always have to pull myself up and tell myself, what I know perfectly well, that merely because a task is vitally urgent and necessary, it is not necessarily on that account alone the more difficult. There are many drab, unimportant tasks in life which can be extremely tantalising. Importance and urgency can indeed be turned to good account for, as the right hon. Gentleman opposite and other hon. Members have said, it can be made the basis of a stirring call to the whole nation for co-operation. I realise that a tremendous effort is required from all. In the discharge of my responsibility it will be my endeavour, with the support which I trust I shall have, which I know is quite indispensable, to call that effort forth.
8.15 p.m.
Mr. Garro Jones: The right hon. Gentleman who has just addressed the House had the wisdom to refrain from attempting to defend the record of the Government. He makes no claim, as yet at any rate, to be a skilful Parliamentarian; but he showed himself to possess a knowledge of tactics as great as if he had been sitting in the House during the whole long period of his administrative career. The right hon. Gentleman has a great record as an administrator, and if I as one of the back-benchers of this House may assure him of one thing it is this: I would say that his record in his present task will be judged in his capacity as an administrator rather than in his capacity as a debater. I was rather sorry, however, to see him attempt to make that point about not being a Tory. I do not know his innermost feelings on that subject, but he cannot, surely, I believe,

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with the world-wide reputation for clear thinking which he possesses, that a Government which represents only about 20 per cent. more of the electorate than is represented on this side, and which is not represented by any representative of organised labour at all, is a national Government in any true sense of the term. He must further be aware that this National Government could not possibly enter upon, let alone successfully conduct, any sort of campaign without at any rate the tacit support of the party which he leaves out of account when he describes himself as a Member of the National Government.
I believe it is the first time that we have had a member of the Cabinet, who presumably takes the whip from the Tory Prime Minister, declining to accept Tory principles. In his election campaign he had two Conservative Cabinet Ministers to assist him, and no one else. [Interruption.] I believe that that was the case. I believe that the Secretary of State for Scotland at that time, the present Minister of Health, at any rate, made public pronouncements in his favour, and the only symptom of weakness of party affiliation which I was able to detect in watching his campaign was that he expressed himself as being in favour of the moderate forms of Socialism, which I consider to be a very safe promise to make in the year 1938.
One of the dangers of Parliamentary Debate, as I see it, is that it tends to operate rather as a soothing syrup than a tonic and a stimulant to action, and that is especially the case when the Government are able to put up a new Minister to answer a long series of criticisms of their past administration. The House ought to understand how this technique of bringing in a new Minister has operated to shield the Government from criticism. First, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Fareham (Sir T. Inskip) was brought in. Then we had the right hon. Member for Horsham (Earl Winterton) brought in, after a long period of the most intense criticism of the Government. Before he had been in office more than a few weeks, we found that all our criticisms of the Air Minister bore fruit and that the Air Minister was compelled to resign, and at the very height of the campaign against the maladministration of the Government we
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were suddenly confronted with another Air Minister. Between these new major Ministers we have had two or three minor Ministers. Therefore, it is not surprising that the right hon. Gentleman the Lord Privy Seal, if I may use a colloquial expression, tumbled very quickly to this technique and that he repeated the appeal of the Prime Minister, who hold us that the question now before the country is not what blame should be attributed for errors that are past, but what action should be taken in order to prevent cause for blame in the future. That would be an irresistible appeal if we had any confidence in the Ministers who were to apply themselves to these remedies.
I would like, as far as I am concerned at any rate, to assure the House that I have no desire at all to make any party capital out of this; I assure the House that that is so. Closely in contact as I am with the immense military and air menace which affects this country, I have no desire to make any party capital out of that at all. I am deeply concerned, as I believe are a great number of hon. and right hon. Members opposite, with the lack of co-ordination, grip and drive which has been displayed by Ministers in charge of the Defence Departments. I have had the fortune, or the misfortune, to listen for a fair number of years in this House to the speeches of the present Home Secretary. He is, I believe, a friend of the present Lord Privy Seal. The Lord Privy Seal has helped him out of many an awkward corner in the past, but the Lord Privy Seal has never been a greater friend in need to the Home Secretary than he was to-day.
I would like to bring the House back really to the subject of our complaints against the Government, because, if we are not prepared to face up to those complaints and act upon them, no amount of soothing speeches and new assurances in substitution for broken assurances is going to get us anywhere in our Defence organisation. Although perhaps it is not necessary to assess the comparative importance of different measures of National Defence, I regard evacuation as one at least of equal importance to that of protecting the civilian population from direct hits or from the effect of blast or gas in the great cities. I have taken the trouble to look at the record of the Government on that question. Unless we are prepared to follow the successive

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assurances which have been given and the way in which they have been broken, we shall never be able to measure the extent of the incompetence which has been shown by the present Home Secretary. He still remains in a powerful position in the Inner Cabinet to handle these affairs. It was in July, 1935, that my hon. Friend the Member for Govan (Mr. N. Maclean) asked the Home Secretary what steps he was taking to prepare for the evacuation of our great cities in the event of war. Prior to that I had myself put a question on the subject and was told that evacuation was not considered to be a practicable policy. But in July, 1935, the Home Secretary said:
"All aspects of air-raid precautions, of which this is one, are being considered by the Government."—OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th July, 1935; col. 1850, Vol. 304.]
I hope that the House will be patient with me while I give these dates. I am not seeking to do anything but to establish the fact that the present men responsible for this system of Defence are not competent to carry it out. On 9th December, 1935—six months later—replying to the hon. Member for Central Southwark (Mr. Day), the Home Secretary stated that evacuation was being considered by the Air-Raid Precautions Department in consultation with other Departments concerned, and that no decisions had been arrived at. The next occasion which I have been able to find, in a cursory search in the Library, was 20th July, 1937, when, in reply to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Cornwall (Sir F. Acland), the present Under-Secretary for the Home Department said:
"The possibility that it might be necessary to evacuate persons from densely populated areas is under examination along with other measures of air-raid precautions."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th July, 1937; col. 1985, Vol. 326.]
On the 3rd January this year the Board of Education issued a Circular about the children. On the 14th April, 1938, we received this statement from the present Under-Secretary:
"The whole question of evacuation is now being considered by my right hon. Friend."
He was referring to the Home Secretary:
"My right hon. Friend is right in thinking that no definite steps can be taken until my right hon. Friend has considered the matter."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th April, 1938; col. 1300, Vol. 334.]
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Here we had a fundamental necessity for a decision to be arrived at, and for three years, with all the information before him, with all the Civil Service available to make the necessary researches and to present the problem in a summarised form, the present Home Secretary was not able to come to a decision on that vital matter. If we are to have at the head of affairs Ministers who are incapable of coming to a decision on a question of that kind, no amount of willingness on the part of the civil population, no amount of skill in administration on the part of subordinate Ministers is going to save us from the continuous chaos from which we have suffered.
I should be sorry to make a personal attack upon the Home Secretary, for I have never made a personal attack upon anybody in this House. I have heard the Home Secretary for many years making speeches about our air preparedness, and I say that the same qualities which are failing us now in his present office have failed us in the past in his former offices. I say nothing about his record as Foreign Secretary, because on that there are two opinions; but I remember more than 10 years ago the Home Secretary assuring us in this House that we had a Royal Air Force which, though not large, was organised on a plan which rendered it susceptible of rapid extension, if the need arose. I remember him telling us later that the Air Force did not regret the slowing down in the output of aircraft because it enabled training to keep up with output. On a later occasion, when we were having a certain amount of difficulties in the manufacture of wooden aircraft, he said that the tendency was for aircraft to be manufactured out of metal and that when that tendency was fully developed it would be of enormous advantage to this country, with all our resources of metal and engineering. Then we found that it was that very changeover which enabled a nation which we regard as a danger to us to outstrip us immeasurably in that sphere. So we find again and again in looking back over his speeches year after year that the present Home Secretary is incapable of grip or decision in the administration of his responsible office.
I do not consider that the successive White Papers which have been issued, ostensibly to explain the defence policy of the Government, have been quite straight-

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forward.If hon. Members will take the trouble to assemble a collection of these many White Papers and read them in the light of the facts which are available to-day, and which must have been available to those who prepared those White Papers at the time they were written, they will agree with me that the Government have not been honest in stating the facts to this House. I would ask the new Minister, at any rate, to avoid that error, which is one which the House does not readily forgive if brought home to any particular Minister.
I want to say a few words about another aspect of passive defence, which has not been touched upon but which will be touched upon increasingly as the Debate proceeds. I refer to the question of anti-aircraft guns. I hope that we are not going to accept any equivocal assurances on that subject from the Secretary of State for War. He told us the other day that the Bren guns were now being manufactured to maximum capacity. That is typical of the assurances which we receive. It means absolutely nothing. It is not intended to mean anything. It is intended to conceal the fact that not sufficient of these guns are being produced for our needs. If hon. Members would go through the White Papers that have been issued they would find on every page assurances with two or three different meanings, which convey the impression to the superficial and casual reader that the problems are being tackled, but which are mere eyewash and prove in fact that nothing has been done. I will read one which was issued last week about air-raid precautions:
"The Government"—
says the Home Secretary—
"has accepted the principles of the recommendations made by this Committee, and occasion has already been taken, both in the light of the recommendations in this Report and of the experience gained during the recent emergency, to examine and prepare in detail evacuation schemes."
There we are told that "action has already been taken to examine and prepare in detail evacuation schemes."
That gives us no indication whatever about anything that has been done. It is the same old story. First we are told that plans are being considered, then we are told that plans are being prepared, and then we are told that production has begun, when perhaps only one machine
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has been turned out. For instance, we have been told by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence that output had begun in a very important type of aircraft, when one machine only had been produced, with great difficulty, in one factory. At a time when we wanted 20 or 30 a week one machine had been produced. There was an interval of months before another machine was produced, and yet we were told that output had already begun. I do plead that we should have no more of these equivocal statements. They do not deceive our enemies and they do not deceive this House. The public do not want that kind of consolation.
In regard to anti-aircraft guns, we have no conception of the scale of production required for that important weapon. I have been looking up the calculations made the other day on such experience as we have with anti-aircraft guns. It was calculated by the Staff during the last War that if a machine was flying at 8,000 feet and 100 miles an hour it would take 160,000 shells to be sure of making a direct hit upon that machine. Every hon. Member knows that it takes a certain length of time for a machine to reach a certain altitude, and it takes half a minute for a shell to reach 20,000 feet. Therefore, that machine has an illimitable number of manoeuvres which it can carry out, and a very large range in three dimensions has to he covered in order to ensure a direct hit. If it takes that vast number of shells to ensure a direct hit on a machine travelling at 100 miles an hour and at a height of 8,000 feet, what weight of barrage would be required to ensure a direct hit against a machine at 20,000 feet, which is the minimum height of bombers, and travelling at 250 miles per hour. We ought to be discussing an output of anti-aircraft guns not in dozens but in thousands.
Major Dower: Is the hon. Member suggesting that he has made a correct statement about anti-aircraft hits? At camp this year there were three direct hits by one unit alone in one week.
Mr. Garro Jones: I am not suggesting that it takes 160,000 shells to make a direct hit and bring down one aeroplane. There are questions of luck and other considerations which enter into the matter, but no matter how accurate modern instruments may be for sighting

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and finding the range, no scientific instrument has yet been invented which can forecast the direction which a machine will take from the moment the shell leaves the barrel of the gun until it reaches an altitude of 20,000 feet. Therefore, our anti-aircraft guns, if they are to be regarded as an important part of our antiaircraft defences, must be produced in numbers far beyond the numbers which have been considered so far by the War Office. I should hesitate to trust my own computation in this matter were it not for the fact that a similar lack of perspective has been shown by other Government Departments in the production of other weapons. In 1919 this country had planned to produce 40,00o aircraft and 60,000 air engines. To-day Germany on the best information I can obtain can produce 24,000 front-line machines per annum, and we have not yet even begun to contemplate such figures, let alone take the steps to produce them.
The question arises as to what remedies we propose. Of course, we all hope that the Prime Minister's hope of appeasement will prove to be well founded, but that at present is nothing more than a hope upon hope. We have not yet seen any definite evidence that it is going to eventuate as the right hon. Gentelman desires. Nor can we see that we shall be in any better position in a year or two than we are to-day, because at the present rate of progress there is not a Minister on the Front Bench who can say that in relation to our prospective enemy our rearmament in the things that matter is proceeding any more rapidly than theirs. I say that we have to make certain that the cause of this chaos and maladministration, this lack of co-ordination and decision, does not reside in the characteristics and temperament of the Ministers who are handling these matters. I am very much concerned about that and have been for two or three years. I have heard the Prime Minister on several occasions get up and defend the case against the overwhelming criticism which has been brought against the former Air Minister; the Prime Minister has leapt to his feet in anger in his defence, whereas if he had allowed his intellect to judge of the criticisms he would have seen that it was indeed time to make a change. One thing is sure, and that is that our situation is
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not going to be alleviated by new assurances by the right hon. Gentleman in substitution for a long succession of similar assurances which have not been fulfilled.
Unless the Government disabuses its mind of prejudice against State control and organisation and ownership where necessary we shall not have the progress which we desire. Both in Germany and in Italy the tremendous passive resistance of private enterprises against actions which they believe will affect their profit-making capacity have been swept away. I am very much afraid that in the consideration of the establishment of a Ministry of Supply the Government are thinking too much about our export trade, too much about the money market, too much about the fear of the export of capital, too much about the representations which are being made to them by firms which fear that their export trade will suffer if these restrictions are put upon them. We have reached a situation when we cannot allow considerations of that kind to weigh at all.
When I consider possible successors to the present Prime Minister I am not at all sure that I would not be prepared to choose the Lord Privy Seal. I hope the right hon. Gentleman, in so far as his influence is concerned, will extend his willingness and accept a moderate form of Socialism at any rate in the armaments supply industry. I hope that this House will exert its authority on the Government. We have had these Debates for two years and incompetence and indecision has been brought home beyond all cavil to the Government, and yet no action has been taken. I believe that it is not the Government which is under test. The failure of the Government to handle this particular problem has been proved to the hilt. The House of Commons itself is under test, and unless hon. Members on all sides are prepared to join us in telling the Government that they want in office men who are capable of handling these matters, I fear that we may one day have to pay a heavy price for our failure.
8.42 p.m.
Sir Edward Grigg: I am very glad to be one of the first of his immediate supporters—I understand the right hon. Gentleman does not encourage the use of the words "of his party"—to con

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gratulate the Lord Privy Seal on his successful speech as a debutant on that august bench, although I am afraid he will find it somewhat uncomfortable. I welcome the tone and temper of his speech. I welcome it because it is of the greatest importance from the patriotic point of view that he should be a success, and I can assure him that he carries with him the good wishes of every patriotic Member of this House. I am sure I am speaking without regard to party. I also welcome his success because he and I are members of a rather despised trade union, the trade union of ex-Governors, and I am glad to see a member of that particular profession demonstrating to this House that even an ex-Governor can speak with tact and humility, and also with some acceptance. I came down to the House this afternoon, I must confess, with a good deal of apprehension and disquiet. As a nation we have just emerged from a crisis—an experience which has shaken us to our depths.
The whole country, I think, realises that it is facing a challenge, and facing also an opportunity greater than has presented itself for many decades past. I was afraid that, recent as is that great experience, we were going to lapse into one of our well-known party wrangles in this House, one of those Debates of the pot and kettle type, in which all that the Government does is considered wrong on the other side and all that the Opposition says is considered stupid on the Government side. I confess that I have been greatly reassured and comforted on that point, and I should like to pay a sincere and whole-hearted tribute to the speech made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Hackney (Mr. H. Morrison). I do not think he could have dealt with a great national subject at a time of emergency in a better tone and temper than he did. I detected no sign of party bias in what he said. I thought he put his case with moderation, with an extraordinary solid grasp of the facts, and in a tone and temper which we hope will govern all the discussions on this subject in the House. I am glad to recognise that that was the tone and temper in which my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal spoke also. I hope and believe this augurs well for future discussions of this sort in the House; for I am certain that we shall not emerge from the difficult situation with which we are faced unless
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there is full co-operation between men of all parties in the House. Of that, I am absolutely convinced.
There was only one observation made by the Home Secretary on which I would like to say a few words. I refer to it because I think it is very important in this country at the present time to be absolutely fair to the Government and people of France. My right hon. Friend said that our evacuation schemes are better than any in existence, except those in Germany; he said that only in Germany are the air-raid precautions superior to ours; and when an hon. Member mentioned to him the evacuation schemes in Paris, he said, if I remember rightly—I hope I am not misrepresenting him—that he thought they were paper schemes and that they had no reality except in that way. During the War I had a good deal of experience of French schemes, French staff plans, French appreciations of situations at the front, and so on. I admit there was always in them an element of hope. There was always the likelihood that one would find that, whereas on the paper plan which was presented to one, there were 300 yards of barbed wire at the front of the line, when one went to look that barbed wire was not there. That sort of weakness, I agree, tends to present itself in plans produced by our allies the French—
Mr. Fleming: I think the hon. Gentleman will agree that during the War we had to pick a Frenchman to be Commander-in-Chief—Marshal Foch.
Sir E. Grigg: If the hon. Member had not interrupted me, that was what I was about to say. But I learned, after experience of the French, that, while their plans on paper always seemed to be a bit too optimistic, in an emergency, when their hearts went into it, they were always even better than their plans. It is true that French plans always seem to us to be chaos. When one arrives at a French railway station, it looks like chaos. The road to Verdun, when the French were defending it, looked like chaos to any of our staff, but Verdun was saved, the Germans did not pass. Having, in Paris, looked at the French plans for evacuation, and their plans for billeting, which are more advanced than ours, I really do not think it is just to say that the plans of that Government are merely paper plans.

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I think they have carried their plans a good deal further than we have.
So much for the past. I do not think any party in the House has any moral right to cast stones at any other party about the defects in our system of Defence. We all live in glass houses, and there is a great deal to be said against all our records in the House. I prefer to draw a veil over the past and rather to see how we can get together to make this country absolutely secure in the future, and to give its diplomacy an influence and a strength in Europe which are essential if all that we believe in is to survive. There are two vital necessities on which I wish to say a few words to-night. One of them affects my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal, and refers to the organisation of our voluntary services. The other affects the Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defence; at least, I presume it affects him, since it refers to the production of equipment which is absolutely essential if we are to remedy the defects without undue delay. I will deal first with the second of those necessities, the position in regard to industry. I find it very difficult to believe that we shall get the requisite acceleration in the production of articles or munitions which are vital to our defence unless the Government take greater powers than they possess at present. I do not intend to say anything about a Ministry of Munitions or a Ministry of Supply, for I do not feel that I know enough about the working of the present Supply Departments or about what might happen if those Supply Departments were combined under one head. I do not know sufficient on that matter to say whether that is the necessary step, but I am convinced that, whoever exercises the powers, some greater powers than the Government at present possess should be taken to accelerate the production of essential munitions.
The powers which I have in mind were mentioned by Lord Swinton yesterday in another place. He seemed to think that the vital powers which the Government should possess are, first, the power to call upon any particular manufacturer to produce an article if the Government feel that article must be produced and that that is the firm which ought to produce it—the power to requisition a firm to produce what the Government needs;
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secondly, the power to require priority for Government orders; and thirdly, the power to fix prices by arbitration if agreement cannot be reached otherwise. I believe those powers will prove to be essential. As the Secretary of State for War is to reply to the Debate, I hope that one of his colleagues on the Front Bench will mention that this subject has been raised, and that we expect a more definite statement on the subject than we have yet had in the House. It has been dealt with much more fully in another place, and I consider that we are entitled to a very much fuller statement of the Government's case against a Ministry of Supply if there is to be no question of taking powers of that sort. For my part, I feel that these powers are essential, whether we have a Ministry of Supply or not, and I believe that if they are not taken, two things will happen inevitably. First, there will be a quite avoidable delay in production. We have been told time after time that delays are not taking place, and time after time those assurances have proved to be delusive and false; and it is not sufficient to give those assurances any longer. It is not sufficient to say that a five years' programme is being carried out, and that we are now only in the third year of that programme. We must have the definite certainly that a great acceleration will take place.
The second thing that will happen if these powers are not taken is that there will be a great feeling in the country about undue profits, and it will be felt, as the speech of the hon. Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Garro Jones) indicated, I think quite justly, that the Government are allowing themselves to be held up to ransom and that the necessity of the country is being exploited for private gain. There is nothing that could do more harm than that. Surely, the Government realise that of all the dangers they have to meet, that is perhaps the greatest. Therefore, I hope these powers will be taken, and that we shall have some indication of that in the Gracious Speech next week. I think I can understand why the Government hesitate. They are afraid of the effect on trade and revenue. They are afraid that by putting too much of a strain on industry the revenue of the country may be reduced and the revenue, therefore, of the Government may be

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reduced, and that we may find ourselves hard put to it to maintain not only our defences but our social services. Everybody in this House will have sympathy with fears of that kind, but I am convinced, and I believe many Members of this House are convinced, that those fears are utterly unfounded and that a real drive for home defence will not hinder business recovery, but help it.
I give two reasons for that view. In the first place, if we are to go on with this unlimited competition in armaments, then all nations are facing ruin and ultimately facing war. We, obviously, must do our utmost for material as well as for moral and spiritual reasons, to try to put an end to this competition in armaments. That must be the first object of our foreign policy. It is an essential and a most essential part of the policy of appeasement to which the Prime Minister is, I believe, giving his heart. For my part, I do not despair of a limitation of armaments. I have no grounds whatever for making a prediction of this sort, but I am prepared to state here and now, that I should not be in the least surprised if in the next few weeks the German Government declared once again that they were prepared to drop altogether the bombing aeroplane.
Of course, if such a proposal were made, it would certainly be greeted with great enthusiasm in this country, but we should have to consider why that proposal was made. I am all for accepting it, but let us be clear about the conditions upon which any proposal of that kind is going to be accepted. Why is it going to be made? It is not going to be made because it is in our interest. If it is made at all, it will be made because it is, in the first place, in the German interest, and I do not blame the German Government for that. After all, the German Chancellor has already once proposed it, and he usually means what he says. Not only that, but it is perfectly obvious that Germany, as a Central European Power, has a great interest in securing the abolition of the only weapon which can be used to attack her on her own soil and in her own cities. When you talk of collective security it is well to remember that this is one implement which collective security may still be held to possess. These things are probably present as considerations to the German
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Government. But I go further. The German Chancellor is, in his way, an idealist, and he is a builder. He is putting up buildings in memory of his regime in many parts of Germany, and I believe that no man with that kind of psychology wants to see what he is setting up destroyed.
Therefore, there are many reasons—and these are purely my own premonitions—for believing that we may have such an offer presented to us in the next few weeks. As I say, I would not be in the least surprised if it came. I am sure that we ought to accept it, but on conditions which must be very clear. If there is such limitation and such abolition, it must be on terms which are fair to us and fair to the smaller nations of Europe who will have a great deal to say on this point. If our Government is to be able to use discussion on this theme for the purpose of appeasement, then it must be absolutely clear that we are proof against intimidation by the threat of war. There is no possibility of strong, firm and provident negotiation unless we have an assurance that we are not to be intimidated into accepting what we would not otherwise accept. I also believe that there will be no expansion of business in this country—and this is the other argument for the powers which I suggest—without confidence, and there will be no confidence in this country unless it is made as proof as we can make it against air attack. I believe that is the strongest argument at the present moment why the Government should take powers to deal with industry in regard to the production of essential munitions, and I hope that we shall have evidence in the King's Speech next week that that has been considered.
There is only one other subject on which I wish to say a few words. It is a subject which, I think, will be dealt with more particularly by my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal. I am bound to say that I regard with great anxiety the announcement which has been made twice in another place but not in this House, that the national register which is contemplated is not to be compulsory, and therefore cannot be complete. The right hon. Gentleman who initiated this Debate said in the only passage of his speech which I personally regretted, that some of us on this side were "flirting with

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compulsion." I regretted that observation. It seemed to me one of those observations which are thrown out, and which hardly do justice to the ideas held by many of us on this side. I have never, for one moment, suggested that we need compulsory military service in this country, nor have I ever suggested that we should have compulsory service of any kind whatever. Once you get compulsory service for adults, it seems to me you are getting very near the totalitarian system, and I have never recommended any such force—unless we were involved in war, and anything might happen then.
The only forms of compulsion which I have advocated are two forms. One is compulsion to register, and the other is a form of compulsory training for all our youth at the end of the period of education, and before the attainment of the vote. That is, however, an entirely separate subject which does not enter into our discussion this evening. It is only the register point which I wish to discuss. I feel that if we are to have a national register worth anything it must be compulsory. I regard the preparation of a compulsory national register in time of peace as an absolutely indispensable side of readiness for war. My right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal probably knows more than I do about the history of the register made during the War. I had no direct experience of what happened then, but I have gone into the matter, and these are the facts. An Act enforcing registration was passed in July, 1915, about 10 months after the outbreak of the War. The obligation to register was universal on all people between 15 and 65, and there was a penalty for not registering, I think, of £5 and a further penalty for delay in registering.
What I would point out is that that register was introduced before there was any idea of compulsion. It was introduced in order to make it possible to use the voluntary system with reasonable providence and without risk. That was why that register was introduced. The compulsion to register did not come till a year after the War started, sometime in the summer of 1915. The register was introduced in order to facilitate the selection of people for voluntary service, and if it was necessary in June or July, 1915, surely it must be clear that it would have been far better to have had it ready in
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the summer of 1914. There might not then have been, as we all know there was, the most appalling confusion and waste of valuable life. That is what came from not having a register of that kind. I believe that case is accepted by the Government, because they have said again and again that there is going to be a register if we find ourselves engaged in war.
If there is to be a register, why not learn by the previous war and have that register ready beforehand? What is the objection? I believe the only objection to it is the fear that compulsion to register may be resented by the population, but I do not believe it. I believe the people of this country are prepared to do anything which they are called upon by the Government and by their representatives to do, provided the reason is clearly explained. And, after all, this matter of compulsion in regard to registration is already a well-accepted principle. It is nothing new. There is talk about the conscription of wealth. So far as the compulsory registration of wealth goes, it has been in existence in this country for many years. The whole of a man's property has to be revealed compulsorily to the State. He cannot conceal a thing about it, and it is under very severe penalties. That principle already exists, but there is also in existence in this country an absolute compulsion to give information for the exercise of the Parliamentary franchise. That exists. People do not seem to be aware of it, but here are the words of the Act:
"The registration officer may require any householder or any person earning or occupying any land or premises within his area, or the agent or factor of such person, to give in the prescribed form any information in his possession that the registration officer may require for the performance of his duties as a registration officer, and if any person fails to give the required information or gives false information he shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeling £20."
If we accept without murmur the necessity of registering everything that we possess for the information of the State, if we accept without murmur the fact that we have to make returns in order that we may exercise the vote, surely we cannot object on principle to being registered in order that we may defend all that goes with the vote. As a matter of fact, millions in this country are already registered. It is chiefly the wealthier classes which are not registered in some way or

