Sitting of 24 March 1925

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.
PRIVATE BUSINESS.
  HAMILTON BURGH ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL,
  "to confirm a Provisional Order under the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, relating to Hamilton Burgh," presented by Sir JOHN GILMOUR; and ordered (under Section 7 of the Act), to be considered To-morrow.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS,
  TRADE AND COMMERCE.

    RUSSIA (TRADE FACILITIES).
    Mr. MAXTONasked the President of the Board of Trade whether His Majesty's Government has now decided to cancel the Board of Trade Order excluding Russia from the Overseas Trade Acts and Trade Facilities Acts; and whether it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to publish this decision in the daily press and in trade journals for the information of British manufacturers and exporters?
    The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of TRADE (Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister): The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative, and the second part, accordingly, does not arise.
    Mr. MAXTON: Does the right hon. Gentleman not think it is time that this question was seriously considered and settled by the Government, when he has good advisory committees on both these matters that would give a reasonable decision?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: It is precisely because it has received careful
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    consideration that I have given the answer I have given, and I have no doubt that, until Russia creates a condition in which credits are possible, both advisory committees will decline to entertain applications.
    Mr. MACKINDER: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that credits are actually being arranged through bankers which should be done under this scheme?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: No, Sir. No credit which can be done through a banker ought to be done under this scheme.

    AIRCRAFT (EXPORTS).
    Lieut.-Colonel HENEAGEasked the President of the Board of Trade the number of aircraft exported to foreign countries, according to the latest avail able returns, from England?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: The number of aeroplanes of United Kingdom manufacture exported to foreign countries during the year 1924 was 137, and during the first two months of 1925, three. The numbers of airships and balloons of United Kingdom manufacture exported during the same periods were one and three respectively.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Is not the Department of Overseas Trade specially charged with assisting the trade in aeroplanes?
    Mr. SPEAKER: That question does not arise.

    DYESTUFFS.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHYasked the President of the Board of Trade whether any licences to Import synthetic indigo have been granted under the Dyestuffs Act; if the Government have imported certain quantities under the scheme for the payment of German reparations in kind; and why the sale of this imported indigo has been placed in the hands of the only firm manufacturing indigo in this country?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: The only licences which have been granted for the importation of synthetic indigo were in respect of certain quantities imported on Reparation account in 1922 and 1923, under a special arrangement made at the

    207
    time with the principle indigo consumers and with the British Dyestuffs Corporation, details of which were given by my predecessor on the 24th June last in an answer, a copy of which I am sending to the hon. and gallant Member.
    Mr. MORRISasked the President of the Board of Trade the quantity of printed and dyed cotton cloth and dyed or bleached cotton yarn exported from this country in the years 1913 and 1924, respectively?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE - LISTER: The answer contains a table of figures, and the hon. Member will, perhaps, allow me to circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

    Description.

    1913.

    1924.

    PIECE GOONS OF COTTON:—

    Linear Yards.

    Linear Yards.

    Printed:—

    Flags, Handkerchiefs and Shawls in the piece

    54,167,200

    5,687,900

    Other sorts

    1,170,586,900

    723,031,700

    Dyed in the piece

    1,151,375,800

    858,046,100

    Manufactured wholly or in part of Dyed Yarn and commonly known as Coloured Cottons.

    290,377,600

    182,868,400

    Lbs.

    Lbs.

    COTTON YARN, Bleached and Dyed

    36,159,700

    18,662,500

    The particulars for 1924 are provisional and subject to possible slight amendment on final examination of the returns.
    The particulars for 1913 relate to Great Britain and Ireland; those for 1924 relate to Great Britain and Northern Ireland only.

    FROZEN BEEF (EXPORT).
    Mr. BARNESasked the President of the Board of Trade (1) whether he can submit a Return to the House showing the quantity and value of frozen beef for export for the months of February, 1923, 1924, and 1925;
    (2) whether he can submit a Return to the House giving the names of the firms who exported the quantity of frozen beef as shown on page 183 in the Monthly Statement of Trade for February, 1925?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE - LISTER: As the reply contains a table of figures, I will, with the permission of the hon. Member, have it circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the reply:
    The quantities and declared values of frozen beef re-exported during the months in question were as follow:
    Mr. MORRIS: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether there has been a decrease, and whether that decrease is due to the Dyestuffs Act?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: The hon. Member will be able to see the figures on the Return. I am quite satisfied that the Dyestuffs Act, which, I think, means the Dyestuffs (Import Regulation) Act, will have no adverse effects at all.
    Following is the reply:
    The following statement shows the quantities of certain kinds of cotton goods of United Kingdom manufacture exported during each of the years 1913 and 1924:

    Cwts.

    £

    February, 1923

    …

    5,884

    14,269

    February, 1924

    …

    11,371

    25,110

    February, 1925

    …

    50,684

    75,058

    It is not the practice to give the names of exporters, and so disclose the nature and extent of the business of particular individuals or firms, and I do not see my way to vary the practice in the present instance.
    Mr. BARNESasked the President of the Board of Trade whether the Customs statistical office accept the declarations made by exporters of frozen beef without satisfactory documentary evidence; and whether the Customs authority have any powers under statute to demand such evidence, and if it was exercised to verify the value of the February consignments?
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Mr. Guinness): I have been asked to reply. Where there is any reason to doubt the accuracy of information in declarations made by exporters, the exporters are called upon to substantiate their declarations by documentary

    209
    evidence. The Customs are empowered by statute to demand such evidence, and these powers were exercised in regard to some of the consignments of frozen beef included in the figures in the February trade accounts.

    INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF MANUFACTITRERS.
    Mr. MARDY JONESasked the President of the Board of Trade whether any information has been compiled and can be supplied to this House with respect to the existence of international associations of manufacturers and industrialists or national associations of this character, having international connections, giving their names, objects, and, so far as possible, their extent and membership; and whether, in the event of such information not being already available, he will cause inquiries to be made?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: Complete information on the subject is not available, and could not be obtained without legislation. The Balfour Committee on Trade and Industry are collecting a certain amount of information, which will be dealt with in their Report.

    SAFEGUARDING OF INDUSTRIES
    Mr. LEES SMITHasked the President of the Board of Trade whether instructions to committees under the safeguarding scheme which may be drawn up, other than those laid down in the White Paper, will be issued?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: I do not propose to issue any further instructions to committees at present.
    Mr. SMITH: Have people been asking for any further particulars in addition to those already given and if so, have such particulars been supplied?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: I do not quite understand what the hon. Gentleman means by "people asking for particulars." If an industry puts in an application and does not supply all the information, they are required to submit that information.
    Captain WEDGWOOD BENN: If any further instructions are given to the Committee, will the House be consulted?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: Oh, yes, if I gave any new instructions to the Committees I should certainly publish them, in the same way as I published the White Paper, but I think the White Paper contains all the instructions which the Committees need or require.
    Mr. DREWEasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has yet come to any conclusion respecting the application of the National Association of Fabric Glove Manufacturers, dated 4th February, making application to come under the Safeguarding of Industries Act?
    Mr. MacKENZIE LIVINGSTONEasked the President of the Board of Trade the number of applications he has received for assistance under the safeguarding of industries policy to date; and how many of them he has approved?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: I will answer these questions together. I would refer the hon. Members to the answer which I gave to the hon. Member for West Middlesbrough (Mr. T. Thomson) and others on the 17th March, of which I am sending them copies.
    Captain BENN: Why is the right hon. Gentleman not able to say frankly what applications are made; and is he not aware that these applications are widely stated in the trade papers?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: No, Sir. I have explained to the House both in Debate and at Question Time the reason why I do not propose to give information—following the precedent of the previous Act—about pending applications. To those I adhere.
    Mr. P. HARRIS: Is not the Board of Trade subject to this House, and is not this House entitled to be kept fully informed of everything the Board of Trade is doing?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: No, Sir. The House is entitled to challenge administration through the ordinary channels. We had a Debate on this matter and the whole procedure was explained and endorsed.
    Captain BENN: Is the intention to conceal information, so as to give an advantage to one side?
    Mr. GEORGE THORNEasked the President of the Board of Trade the date when the Committee appointed under the Safeguarding of Industries Act will meet for consideration of the claims of lace producers in this country for a duty on imported lace; and if sufficient time will be allowed for those who are in opposition to such proposals to prepare their case and instruct, their counsel?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: The first public sitting has been announced for Monday, the 30th March. I have no doubt that there will be reasonable time for those who are appearing in opposition

    The following STATEMENT shows the Quantity and Value of Scientific Instruments and Appliances (except electrical) registered as imported into the United Kingdom during each of the years 1922, 1923, and 1924.

