Sitting of 18 February 1936

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

CONSOLIDATION BILLS.
Message from the Commons to acquaint this House that they have appointed a Committee of six members to join with the Committee appointed by this House, as mentioned in their Lordships' message of February 12, to consider all Consolidation Bills of the present Session.
A Message ordered to be sent to the House of Commons to propose that the Joint Committee do meet in Committee Room C, on Tuesday next, at twelve o'clock.

REFRESHMENT ROOMS AND LAVATORIES.
Message from the Commons to acquaint this House that they have appointed a Committee of six members to join with a Committee of this House, to consider and report upon the accommodation for refreshment rooms and lavatories in the Palace of Westminster, and that they have made the following Order: That the Minutes of Evidence of the Joint Committee on Refreshment Rooms and Lavatories in the last Session of Parliament be referred to the Committee; and to request their Lordships to appoint an equal number of Lords to be joined with the members of their House.

WATER RESOURCES AND SUPPLIES.
Message from the Commons to acquaint this House that they have appointed a Committee of seven Members to join with the Committee appointed by this House to consider and report on measures for the better conservation and organisation of water resources and supplies in England and Wales, and that they have made the following Order: That the Minutes of the joint Committee on Water Resources and Supplies in the last Session of Parliament be referred to the Committee; and to request this House

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to appoint an equal number of Lords to be joined with the members of their House.

TRIAL OF PEERS (ABOLITION OF PRIVILEGE) BILL. [H.L.]
VISCOUNT SANKEY: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to abolish privilege of Peerage in relation to criminal proceedings, and to move that it be rend a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Viscount Sankey.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (CONSTITU- TION OF ORISSA) ORDER, 1936.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND): My Lords, I beg to move the first Motion standing in my name.
Moved, That a humble Address be presented to His Majesty praying that an Order be made in the form of the draft presented to Parliament on the 20th of January last, and approved by the House on Thursday last.—(The Marquess of Zetland.)
On Question, Motion agreed to: the said Address to be presented to His Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (CONSTITU- TION OF SIND) ORDER, 1936.
THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND: My Lords, I beg to move the second Motion standing in my name.
Moved, That a humble Address be presented to His Majesty praying that an Order be made in the form of the draft presented to Parliament on the 20th of January last, and approved by the House on Thursday last.—(The Marquess of Zetland.)
On Question, Motion agreed to: the said Address to be presented to His Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

HOURS OF EMPLOYMENT (CONVENTIONS) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed, and sent to the Commons.
UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) (EXTENSION) BILL.
Read 3a (according to Order), with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

THE ITALO-ABYSSINIAN DISPUTE.
LORD PHILLIMORE LORD PHILLIMORE rose to inquire what steps, if any, His Majesty's Government are taking to promote a peaceful settlement acceptable to all parties to the Italo-Abyssinian dispute and to put an end to the danger now run by this country of becoming involved in war; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, before I deal with the Question which I have put on the Paper in my own name I should like to say this. My noble friend Lord Rennell has a Question on the Paper for to-morrow the subject matter of which is, to some extent at any rate, interlinked with the subject matter of what I am going to talk about. His Motion, however, deals with future policy, mine deals rather with the immediate present, and I shall try my best not to trespass on his ground. If that leaves a few gaps in my argument these will no doubt be filled to-morrow.
The terms of my Question inevitably recall that very painful debate which took place last December on the Hoare-Laval peace proposals. It is not too much to say that most of us were aghast at the reversal of Government policy. And why were we aghast? Because, I venture to say, we could foresee the disastrous consequences of throwing away a 'peace at that juncture. In our bones we felt that the Government's second policy was wrong and their first policy was right. If, then, I proceed to point out in what way disaster has since accrued, it is because, unless we can realise the unreality and the impossibility of maintaining the policy snatched up at the last moment by the Government on that occasion, and forced upon them by a vociferous minority, there is no hope of peace. And if a settlement of this dispute was pressing last December surely it is twice as pressing now. The international situation as a whole has definitely worsened since that day. Look around Europe and we see a perfect frenzy of armament, a perfect hysteria and fear among nation after

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nation, and much of this is attributable without doubt to the continuance of the Abyssinian war.
I think that it will throw some light on the problem which sooner or later we shall have to confront if for some minutes we consider exactly what has resulted from the rejection of the Hoare-Laval proposals. Here I should like to point out that it is not my affair whether those proposals were good or bad or the best that could have been put forward at the time. From my point of view they represent terms which at one time were acceptable to the British Government, which were acceptable to the French Government, and which, as we now learn from Signor Mussolini, would have formed an acceptable basis for negotiations in the case of Italy. That being so, it is not too much to say that the continuance of our first policy might have led to an early peace and to a settlement somewhat on those lines. From my point of view it would have been a peace at any rate, and we should have been spared much that has happened since. But the terms were withdrawn and the war was allowed to go on. No final military decision has been reached, and I am not going to be so stupid to-day as to forecast what the final military result will be, but let us consider the failure to make peace from the point of view of the parties themselves. The first and most obvious thing is that the two protagonists have suffered in losing some thousands of lives of their nationals. The civilian population have suffered, economically and otherwise. Some millions of pounds have been blown, into the air.
On our side—and I must be pardoned if I devote more of my time to our interests than to those of other people—many disasters, or perhaps I should say many misfortunes, have accrued. In the first place, but perhaps not in the most important place, the December figures of the exports to Italy show a falling off in our foreign trade with that country to the tune of £8,500,000. I have taken some care to get those figures. That, of course, should give us a sense of conscious virtue which is about the only thing we have gained by the existing policy. But that gain must be rather feeble consolation to the miner who is out of work because Italy is no longer allowed to take his coal. It must be rather feeble consola-
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tion to our traders to hear that whereas the Yugoslavs are recognised by our own Government as worthy of compensation, our traders and our farmers are not entitled to anything for the trade that they have lost.
On the other side of the account we have seen the bill in the newspapers this morning. The cost of keeping a good half of the British Fleet packed tight in the harbour of Alexandria, a mark, and an easy mark, for the bombing aeroplane, and the cost of keeping I would not like to say what proportion of our Army in Egypt, has meant the expenditure even during these few months of over £6,000,000—£6,000,000 of wasted and worse than wasted money. But far more important than this consideration is the increasing hostility of the Italian people to this nation. How can you expect anything else? As the war goes on, and bullet after bullet of British make strikes a Blackshirt and lays him low; when a one-sided embargo permits the export of arms to their black foes and not to themselves—put yourself in their place, and see if bitterness would not be gradually growing upon you. We have gone some way towards destroying the Triple Entente which saw us through four years of warfare. Have we gained any corresponding security? We of course know now that the Mediterranean is no longer a safe channel for our ships with a hostile Italy. That, at any rate, is a piece of knowledge which is worth having. We know that the tribes throughout that part of Africa such as the Ogaden Somali—I know it on the best of information—have already acquired great numbers of rifles. We know that these people for years have troubled our northern Kenya boundary, and that the small expenditure permitted by the Kenya Budget has only just sufficed to keep them in check up to date. That expenditure will have to be largely increased, and, I will not say many, but certainly a few settlers and a few officials are likely to pay for it with their lives.
Now I come to perhaps the most startling fact of all. I hope you have all studied Command Paper No. 5072, which is entitled "Dispute between Ethiopia and Italy: Correspondence in connection with the application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations." In it you will see that our Government, feeling no doubt extremely insecure in the

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Mediterranean, invited the Governments of France, Yugoslavia, Italy and Greece to state whether, in the event of special measures of a military character being aimed at Great Britain by Italy, those Governments would be willing and able, should the need arise, to collaborate in resistance to such measures. I venture to say that the publication of this request created an extremely unfortunate and unfavourable impression both here and abroad. It was not the kind of thing that we quite expected from a British Government. It was obvious that the French Government disliked it, and if for that reason only I think that we may feel that France: is very little likely to draw us into trouble.
But are we so sure about countries such as Yugoslavia and Turkey—Yugoslavia who ever since the War has considered herself robbed of Fiume and the Dalmatian coast, Turkey which has thought the same about the Dodecanese a few miles from her shores—are we so sure that our connection with these countries will not land us in trouble? Yugoslavia and Turkey must have jumped for joy when they got that request, because, naturally, the assurance that we demanded had to be reciprocated with an assurance given, and we are now obliged by the correspondence which passed at that time to go to the aid of Turkey or -Yugoslavia in the event of any incident which can be attributed to the enforcement, shall we say, of sanctions against Italy. I hope the noble Earl who is going to reply will be able to find me wrong on that point, but I do not think I am. Do you think that in the case of these two nations, who have strained at the leash for years in order to get back what they think has been unjustly taken from them, it will take much to provoke another Walwal incident between Yugoslavia or Turkey and Italy? Quite recently, as far as I can tell, possibly since these inquiries from our Government went out, Turkey has more than doubled the divisions facing the Dodecanese and has spent a whole heap of money on her fortifications. I think that was a criminal step.
But, my Lords, however ill the consequences of throwing Sir Samuel Hoare overboard may have been for the British Empire, it was, and no doubt it will be again, maintained that he was thrown overboard for the sake, not of the British Empire, but of the League of Nations.
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Has the League of Nations gained much by seeing him go over the side? One thing is certain, the League of Nations can say to itself that there is no hope of the United States of America supporting the coercive policy of Article 16. It can also say with regard to that very difficult question, the independence of Austria, a matter with which it has concerned itself for many years, that what was a promising situation is now indefinitely postponed until the only active guarantor of Austrian independence, Italy, is able to pay attention to European affairs. These are the results of failure to bring about a peace, and there are worse results which I foresee by the prolongation of this war. I can hardly be blamed if I beg His Majesty's Government to give very serious consideration indeed to the promotion of a settlement by peaceful means of this dispute. I would point out that the longer that settlement is delayed the greater will be in each particular country the pressure to make themselves economically and militarily independent in case such sanctions are enforced against themselves.
If we want peace, and I hope we do, and if we regard ourselves as a party to this dispute—at any rate as a Member of the League of Nations, which is, I understand, a party to this dispute—then like other parties who go to" the conference table, we must be prepared, if we want peace, to forgo some part of our claims. This is a country which is old in conciliation, and we know that it is a hopeless idea that you can go into any conference with a view to settling any dispute if you are determined beforehand to stand rigidly on your full claims. I will return in a moment to the question of our claims; there is one other thing with which I should like to deal first. It may be that it is not destined for us to be an actual negotiator for peace. It may be that it will be our unpleasant role to advise the Ethiopian Emperor to accept terms unfavourable, perhaps, in Ethiopian eyes lest worse befall. But, if we are to be the peacemaker at all, surely we must cease to regard ourselves, and to be regarded, as the spear-point of the forces hostile to Italy in this matter.
Your Lordships may remember a debate which took place last May on reconciliation with Germany, in which the sense