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another, and I believe that to make this registration compulsory and universal is the truly democratic course. I plead for that, because I am convinced that if Parliament does not come to the country with some proposal of this kind, it will not be truly representing the spirit of our people, after the emergency through which they have just passed. We are a very puritan people, and I do not think there is any doubt that at the present moment there is throughout the country a spiritual feeling of dissatisfaction at what has passed in recent times. Under all the gratitude to the Prime Minister which is felt—and that gratitude is almost universal and very deep—under the almost universal sense also of relief, there is a strong feeling in the heart of this country, in the mind of this country, if I may quote the words of the "General Confession," that "we have left undone" certain things "which we ought to have done," and that in that respect "there is no health in us." That is, I believe, the feeling of the great majority in this country at the present time. The country really wants to be called upon for a great effort, for an expression of its spirit. It wants to liberate its soul. It wants to perform, I believe, some act of expiation, because it is not entirely happy about what has happened. It wants to take some strong and new resolve, and it wants, above all, to prove that it is once again what it has always been and what it ought always to be, a fearless champion of freedom and right in the world. That, I believe, is what the country at this moment wants, without distinction of party, and I hope that that spirit will be represented next week in the spirit of the King's Speech.
9.11 p.m.
Colonel Nathan: The hon. Member for Altrincham (Sir E. Grigg) has given in his concluding words, I do not doubt, expression to what is the temper of the nation at this juncture, though whether the manner in which he would give practical effect to the public temper at this moment is the wisest policy for the urgent necessities of the time is a matter upon which there may be controversy on the one side or on the other.
The Lord Privy Seal is in a fortunate position. In the world of industry, when a new process is being considered and brought into operation, there is often the laboratory stage and after that the commercial stage, when the point of exploita
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tion is reached. The Home Secretary and his Under-Secretary have been experiencing all the difficulties of the laboratory stage. I hope the Lord Privy Seal, in his high and responsible office, may be able to reap the rewards of the exploitation stage, and I am sure that none of us, and least of all the Home Secretary, will grudge him any success in that direction. In the course of his remarks, the Lord Privy Seal referred to what he called the inertia of the population. I do not want in any way to be recriminatory, but I am bound to say that I think that to some extent that inertia among the people, in so far as it existed, was a reflection of inertia in Government circles.
I want to limit myself in these observations to one particular subject-matter, both as an illustration of what I shall say and also because it seems to me that it is a matter which ought to, and will, receive the attention of the Lord Privy Seal. It happens that I took, and take, a particular interest in the active work of voluntary hospitals. In the early part of this year I wrote a letter to the "Times," in which I asked what was expected of the voluntary hospitals, and I asked question after question in this House upon that subject, but no information was forthcoming. I went down to the Mansion House to speak under the chairmanship of the Lord Mayor, and I made a speech which had a certain amount of publicity, in the hope that it would direct the mind of the Government to the urgent necessity of dealing with the position of voluntary hospitals, but in the end nothing was done.
This is a matter of interest to hon. Members. I am concerned with two of the voluntary hospitals. One is a special hospital with which my hon. Friend the Member for Drake, Plymouth (Lieut.-Colonel Guest) is also associated. The other is one of the great teaching hospitals. They are both within the danger area. The special hospital of which I am chairman is the Infants' Hospital in Vincent Square. The great teaching hospital is Westminster Hospital, the House of Commons hospital, of which I am chairman of the committee charged with dealing with air-raid precautions. Hon. Members may be interested to remember that Westminster Hospital is the hospital to which they would be taken in the event of their suffering injury from air raids within the precincts of the Palace of West

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minster.I can almost say, therefore, that I am speaking of a domestic matter. I would like to tell the House what happened with regard to the hospitals. I have pointed out that for a period of months efforts were made to obtain some directions as to what the hospitals were expected to do with regard to their patients, their staffs and their buildings, what would be their functions in the case of air raids and of casualties being incurred, and where the expense would fall. To none of these inquiries was any answer of any kind forthcoming.
It was only on the day on which the Prime Minister's journey to Berchtesgaden was actually announced, it was only, that is to say, at the very climax of the crisis, that the first steps were taken. A meeting of representatives of the great teaching hospitals was suddenly called at the Ministry of Health. The meeting took place in the basement of the Ministry and the Director-General stated that the hospitals' emergency service had just been created. I wish to say at once that Colonel Hebb, the Director-General of this emergency system, assisted in the London area by Dr. Dobbie of the London County Council, from the moment they began to function gave unstinted and most devoted service and were of the utmost help and encouragemnt. The statement that was made at the meeting was this: "Gentlemen, this emergency hospital service has just been created. You must expect bombs to fall on London at any moment. Do the best you can." It has been said by a distinguished civil servant that the instructions of the Home Office were the sloppiest a Government Department had ever issued. That cannot be said of the Ministry of Health, because from beginning to end the Ministry of Health never issued any instructions at all. There is not one scrap of writing as far as my knowledge goes—and I speak from intimate daily and hourly knowledge of what is taking place, because mine was a great responsibility—and no written instruction was ever issued from beginning to end. Therefore, there was nothing sloppy about the instructions.
On the contrary, we were left entirely to our own devices. We were told we must evacuate our hospitals, and when we asked how, we were told that ambulances would be provided, but that arrangements had only that day been made for the conversion of rolling stock
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and road transport to take stretcher cases, and the services would not be available for three weeks. That was the information given to us on the day before the Prime Minister flew to Berchtesgaden. We were told we were required to increase the amount of accommodation by 30 or 50 per cent. We asked what arrangements had been made for additional bedding and things of that kind, but not a blanket, not a mattress, not a bedstead, nothing had been ordered. When the Department was asked, "What are you going to do about it?" they said, "We are going to commandeer blankets and bedsteads from Harrod's, Selfridge's and others." That was the position at the very height of the crisis.
Strong language could be used about the devastating situation with which the hospitals were confronted. I am not going to use it because I am referring to these matters as a guide to the future and not as a criticism of the past. I know that there were difficulties, although I think it is almost unforgivable that no steps of any kind should have been taken, because every casualty resulting from air raids would have had to be treated in some hospital. I could tell the House, but I will not, what the estimate of casualties was. I could tell the House, but I will not, how many hundreds of casualties we were told we should be required to take per hour. Yet no arrangements of any kind had been made by the central authorities. These are not notes of my speech which I hold in my hand; they are notes of the conference that was held on that evening of 14th September at the Ministry of Health. We were told we were to provide emergency stores. At the same time—and here is a bitter irony—when we were asked as voluntary organisations to do all these things, we were told, "If there is no war the Government will not pay anything to them." We were to make these arrangements at the expense of charitable funds, and we were to be wholly responsible unless there was a war. If there was a war some unspecified contribution would be made from Government sources.
The two hospitals of which I speak went ahead. We went ahead in such a way that we were able within a week of the first instructions from the Ministry of Health to inform the Ministry that we were ready to take emergency cases to an extent greater by 50 per cent. than our

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ordinary accommodation. If we had had the same sort of instructions that were issued by other Departments, I doubt whether we could have done anything of the kind. We acted upon our own initiative and we sought no Treasury consents. We got the job done, but I am bound to say that we had a good many difficulties. The Home Office, for instance, was unable to provide us with a sufficiency of gas masks, not merely masks for patients, but duty masks for the staffs.
My hon. Friend the Member for North Tottenham (Mr. R. C. Morrison) made the suggestion that the Government took the view that gas protection in hospitals was unnecessary. I think that was a misunderstanding. My own interpretation of what we were told is that it was recognised that in a hospital, with the constant traffic of patients in and out, it is impracticable to have proper and complete gas protection. Certainly we were advised that special accommodation and gas proof rooms should be made for cardiac and other chest cases and for the protection of food and so on. We were told we should not be required to look after the dead—our duty was ended when death took place—but that there would be officers from the local mortuary whose task it would be to deal with that aspect of the matter. When we asked the local authorities what arrangements they had made with regard to the dead we were told, "We have heard nothing from the Home Office or the Ministry of Health about this at all. We have had no instructions and no information and we have no intention, unless instructed, of dealing with the situation." I mention that as an instance of complete lack of co-ordination and co-operation between Government Departments and between the central and local government in many important respects.
What I have said applies to Westminster Hospital, the House of Commons Hospital, but I must say a word about the special hospital in Vincent Square. Originally, we were told that it was to be a grade A hospital for infants. It is well suited for that. It is the first hospital of the kind in Europe. I do not complain of the alteration in the decision—it was wise and proper—but later, after we were ready and fully equipped to deal with children who might be injured, we were suddenly told that this infants' hospital was to be transformed at once into an adult casualty clearing station.
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Imagine the situation with which we were confronted, with no equipment and no sanitary arrangements suitable for anything except children, with perhaps the most skilled staff in the country for dealing with children but not equally skilled in dealing with adults. We were told to make this change and we set about doing it and, save in one particular, the change was made and in a week the hospital was made ready to receive, instead of 100 infants, 175 adults as a casualty clearing station. The one particular in respect of which we were not ready was this: I informed the Ministry of Health that we had operating instruments only for infants and that we had no surgical instruments for adults. I asked where we could get them, and how the expense would be borne, for I did not feel justified in buying adult instruments for an infants' hospital. They said they had no instruments and they could not help us to get them and, if we bought them, we should not get any grant from the State, that is if there were no war. So we were asked to take the whole of the risk, and we took it.
The whole arrangement with regard to hospitals opens up a tremendous number of other questions. There is the question whether men and women should be treated in the same hospital. It may be said that they go to the same ordinary hospitals now, but it is not so simple as that when you are dealing with casualties resulting from air raids. The casualties will be either gas or surgical cases. The number of medical cases will be very small. In the ordinary way, of course, men go to the men's wards and women to the women's wards, but in the case of a casualty clearing station, when you have a constant flow of casualties in and out going to the base hospitals, you cannot do that kind of thing at all and both have to remain for a time in the outpatients' department. The Home Office said it was a condition that men and women should be separated, but I very much doubt whether that is practicable in the same hospital.
The next question is this: How are the casualties to be directed to the various hospitals? There are to be first-aid stations. I believe it is essential that the first-aid stations and the hospitals should be under the same general and central direction and administration and, whereas it has so far been arranged on the whole

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that there shall be no medical officer attached to first-aid stations, it is imperative that there should be a medical man in charge of each first-aid station, otherwise it would be quite impracticable for the hospitals to cope with the inrush of casualties unless they had first been sorted by some responsible person into the more and the less serious cases. This is a subject upon which I cannot elaborate, but I have hinted at some of the difficulties with which hospitals are confronted and perhaps I may have an opportunity of discussing them with the Minister.
The question of the protection of the population against casualties resulting from air-raids is not a matter upon which political opinion need be divided. On the contrary, it is a matter in which we all have an identical interest. As far as I am concerned, I have spoken to-day, not with a view to making any Party capital out of criticism, but in the hope that lessons for the future may be derived from the experience of the past. With what I say on this point I doubt not that every one of my friends of these Benches will find himself in sincere agreement.
9.34 p.m.
Major Dower: As an officer in the anti-aircraft defence of London, I wish to draw attention to one or two points and to deny certain criticisms that I have heard from time to time about the antiaircraft defence of the country. First of all, with regard to recruiting, a good many people say we are short of recruits and cannot get them. That was the condition that existed 12 months ago, and it was a very serious one, but to-day it does not. Whereas a year ago I held several recruiting meetings in a week and at the end of the week had a band of only about three or four, if you have recruiting meetings now, at the end of a week you get away with about 50 or 60. I think the reasons for the improvement are, first, the status to which my right hon. Friend has raised the Territorial Army; secondly, the fact that the country is now defence conscious; and, thirdly, that the people are determined to put the country's defences into such a condition that we can stand by our principles.
The greatest credit is due to my right hon. Friend for the way the Territorials were treated during the crisis. It was a
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sudden crisis, and undoubtedly we were not ready for it-everyone will admit that. The men in the Territorials were treated well—generously. Their rate of pay was good, and their ration allowance of 4s. a day was more than a reasonable one: it was a generous one. In addition to that, they were set at liberty immediately the crisis was past in order to ensure that they did not lose their civilian jobs, and in many cases when they returned to them they received pay for the time when they had been on leave. With that spirit of generosity we shall undoubtedly have got the good will of the Territorial Army. One difficulty is the enormous number of men now in the Territorial Army who know nothing at all about soldiering. Whereas last year we might have had only 100 men, we now have 1,000, and it is a tremendous task to train them, especially when it is remembered that in a battalion there are 1,500 men and 50 officers.
With regard to equipment, for many reasons one does not desire to make specific estimates of the shortage, but observations such as "There is hardly a gun anywhere," or "We had not got enough lights to send up beams for exposing enemy aircraft" do not represent the truth. Twelve months ago they might very well have been truthful observations, and admittedly we have not yet got our full complement, but the equipment is coming through, and not in a trickle but in a steady flow. If there are any hon. Members who would like to assure themselves on that account I shall be delighted to take them to the battalion in which I am an officer and show them the equipment we have got there. But I should like the Government to recognise the magnitude of the task that lies ahead of us. We have these enormous numbers of men, the best fellows in the world, but they do not know their job and will have to be taught, and we are short of technical instructors. A battalion of 1,500 men and 50 officers is a very big unit to administer, especially in view of certain small economies which I hope my right hon. Friend will be able to dispense with in the near future. It is not worth my saying more than a few words about them, but there is the clerical work, which is very difficult to deal with. We have an allowance for the company office of about 7s. 6d. a week, although the amount of work to be got through is

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worth about £2 or £3 on a commercial basis.
My last observation is about the Territorial Army in general. The Territorial Army is ideal for the purpose of antiaircraft defence in this country, not on the ground of its economy, but from the point of view of efficiency, and I speak both as a Regular and a Territorial officer. The reason is that the men are more suited to the job. The old type of soldier we required was a man who had more brawn than brains. The men we want now are preferably men with brains; they need not have so much brawn. Technical instruction has to be given in working the predictors, the locators, the telephone concentrators and we want recruits who have the technical knowledge and the brains to master them, and we get such men in the Territorial Army, whereas we do not get them in the Regulars. To give one small illustration, I had great difficulty in getting the right kind of men to repair electrical breakdowns that might occur in the apparatus, and that difficulty continued for some time. Eventually there came into my company office a man who wanted to join. I asked him what his job was and he told me "I am an electrician. I am employed by a chain of cinemas and am responsible for the maintenance of all the electrical equipment in those cinemas." I said, "Come along, you are just the fellow I want." He is now the electrical-mechanist staff-sergeant, and all repairs are done in about two minutes. In his civilian job he is probably getting £500 or £600 a year. [HON. MEMBERS: He is lucky."] I think he is probably getting that amount—and in the Territorial Army we have his services for next to nothing; although he is a man who would never go into the Regulars. One very generous organisation said, "We will supplement the military pay of our men to bring it up to their civilian pay," but it was found to involve such an enormous outlay that it was impossible for them to carry out that promise, because a great number of my men are regularly getting four or five times more than they would get in the Army.
I will close by saying that, from what I have seen of it, I think the Territorial Army is a magnificent service. The men who join are very keen and are determined to make a success of their job. Their heart is in the job from the point
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of view of the service and not from the point of view of what they can get out of it. I think my right hon. Friend has paid them a very great compliment. He has said that they are taking on a most responsible task with a determination to make a success of it, and if we in this House back them up thoroughly and wholeheartedly, then in a reasonable time we can in a time of crisis regard the state of the defences of this country with confidence and with hope.
9.43 p.m.
Mr. Dalton: The hon. and gallant Member for Penrith and Cockermouth (Major Dower) was saying, I am sure, what we all feel when he was praising the Territorial Army. Before I sit down I shall have something to say on one aspect of the Territorial Army's work, namely, antiaircraft defence, but first I should like to say a word or two on the subject of air-raid precautions which has been debated throughout a large part of to-day. My right hon. Friend who opened this Debate was confronted with certain points—as he thought somewhat of the nature of debating points—by the Home Secretary, and I have been in consultation with my right hon. Friend on some of those points. I wish at this stage to remind the House that the Home Secretary paid a well-deserved tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Hackney (Mr. H. Morrison) when a few days ago he described him as having been a tower of strength during the crisis period so far as the London County Council's part in the work was concerned. We on these benches, although we are not as yet in power nationally, are proud of what was done by those of our representatives who are in power locally, both in London and elsewhere, and we believe that a great deal of their work consisted in pressing forward sleepy, indecisive and lethargic persons at the Home Office. That is so on the evidence that we have.
Sir S. Hoare: It is very incomplete evidence.
Mr. Dalton: We shall have the opportunity of going further into that point on another occasion next Session. As regards the observations made by the right hon. Gentleman about the part played by the London County Council, I have been placed in possession of the following statement. First of all, the Secretary of State said that the London County Council had no fire scheme that

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had been submitted to and approved by the Home Office. I understand that that is true in a formal sense, but I am informed also that that position is well-known to the Home Office officials and accepted by and agreed to by them, and that they are not at the moment demanding a formal scheme from the London County Council; and that there is an effective practical scheme in operation by consent between the two bodies of officials who have been managing this matter. That is what I am told. There is, in fact, a scheme which has been agreed upon by the two sides, and it is working.
Sir S. Hoare: The hon. Member will allow that I should know the facts, and I say that that is not the case. From other places we have had schemes, but from London we have not had a scheme, and we are still waiting for it.
Mr. Dalton: Yes, but meanwhile it is not true to say that there has not been constant and harmonious consultation between two bodies of officials and, even though there is not a formal scheme, there is a scheme which is, in fact, operating, and which is judged by both sides to be effective.
Sir S. Hoare: It is still incomplete.
Mr. Dalton: No doubt my right hon. Friend will have something more to say about this later on. If that scheme is considered incomplete, it is not the only thing which is incomplete. A great many schemes entirely within the responsibility of the Home Office are notoriously incomplete. I must not spend too much time in talking of the London County Council, but none the less it was only right that I should make this reply on the points furnished to me by my right hon. Friend. In regard to fire-service recruits, there was a shortage before the crisis, in London as everywhere else, but my right hon. Friend thinks that the Home Secretary will not deny that he has been exceedingly active. He has broadcast an appeal and taken many other active steps to secure recruits and the numbers are now 13,200, which is by no means a negligible total, having regard to what has been done elsewhere by other authorities. My right hon. Friend thinks that it is a little ungrateful of the Home Secretary not to recognise the efforts that have been made by the London County Council in this matter.
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In regard to fire-fighting equipment, my right hon. Friend informs me that there was, as has indeed been stated, a disagreement between the Home Office and the Council regarding certain specifications for equipment. My right hon. Friend is not prepared to admit that his officials who deal with fire-fighting appliances are less competent than their opposite numbers at the Home Office. There was definite disagreement as to the utility of various appliances, but I am told that that is now a matter of history. There is no doubt still a great shortage of equipment in relation to the volunteers whom my right hon. Friend has secured by his broadcast and other activities. I will leave the matter there, but a reply was certainly called for.
Sir S. Hoare: Let us resume the discussion.
Mr. Dalton: No doubt. The right hon. Gentleman said that we had done well in air-raid precautions, comparatively speaking, so far as other countries, except Germany, were concerned, but I submit that this country, being immensely more vulnerable than those other countries, requires very much more effective precautions than they to enable us to say that, with the exception of Germany, we are ahead of other people. We are infinitely more vulnerable by reason of this grotesque concentration of population in London, and very much more is required from us, particularly in regard to evacuation schemes. Personally I have always been in favour of the maximum evacuation, and I am very glad that the Government are moving in that direction, but even now many of my hon. Friends hold the view that they are not yet as keen evacuationists in the event of war as some of us are. We admit that the Lord Privy Seal has made a step in the right direction but it is not a sufficiently long step. Apart from the fact of publishing it—and it may have been wise not to publish it—we regret that more speedy action was not taken by the Government upon the report which was received. I think it is true to say that during August it was sat upon and no action was taken upon it. Local authorities were not made aware that any action was to be taken in regard to it and if any action was decided upon in the Home Office no information got out. I am also informed that there was complete lack by the Departments concerned

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of any preparations for feeding the evacuated persons in their new domiciles.
Sir S. Hoare: Every preparation was made.
Mr. Dalton: I am told by people who have been in touch with these matters that the Food Defence Plans Department were not communicated with by the Home Office on evacuation until an exceedingly late date, and that until the crisis came there were no effective schemes for mobilising food supplies for these people. The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head There will be a further opportunity for debating this matter, The fact which I have been citing, from statements made to me, show that on every part of the front of air-raid precautions there was lethargy, indecision and lack of plan.
I will now pass to another aspect of air-raid precautions, the provision of antiaircraft guns. We felt it would not be useful in to-day's Debate to do more than to arraign two Departments, the Home Office and the War Office, and that it would be going too wide to introduce matters relating to the Air Ministry. They will no doubt have their day later. But it seemed to us that there was some utility in this Debate in linking together these two closely related Departments of ground defence, and I want to put a few questions to the Secretary of State for War on which we shall be glad to have elucidation. There has been much conflicting evidence about the numbers and types and general efficiency of our anti-aircraft artillery. Every man who knows the facts must be a judge of how much it is within the public interest to reveal, but the more facts that can be revealed, the better, both in order that we shall be able to learn how there came to be such a grave shortage and how great a problem remains to be solved before we may be reasonably secure in this line of defence. The Prime Minister has promised us peace in our time, so there is plenty of time in which to make good the admitted defects which existed in the month before last, and even if as the hon. Member for West Leicester (Mr. Nicolson) has suggested, the Prime Minister has secured us peace for only six months, that, at any rate, is a period in which much can be done.
Much has been said about the antiaircraft defence of London, and I shall cite some facts in regard to it. Much
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less has been said about the anti-aircraft defence of other great centres of population. I hope that the Secretary of State will tell us something about the antiaircraft defence not only of London, but of Midland towns like Birmingham and Coventry, and of the great industrial centres of the North and of Scotland. I am informed—and I ask the Secretary of State whether he will confirm or deny it—that, terribly inadequate as the antiaircraft defences were, even such guns and apparatus as we had for the defence of London were got together only by stripping almost naked the anti-aircraft defences in every other part of the country. I wish to know what the right hon. Gentleman has to say in reply to that statement, which is being freely made, not by political partisans, but by persons with knowledge and information in the Midlands and in the North. Our information is that the lack of antiaircraft defence, serious enough in London, was almost complete so far as the other principal crowded industrial key areas are concerned.
I will come in a moment to the number of guns, but, with regard to the types of guns, in spite of a certain amount of writing up in the Press, which I will not go into now, though I have here several very optimistic statements made by air correspondents of papers within the sphere of influence of the Government—in spite of that, it is generally admitted that in numbers our anti-aircraft artillery is grossly and fantastically inadequate; but, given this lack of numbers, how does it come about that so little has been done to draw upon the experience and productive resources that can be made available for the Navy? The Navy for some time has had, according to good judges, excellent anti-aircraft guns both against high-flying and against low-flying aeroplanes. Indeed, in these controversies, in which most sections of our Defence Departments have come in for deservedly rough usage, the Admiralty, on the whole, has came through unscathed up to date, and it would appear that the other Defence Departments would do well to learn from naval experience and endeavour to apply it on land. The naval 4-inch gun is highly spoken of by persons with knowledge, and also the naval 2-pounder for defence against low-flying attack, and, in view of the shocking shortage of anti-aircraft

