Sitting of 2 August 1928

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
THE PROROGATION.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, I understand that there is no possibility of holding the Royal Commission until about 2 o'clock to-morrow afternoon. I suggest, therefore, to your Lordships that we should meet at 1.45. There will be no business, I imagine, for your Lordships to transact except being present at the Royal Commission. As I am on my legs, I might take the opportunity of telling your Lordships that the new Session of Parliament is to begin on November 6.
THEATRICAL EMPLOYERS REGIS TRATION (AMENDMENT) BILL. [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT BILL.
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments, agreed to.
RACECOURSE BETTING BILL.
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments, agreed to.
RATING AND VALUATION (APPORTIONMENT) BILL.
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments, agreed to.

HULL GAS ORDER, 1928.
THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH: My Lords, I beg to move that the Special Order standing in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Peel, be approved.
Moved, That the Special Order which was presented on the 3rd of July last be approved.—(The Earl of Plymouth.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

WREXHAM GAS ORDER, 1928.
THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH: My Lords, I beg to move that this Special Order be approved.
Moved, That the Special Order which was presented on the 12th of July last be approved.—(The Earl of Plymouth.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

CHESHAM ELECTRICITY (EXTEN SION) ORDER, 1928.
  BOURNE GAS ORDER, 1928.

    DURSLEY GAS (No. 2) ORDER, 1928.
    THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH: My Lords, I beg to move that these Orders be approved.
    Moved, That the Special Orders which were presented on the 16th of July last be approved.—(The Earl of Plymouth.)
    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    BILSTON GAS ORDER, 1928
    LINCOLN GAS ORDER, 1928.
    SHEPPY GAS ORDER, 1928.
    WORKSOP GAS ORDER, 1928.
    BRACKLEY, BUCKINGHAM AND WINSLOW ELECTRICITY ORDER, 1928.
    LLANELLY ELECTRICITY (EXTENSION) ORDER, 1928.
    NORTHAMPTON ELECTRICITY (EXTENSION) ORDER, 1928.
    THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH: My Lords, I beg also to move that these Special Orders be approved.
    Moved, That the Special Orders which were presented on the 17th of July last be approved.—(The Earl of Plymouth.)
    On Question, Motion agreed to.

BRIDLINGTON HARBOUR PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill: Bill reported without amendment.
Then (Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended) Bill read 3a, and passed.

LINCOLNSHIRE RIVER FISHERIES PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

COMPANIES BILL.
Amendments reported (according to Order).
Then (Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended) Bill read 3a, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
LORD PARMOOR LORD PARMOOR had given Notice to ask His Majesty's Government whether they have any information to give on the conditions in China and Egypt, or in reference to the correspondence on the Kellogg Pact; and to move for Papers. The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I rise to ask the Questions which stand in my name on the Paper. They refer to conditions in China and Egypt and the Kellogg Pact. The substantial question as regards China is whether the British Government are prepared, like America, to propose a tariff autonomy to the Nanking Government and recognise it as the Government of united China. I will not go back to former discussions during which the representatives of the Government in this House pointed out that the difficulty of dealing with China (in reference to which certain suggestions were made) was that there was no Government which could fairly be looked on as representative of a united country. Now the elimination of Peking as a centre hostile to the progressive international movement in China, and the disappearance of Chang Tso-lin have created a new condition, and although it may take some time before the new Government is stabilised and secure, which is natural enough after such a prolonged period of civil war, I think for practical purposes and for purposes of policy we can consider that there is at the present time a united Government in China representing a united China. Although it may involve some risk—everything requires same risk—I think we ought with as little delay as possible to follow the policy already entered upon by America.
I do not want to say anything of America except what is entirely friendly,
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nor would anyone in this House wish to do so. But, after all, in China perhaps particularly, and certainly in regions of the East, industrial competition must inevitably arise between the United States of America and ourselves, and our desire is—and I believe it is the desire of the Government—that we should be in as good a position and in as friendly a position as America for the purposes of that competition when it arises. We are really interested beyond any other country in the peace and prosperity of China. We have one interest in our relationship with China and that is to encourage peaceful industrial intercourse for the benefit of both countries. Lancashire has long ago given a note of warning and evidence that it will suffer so lung as the unsettled conditions of China continue. There is some improvement in late statistics, but the problem of unemployment in the cotton industry is still largely connected with the absence of a peaceful settlement in China, and that peaceful settlement would be of enormous interest to our industrial activities. Indeed, in the long run if I am to take Lancashire as a test, I see no prospect of the unemployment period coming to an end until the conditions in the East, and particularly in China, have become again permanently satisfactory and permanently on a friendly basis.
So far as America is concerned, I understand that a Treaty has already been signed by the parties, granting a system of tariff autonomy to China as from December, 1929. It is obvious that when conditions become settled China is entitled at any rate to a large measure of tariff autonomy. The principle, I think, has been settled. It is really rather a question of discussing the terms than of going into matters of first principle. Perhaps I may say upon this point that I see it reported that Sir Sidney Barton, the British Consul-General at Shanghai, and Sir Miles Lampson, who has done so much in my opinion to assist the growth of friendliness in China, are said to have met at Peking and to have expressed the opinion that the time had come to reopen negotiations with the Nanking Government in relation to the Nanking incidents of last year. I regret that that matter has not been settled, but it seems there is every chance of its being brought under a more friendly system. The report to