    Article.

    Unit of Quantity.

    1922.

    1923.

    1924.

    Quantity.

    Value.

    Quantity.

    Value.

    Quantity.

    Value.

    £

    £

    £

    Scientific instruments and appliances (except electrical):—

    Dental, surgical, medical and veterinary instruments and appliances (except optical): Instruments

    Value only.

    —

    26,675

    —

    41,959

    —

    47,510

    Appliances, including trusses and artificial limbs, but excluding artificial eyes.

    Value only.

    —

    9,514

    —

    17,098

    —

    17,089

    Furniture, asceptic, hospital.

    Value only.

    —

    9,674

    —

    13,299

    —

    16,357

    Other sorts, including general dental goods (except dental platinum).

    Value only.

    —

    49,661

    —

    76,347

    —

    84,263

    Photographic (not including lenses):

    Cameras

    Number

    281,797

    120,353

    396,973

    154,749

    438,843

    167,762

    Cinematograph and projection apparatus (including magic lanterns).

    Value only.

    —

    29,969

    —

    31,847

    —

    30,567

    Sensitised photographic paper.

    Value only.

    —

    97,413

    —

    101,199

    —

    116,099

    Sensitised photographic plates and films.

    Value only.

    —

    616,787

    —

    700,665

    —

    762,452

    Cinematograph films for the purpose of the exhibition of pictures or other optical effects means of a cinematograph or other similar apparatus:

    to the application to prepare their case. I would remind the hon. Member that the appointment of the Committee was announced as long ago as the 11th March.
    Mr. THORNEalso asked the President of the Board of Trade the number and value of optical and scientific instruments imported during the years 1922, 1923, and 1924?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: The answer contains a table of figures and the hon. Member will perhaps allow me to have it circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the answer:

    Article.

    Unit of Quantity.

    1922.

    1923.

    1924.

    Quantity

    Value.

    Quantity.

    Value.

    Quantity.

    Value.

    £

    £

    £

    Photographic (not including lenses)—cont. Blank film on which no picture has
    been impressed, known as raw film or stock.

    Linear ft. of the standard width of 1⅜ ins.

    68,050,185

    251,417

    97,138,776

    275,202

    71,500,892

    229,942

    Exposed films: Positives, i.e., films containing a picture and ready for
    exhibition.

    Linear ft. of the standard width of 1⅜ ins.

    20,180,678

    189,098

    20,456,771

    169,055

    36,431,646

    245,949

    Negatives, i.e., films containing a photograph from which positives can be
    printed.

    Linear ft. of the standard width of 1⅜ ins.

    7,370,893

    535,473

    7,240,332

    670,959

    6,691,686

    683,367

    Other photographic and cinematograph appliances, not elsewhere specified (excluding
    photographic chemicals).

    Value only.

    —

    85,385

    —

    62,468

    —

    77,451

    Optical instruments and appliances:

    Lenses, prisms, etc., optically worked, mounted or unmounted (including those imported with
    complete instruments).

    Number

    7,489,532

    194,743

    8,473,164

    229,495

    7,211,445

    224,886

    Bodies for telescopes, microscopes and other instruments for holding lenses.

    Number

    1,269,379

    41,908

    1,681,454

    56,217

    1,306,999

    73,998

    Other scientific instruments and appliances: Precision balances

    Value only.

    —

    7,238

    —

    7,336

    —

    5,785

    Gauges

    Number

    19,657

    11,326

    26,633

    14,069

    33,314

    18,342

    Mathematical instruments.

    Value only.

    —

    8,554

    —

    10,154

    —

    9,929

    Slide rules, calculating discs and cylinders.

    Value only.

    —

    3,448

    —

    2,822

    —

    2,793

    Other descriptions not elsewhere specified.

    Value only.

    —

    87,370

    —

    141,051

    —

    193,365

    TOTAL of scientific instruments and appliances and parts thereof (except electrical).

    Value only.

    —

    2,376,006

    —

    2,775,991

    —

    3,007,906

    NOTE.—As from 1st April, 1923, the figures are inclusive of imports from the Irish Free State and exclusive of direct imports into the Irish Free State from places outside the British Isles.

    Mr. LIVINGSTONEasked the President of the Board of Trade whether, on receipt of applications from particular industries who desire committees of inquiry to be established under the safeguarding of industries procedure, he will be prepared to undertake to give his decision within a period of not more than one month?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: Applications will be dealt with as expeditiously as possible, but I am unable to give any undertaking as to the precise period within which a decision will be reached in every case.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHYasked the President of the Board of Trade how many of the 7,927 consignments sampled by the Customs, and analysed by the Government chemist, under Part I of the Safeguarding of Industries Act, 1921, during the year ended 31st March, 1924, were found to be liable to duty under this Act?
    Mr. GUINNESS: I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to my answer of the 10th March to his previous question in precisely the same terms on this subject.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Is not the real answer that over 4,000 of these consignments were found to be non-dutiable, and why cannot we have that information?
    Mr. GUINNESS: I have not got that information.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I have the information from a recognised source? [HON. MEMBERS: Why ask for it?"]
    Mr. GUINNESS: I do not feel justified in putting civil servants on a task of that kind which, on the hon. and gallant. Member's own admission, can only be used for propagandist purposes.
    Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY: Why not?
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHYasked the President of the Board of Trade whether, having regard to the fact that the key industries duties come to an end in the autumn of next year, he as prepared to consider applications for
    216
    safeguarding of industries protection from associations of manufacturers who at present enjoy key industries protection; and whether consideration of such applications will be deferred until such date as His Majesty's Government has decided what it will do in regard to the renewal or otherwise of the Key Industries Schedule?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: The conditions in which applications under the safeguarding procedure may be made are set out in the White Paper, and I do not propose to modify them. But it is the intention of the Government to review the position of the industries engaged in the production of the articles scheduled to the Safeguarding of Industries Act in good time before the expiry of the relevant provisions of that Act.
    Mr. L. SMITHasked the President of the Board of Trade what provision will be made under the safeguarding of industries scheme to cross-examine witnesses in cases where the industry asking for protection produces finished articles?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE- LISTER: Committees will be entitled to hear such evidence as they may consider relevant to the particular matters referred to them for inquiry, and to allow cross-examination by the representatives of the interests tendering such evidence.
    Mr. SMITH: Is not the right of cross-examination confined, by the right hon. Gentleman's White Paper, to industries using goods produced by the trade which is asking for safeguarding; and what would be the position in the case of a trade producing finished goods where no industry uses such goods?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: No, it is not confined to that. The White Paper treats certain matters as relevant, and on all these matters evidence can be tendered for or against, and, on these matters, cross-examination can be allowed—not otherwise.
    Mr. HARRIS: Is not provision made for cross-examination on all the facts?
    Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member should put that question down.
    Mr. WELLSasked the President of the Board of Trade the nature of the discrimination which Austria has recently

    217
    adopted against goods produced in countries under unsatisfactory labour conditions?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: The Austrian Customs Tariff Law of last year authorises the Austrian Government to increase by not more than 33⅓ per cent. the customs duties On industrial products from countries which have not ratified the Washington Agreement of 1919 on Hours of Labour, and in which the hours of labour are obviously not in accordance with that Agreement. I have no information of any increases in customs duties or other measures which the Austrian Government has actually adopted in this connection, but I will have inquiry made and inform my hon. Friend of the result.
    Mr. MORRISasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that on the occasion of the sate-guar ding of industries inquiries, 1922, precautions were taken by importers those trades were Likely to be affected to expedite delivery of large import consignments, which created a glut on the market; and whether, on the present occasion, he is proposing to take steps to render this impossible?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave to the hon. Member for Penrith and Cockermouth (Mr. Dixey) on the 17th February, of which I am sending him a copy.