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guns on land, I would ask the Secretary of State whether he has any explanation of the fact that these naval guns have not been called into use, and whether the position can be defended that, at a time when the Navy is, I will not say over-equipped, because that would not be true, but when the Navy has been getting the lion's share both of the money and of the stuff for defence generally, there is a lack of any complete system of priority and a complete failure of the so-called Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, and, while the Navy has been supplied with large quantities of anti-aircraft guns for use against both high-flying and low-flying attack, the Army has been left almost without any. No new arguments are needed in favour of establishing a proper and rational priority in relation to our defence requirements as a whole, and not merely allowing Ministers to scramble against one another, subject to the benevolent but rather ineffective neutrality of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. The time has now come when it should be generally realised that to hold command of the sea and yet allow London to be smashed up in the early stages of a war would be a reductio ad absurdum of any system of national defence.
The 3·7-inch gun, according to evidence at the disposal of a large number of people, is a very great improvement on the old 3-inch gun. How does it come about that the production of these 3.7-inch guns is still as inadequate as it was shown to be when the defences had to be mobilised recently? I have a further report to the effect that there are very few 3.7-inch guns available for the defence of London and other cities, and I think some explanation of the delay in getting really speedy production should be forthcoming. Turning to low-flying attack, which is sometimes left out of account, will the Secretary of State tell us when we are going to get the first consignment of the modern type of gun which has been approved, I understand, by the War Office—the Swedish 2-pounder—and whether we are to get it from Sweden or from Vickers? I am informed, and I would like the right hon. Gentleman either to confirm or deny it, that not one single specimen of that 2-pounder gun for defence against low-flying attack by aircraft has yet come to
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hand in a form suitable for use. Is that true, and, if so, why?
The line of division between the Air Ministry and the War Office is in a sense arbitrary; arrangements have been made that the one should be on one side and the other on the other; but I have had some disturbing information. I have not got it by any more elaborate method than by going about the country listening to what people tell me. [Interruption.] It is not from a General at all, or even from the Attorney-General. We should welcome any repetition of the tactics pursued towards the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. Sandys). But perhaps that is a side issue in to-night's Debate. I have this information, not from experts, but from straightforward observers who go about and see what is happening under their noses. I am not sure that it is really the right hon. Gentleman's business so much as that of the Air Ministry to answer on this point, but I mention it as it ought to be within his knowledge at any rate. I am informed that at a certain aerodrome in Yorkshire—and I gather that a similar situation prevails at other aerodromes—there were some anti-aircraft guns available for defence, but no ammunition. I am informed that at Dishforth Aerodrome there are one or two antiaircraft guns, but no ammunition for those guns. I desire to know whether the right hon. Gentleman takes responsibility for that, or whether he wishes the matter to be postponed until we get some statement from the Air Ministry. If it is true, it is most shameful, and if it is as widespread as I have reason to believe, it should be probed.
Other matters relating to the Air Ministry I postpone, and come to the question of the manning of these antiaircraft guns. In spite of what has been said by the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just spoken about the competence and admirable spirit of the Territorials, which we all recognise, there are high authorities who hold that there should be at least a Regular nucleus, some skeleton provision for defence, and that it should not be all left to the Territorials, most of whom are engaged in full-time civil occupations. Admitting all that can be said in favour of the Territorials, of their spirit, their ability to pick up new technique in the use of new instruments and so on, there should be a skeleton force of Regulars. That

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was very admirably put by the military correspondent of the "Times" in an article in that newspaper and in a letter which he wrote, in reply to comments oil the article, on 26th October. Captain Liddell Hart who, I believe, is the military correspondent of the "Times," states:
"Our present system provides no intermediate precautionary measures between complete defencelessness and complete mobilisation of the Territorial Anti-Aircraft Force."
He goes on to suggest that we should follow the example of other countries which have frontiers liable to be crossed at high speed without notice by enemy aircraft, for we are in that sense reduced to the level of a mere Continental State now. He suggests that we should arrange a skeleton system of gun and searchlight positions manned by a nucleus of Regulars quartered on the spot. He argues that the addition to the Regular Army required by such a skeleton provision would not be large. I will not give the details of the calculation, but he comes down to a final total of an additional 2,000 Regular soldiers, which he thinks would be enough to provide what he regards, and I must say I agree with him, as a very necessary additional safeguard to our ground defences. I would like the Secretary of State to give his view on that matter.
I come now to the question of what guns there were, and what happened to the guns during the crisis, when all the speeches of the Secretary of State in drill halls and other vantage places were brought to the acid test of reality. The Territorials were not called out, and no effort was made to get the guns out, until 26th September. I say bluntly that I consider the Secretary of State was most gravely to blame in delaying so long in taking this most necessary precaution for the protection of London and other cities against air attack which many thought was most necessary. From 12th September to 26th September constant pressure was being brought on the War Office to call out the Territorials and get out the guns. It took a fortnight for this pressure to have its effect. If we had been attacked during this time, there would have been literally no ground defences at all. Meanwhile, in Berlin and other peaceful centres of civilian life you had guns and their crews visible on the sky line, on the roofs of high buildings, to maintain the morale
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of the people, and perhaps for more necessary practical purposes.
Many Territorial officers were gravely concerned at the lethargy of the War Office. Territorial officers spoke to me—if the Attorney-General asks me for their names I shall deny him the information. They said, "Cannot you of the Labour party do something to stir these people up?" We did our best, and indeed, as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Hackney has already told the House this afternoon, he, being responsible in a democratic sense, as leader of the ruling party in London, for the safety of this City, found it necessary at one stage to address a communication to the Prime Minister himself, to which I believe he did not even receive the courtesy of a reply. This was followed, however, on 26th September by the calling out of the Territorials and an attempt to get the guns in position, after a fortnight of grave danger for this country.
I have consulted, as any free citizen can still consult without penalties, the Army List, and I observe that the first anti-aircraft division consists of two groups, according to the last Army List available. These groups are the London group and the Thames and Medway Approaches group. The London group, according to the Army List, consists of five anti-aircraft brigades, comprising 15 batteries, with a total of 120 guns. In fact, I am told that this establishment was not reached. There were not 120 guns. I am told that, even if you add the Thames and Medway group, you do not get 200 guns available for the defence of London. Of the guns got into position, I am told that, for a variety of reasons, half would not have been able to engage enemy aircraft if these had appeared. Some lacked predictors, others lacked dials; some had defective predictors or dials that were not working properly. I am told that there were the gravest deficiencies of stores, both of equipment and other things.
I am told that at Woolwich Arsenal—and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will inquire into this, as he is responsible for these facts if they cannot be denied—there was a state of sheer chaos. Some anti-aircraft units which sent transport to draw stores were kept waiting for long hours. In some cases transport was sent away and told to report the next day. In one case the non-commissioned officer in

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charge of the transport was told that he should have prepared indents in quadruplicate, and that until this formality was complied with nothing could be issued. If this is true, or if anything approaching this is true, some one should be severely dealt with. I ask the right hon. Gentleman, if he is not in a position to confirm or deny this, to have the most vigorous inquiry made.
I am told that in some cases ammunition was delivered to gun positions fitted with fuses quite different from those for which the units were prepared. If that is so, it shows gross incompetence which should be investigated. I have already referred to the Swedish two-pounder gun, and I am told that not even one gun of this type was available for the defence of London against low flying aircraft. I am told that all there was was a few old naval guns, firing over open sights, and some Lewis guns, which would have done more damage to civilian life and property than to attacking aircraft. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will say what steps have been taken to remedy this grave deficiency.
There was a grave shortage of searchlights, even on the meagre establishment provided by the War Office. As for balloons—but that is not the right hon. Gentleman's business—there were only 100, some of which have involuntarily crossed the North Sea. The Midlands and the North were stripped almost bare of anti-aircraft defence in order that some kind of show might be put up in London, and in London it was observed that only about one-fifth to one-sixth of the guns were of the modern 3.7-inch type, and no modern two-pounder guns at all and no 4.5-inch guns. The right hon. Gentleman has been demanding from the London County Council pieces of the children's and young men's playing fields for fixed emplacements for 4.5-inch guns, and many playing fields have been disfigured in order to oblige him; but no guns were available for these fixed emplacements of the modern 3.7-inch guns, at least half were unable to fire. In face of this undisguisable incompetence, what conclusions can we draw? How can we have any confidence in Ministers who have been responsible, through periods of months and years, for the state of affairs which I have been describing? It is not
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yet too late. The effort required is not superhuman in order to repair these grave defects in our anti-aircraft defences, but what confidence can we have that those responsible for this state of affairs have the power or the capacity to retrieve the position?
My hon. and right hon. Friends have put down this Motion on the Paper. It is indeed a Vote of Censure on the Government, and a Vote of Censure in particular upon the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for War, upon the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence for not having co-ordinated their activities to better purpose, and, above all, upon the Prime Minister for having let the whole thing slide owing to his pre-occupation with meeting foreign potentates rather than spending more of his time on the Defences of this country. [Interruption.] The price of Munich will be revealed in due course. I do not stand here to-night in order to pay compliments to a disastrous Prime Minister, or even to speak smooth and pleasant words to his mechanical supporters. Never before in the long history of our Parliament has a Government so ducked its head before a Vote of Censure. In general, Governments have stood up to votes of censure and sought to repel them. This Government has created a new precedent. It has moved an Amendment to a Vote of Censure, which is, by its own terms, a Vote of Censure, condemning the gross incompetence of Ministers who yet have not the grace to cede their positions to those less incapable. I have noticed that the Secretary of State for the Home Department, although he is associated on the Order Paper with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has not said one word to-day in defence of the gross neglect of the Chancellor of the Exchequer during the years when he held the office which the right hon. Gentleman now holds and was responsible for air-raid precautions. That silence is more eloquent than even the most ingenious defence could have been. Therefore, we shall go into the Lobby with great satisfaction, with the assurance that we hold in this Debate the larger truth, in support of our own Vote of Censure, but if that is rejected, we shall not think it necessary to challenge the amended Vote of Censure which the Government are willing to pass upon themselves.
10.19 p.m.
The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Hore-Belisha): The subject which we are discussing must be treated fearlessly, candidly, without exaggeration, and, above all, without complacency. No one must be allowed to minimize—and no one, I think, desires to minimize—the real sense of apprehension of this people and their legitimate concern with our air defences. That feeling of apprehension is attributable, I think, to the sudden and overwhelming realisation that our island security was open to be violated. Henceforth, we must pay the same attention as a nation to our anti-aircraft defences as we have always paid to the maintenance of the Fleet.
We have dealt this afternoon with those measures within the control of civil Departments, now to be co-ordinated by my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal, which are concerned with passive defence: measures intended to mitigate the effects of air raids. We have now passed, as the House will have realised from the speech to which we have just listened, to the measures concerning active defence which are in the charge of the fighting Services. Active defence is concerned with preventing air raids or defeating them if they should occur. The central instrument of our air defence is the fighter aircraft, and the guns and searchlights are intended to assist it.
All the various forms of active defence are inter-related, and before we can say, for instance, how many guns are required in a particular area we must know how many fighter aircraft are allotted to cover it. I make this point because some people if they do not see a gun feel that they are unprotected. That is not necessarily the case. They may in fact be protected by a form of defence which they do not see. Neither is it of any value to compare the number of guns which we may have at any given moment, particularly without reference to the calibre, with the number of guns existing in some other country. The geography and climatic conditions, the number of exposed frontiers, the number of vulnerable points, the concentrations of population—these and other factors influence the proportions and numbers of any particular weapons or of any particular kinds of defence.
There is one fortunate feature in this gloom in the matter of anti-aircraft de
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fence, and that is that there can be no race of armaments, and one nation cannot provocatively outbid another. It is not a question of ship for ship, machine for machine, or gun for gun. We can meet our own defence requirements without relating them to the requirements of any other country, and we are determined to meet these in the completest possible sense that science, design, ingenuity and production can furnish. I ask the question, and many persons ask the question, why the problem was not conceived earlier as it is now conceived. I find the explanation, in reference to the recent history of the past, in the belief which was concurrently held not so very long ago that the gun had no effectiveness against the modern aeroplane. I found this belief in one leading article, I think it is representative, in a popular newspaper in August, 1934:
"Anti-aircraft guns are practically a useless form of defence against air attack … and the experience of this country demonstrates the futility of relying upon ground defence. During the War there were 19 aeroplane raids over London in which 280 machines took part, and of these not more than nine were shot down by gunfire and none fell over London. …"
If expert opinion which at one time was more or less in tune with that view has recently changed it is, I imagine, because of the perfection of the new precision instruments enabling us to place greater reliance upon the efficacy of this form of defence. It must be realised that in 1935 we had virtually no organisation at all for anti-aircraft defence on the ground. In the latter part of that year we entrusted the task of forming such an organisation to the Territorial Army. On 1st January, 1936, the first anti-aircraft division was formed and its strength at this time was about 5,200 all ranks. Recruiting was bad, and by the end of the year its strength was still only 7,700 men. In June, 1936, we formed a second anti-aircraft division. Recruiting was still bad and the actual strength of this division was just under 7,000. It may be said that the popular imagination had not then become fired with the necessity for providing ground defence against air raids. In 1937 for the first time the tendency of recruiting changed for the better and by the end of that year the strength of the two divisions was 27,000. By June of this year the numbers had risen to 45,000, and profiting by this hopeful increase the Government decided

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to create five Territorial divisions numbering 100,000 men and covering the whole country.
Obviously so vast and rapid an expansion, all of it recent, all of it sudden, called for accommodation and equipment on a great scale. We are apt to forget the rate of expansion and what has been done in so many respects to make it possible, and to forget also what has been done and is being done in the matter of equipment. Clearly, if we had left our organisation on the lower level the amount of equipment in relation to the number of men would have been greater. We did, however, decide to take the risk of getting the men in advance of the equipment. It was a risk with a definite time limit, for in 1937 the final design of the new 3.7 anti-aircraft gun had been approved and new plant had been planned for its production. I, therefore, knew that as surely as day would follow night this gun would come into issue, and I felt very strongly that it was better to have the men who could be trained in advance of the full equipment than to have the full equipment at a later stage, but not to have the men who could handle it. It would have been easier and more comfortable to have taken the reverse course. The same considerations apply to our defence against low-flying attack, including the defence of aerodromes for which the Army has now accepted the major responsibility.
During the months after the tide of recruiting had turned, my anxiety was not lest full equipment should not come, for I knew it would, but lest those who kept stressing the lack of full equipment, which was about to be produced, should effectively impede the tide of recruiting and repel it. Part of the duty of government is to keep alive the vital processes of confidence, and here there was good ground to do so. However, fortunately nothing has succeeded in stemming the enthusiasm of the Territorial Army. If, during this time, I was anxious to emphasise, as I always have emphasised, that training equipment was available, it was with the motive of making it possible for this country to have an adequate force of defenders when the new weapons of defence were ready. Of course, there are those who feel that there ought to have been more training equipment; that will always be so; but it is noteworthy that
524
despite the great expansion in numbers a quota was available for every unit of at least two guns per battery, with instruments and training stores for the artillery and searchlights, and sound locators for the battalions. I had never said that more than training equipment existed. That this training equipment has achieved its purpose is shown by the results of the training camps and exercises which are on an extremely high standard.
Now I come to the question of production, and I do not think that I need authority to say that a programme is a developing and not an instantaneous phenomenon. As has been stated in this House, in vivid language which may perhaps be recalled, "in these sombre fields, in the first year you have to sow and in the second year you have to harrow; the third year is your harvest." We have shortened the period. I have pointed out that the design of the 3.7-inch gun was finally approved in the middle of 1937. On our existing enlarged organisation, our requirements of this gun for the whole five divisions should, if the present accelerated production is maintained, be substantially provided by the middle of the coming year—practically the whole of our requirements. If that forecast be fulfilled, it will be a record of production favourably comparable with anything that has previously been done in this or any other country, even in war. I hope the House will remember that some of the factories where this production is in progress were, less than two years ago, empty shells for which all the plant and tools had to be made and assembled. There has further been recruitment and training of labour, of which there is still a shortage on this work. It must be borne in mind that practically the whole of the armament industry in this country was closed down after the War.
In the case of the 3·7-inch gun, it is not only a question of the production of components of the gun itself, but also of the provision of complicated instruments and their ancillary equipment, which should keep pace with the production of the gun and will also be forthcoming with the guns to the extent of our full requirements in substance by the middle of next year. There has been a grave shortage of labour on the instruments, because there are not many men in this country who had been trained in that work, and it takes three years in

525
which to make them efficient. It may interest the House to know that we could have doubled the number of 3.7-inch guns in action in the crisis, if a firm making one small part of the computing mechanism had not failed to meet their contract. Such disappointments occur even under the best systems of production.
One of the disadvantages of producing a new gun is that it creates the impression that all existing equipment is inadequate. For instance, many people, among them the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken, assert that the 3-inch gun is now ineffective. That is not the case. It has, in fact, been modernised and has the same system of fire control as the 3.7-inch gun. It is quicker firing and more mobile than the 3.7-inch gun and within the limits of range, which are considerable in relation to the normal climatic conditions in this country, it is an accurate weapon. It should be noted that the anti-aircraft organisation in foreign countries includes, almost invariably, a weapon of a similar nature, and that the bulk of the air activity in Spain has taken place at heights well within the compass of the 3-inch gun. Even when guns of heavier calibre are used, we shall continue to use the 3-inch gun as an essential part of cur artillery. I hope that the putting into production of the new heavy gun which was approved later than the 3.7-inch gun, will not cause those who have 3.7-inch guns allotted to them to consider it, in turn, obsolete. Here again, the 3.7-inch gun is complementary to the heavier gun, just as the 3-inch gun is complementary to the 3.7-inch gun. Each has its role.
I am asked by the hon. Gentleman whether the naval 4-inch gun would not have been as suitable as the 4.5-inch gun which we have selected and whether it could not have come into production earlier. Even if it could have come into production earlier, and it is possible that it might have done, but very slightly, its design as a twin would not have been suitable or, at any rate, not as suitable as the gun which we had, in fact, selected. This gun, the 4.5-inch gun, is already beginning slowly to appear, although the design details were only approved for manufacture in 1937. It was, indeed, in 1937, and in some cases in 1938, that most of our modern equipment was approved in design.
526
I have seen representative employers of industry and I have asked them whether there is any means of accelerating our production. I did this not after the crisis, but well before the crisis. I asked them to criticise anything which it might occur to them to criticise in our organisation and to be quite relentless in doing so, sparing neither persons nor the organisation itself. They expressed the highest opinion of the organisation existing at the War Office, and said that virtually nothing could be done to improve it—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"]—and if any hon. Members can suggest to me any defect in that organisation I shall be very glad to know of it, because I would ask them to bear in mind that my one desire, as it is the desire of the Government, is to effect every possible improvement.
Mr. Churchill: Do I gather that the right hon. Gentleman says that the design of the most improved modern equipment was effected only towards the end of 1937?
Mr. Hore-Belisha: I did say so, and I have no doubt that some other instruments of defence will be designed in the next year. Defence is not a static, but a dynamic thing, and there is no means by which you can order a particular designer to produce a gun on a particular date. No Government can force the design of a gun before it is ready.
Mr. Churchill: I understood the right hon. Gentleman was speaking about the 4.5-inch gun. I understand that the decisions on that were not taken till late in 1937.
Mr. Hore-Belisha: That is so. I desire to be accurate and candid with the House. I pass to the other matters raised by the hon. Gentleman, which I shall deal with, I hope, quite fairly. On Monday, 26th September, 50,000 men of the anti-aircraft and coast defence units of the Territorial Army were called out for emergency service. This was the first time that Territorials had been embodied in advance of the Regular Army, and also the first time that Territorials had been called upon to fulfil the new role so recently entrusted to them. The House will wish, I am sure, to join in a tribute of praise to those 50,000 officers and men who laid aside their normal avocations and presented themselves at once at their

527
appointed places, and also to those who made the transport so quickly available. Mostly in good condition and often at great inconvenience, buses and lorries were promptly diverted from their normal role. Employers too played their part by releasing their men without question and restoring them to their jobs when they returned.
These parts of our arrangements worked on the whole smoothly and efficiently, but in judging the development as a whole it must be remembered that we were prematurely bringing into operation a mechanism which had never previously been tested. There was no power of rehearsal, and much had to be improvised. It must also be remembered that the complementary mechanism of the Regular Army which could have supplemented our arrangements was not mobilised. Nothing, of course, could atone or will atone, until our programme is complete, for the shortage of war equipment. It is the purpose of our rearmament programme to remedy this and the programme proceeds as I have described. All the defects in our deployment—and the hon. Gentleman has catalogued them—relate in one way or another to the shortage of equipment and the incomplete state of our organisation.
It is necessary to consider the deployment in two separate parts—firstly, the normal deployment of personnel and equipment in unit charge. This was carried out smoothly and expeditiously, and the unit itself was in a position to ensure that its equipment was fully serviceable. The second head under which it is necessary to consider the deployment relates to emergency equipment which it would normally not be necessary to use, and which was either in practice camps or in process of assembly for issue in arsenals. Every effort was made in a great hurry to give the country the advantage of all that we could muster. Until production has provided the equipment required it will always be necessary to make urgent arrangements to use all available equipment, and these arrangements must necessarily be ad hoc. When I speak of bringing up emergency guns, I would like categorically to reassure the hon. Gentleman who suggested that we stripped the industrial areas in order to send guns to London that not one gun was removed from the industrial centres to London.
528
Some confusion is bound to arise, and some weapons are bound to be imperfect, when you are making emergency arrangements. I propose myself to mention some of the defects and deficiencies disclosed. Guns sent from practice camps in some cases were separated from their instruments and delay was caused. Further, some were sent into action without overhaul. This was due to the desire to make them available as early as possible. Such overhaul is essential and will in future take place. Some of the guns were issued without dials. I have explained the reason for this—the failure of the firm that was making them to deliver them. This defect has been remedied. Some predictors were out of order. They are delicate instruments and we have suffered from lack of experienced personnel for their maintenance. It takes time to train such personnel, and we are taking such steps as we can to do so. Electric storage batteries were in some cases run down. [Laughter.] I wish to tell the House the facts. At the same time, units hold spare batteries and charging plant, and such faults are very apt to occur unless units take the precaution of charging their batteries.
Certain units did not draw their full complement of stores and particularly fuze keys. Most units improvised satisfactory expedients. Some stores were found to be deficient and steps are being taken to send to section commanders a simple aide memoire of what they should have ready for an emergency. Two types of ammunition are in use, and it is essential that each gun station has the equipment appropriate to its ammunition. In some cases this was not done. [Laughter.] I am candidly stating the position. I am showing these omissions because if I did not candidly confess them the House might feel that I am not applying the necessary remedies for the future. It is, of course, my intention to do that. Over 90 per cent. of the searchlights were deployed expeditiously. In some cases there were defects in transport, and units in future will themselves be charged with the duty of keeping their eye on the transport that will be allotted to them in case of emergency.
Every unit has been asked to state exactly what were the shortcomings that they found and these are the principal shortcomings that have been stated. Every step possible will be taken to

529
remedy them. It is, however, quite another story when these defects are exaggerated. I read in one newspaper, and I heard the statement here again to-night, an authoritative statement that we had only 100 guns in action in London. In another newspaper it was stated equally authoritatively that we had only 50 guns in action in London. In both cases it was stated that we might as well reveal these facts because a potential enemy knew just as much about them as we did. Which fact does the enemy know—that we had 100 guns, or that we had 50 guns? Neither figure happens to be correct. The varying character of these estimates of the number of guns at our disposal is in itself a justification for not stating the figures. No country publishes figures of this kind and no statement that I have seen of the number of guns in our possession fit for action happens to be accurate. If the calamity had occurred we should have rendered quite a good account of ourselves despite the deficiencies from which we suffered.
I have been asked whether our organisation could be strengthened, whether we could not have a stiffening from the Regular Army so that the time of deployment could be curtailed. The fact is that the organisation as a whole was deployed within 24 hours, and a large percentage of it within very much less—some units within a very few hours. To reinforce or stiffen the Territorial organisation with Regulars on an adequate scale over the whole country would require an enormous increase in the Regular Army and would deprive the Territorials of the most responsible part of their trust. It is extremely difficult to mix Regulars and Territorials and to select which duties each is to perform, and, if possible, one would like to leave the credit of running this organisation and discharging this most serious of our responsibilities with the Territorial Army. Therefore, we must find some means of making the deployment even more expeditious. It should be possible by having more guns on fixed sites with equipment more ready to hand and more regular personnel with the units
ready to assist in the despatch of the equipment. In these ways I think we can obtain an even greater acceleration, but we shall not hesitate to take any measures which may be practical and effective, keeping in mind our desire not to relieve the Territorials of the major part of this responsibility which they so well discharged.
Mr. Dalton: I asked about guns for defence against low-flying attack.
Mr. Hore-Belisha: I thought I had mentioned the subject. We have acquired the manufacturing rights of a gun suitable for this purpose. We have obtained some of this particular type of gun from abroad, and they are now in our possession and further deliveries are to come, and one of the principal manufacturers in the country is now engaged in completing a plant to make this gun and deliveries are expected to commence in June of next year. With regard to the question of a gun for defence against low-flying attack at an aerodrome being without ammunition, I am unable to verify the fact, but I will endeavour to do so if the hon. Gentleman will give me the name of the aerodrome again.
I have dealt frankly with the present state of our deficiencies and it is not a state which will endure. Every month will find the nation stronger. Within two years public opinion upon this matter has been changed, a vast organisation has been built up, a great industry has been created and production has begun. It was at a stage in the process that the emergency arose and the deployment was ordered. The country has a right to know that His Majesty's Government are resolved to see that the legitimate fears at present entertained shall, so far as is humanly possible, be averted, and in the shortest possible time.
Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
The House divided: Ayes, 130; Noes, 355.

Division No. 334.]

AYES.

[10.57 p.m.

Adams, D. (Consett)

Banfield, J. W.

Broad, F. A.

Adams, D. M. (Poplar, S.)

Batey, J.

Brown, C. (Mansfield)

Adamson, W. M.

Bellenger, F. J.

Brown, Rt. Hon. J. (S. Ayrshire)

Alexander, Rt. Hon. A. V. (H'lsbr.)

Benn, Rt. Hon. W. W.

Burke, W. A.

Anderson, F. (Whitehaven)

Benson, G.

Cassells, T.

Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.

Bevan, A.

Chater, D.

Cluse, W. S.

Jenkins, Sir W. (Neath)

Ritson, J.

Cooks, F. S.

Jones, A. C. (Shipley)

Roberts, W. (Cumberland, N.)

Collindridge, F.

Kelly, W. T.

Robinson, W. A. (St. Helens)

Cove, W. G.

Kennedy, Rt. Hon. T.