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which I have referred went on to say that they also suggest a grant from Great Britain of tariff autonomy, leaving open the question of unequal Treaties. Of course, the question of extraterritorial rights, as they are called, and of unequal Treaties is a large matter, and I agree it cannot be settled merely by the denunciation of China. It must be settled by treaties and by agreement. But if we recognise the Nanking Government as the Central Government of a united China and if, in a friendly way, we could settle what are called the incidents last year at Nanking and also grant tariff autonomy, it may well be hoped that the other question, which I admit is a greater question, could also be settled in a friendly spirit.
At any rate, the view I hold is that the policy already adopted by America and, as I understand, suggested by Sir Sidney Barton and Sir Miles Lampson, should, without delay, be put into operation by the British Government. When I say "without delay" I mean that want the friendliness towards this country, which is growing in China, according to the evidence I have from a large number of letters from persons in China, to be encouraged to the utmost. It is nothing but a misfortune that what is sometimes called an anti-English feeling should exist in China. We do not want it. It is adverse to the peace policy which we ought to press forward. At the same time, I believe that there is a growing spirit in China perfectly ready to meet us, or even to come half way if such an arrangement as I have suggested could be adopted.
I have one or two short extracts from Chinese papers—not in the English language, but in the Chinese language—which have been sent to me. They are not excerpts especially selected, but are given as fair illustrations of opinion in China.
"We hope and wish for friendly relations."
That is the first extract.
"We want to oppose foreign aggression, and we want to clear militarism out of China."
That is another. And I will quote a third:—
"We shall reciprocate what we receive and treat with others as they treat with us."
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That is a perfectly fair statement, but it shows the importance of the British Government taking the initiative on the lines which I have suggested. Then I find in a letter to Sir Miles Lampson, of whom I speak with all respect for the excellent work he has done, that the writer says:—
"We are opposed to the gunboat policy."
Well, that is a short way of saying: "We want peace, and we do not want a war policy." We also want peace and we do not want a war policy. It seems to me that now the occasion has arisen when we may well hope that our troubles in China have come to an end, and that a new era of peace between the two countries may be the basis of increased commercial and industrial relationship.
I will read one further extract sent to me by a person who has been in China for a long time and who is a skilled observer. This is the extract:—
"The effect of a stable Government on conditions in China would be tremendous. Everywhere we found the sense of impermanence and uncertainty stultifying effort in every direction. Were this uncertainty removed, the immense amount of ability and good will now latent would be turned into reconstructive channels and militarism would disappear."
That is the opinion of a very skilled observer, thoroughly cognizant of Chinese conditions. It only bears out what I have already been saying. The question I want to ask the noble Marquess is this: Is the Government prepared to meet the Nanking Government in order to settle up what are called the Nanking incidents of last year, to give a measure of tariff autonomy as the Americans have done, and, in addition, to recognise the Nanking Government as the Government of a united China? I do not want to ask questions in such a way as to cross-examine the noble Marquess, but I think I have made the point perfectly clear. I noticed the other day—and I was very glad to notice it—that in another place Sir Austen Chamberlain expressed a decided view against any proposal for separating Manchuria from the rest of the Chinese nation.
That is what I want to say about China, subject only to this: we are all aware that some time ago, as a result of