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of your Lordships' House and, I am glad to say, as it subsequently proved, the sense of His Majesty's Government was very decidedly in favour of our adopting a fairer and more generous attitude towards that country. I remember that debate because I have for long felt that the position of being what I may call the common scold of Europe was not a position that I cared to see this country adopt, and I remember that I had no intention of speaking, having heard other speakers express what I wanted to say myself. But I remember well that the noble Viscount on the Cross Benches, Lord Cecil, leapt to his feet and began to urge in phrase after phrase that it was our duty rather to point out once again to Germany the full extent and criminality of her misdemeanours—this at a time when the great majority of your Lordships, at any rate, were feeling that the one thing essential was to try to understand the German people and get nearer to them. If we are going to maintain that Xanthippe-like attitude at the command of the League of Nations Union or anybody else, there is no hope for peace in Europe, and still less is there hope that we shall obtain peace and keep it.
Now, my Lords, I shall return to the question of our claims, which are, I admit, the claims of the League of Nations. Now, if I understand it, the official attitude is that our membership of the League of Nations compels us to use the coercive machinery of Article 16—although it did not compel us in the case of the Chaco or in the case of Japan and China, nor in the present invasion which is going on to-day in the North of China. In this case, however, it compels us, and we claim by the use of the measures outlined in Article 16 that we must punish the aggressor, or at any rate see that the aggressor shall not be rewarded. Further, we say that on this depends the whole so-called collective system, and that if Italy escapes her punishment, even greater countries will expect with justice to escape theirs. If this remains the official attitude in all its rigid entirety, there is no hope of peace so long as we and the League of Nations are a party to the dispute. The only peace that can result is a peace enforced by arms or economic circumstance possibly a year, possibly two years hence. But does not the official
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attitude ignore the very essence of this question, and that is that the rigidity of the system of treaties now prevailing in Europe, and the distribution of the good things of this world which is arranged under those treaties, are unfair to Italy? It is easy to talk of aggression. That is the common attitude of the bad employer in the face of a strike when he knows that he is responsible for the conditions. If Italy struck last October, we may well think that she did not strike altogether without cause, and that that consideration entitles her to a measure of justice transcending the coercive formulas of Article 16.
Before I sit down there is one other side of the question upon which I should like to touch. As Sir Austen Chamberlain pointed out last week in another place, the Government have puzzled the nation by one or two—apparent, at any rate—inconsistencies. I should like to suggest that there is one safe guide which they could follow, one course of which the nation would approve and by which the nation would be reassured. Let them tell the nation, and tell the nation with one voice—not with one voice from Geneva and a different voice from Downing Street—that they have no intention of allowing this country to be led into war except on behalf of the immediate and direct interests of the British Empire. Only last night a working-man correspondent—not that I knew him before—wrote to me from Lancashire. He told me that he had just been present at a meeting of some two hundred of his workmates and had been asked to write to me. The gist of the letter is this: "Whether or not Italy is right or wrong, League or no League, it is not our war, and it is up to us to see that we are not involved. There is serious trouble ahead if we are dragged from our homes again to fight in a war which has been made." I beg to move for Papers.
LORD NOEL-BUXTON: My Lords, I wish to support the noble Lord in his demand for action towards the earliest possible settlement of the Italo-Abyssinian question, but I do so from a somewhat different point of view from his. I desire to urge that we should aim at a settlement which not only vindicates collective peace—because I am a warm advocate of that system—but which also meets the need of a stable system in Abyssinia after

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the war. That view has been notably identified with the views of The Times newspaper in recent, days, and I support it because I have some personal knowledge of Abyssinia. It seems to me very opportune that Lord phillimore has raised a debate on the subject, and I much hope that the Government will not be deterred from pressing on with this question because, if I may say it without rudeness, they have burnt their fingers over it in rather recent times.
There is a tendency to feel that we should let the war take its course, and that we can hardly expect the Government to try negotiating for some time yet. We hear it urged on the one hand that Italy, it may be, is doing very badly. and if so we should arrive at a League success without the risk of further sanctions. Again, it is urged that the Abyssinian Emperor would refuse to accept any terms which might be offered now. I think the answer to that is that the Emperor has himself applied to Geneva for a discussion of the question, and an enunciation of the League views, and that therefore it is relevant that the question of attempting mediation should be raised. I think another answer is that if the war drifts on and arrives at a knock-out, in whichever direction the knock-out should occur, it would be a very unfortunate thing. And thirdly, peace, as the noble Lord has said, may have been available for many weeks past, and if so it is an awful responsibility that the British Government should have felt themselves restrained from activity in that direction.
We, of course, without inside knowledge, cannot tell what opportunities there may be or when one will exist, but I do feel that public opinion ought to urge on the Government that they should seek an opportunity and be unremitting in working towards an end of the war. Just consider the evils of letting things glide in an indefinite way. In the first place we all realise the fearful risks of an extension of the war to a big war, and if there is an argument against oil sanctions that they would increase the danger of an extension of the war, that also is an argument against delay in this matter. Secondly, there is a risk, as I believe, in a knock-out either way. If we drift on and arrive at an- Italian victory, what an appalling failure from
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the League point of view we may have been responsible for. In any case, as I think Mr. Eden pointed out in the very earliest days, war itself is a terrific evil and an incalculable evil increasing from day to day. There is a natural disposition to admire Abyssinian heroism and to feel that we should encourage them to victory if they can get it, but is that always considering the Abyssinian interests in the long run? It seems to me that Sir Samuel Hoare said a very true thing when he remarked that we might be responsible for leading Abyssinia into worse trouble than we were able to rescue her from.
Of course the Abyssinians have gone a very long way in asking for intervention. Patriotic feeling might have forbidden them—it naturally does forbid a request for mediation even if it be desired—but they have asked for it. We cannot help thinking of what a terrible weight falls from the war upon the non-combatant population of Abyssinia. I am connected with a society which is doing what it can to relieve the non-combatants, where women and children have arrived as refugees, and we all know how much British charity has done for the British Red Cross. It is a very sad thing if we must be in any way responsible for the prolongation of a situation in which the Red Cross from this country, along with others, is assiduously bombed, and bombed, it is said, by the use of petrol on which the British taxpayer is in some degree making a profit. Somebody said—I think it was Professor Murray; it is not my original remark—that it is not decent that that should continue. An embargo may be more difficult than we without inside knowledge know—it may be a technical question on which the Government have an opinion overriding that of the public—but this is a deplorable feature of the situation which we should all like to see ended.
Supposing, on the other hand, we get an Abyssinian triumph, secured with great suffering and great loss of life, but a triumph for a cause which vast numbers of us would think was on the side of right—should we not very likely by that event lose a good settlement? Just consider the difficulty that would then arise in bringing about any sort of League guidance for Abyssinia, such as was envisaged by the terms of the Committee of Five last autumn. We have suffered

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ourselves from raiding from Abyssinia into the Sudan and Kenya. I have heard it recently argued that if there was an Abyssinian triumph that raiding would be more difficult to control, and that the raiders would be better armed than hitherto. Then, perhaps more important than that is the welfare of the inhabitants of Abyssinia. We ought never to forget that the vast majority of the inhabitants are not Abyssinians but are subjects of an Imperial race, the Amhara, who rule tribes conquered not so long ago. We naturally feel a sympathy for fighters against overwhelming odds, and a glamour attaches now to the Abyssinians which is very natural but which seems to me a dangerous guide in leading us to say: "Let them fight it out." After all, Abyssinia is an empire, and it is very doubtful whether its existence as an empire over vast subject tribes is really an advantage to the Abyssinians themselves. It is certainly the case that the Turkish empire was hampered by its nature as an empire, and that the Turks proper have profited greatly since they were deprived of the subject provinces which more or less corresponded with the subject provinces of Abyssinia.
Then there is the question which the most reverend Primate and others in this House have raised, the question of slavery. Everyone knew that reform in that respect was overdue long before the War. The Emperor has done his best, but he is comparatively powerless to bring about reform. Sufficient evidence of that, I am afraid, is furnished by the resignation of his British adviser, Mr. de Halpert, who found his hands entirely tied many months before the war. We saw in The Times figures giving the depopulation of Abyssinian provinces by misgovernment and by raiding for slaves. It is uncongenial to raise this point in time of war, but it is of course a fact. There is a little evidence of improvement in this respect in recent days because of the departure of leading slave raiders for the front, but that is a temporary advantage to those who are raided, and I only fear that many of the raiders will return better armed than before.
Against all that I would like to avow my adhesion to the cause of collective peace. That interest is paramount. But must the cause of collective peace con-
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flict with the advocacy of mediation: must it conflict with the cause of reform? There are many advocates of League interests who, I think, feel that reform is, after all, a minor interest, which must be sacrificed if necessary, that the exercise of sanctions as such is immensely desirable, and who would insist that before there is any negotiation the Italian forces must be wholly withdrawn from Abyssinian territory. Well, if collective peace requires that, peace is a long way off. But does it require it? Others of us see that the cause of collective peace might be best served by a realistic view of the peculiar possibilities of this case. The advantage of 100 per cent. sanctions is perhaps outweighed by the advantage of more rapid settlement. After all, the League has done a great deal, and has shown an object lesson which potential aggressors never thought that the League would show. If the Italian Government were led by successful mediation to settle now or at an early date, it would be due to League pressure.
As to oil sanctions, I suppose that is very much a technical question, but surely they are desirable if they are feasible; but whether they are feasible or not, ought not opportunities for mediation to be sought independently of the question of further sanctions? If the aim we have in view is the failure of aggression and the showing of an object lesson to possible aggressors in the future, I suggest that a test of failure lies in the terms of the Committee of Five—the Geneva terms. Italy could have got those terms. It is said that Russia was very much opposed to them, but after all the Abyssinian Government did agree to them, and surely if Italy obtained less than those terms it would spell disaster for Italy. Coupled with the financial ruin and the great loss of life, it would be an object lesson of a striking kind to possible aggressors. The terms were, I thought, too favourable to Italy only in one or two respects. They did embody a certain privilege for Italy's subjects, and that certainly would seem to be an impossible feature in any settlement after what has occurred. Preference for Italian rights, I think, is not to be thought of. Another condition was that annexations should be part of the Committee of Five scheme. Well, annexations, we might surely say, are possible by way of exchange, but not by way

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of Italian aggrandisement. Speaking generally, the terms of the Committee of Five seem to me to stand as a test by which Italian failure would be registered.
The problem, then, is to harmonise the penalisation of aggression with a settlement which is a good and lasting one; and is not the solution of that problem the importation of League influence into the constitution of Abyssinia? It is the way both to peace and to reform. In regard to peace, although it is no gain to Italy as the result of conquest, the fact of League influence is something of an attraction leading Italy to desire peace because it would mean security against invasion of her colonies, which was a factor in her policy. On the other hand, it would be no gain to aggression, and it is no more than what the League ought to have done years ago. We, after all, opposed the entry of Abyssinia into the League, having in view the need of such League control. It would be no gain to Italy, because no privilege would be accorded to Italian subjects. It would also be the way to reform, and we must have reform so far as it is compatible with the penalisation of aggression. A settlement without League control would be bad. It would leave very great dangers; it would mean a long war; it would mean the risk of a greater war; it would mean the risk of a victory for aggression or, on the other hand, of a régime which preserves slavery, even slave trading and slave raiding, and which leaves the seeds of further war in the future.
There is only one word that I would add on an allied topic raised by Sir Samuel Hoare. To the surprise of most of the world, he raised the question of colonial sharing in connection with the Abyssinian problem. He regarded it as part of the problem, and we must consider that he was correct when he indicated it as essential to peace in the future in the world at large. It does seem to me that, along with the pursuit of mediation, the question of colonial sharing raised by Sir Samuel Hoare should be pursued, and it might be a valuable factor in hastening an Abyssinian settlement as well.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords. I listened with the greatest sympathy to the speech of my noble friend who has just sat down, and I think we may all agree that there is no question
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that the re-establishment of peace at the earliest possible date is what we should all desire. I should personally agree also with him in saying that a complete victory by either side is very undesirable. I do not disagree indeed with any of his arguments, but I confess I have a little doubt whether his purpose would be now served if our Government were to imitate the proceedings of M. Laval during the last autumn and were to shower upon Rome proposal after proposal for a solution of the difficulty. I personally believe that that procedure, so far from bringing peace nearer, made peace more remote; and until there really is some clear disposition on the part of the Government of Italy to entertain proposals of a reasonable character for the settlement of this war, I do not think that any advantage is likely to be gained in making offers of mediation. I always used to be told when I was younger that you should never attempt to mediate in a war until both sides were ready to accept your mediation. Though that may be, and is indeed, modified by the existence of the League of Nations, I still believe that on broad lines it is essential to have some prospect of agreement before you make offers. The only result of making offers when there is no prospect of agreement is really to make one side or the other think that if they go on further they will get better terms.
With regard to the speech of the noble Lord who moved this Motion, I feel, I am afraid, almost wholly of a different opinion. Therefore, it gives me great pleasure to seize upon one observation which he made with which I can agree. He said—I forget the exact words—something about the extremely critical condition of the world and particularly of-Europe, the massing of arms, and so on. I entirely agree. I think it is impossible to exaggerate the critical position of Europe. I do not mean to suggest there is a prospect of an immediate outbreak of war in Europe. I do not think there is. But that the situation is tending towards war, and unless it can be arrested will result in war, I personally have no doubt whatever. I think the piling up of arms is most formidable. It is difficult to know how far it is wise even for an unofficial member of this House to mention names, but it is so very well understood that one. Power has enormously increased its military strength in the last few months,