Rothschild, J. A. de

Cripps, Hon. Sir Stafford

Kirby, B. V.

Sanders, W. S.

Daggar, G.

Lathan, G.

Seely, Sir H. M.

Dalton, H.

Lawson, J. J.

Sexton, T. M.

Davidson, J. J. (Maryhill)

Lee, F.

Shinwell, E.

Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)

Leonard, W.

Silkin, L.

Day, H.

Leslie, J. R.

Silverman, S. S.

Dobbie, W.

Lunn, W.

Simpson, F. B.

Ede, J. C.

Macdonald, G. (Ince)

Sinclair, Rt. Hon. Sir A. (C'thn's)

Evans, D. O. (Cardigan)

McEntee, V. La T.

Smith, Ben (Rotherhithe)

Evans, E. (Univ. of Wales)

Maclean, N.

Smith, E. (Stoke)

Fletcher, Lt.-Comdr. R. T. H.

MacMillan, M. (Western Isles)

Smith, Rt. Hon. H. B. Lees- (K'ly)

Foot, D. M.

MacNeill Weir, L.

Smith, T. (Normanton)

Frankel, D.

Mainwaring, W. H.

Stephen, C.

Gallacher, W.

Marshall, F.

Stewart, W. J. (H'ght'n-le-Sp'ng)

Gardner, B. W.

Maxton, J.

Stokes, R. R.

George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)

Milner, Major J.

Summerskill, Dr. Edith

George, Megan Lloyd (Anglesey)

Montague, F.

Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)

Gibbins, J.

Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Hackney, S.)

Thorne, W.

Gibson, R. (Greenock)

Morrison, R. C. (Tottenham, N.)

Thurtle, E.

Grenfell, D. R.

Muff, G.

Tinker, J. J.

Griffith, F. Kingsley (M'ddl'sbro, W.)

Nathan, Colonel H. L.

Viant, S. P.

Griffiths, G. A. (Hemsworth)

Naylor, T. E.

Walkden, A. G.

Griffiths, J. (Llanelly)

Noel-Baker, P. J.

Watkins, F. C.

Groves, T. E.

Oliver, G. H.

Westwood, J

Hall, J. H. (Whitechapel)

Paling, W.

Whiteley, W. (Blaydon)

Hardie, Agnes

Parker, J.

Wilkinson, Ellen

Harris, Sir P. A.

Parkinson, J. A.

Williams, D. (Swansea, E.)

Hayday, A.

Pearson, A.

Williams, E. J. (Ogmore)

Henderson, A. (Kingswinford)

Poole, C. C.

Williams, T. (Don Valley)

Henderson, T. (Tradeston)

Price, M. P.

Windsor, W. (Hull, C.)

Hollins, A.

Pritt, D. N.

Woods, G. S. (Finsbury)

Hopkin, D.

Quibell, D. J. K.

Young, Sir R. (Newton)

Jagger, J.

Rathbone, Eleanor (English Univ's.)

Jenkins, A. (Pontypool)

Richards, R. (Wrexham)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—

Mr. Charleton and Mr. John.

NOES.

Adams, S. V. T. (Leeds, W.)

Brown, Rt. Hon. E. (Leith)

Crossley, A. C.

Agnew, Lieut.-Comdr. P. G.

Brown, Brig.-Gen. H. C. (Newbury)

Crowder, J. F. E.

Albery, Sir Irving

Browne, A. C. (Belfast, W.)

Cruddas, Col. B.

Alexander, Brig.-Gen. Sir W.

Bull, B. B.

Culverwell, C. T.

Allen, Lt.-Col. Sir W. J. (Armagh)

Bullock, Capt. M.

Davidson, J. J. (Maryhill)

Amery, Rt. Hon. L. C. M. S.

Burghley, Lord

Davies, Major Sir G. F. (Yeovil)

Anderson, Sir A. Garrett (C. of Ldn.)

Burgin, Rt. Hon. E. L.

Davison, Sir W. H.

Anderson, Rt. Hn. Sir J. (Sc'h Univ's)

Burton, Col. H. W.

De Chair, S. S.

Anstruther-Gray, W. J.

Butcher, H. W.

De la Bère, R.

Apsley, Lord

Butler, R. A.

Donman, Hon. R. D.

Aske, Sir R. W.

Caine, G. R. Hall-

Denville, Alfred

Astor, Major Hon. J. J. (Dover)

Campbell, Sir E. T.

Despencer-Robertson, Major J. A. F.

Astor, Hon. W. W. (Fulham, E.)

Cartland, J. R. H.

Doland, G. F.

Baillie, Sir A. W. M.

Carver, Major W. H.

Donner, P. W.

Balfour, G. (Hampstead)

Cary, R. A.

Dorman-Smith, Major Sir R. H.

Balfour, Capt. H. H. (Isle of Thanet)

Castlereagh, Viscount

Dower, Major A, V. G.

Balniel, Lord

Cayzer, Sir C. W. (City of Chester)

Drewe, C.

Barclay-Harvey, Sir C. M.

Cayzer, Sir H. R. (Portsmouth, S.)

Duckworth, Arthur (Shrewsbury)

Barrie, Sir C. C.

Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)

Duckworth, W. R. (Moss Side)

Baxter, A. Beverley

Channon, H.

Dugdale, Captain T. L.

Beamish, Rear-Admiral T. P. H.

Chapman, A. (Rutherglen)

Duggan, H. J.

Beauchamp, Sir B. C.

Chapman, Sir S. (Edinburgh, S.)

Duncan, J. A. L.

Beaumont, Hon. R. E. B. (Portsm'h)

Chorlton, A. E. L.

Dunglass, Lord

Beechman, N. A.

Christie, J. A.

Eastwood, J. F.

Beit, Sir A. L.

Clarke, Colonel R. S. (E. Grinstead)

Eckersley, P. T.

Bennett, Sir E. N.

Clarry, Sir Reginald

Eden, Rt. Hon. A.

Bernays, R. H.

Colfox, Major W. P.

Edmondson, Major Sir J.

Birchall, Sir J. D.

Colman, N. C. D.

Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

Bird, Sir R. B.

Colville, Rt. Hon. John

Ellis, Sir G.

Blair, Sir R.

Conant, Captain R. J. E.

Elliston, Capt. G. S.

Blaker, Sir R.

Cooke, J. D. (Hammersmith, S.)

Emery, J. F.

Boothby, R. J. G.

Cooper, Rt.Hn. A. Duff (W'st'r S.G'gs)

Emmott, C. E. G. C.

Bossom, A. C.

Cooper, Rt. Hn. T. M. (E'nburgh, W.)

Emrys-Evans, P. V.

Boulton, W. W.

Courthope, Col. Rt. Hon. Sir G. L.

Entwistle, Sir C. F.

Bower, Comdr. R. T.

Cox, Trevor

Errington, E.

Boyce, H. Leslie

Cranborne, Viscount

Erskine-Hill, A. G.

Braithwaite, Major A. N.

Craven-Ellis, W.

Evans, Capt. A. (Cardiff, S.)

Brass, Sir W.

Critchley, A.

Everard, W. L.

Briscoe, Capt. R. G.

Croft, Brig.-Gen. Sir H. Page

Fildes, Sir H.

Broadbridge, Sir G. T.

Crooke, Sir J. Smedley

Findlay, Sir E.

Brocklebank, Sir Edmund

Crookshank, Capt. H. F. C.

Fleming, E. L.

Brown, Col. D. C. (Hexham)

Cross, R. H.

Fox, Sir G. W. G.

532

533

Fremantle, Sir F. E.

Lloyd, G. W.

Russell, R. J. (Eddisbury)

Furness, S. N.

Locker-Lampson, Comdr. O. S.

Russell, S. H. M. (Darwin)

Fyfe, D. P. M.

Loftus, P. C.

Salmon, Sir I.

Gibson, Sir C. G. (Pudsey and Otley)

Lyons, A. M.

Salt, E. W.

Gilmour, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir J.

Mabane, W. (Huddersfield)

Samuel, M. R. A.

Gledhill, G.

MacAndrew, Colonel Sir C. G.

Sandeman, Sir N. S.

Gluckstein, L H.

McCorquodale, M. S.

Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir P.

Glyn, Major Sir R. G. C.

MacDonald, Rt. Hon. M. (Ross)

Scott, Lord William

Goldie, N. B.

Macdonald, Capt. P. (Isle of Wight)

Selley, H. R.

Gower, Sir R. V.

McEwen, Capt. J. H. F.

Shakespeare, G. H.

Grant-Ferris, R.

McKie, J. H.

Shaw, Major P. S. (Wavertree)

Granville, E. L.

Maclay, Hon. J. P.

Shaw, Captain W. T. (Forfar)

Greene, W. P. C. (Worcester)

Macnamara, Major J. R. J.

Shepperson, Sir E. W.

Gretton, Col. Rt. Hon. J.

Macquisten, F. A.

Shute, Colonel Sir J. J.

Gridley, Sir A. B.

Magnay, T.

Simmonds, O. E.

Grigg, Sir E. W. M.

Maitland, A.

Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir J. A.

Grimston, R. V.

Makins, Brigadier-General Sir Ernest

Sinclair, Col. T. (Queen's U. B'lf'st)

Gritten, W. G. Howard

Manningham-Buller, Sir M.

Smiles, Lieut.-Colonel Sir W. D.

Guest, Lieut.-Colonel H. (Drake)

Markham, S. F.

Smith, Bracewell (Dulwich)

Guest, Hon. I. (Brecon and Radnor)

Marsden, Commander A.

Smith, Sir Louis (Hallam)

Guest, Maj. Hon. O. (C'mb'rw'll, N.W.)

Mason, Lt.-Col. Hon. G. K. M.

Smith, Sir R. W. (Aberdeen)

Guinness, T. L. E. B.

Maxwell, Hon. S. A.

Smithers, Sir W

Gunston, Capt. Sir D. W.

Mayhew, Lt.-Col. J.

Somervell, Rt. Hon. Sir Donald

Hacking, Rt. Hon. Sir D. H.

Meller, R. J. (Mitcham)

Somerville, A. A. (Windsor)

Hambro, A. V.

Mellor, Sir J. S. P. (Tamworth)

Southby, Commander Sir A. R. J.

Hammersley, S. S.

Mills, Sir F. (Leyton, E.)

Spens, W. P.

Hannah, I. C.

Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)

Stanley, Rt. Hon. Oliver (W'm'l'd)

Hannon, Sir P. J. H.

Mitchell, Sir W. Lane (Streatham)

Stewart, J. Henderson (Fife, E.)

Harbord, A.

Mitcheson, Sir G. G.

Stewart, William J. (Belfast, S.)

Harvey, Sir G.

Moore, Lieut.-Col. Sir T. C. R.

Storey, S.

Haslam, Henry (Horncastle)

Moore-Brabazon, Lt.-Col. J. T. C.

Stourton, Major Hon. J. J.

Haslam, Sir J. (Bolton)

Moreing, A. C.

Strauss, H. G. (Norwich)

Heilgers, Captain F. F. A.

Morgan, R. H.

Strickland, Captain W. F.

Hely-Hutchinson, M. R.

Morris, J. P. (Salford, N.)

Stuart, Lord C. Crichton- (N'thw'h)

Heneage, Lieut.-Colonel A. P.

Morris-Jones, Sir Henry

Stuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)

Hepburn, P. G. T. Buchan-

Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Univ's.)

Sueter, Rear-Admiral Sir M. F.

Hepworth, J.

Morrison, Rt. Hon. W. S. (Cirencester)

Sutcliffe, H.

Herbert, A. P. (Oxford U.)

Munro, P.

Tasker, Sir R. I.

Herbert, Major J. A. (Monmouth)

Nall, Sir J.

Taylor, C. S. (Eastbourne)

Herbert, Capt. Sir S. (Abbey)

Neven-Spence, Major B. H. H.

Taylor, Vice-Adm. E. A. (Padd., S.)

Hoare, Rt. Hon. Sir S.

Nicolson, Hon. H. G.

Thomas, J. P. L.

Holdsworth, H.

O'Connor, Sir Terence J.

Thomson, Sir J. D. W.

Holmes, J. S.

O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir Hugh

Thorneycroft, G. E. P.

Hope, Captain Hon. A. O. J.

Orr-Ewing, I. L.

Titchfield, Marquess of

Hore-Belisha, Rt. Hon. L.

Palmer, G. E. H.

Touche, G. C.

Horsbrugh, Florence

Patrick, C. M.

Tree, A. R. L. F.

Howitt, Dr. A. B.

Peake, O.

Tryon, Major Rt. Hon. G. C.

Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hack., N.)

Perkins, W. R. D.

Tufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.

Hulbert, N. J.

Peters, Dr. S. J.

Wakefield, W. W.

Hume, Sir G. H.

Petherick, M.

Walker-Smith, Sir J.

Hunloke, H. P.

Pilkington, R.

Wallace, Capt. Rt. Hon. Euan

Hunter, T.

Plugge, Capt. L. F.

Ward, Lieut.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)

Hurd, Sir P. A.

Pownall, Lt.-Col. Sir Assheton

Ward, Irene M. B. (Wallsend)

Hutchinson, G. C.

Procter, Major H. A.

Wardlaw-Milne, Sir J. S.

Inskip, Rt. Hon. Sir T. W. H.

Purbrick, R.

Warrender, Sir V.

Joel, D. J. B.

Radford, E. A.

Waterhouse, Captain C.

Jones, Sir G. W. H. (S'k N'w'gt'n)

Raikes, H. V. A. M.

Watt, Major G. S. Harvie

Jones, L. (Swansea W.)

Ramsay, Captain A. H. M.

Wayland, Sir W. A.

Kerr, H. W. (Oldham)

Ramsbotham, H.

Wells, Sir Sydney

Kerr, J. Graham (Scottish Univs.)

Ramsden, Sir E.

Whiteley, Major J. P. (Buckingham)

Keyes, Admiral of the Fleet Sir R.

Rankin, Sir R.

Williams, C. (Torquay)

Kimball, L.

Rathbone, J. R. (Bodmin)

Williams, H. G. (Croydon, S.)

Knox, Major-General Sir A. W. F.

Rawson, Sir Cooper

Willoughby de Eresby, Lord

Lamb, Sir J. Q.

Rayner, Major R. H.

Wilson. Lt.-Col. Sir A. T. (Hitchin)

Lambert, Rt. Hon. G.

Reed, A. C. (Exeter)

Windsor-Clive, Lieut.-Colonel G.

Latham, Sir P.

Reed, Sir H. S. (Aylesbury)

Winterton, Rt. Hon. Earl

Law, Sir A. J. (High Peak)

Reid, Sir D. D. (Down)

Wise, A. R.

Leech, Sir J. W.

Reid, W. Allan (Derby)

Wolmer, Rt. Hon. Viscount

Lees-Jones, J.

Remer, J. R.

Womersley, Sir W. J.

Leigh, Sir J.

Rickards, G. W. (Skipton)

Wood, Hon. C. I. C.

Leighton, Major B. E. P.

Robinson, J. R. (Blackpool)

Wood, Rt. Hon. Sir Kingsley

Lennox-Boyd, A. T. L.

Ropner, Colonel L.

Wragg, H.

Levy, T.

Rosbotham, Sir T.

Young, A. S. L. (Partick)

Lewis, O.

Ross, Major Sir R. D. (Londonderry)

Liddall, W. S.

Rowlands, G.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—

Lindsay, K. M.

Royds, Admiral Sir P. M. R.

Captain Margesson and Lieut.-

Lipson, D. L.

Ruggles-Brise, Colonel Sir E. A.

Colonel Kerr.

Llewellin, Colonel J. J.

Russell, Sir Alexander

Main Question, as amended, put, and agreed to.

Proposed words there added.
Resolved,
"That this House, while taking full note of existing deficiences in the system of civilian defence, welcomes the decision of His Majesty's Government to entrust the responsibility for the system to a Minister appointed for that purpose, and declares its full approval of the Government's determination to complete with the utmost speed the measures necessary to provide for the country's needs."
The Orders of the Day were read, and postponed.
ADJOURNMENT.
Resolved, "That this House do now adjourn."-[Captain Margesson.]
Adjourned accordingly at Ten Minutes after Eleven o'clock.

EDUCATION.
  SCHOOL CHILDREN (TRANSPORT FACILITIES).
  SCHOOL CHILDREN (TRANSPORT FACILITIES).
  NATIONAL PHYSICAL TRAINING COLLEGE.
  NATIONAL PHYSICAL TRAINING COLLEGE.
SCOTLAND.
  HOUSING.
  HOUSING.
  FISHING INDUSTRY (FOREIGN VESSELS).
  FISHING INDUSTRY (FOREIGN VESSELS).
  ALLOTMENTS.
  ALLOTMENTS.
  OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS.
  OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS.
  SPAIN.
  SPAIN.
  GAS WARFARE (GENEVA PROTOCOL).
  GAS WARFARE (GENEVA PROTOCOL).
  RUSSIA.
  RUSSIA.
  CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
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  CHINA AND JAPAN.
  CHINA AND JAPAN.
  CINEMA NEWS REELS.
  CINEMA NEWS REELS.
  WAR RISKS INSURANCE.
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  YUGOSLAVIA.
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  EXPORT CREDITS.
  EXPORT CREDITS.
  INTERNATIONAL CRISIS (SPECIAL MEASURES COST).
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  EXCHANGE EQUALISATION FUND.
  EXCHANGE EQUALISATION FUND.
  COAL INDUSTRY (YORKSHIRE).
  COAL INDUSTRY (YORKSHIRE).
  ARMAMENTS EXPENDITURE.
  ARMAMENTS EXPENDITURE.
  UNMARRIED WOMEN (PENSIONS).
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  ROYAL AIR FORCE EXPENDITURE.
  ROYAL AIR FORCE EXPENDITURE.
AGRICULTURE.
  NATIONAL FARMERS' UNION.
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  MILK MARKETING.
  MILK MARKETING.
  CATTLE DISEASES.
  CATTLE DISEASES.
  SAUSAGE CASINGS (EXPORTS).
  SAUSAGE CASINGS (EXPORTS).
  HOPS MARKETING SCHEME.
  HOPS MARKETING SCHEME.
  DERELICT LAND.
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  FISHING INDUSTRY.
  FISHING INDUSTRY.
  BURNING PIT HEAPS.
  BURNING PIT HEAPS.
  CONTRIBUTORY PENSIONS (STATISTICS).
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  INFANTILE PARALYSIS, SOUTH WALES.
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  PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND OLD AGE PENSIONERS.
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  VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTORY PENSIONS.
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  AIR-RAID PRECAUTIONS.
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  BROADCASTS (EX-MINISTERS' SPEECHES).
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  WEST AFRICA (COCOA AND COTTON).
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POST OFFICE.
  TELEPHONE SERVICE, SCOTLAND.
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  POST OFFICE (FIGHTING SERVICES).
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BRITISH ARMY.
  ARMY COUNCIL.
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  MARRIED SOLDIERS' ALLOWANCE.
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  ARMY COMMANDS.
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  TERRITORIAL ARMY (ESTABLISHMENT AND STRENGTH).
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  ARMY EXPENDITURE (STATISTICS).
  ARMY EXPENDITURE (STATISTICS).
  ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS.
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  WAR MEMORIALS, FRANCE AND FLANDERS.
  WAR MEMORIALS, FRANCE AND FLANDERS.
  TERRITORIAL ARMY BADGES.
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  AUXILIARY TERRITORIAL SERVICE COMMISSIONS.
  AUXILIARY TERRITORIAL SERVICE COMMISSIONS.
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.
  MINISTER OF DEFENCE.
  MINISTER OF DEFENCE.
  ITALIAN SHIPPING LINES (SUBSIDY).
  ITALIAN SHIPPING LINES (SUBSIDY).
TRANSPORT.
  TRAFFIC CONTROL SIGNALS, ACTON.
  TRAFFIC CONTROL SIGNALS, ACTON.
  ROAD ACCIDENTS (PREVENTION).
  ROAD ACCIDENTS (PREVENTION).
  RIVER TYNE FERRY, JARROW.
  RIVER TYNE FERRY, JARROW.
DEFENCE.
  ENLISTMENT APPLICATIONS (REJECTIONS).
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  ACTIVE SERVICE (SEPARATION ALLOWANCES).
  ACTIVE SERVICE (SEPARATION ALLOWANCES).
ROYAL NAVY.
  ARDROSSAN HARBOUR.
  ARDROSSAN HARBOUR.
  DOCKYARD WORKERS (STATISTICS).
  DOCKYARD WORKERS (STATISTICS).
TRADE AND COMMERCE.
  RUSSIA (IMPORTS AND EXPORTS).
  RUSSIA (IMPORTS AND EXPORTS).
  COTTON INDUSTRY.
  COTTON INDUSTRY.
  AEROPLANES (EXPORTS).
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  ANGLO-FINNISH TRADE AGREEMENT.
  ANGLO-FINNISH TRADE AGREEMENT.
  ARMS AND MUNITIONS (EXPORTS).
  ARMS AND MUNITIONS (EXPORTS).
  GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA (STATISTICS).
  GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA (STATISTICS).
  AUSTRIA AND SUDETENLAND (BRITISH TRADERS).
  AUSTRIA AND SUDETENLAND (BRITISH TRADERS).
  GREAT BRITAIN AND UNITED STATES (TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS).
  GREAT BRITAIN AND UNITED STATES (TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS).
  AFFORESTATION (COMMISSION'S EMPLOYES).
  AFFORESTATION (COMMISSION'S EMPLOYES).
  MERCANTILE MARINE (COASTWISE TRAFFIC).
  MERCANTILE MARINE (COASTWISE TRAFFIC).
  UNEMPLOYMENT (EMERGENCY WORKERS).
  UNEMPLOYMENT (EMERGENCY WORKERS).
Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

THE ANGLO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (VISCOUNT HALIFAX)THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (VISCOUNT HALIFAX) rose to move to resolve, that this House welcomes the intention of His Majesty's Government to bring the Anglo-Italian Agreement into force. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I rise to move the Resolution standing on the Paper in my name, and I would like to make it plain, at the outset, that I do not conceive this debate to be concerned with the question of the merits or demerits of the Anglo-Italian Agreement itself, for that question has already been decided by Parliament in May last, with overwhelming approval. The question that now arises is whether or not this is the moment to bring that Agreement into force. There are two preliminary aspects of that question—particular and preliminary—on which I must say a word or two. There is, first, the strictly Spanish aspect, and secondly, there is the question that of course is intimately linked with or arises out of the Agreement—namely, the recognition of Italian sovereignty in Ethiopia; and I must say a word or two on each before dealing with the more general considerations.
May I first of all say something with regard to the Spanish aspect of this question? His Majesty's Government, as we all know, have been pledged to await settlement of the Spanish question before bringing this Agreement into force. That, as your Lordships will remember, was made clear to the Italian Government at the time of the signature of the Agreement in April, and that is the position accordingly that obtains to-day. Repeated attempts have been made, certainly in another place and I think here, to secure from His Majesty's Government a firm definition of what they mean by "settlement," and that has obviously been difficult, not, let me assure your Lordships, because there has been any intention or desire on the part of His Majesty's Government to be evasive, but
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because that definition was, and is necessarily, as your Lordships will readily recognise, dependent upon circumstances. If I may state it quite plainly to your Lordships, I would state it like this. Settlement in that connection must have meant something different from the end of a purely civil war and had to be judged in relation to the consideration that had been held to justify the imposition of the original condition. I say that for this reason. It is quite obvious that there is no intrinsic connection between the Anglo-Italian Agreement and the Spanish Civil War, except the connection that arose from the fear that civil war in Spain might lead to international complications.
I am well aware that there is a body of opinion, which I have no doubt we shall hear voiced with great sincerity in this debate, that regards the bringing into force of this Agreement as a blow struck by His Majesty's Government at the Spanish Government. But, with all respect to the sincerity of that view, and with all respect to the strength with which it is held, I venture to think that it proceeds from an essential confusion of thought. As I see it, it rests upon two assumptions, both of which I believe to be without foundation. The first assumption is that to which I referred just now, that the Anglo-Italian Agreement and the Spanish question are naturally linked together, which I do not think they are, except from the point of view of the danger of Spain starting a European conflagration. The second assumption which I believe to be without foundation is this: A great many people assume that what His Majesty's Government do or do not do about the Anglo-Italian Agreement could have at this moment, and might have had in past months, a decisive effect upon the fortunes of the Spanish Government, waging their struggle in Spain. I realise to the full, as I have said, the strength of the feeling on this question, and how much those who have that feeling are moved by the humanitarian side of the problem and the events to which this civil war has given rise; but in being so moved they are by no means alone, and it is worth while perhaps, by way of parenthesis, reminding your Lordships, and through you a wider audience, of what in fact has been the record in the humanitarian field of His Majesty's Government. I think it is no mean one.
In the early days of the war we initiated proposals for the organisation of Spanish relief on an international basis, and when later on the International Commission for the Relief of Spanish Refugee Children was formed you will recollect that we contributed £10,000 to it, and we are now about to double that contribution. We have also contributed between £7,000 and £8,000 to the Spanish section of the International Red Cross. Since the beginning of the war the ships of His Majesty's Navy have evacuated no fewer than some 30,000 Spanish refugees, and I believe I am right in stating that 150 refugees from the Cuban Embassy in Madrid will be travelling to France to-morrow in one of His Majesty's vessels. Our representatives in Spain, and in particular the Acting Consul at Madrid, have been tireless in their efforts to relieve the sufferings of non-combatants in various ways, and our Embassies at Barcelona and Hendaye have negotiated a considerable number of small exchanges of prisoners and hostages. Moreover, your Lordships know that the Commission recently appointed under the Chairmanship of Field-Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode is doing everything it can to achieve an exchange, which it is hoped will be on a considerably larger scale.
One other word on another side of what may be called the humanitarian aspect: We have repeatedly urged the contending parties in Spain to refrain from bombing civilian areas and to adopt a policy of greater leniency towards their political and military prisoners, and we have invited other Governments also to associate themselves with us in taking similar action. I am glad to note, as have we all, that since the appointment by His Majesty's Government of the Commission, which is at the service of both contending parties, for the investigation of aerial bombardment, and which has already issued five Reports, there have been no air raids on civilian areas comparable in scale with those which took place earlier in the war. As regards the future, it is hardly necessary to say that so long as this war continues it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government to relax in any way its interest in the welfare of the non-combatant section of the Spanish population. In the meantime we are considering
1624
whether there are any steps which we can take to ensure the safe passage into Spanish territory of provisions destined for distribution to non-combatants by certain approved relief organisations.
I said that I fully understood how strong was the feeling of the Party for whom the noble Lord opposite speaks in regard to these several humanitarian considerations, but—and this is the point that I want to emphasize with all the force that I can summon—it has never been true, and it is not true to-day, that the Anglo-Italian Agreement had the lever value that some think to make Italy desist from supporting General Franco and his fortunes. Signor Mussolini has always made it plain from the time of the first conversations between His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government that, for reasons known to us all—whether we approve of them or not—he was not prepared to see General Franco defeated. He has always made it plain, on the other hand, that he would assist, as he has been assisting, the work of the Non-Intervention Committee, and it is not his fault that greater progress has not been made by that Committee in bringing its plans into operation. We, as is known, have followed throughout all this business a different line, a line of absolute non-intervention; and we have been assisted in doing that by the fact that the Anglo-Italian Agreement and the Non-Intervention Committee's Plan are separate and distinct. The Non-Intervention Committee's Plan seeks a solution of the Spanish problem by the withdrawal of volunteers on both sides, while observing absolute impartiality between the parties, and it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to do all they can to bring the Non-Intervention Plan into operation as soon as possible.
Therefore, whether or not General Franco should receive belligerent rights, that question has nothing whatever to do with the Anglo-Italian Agreement, but is a matter that, under the terms of the Non-Intervention Committee's Plan, to which we are party, is dependent upon the progress that that machinery finds it possible to make. On the other hand, the Agreement is an engagement directly between His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government. It embraces many questions of European interest out-

