Sitting of 9 June 1926

Preamble
The House, met at a quarter before four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
THE MARQUESS OF READING.
The Rt. Hon. Rufus Daniel Earl of Reading, G.C.B., G.C.S.L., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., having been created the Marquess of Reading—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.

FORESTRY BILL. [H.L.]
LORD LOVAT: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to authorise an increase of the number of Forestry Commissioners, and empower the Commissioners to make by-laws with respect to land vested in them or under their management or control, and for purposes consequential upon the matters aforesaid; and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Lovat.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

BERMONDSEY BOROUGH COUNCIL (STREET TRADING) BILL.
Read 2a.
MANCHESTER SHIP CANAL (STAFF SUPERANNUATION) BILL.
Read 2a.

MIDDLESBROUGH CORPORATION BILL.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE): My Lords, I beg to move that Standing Order No. 93 be considered in order to its being dispensed with in respect of a Petition of Frederick William Goundrey. I have been satisfied that the delay in regard to this Petition arose over the trouble of some two or

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three weeks ago; otherwise, it would have been up to date. The promoters of the Bill object to the contents of the Petition, but do not object to the deposit of the Petition and therefore I ask your Lordships to agree to this Motion.
Moved, That Standing Order No. 93 be considered in order to its being dispensed with in respect of a Petition of Frederick William Goundrey.—(The Earl of Donoughmore.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and leave given to present the Petition accordingly.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION (No. 3) BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order).
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER CONFIRMATION (ASHTON- UNDER-LYNE EXTENSION) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 2a (according to Order).
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION (No. 11) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 2a (according to Order).
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER CONFIRMATION (EALING EXTENSION) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 2a (according to Order).
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION (No. 1) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill: Bill reported without amendment.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION (No. 2) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill: Bill reported without amendment.

COUNTY DEPUTY LIEUTENANTS.
THE MARQUESS OF ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR THE MARQUESS OF ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR asked His Majesty's Government if information can be given as to when the limitations were introduced which are at present imposed in regard to the discretion of Lords Lieutenant of counties, as to the qualifications, and also the number, of persons who may be recommended for appointment as Deputy Lieutenants; and also, to what extent the said limitations are based on statutory authority?
The noble Marquess said: My Lords, the Question I have put on the Paper may seem at first sight to be of quite a simple character. It is in one sense, but, nevertheless, it is not free from some complications and at any rate the subject has a history. It will be seen that there are two divisions in this Question. The first deals with the matter of the qualification of persons whom Lords Lieutenant wish to recommend. I am aware, and I am sure my noble friend who I am glad to know will answer the Question—I say "glad" because I am aware that he is familiar with all the details—would certainly remind me, if I were not already well acquainted with the fact, that there is an Act of Parliament—namely, one passed in 1918—which deals specifically, amongst other things, with this question of qualification. It may be said that such being the case, cadit quæstio. But there remains the matter of interpretation.
It used to be said that you can drive a coach and four through any Act of Parliament. I have not heard the phrase lately, but there was a time when it was rather often quoted. The obvious meaning is that a way can be found, by means of ingenuity, of interpreting any Act in more ways than one. I venture to think that I can find an example of this very process of interpretation in no less distinguished a quarter than the Department which has charge of this matter—namely the War Office, because there have been circulars issued from time to time in the name of the Secretary of State for War, based, I suppose, necessarily or nominally on this very Act of Parliament, and there are some points in these circulars which I do not find literally set forth in the Act. It is certainly stated in the Act that in order to be qualified for a Lieutenancy

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the person recommended must have taken part in one of His Majesty's Forces, the Army, the Navy, the Air, or Territorial Forces, but in a recent circular it is stated not only that the applicant or nominee must have taken part in some way in such service but is still so engaged at the time when the Lord Lieutenant of the County wishes to nominate him. I venture to think that is an example of interpretation.
This is not the first time this subject has been brought before your Lordships' House. Indeed, I find myself in uncommonly good company, because in the year 1907 this very subject was brought up by no less a personage than my noble friend Lord Rosebery, whom we all wish we could see often in this House. He remarked that the appointment of Deputy Lieutenants was the only means given to Lords Lieutenant of rewarding public service in connection with localities, and he asked the Secretary of State to give further attention to the matter so that it might be open to Lords Lieutenant to give these appointments to people, who had rendered public service. I think there can be no doubt that what Lord Rosebery had in mind was public service other than that connected with the military and other kindred forces. My late noble friend Lord Lucas, who then represented the War Office, replied to this suggestion rather in the sense of indicating that it would not come within the purpose of the circular alluded to, but he promised to bring what Lord Rosebery said before the Secretary of State. I hope I need not assure the House that I should be the last person to seem to fail in appreciation of the splendid services of all those who have taken part in different degrees but with the same mind and purpose, in the work of the Great War, and in connection with the Territorial Army and other matters. But the point is that there is at present a very real difficulty in recognising services of an important kind in connection, for instance, with county administration.
The other part of my Question refers to numbers. I do not find anything about that in the Act that I have mentioned, but at present there is a limitation in regard to the number of Deputy
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Lieutenants who may be appointed. I do not want to bring in a personal note, but I speak somewhat feelingly about this because for forty-five years I have had the privilege of occupying the position of Lord Lieutenant of Aberdeenshire and I have thus had opportunities of watching many changes. In the good old days the Lord Lieutenant had a comparatively free hand. I never heard any complaints as to lack of impartiality and the War Office, to whom recommendations were made, never questioned the propriety of any of the appointments proposed. But all that has been changed and now, as I have said, there is a limitation. What is the position? There are a number of men qualified tip to the hilt in exactly the light in which the War Office views the matter. They have done distinguished service and are prepared to do more, but at present only one in three can be appointed when vacancies occur. I have very little doubt that some of these distinguished men have wondered, or at any rate their friends have wondered, why they are not considered to be Qualified for the position of Deputy Lieutenant; and I confess that I should not be sorry if one of the results of bringing the matter before this House is that they will understand that it is not due to any negligence on the part of the person who has the privilege of recommending them.
Perhaps I have said enough, but I venture to allude to the Met that there has been, as your Lordships know, a gradual process of change in regard to central control in such matters. Instead of giving my own opinion on this point, I will recall a very notable utterance by no less a personage than the noble Marquess who was so long a leading ornament of this House, the late Marquess of Salisbury, who, on a certain occasion, uttered words which might be taken as an indication of his view regarding increased control on the part of the permanent Civil Service, especially as represented in the chief Government Departments. We all have a deep appreciation of the splendid work carried on by these very able men and we all know that their only desire is to do what is best for the country. Some would say, doubtless, that it is a very good thing for the country that matters should be regulated at headquarters rather than in each locality, but, after all, local govern-