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or few years, that there may be no harm in referring to it.
I am quite aware that in spite of these great preparations we are continually assured that the Power in question has no aggressive object. I am quite ready to believe that these assurances are given in the utmost good faith. But after all nations, perhaps even more than individuals, must be judged more by what they do than by what they say, not because one wishes to attribute any dishonesty to them, but because if you see a nation adopting a course which will in all probability, or even you may say with something like certainty, lead to a particular result, it does not matter whether that nation at the moment foresees that that result is going to take place or not. From the point of view of the other nations they have to assume that the result that appears to be likely will occur.
One must be perfectly frank. After all, it is not only that Germany has enormously increased her armaments. I do not know whether the Government will admit that that increase has surpassed their expectations; we shall no doubt hear when we come to discuss other proposals of the Government what the actual facts are; but that they have increased is beyond doubt. I cannot meet any one who comes back from that country who is not impressed by the tremendous glorification of the military idea. These are facts, but it seems to me a matter that requires further explanation. If there is no danger of aggression or something like aggression in the future, it is curious that Germany should have left the League of Nations, should have abandoned all the machinery which had been erected for the purpose of peaceful settlement of questions in dispute, should have abandoned the Disarmament Conference, which was designed, rightly or wrongly, for the same purpose, and should have embarked on this enormous expenditure which in itself makes peace more difficult to maintain.
You will not get nations to endure great military expenditure except you tell them that for some purpose it is essential, that you are afraid of attack from somebody; and when you say that, you do something, sometimes a great deal, to create that atmosphere and that temper which some accidental circum-
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stance may change into a warlike action. It is quite evident—this indeed illustrates what I have been saying—that our Government, whom nobody, I am quite certain, suspects of anything in the nature of aggressive action or aggressive desires, feel extremely anxious about all this, and they are going, so we understand from the newspapers, to present a large scheme—I do not know whether the public anticipations of that scheme have any relation to the facts; but there is to be a large scheme for an increase of armaments at apparently very considerable expense.
No Government in their senses desire to do that kind of thing. They know quite well that large expenditure of that kind must be the cause of great difficulties, must make it more difficult for them to pursue other objects which they no doubt have in view, must be in itself a bad thing. The only conceivable reason there can be for doing this is that they are afraid that circumstances may lead to a sudden attack by some Power or other, and in that regard it does not matter which Power. They feel that further protection is absolutely necessary. I am sure there will be many of us who will scan their case and their proposals with the utmost care and with grave doubts as to whether what they propose is the best course. No one can tell until we see what their proposals are. All I say is that, individually, I am quite certain that if that is the whole of their policy with regard to war, it is quite inadequate for the purpose. No amount of piling up of arms by this or any other country is ever going to give real security from attack. Therefore I venture to say this much about the general situation because, to my mind, that is the whole point.
I have heard it said, not without truth, that the Abyssinian question has nothing to do with Abyssinia; by which is meant that the reason for our action and our policy is not that we have any particular sympathy with Abyssinia, still less that we have any hostility to Italy. It is because we feel that this attack on Abyssinia is a great attack, avowedly a great attack—there is no question of it, it has been proclaimed as an attack—on the collective system. That is the real point, that is the fundamental point. Unless we agree about that, then I admit it is impossible usefully to discuss the matter.

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I am not going to quote the necessary statements. Everybody must have them fresh in his mind. Italy contends that this is a matter between her and Abyssinia and that nobody has a right to interfere. "Your collective system does not apply. It has no value at all in this case. We are going on whatever you or anybody else say." That is the point. If that proposition is made good and is accepted as the general principle for European relations, we are going to suffer an injury compared to which it is impossible to suffer anything that will be greater for our safety, our honour, and, indeed, for our existence.
I heard my noble friend say—I heard it, he will forgive my saying so, with some regret—that he wished the Government to make a statement that in no circumstances would they run the risk of war unless our interests were directly affected. In what way can our interests be more directly affected than by the destruction of the collective system? That is the whole point. To my mind unless we are agreed about that we are bound to differ. Unless we are agreed about that, then I agree there is no justification for our intervening; we had better resign immediately from the League of Nations; we ought indeed to have done it some time ago. But I take a different view. I accept the view adopted by every Government in this country—that is that the collective system is essential to our safety.
I listened with great anxiety to hear from my noble friend what it was that he proposed to pat in its place. I heard nothing; no suggestion of any sort or kind. He said he was very strongly in favour of peace. I agree. He said he disliked the Italian hostility. I agree. Nobody doubts that. He said something about the Triple Entente which, I suppose, was Stresa. Does he really suppose that such an instrument as some kind of treaty of alliance between three Powers at Stresa is going to guarantee peace? That is going back a long, long way in history, It is going back to expedients which have been tried over and over and over again and never have succeeded. They might conceivably postpone war, but I doubt whether they would have done that for very long. What was the result? Why this country of which I have been speaking, Germany, instantly said: "This is an attack upon us; this is an attempt
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to surround us and to coerce us by these three Powers." And whether she would have felt herself strong enough immediately to challenge those Powers or not, she would never have rested until she had built up a rival organisation amongst the nations of the world which would have eventually caused the crash the possibility of which we all view with such profound anxiety. That is the issue as it seems to me.
My noble friend talked about a vociferous minority. If minorities are to be judged by their vociferousness, the minority represented by the Daily Express and the Daily Mail must be an extremely small one. I have no doubt at all that the views which I have been attempting imperfectly to express are the views which are adopted and accepted by the vast majority of the people of this country. And I base that opinion upon these two facts. First of all there is the celebrated Peace Ballot which a noble Lord who I understand is to take part in this debate thinks was unfairly conducted. I want to assure him that his information is grossly insufficient upon that subject. But that is not the main thing. The main thing is the General Election. All the members of the present House of Commons, with a quite insignificant exception, are pledged to support peace by the collective system. If our Constitution has any meaning we are bound to accept that as a representation of the wishes of the people. Apart from a few exceptional constituencies, if anybody stood saying he was in favour of abandoning the League of Nations, going back to the old system of alliances and armaments and counter-alliances and counter-armaments, I doubt whether he would save his deposit.
I want to say a few words about the actual course of the proceedings that are going on now. I should be very glad if the Government can tell us what in their view is the present position of affairs. I am not one of those who say that nothing has been done. On the contrary, I think a great deal has been done. You have an agreement amongst fifty nations, you have their acceptance of certain measures. That is an immense step forward, something quite new in the history of international relations. I have no doubt the progress has been considerable, but it is very slow. And—it is another point upon which I do agree

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with my noble friend—I do think that the longer this war is allowed to go on the more dangers are bound to supervene. You cannot tell what those dangers will be, but you cannot have a war going on under modern conditions anywhere without there being a certain number of dangers accruing. And of course it is expensive, though I do not really feel very much impressed by the arguments of my noble friend on that point.
Therefore I still regret—I do not wish to conceal it—that it was impossible, as I suppose it was (I do not know), to take much more drastic and vigorous measures at the very outset on the top of the great speech of September 11 at Geneva. I cannot help feeling that if we had then been able to take really decisive measures, such as cutting the communications between Italy and Africa, the war would have been automatically prevented. I do not believe for a moment that anything else would have happened; but in any case the whole thing would have been over in a few months, and we should by this time have been in a position to establish some such scheme of final settlement—I do not pledge myself to the details—as my noble friend Lord Noel-Buxton sketched in his interesting speech. I still believe that was the right policy.
Let us now do whatever lies in us to make the thing more effective, to make more rapid the advance towards peace. I do not use language such as punishing the aggressor. I do not think that is the proper way to look at the matter at all. Let the aggression be disposed of, let the aggression be stopped. Once you have that really settled in one way or another then by all means consider what is the best and the fairest and the most satisfactory scheme for settling the whole dispute as it was originally. In this connection I should be very glad to hear that the Government were prepared to support—perhaps they will think it is not desirable for them to say anything on the point at present—or even to propose the application of what are called oil sanctions. I am told that owing to the action of the United States those oil sanctions would not be nearly so effective as they would have been if the United States had been prepared to come in and take their part; but, as I read the Report of the Expert Committee, even so they would have some value, and I should be very
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glad to hear that they were to be imposed. On this matter I should think I might have the assent even of my noble friend who moved the Motion. I do regret the continual delays in this matter. There is no advantage in hanging the thing up. I cannot see why the necessary Committee should not meet before March 2, or, as I see it is now suggested, not meet before March 9. I cannot help thinking that all these delays are unfortunate. I cannot help feeling that if we adopt this policy there is no object in its being a half-and-half policy.
Although I have tried to express, I hope with due courtesy, my disagreement with the noble Lord, I understand his view. He wants to abandon the League of Nations and go back to the pre-War system. I do not think he would have the least chance of carrying that policy in the country, and I believe it would be disastrous if he could; but I understand it. It would mean the abandonment of Abyssinia, the abandonment of our undertakings to her when we accepted her as a co-signatory of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It would mean tearing up and throwing into the fire the whole basis of the Kellogg Pact. It would mean, as I read it, the ignoring of several promises we have made to Abyssinia to respect her territorial integrity. But still it is an intelligible policy, though it seems to me, if I may say so—I do not mean any personal disrespect to the noble Lord—a dishonourable policy and I believe it would be, in the end, fatal.
I understand his policy, which is to stop the war as soon as possible, and that I believe to be the real and merciful policy, and in the end the policy which will avoid, as much as possible, that enmity of Italy which the noble Lord deplores. But I do not think there is any advantage, to quote the very hackneyed phrase, in letting "I dare not" wait upon "I would," or even in letting "I dare not" wait upon the pleasure of the United States of America or any other country. I believe it is of great importance that we should have a clear, distinct, definite, courageous, uniform policy, and I am confident that if we have that policy and if we press it with the whole strength of our influence and position in the world there will not be any difficulty in finding followers from

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all the other countries, as we have found them until now at Geneva.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: My Lords, the three noble Lords who have preceded me have been in agreement, as I have no doubt every one of your Lordships will be in agreement, that this unfortunate war should be terminated as soon as possible, but I do not think that either of the noble Lords who spoke second and third produced any substantial contribution as to how that desirable state of affairs is to be effected. I am in entire agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Buxton, when he says that a knock-out, whichever side has to sustain it, will be disastrous, and I should like briefly to point out why. Should Italy win, it would be of course not merely a great blow to the League of Nations but to the whole principle of peace; but, should Italy lose, it would be at once a great encouragement to all that stands for mischief and sedition among the coloured races of the world and at the same time would cause a very great danger to our own East African possessions. It would be, moreover, very dangerous in Europe and to that point I shall allude later.
Though I cannot claim to have any personal knowledge of Abyssinia or East Africa, I do happen to have read a number of books dealing with those regions mainly in regard to travel and exploration. I do not think there is one of them that does not mention the trouble which our people in East Africa have to put up with from raids from the outlying portions of Abyssinia. Hitherto, we have been able, though at the cost of valuable lives, to beat off those raids, but I would ask your Lordships to consider the position in the future, when we have Ogaden Somalis and other particularly truculent tribes, armed no longer merely with swords, spears and gas-pipes, but with the most modern weapons of the infantrymen of the West, and possessed in many cases of the knowledge of how to use them. I fear the trouble we shall have to face in the future will be very serious indeed. But it is to the position in Europe that I would ask your Lordships to turn your attention for a few moments.
The noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, while admitting that there was a danger of war in the future seemed to think that there was no special risk of conflict
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breaking out in the near future. In that I am afraid the noble Viscount is optimistic. Some colleagues of mine in the Imperial Policy Group returned only a few days ago from an extensive tour of Central Europe. During that tour they visited Brussels, Berlin, Prague, Vienna and Paris. They had consultations with British Missions in each of those places and were also fortunate in meeting Herr von Ribbentrop, Dr. Benes, Herr von Schuschnigg and other eminent men. They came back with an impression that the whole of Central Europe is in a state of panic, each country suspecting that war may break out almost immediately. One of the unfortunate effects of the policy which has been adopted towards Italy is that the French, seeing their newly-achieved friendship with Italy likely to vanish, have been seeking to establish more cordial relations with Soviet Russia. Of the moral aspect of that attempt I will not speak, but the effect has been to cause great resentment in Germany and to make quite responsible people in that country threaten at no distant date to occupy the demilitarised areas by the Rhine. France has already said practically that she would regard any such step as an act of war and would march. We know also that there are ever-present danger spots in connection with Austria, Memel and other places. In these circumstances, it is not going to need a very great change in the situation to produce the beginnings of a. European war and we all know that once we have the beginnings we shall be in the middle of it very shortly. Furthermore, if Italy is defeated or sustains a really serious reverse, then that will be the most direct encouragement to Germany that there can possibly be.
If we are to achieve peace, how is it to be managed? I venture to suggest to your Lordships that the last way in which it will be brought about is by the suggestion of the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil. We all know his sincerity, but I am convinced that the only effect of putting into operation an embargo upon oil in the near future would be to precipitate a European war because no nation, as I have pointed out here before, could afford to see the youth of the nation being massacred by barbarians on foreign soil simply because other European nations would not permit oil to enter