1625
side Spain, and it is not directly, I repeat, concerned with the question of non-intervention in Spain, except in so far as the Spanish question and the civil war might appear likely to threaten general European complications. It was for those reasons that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, speaking in another place on July 26, used the words that are not now any longer unfamiliar to your Lordships. He said:
"If His Majesty's Government think that Spain has ceased to be a menace to the peace of Europe, I think we shall regard that as a settlement of the Spanish question."
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Would my noble friend mind reading the previous sentence?
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: I certainly would if I had it, but I have not got it. If the noble Viscount has got it and will read it, I feel every confidence that it will not destroy the force of what I have said. When the Prime Minister said that, things were already moving in that direction. On July 5 all the interested Powers, including Italy, had accepted the British Plan, and it will be within your Lordships' recollection what has happened since. The Spanish Government have announced their intention of securing the withdrawal of the International Brigade. I do not know what the International Brigade numbers. Signor Mussolini has not only let it be known that he would withdraw half the Italian infantry, 10,000 men, from Spain, but has actually withdrawn them. That has been purely unilateral action and has not been the result of pressure exercised upon him from any quarter.
It is very easy to excite a natural resentment by arguing that an Italian air force or Italian pilots still remain to bomb British ships. There is a good deal to be said about that, but if I were to say it it would not be novel, and I should not expect the universal agreement of noble Lords opposite in what I should have to say. It is perfectly easy also to argue, and it is quite true, that Italian men and material and aircraft still remain in Spain. On that the only observation at this stage that I permit myself is that it is not only Italian men and material but the men and material of many other nationalities that are still to be found on one side or the other in Spain. And what is more relevant
1626
to observe is that Signor Mussolini has declared his intention not only of ultimate withdrawal when the Non-Intervention Plan comes into execution, but by voluntarily and immediately effecting the actual withdrawal of 10,000 men, half the Italian infantry, has given earnest of his good intentions and made a large contribution, as I think, towards eliminating the Spanish question as a source of international friction. Moreover, he has assured His Majesty's Government that the remaining Italian forces, whatever they are, of all categories will depart when the Non-Intervention Committee's Plan comes into execution, that no further Italian troops will be sent to Spain, and that the Italian Government have never for a moment had the idea of sending air forces in compensation for the withdrawal of infantry that they were making.
That brings me to the other particular aspect of the question on which I must say a word or two, and that is the complaint that I anticipate, that the bringing of the Agreement into force involves the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia. Your Lordships will not forget that in May last a large majority of the Council of the League of Nations expressed a definite and decisive view that the question of the recognition of the Italian position in Ethiopia was one for each nation to decide for itself. It is the fact to-day that of all European countries there are only two—ourselves and Soviet Russia—who have up to now refrained from according other than de facto recognition. The last country to recognise Italy's sovereignty over Ethiopia is France, which has recently decided to accredit a new Ambassador to the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia. It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to keep in line with the French Government on this matter, and new credentials on similar lines will therefore be issued as soon as possible to Lord Perth, thereby according our legal recognition to Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia. I may perhaps add that when we informed the French Government of our intention to issue fresh letters of credence to Lord Perth and to bring the Anglo-Italian Agreement into force, the French Foreign Minister authorised me to say that the French Government welcomed generally anything that might contribute to the improvement of Anglo-Italian relations.

1627
As your Lordships may be aware, that view has also been expressed with great force and great directness by the Prime Ministers both of Australia and of the Union of South Africa.
I would like those of you who may be interested in this particular side of the problem to look squarely at what are the actual facts. As long ago as December, 1936—just on two years ago—His Majesty's Government acknowledged the de facto existence of Italian sovereignty. In the two years that have passed since then nothing has happened there or elsewhere to cause His Majesty's Government to question that fact of the practical sovereignty of Italy. With all respect I would say that it is really no good crying over spilt milk that no human agency can put back in the jug. If it is a fact, let us recognise it as a legal fact, and clear up once for all the innumerable outstanding questions that arise. So long as this legal fact is not recognised by us, it does no good to anybody, but merely makes for friction between this Government and the Italian Government and adds overwhelmingly to the difficulties of administration in the British territories concerned with boundary questions and the like adjoining Ethiopia.
I said a moment ago that I disclaimed any intention of going into the merits or demerits of the Agreement in view of the fact that they have already been debated, but perhaps I may say, in passing, just a word or two about the Agreement. Apart from the general purpose of the Agreement to place the relations of the two countries on a more satisfactory and secure footing, is it of no advantage that we should have solemnly reaffirmed the delaration made by us—Italy and this country—in January, 1937, regarding the status quo in the Western Mediterranean, and that Italy should once again reaffirm her assurance that the integrity of the present territories of Spain should in all circumstances remain intact and unmodified? Is it, I would ask, of no value that we should show so far our mutual confidence in each other to the extent of exchanging military information regarding our respective forces in those areas of the Mediterranean and of the Near East where the boundaries of our Empires meet, or that we should regulate those relations in regard to certain areas in the Middle East? Again, I cannot think that it
1628
is of small value that our two Governments should undertake that any attempt by either of them to employ the methods of publicity or propaganda that may be at their disposal in order to injure the interests of the other would be inconsistent with the good relations that it is the object of the Agreement to establish and to maintain. And, again, I cannot think it is of small value that the Italian Government should, as soon as the Agreement comes into force, agree to accede to the London Naval Treaty. These are only some of the points that arise, and which are covered by the Agreement.
I frankly confess that, overriding them all, there seems to me to be the psychological advantage, on the one hand, of an honest attempt to restore the state of mutual friendship and trust which for so long characterised the relationship of our two countries, and, on the other hand, of taking a further and important step towards the general improvement of wider international relations. I must say a few words, with your Lordships' permission, upon what seem to me to be the wider issues that are here involved. As I have said, I judge this matter by the test of whether or not Spain is now to be reckoned a menace to the peace of Europe. In every one of the debates on this subject that have taken place no warning has been more gravely or more constantly addressed to His Majesty's Government than the warning of how great would be the danger from Spain in the event of European war. By the side of that, and correcting that, is it not necessary now to put the fact that when European war was, in fact, threatened at the end of September both sides in Spain, so far from showing any signs of trying to utilise the occasion for enlarging the background of their own struggle, at once took every step to protect themselves from such developments? The Government side at once decided to try and divest themselves of foreign troops, and General Franco at once proclaimed his neutrality and stated that he would not violate the French frontier unless he was himself attacked from that quarter.
If Europe was not plunged into Armageddon by the Czech crisis, does anyone seriously suppose that the peoples and rulers of Europe, with that experience behind them, are now going to fly at each other's throats over a civil war in Spain? I do not think anyone could

1629
seriously maintain that, for this reason, that it is not now to Spain that the eyes of the peoples and leaders of Europe are directed. They are directed to the much more urgent problem of their own internal situation and the much wider problems that have been opened up by the changes in the map of Europe which have taken place and are taking place at the present time. Therefore my conclusion to all that lay-out of facts is one that I do not think can be seriously challenged, that from the international point of view the Spanish conflict is losing, if it has not already lost, the importance that it was thought to have as a potential powder magazine of Europe.
The second thing I would say is this. I think there would be a very wide measure of agreement that the hope was right, whatever might have been thought about the precedent circumstances, that Munich was to be a starting point of new relationships, that it was to show the way to the adjustment of differences through consultation, and to show the way to greater confidence and to relations of greater understanding. I ask whether it is not worth while to take a step which is calculated to remove suspicions between two great countries and make some contribution to a happier state not only in the Mediterranean but also in Near and Middle East. There are plenty of people always ready enough to protest effusively their sympathy for the general cause of peace, but immediately it comes to the point of taking any practical or constructive step many are apt to hold up their hands in horror and fall back upon what are often quite impracticable generalities, and that gives no hope to anybody.
I do not myself forget that when the issue of peace or war faced Europe on the morning of the 28th September last, it was Signor Mussolini who came down on the side of peace, and it was his prompt response to our Prime Minister's appeal that saved Europe from what all are agreed might have been the end of European civilisation as we know it to-day. And I ask this simple question. Is there anybody here who thinks that he would have been in a position to take that action if the Anglo-Italian Agreement had not been signed last April? If anything of that kind of progress is to have a chance, I do venture to insist upon the necessity, so far as I may, of restraint of language when we are discussing these international
1630
affairs. Nothing is more certain than that provocative expression of opinion on one side immediately provokes provocative retort, and the greater the authority behind the language the greater the evil that the language does. The present moment makes great demands upon us all for cool judgment, for the attempt to see things straight and as they are, and for great care in refraining from making a difficult situation more difficult.
On that there are two general comments only that I wish to make. The first is one that perhaps I may make not without an element of self-interest. I readily admit that criticism of any Government is helpful, and may serve a most useful purpose on certain conditions. Governments, of course, expect criticism. They are rather like the proverbial donkey of the Irishman and would think that the world had gone astray if blows ceased to rain upon their shoulders. But criticism to be valuable must, I think, be the outcome of constructive thought and of a desire to lend constructive assistance to the public interest. Criticism that is evidently inspired rather by a desire to turn these difficulties to narrower purposes and to bring division where all sorts of people want greater unity serves no useful purpose and is merely mischievous. The second thing I would say is this. It is really unprofitable to utter insults and challenges and at the same time expect to arrive at settlement. The things do not go together.
Speaking with great respect of the Labour Party, I recognise how much I have owed to the leaders of that Party during recent strenuous weeks and months for the most considerate restraint of those on whom certain responsibilities lay, but the noble Lord who leads that Party here will not mind my saying that his Party seems to me not infrequently to be torn between two conflicting emotions. On the one side they must, as reasonable men, recognise the need of peace through accommodation even with Dictators; and on the other side, they are often urged forward by an imperative impulse, as it seems to me, towards criticism and condemnation of totalitarian philosophy, whatever the consequences for international relations and ultimately for international peace. I think that in deciding their line on these matters they must really make up their minds which

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of these two horses they ultimately prefer to ride, because they cannot ride both.
I venture to suggest that the policy of His Majesty's Government is quite plain, and I think the feeling of the country is much more unanimous about it than we might sometimes be led to suppose. I believe that, beneath and outside all our differences that express themselves in newspapers or in debates or the like, we really all share in deep devotion to the way of life that we have made our own, and which, if need ever arose, we should all as one man defend together. And, if that is so, I suggest that it is with the future that we are all principally concerned. I do not think as a matter of fact that our action in this matter would excite much opposition unless it were thought our action in regard to this Anglo-Italian business betokened some divergence of thought upon issues much more fundamental than the actual question of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. I do not believe that any such divergence of fundamentals in fact exists. We all—the noble Lord opposite and I—with absolute equality desire to see the world freed from the anxieties that have recently overshadowed its thought. We all desire to see our country, in making every effort it can to that end, remain true to the things that have made it an idea worth serving, even if we cannot at any time secure full and universal acceptance of our own ideals by all other peoples. If we do sincerely believe, as I fancy we must, that at bottom most of us have much the same sense of values about the things that matter most, I would earnestly hope that we should not allow any efforts for peace, which is the purpose of us all, to become matters of acrimonious Party controversy.
I am convinced, and I hope that perhaps what I have said may have done something to convince your Lordships, that the action of His Majesty's Government in this matter does truly give us the opportunity of making progress and is not fairly to be held open to the charges either of implied disloyalty to British principles or of inflicting practical mischief upon any cause through which those principles seem to be to-day expressed. I am also convinced—and this is my last word—that to-day this country needs all the unity of spirit that it can command, and it is for these reasons that I hope, in spite of what I know the noble Lord
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opposite is now going to say, that your Lordships may feel able unanimously to accept the Resolution which I now move.
Moved to resolve, That this House welcomes the intention of His Majesty's Government to bring the Anglo-Italian Agreement into force.—(Viscount Halifax.)
LORD SNELL: My Lords, because I had no opportunity of doing so yester- day or the day before, I hope your Lordships will not think it out of place if, from my position here, I very heartily congratulate the noble Earl the Leader of the House on the great position that he has assumed. I hope your Lordships will derive some comfort from his advent to that great office owing to the appropriate fighting spirit with which he has begun his career. So long as his broadsides are directed to Epping rather than to myself and my friends on these Benches, we shall give him all the support that his attacks may merit.
The noble Viscount, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has moved this Motion with all the dignity and persuasiveness that we have learned to expect from him. No man, so far as I know, can make a better showing of a questionable or bad case. I feel that the noble Viscount has excelled himself today in the art of covering up weaknesses and in the art of suggesting that, after all, if fault there be, it lies with people other than His Majesty's Government. We on the Labour Benches are, of course, for this occasion the Arabian donkeys on whose backs these unmerited blows fall, but I do not really understand why it was necessary for the noble Viscount to admonish me before I had committed any sin to-day, or indeed to level blows at my Party. If any Government ever had a Party in opposition which placed restraint upon itself in a time of national emergency, my Party has supplied it. Our efforts at self-suppression may not have appeared dramatic, but they have been intensely painful to those of us who have had to suffer.
In spite of the admonition of the noble Viscount, I am pot going to fall for the persuasive case that he has placed before your Lordships. You will notice, if you read this Motion carefully, that Parliament is not to approach this whole matter as an open question. The Government tell us in so many words that they are

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going to do it and that all that we have to do is to sign on the dotted line for something that is inevitable. It seems to me that the contact which His Majesty's Government have recently had with Dictators is likely to curb a fine democratic tradition that Parliament itself is the supreme authority and not an Executive, however distinguished it may be. We are, on this occasion, apparently expected to become the dutiful menials of that Executive and we are warned in a genial way that it would be impolite even to discuss what is placed before us.
We are expected to welcome this Agreement which is put before us. I suggest that a welcome is too much to ask of us. We may tolerate it, we may feel it necessary to accept it, but I hope even your Lordships' House will retain the courage not to welcome such an Agreement on this occasion. Further, I think we were told that on this festive occasion it would be bad form to remind the Government either of its own past or of the events which have led up to the present situation. "Let the dead bury their dead." Today's needs do not require the assent of yesterday, and what we do to-day must nave no relationship to the policy which has led up to this necessity. When this Resolution is reduced to ordinary political experience it means that we are called upon to-day to set aside a long and glorious tradition in the name of expediency. We are expected to embrace these proposals as though they had some basic ethical value and to agree to conditions that I believe our fathers would have died rather than have accepted. What we are really asked to do is to welcome the fact that the moral order of the world has suffered defeat, that pagan force rules the world and that our only duty is to accept the world as we find it. With great deference to the noble Viscount and to your Lordships' House, I find myself unable to do that.
Let me come to the two divisions of the subject to which the noble Viscount directed his remarks. He has reminded your Lordships that some time ago the most solemn assurances were given that the British Government regarded a settlement of the Spanish question as a prerequisite of the entry into force of the Agreement between the two Governments. Has there been such a settlement? What has been the settlement that has taken place? Have the Italians, for example,
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stopped killing Spaniards? Have the Italians taken away their Moors from Spanish territory? Have Italian aeroplanes stopped civilising Spanish women and children? The facts as we know them are quite otherwise. We know that in Spain to-day there are far more Italian fighting forces and equipment than have been taken away. I do not care to trust to my own suspected judgment in these matters, but in another place yesterday the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said:
"We have been told that 10,000 Italian infantrymen have been withdrawn, and everyone welcomed that, but the main contribution of Italy to the Salamanca authorities"—
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: Surely the noble Lord is aware that it is completely out of order here to quote textually from a debate in another place. Mr. Speaker there is always most active in at once stopping any quotation from a debate in your Lordships' House. I am very sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but that is the rule here, though it has not always been strictly observed.
LORD SNELL: I feel that all that has been done is that 10,000 war-weary soldiers have been removed, and we are not clear that there has not been a renewal of men and of equipment. What I thought was meant by a settlement, and what I think every normal Englishman meant by a settlement, was the end of the war: that—if it is possible to refer to a debate that took place yesterday—the Spanish people should be left to shape their own destinies without interference from outside. That assault which has been made on a free people has been a great misfortune. I do not know whether the noble Viscount is well grounded—he has information, of course, that I cannot hope to have—in his belief that further withdrawals will take place, hope that may be so. I should like to have the withdrawals first, and then we should welcome the Pact after that had taken place. I have not, as I say, access to that information, but I hope it may be so.
Then in regard to Italian good faith: We have not had the privilege of meeting Signor Mussolini or of gazing in ecstasy on that winning countenance. It may be that all he has promised will take place. But I should like to ask His Majesty's Government to make sure that promises

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will be honoured, and incidentally they might explain to us how it comes about that previous promises have not been kept. I thought the policy which our country ought to adopt was that of Spain for the Spaniards. We have not, I think, any guarantee at the present time that that is what will happen. I should like to ask whether the Italian organisation of provocation in Palestine is to end as a part of this Agreement; whether the Mediterranean is to remain a free channel for the commerce of the world, without domination and intimidation from Italy or any other Power. Finally, so far as Spain is concerned I should like to express my own belief that the Spanish people have made a stand of heroic quality and endurance for the freedom to govern their own country as they like. What they have done is to me one of the few inspiring things in this sad world. Against the assembled forces of internal dissension and outside oppressors they have done all that brave men could do, and if foreign intervention were removed from them they would be able by their own efforts to clear up the situation in Spain in a month's time.
The only other matter upon which I desire to say a word or two is that of Abyssinia. Here, I think, we pass somewhat out of the realm of politics and material things, for it becomes to us a question of morals and of eternal justice. We are asked to welcome the annexation of this land to Italy. We are asked to recognise Italian sovereignty over this territory, to put it in another way. It was the last of the free African States, and I very much wanted one African State at least to be free to develop on the lines of its own genius—
LORD MOTTISTONE: The Sudan.
NOBLE LORDS: Order, order!
LORD MOTTISTONE: One word—
LORD SNELL: If the noble Lord wishes to speak at a later period, I beg him just to allow me—
LORD MOTTISTONE: I said one word, and I apologise.
LORD SNELL: In a speech on a very difficult matter it is important not to be led into words that might be injurious rather than helpful. Now we are told that Italy is in possession of Ethiopia.
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But is she? I am not convinced that the hold of Italy over Abyssinia is in any way effective. We know that there is a great organised opposition against her power there. We know, too, that the Italian people have not found Abyssinia the rich and promising El Dorado that they expected, and what the Italians themselves feel about it may be indicated by the fact that they are now going to offer it to the Jews to develop, which shows the barren and unpromising character of their occupation. I wanted to ask whether any conditions are going to be attached to this recognition, respecting either the organisation of a black army in Ethiopia, or the treatment of a brave people who have fallen in the noble cause of fighting for their freedom.
My concluding word is just this. The noble Viscount chided us that as critics we never made any suggestions. I do not believe I have ever addressed your Lordships' House in the way of criticism without trying to add to it something which I thought ought to be done. If this Italian Agreement is part of a general settlement, if it is merely an item in a considered plan which is going to reorganise the world on a better basis, then this Agreement might be tolerated on that assumption. The peace of the world, so earnestly desired, is dear to us all, and I would compromise with my own conscience at least in the hope that the coming good would excuse what I think is the present evil, but I cannot welcome, as this Resolution asks me to do, an arrangement which I believe is based upon wrong, and with no promise in it for the future peace and happiness of the world.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, there is a captivating simplicity in the terms of the Motion read by the noble Viscount, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but when the details come to be considered the complications seem entirely to destroy that simplicity. It is quite true that everybody, in general terms, would welcome an Agreement with Italy. Italy is the one great European country with which we have never been at war, and in the last hundred years we have fought side by side on more than one field of battle. Our cultural sympathies are also well known to us all. But when we are

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asked to welcome this particular Agreement it appears to me that we are invited to approve of the entire policy which, during the last few years, has led up to this Agreement. That I for one find impossible, and therefore I could not possibly give my vote in favour of the Motion of the noble Viscount.
I wish to say a word about Abyssinia, though not at any great length, because, as the noble Lord who has just spoken has pointed out, that has ceased to be a question of current importance, although undoubtedly one of current interest on the moral side. We all have to agree that the Italian occupation of Abyssinia has been an undisguised and unabashed conquest of a weaker country by a stronger, of a kind which has been undertaken during the last four hundred years by most European countries; but it had been hoped that a different spirit had arisen in great European countries, and, whether through the agency of the League of Nations or in obedience to any of the pacts on which agreement has been made, that such an absolutely open aggression upon a weaker enemy had become impossible. However that has not proved to be the case, and it is undoubtedly true that sooner or later the occupation and possession of Abyssinia by Italy would have to be admitted, subject to the fact, no doubt, raised by the noble Lord, as to whether that possession can as yet be regarded as absolutely secured.
Then the imperial title of Ethiopia is to be assumed by the King of Italy. In passing I think we cannot help expressing our profound sympathy with the recent holder of that title, both on account of his misfortunes and of the manner in which he has faced them. Whether the addition of this particular title adds much dignity to the House of Savoy with all its brave traditions is another question. I can remember, although I was then not yet a member of your Lordships' House, the assumption of the imperial title of India by Her Majesty Queen Victoria and the debates which took place in this House on that occasion. The Opposition, by no means of a partisan character, was largely inspired by the fear that the assumption of the title of Emperor would be regarded as something higher than that of the Sovereign of this country, and it was said with truth that there was no greater title than that of the King of England. However that may be, I do not think there
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will be any desire to invite his present Majesty to assume the title of Emperor of Nigeria, although, as a matter of fact, the great Mahomedan Emirates of Northern Nigeria represent a good deal more real sovereignty than do the Abyssinian chieftainships to which the title of Ras or Kinglet is attached.
I pass from that to a few words on the question of Spain, with which this Motion is far more directly concerned. It has been argued by the noble Viscount that the Italian Agreement ought to come into force concurrently with a settlement of the question of Spain, and that that settlement could be treated as having arrived when the Spanish question ceased to be a menace to the peace of Europe. A great many people—I should have thought most people—were under the impression that a settlement of the question meant the withdrawal of foreign troops, but, somewhat to my surprise, and I think to the surprise of many people, that reading of the condition seems to have been set aside. And perhaps it has been set aside with some reason if what His Majesty's Government want, in order to ensure a settlement with Italy, is the conclusion of the Spanish war in favour of what some call the Nationalists and others call the insurgents. Because, as the noble Viscount so clearly stated, Signor Mussolini has made it evident that, though he is willing to withdraw troops, they must not be withdrawn in such a manner or to such an extent as will prevent General Franco and his Party from gaining the ultimate victory and obtaining the government of Spain.
One is tempted then to ask what is the meaning of any withdrawal, what is the real substance in the withdrawal of these 10,000 men, if it is understood that a sufficiently large Italian force, whether composed mainly of troops of the line or mainly of other arms, is left in Spain to ensure the victory of that particular side. I would just ask the noble Viscount this: I do not know whether it was impossible, but supposing that the Russian Government had sent from the Baltic to the Bay of Biscay a convoy of transports containing an army corps of Russian volunteers, carrying also guns, munitions and aeroplanes, all done in the name of non-in-tervention—would that have created the European crisis which it was so important to avoid by turning a blind eye to the Italian expedition? And if not, I should

