Sitting of 16 November 1927

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.
PRIVATE BUSINESS.
  DUNDEE CORPORATION ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL,
  "to confirm a Provisional Order under The Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, relating to Dundee Corporation," presented by Secretary Sir John Gilmour; and ordered (under Section 9 of the Act) to be read a Second time upon Thursday 24th November, and to be printed. [Bill 201.]
  LERWICK HARBOUR ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL,
  "to confirm a Provisional Order under The Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, relating to Lerwick Harbour," presented by Secretary Sir John Gilmour; and ordered (under Section 7 of the Act) to be considered To-morrow.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

  STEAMSHIP "MANATAWAY" (CHARGE OF CRUELTY).
  Captain ARTHUR EVANSasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he has yet received a reply to the representations which he has made to the United States Government regarding the case of Mr. Frederick Thomas, a former officer of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, in connection with a charge of cruelty brought against Captain Crowley, of the steamer "Manataway," in which ship Mr. Thomas served as steward?
  Captain HACKING (Secretary, Overseas Trade Department): On receipt of the representations made by His Majesty's Government in this case, the
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  United States Government caused the matter to be brought before the Federal Grand Jury. The Jury, however, on the evidence submitted to them, refused to indict Captain Crowley. Steps are being taken by His Majesty's Government to secure further evidence with a view to the case being reopened.
  Mr. HARMSWORTH: Does the hon. and gallant Member know the facts of this case?
  Captain HACKING: Yes, I know the facts, but I think it would not be desirable at this moment to state the whole of the case, as we hope to get the matter reopened.
  Captain EVANS: Do I understand that fresh evidence has been submitted to the United States Government by the Foreign Office?
  Captain HACKING: We hope to get further evidence, and we anticipate that we shall be able to get it.

  TANGIER.
  Sir JOHN POWERasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any further developments have taken place in respect of the future status of Tangier?
  The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir Austen Chamberlain): No, Sir. The Franco-Spanish conversations have not yet been concluded.

  LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

    SUBSCRIPTIONS (STATES IN ARREARS).
    Sir ALFRED KNOXasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any States have defaulted in their subscriptions towards the expenses of the League of Nations; if so, which States; and whether the default has-thrown a greater burden on the British taxpayer?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: The following States are in arrears: Bolivia, China, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru. A continued default on the part of these States would eventually increase the burden on the British taxpayer.
    Sir A. KNOX: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether any default on the part of these States to pay their contributions has caused any additional expenditure by His Majesty's Government?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: No, not up to the present, but continued default on the part of these States would involve additional expenditure by the other States.
    Sir JOSEPH NALL: If these States are not sufficiently loyal to the League to pay their contributions, are they likely to be loyal enough to carry out its decisions?

    COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE.
    Mr. TREVELYANasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether His Majesty's Government has noted the unconditional acceptance by the German Reich of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice in such disputes and under such conditions as are specified in Article 36 of the statute of that Court; and whether His Majesty's Government will now, in its turn, see its way to accept this jurisdiction?
    Mr. PONSONBYasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Secretary-General of the League of Nations has forwarded to him, in accordance with the Council's decision, the resolution adopted by the Eighth Assembly of the League on 26th September, urging the use of pacific means for the settlement of disputes of every description; and whether, as a practical way of showing His Majesty's Government's concurrence in this aim, he intends to hasten the acceptance by Great Britain of the optional clause in Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: The Assembly resolution is now being considered by His Majesty's Government. I can at present add nothing to previous declarations made by His Majesty's Government.

    WARS OF AGGRESSION (POLISH RESOLUTION).
    Mr. PONSONBYasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in view of the fact that the British delegation at the eighth Assembly of the League
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    of Nations voted for the Polish resolution ordering that war of aggression is an international crime, that all wars of aggression are and shall always be prohibited, and that States members of the League are under an obligation to conform to these principles, and seeing that this resolution, unanimously passed by roll call of the Assembly, has now the binding force of an understanding of international law, was any definition of the term war of aggression reached by the Assembly before passing this resolution; and, if not, can he indicate the nature of the commitment undertaken on behalf of Great Britain by His Majesty's Government?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: No definition of the term "war of aggression" was made by the Assembly. It was pointed out by several speakers that by subscribing to the Polish resolution, no fresh engagement was undertaken, since the undertaking not to wage wars of aggression is implicit in, and, indeed, is the very essence of the Covenant; but it was held that there was value in this solemn re-affirmation of an existing obligation.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Is it not a fact that the words "of aggression" were only put in at the instance of His Majesty's Government, and that in the last Debate the hon. Member for Wood Green (Mr. G. Locker-Lampson) said that no definition of these words existed?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes, Sir; and I think that the Assembly wisely refrained from attempting a definition. It is easier to recognise wars of aggression than to define them. Any attempt to define precisely in advance the tests by which the Council should judge or anyone should judge what a war of aggression is, would only be to frame a trap for what was quite possibly the innocent party.
    Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY: Do not these words weaken the resolution?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: These words are a solemn re-affirmation of the Covenant as it stands. They are not an amendment.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: If we cannot define aggression, what is the use of putting in the words?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: That is a matter for argument. I think it is far wiser not to attempt to define a war of aggression, but to leave the competent authority to decide who is the aggressor when the facts are before them.

  AFGHANISTAN.

    CONSULAR OFFICERS.
    Sir A. KNOXasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at what places in Afghanistan the British Government maintains consuls of British nationality; whether the Soviet Republic has any consuls of Russian nationality in Afghanistan; and, if so, where?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: There are consular officers of British nationality at Kandahar and Jallabad and Soviet consular officers, who, so far as I know, are Soviet citizens, at Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and Maimana.

    TELEGRAPH LINES.
    Sir A. KNOXasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to what extent the provisions of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1921 have been carried out, especially as regards the construction of a telegraph line from Khushk via Herat and Kandahar to Kabul, and the payment of an annual subsidy of 1,000,000 gold roubles?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: A telegraph line from Kandahar to Kabul has been opened and another from Khushk to Kandahar is in course of construction and is understood to have reached Farah. My information is insufficient to enable me to reply to the remaining part of my hon. and gallant Friend's question.

    ARMAMENTS (EXPENDITURE).
    Sir J. POWERasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can furnish a statement showing the present and the pre-War effective expenditure on armaments by this country and by the principal European countries whose areas have not been very materially altered, together with the present rate of expenditure if corrected to the pre-War value of money in each country?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: No, Sir. I could not give any figures which would
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    be likely to be accepted by all those concerned, nor could I myself take responsibility for any estimates which might be framed.
    Lieut-Commander KENWORTHY: Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the estimate that has been made by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, giving this matter in full detail?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: Whatever the Secretariat of the League of Nations has published is entitled to all the authority which is due to that source, but I cannot make myself personally responsible for the presentation of an estimate which I could not guarantee.
    Mr. HERBERT WILLIAMS: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budget speech made an estimate which differs materially from that published by the League of Nations?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: That rather confirms what I have said; that no one estimate is likely to command approval by all parties concerned.

  CHINA.

    HANKOW.
    Mr. LOOKERasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can inform the House of the present state of affairs in Hankow as regards the municipal administration of the ex-British concession under the Mixed Chinese and British Council set up by the Chen-O'Malley Agreement, particularly as regards the state of the finances of the area involved, the existence or otherwise of discipline in the police force, the carrying out of the necessary measures of sanitation, and the discharge of the obligations, whether for principal or interest, in respect of the debentures issued by the late British municipality?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: A recent report from His Majesty's Consul-General at Hankow shows that, owing largely to the fact that the municipal administration had been forced to accept depreciated currency, its finances had been placed in a precarious situation. From the 3rd August last payment of rates and taxes has been placed on a silver basis, and it is hoped that this measure will help to restore the financial position, but

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    it cannot be pretended that the financial administration of the area has been above reproach.
    During the first few weeks of the new administration the efficiency and discipline of the police were unsatisfactory, but in May energetic efforts were made to effect an improvement, and recent official reports do not indicate that either the state of discipline of the police force or the sanitation of the area furnishes substantial ground for complaint. His Majesty's Consul-General has expressed doubts as to the trustworthiness of the police in the present crisis, but his fears have not so far been realised: the Chinese authorities have drafted special police to the district for its protection bringing the total strength of the force up to 300.
    As was stated in my replies on the 6th of July last to my hon. Friend and to the hon. Member for Stourbridge (Mr. Wellock), the payment of debenture interest due on the 30th June was made in depreciated currency. On representations being made to Mr. Chen at the time, he accepted in principle the obligation to make payment in silver, and the Director undertook that, on the collection of rates and taxes on this basis, sufficient sums should be deposited in a British bank to ensure payment of debenture interest.
    Mr. LOOKER: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether it is the case that the municipality of Hankow is practically in a state of bankruptcy; that the concessions are rapidly becoming derelict for want of a proper authority, and will he undertake to set up some effective form of administration in trust for all parties concerned before it is too late?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: No. I certainly cannot give an undertaking of that kind in reply to a supplementary question. I have answered as to the state of Hankow according to my present information, which does not wholly bear out the description of my hon. Friend.
    Mr. LOOKERasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in whom, under the provisions of the Chen-O'Malley Agreement relating to Hankow, the right to appoint and select the director of the municipal bureau is now vested and by whom such appointment has to be confirmed; in whom the right to appoint the
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    executive secretary of the bureau is now vested, and whose direction and supervision such secretary is now subject to; in whom the right to appoint and control the chief of police is now vested; whether the office of director of the bureau is now filled or vacant; and if any existing authority is now recognised by His Majesty's Government as entitled to exercise the powers of selection and appointment, which the Agreement provides shall be exercised by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of confirmation, which the Agreement provides shall be exercised by the Nationalist Government?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: Article 6 of the Regulations attached to the Hankow Agreement of the 19th February provides that the director shall be appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his appointment confirmed by the Nationalist Government; in view of the fact that the regime with which the Agreement was concluded has disappeared, it is at present, as was explained in my reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Sir J. Power) on the 8th November, uncertain what authority, if any, can be regarded as competent to exercise these functions. Articles 8 and 12 of the Regulations provide that the executive secretary shall be appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the nomination of the director and with the approval of the Council and shall be subject to the direction and control of the director; Articles 11 and 12 provide that the chief of police shall be appointed by the director subject to the approval of the Council, and shall be under the control of the director.
    As was stated in the reply given to my hon. Friend to which I have already alluded, the director fled on the 26th September and, for the reasons already given, the appointment of a successor has not yet been recognised as in accordance with the Agreement. In the meantime, in accordance with the written request of the outgoing director, the Council is, as an emergency measure, acting as a committee for the exercise of the functions of the director, and on this basis controls and supervises the executive secretary and the chief of police. The question of the right of appointing these officers has not arisen in the present emergency, and I therefore think it undesirable to express any opinion on the subject.
    Mr. LOOKER: May I ask whether it is not the case that the machinery created by the Hankow Agreement, which gave the Chinese a greater share in municipal affairs, has completely broken down; that there is no existing authority to appoint fresh members, with the result that there is no administration at all as contemplated by the Agreement, and what steps the right hon. Gentleman proposes to take in the circumstances?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: I have answered, and I think very fully, my hon. Friend's question, and if he wants to put further questions I must ask him to be good enough to give me notice.

    CHANG TSO-LIN (LOANS).
    Mr. VIANTasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any information respecting two British firms having made two loans to Chang Tso-lin, one of 20,000,000 Mexican dollars, secured by the concession of the exclusive right to build a railroad in Chihli province, and the other 10,000,000 Mexican dollars to be known as the industrial and pasturing loan; and, if such has been arranged, whether these loans have been made with the knowledge and sanction of His Majesty's Government?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: I have no knowledge of either of these transactions, nor have I any reason to believe that such loans have been arranged. I should be glad if the hon. Member would communicate to me the information on which his question is based so that I may make inquiries into the matter.

    BRITISH WARSHIPS.
    Mr. WELLOCKasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the aircraft-carrier "Hermes" has now been withdrawn from Chinese waters; how long she was stationed in China; how many flights were made over Chinese territory from her decks during her stay in China; and for what purpose these flights were made?
    The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Bridgeman): His Majesty's Ship "Hermes" has returned to England to refit and recommission, and will return to the China Station on completion, probably in January.
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    She was on the China Station from August, 1925, to February, 1926, and from October, 1926, to September, 1927.
    As regards the remainder of the question, flights over Chinese territory were made on nine occasions, eight of which were in connection with Chinese piratical activities or attacks on merchant ships.
    Mr. WELLOCKasked the First Lord of the Admiralty what is the number of British warships of all classes now in Chinese waters; and what number of men of all ranks and marines are carried on board these ships?
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: The number of British warships now in Chinese waters is:—

    5 cruisers.

    1 aircraft carrier.

    4 sloops.

    2 destroyer flotillas (comprising 2 flotilla leaders and 16 destroyers).

    1 despatch vessel.

    1 submarine tender.

    2 submarine depot ships.

    12 submarines.

    17 river gunboats.

    4 armed launches.

    The number of officers and men, including marines, comprised in the complements of these ships is 8,550.

    ALBANIA (BRITISH LEGATION).
    Captain CAZALETasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to keep the British delegation at Durazzo?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: His Majesty's Legation in Albania now occupies a house at Durazzo, the present lease of which determines on 11th August, 1928, but can, however, probably be renewed. No suitable house is understood to be availale at Tirana, and it would therefore be necessary for His Majesty's Government to purchase land in the capital and erect a Legation house thereon. This would entail considerable expense which in present circumstances is not justified; but the desirability of ultimately establishing the Legation in Tirana will be kept in mind.
    Captain CAZALET: Is it a fact that we are the only nation with its Legation 25 miles from the capital?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: There are a good number of our Embassies and Legation houses which are not such as give me satisfaction, but in these days when economy must be observed we can only proceed very slowly and with the most urgent cases.
    Colonel DAY: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what is the rental of the present house?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: Not without notice.

  RUSSIA.

    BRITISH EMBASSY, PETROGRAD (LOOTING).
    Colonel HOWARD-BURYasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs wehther he has any further information with regard to the Embassy plate that was looted from Petrograd?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: Information that some silver which may have formed part of the plate belonging to the Petrograd Embassy was about to be sold in Riga was brought to the notice of His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires. Mr. Carr has lodged a provisional claim with the Latvian police authorities, pending the definite identification of the silver in question, which is at present in a Customs warehouse at Riga.
    Colonel HOWARD-BURY: Can my right hon. Friend say what is the exact position of this property which was stolen at Petrograd and seized by the authorities of a foreign country for payment of debt?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: As to the exact position at the moment, that is the only definition I can give. It is in the Customs House at Riga, but His Majesty's Government have lodged a provisional claim pending definite identification of the property as having been part of that stolen from the Embassy.

    GREAT BRITAIN (DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS).
    Mr. PONSONBYasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the inconvenience and obstruction to international intercourse caused by a rupture of diplomatic relations and the consequent absence from their posts of diplomatic representatives, His Majesty's Government will abandon
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    this method of expressing disapproval of the action of a foreign Government and permit the resumption of their normal functions by the diplomatic missions?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: The rupture of diplomatic relations clearly causes inconvenience, but there are occasions, happily rare, when this inconvenience is inevitable, namely, when a State has so abused those relations that the continued presence of its official representatives can no longer serve a useful purpose.
    Mr. PONSONBY: In a case where there are strained relations between the countries and grave matters in dispute, is it not all the more necessary to have diplomatic missions to the respective Governments?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: It entirely depends upon what purpose those diplomatic missions have.
    Sir WILLIAM DAVISON: Is it not a fact that the relations are likely to become more strained if these so-called diplomatic representatives used their diplomatic status to plot against a country?
    Mr. SPEAKER: That is a matter for argument.

    CONSULAR POSTS, PERSIA (INDIANS).
    Mr. KIRKWOODasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the cost of His Majesty's Legation and Consulates in Persia is shared by the Imperial and Indian Governments; how many British Consular posts in Persia are maintained by the Indian Government; whether Indians are eligible for appointment to these posts; and what effect has the maintenance of this joint financial responsibility for diplomatic and Consular representation upon the relations between Britain and Persia?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The Consular posts staffed by officers of the Government of India are those at Bushire, Meshed, Bandar Abbas, Kerman, Seistan, Moham-merah, Birjand and Duzdap. Indians are eligible for appointment to these posts. So far as I am aware, Anglo-Persian relations are not in any way affected by the present arrangements for financing diplomatic and Consular posts in Persia.
    Mr. KIRKWOOD: Can the right hon. Gentleman just answer me quite plainly without any lengthy statement, whether the Indians who are jointly responsible with us are upon an equal footing so far as we are concerned in this matter? Does the right hon. Gentleman know English?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: I am not quite sure that I understand the hon. Member's question. I would be obliged if he would put it on the Paper.
    Mr. KIRKWOOD: It is on the Paper. You will see, Mr. Speaker, that the question which I have put is on the Paper and in English.
    Mr. SPEAKER: To which part is the hon. Member referring?
    Mr. KIRKWOOD: The part which asks:
    "Whether Indians are eligible for appointment to these posts; and what effect has the maintenance of this joint financial responsibility for diplomatic and Consular representation upon the relations between Britain and Persia?"
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: My answer, which I hope was also in English, is explicit on both points. Indians are eligible for these posts. So far as I am aware, Anglo-Persian relations are not in any way affected by the present arrangements for financing the diplomatic and Consular posts in Persia.
    Mr. KIRKWOOD: How many Indians have been appointed to these posts?
    Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN: I cannot answer without notice.
    Mr. KIRKWOOD: If I give the right hon. Gentleman notice, will he obtain the information?

  ROYAL NAVY.

    PERSONNEL AND ADMIRALTY STAFF.
    Mr. TREVELYAN THOMSONasked the First Lord of the Admiralty what was the number of the Admiralty headquarters staff and the total numbers serving under the Admiralty command in 1914 and at the present time?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Lieut.-Colonel Headlam): The figures for 1st August, 1914, are 2,072 and 215,331, respectively, and for 1st October, 1927, 3,195 and
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    172,724. I will, with the hon. Member's permission, circulate the details in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. HARMSWORTH: In view of the fact that the hon. Gentleman's answer periodically is always rather unsatisfactory, will he make determined efforts to cut down the staff in the same proportion as the Fleet, compared with 1914?
    Following are the details:
    The total civilian and naval staff (including messengers and charwomen) employed at the Admiralty on the 1st August, 1914, numbered 2,072. On the 1st October, 1927, the number was 3,195.
    The personnel of the Navy on the 15th July, 1914, numbered 146,047. On the 1st November, 1927, the number was 102,709.
    The total civilian staff employed in all Admiralty establishments at home and abroad, including Admiralty headquarters, numbered 71,204 on the 1st August, 1914, and on the 1st October, 1927, the number was 72,952.
    The figures comprise the following:

    —

    1st August, 1914.

    1st October, 1927.

    Non-Industrial Staff—

    Headquarters

    1,920

    2,937*

    Elsewhere

    3,586

    5,980

    Industrial Staff

    65,698

    64,035

    Total

    71,204

    72,952

    * The figure 2,841 given in the details circulated in the Official Report of 16th February, 1927, Columns 911–912 should read 2,941.

    BATTLESHIPS (AIRCRAFT).
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHYasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the new battleships, His Majesty's Ship "Nelson" and His Majesty's Ship "Rodney," and the new county class cruisers carry aircraft or are to carry them?
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: These ships do not at present carry aircraft but will be fitted with catapults later. "Nelson" and "Rodney" will each carry two aircraft and the county class cruisers one aircraft each.
    Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY: What is the reason for the delay in fitting the ships that are completed?
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: I would like notice of that question.

    CRUISER CONSTRUCTION.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHAasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, seeing that provision was made in the current Navy Estimates for the laying down of three new cruisers, one at Devonport Dockyard, he will state whether arrangements are being made for the laying down of these cruisers this year?
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: The cruiser allocated to Devonport will be ordered before the end of the financial year. The Government have decided that, in the light of the situation disclosed at the recent Geneva Naval Conference, it is not necessary or desirable to proceed with the laying down of the other two ships this year.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: With regard to the ship which is to be laid down at Devonport, may I ask when it will be laid down actually and when the work will be commenced?
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: The hon. Member knows that the provision in the Estimates was only sufficient to allow these three cruisers to be begun at the end of the financial year. It will be near the end of the financial year before this ship will be laid down.
    Mr. THURTLE: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that there is no urgency at all about this matter?
    Mr. KIRKWOOD: Where are the engines of this cruiser to be made 1 Are we to get a share in the machinery?
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHYasked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many cruisers, other than battle-cruisers, were under construction for His Majesty's Navy, other than for His Majesty's Dominions Navies, in each of the years 1911, 1912 and 1913?
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: The figures as at 1st November in each of the years mentioned are as follow:

    1911

    6

    1912

    10

    1913

    19

    DESTROYERS (MAINTENANCE RESERVE SCHEME).
    Mr. HORE-BELISHAasked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many destroyers have already been sent or are under orders to go to Rosyth; from which ports have they been or will they be drawn; and how many it is intended to leave at Devonport, Portsmouth and Chatham, respectively, exclusive of the two which are manned at each port for emergency purposes?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: 24 destroyers have already been sent to Rosyth in connection with the Maintenance Reserve scheme, and a further 11 vessels are under orders to proceed there as soon as necessary refit work on them has been completed; of these 35, 15 were drawn from Devonport, nine from Chatham, eight from Portsmouth and three were formerly based on Port Edgar.
    In addition, a further two vessels ("Torbay" and "Toreador") from Portsmouth will probably be sent to Rosyth.
    The vessels which will eventually remain at the three southern ports, excluding those actually employed as emergency destroyers, and as tenders to training establishments, are as follow—
    Devonport, 3. (This number does not include the three destroyers employed in Irish waters which use Devonport as a base for refit, etc.)
    Portsmouth, 3.
    Nore, 3.
    At the Nore there will also be four destroyers and six or seven flotilla leaders held in maintenance reserve.
    Mr. W. M. WATSONasked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many reserve destroyers are now stationed at Rosyth dockyard and the number of naval ratings sent to keep them in order; and whether any local men have been engaged for this class of work?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: 24 of the 35 destroyers to be placed in Maintenance Reserve at Rosyth have already arrived.
    346 naval ratings will be allotted to keep the 35 vessels in order. No civilian workmen will be employed on this duty but six additional local men have been engaged to work the caissons, etc., whilst the destroyers are being received and berthed.
    Mr. KELLY: Is this a departure from the Admiralty practice—that is, the employment of naval ratings on this work as against civilian labour?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: No, it is not anything of the kind. Generally, it is considered right that sailors should look after ships.
    Mr. KIRKWOOD: Does the hon. and gallant Gentleman really mean to say that it is less than seven per ship?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: The hon. Member can calculate that as well as I can.

