Sitting of 14 March 1934

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.
Ministry of Health Provisional Order (Accrington) Bill,
Ministry of Health Provisional Order (Watford) Bill.
Read a Second time, and committed.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

  AUSTRIA.
  Mr. MANDERasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is able to make any statement with reference to the situation in Austria; and whether any further information has been received from the Austrian Government with regard to the summoning of a special meeting of the Council of the League of Nations to consider the position or whether that has been abandoned?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir John Simon): In reply to the first part of the question, I would refer to the answer given yesterday to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood). In reply to the second part of the question, the Austrian Government have made no recent statement regarding the intention which they annouced some weeks ago of appealing to the League of Nations.
  Mr. MANDER: Is my right hon. Friend being kept informed of the conversations that are now going on in Rome?
  Sir J. SIMON: They have only just begun. I understand that the visit to Rome is to discuss the economic situation. I have no doubt that our Ambassador will do his best to keep me informed.

  CHINA (RAILWAY DEBTS).
  Mr. MOREINGasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his
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  attention has been drawn to the statement of policy by Mr. Wang Ching Wei, the Prime Minister of the Chinese Government, with regard to the payment of railway debts which has been issued to the Press by the Chinese Legation; whether he has received official confirmation of the assurances given in the statement; and whether he has received any information of the steps the Chinese Government are taking to implement the undertakings contained in it?
  Sir J. SIMON: Yes, Sir. My attention has been drawn to the statement to which my hon. Friend refers. No official confirmation of it has, however, yet been received and I am making further inquiries.

  GERMANY (BRITISH FILM).
  Mr. MANDERasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he proposes to take any action with reference to the banning in Germany of the British film "Catherine the Great," after it had been passed by the censor; and whether compensation will be paid to the company concerned?
  Sir J. SIMON: Representations have been received on this matter from the producers of the film in question, and these are now being considered.
  Mr. MANDER: Is it to be understood that no British film in which there is a Jewish actor or actress will be permitted to be shown in Germany in future?
  Sir J. SIMON: I think that is a different question.
  Mr. CHARLES WILLIAMS: Will my right hon. Friend assure the House that he will not stir up trouble with Germany because of a film censor?
  Colonel WEDGWOOD: Why not?

  CEYLON.
  Brigadier-General Sir HENRY CROFTasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has now had an opportunity of looking into the facts with regard to the attempt in 1932 to serve writs upon members of the State Council in Ceylon in connection with debts, or whether he is satisfied that.

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  there are no members against whom there was an attempt to serve a summons?
  The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for DOMINION AFFAIRS (Mr. Malcolm MacDonald): I have been asked to reply. I have seen in the Ceylon Press accounts of the incident to which my hon. and gallant Friend refers, which arose from the attempt by a process server to serve summonses on two members of Council. As I said in my speech in the Debate on the 21st of February, if any member of the State Council were to become bankrupt, he would under the terms of the Constitution be ineligible to continue as a member.
  Sir H. CROFT: I understand the hon. Gentleman to say that there was an attempt to serve a summons. Am I right in saying that this was only prevented by the accused pouring red ink over the process server when he attempted to hand the summons to the members of the Council?
  Mr. MacDONALD: If the Press reports are correct, that is so.
  Sir H. CROFTasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has now received information with regard to the attempts by the State Council to reduce the various allowances to the Governor of Ceylon; whether the Governor's travelling allowance reduced in committee has been restored, and, if so, by what majority; whether the allowance for upkeep of furniture and equipment was cut; and, if so, by what amount?
  Mr. M. MacDONALD: My hon. and gallant Friend presumably alludes to certain, reductions made in Committee in the Governor's allowances during the passage of the Appropriation Bill for the financial year 1932–33. No reduction was made in the Governor's travelling allowance in Committee, the provision being carried my a majority of one. The allowance for the upkeep of furniture and equipment was reduced by Rs. 10,000 from Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 15,000. No reductions were made in Committee during the passage of the Appropriation Bill, 1933–34. I may point out to my hon. and gallant Friend that the critical examination of the estimates
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  by the State Council in the year 1932–33, when economies were urgently necessary, was extended to all the heads of expenditure.
  Sir H. CROFT: Would it be unfair to suggest that these petty vexations may be described as in the nature of "baiting" the Governor?

  TRADE AND COMMERCE.

    IMPERIAL PREFERENCE (CEYLON).
    Sir H. CROFTasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he can state what articles of importance were eliminated from the Imperial preferential tariff in Ceylon?
    Mr. M. MacDONALD: The most important items excluded by the Ceylon State Council from the list of articles in respect of which the Board of Ministers in Ceylon in December, 1932, proposed that Imperial preference should be introduced were as follow: Cotton piece goods, cement, iron and steel plates and sheets and some other iron and steel products, apparel and silk and artificial silk hosiery.
    Sir NAIRNE STEWART SANDEMAN: What are the Government going to do about it, in view of the situation in Lancashire?
    Mr. MacDONALD: My right hon. Friend has said on several occasions what the Government have done about it, and I am afraid I cannot add anything to those answers.
    Colonel WEDGWOOD: Is not pottery to get a preference in Ceylon?
    Mr. MacDONALD: I should require notice of that question. This is a list of those things that are excluded from preference.
    Colonel WEDGWOOD: Presumably, pottery from Staffordshire is admitted on preferential terms?
    Mr. MacDONALD: I should require notice of that question, but, if it was admitted, it still is.

    JAPANESE COMPETITION (COLONIES).
    Mr. CHORLTONasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will give a statement for the first two months

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    of this year of imports into the Colonies of Japanese goods together with those from this country, with the equivalent figures for last year?
    Mr. M. MacDONALD: I regret that this information is not yet available.
    Mr. CHORLTON: What action does the hon. Gentleman now propose to take, in view of the negotiations that have been going on between the trade delegations having broken down?
    Mr. MacDONALD: That is not a matter that I can answer, but we are ready to give any assistance that we can in helping trade negotiations to be successful.
    Mr. CHORLTON: But the negotiations having definitely broken down to-day, we in Lancashire, where the matter is important, want to know what action the Colonial Office is going to take with reference to these particular goods?
    Mr. MacDONALD: Obviously, I should require notice of that question.

    COLONIES AND PROTECTORATES (RUSSIAN IMPORTS).
    Sir PARK GOFFasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is aware of the export of Soviet cotton goods and fabrics to British possessions in Africa, to the Straits Settlements, Siam, and the Malay States; and whether he will take action to counteract the activities of the commissar of foreign trade in this respect and protect British trade with those places?
    Mr. M. MacDONALD: I am aware that there are certain exports of this character to the British Colonies and Protectorates named in the question, but I have no information that the volume of trade is substantial. The matter will not be lost sight of.
    Sir P. GOFF: Is my hon. Friend aware that these exports have been steadily increasing ever since 1931 and that now they are treble what they were at that date?

    LADIES' GARMENTS (ADVERTISEMENT SALES).
    Mr. ALLENasked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that finished ladies' dress skirts of Japanese origin have been selling in London, retail,
    352
    at 6d. and 1s. each, made of materials that contain 36 and 85 per cent. of wool, respectively; that such material could not be manufactured in this country under 1s. to 1s. 6d. per yard; that the labour cost alone to make such skirts in this country would be 1s. 3d. per skirt; and whether he proposes to take action in the matter to protect British workers?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the BOARD of TRADE (Dr. Burgin): I have made inquiry into the transactions referred to by my hon. and learned Friend, and I am assured that the garments in question were of British and not of Japanese manufacture. I understand that the goods were offered by a firm of retailers at these extremely low prices an an advertisement in connection with their annual clearance sale. The second part of the question does not, in these circumstances, arise.
    Mr. ALLEN: Will my hon. Friend inquire what were the wages paid to British labour for making these garments?
    Dr. BURGIN: I have been into this subject very thoroughly because I was shocked by the suggestion in the question, and I was very glad to find there was no foundation for it whatever, and that it was merely an advertising stunt.

    BRITISH HERRING (RUSSIAN PURCHASES).
    Sir P. GOFFasked the Minister of Agriculture whether, in view of the fact that large sales of herring have not resulted from the Russian Trade Agreement, he will consider the advisability of a Government export bounty of 2s. 6d. per barrel to stimulate the export of herring to Russia?
    Captain Sir GEORGE BOWYER: I have been asked to reply. My right hon. Friend is satisfied that the absence of any large sale of herring to Russia since the conclusion of the agreement is largely due to the fact that the stocks of herring in this country are virtually exhausted. He is afraid that the suggestion put forward by my hon. Friend is, in any case, not one which the Government could entertain.

    SHIPBUILDING, NORTHERN IRELAND (GUARANTEED LOANS).
    Mr NEIL MACLEANasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the rate or

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    rates of interest charged by the Northern Ireland Government upon loans under the Loan Guarantee Act which are given to shipowners who place orders in Belfast shipbuilding yards?
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Mr. Hore-Belisha): The loans gauranteed by the Government of Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland Loans (Guarantee) Acts do not appear to be publicly quoted, and I have no information as to the rates of interest at which they were issued.
    Mr. MACLEAN: Cannot the Chancellor of the Exchequer of this country obtain the information asked for in the question from the Government of Northern Ireland?
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: No; that is a question which should properly be addressed to the Home Office. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is responsible only for the finances of this country.
    Mr. KIRKWOOD: Is there any truth in the statement that is made that the Government of Northern Ireland is in the position to place funds at the disposal of the shipbuilders of Belfast to the detriment of the rest of the shipbuilders of Great Britain?

    MARINE INSURANCE (STAMP DUTY).
    Mr. BROCKLEBANK (for Mr. RANKIN)asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether his attention has been called to the burden upon the British shipping industry caused by the Stamp Duty which it is necessary to pay in connection with insurance; and whether, with a view to giving some assistance to the shipping industry and reducing the inequity of this duty in this connection, he will review the whole matter in connection with the forthcoming Budget?
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: I am aware that representations have been made in regard to the Stamp Duty chargeable on policies of marine insurance. As regards the second part of the question, my hon. Friend will not expect my right hon. Friend to anticipate the Budget statement.

  ROYAL AIR FORCE.

    AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURE.
    Rear-Admiral Sir MURRAY SUETERasked the Under-Secretary of State for Air whether, in the view of the
    354
    Air Ministry, the number of firms manufacturing aircraft at the present time is sufficient for all probable contingencies?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for AIR (Sir Philip Sassoon): The number of such firms is considered sufficient for peace time requirements and for providing an adequate basis for expansion in emergency.
    Sir M. SUETERasked the Undersecretary of State for Air whether, in view of the uncertainty that now prevails in Europe, the Air Ministry is distributing its business over the aircraft industry with a view to keeping all firms competent to manufacture aircraft reasonably employed?
    Sir P. SASSOON: My hon. and gallant Friend may rest assured that all relevant factors are taken into account in distributing Air Ministry business in the aircraft industry. He will appreciate, however, that the primary factor is the technical efficiency of the competing types offered.

    AIR STRENGTH (ONE-POWER STANDARD).
    Mr. MANDERasked the Undersecretary of State for Air if he will state approximately the estimated annual increased cost to the Air Estimates of bringing this country up to parity with the largest European air Power on the existing basis?
    Sir P. SASSOON: The increased air expenditure involved by the maintenance of the Royal Air Force at parity with the strongest European Air Force existing to-day may, on a basis of current prices, be put at approximately £8,000,000 annually.
    Mr. MANDER: Would that be the same for the first year as for subsequent years?
    Sir P. SASSOON: No. It would average out.

    MARINE CRAFT.
    Mr. LAMBERTasked the Undersecretary of State for Air if competitive tenders are invited for the supply of marine craft required by the Air Ministry?
    Sir P. SASSOON: The general practice is to invite competitive tenders. In the case of launches and propeller dinghies, however, it has been necessary to standardise the successful types for a

    355
    reasonable period. I may add that, with a minor exception, the whole supply for 1934 will be competitive.
    Mr. LAMBERT: May we take it that it will be a general rule in the Air Force that competitive tenders will be invited?
    Sir P. SASSOON: Yes, it is the general rule, but the right hon. Gentleman realises that standardisation up to a certain point is necessary in the interests of economy.
    Mr. LAMBERT: But standardisation may lead to favouritism, and favouritism certainly should be taken out of the Air Ministry.
    Mr. NEIL MACLEAN: Is it not the case that there is a standardisation now of motor craft required by the Air Ministry, and that these motor craft could be supplied by several firms if they were allowed to tender for them?
    Sir P. SASSOON: In the coming year all tenders will be competitive.
    Mr. CHORLTON: Is it not a fact that by the methods of costing adopted by the Air Ministry only the very best machines and engines can be obtained, but that the prices are always proper prices, and not too much is paid?
    Sir P. SASSOON: That is so.

  AVIATION.

    IMPERIAL SERVICES (PASSENGERS' NATIONALITY).
    Mr. MALLALIEUasked the Undersecretary of State for Air whether he is aware that two persons of German nationality were refused permission to travel on the Imperial Airways air-liner leaving Alexandria for Athens on 4th March last, on the ground that there was no room, when in fact there were two seats unoccupied; and whether it is in accordance with the subsidy agreement with Imperial Airways, Limited, that there should be discrimination between different nationalities?
    Sir P. SASSOON: I am informed that the company in London have no knowledge of this incident. Inquiries are being made, and I will communicate with the hon. Member later. There is no provision in the subsidy agreement bearing
    356
    on the nationality of passengers, and discrimination on this point would be contrary to the company's policy.

    AIR MAIL SERVICES (SPEED).
    Mr. CHORLTONasked the Undersecretary of State for Air if he will give the air speeds of the American postal air services on the principal routes and the equivalent speeds of those run from this country to the Continent and to the East and South Africa, together with the frequency?
    Sir P. SASSOON: It is hardly practicable to give the information for which my hon. Friend asks within the limits of a Parliamentary answer. I will accordingly communicate with him privately on the subject.
    Mr. CHORLTON: Is it not a fact that American machines are of the order of 50 per cent. faster than the machines that we are building in this country, and is not that a very important thing indeed?
    Sir P. SASSOON: I think that could only be in exceptional cases. As my hon. Friend knows, the conditions of commercial aviation in the United States of America for the last few weeks at any rate have been rather unsettled.

  TRANSPORT.

    ROAD ACCIDENTS (SOUTH MIMMS).
    Mr. LOVAT-FRASERasked the Minister of Transport if his attention has been called to the village of South Mimms, in Hertfordshire, where the average of deaths from road accidents is one a week; and if he will exercise his powers under Section 29 of the Road and Rail Traffic Act to impose a speed limit for the village?
    Sir FRANCIS FREMANTLE: May I draw the Minister's attention to the regrettable fact that the village of South Mimms is in Middlesex and not in Hertfordshire?
    The Minister of TRANSPORT (Mr. Oliver Stanley): My hon. Friend appears to be misinformed when he states that the deaths from road accidents in this locality average one a week. The information in my possession is to the effect that during the 12 months ended 28th February, 1934, there was one person killed in a road accident in the village of

    357
    South Mimms, and two persons were killed outside the village at the junction of the Barnet By-Pass and St. Albans Road. I deplore these accidents but in any case Section 29 of the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933, would not enable me to impose a speed limit in the village. If, however, the local authority takes action under Section 46 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, as amended by Section 29 of the Act of 1933, for the imposition of a speed limit, the matter shall have my immediate consideration. I may add that light signals are about to be provided at the junction to which I have referred.
    Mr. LOVAT-FRASER: May I ask where the hon. Gentleman got his information as to the number of deaths?
    Mr. STANLEY: Through official sources.
    Mr. LOVAT-FRASER: May I ask—and I hope the House will not regard my question in a facetious spirit—if the hon. Gentleman is aware that an inn in the centre of the village has recently been closed for want of custom and that the premises have been opened by a funeral undertaker?

    BRIDGES.
    Captain STRICKLANDasked the Minister of Transport whether, in view of the impossibility of repairing essential bridges, scheduled as weak, within a reasonable immediate period of time and seeing that those bridges have been, and are, successfully carrying Toad traffic, he will now consider postponing the operation of Section 30 of the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933, or inform the House what he proposes as an alternative?
    Mr. STANLEY: I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the answers which were given on this subject on the 5th and 7th March to the hon. Member for Newport (Mr. Clarry) and the hon. Member for Henley (Sir G. Fox) of which I am sending him copies.
    Captain STRICKLAND: May I ask the Minister a definite question? In the case of a bridge that is acknowledged to be unsafe and about which neither the local authority nor the bridge authority is prepared to move, has the Minister no power to insist on the bridge being made safe; and, in the alternative, is road transport to be held up indefinitely until these people come to some arrangement
    358
    to have the bridge put in such a state that the roads can be used for their legitimate purpose?
    Mr. STANLEY: Perhaps my hon. Friend will put that long question on the Paper.

    RIVEE TAY (ROAD BRIDGE, DUNDEE).
    Mr. DINGLE FOOTasked the Minister of Transport whether he has considered the copy sent to him of a resolution passed by the Dundee Corporation, on 6th February, urging upon the Government the desirability of proceeding with the construction of a road bridge over the River Tay at Dundee as a work of national and local importance; what answer he has returned; and whether he will state the attitude of his Department towards this project?
    Mr. STANLEY: Consideration has been given to the resolution to which the hon. Member refers and I am sending him a copy of the reply which explains my Department's attitude towards the Tay Bridge project.

    DOCKS AND HARBOURS (REORGANISATION).
    Mr. NOEL LINDSAYasked the Minister of Transport whether he will institute an inquiry into the reorganisation of the port and harbour system of this country, with special reference to the relations between dock undertakings and railway companies and to the standardisation of charges?
    Mr. STANLEY: Questions such as those to which my hon. Friend refers would appear to be for the consideration, at any rate in the first instance, of harbour authorities themselves.
    Mr. LINDSAY: Is it not a fact that the authorities concerned are pressing for an inquiry such as is indicated in the question?
    Mr. STANLEY: I know that a gentleman connected with one harbour has circulated a paper to that effect, but beyond that I have not got that information.
    Mr. LINDSAY: But is it not a fact that the views expressed in that paper coincide with those of the majority of dock and harbour authorities?
    Mr. STANLEY: I think that is a question which the hon. Member can answer.

  COAL INDUSTRY.

    ROSS COLLIERY, HAMILTON (WORKMAN'S DISMISSAL).
    Mr. DUNCAN GRAHAMasked the Secretary for Mines if, when the inspector of mines was making inquiry into the irregularities at Ross Colliery, Hamilton, any inquiry was made into the reason why a workman was dismissed for refusing to commit any of the irregularities mentioned in his letter of 1st March; and what action will be taken by his Department to ensure that workmen at this colliery will not be intimidated into breaking the law or dismissed for refusing to do so?
    The SECRETARY for MINES (Mr. Ernest Brown): The answer to the first part of the question is that three separate inspections were made in connection with the hon. Member's complaint, and all the circumstances fully investigated. With regard to the second part of the question, there is no evidence of intimidation and, although it is a fact that a workman was dismissed, I am not satisfied that the circumstances of his dismissal were quite what the hon. Member suggests. The matter is not, however, one which can conveniently be dealt with within the limits of question and answer, and I would, therefore, suggest that the hon. Member should meet me at some time convenient to himself, when I will place all the relevant facts before him.

    COAL MINES BILL.
    Mr. ROBINSONasked the Secretary for Mines (1) whether he has yet reached terms of settlement with the coalowners in regard to the inter-district co-ordination of minimum prices; if so, what have been the terms of the settlement and when will it come into operation;
    (2) whether, following negotiations between himself and the coalowners, he can now inform the House whether the Government intend to proceed with the new Coal Mines Bill?
    Mr. E. BROWN: The Bill which was introduced into this House on 15th February, 1934, covers the inter-district co-ordination of minimum prices. I have informed the President of the Central Council of Colliery Owners that if agreement can be reached covering the matters
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    dealt with in the Bill in a manner considered satisfactory by His Majesty's Government, effect will be given to such agreement by Order and the Bill withdrawn. As, however, the coalowners have tried for nearly two years to reach agreement, but have not succeeded, the Government has no intention of delaying the Bill which will be proceeded with in the normal course.
    Mr. ROBINSON: May we then take it that in no circumstances will the Secretary for Mines depart from his original pledge to secure an effective amendment of Part I of the Coal Mines Act?
    Mr. BROWN: My hon. Friend should consider the answer I have given.
    Mr. GEOFFREY PETO: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this Bill is very distasteful to many coalowners in the north?
    Mr. BROWN: I am aware that many of the things that they themselves have considered are also distasteful to various sections.
    Mr. PALING: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether the coalowners are still trying to come to an agreement or whether they have given up all hope?
    Mr. MARTIN: Can the hon. Gentleman say when the next stage of the Bill will be proceeded with?
    Mr. BROWN: That question should not be addressed to me.

    BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION.
    Mr. HOLFORD KNIGHTasked the Postmaster-General whether and, if so, when power has been exercised under Article 16 (iv) of the Royal Charter of Incorporation of the British Broadcasting Corporation to examine the accounts of the corporation and to obtain information and documents of the receipts and expenditure thereof?
    Mr. BLINDELL (Lord of the Treasury): The power given by Clause 16, paragraph 4, of the charter has been exercised on one occasion, in 1930, when an examination of the corporation's accounts was undertaken by an officer of my right hon. Friend's Department in

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    connection with an application made by the corporation under Clause 18, paragraph 7, of their licence for a revision of their scale of payment.
    Mr. KNIGHT: Will my hon. Friend be good enough to ask the Postmaster-General whether, in view of the complaints as to the administration of the corporation, it is not desirable that there should be some further inquiry?
    Mr. BLINDELL: I will convey that observation to my right hon. Friend.
    Mr. MAXTON: May I ask why it is not possible for either the Postmaster-General or his efficient under-study to be present to answer questions?

    BRITISH ARMY (VOCATIONAL TRAINING CENTRES).
    Mr. JANNERasked the Financial Secretary to the War Office the fees

    Statement showing the number of men trained at each of the Army Vocational Training Centres since their institution.

    Year ending.

    Aldershot.

    Chisledon.

    Hounslow.

    Total.

    31st December, 1923

    …

    …

    (a)

    (b)

    160

    160

    31st December, 1224

    …

    …

    —

    170

    347

    517

    31st December, 1925

    …

    …

    —

    362

    418

    780

    31st December, 1926

    …

    …

    —

    567

    505

    1,072

    31st December, 1927

    …

    …

    219

    670

    526

    1,415

    31stDecember, 1928

    …

    …

    410

    639

    554

    1,603

    31stDecember, 1929

    …

    …

    661

    821

    711

    2,193

    31st December, 1930

    …

    …

    631

    652

    708

    1,991

    31stDecember, 1931

    …

    …

    732

    908

    789

    2,429

    30th September, 1932

    …

    …

    758

    780

    665

    2,203

    30th September, 1933

    …

    …

    725

    982

    633

    2,340

    (a) The centre at Alder shot was instituted on 1st April, 1927.

    (b) The figures for 1923 are not available. Previously to September, 1927, this centre was located at Catterick.

    IRISH FREE STATE.
    Viscount GASTLEREAGHasked the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs whether he is aware that during the Ottawa Conference an offer was made by a representative of the Government for the settlement of the dispute with the Irish Free State, one of the terms of which was that Northern Ireland should be brought into a federation with the Irish Free State; and whether he can make any statement regarding the matter?
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    charged to each rank of students attending Army vocational training centres?
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the WAR OFFICE (Mr. Duff Cooper): The weekly charges are:

    s.

    d.

    Lance-corporals and privates

    5

    0

    Lance-sergeants and corporals

    6

    0

    Staff-sergeants and sergeants

    7

    0

    Warrant officers, Class II

    8

    6

    Warrant officers, Class I

    10

    0

    Mr. JANNERasked the Financial Secretary to the War Office the numbers of men trained at each of the Army vocational training centres for each year since these centres have been instituted, respectively?
    Mr. COOPER: As the answer contains a number of figures, I will, with my hon. Friend's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the answer:
    Mr. M. MacDONALD: My right hon. Friend has seen the Press report to which I gather my Noble Friend refers. He can only describe the account there given as fantastic.

  LOCAL LOANS FUND (ADVANCES).
  Mr. DUNCAN GRAHAMasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Public Works Loan Board are authorised to lend money for approved purposes to local authorities whose valuation is less than £250,000; whether he is

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  aware that the present rate of interest chargeable on such loans is 3f per cent.; and will he, in view of the pressing need for working-class houses, consider the advisability of reducing the rate of interest to local authorities?
  Mr. HORE-BELISHA: As I stated yesterday in reply to a question by the hon. and gallant Member for North-East Bethnal Green (Major Nathan) it has been decided to reduce the minimum rate of interest on new advances made from the Local Loans Fund from 3⅝ per cent. to 3½ per cent. This will apply to advances made to local authorities on the security of local rates for any purposes of the Housing Acts on and after the 13th March. Local authorities are eligible for such advances if their valuation does not exceed £200,000 in England and Wales or £250,000 in Scotland.

  BRITISH GUIANA.
  Mr. PALING (for Mr. LUNN)asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what progress has been made in the development of the goldfields in British Guiana by the building of the Bartica-Potaro road; whether any improvement in the communications with the Mazaruni diamond fields has been effected; whether the geologists engaged in examining the area have made any preliminary report; and, if so, what are its conclusions?
  Mr. M. MacDONALD: The quantity of gold produced in the Potaro area increased from 4, 999 ounces in 1932 to 10,020 ounces in 1933. This increase may be in part attributed to the improved communications afforded by the Bartica-Potaro road. A survey of a branch road to Tiboku in the diamondiferous area on the River Mazaruni is in progress. A brief preliminary report by the Director of the Geological Survey has been received, and this indicates that certain new gold finds have been made; but the report is not sufficiently detailed to admit of any conclusions being drawn as to their economic value.
  Mr. PALING (for Mr. LUNN)asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is aware that there has been an extensive flood and destruction of small farmers' lands throughout the coast lands of British Guiana; that the Government of the colony has closed to the
  364
  local miners the entire river frontage on both banks of the Mazaruni through the proved diamondiferous lands for a depth of one mile and a length of some 136 miles; and whether, seeing that exclusive permission has been granted to a company to prospect over the area for a year, he will state the name of the company and the promoters?
  Mr. MacDONALD: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. A despatch has now been received from the Governor reporting on the steps taken to afford immediate relief to sufferers. Funds have been made available for relief measures. As regards the second and third parts of the question, I am not aware that action of the nature indicated has been taken, but I am causing inquiry to be made.
  Mr. ROBINSON: Can my hon. Friend say whether the Minister proposes to make any grant out of the funds at his disposal for the relief of the distress caused by these floods?
  Mr. MacDONALD: A good deal of relief is being given out of administration funds, and, in addition, there have been contributions from private sources.

  HOUSING BILL.
  Sir GEOFFREY ELLIS (by Private Notice)asked the Minister of Health whether in the Housing Measure announced in the King's Speech provision will be, made for dealing with the evils of overcrowding, in addition to measures to promote the reconditioning of unfit houses dealt with in the Moyne Report; and, if so, whether he can make any statement as to the nature of the intended provisions?
  The MINISTER of HEALTH (Sir Hilton Young): Yes, Sir. It is proposed that the Measure shall include provisions for combating the evils of overcrowding, and that assistance from public funds shall be made available for the purpose, subject to certain conditions. These provisions will be in addition to provisions dealing with reconditioning. It would not, I think, be of advantage that details of the nature of the provisions in question should be stated before the introduction of the Bill.
  Mr. CHORLTON: Will any of these subsidies be applicable to flat dwellings built in storeys?
  Sir H. YOUNG: I would refer my hon. Friend to the latter part of my answer.
  Mr. THORNE: Does the same principle apply to overcrowded commercial offices?
  Mr. BUCHANAN: May I ask whether it is the intention—perhaps the Prime Minister can answer this—that this Bill shall cover Scotland, or is it proposed to bring in a separate Bill to deal with the problem in Scotland?
  Sir H. YOUNG: I think the hon. Member had better give me notice of that question.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Mr. MORGAN JONES: I see that the Prime Minister has a Motion on the Order Paper for the suspension of the Eleven o'Clock Rule. Will the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to tell us what purpose he has in view in moving its suspension?
The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Ramsay MacDonald): I am moving the suspension of the Eleven o'Clock Rule to-night in order to get the Committee stage of the North Atlantic Shipping Bill, which was postponed last night. It has come to my knowledge that there are hon. Members in all parts of the House who are desirous, with the Government, of getting this Bill passed without delay. It is a very urgent and important Bill, and we hope that hon. Members will cooperate with us in making it possible to have this Bill considered at a not exceptionally late hour.
Mr. JONES: Speaking for my hon. Friends on this side of the House, I would like to say that we shall be happy to co-operate with the Government for that purpose.
Mr. BUCHANAN: May I ask the Prime Minister why there has been this departure? We had agreed to go on with the Bill last night, and now we are taking it to-day. As one who did not delay the proceedings yesterday in any way—I took no part in them—I ask why there has been this departure from the programme of business as originally arranged?
The PRIME MINISTER: I think my hon. Friend was in the House last night and heard the explanation given by
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the Patronage Secretary regarding the announcement that had been made at the beginning of business last night, and of the Government's determination to stand by their promise, and, because it was found impossible to take the Bill and to keep that promise, the Government are moving the Motion referred to.
Mr. MAXTON: Are we to understand from that statement that the promise given yesterday by the Lord President of the Council, that the House would not be kept unduly late, is not being agreed to to-day?
The PRIME MINISTER: No, I hope that we shall get to this business reasonably, before Eleven, so that in order to finish the business the House will not have to sit unreasonably late; but that is not a pledge.
Mr. MAXTON: Does that mean that there is some understanding, which we are required to enter into, by which one of the few Supply Days available to the Opposition is to be cut down?
The PRIME MINISTER: Oh, no, I think the House is perfectly clear about that.
Mr. BUCHANAN: Previously, the Government announced a programme of business on their day. To-day it is the Opposition's day in connection with Supply, and we are now asked either to sit unduly late or to cut into the Opposition's time. I want to know why the Bill was not proceeded with yesterday as arranged, or taken on a day when Government business was the Order of Day.
The PRIME MINISTER: We do not propose to cut into any rights of the Opposition. We gave a pledge yesterday, which was carried out. Because we were unable to get through early the programme for yesterday which we had announced, we now have to move this Motion.
Mr. BUCHANAN: I wish to ask you, Mr. Speaker, or the Prime Minister, whether this is not a flagrant breach of the ordinary practice of the House? [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] I wish to ask whether there is any protection for us? A programme of business was announced for yesterday, and for no reason the Government change that order of business, and on short notice. I wish to ask

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whether the House has any protection from this state of affairs—that after an arrangement has been made to take an important Bill on a certain date a change should be made in that date at short notice and for no reason at all? I wish to osk, Mr. Speaker, whether you have any powers to defend the House from that kind of thing?
Mr. SPEAKER: I have no powers in the matter; and it seems to me that the hon. Member needs no protection.
Ordered,
"That this day, notwithstanding anything in Standing Order No. 14, Business other than Business of Supply may be taken before Eleven of the Clock, and that the Proceedings on Government Business be exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House).—[The prime Minister.]

SELECTION (STANDING COMMITTEES).

  STANDING COMMITTEE C.
  Mr. William Nicholson reported from the Committee of Selection; That they had discharged the following Member from Standing Committee C: Miss Rathbone; and had appointed in substitution: Mr. Herbert Williams.
  Report to lie upon the Table.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  SUPPLY.
  [2ND ALLOTTED DAY.]
  Resolution [1st March] reported.

  SUPPLY.

    CIVIL ESTIMATES AND ESTIMATES FOR REVENUE DEPARTMENTS, 1934 (VOTE ON ACCOUNT).
    "That a sum, not exceeding £153,005,000, he granted to His Majesty, on account, for or towards defraying the Charges for the following Civil and Revenue Departments (including Pensions, Education, Insurance, and other Grants, and Exchequer Contributions to Local Revenues) for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1935."—[For details of Vote on Account, see OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st March, 1934; cols. 1285–1288.]
    Resolution read a Second time.

  FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
  3.23 p.m.
  Mr. MORGAN JONES: I beg to move, to leave out "£153,005,000" and to insert instead thereof "£153,004,900."
  The Debate which we are now about to initiate takes place in circumstances which are different from those in which we thought we would conduct it when we decided to take this Supply Day. In common with all other hon. Members, we anticipated that the Government would be in possession of the complete series of replies from all the Governments with whom they have consulted, but I gather from the public Press that so far the Government have not received any reply from the French Government. That being so, I hasten to say to the Lord Privy Seal that I do not expect the detailed observations from him that one would have expected in other circumstances. I might say none the less that, in as much as he has recently conducted a journey to some of the capitals of Europe, he might perhaps, without going into details, give us some general idea as to the attitude of the Powers in whose capitals he has been upon the problem which the Government put before them. While there is that disadvantage in having this Debate to-day, it will not be entirely without usefulness, because in the absence of a Government pronouncement of an official character hon. Members in all parts of the House will probably feel a little freer to express
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  their views, and to pool their opinions in advance of any Government pronouncement.
  A significance attaches to the fact that this foreign affairs Debate is sandwiched between two Debates upon the Estimates. I have no powers of draftsmanship, but, if I were a political cartoonist I should try to adapt a well-known picture which was familiar to us all some years ago. In that picture a child is welcoming its father home. It is putting its hands into its pocket and saying, "Daddy, look what I've got." The Lord Privy Seal has returned from various capitals to Whitehall, and I would like to have the power to draw a picture of the First Lord of the Admiralty saying to him, "See what I've got," and producing a model of a cruiser; of the head of the Air Force producing his model aeroplane, or of the Secretary of State for War his toy soldiers, and each one saying to the itinerant parent on his return "See what I've got." The hon. Gentleman has been engaged in what I presume to have been a journey on behalf of peace. He returns to this country, and the Government welcomes him home with increases in the Estimates of the various Service Departments.
  An hon. Member addressed a remark last week not actually to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) but about him, when the right hon. Gentleman was not in the House. The hon. Member made the obserfvation that the right hon. Gentleman "might have left his reference to foreign affairs to another day" and have allowed the hon. Gentleman to go on with the discussion of the Air Force. I think that the remark sprang from a wrong conception of things. There is a close association at all times between diplomacy and the strength of our fighting services, and that association we on this side of the House cannot afford, and do not propose, to ignore. Looking out upon the world to-day, no one would I believe controvert the proposition that everywhere there seems to be a worsening of international relations and that we are lapsing as rapidly as we can to something akin to pre-War conditions. There is unrest in the Far East, unrest in Europe, a certain amount of drifting towards alliances and the grouping of Powers, and, lastly, but not least, the apprehensions which many of us are entertaining as to the

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  ultimate issue of the Disarmament Conference, to add to our general sense of disquiet.
  I will add another observation, and I think it will be accepted without question. There has been more talk of war and more rumour of war in Europe in the last month or two than we heard in the whole lifetime of the late Labour Government. That is beyond question. I believe that one reason for it—I would not dare to put the whole blame for it upon the Government but I state this as my position—is that the Government have been rather hesitant in their leadership among the nations of the world. Whatever else might be said by way of criticism of the Labour Government of 1929–1931, in relation to foreign affairs there was leadership during those years. Britain did lead the nations of the world and other nations did know where we stood and what we stood for, and many rejoiced in the fact that we were leading.
  Having laid down that proposition, let me ask: Can any hon. Gentleman say with any confidence what our policy is in international affairs at this moment? Are we for the League of Nations or are we not? Are we for disarmament, or are we not? It is not at all easy for an opponent or even for a supporter of the Government to give a confident reply to those questions. There is a sense of dissatisfaction in our own country, and I am quite sure that there is a sense of dissatisfaction abroad. The importance of this is clear to us all, because, whatever Government is in power in our own country, the position taken up by the British Government at a given moment is of supreme importance to the world. Therefore, if there is hesitancy or lack of direction, lack of clarity or lack of touch—if I may use that expression—on the part of the British Government it leads consequentially to hesitancy and to lack of precision and direction abroad.
  Before I deal with that matter in detail, I want, if the hon. Gentleman will allow me, to interpose at this point one or two questions concerning individuals. I do so in order not to interfere with the main line of my argument later. In the first place, I should like to ask the hon. Gentleman what the position is in regard to a case which I cited in this House some months ago, and in regard to which, I fear, there has been very
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  little development. If there has been any development, I shall be very glad to hear of it this afternoon. It is the case of Mr. Lenox-Simpson, who was in business, I think on a fairly large scale, in the territory of Manchuria. I think his headquarters were at Harbin. Mr. Lenox-Simpson was, I think, in the publishing trade, and suddenly the Manchurian authorities, by, I take it, the direction of the Japanese authorities, removed him from his business headquarters. He was turned out neck and crop, and is now, I think, quite removed from the actual centre of his business. He has no control over it. Others are carrying it on as agents for him. But, as any business man knows, to have agents doing a piece of work for you when you feel that you ought to be looking after it yourself is not at all satisfactory. I should be very glad indeed if the hon. Gentleman could tell me whether Mr. Lenox-Simpson's case is receiving attention from the Foreign Office, and whether the Foreign Office is following it up with, shall I say, as much vigour as they did the case of the engineers in Russia.
  I would also ask a question with regard to another individual. I am afraid I have mislaid his name for the moment, but he is a boy of 16 who, judging from the public Press—I have nothing more to go upon—has been arrested, together with two other people, I think in Spain.
  The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir John Simon): It is Mr. Richard Clark.
  Mr. JONES: I am much obliged. That was the name that I had in mind, but I did not like to commit myself to it, as I was speaking from memory. He is 16 years of age, and he has been in prison now for, I think, something over a month, without, so far as I can gather, any trial at all. I should like to feel that the case of a boy of these tender years will be carefully watched by the Foreign Office, and, if we can get some information on the matter this afternoon, I shall be very glad indeed. I hope that the House will forgive me for calling attention to these two individual cases. After all, we must safeguard the interests of our nationals in foreign countries, wherever they are.
  I turn now to the general argument upon which I have embarked. I asked a few minutes ago what was the attitude

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  of the Government in relation to the League of Nations. When I spoke on this subject some four months ago, I ventured to suggest that the Government were not acting with sufficient clarity in relation to affairs and events in the Far East. I take the view, and I think I could fortify it with arguments, that the action of our own Government through the League, or rather, the inaction of our Government through the League, has proved to be a very serious blow indeed at the prestige of the League in all parts of the world. On the 24th February, 1933, as the House will remember, the League Assembly arrived at two conclusions concerning Japan's action in the Far East. One was that China had been the victim of Japanese aggression, and the other was that Manchukuo, as it is now called, was a State set up by Japanese arms on Chinese territory. I understand—I speak subject to correction—that the position of the Government in relation to Manchuria and its independence and sovereignty remains exactly as it was during the lifetime of the last Conservative Government. I am not going to argue this afternoon whether the action of the Government in relation to Japan was right or wrong. I merely cite it in order to say this: Whether it was right or wrong, it must, I think, be accepted that the effect of the inaction of our own Government and of the League itself has been of a very serious character. Article 16 of the Covenant speaks, I was going to say very explicitly, but I know there are differences of view concerning the interpretation of Article 16. I will give its actual words:
  "Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants…it shall ipso facto"—
  I desire to emphasise the words "ipso facto"—
  "be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not."
  The point that I want to make apropos of Article 16 is this: If it was not the intention either of our own Government or of all the Governments that are members
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  of the League to implement Article 16 of the Covenant, it seems to me that it was their bounden duty to make that abundantly clear. After all, if you have committed yourself to a covenant embodying certain provisions, and if you pick and choose—if you say at a particular moment, "This one I accept, that one I do not"—from that very moment you begin to throw doubt upon your loyalty to the Covenant as a whole. If you are not prepared to implement Article 16, clearly one of two things must be done. There is the possibility of a withdrawal from the League, which no one would urge. On the other hand, if you remain in the League, it seems plain that, if Article 16 is unacceptable, you must take what steps are open to you in order to get Article 16 removed from the Covenant.
  I am convinced that this question of economic sanctions is one which the nations who are members of the League must study with very great attention. We have moved into a new world since the War, and it seems to me that if we are, through the medium of the League, to bring pressure to bear upon a recalcitrant State, one of the most potent instruments at our disposal is this instrument which we call economic sanctions. I know that it is a tremendous weapon; but, tremendous as it is, and far-reaching as I admit its consequences are, it is, after all, in the long run, a more innocuous form of sanction than military or naval sanctions. But, if you arrogate to yourselves the right not to implement Article 16, what becomes of Articles 10 and 11? The point I want to make is that, if your attitude with regard to various Articles of the Covenant becomes suspect, then the whole loyalty of nations to the League becomes suspect in consequence. Let us apply this to the question of disarmament. Many States are unwilling to disarm because they are not prepared to submit themselves to what they regard as undue risks. They want assurances concerning security. If we cannot be relied upon in regard to the articles which I have cited, clearly we encourage States thereby to be more exacting in the matter of security and less disposed to face the problem of disarmament. In my judgment, the Government are open to the criticism that they have given the impression by their policy of indeterminateness,

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  of indecision, of lack of clarity, and of lack of purpose. If Britain is open to a charge of that sort, the nation which ought naturally to accept the leadership of the League is subject to suspicion.
  I said earlier that I should not like to place the responsibility for all the unfortunate circumstances in which the world now finds itself at the door of the present Government, but they have failed to avail themselves of certain favourable conditions which have been available in the last year or two. Take Germany. Before the Hitlerite regime, Doctor Bruening was responsible for affairs, and his policy was largely a programme of the maintenance of democracy and the fulfilment of peace treaties, and for the most part he successfully resisted the pressure of rearmament, not perhaps entirely, but still his attitude was one of resistance to the pressure for rearmament. But he was not encouraged, and the result is that the youth of Germany has been led to believe that the only way of breaking the shackles, as they call them, of the Versailles Treaty was by force, and Herr Hitler has been able to succeed to power largely because of the failure of the nations at Geneva to give that large measure of encouragement to the late German Government which ought to have been accorded to it. Now we have an entire change of scene and last week Member after Member of this House was emphasising the fact that in Germany a considerable measure of rearmament is going ahead at a fairly rapid pace. Observers tell us that in the area of the Saar things are in a very precarious condition indeed, and the pressure brought by Germany upon Austria has been sustained, though hitherto it has been unsuccessful.
  Let me take France. Last year there was, as Governments go in France, as progressive a Government as they have had for a long time. That pacifically-minded Government was, as I understand, in favour of a reasonable measure of security from the League of Nations. It offered a drastic measure of disarmament in order to avoid, as I believe, the prospect of rearmament in Germany. Largely due to the comparative failure hitherto of the Disarmament Conference to arrive at conclusions and to the reaction in the direction of German rearmament, that Government of the left has
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  lost its hold and there has been a collapse and a reaction to a more right wing form of government. In the United States we have one of the most progressive Governments that America has ever seen. I believe it offered in 1933 the abolition of all weapons forbidden to Germany in 1919, and I believe that offer was acceptable to Germany. Was the position of our Government favourable or unfavourable? I think it was very unsatisfactory.
  The LORD PRIVY SEAL (Mr. Eden): What was the date of that offer?
  Mr. JONES: I gather that they made an offer soon after Mr. Roosevelt came into office.
  Mr. EDEN: What was it?
  Mr. JONES: My information is that the Roosevelt Government very early in its career was prepared to entertain disarmament to the level even of the disarmament imposed upon Germany in 1919.
  Sir J. SIMON: I have heard that statement made before but only outside the House. I understand the hon. Gentleman to say that, according to his information, the United States Government offered to agree to the abandonment of all arms except those allowed to Germany by Treaty. I assure him he is quite mistaken. It is quite inconsistent with anything that I know of United States policy.
  Mr. JONES: Then clearly my information is not accurate on the point, and I at once withdraw it. But the attitude of our Government in relation to America's approaches to disarmament was unsatisfactory for—there is no official announcement in the matter, but we are entitled to our own conclusions—towards the end of last year the unofficial Ambassador of the United States left Geneva and, as far as I have heard, he has given no sort of indication of returning to Geneva since. In 1932 Italy too made for her a very progressive proposal. Here again our own Government was very largely in hostility to some of the proposals put forward by Italy. Indeed, in case after case there have been favourable conditions presented to the Government by reason of the nature and character of the various Governments in various countries with which they had to deal. Take the case of Russia. As everyone knows, in relation to Russia, there has

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  been for a very long time ill-concealed antagonism culminating in the withdrawal of trade facilities on both sides. That has passed. Let us hope that it is a chapter which has been finally and definitely closed. But it was a situation which was not helpful to the development of disarmament proposals on the Continent of Europe. As to our immediate neighbour, I think that I should be right in expressing my opinion of the situation something like this. We have not availed ourselves of the international policy propounded by the more left-wing form of government in France for obtaining security through the League of Nations. On the other hand, in relation to Germany, that country has been convinced not solely, but largely by the action of the League of Nations itself that the only way of breaking the chains of Versailles was by means of force.
  Sir AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: What does the hon. Gentleman mean by the "chains of Versailles"?
  Mr. JONES: It is a form of expression which I should have thought everybody would have appreciated. The imposition upon Germany of certain conditions of disarmament by countries which have as yet not disarmed would be to the German mind a chain imposed on the limbs of the Germans which is not imposed on the limbs of other nations.
  Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: In relation to disarmament?
  Mr. JONES: In relation to disarmament, and we can see the effect of that mentality in the observation of Herr Frick so frequently quoted by critics in all parts of the world, when he said:
  "We admire the League, but we thank Japan for her example."
  That was to say, that the Germans felt that what Japan had been allowed to do was something which Germany ought equally to be allowed to do. Whether that reaction was justified or not, it is not for me to say. I will add this observation from Herr Von Papen who claimed in a speech that since the Covenant had not been applied to Japan it could not be applied against Germany if she rearmed. I merely cite these instances in order to show the effect upon the mentality of other nations.
  I think that in general I could summarise the result of the policy of the
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  Government in this way. I suggest that it might be held that by allowing the Covenant to be violated in Manchuria the National Government have very seriously damaged British interests. The Manchurian market which was capable of very great expansion has been closed to British trade very largely. The Japanese militarists are now openly aiming at securing a similar monopoly in the rest of the Chinese market and have advanced beyond their hopes by their success in Manchuria. Thirdly, I would suggest that the future of the international settlements of Shanghai, and of Hong Kong may be seriously prejudiced as well. The British position there has been based upon international treaties, European prestige and the Chinese fear of European armed forces. But as the restraining power of all these motives has been undermined if not destroyed, and if China should cease to fear Japan, or should decide to ally herself with Japan, the future of the settlements would appear to be extremely precarious. We see something of the reaction of those settlements in the preparation for the defence of British Dominions, especially Australia and elsewhere. I think that the world balance of power, of naval power certainly, is seriously threatened. I understand that the Japanese do not now intend to renew the London and Washington Treaties unless they are granted parity. Great Britain would be hard put to it, I fancy, to stand the pace of competition both in Europe and in the Far East.
  Lastly, I submit that owing to the rise of the Hitler movement Europe is now faced with a very real danger of war in which Great Britain might only too easily be involved. We may all draw our own conclusions from those facts, but as to the reasons for the existence of those facts the National Government must take their share—I am not suggesting more than their share—of responsibility for that situation. We can have little satisfaction, after all, from a review of the past. Whether the Government have blundered in the past or not cannot help us at this moment. We are concerned with the future. I should like to know from the right hon. Gentleman whether there is any prospect of a re-assembly of the Economic Conference or something akin to it? I saw a paragraph in the Press towards the end of last week—

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  it was only a news paragraph and not official in any way—to the effect that there was some suggestion that perhaps the United States of America might presently ask for the re-convening of some such conference. I do not know whether there is anything in it or not, but I should be very glad to know what would be the attitude of the Government to the reconvening of the Economic Conference. Whatever we may feel and whatever our differences may be concerning disarmament and other problems relating to it and to international problems generally, we all will admit, I think, that at the bottom economic causes play a very big part in the international unsettlement at this moment.
  As to our attitude towards international treaties generally, Members of this House can be divided pretty well into three groups. There are those who are frankly isolationists. I am not of that group, but, if I were an isolationist, I confess that I should be very strongly, and perhaps even enthusiastically, on the side of those demanding better armaments of every sort. I believe that isolationism must necessarily involve that policy in relation to armaments, but as a policy I think that it is impossible. After all, the nature of the Empire makes isolationism a policy thoroughly outside the pale of acceptance. The second alternative is the policy of alliances. That was the old policy in Europe before the War. The grouping of Powers on the one side and the other, each side being attended by vast accumulations of armaments, is the old system which inevitably must lead to war sooner or later.
  There are tendencies, it seems to me, in Europe at this moment in the direction of certain groupings. There was a reply given at Question Time to-day to a question put by the hon. Member for East Wolverhampton (Mr. Mander) in relation to Italy, and the same applies there, but I would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether there is any information available as to the purpose of the Conference about to take place in Rome at which representatives of Austria and Hungary are to take part with Signor Mussolini? It is a subject of some importance to us as well as to the rest of the world. The third alternative is that school which believes in pooled security. For my part, I feel compelled to come
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  down upon that side. It was inherent, as I understand it, in the Covenant; it is certainly in the Protocol of 1924. I do not know what the present opinion of the Prime Minister is about the Protocol—I would not venture even to guess—but I think that, sooner or later, governments will be compelled to come back, if not fully, at least in part, to some of the ideas contained in the Protocol of 1924.
  Lastly, on the question of Russia I believe it is true that at this moment there are no longer any territorial questions outstanding. Are we now to take it that His Majesty's Government are about to work heartily with the Russian Government in the direction of peace and co-operation? I rather like an idea—I do not say that I commit myself entirely to it, but I was intrigued by it—which was thrown into the arena, as it were, by hon. Members on more than one side of the House a week or fortnight ago in which a suggestion was made that those nations which are prepared, through the League of Nations, to accept the idea of pooled security, should associate together, and, if I remember rightly, some three or four were cited as likely to associate, namely, Great Britain, the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and, I think one hon. Member said, Sweden. It is just possible that an idea of that kind might even commend itself to France—I do not know. Anyway, the idea was not developed very fully in the House, but it does seem as though there might be something to be said for availing ourselves of the cooperation of all nations who are prepared to accept collective security. I beg the House to understand that I am not asking for an initial step to create a new alliance—far from it—but for leaving the door open to all nations to associate themselves together in the direction of establishing the idea of pooled security in the world.
  Lastly, I want to say this about the German position as I see it. Some months ago I ventured to ask the Foreign Secretary what was the attitude of the Government in relation to German equality. For myself, I see no escape from granting equality of status to Germany, but that equality in relation to disarmament can only take one of two forma. Either you must bring down the armaments of other nations steadily, gradually if you like, to the level of Germany,

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  and achieve equality in that way, or, if you do not disarm, you must allow Germany to rearm up to the level of other nations. The second alternative would not be disarmament but rearmament, and rearmament is not what the nations of the world desire. I would, therefore, urge upon the Government that no stone should be left unturned in order to give effect to what I conceive to be the real desire of the people of this country, namely, not increased expenditure on armaments, but the actual achievement of a measure of disarmament among the nations of Europe. Surely we ought to be able to look forward confidently to the time when this perpetual divergence of views between Germany and France which is leading almost inevitably to further exacerbation in Europe, should be brought to an end. I was going to suggest that, perhaps, the three rivers, the Rhine, the Seine and the Thames are symbolic of what we would desire in our international relations. Each has different sources. They irrigate different territories; they pass through divergent landscapes, but they pour their waters into the same sea. The ships that ride them carry merchandise over all the world; they make their common contribution to the world's trade. May we not hope that in the near future the great streams of British, French and German culture and ideals, deriving their inspiration from varying sources, and serving peoples of divergent outlook, may also contribute to the great ocean of human activity, wide as the world in its service, and contributing to the happiness and contentment of all mankind?
  4.7 p.m.
  Mr. EDEN: The hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. M. Jones) began by asking me a number of questions about recent visits which I have made to Paris, Berlin and Rome, and I would like to confine my remarks, in the main, to telling the House what I can upon that subject. Before doing so I would like to reassure the hon. Gentleman on one or two points. He suggested that on my return I might have found that my task had been made more difficult by the increases in the Estimates of our fighting services. I would like to reassure him on that point, because they had not the least effect on the work I was trying to do, nor were they likely to have any effect in view of their extremely modest proportions;
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  in fact, the largest of them, the increase in the Navy Estimates, is, of course, within the limitations of the London Naval Treaty, and if only all the increases of armaments in the world in the post-War years had been within treaty limits, the House would not have been worried by so many debates upon the subject of disarmament.
  I would also like to deal with the criticism which was made as to His Majesty's Government's past conduct at the Disarmament Conference. I do not want to delve into past history, because the House is so familiar with it, but I seem to find two new lines of criticism to-day. The first was that there had been on occasions Left Governments in France, and on occasions Left Governments in Germany. Those Governments have not chonologically coincided. This was unfortunate, but I really cannot see where our responsibility comes in for the decisions of the electorates of France and Germany. It was unfortunate. The points of view of the two countries, or rather those sections of the two countries whose points of view most coincide, did not happen to coincide with the work of the conference. That is a matter which we may deplore, but for which we can scarcely be blamed. Then there is the new argument that in some way the United States Government and our own Government have not been in accord in the later stages of the work of the conference. That quite definitely is not so. The United States Government have lent throughout most valuable support to our Draft Convention, and the chief representative of the United States, to whom the hon. Member has just referred, speaking at Geneva about our Draft Convention, said:
  "As it represented a real measure of disarmament, the United States Government accepted it whole-heartedly as a definite and excellent step towards the ultimate objective. It was therefore prepared to give its full support to the adoption of that plan."
  And it has consistently given such full support. I believe it to be no exaggeration to say that in the difficult months of the Disarmament Conference one of the most encouraging features has been the close collaboration between the representatives of this country and the representatives of the United States. Finally, a very few days ago, as the House will he aware, President Roosevelt