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ment is an institution and I think we might almost claim that this matter of the Lieutenancy comes under that head. If anybody is likely to know who are suitable for recommendation as Deputy Lieutenants it is the Lord Lieutenant, who lives on the spot. The Lord Lieutenant himself, of course, is not appointed at the instance of the War Office or, at least, not ostensibly. That appointment rests solely with the Prime Minister, who recommends to the Crown the person who he thinks ought to be appointed, without, so far as I know, any special reference to his war service.
I am sorry that I cannot give the exact date when Lord Salisbury expressed his opinion, but I shall continue my research and I hope to find the exact occasion. It may be asked why I do not apply to the distinguished son of a distinguished father, the noble Marquess who leads the House. The objection is that, though the noble Marquess has for a very considerable time taken a leading part in public affairs, the utterance of which I speak was made a considerable time ago and, though the noble Marquess entered public life very young, he can hardly be expected to carry in his mind what happened probably when he was at school or even earlier.
In conclusion, reverting to the scope of the functions of the Lieutenancy, perhaps I may be allowed, in a sentence, to draw attention to the fact that quite recently His Majesty was graciously pleased to address a communication to the Lord Lieutenant of each county in England and Scotland, drawing attention to the importance of the movement for providing playing fields and other means of recreation throughout the country, and expressing the hope that Lords Lieutenant would do all in their power to promote that movement. Your Lordships will, I think, agree that there is a significance in this incident, on which I need not now enlarge. I beg to ask the Question that stands in my name.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): My Lords, the noble Marquess asks me when it was that limitations were placed upon the discretion of Lords Lieutenant in appointing deputies both as to numbers and as to qualification. Perhaps he will permit me to deal with the two matters separately and to take the question of
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numbers first. As the noble Marquess has said, there was a time when Lords Lieutenant were given full discretion in their recommendations and there was no limitation whatever as regards numbers. He has said with great truth that, so far as he knows, no questions were raised as to the justice or propriety of the recommendations that came from Lords Lieutenant. We are all agreed, I think, upon that, but it so happened in the year 1901 that the whole question was reviewed and the conclusion was come to that in order to maintain the dignity of the office of Deputy Lieutenant it was desirable that some kind of limitation should be placed upon the numbers which it was within the power of Lords Lieutenant to recommend.
Certain counties had a larger number of Deputy Lieutenants than seemed desirable. One county, for instance, a county without a very large population, had in 1901 no fewer than 130 Deputy Lieutenants, and there were other counties which also, perhaps, had a too considerable number in relation to their population. It was thought advisable to make some regulation. This was not a statutory regulation, and the noble Marquess was right in saying that he did not notice it in any Act of Parliament, but it was an arrangement arrived at by the then Secretary of State for War. The suggestion which was adopted was that the creations of Deputy Lieutenant should be based on the population of the county, and a certain quota was fixed. I am speaking now of England and Wales; I shall deal with Scotland in a moment. For the first 50,000 inhabitants the number fixed was ten Deputy Lieutenants, for the next 150,000 there were to be fifteen, and for the next 800,000 thirty-two. Then, when the population reached a million, one Deputy Lieutenant was allowed for every 50,000 people. Therefore, if you had a county with a population of a couple of million, you would be allowed a quota of seventy-seven Deputy Lieutenants.
Some of the counties had, as I said just now, more than this quota The question arose how the numbers were to be reduced to the exact quota which had been laid down and it was arranged that the first three vacancies which occurred were not to be filled but the positions were to lapse. After that, in the case of the next three vacancies one only was to

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be refilled; that is to say, for the first six vacancies one new Deputy Lieutenant was to be allowed and afterwards only one in every three. The result has been that in England and Wales there are now only three counties with an excess over establishment, and one of those is the City of London, which occupies a different position from any other county and should not be considered in comparison with any other county in England. Before I pass to the Scottish question I should like to say that although the counties have a quota regulated by population, as I have explained, yet every county is allowed twenty Deputy Lieutenants whether the population permits it or not. That is the case as regards England and Wales.
In 1901, when the matter was considered with regard to Scotland, it was not thought that the English and Welsh system was suitable for Scotland and so a different system was initiated and settled between the then Secretary of State for War, Lord Midleton, and the then Secretary for Scotland, the late Lord Balfour of Burleigh. The Scottish quota was not fixed upon the population basis adopted for England and Wales but was in accordance with a special scheme based upon the relative density of population per acre in the county. I will take the Scottish county of which the noble Marquess has been Lord Lieutenant, for forty-six years I think he said. In 1901 the density of population per acre in Aberdeenshire was 13 and so the quota fixed for that county was 43. The noble Marquess has told us that Aberdeenshire is exceptionally well endowed with men fitted to fill the position of Deputy Lieutenant, and that is fairly proved by the fact that in 1901 no fewer than 81 enjoyed that distinction.
Under the original scheme which was approved by Lord Balfour of Burleigh and Lord Midleton the Aberdeenshire quota was fixed at 43, and under that arrangement when the noble Marquess had reduced the figure of 81 to 43 he would have been able to fill every vacancy as it occurred, but, unfortunately for those in Aberdeenshire who wished to exercise the office, a further change was made in 1921. There was a further conference between the then Secretary of State for War and the Secretary for Scotland, and it was arranged to assimilate the Scottish system to the English and
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Welsh system, and adopt the population basis. Under that system the population of Aberdeenshire only permits the minimum of 20, instead of 43. At the present moment I think there are 38 Deputy Lieutenants actually in the County, and so, in order to get down to the establishment, there must be a further reduction of 18, and that reduction, as the reduction in other counties, would be made by the same process of only filling one vacancy in every three.
I should remind your Lordships of one point where Scotland differs from England and Wales. There are in Scotland four Cities which are counties in themselves—namely, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Dundee. There is a separate Lieutenancy for the City of Aberdeen, which also has an establishment which is fixed at twenty. So for the City and County together there is a quota of forty. In England and Wales there are not many anomalies with regard to the geographical county not coinciding with the Lieutenancies. In England there is the City of London, there are separate Deputy Lieutenants for the Isle of Wight, appointed by the Governor, and for the Stanneries, appointed by the Wardens. In Wales there is the separate Lieutenancy for Haverfordwest, which has its own Lord Lieutenant.
The Acts of Parliament which regularise the status of Lord Lieutenants are as follows. The first, I think, is the Act of 1662, and under that the position of Deputy Lieutenant is defined. Under that Act they exercised with regard to the Militia very similar functions to those which are exercised by the Territorial Associations nowadays with regard to the Territorial Army. I have read a great- many interesting accounts of meetings in Surrey, and I think that if anybody has any interest in county history he will be well repaid by looking at the proceedings of the Council of the Lieutenancy. The Deputy Lieutenants continued to exercise military functions in raising troops for the Militia under the Militia Ballot Acts. When the practice of raising troops under those Acts lapsed there was nothing for the Deputy Lieutenants to do, and their military status became obscure until the time of raising the Territorial Army, but the fact that they had a military character was always