    DOCKYARDS (DISCHARGES).
    Mr. HORE-BELISHAasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether any plan has been drawn up by the Admiralty which would have the effect for a period of years of reducing the present establishment in His Majesty's dockyards; and whether, in the interests of the towns concerned, he can make a statement on the subject in order that they may know what obligations may be cast upon their finding employment for the discharged men and in making prospective arrangements for housing accommodation and other matters?
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: The reply is in the negative. The hon. Member was present when the whole matter was discussed fully with me last week at a deputation from Portsmouth and Plymouth and I have nothing now to add.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it would be of great assistance to the municipality of Plymouth, if they could have some indication of what the plans of the Admiralty are likely to be, particularly in view of the curtailment of the shipbuilding programme?
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: As the hon. Member knows from the reply to the deputation, of which he was an attentive member, I should be very glad if it were possible to stabilise work in the dockyards. A consistent programme of naval construction is the best way of stabilising it; until that is settled it is not very easy to do so.

    OFFICERS (PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATURE).
    The following Question stood on the Order Paper in the name of LIEUT.-COMMANDER KENWORTHY:—
    22. To ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the recent Fleet Order against officers on the Reserve or half-pay becoming candidates for Parliament applies also to officers who are peers; and whether these peers will be permitted by the Admiralty to retain their commissions if they sit and vote in another place?
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: I notice that in this question I have left out some words. It refers to the whole circular and not only to the part mentioned.
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: In reply to the first part of the question, the Fleet Order deals only with candidature for Parliament, and gives effect, so far as the Navy is concerned, to the provisions of the Servants of the Crown (Parliamentary Candidature) Order in Council of 25th July last. Officers who are peers could not become candidates for Parliament unless they are Irish peers, in which case the Fleet Order applies to them. As regards the second part of the question, no necessity has arisen for any new rule that would prevent officers on the active list who are peers from taking part, to the same extent as hitherto, in the proceedings of the other House. It has long been the tradition that they do not take part in political controversy.
    Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY: Does not the right hon. Gentleman see that he is here making a difference between another place and this House and is preventing a commoner from engaging in politics, while permitting a peer to do so?
    Mr. H. WILLIAMS: Will the salaries of these officers be voted in another place or by this House?
    Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY: May I have an answer to my question?
    Mr. SPEAKER: It seems to me there are too many supplementary questions. I would ask hon. Members to think of their colleagues. It is rather unfair to take so much time over the earlier questions on the Paper.
    Mr. THOMAS: May I ask in fairness to the importance of the question and the supplementary question, whether the

    1017
    simple issue is not, if a preference is to be given to peers over commoners? That is a simple question, and we are entitled to an answer.
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: All I said was that what we have done has been to carry out, so far as the Navy is concerned, the Order in Council of 25th July last. The Admiralty is not responsible solely for that Order in Council, but we have had to give effect to it, as it stands, as regards the Navy.
    Commander BELLAIRS: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Order in Council was smuggled through this House just before the holidays, and no one was aware of it? What notice was given to Parliament in regard to this profound change in the constitution of Parliament?
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: I was at Geneva on 25th July last, and therefore I have no knowledge of that. I should like notice of this question, and indeed I think it is not one which should properly be addressed to the Admiralty at all.
    Mr. THOMAS: Does not the Government's legislation, which interferes with civil servants taking part in politics, justify, in itself, a reconsideration of the whole position?
    Mr. SPEAKER: This is a general Order in Council, and questions upon it should be addressed to the Prime Minister and not to the First Lord of the Admiralty.
    Mr. THOMAS: I accept that and will, myself, give notice of a question.
    Mr. AMMONasked the First Lord of the Admiralty in what respect the restrictions on the political activities of officers and men in the Royal Navy are altered by the Fleet Order issued in August last as compared with those prior to that date; and whether the order applies equally to officers and men on the active list as to those on the half-pay list and to retired officers and officers and men of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve when called up for service?
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: The general effect of the Fleet Order is to provide that officers on the active list and men serving on an active service naval engagement
    1018
    may not become candidates for Parliament until they have been released from their active service obligations. In the case of an officer, this involves retirement or resignation, and in the case of a man, transfer to the Royal Fleet Reserve or acceptance of a free discharge. Previously the position on the active list of an officer or man was not affected unless his candidature was successful, in which case, if an officer he was placed on half-pay, and if a man was given the option already mentioned. The answer to the second part of the question is in the affirmative.
    Mr. AMMON: Is the position of officers and men of the Navy in this respect fixed by Statute Law or simply by order of the Department?
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: I should like notice of that question.
    Mr. AMMON: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider, in that case, whether it is right that this should be done without consultation with Parliament?
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: I have already pointed out that this is not a matter which affects the Admiralty only. I have tried to make clear that what we have done has been in order to try to carry out, as regards the Navy, a general Order-in-Council.
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: Has any change been made in regard to the right, of officers or men of the Navy to participate in other political activities, not actually standing for Parliament, such as attending meetings during a General Election or voting?
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: I should like to have a definition of "other political activities" before attempting to answer that question.
    Commander BELLAIRS: As the Order is being applied to half-pay officers, has the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown been taken as to whether half-pay officers are employed by and under the Crown?
    Mr. HORE-BELISHA: May I have an answer to my question? I mean by "other political activities" attending public meetings and voting. I do not

    1019
    want to press the right hon. Gentleman if he is not sure.
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: I am afraid that I cannot give any further information in answer to these questions. If I tried to give further information, I might not be quite accurate, and I should be sorry if that were so.

    PUNISHMENTS.
    Mr. ROBINSONasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether any complaints have been received through the welfare committees with regard to excessive punishment on board any of the ships in the Royal Navy; whether he will state what precautions are observed to prevent dissatisfaction arising in the Navy following numerous punishments; and if all punishment lists are examined by the Admiral of the Fleet or other superior officer at frequent intervals?
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: Matters affecting discipline are outside the province of welfare conferences. But the Regulations provide a procedure whereby any person who considers that he has been unjustly punished may appeal to superior authority. Records of all punishments are examined quarterly by the Admiral under whose orders the ships are.

    MESSRS. VICKERS, LIMITED (FAIR WAGES CLAUSE).
    Mr. BROMLEYasked the First Lord of the Admiralty if his Department has received any complaints from the Boilermakers' Trade Union as to breaches of the Fair Wages Clause in the case of members of the union on the part of Messrs. Vickers, Limited, Barrow-in-Furness, for working a certain class of steel rivets during the construction of His Majesty's Ship "Cumberland"; and if he will inquire into the matter with a view to removing the complaint?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: Complaints were made as stated by the hon. Member and a deputation was received by me. After due inquiry and consideration the conclusion was reached that Messrs. Vickers were not infringing the Fail-Wages Clause in their contract.
    Mr. BROMLEY: Does the hon. and gallant Gentleman mean after inquiries had been made from the firm?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: I had a deputation before me, and they stated the case, and, on the evidence, we came to that conclusion.

    MR. J. LAVERICK, STOCKTON-ON-TEES (GRATUITY).
    Miss WILKINSONasked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will make inquiries in the case of Mr. J. Laverick, of 15, Beaumont Street, Stockton-on-Tees, No. B. 5649 Royal Fleet Reserve, who was refused his Royal Fleet Reserve gratuity on the ground that as a member of the 2nd Portsmouth battalion he was implicated in the disturbance at Newport in 1921; whether he is aware that Mr. Laverick arrived at Newport after the disturbance had started, and that at the official inquiry he was exonerated; and if, in the circumstances, he will authorise the payment to Mr. Laverick, who served through the War, having the 1914 Star and bar, the money apparently due in respect of his gratuity?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: Inquiries will be made, and if the facts prove to he as now stated, the question of this man's Royal Fleet Reserve gratuity will be reviewed.

    HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP "SUFFOLK" (PAINTING).
    Mr. KELLYasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty whether naval ratings were engaged in painting work on His Majesty's Ship "Suffolk"; if so, what number were so engaged; and what is the reason for this departure in carrying on the work at Portsmouth dockyard?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: Yes, Sir, in accordance with the normal practice when a ship is in commission for trials. I have no information as to the precise number of men who have been thus employed.
    Mr. KELLY: Are we to understand that it has been the normal practice of the Portsmouth yard to engage this kind of labour?
    Lieut.-Colonel HEADLAM: Yes, the practice is as I have stated.

  UNEMPLOYMENT.

    ELLAND DIVISION.
    Mr. ROBINSONasked the Minister of Labour the number of unemployed on the books of the Employment Exchanges in the Elland Division of Yorkshire on 1st October, 1925, 1926, and 1927, respectively; and the number at present in receipt of covenanted benefit, extended benefit, and those who are unemployed but receiving no benefit?
    The MINISTER of LABOUR (Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland): Statistics are available only in respect of the Employment Exchange at Brighouse and branch offices at Elland and Greetland. The numbers of persons on the registers at these offices were 2,233 at 5th October, 1925, 3,586 at 4th October, 1926, and 1,258 at 3rd October, 1927. Of the 1,258 on the registers at 3rd October, 1927, approximately 850 were in receipt of benefit, but I cannot say how many were receiving standard and extended benefit, respectively.

    STATISTICS.
    Mr. T. THOMSONasked the Minister of Labour the total number of unemployed for the latest available date, and the number for the corresponding period last year?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: The total number of persons on the registers of Employment Exchanges in Great Britain at 5th November, 1927, was 1,111,700, as compared with 1,562,959 at 8th November, 1926. The figure for November, 1926, was affected by the dispute in the coal mining industry but is exclusive of persons in that industry who were disqualified for unemployment benefit by reason of the dispute.

    BUILDING TRADE.
    Mr. H. WILLIAMSasked the Minister of Labour the increase in the number of persons registered in the building industry between 1st July, 1926, and 1st July, 1927, together with the increase in the number actually at work on both dates?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: The estimated number of insured persons classi-
    1022
    fied as belonging to the building trade in Great Britain was 833,940 at July, 1927, as compared with 789,560 at July, 1926. The number of such workers recorded as unemployed at 20th June, 1927, was 52,112, as compared with 68,191 at 21st June, 1926. There was thus an increase in the numbers in employment of approximately 60,000.
    Mr. T. WILLIAMSasked the Minister of Labour how many building operatives were registered as unemployed on 1st May and 10th November, or the latest date for which figures are available?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: At 24th October last, 93,190 persons in Great Britain classified as belonging to the building industry were recorded as unemployed, as compared with 58,465 at 25th April, 1927.
    Mr. WILLIAMS: How far does the right hon. Gentleman attribute this increase in unemployment to the change in housing policy in this country?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: Perhaps the hon. Member will put any questions on that point to the Minister of Health,, but, to prevent misunderstanding, I should say that more than half—about five-eighths—in many cases of those who are recorded as unemployed do not belong to the ordinary five or six skilled categories of building labour which most people generally class under that term.
    Mr. WILLIAMS: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware—
    Mr. SPEAKER: I really must ask hon. Members to consider their colleagues.
    Mr. BUCHANANasked the Minister of Labour the total number of unemployed building workers in Glasgow at present and the number of craftsmen included in that number?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: At 24th October the number of insured workpeople in the building trade in the Glasgow area recorded as unemployed was 2,450. I am circulating in the OFFICIAL REPORT a statement analysing this figure by occupations.
    Following is the statement:

    Insured workpeople in the building trade in the Glasgow area* recorded as unemployed at 24th October, 1927:

    Occupation.

    Number.

    Carpenters

    104

    Bricklayers

    11

    Masons (including monumental masons)

    140

    Slaters

    18

    Plasterers

    10

    Painters

    557

    Plumbers

    134

    Labourers to above

    677

    All other occupations

    799

    Total

    2,450

    * Area comprises: Bridgeton, Finnieston, Glasgow, Glasgow (south side), Govan, Kinning Park, Kirkintilloch,, Maryhill, Parkhead, Partick, Rutherglen and Springburn.

    Mr. BUCHANANasked the Minister of Labour the total number of unemployed building workers in England at present and the number for the same period last year?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: The number of insured workpeople classified as belonging to the building trade in England recorded as unemployed at 24th October, 1927, was 79,314 as compared with 72,754 at 25th October, 1926.
    Mr. STEPHENasked the Minister of Labour how many plasterers are registered as at present unemployed in Glasgow?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: At 24th October last nine plasterers were recorded as unemployed in the building trade in the Glasgow area.

    MINERS.
    Mr. T. WILLIAMSasked the Minister of Labour how many miners were registered as unemployed at Edlington, Rossington, Stainforth, Hatfield, Thorne, Askern, and Doncaster on 10th November or the last date for which figures are available?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: At 24th October, 1927, the numbers of insured persons classified as belonging to the coal mining industry recorded as unemployed
    1024
    were 7,117 at Doncaster, including Edlington, Rossington, Stainforth and Hatfield, 1,274 at Thorne and 77 at Askern.
    Mr. WILLIAMS: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that two of the colliery companies are at present importing large numbers of men from Durham and elsewhere, when they are unable to find work for their own people in the area, and will he ask the Employment Exchanges to communicate with them and ask them not to persist in what they are doing?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: I understand that as a rule when Employment Exchanges are asked to supply men they find out, first of all, if labour of the description asked for is available in the locality. On the other hand, if the particular descriptions which are asked for are not available locally, they try to supply what they are asked for. I may say also that we try to view the mining question as a whole and as one which quite essentially ought not to be cut up into water-tight compartments between districts.
    Mr. WILLIAMS: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that in this particular area, where there are over 7,000 mine workers unemployed and 10,000 on short time, miners are still being imported from other districts, which increases the hardship both for the imported men and for those who live in the district?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: If the hon. Member will communicate any information to me which he thinks I ought to consider in connection with trying to draft unemployed miners from one place to another, I will gladly consider it. I have given him the general principles on which we do it, and I would state again that in order to try to improve the state of affairs in the mining industry generally, we ought to consider the country primarily as a whole.
    Mr. PALING: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in spite of this huge number of unemployed, amounting to over 7,000 in the Doncaster district alone, people have not only been sent down to get work, but sent down by Employment Exchanges, from Durham and elsewhere, with full knowledge of the huge army of unemployed existing round about Doncaster?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: I have asked hon. Members to communicate any information to me which bears on the subject.
    Mr. KIRKWOOD: Does that mean that the Government's idea of the mobility of labour means scab labour?
    Sir J. NALL: May I ask whether there is still to be liberty in this country to people to move from one place to another if they wish?
    Mr. GRUNDYasked the Minister of Labour the number of persons at present working at the mines (surface and underground), the number unemployed, and the number in receipt of the unemployment insurance benefits?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: The estimated number of insured persons in the coal mining industry is about 1,198,800. On 24th October the number of such persons recorded as unemployed was 223,691, of whom 133,912 were wholly unemployed and 89,779 temporarily stopped. The balance of 975,109 includes persons who were sick or for other reasons were not actually at work though not recorded as unemployed. According to the returns made to the Mines Department the number of wage earners on the colliery books on 29th October was 982,504, but this number is not precisely comparable with the number of insured persons. I am unable to state the number who were in receipt of benefit. Separate figures for surface and underground workers are not available.
    Mr. GRUNDY: Is it not possible to tell us how many were receiving unemployment insurance out of the number of unemployed miners?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: If I were able to get the information without an undue amount of labour, I would give it, but the tabulation of unemployed in industries is done from a separate lot of figures from the ordinary unemployment benefit figures, and it could not be done without an intolerable amount of labour.

    BENEFIT DISALLOWED.
    Mr. CECIL WILSONasked the Minister of Labour (1) whether he is aware that unemployment benefit has been refused to Luke Coats, 2, Yeomans Road, Sheffield, box 15, book No. 138,391, class 194/6, on the grounds
    1026
    that he was not making reasonable effort to find employment; whether he is aware that this man ceased work in June, 1926, after seven years' continuous employment with Messrs. Hollingworth and Pickard, and that he is a motor driver, handyman, and rough joiner, and has produced letters of prospective employment from several employers; and whether inquiry will be made into this case;
    (2) whether he is aware that unemployment benefit has been refused to Leonard Gadd, 38, Burton Street, on the ground that he is not making reasonable effort to find employment; that several letters have been produced to the Sheffield Guardians showing that repeated attempts have been made to secure employment and interviews taken plane; that this man of 23 has tramped to Leeds and other places and back in fruitless efforts to find work; and whether further inquiry can be made into the case;
    (3) whether he is aware that unemployment benefit has been refused to George B. Cauldwell, 967, Penistone Road, Sheffield, box 33, book No. 144,364, class 20/2, on the ground that insurable employment is not available; that this man of 64 years of age has recently been in regular employment as a wheelwright at Bridge Foundry, Rotherham, ceasing work on 3rd September, 1927; and, seeing that he has every prospect of restarting work any day, can he state why it is that this decision has been arrived at?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: I have had inquiries instituted into the cases referred to in these question, and will communicate with the hon. Member regarding each case as soon as possible.
    Mr. WELLOCKasked the Minister of Labour what is the respective number of persons who have applied for benefit and who have been refused benefit, and the reasons for the refusal, at the Stourbridge, Oldbury, and Cradley Heath exchanges during the first nine months of the current year?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: During the period 28th December, 1926, to 26th September, 1927, the number of claims to benefit, including repeat claims from the same individuals, made at the employment exchanges named was 29,259, of which 6,679 were made at Stour-

    1027
    bridge, 5,460 at Oldbury, and 17,120 at Cradley Heath. During the nine months ended 10th October, 1927, out of 12,920 applications for extended benefit considered by the local committees at these exchanges, 2,907were recommended by the

    APPLICATIONS for Extended Benefit considered by the Local Committees at Stourbridge, Oldbury and Cradley Heath, during the nine months ended 10th October, 1927.

    —

    Stourbridge.

    Oldbury.

    Cradley Heath.

    Applications considered by Committees during period

    3,952

    2,678

    6,290

    Applications admitted by Committees during period

    3,237

    2,096

    4,680

    Applications recommended for disallowance during period:—

    Not normally insurable and not seeking to obtain a livelihood by means of insurable employment.

    12

    12

    10

    Insurable employment not likely to be available

    8

    2

    24

    Not a reasonable period of insurable employment during the preceding two years.

    249

    171

    395

    Not making every reasonable effort to obtain suitable employment or not willing to accept suitable employment.

    105

    97

    146

    Single persons residing with relatives

    198

    115

    164

    Married women who could look for support from their husbands.

    7

    45

    141

    Married men who could look for support from their wives.

    —

    4

    —

    Working short time but earning sufficient for maintenance.

    136

    131

    730

    Aliens

    —

    1

    —

    Postponed for a definite time

    —

    4

    —

    Total recommended for disallowance

    715

    582

    1,610

    Mr. SMEDLEY CROOKEasked the Minister of Labour the total number of persons who applied for unemployment benefit in the city of Birmingham during the past two months and the number refused; and the number of men and women, respectively?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: As the reply involves a number of figures in tabular form, I will, if I may, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the reply:
    During the nine weeks ended 31st October, 1927, 30,896 claims to bene-

    APPLICATIONS FOR EXTENDED BENEFIT considered by Local Committees in the Birmingham Area during the two months ended 10th October, 1927.

    —

    Men.

    Boys.

    Women.

    Girls.

    Total.

    Applications considered

    12,131

    68

    2,309

    41

    14,549

    Applications recommended for—

    Allowance

    10,845

    38

    881

    16

    11,780

    Disallowance

    1,286

    30

    1,428

    25

    2,769

    committees for disallowance. I am circulating in the OFFICIAL REPORT a statement showing the reasons for disallowance. Corresponding figures for standard benefit claims are not available.
    Following is the statement:
    fit, including repeat claims by the same individuals, were made at employment exchanges in the Birmingham area, of which 21,312 were made by men, 7,422 by women, and 2,162 by juveniles. During the two months ended 10th October, 1927, 14,549 applications for extended benefit were considered by local committees in that area, of which 11,780 were recommened for allowance and 2,769 for disallowance. Corresponding statistics in respect of claims for standard benefit are not available. The following statement gives separate figures regarding the decisions on the claims for extended benefit of men, women and juveniles:
    Mr. W. M. WATSONasked the Minister of Labour the number of claims to unemployment benefit disallowed in the Dunfermline and Kirkcaldy districts of Fife from the beginning of the year to the latest available date; how many were from male and female claimants;

    * APPLICATIONS FOR EXTENDED BENEFIT considered by the Local Committees in the Dunfermline and Kirkcaldy areas during the period 7th January to 10th October, 1927.

    —

    Dunfermline District.

    Kirkcaldy District.

    Men.

    Women.

    Juveniles.

    Total.

    Men.

    Women.

    Juveniles.

    Total.

    Applications considered by Committees during period.

    9,234

    755

    393

    10,382

    4,568

    324

    234

    5,126

    Applications admitted by Committees during period.

    8,109

    507

    297

    8,913

    3,964

    167

    103

    4,234

    Applications recommended for disallowance during period—

    Not normally insurable and not seeking to obtain a livelihood by means of insurable employment.

    33

    13

    5

    51

    32

    27

    4

    63

    Insurable employment not likely to be available.

    68

    8

    1

    77

    29

    6

    1

    36

    Not a reasonable period of insurable employment during the preceding two years.

    450

    34

    3

    487

    295

    1

    2

    298

    Not making every reasonable effort to obtain suitable employment or not willing to accept suitable employment.

    444

    83

    18

    545

    80

    34

    24

    138

    Single persons residing with relatives.

    105

    78

    63

    246

    124

    79

    96

    299

    Married women who could look for support from their husbands.

    —

    1

    —

    1

    —

    —

    —

    —

    Married men who could look for support from their wives.

    —

    —

    —

    —

    2

    —

    —

    2

    Working short time but earning sufficient for maintenance.

    11

    15

    —

    26

    2

    9

    —

    11

    Postponed for a definite time.

    14

    16

    6

    36

    40

    1

    4

    45

    Total recommended for disallowance during period.

    1,125

    248

    96

    1,469

    604

    157

    131

    892

    * Statistics of the number of individuals concerned in these applications are not available nor can figures be given showing the number of applications for Standard Benefit disallowed.

