Sitting of 15 May 1930

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.
Rochdale Corporation (No. 2) Bill, Read the Third time, and passed.
Kingsbridge and Salcombe Water Board Bill (Certified Bill),
As amended, considered; read the Third time (pursuant to the Order of the House of 11th December), and passed.
Derby Corporation Bill,
Order for Consideration of Lords Amendments read.
Mr. CHARLES WILLIAMS: Object!
Mr. SPEAKER: I am not quite certain what it is to which the hon. Member objects.
Mr. WILLIAMS: I want an explanation as to how this Bill affects unemployment.
Mr. SPEAKER: This is not the time for that.
Motion made, and Question, "That the Lords Amendments be now considered," put, and agreed to.
Lords Amendments considered accordingly.
Lords Amendment, In page 7, line 11, insert new

CLAUSE 6.—(For Protection of John Alfred Edwin Drury-Lowe.)
Mr. WILLIAMS: On this, I think that I am entitled to ask for an explanation from the hon. Member. It is some time since he gave an explanation, and I think that we should have a full explanation.
Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member said that he wishes to raise a question as to the effect of this Bill on unemployment. This is not the time to do that. That should have been done on the Second or Third Reading of the Bill.
Mr. WILLIAMS: Does that prevent me from asking for an explanation of this particular Clause?
Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member would be entitled to do that.
Mr. WILLIAMS: I do ask for an explanation.
Mr. SPEAKER: Further consideration of the Bill had better be deferred. What day?
The CHAIRMAN of WAYS and MEANS (Mr. Robert Young): Monday.
Further consideration deferred until Monday next.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (HENDON RURAL) BILL,
"to confirm a Provisional Order of the Minister of Health relating to Hendon Rural District," presented by Mr. Greenwood; read the First time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, and to be printed. [Bill 193.]
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS (GOOLE AND OLDHAM) BILL,
"to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Minister of Health relating to Goole and Oldham," presented by Mr. Greenwood; read the First time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, and to be printed. [Bill 194.]
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS (DONCASTER, SAINT IVES (CORNWALL), AND SCARBOROUGH) BILL,
"to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Minister of Health relating to Doncaster, Saint Ives (Cornwall), and Scarborough," presented by Mr. Greenwood; read the First time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, and to be printed. [Bill 195.]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
  UNEMPLOYMENT.

    BOROUGH.
    Mr. DAYasked the Minister of Labour the total number of claims considered for benefit by the Walworth

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    Borough Employment Exchange to the 12 months ended to the last convenient date, and the total number of such claims recommended for disallowance during the same period?
    The MINISTER of LABOUR (Miss Bondfield): As the reply contains a number of figures, I will, if I may, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. DAY: Can my right hon. Friend say whether the claims which are recommended for disallowance have increased at that Exchange?
    Miss BONDFIELD: It is a very long reply, and I would ask the hon. Member to look at it.
    Following is the reply:
    During the period 9th April, 1929, to 14th April, 1930, 61,322 fresh and renewal applications for unemployment benefit were made at the Borough Employment Exchange. During the period 9th April, 1929, to 12th March, 1930, 5,511 applications for benefit were disallowed by insurance officers, and 317 cases were recommended for disallowance by courts of referees on review after payment of 78 days' benefit. On 13th March the new Act came into operation under which disallowances of benefit (except in trade dispute cases) can only be imposed by courts of referees; between that date and 14th April, 1930, 243 applications for benefit made at this Exchange were disallowed by courts of referees.

    TRANSFERRED WORKERS' DEATH, SOUTHAMPTON.
    Mr. McSHANEasked the Minister of Labour whether she is aware that Mr. Harry Lynex, of 100, Cobden Street Walsall, was sent, under threat of losing his unemployment pay, by the Walsall Employment Exchange to a labourer's situation at Southampton; that there, within a few days, he contracted meningitis from which he died; that this disease is infectious and endemic in seaports and barrack towns; and that to bring his body home his parents, who are poor, had to pay £11 10s., apart from funeral expenses; and whether, under these circumstances, she will consider making some ex-gratia payment to his parents for the financial loss sustained?
    Miss BONDFIELD: Mr. Lynex was in training at the Department's centre at
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    Garrison Lane, Birmingham, for the six months ending 6th March, 1929, and during that period lived at home. Employment was not available for him immediately after the end of his training but he was placed in a job at Southampton on 15th July, 1929. I have made inquiries into the allegation that he was sent to this job under threat of losing his unemployment benefit, and have ascertained that when Mr. Lynex was interviewed and informed of the vacancy he expressed his satisfaction and agreement to undertake the work, and that no question arose with regard to threatened loss of benefit. I desire to express my sympathy with his parents on account of his death, but as regards any question of making an ex-gratia payment I must make it clear that there is no ground on which such a payment could be justified.
    Mr. McSHANE: With regard to the second part of the answer that there was no loss of unemployment benefit, is the right hon. Lady aware that he had already been thrown off his benefit? When he was thrown off, he was told that his parents would have to keep him. We took the matter up and got him re-established on unemployment benefit.
    Miss BONDFIELD: That information does not accord with the information in my possession.
    Mr. McSHANE: Apart altogether from the personal sorrow of the father and mother in this case, I would like to ask the right hon. Lady whether I am to understand that, in sad cases like this, there is to be no touch of human kindness at all in the Ministry of Labour?
    Mr. HERBERT GIBSON: Is it the Minister's opinion that in exceptional cases like this—[Interruption].
    Mr. McSHANE: I wish to give notice that, owing to the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I shall raise this matter at the earliest opportunity on the Adjournment.

    WOOL-PACKERS, TAVISTOCK.
    Sir BERTRAM FALLEasked the Minister of Labour if she is aware that the wool-packing factory at Tavistock recently made a 10 per cent. reduction in wages; that all men employed had to accept this or leave; that the men who

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    refused these lower wages have been adjudged ineligible for unemployment benefit, and that the wages for wool-packers at Tavistock were 35s. for a 54-hour week and, after the reduction, 31s. 6d.; and will she state on what grounds these men have been deprived of unemployment benefit?
    Miss BONDFIELD: I am having inquiries made, and will communicate the result to the hon. Member as soon as they are completed.
    Sir B. FALLE: Is there a minimum wage below which a man cannot be forced to work without losing his unemployment benefit?
    Miss BONDFIELD: That depends on the nature of the agreement in his trade. Undoubtedly, there will be a minimum below which any man will not be expected to take a job.
    Lieut.-Colonel Sir FREDERICK HALL: Does not the Government recognise that the products of sweated labour are coming into this country without any tariff?

    GRANTHAM.
    Sir VICTOR WARRENDERasked the Minister of Labour the numbers of persons on the live register in Grantham on 1st May, 1929 and 1930, respectively, or the nearest available dates?
    Miss BONDFIELD: At 28th April, 1930, there were 1,002 persons on the registers of the Grantham Employment Exchange, as compared with 583 at 29th April, 1929.

    COURTS OF REFEREES.
    Mr. TINKERasked the Minister of Labour (1) how many additional Courts of Referees have been set up since the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1930, came into operation;
    (2) the number of appointments she has made of chairmen of Courts of Referees since the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1930, came into operation; and how many of them are members of the legal profession?
    Miss BONDFIELD: 106 new Courts of Referees are being established, and in addition the Metropolitan Court, which was formerly one Court with a panel of chairmen, is now divided into 45 separate Courts. The chairman necessary
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    for the new Courts are in process of selection. Up to the present two new chairmen have been appointed, one of whom is a member of the legal profession.

    SCOTLAND.
    Major COLVILLEasked the Minister of Labour the number of unemployed persons in Scotland at the latest available date, and how this figure compares with the corresponding figure for 1st June, 1929?
    Miss BONDFIELD: The number of persons on the registers of Employment Exchanges in Scotland at 5th May, 1930, was 213,178 as compared with 144,243 at 3rd June, 1929.
    Major COLVILLE: Is it not the case that the number of unemployed persons in Scotland has increased continuously since the present Government took office, until it has now reached a figure which has not been equalled for eight years?

  SAFEGUARDING OF INDUSTRIES (LACE).
  Major the Marquess of TITCHFIELDasked the Minister of Labour the number of people in the country employed in making machinery for the lace industry?
  Miss BONDFIELD: I regret that statistics respecting the number of persons engaged in making machinery for the lace industry are not available.
  Marquess of TITCHFIELDasked the Minister of Labour what was the total amount of wages paid to the lace workers in this country for the years 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928 and 1929?
  Miss BONDFIELD: I regret that statistics showing the total amount of wages paid to lace workers in the years 1924 to 1929 are not available.
  Marquess of TITCHFIELD: May I thank the right hon. Lady for her answer?

  TRADE BOARDS.
  Mr. MANDERasked the Minister of Labour whether any further applications for the setting up of trade boards have been received in addition to the catering trades; if she will state generally

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  what action has been taken in the matter since the Government took office; and whether any further steps are contemplated?
  Miss BONDFIELD: I have no applications under consideration at the present time apart from the catering trade. As regards the second and third parts of the question, I do not think that I can add anything to the replies previously given to the hon. Member.
  Mr. MANDER: Are not the Government prepared to take more energetic action to help the people who are suffering from bad conditions?
  Miss BONDFIELD: The absence of applications is the answer to that question.
  Mr. MANDER: Is it not possible for the Government to take the initiative?

  DOMESTIC SERVANTS (HOLIDAYS).
  Mr. MANDERasked the Minister of Labour if the Government are prepared to introduce legislation providing by law for domestic servants a compulsory weekly half holiday, Sunday afternoon every other week, and an annual holiday with pay?
  Miss BONDFIELD: No, Sir.

  WASHINGTON HOURS CON VENTION.
  Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHYasked the Minister of Labour particulars of the countries awaiting the passing of legislation by Great Britain to give effect to the Washington Hours Convention, before introducing similar legislation or enforcing legislation already passed?
  Captain PETER MACDONALDasked the Minister of Labour complete information up to date showing what countries have passed legislation giving effect to the terms of the Washington Hours Convention; and, of these countries, in what cases is the legislation in operation?
  Miss BONDFIELD: The following countries have ratified the Convention and are consequently under an obligation to give effect to its terms by legislation:
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  Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Greece, India, Luxemburg, Portugal, Rumania. Five other countries, namely, Austria, France, Italy, Latvia, and Spain have ratified the Convention, with a proviso that the ratification shall not become operative until the Convention has been ratified by certain other Powers. I cannot say whether the relevant legislation in these countries gives effect to the terms of the Convention or not.
  Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: In fact, there are five countries which are waiting for this House to ratify this Convention before they will do it?
  Miss BONDFIELD: That is so.
  Captain MACDONALD: Has the right hon. Lady had an assurance from those countries that have ratified the Convention that they place the same interpretation on it that we do in regard to hours of work?
  Miss BONDFIELD: Until we have ratified, we are not in the position to demand such an assurance.
  Captain MACDONALD: Is it not a fact that the reason for delay in ratification is that they place an entirely different interpretation on hours and wages?
  Miss BONDFIELD: That is a matter of opinion.
  Sir ARTHUR STEEL-MAITLAND: If we do ratify it, shall we be in a position to demand that they should place the same interpretation upon it?
  Miss BONDFIELD: We shall certainly be in a position to ask for full reports.
  Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: With reference to the right hon. Lady's previous reply, shall we be in a position to demand it, so that we can be secure that, when we have ratified, a similar interpretation will be placed on these most important phrases by other countries?
  Miss BONDFIELD: I think that the right hon. Gentleman is fully seized of the procedure that will be adopted; he knows that we shall then have certain rights which we do not possess at the present time.
  Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: Is there any guarantee under these circumstances?
  Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Has not this legislation been held up by the right hon. Gentleman opposite?
  Sir V. WARRENDERasked the Minister of Labour at what date the Washington Hours Convention must come up for revision?
  Miss BONDFIELD: Under Article 21 of the Convention the Governing Body of the International Labour Office is required before the 13th June, 1931, to present to the General Conference a report on the working of the Convention, and to consider the desirability of placing on the agenda of the Conference the question of its revision or modification.
  Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: Will that hold good whether we pass legislation to ratify it or not?
  Major COLFOX: When may be expect that the House will proceed with the Second Reading of the Bill to secure ratification?
  Miss BONDFIELD: That question should be addressed to the Prime Minister.

  LABOUR CONDITIONS, EAST LONDON.
  Major NATHANasked the Minister of Labour whether her attention has been drawn to the sweated wages and unhealthy conditions of labour among many out-workers in East London, particularly in the boot and shoe industry; and whether she proposes to take steps, by the creation of a trade board or otherwise, to improve the conditions?
  Miss BONDFIELD: I assume that the hon. and gallant Member has in mind a report on conditions of employment in the boot industry in the East End of London, prepared by Dr. A. D. Denning, for the National Federation of Boot Manufacturers' Association and the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives. I am having inquiries made into the wages position in this trade in East London.
  Major NATHANasked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been
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  drawn to the conditions prevailing in many workshops and factories in the boot and shoe industry in East London; and whether he proposes to take any action?
  The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. Clynes): Representations on this subject were recently made by the Federation of Boot and Shoe Manufacturers and the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, and, after an interview with representatives of these associations, the Chief Inspector of Factories arranged for special inquiries, which are now in progress. I will give the matter my careful consideration as soon as the Chief Inspector's report is received.
  Major NATHAN: Will the report, when it is received, be published?
  Mr. CLYNES: I am not certain as to what is the usual practice on that head, but I will look into the matter.

  INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATIONS (DISCUSSIONS).
  Mr. MANDERasked the Minister of Labour whether it is proposed, in the near future, by voluntary action, with Government encouragement or otherwise, to establish a national industrial council?
  Miss BONDFIELD: The Trade Union Congress General Council, the National Confederation of Employers' Associations and the Federation of British Industries agreed early this year upon a joint scheme for the discussion between them of matters of common interest to British industry. In the view of the Government the proper course is to allow time for experience of the working of this scheme.
  Mr. MANDER: Cannot the Government do something to encourage its being brought into force, not leaving everything to others without themselves taking the initiative?
  Miss BONDFIELD: This Committee is brought into being.

  VIVISECTION.
  Mr. FREEMANasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is now in a position to state the number of experiments that were

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  conducted by vivisection during 1929; and, if so, how many were conducted on dogs and how many when inspectors were present in each case?
  Mr. CLYNES: I regret that the figures are not yet available.
  Mr. FREEMANasked the Home Secretary whether he will consider the desirability of withholding licences for further experiments on living animals which have been proved over a long perod of time to have failed to reduce the mortality figures, as in the case of cancer?
  Mr. CLYNES: The answer is in the negative. Having regard to the amount of suffering and the mortality caused by cancer, I could not take the responsibility of a general refusal to grant licences for experiments bearing on cancer which are recommended by the scientific authorities under the Act.

  CALCUTTA SWEEPSTAKE.
  Mr. DAYasked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been drawn to the fact that numbers of tickets for the Calcutta Sweepstake on the Derby are being obtained for the public through various sources; and whether he has issued any instructions to the police to take action in the matter?
  Mr. CLYNES: No evidence of the commission of any criminal offence has come to my notice.
  Mr. DAY: May I ask whether the decision as laid down as to the sale of tickets also applies to the sale of numbers of tickets—sales of tickets for the Calcutta Sweepstake?
  Mr. CLYNES: I should require notice of that question.
  Mr. DAY: Does not that more or less follow from what is in the question?
  Mr. HAYCOCK: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the questioner himself has purchased these tickets?
  Mr. CLYNES: If I were to know that, action might be taken.

  CLERK OF THE PEACE, STAFFORD SHIRE (SALARY).
  Mr. McSHANEasked the Home Secretary whether he has sanctioned the increase of the salary of the clerk of the peace for Staffordshire from £2,000 to £2,500?
  Mr. CLYNES: The present position is as stated in my reply to the hon. Member's question on the 6th instant.
  Mr. McSHANE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the gentleman to whom the question refers has at least six other jobs, and that his present—
  Mr. SPEAKER: The question merely asked for information, and the hon. Member is now going into another point.
  Mr. McSHANE: On a point of Order. The question I wish to ask has a distinct bearing upon whether the right hon. Gentleman should or should not sanction the appointment.
  Mr. SPEAKER: Perhaps the hon. Member will put down another question?

  RUSSIA.

    Arcos (Ex-EMPLOYÉS).
    Mr. SMITHERSasked the Home Secretary whether the 11 ex-employés of Arcos who are still in this country are under police supervision; and, if so, what are the conditions and regulations which are being applied to them and, especially, are their addresses known to the police and are they obliged to report themselves periodically?
    Mr. CLYNES: These aliens, like other aliens in this country, have to register their addresses and occupations, and any changes therein, with the police; but they have not to report periodically. They are not under police supervision; but it is always possible for me to make special inquiry about them.
    Mr. SMITHERS: In view of the record of these gentlemen, may I ask why the right hon. Gentleman is not taking special precautions to see that they are not engaging in propagandist activities in this country?
    Mr. CLYNES: It is because of their record that no further action than that which I have announced is thought desirable.

    CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVES (DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY).
    Lieut.-Colonel ACLAND-TROYTEasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the consular representatives of the Soviet Government in this country receive diplomatic immunity; and whether they are relieved from paying rates, either on their business premises or on their private residences?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Dalton): No, Sir. No consular representatives of foreign Governments in this country enjoy any diplomatic immunity nor any relief from rates either on their business premises or their private residences.
    Mr. ALBERY: Can the Under-Secretary give me any reason why it is necessary that members of a trade delegation should have these privileges?

  RACECOURSE BETTING CONTROL BOARD.
  Mr. RHYS DAVIESasked the Home Secretary if he will give the names of the persons appointed by each Government Department, respectively, at present serving on the Racecourse Betting Control Board?
  Mr. CLYNES: This information is set out on page 2 of the Board's report, to which I would refer my hon. Friend.
  Mr. DAVIES: Are we or the Departments responsible for the conduct of the business of this Board?
  Mr. CLYNES: They have a great deal of freedom, and there is not the degree of legislative authority over them which some hon. Members imagine.

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT (CARMARTHENSHIRE).
  Mr. HOPKINasked the Home Secretary the numbers of electors in each division represented by each county councillor of the county council of Carmarthenshire; if his attention has been
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  called to the inequality in the numbers of these divisions; and whether he proposes to take any steps to give better and fairer representation to the industrial districts of the county?
  Mr. CLYNES: I will send the hon. Member the figures of the electorate for the several electoral divisions of this county. The considerations which govern the constitution of such divisions are set out in Section 51 of the Local Government Act, 1888. I have had no complaints about the electoral divisions here, and as every county council must shortly make a complete review of the divisions in pursuance of Section 50 of the Local Government Act, 1929, I cannot take any action at present to correct any irregularities which may exist.
  Mr. HOPKIN: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in one part of the county there are 550 electors to one councillor, and in another part 3,500 electors to one councillor, and is he going to do nothing about it?
  Mr. CLYNES: I shall be glad to have from my hon. Friend any evidence supplementary to that already in the Department.

  INDUSTRIAL DISEASES (RESEARCH).
  Mr. HOPKINasked the Home Secretary if his attention has been drawn to the work done at the Beck Laboratory, Swansea, in the investigation of the causes of fibrosis of the lungs of miners in the anthracite district; and, in view of such work, is he prepared to extend this work so that the staff may give more time to research work in this matter?
  Mr. CLYNES: I understand that the work referred to in the question is being carried on as part of a scheme of research organised by Professor Cummins, the Director of the Welsh National Memorial Association. As my hon. Friend is aware, the Medical Research Council has recently set up, at my request, an expert committee on industrial pulmonary diseases, whose duty it is to consider proposals for new inquiries or extending existing inquiries and make recommendations to the council, and I will see that his suggestion is brought to the notice of this committee. I am

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  informed that the council have already made a grant for the expenses in connection with the research at this laboratory.

  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL (NORTHERN IRELAND) BILL.
  Major ROSSasked the Home Secretary whether he is now in a position to make a statement as to when he will be able to introduce the Court of Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Bill?
  Mr. CLYNES: I am not yet in a position to make a statement.
  Major ROSS: When will the right hon. Gentleman be able to give us some idea as to when this Bill which is asked for by all parties in Northern Ireland may be expected?
  Mr. CLYNES: There are Bills which are thought to be non-controversial, but which afterwards are found to meet with strong opposition. I cannot at present add to my answer, but perhaps my hon. and gallant Friend will repeat the question later.
  Major ROSS: Will it be possible to see the Bill in print? Then it might be easier to say whether it would be controversial or not.

  MAIDSTONE PRISON (SALE).
  Mr. MATHERSasked the Home Secretary whether any progress has been made with the proposal to dispose of Maidstone Prison; and whether, with a view to facilitating the necessary arrangements, he will make an order under the Prison Act, 1877, fixing a definite date for the discontinuance of the prison?
  Mr. CLYNES: I am obliged to the hon. Member for giving me an opportunity to explain the position. Negotiations have been proceeding for the purchase of this prison by the Kent County Council and have reached a stage when it is desirable to fix a date at which the council can be assured of obtaining possession. The date suggested is 30th April, 1932, and I propose to make and lay before Parliament in due course, an Order under Section 33 of the Prison Act, 1877, discontinuing the prison as from that date.

  ALIENS (ISADORE DREAZON).
  Sir KINGSLEY WOODasked the Home Secretary whether he can now state the result of his inquiries into the antecedents of Isadore Dreazon, recently convicted at Manchester, and his activities whilst in this country; and whether arrangements have been made for his deportation?
  Mr. CLYNES: During the Debate last week I gave the House certain information with regard to this man's antecedents, and the information now in my possession leaves no room for doubt that while in this country he has been engaged under an assumed name in promoting Communist activity. He will be deported in accordance with the recommendation of the Court on the expiration of his present sentence.
  Sir K. WOOD: Has the right hon. Gentleman ascertained whether this man is a member of the executive of the Third International?
  Mr. CLYNES: Our inquiries so far have not disclosed that fact.
  Sir K. WOOD: Is the right hon. Gentleman pursuing the point?
  Mr. CLYNES: It has been within the course of the inquiries we have made, but I do not mind satisfying the wishes of the House and of the right hon. Gentleman by making further inquiries.
  Mr. MARJORIBANKS: Has the Foreign Secretary been asked to inquire of the Soviet Ambassador if he can give any information?
  Mr. SMITHERS: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the alias under which this man worked is "Jack Mills"? [HON. MEMBERS: "Order!"] This is most important.
  Mr. SPEAKER: It may be very important, but it does not arise out of the question.
  Mr. SMITHERS: On a point of Order. In all sincerity, it is most important that the alias of this man should in no way connect him with my neighbour and friend the hon. Member for Dartford (Mr. J. Mills).
  Mr. CLYNES: I may say that hon. Members opposite are quite mistaken. This man is an American citizen.

  BROOKLANDS MOTOR TRACK (ACCIDENT).
  Sir GEORGE PENNYasked the Home Secretary whether, in view of the accident at Brooklands last week, the authorities are satisfied that the safety of the public and the drivers is sufficiently protected; and whether he intends to call for a report with a view to strengthening the safety regulations either by way of imposing a speed limit for the track or by keeping spectators farther from the track?
  Mr. CLYNES: I have seen a Press report of the proceedings at the inquest. The track at Brooklands is private ground, and there is no Statute which either requires or empowers any public authority to make regulations with regard to its use or to impose a speed limit. I observe that the coroner's jury added a rider to their verdict, in which they suggested to the club that the rules with regard to racing should be more strictly supervised, and I have no doubt that the authorities of the club will give careful consideration to this representation.
  Sir G. PENNY: Will the right hon. Gentleman take steps to see that the general public who attend these displays will be protected, because I feel sure that the authorities at Brooklands will themselves do all that they possibly can to prevent a recurrence of accidents?
  Mr. CLYNES: As regards speed, which may be the element of danger, no Department or local authority has power.
  Sir G. PENNY: Will the right hon. Gentleman make representations to the authorities to see that the public are put far enough away to prevent accidents happening?
  Mr. CLYNES: I have no doubt that the publicity which will arise from this answer will cause due action to be taken.

  HULL ICE WORKS (ACCIDENT).
  Mr. THORNEasked the Home Secretary whether he has received a report from the factory inspector in connection with the death of an employé of the firm of Hull Ice Works, Limited, owing to the shafting not being properly fenced; if he is aware that the company were fined £50 and costs; whether he has
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  received an application from the stipendiary magistrate for the fine to be handed over to the dependants of the deceased; and, if so, whether he intends taking any action in the matter?
  Mr. CLYNES: I have received a report from the factory inspector giving particulars of this case and the recommendation of the stipendiary. I have decided to act on the recommendation, and award the fine to the widow.
  Mr. THORNE: Will my right hon. Friend make inquiries as to how long this machine has been at work, and when was the last time that the factory inspector paid a visit to the works?
  Mr. CLYNES: Yes, I will act on that suggestion.

  PROSECUTION AND SENTENCE, BRISTOL.
  Mr. ALPASSasked the Home Secretary whether the case of Herbert Henry Woodward, of Philip Street, St. Philip's, Bristol, has been brought to his notice; whether he is aware that this man was prosecuted for theft and sentenced at the Bristol Police Court on 4th May last to eight months' imprisonment with hard labour; and whether, in view of the facts that Woodward had held the position of porter for 16 years, that no complaint had been made against his character previously, that his wages were only 20s. per week and a small commission, and that this was his first offence, he will consider the question of modifying the sentence?
  Mr. CLYNES: I have called for reports, but I am not yet in a position to reply.

  POLICE.

    TAXICAB INSPECTION DEPARTMENT, LONDON.
    Mr. REMERasked the Home Secretary what steps are being taken to reorganise the taximeter-cab inspection department of the Metropolitan police to prevent the state of affairs recurring as disclosed in a recent disciplinary inquiry?
    Mr. CLYNES: In the case to which the hon. Member refers, the charges related to incidents occurring in 1928 and

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    early 1929, which have only now come to light. Measures were taken last year which should prevent the possibility of a recurrence of similar incidents, but I hope that, for obvious reasons, the hon. Member will not press me to disclose them in detail.

    COLLEGE (COMMITTEE).
    Captain P. MACDONALDasked the Home Secretary the names of the members of the committee which is engaged in preparing the scheme for the proposed police college?
    Mr. CLYNES: With the hon. and gallant Member's permission, I will circulate, with the OFFICIAL REPORT, the names of the members of this committee, which has been appointed as a sub-committee of the Police Council.
    Captain MACDONALD: Has this Committee met yet?
    Mr. CLYNES: I cannot say.
    Miss WILKINSON: Will women be eligible for instruction at this proposed college?
    Mr. CLYNES: That is the subject of a separate question on the Paper.
    Following is the list:
    Mr. A. L. Dixon, C.B., C.B.E., Assistant Secretary, Home Office (Chairman);
    Major-General Sir Llewelyn W. Atcherley, C.M.G., C.V.O., His Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary;
    Sir Francis Blake, Bt., C.B., Chairman, Northumberland County Council;
    The Right Hon. Lord Deramore, T.D., J.P., Chairman, East Riding County Council and Standing Joint Committee;
    Sir Leonard Dunning, His Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary;
    Mr. J. Farndale, C.B.E., Chief Constable, Bradford City Police Force;
    *Police Constable A. Goodsall, Metropolitan Police;
    Alderman R. H. Millican, J.P., Chairman, Newcastle-on-Tyne Watch Committee;
    Captain C. Mitchell-Innes, C.B.E., Chief Constable, Lincolnshire;
    Rear-Admiral Sir Charles W. R. Royds, K.B.E., C.M.G., Deputy Commissioner, Metropolitan Police;
    *Staff Sergeant G. Strangeways, Newcastle-on-Tyne City Police Force;
    *Inspector L. Townend, West Riding County Constabulary;
    Chief Superintendent W. Trigg, M.B.E.,
    Lincolnshire County Constabulary;
    Lieut.-Colonel Sir Hugh S. Turnbull, K.B.E., J.P., Commissioner of Police for the City of London; and
    Alderman V. Wyles, J.P., Member of the Coventry Watch Committee.
    * Representatives of the Police Federation of England and Wales.

  AUTOMATIC TRAFFIC SIGNALS.
  Major GLYNasked the Home Secretary whether any decision has yet been reached in consultation with the City of London police for the provision of automatic traffic signals in the streets of the Metropolitan and City areas; and whether he will consider sending a mission of police officers to study the methods in use in Paris, Barcelona and other cities of the Continent?
  Mr. CLYNES: The question of these signals is being dealt with by the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee, on which the Metropolitan Police and City Police are both represented. The methods in use in certain continental cities, including Paris, have already been investigated by a representative of the Metropolitan Police, and the possibility of obtaining useful information by visits to foreign countries is being constantly borne in mind.
  Major GLYN: Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that the traffic conditions of London are not capable of improvement?
  Mr. CLYNES: I think the facts show that they are.
  Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Is not the traffic control in London infinitely superior to that in Paris and Barcelona?
  Mr. SMITHERS: And Moscow!
  Mr. REMER: Has the right hon. Gentleman's attention been called to the

  2037
  success of this system in certain provincial cities, namely, Manchester and Birmingham?
  Mr. CLYNES: I think that all these points are before the Committee.

  LOTTERIES.
  Mr. GREENEasked the Home Secretary whether, seeing that the present position of the law with regard to lotteries entails loss to recognised charities such as hospitals, he will consider the revision of the law to the effect that those desiring to promote lotteries may apply to some authority, later to be designated, for permission to promote such lotteries under conditions, later to be laid down, such as that a certain percentage of the moneys to be received should be distributed to approved charities?
  Mr. CLYNES: Proposals of this kind have been considered from time to time, and I recall that in 1918 a scheme was before this House, but, though confined to registered War charities, was rejected by a small majority. I am not, as at present advised, prepared to take the initiative in reopening the question.
  Mr. GREENE: Would not the suggestion contained in the question do away with the infringement of the law, while at the same time saving the hospitals and other charities?
  Mr. CLYNES: The wealth of suggestions on this subject indicates a very great variety and difference of opinion, and I cannot at present add anything to my answer.
  Mr. MARJORIBANKS: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what is the loss to charities through the abandonment of the Stock Exchange Sweepstake?

  LEASEHOLD ENFRANCHISEMENT.
  Captain E. N. BENNETTasked the Prime Minister whether it is the intention of the Government to deal with the question of leasehold enfranchisement?
  The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Ramsay MacDonald): I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the answer which I
  2038
  gave on the 11th November last in reply to a question by my hon. Friend the Member for Berwick and Haddington (Mr. Sinkinson).

  BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION.
  Major GLYNasked the Prime Minister whether he will inquire into the charter of the British Broadcasting Corporation with a view to its revision so as to make the Postmaster-General responsible for questions such as the treatment and remuneration of the officials of the corporation, and also to enable the programmes to be subjected to effective criticism both concerning their quality and the sums paid in some instances for the rights of reproduction?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I do not consider that it would be advisable to revise the charter of the British Broadcasting Corporation in the sense indicated by the hon. and gallant Member.
  Major GLYN: What steps can be taken by officials who feel themselves aggrieved owing to their dismissal?
  The PRIME MINISTER: Perhaps, if the hon. and gallant Member would put that question down, or would communicate with me privately, we might consider it.
  Miss WILKINSON: Is the Prime Minister aware that the present restrictions on Sunday broadcasting are causing a considerable amount of dissatisfaction, and is there any appeal from the decision of the British Broadcasting Corporation?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I have not the provisions of the Charter at my fingers' ends, but the Charter was granted in 1927 for 10 years, and on that basic fact I gave my reply to the question of the hon. and gallant Member opposite.

  PALESTINE.
  Colonel HOWARD-BURYasked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the breaking off of the negotiations between himself and the Arab Palestine delegation, he is taking any steps to remedy their grievances?
  The PRIME MINISTER: A series of conversations have taken place in the course of which the delegation have placed

  2039
  their views before Members of the Government in a friendly and helpful way. These conversations have now come to an end, but I should not use the expression "broken off." The Government is informing itself of the opinions of the interested parties before deciding what further steps should be taken.
  Colonel HOWARD-BURY: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it would be quite possible, within the terms of the Mandate, to comply with the requests of the Arab Delegation; and, in view of the increasing interest felt by over 100,000,000 Mohammedans throughout the world, could he not give his very serious attention to this very difficult problem?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I can assure the hon. and gallant Member that I conducted a good deal of the conversations myself with the Delegation, and am fully seized of the points which they brought out, and, I hope, of the various considerations attendant upon them.

  STANDING COMMITTEE C (LAW OFFICERS).
  Mr. REMERasked the Prime Minister if his attention has been called to the difficulty experienced in Standing Committee C through the continued absence of any Law Officers of the Crown; and if he will take steps to see that one of the Law Officers attends all meetings of the Committee?
  The PRIME MINISTER: The Solicitor-General has attended 19 out of the 20 meetings of the Committee. In these circumstances there appears to be no justification for the hon. Member's complaint.
  Mr. REMER: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Committee has been sitting in the afternoons as well as the mornings, and that, at, several sessions from four to six, the Solicitor-General has been absent when legal questions have been raised?
  Mr. ERNEST WINTERTON: Is it not a fact that the proceedings of the Committee would be very much hastened if the hon. Member stayed away?

  AGRICULTURE.

    POLITICAL PARTIES (CONFERENCE).
    Major Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIRasked the Prime Minister whether, having regard to the condition of the agricultural industry, and in view of the support accorded in this House and in the country to the proposal that a conference of representatives of all three parties should be called to consider the problems arising therefrom, he is now prepared to state whether the Government will summon such a conference?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I doubt if a formal conference would be helpful in view of recent experiences, but I should be glad to have the benefit of a consultation on the subject with leaders of parties, should they so desire.

    POTATO, PRICES.
    Major CARVERasked the Minister of Agriculture the average prices of old-crop English potatoes of the principal varieties, respectively, realised at the important markets in Yorkshire for the week ending 30th April last; and whether these are the prices realised by the growers?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY of AGRICULTURE (Dr. Addison): As the reply includes a number of figures I propose to circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Major CARVER: Will the right hon. Gentleman say from what source he obtains these figures, because the last time he gave them to me they were about double the price farmers are getting.
    Dr. ADDISON: They were supplied to me by the officers in the Department which dealt with this branch of business, but, if there is a further question, I should like notice of it.
    Following is the reply:
    The average prices of old crop English potatoes at Hull, Leeds and Doncaster for the week ending 30th April are set out in the following table. The prices at Hull and Leeds are the average prices paid by retailers to wholesalers, and at Doncaster the prices paid by wholesalers to growers.

    Variety and Quality.

    Price per Ton.

    Hull.

    Leeds.

    Arran Chief:

    s.

    d.

    s.

    d.

    1st

    50

    0

    —

    2nd

    40

    0

    —

    Great Scot:

    1st

    50

    0

    50

    0

    2nd

    40

    0

    40

    0

    Majestic:

    1st

    50

    0

    50

    0

    2nd

    40

    0

    40

    0

    King Edward VII.:

    1st

    60

    0

    70

    0

    2nd

    50

    0

    50

    0

    Doncaster.

    Ally and Great Scot

    20s. to 25s.

    Majestic

    22s. 6d. to 27s. 6d.

    King Edward VII. (limestone and warp lands).

    37s. 6d. to 47s. 6d.

    King Edward VII. (other districts).

    32s. 6d. to 42s. 6d.

    Red King

    32s. 6d. to 42s. 6d.

    FRENCH WHEAT (IMPORTS),
    Major CARVERasked the Minister of Agriculture if he is aware of the quantity of French wheat now being imported and offered for sale here; and if he can state the approximate delivered price of such wheat and also the current price per quarter of English wheat?
    Dr. ADDISON: As the reply contains a number of figures, I propose, to circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. GUINNESS: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us what proportion of the total imports of soft wheat are represented by these French exports?
    Dr. ADDISON: I will gladly do so, but I require notice of the question.
    Mr. SMITHERS: What is the value of this 3 per cent. of French wheat in pounds sterling?
    Dr. ADDISON: There, again, I require notice, and, if the hon. Member will put down a question, I will gladly answer it.
    Following is the reply:
    My right hon. Friend is aware that imports of wheat from France into the United Kingdom during the current year have been large compared with imports from that country in previous years.
    2042
    They have, however, represented only a little more than 3 per cent. of the total imports during that period.
    The average ex-ship price for fair quality French wheat is about 32s. 6d. per quarter of 480 lbs. with best lots making a few shillings more. Landing charges would increase the ex-ship price by from 1s. to 1s. 6d. per quarter.
    The latest available Gazette price of English wheat which relates to sales during the week ending 3rd May last was 38s. 3d per quarter of 480 lbs.

    UNEMPLOYMENT (ESTIMATE).
    Mr. HURDasked the Minister of Agriculture the source and details of the official estimate that 40,000 agricultural workers are out of employment?
    Dr. ADDISON: As stated by my right hon. Friend in his speech on the Ministry's Estimates on Monday last, the approximate estimate of 30,000 to 40,000 unemployed agricultural workers related to the month of February, and was based on reports received from the Ministry's crop reporters. My right hon. Friend regrets that the lack of uniformity of these reports precludes any tabulation in detail.
    Mr. HURD: Does it not appear that this national figure has been built up on local figures which may not have any really national significance?
    Dr. ADDISON: You are bound to obtain figures in the locality, and we make the best possible use of them.
    Mr. HURD: You cannot make a national figure true in that way.
    Dr. ADDISON: But the national figure is built up on local figures.
    Mr. LAMBERT: Do these figures relate to regular agricultural workers or only to casual workers?
    Dr. ADDISON: No, they relate to regular agricultural workers.
    Mr. BLINDELL: Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that this figure is approximately correct?
    Dr. ADDISON: Yes, that is what I said.
    Mr. HURD: May we know how many reporters are concerned?
    Dr. ADDISON: We have a very large number, and if the hon. Member will put down a question I will tell him.

  FRANCIS LORANG (EXTRADITION).
  Sir K. WOODasked the Home Secretary whether he has yet received any information concerning the extradition of Francis Lorang?
  Mr. CLYNES: The matter is still before the French authorities and supplementary evidence in support of the application for extradition is about to be submitted to them.
  Sir K. WOOD: Is there any justification for the statement that there has been any delay on our part?
  Mr. CLYNES: I think there is no justification for that.

  EDUCATION.

    RUSSIAN SCHOOL TEACHERS.
    Commander BELLAIRSasked the President of the Board of Education whether there is any intention to revive the agreement he made with the Soviet Russian authorities for the exchange of school teachers?
    The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of EDUCATION (Sir Charles Trevelyan): No such agreement was made.
    Commander BELLAIRS: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he stated in Parliament on 8th October, 1924, that he hoped it would be possible for a limited number of teachers to go to Russia, and that it is only on the Russian side that they did not agree to send teachers here?
    Sir C. TREVELYAN: I have nothing to add.

    OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHYasked the President of the Board of Education whether, in the case of the 74 schools in receipt of grants from public funds and maintaining officers training corps for the schoolboys, he interferes in cases where the existence of these officers training corps interferes with education or is considered undesirable for other reasons?
    Sir C. TREVELYAN: No such case has been brought to my attention.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Is the right hon. Baronet satisfied that he has the necessary powers to deal with such cases?
    Sir C. TREVELYAN: I have not considered it, as no case has been brought to my attention.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: In that case, is not the right hon. Baronet himself responsible for the existence of the training corps?
    Sir C. TREVELYAN: No, I have nothing to do with the training corps.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: If the right hon. Gentleman has nothing to do with the training corps, how can he escape responsibility in view of the grants of public money to these schools?

    DIFFERENTIAL RATING, CARMARTHENSHIRE.
    Mr. HOPKINasked the President of the Board of Education if he has taken any steps to abolish the system of differential rating as applied to elementary and secondary education in Carmarthenshire; and what he proposes to do in this matter in regard to schemes of reorganisation from this county?
    Sir C. TREVELYAN: It is for the local education authority to decide whether differential rating should be abolished in their area. I have been in communication with them on the subject, and I understand that they are now giving it further consideration. In the meanwhile, I have asked them to submit their programme for the period 1930–33, or a partial programme, at their earliest convenience.

    SALESMANSHIP.
    Mr. GRAHAM WHITEasked the President of the Board of Education what steps are being taken to give effect to the recommendations of the Committee on Education for Salesmanship?
    Sir C. TREVELYAN: The Committee on Education for Salesmanship have as yet presented an interim report only, and this does not contain any recommendations calling for action by the Board of Education. I understand that, though the Committee hope shortly to present a second interim report dealing

    2045
    with modern languages, they will reserve their conclusions and recommendations for their final report, which will deal with the subject matter of their inquiry as a whole.

    NEW AGE-GROUP.
    Duchess of ATHOLLasked the President of the Board of Education whether, seeing that the average cost of educating a child in a public elementary school is at present about £12 10s., he is satisfied that the children of the new age-group can be educated at an average cost of less than half that amount?
    Sir C. TREVELYAN: I am satisfied that the children of the new age-group can be educated at an additional cost to public funds of about £2,500,000 a year. It would be incorrect to apply to the new age-group the present general average figure relating to all groups, since the requirements of the new age-group will, to a considerable extent, be met by means of reorganisation.
    Duchess of ATHOLL: Does the right hon. Gentleman really think that reorganisation will account for the difference, when he takes into account that the number of children in the additional age-group is estimated to be about half a million, that the £2,500,000 mentioned in the Financial Memorandum to the School Attendance Bill will only allow about £5 a child, and that the regulations require higher standards of staffing, accommodation and equipment for senior children?
    Sir C. TREVELYAN: That is the impression which we have got by studying the programme.
    Duchess of ATHOLLasked the President of the Board of Education how many additional teachers for the children of the new age-group are allowed for in his estimate of £2,500,000 as the cost of educating them from 1938 onwards?
    Sir C. TREVELYAN: The number of additional teachers allowed for from 1938 onwards is 7,500.

    STAFFING.
    Duchess of ATHOLLasked the President of the Board of Education whether he can now supplement the figures previously given by him on the basis of 104 programmes submitted by local education authorities, and state how
    2046
    many additional teachers, as shown by the programmes received to date, are likely to be required in the years 1930–31, 1931–32, and 1932–33?
    Sir C. TREVELYAN: Of the programmes so far received 180 contain estimates of the additional teachers required during the programme period to meet the needs of normal expansion and the raising of the school age. They anticipate a need for 1,396 additional teachers in 1930–31, rising to 5,718 in 1931–32 and to 8,504 in 1932–33. I shall be prepared to make a full statement in regard to the total number of additional teachers required for the whole country when the Bill is before the House.

    MAINTENANCE ALLOWANCES.
    Mr. McSHANEasked the President of the Board of Education whether in any countries where the legal school-leaving age is beyond 14 years of age maintenance allowances are granted; and, if so, whether there is any means test for such allowances?
    Sir C. TREVELYAN: I have no information as to maintenance allowances in other countries.

  PUBLIC HEALTH.

    RADIUM.
    Mr. DAYasked the Minister of Health whether he is considering rendering Government assistance for the purpose of obtaining supplies of radium for curative purposes in Great Britain; whether any final decision has been arrived at by the sub-committee of the Committee of Civil Research; whether investigations are being made; and can he give particulars?
    The MINISTER of HEALTH (Mr. Arthur Greenwood): The Radium Trust and the Radium Commission were constituted by Royal Charter in July last to administer a sum of £250,000, consisting of £150,000 from the National Radium Fund and £100,000 voted by Parliament for the purpose stated in the question.
    Mr. DAY: Are the facilities now easier for the institutions under the right hon. Gentleman's own control?
    Mr. GREENWOOD: There are none under my own control.
    Commander BELLAIRS: Are any steps being taken to keep the price down by bringing pressure to bear through the League of Nations?
    Mr. GREENWOOD: The radium that has been purchased so far has been purchased on most-favoured-nation terms.

    MATERNITY HOSPITALS (GRANTS).
    Major CARVERasked the Minister of Health whether, under the new system of payment, grants to maternity hospitals will be made in their entirety for 1929 so that there will be no gap between the cessation of the Ministry's payments and the payments by the local authorities concerned?
    Mr. GREENWOOD: The answer is in the affirmative.

  POOR LAW.

    CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES (RELIEF VOUCHERS).
    Sir K. WOODasked the Minister of Health what action he has taken with regard to the deputation recently received of the parliamentary committee of the Co-operative Union, with reference to the action of certain Poor Law authorities in insisting on dividends on out-relief vouchers issued by co-operative societies being paid to such Poor Law authorities?
    Mr. GREENWOOD: My discussions with the Committee related to the legal position. It is not a matter in which action on my part arises.
    Sir K. WOOD: Is it a fact that the right hon. Gentleman has told them he is not able to do anything for them, although he promised a great deal in days gone by?
    Mr. JAMES GARDNER: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us what he did while he was in charge?

    CASUALS.
    Sir CHARLES OMANasked the Minister of Health whether he will consider the amendment of Section 44 (2) of the Poor Law Act, 1930, which directs that a casual shall not be entitled to discharge himself until the fourth day after his admission from a casual ward if he has been admitted during the last month
    2048
    into any other casual ward of the same county; and, unless and until some amendment is made, will he make an order directing that a casual detained for more than three days in the same ward should be provided with more than the normal minimum allowance of food on the one-day scale for each day of his supplemental detention?
    Mr. GREENWOOD: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given on this point to the hon. Member for Darlington (Mr. Shepherd) on the 8th instant, a copy of which I am sending to him.

  CONTRIBUTORY PENSIONS ACT.
  Mr. GOULDasked the Minister of Health the total number of pension claims received under the Widows', Orphans', and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act, 1929: the number already sanctioned: and the classes to which they belong?
  Mr. GREENWOOD: 264,832 claims for pension under the Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act, 1929, have been received and up to the present 101,446 awards have been made, 22,707 being awards of old age pension to wives between the ages of 65 and 70 of men who were over 70 on 2nd January, 1928, and 78,739 being awards of widows' pensions, which, however, will not become payable before 1st July next. In addition to the awards already referred to, pensions have been restored or granted at the full rate, under the provisions of the Act to 28,340 beneficiaries.
  Sir K. WOOD: What is the right hon. Gentleman doing about the 8,000 widows to whom he has refused pensions?
  Captain P. MACDONALD: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the strong feeling of dissatisfaction throughout the country at the delay in dealing with these pension claims of widows?
  Mr. GREENWOOD: No, I am not. Most of them do not come into force until 1st July next.

  NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE.
  Mr. ARTHUR LAWasked the Minister of Health if he will make provision

  2049
  to ensure the benefits of the National Health Insurance fund being paid to a contributing member whose employer defaults and does not stamp the card, even after legal proceedings have been taken against him?
  Mr. GREENWOOD: I regret that I have nothing to add to the replies addressed to the hon. Member with regard to this matter on 20th March and 1st May last, and also to the reply addressed to the hon. Member for Plaistow (Mr. Thorne) on 20th March last on the same subject.
  Mr. LAW: Is the Minister prepared to allow the approved societies to stamp the cards and pay the benefits if it is impossible to get the stamps from the employer?
  Mr. GREENWOOD: I pointed out that in most cases it is possible to get the stamps from the employer, but, if any other means can be devised, I shall be glad to consider the matter.

  LANDSCAPE DISFIGUREMENT (LAKE DISTRICT).
  Mr. E. D. SIMONasked the Minister of Health whether he is aware of the mining work which is being undertaken at Red Tarn which, if developed, will destroy one of the beauty spots of the Lake District, and of the threat of other similar industrial developments; and whether he will accelerate regional planning, or take other action, to control such development in order to preserve the amenities of rural England?
  Mr. GREENWOOD: I have no information as to the particular mining development referred to. With the assistance of my Department two Regional Planning Committees have already been set up covering a large part of the Lake District. If the hon. Member will supply me with details of the case, I will bring the matter to the notice of the local bodies concerned.

  CENSUS, 1931.
  Mr. FREEMANasked the Minister of Health whether he is yet in a position to announce the date on which it is proposed to take the Census in 1931;
  2050
  and whether any changes are contemplated in the statistical returns to be made?
  Mr. GREENWOOD: I am not as yet in a position to add to my reply of the 26th March last to a similar question by my hon. Friend.

  RATES (METROPOLITAN BOROUGHS).
  Mr. CHATERasked the Minister of Health the increase in rates in each of the Metropolitan boroughs due to the operation of the Local Government Act, 1929?
  Mr. GREENWOOD: As the reply involves a tabular statement, I propose, with my hon. Friend's permission, to circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
  Following is the reply:
  The following statement shows, in colums 1 to 6, inclusive, the poundage of the rates levied in each separately rated area in London since the beginning of the year which is the "standard year" for the purposes of the Local Government Act, 1929, namely, the financial year ending in March 1929. It is clear that in some cases in the financial year ending in March, 1930, boards of guardians (then about to be abolished) met out of their accumulated working balances expenditure which would otherwise have been met out of rates in that year, with the result that the poundage of the rates for that year—and especially for the second half of that year—was lower than it would otherwise have been. The amounts (in terms of a rate in the £) by which the guardians' balances were reduced during the year are set out in column 7. It is also clear that in the same year a few boards of guardians increased their working balances, i.e., called for more from the rates than was needed to meet the expenditure of the year, and the amounts (in terms of a rate in the £) of these increases are set out in column 8. The comparisons are also affected in varying degrees by many other factors. It will be seen from the table that, after allowance is made for the use of guardians' balances in 1929–30, there has been a reduction of rate in many of the boroughs, and that in scarcely any borough has there been a material increase.

  Name of Metropolitan Borough.

  Rates levied in half-year ending in

  Net increase or decrease of Guardians' balances as between 31st March, 1929, and 31st March, 1930, expressed as a rate in the £.

  September, 1928.

  March, 1929.

  September, 1929.

  March, 1930.

  September, 1930.

  Decrease.

  Increase.

  1.

  2.

  3.

  4.

  5.

  6.

  7.

  8.

  s.

  d.

  s.

  d.

  s.

  d.

  s.

  d.

  s.

  d.

  s.

  d.

  s.

  d.