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recognised. That was shown by the Militia Act, 1882, because that Act included the qualifications for the position of Deputy Lieutenant.
That Act laid down the qualifications until 1907, when the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Haldane, made certain alterations in the qualifications. The object was to bring the duties and status of Deputy Lieutenants back to the old status and to enable them to be more closely connected with the Territorial Army. The qualifications which the noble and learned Viscount laid down in 1907 were these: either to have held a Commission for at least ten years, or to have rendered service to the Territorial Association, In 1918, however, a simple system was adopted whereby the Deputy Lieutenants had to have a residential qualification in the county, and also to show that they had rendered worthy service to the Forces. Those are the qualifications which exist to-day. This latter qualification has been the subject of a considerable amount of correspondence with Lords Lieutenant with regard to its interpretation, and I think that at the War Office what has been more particularly laid stress upon has been that the services should be as far as possible—not exclusively—with the Territorial Army. I think your Lordships will agree that this is not unreasonable, because the Territorial Army is a purely county organisation, and the Deputy Lieutenants are entirely county officers.
As regards the question of reducing the numbers of Deputy Lieutenants, a Deputy Lieutenancy is held for life. But it may happen that a Deputy Lieutenant who has been very active becomes unable, owing to ill-health or for some other cause, to give the services which otherwise he would wish to give to his county. It is open to such a gentleman to offer his resignation. Again, it may happen that a man may leave the county or, for a business or some other cause, he may not be able to render service. In such a case, if voluntary resignation is not tendered, it would be open to the Lord Lieutenant to report the fact and to recommend, under the Militia Act, the compulsory retirement of such an officer. In the event of Lords Lieutenant receiving the resignation of a Deputy Lieutenant, or of their being themselves compelled to recommend his retirement.
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it is open to them to recommend that such an officer, when gazetted out, should receive permission to continue to wear his uniform. I venture to think that this power which is exercisable by Lords Lieutenant offers some method of solving the difficulty of reducing the numbers to the authorised quota. After all, there must be many people in counties who, for various reasons, are not able to continue to perform their duties as Deputy Lieutenants or to render services to the Territorial Army. And if their position is recognised, and if they can become retired Deputy Lieutenants and are able still to wear the uniform, they might not be unwilling to retire and to open the door for younger men who are able to render more active service, and for whom at present there exist no vacancies.
I come to the next question which the noble Marquess raised, and that is the question of services, and especially War services. One feels that it is impossible to do too much, as the noble Marquess very properly observed, for those who bore the stress and burden of the War and rendered invaluable service to the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force during that period. But at the same time it is now seven years since the War was over, and there are many people who have rendered eminent service, especially to the Territorial Force, who perhaps were not able to serve—who perhaps were too young to serve—during the Great War. It seems to me that such men have at least an equal claim to consideration with those who rendered War service, and especially to those who rendered War service and good service then but are not in a position to render service now. We know that the War Honours List is now closed, and, as time goes on, those who have been able to join in the last seven years and have been able to render service of the Territorial Force should have the chance of having their services recognised.
The noble Marquess also raised the question of county administration. From what I have said it will be gathered that it is impossible by a commission of a Deputy Lieutenant to recognise services which are only rendered to county administration, and not services of a more or less military character. When I mentioned that Aberdeenshire has an excess over establishment—and I think there are

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one or two counties that I mentioned which have an excess over establishments—I ought to have added that there are many which are not up to the authorised establishment, and indeed are considerably below it. Of course, the incidence of vacancies arising depends on the number that existed in 1901 and the speed at which it has been possible to reduce the number of Deputy Lieutenants in a county to the quota which has been fixed. I do not know whether there are any other points which the noble Marquess wished to have answered, but I will endeavour to answer them if there were.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: My Lords, if I desire to take part in this discussion for a few moments it is because I have had something to do with the history of the question. The noble Earl opposite has given a very fall explanation of the historical genesis of this question. He has referred not only to the old Militia Acts but to the Deputy Lieutenants Act of 1918. I want to put the answer to my noble friend's Question on a somewhat broader basis. What is the primary function of a Lord Lieutenant and of a Deputy Lieutenant? The Lord Lieutenant is the representative of the Sovereign in county affairs, and he has various duties, most of them of a highly honorary nature, such as attending at any public function or at the railway station when the Sovereign arrives. But he has other duties. He used to have a large responsibility in connection with the Militia. As the Militia ceased to be a prominent force and became, as it ultimately was, superseded by a new force, the functions changed, but the duty of the Lord Lieutenant was continued.
When the Territorial Force Act, 1907, was passed the county committees were set up for administrative purposes, for doing the work which the Quartermaster-General's Department of the War Office did for the Regular Forces, but doing it by means of county committees. The Lords Lieutenant were the natural heads of those Committees, and they were assisted by various persons who were supposed to be qualified by their zeal and interest in the Territorial Force. The Territorial Force grew until it became an integral part of the Army of the country, and it became more and more necessary to see that these county committees were put on
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a proper footing. In order to stimulate the zeal of the Lords Lieutenant, the Sovereign was graciously pleased to summon a conference at Buckingham Palace—I am not sure that my noble friend was not out of the country at that time—and there the King delivered an address in which he pointed out to the Lords Lieutenant what their duties were in connection with the Territorial Force. The office of Lord Lieutenant is not merely a statutory one. It is a Common Law office, and the Deputy Lieutenants are merely the deputies whom the Lord Lieutenant was allowed to appoint in order to assist him in the discharge of his local duties. It has been more or less regulated by Statute, but primarily it is a Common Law appointment.
In that condition of things it became important, when the Sovereign had issued this summons to the Lord Lieutenant to discharge these duties, that the matter should be taken up and looked into, and it was taken up with great zeal by a number of Lords Lieutenant who were members of your Lordships' House. The noble Earl, Lord Dartmouth, in particular, took a mast prominent part and showed great public spirit on behalf of the new organisation and he was Chairman, I think, of the Territorial Force Association for a long time. But that was not all. There were Lords Lieutenant who did not enter with quite so great a zeal as others into this arrangement and consequently, as those Lords Lieutenant had been appointed and would continue to be appointed on the advice of Ministers, an arrangement was made by which the Prime Minister, in giving the advice which it rests with the Prime Minister to give, was to consult with the Secretary of State for War so that the Lord Lieutenant might be a suitable person for the discharge of those duties, and so that the Deputy Lieutenants were likely to be appointed in such a fashion as to make them suitable.
That was the arrangement which went on after 1907 and there were various persons who did not like it. They had to submit to the force of public opinion, and ultimately they had to submit to the Statute which was passed in 1918 for the purpose of declaring what the law already really was. That is the history of the whole thing, and your Lordships

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will see that it is necessary that there should be restrictions on the number of Deputy Lieutenants. You do not want more than are required for the specific purposes which I have described. It is necessary, too, that there should also be restrictions on the qualifications which are recognised as belonging to the office. It is for that reason that the whole matter has grown into the constitutional question which it now occupies, and, I think, that is in substance the answer which the noble Earl has given.
THE MARQUESS OF ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR: My Lords, may I be allowed to thank the Under-Secretary for War for his considerate reply? A good many people are very much interested in this matter, and I welcome the hints that the noble Earl gave as to certain possible alleviations.