    BRITISH SEAMEN.
    Colonel DAYasked the President of the Board of Trade if lascars and other coloured nationals of the British Empire are considered as British seamen where that term is used?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: I presume that the hon. and gallant Member is referring to Board of Trade statistics of the employment of British seamen. The methods of obtaining these statistics were explained at length in an answer given on the 17th December last to the hon. Member for Southampton, a copy of which I am sending the hon. and gallant Member. In Tables II and III, containing statistics of seamen employed, Lascars are shown separately. The term "Lascar" includes all Asiatics and East
    218
    Africans engaged on agreements which are opened and terminated in Asia, and other seamen are classified as "British" and "foreign." In Table I, relating to the engagements of seamen at ports in the United Kingdom, there are no Lascars.

    COMMERCIAL TRAVELLERS (NORWAY AND SWEDEN).
    Mr. WARDLAW-MILNEasked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been drawn to the regulations of the Norwegian and Swedish Governments under which British commercial travellers are required to take out a licence, costing 100 kroner per month, before they are permitted to discuss business with firms in those countries, and also that the same fee is charged even when the visit is for a week only; and whether it is the intention of the Government to take any steps to impose upon commercial travellers from Scandinavia visiting this country similar restrictions and similar costs?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second part, I am advised that it would not be possible, having regard to the existing treaty engagements between this country on the one hand, and Sweden and Norway on the other, to impose on Swedish or Norwegian commercial travellers restrictions or taxes which are not at the same time applicable to the commercial travellers of every other foreign country.
    Mr. WARDLAW-MILNE: Are we to understand from the reply that the Government are unable to do anything in the case of Norwegian and Swedish commercial travellers coming to this country; and are we prepared to sit down without doing anything to protect our commercial travellers who are treated in this way?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: No, Sir. The hon. Member must really understand what I have said in my answer, which is that if you were to attempt to impose this restriction on Norwegian or Swedish commercial travellers you would have to impose Similar restrictions on every other country with which we do business.
    Mr. WARDLAW-MILNE: Then is it the case that Norway and Sweden are in a position to make a differentiation, and we are not?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: No, they are not. They make the same terms and charge the same rates for commercial travellers of all countries.

    GERMAN SHIPYARDS (HOURS AND WAGES).
    Mr. WARDLAW-MILNEasked the President of the Board of Trade if he can give figures showing the working hours and rate of wages in German shipbuilding yards as compared with those paid in similar establishments in this country?

    Weekly Time Rates of Wages in Shipbuilding Yards.

    —

    Great Britain (9 Principal Shipbuilding Centres).

    Germany (Mean of Rates for Hamburg and Stettin).

    German Currency.

    Sterling.

    Skilled:

    s.

    d.

    Reichmarks.

    s.

    d.

    i. Shipwrights

    …

    …

    …

    55

    7

    31·00

    30

    10

    ii. Shipjoiners

    …

    …

    …

    57

    9

    Mean of i. and ii.

    …

    …

    …

    56

    8

    Semi-skilled

    …

    …

    …

    No information

    29·16

    29

    0

    Unskilled

    …

    …

    …

    38

    5

    25·38

    25

    3

    NOTES:—(1) The German rates are those paid to single men. Supplementary allowances are paid to married men at the rate of 1 pfennig per hour for a wife, and 2 pfennigs per hour for each child. For a married man with two children this represents an addition of 2s. 8d. per week.

    The weekly rates for Germany shown in the Table were obtained by multiplying the hourly rates given in the source by 54, and converting the results into English currency at the rate of 20·10 Reichsmarks to the £.

    (2) For both countries the rates shown in the Table are based on minimum agreed time rates (per week in Great Britain, per hour in Germany). In both countries rates in excess of this minimum are in practice frequently paid. Futhermore, no allowance has been made in respect of extra pay for piecework or for overtime. Consequently a comparison of the average
    weekly sums actually earned in the two countries might yield different results.

    BANKRUPTCY ACT.
    Mr. GILLETTasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is able to state what action he proposes to take in regard to the recommendations made in the Report, recently presented to him, by the Committee appointed to consider the working of the Bankruptcy Act?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER: I cannot at present add anything to the reply which I gave to the hon. Member for
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY of LABOUR (Mr. Betterton): I have been asked to reply. The weekly working hours in shipbuilding yards are at present 47 in this country and 54 in Germany. As the comparison of wages includes a tabular statement, I will, with my hon. Friend's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. WARDLAW-MILNE: May I ask if it shows that the wages are materially lower in Germany.
    Mr. BETTERTON: Yes.
    Captain BENN: Has the hon. Gentleman any information to show that the reparation policy is responsible for the low wages?
    The statement promised is as follows:
    Sunderland (Mr. Raine) on 24th February. I am sending the hon. Member a copy of that reply.

    ANGLO-HUNGARIAN MIXED ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL.
    Mr. SANDEMAN ALLENasked the President of the Board of Trade whether the test case arranged between the British and Hungarian Governments has yet been brought by the British

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    Clearing Office before the Anglo-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to settle certain British claims for the period between July, 1919, and the date of the coming into force of the Treaty of Trianon, 1921; and, if it has, will he state what the decision was and the date last year upon which the British and Hungarian Governments agreed that the test case should be brought?
    Sir P. CUNLIFFE- LISTER: The answer is somewhat long, and my hon. Friend will, perhaps, agree to my having it circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the reply:
    This case was heard by the Anglo-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal on 12th February, and judgment was given in favour of the claimant on 3rd March. The Tribunal decided that the Hungarian Government was responsible to the British national concerned for the payment of all dividends upon her holding of secured bonds of the former Hungarian Government which had accrued due during the War, with the exception of one coupon, the payment of which had been suspended to all holders, Allied, Hungarian, neutral or others.
    In reply to the last part of the question, it was agreed with the Hungarian Government at the end of September last, after discussions for a settlement upon the basis of an earlier decision of the Tribunal had proved abortive, that this case should be brought to decide the point in dispute.

  BRITISH ARMY.

    PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, ALDERSHOT.
    Mr. COUPERasked the Secretary of State for War what is the position in regard to a Presbyterian church for Aldershot; whether he has approached the Treasury for a grant for the erection of such a church; and, if so, with what result?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Sir Lamington Worthington-Evans): I have seen the Joint Committee of the Scottish and Presbyterian Churches regarding this scheme for the erection of a new church at Aldershot as a war memorial, and I have undertaken, on behalf of the War Office, to contribute
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    £2,500 spread over three years if the Committee can collect the balance of the funds required.
    Lieut.-Colonel WATTS - MORGAN: Another dole to Scotland!

    ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS (OFFICERS' PENSIONS).
    Major - General Sir RICHARD LUCEasked the Secretary of State for War if he is aware that an officer in the Royal Army Medical Corps has recently retired, after 20 years' service, with a pension of £328 per annum, and that this sum is £37 below the sum he understood he would receive, after 20 years' service, when he joined the corps; and if he will take steps to secure that no officer who joined the corps before the warrant of 1919 came into force will in future be retired on a lower pension than he would have received under conditions existing when he joined the corps?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: The fact referred to by the hon. and gallant Member is due to the joint effect, on this individual case, of the rule that service on the West Coast counts double towards the 20 years required for voluntary retirement, and of the introduction in 1919 of a rank element into the calculation of retired pay. I am, however, looking further into the position.
    Sir R. LUCEasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that a major, Royal Army Medical Corps, retiring after 20 years' service, only received an increase by the 1919 Warrant of £31 to his previous pension of £365, and that, by the reduction of 5½ per cent. on the increased pension of £396, he has had the increase reduced not by 27½ per cent., but by nearly 67 per cent.; and if he will take steps to secure that these officers do not in future have their pensions reduced by a larger amount than 27½ per cent. of the increase granted in 1919?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: My hon. and gallant Friend's question is, I think, based on a misapprehension. The revision due to the fall in the cost of living which was made from the 1st July last, applied to the 1919 rate of retired pay itself and not to the difference between the rates under the 1914 and 1919 Warrants. A reduction of 5½ per cent, was therefore applied correctly to the 1919 Warrant rate of £396 per annum

    223
    in the instance quoted. A full explanation was given in the statement which appeared in the Press last December, a copy of which I am sending to my hon. and gallant Friend.
    Lieut.-Colonel FREMANTLE: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that., despite his explanations, this fact and similar facts are responsible in a large degree for the failure to recruit to this Service, which is so dangerous for the whole Army?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: I am very sorry if that should be the case. I can quite well understand that some misapprehension has arisen, and it is for that reason that a printed statement of what actually has happened has been circulated, and I shall be very glad to send the hon. and gallant Member a copy.
    Lieut.-Colonel FREMANTLE: Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that, it is not the misapprehension, it, is the fact that he is sailing so close to the wind and not giving sufficient remuneration?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: No, I cannot admit—
    Mr. SPEAKER: That is a matter for argument.

    HORSE HIRE (GLAMORGAN).
    Mr. MARDY JONESasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that Mr. Rhys Davies, farmer, of Mill Farm, Miskin, Pontyclun, Glamorgan, and a number of other farmers in Glamorgan, have not yet been paid for the hire of horses supplied for the Territorial trainings held last summer in the County of Glamorgan; and whether he will have this grievance of the farmers affected rectified forthwith?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: I find that this is not a matter in which the War Department or the Glamorganshire Territorial Association can intervene. The farmers' claims are against a sub-contractor of the firm who supplied the horses to the Territorial Association. I am informed that there is nothing owing to this sub-contractor either by the Association or their contractor, but owing to other losses he is unable at present to meet his obligations to the farmers.
    Mr. JONES: Is the War Office not really responsible, and did not these men imagine that the War Office would be responsible for seeing that they were covered?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: I am afraid that all that the War Office or, rather, the Territorial Association, have done is to pay the person with whom they contracted, and it is a sub-contractor who has defaulted to the farmers. For that, I am sorry, but I cannot assume the liability.
    Mr. JONES: Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that he will see to it that in future people shall be protected from sub-contractors acting in this way?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: No. I cannot give any undertaking that no one will make a bad debt. I could give advice, that the farmers should see that the sub-contractor with whom they contract is a person of position.
    Lieut.-Colonel Sir JOSEPH NALL: Is it not the duty of associations to hire the horses from as many contractors as possible, and where a contractor hires from a sub-contractor, ought not the association to take some steps to see that the sub-contractor is adequately protected?
    Mr. JONES: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that these farmers are dependent in summer time on these contractors, and why should the War Office get the benefit of the horses and not be liable to the farmers?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: The hon. Gentleman assumes that either the War Office or the association has not paid, but it has paid. It has paid the contractor. I hope it will not occur again that the farmers will be cheated by a sub-contractor.

    COAST ARTILLERY SCHOOL, SHOEBURYNESS.
    Colonel DAYasked the Secretary of State for War whether, seeing that the commandant of the Coast Artillery School receives a salary of £950 and the superintendent of experiments receives a salary of £949, and that the school and experimental establishment are both situated at Shoeburyness, he will consider the desirability of effecting some

    225
    economy in expenditure by putting both these artillery establishments under one commandant?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON - EVANS: Although the Coast Artillery School and the experimental establishment are both at Shoeburyness, the functions of the two establishments, and the qualifications required for their direction are quite distinct, and it would not be feasible to combine them under one commandant. Further, the time of both the commandant of the school and the superintendent of experiments is fully occupied by their respective duties.

    CLOTHING FACTORY (WAGES).
    Colonel DAYasked the Secretary of State for War hew many of the employés at the Army Clothing Factory are in receipt of wages of 49s. a week, and what are their duties; and whether, in view of the high cost of living and rents in London, he has under consideration the question of increasing the wages paid?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON - EVANS: There are 141 employés at the Royal Army Clothing Department factory and store in receipt of wages of 49s. a week, which is the minimum wage for War Department unskilled adult labourers in London. This 49s. includes an increase of 5s. awarded as a. result of arbitration last year. I am not aware of any new factors in the situation which would justify a revision of this rate at present. The duties of the employés in question comprise piling bales and cases, unpacking, loading and moving made-up clothing and materials.
    Colonel DAY: In view of the high cost of living, will the right hon. Gentleman consider granting bonuses to these very poorly paid people?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: No. As I say, the wage was increased by 5s. last year, and I cannot see that I should be justified in making any further increase at present.
    Mr. J. JONES: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the men employed in Government Departments all over the country, and particularly in the London area, are now sending in an application for a minimum wage of £3per week?
    An HON. MEMBER: Why not £5?
    Mr. J. JONES: You spend as much on one dinner!
    Colonel DAY: In view of the impossibility of these people existing on this very small salary, perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will consider granting them an increase?
    Mr. LIVINGSTONE: Does the Minister not think that the Government should show an example to other employers?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: I should like to give everybody the highest wage possible, but I have to take these cases with a great number of others. These employés got a rise of 5s. last year, after an arbitration, and I see no circumstances which have occurred which make any difference between this year and last year.
    Mr. LIVINGSTONE: But those wages are not fair.
    Lord HENRY CAVENDISH-BENTINCKasked the Financial Secretary to the War Office the wages paid in the Royal Army Clothing Department?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: I have given certain information regarding the wages paid in the Royal Army Clothing Department in reply to the hon. Member for the Central Division of Southwark (Colonel Day). If my Noble Friend will let me know what further information he requires I will endeavour to supply it. I hardly think he will require a complete statement of all the rates paid to all the different grades of employés, of which there are a very large number.
    Lord H. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is considerable dissatisfaction owing to the fact that the wages are not sufficient to keep a man and his family?
    Viscountess ASTOR: In considering this, would the right hon. Gentleman look into the question of these men not getting any annual leave with pay beyond the ordinary Bank-holiday?
    Sir J. NALL: May I ask the Minister whether it is not fact that this Department exists largely for supplying clothing

    227
    to the Territorial Army, and would it not be better to let the county associations make their own arrangements?

    JUDGE ADVOCATE-GENERAL (LEGAL ASSISTANT).
    Mr. CLUSEasked the Secretary of State for War what are the legal qualifications of the legal assistant of the Judge Advocate-General, who is to receive a salary of £288 for the year 1925–26; and whether it is a whole-time post?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: The legal assistant of the Judge Advocate-General is a barrister and Bachelor of Laws. The salary of the appointment is £200, increasing by annual increments of £15 to £500, plus Civil Service bonus. The present holder, who was appointed last June, was allowed to enter the scale at £275, which, with the bonus added, amounts to £409. It is a whole-time appointment.