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this prolonged civil war, there was very severe famine in the Shantung district. The accounts sent home were lamentable. Millions of people were said to be affected by starvation and to be subsisting on food which was not callable of sustaining life for more than a short period. I should like to hear from the noble Marquess—I have given him an intimation of the questions I am going to ask—whether the Government have knowledge as to whether the conditions of starvation in Shantung have come to an end, and whether the position as regards the provision of food and ordinary necessaries is now satisfactory. Of course we should all wish that. I am not now speaking in a political Party spirit in any way. We should all wish that, just as we should all wish to approach this question from a national standpoint, although when we come to consider what that national standpoint should be we have differences of opinion and different views on methods of procedure.
The next point I want to ask about is Egypt. I have told the noble Marquess in a letter I sent him exactly what I want to know. So far as Egypt is concerned it is well known that in principle there is no difference between the policy of the present Government and the policy of the Labour Party. When the Labour Party was in office in 1924, I had to express in your Lordships' House what their policy was in Egypt, particularly in regard to the Sudan. A former representative of the Foreign Office, the late Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, expressed his approbation of the statement that I made as to our determination not to make any change in the principle of our policy towards Egypt. No doubt that principle involved, in a sense, two principles which might come into conflict. One was that in constitutional matters Egyptians should have all the rights of an independent sovereign Power. There is no difference of opinion on that point, because that was promised to the Egyptians by this country at the end of the War in the most solemn way. When that promise was made four points were reserved, and there has never been any difference of opinion that, in any final settlement between Egypt and this country, those reserved points must be
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carefully safeguarded. On that there is no difference betwen the two Parties. The difference is not one of principle but one of treatment and application. When you have complete Constitutional independence on the one side and these four reserved points on the other, there may be a conflict between the rights reserved and the privileges granted.
When Zaghlul came over here in 1924, although it seemed impossible at one time that a settlement could be made, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, was able to carry one through completely. Since that time the conditions have not improved, and it has now been thought necessary to suspend the Constitution, to which Egyptians are legitimately entitled, for a period of three years. That must be a matter of regret to every one. A Question was put—I am not sure that it was answered—to Sir Austen Chamberlain by Mr. Ponsonby in the other House on this point, and I think it is a matter of considerable importance. Is it possible, he asked, during a period when the Egyptian Constitution is suspended, to enter profitably into negotiations for the settlement of the whole Egyptian question? So far as I understood him, the Foreign Secretary said that no negotiations were going on at the present time, and I also understood from his answer—I do not want to suggest words that are not to be found there—that he assented to the proposition that negotiations for a final settlement with Egypt could hardly be profitably embarked upon while the Constitution itself was suspended.
Surely that is true. Whatever one may feel about it, however one may regret it, it is not much use hoping to obtain a final settlement with a country such as Egypt if at the time when you are seeking to obtain it the Constitution of that country, to which in ordinary conditions it is legitimately entitled, has been temporarily suspended. The conditions to-day are very much as they were in the time of the Zewar régime, and I want to know, first of all, whether there is any thought that the period of suspension may be shortened, and, in the second place, whether it is the view of the Government that during that suspension no profitable steps can be taken in order to settle these Egyptian affairs finally. Of course we want them settled. While we