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Italy. Besides, to make such an oil embargo effective, it is obvious we should have to block the entry of oil in American tankers, and the United States of America has shown in the past, and would certainly show in the future, that she does not appreciate interference with her trade and commerce. What solution then is there? I would respectfully suggest to His Majesty's Government that the first thing they should do is to try and call a conference of the two interested parties, to be held, say, rather in Brussels than in Paris, because there is not there the direct interest in the affair; and that there some terms of peace should be brought forward for tentative discussion. It is quite obvious that, had all our proposals been accepted as a basis for discussion and nothing more, we should have had a far greater chance of achieving peace by now—or at least of being well on the way to achieving peace—than we are to-day.
If these negotiations were to break down hopelessly, then I consider that His Majesty's Government should point out to the League of Nations that we are not at present, and will not be for some time to come, in a military position which would enable us to carry out the commitments on the Continent of Europe which we should certainly be expected to fulfil in the event of trouble breaking out there; and that until such time we could fulfil those commitments only by denuding ourselves of our resources here and laying ourselves badly open to foreign attack, which, I suggest to your Lordships, is not an attitude which the country would endorse on the part of any Government. Then, too, if negotiations break down we must also bear in mind that, should a war come to pass, it is not most of the countries of the League of Nations who would have to carry on that war. For all their protestations, the vast majority of the fifty-three countries are either unwilling or unable to do much to assist in a blockade. It would be left practically entirely to the British Empire, and indeed, I do not think even to the British Empire, because I believe that there are many parts of that Empire—the self-governing portions of it—which would be very chary about taking an active part in a struggle which did not directly concern Imperial interests and out of which they might well consider we ought to have kept. In
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those circumstances, my Lords, it is practically certain that Britain, as usual, would have to do what might be colloquially termed "the dirty work." I suggest to your Lordships that in this case, as it would certainly be we who should have to pay the piper, we should to some extent call the tune.
LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, I rise only for a few minutes, cordially to support the noble Lord, Lord Phillimore, and to beg His Majesty's Government to accept this Motion in substance and to assure your Lordships' House that they will do their utmost to find a means of securing peace. I would not detain your Lordships unless I had something to say which may perhaps be new. It is said by the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, that we must go on with this war and pursue the policy which we have pursued up till now, because this must be made a test case. I would implore the Government to realise that this is the worst possible case for the League of Nations to fight on. Judged by any available standpoint, you could not have a worse one. From the juridical point of view a learned friend of mine assures me, and I have no reason to doubt it, that no English Court of Law, however august—let us say the Court of Appeal—could be found, after considering the documents, the Covenant and the preamble, and the facts, to say that Abyssinia is at this moment, or was six months or a year ago, a Member of the League of Nations. I have no doubt whatever, and I assert it, that any English Court of Law, and I think any International Court, would say that Abyssinia certainly is not, and has not been for years past, a Member of the League of Nations. In order to be a Member of the League of Nations you must fulfil the essence of your contract but if you examine the preamble and the Articles of the League of Nations, you will find that her complete breach of all that is contained therein, and notably justice—that is, justice to all—makes it certain that, juridically, Abyssinia is not a Member of the League of Nations. That has always been the Italian claim. It may not excuse Italy's conduct, but it makes it a very bad test case for the League to fight on.
Then, think of another reason why it is such a very bad case to fight on. One has only to consider the speech made by

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my noble friend Lord Noel-Buxton and his devastating destruction—for, indeed, so it was—of the theory that we ought to fight in support of Abyssinia against Italy. Who comes into any court must come with clean hands. As Lord Noel-Buxton pointed out, there is a comparatively small caste, a ruling caste, who recently conquered the people of what is called Abyssinia and who are undoubtedly oppressing them and enslaving them. As he pointed out, the enslaving and the cruelty are somewhat better now, because the slave dealers and the slave raiders are away at the front, but he fears, speaking from those Benches, that when they return, unless there is somebody—the League of Nations or somebody else—to protect them, the unfortunate majority of the people will be oppressed as badly as ever by this minority. Can one imagine anything more extraordinary than to say that the League of Nations is to make a test case of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict? Judged by the available tests it seems to me to be the very worst.
I suppose the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, whom I do not see in his place, is prepared to say: "Yes, we wish to go to war with Italy about this, but we do not want to go to war with Japan." I do not want to go to war with either, but if you are to make a test case, Japan is a far more serious case than Italy. To that I think nobody can reply, except to say: "It does not suit us to quarrel with Japan, but if it comes to Italy, we know that we have them bottled up; our Fleet can cut them off. We have the best of this deal, so let our hearts vibrate, let us mouth all these platitudes about the glories of the sanctions policy." To me, the whole thing, if I may use the phrase in your Lordships' House, savours of sanctimonious humbug. We are straining at the gnat and swallowing the camel. We are shutting our eyes to much that is base and wrong, and concentrating upon this issue because we think that it is an easy conquest. That is not the way in which Britain has been led before, and I hope the will not be led that way now.
Now see the other argument against negotiating for peace if you can possibly get it: "Oh, well, having once begun the policy of sanctions, we must go through with it." Now on that question of sanctions there is something quite definite to be said. I am here to say that I know
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that His Majesty's Government, before many weeks or months are past, will have to drop sanctions. They had much better drop them now and tell the League of Nations that they mean to, and for this reason. What is the object of these half-sanctions, as we may call them, which have been imposed? At once when they become a danger we shy off them, but we pursue this policy of half-sanctions. What was the intention? It was not only that we might save Abyssinia. No, it was to make the Italian people suffer so much that they would begin to get tired of the war. We were told so; we were told by everyone who approved of this policy of sanctions that it would lead first to inconvenience and then to suffering on the part of the Italian people, and that therefore they would turn against their Government and their Prime Minister and force a peace.
There is no good in shutting our eyes to the facts and the truth. I have been to Italy comparatively recently. Only the other day I saw a very famous Italian statesman, and asked him if it were true, as I had been told by all the people learned in diplomacy whom I had seen, and who knew about Italy, that the effect of these sanctions, instead of making the people anxious to rebel, was to bring about a national unity so intense that they move as one man and one woman. He assured me it was absolutely true, and I should be very glad to hear from the Government whether it is not the fact that the effect of these sanctions has been greatly to increase the will to fight and the will to win of the Italians, and has had exactly the contrary effect to that intended. Why go on with such a futile policy which is resulting only in bringing on to the side of the Italian policy the whole people, from the top to the humblest peasant, the whole Catholic Church at last, throwing their whole weight into the: scale and all the gold they have, all their gold ornaments, into the crucible in support of a policy which they believe to be righteous and just. If all this be true, and I challenge contradiction from informed sources, surely we should drop this policy of sanctions which is dislocating trade and therefore tending to increase unemployment, not only in this country but throughout Europe, and is having the contrary effect to that which was intended.

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I believe that the Government should now say, as they certainly soon will have to say: "We did this with the best intentions and it has failed, and we ask the League of Nations to abandon the idea of sanctions altogether." Let us admit that this new-found plan—for it is new in this sense, that when we started through this uncharted sea we went in a certain direction which we believed would lead us where we wanted to land and we found we were sailing in the wrong direction and drifting swiftly on to the rocks—has failed. Let us now abandon it altogether. I think "prohibitions" would be a better word than "sanctions." We are told that fifty-two States of the world agreed to this policy, but fifty-two people have been demonstrably wrong. There is no good in shutting your eyes to this. Just as so many States agreed to apply prohibition to stop drunkenness in the United States, so fifty-two nations agreed together to stop war by sanctions; but of course, in the first case it failed for the reason which I am sure my noble friend will accept, that there were really no police to enforce the law, and if that is so, what is the good of it. In the same way here the nations do not mean what they say.
When the noble Lord answers us no doubt he will tell us what other nations have spent anything comparable to our £6,250,000. I do not complain of His Majesty's Government having spent £6,250,000. They were trying a policy and it was the only thing they could do; but the Foreign Secretary said that although we were anxious to pursue the League of Nations policy, it was essential that the burden should fall upon all nations and not upon one or two. It seems to have fallen nearly all upon one. Perhaps the Government will tell us how much other nations have spent. They cannot have spent much, because when Sir Samuel Hoare resigned he said that not a ship, gun or man had been moved. I hope that His Majesty's Government will drop the whole policy of sanctions for which that great organisation, the League of Nations, is not adapted, and endeavour to conciliate and not compel. The latter policy is one for which they have no power and which may land us into a great war.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, I confess that I have followed this controversy and
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without saying anything about it, either in this House or in the country, and now I am more and more bewildered by the inconsistency between Government pronouncements and the policy which they practise. If the Government had ever spoken or were still speaking to-day with a united voice on the question of sanctions or collective security or the protection of Abyssinia, I could understand their policy even if I did not agree with it, but the Government have never spoken for months past with a united voice on these questions. Take the question of sanctions. The Prime Minister has told us over and over again that
"there is no such thing as a sanction that will work that does not mean war."
He is pledged against war, but he applies sanctions! There is a complete conflict between pronouncement and policy.
Again, if the Government had been united and consistent about collective security, one could, at any rate, have understood their policy. They never have been. Do they think they are going to stop war by collective security? The Prime Minister said in his well-known quotation only a year ago that
"A collective peace system in my view is perfectly impracticable."
He gave his reasons, and he added:
"It is hardly worth considering…whether a collective peace system could be undertaken."
There is again complete conflict between pronouncement and policy. We are entitled to ask the Government representatives to-day if they will explain what is the meaning of this perpetual conflict between pronouncement and policy. If they had loyally stood by Article 16 and applied the coercive aspects of that policy I, like the last speaker, would have profoundly disagreed with it, but if they had loyally stood by Article 16 and applied those aspects of it, we might have understood. They have never done so.
We have infinitely greater danger to this Empire than anything which could occur in the Red Sea, where already the Italianshad a littoral position, and therefore the strategic position would not be affected by the war one way or another. If the Government had ever stood loyally by Article 16 one would have understood their policy. Not only did they not do so, because it did not suit them, but