DISARMAMENT.
LORD PARMOOR LORD PARMOOR rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can make a statement as to the progress made at Geneva at the preliminary meeting to prepare for a Conference on Disarmament; and to move for Papers. The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this Question, which I am asking the Government and to which, I understand, the noble Viscount will reply, is one of greater complexity and difficulty than the matters about which I asked him yesterday afternoon. In one sense it is much more important, because from time to time such a question as the reconstitution of the Council comes to the front, but disarmament is one of the most important matters with which the Assembly and the Council deal at Geneva and it really is of the utmost importance if, in the long run, the League of Nations is to carry out all that those who desire it to succeed hope it will accomplish.
I noticed a statement in the newspapers this morning which I quote only to show how one approaches this matter. The statement was that the League of Nations was bound by its charter to work for disarmament without intermission. I do not think the noble Viscount will in any way differ from that statement. In order to make my own position quite clear, may I say that although the word disarmament is used in reference to this question, I think a far more accurate
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term would be to use the term "reduction in armaments." What we are really dealing with and what the noble Viscount was dealing with at Geneva is not disarmament in the sense of no armaments, but merely a reduction of armaments to a standard level, which we find expressed in the terms of the Covenant of the League itself.
It is extremely important to remember that this question of the reduction of armaments is not a matter of choice, a matter of new policy. It is a very solemn Treaty obligation, binding not only upon all those who are Members of the League of Nations and have signed the Covenant, but binding also, under one or two quotations which I shall venture to make, upon all the Allied and Associated Powers at the time that the various Peace Treaties were made. There is no country that I know of which has prided itself, and properly prided itself, more than Great Britain on its scrupulous adherence to Treaty obligations. That is a matter of the greatest importance because unless you could rely on a great Power such as Great Britain being scrupulously alive to its Treaty obligations, you would sap the whole foundation of the international relationships on which we rely and which is the only ultimate safeguard of fair international relationships.
Let me for a moment quote the Article from the Covenant of the League. I quote it because these matters, which are common to most of us, are apt to be forgotten by some of our outside critics:—
"The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments"—
Now to what standard?
"to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."
I do not for a moment suggest that under existing circumstances the level of armaments should in any way be reduced below the level stated in the terms of the Covenant itself, the object being that, whereas on the one hand the armaments should not be reduced below the point consistent with national safety—and I do not think anybody would desire that—on the other hand they should not be of a size and equipment suitable not so much for purposes of national safety but of aggressive warfare. The whole object of the Covenant of the League of Nations is

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to put an end to aggressive warfare and if aggressive warfare is ended then we need not trouble about all other kinds of warfare. They will necessarily at the same time come to an end.
The importance of the Covenant of the League, upon this point was emphasised in the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to Germany at Versailles. We know that Germany raised objections to the standard of disarmament imposed on her various military, air and naval equipments. What the Allied and Associated Powers said was as follows:—
"The Allied and Associated Powers regard the Covenant of the League of Nations as the foundation of the Treaty of Peace"—
the foundation of the Treaty of Peace because it carried the obligation that the standard of armaments, though sufficient for national security, should not be of a standard that could be utilised for purposes of aggressive warfare. In the same way, in every Treaty, whether it was the Treaty with Austria, with Hungary, or with Bulgaria, there was a clause introduced in these terms:
"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations"—
then followed the name of the country concerned—
"undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."
There again, in the very forefront of the Treaties and as a part of them, the Allied and Associated Powers stated that in their view the limitation of armaments properly imposed upon the defeated ex-enemy countries should enable a general limitation of armaments of all nations to be instituted upon the same basis.
There is one other quotation which I wish to make as it is very important that we should realise what our duty in this respect really is. It is not merely a duty imposed upon the Council or on the Assembly, but a duty imposed upon the constituent countries which have become signatories of the Covenant and have assented to the obligations therein contained. This was the letter written to Germany at Versailles at the time when this question was raised. What the Allied and Associated Powers said was this:—
"They recognise that the acceptance by Germany of the terms laid down for her own disarmament will facilitate and hasten the
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accomplishment of a general reduction of armaments; and they intend to open negotiations immediately"—
I will ask your Lordships' attention, and the attention of the noble Viscount, to those words "they intend to open negotiations immediately"—
"with a view to the eventual adoption of a scheme of such general reduction."
That is to say, taking Germany as a standard—a far lower standard had been accepted between themselves, for instance, by some of the Latin Republics—taking Germany as a standard of adequate provision for national safety, but not to allow the possibility of aggressive warfare, they say that "they intend to open negotiations immediately with a view to the eventual adoption of a scheme of such general reduction."
They added:
"It goes without saying that the realisation of this programme will depend in large part on the satisfactory carrying out by Germany of her own engagements."
I think we may say now, after a certain period when there was a difference of opinion—I recollect very well how that question was raised when I was on the Council at Geneva—that Germany has made satisfactory progress in carrying out all her engagements as regards disarmament to the Allied and Associated Powers, and soon she will become a Member of the Assembly and the Council of the League.
Lastly, as to the Locarno Treaty, there is some difficulty in the fact that the Locarno Treaty was the product rather of Locarno than of Geneva. But I put that on one side, because I think the terms as between Germany and France and Belgium, for instance, are of such great importance to the future of the question of reduction of armaments that they override all other considerations The words of the Treaty are:—
"Great Britain undertakes, with other countries, to give her sincere co-operation to the work relating to disarmament already undertaken by the League of Nations and to seek the realisation thereof in a general agreement."
I can appeal, I am sure, to the noble Earl or to the noble Viscount when I say that from the very start the work relating to disarmament was undertaken, but, owing to what I admit were the difficulties and complexities of the question, and particularly owing to the war

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spirit which very naturally survived the war fighting, up to the present moment very little of any consequence has been done, except—and it is a very important exception—in the case of the naval invitation under the terms of the Washington Conference.
I know the noble Viscount, working as he did with great determination and power, desired as part of the terms of what he called the Treaty of Mutual Assurance to bring about a proper scheme of relative disarmament and the same object, of course, underlay the terms and conditions of the Protocol. But, unfortunately, whatever the reasons may be—I do not want to go into them now—neither of those schemes eventuated in ultimate success, although, I believe, perhaps because of my partiality to the Protocol, that it will ultimately be the basis of general friendly relationships which, more than anything else, are wanted if we are to have a general reduction in armaments. I have often heard the noble Viscount himself say that an essential condition of disarmament, or reduction in armaments, must he a sense of international security. I entirely agree with him in that respect. In order to obtain conditions of international security you want a system under which, as far as possible,—I would go to the utmost limit—all international disputes may be settled by peaceful means, and I use those words from the Treaty of Locarno, because, under that Treaty, all international disputes are to be "settled by peaceful means" as between the particular countries, Belgium, France and Germany.
I admit, of course, that this country has not taken that view up to the present. I regret it. But the noble Viscount belongs to a Government which has taken a different view. The view has been taken that this country ought not to put itself into the position of submitting all questions to conciliation or arbitration or Court decision, however vital or however important they may be. Until that decision is taken we are, of course, outside the provisions which have been adopted in the Treaty of Locarno that all such matters in dispute, practically without any exception, should go for settlement either to conciliation or arbitration. I must say one word as to why that is necessary. I do not think we always mean the same
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thing when we use the word "security." When I use the word "security" I mean that you obtain that security from aggressive warfare by making aggressive warfare a crime not as between the nations concerned but against the community of nations who are represented in the League itself.
I recollect, as I dare say some of your Lordships do, a most valuable speech made on the question of the League of Nations by one of the greatest jurists, as I consider, of my time, the late Lord Parker. He traced national security to the time when such a crime, for instance, as murder was no longer a matter to be settled between the parties concerned but one that had to be punished because it was an offence against the community as a whole. What I mean by "security" is to obtain the condition—and it could be obtained if you had an all round reference of disputes to conciliation and arbitration—that all disputes which might otherwise end by a resort to war ought to be settled by friendly means, and the non-resorting to such friendly means is what we call in the Protocol an "international crime against the community itself." That is a very important matter when we are considering the question of disarmament.
It is often said that one of the difficulties in this question is the sanction of the League of Nations or the Assembly or the Council against the particular nation that goes counter to the obligations that it has undertaken in signing the Covenant or any Amendment thereof. That difficulty, in my opinion, will be largely solved if the community as a whole was altogether stronger as regards equipment and matters of that kind than any one particular State amongst its constituent members. Therefore, if you had disarmament, or reduction in armaments, you would have a double security. You would have the security that aggression may be extremely difficult, and you would have the security that the community of nations represented in the League of Nations would be so strong and in such a position that no one in that country would risk bringing a force and power and opinion of that kind against its own national interest.
That, I think, is a very strong point indeed, but you must go the whole length. I am not one of those who think the League of Nations ought in any way