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were in office everything was done towards settling them. Undoubtedly there are difficulties that can only be overcome by good will on both sides, but I am afraid that there is an absence of good will at the present time. I hope that it may not continue and that, as soon as opportunity arises, an attempt may be made to settle this complicated question without infringing upon the Constitution of the Egyptians and without surrendering, as we cannot do, any of the four points that we reserved as essential to the future of this country.
With regard to my third point, I will try to be as short as possible, considering the period of the Session. I refer to the Kellogg Pact. In discussing this Pact—I will compress my remarks as much as I can—we have to remember that ultimately its ratification or non-ratification rests, so far as America is concerned, with the Senate. It happens that a large number of Americans who are specially interested in the Pact have been over here lately. They desire it to go through as a complete success, but they have uttered a note of warning that we in this country ought not to forget. They say that there is an opposition side in America and that, if we give it an opportunity of coming to the front, the friendly intentions which undoubtedly underlie the proposals of Mr. Kellogg may not be realised. The Kellogg Pact as it stands is a declaration in favour of peace and what is called the renunciation of war as a basis of national policy. So far, I suppose, we are all agreed. We all heartily welcome this declaration of principle in the Kellogg Pact. But we must have a certain caution. No one who has studied the question supposes that the renunciation of war as the basis of national policy carries you all the distance towards what is called the outlawry of war. It is only one side of a complicated question.
I think that Mr. Kellogg did perfectly right in putting his declaration in a simple manner, but it would be an utter mistake to suppose that this Pact will be of lasting value unless it is followed by some mechanism or machinery in order to carry out the principle which Article 2 of the Pact enunciates—namely, that—
"the settlement or solution of disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or origin they may be, shall never be sought except by pacific means."
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To make that effective you must evolve the pacificmeans. I am not now saying that this should be done prematurely, but it has to be kept in mind. Dr. Charles Clayton Morrison, one of the protagonists of the Kellogg Pact in America, has himself issued a caution which we must carefully consider. He says:—
"The bare denunciation of war will not suffice. The crowning of Mr. Kellogg's present effort with complete success, while it would be the most stupendous achievement in the history of international relationship"—
I would ask your Lordships to note the words that follow—
"would surely prove a disappointment and perhaps a world tragedy unless, having renounced war, the nations set to work with a will to erect on that foundation a permanent structure of peace."
That brings me to what has been very clearly enunciated in this House by the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil of Chelwood. In the Covenant of the League which, of course, has gaps in it, you have a complete machinery for submitting to arbitration or conciliation matters which under the terms of the Covenant are required to be sent either to arbitration or to a conciliation tribunal. In the same way, so far as Locarno is concerned, Locarno not only says you are to settle all international disputes between the parties concerned by peaceful means but it gives the methods or mechanism by which these peaceful mewls can be found and asserted. So, too, if you go to a document about which I am supposed to be unduly prejudiced—I do not feel that myself—in the Protocol of Geneva, 1924, the principle is exactly the same as the Kellogg Pact; that is, that all disputes were to be settled under the terms of the Protocol by peaceful means, and means were included in the document. I am not going into that document—you may say that coming to matters of detail it is not a success—but, after all, the mind of Geneva, which we have to consider, is still impressed with this fact, that it is not enough to renounce war unless at the same time you provide the means by which matters in dispute, which might lead to war, can be peacefully settled.
This brings me, and it is sufficient for my purpose, to illustrate what I mean by the correspondence as regards the Kellogg Pact. The correspondence is really summed up by what is said by the

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Foreign Minister in his last Despatch to America. It is so important in my view that the Kellogg Pact should come to a satisfactory result, that I think a few minutes must be spent in making it quite clear where the danger lies. This is from Sir Austen Chamberlain's Despatch:—
"As regards the passage in my note of the 19th May relating to certain regions of which the welfare and integrity constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety, I need not repeat that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new Treaty upon the understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect."
That is very wide and very indefinite, and if you really do not have machinery going the whole distance of the Pact itself that is, the renunciation of all war as a basis of a national policy, you leave open the very difficulty which has been pointed out again and again in the Covenant, that you do not get a sufficiently assured security in order to lead to an agreed system of disarmament.
Let me read the next passage in the Despatch:—
"I am entirely in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Kellogg in his speech of the 28th April that the proposed Treaty does not restrict or impair in any way the right of self-defence, as also with his opinion that each State alone is competent to decide when circumstances necessitate recourse to war for that purpose."
If you leave it to each country to determine whether in going to war it is really taking defensive action, you go a very little way towards putting the renunciation of war into any practical measure of policy. It is notorious that if each country is to decide for itself it will always say it is waging defensive warfare and that the other people are attacking it. I do not think you will find a single instance in modern history of a country that did not put forward that contention, and What you must really have, in order to make the renunciation of war of any value, is not that each particular State is to determine whether a war is justified as defensive war or not, but you must have that question decided by some strong and impartial tribunal. In the Protocol aggressive war was denounced as an international crime, but, by aggression was not meant the opinion of either one country or the other which went to war. The aggressor was the person who went to war without
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complying with the obligations which he had undertaken, and the question was to be determined by some impartial tribunal.
I want to say that if you look through all the authorities, from Grotius to the present day, you will find it universally admitted that aggression in war could not be determined by the parties to the war, but must be determined by whether you are failing to comply with obligations undertaken, which would send the matters in dispute for pacific, and friendly settlement. It is just the same in ordinary national legal life. Murder in the old days was a crime between the parties concerned which might be punishable by fine. Now it is a crime against the State, and so you must make warfare a crime against the State and a crime against the obligations which countries have entered into. In that way only can you draw a distinction between aggressive and defensive war, which is all-important if you are going to carry out the Kellogg Pact. We must be careful lest we fall into the mistake, and it would be a great mistake, of vitiating the principle not only by not suggesting any mechanism, but by suggesting policies which are absolutely inconsistent with the principle itself.
Just one other word, and I will not detain your Lordships further. The Foreign Minister, the other day, said that we must bear in mind that war was a thing to be had recourse to as a last resort. That is absolutely inconsistent with the principle of the Pact. The principle of the Pact is surrender of the right to appeal to war, and if you retain an ultimate right of resort to war, how can you have either security or disarmament? The principle of the Kellogg Pact is that the age-long right to appeal to war must go; and are we prepared to assent to it? I believe we are. If so, I hope that any question of reservations and limitations will be confined within the narrowest limits, and that we shall have a very distinct interpretation as to what is included within those terms.
I have noticed that there is a suggestion that on the question of disarmament some arrangement has been made with France. I hope that is so, if the arrangement really points to disarmament: but if it is only in the nature of an agree-