  City of London

  …

  …

  …

  4

  6

  4

  8

  4

  9

  4

  7

  4

  9

  0

  0¾

  —

  Metropolitan Boroughs:

  Battersea (formed part of Wandsworth Union)

  …

  6

  5

  6

  5

  6

  3

  6

  3

  6

  6

  0

  2½(c)

  —

  Bermondsey

  …

  …

  …

  9

  0

  8

  6

  8

  0

  8

  0

  8

  0

  0

  2¾

  —

  Bethnal Green

  …

  …

  …

  9

  8

  7

  4

  7

  2

  6

  8

  7

  4

  1

  0¾

  —

  Camberwell

  …

  …

  …

  6

  2

  6

  0

  6

  0

  5

  8

  5

  8

  0

  7½

  —

  Chelsea

  …

  …

  …

  5

  2

  5

  1

  5

  0

  5

  0

  5

  0

  0

  0½

  —

  Deptford (formed part of Greenwich Union)

  …

  6

  10

  6

  8

  6

  11

  6

  6

  6

  10

  0

  4(d)

  —

  Finsbury (formed part of Holborn Union)

  …

  5

  1

  5

  0

  5

  1

  5

  1

  5

  10

  0

  1¼(e)

  —

  Fulham

  …

  …

  …

  5

  4

  5

  5

  5

  4

  5

  1

  5

  2

  0

  5¾

  —

  Greenwich:

  Parish of:

  Charlton and Kidbrooke (formed part of Woolwich Union).

  6

  4

  5

  10

  5

  10

  5

  4

  6

  4

  0

  7¾(f)

  —

  Greenwich (formed part of Greenwich Union)

  6

  4

  6

  4

  6

  6

  6

  4

  6

  4

  0

  4(d)

  —

  St. Nicholas, Deptford (formed part of Greenwich Union.

  6

  10

  6

  8

  6

  8

  6

  4

  6

  4

  0

  4(d)

  —

  Hackney

  …

  …

  …

  5

  8

  5

  7

  5

  8

  5

  8

  5

  8

  0

  3½(g)

  —

  Hammersmith

  …

  …

  …

  5

  9

  5

  9

  5

  9

  5

  6

  5

  10

  0

  0¼

  —

  Hampstead (a)

  …

  …

  …

  5

  8½

  5

  8½

  5

  6

  5

  6

  5

  8

  0

  0¼

  —

  Holborn:

  Parish of:

  Furnival's Inn

  …

  …

  …

  5

  0

  5

  0

  4

  11

  4

  9

  5

  1

  0

  1¼(e)

  —

  Saffron Hill

  …

  …

  …

  5

  2

  5

  2

  5

  1

  4

  11

  5

  0

  —

  St. Andrews and St. George

  …

  …

  …

  5

  0

  4

  9

  5

  0

  4

  10

  5

  0

  —

  St. Giles and St. George

  …

  …

  …

  5

  1

  4

  10

  5

  0

  4

  7

  5

  0

  —

  Staple Inn

  …

  …

  …

  5

  0

  5

  0

  5

  0

  4

  10

  5

  1

  —

  Gray's Inn

  …

  …

  …

  4

  11

  4

  11

  4

  9

  4

  6

  4

  8

  —

  2052

  2053

  Lincoln's Inn:

  Township

  …

  …

  …

  …

  5

  1

  5

  0

  5

  2

  5

  0

  5

  4

  —

  —

  St. Clement Danes

  …

  …

  …

  …

  4

  10

  4

  9½

  4

  10½

  4

  10½

  5

  0½

  —

  —

  Liberty of Rolls

  …

  …

  …

  …

  4

  11

  4

  10

  4

  10¾

  4

  10¾

  5

  0¾

  —

  —

  Hall

  …

  …

  …

  …

  5

  3

  5

  1

  5

  3

  5

  3

  5

  5

  —

  —

  Islington

  …

  …

  …

  …

  5

  4

  5

  2

  5

  4

  5

  2

  5

  4

  —

  0

  2

  Kensington

  …

  …

  …

  …

  5

  0

  4

  11

  5

  1

  5

  0

  5

  0

  —

  0

  3

  Lambeth

  …

  …

  …

  …

  5

  3

  5

  3

  5

  3

  5

  3

  5

  7

  0

  1¾

  —

  Lewisham

  …

  …

  …

  …

  5

  10

  5

  10

  5

  10

  5

  6

  5

  6

  (b)

  (b)

  Paddington (a)

  …

  …

  …

  …

  5

  3½

  5

  3½

  5

  0

  5

  0

  5

  2

  0

  5½

  —

  Poplar

  …

  …

  …

  …

  12

  0

  11

  4

  10

  0

  7

  8

  9

  6

  2

  3¾

  —

  St Marylebone:

  Principal Area

  …

  …

  …

  …

  4

  11

  4

  10

  4

  9

  4

  9

  4

  11

  —

  0

  0¾

  Crown Estate

  …

  …

  …

  …

  4

  4

  4

  2½

  4

  2

  4

  3

  4

  4

  St. Pancras:

  Principal Area

  …

  …

  …

  …

  5

  4

  5

  2

  5

  0

  4

  11

  5

  1

  0

  1¼

  —

  Crown Estate

  …

  …

  …

  …

  4

  6

  4

  5

  4

  2

  4

  1½

  4

  3½

  Shoreditch

  …

  …

  …

  …

  6

  6

  6

  2

  6

  0

  6

  0

  6

  6

  0

  5

  —

  Southwark:

  Parish of:

  Christchurch

  …

  …

  …

  …

  6

  10

  6

  2

  6

  2

  6

  2

  6

  2

  0

  7¼

  —

  Newington

  …

  …

  …

  …

  6

  0

  5

  4

  5

  4

  5

  4

  6

  0

  St. George the Martyr

  …

  …

  …

  …

  6

  4

  5

  8

  5

  8

  5

  8

  6

  2

  St. Saviour

  …

  …

  …

  …

  6

  2

  5

  6

  5

  8

  5

  8

  6

  0

  Stepney:

  Formerly Parish of:

  Limehouse

  …

  …

  …

  …

  7

  6

  7

  6

  7

  7

  6

  3

  7

  3

  0

  8¾

  —

  Mile End Old Town

  …

  …

  …

  …

  7

  7

  7

  6

  7

  8

  6

  3

  St. George in the East

  …

  …

  …

  …

  7

  4

  7

  3

  7

  5

  6

  0

  Whitechapel

  …

  …

  …

  …

  7

  8

  7

  8

  7

  9

  6

  5

  Stoke Newington (formed part of Hackney Union)

  5

  6

  5

  6

  5

  6

  5

  2

  5

  6

  0

  3½(g)

  —

  Wandsworth

  …

  …

  …

  …

  5

  6

  5

  6

  5

  4

  5

  2

  5

  4

  0

  2½(c)

  —

  Westminster: City of

  …

  …

  …

  …

  4

  8

  4

  6

  4

  4

  5

  4

  9

  0

  1½

  —

  Woolwich:

  Parish of:

  Eltham

  …

  …

  …

  …

  6

  1

  6

  0

  6

  6

  7

  7

  0

  (b)

  (b)

  Plumstead

  …

  …

  …

  …

  6

  11

  6

  6

  6

  8

  6

  6

  7

  0

  0

  7¾(f)

  —

  Woolwich

  …

  …

  …

  …

  7

  1

  6

  11

  6

  10

  6

  5

  7

  0

  0

  7¾(f)

  —

  2054

  2055

  —

  Rates levied in half-year ending in

  Net increase or decrease in Guardians' balances as between 31st
  March, 1929, and 31st March, 1930, expressed as a rate in the £.

  September, 1928.

  March, 1929.

  September, 1929.

  March, 1930.

  September, 1930.

  Decrease.

  Increase.

  1.

  2.

  3.

  4.

  5.

  6.

  7.

  8.

  s.

  d.

  s.

  d.

  s.

  d.

  s.

  d.

  s.

  d.

  s.

  d.

  s.

  d.

  Highest rate in the £ for the half-year (h)

  12

  0

  11

  4

  10

  0

  8

  0(i)

  9

  6

  —

  —

  Lowest rate in the £ for the half-year (h)

  4

  6

  4

  6

  4

  6

  4

  5(i)

  4

  9

  —

  —

  Difference between the highest and the lowest rate in the £ for the half-year
  (h).

  7

  6

  6

  10

  5

  6

  3

  7(i)

  4

  9

  —

  —

  (a) For the areas which are marked (a) in column 1 annual rates
  are levied and, for the purposes of this statement, one half of the annual rate has been treated
  as levied for each half of the financial year

  (b) Particulars for the Lewisham Union (which comprises the Borough of
  Lewisham and the Parish of Eltham in the Borough of Woolwich) have not been furnished.

  (c) Figures for the Wandsworth Poor Law Union as a whole.

  (d) Figures for the Greenwich Poor Law Union as a whole.

  (e) Figures for the Holborn Poor Law Union us a whole.

  (f) Figures for the Woolwich Poor Law Union as a whole.

  (g) Figures for the Hackney Poor Law Union as a whole.

  (h) In boroughs where differential rating exists the rates levied in the central areas have been taken for the purposes of these comparisons.

  (i) The figures for the half-year ending in March, 1930, were affected (as explained above) by the unusual course adopted in regard to the disposal of Guardians' balances.

  Mr. CHATERasked the Minister of Health if his attention has been drawn to the increase in rates caused to the borough of Woolwich and other Metropolitan boroughs due to the operation of the Local Government Act, 1929; and if it is his intention to institute an inquiry into the working of that Act with a view to a more equitable distribution of the rates it entails?
  Mr. GREENWOOD: In reply to another question by my hon. Friend, I am supplying him with particulars of rates levied in each half-year in all Metropolitan boroughs, including Woolwich. As regards the position in that borough, I would refer him to the replies which I made on 24th March, 27th March and 10th April to the right hon. Member for West Woolwich (Sir K. Wood), copies of which I am sending to him.
  Mr. W. THORNE: Will the right hon. Gentleman be prepared to extend his inquiries and get a return from all local authorities as to the increase in rates, or otherwise?
  Mr. GREENWOOD: I hope to be furnished very shortly with the present position in regard to rates.

  REPARATION LOAN.
  Mr. ALBERYasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can give any particulars as to what form of guarantee will be attached to the British issue of the loan to be issued under the Young plan?
  The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER (Mr. Philip Snowden): Under the arrangement agreed to at the Hague Conference in January last the service of the proposed loan will be covered as to two-thirds by a deduction from the unconditional part of the German reparation annuities and as to one-third by a separate payment from the German Budget to the Bank for International Settlements. I am not at present in a position to give any further particulars as to the detailed terms of the bonds, but of course there is no question of any guarantee by the British Government.
  Mr. ALBERY: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether there is any
  2058
  truth in the report that the British issue will be of a different nature from that of the continental issues, and, if it is so, is it at the desire of the British Government?
  Mr. SNOWDEN: I do not know quite what the hon. Member means by being of a different nature, but bonds issued in London will, I understand, be denominated in sterling, and will not have convertibility into a number of other national currencies.
  Mr. SMITHERS: Can the Chancellor of the Exchequer tell us how much of the loan will be issued in London, and will the coupons be payable in sterling?
  Mr. SNOWDEN: Yes, I said that. Coupons will certainly be payable in sterling. I cannot at the moment say how much will be issued in London, but we are entitled to £5,250,000 if the total issue be £60,000,000, and if we take, in London, more than that, as I have announced in the House already, it will be kept in London
  Mr. WISE: Will there be any guarantee that British capital will not be used to purchase those portions of the loan issued in New York, Paris and elsewhere?
  Mr. SNOWDEN: The hon. Member knows quite well that there is an internationalism in these issues, and I do not see how it will be possible for the nationals of some other country to be prevented from selling their bonds here, but the fact that we are insisting on the retention of the whole of the London issue in this country shows that we are quite alive to the point which the hon. Member has raised.
  Mr. WISE: Is the right hon. Gentleman taking any steps to prevent British capital being used for that purpose?
  Mr. STRAUSSasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the proportion of the reparation loan to be issued in London will be equivalent to Great Britain's share of German reparations?
  Mr. SNOWDEN: Yes, Sir. The whole of the proceeds of the reparation loan issued in London will be retained by the British Empire.
  Mr. WISE: Are we to understand that this country is to find the capital to pay its own reparations?
  Mr. SNOWDEN: I really do not know what the hon. Member means; I have not the slightest idea what he means.
  Mr. STRAUSS: Is it a fact, in regard to the amount subscribed by the British participants in this loan, that these people will, in fact, be guaranteeing a similar proportion of German reparation payments?
  Mr. SNOWDEN: I have already said "No" in reply to the point as to whether there was any British Government guarantee.

  PLUMAGE (PROHIBITED IMPORTATION).
  Mr. WOMERSLEYasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether he will give a list of birds the plumage of which has been illegally imported and confiscated under tale Importation of Plumage (Prohibition) Act, 1921, during the period of the 1st October, 1929, to the 31st December, 1929, together with the approximate quantity of plumage involved in each case?
  The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence): As the answer is long I will circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
  Following is the answer:
  The following is a list of birds, the plumage of which was illegally imported and was confiscated by the Customs authorities under the Importation of Plumage (Prohibition) Act, 1921, during the period 1st October, 1929, to 31st December, 1929, together with the approximate quantity of plumage involved in each case.
  Name of Bird and Approximate Amount of Plumage.
  Amazon Green Parrot—20 single feathers.
  Egret—2 small bundles.
  Indian Roller—2 wings.
  Kingfisher—12 ornaments each containing a small amount of this plumage mounted on metal.
  Parrot—10 single feathers.
  Peacock—3 fans, 113 single feathers, 1 ornament containing a small quantity of this plumage.
  Swan—12 skins.
  Stork (Leptoptilus)—1 small bundle.
  Vulturine Guinea Fowl—1 piece of skin with feathers.
  In addition to the above two packets, each containing a small quantity of plumage not identified, but clearly prohibited, were seized.

  EX-ENEMY ACTION CLAIMS.
  Captain P. MACDONALDasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury what payments were made in the last financial year to dependants of persons whose death was directly consequent upon enemy air raids or bombardments and to persons who sustained injuries in consequence of such enemy action; whether there are any outstanding claims; and, if so, when decisions may be expected to be arrived at?
  Mr. PETHICK-LAWRENCE: The report of the Royal Commission on Compensation for Suffering and Damage by Enemy Action which dealt with the claims referred to was presented in January, 1923, and the awards granted by the Commission have long since been paid except in a trifling number of cases where the claimant cannot be traced. One such payment amounting to £20 was made in the last financial year. In certain cases which were dealt with before the appointment of the Commission, ex gratia awards had been made by the Ministry of Health in the form of continuing weekly allowances. An expenditure of £1,940 was incurred by the Ministry of Health in respect of such cases during the last financial year.

  TRADE AND COMMERCE.

    EXPORT CREDITS.
    Mr. R. A. TAYLORasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury if he can make any statement as to the Government's proposals for long-term credits, apart from those under the Overseas Trade Acts, 1920 to 1929, being made available for the assistance of the depressed export industries?
    Mr. PETHICK-LAWRENCE: I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given by my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal to his question of the 15th April last.
    Mr. TAYLOR: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether this is now under the consideration of any specific committee, and if so, which committee?
    Mr. PETHICK-LAWRENCE: If my hon. Friend wants further information with regard to the export credits scheme, he had better put a question to the Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department.

    EXHIBITIONS.
    Mr. R. A. TAYLORasked the Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department whether he will consider the organisation of a national fair on the lines of the Leipzig fair; and how many sectional exhibitions have been held in Great Britain in the last two years?
    Mr. GILLETT (Secretary, Overseas Trade Department): I am unable to make any statement in reply to the first part of the question pending the report of the Chelmsford Committee. With regard to the second part, I am aware of about 140 such exhibitions.
    Mr. TAYLOR: Does not the hon. Member consider that a unified national effort would be much better than a large number of sectional exhibitions?
    Mr. GILLETT: We are awaiting the report of the Chelmsford Committee on the whole question.

    CANADIAN TARIFF.
    Mr. HURDasked the Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department if he will call for a report from the British High Commissioner in Canada on the effect of the increased British preferences in the Canadian tariff, and especially the means of carrying out the declared intention of the Canadian Government that the new tariff should be regarded as a straightforward offer for increased British trade?
    Mr. GILLETT: The reply to the first part of the question is in the negative; but I am in constant communication with His Majesty's Senior Trade Commissioner in Canada on this matter. As regards the latter part of the question, I would say that, with a view to assisting firms interested in the export trade to Canada, who cannot fail to regard the action of His Majesty's Government in Canada as an encouragement to them to increase
    2062
    their trade with that country, preliminary telegraphic reports on the new tariff rates transmitted by His Majesty's Senior Trade Commissioner in Montreal have been communicated to them and have also been published in the "Board of Trade Journal." The full official statement has just been received and complete particulars of the changes involved will be published in the next issue of the "Board of Trade Journal."

  DYESTUFFS ACT.
  Mr. DOUGLAS HACKINGasked the President of the Board of Trade whether the Government have yet reached a decision regarding the continuance of the Dyestuffs Act which is due to expire on 15th January, 1931?
  The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of TRADE (Mr. William Graham): I would refer the right hon. Member to my answer to the hon. Member for Newcastle, North (Sir N. Grattan-Doyle) on 13th May.
  Sir N. GRATTAN-DOYLE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the answer which he gave to the hon. Member for Newcastle, North (Sir N. Grattan-Doyle) conveyed no information whatever?
  Mr. W. GRAHAM: The important point is that the hon. Member has asked me for a declaration of policy, and I reply that that is still under consideration and that at the earliest possible moment the policy will be announced.

  INDIA.

    INDIAN ARMY (COMMISSIONS).
    Major GRAHAM POLEasked the Secretary of State for India the number of Indians and Europeans who were granted King's commissions in the Indian Army in the year 1929–30?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for INDIA (Mr. Wedgwood Benn): The numbers of candidates commissioned in the regular line since the 1st January, 1929, are: 13 Indians and 116 Europeans.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Is my right hon. Friend satisfied with these numbers?
    Mr. BENN: The hon. and gallant Member is well aware that this matter is, and has been, under the consideration of the Government?
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Is my right hon. Friend aware that nothing has been done for years?

    AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH (IMPERIAL INSTITUTE, PUSA).
    Major G. POLEasked the Secretary of State for India what action has been taken by the Government of India in regard to the recommendation of the Agricultural Commission in favour of the appointment of a whole-time director of the Imperial Institute of Agricultural Research at Pusa?
    Mr. BENN: The recommendation has been accepted, and it is hoped that the director will take up his duties next October.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Mr. STANLEY BALDWIN: May I ask the Prime Minister what business is to be taken next week?
The PRIME MINISTER: Monday, Supply (8th Allotted Day).
Tuesday: Finance Bill, Second Reading.
Wednesday and Thursday: Supply.
The Votes to be put down for Monday, Wednesday and Thursday will be announced later. As yet, I have had no subjects handed in to me.
On any day, if time permits, other Orders may be taken.

BILLS REPORTED.

  MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS (ASHBY-DE-LA-ZOUCH AND SLOUGH) BILL.
  Reported, without Amendment [Provisional Orders confirmed]; Report to lie upon the Table.
  Bill to be read the Third time To-morrow.

  MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS (AYLESBURY, CHESHAM, AND GUILDFORD) BILL.
  Reported, without Amendment [Provisional Orders confirmed]; Report to lie upon the Table.
  Bill to be read the Third time To-morrow.

  MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS (BRENTFORD AND CHISWICK AND RAMS GATE) BILL.
  Reported, without Amendment [Provisional Orders confirmed]; Report to lie upon the Table.
  Bill to be read the Third time To-morrow.

  MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS (CHIPPENHAM AND GRIMSBY) BILL.
  Reported, without Amendment [Provisional Orders confirmed]; Report to lie upon the Table.
  Bill to be read the Third time To-morrow.

  MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (HEXHAM) BILL.
  Reported, with Amendments [Provisional Order confirmed]; Report to lie upon the Table.
  Bill, as amended, to be considered To-morrow.

BARNSLEY AND DISTRICT TRACTION BILL [Lords].
  LANCASTER CORPORATION BILL [Lords].

    MALVERN HILLS BILL [Lords].
    FAVERSHAM OYSTER FISHERY COMPANY BILL [Lords].
    Reported, with Amendments; Reports to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

    PORTSMOUTH WATER BILL [Lords] (Certified Bill).
    Reported, with Amendments; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
    Bill, as amended, to be considered upon Monday next, pursuant to the Order of the House of 11th December.

MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS.
That they have agreed to,—
Kirkcaldy Corporation Order Confirmation Bill, without Amendment.
That they have passed a Bill, intituled, "An Act to extend Section forty-seven of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, to industries involving exposure to asbestos dust, and to amend the provisions of that Section relating to medical arrangements and examinations." [Workmen's Compensation (Silicosis) Bill [Lords.]
Also a Bill, intituled, "An Act to extend the period for the completion of certain works authorised by the Lochaber Water Power Act, 1921; to extend the area of supply of, and confer further powers upon, the Lochaber Power Company; and for other purposes." [Lochaber Water Power Bill [Lords.]
And also, a Bill, intituled, "An Act to authorise the Fife Electric Power Company to raise additional capital; to confer further powers upon the Company; and far other purposes." [Fife Electric Power Bill [Lords.]

LOCHABER WATER POWER BILL [Lords].

  FIFE ELECTRIC POWER BILL [Lords].
  Read the First time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.

  Date.

  Finnieston.

  Glasgow Central.

  Men.

  Women.

  Juveniles.

  Total.

  Men.

  Women.

  Juveniles.

  Total.

  28th January, 1929

  2,220

  346

  177

  2,743

  4,657

  1,147

  523

  6,327

  27th January, 1930

  2,684

  472

  229

  3,385

  4,898

  1,283

  465

  6,646

  29th April, 1929

  2,187

  307

  128

  2,622

  4,249

  957

  400

  5,606

  28th April, 1930

  2,917

  605

  145

  3,667

  5,805

  1,660

  328

  7,793

  The industries in which the largest numbers of insured persons were recorded as unemployed at each date at the Finnieston Employment Exchange were—among men: shipping service; dock, harbour, canal, etc., service; shipbuilding and ship-repairing; marine engineering, and the distributive trades; and among women: the distributive trades and hotel and boarding house service. At the Glasgow Central Exchange the industries in which the greatest numbers of insured persons were recorded as unemployed at each date were: among men: the distributive trades, the building industry, general engineering, road transport, shipbuilding and ship-repairing, and public works contracting; and, among women: the distributive trades, hotel and boarding house service, and printing and bookbinding.

  INSURANCE.
  Mr. HARDIEasked the Minister of Labour how soon steps are to be taken to provide for able-bodied unemployed who,

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE.
The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Ramsay MacDonald): I beg to move, "That this House do now adjourn."
I am moving the adjournment of the House in order that an opportunity may be given to discuss in the widest possible way the work and issues of the recent London Naval Conference. May I say, before entering into the subject itself, that, whatever the achievements of the Conference may have been, however small they may have been, they were only made possible by the very great forbearance, helpfulness, and good will of the delegates from all the countries which were represented. No Chairman will ever be able to look back upon such sheer enjoyment of hearty co-operation with his colleagues as I do when I think of the London Naval Conference. Although the immediate subject of the Conference was the Navy and naval affairs, let there be no mistake about it: the London Naval Conference was not merely a Naval Conference. It aimed at making a substantial contribution to the problem of general disarmament. We must bend our attention not merely to the sea, but to the air, and to the land as well, because by the mere limitation of one form of armaments we are not going very far to secure the peace of the world.
We had also to note another very serious circumstance. Since the failure at Geneva in 1927 great deterioration in the peace spirit has taken place. I attribute no blame for that failure, but, if hon. Members will look at the shipbuilding programme and various other military programmes since 1927, they will find that the failure at Geneva has been a great impetus to trusting once again to military preparation rather than to the pursuit of pacific ends. Another situation which was only too apparent was this: Since the last War we have created the League of Nations. We have signed arbitration Treaties of varying scope. We have: signed Treaties of peace, Peace Pacts like the Kellogg Pact, but, curiously enough, when we came to close purposes on the problem of armaments and the provision of arms, the mentality and assumption regarding how wars are to be kept off and national security established were such that we found deplorably little trust placed upon these Peace Pacts and the
2086
organisations to secure peace. The nations undoubtedly are falling back into their old mentality. The old fears, the old superstitions regarding security are returning and exactly the same kind of arguments that were so familiar before 1914 are coming back unblushing and unashamed in 1930. I do not say these things in order to strike a pessimistic note. Quite the opposite, because the time is still with us when we can stop it, and by making a sturdy effort to change that mentality and to hold back the tide that is flowing to international destruction, we can still save Europe and the world from what is called the next war. We had these things in mind during those long days of the London Naval Conference.
There was a general view that very little could be done by way of advance in naval disarmament until the United States and ourselves had come to an agreement. I think that view was sound. We had come to an agreement on words. Our predecessors had said, quite candidly, that they were perfectly willing that the United States should build to parity, but what had not been said was what was the programme of parity, and there was a school, or certain individuals—certain friends of mine—who had come to the view that it was unnecessary to pursue the agreement any further. Their view was, "Just let us say 'parity.' We never could imagine a conflict with America. Why should we worry about the force that America is putting upon the waters, whether they are putting 8-inch gun cruisers or 6-inch gun cruisers or whatever they care to build. It is no concern of ours." That view is a very attractive one, but it is a very unsound one. If the whole world occupied with America the same relation which we do, it might be a very sound view, but, unfortunately, that is not the case, and whether we take notice of what is being done on the other side of the Atlantic or not, other nations will. With those other nations we are concerned, and, consequently, one has to come to the conclusion, and I have come to the conclusion, after very careful consideration, that the foundation of a real, secure international understanding relating to naval building, must be an agreement between America and ourselves such as

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we were able to effect at the London Naval Conference. That piece of work has been done.
There were two other prominent aims. I do not name them in any sort of logical or organic order, but rather in the order of convenience. There were two other objects that the Naval Conference had to try to achieve. The first was this. What is so disturbing to peace is not always so much the size of fleets, as the growing competition in the building of fleets. The most deadly thing that can arise is a return of that competition which existed, as hon. Members will recall, between Germany and ourselves prior to 1914. I repeat that it is not always the size of the fleet that is dangerous, it is the competition between possible rival fleets. Unfortunately, that was beginning—that had begun—and, therefore, as soon as the opportunity arose to get the five leading naval Powers of the world at the moment at any rate, to come together, we had to strive with might and main to come to an agreement which would end competition.
I tell the House quite candidly that if it had been necessary to increase the size of our fleet, in order to have got an agreement which would have ended competition, it would have been an economy. It would have been wisdom, for the time being to have increased the size of the fleet rather than lose the opportunity of getting certain standards set, upon which further negotiations could proceed. I ask hon. Members to turn their minds to the relations between Canada and the United States to-day on the lakes dividing those two countries, where there are no armaments except insignificant things and to remember that however great the failure—or I would rather put it however imperfect the success—of the Washington Conference, the limitation in expanding tonnage put into capital ships and aircraft carriers, has had a tremendous effect in keeping those buildings stable. It gave us a chance, which we took as I will show in a minute, of considering not programmes which are most difficult things to manipulate when you are negotiating, but of considering actual strengths, and, in consequence, being able to reduce these figures without one-tenth of the trouble which we had to reduce figures
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regarding unregulated categories of ships both in this country and in the others. The stopping of competition in building is worth a great sacrifice. We have given nothing by way of expansion. We have succeeded, as regards three Powers at any rate, in stopping competition, and we have also succeeded in getting from the other two Powers which, for various reasons, were unable to subscribe to Part III of the Treaty, declarations that they are going to consider the situation in which they find themselves, with a decided and decisive determination to accommodate their building in the future to the standardisation that has been put into Part III of the London Treaty. That is a very great achievement.
4.0 p.m.
I come to the second of the other two points. Competition was the first and the next is reduction. So far as reduction is concerned, we were only able to get three Powers to agree to it. But the story is not yet finished. It is still being continued, and all I can say at the present moment—if I may say so without doing any harm—is that after such speeches as that delivered by Signor Grandi the other day, breathing the very best spirit that animated the London Naval Conference, I am encouraged to entertain hopes that the continuing conversations will be successful. Then, the House will remember, that the Conference at Geneva was a three-Power conference, and anyone who likes an easy job must have envied those who had to handle, not only three Powers, because that is only part of the easy business, but those who had to handle a three-Power conference which had unified interests—and I am not at all sure that the spectacular effect might not have been very much greater if the London Naval Conference had been from the beginning only a three-Power conference. A three-Power conference would have been a high seas conference pure and simple—America, Japan and ourselves—but Great Britain never could get security on only the agreement of a three-Power conference. We had to face the tremendously more complicated and difficult problem of grouping the United States and Japan with ourselves for what I have called high sea purposes, and then group France. Italy and ourselves for European Continental purposes.

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That is the problem. That is the tremendous difficulty. Although a five-Power Conference, as a matter of fact it was not merely five separate nations, but it was two separate groups of Powers consisting of three each, Great Britain practically playing the double part, appearing in the high seas group and also in the Continental; and, if I might add, Great Britain on this occasion, as on several previous occasions, was not merely representative of this country, but we had seven practically independent—I do not want to use words which would be misunderstood over here or in the Dominions—autonomous—I believe that is not quite satisfactory now, but, in any event, do not misunderstand me—we had five Dominions and India represented at London by admirable men, each holding his own view and each the head of an independent, delegation.
The various problems for the handling of such a Conference do not require to be stressed, but for the first time in history, as a result of this Conference, an agreement has been come to which covers the most formidable battleship, on the one hand, and the smallest submarine on the other. This has been possible because, though not a new method, it having been tried before, but because an old method has been tried with a little more consciousness than hitherto, a little bit more thinking out as a fairly efficient method for handling such an arrangement as this. The old method was this: If we had tried, say, a 10 years' agreement, we could not have got such a sympathetic arrangement as we have got. We, therefore, proposed, first of all, that the Treaty should last until 31st December, 1936, that it should be the subject of consideration in 1935, and in that way we got the various Powers—it was not a case of getting them, for they all together saw that the right way is, in the present state of suspicion, in the present condition of facing almost the unknown, instead of making a long-reaching agreement—to make a comparatively short-term agreement, but to take care that in that agreement certain essential things have to be fixed, such as limits of tonnage, and so on, to which I will briefly refer later—to fix the essential things now, and in 1935 revise the experience of five years. The result will be further reductions, more stringent limitations
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upon competition, closer relationships between the Powers which, but for those Conferences, would remain apart, and a much more solid and suitable laying of foundations upon which the fabric of peace has got to be based.
As to the programme we have got, I will not take up the time of the House, because it has been published in various ways. The Washington Treaty dealt with battleships, and so we did not deal with them, except on two points. The Washington agreement allowed us to keep 20 battleships until 1936. It allowed us to keep five battleships until 1936 over and above the 15 which was fixed as our quota. It allowed the United States three and Japan one, but the Washington arrangement was that we should have 15 battleships, the United States 15 battleships and Japan nine battleships. We decided mutually—the United States, Japan and ourselves—at once to cut off our superfluous battleships and keep on the basis of 15. That is going to save, according to estimates, about £4,000,000. But then there was something much more serious than that as a consequence of the Washington agreement. Between now and 1936 replacement would have had to come into operation. We should have had actually to have five new battleships in commission before 1936, and to be building five, and those would be at various stages of their building. Japan, the United States and ourselves said, "We will cut the whole thing, and go in for an absolute holiday so far as battleships are concerned." That will save us about £50,000,000 up to 1936.
There are various suggestions made by my good friends behind me that we ought to use this opportunity either to devise a new battleship or to reduce the tonnage of battleships. The battleship at the present time is 35,000 tons, and it is suggested that we might put a 10,000 ton battleship on the water instead of a, 35,000 ton. First of all, we could not get any two Powers to agree as to the reduction. They were quite willing to reduce, some to 28,000, some to 25,000, but no Power would reduce to 10,000, and the reason put up was that you cannot build a battleship of 10,000 tons. I do not know. I am an amateur. I am as ignorant of the technical problems of battleships as most amateurs are, and I confess I avoided the difficulty

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by seeing, or thinking I saw, that if you begin to tamper with your battleships you do not know where you are going to end. Instead of having the problem of a small type of battleship of 10,000 tonnage, the chances are that your naval designers will evolve a totally new type of fighting vessel, and you will have then to put a fleet, or a section of a fleet, of this smaller type of vessel on to the sea in order to keep up with the competition of the other Powers. I think that the view we took was sound, instead of tampering with battleships, to stop building until 1936, and that by 1936 there would be plenty of time to consider what is the function of the battleship in naval strategy, what is the size of the battleship and what is the advantage of the heavier type of war vessels which have been devised by the various naval designers all over the world, or, what would please me far better, whether we cannot come to the conclusion that the battleship had better be regarded as an obsolete vessel.
On the cruisers, there has been a good deal of controversy, in which the Admiralty has been blamed that, instead of 70, which has been the figure up to now regarded as the minimum for safety, we had fixed upon 50, made up of 15 eight-inch gun cruisers and 35 six-inch gun cruisers. It has been said that that has been done by us under pressure by the United States. That is not the case. Before the United States gave any views at all upon the subject, we were having this subject investigated by our experts. The Admiralty's position has been already declared, and I will declare it again, so that there may be no misunderstanding in this matter. The Admiralty's position was that, under international conditions such as they exist to-day, the number of 50 cruisers could be accepted for a strictly limited period, provided always that other Powers met our standard of 50, and provided that in our number, that is, in our 50, there is a proper proportion of new construction suitable for extended operations. There is in that nothing terrible or horrible, nothing that could shock my pacifist friends. A good many of our six-inch gun cruisers were built specially for war purposes and during the War, and their operations were meant to cover only the North Sea and
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the immediately adjoining waters of our coast. In replacing them, the Admiralty said that we would require to have cruisers not of more tonnage, not of heavier metal, or anything of that sort, but cruisers which would enable sailors to be comfortable inside them if they were further removed from Great Britain than these special War-built vessels allowed them to be. The saving on the programmes of cruisers, destroyers and submarines is estimated at a sum of about £13,000,000.
Another point has given rise to a great deal of discussion and if I have not been able to follow the seriousness of the discussion it is because I think our critics have discovered a very had mare's nest. The House is now familiar with the controversy about the 91,000 tons limitation. It is an intricate sort of point and one which is not easy to explain although it is exceedingly simple in itself. Let me see if I can get the House to understand the intricate position. The London Naval Treaty provides that cruisers laid down before the 1st January, 1920, that is war cruisers really, shall be valued for the purposes of the Treaty at 16 years. That is when they have passed their sixteenth year they become over age. Cruisers built after that date will be valued at the age of 20 years. Then it is provided that we shall build in replacement and in relation to our 50 cruisers which are to be on the sea in 1936 no more than 50—we shall build new contruction equal to, up to 1936, 91,000 tons. Does that allow us to have 50 cruisers? That is the point. The critics say, no. It works out in this way. If we take the 16-year cruiser in the bulk and scrap it all and replace it before 1936 we should have to build 62,220 tons more than we now do. We retain, in other words, in our 91,000 tons, or because of our limitation to 91,000 tons, 62,220 over age tonnage, taking over age at 16 years. None of the over-age tonnage is more than three years over 16.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) knows that the calculations that I am giving are not my own. If we take 20 years as the life of the cruisers in 1936, the 91,000 tons would satisfy all replacements and give us 11,820 tons over and above it. What is the situation? There are two things that we have to consider, and I believe that the expert is with me here. I know

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that he has dinned into my ears again and again until I believe that my advice is given without dissent. It is a great mistake to have a big block of ships in any category which is of the same age. I cannot discuss that matter. I am told that that is so and I have accepted that as true. I will tell the House what is the parallel condition and result of that, and I do understand that part of it, that if, say, in 1931 you lay down more than your average annual requirements in cruisers you take more men into your dockyards for construction, and into your private yards also, than you can keep going two and three years afterwards. The result—I have had it worked cut—is this: one of the great troubles that Government after Government has experienced in the employment of labour in dockyards has been that the curve of demand for labour has gone up and down and up and down. Therefore, when you get a chance, as we now have, of regularising the curve and making it far more of a straight line, averaging your demand so well out that you do not require to wiggle waggle your demand for labour, you ought to take your opportunity, and that is involved in this proposal.
Mr. CHURCHILL: I do not want to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman in an intricate statement, but can he say, for our information, if 91,000 tons enable cruisers to be replaced during the next five years with a 20 years' life, how many tons would be required to enable them to be replaced after a 16 years' life?
The PRIME MINISTER: I am sorry if I have not made myself clear. I am sure that it is my fault. Take the 16 year basis and supposing you say that you will disregard all block building. You may have 20 cruisers falling out in one year, because they have come to over 16 years. Next year you may have four and in the following year you may have 10 falling out. That is an absurd arrangement. Therefore, what you have to do is to take your average falling out, and in the year when 20 fall out your average will not give you enough rebuilding, but as you go along and you average your requirements, and your apparently short commons in allowance of replacement satisfy you, you have regularised your demand for labour and you also properly co-ordinate your fleet. Whether the 91,000 tons will do that or
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not, that is the idea, but if we had taken the 16 years basis and replaced every one of the ships as soon as they came out, we should have required 62,220 tons more.
Mr. CHURCHILL: Thank you very much.
The PRIME MINISTER: If we had taken it as 20 years, then we should have got 11,820 tons too much, so that the average falls between 16 and 20, slightly nearer, I think, the 20 than the 16. I apologise to the House for delaying so long on that point. I have done my best to make it plain or, at any rate, to put the House in possession of the idea which is behind what appears to be rather absurd mathematics. As regards the United States, there was no provision required for it because it was building up to parity, and it had no replacements. As regards Japan, there is no figure there, although if hon. Members look carefully at another article they will find that that other article does impose certain limitations. As a matter of fact, Japan, using all the rights that it has got and all the special privileges that it asked for in order to enable it to keep labour in its yard and not to have four years absolutely blank in building cruisers—we met it sympathetically—when it uses all its rights against our 91,000 tons cannot possibly fit up one single ton above 35,655 tons.
I pass from destroyers and submarines, as there is nothing special in regard to them. We tried to get reductions there which we could not get, but I would like to remind the House that when we enter an international conference we do not get what we propose but what we can get our colleagues in the conference to accept with us. We can fight as hard as we like to get them to accept more than they are willing to do, but when the last word is said it is the last word of a conference, and not the last word of the majestic and imperious will of any one Power. In addition, there were a great many technical points, apparently small but of the very greatest importance as regards the future. There was the size of units, armaments, the definition of cruisers, destroyers, special ships, aircraft carriers. There was the rule about the use to which submarines might be put in attacking merchant

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vessels, rules for scrapping, displacement and so on. You read them with dull minds as you go down column after column of the London Treaty, but do remember this, and I hope hon. Members will not forget it, that these little definitions, these pettifogging little points have just been like nails on the way, pricking and puncturing every attempt to get over the preliminaries of a real international naval agreement.
There is one important point, a point of difficulty which, on the face of it, made Geneva an impossibility. Ought, when efforts are being compared, the settlement to be upon what is called globular tonnage, that is, the total tonnage of all kinds of ships, or ought it to be divided into categories and each class assigned a number of tons for itself? Italy and France fought us. America and ourselves stood side by side, and there was no possibility, apparently, of reconciliation. There was the famous French memorandum put in at Geneva. There were our proposals and the United States proposals, and no bridge, golden or other, appeared to be possible. Well, we have settled it. It has been settled with this precaution—which I felt I ought to take, because I wanted to see just another step forward, before letting it go loose, perhaps to be applied by those who still were not quite converted to the formula—and that was that before we finally accept it in the abstract as a formula that should be applied again and again we would just like to see the first results of it in figures. It has gone to the Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations and we have put in it the precautionary condition that before we can completely subscribe to it, we would like to see what figures it produces in relation to the programmes which we have been working out at the London Naval Conference.
All these are really very good achievements of the Conference. So I think I can leave it there. It is a gigantic task. We have simply made a little nibble at the cherry. There is no use magnifying it and there is no use minimising it. The Conference has done some very good preparatory work, very essential preparatory work, and anyone knows this who sat through those months, although, as a matter of fact—and this ought to be said for the Conference—five weeks were absolutely
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lost on account of the change of Government—there was a loss of three weeks and of a fortnight later on. I have no complaint on that, but I hope that that will be taken into account when the time occupied by the Conference is considered. We have to start again the conversations with Italy and France. The Preparatory Commission at Geneva must go on. We have to face the land problem, and the air problem. We have to co-ordinate them altogether in a well-thought-out and well-balanced scheme of security, of actual reduction. The greatest obstacle of all is that of the mentality of people whom, while they know perfectly well that they will never get security by military power, nevertheless, as soon as you bring up their experts and their representatives to face actual proposals of programmes of reduction, you find quivering and shaking and being unwilling, while candidly admitting that they are taking the risk of war, to take the risks of peace for once, to see if that will not be more successful than the other. That has been our work, imperfect, unfinished, but nevertheless done in the very best of good will and with the steadfast determination, and ended for the time being, or rather postponed. The representatives of the Five Powers, therefore, have gone back determined to do everything that they can to advance the cause of peace.
Mr. CHURCHILL: The House is under an obligation to the Prime Minister for the care and pain he has taken to make us a statement on the subject which is now before us. To-day, I must remind the House that we are only discussing a question which you, Sir, have just put from the Chair, namely, whether we should or should not adjourn. This procedure has been adopted at the wish of the Conservative Opposition, because we wish, at this stage, to allow the Government to lay their whole case before us, not only in its diplomatic but also in its naval aspects, so that we may decide what further action it is our duty to take, and, in particular, whether our objections to this Agreement can be adequately expressed by a discussion of Vote 3 of the Navy Estimates or whether they will require to be embodied in some definite Motion put forward by the Conservative party. I say this at the outset to make it clear that we view what is proposed in the

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Draft Treaty with the most serious anxiety; and I must say that this anxiety has not been removed at all by the agreeable and lucid speech to which we have just listened.
I am going to make some demand on the patience of the House this afternoon. We must recognise, first of all, that the policy of a naval agreement with the United States or other Powers, supplementary to the Washington Agreement of 1921, has been accepted in principle by all parties in Great Britain. The Prime Minister and his colleagues were therefore, it seems, justified in their efforts to arrive at such an agreement. We ourselves had made a series of important proposals designed to avert or slacken naval competition in armaments and make more secure the growing strength of the foundations of peace. Finally, we do not and must not forget that the Clauses in the Treaty of Versailles have bound the victorious Powers to pursue faithfully and earnestly a policy of disarmament, not only naval disarmament, for, as the Prime Minister has reminded us, naval, military and air disarmament all stand together. It is our belief that we have done by action and example more than any other signatory Power of the Treaty of Versailles or indeed of any other Power in the world. That is a course—I am speaking on behalf of this side of the House—which we are determined steadfastly to pursue, so far as the national safety and interest of the British Empire or of the Commonwealth of Nations, if that term be preferred, will allow. I must also recognise that the Prime Minister in his protracted and difficult negotiations, of which he has given us some account this afternoon, has made a personal contribution of forbearance, sincerity and patience which, quite apart from the merits of this Treaty, command general respect in this country. There is no doubt that the visit of the Prime Minister to the United States was the occasion for a marked and impressive manifestation of American good will towards Great Britain, the calling forth of which was in itself a service to the State. In this navy matter, as in this question of India, the Prime Minister and his colleagues are on the stage of history; what they say will be recorded in other volumes than those of the OFFICIAL REPORT and certainly, in his
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conduct of these negotiations, the Prime Minister has done or said nothing that is in contrast with the dignity and consequence of the events with which he was dealing.
But I am afraid I did not rise to-day for the purpose of paying compliments to the right hon. Gentleman. Indeed, I apprehend that, if I were to pay tributes, or if tributes to his policy and conduct were paid from this side of the House, that would not commend his policy or his conduct either to the bulk of his own party or to the foreign countries with whom we have been in conference. I, therefore, proceed forthwith to the practical question which lies before us, namely, the wisdom or unwisdom, the merits or demerits of the proposed agreement itself. I think I must make three main submissions to the House. The first is that the Agreement of London is not the natural successor or child of the Washington Agreement of 1921, but, on the contrary, differs fundamentally from it. That is my first submission. My second is that it is not a Treaty of parity at all in the sense that Great Britain and the United States should be equal Powers upon the sea, but that, on the contrary, it is a formal acceptance by Great Britain of definitely inferior sea-power. Thirdly, I submit that the London Agreement contains within itself subsidiary provisions which will have the effect of ensuring that that inferiority is attained before the Treaty comes to be revised in 1936. Those are my three main submissions, and I will endeavour to make them good.
The Washington Treaty, might I remind the House, rested upon the basis that Great Britain and the United States should be equal in all the battle elements of their respective Fleets. It was confined exclusively to those elements. It did not raise any question of that disparity which we can imagine to exist between this small, densely populated island, the centre of a commonwealth of nations and dependencies spread all over the world, and lying itself in the closest proximity to European centres, between that entity on the one hand and on the other the vast State, almost a Continent, virtually self-supporting in every essential of life and power, separated by thousands of miles on all flanks from all possible attack. None of the disparity

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was raised by the Washington Treaty of 1921. It confined itself to the battle sphere. It left unfettered our rights to take the necessary measures, whatever we might conceive them to be, for the protection of our commerce and our food against submarines by means of cruisers, convoy vessels—an expression which should be taken into consideration by naval representatives—and also our rights to make provision for flotillas and small craft as they might be required as long as submarines remain a great factor in the narrow waters and inland seas through which so much of our economic life has to flow. To show how strongly these points were insisted upon at Washington, I need only cite a passage in the instructions which were sent to Lord Balfour, our chief representative, by the Government of that day:
"We welcome your decision to press for the total abolition of submarines. Even if you can obtain this, we wish to be consulted before a final decision is taken upon the limited scales of construction in small craft permitted to the various signatories. The position of Britain, with her world-wide possessions and food supplies, on the one hand clearly requires an entirely different standard from that acceptable by self-contained nations. We apprehend, however, that there is very little chance of the abolition of submarines being agreed upon, and in this event we must insist at all costs upon absolute freedom in regard to the character and number of all vessels under, say, 10,000 tons. We cannot, in the face of French freedom to construct a great submarine fleet, to say nothing of the submarine and cruiser construction of other Powers, enter into any agreement fettering our liberty to build whatever numbers and classes of cruisers and anti-submaine craft we may consider necessary to the maintenance of national and Imperial life. We feel sure, from our knowledge of your outlook on the whole problem, that you will share this view to the full. Even at the cost of a complete rupture, we feel certain you will not agree to any restriction in this sphere without previous consultation with the Cabinet."
The PRIME MINISTER: Has that paper been published?
Mr. CHURCHILL: No. That is an extract from a telegram of instructions which was sent 10 years ago by the Government of which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) was the head.
The PRIME MINISTER: May I ask whether it is not one of a whole series of instructions?
Mr. CHURCHILL: Certainly. It was one of an immense series of telegrams, but it is of immense importance, in studying these grave matters—
Mr. LAMBERT: Have those telegrams ever been published?
Mr. CHURCHILL: No, but I take the fullest responsibility for the exercise of my own judgment in this matter.
Mr. LAMBERT: Surely, under the Rules of the House, this is a Cabinet document, and should be published, if it is quoted from.
The PRIME MINISTER: I happen to know the document. Is this a Cabinet paper, and, if it is a Cabinet paper, has the right hon. Gentleman got the usual leave for the disclosure of Cabinet secrets?
Mr. CHURCHILL: This is not a Cabinet paper. This is one of a great series of telegrams which have passed. Many telegrams have been published, and this is most relevant to the immediate matter. Ten years have passed since these messages have passed. Immense publications are being made of telegrams which have been sent and have passed on all sorts of confidential matters, and I should not be doing my duty to the House if, in discussing a matter of this vital importance, I failed to place this grave issue before Parliament with all its lineaments fully portrayed.
Mr. BROCKWAY: On a point of Order. Is it within the Orders of this House that a Member who has been a member of a previous Cabinet should quote from Cabinet documents which he has had in that capacity and which have not been published?
Mr. SPEAKER: I understood, in the first instance, that that question could not arise, because it was not a Cabinet document.
Mr. CHURCHILL: It is an administrative paper, but anyhow—[an Holy. MEMBER: "Who sent it?"]. That telegram was sent upon the authority of my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I should certainly have thought, with due respect, that this was a Cabinet document, and I very much regret that my right hon.