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honour seems to have geographical limitations sometimes. Not only did the Government not carry it out, as we have heard, over Japan or South America, but in 1925, as was pointed out and never answered in another place, a few weeks ago, they did not repudiate the coercive aspects of Article 16 but definitely abandoned them. They never believed in collective security or they would never have entered into the Locarno Treaty. If France had believed in it in 1925 she would never have painfully woven an intricate web of collateral treaties of reinsurance in Europe.
Did they ever believe that this policy could protect Abyssinia, a weak nation, wrongly, as I think, attacked by Italy? Sir Austen Chamberlain, in 1935, said: "It is no good talking of economic sanctions without war." And Mr. Baldwin in 1934 said:
"It is untrue to say that the League does now, nor can in any time which anyone can predict, guarantee the nation which is a victim of the attack—or the world at large."
Yet you have the Government leading this country, as I think, into very grave dangers by their policy, by a system of expedients which their own Prime Minister has on each occasion announced to be impracticable, and even dangerous. But I think the noble Lord to whom we are indebted for this debate used a very good term when lie said it was time we stopped being the scold of Europe. And we might indeed also, I think, proceed to take the beam out of our own eye before extracting motes from other people's. That causes offence in Europe.
Are we really so impeccable ourselves? If one were not naturally reluctant to tell an old story which does not reflect credit upon our Governments, one might say a great deal more than I intend to say this afternoon. But there was such a thing as the Anglo-German Naval Treaty. Mr. Baldwin had said only just before in regard to the very Treaty the violation of which was condoned in the Anglo-German Treaty that "What Great Britain has signed she will adhere to." Not many months later we made a naval pact with Germany, I will not say entirely behind the backs of our own allies, but not in the fullest consultation with them, which was a definite condonation of a gross and complete breach of the Versailles Treaty. It may be it is dis-
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honourable not to perform what you have promised, but it is just as dishonourable, especially in national affairs, to promise to do much more than you know you can perform. That is what we have been doing all these last years. No one will accuse me of being politically biased in favour of Sir Samuel Hoare's policy, but I believe he is the first person who has attempted to reconcile, as it must always be reconciled for the security of the country, the true march hand in hand of policy with strategy. For the last five years we have been over-calling our hands, with a weak state of defence, and vet have been the scold of Europe and have sought to thrust our morals down other people's throats. I think that unless we are to be faced with greater evils than to-day, all that has to be put a stop to.
I am not going to say a word in condonation of Italy's breach of her signature, but she is not the only guilty party in this matter of breach of treaties. But there is one thing, I think, that should be pointed out—because you cannot discuss policy and the affairs of a great nation if you tear them from all the context of the past diplomatic history. In justice to Italy, quite apart from the growth of her population, quite apart from her own national needs, possibly quite apart from her own very grave internal difficulties—quite apart from all that, she has had a good deal of right on her side in this Abyssinian question. After all, it is not always remembered that the Anglo-Italian Agreements—and I hope the noble Earl will correct me if I make a false statement here—it is not always remembered that the Anglo-Italian Agreements of 1891 and 1894 still hold good to-day, and by virtue of those agreements almost the whole of Abyssinia was recognised by Great Britain as being an Italian sphere.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Only for commercial purposes.
LORD LLOYD: Well, we will come to that in one moment. We will take a more recent case. In the Anglo-Italian correspondence of December, 1925, there was an exchange of Notes with Italy in which, conditionally upon our obtaining commercial terms, the Tsana Concession, we promised to recognise an exclusive Italian economic influence in the west of Abyssinia and in the whole of the territory to be crossed by the railway that we

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had agreed to. And it was added that His Majesty's Government would further support all Italy's requests for economic concessions in the above zone.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Hear, hear.
LORD LLOYD: The noble Viscount says "Hear, hear." If we asked the French Government whether that was done behind their backs or not, we might receive a surprising answer. I did not intend to intervene in this debate except to support the noble Lord who spoke last and the noble Lord who moved this Motion in their appeal to the Government to abandon this inconsistency of policy and face the square facts of a very dangerous situation. I am always tempted, I must say, to follow my noble friend who sits beside me on these Benches (Viscount Cecil of Chelwood), and when he talks about going back to the old arbitrament of war I cannot help reminding him that the League of Nations and such things are just as ancient as war itself, and that of the last notable attempt at doing what His Majesty's Government are rather feebly doing to-day, Talleyrand said that the League of God created more disturbance in Europe than his own master, Napoleon himself. And when the noble Viscount talks about a war never settling anything, and says that armaments never saved any country from attacks, I wonder whether he has ever read the speech at Gettysburg and remembers what was said then. If it is true that armaments have never, or rarely, saved a country from attack—and I do not accept that: they have saved several countries from attack—they have practically always been sufficient to save a country from the horrors of defeat.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: I had intended to wait until after the noble Earl had replied, because I thought that in his speech I should get some food for my remarks, but I feel very much inclined to join in this violent conflict that is going on on the Front Cross Bench. If I had been told a few months ago that in this conflict I should find myself on the side of the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd. and against my noble friend Lord Cecil. I should have wondered what the subject could possibly be. But I want to concentrate my attention for a few moments on the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, because he exercises a very great influence
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in the country, and he is personally responsible for a great deal of the opinion that exists in this country. And I want to see if I cannot impress on him the fact that he is doing the League of Nations a very bad service.
He ended up an eloquent peroration by saying that we must not go back to the bad old times of the Concert of Europe and competition in armaments. Well, as we look at the world to-day can he quote any period of history where the aspect of international relations was worse than it is to-day, or when the peoples of the world were spending more on piling up these damnable engines of war? In no period of history has it reached this point. What is it that has made it reach this point? Not the collective system, but the misinterpretation of the collective system. A League of Nations, yes, but a League of All Nations. Sanctions, yes, but immediate, complete and drastic—on the day, on the nail. That is all right. But sanctions delayed, dilatory, halfhearted, have, as the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, has said, acted not as prohibitory, but simply as provocative. They are pinpricks which have caused Italy to unite together behind Mussolini in its enterprise which we have condemned. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, when he said this was a very bad instance to take as a test for the collective system because, after all, Italy has only lapsed back into one of our old habits. No, my Lords. Where I think the noble Viscount makes his mistake is in straining the League of Nations and straining the Covenant to execute a purpose which it is as yet too weak to perform.
I do not think there is anything more fatal between individuals, between organisations, between Governments and their peoples, and between nation and nation than to lay down rules and regulations and laws and treaty stipulations which cannot be enforced. The only effect of that is to bring the authority which tries to enforce them into disrepute. We know of a very famous instance, to which I shall not allude, of a Government attempting to enforce a regulation which it was quite unable to do, and of the law being brought into contempt by imprisonment and the authority being weakened. Those who are supporting the collective system and those who are supporting

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the Covenant of the League of Nations are not doing the League a service by urging the Government to go forward with more sanctions. I do not expect, that the noble Earl can possibly tell us what the opinion of the Government is on this particular point. We do not expect him to disclose anything before the Committee of Eighteen has met, but I think it has been very useful to-day that he should hear so many positive, strong, I would almost say violent, opinions against this policy of attempting to impose further sanctions.
The oil sanctions I really think are bound to be ineffective. The noble Viscount says he would rather have them even if they were ineffective. I think those who are in the know were able to see some weeks back that oil sanctions could not be made effective, irrespective of the decision of the United States. Do we really expect the great oil interests to sit round the table and say: "We are so strongly in favour of international justice that we are going to lot ego all the profits we shall get by what is going on in Abyssinia"? Nothing is so absurd as to suppose that you could regulate the oil supply unless you are prepared to use your Fleet to blockade the ports of Italy. I do not know what the mind of the Government is. We none of us know. The Prime Minister has turned out to be a first-class contortionist; and we really shall not be very certain whether we can rely on any statement of policy that he makes. But I think the Government have learned that the policy they have been attempting to pursue has failed. It has not stopped the war, it has not weakened Italian opinion, it has not checked Mussolini, and it has brought the League into disrepute. Let them make one more turn, one more change, and come down on the side of conciliation, basing their whole policy on the policy which was so finely enunciated in the House of Commons by my right honourable friend Mr. Lansbury, which is the treatment of this whole question of international troubles, not from the point of view of arms and weapons and how to wage war, but from the point of view of the causes and the troubles and the claims of one nation against another.
Until the Government undertake to do that, until this question is grasped from
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the right end, there is no possibility of stopping the piling up of armaments and the constant arising of international disputes and international jealousies. I really feel we are standing on the brink of a chasm. I feel the Government have got an enormous responsibility in preventing this nation getting closer to the edge. I regret very much, as I did from the first, that our naval arm was used so rapidly and so rashly as to draw upon us the enmity of Italy, with the result that we had to make a great many lame excuses. I do not know why that was done. We were told there were threats, we were told there was danger, we were told we had to take precautions, but these matters were screened from us, and I have yet to believe that it was the intention even of Mussolini to attack the British Empire. I do not believe that for one moment, and I think the concentration of our ships in the Eastern Mediterranean was a further provocative move. It is very difficult for the noble Earl to reply to this debate because, of course, he cannot disclose what must be a matter to be settled by the League, but I hope he will tell us what the intentions of His Majesty's Government are with regard to their voice in the decisions that will come up at Geneva. I trust lie may be able to give us some hope that the Government are sufficiently far-sighted to see that their present course is the wrong course. In any case, I think this debate has shown him that there is a very large body of opinion in your Lordships' House that has a very distinct view on this question.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I had not intended to intervene at this stage in this debate. In fact my instructions were to watch the debate and see if it were necessary to intervene in the absence of my noble friend Lord Snell; but the speech made by my noble friend who has just resumed his seat requires an immediate answer, and with your Lordships' leave I propose to attempt to give it, inadequate though no doubt it may be. My noble friend always speaks with great sincerity and with an adroitness and an agility which I have always admired, and he is also honest enough, I am sure, to say that he is speaking only for himself and those noble Lords who support his policy. He is not speaking for the Labour Party in the House of Commons nor in the country, as was proved very decisively

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when last we debated this matter. The last time this question of sanctions raised by Lord Phillimore and other noble Lords was debated by the Labour Party was at Brighton last October, and on that occasion, after two days of very good tempered but very keen debating, in which my noble friend played a very prominent part, his point of view and that of the noble Lord, Lord Phillimore, which was very ably presented in the Labour Party Congress, was defeated by a twenty to one majority. It is therefore necessary, I suggest, to make clear exactly where we stand.
From the moment I had the honour of entering your Lordships' House I have only ventured to address your Lordships in an endeavour to represent the view of those people who voted for the Labour Party at the last Election. It would be absurd to pretend that our Party is completely united on this question, but the great majority take the view which has been expressed by my noble friend Lord Noel-Buxton and, to some extent, by the noble Viscount on the Cross Benches, Lord Cecil. If the noble Earl who will speak for the Government cares to gibe at us, if he cares to mock us, because there is this difference of opinion between my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, speaking for his minority, and myself, speaking for my majority, he is welcome to do so, but I hope he has taken comfort from the debate so far. Everyone from his own side of the House, not excepting the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, has attacked him and his Government with horse, foot and artillery. It is said: "Beware when all men speak well of you." I do not know if the converse is the case, but, so far, all men have spoken ill of the Government and of the noble Earl and their conduct of affairs at Geneva and Paris and London. I am almost tempted, out of chivalry, to make a quixotic attempt to defend him, but at any rate I will not attack him in the way he has been attacked by noble Lords who have spoken, apparently, for the Conservative Party.
I will endeavour to reply to the important points raised by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. But first I want to express my regret that the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the Admiralty, has had to leave the Chamber, because I felt very deeply for him at not being
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ready to reply when he was attacked by the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, for making his Anglo-German Naval Treaty. That is not perhaps relevant to the debate raised by the noble Lord, Lord Phillimore, but I must say I would dearly have loved to hear another of those eloquent speeches from our latest recruit to the Government Front Bench, the noble Viscount, Lord Monsell, in defence of that extraordinary proceeding. The extraordinary thing was to find agreement between the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, and my noble friend. My noble friend says that the League of Nations was too weak to perform its functions. We did not know that at the time, last October.
LORD MARLEY: We told you so.
LORD STRABOLGI: My noble friend says he told us so, but who could have foreseen that M. Laval would have quite handled matters as he did as Prime Minister of France and been allowed to handle them so? Who could have foreseen now, as has been admitted and even during the General Election itself, even when the Government were reiterating in the country the peroration of the Lord Chancellor's eloquent speech just before we dispersed about their whole-hearted support for the League and the collective system—who could have known that during the General Election itself, and immediately the majority was assured, the attempt would be renewed and that these underground consultations were going on with the object of doing what has been called colloquially by the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, the "dirty deed"
Who would have known that when the Government were paying lip service to the Covenant of the League of Nations and its support in your Lordships' House and at Geneva—I am sure quite honestly by the noble Earl who represents the Government with such aplomb and with such efficiency at Geneva—the underground channels were being used for preventing, in the first place, the full application of sanctions, and secondly, to put forward what the great majority of the British people consider, including I believe my noble friend himself, most dishonourable terms, giving the aggressor more than the aggressor probably would conquer by force of arms? We did not know these things last October as a Party, and in the Election I dare say we may have lost a certain amount of