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ment agreement between two parties, not to disarm but to help one another, that would not be consistent with accepting the principle of the Kellogg Pact. I think the time has come when not only the principle of the Kellogg Pact should be accepted in its wider form, but that steps should be taken to evolve a mechanism which would give an alternative form of appeal in international disputes, and thus bring about what I believe to be the only salvation of the world in the future—the cessation of the war spirit and war preparations. I feel this myself exceedingly strongly. I believe there is a very strong opinion in the same direction in this country; but, whether that is so of not, I cannot imagine any one envisaging another war which would be even more barbarous than the Great War, and in which, as the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, told us the other day, we should be exposed to bombs which, in a moment of time, might wipe out whole masses of the civilian population in any part of an industrial country like ours. I move for Papers merely to give me the right of reply, if need be.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, I have been very much obliged to the noble and learned Lord for his courtesy in giving me notice of several of the points which he proposed to raise this afternoon, though I confess I am a little appalled when I contemplate the field which the noble and learned Lord invited your Lordships to cover in respect of the foreign policy of this country in almost every part, of the world. I will, of course, do my best to give what information I can to the noble and learned Lord and to your Lordships, but I cannot hope to cover anything like the field which he has invited us to traverse. The noble and learned Lord began with China; he wanted to know what the British Government were going to do about recognition, what about the Nanking outrages, what about tariff autonomy? Upon those questions he appealed to the example of America. I am not going to make any comment upon the act of state which the American Government have recently carried out. I have no doubt whatever that they are intent upon exactly the same objects as we are—trying to set China upon its legs again, internationally
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and nationally, improving trade, and gratifying, so far as is possible, the national susceptibilities of that country.
But I would like to make this precautionary observation. The tariff concessions which the American Government have granted to China are strictly limited by the most-favoured-nation clause. I need not inform the noble and learned Lord, who is familiar with these questions, that that constituted a purely suspensory concession. Nothing will happen, as far as I can understand it, in respect of the tariff relations between America and China until the American Government can be assured that the conditions which America obtains are no less favourable that the conditions which any other country obtains. As to Nanking, I need not tell your Lordships that we are at least as anxious as the noble and learned Lord that the Nanking incident should be liquidated; but, of course, we cannot accept terms which are inequitable and unjust to the interests of our own nationals and our own nation. We have made every effort, and are making every effort, to bring that incident to a close, and may I say I have every hope that in the near future it will be brought to a close, but of course it must be upon terms which are befitting the interests and the dignity of this country.
There is, in fact, no change in the policy of His Majesty's Government. We have sought from the first to secure, if we could, a settlement of the Chinese difficulty. We have indeed been the leader amongst the nations in helping forward China in the direction of tariff autonomy. We were the first to recognise that it was reasonable that she should enter upon a totally different relation to other countries in a tariff point of view from what she had hitherto. And we continue exactly in that frame of mind. It is, as the noble and learned Lord said, to our interests that the welfare of China should be strictly pursued. I noticed that the noble and learned Lord said that there was an increase of friendliness between China and ourselves. That is so, but it would have been kind, I think, if the noble and learned Lord had given a little credit to His Majesty's Government for that result.
LORD PARMOOR: I was not discrediting His Majesty's Government.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am quite aware that the noble and learned Lord was not at all unfriendly, but I just waited for a little word of praise on that point.
LORD PARMOOR: I will give it now.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I think that the policy of His Majesty's Government, and especially the policy of my right hon. friend Sir Austen Chamberlain, has been crowned with success. May I remind the House that that policy was not without difficulties at the beginning? it was not easy, in face of the tremendous provocation which China gave us, to pursue the path to friendliness, but we were able, I think, to show that we were above any petty feelings in the matter, and the policy, which was quite consistent from the very first, is already, as the noble and learned Lord admits, beginning to bear fruit. But the noble and learned Lord said: "Cannot you recognise that you have now a united China?" Does the noble and learned Lord really think that we have reached that point? I wish he was right. Nothing would please His Majesty's Government better; but I am afraid he is in a world of dreams. It is quite true that Manchuria, so far as the British Government is concerned, is still part of China; but it is not under the control of the Nationalist Government. And even in the rest of China we have no security that the Government can control the Generals or that the Generals can control each other. Nothing like a peaceful condition has been restored in China. I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord is aware that according to our estimate there are, at this moment, probably no fewer than 2,000,000 men under arms in China.
LORD PARMOOR: I thought there were 3,000,000.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Then the pacific sentiments of the noble and learned Lord are gratified at any rate to that extent. Still, we are a long way from peaceful conditions. These 2,000,000 men are under the command of four separate military parties who are sometimes fighting with each other and sometimes negotiating with each other: but for the life of me I do not know which they are doing at the present moment. The condition of the restora-
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tion of order in China is not yet attained, but we marked with great satisfaction the other day that there is at any rate a movement in favour of the disbandment of some of the troops, and I think it will be a matter of interest and also a test of sincerity how far this movement for disbandment is actually fulfilled. We shall watch the result, of course, with great interest.
The noble and learned Lord is quite right in saying that the condition in China is a very unfortunate one not only for China herself but for international trade. It reacts undoubtedly upon our own trade, our Lancashire trade, and we should be most gratified if it could be brought to an end. I am informed that whereas there were some 87,000,000 cotton piece goods imported into China in 1926, the figure had fallen to only 54,000,000 in 1927, showing the reaction on trade of the civil war in China. I am glad to say on the question of trade that we think there are signs that the corner has been turned; but it does not do to exaggerate that. Recently we sent a commercial mission up the Yangtse to see how far trade could be reopened, and it has been reopened as far as Chungking. So that there are signs of improvement. But as to a united China, that has yet to be found.
Then the noble and learned Lord asked me a question about the famine in China. That, of course, is only an illustration of the same state of things. I do not mean to say that we have at the Foreign Office very much information on the subject, but as far as we know there has been no natural disaster of any kind which accounts for the famine. That there is a famine in several parts of China, notably, in Shantung, is the fact; but there has been no natural condition which would have brought that about. The reason is the civil war.
LORD PARMOOR: Certainly.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: That is what has produced the famine. The only people who are to blame are—I was going to say the Chinese; but that would be hardly fair. It is not the Chinese people themselves who are to blame. It is the soldiers and brigands, who batten upon their unfortunate country and fight among themselves, who