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like to know why not, because I confess there is no difference that I can see between the two cases.
It is quite true, or I believe it to be true, that it is the case of the Nationalists that the other people began it. The first armed forces and munitions which were landed were landed from revolutionary sources on behalf of the Government, which is entirely a revolutionary Government in the sense that it is inspired by the precedent of the French Revolution modified by the subsequent tenets of revolutionaries of the nineteenth century. But I think there are two answers to that. In the first place those imports were on a very minor scale—I have always understood chiefly of small arms landed at Barcelona and handed out to all the riff-raff of that town—and also that they were in the possession, whether you like it or not, of the Government of the country, who were therefore entitled, if they chose, to buy arms and munitions and supplies of any kind. It is of course equally possible to argue that those who disliked the views and actions of that revolutionary Government, anticlerical, anti-landlord, anti-bourgeois, were entitled to rise and rebel against it. That I do not dispute for a moment. But that does not to my mind in any way cover the ground to which so much objection is taken—that of the vast and surely completely unauthorised scale to which intervention has grown during these last few years.
The noble Viscount seemed to think it was possible to carry on a policy on two entirely separate lines, one of complete non-intervention, the other that of pursuing the course of European peace, leaving the question of intervention or nonintervention altogether aside. I confess I do not see how it is possible to keep those two balls in the air at once, and the noble Viscount's exposition of how that was done or might be done I confess failed to convince me. I really, therefore, cannot think that the conditions on which it was agreed that this settlement with Italy should be brought about have been in fact carried through, and therefore, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, it will be impossible for me to give a vote in favour of the Motion of the noble Viscount. Somewhere or other in the works of a famous Italian of an earlier generation, Machiavelli, he says, in speaking of treaties, that it is a mistake to
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expect too much of a treaty and that what you have to do is to examine all the most unfortunate and unfavourable issues which may be involved and, if you can, get the least unfavourable of these in your settlement; then you have to be pretty well contented. Possibly that is the position which His Majesty's Government have to take up, though it is not at all necessary for the Italians to take it up, because by this Agreement, it seems to me, they have got everything they could possibly desire.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, I rise to say in a very few words that I am in entire agreement with my noble friend's policy in regard to this Anglo-Italian Agreement. It was my misfortune to be unable to get down to the House in time to hear my noble friend's statement, but presumably it did not differ in any essential respect from the statement made in another place by the Prime Minister yesterday. I am sure your Lordships would not wish any one of us to-day to re-discuss the details of the Treaty which were debated some months ago in your Lordships' House. But, lest I be misunderstood, I should like to state very briefly my reasons for supporting the Government in this matter.
I should like to remind some noble Lords opposite that I have never attempted to justify or condone Italian policy in Abyssinia. I have always been in favour of friendly relations with Italy, but I have never attempted to condone or justify what Italy did in Abyssinia. As I have said before in this House, if His Majesty's Government had felt able, at the time when the action originally occurred, to defend Abyssinia by force of arms in defence of our agreements, I should have absolutely understood, and if our power had been deemed sufficient at that time to intervene swiftly and successfully I should have supported the action. But owing to the disarmament policy, from which, I repeat, so many of our grave evils to-day flow, I must suppose from the Government's action or non-action at that time that it was not considered possible in the general situation so to have acted. Instead of this, for a long period we had impotent, nagging, and half-hearted sanctions, because, after all, many of us know how half-hearted many of these sanctions were. Essential commodities for munitions were going under the

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Government's nose sometimes through Germany, sometimes through other agencies, to Italy which could perfectly well have been stopped by the Government if they had chosen. For these impotent, hesitating sanctions, if I could not take military action, I should merely have substituted a clear protest, and once Abyssinia had been conquered I should have accepted the fait accompli—one policy or the other. I differed from the Government's policy at that time because it seemed to me we did not pursue either the one course or the other.
Some people have attempted to compare Italy's action in Abyssinia with Germany's action on the Rhine, with the rape of Austria or with her recent action with regard to Czechoslovakia. There was, of course, one thing in common between all these, and that was a broken pledge. Nobody is going to deny that for a moment, I presume; but that is the only thing in common. It is a very important thing, but it is the only one. On the other hand people are too apt to forget that Italy's claims in Abyssinia, for one thing, were based on a series of well-established treaties, many of which if not most of which—I have not had time to look them up recently—were made with the cognisance and approval of the British Government. That makes a big difference. There was another big difference. I for one have always welcomed the substitution of civilised rule in a country like Abyssinia for one of infamously bad government where slave-trading and slave—running have been a scourge to the people. Perhaps you will think that is too realistic a policy, but the happiness and welfare of a great number of people like the Abyssinians—at any rate the comparative happiness, because I do not know that they are very happy now—seem to me to weigh something in the balance.
As against and in addition to all that I confess quite candidly that there is another thing that weighs with me very much, and that is British interests. I believe that it is, and always has been, a vital strategic interest to have friendly relations with Italy, and I believe that such relations are as much in the Italian interest as our own. It is surely rank folly to quarrel with a Power which has been friendly by disposition and by habit and whose people, as I know, through the difficult clays we have been facing in the
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last few years, have, in so tar as they have adopted an unfriendly attitude towards us, adopted it with the greatest reluctance and the greatest difficulty. One of the most interesting things to see for anyone who reads the Italian Press carefully—my noble friend Lord Rennell, who knows it better than I do, will endorse this—was the way in which the Italian people snatched at the opportunity of restoring good relations with us, irrespective of the Governments on either side.
There is one caveat I should like to enter. I would ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he would give us some assurance in regard to the following. The noble Marquess, Lord Crewe, has just said that you cannot expect too much of a treaty. I hope, at any rate, we shall be able to expect this much. Those of us who follow Eastern policy at all closely have grave anxieties about the situation in the Red Sea, and I hope the noble Viscount on the Front Bench will be able to assure us that it is quite understood that this Treaty gives a clear understanding that any further what I shall call "Albanianising" of the Yemen will cease, that occupation of islands round Perim will be discontinued, and that any unfriendly activities such as have certainly been going on in the last year or two on the Red Sea coast, and indeed a little further north, by radio, pen, speech, and Press, will have a final quietus.
I shall be very glad if my noble friend can give us some indication as to whether we are not justified under this Agreement to hope for this. I personally am not too anxious about it. I am certain that the Italian people want friendly relations with us. I have had the honour of some acquaintance with the Leader of the Italian Government, and I believe that wish is shared by him. It does not always seem from his expressions to be very likely, but I am confident it is true, and I believe that this Treaty is going to be of great value to this country strategically and politically. I for one congratulate His Majesty's Government on having put it into force. I am not deterred from my congratulations by the knowledge that the conditions which were laid down have not, in my judgment, been fulfilled. I do not think anybody could pretend they have, but I think that in the end it will be to the good that this Treaty has been entered into, and I congratulate my noble friend on it.
LORD RENNELL: My Lords, in the interesting debate that was concluded in your Lordships' House yesterday it was gratifying to find that in discussing a grave national issue there was no evidence of any Party spirit. I could wish that to-day also, in considering the Resolution that has been put forward by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, we might think that it could be considered without regard to the past, but on its merits and without any spirit of prejudice. Mistakes have, of course, been made in our relations with Italy—on both sides, in my opinion—in the handling of events which have resulted in a political tension between two nations which, after almost a century (in a sense more than a century) of cordial understanding and co-operation, would have seemed almost impossible to anticipate. Prejudicial estimates of motives have been advanced without any real justification, and susceptibilities aroused in people in whom genuine temperamental differences from our own have never before presented any obstacle to genuine friendship. But let me assure your Lordships, as one who can speak with real knowledge of a country which I first visited, I am afraid, even a little more than seventy years ago, and where I have resided for a certain number of months every year since I left the Embassy at Rome in 1919, that I have not found any alteration in the feeling of the masses of the Italian people towards this country, or any diminution of their confidence in the stabilising influence of a country that they will always respect; or, indeed, I may say, anything but the keenest desire to restore those traditional relations of mutual confidence, a suspension of which is regarded I think almost universally as unnatural.
I have more than once advanced criticisms on the indefiniteness and lack of coherence in our own policy since the initial error made by Italy and supported by France in insisting, in spite of our protest, on including in the League of Nations an African country, which in our opinion—and I have no doubt that opinion was right—was not yet ripe at that time for membership of that body. I shall not, therefore, recapitulate now the story of recent years. It will suffice, I think, if I say that careful and continuous study of the previous and subsequent succession of events seems to me to leave little doubt that but for that insistence
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occasion for the tension which has arisen would never have come about. The intention to invade Abyssinia, and the very vast preparations to do so, were of course obvious to every careful observer at least a year before that invasion took place. We were not, I am perfectly well aware, alone in inducing Ethiopia to withdraw her protest against the menace, which she was entitled to put forward under the terms of the Covenant, in virtue of a procedure which could only result in loss of time, but when the League actually and tardily took the matter up we were left practically alone to be the mouthpiece for the invocation of sanctions which, being only partially imposed, were bound to be ineffectual, and the odium which they aroused in an ill-informed country was almost exclusively directed against ourselves.
There was yet a chance for either party to withdraw from a situation which was obviously distasteful to both presented by the Hoare-Laval proposals, but the almost sacrosanct reverence attached to the Covenant, which had already twice failed in its main object, in a country which would not realise that the logic of morals is always weaker than the logic of force, led to their abandonment. It has long been obvious that if appeasement and reconciliation were to make any progress in Western Europe it was imperative to terminate a situation which there could be no justification in prolonging, unless it were to indicate a platonic disapproval of the disregard of a Covenant certain prescriptions of which have always seemed to me more likely to menace than to guarantee security. With his practical clarity of political vision the Prime Minister realised that the time had come to take action in this sense, and the Anglo-Italian Agreement was drafted.
Personally I could have wished that it might have come into force without conditions. The time lost in waiting for the fulfilment of those conditions has not been advantageous to our foreign relations in general. The Prime Minister has now stated that he considers those conditions are in actual process of fulfilment, and I should therefore like to see a unanimous vote in favour of the Resolution. Let us try to see with the same clear vision of future possibilities as the Prime Minister. Though long out of active service, I still preserve many contacts abroad, and I cannot doubt the sincerity of the en-

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thusiasm with which his attitude has been approved by the mass of European feeling. In some countries the people had long been kept in ignorance of so much that was going on around them that the events of the last weeks have considerably opened their eyes. They have realised that a lack of patience at a critical moment, a failure to appreciate the difficulties of an opponent, one false step on the edge of an abyss, might have plunged them again into war to which they are all, I am convinced, heart and soul opposed. The people may, I think it is now probable, have in the near future a greater voice in decisions.
Abroad, at any rate, there seems to be immense confidence in the leadership of the Prime Minister and that confidence appears to be shared by the Leaders in other countries also. A letter was brought to my knowledge only yesterday from a correspondent in Italy, who wrote:
"If Mr. Chamberlain were to come to Rome now the Pope would have to canonise him."
The keystone has been replaced in the arch of the bridge over which Signor Mussolini and the Prime Minister could meet, and the Prime Minister has testified to the great value of the good-will and cooperation which Signor Mussolini displayed in doing so. He has signed an understanding of the highest significance with the Leader in Germany. The outlook today, believe me, is brighter. Let us not suffer recriminations and suspicions to place any further obstacles on the road which leads to conciliation and peace.
LORD MARLEY: My Lords, the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has, I think, accused the Opposition of essential confusion of thought, or something of that kind. I am not at all sure that there is not a good deal of essential confusion of thought throughout the country on the question of foreign affairs, and I should at least like to make my own position clear in a brief contribution to the debate on the subject before your Lordships. I have no objection whatever, and indeed I offer support, to the principle of an Agreement between this country and Italy. I do not like totalitarian Governments. I particularly object to the cruelties that they have inflicted upon the Jewish minorities in their countries and upon their political opponents. But I would like to be con-
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sistent in this matter, and I am aware that, when noble Lords opposite opposed any agreement with the Soviet Union because they disliked that form of government, I took an opposite point of view. Therefore, although I do not like totalitarian government I believe that that is no reason why we should not come to an Agreement between Great Britain and Italy.
I would not desire to beat the donkey to which the noble Viscount has compared the Government on that issue. I would spare the Government ass in this matter, because for one reason any blows I might rain upon its shoulders would be not at all painful. But what I take exception to is the time chosen for ratifying the Agreement. I do not think there is any member of your Lordships' House who could possibly accept the statement that the position in Spain has been settled. The position in Spain is clearly not settled, and I am inclined to think that one point in the noble Viscount's speech indicated his acceptance of that view. He stated that the Government intended to double their grant to help the refugees. I welcome that promise, because the money is badly needed, but it seems to indicate at least a fear that there may be even more need for that grant in the immediate future.
I think it is a little too early to ratify this Agreement and I find myself entirely out of agreement with the noble Viscount on one point. He said that this had no lever value. I suppose he meant by that, that we could not by holding up our Agreement with Italy secure any better terms in Spain. I do not believe that that is quite the case. I cannot help thinking that in making that statement the noble Viscount was on rather weak ground. As I understood his argument, it was that as Signor Mussolini supported the Non-Intervention Plan therefore he was already committed to carrying out the terms of that Plan as soon as it come into force, and that he was not responsible therefore for holding it up. But, after all, the responsibility for holding it up is the non-acceptance of the Non-Intervention Plan by General Franco, and I suppose there is no one in this House who would deny that Signor Mussolini must have considerable powers of persuasion with General Franco in this matter. Therefore I am inclined to think that there is—or at least there would have

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been—a very considerable lever value in this Agreement, and I for one profoundly regret that we have not been able in a very gentle and friendly way to make use to some extent of that lever value to secure a settlement in Spain.
I say that not because I am concerned for the moment with oue side or the other in Spain. I am concerned with what the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, emphasized in his speech—namely, British interests. I cannot help thinking that British interests are liable to be in the course of being sacrificed by what we may now see to be the almost inevitable result of the Spanish conflict. The Italian and the German support of the Nationalist Government in Spain will now continue, and it may increase. I see that the Spanish Government claim that it has already increased. Therefore, we cannot but foresee the possibility at least of the defeat of the Spanish Government. I understand that one of the effects of any such decision as the granting of belligerent rights will give the right to the Nationalists or insurgents to secure the support of Italian warships in interfering with the food supply to the Government side. I am not at all sure that we have not already seen the beginning of that in the recent attack on a ship off Cromer. I do not know, but it would appear at least to be possible.
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: I do not wish to interrupt the noble Lord, but I cannot help thinking that he has misconceived my argument. I was careful to say that there was no connection whatever between the granting of belligerent rights to General Franco and the bringing into force of this Agreement.
LORD MARLEY: I am very much obliged to the noble Viscount. That removes a great fear I had that any such grant might give an unsatisfactory and unfair solution to the Spanish problem. I welcome enormously that statement, and already I feel happier, to some extent, about what we are discussing.
Now let me take another point in which British interests may be profoundly affected. We all know that this Government are concerned with the prosperity of this country, and it is only natural that they should expect, as a result of their comparatively open attitude on the
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Spanish situation, that this country would be called in to help in the reconstruction of Spain when this unhappy war is over. I see in The Times leading article to-day that that wish is mentioned in a sentence: The Times says that the Governments that have taken no side will obviously be best equipped to lend a helping hand in Spain. I cannot help thinking that that is a false belief. We must remember that if in fact the Nationalists win in Spain, they will owe a very deep debt to those who have aided them—namely, the Italians and the Germans. Already, we know, the Germans are installed and are engaged in planning for the reconstruction of Spain, and they demand in return for their machinery the raw materials—the iron, copper, mercury, lead, and so on—which are such an important factor in Spain. We know, similarly, that an insurgent victory would mean in all probability, if not a territorial modification of the Spanish situation, at any rate the risk of a territorial modification of Spanish Morocco, which, it is suggested, is at least being very anxiously looked at by the Germans and/or the Italians.
That brings me to the last point I want to make: the vital effect on British interests of leaving in Spain a domination by Germans or Italians which might, in the unhappy event of a conflagration in which the British Empire was involved, seriously affect our strategic position. We are told that they have no territorial ambitions. We are told that General Franco, in the last crisis, immediately declared for neutrality. I would remind the House that the Spanish Government declared for neutrality in the last Great War, but that did not prevent the Spanish Government giving what assistance they could to the side in the Great War which was opposed to the Allies. In this case how much greater would be the power with which an actually hostile though a nominally neutral Spain might be able to affect our security. The threat to France from the air occupation by Germany and Italy of the northern frontiers of Spain is obvious to anybody who considers it, and I suppose may even have had some effect in the last crisis. The communications between France and Africa must be affected by the control, if not the occupation, by Italy and Germany of the Balearic Isles.

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I would venture to suggest that if any members of your Lordships' House who are interested in the possibility of the closing of the Mediterranean through the occupation or control by Germany or Italy of Spain, care to consider the effect on British trade, they will find that there may be a very dangerous threat to British interests if the emergence of a free Government in Spain, as our Government hopes, is not in fact realised. It is because I think that we are giving up this lever at too early a date that I fear we are running the risk that the result of the Spanish situation may be against the interests of our country. I would remind your Lordships of the position of Gibraltar. We have had debates within the last few months on the threat to Gibraltar of guns in a hostile territory. There is also a small factor which has not been realised, and that is that ever since this country has held Gibraltar there has never been a settlement of the question of territorial waters between Great Britain and the Spanish Government. The whole of the commercial anchorage of Gibraltar lies within the normally-accepted three-mile limit of the territorial waters in Spain.
Finally, in this connection, without any territorial ambitions in Spain it is quite possible for Spanish ports to be used, in repayment for the debt which General Franco owes to Germany and Italy for their support, as submarine bases, which might have the most serious effect on British trade coming round the Cape, coming round from the Far East, from Australia, by the threat of submarine or air attack from bases in Vigo, Pontevedra and other Spanish ports. It is therefore purely in line with British interests and the danger to them that I feel that a profound mistake is being made in bringing this Agreement into force at this time. Had we been able to wait a little, had there not possibly been electoral demands, had it not been for the building up of a case, which is unhappily necessary in this country, we should have been far better off if we had been able to delay. I only hope that my fears are ill-founded and that the hopes of the Government are justified, but it is because of my fears that I am not able to support this Motion.
THE EARL OF CAVAN: My Lords, having been in Italy as a member of the Anglo-Italian War Graves Commission within one week of the crisis, I hope your
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Lordships will allow me to give you a few of the impressions that I there formed. I should like in parenthesis to draw your Lordships' attention to the very great strength, even after twenty years, of the bond of our common heritage of the dead, not only between ourselves and our Allies in the late War, but between ourselves, Germany, Turkey and Bulgaria. That, I think, is a wonderful tribute to the work of Sir Fabian Ware and his Commission.
When I was in Italy I had wonderful opportunities. I had talks with all classes, with Their Majesties the King and Queen, with Signor Mussolini, with the Under-Secretary of State for War, General Pariani, with the Foreign Secretary, Count Ciano. Further, I talked with Marshal Caviglia, a very old colleague of mine, and many old soldier friends of 1918. Lastly, but by no means the least important, I talked with the widows and children of the fallen in the Asiago district. In each of the five cemeteries that we visited there, these women came to me and wrung my hand with tears of thankfulness for peace. The children outside our hotel lined up and shouted "Pace, Pace," as we came through. Aeroplanes from Italy's great Air Force, when we were at those cemeteries, dropped flowers on our heads, and as I laid our wreath upon the tomb of the Italian Unknown Warrior, our two National Anthems, following each other, sounded to me like a hymn of hope. I am quite sure that if any of your Lordships had been with me you could have formed but two impressions of Italy—thankfulness for peace, and an intense and sincere desire for friendship with Great Britain.
Now what are we asked to do? To recognise the Abyssinian conquest in return for the withdrawal of 10,000 men from Spain. As I see it, with the plain eyes of a simple soldier, Abyssinia is definitely under the control of the Italians, and I think 10,000 men are 10,000 men. If I had been in command of an army corps on either side in Spain, and if I was asked to give up 10,000 men, I should have said it was impossible. I am convinced that one generous gesture now to our old friends and Allies will meet with a very full response. I say this deliberately, from experience, because I know how that great-hearted people always respond to the encouraging word. When I was first sent to Italy in their

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darkest days in October, 1917, Sir William Robertson said to me: "I want you to put new heart into their divisions." Four months later, when General Plumer was recalled to stem the German assault in France, he said: "Do your best to help and encourage them, and they will serve you well." Were they not proved to be right? Did not Italy completely defeat the grand attack of the Austrian army in June, 1918, and was not Italy the first of our Allies to bring about the blessed word "Armistice" on November 4, 1918, by her victory of Vittorio Veneto? My Lords, we want friends, not enemies, in Europe.
With regard to my interview with Signor Mussolini, some of your Lordships will perhaps know that long room in the Palazzo Venezia, where he has his desk at the extreme end. To me, anxious as I was to do the civil and correct thing, it was a great problem as to whether to salute on entering the door, and then introduce the delegation, or to march boldly up the twenty or twenty-four paces between me and the desk before taking notice of the great man; but all that trouble was unnecessary, for the moment we were introduced he got up and advanced to meet us, shook me warmly by the hand and said: "I am glad to see you," with emphasis on the "am." I then introduced the delegation, and thanked him for all the hospitality we had received, ending up by saying: "Sir, speaking as a soldier to a soldier, I beg to thank you for your timely intervention at Munich at a decisive moment." He again got hold of my hand, and after I had told him of the work of the Commission, he said: "I wish you goodbye, I love England, and I would like to put our relations on a new basis." I think we should help him to do so, and therefore I welcome with all my heart the decision of the Government.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords, we have listened to one of those speeches which are far better than an eloquent oration. They are the kind of speeches which influence your view, even your strongest convictions, if they are in any way contrary to what has been said. I can say with absolute truth that nothing, I believe, could be more desirable than the restoration of complete good relations between this country and Italy. I most heartily agree with what
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the noble and gallant Earl said when he said that we want friends. That is quite true. As I shall have occasion to point out in a moment, I think the situation is exceedingly anxious for this country. I do not think it has been so anxious since the close of the Napoleonic wars. I believe it is intensely serious, and it is for that reason, I confess, that I have my doubts as to the wisdom of the step which the Government have taken.
The Prime Minister said, on an occasion which we can only refer to indirectly, that in international affairs one thing led to another. I entirely agree. You cannot deal with any incident in international affairs without considering not only the immediate result and the consequences of the actual step taken, but also what will be the ultimate result and the indirect consequences of what is done. In this particular case—and I am going to be as brief as I can—I should agree with the Foreign Secretary in saying that the direct effect is not very considerable. We have decided in this House and the other House to approve the Anglo-Italian Agreement, and the recognition of Abyssinia. That is a question which has been decided, though I personally was very doubtful, to put it mildly, as to the wisdom of that step. Abyssinia has been sentenced, and this may be regarded as the execution, but it is not more than that. But even so I think there are some considerations which even on this subject, directly considered, ought to be borne in mind.
Undoubtedly when the Agreement was laid before us great stress was laid upon the proposition that it was not to come into force until there had been a withdrawal of the Italian assistance to Franco. I am not dealing with the exact wording, but I think that is the clear sense of the wording. It was laid before us and the other House upon that distinct understanding. I do not think there could be any serious doubt about it. I know my noble friend the Foreign Secretary quoted a passage from a speech made by the Prime Minister on July 26, and I am afraid he thought my interruption a little impertinent, but it was not intended to be impertinent at all, but merely to clear up what seemed to me the ambiguity of the speech. The words he quoted have been quoted very often, and were these:
"If His Majesty's Government think that Spain has ceased to be a menace to the peace

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of Europe, I think we shall regard that as a settlement of the Spanish question."
I think, in fairness, the previous sentence ought to be quoted. The Prime Minister was being pressed to say what was a "settlement." He had explained previously:
"We shall do all that we possibly can to facilitate the withdrawal of the foreign volunteers from Spain, in order that that country may cease to offer any threat to the peace of Europe."
He was pressed again to say exactly what "settlement" meant, and in declining to define what he meant by a settlement he said:
"I would like to see what happens when the volunteers are withdrawn."
Then came that passage which has been quoted.
I confess, reading that fairly, it seems to me that the Prime Minister said perfectly clearly that before the volunteers were withdrawn there could be no question of this Agreement coming into force, but if after that withdrawal we were satisfied that there had been a settlement of the Spanish question then we should be prepared to recognise Abyssinia. I may have entirely misunderstood the Prime Minister, but that, I think, was what was understood by the audience to which he then spoke.
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: I do not want to interrupt my noble friend. Of course he has quoted the words as they stand quite correctly, but I think it is perhaps important that he should not leave an impression on the House that is, I think he would agree, an impression different from what was at We time those words were used probably the accurate meaning of them. At that time, as he knows perfectly well, the minds of all those who were concerned with this matter were upon the bringing into operation of the Non-Intervention Committee's Plan, and the basis of that Plan was that when what was called "a substantial number" of volunteers was withdrawn then everything else followed and the machine would work, and General Franco would get belligerent rights, and all the rest of it. The only point I am concerned to make clear—and I am quite sure the noble Viscount will not disagree with it—is that it would be wrong if there was any impression left in people's minds that these words meant at that time that all
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the volunteers had to be withdrawn before anything else could happen. That was never so.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Of course I accept instantly what the Foreign Secretary tells me. Unfortunately I was not present when these words were used; I can only judge by the language as reported. I do not wish to press the matter unduly, because these wrangles about what exactly was said interest the House of Commons and possibly your Lordships, but they interest no one else in the country. They are part of the ordinary Parliamentary small arms, and of no particular importance. But, putting aside anything that the Prime Minister may have said, I do think that the statement that a withdrawal of 10,000 men amounts to a settlement of the Spanish question is a very serious statement. The Foreign Secretary has said perfectly truly that the question of the Non-Intervention Agreement is separate from this question. But the action taken here will certainly be used as an argument why the Non-Intervention proposal should come into force without any further withdrawal of these troops. If it is said, "Withdraw 10,000 men and at once you have a settlement of this question," then you can scarcely argue that the condition of the Non-Intervention Committee that there should be a substantial withdrawal has not been fulfilled. That is the importance of it. Of course, I must take exactly what the Government tell me is their intention in this matter, but I do think this is a frightfully important question.
I cannot help feeling that if this is really going to operate as a great asset to General Franco, and if it is so regarded, as I fear it will be regarded—I am very ready to accept the Foreign Secretary's statement that that is not the object or intention, but I am very much afraid that that will be the effect—the result will be that once again we shall be in the presence of an international question in which you have had the forces (I am sorry to use these phrases but they are essential to make my point clear) the forces of democracy on one side and the forces of absolute government on the other side, and in which, in point of fact, after a controversy, the British Government have put their influence on the side of the forces of absolute government. That is what I am afraid will be the effect of the