    Mr. GIBBINSasked the Minister of Labour the number of persons who have been refused benefit in the city of Liverpool for the three months ended 31st October, 1927, and the reasons for such refusal; and, if any have been refused benefit for not accepting employment, the nature and conditions of the work offered?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: As the reply involves a number of figures in tabular form, I will, if I may, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    and the grounds upon which the claims were disallowed?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: As the reply includes a number of figures, I will, with the hon. Member's permission, circulate a statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the statement:
    Following is the reply:
    Out of 40,808 applications for extended benefit considered by the local committees in the Liverpool area during the period 12th July, to 10th October, 1927, 34,348 were recommended for allowance and 6,460 for disallowance. The following statement shows the reasons for such disallowances. Statistics regarding the disallowance of applications for standard benefit are not available.
    As regards the last part of the question, it is not practicable to give this information.

    Applications* for extended benefit recommended for disallowance by local committees in the Liverpool area during the period 12th July to 10th October, 1927.

    Reasons for disallowance.

    Number of applications recommended for disallowance.

    Not normally insurable and not seeking to obtain a livelihood by means of insurable employment

    412

    Insurable employment not likely to be available

    111

    Not a reasonable period of insurable employment during the preceding two years

    3,453

    Not making every reasonable effort to obtain suitable employment or not willing to accept suitable employment

    1,366

    Single persons residing with relatives

    639

    Married women who could look for support from their husbands

    85

    Married men who could look for support from their wives

    3

    Working short time but earning sufficient for maintenance

    370

    Postponed for a definite time

    21

    Total recommended for disallowance

    6,460

    * Statistics showing the number of separate individuals concerned in these applications are not available.

    Mr. NEIL MACLEANasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that James Haggerty, of 110, Queen Street, Govan, has been refused benefit by the Govan Employment Exchange on the ground that the committee consider he has failed to prove that he is making every reasonable effort to obtain employment suited to his capacities and is will-
    1032
    ing to accept such employment (Clause 4, U.1. 503); that Haggerty's record of employment from April, 1927, has been from 28th April to 24th June with Barclay, Curie, and Company, Govan; from 28th June to 13th July with Cochrane, Morgan, and Company, Govan; from 18th July to 17th October with Barclay, Curie, and Company, Govan; that his record of stamps for 1927 is 1/27 24 stamps, 2/27 16 stamps, a total of 40 stamps for 45 weeks; whether he will make an inquiry to see if some mistake has been made in this case; or whether, seeing that Haggerty accepted employment during the Glasgow holiday week, and is therefore making reasonable efforts to obtain and is willing to accept employment, he will have this case reconsidered?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: I am having inquiries made in this case, and I will let the hon. Member know the result as soon as possible.

    DOCK LABOUR (DECASUALISATION).
    Mr. LUMLEYasked the Minister of Labour when he expects to receive the Report of the Committee on the Decasualisation of Dock Labour?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: In the two Reports made by the Committee in 1924 the establishment or revision of registration schemes at the principal ports was recommended as a preliminary to further measures. The Committee remain in being and are kept informed of the progress of these schemes, but further experience of their working is necessary before the Committee can be in a position to make additional recommendations.

    KINNING PARK EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGE, GLASGOW.
    Mr. T. HENDERSONasked the Minister of Labour if his attention has been called to the unsatisfactory condition of the Kinning Park Employment Exchange, Glasgow whether he is aware that these conditions arise from the structural defects of the building, which cannot be remedied; and will he be prepared to consider the advisability of obtaining new premises in the vicinity?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: The question of providing other accommodation in this case is under consideration.

    SUGAR REFINING INDUSTRY.
    Mr. T. HENDERSONasked the Minister of Labour the number of unemployed persons in the sugar-refining industry at Greenock, Liverpool, and Silvertown for the months of October 1924, 1925, 1926, and 1927, respectively?
    Mr. BARNESasked the Minister of Labour the number of persons employed in the British sugar-refining industry, excluding beet-sugar factories, in October 1924, 1925, 1926, and 1927, respectively?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: I regret that separate statistics of the numbers insured and the numbers unemployed in the sugar-refining industry are not available.
    Mr. JOHNSTON: Will the right hon. Gentleman not consider the advisability of issuing some official statement on this matter after making allowance for the number of men who have been employed in agriculture?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: The trouble is that one cannot sub-divide the occupations too much. Otherwise, one gets an interminable list. Here we have got a classification for other food industries of which beet-sugar is a comparatively small part.
    Mr. HENDERSON: Has the right hon. Gentleman's attention not been called to a statement made by the Council of Greenock giving the number of unemployed through the action of the Government?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: Perhaps the hon. Member will give it to me.
    Mr. HAYES: Has the right hon. Gentleman asked the sugar refiners as to the number of men they have stopped or intend stopping?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: If the hon. Gentleman will give me any information he has received, I shall be glad to go into it.

    DOMESTIC SERVICE (ALIENS).
    Sir W. DAVISONasked the Minister of Labour generally the reasons and under what circumstances between three and four thousand alien women received permits during the past two years in order to take up domestic service in this
    1034
    country; and whether there were no unemployed British women who would have been eligible to undertake the employment given to this large number of aliens?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: Permits to bring to this country alien women domestic servants are issued only when the employer shows that he has made every possible effort to find suitable labour without success. There is still a large unsatisfied demand for resident domestic servants and no unemployed British woman who is qualified and willing to undertake this work need remain out of a situation for long.
    Sir W. DAVISON: Will my right hon. Friend deal with the last paragraph in the question? Of the considerable number of British unemployed women, were none of them eligible to take these 4,000 places that were given to foreigners?
    Miss WILKINSON: If there are so many posts for resident domestic servants, why has the right hon. Gentleman cut down the grant for training women in this work?
    Mr. THURTLE: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that there are very large numbers of unemployed young-men to be found in the residential parts of the West End of London?

    TRAINING CENTRES.
    Mr. CONNOLLYasked the Minister of Labour whether, in the cases of Government trainees whose first period of employment after training is short-termed, any second attempt is made to replace them in employment; and whether, having regard to the importance of ascertaining the net results of Government training, any records or data regarding the permanence of employment secured by Government-trained men, women and boys are available to Members of this House?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. Records are being kept, so far as possible, with a view to ascertaining whether the employment obtained by young unemployed men after training is permanent, but the training scheme has not yet been long enough in operation to furnish reliable data. As regards women, the information available from one or two of the training centres is that a substantial proportion of the

    1035
    women who enter domestic service or a kindred occupation after training remain in it. I am considering whether to arrange for obtaining fuller information, which would, of course, entail some additional expense.
    Mr. BUCHANANasked the Minister of Labour the number of persons receiving training from his Department at the present time and the number at the same date last year; and the sums expended on these dates?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: The number of young unemployed men in training at the end of October was 1,115. The corresponding figure last year was 1,097. Expenditure from the beginning of each financial year to the end of October was £55,684 and £55,432, respectively.

    EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGES (TRADE UNION MEETINGS).
    Mr. R. YOUNGasked the Minister of Labour how many trade union branches hold their regular branch meetings in Employment Exchange offices; whether any and, if so, what rent is charged for the holding of such meetings; and whether any applications to hold such meetings have been refused and, if so, for what reasons?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: This matter is dealt with locally, as a rule, under General Rules, of which I am sending the hon. Member a copy, and I regret, therefore, the information asked for in the first and last parts of the question could not be given without special inquiry. I may say, however, that a considerable number of branch meetings are held on Exchange premises, and, in what I believe are the rare cases in which permission to hold a meeting is refused, accommodation being available, the reason is one of those set out in paragraph 5 of the General Rules. The ordinary charge per meeting is 2s. 6d. or 1s., according to the nature of the accommodation available.

    ENGINEERS, GLASGOW.
    Mr. KIRKWOODasked the Minister of Labour the number of1 engineers who are registered in Glasgow as unemployed at the last available date; the similar figure at the same date during the last two years; and whether
    1036
    any of the men in the Government training centres are being trained as engineers?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: The number of insured persons classified as belonging to the engineering and motor vehicle industries recorded as unemployed in the Glasgow area at 24th October, 1927, was 6,028 as compared with 16,641 at 25th October, 1926, and with 12,734 at 26th October, 1925. The answer to the last part of the question is in the negative.

    YOUNG PERSONS, GLASGOW.
    Mr. WHEATLEYasked the Minister of Labour the number of boys and girls leaving school in Glasgow during the last three years who so far have been unable to find employment?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: I regret that statistics giving the information desired are not available.
    Mr. WHEATLEYasked the Minister of Labour the number in Glasgow of young people between the ages of 16 and 18 who are registered as unemployed; the number of young men and women, respectively, between the ages of 18 and 21 at the last available date; and the number of those who have been unemployed for 12 months or more?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: At 24th October, 1927, the number of insured persons aged 16 and 17 years recorded as unemployed in the Glasgow area was 1,454 of whom 851 were boys and 603 girls. I regret that I am unable to state the number of uninsured persons of these ages registered as unemployed or to give the information asked for in the remainder of the right hon. Member's question.
    Mr. BUCHANAN: In view of the importance of securing these figures for the discussion of the Unemployment Insurance Bill, in order to see the number affected by the Bill, cannot the right hon. Gentleman see his way to secure the numbers idle at these ages?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: I said if I can get the information I will gladly let the right hon. Gentleman have it. So far as I am aware, the percentage for young men is probably rather lower than the average for males as a whole,

    1037
    and the average for young women is just about the same—possibly a little more—as for women generally.

    EMPIRE SETTLEMENT (TRAINING SCHEME).
    Viscount SANDONasked the Minister of Labour in view of the fact that the State training scheme for Empire emigrants run by his Department costs 53s. a week per youth, and that the Salvation Army scheme costs 30s., what extra advantages lie in the State scheme to account and compensate for the additional cost; and whether he has considered contracting out this work at a lesser cost to such Voluntary societies as are prepared so to tender?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: I understand the figures quoted are not comparable as regards the items of cost included or as regards the age of the persons trained and the extent of the training. I understand that it is open to any voluntary society which can undertake training for overseas to apply to the Overseas Settlement Department for a grant in aid under the Empire Settlement Act.
    Viscount SANDON: Can the right hon. Gentleman give particulars of what the differences are? I mean, will he publish them at some time?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: If the hon. Member will communicate with me, I will make inquiries and see in what form any particulars can be given.
    Mr. LOOKER: Have not the Salvation Army activities in promoting Empire settlement been extraordinarily successful, and do they not pay great attention to training the men, placing them in responsible positions, and looking after them afterwards; and cannot the right hon. Gentleman take greater advantage of it?
    Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member should put those questions down.
    Captain CROOKSHANKasked the Minister of Labour what is the cost of the training of men prior to migration overseas under the scheme administered by his Department as compared with the cost of training soldiers under the similar scheme administered by the War Office?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: I am not sure that comparable figures can be-obtained, but I am inquiring into the matter and will communicate the result to my hon. and gallant Friend.
    Captain CROOKSHANK: May I ask my right hon. Friend if his training advisers are taking advantage of the experience gained by the Army vocational training?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: Yes, they are in communication one with another.
    Mr. HAYESasked the Minister of Labour how many applications have been received during the past 12 months at Merseyside Employment Exchanges from unemployed men for training with a view to taking up employment on the land in Australia, Canada, etc.; the number of applications rejected; and whether applicants are informed of the grounds upon, which rejection is made?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: 128 unemployed men have applied at the Merseyside Exchanges in the last 12 months for training for settlement in Australia. Eleven withdrew their applications and 57 were not accepted by the Dominion authorities. Eighty-two unemployed men have applied for training for settlement in Canada. Ten withdrew their applications and 16 were not accepted By the Dominion authorities. The decision as to suitability for training for settlement overseas rests with the representatives of the Dominion Governments and these authority do not normally disclose the reasons for their decisions.
    Mr. HAYES: In the event of rejection taking place on account of suggestions that men are not suitable, in the sense that they have not been genuinely seeking work, might the applicant not have an opportunity of hearing the evidence against him?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: I do not know on what grounds the Dominion authorities reject applicants. As far as I know, generally it is on physical grounds.
    Mr. PALING: Does the right hon. Gentleman's answer mean that all applicants not rejected have either proceeded to a training centre or will be given facilities to go?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: As a matter of fact, all those not rejected were admitted to the training centre.
    Sir CLEMENT KINLOCH-COOKE: Would it not be better to see whether these men are physically fit before they go for training?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: That is what is done.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: When are these men submitted for examination to the Dominion authorities?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: They are submitted to the Dominion authorities before they go to the training centres.

    The following Table shows the estimated numbers of persons in certain industries in Great Britain insured under the Unemployment Insurance Acts and the numbers of such persons recorded as unemployed at certain dates in 1925, 1926 and 1927 respectively.

    Industry.

    1925.

    1926.

    1927.

    Estimated numbers insured at July.

    Number of insured persons unemployed at 22nd June.

    Difference.

    Estimated numbers insured at July.

    Number of insured persons unemployed at 21st June.*

    Difference.*

    Estimated numbers insured at July.

    Number of insured persons unemployed at 20th June.

    Difference.

    Construction and repair of motor vehicles, cycles and aircraft.

    212,590

    11,974

    200,616

    221,810

    22,056

    199,754

    230,970

    12,638

    218,332

    Silk

    46,550

    2,956

    43,594

    50,820

    5,565

    45,255

    55,040

    3,268

    51,772

    Lace

    19,500

    3,377

    16,123

    18,880

    3,750

    15,130

    18,170

    1,403

    16,767

    Musical instruments.

    21,630

    1,266

    20,364

    24,380

    3,996

    20,384

    24,700

    2,073

    22,627

    *The figures for June, 1926, are affected by the increase of unemployment due to the general stoppage in the coal mining industry.

    The columns headed "Difference" would include at each date a number of persons who were not actually at work as a result of sickness, or holidays, or unrecorded unemployment.

    AGRICULTURE (POLICY).
    Mr. HARMSWORTHasked the Prime Minister whether he will take an early opportunity of announcing a definite policy to stay the growing depression in the agricultural industry?
    The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Baldwin): The Government fully appreciates the difficulty through which the agricultural industry is passing, but I would remind my hon. Friend that those difficulties are by no means confined to the industry in this country alone. The difficulties with which the industry is at present faced are very largely attribut-

    IMPORT DUTIES (EMPLOYMENT).
    Mr. H. WILLIAMSasked the Minister of Labour whether the count of insured persons as at 1st July last is now completed; and, if so, the total number of persons actually at work on that date in the following industries: motor car, silk, lace and musical instruments and, for comparison, the corresponding total on 1st July, 1926 and 1927?
    Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: As the reply includes a number of figures, I will, with the hon. Member's permission, circulate a statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the statement:
    able to causes beyond our control, many of which are of world-wide operation. The Government will, however, continue to afford to the industry such assistance from time to time as is reasonable and practicable, having regard to the present financial stringency.
    Mr. BUXTON: Can the Prime Minister say whether the White Paper of 1926 is still a complete statement of the Government's intentions with regard to agriculture?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I shall have to refresh my mind before I can answer that question.

    GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.

      STAFF.
      Mr. HARMSWORTHasked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that the last issued quarterly return, giving the number of persons employed in Government Departments, shows an increase of 3,390 within three months; whether he will consider the question of imposing limits to staff extensions; and whether he will undertake not to introduce legislation necessitating increased expenditure upon salaries?
      The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Mr. Arthur Michael Samuel): My hon. Friend is no doubt referring to the increase in the staff of Government Departments at 1st July last, as compared with 1st April last. That increase is accounted for by the growth of postal and telephone work, by increase of work in connection with the Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act, 1925, and by temporary increases due to seasonal pressure. The return of the staffs of Government Departments as at 1st October last, which is now available shows a reduction, as compared with 1st July, 1927, of 933, notwithstanding a further increase of 376 due to the continued growth of postal work. The quarterly returns for 1st July and 1st October, 1927, show substantial reductions as compared with the corresponding figures for 1926, notwithstanding increases of 2,749 and 2,684, respectively, in the staff of the Post Office. With regard to the latter part of the question, it is the intention of the Government, as my right hon. Friend indicated in his Budget Speech, to effect a marked contraction in the number of new entrants to the Civil Service during the remaining years of this Parliament. The Government cannot, however, go so far as to undertake that in no circumstances will they introduce legislation that may have the effect of increasing expenditure on staffs.

      CLAIMS AND RECORDS OFFICE, KEW (DISCHARGES).
      Mr. KELLYasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that 163 men are being discharged from the Claims and Records Offie at Kew; that most of these men are married with families, and have been employed in the
      1042
      service seven or more years; will he state the reason for discharging so many men at a time when unemployment figures are rising; whether he is aware that employés in other Departments are working overtime; and whether he will give careful consideration to the possibility of withdrawing the notices or having the men in question transferred to other Departments where overtime is being worked?
      Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: With regard to this question generally, I would refer the hon. Member to the replies given on the same subject on the 10th November and 14th November to the hon. Members for Leith (Mr. E. Brown) and Plaistow (Mr. W. Thorne). With regard to the last two parts of the question, I have no authority to intervene in the organisation of other Departments; but I can assure the hon. Member that the Joint Substitution Board for the Civil Service is taking all possible steps to secure the re-employment of these men in suitable vacancies.
      Mr. KELLY: In view of the fact that in his own Department much overtime is worked, and in view of the fact that he is unable to give the information asked for in some of the questions put to him, cannot the right hon. Gentleman employ these people in helping him?
      Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: I cannot do more than I am doing at the present moment. I have done and am doing the utmost I can as the vacancies are created. Of course, I have to have regard to any work that can properly be done for me.
      Mr. MONTAGUE: Is not a great amount of work being done at Acton?
      Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: Not that I am aware of.

      SHIPYARD WORKERS (WAGES).
      Mr. STEPHENasked the Minister of Labour the average rate of increase of wages of shipyard labourers and craftsmen between 1914 and 1927?
      Sir A. STEEL-MAITLAND: I am sending the hon. Member a copy of the Ministry of Labour Gazette for October, on page 369 of which appears a summary of the information available on this matter.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Mr. RAMSAY MacDONALD: Will the Prime Minister be good enough to tell us what business it is proposed to take on the remaining days this week?
The PRIME MINISTER: Tomorrow, completion of Report and Third Beading of the Cinematograph Films Bill and Committee stage of the Expiring Laws Continuance Bill.
Friday, Third Beading of the Landlord and Tenant (No. 2) Bill; Committee of the Public Works Loans (No. 2) Bill; and, if time permit, other orders on the Paper.

MESSAGE FROM THE LOBDS.
Law of Libel Amendment Bill [Lords],—That they propose that the Joint Committee appointed to consider the Law of Libel Amendment Bill [Lords] do meet in Committee Boom C on Wednesday 23rd November, at half-past Eleven o'clock.
Lords Message considered.
Ordered, That the Committee appointed by this House do meet the Lords Committee as proposed by their Lordships.—[Commander Eyres Monsell.]
Message to the Lords to acquaint them therewith.

CBIMINAL APPEAL (SCOTLAND) BILL,
"to amend the provisions of the Criminal Appeal (Scotland) Act, 1926, with regard to the power of the Secretary of State to refer a case or any point arising therein to the High Court of Justiciary," presented by Secretary Sir JOHN GILMOUR; supported by the Lord Advocate, the Solicitor-General for Scotland and Major Elliot; to be read a Second time To-morrow, and to be printed. [Bill 202.]

RUBBER INDUSTRY.
Mr. CAMPBELL: I beg to move,
"That leave be given to bring in a Bill to provide for the collection of a contribution by rubber manufacturers in Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the funds
1044
of the research association of British rubber and tyre manufacturers; and for other purposes connected therewith."
I have been asked to bring in this Bill, I presume, because I am supposed to know a little about rubber. Immediately on being asked to do so, I made it my duty to inspect the balance sheets of the Rubber Research Association, and to inspect their works at Croydon, to the best of my ability. I have come to the conclusion that this Bill will serve a very useful purpose. You, Mr. Speaker, and other Members of the House have heard me advocate on many occasions the necessity for research, and therefore I was pleased when I was asked to bring in a Bill of this description, by which rubber research will be in the hands of and paid for entirely by those interested in rubber, instead of being financed by the Government, as has been the case hitherto to a certain extent. When this Research Association was started in 1920 it was subsidised to the extent of 50–50 by the Government. In 1925 it got a block grant of £2,000, the grant diminishing by £400 each year, so that in 1929 the Research Association will be entirely without any Government grant whatsoever. The grant is paid from the sum of £1,000,000 allotted to the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. The rest of the money was found by voluntary subscriptions.
The idea of the Department in giving this subsidy is to enable a research association—this or any other research association—to get on its legs and then run by itself, and, in short, the object of this Bill is to achieve this. As I have said, the Government grant will expire in 1929, and the Research Association is very anxious to have established itself on a firm financial basis and to have procured a steady annual income by that time. At the present moment, a good deal of the income of the Research Association goes on propaganda to obtain new members for the Research Association. If this Bill be agreed to, the funds can be spent on research, and on that only, and that is all to the good. Dr. Young, a high official of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, reporting on this question, said:
"It is necessary to have a Central Intelligence Organisation."

1045
The scientific assessors said that there was a lack of good senior staff. This was owing to lack of funds. It is also absolutely necessary that they should have a first-class library and a first-class librarian. The chairman of the Library Information Bureau Committee writes that:
"unless some systematic record be kept much of the time spent in skimming the weekly periodicals and reading occasional articles and scientific papers will have been wasted."
The cost is taxed at £15,000, which will all go on research. This will be collected by a collection on the basis of 1–25th of a penny per pound weight on all the raw rubber retained for use in Great Britain. The estimated annual consumption of rubber in this country is 40,000 tons, and, if all the rubber retained for use pays a contribution, the individual sums paid will not be at all excessive. The Bill is based—this is very important because there are those in the House who do not exactly understand what it all means—on the Cotton Industry Act of 1923, which provides for the maintenance of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation which has proved very satisfactory. There are several of my backers who are cotton men, and they have willingly put their names to this Bill. This Measure is supported by 85 per cent, of the total capital engaged. In other words, out of £50,000,000 capital those representing no less than £44,000,000 have agreed to this Measure. As far as I have been able to ascertain, I only know of two large firms who do not agree with this Bill in principle, although they make use of the Research Association. The Bill is limited to five years, and to an average contribution of £15,000. In this connection, we have to deal with keen competition from America, Germany and the rest of the Continent, and to my mind it is absolutely essential that the whole of the rubber industry—research in rubber is still in its infancy—should support this association, and enable them to have this Bill by which they can collect these contributions and spend all the money on research.
Question put, and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Campbell, Mr. Sidney Webb, Sir Hilton Young, Mr. William Graham, Mr. A. V. Alexander, Sir Robert Hamilton, Sir Sydney Henn, Viscount Sandon, Sir
1046
Archibald Sinclair, Mr. Oliver Stanley, Mr. Wardlaw-Milne, and Mr. Wiggins.