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are responsible. Incidentally, owing to the civil war no foreign relief measures to the famine have been possible, as the noble and learned Lord will readily understand.
LORD PARMOOR: Might I ask the noble Marquess to answer one question which is not asked in any controversial spirit? I stated that it had been reported that Sir Sidney Barton and Sir Miles Lampson met together at Peking and recommended autonomy and also the recognition of the Nanking Government.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I have no information at to whether Sir Miles Lampson has met Sir Sidney Barton; but he is in constant communication with him every day and every hour of the day.
LORD PARMOOR: They met at Peking.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am quite certain, whether they met or not, that the communications which passed between them are entirely confidential and neither your Lordships' House nor the noble and learned Lord would expect me to give any account of what passed.
I turn to Egypt. The noble and learned Lord asked me several questions upon what had recently transpired in Egypt. I was glad to note that he was very emphatic that there was really no substantial difference in the main lines of the policy of the British Government, whether it was a Labour Government or a Conservative Government.
LORD PARMOOR: Hear, hear—not in Egypt.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I agree with the noble and learned Lord that if you look over the whole field of politics there is a very considerable difference: but at any rate so far as Egypt is concerned there is no difference. We both hold closely to the Declaration of 1922 and to the four reserved points which in our view are essential to be maintained. As to the recent political events in Egypt, that is not a matter for the British Government at all. That was a matter which concerned the King and people of Egypt. We have no responsibility in the matter. We have interfered in no way in respect of it. We
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have given no advice to the Egyptian Government, neither we ourselves nor our representative in Cairo. We do not desire to interfere with the form of Government which it may please the King and the people of Egypt to prefer. But the noble and learned Lord asked me whether negotiations were going on. There are no negotiations going on with Egypt at the present moment. He spoke of a final settlement. If I may speak the truth, I do not believe in final settlements of hardly any question. There is no prospect, of course, of a final settlement, and I do not think there is any answer which I can give on that subject. So long as the Egyptian people have a Government with whom we can be in elations we shall treat it, of course, as the Government. But there is nothing to be said about negotiations, which are at the present moment non-existent.
Then the noble and learned Lord leapt across the Mediterranean and the Atlantic and asked me a number of questions about the Kellogg Treaty.
LORD PARMOOR: The Kellogg Pact.
THE MARQUES OF SALISBURY: The Kellogg Pact. I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord; that is the proper phrase. I know he has carefully read the speech of my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary, and he will be aware that though my right hon. friend spoke, as he ought to speak, in the highest terms of this effort after peace, yet he warned his hearers not to exaggerate the effect of it. I am so terrified of these exaggerations. You hold out tremendous hopes which are not necessarily well-founded, and there is afterwards bitter disappointment. At the same time it is undoubtedly a very important declaration which the nations of the world are going to make in favour of peace, and we believe it will do a great deal of good. The noble and learned Lord said that is not sufficient. Of course it is not sufficient. You must build up a system under which the peace of the world can be secured. That is a very difficult and a very gradual process, and we are engaged upon it. The noble and learned Lord himself has done a great deal of good work in the same direction. There was the Covenant. There was the development of the League of Nations at Geneva. There were the Treaties of Locarno. These things are gradually building up a great structure