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  issued a statement again lending full support to our fresh initiative in the shape of the United Kingdom Memorandum. In the face of all that evidence, I hope that we have heard the last of any attempt to find new differences where no differences exist. Our task is hard enough without imagination added to its difficulties.
  I wish it had been possible this afternoon for me to give to the House some record of events during my visits to Paris, Berlin and Rome, but the House will recall the limited scope and purpose of my work. I was to explain to those Governments the purpose of the proposals in the British Memorandum, to seek to meet their criticisms upon them, and, if possible, to gain from them statements of their point of view upon our proposals. When I had completed my task, it was hoped that His Majesty's Government would have been in a position to see how far there was agreement upon the proposals they put forward in their Memorandum of 29th January. That hope, unfortunately, has not yet been fully realised, but it will be within a very few days. We have an expression of opinion on our Memorandum from two of the three Governments, and we expect to have the view of the third Government in a very few days; but at present it would clearly be undesirable for me to attempt to give any account of what was said to me by these Governments. Moreover, of course, it would be necessary, first, to obtain permission to do so.
  While I am, therefore, unable to do that, I might perhaps seek to give to the House, briefly, certain impressions which were forced upon me in the course of those journeys. After all, it was perhaps an exceptional opportunity for comparative observation, and what I am going to say now is in no sense official, in no sense the direct result of what was said to me by any of the heads of Governments whom I met in the various States, and, indeed, is nothing more than the impressions of an ordinary observer who had, perhaps, extraordinary opportunities.
  It has always seemed to me that in the last few months especially, the Disarmament Conference has been suffering from the limitations of its title. Something very much more than the future of the Disarmament Conference must be decided in the next few weeks, and it is well perhaps that we should look
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  beneath the surface and see the stark realities, even if we are a little discomforted in the process. It is better that we should know what they are and decide our policies accordingly.
  Why is it that this Conference has been so long delayed? It is not because the experts cannot agree upon the number of tanks, the calibre of guns, the weight of aeroplanes. The interminable paraphernalia of disarmament is wearisome enough, but it is not those questions that are holding us up. It is rather, I think, that the nations of the world have not been able to summon sufficient confidence, or, if you like, sufficient courage to trust one another to the extent that is necessary if a Convention is to be realised and kept. Ever since the War, I suppose as an inevitable legacy of the War, hon. Members must have been conscious of two overmastering motives and their presence in Europe, according as each nation has been affected by the outcome of the War—on the one side a mistrustful apprehension and on the other side aggravated impatience. Perhaps those two motives are not always conscious motives, but they are always there, and it is quite impossible to move from one capital to another in Europe to-day without realising their existence.
  The rival demands, with which we are so familiar, for security on the one side and equality on the other are only a vocal expression of those sentiments which are so strongly held. How difficult it is for a citizen of Paris to appreciate the point of view of a citizen of Berlin, and, even if he can do that and vice versa how infinitely more difficult it is to appreciate the sentiments or even the convictions upon which those views are based. For a moment I will try, by leave of the House, to place myself in each of those capitals and to look through their respective spectacles. We shall then, at least, know the extent of the problem with which we are faced. France's anxiety, as it has ever been since the War, is for security; a demand that is based in every Frenchman's mind upon deep and abiding memories. Just as France has this instinctive desire for security herself, it seems none the less difficult perhaps to her in turn to appreciate that it is possible that Germany may have the same feeling, expressed in another form. France is so convinced that she has no intention whatever of

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  attacking anybody else that she finds it difficult to believe that another country, which cannot at present have and is not at present permitted to have comparable armaments, may not feel absolutely secure in her vicinity. The problem of population, again, increases France's natural anxiety on account of the pari-military training as it is called in Germany.
  There is another motive in the French mind, which we share. We, as they do, set great store upon the collective peace system which has been built up since the War and of which the League is the outward symbol. It is difficult for Frenchmen to believe that a great Power of Western Europe can remain for long away from Geneva with good intentions. From time to time events have happened and speeches are made which add to these fears. There was one such speech in the last two days, the speech of General Goering. I am frankly prepared to admit that a distinction exists between a military nation and a militarist nation—this country which is, perhaps, to-day neither one nor the other, should not forget that distinction—but I am equally confident that in the judgment of the people of this country the tone of that speech belongs rather to the latter nation than to the former. These things would not be of so much account if trust between nations was instinctive and confidence was deep and abiding. It is just because that is not the present situation that incidents which in themselves are perhaps of comparatively small importance may have a greater significance. Let us complete the picture by seeking to look for a moment through German spectacles. It is no doubt the German contention that her own security can be of as much vital interest to her as the security of France is to France. She would contend, no doubt, that she has waited long for equality, and she might add that for a German it is hard to believe that France can really need yet more security,
  If these have been the respective positions, not of Governments but of nations and of sentiment for some years past, it is clear that they cannot be readily reconciled. How is it to be done? Can it be done at all, and is it the experience of the brief mission upon which I was engaged that it is hopeless to try? Perhaps I can answer the last question first. The answer to that question, in my
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  judgment, is "No. Definitely no." Until we are in possession of all the replies to our Memorandum and the complete cycle of answers, it is premature to be so pessimistic. Not only is it that, but I believe it to be definitely wrong to paint the picture darker than it is in fact. While there is still a glimmer of light we cannot admit defeat, and there is more than a glimmer.
  Our interests in this matter are those of Europe. We have as a nation very much at stake. I noticed how from the start of my brief mission certain newspapers, particularly one which has a wide circulation on the Continent, were good enough to take it upon themselves to express the conviction, sometimes it seemed to be a cheerful assumption, that I must fail. I do not know that I altogether envy the consciences of people who put out such stuff abroad. Our stake as a nation in peace is probably greater than that of any other nation in the world. Our stake in the League is very great also. If the Conference fails, it is no doubt true that we, like every other country, will have to take certain steps. If the Conference fails it will not only be the security of this or that continental country which will be at stake, but our own security. Just as when we sign a convention, we are as interested in keeping it as any other signatory, so if there is no convention we have perhaps as much cause for anxiety as any other nation in the world. If the Conference fails every country, no doubt, will then have to proceed to review its armaments, we, like every one else, and we perhaps more immediately and more urgently than others because we have disarmed so much voluntarily already.
  If that be so, how many of us believe that even a manifold increase in our existing armaments in this country would alone suffice to ensure our national security? I myself have no such belief and no such faith. Competitive armaments in themselves are no security. We had competitive armaments before 1914 and they availed us nothing as a preventive of war. Therefore, however much we may spend on our own security by armaments, we cannot flatter ourselves that we shall then have realised the luxury of isolation. Our efforts, not in the interests of this or that continental country, but in the interests of our own

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  national security, need no apology at this time, and those who prefer to substitute cheap sneers for statecraft deserve the severe condemnation of every right-thinking citizen.
  What can be done to restore this waning international confidence and to bridge the gap between France and Germany? I do not myself believe that the situation, anxious as it is, is desperate. It is not so. Something is surely to be gained from the fact that public opinion in many nations of the world is to-day alive to the seriousness and the anxiety of the situation. That was not, so far as I am aware, the case in 1914. Better clean timber than a blind ditch. I do not therefore accept the judgment of those who speak as if war in Europe is imminent. But that is not to say that we have not an immediate and an urgent responsibility to get on with the work. Every month that passes makes our task more difficult. That task seems to me to be twofold—and we must realise both parts of it or we shall not have contributed enough to bring back confidence to Europe—first, to realise a Convention, not a spectacular Convention, perhaps that is out of our reach, but a Convention which contains some disarmament, a Convention which faces the realities of the present time, in short, a Convention on the basis of our recently issued Memorandum. Second, to seek to restore to the League of Nations that full authority which can only be enjoyed from a membership of all the great Powers of Western Europe. It seems to me that every development of science and policies since the War has increased the need for some such organisation as the League of Nations. If immediately after the War it had not been set up some one would have improvised it in the years that have elapsed. The world becomes so much smaller every year, it becomes almost a village, and we are almost uncomfortably close to one another. That process has not yet come to an end, and the widest possible membership of the League of Nations has become now an indispensable element in our international economy.
  Those are our twin objectives still; the realisation of a Convention and the restoration of membership of the League of Nations in so far as it can be fully obtained. Nothing in my experience in the past few weeks has in any way
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  caused me to regret the initiative of His Majesty's Government in putting forward their Memorandum, or the decision they took to send this mission to the three capitals. If we can realise these twin objectives we shall put a stop to the rot and shall be able in the future to improve upon the situation thus realised.
  That is my answer to the hon. Member for Caerphilly who says that public opinion here and in other parts of the world is doubtful whether we really want disarmament or really believe in the League of Nations. I do not believe that public opinion abroad has any such doubt, and I cannot believe, after the course of events in the last few months, that there is much doubt on that score at home except possibly for electoral uses. I make no complaint, but I do not believe that these doubts have any sounder foundation. It was, I think, too much to expect that the recent initiative of His Majesty's Government and the mission would have been enough in themselves to bridge the gap which exists. They have not done so, but they have definitely narrowed that gap. These initiatives were taken upon the responsibility of His Majesty's Government. Other nations, other countries, have their responsibilities also.
  What I have learnt in these three capitals has convinced me that there is no alternative to the general lines of our Memorandum, that there is no substitute for it if agreement is to be reached upon a Disarmament Convention at all. When His Majesty's Government have received the complete replies of the three countries whose capitals I visited we shall examine them with sympathy and understanding, and with the conviction that no nation will willingly allow a final breakdown of the Conference. Not one of us in any capital who has these responsibilities can allow it to be said that in so great an issue we failed in our generation for lack of real endeavour. I am convinced that if the nations will pursue the work upon which they have been engaged in recent weeks upon our Memorandum in the spirit to which I have just referred, then, even now, difficulties notwithstanding, no man need despair of an issue to these long and trying labours.
  4.35 p.m.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: It is no doubt unfortunate that this important Debate on

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  foreign affairs should have taken place when the representatives of the Foreign Office are not in a position to make anything but an interim, an exceedingly guarded, and, if I may say so, an obscure statement upon the actual facts of the European situation. I was taken to task the other day for saying that my hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal in his mission to the three capitals in Europe had failed. I have listened to his very agreeably delivered speech, so excellent in its phrasing and so well meant in its sentiments, and I am bound to say that the furthest I can go in altering my statement that his mission had failed is to say that up to the present at any rate it has not succeeded. There is certainly no one in this House who would throw the blame on the hon. Gentleman. We are quite sure that if at Berlin, Paris and Rome, he did no good, he did no harm as far as we are concerned, for no one seems to have mastered more completely the art of discussing these grave topics of foreign affairs without at any point committing an indiscretion or using expressions which would be likely to hinder the growth of that harmony which is no doubt the desire of all.
  As I said the other day, the hon. Gentleman was set an impossible task. Take one instance. He had to commend to France an elaborate scheme of disarmament which meant that the French would have to agree that their Army in Europe, long the most famous in the history of the world, should be no stronger than the Army of Poland, Germany or Italy. It seemed to me, even before my hon. Friend set out on his tour, extremely unlikely that France would agree to that at any time, least of all at a time like this. I ventured to say a year ago, when the Prime Minister's first scheme was put forward, prescribing in great detail to the countries in Europe exactly how large their armies, navies and air forces should be—and may I say that that proposal was in no way detrimental to Great Britain, on the contrary, it was advantageous—that there was no chance of it being accepted. And when this scheme had been received by the French with the greatest politeness, and with an ingenuity born of what is now a long and careful study of the Anglo-Saxon mentality and the character of public opinion in the United Kingdom and in the United States, when they accepted
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  with great civility the scheme as a most valuable contribution to the progress of mankind and the consolidation of the peace of the human race, but mentioned that there were a few little reservations on this point and that which they might find it necessary to introduce, I ventured to predict what the fate of the scheme would be. The modifications in the scheme have not relieved the proposal from the fact that it is bound to encounter the greatest opposition and resistance, which will be put forward through diplomatic processes of which we are now only too painfully familiar.
  The Lord Privy Seal has pointed out that the objections now are not the technical objections of experts as to the size of cannons, and so on; that is not what is holding up agreement. For a long time we were told that this was the difficulty, but as the experts have now adjusted their views we have got back to where we started. Nations are not prepared to accept a great diminution of their individual security at this juncture, and they begin, at their end, to raise new and fundamental opposition to the principles of the proposals put forward. Another proposal with which the Lord Privy Seal was charged was that France should reduce her air force to 500 machines. Actually at the moment she is proposing to spend, over a certain period, £40,000,000 to £50,000,000 in order to improve the character, quality and power of her air force, which already numbers three or four times that figure. Are they likely to agree? Will the French write back to us and say that they are entirely converted from their point of view and are ready to reduce their air force to 500 machines, while contemplating an improvment in the German air force at the same time?
  We are awaiting the French answer. What answer does my hon. Friend expect? Is it realy worth while indulging in these illusions? Can we expect the French to write back to us agreeing with the proposal? What is their position? They have been feeling very anxious about our own weakness in the air. Public men have been making statements about their alarm as to our own position. They desire to fill the gap in our defensive system. Now we are told that we must expect them to write and say that in consequence of the threat that England will increase her Air Force

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  they are willing to reduce theirs. It is the exact opposite. By not reducing their air force they will compel us to put ourselves in a position of reasonable security; that will certainly have its bearing on the answer which the French Government will give. We are deluding ourselves if we suppose that we are going to receive from this outstanding Government something which will meet the first MacDonald scheme or the second Mac-Donald scheme. It is a mistake to indulge too long in credulity. The word "credulity" reminds me of a famous quotation from Dr. Johnson, which might well be read and pondered over by my hon. Friend:
  "Ye who listen with credulity to the whispers of fancy, and pursue with eagerness the phantoms of hope, who expect that age will perform the promises of youth, and that the deficiencies of the present day will be supplied by the morrow; attend to the history of Rasselas, Prince of Abysinia."
  But I did not find very much of that in his most attractive and engaging speech. Neither did we find very much that was reassuring. On the contrary, in the most correct phraseology which could possibly fall from the lips of a Minister of the Crown he painted for us a more sombre picture of the deterioration which has been going steadily forward in the European position, than any we have yet heard from that Bench. I venture to suggest to my hon. Friend, in whose career really the whole House has a common interest, because we do like to see new figures emerge, to be very careful not to be too obliging in his departmental duties and not be too ready to do what is asked of him on all occasions, because he is very valuable, and we all hope that he will be associated with real successes in the domain of foreign affairs.
  But, as the House knows, I have for the last four years and more been pointing out the difficulties into which we have got by this persistent harping upon disarmament. False ideas have been spread about the country that disarmament means peace. The Disarmament Conference has brought us steadily nearer, I will not say to war because I share the repulsion of using that word, but nearer to a pronounced state of ill-will than anything that could be imagined. I pointed out four years ago,
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  when we were in opposition, that this pressing of Disarmament Conferences upon nations who had already signified in one way or another their desire not to be pressed further, was most dangerous diplomacy. First of all, you were met with a competition among the different countries to disarm the other fellow, to take away the peculiar weapons of this or that other country, while safeguarding their own special military or naval interests. Then, in the second place, at Disarmament Conferences which were persisted in again and again year after year in spite of every failure, the desire was to throw the blame of the inevitable breakdown on some one country or another. "It was not me but that other country which was responsible for the failure."
  So, in the end, what have we got? We have not got disarmament. We have the rearmament of Germany. That is the monstrous child which has emanated from this immense labour—the rearmament of Germany. Why, it is only a little while ago that I heard Ministers say and read diplomatic documents which said that rearmament was unthinkable—"Whatever happens we cannot have that. Rearmament is unthinkable." Now all our hope is to regulate the unthinkable. Regulated unthinkability—that is what is the proposal now; and very soon it will be a question of making up our minds to unregulate unthinkability.
  I think it is always an error in diplomatic policy to press a matter when it is quite clear that no further progress is to be made. It is also a great error if you ever give the impression abroad that you are using language which is more concerned with your domestic political state of things than with the actual fortunes and merits of the various great countries upon the Continent to whom you offer advice. Even suppose that the hon. Gentleman's mission shall be judged eventually to have failed, I am not be sure that we shall be so much worse off than if he had succeeded. Suppose France had taken the advice which we tendered, and have tendered during the last four or five years, and had yielded to the pressure of the two great English-speaking nations to set an example of disarmament. Suppose she had taken the advice of the Liberal news-

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  papers. Only a short time ago, three or four years ago, we noted the derision with which they wrote about the French barrier of fortresses which had been put up, and so forth. Suppose the French had followed our example. Suppose they had made this gesture which is on everyone's lips to-day, and had reduced themselves to allowing their defences to fall into the kind of disarray to which we, out of the highest motives, for which we do not always get credit abroad, have reduced ours? What would be the position to-day? Where should we be?
  I honour the French for their resolute determination to preserve the freedom and security of their country from invasion of any kind; I earnestly hope that we, in arranging our forces, will not fall below their example, so far as the freedom and independence of this country are concerned. The awful danger, nothing less, of our present foreign policy, is that we go on perpetually asking the French to weaken themselves. And what do we say is the inducement? We say, "Weaken yourselves," and we always hold out the hope that if they do it and get into trouble, we will then in some way or other go to their aid, although we have nothing with which to go to their aid. I cannot imagine a more dangerous policy. There is something to be said for isolation; there is something to be said for alliances. But there is nothing to be said for weakening the Power on the Continent with whom you would be in alliance, and then involving yourself more in Continental tangles in order to make it up to them. In that way you have neither one thing nor the other; you have the worse of both worlds.
  The Romans had a maxim, "Shorten your weapons and lengthen your frontier." But our maxim seems to be, "Diminish your weapons and increase your obligations." Aye, and diminish the weapons of your friends. It has been a most extraordinary policy in late years. Great hopes were put on the Disarmament Conference when it began, and after Locarno there were great hopes. I am not going to pretend or suggest that the insistence on disarmament, the nagging and harping on disarmament, have been the sole cause of the great degeneration of European affairs. That would be unfair. Hideous and new factors have rushed up at us from the gulf. Hideous new events have taken place which no
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  one could have foreseen. I quite agree. Surely now we have reached a point where we ought to make an end of this effort to force disarmament upon countries which feel themselves in great danger, and to put ourselves in a reasonable position of security. That will be better for peace, much better for peace, much better for our own safety if peace should fail.
  We now have an urgent duty, and I am very glad the Prime Minister is in his place, because we know that the Lord President of the Council has been called away on some urgent business. The Lord President made a very important and very welcome declaration in Debate last week upon air policy, that if these attempts to obtain a Disarmament Convention failed, we should then place ourselves in a position of air parity, or words to that effect. I accept a statement of that kind in the most absolute good faith, because I am certain that with his reputation and with his responsibility my right hon. Friend would not have made such a statement if he had intended merely to use it to get round a Parliamentary-corner on a particular occasion, or to stave off the fulfilment of his undertaking by dilatory processes. Therefore, I did not share the anxiety of some hon. Gentlemen at some passages in the right hon. Gentleman's speech.
  But there is one point on which anxiety might have arisen. When my right hon. Friend was making his speech and saying that if all failed, then—we all expected him to say, "Then we shall immediately take steps to put ourselves in a satisfactory position"; but after the "then" came something different. He said that then there would be an Air Convention. That was rather disappointing to some of our hopes, rather anticlimax in a way. But it seems to me that if the Air Convention, that is to say if this main tableau of military and naval arrangements, cannot be accepted, as I am sure it will not be accepted, then I gather it is the intention of the Government to say, cannot we make a convention limiting the air forces? There would be no harm in that, and I do not see why it should take very long. But what would be very dangerous indeed would be if we had to begin again in regard to the Air Convention all those elaborate discussions with all the Powers, the tremendous procedure at Geneva, to go over the whole

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  course again for one-third of the prize as it were, and at the same time remain ourselves in this extremely dangerous position, while all the time the situation, for all we know, might be altering from week to week by the development of the aerial armaments and facilities of Germany.
  Therefore, one hopes that when the Minister who is to reply speaks he will say something to reassure us that this Air Convention which, if the main Convention fails, is to be entered upon, will not interpose a delay of more than a few weeks in the proper review and reconsideration of our domestic defence. I made a proposal myself that we should endeavour to have an agreement with different Powers near us to limit the use of the air weapon. That is quite a different matter. There need be no delay in consequence of that—to regulate air warfare as far as you can to the zones of the armies or military objectives. There need be no delay in that, because the essence of it is that we have parity, have an equal air force. Therefore, every step we make meanwhile to secure parity would help an agreement if it could be reached on the limitations which should be imposed by either side in the use of aircraft.
  I hope that the Prime Minister will be able to promise us another day some time between Easter and Whitsuntide to discuss the general question of air defence. There ought to be some day found for it, and I am sure everyone would be quite willing and content to wait till then. But there are a very great number of Members who are very anxious about it, and the Government are very anxious, as we know and see by their utterances, and it would be only reasonable to have a day to discuss the Air, either on the existing Estimates, which seem wholly inadequate, or else upon new proposals which the Government will put before us.
  I do not intend to detain the House any more. But there was one remark thrown out very tentatively and guardedly by the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. M. Jones), a remark which I am bound to say seemed to me to be pregnant and deserving of attention. He said, in effect, why, if other things fail, should not the nations who are actually in agreement about keeping the peace
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  and so forth, reach out their hands to one another? I think that is an idea which should be pursued, but it should be pursued through the League of Nations. It is to the League of Nations that France or Belgium or any of those countries who are alarmed by the proceedings of their powerful neighbour, Germany, should have recourse. There it is that they should make their case and all consequential action should be taken under the authority of the League of Nations.
  If it be true that those countries are deeply alarmed by proceedings across their frontiers and if no satisfaction is given to them and no explanation made of what is going on, then it seems to me that those nations who are alarmed and who agree together should associate themselves one with another, under the aegis of the League of Nations and within the circle of the League and under its express authority. Thus you would have a large number of countries who agreed and who had powerful forces and who could stand there, armed, as it were, to defend each other if necessary, but who would not be able to move in any way except by the sanction of the international body. You would thus have the strength of the individual armies plus the control and authority of a great world-wide international organisation. I do not believe you will ever succeed in building up an international force in a vague and general manner or that it can be created out of cold blood. But it might well be that an international force would come into being by an alliance of national forces for a particular emergency or for particular purposes, and, once having been started, it might give the security to the world which would avert the approaching curse of war.
  5.3 p.m.
  Sir ARTHUR STEEL-MAITLAND: I am sure everyone has listened with intense interest to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill). I find myself in agreement with some of the remarks which he has made, but, while he spoke with his usual eloquence and wit, some of his other remarks left me wondering. I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman himself has faced certain facts which enter into the situation, and cannot conceivably be neglected by anyone who wishes to deal with it faithfully. The right hon. Gentleman deprecates

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  any further attempt at a convention. I wonder whether he himself envisages all the possibilities. I assume that he would prefer that the French should remain as fully armed as they are and that we should welcome all preparations made by them for defending their country and maintaining their army at its present strength. I assume also that in the right hon. Gentleman's view we ourselves should be asked to make increases in our present forces in order to be able to act together with the French. I ask the right hon. Gentleman what does he think would be the course taken by Germany under those conditions and how he would propose to treat that great country in those circumstances.
  Is Germany, under the conditions I have indicated, to be allowed to go on rearming or not? Is there any point at which France and this country would step in during the course of Germany's rearming? Looking at the question as dispassionately as possible I would say that without question Germany intends to arm, and she is probably doing so already. There is no question that she is drilling, and, as some people would say, militarising her people. Yet can one say that she is wrong? There she is without arms, in the middle of peoples who are fully armed. If she goes on in her present course who shall say that she is wrong? Everybody who has been in Germany can give accounts of how she is drilling her young men, how they are marching along the streets singing and laughing, glad instead of sorrowful, joyful instead of pessimistic, full of hope instead of full of despondency as they were before. If they are making these young men into troops, who can say, in the circumstances, that it is wrong for them to do so? What is the right hon. Gentleman going to do to deal with that situation? Is he going to let Germany go on arming? Does he visualise that as a part of the situation which would arise or, on the other hand, does he propose that at any point Great Britain and France together should step in and prevent any further re-arming by Germany? When one faces that situation one sees that it leads to an impossible result either way. As to preventive occupation, I cannot believe that either the people of France or the people of this country would agree to it for one moment.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: My right hon. Friend has himself answered the question which he put to me.
  Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: I am glad to think that the right hon. Gentleman agrees that preventive occupation of Germany by France or this country is inconceivable. If, on the other hand, Germany continues to re-arm, without let or hindrance, we get back exactly to the position which existed before the last War. We get back to a competitive race in armaments, and the result of that race will be just the same as it was before, a conflict like that from which the world is only now painfully and slowly emerging. That is the vital flaw in part of what the right hon. Gentleman has said. I would put to the House this proposition with part of which I know the right hon. Gentleman would disagree, but with another part of which I think he would agree. In the first place, it is of prime importance to try to get a convention, at as low a level of armament as possible. At the same time we ought not to stop trying to get a convention, even if the level of armaments should be a great deal higher than we would wish to see it. The making of such a convention would call a halt in the armaments race which otherwise must inevitably lead to another war.
  I have no illusions about a convention or about the value of international inspection. I do not think a convention could guarantee peace. I do not think that international inspection could give full knowledge. But the greater number of the peoples of the world are peaceable and the existence of a convention with the restraints which it would impose, would reinforce their influence and enable the world to have a breathing space. No one need cherish any illusions about international inspection. It would never be a hundred per cent. effective, but it might be 40 per cent. or 50 per cent. effective, and, taken together with all the other sources of information which any country would be able to use, while it might not give complete knowledge, it would make it impossible that any prolonged or flagrant breach of a convention should pass without notice. For that reason, I would give all the support I could to every attempt to make a convention

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  even at a level of armaments which we should not ourselves desire. If by next year a convention has not been made, we may look back and wish to heaven that we had made one while the opportunity was with us:
  "The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
  Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit
  Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
  Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it."
  I would make a second proposition which is the corollary of the first. If a convention should be made, I put it to the House and to the Government that our own air armaments should be brought up to whatever level is agreed upon in that convention. I would not have imagined some time ago that I should have proposed or even assented to an increase in British armaments. But one has to face facts, and, though the objective remains the same, there may have to be a different method of approach. There are two methods of approach to disarmament. One is the "go-as-you-please" method in which one nation sets an example hoping that the others will follow. We have tried that and failed. We have disarmed and the other nations have not. The second method is to try to arrive at parities, and, when you have done so, then perhaps you will have a breathing space in which to make another endeavour at disarmament.
  I think we owe it to ourselves and to others if there is a parity in air armaments to bring our own air armaments whether we like it or not up to that parity. The reason is obvious. This country has always had a belief in the essential character of its Navy. Yet today air armaments are just as essential to our defence as our Navy has ever been throughout past centuries. It would be idle disputation to argue as to which is most essential to-day, but there is this to be said that the air arm is always a surprise weapon. Its great force lies in the surprise character of the attack. Therefore, the existence of a sufficient air force in being at any moment is a necessity.
  I say that from our own point of view, but I also venture to say that the existence of such a force would be helpful to other nations as well. I listened to the Lord President of
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  the Council the other night, and I agreed with what he said. One nation may attack by air another nation when it is confident of its own superiority and feels certain that it will not have to suffer the horrors of air bombardment in retaliation. But it is likely to pause before delivering an air attack on another nation when the forces are equal and there is a risk of its own population having to suffer. It is not likely to engage at all in such an attempt when its forces are inferior to the forces that may be brought against it. For that reason, I think that it would be for the benefit of other nations as well as ourselves to bring our air armaments up to the level that might be fixed in any Convention. I believe it would turn a Convention which could never give a guarantee of peace but only the likelihood of it, into something as near to certainty as could be ever be obtained in this imperfect world.
  There is a third proposition. I think it would be a good thing for this country if we could make our foreign commitments clear. I doubt if there are many people in this House or anywhere else who want to extend the area of those commitments, but at any rate there are some which exist already. It is not a case of extending them. They are there, and we cannot get away from them. I think we ought not in this respect to get the worst of both worlds; we should not have obligations by which we are bound, but which, because of some obscurity in their language, neither inspire the confidence of nor give security to the country to whom we are obligated. I refer to the Treaty of Locarno, by which we are bound jointly, both to France and Germany, that if an act of aggression is committed and the country which is attacked has itself observed the Treaty, we should go to its support. We must ourselves, I think, always continue to be the judge of what constitutes an act of aggression, but my point is that we are bound by that Article if the occasion should arise, and yet there are words in it which undermine the confidence of others, though we could never appeal to those words to release us from our own obligations. I am referring in particular to the words at the end of Article 4 in that Treaty. I think they create uncertainty in the minds of others. We should therefore

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  clear them away, because the greatest folly of all is to get the worst of both worlds, to be under an obligation without it doing the good at which we aim.
  I have always believed, and I shall continue to believe, utterly in the necessity of some international body, and I believe the League of Nations will come to its own again, but again I would ask this House to face the facts. I suggest that we should never jeopardise the possible attainment of a Convention through formalities which are not absolutely necessary. We should not complicate the obtaining of it in any way, but we should try to get a Convention which would stand by itself as a desirable fact, eyen if at the moment it was not under the aegis of the League. Once the Convention was obtained, we ought to try to restore to the League its greatest effectiveness, an effectiveness which has in fact been impaired by the events of recent months. I have placed before the House such views as I have ventured to express as briefly as I can, and I think they express what many average people in this country would feel if they tried to look at the facts and to face them squarely and also to draw the inferences from them.
  I think perhaps I have had one advantage which some of my friends have not had. Absence at a distance of 3,000 or 4,000 miles from this country sometimes gives an opportunity of seeing facts in their perspective which otherwise one cannot very well obtain. Recently, when I was in Canada, I was impressed by two different facts. One was in the economic sphere. Three or four years ago the Canadians there regarded this country with affection but at the same time with another feeling, a feeling akin to pity for the old country, as if it were becoming a back number and almost down and out. When I was there quite recently, there was a complete change of feeling. They expressed openly and willingly, in the first place, their belief in the virtue of the steadiness and sticking power of the British nation as a valuable asset to the world, and, secondly, their belief that we were taking the lead in leading the world, in its recovery all too slowly, from the misery of the present slump. That was one impression. The other was that there is an opportunity for us in the international
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  sphere of politics which is just as great as in that of economics. We really need to believe in spirit and in truth that the ideal is in facing the facts of armaments at the present moment. If we do so with a sense of realism, then in the end we may help not only to seek peace but to ensue it with the other nations which are our neighbours, and to do something to help them out of the jungle of distrust and of wars and rumours of wars into the clear air and peaceful land outside.
  5.21 p.m.
  Colonel WEDGWOOD: I feel that the speech of the Lord Privy Seal this afternoon was an admirable example of work well done for a good cause, but slightly out of date. I am speaking this afternoon because I wish that the policy of His Majesty's Government should be directed a little more towards realities. I would refer to the speech which we have just heard from the right hon. Member for Tamworth (Sir A. Steel-Maitland). We know very well that the situation to-day is completely different from what it was a year ago, not because the League of Nations has been weakened, but on account of the new attitude of the German Government. They are outside the League, and I am glad they are outside the League; and they have introduced into all our foreign politics an entirely new situation. As the Prime Minister knows, there was a time when I was bitterly opposed to the Protocol, a time when I voted against Locarno. The change in the situation has changed my views and, I think, changed very largely the views of a great many people in this House.
  It seems to me that, in spite of the admirable work that the Lord Privy Seal has been doing, we are still adrift and that all the Powers on the Continent, Germany included, are completely at sea as to what British policy is in reality. They know that we are in favour of disarmament, but as to the points at which England can be squeezed or as to the point at which England will put down its foot, they are still at sea. It is open to argument that in 1914 there would have been no war if France and Germany had definitely known that we should come in. I am: not of the school that thinks that if they had known, the Germans would not have fought, but still it is possible that war might have been avoided if

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  France and Germany had known. Now I am particularly anxious that the same uncertainty on the part of either Germany or France should not land us in exactly the same situation.
  Locarno, so far as it goes, has a certain advantage. The French know—I am not certain that they know as well as they did before the speech of the Foreign Secretary some time ago—that if there is trouble on that particular frontier, they will have us with them, and the Germans know that we shall be on the other side. That does give a certain element of stability on that particular front, but the whole question is, How far do the French and the other people also bordering on Germany know whether we shall line up or whether we shall concede? In Germany to-day there is no immediate fear of any action on the Alsace-Lorraine front. The whole German spirit, particularly the new spirit in Germany, is based on what they call the Drang nach Osten. Extension to and through the Baltic States is their ambition. Their colonisation will dream ever of expansion in Lithuania, in Latvia, in Estonia, and in Finland. They see there their future Colonial expansion, exactly as we saw ours in America 200 years ago. That is their historic field. They are not really interested in tropical colonies, but they are interested in that Drang nach Osten, which, ever since the time of Bismarck, has been the goal of the super-patriotic Junker class in Germany.
  I want to ask whether something in the nature of Locarno could not be extended elsewhere. The question of the extension of Locarno is, I believe, the really vital issue at the present moment. I do not want the Government to rush into it. I am merely showing that I think that is the problem of the immediate future, that we should lay down some limit beyond which Great Britain cannot be pushed. Before the present German Government came in I think we were all in favour of the revision of the Versailles Peace Treaty in certain particulars, but I have no longer the slightest desire to revise it in any direction. It may be that we ought to do so, but undoubtedly those of the Powers of Europe which are in danger to-day should come to an understanding as to how far that revision should go. Personally, I dislike the German Government
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  to such an extent that I would object to their getting any concessions in the East at all. I think we should all resent, nationally, the suppression of Latvia and Estonia, and I am certain that we should not tolerate Denmark being robbed of those Danish provinces in Schleswig-Holstein which were restored to Denmark by the Peace Treaty.
  It is a question of where you are going to draw the line, because these demands will not all be made together. The German Government are certain to try first one thing and then another. We have had Dantzig, we have got the Saar next year, and, I suppose, the Austrian question, one after the other. It is never worth while to fight for each individually, but there ought to be a line drawn, known perfectly well to the Government and to our colleagues abroad whose interests are the same as ours. I do not say that it should necessarily be known to the public or even to Germany, but the people who are in danger ought to know at what point the stand must be made. If I could think that the German Government would ever change, would ever be upset, I think I should be prepared to go on without coming to any definite decision or making any pledge, but I feel that the dictatorship in Germany, the suppression of liberty in Germany, is permanent for our time. It can only be upset by a complete revolution, so I think it is necessary to recast our ideas, and I am willing to appear in a white sheet and to apologise for my opposition to those measures which now, in the present year, would, I think, be desirable for Europe.
  The Lord President of the Council in his speech the other day pleaded for equality in air armaments, as also did the right hon. Member for Tamworth just now. That, too, would have been all right under the old conditions, but I feel that we ought to realise that the next war is almost sure to begin by surprise, and equality of armaments will be of no value if the other people destroy our aeroplanes and our petrol tanks before the declaration of war and before the risks are even known. The advantages of surprise were great in the old days, but they are infinitely greater to-day. It would be as if you started by having all your artillery put out of action. After that what could the Navy or the Army do, what could even the resolution of a great

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  people do, if suddenly we were deprived of our new arm? The aeroplane is I believe, going to replace the gun, and if before a declaration of war comes your equal armaments in aeroplanes are blown sky high in their aerodromes and our reserves of petrol, which we can see on the river all too obviously, are blown up; if the advantage of surprise is thus given to people who consider they have been treated badly in the past, and think they may treat other people badly in future, many excuses can be made. They can make the excuse that they are not making war, but are levelling things out before they sit round a table with you to argue about it.
  When you are dealing with a situation such as that, it is vital that there should be not merely a Convention, but a realisation on the part of our forces that the next war may be over in half an hour. When arguing with people who are disarmed, you rely upon the justice, the good faith and the rightness of your cause, but if when you are bargaining with people who are capable of doing what I have visualised, you get into such a position, you can roll up the map of the British Empire. So that the two new things I would point are, that it is desirable that somebody who matters should know where we are to draw the line and where we are to stand fast; and on the other hand, that the air service should not have unlimited money spent upon it, but unlimited new ideas pumped into the higher command so that they may realise the danger to which the Empire is exposed and work out, if it be possible, a counter to the most dangerous movement that could possibly be made against this country.
  5.35 p.m.
  Mr. GODFREY LOCKER-LAMPSON: I should like to refer to something out-side the question of disarmament, although it is, I think, indissolubly connected with it. I refer to the question of the reform of the League of Nations. In answer to a question the other day, the Foreign Secretary told us that disarmament must come before the reform of the League, and that he had consulted the Governments of France and Italy, and they agreed with him that disarmament must come before the reform of the League. My right hon. Friend never told us whether he had also consulted the Governments of the United States of
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  America, of Germany, of Russia or of Japan in this matter, but he took it for granted that the question of disarmament and reform were wholly divorced one from the other. I venture to think that this cannot be so. In the United Kingdom Memorandum which was issued the other day, it is made clear that the question of disarmament and the reform of the League are very closely associated. In the last sentence it says:
  "If agreement is secured and the return of Germany to Geneva and the League of Nations is brought about—and this ought to be an essential condition of agreement—"
  that is to say, agreement on disarmament. That means that agreement on disarmament is made dependent on the return of Germany to the League of Nations, and that if Germany will not return to the League no agreement on disarmament is possible. If that be really the case, is it not of paramount importance to find out whether the League in its present form is the kind of body to which Germany can give her adhesion. I do not see, after this statement in the White Paper, that the Government can possibly divorce the two questions from each other, or postpone one in favour of another. I do not for a moment suggest that the question of disarmament should be postponed, but I do suggest that we should not postpone the question of the reform of the League of Nations.
  The League is now 13 years of age, and I do not suppose anybody has the slightest doubt that the creation of the League has been an outstanding event in the world's history. No one can doubt that the League has done an immense amount of valuable work in various directions quite outside and unconnected with the questions of war or peace. But no one can deny that, in spite of those 13 years of activity, the armaments of some of the greatest Powers in the world have grown progressively and enormously. Everyone knows that at the present moment Europe is little less than an armed camp. No one also can deny that, in spite of the League, international animosities are more virulent in some directions than at any time since its formation. In fact, during the last year Europe has been nearer the possibility of war than at any time since the formation of the League. It is true that the other day the tension was slightly relaxed owing to the agreement between Germany

  411
  and Poland. But that agreement was negotiated entirely outside the League of Nations and without any assistance from the League—a fact which in itself has derogated from the prestige of the League. Finally, no one can deny that the League has been unable to stop wars taking their usual course of victory and defeat in different parts of the world, not only between small Powers, but between great Powers.
  If these statements are unchallenged, I venture to say that the time has come to review the League and the Covenant of the League. The Foreign Secretary a few days ago at Birkenhead said that he deeply deplored the present situation, that is to say, deeply deplored the inability of the League to counter the movement for increased armaments. To deplore the situation is not enough. The League of Nations to-day is obviously not a League of Nations in the ordinary sense of the term; it is a League of most of the small Powers plus a minority of the great Powers of the world. Four great Powers now stand outside the League, and one other great Power has expressed grave dissatisfaction with the present constitution of the League. If Italy left, there would remain only two of the great Powers, and that, I think, would probably spell the end of the League for all practical purposes. It would simply resolve itself into an Anglo-French alliance with Great Britain on the one side and France and the Little Entente on the other. That might be an extremely strong combination for various European purposes, but it would certainly not be a League of Nations and would undoubtedly be conducive to war.
  What really is the weakness of the League of Nations constituted as it is at present, which prevents its obtaining the adhesion of other great Powers of the world and prejudices the question of disarmament? I submit with all humility that there are two cardinal defects that go to the root of the League of Nations, namely, the incorporation of the Covenant with the Peace Treaties and the punitive sanctions which are embodied in the Covenant. May I take the first point? The Covenant is inextricably bound up with the four great Peace Treaties—the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, the Treaty of Saint Germain
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  with Austria, the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria, and the Treaty of the Trianon with Hungary. In all these treaties the 26 articles of the Covenant are incorporated. I ask the House, how are we ever to get a revision of the treaties in those circumstances? It is true that Article 19 of the Covenant provides in a general way for a revision of any treaty, but: no revision can take place under Article 5, unless the members of the Assembly and of the Council are unanimous and, as everyone knows, some of the nations in Europe, including France and the Little Entente, are bitterly hostile to any revision whatever.
  Can you be surprised that Germany left the League in those circumstances when there was practically no hope that the League would ever agree to any kind of revision? I do not think that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will disagree with me, that it is not any exaggeration to say that the machinery of the League has over and over again been utilised by certain Powers to preserve the letter of the Peace Treaties when a timely revision of those Treaties would have made all the difference. In fact, if we look at the Covenant, the whole tenor of Article 10 is to perpetuate the Peace Treaties, guaranteeing, as it does at present, the territorial boundaries of all members of the League against an aggressor. This is, to my mind, the one fundamental reason why the United States of America refuse to join the League. How can we hope that they will ever give adhesion to the League as long as this Article in the Covenant asks them to guarantee European boundaries which they never ratified? I think that it is absolutely hopeless to expect them to do so.
  I submit that the second great difficulty of the League as at present constituted lies in the sanctions embodied in Articles 16 and 17. Under the Sanction Clauses nations are bound, if necessary, to go to war for some quarrel in some part of the world with which they have no concern at all. These are the words:
  "It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League."

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  That certainly is not disarmament, whatever else it may be. In fact, these Clauses containing the sanctions necessarily imply preparations for war inside the League itself. Surely that ought not to be one of the objects of the League of Nations if they want all the great Powers to join. Everybody knows that there are no sanctions in the Kellogg Pact, and I do not believe the United States of America will ever undertake the responsibility of compulsory sanctions. The United States of America expressly refused to attach penalties to any breach of the Paris Pact. It is prefectly true that one American statesman—I think Mr. Norman Davis—not long ago declared that America would not stand in the way of collective effort against an aggressor if the United States were in agreement with the League about the quarrel, which is a very, very important qualification. But going even to that extent is a very long way indeed from the sanctions in Articles 16 and 17; and since then President Roosevelt has made it absolutely clear that the United States of America are never going to join the League of Nations in its present form.
  Therefore, it seems to me, with all respect, that these sanctions will have to disappear from the Covenant if we want the United States to join the League. In any event, these sanctions cannot possibly operate without the United States of America. Certainly this country would be very ill-advised indeed to carry out any sanctions which would mean interference by the British Navy in American neutral trade. The effectiveness of these sanctions obviously depends upon their acceptance by all the great Powers of the world. I notice that the other day Professor Gilbert Murray, one of the greatest authorities, I suppose, on the League, replied to certain criticisms of the League of Nations at a big meeting at Oxford, but, unless the report I read was very much abridged, he never referred to the sanctions of the Covenant, and I am hardly surprised, for there is no excuse for their retention in the Covenant to-day.
  Mr. COCKS: Professor Gilbert Murray has repeatedly supported the sanctions of the League.
  Mr. LOCKER-LAMPSON: I am referring to this particular speech. It may have been an abridged report, but he
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  certainly avoided meeting any criticism that had been made against those sanctions. After all, the Covenant has already been modified several times. Articles 4, 6, 12, 13 and 15 have been modified, and one advantage is that the amending of the Covenant, although it requires a unanimous Council, needs only a majority of the Assembly. But the Government have told us that the reform of the League should await the results of the Disarmament Conference; in other words, that disarmament should precede reform. To my mind, that is absolutely putting the cart before the horse. How can we get permanent and general disarmament by means of the efforts of the League unless we persuade all these other big Powers to join the League as members and undertake its obligations and how can we expect them to become members of the League unless we, first of all, make attempts to alter its present scope? To think we can do that is to live in a fool's paradise. Without the United States, without Japan, without Germany and without Russia in the League, the case for disarmament is completely hopeless. We are trying to build a top storey with no supporting scaffolding underneath. As my last word, I hope that before this Debate is concluded the Foreign Secretary may be able to indicate whether the Government have any policy in this matter—they must have some ideas on the subject—and that the disinclination of any particular European Power, however friendly, to consider this question of reform ought not to deter the Government from formulating their own policy.
  5.53 p.m.
  Mr. WILMOT: No one who listened to the speech of the Lord Privy Seal, charged as it was with the most obvious sincerity, could fail to feel that it was a very valiant attempt to disguise a conviction of impending failure. I make no claim to any specialist or expert knowledge on this subject, but it is the ordinary man who will have to pay the price of failure, if failure supervenes. I feel that that speech, to which we listened with so much interest, was marred by the charge that those of us who express doubts and misgivings as to the past and current policy of the Government do so not from conviction but from a desire to exploit the national extremity for party purposes. That is

  415
  an unworthy statement, and I rather wonder it was repeated. This question of war and peace is far too terrible a responsibility for any man with any sense to seek to gain party capital or advantage from it, and if we on this side of the House express our anxieties and our fears, we do it because we believe that it is better to face stark realities than to deal in smooth phrases and endeavour to make out that we exist in some cloud cuckoo-land.
  I feel that the mission which was undertaken by the Lord Privy Seal was a hopeless mission from the start, but that does not mean that the situation is altogether hopeless in every respect. He went to persuade two other Powers to smile upon the latest proposals of the British Government. I suppose everybody realises now that those proposals were made too late. To say that is not deliberately to paint a dark picture for the pleasure of doing it, but because it is better to realise where the mistake lies than to go on with the facile optimism that something will turn up to rescue us in the end. I believe that the fundamental cause of the failure lies in the fact that this country is governed by a Coalition Government made up of dissimilar elements expressing fundamentally different conceptions of what the foreign policy of the country ought to be. That is why, in my view, when the right thing is done it is, time after time, done too late. If the latest British Memorandum had been put forward 12 months earlier, it would possibly have achieved its object, but it was drawn up after the rearmament of Germany had proceeded some distance and had, in fact, been condoned, and at that point it was obviously useless, as the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) pointed out. It was obviously useless to suggest to France the proposals which were embodied in the Memorandum.
  The tragedy of this situation is that nobody believes, nobody understands, what is the real, fundamental policy of the British Government. Nobody knows whether we are pursuing an out-and-out frank League of Nations' policy or pursuing a policy which is one of making a gesture towards the League, one of, perhaps, hoping that something may come from that direction while holding a real
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  belief that nothing really can be done, and that in the end we shall have to come back to some pre-War system of security, if security it be. We have had the unfortunate fact that the Estimates for the righting Services have been introduced at the very time when this question of disarmament has arrived at its most critical juncture. It seems ludicrous that the British Government should be able to decide what the size of our armaments are without knowing what the future of our foreign policy is to be. Are we to build battleships and aeroplanes in the belief that we are part of a collective peace system? If so, what contribution are we expected to make to that system of collective security, who else is going to contribute to it, and what is the magnitude of their contributions?
  I was very much surprised to hear that sincere friend of the League of Nations the right hon. Member for Wood Green (Mr. G. Locker-Lampson) express the views he holds with regard to sanctions. Unless the League of Nations is to be armed with some power to enforce its decisions it will be as useless as the Kellog Pact has proved to be. It is so difficult to expect the other nations of Europe to believe in our sincerity when we bring forward our increased armament proposals at the very time that the fate of disarmament is trembling in the balance. What is our policy? Do we believe that security is only to be found in our own strong right arm? There are many hon. Members who believe that. I give them credit for their sincerity. If I believed that the best security from invasion for our people lay in a big Army, a big Navy and a big Air Force, I should support those policies. My prime interest in this matter is to see to it that nothing is left undone that will protect our people from the horrors of war and invasion. I do not know—nobody knows—whether the British Government believe that the best and only form of security is to be found in armaments. Do they believe that some sort of balance of power, for instance, can best be evolved, and that we had best pool our forces, not with the other member-States of the League as a whole, but with a selection of powers who can be got into an alliance, much as was the situation in 1914? Even then it is necessary to know who are our allies upon whom we can depend in an emergency, and against which possible combination

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  of Powers we are to build and arm. None of those things is made plain. Nobody knows what the conception of the future policy of the Government is, and in such a situation is it to be wondered—
  Mr. HENDERSON STEWART: How can any Government at any time declare against what enemy or potential enemy it is arming?
  Mr. WILMOT: That question displays a lamentable lack of knowledge of the history of British foreign policy.
  Mr. STEWART: I was referring to the present.
  Mr. WILMOT: The present is not different from the past in that respect. A policy to be effective must be related to the conditions that surround it. It is useless to stand in a vacuum unable to decide whether we are to depend solely upon our own armaments, or whether to get the best alliance that we can—
  Mr. STEWART: That is not the point.
  Mr. WILMOT: It is the point that I was making—or whether we are to depend upon a new conception of security embodied in the idea of the League of Nations. I believe that it is the vacillation, or the apparent vacillation, of the British Government's policy which is primarily responsible for the impending tragedy. All of us believed at one time that every British Government, no matter of what party, was a firm supporter of the idea of collective security. That idea was accepted throughout Europe. I believe—I say it with the deepest respect to the Foreign Secretary, and in his presence—that the fatal blunder that was made with regard to the Japanese aggression was the worst blow that was delivered against the belief in the effectiveness of the League system. A similar blow was dealt in this House by the same right hon. Gentleman when he made that memorable speech upon the implications of Locarno. After that speech, is it to be wondered at that nobody in Europe believes that the Locarno Pact means anything? Unless in undertaking to go to the aid of a State which is attacked, we abide by the judgment of the League, we are placed in the position of judge
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  and executioner as well. We become the judge of our own liabilities.
  If we were sitting in Paris and were looking at the actions of a foreign Government, and we were asked to rely for our security upon a pact the interpretation of which was left until the emergency had occurred, we should regard that security as mere waste paper. That is the second vacillation of policy, lack of decision, and failure to convey a sense of security, which have caused the whole of Europe to regard the policy of the British Government as beyond human understanding, and in extremis to turn to the old and the simple method of getting security, which 13 by building the biggest armaments that you can afford. If I believed that that was the one way left, and that only by the big armament policy could we secure peace and freedom from invasion, I would whole-heartedly support it, but such are the conditions of modern war, that however large our forces may be, however much we drain away our substance and for however long we give up all hope of social development because of the burdens that we are going to put upon our backs, we get no more security.
  We might get some sort of guarantee that we shall not be quickly defeated in a war, but we get no guarantee that we shall not be destroyed. In the new conditions of warfare it is the destruction of the civilian population, rather than the defeat of the armed forces, which is the objective of any potential enemy. Therefore I believe that the course of those who really and sincerely desire to do what is possible to protect our people is still to endeavour to secure at all costs, and at no matter what risk, something in the way of a system of collective security. I see no hope in any other direction. I believe that it is not yet too late. I believe that because, speaking here in England and voicing, as I believe in my humble way, the feelings of the ordinary man-in-the-street, I know that in France and in other countries similar people are thinking along similar lines. If only some great Power occupying a key position, as we do, would, even now, take a lead in this matter, something would be done.
  Let us look at the situation as it now is, desperate and black as it looks.