RUBBER INDUSTRY BILL,
"to provide for the collection of a contribution by rubber manufacturers in Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the funds of the research association of British rubber and tyre manufacturers; and for other purposes connected therewith," presented accordingly, and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 203.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  COAL INDUSTRY.
  Mr. RAMSAY MacDONALD: I beg to move.
  "That this House regrets that the growing difficulties in the coal industry and the increasing distress and unemployment amongst the miners have been neglected by the Government, upon whom, particularly after its actions of last year, a special responsibility rests; and calls for immediate action to secure an efficient organisation of the industry and of the sale and use of its products; and to deal with the embarrassing condition of local relief authorities, the recruitment of labour, and the treatment of the vast number of miners on short time and out of work."
  I think there will be no division of opinion on any side of the House that the coal industry is in a very critical and a most unhappy position, nor can there be any division of opinion that the coal industry cannot be dissociated or isolated from our general national industries. I do not think there will be any division of opinion on this much more serious statement that the coal industry to-day is passing through a transforma-which requires careful consideration and handling, not only by those who have money invested in it, not only by those whose labour is employed in it, but by the Government itself.
  The days when people used to talk about industry being dissociated from politics are as dead as Queen Anne. What we raise by this Resolution is the coal situation, but if this Government and this House imagine that you can discuss the coal situation and deal with it by a Departmental reply, that shows once again how utterly incompetent the Government are either to understand or handle this problem. I have been told to-day that the Government reply is going to declare that its only conception of the coal situation is the Board of Trade conception. We are going to raise issues to-day which are not Board of Trade issues at all. Nobody knows better than the Prime Minister that he never can answer our attack unless he answers it himself as a representative of his Cabinet and his Government. The country is a spectator of all this. My first point is that in the arrangement that has been made by the Government
  1068
  for the Debate to-day the nation has once more got a demonstration of how blind the Government are to the problems with which they have to deal.
  4.0. p.m.
  The present situation has not arisen since last year or since the dispute of 1925. The present situation has been heralded through a goodly number of years by a procession of worrying events, one after another coming up rank upon rank, which every man with eyes to see and a mind to comprehend, must have understood. Last year the Government took a certain view at the end of that procession, and at the time when the procession showed itself to be critical. The Government view was this: "Accept lower wages, accept longer hours, and we will guarantee a better condition of the industry." The other day I was reading a speech delivered by a representative of the owners' association. It showed that that is the frame of mind of the owners officially even now. We were told miners' wages must still come down, and, not only that, but that the wages of outsiders who co-operate in the handling of the coal, in the haulage of the coal, and in the transport of the coal must also come down. In fact, what this nation is up against is that there is on the part of very important people, very powerful people organised in this country, a view that you can make national industry flourish upon sweated conditions. Last year we fought the Government upon this and we said: "You are making a mistake. When you get wages down, you have to improve the condition of the industry." You have got the wages down and there is this Debate to-day, and there is not a single fact that any of my hon. Friends behind me can bring forward in this Debate up to eleven o'clock to-night that is new to 1927. Everyone of them was brought before the House and the Prime Minister last year was asked to consider them seriously in an economic setting and not in a political aspect and he refused to do so. To-day you have production increased. To-day you have overhead charges reduced. To-day we are producing coal at less cost per ton than we did last year. To-day our coal is selling in foreign markets at shillings per ton more than it did last year. To-day British coal is being sold in Berlin, not at 6d. less than German coal, not at a

  1069
  penny or two less than the foreign producer can sell his coal, but I am informed by one whose word I take that when he was in Berlin the' other day he found English coal was being sold at four shillings per ton less than its nearest competitors.
  Mr. AUSTIN HOPKINSON: Can the right hon. Gentleman give us the name of his informant?
  Mr. MacDONALD: If there be any doubt about it, I hold in my band an extract from the "South Wales Journal of Commerce," which is pre-eminently a mineowners' journal. It says in a leading article:
  "The fact that the much lower price of British coal has not brought salvation to the trade is sufficient proof that factors other than that of cost of production are responsible for the present depression of industry."
  It goes on to say:
  "It is quite true that the costs of production are comparatively high, but so also are the costs of production in every other country relatively to those ruling in pre-War years, and in so far as labour costs are concerned the figures for this country are more favourable than those of either Germany or the United States. In the States the labour cost is probably to-day at least double what it was in pre-War years. In the Ruhr, according to the latest return of the Westphalian Syndicate, it is at least 40 per cent, more than it was in 1913, whereas in South Wales the last audited return showed an increase over the pre-War level of some 30 per cent."
  Those are the facts. The Government policy of last year has absolutely failed. They did one thing. We all remember that they asked this House to pass a Mining Industry Bill for eight hours. That was their compensation for standing alongside of the owners and behind the owners in forcing a certain industrial issue to a certain result. What have they done? A question was put to the Minister of Mines the other day as to what effect this Mining Industry Bill had had. The Minister replied, "It is not time to reply." Should I go very far wrong, should I be exaggerating very much if I suggested that the reason he gave that answer was that he had nothing whatever to say.
  But there is more than that. The Prime Minister himself in asking this House to accept certain proposals he was then making, made a statement—I have
  1070
  had it looked up again, lest my recollection or impression betrayed me—which gave us to understand that he had come to a bargain. Here are his words:
  "I have received positive assurances from the owners that on the basis of an eight hours' day"—
  Then he corrected himself:
  "I have not received them myself but one or two of my colleagues received them before I would consent to introduce this change which I am advocating this afternoon—there are certain districts, producing approximately half the output of the country, in which the men will be offered a continuance of their existing wages for July, August and September and that over more than half of the rest of the country the reduction asked, if one is asked at all, will be something materially less than the 10 per cent, drop that the offer already made by the owners on the eight hour basis contemplated."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th June, 1926; col. 2148, Vol. 196.]
  In moving the Third Reading the First Lord of the Admiralty held out to us the prospect, that the operation of the Bill would certainly, if accepted, either reduce unemployment or produce very much less unemployment than any of the other alternatives. Are the Government going to tell us to-day that when they took the action they did last year, both administrative and legislative, they had not persuaded themselves on having received assurances from the owners that lower wages and longer hours were going to relieve the industry of the strain it had to bear then? If they did not, I leave it to the reflection of the country. If they did, I want them to tell us to-day what they are going to do in order to undo their own mistakes of last year. We have had in recent days renewals of a faith in optimism. I am an optimist, but I am not a lotus eating optimist, and the mere declaration of optimism under conditions such as those under which we are to-day is doing the country's energy, the country's heart and the country's will very serious damage indeed.
  I ask the Government what is the position. First of all, production. The figures show that, if production can be abstracted from everything else, if the problem of production is solved the moment you can announce certain figures of tons having been sent up from the bottom of the pit to the top of the pit, that problem has been solved, because production merely on figures is not so bad. But everyone knows that solves

  1071
  nothing at all. First of all, the great problem in coal now is the transference of coal into power, and this country is seriously behind the Continent in experiments in that direction. The question of how coal is to be transformed into oil and into certain other valuable by-products essential to the continuance of national prosperity is not a matter for individual enterprise, is not a matter for simply those who are making profits in coal getting. It is a matter to which no Government who understand the duties of a modern Government can close their eyes and blind themselves. What are the Government doing in relation to this? What interest are they taking in all these scientific experiments and explorations directed to discovering how these black lumps of fossilised vegetable can be translated into power? That is the first thing that must be settled in connection with the coal problem to-day.
  The next point is: When the coal is produced, how is it going to be disposed of as coal? We are told a great deal about the competition the British coal-owner has to meet in the market, and by a kind of sleight of hand trick that competition is palmed off as though it were a competition between foreign countries and ourselves. It is nothing of the kind. The figures I gave regarding Berlin show, as a matter of fact, that the competition from which we are suffering is competition between British owners themselves trying to get to the same markets. It is not the competition of the Ruhr versus South Wales; it is the competition of South Wales exporter versus South Wales exporter, and while that competition is going on every advance in production, every reduction in the cost of production is going not to benefit industrial capital, not to benefit labour. It is not going to be controlled and managed as a pool of advantage in which the great producing elements in the country are to share. It is simply going to be used as a pool of advantage which will enable English capitalist or exporter A to cut down his prices against English exporter or capitalist B. The result is that the lower the wages, the longer the hours, the greater the production; there is absolutely no benefit that is going to accrue to the miner or improvement of the social conditions of the trade.
  1072
  We found that when the Government gave the subsidy. It was simply squandered in internal competition. Hardly a penny of it was paid for the purpose of building up the industry so as to make it stronger to resist the competition it had to meet, and so it is to-day. The Government gave the subsidy, and they permitted the owners to reduce wages and gave them the eight hours' day, and precisely the same economic and industrial result has followed from the second blunder as followed from the first. The owners themselves are beginning to see that, and they are talking now about forming syndicates and cartels, and all that sort of coordinated selling activity. Here, again, the Government responsibility comes in. The Government know perfectly well that if they allow these syndicates to be formed without any sort of social and commonweal control, it is only putting the whole of that industry in the hands of the economic power to use the industry as it likes itself. That is an impossible position for a Government to take up. Industrial efficiency, selling efficiency is all very well, but if that selling efficiency simply means more power for the combined wills of a few individuals to put coal on the home market at any price they like, to put coal on the foreign markets at any price they like, and to have the Government in their pocket as far as hours of labour are concerned, then let us speak in plain terms. That is a system of industrial slavery. In fact, if there be any variance in that interpretation of what is going on it belongs to a dead generation.
  There are two questions relating to production—the use of the materials produced and the organisation for selling and marketing materials, and in neither department can a Government of this country in 1927 refuse to take an active and a serious interest, and we want to know from the Government what they are doing in this respect. Then we come to the other point which to-day, of course, is the most serious, because it is the most dramatic. Yet I am bound to say that to-day that which is most dramatic is not always that which goes down to the positive root of affairs. The most dramatic thing to-day is, of course, the condition of the miner and his family. The right hon. Gentleman spoke last year

  1073
  about a 10 per cent. reduction. How blessed scores and thousands of our people in these islands today would be if that reduction were 10 per cent. The fact of the matter is—I can only give it as I was told by decent, truthful women who have to spend the money and to produce results from Sunday morning to Saturday night—that in great parts of our country to-day while we hear talk about averages and basic prices, and all that sort of thing, that is not what happens to the pocket and the purse of the working miner. I have cases given me where for a run of weeks the net wage was 25s. It is very common to have net wages varying from. 25s. to 30s. a week. I have a letter which came for me since I arrived in the House this afternoon—I happen to know, I think, the writer. I do not say it is an average; I do not want to exaggerate the case at all, because a case stated in the most minimum way is the strongest case in the matter we are raising now. The writer says:
  "I should like to ask certain Members what their wives would do with 6s. 5d. for a wife and family to live on. I have not averaged £1 a week since April. Our wives and children are destitute, with nothing to look forward to but drudgery and misery. We are trying to exist on, as we cannot live. I know two cases who have committed suicide during this last fortnight through low wages and getting into debt and no signs of getting out. I am cutting my name off the checks, as I know what they would do if they found me out."
  With that letter the writer enclosed two checks. The first shows a gross wage of 15s. 4d. for the week.
  Mr. A. HOPKINSON: A shift.
  Mr. MacDONALD: The hon. Member does not live on shifts. He lives on half-crowns, or pounds or five-pound notes. If there is no shift, that is one of the tragedies. If the hon. Member has discovered any other way of living, I would like very much if he would communicate it to me, because I should benefit very much from it. If I have no order for my work, at the end of the week when I have to make my income, it means that at the end of the month when the cheques come in, I am short of cheques, and have to do without necessities. Shifts or no shifts, there is his pay-sheet and his week's wage. On his pay-sheet is 15s. 4d. He did not pocket that, however. He has various deductions—they are all in front
  1074
  of me—and all the money he pocketed to enable his wife and children to live decently was not 15s. 4d., but 13s., after deductions were made. That is the first sheet. It was dated the end of last month. The second one is dated this month. In this case the gross wage obtained is 8s. 9d. and the net wage paid, the actual money handed over, is 6s. 5d. I am not saying that is an average—not at all. It is not. I am simply saying that in the ordinary operation of your industry—and I give my own experience in the last three or four weeks—you will hardly go through a single mining village, I do not care whether it is South Wales, Durham, Northumberland, without getting cases like these.
  Then as to unemployment. The figures were given again to-day, and I will not take up the time of the House by repeating them. But on that we have got to remember three things. First, the actual figures as registered, and, secondly, the figures of short time, like these. These were short time checks. But there is more than that, and this is really where the Government must exercise some forethought. This is what is going to happen. I have heard, since the beginning of this week, of a pit employing, when it is fully working, 1,200 men, or thereabouts, and another pit, also when fully employed employing something like 1,800 men, where notices have been posted or are about to be posted that both pits will have to be closed. Therefore, the Government in considering the whole situation must not merely consider the figures that are registered; they must consider the figures that are going to be registered. They must anticipate, because all these movements and figures are absolutely meaningless unless this meaning is attached to them. The whole of the industry is in a state of flux and readjustment, and it must emerge at the end somewhat different in its organisation and proportions from what it was before the War.
  Therefore, in dealing with the coal industry to-day, the Government have to deal with the question of the adjustment of population to new industrial conditions. We have been hammering at this for a long time. The other day, in the Debate on the Insurance Bill, my hon. Friend, who replied for the Ministry, produced a book which I wrote, I think, somewhere about 1912. I am awfully

  1075
  glad that these books are read with such study and consideration in Government Departments. I wish I was more convinced of the sound effect of the reading of the ideas, but I stand by that. Given industry as a going concern, there are two risks, first of all, the risk of fluctuation, and, secondly, the risk of very temporary dislocation like a coal-shaft geting into disrepair. But given industry under these conditions, you can insure for unemployment, because the thing you are insuring is something to which you can give a mathematical meaning.
  That is not your problem at all to-day. That is only a little bit of your problem. The problem to-day is that a great crowd of people is being recruited and amplified from both ends, which is not unemployed in that sense at all, but is out of industry. You are giving very old men—you get them in hundreds in these mining districts—who have been in industry and are insured. They never will be in industry again. They are not yet ready for old age pensions. The right hon. Gentleman can bring down his age for old age pensions as low as the finances of the country will allow him, and yet those people are not touched by this beneficence. What are you going to do about them? You cannot make them a burden upon insurance funds which were intended, not to meet those people's needs and circumstances, but a totally different industrial risk carefully valued out. Then, from the other side, you are having a still more ominous crowd of young people, boys and girls, who have never been in industry at all, who will never be insured, and will never put themselves in the position of being insured persons as industrial workers.
  What are you to do about them? You have that standpoint illustrated very tragically indeed in the present coal situation. You go to the mining villages now, and you will see. I will give a little illustration of a pit that before it was closed was employing round about 900 or 950 men. That was the standard of employment. It is now employing 250. Men go there day after day religiously, although they know it is all humbug and a farce, lest there should be a vacancy—it might be due to an accident in the pit—of some kind or other, and ask for a chance of being taken on and are turned away. If they live for the next
  1076
  20 years, that is going to be their experience. On the other hand, you go to your recreation grounds, those small places cut out from the sides of the mountain. I have an actual case in point. I see it in front of me as I address this House. This little ground, cut out from the side of the mountain, is full, at the middle of the day, of young people who have passed the school age, young people who normally would have been down the pit assisting their fathers and being taught the art and mystery of coalmining. They were not in the pit, and were without the ghost of a chance of ever going down the pit with tools to enable them to become coalminers. Right hon. Members sit calmly and wait until the laws of God operate, because they cannot devise laws of man to meet the circumstances of the situation. That crowd of uninsurable persons is a national concern. It is not a local concern; it is a national concern.
  We want to know what the Government are doing in order to fulfil their responsibility to unemployed miners. What they are doing now is this. They are knocking many off the insurance, and are considering a Bill which will systematically drive men on to the Poor Law. Then the right hon. Gentleman comes along—from a strict red tape position, I do not quite know that he would challenge it very much—and says, "Oh, the Poor Law is not meant to be for you." Of course, it was not meant to be. The only thing we object to is that he finishes his song in the middle of the tune. What was meant for you? We say that the Government's policy in this respect is a most disastrous policy. Knock them off the insurance fund! Put them on the Poor Law! Then put a sieve on to the Poor Law; sift them out of the Poor Law, and what beggary and destitution! The Government sit and look on, and makes speeches, sympathetic and optimistic, but keep their hands in their pockets. The opportunity that they had last year to settle this as a quid pro quo was lost. We are now in the same position as we were then, and we ask the Government: What are they going to do? The Government cannot go on merely relieving the unemployment insurance fund. They cannot go on merely relieving the rates. They must produce a positive policy. A policy that remains

  1077
  negative is bad, but a negative policy has a most positive effect upon the revival of industry.
  It is all very well to publish White Papers about Bedwellty. Bedwellty might be the greatest sinner that local government has in this country. What has happened? Owing to the way in which our rates are levied, the very districts that are hardest hit now are having the heaviest burdens imposed upon them. I think it is a very open question—the Colwyn Committee came as near to the truth as any Committee ever came—that direct taxation has a much less evil influence upon industry than a great many people imagine; but a higher rate has a direct, a specific, and an unescapable evil effect upon industry. They go to Bedwellty, they go to Chester-le-Street, and they say to the miner, "Off insurance."
  The board of guardians are upset. The board of guardians give the relief. The board of guardians refuse to give relief that is neither one thing nor the other. The board of guardians feel that, if it is going to be relief at all, it ought to be a satisfactory relief. But we know perfectly well that if that policy is continued up will go the rates, and, if rates go up and trade is bad, the property paying the rates goes down in value, and the basis of rateable value is reduced. Therefore, the cost of unemployment and bad trade gets steadily shifted off the big properties on to the small properties, when the big properties are doing their level best to throw off these titanic powers of bad trade that seem to be fixed upon them and trying to reduce their cost of production and trying to conduct industry efficiently. In the very worst places those big industrial concerns are crushed down by the evil effect of the bad trade through which we are passing. Can any economic and industrial policy be more insane than that, which is the policy the Government are pursuing?
  The Exchequer has to come to the aid of local government, but we want to know what the Government are doing. What are they proposing to do? With all due respect, the President of the Board of Trade is not the Minister who can answer this question. From another point of view, everybody with some sort of strength of mind and determination who faces this problem will see that it is essential that there should be a very close and a very intimate exchange of opinion
  1078
  between the owners and the men. The Government this year were terribly moved in their hearts and souls—I am sorry not only because of the reason why I was not here, but because of the pleasure I should have had in sitting here to hear that this moral exercise was being pursued by the Government—because one workman coerced and boycotted another workman. That is so contrary to British tradition that this Government produced a Bill to make it impossible for a trade unionist who did subscribe to political funds to boycott one who did not. If the Government's principle was sound, it was also equally sound regarding employer and workman.
  What is going on in the coalfields to-day—in Durham, Northumberland? In South Wales—I aim speaking now not from correspondence and from what I have read—you get employers who say, "You belong to the Labour party?" "Yes." "You were an official in the lodge, were you not?" That is the Miners' Union. "Yes." "Well, you can come here for the next quarter of a century, but there is no work for you." A man, a leader of his chapel, a man who has been employed for years and years in the pit, a man whom I am perfectly willing to confess when we got into trouble with what we call extremists and all those blithering people, we used as a good, straight, level-headed man to keep his men firm and to make them proof against all the silly blithering nonsense to-day, is out of employment. He cannot get in. He will not get in. I ask the Prime Minister, does he still believe in all this boycotting sentiment that produced, at any rate, certain Clauses of his Bill of this year? If he does, what has he to say to that? There is a miners' official whom I have known a great many years and who is known to hon. Members on all sides of the House—Mr. Straker, the secretary of the Northumberland Miners' Union. Everybody knows Mr. Straker. Everybody knows that he is a quiet, reasonable—I was almost going to say godly—clean man. Mr. Straker wrote in his circular the month before last a statement which really ought to move this House, and which would certainly move the Government if they had any meaning in nine-tenths of the speeches they deliver. This is what Mr. Straker says:
  "If I speak strongly regarding this matter it is because I feel strongly. At some