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of peace. But we must not go too far. The noble and learned Lord I understood to be a great partisan—and he will be quite right in so being—of Mr. Kellogg's policy, but it was an integral part of Mr. Kellogg's policy that there was a limit beyond which you could not pursue the path of peace. The noble and learned Lord spoke as if my right hon. friend Sir Austen Chamberlain had invented the exception of defensive warfare. Not at all. That was Mr. Kellogg's policy announced in the most solemn way in America.
LORD PARMOOR: That is so. It was when he was addressing the Legal Council. Everyone is aware of it.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: But you would not have found it out from the noble and learned Lord's speech. It was an essential part of Mr. Kellogg's policy that defensive warfare was permissible.
LORD PARMOOR: May I interrupt the noble Marquess? I should not like to be inaccurate in a matter or this kind. I read Sir Austen's statement in which he said he was in accord kith the views expressed by Mr. Kellogg on the defensive war question. I read that out.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I apologise to the noble and learned Lord. I think perhaps I went too far in that respect.
LORD PARMOOR: I only wanted to be accurate.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble and learned Lord did make that reference. I am afraid in this imperfect world defensive warfare may still be necessary. No other warfare than that will ever be engaged in, I hope and believe, by the British Government, certainly not by this British Government. We should never dream of engaging upon an aggressive war. I hope there will be no occasion whatever for a defensive war, but let there be no misunderstanding; at any rate, do not let us pretend. It may be necessary, and when you come to speak of certain regions in which we have a special interest then these defensive and precautionary limitations are very essential. We are bound to reserve our liberty of action in respect of certain regions where we have a special relation, and where the welfare
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of the people of the country and their integrity are vital to us. There we must make it quite clear that our hands, are not tied. The noble and learned Lord seemed to think that that was a very unfortunate reservation, but I do not notice any appearance of that feeling in America. We have just got the information that. Mr. Kellogg himself is coming across to France to sign the Treaty, and, therefore, presumably, everything is on right lines. We must not assume—I will not assume for a moment—that the American Senate are going to be unreasonable in matters of this kind. Why should we assume it? They are a very great assembly, with great traditions and a great responsibility. Let us treat them as we would treat our own Parliament, with every confidence.
LORD PARMOOR: I never suggested the Senate would be unreasonable. The question is what they think reasonable; that is a different proposition.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: "Reasonable" is not a relative term, but an absolute term. What is reasonable? I suggest the policy which has been enunciated by my right hon. friend is an entirely reasonable policy. It is in that spirit that we have co-operated with the American Government in the pursuit of this great peace Pact, and we shall hope that this Government, or the Governments which succeed it, will be able to pursue the same path—a gradual path, the end of which is not to be reached in a day, nor in a year, but over a period of time, when a system of peace may be built up and we may never have to witness again the horrors of the Great War.
LORD PARMOOR: My Lords, I very cordially thank the noble Marquess for the speech he has made and for the information he has given. It is never my intention on matters of foreign policy or international policy to make an exaggerated statement, or to refer to anything I have not at any rate endeavoured to study as accurately as possible. There are one or two points mentioned by the noble Marquess to which I desire to call attention, not for the sake of mere controversy, but in order to see on these great national questions what the problems are and