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  There is France, desperately desiring security, for reasons which we can well understand. There is Belgium. There are the Scandinavian countries. There is Italy and there is Russia—all of them staking their all upon continued peace—and, removed by distance but not in sentiment, there is the new world across the Atlantic. Is it too late to make a fresh start to try to cut through these disbeliefs and this lack of conviction in our security and our intentions'? Can we not determine on a policy and stick to it, and not give it up until at last we say, "We can go no further, and we will take the only alternative that is left"? We cannot possibly ride more than one of these policies at the same time. I beg of the Government to make one more attempt to do all that is possible to bring into the society of nations that great new factor, the implications of whose co-operation we cannot measure; I refer to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and to see whether we can, in this desperate situation, bring the Soviet Republics into the collective peace system. We should see also whether America in her new temper, with her new hopes and her new conception of world responsibilities, will not lend to our endeavours a closer co-operation than we have had before. If the Government would do that, if they would put aside their own past and would stick valiantly to that policy, I am sure that there would be throughout this land a sigh of relief and of thankfulness, and that the British Government would earn the gratitude of the whole world.
  6.12 p.m.
  Sir HERBERT SAMUEL: The purpose of this Debate was primarily in order that the House might hear from the Lord Privy Seal the impressions made upon him by his journey in Europe to certain capitals upon the Continent. The hon. Member was sent out like the dove from the Ark to see whether the waters had abated from the earth—the waters of suspicion, enmity and antagonism—and it was hoped that he might come back bearing the sprig of olive. He has returned, and there is as yet no leaf of olive. The floods still cover the face of the earth. Although his journey has been completed, his mission has not yet been fully completed, for that will not
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  be until we have the replies from all the Governments whose capitals he visited, and with whom he was in consultation; and that is not yet. So that really this Debate is premature, and it must necessarily be incomplete and inconclusive. I confess that I am rather sorry that the official Opposition did not, in the circumstances, substitute some other subject for foreign affairs in their request for the allocation of to-day's Debate, and postpone it until a week or two hence, when advices would have been received on this subject for the consideration of the House of Commons.
  Mr. MORGAN JONES: The right hon. Gentleman will be interested to hear that we did try to postpone the Debate.
  Sir H. SAMUEL: Then the Opposition are certainly absolved from criticism. I am sorry the arrangement could not be made to postpone the Debate, because then we might have had a much more effective discussion, and there would have been greater interest in it in the House and in the country. Still, the occasion having arisen, the House must avail itself of the opportunity to express the feelings which are uppermost in the minds of hon. Members. I regard this as an occasion on which it is right that we should express our very grave concern that it should appear that the race of armaments is again beginning. The cost is likely to be enormous. We read that France is now allocating an additional sum of £28,000,000 to her defences, including £750,000 for the provision of gas masks for the population. We know that Japan has been spending enormously upon armaments, and the United States are devoting a, further immense sum to armaments, while our own Defence Estimates have increased this year by £4,500,000, and we were told to-day at Question Time that, if we are to have the parity in the air for which some right hon. and hon. Members are pleading, that will involve a further addition of £8,000,000 to our Estimates.
  All this must be a matter of grave concern, not only to the House of Commons but to the whole country, because everyone knows that these resources are needed for other purposes. They are needed for many measures of social amelioration, touching very directly the lives of great masses of the population. They are needed also for the relief of

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  taxation, for we have had impressed upon us again and again that it is essential for the development of industry and the restoration of prosperity that the enormous burden of taxation, still equal, or nearly equal, to what we were bearing in the War, should be lightened. But, if this race of armaments is to proceed, and further millions year by year are to be devoted to this purpose, all hopes of reduction of taxation or amelioration of social conditions must vanish.
  When the Disarmament Conference first met, everyone said that it must not fail, that it dare not fail, that its failure would be a confession of the world's bankruptcy of statesmanship; and yet at this moment it is on the very edge of failure, and its failure will be a declaration of bankruptcy of the world's statesmanship. Such an event must undermine the confidence of the great mass of ordinary people—such confidence as they may have—in their rulers. In our great population of 40,000,000 there are vast numbers of people who are sorely tried, whose lives are very hard, and who know that our social system treats them harshly. They are subjected to grinding poverty, and to unemployment from time to time; they live in evil environments. All those people will revolt against the idea that tens of millions, increasingly year by year, are to be devoted by Parliament merely to the piling up of more and more competitive armaments, and at the end we shall have no greater security than at the beginning. As the Lord Privy Seal said to-day in his wise and able speech, if I may venture so to term it, "competitive armaments are no guarantee of security." That is an absolute truth, and it is well to hear it from the Treasury Bench. I only wish that my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) would realise the truth of that statement. He seems to be under the delusion that two neighbouring Powers can both obtain security by each of them being stronger than the other.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: No.
  Sir H. SAMUEL: He seems to forget that, if one country has full security from its armaments, its neighbours must by that very fact have insecurity, that what is one country's security from armaments is its neighbour's insecurity. You do not get any general feeling of security or tranquillity in Europe by a policy of that kind. My right hon. Friend claims that
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  we should have parity in the air with the next strongest Power in Europe—I gather that that is his plea at the moment—with any Power which happened to be the strongest in Europe. If that were Russia, I presume we should have to build enormous fleets of aeroplanes against the imaginary possibility of a conflict with Russia. My right hon. Friend shakes his head—
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I said we should have parity with any Power that could get at us—with any Power within striking distance, to use the phrase of the Lord President. I quite agree that, when you come to a Power so remote as Russia, that factor comes in.
  Sir H. SAMUEL: It is better that we should speak frankly. No offence is meant to any other particular countries, but these discussions would be unreal unless we did envisage particular countries. It is obvious, however, that no question could arise with regard to Belgium, or Holland, or the Scandinavian countries. Therefore, when my right hon. Friend says we must be equal in power to any country that is within striking distance from the air, there are only two other countries, France and Germany.
  With regard to France, my right hon. Friend has been pleading to-day that France should increase her air force, and that we should encourage her in her efforts. He says that now she is developing her armaments, that it is a good thing that she should do so, and that we have been wrong for years past in trying to induce France to lower her defensive power, to reduce her army, navy or air force. My right hon. Friend would see with gratification an increase in the striking power of the air force of France, and, that having been effected, he would immediately come to the House of Commons and say, "Now you must vote another £5,000,000 or £10,000,000 in order to secure parity with France." If he does not mean that, what does he mean? Obviously, my right hon. Friend is declaring on the one hand that we must be equal to the strongest Power in Europe, and next he says that France is to be encouraged to increase her air force and is quite right to do so.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I never said that France was to be encouraged to increase her air force. I mentioned the fact that we were asking her to diminish it at a

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  time when she had already embarked on a programme of increase.
  Sir H. SAMUEL: It really comes to the same thing. My right hon. Friend would view without dissatisfaction—I will put it in that way—a strengthening of the forces of France, which he regards as really a pacifying influence in Europe, and as tending by their strength to maintain tranquillity and prevent attack from any quarter. Having done that, he would say that, while it is true that we are in no danger from France, because she is a pacifying element in Europe, and, therefore, her strength is to be regarded as a good thing, nevertheless it is necessary for us to build an equal number of aeroplanes to whatever France may require—that, although France has to consider, not us, but various other countries on her borders, yet, whatever she may consider to be necessary for her own security in view of her relations, North, East and South, we must necessarily, for the very reason that we have adopted this formula of parity with the strongest Power in Europe, spend unknown millions in order to achieve the same standard. If it is not France, it is Germany.
  I agree if there is any menace from the air from any country within striking distance, but can anyone say that at the present moment, or in the immediate future, there is any menace on that scale from the air from Germany? Whatever she may have in the way of civilian aeroplanes, and whatever surreptitious developments there may be in secret arming—I know nothing as to what the facts may be—it is certain that we have far more than parity at the present time as regards Germany; and yet my right hon. Friend says that our present Air Estimates are wholly inadequate, and that it is necessary that we should take immediate steps to put ourselves in a reasonable position of security. Security against whom? Until my right hon. Friend says what are the dangers against which we have to defend ourselves, it is absurd to come to the House of Commons and press the Government to spend from this country, which is over-burdened with taxation, further sums to provide against a wholly unreal danger.
  There has been in these recent Debates a new development with regard to the question of disarmament, and I think the
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  House would be well advised to give its attention to it. Gradually our hopes have been diminished, the proposals at Geneva have been whittled down stage by stage, and now it appears that, if the whole Convention fails, at any rate something may be saved from the wreck. The Lord President of the Council has suggested that, if a general convention proves to be impossible, there might be at all events an Air Convention, and we might endeavour to provide against the terrible danger to the civil populations of all the countries from air attack. That is a new development which has been presented to the House and to the country.
  I had the privilege of being at Geneva, as one of the representatives of the Government when I was a member of it, in the summer of 1932, with my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, and I took part in the conversations that were proceeding then with, in particular, the French and the Americans, and also the Italians and others; and my right hon. Friend will not, I know, object to my mentioning the fact that among those conversations—I think it was made public at the time—there were discussions with regard to the possibility of reaching an agreement to limit any air attacks that might be permissible to military objectives. The whole subject is surrounded by very great difficulties in regard to defining what military objectives are. However, the conversations went on, and were not unhopeful at the time. Indeed, it seemed to me then that, whatever might be the result of the Conference in other respects, there was a real possibility of achieving agreement there, and also with regard to the complete prohibition of the use of gas. Everyone seemed to be agreed on these matters. That hope was to a large extent destroyed by a speech—a most admirable speech in many respects, which won world-wide admiration—that was made by the Lord President of the Council in November, 1932. It was the famous speech in which he described in most vivid terms, and with great eloquence and power of language, the terrible perils which faced the civil populations from air attack. In the course of that speech he said:
  "The prohibition of the bombardment of the civil population, the next thing talked about, is impracticable so long as any bombing exists at all."

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  He went on to say:
  "The first difficulty about that is this—will any form of prohibition not to bomb, whether by convention, treaty, agreement, or anything you like, be effective in war? Frankly, I doubt it, and in doubting it, I make no reflection on the good faith of either ourselves or any other country. If a man has a potential weapon and has his back to the wall and is going to be killed, he will use that weapon whatever it is and whatever undertaking he has given about it. Experience has shown us that the stern test of war will break down all conventions."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th November, 1932; col. 634, Vol. 270.]
  That is a view which is held by very many people, but for my own part I do not agree with it, and I deplore the making of that statement, because in effect it meant that no convention of any kind that might be made at Geneva, no matter how universally signed, would be of any avail under this stern test of war; that, even if the right hon. Gentleman's own proposal were adopted, and all bombing were prohibited and all naval and military aircraft abolished, that also would be equally infringed; and, similarly, that all the conventions that have been made for arbitration and conciliation and everything else are mere paper and would prove to be worthless. As I say, I know that that view is very widely held by those who regard themselves as realists in this matter. I do not think it is a true view, because I think that the moral forces in the world have a tremendous effect upon wars, and did in fact decide the Great War of 1914–18.
  It was the German invasion of Belgium, the breach of a treaty, which brought this country into the conflict as a united country. If Belgium had not been invaded, if the treaty had not been broken, if we had not been able to appeal to the law of nations as a reason, certainly the then Cabinet would not have been united, and there might not have been a majority for participating in the War. Certainly, the country would have been disunited; certainly the Labour party as a whole would have opposed the War; and the whole course of events would have been entirely different. That, at the beginning of the War, was a great moral issue which brought the whole power of the British Empire unitedly into the conflict. Then, step by step, the use by the Germans of gas, their sinking of some hospital ships, and events of that kind,
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  caused a feeling of anger and resentment to prevail in a large part of mankind, which had a profound influence upon the issue. Finally, the sinking of merchant ships by submarines, against treaty obligations, was the main reason that brought the United States into the War, and consequently it was really the breach of treaties which, by bringing in the whole of the British Empire and finally the United States, was the absolutely deciding factor in that Titanic and world-wide struggle.
  Therefore, I believe that, if the Powers to-day solemnly signed a convention declaring that in no circumstances would they attack ordinary towns with civilian populations—definitions, no doubt, would be necessary—arid would limit themselves to military objectives and, if any country after that were, in definite breach of it, to send great fleets of aeroplanes to bomb the defenceless civilian population of ordinary towns, there would be such an explosion of anger and such a moral revulsion throughout the world against that country, that it would lose infinitely more than it could possibly gain by an attack of that character. So I think it would be well worth while pursuing this line further, and I am glad to find that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill), with whom, I am sad to think, I find myself so seldom in agreement nowadays, and particularly on these matters, revived this project and took the initiative on the 8th instant in pleading for an international convention, or a series of treaties, confining our air warfare to military and naval objectives. What is more significant even, considering the course of past events, the Lord President of the Council, in spite of his speech in November, 1932, responded to the right hon. Gentleman's invitation and in the same Debate used these words:
  "I agree most warmly with my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping with regard to agreements for the definition of specified areas for bombing. It may not be a great deal; I do not know. I am not sure, but I feel that coupled with restrictions and equality—with those two things together—it would be a far better combination for the maintenance of the peace of Europe."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1934; col. 2078, Vol. 286.]
  Although the right hon. Gentleman was guarded in what he said, he spoke in quite a different tone from his earlier speech, in which he said that all such

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  conventions were useless, that they would be broken under the stress of war and were not worth having. Now I am glad to think he agrees that that line could be further pursued and I trust that, as the outcome of these discussions, if the Government find that a general convention proves impracticable, they will fall back on their second line of defence, a convention with regard to the air, and will explore the possibilities of securing agreement, with adequate definitions, to protect the civilian populations, at all events, from the worst barbarities of modern warfare.
  The present tension in Europe and the parlous state to which the Disarmament Conference has been brought, is undoubtedly due to the emergence of a new factor, namely, the German revolution and, as a consequence of it, the withdrawal of Germany from the League and the revival of the spirit of militarism. I was very glad that the Lord Privy Seal drew attention to a very significant and, I think, deplorable speech at Potsdam a few days ago by General Goering, the Prime Minister of Prussia, and particularly these words:
  "We should be proud to be laughed at abroad as a nation of militarists. We know what this militarism has achieved."
  No one has laughed. No one regards the revival of German militarism as a comedy fit for laughter. It is a tragedy fit for tears, and a tragedy in which, it may be, all of us will be doomed to take a lamentable part. It was said by Gibbon, who could speak, if any man could, in the name of history, that:
  "History, after all, is little more than a register of the crimes, the misfortunes and the follies of mankind."
  That is a pessimistic view, but a declaration such as that of General Goering is a confirmation of that view and, indeed, an assurance that history will continue to be a register of the crimes, the misfortunes and the follies of mankind.
  This revival of German militarism has placed Europe in a terrible dilemma. Are we, on the one hand, to acquiesce, to watch it grow and become more and more formidable until some day it results in a terrible catastrophe for Germany and for the world, or, on the other hand, are we to take steps to endeavour to stop it and thereby to refuse to a great
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  country like Germany that equality of status to which she has laid claim, and which our Government have in principle admitted? It is a terrible dilemma, and, whatever answer is given, the result cannot fail in some degree to be evil. And yet I think of the two it is not possible to say to any great country anywhere in the world, "You shall be kept disarmed in the presence of an armed world," and, if the other countries will not disarm, you cannot say to Germany that the restrictions of Versailles shall be indefinitely maintained. As I have said previously, speaking on these matters, it such a demand had been made after the Napoleonic Wars in 1814 at the Congress of Vienna, and France had been required to disarm and to remain disarmed in the presence of an armed world, who can imagine that such a state of things could possibly have lasted throughout the whole of the 19th century? Very significant was the speech of the Prime Minister of Belgium a few days ago, in which he declared that it would not be possible to maintain such a regime of inequality. So I believe Europe must choose that horn of the dilemma which admits a greater equality of armaments, trusting that a sense of fairness may lead in time, perhaps, to some change of heart among the masses of the people in Germany. I agree with the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. M. Jones) that it is not in a policy of isolation, which must lead to competitive armaments, and it is not in a policy of alliances, which always in history have led to war, but only in a policy of maintaining a collective system of control that the hope of the world can lie.
  6.39 p.m.
  Captain LUMLEY: Every speaker in the Debate, including the right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken, has contemplated the possibility, or the danger, of another war. To one who, like many others, left the regular Army at the end of the last War in the belief that it would be impossible for such a thing to occur again, that is a very singular feature, and it seems to indicate that these next few weeks, in which very vital questions will have to be decided, will be fateful weeks for Europe and for this country. I think the speech of the Lord Privy Seal, although it was obviously not intended to be a definite pronouncement of Government policy, has served a very

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  useful purpose, because it has cleared the minds of many of us in relation to these very important matters, and although we could not reasonably expect that the Government would be able to-day to say very much on this all important question, I hope no harm will be done if I attempt in a general way to face up to the situation which would arise if these disarmament negotiations were to end in a deadlock. If I contemplate the possibility of such a deadlock, that does not mean that I think we must abandon all hope of a successful result. On the contrary, we can still retain the hope that all the work during the past few years of the Foreign Secretary and the Government, as well as the visit of the Lord Privy Seal to the three capitals, will result, even at this eleventh hour, in a convention which at least will contain some limitation of armaments, and, I hope, some curtailment of armaments.
  Neither does it mean, if we contemplate the possibility of a deadlock, that that would be any justification for laying the blame for it on the British Government. In all the welter of criticism, some of it contradictory, some ill-natured, which has been bandied about for the past few months, this fact seems to me to emerge perfectly clear and incapable of contradiction, that it has been the British Government which has already saved the Disarmament Conference from failure on more than one occasion, and has time and again taken the lead in putting forward practical proposals. I do not think any fair-minded person can say with truth that, if a deadlock should arise, the blame for it can be placed at the door of our Government. But, although we still retain hope of a successful issue, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that a deadlock is at least possible and may very soon be upon us, and I think it is time that the House and the country considered the situation which would then arise. It seems to me that, if at the end of all these negotiations there is a deadlock or a breakdown, there will be two possible courses of action open to our Government. Either we may accept the deadlock and leave it at that, or we can make yet one more attempt to try to resolve it.
  I should like to examine each of these possible courses of action from the point of view of security—not the French security, about which we hear a great
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  deal, but the security of the people who live in these islands, for. I believe, however high may be the ideals of our statesmen, in the long run no Government in this country will be forgiven if it fails to produce the largest measure of security for our own people in a disturbed world such as ours is to-day. Let me take, therefore, the first alternative. If no agreement is reached and a deadlock ensues, what will be the result? I do not believe that anyone will deny that the most probable result would be the open re-armament of Germany, that that would be followed by an increase of the armaments of France, and possibly many other countries would follow suit. In other words, the course would be clear once again for a race in armaments over the Continent of Europe. If those were the circumstances, what advantages could we gain? One advantage would occur to us at once. In those circumstances we should feel free to increase the level of our own armaments to make ourselves more secure, and that seems to me to be an inevitable course which would be forced upon us. But the amount of security which we could obtain by our own armaments in a re-armed Europe can be very much exaggerated. It would be limited to making ourselves secure only against a sudden and treacherous attack, and I doubt whether it would be any more than that.
  It does not seem to me that our own armaments would secure us from the risk of being entangled in a European conflict, neither would they secure us from the consequences of such a conflict. Even supposing that Great Britain was no longer moved by considerations of honour, it would be a very strange thing if, should such a conflict arise, sooner or later she was not compelled to intervene on one side or another in her own interests. No great country could keep out of the last War, and I cannot recall more than a few instances in our history in which we have been able to stand aloof from a great European war. If we were able to stand aloof, would our people be secure against the economic catastrophe which would be bound to follow any major war? There could be no security against that. It would be folly to present the situation as any more gloomy than it is, but I feel that if the Disarmament Conference ends in a deadlock and gives rise to a race in armaments,

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  it will be a very grave event for us.
  I do not share the views of those who consider that armaments by themselves are the cause of war. The danger lies much deeper. The reasons which make nations arm are the causes of war, and the danger which I see in the re-armament of Europe is that such a race in armaments would be the expression of the mounting fears of Europe. If there is any ground for the apprehension that a failure to reach agreement on disarmament would lead to re-armament, I am driven to the conclusion that the security which we could obtain by rearming ourselves would be very limited—so limited as to make it well worth our while to examine the other alternative, which is to go further than we have gone hitherto to obtain an agreement among the other nations about disarmament. It amounts, in plain language, to giving a more definite guarantee to France. It is not necessary for me to state why that particular course would seem to be necessary. No doubt the reasons which make the present situation in Europe so tense are well known to hon. Members. Germany will not acquiesce in a position of inferiority any longer and desires rearmament, and France dare not disarm unless she is given greater guarantees of security.
  Therefore, the key to the immediate problem is to find some guarantee for France that will satisfy her. Let me assume for the sake of my argument that we could find such a satisfactory guarantee. What then would be the advantages to ourselves? Here, again, one advantage is obvious, and immediately leaps to our minds. We would not need to burden further Budgets with large additional estimates for the fighting services and so destroy for many years to come our hopes of reducing the burden of taxation or of improving the social services. If the shadow of that great impending financial burden could be removed from our horizon, there is not a Member in this House who would not be glad. It would meet with universal approval. One might even hope that the bench of bishops would discover unanimity upon it. What would be the effect upon our security? If we accepted a policy, such as that adumbrated by the Lord President of the Council, of parity, we should retain the
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  only advantage which we should have from the former alternative; we should still have security against any sudden or treacherous attack. But by far the most important aspect of this question is, What security can we obtain if we give a further guarantee? Would we obtain greater security or would we run greater risks from entanglements in a possible European conflict?
  Here we are treading upon such vital ground that it would be a crime to make any exaggerated claim. Let us approach the matter with caution. All I would say about it is that I would feel much safer with more commitments in a disarmed Europe than I would without commitments in a re-armed Europe. I believe that that is the position which is before our country to-day. I do not feel competent to state in any more exact language what kind of guarantee we could give to France, but if we do give a guarantee we must have something in return, and it ought to be definite and substantial disarmament in Europe. Any guarantee which failed to obtain that result would seem to be wasted. As far as I have been able to follow the statements which have been made public by the French Government during these negotiations, our French friends have often asked us for further guarantees, but they have never stated in very plain language what they would give in return. It would be essential, if we were to reap the full benefit from any guarantee that we might give, to make quite sure that in return we achieve disarmament. The coming weeks, when these decisions will be taken, will be very vital weeks for the future of Europe. I have tried to consider this question from the point of view of our own security, and as far as I am able to do that, it is to our advantage to make yet another attempt, if a deadlock in these negotiations is reached, by giving a further guarantee to France. I believe that if the choice were placed fairly before the country of general re-armament or another guarantee by us, or another commitment to obtain disarmament, I believe that the country would accept the second alternative, and would give its approval to the Government if that decision were boldly taken and effectively pursued.
  6.57 p.m.
  Mr. HAMILTON KERR: I hope that the hon. and gallant Member for York

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  (Captain Lumley) will forgive me if I do not follow him in some of the points he raised in his interesting speech. I am certain that all hon. Members who follow the European situation with care, and with a certain knowledge of the facts, cannot fail to congratulate the Government on the sincere desire for peace which their latest White Paper shows. It is a document which, if disappointing to idealists, nevertheless faces the iron realities of the European crisis.
  The kernel of discontent which exists in Europe to-day is, as hon. Members know, the essential opposition of the French demand for security with the German insistence on equality. The teaching of history surely shows us that, of all the guarantors of peace, the policy of Macht-politik, to use the Bismarckian phrase, or power politics, is the most uncertain. After 1870, when Germany snatched the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine from France, the whole genius of Bismarck devoted itself to the encirclement and the humiliation of his fallen enemy. Every combination his political skill devised professed this one objective—the isolation of France in Europe. But this policy, so far from ensuring peace, aroused in the minds of that proud and martial nation a bitter desire for a war of revenge. Similarly Mr. J. A. Spender, in his book "Fifty Years in Europe," shows how both the Kaiser and Von Tirpitz thought that they could pass a succession of Navy laws and yet maintain their friendship with England. "Build more battleships and England unable to ignore us will extend to us the hand of friendship," they told their adherents. Thanks to this fantasia every sincere and disinterested attempt at reconciliation from both sides inevitably broke down.
  France, like Prussia after 1870, now dominates Europe with her military strength. To-day she evidently believes the maxim Samuel Butler enunciated in his notebook:
  "What is the use of exalting the humble and the meek? They will not remain humble and meek long once they are exalted."
  Under the crushing burden of her armaments her finances are strained to the uttermost. But it is an idle dream of her statesmen to suppose that, by maintaining large air and military forces, she can for ever protect herself from a war of revenge undertaken by Germany. No network of alliances could hold in check
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  a Germany disillusioned with a bitter sense of being disarmed in the midst of powerful surrounding enemies. The White Paper shows its wisdom in recognising this essential fact. If international agreement grants to Germany, as the White Paper suggests, the 155-millimetre gun and the 6-ton tank, French military experts need have no qualms on that score. Against the great defensive systems of the Maginot line, these weapons would be of no more effect than pellets thrown against the hide of an armadillo. While French military experts need have no qualms about the security of their eastern frontier, this concession would do much to soothe the very sensitive German amour propre.
  The great danger in Europe at this moment is that some Power should attempt to upset the status quo by force of arms. However unjust certain people believe this Peace Treaties to be, however jealous the victors are of maintaining the territories they won after such hard conflict, the overriding necessity of peace demands that these disputes, so far from being carried to the extremity of war, shall be submitted to the League of Nations. At Geneva the only justifiable and necessary machinery already exists. The Government White Paper states its belief that in reduction of armaments coupled with political assurances the best solution of peace will be found. From the earliest dawn of civilisation in Egypt and Mesopotamia, to the sheriff and his posse in the Western States of America to-day, men of determination and good will have always banded themselves together to defend the elemental rights of the community. This idea survives in the name of the Watch Committees in many of our English boroughs. We need a watch committee of the great European nations, and I include Germany among them, to see that no dispute is carried to the extremity of war. If smaller nations believe that such combinations menaced their security, they might possibly group themselves in combinations equal in strength to any one of the great Powers. One would perhaps be the Little Entente, another perhaps the Balkan nations. Such schemes would form the groundwork—so to speak—of local security pacts.
  It seems to me that the League of Nations has failed so far because those nations who are its members have been either unwilling or unable to put the

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  sanctions into effect where no immediate interests gave them a stake. Take the case of Manchukuo. The Powers interested in the Pacific are the United States, Russia, Japan, China and, to a lesser extent, ourselves. Of these both Russia and the United States are outside the League of Nations; China is helpless. And, had the League of Nations decided to employ sanctions against Japan, our forces would have been the only forces available for putting those sanctions into effect. The situation was obviously impossible.
  It seems to me, however, that the local security pact, combining nations whose interests are immediately at stake in local dangerous areas, would be more effective. The Treaty of Locarno guaranteed the German and French frontier. Lately Herr Hitler has formed a security pact with Poland lasting for a period of 10 years. Mr. Litvinoff, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, has likewise guaranteed his Western frontier and made a peaceful agreement with the Balkan nations. Why should we not, in such storm centres as the Danubian basin and the Italo-Yugoslav frontier, have a number of security pacts to maintain the status quo as it exists to-day? The principle might be applied to the Far East, to Manchukuo, where many Powers have an immediate interest in preventing war, and the situation has lately been considerably eased by the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Soviet to the Japanese authorities.
  The military philosopher Clausewitz defined war as a continuation of policy pursued in a more violent idiom. The Pact of Paris formally outlawed that conception, but the new conception of the Pact of Paris requires additional guarantees. In his monumental work "Leviathan," Hobbs writes some interesting facts about war:
  "For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together, so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary."
  It is this "assurance to the contrary" which Hobbs so strongly postulates that we need in Europe to-day. I therefore claim that any agreement entered into now, however limited in scope, however disappointing to those who place great
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  hope in it, is better than no agreement; that any small breastwork or barrier against the rising tide of armaments is better than no barrier. Such an agreement could, perhaps, prove the first, over a period of years, of further agreements amplifying and extending the security system throughout Europe. If that be the case, the old Scotch saying will prove itself worthy of application:
  "Wha does the utmost that he can,
  Will whiles do mair."
  7.6 p.m.
  Mr. HENDERSON STEWART: I come to this discussion realising that we are considering perhaps the gravest and most perplexing problem that confronts men to-day, one that is a matter of life and death for this civilisation and the civilisation into which we shall introduce our children. It is, therefore, a question which each one of us must consider with the greatest possible care and anxiety. I have not myself hitherto ventured to intervene in these Foreign Office Debates, because I have never felt competent to deal with the technicalities. I do not feel any more competent to-day, but the House will perhaps bear with me if I admit that the more I read and study the reports from Geneva and from abroad, the more anxious and the more concerned do I become.
  No one can accuse the Scots of being a nervy race. I have heard them described by some of my hon. Friends below the Border as being cautious, canny, even narrow. We had an example the other day over the Sunday Trading Bill. I have even heard the adjective "extortionary" used to describe my fellow-countrymen—an adjective for which there is no justification—but never has it been suggested of the Scots that they are a nervy race and easily fluttered. In no part of Scotland is there less nerviness, less-fluttering, less shakiness than that division which I have the honour to represent. In the War we found in that part of the country some of the most amazing responses to the nation's call. The figures of recruiting in Fifeshire were as high as the figures in any part of the country. Yet, in that county of sane, sober, supremely sensible people, there is at this time real concern as to the future and the safety of the country. A woman with a child in her arms asked me only

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  the other day, "Is it true that we are going to have another war?" I met not long ago a man working on the roadside who stopped me and inquired, "Are they really gathering their forces again in Germany?" I came across in a club, a week or two ago, a group of young men considering and wondering what is about to happen.
  I will not say that there is alarm in the country, but there is at any rate that worried, concerned feeling among very many people, and that is my excuse for intervening in this Debate. Their feeling is not only concern for Europe, Germany and France; it is concern for this country and ourselves. When they ask, "Is Germany arming, or preparing for war?" deep down in the hearts of these people is the question, "What is to happen to us in such an eventuality?" In all the obscurity which surrounds Europe and the world at this time one fact is abundantly plain: that the people of Great Britain are determined to stand out of any conflict. It is no exaggeration to say that no cause, other than direct or threatened invasion of our shores, no call, no appeal, no matter from what source, will make this people go to war. That is an overwhelmingly important fact. It is one that should be the burden of speeches and debates; it is one that should form the background of and colour every memorandum issued.
  What does it mean to us? We are here responsible for the safety and the future of this country. It means that our first duty is to ensure the maintenance of peace in this land. Are we performing that duty? Are the Government pursuing a course in line with the desires of the people? To hear some of the criticism that has come from that Opposition Bench to-day, you would imagine that we have on the Government Front Bench a gang of professional warmongers, bereft alike of courage, common sense and common decency. I hear hon. Members say that the Government have been dilatory, aimless and lacking in purpose. The hon. Member who introduced this Debate quoted, as one of the opportunities missed, a so-called advance by Amercia. That was the best example that he could produce, and it was immediately proved to have no foundation in fact. If that is an example, as I take it to be,
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  of the strength and foundation of the criticisms of the Opposition, I do not think much of it.
  I hope that I am charitably minded. Many of the hon. Members who from time to time criticise the Government's foreign policy are my friends, for whom in private I have the greatest respect and admiration. But somehow or other, however, when they enter this Chamber and rise to their feet, every quality of fair play, fair dealing and fair sense seems to leave them, and they become little more than prejudiced partisans. That is how it strikes me. The subject of this Debate is not, one would have thought, a subject to be viewed from a partisan or a party point of view, but one to which we should all attempt to offer what contributions we can. The suggestion is that the Government have done nothing. Time and time again, at Geneva and elsewhere, we have made proposals, we have tabled suggestions, we have offered guarantees, some of them involving great sacrifice for this country and its people. Not only has our pressure for peace been unremitting, but we have also weakened our defence during the last two or three years for the sake of peace and in the interest of disarmament.
  I interrupted the hon. Member who introduced this Debate when he suggested that we did not know where we were or what the Government's policy was. He did not allow me to ask him whether he had read or studied the British Draft Convention. You may not agree with the terms of the British Draft Convention, but you will agree that it represents the greatest constructive effort in this direction that any Government has made in recent years. It is ridiculous for any hon. Member in those circumstances to ask what the Government are doing or to pretend that nothing has been done in recent years.
  I want to address myself to the position in Europe. The right hon. Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel) offered a constructive and helpful proposal, and I should like to follow him on that line. What is the trouble in Europe? The trouble mainly is to reconcile the interests of France and Germany. If those interests were reconciled other major problems would automatically solve themselves. There have been notes between

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  the British, French, Italian and German Governments, and the striking feature of those notes is not the disparity of their aims or purposes but the large amount of common ground that exists between those nations. They are all anxious for peace and disarmament. That is repeatedly stated not only by ourselves but by the other countries, including the German Government. Some people may say that it is all talk. I do not take that view. I am more inclined to agree with the view expressed by the Italian Government in giving:
  "the utmost weight to the pacific declarations of President Hindenburg and Chancellor Hitler."
  If the countries desire disarmament, it may be asked what it is that prevents it coming about? It seems to boil down to a difference on two points. One is the reckoning of the effectives that are to make up the German forces, and the other the date of the equipment of the future German army with defensive weapons. It is agreed by France and the other nations that Germany should be allowed to re-arm, and it becomes a question only of when and the exact character. On other major matters there are grounds for agreement between the various nations. That is a considerable tribute to my hon. Friend and his Government. Both sides accept the principle of supervision. That in itself is a very considerable step forward. Both are ready to agree to some form of limitation of aerial bombing and the bombing of civil populations. More important still, Germany and Italy are prepared to allow France to maintain her present level of armaments. That is the most important of the various points of agreement. I grant that it is also the most disappointing—that Germany is prepared to leave France with her present level of armaments, on the understanding only that there is no further increase. That view is shared by Italy, regretfully shared, but stated definitely.
  It may be tragic as well as disappointing that after eight or ten years' constant negotiation at Geneva and elsewhere all that we have got is a promise by France, not to disarm, but only not to increase her armaments still further. To those who have laboured hard in the cause of peace that may seem calamitous. I understand that it is the view of His Majesty's
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  Government that it is calamitous. In their note they say that they
  "Cannot contemplate as acceptable a conclusion which though it would provide for a limitation of armaments would do nothing to secure their reduction."
  I do not suppose that there is any one in this House who does not share the regret of His Majesty's Government that that is the position, but I wonder—I am offering this in the most helpful spirit and in no defeatist spirit—if we could not swallow our regret, as we have swallowed a good many other regrets in the past, for the sake of an immediate agreement; what Hitler calls a rapid settlement. France resolutely refuses to move from her present decision not to disarm further. Italy accepts that as a matter of fact and so, surprisingly enough, does Germany. It is looked upon by all the other countries in close touch with Germany as a fait accompli, as something which is done and not worth arguing more about. If that is the view taken by the other countries, why should we hold out against it? Why withhold our support for a possible agreement because of that which has now become an accomplished fact, if from that agreement we can obtain some reasonable security for the future? The value of an immediate agreement cannot be exaggerated. In the words of the Government's note:
  "We must seek the solution where the solution exists."
  If a solution in international affairs is not to be found in the gallery, do not ignore it if it rests somewhere in the pit. If we cannot have the lofty and noble thing that we have striven for for years, do not let us ignore something less lofty, something that would be useful for mankind. I believe that such an agreement can be reached if we recognise that state of affairs. If we leave France with her present armaments, (supported by our latest offer of guarantees) and restrict German rearmament to their own modest claims, we shall give to France the security asked for and at the same time recognise for Germany the equality which she finds necessary. This may be disappointing and unheroic, but at least it is something. I believe with Signor Mussolini that such an agreement, disappointing as it may be, could be made to form the basis of a

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  greater and loftier agreement in years to come.
  Let us make the treaty now. Let us obtain by that means, not heroic but practical, the signature of Adolph Hitler. It is impossible to over-estimate the value of that signature upon a document. We may have our views about Herr Hitler—the right hon. Gentleman opposite has very definite views about his barbaric methods and philosophy but Hitler has shown that he is a man of his word. No promise that he has made to other countries has been broken, and I believe that if his name was affixed to a document, an agreement with other nations, he would hold to that pledge. Let us also get the signature of France now, because in two or three months' time it may not be so easily obtained. Democracy holds out its hand to peace, but a dictatorship may scorn it. So long as that peace-loving democracy enjoys free institutions, let us get its signature now. Agreement can be obtained on those lines. I am not concerned about the numbers of effectives. That is a matter for the technical experts to examine and settle. Nor am I afraid of an armaments race. If you have armaments, limited as they would be by such an agreement, and if you have international supervision, I see no necessity for an armaments race. In any case, I can see no alternative.
  "It cannot be proposed that Germany shall remain subject to unilateral disarmament which is not applicable to other States and which has no relation to the level of the armaments of those States."
  I have been quoting from the German document. To accept a position of that kind would be in very deed to encourage a new race in armaments, with all the drive and with all the strength of a nation made rancorous by unfair treatment. I beg the Government, the country and the House to face realities. Because we cannot get all we would like, do not let us turn down something which may be useful. My suggestion, summarised, is that we negotiate on the basis of the status quo. If we cannot get France to reduce her armaments, then let us negotiate with France on her present position, with the single purpose of getting an immediate agreement. Time is running out. The Italian Government expressed the view, and I think it was the proper view,
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  that unless this problem is taken in hand within the next few weeks, no man knows what may be the position of Europe. Therefore I suggest that we should swallow whatever regrets we may have that our first object has not been obtained, that we should negotiate on the basis of the status quo and in that way obtain immediate agreement between the great Powers of Europe. We have taken steps in the last two years to alter, amend and change the economic organisation of this country. We have swallowed some of our life-long beliefs and convictions. Let us for the sake of the peace of the world swallow some of the high desires that we may have had, and let us obtain for the sake of peace and disarmament something which, be it modest, be it only half-hearted, would mean immediate agreement and peace between the nations of the world.
  7.28 p.m.
  Colonel CLIFTON BROWN: This is the first time that I have ventured to address the House on foreign affairs, on which I do not pretend to be an expert, but I have travelled in Europe and abroad as much as any ordinary Englishmen and I can represent the views of the average Englishmen on this question. The last speaker said that we want an agreement now. I doubt whether we can get it. I doubt if there are the conditions in Europe which would give us an agreement now. There are many people in this country who have some doubt whether a far-reaching agreement would really be of great value at the present time, because there are not the conditions in Europe which would make an agreement binding. When one looks at the condition of Europe and at the Governments of Europe and how unstable they are, one wonders what would be the value at the present time of a signature on paper to an agreement when the Government concerned in that signature or the individual who represents that Government may be changed at any moment.
  We have in Europe to-day too many one-man Governments. And they are not the most stable things in the world. They are often upset by another man, who undoes everything his predecessor has done. I doubt whether in present conditions you can hope or expect to get lasting agreement in Europe. If that be so, then I think that the efforts of His

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  Majesty's Government ought to be applied, not so much towards getting a far reaching agreement, as to creating conditions which may produce stability abroad, and by that I mean to encourage governments who can be relied upon and with whom an agreement would be binding. Far more important than obtaining an agreement now is for the Government to encourage everything which will make for stability in Europe. One thing which would make for greater instability in Europe is for this country to start a large programme of rearmament. That would destroy the position abroad and put a burden on the taxpayers of this country which would be very intolerable at the present moment, and in the opinion of most people would take us but a very little way upon the road to security.
  While that may be true, there are other things which the Government can do to help the friends of peace in this country and abroad. It is essential that we should keep our forces up to present limits, and not neglect them in any way. They should be efficient although small, and then they would be a factor in European politics should any country suffer from a fit of hysteria and embark on warlike courses. Apart from that, there is very little the Government can do beyond looking after the interests of this country. We must also realise that the enemies of peace are not so much the people of other countries as sometimes their Governments. Governments may train their people to be warlike, but even in Germany and in other countries there is always a sound body of business men whose interest is to carry on their trade in a peaceful way. These are the factors which, if given time, are bound to have an effect upon their Government, and the more we can do to help these people, to give them confidence and prevent them being stampeded by their Governments, the more we are really helping the cause of peace in Europe.
  This country has a role to play in establishing peace in Europe. The right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) said that the Government was much to blame because they pestered France and other countries with proposals for disarmament which were not welcome. I do not know whether they were welcome or not, but I am certain that the efforts of His Majesty's Government must have
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  been some encouragement to those people who really are anxious about peace. If we relax these efforts, I am afraid that these people will lose heart, and then there is very little chance indeed of Europe coming into line or making any agreement in the future. Therefore, even if the mission of the Lord Privy Seal has been fruitless—I am certain that it has not—it will have been well worth while, because it has shown to people abroad that England, after all, is keeping the flag of peace flying, is not going to withdraw but intends to do everything she can to keep the peace spirit alive among the countries of Europe. I have no complaint to make against the Government in their foreign policy. I have no faith in quick remedies. We must have patience, and, if we continue on our present road, in due course we shall get our reward.
  The Government have been accused of not following strictly a League of Nations policy. In fact, one hon. Member said that what is wanted is a strong policy by the Government along the lines of the League of Nations. What good is that at the present moment in Europe? What encouragement is it to business men in Germany to be told that England is following a League of Nations policy when Germany is outside the League? What encouragement is it to the Italians, or what hope and encouragement is it to Japan? I am afraid that we are not facing realities. There are some countries which are suffering from a kind of hysteria, and a time of hysteria is not the right moment at which to expect a lasting and far-reaching agreement. We must go forward with our present efforts and I am sure that we may look forward, in the long run, to their bringing their reward; the peace and security of Europe.
  7.40 p.m.
  Mr. EMRYS-EVANS: The right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) referred to the rearmament of Germany as a monstrous child of the Disarmament Conference. I think the rearmament of Germany is really the result of something much farther in the past. It is the result of the Versailles Conference and Treaty. We then missed our opportunities. It was then that we failed to lay the foundations of a new Europe. The Treaty was based on the fears of the moment, not on the hopes of the future.
  Notice taken that 40 Members were not present; House counted; and 40 Members being present—
  Mr. EMRYS-EVANS: In 1932, we had passed from a period of what I may describe as one of uneasy stability into a period of movement; the international situation had become liquid once again. With this new period there were new opportunities and also new dangers. I have an uneasy feeling that this problem has been dealt with in what I may describe as the traditional spirit, the pre-War spirit. In the course of a speech last week the right hon. Member for Epping said that we should regain our freedom of choice. He spoke with vast knowledge and with great authority, but it seems to me that freedom of choice leads us towards the attitude of mind of a mediator; it means that this country adopts a policy towards European affairs which is to some extent detached. It means that the Government hesitates when it is dealing with questions which mean our entering into further international obligations, and it hesitates because it feels that there may be some other way out of the difficulty than undertaking obligations which are necessary if we are to find a new basis for peace in Europe. I do not believe that freedom of choice is any longer possible in a world of changed military, naval and aerial relationships. Surely, the attitude of mind of the mediator is utterly unsuitable for dealing with the present conditions in Europe.
  Our hesitation to co-operate with other nations is not a sign of freedom and liberty of action but a sign of real weakness. At the present time there is cause for a great deal of anxiety, not abroad but in this country. I have a feeling that public opinion is not being consolidated as far as foreign affairs are concerned. There has been no real effort to consolidate public opinion in favour of a definite line of policy. We are often told that public opinion will not stand this line of policy or that line of policy, my complaint is that public opinion has not been asked to stand any line of policy. The position of the public towards the Government is similar to that described in these lines:
  "Great Chathan with his sword drawn,
  Stood waiting for Sir Richard Strachan;
  Sir Richard, longing to be at 'em,
  Stood waiting for the Earl of Chatham."
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  Let us look at Germany. She is united. She is being driven forward in both foreign and domestic fields by ideas which may be crude and primitive, but nevertheless have dynamic force; and it is because German public opinion is being consolidated and directed that she has gained one diplomatic victory after another during the last year. So successful has her diplomacy been that within a short period of two years she has emerged from her weakness and is facing Europe with renewed strength. We see a dictatorship on the one hand, strong and confident, and a democracy, on the other hand, hesitant. The hon. Member for Fife (Mr. H. Stewart) said that this country would not fight under any circumstances. If that is true, I despair of the future of peace. I do not think it is true. I do not share the feeling that public opinion is not prepared to face its responsibilities and that democracy has not the courage to take decisions. Public opinion in this, as in other matters, is alert and expectant. We are often told that there are great difficulties and dangers about this course or about that course. There are always great difficulties and always great dangers in foreign affairs. Two years ago there were great difficulties and great dangers, but they were less than they are to-day. If in future we do not take a more active line, if we have not adopted a more definite policy, I believe that the dangers will become still greater and that the position will continue to deteriorate.
  I do not believe that the nations of Europe are really so worried or so anxious about the wording of this agreement or that instrument. What they are anxious about and are looking to this country for is some kind of spirit behind these agreements which will assure them that we will carry them through when the day of trial comes. I hope that the Government will not cling to what I might describe as the traditional policy of this country, trying to stand aside as long as possible. I think that the day for that policy has passed. It is essential that we should go forward in Europe and be prepared to give guarantees and to enter much more closely into the European system than we have entered before. I believe that it is only by taking the country into their confidence, only by deciding on a vigorous policy of close co-operation in Europe, that it will be possible for the Government

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  to take any part in preventing the world from drifting still further into those dangerous places where the preservation of peace becomes so difficult.
  7.47 p.m.
  Mr. BERNAYS: It is just a year since the right hon. Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) gave his historic warning to the House of what the new Nazi Germany meant. At the end of the year the right hon. Gentleman has the right to say that every one of his words has been abundantly justified. We have had the speech that has been quoted by my right hon. Friend the Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel) this afternoon-General Goering's speech. I think that that speech is more ominous than anything that even the ex-Kaiser said before the War. What heightens the danger is that there is no criticism in Germany. The war party in pre-War Germany at least had before it the menace of a rising Social Democratic party. That opposition has gone; the party has been dissolved, the leaders are in exile or in gaol; and the military party in Germany is now in undisputed control. What is to be done? Those surely are the stark realities of the situation.
  The situation so far as we are concerned is changing very fast. We who for want of a better term are on the left in politics feel that disarmament is for the moment off the map. The Government are not thinking on those lines. It is not the time to criticise or to apportion blame. The situation is far too serious for that. What the Government are now asking for, apparently, is a restricted German rearmament and a limitation of general armaments among other nations. It may be only half a cake, but it is a thousand times more worth having than no cake at all. Unless we can get this limitation on the lines of the British Memorandum, it seems to me that we are doomed to nothing else but unrestricted re-armament.
  In this connection, speaking as a Liberal, I must confess that I welcomed the declaration of the right hon. Gentleman the Lord President when he spoke of the possibility of having to build up to a one-Power standard in the air, not because that leads to re-armament, but because it takes away all inducement from among other nations of the world
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  to stand out against the limitation of air forces. After all, if there is to be—Heaven forbid—a race in armaments, this country can stand the strain better than any other country. I remember the days before the War when we were building a Fleet. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) came down to this House, I think it was in 1909, and said, "For every keel that is laid down in Germany we will lay down two." We stood the strain. We put out all the resources of our nation, and we kept to the bargain. It is well that Europe should realise that when it comes to spending money on armaments there is no country in Europe that can keep pace with us.
  The Government are asking for a guaranteed security. That security, I suggest, depends on the extent to which we are prepared to guarantee it. How far do we really mean it? I would like to direct a question to the hon. Gentleman who will reply for the Opposition to-night. How far are the Opposition, who may one day be the Government, prepared to back up the League of Nations, if necessary in the last resort by force? I have here a remarkable speech by the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition. On 6th February he taunted my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary with this:
  "Perhaps the knowledge that the right hon. Gentleman is never prepared to stand pat when it conies to the point accounts for his having to give way all the way down. It is no use the right hon. Gentleman rattling the sheath because they know that he will never draw the sword."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th February, 1934; col. 1003, Vol. 285.]
  Did the Labour party say that in East Fulham? Did they say that in no circumstances would the Foreign Secretary draw the sword, that they knew he would "never draw the sword for anything at all," not even for collective security? We have a right to ask and the country has a right to ask the official Opposition whether they are prepared to draw the sword for guaranteeing security. Will they say it to-night, and, what is much more important, will they admit that they have said it in the forthcoming by-election in North Hammersmith? The official Opposition have complained that the Government have no policy on disarmament. I find it very difficult to discover the official Opposition's policy. They profess a belief in guaranteed securities and then they proceed to vote against the

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  Navy and the Air Force Votes, which alone can make that guarantee effective. They talk about Japan, and they were anxious for the Government to intervene with all its might in Japan, but on Monday night they voted against the Singapore Base, which alone would make that effective.
  Surely it is time that we exposed our views on peace to the cold douche of realism. The pacifists may be the worst enemies of peace. Do hon. Members say that in no circumstances will Great Britain fight. They cannot say in the next breath that they believe in guaranteed peace. The time may come when that will be put to the test. Germany is rearming. She is rearming for no other purpose than to win back her lost territories. I am just old enough to remember the warning given by Lord Roberts in 1913 regarding Germany. He said: "Germany will strike when Germany's hour has struck. That is the policy of the Wilhelmstrasse." After General Goering's speech at the week-end one cannot help thinking that that, too, is the policy of the Wilhelmstrasser now. Hon. Gentlemen say in this House or outside that it is no concern of ours, that this is a fight between France and Germany and they should fight it out between themselves. Will there not come a time when we shall be forced to say, "This is our concern."
  To what extent are we going to let Germany return to her old position? Are we going to sit back and let Germany cripple Denmark, swamp Austria, regain Alsace and Lorraine, and sweep over the Polish Corridor? Is there any moment when the opposition will say, "Stop!" Are we going to Jet Germany return to her old position of bullying and blustering and dominating and straddling all over Europe like a monster? Is there no moment when the Leaders of the Opposition here will say, "We cannot stand this." That would be a betrayal of those who died in the War; it would be the end of all for which they died. I do not believe there is a Member of the House who would support such an attitude.
  What is it that those, like myself and hundreds of other hon. Members, who loathe and detest the idea of rearmament—what is it that we put our trust in? There are hon. Gentlemen who talk about the value of the collective front, the League of Nations, the collective protest.
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  I wish I thought that that was really effective. We have seen its results in the case of Japan. Japan snapped her fingers at it, and there was no answer. Then supporters of the League of Nations say, "Well, the League is a European institution, and it stands or falls by Europe." Germany has pretty successfully defied it. Collective protest was no use there.
  There are hon. Members who believe in the economic blockade. I would like to think that that would be really effective. I agree that there might well be a restatement of the economic boycott provisions of the Covenant. Those provisions are practically in abeyance owing to the non-adhesion of the United States. It is very well worth while exploring the possibilities of bringing in the United States. But will Russia support an economic blockade? Will Italy? If they do, will it be effective? Germany is a debtor nation, and it is not easy to blockade a debtor nation. She owes I do not know how many millions in interest on the Dawes Loan, on municipal loans and the like, and a blockade might easily mean that this House would be asked to pay those loans instead of Germany. I cannot believe that that would really in the last resort be effective. I wish it could. I believe that the main guarantee, the only guarantee is the strengthening of the guarantees through the League of Nations.
  I am not in the least afraid to say, speaking for myself, that I would like to see Locarno strengthened. There is the analogy of the Great War. It is almost indisputable now that if Germany had realised that in her attack on France she would be certain to have the swift and smashing force and might of the British Empire against her, even then, at the last hour, she would have hesitated and drawn back. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for North Tottenham (Mr. Doran) will see that I am banned in Germany, but he cannot ban me here. We are not yet in possession of the French answer to the British Memorandum—a fact which makes this Debate rather unreal—but if that answer entails suggestions for more specific guarantees I suggest that the Government ought to give them the most searching consideration. At least, we ought to agree to co-operate in defence against air attacks.

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  We might go further and more precisely define what we mean by the terms of Locarno. France surely has a right to know more precisely than she knows now, in what circumstances she can be certain that there will be thrown into the scale the whole resources of the Empire. I fully recognise, as everybody must, the dangers. It may be argued that Prance would wantonly provoke a war. I do not think so. I think it has been well said by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping that France is armed to the teeth but pacifist to the core. When one passes from a German village to a French village one is impressed by the enormous difference in the atmosphere. Even after 1870 there was really no revenge party in France. Marshal Joffre's memoirs published recently disclose how desperate was the anxiety of the French general staff, even in the last few days before the War, to avert the clash if possible.
  It will be argued that the British electorate will not stand for further commitments. I do not believe that at all. In my judgment, the lessons of East Fulham have been misunderstood. That was a passionate protest against isolated rearmament and against the "my country right or wrong" mentality. I do not believe it was against peace through international action. The electors believe in the framework of securities, and they are prepared to take risks for peace if only they are given a lead. What they will not tolerate in their Government is an aimless drift to re-armament and rightly or wrongly, that is whither they feel Government policy is leading them. A policy of the strengthening of international guarantees if promptly "put over" and resolutely followed, will not fail, I believe, for want of support from the British people. Whatever may be said by the pacifists, patriotism is not dead in this country. But there must be a price for this guarantee, and I suggest that the price should be the acceptance by France of the British Memorandum. If one could make a criticism of Locarno, it seems to me that we did not get a quid pro quo. We gave guarantees, but got little in return. In return for those guarantees, we should make France sign along the dotted line the British Memorandum.
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  The price we should get for a real definition of Locarno is incalculable. The shadow of war would recede. It would mean reconciliation between France and Germany, and once that is achieved then real disarmament of the kind we want becomes a? practical possibility. Surely it is worth taking risks for that. The Nazis are not all General Goerings. There is a powerful section of them desperately anxious to reorganise and revitalise their own country and opposed to foreign adventures. If only we could get this breathing space, I believe there would be a chance for these better forces in the Nazi movement to come to the top. There are dangers in this policy. Of course there are, but they are nothing to the dangers which would result from isolated re-armament and the blind piling up of one fiendish weapon of destruction after another until civilisation as we know it comes crashing in ruins about our heads.
  8.7 p.m.
  Mr. LEWIS: The House this afternoon has been engaged in debating grave matters of high policy, and I feel that I ought to offer some apology for asking hon. Members to turn their attention for a few moments to something which, though important, cannot challenge comparison in importance with the supreme issue of peace or war to which the majority of the speakers have devoted themselves. The matter with which I wish to deal is referred to on page 4 of the Vote on Account. There, hon. Members will see in Class 2 the following item:
  "League of Nations, Required on Account for 1934, £85,000."
  I would direct the attention of hon. Members, and particularly of the representatives of the Government, to the extremely unsatisfactory state of affairs which exists with regard to the contributions to the cost of the upkeep of the League of Nations. The latest figures were given on Monday last by the Lord Privy Seal in the following reply to a question:
  "The approximate total of the contributions of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to the expenses of the League of Nations, including the International Labour Office, was, up to the end of 1933, £1,469,800. The contributions in arrear from other countries on the 21st January, 1934, amounted to gold francs 29,401,836,41, equivalent, at the current rate of exchange, to £1,872,700."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th March, 1934; col. 4, Vol. 287.]