  1079
  of our pits—exceptions, I am glad to say—colliery officials in both high and low places are treating the workmen under them in such a tyrannical way that all co-operation between them and their workmen is simply impossible. If I had been told only two years ago that such a reign of blind tyranny could have existed at any of the coal mines of Northumberland, I would have refused to believe it."
  Co-operation, consultation between employers and men is absolutely essential, and it is being prevented, and the Government gave the owners the power which enables them to do these things. I have seen the condition of certain sections of people in South Wales. I have seen the process of human deterioration. I have seen marvels of bravery in the capacity of the women, which made me feel a prouder man than ever I have felt in my life that these mothers were precisely of the same stock as our own mothers. I have talked to them and I have seen them staring, as it were, into the blank outlook ahead. Families who have been careful have mortgages upon their houses and are being compelled to surrender. They are coming nearer and nearer to the day when the surrender must take place. There are public utility societies going bankrupt. Families have tried to pay, but the vast majority cannot pay. One co-operative society, I am told, has closed its doors. Shopkeepers do not know what to do. They are beginning to be impatient with this House. They are beginning to become impatient with political matters. They are beginning to wonder whether, after all, there is not some swifter and more decisive method. They are living, as I have said, under a reign of terror in some places, and certainly under a reign of boycott.
  As far as I am concerned and as far as my friends are concerned we are still in favour of the political method as the only effective method of bringing about changes, economic or constitutional, in this country; but one despairs when one sees men, as I saw them the other day, trudging down from the top of a valley, compelled by the rules of the Labour Department to walk 2½ miles down the valley and the same distance back again, making five miles in all, in order to register their names to qualify for unemployment benefit, with the rain pouring in torrents. The right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Labour must understand
  1080
  and the Government must understand and it would be well for the country to understand these things. If it was that alone, one might get impatient with complaints. Hon. Members must use their imagination and try to visualise what has happened in all these months. These men have had small wages; then there comes the boycotting experience, the men find themselves out of work, they suffer; some of them have been out of work for a year, some out of work for three years, and now they have to turn out in the mornings and trudge up and down that mountain road, five miles, in order to register for unemployment benefit. One can understand the feelings that are growing in the minds of a great many of these men. I am sorry. It is a Government affair; it is not a Departmental affair. There is no Department that can handle this situation. It is a question of Government policy. It is a Cabinet policy that is required, and I appeal to the House, irrespective of party, to make up its mind to mobilise its credit, to mobilise its conscience, to mobilise its intellectual capacity in order to put this industry on a satisfactory and efficient footing.
  The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of TRADE (Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister): Mr. Speaker—
  HON. MEMBERS: Prime Minister!
  Mr. SPEAKER: I assume that the hon. Members on my left desire to have the Motion debated.
  Mr. SUTTON: Yes, but we want the responsible Minister.
  Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER rose—
  HON. MEMBERS: Prime Minister!
  Mr. SPEAKER: There can be no Debate if one side or the other tries to impose their conditions.
  Mr. KIRKWOOD: On a point of Order. I want to put it to you: Are we not acting perfectly Parliamentarily in our method of procedure?
  Mr. SPEAKER: I was trying to discover if hon. Members wish their Motion to be discussed.
  Mr. KIRKWOOD: Is it not according to precedent what we are doing here today? Are we not acting perfectly Parliamentarily?
  Mr. SPEAKER: If hon. Members wish me to adjourn the House, that will suit me very well.
  Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER rose—
  HON. MEMBERS: Prime Minister!
  Mr. KIRKWOOD: This is not a boy's job. This is a man's job.
  Mr. SPEAKER: The Motion which has been moved deals with a very serious matter, a matter which the House wishes to hear discussed, but, as I said before, if I am compelled to adjourn the House it will suit me quite well.
  Sir WILLIAM DAVISON: If the miners' representatives do not desire to have the matter discussed in the House, I beg to move, "That the Question be now put."
  Mr. SPEAKER withheld his assent, and declined then to put that Question.
  Mr. KIRKWOOD: Shall I be in order in moving, "That the President of the Board of Trade be not heard"?
  Mr. SPEAKER: That would not be in order.
  Mr. SULLIVAN: Is not the Prime Minister mainly responsible? We want him to answer the case.
  Mr. SPEAKER: That was the view put by the Leader of the Opposition, and hon. Members are entitled to their view, but I called upon the President of the Board of Trade, who rose in his place. The President of the Board of Trade.
  Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER rose—
  HON. MEMBERS: Prime Minister!
  Mr. DUNCAN GRAHAM: On a point of Order. May I ask whether it is not the case that our Motion is an arraignment of the policy of the Government and not an arraignment of the policy of the Board of Trade? If I am correct in so describing our Motion, is it not perfectly reasonable for hon. Members on this side of the House to ask the head of the Government to reply?
  Mr. SPEAKER: The Government are always supposed to be one and indivisible.
  Mr. KIRKWOOD: I wish emphatically to protest. The Leader of the Opposition has impeached the Government on a very serious matter—[HON. MEMBERS: "Divide!"]—which the country is up against, and we ask the Prime Minister to reply. We will not—
  Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member is not entitled to make a speech. If this disorder persists, I shall immediately adjourn the House. I call upon the President of the Board of Trade.
  Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER rose—
  HON. MEMBERS: Prime Minister!
  Mr. HARDIE: On a point of Order. Is it not the custom of this House that when a Vote of Censure is moved against the Government, it is replied to in the first instance by the Prime Minister?
  Mr. SPEAKER: I am not aware of such a custom.
  Mr. MITCHELL BANKS: Is there not a great difference in the procedure of this House between disorderly interruptions on the one hand and the well-known cry of " 'Vide, 'vide"?
  Mr. LANSBURY: Is it not a fact that during the debate on Chinese slavery the Liberal party howled down the late Mr. Alfred Lyttelton, because they wanted the Prime Minister to answer? The Prime Minister has been impeached to-day, and he is putting up the President of the Board of Trade, a man who knows nothing whatever about it.
  Mr. SPEAKER: I believe I was present on that occasion on one of the benches, and my recollection is that the disorder which then took place did not achieve the purpose designed.
  Mr. LAWSON: May I draw your attention, Mr. Speaker, to the fact that during the last two or three mining debates the situation has been handled very badly. The Government have made a regular policy of putting up a Departmental representative, but there are forty men on this side of the House who come from famine areas—
  HON. MEMBERS: No!
  Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member is not entitled to make a speech now. The President of the Board of Trade.
  Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER rose—
  HON. MEMBERS: Prime Minister!
  Mr. SPEAKER: In view of the continued disorder, I now suspend the Sitting until Six o'Clock.
  Sitting suspended accordingly at two-minutes after Five o'Clock.
  Mr. SPEAKER resumed the Chair at Six of the Clock.
  Mr. SPEAKER: The President of the Board of Trade.
  Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER rose—
  HON. MEMBERS: Prime Minister!
  Mr. THOMAS: On a point of Order. I should like to ask whether in your recollection, Mr. Speaker, there is any precedent for a Vote of Censure being moved in the name of the Opposition, by the Leader of the Opposition, and for the Prime Minister of the day, when present and in a position to take part in the Debate, to refuse to do so?
  Mr. SPEAKER: It is not a matter of order for the Chair. I have not looked up precedents, but I think I can recollect other occasions.
  Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER rose—
  HON. MEMBERS: Prime Minister!
  Mr. THOMAS: While it may not be a matter of order, it is a matter that affects the whole position of the House of which you, Sir, are guardian. We have endeavoured to find a precedent, we have failed to do so, and I submit to you, very respectfully, that the Motion is a censure on the Government as a whole, and that that Motion, moved by the Leader of the Opposition, indicted the Government, exploring the whole field. The Minister who is called upon to reply—he will quite understand that I make no personal reference—I understand on his own previous request, but certainly on the instruction of the Government, when the difficulties that we are dealing with to-day were a subject of debate last Session—the Minister who is replying to-day was prohibited from taking part.
  Mr. SPEAKER: That really is not a point of Order.
  Sir W. DAVISON: On a point of Order—
  HON. MEMBERS: Sit down!
  Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER rose—
  HON. MEMBERS: Prime Minister!
  Mr. SPEAKER: I must ask hon. Members to be good enough to allow the Debate to proceed.
  Sir W. DAVISON: On a point of Order. Arising out of what the right hon. Gentleman opposite said, is there any precedent in the history of the House, when the Government have been asked to give a day for the discussion of a matter of interest to the Opposition, for the Opposition to dictate the order of the speeches to the Government?
  Mr. SPEAKER: That, again, is not a matter of order for the Chair. I have called upon the President of the Board of Trade.
  Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER rose—
  HON. MEMBERS: Prime Minister!
  Mr. PALING: Further to that point of Order—
  Mr. SPEAKER: I have ruled that there is no point of Order. The President of the Board of Trade.
  Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER rose—
  HON. MEMBERS: We want Baldwin!
  Mr. MacLAREN: On a point of Order—
  Mr. SPEAKER: There cannot be a point of Order. As hon. Members apparently do not wish the Debate to proceed, under the powers of the Standing Order I adjourn the House.
  Adjourned accordingly at Seven Minutes after Six o'Clock.

BRITISH ARMY.
  WAR CASUALTIES (IDENTIFICATION).
  WAR CASUALTIES (IDENTIFICATION).
  MECHANISATION.
  MECHANISATION.
  EX-SERVICE MEN (REPAIRS OF BUILDINGS, SALISBURY PLAIN).
  EX-SERVICE MEN (REPAIRS OF BUILDINGS, SALISBURY PLAIN).
  AIRSHIP CONSTRUCTION.
  AIRSHIP CONSTRUCTION.
  AIR DEFENCE, LONDON.
  AIR DEFENCE, LONDON.
SCOTLAND.
  HOUSING, CLYDEBANK AND DUMBARTON BURGHS.
  HOUSING, CLYDEBANK AND DUMBARTON BURGHS.
  GAME LAWS AND DEER FORESTS.
  GAME LAWS AND DEER FORESTS.
  HOMELESS PERSONS, GLASGOW.
  HOMELESS PERSONS, GLASGOW.
TRANSPORT.
  TRAFFIC SIGNALS, LONDON.
  TRAFFIC SIGNALS, LONDON.
  OVERCROWDING, OMNIBUSES AND TRAMS (EDINBURGH).
  OVERCROWDING, OMNIBUSES AND TRAMS (EDINBURGH).
  ROAD FUND.
  ROAD FUND.
  OFF-LICENCES, WALES AND MONMOUTHSHIRE.
  OFF-LICENCES, WALES AND MONMOUTHSHIRE.
  INEFFECTIVE MOTOR SILENCERS.
  INEFFECTIVE MOTOR SILENCERS.
  YOUNG OFFENDERS COMMITTEE (RECOMMENDATIONS).
  YOUNG OFFENDERS COMMITTEE (RECOMMENDATIONS).
  NEW EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGE, HULL.
  NEW EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGE, HULL.
  HOUSE OF COMMONS (DIVISION RECORDS).
  HOUSE OF COMMONS (DIVISION RECORDS).
  ANCIENT PAVEMENTS, BIGNOR.
  ANCIENT PAVEMENTS, BIGNOR.
  CONTRIBUTORY PENSIONS ACT.
  CONTRIBUTORY PENSIONS ACT.
  HOUSING (COBHAM, SURREY).
  HOUSING (COBHAM, SURREY).
  FLOODS, FLEETWOOD
  FLOODS, FLEETWOOD
  LOCAL EXPENDITURE (EXCHEQUER GRANTS).
  LOCAL EXPENDITURE (EXCHEQUER GRANTS).
  POOR LAW ESTABLISHMENTS PROVISIONS).
  POOR LAW ESTABLISHMENTS PROVISIONS).
PUBLIC HEALTH.
  CONDENSED SKIMMED MILK.
  CONDENSED SKIMMED MILK.
  ACCESSORY FOOD FACTORS.
  ACCESSORY FOOD FACTORS.
UNEMPLOYMENT.
  SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS.
  SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS.
  BENEFIT DISALLOWED.
  BENEFIT DISALLOWED.
  STATISTICS, MIDDLESBROUGH.
  STATISTICS, MIDDLESBROUGH.
  WOMEN (TRAINING).
  WOMEN (TRAINING).
KENYA.
  LABOUR COMMISSION'S REPORT.
  LABOUR COMMISSION'S REPORT.
  DETENTION CAMPS.
  DETENTION CAMPS.
  TANGANYIKA (MANDATED TERRITORIES).
  TANGANYIKA (MANDATED TERRITORIES).
  ARABIA (ITALIAN TREATY).
  ARABIA (ITALIAN TREATY).
  MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT, 1926.
  MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT, 1926.
  POST OFFICE WAGES (ARBITRATION AWARD).
  POST OFFICE WAGES (ARBITRATION AWARD).
  BETTING DUTY.
  BETTING DUTY.
  SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS, AEROPLANES.
  SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS, AEROPLANES.
AGRICULTURE.
  TRADE FACILITIES ACTS (GUARANTEES).
  TRADE FACILITIES ACTS (GUARANTEES).
  LAND DRAINAGE (ROYAL COMMISSION'S REPORT).
  LAND DRAINAGE (ROYAL COMMISSION'S REPORT).
  CREDITS.
  CREDITS.
  SUGAR BEET.
  SUGAR BEET.
  IMPORTED EGGS (MARKING).
  IMPORTED EGGS (MARKING).
COAL INDUSTRY.
  WAGES COST, SCOTLAND.
  WAGES COST, SCOTLAND.
  STATISTICS.
  STATISTICS.
  PITHEAD BATHS.
  PITHEAD BATHS.
  ACCIDENTS.
  ACCIDENTS.
  CLOSED PITS.
  CLOSED PITS.
  INSPECTION.
  INSPECTION.
  INDIAN MILITARY ESCORTS.
  INDIAN MILITARY ESCORTS.
Preamble
The House met at a quarter before four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
THE LORD BISHOP OF BATH AND WELLS.
St. John Basil Wynne, Lord Bishop of Bath and Wells—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.

RENFREWSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL (GIFFNOCK RAILWAY BRIDGES) ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL. [H.L.]
THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND): My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to confirm a Provisional Order under Sections 8 and 9 of the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, relating to Renfrewshire County Council (Giffnock Railway Bridges); and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a—(The Duke of Sutherland.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; and to be printed.

EDINBURGH CHARTERED AC- COUNTANTS ANNUITY, ETC. FUND ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL. [H.L.]
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to confirm a Provisional Order under the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, relating to Edinburgh Chartered Accountants Annuity, etc. Fund; and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(The Duke of Sutherland.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; to be printed; and (pursuant to Section 7 of the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899) deemed to have been read 2aand reported from the Committee.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
LORD PARMOOR LORD PARMOOR had given Notice to call attention to the position at Geneva and to questions of foreign policy; and to move for Papers. The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I rise to move the Motion which stands in my name and I understand that it is to be replied to by the noble Lord, Lord Cushendun, whom, if I may, I congratulate on his presence in this House. I hope that on the matters I am going to discuss he will have a view which may not be unfavourable. The last time we met was on a League of Nations platform in Chelsea and I recollect his sympathetic attitude on that occasion. The reason why I thought it necessary to bring this matter forward now is that on November 30 what is known as the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament meets again at Geneva and meets under new conditions. It is in reference to those new conditions that I want to ascertain what the opinion of the Government may be. The Commission has been instructed when it meets to make a new start by considering Resolution 5 of the Third Commission of the League Assembly at Geneva. There is one clause of that resolution which it will be necessary to refer to in detail, but not until a later stage. When this Preparatory Commission last met in March very little progress had been made at all. I think that that will be generally recognised. As a matter of fact the differences between the various members of the Commission had been stated in parallel columns, which accentuated those differences rather than showed that any solution whatever had been reached.
Through the recognised channels I have told the noble Lord that the matters I propose to ask about this afternoon under the somewhat wide terms of my Resolution refer to the question of disarmament, which has been for some years now the leading question at the Assembly at Geneva and which in a very special way was discussed this year. In order that there may be no mistake perhaps I may restate to the noble Lord the questions I desire to ask, although I know he has had a summary of them already. The first is: Is the Government prepared to adopt the Optional Clause (Clause 38) of the International Statute of the Court at The Hague. Secondly: Is the Govern-

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ment prepared to press forward a system of all-inclusive arbitration and to recognise the interdependence of arbitration, security and disarmament, which were the three pillars so often quoted from M Herriot's speech? Lastly there is a third question—though I am not sure that I called the noble Lord's attention to this—which is of less importance at the present time but still of considerable importance. What is the view of the Government on the movement made by M. de Brouekère, the Belgian Delegate, in order to improve and strengthen the machinery of Article 11 of the Covenant? Article 11 is intended to prevent war breaking out whereas Article 16 provides sanctions and punishments supposing war does break out. Everyone who is interested in the future progress of the League would like to develop the principles of Article 11, to prevent war rather than give sanctions after war has begun.
I want to say a general word on what I call the principles of 1924. I will not use the word "Protocol" because I understand it is a word that is not loved by some members of the Government, but I do not care in the least what word is used. I only want some form of expression to show what were the underlying principles in 1924; therefore I think if I use the expression "the principles of 1924" I shall escape prejudice on either side. The noble Viscount whom I see in the House, Lord Cecil of Chelwood, has taken a prominent part in pressing forward the disarmament question. In 1924 and indeed in the earlier Assemblies the general basis which we had to consider was this. How in the place of the international chaos which so greatly conduced to the Great War can we, under the principle of the League of Nations, introduce a new international order founded on law and justice? In other words, how far can we pursue the pathway indicated by all writers and speakers from Grotius downwards, who say that if you want to have international law between nations you must proceed on the same lines as those which established national order among citizens?
The Covenant fundamentally changed International Law as between the constituent States. We must never lose sight of the fact that whereas in 1914 any nation might embark upon aggressive war or upon any war, whether justly or unjustly,
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since that date very substantial restraints have been imposed, restraints of the greatest value to the future peace of the world. It was found by experience that those restraints did not go far enough to give the sense of security required in order to carry through by agreement a satisfactory scheme of disarmament. So in 1924 what was really attempted and intended was a further amendment of International Law beyond the amendment of it which had already been formulated in the Covenant itself. This is what was called filling up the gap and its effect would have been that in all cases aggressive warfare would have become what was called an international crime; that is to say, an offence not merely as between the nations concerned but against the League community itself. That point was very much emphasised in this House, as some of your Lordships may recollect, by the late Lord Parker, whose juridical and juristic knowledge and experience held a unique place. It was also one of the principles of 1924 that arbitration, security and disarmament must be inseparably connected as the three pillars in the structure of a peace system. I believe (and I shall have to call attention to what passed at the Assembly) that there has been no weakening in that respect and that the principles formulated by Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot still hold the field. It is only in this way that a definition can be got of "aggressor" in order to deal with the great evil of aggressive war; and as I have stated—this also is an analogy from municipal law—as crimes between individuals become crimes against the State so aggressive war must be regarded as a crime against the whole order of world peace and not merely as an offence between the parties concerned.
I do not wish to develop my view of the underlying ideas and principles of 1924 to a further extent. Indeed, it would take too long and what I have indicated is sufficient for my purpose. It enables me to found the arguments I desire to raise on what passed at the recent Assembly and on the resolutions to which that Assembly came. I fear I might not have the entire assent of the noble Earl opposite when I say that everyone who has been present at, or has carefully read the reports of, the proceedings of the Assembly since 1924, will find not that those principles are moribund—an expression which I notice has

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been used—but that they are growing in strength and vitality, and that each year there has been a larger and growing support of the principles which I define as the principles of 1924. I was told by one who was present in the Assembly this year that ten or eleven—he seemed not to be quite certain of the number—Foreign Secretaries mounted the platform in succession and urged that the principles of 1924 should be accepted, re-established and made the basis of further progress. Then came what I must call a chilling blast from the Foreign Secretary. I do not doubt his sincerity; no one would doubt it for a moment; but it was a blunt and uncompromising speech and no doubt was intended to be so. There is no secret about it. But isolation in these matters at Geneva does not promote influence in international affairs. On the contrary it lessens the influence which a great country like Great Britain and the British Empire can and should exercise upon all occasions over the proceedings at Geneva. International co-operation, which of course is the essence of the outlook at Geneva, requires sympathy with collective opinion. You must have sympathy with collective opinion in order to promote international co-operation.
I should like to say a word on one point in the Foreign Secretary's speech, which stands in print for everyone to read. It is his reference to the Dominions. He used some very strong terms regarding the effect of the principles of 1924 upon conditions in the Dominions, and I should like to put this view forward against that. I agree that in the Dominions, as in our own country and other countries, there is naturally a difference of opinion upon these points. But in 1924 the Delegations from the Dominions were in hourly and daily consultation with the Delegation from this country and were unanimous in their support of the principles then accepted by the Assembly. I should like to go a little further than that in two directions. An absolutely essential feature of the principles of 1924 was the acceptance of the Optional Clause, Clause 38, of the Statute of the Court of International Justice. That clause, I believe, was largely inserted through the wisdom and wide outlook of the noble Lord, Lord Phillimore. Since that date Canada, I think, has publicly expressed the opinion that it is not unfavourable
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to the Optional Clause. I regard that as a matter of the greatest importance. It is a first step in the right direction as showing the sincerity of Great Britain and of the British Empire in the desire for peace, and it is a step of the very greatest importance. If, as I have tried to indicate, you are to have an amendment of International Law as the basis of a new international order, it is of the first importance that juridical and legal matters should be under the jurisdiction and power of a court which is recognised to have competent authority. We know that the support of this clause is part of the American scheme, and I would point out that one very important Dominion at any rate, not only does not oppose what was a basic factor of the principles of 1924 but cordially supports it.
When I was at Geneva the representative of Canada was M. Dandurand, a most competent and capable representative, who was President of the Assembly of the year before last. What is he reported to have said? He did not say that Canada was against the idea of arbitration; but, after stating what is quite true, that Canada had suffered a good deal from arbitration—that is to say, had often been found not in the right—he went on to make this statement. He is reported to have said that, after all, the chance of a non-suit in arbitration is an infinitely less national risk than the risk of the recurrence in an aggravated form of such a war as that which broke out in 1914.
I should also like to give an illustration from Australia. I do not doubt that there is a difference of opinion, but to speak as though all public opinion were one way, either in Canada or Australia, cannot for a moment be supported. Professor Naylor, a professor of history at Adelaide University, speaking not long ago, stated most positively that in his opinion the majority of people in Australia were in favour of those principles which I have indicated. He said, moreover, that it was not to be wondered at because the Delegation from Australia, differing in every respect from the Delegation of this country, did not represent one Party but all Parties. Amongst others it had upon it the then Leader of the Labour Party, Mr. Charlton. It was a Delegation representative of Australia at large and not of any particular

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Party. May I give one further illustration? I was speaking the other day in that centre of ideas for International Law, the hall of All Souls College, Oxford, During the discussion one Australian got up—I do not know his name—and discussed very well his point of view, which was unfavourable to these principles, but immediately, on the other side of the hall, another Australian rose and said that he entirely differed. Not only was he strongly in favour of these principles but a large majority of people in Australia, he said, held the same opinion because their basic desire was peace and not war.
This, I think, brings me to the first question that I want to ask the noble Lord and that is: What is the attitude of the Government on the Optional Clause? When I was at Geneva we had to consider that clause and also the reservations, and a special representative, a most able naval expert, was sent from the Admiralty, who stated that he doubted whether the reservations, as they stood, were sufficient to preserve the belligerent rights in naval warfare as they are now understood in this country. We were able to put in words in Article 4 amounting to a special reservation, showing that the whole question could be reserved and is intended to be reserved. He wanted another amendment later on in Article 11 which brought about the same result. Why should not this clause be adopted with reservations? The noble Lord, Lord Phillimore, is more familiar with this clause than I am. So far as I know there is no limitation to the principle of reservation and any particular matter which this country desired to reserve could be reserved without in any way imperilling the application of the main clause. I earnestly press upon the Government that when this Preparatory Commission meets again at Geneva, when this matter is certain to come forward as one of the main points, the then representatives of the British Government should be able to show not only a sympathetic attitude but a movement in the direction of accepting the obligations—if they are to be called obligations—which in reality are security for peace on both sides.
I want to pass on to the provisions and resolutions actually passed at the Assembly, and in order that I may not be in any way inaccurate I have brought here
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—I do not know whether the noble Lord has it—the official journal of the League of Nations containing the resolutions and recommendations adopted by the Assembly. I have no doubt the noble Lord knows them, even if he has not the book which I have before me. There were two resolutions, both of which are of vital importance. I do not quite know what the attitude of the Government is, but I understand that Lord Onslow, who then represented the Government, was not unfavourable, and the Foreign Secretary stated in Paris on his way home, if I understood him aright, that these resolutions showed, to him, a tendency in, shall I call it, the right direction—a tendency in the peaceful direction. What is the first of those? The resolution was originally framed by the Poles and is called the Polish Resolution. It is altered somewhat in order to get rid of the word Protocol. To my mind I do not think that matters in the least. It is not on a matter of language but of substance that these resolutions are based.
The first one is:
"All wars of aggression are, and shall always be, prohibited."
The Government assented to that. And what do they mean? In phraseology the resolution goes the whole distance—"are, and shall always be, prohibited." Are the Government prepared to accept, in order to carry that out, the only way so far explored both to define an aggressor and also to prohibit all aggressive wars, that is, to give a complete all-inclusive alternative? Then, if that alternative is placed on one side, and if in spite of it an aggressor begins war, he properly and naturally becomes subject to the punishment and penalties in the Covenant. The second resolution, which I hope was not only accepted as a matter of phraseology but as a matter of substance, is this—
"Every pacific means must be employed to settle disputes, of every description, which may arise between States."
I want to ask the noble Lord this. He notes the words "of every description." That would mean filling up what is known as the gap in the Covenant. In assenting to that proposition, in those words, did the Government intend not only to accept what I may call a general proposition, but did they intend to support the only way at present explored in which every