    CHELSEA HOSPITAL.
    Mr. CLUSEasked the Secretary of State for War whether, seeing that 500 in-pensioners of Chelsea Hospital receive £2,939 in pay and 16 officials receive £5,528, in addition to retired pay in the cases of the governor, lieutenant-governor, and six captains of invalids, he will consider whether some reduction can be made in the emoluments of the higher officials and an increase made in the pay of the pensioners?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: The 16 officials referred to receive their pay for the performance of specific duties as prescribed by the Royal Warrant for the government of the hospital. The in-pensioners, who are not required to perform any duties in return for their maintenance in the hospital, also receive pay at amounts varying from 3d. up to 1s. 6d. a day, which is in the nature of pocket money. I do not consider there is room for any such adjustment as the hon. Member suggests.

    RIDING ESTABLISHMENT (ROYAL ARTILLERY).
    Mr. B. SMITHasked the Secretary of State for War if he will furnish details of the proposed expenditure of £13,000 for riding instruction to the 225 cadets
    228
    at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, during the year 1925–26?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: The figure quoted represents the share of the cost of the Riding Establishment, Royal Artillery, which is estimated to be attributable to the instruction of cadets at the Royal Military Academy. The detailed estimate of the cost of the Riding Establishment, Royal Artillery, is shown on page 60 of Army Estimates, 1925–26.
    Mr. SMITH: Surely the amount of £60, approximately, per cadet, for riding, is an exorbitant figure; would the right hon. Gentleman not consider reducing it and applying the balance to increasing the wages?

    EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS.
    Mr. B. SMITHasked the Secretary of State for War whether, seeing that in the Army Estimates provision is made for some 52 educational establishments and schools of instruction, each under a commandant or superintendent with salary ranging up to £1,725 per annum, he will set up a committee to inquire as to the possibility of amalgamation of certain of the schools so that economy may be effected by a reduction in the number of supervisory posts?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: I do not think that any useful purpose would be served by the appointment of the proposed committee, as these establishments have only recently been subjected to a comprehensive review by a Departmental Committee and are scrutinised periodically in connection with the annual estimates; but if the hon. Member has any specific suggestion to make I will consider it.
    Mr. MAXTON: Are the salaries mentioned in the question subject to annual increments?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: I should like notice of that question.

    GRENADIER GUARDS (CAMP).
    Lieut.-Colonel JAMESasked the Secretary of State for War if he will explain why a battalion of the Grenadier Guards at Aldershot has been ordered to go under canvas on 1st April; and whether, in view of the discomfort caused to troops by such an early

    229
    beginning of the camping season, he will consider the desirability of not sending troops under canvas before the beginning of May, which was the normal period?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: Two battalions of the Guards will be in camp between 28th March and 2nd May while they are firing their annual weapon training course. I am advised that there is no medical objection to the troops going under canvas; the tents will have floorboards and there will be a good supply of blankets. An early beginning of the camping season is necessary in order that the training programme may be carried out.
    Lieut.-Colonel JAMES: Is not the camp situated half a mile or is it more than two miles from the barracks?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: I am not quite sure.

    ROYAL DOCKYARD, WOOLWICH (DISCHARGES).
    Mr. SNELLasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that, in connection with the proposed evacuation of the Royal Dockyard at Woolwich, a number of soldiers' widows who have been employed there for many years have received notices of discharge; that many men employed in the saddlery department, some of whom are disabled ex-service men who have many years of unbroken service, are also under notice of discharge; and whether he will suspend discharges in the Royal Dockyard so as to enable him to consider the possibility of transferring these employés to other departments in the Royal Arsenal?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: 32 soldiers' widows and 30 saddlers are under notice of discharge on 31st March, and every effort has already been made to find them employment elsewhere. This is in accordance with the recommendations of a Committee which was specially set up to consider the effect of the evacuation of Woolwich on Army Ordnance Department employés and which, contained among its members representatives of the employés. A few men have been absorbed in another establishment and it has been found possible to defer the discharge of the women for a short time. But apart from this, I regret that there is no alternative to their discharge.

    ROYAL SCOTS GREYS (RECRUITS).
    Mr. MacINTYREasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that practically no recruits of Scottish nationality are being drafted into the Royal Scots Greys Regiment; and whether he will take steps to ensure that a largo proportion of recruits for this Scottish regiment shall be of Scottish nationality?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: At the moment there are 190 men serving in the Royal Scots Greys who are of Scottish nationality. The number of Scotsmen who enlist into the cavalry is at present small, and it has been necessary to draft to the Royal Scots Greys from any of the three regiments of dragoons at home, irrespective of nationality, in order to provide the regiment with the necessary number of men of the various categories of service. Special endeavours will be made to draft Scotsmen to the Royal Scots Greys as soon as circumstances permit.

    RECRUITS (DEFECTIVE EYESIGHT AND TEETH).
    Mr. GILLETTasked the Secretary of State for War what number of the 49,245 men who were rejected last year as recruits to the Army were refused on the ground of defective eyesight, and what number on account of defective teeth?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: The information required is only available in the case of the 20,742 men who were rejected by medical officers on primary medical examination and after attestation. Of these, 1,743 were rejected for defective vision and 2,062 for defective teeth.

    SUDAN CASUALTY ALLOWANCES.
    Mr. PETHICK-LAWRENCEasked the Secretary of State for War why the casualty allowances in the Sudan are considerably lower than those payable in respect of casualties arising out of the Great War?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: The pensions payable in respect of recent casualties in the Sudan are in accordance with the scale which was adopted by His Majesty's Government as appropriate to the normal conditions of service in the Navy, Army and Air Force after the War.
    Mr. PETHICK-LAWRENCE: Is it the intention of the right hon. Gentleman to reduce the scale of allowances in respect of the Great War to that of this scale in 1926?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: Oh, no, Sir.

    EX-RANRER OFFICERS.
    Colonel APPLINasked the Secretary of State for War whether he can inform the House what the approximate cost would be of granting officers' pensions to warrant and non-commissioned officers of the Regular Army who were given temporary commissions during the War?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: The cost of meeting the claim of these warrant and non-commissioned officers is fully set out in the memorandum on the subject which was published as a Command Paper (Cmd. 2076).

    SUPPLEMENTARY RESERVE.
    Mr. SAKLATVALAasked the Secretary of State for War (1) if he will inform this House, from the answers given to question 5 in the enlistment form filled up by men desirous of joining the Army Supplementary Reserve, the number of engine drivers and firemen, and the number of electricians, so far obtained for service in that unit;
    (2) if the number of recruits required for the Army Supplementary Reserves from different technical trades and occupations are being enlisted in satisfactory numbers from each trade; and, if not, in what trades is there a deficiency?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: I have nothing to add to my statement on the introduction of Army Estimates, and to my reply on the 3rd instant to the hon. Member.
    Mr. SAKLATVALA: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the answers continually given, I beg to give notice that I will raise this question on the Adjournment.

    YOUTHS (DISCHARGE)
    Mr. THURTLEasked the Secretary of State for War if he is prepared to introduce the necessary changes in enlistment Regulations whereby boys or youths who enlist before reaching the age of 17 may have the option of taking their discharge before reaching the age of 18?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: I am not prepared to alter the rule that a recruit who mis-states his age on enlistment is held to serve, unless either he is found to be under 17 or there are special compassionate grounds for sanctioning his discharge.

    DISCIPLINE (COMMITTEE'S REPORT).
    Mr. THURTLEasked the Secretary of State for War when the Committee appointed to consider questions of discipline is likely to report; and whether it is intended to publish the Report?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: Yes. Sir; the Committee has recently rendered its Report, which will be published shortly.
    Mr. THURTLE: Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether we may have this Report before the Army Annual Bill is discussed in Committee?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: I hope so.