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  That means that other countries are in arrears with their contributions to a greater extent than the whole amount charged to and paid by this country since the beginning. I regret that when the League of Nations was started a rule was not made such as I venture to say would be made by almost any other assembly of men, that if anyone refused or neglected to pay his proper share of the general cost, while he did so, he should not be entitled to take part in the management or direction of that institution. No doubt it was thought at the time that the nations of the world would have sufficient national pride to prevent such a situation as this arising. But the plain fact is that at present a large number of countries refuse to contribute anything to the cost of the upkeep of the League and leave the whole burden to be borne by this and certain other countries.
  Possibly some hon. Members do not realise how widespread is this state of affairs. In November last in reply to a question put by the hon. Member for East Dorset (Mr. Hall-Caine) the Lord Privy Seal said that 19 countries which were represented at the last meeting of the League of Nation's Assembly were in arrears with their subscriptions. No fewer than 19 countries are in arrears but are anxious to take part in the work of the Assembly. It may be urged that those countries find it difficult to pay and that they are hard up. It is difficult for us to pay; we are hard up and I fail to see why the burden should be thrown to such a large extent on the British taxpayer. When the late President Wilson conceived the idea of the League I ventured to think he had in mind something which would be a reality and not a sham; that he visualised the meeting together of nations in equality and not a gathering at which a few nations entertained the others for a time at Geneva.
  The Lord Privy Seal, in reply to a Supplementary Question on Monday last, told the House that this matter of arrears of contributions had been constantly before His Majesty's Government and that they were doing their best to secure payment. If someone on behalf of the Foreign Office is replying to this Debate I hope he will spare a few minutes to tell the House exactly what the Government mean by "doing their best to secure payment." Does it mean that
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  occasionally they ask the representatives of these other countries to pay? It is perfectly evident that that course of procedure is futile. I submit there are two ways in which the matter could be brought to an issue. It would be possible for the Treasury to make a calculation as to what relief we should have in our contributions, were all arrears paid up, assuming a continuance of the present expenditure, and the Government could refuse in future to pay more than was shown to be really due from this country.
  Alternatively, it would be possible for a representative of ours at Geneva to bring the matter up in the Assembly and to urge that countries which care so little about their responsibilities to the League, if they are, shall we say, more than a year in arrears with their allotted contributions, should be disqualified, until those arrears are paid, from appointing representatives to the Assembly, Council, and various committees; in other words, disqualified from taking part in the management and direction of the League. It may be that the spokesman for the Government may say that neither of these two methods commends itself to the Government. If that be the case, I would be glad, and I think there are others also who would be glad, to hear what alternative the Government propose. We have been told by the Lord Privy Seal that the matter has been constantly before them and that they are doing their best to secure payment. Again, I ask that when the opportunity comes later in the Debate, and the Foreign Secretary is replying, he will spare a few moments to tell us actually what the Government are doing in the matter.
  8.15 p.m.
  Mr. JANNER: I hope my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will forgive me if I deviate a little from the general trend of the Debate so far. I know the House will be sympathetic when it hears that I propose to deal with the position of the minorities and in particular of the Jewish community in Germany. There is an impression about that circumstances have changed very considerably, and no doubt there has been some slight relief in respect of the brutal attacks that were made upon the persons of individuals, but I am not at all sure that that in itself has ceased.

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  On the contrary, I am given to understand that it is continuing. I remember, when this matter was first raised, we received in this country a number of publications from the German authorities, or rather directed by the German authorities, and I have one of those publications in my hand. It is headed, "For the Vindication of Truth, Freedom, and Right," and among the statements that it contains are the following:
  "It is not true
  that foreigners or German Jews are molested or even ill-treated.
  It is not true
  that German citizens or their property are in danger merely because they belong to parties hostile to the existing Government.
  The truth is (amongst other untruths which were at that time spread) all foreigners and all German citizens irrespective of their religious beliefs and of their race enjoy the full protection of the German Government, that they follow their usual occupations in the same way as always, and that they, too, acknowledge the admirable discipline of the National Socialist Government."
  Mr. FLEMING: Will the hon. Member tell the House who actually wrote that?
  Mr. JANNER: I am sorry to have to tell my hon. and learned Friend that the many publications came from anonymous sources and in an anonymous manner, but they did undoubtedly emanate from certain directions which are not difficult to trace. The anonymity of this unfortunate document, which was widely spread, does not detract from its value, as it was information which was being spread at that time.
  Mr. FLEMING: I gathered from the hon. Member's remarks that it was an official document, but perhaps I was mistaken.
  Mr. JANNER: If I have said that I knew definitely that it was official, then I withdraw that statement, but I am sure that every one who received that document felt that it was not spread by minorities in Germany or with the intention of conveying any other impression than that the National Socialist Government in Germany was not to be blamed. We saw what happened. In this House Members of all parties rose in their places and condemned the brutal actions that took place, times without number. In other countries the same attitude was
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  adopted, and recently in America a tremendous meeting was held which examined the position and came to the conclusion that the attack which was being, made upon minorities in Germany was an attack that was contrary to all the principles of civilisation. No one can deny it. His Holiness the Pope recently himself issued a statement of a somewhat similar kind. The position has not altered, and I would like to quote some of the examples which illustrate how the position has not altered. For instance, a marriage between an Aryan and a Jew has been annulled. The Aryan appellant pleaded ignorance of the danger to the race when the marriage was contracted. The ruling of the court was:
  "There is no provision in Aryan legislation regulating this question, but in view of the pernicious character of such marriages, the divorce must be allowed."
  A new rule for divorce, in spite of no legislation regulating it, is there made. A Jewish merchant, who objected to an attack which had been made upon him in a market, was arrested because of the fact that he brought his claim to a court, and was himself sent to a concentration camp. I am not raising these cases merely in order to bring forward once again the serious and sad condition particularly of people whose Jewish descent is being traced back to the fourth and possibly to the fifth generation. I am raising this for the purpose of getting from the right hon. Gentleman particulars of what action may be taken at some later stage in respect of the specific obligation which rests upon members of the League of Nations.
  I would also like to bring forward the position of the child, the poor, innocent, Jewish child attending schools, in many cases placed on separate benches, submitted to the torture of having to listen to lessons which are anti-Jewish, and in one case at least, I am informed, actually being brought forward in a queue where milk was being distributed to the other children, being made to follow that queue and, when the turn of that Jewish child came, not being given an allowance of milk. The Leipzig education authority has suspended Dr. Behrehds, the headmaster of the Goethe School, and Fraulein Vorwerk, one of the teachers. The circumstances, I understand, are these: Fraulein Vorwerk refused to allow

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  a pupil to recite an anti-Semitic poem by Dietrich Eckart in the presence of Jewish children. The father complained to Dr. Behrends, who supported the teacher. The father then took his complaint to the local authority, which took the action to which I have referred.
  There is one other incident that I should like to bring to the notice of the right hon. Gentleman. I am sure it must be known to him, and I am also sure his sympathy must be with these people, but I think the House ought also to have these facts before them, in view of the fact that so little is known at present of the crystallisation of this unfortunate position in Germany to-day. Driven from the professions, driven from the arts, driven from academic life, even on the soil in circumstances where he decides to train in order that he may possibly be able to obtain employment in another country, this unfortunate member of a great race, a very great race, is subjected to refusal even for this purpose. I would like to quote from the "Jewish Chronicle," which is very widely read. They write:
  "In one village the peasants were called together by a Special Commissioner and told to dismiss immediately all Jewish youths working in their fields as agricultural labourers. In other places the peasants have been instructed that they must not train Jews in agriculture even if they are paid fees and intend to go to Palestine, Brazil or other countries as qualified agricultural workers. In the Rhineland, 70 farmers have been called together by the local authorities and ordered to dismiss their Jewish trainees immediately. A Jewish landowner who was employing a number of young Jews on his land was taken into protective custody by the Gestapo—secret police—and kept there for several days, being released only when he undertook to dismiss all the Jews. The Chamber of Agriculture for the Province of Brandenburg and Berlin has issued instructions to all peasants in its area that only Ayrans are to be admitted for training in land-work. There were newly 30 training centres established at Sommerfeld with the express authorisation of the authorities. These have now been dissolved, the authorities notifying them that the land is required for other purposes."
  The position is becoming more serious every day. It is not surprising that we now find books issued in Germany which emphasise the fact that religions which have prevailed hitherto are of no account at all and that the Edda religion is the religion that must be put in their place. It would be foolish for people who pursue
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  the policy to which I have referred to attach themselves to any of the great religions. In these circumstances is it not remarkable that considerable apprehension exists as to the fate of the 4,000 or 5,000 Jews in the Saar in addition to those who are members of other minority units, in the event of that territory being handed over to Germany by the League of Nations as a result of the plebisite next year. The handing over in cold blood of these individuals to a regime which will deny them more or less elementary rights of humanity cannot be contemplated without a shock. If they venture to express themselves against the return of the territory to Germany their fate is likely to be too awful to contemplate. As I have said, the regime of terrorism may have abated to some extent in Germany, but it is not over. There are still constant reports of individuals being spirited away to internment camps and their relatives being left without knowledge as to their whereabouts. Such a state of affairs was not contemplated when the Treaty of Versailles was drawn up. Otherwise, it is certain that provision would have been made for the protection of the rights of the inhabitants of the Saar in the event of a return to Germany.
  I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman can take steps to ascertain whether it is still possible to obtain guarantees for the protection of these people or, at the least, to make representations to the German Government as to the anxiety which is being felt on their behalf. It is necessary, moreover, to consider that this anxiety as to their eventual fate is one of the conditions that must be examined if the plebisite is to be regarded as a fair test of the feelings of the inhabitants. The terror of their eventual fate if they are known to have voted on the wrong side is itself sufficient to impair the freedom of the voting, and one can say that it is not possible in present conditions to ascertain the true opinion of the inhabitants. It may be possible to get the German Government to accept minority obligations—as she said she was prepared to do when the treaties were made—in respect of this territory, as in the case of Upper Silesia though one has reason to doubt the efficiency of such an arrangement. Can the Government say, for example, that the minorities of Upper Silesia are now

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  in full enjoyment of the rights guaranteed to them by the Minorities Convention applicable to that territory.
  It is a serious problem. The number concerned is relatively small, but do not our extradition laws require our courts to examine the circumstances of even a single individual whose handing over to a foreign Power is requested? I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will appreciate the concern that exists. I am sure that he does, and I am sure that from the statements he has made from time to time that he realises full well that I and others who speak on this matter speak in the sincere hope that there will once again be established a brotherhood of man among those who are living in that great country of Germany, and that, instead of having a constant fear and terror hanging over them, as it does to-day, there will be re-established for them, within, let us hope, a short time and with the help of such action as the Government may be able to take here and as they can foster, a spirit of friendship and good feeling.
  8.32 p.m.
  Rear-Admiral Sir MURRAY SUETER: I am afraid that I cannot follow the hon. Member for Whitechapel (Mr. Janner) in the case he has put before the House, but I am sure that everyone, not only in the House, but in the country, sympathises with the lot of these unfortunate people. We listened with great interest-to the speech of the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones). I know him as a great pacifist, and I always respect his views. He put before us in great detail the unrest in Europe and in the Far East and wherever there are disturbances throughout the world. When I listened to him I thought how wise the airmen were to press for an adequate air defence of this country. We are the fifth or sixth Power in the air. We have sunk to that level because many Governments have reduced the force in order to make a great peace effort. Then we had speeches on the other side of the House telling us how all other countries are re-arming in the air. The right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) said that Germany was re-arming and creating air fleets and that in all the other nations they were voting money for the air. The airmen welcomed very much the statement of the Lord President of the
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  Council, and the Members who are associated with me on the Air Committee thank him for what he said about parity. He also made another statement for which we were grateful. I do not think it was quite understood, and I will quote it. He said:
  "I would not then relax for a moment, nor would the Government relax, the efforts, if a convention on our lines failed, to start work the next morning to get an air convention alone among the countries of Western Europe, even if we could not get in some that are far away, for the saving of our own European civilisation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1934; col. 2077, Vol. 286.]
  All we ask if the convention fails, if the Disarmament Conference fails, and we have to set up an air conference, is that its work shall be speeded up as much as possible. We ask another thing, and that is that there should be a maximum number of airmen on that conference. The reason I ask that of the Lord President of the Council is that I was a member of the first Air Conference of European Powers, which was held in Paris in 1911 or 1912. Delegates from all the European powers were sent to that conference to get out rules for the navigation of the air. Great diplomatists, international jurists, admirals, generals, poets and a few airmen were sent there to represent the different European countries. They sat for six weeks in Paris, the literature mounted higher and higher every day, until it would almost reach the roof of this Chamber, and they never came to a single decision. One after another the delegates got up and opposed the most trifling things. If this conference is formed to draw up an air convention I ask that it should be composed largely of airmen, because then they will get on with the work. The Lord Privy Seal said the reason why the Disarmament Conference went on so long was that the nations were not able to summon sufficient courage to trust one another to keep a convention. I would say that the Disarmament Conference has failed because it took on too much. They try to go into too much detail. If only they would take some simple point and thresh it out they might be a little more successful.
  We have heard about limiting the air arm and I agree with that entirely, and with what the right hon. Member for Epping said. I think it would be possible to come to an agreement to outline the

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  great open cities of Europe which have no munition factories in their area, which have no armaments and no combatants, with a cordon of balloons by day and a cordon of searchlights by night. If we could bring that suggestion before an international conference we might get agreement on it, because none of the great nations, and particularly the airmen of the great nations, want to bomb civilians. If that proposal were put forward at a conference we might get agreement, and I think the nations would carry out that agreement in exactly the same way as they refrained from using the expanding bullet in the late War. No nation used that bullet. There may have been one or two exceptions, but, generally speaking, the nations kept that agreement. I suggest to the Foreign Secretary, if he goes to this conference, that he should press for what I have suggested. The League of Nations has cost the nations of the world something over £11,000,000—I believe it has cost this country some £1,500,000—and the people of the world and of this country are getting tired of it, because nothing comes out of the League of Nations. I ask the Foreign Secretary to give me an assurance that the whole question of marking out these cities shall be gone into at the conference. I feel quite certain that something can be achieved on those lines to justify the great expenditure on the League of Nations.
  8.40 p.m.
  Captain CUNNINGHAM-REID: The Lord Privy Seal has recently had an opportunity of observing the vicissitudes of political life in a form rather more consecrated than falls to the lot of the ordinary man. Only a few months ago he returned from Geneva, that veritable graveyard of reputations, where he had been conducting his country's case with extreme ability, to find that it was "Roses, roses all the way." He was, very rightly, overwhelmed with congratulations, and was rewarded with the appointment of Lord Privy Seal. He now returns from a journey of equal importance to find that a change has come o'er the spirit of the dream. Surely a young Minister setting out upon so important a mission—agreed that he has been asked to make his disarmament bricks with perilously little straw; nevertheless, for the time being, he has been the country's principal champion in its hopes for peace
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  —ought to have been able to carry with him the united support of this country, and particularly of this House. Yet what is it that he has received? I consider that it has been most unworthy treatment. There have been sneers and jeers and a general assumption of failure coming from the Press, and coming even from this House in the Debate to-day. I suggest that these critics have not even taken the trouble to read the memorandum as to disarmament that was issued by the Government this year. Had they done so they would have observed the very limited objectives of his mission, and I must really take up the time of the House to the extent of reading just one paragraph from that memorandum:
  "His Majesty's Government are making the present communication not for the purpose of formulating unattainable ideals, but in order to indicate the lines of compromise which they believe, after reviewing the history of the discussions and closely studying the recent interchange of views, should be generally acceptable."
  I suggest that it has been wrongly assumed that the mission of the Lord Privy Seal was to negotiate. There was no reason whatsoever for thinking that. The only purpose of his recent trip to the capitals of three countries was to carry out the spirit of the paragraph which I have just read; there was no other reason. Only this week one newspaper discounted his mission in advance on the ground that he left Rome a day earlier than was originally intended. I consider that to be extremely petty, and decidedly harmful. The very excellent speech made by the Lord Privy Seal earlier this afternoon greatly interested me. If I may say so, it was a very difficult speech to make, because I am convinced that the majority of the House anticipated hearing something which it was impossible for the Lord Privy Seal to tell them. He asked what can be done to augment waning international confidence? I suggest that one thing that would help in this respect would be for the Press of this country to realise their very grave responsibilities. The majority of the Press have not recently been of much use to the cause of disarmament. The hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones) made a statement in his opening remarks concerning an American offer, which he very rightly conceded subsequently was,

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  on the whole, incorrect. I recognised that statement as a canard of a certain organ of the Press that occurred during the last few days. One way or another, some of the Press have recently made matters very difficult for those desiring disarmament.
  The Lord Privy Seal is of too equable a temperament to be disturbed by the inevitable alternation of political bouquets and political bricks, but I should like him to know that there are a great many people who feel that, on account of Press criticism and criticisms in this House, he has not received a square deal. Without appearing to be too presumptuous, I should like to offer him a back bencher's congratulations, on his courage and ability, and upon the singleness of purpose with which he has striven during the last few months for the cause of peace in Europe.
  There is only one other matter to which I desire to draw attention, and I shall do so in practically one sentence. It will be of particular interest to learn from the Foreign Secretary whether he can indicate some time limit for the disarmament negotiations. The Lord President of the Council gave a very welcome undertaking last week as to air defence. This afforded general relief, but he was naturally unable to indicate when such relief could be expected. It stands to reason that the Foreign Secretary, with the information at his disposal as Foreign Secretary, and with the advantage of having heard the impressions—though I agree they are incomplete—of the Lord Privy Seal, is in a better position to give some indication of a time limit for our anxieties. Would it be possible for the Foreign Secretary in his reply to relieve those anxieties in a more definite manner than has been possible to other spokesmen of the Government during the last few days?
  8.50 p.m.
  Mr. ATTLEE: I do not think that anybody who has listened to this Debate would be inclined to regret that the subject of foreign affairs was taken to-day. When we put this subject down, we hoped that we should hear some definite replies from foreign countries, and when we found that we should not, we made an eleventh-hour attempt to alter the subject; but that was not possible without inconveniencing the House and would not
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  have been fair to those who wished to take part in the Debate. The speeches to-day have, I think, justified the discussion.
  Before dealing with the subject matter, I would like to refer to an incident which occurred during the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones) when he stated that President Roosevelt had made an offer to join in reducing armaments to the level provided for the defeated Powers. The Foreign Secretary interjected and said that no such offer had been made. I do not know whether President Roosevelt made the offer in exactly those terms, but undoubtedly, in May, 1933, a very remarkable series of statements was made by President Roosevelt, and there was a remarkable speech by Mr. Norman Davis. I will quote the following extract from that speech as reported in the "Times" newspaper of 23rd May:
  "In particular, as emphasised by President Roosevelt, we are prepared to join other nations in abolishing weapons of an aggressive character."
  Those are to some extent the weapons denied to Germany and to other defeated States by the Treaty of Versailles. Mr. Davis then said:
  "Almost a year ago the American Government submitted a proposal along these lines."
  Later Mr. Davis said:
  "But we are firmly convinced that in the long run this security can best be achieved through a controlled disarmament by which the military strength of the most heavily armed is progressively reduced to a level such as that provided in the Peace Treaties."
  In the face of that, the Foreign Secretary's observations to my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly might have been couched in rather different language. The impression that the Foreign Secretary gave to me was that no such offer of any sort or kind had been made. In the words which I have quoted I think there is an offer. It may be that everybody was mistaken at that time, but Herr Hitler understood the offer in that light, and in that sense it was very generally discussed. Of course, it may be that we were all wrong. If so, my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly erred in a remarkably large company. It would have been better, if a correction had to be made, to state that an offer was made, though it might not have

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  been exactly and textually in the words used by the hon. Member for Caerphilly.
  We have had a series of speeches this evening, and on the whole they were rather gloomy; even that of the Lord Privy Seal, who tried to cheer us all up by suggesting that there were lights in the gloom. I did not think that those lights twinkled with any very great brightness. The Lord Privy Seal conceded that things were not really as simple as that, that the quarrel was not over qualitative or quantitative disarmament, and that the real difficulty was the suspicion and distrust of the nations. I would rather that they were quarrelling about the calibre of guns or the weight of tanks than that they should be filled with distrust and suspicion. What the hon. Gentleman meant, in effect, was that there was no real feeling of security among the nations. That is a point which has been urged by many in this House, including myself, many times—that there can be no disarmament without security.
  I gather that, while I was absent from the House for a short time, getting a little refreshment, the hon. Member for North Bristol (Mr. Bernays)—who, I think, is himself now out of the House, probably on the same errand—challenged the attitude of the Opposition on this question, and in particular because he wanted us to reconcile our position with regard to sanctions with our position regarding the Estimates for the Fighting Services. I think that our position is perfectly clear. We believe that no nation should enter into international obligations which it is not prepared to honour; we, believe in a system of pooled security under the League of Nations; we believed that such a system had been built up; we hold that there has been a failure to honour the obligations of the League of Nations to China—I am not going to elaborate that—and we therefore stated that it was not possible to get the kind of security that we have been trying to build up under the League of Nations unless the members of the League felt that those obligations would be honoured to the full. We hold that a great deal of the blame for the failure of the Disarmament Conference must fall upon the member States of the League of Nations, because they did not effectively intervene on behalf of China.
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  It has been suggested to us, "If you say that, you are out for war." We are not out for war, but we say that a position was brought about by successive Governments in which you had to face the possibility of war if you were prepared to carry out your commitments to the League of Nations. That may be a right thing or it may be a wrong thing to do, but it is perfectly clear, I think, to everyone that you cannot build up a system of pooled security unless you are prepared to take certain risks. I am asked, "If you say that, why, then, did you oppose the Estimates?" I stated our attitude very clearly in the Debate on the Air Estimates. I said that we on these benches did not believe in national armaments; that we could only agree to armaments if those armaments were part of a system of pooled security to be used on behalf of the League for keeping the peace of the world; and inasmuch as, owing to past events, we do not believe that there is that system of pooled security to-day, because when the test came the League failed, therefore we are not prepared to Vote for the Estimates.
  I have said that the Lord Privy Seal left me in rather a gloomy condition. I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) cheered me up very much, although there was a touch of his old imagination and romance. I must say that I cannot very greatly believe in the suggestion put forward by him, and fortified by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel) and by the hon. and gallant Member who spoke just now, that it is possible to delimit the sphere of action of the air arm. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping suggested that it might be confined to, I think he said, the battlefield; but where does the battlefield begin and end? May you bomb dumps, though you must not trace them back to the railway junction or the munition factory? I think that that all belongs to an out-of-date and romantic idea of war. I have no doubt that you could get agreements to do this and that, but the whole point is, would they as a matter of fact be effective when war came? I must say that I thought the Lord President of the Council dealt with this question most effectively in that famous speech of his. I do not think you can get that. You certainly did not get it in the War, and I

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  think there is really a certain false sentiment in imagining that you can get it. For instance, would you give up the right of blockade, which has been supported by this country for many years? That attacks women and children just as much as the air does. I think you will have to face up to the fact, as the Lord President said, that when nations are engaged in a life-and-death struggle all these paper regulations will be disregarded.
  I do not even think that the suggestion that we should have balloons and lights all round the towns would really be very satisfactory. I do not know what the rural Members would say to it. Moreover, it might have just the opposite effect. An hon. Member on these benches has reminded me of a similar case which occurred in ancient Rome. A senator suggested that all slaves should have distinctive costumes, so that they might be recognised as slaves; but it was pointed out that that at the same time would enable the slaves to see how numerous they were, and how few were the free men. It might be that, if the towns were lit up in that way, unless it were possible for the nations to trust one another far more than they do to-day, it would be merely lighting up the objective for a rapid, sudden and unexpected attack. There might be something to be said for lighting up the premises of people who advocated war in any country, if there be any such. I thought that we really had much more reality in the admirable speech of the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lumley). He went behind the question of armaments, towards the causes of war and peace.
  The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping has an extraordinary power of deflecting Debates. He came down to the discussion on the Air Estimates, and turned it into a discussion on Foreign Affairs. He now comes down to a Foreign Office Debate, and turns it into a discussion on the Air Estimates. For the purposes of the argument that I wish to address to the House I want to assume what we all hope, that the Lord Privy Seal is absolutely successful in his mission; I want to assume that the British Government's draft is accepted by the other Powers, and that we have, therefore, whatever measure of disarmament may be
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  considered to be embodied in that document. After that, I want to ask what is the foreign policy of the Government, because the whole of the foreign policy of the Government is not, as an hon. Member below the Gangway seemed to suggest, embodied in that document which was presented to the Disarmament Conference. We must consider something wider than that. It is no good suggesting that you are going to get peace in the world if you do not look further and consider what are the causes of disturbance.
  I should like to hear from the Government of something in the way of a long-term policy for the peace of the world. It seems to me that at best the present effort is designed to get a certain breathing space. We have heard from many speakers of the disturbed condition of the world. We have an irruption of political and economic nationalism, and we have to face the fact that we have a world disordered politically and economically. To my mind, Fascism is essentially the result of an economic disorder, although at present under the guise of a political nationalist movement. Fascism is the organisation of national States by national capitalist groups for the purpose of competition, and our fear is that on that point of economic organisation we are apt to see economic war turning into real war. In this country we have not got as far in the way of organising the nation economically as a separate unit for the purpose of competing with other States. We have not gone sufficiently far to range ourselves with the examples of economic nationalism that you have on the Continent, and indeed I think the Government recognise perfectly well, as every one must, that our interests are bound up with world trade, world society, and world peace. What is our Government going to do now to try to smooth out some of the economic difficulties of the world? Let us carry our minds back a very short time and remember that we were told over and over again that the success of everything depended on the World Economic Conference. The World Economic Conference came and went and nothing resulted. That was then the policy of the Government. What has taken its place?
  The next point is the political condition of the world. Does the Government intend to sit down, so to speak, and endeavour

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  to keep the world in the same condition politically that resulted from the Peace Treaties? It is obvious to all of us that, if you are to have a peaceful world, there must be provision for change and for development. I am afraid of the world drifting into international political and economic anarchy, and I believe this country has much the widest interests and much the best prospect of setting a lead to get away from that. I think it can only be done by facing up to the facts of the modern world, and the facts of the modern world seem to me to forbid the extreme assertion of the national sovereign State on the one hand and the supreme assertion of economic nationalism on the other. It seems to me that that merely means the organisation of starvation and of war and that we should be looking forward, as Members in various parts of the House have suggested, to giving a lead to the world towards moving to an international State, to a world linked up by common interests, protected by a common world law and supported by a common world police force. I hope to hear from the Foreign Secretary, if he can tear himself away from the inevitable preoccupation of getting a breathing space, what is the general policy of the country, because I believe the world as a whole is looking to this country for a lead. They want to know where we stand in this modern world. The Foreign Secretary may say, in the words of his leader, "One step enough for me," but most of us in these days are forced to look ahead, and we want to see beyond that step.
  I have spoken mainly of Europe. Now I want to say a word about Asia. I think most of us will agree that one of the biggest questions that face the world is the adjustment of the relations between Europe and Asia—Europeans and Asiatics. We are engaged at present in making an effort to come to that kind of agreement within the British Empire. One has to face the kind of dangers which make for war which exist in the Far East. I do not want to reopen the Sino-Japanese question, but I hope, now that we have a trade agreement with Russia, that is going to open a better era in the Far East. I hope we shall make it plain that peace in the Far East is a British interest, and I hope that no British or European capitalists will be so foolish as to advance money to any Power which
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  may be wanting to break the peace in the Far East.
  But I cannot help feeling, in, listening to this Debate, that there hangs over us all to-day the feeling of world unrest and world danger. It may be a few years off, but, unless the nations of the world try to look ahead and see the kind of forces that are arising in Asia and the kind of difficulties that we have in Europe and try to work out some way by which the world can settle those difficulties without war, we may find civilisation crashing. We on these benches believe that we must work for an international order. We believe that the day of national armaments should be past and gone and that you have to build up a rule of law supported by sanctions. We realise the enormous difficulties involved in that, but we do not believe that the difficulty of getting nations of different outlooks, different temperaments and different languages to agree together to live in one world is really greater than getting 4,500,000 people to live in the City of London with, on the whole, so extraordinarily little disorder and such a vast amount of co-operation, and we hope it will be this country which will give a lead to the world in a long-distance policy.
  9.15 p.m.
  Sir J. SIMON: I agree entirely with the hon. Member for Limehouse (Mr. Attlee), that although it might have seemed that to-day's Debate was rather mistimed, it has in fact been both a most interesting and, I think, a most useful discussion. There have been a large number of speeches made to-day by hon. Member on back benches which all who were here were very glad indeed to listen to, and some of which I shall gladly take the opportunity of studying at leisure. Perhaps I might begin by dealing with two more or less personal points—points dealing with individuals—which were put to me by the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. M. Jones), who opened the Debate. He asked me about the case of a young man named Mr. Richard Clark, and also about the case of Mr. Lenox Simpson. As regards Mr. Clark, who, he said, is only 16 years of age, my information is that his father spends a good deal of time in a yacht off the Spanish coast—the Catalan coast, I think—and this young gentleman, Mr. Richard Clark, was staying at Barcelona in the house of somebody

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  there. The man with whom he was staying was suspected, and had been suspected for some time, of espionage and was, in fact, arrested. As the police found this young man there as well, he also was taken into custody and was searched. My information is that before doing this they notified His Majesty's Consul-General at Barcelona what they thought they would do. Inquiries have been made of the police, and they have said that the reason why this man was detained was because he was found on the premises and was employed by the occupier of the house. Clark has been transferred to Madrid. We have continued to make inquiries concerning his treatment and welfare. The acting-British Consul has visited Clark in his confinement, and arrangements have been made for him to receive any extra comforts he may require. His Majesty's Ambassador is keeping in close touch with the judicial authorities in the matter. We have been informed that no specific charge has so far been brought against Clark, who is detained pending information as to his associations with the other man.
  As regards Lenox Simpson, that case has been more than once mentioned by the hon. Gentleman. The House will recall that Mr. Simpson was the editor, and, I think, the proprietor of a newspaper published in English and in Russian, and known as the "Harbin Herald," at Harbin, in Manchuria. The Russian section of the paper catered largely for the Soviet employés on the Chinese Eastern Railway, and I gather that the local authorities have for a long time considered that they had complaints against the contents of the paper. Of the merits of that I know nothing at all. At any rate, the newspaper was by the local authorities suspended from publication from March, 1931, and resumed publication in September, 1932, Mr. Simpson giving an undertaking that it would carry no political propaganda and publish no matter discouraging to the present regime in the area. None the less, complaints were made to the paper, and His Majesty's Consul-General was informed that as the "Harbin Herald" continued to publish what was regarded as Soviet propaganda, the authorities had decided to close down the paper, and Mr. Simpson was to leave the country.
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  Protests were made on Mr. Simpson's behalf by the British Consul-General, but, as I understand that this man is entitled to British Treaty rights, there was a long controversy in which the British Consul-General played an active part, and finally there was an arrangement made for the compromise by which Mr. Simpson was to move to Dairen, which was some way off, but also, of course, in Manchuria. He was to continue his bookselling and printing business, but his newspaper has not resumed publication. Mr. Simpson has recently invited the British authorities to assist him in the claim which he is making in respect of the treatment he has received. The claim has been under the examination of the Foreign Office in consultation with our Legation in the Par East. It appears to be a complicated situation, and rather intricate questions of law arise. The examination, I am informed, is very nearly concluded, and it is hoped that it will be possible to communicate the decision, to Mr. Simpson very shortly. I have given the hon. Member all the information that I can in answer to the two matters that he raised.
  Mr. MANDER: Is it not a fact that the British Consul-General at Harbin never admitted that there was any foundation in fact for the charges made against Mr. Simpson?
  Sir J. SIMON: I am sure my hon. Friend is well informed about that. I should think that it is most improbable that a British Consul-General would admit that somebody was guilty on a matter in which he had no first-hand information. I should expect him to take up that attitude.
  I should like to say a few words on some more general matters. First, may I deal particularly with a matter of great importance which was referred to in the opening speech, which led to an intervention from this side, and which was taken up again by the hon. Gentleman in his concluding speech for the Opposition. It has to do with the attitude and proposals of the United States of America in relation to disarmament. I am sure that the Whole House will agree that in matters of this sort it is very necessary for all of us, on whichever side of the House we sit, first of all to inform ourselves accurately, and then to speak with precision on such a matter. It would be

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  no service to the cause of disarmament, but would only lead to confusion and misunderstanding if there were either exaggeration on the one hand or belittlement on the other as to what it is that the United States has declared itself ready to do. I had heard the particular statement, which was made by the hon. Gentleman outside the House before, and I have some reason to think that it has been given considerable currency by whoever was the author or the promoter. There is no truth at all in the statement, and it is very much better that we should say exactly where the matter stands and avoid any possible misconception.
  What was the statement? It was in two parts—first, that the President of the United States had declared on behalf of that great country that the United States made the offer of agreeing to abandon all arms except those that were allowed to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles, and, secondly, that in so doing the views thus expressed on behalf of the United States were in sharp contradiction with the proposals and the attitude of His Majesty's Government, who thereby stood exposed to the world as not putting forward proposals adequate from the first. What has been the actual statement of the President of the United States? Anybody can find it at any moment, for it was a message which President Roosevelt sent to the rulers of all the world, and it was very widely published the next day. The date of it was 16th May. The quotation which the hon. Gentleman just made from the speech of Mr. Norman Davis relates to the speech which Mr. Norman Davis made at Geneva—I think that I was present at the time—on 22nd May, 1933, a few days later. Let us see what it was that President Roosevelt said. The last thing I wish to do, or anybody wishes to do, is to belittle the importance of the American proposition. It is a very different thing from allowing the legend to grow that something was said quite contrary to what was said. What President Roosevelt in his well-known message said was:
  "If all nations will agree wholly to eliminate from possession and use the weapons which make possible a successful attack, defences automatically will become impregnable, and the frontiers and independence of every nation will become secure. The ultimate objective of the Disarmament Conference must be the complete elimination of all offensive weapons. The immediate objective is a substantial reduction of
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  some of these weapons and the elimination of many others."
  Having then set out this quite unexceptionable purpose, he goes on in the clearest way to discuss what can be done. He mentions various steps and says that the first step is:
  "To take at once the first definite steps towards this objective, as broadly outlined in the MacDonald plan."
  What is the good of pretending that the President of the United States was preaching some new gospel which may be set in violent contradiction to the proposals of the British Government, when, in point of fact, he was laying down a proposition with which all will agree and saying, "If you want to get to business, the first thing to do is to adopt the MacDonald plan"?
  Mr. MORGAN JONES: Do I understand from the right hon. Gentleman that the British Government accepts as the ultimate objective the reduction in the terms of the President's statement?
  Sir J. SIMON: If the hon. Gentleman will give me a moment, I will tell him that we not only accept it, but that, without wishing to claim any pride of authorship, we may perhaps be regarded as the originators of the idea. The date of the President's declaration is 16th May, 1933. I have in my hand the Resolutions which were proposed by myself at Geneva, and were adopted unanimously by the General Commission at Geneva on 22nd July, 1932, very nearly 12 months before. I have heard a great deal of criticism, not always favourable, of the Resolutions, which draw the distinction, as far as I know for the first time, between the effort to abolish offensive weapons and the encouragement of defensive weapons. I will take the liberty of reading to the House what these Resolutions of April, 1932, were:
  "1. Without prejudice to other proposals which fall to be discussed under later heads of the agenda, the Conference declares its approval of the principle of qualitative disarmament"—
  That very phrase was the phrase which was brought forward by the British Delegation—
  "i.e., the selection of certain classes of descriptions of weapons the possession or use of which should be absolutely prohibited to all States or internationalised by means of a general Convention.

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  2. In seeking to apply the principle of qualitative disarmament as defined in the previous resolution, the Conference is of the opinion that the range of land, sea and air armaments should be examined by the competent special Commissions with a view to selecting those weapons whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians."
  The British Delegation, 12 months before, had produced this exact proposition: that you had to attack and specially suppress the offensive weapons, because thereby you enormously increased the validity of defence. That is the object of the proposition which is now so exceedingly familiar, and which, I think, having dealt with the matter at a great many meetings, is highly desirable.
  I have shown the House, first of all, that there is no justification for representing that the proposals made by the American Government were in the terms which my hon. Friend suggested. They were actually in strong support of the view which we had put forward 12 months before, namely, that it was desirable to try to suppress or, at any rate, to regulate offensive weapons, because that would so greatly improve the prospect of defence as to make an attack or aggression unlikely or unprofitable. I have shown what the United States said 12 months later. So far from putting forward a proposition in contrast with the proposals of the British Government, in the same document President Roosevelt goes on to say what is the first step to take:
  "First, to take, at once, the first definite steps towards this objective, as broadly outlined in the MacDonald plan."
  Mr. JONES: Was the objective accepted?
  Sir J. SIMON: Of course it was accepted. I have said so once before. I can assure my hon. Friend that everything that can be done to make this more effective has our complete good will. It is plain that from the first we have played a prominent part at Geneva. In our view if we are to secure by practical measures real, effective disarmament, the thing to do is to attack offensive weapons—abolish them altogether, or reduce them as far as we can. When the hon. Gentleman asks, "Is that accepted?" he will excuse me if I say once again, "Would
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  you mind reading the British Draft Convention?"
  Mr. JONES: I am very sorry to interrupt again, but I am addressing myself to this single point. The President of the United States used these words: "The ultimate goal being the weapons allotted to Germany—"
  Sir J. SIMON: He did not.
  Mr. JONES: The whole dispute arises over the words which I myself used. I will quote the actual words which I used. I said:
  "It actually offered, in the early part of 1933, the abolition of all weapons forbidden to Germany in 1919."
  Sir J. SIMON: The hon. Gentleman is manifestly informing the House of some information which he has been given from outside. He is not reading any document at all. If the hon. Gentleman is prepared to give me the name of the person who gave him that information I should be greatly obliged, because I have already proved to the House, I think quite clearly, that—
  Mr. JONES: It makes no difference who it was who gave me the information. [Interruption.] The question is, was it right or wrong? [HON. MEMBERS: "Wrong."] The right hon. Gentleman, as I understood him, suggested that my information concerning President Roosevelt—
  Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN rose—
  Mr. JONES: The point I wanted to make was this. The right hon. Gentleman has explained that the Government took a certain line in 1932. I asked the right hon. Gentleman whether it is the fact that the British Government accepts as its ultimate objective the objective which the President of the United States said was his.
  Sir J. SIMON: I must really explain this to the whole House. The hon. Gentleman has been provided in all good faith with a piece of information which I have shown to the House is quite unfounded in fact. It is no good his reading from a piece of paper what somebody else has told him that President Roosevelt has said, when I have before me here—though indeed anybody can find them in the Library—
  Mr. JONES: They have been quoted to-night.
  Sir J. SIMON: If the hon. Gentleman can find in President Roosevelt's message any words which justify what he has just been quoting, I should be very glad at once to see what they are, and will see that he has full information. I have not spoken without having informed myself and without knowing something on this particular point. This statement has been made outside the House again and again, and it is a statement without any foundation. Ill our domestic controversies we ought to keep clear of appearing to impute to some foreign State or to the head of a foreign State a declaration about disarmament which he has not made, and which is not any the better because that allegation is really relied upon for the purpose of holding up to obloquy the British Government.
  Let me turn now to another interesting and important matter. Reference has been made to the tour of my hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal. He is his own justification. I think the whole House will feel that they owe him a debt for the way he presented his account and the way that he endeavoured to discharge his mission. I must be allowed to point out that there is something more than a mere error in anyone speaking as though my hon. Friend's mission had failed. Not only is that not true, but it is a misunderstanding of what he was asked to do. The hon. and gallant Member for St. Marylebone (Captain Cunningham-Reid) put the point correctly. The House has been told again and again that the purpose for which the Government asked the Lord Privy Seal to undertake this very difficult piece of work was not to go and negotiate, but to go to the three Capitals, himself being very fully informed and charged with the whole meaning and purpose of the British Memorandum, and to gather at first hand from the responsible statesmen whom he met in the three countries what were their reactions to our proposals and where the difficulty, if any, arose. It was an extremely important piece of work, and it was a piece of work which could not be done in the same way by Ambassadors, because it is essentially dependent upon a comparison of three different points of view. That is not the same thing as going to negotiate. It is
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  therefore not in the least fair to my hon. Friend even to contemplate the proposition that he has failed in his mission. On the contrary, he conducted his mission with the most admirable skill, and it remains to complete the information by our learning from one of the three countries what they have to say. In the meantime I am speaking for the whole Government when I say that the results he has gathered are of first and great importance for a further immediate study of the question.
  The right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) made the amende honorable, because he had spoken about my hon. Friend's mission as having failed, and he went on to say: "I will say that it has not yet succeeded." Those two propositions are very different. It remains to be seen whether or not something useful cannot be recovered out of this very disturbing and very urgent situation. The right hon. Member for Epping proceeded to do something else, which, frankly, I regret. He took note of the fact that the French Government had not replied as yet to our Memorandum, and then he exercised his ingenuity, very agreeably, but I am afraid a little mischievously, in providing a reply for the French Government. It is best to leave the French Government to answer for themselves. It is just possible that there may have been considerations put before them by the Lord Privy Seal which at the moment are not in the mind of the right hon. Member for Epping. I cannot think that it was a very useful exercise of his immense Parliamentary talent to make up for the fact that this Debate takes place rather earlier than is convenient by anticipating, in a spirit of prophecy, what will be the answer we may ultimately receive from France.
  The explanation is this. The right hon. Gentleman has always been perfectly consistent and outspoken on this subject. He is a vehement opponent of disarmament discussions. He does not believe in and therefore he does not want regulated armaments, and he produces, as so brilliant a mind is sure to produce, very plausible reasons to support his view. If he were here I should like to point out to him that those who reject, with the great vehemence and positiveness that he rejects, the idea of disarmament conventions and of regulated armaments

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  doing any good, must be prepared to face the alternative and to declare that the alternative is preferable. What is the alternative? He has sometimes reproached the Government, because they have pursued this subject too long, with too much detail, with wearisome reiteration, and yet we are told that we have no enthusiasm for disarmament.
  What is the alternative? The alternative is unregulated competition in armaments throughout the world. No one is entitled to take up the position which my right hon. Friend is disposed to recommend in opposition to disarmament discussions and reject the idea of international regulation, unless he says: "I would prefer to see unregulated competition in armaments throughout the world." That is an appalling prospect. With regard to the agreements that have been made for naval limitation no one can doubt that they have had the effect of removing some of the uncertainties in that particular branch of armaments. Let the House conceive for a moment what would be the actual measure and the full depth and width of the situation we should have to face if all these efforts for disarmament broke up. In the first place, there would begin a scramble in rearmament, perfectly unregulated and unlimited, unchecked by any form of inspection or supervision. It would be not merely a scramble in rearmament, but it would be rearmament in a fog. We should have none of the political consequences which would go with disarmament agreement. The absence of disarmament agreement would mean that suspicion and fear were too great for people to agree, and therefore suspicion and fear would run riot over the world.
  What about the League of Nations? My right hon. Friend the Member for Epping always interposes at certain stages of his speeches a statement that he is all for the League of Nations. Could one imagine a more serious blow that could be inflicted on the League than that we should all avow that there has been a complete failure of the efforts at disarmament? It would be more than a failure; it would be a setback—we may have to face it, but at least let us realise what we are coming to—to all efforts at international co-operation. I draw the conclusion, therefore, which has been
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  drawn by several speakers in this Debate, that it would be better, a hundred times better to have a bad agreement on this subject than no agreement at all.
  The right hon. Member for Tamworth (Sir A. Steel-Maitland) made a speech this afternoon which I thought was very powerful, in which he referred to the terrible dilemma which is created by the fact that we have Germany in her two aspects. On the one hand, you have a Germany indicating some of the symptoms referred to by the right hon. Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel) and illustrated by the recent speech of General Goering, very alarming and disturbing, a very menacing outlook, and, on the other hand, a great people who are claiming that they must have the treatment which equality suggests, and are, therefore, exacting by every means in their power full permission to do what they want to do. The right hon. Member for Tamworth went on to say that he had come to the view that it was far better there should be an international agreement which restricts, defines, and limits armaments, even if it includes rearmament rather than that there should be no agreement at all. The same point was made by the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. H. Kerr) who said that any agreement was better than no agreement.
  A question has been raised as to the suggestion which the Lord President of the Council threw out the other day, that if other efforts fail we should still have to pursue actively and quickly the possibility of a more limited Convention, as, for example, an Air Convention. I should like to relieve the minds of any one who supposes that our idea is that this would be a substitute or merely an excuse for delay, meandering and waste of time. There never was a clearer case that time is running against the friends of disarmament; it is a case of acting quickly in every possible way that we can. As regards quick discussions of such a topic, it has to be borne in mind that an agreement on air deals only with one arm, a very important and complicated arm, but, what is perhaps more important, it is an agreement which would only involve a few countries. It is only those countries with big air forces which really matter. My own experience after Geneva is that one of the reasons for

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  delay and complication is the fact that when you are discussing general disarmament you have 64 nations present, each with their own point of view, and desirous of contributing to the discussion, and there is an enormous extension of the time taken up in debate and analysis. An Air Convention might very well be regarded as one which would involve for practical purposes a limited number of countries dealing with a single subject.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: Would it deal with the scale of the arm or the use of the arm?
  Sir J. SIMON: It would deal with one arm and it would make for simplification and speed. My right hon. Friend the Member for Epping is much attracted to the idea of air regulation and restriction by a method not necessarily of abolishing the forces, or indeed, of reducing them to any great extent, but of making sure that certain areas will not be attacked; that the air arm would only be used for military objectives. That is naturally a matter on which there has been a great deal of examination, technically and politically. The right hon. Member for Darwen was quite right when he said that it was being discussed as long ago as the summer before last when he was at Geneva with us. I have no wish to put up any obstacle, but I must point out that there are considerable difficulties in the way of a practical application of the idea, and this has been found to be the case as soon as it is handled.
  What is a military objective? Is the capital city of the country, or that part of the capital city which contains the Government Departments, or the Air, the Navy and the Army Departments which have to deal directly with the conduct of the war—are they a military objective? It is not a very easy matter to answer. Are you to schedule geographically particular and selected areas that are to escape, or is it to be done by a more general definition? These are undoubtedly great difficulties, and when it is said that, after all, you must trust the people to keep to the rules, there is this difference between the two ways of dealing with it. If you are able by international agreement to secure the abolition of particular kinds of instruments in the air and accompany it with supervision and inspection, these things would
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  really be abolished. But the other method, the method of saying we will keep our instruments but we will promise one another by international treaty that we will not use them in particular areas, is, in the nature of things, a promise which we hope will be kept, but a promise which at least it will not be impossible to break because the instruments will be there. Therefore, I think it will be found necessary to examine the pros and cons of the different methods of limitation. The immediate question which I am now answering is, that we have not the slightest intention, if we are thrown back to discussing an Air Convention only, of allowing such discussions to be spread over a great length of time. It is essential to do it quickly, and we have to face it. As and when the hopes of better things disappear we have to face the consequences in our own country, and to prepare what is to be done here accordingly.
  Let me reply to one or two questions which have been put. The hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Lewis) asked what was being done in connection with the League of Nations to make other members pay their subscriptions. I think it is desirable to make a short statement on this matter, as this question is constantly arising in all parts of the House. Last year the Financial Secretary to the Treasury went with me to Geneva, and I asked him to take charge of this question. What was happening in Geneva was this. For some years, there has been at Geneva a systematic method of over-budgeting, of over-estimating the amount that would be required in the coming year, which I have no doubt was influenced by the knowledge that some members would pay and others would not. I need hardly say that my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury presented the strict Treasury view, and maintained with good effect, before this international audience, that the one sound principle is that all estimates must be honestly made to cover as accurately as possible the estimated expenditure, and that it is not justifiable to swell the figure for which you ask because you are not certain what contributors will pay their subscriptions. He did it so well that he obtained an immediate reduction of 1,000,000 gold francs, and an assurance by the Financial Committee of the League that the point he had made so

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  powerfully and clearly would certainly not be overlooked or forgotten, and that he might expect the estimates in the future to be based on proper British principles. That, I think, was a not altogether unsatisfactory piece of work.
  The hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks) mentioned the word "security." On all these subjects we must not, any of us, allow phrases to take the place of well-thought-out and detailed policy, and the subject of security is much too big a subject to be dealt with at the end of a reply such as this. But for myself I must say that I am very deeply impressed by the way in which, on all sides of the House, from different points of view, this aspect of international relations has been emphasised to-day. It was dealt with by the hon. Gentleman who opened the Debate, backed up on this side of the House and below the Gangway opposite, and I do not doubt that the mind of the country is being very seriously preoccupied and concerned with this question. There have been speeches made in this House recently by my hon. Friend the Member for Altrincham (Sir E. Grigg) which have put the argument in the most powerful manner. I think the time may come when the whole House will have to consider this in much greater detail. The question may arise as to whether it makes or does not make a difference to getting an agreement. Manifestly it is the duty of everyone to face it in this House rather than simply pass it by in silence.
  As for the general challenge, which I am becoming accustomed to, as to what is the policy of the Government in foreign affairs, really I do not think that the Government deserves the imputation that it has not steered a clearly consistent course. There are two considerations which I would like to mention, which show why it is that this kind of question is much more directly in the public mind than it used to be. In the old days, and not so long ago, we were engaged in this House and outside continually in some sharp-cut, bitter domestic controversy, whatever it was, Home Rule, the Parliament Act, or whatever it may have been. We have our controversies now, but they are nothing like so sharp-cut. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] Hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway opposite
  484
  are mistaken if they think they are so sharp-cut. There is a much more general feeling in this country than there used to be that in domestic questions there is a good deal to be learned and got from different kinds of people. There is a great deal more co-operation than conflict. One result of that is that public controversialists, newspapers and so forth, which took a great part in the cut and thrust of debate, naturally turn to foreign affairs as another topic on which to display their controversial qualities.
  There is a second reason, and it is making a profound difference. At six o'clock and nine o'clock every week-day, and at ten minutes to nine every Sunday, pretty well every home in the land is being supplied with a piece of detailed foreign policy information. That is the result of the wireless broadcast. As a rule, I think it is admirably done. But the point is that to-day in England there are hundreds of thousands of people who know that General Gombos is visiting Signor Mussolini at Rome. How many homes would have known that 20 years ago?
  Mr. MAXTON: How many of them care now?
  Mr. BUCHANAN: Does it make any difference?
  Sir J. SIMON: I think it does make a difference, and I should have thought that of all the people in the world who would have admitted that it made a difference those who claim that their interests are international and not narrow would be the people. I would state the broad outlines of British policy in very simple terms. I would say first of all, that, as always, the first and main objective of British policy is the maintenance and promotion of peace. It so happens that in our situation, that is not only the British interest in the narrow sense, in the sense that we want to keep out of trouble, but is also an immense British interest in the wider sense, because the peace of Europe and of the world is really essential for our own prosperity, and it may be for our own safety. To secure that, we have shown throughout, and it really is flying in the face of the facts to dispute it, that we desire to do everything we can to support the League of

  485
  Nations, to maintain its authority, to restore its membership. An hon. Gentleman quoted a passage from the last paragraph of the British Memorandum, calling attention to the fact that the Government had said that they took the view that Germany's return to the League, resuming her seat in this international council, ought to be one of the concomitants of reaching an agreement about armaments with them. Exactly the same view has been taken by Signor Mussolini, who indeed described it as being the fundamental counterpart of meeting Germany's claims.
  In the second place, our own policy is directed to realising a disarmament convention if by any possible means that can be done, and to realising it at the lowest level at which armaments can be agreed. When people say it does not matter whether the level is low or high, I profoundly disagree with them, and, if for no other reason, because it makes all the difference to the burden cast upon the people of this country. It is only by agreement that we shall be able to show that in fact the tension has been relaxed. It is not, of course, that disarmament in itself accomplishes that result. It is that if you can secure it and as you secure it you are establishing the fact of an increase of confidence and of good feeling between one State and another.
  I make no apology that the British Government's conception of the course which foreign affairs ought to take is expressed in these simple propositions. It is no part of the business of His Majesty's Government or of the Foreign Minister to endeavour to produce some spectacular policy. The fundamental effort that Britain makes in the realm of international affairs is a conception ever directed, perfectly disinterestedly and at the same time in the real interests of the country and the world, to the promotion of peace and the establishment of good relations.
  Question, "That £153,005,000 stand part of the Question," put, and agreed to.
  Motion made, and Question, "That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution," put, and agreed to.