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how we can best deal with them. On tariff autonomy it does not seem to me to make much difference that America has retained the most-favoured-nation clause. I think that any country would be right to have a precaution of that kind at this stage. What really has been done by America—I think they are the first country to do it—is to offer to China, through the Nanking Government, what China so long demanded—tariff autonomy—in order that she may have command over her own income and resources. As regards a united China, the noble Marquess suggested, and I agree with him, that immense progress has been made in that direction. There is no question about that, but I go a little further than the noble Marquess does. I know he would desire a united Government and a united China. That must be the desire of all English people. I think the British Government, who, of course, have enormous influence in the East and in China, would go a long way towards attaining the result which they desire by giving their assistance to the Nanking Government through recognition. I do not know how many letters I have received saying that the stability—I think that is the proper term—of the United Government would be enormously enhanced at once and their position would be much aided if the British Government would give the recognition which America has given.
I do not think that I need deal further with the Egyptian question, because there is little difference between us, but I think it is rather difficult to go so far as to say that for the suspension of Parliament we have no responsibility. I gather the noble Marquess said that at the present time no negotiations are going on, and I agree that whilst the Constitution is suspended they could not go on. There is no such
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thing as finality, certainly in this world whatever there may be elsewhere, but what we generally mean by the word "final" is permanent. I dare say that logically final is not the right word to use, but practically we all understand what is meant.
I only want to say one word on the Kellogg Pact. I would not say anything to discourage that Pact. I have advocated it throughout as a splendid example given by America in aid of the peace of the world, and I still hold that view very strongly indeed. But I do regret what we call the reservations and limitations. I regret them because without further definition of those indefinite reservations you really seem by the reservations to undo what the general principle of the Pact appears to do. I do not want to go further into that because I do not want to raise difficulties. Perhaps I am more optimistic than the noble Marquess. I may have a happier outlook on life, and if the Kellogg Pact were followed up by what the noble Marquess agrees is necessary, a mechanical system by which these international disputes can be settled apart from war, I do believe that a period of peace would arise. Until it does arise we shall not shake off the dislocation and troubles of national and international intercourse which are the legacy of the Great War. I beg to thank the noble Marquess for the information he has given and to assure him that on our side we do not want to make these questions matters of one Party or the other, but always to work for what we consider the great object of national prosperity. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion for Papers.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
House adjourned at twenty-five minutes before six o'clock.

BARONY OF POLE OF MONTAGU.
Petition of Constantine Marg Joseph Lubienski-Bodenham Petition of Constantine Marg Joseph Lubienski-Bodenham, praying that he may be allowed to refer in the evidence and in the printed case to the evidence which was taken in the years 1861 to 1864 in the claim of William Selby-Lowndes of Whaddon to the. Barony of Montacute, and also to the evidence which was taken in the claim of Edith Maud, Countess of Loudoun to the Baronies of Botreaux, Hungerford, De Meleyns and Hastings, and also in the claims of Edith Maud, Countess of Londoun, and Elizabeth Frances, Viscountess St. Davit's, to the Baronies of Botreaux, Hungerford, De Moleyns, Hastings, Strange of Knokin and Stanley, upon which resolutions and adjudications were made by this House on the 1st August, 1871, and 17th December, 1920: Read, and ordered as prayed, subject to all just exceptions and a liberty to all concerned to take objections hereafter.
BOGNOR URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL.
Message from the Commons that they concur in the Resolution of this House, communicated to them on Monday last, on the subject of the Bognor Urban District Council Bill.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 6) BILL.
Message from the Commons that they concur in the Resolution of this House, communicated to them on Tuesday last, on the subject of the Ministry of Health Provisional Orders (No. 6) Bill.