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to be in the position of a super-State—I think that is a great mistake—but it does mean that the constituent countries have come under obligations to each other and those obligations can be enforced more readily and easily, without doubt, when there has been a reduction of armaments to the level which is indicated in the Covenant itself. There is one other point only before I come to the questions which the noble Viscount told me before we entered the House that I had administered to him in the nature of cross-examination. I did not mean to administer them in that sense, but to give him notice of what I was going to raise. I have noticed lately—and I have attended a very large number of meetings of the League of Nations Union—a very large growth in the direction of a desire for the reduction of armaments. I have noticed it very largely on economic grounds, perhaps particularly emphasised by the economic conditions in this country at the present time.
I do not want to argue the point, but I want to make two quotations as regards the danger to the economic condition of industrial Europe—I do not want to limit it to this country—owing to the expenditure which is made at the present time on naval and air and military equipment in the various countries. Immediately after the War, I think it was in 1922 or 1920—the noble Viscount will correct me if I am wrong—the Council of the. League of Nations referred this economic question to the Financial Congress at Brussels.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: 1920.
LORD PARMOOR: In 1920 they made this Report. They reported on the crushing burden which on their existing scale armaments imposed on the impoverished peoples of the world, sapping their resources and imperilling their recovery from the ravages of the War. I do not think any one has ever questioned the accuracy of that statement, made at a Financial Conference to which were invited all the chief experts that could be found in any part of Europe. I will only give one other quotation. The same point is to be found in what was said by Sir Josiah Stamp, who, with Mr. Pigou, made a very close estimate, as far as you can make a close estimate,
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of the effect of our War expenditure on our economic conditions. He did not confine it to our economic position but the position of industrial Europe. He said that war expenditure is for the mass of the people of the nations affected the difference between grinding penury and a reasonable standard of comfort. That is a very notable statement and as far as I know it has never been questioned.
It may be said that there has been some diminution in war expenditure, but it is very slight. I took out the other day from the publication of the League of Nations which gives an authoritative statement on these subjects, these facts as regards our expenditure. The publication gives the facts also as regards the expenditure of other countries, but I limit what I say to this country. In 1913 and 1914, the period immediately before the War—no doubt your Lordships know that just before the War the expenditure on armaments went up at a very highly increasing ratio, so that from 1908 to 1914 the expenditure of the six leading countries was no less than £100,000,000 per year—at that date after that ratio of increase the expenditure was £72,000,000 odd. At the present time, allowing for the difference in the use of the term "sovereign"—because, of course, you have a difference as regards purchasing power at the present time—to the last available year that I have, it is £79,500,000 or, if you are to put it into actual sovereigns without making the allowance which I think ought to be made, it would be £125,000,000 odd. The difference between the £125,000,000 and the 79,000,000 is, for the purpose of comparison, as nearly as possible placing the sovereign in the same position then as it was in 1914.
Your Lordships will recollect the statement made in his memoirs by a member of your Lordships' House in whom we all have great confidence in matters of that kind, I mean Lord Grey, who said that not only did this huge rise in expenditure not give that sense of security which is the only safeguard of a general peace, but on the contrary raised the sense of insecurity which in his opinion was one of the most potent factors in the outbreak of the Great War. I do not want to go further this afternoon. I wanted to formulate the basis on which I approach the question of the reduction of armaments. I can never find much difference

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between the noble Viscount and myself, or even between the noble Earl and myself, on questions affecting the future and the stability of this great institution which will be the one great historical factor, in my view, when these matters are related in the future, the League of Nations.
I have had given to me from the League of Nations Union, as I have told the noble Viscount, a number of matters which I understand were discussed at this late meeting at Geneva. I know it is only a preliminary meeting for the calling of a future Conference, but what I do want to know is whether, in the opinion of the noble Viscount, any real progress has been made or whether what has gone on at Geneva has merely shown that at the present time there are deep differences of opinion which threaten any possible movement in the direction of reduction of armaments. The first document is headed: "List of complicated questions." I am bound to say that the questionnaire—I do not know whether it was issued by the Committee or before the Committee met, the noble Viscount will tell us that—put a series of questions which are of a complicated kind and I should hesitate to put upon the noble Viscount, even with all his knowledge, the responsibility of replying to them in answer to the questions which I want to put to him.
First of all, I want to ask him this question. In considering the standard of the reduction of armaments did the Committee take into consideration the suggestion made in the very able book by Professor Noel Baker that if it was possible by expert and technical advice to reduce Germany to such a level that she only had an Army equipment suitable for her national security, what is the difficulty, if you really desired it—I admit, of course, that is a condition precedent—of limiting in the same way other warlike equipment to the same general level? In that connection there is one other question that I should like to ask. The noble Viscount knows that in the Latin-American Republics Treaties have been signed for the reduction of armaments to a much lower level than has been suggested for the reduction in the case of Germany. I should like to know whether the Preparatory Commission has in any way suggested that those cases might be considered and observed in order to see
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what the effect of those reductions of armaments has been.
Then there is a matter which was very much discussed and in which the noble Viscount was said to be the protagonist on one side and M. Paul-Boncour the protagonist for France on the other. Are you to take peace conditions as the standard, or are you to introduce what is called the war potential? The preliminary Commission apparently came to the conclusion—I do not know how far it really decided anything—that the noble Viscount was right in suggesting the peace basis, but that at the same time the war potential was to be taken into consideration. Perhaps he will tell us how those two somewhat inconsistent matters can be taken into consideration as a basis for the same ultimate result.
In order to make the position as clear as possible I will read an extract from what has been supplied to me as part of the Report made by the Commission. Perhaps the noble Viscount will tell me if I am quoting correctly. I have given him the passage so that he may look it up. The Commission is said to have reported:—
"That it would not be practicable at the present time to limit the ultimate war strength of a country, but that on the other hand"—
and this is the important part—
"it is possible to limit the land, sea and air forces permanently maintained in peace time by the various countries or capable of immediate use without preliminary mobilisation measures."
Of course if that can be done it is obvious that a great advance can be made. To a very large extent it would answer the economic difficulty to which I have called your Lordships' attention, and which cannot be disregarded. I remember that during the War, when we were discussing the future of the League of Nations, the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, expressed a very decided view that industrial conditions at the end of the War would necessitate a very large reduction in war expenditure.
Next, I should like to ask the noble Viscount for information on a very important point. Was it thought possible to control or supervise chemical armaments? I think that this is going to be a very big factor in the miseries and devastation of the future should