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Government's action. Now that seems to be a very serious matter. I am not the least impressed by the fact that we are told that General Franco declared his neutrality just before the Munich Agreement. He was in a frightful position. If he supported either side, and the other side had won in what he thought was going to be a tremendous controversy, and possibly a war, he would have been in a very serious position; and that he should have thought that on the whole the safest thing was to declare his neutrality does not seem to me to indicate at all that that is going to operate always and that, supposing he becomes the ruler of Spain—which I hope he will not—he will always act with absolute neutrality as between a Fascist Government and a Government like our own.
I may be unduly nervous about these matters, but I am exceedingly anxious about the position we have been brought into by the events of the last few years. I cannot tell the House how anxious I am on the subject. What has happened? In Africa we took action which, so I am informed, was universally regarded by the black races of Africa as the abandonment of a black race who were fighting for their independence because we were either unwilling or unable to resist a perfectly indefensible aggression by a white race. I am assured by those who speak as though they knew that that has produced a tremendous effect throughout Africa. The Government have better information no doubt than I have, and they may say that no such effect has been produced; but that is the information which reaches me from several sources. That is one thing. Some noble Lord, I think it was my noble friend Lord Lloyd, said that in this matter we ought to regard British interests, but no one will doubt that the alienation of the black races of Africa would be a terrific blow to British interests. We have always been regarded with friendship by those races. Our record in the question of the slave trade and other matters has given us a tremendous prestige. If we were to lose that, we should lose a very valuable asset—I am not putting it higher than that, though I do in fact have other motives for regretting that decision.
Take Asia. What has happened there? We have certainly been closely allied with China. We have expressed on two
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occasions—in the Manchurian fight and in the present fight—our conviction that she was suffering from a grave aggression. We have read lectures—or perhaps that is an offensive way of putting it, we have made solemn condemnations of the action of Japan, and yet we have stood by while a war, waged with a ruthlessness which I think has very rarely been exceeded, has been going on, thousands and tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of people have been slaughtered and tortured, and their women outraged; and we have been unable to do anything. That seems to me a very serious matter, and if—which I again say I hope profoundly will not happen—Japan should be victorious and China should be ultimately beaten, driven by slaughter and starvation to make peace, is not that going to have a tremendous effect on our position in China?
I will come to Central Europe. I know that it is almost indecent to express any doubt about the Munich arrangements. I can only say for myself that we suffered when that Munich Agreement was made the greatest disaster which has occurred to us since the battle of Austerlitz. That is my conviction. I may be entirely wrong but that seems to me to be the truth. I do not wish to keep up hostility to this or that country, but, after all, of whom are we afraid here? Of course, it is Germany. Suppose the German Army were removed, should we be spending £1,500,000,000 on rearmament? Of course we should not. That is what we are afraid of. We are afraid of German strength and we are uncertain—I do not want to put it higher—whether that strength will be used against us. That is the reason why we are rearming. There is no other possible reason that can be suggested. We are not afraid of France, we are not afraid of Russia as things stand—we might have been, but we are not—we are not afraid, at least yet, of Italy. There is only one country we are afraid of.
And what have we done in Czechoslovakia? We have handed over a country with a very large Army, with a passionate belief in independence, a country whose people were our friends right through, during the War and after the War, in every effort for peace that we have made. It has gone, and with it has gone not only Czechoslovakia but the whole of our posi-

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tion in the South-East of Europe. That seems to me a tremendously serious position. Are we going to do the same in Spain, in the Western Mediterranean? I hope not. I hope the Foreign Secretary is right, and that this step is in no sense the prelude to anything of that kind, but I admit I am exceedingly anxious on the point.
My noble friend, in his extraordinarily convincing manner, had a passage about peace and democracy, and how we were not going to give up our belief in either, to which we were passionately attached. He said—and I entirely agree with him—there was practical unanimity in the country. Yes, but we must not make the position too difficult. It may be that there is no fear of an attempt by Germany, and that our rearmament is quite unnecessary. I am not against rearmament. It may be that we should look upon this as the first step in a new era of understanding, but I cannot myself think that this is the right way to encourage a new era of understanding. I do not think, apart from the repugnance everyone has to such a policy, that you will build a general understanding on the basis of our always sacrificing our friends in order to placate, I will not say our enemies, but those of whom we are afraid. I cannot think that is going to be a good policy. Is there evidence to show that, in fact, it is producing that result? I am afraid I see none. We have had a number of speeches delivered in Germany since. We have had one from Herr Goebbels, who is supposed to be one of the most influential men in Germany. He said, "You think that Mr. Chamberlain came to Godesberg or Munich because he wanted to. Not at all. He came because he was afraid. He dare not resist the threat "—I am paraphrasing but I do not think I am paraphrasing wrongly—of I forget how many million men he cited as Germany's strength.
My noble and gallant friend (Lord Cavan), if he will allow me to call him so, in a very eloquent passage said that Signor Mussolini had said that he was a friend of England. I forget the exact phrase he used, but it was something to that effect. I should like to believe it. In a sense it is true, but his newspapers, which are all under his control, are certainly rather inconsistent with that statement of Signor Mussolini. They are not like our newspapers, they are absolutely
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under his control, and they do not publish anything of which he does not approve. They have been full for months past, and have not ceased since Munich, of the most violent attacks on us. I confess that this policy seems to me hazardous in the extreme. It seems to me we are putting our heads into the lion's mouth. Sometimes that answers, sometimes the lion does not take advantage of that position, but sometimes he does, and I am afraid—deeply afraid—lest we have not gone so far and given the lion such temptation that we cannot rely upon his moderation.
I know that possibly some of your Lordships may think I have spoken with undue pessimism, and that I have made the position worse than it is. That is the difficulty we are in, in the form of government under which we live. If we see something being done, which is, as we think, quite wrong in the foreign affairs of our country, if we protest we must give the reasons, and these reasons cannot fail to be possibly inconvenient, certainly disagreeable, to those who are conducting the negotiations. Yet if we stand aside and do not do that, and the disaster which we fear may happen does happen, then we should be reproached bitterly, and rightly, with not having used our constitutional position and tried to avoid that result. I am most anxious that there should be at this moment national unity in what I think should be a supreme effort to increase the armaments of the country. I must submit very seriously to the Government, who I believe desire that unity as much as I do, that they cannot hope to obtain it unless they can conduct their foreign policy in such a way as will seem to us, at any rate, reasonable and proper in the circumstances. You may say that all this is the carping criticism of the moment, but, after all, look back to 1931. Compare the state of the world, the state of Europe, and the state of this country then and now. I am sure that the comparison will fill you with the gravest anxiety and misgiving. You may say it is not the fault of this country or that, or of this man or that, but if you are honest and look things fairly in the face, and compare what has actually been done, I do not think you will say that the policy pursued by the National Government during these years has been free from blame.
LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, the noble Viscount asks us to look back to 1931. The speech to which we have just listened would mean that we should never have peace in this world. If you go forward to shake hands with a man you are told you are putting your head in the lion's mouth. The noble Viscount tells us to look back to 1931, but we are now discussing friendship with Italy. Look back to a few years later when the noble Viscount was the apostle who preached sanctions threatening to lead to war, and said in answer to me in this House, as he will well remember, that he would not flinch from imposing sanctions leading to war with Italy. I say praise be to Providence that his advice was not followed and that, instead of having had a bloody war with Italy, the end of which nobody could foresee, and on which we were on the very verge, as your Lordships will remember, we are now present to make a treaty of amity with Italy.
I would not have risen in this debate but for the fact that what is called the moral issue was raised in an acute form by the Leader of the Opposition, Lord Snell. He said in effect that if we acquiesced in this proposal there would be humiliation, that our children and grandchildren would be humiliated by what we were doing. It seems to me that that is a brutal thing to say of those of us who do not take his view. I admit I am only what Kipling called a rough and tough soldier, but my conscience is very far from being seared. I do have a conscience of sorts, and in my heart and soul I believe that what we are doing now is an act of justice, and if I did not believe that I would not vote for this Motion. How dare our opponents assume that we are all acting against our consciences for the material advantage of making peace with Italy? What is their justification?
I turn to the speech of the noble Lord. Surely it cannot be the Spanish question, because there you are dealing, not with moral values, but with numbers. You say that if 20,000 troops are brought away it is all right, but if only 10,000 are returned it is not. Where is there anything of morals in that question of numbers? Or is it Abyssinia, on which the most reverend Primate will remember he and I for the first and last time in our lives had a difference? But look-
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ing back at it must our consciences be seared? I interrupted the noble Lord by one sentence. He mistook words that were spoken in conversation between myself and my noble friends Viscount Samuel and the Marquess of Crewe. I used the word "Sudan." It is true that you might claim unprovoked aggression on the part of Italy, but there is another side to that. It is also true that we are guilty of a crime against the whole moral code if we arrogate to ourselves the rôle of inducing people to condemn Italy for what that country has done in Abyssinia, seeing that practically the whole of our Empire has been obtained by what is termed unprovoked aggression. "Oh," you say, "but that was before the League of Nations." I think it was Bernard Shaw who hit the nail on the head. He said that when you talk abour moral issues in this matter, you must all remember that if the burglar says at the end of a prosperous career: "Let us agree that there shall be no more burglary," the answer is "Hand over your booty before you talk morals."
LORD STRABOLGI: Does the noble Lord mean by that that we are to hand over our Empire?
LORD MOTTISTONE: On the contrary. I have never suggested that. I say that, before we find fault with Italy for having taken Abyssinia, before we say one word in condemnation we are bound in honour to hand over as much as we have taken by the same methods as she adopted in Abyssinia. Otherwise what one should do would be to adopt the Christian principle—find fault with nobody, to remove the beam from one's own eye before criticising others. Are we going to condemn the Italian people with whom we seek to make friends because they did a thing which we have done over and over again ourselves? I say no, not until you do what you are bound to do. The Lord Chancellor will agree that in a Court of Equity he who goes into that Court must do so with clean hands. Until we have got clean hands let us leave this question of morals alone.
I was in Italy at the same time as my noble friend Lord Cavan. He was talking to Signor Mussolini and others and I was having the advantage of conversations with people of all sorts, including peasants. I can confirm what he said. I also had an opportunity of meeting the

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people at the head of that State and from the conversations which I had with men and women of all kinds in Italy, where I was for some weeks, I can confirm that there is one universal wish amongst the Italian people, as they put it to me, to "resume our ancient friendship with England." My noble friends on that Bench may say," Oh; that is all very well, but Signor Mussolini is an autocrat, and we are democrats, and we won't shake hands with autocracy." But the greatest autocrats cannot succeed any more than the democrats can unless their people are behind them. I am here to tell your Lordships, having many contacts with Italy all my life, that it really is true that there is a natural affinity and friendship between the English and Italian people, and that their rulers have only to say the word and automatically friendship follows. We cannot say that of many groups of people in this world, but it really is true of the Italians. So, while I protest against any suggestion that we are doing anything contrary to morals in supporting and welcoming this Agreement, I would beg of this House with deep respect, speaking with some knowledge of the Italian people spread over sixty years, to take time by the forelock, and take Italy by the hand and make friends with Italy for ever.
VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN: My Lords, I would not have ventured to address your Lordships after the speech of my noble and gallant friend (Lord Mottistone) if it had not been for the speech of the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cecil of Chelwood). He made some statements which I do think were a little unfortunate, if he will allow me to say so with respect. He referred to the position created in Africa owing to what I think he said was our desertion of an independent African race. It is not fair to treat us and the League of Nations as interchangeable terms, which is what the noble Viscount did. We did not desert anybody. It was the League of Nations that deserted Abyssinia. So far from the noble Viscount being correct in his estimate of the effect on the Africans, I had occasion in 1036 to travel across Africa from East to West and up from the Zambesi to the North coast, and the idea that any African, except perhaps a few extra-educated ones, were paying the slightest attention to events in Abyssinia is a complete delusion. A friend of mine
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who happened to be on an expedition on the Abyssinian border asked the Hamran Arabs whether they had any news of the war, and their reply was "No, we have no news, but we hope the Abyssinians are getting a good hammering." That does not at all appear to be the view of the noble Viscount, and, he will forgive me for saying so, possibly it is based on pure theory. It ought to have been so, but it was not so.
The impotence of the League of Nations was discovered very early on. I object strongly to our being tarred with the League of Nations brush and being made to assume responsibility, of which we had exactly one-fifty-second part and no more, the rest being shared by the other fifty-one nations. The noble Lord also referred to the withdrawal of 10,000 men from General Franco and somehow or other he seemed to think that would be an asset. I prefer to accept the view of the noble and gallant Field-Marshal. How the withdrawal of 10,000 men can be claimed as an asset passes my comprehension. It is rather curious that, although this debate is on a Motion to agree to the Government Anglo-Italian Treaty, so far as noble Lords on the other side are concerned, seven-eighths of it has been taken up with references to Spain or Abyssinia, the importance of Italy being minimised.
Stress has been laid by several noble Lords on the other side on the extent of the intervention of Italy in Spanish affairs. I am always amazed that they should believe that they can get away with that so easily and that no reference is made to the equally blatant interference or intervention on the other side. I would like whoever replies for the Government in this debate to say whether this statement which appeared in the Press a few days ago is correct:
"It is only fair to remember that in the early days of the Non-Intervention Committee Germany and Italy put forward the proposal that no foreign volunteers should be permitted to enter Spain. Why was this useful proposal allowed to drop? France was organising and equipping at Perpignan and elsewhere the powerful international force which has since rendered such splendid servic to the Republican cause—has indeed, proved the mainstay of Republican defence. It was only after this force had defeated the Nationalist attack on Madrid that General Franco appealed to Germany and Italy for help, and that foreign intervention on a large scale in his favour began."

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It surely is not fair, as noble Lords and their friends in and out of Parliament are doing, to talk of intervention in Spain as if it were all on one side. I think, bearing in mind how strongly Signor Mussolini feels about the need for preventing a Bolshevik State being established in the Mediterranean, that it speaks volumes for the importance which he attaches to the Anglo-Italian Treaty that he should have consented to the condition of the withdrawal of troops from Spain. More than that, there is not merely the question of the volunteers but the amount of the material that the Spanish Government are receiving. It is certainly not less than that which is being sent to General Franco, as statements in the Press have shown.
As regards Abyssinia also, I think noble Lords were not quite fair to Italy. The League of Nations, as usual, refused to take notice of the complaints of the Abyssinians or of the Italians. The matter was put off in the true League of Nations form, and the Italians not unnaturally lost patience. Then there came something for which we, or the Government of the day, were very much to blame. When the Stresa Conference was held, though Abyssinia had been a burning subject, not one word was said about it by the British representatives who attended that Conference. It was not unnatural that Signor Mussolini should have thought that as sanctions were not enforced in connection with Japan they would not be enforced against Italy. That was not an unnatural supposition. Indeed, the enforcement of sanctions depends entirely on convenience. There is no fixed principle of sanctions at all. I do not think the League of Nations has any fixed principles in any case.
Be that as it may, the present proposal of the Government so far from justifying the extremely gloomy remarks of the noble Viscount opposite appear to be the first ray of light, the first break in the clouds that have been settling down more and more over the world since it has been dominated by the muddle and make-believe that emanate from Geneva. I can only hope that having broken through that with great courage and wisdom the Prime Minister will continue the good work. Surely, it is important to remember how much we gain by our understanding with Italy. My noble
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friend Lord Rennell from his long experience has pointed out a considerable number of gains, and my noble friend Lord Lloyd did the same, but there are two very plain and very important gains to which attention has not yet been drawn.
In the first place it shatters that isolation from which we were suffering, which was nothing of an advantage to us and was becoming a danger. We now have once more firm friends in the combination of States which hitherto had been growing more and more consolidated against us. Secondly, do not let us forget that Italians have shown in the past that they are not fair weather friends. It was not by their wish that we fell out, and remember—if I may venture to recall it—that during the South African war the Italians were among the very few nations who were not hostile to us. The Prime Minister, in his praiseworthy attempt, as I think, to find a new road out of the impasse into which this mad worship of the League of Nations has brought us has adopted the common-sense line of going to see the men who really do govern the States with which we must trade and with whom we must live and be on good terms. Surely there can be no greater advantage and no greater help in dealing with Germany than to have on your side as a friend and supporter the man whom Herr Hitler has described as his best friend in the world.
LORD PHILLIMORE: My Lords, I set such high value on the friendship of Italy that, like my noble friend Lord Rennell, I regret that the approaches to this friendship have been sown with conditions. These matters, one would have thought, might have been regarded as a thing of the past and left as such. The very existence of these conditions has provoked on the opposite side the raising of further difficulties and the raising of further bad blood with another nation. After all, what is to be gained by importing into this discussion of friendship with Italy an attack, thinly veiled, on Nationalist Spain? And not only thinly veiled, but so founded on misapprehension, and I might almost add on misrepresentation of the facts, that it becomes a positive attack on the ruler of what is, after all, 80 per cent. of the country of Spain.

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I will only quote one or two instances. We are told in one breath after another that if, as a consequence of the Italian Agreement, belligerent rights were granted—to both sides, I presume—in Spain, that might involve the active interference of Italian warships in sinking, I believe it was suggested, neutral shipping. I am no authority on International Law, but I am pretty positive that the granting of belligerent rights would not allow a nation which was not concerned in the war to sink neutral shipping. Then we were told that as one condition of their support the Germans in this case, and not the Italians, would demand compensation by being given an exclusive position with regard to the iron ore and metals of Spain. What is that founded on except a sheer malicious supposition? In actual fact, if noble Lords would take the trouble to look at the trade figures, they would find that the exports of iron ore to this country during the first six months of 1938 are quite notably in excess of the exports of iron ore from Spain to this country in the first six months of 1936, before the civil war took place. If Germany were going to bring pressure to have the exclusive rights over iron ore, why has she not done it this year, at a time when she would require iron ore above all other times for the rearmament policy in which she is engaged?
Then it was suggested that territorial modifications in Spanish Morocco would be, the price of German, and Italian assist ance to General Franco. That is, of course, to ignore the Note, as recent as August 15, 1938, which General Franco sent from his Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British Agency at Burgos. I apologise for quoting his words; he says that his Government take
"this opportunity of making known to the world … that [the Nationalist Government] solemnly reiterates its former affirmations that it is fighting for the greatness and independence of the country and does not consent, and never will consent, to the slightest mortgage on its soil. … It will defend at all times, to the last handful, its territory, its protectorates and its Colonies, if any one dares to make an attempt against them."
General Franco is one of the people who has always stood by his word, and in making that declaration he made it not only to the outside world but also to his own people. Even if he were not inclined to stand by his word, he would suffer at the hands of his own people if he went
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back on that promise. No one has any right to say that the promise will not hold good.
Last of all—and I do detest this making of bad blood with foreign countries—a most ungrateful reference was made to the conduct of the Spanish Government during the Great War. Do noble Louis forget that Spain was the principal granary and raw material depot for France all through the Great War? Do noble Lords forget that Spain interned German warships? And have noble Lords forgotten the magnificent work of King Alfonso, who organised a bureau for the help and succour of prisoners of war throughout the whole world? Those are the points that I wish to make. They should not have arisen in this debate, but as they have arisen, it is desirable that we should not start our talks with Spain on the same evil basis as that on which we have had before to deal with other countries.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, said in the course of his interesting speech that he hoped that the debate on this Motion would be conducted on its merits and without any kind of Party bias. Up till now that hope has been realised in all the speeches that have been made, and I certainly intend to the best of my ability to continue the same practice. Another interesting common feature of the speeches that have been made from both sides of your Lordships' House is that every speaker without exception has expressed a profound desire for agreement and understanding with Italy. The critics of the Government do not differ from those who are responsible for our present policy in that respect, but rather on what constitutes the nature and scope of a satisfactory and durable Agreement. But I am sure that noble Lords opposite appreciate that no responsible person, however critical he may be, wishes to prolong a state of tension or friction between two great Powers, whatever their forms of government may be, for a moment longer than is absolutely necessary. I share with the noble Lord, Lord Phillimore, the desire to avoid making bad blood with foreign countries, but I cannot help thinking that perhaps his eloquent defence of Nationalist or insurgent Spain might not have been altogether pleasing to the legitimate Government of that country.

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My fundamental criticism of the Agreement that the Government have reached with Italy is that it violates the axiom of diplomacy that you never confer a benefit on another country without receiving at least an equivalent benefit in return. According to the Munich Agreement the heavy price that was paid—and everyone admitted that the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia was a heavy price and that the great increase in the power and prestige of Germany was a possible danger to Europe later on—was justified by the avoidance of war. At any rate, that is what those who are in authority at the moment tell us, and it is difficult for others to say that they are mistaken. No benefit as great as peace accrues from the Agreement into which we have entered with the Italian Government.
Let us examine quite clearly what the advantages and disadvantages are on both sides. On the one hand, Mussolini gets the inreased prestige in Europe and Africa that the recognition of his Abyssinian Empire will bring, and, as many noble Lords have pointed out, that is a state of affairs which he has desired for a long time past and which is, in his view at any rate, a great advantage for Italy. We gain, according to the terms of the Agreement, a cessation of the anti-British propaganda that has been conducted for some time past by the Italian Government, and the withdrawal of 10,000 men from Spain, which was probably the result of a desire to come to terms as soon as possible. Now I profoundly hope that propaganda of all kinds, both printed and spoken, tending to undermine British authority in the Mediterranean and the Near East, may cease in the future. But we are bound to remember that for many months past the Italian Government have fomented trouble in Palestine and that our difficulties there are largely due to agitators, to money provided from elsewhere; and we cannot forget that Signor Mussolini—I hope with no intentions that would be contrary to our interests—has actually assumed the role of protector and patron of the Arabs. Let us hope, however, that that again is a concrete gain, and a permanent gain for us.
I think it is exceedingly probable that when this Agreement was signed at the end of April of this year the Prime Minister did not ratify it, or bring it to Parliament
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for ratification, immediately, because he hoped that the Plan of the Non-Intervention Committee for the withdrawal of volunteers on both sides would be implemented during the course of the summer, and in that way we would have realised the wish, I think of all parties, that foreign intervention in Spain should cease. That state of affairs, unfortunately, as Lord Plymouth will remember, in spite of his extremely industrious and persevering endeavour to obtain agreement on both sides, was not brought about, principally because General Franco refused to accept the recommendations of the Non-Intervention Committee.
The Prime Minister was then confronted by a position in which he was unable to get effective withdrawal of the foreign forces in Spain, and at the same time he was bound by a condition which has been attached to the full ratification of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. I may be wrong, but that is what I am inclined to think was the true fact of the case; but if a settlement, as it has been termed, in Spain was in fact only regarded as the removal of any danger of a general conflagration in Europe resulting from the war in Spain, then surely there was no reason why the Agreement should not have been ratified immediately. I cannot believe, although it has been stated in another place as the reason for this delay, that the Spanish war is any less a danger to the peace of Europe at the present time than it was six months ago.
The only argument I think that could be produced for that assertion is that the Spanish Government has dismissed a few thousand foreign volunteers fighting on its side, and Signor Mussolini has removed ten thousand of his troops from Spanish soil. Of course those of your Lordships who are experts in military affairs realise, and have said already, that ten thousand men are by no means a negligible quantity in any war that may be going on. At the same time I think the noble Earl, who is a great authority in that matter, would agree that when the bulk of the Italian army remains in Spain, and the whole of the Italian air force and the Italian artillery, pilots, gunners and Italian technicians, no one can say that intervention is not continuing on a very considerable scale, certainly on one side in the war in Spain.
I profoundly hoped, and I believe many members of the Government hoped,