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Friend, seeing that probably this is a telegram which was sent by me, had not the courtesy at least to inform me, because it must have been one of a series of telegrams, some of which it might have been very inadvisable, not from the point of view of the members of the Cabinet, but from the point of view of the relations of the various countries, to publish. I very deeply regret that, at any rate, some opportunity was not afforded me, who happened to be head of that Government, and who probably sent that telegram, of seeing what the nature of the telegram was, and whether there were not other communications. I should have thought, on the point of Order, that this was essentially a Cabinet document.
Mr. SPEAKER: The right hon. Gentleman, and indeed the House, will realise that it is not within my authority to say whether it is or is not a Cabinet document. I was only quoting what the right hon. Gentleman said who has produced it, that it was not a Cabinet document. I cannot be the judge of that matter.
Mr. CHURCHILL: At any rate, it is not a point of Order. [An HON. MEMBER: "It is a point of honour!"] It is a matter on which I very readily submit myself to the measured judgment of the House and of this country.
Mr. TOOLE: Are we not, entitled to know who first published this telegram?
Mr. CHURCHILL: That is not a point of Order. On the point which was raised by my right hon. Friend—[Interruption.]
Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member asked me, on a point of Order, whether the House is entitled to know who first published the telegram. I can only say that, under the Rules of this House, when a Member is quoting from a document he makes himself responsible for it. Beyond that I cannot go.
Mr. BROCKWAY: Further to the point of Order which I first raised. I appreciate that the Chair cannot decide whether this is a Cabinet document or not, but I suggest that it is possible to put to the right hon. Member the definite question whether this is a Cabinet document or whether it is not.
Mr. CHURCHILL: In my judgment, it is not a Cabinet document, but only one of a series—
Mr. BROCKWAY: In the judgment of your Prime Minister it was.
Mr. CHURCHILL: The hon. Member asked me a question, and I presume he would like me to reply, but I do not wish to reply if he does not want to hear the answer. In my judgment, it is not a Cabinet document. It is one of an unending series of administrative telegrams which have been sent—
Mr. J. JONES: On a point of Order. If the document is not a Cabinet document, who sent it?
Mr. CHURCHILL: Replying to the point of my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs. [An HON. MEMBER: "Run away!"] Who is running away? I am going to be here for another hour. Replying to the point raised by my right hon. Friend—[Interruption].
Mr. SPEAKER: We are discussing a very important question, and we cannot do so in an orderly manner with so many interruptions.
Mr. CHURCHILL: Replying to the point raised by my right hon. Friend, I would gladly have given him notice of my intention to cite, in one form or another, the important instructions which were given by his Government in 1921, but I am bound to say that I thought those instructions would so redound to his credit and reputation that I could not conceive that there would be any occasion where he would wish me to inform him. If I have erred in this matter, I express to him my regret. These were the instructions and the spirit of the instructions which were sent by my right hon. Friend, and on his authority, and on the authority of his colleagues, at a time when he was defending, with resolution and success, the vital interests of this country.
Mr. TOOLE: On a point of Order. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman might at least tell us—
Mr. SPEAKER: That is not a point of Order.
Mr. CHURCHILL: I have been so much interrupted that perhaps I may recall the House to the theme of the argument which I am addressing to it. My argument is that this London Agreement bears no relation to the Washington Treaty, to which it is apparently a supplement, and that the Washington Treaty carefully and specifically excluded all attempts at achieving parity in regard to minor vessels. I have quoted the instructions that were sent by the Government of that day, and I need scarcely say that those instructions were given the fullest effect by Lord Balfour and in the Washington Agreement. The London Agreement, on the other hand, seeks to apply or purports to apply strict parity to the naval forces of all kinds, whether required for battle or for trade and food protection, and, by so doing, brings directly into the foreground of our minds those immense differences in the situation of the two countries to which I have already referred. There, then, is the fundamental difference which the Pact of London has superimposed upon the Washington Agreement of 1921. This is a change of principle of the most profound and far-reaching character, which has certainly not escaped the attention of any country in the world except perhaps our own. That is my first point, and it leads me directly to my second.
5.0 p.m.
My second point is this: What we are asked to agree to now is not a treaty of parity at all. Under superficial and paper appearance of parity, this treaty embodies a solemn acceptance, not only by Great Britain, but by the British Empire, of a permanent secondary position in seapower. We have abandoned, in fact—and when I look at some of the clauses I think we have also abandoned in form—the principle of the one-Power standard to which our naval strength was reduced after the War. Let me remind the House how that standard has been successively reduced. First of all, for some generations we were as strong at sea as all other countries put together. We did not abuse our strength. Next for a long period we adopted the principle of being substantially stronger than the next two strongest Powers combined, the United States not being at that time a factor. Then, when the German danger grew upon us in the early years of this
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century, we declared our standard of 16 battleships to Germany's 10 and a two-to-one superiority in cruisers and small craft, all Dominion vessels, let me point out, being excluded, and consequently additions to the calculation. I think that is a sound basis, for, after all, the Dominion navies have separate communities of their own to protect, separate difficulties and dangers to face. After the War, at Washington we accepted the one-power standard in all that contributed to battle strength, excluding all other elements necessary for the protection of food supplies.
The Prime Minister asks us to abandon, in effect, the one-Power standard. We are no longer to have a Navy equal even for purposes of battle—I say nothing of trade protection—to the other leading Navy in the world. That is my assertion. Perhaps the First Lord will address himself to it when he comes to speak later in the Debate. I will try to explain on what I base that statement. I am afraid I am going to speak for some time. We are not going to have interests, rights and securities that have been built up over centuries dismissed without patient and searching examination. First, let me say in discussing this matter, that war between the two great English speaking peoples is completely excluded from our minds. It has never played any part in our precautions or preparations at any time, and it has been expessly banished in the most solemn and irrevocable manner by the Kellogg Pact. I will therefore use to illustrate my arguments, letters of the alphabet instead of the names of countries. If you have two Navies, "A" and "B," each of which has 20 battleships and 50 cruisers, you have paper equality. But if "A," by sending its cruisers to raid the trade routes of "B," can draw 30 cruisers of "B" to protect those trade routes, the resultant forces available for battle will not be equal. "A" would have 40 cruisers to protect her battle fleet and find her opponent's battle fleet, and "B" would have only 20. The result in the battle sphere—[An HON. MEMBER: "What about C and D?"] That is a complication going to be still more embarrassing to that nation with the longest trade routes.
I have taken only one illustration, but one has only to read the evidence which

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Mr. Stimson has been giving before the Senate committee, for the report of which we are indebted to the "Times," in the last few days. Mr. Stimson is a man most high-minded, most fair-minded, most sober-minded, and although, no doubt, in putting his case to the Senate committee, he would naturally make the best of the mission with which he was charged over here, we make allowances for that. Nevertheless, so far as I see from independent study, everything he has said is absolutely correct. Let us see some of the things he said which have appeared only this morning. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman is going to give great attention to this. Mr. Stimson spoke of the Anglo-American equality now established by the Treaty in the battleship class which could even
"be turned to superiority if the United States should modernise its vessels."
He explained how they had put forward a demand for a new great battleship, not because they thought it would necessarily be accepted, but because it would be something to give away, so that they would be sure to acquire the right to modernise their battleships, which in his words would have the effect of giving them the superiority in the battle fleet. He proceeded to say
"They secured under the Treaty some superiority in the 8-inch class and they had been successful in reducing British superiority in the 6-inch vessels from 26 to 10 down to 13 to 10."
Mr. Stimson went on to say that
"The United States was to-day free to build 10,000-ton cruisers carrying 6-inch guns if she chose to do so. And, when the relative gun-power of the British and United States cruiser fleets was considered, he thought it would be found that the position of the United States was even better than in respect of tonnage."
Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY rose—
Mr. CHURCHILL: I have already got a long way behind time. No doubt the hon. and gallant Member, as one of the protagonists in this discussion, will have the opportunity of addressing the House in good time. My objection is to steer as clear of technical points as possible in order that the House may follow my argument. I have given illustrations and quoted Mr. Stimson, and there is one final test to establish my thesis that we are asked to agree not to parity but
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to inferiority. Let us compare, therefore, the British and American cruiser fleets, as they will be built, or virtually built, at the end of 1936. I say virtually," because there are two American cruisers which may only approach the verge of completion. I assume that both countries build according to the Treaty. I have divided the ships into two classes, the modern or new ships and the older ships. Of modern or new ships, Great Britain will have of 8-inch gun vessels 15, and the United States of 8-inch gun vessels, 18. Great Britain of 6-inch gun vessels will have 14 and the United States of 6-inch gun vessels, 9. The total for Great Britain of modern or new ships is 29, aggregating 237,000 tons, and the 27 United States ships aggregate 253,000 tons.
I come to the older ships. We shall have two Emeralds of 7,000 tons and one Adelaide which may come in that class, and 18 small obsolescent 4,500-ton cruisers. As against this, the United States have 10 Omahas of 7,000 tons or upwards. Such are the fleets. But observe nearly all our 15 8-inch gun ships already built or in process of completion. Nearly all the American 8-inch gun ships are still to build, with all improvements in design and power which the naval science of every year makes it passible to bestow on new vessels. Therefore, I have no doubt that they will be superior at every point to the British 8-inch gun ships—at every point science can give them. All the American 6-inch gun ships are new or under 16 years, and they are all of large tonnage. Mr. Stimson makes a great point of that, which, of course, is of enormous importance, where you have to have a considerable radius, stability, strength to resist artillery attacks, and safety in a rough sea. All these are of the utmost consequence.
There are the two fleets, and there is no doubt whatever of these two fleets, as they will be in 1926 cruiser fleets, that of the United States will be definitely superior in strength. That is taking no consideration at all of the different tasks. One has to protect the immense trade routes on which the life of this island depends, and the other is for war unconnected with the bringing in of supplies. But there is a method of testing which of these two fleets will be

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stronger, because it has been arranged as an alternative that the United States shall be free to construct an exact parity cruiser fleet to our own, a virtual replica as far as possible of our own. By so doing, they will gain 13,000 tons of additional construction. But are they going to do it? They know perfectly well that a far better arrangement for their naval forces and a far better disposition of money for their cruiser fleet will be made by the building which I have set out and not by adhering to an exact replica of our own fleet.
I cannot conclude my argument about parity without dealing with one more point. It is freely stated in the United States, and it is one of the arguments which no doubt the right hon. Gentleman and his colleague the First Lord had to meet, that Great Britain has her large mercantle marine and naval bases all over the world, and that the United States must have a stronger navy to equate this. That is an altogether ill-founded idea. These bases and the merchant ships which we have are not sources of aggressive strength; they are only the vital apparatus by which we compensate ourselves for our dispersed situation and our dependance on overseas food. It the naval power which uses these bases and guards these merchant fleets becomes inadequate, they all sink together in helpless futility. I have used the similitude of the diver. The diver has a helmet, a special dress and heavy boots; he has an air-pipe and pumping apparatus of the most complicated character, but the diver, with all these possessions will not be in a stronger position than the man who is standing on terra firma without any of them. If the air-pipe is severed, the diver and his apparatus perish together and to say that we should bring our mercantile marine and bases into this calculation, is to use an argument to which we would never lend ourselves.
In proposing a Treaty binding us to a definite naval inferiority to any other Power, the Government have gone beyond what is wise and right and in harmony with the long and hitherto carefully guarded interests of this country. The signature and ratification of this Treaty will be a memorable and melancholy event in our history. I look upon it with amazement. If anyone had told me that 15 years after the Royal Navy
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had saved this country from the horrors of invasion, that 13 years after it had saved us from actual starvation, that 12 years after it had brought all the allied nations safely and victoriously through the Great War, we should be sitting here to approve a Treaty which denies us, not supremacy, for that has been given up, but even the right to have a navy equal to that of any other great Power, I would have thought him mad. We on this side of the House may be powerless to save such a position, but we cannot accept the slightest responsibility for it. We cannot invest the act of the Government with national sanction. We hold ourselves free to review the whole situation. I was very glad when I saw in this Treaty the provision which had been inserted for a review in 1935, and I shall have a word to say about that later.
I come to my third point. We are allowed a total of 50 cruisers aggregating 339,000 tons. Leaving the United States out of account, is this sufficient for our needs? The Prime Minister did not think so when he was last in power. On the contrary, he began a programme for the construction of these 10,000 ton 8-inch gun cruisers with an instalment never equalled by the Conservative Government in the succeeding years. The Admiralty did not consider it adequate in 1925; on the contrary, they presented arguments and calculations worked out in elaborate detail for every area showing the cruisers required for every area from which it was necessary for this country to draw its food and raw material. They threatened to resign on their cruiser programme so strongly did they feel. At Geneva, the Admiralty adhered to the same figures backed with an immense amount of technical detail. Let us quote Mr. Stimson again:
"The new British Government came in determined 'to do better,' and he did not think there was sufficient realisation in this country of 'how much they have done.' He drew a comparison between the statement of the British minimum cruiser requirements made at Geneva—70 vessels aggregating 420,000 tons—and the present agreement on 50 vessels of 339,000 tons, and described it as remarkable."
We will all agree that it is remarkable. What is the reason which had led the Naval Lords to make such an immense change in the professional advice which it is their duty to tender to the Ministers of the day? It cannot be any improvement in our relations with the United

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States, or any pact we have signed with them, because we had always excluded the United States as possible enemies from our calculations. We are assured by the Government that it is the effect of the Kellogg Pact and the general improving sentiment for peace which has justified this surprising alteration in professional views. I did not agree with the Lords of the Admiralty in their estimate of 70 cruisers unless many of them were very old vessels. I am none the less surprised, knowing the very solid and detailed arguments on which they based themselves, at their change of attitude and conviction. I cannot understand how expert naval opinion upon the number of cruisers required in particular areas to assure our food supplies can be influenced by the agreement of other Powers to the Kellogg Pact, especially when it has unhappily been followed in almost every case by a marked increase in naval armaments and an increased interest in naval strategy.
I can understand that the argument about improved conditions of peace might well influence the Government and the House of Commons, but I do not see how it is relevant to the purely technical calculations on which all the previous advice of the expert advisers has been based. There is, however, one explanation which suggests itself. Fifty large cruisers of modern type might give us as great a measure of security as 70 cruisers, a large proportion of which were small, old and obsolete. But this explanation is largely swept from us by the extraordinary provision about the 91,000 tons, the significance of which was only realised by the country after the Treaty was made public. Under this provision we are forbidden for the next five years to build up even to our replacement quota of cruisers within the tonnage which is still allowed to us, and we are allowed to build only 91,000 tons. Therefore, during that period we shall be making replacements approximately at 20 years life instead of at 16 years life. I see no objection to extending the life of cruisers by treaty to 20 years, provided that that condition is simultaneously obligatory on every other party signatory to the treaty. But what are we to say to a provision which compels us, whose cruiser fleet is already largely obsolete, and is also our life and
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protection, to rebuild cruisers after only 20 years, while other parties to the agreement are authorised immediately to replace upon a 16 years basis?
Thus we are neither to have numbers nor quality. We are deliberately to be made to allow the main character of our cruiser fleet to degenerate into Obsolescence, while other Powers will be increasing theirs in numbers and modernity, and when the United States will be making enormous and feverish additions to her naval strength. After more than 20 years close connection with these matters, I am astonished that any Admiralty board of naval officers could have been found to accept responsibility—and it is a very grave responsibility—for such a ham-stringing stipulation. The effect is obvious, and I hope that the House marks very carefully the effect; it is to make it certain that our cruiser forces will be reduced to inferiority before the Treaty comes up for revision in 1935 or 1936. That undoubtedly must be considered by us in estimating the importance of the review which we will give to these matters in 1935 or 1936. By then we shall have definitely become the second naval Power.
British affairs, naval and other, have, I think, suffered from lack of will power, through lack of confidence in ourselves or in our duty, and lack of national conviction as to our course. Other countries have their plans and resolves. We drift, seeking the easiest way out, the smoothest course, and taking the line of least resistance. Other countries, much weaker countries, do not hesitate to state their views and intentions and to stand by them. Do they suffer for it? No; they are respected, and deference is shown to their views. We are the passive matrix on which others imprint their claims. Nevertheless, we have not yet reached the position where we need fear to state our views and intentions plainly and resolutely. I have dealt with some of the disadvantages of this Treaty, but what are we going to gain by it? It is called a Treaty of Disarmament. Whom does it disarm? Japan? Japan has secured an increase of her ratio, and she approaches now to within 30 per cent. of the cruiser strength of the British Empire, which is scattered all over the globe. France and Italy? They have gone off to embark, perhaps, on a serious naval

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rivalry between themselves, which will be the cause of much anxiety to other Powers.
The United States are, of course, making the greatest naval expansion that has been seen. The only Power to be disarmed is the Power which has already disarmed the most; the only navy to be cut down is the Navy of the country that cannot live without sea-borne food. We are told that a great deal of money has been saved. The Prime Minister mentioned £50,000,000, but I have seen £70,000,000 claimed as the saving to the taxpayer in the next five years to be effected by this Treaty. What truth is there in that? The Government's position is that we must build what, in accordance with their views, is the absolute minimum compatible with safety, excluding the United States. We should have had to do that, anyhow, neither more nor less.
What, then, have we saved on it? "Ah," we are told, "we have not got to replace great battleships." I approve of the extension of the life of battleships, it has always been our aim, and we would also have been very glad to see that important additional measures were taken to secure a substantial reduction in their size; but supposing that no agreement had been made and that we had built no more battleships after 1931? Is it certain that the United States would have built any? I think it would be very difficult for the United States to build a series of new and monster battleships if they were the only ones that were being constructed in the world. It would not be difficult through any lack of material or any lack of resources, but it would be difficult because of the moral outlook of very large masses of the population of the United States, and immense opposition would gather against such a policy. This moral resistance would in this case have been re-enforced by practical arguments of the highest significance, namely, that air power, as it increases, will seal the doom of these £8,000,000 or £9,000,000 monsters. Whether that be right or not I am not saying, but at any rate it is an argument which is much supported in the United States, and it seems to me that we need have taken no steps to renew our battle fleet until other Powers embarked on new building.
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Therefore, I conclude, but I am only in the region of conjecture, that the agreement reached on battleships is not the result of a bargain or the fruits of this Conference, but the results of the conviction in many quarters, and especially in the United States, that giant battleships are following the mammoth into extinction. Then what money has been saved by signing the Treaty? There is no question of our reducing our normal Estimates by £50,000,000 or £70,000,000, spread over five years. There never was a question of doing more than averting an expenditure which had not yet arrived, and I submit to the House that it is very probable that this new battleship construction would never have come to pass. There is, however, one great prize which might have been gained by this Treaty, which, if gained, would make amends for much. We ask ourselves whether this immense surrender on our part, this sacrifice to which Mr. Stimson has borne unstinted witness, will end the naval controversy between Great Britain and the United States? Shall we reach the position where British and Americans will not worry any more about each other's fleets and leave off ceaselessly comparing them, gun for gun and ton for ton? [Interruption.] But we cannot blame the British Nation for being anxious on this matter. After all, we see the Senate of the United States holding the most strict inquiry, examining its officers and representatives, summoning before it admirals and experts, and spending we do not know how many weeks in the most searching examination of every detail of a matter which, after all, is infinitely less important to them than it is in our case. Therefore, you cannot blame us for worrying while we are forced to consider propositions of this kind.
I confess that I would, to end this naval controversy between the two English-speaking peoples, pay a great price—[Interruption.]—but not any price. But will this Agreement achieve it? [Interruption.] I am submitting a reasoned argument to the House and I have not been hurrying, because I really think one ought not to hurry over this. I ask again, Will this agreement achieve it? That is the crux of our discussion. I fear, on the contrary, that this Agreement is only the beginning of a protracted and delicate and difficult controversy

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between the two countries on technical naval details. Look at the disputes which arose about the simple Washington Agreement. Look at the bitterness which was exhibited about the elevation of the guns, and questions of that kind, and how often we were told that the clever British diplomatists and experts had "pulled the wool" over the eyes of their cousins across the ocean. Look at the bitterness about that simple matter, and conceive what a field for controversy is opened by this enormously complicated Agreement, extending as it does to so many classes of vessel. I fear deeply that this Treaty will create misunderstandings and heart burnings. It has already created misunderstandings and heart burnings on each side of the Atlantic which will hinder and not help the march of the great verities and unities of the English-speaking world. If that be so, all our sacrifices will have been made in vain.
It would have been better to have said that we could not accept numerical parity, because it takes no account of the conditions of our life; it would have been far better to have said, "Let us each build as little as possible and act in a neighbourly manner. Let us each build what we think we require. We are sure that our fleets, however constituted, however contrasted, will, if they act at all, in all human probability act together." That would have been a far wiser answer to have given. The right hon. Gentleman has asked, what would be the effect of giving such an answer on the building of other Powers? He said they would start building, and a repercussion would have been drawn from the United States and another from ourselves. But all that is taking place now. The United States are engaged in building, the Japanese have been given an increase in their ratio; naval construction is going on everywhere, and all that is happening is that we, and we alone, are barred.
Since the War the relations of Great Britain and the United States have become to a very large extent the politics of the world. We in Great Britain can clearly see the course which we should take. We ought to strive to unite the British Empire or British Commonwealth of Nations as closely as possible into one effective whole, so that we can co-operate with the other great
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branch of the English-speaking peoples on equal terms and as equal partners in high endeavour and equal guardians of peace and progress among all nations. But equality is the foundation of that co-operation. There is the path of safety and honour for all. It is now to be impeded most gravely by action which, though well intentioned, is wrongly conceived and improvidently executed, and I urge upon the House that a far more stringent examination of this issue should be made by Parliament before we commit ourselves to what is certainly a lamentable and may well be an irrevocable decision.
Mr. GEORGE LAMBERT: It is always with great regret that I find myself in collision with the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill). I was under him at the Admiralty, and served with him for some years, and it seems to me that, so far as the Liberal party is concerned, he has deserted our camp. I agree with him that we want, if we can, to improve the relations between the great United States and the British Empire, but surely that is far better done by a Treaty of Arbitration than by a meticulous examination of the strength of the United States Navy. My right hon. Friend has examined the United States Navy. That examination is going on in the Senate of the United States at the present moment. I have here quotations from the remarks of Senators in the United States who are cavilling at the great superiority that is left to the British Navy. For my part, I value goodwill and good relations with the United States far more than any battleships or cruisers or submarines, and I believe that the Prime Minister did a great work when he brought about better relations between the United States and ourselves, and congratulate him upon that. My right hon. Friend must know that relations between his Government and the United States were chilly and cold before last May. I am glad they have been brought into a better state. When he argues whether we have had the best or the worst of the bargain, that is exactly what United States Senators are saying over there.
Mr. CHURCHILL: The point is, what is the fact?
Mr. LAMBERT: It is a pretty difficult matter. I could give my right hon. Friend

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a good many facts from the United States Senate. Here is a quotation from Senator Johnson. I know that my right hon. Friend has much greater knowledge than Senator Johnston. Senator Johnson said:
"I have heard, for instance, that the Nelson and the Rodney were of such power that they could wipe out the whole American Fleet."
That is exactly the same as my right hon. Friend has been saying. Let me give another quotation. I hope that my right hon. Friend will come to see that arbitration is better than the war mind. I want to get out of the war mind. I speak as an older man than the right hon. Gentleman, though not so old in administrative experience. Another Senator was saying that the United States have not parity with Great Britain because the British mercantile marine is so much larger than the United States mercantile marine, and he was asked:
"Is it your suggestion that in order to have parity with Great Britain the United States must have a larger navy than Great Britain, and if so how many cruisers should we need to offset Great Britain's greater merchant tonnage?"
That is the kind of question being asked over there. Of course, we always welcome my right hon. Friend's great naval knowledge. [Laughter.] Oh, no, no! The right hon. Gentleman did a very great work at the Admiralty before the War, and we should never forget that. I am always sorry to find myself in collision with him. There is one other point which I want to clear up, and that is that the Board of Admiralty must be the judges in these matters. The Board of Admiralty, composed of distinguished men, are the servants of the nation, and not the masters of the nation.
Sir WILLIAM DAVISON: What is the Board of Admiralty for?
Mr. LAMBERT: That is not the point. The real point is, has the Government of the day the support of the House of Commons? That is the real point. [Interruption.] If my hon. Friends will allow me to say so, I had a good deal of experience at the Admiralty. I was there for something like 10 years. If you are going to make the Board of Admiralty the masters of the nation, why not also the Army Council, or the Air
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Council? As a matter of fact, the First Lord of the Admiralty is the keystone of the Admiralty arch. He is responsible to this House, and this House could dismiss the First Lord of the Admiralty to-morrow. If a Motion to reduce his salary were carried, he would have to go, and the whole Board of Admiralty would go. The responsibility for policy and the strength of the Navy cannot depend upon the official members of the Board of Admiralty; it must depend upon the civilian members, as represented by the Government of the day and the First Lord of the Admiralty.
Sir BERTRAM FALLE: What about the Sea Lords?
Mr. LAMBERT: The Sea Lords are there to advise the Government of the day upon questions of naval strategy, but the policy must depend upon the Government. I can quite understand the First Lord of the Admiralty saying to his naval experts, "We expect danger from this country or that." That is the point that he must put to them. But for them to say, "We have not security all over the world" is a doctrine which really will not hold water in this constitutionally governed country. What enemies are the Board of Admiralty to meet? Are they to meet everyone? Are they to meet all the nations of the world? What is to be the standard? Let us get back to the constitutional point. The First Lord of the Admiralty is responsible, and, so long as he is responsible, the House of Commons has absolute control over the policy. To make the Board of Admiralty responsible would, of course, be perfectly hopeless. I was a little astonished to hear this argument from the last speaker, because I know that he welcomed expert opinion when he agreed with it, though there were times when he did not quite agree with it. For my part, I refuse altogether to consider meticulously these estimates of strength as between ourselves and the United States. I cannot understand why they have been made here this afternoon, because we have been told over and over again that war between ourselves and the United States is unthinkable. If that be so, why bring in these comparisons? I really cannot understand it, and I do not think that it adds to good relations between the Powers. I listened

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to the Leader of the Opposition speaking at, I think, one of the Pilgrim dinners. He said:
"We shall never build against the United States of America."
If that be so, why compare the Fleets? Really, my hon. and right hon. Friends on this side of the House are not so bad as they try to make themselves out to be. They wanted to negotiate a naval treaty at Geneva. They failed. I am sorry that they failed, and I am very glad that the present Government have made a step in advance. My complaint, however, about the Government, is not that they have done too much, but that they have done too little. I really think that, if the Prime Minister had taken a different course in the early part of his administration, he would have done much better. As an American journalist put it, if he had gone to Washington via Paris, he would not have offended French susceptibilities. As it is, the Naval Treaty is in the air. If the French or the Italians began to build, we should have to begin to build, and I really think that from that point of view the Naval Treaty does not go far enough. I do say that, although we have done a great work in the reduction of our armaments, efforts must still be made to go further.
There is one subject that has not yet been referred to in this Debate, and that is the Versailles Treaty. We are bound by that Treaty to reduce our armaments. If we do not reduce our armaments, how can we expect Germany to carry out her pledges and the conditions of that Treaty? For my part, I really think that the nations of Europe have not carried out their obligations to Germany in this matter of disarmament, and we may expect repercussions later. I welcome all these reductions of armaments, because I believe that the late War was largely caused by competion in armaments; and I welcome them also because of finance. To-day we are spending £110,000,000 on armaments. Surely that is enough and far more than enough, after a terrible, devastating war. I regard finance as being much more important to-day than armaments. I do not believe for one moment that we have given sufficient consideration to finance. I believe we are spending far too much
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money to-day in this country. Our taxation is far too heavy, and anything that will reduce it, I should be very glad to welcome. This Treaty, if it reduces expenditure, I shall be very glad to welcome with both hands. I do not know if hon. Members realise it, but during the late War we were in a very parlous state as regards finance. A photograph is to be seen in New York of the cheque which our representatives, in April, 1917, signed on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for 200,000,000 dollars; but no one knew whether it would be honoured or not until the American Cabinet had decided to honour it. Therefore, I say that finance is one of the most important parts of our, shall I say, war strength. I am very glad indeed that the Government are saving money on armaments. I wish they could save very much more.
There is just another point that I want to mention, and that is about Japan. I have watched these negotiations with a very great deal of interest, and I think that the great nation of Japan has always played the game with England. It fulfilled its treaty obligations in the War, and, when the Alliance was denounced, the Japanese did not take umbrage. I want to ask the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty, are they going on with the naval base at Singapore? That is a question to which I should like to have an answer. Here is the opinion of the chief Japanese delegate. I got this from a newspaper of the 12th January, 1930. The chief Japanese delegate said:
"It is true that the people of Japan do not like the construction of a strong naval base, such as Singapore, in the Pacific. We are friends. Why should our friends come and build this thing at our gates our people ask."
[Interruption.] It is their gate; it is 3,000 miles away. At any rate, why are we building it? I earnestly press upon the Prime Minister the necessity of suspending, if possible, the work on this naval base. Surely having signed an arbitration treaty with Japan we are not going to spend millions of money on a naval base at Singapore. So far as I am concerned I welcome the Treaty so far as it goes. I am sorry that it does not go further; I wish that it did go further. The Prime Minister, however, in his speech came down to what

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I thought was a very pianissimo tone. It was quite a different speech from those which were made by the delegates when His Majesty opened the Conference in another place. I congratulate him so far as it goes. It is a step forward. It is only a halting step, but I hope we shall march still further towards the goal of disarmament.
Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) has a habit of making very controversial speeches in this House, of refusing to give way to hon. Members who, I think, have some right occasionally to express an opinion on a technical question, and then disappearing. This is the second time that we have discussed this question of the British Navy and relations with other Powers, and each time the right hon. Gentleman has come down here and made a flamboyant speech and has then run away out of the House. I think that that is treating the House with great disrespect, and that it is time that a protest was made.
My right hon. Friend the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert) will forgive me if I do not follow him in any detail, but I do not think there is one word that he said with which Members on this side of the House would not be wholly in agreement, especially in regard to Singapore. As my right hon. Friend knows, however, any change in policy with regard to Singapore has to be arranged with the Dominions, and it is an unfortunate fact that the Admiralty and the Government have been shackled by the previous Administration in a matter that should have been very carefully examined into, and I think it will bear exposure. We have had to find ways of getting out of this difficulty, but it is, of course, the fact that, as the Prime Minister said, to put it no higher, it is doubtful whether the great nations of the world will decide to continue to build hyper-super-Dreadnoughts. Even the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping has his doubts on that matter, and in these circumstances, surely, even the party which has come to be known jocularly in the country as the "Stupid Party" will not be prepared to spend the taxpayers' money to the extent of £10,000,000, as will be necessary if you include the accompanying military, naval and aerial
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defences, batteries and so on, on a battleship base at Singapore for battleships which in five or six years' time will be wiped out of the world's navies by mutual agreement. It is like a man building a huge garage when he intends to give up motor cars and take to aeroplanes instead.
May I be allowed, with great humility, to congratulate my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, first of all, on his achievement, which was a very great personal triumph, and the most important part of which was that he carried through this Treaty, which he admits was only partially successful, without any rupture between the delegates, and all of them left London with at any rate good feelings towards this country; while, in the case of the great Power on the other side of the Atlantic, his action in visiting America and his conduct of the negotiations have undoubtedly improved relations between us and America to a very great extent. My right hon. Friend is, as we all know, very firm and strong on certain aspects of policy, but he also knows how to use the soft words of diplomacy, and they were very useful on this occasion. If he will allow me to say so, his speech to-day was an example of great persuasiveness, and, combined with the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping, it almost reconciled me to the Treaty itself. My right hon. Friend, if I may be allowed to add this sentence—and I said this when I was not in his party—when he was Foreign Secretary in 1924, achieved great things in improving our relations with every Power on the mainland of Europe, and I believe he has achieved as great a victory now in improving our relations with America. We shall see the fruits of his endeavours, not now, but in years to come, and in years to come we shall have need, I daresay, of all our friends. In fact, the Prime Minister, whatever we may think about this Treaty, should receive the praise that the Roman General Varro received because he did not despair of the Republic.
6.0 p.m.
I am wondering if the House noticed that at one time the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping was trying to terrorise us by saying the American Navy might dispose of a fleet more powerful than our own, and a little later he said the

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United States Navy had always been omitted from our calculations. The First Lord of the Admiralty in the Government of the late Mr. Asquith took no account of the United States Navy, and that was admitted again to-day by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping. How can we account for these two conflicting points of view? There is only one explanation, and it explains the reading of that obsolete and out-of-date telegram which some of my hon. Friends took so seriously. The right hon. Gentleman was engaged in what the Germans call schadenfreude—the love of making mischief and trouble—and that is the only thing he can do now, fortunately. There was not one constructive suggestion in the speech.
It was a most extraordinary example of lack of appreciation of the value of our mercantile marine. He says our incomparable mercantile marine, one-third of all the merchant shipping of the world, must not be considered as any asset for us at all, and yet this is the right hon. Gentleman who was First Lord of the Admiralty when the tenth cruiser squadron was formed of merchant ships which did most valuable service in carrying on blockade service in the Northern oceans. He was the right hon. Gentleman who led men drawn from the mercantile marine and wasted them at Antwerp with insufficient equipment. He does not know that, without the mercantile marine and the trawlers, the Grand Fleet could hardly have gone to sea, the submarines could not have been combatted, and we should have lost the War. Having forgotten all these things, for the sake of making a party point against the First Lord and the Prime Minister, he says you have no business to take the mercantile marine into account. Of course, you must take the mercantile marine into account. If, by some lucky stroke of commonsense on the part of the Governments of the world, every war vessels could be scrapped by mutual agreement and we had no regular Navy, we should be incomparably the strongest naval power. The lower you cut down the navies of the maritime Powers, the stronger we become, as long as we preserve our mercantile marine, and see that there are not too many Chinese and Arabs under the British flag.
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This is the point I wished to put to the right hon. Gentleman when he unfairly refused to give way. I have always given way to him or to anyone who wished to put a serious point. He wanted to make play of the fact that Mr. Stimson, in his evidence in to-day's "Times," described how he had got permission to raise the elevation of the American guns. The explanation is very simple. It is that we had the "Rodney" and the "Nelson," two vessels built by agreement after the 1921 Washington Treaty, with maximum elevation for their heavy guns. They were able to fire at longer range than the United States vessels and, for the sake of theoretical parity, it was quite reasonable that the American Navy should be allowed to elevate their guns. It is obviously impossible to get actual parity between navies. You can no more get parity between navies than between racehorses, in fact rather less. So much depends on personnel, on the duties to be carried out, on the resources of the mercantile marine, on oversea bases and on shipbuilding resources, on how much is spent on training and sea and target practice that you cannot get actual parity.
I am inclined to press on the Prime Minister that the search for parity can be dangerous. There was this much of truth in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping, that parity in itself, unless you have a political agreement, may lead to another and a dangerous form of rivalry. Actual parity between navies, especially in such a different position as ours and the United States, is utterly impossible of attainment. In fact, I am told that at the Naval Conference there was so much bickering between the naval experts as to which fleet was the stronger, the Americans saying ours was, and we saying that theirs was, that some bright spirit suggested that we should exchange fleets—a good judgment of Solomon. I am glad to see that the story has reached Admiral Pratt and that he has told the American Senate that he would not swop his fleet for ours.
Sir B. FALLE: Not the Fleet as it is, but as it will be in the future.
Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: The hon. Baronet is quite right—when they have spent 1,000,000,000 dollars. The most necessary thing is to have an agreement. That we have and on that we can

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now work. But before we can get a real reduction in armaments, there are a great many misconceptions which will have to be cleared out of the way. First of all, is it absolutely necessary that we must build up to the scale of tonnage laid down in the Treaty because if we are going to build cruisers up to 339,000 tons, it will mean laying down in the next four years 13 or 14 cruisers, at very great cost. If we are going to follow the American example and build 6-inch gun cruisers of just under 10,000 tons—we have built far larger cruisers in the past to carry 6-inch guns than 10,000 tons, and very unsuccessful they were—then it will be nine or 10 very large cruisers. But why must we begin to build up to this agreed ratio? Why not wait to see what happens? When this Treaty has passed through the sieve of the Senate, something else has to happen at Washington. The Naval Appropriation Bill has to be passed.
This part of the statement of Admiral Pratt was not quoted by the right hon. Gentleman. The cost of achieving parity, if we all build up to what we can build up to permissively under the Treaty, is for the American nation 1,071,000,000 dollars. For us it will undoubtedly mean Supplementary Estimates this year. It will mean three or four cruisers a year for the next four years. Then there is the destroyer question. It will mean 12 or 13 destroyers a year from now onwards. We shall have to begin submarine building in the same way when we do not know that the American people will find the money to build up to parity with us. I am hoping that, while the Senate may ratify the Treaty, the American people will refuse to find the appropriations for the tremendous expansion of the fleet. If you look at the figures of the fleet now and as it will be if they build up to parity, it is a tremendous expansion. Why should we set the example? In 1924 I felt it my duty to attack the Prime Minister on his proposal to lay down the five cruisers. I believe, if he had known everything that he knows now, and if he had been in a stronger position—he was in a weaker position as a minority Government than now—he would have called a halt and delayed the laying down of those five cruisers. I know it was a cutting down
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of the previous Government's intention, but it started the race.
I do not want to see this new type of 10,000 ton 6-inch gun cruisers started in America, because there are people who will demand that we shall build similar cruisers. They are like women who see other women in the streets in new fashions. I beg of the Prime Minister and the First Lord to hold their hands and to see what happens in America. In Japan there has been a conflict between the naval staff and the Cabinet. I hope the Cabinet will win. The Japanese people are overtaxed, and they are hit by the same trade depression that has been so detrimental to the labour market in this country. I hope the Japanese people will also refuse to find the money, but I have a greater hope still, that the Foreign Secretary's efforts at Geneva will be successful and that he will build on the foundation laid by the Prime Minister, and that France and Italy will come to the agreement that they were unable to be brought to in London, and that the Italian and French programmes will remain programmes on paper.
I am still hopeful—we must be optimistic in these matters—that the League of Nations, through the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament will now, after this question of the battleship and tonnage has been settled, draw up a treaty for disarmament to make it possible for all nations to agree upon a lower total tonnage. We may find that we may have to scrap ships built at great cost because of the atmosphere of the next few years. I make this request to the Government. First of all, there should be no Supplementary Estimates this year, as foreshadowed in the statement of the First Lord in introducing his Estimates. They are unnecessary. The very fact that the Americans, if they are to achieve parity, have to spend 1,000,000,000 dollars shows the immense advantage that our Navy has, in spite of the moans and complaints of the right hon. Member for Epping. We are immensely strong in comparison with the navies of any other Power, and with the American Navy in particular. I hope that 1935 is not to be the year of the Conference. I hope that if Italy and France can be brought to agreement and we are able to come to an agreement, another conference will take place much

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sooner. That is a very important matter. If the atmosphere is suitable in America—and I believe it will be, if they are faced with the immense expansion of the American Navy at a cost of 1,000,000,000 dollars to the American taxpayers—and we are faced with a considerable increase of our own Estimates, it, will be possible to have an earlier conference. I hope that certain matters will then be dealt with in regard to which it has not been possible to seek agreement in the present Treaty.
I am coming straightaway to the particular question which, I hope, will be dealt with as soon as possible. Article 22 of the Treaty is altogether unsatisfactory. I refer to the new rules for the use of submarines in warfare against merchant shipping. I hold in my hand a letter from the National Union of Seamen speaking for 80,000 British seamen, and I make no excuse for quoting it. These are the men who received the thanks of this House after the War, and they are all aware of the terrible sufferings caused during the late War by submarine attack. They asked me if I will kindly refer—
"to our anxiety respecting the meaning of that Article. It appears to us as merchant seamen that we are Still in the same position of danger that we were in during the late War. We are very anxious to know that in any treaty respecting the discussion of naval armaments, the interests of merchant seamen will be fully safeguarded and that they may not suffer the untold hardships they suffered in the past."
The letter is signed by the General Secretary of the National Union of Seamen on behalf of the management committee. I ask the First Lord of the Admiralty to give careful attention to this protest, which I do not take lightly. What are the grounds of complaint? Under these rules a submarine commander will be permitted, in certain circumstances, to sink a vessel on the high seas and allow the crew to take to the doubtful safety of open boats, providing that the proximity of land is such that they are not in danger. Who is to be the judge of the proximity of land? An open boat voyage has at times taken six weeks. In the late War some of the ships which were sunk were thousands of miles from land and indescribable suffering was caused. Their crews, in some cases, reached land in open boats, but in other cases they died of hunger and thirst. The submarine commander is to
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be the judge of the proximity of land. In former rules drawn up at Washington in 1921 relating to submarine warfare the commander who broke the law could be tried as a pirate. This provision has been wiped out. [Interruption.] It was never ratified, I know. These rules are a deterioration. The acts of the German submarines in the War were illegalities. During three centuries of sailing ship warfare the war vessels and the privateers in all those wars had a rough chivalry of the sea, in which the merchant seamen, when his ship was taken prize, was always made a prisoner and kept in a position of safety. He was never turned adrift in the old sailing days. That was the chivalry of the sea in the old days, and it was not until the Germans broke it under the special plea of necessity in the late War that this dishonour was committed. We are allowing a very wide loophole for the same practices in a future war.
I am not making a reflection upon the Prime Minister or upon his fellow-delegates in this matter. I am sure that they did their very best, but I hope that this question will be attended to in future conferences, which, I trust, will soon take place. The answer may be, "Ah, yes, it is no use having any rules of war. What does it matter whether you have rules or not?" I would remind those who say that, that the Germans broke the rules of war, and they brought America into the war against them. And I have heard it said that the man who sank the "Lusitania" won the War. The rules of war in the past were very faithfully observed. One rule was that a vessel must not be condemned and sunk but taken into the prize court. The captain of the cruiser capturing the merchant ship was not to be the judge in his own case as to whether she was good prize or not. There is a great deterioration in these rules.
It may be said, "Is it not far better to abolish submarines altogether" I agree, and I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty upon making his effort to have the submarine abolished. He would have had more success if he had been prepared to abolish the battleship as well in return and in exchange. I know that he tried to have the figures reduced there and that other nations stood in the way.

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In the meantime, as long as the submarine exists, I regret the deterioration of the rules which have been agreed to. I hope that they will be amended at the earliest possible moment either through the machinery of the League of Nations, or other international conference, or some other way. Even if we abolish the submarine, there is another great danger to merchant shipping in a future war. We have to envisage future war, or we would not be maintaining such huge Naval forces. I am prepared to back up the League of Nations, and I believe in the League of Nations, and I believe that the Kellogg Pact for the outlawry of war has transformed the whole international situation; but the very fact that we are discussing this Treaty with its heavy tonnage of war vessels shows that war in the minds of the Committee of Imperial Defence is, at any rate, still possible.
There is another menace to merchant shipping in a future war, and it would affect us as neutrals. If some future war occurs through a gap in the League of Nations, when arbitration and like measures have failed, we may be badly treated as neutrals, just as the neutrals were treated in the late War. All their shipping was decimated. The aeroplane will, in a future war, be used against merchant ships as the law stands to-day. The sanction behind these laws and rules is the fear of the neutrals intervening. I do not make these suggestions in a critical sense at all, and I hope that they will be taken note of by those who have this great responsibility.
I do not care to make criticisms after a great international Conference, but I must make two observations. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty will not close their minds on the subject of what is called the battleship. There is no such thing as a battleship, really. This is quite a modern term. Your capital ship is your strongest ship in any part of the sea. You may have a campaign like the campaign in the Caspian Sea in the aftermath of the late War against Bolshevist forces where the capital ships were light gun-boats. On Lake Victoria Nyanza a motor-boat put together in sections, with gun mountings, was made the capital ship and it took control of the lake. It was able to drive
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off the paddle-steamers and so on. That was the capital ship. Cruisers can fight battles and so can destroyers.
This point in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman rather alarmed me. It is said, "If you agree future that you will not have a larger tonnage than 10,000 tons, you will start a new competition in a new type of vessel." If my Lords of the Admiralty can get successive Governments to increase the size of battleships—the Dreadnought was only 18,000 tons; the Nelson and the Rodney 35,000 tons—why do they not get them to agree to come down. I believe we suggested a willingness to agree to 25,000 tons, with 12-inch guns, as the main armament. That would be a new type.
It will be unfortunate if we let it be understood that we are opposed to a very drastic reduction in the tonnage of warships after 1935–1936. There are very strong technical reasons for the smaller war vessel. I will content myself with one only. Your great battleship needs a tremendous number of small vessels, mine-sweepers, destroyers, seaplanes, aeroplanes and so on. During the height of the submarine campaign when every cruiser and destroyer was almost worth its weight in gold, the Grand Fleet, because it was composed of great super-Dreadnoughts, had to have 80 to 100 torpedo boat destroyers and 50 or 60 cruisers to escort and mother it when it went to sea. The more battleships you have, the more auxiliary vessels and cruisers you require for protection. It is said that it is only by this very large tonnage that you can make battleships invulnerable to torpedo or aeroplane attack. That is true up to a point. If nobody has the large battleship, it does not matter at all. We shall be no worse off.
If we could have wiped out battle fleets altogether, we could, on the calculation of Lord Jellicoe, save 25 cruisers straight away without weakening our defences. He put forward a theory which has not been challenged, that for every three battleships you should have five cruisers to scout, for them and to screen them. There is no reason why the tonnage should not drastically be reduced in future. Although it is a fact that the German battleship or capital ship "Ersaty Preüssen," or "Admiral Von Scheer" as it is now to be called,

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possesses very novel features, it is possible on that tonnage to make a very powerful ship. We have no guarantee that the same novel principles and the same kind of internal-combustion engines now applied to that vessel will not be used in bigger ships, too. My right hon. Friend, I know, has not closed his mind to this matter, because he gave a very satisfying hint in the latter part of his speech that the continued hope of the Government is that the battleship will be finally abolished by mutual agreement.
I warn the First Lord and the Prime Minister to beware of the seduction of technical arguments. The study of technical controversies is very fascinating, and one is rather apt to become a protagonist of one class of vessel. I am afraid that the First Lord is becoming so in regard to the battleship. I ask him to adopt a judicial attitude and think not only as the civil head of a great Service, with romantic associations, a great example of practical Socialism, but also of the British taxpayer and the effect of the continuance of these great armaments on the work of the League of Nations and on nations like Germany, which have been disarmed under the Peace Treaties. I regret that an arrangement was come to between the British and the American delegates to prevent any discussion of what is known as the freedom of the seas.
Mr. HOLFORD KNIGHT: What authority is there for that view?
Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: The Foreign Secretary in answer to a question in this House. They came to a decision not to discuss it. I am not giving away any secrets. First the Americans said we would not allow it to be discussed, and we said the Americans would not allow us to. Now it appears there was a mutual understanding that this was too dangerous a topic to be discussed at the moment. We have Article 22 instead. One thing which is required is the education of public opinion in this country to accept the freedom of the seas as part of the peace structure throughout the world. I know the Prime Minister's views on this matter, and I do not want to do him the courtesy to quote from his writing. I could quote far more eloquent passages than anything I can say to the effect that there can be no lasting agreement between us
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and the United States on the mere basis of tons and guns and ratios. But this is a question which will have to be discussed and discussed publicly. In other countries the same Governments will not always be in office. I am looking myself for great results from a change of government in more than one Continental country, and we must let them know that the Labour Government of this country, though it has had to give way on this valuable point because the forces against it were very great, still holds that this path will have to be followed if real disarmament and lasting peace is to be achieved. These are the few and humble suggestions that I desire to make in a most friendly way. The right hon. Gentleman knows, and we know, that we are not satisfied with this Treaty, but at the same time we appreciate the difficulties and we believe that he will do better next time.
Colonel GRETTON: We have listened with some patience and interest to the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy), and there is no one in this House, or elsewhere, who will not agree with his criticism of Article 22 of the Naval Treaty. The rules for the regulation of submarine warfare are entirely illusory and are not likely to be kept by any Power which is hard pressed in war. The hon. and gallant Member has expressed general agreement with the Naval Treaty, but someone has furnished me with an article which appears under his name in a paper called "Everyman," published on the 1st of May. After a few preliminary observations on where the Naval Conference failed, he says:
"The Washington Treaty resulted from the greatest and most successful disarmament conference ever held."
He goes on to compare it with the conference at St. James's Palace. In the course of his remarks he says:
"The corresponding Japanese Fleet of 167,000 tons is to be increased to 209,000 tons. The increase to be provided for the American Fleet is astounding. Her existing cruiser squadron of 90,500 tons is to be increased to 323,500 tons."
Under the heading "Widening the Gap," he says:
"Italy and France have parted in polite enmity, with their mutual relations far worse than before the conference opened."

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Under the heading "Fictitious Economy," he sums up in this way:
"We may look for little actual cash savings in the present level of our own Naval Estimates, the Japanese must face an increase in theirs, and the Americans a very substantial addition to what their taxpayers must provide in Naval Appropriations."
That is very like the speech he has just made. The hon. and gallant Member agrees largely with the main line of criticism in this House, and if they had not been made from this side of the House he would have probably said the same thing from his place. I am not a naval man, although I have taken great interest in the Navy all my life and I am not going into technical details. I would represent, however, for the consideration of the House that the Naval Conference of London has failed. The intention was to secure a Five Power agreement. The Prime Minister and other Ministers have repeatedly made statements to that effect and in such a form that many people believed until the end of the Conference that no agreement would be entered into unless it was a Five Power agreement and that a Three Power agreement would not be satisfactory. A question was asked as late as the 19th March and the answer was still the same. I have listened with great attention to the Debate, and all the speakers who have contributed to the discussion have agreed upon one point, and that is that it is not necessary for us to have an agreement with the United States because in their view there can be no war under present conditions between us and that great country. What is the use, therefore, of a Naval agreement with the United States, and that is the one achievement which the Prime Minister can claim as a result of this Conference.
How has it been brought about? It has been brought about by scaling down the British Navy to the size which suits the United States, and getting Japan to agree to a balance in certain categories of 60 per cent. instead of 70 per cent. of the next strongest power which Japan desired. We have an agreement which admittedly sacrifices our Naval power. It has never been explained, but I hope it will be by the First Lord of the Admiralty, why the number of cruisers required for the safety of the Empire
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can safely be reduced from 70 to 50. When the original Admiralty estimate was made of 80 cruisers, in 1921, after the closest examination and some considerable argument on the ground of economy and the existing state of the world the number was reduced to 70, minimum. What has happened, since, except the Kellogg Pact? That is the only reason, and it is a reason which convinces nobody who seriously considers the situation. The Kellogg Pact is merely a pious expression of opinion. It carries neither force nor guarantee, and following this Naval Pact every Naval Power has increased its Navy except ourselves. We have cut down our Navy to a position of inferiority.
It is very unfortunate that when considering the question of naval strength required it seems to have been forgotten that we are in a dual position. America is isolated and far removed from those parts of the world where powder magazines explode and cause ware between nations. Those who study the operations of a battle fleet consider that they cannot operate 3,000 miles away from their base, and, therefore, the vital question in dealing with distant powers is cruisers. The battle fleet can only be maintained on a base within a comparatively easy distance of the waters in which the rival fleets are expected to come into conflict. Therefore I cannot understand how hon. Members who profess to know naval questions can seriously argue in this House that Singapore is a menace to Japan as it is 3,000 miles away from any Japanese base or territory. We are reduced to a position of naval inferiority, and so great is the anxiety of the Government to give things away that they have bound us to 90,000 tons in cruisers, a point which has been alluded to by several hon. Members and particularly by the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill). I cannot understand why any such agreement was inserted. We are to build below the permitted scale without any such agreement that we must do so. If it is the Prime Minister's desire to flatten out the building programme so as to maintain an even flow of work to the dockyards and the private yards, it is going to be done at the sacrifice of some proportion of our power, until the time comes when the worn-out vessels have to be replaced.