  NORTH ATLANTIC SHIPPING BILL.
  Considered in Committee.
  [Sir DENNIS HEBBEET in the Chair.]

  NORTH ATLANTIC SHIPPING BILL.

    CLAUSE 1.—(Power to Treasury to make advances to certain companies.)
    10.5 p.m.
    Mr. BATEY: I beg to move, in page 1, line 6, to leave out "from time to time," and to insert:
    "within a period of two years after the passing of this Act."
    This Clause gives the Treasury power to make advances to certain private companies and the object of the Amendment is to limit the period within which those advances can be made. Under the Bill as it stands the payments can extend over an unlimited period. When the Chancellor of the Exchequer made his first statement in regard to these payments the impression was that the money would be needed almost immediately. The Amendment suggests two years as the limit of time within which this money should be granted. We believe that to be as long a period as the Committee should accept. There are many different opinions in the Committee in regard to this Bill. There is an opinion that it would not be fair if any portion of this money could be granted during an unlimited period if its purpose is merely to put the company in a position to build the fastest vessel on the Atlantic. There is also an opinion that it would not be wise to give the Treasury this power for an unlimited period to grant money for the purpose of bolstering up a private company.
    There is also an opinion in this House that the Treasury ought not to have unlimited time in which to grant money to this company merely for the purpose of building a luxury vessel intended to carry rich people across the Atlantic. There is general agreement on one point only and it is that ship No. 534 should be completed so as to give employment to thousands of working men who are not now employed. We believe that that was the reason which really attracted the House of Commons to this proposal. We say that for that purpose the grant of the money ought to be within a time limit and that unless the company takes steps to obtain the money within two

    487
    years and unless they deserve the money within two years then the money ought not to he paid.
    10.10 p.m.
    The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER (Mr. Chamberlain): The purpose which the hon. Member had in mind in moving this Amendment was disclosed by him in the last sentence of his speech in which he expressel the opinion that if any money had not been paid in accordance with the provisions of the Bill by the end of two years, the power to advance the money ought to lapse. I would point out to him, however, that that purpose would not be effected by the Amendment. It is, no doubt, the case that, in all human probability, all the money required for the completion of ship No. 534 will have been advanced before the termination of two years. The only money which would then be left over unadvanced would be perhaps some part of the working capital and the amount required for the second ship or ships. But if at the end of two years, supposing the Amendment were carried, the whole of the money has not been advanced the Government might find themselves in this position, that in view of the coming lapse of their powers they were bound, as they would have the power to do, to advance the whole of the remainder before the two years had elapsed. Thus the only result of the Amendment might be that the Government would be forced to make the full advance long before they were required to do so or indeed before they had made up their minds that it should be made. In those circumstances I hope the hon. Member will not think it necessary to press the Amendment.
    Mr. BATEY: After the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Mr. BUCHANAN: I desire to speak on the Amendment.
    The CHAIRMAN: The hon. Member for Spennymoor (Mr. Batey) has asked leave to withdraw the Amendment and I would point out that if any hon. Member speaks now upon it, it cannot be withdrawn.
    10.12 p.m.
    Mr. BUCHANAN: May I point out that the Chancellor of the Exchequer in declining to accept the Amendment said
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    it might mean the Government granting this money earlier than they otherwise would. On the other hand, as the Bill now stands, without an Amendment of this kind, this money can be paid without any time-limit at all. The purpose behind the Amendment is to have a reasonable time-limit for the completion of the one ship. If all the thousands of people who have been promised work on this ship are to get it, the ship should be completed inside two years and since we are told that the purpose is to provide work it is not unreasonable to expect that the provision of that work will have been accomplished inside two years and that the Government's financial commitments should be limited to that period. When the Chancellor of the Exchequer says that it might mean granting the money before the time, that would only occur if the vessel had not been completed in the two years and it seems to me that there must be something wrong if the vessel cannot be completed within that period. I think a limit of two years gives ample time, and if the primary object is the provision of work such a limit is only reasonable. The insertion of the Amendment would mean that if the ship were not completed by that time the Government's commitments would cease and I think that would be a powerful lever.
    Sir GEORGE GILLETT: Is the hon. Member correct in thinking that this applies only to the one ship? Does it not apply to two ships?
    Mr. BUCHANAN: If the hon. Member had listened to the Mover of the Amendment, he would have heard him say that this Bill had gone through so far because it was for the provision of work on this vessel. Clearly the purpose of the Amendment is to limit it to one ship.
    Sir G. GILLETT: If the Amendment were carried, the result could only be obtained through some other Amendment being moved subsequently. I think this refers to the sum of £9,500,000 and is not, therefore, confined to one ship.
    Mr. BUCHANAN: I am thankful for these lectures on Parliamentary procedure, but Governments often move Amendments with the idea of subsequent Amendments being also moved, and the rights of the Opposition must not be taken away from them in this respect.

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    Having regard to the later Amendment on the Paper and to the fact that this Amendment cannot be separated from the consequential Amendment, I think this is a very reasonable and necessary Amendment. I think also that no Government should have an unlimited time in such a matter as this, because the Bill as it stands can continue for all time, provided the sum of £9,500,000 has not been used.
    Question put, "That the words pro-nosed to be left out, stand part of the Clause."
    The Committee proceeded to a Division.
    The CHAIRMAN stated that he thought that the Ayes had it and, on his decision being challenged, it appeared to him that the Division was unnecessarily claimed, and he accordingly called upon the Members who supported and who challenged his decision successively to rise in their places, and he declared that the Ayes had it, two Members only who challenged his decision having stood up.
    10.19 p.m.
    Mr. RHYS DAVIES: I beg to move, in page 1, line 15, to leave out "nine," and to insert "four."
    I understand that it has been arranged that we shall take the following Amendment standing in my name—in line 18, to leave out "or more large vessels," and insert "large vessel"—in conjunction with this one.
    The CHAIRMAN: Yes. I think these two Amendments really form one, and that the hon. Member will be satisfied with a decision on the first Amendment.
    Mr. BUCHANAN: For the sake of guidance, do I understand that the first Amendment, to limit the amount Co £4,500,000, is to be taken with the second Amendment, to leave out "or more large vessels" and insert "large vessel"? Am I right in thinking that they will be taken together?
    The CHAIRMAN: I put it in this way, that I looked upon these Amendments as one because the lesser amount referred to in the first Amendment is regarded as the necessary money for only one vessel. Consequently, if that Amendment were carried, the second would be consequential, but if the hon. Member takes a different view, I am quite satisfied, if these Amendments are discussed together,
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    to put the Question on the second Amendment, but to have no further discussion on it.
    Mr. BUCHANAN: So long as I can safeguard my right to vote on the two Amendments, I am satisfied.
    Mr. DAVIES: These two Amendments are really one because, if the first Amendment be carried, it will mean that there will be no money left to build the sister ship at all. The reduction of the sum from £9,000,000 to £4,000,000 would automatically mean that only one vessel would be built. The reason we are moving this Amendment is very simple. When this issue first came before the House, all we heard about was ship No. 534, but in subsequent negotiations that have been proceeding between the Government and the shipping companies, a sister ship has loomed on the horizon. We are beginning to wonder whether the Government are in fact determined to help the company with the sister ship at all, and, indeed, we are beginning to wonder too whether if No. 534 is proceeded with, there is any advantage in promising money for the second ship. All the arguments that have been employed against building No. 534, can be muliplied ten fold in the case of building a sister ship.
    I have looked over the documents that have been issued in connection with this matter, and I find that they are very nebulous about the second ship. If the right hon. Gentleman will turn to page 4 of the agreement, he will find that I am justified in saying that there is very little in the agreement to show that the second ship is warranted by the proceedings that have already taken place between the Government and the company. The argument has been employed justifiably from this side of the House that the Government are taking a grave risk in lending this money, but if it be admitted that we are right in lending it to build the ship that has already been begun, we are entitled to say that we should not guarantee sums of money in respect of a ship that has never been begun. The arguments may be very strong in favour of completing No. 534, but if it is agreed that the Government should not go beyond that and lend money for a second ship, the case is made out for my Amendment.

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    Unless we get an adequate reply from the right hon. Gentleman we shall be compelled to make a protest in the Lobby against what is done in this Clause. There is no time limit neither with regard to the second ship, and as far as I have been able to read these documents, the Government in their promises are going beyond anything that the companies have asked them to do. If the finances of the country are in as bad a way as we are told they are, we should not throw our money away on this second ship.
    10.25 p.m.
    Mr. CHARLES WILLIAMS: I find myself in somewhat of a difficulty with regard to this Amendment. Like a great many other hon. Members I was returned to this House to endeavour to save the money of the taxpayers, and I have always done my best to help my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to keep down expenditure. Again and again I have refrained from asking him to spend money on objects which I approve. Here is expenditure which I do not like in the least, because I think it is a great waste, and when I find the Socialist Opposition moving an Amendment to reduce the amount of that expenditure, really, what am I to do? I cannot very well go back upon the electors who sent me here to save money. I find myself faced by a lot of people who say "Let us have all the money we can—give it out three for two, or whatever the phrase is," and others who say "Cut down taxation." If we spend money it is obvious there will not be so much to balance the Budget and help to right the financial position of the country. Quite honestly, many of us are placed in a very difficult position in face of this Amendment, because we do not want to vote against the Government if we can possibly avoid it.
    But, after all, the Government may take the line of saying that this expenditure will be in the interests of encouraging national trade, and that ultimately the Exchequer will gain more than it loses, and if that is the position then it becomes a wholly different proposition. But I would repeat to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that I and others find ourselves in a difficult position when a proposal of this kind is brought up, and we are faced with the direct question, Are
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    you going to help the Chancellor to balance his Budget or to increase the expenditure of this country? I can see that in many ways the Chancellor is in a difficult position, and I should be the very first person to endeavour to help him out of all his difficulties, but I hope the House will appreciate the difficult position in which I stand when I am faced with a direct Amendment which would help to save money.
    10.28 p.m.
    Sir CHARLES BARRIE: I do not intervene from any desire to oppose the Government in their desire to support the Cunard Line in the policy they are developing for the Atlantic trade, but to point out that it was obvious from the start that there must be two ships to carry on the service which they are at present running with three ships. That is the policy which the Cunard Line have developed from the beginning, and it is clear that there is not the slightest good in their building one ship unless there is the possibility of having two. That is why the Government are asking in this Measure for the sum of £9,000,000, an amount which the Amendment seeks to reduce. My purpose in intervening is to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Financial Secretary to the Treasury—to whom I put the question in a previous Debate—whether the House will have an opportunity, at a later stage, of knowing whether the Cunard Line are to proceed with the second vessel.
    A very large sum is being spent on one vessel—and it is probably right that that expenditure should be incurred: I am all in favour of large vessels for the Atlantic trade—but I must remind the Committee that we are continually told that there is not a very large sum of money available to be spent upon various industries in the country. At a time when the shipping trade is placing before the Government proposals that another section of the trade should have consideration, I find that a total sum of £9,000,000 is being asked for in respect of two vessels. The chances are that when the Cunard Line wish to proceed with the second vessel, the section of the shipping trade to which I have referred will be in such a position that, unless the Government support it in the meanwhile, it will have to ask the Government for some measure of assistance. The Government might then say, "We have spent £9,000,000 already on

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    the shipping trade, and we cannot afford to spend any more."
    I repeat the question which I put in a previous Debate as to whether the House is to be informed in any way before the second ship is proceeded with, so that we may have an opportunity of stating, on behalf of the shipping industry as a whole, whether the industry consider that they might as well have a share of what is going. I pointed out in a previous Debate that, roughly speaking, 100 tramp vessels could be built for the cost of one Cunarder. The tramp shipping trade undoubtedly requires revival with new tools, but it is possible that although the Government might think that that would be a very good thing to do, they might object that they had already spent £9,000,000. Is there to be an opportunity of discussing whether the Cunard Line should proceed with another vessel at a later stage, or is this, so far as the House of Commons is concerned, the finish, and there will not be an oportunity of discussing the matter again? That was my object in rising, and possibly we might get an answer to my questions.
    10.32 p.m.
    Mr. MARTIN: Like an hon. Friend who has spoken I was returned to this House for the purpose of helping the Government to keep down expenses, but I was also returned to help the Government to extend employment. I understand that one of the main arguments for putting through this Bill is to give employment for a long period to a large number of men. That fact, and the other fact that this ship cannot run alone but must have a sister either of equal size or smaller, requires that we should support the Government and should reject the Amendment. I shall not discuss the point as to whether the Government could use this £4,000,000 in a better manner, as an hon. Friend has suggested, in a way which would go direct towards employment, or in ways in Which it is not meant to go. It is important to remember that if we support the Chancellor in regard to one ship, largely for the sake of its employment value and for the regaining of our prestige and our trade upon a certain route, we have to support him in having money—or at least having the power to give money—for a second ship. I only wish to ask the Chancellor, as I tried to ask him before, exactly how the £4,000,000 will be dealt with after the
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    first ship is built, and when he comes to consider with his colleagues whether the extra £4,000,000 should be advanced or not. We should reject the Amendment and support the Chancellor.
    10.34 p.m.
    Captain CROOKSHANK: I must make my position quite clear. I support this Amendment. I know there are many hon. Members who hold that view, even if they do not vote in the same Lobby as the official Opposition. The junior Member for Southampton (Sir C. Barrie) has played right into my hands, and into the hands of those who have been speaking against this Measure. He said the other day:
    "The Government may be, and I think they are, wise in insisting so far that the second snip is not to be proceeded with."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th March, 1934; col. 1853, Vol. 286.]
    He says that to-day with a different implication. The other day they were wise in not insisting on proceeding with the second ship for large reasons of policy; but to-day, because in the meantime the tramp shipping people and so on—I do not mean that in a personal sense, but different sections of the industry—may want some of this money before the Cunard Company build the second ship, my hon. Friend is not so sure, and he wants to be certain that the House will have an opportunity of reviewing the arrangement. I can tell him the answer to his question: the House will not have such an opportunity. If the figure of £9,500,000 remains here, it will give that amount of borrowing power to the Government, and that will be the end of it.
    Hon. Members may ask as many questions as they like at Question Time, and the Government may say they are not going on with it, but they will have the power to do so. Moreover, this Government will not always be in office. Another Government may delay action, but still the statutory power will be there, particularly under the very extraordinary borrowing Clause which the Government have drafted. If my hon. Friend wants a subsidy for tramp shipping—and that, of course, is one of the unfortunate results of this Bill; all the shipping people come forward for more subsidies—he will have to get it separately and unconnected with this Amendment. If the Amendment is not

    495
    carried, and the words stand in the Bill, the Government will have the power, and that is what is so regrettable. I agree with my hon. Friend, not because I think the interval ought to be spent in shovelling out £4,000,000 or so to tramp shipping, but because I think the interval ought to be preserved, and this House ought to have the right, if there is to be a second or more ships, to discuss the matter at the proper time, when they see the experience of the first large ship.
    This is not a party matter at all; it is a purely common-sense financial Amendment, and I hope the Chancellor of the Exchequer will see his way to accept it. There is, indeed, great force in what my hon. Friend the Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams) has said. It is putting all the supporters of the Government in a very awkward position to ask them to find a vast sum of money like this, because, even though it is nominally a loan, we know that it will not be repaid. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] Because it is such an uneconomic proposition. Certainly, if repayment was so easy on a commercial basis, the Cunard Company would have no difficulty in raising the money in the City of London. That is the answer to that question. My hon. Friend the Member for Torquay is quite right in saying that it has put us in an awkward position, because the great body of supporters of the Government were sent here to get the finances of the country straight. It may be, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton (Mr. Macmillan) has said several times, that the Government are changing their policy and embarking on a policy of works; but, if that be so, why should they select this one particular item as the starting point? Would not a great housing loan, for example, be much more sensible?
    That is why those of us who are the real supporters of the Government—and I do not look in any particular direction—are anxious on their behalf to limit their responsibilities as far as we can. Some of us would prefer that there should be no grant for shipping, or that, if there is to be a grant, it should be as small as possible, and I hope that during the discussion on this Amendment we may have a reply from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade. I am
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    very happy to see that at last one of the Board of Trade Ministers is present at these Debates. The curious will have observed that, in the Division the other day, none of the Board of Trade Ministers voted for the Bill, that none of the Cabinet Ministers from Glasgow voted for the Bill, and that the hon. Member for Dumbarton Burghs (Mr. Kirkwood), who, with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Home), is supposed to be one of the fathers of the Bill, refrained from voting for it.
    Mr. KIRKWOOD: On a point of Order. What I did was to refrain from voting against the Amendment of my party. There was no vote on the Bill. The whole House was agreed on allowing the Bill to go through.
    Mr. C. WILLIAMS: On that point of Order—
    The CHAIRMAN: It is not a point of Order.
    Captain CROOKSHANK: That shows that some Members are in a very anomalous position with regard to the Bill. Those who are the real supporters of the Government and want to keep them on the path of economy and good finance suggest that it would be enough to take the amount mentioned in the Amendment rather than the amount mentioned in the Bill. We hope even now to soften the heart of the Chancellor and making him realise that it would be better, perhaps, to make the experiment on the first ship, which is now on the stocks, and let the decision with regard to future sums that may have to be raised for the purpose be come to after we have a good deal more knowledge than we possess now.
    10.41 p.m.
    Mr. McENTEE: I want to oppose the loan altogether, but, not being able to do that, I suggest that it is unwise to spend £9,000,000 on a project which no financial house will touch and on which no bank would lend 10s., because it is considered by all of them to be a project which in all probability will fail. It appears an extraordinary thing to me that a Government which is still telling the public that it cannot find money for far more important things than this should be willing to lend £9,000,000 which everyone believes will never be paid.
    The CHAIRMAN: This is not an Amendment to stop the spending of any money. It is to reduce the sum to £4,000,000.
    Mr. McENTEE: I think we have a right to ask the Chancellor whether there is a probability of the money being paid. Experience teaches us that it will not, because there is already a very large sum of money owing by the same company. If there is reason for the belief that the public money that we are asked to lend is not likely to be paid and if there is evidence, as there appears to me to be, in proof of that statement, I think I am perfectly in order in making the statement.
    The CHAIRMAN: The hon. Member would be quite in order in arguing that on the Clause. In fact, it has been argued on the Second Reading. But he cannot argue it on this Amendment.
    Mr. McENTEE: I bow to your Ruling, Sir, but it is rather a pity that it was not given a little earlier in the evening, because others have referred to it, and that is why I was led into the error of believing that I also could do so. There were some arguments put up for the completion of the boat which has been already started, though I was never convinced that there were arguments put up why public money should be used for building it. The security is altogether inadequate, and the proof of that is in the fact that private enterprise will not lend any money to the project at all. Therefore, I hope the Committee will say to the Chancellor that if he has, as he appears to have now, a considerable amount of money to spend, the £9,000,000 could be spent in a better way. I suggest that a great many houses could be built with that £9,000,000.
    The CHAIRMAN: The hon. Member must confine this remarks to the Amendment.
    Mr. McENTEE: I would point out that the argument has been made before in this Debate. I hope that the Committee will definitely tell the Chancellor of the Exchequer that we are not prepared to spend the additional £5,000,000. If any reasonable argument at all can be made for the spending of the money, it can only be argued in respect of the ship which has already been started. I should be glad to hear from the Chancellor of
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    the Exchequer when it is proposed to start the second ship, and under what conditions. Where is it proposed to be built? The argument has been used that the principal reason for starting a second ship after building the first is in order to provide work. I do not agree. I do not believe that the provision of work is the principal reason. The principal reason in this, as in many other things, including subsidies, is to assist private enterprise which assisted the Government so well that they were enabled to obtain the majority which they have today. It is a question of the old saying "One good turn deserves another." The Government have had their good turn, and now they are paying what they owe to private enterprise for the assistance it gave in helping to form the National Government.
    If I were in the position of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to-night I should say, as probably he will say, "Save me from my friends." I think that when the reports are published to-morrow they will show the public that there are some of those who sit on the Government Benches who are beginning to see that the giving away of public money has reached the limit and that Parliament ought to say to the Government—and I hope it will be the case to-night—that the loaning of public money for bolstering up a failing industry—the shipping industry to-day is a failing industry, otherwise there would be no reason to come here and ask for money—should be stopped, and that private enterprise ought to find the money.
    10.49 p.m.
    Mr. BOOTHBY: I find myself in a dilemma, like my hon. Friend the Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams), but for a slightly different reason. I have for some time past, in fact almost always, been in favour of a policy of expansion. I am all for a progressive policy towards industry on the part of the Government with a view to putting more people into employment, and in connection with this Bill I welcome the apparent conversion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to that view. But what puzzles me is the first choice which he has made of the Transatlantic shipping industry of two enormous ships of 75,000 tons. We have not been told what speed they are going to do, nor the reasons why the Government

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    think that they will prove an attractive financial proposition. We have never from the start up to the present moment been given the reasons why the Government have chosen to subsidise two giant liners for the Transatlantic passage, and why they think that these two liners are the best opening move in their policy of expansion at the present moment. On the whole, I feel with those who would like, at any rate in the beginning, to limit this expenditure to the first ship until we have had an opportunity of judging from a practical point of view what sort of commercial proposition it will be, that the right hon. Gentleman is asking the House to take a tremendous leap in the dark. We do not know whether these ships will prove a commercial proposition. Would it not be advisable for the right hon. Gentleman to let us see how this first ship does before asking us to commit ourselves to this very large sum?
    I have been somewhat alarmed by the speech which has been delivered on this question by my hon. Friend the junior Member for Southampton (Sir C. Barrie). He keeps coming forward and saying, "We have one ship now; it is all right to have two ships; why not?" But the next thing we shall want is, perhaps, a hundred ships. The right hon. Gentleman must seriously consider subsidising the entire fishing industry of this country. The hon. Member for Southampton is asking for nothing less than the subsidisation of the whole shipping industry, to which I should certainly add the subsidisation of the whole fishing industry, and the right hon. Gentleman will be assailed with demands from all quarters for the subsidisation of every industry. Before, therefore, we grant this very large sum of money, £9,000,000, for the construction of two ships, we have a right to ask the right hon. Gentleman to tell us what is the underlying principle which is guiding the Government in this issue, and why they have chosen to subsidise these two particular large ships in preference to any other class of expenditure.
    The CHAIRMAN: I must tell the hon. Member that I could not allow the Chancellor of the Exchequer to answer that question on this Amendment.
    Mr. BOOTHBY: We are arguing on this Amendment whether there should be one or two ships, and I will confine my remarks to that question. There is something to be said for this House exercising its undoubted right of control over public expenditure and limiting this expenditure until it has had some opportunity of judging whether this first ship will be a successful commercial proposition or not. That is not an unreasonable request to make, and I hope that we may at any rate have some reasonable reply from the Government on that point.
    10.53 p.m.
    Captain GUEST: Two minutes is quite sufficient for the two or three remarks that I have to make. They are merely based upon the fact that during the last 26 years I have—I think I am probably right in saying—crossed the Atlantic Ocean more often than anybody else in this House. This may be a risky thing to say, but I expect that I can prove it true. My object in saying that is that I have crossed by every line and almost by every ship in the last 26 years, and I am also in a position to say, as well as anybody else in the House, that most of the ships are half empty. Only within the last two or three years I have crossed by the two latest blue-ribbon ships known as the "Bremen" and the "Europa," built by the German Government, or by some company subsidised by the German Government. Are we to undertake this terrible gamble? It may be true to say that the first ship was started three or four years ago in peculiar circumstances, and that the Government are reasonably advised in seeing it through. It is a pity to scrap a half-finished article. But to launch upon the second ship until the first is proved to be a success seems a terrible waste of public money. I urge the Chancellor not to consider the programme of this second ship until he has some proof that the first one is not only going to be needed, but is going to be thoroughly used and full.
    10.55 p.m.
    Mr. GRAHAM WHITE: I beg to move,
    "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."
    I do so in order to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can give any information in regard to a cable which has been circulated from New York by the Exchange Telegraph Company,

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    to the effect that representatives of the White Star Line are seeking an injunction in the courts in order to prevent any further progress with the merger?
    10.56 p.m.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The information which the hon. Member has given to the Committee comes to me for the first time. I have no information which would confirm the statement he has made. In any case, I submit that the information should not prevent the Committee from carrying out the remaining stages of this discussion. If it were a fact that an injunction were sought and subsequently an injunction were granted, that might render useless the work which Parliament would do in carrying this Bill; but I do seriously suggest that to postpone the possibility of restarting work upon No. 534 indefinitely in order that we might wait and see what may happen to an action which may never come on, as far as I know—I do not wish to be taken as accepting the correctness of the statement that has been made, in the absence of other information—would be an inexcusable thing to do.
    10.57 p.m.
    Mr. MANDER: Perhaps the Chancellor of the Exchequer will allow me to quote the actual words used by Mr. Franklin, the President of the International Mercantile Marine Company. He says that:
    "The merger would be a gross violation of the rights of the Oceanic Company's stockholders,"
    and he has instructed his attorney to seek an injunction. He says:
    "It is nothing more or less than the creation of a British national line, backed by the British Treasury to the extent of about 50,000,000 dollars (£9,000,000)."
    Therefore, he is withholding his consent. He considers that while the arrangement would be beneficial to the Cunard Company it would be unfair to the Oceanic Line. I do not express any opinion as to the facts of the case, but it seems to me that in these entirely new circumstances it would hardly be dignified or wise for the Committee to continue discussing a Bill which may never have to pass.
    10.58 p.m.
    Mr. MORGAN JONES: I take it that even if the Committee proceed with the present stage of the Bill we can expect from the Government, if there is to be
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    a Report stage, an announcement as to their future action if in point of fact the statement which has been made to the Committee turns out to be well founded. I suggest that no harm would be done if we proceed with the Committee stage, on the understanding that when we come to the Report stage we may expect from the Government some fuller statement of the course which they propose to adopt.
    10.59 p.m.
    Mr. BUCHANAN: Is there to be a Report stage? The Chancellor of the Exchequer knows whether there is to be a Report stage or not. The Government so far have shown no signs of accepting any Amendment, and if no Amendments are accepted there will be no Report stage. Everybody knows that the Third Reading will be put down for to-morrow. I am surprised if the hon. Member in charge of the Opposition does not know that there is to be no Report stage.
    11.0 p.m.
    Mr. PALING: Is it not the case that when the Bill was presented the argument of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was that an agreement had been reached by the various parties responsible for the merger company, and that were it not for the fact that such an agreement had been reached the Government would not have presented the Bill to the House?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: It is true that a conditional agreement had been reached when the Bill was presented, and as far as I was aware all the consents necessary had been obtained or were in process of being obtained. The Committee will see that I am at a disadvantage in knowing nothing about the circumstances brought to my notice, but I shall be glad to accept the suggestion of the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones) and give the Committee this assurance, that if the Government are not in a position to make a statement to-morrow before the Third Reading, we will postpone the Third Reading until such time as we are in a position to make a statement. I hope on that understanding that we may proceed with the Committee stage now.
    Mr. WHITE: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
    Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
    Question again proposed: "That the word 'nine' stand part of the Clause."
    11.2 p.m.
    Mr. DAVID MASON: The hon. and gallant Member for Gainsborough (Captain Crookshank) who is an acute critic of the Government wants to cut down this sum to £4,500,000. I would remind him that this is a business proposal. I would also remind hon. Members that it is only permissive. It says:
    "The Treasury may from time to time…advance."
    We must assume that the Treasury are not bereft of all reason. They are not fools, and they will consider how the first vessel is progressing before they go forward with the second.
    Captain CROOKSHANK: The point is that the Treasury are not the guardians of the public purse in the same way as the hon. Member of this House. They are not responsible to the taxpayers. We are.
    Mr. MASON: The Treasury are the guardians of the public purse, and they have taken precautions in the Bill, if hon. Members will only read the passage. It says:
    "The Treasury may from time to time on such terms as they think fit advance out of the Consolidated Fund."
    I think we should consider this as a business proposal. If we are prepared to go forward with it, I think it is a fair venture, we ought not to worry about the figure. I do not think the Amendment should commend itself to the good sense of hon. Members.
    11.5 p.m.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: In replying to the speeches made in support of the Amendment I want to confine myself as closely as possible to the actual subject we are discussing. We are not discussing the whole policy of the Bill. We are discussing merely whether we should confine the powers of the Treasury to the advancement of a sum sufficient to build the first ship or whether we should allow the full amount named in the Bill to be granted within the discretionary power of the Treasury. Let me make perfectly clear what the effect of accepting the Amendment would be. It would be to destroy the whole scheme absolutely and to tear up completely the whole agreement we have made with the other parties. Why? The reason is obvious. The scheme must be taken as a whole. There
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    are obligations on all sides. This is not merely the expenditure of money by the Treasury, as has been represented. It is the advance of money by the Treasury, but it is also the engagement on the part of this great enterprise of a very large sum of money in this first ship and in, possibly, two ships that may be built. It is the settled conviction of the Cunard Company, whose business it is to run ships across the Atlantic, and who have to be responsible to their shareholders for the way they conduct their business—it is their conviction after their long experience of the trade—
    Mr. MAXTON: And their great success.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: —that in order to secure the passenger trade on the North Atlantic you must build ships which are faster than any of their competitors. The point to which the passenger looks is the speed of the ship. I am not proposing to give this as my own view, but as the view of the Cunard Company. The point which attracts the passenger is the speed of the ship, and, subject to being able to pay the price, he will travel by the ship which gets him across the Atlantic in the shortest possible time. I have already explained that it is an entire misapprehension of the character of a ship of this kind to suppose that it is fitted for nothing but millionaires. A ship of this kind in these days is fitted with a very large number of cabins of moderate size, with a moderate amount of luxury in their fitting, which are intended to take people who can afford a certain price but, are not able to pay the great price charged for the suites of rooms intended for millionaires. Whatever company has upon the North Atlantic the fastest ships, that company will attract the cream of the passenger traffic.
    In their view it is necessary to have a double service, so that you can have one vessel going each way, because the passenger who goes out wants to be certain that he can come back by a similar ship. Therefore in the minds of the Cunard Company there is no possible doubt that it will require a second ship, a sister ship to the first. I am not saying that that is the view of every shipowner, or that it is the view of every shipowner in the North Atlantic. It is the Cunard's view. The Cunard Company are putting a very large amount of money into the ship. They would not be prepared to go on with the

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    ship and to embark their shareholders' money in her, if they felt it possible in the near future that they might find themselves crippled in the possibility of providing that double service which in their opinion is necessary, because they could not raise the money for a second ship. Therefore, they say, if they are to put the first ship on the service, they must know beforehand that they will not be prevented from putting the second ship on the service, for want of the necessary finance.
    Mr. McGOVERN: Why cannot they raise the money?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: It is quite possible that they may be able to raise the money. That is the reason for giving complete discretion to the Treasury whether to make the advance or not. We are not committed to the advance of the £5,000,000 for the second ship, but we say that if the merger company decide that the second ship is necessary for the proper and economic carrying on of the service, the Treasury must have power to grant them the balance for that second ship. That is really a business proposition. I put it to the Committee that if they grant the power to the Treasury to advance money for the first ship, in their own interest they must give the power to grant money for the second ship otherwise they may make it impossible for the first ship to pay. That is the answer to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Captain Crookshank) and others who say that we ought not to take out of the hands of Parliament the power to control the advance of this sum for the second ship. My hon. and gallant Friend said that this Government might not be here when the second ship was being built. It would be possible to go further and say that the present House of Commons may not be here when the second ship is being built. Another Government and another House of Commons may be in possession by the time the second ship is built. Those who are committing themselves to the considerable liabilities involved in proceeding with the first ship should have some assurance that they will not be deprived of the opportunity of completing the service because some new House of Commons which has not heard the arguments, which is not familiar with the circumstances in which the first grant has been made, may—perhaps
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    on some entirely different ground—cripple their resources and make useless the large sum already advanced.
    11.13 p.m.
    Mr. BUCHANAN: The last point made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer is one of the most remarkable arguments I have ever heard. He says that this House of Commons is to bind every other House of Commons in the future because the future House of Commons will not have heard the arguments. In other words those who elect the next House of Commons and those who comprise the next House of Commons are not to have any say in this matter, because they have not heard the arguments. If that is to be accepted, the present House of Commons should not have a say either, because most of them have never heard the arguments. The great mass come in and vote from day to day without hearing a single argument. But is it to be said that another Government which may replace the present Government is to have no say in an expenditure of £5,000,000 of public money? That is the negation of Parliamentary democracy and Parliamentary control. The right hon. Gentleman also says that this company is putting a large sum into this undertaking. How much are they putting in? We have never been told. When the Government bought a certain literary work, there was an arrangement for paying pound for pound. Are the Cunard Company paying pound for pound? Are they putting in £9,500,000? Are they risking an equal amount?
    There is a third question. I should say that from every angle tramp shipping needs this money more than anything else, because great numbers of sailors on tramp ships are to-day living under conditions that need improvement and considerable readjustment. For that reason alone there might be a defence for spending large sums of money in renovating your tramp shipping so as to give these men comfortable, decent conditions.
    The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN (Captain Bourne): I think the hon. Member is travelling rather beyond the Amendment.
    Mr. BUCHANAN: I admit that. The right hon. Gentleman said that this was not a millionaire ship, that large numbers of people in not very luxurious cabins would have the right to travel on it. What will the fares be? It is the fare that determines who shall travel.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Does the hon. Member not know that the fares are governed by a conference?
    Mr. BUCHANAN: Yes, but the fare is governed in addition by the type of ship that you travel in, and the right hon. Gentleman knows as well as I do that that type of ship may alter in conference because it is a super-ship. If it is to repay the money at all, it must charge more. If it is to get a reasonable chance of bringing back the money invested, it must increase its charges. What are the estimated fares? Is it to be for the average man of moderate means, by which I mean the man with, say, £1,000 a year, or with £500 a year, or, if you like, less? Perhaps I had better leave out the man with less than £500 as not being likely to cruise, but could a person of moderate means travel even in the big ships to-day? He has not the means at his disposal. I must confess that we have not had any answer on this case at all. I was surprised at the hon. Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. D. Mason), who last week was holding up his hands and watching that the boys of Scotland did not get eating ice-cream on Sunday, watching that nobody should buy black strip balls on Sunday, saying just now, "What are you worrying about? It is only £5,000,000!" He crossed the Floor of the House, he went from those benches to these, because the Government's financial policy was wrong, and he says now, "Give them this £4,500,000. Let them play with it. Why worry?" That is the apostle of "peace, retrenchment, and reform." In these days I would have expected from him an Amendment that this money should not be granted if the boat was to sail on a Sunday.
    But, seriously, the Opposition say, "We have a right to have a certain control over the spending of such a vast sum of money." That is a reasonable and a proper attitude for the Opposition to take. They say, "We are not saying that the second ship is to be built or not to be built." All that the Opposition are saying is that they are not committed one way or the other. They are only saying that the House of Commons should be asked, in the light of the circumstances, to be allowed to express an opinion on it. Along come the hon. Member for East Edinburgh and the Chancellor of the Exchequer who say, "This is a bargain;
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    what does it matter what the House of Commons says? The Cunard Company says it, and we must do what the company tells us."
    Mr. D. MASON: Will the hon. Member read the Bill?
    Mr. BUCHANAN: I have made myself acquainted with it.
    Mr. MASON: The hon. Member is wasting time.
    Mr. BUCHANAN: I do not waste a whole Friday, like the hon. Member, on black strip balls and ice-cream. I know that he would sooner waste millions of money than waste 10 minutes now. A million is nothing to him, but a half-hour now is valuable. The Opposition are quite reasonable in asking that the House of Commons should be given a second opportunity. During our discussions on other matters in recent times, the hon. and gallant Member for Gainsborough (Captain Crookshank) and the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps) have deserved a certain amount of credit, for they have been insisting more and more on Parliamentary control in financial matters. In this matter the House is allowing the control of large sums of public money to pass out of its hands, and the Opposition are performing their public right in saying that before this money is spent, the House of Commons should have an opportunity of reviewing the circumstances.
    11.23 p.m.
    Mr. BRACKEN: I agree with the hon. Member for Gorbals (Mr. Buchanan). I cannot understand the Chancellor's arguments against the Amendment. He tells us we ought to bind another House of Commons to support this Measure. I should have thought that he above all people would have realised that it is impossible for this House to bind another House; but perhaps the Chancellor had another meaning. Perhaps he thought that the next Government would not shovel out public money with the same lavishness. Perhaps that is the explanation of his appeal to the House to rush this matter through, so that the next House of Commons should not have an opportunity of reversing the policy. There was another interesting observation made by the Chancellor of the Ex-chequer.

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    He is at the moment busy talking to his neighbour, and perhaps he will listen to what I am saying. I must congratulate him on being associated with the chairman of the Sound Currency Association, the hon. Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. D. Mason). They both agree that this is a sound business proposition. If that be so, why was it not taken into the City of London, which is anxious to provide money for any sound industrial venture. I cannot think that this is a sound business proposition, because it is brought to the Treasury. I do not think it is sound for another reason. The President of the Board of Trade has neither voted for the Bill nor given any support to it. He knows the shipping industry, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer does not. When the right hon. Gentleman treats us to the argument that we must bind the next House of Commons and that this is a sound business proposition, I wonder where he has learned his economics. Perhaps he has learned them from the Archbishop of York, with whom he has been engaging in economic fisticuffs lately. I do not see that there is much to be said for this Bill. It is wicked at the present time to spend a great sum of money on subsidising shipbuilding.
    The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: That might be an admirable argument against the Third Beading, but it does not arise here,
    Mr. BRACKEN: I bow to your Ruling, Captain Bourne, but I submit that the argument has been advanced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as a reason for building these two ships, that we must have the blue riband of the Atlantic, and that British shipping prestige must be kept up to the old standard. I think it is a great mistake to put forward proposals to spend £9,000,000 as a subsidy to shipping at a time when we are explaining to the Americans that we are too poor to pay our American debts. That argument appears to be disingenuous.
    Then the Chancellor tells us that he attaches great importance to the information from the Cunard Line that the fastest ships get the greatest number of passengers. I have seen the "Bremen" and the "Europa," the fastest ships on the Atlantic, and they are almost empty. If
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    the fastest ships carry the largest amount of traffic why should the "Bremen" and the "Europa" be almost empty? There has been a curious suppression of information on this matter. We have not been told what new sum the Cunard Company are putting into this ship or ships. The Chancellor has told us that an enormous sum of money is being put into the project and that the shareholders of the company are agreed that this is a good business proposition. But what is the amount? We know the Government are putting in £9,000,000; what sum are the Cunard Company finding? The Chancellor remains silent, and I think he is silent for a reason.
    I hope that the House, quite independent of party considerations, will take a firm line on this matter. We have had many speeches from Ministers, like the Parliamentary Secretary of the Board of Trade, condemning shipping subsidies, saying they are wicked and contrary to every public interest. The House should take a firm line. If, for the sake of argument we are committed to the building of one ship it is our duty to cry halt and try to find out whether the first ship pays. How do we know that these ocean "Ritz's" will not remain empty? Members have been going round the country saying that the Treasury is empty and that we cannot spend money on slum clearance. If they are right we ought to hold our hand on this question of spending £4,500,000 on a second ship before we know the results from the first. That is a perfectly reasonable suggestion.
    Why not treat this as an experiment? The Chancellor may be right in his belief that this is a good business proposition, and in that case the money for the second ship could be found in the City. I hope the House will take notice of the arguments so frequently heard from the Chancellor that we must have economy and we cannot throw public money about, and contrast them with his present attitude, when he airily dismisses every argument put forward by the hon. and gallant Member for Gainsborough (Captain Crookshank) and says this expenditure must be regarded as a business proposition. If this is a business proposition then the Chancellor has been very unforthcoming in his attitude to many other business propositions. I repeat that on this question the House ought

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    not to vote on party grounds. It is a very dangerous development that one House of Commons should be asked to bind a succeeding House of Commons to the expenditure and so large a sum of money.
    Let us build this particular ship by way of experiment, and then, if the experiment be successful, the Government can come to the House and ask for a further £4,500,000 or £5,000,000, although I do not see why, if it proves a success, the Cunard Company should not be able to raise the money itself. I hope the House will get rid of all notions of party, and insist on its control of the public purse, because if that goes there is very little left for the House of Commons to do.
    11.30 p.m.
    Mr. EDWARD WILLIAMS: I do not think we have heard one supporter of the Government—
    Mr. BRACKEN: You have had the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
    Mr. WILLIAMS: Most Members of the Committee fully appreciate the arguments that were advanced by the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Gainsborough (Captain Crookshank). When this matter was first brought before the House of Commons we never heard a word about anything except the ship that was actually on the stocks at the time. There was no reference whatever to a second ship. I can find no reference at all, in the Debates that took place, to it being essential that a second ship should be built. When claims were made by my hon. Friend the Member for Dumbarton Burghs (Mr. Kirkwood), it was for the specific purpose of completing the ship that was lying on the stocks in his constituency. Hon. Members of this Committee have been deceived in this connection. The Government have realised at last after consultation with the directors of the Cunard Line that it is impossible to make one ship a competing proposition. After realising the necessity of building two ships, the Government have inserted in this Clause the sum of £9,500,000, contrary to the views that were held by every hon. Member, when the matter was originally advocated. The argument that has been advanced by the hon. Members for
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    Gorbals (Mr. Buchanan) and North Paddington (Mr. Bracken) are valid. The Chancellor ought to be the last person in the world, as an old Parliamentarian, to advance the argument that we heard from him. Why should this House of Commons bind its successor? It cannot do so, and the Chancellor was taking a mean advantage of the Committee by advancing an argument of that kind. He put it forward in the hope that it might convince some of his supporters as to the legitimacy of the claims that have been advanced in connection with the Bill. I hope the Chancellor will appreciate that he cannot really resist this Amendment. The fact that not one supporter of the Government has made any case against the Amendment indicates that he should be prepared to accept it out of reasonableness to the Opposition. I support the Amendment, and I hope that we shall have continued support from Members on the Government Benches who preach economy all the time. We are not averse as an Opposition to the expenditure of money upon public works or upon any enterprise, provided that there is Government control. Associations in the mining industry would welcome the expenditure of money upon hydrogenation—
    The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: I hardly think that that arises on this Amendment.
    Mr. WILLIAMS: I was putting that as an illustration. We heard the argument from the junior Member for Southampton (Sir C. Barrie) that implied that he might come along at some time to ask for assistance for tramp shipping. I might also give notice that we, as miners, will ask for support for the mining industry. I will not develop that point, and I bow to your Ruling. I hope we shall have the support, not only of those who have spoken in favour of the Amendment, but of those who realise the logic of the case, and the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has not met that case.
    11.35 p.m.
    Mr. LOUIS SMITH: It has been said more than once in the Debate on this Amendment that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has had no support for the Bill. Many of the Members on this side have not spoken, but I think the large

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    Majority of them are supporting the Bill. We have heard wild statements about the two leading boats crossing the Atlantic; but I myself a short time ago, before business had improved as it has done recently, crossed in the "Europa," and the vessel was very nearly half full. It is quite wrong to say that these two ships, the "Bremen" and the "Europa," are running nearly empty; 18 months ago, when the world depression was on, they were nearly half full. These two German boats are taking the cream of the traffic. When the Cunard Company were so optimistic as to put in hand a vessel which would compete with these two German boats, it was a piece of British enterprise that we in the House of Commons should not only admire, but support. I think that when a Government enters into a business transaction with a company which has had the courage to do that, it is not for the House" of Commons to pull the contract to pieces. We have heard from the Chancellor of the Exchequer that, if the money for the two boats is not provided, it will destroy the Bill.
    It is surprising to hear from my side of the Committee speeches from Members who for some time have been emphasising the necessity for the Government co-operating with industry to try to maintain employment, and then, when a Bill of this kind comes before the House, to see attempts to destroy it—because, unless a contract which has been entered into can be carried out, it is impossible to proceed. To vote for this Amendment and upset the whole contract, making it impossible to proceed with these two boats in order to obtain again our premier position as the leading shipping nation of the world and regain the Blue Riband of the Atlantic, would show the country that the House of Commons was not sincere in endeavouring to provide the best employment for our people and the best name for our country.
    11.38 p.m.
    Lieut.-Colonel SANDEMAN ALLEN: I must say that the facts of this case have not been put before the Committee. I am going to support the Chancellor of the Exchequer, because in my view one boat alone is of no use. Personally, I am dead against the scheme; I think it is going to be very costly; but I am positive that one boat will not
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    be able to provide the service by itself—there must be two, or possibly three. The Chancellor of the Exchequer mentioned, earlier, the possibility of two smaller boats. The science of shipbuilding is making such rapid advances that there is no reason why a smaller boat should not be able to produce the necessary speed. We have heard no facts about passengers, except broad facts about "the cream of the passenger traffic." The passenger traffic is skim milk—there is no cream on it. There is no doubt that the "Europa" and the "Bremen" are getting more passengers than any other vessels afloat at the moment. The French liner "Normandie," which is about to come into the service, has a speed estimated at 33 knots. I trust that this vessel will be able to attain that speed. Unless you can get team work on this service, you are going to have an absolute failure. The question of mails comes in. If you do not put your mails across in a fast boat, you will lose all your mail contracts, and that is a very vital question. I am convinced that the right answer is two small boats. We are committed to building the first one and we do not want to lose the money that has already been spent, but if we could possibly get two smaller boats instead of a second large one, we should be much more on the right track. The Chancellor of the Exchequer did not preclude that in a previous speech. The question of insurance has not been specifically raised.
    The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: I do not think that arises on this Amendment.
    Lieut.-Colonel SANDEMAN ALLEN: I submit that it arises in this way, that it is going to put up the expense considerably, because the insurance market cannot insure one of these large vessels without assistance.
    The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: There is a special provision in the Bill dealing with that question.
    Lieut.-Colonel SANDEMAN ALLEN: I admit that there is a special provision but, nevertheless, the extra expenses are there. I trust that the Committee will realise that, unless you get a proper team of boats running the service, the money spent on one boat is absolutely valueless.
    Mr. PALING: The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that the Cunard company have put a large amount of money into this, but he did not state any figure. As we know what the obligations of the Treasury are but do not know the obligations of the company, is it asking too much that he should tell us what the amount is?
    11.43 a.m.
    Mr. CWAMBERLAIN: I have an impression that the information that the hon. Member asks for has already been given but I shall have much pleasure in repeating it. The Cunard Company has put £1,750,000 into the ship. It is borrowing from the Government another £1,000,000 for further work upon it and that £1,000,000 is, of course, an obligation of the Cunard Company. Therefore, although hon. Members say the Government is putting in £1,000,000, and do not regard that as part of the liabilities of the
    Cunard Company, that is a false view to take of the transaction. The Cunard Company is borrowing £1,000,000, and is to that extent involving itself in that liability in respect of the ship, and in that sense the Cunard Company is putting that £1,000,000 into it.
    Mr. JOHN WILMOT: Would it not be true to say that the Government are finding no money and that the whole lot is the liability of the Cunard Company or the merger company?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN Mr. CHAMBERLAIN indicated assent.
    Mr. WILMOT: Then the light hon. Gentleman's reply leaves us exactly where we were before it was made.
    Question put, "That the word 'nine' stand part of the Clause."
    The Committee divided: Ayes, 176; Noes, 37.

    Division No. 162.]

    AYES.

    [11.44 p.m.

    Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-Colonel

    Ford, Sir Patrick J

    Loftus, Pierce C.

    Agnew, Lieut. Com. P. G.

    Fox, Sir Gifford

    Lumley, Captain Lawrence R.

    Allen, Lt.-Col. J. Sandeman (B'k'nhd.)

    Fraser, Captain Ian

    MacAndrew, Lieut.-Col. C. G. (Partick)

    Apsley, Lord

    Fremantle, Sir Francis

    McConnell, Sir Joseph

    Aske, Sir Robert William

    Fuller, Captain A. G.

    McKie, John Hamilton

    Bailey, Eric Alfred George

    Gillett, Sir George Masterman

    Magnay, Thomas

    Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley

    Glossop, C. W. H.

    Makins. Brigadier-General Ernest

    Balfour, Capt. Harold (I. of Thanet)

    Gluckstein, Louis Halls

    Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.

    Barclay-Harvey, C. M.

    Goff, Sir Park

    Martin, Thomas B.

    Barrle, Sir Charles Coupar

    Goodman, Colonel Albert W.

    Mason, David M. (Edinburgh, E.)

    Bateman, A. L.

    Gower, Sir Robert

    Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel John

    Belt, Sir Alfred L.

    Graves, Marjorie

    Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)

    Bernays, Robert

    Griffith. F. Kingsley (Middlesbro', W.)

    Milne, Charles

    Blindell, James

    Grimston, R. V.

    Mitchell, Harold P. (Br'tf'd & Chlsw'k)

    Bossom, A. C.

    Gunston, Captain D. W.

    Molson, A. Hugh Elsdale

    Bower, Lieut.-Com. Robert Tatton

    Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.

    Moreing, Adrian C.

    Bowyer, Capt. Sir George E. W.

    Hamilton, Sir R. W. (Orkney & Z'tl'nd)

    Morris-Jones, Dr. J. H. (Denbigh)

    Braithwaite, Maj. A. N. (Yorks, E. R.)

    Hanley, Dennis A.

    Morrison, William Shephard

    Braithwaite, J. G. (Hillsborough)

    Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry

    Muirhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J.

    Broadbent, Colonel John

    Hartington, Marquess of

    Munro, Patrick

    Brown, Col. D. C. (N'th'I'd, Hexham)

    Harvey, George (Lambeth, Kenningt'n)

    Nall, Sir Joseph

    Burgin, Dr. Edward Leslie

    Headlam, Lieut.-Col. Cuthbert M.

    Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.

    Campbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley)

    Hellgers, Captain F. F. A.

    Normand, Rt. Hon. Wilfrid

    Caporn, Arthur Cecil

    Heneage, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur P.

    Nunn, William

    Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)

    Hills, Major Rt. Hon. John Waller

    O'Donovan, Dr. William James

    Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. N. (Edgbaston)

    Hope, Capt. Hon. A. O. J. (Aston)

    O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir Hugh

    Christie, James Archibald

    Hore-Belisha, Leslie

    Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. William G. A.

    Clayton, Sir Christopher

    Horsbrugh, Florence

    Palmer, Francis Noel

    Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D.

    Howitt, Dr. Alfred B.

    Pearson, William G.

    Colville, Lieut.-Colonel J.

    Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)

    Penny, Sir George

    Cook, Thomas A.

    Hudson, Robert Spear (Southport)

    Petherick, M.

    Copeland, Ida

    Hunter, Dr. Joseph (Dumfries)

    Powell, Lieut.-Col. Evelyn G. H.

    Crookshank, Col. C. de Windt (Bootle)

    Hunter, Capt. M. J. (Brigg)

    Radford, E. A.

    Croom-Johnson, R. P.

    Jackson, Sir Henry (Wandsworth, C.)

    Ramsay T. B. W. (Western Isles)

    Cruddas, Lieut.-Colonel Bernard

    James, Wing-Com. A. W. H.

    Rea, Walter Russell

    Davidson, Rt. Hon. J. C. C.

    Janner, Barnett

    Reed, Arthur C. (Exeter)

    Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovll)

    Jesson, Major Thomas E.

    Reid, Capt. A. Cunningham-

    Doran, Edward

    Jones, Lewis (Swansea, West)

    Remer, John R.

    Duncan, James A. L. (Kensington, N.)

    Kerr, Lieut.-Col. Charles (Montrose)

    Renwick, Major Gustav A.

    Eastwood, John Francis

    Lamb, Sir Joseph Quinton

    Rickards, George William

    Ellis, Sir R. Geoffrey

    Law. Sir Alfred

    Roberts, Aied (Wrexham)

    Elmley, Viscount

    Leckie, J. A.

    Robinson, John Roland

    Emrys-Evans. P. V.

    Leech, Dr. J. W.

    Ropner, Colonel L.

    Erskine-Bolst. Capt. C. C. (Blackpool)

    Leighton, Major B. E. P.

    Ross Taylor, Walter (Woodbridge)

    Essenhigh, Reginald Clare

    Levy, Thomas

    Runge, Norah Cecil

    Evans, David Owen (Cardigan)

    Liddall, Walter S.