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another war by any misfortune break out before that matter is settled. I notice that the German delegate said that all schemes for assistance between the different countries should be based on reduced armaments after conference. I should think this would be an admirable basis. I do not want to go into any technical question. When I was at Geneva we submitted all technical questions to a technical body, the Permanent Advisory Committee, and I think it would be the height of folly for any one who has no special knowledge of these matters to enter upon the technical points at all. I do not wish to drown the noble Viscount in further questions. I do hope most sincerely that he may be able to say that in his view real progress has been made, and that there is that spirit, that desire to bring about a reduction of armaments to which he referred when I last spoke in this House as the ultimate basis, whether you had a successful reduction or not.
I hope that he will be able to answer those questions and, apart from any particular matter to which I have called his attention, I hope that we may hear in this House, as I am sure it would be a satisfaction to all Parties to hear, that in his opinion the preliminary effort has been successful and that he is hopeful that it may lead on a further occasion to a reduction of armaments, not below the level of national security, but such that the nations shall not be capable of using them for aggressive warfare. In order to keep my right of reply in case I desire to say anything further, I beg to move for Papers.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD): My Lords, I have to thank the noble Lord for his courtesy in giving me notice of the kind of questions upon which he desired information. I certainly did not mean to intimate any criticism of his procedure in doing so. On the contrary, I was very grateful indeed to him for his courtesy in the matter. I do not think that your Lordships will expect or desire me to enter on this occasion into a discussion of the general case for disarmament. The noble Lord has said something on the subject and, broadly speaking, I imagine that his views would represent the opinion of the whole, or practically the whole, of this House. I
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cannot imagine that there is any one who is not in favour of a reduction and a limitation of armaments both on financial grounds and on grounds of general security and world peace. I do not propose at this moment to say anything more on that general subject.
In the course of his review of the question the noble Lord referred to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Protocol, and I was, I admit, a little relieved to know that we were not going to have a further discussion of the advisability or inadvisability of those attempts to deal with this problem. Perhaps, however, it is worth while just to say that those proposals, whether good or bad, were based on the principle that it was essential to re-establish security before, you approached the question of disarmament and I believe that it will always be found that, broadly speaking, it is necessary to proceed in this way. The present efforts which are proceeding at Geneva start rather from the other end. It is pointed out that we have done something for security by the Treaties of Locarno, and it is hoped that security is advancing in other ways; let us now torn our attention to the practical difficulties and problems which are raised by disarmament itself. It was in that spirit that the last Assembly requested the Council to draw up a scheme for the appointment of a Preparatory Commission—I do not think that it was called by that name at the Assembly, but that is what it was called afterwards—
LORD PARMOOR: A Preliminary Commission.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: It may be that it was called a Preliminary Commission, but it was afterwards called a Preparatory Commission, and was for the purpose of examining the basis upon which a Disarmament Conference could be called, and the Assembly intimated that they thought such a Commission should embrace other countries than those represented on the Council. Accordingly, in December last, that Preparatory Commission was constituted. It consisted of representatives of all the States represented on the Council, together with, I think, five, and ultimately seven, others, drawn from the Members of the League, and three outside the

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League were invited also to send representatives—namely, Russia, Germany and the United States. Unhappily, the present Russian Government did not feel able to comply with that invitation, but both the German and American Governments sent Delegations. The American Delegation was a very important and admirably equipped Delegation of eighteen or nineteen persons. Both took part in the discussions at Geneva which have just taken place.
There is one fact in connection with the Commission of which sight must not be lost. It has been summoned by the League, it has been sitting at Geneva, and it has, at any rate, been assisted secretarially by the resources of the Secretariat of the League; but it includes States outside the League. It is an international body summoned and assisted by the League, but outside the actual organisation of the League. That turned out to be of some little importance in setting up its actual organisation. Its business is, as I have said, to prepare the basis for a Disarmament Conference, and I am sure the House will agree with me that that is very essential work, if you are really to achieve any useful result in this connection. The question of disarmament, or, as the noble Lord very properly said, of the reduction or limitation of armaments, is an exceedingly difficult and complex question. It raises technical questions of great difficulty, and it raises political questions of even greater delicacy and difficulty, and unless the ground is thoroughly prepared, and the way made thoroughly plain for the Conference, it is very unlikely that the Conference will reach a successful result.
Therefore that is the object with which this Preparatory Commission has been constituted, and, in pursuance of the plan formed by the last Assembly, a questionnaire, or as we should say agenda, was drawn up, not meaning to be exclusive but as indicating some of the questions which it was thought that such a body would have to examine. Undoubtedly, as the noble Lord has said, these questions are exceedingly complex to read and even more complex to answer, and that is the first duty of the preparatory tribunal. I shall have a word to say about that in a moment. As to what has been done, the Preparatory Commission met last month at Geneva. It decided that its meetings
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should be in public, and it began with a general discussion. The general discussion proceeded for a day or a day and a half, and in the course of the proceedings it was my duty to state very generally, and not at all at length, the attitude which my Government took up in the matter.
I need not tell the House that I was instructed to say, and did say, that the British Government were there to give all the assistance in their power to the general objects of the Conference; that they had, in fact, greatly reduced their armaments, not only as compared with what they were during the War, which, of course, is obvious, but generally speaking in comparison with the armaments which they had before the War; that that was true particularly of their Navy, which was very considerably reduced as compared with what it was before the War; that it was true to a lesser extent, but still substantially, of their Army, but of course it was not true of the Air Force, which, of course, scarcely existed before the War; and that the British Government had already shown their readiness to enter upon a reduction agreement with regard to the Navy at Washington; that they were quite prepared to go on with that policy, and particularly in the matter of submarines, and in reference to the size of the cruisers of their Navy.
I also said that they were equally prepared to enter upon any reasonable agreement for the limitation and reduction of the Air Force, and although very anxious indeed to find a way of reducing expenditure upon the Army, they were not prepared at present to say that they thought it could be reduced below its present level, having regard not only to commitments before the War, but to increased commitments which have been placed upon our shoulders by the results of the War. That was a broad outline of what I endeavoured to say on behalf of the Government, of course at a little greater length than now.
Discussion then proceeded. We then took up the questions which had been drawn up for our consideration last December, and there was a general discussion upon them, with the result that it became obvious that in a body of the size of the Preparatory Commission it was very difficult to examine so detailed