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Why should we bind ourselves to do less than we are permitted to do and less than arty other country under the Three-Power agreement is permitted to do? We must remember that this country, as the centre of the British Empire and as its naval base, is brought into the orbit of the European Powers by its situation on the North Sea and on the borders of the coast of Europe. We cannot escape the consequences of that position; we are a European Power as regards naval questions, and the building of increased European navies is a matter of vital interest to us. It is foolish to say that we do not expect war with any other Power. Have we ever expected war? Since the days when the Plantagenet kings invaded France and sought to establish themselves on the French coast, have we ever in our history carried war on to the Continent? We have always been driven into war by circumstances and we have never been prepared. [An HON. MEMBER: "That is how we got our Empire!"] I am talking of European war and I say that we have never gone to war ourselves, but have always been driven into war in maintaining the balance of power and in supporting allies who were in danger of being overwhelmed or isolated. It has always hen our history on land and sea to be unready at the commencement of war. What nation which was planning war would be unready for war?
As a result of this naval Treaty, we are placed in the unfortunate position of having to watch closely the navies of the European Powers. There is no Five-Power agreement, and remember that outside of the Five Powers represented at the Conference, there are considerable naval forces in Europe. I do not know if hon. Members opposite read the French papers, but if they do they will know that French public opinion was profoundly stirred by the entry into the Mediterranean Sea of a new cruiser squadron, accompanied by destroyers, from Germany. There were, I think, five cruisers and a number of destroyers, making a tour of the Mediterranean, entering all the ports, and showing the German flag. Then there is the navy of Greece which though not a very large one, yet presents embarrassing possibilities of naval action in certain circumstances. Hon. Members opposite are
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probably aware also that the present Government in Russia maintains the largest land force in the world and infinitely the largest air force and that they are beginning to build a navy. All these things have to be taken into account. We are obliged to watch these movements and developments when we are in the position of having to go cap in hand and represent our circumstances to other Powers, if we desire for our own safety to make any increase which we consider necessary in any category, or in several categories, should an increased building programme become necessary for us. Difficulties and friction must result from arrangements by which our country is required to place herself in such a position.
We have already seen that the Naval Conference was unable to reach agreement. I have quoted the statement of the hon. and gallant Member for Hull and it is notorious that the Conference has actually led to increased rivalries in regard to naval strengths. Immediately following on the Conference the Italian Government announced their intention of laying down 27 additional vessels—a substantial increase of the building programme already undertaken. Actions of that kind will be watched most closely and jealously. We have gained nothing substantial from this Conference and it is a delusion to regard it as a step on the way to peace. To describe this Treaty as a Treaty of disarmament, is a mis-statement in terms, because the only power which has disarmed is the British Empire. From the time when these negotiations commenced, with the Prime Minister starting on his journey to the United States, until the closing days, these negotiations have been treated with great secrecy. Repeatedly, in this House and elsewhere, in reply to inquiries, we have been told that if we pressed those inquiries too far and sought too much information, we would endanger the success of the Conference. Therefore no substantial information has been given to us at any stage of these negotiations until near the end. We have had to learn about them, little by little, not from our own Ministers but from the foreign Press who have received their information from others in attendance at the Conference.
I am going to ask a question, about the answer to which I have myself very

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little doubt, but which is I think a question that ought to be put at this moment. This Treaty, which is dangerous to this country and to the British Empire, has been arrived at by secret diplomacy, and because of that secrecy I would ask if there is any sort of understanding between the Government and any other Power represented at the Conference, which has not yet been disclosed. I think that that is a question which could be answered and one which ought to be answered, in order to clear away any doubts which may exist upon the subject. I regard this Treaty as one which weakens the power of the British Empire and is of no benefit to this country. It is a Treaty which is calculated not to bring about disarmament, but to bring our country and our Government into ridicule and derision throughout the world.
Mr. MALCOLM MacDONALD: I think we all recognise, when we are reminded of the fact, that the Treaty which we are discussing has much greater significance than the details which have been the subject of Debate. There may be room for controversy about the 91,000 tons of replacement of cruisers, and about two or three of the other details, but those are very few details in a Treaty which is a mass of details, and I submit to the House that the effect of the Treaty, as a whole, on the mind and the spirit of the world, is quite beyond dispute. At any rate, I think it will not be disputed by anybody, except possibly the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Burton (Colonel Gretton). He has put forward the theory that the Conference which has just been adjourned, has made much worse than they were before the relations between Italy and France. In support of that theory, he quoted an article written by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy). I think he might have quoted far more effectively the speech delivered by Signor Grandi the other day during the discussion on the navy estimates in the Italian Parliament. He might have quoted effectively against his own argument the fact reported in the "Times" that Signor Grandi and M. Briand are, at this moment, engaged in the most
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cordial and amicable conversations in Geneva regarding the relations of the two countries.
I contend that the effect of the Treaty as a whole has been of great benefit to the peoples of the world. The five most formidable naval Powers have met and have exchanged views very frankly, and have come to a perfect understanding regarding their respective positions. They have put their signatures to a Treaty which goes a long way to stop competition altogether in naval building between the five Powers and completely stops competition between three of the most important of those Powers. The statesmen who attended that Conference have gone away determined that the Treaty which they signed is simply one step in a series of steps towards the ultimate objective of naval disarmament. I believe that the effect of that Treaty on the world has been enormously to reinforce the cause of peace. It has spread a sense of confidence between the nations and it has had the effect of putting fresh heart into all those persons who are working, in various fields, for the creation of a permanent and unassailable state of peace.
Despite that broad effect, there have been various criticisms of the Treaty in detail. There was the criticism levelled in the most friendly spirit by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert), who said that the Treaty did not go far enough in reduction. On this side of the House, we all agree very heartily with that sentiment. If the Treaty could have brought about greater reductions, by agreement, in the naval forces of the five Powers concerned, or even the three Powers mainly concerned in the Treaty, we should have welcomed that fact. If the Treaty had resulted in the complete abolition of all the navies of those five Powers, we should have been highly delighted, but we are dealing with practical possibilities arising out of the experiences of five different peoples, and I believe we can congratulate the Government on having achieved a very satisfactory and a praiseworthy measure of success. I have heard criticisms also among my own friends on this side that the Treaty does not establish any reduction in naval armaments. I dispute that view. The significant point which we have to consider in examining this question of reduction is that the

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Treaty will establish a certain position in 1936. It establishes that the size of the three main fleets shall reach certain proportions, and we have to consider what would have been the respective strengths of those three main navies, in 1936, if this Treaty had never been signed.
7.0 p.m.
We have to consider not merely whether there is a reduction in the actual forces already existing on the oceans of the world, but whether the Treaty has not succeeded in bringing about a reduction in the prospective programmes of the various naval Powers, in the programmes which would have been carried into effect, and the ships which would have been launched had this Treaty not been signed. If we go through the controversies of the last six months and examine most of the claims made by the various countries concerned, we shall find that this Treaty has resulted in a very considerable reduction in the programmes of the three Powers who have come into the Three-Power agreement. I would remind the House of one instance. If I have read my newspapers correctly, even after conversations had started between the United States and ourselves, and even after negotiations had started, the Americans were asking for a minimum of 21 8-inch gun cruisers. The Americans, apart from this Treaty, had the right to build these 21 8-inch cruisers, and, therefore, the Japanese would have had to raise their cruiser fleet, and we should have had to build extra cruisers to secure equilibrium with the other Powers. Therefore, I contend that the negotiations in London during the Conference managed very effectively to reduce the programmes of naval building which the Powers had in mind and would have carried out between now and 1936. Consequently, this Treaty does bring about reduction in naval strength as well as establishing that even more important condition, a stoppage in naval building between the three naval Powers of the world.
A far more formidable series of criticisms has been levelled at the Naval Treaty from the spokesmen of the principal Opposition party. I hesitate to enter into a controversy with the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill), though it is rather a relief to enter into controversy with him in his absence, but he laid down certain principles
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governing his opposition to the Naval Treaty, and, first of all, he criticised it on the question of parity. He disagreed with the Government as to what parity ought to consist of. He said that this Treaty recognises a certain kind of parity between America and ourselves. It is a parity which consists of one Fleet being as strong as another. It is a parity which consists of every category in one Fleet being the equivalent in strength of the opposite category in the other Fleet; and the right hon. Gentleman said that the parity which consisted of that and which simply recognised equality between two Fleets, irrespective of the duties to be carried out by those Fleets, was not the parity which ought to commend itself to Members of this House. I would remind the House that, if we had gone into the Naval Conference asking for the kind of parity for which the right hon. Gentleman said we should have asked, there would have been no five-Power or four-Power or three-Power agreement to-day. The British Government going into a Naval Conference demanding that kind of parity would have been simply asking for a complete deadlock and break-up of the Conference within the first week of its meeting. We could not have got other Powers to agree with that principle.
What enormous difficulties there would have been and insoluble problems if we had tried to calculate what that kind of parity meant to ships belonging to Great Britain and to the United States! We should have had to take into consideration trade routes, defence of our sources of food and other supplies. How are you going to calculate this distinction in terms of capital ships, cruisers, destroyers or submarines? [An HON. MEMBER: "The French did that."] The French figures were apparently unacceptable to the United States. If we had gone into a calculation of that kind of parity, we should never have had any signature to any Treaty embodying that principle. It would have been extremely difficult to calculate parity in ships in that way. But, quite apart from that difficulty, we could not have got a Treaty out of a Conference considering that question at all, because the Delegation of the United States would absolutely have refused to discuss parity on that principle.

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I think the House ought to know whether, when the right hon. Gentleman gave his ideas of parity, he was speaking his own individual ideas or the ideas of his right hon. colleagues on the Front Bench opposite. The late Prime Minister made various speeches about parity between the United States and ourselves, and I certainly understood from those speeches that the kind of parity which he was speaking about was not the parity of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping, but the parity which the Naval Treaty of 1930 gave. In another place, a few days ago there was a Debate on this Treaty, and the Noble Lord who was First Lord of the Admiralty in the last Government, Lord Bridgeman, criticised the Treaty, but not because he had accepted a principle of parity similar to that outlined by the right hon. Member for Epping. I do not believe that the parity of which he spoke this afternoon is a parity which his own Government would have insisted on if they had been in office, and had gone into conversation with America. As a matter of fact, we know it was not that idea of parity, because on various occasions when the spokesmen were talking about parity with the United States they gave this impression quite definitely that, so little did they desire competition with the United States, so little was there any consideration that war could take place between the United States and ourselves, that they would not have insisted that parity between the Fleets should mean that the two Fleets were to be exactly the same strength. The Noble Lord said that he would not have minded if the American Fleet in this respect had gone a bit above parity as opposed to our own Fleet.
I contend, therefore, that the right hon. Member for Epping is not expressing the opinion of his colleagues and his party in saying that the kind of parity he advocates is what we should have insisted on. If we had done so, the only result would have been the failure of the Conference and the alternative of competitive building between this country and the United States and between the United States and Japan, and, after a term of years, a position which would not even have given us the kind of parity with the United States that we have secured. The
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United States with her great material resources and wealth would have launched a greater Fleet than the British Fleet. The right hon. Member, having made his case for a parity which he recommends, forgets the kind of parity which we have secured in this Treaty. He then went on to say that, nevertheless, even if we have got the kind of parity which the Government have secured, and that is a proper kind of parity, yet when we examine the actual figures the British Fleet as against the United States Fleet, as they will be 1936 under this Treaty, is inferior in guns and strength to the American Fleet which we are going to allow. He produced facts and figures in support of his case.
It is interesting to compare that with the report published in the "Times" today, in which the enemies of the London Naval Treaty in America are using the same argument with the same ingenuity to prove that the British Fleet in 1936 in guns and strength will be superior to the United States Fleet in that year. I must say, when I hear the right hon. Gentleman who does not like this Treaty declaring that the American Fleet is going to be superior to ours and also see that the enemies of the Treaty on the other side of the Atlantic are saying the opposite, I think it is extremely good evidence of the fact that the Government with the approval of the naval expert advisers have come to a very equitable arrangement with the United States, and we in this House can rest satisfied that a proper and just parity has been obtained.
Then there was the criticism which has been repeated in speeches on the other side, that this Treaty, far from being a Treaty for the reduction of naval armaments, is one which allows the Americans and Japanese to increase their fleets, and leaves us the only naval Power to make actual reductions in our strength. But what is the alternative? Either you have to accept a principle of parity with the United States, or else you will not. There are two methods. Either we can consent to the Americans building their fleet up to our strength, or the alternative is to scrap our ships till our fleet strength comes down to the present level of America. Hon. Members opposite would not have been satisfied with that second alternative. They think that we have reduced to too low a level already.

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If they will not accept that alternative, they are bound to accept the other alternative, and allow the Americans to go in for a considerable programme of shipbuilding by 1936. The American taxpayer will have to foot the Bill, but we have nothing to do with that. We have a Treaty which will save £17,000,000 between now and 1936. The figure of £50,000,000 which has since been misquoted referred simply to the construction of new battleships. I contend that the whole of this argument about parity is an argument which is not only against the terms of this Treaty, but against the Treaty altogether, because we could not have got a Treaty based on the principles laid down by the other side.
What about the Treaty at any price? somebody asked. What kind of a price have we paid in order to get this Treaty? Hon. Members opposite have said that we have paid too great a price in reducing our minimum requirements in cruisers from the figure of 70 to the figure of 50. What are the facts to-day? What kind of a cruiser fleet have we to-day? Have we 70 cruisers? Have we had 70 cruisers in our fleet at any date since the War came to an end? We have only 58 cruisers to-day, of which 54 are completed and four building. Are we insecure? Are we in a condition of great lack of safety? I contend that we are not. If we are not secure with 54 cruisers and four building, why did the late Conservative Government continually drop cruisers out of their building programme? If the late Government could afford—considering, as I have no doubt they did consider, the proper security of this country—to drop cruisers out of their programme and bring the strength to 54 or 58 cruisers, then we are enjoying perfect security with that cruiser fleet to-day. If we have to prove that we require not 58 but 70 cruisers, we shall have to establish the fact that since the late Government went out of office international relations have become so bad that there is a new danger of war. I submit that that is an absurd contention. What new danger is there? What new international feature is there which says that although we had security with 54 cruisers 12 months ago, we have not security to-day unless we have 70 cruisers? I submit that the very opposite is the case. During the last 12 months international relations
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have improved sufficiently to justify one in saying that instead of danger having increased, the danger of war and the danger of an attack upon this country has receded a little more into the background.
Let me press the argument a little further. Even if we assume that at Geneva in 1927 our delegation were right in saying that we needed 70 cruisers; if 70 was the figure for 1927, should 70 be the figure for 1930? Has nothing happened to improve international conditions during the last three years, during two years of which a Conservative Foreign Secretary was responsible for conducting the foreign relations of this country? Since 1927, has the Locarno Pact had no increasing effect in producing confidence and peace in Europe? Have the Kellogg Pact, the Pact of Paris, signed by a Conservative Government, had absolutely no effect in improving international relations and putting further into the background the possibility of war? I should like to hear what the late Foreign Secretary would say in reply to his own colleagues who say that conditions have not altered since 1927, that nothing has been done in foreign affairs to mean that we can reduce our demand from 70 cruisers to some lower figure. As this House well knows, the influence of the Locarno Pact and the Kellogg Pact, the influence of the work done by this Government in the last 12 months, the signing of the Optional Clause and this Naval Treaty—this Naval Treaty is going to have an effect between now and 1936—all these new treaties and these new agreements in international affairs have had a very considerable effect since 1927 in improving the prospects of peace and allowing us to make some reduction in the figure for our minimum cruiser requirement, which we declared in 1927 to be 70. Having quoted 70 in 1927 and these other things having happened in the meantime, if we again had quoted 70 in 1930 it would have been a declaration to the world that the British Government attach no importance to these international treaties and agreements. No greater blow at peace could have been levelled, and nothing could more misrepresent the real sentiments of this country.
This Treaty, which has improved the prospects of peace, which heals a breach not only between America and ourselves but between America and Japan, a very

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important consideration; this Treaty which has not only made more friendly relations between the two great nations which face each other across the Atlantic but between the two most formidable nations which face each other across the Pacific, is a Treaty which should command the respect and support of all Members of this House. It is an honourable Treaty. It is a wise Treaty. It is a Treaty which will bring great blessings to the world, and I hope that this House will show its statesmanship by supporting the Treaty and approving it in the most hearty manner.
Rear-Admiral BEAMISH: I want to comment on the Prime Minister's speech and to say that I, and I think all of us, cordially agree with his desire that the world might be a more peaceful place in the future. He made a remark which interested me very much, to the effect that he thought the only way to real international peace was for us to make some form of agreement with the United States. I should very much have liked to have interrupted him then and to have asked him to explain that idea more fully, because it may be that he has something in his mind, which a great body of opinion in this country would welcome, if such a thing were possible, as to an agreement, a useful kind of agreement between the English-speaking races. But he did not explain it, and it remains for us to hear in the future, perhaps, what he really thinks. One further point about the Prime Minister's speech which struck me was that, so long as we have a Navy and so long as we must maintain it, he made it perfectly clear that everything that he had to say accentuated the necessity for the steadiest of replacement programmes, and not merely rushing in and building a large number of ships and laying up liabilities for our successors. I shall return to that aspect of the question later, because I regard it as the most important and most vital of the subjects that we are discussing at the moment.
Speeches from the other side, including the Prime Minister's speech, were notable for the usual exception, and that was that not one single word was said in regard to the responsibilities, dangers and necessities of national security in this country. The hon. Member for
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Bassetlaw (Mr. Malcolm MacDonald) referred to the burden upon the taxpayers of America, but I do not believe that the taxpayers of America will feel any very great comfort at the sympathy of British pacifists because they have to pay a little more for their security. The effect of the Treaty in general is to bring about a state of affairs which has resulted in our accepting a strength of fleet which is utterly out of conformity with the duties that we have to perform, and the vital necessities of the Empire. The United States and Japan will build up a newer, better and more efficient fleet than either of them has ever possessed in the past, and yet we are asked to accept the idea that this is a disarmament treaty. Moreover, France and Italy are left with a perfectly free hand not only to build just what they like, but when they like. They can create for us in some respect, and they seem to be making a start in that direction, a most serious menace across our communications in various parts of the world.
My right hon. Friend has said that he considers that Part III of the Treaty is clearly against the interests of the British Empire and ought not to be ratified. I very cordially agree that that is so. I notice that the Treaty is called, "A Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments." That is a fraudulent and misleading title. It is literally a falsehood to call it that, and it comes very badly from a Socialist administration. The Prime Minister has said that the sea is us, and he made very great endeavours to turn the "U.S." into U.S.A. I have been told many times that this is a most complicated Treaty. It is complicated if you do not read it, but if you do read it it is not complicated. It embodies surrender, and I would remind the Socialists that surrender is always an easy thing for the man who has a defeatist mind. He has no mental effort, but merely surrenders. It is a very mean and crude kind of surrender and will leave an indelible stain on the already murky record of this Government.
Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Is that remark in order?
Rear-Admiral BEAMISH: I did not hear the remarks of the hon. and gallant Member for Hull (Lieut.-Commander

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Kenworthy), otherwise I would have replied to his remarks about myself.
Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: I asked if "murky" is a Parliamentary expression.
Rear-Admiral BEAMISH: If not, it would be ruled out of order. There are two particular reasons why I consider that Part III of the Treaty should not be ratified. I think that the whole Treaty should be revised and certainly that Part III should be subject to the closest scrutiny, because it is contrary to the interests of the British Empire. It is a surrender, after centuries of effort on the part of this country, of our only means of offence and our only means of defence to another Power against whom we can have no conceivable issue as regards her possessions and her interests. It I know is a strong thing to say, but one must take notice of what people of prominence have to say in the United States. It has been said not once but time and again that the United States fleet is being created for a particular purpose, and we have already had some experience. The day that we are called upon to defend our interests or any other nation's interests by reason of the Covenant of the League or of the Locarno Treaty, if it does not suit the interests of the United States, I do not hesitate to foretell that they will make use of their fleet in order to add to the difficulties of our position. That is the first reason why Part III I say is not in the interests of the British Empire and of this country in particular.
The next reason is that Part III of the Treaty excludes the two Continental Powers, France and Italy, with the inevitable difficulties which must arise in such a case, and I submit most definitely that they are beginning to show themselves, ever since the Conference dissolved. It excites animosity and produces undesirable comparisons. Mr. Stimson says that the American delegates were all unanimous. That is a very nice condition to be in. I understand that our political delegates in this country were unanimous, but I submit that they were also pusillanimous. How easy it seems to be for the right hon. Gentleman to agree to such a Treaty. I know he is impelled by a very sincere idealism, but I would say also that he is fortified by the knowledge that only a very small
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minority of his party ever have rendered or ever will render any assistance to this country when it is in trouble. It is a strong thing to say, but I feel that if I were to sign and to be responsible for Part III of this Treaty, I should be as one who acts disloyally to his country, and I should expect the term of "traitor" to be applied to me if I allowed myself so far to forget my loyalty to my country as to sign such a Treaty.
I would now refer to two things in the Command Paper 3485. Paragraph 5 on page 4, dealing with this country and the United States, says:
"The Government takes the view that if the strengths of national fleets are not to be a menace, they must be the subject of international agreements, the purpose of which should be to maintain an equilibrium. This equilibrium will not be secured by mere numerical equality in ships and tonnage—which may indeed be a condition of serious inequality from the point of view of effectiveness—but by agreed programmes which will be based on considerations of requirements affecting dispersion, etc."
I have already remarked that the United States have a superiority with regard to what has been done at this Conference, but I want to ask how it comes about that this qualification for comparing the strength of the British Fleet with the American Fleet has apparently had no effect on the Conference? There is a still more important question. In paragraph 7 on page 6 of Command Paper 3485, the question of the tonnage of destroyers comes up, and it says there that the British
"present building programme will ultimately consume 200,000 tons, but this can be reduced if the submarine programmes of other Powers are similarly reduced."
Do the Government realise that the French will possess 100,000 tons of submarines in 1936 and that we are condemned to have not 200,000 tons of destroyers, but one quarter less than that, namely, 150,000 tons? Why have the Government accepted this position? We have the right to know what steps they are taking to remedy that for it is to be observed that France show no signs of any reduction in their programme. I think that has been done because the Prime Minister was again pressed by his idealism to the view that any form of Treaty was better than no form at all. It is a strong thing to say, but I feel that it is so, that he

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felt his pride would be injured and that he must save his face, and I submit that he has saved it at the expense of this country.
So many technical details have been put forward that I hesitate to say anything more. I have, however, studied the position that will arise in 1936 in regard to the position of our Fleet compared with those of France and of Italy. I am not suggesting that France and Italy would ever combine, but, if they do not do so, there is a lesson to be learned from the figures I am going to put to the House. Everyone realises that the ships they will have will be of the most efficient type. The situation is this, that in 8-inch cruisers, combined, they will have no less a superiority than 33 per cent. over this country, in ships not 16 years old. In 6-inch cruisers we shall have twice their combined forces. In destroyers, France will exceed our force by 60 per cent. and Italy will exceed by 33 per cent. I think everyone will agree that these are startling figures. I now come to submarines. I have taken into account the prospective building programmes in submarines. Everyone, I think, will agree that it is a serious menace when I say that in submarines France will have approximately double the strength of Great Britain, and Italy will have a force equal to our own. France's tonnage will be in the neighbourhood of 100,000 tons of submarines by the Treaty, and ours will be only round about 52,000 tons. I almost hesitate to ask the House and our Socialist opponents to make this more of a national question than it has hitherto been made. I know that there must be a number of Socialists who take the truly national point of view, but, on the other hand, there are a large number who do not. I ask them to consider what the British Empire means and to realise with the Members on this side of the House what the history of our country is and its responsibilities.
I turn now to what I conceive is the most vital of all the questions facing us at the present time. If the Treaty should be ratified, we shall still be faced with the most serious question of replacements. I want to ask on this two specific questions, which with the two I have already asked will make four in all. First, what is being done, and why has
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nothing been done, about the 1929 programme of submarines which were suspended because of the pious hope that submarines would be dispensed with in the future? That hope has not come off and submarines have not been dispensed with, and, although the matter is to be controlled to some extent by the Treaty, at the same time the building programme is to be continued. I would ask: Has the British Admiralty put before the Cabinet a definite replacement programme? It is of the utmost importance that we should be informed on that point. We do not want all the details, but we should know if a replacement programme has or has not been placed before the Cabinet. I hope that we shall have a reply to that question at the earliest possible moment.
There are one or two figures of importance on this matter which I must mention. One is that 14 new ships mentioned already will have to be laid down and completed between now and December, 1936, and at least another 14 more will have to be laid down during the years 1934, 1935 and 1936. They will not be completed by the end of 1936. That means a total of something like 27 or 28 ships have to be laid down and spread over the next five or six years, and I say it is of urgent and immediate importance that the Government should make up their minds in this matter. I ask them to realise that this is a national question, and, if the Treaty is to go on, it would be unfair on future Chancellors of the Exchequer or future Government if this Government allowed the liabilities to pile up. Let us face it now, and, if the Treaty is a good one, and the country approves of it and it is ratified, let us face the burden and get on with a good replacement programme. It seems a little hard that when we have 1,750,000 unemployed, and with the great opportunity which our private shipping yards can afford for providing employment, as well as our dockyards, that this opportunity should not be seized and a certain amount of employment provided.
It seems to me that many of the joys of life appear to have been denied the delegates at this Conference. Our delegates do not seem to have been impressed by the glory of our history and the lesson to be drawn from it by anyone of reasonable intelligence. They seem utterly unaware of the responsibility

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facing us in this country and appear to have been determined to blot out our history. They have to a great extent endeavoured to place, if they have not succeeded in placing, in alien hands the control and destiny of this country or at least of making its defence for us in war time, if ever we are so unfortunate as to be faced again with war, one of great difficulty. It also seems to roe that we are going through a period of progressive doles and demoralisation, and, if we are to continue in this way and refuse to carry out the terms of the Treaty in the matter of replacement, we shall sink into shameful insignificance as a nation.
I ask the Prime Minister and those who advise him to consider these points and remember particularly what I have asked, that the replacement programme shall be concentrated upon and faced courageously and put into action forthwith. I feel strongly that we have not the right to go on as we are doing, and I cannot avoid quoting the view of the Poet Laureate in this matter:
"I see the ramparts of my native land, One time so strong, now dropping in decay,
Their strength destroyed by this new age's way,
That has worn out and rotted what was grand."
It is the duty of the British people to stop that decay.
Mr. BROCKWAY: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was very restrained in the claims which he made for this Treaty. He urged that it was only the first step towards further achievements for peace and disarmament, but there is one achievement in connection with this Treaty upon which I would like very sincerely to congratulate him and the Government. The right hon. and gallant Member for Burton (Colonel Gretton) said that no one fears a war with America, and why then have a naval agreement? One comment upon that statement would be that the hon. and gallant Member for Lewes (Rear-Admiral Beamish) quite clearly foreshadowed the possibility of some naval conflict between this country and America, and that even the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) did not hide the Power at which he was aiming by describing it as "A" instead of as America.
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We are inclined to forget to-day the relationship between America and this country which existed a year ago. There was then the danger of naval rivalry between the two countries. There is serious economic competition between the two countries, and when there is such competition, opposition is likely to find expression in other ways. No one could read the literature or the Press of either America or this country without being disturbed by the tone of the reference of one country to the other. All that has been completely changed by the negotiations which took place between our Prime Minister and General Dawes in the first instance, by the Prime Minister's visit to America, and by the Treaty which has now been signed. I was recently in America, and I experienced there the very great change which had been accomplished.
While we recognise the contribution which the Treaty has made in that respect, I think we shall make a great mistake if we regard it as any substantial contribution to the cause of disarmament in the world. I was astounded by the statement of the right hon. Member for Epping that this country has fulfilled its obligations under the Versailles Treaty so far as disarmament is concerned. By that Treaty, Germany was almost completely disarmed, her navy had been sunk, and then the victorious Allies solemnly gave the assurance that they too would proceed with a policy of disarmament. It is true that since the War the number of our battleships and cruisers has been reduced, but some of the most formidable instruments of naval warfare have been very substantially increased.
In 1913 the method of aerial warfare was practically unknown in connection with navies, and our expenditure in that respect was insignificant; now, the tonnage of our aircraft carriers is 107,550 tons. In 1913 our submarine tonnage was 29,500, but to-day it is 45,472 tons. The tonnage of our destroyers was then 141,400; now it is 189,165 tons. Yet it is said that with all those great increases in those three formidable instruments of naval armament we have satisfied the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles, wh looked forward to the day when not only Germany but the victorious Allies also

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would be disarmed. Since the Versailles Treaty we have had the League of Nations Covenant, the Locarno Pact, and the Pact of Paris, and surely, if all those treaties and international agreements mean anything, they mean that we should have gone even further to-day than what was looked for in the Versailles Treaty.
In regard to the London Naval Conference itself, I want to express regret that so much of its proceedings was carried out with secrecy. I believe that if they had been carried out in the light of day, the public opinion both of America and of this country would have been able to exert much more effective pressure for further disarmament on both sides, and I believe that if, under conditions of publicity, a much bolder lead had been given, public opinion in both countries would have responded to that lead. As a result of this Treaty the taxpayers of America, as has been pointed out by the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. M. MacDonald), will have to dig deep in their pockets to pay for increased armaments, and I suggest—and indeed my experience in America while the Naval Conference was proceeding leads me to believe—that if in the light of publicity it had been possible for our representatives to give a lead, say, for the total abolition of the battleship service, or even for reduction of that service by 50 per cent., the public sentiment in America would have immediately responded to that lead, and there would have been very great pressure towards much more effective reductions in both countries.
In the section of the Treaty which deals with the Three-Power Agreement between America, Britain and Japan, there is a Clause which permits of a revision of the figures if the requirements of national security are materially affected by new construction on the part of any Power not participating in the Agreement, and that decision to increase the strength of the Navy, irrespective of the terms of the Treaty, can be reached by any one of those three Powers at its own discretion, and its only duty is to forward a statement of its reasons to the other two Powers. That is a very dangerous Clause in the Treaty. I hope it will be many years before the right
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hon. Member for Epping is responsible for the Navy, or has any responsibility in the Government of this country, but the possibility, distant as it may be, is still on the horizon; and during his speech on behalf of the Conservative party he definitely warned us that the Conservative party would hold itself free to review the proportions which this Treaty had laid down.
We are well aware that there is danger of naval rivalry between France and Italy, and even though the hon. and gallant Member for Lewes has said there is no reason to anticipate a combination of those two countries, if those two countries build against each other there is very great danger that, our Admiralty and Government may regard that as a reason for going beyond the proportions which are now allowed within the terms of the Treaty. Does the Admiralty still maintain the principle of the Two-Power European standard, and is it going to say, for example, that if Italy and France build against each other, the Navy of this country must be equal to the size of the Italian and French Navies together? That European Two-Power standard is a fantastic idea when one appreciates the realities of the situation. The hon. and gallant Member says there is no possibility of the Italian and French Navies being combined against this country. Then why on earth should we maintain a Two-Power European standard which assumes that they may combine against us?
The hon. Member for Bassetlaw, in slimming up the effects of this Treaty, claimed that it meant substantial disarmament. It is true, of course, that the holiday which was laid down in the Washington Convention is extended, and that the replacement of battleships is to be postponed until 1935; but when any great claim is made for that, I would remind the Government that, despite the speech of the right hon. Member for Epping, the Conservative Government itself, at the Geneva Conference, made the very same offer which our Government has now embodied in this Treaty. Those of us who are on these benches desire that our Government should go very much further in the process of disarmament than the proposals which had been foreshadowed by the Conservative Government which preceded it. Moreover,

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when we begin to examine some of the other categories, we find that, while the number of British cruisers is to be reduced from 54 to 50, the actual tonnage of those cruisers is to be increased and that the actual expenditure may be greater. We find that there is to be destroyer building and submarine building, and we shall be in the extraordinary position in this House, within a few weeks, of having to vote Supplementary Estimates for an increase in the Navy as a result of the Treaty which has been proposed at the London Conference.
8.0 p.m.
I say quite definitely that when we are faced with the alternative, which the hon. Member for Bassetlaw gave, of America increasing her standard to reach our standard, or of our reducing our standard in order to reach America's lower standard, those of us on these benches have no doubt at all about the answer which we would give. We would reduce our Navy to the America standard rather than that the American Navy should be increased to ours. I want to raise the fundamental difference between those who are associated with me and the principle applied in this Treaty. I want to suggest that the result of the London Naval Conference indicates the almost insuperable difficulties of effective and wide disarmament while it is based on national security by armament. So long as we base security on armaments, and therefore on parities and proportions, it is hopeless to expect a disarmed world. We believe that the myth of security by armament must be destroyed. We believe that security can only rest on justice of policies. The Prime Minister, in opening his speech, urged that the mentality of the world must be changed before we can proceed further on lines of disarmament. We want to suggest that the mentality of the world can only be changed by one Government in the world daring to break through the circle of armaments, changing the psychology of the world, and encouraging the forces in other countries seeking disarmament, so breaking through the mentality that bases security on force, and putting in its place the mentality that bases security on justice of policies. This difference of view was indicated by the Prime Minister in an address to journalists
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during the Conference and published in the "Times" of 16th January. He then said:
"Great Britain is not going to disarm as an example to other nations, and the Government do not propose to do anything merely as a gesture. What can reasonably be done in that respect has already been done, and this country can only move on condition that other countries move to some extent."
A policy of disarmament on that principle may mean that we can economise, but the temper of the world is not changed. I remember a cartoon in an American paper of a British battleship with a large gun extending from it, and an American battleship with a large gun extending from it. Politicians were sitting on each of the ends of the guns, and simultaneously cutting off six inches, with the ironic remark that that meant disarmament. We believe if disarmament is to take place, if we are to have a, warless world, a Government that believe in peace must take risks for peace and give a lead in the direction of disarmament. We are told that we have sea routes to defend. If we pursued just policies to other nations, to our subject peoples, there would be no need to defend the sea routes, because there would be no danger of war in the world.
We urge on our Government to be much bolder in its proposals for disarmament. The Prime Minister speaks of "merely a gesture." We are proposing an act and a deed which will compel the world to understand that the Government of this country have turned their backs on and repudiated the method of warfare altogether. The European sees this country with its naval power, with its control over Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, Aden, and now Singapore, and we suggest that a gesture to make a difference in the mentality of the world would be to say that such international communications, essential to all the world, should be under the control of an international authority and not one authority. An hon. Member spoke of our country falling to a position of insignificance, because the proportion of armaments is not what it was in the past. We desire to rise to a position of significance, not in the instruments of war, but in peace, so that there may be social justice within our own border and justice to other nations outside our borders, and, if our country can attain that reputation in the world,

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it will live in history as a far greater nation than one that was a great military and naval Power.
Captain EDEN: The hon. Member who has just spoken has said that all would be well in the world if we carried out such drastic geographical alterations as would indeed be looked upon as astonishing by future generations. We are to hand over to an international body all coaling stations and bases, such as those at Malta and Gibraltar, and to entrust them to that body, so that in the future other fleets as well as our own might use them. How that is going to forward the cause of peace is anything but clear to me. I would suggest that it is not only this country that needs to make gestures. If those gestures are to be effective, then perhaps the Prime Minister came nearer accuracy when in his judgment he said that progress, if slow, is none the less sure towards disarmament. A gesture which is mere gesticulation, can hardly lead to the response the hon. Member expects. After the admirable speech of my hon. Friend behind me, I would not speak on the technical side at all, but there are one or two points of a technical nature on which I feel entitled to ask for information. There is surely one issue in regard to Article 20. It is not necessary for us to examine the statements of the American naval authorities to the effect that they will have a better fleet than ourselves six years hence, but we wish to know why the 91,000-ton limitation is included. There was no need to put a matter of that kind into an international agreement. It is a matter purely of domestic concern.
My chief criticism of this Treaty, so far as the technical side is concerned, is that the Government are not fulfilling within its terms what they stated was the minimum need for Imperial naval security. Do they still hold that 50 cruisers is the minimum need? If so, why are they cutting down the naval building programme below that? That is my first question. I have only one word to say of Singapore. We should like more information if we could have it. The right hon. Gentleman below the Gangway thinks the work ought to be dropped. My view is different. No one will be convinced by the argument that the Singapore dock is at Japan's front door. You might just as well say that
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Plymouth is at Boston's front door—they are the same distance apart. I have never understood why it was necessary to bring Singapore into this Treaty at all. Whatever size of fleet you have, you will need a base for it. If the fleet is to be smaller, your need of adequate naval bases will be greater than before. We should like to know, if possible, when a decision is likely to be arrived at on this question. Is it to be held over to the Imperial Conference in the autumn, or will something be heard of it before then?
I want to come to what in my mind are important considerations in this agreement, not technical but political. The Prime Minister said this afternoon, very unlike the speech of the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. M. MacDonald), that he regretted not to have come to a five-Power agreement. We also regret to say that that is the position to-day, for a three-Power agreement out of five is not even as good as half an agreement. We are confronted with the position to-day in which the Conference was not really half successful. We need, as the Prime Minister admitted, to correlate our position with the European situation and the world situation. It matters not to Japan and America what the building programme is in Europe, except our own; it is a matter of indifference to them, but it is not so with us, to whom it is as important as the programme of the United States and Japan. That is my first criticism—in that it is not a five-Power agreement and leaves us with the work less than half done and a serious position to face.
I wonder whether any members of the Government, while they were going through these negotiations, let their minds travel back to the time when the late Government endeavoured to negotiate an Anglo-French preliminary naval agreement. A great deal was said about it at the time which was wholly unjustified in abuse of that proposal. I do not believe to this day that the late Government was wrong in endeavouring to arrive at an agreement. They were right, and I do think that perhaps the Prime Minister, in a natural anxiety to make the most of his visit to the United States, to make the most of other factors in improving Anglo-American relations, failed to pave the way as it should have been paved. I am definitely of opinion that several things that occurred shortly

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before the Naval Conference were far from assisting in a happy solution so far as the Conference it concerned. I cannot help thinking that the representative of this Government at Geneva last autumn would have been wiser to have postponed the resurrecting of the question of trained reserves. I have no doubt that this was done with all sincerity, but it defeated its object, if it was to pave the way to a Naval Conference. That is all past now, and what we have to consider to-night, and what the House has not yet turned its attention to, is the present position.
What is going to happen next? It is obviously quite impossible that matters should be allowed to stay as they are now. The Prime Minister surely does not accept the present position as satisfactory. We cannot leave things as they are. The difficulty that confronts us today is that in Europe this country has not a definite policy at all. The Prime Minister must turn his mind for the next few months from the process of gilding the lily of Anglo-American friendship, a very pleasing, but now happily unnecessary pastime, in order to grasp some of the thistles that are flourishing in the European garden. Until he can do that he will not achieve any progress in the European problem. Things are happening in Europe which affect this problem, and one of those which we should be considering to-day is the movement for the economic federation of Europe. There is, for instance, the proposal of Monsieur Briand, who is above all things a practical statesman, for a united states of Europe. Matters of that kind must be considered by us, and this country should have a definite policy which it is prepared to pursue. To transpose a saying of Burke, we have to contrive so to be imperialists as not to forget that we are Europeans and co-ordinate our imperialism with our existing but not always pleasant European responsibilities. Unless we do that we shall not further European peace or international disarmament.
There are reasons why some of us are not convinced that the Government, in their lack of policy, have under consideration the present events in Europe. There was a suggestion while the Conference was in progress that there should be a new interpretation of Article 16. The suggestion filled some of us on this side of the House with considerable uneasiness.
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We cannot conceive of any interpretation of Article 16 which is not a new commitment. Fortunately, nothing came of the proposal, but the very fact that it existed shows that there is still some loose thinking in respect of England's foreign policy in Europe. Is our policy that we are prepared to enter into greater commitments, for, after all, these fillings up of gaps in the Covenant are new commitments. I prefer a gap, however, to a bad patch. But everybody received it with enthusiasm because it was thought that here was another bit of work in the building of the temple of peace. I am not quite sure that it was; just to say that a gap should be stopped does not mean that stopping the gap is good. The gap may be a safety valve. Nobody wants to stop that. It is to considerations like that which our Government, irrespective of party politics, should turn their attention, because I am convinced that there is a feeling in Europe that we do not stand for any definite policy. There would have been no suggestion of interpreting Article 16 if France had known what our attitude was going to be before the suggestion was made.
If our policy is that there shall be no more of these commitments, let us say so, and the other countries of Europe will know where we are, but it is a mistake to dangle that hesitating bait before the nations of Europe to make then think that we shall do this or that to further disarmament. Before we can make further progress in disarmament, we must examine the European situation today, for we shall do nothing more unless we tackle the real difficulties that exist in the European field. It is no good looking further abroad; it is here where we have to meet the problems, and nowhere else. We shall get no real improvement in Europe unless we are able to bring to the present situation a definite policy of our own which will help the difficulties which exist. It is no use to think of disarmament as a separate problem. It is nothing of the kind. Armaments are simply a reflection of a state of mind, and unless in Europe we make progress in improving that state of mind, there will not be further progress in disarmament.
I do not think that anyone viewing the European situation can feel any optimism at the present state of affairs. I

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differ from the hon. Member for Basset-law, who sees an improvement in the past year, for it is certainly true that in the last year there has been a steady deterioration in the state of international relations in Europe. Is that to go on? It is not necessary, and it would be unwise, to specify where that deterioration exists, but hon. Members who study the position know very well. Where do we stand between these cross currents? Where is our influence to be felt? These are considerations to which the Government must turn their minds, for there is to-day a feeling that no real Government policy is being pursued in Europe to-day. This country needs to do more clear and hard thinking as to its responsibilities in Europe, because no amount of good will or carefully phrased sentiments are going to bring us any nearer disarmament. They only draw wool over people's eyes, and prevent them observing the real state of affairs, which it should be this country's constant effort to improve.
Mr. LOVAT-FRASER: I candidly confess that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who spoke at an early stage of the Debate from the Front Opposition Bench, setting forth a large array of figures and statistics and comparisons, left me perfectly cold. I am prepared to take any risk with the United States. We must take risks in politics; that is a lesson which Lord Asquith used to inculcate in his followers. I believe that the feeling between this country and the United States is such that we can take any risks in future. May I call attention to a very remarkable experiment in history in the relations of the United States and Great Britain, in which a great risk was taken with remarkable success. It is one of the most wonderful phenomena in the relations between States that the boundary between Canada and the United States, which extends some 4,000 miles, is quite undefended. That state of things did not always exist. In 1812 there was a war between Great Britain and America, in which I think Great Britain was in the wrong. Great Britain succeeded in burning the city of Washington and enforcing her will upon the United States. After that war, Great Britain proceeded to build forts and to strengthen the defences between Canada and the United States. Feverishly and
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at great expense forts were erected, warships were built, and the frontier was strengthened.
Fortunately, there was in American politics a certain Quaker named Richard Rush of Pennsylvania. He saw the folly of the action, and he approached the British Ambassador, who, fortunately, was a wise man, and between them they made up their minds that this folly should be prevented. They approached the President of the United States, who in his turn approached the British Government, who, after great difficulty, were persuaded to enter into an agreement displacing the war vessels and forts and all the necessary apparatus of war, with the result that from that day to tins the frontier between the Empire and the Republic has remained absolutely undefended. That seemed a great risk at the time. It was a risk taken after a war between the two countries in which the United States had got the worse of it. But that risk was splendidly successful, and I invite the House to follow that example, and deal with America in the spirit exhibited in 1812. If that is done, this foolish rivalry, this building of vessel against vessel, can be dispensed with, to the lasting benefit not only of the peoples of the two countries but of the whole world.
I wish to touch upon the question of relations between France and Italy. I earnestly hope the Prime Minister will turn his attention to the bringing together of those two countries. He did splendid work in Washington, and I should very much like to see him going to France as the spokesman of Italy, and going to Rome as the spokesman of France. France, one can say quite candidly, is jealous of Italy. Italy is progressing in the most amazing way. I have known Italy for 30 years. My first visit was paid in 1900 and my last in the Autumn of last year, and I have been astonished at the amazing progress made by that country. The great cities of Milan and Bologna, which I visited last September, are increasing by leaps and bounds, and I was told that the coming city in the North of Italy was Padova, whose streets were covered with grass at no distant date. Coupled with this wonderful material advancement there is a moral and intellectual advancement. Italy is dreaming of the glories of Rome and the Roman Empire. She aspires to

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fill the place of the Roman Empire. Looking round the Mediterranean, she remembers that every shore of the Mediterranean was once part of her Empire, and with her intellectual growth and her material growth she is becoming strong and confident. France, which with her declining population is advancing much less rapidly in material things, is looking with jealousy upon Italy; but I am convinced that if those two nations can be brought together by wise diplomacy it is possible to induce them to dismiss from their future policy the building up of rival navies. I am very glad that Japan forms a third in the agreement which has just been completed, because it cannot now be said that Anglo-Saxon domination is threatening the world. The task of our Government, the task of the diplomatists and statesmen of this country, is to bring Italy and France together, and, having brought them together, to unite them with the other three Powers to form a league which, if established, will, I am certain, bring perpetual peace into this much-harrassed world.
Lord ERSKINE: I hope the hon. Member for Lichfield (Mr. Lovat-Fraser) will not mind if I do not follow him into European politics, but I would like to congratulate him upon the wonderful tribute he has just paid to the Fascist system in Italy. I did not think we should ever get such a tribute from the Labour Benches, a tribute of which Mussolini himself would be very proud. However, I do not intend to go into the intricacies of European politics. What I want to say is that I, at any rate, am not opposed to a Treaty for the limitation of naval armaments. I think most of us on this side have always said that if we could get general disarmament we should be as well prepared to disarm as anyone else, but there are certain features about this particular Treaty, and particularly Part 3 of it, to which I wish to offer a few criticisms. I am sorry that I cannot agree with the statement of the Prime Minister in his opening words that people were wrong in saying that it would be a good thing if we left America out of account altogether. Personally, I do not see why there should be any rivalry between America and ourselves. Our interests are the same. As far as I can see, there
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is no cause for hostilities between us, except, perhaps, in the case already been mentioned, in which we might be blockading at the behest of the League of Nations and America would desire to get her trade through. That is the only case, as far as I can see, in which, in these modern times, we might be involved in trouble with the United States of America.
I would far rather say to America, "We never considered your Fleet before the War, it did not enter into our calculations, and we will once more return to that position. You build what you like. You are a wealthy nation. If you desire to do so no doubt you can outbuild us; but we have no possibility of trouble with you. All we desire is our own security and sufficient ships to protect our own trade routes." If we did that we should get out of a great deal of the trouble which we are now in. Ever since the Washington Treaty there have been bickerings with America. There was trouble about the raising of the elevation of the guns of the battleships, and trouble over the question of 8-inch or 6-inch guns in the cruisers. There is trouble as to what exactly is parity. A great many of these troubles would be got over if we said "We will return to the pre-War position." It may he said that it is too late for that now, that that should have been considered before the Treaty of Washington. Very probably that is true, but since the War I think we have got into unnecessary trouble with the great Republic overseas because of these bickerings as to what parity is and what parity is not.
A great many speakers in the Debate have made the charge that this country has not carried out her obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. They said we have not disarmed. I would like to point out to them that the Navy of this country now is half the size it was in 1919. In the case of capital ships, we have scrapped 25 battlecruisers and battleships, all very good ships, a great many of them better or just as good as the ships which are now in the possession of any other Power, and we have also scrapped many cruisers. Therefore, I do not think we can be accused of having failed to live up to the Treaty of Versailles. But we do remember that we