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support by appearing to put forward a policy too like the declared policy of the Government's? Who would have known there would have been this tortuous zigzag policy which has been so rightly condemned by several of your Lordships in to-day's debate? That is why the League has been weak. The League is only as strong as the States Members who compose it. The same thing can be said about a Church. A Church's strength depends upon its adherents. The same applies to the Cover ant of the League of Nations.
May I ask the noble Earl when he comes to reply to state what really is the trouble about the oil sanction? Let us know it, and if we possibly can let us be told quite plainly. Do you intend to drop it, or do you intend to go on with it? It is no use talking about the United States of America. This is a moral question as my noble friend Lord Noel Buxton pointed out. The consciences of the majority of the people of this country, and I believe of the people in most other countries, are outraged by the use of oil, some of it supplied by British oil companies, in one of which the British Government have a large shareholding, to the Italians. For what? For the bombing of undefended villages, for the attacks by aeroplanes on Red Cross units, and indeed for the whole conduct of the war. The Foreign Secretary, speaking yesterday in another place in reply to a question, said that no date had been fixed for the consideration of the Committee's Report on oil embargoes by the Committee of Eighteen. May I ask why no date has been fixed? That Report was issued and the date of the White Paper, as the noble Viscount has pointed out, was February 12. When we imposed the original sanctions, the whole work was done in about a week last October. I think I am right in saying that.
Why has there been this extraordinary delay with regard to oil sanctions We all know the technical difficulties. There is one that has not been mentioned. During the Great War we used to import oil not in tankers, but in the double bottoms of merchant ships. It is true that if there are leakages, and if, for example, from Hamburg or the United States oil can be obtained, then perhaps the effectiveness of the oil sanctions would be comparatively small, But I
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submit to your Lordships that that is not the real argument in the matter. It is not whether oil sanctions are going to bring the war to an end quickly or not—I believe they would have done so if they had been applied in October—but whether it is right to go on supplying oil to the aggressor. If that question is plainly poised before the people of this country, I myself have no doubt whatever what the reply would be. It is wrong and it is immoral.
My noble friend Lord Ponsonby says: "Oh, how can you expect the great oil interests to forgo their profits obtained from supplying oil?" Of course, you do not expect the great oil interests to do anything of the kind. Neither do you expect great financial interests who might be making money to-day by lending money to Italy to forgo making profits in that way. Neither would you expect the munition makers to forgo profits by not sending arms to Italy. But those persons and interests can be coerced and prevented by the Governments concerned from doing so. Just as the Government can prevent the financial people from lending money and the armament makers from sending arms to Italy, so they can prohibit the oil interests from sending oil to Italy. The oil interests can be brought into line by the Government in the same way as other interests can. One of the big British oil interests is, in the interests of its shareholders, supplying oil to Italy, and at present it is legal for it to do so. I submit that it ought to be made illegal. I should like the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, when he replies, to say what the cause of the delay is.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: What about the United States of America?
LORD STRABOLGI: The noble Viscount is good enough to ask what about the United States of America. How can you expect the United States of America or the Congress of America to take us seriously after the sort of debate we get in this House to-day, with justification accusing the Government of vacillation? I can only speak for our own Government. How can you expect the United States of America to take this matter seriously when we have permitted during all these months the so-called Laval policy to prevail, with the delays and postponements and elaborate in-

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vestigations of technical committees, and then, when asked: "When are you going to have any date fixed for the next step?" there is no reply. United States Senators and Congressmen will shrug their shoulders and say: "There you are. You Europeans are not serious. There is no real desire behind the efforts of the representatives of the various Governments at Geneva. All the British are thinking about is themselves and their Imperialist interests." That is what will be said in America—that we are acting in our own Imperialist interests. No; I believe if you put the United States of America in the moral dilemma of being the only great Power supplying oil to Italy there would be a rising of public opinion in the United States which would bring the recalcitrant Senators and Congressmen into line on this matter.
The noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, says that whoever comes into court must come with clean hands. He was speaking of the Abyssinians. I venture to say that the Italian conduct of certain phases of the operations has been atrocious. I do not think that Italy can come into court with clean hands. And by permitting the export of oil and other fuel and the means of continuing the war, I do not think we have clean hands either. I agree with previous speakers to the extent that if we are going to drop sanctions, and allow leakages and gaps to appear in the wall of sanctions, as we are doing at present, it would be far more honest to drop them at once. But for myself, I believe that the sanctions so far imposed are going to prove more effective than some people believe. I believe that the financial sanctions have been important. I believe that the stoppage of imports from Italy has been important also. I believe that these sanctions will have a cumulative effect. I myself would prefer oil sanctions to be applied and applied seriously. My invitation to the noble Earl who will speak on behalf of the Government is to explain the Government's policy with regard to sanctions in the past and their present policy. In the meantime I say keep on the present sanctions and I believe they will prove effective in the end.
LORD DAVIES: My Lords, I think we are greatly indebted to the noble Lord opposite for having started a very interesting debate. We have witnessed a most extraordinary spectacle in that
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we have discovered the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, apparently in complete agreement. It is not often we find the lion lying down with the lamb. When my noble friend Lord Ponsonby speaks on these subjects, he always appears to have a violent dislike of any kind of restraint or of any sort of policing system. He told us in his speech that one of his reasons for that is that it brings the law into disrespect. Well, what are the attributes of law? One is that it should be endorsed by public opinion, and another is that it can be changed by some peaceable procedure. The third principle, and perhaps the most important of all, is that it can be enforced. When at Geneva a few months ago the question of enforcement cropped up, we found that fifty nations agreed to the imposition at any rate of some of the sanctions, though not all, adumbrated under Article 16 of the Covenant. I venture to suggest to your Lordships that the willingness of nations to impose those sanctions did prove that public opinion was behind Article 16, and that nations were prepared at any rate to pool their economic resources and to impose economic and financial sanctions upon the aggressor nation.
In the Notice placed on the Paper by the noble Lord opposite, he urges the Government "to promote a peaceful settlement acceptable to all parties in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute." May I point out that it would be asking our Government, or indeed any Government, to do the impossible in endeavouring to find a settlement which is going to be acceptable both to Signor Mussolini and the Emperor of Abyssinia. The noble Lord knows perfectly well that for weeks and months at Geneva and in the Chancellories of Europe, attempts were made to promote such a settlement before the Italian Government embarked upon hostilities. Unfortunately, as we know, all these efforts broke down. Therefore I submit that we are now faced with the problem not of finding a settlement which is acceptable to all parties but one that is acceptable to public opinion and to the League. Clearly the policy of His Majesty's Government should be concentrated upon finding a League settlement, because the only alternative is one which may be imposed by one of the belligerents upon the other as the result of military operations.

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I suggest that to do this, it is essential to set up the appropriate machinery as quickly as possible in order that the League may be able to decide what is a just and equitable settlement, which is what they have not yet been able to agree upon. I suggest that this settlement should have regard first of all to the progress and development of the Ethiopian people; secondly, to any legitimate claims that Italy may have for economic expansion, and that it should also safeguard the interests of all other States Members of the League in the economic development of Abyssinia. This involves, as I have ventured to suggest to your Lordships' House on several occasions, the setting up of an Equity Tribunal on the lines of the Lytton Commission to investigate all the facts and to recommend to the Council and Assembly of the League what, in its opinion, would be a just and equitable solution of this problem.
It seems to me that we are apt to approach this matter from two different angles. First of all there is the point of view of those people whose minds are steeped in what I may call the pre-War mentality and outlook, and we have heard speeches on those lines this afternoon. On the other hand there are those who regard these issues in what I may describe as a post-War state of mind. We all know, from the experience of the last War, that war is the greatest evil which we have to face at this moment. These people who so lightly support the system of international duelling and competitive armaments appear to forget that 40,000,000 people, directly or indirectly, lost their lives in the Great War and that thousands upon thousands of millions of property was destroyed during those tragic years. They also fail to realise that at the conclusion of this terrible catastrophe, the nations of the world, or at any rate the majority of them, collaborated in drawing up a constitution of peace—the Covenant of the League—and formed themselves into an association for the sole purpose of preventing war. Under the articles of this association, as your Lordships know, they entered into certain mutual obligations which they believed to be essential in order to achieve their purpose.
Consequently I think we can maintain that whatever the international system was before the War, and however lawful
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it was in those days to grab territories and to flout interinational obligations, since then this system by mutual consent has been abandoned, and there has been substituted for it the rudiments at any rate of a reign of law. This pre-War mentality was expressed very cogently in the comments of an Italian newspaper the other day upon the policy which this country has pursued over a period of about 200 years. This is what it says:
"Empires are built with blood and hardships, and those who have built theta do not expect demands of partition. We Italians, too, if we had an empire, would defend it unguibus et rostris. But it is just in order not to ask the British Empire to make any sacrifice that Italy has gone to Abyssinia…Italians do not ask for British territories, but they mean to act as the British did for centuries. Italy, too, has the right to a place in the sun."
Now, it is quite true that if international relationships are to be run on the old system, then Italy has a perfect right to conquer Abyssinia and to grab everything which she possibly can. On the other hand, if the Covenant means anything at all, if the Kellogg Pact outlawing war as an instrument of policy is to be regarded as anything more than a-scrap of paper, then it seems as if the old policy of grab must be abandoned.
The Italian Government, as several speakers have told us this afternoon, has repudiated this new conception of international relationships, and in doing so it has struck a blow at the very existence of the League and has undermined any system of collective security. Consequently I would venture to suggest to the Government that the policy of our Government and of all States Members who are loyal to the League must be the vindication of a Covenant to which they all affixed their signatures at the conclusion of the Great War. Our complaint against the Government, which has been expressed in several speeches to which we have listened here this afternoon, is that since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles—and this refers not only to the present Government, but also to its predecessors—they have forgotten a very old maxim: the importance of securing continuity in our foreign policy. Looking back over this period, it seems to me that there are, broadly, two phases. The first may be described as the Disarmament phase, when we endeavoured to secure an all-round reduction of arma-

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ments and, in my opinion very foolishly, disarmed ourselves before we had succeeded in inducing other nations to adopt a similar policy. Also, may I point out that during this period we did our best to minimise all our commitments under Article 16? We made no secret of the fact that we regarded Article 16 as a dead letter; sanctions of every kind were taboo, and whenever France suggested at Geneva the pooling of the economic and military resources of the States Members of the League and the creation of some kind of International Police Force, we always gave her the cold shoulder. In the meantime we took no steps, other than joining in the discussions and deliberations at Geneva, to discover some peaceful procedure for the settlement of grievances and outstanding disputes in Europe.
I suggest that this phase ended rather abruptly about twelve months ago when the Government announced their willingness to co-operate with other nations in sending an International Police Force to occupy the Saar territory during the period of the plebiscite. This was the beginning of the second phase, which we call the Collective System. Last autumn we announced our intention of honouring at least some of our commitments under Article 16, and, as has already been pointed out, our lead was followed by about fifty other States Members of the League. An embargo was put on the export of arms to Italy, and financial and economic measures were also put into operation, but I should like to point out that all this had to be done in a tremendous hurry. A Committee of Experts was appointed to draft these proposals for putting financial and economic sanctions into operation; we all know that it worked at high pressure day and night in order to produce a workable plan. I venture to submit to your Lordships that all this should have been planned ahead years ago, so that the implications of Article 16 would have been worked out beforehand in order that, once the Council decided to put sanctions into operation, a practical plan would have been forthcoming at once.
The same remark applies to the diplomatic sanctions and to the oil sanctions. If that had been done, we should not have found ourselves in the unfortunate position in which we are to-day, because a plan on these lines would probably have
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provided a sufficient deterrent effect to prevent Italy from resorting to hostilities at all. When you come to think of it, the whole object and value of sanctions is to prevent hostilities from starting and not to punish the aggressor after he has committed his crime. However this may be, the point I want to emphasise is that, because there is no continuity of policy and because the Government were unable to make up their minds what policy to pursue until the pressure of events forced them to do so, we have muddled into an extremely dangerous and unfortunate position.
There are a great many other points which have arisen during the discussion to which I should like to allude, but I am sure that we are all anxious to hear the reply from the Government Benches to speeches which have been made, and therefore I will not detain the House by referring to other points which I should like to mention. I will simply suggest that sanctions alone will not produce a real and sound system of collective security. There must also be some method, some procedure, of providing peacefully for changes which in the old days meant a resort to war. We have to find some substitute for war, and I venture to suggest that when negotiations break down, the only possible procedure left is to refer the matter to an impartial and disinterested tribunal. We feel that this is the time when such a tribunal should be investigating all the facts and sifting all the evidence, in order that through sanctions, which by themselves cannot produce the kind of settlement that we want, the Assembly and the Council of the League might be able to impose a settlement upon not only one of the belligerents but both, in the interests of the world and in the interests of peace generally.
LORD DICKINSON: My Lords, I am not going to keep your Lordships more than a very few minutes, but I should like to say one word. I did not intend to speak, especially upon the Motion that appears upon the Paper, namely, that the Government should do all they can to bring this lamentable war to a close. On that I think we are all quite unanimous, and I am perfectly certain that the Government are doing all they can in that direction. But the debate has extended far beyond that, and certain things have been said which