    SANDHURST CADETS (FEES).
    Mr. PALINGasked the Financial Secretary to the War Office how many of the cadets at present in the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, are exempt from payment of fees; how many are paying the privileged rates of £20, £55, £80, £95, and £105 per year, respectively; how many are full-fee paying students; and will he state how many are sons of noncommissioned officers and how many the sons of privates?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: As the answer contains a large number of figures, I will, with the hon. Member's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the answer:

    Number of cadets exempt from fees (i.e., King's Cadets and N.C.O. Cadets)

    43

    Number of cadets paying privileged rate of £20

    19

    Number of cadets paying privileged rate of £55

    98

    Number of cadets paying privileged rate of £80

    92

    Number of cadets paying privileged rate of £95

    18

    Number of cadets paying privileged rate of £105

    2

    Number of cadets paying full rate of £200

    257

    In addition there are 23 cadets paying £105 per annum, having been awarded Prize Cadetships; and 24 cadets holding King's India Cadetships, whose rate of contribution is assessed by the India Office. The number who are sons of N.C.O. s is five; there are no eons of privates.

  "COLOGNE POST" (Mr. E. P. NICHOLSON).
  Sir ALFRED KNOXasked the Secretary of State for War if he can see his way to arrange for an inquiry by an independent person into the claim of Mr. E P. Nicholson, who states that his business as photographer was seized by the official Rhine Army newspaper, the "Cologne Post," in 1921, without compensation?
  Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: The "Cologne Post" is not financed from Army funds, and is not an official publication except in so far as the military authorities exercise a control over its contents. The War Office- can accept no liability for the action of the management of the newspaper in terminating Mr. Nicholson's agreement with them in 1921, and I can see no purpose to be served by my instituting any inquiry such as my hon. and gallant Friend suggests.
  I may say, however, that Mr. Nicholson's complaints were carefully investigated by my predecessor and the Army Council, who came to the conclusion that they called for no action by the War Office.

  POOR LAW REFORM.
  Mr. TREVELYAN THOMSONasked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the fact that all parties in the last Parliament agreed that immediate legislation was required for the revision and reform of the Poor Law system, he will state what steps he intends to take to meet the unanimous desire of the last Parliament?
  The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY of HEALTH (Sir Kingsley Wood): I have been asked to reply. The question of Poor Law reform is being closely considered by the Government with a view to the discussion with and ultimate circulation to local
  234
  authorities, boards of guardians and others interested of a draft Bill following the procedure adopted in the case of the Rating and Valuation Bill.
  Mr. THOMSON: Is the Bill likely to be introduced this year, following on what the hon. Gentleman has said?
  Sir K. WOOD: I can say that satisfactory progress is being made, but I cannot name a date when the Bill will be introduced.

  LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

    NON-JUSTICIABLE ISSUES.
    Mr. FISHERasked the Prime Minister whether the Canadian Government has informed the Secretary-General of the League of Nations that it is ready to consider methods for supplementing the provisions of the covenant for the settlement of non-justiciable issues; and whether this proposal has the support of His Majesty's Government?
    The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Baldwin): The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second part, His Majesty's Government have stated that they are not opposed in principle to schemes for clarifying or strengthening the Covenant, and they will always be prepared to examine well-considered proposals with this object.

    PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE.
    Mr. FISHERasked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that a Note has been addressed by the Canadian Prime Minister to the League of Nations indicating that Canada is prepared to consider the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice in justiciable cases with certain reservations; and whether this is also the position of His Majesty's Government?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I am aware of the statement by the Government of Canada, but I cannot add anything to what is said on this subject in the statement by His Majesty's Government regarding the Protocol.

    OPIUM CONVENTIONS.
    Viscountess ASTORasked the Prime Minister whether the Government

    235
    has considered the question of the ratification of the recent Opium Conventions; and whether he can say when it is proposed to ratify them?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. Godfrey Locker-Lampson): I have been asked to reply. It is certainly the intention of the Government as at present advised to ratify these Conventions.
    Viscountess ASTOR: Would the Government consider the ratification before the next meeting of the Assembly, considering how much misrepresentation there has been on the subject of this country's good faith in the suppression of the traffic?
    Mr. LOCKER-LAMPSON: I will represent that to the Home Secretary.

  OFFICIAL STATISTICS.
  Sir WILFRID SUGDENasked the Primo Minister if he will consider the setting up of a Government statistical board, such as at present exists in the United States of America, to deal with every section and phase of industry; and if he will utilise for such purpose the staff at one time concerned in land valuation work?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I am not aware of the nature and functions of the board in the United States referred to in the question. A permanent consultative committee for the co-ordination of official statistics has existed in this country since 1921.
  Sir W. SUGDEN: If I give the right hon. Gentleman details of the exact type of Government statistical department in the United States, will he consider the desirability of a similar department under our Government with a view to helping the trades and industries of the country?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I shall be glad to look into anything my hon. Friend cares to send me.
  Mr. J. JONES: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the American department to which the hon. Gentleman refers has made the statement that if the machinery
  236
  of the United States could be used and all the workers did their share of service, that there could be a higher standard of living than now on a three-hour day?

  HOUSE OF COMMONS (HOURS OF SITTING).
  Mr. THURTLEasked the Prime Minister if he is prepared to recommend to the House the appointment of a Select Committee to consider and report on the hours of sitting of the House, with a view to the introduction of such changes as may be desirable from the point of view of the convenience of Members?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I think I cannot do better than repeat the answer given by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition to a similar question addressed to him on the 4th March last year by the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Ken-worthy), with which I am in complete agreement. He said:
  "I do not think that the hon. and gallant Member's proposal is practicable. Even under existing conditions the pressure of public business renders it most difficult for Ministers to find adequate time for the despatch of the business of their Departments, and if the House were to meet earlier, their task in this respect would be made impossible."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th March, 1924; cols. 1214–5, Vol. 170.]
  Mr. W. THORNE: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that many years ago this House met at 2 o'clock instead of 2.30, and is he not aware that nobody would be inconvenienced by meeting to-day at 2 o'clock and adjourning at 9.45 p.m.?
  Lieut. - Colonel Sir FREDERICK HALL: Before the right hon. Gentleman answers, may I ask if the hon. Gentleman is speaking only on behalf of himself, or on behalf of the whole of the Members of this House?
  Mr. THORNE: I am speaking on behalf of the intelligent ones, the Members on this side of the House?
  Sir F. HALL: The intelligence is all above the Gangway!
  Mr. SPEAKER: This is not the time for those pleasantries.

  INCOME TAX.
  Mr. MACQUISTENasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the Italian Government has decided to levy Income Tax upon companies only on the sums distributed in dividends and not upon sums reinvested by way of reserve in the companies' businesses, and that the same practice has for a long time been in existence in Holland, and that thereby thrift, industry, and employment are stimulated; and will he, in the ensuing Budget, grant abatements of tax to all British companies upon profits placed by them to reserve and reinvested in the businesses?
  The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER (Mr. Churchill): I have as yet no official confirmation of the Press reports of the Italian proposals on this subject, but I am aware of the provisions of the law thereon in Holland. As regards alterations in our own system of Income Tax, my hon. and learned Friend will not expect me to anticipate my Budget statement.

  MESTON COMMITTEE (REPORT).
  Sir JOHN MARRIOTTasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware of the length of time which has elapsed since the appointment of the Meston Committee; whether it has now reported; and, if not, when the Report may be expected?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I am aware of the length of time which has elapsed since the Committee's appointment. I have lately seen the Chairman, and he informs me that he hopes to be able to report during the present Session.
  Sir J. MARRIOTT: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his predecessor expressed a hope in July last that a similar report would be presented before the Summer Recess, but it was not so presented, and that in August he suggested it might be presented before October?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: Many unexpected circumstances interrupted the course of things last year.