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live by the sea. The Prime Minister said that the Navy is "us." We have miles of communications to guard and to police, and we want small ships for that purpose. A very good instance of the use of the Navy is being seen to-day in the China Seas, where piracy has cropped up again. We never know when we may want to use our cruiser squadrons, not for attacking anybody else, but merely for defence of our own mercantile marine—not even for defence against other ships of war.
There is one question I would like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty. On Page 5 of the Foreign Office Memorandum issued on the 4th February, 1930, the following sentence occurs:
"In the opinion of His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom the battleship, in view of its tremendous size and cost, is of doubtful utility."
I should like to ask the First Lord whether that paragraph received the assent of his technical advisers, because this White Paper was issued over the signature, not of the Admiralty, but of the Foreign Secretary. Of course, the Government, when the Foreign Office is issuing a White Paper, are perfectly at liberty to say what they, as a Government, think, but I think that the nation and this House have a right to be told whether that declaration was assented to by the Naval Lords. After all, the battleship has been doomed by a great many people for very nearly two generations. I believe that when the old "Inflexible" was launched the then First Lord went down and said that, owing to the introduction of the torpedo, it was probably the last big ship that would he built for our Fleet. That, however, has not been the case, and in fact the large ship of the line has been getting larger and larger. Of course we all know the tag which Admiral Mahan wrote about the old Grand Fleet, that:
"It was only those distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never looked, that stood between it and the dominion of the world."
He was referring to our ships of the line in that war. It may be said that that is 100 years out of date, but I happened recently to be reading the memoirs of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, and I came across a passage that interested me with regard to this question of the opinion on capital ships. He said:
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"The Entente has defeated us by means of the British ships of the line, which made blockade possible. Of all the reproaches that have been heaped upon me, only one has really affected me, and that is that I did not build more battleships."
That is a technical expression of opinion from an individual who, perhaps, had more to do with the building up of a great fleet of modern times than any other individual. I do not think there is much doubt that the technical opinion in the Navy now is that if we had unlimited means—which we have not—the most effective form of fighting ship is the battleship, and it might even get larger unless there was a limitation. I think that the capital ship, or a form of capital ship, must always remain.
After all, the capital ship may change. I quite agree—it is about the only time that I have ever agreed—with the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) in his remarks about capital ships. He said that the word "battleship" was a bad word. I prefer the old term, "ship of the line," which I think means the ship which, if you are so unfortunate as to have to fight, will be the ship that you will bring up at the last resort, and upon which all your lighter forces will retire. It may be that in the future the capital ship will be able to submerge itself beneath the water, or even to rise and fly in the air, but, there is no doubt whatever that as long as any navies exist there must be a form of ship which will be the ultimate line on which smaller ships fall back, and I do not think we shall ever be able to get rid of what we may call the capital ship from the navies of the world. I wish that the Prime Minister, when he was negotiating this Treaty, had been able to persuade the other nations—and I believe that three of the other nations agreed—to accept the lesser tonnage for capital ships on which we tried to agree at Geneva, and I hope that in any future negotiations that we may have he will try to get a reduction in the size of these ships, because I think that that is the only way in which we can get a reduction of expense.
The PRIME MINISTER: If I may interrupt the Noble Lord for a moment, his statement that two of the other Powers agreed to that is really not accurate. If I allowed that to go without contradiction, I do not know what would happen.
Lord ERSKINE: I thank the Prime Minister very much for interrupting me. I did not mean, by saying that three had agreed, to put him in any embarrassing position. I believe, and I think the Prime Minister agrees, that if he could get an agreement at some future time to limit the size of the guns and the tonnage of these ships, he would be doing a great service towards reducing the cost of the Fleet.
There is one other thing that I want to say. I regard as the worst feature of this Treaty Article 21. I know that, because it was not possible to get a Five-Power Pact, we had to have something which would allow us to build if the two Powers who did not sign enlarged their fleets, but I think that this Article is a dangerous one, because I am so afraid that, supposing that there is a rivalry and we find that we have to build, we shall have to go to Japan and America and say that we are going to build, as we can according to the Treaty, and we shall then be accused of starting a new naval race in armaments. I do not desire to see a new naval race in armaments started, and I hope that this Article 21 will never have to be used, but I think it is a blot. I remember that the Prime Minister, when he began this Conference, emphasised the fact that what he really desired was a Five-Power Pact, and that he did not want to sign a Three-Power Pact. He had to sign a Three-Power Pact, and to that extent the Conference failed. I am sorry that it was necessary to put in this Article, because I think it may be a source of great embarrassment to us in the future, though, as I have said, I hope it may never be used. That is the reason why I do not think it is a good thing that this House should pass Part III of the Treaty.
With regard to replacement, I hope that shortly a programme will be placed before us. I think the Prime Minister will agree that, although our Fleet is smaller, it should be efficient, and at the present time I certainly do not think it is efficient unless we are able to replace the older ships. After all, the ships of the "C" Class were built during the War. They are small; they had a great deal of work in the War; and I understand that it is the opinion of the Admiralty now that one year's war service
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is equal to at least two years' peace service. I hope, therefore, that we shall be given a replacement programme to consider as soon as possible. I do not believe that the Fleet will be efficient without it. We have reduced—wrongly, as I think—our cruisers from 70 to 50. In the last War we had a, great piece of luck, because we were so placed geographically with regard to Germany that we could blockade her; but when a very few of her cruisers got out, they required a, great many of our cruisers to run after them. The "Emden" had 70 ships chasing her. We shall never be in that very favourable geographical position again. If we are so unfortunate as to be engaged in hostilities with another Power, we shall find that it has a long coast-line, and that it will be almost impossible to prevent its raiding cruisers from getting out. Nine cruisers required some 104 British cruisers to capture them, and we shall probably find a great many more cruisers on our trade routes, and our food supplies will be in jeopardy.
Because I think that Article 21 is dangerous and that the reduction in the number of cruisers is not justified, I do not believe it was a good thing to conclude the Three-Power Pact, leaving the other two Powers out, and having a saving Clause, and for my part I do not think that the Treaty will do very much. It does not seem to me that it will bring about a great deal of saving. There is a hypothetical saving, but we must consider what the Estimates are going to be in the next few years. It does not seem to me that there is going to be any very large saving, because what will be saved on the four "Iron Dukes" will certainly have to be spent in replacements.
The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. A. V. Alexander): Does the Noble Lord agree that we are building enough?
Lord ERSKINE: No; I should have preferred to see a few more built; but, if there is going to be a saving—I do not think there is—it will only be hypothetical, and actually I think we shall find that the Navy Estimates will be very much the same as they were last year and the year before. On the whole, I do not think that the saving is going to be very great, but I do think that the safety of our trade routes has been jeopardised, and for these reasons,

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although I congratulate the Government on parts of the Treaty, I certainly cannot congratulate them on Article 21.
Mr. KNIGHT: The Noble Lord's concluding observations bring the House to the heart of this matter. Before I say a few words as to that, I desire to make a general observation on the situation. The unfortunate intervention of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) destroyed temporarily the excellent impression created by the Prime Minister's statement. While my right hon. Friend was speaking, I took down his own account of this Treaty and, in justice to him and to the Government who wrought so valiantly for weeks to attain it, the House should refresh its recollection of the description given by the Prime Minister himself. He said he had made a nibble at the cherry and that it was good preparatory work that had been accomplished. I do not use this expression to diminish in any way my appreciation of the work which the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues carried out. I adopt the right hon. Gentleman's own description of his work, because the House should bear in mind that this work has ended in an instrument which is extremely defective and which does not profess to give effect to the whole policy of the Government, but is the utmost that they were able to wring out of very untoward circumstances.
May I say a word as to the intervention of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping, who is not here, as is his custom after his intervention in Debate. He astonished the House by citing a document which at first he declared was not a Cabinet document. On that account being repudiated by the then Prime Minister, who was responsible for it, he apologised to the right hon. Gentleman and apparently withdrew his description of it. The House can have no doubt that it was a Cabinet document. Within a few hours of this time, a responsible and honoured journalist has been interrogated for hours by the police for collecting impressions which resulted in the disclosure of a Cabinet decision of a very grave character. The unfortunate journalist underwent this interrogation—I do not say it was not a proper interrogation—and the right hon. Gentleman is allowed
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to go scot free for playing fast and loose not only with the traditions of the House but with the decencies of public life. The circumstances a this afternoon recall to my mind his own confession in his book "The Crisis," where he gloats over the fact that, as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1914, he disregarded a Cabinet decision and dispatched the Fleet to its war stations, contrary to the decision of his colleagues in the Cabinet, an act considered in relation to the then international situation, when the Foreign Secretary was doing his utmost to prevent war, or the most provocative and mischievous description and now, when its full consequences are appreciated by the world, the right hon. Gentleman gloats at his action. To-day he repeats a similar performance by using this document. I protest against his action.
What was the document? That is the serious part of the matter on which I desire to address the House. It was an instruction given by the then Government to its distinguished representative at the Washington Conference the nature of which rendered any successful termination of the Conference impossible, because it embodied a view on which international disarmament is impossible. The view is that the interests of Great Britain are such that no international arrangement can be made which interferes with the view of those interests held by the right hon. Gentleman and his friends. I am not attacking the sincerity of the right hon. Gentleman's speech or of his view. It is the traditional, Conservative, blue water view. We are living in 1930 and not in 1914 and, outside the House, there is an enormous population which is looking to this Parliament to give effect to the new view, the after-war view. The principle embodied in that instruction sent to Lord Balfour would not permit of any improvement in the international situation, because the notion that the high seas, the arteries of the world's commerce, can he controlled by a great Power is a notion which the rest of the world will not accept. It cannot he made a counter in the international conference and, if it had been put forward, it would have wrecked the conference and would be a full explanation of the narrow limits within which the conference has succeeded.

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I want to ask the First Lord whether this matter was raised at the Conference. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) said the Foreign Secretary denied that the question of the regulation of trade routes had come before the Conference, that it had been excluded from the purview of the Conference at the request of the American delegation. I said in the country, when I read that answer, that I should desire to have some corroboration of its accuracy, because for years I had the advantage of conferring with the highest authorities in America, both in the State and in the Admiralty, as to these matters, and I find in yesterday's "Times" this account of the questioning which Mr. Stimson was put to by Senator Swanson. I ask my right hon. Friend whether this account is correct as it appears in the dispatch of the correspondent of the "Times" yesterday. If it is not correct, it should be corrected by himself. Mr. Stimson was asked by Senator Swanson whether fleet equality for warlike purposes only had been considered, or whether the protection of commerce also had been taken into account. The reply was that both had been considered, for the goad reason that the protection of commerce was inseparable from any combat at sea. On the point of accuracy I invite my right hon. Friend to say whether this is an exact account of what occurred at that Conference. I hope it is correct. If this was the line taken by the American delegation, it is in line with the steadily pursued policy of America as opened by President Wilson himself and finally embodied by that distinguished man in the second of his 14 points.
I am not a newcomer to these controversies. I speak of what I know. Hon. Members in this House who have followed these matters will agree with what I am saving, if they do not accept the view which the Americans have been putting forward. Since the termination of the War, America has steadily pressed for a consideration of the question of the regulation of trade routes in the belief, as Mr. Stimson is reported in the "Times" yesterday to have said, that the protection of commerce is inseparable from any combat at sea. I doubt whether public opinion is very much informed about the technicalities which have
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figured largely in this discussion, and that when the Debate is issued to-morrow whether the general public will find any particular satisfaction in the kind of technicalities which have been put forward to-day. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) and I worked for years before the War in trying to get public opinion concentrated on this crucial fact, that for the peace of the world trade routes must be regulated by international agreement. Such a regulation would have to be vested in a law which all the nations had had a share in formulating. It would have to include provision for the determination, by a tribunal, of disputes, and if the commerce of the world, on the trade routes of the world, was protected by such a regulation, the peace of the world would be assured.
That is the root question connected with disarmament. The experience of the Washington Conference is fresh in our minds. You may make any arrangement you like between Admiralty experts—and I speak with all respect to them—but you will find that they will thereafter find reasons in their own national interests of escaping from the conclusions arrived at. The whole history of disarmament during the last few years is a succession of attempts to get naval experts to agree, and they have always been followed by fresh disputes. Washington was the last occasion. The whole House desires that this Conference shall not end with further disputes between the nations concerned. There is not a Member in this House who will not come to realise that any arrangement you may make can never succeed unless such arrangement gives effect to policies approved by the people. I take this occasion to criticise the way this Conference was conducted behind the ears of this House, and to express regret at the scanty particulars which were given to the House as to what was happening at the Conference, but I rejoice in this particular, that while I criticise the right hon. Gentleman in certain respects, I congratulate him on the success he has attained. I am certain, and I believe that he has reason to feel, that this Conference has resulted in preparatory work, and that this preparatory work will form the foundation for future conferences.
9.0 p.m.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I had not intended taking part in this Debate, but there are two or three things which have occurred in the course of the discussion which I feel make it incumbent upon me to make some contribution. I should have been prepared to leave the presentation of the case for my hon. Friends and myself to the speech delivered by my right hon. Friend the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert). I have risen at a time when I should not interfere with the arrangements which have been made by the Gentlemen on the two Front Benches. I shall not detain the House very long. First of all, I should like to congratulate the Government upon the measure of success which they have attained. It is a partial success, but I agree with what the Prime Minister said, that that is all that we can hope to secure at any of these conferences. He described this very modestly—shall I say with characteristic modesty—as a nibble at the cherry. I think that this cherry will need more than two bites before you get rid of it. It has appeared at many conferences. It will appear at many more conferences. The same old cherry will appear in the conference cocktail for a great many years to come. But when the Prime Minister said that you must judge a conference not by what you propose to the conference but by what you can get out of it, I was very glad to hear him say so. I have had even more experience of conferences than he has, and I am very glad that he and his friends begin to realise that you cannot be responsible for everything that is carried in a conference. You never secure more than a modicum of the projects which you submit to it.
The Government are gradually learning by experience, and I hope that in due course they will profit by it. The right hon. Gentleman was rather pleased with the fact that the proceedings showed considerable good will, and that the delegates were on the friendliest terms with each other. I can assure him that that is no new experience, and he must not rely too much upon it. It is worth a good deal, no doubt, but I have never seen a conference which did not end with "complete accord." It was the favourite formula with which we announced the result of
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all our conferences, and the more complete the accord very often the less was accomplished. Still, it is an advantage that delegates should part on good terms with each other. But we must judge the Conference rather by what has actually been accomplished, and not merely by the temper in which the discussions have been conducted.
Before I come to the nature of the Agreement itself, I should like to say one word about the Washington Conference. I wish the Prime Minister had been a little more gracious. I am not pleading in the least for myself for the Washington Conference, because, although I happened to be the head of the Government at the time, I took no part in it. The success of the Washington Conference was due to Mr. Hughes, who is now Chief Judge of the Supreme Court in the United States, to the late Lord Balfour, and to a large extent to the initiative of Senator Borah. Those are the three men who are primarily and almost exclusively responsible and, therefore, when I put in a plea for the Washington Conference, I am not putting in a plea for the Government of which I was the head. The right hon. Gentleman dismissed it with the phrase, "failure, or want of success." That is a little unfair and a little ungracious.
What happened at that Conference? It was the first Disarmament Conference ever held between nations which ended in actual disarmament. What was accomplished? Over 70 battleships were scrapped, some of them old battleships, some of them battleships which were in course of construction, including vessels on which as much as 90 per cent. of the work had been completed. When you come to the cost, it would be over £400,000,000. The result of that Conference and the scrapping of the battleships have enabled the right hon. Gentleman to prolong the holiday. He said that a mistake was made by the promoters of that Conference when they went in for a 10 years' holiday instead of five. They went in for a 10 years' holiday and got it. They scrapped over 70 battleships, and the right hon. Gentleman is merely prolonging for another five years the holiday which these great men achieved by remarkable courage and foresight, at a time when it was a very

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difficult thing to do. It was only three years after the War. The psychology of the War still remained, yet they were able to scrap these gigantic battleships. The importance of it lies in this fact, that the building of these enormous ships had a great deal to do with provoking the temper which led to the War.
When the Washington Conference scrapped over 70 battleships and made arrangements that we should consider at the end of 10 years whether there should be a renewal, it was one of the greatest achievements in the history of any Disarmament Conference in this world, and it would have added a good deal to the force of the statement of the right hon. Gentleman if he had quite fairly stated that fact. I am bound to do it, as being due to the memory of our great and distinguished representative on that occasion. As a matter of fact, the total tonnage scrapped was 1,770,000 tons. I do not want to institute comparisons. I had not intended to do so, but I am bound to do it. There is here no scrapping comparable with that, unless you add the fact that you are not renewing ships which might have been due for renewal if you had not extended the Washington holiday.
Now I come to what I consider to be the greatest achievement of this Conference. In my judgment, the greatest achievement is the fact that we have arrived at an understanding with the United States and Japan. That is worth more than 100 cruisers. It is the outstanding achievement, and it will have a very profound effect upon international history. In fact, there are so many possibilities embodied in that understanding that no one dares to discuss them in public, but I have not the slightest doubt that it will have a most profound effect upon the story of the nations. As far as the Agreement itself is concerned I would say, that as far as it relates to the deep sea situation, it is satisfactory. The Pacific is more or less dominated by this Agreement. When you come to the narrow seas, I do not think it is satisfactory. There are elements of very great peril in it. In fact, in many ways I think the situation has been worsened, because you have stimulated activities, prejudices and rivalries which were dormant, but which have been rather stirred into activity by
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the discussions which took place, and the attempt to achieve agreement at a moment when things were not quite right. As we are concerned, not merely with the deep sea situation, but also very vitally in the narrow seas, on our trade routes, it is a situation which I sincerely trust the Prime Minister will not leave where it is, because it is of such enormous importance. It is not a question, in my judgment, of cruisers. It is a question of a very different character, upon which I do not care to enter. It is of vital importance to this country, even if you are going to preserve the integrity of this Agreement, that you should regularise the position in so far as the menace of the submarine in the narrow seas is concerned.
It was the speech of the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) which has led me to intervene in this discussion. I sincerely regret that the right hon. Gentleman should have departed from precedent by quoting secret instructions sent by the Government at home to their emissary at the Conference. In my judgment that is one of the gravest things that has happened in this House. There are occasions when documents of this kind should be published, but they should only be published after full consultation with the members of the Government who are responsible for foreign affairs for the time being, and if any individual member of an old Cabinet takes upon himself to publish secret instructions of this kind upon his own responsibility—well, there is mischief involved in it. This document, which I have had an opportunity of reading, was sent, I see, by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Balfour and it is "Personal and Secret." I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman fully realises the consequences which may ensue unless this precedent is repudiated by all parties in this House immediately. Every Government leaves behind secret memoranda, some of them of a very confidential character, and some of them of a very controversial character. Their successors come in and get hold of all these papers and documents. There is no doubt at all that there is very considerable temptation to publish documents of that kind when you come across them. There may be a certain political advantage in doing so, but up to the

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present every ex-Cabinet Minister has honourably observed the precedent that these documents, being secret documents, ought not to be published without the consent of the parties concerned.
But when you come to foreign affairs it is very much more serious. When you are dealing with foreign affairs you send secret documents to your emissaries, not for publication by them, but rather in order to give them your view as to the line that ought to be taken and your reasons for taking those lines. Those reasons may be of a very secret character. They may involve reflections upon other countries, which if they are given to the world may provoke the most serious ill-will between one country and another. There are some of these documents—I have had an opportunity of seeing them—as to which I may say that if we had had any idea that they would be published, we could express ourselves in a different manner. But we were talking freely to one of our own colleagues across the water—in cipher.
I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman this: Supposing the Prime Minister were to follow this example and were to publish the secret instructions sent to Geneva to the Naval Conference there, and, particularly, the replies given by Lord Robert Cecil, would he regard that as quite playing the game? If this precedent were to be followed it would be, in my judgment, an extraordinarily serious departure from what has been the practice. In this case this document, taken by itself, does not fairly represent what took place. After all, these are views which were formed by the Government at home upon such information as they had. They might modify those views according to other facts which came to their knowledge. Even the right hon. Gentleman has changed his opinion, and everybody does it, when there is sufficient reason for doing so. We had to consider the situation from day to day. We sent our views across the Atlantic to Mr. Balfour, and, on the other hand, he sent his replies, which we considered from day to day. He weighed what we said, and we, certainly, attached very great importance to his opinion. But there was no idea of publishing these things because that might create a very serious situation in foreign countries which it would be very difficult for us to put right.
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I regret that the right hon. Gentleman should have raised this matter. He has said that I ought to be very proud of that document, but that has nothing to do with it. I have made inquiry, and I have discovered that the right hon. Gentleman's remark is not prompted by any zeal to defend my patriotism. It is due entirely to the fact, as far as I can see, that the right hon. Gentleman wrote it himself. It is really not friendship, but parental pride, that makes him feel such enthusiasm for this document. No doubt I approved of it. I must have sanctioned it, and I accept full responsibility for it, but I do enter a very emphatic protest against anything of this kind being done without full consultation with the Ministers who are responsible, for the time being, for the conduct of the affairs of the country, and, I think, also consultation with the person who was responsible for sending the document. I observe that, although the right hon. Gentleman wrote it, I signed the paper, and, as I say. I accept the responsibility, but may I point out, in order to show that it does not really convey the whole impression, that it was not so much a question of cruisers, but a question of our protecting ourselves against submarine attacks. It was not so much a question of cruisers for the high seas, although they are mentioned. In the main it was a question of how to deal with submarine attacks in the narrow waters, and subsequent documents will prove to the right hon. Gentleman that that was the view taken by Mr. Balfour himself, because he replied, not by reference to cruisers, but by reference to the fact that we had 3,667 small craft dealing with submarines. What has that to do with cruisers of 9,000 tons and 10,000 tons? It was purely a question of our not being fettered if there was a danger of submarine attack. It was always more or less a question of the narrow waters and of not being fettered in the construction of small craft for protection.
What has happened in this case? I followed this very closely. What has happened in this case is that the Admiralty are convinced that, in so far as submarine construction has gone, they are equipped with an adequate supply of craft for dealing with it. That is, in so far as construction has gone, but supposing the construction of submarines develops to such an extent as to increase the menace beyond what they

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contemplate, they have a provision in this Treaty, a safeguarding provision, which enables them to increase their quota of anti-submarine craft by merely giving notice to the other signatories of the Treaty. That is the position, as I understand it, as far as this matter is concerned, and that is quite in the spirit of the telegram which the right hon. Gentleman read to this House, but reading it out like that, without giving any notice, without giving any opportunity for examining all the conditions, without giving any opportunity to read the documents that prefaced it and the documents that followed it—
Mr. CHURCHILL: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman one question, and only one? Does he suggest that the information conveyed by the extract which I read was new information, information that had not long been before the public? Does he suggest that the statement that we informed the United States that in no circumstances would we agree to parity at Washington in small craft and cruisers, is an exaggeration, and that it had not been made public before? We have had very heavy weather on this matter and I should like an answer to that question.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: In so far as there was any statement made in public, the right hon. Gentleman was entitled to quote it, but does he mean to say that if a statement is made in public that justifies him in quoting documents which are secret and confidential?
Mr. CHURCHILL: I do say that when a matter of this kind has been public knowledge, as a point of principle, for nearly 10 years, and when it becomes relevant to a great public discussion like this, a statement upon it would be perfectly legitimate. Whether it should be paraphrased and given in the third person or read out directly is, I agree, a point on which the right hon. Gentleman may dilate. The point as to whether it should be put in the third person or the first person may, I admit, be argued.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Really this makes the situation much more serious. I really think that we are entitled to have the view of the late Prime Minister upon it. What does this mean? Does it mean that if there are any discussions at Geneva, or Washington, or in London,
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where secret and confidential instructions are given to an emissary by the Government, if there are statements made in the Press as to the general attitude of the Government, then any Minister or ex-Minister is entitled to get up in this House, without obtaining the permission of the Sovereign through the Prime Minister, and read out these telegrams? If that is to be laid down as a principle, then I say it is disastrous. I know perfectly well what would be said if any Minister on that side took such a view. I should be very surprised if the late Prime Minister would get up in this House and say that he accepts that doctrine. The right hon. Gentleman has given his answer. What is much more important is that we should have the answer of the responsible leader of his party upon something which may affect the conduct of every Cabinet and ex-Cabinet Minister in this country who obtain secret and confidential information. That is all I have to say upon it.
One word in conclusion upon the argument advanced by the right hon. Gentleman as to the inferiority of our ships. He says, that although we may have the same number on the seas "Ah, well, they are older." I observe that the same arguments have been used at this very time by the big Navy men in the United States to show that the right hon. Gentleman has got the better of them there. As a matter of fact, you always have those arguments. The argument is that of the old and new ships. That argument is older than any ship in the British Navy. It has always taken place whenever you have had a demand from the Admiralty for an increase. Why, the right hon. Gentleman and I very often had arguments about that whenever there were great demands from the Admiralty for an increase in their armaments. If you go on numbers, it is said that they are old. The right hon. Gentleman has not only used that argument, but has also refuted it according to the particular office he held for the time being. That is always the case, and that is always the argument which is used. There is many an old warship which is quite capable of taking charge, and taking care of itself in any battle. The same is true of the British Navy. The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that there were ships which were rejected and regarded as

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scrapped, and when the War came they were some of the most useful ships we had in the British Navy. [HON. MEMBERS: "What about Coronel?"] At Coronel they were outnumbered, but if you had anything like equality of guns—[Interruption]. All I can say is that those ships were put into action by the right hon. Gentleman and others, and turned out to be very useful. There were a good many of them at the Dardenelles.
You always get that argument, and the fact of the matter is that those men in the United States who plead for a bigger Navy and more cruisers will be using that argument, and the experts on this side will also be using it. If you listen to this, you will never come to any agreement on earth. I am glad that the Government, carrying their experts with them I have no doubt, have had the courage to face that, and that the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have also had the courage to face it. We have signed pacts of peace and treaties. We have signed a document which has simply abolished war, and still we go on adding battalions, divisions and airships and bombers every year. All this is based on the assumption that we are preparing for another war—the very thing that will provoke war. Let us argue on the assumption that there will be no more war. Even for war, it is far more vital to this country to restore its economic strength. I do hope that the Government will go on, as the Prime Minister has promised, not merely to carry these agreements through, but to proceed with the bigger problem of land disarmament, so that these pacts which we have signed solemnly one after another are made good.
Mr. AMERY Mr. AMERY rose—
HON. MEMBERS: "Baldwin!"
Mr. SPEAKER: I would ask hon. Members to allow the right hon. Gentleman to proceed.
Mr. AMERY: I am sure that the House will not expect me to follow the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) in dealing with matters of which my right hon. Friend very truly said that the right hon. Gentleman made extremely heavy weather. My right hon. Friend is
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perfectly capable of dealing with that issue himself.
The PRIME MINISTER: May I ask whether we are to accept the final statement regarding the position which the right hon. Gentleman has taken up as an expression of the future view of the Conservative party?
Mr. AMERY: Any statement that is required will be given on the proper occasion. I hope that, at this hour of the evening, I shall be allowed to submit such arguments as I have at my disposal for dealing with the subject matter of this discussion. The right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs has not devoted much of his time to that subject, but in the last few sentences he professed to deal with the whole of the technical argument which was advanced so powerfully and so effectively by my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill). He suggested that it is the habit of technical experts, when numbers are in question, to point out that some of the numbers consist of out-of-date or small ships, and that, when the question of the condition of the ships arises, they draw attention to the shortage of numbers. The whole case that my right hon. Friend made this afternoon was that neither in numbers nor in quality has this Treaty secured equality for this country.
The right hon. Gentleman had an eloquent peroration, the gist of which was that armaments, and armaments alone, are the chief cause of war. Our whole attitude towards this Treaty, towards the terms of this Treaty, unsatisfactory as we regard is from the technical point of view, must also be governed by our judgment of what part we must assign to disarmament, as such, as a contributor to the cause of peace, and to what extent we consider that armaments, as such, are the principal cause of war. I would suggest to the House that armaments are only in a very subsidiary degree the cause of war. The main causes of war lie sometimes in the ambitions of nations and of rulers, sometimes in the conflict of economic interests and even more—this is where the tragedy of war comes in—in the conflict of irreconcilable ideas which cut across frontiers and which, for their fulfilment, demand the destruction of nations and involve peoples in war. Europe was convulsed

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for generations by the conflict of religion. In the last Great War we were confronted with the final outcome of a long conflict for a national idea, the idea that those who speak a particular language or belong to a particular race ought to think first of nationality, and ought to promote it regardless of whether that effort can be accomplished peacefully or by the sword. I remember that one who, in his time, was one of the greatest ornaments of this House, Mr. Healy, was once speaking of what he regarded as the indefeasible claim of Irish nationality. He was asked, "What do you mean by nationality?" and he retorted: "Nationality is that which a man is prepared to die for." He might have added, "and equally prepared to make others die for." Is it that idea, far more than the armaments which may incidentally accompany the development of the idea, which is responsible for war.
Some of us were shocked the other day to read of the erection of a memorial in Zagreb to the memory of the man who committed the assassination which precipitated the war. There are still to-day millions of people in the world to whom that act is a symbol of the desire to lose life for the sake of an idea, and so long as that kind of idea exists in the world, or recurs in the world, you have to face the danger of war. So long as that idea exists, it is not armaments that provoke war; on the contrary, it is only when armaments are on the side of those who wish to change things that war is provoked, while the possession of armaments by those who care to maintain the existing order of things is in large measure the surest guarantee of peace. Even to-day it is largely armaments that are preserving the peace of Europe against the reversal of the Treaty of Versailles. It is only in a change of heart and in a change of outlook in Europe, which will make the issue of racial nationalism less vital to the minds of men, that we may hope that permanent peace, with its natural concomitant, disarmament, will come. The Prime Minister quoted the example of the United States and Canada, with one gunboat on each side, and with practically no armed men over 4,000 miles of frontier. Yes, because there have been no real issues to divide them. So long as that state of affairs occurs, you can
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well reduce armaments, but where there are real issues, it is the armaments of the peace-loving and those who stand for the preservation of the existing order of things that are the guarantees of peace.
Any standardised fixing of armaments at any particular low figure, unless it contributes to solving the conflict of ideas in the world, can only precipitate the outbreak of war, when those who wish for change feel that those who wish to maintain peace are weak enough to be attacked. With regard to the Prime Minister's statement that it is the conflict of experts that promotes war, there is the danger of experts on each side always exaggerating the strength of the other side and, by their competition, provoking friction and national trouble. Obviously, it is the duty of statesmanship to intervene to guide and, if necessary, control the experts, but I am not sure that the best way of doing that is not by informal discussion between the Powers directly concerned, because, when you come to formal public conference, you create real danger. You create the danger that each nation pitches its claim at the very highest to cover every possible contingency that may arise. Have we not seen that at the recent Conference, at any rate, as regards two of the great Powers represented, with the result that the entering upon such a conference has led to a state of affairs which, although we hope it may not aggravate the international situation, at any rate means an element of danger in that situation.
There is another serious drawback to standardisation. It does create the belief in different countries that each of them has some claim to interfere in the defensive arrangements of another country. It is a state of things which may in given circumstances lead to a danger to peace. More than that, standardisation has a logic of its own, which is not always the same as the logic of facts and reality. Take the Washington Treaty. I agree with what the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs said, that that Treaty was in itself a great achievement. Not only was it a great advance in disarmament, reckoned in tonnage scrapped, but because it confined itself to the realities of the oceanic situation, and safeguarded us, as the right hon. Member pointed out, from the dangers of that narrow sea

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situation to which the Prime Minister referred, and from the dangers of being inefficiently equipped for our police work and the protection throughout the world of our trade routes. A certain standard of parity was set up at Washington, confined by those who made the Treaty to carefully safeguarding all our other needs and our complex and varied requirements. But popular logic in the United States led to a demand that in every type of vessel, regardless of our or their needs, the United States must have parity, and it is that which created the most difficult situation for the present Conference.
The difficulty was between what could easily be settled from the point of view of great oceanic Powers, and our difficulties in protecting the narrow seas and our trade where we have the development of submarines and aeroplanes constituting a situation which in certain circumstances can impose a tremendous strain on us, even perhaps greater than in the time of the Great War, when we were able to bottle up Germany and had only to deal with casual raiders. Moreover, the weakening of our cruiser position may actually lead to an increase in submarines, a situation which has already been opened up by Italy's new submarine programme. That the present Treaty does not appear to have solved. It has been side-stepped by that reservation in Clause 21, which in some respect is the most important Clause of the Treaty. It is one dealing with security against an international situation which might conceivably become one of very great danger to this country. I ask the First Lord to make clear to the House whether that reservation is a reality. He has the opportunity of making it clear to the United States. We have introduced it formally, but we have reserved to ourselves the liberty to alter the number of cruisers if we find a situation arises through the action of other Powers which endangers our position.
I trust that in the fullest sense we have made it clear, and will continue to do so, to the United States, as to where we stand in this matter for the future. It is worth while pointing out that, while we made our own strategical situation clear in Washington and there was no misunderstanding at the time, the fact is that, while we laid emphasis on
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that position, we have had a different outlook growing up. There is a grave danger that if in the near future we do take advantage of that Clause we run the risk of misunderstanding and the possibility of international and the present satisfactory outcome of the Treaty with the United States might very well be worsened rather than improved by the ultimate outcome of this Treaty. This is a matter which may turn out to be grave, and I am afraid it is a price which we have to pay for a Treaty which has been built up on the basis, not of the reality of the strategical situation, but on mathematical tables, not on technical realities, but on the easy logic of the public, in the United States.
It is for those reasons as much as any other that I regard this Treaty with grave apprehension as one which, while it has disposed of some difficulties, while it has apparently settled some things, does leave loose ends which may very well lead us to a serious position in later years. Turning to the technical aspect of the matter, my right hon. Friend pointed out that by nominal parity in cruisers we have in fact established permanent inferiority as compared with the United States, and that that is not the best basis for a free and equal co-operation. I will not repeat the figures to which he called attention, but he pointed out that the needs of our scattered Oceanic routes, of policing those routes, are bound to deprive and weaken the actual cruiser strength which we might have in any battlefield. The absence from such a field owing to the policing duties of a number of our cruisers gives them an advantage through their having all their cruisers practically ready for battle purposes as against our great disadvantage from having our cruisers locked up, as it were, by the policing ditties which we are called upon to perform.
These requirements of ours are based on the extent of routes which we have to defend. The problem is the same as the policing of a great city, where the number of police is not affected by the number of criminals at large, but by the number of streets and of the property which have to be protected. The Admiralty have fixed that requirement at 45 cruisers, and after taking 25 for the battle fleet. It is now fixed at 25. It has

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been halved when practically no change has taken place in the situation, and that seems to me a very grave matter. It is not so much the gravity of the situation as against the United States; the gravity of it lies in this, that for the ordinary needs of our ocean security, in whatever way it may be menaced, we are now left with a provision that on the figures is utterly inadequate. I am not surprised, with regard to the American case, that Admiral Pratt said confidently yesterday that he would not be prepared to swap the United States Fleet for the British.
When it comes to that wholly inadequate figure of 50 cruisers, we are then confronted with this strange and, to my mind, not yet clearly explained problem of why we, and we alone, inserted a limitation upon our right to re-equip ourselves by 1936 with efficient and not obsolete vessels. The Prime Minister gave certain arguments derived from the convenience of spreading your building—convenience both from the point of view of naval efficiency and of the men in the dockyard. That argument was not considered when all building was suspended during the time before the Conference, though he must have known that by no possibility could we come to a figure below 50, and if that argument had counted, I should have thought that, looking ahead even to 50 as a maximum, we should have begun to build to avoid undue pressure in the future.
But even giving to that argument all the force you like, that is an argument derived from our own convenience, and what necessity was there for incorporating it in the Treaty? Why should we bind ourselves to this irrevocably, to something to which we might well bind ourselves voluntarily? There was no reason why we should be compulsorily tied to the position that in fact, by 1937, we cannot have more than at most 40 cruisers in any sense fit to take the seas, or in any sense comparable to the vessels possessed either by Japan or by America. In other words, if we deduct the 25 cruisers required for the battle fleet, and cruisers that will be in dock for repairs at any one time, the position is that we shall not have a dozen fit cruisers to control 80,000 miles of sea routes. That is a profoundly unsatisfactory situation.
10.0 p.m.
We have also, I think, the same right to be told—the Prime Minister has not
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told us—what the Government propose to do now, after all this delay, in carrying out those essential replacements. The First Lord only a day or two ago declared that as long as we had a Navy, it ought to be efficient, and that he would not ask any man of our flesh and blood to go to sea in an unseaworthy ship. I hope he will be able to prove to us this evening that he has got a programme, a definite replacement programme, and I hope he can tell us what that programme is and for how many years it is to be carried out. We have had it stated, on the great authority of Lord Jellicoe, that even accepting this figure of 91,000 tons, we shall require 13 or 14 cruisers to be laid down between this and 1933, 16 destroyers a year, and three submarines. We are entitled to know whether that minimum effort to come up to a figure which is still far below parity is going to be directly initiated and conscientiously carried out by the present Government, or whether it is to be postponed indefinitely, so that when the burden is thrown upon other shoulders, they may be charged with extravagance and with provoking naval competition.
There is one point to which I wish to draw the First Lord's particular attention, and that is the position of the Government's naval advisers, the Sea Lords, in this matter. The Sea Lords, Members of the Board of Admiralty, are not in this matter in the position of ordinary civil servants. They have a peculiar responsibility for the safety of the State. It is not, I recognise, a political responsibility. Theirs is a technical responsibility within the limits of the political policy that is laid down for them. But on this matter, which affects the very existence of the British State and the very existence of the Empire, this House and the country are entitled to know quite clearly under what conditions and within what definitions they have exercised their technical responsibility. The Prime Minister told us this afternoon, with regard to the point of a reduction from 70 to 50 cruisers, that the Admiralty position was that under international conditions to-day 50 cruisers could be accepted for a strictly limited period, with a proper proportion in that 50 of new construction suitable for extended operations and long-distance work. I assume that when the Prime Minister said the Admiralty, he did in that context mean the Sea Lords.
The PRIME MINISTER: Yes.
Mr. AMERY: I am glad we have that point quite clear, but we should like to know how that strictly limited period is defined. Was it laid down on the authority of the Government that there was to be no possibility of war within so many years? If such a definition was laid down, that definition has been in force for a great many years. It was the existence of that definition that justified the Admiralty in fixing the figure of 70, as against the 115, which was our peace standard in the years before the War. We have already taken that into account, and I should like to know what additional political provisos were given to the Sea Lords to justify their changing their mind and accepting the standard of 50 instead of 70. There is this further point. The standard of 50 was accepted on the condition that in the 50 there was a proper proportion of new construction suitable for extended operations. Were the Sea Lords equally consulted when that figure was modified to 40, or less than 40, by this over-riding provision that only 91,000 tons were to be replaced in the next three years? A clear answer on that point would be very reassuring to this House. I understand from the Prime Minister that the Sea Lords were consulted.
The PRIME MINISTER: Yes.
Mr. AMERY: No doubt the First Lord will amplify that point. Again, the Sea Lords stipulated for a definite replacement programme, and I hope we shall hear from the First Lord that the replacement programme that he now has in view, which will be introduced, I suppose, in the next few weeks, is in accordance with the conditions under which the Sea Lords accepted the grave responsibility of those reductions. I want to put this question, not in any captious sense, for this is, after all, a matter in which the safety and security of the State are concerned. We feel, above all, that the country and Empire are entitled to know what the advice of the Government's expert advisers has been, and the conditions and the stipulations under which that advice was given. I do not wish to follow up this matter any longer—I know that the First Lord of the Admiralty wishes to speak. I will only say in conclusion that this is a Treaty we on
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this side of the House can only regard with the gravest disquiet. The Prime Minister says it is not the conditions under which negotiations are opened that matter, but the results that come out of them. We entered into this, professedly, to secure a Treaty for international disarmament, and come out bearing a Treaty for British disarmament alone, a Treaty under which every other Power is building up naval power, some within limits, some without. We who have already reduced our Navy more than the others, alone have to submit to further reductions, these reductions definitely relegating us to the place of second Power. That is all the more serious, as we are concerned with the problems of Europe and the East, where our Navy is likely to be inadequate in the performance of the duties necessary for the preservation of our security.
We might accept these risks if in the Treaty there were some indication that it was making some contribution to disarmament which would permanently establish the cause of peace and permanently strengthen good will among nations. We recognise willingly the efforts of the Prime Minister in the United States, the good influence that his presence and speeches have had, the good effect of his conduct here on the negotiations, yet there are elements left unsettled in this Treaty which are capable of creating grave dangers in the future, that may well make us some day regret that this Treaty was ever passed. I cannot help feeling, too, some misgivings that the terms of this Treaty are not going to be fully implemented. I hope we may have an assurance of that, for the attitude of the Government and their supporters so far has not given us any confidence. Under conditions like these, obviously, we on this side of the House cannot be expected to share the responsibility of the Government in this matter. It is their Treaty. It would be difficult for anyone to go back on a Treaty once achieved without creating new problems and difficulties. It is a Treaty that contains so much from our point of view that is dangerous—perilously dangerous—that we must disclaim responsibility for it.
Mr. ALEXANDER: The last word uttered by the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down was practically identical with the last word uttered by

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the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill). In view of that last word, I should like to put a question, because it is only fair that the country should know where the party opposite stands on this matter. The right hon. Gentleman said he must, and his party must, disclaim all responsibility for the Treaty. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping went further and said that they must retain the right to review the whole situation at the earliest possible moment. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] I see that that is accepted. I want to know whether we are to take it from this Debate that it is the intention of the party opposite, having examined the draft Treaty, to tell the country at the first opportunity that they will denounce the London Treaty of 1930. In view of the two statements made one after the other by the right hon. Member for Epping this afternoon, and now by the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery), I think that the country is entitled to know this, especially in view of some other things said.
Mr. AMERY: Obviously, no Government can denounce within the period of the Treaty a Treaty formally entered into. All we can say is that when the Treaty comes up for fresh consideration in 1935, I hope that we shall enter on those discussions in a more watchful and careful spirit than the Government.
Mr. ALEXANDER: That is a very timely explanation of the statements we have heard, in spite of the qualifications attached to it, which come quite naturally from the party opposite. I welcome the explanation. It would be a very serious thing for this country if it were broadcast to the world that the party opposite had denounced the Treaty. I welcome the statement made in that connection. The right hon. Member for Epping—I am sorry he is not in his place—at the opening of his speech said that the Government were on the stage of history making history. I could not help thinking when I listened to his speech that one of the chief grievances was that he was not on the stage making history. I think that that has characterised a great many of his speeches. After a long and varied political career, spent under the shadow of more than one political leader of various colours, he bitterly resents that almost for the
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first time in his long Parliamentary career he is not here helping to make political history. I agree that the right hon. Gentleman has had a great deal to do with past political history, making some good, some indifferent, and some pretty bad. But I do not think that he need worry as to what the view of the country is as to the Government's handling of this Treaty. I resent bitterly the sort of insinuation from the party opposite that members of the Labour party are less anxious about the security and future of the country than the party opposite. [Interruption.]
I have listened very carefully all the afternoon without interruption, and, although one asks for interruptions by rhetorical comments, I hope that I shall be allowed to develop my argument with as much freedom as possible. I have said that I resent the suggestion that is so often made that we are less concerned about the future safety of the country than other parties. There may be differences in our views as to how that safety is best to be secured, but, whatever we have done in connection with the Treaty which has been under discussion to-day, has been done from the point of view not merely of the general question of peace and disarmament in the world, but of the best interests of our own country.
Now that the right hon. Member for Epping has come in, I would like to say one or two things about the incident which occurred to-day. The important Debate in which we are engaged was impaired by that unfortunate incident caused by the quotation of a secret telegram by the right hon. Gentleman, upon which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) has commented at some length and with very great force. There is not a single comment upon the action of the right hon. Gentleman which has been made by the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs with which we on these benches do not agree.
Mr. CHURCHILL: Naturally!
Mr. ALEXANDER: The right hon. gentleman says "naturally." Let me put one or two points. He quoted a secret telegram, which is taken from the secret papers connected with matters which are related to what we are discussing to-day. It would have been quite possible for

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us, if we had wished to follow the right hon. Gentleman's example, to produce paper after paper which would have suited our political arguments down to the ground, and have been very much to our political advantage. We have asked a question to-night whether the action of the right hon. Gentleman is to be regarded as a precedent. I am going to answer for the Government at once what our idea of the position is. Our idea is that, although on this matter and on many other matters, it would be greatly to our political advantage to follow the example of the right hon. Gentleman, we do not propose to do so in the public interest, and we invite the Leader of the Opposition to tell the House whether he accepts the same point of view. [Interruption.] I think that it is due to the House. [Interruption.] I will leave it to the right hon. Gentleman to choose, but I think that he will see that it is vital that the pronouncement should be made by him as Leader of the Opposition, so that the country may know where we are. [Interruption.]
If the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping will allow me, I will now deal with his speech. He said at the beginning of his speech that the Versailles Treaty was binding upon the victorious powers to disarm. I should hardly have thought that by the end of his speech, he remembered what he had said at the beginning. I fully agree with what he said at the outset that it is vital for all the victorious powers that were signatories to the Treaty of Versailles, that they should remember that the Preamble to that section of the Treaty makes it incumbent on them to disarm if they are to expect the nations who were treated as the vanquished to continue in a state of disarmament. If his party and himself will bear that in mind, I think they may save a good deal of trouble in Europe in the future. I agree that if we are making perhaps the biggest contribution to disarmament, if we are making sacrifices in our main arm of defence—and I fully agree that we are doing that—we ought to be able to expect that there should be a corresponding contribution to disarmament from those whose main defences in the past as in the present have been on the land and in the air.
Mr. CHURCHILL: Doing in the French, that is what you mean.
Mr. ALEXANDER: The right hon. Gentleman knows quite well that the proceedings at the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament have up to the present made little progress in the direction of disarmament either in land or air forces, because there has been so much misgiving as to the position in naval circles in the world. We have made a real beginning by this Three-Power Pact arrived at between ourselves, the United States, and Japan, and we can go to Geneva with very much more confidence, and indeed a fair case for pressing for disarmament on land and in the air. The right hon. Gentleman said the Agreement that we have entered into ought to have been a natural supplement to the Agreement arrived at at Washington, and he claimed this afternoon that our Agreement was not really a supplement of that Agreement. I take it he meant that at Washington it was never argued, never intended, that we should have any limitation at all in auxiliary craft other than those that were to be used exclusively with the battle fleet. I take it that was what he had in his mind. But my examination of the papers and the general discussion at Washington does not leave that impression upon my mind. It is perfectly true that the delegates from the British Empire were not prepared at Washington to agree to a strict and ratio-provided limitation of auxiliary craft, but it is also true to say that one can tell from the published reports of the Washington Conference that it was fully contemplated by many of the delegates that there should, if possible be an extension of the agreement then arrived at to the whole of the auxiliary craft—the whole—and it was that part of the proceedings at Washington which my right hon. Friend described this afternoon as having been a partial failure.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) seemed to be rather upset by the reference which the Prime Minister made this afternoon to what had been accomplished at Washington. I think when he comes to examine the OFFICIAL REPORT to-morrow morning he will find that a generous tribute was paid by the Prime Minister to what was accomplished

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for disarmament at Washington, but the great difficulty was that the agreement did not cover in any degree the various auxiliary craft. If the right hon. Gentleman's idea was that we ought to have had an agreement in London in 1930 which confined itself only to craft which were attached to the battle fleet, what exactly would he have proposed? I could not discover from his speech this afternoon. Would he have proposed that we should try to get an agreement which would be confined only to cruisers and other craft which would be attached to the battle fleet? If so, how was he going to get a limitation at all? How would he deal with that question in relation to other Powers? He knows perfectly well that to have proceeded along that line would have meant that it would have been impossible to get any agreement at all in regard to auxiliary craft. Any Power that had, say, 20 cruisers attached to its battle fleet, if there were no limitation upon it in respect of auxiliary cruisers in other services, if it could do exactly as it liked, if it could build what it liked—and apparently that is what the right hon. Gentleman would wish—would have little difficulty in the future in attaching these auxiliary craft to its actual battle fleet if they were required.
That is not the way in which to get a complete and firm agreement about general naval disarmament. If there is to be real progress in general naval disarmament, you have to be prepared to face the issue of having agreement for all classes of craft which are in the fleet, and one of the great successes of the London Naval Conference has been that an agreement has been reached between the three principal naval Powers of the world which is not confined either to capital ships or aircraft carriers or cruisers attached to battle fleets, but which does cover every class of ship in the naval armament. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Treaty was not a Treaty of parity, but was a form of acceptance of inferiority, and I gather from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down that he holds exactly the same view. That means, if anything, that we are being charged by the right hon. Gentleman with having, in the policy that we have carried through in the Naval Treaty, definitely reduced our relative naval strength, and thereby reduced the national security.
Mr. CHURCHILL: By 1935.
Mr. ALEXANDER: All right. Now I understand what the position is. That is the gravamen of the case which is put up against us. Let me deal with that point by point and examine it. The right hon. Gentleman does not say that that is the case in regard to capital ships. He expressed general approval of what had taken place, except that he was not very generous in his remarks about the modernisation of the capital ships in the American fleet. I think it is perhaps due to our American friends to say that, although we have arrived at the reasonable arrangement with them for the modernisation of the Fleet, as a matter of fact it had been carried out in respect of the whole of their capital ships with the exception, I think, of three. We have simply made it plain on the basis of agreement that it was possible.
Mr. CHURCHILL: They had done it already?
Mr. ALEXANDER: They had done it already in respect of all the capital ships except three. They held that, at the time when they did it, they were not really debarred under the Washington Treaty from doing it, and we have now made it plain that we agree that they were quite entitled to do it. Even during the Government of the right hon. Gentleman, in which he was so powerful an advocate of naval supremacy—even when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, he was not able, apparently, to raise any effective objection to it. They had done a great deal to modernise their battle fleet at that time.
In regard to the cruiser question, a great deal of the criticism in this Debate has turned upon the point that we have reduced the programme—and I emphasise the word "programme" because we had not 70 cruisers available for this country when we took over from the people opposite—that we have reduced the programme from 70 cruisers to 50. A good deal has been said as to what was the exact position of the Board of Admiralty with regard to this reduction in the number of cruisers from 70 to 50, and a little misunderstanding was, no doubt, caused by the fact, that the full statement which it was intended to make was not made during the Debate in another place last week. On that occasion, the Lord President