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a matter as the questions, and they were accordingly referred to a Drafting Committee, with broad instructions. That Committee, after examining them, made a report to the Preparatory Commission, and it was adopted, and if the noble Lord wishes I will lay it upon the Table. It is a public document, of course, and it shows, perhaps better than anything I can say, the real position reached in the course of the discussions at Geneva. When we came to examine the questions it was obvious that although they were very complicated, and went into a considerable amount of detail, the broad questions put, although difficult, were not either complex or unduly detailed. The first broad question was: What armaments are there that can be reduced? What is to be the subject matter of your reduction? I will say a word about that in a moment.
Then there was the question whether you can make a distinction between offensive and defensive armaments. That turned out to be a far more important question than I had imagined when we went there, because it was pointed out that the real object was to prevent the possibility of aggression. As the noble Lord is well aware, the Assembly has more than once laid it down that aggressive war is an international crime, and the object, no doubt, of all schemes of reduction and limitation must be to make aggressive warfare and impossibility. If that can be done you will have a real increase in international security, and a real hope of permanent peace, and therefore it becomes a very important question to consider whether, whatever armaments are ultimately agreed to be maintained, you cannot so constitute and organise those armaments that they will not be available for aggressive purposes, or, if some portion of them are available for those purposes, yet the general body of the armaments shall not be so available. Therefore it, becomes much more important than at first appears to examine the distinction between "aggressive" and "defensive" armaments.
The third question—a very important practical question—is what is to be your unit of measurement. When you are comparing Fleets the thing is simple. You have the ships and you have the guns, and if you reduce the size of the ships and the number of the ships and
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the calibre and the number of the guns you have reduced your Fleet. But when you come to land Armies the thing is much more complicated, because it is quite evident that your equipment is a very much more complicated matter, and the troops themselves may be of very varying efficiency, and therefore your unit of measurement is much more complicated. That is the next question that has to be examined. In that connection the methods of reduction obviously become important, because you may reduce not only by reducing numbers or by reducing budgetary expenditure but also by reducing the conditions of service, the period of service, and on that, of course, the whole question of conscription may be raised, and was slightly raised in the discussion that took place at Geneva.
Then the next question is the ratio of reduction, which is, of course, the great question. When you have got the preliminary difficulties out of the way, what is to be the force that is to be allowed to each of the nations? As to that the discussion was of a purely preliminary character at this stage. A great number of technical questions were raised in connection with the subjects that might be considered as bearing upon the ratio of reduction, and those were referred to technical Committees, but beyond that we did not proceed. And therefore I am unable to answer one of the questions put to me by the noble Lord, as to whether the standard allowed for Germany and the standard agreed upon by Latin-American countries was considered as giving a line on the standards to be allowed to other countries. I can only say that the matter really was not discussed at this stage, though no doubt when we come to the later discussions all relevant considerations of that description will have to be taken up.
In this connection and as part of the same question there is, of course, the question that we always come up against: When you are considering the standards to be allowed the nations, must you not also consider the amount of security that they have against aggression? That is a matter which is always strongly pressed by every Continental nation in every international assembly. What they say, and say with a great deal of force and truth, is that the more security you can have the more disarmament you can have, and

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if you are not going to give any increase in security then the disarmament can only be of a very moderate, indeed perhaps of a very insignificant, description. It was in connection with that that the German statement was made, pointing out—what is no doubt perfectly true—that once you begin to get a reduction of armaments you get increase of security, and that therefore your increase of security reacts again, and you are able to get a further reduction of armaments. That is a very encouraging fact, so that even if we have to begin, as it may well be that we shall have to begin, by a comparatively small reduction, there is every ground for believing that, once you have started in that direction, you will gradually increase your reduction as you increase your security. In connection with that the question of Article 16 was raised. I am not sure whether the noble Lord asked me about that, but he put it on the paper which he handed to me.
LORD PARMOOR: I do not think did, but I shall be much obliged if the noble Viscount will deal with it.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Article 16 provides that in case of aggression measures of coercion (I will not go into the details of them) are to be taken by all Members of the League against the Covenant-breaking State. What was said was, What exactly does that mean? That was really the substance of the question that was raised, though no decision was arrived at. "Is it possible," it was asked, "to define more closely what the obligation really will be under Article 16?" It became my duty to point out that that was a matter of the construction of the Covenant; it was not a matter therefore very conveniently discussed by a body which contained representatives of nations which were not Members of the League. It was ultimately referred to the Council of League itself to deal with, and I have no doubt that sooner or later we shall hear what conclusions they have arrived at. In this same bundle of questions bearing on the standard of armaments and on the condition of security one further question was raised. It was asked whether, where you have some regional security such as is produced by the Locarno Agreements, that will make it possible to have some measure of regional dis-
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armament. That question is also one which has been referred to our technical advisers for opinion.
Then my noble friend asked me a question about chemical warfare, and that undoubtedly is one of the great questions which we shall have to face. A very remarkable speech was made by the Belgian representative, M. de Brouckère on that subject. He drew a picture, not in the least exaggerated and well borne out by all the authorities that we possess, of the terrible results which may be expected from the unfettered use of chemical warfare, especially in combination with aeroplanes, and be pointed out the fearful destruction that would be wrought in great cities, not only on combatants but on the whole population, perhaps most upon the more helpless parts of the population, the women, the children, and the old people, who would be unable to protect themselves from so terrible an eventuality. His speech produced a very great impression on all who heard it in the Commission, and it was thought that we ought evidently to enlarge our questionnaire to some extent in order to raise that question. I myself drafted a number of questions, more with a view of examining what the actual state of things was at the present moment than with the purpose of suggesting what would be the best remedy to be applied. I will not read to your Lordships those questions—there are eight or nine of them—but they culminate in this question, which is perhaps worth mentioning. Our technical advisers are invited to consider what effective sanction can be proposed for the enforcement of the international Undertakings which already exist not to employ poison gas or bacteria in warfare. If some really effective practical sanction can be suggested that would be a very important advance.
Those are the broad questions which we had before us, and to deal with them the Committee appointed, or rather completed the appointment of, two sub-committees, a technical military sub-committee, which we called Sub-Committee A, which consists of technical experts in the three arms, the Air, the Navy, and the Army, and Sub-Committee B, which was to deal with the economic questions raised in connection with these matters. The Drafting Committee very elaborately went through the questions to which the

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noble Lord has alluded, and distributed them to these two Committees, pointing out exactly what information we required in order to enable us to consider them later. That was a very large part of what we did on this occasion. But we went in two respects a little further. We did decide, in the terms which the noble Lord has read out, that the reduction must be in our opinion of the peace armaments; that is to say, the armaments maintained in time of peace, rather than any attempt to deal with the potential war strength of a country. I think that is right and essential. You cannot really reduce the total war strength of a country. The war strength of a country ultimately depends upon its population and resources and those cannot be reduced by any agreement.
What you can reduce is the Army that is ready to attack, the aggressive force, and that is the essential thing to reduce. That is the thing upon which security depends. If you could really get all the armaments of the world so limited and reduced that there was no longer any aggressive force in existence which could at any moment pour across the neighbouring frontier and carry desolation and destruction into a neighbouring country, then you would have gone a long way towards the limitation of armaments which is contemplated under Article 8 of the Covenant. Therefore I believe myself hat the thing to limit is the peace armaments in that, sense; that is to say, the armaments which can be used for aggressive war without further preparation. There was a very long discussion, which is not yet finished, as to what exactly you are to include in the peace armaments, whether you are to include only the non actually with the Colours and their equipment or what are called the immediately mobilisable forces, which could be brought into existence within a few days of the declaration of war. That is a long and technical discussion with which I will not trouble the House. The broad proposition was accepted on all hands that what you are to operate on is the force in the country available for war, either at a moment's notice or at very short notice.
The noble Lord referred to the discussion about war potentials. That has always appeared to me one of the most
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fruitless discussions you can engage in. It is perfectly true that countries do differ in potential war strengths and if you are to examine the potential war strength of a country you are plunged into an examination of the whole of its resources, its material resources and its moral resources as well, for they do come in, as we know ourselves from our own experience in the last War. I have always shrunk from such an inquiry and I hope we shall never be driven to such an elaborate inquiry as that. I think there was a misunderstanding and that no one now maintains that we should reduce the ultimate war strength. If that ever was put forward it has been completely abandoned.
What is suggested is that in considering what actual armaments ought to be allowed to each nation it ought to be all-important to see what is its ultimate strength in this sense, that a very strong nation is not really in so great a danger of aggressive attack. Although it may be taken off its guard for a moment, in the end it is not likely to be overwhelmed, whereas a small nation or a weak nation may be overwhelmed and it is suggested that that ought to be considered in the consideration of the immediate armaments which are to be available. That is one of those semi-metaphysical propositions which I do not think will be of any importance when we get further into the discussion. I personally think that what will be the overmastering question will be: What are the armaments of the country next door? and that that is the question which will determine the armaments to be laid down. That was the first proposition to be laid down—that the reduction should be in the peace armaments.
The next, on the proposition of the French Delegation, was that the best way of beginning the final discussion would be for each country to bring forward the full limitation which it could make, with full reasons justifying the reduction it thought could be made. That would then be considered by the Conference, or whatever authority was appointed by the Conference, and it would have to be decided whether that was a sufficient reduction or whether a larger reduction might not be asked for from the country concerned. That is the state of things at the present moment. The Technical Committees are now at work. The Technical Military