    Russell, Albert (Kirkcaldy)

    Everard, W. Lindsay

    Lindsay, Noel Ker

    Russell, Hamer Field (Sheffield, B'tslde)

    Fielden, Edward Brocklehurst

    Llewellin, Major John J.

    Rutherford, John (Edmonton)

    Foot, Dingle (Dundee)

    Lloyd, Geoffrey

    Salmon, Sir Isidore

    Sandeman, Sir A. N. Stewart

    Stevenson, James

    Ward, Sarah Adelaide (Cannock)

    Savery, Samuel Servington

    Stourton, Hon. John J.

    White, Henry Graham

    shaw, Helen B. (Lanark, Bothwell)

    Strickland, Captain W. F.

    Whyte, Jardine Ball

    Smiles, Lieut.-Col. Sir Walter D.

    Sugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart

    Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)

    Smith, Bracewell (Dulwich)

    Summersby, Charles H.

    Wills, Wilfrid D.

    Smith, Louie W. (Sheffield, Hallam)

    Thomas, James P. L. (Hereford)

    Wise, Alfred R.

    Somervell, Sir Donald

    Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles

    Womersley, Walter James

    Soper, Richard

    Titchfield, Major the Marquess of

    Sotheron-Estcourt, Captain T. E.

    Todd, Lt.-Col. A. J. K. (B'wick-on-T.)

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES—

    Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.

    Tufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.

    Sir Victor Warrender and Lieut.-

    Spens, William Patrick

    Ward, Irene Mary Bewick (Wallsend)

    Colonel Sir Lambert Ward.

    NOES.

    Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)

    Greene, William P. C.

    Mander, Geoffrey le M.

    Bracken, Brendan

    Greenwood, Rt. Hon. Arthur

    Maxton, James

    Buchanan, George

    Grundy, Thomas W.

    Milner, Major James

    Cape. Thomas

    Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E.

    Paling, Wilfred

    Cocks, Frederick Seymour

    Hall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvll)

    Parkinson, John Allen

    Cripps, Sir Stafford

    Hicks, Ernest George

    Smith, Tom (Normanton)

    Crookshank, Capt. H. C. (Galnsb'ro)

    John, William

    Tinker, John Joseph

    Daggar, George

    Jones, J. J. (West Ham, Silvertown)

    Williams, Edward John (Ogmore)

    Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)

    Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)

    Wilmot, John

    Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)

    Lawson, John James

    Dobbie, William

    Leonard, William

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—

    Edwards, Charles

    Lunn, William

    Mr. Gordon Macdonald and Mr. Groves.

    George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)

    McEntee, Valentine L.

    Graham, D. M. (Lanark, Hamilton)

    McGovern, John

    The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the right hon. and gallant Member for Ripon (Major Hills) to move his Amendment, I ought to warn him that I have been in some doubt about it, but I think he is in order. I may, however, find that my doubts are justified.
    11.53 p.m.
    Major HILLS: I beg to move, in page 2, line 1, to leave out Sub-section (2).
    I wish to assure the Chancellor of the Exchequer that, unlike some of my colleagues on this side, I support the Bill. It is my contention—and I hope that I shall succeed in convincing the Chancellor of the Exchequer—that the War Loan Act, 1919, gives the Treasury power to exercise the prerogative of this House. It may have been right to do that in 1919. At that time a large amount of debt was maturing, and that debt had to be paid off. Now, however, that things have reached a more normal and regular stage, the House ought to recall those powers and ought not to delegate to the Treasury that power to create debt. Perhaps the Committee will allow me, quite shortly, to explain the position. This is the important point. Before 1919, the practice was that the House of Commons alone was authorised to create debt. A Resolution in Committee of Ways and Means was introduced, and then a Section authorising borrowing for Appropriations was incorporated in the Consolidated Fund Act. Therefore the House kept
    518
    control over borrowing. In the Act of 1919 the Treasury were given power to borrow money for certain purposes without coming to the House. Those purposes were to meet payments for maturing securities under the War Loan Acts, 1914–18, Treasury Bills and Ways and Means advances. Those powers still exist. Therefore the House of Commons parted with a very large and very important part of its powers. Instead of the House being called upon to authorise each individual case it gave general power to the Treasury for certain purposes. The words of Subsection (1) are:
    "Any money"—
    for the purposes I have recited, that is, for meeting maturing debt in the financial year or the floating debt—
    "may be raised in such manner as the Treasury may think fit, and for that purpose they may create and issue any securities by means of which any public loan has been raised or may be raised or such other securities bearing such rate of interest and subject to such conditions as to repayment, redemption or otherwise as they think fit."
    That Act passed through the House of Commons with practically no discussion in 1919. I do not think the House realised what they were giving up. The Resolution was passed and the Second Reading of the Bill was passed with no discussion. There was no discussion in Committee or on Report, and on the Third Reading only a very short discussion took place on any of the questions I am now raising. I do not think the

    519
    House knew what they were giving away; but whether they knew or not, I think the time has come when this House should resume its powers. The present application of those powers goes a good deal further than the intention of the Act of 1919. That Act gave the Treasury power, without coming to the House, to raise money for certain purposes, chiefly to pay, off maturing debt and to borrow for ways and means advances and Treasury bills, but in this case and in other eases the Treasury are to be given power to create a new debt without going through the procedure which was formerly necessary. For 12 years, from 1919 to 1931, the power given to the Treasury lay dormant; that is, the power of creating new debt under this Subsection was never exercised between 1919 and 1931, but between 1931 and 1933 it has been used five times without any application to the House. Parliamentary control is not preserved. If Subsection (1) of Section 1 of the War Loans Act, 1919, is to be used it does away with the procedure of this House in regard to the sanctioning of borrowing.
    It is a big sum which we are asked to sanction to-night. It is a sum of £9,500,000, which would pay twice over the cuts in unemployment benefit and would increase by half the size of our Air Force. The powers which Parliament has exercised in the past should be exercised now before we pass this money. Parliament should not part with its control. I agree that the Act of 1919 is useful to a certain extent. It may be a good thing that the Treasury should have power uncontrolled by this House to meet a debt falling due, but by that we do not increase the amount of debt. To create a new debt is entirely wrong. It is generally considered that these powers ought to be withdrawn from the Treasury. The Treasury have always taken the opposite view, but I hope the Chancellor of the Exchequer will agree with me that as Parliament is the custodian of the public purse it ought to possess these powers and not delegate them to any Department.
    12.2 a.m.
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Mr. Hore-Belisha): I do not think that my right hon. and gallant Friend appreciates entirely the position
    520
    which would arise if the Amendment were accepted. If we withhold from the Treasury the power to borrow in order to make this advance, the amount would have to be found out of the taxes. My right hon. and gallant Friend is not concerned with the literal interpretation of the Amendment, because he has told us that he is raising the matter as a protest. He complains that in some way we are infringing the ancient powers of this House, and he told us that before 1919 the House of Commons alone could authorise the borrowing of money. I can well understand his solicitude for the traditions of this House, but I think he is under a misapprehension.
    This Sub-section does two things. It gives power to borrow, and it provides us with the machinery whereby that borrowing may be conducted. The House of Commons by passing the Financial Resolution, upon which the Bill is based, and this Clause is authorising the Treasury to borrow money. There is no question about that. There is no borrowing behind the back of the House of Commons. All that remains to be decided is the machinery under which this borrowing shall be conducted. In the comparatively stable conditions which prevailed before the War and having regard to the small amounts which were then borrowed, it was possible to lay down with precision in an Act of Parliament all the conditions under which the money should be borrowed, including the rate of interest. Conditions are different to-day. If the right hon. and gallant Member will look at any of the pre-War Acts, he will see how particular they are in regard to the conditions. Not only is the sum of money to be borrowed specified, but the rate of interest is laid down in advance, and the dates on which the interest shall be paid.
    Major HILLS: All those conditions are laid down by the Treasury, but not by this House.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: If my right hon. and gallant Friend looks at any pre-War Act he will see that all those conditions were laid down in detail in the Act. That is what we are asking for to-day. It was possible in the pre-War days, when comparatively small sums were being borrowed, to lay down all the conditions with great particularity. Every single detail was specified. But conditions have

    521
    changed, and unless we are to put into every Act of Parliament all the conditions which must prevail in regard to borrowing, including the exemption of Members of this House, who otherwise would not be entitled to hold War Loan and vote in this House—unless we put in conditions of that kind seriatim we must proceed by reference. Accordingly we proceed here by reference to the War Loan Act of 1919, which gives us these general powers.
    Major HILLS: I am sorry to interrupt. I left out one statement regarding the whole process. The money could be issued as soon as there was a Resolution through the House of Commons, and as a matter of fact all the preparations for the loan were made beforehand.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: Really my right hon. Friend has not yet made it clear. You are to specify all those details in an Act or you are not. We do not specify in this Bill all the details regarding the borrowing of this money. In view of the market conditions of to-day we must be left with discretion as to the rates of interest and the dates on which interest shall be paid. As regards the authorisation of the House of Commons, that is an authorisation for which we asked when we introduced the Financial Resolution. I trust I have made the point clear to my right hon. Friend.
    12.8 a.m.
    Mr. ALBERY: When the Financial Secretary says that all these particulars and details of a loan were given, does he say that the actual price at which the loan was to be offered to the public was given? That would be the governing factor.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: I certainly say that, if my hon. Friend will look at the pre-War Acts he will find that all these particulars are stated, the title of the stock, the interest and the date of repayment, but I cannot say whether the price of issue was set out.
    Mr. ALBERY: I do not think it was. That makes the whole difference. That is the governing factor.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: But surely my hon. Friend with his long experience of the Stock Exchange would not suggest that we should announce in advance the price of issue. The Treasury must have
    522
    discretion as to that and must be guided by the condition of the market.
    Mr. ALBERY: One obviously could not state the price. It was not done then and one could not do it now. If one does not state it the other particulars do no harm. I cannot understand, even after the explanation that has been given, what the real difficulty is in borrowing money for the State under conditions similar to those under which it was borrowed before the War. The Act of 1919 was, I believe, an enlargement of the original War Loans Act of 1914, which dealt with the power to raise money for the purposes of the War. Obviously we had ample facilities for raising money before the War and the point which my hon. Friends and I are trying to make here is this. We hope that at long last the War is over and we ask has the time not come to return to the conditions of borrowing which prevailed before the War and under which this House had a greater degree of control than it now possesses?
    12.11 a.m.
    Mr. C. WILLIAMS: We are using this War Loan Act as an easy way of borrowing money. It is a remarkable thing that we should now be making use of that Act, so long after the War and for a purpose for which it was not intended. It is particularly remarkable that that should be done at the request of a Government which was returned to stop borrowing and to pay its way. It is a pity that we should continue to insert in Bills of this kind provision for an easy method of borrowing. Surely, at the present time, it should be our desire to make it, at any rate, not too easy for any Government to borrow. I respectfully suggest that the Government are ill-advised in creating a precedent by inserting this Sub-section, if there is any possibility, as I gather from my hon. Friends there is, of dealing with the matter in any other way.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: Perhaps I can reassure my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesend (Mr. Albery). I think I now see what his point is. He feels that there may be some sinister provision in the Act of 1919.
    Mr. ALBERY: No, no.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: It is purely machinery. There is nothing in the Act to—
    Mr. ALBERY: I did not for a moment suppose that there was any sinister provision of any kind in it. I am only drawing attention to the change which has taken place in the method and suggesting that we should revert to the older and safer method.
    12.13 a.m.
    Captain CROOKSHANK: I hesitate to quarrel with the hon. Gentleman the Financial Secretary, who has more or less suggested that my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ripon (Major Hills) did not know what he was talking about. As my right hon. and gallant Friend has written a book on Government finance which is a text-book on the subject, it may be that the boot is on the other leg. My right hon. and gallant Friend is an expert on the subject and he is trying to draw attention to the fact that we have departed from long-established practice. We have only departed from it, by adopting this provision of the War Loans Act, 1919, on five occasions since the War. All five occasions have been since 1931. In three out of the five cases the power was taken for purposes which were practically speaking, connected with the War Loans Acts. One was a payment in connection with the American Debt; the second a payment to the National Debt Commissioners with regard to Death Duties and the third was the payment of the cash bonus and expenses connected with the conversion of the War Loan. Those purposes were ancillary to the purposes of the original Act. The other two cases were the setting-up of the Exchange Equalisation Fund, about which there was some criticism from several quarters and the provision in the Finance Act of last year for the contractual Sinking Fund payments in the current year. I understand that that power has not been used.
    It is remarkable that we should now, for an entirely different purpose which can have no connection with anything arising out of the War Loans or national finance at all, seek to use this method. This is borrowing for a specific purpose. The Financial Secretary says that it is impossible to lay down with the same particularity as before the War, the details of Government borrowing. He may say so, but he gives us no reason. I should be more happy if I could be told
    524
    why. It has perhaps escaped his notice that under the pre-War practice, the passage of the Money Resolution gave the powers and the Bill which followed was, more or less, declaratory. The powers were taken but each time there was borrowing the House had to be consulted. The general powers were laid down in each Money Resolution for each specific purpose. Generally speaking, there was a comparatively short period involved. So that the House, on the maturing of the debt, even if the original purpose was not achieved, had an opportunity for re-consideration. I advise the hon. Gentleman to make a profound study of my right hon. and gallant Friend's book—I think he will find it laid down there—in order to get a reason why the Treasury cannot revert to pre-War practice in this matter. No doubt they have a very good reason but we ought to know it. I dare say the Treasury does not want to give reasons but it is the increasing power of Government Departments that the House of Commons is up against, and those of us who try to stress the importance of the House of Commons feel that very strong arguments should be advanced for adopting in this case a practice which had gone out of use before 1931 and reverting to an Act passed to deal with a War situation. We want to know why we should not go back to the original system which enabled the House of Commons to maintain its power over borrowing. I hope the hon. Gentleman will tell us the exact reason why it is impossible to particularise in the way suggested.
    12.17 a.m.
    Mr. DAVID MASON: I am glad to find myself in this case in agreement with hon. Members opposite. I think it would be an advantage to the Treasury to accept the Amendment. Under the Amendment they would be able to select whatever method they thought best for borrowing. In the Bill, as it is, they are confined to the powers given by the War Loans Act. According to the former practice when the Treasury wanted to borrow, they brought in a Bill, for whatever measures they thought advisable, having regard to the market conditions at that time, and the control of the House of Commons over borrowing was maintained.
    Mr. ALBERY: As the question raised by my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ripon (Major Hills) is of

    525
    importance, may I ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer to have the matter looked into, at least with reference to future borrowing?
    12.19 a.m.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Captain Crookshank) appears to think that because a man has written a book upon a subject, and is himself an expert upon it, he must therefore be intelligible to everybody who has not done so. That has not been my experience in the past and I share with my hon. Friend a difficulty in apprehending exactly what is the anxiety in the mind of my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ripon (Major Hills). I would like to explain to the Committee what I understand to be the purport of this Subsection and why it is in its present form. What is this Sub-section of the War Loans Act of 1919 and what is its effect? It is not the provision which now governs the Treasury's power to borrow. The power to borrow in this case is given by the Sub-section which we are discussing, Subsection (2) of this Clause in the present Bill. What the Sub-section of the War Loans Act to which we are referring says, in effect, is that the Treasury may raise the amount, which you are going to authorise them to borrow, in any way they think fit. My right hon. and gallant Friend asks why we should give the Treasury this power to raise the money in any way they think fit, and why the House of Commons should not maintain in its own hands the power to say how the money should be raised. I want to give an answer to that question. The answer is that the conditions in the money market change so rapidly, as we have seen in the last week or so, that a method which would be appropriate to-day might be entirely inappropriate in a fortnight's time. Therefore it is for the purpose of saving money in order that we may borrow in whatever may be the cheapest way in which we can borrow when the borrowing has to take place that we have made use of this old Act which gives that latitude that we want, and which, of course, we might have set out in full in this Subsection.
    12.21 a.m.
    Major HILLS: I thank my right hon. Friend for his explanation, but it does
    526
    not meet our point. Under the old procedure you had just the same elasticity, just the same speed, and just the same objection of the Treasury. Here you are giving to the Treasury a power that before was specially brought into force by this House. It may have been a cumbrous system and have taken time. I dare say it did, but a great deal of our procedure that seems cumbrous is necessary for the complete control of this House over finance. I do assure my right hon. Friend that it has long been recognised outside the Treasury that this power ought to be recalled, and I hope that he will after this Debate reconsider the whole question.
    Amendment negatived.
    12.22 a.m.
    Mr. D. MASON: I beg to move, in page 2, line 15, at the end, to add:
    "(4) Until the advances made under this Section have been repaid there shall be allocated to the Treasury one representative on the board of directors of the merger company."
    On the Second Reading of the Bill the Financial Secretary made reference to this matter and said that the Government were mortgagees and had no status to ask to be represented on the board of directors. I think there are cases where representatives of the debenture holders have been placed on the board of a company. I will give one or two instances in proof of that assertion. There is the outstanding case of the Cordoba Railway Company, of which Lord Farrer is chairman. This company has had a chequered career, and I agree it is not a complete analogy with the present case inasmuch as it is a railway company. The chairman of the company had two directors, and two further directors were added to the board to represent the 5 per cent. income bebenture stock.
    There was some justification for those debenture holders asking for representation on the board, and I think the same argument applies to this case, because the Cunard Company are quite unable to raise the necessary funds just now. They have no revenue returns over the past few years which would justify them going into the money market and asking the public for £4,500,000, and as the State has to come in I think the request I am making is a reasonable one. Where there is public money there should be some measure of public control. In the

    527
    case of the railway company I mentioned directors were placed on the board to represent the debenture holders. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury says that in this case we are mortgagees; but where a large sum of public money has been advanced we are entitled to have our point considered. The Government's action has met with a good deal of criticism from all parts of the House, and I feel that it would meet that criticism in large measure if a representative of the Treasury, of the taxpayers, were put on the board. In acceding to this request the right hon. Gentleman will be doing a service to the Government and helping to secure public approval for the action the Government have taken in this matter.
    12.27 a.m.
    Mr. WILMOT: Since it appears that this unfortunate flutter by the Government is going forward it is to be hoped that this Amendment will be carried. When deciding that they would invest some money in the shipping industry it was unfortunate that the Government should choose this particular sector of company finance on which to back their fancy. This merger company is to be made up from the Cunard Company and the Oceanic, the latter being, I believe, a subsidiary of the White Star Line. The White Star Line was a part of that remarkable structure the Royal Mail Steamship Company. I do not propose at this time of night to go into the history of that very unfortunate business, because it, is familiar to us and the closing stages of that drama are not very old, but when one considers that history one certainly does have a great deal of misgiving on realising that the board of this company is going to provide a part of the board which will be the custodians of £9,000,000 of public money. The board of the White Star, I would remind hon. Members, is very much the same board as that of the Oceanic Company, which is its subsidiary.
    It was the board of one of these shipping companies which performed that remarkably successful shipping transaction designed to demonstrate to the Labour Government of Australia how to make shipping pay. It will be remembered that they purchased the Commonwealth Line fleet from the Commonwealth Government for the sum of £1,900,000; and,
    528
    having done this with a great flourish, which brought a great deal of pleasure to the hearts of all good supporters of private enterprise, they failed to find the money to pay for it, and only quite recently the Commonwealth Government foreclosed on the boats for non-payment of debt, and the company, which paid £1,900,000 for the fleet—and they have put it in their last balance-sheet at £2,250,000—had to sell the entire fleet for £500,000. It is the gentlemen who were capable of that deal who are to take a part in forming the board of this merger company, and it is to be hoped that the Government feel more happy about them.
    Mr. SPENS: Is the hon. Gentleman quite correct in his statement that the gentlemen who were capable of that deal are to form part of the board of the new company, seeing that those gentlemen have all along ceased to be directors?
    Mr. WILMOT: I am obliged to the hon. and learned Gentleman for giving me the opportunity of making a minor correction. It is the board of this company which will take a part in constituting the board of the new company. I believe the hon. and learned Gentleman is right in saying that all members of the present board are not the same as the board which carried out that transaction. I am glad to have the opportunity to make that correction, but the principle remains, and, if public money—and so much of it—is to be sunk in a company which has this history, then it is to be hoped that the Government will see the wisdom of securing adequate control over the money.
    The hon. Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. D. Mason) mentioned the question of the rights of debenture holders to nominate a member on the board. That is quite common, but it has to be remembered that this enormous sum is not secured on the first debentures, or only a very small part of it is. A large part of it is secured on the second charge, ranking after a good chunk of first debentures which come in front of it. A still further part is secured without debentures at all. That is the income debenture bond, which is nothing more or less than a preference share. So that the Government is becoming a preference shareholder in this merger company, and I am sorry, therefore, that this Amendment does not signify more than one

    529
    representative. I believe I am right in saying that, after the disclosures of Royal Mail finance, the Treasury insisted, in the reconstruction scheme that followed, on taking powers to nominate one or more members of the board. Even so, the arrangement for the benefit of the White Star Line shareholders in the issue of notes in default of preference share interest has not been complied with. It is to be hoped that the Government will see the wisdom of keeping adequate control of this board. Not only, in my view, is this whole transaction very questionable, but it is made the more so by reason of the circumstances of the company involved. I hope that the British Government in this little venture will have better luck with the board of the company than the unfortunate shareholders have had hitherto.
    12.35 a.m.
    Captain ARTHUR EVANS: I hope the House will extend some indulgence to me at this time of night, but I have been requested by certain important shipping interests in the city of Cardiff to join with my two hon. Friends in supporting the Amendment. I remember that on the Second Reading of this Measure the Financial Secretary to the Treasury told the House that the Government were not anxious in any way to appoint representatives of the Treasury to take an active interest in operating shipping companies in this country, and that their interests were limited to those of mortgagees. As has been pointed out, their interests in fact go beyond that. It is the fact that this money will be a second charge, and it is reasonable to suppose that the directors of the merger company, representing, as they do, the holders of the first charge, have a perfect right to consider their interests before they consider the interests of the taxpayer who might be called upon to provide this very large sum of money. After all, I cannot appreciate the objections of the Government to having a representative on the board. It has been pointed out that a very large sum of money is involved—£9,000,000—and there are certain shipping interests who feel that, if money is to be spent, it might perhaps be spent to better advantage in other interests of the shipping industry. I will not pursue that now, but I invite the hon. and gallant Gentleman to submit a better
    530
    reason for not allowing a representative of the Treasury to have proper control over the taxpayers' money, in the same way as in the case of other industries in which Government money is involved.
    12.37 a.m.
    Lieut.-Colonel C. MacANDREW: In regard to the plea that a director appointed by the Treasury should be put on this board, we should bear in mind the result of the very line referred to by a previous speaker, in which Australian ships were concerned. In the 12 years from 1916 to 1928, they lost altogether £14,000,000 of the taxpayers' money. It would be very stupid of the House to try to nominate directors to run a business which could be much better run by the company themselves.
    12.38 a.m.
    Sir ROBERT HAMILTON: As the House always likes precedent in this matter, may I be allowed shortly to recall what was done on the occasion of the MacBrayne Shipping Company, when the House handed a considerable sum of money over for the purpose of subsidising that line? There, as here, the taxpayer was interested in the dividends of the company. I have the agreement here, and, though the wording is somewhat different, the objects to be attained are exactly the same. It says this:
    "The Minister"—
    that is, the Postmaster-General—
    "shall reserve the right at any time to nominate a person to serve for such period as the Minister may determine on the board of directors."
    In answer to the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken, that is not with the object of running the shipping company. The one director who would be placed on the board would be there to keep the Government in close touch with what was happening on the board.
    Sir JOSEPH NALL: That was a Scottish company.
    Sir R. HAMILTON: I do not see the relevance of that remark, because, if it was considered advisable in that case, how much more advisable is it in this? The object of doing that was really to keep the Government in close touch with the working of the board—not to direct the shipping company and try to run it, but to keep in touch with the financial

    531
    side. That is a different thing from seeing the balance sheet at the close of the financial year. If there is a director on the board with the right to be in touch with what is going on, he can keep the Government fully informed. That is in the interests of the taxpayers, who are supplying the money in this case. It is most desirable, and I hope the Chancellor of the Exchequer will see his way to accept the Amendment.
    12.40 a.m.
    Mr. C. WILLIAMS: I am supporting the Government on this particular occasion. If you are going to set down what financial terms you will have, it is perfectly absurd to place Government officials on this company's board. Whoever is put there will have to be paid, and I would say that, in an ordinary British company at the present time, the connection between them and the Government is so easy that it is absolutely unnecessary to interfere in this way. As regards the efficiency of the people themselves, it was said in the Debate the other day that the men who are projecting this merger are the most astute business men, not only in this country, but in the world—that none are more astute and none are more capable. We know that that is their position, and we were told that by the hon. Member for Dumbarton Burghs (Mr. Kirkwood) on the 7th March. I think that that is all we need say about a rather absurd speech.
    12.41 a.m.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I hope the Committee will consider very carefully what the effect of this Amendment would be. It is quite clear that one director could not influence appreciably the policy of a company if he had all the rest of the board against him. All that he could be expected to do would be to act as a sort of, I will not say spy, but a sort of channel of communication giving information to the Government as to what was going on inside the board. In the first place, let me say that I do not imagine that, if we had asked to put a director on the board, we should have been refused. If we have not asked, it is because we do not think the interests of the country would be served. Let us assume that we did put one on, and that he acts as a channel of information. Are the Treasury to set themselves up as a
    532
    greater authority on how to conduct the company than the board? Surely, that is assuming for the Treasury a much greater amount of competence in a technical matter than they would assume. If the Committee can imagine that the establishment of this merger company served some interest quite apart from the commercial and financial interest and that, for example, its existence, prosperity, or policy was in any way bound up with strategic considerations or military considerations, then, indeed, you would have to require that some representative of the Government should be on the board in order that those considerations should be kept in view which would not, of themselves, appeal to those who were there for commercial or financial interests. You may see an example of a similar matter in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. It would be assumed, if the Government did have a director on this company, that its policy was Government policy. Have we not already heard this afternoon words quoted by an hon. Member opposite—I do not accept them as correct—words from a Mr. Franklin, who, it was stated, was going to apply for an injunction against this merger? Did not that suggest that there was here some question of rivalry between the British and American nations? If we were to give any handle to a suggestion of that kind, and do anything to have the effect of causing the American people to think that we opposed a line because it was a line belonging to another nation, it would be very unfortunate. This is a line that is not going to be governed by Government policy, but by commercial considerations.
    12.44 a.m.
    Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS: I really think that the explanation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer for not accepting this Amendment is not very satisfactory. The right hon. Gentleman says that he does not wish to raise any competition or rivalry with another country. I thought the whole object of this was to get the Blue Riband of the Atlantic.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Competition between an American company or a German or French or any other national company is going on every day. What I object to is that the British Government should be brought in.
    Sir S. CRIPPS: The British Government is coming in to the tune of £9,500,000. We are told that one of the purposes is to get the Blue Riband of the Atlantic. The fact that, although there is not a Government director, the suggestion has been made, seems to show that it does not depend on a Government director. That is really a bogey that should not have any effect as regards the decision on this point. The Chancellor of the Exchequer says that if there were military or strategic reasons we ought to have representation on the board. But there is a very vital financial interest here, and the amount of money that goes to the use of the merger company will depend on what happens to the merger company. We are not going to give them the whole of the £9,500,000 on the first day, but presumably as it is required, according to the circumstances of the company. The interests of the directors of the company may well be to get as much as they can, and the interests of the State may well be to get them to finance themselves as much as they can without drawing on it. In those circumstances, surely it is wise for the Government to see that, while this money is not fully advanced, it is desirable for the Government to have someone who is in intimate contact with the proceedings of the board of the company, in order that they may consult with the Government and assist in directing the company's policy as regards further advances from time to time. I presume that the Government will have some say as to whether the second ship is to be built, as judged from the success of the service. Surely it is vitally essential that, where the interests of the Government in advancing the money, and of the company in getting it, may clash, the Government should have its own independent adviser to be its own independent director on the board of the company.
    I am sure that no one would imagine that one director out of the 10 would direct the policy of shipping. That would be perfectly well understood, as well as the fact that the Government, having this very large financial interest—which might be more or less as the time goes on—would be right in saying, "We want independent advice regarding the proceedings of this company, and we can only get it by having our representative on the board." It is a perfectly proper
    534
    protection, in the case of so large a sum of money, that the Government should have this advice.
    12.51 a.m.
    Mr. BRACKEN: I think it is necessary for hon. Members of this House to deal with the points raised by speakers responsible for giving a large sum of money to this company. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has overlooked a rather interesting precedent. Why do the Government appoint directors to Imperial Airways? The Government do so because to a large extent they subsidise Imperial Airways. I do not think that Government directors are greatly advantageous to companies which have them. But their presence will encourage those companies to do their best to pay off a Treasury loan if only to get rid of them. And I think that a Government director might be useful to the Treasury when there is a question of curbing megalomania, and there has been a good deal of megalomania in the building of ships. If the Government had a representative he might not be able to prevent his colleagues adopting extravagant policies, but they would take a great deal of notice of what he said. That may be one of the reasons for having directors of Imperial Airways and of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The Government, on one occasion, insisted upon a change in the chairmanship of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, because they thought a better man was required for the post and one of the Government directors became chairman.
    The right hon. and gallant Member for Ripon (Major Hills) was, I believe, a Government director of Imperial Airways. We give very much less to Imperial Airways than we are going to give to the Cunard Line. Why, then, should we not have a director? We are giving £9,000,000 to the company, and the Government might well be represented on its board. I would remind the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams) that it is not a question of spending a very large sum of money on directors' fees. The directors' fees would be small. The Government could appoint a retiring civil servant or if they agree to reconstruct the Administration one of its Members might serve as a director. When the public's money is invested in a company the Treasury ought to have a director to keep an eye on policies and developments. I do not see why the

    535
    Chancellor of the Exchequer objects to this Amendment when the precedent of Imperial Airways exists.
    1.2 a.m.
    Mr. HICKS: I beg to move, in page 2, line 15, at the end, to add:
    "(4) There shall be attached to the making of any advance under this Section a condition that the Fair Wages Clause of the House of Commons shall apply to the work of construction and fitting out of the vessel or vessels."
    Question put, "That those words be there added."
    The Committee divided: Ayes, 37; Noes, 129.

    Division No. 163.]

    AYES.

    [12.55 a.m.

    Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)

    Grundy, Thomas W.

    Mason, David M. (Edinburgh, E.)

    Bracken, Brendan

    Hall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvll)

    Maxton, James.

    Buchanan, George

    Hamilton, Sir R. W. (Orkney & Zetl'nd)

    Milner, Major James

    Cape, Thomas

    Hicks, Ernest George

    Paling, Wilfred

    Cocks, Frederick Seymour

    Janner, Barnett

    Rea, Walter Russell

    Cripps, Sir Stafford

    Kirkwood, David

    Roberts, Aied (Wrexham)

    Daggar, George

    Lawson, John James

    Smith, Tom (Normanton)

    Davies, David L. (Pontypriad)

    Leonard, William

    Tinker, John Joseph

    Dobble, William

    Logan, David Gilbert

    White, Henry Graham

    Edwards, Charles

    Lunn, William

    Williams, Edward John (Ogmore)

    Foot, Dingle (Dundee)

    McEntee, Valentine L.

    Wilmot, John

    George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)

    McGovern, John

    Griffith, F. Kingsley (Middlesbro,' W).

    Maclean, Neil (Glasgow, Govan)

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—.

    Mr. John and Mr. Duncan Graham.

    NOES.

    Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-Colonel

    Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.

    Radford, E. A.

    Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.

    Hanley, Dennis A.

    Ramsay T. B. W. (Western Isles)

    Allen, Lt.-Col. J. Sandeman (B'k'nh'd.)

    Hartington, Marquess of

    Reed, Arthur C. (Exeter)

    Aske, Sir Robert William

    Headlam, Lieut.-Col. Cuthbert M.

    Reid, Capt. A. Cunningham

    Bailey, Eric Alfred George

    Heligers, Captain F. F. A.

    Remer, John R.

    Baldwin-Webb, Colonel J.

    Hope, Capt. Hon. A. O. J. (Aston)

    Renwick, Major Gustav A.

    Barclay-Harvey, C. M.

    Hore-Belisha, Leslie

    Rickards, George William

    Barrle, Sir Charles Coupar

    Horsbrugh, Florence

    Robinson, John Roland

    Bateman, A. L.

    Howitt, Dr. Alfred B.

    Ropner, Colonel L.

    Belt, Sir Alfred L.

    Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)

    Ross Taylor, Walter (Woodbridgs)

    Blindell, James

    Hudson, Robert Spear (Southport)

    Range, Norah Cecil

    Bossom, A. C.

    Hunter, Capt. M. J. (Brigg)

    Russell, Albert (Kirkcaldy)

    Bowyer, Capt. Sir George E. W.

    James, Wing-Com. A. W. H.

    Rutherford, John (Edmonton)

    Braithwaite, Maj. A. N. (Yorks, E. R.)

    Jesson, Major Thomas E.

    Salmon, Sir Isidore

    Braithwaite, J. G. (Hillsborough)

    Jones, Lewis (Swansea, West)

    Sandeman, Sir A. N. Stewart

    Broadbent, Colonel John

    Kerr, Lieut.-Col. Charles (Montrose)

    Shaw, Helen B. (Lanark, Bothwell)

    Brown, Col. D. C. (N'th'I'd., Hexham)

    Leckie, J. A.

    Smith, Bracewell (Dulwich)

    Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.

    Leech, Dr. J. W.

    Smith, Louis W. (Sheffield, Hallam)

    Burgin, Dr. Edward Leslie

    Liddall, Walter s.

    Soper, Richard

    Campbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley)

    Lindsay, Noel Ker

    Sotheron-Estcourt, Captain T. E.

    Caporn, Arthur Cecil

    Llewellin, Major John J.

    Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.

    Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)

    Lloyd, Geoffrey

    Spens, William Patrick

    Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. N. (Edgbaston)

    Loftus, Pierce C.

    Stevenson, James

    Christie, James Archibald

    Lumley, Captain Lawrence R.

    Stourton, Hon. John J.

    Clayton, Sir Christopher

    MacAndrew, Lieut. Col. C. G. (Partick)

    Strickland, Captain W. F.

    Cook, Thomas A.

    MacAndrew, Capt. J. O. (Ayr)

    Sugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart

    Copeland, Ida

    McConnell, Sir Joseph

    Thomas, James P. L. (Hereford)

    Cruddas, Lieut-Colonel Bernard

    McKie, John Hamilton

    Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles

    Davidson, Rt. Hon. J. C. C.

    Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.

    Titchfield, Major the Marquess of

    Duncan, James A. L. (Kensington, N.)

    Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel John

    Tufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.

    Elmley, Viscount

    Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)

    Ward, Lt.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)

    Erskine-Bolst, Capt. C. C. (Blackpool)

    Mitchell, Harold P. (Br'tf'd & Chisw'k)

    Ward, Irene Mary Bewick (Wallsend)

    Essenhigh, Reginald Clare

    Moreing, Adrian C.

    Ward, Sarah Adelaide (Cannock)

    Everard, W. Lindsay

    Morris-Jones, Dr. J. H. (Denbigh)

    Warrender, Sir Victor A. G.

    Fox, Sir Gifford

    Morrison, William Shepherd

    Whyte, Jardine Bell

    Fraser, Captain Ian

    Muirhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J.

    Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)

    Fremantle, Sir Francis

    Munro, Patrick

    Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)

    Glossop, C. W. H.

    Nail, Sir Joseph

    Wills, Wilfrid D.

    Gluckstein, Louis Halle

    Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.

    Wise, Alfred R.

    Goff, Sir Park

    Normand, Rt. Hon. Wilfrid

    Womersley, Walter James

    Goodman, Colonel Albert W.

    Nunn, William

    Graves, Marjorie

    O'Donovan, Dr. William James

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—

    Greene, William P. C.

    Palmer, Francis Noel

    Sir George Penny and Major George Davies.

    Grimston, R. V.

    Powell, Lieut.-Col. Evelyn G. H.

    Gunston, Captain D. W.

    I rise with the expectation that the Government will see their way clear to accept this Amendment, and, consequently, I am not proposing to make an elaborate speech in urging the importance of its acceptance. The short history of the facts is that, prior to the House of Commons passing a Resolution approving

    537
    of fair wage conditions, a number of contractors were quite willing to take advantage of the position of having the Government as an employer without observing fair conditions. The House of Commons at that time recognised the importance of placing on record the fact that, when people were working for good employers, they should observe good conditions. I think that in all the work on the vessel and in the fitting out, as public money is being advanced for the purpose, the conditions of labour should be those generally observed between employers and trade organisations. I urge the importance of this, and trust that the Government will accept the Amendment.
    1.5 a.m.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: I can give the hon. Gentleman the assurance which he requires. I am informed that it may be stated without hesitation that the wages will conform to the principles of the fair wages clause. I hope that he will accept the assurance, and that, if there is no reason to doubt it, he will not press for the insertion of his Amendment in the Bill. The reason I ask him not to press it is because it forms no part of the actual agreement. The hon. Gentleman knows that the firm constructing this vessel is a firm engaged on contracts for the Admiralty, and is quite accustomed to the observation of this Clause, and that the trade union is a powerful one and will be able to protect the rights of the working people.
    1.7 a.m.
    Mr. BUCHANAN: I want to raise a number of points that have not so far been raised in this Debate. The Government are spending £9,500,000 on these operations. So far as I can gather, the Amendment covers not merely the building of the ships, but also the operation of the fair wages clause in the running of the ship.
    The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: I think the hon. Member is under a misapprehension. The Amendment deals merely with the construction and fitting of the ship.
    Mr. BUCHANAN: It is all very well for the Financial Secretary to the Treasury to say that there is a powerful trade union, but this does not affect the shipyard
    538
    only. A large proportion of this work is sub-contracted for, possibly all over the country, and it is impossible to say that the fair wages clause is carried out everywhere. I have no doubt that in the yard itself it is carried out for, apart from the strength of the union, you get public opinion to see that the conditions are carried out. But you might have the making of furniture sub-contracted, and contracts given to firms which do not observe the fair wages clause. These conditions are carried out when a ship is built for the Admiralty, and, as the Government are giving money for the building of this ship, the same conditions should apply to this ship as for ships for the Admiralty. While the unions may be powerful, the Committee must remember that there is a large proportion of boy labour employed. I do not say whether this is necessary or not, but these boys are not protected in the same way as other workers, and I should like to see that in their case they are safeguarded by these conditions. When work is sub-contracted for, there might be places where the unions are not strong and I do say that in relation to these matters we should get the fair wages clause in the Bill itself. At least we ought to have it as a provision in the Bill that the fair wages clause should be observed.
    I quite admit that the Financial Secretary to the Treasury speaks in good faith in this matter, but, when the Act is passed, it is not good faith that we shall be dealing with; it will be the Act, and the Labour Members are entitled to insist, and are only doing their proper duty in insisting, not on having verbal words, but that this principle of the trade union fair wages clause should be inserted in the Bill in the same way as it is inserted in the case of every other Government contract. It is inserted in the Post Office contracts. They could say there that they will not have the clause inserted, and that the trades unions are strong and public opinion is sufficient. That could equally be said in the case of every Government contractor. It was found in practice in the old days that this was needed in every Government contract. If the contractors are going to pay the trade union rates, there can be no objection to putting it into the Bill. They can lose nothing by it if they intend to observe the principle in the

    539
    spirit and in the letter. This is a fair proposition. It is all very well to say that the trade unions are strong, but we ought to have a guarantee that it will be done. In order to see that it shall be done, and that we leave no loophole outside the Act of Parliament, I hope hon. Members in the House of Commons will accept nothing less satisfactory than that which is accepted in the ordinary Government contract.
    1.13 a.m.
    Mr. CAPE: I was disappointed by the reply given by the Financial Secretary, for I thought the Government would have had no hesitation in accepting this Amendment. I want to emphasise the point made by the hon. Member for Gorbals (Mr. Buchanan), and to go beyond some of his statements. It may be possible that, in the yard where the principal part of the shipbuilding takes place, they will conform to the fair wages clause that is laid down by Parliament, and they may pay trade union rates of wages, but, as has been said, a good deal of the work may be put out to subcontractors, who may escape, or may try to escape, their obligation under the fair wages clause. I suggest to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that, if this does not apply to the firm which is responsible for the largest portion of this work, it may happen that one contractor may fulfil the obligation while another contractor may be allowed to escape it. That would be grossly unfair to the men employed by such a contractor, as well as to other contractors.
    In the second place, it may be argued that the fair wages clause applies in all Admiralty work, and it is said that this firm do a good deal of Admiralty work and that therefore they know perfectly well what the Government requires. I would point out, however, that, while the Government are going to be responsible for finding the major portion of the money required to build this ship—or it may be two ships—the work is to be under the jurisdiction of a private firm. Consequently, although there might be a strong trade union in that yard, it might be said that this was not a Government contract, but a contract of a private firm. In that way I think we are entitled, in the special circumstances
    540
    surrounding this Bill, to make it definite and put it in the Bill that this has got to be done.
    As the hon. Member for Gorbals (Mr. Buchanan) has said, we do not mistrust the sincerity of the Financial Secretary, or doubt that he really means what he says, but what you have to look at is the Act of Parliament. We have had experience, as trade union leaders, in dealing with employers in regard to Acts of Parliament. When we quote to them what a certain Minister has said, we are told, "Oh, we go by the Act, and by the wording of the particular Clause." Consequently, while the Financial Secretary is genuine, as we honestly believe he is, in his statement, he cannot be responsible for an employer when that employer fails to meet this requirement and says there is no obligation placed on him by the Act of Parliament. I beg the Financial Secretary to accept this Amendment, and to put in the Bill the fair wages clause, which makes it safe for all men employed by any contractor.
    1.16 a.m.
    Mr. TINKER: I rise to support the Amendment, and to press the Government to accept it. We were under the impression that there would be no discussion upon it, and that the Government would accept it. I understood that some promise had been given that they were willing to accept it, and I gathered from the hon. Member for Gorbals that he curtailed his remarks because of that, and that he thought that it was virtually agreed. After all, one of the things that we stand for when public money is being handed out is that at least the fair wages condition shall apply. The Financial Secretary said that to all intents and purposes that would be carried out. If that is so, why should it not be put in the Bill? I have heard no reason why it should not. It is not in the agreement, but surely, when the loan of the money was promised, it was understood that some kind of conditions would be required by the Members of the House, and that the whole matter would have to be submitted to us? It is a small thing that we are asking, but it is of vital importance. We should not have been doing our duty to the people working on the vessel if we had not insisted on having this in the agreement. I do expect,

    541
    even at this late—or early—hour, that this will be granted by the Government. If not, I shall ask our people on the Front Bench to force it to a Division, to show that at least we intend to get it in the Bill.
    1.19 a.m.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: I will reply at once to the point raised by the hon. Member for Gorbals (Mr. Buchanan), which seems to be the point most agitating hon. Members. He took a perfectly good point, but the Government anticipated him by making the necessary inquiries. I cannot do more than read to the House the exact words of the statement which has been made to us by the Cunard Company:
    "We have conferred with the builders, John Brown and Company, who advise us that, as practically all their sub-contractors are contractors for Admiralty work, it may be stated without hesitation that wages will conform to the principles of the fair wages clause in the case of sub-contractors working on the 534, just as they do for work under the main contract."
    Mr. MAXTON: What is the date of that letter?
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: It is quite recent. I have not the date before me, but it is within the last day or so. As soon as the point was raised we made the inquiry. I have told the Committee quite frankly why the Amendment cannot be accepted. There is no provision in the agreement. We do not desire to delay the work on this ship one hour more than is necessary. If this agreement is interfered with in any particular, it will lead to delay because parties have to be consulted. I am sure that hon. Members would not desire to hold up the work on account of this point, which is small in view of the assurances that I have given to the House. The hon. Member for Dumbarton Burghs (Mr. Kirkwood) has been pressing with natural enthusiasm that there should be no delay. He has accepted our assurances, and I hope the Committee will do the same.
    Mr. HICKS: Having had a reply from the Cunard Company, and the Government being relatively satisfied with that answer, could I get a guarantee from the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the Government will watch this matter and see that in the money which is spent the
    542
    terms observed shall be those generally observed in regard to Government contracts?
    1.22 a.m.
    Mr. PALING: We have just heard again that an Amendment cannot be accepted because it is not in the agreement. I have heard that several times to-night as an excuse for not accepting most of the things put forward from this side of the House. When this agreement was made with the Cunard Company and the other people concerned, surely the Chancellor of the Exchequer knew that he would have to bring it to the House of Commons, where it would be subject to debate, and that the House of Commons would probably want to alter it in various particulars. Does the Chancellor of the Exchequer tell us that he has been to the Cunard Company and said to them, "Here is the agreement, word perfect. Trust me; I can get it through just because I can depend on a majority in the House of Commons to drive it through"? Surely there ought to be some elasticity so that it can be incorporated in the Bill. It is equivalent to telling us that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has all the power and that the House of Commons cannot alter anything that he has done. That is asking too much. In contracts given by local authorities, whatever the bona fides of the contractors may be, you always insist on the fair wages clause being part of the agreement, and, if that be so, why should not we do so now?
    1.24 a.m.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The hon. Member who has just spoken says that I must have known long ago that this matter would have to be brought before the House of Commons. Of course, I knew. If there is any blame attaching to anyone for a fair wages clause not being inserted in this agreement I must bear that blame. But a fair wages clause is not ordinarily inserted in a commercial agreement. I frankly say that it never entered my head that the question of fair wages could possibly arise in the construction of a ship of this size and with builders of the reputation of John Brown and Company. To me it seems absolutely fantastic that the construction of a ship of this character should be carried on without fair wages being paid. That is my explanation, or my excuse

    543
    if you like. As to an assurance that the Government will watch over this matter and interfere in any attempt to break the fair wages clause, I should like to give that assurance if I could, but there is no power for the Government to interfere in a contract already placed. There is, however, this indirect power, that this is an agreement which does not concern only one ship. It concerns also a prospective second ship which the Cunard Company believe it will be necessary for them to build.
    I will give this assurance, at any rate, that the Government will look with the utmost disfavour on any breach of the conditions generally applicable to the fair wages clause, either in the construction of the present ship or in the construction of the second ship, and will not hesitate, in such an event being brought to their notice, to call the attention of those concerned to the breach, and intimate their disapproval of that course. Considering that the building of the second ship is subject to the veto of the Treasury, I think it might be fairly said that that assurance is practically of the same value. I can quite understand hon. Members hesitating about this being an agreement which cannot be broken. What I do say is that it risks a serious delay, that this agreement has still to obtain various consents, that someone might raise various questions. I do ask the Committee to think of those men who have been waiting months and months for an opportunity of getting work, and I ask them not for a technicality to run the risk of keeping those men waiting longer.
    1.39 a.m.
    Mr. LEONARD: I accept this continual reference to the fair wages clause to mean the fair general conditions that have to apply under the fair wages clause. With regard to the sub-contractor, I want especially to draw attention to difficulties I have experienced myself in shipyard negotiations affecting apprentices. The fact of the matter is that in most of the trades functioning outside the shipyards to-day there are apprentices' agreements which do give some kind of ratio between the men and the apprentices. In the shipyards there are no such agreements. The shipyards have always claimed the right to determine
    544
    the numbers and wages of apprentices. I trust, if there are discussions in the future such as are visualised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the statement that he has made, that something will be done to make it clear to the shipyards that some regard should be paid to the apprentices and under-paid labour in relation to fully-paid labour.
    1.31 a.m.
    Mr. RADFORD: I would like to suggest for the consideration of the Committee a line of argument against the possibility of accepting this Amendment, however much sympathy the Committee and the Government may feel for it. I gather that hon. Members are not so uneasy about John Brown's as about the sub-contractors. Hon. Members must remember that on this Cunarder £1,750,000 has already been spent and, when it was laid down, the bulk of the sub-contracts were fixed. I know individual firms who have got sub-contracts for the 534. These sub-contracts have been lying dormant and, if these sub-contracts have been made by John Brown without a specific provision regarding the fair wages clause, and the Government now lay down that John Brown have got to place contracts with firms who have undertaken this condition, it may mean the cancellation of these contracts and the payment of damages. I think the Committee should view this thing as a general obligation on new contracts, whereas it is being pushed on sub-contracts already placed, but which have been lying dormant for the period of a year.
    Mr. MAXTON: The suggestion is presumably that a certain number of people who have got contracts will not obey the fair wages conditions.
    Mr. RADFORD: No. I do not suggest anything of the kind. The contracts were already made. It was not a case of placing contracts. The firms have already contracts.
    Mr. MAXTON: If these firms are giving their workers reasonable conditions, they are suffering nothing whatever by being told now that the fair wages clause has to be observed. The only value would be in the suggestion of the hon. Member that there may be contractors of whom it possibly can be said that their labour conditions are not up to that standard.
    Mr. RADFORD: The hon. Member's knowledge of commercial law must be singularly limited if he thinks that where a contract has been made it is competent for one of the parties to turn round and say you have to observe certain conditions not laid down in the contract.
    1.34 a.m.
    Mr. MAXTON: I am not going to place my knowledge of the law against that of the hon. Gentleman. If this is the same business arrangement as was entered into when the ship was laid down I do not understand business at all. There was no question at that time of Government interference. It was private enterprise on the part of the Cunard Company. What we are doing alters the whole situation. It gives us in this House some right to say that it throws an extraordinary light on the way the Government entered into these negotiations. The question of the fair wages clause never crossed their minds. In many of the shipbuilding trades now, after about 10 years of stagnation, even the union conditions provide a very miserable standard of life for the working people. The Committee should not refuse to put this in a Bill which has been recommended to the Committee to help the workers of the Clyde. That was the argument put behind the presentation of this Bill, and it secured a large measure of support because of that. Could not the Committee reasonably put in the Bill the bare minimum that trade unionism, in a bad period of time, has been able to maintain for the workers? It is easy for the Financial Secretary to the Treasury to say that the unions had power. Even inside the actual yard on the construction of the ship there were about 10 unions involved. Outside, there were about 100 different unions. Some of them are strong and some of them are very weak. I am thinking principally of the men in sanitary engineering involved in ships of this kind, in the provision of baths, wash-hand basins and sanitary appliances of that kind. I know that trade reasonably well in the North of Scotland. Trade unionism is powerless in it. The ordinary trade union regulations are set at defiance.
    The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer has made an apology for neglecting to think of this matter when the negotiations were going on. Since that time communications have
    546
    passed between the Treasury and the firm concerned. The Financial Secretary has read a letter which, one is entitled to assume, is genuine, honest and sincere. If I were given £9,500,000 I would be genuine and sincere to the people giving it to me. If we assume that it is sincere, it is a statement on the part of the people concerned that they fully intend to maintain the fair wages conditions. Since they made that statement in writing, and it has been read in the House of Commons, there can be no long drawn-out negotiations. If we here decide that we accept their statement on its merits, at its face value, as honest and genuine, we ought to be prepared to give it statutory-standing in our legislation. I urge the hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment not to accept the assurance. The Chancellor of the Exchequer says, quite rightly, that it is not in the agreement. That is not an argument for not putting it in the Bill. The right hon. Gentleman says he will use pressure. Unless we have it in the Bill fee is powerless, except to threaten that when half-way through the bargain fee will break the bargain, which he said was a silly bargain unless completed 100 per cent. Therefore, I urge the hon. Gentleman who moved this Amendment to push it to a Division so that at least we on this side can register our opinion.
    1.41 a.m.
    Mr. WILMOT: I think the Committee will insist that this Amendment should be carried. The point raised by the hon. Member for Rusholme (Mr. Radford) was that these contracts must have been varied in point of time and that this small matter can also be easily adjusted. This is a small matter if the firms are accepting the conditions, but, if they are not, it becomes a very important matter. I appeal to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to appreciate the feeling of the Committee and to give us an assurance that after all that has been said as between the three parties he can put the matter right to-morrow.
    Major RENWICK: I would like to remove a certain measure of misapprehension that has arisen from the speech of the hon. Member for Gorbals (Mr. Buchanan) in regard to what fee said about the running of the ship.
    The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: That is exactly the point that I ruled the hon. Member for Gorbals (Mr. Buchanan) must not follow.
    1.50 a.m.
    Vice-Admiral CAMPBELL: I beg to move, in page 2, line 15, at the end, to add:
    "(4) No sums are to be paid under subsection (1) of this section unless a guarantee is given by the company that the vessel or vessels are to be manned solely by British crews."
    Although this Amendment is an important one, I shall only occupy a few minutes in explaining it. In the first place, I should like to say a word about
    Question put, "That those words be there added."
    The Committee divided: Ayes, 31; Noes, 120.

    Division No. 164.]

    AYES.

    [1.44 a.m.

    Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)

    Hall, George H. (Merthyr Tydvil)

    Maxton, James

    Buchanan, George

    Hicks, Ernest George

    Milner, Major James

    Cape, Thomas

    Kirkwood, David

    Paling, Wilfred

    Cocks, Frederick Seymour

    Lawson, John James

    Rea, Walter Russell

    Cripps, Sir Stafford

    Leonard, William

    Smith, Tom (Normanton)

    Daggar, George

    Logan, David Gilbert

    Tinker, John Joseph

    Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)

    Lunn, William

    White, Henry Graham

    Dobble, William

    McEntee, Valentine L.