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of the Council intended, and clearly indicated by his speech that he intended, to make a full statement. I propose to say to the House to-night exactly what I said in the country last January, which covers quite clearly the position of the Board of Admiralty in regard to this question of 70 or 50 cruisers. The right hon. Gentleman who last spoke must not forget that we had five Dominion and one Indian representative present at the Conference, and they have fully concurred in the Treaty.
"Our estimate of the defence requirements of the British Commonwealth has been summed up in the policy of successive Governments of His Majesty here and in the Dominions, namely, a one-Power naval standard. In the matter of capital ships, this has been very simply expressed in the form of parity with the greatest other naval Power. This was the main achievement of the Washington Conference. In the matter of cruisers, it is not so simple, and this was the crux of the Geneva Conference of three Powers which failed to reach agreement. One of the most important aims of the London Conference will be to reconcile our defence needs in the matter of cruisers with the requirements of international agreement.
After the Washington Conference, at which the question of cruiser strength was only to a limited extent touched upon, the Board of Admiralty advised the Government of the day of their view of the needs of the British Empire in cruiser strength. The number which is based on the needs of the defence of our world wide and vital sea communications, was fixed at 70. That was the number for which we held out at Geneva. That is the number which, had the conditions remained the same, would be our requirement to-day. But to-day we have to take account of a new situation which has arisen through the signature of the Pact of Paris, outlawing war, by most of the nations of the world, including all the major Naval Powers, not only those who were members of the League of Nations but also by the United States of America who, by their authorship of this Pact, take their second great step in the practical solution of the world's need for assured peace." [Interruption.] Hon. Members have been asking for weeks if I would state the position of
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the Board of Admiralty. I am saying now what I said in the country officially for the Board of Admiralty just before the Conference met, a statement which many critics of the Board of Admiralty have been very glad either to overlook or to forget during the past few weeks.
"With such powerful support for peace, we feel justified in looking forward to a period in which armed conflicts need not be expected. The Board of Admiralty, therefore, having regard to all the circumstances of to-day, and especially the Pact of Paris, and improved world political relationships, are prepared to agree to 50 cruisers as the minimum needs of the Empire up to the next date for conference and revision, which we expect will be 1936. I must emphasize that this figure is the lowest that we feel can be fixed to meet even peace conditions in present world circumstances. The responsibilities of the British commonwealth, both Imperial and international, including large commitments to the League of Nations, are enormous and the Navy is required again and again, as illustrated in the recent Palestine disturbances, to take both precautionary and effective action in carrying out our obligations and to keep the peace in some parts of the world, even when the major Powers of the world are at peace."
Mr. CHURCHILL: Is this a new statement?
Mr. ALEXANDER: It is not a new statement. It is a new statement to Parliament, but I made it in the country on behalf of the Board of Admiralty. Many of the right hon. Gentleman's Friends have made speeches and have asked questions as if no statement ever had been made on the part of the Admiralty.
Mr. CHURCHILL: We are right in assuming that the right hon. Gentleman is not giving us any new statement but merely reading out something he said in the country three or four months ago?
Mr. ALEXANDER: And which the right hon. Gentleman and his friends seem largely to have forgotten, because I made it perfectly plain at the time that I was speaking for the Board of Admiral, speaking as the head of the Board of Admiralty, speaking with their full knowledge and after full consultation with them. I am repeating what I said then

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to the House and then it will be on the official records of the House. The Board of Admiralty made one other addition which the Prime Minister mentioned to-day, and that was that there should be adequate replacement of ships during the period of the Treaty of the kind which would give the radius and range of action to which the Prime Minister referred to-day. I do not think I need say more about the relative position of the Board of Admiralty and the figures which have been arrived at in the Treaty. If the Board of Admiralty made it a condition that there was to be a relative reduction on the part of the programmes of other Powers, as we did, am I not entitled, in reply to charges made against us that we have lessened the security of this country and reduced relatively our strength, to ask: What about, the relative programmes? What is the position? When I went to the Board of Admiralty when the Labour Government took office, what did I find in regard to the cruiser fleet? I want to answer the charge whether we have really reduced the relative naval strength?
Mr. CHURCHILL: You will not get many cheers there from your own side.
Mr. ALEXANDER: We found first of all that there had been a programme of 8-inch cruisers for 23 ships, but we found that five of the 23 ships had been cancelled mainly at the instigation of the right hon. Gentleman. Therefore, the programme, building and projected, was 18. We found, on the other hand, that although he and his Cabinet had made a cut in ships which were projected, they had obtained no corresponding offer of reduction from the United States of America. What is the position now? If you take the figures of the Treaty, we are now resting upon 15, and the United States programme is reduced from 23 to 18. As far as 8-inch cruisers are concerned as between ourselves and the United States of America, instead of reducing the relative strength, we have improved it. Take the case vis-a-vis Japan. Japan had 12 8-inch cruisers, built, building, and authorised, in 1927, when the position was being discussed after the failure of the Three-Power Conference at Geneva. What is the position now? Japan is resting upon 12 8-inch ships in
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the Treaty. We shall have 15 ships as compared with the 12 we had building in 1927. How have we reduced the relative naval strength in cruisers on that account?
Let me go further. Take the consideration of the general cruiser position. Apart from her programme, to which I have just referred, in 8-inch ships of large type, the United States of America had 10 large 6-inch ships of the "Omaha" type, and in 1928 about 100,000 tons of old cruisers. She was free to build what she liked, and, indeed, Lord Bridgeman said last week that he not only considered America might have parity, but he would very much like to see her, if she wished it, build more than parity. Therefore, in 6-inch ships the United States of America was perfectly free to go on building as much as ever she liked. Now she is limited to a, total tonnage, including 8-inch as well as 6-inch ships, of 323,500 tons. We are to get 339,000 tons. How does that reduce our relative naval strength, and, therefore, our security?
Take the position vis-a-vis Japan. If the right hon. Gentleman will go back and study the situation in 1929, he will find, taking the whole of the cruisers of Japan, both 8-inch and 6-inch, and allowing for over-age tonnage, which appeared on the list in 1929, Japan had 75 per cent. of the British cruiser fleet at that time built. What will be the position under the Treaty in 1936? Japan will get, as she has stood out for far her special purposes, rather more than 70 per cent. in 8-inch gun cruisers, but her total percentage of cruiser tonnage, with the old tonnage not replaced, will be lower than it was in 1929 when the right hon. Gentleman and his Friends left office. Our position will be improved from that point of view. How can it be said that in the reductions we have secured under the Treaty we have at the same time reduced our relative naval strength?
Let me go a little further; we have been attacked on these points and I am entitled to make a full defence. Take the question of destroyers; and I should like to say that I do not disagree at all with the statement made in the Press by various people and various authorities about the age of the British destroyer fleet, but no one on the other side of the House has the right to say that the present Government is to blame for the

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age of the destroyer fleet. It is perfectly true that a very large percentage of our present destroyer fleet will become old under the terms of the Treaty very soon, but that is largely because of the failure of past Governments to have a regular and steady building programme in destroyers. Let me examine the figures. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about the Treaty?"] I happen to be dealing with the Treaty and with the criticism that under this Treaty we have reduced our relative naval strength and thereby endangered the Empire. I shall complete my argument. Take destroyers. In 1929 the destroyer fleet of Japan was 107,275 tons. By 1936 that destroyer fleet will be 105,500 tons. The United States of America in 1929 had 290,304 tons. In 1936 that 290,304 tons will be reduced to 150,000 tons. The British Empire, in 1929, had a tonnage of 157,000 tons. In 1936 we get 150,000. Who can possibly say, on these figures, that although there have been heavy reductions we have reduced our relative naval strength. That cannot possibly be contended.
Let me go on to the next category. Take submarines. In submarines we are to get parity with the United States and Japan. At the Washington Conference in 1921 Japan's tonnage in submarines was 33⅓ per cent. only of British submarine strength. By 1929 she had increased that percentage of submarine strength from 33⅓ to 125 per cent. of the British submarine fleet, and the Conservative administration apparently did not have it in mind to change the British provision in order to meet that position. They sat perfectly quiet while this was going on. Although in the Treaty Japan is now reducing so that she will only have 100 per cent. with us in submarines we are told that we are thereby reducing our relative naval strength. If you examine the submarine position in relation to the United States the same thing emerges. Under the Treaty, although we are reducing our programme of submarines, the United States is also reducing so much that we do not lose in relative naval strength in consequence of the Treaty. I hope therefore that that charge will not be made again.
The right hon. Gentleman may say that I am not taking note of his argument
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that it is according to the responsibilities of the Fleet and the division of the work of the Fleet that we have to judge whether or not there is still parity, and whether or not we are reducing the relative naval strength. Let us look at that question. The right hon. Gentleman himself and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) and other leaders of the party opposite have said, again and again, with their hands on their hearts apparently, that in no circumstances at any time would this country, with their consent, go to war with the United States of America They said that they never took America into account in estimating naval requirements. The right hon. Gentleman said that America could do what she liked. Those were almost the last words of his speech. Then, why use the argument of the fleet of the United States in talking about the distribution of our Fleet? Not only have we got what, in our view, are reasonable parity figures with the United States, but by those parity figures, and by the improvement of relationship with the United States, we occupy a much better position for handling the rest of the world situation than was possible under the plans of the right hon. Gentleman.
Rear-Admiral BEAMISH: I asked the right hon. Gentleman three very important questions on the subject of the replacement programmes for 1929 and 1930, and the 28 ships to be built between now and 1936. Will he answer those questions?
Mr. ALEXANDER: I am not sure that I have got down fully all the questions of the hon. and gallant Member, but, in any case, there will be plenty of opportunity for debating the construction programme when we come to deal with the Estimates.
Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Supplementary Estimates?
Mr. ALEXANDER: One of the other points which the right hon. Gentleman raised was this. He said that not only were we going to have a reduction of relative strength, but that that was to be arrived at before 1936, and he made considerable play with the question of replacement. I would point out to the

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House, first of all, that the parties to the London Naval Treaty agreed in principle to the life of cruisers being 20 years. There is nothing very serious about that. If hon. Members turn up the actual records of the technical committee at the Geneva Three Power Conference they will find that it was argued and very well argued by the technical experts that, as far as 8-inch gun cruisers were concerned, a 24-year life might well be assumed and obtained with proper repairs; that in the case of 6-inch gun cruisers the usual practice of the Admiralty was to allow a life of 20 years, and that in the case of destroyers, with proper care and proper repairs, they could be made to take quite economically and well a life of 20 years.
What is the position? All three Powers accepted the principle of a life of 20 years but Japan would have been in the position of having hardly any work at all in her yards in cruiser building during the life of the London Naval Treaty unless we had been prepared to give her some accommodation. We gave her that accommodation not without some advantage to ourselves, because we shall be able, if we wish, to scrap prematurely with a life of 16 years, two or three of the cruisers which fall to be replaced; and in the light of that agreement which was come to with Japan, we put into the Treaty, not a figure which was enforced by the Government for political reasons, but the figure which was requisite and necessary in the view of the Board of Admiralty to secure a proper replacement programme.
I have been asked if I can say what the replacement programme will be. I cannot. I hope to be able to tell the House at no very distant date what it will be, and we shall submit to the House what we consider to be a fair and equitable way of dealing with the replacement required to keep the Fleet in a proper condition. If we had adopted any other method than that which we are adopting, we should probably have been pressed, as we are being pressed by some of the right hon. Gentleman's supporters, to lay down 26 ships in four years. If we did that, we should find that thereafter we should be required to lay down only six in a period of 12 years. That would be a perfectly ridiculous situation. It practically means that we should lay down
2202
6½ cruisers a year for four years, and after that we should have only half a cruiser to lay down in each of the next 12 years. We certainly do not propose to do that. We propose in the light of proper technical opinion given in the past by the Admiralty experts as to the life of cruisers and destroyers to see that the replacement programme is properly spread over the interval, to be on the safe side for the Fleet and to stabilise industry and dockyard requirements.
I observe that in the course of his speech the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping said that there appeared to be a lack of confidence and will power in this country in handling these matters. He said we were a passive nation on which the other nations planted their claims. I could not help wondering when I heard that whether he was thinking of himself or of the members of the present Government who signed the London Treaty. I should rather think he must have been thinking of himself. I could well understand that charge being made by his own supporters against him for his handling, say, of the European debts question or it being levied against the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bewdley (Mr. Baldwin) for his handling of the American debts question, but I do not see any real reason for making the charge against us. We have produced a Treaty which covers the whole of the categories of naval ships, which has been agreed to by the three principal naval Powers, and which, I think, is approved by the House. Although the agreements secure reductions in the mass, they do not, any one of them, reduce our relative naval strength. It would be better for the right hon. Gentleman to look to his own history rather than to make that charge against us. Then he said he believed that this treaty would create misunderstandings and heart burnings in America.
Mr. CHURCHILL: On both sides.
Mr. ALEXANDER: I should have thought from what has taken place in the last three or four years that it was much more true to say that, misunderstanding and heart burning took place as the result of the failure of his own Government to bring the Geneva Conference to a successful conclusion. The feeling between ourselves and the United States was not quite as cordial as all

2203
parties desired it to be after that Conference, and he himself admitted, in some of his speech to-day, that the feeling was much better than it has been, and he did not fail to pay a tribute to the Prime Minister for his efforts. I cannot imagine that he has any ground for saying that this Treaty will create misunderstandings and heart burnings in America. The right hon. Gentleman said that he would pay a great price to end controversy between the United States and this country, but he never said what price. I will tell him what the price was. It was that we should let the United States build exactly what they liked. That was the price. How could that lead to an end of the naval controversy between us? That was the only suggestion that he made in the whole of his speech—let them build what they like and let us build what we like. I agree that if we were considering the situation only between ourselves and America, it would not matter, but does the right hon. Gentleman really think that a big building programme by any Power in the world is unobserved by others? Does he think that it calls for no action by other Powers? Does he think that a large building programme in America would not have repercussions on other Powers, and thereby reduce our security?
Mr. CHURCHILL: Are there to be no large building programmes in America now?
Mr. ALEXANDER: There is to be a much less building programme in America than there would have been if they had rested on the results of Geneva in 1927. That is the answer. We have been told that this Treaty and the way in which it is drawn—I think the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) said it—is likely to cause considerable misunderstanding and inconvenience if we have to operate the safety Clause. He hinted that the development of the French and Italian naval programmes was partly a result of this Treaty. I do not think that any right hon. Gentleman can maintain that point of view. They know—they have been in office—that the French programme has been on paper and has been proceeded with year after year since the passing of the Statut Naval in 1924, and if they examine the
2204
naval programme of Italy and examine the curve of the programme, they will see that the Italian curve has travelled sympathetically and faithfully with the annual French building since the Statut Naval.
So far from making the position worse, we have made it quite plainly understood that, whilst we have come to an agreement between the three principal naval Powers, if there is any need to operate Article 21 we must be free to operate it in our own interests and in the necessary defence of those interests; but we did not come away from the Conference with the idea of operating that Clause at once, and I do not want that impression to get abroad. We left the discussion at the Conference in such a way that we can continue it in the future with a view to getting the Italians and the French to adhere to the principle of the London Naval Treaty. I believe that the country knows that we have made a really great advance in the cause of disarmament, and that, whatever may have been said by hon. and right hon. Members opposite to-night, when it comes to the test of the country on this issue there can be no doubt as to the result.
Major ROSS: The First Lord of the Admiralty has made several startling complaints. He complained of the number of ships laid down by his predecessor in replacement of ships worn out. The first action of the right hon. Gentleman, after coming into office, was to cancel every ship that was ordered that he possibly could. He cancelled cruisers and he cancelled destroyers, well knowing that, whatever the result of the Conference might be, these ships would be necessary as replacements. There was a modest programme of eight every year in place of destroyers, eight to be finished this year and eight next year, but as to those which were on order when the right hon. Gentleman came in, I think, although I am not quite certain of the number, that he cancelled them all except one or two. Then he complains, with an air of righteousness, that he was left in an unfortunate position by his predecessors, whereas any cancellation by his predecessors was entirely eclipsed by the much larger cancellations for which the right hon. Gentleman was himself responsible. Let us judge the success of the Conference on the right hon. Member's own paper of 4th February.
It being Eleven of the Clock, the Motion, for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  ELECTRICITY (SUPPLY) ACTS.
  Resolved,
  "That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1928, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supple) Act, 1919, in respect of the parish of Bradenham, in the rural district of Wycombe, in the county of Buckingham, which was presented on the 10th day of April, 1930, be approved."
  Resolved,
  …"That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1928, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the township of Bold, in the rural district of Whiston, and part of the township of Burtonwood, in the rural district of Warrington, in the county palatine of Lancaster, which was presented on the 15th day of April, 1930, be approved."—[Mr. Herbert Morrison.]

INVERGORDON WATER SUPPLY BILL.
Rear-Admiral Beamish, Mr. Hardie, and Mr. Ramsay nominated Members of the Select Committee on the Invergordon Water Supply Bill.—[Mr. T. Kennedy.]
The remaining Orders of the Day were read, and postponed.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Kennedy.]
Mr. STANLEY BALDWIN: I will occupy the House for about five minutes in answer to a question put to me by the First Lord of the Admiralty. The question was perfectly legitimate and he understood the gravity of it by not demanding an answer on the spot, which I certainly would not have given, for it is a question which deserves some moments for a reply; and there is a good deal more in it than hon. Members imagine who call with such avidity for
2206
me and offered me such a hearty welcome. The question really is what rules, if any, do regulate the use in the House of Commons of Cabinet papers and, arising out of that question, what are Cabinet papers and the limits within which those rights apply. There are certain things which are perfectly clear and some which are less clear. It is perfectly clear that with regard to all discussions in a Cabinet these are absolutely secret and can only be given away by permission of the King, a permission which, when a Minister resigns, is always given freely. He may give his explanation why he has resigned, but no Minister has a right to say, for instance, he was a dissenting party from action taken by the Cabinet. That by the way, for that only bears indirectly on what I am discussing, the practice of my Government was, of course, exactly the same as that of what the First Lord declared was the practice of the Government to which he belonged. He put it more briefly because he had not envisaged all the circumstances. When a Government was in office, and this is true of all Governments I have known, no documents were published that belonged to any predecessor of that Government without the consent of the Minister who was responsible for that Government during its lifetime. Here again doubt has existed, because I remember quite well a single case during the term of my own Government. If my memory serves me, my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain), who was then Foreign Secretary, read from a paper which had been written by Lord Haldane, who was Lord Chancellor in the Labour Government of 1924. My right hon. Friend had had Lord Haldane's ready consent. Lord Haldane, of course, was one of the most experienced Cabinet Ministers living. He had been in office on and off over a term of 20 years. The present Prime Minister, if I remember aright, took exception—and, I think, correctly—and my right hon. Friend and I discussed the matter, and we came to the conclusion that perhaps it would have been better had we not only got Lord Haldane's consent, but also mentioned it to the right hon. Gentleman who had been Lord Haldane's Chief in the Cabinet. No other question of the kind occurred during our term of office.

2207
The position out of office is rather different. An ex-Minister's right to quote from his own documents, by which I mean a document that he himself has composed, is in some doubt. I have never heard any clear ruling on that point. A Minister must be guided by circumstances, by the time that has elapsed, and so forth. There has been an alteration in practice in this regard since the War, owing to the number of documents that have been published in memoirs, in diaries, and in histories, documents of the most confidential kind; and, more than that, the whole situation has been complicated by the revelation of the most secret documents in publications that have been made by foreign Governments. The position as regards an ex-Minister's right to quote, as I say, from one of his own documents is not clear, and the right of a Government to utilise documents in its possession I do not think is wholly clear either.
There would be, of course, absolute and general agreement that no communications between members of a Government and the Civil Service, for instance, ought in any circumstances to be betrayed, and they never are, and there are many documents of that kind, it is perfectly obvious, which are confidential, and must remain confidential, as between one Government and another, whatever the complexion of that Government may be, or it would make all working together absolutely impossible. But then, on the other hand, in the compilation of blue books and particularly of blue books which have reference to foreign affairs, certainly in any short time after a Government coming into power, extracts must be made from documents of the previous Governments to get the whole story, and in fairness very often to the Ministers who wrote those documents; and in my view in both these questions there is no clear ruling.
I should like to submit to the Prime Minister what I think I submitted in the last Parliament, though I cannot remember, I confess, why it was that nothing came of it. I think it is really very desirable that, for example, he and I and the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), and possibly, if he thinks fit, one or two more Cabinet Ministers of long experience,
2208
should meet together at some time to clear up some of these points that are doubtful, and I am perfectly certain that whatever should be agreed to by such a committee as that would be held to absolutely and strictly by any Government which might be in power and in opposition. I put the matter so far as I see it in perfect frankness to the House. I do not think there is anything I can possibly add on the subject. I would just summarise what I have said. As far as the Government are concerned, the practice is clear and has always been observed in my knowledge of Governments. With a party in opposition, the practice is not so clear. I should only be too glad to help to take steps to help to clarify the position.
The PRIME MINISTER: I should be very glad to assist in clarifying any doubtful points as to the use of these documents. If I respond to the invitation of the Leader of the Opposition to assist in that, the House must clearly understand that I do not agree that what happened to-day covers a doubtful point. I do not want to press it too far, but if there is any justification to be based on the fact that the right hon. Gentleman himself wrote that telegram, and that therefore the telegram is his own production, I make this observation. If an ex-Minister has a right to do that, then a Minister of the Government against whom he has used a very partial quotation from a document has a perfect right not only to publish the whole of the document, but to publish any other documents from the whole group of documents to which it belongs, so that the House of Commons and the country may know the whole truth.
There is another point. Before the right hon. Gentleman saw that document, I had to give my consent. It is perfectly true that in these circumstances the Prime Minister's consent is purely formal, or at least the request made to me is purely formal, for a Prime Minister would never think for a moment of putting an obstacle in the way of an ex-Minister seeing a Cabinet document or a Committee of Imperial Defence document or a document of the nature which has been quoted in order to refresh his memory or even to take notes. The mere fact that the liberty is asked for indicates that there is a certain preservation

2209
of these documents, and that the Prime Minister is supposed to exercise his judgment as to whether these documents should be kept absolutely secret, even from ex-Ministers or whether they should be revealed. I say that I do not want to press the matter any further, or at any rate, too far. I do hope it will not be understood, whether this consultation is going to take place or not, that the doctrine laid down by the right hon. Gentleman in the course of conversations he had with the right hon Member for Carnarvon (Mr. Lloyd George) is going to be accepted by the Conservative party, or even that the Conservative party thinks that doctrine to be of such lightness of consequence, as not to express a view upon it. I leave it there. I repeat, if there is any doubt as to how a certain class of document can be used or not, I should be only too glad to join with those who have been Prime Ministers or old, experienced Cabinet Ministers, in order that a clear rule of practice might be established.
Mr. CHURCHILL: I should like to say a word, if the House will allow me. I was certainly not trying, in answer to the unexpected attack of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), to lay down any doctrine on these matters which, even when they are compressed into a state of definition, are not such as can be dealt with on the spur of the moment. But I must say this in fair play to the House. I was a Member of the Government which sent these instructions. I was one of those most closely connected with that part of the policy. The fact is, though I did not disclose it myself, that I actually made the draft which I submitted to the Prime Minister of the time. If I, during the tenure of office of that Government, in the course of my duties as a Minister in the very centre of this policy, had been called upon to defend or explain the policy of the Government, I should have explained it in those very words or almost those very words. I should have said this: "These are the instructions we have sent; this is the sense in which we have acted"; and I must say that I cannot feel, so far as I am concerned, that the lapse of time prevents me from saying what was the policy of the Government in those days, what were the stipulations we made, and what were the limitations.
2210
Still less do I feel that I should be inhibited in this matter when I know that the facts have been stated a hundred times, and stated twenty times by me.
On every platform here and in America I have said, "You made a great mistake in saying that we have played you false because we have not the universal parity which you expected at Washington." Twenty times I said we always excluded the cruisers and small craft. There is nothing new in that; it has been stated again and again. When we come to the question of how far these matters are affected by the lapse of time I would point out that it is nearly 10 years ago. That is a very long time, and I certainly do not consider that a Minister deeply concerned with a particular policy is not entitled, after 10 years, to explain in general terms what his view was, and what the course of the Government was.
Now I come to the question of whether I ought to have paraphrased this statement or not. It is true, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, that I could not have had access to the document without his permission. I remember perfectly well the course I took and my action with the Prime Minister in those days in the matter. Instead of rummaging among my archives, I asked that he should supply it to me. It never occurred to me for a moment that there would be all this story about the difference between my reading a perfectly innocent paragraph, the whole substance of which has been published for four or five years, and my paraphrasing it, as I could so easily have done, and perhaps as I ought to have done. I am ready, in the absence of any close definition, to admit that perhaps I ought to have paraphrased it. Instead of saying, "This is what we said," I should have said, "Our instructions to Lord Balfour at Washington were to the effect that he should do so-and-so, but that he was not to do this or that." It would have-been quite easy. I think it is possible, on the point of form, that I am in fault, and to that extent, if I am in fault, I am glad to be corrected—and no one can doubt that I have been corrected. It has been the subject of expressions of opinion from almost every quarter in the House, but I ask in fairness, appealing to my fellow Members of the House of Commons, that they should

2211
look at the text of the words which I read out and see how completely innocent they are of anything that could have the slightest injurious effect upon our affairs. In order to make them innocuous I did, in fact, leave out deliberately references to certain countries. If hon. Members will do that they will see that in this matter there is no grave and serious breach of the foundations of our public proceedings, but that, on the contrary, a statement has been made which was necessary and relevant to the actual Debate.
I must admit, so far as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) was concerned, that he had a ground of complaint against me, in that I did not say to him beforehand, "I shall have to mention the line we took at Washington in 1921." That is the sort of thing that I should have said—that I ought to have
2212
said—but I did not happen to see the right hon. Gentleman, and it never occurred to me for one moment that he could have objected. However, if it is his desire to define these matters more precisely, I certainly think that would be very advantageous; but, however you define it, there must be some statute of limitations imposed. After 10 years have passed, or after 20 years, or after 50 years, some freedom must be permitted in the statement of what actually happened, and why it happened, and in this case I rest myself upon a perfectly innocent use of a document which had ceased to have validity for 10 years, and which represented my statement of a course of policy which I had taken a grave and general responsibility in propounding.
Question put, and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at Twenty-two Minutes after Eleven o'Clock.

UNEMPLOYMENT.
  GLASGOW.
  GLASGOW.
  COURTS OF REFEREES, GLASGOW.
  COURTS OF REFEREES, GLASGOW.
  BOROUGH.
  BOROUGH.
  NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE.
  NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE.
  TRADE DISPUTES.
  TRADE DISPUTES.
POST OFFICE.
  WIRELESS LICENCES.
  WIRELESS LICENCES.
  POSTAL FACILITIES, STOWUPLAND.
  POSTAL FACILITIES, STOWUPLAND.
  PROFIT.
  PROFIT.
  NURSERY SCHOOLS (TEACHERS).
  NURSERY SCHOOLS (TEACHERS).
  COUNCIL HOUSES (LIGHTING).
  COUNCIL HOUSES (LIGHTING).
  STONE-BREAKING, PLYMOUTH.
  STONE-BREAKING, PLYMOUTH.
  GREYHOUND TRACK, GLASGOW (TOTALISATOR).
  GREYHOUND TRACK, GLASGOW (TOTALISATOR).
  INDIA (CINCHONA CULTIVATION).
  INDIA (CINCHONA CULTIVATION).
POLICE.
  PROPOSED COLLEGE.
  PROPOSED COLLEGE.
  REST DAY.
  REST DAY.
  SEXUAL OFFENCES (COURT PROCEDURE).
  SEXUAL OFFENCES (COURT PROCEDURE).
  COMMUNIST PUBLICATION.
  COMMUNIST PUBLICATION.
  GRAMOPHONE RECORDS.
  GRAMOPHONE RECORDS.
  RUSSIANS (PASSPORTS).
  RUSSIANS (PASSPORTS).
  MINES (SAFETY DEVICES).
  MINES (SAFETY DEVICES).
AGRICULTURE.
  HORSES (EXPORT).
  HORSES (EXPORT).
  FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE.
  FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE.
  FARM SETTLEMENT, HOLBEACH (RENT).
  FARM SETTLEMENT, HOLBEACH (RENT).
  RIVER POLLUTION.
  RIVER POLLUTION.
TRADE AND COMMERCE.
  TARIFFS.
  TARIFFS.
  BRAZIL (UNITED KINGDOM EXPORTS).
  BRAZIL (UNITED KINGDOM EXPORTS).
  MERCANTILE MARINE (SEAMEN).
  MERCANTILE MARINE (SEAMEN).
  CONSUMERS' COUNCIL.
  CONSUMERS' COUNCIL.
  SAFEGUARDING AND IMPORT DUTIES (LACE).
  SAFEGUARDING AND IMPORT DUTIES (LACE).
Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
LAND DRAINAGE BILL. [H.L.]
Committee of the Whole House (which stood appointed for this day) put off to Monday next.
LOCHABER WATER POWER BILL. [H.L.]

  FIFE ELECTRIC POWER BILL. [H.L.]
  THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE): My Lords, with reference to the first two Bills on the Order Paper, I beg to move that Standing Order No. 143 be dispensed with in order to accelerate their progress to another place.
  Moved, That Standing Order No. 143 be considered in order to its being dispensed with in respect of the said Bills, and that the Bills be now read 3a.—(The Earl of Donoughmore.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to: Bills read 3a accordingly, and sent to the Commons.

KIRKCALDY CORPORATION ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL.
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (SILICOSIS) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order).
Schedule:
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (EARL RUSSELL): My Lords, there are a number of Amendments on the Paper. They are all purely drafting and perhaps your Lordships will allow me to move that the Amendments on the Paper be agreed to.
Amendments moved—
Schedule, page 4, line 9, after ("words") insert ("fibroid phthisis or silicosis of the
666
lungs, in this section referred to as 'silicosis' or from")
Schedule, page 4, line 10, leave out ("fibroid phthisis") and insert ("silicosis' (that is to say, fibrosis of the lungs due to silica dust) or from fibrosis of the lungs")
Schedule, page 4, lines 15 and 16, leave out ("fibroid phthisis") and insert ("fibrosis of the lungs")
Schedule, page 4, line 20, leave out ("fibroid phthisis") and insert ("fibrosis of the lungs")
Schedule, page 4, line 27, leave out ("fibroid phthisis") and insert ("fibrosis of the lungs").—(Earl Russell.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

COAL MINES BILL.
House again in Committee (according to Order):
[The EARL OF DONOUGHMORE in the Chair.]
Clause 14:
Temporary amendment of 8 Edw. 7. c. 57. s. 3. 16 & 17 Geo. 5. c. 17.
14.—(1) During the continuance of the Coal Mines Act, 1926, Section three of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1908, shall have effect as if for the words "one hour" there were therein substituted the words "half an hour."
(2) This section shall come into operation at the expiration of the period of four months from the passing of this Act.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR (LORD THOMSON): The first Amendment upon the Paper stands in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Melchett. Before the noble Lord moves that Amendment, I would suggest that it might be for the convenience of the House if we had one general debate on this Part of the Bill, with reference to the questions of hours and of the extension of the Act of 1926. If the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, will permit, we might have a general discussion on the Amendment that stands in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Gainford.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: So far as noble Lords sitting on this side of the House are concerned, I am sure that they will not wish to stand in the way of the noble Lord's suggestion that we should have a general discussion. It can be done by leave of the Committee, though it is irregular in one sense. I am

667
sure the Committee will acquiesce. I ought, however, to say that the two points—the "spread-over" and the extension of time—are not at all the same.
LORD THOMSON: They are both included in the Amendment of Lord Gain-ford to which I referred.
LORD MELCHETT LORD MELCHETT moved, in subsection (1), after "1926," to insert "and for four years thereafter." The noble Lord said: I beg to move the second Amendment that stands in my name. I understand that it will be to the general convenience of the Committee if I do not merely confine myself to the actual Amendment, and that your Lordships should be able to deal with the wider problem of what is now generally known as the spread-over of hours, or the 90-hour fortnight: I do not move my Amendment which deals with this subject, since it is preferable to support that of Lord Gainford, which is on similar lines, though it is worded somewhat differently.
On the general principle I think I must repeat here to some extent that which I adumbrated on the Second Reading of this Bill. It seems a most unfortunate circumstance, when the coal industry of the country has been passing through so many years of extraordinary difficulty, has been losing money in very large sums and has been finding the greatest difficulty in maintaining the export trade, that this moment should be chosen to interfere with working hours, and not merely with working hours but, consequentially, with wages and wages agreements. There is no doubt whatsoever that in districts which are not working 7½ hours, which this Bill will reduce to uniformity, the introduction of this measure must produce a considerable increase in costs. That increase will vary, of course, from area to area and even from pit to pit, but a figure of 1s. 6d. per ton has been generally assumed, and this figure seems to bear investigation, though it will be higher in some cases and lower in others.
I have taken the trouble to have some actual figures got out in two separate pits of somewhat different character and area in the colliery company of which I happen to be Chairman, which deals with anthracite coal and not with steam
668
coal. It is very interesting to see the effect of hours on costs in actual working out in a colliery. In 1926, when the working hours were 7 per day or 42 per week, the cost per ton was 13s. 11.5d.; in 1930, when the hours were 8 per day, the cost was 10 s. 6.30 d., a reduction of over 3s.; and the estimated cost of working with a 45-hour week, under this Bill, is 11 s. 9d., an increase of 1s. 3d., due to hours. In another colliery in another part of the area the figures worked out a little differently. In 1926 the cost was 10 s. 11 d.; in 1930, 9s. 1d.; and the estimated cost with the new hours is 10 s. 2d., an increase of 1s. 1d. These figures have been worked out carefully. I will not trouble the House with the details, but they show that the increase to 8 hours produced a large reduction of costs, and the decrease to 7½ hours will produce an increase of costs. That is undoubtedly the case, for in any industrial enterprise costs must vary with output, but in the collieries, with the labour costs such a very large element of the cost of production and the output so strictly related to the amount of labour and the number of hours worked, it is even more marked than in other industries.
I said a few moments ago that it seemed almost a crime that at this moment we should be dealing with a proposal of this kind. I can imagine other and happier conditions in the coal industry in which you could safely adopt a reduction of hours and even go back to the 7-hour day. But those are not the conditions of the present time. I think it is little realised to what extent the coal industry, and especially the export coal trade of this country, has suffered. Bear in mind that we are not yet back to our export coal figures of the year 1913. When you think that 1913 is seventeen years ago, that a normal rate of increase in business of 3 per cent. would put our coal exports to-day at about 50 per cent. above those of 1913, and that the position in regard to employment, shipping and everything else was then intensely different from what it is to-day, you will see that we are dealing with an industry which has not yet got back to its pre-War position.
Why? We all know the reasons. They are very largely not under our control or of our making, and they are not the fault

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of the coal owners or of the coal miners. Neither of them have been able to control the enormous development of hydroelectric works in markets which used to be dependent on our coal, and they could not control the change of the battleship fleets of the world from burning coal from South Wales to burning oil, or the development of the motor engine on steamships. These things are not the fault of the industry or of the people connected with it. They are not due to any delinquency or to lack of amalgamations, but are of a very much more fundamental character.
That being so, the coal industry is having a very hard struggle to hold its own, and although those who do not know the industry may think that 1s. or 1s. 6d. on a ton is not a very large amount, they must remember that they are dealing with a product of extraordinarily low money value with very small margins of profit. A sum of 1s. 6d. or 1s. a ton may make all the difference to many collieries between what you may call marginal profits and no profit at all, or even loss. There are collieries to-day in South Wales, the district that I know best, in which an increase of costs of that character would practically compel the owners to close down and dismiss men, whom we are all delighted to see back at work after the long unemployment and sad times which they have been through.
Let me say something else. I do not believe there has been a time for many years in the coal fields, certainly so far as South Wales is concerned, when the relations between those responsible for the management of the mines and those representing labour have been of a more harmonious and friendly character than they are to-day. The Lord Chancellor seemed to indicate in his speech on Second Reading that the coal fields were seething with discontented people, who were angry because they had to work 8-hour turns. That is an illusion. The colliers have come back to the areas they had left, glad to be back at work and earning wages. They have no wish to be disturbed, and they have never been consulted, nor do they understand what the effect of this measure is going to be. I am sure that if you took a ballot of the South Wales coal fields you would find that they would much sooner go on under the present arrangements, than work lower hours and earn the lower
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wages or suffer the unemployment which must inevitably be the result.
Why are people continually trying to interfere in these industrial relations? The coal trade is not an easy one to work—perhaps it has something to do with the product, or the psychological effect of working underground—but if they have their quarrels they have their ways of settlement, and they at least understand the problem at issue. They both know and recognise, to-day, the economic position, and the miners' representatives in these areas, by bitter experience, just as the coal owners by bitter experience, realise that only by co-operation in a friendly way can the industry manage to survive and revive. Competition in many directions becomes more keen. The company which I am interested in is more interested in anthracite and hard coal than in soft coal. We have developed a business in Canada, and that business is threatened with competition from Soviet Russia. It is difficult to maintain our markets in face of competition of that peculiar kind, and why, when we have acquired these things, and our pits are again working instead of having 30 per cent. standing idle, should we have this further difficulty thrown upon our already overburdened shoulders?
It is really heartbreaking for those who have been engaged during the last two years in endeavouring to re-establish the coal industry. Why cannot we arrive, in the interests of all concerned, at some kind of rational settlement? I am making an appeal to noble Lords opposite representing the Government. They and their Party, I am sure, do not want to do anything which will fundamentally injure the thousands of workers who are their constituents and not ours. They do not wish it, and surely if some arrangement can be made, by agreement, in these various areas, by which, by a modification of hours and by not taking short periods but periods of a week or a fortnight, you can arrive at the same sort of result as you would arrive at by this Bill, without having its effects upon costs and wages, why should anyone object?
If no agreement is arrived at the inevitable must happen. It is a mistaken idea that your coal fields are the same. To a large proportion of your coal fields this Pill will make no difference, but the

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South Wales coal fields are in an exceptional position. We have extraordinary customs which do not exist in other fields. We have to pay more for repair gangs, who have to work more perhaps than those in other fields. We pay them six shifts for five shifts work. We have to employ more repair shifts because of the structure of the ground and the depths of the collieries, and repairs have to be done carefully, if life is not to be endangered. The local conditions are well known to those in the industry in South Wales. They differentiate that coal field from the Yorkshire or Midland fields, and may differentiate it from other coal fields with which I am not so familiar. The idea that you must have uniformity when physical conditions may vary is surely a fallacy and mistake. Why should not South Wales be allowed to arrange, within the framework of this measure, its own time? So also Lancashire. That is what we plead for in asking for this Amendment.
Then the complications of this legislation by reference is almost overwhelming. If you look at the clause as it stands you have to get three separate Acts of Parliament and refer back in order to see the meaning of this simple four-lined clause. You have the Coal Mines Regulations Act, 1908, which gives you 8 hours plus 1 hour on 60 days in the year. Then there is the Coal Mines Act, 1919, which gives you 7 hours, plus 1 hour on 60 days in the year. Then you have the Coal Mines Act, 1926, which gives you 7 hours, plus 1 hour on 365 days in the year until July, 1931, and after July, 1931, you come back again to the 7 hours plus 1 hour on 60 days; and now you have another Bill giving you 7 hours plus ½ hour on 365 days in the year. That is the complicated and cumbrous manner in which this thing has been done. It would have been simpler to go back to the Act of 1908 and have some definite Amendment and repeal of the Act of 1919. It would have been simpler to have some straightforward arrangement.
Then there is the question of machinery, on which a word may have to be said later on, but I have tried to draw a general picture. May I point out that in reality what we are dealing with in this problem is the question of week-ends. If you compare the
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hours worked in our coal mines with those worked in coal mines abroad, with the exception of Poland there is not very much difference. There is the difference that, whereas they work six days a week, we have a week-end. The weekend is part of your difficulty in this problem, and it is exactly the same kind of difficulty that arises in regard to the Washington Eight Hours Convention. There the Government are proposing to make special regulations for the weekend. And I may point out that quite recently this has been the subject of discussion at a meeting of the International Labour Office in Geneva, where an attempt has been made to arrive at some kind of international hours convention.
The following provision was incorporated in the Draft Convention on Underground Hours in Coal Mines, which has been prepared at the instance of the British Government:
"Article 5.—When under international regulations or collective agreements concluded between representatives of the employers and workers hours spent in the mine on one day of the week or fortnight are less than the maximum permitted, the daily hours spent in the mine as laid down in paragraphs (iii) and (iv) of Article 2, as the case may be, may be exceeded during the remaining clays by not more than one hour per day, provided, always that the total hours of work in a fortnight do not exceed twelve times the daily hours spent in the mine as laid down in this Article."
This provision was adopted at the Preparatory Technical Coal Conference in Geneva in January last. It may be added that a meeting was held in December last between the delegates of the British Government, the colliery owners, and the Miners' Federation; it was held at the instance of the Miners' Federation in order to endeavour to arrive at a common point of view before proceeding to the Preparatory Technical Conference in January. The President and Secretary of the Miners' Federation accepted the principle of the spreading of the hours of work over the fortnight, provided (1) that it was by agreement between the representatives of the employers and employed, and (2) that day-wage men receiving a full day's wage for a short Saturday day shift should not lose the benefit of it if a Saturday was dropped. That is exactly what we are trying to introduce into this Bill.
Why should not what is good sauce in Geneva be good sauce here? Why should not the same principle be adopted here which all parties were apparently prepared to adopt in Geneva? I have never yet understood why this differentiation has been made. One has heard vague and extraordinary rumours of differences of opinion between those who are the official representatives of the Miners' Federation and others who are the political representatives. One does not wish to attach too much importance to rumours, but it does seem a striking fact that if you were so near agreement a short time ago we seem to have got so much further away from it now.
I have no doubt what the result will be of a Division on these Amendments. This House, being as it must be I think to the fullest extent the guardian of all interests, and having no political axe to grind in the way of majorities or minorities, Governments or Oppositions, must take the broad line of allowing these districts to have this liberty. I am certain that they would like it. I know equally well that another place is under leadership which may take another view. Would it not be really of the utmost advantage to this nation if an agreement could be arrived at for a settlement? I do not officially represent the coal owners, though naturally I am a member of their association, but I am perfectly certain that the majority of those engaged in the coal industry wish at all costs to avoid a further labour disturbance. Surely in the national interests it must be avoided. No one who has any experience of industrial or financial matters can forget the disastrous effect which the last coal strike had on the industry of this country—not on the coal industry only, but on industry generally.
We do not want to contemplate anything of the kind again; we want quite the opposite. We want to see a much greater spirit of co-operation and friendliness in the coal industry, as it exists to-day in other industries. Some, like myself, who have come from other industries at a late stage into an industry like the coal industry have been rather appalled at the kind of relationships which have been customary in the past—relationships of suspicion and distrust on all sides. I think that has largely passed a way. I think under the stress and moulding force of adversity and
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internal strife it has been at last recognised that that is disastrous, if anything is to remain of the industry at all.
The Lord Chancellor said he wanted to bring peace. He is a man who knows this question. He knows South Wales very well. I am certain also that he has great influence with this House. Why cannot he bring an olive branch and not a sword into that area? I have in my hand an article written by a gentleman who is the President of the Coal Owners' Association of South Wales, who is well known in mining circles, and who has been engaged in this industry all his life, Sir David Llewellyn. He points out, as I have endeavoured to point out, the particular difficulties of the South Wales coal field. He concludes his article with these words:—
"I cannot understand that the workmen in South Wales, who have suffered such extreme hardships during the past nine years, should not have been informed of what this Bill is going to mean to them, and a clause should certainly be inserted giving every district—that is, the workmen of every district—the right to chose between a fixed 7½-hour day and a 90-hour fortnight, when the wages that can be paid under the two alternative schemes are made known to them. The only possible means to continue work at all in South Wales will be a drastic reduction in wages. I am positive that when the workmen realise that the difference between a rigid 7½-hour day and a 90-hour fortnight means from 10 d. to 1s. per day for every person employed, they will be up in arms against it, and it will be a tragedy if this calamity is not averted before it is too late."
That is the opinion expressed by one of the most competent men I know in this country in the mining industry. And why should we provoke this calamity simply in order to seek a pedantic uniformity? I think we are becoming much too pedantic in all these problems, and much too unpractical. Let us at any rate give to those who will suffer most the right to make a choice for themselves. After all, it is always the workman who has the most to suffer, not the shareholder of a colliery.
I would like to pass from this general topic to the Amendment which I am moving, that is for an extension of four years. I pointed out on the Second Reading, and I do not think it has been generally appreciated, that, as far as hours are concerned in this Bill, the Bill will be operative for an extremely short space of time. When the Bill is passed

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there are some three months before it comes into operation. If it obtains the Royal Assent by the end of June, which is a sanguine view, it will not come into operation until October. It expires in July, 1931; that is to say, it has a life of nine months only. At the end of that nine months you go back to 7 hours. How can a serious body of men wish to inflict on a difficult industry these frequent and continuous changes in operation, wages agreements and costs? We have to make our contracts in many cases over a year ahead, especially in the export business. They do not work in these broken periods. The idea that you may have to make possibly two wages agreements within such a short period as this seems to me most impracticable. You can settle down to nothing. The intervening period will be one of uncertainty in which you cannot settle to any basic conditions.
The idea of the differential in this Bill was no doubt to provide a kind of cushion to enable the industry to become accommodated before it went back to the seven hours. I must say that I hope the time may come when the industry will be able to go back to the seven hours; but that cushion must have sufficient elasticity for it to be some kind of cushion. At present it is only a kind of hard ball of a slippery character. Surely those who framed the Bill must give some extension of time. I put the period of four years into my Amendment because, with the time mentioned in the Bill, it would be almost five. It might be argued that that is too large a cushion, but nine months is, surely, neither here nor there. Collieries are not things that you can alter quickly. People talk about new methods, reduced costs and improvements. Certainly there are many that should be made. But it is only those who have a fairly intimate knowledge of mining conditions who realise that there is nothing slower from the very nature of the thing than the making of alterations underground in collieries. It must take time. It needs careful thought and study, and even when you have done all the technical work outside the work itself takes time from its very nature. Until those changes are made, until the industry can technically produce at a lower rate, how are you to reduce costs except by the barbarous and, to me, entirely unsympathetic method of reduced wages?
There is in some collieries a system of profit-sharing of the most elaborate character. It is estimated that under this Bill the workmen in the collieries will lose £5,000,000 a year in wages. I do not know whether, when they are aware of this fact, they will be so enthusiastic for the Bill as they are to-day. But we never have a chance of showing how profit-sharing schemes work because we are never allowed to make any profits to share with anyone, owing to these continual changes in one condition—the condition of hours. I am certain, therefore, that this measure ought to have a reasonable extension if it passes at all. I am sure it ought to go on until, at any rate, we have arrived at some international agreement. I understand that the discussion of an international agreement as to hours has been proceeding for some time and that should, surely, result in an accomplished fact in the not far distant future.
It must be a great disadvantage to those who are negotiating for the British Government to begin in the position of having nothing to bargain with. It seems to me that we always tie our hands behind our back by means of a self-denying ordinance whenever we go into any international conference, and then we are surprised when we get no result. If you go to such a conference and say that whatever happens these hours are already fixed according to the law of England, what arguments have you to bring forward to the other people to enable them to come into line with you? The only argument you have is: "If you do not come into line with us we will work longer hours, our costs will be lower and our competition will be more keen. And after all, none of us will be any better off than we are." Could we not get to the point at any rate that this Bill shall remain where it is until the international conference has had a chance of arriving at some fruitful result? I am too little acquainted with the details to know when that would be, but surely we ought not to limit the hours to the short period which is stated in the Bill to-day. There ought to be more elasticity. The Government ought to take, if not an actual period, some power to enable it to extend the time beyond July, 1931.
I have no doubt the noble Lord opposite will tell us that when that period

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was fixed there was some idea in the minds of those framing the Bill of the length of time they expected it to operate. I imagine that they expected this Bill to be on the Statute Book at a much earlier date, and, therefore, thought that the period in the Bill would be one of some substance. But owing to circumstances, the accidents of Parliamentary exigencies, this Bill will reach the Statute Book very much later than they expected. Therefore, the whole time-table has been upset. If the whole time-table has been upset, why should one part of it only remain, and why not extend that to a reasonable period in order to give those engaged in the industry the fair opportunity to which they are entitled, of doing all that can be done to put their house in order, and to carry out all these schemes for selling and amalgamation that we have heard so much about? Surely, it is not much for those engaged in a most difficult and vital industry, who have been labouring under very grave disadvantages, to ask their fellow citizens for some assistance and some indulgence. They are not putting a very high claim forward. They are not asking that this measure shall never come into operation. They are not asking that the working hours of miners shall never again be reduced. What they are asking, and what they are entitled to claim in the fullest sense of fairness to all concerned, is that the industry should be put in a position in which it can afford to make these alterations which we all desire, but which, like so many things in this world, unfortunately cost money. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 20, line 30, after ("1926") insert ("and for four years thereafter").—(Lord Melchett.)
LORD GAINFORD: By the kindness of the noble Lord in charge of the Bill, I am permitted to emphasise some of the points which have been so lucidly and ably made by my noble friend Lord Melchett. Your Lordships ought to understand, I think, that the debate which is now taking place will deal with two distinct points. At the same time they are very much intermingled in connection with the arguments which I shall address to your Lordships' House. The first Amendment is designed to prevent, in July of next year, the present hours, which by this Bill are being reduced from 8 to 7½, from being further reduced to 7
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hours: in other words, to extend the operation of this Bill, when it becomes an Act, for a further period of four years. That in no way, of course, prejudices Parliament to interfere with the hours during the course of those four years; but in the opinion of those who are interested in carrying on the industry it would secure a certain amount of stability and rest in the industry, which will be absolutely impossible if this question has to be raised again next year with a view to trying to prevent what would be a terrible disaster to the coal industry and other industries in this country if there is to be a great difference in connection with wage settlements and hours of work. I therefore do appeal to the House to allow the first Amendment to be passed into law—namely, that the period should be extended.
It is impossible to carry out long contracts, or to make long contracts, if you have no idea of the cost of producing the article which you are about to raise from the earth, and when we know that the hours are more or less stabilised at 7½ per shift, or at 90 hours a fortnight in the event of an agreement being come to, there is a prospect of the industry being carried on, and I hope being profitably carried on, in the interests of those engaged in it, and especially the miners, for whom I venture to speak to-night, although I am not nominally entitled to do so. I want the Committee to realise that the time for an increase in our costs of production is not the present time, and it really ought not to be imposed upon the men, who are quite prepared, as I believe they are in many districts, to arrange with their employers for averaging the period so that they work 90 hours per fortnight, which would give an average of 7½ per day.
Lord Melchett has alluded to the difficulties of the industry, but I do not think he entirely covered the ground. I referred on Second Reading to the political interference—Parliamentary if you like so to call it—with the industry during the last nine years, in which eight Acts of Parliament have been passed interfering with the progress of the industry. I am constantly taunted, even by my friends in this House, by the statement that there are obvious differences among the coal owners themselves. The coal trade is not like any other trade.