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dispute of every description can be settled without resort to war? That is a simple question.
I do not want to rake up old controversies, because I think we are coming closer together in many directions upon this point, but there were phrases in the statement made by the present Foreign Secretary in March, 1925, when he unconditionally rejected the Protocol, which appeared to be to many people, certainly to Americans—I have read a great many articles on this matter written by them—not an indication of settling disputes of every description, but on the contrary suggest that force must still remain—I think it was called "brute force," but that does not matter—force must still remain as the deciding factor between nations.
The other thing is what is called Resolution No. 5. I am sure the noble Lord will understand what this resolution is and I hope that he has a copy before him. Resolution No. 5 is of very great importance. It was originally suggested by the Foreign Minister of Holland and after considerable discussion and alteration in the Third Commission, which is the Commission to which questions of this kind are always referred at Geneva, it reappeared and was unanimously adopted by the Assembly. I cannot read it all because it is too long—it occupies a page and a-half—but I will extract out of it the two or three passages which really deal with this question of disarmament. They are extremely important, because they show what was the feeling of the Assembly, and I think the Earl of Onslow said on behalf of the Government that the Government assented to the passing of this resolution. It says:
"Being convinced that the principal condition of this success—"
the success there referred to is the approach towards disarmament—
"is that every State should be sure of not having to provide unaided for its security by means of its own armaments and should be able to rely also on the organised collective action of the League of Nations …"
That is the most important point.
Are the Government in favour of giving what is called pool security—that is, the security of the organised collective action of the League of Nations, increasing enormously on the one side the basis of
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security and diminishing the risk of any separate State upon the other? I do not know how that is to be done except in accordance with the principles of 1924, or unless you make an aggressive war not only an offence between the States but an offence against the community of the League itself. My own belief is that if that was properly carried out the risk of war would be infinitesimal. No one country could really face the organised collective action of the League of Nations. Therefore that is a question which I want to ask the noble Lord. Do the Government support this principle of organised collective action by the League of Nations?
Then it goes on to affirm
"that such action should aim chiefly at forestalling or arresting any resort to war …."
I want to pause for a moment. This is where M. de Brouckère comes in. That, I think, is a matter of enormous importance. It is with reference to Article 11. I want in a moment to give an illustration of what I mean while I am upon this point. M. de Brouckère, whose efforts in the cause of peace must be recognised by everyone as well as his great knowledge of all these international questions, has more than once expressed the decided view that the efforts of the League should be directed rather to the prevention of war than to the punishment of the aggressor. No one can doubt for one moment that if you can prevent war it is a far greater, more beneficent and more far reaching reform than punishing the aggressor after war has broken out. I will give the illustration I referred to. I do not want to go into it at length, because this would not be the proper occasion. Let us take China.
Many noble Lords here will recollect having heard this before from me. I have always thought that the difficulties of China ought to have been referred to the League of Nations, although the Earl of Balfour has expressed more than once the difficulties arising from the national chaos in China. That is a difficulty which I have always said I believed the machinery of the League could have overcome. There cannot be the smallest doubt that we were entitled to bring this dispute under Article 11 to the notice of the League of Nations at Geneva, but as I understand the answer which has been made—I do not say I agree with it

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—that answer was that the provisions of that Article are not sufficient to meet the difficulties. M. de Brouckère especially has acknowledged that this Article in such a state of things as this would be sufficient to meet the difficulty. You must recollect that China was a Member both of the Council and of the League in the same sense that we were. If a matter of this kind could have been brought under Article 11 and difficulties had been raised, as they might have been raised—I am not going to underrate those difficulties—I believe myself the facilities of procedure at the League would have been sufficient. If they are not sufficient, let them be increased.
What has gone on, and is going on, is to the loss of everyone. No one denies that. I am not going into all the difficulties, they are many and great, but if a difficulty of this kind could have been avoided and a friendly accommodation made, it would have been of enormous advantage, particularly to Great Britain, and a guarantee of preserving what is of the utmost importance to us in the future—our trade with China. The risk now is that the demoralisation in China may produce a condition of poverty which will make that trade necessarily curtailed, infinitely less important and less flourishing than it should have been. At any rate there is the point which I want to put to the noble Lord opposite. Will the Government, if this is raised at Geneva, be prepared, as one of the roads towards peace, to give their influence and authority to the proposal made by M. de Brouckère to increase the efficiency of Article 11?
There are one or two other clauses which I ought to read, but I am afraid of infringing too much on the patience of the House. They are all in the same direction, all in the direction of asking that the Committee appointed by the Commission should work with the Commission in the direction of disarmament. But this Commission—and this is a further point—has referred to it the very two points which I have mentioned—the linking of arbitration and security with disarmament. That is the really important issue of the whole matter as I have tried to express my view before coming to this stage of my argument—a Commission appointed to consider the interdependence and the
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natural effect one upon the other of arbitration, security and disarmament What is the attitude of the Government going to be? No one can read the facts and doubt that what is aimed at is what is called all-inclusive arbitration as a basis of security, to be carried out either before or after disarmament. I am not going to discuss the relationship between, the one and the other and I do not want to get into matters of controversy if I can help it. I merely wish to emphasise the question of interdependence and of the Commission specially entrusted with consideration of the interdependence of arbitration, security and disarmament. That is the kernel of the whole matter. Are the Government going to support that? If they do, I say quite frankly that I do not want to find fault with them and that this will be supporting the policy of 1924 which, in my view, is the right policy to adopt in these difficult questions. I will not read any more opinions, which would tire the House, but I think that I have indicated sufficiently what I mean.
In conclusion, there are two considerations that I wish to put before the House. There are two outstanding differences, apart from these resolutions of the Assembly, between the conditions now and those that obtained when the Preparatory Commission last met in March this year. One is brought about by the failure of the Naval Conference. I can hardly say that this matter was fully discussed in the House the other day, but I am certainly not going to raise it again. I want to agree entirely with what has been said by the noble and learned Viscount beside me, and also by the noble Viscount, Lord Grey of Fallodon, whose opinion is of great value in these matters. This is not to be dealt with as an algebraical or mathematical addition of figures. It is of the utmost importance that in every direction perfect good feeling should be encouraged between this country and America, and there could be no greater misfortune than anything in the nature of competition in naval armaments as between this country and America. It is an almost unthinkable evil to do anything that would encourage that idea or in any way weaken the friendliness which we have often been told was aroused in a special manner by the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, between this country and the

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United States. We have these things widely. The peace of the world is almost assured if America and this country act in friendly co-operation. On the other hand, there are points of contact and points of danger. We do not want to consider them. They will come to nothing if friendliness is preserved and they will loom as difficulties only if friendliness is interfered with.
The other point of difference is provided by Russia. At the next meeting Russia will be represented at the Disarmament Conference. I think that this is a great advance. I think that it is one of the pathetic aspects of modern thought that there seems to be a desire to keep Russia outside the comity of European nations. I am not now going to discuss any question of Russia apart from that. I consider the fears regarding Russia grossly exaggerated. The Slavs of Russia are the most peaceable people in any part of the globe, and certainly in Europe. What I want to emphasise is another view. Cannot this be taken as an opportunity of drawing nearer the industrial intercourse between this country and Russia? Orders to the amount of £27,000,000 are said to have been lost through the Arcos raid. I have a list here that would not be relevant at the present time. When we talk of peace in industry, we must remember that this does not depend so much upon political action as upon constancy of employment. One man in every four in this country is normally concerned in producing manufactured articles for export. Any interference with our export trade is extremely dangerous. I can only say that I am one of those who hope that the time will soon come when the most inviting field, if I may use that expression, the largest field, the field which promises best for the future, will be freely open to the manufacturers and workers of this country and that we shall not allow an opportunity of that, kind to go by default. Those are the questions which I desire to ask the noble Lord opposite. I hope that I have put them courteously and in a way that he can appreciate and understand, and I am sure that he will have all the sympathy of the Opposition when we listen to his first address to this House. I beg to move formally my Motion for Papers.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (LORD CUSHENDUN):
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My Lords, I wish to express my gratitude to the noble and learned Lord for the very kind way in which he referred to myself, both at the outset of his speech and in his concluding words. I am glad to know—at least I have been so informed—that it is the habit of your Lordships, as it is in another place, to extend some measure of indulgence to those who address you for the first time. I think there have probably been few that have had that benefit who can have felt more in need of it than I do at this moment. I was gratified to hear the noble and learned Lord refer to the fact that the last time that he and I met was on a League of Nations Union platform, because that gives me an opportunity, which I hope your Lordships will forgive my taking, of making my first words on the subject that has been brought before the House something in the nature of a confession of faith. I am no halfhearted believer in and supporter of the League of Nations. I have not had the opportunity of giving it any very effective support, but that was owing to circumstances and not to lack of will.
I have been convinced, ever since the War, of two things. They are really platitudes, and I can hardly imagine a difference of opinion upon either of them. The first is that any repetition of the War on any considerable scale, or even on any scale at all, would be an absolutely unthinkable disaster for mankind and for the world. The last War was, in all conscience, horrible enough, but when we remember that scientific experts tell us that it would pale into insignificance before the horror of the next I cannot imagine any human being not taking the view, which I am sure all your Lordships do, as to the overwhelming and vital necessity of doing anything that men can reasonably do to make a repetition of that disaster an impossibility for the future. The second point is that I believe, most firmly, that far the best hope of being able to accomplish that end lies in the institution and the working of the League of Nations and its various arms. Therefore, I would like to claim that, so far as the noble and learned Lord and myself are concerned, as regards the principles to which he has been referring, there really is no difference of opinion whatever with regard to the principles and the aim.

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No doubt we may not entirely agree, and we do not agree, when it comes to questions, not of principle and aim but, first of all, the extent to which that aim can possibly be realised and, secondly, the means by which a nearer approach to that ideal can be found. There must inevitably be difference of opinion on questions of method and ways and means. I like to make that statement at the outset because, of course, I realise that I stand here as a stranger to your Lordships, and I would like to make quite clear what my faith is with regard to the question of the League. The noble and learned Lord has put certain questions to me as to the intentions of the Government. I confess that I am put in some difficulty by being called upon to answer those questions at this moment. I think those questions, if I may say so, are premature, so far as the intentions of the Government at the forthcoming meeting at Geneva are concerned. No instructions have yet been drafted for the guidance of our representative at Geneva in December. The whole of these questions which the noble and learned Lord has put are under the consideration of the Government, and I am afraid that the most I can do is to give an indication of some of the factors which we have to take into account, and which, after all, are quite as familiar, or more so, to the noble and learned Lord as they are to myself. I must ask him, however, to be content to recognise that in anything I say on the subject I am not in a position to express any absolute decision of the Government upon those points.
The first question which the noble and learned Lord asked me was with regard to the Optional Clause—whether it was the intention of the Government to sign that Clause? I was a little puzzled, I must confess, by the way in which the noble and learned Lord attempted, I thought not very successfully, to link the question of signing the Optional Clause with what he, for the sake of euphony, called the principles of 1924.
LORD PARMOOR: It was a term of the Protocol that the Optional Clause was to be signed.
LORD CUSHENDUN: I agree, but there was a great deal more in the Protocol than that, and there was no very close connection between the Optional
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Clause and the Protocol of 1924. I do not recognise any very particular principles of 1924, and I am bound to remember that that Protocol, with which I believe the noble and learned Lord was largely concerned, was never countersigned by the head of his own Government, and I have always understood that it was through no oversight at all that the signature of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary at that time was not attached.
LORD PARMOOR: I think I must correct that. Every step taken was taken with the Foreign Minister, who was also the Prime Minister, in daily communication. Of course, before the matter could be finally considered by the Government at large a General Election took place.
LORD CUSHENDUN: Of course we cannot solve the puzzle. Up to the point at which the noble and learned Lord attached his signature no doubt it was all carried out in communication with the Government. The fact, nevertheless, remains that that instrument was never signed by the British Government of that day—it was never authoritatively signed—and therefore I think it is rather too large a claim to make for it to call it now "the principles of 1924," as if it were accepted and universally recognised as a document which is entitled to that very high place of honour. At any rate I am quite prepared, as the noble and learned Lord has raised that point, before dealing more precisely with the question of the Optional Clause, to say this with regard to the Protocol. He complains very much of the speech made by the Foreign Secretary at Geneva, which he said was a cold blast. He said that there was a growing support for the Protocol but it was all chilled by this cold blast from the Foreign Secretary. I do not quarrel with that language. I think it was a cold blast, and most useful for the purpose.
After all, it was the most natural thing in the world that this Protocol should have growing support. What does it offer? It offers, to a large number of States, who perhaps are not feeling as secure against their neighbours and against the world as they might feel, what they are anxious for more than anything else—namely, the guarantee of the British power, and it involves, as has

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been pointed out over and over again, and as was pointed out at the time when it was rejected at Geneva, a degree of risk of commitments which I do not believe that any British Government will accept. I certainly think I may say, with a fair amount of confidence, that that terrible risk—as it is if it is analysed—will at all events not be accepted by the present Government of this country.
I want to deal now a little more closely with the Optional Clause, apart altogether from the principles of 1924. The first thing I would point out to your Lordships is that there have been quite a number of authoritative decisions upon this point by His Majesty's Government. By that I do not mean merely the present individuals who hold office, but His Majesty's Government in the large sense have made decisions several times against the signing of that Clause. What is the history of the Clause? When it was first drafted it was in a compulsory form, not in an optional form at all; and I believe I am right in saying that it was very largely owing to the influence of this country, at the time when Mr. Lloyd George's Government was in power, and the Lord Chancellor of the day and both the Law Officers of the Crown strongly-advised against acceptance of that draft, that a change was made, and the Clause was put into its present optional form. Of course, the rejection of a compulsory draft and turning it into an optional one is exactly the same thing in principle and in fact as refusing at the present time to sign the Optional Clause. I do not know whether I am entitled to say it, but I have always understood that the noble and learned Viscount opposite (Lord Haldane) when Lord Chancellor expressed an opinion (I think I have seen it in print) that although some time or other it might be necessary to sign that Clause, at all events in 1924—that sacred year of this sacred principle—it was still premature to sign that document.
In the same year the opinion of our Dominions was made known in a very striking fashion. The noble Lord has said a great deal about the opinion of the Dominions, and I gathered from him that he attached importance to individuals here and there who expressed an opinion upon one side or the other. He discovered an Australian who was in favour of the clause and another Australian
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who was against it, and one who said that the whole of Australia would really be willing to accept it.
LORD PARMOOR: The majority.
LORD CUSHENDUN: Surely His Majesty's Government cannot act upon information of that sort. If Australia, or even a large body of opinion in Australia, is anxious to see this Clause signed its proper course is to bring that opinion to bear upon their own Government, and the Government of the Commonwealth can always approach His Majesty's Government here in order to show that their opinion has changed. But the matter does not end there. Last year was the year of an Imperial Conference and this matter was carefully considered by the Government here, and it was then considered by a Committee on Inter-Imperial Relations, presided over, I think, by my noble friend Lord Balfour. That Committee reviewed the whole matter from the point of view of Dominion opinion, and it is quite true that there were differences of opinion. That was perplexing, but there were very strong and emphatic opinions from some parts of the Dominions and India against any step being taken, and the language which was put on record was very striking. They said it was agreed that no step should be taken in the direction of signing this Clause without further consultation between the Dominions and the Government here. That is a fact on which I am in a position to give positive information to the noble Lord, because that is an agreement by which, of course, we are bound. It is impossible, as we are situated at present, to take any steps without further consultation with the Dominions. It may be urged that if we in this country saw any great advantage in signing this Clause we could ourselves again approach the Dominions, put arguments before them, and implore them to consent to the signing of this clause. What would be gained, supposing that that course were taken? What new facts have emerged, what new situation has arisen which we could put before the Dominions to slow that there is good reason for altering the decision arrived at before?
The question above all others that I would respectfully press upon your Lordships is this. Supposing we signed the

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Clause to-morrow, the British Empire as a whole or the seven Governments independently, to what extent would peace be made any more secure than it is at this present moment? That, of course, is the most important question of all. It seems to me that in order to answer that question you have to consider what categories of disputes are not at present covered by any form of arbitration agreement signed by this country. The noble Lord spoke about filling up the gap which is not covered by any obligatory arbitral undertaking. I believe that if your Lordships really analysed the obligations which we have undertaken under Articles 13 and 15 of the Covenant it would appear how very small that gap is. Article 13, with one exception to which I will refer in a moment, not only covers all the ground of the Optional Clause, it covers more ground than the Optional Clause. Any dispute occurring imposes upon us as a signatory of the Covenant the obligation to refer it to arbitration. Of course, I know what the view of the noble Lord is with regard to the exception. The exception is that it is only so to be referred if the party considers that it is suitable for arbitration. No doubt the noble Lord and those who agree with him hold the view that that is so large a gap that every conceivable sort of dispute may be rushed through it. I do not think that anybody is justified in saying that, and if that is argued it appears to me to show a very great lack of faith in the Covenant as it stands, and also in the good administration of that Covenant and the good will of the signatories. Without the will to peace it is no good, but if you have the will to peace I cannot conceive that advantage would be taken of that particular exception in Clause 13 except in extremely exceptional cases.
Then comes in Article 15, because, even supposing that you do attempt to withdraw your dispute from arbitration under Article 13, the other party, or, indeed, any member of the League can then have recourse to Article 15 and bring to bear practically all the machinery of the League. We have lately had an example of this in the dispute over the Iraq frontier. Had we been a signatory to the Optional Clause that dispute would have had to go to the Permanent Court at The Hague.
LORD PARMOOR: No.
LORD CUSHENDUN: The noble and learned Lord dissents, but I venture to suggest—
LORD PARMOOR: That dispute would not in any way have been included in the class of disputes covered by the Optional Clause at all. It was referred to the Council of the League.
LORD CUSHENDUN: It is only with the very greatest diffidence that on anything like a legal question I venture to hold a different opinion from the noble and learned Lord; nevertheless, he has not convinced me that in this statement I was wrong. The dispute arose technically, I should have suggested, in reference to the interpretation of the Treaty of Lauzanne and, therefore, as a matter of fact, I fancy it really would come under the first of the four categories laid down in the Optional Clause as being referable to the Court.
LORD PHILLIMORE: Why?
LORD CUSHENDUN: Nothing very much turns upon it whether I am right or wrong about that particular point. The fact is that by referring that dispute to the Council instead of to the Court, as I think everyone who has closely followed it would agree, a very much more satisfactory sort of tribunal for the dispute was invoked, and surely it stands to reason. Whether that is an exact or proper illustration or not I do not mind, but it is easy to imagine cases where, technically speaking, a dispute might arise either on the interpretation of a Treaty or under one of the other categories in the Article, which in substance was not a judicial dispute at all but a political dispute. Where disputes of that sort arise I think it is far better, and it ought to be possible, to go as we did in that particular case to the Council of the League rather than to the Court.
Returning for a moment to Article 13 and the exception which is admitted under the words that the parties must consider a dispute "suitable for submission to arbitration," that exception corresponds and I suppose is intended to correspond to the saving clause which appears, I think, in almost all our Arbitration Treaties. There is always a saving clause on matters of vital interest, honour and independence of the State. If the Government of this country were

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to sign the Optional Clause as the noble and learned Lord wishes them to do, what would be the result so far as the gap which is not covered by the arbitration arrangements is concerned? What would happen, and all that would happen, would be that you would abolish that saving clause for the benefit of matters touching the vital interests, honour and independence.
LORD PHILLIMORE: Would the noble Lord state what clause he is referring to in Article 13? I have it before me and I think I might save him trouble. He will not find anything about vital interests in that clause.
LORD CUSHENDUN: Perhaps I have quoted the wrong Article.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: I think the words the noble Lord wants are in the third line of Article 13, quite at the beginning.
LORD CUSHENDUN: "Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognise as suitable for arbitration …." That is what I was referring to, and I say that there is what some people regard as a big gap opening the way for removing these disputes from arbitration.
LORD PARMOOR: That allows either party at once to withdraw everything from arbitration.
LORD CUSHENDUN: I know, and I have already attempted to deal with that particular point and to show that even if that were done there is the ability to fall back upon Article 15. But the point I am dealing with now is not quite that. What I want to insist upon is that signing the Clause would amount to the abolition of the hitherto accepted saving clause as to vital interests, honour and independence. I gather that the noble and learned Lord is prepared to face that proposition.
LORD PARMOOR: There are only four matters which can be referred to the International Court, and as regards those four matters, yes.
LORD CUSHENDUN: It is clear that within those four matters, on one or some of them, it is conceivable that this saving clause would at present come
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into operation; but the noble and learned Lord is prepared to take that tremendous risk. As I say, this matter again has not been decided by His Majesty's Government; it was decided in former years, and I am only putting these considerations before your Lordships to show the way in which, I think, the reasons for and against must be considered. I can understand noble Lords or anyone else arguing: "Can you imagine any interest so utterly vital to us as the maintenance of peace?" I agree it is very difficult to imagine any issue between any foreign nation and ourselves which would be really comparable in importance and vital interest with the maintenance of peace. But I cannot imagine any British Government, unless some very exceptional issue arose, withdrawing anything from the arbitration set up by Article 13 on the plea that it was not suitable for arbitration. I doubt very much and I do not believe in practice that there is really any danger of a dispute arising which, under one of these provisions, would not be brought to arbitration.
On the other hand I doubt very much whether public opinion in the country would tolerate the laying down in advance by the Government of this country that under no conceivable circumstances,, foreseen or unforeseen, could any dispute arise which they would not be ready to submit to arbitration. I am not at all Mire if that were done, if such a risk as that were taken, that it would not really defeat the object which we all have in view, because I am not at all sure the result of that in the country would not be, instead of creating public confidence, to give rise to public nervousness. I am not going to trespass much longer on your Lordships' patience, but I would ask you to bear with me while I point out that we are not in these matters in the same position, or anything approaching the same position, as any other country. It is often said that our position is unique and of course it may be very difficult, when we are taking up a particular position in an international Assembly, to get other people at once to accept our view that we are in a unique position, but I cannot imagine any Englishman who understands our interests and our governmental system not seeing that the distinguishing mark