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to my mind are of extreme danger. The noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, definitely said that he appealed to the Government to drop the whole policy of sanctions. Does my noble friend realise what that means? The sanctions that are being applied are sanctions that have been applied by us under our covenant to apply Article 16 as a part of the Covenant, and in Article 16 it definitely says that Members of the League undertake immediately to subject a Power which has broken its word to the severance of all trade or financial relations, and the prohibition of all intercourse between their populations——
LORD MOTTISTONE: Of course I was fully cognisant of that fact, but I endeavoured to make it clear that we had not endeavoured to impose all these sanctions but had insisted upon the partial imposition of the sanctions. The full imposition of sanctions would have meant war. This partial imposition has failed entirely of its purpose and I therefore ask for the abandonment of the policy altogether.
LORD DICKINSON: The question whether they are full sanctions or not is open to discussion, but they have been chosen to be put in force with the consent of fifty-two nations, and it has merely been the duty of this country to impose them. It could not really have escaped from imposing these sanctions, and if the Government were to suggest that we should go back one iota from these sanctions they would be betraying fifty-two nations. I assure this House that these other nations have by no means played a secondary part. It is perfectly true that the British Government have taken the lion's share of the discussion, but the other countries have been even more interested in this question of sanctions than we are ourselves. You have only to follow the debates that have taken place recently in Sweden, Holland and other countries, to realise that, and I feel sure that if, by any chance, we were to drop the sanctions policy, we should be betraying the whole world, because the whole world, even our American friends, depends upon our carrying on the policy that we have commenced.
It would be not only an unsafe act but not a wise one. Italy has no friend among the nations of the world at the present
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moment, for even Austria cannot be said to be friendly. Italy has ostracised herself by her action, and sooner or later that will operate upon Italy, and then I think we shall get negotiations to end the war. What is the real point which has raised this feeling in this country and throughout Europe? It is whether or not States, having signed treaties not to go to war, are free to break them. That is the objection taken by the ordinary people to the action of Italy, and I feel sure that unless we can enforce such treaties, not only the League of Nations will fall to pieces but the whole idea of getting an international system under which peace and law shall reign. It is because of that that we are so anxious this policy should be upheld, and we trust and certainly believe that His Majesty's Government will uphold it in the future.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (EARL STANHOPE): My Lords, I must apologise to the noble Lord behind me for inadvertently trying to cut hint out of the debate, and I apologise all the more because I welcome the contribution which he has made to the debate, and I should have regretted if it had not been made. I rejoice that someone has at last brought the House back to the subject matter on the Paper. When I listened to the debate and to the very interesting speeches which have been made, I really rubbed my eyes and looked at the Paper to see what I was supposed to be answering in the House. I am glad, therefore, that the noble Lord has emphasised the whole policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to collective security and the League of Nations as a whole.
May I begin by trying to answer the Question on the Paper, before trying to deal with the questions which have been put in various parts of the House? Your Lordships will remember that when we were discussing this matter some two or three months ago, on December 5, I reminded the House that on November 2 it was suggested to the Co-ordination Committee of the League of Nations that the United Kingdom and France should be entrusted with the task of trying to find terms of peace which would be acceptable to Italy, to Abyssinia, and to the League of Nations itself. I rather think that the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, questioned at that time the fact that the

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terms of peace would be satisfactory to the League of Nations. Perhaps I misunderstood him. Subsequent facts have, I think, proved that I was right in making that statement. As your Lordships know, these efforts finally took shape in what are known as the Hoare-Laval proposals, which proved no more acceptable in Geneva than they had done in London.
With the abandonment of these proposals the mission which had been entrusted to this country and the French Government came to an end, and the matter was referred once more to the League of Nations as a whole. The matter is not, of course, one by any means for His Majesty's Government or the Government of any single country, and it is one of the criticisms, if I may be allowed to say so, of my noble friend Lord Phillimore, with regard to his Question as it appears on the Paper. It appears from the way in which this is put on the Paper as if this is a matter between the United Kingdom and Italy. Of course, as has been said over and over again on behalf of the Government, in this House and in another place, and throughout the country, this is a matter between the League and Italy, and no more between this country and Italy than between Italy and any other Member of the League. At the present moment there is no request or suggestion from either Italy or Abyssinia for conciliation, and the Committee of Thirteen therefore reported to the Council of the League, on January 22, that they saw no opportunity for concluding a settlement of the dispute at that moment. The Council of the League accepted the Report of the Committee of Thirteen.
That is still the situation, and neither His Majesty's Government nor, so far as I am aware, any other Member of the League is at this moment preparing any new proposals for conciliation. I think it was Lord Cecil who said that he thought we were right in not putting forward a succession of proposals for conciliation, one after the other, as he said M. Laval had done last autumn. I agree with that view. I think that if a succession of proposals is put forward to Italy, it only encourages Italy to go on in the hope of getting better terms, and every member of this House, whatever his views on other subjects may be, agrees in this,
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that we all desire this war to come to an end at the very earliest possible moment. Therefore, to make suggestions which might encourage Italy to go on with the struggle is obviously not in the interests of peace at all.
As I have remarked on other occasions, the policy of the League, and of course of this country, has been twofold. It has been a policy of attempting to find terms of peace on the one hand, and of imposing sanctions on the aggressor on the other. Those aims have been running together, pari passu, and I think that is what has caused several members of your Lordships' House to think that the policy of the Government was not clear and definite. It is obvious that when you are pursuing two courses at the same time it is not as easy to make your course clear to everybody as it would be if you were only following one. But we feel that if we had not had the double policy we were not likely to get a satisfactory solution of this question. The whole point has been that Italy, by tearing up four treaties, really placed herself in a position in which the League of Nations had no other alternative but to take action unless it was going to stultify itself altogether.
That is why sanctions were imposed. Nobody wished to impose sanctions. Nobody likes sanctions. I do not like sanctions any more than the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, but I have more faith in their effectiveness than he has, and that is the difference between us. I have no doubt in my own mind that, although it might have been quite true at one time that the imposition of sanctions brought the Italians together almost as one man behind Signor Mussolini, that is not the situation to-clay, and the increasing pressure of sanctions is certainly having its effect. This is not the moment to say how far the League is going to succeed, and how far it will manage to bring the war to an earlier conclusion than would otherwise have been the case. Nor are we in a position to say yet that we shall have proved to the world that aggression does not pay, and that Italy could have obtained everything that she will obtain if she had only come to the League and submitted her case there, and had refrained from any action in Abyssinia at all. We must wait upon events. But I at any rate am optimistic with regard to

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the future, and I believe that the League will be able to show that it has been able to achieve a success.
The Resolutions of the Committee of Eighteen which were adopted on January 22 are to be found on the last page of the White Paper (Cmd. 5071) which was recently laid before Parliament. If do not think I need go into those Resolutions at any length, but briefly they show that existing sanctions are being maintained and are being imposed by practically all the States of the League with, I think, only three exceptions. Albania, Austria and Hungary. The Committee of Experts has reported on these sanctions and has drawn up a detailed questionnaire in order to elicit the fullest possible information as to how sanctions are working. This being the first time that sanctions have been put into operation, of course we have a good deal to learn about them, and there are no doubt certain loopholes that have to be closed. The Petroleum Committee, set up at the same time, completed its Report on February 12, and this is available to your Lordships to-day in the Printed Paper Office. I think the Committee of Eighteen is expected to meet early in March to receive its Report.
The noble Lord opposite, who I am sorry to observe always expects me to throw a gibe at him—which only shows, I think, that once or twice I have been able, as the French would say, to say "touché," but I have no intention of doing it on this occasion—asked me several questions with regard to oil sanctions. Frankly, I do not see anything very much more moral in supplying coal in order to convey troops to Abyssinia than in supplying oil, but the fact remains that people get an idea that there is something immoral about oil. I am afraid I cannot give any answer at this moment. The Government refrain from declaring their policy until our representative attends at Geneva and hears all the arguments on both sides. But the whole idea of sanctions is that you should only impose a sanction when you think it is going to be effective. It is for the League to decide whether an oil sanction is going to be effective or not, and whether that can be the case supposing the United States is not prepared to collaborate with the League on this matter. That is the sole question—whether it is going to be effective or not.
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And when some noble Lords maintain that the oil magnates are making enormous profits out of this war, I can only say that, as regards British oil, that is not true. Because the amount of oil which has been supplied to Italy by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company—I am quoting from memory, because this is far outside the terms of the Motion on the Paper—has dropped from something like the normal eleven per cent. to four per cent. I am almost certain that it is not more than four per cent, of the total supplied to Italy and Eritrea at this moment. If oil were cut off, it is as well that we should realise that of the three to three and a-half months' supply which is what the experts think is now available to Italy—that is, of course, all kinds of oil, not only petrol, but lubricating oil and every other type—it is calculated that only about 20,000 tons per month are actually being used in Abyssinia. Therefore, if Italy decided that there should be a very great curtailment of the use of oil in Italy that would not stop the war with Abyssinia by any means in three months, or anything like it. It would simply mean that less oil would be consumed in Italy, and petrol would still be available for lorries on the roads in Abyssinia and for flying over the territory in aeroplanes. I am sorry I cannot go further into that question, but it is far outside, the Motion.
LORD STRABOLGI: May I ask what is the cause of the delay in the meeting of the Committee of Eighteen since February 12, when this Report was published?
EARL STANHOPE: I am not sure I can answer that. It is not a matter for this Government or for this country; it is a matter for the Secretariat of the League and, I suppose, for the Secretary-General. I hazard a guess—it is not more than that—that the experts really got through their work a great deal faster than any one expected. I understand that it is one of the best Committees that has ever sat at Geneva, and with a question of that complication, its members were certainly expected to take longer over their Report than they did. When they have reported, that Report has to go to all the countries which are represented on the Committee of Eighteen, some of them a very great distance away, and those countries obviously must consider the question with great care before their representatives go to Geneva. It is not a