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The difference in the commodity which we produce is overwhelming. The purposes to which coal may be adapted increase almost every day. At the present moment, for instance, you have the illustration that this Bill, so far as it affects hours, is hardly likely to prejudice Yorkshire at all. Yorkshire naturally rather accepts the reduction of hours imposed upon other districts, because Yorkshire knows that the costs of other districts will go up very much more than their own, and that they will be able, possibly, to secure some of the trade which is at present enjoyed by those other districts.
When these differences occur it is the duty of this House to see that justice is done all round, and it is for those reasons I am venturing to suggest, when we have these enormous diverse interests in a very complicated industry, that you should recognise that many of our troubles arise from the fact, as Lord Melchett has said, that such a very large proportion of the cost of our production is due to the payment of labour. In round figure 75 per cent. of our costs is attributable to wages. In no other industry does anything like that prevail. Therefore, when we have done everything that is possible to reduce our costs for material, of buying timber and stores, and bringing down overhead charges, there remains the one big item which we are bound to look at when our costs of production go up, and, horrid as it may seem to many of us to ask the men—and some of them have not too large a remuneration for the services they render—to accept a lower wage, we are compelled to say that the industry cannot be carried on without a reduction in wages if the cost of production goes up.
My case is that this is not the time to force upon the industry an increased cost of production. Look at your unemployed figures yesterday—gone un to 1,700,000. Look at the condition of agriculture. Look at the condition of the iron and steel industry—blast furnaces going out almost daily at the present time. Look at the conditions of the cotton and wool industries and at the shipbuilding yards of this country. I could take you round the Rivers Tees and Tyne and show you weeds growing up in the shipyards because no orders are forthcoming to provide the men ordinarily employed in those yards with work. This is not a time to raise the
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cost of producing coal. We have lost in the industry, since the settlement to which Lord Melchett referred, £55,000,000 owing to our minimum wage arrangements by which the men have a guaranteed minimum wage. The industry has not secured its proper proceeds to enable it to carry on and develop.
We have done our best in these difficult times, although we have been attacked in many quarters for not having done more, but we are about the only industry which has been increasing employment for the men of this country. Last year from January to March 916,000 men were employed on an average. The latest figures show that to March of this year, instead of employing 916,000 men, we have been employing 955,800, an increase of nearly 40,000 men. No other industry has been increasing its employment. The wages which have been paid to the men have correspondingly increased. I am aware that the figures in to-day's newspapers show that the figure of 955,000 has fallen to 941,000. Last week it was nearly 946,000. These figures vary from week to week and the tendency at the present moment, I have to admit, is downward; but that only emphasises my point that, although we have been securing more employment for the men as compared with a year ago, this is not the moment to increase our costs and so throw more men out of employment or force a reduction of wages.
It is perhaps not understood fully how it is that this reduction of hours is going to increase the cost of production. From January to June, 1925, the men employed both above and below ground were working 7 hours a day as compared with the 8 hours which they are working now. They produced on an average, taking all men employed at the collieries above and below ground, 17.9 cwts. per man employed. Immediately the hours were increased by the late Conservative Government the output per man per shift increased to 20.6 cwts. for the ensuing first quarter, before very much had been done, following the prolonged strike, to improve machinery and do other things. Partly owing to the willingness of the men to work, partly owing to improved machinery, more coal cutters and more conveyors being introduced, we have now reached the point of 21.78 cwt. per man per shift, and we do not look forward

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to the day when by a reduction of hours the quantity per man per shift is going to be reduced, because inevitably it comes back upon the workman first and hits him harder than anyone else.
The effect of the spread-over, as the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, said, will be to enable the men, if they like to accept the offer which the owners I am quite sure will make in Scotland and in Northumberland and Durham and in South Wales, to earn additional wages of £5,000,000 a year. Two shillings per person employed, or 2s. 6d. per week for every man, is a consideration and I find when I talk to the men in the County of Durham that they would sooner continue to work the hours they are at present working and get that 2s. 6d. and a half-holiday on Saturday than they would accept the 7½-hour day. All we ask Parliament to do is to allow the owners and the men in an amicable way to hear what are the arguments that can be brought forward in favour of the reduction of hours in each district. If the men are not convinced that the reduction of hours is better for them they will not assent to it, but if they are convinced that this proposal is better for the industry and better for themselves, then I feel that this House would be doing wrong in not giving them the opportunity of accepting it.
I said just now that I am not entitled to speak for the men's interest. During my public life I have on ten different occasions appealed to miners for their suffrages. On six of those occasions I have been opposed by a Socialist. The miners on every one of those occasions returned me at the head of the poll against the Socialist. My love and regard for the miners is no less to-day than it was when I endeavoured to represent them in another place or on the county council of my own county. I feel that I am speaking in their interest, and I am sorry to say that they have not been able owing to lack of information in another place to realise the importance of the issues in connection with this proposal; otherwise I believe this Amendment which we are now presenting to your Lordships would have been accepted in another place. My complaint is that the men to a certain extent have been badly advised, but it is more due to Election pledges, which have created a political atmosphere in another place
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against a concession which I believe this House, in its cool and quiet judgment, ought to secure for the men if they like to take advantage of it.
Mr. Snowden, in an able speech which he delivered a few months ago, said it would be a disaster to the industry if you were to resume 7 hours as against the 8 hours which are at present in operation. That is the case for the extension of the period which Lord Melchett's Amendment—which will be the first I understand to be put from the Chair—will secure. If by an extension you avoid a return to 7 hours you will avoid that disaster which Mr. Snowden anticipated. All I have to say is that if we are going to have 7½ hours per shift instead of the 8 hours which we have at present, it will obviously mean half the disaster which Mr. Snowden had in his mind. We have by struggling secured an increase of exports from 40,000,000 tons a year in 1025 to 60,000,000 tons a year. If we are going to do anything to secure an equivalent of the increased cost it will be necessary for us to advance the price of our export coal by 3s. a ton in order to carry on our collieries. Three shillings a ton on export coal means an advance which knocks us out of the European markets, which we have been gradually securing for ourselves. These facts have to be faced. If we cannot get it in wages we must get it in increased prices. We do not want and we cannot expect, as I explained on Second Reading, to get much from the home consumer and we have to try to get it from the export trade, a trade which I think all noble Lords recognise is absolutely vital in the interests of the nation.
To put it in another way to your Lordships, 2s. a ton less, which we will have to meet in many cases in connection with the 7½-hour day, is the equivalent of 10 s. a week in reduction of wages. Before the War we did not realise anything like 2s., but that is what we anticipate to be the normal profits of the industry in order to keep it developing progressively. We are now just carrying on on what I may call an even keel. If we are going to lose the 1s. 6d., which was the figure at which Lord Melchett arrived, or the 2s. which I believe is the estimate in Wales, we are going to lose exactly that equivalent of 10 s. a week less for the wage-earner. The wage-earner's interest

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is at my heart just as much as the industry for which I am believed by many noble Lords to be speaking here. I do appeal to your Lordships to allow this spread-over to take place, not only in the interests of the industry and in the interests of the nation, but also, I am sure, in the interests of the men. I hope your Lordships' House on this occasion will rise to its duty and will see that this Amendment is inserted in the Bill.
THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW: For the advantage of those of your Lordships who are not familiar with mining conditions in the North and particularly in Scotland, I would ask leave quite shortly to detail some of the practical considerations which make the spread-over of hours, 90 in a fortnight—or in fact 88, for that is what we have in mind—so important in our eyes. Mining organisation in Scotland has reached a very high degree of perfection, or so we claim. It has reached a point in Scotland—and I know this is not singular to Scotland—at which specialisation per shift is in vogue over a very large part of the field. That is to say that three shifts of 8 hours are interlocked so that they form in the twenty-four hours one complete cycle of operations. Thus the typical arrangement is that in the first shift you have coal cutting; in the second shift you have the operation of shifting your conveyors, of drawing your props, of hole-boring and shot-firing; and in the third and final shift of eight hours you have coal stripping—that is to say, "filling." This is really an application of the principle of mass production to coal mining. In the Scottish pits that degree of organisation has been made possible by, and is based upon, a very extensive use of machinery. It may interest your Lordships to know that, as far back as 1928, 3.02 h.p. of electrical motor power per person employed was available in Scotland, whereas only 2.49 h.p. was in use in the Ruhr district, about which we have heard a good deal in these debates. Again, in 1928 no less than 1,604 coal cutters were at work in Scotland, as compared with 1,311 in the Ruhr.
On the next point I cannot speak from my own knowledge, but I am assured by those who have spent their lives in the trade and are at the head of great mining concerns in Scotland that, if this cycle
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of operations is to be pursued with the maximum economic advantage, it is really essential that each shift should be of 8 hours, and it is practically the case that one shift of 5½ hours would seriously disorganise the industry in those pits in which this system is employed. I would seek support for this contention from a district which will not in this case be suspected of any prejudice in favour of the scheme that I have described. Some time ago the South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire coal owners, in collaboration with the Midland Institute of Mining Engineers, appointed a special committee to investigate and report on underground conveying and loading of coal by mechanical means. The committee visited 35 collieries in different districts and made detailed reports on- the system in operation at each.
I need not trouble your Lordships with the details of their conclusions, but I will read just two paragraphs of their report:—
"it is conclusively proved from the information that has been obtained that the best results can be achieved only where there is some flexibility with regard to hours, so as to ensure, whenever any abnormal delay or unforeseen difficulty occurs, that the workmen who, owing to the delay or difficulty, no matter for what reason it occurs, are unable to complete their work in the normal shift must stop and complete it, otherwise the work of the succeeding Shift is entirely disorganised and considerable output lost.
"The success of machine mining and conveying depends upon the regular and continuous sequence of the performance and completion of the necessary operations. It is abundantly clear that this continuous sequence is best secured with the 8-hour shift, and any variation from it will lead to a reduction in output per man employed, not merely equal to but considerably in excess of the reduction in time worked."
The view of experts on this matter in Scotland is that do what you will you cannot get a sufficient amount of any one of the three operations carried through in a 5-hour shift fully and usefully to employ the following 8-hour shift.
We contend that the men have enjoyed important advantages from the efficient application of this method of organisation. I have before me the earnings for the year 1929 in various parts of the country, taken from the Annual Report of the Secretary for Mines. In 1929 Scotland headed the list with earnings at

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£136, and South Wales was next with £129, and so forth. Those are the annual earnings and do not deal with any particular shift. Our intention, if we can come to an agreement with the men as to the application of a 90-hour spread-over rather than a 7½-hour day, assuming that Parliament makes that possible by this Bill, is to arrange for an 88-hour fortnight, 40 hours in one week and 48 in the next—a 5-day week followed by a 6-day week. That would mean, of course, a reduction of 8 hours in those pits at present on a 12-day fortnight basis, and, as your Lordships probably know, many of the older pits are working those hours to-day. It would not mean a reduction of hours in those pits that have an 11-day fortnight and an 8-hour day.
I was interested to hear the estimate of the difference in the cost of production with a 7½-hour day, as compared with the 90-hour or 88-hour spread-over, that was given to the House by the noble Lord, Lord Melchett. His figures compare very closely with those with which I have been provided, I think from very reliable sources. My information is that a 7½-hour day with wages unchanged would raise the cost from 10 d. to 1s. a ton, whereas an 88-hour fortnight, arranged in the manner that I have tried to explain to your Lordships, would raise the cost of production by only 3d. per ton; and, unless the market goes from bad to worse, I have very real hopes, as have many of those far better qualified to judge than I can claim to be, that if we get the 88-hour spread-over we shall be able to maintain the existing rates of wages. I am quite certain that, if we are forced to adopt the 7½-hour "straight" day, as we call it, we shall not be able to maintain the wage at its present level.
'I was careful to say: "if we can come to an agreement with the men." That agreement would, of course, include the wage factor. For the life of me I do not see how you can divorce the question of hours from the question of wages, and I should find myself, if the matter were pressed to a vote in this House, unable for that reason to support the Amendment that stands on the Paper in the name of my noble friend Lord Midleton. I think that to standardise wages or to admit a guaranteed wage over any pro
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longed period in face of the present markets would be, to put it at its lowest, most unwise. For these reasons I hope that, when the time comes, your Lordships will support Lord Gainford's Amendment providing for the 90-hour spread-over. I would add that so far as I can understand these matters, it is most important, on account of its bearing on future contracts, that the industry should know where it stands for a little longer than would be the case under this Bill if it is not amended. I shall support my noble friend Lord Melchett in his Amendment to give that extension.
LORD THOMSON: I have spent the last three days in either confronting the most formidable legal talent in this country or in confronting the most formidable representatives of coal mining. In the case of the former I can fall back upon the very able assistance of Lord Russell, but the ranks of the Labour Peers do not include experts on the coal mining industry. Therefore I stand alone, with the knowledge derived from a fairly close study during the past three weeks of what I may call the facts of the situation as they appear to the man-in-the-street. In the first place I would like to deal with the Amendment moved by Lord Melchett with reference to the extension of the 1926 Act for a further period of years. A good many arguments have been advanced in favour of that, and some of them are very cogent at first sight. It was pointed out that this was the most unhappy moment to change the hours in any case, but that if they were to be changed for only nine months, and another change occurred at the end of that period, the results would be even more disastrous.
As an argument that appears to me to have overlooked two fundamental facts of the situation. The first is that every coal concern in this country must have known for the last five years that the 1926 Act would expire in 1931. There was no mistake about that. To say that it is electioneering on our part now to reduce these hours and hold out the hopes that we do hold out is not quite fair. May I read to your Lordships extracts from a speech made in this House by the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil of Chelwood, on the introduction of the 1926 Act, describing its purpose and its duration. He said:—

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"… it is made quite clear, even on the form of the Bill, that the rule of seven hours is not interfered with as a general rule; but for the five years period, in order to meet this emergency, one hour more is to be allowed in those mines in which this Act is adopted. … The Bill, therefore, is exceptional in its nature and it is temporary and permissive in its operation."
Even as such it was hotly opposed by the few Labour Peers who at that time sat on those Benches, but the warmest advocates for the Bill at the time of its introduction never made any concealment of the fact that it was both temporary and permissive. They stressed "permissive" a good deal more than "temporary," but, there is hardly a member of the front Opposition Bench who can deny the truth of the remarks that I have just made.
If further confirmation were required. I may read what was said by the Minister of Labour in another place in regard to the 1926 Bill:—
"For a period of five years this Bill enables the extra hour which is already possible on sixty days of the year to be worked on other working days as well. It is not a permanent measure. It does not compel the extra hour to be worked on these other days. It is temporary only in its effect and permissive only in its character."
We are told by some noble Lords who have displayed the very greatest vision and ability in the conduct of their affairs that this change of hours next year is going to bring them ruin, because it is unexpected, or it was unexpected. Lord Melchett gave a very admirable description of what the Bill before the House does, in so far as this Amendment is concerned. It serves as a cushion, and four months will elapse after the passing of the Act to enable the industry to adjust itself.
We have been told of the sum of money that is going to be lost per ton of coal and of the necessity for reducing wages. I will return to this at a later period, but it is estimated that the loss due to the first half hour per ton spread over the country is 7d. to 10 d. per ton. The 1s. 6d. or 1s. 7d. quoted by Lord Melchett is the peak figure, and to that extent abnormal. Against that can be put the benefits to be derived from the Derating Act, both in direct application to the coal trade and its application through freightage. That will amount to 6d. or 7d. per ton. I hope I am not giving figures which will cause Lord
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Melchett pain, because they have been carefully examined, and I have quoted them to prove that the average loss due to the half hour coming off is almost, if not quite, compensated for by measures already passed in this country. Seven-pence being the average loss per ton throughout the country, I do not say that it will be quite compensated for, but gains under the derating and freightage may almost compensate for it.
I pass now to the question of hours, before dealing with the question of spread-over. Various descriptions have been given of the hours worked under the various Acts, and I have here a document by an expert which to my mind gives what is the clearest explanation of this matter. He states:—
"In the language of the relevant Acts of Parliament, the expressions 'eight hours,' 'seven and a-half hours' or 'seven hours' mean the length of time for which the men are allowed to be underground between winding."
He also says that the effect of the three Acts of Parliament, 1908, 1919, 1926, and of the present Bill, may be stated shortly in this way. The 1908 Act provided for 8 hours per day plus 1 extra hour on 60 days in the year. The 1919 Act modified the 1908 Act and brought down the 8 hours to 7, so that the working hours were 7 plus an extra hour on each of sixty days in the year. Then came the 1926 Act, which allowed for 7 hours plus one extra hour on every day in the year —permissive and (may I remind noble Lords without wishing to rub it in) temporary. The present Bill allows for 7 hours plus one half hour extra on every day in the year. The 1926 Act, I should like to point out, represented a difference of only sixty working days throughout the whole year in the way of improvement on the 1908 Act so far as the men were concerned. In other words, ft was only on sixty days a year that the men were better off under the 1926 Act than they were under the 1908 Act, and for purposes of industrial organisation I think it is fair to say that 1908 is almost in the dark ages.
Now I make no concealment of my belief—and I have talked to a great many of the men's leaders on this subject, and I think it may be frankly stated—that the men do expect and ask for some advantage to themselves under this Bill. They do not like working 8 hours a day.

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They find those conditions very grievious. They find that they affect their health. The men are frankly anxious to get some advantage out of an Act of Parliament which shall shorten their working day. They want that advantage, and the Bill does give them the advantage of from 2½hours to 3 hours a week. That is what the men want.
LORD CARSON: Do they want the same wages?
LORD THOMSON: They want the same wages. I have endeavoured to explain to the noble and learned Lord already, but perhaps I did not make myself clear, that the conditions produced by derating, by what is hoped will be an improvement in the trade owing to better organisation, and the other factors brought about by improvement in the export trade ought to enable the employers to give the same wages, even with that half hour off. In any case, when we are told about the disastrous situation that now confronts us, is that due to the extra half hour? The coal owners have received in the last five years £23,000,000 in cash; they have had a reduction in wages; they have had the lengthening of hours; they have had every sort of concession made to them that could be made. And I am afraid it is true to say to-day that the position of the coal trade is not good. The noble Lord hinted at it when he told us that in 1930 we were not doing as well as the average of 1929. But that is not due to any legislation.
LORD GAINFORD: The figures I gave show that the industry has advanced very considerably both in the number of men employed, in the wages paid, and in turning a loss into a profit, if you take the first three months of this year and compare them with the first three months of last year; but I admited that in the last two or three months there was a diminution in the number employed from 950,000 to 941,000.
LORD THOMSON: I accept the explanation, in fact I think we have said the same thing. What I was getting at was that the first three months of 1930 compare unfavourably with the average of 1929. That, I think, is true. But 1929 was quite a good year; the 10,000,000 tons increase proves that. I have endeavoured to give an outline of the hours position, and have stated that
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the men want an improvement in their conditions. It is not an unnatural desire on their part, as any fair-minded person will agree. The offer that is now made by the noble Lords, Lord Melchett and Lord Gainford, in their Amendment, is that instead of the half hour proposed by this Bill in the way of relief, the men should accept the spread-over of 45 hours a week, or 90 hours in a fortnight, and various extremely plausible arguments have been advanced in favour of that course. The answer to that is that the spread-over would not benefit the men at all in some of our greatest coal fields.
They would not gain an hour a week, they would not gain a quarter of an hour a week in some other of our largest and most important coal fields. Under present conditions the Bill will only affect 63 per cent. of the men employed in our coal fields, because 37 per cent. are already on the 7½-hour day. Therefore only 63 per cent. of the men gain any advantage under the Bill. Add the spread-over, and only 33 per cent. of the men will get any advantage under the Bill at all, and they will only get a very small advantage in many cases—a quarter of an hour a week, an hour a week in some cases, and at the very most two hours a week—over their present conditions. Well, the men naturally do not want to accept that. They are told that they must face lower wages if they do not accept these new conditions. Clause 15 proposes to set up a Board, which will investigate this matter and put all the facts before the public, and the public can only form an adequate opinion on such matters when all the facts are put before them.
A remark has been made by two noble Lords to-day to the effect that the men are known to be favourable to this proposal and frequent reference has been made as to What happened at Geneva. I think Lord Melchett said that the men's representatives there agreed to the spread-over idea. That is not the story that I have heard. My story is that there were three representatives at Geneva—one representing the men, who voted against the proposal, one representing the owners, who voted for it, and one representing the Government, who did not vote at all.
LORD CARSON: Good old Government!
LORD THOMSON: I think that that disposes of the story that at Geneva the representatives of the men sang one song, and now that they are back in England they sing another.
LORD MELCHETT: Which statement is correct? Have you any minutes of Geneva?
LORD THOMSON: I have not got the minutes before me at this moment, though I have seen them. I am afraid that this Amendment, which now occurs in a rather constant form, will have to be opposed by the Government. I have given a very careful hearing to the arguments employed. On the first count, the extension to five years of the 1926 Act, I think I have given a sufficient explanation—namely, that the Act was temporary and permissive in its character and was known by all interests in the coal trade to be so. If they made their plans on any other basis they were not justified, I should say, as business men in doing so. On the other count—namely, the desirability of the spread-over and the Amendment which suggests a spread-over —I think I have also given the various reasons why the men object.
It may be said that the men are not the only people concerned in this matter and that their obstinacy should not be allowed to prevent a good Act of Parliament going through. On several grounds I should say there was a great deal in that case, but what I want to point out is that the Bill before your Lordships on this occasion represents the first concession that has been made to the men's point of view since 1919. Every other interference by the Government in the coal trade during that period has been favourable to the owners and very unpalatable to the men. The men have seen their hours lengthened and their wages reduced steadily during that period. This is the first occasion on which the owners are invited to make a sacrifice. When one hears the tragic story of the condition of the coal trade at this present moment—
LORD DARYNGTON: And for years.
LORD THOMSON: —end for years, I should be the last person to accuse anybody of the blame for that. I do not think that all coal owners are scoundrels or robbers or anything else of the kind,
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or that they are even as bad as they were described as being by the ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr. Baldwin. I do not go so far as that. I remember reading some very unpleasant descriptions of coal owners by both those statesmen. I do not share in that abuse—not a bit. I have a great respect for coal owners and I think they have done their best. But on the facts of the case, I think it is really obvious that they have not been particularly successful. They have got the industry into its present plight.
What does the Bill propose to do? Leaving as much initiative as possible to the coal owners who have experience of the trade, this Bill attempts to set up some new form of organisation in the coal trade. It is a form of re-organisation which is badly needed. All our debates have proved that. Nobody denies that some re-organisation is required. No one has yet asserted that all is for the best in the best of possible industries—the coal trade. In fact, what we have listened to from coal owner after coal owner is a tale of woe. And a tale of woe after five years during which the coal owners have had every advantage that any Government could give them. All their demands satisfied—cash subsidies, lower wages and the rest.
LORD DARYNGTON: May I point out that the coal owners never asked for the subsidy? They were all against it.
LORD THOMSON: They did not refuse it, if the noble Lord will permit me to say so. Now they seem to be trying to undermine some of the most fundamental requirements of re-organisation. Frankly, I do not think it is unfair to say that a fundamental requirement of re-organisation is an endeavour to meet in some way the reasonable requests of the men who work in this industry, who for years have demanded a reduction in hours, who got it in 1919 for very sufficient reasons and who found the 1919 decision reversed for a temporary purpose by the late Government. That is a question on which the Party to which I have the honour to belong cannot yield. We not only represent the men; we are in very close touch with them, and it is idle to say that the men are satisfied or that they could make terms with their employers. How do your Lordships account

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for the presence of fifty odd miners' representatives in another place, whose expenses are paid by the Miners' Federation? Is there no discontent among the men which has produced so concrete a result? Obviously the men want improvements in their conditions, and, thank goodness, they are trying to improve their conditions by constitutional means. They are doing it through their elected representatives in Parliament and we should be grateful that they take that moderate course. Let us hope they will continue to pursue the same moderate course.
The noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition—I will not say admonished me yesterday, but said that your Lordships' House does not care for any reference to what might happen in another place in the form of a threat. May I say here and now that I entirely endorse that view. When I spoke about another place I was not in any way putting the point of view that we should yield every time because the other people think differently from ourselves. I am very proud of being a member of your Lordships' House, and I would much rather be here than in another place.
LORD CARSON: The noble Lord is quite wrong.
LORD THOMSON: The noble and learned Lord has the advantage of me in having had both experiences. I often sit in the gallery of another place and I am not jealous. I think the noble Marquess will admit that it is only right for a member of the Government to put to the House what is the view of his Government in regard to an Amendment and the reasons on which that view is based. As a Party we cannot recede from this particular point. The noble Marquess went on to say that we should do or would do what is right. What is right in this matter? Under the combined pressure of very formidable legal talent and technical knowledge the Government have been driven from position to position. Many valuable parts of this Bill have been lost already. We have lost the central levy—perhaps not an irreparable loss.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: It was never in the Bill, and it was lost in another place.
LORD THOMSON: It was never in the Bill, but the Amendment moving it was accepted by the Government. We have lost the district levy, which is rather a serious matter. Thanks to the noble Duke, the Duke of Northumberland, we have had bureaucracy enthroned in the form of the Board of Trade. That may or may not be a vital matter. It seems to me to be very little different from having Commissioners. But here we have got to a vital matter, because it is a human matter, and it is not a question of taking sides betwen coal owners and coal workers. I should be the very last person in the world to suggest that any coal owner was a man who went out of his way to oppress his employees. I am well prepared to believe that every coal owner in this House is a popular person with his employees, and could go round and call them by their Christian names and be on the best of terms with them. I will go further and say that if any special case of injustice or hardship was brought to the notice of any of the coal owners in this House, they would, as far as was humanly possible, redress it.
I make a present of that admission, but I submit that the proposition does not work out quite like that in a huge business like the coal trade. There is something ruthless and implacable about the processes of economics. The mills of big business grind slowly but they grind exceedingly small. It is that which fills the men with distrust when they are asked to accept a 45-hour week, or a 90-hour fortnight. They say there is some trick in this, and they have been tricked before. They have suffered every time. They know perfectly well that a 45-hour week might be turned into five days of 8 hours and nothing on the sixth. The noble Lord, Lord Melchett, would say: "Never if I had anything to say on it." But the economic machine grinds on, and it is for that reason that Parliament has from time to time to lay down something definite and statutory so as to protect the rights and liberties of individuals who are not able to protect themselves. That is why we are met here to-day, and that is why I come back to the point which I originally made with regard to the noble Marquess's observations about our doing the right thing.
What is the right thing in this matter? Are we to do the right thing in the name

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of the arguments that have been put forward to us to-day with regard to the economics of the coal trade—arguments put forward with extreme ability, I will admit, but which really, in view of the recent history of the coal trade, lose a great deal of their weight? Or are we to consider this as a human problem? It is a problem which has lasted now for many years, and are we to say "No" because of these arguments, and let the men go back to conditions which they regard as unjust and unfair—conditions which make a British miner, whether he is in Scotland, Wales or England, work longer hours, or rather be longer at the disposal of his employer, than any miner in the world except a few in Cracow, Dombrowa and Belgium? Is that the idea of British industry and British organisation? Is it right we should condemn our men to conditions of that kind? Or is it right that we should say: "No; we have tried these other methods; we have reduced wages; we have lengthened hours; we have given subsidies; they have all failed. Now we bring in a Bill which does provide a new organisation to go with it. We are going to give the men an instalment of that shortening of hours which is their due, because the lengthening which makes it necessary was, on the part of the Government which brought it in, only temporary and permissive." I hope I have put my argument fairly and clearly. I feel very strongly on the subject myself, and I sincerely hope that your Lordships will not on this vital point defeat the Government, and pass this Amendment.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I think no one in your Lordslhips' House will complain for a moment of the manner in which the noble and gallant Lord addresses us. I hope he will realise in anything I am going to say that it is entirely a reference to the substance of his speech and not in any way a criticism of his manner. Turning to the substance of his speech any one who listened to the peroration with which the noble and gallant Lord concluded would have imagined that we were proposing to throw out the Bill. He said, in effect: "Your Lordships surely will not drive the men back to the old conditions of things after all they have suffered." There is no suggestion of the kind in this Amendment, or in these Amendments which we are now discussing. The spread-over will not
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drive the men back to their old conditions. The spread-over will be a reduction of the total amount of labour which they will be called upon to make in the course of a week or a fortnight, exactly the same as it would in the 7½-hour day. Therefore, all that part of the noble and gallant Lords speech is really beside the point. So far as the spread-over part of this question is concerned there is no question of going back to what the Government suggest.
LORD THOMSON: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Marquess, but 66 per cent. of the men would go back to the same conditions.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I shall have a word or two to say about that in a moment. What the noble and gallant Lord did not seem to me to recognise is that the condition of the coal trade is a very depressed one. What is the good of talking about the right of the men to have shorter hours if the condition of their trade will not permit it? What sense is there in asking your Lordships to take account of such rights in the present state of the industry? I do not endorse any of those criticisms that the noble and gallant Lord made on the coal owners. The fact remains that at the present moment the coal trade is profoundly depressed. The noble and gallant Lord does not deny it, and the question which my noble friends behind me have asked is: Is this a moment at which to throw an extra burden upon the trade?
The noble Lord suggested that there were declarations by Conservative Ministers at the time the 1926 Bill was passing into law. Those declarations were made four or five years ago. What relevance have they to this present moment? The question is: What will the trade bear now? not what Ministers four or five years ago hoped it would be able to bear. That is what we must address ourselves to. We think that it has been shown over and over again that if the 7½-hour day is passed without any kind of elasticity, then it will constitute an additional and perhaps an overwhelming burden upon the coal owners. The noble Lord said "Oh, no, there is going to be reorganisation." Well, whether reorganisation is to be by a peripatetic Commission or by the Board of Trade is immaterial so far as that point

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is concerned. But how soon does he think reorganisation will begin to operate? Of course, anything of the kind must take a very long time if it is to be advantageous at all, and the idea that the depression of the coal trade can be spirited away merely by the prospect of reorganisation is to my mind the most futile idea in the world. We must deal with the coal trade as it stands, and the fact is—so we are assured by every expert—that the substitution of the 7½-hour day for the present system, if no kind of elasticity is introduced, will increase cost of production. Is that denied? Is it denied that it will?
LORD THOMSON: If the noble Marquess asks me, it is not denied that it will increase cost of production, but what is claimed is that derating plus the gain on freightage should almost make up for it.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Of course, derating and the freightage proposals are an advantage. They were passed by a Conservative Government. Of course they are an advantage, but they were bitterly opposed by noble Lords opposite who now fall back upon them for their defence. They were passed last year, or was it two years ago?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: They were passed two years ago and came into operation last year.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: They came into operation last year. The fact remains that the figures given us are not the figures before derating but after de-rating, and we are told that the coal trade will be under an extra and overwhelming burden by the 7½-hour day if it is passed in the form in which the Government have proposed it. No doubt derating is a great advantage to the country. It was introduced by a Conservative Government. I admit that. I admit that derating was an admirable plan, although it was denounced especially by the noble and learned Lord the Leader of the House.
LORD PARMOOR: Hear, hear.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Exactly, but without derating I do not know where you would be. We seek, if we can, to mitigate this effect of raising the cost of production. What arguments
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have we in that direction? We must rely, of course, upon expert advice, and expert advice—and I believe it is not denied—is that the spread-over as compared with the 7½-hour day would be a relief to the cost of production. I do not believe that is denied. I have never heard it denied. Not by any of the geniuses who sit there has it been denied. They all admit that the spread-over would lower costs of production as compared with the 7½-hour day. Then why in the world should we not insert it in the Bill? We know the employers want it. What about the men? I want the noble Lord to be a little frank with us about the opinion of the men. He told us he has special access to the opinion of the men. I doubt very much whether he knows as much about the opinion of the men as Lord Gainford does or as Lord Melchett does, but still he says he knows.
LORD THOMSON: I have the privilege of the acquaintance of several men who represent them.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: So have I, and I am proud of it. There is nothing in that. He is not peculiar in that respect. I am not speaking from any private information, I can assure your Lordships. I am only speaking of what appears in the public Press and we are given to understand that the men very nearly accepted some form of spread-over. There was by no means a unanimous opinion against it. I am not a bit surprised. On the face of it one would expect them to approve of it. What the men want above everything is to have a little leisure and good wages, or perhaps I ought to put it the other way—good wages and a little leisure. We are informed by those who advise us that by a spread-over system there would be no occasion to lower wages, at any rate anything like so much as they would be lowered under the 7½-hour day. I put it to the noble Lord that if you asked the men: "Which would you prefer, to work a little longer on particular days or to have lower wages?" they would almost one and all elect to work little longer, because the truth is that the men do not care very much about this question of hours. What they do care about is the question of wages, and if I were one of them I should take the same view.

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Then they like a little leisure. Why should they not? I am sure all of us would like a little leisure. I am afraid I cannot think the Government have much leisure, but I am sure they would like it if they could get it—not permanent leisure, I do not mean that. That is the great advantage of this spread-over system. It gives the men leisure. By a little arrangement between the parties they can get a complete holiday at any rate on alternate Saturdays. I believe that they would enjoy that immensely. I am quite sure that if there were time to go round and collect the opinions of the men, and to put these alternatives to them, they would certainly say: "Give us better wages, give us the alternate Saturday as a holiday." I am certain all your Lordships would approve and sympathise with that position of the men. That is all that we are asking your Lordships to do by the Amendments which provide for the spread-over. I said "by arrangement between the parties," because I would remind your Lordships—though I think it is not really necessary to remind you—that there is no compulsion on the men to accept the spread-over arrangement. It is purely voluntary. It is open to them to make that particular arrangement with their employers, and I do not believe in the least in the theory which is put forward that the men have no real liberty of action when they are negotiating with the employers. That used to be true many years ago, but it is not true now.
Just look at the present condition of the coal trade. They may, if they please, work 8 hours a day, but a great many of them do not. By arrangement with the employers they work much less than 8 hours. How can it be said, therefore, that the mere permission for them to have a spread-over forces them to accept it? They are complete masters of the situation. If they do not like the spread-over and prefer lower wages and no holidays, it is quite open to them so to decide. All we ask your Lordships is to render it possible for the men to come to such a conclusion, which all of us think is profoundly reasonable. Personally, may I say, I am intensely anxious to be fair to the men. I do not want to see them pressed and I do not believe any of your Lordships want to see them pressed. If it is possible to put into the Amendment words which would protect the interests
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of the men, personally I should be only too delighted to accept them if there are any words which can be so drafted. My noble friend the Earl of Midleton has some words in his form of the Amendment designed to protect the men. There are, I know, great difficulties in respect of those words. For my part, I entirely assent to that position.
If, in the spread-over Amendment, anything could be done to remove from the men's minds, the suspicion of which the noble and gallant Lord speaks, I should be delighted to help it forward. He is quite right in saying that the fundamental mischief, not only in the coal trade but, I am sorry to say, in many other trades, is this atmosphere of suspicion between the employers and the men. We in your Lordships' House are quite impartial on these matters. It does not matter to our personal interests in the least, but we should earnestly desire, if we could, to eliminate this atmosphere of suspicion. Cannot we cooperate on both sides of the House to do that? After all, we are only interested in trying, if we can, to put through legislation which will be good for all parties, and I echo the regret that the noble and gallant Lord has expressed as to the suspicion that exists. I hope that by this Amendment regarding the spread-over, which is really designed quite as much in the interests of the men as of anybody else, we may do something to remove that suspicion.
I must now say a word upon the actual Amendment that is before your Lordships. The noble and gallant Lord, in dealing with this subject, has reminded us perfectly accurately of the attitude which he and his friends adopted when the Act of 1926 was passing through Parliament. He and his friends have stood for a reduction of hours over and over again, and notably at the recent General Election, and I suppose almost every Member of the House of Commons who was returned in the Labour interest was pledged to reduce as far as possible the hours of labour. I think that this was a most profound mistake. I said so on the Second Reading. I do not believe that British industry is properly in a position to endure heavy extra burdens being thrown upon it. But when I spoke on the Second Reading, if I may be so vain as to remind your Lordships of what

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I said, I put it forward as the reason why I thought the House should agree to the Second Reading that we must take the General Election to have decided that a Government should be in power one of whose principles should be the reduction of the burden of toil resting upon the shoulders of the workers. The Government are undoubtedly pledged.
Then I come to consider the Amendment providing for an extension to four years. Let me remind your Lordships exactly what would happen. If no such Amendment is inserted, then technically —for I shall have a word to say as to how far the prospect is real—in July next year the coal industry would revert to a 7-hour day; and the Government have come into office upon a pledge that they will reduce hours, so that, if my noble friend's Amendment is passed, I am afraid—no, I will not say "afraid," for I should heartily approve of it, but it is the fact—that for all the later years of its operation, so far from meaning a reduction of hours, it would mean an increase of hours. That is undoubtedly the fact, because, whereas in the later years of the period the hours would fall to 7, under that Amendment they would be maintained at 7½ or an equivalent spread-over.
The question that I have to put to myself is: Ought we to try to force the Government into that position? I am at once torn by exactly the same difficulty as I was in when I spoke before. I am perfectly certain that, from the point of view of the coal trade, it would be better to pass my noble friend's Amendment and to extend the provision for four years, or indeed much longer. What you want in the coal trade is stability of conditions, and what is so bad is the perpetual change. But I cannot help recognising that not only are the Government pledged in the other direction, but the majority of the House of Commons, and I suspect even the Liberal Party—though I can never quite make out what the Liberal Party think—are similarly pledged against it. I have referred to the effect of my noble friend's Amendment, which is now immediately before the Committee. As a matter of fact, however, I do not take quite so gloomy a, view of the future as my arguments hitherto may have led the House to suspect, because I do not really think that, when we reach July of
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next year, any Government—even that Government—will allow matters to fall back to the 7-hour day. I think it incredible. I think the arguments that have been delivered in their presence, both in this House and in another place, must have convinced them of the extreme urgency of not putting a heavy weight upon the coal industry. Accordingly my conviction is that, whatever Government is in office, they will never find themselves able to go back to the 7-hour day. If they do, that will be the time for your Lordships to act, if you are called upon to act.
As regards this particular Amendment for extending the time, I have a feeling that it will, in fact, be equivalent to the rejection of the Bill, and therefore I rather hope that it will not be persisted in. Up to now, although the Government do not seem to take that view, I think we have done nothing but help the Bill forward. We have certainly opposed the central levy, which the noble Lord mentioned, but which, as I think he had forgotten for the moment, was omitted through the action of the House of Commons. We also passed a consequential Amendment eliminating the district levy, but that was merely making the Bill shipshape and putting it into obvious and proper symmetry. Then we have substituted for the peripatetic Commission whose business it is to amalgamate everybody a Government Department which will take the thing moderately and will amalgamate only where the ease justifies it. I believe those are thoroughly sound Amendments, which I hope the Govern-will see fit to accept. So far we have done no harm to their Bill. We have done nothing but improve it, and I say that, if we now pass the spread-over Amendment, we shall do nothing but improve it. We shall merely be making the Bill more workable and more acceptable, not only to the employers but to the men themselves. I sincerely hope that your Lordships will think that this spread-over Amendment should be put into the Bill now and should be kept in the Bill. With regard to the other Amendment, I confess that I hope that my noble friends will not press it.
EARL BEAUCHAMP: The noble Marquess, the Leader of the Opposition, has issued a direct challenge to the Liberal Party with regard to their atti-

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tude, and I lose no time in saying that I shall have the greatest pleasure in supporting the noble Marquess with regard to this Amendment; but although I support him it is possibly for diametrically opposite reasons. I have had the advantage of listening if not to the whole of the debates to at any rate three-quarters of the speeches which have been made, and I welcome the last two speeches because they have not been the speeches of experts. On the whole I think we have had too much from the experts in this House. If Lord Joicey gets up below the Gangway and speaks as a coal owner, he is immediately answered by Lord Aberconway who speaks as a coal owner with different interests. If Lord Lindsay speaks as an expert coal owner in one part of the country, he is immediately answered by my noble friend Lord Gainford, or by some other noble Lord equally expert, in some other part of the country, and I confess that in the course of these discussions I have been constantly confused by the advice given to us by a number of experts.
When the noble and gallant Lord who spoke on behalf of the Government complained that he had no experts to support him I venture on the whole to say that it was a rather good thing he had not. Does not this discussion which has taken place emphasise what we have often heard from the wisest and best members of this House, that the great difficulty of this House is that it is not entirely representative of the people of this country? Would it not be of great advantage in our discussion of this Bill if we could have had representatives of the miners in this Chamber? I know that I speak the opinion of noble Lords in Opposition quite as much as I do the opinion of myself when I say that we would welcome here representatives of the miners. In view of this is it not a little unfortunate that the experts who have spoken have done so from the opposite point of view only. I know there are amongst mine owners many generous, public-minded men who have lost year by year through the working of their mines, and yet have kept them open for the sake of the men and the women who are dependent upon them. There are noble Lords who are known throughout the country for their
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generosity in matters of this kind, but none the less I repeat that it is a pity that we have not, on an occasion like this, representatives of the miners themselves here to join in the discussion.
In those circumstances what is to happen? I cannot claim that I am an authority. I have not an acquaintance with miners' representatives. I am unfortunate in not being able to speak from personal knowledge of what they think about the Bill, and I distrust entirely what I see in the newspapers with regard to their opinions. I distrust the personal gossip in the newspapers as to what one person told another, as to what another person said or thought, or what a third person used to think five years ago. I am bound to take into consideration votes given in another place, and I say here quite distinctly, whatever we may think of the advantage of this, that or the other Amendment, there is something else to be considered. It is not only a question whether such an Amendment would be a good thing. There is something much more important than good government and that is self-government, and if an industry or the men in a certain industry think that an Amendment is a bad Amendment, and is going to do harm to their interests, it is a serious thing if we should insist upon putting it in against their wishes. Therefore I have the greatest hesitation in voting for an Amendment which is going to insert something which the miners' votes in another place declare to be inimical to their interests.
I do not say whether they are right or wrong, but I say that it is a dangerous thing, in view of the general maxim that self-government is more important than good government, to do something contrary to the votes of miners' representatives. It may be that they ought to have powers with regard to the spreading of hours. I do not wish to say whether that is right or wrong, but I only point to the votes taken in another place with regard to that point. I have been severely rebuked by Lord Gainford for having spoken about contentment in the mines. Whether there is contentment in the mines at the present moment, or whether there is not, the thing for us to do at the present time is to consider what is best for the industry as a whole. Unfortunately, in this House we have

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not got, as I have said to our universal regret, those who can speak for the miners. In another place they are unanimous, as much against the opinion of mine owners in this House as they can be, and therefore I heartily support the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, although for diametrically opposed reasons, and hope your Lordships will not agree to the Amendment.
THE EARL OF MIDLETON: The noble Earl invariably addresses the House in a very plausible tone, but I must take exception to his statement that he would welcome miners' representatives in this House. It will be in the recollection of the House that only fifteen months ago Lord Clarendon submitted a Resolution proposing immediate action, the effect of which would be to give large Socialist representation in this House after the next Election. The noble Earl, as on the last three occasions, went into the Lobby against that reform. The noble Earl makes these speeches, which sound very well but have no foundation at all. Whenever any opportunity has arisen for increasing popular representation in this House he has always succeeded in finding some reason why that particular reform should not be adopted. He has never helped your Lordships by giving any idea what his Party would do, but has left a state of things which we all agree has become injurious to the public service. Then he asks for your sympathy for his confusion of mind because one coal owner may take one view and another coal owner may take another view. I really could not extend my sympathy to him. The noble Lord told us on the Second Reading that he intended to vote for the Bill and hoped it would go through without any change, without listening to any of the arguments, and that being his view, whether he is in a state of confusion of mind or not matters very little to the House.
I have only risen because I have an Amendment on the Paper, and I would ask your Lordships to allow me to state in a few words the course which I propose to take with regard to it. There are three points. There is the point of the spread-over, of which we have heard. There is the question which Lord Melchett has raised, of the extension of the period of the Bill. There is a third
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question, which would have to be dealt with if the Amendment which I have put down were dealt with separately, instead of being taken with the Amendment already before the Committee. That is the question of wages. I want to say at the outset that I do not want to do any more than this—to provide that no class of men should be prejudiced in their wages by the fact that there is a spread-over with the same number of hours. I am informed that 60 per cent. of the men are daily wage-earners. If that be so, and if we have a spread-over of thirteen days on the same number of hours it is quite clear that those men must be paid, for the extra work they do in thirteen days, what they would otherwise be paid for fourteen days. Otherwise there would be a distinction between the day man and the piece man, which none of your Lordships who are coal owners would desire to make. But the words which have been drawn up with that object are too widely expressed. The only distance we can get to-day, so far as I know, is to consider now alone the spread-over, on which we shall vote, and subsequently to consider the point of the duration of the day, put by Lord Melchett.
With regard to the spread-over, I want to make one point which has not been sufficiently emphasized. Everybody agrees that this must be voluntary. Everybody agrees that, if possible, it should have the effect of relieving the men entirely one day out of the fourteen. Everybody knows that if that is done you will for the first time in this Bill get more production, without any sacrifice by anybody. You will get in gain to the men, and in gain to the owners, something which is either half an hour, or an hour and a half in some cases, from the fact that the men have only to go down the pit thirteen days, instead of fourteen. There is another gain. The working of the machinery and such expenses will be limited. There is still another which has not been mentioned to-night. Many men, either from not feeling quite up to the mark, or for some other reason, take a voluntary day's holiday for which they are not paid, which they sacrifice. It is a pure loss to all concerned. Coal owners who have full knowledge tell us that in a great many cases that voluntary

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absenteeism would be decreased, if not altogether done away with, if the men were certain that they would get their fourteen days clear.
Therefore, you have a gain in the number of hours at the face; you have a gain in the distance walked; you have a gain in regard to absenteeism, and a gain in regard to the working of the machinery. There is no other clause in the Bill which gives a gain to one party without a loss to the other. The hours provision will reduce the profit 1s. 6d. a ton; the levy—if it takes place, and if it is to be replaced in the Bill by the House of Commons and your Lordships do not insist upon your Amendment—must penalise the home-sold coal in order to support the foreign; the compulsory closure of mines must have the effect of handicapping the better equipped mines in order to support the less equipped mines, or else there must be a heavy loss to the less well equipped mines. I do urge that we should let this Bill go back with at least one gesture of sympathy to the national importance of the Bill, by trying to find something which has not been found in another place which is to the benefit of all parties, to the industry and to the nation. That you have in the spread-over.
I say with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Thomson, that although he has conducted this Bill, as your Lordships feel, with great courtesy and great knowledge, he did not deal with that point at all. I would appeal to the Lord Chancellor, who made so great a pronouncement at the commencement of these proceedings, and whose absence even from the Divisions on the Bill have been a source of astonishment to many of us. The Lord President of the Council, who leads the House, and the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Colonies have also been absent. Never in the whole of my Parliamentary experience do I remember an occasion when, on the chief measure of the Session, the three leading members of the Government in this House have not even taken the trouble to go into the Lobby during six or seven hours of discussion in support of their own Bill. I now ask the Lord Chancellor. Here is a proposal—a voluntary proposal—which all the experts say will be a gain to both parties. Cannot we, who desire to con-
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sider this Bill in the national spirit of endeavouring to do something for the good of the whole industry, command the support of the Government for this very limited proposal, whatever course they make take with regard to the extension of hours and other proposals?
LORD DARYNGTON: I should like to join in the tribute to the noble Lord opposite on the way he has conducted this Bill through the House, and I should like to make one or two remarks in regard to his speech. It is a remarkable fact that probably not five per cent. of the people of this country have the slightest idea that we are legislating in this matter for a period of only about nine months, perhaps only six months. It is perfectly plain that, whatever happens, this Bill cannot be operative before October 1 next, and if it is only going to last till July 1 next year at the moat it can only operate for nine months. The noble Marquess below me (Lord Salisbury) said he did not feel inclined to vote for this Amendment. As one who has had some commercial experience, but is not an expert on coal mines, I should like to say how extraordinarily important this matter is from the point of view of sales forward. Any one who has had experience of sales in regard to iron or steel or any other commodity will realise that it is necessary to know under what conditions one can supply the material. If this Bill is going to pass in its present form and it is not known in the least whether the 7-hour provision is going to apply after next July the position will be made absolutely impossible. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, who said that 7 hours would be disastrous, must feel that it is necessary to decide whether this 7-hours provision is going to be operative after July next year or not.
I should like to refer to the question which arose in reference to the subsidy which was paid to the coal trade. The noble Lord, Lord Thomson, said coal owners had received certain advantages. I should like to point out one thing that is of very great importance, and that is that on the afternoon of the day on which the subsidy was arranged the coal owners protested both to Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland and to Mr. Baldwin against the concession, and those coal owners whom I know were very much opposed to this subsidy because it made the posi-