    Williams, Edward John (Ogmore)

    Edwards, Charles

    McGovern, John

    Wilmot, John

    Foot, Dingle (Dundee)

    Maclean, Neil (Glasgow, Govan)

    Grundy, Thomas w.

    Mason, David M. (Edinburgh, E.)

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—

    Mr. John and Mr. Duncan Graham.

    NOES.

    Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-Colonel

    Greene, William P. C.

    Petherick, M

    Agnew, Lieut-Corn. P. G.

    Grimston, R. V.

    Powell, Lieut.-Col. Evelyn G. H.

    Albery, Irving James

    Gunston, Captain D. W.

    Radford, E. A.

    Allen, Lt.-Col. J. Sandeman (B'k'nh'd)

    Hanley, Dennis A.

    Ramsay T. B. W. (Western Isles)

    Bailey, Eric Alfred George

    Hartington, Marquess of

    Reed, Arthur C. (Exeter)

    Barclay-Harvey, C. M.

    Headlam, Lieut.-Col. Cuthbert M.

    Reid, Capt. A. Cunningham.

    Bateman, A. L.

    Heilgers, Captain F. F. A.

    Remer, John R.

    Belt, Sir Alfred L.

    Hope, Capt. Hon. A. O. J. (Aston)

    Renwick, Major Gustav A.

    Bossom, A. C.

    Hore-Bellsha, Leslie

    Rickards, George William

    Bowyer, Capt. Sir George E. W.

    Horsbrugh, Florence

    Robinson, John Roland

    Braithwaite, Maj. A. N. (Yorks, E. R.)

    Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)

    Rots Taylor, Walter (Woodbridge)

    Braithwaite, J. G. (Hillsborough)

    Hudson, Robert Spear (Southport)

    Runge, Norah Cecil

    Broadbent, Colonel John

    Hunter, Capt. M. J. (Brigg)

    Russell, Albert (Kirkcaldy)

    Brown, Col. D. C. (N'th'I'd., Hexham)

    James, Wing-Com. A. W. H.

    Rutherford, John (Edmonton)

    Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.

    Jesson, Major Thomas E.

    Salmon, Sir Isidore

    Burgin, Dr. Edward Leslie

    Kerr, Lieut.-Col. Charles (Montrose)

    Sandeman, Sir A. N. Stewart

    Campbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley)

    Leckie, J. A.

    Shaw, Helen B. (Lanark, Bothwell)

    Caporn, Arthur Cecil

    Leech, Dr. J. W.

    Smith, Bracewell (Dulwich)

    Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)

    Liddall, Walter S.

    Soper, Richard

    Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. N. (Edgbaston)

    Lindsay, Noel Ker

    Sotheron-Estcourt, Captain T. E.

    Christie, James Archibald

    Llewellin, Major John J.

    Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.

    Clayton, Sir Christopher

    Loftus, Pierce C.

    Spens, William Patrick

    Cook, Thomas A.

    Lumley, Captain Lawrence R.

    Stevenson, James

    Copeland, Ida

    MacAndrew. Capt. J. O. (Ayr)

    Stourton, Hon. John J.

    Crookshank, Col. C. de Windt (Bootle)

    McConnell, Sir Joseph

    Strickland, Captain W. F.

    Cruddas, Lieut.-Colonel Bernard

    McKie, John Hamilton

    Sugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart

    Davidson, Rt. Hon. J. C. C.

    Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.

    Thomas, James P. L. (Hereford)

    Davies, Ma). Geo. P. (Somerset, Yeovil)

    Martin, Thomas B.

    Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles

    Duncan, James A, L. (Kensington, N.)

    Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel John

    Titchfield, Major the Marquess of

    Elmley, Viscount

    Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)

    Tufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.

    Erskine-Bolst, Capt. C. C. (Blackpool)

    Mitchell, Harold P. (Br'tf'd & Chlsw'k)

    Ward, Lt.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)

    Essenhigh, Reginald Clare

    Molson, A. Hugh Elsdale

    Ward, Sarah Adelaide (Cannock)

    Everard, w. Lindsay

    Moreing, Adrian C.

    Warrender, Sir Victor A. G.

    Fox, Sir Gifford

    Morris-Jones, Dr. J. H. (Denbigh)

    Whyte, Jardine Bell

    Fraser, Captain Ian

    Morrison, William Shephard

    Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)

    Fremantle, Sir Francis

    Muirhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J.

    Wills, Wilfrid D.

    Glossop, C. W. H.

    Munro, Patrick

    Wise, Alfred R.

    Gluckstein, Louis Halle

    Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.

    Womersley, Waiter James

    Goff, Sir Park

    Nunn, William

    Goodman, Colonel Albert W.

    O'Donovan, Dr. William James

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—

    Graves, Marjorie

    Palmer, Francis Noel

    Sir George Penny and Mr. Blindell

    the two companies to whom this Bill refers. I am second to none in my admiration for the efficiency and discipline of the officers and men on these ships, from the captain down to the cabin boy. Connected with that efficiency and discipline is their great courtesy and care and attention for the comfort of the passengers, a thing which is most important in these big vessels. I have little doubt that the Cunard line and the new merger company will continue to maintain those very high traditions of service

    549
    of the two companies. I am confirmed in that opinion by the very fact that this line carries the Blue Ensign of the Royal Naval Reserve. We have, however, to consider the fact that this Bill strikes a new note and may form a precedent for similar innovations. We have to remember that the President of the Board of Trade has promised to do something more for shipping. With that idea in my mind, I have put down this Amendment, because we have to face the very unfortunate fact that at the present moment there are many British ships on the seas under the British flag without a single British officer or man on board them. In other cases British ships at sea fly the British flag with only one British officer on board, the remainder being foreigners. We also have some shipowners who in several instances have transferred their ships to neutral flags. I do not believe that the merger company would ever do that. But we must bear in mind that there is this unfortunate state of affairs in our British shipping at present, where we have an enormous amount of unemployment.
    In this Bill and in other Bills to follow to help unemployment we must remember the employment of British sailors. I do not wish to press the Government unduly in this matter. We realise that any company which is catering for passenger traffic from one continent to another may, in exceptional cases, wants to have one or two special people on board who may not be of British nationality. I can understand that the President of the Board of Trade may like to reserve the right to give licences to certain individual persons of non-British nationality. That is the limit to which I would be prepared to go. I hope the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, in considering this Amendment, will bear in mind what I have mentioned. I am raising this matter as a principle of vital importance.
    1.55 a.m.
    Mr. C. WILLIAMS: As I was the only person to raise this matter on the Second Reading, I hope the House will allow me two or three minutes. The idea behind the Amendment is one which I feel sure will commend itself to every Member. It is that, if you are to win back the Blue Riband of the Atlantic, at any rate you should do it with British sailors. I feel sure that the Government will not
    550
    fall back on the excuse that it is not in the contract, because after all these ships will not run for a few weeks; and I hope we shall not be told that by pressing this Amendment we are holding up the building of this vessel, because that does not apply. Under this Bill we are deliberately supplying the capital for the running of this ship. It will he a long time before that becomes operative, and I want to see it laid down definitely and clearly in the Bill—not only for now but for the future—that if now some shipping subsidy is given, at any rate the vast proportion of the men shall be British seamen. It can be put in without breaking the contract or agreement, because you could hardly put anything else in the agreement. I feel equally sure that the Cunard Company will almost entirely run with British seamen. The principle of the Amendment should be laid down now for all time and on the Report stage the Government can insert a figure of 90 per cent. or 95 per cent. if they do not like the exact wording of the Amendment. I hope the Government will meet the Amendment in the spirit in which it is moved, which is the only spirit in which we can possibly tackle this shipping question. Those of us who have from time to time seen something of British seamen know that it is essential that it should be laid down in the clearest way possible and that this should be included in the Bill.
    1.57 a.m.
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the BOARD of TRADE (Dr. Burgin): The hon. and gallant Member for Burnley (Vice-Admiral Campbell) and those associated with him are really pushing an open door. Everyone wants as far as possible to employ British seamen in connection with this vessel. I have caused inquiries to be made and the Cunard Company entirely accepts this obligation and the principle which the Amendment implies, so far as masters, officers and engineers are concerned. As to the other members of the crew, the same principle applies entirely to the deck and engine department. In the stewards' and catering department the only exception will be a certain number of members of the staff whose duties bring them into association with foreign-speaking passengers and a few specialist ratings, such as chefs. I hope after the

    551
    assurance I have given that the hon. and gallant Member will see his way not to press the Amendment. In the first place, the whole question of the employment of aliens on board ship is already governed by Statute—namely, the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act of 1919, Section 5, which was modified by another Act in 1925. That Act lays down clearly that aliens shall not be employed on British ships in any important capacity.
    It would be much too hard and fast a rule to say that you should never have on a British ship anyone other than British subjects as members of the crew. The President of the Board of Trade has said that shipping is an extremely elastic trade. You cannot tie the shipowner's hands so tightly as to say that in no circumstances shall he be empowered to employ in some capacity connected with shipping a seaman who is not a British subject. It has been found to be quite unworkable to make a rigid insistence, as a matter of law, that only British subjects shall be employed. In a vessel of this kind, designed, built, and having as its object the winning of the greatest measure of popular approval, we must run it as a first-class travelling hotel, among other things. So, it stands to reason, that there will have to be, in certain specialised categories, people who will not be British subjects. But for the effective running of the ship, as a ship, they will be British subjects. Only in quite incidental, employments is there any likelihood of foreign or foreign-speaking people being employed. With that very clear statement of the law and of the desire of the company to accede to the spirit behind this Amendment, together with assurances given by the Cunard Company, I hope that the hon. and gallant Member will not press his Amendment as I should be obliged to ask the Committee to resist it if it is put as a matter of law. The House is trying to help shipping and it will not be helping shipping to make it a rigid test.
    Mr. C. WILLIAMS: Will the hon. Member accept the Amendment if we omit the word "solely" and say 90 or 95 per cent.?
    Dr. BURGIN: No. I could not accept any such arbitrary measure. You are not helping the cause you have in view. I agree with the hon. and gallant Member
    552
    who moved the Amendment about the courtesy and conduct of these officers. Here is a pre-eminently British ship, built for a first-class line. It is of the essence of that ship that she should be British throughout. But you must not insist on impossibilities. You are not going to say that a West-End hotel must be staffed by British subjects only throughout.
    HON. MEMBERS: Why not?
    Dr. BURGIN: Because you would defeat the object of a first-class hotel. I have tried to meet the spirit of the Amendment, and I am most anxious that the principle should gain currency, but you cannot put it into law in this form.
    Mr. MACLEAN: Since we are supposed to be winning back the Blue Riband of Atlantic shipping for Britain, is it not to be expected, if she has foreign chefs on board, that you cannot obtain the blue riband for cooking?
    2.5 a.m.
    Lieut.-Commander AGNEW: I do want to press the hon. Member on this point. There are unemployed in this country estimated at about 3,000 officers and 40,000 mercantile seamen. This Bill deals with a particular area—the North Atlantic. In certain parts of the world you must of necessity employ Lascars, because white men cannot stand the heat. But that does not apply in this Bill, which deals only with the North Atlantic, where you have a temperate climate. When the First Commissioner of Works is letting out tenders for a contract he is not content with the assurances and desires expressed by contractors that they will, so far as they can, employ British workmen and British materials. He insists that they must be employed. Here it is doubly important to have it rigidly stipulated that the labour should be British, especially when this is not a case of trying to lay down a restriction or law that the whole of the crews of the Cunard Line should be British but only relates to this particular ship, running on a particular route and under conditions where it is being financed by public money. Therefore, although the Parliamentary Secretary has stated that the conditions of the Amendment are going virtually to be carried out, surely there can be no real objection

    553
    to having the principle of the Amendment embodied in the Bill.
    2.8 a.m.
    Mr. LOGAN: I make no apology at two o'clock in the morning for speaking on this subject. I have been speaking on it for two years, and I do not want to speak for another two years. We have come to the culminating point where we have a right to make known our views. It is well known to the Board of Trade that this very important matter has been discussed and the answers have been most unsatisfactory. On Mersey-side ships that have been sailing under the British flag for many years and carrying nothing but British crews are now carrying Chinese crews. If the Riband of the Atlantic is to be manned by what is called British labour, that is, Lascars, Chinese—
    Mr. WHYTE: Is the hon. Member aware that never in the history of the Cunard Company has any native labour been used?
    Mr. LOGAN: I am aware of that fact. I want to pay my tribute to the prestige and reputation of the Cunard Line. But ships are sailing from Liverpool where, owing to the extreme urgency of competition, they have placed the national on the dockside and had recourse to black, coolie and Chinese labour. As I have said in this House before there are ships sailing with aliens under terms of contract which enable them to go back to their own land leaving wives behind them in Liverpool. I want to see British ships built and the Cunard getting along successfully. It would give work, and I want to see the streets relieved of men. I know men who have to stand about who have been six or seven times torpedoed in the War. It cannot be denied that that is happening in the Scotland division of Liverpool. I can give the names of a dozen men who have been torpedoed in the War that number of times. I have a right to say in this House that, when a British ship is being built, the work should be given to our own men. I dislike seeing the manhood of the nation standing about in the streets without employment.
    I am told, when I ask questions, that blacks, coolies, Lascars and Chinamen are to be rated as British, and that our young men have to be left to stand in
    554
    the streets. Had I had the opportunity earlier in the Debate I would have liked to remind the President of the Board of Trade that, regarding even some of his own ships that I could mention, I have my own views about the British flag protecting some of the crews going about in some of the boats. There are young men and women in Liverpool and they are anxious to see what can be done for the idle steamer and the idle sailors. I know that on a great liner 100 per cent. will not be applicable. There are the interpreters, and it is absolutely essential that you must have a service equal to the continental service. I believe the Cunard are loyal and anxious to see this case answered.
    2.16 a.m.
    Mr. PALING: The Chancellor of the Exchequer anticipated the last Amendment by giving a kind of guarantee with regard to the fair wages Clause. I want to ask if it is not possible to accept this Amendment and to get a letter from the company similar to that guarantee—that the labour as far as humanly possible shall be British.
    2.17 a.m.
    Dr. BURGIN: I had hoped that I had explained to the Committee that I had approached the Cunard Company the moment I heard of this Amendment. May I read the communication again.
    "It can be stated that the Cunard Company entirely accept as an obligation"—
    not as an assurance—
    "the principle which the Amendment implies, so far as it implies the master, officers and engineers, deck and engine departments. In the steward and catering departments, the only exceptions are in relation to the members of the staff whose duties bring them into association with foreign-speaking passengers, and specialist ratings such as chefs."
    I think that really meets the point. I am very sympathetic with what the hon. Member for the Scotland division (Mr. Logan) has said. He and I have had many passages of arms in regard to this question. It is a fact that whatever the colour of those to whom he has called my attention may be they are by nationality British subjects, so that none of us could get further than recognition of the birth certificates. I would like to call the attention of the hon. and gallant Member for Camborne (Lieut.-Commander Agnew) to the fact that if you

    555
    push nationality you invite reprisals. Careful consideration of the advantages and disadvantages has been made by the President of the Board of Trade, who is a great authority on shipping both inside and outside this House, and he has come definitely to the conclusion that you do not reach the object which the Committee have in mind, of securing the greatest possible amount of employment for British mercantile officers and seamen, by insisting on nationality. Many of our nationals are in profitable employment in the service of other nations. If we make it too rigid with regard to no one going on British ships except Britishers, other countries may make a similar rule.
    Vice-Admiral CAMPBELL: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment in view of the assurance about this particular ship.
    HON. MEMBERS: Object!
    Question, "That those words be there added," put, and negatived.
    Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
    Clause 2 (Exemption from Stamp Duty and Fees), ordered to stand part of the Bill.
    CLAUSE 3.—(Provisions as to Cunard (Insurance) Agreement Act, 1930.)
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."
    2.23 a.m.
    Mr. BUCHANAN: I want to say that although we are allowing these Clauses to pass we are not to be taken as being in agreement with them in every case. There are only a small number of us, and we do not wish to put the House to the inconvenience or trouble of voting, but we must not be taken as agreeing to the provisions contained in the Bill.
    Question put, and agreed to.
    Clause 4 (Short Title), ordered to stand part of the Bill.
    Bill reported, without Amendment; to be read the Third time To-morrow.
    The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.
    It being after Half-past Eleven of the Clock upon Wednesday evening, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
    Adjourned at Twenty-five Minutes after Two o'Clock.

  CYPRUS (LATE M. TRIANTAFFILIDES).
  CYPRUS (LATE M. TRIANTAFFILIDES).
  INDIA (SILVER AGREEMENT).
  INDIA (SILVER AGREEMENT).
  VACCINATION.
  VACCINATION.
  SLAUGHTER-HOUSES (LICENCES, FARMERS).
  SLAUGHTER-HOUSES (LICENCES, FARMERS).
  ROYAL AIR FORCE ("FURY" AIRCRAFT).
  ROYAL AIR FORCE ("FURY" AIRCRAFT).
  ANGLO-FRENCH COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.
  ANGLO-FRENCH COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.
  EX-PRISON OFFICER (COMPENSATION).
  EX-PRISON OFFICER (COMPENSATION).
SCOTLAND.
  HOUSING.
  HOUSING.
  PRISON SEVICE.
  PRISON SEVICE.
  BROADCASTING (PEACE PROPAGANDA).
  BROADCASTING (PEACE PROPAGANDA).
  NEW EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGE, BRISTOL.
  NEW EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGE, BRISTOL.
Preamble
The House met at a quarter before four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

TORQUAY CORPORATION BILL. [H.L.]
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): My Lords, I beg to move that Standing Order No. 105 be considered in order to its being dispensed with in respect of the Torquay Corporation Bill. The reason is that there has been a delay in receiving the Report of the Attorney-General, and we could not put the Bill down for Second Reading until that had been received. Now it has been received and therefore I ask your Lordships to agree to the Standing Order being dispensed with.
Moved, That Standing Order No. 105 be considered in order to its being dispensed with in respect of the said Bill, and that the Bill be now read 2a—(The Earl of Onslow.)
On Question, Motion agreed to: Bill read 2a accordingly.

AIRE AND CALDER NAVIGATION BILL.
Read 2a.
INDIAN PAY (TEMPORARY ABATE MENTS) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and to be printed.
MINING INDUSTRY (WELFARE) FUND.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a;and to be printed.
RURAL WATER SUPPLIES BILL.
Brought from the Commons, endorsed with the Certificate from the Speaker that the Bill is a Money Bill within the meaning of the Parliament Act, 1911; read 1a; and to be printed.
BRIGHTON, HOVE AND WORTHING GAS BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and referred to the Examiners.

PUBLIC WORKS FACILITIES SCHEME (BOSTON CORPORA TION) BILL.
Considered on Report (according to Order).
Clause 1:
Scheme in schedule confirmed.
1. The Scheme of the Minister of Health which is set out in the schedule to this Act is hereby confirmed and shall have full validity and force.
VISCOUNT GAGE VISCOUNT GAGE moved, after "which," to insert "as amended." The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this Amendment and the one following it, of which Notice has been given, are purely formal. They arise from the fact that certain sections of the Public Health Act, 1857, will be superseded on June 1 next by the provisions of the Local Government Act, 1933. I move that this purely technical Amendment be agreed to.
Amendment Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 10, after ("which") insert ("as amended").—(Viscount Gage.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule [Boston Corporation Water Scheme]:
VISCOUNT GAGE VISCOUNT GAGE moved to insert the following new paragraph:
As to Local Government Act, 1933.
"27. On the coming into operation of the Local Government Act, 1933, this Scheme shall have effect as if that Act had been passed after the Act confirming this Scheme."
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I beg to move the other Amendment standing in my name.
Amendment moved—
Page 16, line 22, at end insert the said new paragraph.—(Viscount Gage.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PRO VISIONAL ORDER (CROSBY, LITHERLAND AND WATERLOO JOINT CEMETERY DISTRICT) BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order).
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PRO VISIONAL ORDER (ROCHESTER, CHATHAM AND GILLINGHAM JOINT SEWERAGE DISTRICT) BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order).
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PRO VISIONAL ORDER (WIRRAL JOINT HOSPITAL DISTRICT) BILL.
Read 2a(according to order)

DEFENCE SERVICES.
LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE rose to ask His Majesty's Government to consider the desirability of coordinating the three Fighting Services under a Ministry of Defence; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Motion which stands in my name is one which I venture to suggest is of great importance to our country and one which, at the present, moment especially, ought to receive the serious consideration of the Government. Rules of procedure in another place prevent the discussion of this subject on almost any occasion, and it is only, as, I lately discovered, on the Appropriation Bill that members in another place can really discuss this subject of the coordination of the three Services. Recently in another place there was a declaration by the Lord President of the Council that he vas considering the Estimates for the three Services together. I presume when he said that that he meant that discussion would take place within the Cabinet, certainly not before Parliament. I am happy to think that the procedure in your Lordships' House allows such a very important subject to be debated much more freely than is possible in another place.
I bring the question forward with every helpful feeling towards His Majesty's Government. I know that they have a difficult task and I know that from time to time they have examined this very difficult question. It was raised in 1928 in the House of Commons when the Prime Minister of that day, the present Lord President of the Council, made a very long and interesting speech. I venture to suggest to your Lordships that the situation to-day is much more serious than it was in 1928. It is much more serious from the point of view of the situation in Europe. The position has far advanced from the opinion rightly expressed at that time, that we were a long way from a future war. There was no indication then that the European situation would develop so
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rapidly as it has done in the last six years.
Coming to the purely financial aspect of the case one finds under the recent Estimates provision for an expenditure on the Navy of £56,550,000, a small increase of about £2,980,000; on the Army £39,600,000, an increase of £1,650,000; and on the Air Service, £17,561,000, a small increase of £135,000. What strikes one when looking at these Estimates, in view of the extraordinary development of the Air arm, its striking power, its extraordinary rapidity of action, is the small relative cost to this country of the Air arm in relation to the older services of the Army and the Navy. For a long time in another place it has been argued that the taxpayers of this country are undefended against the Estimates of the individual Services. The various Ministers in charge of the Army, Navy and the Air Service put forward their demands for a share of the loot, for a share of the available money which this country can afford to spend on armaments. I cannot think that the Secretary of State for War or the First Lord of the Admiralty or the Secretary of State for Air really considers the other Services when he puts forward his own Estimates. After all, the Government have no money to spend except the money they can extract from the taxpayers and the only watchdog the taxpayers have got is the Treasury.
What technical experience has the Treasury in dealing with the Secretary of State for War or the First Lord of the Admiralty or the Secretary of State for Air? The Secretary of the Treasury can only try to the best of his ability to limit the demands put upon the national purse. It always seems to me that we ought to have some expert type of board that can protect the taxpayer against demands for the various Services. How do we know that the total money voted is being rightly spent? How do we know, when demands are made for money to be spent for the safety of the country, that the money is allocated so as to get the best value in terms of defence? That leads me to think that we ought to have some expert body able to examine the Estimates and report to the Commons exactly in what channels they consider the total sum about to be voted for defence can best be spent. Human nature being as it is, undoubtedly the most powerful personality among the three

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Ministers concerned with defence will be most successful in getting a large share of the total expenditure. I venture to suggest that in the experience of the world to-day perhaps the Air Minister has not got quite his fair share. I see increases for the Army and the Navy, and only a very small increase for the Air Force. I think perhaps that that might be altered with advantage to the safety of our country. At any rate it is true that there is a feeling—and I felt it when I was in another place—that there is no buffer between the House of Commons and the demands for the various arms; that is, the Army, Navy and Air Force; that there is no allocation of the money as a whole, and that it is not allocated with expert advice. I think that on those grounds alone a good deal could be done towards giving us better value for the money spent.
I now come to a question which involves closer co-ordination between the three Services. I know perfectly well that a great deal has been done in recent years towards improving that co-ordination between them, which was so much lacking during the early stages, at least, of the Great War. We had the Committee of Imperial Defence, and here let me quote what was said by my old chief, Sir William Robertson, with whom I spent so many years of service before, during and after the War. He said:
"War is not nearly so much a matter for soldiers and sailors as soldiers and sailors think. On the contrary, it embraces all the activities of the nation."
I believe myself that the great want that we have at the present moment is in the strategical direction of our defensive forces. If we have learned anything at all from the last War—and I thoroughly realise that the war of to-day is not the war of yesterday, as the war of tomorrow will probably not be the war of to-day—I do think that a great deal can be done to bring in the principles of higher direction. Although the elements with which we have to deal may differ, according as the applications of science and other things are directed towards war, still the main principles remain the same, and it is the violation of those principles which brings about the disasters which come to those who violate them.
I think one of the lessons which we learned after the Great War was the
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faultiness of the higher direction in the War. Anyone who was associated in any way with the higher direction of the War knows how difficult it was for a Cabinet composed of twenty-one or twenty-two members to direct and deal with the higher leadership of our forces at the beginning of the War. After many months it was proved that that sort of direction was quite impossible, and when Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister he appointed a small War Cabinet, of Ministers who were not tied up in the various Departments which Ministers usually have, in order to carry on that direction. But that direction suffered from a very great difficulty, and that difficulty was that they had no expert staff to advise them, nor an executive staff to issue the necessary orders. They could only advise. They could advise the Prime Minister, who obviously must always be the one individual who gives the final direction to his country. They had no expert staff in which to coordinate and collate the information which must necessarily be placed before any body of people directing the efforts of a great nation at war.
This small Cabinet, which did carry on and was known as the War Cabinet, did very good work. It certainly repaired the lack of direction which a large Cabinet had; hut unfortunately, and I think unfortunately for our country, it ceased to act at the end of the War. I think it would have been a good thing if that type of direction had been carried on; but do not forget, my Lords, that the direction was only concerned with two Services. The Air Service at that time was not in being. It was part of the Army machine, and it was only afterwards that this arm gradually grew, with the various activities of the War, until it became the very great Service which it is to-day. Therefore it seems that now, when you have a third great Service added to the older Services of the Army and Navy, it is the more desirable to have some form of definite coordination of the three Services. It is undoubtedly true that we have to-day a much closer co-ordination and working together of the three Chiefs of Staff. After 1923 and the inquiry into the activities of the Committee on Imperial Defence you undoubtedly got a very close coordination between the three Chiefs of Staff, but I beg to point out to your

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Lordships that this co-ordination, however welcome and however beneficial to our defensive arrangements, is limited to this extent, that although they issue the Annual Report which is laid before the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, and which is based on the foundation of a survey produced by the Foreign Office, you still go back to the individual Services in order to carry out any of the findings of that combined body.
What I fear more than anything else is that you will not get quick enough action unless there is some form of executive staff to deal with these combined Services. You have to make arrangements beforehand. You have this new element of the Air Force—comparatively new because it only originated at the beginning of the War—an element which predominates over the other two Services, which, owing to its speed, owing to its quickness of attack, owing to its secret movements adds a new dreadful peril to any country which is in danger of war. Far be it from me to suggest that we are in any danger of war at this moment; but any prudent people dealing with the defence of their country, and the defence of an Empire such as ours, must undoubtedly take notice of the various movements in the world. I think everyone who talks on this subject with knowledge agrees that there is a danger of a rapid and devastating attack coming from an enemy country or a collection of enemy countries by air. It seems only natural that we should take precautions and prepare our plans to deal with that devastating attack. We cannot afford, and we certainly shall not have time, to improvise. In the last war, thank God, We had more than two years to improvise and deal with a faulty organisation. I venture to say that if and when the next war comes, unless we are prepared beforehand, unless we deal with these matters now in time, of peace, our country will suffer very severe trouble.
The last time this question was debated it was pointed out by the Prime Minister of that day, Mr. Baldwin, in a very long and valuable statement, that all these questions were being attended to within the Committee of Imperial Defence—the various Committees and Subcommittees, innumerable Sub-committees dealing with every aspect of national defence. They all issued their Reports; but who, may I ask, collated those
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Reports? Who read those Reports? Who dealt with the findings of those Reports? In many cases, I have no doubt, they were dealt with by the Admiralty, the War Office and the Air Ministry. But who dealt with them as a whole? What directing force was there to deal with the admirable findings of those Sub-committees? I venture to say that it was quite impossible for members of the Cabinet or for the Prime Minister to look at one-tenth part of these various Reports. Moreover, it was almost impossible to get any real direction as the result of those Reports.
I feel very strongly that you do want some executive force, some executive headquarters. I am not pleading for the great super-man, the Minister of Defence, although there are arguments in favour of that. What I am asking for is that there should be some inquiry into the question of a Ministry of Defence. Whether the head of that shall be an individual or a board does not matter to me. What I do suggest is that the present Committee of Imperial Defence should be turned into an executive body; they ought to be a Superior General Staff. You have your Imperial Staff College, which has been going now for some years, preparing officers—for what? For that very purpose which I believe is so necessary for our country. Those officers who are now being trained at the I Imperial Staff College are the very officers you ought to collect together in the form of a General Staff. All civil activities, whether it is coal, or iron, or manufactures of all kinds, are going into larger units, and yet we continue in the most important matter of the Defence Services to keep the vital units acting without that co-operation which I believe is so necessary for the safety of this country.
Speed is the element that we have now to consider. Speed is the thing that is going to hit this country, or any country, in the future when it has to deal with war, and that question of speed has become more vital than ever, in view of the fact that democracies in many countries have disappeared. You now have dictatorships in Germany, in Italy, and in Russia, and one is coming in France. That dictatorship system means speed, action secretly directed, and, I am sorry to say, very often without consulting or without giving consideration at

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all to the masses which those dictators are supposed to represent. Any machine of government that is based on democracy is then bound to suffer because it cannot act so quickly as that type of direction under a dictatorship. That is a consideration which ought to be very closely examined by our Government to-day.
The war of the future will undoubtedly concern not only the Army, the Navy and the Air Force; it will touch every ramification of our civilised life. The Foreign Office did well in the last War in bringing in certain countries; it brought in Italy, but it failed in regard to Turkey and Bulgaria. When we are considering any future attack on this country therefore, we must consider the question of the Foreign Office, and we must consider also high finance. The India Office is concerned and so are the Dominions Office, the Colonial Office, and the Board of Trade. What about the feeding of our people? I see here the noble Viscount, Lord Devonport, who dealt with our food supplies in the days of the War. He knows how near we were at that time to starvation. With the destructive methods of modern science as applied to war we are much more likely in future to find this country within a very short period of the outbreak of war in the position of not being able to feed its people. For that reason, although I do not want to exaggerate, I say that we want plans to be thought out beforehand collectively, and that is why I plead for a thorough investigation as to whether or not some co-ordinating body of a larger General Staff ought not to be set up in this country.
I do not want to exaggerate, but anyone with imagination and knowledge can picture the devastating effect of a rapid or secret attack by large bodies of aeroplanes on this country. There is no passive defence to that. There is only counter-attack, and it is the fear of the counter-attack that will stop such an attack being made. I see my noble friend Lord Trendhard in his place. He knows very well what the effect may be of a sudden attack on our aerodromes or war supplies, on our machines themselves, and on the factories which produce the aeroplanes, all within a very small area round London. Have plans been made to meet that probability? I can only say that I hope the Air Ministry have
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got those plans, but they cannot make those plans alone; and not only have plans got to be made but you have got to have an executive body under the direction of the Cabinet or War Cabinet to issue orders. We do not want to have the Dardanelles over again. I am not going into the details of that, but anyone who has had inside knowledge of the want of co-ordination between the Services then knows perfectly well what I mean. You do want a guiding, directing force that can give orders and make absolutely certain that you get the coordinating and united effect of all the elements in our national defence.
I would ask the Government: Who are working out these plans? Who are really dealing with all the various ramifications of national defence? Who is dealing with things like the switching-over of industrial effort to war? Are the plans being made now? Can industrial effort switch over quickly to the provision of material, which, as we know well, in the late War was two years behind the provision of men? The men are there, but unless you have the necessary material and equipment they are of little use in modern war. Do not let us forget this, my Lords, that if and when we are drawn into another world war the whole nation will have to be applied to that purpose. I hope we shall not make the mistakes then that we made in the last War in the application of conscription. Conscription was new to us then, but I hope we have learned the lessons of the late War in that respect. Conscription will be necessary over every form of national life, not only in respect of the Fighting Services but in respect of our mines, our factories, and every ramification of our national life. And it will be necessary to call up not only the men of twenty-one, then of twenty-five, then of thirty, and then of forty; but you will have to call up sections of the nation of all ages and place them where their physical capacity and their ordinary uses in civil life best fit them to be. One of the great mistakes we made in the last War was in not applying the old men to the jobs they could do, but in putting men into jobs for which they were ill-fitted. I know what I am talking about because I had to try and reconstruct that phase of national life in 1917, and one thing I was up against then was the misplacing

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of our man-power in the various efforts which had to be made in the War.
Who are making these plans now? Are they being attended to? It does not concern one Service alone—it concerns the whole nation. It is vital to success if we ever have to face a national need as was the case in 1914. I am pleading for the Government to look at this question, which I believe in my innermost soul and in my bones to be so necessary for the safety of our country. It is necessary that these plans Which are essential for war should be looked into now in time of peace, that the co-ordination of our Services should be done by a collection of men, the best. we can get out of the nation, and that they should be brought together to think out these plans now, beforehand, and have them ready, and be the driving force which will issue orders For the nation if and when the time comes. I am pleading for a Ministry to deal with these great problems, not a Minister, although there are men who could do that job. I remember very well years ago in Rome meeting Signor Mussolini and asking him: "How do you find time to deal with five Ministries—Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, the Army, the Navy and the Air? "And I remember his reply. He said: "It saves me time because I have not got any departmental arguments or quarrels to deal with." Any one who had departmental trouble during the War knows what that means.
I am not pleading for a superman. I am quite willing that it should be a board, a board of Cabinet Ministers without portfolio-anything that will give the direction and will be the head of a, real General Staff to deal with matters of our national de fence. From day to day this country is faced with the problem of who is the enemy. I doubt whether any one can say who is the enemy of tins country. We try to be on friendly relations with all, but the time may come when we shall be up against the problem of an appeal to arms, and we must be prepared for all eventualities. The only way we can be prepared is to have an efficient Staff to look into what is moving in the world. We have not only national defence to consider, but we have Imperial defence as well, and we may well be drawn into quarrels in Imperial defence which will make our national defence the more vulnerable. We are building to-day a great
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base at Singapore. That may well be a target to draw a good deal of our forces to its defence, because once that is attacked we are bound to go to its defence. And once drawn into the Far East, how much more vulnerable are we here! Therefore it seems to me that this problem of national defence is a problem which cannot lightly be dealt with by each individual Service, but is one which demands the collective action of a higher General Staff.
I know that within the time available for me this evening I cannot possibly deal with many matters of detail, for there are ninny others of your Lordships who want to speak on this great subject, but I venture to suggest to His Majesty's Government that it might be well to take the opportunity to appoint a Committee from those who have had great experience in the War, to enquire into this aspect of Imperial Defence. We have still with us men like Mr. Lloyd George, who was Prime Minister; we have Mr. Winston Churchill, we have Lord Cecil, we have Mr. McKenna, we have Sir Austen Chamberlain, we have Mr. Amery, we have Mr. Bruce, of Australia, we have Sir Frederick Sykes, home from Bombay, we have Lord Lloyd, who has had great experience in these matters. I venture to suggest that the Government could well select from men of that calibre, who have had that experience in the past, Committee to examine and report upon this matter. I do not ask for more. I do think that we have reached a point in national development which demands some movement forward. I remember Mr. Baldwin saying in 1928 that we were in a condition of evolution at that time. 1928 was a long time after the end of the War—ten years. We have progressed since then, and I venture to say that the evolution which has taken (place, certainly in the Air Service, is such that we may contemplate a very much greater evolution in the next six or ten years. Therefore I venture to suggest, my Lords, that now is the time.
There is one last word which I would say, and it is this: Whatever may be decided in this great matter, it is perfectly true to say that the Air Force is such that it cannot remain in the air all the time, but must come back to earth; and I believe that great economies and great advantage, not only in the interchangeability of personnel but also in thousands

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of minor details, would be secured by combining the Air Force and the Army. I do not care whether the Army takes over the Air Force or the Air Force takes that the economic contradictions between over the Army; that is immaterial to me as an old soldier; but I do believe that you want some combination between the two, because the two are absolutely dependent upon each other. The Army cannot act without the Air Force; the Air Force undoubtedly has got to come back to land and therefore cannot act without the the Army. Of all the more immediate steps which can be taken towards a final co-ordination of the three Services, I think that that at least is the step. I have no feelings of pride, and from that point of view it does not matter to me whether the Air Force takes over the Army or the Army takes over the the Air Force, but I do think that it would be of great advantage to the State if those two forces could be amalgamated. I do press the Government to carry out an inquiry such as I have suggested. I believe that it is necessary; I believe that we have arrived at a point in our evolution which demands it; and one last word that I would say is that we ought to do it now, before we are again brought into the violence, the controversies, and the troubles with which the world is faced. I beg to move.
LORD MARLEY: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just spoken has outlined in a wholly admirable manner of number of arguments in favour of a Ministry of Defence as against the separate existence of the three Services, and the case for an inquiry into this subject. The Opposition are in favour of such an inquiry. We hope that the Government will seriously consider the proposition put forward and accede to the request of noble Lord. He has argued his point on the broadest possible lines, and in particular has dealt with an aspect of it which is of great importance at the present moment, Fascism versus Democracy. On that ground alone I believe that there is a real reason for an inquiry into the proposal put forward.
He has also argued the matter from the point of view of the change which is gradually taking place in the weapons at the disposal of any Government undertaking a war. Personally I am against all war, war, and I believe that in a future ware lare sections of the population of of country will not co-operate in any
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such operations: but under the system of private capitalism under which we live I believe that war is quite inevitable—that the economic contradictions between capitalist, and finally between Imperialist, Powers make war quite inevitable, in the circumstances in which we and other nations are governed. Therefore I think that it is important to support any measure which makes for greater efficiency in out forces because of the war into which we are being led. If with that efficiency we can couple economy, then we have a double reason for supporting this inquiry. As regards economy, I have come to the conclusion that we could save a minimum of £10,000,000 a year, of the £113,000,000 which we are wasting on the armed forces of this country, and that £10,000,000 or a sum between the two, might well be used for the social Services, and for the raising of the standard of living of the people of this country, which is the sole purpose for which any Government really exists.
The noble Lord dealt with the supremely important matter of speed in modern war, and I believe that he put his finger on the real reason for which a Ministry of Defence is vitally necessary. When I look back to the state of affairs in the last few years, I believe that the inefficiency—the failure to obtain full efficiency—of the three Services can be examined and can be proved to be quite indefensible. Take for example, first, the failure to co-operate between the Services. The noble Lord mentioned the Dardanelles campaign. From the point of view of national pride, I suppose the less we say about that the better, save to remember the incomparable bravery of the men who were sacrificed owing to the failure to co-operate between the Services. Again, we have the struggle as to who can best defend the North-West frontier of India. We have the Army claiming that its work can be much more permanent, the Air Force claiming that its work is much cheaper, but no full co-ordination or consideration of that work from the point of view of the best service at a minimum cost. There is merely a constant quarrel between the Departments as to who can best do the work.
We have a similar difficulty with regard to the defence of the ports of great Britain. Ought it to be the Army, ought

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it to be the Air Force to carry through this defence, or ought we not to have some system by which we can co-ordinate the efforts of both? Surely a Ministry of Defence is the right means of carrying through that fully-considered plan. During the War I came across examples of this failure. At the beginning of the War I was in the Admiralty but I happened to be at the Army Staff College. I had mobilisation telegrams from both the admiralty and the War Office directing me to different places. My War Office telegram said I was to be an embarkation staff officer somewhere and my Admiralty telegram put me on the staff of one of the units of the Fleet. I tossed up which I should do.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR (THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY): you were so valuable.
LORD MARLEY:: No, I am not pointing out my value but the failure to co-ordinate the services of Departments for one of which the noble Marquess is responsible. I have no doubt he has learned lessons from the failures in the last War. I hope he has, but it seems he has not been successful in securing that large share of the spoils to which the noble lord referred as against the largely increased Estimates of his stronger colleague the noble and learned Viscount who leads the house, the Minister for War, and, of course, the First Lord of the Admiralty. I think his paltry hundred thousand pounds is only a proof of his failure to secure a larger share of the spoils, and I hope he is feeling ashamed of himself in getting such a poor increase. He does not look ashamed, I admit. No doubt he has got the best he could.
At present we get a duplication of services. I wonder whether the noble Marquess really thinks it necessary to have a separate service of chaplains for the Air Force. Why is it that we could not have one common service? I notice that the most reverend Primate has left the House. After all why should we have different chaplains for all the services? A Ministry of Defence might save a good deal in that direction. Why different Medical Services? It is difficult enough to get doctors for the Services. Why not one co-ordinated service which might be started by the Ministry of Defence. Then what about the duplication of Attaches
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in foreign countries—Naval, Military, Air Attachæs. Why not, in the smaller countries, one Service Attachædoing the work of the three Services and saving the taxpayer's money by doing away with the duplication of unnecessary officials? What about the Intelligence reports? I remember reading the Intelligence reports of the Admiralty and the War Office concerning one country some years ago. They were entirely different. Each brought out quite opposite viewpoints; each reported entirely different results. As a matter of fact in this case the Admiralty were entirely right and the War Office information was entirely wrong. That sort of duplication of expensive information, one report different from another, allowing you to take your choice, seems to me to be a sheer waste of public money.
And what about the three Services separately enabling the country to be fooled; what I would call the conservatism of the Services, the block headedness of the Services, in certain cases the concealment of obsolescence? Take, for example, the food supply of the country. The noble Lord pointed out that the food supply of this country would be in far greater danger in another war than in the past. Of course it would. We know that the Navy, from the point of view of capacity to protect the food supply of this country, is obsolescent. It cannot possibly do it. In the last War the submarine rendered the position of the country extremely precarious. That was got over by the convoy system, but the convoy system is a gift to the Air Force of an opposing country, and there is no solution as yet discovered for dealing with an Air Force.
The noble Lord referred to singapore. Anyone who goes to Singapore realises that is quite impossible to defend singapore from air attack, and the sooner that simple and elementary practical lesson is learned by the country the sooner we shall cease to waste millions of the country's money on that sort of development. A Ministry of Defence would have seen through the fatuity of building a base which was quite incapable of defence. Gibraltar is the same. You cannot defend Gibraltar now. Yet we go on wasting public money in the dockyard of Gibraltar, with nobody to raise a voice of complaint. That is because

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there is no Ministry of Defence. The three Ministers are each mounted on their separate chargers clothed in—
A NOBLE LORD: White raiment?
LORD MARLEY: No, not white raiment but in shining armour; and the strongest wins. The picture of the Minister of War on a horse in a magnificent cuirass surely must bring pleasure to the nursemaids of Whitehall who watch the changing of the Guard every day. He wins the day. He is the finest skater over difficult places of anyone perhaps in your Lordships' House. He wins by sheer force and strength. There is another argument for a Ministry of Defence which, I think, the noble Lord did not bring out, and that is the fact that three Defence Ministers in the Cabinet give an unfair pull to the Services as against the requirements of the rest of the country. I believe that a single Minister would much more represent the real needs of the country in armaments, and, while I do not think there is serious difficulty in finding a super-Minister, I cannot say I think very much of the board outlined by the noble Lord. I am quite certain that the right move is a Minister of Defence with the Committee of Imperial Defence as an advisory body.
The noble Lord suggested that nobody read the Reports of the Committee of Imperial Defence. I dare say he is right. Probably the only man who reads them is Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, and probably no one else reads the entire series. I am quite certain that the country would gain by having the Departments under three Under-Secretaries of State and one Minister of Defence dealing with the whole of the Services of this country. I hope very much that the Government will accede to the request of the noble Lord.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, my excuse for addressing your Lordships to-day is that I had some opportunity of seeing the direction of the late War from the very inside. Therefore, I have no hesitation in the light of my experience then in supporting the general thesis which has been laid before your Lordships by the noble Lord, Lord Hutchison, to-night. He raised, in the first place, the question whether, under the system in which we have to-day three
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main Services, we are really getting value for our money either for defence or, if you can reconstruct the League of Nations and the collective system, for the collective preservation of the peace of the world. I think there is another question which is agitating the minds of a good many non-Service people about which, I think, some reassurance will have to be given before very long and the answer to which can only be given by something in the nature of a Joint General Staff, for, in the long run, the support of Army and Navy and Air Force depends upon the support of public opinion. That question is as to the real significance of the development of the air arm.
I will put it in this way. In the past we have relied in the main on the Navy, and secondarily on the Army. The main characteristic of naval action is the extreme slowness, if also the ultimate certainty, with which it operates. If you look at the history of naval action you will find that its operation is slow. The business of the Navy is to protect our own trade routes and to deny the seas to the enemy and thereby bring pressure upon him to surrender. But it takes a very long time, as we saw in the late War. It took over four years. Probably never again will there be such a combination directed against a single Great Power with the same power to restrict its access to supplies. It is the same with the Army. Defence, undoubtedly, is stronger to-day than it has ever been. We found that the predictions which many people made, that under modern conditions war would be rapidly settled because of the strength of the offensive weapons, were absolutely falsified in the event, and for four long years armies were locked before they could produce decisive results.
As I understand it—I speak as an amateur—the very essence of the air arm is that it strikes directly in so far as it can do so at the nerve centres, the vital centres of the various countries engaged, and that there is, anyhow up to the present, no such defence as a supreme navy can make on the seas or a superior army can effect on the land. I think the question which is in many minds is this: Assuming war, assuming that the slowness of naval action continues, assuming that no rapid and immediate decision is attainable on land, and assuming that the various nations possessed of great industrial power, great financial re

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sources and the necessary foodstuffs throw their forces into the construction of offensive bombing aircraft, as Germany in the last War threw its resources into the construction of submarines, and assuming you get the systematic continuous use of such offensive weapons on the capitals of various countries, on munition centres, on railway centres, on the harbours, on the narrower waters, will that power be so destructive that it will force surrender before the more slow-moving methods on and and sea can he decisive? That, as I see it, is the primary question which has got to be answered. If the answer is in the affirmative the strategy of the world will he changed and the distribution of the forces of this country and of the Empire will be fundamentally altered. I do not think anybody can give the answer to that question except something like the Joint General Staff that the mover of this Motion recommended.
As I said at the beginning, I saw something of the inner direction, the superior direction, of the Great War. I do not think anybody who witnessed it from within can fail to realise that the supreme advantage which Germany had throughout the War was its unity of command—unity of command not only on the field of battle, but, unity in its General Staff and unity in the use that it made of its financial, its economic and its industrial resources, and not only its own but those of its Allies. The greatest difficulty with which the Allies had to contend in the first three-and-a-half years of the War was the total inability to get anything like unity of command not only on the battle field but in the use of manufacturing resources, finance and so on. Every nation fought the War on its own national front. It was attempted, of course, by co-ordination and co-operation to get some sort of plan, but it was a co-ordination of four or five national plans and not a single plan. It was not until they got something in the nature of unity of command that the Allies began to establish that decisive superiority which, once it was established, brought the struggle to a rapid and conclusive end.
The beginning of that unity of command was not the appointment of a Generalissimo. It was the Joint Allied Council at Versailles. That was not a
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body which consisted of the Chiefs of Staff of the various countries. It was composed of distinguished officers—Marshal Foch, representing France, Sir Henry Wilson, representing this country, and for the moment I forget who were the officers representing Italy and America. They were seconded for the purpose of forming a Joint Staff. They worked together and I think there is not much doubt that many of the strategic plans which Marshal Foch, when he was later appointed Generalissimo of the Allied Forces, put into operation, were worked out in those quiet meetings at Versailles between the officers of all the larger nations engaged in the War.
I venture to suggest to the Government that they should consider as a preliminary measure, with a view to answering this question which I think underlies the anxieties of a great many people in this country as to the real significance of the air arm, whether it would not be possible to create a Joint General Staff acting under the Committee of Imperial Defence—that is to say, a body of officers of great competence and distinction seconded from their own Services, because as long as they are actively in their own Service human nature being what it is they will fight for their own corner. You should get these officers seconded to form a single Staff reporting to the Committee of Imperial Defence on the strategic problems which concern this country, whether it is going to use its forces, as I say, as instruments of collective peace, or is going to have to use them as the instruments of national and Imperial defence. I think that this matter is causing much more anxiety among thinking people than is generally realised. If what I have said is true, that owing to the slowness of military and naval action the air arm has transformed or will transform the problem of war, then the sooner the significance of that change is realised, and such moneys as we do spend on military or naval or air purposes are employed in accordance with the facts which will be revealed, if ever there is another war, the better; and I would venture to submit to the Government the suggestion as to whether as a preliminary it would not be possible to create through a method of combined officers a Joint Staff directly under the Committee of Imperial Defence, to examine problems and report to the Cabinet.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, I think we are all very grateful to Lord Hutchison for introducing these absorbing and interesting questions. We have listened not only to an extraordinarily interesting speech from him, but also to one from the noble Marquess who has just sat down. The last speaker argued, if I understood his argument, in favour of Lord Hutchison's contention and thesis on the basis that unity of command in the field was achieved through the creation of the Versailles Staff, and I think his argument was intended to reinforce the plea put forward by my noble friend beside me. On that question of unity of command in the field of which Versailles was only a part—I need not remind your Lordships of the Doullens Conference in which the Versailles Staff was set up, planned not by one Commander-in-Chief but by two or three—I suggest that unity of command in the field is not germane to this proposition, which is the study of war and of preparation for war in peace time, and how best this can be effected.
In the past people who have raised this issue have not always wanted quite the same thing, as we shall remember if we read the debates, although they all had more or less the same objectives, either economy or efficiency or speed. Sometimes they wanted a single Minister of Defence placed in supreme command of the three great Services. Sometimes they wanted, as I thought my noble friend was going to want, a super-Minister. Anyhow he wants a super Executive, super-imposed over the Minister of Defence, or put shortly, to diffuse the three Services and administer them as one, under one Chief; or to super-impose over existing Ministers a super-Minister and Staff for defence. I shall try to argue briefly that neither of these propositions is feasible or, indeed, advantageous.
Let us consider for a moment only the task that will confront a single Minister of Defence. Even in peace time it would really be entirely beyond the power of one man to perform. He would find himself in control of, and solely responsible for, the work of three great offices of State—not only the routine of three great Departments but, what is enormously important in preparation for war, of the personnel of those three Departments. There is enough in one Department to
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keep a Minister extremely busy. He could barely keep in touch with the heads of Departments, let alone with the commanders in the field. He would, as Mr. Baldwin reminded us in a speech in 1928, as a single Minister of Defence have to have a Navy Council, an Army Council, and an Air Council, and of course a combined Defence Council as well, and he would have to speak for all three in Parliament and answer questions for all three—no small task in itself.
He would be forced to preside over each one of these Councils, and my noble friends who are in the Cabinet themselves, to-day, will I am sure support me when I say that if they are to keep in touch with the work of their offices they have to attend numerous Committees as well. We have heard a great deal about that pre-eminently great man Mussolini, but he has never been tried out in war. One man controlling so many Departments in peace time is a superman, even in a smaller country like Italy; but our experience in the War was not that there was greater concentration of Departments but, on the contrary, that there was greater decentralisation. No fewer than ten Ministries were created, after two years, during the War. We were not alone in that. It was the case in Germany, too. Germany extended her Ministries and Departments. France and Italy did so also. In fact, every country had exactly the same experience—all exactly opposite in practical experience to that which is advocated here to-day by Lord Hutchison. After all, in war you have to face a sudden and vast expansion from the skeleton cadres we keep up in peace to-day.
If you could find such a superman—Lord Kitchener was very nearly a superman—what would be his position in relation to the war policy of the Government? He would supersede If power, authority and influence the Prime Minister himself, and yet in war-time, especially in a country like England, the man who devises and defends, who expresses, explains and propounds the policy of the Government—and in time of war the policy of the Government is war policy—must be the Prime Minister. We have heard something about dictators and their advantages from Lord Hutchison. May I suggest to him that while dictators perhaps have a great

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advantage in the swiftness of the decision to be made, what is more important even than swift decision is that you shall carry with you the will to war of the people, and only the political head of a great State in war-time can do that. I think that that is a very great argument against a combined Minister of Defence for all three Services. So much for the single Minister and his Ministry of Defence.
Then there is the plan to leave existing Ministers in their several offices hut to superimpose an Executive Council over them. I wonder how that would work out in practice. There are several noble friends around me who have been great heads of War Departments. I wonder, if they were in office. to-day and if they had an Executive Ministry of Defence put over their heads, how many of thorn would not find it necessary to consult the Minister of Defence himself and ignore the heads of their own Departments. It must be so, and in wartime the executive heads of the War Office like the the C.I.G.S., or the Marshal of the Air will in the end be obliged to go to the man at the top who is in consultation and direct relation with the Cabinet. My noble friend argue, I think, that there would be some measure of economy in his proposal. But I did not quite understand why that should be so. After all, what is necessary for war to-day is decided in the Committee of Imperial Defence; that is the advisory body, the General Staff which advises the Government and the Prime Minister on all war matters.
LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE: There is no executive authority.
LORD LLOYD: The executive authority is the Cabinet. Having received from the expert staff what they consider is necessary for war. I suggest that there is no other possible authority except the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Cabinet as a whole which can decide how much money is going to be allocated for the defence needs of this country. That is one of the many underlying fallacies of the superficially attractive idea of a Ministry of Defence; you get this division of authority which, I think, would not in the end add to speed but would add a great deal to delay and confusion in time of War.
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May I remind noble Lords—though it is not necessary in this House—of the enormous expansion and development which has taken place in the expert study of war since 1918? You have only to read—I refer to it again because it is so comprehensive—Mr. Baldwin's speech in 1928. You will find there that there are to-day operating in the Committee of Imperial Defence, not just the number of Committees with the narrower range of subjects dealt with before the War but—far the most important—the Chiefs of Staff's Committee, who have, I believe (though I am not sure about this) the absolute right of access direct to the Prime Minister. If that be true you cannot imagine a machinery for swifter or more decisive action between an expert body and the head of the Government. You have a Man-Power Committee, you have a Principal Supply Officers Committee, you have Committees on disarmament, on war trade questions—that, and cognate questions would, no doubt, be delegated—you have a Committee on Censorship, and Committees on Imperial Communications. on oil fuel, on insurance in time of war, on, air raid precautions, on emergency legislation. The noble Lord also referred to that extremely important question the swift transfer of industrial power to war purposes. That is not enumerated in the list of Committees, but I have not the smallest shadow of doubt that so vast a subject as that is not only being studied, but is being regularly studied by the same expert authority to-day.
I was a little surprised to hear that here the noble Lord, who is a very distinguished soldier, made as I think a grave technical error in a remark he made. He said that we were building the fortress of Singapore, which might draw our forces to defend it. I am sure that his military knowledge is not rusty, but after all that is a very odd conception of a fortress, if I may say so. A fortress, if properly conceived, is a place built adequately to defend itself and to provide a further jumping-off ground for other people to take the offensive or defensive.
LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE: I do not want to interrupt, but it is perfectly obvious that if Singapore is attacked it will undoubtedly draw forces of all kinds to its defence. It means war in that area.
LORD LLOYD: I am afraid I must demur to that description again. I do not think it will draw any forces to its defence. It will draw a large number of forces to assist it in offence, or defence from other people, but not in defence of the fortress.
LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE: That is what I mean.
LORD LLOYD: I misunderstood the noble Lord. I thought he meant defence of the fortress. Although we made many mistakes in the War I believe we showed more elasticity, more rapidity in power of recovering our situation than any other country. It is elasticity of machinery that is so enormously important as well as swiftness in time of war. I believe that if noble Lords would examine the machinery—which I am sure is fairly easy for anybody to do—they would feel satisfied, not that the machinery is perfect, but that. if any further amendments on our present organisation should be made they would not be in the direction of interfering with the main control of defence, but rather in elaborating and giving further power and authority to the machinery at present existing.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I crave the indulgence of your Lordships' House in addressing you for the first time, and I also feel I owe an explanation for speaking so soon after I have had the honour of taking my seat in this House. My excuse is that this is a subject on which, with many other noble Lords, some of whom have not spoken, I feel very deeply indeed. I supported the noble Lord, Lord Hutchison, in another place on this question six years ago, and I believe it is even more vitally important in the interests of the nation that this matter should be more sympathetically examined than it was then. For that reason I felt that I must support the noble Lord again in this House.
I think the noble Lord is to be congratulated on his courage in admitting—what is really the truth—that in case we are involved in another great war, in common with other modern industrialised nations, it will not be only a question of conscripting young men for the Army and the Navy, but the whole force of the nation will have to be compelled—or we shall have to attempt to compelit—to assist, in its various spheres, in waging that war. It may as well be recognised that
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that will happen. There is a law on the French Statute Book to that effect already, and the Russians will undoubtedly do it. There are two great Powers who would conscript every man, woman and child in the country for war purposes. I have no doubt also that in the present temper of Germany the Government there would attempt to do the same. If we were involved with any of those three great nations, either as their Allies or their opponents, we should undoubtedly have to follow suit. It is just as well that that should be known and recognised, as well as the fact that they all ought to be, and I hope would be, on a soldier's pay.
In spite of the weighty speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, and the no doubt weighty speech we are to hear from the Secretary of State for Air in opposition to the Motion, I believe that this change is bound to come. In any case, I think that we are sure to be forced into having a common General Staff, such as the noble Marquess above the Gangway pleaded for, and I think it is absolutely essential that this should happen because of the invention of the aeroplane. As soon as we moved from two-dimensional warfare, with navies and armies on the surface, into three-dimensional warfare by the introduction of the aeroplane, some common fighting Staff controlling the three arms became necessary, and with the technical advance of the aeroplane there is no escape from that. I am going a little further even than the noble Lord, Lord Hutchison, in this matter. We are all spending all we can on armaments to-day—the only limit is what the unfortunate taxpayer will stand, and we may as well face the facts—and I believe that if one of the Great Powers devoted the whole of its energy and available money to building up its Air Force only, with the necessary ground troops and naval tenders to support that Force, it would be altogether invincible. Fortunately vested interests in the shape of Admiralties, Ministers of Marine, and War Offices, prevent any nation doing that, even in Italy, where, as the noble Lord has pointed out, Mussolini holds the portfolios of all the Fighting Services. There are tremendous vested interests which prevent that happening, but perhaps in a few years' time some Power like Germany may put all its energies and all its available resources into the Air.