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question, as in our case, of being only at twenty-four hours' distance. That adds to the delay. I am only hazarding a guess in this matter; it is one outside the hands of His Majesty's Government.
I think that is all that I really need say, except perhaps to refer to the other White Paper to which my noble friend referred, No. 5072, dealing with the approach we made to other nations in case an attack were made by Italy on this country, owing to no action of ours, but merely because we had taken part with other nations at Geneva. Somebody—I think it was my noble friend Lord Lloyd—attacked the Government for having taken action in sending the Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean.
LORD LLOYD: It was not I.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: I did.
EARL STANHOPE: Obviously the reason for that was that we were being threatened in the Press and in other ways in Italy and we recognised that to leave our Fleet at Malta at that moment would have been extraordinarily unwise. When it is suggested we were using the Fleet against Italy, of course that is entirely untrue. The Fleet was not used in any kind of way against Italy, unless indeed somebody suggests that to have the Fleet in any way near Italy would have been a threat to that nation. Everybody knows perfectly well that we have not the smallest intention of taking any isolated action against Italy in any sort or kind of way. It should be noted that in our action throughout—and this is perhaps why it has not been so easy to take as consistent action as we should have liked—it has been necessary to work with all the other nations in the League. We had to find the highest common factor, and until we had got that we had obviously to restrain our hands and wait until we saw how far other nations were prepared to come into line with us on this matter.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: The Fleet was not moved at the instance of the League of Nations?
EARL STANHOPE: No, it was moved because it was thought advisable to move it away from close proximity to Italy in view of the threats which were at that time being made.
LORD PHILLIMORE: May I ask whether it has not been strengthened at all above the normal Mediterranean force?
EARL STANHOPE: I believe it has, but only to the extent of bringing it up to what I believe the First Lord would describe as a balanced Fleet. I cannot talk on these matters, because they are not under my Department; but that there was anything in the nature of a threat to Italy by any action taken by the Fleet is entirely wide of the mark. I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Phillimore talked about British bullets being used in this war. As a matter of fact, less in the way of munitions has been sent to Abyssinia from this country than perhaps from any of the greater countries in Europe.
LORD PHILLIMORE: If no British bullets have been sent to Abyssinia I should be delighted to hear it. Can the noble Earl tell me that?
EARL STANHOPE: No, nor did I suggest that statement; but the actual amount sent from this country is small, and therefore to suggest that the casualties which the Italian Army is suffering are due to British bullets is entirely misleading. It is an impression constantly given in Italy, and that is why I hope the noble Lord will never repeat it. It is so misleading, because a speech like that gets quoted against us and, as the noble Lord acknowledges himself, it gives a wrong impression. He made a very curious statement towards the end of his speech. He said that if treaties were unjust a nation which felt aggrieved obviously had to take action, and therefore it seemed unfortunate that the League should prevent their doing so. The only way I can understand that statement is that any nation which feels that treaties are unjust should be entitled to take aggressive action and go to war in order to put that right. The whole policy of the world to-day, as a result of our experience in the Great War, is to try and stop war breaking out if we can. Nobody will pretend that the League is at present in a position to do so. My noble friend Lord Lloyd referred to a statement made by the Prime Minister quite a long time ago, in regard to sanctions.
LORD LLOYD: Last year—not so long ago.
EARL STANHOPE: He has said it on several occasions. What I think my right honourable friend said was that sanctions that would stop a war would obviously have to be of a military character.
LORD LLOYD: That is not what I quoted. The actual quotation I have sent upstairs to the reporters, but what the Prime Minister said was that no sanctions without war could be efficacious.
EARL STANHOPE: Perhaps I have not got it accurately, but my recollection is that the Prime Minister was talking of sanctions to stop war, which are obviously of a military character, and those we could not support.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: May I suggest that these private conversation might; be addressed to the House?
EARL STANHOPE: I apologise. I thought I was audible to the House as a whole. My noble friend Lord Lloyd referred to Article 16, and asked: Does it protect Abyssinia? Obviously not. The whole point of Article 16 is that if somebody became an aggressor then you should be able to bring pressure to bear upon him in order to endeavour to bring war to an end if possible. It is not pretended that Article 16 will prevent war. What we hope is that in time—I admit it may be many years off—the League will get strong enough to be able to show a nation that aggression does not pay. Once you are able to prove to the world that aggression does not pay, you will get no further wars, because obviously it would not pay to take that action. He remarked that we are inclined to promise to do more than we can perform and that the League also takes that line. I agree that sometimes individuals and nations promise to do more than is possible, and certainly the League is no exception to that rule. But what is even more true is this, that to tell the people of this or any other country that in these days of vast armaments any nation is going to be strong enough to stand alone is even more promising the impossible than saying that by taking collective action you are going to get greater security than you are able to achieve in other ways.
The noble Lord referred also to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, and said
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that was indeed a case where apparently we had broken a treaty. I do not want at this late hour to go into the whole question of the Treaty of Versailles and how far we and other signatories had realised that some of that Treaty had become obsolete. Obviously a good deal of it, the payment of war debts and so on, has gone by the board, but I would point out, as regards the Naval Treaty, at any rate that was for a reduction of armaments and therefore in the direction of peace and not opposed to it.
LORD LLOYD: I am afraid I must have put my point very badly. I was arguing on the morality of it, not the effect. I said we condoned, grossly as I think, a breach of a treaty in view of Mr. Baldwin's declaration as to what we signed we adhered to, particularly in regard to the Versailles Treaty, and I thought that was a very bad thing to do.
EARL STANHOPE: I do not want to follow the thing any further, but I think my noble friend will see that there were a great many advantages in the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, and they tended to peace and not in the other direction. Lord Ponsonby remarked that Lord Cecil on the Cross Benches was doing the League a very bad service. I am inclined to agree with him because, although perhaps I find myself in some ways more in agreement with Lord Cecil than with him, I think the noble Viscount is claiming far more for the League than most of us think is attainable in these days. When Lord Cecil suggested that we had only to apply the sanction of blocking the Suez Canal in September and we should have had no war, I reply that we should not have had a war in Abyssinia, but we certainly should have had a war in Europe instead. That is one of the reasons why His Majesty's Government are opposed to anything of the kind.
We have said our idea is to attempt to bring wars to an end and certainly not to take part in them. Therefore to impose a sanction which merely extended war to other countries was quite obviously contrary to our policy and contrary also to the policy of the League of Nations as a whole. What is more, once again we should have failed to get collective action. Sometimes my noble friend Lord Cecil and sometimes I think my noble friend Lord Ponsonby are inclined to

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think community of action does not matter. I do not want to stress too much the moral side of fifty nations proclaiming a nation the aggressor and taking action against that nation, but it obviously has an effect; it is having an effect at this moment. In addition, when that is backed up by financial and economic sanctions, the effect becomes much greater still.
The policy which I understood the noble Lord opposite to desire was one that I am bound to admit I admire. It is the policy of the idealist. Some day, when we become a very Christian nation, which I am afraid we are not yet but rather going the other way, we may have a much higher moral standard than we have today. It may be that then other nations will follow our example, and when we get a very high moral standard the policy which he suggests may become the policy that we shall all follow. But I fail to understand how he thinks that is practicable politics to-day, because if somebody refuses to adopt the high moral standard you are left with nothing at all. The noble Lord does not like imposing sanctions because he thinks that they are dangerous, and he still less likes to revert to arms, so I do not see what we are left with except the ideal which we admire but which ceases to be effective. The policy of the Government we think is better than that. Perhaps it is not so good a one as that which we admire so much, but at any rate we think, to use an Americanism, it has a greater chance of "delivering the goods."
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, said that there was no continuity of policy, and that sanctions alone would not solve the question. Then he went on to talk about his favourite subject, the Equity Tribunal. I wonder if he had had his Equity Tribunal and if that Equity Tribunal had made terms of peace, say, something on the lines of the Committee of Five, what would have happened next'? He proposes that sanctions should then be applied, and then, of course, everybody would bow down because the Equity Tribunal had said so. But that is not how things work in these modern days, and to my mind, even if his Equity Tribunal had gone into facts at enormous length, and neither Italy nor Abyssinia had fired a shot while all these long discussions and considerations were being pursued, when the verdict was filially
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given he would have found himself, in very much the same position as we find ourselves in to-day, still with two nations fighting each other, still with two nations not yet prepared to accept conciliation, still with the League as a whole believing that finally the pressure of combined opinion and of combined sanctions will have its effect, and that sooner or later we shall get conciliation and a peace which the two sides will have to accept. My Lords, I have no Papers to lay other than the two White Papers to which I have referred and the one on oil which is now laid. Therefore I am afraid I have nothing further that I can put before your Lordships. I apologise for having been very discursive, but that was not entirely my fault, and I must apologise also for, I have no doubt, not having answered many of the points that have been made.
LORD PHILLIMORE: My Lords, I at any rate have no reason to complain of the want of support that has been given to me in the course of this debate, and I certainly have to thank the noble Earl who has just sat down for a full answer if not a very satisfactory one. There are one or two points which I must, in my own interest at any rate, clear up. In the first place the noble Earl suggests that I said that all the bullets that were now hitting the Blackshirts were British made. I think if he will turn up the OFFICIAL REPORT he will find that I made no such suggestion. What I did suggest was that the moment any British bullets began striking a Blackshirt in Abyssinia the intensity of the feeling in Italy would certainly be increased, and I regret to hear from him that it cannot be said that no British bullets have been supplied to the Abyssinians for this war.
Then the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, accused me, for what reason I cannot imagine, of advocating the total abandonment of the League of Nations. I mentioned no such idea, and I do not know what his authority can be for the statement. But I will go as far as this, that I am a very strong advocate of the abandonment of coercion by the League of Nations until, at any rate, the World Police and the Equity Tribunal of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and general membership of all the Great Powers are attained. Once they are attained, I shall begin again to think that the League of

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Nations should apply coercive measures. The noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, showed that interest that he always feels. He found fault with Germany, and, amongst other things, when he was dealing with alternatives to the collective system, he pointed out that Germany would never rest, if we returned to the old system of balance of power and so on, until she built up a rival organisation. That shows to my mind, if I may very respectfully say so, the most extraordinary short-sightedness to things as they are to-day. What is Germany doing and going to do now? She is budding up a rival organisation to the collective peace system as we are pleased to call it, but which really is a system for maintaining the status quo as it suits us.
I turn to the reply of the noble Earl. It amounts to this, that the Government, who, as I said in my speech, have all along been the spear point of this attack upon Italy, are new declining to take any measures whatever to promote peace. I cannot but regret that at times the noble Earl talks in a vague kind of way when he says that this country is after all a Member of the League of Nations, and that I ought to have mentioned the League of Nations instead of mentioning this country in my Motion. I address myself to my Government. I am not speaking here to the League of Nations. I am asking my Government to support what I think is in the interest of the country, and I am asking them with all
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the power I can command not from a selfish interest but because, amongst other things, I think that the Government will inevitably fall on this question unless they make up their mind that the nation as a whole will not enter into these foreign adventures which are not directly the concern of the British people. I hope that warning will not be neglected.
It does seem curious that the noble Lord, Lord Dickinson, should claim that the last Election was won by the Government on the policy which they are now pursuing. Surely it was the Party opposite which went to the country on sanctions—and military sanctions as well. It was they who said the collective peace system and Article 16 must be enforced up to the hilt. Were they successful or were they handsomely defeated? The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, referred to the Brighton conference when the collective trade unions decided on sanctions. They went to the country on that policy and they were thrashed. Then the noble Lord, Lord Dickinson, turns round and says the nation is behind the policy of sanctions. It is really extraordinary. I hope the Government will even yet reconsider this attitude of non possumus. I thank the noble Earl very much for his reply and I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.
House adjourned at half-past seven o'clock.

Preamble
The LORD CHANCELLOR The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House, That the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificates from the Examiners that the further Standing Orders applicable to the following Bills have been complied with:

Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Traction [H.L.],

Cornwall Electric Power [H.L.],

Gravesend and Milton Waterworks [H.L.],

North Metropolitan Electric Power Supply [H.L.],

Rickmansworth and Uxbridge Valley Water [H.L.],

Swansea and District Transport [H.L.],

Great Orme Tramways [H.L.],

Imperial Continental Gas Association [H.L.],

Royal National Pension Fund for Nurses [H.L.].

And also the Certificate that the Standing Orders applicable to the following Bill have not been complied with:

Post Office (Sites) [H.L].

The same were ordered to lie on the Table.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (EXCLUDED AND PARTIALLY EXCLUDED AREAS) ORDER, 1936.
Report from the India and Burma Orders Committee, That they have examined the Draft Order as required by the Standing Orders of the House; that in their opinion the provisions of the Order raise important questions of policy and principle which have been accepted already by the House when passing the Government of India Act, 1935, under which the Order is submitted for approval; that the Order is not founded on precedent, inasmuch as no other Order has been made under Section 91 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 that they have considered the Amendments proposed by the Secretary of State for India; that in the opinion of the Committee the Order cannot be passed by the House without special attention, but that no further inquiry is necessary before the House proceeds to a decision on the Resolution to approve the said Order.
Read, and ordered to lie on the Table.