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tion impossible. There was at that time in the County of Durham a loss of over 4s. a ton on coal apart from the subsidy, and it was impossible for coal owners to make the slightest profit even with the subsidy. If the noble Lord will ask for the returns in regard to this particular point, I think he will find that no export colliery in the whole of the North of England, in spite of the subsidy, made any profit, or practically any profit during the whole year. Therefore, as far as the subsidy is concerned, nobody can say that anyone benefited, particularly from the coal owner's point of view, though, of course, it was an advantage to the miner to go on working instead of being out of work.
I want to ask your Lordships a very simple question. According to a statement made yesterday, the Secretary of the Ministry of Labour has announced that it is estimated that on April 28, 1930, there were approximately 9,798,900 insured persons aged 16 to 64 in employment in Great Britain. This was 89,500 fewer than a month before, and 448,300 fewer than a year before. The total number of unemployed persons on May 5, 1930, was 1,712,000. This was 13,614 more than a week before, and 579,295 more than a year before. I ask the noble Lord, whether he is an expert or not, is this really the time to increase the cost of production in one of the greatest trades in this country? According to his figures the cost would be 7d. a ton. That is not the figure which I have estimated from the information I have received, but if it is only 7d. a ton this really is a very serious time to consider any suggestion of the kind.
I should like to refer once more to the statement of the noble Marquess below me regarding the suggestion of a spread-over. I put it in a different way to that in which it has been placed before your Lordships in the very able speeches of Lord Melchett and Lord Gainford. There are 336 hours in a fortnight. It is suggested that it should be possible for a man to work 90 hours out of those 336. I quite understand that the miners' representatives in the House of Commons and a very large number of men in the coal fields would like fewer hours than they have at the present time. That is a natural feeling
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on the part of everybody engaged in any kind of arduous work in the world. At the same time they might ask themselves this question: In view of the fact that practically no coal exporting firms are paying any dividends at all and have not paid any dividends for years and that there is this large number of men out of work in the North of England and in Wales, is the difference between 7½ hours average per day per week and 7½ hours per day so great as to make it necessary to increase unemployment, which is sure to result from this?
The noble Earl below the gangway spoke rather against the opinion of experts. I do not pose as an expert, but I do not agree with him, particularly because I believe that nothing in this world would be much more popular in England to-day than a tax upon imported steel. It is a most peculiar fact that we have now come to a position of things exactly in opposition to free trade in almost every respect, both in regard to the regulations of trade unions and this Bill. No one could suggest for a moment that there was any free trade in this Bill. The Bill is opposed to it in every respect. To-day we are welcoming steel which comes from foreign countries and is made with coal raised by miners who are paid about 4s. 6d., while we are taking the steps we are taking in regard to our own people. I thank your Lordships very much for listening to my remarks on these questions. I would appeal to the noble Lord opposite to consider whether, in the circumstances, it would not be wise to take a very broad view of the situation. The difference between 7½ hours average and an actual 7½hour day is not sufficient to have a crisis in the country. It is not so very important from any point of view, except that of the general trade and general industries of the whole country.
LORD JOICEY: It is not my intention to occupy more than a few minutes of your Lordships' time because I have not been able, unfortunately, to hear all the arguments of the noble and gallant Lord in favour of the Bill and many of those put forward by noble Lords who are opposed to it. But I am bound to say, from what I heard of the speech of the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition, that I thought he had got hold of the right question in connection with

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this matter—what is the reason that the owners are so much opposed to this reduction in the hours? It is simply because they believe that the industry cannot afford it.
I could give your Lordships facts showing perfectly clearly that if you press this matter it will become a much more serious thing than you realise. In my judgment there must, of necessity, be considerable unemployment. Take the case of the County of Durham. Three years ago the coal trade in the County of Durham was more prosperous than it is at present. The owners made a bargain with their workmen to guarantee the wages at 65 per cent. above the pre-War basis. What happened? Prices came down and, instead of getting prices which would enable them to pay these wages, they had to use money out of their own pockets. There was a condition in the agreement that if there was any advance the advance, of course, should not be made until any deficit had been cleared off. What is the position to-day? There is a deficit of no less than £7,000,000 which has been paid by the coal owners in the County of Durham in wages which they have not been able to get out of the prices realised. That, surely, is a fact which ought to strike very forcibly anyone who is not an expert in this matter.
Another point that never seems to be made but is a very important one, I think, is that the hours which are fixed for the men to be underground are not necessarily hours of hard work. Many of the workmen work at a considerable distance from the bottom of the shaft and they are allowed a certain time, in some cases 15 and in others 20 minutes, to go in and come out. In cases where they are working sea coal the men have to go a considerable distance in, and the time so occupied is taken off the hours which are supposed to be hours of work. I think that ought to be understood by many noble Lords who really do not know. What is the result of shortening the hours? The shortening does not come from the time occupied in reaching the working places. That remains the same, whether men work 7 or 8 hours. It comes off the actual time occupied in producing coal and that, of course, makes a considerable difference.
I know that the miners are a fine body of men. I have been associated with
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them all my life and have a great respect for them. I have never forgotten how during the War the difficulty was to prevent them going into the Army and fighting. We had to take some means of stopping them from going into the Army, so anxious were they to help the country in the difficult times which had come upon it. The case we put forward is this. The industry cannot afford the shortening of hours. We have competition abroad, but I shall not go into that now. I hope your Lordships will accept the position stated by my noble friends, Lord Gainford and Lord Melchett, and if you do that I think you will do good, not only to the owners and miners but to everybody concerned in the industry, and to the country. We are in great difficulties at the present time. I have lived and known the coal trade a very long time, and I have never seen the condition of the industry so hopeless, almost, as it is at the present time. I hope your Lordships will take the action which I urge you to take in this matter.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I will not detain your Lordships more than a very few minutes, and I ask your indulgence for speaking at all. I wish to point out that we have in fact been discussing two Amendments together, and I am not quite sure whether all of your Lordships who have not been following the whole of the debate will exactly appreciate what the effect of our votes may be. The great bulk of the discussion has been on what we have called the spread-over—that is to say, the power to allow the miners to work 90 hours a fortnight instead of 7½ hours a day. That is not the Amendment upon which we are going to divide. The arguments in favour of that Amendment—I speak only for myself—seem to me to be overwhelming, and I am not going to take up your Lordships' time by reiterating them, but the Amendment which we are about to divide upon, I hope very shortly, is the Amendment which proposes that instead of this Bill being a Bill to shorten the hours in the mines it shall be turned into a Bill to lengthen hours in the mines—that is to say, that the effect of the Bill shall be made to extend the 7½ hours for another four years beyond July, 1931. I hope I may have your Lordships' indulgence if I beg of you not to vote in favour of the

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Amendment, but to follow the advice which my noble and learned friend the Leader of the Opposition—
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am not learned.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: The noble Marquess makes his points with such accuracy and lucidity that I may be pardoned if I wish to claim him as a member of my own profession. My noble friend the Leader of the Opposition has urged your Lordships to vote against the Amendment, and I will tell your Lordships why I venture to stress that advice. Whether this Bill be a good Bill or a bad Bill—
A NOBLE LORD: It is a bad Bill.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: It may be it is a bad Bill, but whichever it be there is no doubt the genesis of the Bill was that during last year promises and expectations were held out by the Socialist Party at the Election that they would shorten the hours in the mines, and the purpose of the Bill is to implement that promise to a certain extent, but not to the full extent to which it was made, by reducing the hours to 7½ for a period, as it turns out, of eight months. If the Amendment is carried we turn this Bill into a Bill to lengthen the hours in the mine. It becomes then Bill to make the men work half-an-hour less for eight months, and half-an-hour more for four years. It is impossible to suppose either that the House of Commons or that the Government could pass such an Amendment. It certainly will not have the support, for what it is worth, of the Conservative Party in another place. It will have, therefore, the unanimous condemnation of the House of Commons, and it might very likely, I should think, create such an atmosphere that it will be impossible to insist on other Amendments which we have already carried and which I hope the Government may quite reasonably be persuaded to accept. We shall destroy our chance of achieving anything useful, and we cannot do any good, because nobody can suppose we can ever hope to make it into law. I hope on those grounds your Lordships will see fit to follow the advice of my noble friend Lord Salisbury, and vote against the Amendment which is immediately to be put,
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and, I hope, afterwards vote in favour of the Amendment for the spread-over which follows.
Loan MELCHETT: I feel myself in a difficult position as the mover of this Amendment in view of the speeches made both by the noble Marquess and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. On the Second Reading of this Bill I pointed out that if this Part of the Bill is only to remain in force till 31st July, 1931, it was really wasting your Lordships' time to bring you here to discuss the Bill at all. For the noble Marquess to say stand firm against all comers and against all attempts on something that is going to last only six months, seems to me little short of ludicrous. We had much better have the seven hours now and have finished with it. What is the use of the elaborate argument of the spread-over for six months? I am not speaking now as to what the Government has pledged itself to. I am not concerned with the Government. I am not a supporter of the Government; I am an opponent of it. I am not here to implement its pledges. I am not here to help it to carry out its pledges. If I am here for any purpose it surely is to prevent something being done which is going to do the greatest damage to the industry of this country. For that the Government must take its own responsibility.
What is the argument? I said it specifically, and I repeat, that the time mentioned in the Amendment is merely a question of form. If the time were not extended beyond the 31st July next year, obviously the cushion which the noble and gallant Lord spoke about is too small to be of any value. The noble and gallant Lord never really dealt with that point at all. He admitted it was meant to be a cushion, and he must now admit that the cushion is smaller than it was intended to be when we began. He never indicated in any way that he was prepared to make the cushion somewhat larger. That is really the point at which this Amendment is aimed.
Let me go a little further. I deny entirely that this Government has any moral authority such as Governments have had in the past. This Government is a Minority Government. It represents a minority of voters in the country, and a minority of members of the House of Commons. Therefore I maintain that in

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dealing with this question the Government is in an entirely different position from that which used to be occupied by Governments in the House of Commons when they represented, at any rate as a rule, the majority of the electors of this country, and certainly represented the majority of the elected members in the House of Commons. This Bill has never had any kind of majority in the House of Commons. Look at the Division lists. They show that the Bill really has no great moral sanction. The Government cannot get up by its representatives and say it will not look at reasonable Amendments which have been introduced, if this House puts in any Amendment which the Government do not like. If that is its attitude it is so unreasonable that it would be condemned by the country which, after all, will be our final tribunal of appeal.
It is obvious to everyone who understands the industry who has spoken, and it is obvious to anyone who examines carefully the situation, that the period during which this change is made must be lengthened, and lengthened fairly substantially, and the whole object of the discussion has really become futile if we are to be debarred from even expressing our own views on it, because of something that may happen somewhere where we have neither power nor responsibility. Surely we are putting this House in a position in which it can exercise no influence in the country. Our appeal is outside to the country. The country is looking to this House to-day more and more, and is beginning to take an interest in this House because this House takes action of its own. I believe the country has more belief in the unprejudiced views of those who sit in this House than in any other body of men to-day. But if we keep running away from arguments what is the man outside
to think? He will think we are not actuated by what we think are the best interests of the people but by all kinds of interests which he cannot understand. Nothing is more unpleasant than to have to take action opposed to noble Lords on the Front Bench, who must perhaps be influenced from a somewhat different angle. But I do not feel that I should be doing myself justice—after all I have some position in this country as representing industry which is more to me than politics—if I withdrew an Amendment which I adumbrated on Second Reading and on which I based my whole case.
LORD GAINFORD: May I add one word and it is really a very practical word? I want to say that in connection with our trade it is quite impossible for us to make contracts ahead, especially with foreign countries, if there is a prospect in the next few months of another Bill being introduced in the House of Commons. Surely we ought to deal with hours to-day. It is quite open to any future Parliament, if the state of trade justifies going back to the 7-hour day, to introduce a measure to deal with it, but we ought not to feel that there is the possibility of going back to 7 hours next June. The whole industry will be upset if there is to be no stability and peace. It is in the interests of peace that I desire that this Amendment should be passed. Of course if in another place it is rejected and your Lordships take another view later, then we may perhaps be in a different position. But at the same time I do agree with Lord Melchett that we are only consistent in carrying out what we believe to be the right policy in trying to secure a settlement for a few years.
On Question, Whether the said words shall be there inserted?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 65: Not-Contents, 85.

CONTENTS.

Northumberland, D.

Fitzwilliam, E.

Falkland, V.

Rutland, D.

Grey, E.

FitzAlan of Derwent, V.

Halsbury, E.

Novar, V.

Ailesbury, M.

Inchcape, E.

Linlithgow, M.

Lauderdale, E.

Aberdare, L.

Winchester, M.

Macclesfield, E.

Aldenham, L.

Zetland, M.

Midleton, E.

Annaly, L.

Rosslyn, E.

Arundell of Wardour, L.

Abingdon, E.

Askwith, L.

Clarendon, E.

Chaplin, V.

Banbury of Southam, L.

Denbigh, E.

Churchill, V.

Biddulph, L.

Eldon, E.

Elibank, V.

Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

Daryngton, L.

Joicey, L.

St. John of Bletso, L.

Doverdale, L.

Lamington, L.

Swansea, L.

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Lawrence, L.

Trenchard, L.

Forester, L.

Leconfield, L.

Vernon, L.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

Melchett, L. [Teller.]

Vivian, L.

Gainford, L. [Teller.]

Middleton, L.

Wargrave, L.

Glanusk, L.

Newton, L.

Wavertree, L.

Hastings, L.

Oxenfoord, L. (E. Stair.)

Weir, L.

Hindlip, L.

Queenborough, L.

Wester Wemyss, L.

Illingworth, L.

Rathcreedan, L.

Wharton, L.

Jessel, L.

Remnant, L.

Wynford, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Sankey, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Falmouth, V.

Fairhaven, L.

Hailsham, V.

FitzWalter, L.

Parmoor, L. (L. President.)

Hereford, V.

Gage, L. (V. Gage.)

Hood, V.

Hampton, L.

Wellington, D.

Hutchinson, V. (E. Donoughmore.)

Hanworth, L.

Hardinge of Penshurst, L.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Mersey, V.

Harris, L.

Bath, M.

Sumner, V.

Hawke, L.

Camden, M.

Hemphill, L.

Lansdowne, M.

Lincoln, L. Bp.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Reading, M.

Southwark, L. Bp.

Marley, L. [Teller.]

Salisbury, M.

Meldrum, L. (M. Huntly.)

Addington, L.

Merthyr, L.

Bathurst, E.

Alvingham, L.

Mildmay of Flete, L.

Beauchamp, E.

Amulree, L. [Teller.]

Monson, L.

Cranbrook, E.

Arnold, L.

O'Hagan, L.

De La Warr, E.

Bayford, L.

Olivier, L.

Dudley, E.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Ormathwaite, L.

Feversham, E.

Brancepeth, L. (V. Boyne.)

Passfield, L.

Iveagh, E.

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam.)

Ponsonby, L. (E. Bessborough.)

Lindsay, E.

Lindsey, E.

Clwyd, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Lucan, E.

Cottesloe, L.

Rayleigh, L.

Lytton, E.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Redesdale, L.

Onslow, E.

Cushendun, L.

Sandhurst, L.

Plymouth, E.

Darling, L.

Shandon, L.

Russell, E.

Dawnay, L. (V. Downe.)

Stanmore, L.

Selborne, E.

Deramore, L.

Templemore, L.

Stanhope, E.

Desborough, L.

Thomson, L.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

Dickinson, L.

Trevor, L.

Dynevor, L.

Wraxall, L.

Bertie of Thame, V.

Elphinstone, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

LORD GAINFORD LORD GAINFORD moved to add to subsection (1):—
"Provided that—

"(a) the substitution of the word 'half an hour' for the words 'one hour' in Section three of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1908, shall not apply as respects any mine at which, by agreement between representatives of employers and workmen, the daily hours below ground on an average taken over the twelve week days in any fortnight do not exceed the daily hours permissible under Section 1 of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1908, as amended by the Coal Mines Act, 1919, by more than the extension of half an hour made under Section three of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1908, as amended by the Coal Mines Act, 1926, and this section.

"(b) at any mine where an extension of time is in any week made under the said
718
Section three, the workmen, by agreement between representatives of employers and workmen, may, notwithstanding anything in the Coal Mines Act, 1908, as amended by any subsequent enactment, begin their period of work on the Saturday of that week before twenty-four hours have elapsed since the beginning of their last period of work, so long as at least eight hours have elapsed since the determination thereof."

The noble Lord said: I should explain that paragraph (b) of this proviso is merely a form of words designed to enable workmen, in the event of their accepting the spread-over that is provided for in the first paragraph, to leave their work at twelve o'clock on a Saturday, if it can be so arranged between the owners and the men. Under the Statute, at present no workman is allowed to go down a mine within twenty-four hours of having gone

719
into the mine before, and this proviso will allow him to go back two hours earlier than the Statute at present provides, if it is so determined under the arrangement with the employers. It will allow the man to leave work at twelve o'clock, so that he has the whole of Saturday afternoon to himself.
Resolved in the affirmative and Amendment agreed to accordingly.
LORD GAINFORD LORD GAINFORD moved, in subsection (2), to leave out from "operation" to the end of subsection (2), and insert "on the first day of January, nineteen
Amendment moved—
Page 20, line 32, at end insert the said proviso.—(Lord Gainford.)
On Question, Whether the said proviso shall be there inserted?—
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 123; Not-Contents, 16.

CONTENTS.

Northumberland, D.

Falkland, V.

Gainford, L.

Rutland, D.

Falmouth, V.

Glanusk, L.

Somerset, D.

FitzAlan of Derwent, V.

Hampton, L.

Wellington, D.

Hailsham, V.

Hanworth, L.

Hood, V.

Hardinge of Penshurst, L.

Ailesbury, M.

Hutchinson, V. (E. Donoughmore.)

Harris, L.

Bath, M.

Hastings, L.

Camden, M.

Mersey, V.

Hindlip, L.

Lansdowne, M.

Novar, V.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Linlithgow, M.

Illingworth, L.

Salisbury, M.

Lincoln, L. Bp.

Jessel, L.

Winchester, M.

Joicey, L.

Zetland, M,

Aberdare, L.

Lamington, L.

Addington, L.

Lawrence, L.

Abingdon, E.

Aldenham, L.

Leconfield, L.

Bathurst, E.

Alvingham, L.

Melchett, L.

Clarendon, E.

Annaly, L.

Meldrum, L. (M. Huntly.)

Cranbrook, E.

Arundell of Wardour, L.

Merthyr, L.

Denbigh, E.

Askwith, L.

Middleton, L.

Dudley, E.

Auckland, L.

Mildmay of Flete, L.

Eldon, E.

Banbury of Southam, L.

Monson, L.

Feversham, E.

Bayford, L.

Newton, L.

Fitzwilliam, E.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

O'Hagan, L.

Grey, E.

Biddulph, L.

Ormathwaite, L.

Halsbury, E.

Brancepeth, L. (V. Boyne.)

Oxenfoord, L. (E. Stair.)

Iveagh, E.

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam.)

Ponsonby, L. (E. Bessborough.)

Lauderdale, E.

Lindsey, E.

Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

Queenborough, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Cottesloe, L.

Redesdale, L

Lytton, E.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Remnant, L.

Macclesfield, E.

Cushendun, L.

Ritchie of Dundee, L.

Midleton, E.

Darling, L.

St. John of Bletso, L.

Onslow, E.

Daryngton, L.

Swansea, L.

Plymouth, E.

Dawnay, L. (V. Downe.)

Templemore, L.

Rosslyn, E.

Deramore, L.

Trenchard, L.

Selborne, E.

Desborough, L.

Trevor, L.

Stanhope, E.

Dynevor, L.

Vernon, L.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

Doverdale, L.

Vivian, L.

Elphinstone, L.

Wargrave, L.

Bertie of Thame, V.

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Wavertree, L.

Chaplin, V.

FitzWalter, L.

Weir, L.

Churchill, V.

Forester, L.

Wester Wemyss; L.

Elibank, V.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

Wraxall, L.

Gage, L. (V. Gage.) [Teller.]

Wynford, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Sankey, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Russell, E.

Hemphill, L.

Marley, L. [Teller.]

Parmoor, L. (L. President.)

Hereford, V.

Olivier, L.

Passfield, L.

Beauchamp, E.

Amulree, L. [Teller.]

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

De La Warr, E.

Arnold, L.

Thomson, L.

Lindsay, E.

Dickinson, L.

hundred and thirty-one." The noble Lord said: The object of this Amendment is to give a little more time before the Bill comes into operation. I have an alternative Amendment in my name to substitute six months for four months, and I am prepared, if the Government

721
are willing, to accept either of those alternatives. A great number of contracts are made to terminate towards the end of the year and a good many contracts have been made for months ahead with the expectation that the working costs would remain constant, and if the Bill comes into force before the termination of contracts heavy losses may accrue and if the costs of production are going to be increased by the Bill it is important that we should not lose a great deal of money owing to the Bill coming into operation at any earlier period. I hope the Government will accept one of these Amendments.
Amendment moved—
Page 20, line 33, leave out from ("operation") to the end of subsection (2) and insert ("on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-one.")—(Lord Gain-ford.)
LORD THOMSON: This Amendment really raises a rather inconvenient question. In the original Bill the Government put in a definite date for this change and then, owing to delays in passing the Bill in another place, it was provided that the Bill should come into operation four months after the passing of the measure. That period was fixed so as to allow as long an interval as possible for the new hours before the other change of hours. At the very best we shall only have nine months or a year, and the proposal of Lord Gainford would still further reduce the interval, so that it would be hardly worth while going on with this Part of the Bill at all if the Amendment were accepted. I should be very grateful if the noble Lord were satisfied with my explanation and would not press either of his Amendments.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 14, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 15:
Power to constitute Coal Mines National Industrial Board and functions thereof.
15.—(1) The Board of Trade may by order constitute a Coal Mines National Industrial Board (in this section referred to as the "National Board") cosisting of seventeen members appointed by the Board of Trade, so, however, that before appointing the members of the National Board other than the chairman, the Board of Trade shall consult the Mining Association of Great Britain as to six, the Miners Federation of Great Britain as to six, the Federation of British Industries and the Association of British
722
Chambers of Commerce as to one, and each of the following bodies as to one, that is to say—

The General Council of the Trade Union Congress;

The Co-operative Union;

The National Confederation of Employers' Organisations;

and before appointing any person to fill a vacancy among the members of the National Board, the Board of Trade shall consult the body which they were required by this section to consult before appointing his predecessor. The chairman of the National Board shall not be a member of any of the associations, federations, or unions mentioned in subsection (1) of this section.
(2) The Board of Trade may appoint a secretary to the National Board, and there shall be paid by the Board of Trade such remuneration (if any) to the chairman, such travelling and subsistence allowances to the chairman and members and such remuneration to the secretary of the National Board, and such other expenses of the National Board, as the Board of Trade, with the approval of the Treasury, may determine, and any expenses of the Board of Trade under this subsection shall be defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament.
(3) Any agreement between the owners of, and the workers employed in or about, the coal mines in any district providing for the regulation of wages or other conditions of labour throughout the coal mines in the district may be sent to the National Board, and it shall be the duty of the National Board to record any agreement so sent.
(4) Where there exists, or is apprehended, any dispute between the owners of and the workers employed in or about the coal mines in any district as to the terms of a proposed agreement between such owners and workers providing for the regulation of wages or other conditions of labour throughout the coal mines in the district, and there has been a failure to settle the dispute in accordance with the arrangements existing in the district for the settlement thereof, either the owners or the workers may refer the dispute to the National Board who shall thereupon inquire into the dispute and report thereon to the owners and workers concerned.
(5) The Board of Trade may make rules regulating the procedure of the National Board, and those rules may, among other things, provide—

(a) for enabling the National Board to act notwithstanding any vacancy in their number;

(b) for the hearing of a reference in public or in private, at the discretion of the National Board.

(6) There shall not be included in any report or publication made or authorised by the National Board any information, obtained by the National Board in the course of a reference to them, as to any trade union or as to any particular undertaking, which is not available otherwise than through

723
evidence given during the reference, except with the consent of the secretary of the trade union or of the owner of the undertaking in question, nor shall any individual member of the National Board or any person concerned in the reference, without such consent, disclose any such information, and any person who shall be guilty of disclosing any such information without such consent shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds.
LORD THOMSON LORD THOMSON moved, in subsection (1), after "The National Confederation of Employers' Organisations." to insert:—
"the Chairman of the National Board shall not be a member of any of the bodies aforesaid.
"(2)"
The noble Lord said: This and the following Amendments are tidying-up Amendments, re-arranging the order of the last part of the subsection. The provision that the Chairman should not be a member of any of the bodies from which the members of the Board are drawn should immediately follow the constitution of the Board instead of following the provision for the filling of vacancies.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 13, after ("and") insert the said words.—(Lord Thomson.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendments moved—
Page 21, line 15, after ("body") insert ("(if any)").
Page 21, line 17, leave out from the beginning to the end of line 19.—(Lord Thomson.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
LORD MELCHETT LORD MELCHETT moved, in subsection (4), before "a proposed agreement" to insert "an existing agreement or." The noble Lord said: I may be wrong but it appears to me that as the clause is drawn the National Board can do nothing at all if there is any apprehended dispute about any existing agreement. It can only deal with the terms of the proposed agreement. It seems to me it might very well hear a dispute about an existing agreement, and the operations of this body are just as useful in that case as in the case of the proposed agreement.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 40, after ("of") insert ("an existing agreement or").—(Lord Melchett.)
EARL RUSSELL: I cannot at the first blush see any harm in this Amendment. Subject to reconsideration, I will accept it at this stage.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MELCHETT LORD MELCHETT moved, in subsection (4), to leave out "either owners or the workers may refer the dispute to." The noble Lord said: The object is to make it obligatory on the National Board to inquire into a dispute which is actually anticipated, without waiting for the owners or the workers to bring it to the Board's notice. If the National Board has to wait it may have to wait till the time when feelings run so high that its chief function, that of an investigator and that of a judicial exponent of the trouble to the public, might already be very much prejudiced. It would be a very good thing to put the National Board in a position to operate, even if it is not called upon by either of the parties, when it thinks it necessary to do so.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, lines 1 and 2, leave out ("either owner or the workers may refer the dispute to.")—(Lord Melchett.)
EARL RUSSELL: This Amendment is not really very desirable, because it is not the intention that this clause should interfere with the existing conciliation machinery, or with the machinery which is provided by any existing agreements. What is really aimed at is a deadlock in the making of any district agreement, because in that dispute ex hypothesi there is no agreed machinery for settlement, and it is not intended to interfere by this clause with the machinery which already exists under an existing agreement. I hope the noble Lord will not press this.
LORD MELCHETT: No, certainly.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD MELCHETT LORD MELCHETT moved to add to subsection (4) "and such report shall be published in the London Gazette within seven days after the making thereof." The noble Lord said: The point is that a report should be published somewhere in a public document available to the public, the idea being that this Board should make a report to affect public opinion. I do not know whether the London Gazette is the best way of doing it, but it is the only official way we have.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 4, at end insert the said words.—(Lord Melchett.)
EARL RUSSELL: Is not this really leading up to the noble Lord's further Amendment as to making this clause compulsory? I rather fancy it is, and, if so, perhaps he would like to develop the whole of his argument at this stage. There can be no reason for publishing the Board's report in the London Gazette in the case of the mere conciliation machinery which it is proposed to set up.
LORD MELOHETT: One of the objects of this Board, I understand, is to inform public opinion, and if it is nowhere stated where they are to publish their report they may be at some loss as to what to do.
EARL RUSSELL: I would rather not accept that.
LORD MELCHETT: I do not press it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
VISCOUNT BERTIE OF THAME VISCOUNT BERTIE OF THAME moved, in subsection (6), after the first "Board," to insert "the members of which shall be required to make a declaration of secrecy in such form as may be prescribed by the Board of Trade." The noble Viscount said: I have studied this Bill very carefully, and I do not understand why under Clause 8 there is an obligation of secrecy on
"any person who obtains any information in the exercise of the powers conferred upon the council or upon any executive board by any scheme made in pursuance of this Part of this Act;"
whereas in the clause under discussion members of the National Board are under no pledge of secrecy, and get off with a much lighter penalty. I hope I am not over-suspicious, but it does seem to me that this Socialist Government is making one law for the rich and another for the poor.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 14, after ("Board") insert the said words.—(Viscount Bertie of Thome.)
EARL RUSSELL: I do not wish to say that the noble Viscount is suspicious, but he is certainly industrious, and he has a way of going through these Bills with a microscope, but I think I can
726
show him that this Amendment is quite unnecessary. The committee of investigation, with which he compares it, is a numerous body, and the number of members will be large. They will be able to insist upon inspection of books, and so on, and it is reasonable and proper to impose upon them stringent conditions as to secrecy, and to require them to make a declaration. But the National Industrial Board is in quite a different position. It is a single, carefully selected body of more or less public men, called upon to exercise functions in the national interest, and not in their own interest. They will learn no facts or figures except such as are submitted to them voluntarily, and they have no power to compel them to be disclosed unwillingly. Therefore, it hardly seems necessary to impose upon them a rather invidious requirement to make a declaration of secrecy, when they will really have no particular secrets.
VISCOUNT BERTIE OF THAME: I will not press the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD THOMSON: The next three Amendments are merely drafting.
Amendments moved—
Page 22, line 21, leave out ("nor shall") and insert ("and if")
Page 22, line 23, leave out ("disclose") and insert ("discloses")
Page 22, line 23, leave out from ("information") to ("shall") in line 25, and insert ("he").—(Lord Thomson.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
LORD GAINFORD LORD GAINFORD moved to leave out Clause 15. The noble Lord said: I want to emphasise the point made on Second Reading that this Part of the Bill is an unnecessary excrescence, and ought to be removed. The origin of it was entirely due to the fact that the mine owners declined to accept the invitation made to the leaders of the Miners' Federation. When we declined to meet the Miners' Federation, it was intimated that if we did not do so the Government would take some steps to secure another tribunal which would interfere with the industry. The tribunal set up is now called the National Industrial Board, but as coal owners who are associated with our miners, we resent this body being placed in a position to deal with settlements in connection with our

727
wages. After the cessation of operations in 1926 we entered into close intercourse with our workmen in the various districts. We have been working harmoniously with them ever since and there is an increasing tendency to settle all disputes locally without the intervention of anyone. Our conciliation boards enable us to do that rapidly and effectively to the satisfaction of both owners and men.
To set up a tribunal of this kind by Act of Parliament would merely mean delay in settling questions. If either side feels that by appealing to another body there is the possibility of getting some further point than they have already got in the negotiations, those negotiations will be suspended, a settlement will be delayed for some time and there will be friction and hostility. That sort of result is engendered by a proposal of this kind. I know that I am voicing the views of all organised mine owners when I say that we would much prefer to be left to settle our own differences with our men in the districts than have a tribunal of this kind brought into existence by Statute. Therefore, I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 15.—(Lord Gainford.)
LORD JOICEY: This is a very important Amendment indeed. For many years in the north of England we have been able to negotiate directly with our workmen and I think the appointment of such an authority as the Bill provides will have a very prejudicial effect upon our negotiations. We have the very best feeling for each other on both sides. But since the Government have been dealing with the London authorities, that is the Miners' Federation, some of our local and district committees have been practically closed down. They want us to take everything to London. These district committees have been practically like the Whitley Councils, only they were established many years before those Councils and we have found great benefit from them. We have saved many strikes. I think it would be very unfortunate if the two parties were compelled to come to a London authority, and it would be very much better if you left us as we are. The great thing is to bring employers and workmen together as much as possible, because that is always a very great
728
advantage in dealing with various matters in which there is difficulty. There is the best of feeling between the men and the owners, and the mere meeting round a table to discuss matters is such an advantage that I hope this Amendment will be pressed.
Loan AMULREE: I will ask your Lordships to reject this Amendment. In my opinion Part IV is the most important Part of this Bill. It is a step towards industrial peace, and the key to industrial prosperity is peace—peace between nations and peace in industry. Happily we have peace between nations, and I am sure the effect of this clause in the Bill will be a step towards peace in industry. Your Lordships will observe that the object of the clause is merely to deal with disputes or apprehended disputes that may arise in any district as to the terms of a proposed agreement between owners and workers providing for the regulation of wages or other conditions of labour in the district. It, therefore, only deals with two great questions—the regulation of wages and the general conditions of labour in the district. By itself the setting up of this Board merely fills a gap which is not closed at the present time. The idea is that a matter does not come before the National Industrial Board unless there has been a failure to settle a dispute locally. That being so, the matter can only come before the Board after it has been thrashed out locally by the district boards or the conciliation boards and there has been failure to agree.
One of the great drawbacks in the industrial machinery for the coal industry for some time past has been that there existed no central body, no national body to which reference could be made where the local machinery had broken down. The Whitley Committee, presided over by Mr. Speaker Whitley, recommended in their Report that there should be set up in the various industries what they called joint industrial councils and that those joint industrial councils should consist of an equal number of persons representing the employees and an equal number representing the management. They made this further recommendation in the event of disagreement. Those bodies being composed of equal numbers from each side there might be a deadlock if they disagreed and the Committee re-

729
commended that there should be a general arbitration board to which reference could be made in the event of such disagreement. That was adopted in the Act of 1919 which set up the Industrial Court. Certain industries, however, preferred to go their own way. You find that in the case of the railway industry, the tramway industry and one or two other industries, which, instead of going to the Industrial Court, have special machinery of their own to decide those matters which the local councils cannot decide.
The National Railways Board was set up under the Railway Act of 1921 in respect of disputes arising in the railway industry which could not be settled by the local or central board in that industry. Such disputes went to the National Wages Board and that Board, similar in constitution to the Board proposed in the Bill, has dealt successfully with disputes in the railway industry for the last ten years and has secured the confidence of the management of the railways and the workpeople in its deliberations. The other industry which started a similar board was the tramway industry. There you have a joint industrial council under the scheme of the Whitley Committee, and in the event of no agreement being reached in the joint industrial council the question is taken to a tribunal or board similarly constituted to the Board proposed in this Bill. In that respect, therefore, if you allow the existing machinery of the coal industry to stand as it is, there wilt always be a difficulty, where the local conciliation or the district board is unable to come to an agreement, of arriving at a final settlement, and there is the danger of the difficulty continuing and becoming a very serious dispute.
There are in some districts independent Chairmen of those boards to whom a matter might be referred in the event of disagreement; but in many of those districts the matters which can be referred to him are limited in number, while in other districts there is no such official at all, no independent Chairman, and in other districts again there is no conciliation machinery which can deal with these disputes. Therefore you find that under the existing machinery in the coal industry, we have district boards and conciliation boards sometimes with an in dependent Chairman with only limited
730
powers and sometimes with an independent Chairman with full powers; and in some districts there is no conciliation machinery at all. It is very essential for the sake of peace in the industry that a body of this kind should be set up.
Another important element of this Board is the introduction of what might be called a non-coal element in the constitution of the Board. You have in the constitution of the Board as proposed several members representing the coal owners, and an equal number representing the workmen, and, in addition to those, you have a number of members representing persons not directly concerned with the industry. In my judgment that is a most important and beneficial provision. You will get the experience of people interested and experienced in other industries, and you bring their knowledge, long training and experience to bear upon this particular industry in any dispute that might arise in it. In this way you are able to overcome difficulties which might not otherwise be overcome in an acute dispute between the men on the one side and the employers on the other. With such a body you will be able to arrive more speedily at a decision which would be unanimous, and which, generally, would give satisfaction to the whole industry.
It has been said with regard to this particular industry that one district differs so much from another district that you cannot possibly have any national opportunity of this kind to deal satisfactorily with the disputes that may arise. I do not think that is a serious objection, and for this reason. The National Board will be composed of members drawn from all parts of the coal industry—members who represent the districts. It will also have upon it men representing outside interests, whether they be those of the consumer or other interests. Whoever they represent they will be outside persons or bodies, and they will bring to bear the views of those who are outside the industry. Thereby you will be able to arrive at a settlement much more efficiently and much more effectively than if the negotiations were allowed to drag on, and some stranger had at last to be called in by the Board of Trade or by the Minister of Labour to settle the matter.
Further, the questions in dispute are general questions, and are simple in their

731
nature. They are the regulation of the conditions of labour throughout the coal field; they are conditions affecting not a particular pit in the coal field but are of a general nature, affecting the conditions of labour throughout the coal mines in the district. You are, therefore, only dealing with general questions and not with special questions, which might require more technical knowledge, and those general questions, I think, will be more effectively settled by a body selected in this way. When these district boards were set up it was said they could not operate because one pit differed so much from another pit. You had differences of seam, differences in the temperature of seams, and so on, but all those difficulties doubtless were overcome, and you did have these district boards, where they had been set up, dealing effectively with general questions affecting the conditions of labour, and also with the rates of wages. If any matter of this kind does come before the National Board, so far as it affects wages it will be such a question as the district percentage, the subsistence allowance, the hours and the general conditions of labour in the district. That being so I hope your Lordships will allow the clause to pass without amendment.
LORD MELCHETT: I do not want to detain your Lordships at this hour, but I would like to say a word in support of this clause. I hope my noble friend Lord Gainford will withdraw his Amendment. I do not like this Bill, but the only clause in it that I do like is Clause 15, because it is really making a step forward in the movement for industrial peace, and it follows extremely closely the lines which were laid down in the Report of the Melchett-Turner Conference, in which a similar idea was evolved, after a very long discussion between those representing the employers and the trade unions, as to how to obtain not merely the views of those concerned in the dispute but also outside opinion from people who were interested. It has always appeared to me a curious view, taken both by the coal owners and the coal miners, that they were the only people interested in a coal strike. They entirely overlook the fact that the whole of the industries in the country are affected. Their attitude has been:
732
"You get out of the ring, and leave us to settle the thing." Generally, they have entirely failed to settle it.
I have vivid recollections of the last coal strike in which I myself with others had worked out possible terms of settlement, some of which could have been obtained at an earlier date to the interest of everybody, but we were all warned out of the ring at the outset, and told: "You leave this to Mr. So-and-so, and Mr. So-and-so; they are the only people in the kingdom qualified to deal with the subject." You meet with the same difficulty whenever you propose to do something. I think the Coalowners' Association would welcome some machinery which would introduce a body like the Federation of Employers or the Federation of British Industries into consultation. That would widen the atmosphere in disputes, and I think it would be to the interests of the coal industry. People have very great objections to arbitration. One advantage of arbitration is that somebody else on your behalf may give something which you feel you cannot possibly give away yourself. One of the chief reasons why people do give way in disputes is that they are afraid, not of that particular demand, but of the next demand that is coming, and if you are to have somebody from outside to assist you in arriving at a settlement I think it is a very great advantage.
This is a very mild clause and surely it might be given a chance. I do not believe in the legend that people do not settle things if they have to go through a tribunal on which there are sitting people outside the particular industry concerned. I think, when it comes to the point, that those who are concerned in the settlement of some dispute will feel so ashamed of appealing before any independent body of people having power to settle their troubles, that they will be much more likely to settle them than if they were simply allowed to quarrel with each other indefinitely, and carry on disastrous strikes to their hearts' content. I therefore hope the House will reject the Amendment, and that this clause at any rate will be allowed to stand as one which, I think, is a real step forward to industrial peace.
LORD THOMSON: The Government are in full agreement with the noble Lord who has just spoken. We look upon

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Clause 15 as an indispensable part of the Bill, and hope the noble Lord, Lord Gainford, will not press his Amendment.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: May I venture to support the plea which has been made by the noble Lord behind me and re-echoed by the noble Lord opposite, that the noble Lord, Lord Gainford, should not press his Amendment? I hate being in conflict with him on this question—I have already been so once this evening and I should very much regret to be so again—but as we have always stood for conciliation in trade disputes in all political activities in which I have been connected, I think it would have a very odd appearance if we struck out this clause, which is a singular one in being the only one which the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, admires.
LORD GAINFORD: I can only hope that the clause will not be found to do any harm, although I do not expect it to be of very great value. However, in the circumstances and in view of the appeal made to me I beg leave to withdraw.
LORD JOICEY: I confess I do not agree with the withdrawal but, of course, after the appeal that has been made I cannot object. At the same time I must say I think it would be very much better if we were allowed to deal with these matters in our own localities, where we know each other and have good feelings towards each other. That, I think, is very much better than sending these questions to be dealt with by a Board in London.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 15, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 16:
Application of 52 & 53 Viet. c. 49.
16.—(1) The provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1889, shall not apply to any reference to the Coal Mines National Industrial Board, except in so far as any of the said provisions may be applied by the rules made under Part IV of this Act.
(2) No scheme or rules approved or made under Part I of this Act shall exclude the application of the Arbitration Act, 1889, to any arbitration held in pursuance of that Part of this Act except in so far as that Act is inconsistent with that Part of this Act:
Provided that where on any such arbitration an award is stated in the form of a special case for the opinion of the court under paragraph (b) of Section seven of that Act the decision of the High Court thereon shall be final.
THE EARL OF HALSBURY THE EARL OF HALSBURY moved to omit the proviso in subsection (2). The noble Earl said: This is a very small but perhaps an important Amendment. I do not know whether I should say that one can see the cloven hoof or whether I should say the clutching hand of the bureaucratic drafters of the Bill, but evidently they dislike my profession very much. Although they may occasionally let us have something to do with it they try to keep us out as much as they can. Why is it that the ordinary right of appeal given to a person who goes to arbitration is cut out of this Bill? There may be some very important matters which are the subject of arbitration. The last speech from the other side of the House seemed rather to point to the fact that arbitration is a very important matter, but here you have to stop absolutely dead at the first Court. There is no appeal to the Court of Appeal and no appeal to the House of Lords.
The sole object of my Amendment is to secure that the ordinary rights of appeal in litigation which are given to the ordinary person in this country should not be withheld from people who have to deal with matters which are certainly as important as ordinary commercial cases, if not more so, when they deal with questions which are raised in Part IV of the Bill. The last speech from the other side of the House seemed to me to suggest that Part IV is one of the most important, and yet persons are not to be allowed to have the ordinary right of appeal. For that reason I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, leave out from beginning of line 39 to the end of the clause.—(The Earl of Halsbury.)
LORD AMULREE: Perhaps I may be allowed to deal with the point raised by the noble Earl as he has referred to something which I said. Arbitration under Clause 16 of the Bill does not relate to any arbitration that may arise under Clause 15. It relates to disputes that may arise under Part I.
THE EARL OF HALSBURY: Certainly.
LORD AMULREE: I thought the noble Earl was referring to arbitration under Clause 15.
THE EARL OF HALSBURY: Oh, no.
LORD AMULREE: The matter is somewhat technical. Under the Arbitration Act, 1889, there are two forms of appeal from the decision of an arbitrator. There is one section of the Act which says that the arbitrator shall state a case for the opinion of the Court. If he does that and the matter goes to the High Court there is no appeal from the decision of that tribunal. The other provision in the Arbitration Act is that after an arbitrator has made up his mind and decided on his award he may publish his award in the form of a special case. In that event, should the case go to the High Court, there is an appeal to the Court of Appeal and from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords. I think the noble Earl will agree that that is a fair statement of the statutory provision.
The EARL OF HALSBURY: No, certainly not.
LORD AMULREE: I am sorry, but that is so.
THE EARL OF HALSBURY: May I call the noble Lord's attention to a particular case? The first procedure which the noble Lord has suggested is only adopted if it is asked for by one of the parties to the arbitration. That case arises in the middle of the arbitration, the arbitration is suspended and the matter goes to the High Court—that is, to the Divisional Court—which will give an opinion on the point of law that is raised. That was done in the Dunlop case when the arbitrator was the late Sir Alfred Lyttelton. He got a decision from the High Court from which he could not appeal and nobody could appeal. I quite agree with that. But he put that decision straight into his award at the end, whereupon that award was upset by this House on the ground that, the decision made the award bad on the face of it.
LORD AMULREE: I do not think there is really any difference between the noble Earl and myself, but in order to make the matter clear may I read Section 19 of the Arbitration Act, 1889. That section says:—
"Any referee, arbitrator, or umpire may at any stage of the proceedings under a reference, and shall, if so directed by the Court or a Judge, state in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Court any question of law arising in the course of the reference."
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If he does that and is required to state a case there is no appeal from the decision.
THE EARL OF HALSBURY: I quite agree.
LORD AMULREE: The other case is where an arbitrator has finished his hearing and has a doubt as to a point of law. He gives his award in the form of a special case, and in that event the case goes to the High Court and there is an appeal to the Court of Appeal and from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords. All the arbitrations that may arise under this Bill are arbitrations which may arise under Part I of the Bill, and your Lordships will recollect that it comes to an end in December, 1931. As far as I can gather, the object of the clause is to limit this litigation as much as possible. The Bill will come to an end in 1931.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: The noble Lord is mistaken. He has not looked at the Bill. It is 1932.
LORD AMULREE: I beg pardon, I have not the Bill before me. It was a slip. It comes to an end in December, 1932. Litigation from the inception, from the arbitration through the various Courts, the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, will take eighteen months or at any rate a year.
THE EARL OF HALSBURY: No.
LORD AMULREE: Well, certainly it would take a very long time. It is considered, therefore, that it would be much better that where there is an appeal from an arbitrator, whether it is stated during the course of the proceedings or after the proceedings are over, and the appeal goes to the High Court, it should be subject to this limitation. One difficulty which one can conceive is that litigation might be still pending and appeals going from Court to Court when this Bill had come to an end. That might give rise to very difficult questions and to serious and complicated legal questions. In order to make the matter simpler I suggest that the clause in the Bill should be allowed to stand and all litigation limited to one appeal to the High Court and the High Court only. For these reasons I submit that the noble Earl's Amendment should be rejected.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I rather hope that the Government will reconsider their attitude in this matter. The position is this. Under Part I of the Bill arbitration is provided in the case of any coal owner who is aggrieved by a scheme and, in the case of any consumer, if the committee of investigation sends it to arbitration under Clause 5. It is quite clear, I think, that matters of the most serious importance may easily arise for arbitration under that Part. I think the Government would not dispute that proposition. The effect of the words which my noble friend Lord Halsbury wishes to omit is to provide that it shall not be possible to get the opinion either of the Court of Appeal or of the House of Lords on any of these points, however important they may be, although in ordinary arbitration, even on comparatively small commercial matters, the parties can go to the House of Lords. That seems to me to be unfair to the parties affected.
It is perfectly true that there are two alternative means of obtaining the opinion of the Court under the Arbitration Act. In one of them there is no appeal and in the other there is. The result of that is that the one in which there is no appeal is much less used than the other, and, where it is used, what happens is that the result of the first application to the Court is put into the special cases and thereby becomes subject to appeal to the Court of Appeal and to the House of Lords. In practice, therefore, the result of having the two alternatives is that the second, which gives the appeal, is the one which the parties always ultimately adopt. It seems to me a little unfair that, where matters of very grave importance to the parties are going to be determined by arbitration, they should be deprived of the ordinary right which they would have in any other arbitration under the ordinary law.
With regard to the question of delay, it is perfectly easy, as the noble Lord knows and as I have myself experienced, to get a hearing expedited in proper cases. Where, as here, it is a mere point of law—and it must necessarily be a point of law when it is stated in that form—it will be easier to get it expedited. It may easily be disposed of by the Court of Appeal in a very few
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weeks. I have had that experience. When there is any urgency, both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords are only too glad to expedite the hearing. I do not think, therefore, that the noble and learned Lord's objection is a fatal one, and I hope that in the circumstances the Government will see their way to give way on what, after all, is not a point of cardinal importance.
LORD THOMSON: Your Lordships will perceive that the dragon has four heads, and I have listened with the greatest pleasure to the fourth head. I have noticed that even the most eminent lawyers can differ from one another. I should like to point out that this matter was considered at very great length in another place, that the appeal was not in the Bill as originally presented and that this clause was inserted at the instigation and on the Motion of Sir Boyd Merriman, who, I think, worked in close co-operation with the noble and learned Viscount recently.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: He took what he could get.
LORD THOMSON: May I offer a compromise, if we promise to consider this matter carefully between now and Report?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Without prejudice to our right to raise it again.
LORD THOMSON: Without prejudice of any sort or kind.
THE EARL OF HALSBURY: By leave of the House, I will withdraw the Amendment, but may I call the attention of the noble Lord opposite to the fact that, if he were a, practising barrister, he would not be quite so certain that these cases will take a long time to come on in the Court of Appeal. There is not too much work going on.
EARL RUSSELL: I thought the noble Earl had moved this Amendment partly on trade union grounds.
THE EARL OF HALSBURY: On the instructions of my trade union leader.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 16 agreed to.
Remaining Clauses agreed to.
Schedule:
LORD THOMSON: I have a drafting Amendment to the Schedule, on account of the fact that the passing of the Bill will have been delayed much longer than the Government originally anticipated.
Amendment moved—
Page 26, line 15, leave out ("July, nineteen hundred and thirty") and insert ("January, nineteen hundred and thirty-one").—(Lord Thomson.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: May I take this opportunity of asking the Government a question as to the future stages of the Bill? I hope they will not expect us to approach the arduous labours of the Report stage too hastily.
LORD THOMSON: It is proposed that we should take the Report stage this day week—Thursday next.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: On that point, perhaps I may say that I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, but suppose we leave it like this: that perhaps I may have an opportunity of a word or two with the Leader of the House, and in case it may appear in the course of the next day or two that the interval is not sufficient, I shall not be considered to have committed a breach of faith if I ask him to prolong it.
House resumed.
House adjourned at twenty minutes past seven o'clock.

KINGSTON UPON HULL CORPORATION BILL.
Report from the Committee of Selection, That the five Lords appointed a Select Committee on the Torquay and Paignton Traction Bill [H.L.] and other Bills do form the Select Committee for the consideration of the Kingston upon Hull Corporation Bill: Read, and agreed to: All Petitions referred to the Committee, with leave to the Petitioners praying to be heard by Counsel against the Bill to be heard as desired, as also Counsel for the Bill.
LONDON MIDLAND AND SCOTTISH RAILWAY (No. 1) BILL.
Report from the Committee of Selection, That the Lord Teynham be proposed to the House as a member of the Select Committee on the said Bill in the place of the Viscount Mersey; Read, and agreed to.

REDCROSS STREET BURIAL GROUND (BRISTOL) BILL. [H.L.]
Petition for additional provision; of Veno Trust Limited; together with proposed
742
amendments and schedule annexed thereto: Read, and referred to the Examiners.

LLANELLY DISTRICT TRACTION BILL. [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
LONDON UNITED TRAMWAYS BILL. [H.L.]
Leave given to the Select Committee to continue sitting in the absence of the Lord Monkswell.

REDCAR GAS ORDER, 1930.
Special Order proposed to be made on the application of the Mayor, aldermen and burgesses of the Borough of Redcar:
Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) and referred to the Special Orders Committee.

KINGSBRIDGE AND SALCOMBE WATER BOARD BILL.
  ROCHDALE CORPORATION (No. 2) BILL.
  Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and referred to the Examiners.