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of this country, as compared with most others, is the enormous complexity, first of its governmental system and, secondly, of its material interests.
His Majesty the King has not one Government but seven Governments, introducing every sort of complexity into our relations, which are not fully domestic or fully foreign, and it might very well be, with those quite distinct interests as well as common interests, that a danger might be created of not getting the support in the first instance of these different nations and also of a case arising where we would find it very difficult to fulfil what we had undertaken. I do not admit, for a moment, that there is anything either illogical or unreasonable in asking other nations, and encouraging other nations who are under quite different circumstances and quite different interests, to take a step which,, we frankly admit, it is not possible for us to take ourselves—those whose interests are much more simple and more obvious, who are self-contained and self-supporting and who can foresee very much more than we can all the various contingencies which may affect their fortune. It seems to me that it might very well be there are many such nations who would be perfectly safe to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court but who ought not to think on that account that it is absolutely necessary for us to do the same.
The noble and learned Lord asked me a specific question not only with regard to that but certain parts of the Fifth Resolution. First of all, may I say with regard to the declaration concerning wars of aggression that, again speaking subject to revision—I have not definite instructions from the Government—I think the Government would absolutely accept, I am sure they would accept absolutely, those two declarations which, as far as I have been able to make out, really do not go beyond the terms of the Covenant itself. Then, as regards the Belgian proposal, so far as my knowledge goes, the Government welcome the proposal of the Belgian representative. I agree with the noble Lord that it represents an attempt to prevent war rather than to bring into operation sanctions in punishment for war and that, I think, is an infinitely better plan of approach, if we can get it, to peace.
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I understand that that proposal is not only entirely accepted but welcomed by His Majesty's Government.
I must deal very shortly with the questions the noble Lord put to me under Resolution 5. Speaking for myself and as a member of the Government, though not commissioned to give an opinion, I say that I accept every word that is in that resolution. I do not know, of course, whether I put the same interpretation upon every part of it that the noble Lord does. It may be that he puts a little more into it and therefore takes a little more out of it than I do, but I do not think there would be really any large division between us. I do not see that it goes beyond the obligations which we have most solemly accepted as a signatory to the Covenant of the League.
The noble Lord laid stress upon the sentence "organised collective action of the League" and asked me if we could say that we were convinced that the true condition of its success is that every State should be sure of not having to provide unaided for its security by means of its own armaments. Of course we accept it and we have given the largest possible proof of our accepting that principle by already ourselves giving our guarantee, involving very large risks, in order that two of the chief nations of Europe might feel that they were not called upon to provide unaided for their security. That is exactly what we have done in the Treaty of Locarno. It is exactly the principle which we want to see encouraged among other nations. I should like, finally, to give my own assurance to the noble and learned Lord, whom I again wish to thank for his kindness to me personally, and to the House, that we thoroughly accept his view of the inseparability, if that is not putting it too high, of security and arbitration and disarmament as the means of securing peace, and the only difference between us is that we may not perhaps be able precisely to say to what extent, at what moment, a further step may be taken with regard to any of those three factors.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords, I should like, if I may be allowed to do so, before approaching the subject upon which I wish to speak to your Lordships this evening, to express to my noble

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friend (Lord Cushendun) my warmest congratulations on the speech he has just delivered and to say how little he requires the indulgence of the House for a first effort. If he will not think me discourteous I am not going to deal with the substance of his speech. I merely say that it seems to me a most promising speech, which all of us who have been identified with the League of Nations will welcome very heartily.
In the last few days it has been more than once publicly stated that my resignation was incomprehensible. I trust therefore that your Lordships will forgive me if I take the opportunity of the Motion of my noble friend Lord Parmoor to give certain explanations of that resignation which at the time, on the suggestion of the Prime Minister and others, I withheld. No resignation is an isolated act. It is usually related to a string of events of which it is the culmination. I therefore make no apology for touching briefly on what led up to it. When the League of Nations was formed there was laid upon it the duty to formulate plans for the reduction and limitation of armaments generally. That obligation was repeated in each of the Treaties with the ex-enemy Powers, it was enforced in the preamble to the military clauses of those Treaties, and it was expressly promised to the Germans in the correspondence between them and the Allied and Associated Powers before the signature of the Treaty of Versailles as an inducement to them to sign.
Accordingly, at the first meeting of the League Assembly, a Committee was appointed to advise how this duty was to be carried out. I became a member of this Committee about a year after it was formed, and took part in the prolonged and laborious inquiries which resulted in the drafting of what was called the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. I do not now trouble your Lordships with details of that proposal. It is enough for my purposes to say that when it came to be considered by this House it was rejected by the Labour Government, with the approval and support of my noble friends. Perhaps I may be allowed to add that I had not expected such definite conservative action and I will not disguise from your Lordships that both the form and the substance of the rejection were a profound and bitter disappointment to me. It was also a disappointment in
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Paris. The proposal had been largely British in origin and it had secured in its initial stages the warm approval of the British Delegation at Geneva in 1922. Its rejection therefore by the British Government created a painful impression.
A few weeks later came the Geneva Protocol unanimously adopted at the Assembly of 1924. It also had been supported by the British Delegation and was a few months later also rejected by a British Government of a different political complexion. There, too, I had the misfortune to differ from the action taken by my colleagues. It is true the Protocol required, as I thought, considerable amendment, but it seemed to me undesirable to reject it lock, stock and barrel. However defective it may have been it was a genuine attempt to solve the problem of disarmament and demanded rather amendment than rejection. It was followed by the French proposal to appoint an International Commission to examine the disarmament question direct. I had myself made a suggestion of this kind which had not found favour, but I am glad to say that when the French Government independently had the same idea it was accepted, though without enthusiasm. The Commission, after elaborate technical inquiries, met last spring to try to put the result of those inquiries into the form of a draft Treaty laying down the principles and methods but not the figures of disarmament. I was asked to attend on behalf of the British Government. In order to prepare for it, a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence had drafted such a Treaty. I was Chairman of that Sub-Committee and I suppose that is the reason why the Prime Minister, in his letter accepting my resignation, said I had practically drafted my own instructions.
That is really not the case. The draft was a compromise between my views and those of the other members of the Committee. When the draft came to the Committee of Imperial Defence itself it was further amended against my opinion. The result was a document so little satisfactory to me that before I left for Geneva I circulated a minute to the Cabinet explaining how little I approved of it. Perhaps your Lordships will allow me to read a few sentences from that minute. I said:—

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"The Draft Convention … is a compromise between the views of the Fighting Services and those who believe that an international agreement for the reduction and limitation of armaments is essential for the safety of European civilisation and the existence of the British Empire. It follows that the Draft is not satisfactory to those who like myself hold the latter view. In particular I think it regrettable that it contains no provision limiting the material of land armies, that the limitation of aircraft is confined to shore-based metropolitan forces, that naval and air personnel are not dealt with at all, and that the provisions for international supervision are so insufficient. However, it does represent a step in advance—albeit a very small one."
Your Lordships will therefore see that I went to Geneva conscious that in many points my instructions were likely to cause serious difficulties. Exactly what I anticipated occurred, and I was repeatedly put in the position of having to defend in the League Committee propositions which seemed to me indefensible.
It is quite true that in response to urgent telegrams from me I was allowed to make some concessions. But by that time much of the harm had been done. The impression had been produced that the British Government were lukewarm in their desire that the Commission should reach a successful result. Let me give your Lordships an instance of what I mean. The Commission, when considering the methods to be adopted in reducing land forces, had decided that the number of men and of non-commissioned officers should both be limited. When we came to consider the naval limitations I was instructed to resist any limitation of the number of men on the ground that a Navy depended on ships for its strength and not on men. It was pointed out that in point of fact men from ships had constantly been used in land fighting and that therefore, of course, if you did not limit them you left a loophole in your limitation of land forces. I think we were told that the Germans had a naval division in the trenches, and that unless there was a limit such a practice might easily be extended. Moreover, since Parliament is always told the number of men in the Navy there did not seem any possible objection to similar information being given in an international scheme. After considerable correspondence I was informed that I might agree to the principle of a limitation in the Navy, but that that must not apply to warrant officers. For that strange
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decision I was given no reason. It had the effect of inducing the French to withdraw their agreement to limit non-commissioned officers on land—a very serious change.
This was one of several instances of what I must respectfully call departmental obstruction. But I will not weary your Lordships with details of the others. Indeed, I am bound to say that the representatives of the Admiralty scarcely concealed their indifference, if not their hostility, to the whole proceedings. I do not say for a moment that that was the attitude of the Cabinet as a whole, but I do say that I was unable to convince them of the importance of taking a stronger line with their technical advisers and of showing in matters of this kind that we were not going to allow minor technical difficulties to imperil the success of the Commission. In the result, instead of reaching an agreed Draft, there were many points on which we could do no better than record our differences. So strongly did I feel that incidents of the kind I have described were doing a great deal of harm in the course of the negotiation that I asked to be allowed a free hand to decide all such minor matters for myself. That request was refused. All these matters will come up again to be considered at the forthcoming meetings of the Commission, when the country will have the great advantage of being represented by my noble friend Lord Cushendun. He has my best wishes and my hopes that the Cabinet, having seen the result of too great deference to expert advice, will give him greater support than they felt able to give to me.
I returned from Geneva exhausted and discouraged. I felt that although the meeting had not been a complete failure the advance had been quite incommensurate with the importance of the object in view. Above all I felt that there was a fundamental difference between my views and those of the Cabinet as a whole as to the importance of the effort to reach an international agreement on the reduction and limitation of armaments. They were not opposed to it, but they did not think it mattered very much. Accordingly when I was asked by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary to go with my right hon. friend Mr. Bridge-man to the Three-Power Conference, I doubted whether I could be of any use.

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As, however, my colleagues thought differently I yielded to their opinion, particularly as it was believed that agreement was almost; certain and I thought that such an agreement would help the larger negotiations.
Before we set out there was a discussion in the Committee of Imperial Defence as to the case that we were to lay before the Conference. In the course of that discussion the question was raised whether we were to admit that the Americans were entitled to equality in cruisers' on the same model as that which had been conceded to them in battleships. I certainly understood—I may have been wrong—that influential members of the Committee expressed the view that unless we conceded this it was no use going to Geneva. That was unquestionably my own opinion. When we reached Geneva it was apparent that there had been no previous discussion before we met, so that each set of experts came armed with their own plan, to which they naturally were deeply attached. Indeed, I believe that the first we knew of the American proposals or they of ours was when they were announced at a public meeting of the Conference soon after our arrival. That was very unfortunate, and undoubtedly gave the Conference, a bad send-off.
The next thing that became clear was that, as I had anticipated, the Americans attached great importance to what they called "parity"—that is to say, equality of auxiliary craft on the same lines as the equality of battleships agreed upon at Washington. The first Lord of the Admiralty and his advisers at Geneva saw no great objection to accepting the American contention on this point, and after a few days he made it quite clear that, though we doubted whether the American need for cruisers was as great as ours, we had no objection to their building up to our limit if they wished to do so. It was, of course, understood that this should be part of the agreement that we were then negotiating. Unfortunately this decision caused great anxiety to some of our colleagues, though we had in fact received express authority from the: Cabinet to agree to it. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, for instance, has since the breakdown of the Conference stated specifically:—
"Therefore we are not able now—and I hope at no future time—to embody in a
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solemn international agreement any words which would bind us to the principle of mathematical parity in naval strength."
Though I do not in the least agree with him, I am quite sure that my right hon. friend is convinced that this warning is essential to the safety of this country. I am equally sure that, if persisted in, it bangs, bolts and bars the door against any hope of a further agreement with the United States on naval armaments.
My right hon. friend is a very forceful personality and I have no doubt that from the, moment that he realised that we had at Geneva agreed to what he calls the principle of mathematical parity—that is to say, that we had extended to cruisers the standard accepted for battleships—he began to press on his colleagues the necessity of avoiding the consequences of what he regarded as a disastrous concession. Accordingly we began to receive telegrams which seemed to indicate that the Cabinet were dissatisfied. At last they culminated in a request to us to return home for consultation. We pointed out that such a proceeding would be very bad for the success of the negotiations, and for the time being we were allowed to remain.
Meanwhile discussions had been proceeding on the other branch of our negotiation—namely, assuming an agreement that the American auxiliary vessels should be equal to ours, what was to be the amount of the tonnage of such vessels? At the outset the figure that we proposed was a good deal higher than that of the Americans, and the American figures were higher than those proposed by Japan. After prolonged discussion the Americans suggested that, since the British and Japanese were the furthest apart, they might try first to reach an agreement. This invitation was accepted, and by the last week in July we were able to present to the Americans a joint Anglo-Japanese proposal, which the Americans received favourably without committing themselves to every detail of it. I am myself convinced—I say this deliberately—that, so far as tonnage went, they would have accepted it.
On the two most important questions, therefore, and on several subsidiary ones, agreement had been reached, or nearly reached, though there was still one question outstanding. Our naval advisers had only been ready to agree to the Anglo-Japanese figures by dividing the

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cruisers into two classes. The class of larger cruisers consisted of cruisers of 10,000 tons carrying 8-inch guns. The class of smaller vessels was of cruisers of 6,000 tons carrying 6-inch guns. It was agreed that the first class cruisers should be limited roughly in the proportion of 5: 5: 3 for the three Powers. I think that this agreement had actually been arrived at. It was certainly substantially arrived at. There were some existing intermediate-size cruisers which it was proposed should be dealt with similarly. It was with regard to the second class cruisers that the difficulty arose—the cruisers smaller than the intermediate size. The British proposed that the limit to the size of the guns permitted by the Washington Treaty for the calibre of cruiser guns, which was 8 inches, should be reduced to 6 inches, upon the ground that to bring themselves down to the Anglo-Japanese figures of tonnage and yet to have the number of cruisers which their naval advisers recommended, the second class cruisers should not exceed 6,000 tons each; and a ship of 6,000 tons cannot carry 8-inch guns. The Americans, on the other hand, were content to build fewer cruisers of larger tonnage, which could therefore carry 8-inch guns. To get over the difficulty various expedients were discussed, but no agreement had been come to when we were peremptorily summoned home.
I was very much disturbed. Agreement seemed to me to be in sight, and I felt that if there were to be an adjournment for some days it was only too likely that the opportunity would pass. However, the wording of the summons left us no alternative but to obey. When we got home we found, as I have already intimated, that certain members of the Cabinet strongly took the view afterwards expressed in public by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. They thought that it would be most dangerous to have stated in the Treaty that the Americans were entitled to mathematical parity in auxiliary vessels. These Ministers clearly intimated that they preferred no agreement to one embodying that principle. It was to meet these views that the Cabinet decided, against my opinion, to make the statement read in both Houses of Parliament reserving, in effect, full liberty of action to this country on the question of parity at the end of any period for which an agreement
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might be made. I objected to this on the ground that it was unnecessary and likely to increase the difficulties of negotiation. Beyond that, the Cabinet at its first meeting decided that we were to continue the negotiations broadly on the lines theretofore adopted.
There was a second meeting of the Cabinet to complete our instructions, and it was at this meeting that the question of whether we should insist on the 6-inch gun came up for decision. Between the two meetings of the Cabinet telegrams had come from America indicating that the United States attached vital importance to the retention of the right to put 8-inch guns in any cruiser. I confess that the American attitude on this question seemed to me to be entirely wrong and the reasons advanced for it quite unconvincing. But it also seemed to me madness to allow the negotiations to break down on such a point. It was therefore with amazement that I heard the majority of my colleagues decide to insist on a 6-inch gun, even if it meant the breakdown of the negotiations. It was evident to me that such a decision could only be come to by men who took a very different view of the importance of an agreement with the United States on this matter from that which I did. Accordingly I immediately suggested to my colleagues that they should send someone else to Geneva in my place. When it was pointed out that such a change in the middle of negotiations would remove the last chance of success, I told them that I would return with Mr. Bridgeman, but that if the negotiations failed on this point about the guns, as I felt sure they would, I must reserve my full liberty to resign, or words to that effect.
We returned to Geneva. As soon as We arrived there it became clear that without a compromise on the 8-inch gun question there was no hope of agreement, and I personally so informed the Cabinet. At the same time we suggested, as a possible way out of the difficulty, the adoption of a 7-inch gun. In reply we received a telegram rejecting this suggestion and telling us in so many words that we were not to offer any compromise on the 8-inch gun. A day or two later the Americans put forward the suggestion that, if any party so utilised its rights under the Treaty as to cause anxiety to another party, a conference

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might be held and, if no agreement were come to, the Treaty should terminate. We were anxious to reply by giving to this suggestion a more specific reference to the 8-inch gun. The effect would have been to postpone the decision of the question until the Americans actually decided to arm the secondary cruisers with 8-inch guns. This also the Government rejected. The Conference in consequence broke down.
What then was I to do? The Government had, against my most earnestly expressed protests, taken a course which had caused, as I believed, and believe, the failure of these vitally important negotiations. If I remained in office I should have had not only to take responsibility for this decision but to defend it. I felt that was impossible. The decision was wrong in itself, and it seemed likely to threaten the whole course of reduction of armaments by international agreement, which I regarded as vital to the future of the British Empire and civilisation. Further, I felt that it was only too probable that if a similar question arose in the larger disarmament negotiations a similar result would follow. If we could not agree with the United States over a question of minor importance in naval armaments, what prospect was there of an agreement with a number of Powers over much more complicated questions?
Moreover, I felt deeply the fact that whereas Japan was ready to agree on any scheme of limitation, provided it permitted her to make a reduction of armaments, the two great Anglo-Saxon communities, who had always claimed to be the most peace-loving of all States, had preferred disagreement to concession on a relatively insignificant question of the gun-power of second-class cruisers. Surely our two nations, instead of meticulously counting up every ton and every gun in each other's Fleet, should rather have regarded themselves as equal contributors to a joint force whoso chief duty was the maintenance of the peace of the world. Inside the Cabinet it seemed to me that I could do no more for the cause of disarmament. I could only hope that I might be able to serve it better outside.
There is one topic which I mentioned in my letter of resignation, to which I have not alluded to-night, and that is arbitration. There, too, my opinion had
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been overruled, for I had strongly wished that the Government should have signed the so-called Optional Clause. But I do not propose to deal with that now, partly because I do not wish to trespass on your Lordships' attention, and partly because the decision of the Government not to sign was not, as I understood it—I think I do not misrepresent what has fallen from my noble friend—on principle, but rather because they thought the time to sign had not yet arrived. It is still therefore possible that they may be open to conviction on this point. I welcome the invitation which I understand my noble friend to have conveyed, that we who favour the adoption of this step should satisfy the Government that public opinion would support it. We will do our best.
It is inevitable that a speech such as this should be controversial. A Minister certainly ought not to resign unless his difference of opinion with his colleagues is of a very serious character, and any candid explanation must make that clear. But I have no wish to exaggerate that difference. I have no kind of doubt that my noble friends are all as anxious for peace as anyone here to-night. I am ready to believe that they are warm supporters of arbitration, and that they desire the success of the Preparatory Commission. Apart from the unhappy events of last summer at Geneva it may be, as the Foreign Secretary has said, that we differ more about opportunity and method of achieving our objects than about those objects themselves. Time will show. All I say in conclusion is that in all well-directed efforts for peace and disarmament the Government may count on my support, for whatever that may be worth.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE EAEL OF BALFOUR): My Lords, your Lordships will readily understand that I rise on the present occasion with very great reluctance, because I am apparently brought into some kind of collision with my noble friend, with whom I have been associated in politics for many a long year, and with whom my connection goes back far beyond any period at which controversial politics came into consideration. Let me say that I am certain that my noble friend, in the last sentences he uttered, expressed his genuine convictions and his sincerest hopes. Nor do I complain,

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though I regret, that he should have thought it necessary to bring forward the series of charges against his late colleagues which have culminated in our loss, and greatly regretted loss, of his services in the Cabinet Council. I must frankly admit, however, that even after his explanations I am wholly unable to understand how he can think that the course of events in connection with the League of Nations, or indeed any other subject which he has gone through, as I have gone through, can possibly justify the extreme course which he has thought it desirable to adopt.
I do not pretend that I am competent to follow the detailed account which he has given of the various negotiations at Geneva, in which he has taken so important a part. Although my connection with the League of Nations, and with its proceedings, was at one time very close and intimate, of recent years I have not closely followed the details of the work either of the Assembly or of the Council, or of the various Committees on which my noble friend has served. But I cannot help thinking that he has allowed the inevitable differences of opinion which happen whenever independent minds come together to deal with any question, differences in themselves small, to accumulate to a point at which I will not say his temper gave way, because that seems disrespectful and the last thing which I wish to do is to say anything disrespectful to my noble friend—but I am quite incapable of understanding, as far as I have followed the broad outline of what occurred, why he found it impossible to go on working with His Majesty's Government.
His first quarrel in point of time with the Government was not with the members of the existing Administration but with their predecessors in office. They, apparently, are responsible for one-third of the reasons which induced my noble friend to leave his colleagues. With that part of the crimes of the Administration at home I do not propose to deal. I leave that to noble Lords opposite, whose Government were apparently responsible in that particular case. With regard to the next cause of grievance to which my noble friend referred, I am afraid I know too little to say anything that would be of value to your Lordships, but, if I understood my noble
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friend's exposition, there was a controversy between himself at Geneva and the Admiralty at home with regard to naval forces. In that controversy in the main the Government took my noble friend's part as against the technical advisers, and agreed with him except in one point, having to do I think with non-commissioned officers—was it not? I cannot believe that that was in itself an adequate ground of quarrel, or that, in this cumulative process to which my noble friend referred, it could really have added any serious weight to the grounds which have induced him to take so serious a step as to separate himself from so many old friends and colleagues.
I come, therefore, to what, I take it, is the dominating reason of his resignation, and there again I confess I find it difficult to follow my noble friend. That may be in part my ignorance of detail. I cannot help thinking that my noble friend knows too much of the details. What was the real ground of difference—temporary difference, as I hope and believe—between the American Government and ourselves, in which apparently my noble friend thinks that the American Government, though not wholly right, had, broadly speaking, better grounds—I see my noble friend shakes his head, but if I misrepresent him or the facts I hope he will correct me.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: The whole basis of my argument was that the point on which the negotiations finally broke down was quite insufficient to justify either party insisting on its view; but, as between the two, I thought the Americans were wrong, and we were right. But it was madness for us to allow a point of that magnitude, or rather of that small magnitude, to cause the failure of negotiations, the success of which, I am quite sure, my noble friend himself had greatly at heart.
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: My noble friend is quite right, I had greatly at heart the success of the negotiations. But, as I read what happened at Geneva, the fundamental point of difference between this country and the United States—fundamental, but, I hope and believe, temporary—was the refusal of the United States to give any consideration whatever to what we deem to be the special circumstances of this country—not as regards equality of naval power.