  NATIONAL DEBT SERVICES.
  Mr. T. WILLIAMSasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what percentage of the national revenue was expended on National Debt services in the year 1913–14 and the year 1924–25?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: The sum charged on the Consolidated Fund for the service of the Dead Weight Debt was, in 1913–14, 12·4 per cent. of the total revenue, and in the Budget Estimates of 1924–25 was 441 per cent.
  Mr. WILLIAMS: Can the right hon. Gentleman state, approximately, how far this is responsible for the present industrial depression, and what steps he intends to take to remove it?
  Mr. SPEAKER: That is a subject for debate.

  SUPER-TAX.
  Mr. CADOGANasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the total number, according to the latest available statistics, of those who have made a return for purposes of Super-tax?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: For the year 1923–24 the number of individuals who rendered liable returns for the purposes of Super-tax, was, at the 28th February last, 87,704. As assessments to Super-tax may be made at any time within six years after the end of the year of assessment, the number of individuals ultimately liable to the tax may exceed this figure.
  Mr. CADOGAN: Cannot the Treasury devise some expedient for "roping in" the thousands who must be evading their liability to Super-tax every year?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: Every measure is taken to ensure the efficient collection of the tax, and every measure will be taken.
  Mr. BROMLEY: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us if any of the people referred to in his answer are employed at the Army Clothing Factory which was mentioned in a previous question?

  OLD AGE PENSIONS.
  Major GEORGE DAVIESasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can see his way to extend the qualifica-

  239
  tion for an old age pension to applicants who, being British subjects, have resided continuously in this country for 10 years and who, prior to that period, have been employed in Dominion Government service within the British Empire?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: As at present advised I am not prepared to suggest an alteration of the statutory provision under which any periods spent outside this country in the service of the Crown may be treated as residence within the country for old age pension purposes, provided that the service is paid for out of moneys provided by the Imperial Parliament.

  GOLD STANDARD.
  Mr. GILLETTasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he has considered the advisability of calling an-international conference on the gold problem, on the lines suggested in the resolutions of the Financial Commission of the Genoa Conference, 1922?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I would refer the hon. Member to my reply given on the 24th February to my hon Friend the Member for Eastern Aberdeen, of which I am sending him a copy.
  Mr. GILLETT: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the United States Government are proposing to call such a conference?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I have not been so informed.
  Mr. W. THORNE: Has the right hon. Gentleman taken notice of the discussion in this country regarding the gold problem; and will he tell us whether it is the Government or the bankers who will decide whether we are going back to the gold standard?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I have read a very interesting series of observations by the hon. Member on the subject, and I have read statements by other authorities. The Government hold themselves free to handle this matter in their own time, and in their own way, and I am sure that will most conduce to the public interest.
  Mr. THORNE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he has not
  240
  answered the question I put to him? What I want to know is whether the Bank of England or the Government will decide whether we are going back to the gold standard?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: The Government will decide that on their own responsibility.

  NORTHERN IRELAND (LOANS AND GRANTS-IN-AID).
  Mr. COMPTONasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the amount of money given as loans, grants-in-aid, or in any other fashion to the Government of Northern Ireland since its inception, and the purposes for which such moneys were granted; and the amount of money received from the Government of Northern Ireland during the same period?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: As the answer is long and contains many figures, I propose, with the hon. Member's permission, to circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
  Following is the answer:

  The following amounts have been given as grants in-aid, for the purposes specified:

  1922–23.

  £

  £

  Special Constabulary

  2,690,000

  Unemployment Relief

  56,665

  Malicious Injuries

  750,000

  Special initial expenses

  438,326

  1923–24.

  3,934,991

  Special Constabulary

  1,352,534

  Unemployment Relief

  243,335

  Malicious Injuries

  1,250,000

  Additional provision of buildings under the First Report of the Northern Ireland Special Arbitration Committee (Cmd. 2072 of 1924)

  400,000

  1924–25.

  3,245,869

  Special Constabulary

  1,250,000

  Total Grants-in-Aid

  £8,430,860

  The following amounts have been received by the Government of Northern Ireland under the gift of existing land purchase annuities contained in Section 26 of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920:

  £

  1921–22

  …

  250,950

  1922–23

  …

  642,170

  1923–24

  …

  654,012

  1924–25 (estimate)

  …

  661,061

  Total land purchase annuities

  …

  £2,208,193

  The expenditure incurred in the provision of buildings, including their sites, and their equipment for the accommodation of the Parliament and public Departments of Northern Ireland under Section 34 (1) of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and of the Northern Ireland Supreme Court under Section 24 (1) (b) of that Act, has been to date approximately £411,388.
  The total of the foregoing amounts is:

  £

  Grants-in-aid

  8,430,860

  Land purchase annuities

  2,208,193

  Statutory provision of buildings

  411,388

  Total

  £11,050,441

  No loans of money have been made to the Government of Northern Ireland; but under the powers of the Government of Northern Ireland (Loan Guarantee) Act, 1922 (which authorised His Majesty's Government to guarantee the principal and interest of loans to be raised by Northern Ireland up to a total of £3,500,000), loans amounting to £2,112,500 have been guaranteed.
  The following amounts have been received by way of the contribution of Northern Ireland towards Imperial liabilities and expenditure (including debt and war pensions) in respect of the undermentioned years:

  £

  1921–22

  …

  2,820,820

  1922–23

  …

  6,685,645

  1923–24 (provisional)

  …

  4,500,000

  1924–25 (provisional)

  …

  3,000,000

  £17,006,465

  CIVIL SERVICE (WOMEN).
  Mr. T. THOMSONasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether it is understood that future vacancies in the training grade of the executive class,
  242
  other than the 26 already held by women, are not to be filled by open competition but are to be reserved to men; and, if so, whether this is in accordance with the agreement reached on the National Whitley Council providing for the recruitment of women to the executive grade?
  Mr. GUINNESS: In view of the number of redundant clerks on the scale of the training grade of the executive class, it will be obvious that recruitment to the class by open competition must, for the present, remain suspended. It is not, however, the case that all future vacancies in the grade are to be reserved to men, and I am not aware of anything in the existing arrangements which conflicts with the agreement reached on the National Whitley Council.

  LOANS TO FARMERS.
  Captain BOWYERasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury how many applications for loans from farmers are now being considered by the Public Works Loan Board; what is the average delay between the receipt of application and the decision to lend; how many such applications have been agreed to and turned down, respectively; and what is the average charge per 100 lent to the farmers?
  Mr. GUINNESS: 864 applications have been granted and 25 refused in the 18 months since the scheme started. Fresh applications are received at the rate of about 24 a month. No avoidable delay occurs on the part of the Public Works Loan Board in dealing with applications, and the time taken in any particular case naturally depends partly on the promptitude with which the Board's inquiries are answered The fees charged by the Board are in accordance with a scale which I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT. No charge is made for the necessary valuations of property which have to be made.
  Following is the scale:
  SCALE OF FEES CHARGED BY THE PUBLIC WORKS LOAN COMMISSIONERS IN RESPECT OF LOANS SECURED ON PROPERTY IN ENGLAND AND WALES.
  The fees or sums to be paid by the applicants in respect of loans shall not exceed the following sums, namely:

  243

  For the first £1,000, 20s. for every £100 of such loan.

  For the second £1,000, 15s. for every £100 of such loan.

  For the third and fourth £1,000, 10s. for every £100 of such loan.

  For the fifth to the tenth £1,000, 5s. for every £100 of such loan.

  For each subsequent £1,000 up to £100,000, 2s. 6d. for every £100 of such loan.

  Loans exceeding £100,000 to be charged as £100,000.