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I want, if I may, to give your Lordships one or two very brief examples from the past and from the present showing the lack of co-ordination. My noble friend Lord Marley mentioned the Dardanelles. I believe that is the classic example. Your Lordships will remember how a naval force first of all, without any reference to the War Office, bombarded the entrance, beat down the Turkish defences, landed marines and blue-jackets, and marched all over those historic hills which were afterwards soaked with the blood of our best Imperial troops; of course, putting the Germans who were advising the Turks, and the Turks themselves, on their guard, with the deplorable results afterwards which we all know.
Let me remind your Lordships of another example which is very striking indeed. When Lord Allenby was making that famous advance on Jerusalem in the steps of the Crusaders, he had on his right flank Lawrence and the Arabs attacking the Turkish communications and worrying the Turkish left flank whenever they could. Where was the Navy? Why was not the Navy on Allenby's left flank? Why was the Navy not on the Syrian coast landing and raiding in the old tradition of amphibian warfare and harassing Turkish communications in the rear? I was in a position for a short time on the Admiralty War Staff working out the actual plans for that while the War Office on the other side of the street were working out the plans for the land advance. We worked out admirable plans. There was some misgiving about German submarines which might come to the assistance of the Turks in the Levant, but that could have been got over. Nothing was actually done, however, and much loss of time and loss of valuable lives resulted. We might have taken Jerusalem months before if there had been real co-operation between the Navy and the Army, and we might have advanced on Damascus much sooner. These are two examples from the War, of which I venture to remind your Lordships.
Now, may I quote two cases in peace time? The noble Marquess, the Minister for Air, probably knows of the classic case that occurred a few years before he was responsible for that great Service—the case of the naval air pilot who was one of our few expert pilots skilled at landing and taking off from the decks
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of aeroplane-carriers when that art was not nearly so technically advanced as it is now, and for two or three years that invaluable expert was kept in Iraq. The other example has already been quoted by Lord Hutchison—Singapore. It may surprise some of your Lordships when I say that the naval plans for Singapore were drawn up and started and half put into execution without any real executive consultation with either the War Office or the Air Ministry. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, has had to leave the House for the time being, because this is a point on which I wanted to answer him. In order to command the Straits of Malacca, that very vital sea passage, which has nothing to do with the naval base, long-range artillery is needed, but for the defence of any naval base or arsenal now you must have an adequate Air Force available, and there has been the greatest difficulty in finding aerodrome space at Singapore, as the noble Marquess, the Secretary of State for Air, and other noble Lords will be aware.
The whole question of the land defence of Singapore, as the noble Lord, Lord Hutchison, pointed out, is extraordinarily difficult. I am going to venture to submit to your Lordships that if we had had a competent Great General Staff combining the three Services—having nothing to do with the routine that the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, talked about; the burden of administrative routine ruins any staff if it is not separated from these petty details—that Great General Staff, when it really examined Singapore, would have reached the far sounder conclusion that it should be made, not into a great battleship base, a great arsenal, a great fortress, which may be another Port Arthur, but that it should be enlarged as a cruiser base, as it was before; that it should be the advance base for submarines and aircraft; and that our naval force in the Pacific should have been concentrated, not at Singapore, not in Malaya at all, but at Sydney where the Australian Army and Navy would have defended it, and where you would have had invaluable help from the growing industrial resources of that Dominion. That is the second example I venture to submit to your Lordships of what I consider to be the lack of co-ordination.
The third example has more to do with the future. This is a matter of which I

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gave notice to the noble Marquess yesterday, and I hope I shall not receive the reply that it is not in the public interest to give information on this point. The question I have to put to him is this. Apart from the slow, ponderous method of blockade that the noble Marquess. Lord Lothian, referred to, which has always been the great weapon of the Navy, naval operations will nearly always be amphibian operations in co-operation with the Army and the Air Force. We did not do nearly enough of that in the Great War, not so much as we could have done with our immense resources. The tank is a very important weapon to-day, and in future amphibian operations, where you cannot always count on capturing some defended harbour, or it is blown up before you finally seize it, you need a light tank that can be carried on board ship and go through a certain depth of water and land on the enemy coast. I should be very interested to hear if we are making any development along those lines. I know that the Army possesses tanks that can swim across rivers and that sort of thing, but I have yet to know what the Navy is doing in this respect. I have tried to find out, but it is difficult to find out these things, and if it is not in the public interest to say so, I would of course accept that answer, but I am interested nevertheless to enquire whether we are going into this question of a mechanised form of combined landing force for any future amphibian operations.
I think we should be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hutchison, for introducing this Motion. I will refer, if I may, to one more example of what perhaps the future may bring forth. My noble friend referred to the convoy system as the defence against submarines, and he made the very true remark that while the convoy of merchant ships was a useful defence against submarines, it presented a very great and easy target to aircraft. That is going to be particularly true in the future in the Western Mediterranean. We are all talking this afternoon in your Lordships' House of war, and we may as well continue to talk of war as a possibility. Although we are friendly at the present moment, thanks be to Heaven, with every great nation, and hope to continue so, we have to face eventualities. That is why the taxpayers of this country
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have to find £113,000,000 a year to pay for preparations for war. We have to be realists in this matter. The Western Mediterranean trade route is dominated by the aerodromes in French and Italian territory all along that trade route, and with our present forces in the Mediterranean, in the unfortunate and tragic event of some combination of Powers with France or Italy hostile to us we could not possibly use that Western Mediterranean route as things are at present. We would have to route our oil tankers and so on round the Cape of Good Hope. We could hold the Levant, and we could make a very good front in the Eastern Mediterranean, thanks to our position in Haifa, Alexandria and Cyprus, and our hold on the Suez Canal, but the Western Mediterranean as a sea route will become unusable in the unfortunate and tragic event of either a hostile France or a hostile Italy.
These are very grave matters, and I think therefore that the case for a much closer co-ordination, through a General Staff and if possible a combined Ministry of Defence, is really overwhelming. It is always opposed by the heads of the Air Force, the heads of the War Office, and the heads of the Admiralty, both the political heads and the professional chiefs—at least in public they oppose it. A great vested interest opposes this reform, but nearly all the younger officers in all the Services to whom I talk are in favour of it. I had the pleasure of lunching to-day with a most distinguished French submarine officer, and I told him that we were to have a debate this afternoon in your Lordships' House, and the subject of it. He jumped with joy, and he said: "That is what we all want in France—a combined Ministry of Defence; but the heads of our separate Departments will not agree to it."
I make no apology for supporting the noble Lord, Lord Hutchison, on this Motion, and I know that I speak for my friends, one of whom has already addressed your Lordships. My noble friend Lord Marley spoke of the possibility of democracies having to defend themselves against dictatorships. It is possible that the Socialistic States of the future may to begin with have to defend themselves against non-Socialist democracies. The world is certainly in a very terrible state, and we are faced with very grave possibilities, and if we can save the

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taxpayer's money and at the same time improve the combined efficiency of the Services, surely there is no justification for our listening to the specious pleas of the old gentlemen on either side of Whitehall. I repeat that we are all talking of war this afternoon and we have therefore to face the lessons of it. I am delighted to say that all my political friends to whom I have spoken on this matter are strongly in favour of the noble Lord's Motion.
EARL PEEL: My Lords, may I be allowed, at the commencement of the few words which I shall address to your Lordships, to congratulate the noble Lord opposite on the first speech which we have had the good fortune to hear from him; and perhaps I may be allowed to congratulate his Party on the very substantial accession of strength which they will obtain from the noble Lord's entry into your Lordships' House.
In the few words which I want to address to your Lordships I am not going to discuss any of the failures of cooperation between the Services during the War. I could myself give many instances of my own personal knowledge, but I think that that is really and strictly irrelevant to the subject which we are discussing this afternoon. Indeed, when heard so many useful strategical and tactical suggestions made by some noble Lords who are laymen, I really wondered whether we wanted a combined General Staff of technical advisers at all, because there was so much excellent advice that we could obtain from your Lordships without setting up this rather expensive new Department. The only support that I can give to my noble friend Lord Hutchison is, I am afraid, of a rather dubious kind, and I am not quite sure whether he will accept me as a supporter at all, though I am in very large agreement with many of the observations which he made during the course of his speech. I suppose we are all in favour of cooperation between the Services, and more especially since the Air Force came into being—since that new young God of War shot up and rather displaced the two older Services.
But may I thank him for the marvellous generosity that he showed when he said, in a very striking arid eloquent passage: "Let us combine the Air Force and the Army, and I do not mind whether the
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Air Force absorbs the Army or the Army the Air Force"? It so happens that ten or eleven years ago I was a member of a Committee of three of which Lord Balfour was Chairman, which had the duty of deciding whether or not there should be a separate Air Force. I can assure my noble friend that military opinion has changed a great deal since those days if what he says represents military opinion. A very large number of eminent generals came before us on that occasion, and I assure your Lordships that it was not at all their view that the Air Force should absorb the Army. Their view rather was that the Air Force should be a rather humble dependant on the Army. I note that military opinion has altered very much since those days, therefore.
LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTHOSE:The Army has taken over the Air Force.
EARL PEEL: I will argue that with my noble friend later, but the point upon which I wish to dwell is that the only question as regards co-operation is where that co-operation should be—at what point and in what respect. It is upon that point that I want to address a very short observation to your Lordships. There are two details which I should first of all like to mention. One is the question whether there should be one buying department for the three Services. I have often heard this subject discussed by the experts. I understand that the real difficulty is that the technical equipment for the various Services is so different, and that it requires such special knowledge that really you would be only having three separate departments of one department to deal with these different forces. As regards the enormously important question of the organisation of industry for war and of passing, as it were, from a peace industry to a war industry, I do not know how far that has gone now, but know that when I was at the War Office twelve or thirteen years ago, just after the War, that subject was being very carefully and fully discussed. I imagine that by this time plans for it have been very largely developed. Then I come really to the actual suggestion made by my noble friend. If I may say so, I did not: exactly understand what it was. It seemed to vary at different times. There

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was first of all a sort of triple-headed Cerberus who was going to be called a Minister of Defence.
b>LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE: Ministry.
EARL PEEL: First of all a Minister of Defence, and then my noble friend, I thought, shifted a little from that to a Ministry of Defence, and seemed to suggest that it would be better, or just as well, to have a board to control the Minister, or suggested that he did not mind if there was a board. Of course we have had many examples in our history during the last hundred years of boards controlling Ministers. They have been of most extraordinary compositions and very variously composed, but they have always resulted in the other members of the board not appearing, or doing nothing, and the Minister being the sole controller. Let me take the position of this Minister of Defence. This is a very practical question. I am not quite sure in what relation he is going to stand to the three Services that he controls. To begin with, are you to leave the three Services with, shall I say, Under-Secretaries as their heads? In that case, I suppose, all the differences and disputes between the Services would first of all be dealt with by these Under-Secretaries together under the Minister of Defence. Everything, therefore, would be settled by the time the Minister of Defence came to the Committee of Defence. I did not quite understand from my noble friend what was to be the exact relationship between his new Ministry of Defence and the Committee of Defence, because if all these matters have been solved before you get to the Committee of Defence I do not quite see what would be the object of having a Ministry of Defence. Nor, if they were summoned to the Committee of Defence, could they give any other advice or express any other opinion than had been already expressed by their chief. They would either be bound to say the same thing or to differ from him, and the latter would be most unfortunate from the point of view of subordination.
Another consideration is this. They could remain as three separate Ministers, in which case you would have the controlling Minister and the other three Ministers in the Cabinet, and I do not really know who would answer in the
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Cabinet for the different Ministries, whether it would be the heads of the Ministries themselves or whether it would be the super-Minister who had the general control. Again, I am quite unable to see what exactly would be the function of this Minister as regards the Estimates. Would he have a lump sum which he had to divide between the different Ministries, and in order to do that would he have to examine most carefully the Estimates of the different Ministries themselves? If he did that he would have to have a very substantial number of advisers, and you would have to create a sort of additional Ministry, and its relations with the three other existing Ministries would have to be very carefully defined. I feel very doubtful whether in that way, with a sort of super-Ministry controlling the three under-Ministries, you would have any better co-ordination, or in fact so good a co-ordination as you get at present. You would certainly shatter the existing organisation of the Committee of Defence, with all its Committees. That Committee has itself all the flexibility, which was desired by my noble friend, of other Ministries, such for instance as the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade and so on. In the Committee of Defence you get the combined advantage of the knowledge of all these different Ministers sitting together, and also of hearing the opinions of the Chiefs of the Staffs. I think that a great deal would have to be said before you displace that existing machinery, and before you establish a case for setting up the new body which my noble friend wishes to set up.
As regards the more technical questions, they are dealt with already, and have been for years, by the heads of the great Services, and they are not without their advisers also. You therefore have now, what I think my noble friend asks for, growing up—namely, combined strategical and tactical information and knowledge and judgment derived from the constant consultation of the heads of the Staffs with their advisers. You have, therefore, at the disposal of the Committee of Defence and of the Government the best advice you can get at present. I am all for altering the machinery if you think it does not provide you with that you require, but I cannot see why this additional Ministry of Defence could provide you with any better co-ordination or co-operation than you have under

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the present system. If there should be defects in the present system, I am bound to say with great respect that is not so much due to the machinery and organisation itself as to the men who are running it; and if you have the best men and they come together I think that is the best and the most practical system you could have.
As regards the further point of imperial co-operation in defence, no arrangement could be more easy. The Prime Minister has only to call in any Ministers from the Dominions who happened to be here, and you can get their advice in the most easy and most practical manner. If you want a subject more fully discussed you have only to appoint a Committee of the Defence Committee to examine it. Though I am entirely in sympathy with the object which my noble friend wishes to attain, I am very doubtful, if you weigh the advantages of the two systems, whether you will find it necessary to introduce, at considerable expense of course, a new Ministry of Defence, which is going to perform miracles of co-ordination, while most of those matters of co-ordination are perfectly well discharged at present by the existing machinery.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: My Lords, I am sure your Lordships will agree that we have listened to a most interesting and most useful debate, and our thanks are due to the noble Lord, Lord Hutchison, for having brought this matter to your Lordships' attention. We have had the advantage of hearing most valuable speeches. The noble Lord in introducing the subject showed, if I may say so, a very wide knowledge of certain matters but a very limited knowledge of others. He referred to a great many matters which I do not feel called upon to discuss with your Lordships to-night. I think I am right in saying that he made no mention of the existence either of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. I should have thought the fact that there was a Prime Minister in existence and a body of advisers called the Cabinet would suggest that executive body which the noble Lord seems to think is so lacking in the present system. If he will allow me to make one further criticism of his speech, he seemed to suggest that since the War we have stood completely still, and that we have not profited by the lessons learned by those individuals
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who had the same experience as the noble Lord—and he had a very wide experience in the War—and whose services have been made use of by the different Governments of the day. The noble Lord seemed to think we were going to proceed on the same lines as before the War, without having made any improvements in our methods or any consistent step forward in the right direction. I do not think that is really what the noble Lord means.
LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE: I did not suggest that.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: I think the noble Lord knows of the coordination which is in existence at the present moment. I shall hope to show before I sit down that the system which is now in existence, though like all systems it cannot be called a perfect system, nevertheless is one which we believe does meet the needs and necessities of the moment better than any other system that could perhaps be suggested at this time.
The noble Lord, Lord Marley, also raised many matters which I am not able to discuss to-night. He touched upon smaller points rather than larger ones, such, for instance, as the co-ordination of the Medical Services and of the Chaplains to the Forces, and matters of that kind. I agree with the noble Lord that those are very important matters indeed, but I should have thought that from the Ministerial experience which he has had he would know how these matters are dealt with arid that it is the continual study of those in authority to see how these matters can be co-ordinated. I think he is aware that the Weir-Mond Committee in connection with Medical Services said that an amalgamation was not advisable and that it was doubtful if any substantial economies could be effected. I think the noble Lord knows also very well that at home we have only three hospitals, two of which are at Halton and Cranwell, which, as he is aware, are large stations remote from the naval and military hospitals and stations where hundreds of young officers and apprentices are quartered. If he will look into the matter closely he will find that in these matters co-ordination and amalgamation are the object and aim of those who are in authority. As regards chaplains, there is no Air Force chaplain

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where there is an Army chaplain in existence. I think the noble Lord is perhaps not aware that there is a Joint Chaplains Co-ordinating Committee for the three Services. I agree that these matters are of great importance, but they are being continually looked into and where amalgamation and co-ordination can be effected that is one of the chief objects of those who deal with these matters.
The noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, raised a very important question of the wider consideration of warfare in the future. He is well aware of the machinery which exists at the present moment, but I am quite willing to say that his suggestion that officers might be seconded for this purpose is a matter certainly for very serious consideration. These duties are performed, as I shall show later on, by the Committee of Imperial Defence and by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, but the question as to whether there should he a Staff of continually seconded officers is certainly a matter for consideration, and I shall represent it to those quarters in which these matters are considered.
The noble Lord who raised this question desired naturally to satisfy himself as to whether an efficient co-ordination exists between the three Defence Services, or whether the system at present in existence can be improved by the establishment of a Ministry of Defence presided over by a Cabinet Minister with three junior Ministers controlling the three Services. I think that is really the noble Lord's case—that the three Services should be amalgamated together, that a Minister should preside over those three Services and that the Departments themselves should be controlled by junior Ministers who might correspond to Under-Secretaries of State. I am prepared to admit to the noble Lord that I have held views not dissimilar to those which he has put forward himself, and I have perhaps even gone further than the noble Lord and have believed that various Ministries of what I may call a homogeneous character could be concentrated under the authority and control of a single Minister. But after the close examination and after the considerable study which I have given to this subject, I feel that practice has shown us that instead of contracting offices under one chief the opposite tendency has
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compelled us to take a quite opposite course and, as my noble friend who sits on the Cross Benches has shown us, we have seen an increase in the number of Cabinet Ministers.
We often hear that this is quite unnecessary and we sometimes hear that it is due to a venal desire to increase posts and emoluments and to increase civil servants, and altogether to put additional burdens on the already overburdened back of the taxpayer. But I do feel that a very brief comparison of modern business, not only with the business before the War but with the business of the last century, shows an increase so remarkable that I am probably correct in saying that the number of Ministries and the number of officials are, in proportion to the business which has to be transacted, fewer than formerly. As I have said, the noble Lord has really confined himself to the most efficient method of co-ordination of the three Services. That is a matter which interests us all and on which we should be wrong if we were not prepared to listen to all the advice given us, no matter from what quarter that advice comes. The noble Lord was supported by the noble Lord who sits opposite, Lord Strabolgi, and I should like to join with my noble friend Earl Peel in congratulating him on his speech and to say that we are very gratified to hear the words which fell from him. Although perhaps I shall not find myself in agreement with everything he says, still, with the noble Lord's experience in another place and his experience in the Navy, we know that we shall hear from him most capable and valuable contributions to our debates.
As regards the history of the development of the organisation at which we have arrived at this moment, I do not know if your Lordships are aware that at one time the conduct of war was in the hands of the Department of War and Colonies and this system remained in being until the Crimean War, when owing to the terrible inefficiency of the Army—only counterbalanced, as Kinglake tells us, by the fighting qualities of the soldiers—it became necessary to look very closely into these matters. At the time of the South African War the War Office was still not a satisfactory machine, and as a result of criticism the Esher Committee was appointed and the whole war administrative machine was thereby over

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hauled. The War Office organisation was approximated to that of the Admiralty and to-day the systems of those two Departments and of the Air Ministry are in outline very similar.
The Esher Committee, however, did not limit itself to the overhaul of the War Office. In its first Report the Committee pointed out that:
"The British Empire is pre-eminently a great Naval, Indian and Colonial Power. There are, nevertheless, no means for coordinating defence problems, for dealing with them as a whole, for defining the proper functions of the various elements, and for ensuring that, on the one hand, peace preparations are carried out upon a consistent plan, and, on the other hand, that, in times of emergency, a definite war policy based upon solid data can be formulated."
Following the Committee's recommendations, and—as I know I am correctly informed—owing to the able representations by the noble Earl, Lord Selborne, and the noble Earl, Lord Midleton, the Committee of Imperial Defence was set up not only to meet these particular needs, but also generally for the purpose of co-ordinating the whole of our defence preparations. That work of co-ordination was immensely developed during the years preceding the War. At the present time it is not an exaggeration to claim that the objects for which the Committee of Imperial Defence was established are completely fulfilled.
In the early part of the War the machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence was utilised for the various bodies that directed the War effort as a whole, which were known successively as the War Council, the Dardanelles Committee and the War Committee. After the change of Government in December, 1916, the War Cabinet was formed, which absorbed the powers of the Cabinet and employed the machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the same system was later extended to the Imperial War Cabinet which coordinated the War effort of the Empire. After the War we reverted to the pre-War system of the Committee of Imperial Defence, strengthened in the light of war experience by the recommendations of a Committee presided over by the Marquess of Salisbury in 1923. Since that time there has been an immense increase in co-ordination, to which I shall refer later, but at this moment it might be interesting if I were to quote the answer given by Mr.
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Baldwin on February 25, 1926, to the present Prime Minister:
"We are convinced that the way to secure the higher co-ordination in our defence machinery, indispensable to full efficiency and, indeed, to economy, lies in combined action between all three through the machinery of the Committee of imperial Defence and the agency of the recently instituted Committee of Chiefs of Staff."
From 1918 to 1921 an experiment took place which has some bearing on a Ministry of Defence. During those years there was a single Secretary of State for War and Air with a Deputy Minister in the Air Ministry. The unsatisfactory nature of this arrangement was developed in the House of Commons on November 12, 1919, in the personal statement made by General Seely, who now sits in this House and who I am sorry not to see in his place to-day. Lord Mottistone has described the arrangement as "inefficient and wasteful" and "inimical to the interests of the Air Service." If that was true of one Ministry and in a case where the Secretary of State was a statesman of exceptional experience and of great industry, and when his Deputy was one of his most intimate friends, it would be infinitely more true of the Ministers who would come together in the ordinary course of affairs when there were three Deputies working under one Minister of Defence. That was the time after the War when the Air Force sank to its lowest point. The large and efficient Air Force with which we came out of the War was ruthlessly cut down; there was hardly any Air Force, and, within a year or two after a separate Secretary of State for Air had been appointed, we were compelled by actual national danger, revealed as the result of an Inquiry at the Committee of Imperial Defence, to start to recreate our Air Force. The plan of control by a single Secretary of State of two Departments, with a Deputy in one, was recognised as a failure and was dropped in 1921.
This is not an encouraging precedent to the proposals contained in the Motion before the House, and if I might make one reference to the remark made by Lord Strabolgi I would here mention to your Lordships that France has tried a system of a Ministry of Defence. On the formation of the Tardieu Government in February, 1932, the Ministers of the three Fighting Services were replaced by a

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Minister of National Defence, assisted by Under-Secretaries. The experiment, however, was, I gather, not a success, and with the change of Government in June, 1932, there was a return to the former system of a Minister for each of the three Fighting Services. Co-ordination is secured by machinery not unlike our own Committee of Imperial Defence. However, let us assume that it has been decided to set up a Ministry of Defence with a single Minister at its head and perhaps we may be able to consider what his duties would be in time of peace.
First of all he would have to attend the Cabinet, to speak on all Service questions with full knowledge, and, in addition, to watch all questions which re-act upon the Defence Services—matters of foreign, Indian and Colonial policy, and so forth. The Minister can only do that if he is very well up in all aspects of Service questions; otherwise, he would sometimes riot be sufficiently informed to realise that one or other of his Services is affected. He will have to be a member not only of every Cabinet Committee on all or any of the Defence Services or their branches, but also of many of those dealing with matters of Disarmament, Foreign, Middle East or Colonial policy, and many other matters in which the Services are concerned, whether in the first or the second degree. He will have to represent the Services at the meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence and to be a member of its Sub-committees, taking part quite frequently in long and detailed inquiries, in which he will have to speak for all three Services. If he is a member of the House of Commons he will have to speak on all the aspects of the Services arid to answer a great many questions. I hardly think the individual exists at the present moment in such a physical condition that he would be able to undertake all those duties, or, what is much more important, be able to discharge them with the efficiency and knowledge which the country has a right to expect.
One of the most important duties of a Service Minister is to visit and inspect the different establishments for which he is responsible. There is no other way by which he can make those personal contacts with officers and men of the Services, and with the numerous forces and establishments, industrial and otherwise, under his control. These visits are essential
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if he is to be familiar with his subject and to be in a position to adminster his Department with knowledge, efficiency and economy. I myself have only just completed a very extensive tour of inspection throughout the Air Force commands and stations in Egypt, in the Soudan, Trans-Jordan, Iraq and India. My predecessors did the same. The First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War are constantly making similar inspections. Even to-day, with three Ministers at the head of the Defence Services, their pre-occupations with the Cabinet and Parliament sometimes make it difficult for them to visit and inspect as much as they would like. For a Minister of Defence who would be in control of three Services such visits would be almost impossible. I must confess that even now I have been unable to inspect every unit and establishment in this country, and the reason is that the so-called holidays and week-ends for Service reasons are quite unsuitable for this work, and the remainder of the week—as your Lordships know, though I am not sure that the noble Lord who raised this question is aware of this—is so occupied with Parliamentary, Departmental and Cabinet duties that I have had to keep on postponing this obvious duty.
These inspections are of the greatest importance in connection with the making of high appointments in the Services. Many of the appointments of the Defence Services require very special qualities, for on the holders are thrown quasi-diplomatic tasks of a delicate character in many parts of the world. As these appointments become due, it is vital that the Minister should have first hand knowledge of the individual and not have to rely entirely on second-hand information. If it is important in peace, it is even more important in war. How is a Minister of Defence ever to have knowledge of the personnel of three Services, since he will never have time for proper inspections? At times the Minister at the head of the Defence Departments may have to attend International Conferences abroad. On one occasion Lord Lee was absent for several months at the Washington Naval Conference. The Disarmament Conference at Geneva has made a heavy, and I must say at times an embarrassing, demand on the time of the Service Ministers. How is a Minister of Defence to

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look after the affairs of three Services, when his whole preoccupations may have to be given for months together to a Disarmament Conference, or some other Conference at which his presence is essential?
One suggestion that has been made for surmounting the difficulty is that the Defence Minister should have Deputies. That is a most unsatisfactory arrangement. The Deputy Minister's position must inevitably be anomalous. He cannot settle any considerable question or fill any important appointment. He is merely what I might call an extra piece of machinery, interposed between the Staff or the permanent advisers and the Minister. The principal officers of the three Service Departments cannot be expected to accept decisions on questions of policy from a subordinate and deputy Minister. They will rightly insist on having a decision direct from the head of the Department and on maintaining personal contact with him. Yet a Defence Minister will not be fitted to take those decisions unless he is carrying on what I might call the day-to-day routine work of a Cabinet Minister at the head of a Department. No one can deal effectively with these questions unless he is familiar with all the essential details. Neither economy nor efficiency will be promoted by over-centralisation, and the whole tendency of modern administration is quite in the other direction. There is a definite limit to wise rationalisation and that limit would, in my judgment, be passed by any attempt to set up what is called a single Ministry of Defence. As I have already said, the tendency of modern administration has been the other way. In comparatively recent years, besides the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Pensions, there have been established the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Transport, the Dominions Office and sub-departments under the control of Under-Secretaries, such as the Overseas Trade Department and the Mines Department. These developments have taken place to meet an absolute necessity.
Those are the duties which would devolve on the Minister of Defence in time of peace. Now let us try and imagine the task of a Minister of Defence in a major war!The Cabinet, or War Cabinet, or War Committee, would be meeting every day and sometimes twice or thrice a day. They would set up
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many Committees on which the Minister would have to sit. He would be expected to give these bodies at every meeting an appreciation of all the latest developments of warfare, of movements of the forces, training and so forth in three elements. Apart from naval, military and air questions on which he would be expected to lead the Cabinet or War Committee, he would have to bring his mind to bear on the naval, military and air aspects of innumerable questions of Government policy and administration. He would have a huge administrative task to perform; he would have great numbers of high appointments to make. The expansion of the three forces would raise innumerable problems of the greatest complexity, necessitating his personal attention. There would be much legislation for him to see through Parliament. At all hours of the day and night—as anyone who reads the published memoirs of statesmen during the War can see—most difficult and complex problems would present themselves, often simultaneously. Sometimes, as constantly occurred in the Great War, he would have to hurry away to some International Conference or discussion. To anyone who has examined into the work of the supreme control in the Great War, the idea that one man could control it all is fantastic.
It is absolutely certain that in any major war the effective control of the three Services would, at a very early stage, pass beyond the capacity of any single Minister, however competent and industrious he might be. During the Great War we found ourselves compelled to carve out of the then two Service Departments a Ministry of National Service, a Ministry of Munitions, and a Ministry of Air, while several of the other new Departments derived part of their functions from the Service parts, such as the Ministries of Shipping, Blockade and Information. It is certain that in a war of this magnitude we should have to re-establish some at any rate of these Departments. To have to expand in addition from a single Defence Ministry into the three great Service Departments would cause the utmost chaos and confusion. Even that would be less serious than an attempt to try and control them by a single Minister.

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There is a form of Ministry of Defence which has been alluded to to-day, and that is a Ministry superimposed on the existing organisations. That has been dealt with by my noble friend Lord Lloyd, who has shown the great difficulties which would have to be faced by having three Cabinet Ministers arid a Minister of Defence all sitting in the Cabinet. I hardly think I need enumerate all the difficulties which would naturally arise in such circumstances, or discuss the fact that the Minister of Defence would find himself in a most difficult position, more in the position of the fifth wheel to the coach than anything else. In fact, such a position as that of Minister of Defence can only be occupied by the Prime Minister. Some idea of how the proposal for a superimposed Minister of Defence would work can be gained from the experience in the Committee of Imperial Defence after the War. Before the outbreak of War the Prime Minister had invariably presided over the Committee of Imperial Defence, and during the War he presided at. the various War Councils, War Cabinets and so forth. After the War, when successive Prime Ministers were immersed in International Conferences and other overwhelming public business, several experiments were made in delegating part of the work to a Chairman. I am assured by those who are competent to speak that under this system there was often a certain loss of authority, and attendances of members were less regular.
Since 1925, the Prime Minister of the day has regularly attended the Committee of Imperial Defence and the authority of the Committee has automatically been reestablished and its prestige fully restored. The fact is—and I think your Lordships will agree with me—that no one except the Prime Minister carries enough weight to give the last word when difficult questions have to be decided. The work, owing to the efficient organisation I am entitled to say exists, is not unduly burdensome because detailed work is delegated to Sub-committees and the meetings of the actual Committee of Imperial Defence are not frequent. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister of the day always manages to keep an eye on the progress of the work of the whole organisation. This is perhaps facilitated by an arrangement under which the Secretary to the Committee of Imperial
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Defence is also Secretary to the Cabinet, which enables him to keep the Prime Minister informed as to the state of the work of both bodies. Here I am sure your Lordships will join me in paying tribute to the able and devoted work of Sir Maurice Hankey, who has for so many years held these two important offices with such advantage to his country and with such distinction to himself. Another point worthy of mention is that if war should occur the conduct of the war inevitably becomes the main policy of the Government. No one can expound the main policy of the Government in Parliament with the same authority as the Prime Minister, and as far as I know, there has never been a substitute for the Prime Minister in this connection in any democratically-governed country. The Prime Minister will obviously be better equipped for such an emergency if he is at the head of the body which formulates for consideration by the Cabinet the general policy of the country on Imperial Defence, and that body is the Committee of Imperial Defence.
There have been several previous inquiries since the War into the question of a Ministry of Imperial Defence. I know that your Lordships to-day are asking that a further inquiry should be held, but I do feel that such an inquiry at this moment is quite unnecessary. There was the Committee which was presided over by Lord Weir and which in February, 1922, reported in these terms:
"We are of opinion that in existing circumstances the complete or partial amalgamation of the common services of the three Fighting Departments is not advisable, and we do not believe that any substantial economies would thereby be effected."
There was another Committee presided over by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, which reported in practically the same way. As recently as 1931 the May Committee on National Expenditure reported that:
"Our conclusion after careful review of all the evidence is that no substantial reduction of cost would follow from the creation of a Ministry of National Defence, and that on the contrary there would be a serious risk that the efficiency of the Services might be impaired by the alteration of system involved."
It may be added that for many years the heads of all the Fighting Services and of the Civil Service have been opposed to the idea.

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Rather than make radical changes in our present system, with all the dangers of inefficiency and waste which that might entail, it is surely better to build on a system which proved very useful before the War; which was easily adaptable to the circumstances of war; and which has made vast strides since the War to meet the difficulties of co-ordination occasioned by the advent of a third Service. That system is now very complete indeed, and perhaps I may in a few words indicate the system as it stands at the present moment. I was sorry to note in the remarks of the noble Lord and also in those of the noble Lord, Lord Marley, that they are both under the impression that there is an unseemly scramble between the three Defence Ministries for some sum of money which is dangled in front of them by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I can assure the noble Lord that nothing of the kind occurs. Our Estimates are carefully scrutinised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. They come before the Cabinet and are considered, and we are apportioned that sum of money for which we ask—and which is denied us sometimes!I have seldom been present when a higher Estimate has been forced on a Minister—that is quite true—but these Estimates are very carefully considered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and also by the Cabinet.
The Committee of Imperial Defence, as has often been announced, is a consultative and advisory body, and the members of that Committee are, in practice, the Prime Minister, the Lord President of the Council the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, India, Dominion Affairs, Colonies, War, Air and the First Lord of the Admiralty, as well as the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services and the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury. All these are ordinarily summoned. Other Ministers and other persons, including representatives of the Dominions, frequently attend. In recent years attendance by Dominion representatives, when available, has been more and more frequent. The functions of the Committee are those which I have already mentioned in the recommendations put forward as long ago as the Esher Committee. It may interest your Lordships to know that during 1933 no fewer than 405 persons were associated in the work
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of the Committee. These included twenty-one Cabinet and other Ministers; 135 Service officers of different ranks; 211 civil servants; thirty-eight persons outside the Government Service, besides several Dominion representatives, and Governors of Colonies.
The aim of the Sub-committee system is to place the Defence Services and the Defence functions of Civilian Departments in contact and to cover every phase where co-ordination is necessary by concerted arrangements, but without interference with the administrative responsibility of the several Departments. Some idea of the principle of the Subcommittee system may be gained by considering the organisation of any of the Defence Service Departments. Each of them has under the political head of the Department, a Board or Council. The Committee of Imperial Defence, with the Prime Minister at its head, corresponds to this. Each Service Department has a First Member of the Board or Council whose sphere of activity is defence policy, strategy, tactics, training. But I will not weary your Lordships with all these minor details, because I am quite sure that they are in your Lordships' minds, although from some of the speeches which I have heard this evening I do feel that there is an ignorance, if I may use that, expression, of this mechanism which is working, I might almost say, day and night, and carrying out those objects which the noble Lord has put forward.
There are three great pivotal bodies (as I may call them) of the organisation of the Committee of Imperial Defence. There is the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee; there is the Man-Power Committee, which deals with those matters to which the noble Lord drew the attention of your Lordships; and there is another Committee which emphasises the coordinating principles of the Committee of Imperial Defence, known as the Principal Supply Officers Committee. Of course there are as well a number of subordinate Committees planning and co-ordinating in a great variety of details. It should be noted, however, that it has been found necessary to associate in the work of these Committees not only the Defence Services but Civilian Departments as well. The Prime Minister himself is the President of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee, which, I think, disposes

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of the doubt which was in the minds of some of your Lordships as to whether the Chiefs of Staff would have access to the Prime Minister. He is the President of that Sub-committee, which is the most important body dealing with co-ordination of Service policy, although it is not necessary for him to attend its meetings except on special occasions. Nevertheless he is in touch with its work.
The Man-Power Committee and the Principal Supply Officers Committee are presided over by Cabinet Ministers, and include representatives of a large number of Government Departments concerned in their work. The object of these two Committees is to plan our arrangements in order to avoid the costly mistakes of the last War. But besides the three great pivotal Sub-committees already mentioned there are numbers of other Committees, each with its own complete organisation, some including several Cabinet Ministers, and others only officials. They deal, among other subjects, with home defence, overseas defences, Middle East questions, Imperial communications, air raids precautions, all kinds of censorship in war time, the co-ordination of the whole for the possibility of a war emergency, and a variety of other matters relating to Imperial defence. Connected with the Committee of Imperial Defence and under the immediate supervision of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, except so far as administration is concerned, is the Imperial Defence College. Here senior officers of the three Services, as well as officers from the Dominions and India, and selected civil servants both from this country and the Dominions, are trained for co-operation in higher Staff work. It is interesting to mention that many of the graduates at the Imperial Defence College now occupy posts in which they come into almost daily contact with the other Defence Services at the Committee of Imperial Defence, with great practical benefit in co-operation.
The idea so sedulously fostered in some quarters that the Defence Services are in a continual state of warfare, and struggling together for limited sums of money available for defence, has no foundation in fact. Every year the situation as a whole is surveyed in its defence policy aspects by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee (with the aid of material furnished by the Foreign Office and other 204
Departments), while the administration side is surveyed by the Co-ordination Committee, which includes the permanent heads of all Government Departments concerned. Those surveys bring to the notice of the Committee of Imperial Defence any new factors in the situation that require examination. These reports are considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence, who submit them, with their observations, to the Cabinet. The Estimates are then worked out on the basis of the policy finally approved by the Cabinet. The Estimates are co-ordinated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Treasury, in the light of the financial situation and of the approved policy, before they are submitted to Parliament.
LORD MARLEY: Will the noble Marquess say how often the Committee of Imperial Defence meets, and how many meetings there are of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee?
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: I have not those figures with me, but the whole organisation of the Committee of Imperial Defence, the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee and the other Subcommittees which I have mentioned—this complete network is, I might almost say, in continual session. The Committee of Imperial Defence meets probably once or twice a month, or perhaps not as often as that. The Prime Minister presides at all those meetings; and the Chiefs of Staff are in continual communication with each other. I have not the numbers of their meetings, but that is a figure which I will give the noble Lord.
LORD MARLEY: I was thinking of the Sub-committee presided over by the Prime Minister. That is all.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: The Prime Minister does not often attend the meetings of the Sub-committee of Chiefs of Staff, but he is the President of that Committee, and is in continual and close contact with the reports which are made by that Committee. In my judgment, and I hope in the judgment of your Lordships, this system maintains the authority of the Cabinet and Parliament, and also the responsibility of Ministers and their Departments, while at the same time it ensures that, both in policy and in detail, their plans and preparations for

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all matters connected with the defence of the country, and the future plans which will have to be adopted in case the situation changes, are concerted. I think I am entitled to say that it is a progressive system, that it ensures that the whole situation is continuously under review, and that all new factors are immediately taken into consideration. It associates Civilian Departments of Government and outside experts with the work of defensive preparation over a very wide field—and the Great War showed how vital are the ancillary services that they have to perform. In addition, this great advisory body is at the disposal of, and made considerable use of by, the Dominions and India, when they so desire. The system provides for the education of a Staff in these higher functions. Above all, it is at the present time achieving one of the essential bases of any defensive system—namely, the proper co-ordination of the activities of all the Departments concerned.
I must apologise to your Lordships for the length of the speech which I have delivered to you this evening, but in view of the debate which was raised and the questions which were asked I felt that it was of the highest importance that I should make as clear as I could the arrangements under which this co-ordination, which has been Questioned, is being carried out.
LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE: My Lords, I must thank the noble Marquess for his long and very interesting reply. I should be a poor pupil indeed of the Chiefs whom I have served if I for a moment suggested that the Minister of Defence should look after the detailed working of each Service. I never for a moment suggested such a thing. What I did say was that you do want a machine for preparing and executing plans and for advising the Prime Minister on the various items of information which you receive. I think the speech of the noble Marquess to-night is a splendid exposition of that situation. I think he has given every argument why you want to have such an Executive. There are innumerable Committees and an extraordinary amount of information is collected with nobody to co-ordinate it except the individual Services. You do want somebody of that kind to advise
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the Prime Minister and the Government. However at this late hour I do not want to develop that theme further. I thank the noble Marquess for his reply and I ask the House to allow me to withdraw my demand for Papers.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

EXPLORATION FOR OIL IN PALES TINE AND TRANS-JORDAN.
VISCOUNT TEMPLETOWN: My Lords, I desire to ask His Majesty's Government whether, in view of the grave menace of the dependence of our Naval and Air Defence Services on alien or alien-controlled sources of supply of oil, His Majesty's Government will cease to leave the development of the Dead Sea oilfield to private enterprise, and will, forthwith, exercise its powers, under Article 11 of the Mandate for Palestine, and under Article 17 of the Agreement with the Amir of Trans-Jordan, itself to institute, without further delay, the prospecting for and development of these oil resources which are situated in a most strategic and easily accessible position and which are now under British control and protection?
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH): My Lords, I was not aware that the noble Viscount was going to ask this Question without developing and elaborating the subject. I am not quite clear as to the nature of the answer he expects from me in the circumstances, but I think that perhaps I might try to explain as briefly as possible to your Lordships what is the position in regard to this matter. I promise not to delay the House longer than is absolutely necessary. I need hardly say, to begin with, that the Government are fully alive to the importance of oil development generally, and that they seek wherever possible to safeguard the legitimate interests of His Majesty's Government. In the particular case which the noble Viscount has raised to-day, His Majesty's Government have proceeded on lines similar to those adopted in the Colonial Empire in the introduction of legislation designed to secure under proper conditions the development of such oilfields as may be found to exist. In so doing they have had in mind their duty under the terms

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of the Mandate which lays down in Article 11 that the Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary steps to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country.
Perhaps I might explain to your Lordships in a few words the provisions of the Palestine legislation in regard to this matter. In the first place, if anybody wants to investigate the oil possibilities of Palestine, an application has to be made for an exploration permit, and the applicant has to produce satisfactory evidence that he can command sufficient working capital and technical knowledge or assistance to ensure proper and adequate exploration. He has also to undertake to carry out a geological and mineral survey to the satisfaction of the Controller of Mines. This exploration permit is exclusive to the applicant, and the area of any one permit is limited to a Maximum of 500 square kilometres. The permit lasts for two years. If the holder fulfils those conditions, it gives him a preferential and an exclusive right to what is known as a prospecting oil licence, and that licence is over a portion not exceeding 4 per cent. of the area explored by him to the satisfaction of the Controller. Here again, before he is granted a prospecting oil licence, he has to give satisfactory assurances that he has sufficient working capital at his command and technical knowledge at his disposal.
I need not go into the details of the conditions governing these oil licences. They last, I think, for one year and can be renewed up to a maximum of five years, but, in the event of oil being discovered in economic quantities, he is granted what is known as a certificate of discovery. The holder of such a certificate has the right to apply finally for a mining oil lease which shall be granted, again under the conditions that I have enumerated, that he can produce evidence to show that he has sufficient working capital and technical knowledge. This mining oil lease is granted for a period not exceeding thirty years, and can cover at present an area of something like 1,000 square kilometres. This legislation is similar to oil legislation within the Empire and our experience is that it has worked perfectly satisfactorily in the past. Incidentally, your Lordships may be interested to know that a foreign oil
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expert who visited Palestine described the Palestine legislation as one of the best combined mining and oil laws, from the oil operator's standpoint, with which he was familiar.
The noble Viscount in his Question suggests that the Palestine Government should cease to allow private prospecting for oil, and that they should themselves assume responsibility both for the investigation of possible oil resources and their development. I do not favour that suggestion. I say that quite frankly. I venture to suggest that the Government would be better advised to follow the procedure which has worked elsewhere with satisfactory results. I must remind your Lordships that so far as Palestine is concerned, the views with regard to the presence of oil there are conflicting, and no substantial oil resources have yet been definitely proved to exist. Therefore there seems to be every advantage in allowing companies or individuals who are willing and qualified under the law to take out exploration permits.
In this connection it must be realised that the mere existence of surface occurrences of oil, such as have been noticed round the Dead Sea, are not necessarily evidence of the existence of commercial oilfields. In the opinion of the Government the position can at present only be looked upon as speculative, and they would not, therefore, be disposed to consider the substitution of Government for private enterprise. Oil development at the best of times, as I think all your Lordships know, is a very risky undertaking, and can only be satisfactorily undertaken by people with considerable experience. If the work is to be properly carried out very large sums of money would have to be provided and if oil is not found this money naturally would prove to have been wasted. Speculative work of this character is hardly, I venture to say, a suitable medium for the investment of Government funds. Even if oil were found in substantial quantities markets would have to be found for it and further large sums would be required for the provision of pipe lines, storage, tanks, and, perhaps, refineries as well.
I have referred up to now to Palestine, but of course the noble Lord's question includes the area of Trans-Jordan as well. I should like to say that as far as

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Trans-Jordan is concerned the position is similar to all intents and purposes to that in Palestine. The mining law is, in effect, identical but we naturally realise that constitutionally the position is different because the administration of Trans-Jordan has been delegated to the Amir and the Trans-Jordan Government. But the position in Trans-Jordan as well as in Palestine is that Article 11 of the Mandate governs the situation. The relevant portion of that Article is in these terms:
"The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the developiment of the, country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein."
This portion of Article 11, I would like to emphasise, applies equally to Trans-Jordan. The only difference is that in practice we do not directly administer Trans-Jordan as we do Palestine, but by virtue of the Agreement to which the noble Viscount referred His Majesty's Government is enabled to carry out its mandatory obligations for the territory of Trans-Jordan.
I draw attention to the wording of the Article which I quoted just now because
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it seems to me important that it should be clearly realised that under the Mandatory régime both for Palestine and for Trans-Jordan it is the interests of the mandated territories themselves which have to be considered. In conclusion, I would assure your Lordships that both the Palestine Government and the Trans-Jordan Government would welcome the discovery of oil in their territories in economic quantities, but as things are I feel certain that your Lordships will agree that there is nothing to be gained by endeavouring to alter die existing procedure which contemplates development by means of private enterprise. I can assure your Lordships that His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the importance of any new oilfields, and that the position in the areas with which we are dealing will be closely watched in the future.
VISCOUNT TEMPLETOWN: My Lords, I wish to thank the noble Earl for the kind way in which he has dealt with my Question. I may say that I came here very much in ignorance of some of the things which I have heard to-night. I wanted to be quite sure that I knew the whole case because I wish to retain the right to draw attention to the matter again on a future occasion.
House adjourned at five minutes past seven o'clock.

Preamble
TIVERTON CORPORATION.
PETITION FOR BILL.
Examiners' Certificate of non-compliance with the Standing Orders referred to the Standing Orders Committee.

STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE.
Report from, That the Standing Orders not complied with in respect of the petition for additional provision in the
Tyne Improvement Bill. [H.L.]
ought to be dispensed with, and leave given to the Committee on the Bill to insert the additional provision: Read, and agreed to.

TORQUAY CORPORATION BILL. [H.L.]
Committed: the Committee to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.

AIRE AND CALDER NAVIGATION BILL.
Committed.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (CROSBY, LITHERLAND AND WATERLOO JOINT CEMETERY DISTRICT) BILL.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (ROCHESTER, CHATHAM AND GILLINGHAM JOINT SEWERAGE DISTRICT) BILL.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (WIRRAL JOINT HOSPITAL DISTRICT) BILL.
Committed.