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some time ago, that the quid pro quo we should get for this Agreement would be the real evacuation of Italian troops and munitions of war from Spain, the Balearic Islands and Morocco, because we were aware of the profound importance of Spain and its dependencies from the point of view of the Western Mediterranean, and from the point of view of the security of France. It is not our business to tell the French on what their security depends, but it is our business to estimate the value of a more than friend, an ally, and we cannot forget that the war of 1870 was fought by the French in order to prevent a Hohenzollern, a German Prince, from ascending the throne of Spain. That moreover was in the days before the military aeroplane had been invented, and so no doubt our friends across the Channel do attach great importance to an independent Spain as a source of security for themselves.
I am also sure there will be complete agreement, from the point of view of our trade routes in the Mediterranean, that there should be no unfriendly Power which would interfere with our trade ships, either in the Straits or in the course of their voyaging across the Mediterranean, and although I think we should credit without reserve the assertion of Signor Mussolini that he does not intend to infringe the sovereignty and independence of Spain in years to come, it is very difficult to believe that he could have spent millions of Italian lire, and sacrificed thousands of Italian lives, without any expectation of advantage as a result of the final issue of the Spanish war. That is I think a reason for very grave apprehension on our part, so long as there is any foreign interference in that part of the Mediterranean.
A second advantage to us which I should have liked to accrue from this Agreement would have been a real guarantee of immunity for British ships from attack from the air on their lawful occasions in Spanish ports. I know, of course, it will be argued that the Italian Government is not directly in control of the aeroplanes which do the damage. The damage has been extensive. I think fifty British seamen have been killed and 150 wounded, and several million pounds worth of British property destroyed, and not one penny of compensation has been paid. That is the state of affairs. The 'planes are Italian, the pilots are Italian,
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but the Italian Government is not directly responsible for their actions. At the same time one cannot help supposing and believing that if Signor Mussolini had whispered a word of friendly advice into the ear of General Franco, British shipping and sailors might have benefited very considerably in months to come. That is why one would have wished that a friendly agreement had been reached on that point before this very general concession and advantage had been given to the Italian Government. It is unfortunately the case that there are some in Italy and I know Italians myself—not many, and I do not regard them as representative of the Italian people—who do regard the British Empire as being in a weak and possibly decadent state, and who would treat any Agreement that was not a good bargain from our point of view as being a further indication of weakness, and therefore a further encouragement to demands that would be contrary to our national and Imperial interests.
It is therefore on the nature and scope of the Agreement and on the time of its ratification rather than on the principle of the Agreement itself that I think all the critics of the Government differ from the policy that is now being pursued; and I profoundly hope that the Government will appreciate that in strongly opposing what we feel to be another mistake in our foreign policy we desire as ardently as they do themselves that this country should be in a position, thanks to its strength in defence, to enter into fair negotiations for lasting appeasement with all major European Powers, and other Powers indeed, as soon as that can be effected. At the same time we are desperately apprehensive of any policy that would appear to sacrifice the interests and prospects of our own country in order to reach a very hypothetical and temporary state of harmony, which may indeed be disturbed after a not very long period as a result of the Agreement that the Government expected would bring lasting peace.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD MAUGHAM): My Lords, this debate has now lasted three and a quarter hours, and in that time I suspect your Lordships will think you have heard almost everything that can be said on the subject and that most of the arguments that have been presented in approval of the

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Anglo-Italian Agreement have already been used. There are some things, however, which I think may be said, and the first I should like to deal with in an endeavour to answer the questions that have been asked of the Government. The first point is that in relation to the question put by the noble Lord who represents the Opposition in regard to native troops. He will find, if he will study the White Paper, that that is already dealt with by Annex 6, which he will find on page 22 of the White Paper. There is a reassurance by the Italian Government that natives of Italian East Africa will "not be compelled to undertake military duty other than local policing and territorial defence." That, I think, then is disposed of.
There was another question, which I think was in reference to the position in Abyssinia, and the noble Lord wished, quite properly, to know whether in the view of the Government Abyssinia was wholly under the control of the Italian forces. In regard to that the answer is that the greater part of Abyssinia is under that control. There is, however, a small portion which is not yet under the control of the Italian troops, and with regard to that the answer must therefore be that in that part Italy is not in control.
At the same time I should like in reference to that answer to make this observation. The question whether the sovereignty of Italy over Ethiopia should be admitted by this country or not is very largely a question of law, and perhaps on this occasion I may once in a way be thankful that I am a lawyer. I would observe this, that there is a very great difference between the case of a country where there are two recognised Governments in particular territory, who are in control as well as in occupation and who are carrying on an organised government, and the case of Abyssinia, where the troops who are engaged in fighting the Italians in the comparatively small area to which I have referred are not really an organised Government in the sense in which the Negus was at Addis Ababa, nor are they of course in any sense a Government like the Government the Italian State has set up in that country. And you have to bear in mind that it is the interest of any country that wants to have any relation, whether of trade or commerce or otherwise, with such a
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country as Abyssinia, to have an organised Government with which a contact can be made, which can be appealed to if anything goes wrong, and which is responsible for keeping order in that territory. That you can get from the Italian Government except in regard to the area I have mentioned, where, it may be, it will take some time before the Italian troops are completely in control. But you will not get it from any other rival Government, because there is none such.
Now I want to say something in reference to what I think is a complete misapprehension which exists on the Front Labour Bench in this House. The misapprehension is that the 10,000 troops that have already been withdrawn by Italy constitute an end of the matter from the point of view of His Majesty's Government, and that it is on account of the withdrawal of those troops that the Government have taken the view that there has been a settlement of the Spanish question. Of course that is completely wrong. There is not any foundation for that at all. The position is this, that nobody on the Government side, and I believe no sensible person at all in this country, thought that Signor Mussolini would be willing to make a unilateral withdrawal of all his troops in Spain and to leave the volunteers who were supporting what is still called the Government of Spain—
LORD STRABOLGI: Why "still called"?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: —in control or actively assisting that Government. That would be ridiculous. It seems to me to have no good sense at all. We all know—those who want to know anything about it—that there were a number of foreign people—it does not matter where they came from—who went to Barcelona and have been assisting the Spanish Government there and elsewhere to the utmost of their power. It is also known that subsequent to that people from two other countries went to assist General Franco. Does anybody think that Signor Mussolini could have been asked to withdraw his troops unilaterally? That has no good sense behind it at all. But what was thought was that if Signor Mussolini gave plain proof of his intention to withdraw his troops part passu with a withdrawal from the other side

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that would be sufficient to show that this quasi-invasion of Spain by three foreign Powers was coming to an end.
It is quite wrong to suppose that the 10,000 troops represent the whole story. The Italian Government, together with the other persons represented on the Non-Intervention Committee, have accepted the British Plan for the withdrawal of volunteers, and accordingly, presuming that Plan is carried out, the whole of the Italian troops will disappear pari passu with the troops that belong to another country. It is again perfectly wrong to suppose that there has been no other promise given by Signor Mussolini with regard to what is going to happen during the period following the withdrawal of the 10,000 troops and the complete withdrawal of volunteers from Spain, because there has been a definite assurance given by Signor Mussolini that the remaining Italian troops of all categories will be withdrawn when the Non-Intervention Plan comes into operation, that no further Italian troops are going to be sent to Spain, and that the Italian Government have never a moment had the notion of replacing by other troops the 10,000 who have hem withdrawn. It is again quite a mistake to represent these troops as wounded or wasted soldiers who are no longer any use. The photographs in the illustrated papers are sufficient to show that that is a baseless idea. As a matter of fact, these 10,000 are in addition to 2,000 who had already been taken away because of illness or wounds.
For my part I welcome what I cannot help thinking was one of the most eloquent speeches pronounced for a long time in this House by the noble and gallant Earl (Lord Cavan) who sits on the Cross Benches. I welcome his statement as a soldier of what conclusion we may draw from the withdrawal of 10,000 able-bodied soldiers from one's forces when one has in all only some 20,000 infantrymen, and that therefore we may accept this gesture, followed up by the operations of the Non-Intervention Committee, as plainly demonstrating that one's adventure in that war is coming to an end. I believe the suspicions which have been voiced in this House by noble Lords with reference to the gesture to which I have referred are without foundation.
Let me say one word about the bombing of ships. It is true that there has been such bombing, but there is no
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ground, so far as the Government know, to suppose that the bombing has been the act of the Italian Government. It is true that some of these aeroplanes have been lent, and no doubt a number has been sold, to the Spanish people under General Franco. The same is true about the very large number of aeroplanes now in the hands of the Spanish Government, and these two bodies are engaged in waging war according to their ideas of how best to wage it. But that is not a matter which one could expect the Italian Government to put in this settlement. We know quite well that the Agreement is drawn up to last, and it does not contain anything about the bombing of ships for the reason that Signor Mussolini is not in charge of that matter.
Let me say a word in regard to the recognition of the sovereignty of Ethiopia. It is suggested that recognition is an act contrary to moral and eternal justice. I should like to ask why. Is the Italian Government never going to be recognised as the sovereign of that country? Is it a policy that has ever been adopted by any civilised country up to the present that if a country has, if you like, been wrongly attacked and captured, when the capture is effected, and the country is substantially in the hands of the conqueror, and recognised government on the ordinary basis is set up, other countries are not to recognise the de facto sovereignty of the conqueror? I have heard in this House the most astounding doctrines, it seems to me, as to what countries ought to do according to ordinary ideas of public International Law in cases such as we have before us here. It is perfectly new, and I would submit absolutely wrong in the interests of civilisation, that when you have an accomplished fact, various other countries in the world should make up their own minds whether the conquest is a proper one, whether they approve of it, and consequently whether they can recognise the sovereignty of those who are successful. I would submit that that is without any good reason of any sort or kind and that it should be rejected.
My noble friend Lord Lloyd asked a question with regard to the Yemen, being desirous of knowing whether any step had been taken to safeguard British interests. As a matter of fact Articles 1 and 2 of the Agreement provide a satisfactory method for that being done. They state:

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"Neither Party will conclude any agreement or take any action which might in any way impair the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or of the Yemen."Neither Party will obtain or seek to obtain a privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or to the Yemen or in any territory which either of those States may hereafter acquire."
Propaganda was mentioned by the noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, and others. They will find in Annexe 4 to the Agreement, on page 20 of the White Paper, a statement that:
"The two Governments welcome the opportunity afforded by the present occasion to place on record their agreement that any attempt by either of them to employ the methods of publicity or propaganda at its disposal in order to injure the interests of the other would be inconsistent with the good relations which it is the object of the present Agreement to establish and maintain between the two Governments and the peoples of their respective countries."
That, I think, deals with the question of propaganda.
Now what is there that remains with regard to the criticism which has been made of this Agreement? I have noticed that some of the objectors say: "It is too soon to bring it into force. Why seize the present time for entering into this Agreement? "Well, it was signed on the r6th April last after an exceedingly long series of discussions between the British Ambassador in Rome and Count Ciano, and, ever since, the Government have been asked when they intended to put it into force. It may be that it would not have been put into force now but for the crisis which led to the proceedings at Munich. But any noble Lord whose mind is not biased with suspicion of or dislike or hatred for these Continental nations who have totalitarian forms of government must see for himself that Munich has entirely changed the atmosphere of Europe at the present time. The Agreement is one with Italy, and Signor Mussolini is greatly concerned in it. It was he, as has already been stated in this House and in the other place, who, on the 28th September last, less than five weeks ago, took a step which resulted in Herr Hitler delaying the mobilisation which he had ordered. This was followed by a rapid turn of affairs at Munich, where the four Powers got together. When you have an act like that I think it is extraordinary that you should hear that people are still full of
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suspicion against the Leaders of States which at so recent a time played so important a part in preventing a world war.
A totalitarian State is in a very different position, as we all know, to a State such as our own. Signor Mussolini has naturally been very impatient with regard to bringing this Agreement into force. We have had reason to fear that he had a suspicion that His Majesty's Government did not intend ever to bring it into force. Taking that fact into account and combining with it the circumstances I have mentioned with regard to the atmosphere created at Munich by the Prime Minister, we had I think the most ample ground for saying: "This is the moment; we will not delay; we are started on the road to peace and we intend to pursue it." It is not, of course, that we believe that this is the end of the efforts of the Prime Minister or of His Majesty's Government. Nothing of the kind. This is one of the first steps on a difficult road. It has got to be taken and the time is opportune, and nobody can be so good a judge of that time as the Prime Minister, who has played such a great part in preserving peace in Europe.
The noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, whose honesty of thought and many other qualities we all recognise, has told us how terribly anxious he is, and how continuously, as he said, he was disturbed by the state in which the world now is, and he drew a picture of the four great territorial steps that had been taken during the last three or four years. I do not think that the noble Viscount can imagine that the British Government could have gone to war to prevent what has happened in Manchukuo, in Abyssinia, in China and in Czechoslovakia. It is incredible that Britain should go to war all over the world, wherever it may be, because something has been done which is shocking to our sense of justice. At any rate, if that is the view of the noble Viscount I do not think he will get the people of this country to agree with him. It would mean that we should never be at peace. But one thing that the noble Viscount said is true. The position of things in the world is not satisfactory. There are danger spots, and there are possibilities of war—a war into which we might ourselves be dragged—and it is for that very reason and in order

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to prevent that terrible eventuality that this Agreement is presented to you for your approval.
Perhaps before sitting down I might say one other thing. To-morrow week many of us are going to be present at or near the Cenotaph in Whitehall. We shall then be thinking of the millions of gallant soldiers and sailors who lost their lives in the Great War. If there were another war on anything like that scale there would have to be, I suppose, some other cenotaph and some other ceremonial; but your Lordships will realise that the cenotaph of the next war will be of a different character. Over a million soldiers and sailors were killed in the last War. There might be as many killed in the next war, but there will also be killed more innocent citizens than all those men
Resolved in the affirmative, and Motion agreed to accordingly.

OVERSEAS TERRITORIES BILL. [H.L.]
LORD STRICKLAND LORD STRICKLAND had the following Notice on the Paper: To call attention to the Common Law as related to the British Guiana Act, 1928, and to Possessions overseas and to present a Bill amending that Act. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in rising to bring forward this subject I am encouraged by the spadework done as a member of a
who lost their lives, many women and children killed, it may be, in their beds or in the pursuit of their peaceful avocations. Anyone who has any responsibility must feel that a step that can be taken by the Government which tends to prevent that event—namely, a great war occurring between major Powers in Europe—must be taken if he wants to be faithful to the duty placed upon him. It is because the step that was taken in Munich by the Prime Minister leads necessarily to a continuing step in favour of peace, and consequently an acceptance of the present Agreement, that it is presented to your Lordships for your approval.
On Question, Whether the said Motion shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided:—Contents, 55; Not-Contents, 6.

CONTENTS.

Maugham, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Halifax, V.

Hirst, L.

Hampden, V.

Holden, L.

Northumberland, D.

Stonehaven, V.

Iliffe, L.

Trenchard, V.

Jessel, L.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Lawrence, L.

Dufferin and Ava, M.

Aberdare, L.

Luke, L.

Zetland, M.

Amulree, L.

Marchwood, L.

Bingley, L.

Ormathwaite, L.

Airlie, E.

Charnwood, L.

Phillimore, L.

Baldwin of Bewdley, E.

Chesham, L.

Polwarth, L.

Birkenhead, E.

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam.)

Portsea, L.

Bradford, E.

Rankeillour, L.

Cavan, E.

Craigmyle, L.

Rennell, L.

Fortescue, E.

Dickinson, L.

Rockley, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Doverdale, L.

Rushcliffe, L.

Munster, E.

Elgin, L. (E. Elgin and Kincardine.)

Shute, L. (V. Barrington.)

Plymouth, E.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Stanhope, E.

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Fairlie, L. (E. Glasgow.)

Templemore, L. [Teller.]

FitzAlan of Derwent, V.

Gorell, L.

Wolverton, L.

Greenwood, V.

Hindlip, L.

Wyfold, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Lytton, E.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel.) [Teller.]

Snell, L.

Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]

Cecil of Chelwood, V.

Marley, L.

Committee by the Leader in your Lordships' House on the other side, Lord Snell, and by the noble Viscount, Lord Halifax, who was at one time Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. In your Lordships' House on March 21, 1928, on the Motion that the British Guiana Bill be read a second time, Lord Haldane, a former Lord Chancellor, spoke as follows on the main point which it was desired to emphasize. He said:
"I do not rise to offer any opinion on the substance of the changes that are made by this Bill, but there is a question which I want to put to the noble Lord. The new Constitution which is to be set up by Order in Council is a Constitution which super-

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sedes an older Constitution, also I presume set up by Order in Council at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the assumption on which the Colonial Office appear to have proceeded is that it is possible, and the law permits, a change of this kind, superseding an existing Constitution granted by the Crown, to be made by an Order in Council without an Act of the Legislature.
"It is possible that the Constitution of British Guiana, as it stands now, is of such a subordinate kind that it may be legitimate to proceed in this way, and I do not doubt that the attention of the Colonial Office in some shape or form must have been called to this question, that if there is a substantial Constitution, which has been granted by the Crown, once it is granted then, according to the law of this country, you cannot supersede it without a Statute. That was laid down 150 years ago by Lord Mansfield in Campbell versus Hall, and I am afraid that the Colonial Office have taken rather an easy view of that decision. What I want to know from the noble Lord is whether the Colonial Office have considered this question—whether this Constitution comes within the principle laid down in Campbell versus Hall, and whether it is competent to proceed as this Bill proposes, by Order in Council. That is all I am anxious about at present. I wish to be assured that this question has been sufficiently considered—and it has not always been sufficiently considered by the Colonial Office in its legislation—for if it should turn out that there has been a mistake, then everything which is done now will be void and of no effect in law."
It is not to be doubted that Lord Haldane was well aware that whatever might be done by an Act of Parliament was in every case valid and in no case void, except perhaps under one consideration—namely, that at the date when Lord Haldane spoke there could be no change in the Common Law by Act of Parliament unless in that Act of Parliament it was made clear, in the Preamble or otherwise, that it was the intention of Parliament to alter the Common Law. Lord Haldane could not question the efficiency of the British Guiana Act as far as it gives legal effect to any provision therein which is enacted in express terms. It is axiomatic that an Act of Parliament can do anything except make a man into a woman. That is the way in which the textbooks express the potency of Parliament. At the same time it is established that an Act of Parliament cannot alter the Common Law by interpretation or by innuendo, and that to alter the Common Law by Act of Parliament the intention to do so must be declared therein, and must be clearly expressed. The intention to alter the Common Law is not declared in the
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Preamble (or otherwise) in the British Guiana Act, 18 George V, chapter 5, dated March 28, 1928, and, for that reason alone, there appears to be sufficient ground to remove doubts by legislation.
When the British Settlements Act, 1887, was discussed at Westminster, a vigorous protest was made by Sir George Campbell against what he described as "spread-eagle tendencies of annexation" over territory, such as New Guinea, which might be exercised under that Act of 1887. The reply of the then Secretary of State was a reference to an unpublished opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown as to appeals from New Guinea to a Supreme Court in Australia, and was juridically inconclusive as a reply to the question thus raised against the Government in the debate. Moreover, the definitions in the British Settlements Act of 1887 were criticised as confused, and some of the provisions thereof, such as Section 6, cannot easily be reconciled with the Preamble. Opinion as to how territory may be acquired has been considerably modified since 1887, and the Bill now submitted would be of obvious value in adjusting some of the objections of Lord Haldane to the attitude of the Colonial Department in reference to Letters Patent issued without full regard as to the Common Law in the case of British Guiana, if extended and made applicable to other Possessions. The upholding of the Common Law in the speech of Lord Haldane is also the attitude of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Malta in the second ultra vires case, which came on appeal before the Privy Council in Sammut versus Strickland, when a different view was adopted.
What was declared to be the Common Law by Lord Haldane and previously by several Law Officers of the Crown from time to time during more than a century, and what has been repeatedly held heretofore to be the Common Law as set out and established in the case of the Bishop of Natal, should not be set aside by one judgment holding another view unless the new attitude is sanctioned by an Act of Parliament. Nor can any advice given by the Lords of the Privy Council to the Crown alter the Common Law irrevocably, unless generally confirmed by Act of Parliament. In fact, the judgment in the case of the Bishop of Natal gave to the Common Law the same aspect as is

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upheld in the speech of Lord Haldane which followed the accepted textbook of his period. What was contended to be the Common Law in accordance with Lord Haldane's exposition thereof made it illogical to expect, before the Malta Letters Patent Act, 1936, was proposed (to stop the litigation), that the Government could have succeeded in the appeal Strickland versus Galea. In fact the Common Law of England on the subject did not heretofore depend for its origin merely on Lord Mansfield's declaration of the Common Law in Campbell versus Hall, but also on the previous declarations thereof in the opinion of certain Lords of the Privy Council; who, together with other judges, recorded opinions parallel to the decision in the case of the "Post Nati," on "Calvin's Case" and on jurisprudence arising therefrom. Under present conditions there are unconquered Possessions or Colonies, such as Barbados, the Bahamas and British Honduras, which are not Dominions, where no right to legislate by Order in Council is claimed or exercised, as it has been in the case of Malta. A third ultra vires case is now before the Court of Appeal in Malta.
The passing of the Bill which I beg leave to present would stop controversy on widely questionable points of law, and forestall repercussions elsewhere. It would meet the reproach of "spread-eagle annexation" raised in the House of Commons in 1887, when the British Settlements Act of 1887 was hurried through, and it would meet any challenge to the constitutional liberties enjoyed in Southern Rhodesia as deriving from Sammut verves Strickland. The judgment in Sammut versus Strickland placed Malta, a Colony not conquered from the French by the British alone, but by the British and the Maltese as co-belligerents and allies, in an inferior status face to face with British Guiana, a conquered Colony. It is not a logical conclusion. Malta has been treated with much less respect than a conquered Colony in the British Guiana Act of 1928. The British Guiana Act, 1928, upholds the principle that a Constitution once given is to be protected by Parliament from illegal destruction or suspension by the embodiment in Letters Patent of views held, rightly or wrongly, by Chiefs of the Colonial Department, unless the same are sanctioned by Parliament.
The Bill now proposed aims at mitigating an irritating differentiation now having a wide application—namely, the fact that His Majesty's subjects overseas enjoy in groups a difference of status, and do not all enjoy the same status as is claimed by His Majesty's subjects in Great Britain and the Channel Islands, and in Possessions covered by the Statute of Westminster, 1931. This Bill also removes the anomaly that under the British Settlements Act of 1887 any hand of merchant adventurers, being subjects of the King (who might be British subjects in a Colony or of Southern Ireland or of a Possession such as Malta), carry with them a statutory right of British subjects equal to that which belongs to those domiciled in the British Isles. All carry with them "the Common Law of England" as subsisting in England at the date when such subjects of the King take possession of uninhabited land, or, for example, of some unappropriated or uninhabited Pacific Island, or territory with uncivilized inhabitants. To give an example: If British subjects from Malta occupied such a Pacific Island they would enjoy a status which has been denied to the Maltese of Malta in Sammut versus Strickland notwithstanding that both groups are British subjects. Maltese in the land of their birth, and one which their ancestors conquered from the French, and placed under the English Crown, with the reservations set out in the Declaration of Rights recorded by the Elected Deputies of the Maltese nation when the Treaty of Amiens was set aside, would be inferior to Maltese hauling up the Union Jack in the Antarctic. The independence of Malta was, and remained, guaranteed by the King of England by a promise in the Treaty of Amiens.
The Declaration of Rights of the Deputies of the people of Malta contained the expression of allegiance that gives Malta to England, and constitutes a record to which we must trace Melitensium Amor, set out in the inscription over the Main Guard at Valetta, which inscription has been accepted as evidence of a "gentleman's agreement" by the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Malta in Strickland versus Galea. The historical view held in that judgment is the one which is accepted categorically in the judgment of the judicial Committee in Sammut versus Strickland, rightly or otherwise. The reason which justified

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distinction between the position of British Guiana as a conquered Colony, in contrast with Malta as a Possession which was not conquered from the Maltese, is the fact that, in the Capitulations on the surrender to England of British Guiana the maintenance of representative institutions was stipulated in express terms still on record, whereas in the case of Malta the maintenance of representative institutions has to be supported partly by inference, and partly by the Declaration of Rights, and is established as a consequence of the position under the Law of Nations of the Maltese, as co-conquerors from the French. Verbal agreements may be proved by the accompanying circumstances and facts. The Declaration of Rights has value after the guarantee of independence in the Treaty of Amiens, as made before the alleged cession in 1812 when Malta was a Protectorate.
It can be held that the declaration of Parliament to the effect that "no man can act as a judge where he has an interest" does not apply to any "Keeper of the King's Conscience"; nevertheless, it is in the interest of the Empire not merely that justice is administered, but also that those upon whom it is administered are able to understand that it is just juridically, and is unimpeachable. The Bill now proposed is drafted to eliminate these causes of doubt and feeling, and to co-ordinate interpretations of the Common Law under the principle that "Parliament can do everything" and "The King can do no wrong." The Common Law of England has to be traced to the feudal position of William of Normandy, who as Conqueror of England had the vita et necis potestas over all his subjects. This power was curtailed from time to time—for example, by Magna Charta, by the confirmation of the Charters, the statutory legislation following the Cromwellian enactments (such as the abolition of military tenures). The Common Law was altered by the Bill of Rights, and by the Act of the Settlement of the Protestant Succession.
Lawyers overseas can hardly be expected to agree that the Common Law of England can be transferred and equally imposed upon conquered and unconquered Possessions, otherwise than to the extent that the Common Law was accepted in England at the time of such
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transfer thereof into a Possession overseas, on which reliance is placed. Lawyers overseas cannot be expected to understand the view that juridically in 1800, when Cameron was Civil Commissioner, or in 1812, when General Sir Thomas Maitland was Governor, a Common Law could be legitimately transferred and imposed on the Maltese in a shape in which the Common Law existed in England in the days of the Norman Kings, and before the Cromwellian Revolution, or before the replacement, by the Act of Settlement, of the Divine Right of Kings by a Prerogative said to include power to extend Orders in Council beyond possibilities in England, and in fact without any limit, and by inference. When transferred overseas the application of the Common Law up to date has to have support either in the express words of a Statute, or in the fact that there has been a conquest by the sword—that is, compulsion based on force. The proposed Bill is calculated to heal many difficulties, and to pave the way for a fresh start with any new Constitution overseas, by providing a clear and practical exposition of the juridical position. The Bill is inspired by a desire to co-ordinate equality of opportunity.
I am afraid I have detained your Lordships at a late hour, but the subject is important, as it has been represented in the Press that the constitutional position of several British Possessions is conflicting and very difficult to be understood, and that no attempt is likely to be made to clarify it. The research represented by this Bill embodies a long, studied review, which may ultimately be useful to the Government notwithstanding the impossibility of adoption this Session. I beg leave to introduce this Bill and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Strickland.)
On Question, Bill read Iaand to be printed.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (EARL STANHORE): My Lords, there is a formal meeting of the House tomorrow at eleven o'clock, when Prayers will be taken, followed by the Royal Commission.
House adjourned at a quarter past seven o'clock.