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Committee has been at work since. It is now engaged on the very laborious task of answering the various technical questions we have put. It has worked very hard, but not rapidly. I have never regarded this as a question that can be settled with great rapidity. I would much rather it should be settled thoroughly and completely than that any attempt at rapidity of solution should be made.
The result of the meeting at Geneva is that a machine for disarmament has been brought into existence and actually put into operation. It is a going concern, which exists and which is at work. I think it is bound to produce some result, but whether it will be great or little, whether it will be substantial or insignificant, depends upon the future. I am quite sure that the greatness of its result will depend more upon the amount of security, upon what the French call the moral disarmament of the world, than on any other question. No doubt, although some of the noble Lord's friends may not agree with me, the greatest obstacle to moral disarmament at this moment is Russia. She will not come even to discuss disarmament. I do not suggest that the noble Lord is of that mind, but some of his friends might not agree with him on that point. There may be other countries who are also obstacles in the way. That is the state of things.
The noble Lord asked me whether I thought there were deep differences of opinion revealed by the Geneva discussion. I should say, certainly not. On the contrary, the most remarkable thing was that the Delegations came there with instructions to do their best for the success of the undertaking and of the movement in which they were engaged. I know that was the impression of very impartial observers, such as some of my American friends. My own impression is certainly very favourable. The Commission did better than I expected it would, made greater advances and showed a better spirit, but the fined result depends, as the noble Lord is well aware, not on what we do at Geneva, nor on the frame of mind in which the delegates come to Geneva, but on the will to disarm of the peoples of the world. It has been said, and I think with some truth, that Governments will never impose disarmament on the
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peoples, though the peoples may in some cases impose disarmament on the Governments. I believe that is true, and for this reason, that no Government will ever take the responsibility of so grave a step as material reduction of armaments unless it is perfectly certain that in doing so it has the support of the overwhelming mass of public opinion behind it. In this matter it is the opinion of the peoples of the world which will really determine it.
No one can doubt who has examined the matter of disarmament that it is a difficult subject, but it is not insoluble. The problems are not insoluble; they can be solved. We know they can be solved, for we see they have been solved in Latin America and elsewhere. The question is: Do you really want it? The arguments that induce the desire for it are overwhelming. The financial argument to which the noble Lord has alluded is one, but by no means the strongest, for disarmament. Upon a successful policy of reduction of armaments depends our chef hope of extirpating the curse of war and I personally, believe that as and when the peoples of the world come to believe that disarmament is a practical policy it can be done. Their will to disarm will grow and if there be Governments in Europe who are reluctant to disarm they will be compelled to do what their peoples desire.
LORD PARMOOR: My Lords, I desire to thank the noble Viscount for his exceedingly interesting speech. I do not think there is any point on which we disagree in principle and I am glad to hear from him, after he has been at Geneva, that, apart from the principles, in his view really satisfactory progress has been made in solving what we all admit is a very difficult question. There is only one matter to which I wish to refer. He said that there were certain Papers that he thought he might lay upon the Table. I understood that he would really lay upon the Table any Papers that he can in the same way that he promised to lay certain Papers on the Table in our discussion yesterday. I thank the noble Viscount for what he said in that respect. It is quite satisfactory and, with the permission of the House, I will withdraw the Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

TRIBUNALS OF INQUIRY (EVIDENCE) ACT, 1921 (DONCASTER INQUIRY).
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (LORD BLEDISLOE): My Lords, I beg to move, That it is expedient that a Tribunal be established for inquiring into a matter of urgent public importance, that is to say, into the conditions in regard to mining and drainage in an area around the Borough of Doncaster. This somewhat unusual Motion seems to call for a short explanation. The Royal Commission on Milling Subsidence, which is still sitting, had its attention called at the very outset of its labours to the very serious conditions prevailing in what is known as the Doncaster area, where the extensive system of drains and pumping stations is being seriously affected and is likely to be still more seriously affected in future by the colliery operations in that area, which are causing the drains to sink to a very considerable extent below the surface.
The Royal Commission, accordingly, drew up an Interim Report in which they describe this area, as follows:—
"We have a district for the most part of rich soil with its surface already below the level of the rivers and only preserved for agricultural purposes by an elaborate system of drains and pumping stations constructed and … maintained at very considerable expense, and entitled, as to many of the drains, at least to an unqualified right of support. Underlying are rich and extensive coal seams now on the eve of systematic development on the most modern lines."
Elsewhere in the Report it is pointed out that the area is in fact a great virgin coalfield and that it is expected to win from it no less than 4,550 million tons which will take something like 400 years to work out at an annual rate of ten to twelve million tons. The Royal Commission, accordingly, recommended that a small ad hoc Commission should be set up to investigate the drainage and the other problems which are involved in the
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mining development of this area. The Ministry of Agriculture is now in a position to set up this Commission on the lines recommended by the Royal Commission on Mining Subsidence.
Your Lordships may well ask why we come to you for any authority in this matter. The necessity arises in consequence of the Royal Commission having specifically recommended that the proposed Commission should be armed with the fullest powers so as to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents. This, in fact, cannot be done in the case of such a tribunal as this under the provisions of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, unless a Resolution to that effect is passed in. both Houses of Parliament. A Resolution to that effect has already been passed in another place last Monday, and I submit the same Resolution for adoption by your Lordships here. It was asked in another place, and in anticipation of its being asked again here, I will say what the actual area is that is affected. The area is 200,000 acres and is situate mainly in the West Riding of Yorkshire, but to some small extent in the Lindsey Division of Lincolnshire and also in Nottinghamshire. The Chairman of the Tribunal will be Sir Horace Monro, who was Permanent Secretary of the Local Government Board and was subsequently Chairman of the Ouse Commission. The actual personnel of the Tribunal will be according to the recommendations contained in the Report of the Royal Commission. I beg to move.
Moved, That it is expedient that a Tribunal be established for inquiring into a matter of urgent public importance, that is to say, into the conditions in regard to mining and drainage in an area around the Borough of Doncaster.—(Lord Bledisloe.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at six o'clock.

SOUTHEND-ON-SEA CORPORATION BILL. [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
MIDDLESBROUGH CORPORATION BILL.
The Committee to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.

SEAFORD GAS ORDER, 1926.
Special Order proposed to be made on the application of the Seaford Gas Company:
Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) and referred to the Special Orders Committee.

WILD BIRDS PROTECTION BILL. [H.L.]
Second Reading (which stands appointed for Tuesday, June 22) put off to Tuesday, June 29.
MOTOR VEHICLES COMPULSORY INSURANCE BILL. [H.L.]
Second Reading (which stands appointed for to-morrow) put off to Thursday, June 17.