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We have no desire in any sense to go beyond that equality which was the basis of all our negotiations at Washington, and which led on that occasion to most happy results. We had no desire whatever to interfere with that, but we did ask the United States to remember—and surely we did not ask unreasonably—that while they were a great self-contained continent, with a coast-line not open to attack, absolutely impregnable from enemies' efforts either by sea or by land, we were a very scattered Empire, a very small island, whose approaches went through narrow seas and for vast distances, and that when you left the subject of the Fleets, on which naval power ultimately rests, and on which we were ready to grant full equality in every respect to our kinsmen across the sea, we had problems to deal with which they had not to deal with, we had difficulties to face which they never had to face, and that if we were to come to an arrangement which included other vessels than battleships and large cruisers they must remember that we could not by perpetual Treaty, and by a public admission before all the world that that was the permanent position which we were to occupy—we could not consent to a limitation of what we deemed to be the small craft necessary, both in peace and war, to preserve our Empire's security.
That was the fundamental difference. It was the only fundamental difference. I have not the minute knowledge of my noble friend of what went on behind the doors, in public or in private, at Geneva, but I do claim that that was the broad consideration which influenced certainly myself and, I believe, my colleagues, in taking the line we did with regard to the all-important question dealt with at Geneva. But did we do it in any manner that would make future arrangements difficult? Did we do it in any manner which could embarrass any American statesman, irritate the susceptibilities of any American citizen? I hope we did not. I think we did not, because we said to them: "We do not ask you to diminish your building of small cruisers to your own necessities, if you think that inexpedient. We do not pretend to be the judge of your necessities: that is not our affair. All we ask you to do is to recognise our necessities." And how anybody can think that unreasonable, how anybody can think that, a ground on which
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Americans—any American—need cherish resentment against this country completely passes my powers of comprehension.
Speaking for myself—and I suppose as the British negotiator at Washington a few years ago I speak with as much authority about the subject as any member of your Lordships' House—the last thing I think of is jealousy of American shipbuilding. I do ask them to think of our necessities as members of a world empire, with a world commerce on which our very existence depends, and I am certain that every American citizen who looks at that with any species of impartiality will sympathise with the attitude which those who think with me have adopted. These technical discussions are always apt, I admit, to entangle negotiations on big issues. My noble friend has suggested that there might have been, and should have been, more preparation before the Geneva Conference. It is not for me to judge one way or the other, but I am inclined to agree with my noble friend. I can answer for it that the British Admiralty believed that when they went to Geneva their proposals so closely fitted in with the avowed objects, of President Coolidge that the British proposals would be welcomed and accepted without difficulty by their American colleagues. There can be no doubt that the proposals which they thought would be accepted were proposals which led to a great economy and a great diminution of the cost of armaments and were, in consequence, a long step in the direction of the voyage or the journey which my noble friend desires to take. It is impossible to deny that their proposals to diminish the size of battleships, to limit the number of large cruisers, to diminish the size of cruisers—that all those proposals were in the direction of economy, in the direction of disarmament, in the direction of preventing this immense and preposterous diversion of public wealth to naval or military enterprise.
I understand that the Admiralty, therefore, went to Geneva quite sincerely of opinion that they had suggestions to make which the great naval Powers of the world would gladly accept. They were wrong. I suppose if there had been preliminary discussions with Washington it would have been shown that

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they were wrong. Before the Geneva Conference opened I think it is quite possible that preliminary talks would have made each country understand the view of the other and would have led to a happier result. I hope and believe that that happy result, though deferred, is not too far beyond our immediate ken. I agree with my noble friend; I cannot believe and it is really absurd to suppose that the two most pacific countries in the world, the two great countries which are wholly without great military offensive powers, the two countries which depend more than any other upon commerce and industry, the two countries as to which I think you may safely appeal to history to show that they have the least appetite for military or naval aggression, are incapable of coming to some friendly agreement upon this point.
But the circumstances of the two countries—I mean the material, the physical and the geographical circumstances of the two countries—are so different that no doubt it may require some effort of sympathy for them to understand exactly what their positions are. In the meanwhile we have raised no objection to the Americans building as many of these smaller craft as they think necessary either for their duties, their necessities or their dignity. We only say to them: "We have duties to perform to the Empire of which we are a member and, so far as naval matters are concerned, the principal member. We have duties to perform to them. We have duties to perform to our own community in the way of protecting the trade by which they live and giving them the food by which they exist. Do not ask us to diminish the small craft, which do not threaten your existence and threaten nobody's existence, beyond the point which we deem necessary for our safety." Do not tell me that that is a line of policy so inherently unreasonable that the American Government will refuse even to consider it.
I regard the Geneva Conference as interrupted but not ended. Nothing will make me believe that the two branches of the English-speaking race are incapable either of understanding each other or of coming to a common agreement. Our interests, after all, as the non-military maritime nations of the world, are identical interests, and as our
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interests are identical, as our traditions are so largely the same, as our positions in the world have resemblances to each other which they have with no other communities, nothing will induce me to believe in those circumstances that successful negotiation is out of view.
I have been tempted, I think I might go to the length of saying that I have been forced, to go beyond the limits not only of the Motion on the Paper of the House but beyond the scope of my noble friend's speech. It is because I differ and differ deeply from the view of my noble friend, who has found it impossible to work with his colleagues in the Cabinet or with their technical advisers, on grounds which seem to me as compared with the great issues that I have done my best to lay before your Lordships, entirely small and petty. I deeply regret that neither the present Government nor the last Government have been able to satisfy my noble friend that they are worth working with in a cause in which he and we are all concerned and with which he and we—and I include in the "we" noble Lords opposite—are all concerned, which is the furtherance of peace, of international agreement, of arrangements between great countries, of all the steps that may make it impossible in the future that the safety of the world and of civilisation shall again be endangered by a great war. If I have travelled into these wider areas it is because I most sincerely think that the kind of arguments my noble friend has brought before us to-day upon this subject belong to a much lower plane of political considerations than that which I have laid before your Lordships, and that if he had had those issues in mind or had put them in the same perspective as I have tried to do we should still have had the inestimable advantage of his services in the Cabinet and in the Government of this country.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: My Lords, the debate to-day has been one of a profoundly human interest. A trite saying, trite although modern, has it that tragedy is often the conflict not of right with wrong but of right with right, No one could have listened to the two speeches we have just heard without feeling how strong the sense of right was in each case. The noble Viscount we all know

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for his public spirit and his energy and enthusiasm in advocating the principles to which he is attached and the cause of the League of Nations. That has led him to take characteristically strong views whenever he is engaged in these matters. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Balfour) concluded his speech with words to which I listened with great satisfaction, because they indicated that he, for one, does not regard the negotiations for disarmament as more than interrupted. He looks upon them as negotiations which are still, potentially at least, going on. I was very glad indeed to hear that.
Now I will venture to make my own observations as an outsider, and the outsider sometimes sees most of the game. I think both parties in this are open to serious criticism. It is all very well for the noble Viscount to go to Geneva and say: "If I am to do any good the Admiralty authorities must not predominate, must not be able to impose their veto on things." That is very true, but if he is going to deal with the Admiralty authorities he has to know the Admiralty authorities' case in the way in which I am not sure that he does wholly know it. To me the profound error in all these things was going to the Geneva Conference with very insufficient preparation. The question really became a diplomatic one. When the Admiralty had said what they had to say then came the time for the Government, as a whole, to review it from the point of view of strategy as well as from the point of view of diplomacy, and to say by no means necessarily should the Admiralty have all they wanted. If that had been done and the results put in scientific form and communicated through diplomatic channels to the American Government, it may well be that some agreement could have been come to before the Conference took place at which the noble Viscount was present and in which he came into conflict with the Admiralty as well as with some of his colleagues here. But it was not done and you never can, in a question like disarmament, get anything unless you have gone through a period of preliminary preparation and unless you clearly visualise what it is you really want.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Perhaps my noble friend will allow me
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to interrupt him and to say that I never came into conflict with the First Lord of the Admiralty. We were agreed right through.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: NO. I read as much as I could of the proceedings that took place there and the relations were most amicable, but the noble Viscount's complaint is that the First Lord's advisers were insisting on certain things unnecessarily.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Not his advisers at Geneva.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: No, not at Geneva. But that is the whole point. The First Lord does not go to Geneva without being advised here and that is why I said the whole thing should have been settled here. To send the noble Viscount, very naturally inadequately instructed in the procedure of the Admiralty War Staff, to Geneva, without having the whole thing thrashed out and in a position to be submitted to preliminary consideration by the American authorities, seems to me to have been to doom that Conference to failure. What the Admiralty will always do, and what the War Office and the Air Force will always do, is this. If you enter into covenants, if you say we guarantee the frontiers of certain Powers, however unlikely it may seem to the lay mind that those guarantees will have to be put into force and that the Treaty powers we have given will have to be called into action—however unlikely that may be, the War Staffs of the three Services will set to work and get out plans for them and, what it more, I should deplore the day in which they ceased to do that. It is their business to work out all contingencies. Thinking costs nothing and it is their business to think.
What you are going to do when the time comes depends upon what agreements you have been able to come to with other nations and in what way you have been able to avoid that which may call your forces into play. All Treaties and covenants, whether under the name of Treaties of Mutual Assistance or of Protocols, which involve engagements of this kind, inevitably lead to the Services taking what may seem to us outsiders alarmist views of their responsibilities, but which history has proved not to be alarmist views. We have more

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often been caught out unprepared than we have been found prepared. Therefore I will never deprecate the Admiralty or War Office or the Air Service taking a strong line as to what they consider necessary. After that has been done it is a question for the Cabinet of the day to determine how far these conclusions need be pressed. They may be modified by diplomatic agreements, they may be got over in other ways, but all that shows that it is not to Geneva that you should go to settle the whole of these things on the spot.
The noble Viscount seems to me to have been under the impression that he ought to have been able to settle these matters in the Conference at Geneva. I should have very little hope if I were told that he was going to settle matters of that kind under those conditions. The mischief of this matter is that there was not enough preliminary work done before Geneva was approached, and I hope that when the Disarmament Conference is renewed it will not be renewed unless the problem has been worked out not merely by the Admiralty, but by the Government as a whole bringing the best information and advice they can to bear upon it. They have to consider and tentatively sound the advisers of the American Government diplomatically upon the questions which they mean afterwards to submit to the Conference at Geneva. The advantage and the chief function of the League of Nations is to meet at Geneva and there to talk over matters. Very often you get rid of numbers of problems by talking over them before and, when you have to settle highly technical matters of this kind, taking the defined view of each Government, brought to a focus and to an agreement if possible, in order to deal with the whole matter.
I entirely agree with what the noble Earl opposite says, that each nation must work out its own scheme of defence and its own necessity. It does not follow that each nation will wish for the same provision as its neighbours in dealing with those necessities. I cannot imagine that the Chancellor of the Exchequer meant any more than that when he spoke of mathematical agreement. No doubt it may be that one Power will have less of a certain weapon and another Power more, but that may be compensated. In other words, in the scheme of armaments
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you cannot lay down anything mathematically. All you have to do is to bring the wisest heads you can to bear upon the question: Is the Empire sufficiently protected by the arrangements which have been made, even although they may not be precisely the same as the arrangements which the American Government thinks necessary for its own protection? If that was what the noble Viscount had in his mind, then I agree with him; but it is obvious, if I am at all right, that that question was not one for him, not one for the First Lord out at Geneva, but a question to be thrashed out far ahead and to be the subject of communications between the advisers of the two nations concerned. In other words the League of Nations must not be used as a substitute for what really belongs to diplomacy. It will be found whenever you try to do that, that you cannot get these things properly considered and that a conflict of minds—perhaps rather abstract minds—is the result.
That is all I wish to say. The course of the debate has swept away other interesting topics which were touched upon, topics about reservations, Treaties of guarantee, and so on. We cannot go into them at this period of the debate, which has come into the realm of human controversy. I think the noble Viscount has played a very fine part in sacrificing so much for the cause which he had very much at heart. But I also feel that if he had approached his problems possibly a little more gingerly he might have found a way out—a way such as I have endeavoured to indicate to your Lordships and a way by which he would not have been faced with problems in this fashion. I cannot but think that this debate will do good. There has been much discussion to-day which I think is rather inconsistent. We have been calling out for disarmament and we have also been calling out for the signing of agreements. For reasons which I have given your Lordships, if you sign agreements you will have the forces of the nation at once calling upon you to take steps to enable them to be in a position to fulfil the agreements. They will never succeed in doing that if we are only careful to keep things sufficiently in hand for them to be able to protect us and make provision for protecting us against anything which may well arise. I did not like the Protocol just because it involved

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so many agreements and I may say that I never was a party to any suggestion for us to sign it. The noble Lord, Lord Cushendun, has got all the records of these things at the Foreign Office. Therefore he knows. I object to these things because I am not so bloodthirsty as some of my noble friends.
LORD PARMOOR: Oh! yes, you are.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: My noble friends think they are not bloodthirsty because they do not realise fully what they are doing. They are putting weapons into the hands of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force which will be used against them. I do not want to entangle myself with these things. I think we ought to encourage arbitration wherever we can and I think we want to be more definite about some of the matters about which we are bound to arbitrate. There was a question the other day between Hungary and Rumania. I do not like these engagements. I am quite as anxious as anybody to make our position in regard to arbitration clear. That is one thing, but it is quite another to enter into engagements to use force for the purpose of redressing the infraction of Treaties by Powers with whom we have nothing to do.
I doubt if people realise what, at least theoretically, they are letting themselves in for. France is a country with which we are on the most affectionate relations and the last thing likely is that we should go to war with France. But suppose we were forced to blockade France. Suppose France, having strong and justifiable views, made an aggressive attack upon some small Power, and suppose we found ourselves bound to come to the assistance of the League of Nations and to go to war with France; suppose then that we tried to start to blockade France and to stop the commerce of the United States with France, the United States being no party to the League of Nations, where should we be? You may say that that is very unlikely, but I can assure you that your technical advisers will take it into full account when they are advising what you require in naval armaments, I am quite sure that these agreements and these proposals for cutting down armaments are two things which it is not very easy to reconcile. Therefore, I think this has been a very profitable
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debate. I am very glad my noble friend beside me has raised it, because it has brought out a number of points which might have been obscure before but which certainly are not obscure now. I am very glad we have had the opportunity of discovering that between the noble Earl and the noble Viscount there is no conflict of ideals but only one of methods, on which it is not for us to pronounce which is in the right and which is in the wrong.
LORD PHILLIMORE: My Lords, I am very glad to learn that His Majesty's Government have not definitely decided against signing the Optional Clause or the Optional Protocol, and it is with a view of endeavouring to bring the pressure of your Lordships' House upon His Majesty's Government that I venture to address to you a few words. I cannot help thinking after following the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Cushendun, that he is not perfectly acquainted either with the origin or the effect of the Optional Protocol. The two noble Lords who have spoken to-night, the Earl of Balfour and Viscount Cecil, who were then both in office, combined to appoint a Committee to draft a scheme for the League of Nations. They did me the honour, as perhaps your Lordships may be aware, to make me Chairman of that Committee. That Committee discovered that a body could be set up to which unilateral communication could be made and before which a State complained of could in some way be brought willy-nilly. That, as the noble Lord rightly observed, is the effect of Article 15 of the Covenant as it is drawn. A State which considers it is injured can go to the Council and can induce the Council to take the matter up whether or not the State complained of is willing.
The Covenant, which I had no hand in drawing, went so far as to provide that and also to insist, as the noble Lord rightly observed, upon the great benefit of arbitration. It also went further and suggested that an International Court of Justice should be set up. I fancy they felt it was not very likely it would be set up, because twice over at The Hague the attempt to do it had failed. They contemplated the possibility that it might be set up, but they had not been seized fully of the principles of a Court of Justice. They said it should be a Court to which people could go if both parties

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agreed. That is very little different from a court of arbitration. Will your Lordships forgive me if I remind you of the three distinctions between arbitration and the Court of Justice? The first is that in arbitration both parties must agree to have the matter decided. In a Court of Justice the party complaining comes to the Court and says: "Bring my adversary before you that he may answer." The second difference, of course, is that in arbitration you have to choose your arbitrators and agree upon them. With a Court of Justice you have a court already set up for the people to come to, and the Judges established. The third point is that in arbitration you have to agree what is the matter about which you really want to arbitrate or, to put it in another way, how to state the case. Your Lordships may think that a very simple thing. At The Hague, when we were forming the Permanent Court of International Justice, Mr. Elihu Root, who had been Secretary of State in America, told us that when Lord Bryce was Ambassador they had tried for a twelvemonth to state the case for arbitration about the fisheries and each time when they thought they had come to a way of stating the case somebody would say, "You must not state it in that way; that is giving up our side." In the end they had to put the papers at the heads of the arbitrators and say: "You must find out what the question is and you must decide it." Those are the three great differences between a Court of Justice and a court of arbitration.
I had the further honour of being a British representative at The Hague on the Committee which formed the Permanent Court of Justice, and with the great assistance of Mr. Root—and people were good enough to associate me with it also—we arrived at a plan of appointing the Judges which got over the difficulties at The Hague that had been previously experienced. Having established, as we hoped, a Court of Justice, we said that this Court of Justice ought to be a real one. It ought to deal only with juridical matters and—perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Cushendun, will be kind enough to follow this, because I think it might meet his point about vital interests—we limited it to four matters: the interpretation of a Treaty: any question of International Law; questions of any fact which, if established, would
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constitute a breach of an international obligation; and any question of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. We said with regard to those four points that it ought, in our opinion, to be a real Court of Justice before which State A, complaining, could bring State B, complained of.
When this matter got to Geneva, unfortunately, objection was taken, and most unfortunately the British Government was foremost in taking objection. It was then left in this way, that it is a Court of Justice before which Great Britain must come for certain purposes, it has jurisdiction in all cases which parties refer to it for arbitration and all matters specially provided for by the Treaties and Conventions in force. With regard to our obligations under the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of Trianon and so forth, it is a Court of Justice before which we must appear; but with regard to other matters it was left to the various States to agree whether or not they would sign the Optional Protocol. The Optional Protocol, of course, says that we agree to be summoned, not for all matters, but for those four matters of the interpretation of a Treaty, the principles of International Law, facts and damages. It is sometimes answered that we can be got there anyhow, whether we like it or not. If that be so, these precautions on the part of the British Government are ineffective. In a sense it is true that we can be brought, though we have not signed this Protocol, before the Court of Justice, because everyone can act under Article 15, the Assembly can refer everything to the Court of Justice and eventually we may be brought there. Again, therefore, all our precautions are unavailing.
What I want His Majesty's Government to do is to make a gesture in favour of peace and of law. There is no doubt that Sir Austen Chamberlain's speeches, wise and prudent as they were in many respects, did operate as a cold douche and did make the nations of the world think that we were withdrawing from the provisions as to the substitution of law for war which the Covenant and the League were setting out to establish. It would be what the French call a beau geste if England were to come forward now and say: "We will sign the Optional Protocol," if you like, with

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reservations—and you can make any number of reservations. If you are going to sign an agreement, you can sign anything that you think proper. It would be a great thing, and would have a great effect upon the world, if England were to come forward and say: "We trust the International Court." After all, we have one of the most distinguished members of this House, one of the most respected men in this country, Viscount Finlay, as a Judge in this Court, and we have no complaint of the decisions of that Court, which are now many. I have followed them and I do not believe that there are any which have not received general approval as being just and right. Why should we, of all nations of the world, who will always have a Judge, probably a leading Judge, upon that Court, shrink from undertaking to submit to it, not questions of policy, but questions of pure law if we should be cited by another State before them?
That is what I want to urge upon His Majesty's Government. As I think Lord Cushendun said, it is not often that the point will arise. We are obliged, under Article 36, to go before the Court in all cases where we have bound ouselves already by Treaty, we can be brought before the Court indirectly, whether we like it or not, by a prolonged operation under Article 15, and by holding out in this way we simply leave the nations to suppose, either that we do not trust in our right, or that we do not trust the Court. I hope that we shall follow the hint which, I understand, Canada gave, that some at least of the Dominions would not be unwilling that this should be done, and I trust that we shall bring ourselves to sign this Protocol.
LORD PARMOOR: My Lords, I do not propose to address the House again, but will merely ask leave to withdraw my Motion for Papers.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords, before my noble friend withdraws his Motion I would submit a point to his consideration. There is evidently—though I feel I must be wrong—an entirely different opinion between my noble friend Lord Balfour and myself as to what really brought about the failure of the Geneva negotiations. He attached it to an entirely different cause from that to which I attached it. He thinks it was the refusal of America to admit our right to build small ships. I think it was entirely due to the difficulty that we had over the question of the 8-inch guns. I venture to hope that my noble friends will see their way to lay such Papers upon the Table as will make quite clear what really did happen at Geneva. The whole thing is a matter of record. It has all been recorded, and there can be, I should have thought, no objection to laying sufficient Papers to make it quite clear what really was the cause of the breakdown.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (STATU- TORY COMMISSION) BILL. [H.L.]
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.
House adjourned at ten minutes before seven o'clock.