  Where a loan is advanced by instalments secured by one deed, there shall be paid in respect of each advance after the first, an additional fee of £1 if the amount of the advance does not exceed £100, and an additional fee of £2 if the amount of the advance exceeds £100.
  The total amount to be advanced under one security deed shall be considered as a loan; and fractional parts of £100 shall be considered as £100.
  In addition to the above fees, the applicants shall pay the Stamp Duty, counsel's fees (if any), and other disbursements incurred by the Loan Commissioners in respect of the several applications.

  ROYAL AIDES-DE-CAMP AND EQUERRIES (PAY).
  Mr. STEPHENasked the Secretary of State for War why there was an increase of £1,020 in the provision of pay and allowances of aides-de-camp and equerries to the King, Prince of Wales, and Prince Henry as compared with the expenditure of 1924–25?
  Sir L. WORTHINGTON - EVANS: It has been necessary to provide an additional equerry for the Prince of Wales and an equerry for Prince Henry on account of the increasing public duties which are undertaken by their Royal Highnesses.

  SCOTLAND.

    COMMON GRAZINGS.
    Brigadier - General CHARTERISasked the Secretary for Scotland whether his attention has been directed to the
    244
    unsatisfactory situation regarding the regulation of common grazings in Scotland, in that the Land Court under existing statutory provisions is unable to enforce compliance with its regulations; whether he proposes to take action to entrust the Land Court with the duty of prosecution and the power to punish breaches of the regulations or, alternatively, to empower the Land Court to find as to the facts and confine the duty of the procurator fiscal to moving for sentence?
    The SECRETARY for SCOTLAND (Sir John Gilmour): I am considering the question whether any further measures are necessary and practicable for facilitating the enforcement of the Common Grazings Regulations referred to.

    SEED-OATS AND POTATOES.
    Major Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIRasked the Secretary for Scotland how much money was received last, year from smallholders for the purchase of seed-oats and potatoes under the scheme of the Board of Agriculture for Scotland; how much was received from voluntary subscriptions; and how much of the £100,000 voted by Parliament for this scheme has been expended?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: The total sum received from smallholders for seed oats and potatoes supplied in 1924 under the scheme of the Board of Agriculture is £41,785. The total sum received from voluntary subscriptions is £6,374 and the gross expenditure from monies provided by Parliament is £103,786. The nett charge on public funds when outstanding accounts are settled will, it is estimated, be approximately £55,000.
    Sir A. SINCLAIR: Will the right hon. Gentleman say on what objects connected with agriculture he proposes to spend the balance of the money available?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: The balance has been specially earmarked for one purpose, and it cannot be expended for any other purpose.

    FISHERMEN'S GEAR (LOANS).
    Major Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIRasked the Secretary for Scotland how much of the money voted by Parliament last year to grant loans to fishermen, in order to enable them to replace their lost and damaged gear, has now been

    245
    expended; and whether it is proposed to devote the balance to other objects for the benefit of the fishing industry?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: The amount of the loans so far sanctioned under the Net Loans Scheme is £5,086, of which amount £2,793 has actually been paid. The sum included in the Fishery Board's Vote was provided for the specific purpose of making loans for the purchase of drift nets and the unexpended balance is not available for other purposes.
    Sir A. SINCLAIR: Is this money not available for purposes connected with the fishing industry? Was it not designed for that purpose? I would like to know if it is going to be used for the purpose for which it was voted by the last Parliament?
    Mr. BOOTHBY: In view of the fact that the recent loan has been quite ineffective for this purpose, will the right hon. Gentleman consider the advisability of issuing a new loan for this purpose?
    Commander WILLIAMS: If Scotland has an excess of money for this purpose, will the right hon. Gentleman consider the advisability of devoting some of it to the English fishing industry?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: This is a case in which there is a certain sum of money voted for one purpose, and it cannot be allocated to any other purpose. It must revert to the Treasury if not used.
    Mr. LIVINGSTONE: In view of the figures which have been given by the Minister, may I ask if he is aware that this scheme has been a great failure and has not fulfilled the purposes intended, and is he aware that the fishermen are in great want and must have some assistance?
    Mr. MAXTON: Before the Secretary for Scotland replies, I would like him to make it quite plain that this money was voted last year by Parliament for the specific purpose of providing drift nets and not for general distress purposes amongst the fishermen?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: This money was voted by Parliament for the purpose of loans to fishermen to enable them to procure nets under certain circumstances, and it has been so used.
    Mr. MAXTON: And other equipment.

    SMALL HARBOURS COMMITTEE.
    Sir A. SINCLAIRasked the Secretary for Scotland whether the Small Harbours Committee referred to on page 129 of the Report on Sea Fisheries for the years 1919 to 1923, issued by the Ministry of Agriculture, is still in existence; if he will state when this Committee last met; and if any Report on its work is available to Members of this House?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: The Committee referred to, which was an informal standing conference of officials, is no longer in existence. Its last meeting was on the 8th December, 1920. No report of the work of the Committee has been published. The purpose of the Committee was to prevent overlapping between Departments in dealing with applications from small harbours for financial assistance.
    Sir A. SINCLAIR: Is it not time that this Committee should be called together again in view of the serious state of dilapidation into which many of these small harbours have fallen?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: I see no immediate cause for calling the Committee together.

    OLD AGE PENSIONER (FINE).
    Dr. DRUMMOND SHIELSasked the Secretary for Scotland if he is aware that an old woman, an old age pensioner, aged 75, was last week fined £3, with the option of 14 days' imprisonment, at Edinburgh Sheriff Court for failing to disclose an income of 26s. per month; and will he consider the case with a view to a revision of the sentence?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: I am making inquiry into this case and shall communicate with the hon. Member as soon as possible.
    Captain BENN: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider whether it is not possible to restore the pension to this old woman who has no one to support her?
    Captain GARRO-JONES: Will the Secretary for Scotland give instructions in cases of this kind that no prosecution shall be undertaken when the case can be otherwise settled?
    Dr. SHIELS: In view of this and other similar cases will the right hon. Gentleman try to persuade the Chancellor of

    247
    the Exchequer to follow up the good work of the Labour Government and abolish the means limit altogether?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: I have already stated that I am making the fullest inquiry into this case, and I can give no expression of opinion until I have the facts before me.

    SMALLHOLDERS (ORKNEY AND SHETLAND).
    Sir ROBERT HAMILTONasked the Secretary for Scotland the number of smallholders in Orkney and Shetland who have purchased their holdings during the years 1920–24, inclusive, whose holdings have been resumed under orders of the Land Court during those years, and who are through estate sales at the present time in danger of losing their holdings by resumption, respectively?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: I am not in a position to furnish the information asked for in the first and third parts of the question. Nineteen holdings in Orkney and 18 holdings in Shetland have been resumed under orders of the Land Court during the years 1920 to 1924, inclusive.
    Sir R. HAMILTON: Will the right hon. Gentleman get the information which I have asked for?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: I am not aware of any source from which I can get the information.

    GRETNA MUNITION FACTORY (FATAL ACCIDENT).
    Mr. MAXTONasked the Secretary for Scotland if his attention has been called to the fatal accident at Gretna munition factory to a young man, Reginald Purcell, employed there by Messrs. Jackson and Company, the contractors, dismantling the machinery; if a fatal accidents inquiry will be held; and if he will institute special inquiries as to how this work is being carried out?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: My attention had not previously been drawn to this case. A public inquiry under the Fatal Accidents Inquiry (Scotland) Act, 1895, will be held at Dumfries on 9th April. In these circumstances I do not think that a special inquiry such as the hon. Member suggests is necessary, even if it were within my province to order one.
    Mr. MAXTON: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this firm got the contract on very favourable terms such as would enable them to make provision for the safety of the workers engaged on the work, and will he make some inquiry in order to see whether this contract in connection with Government property is being put through with reasonable safeguards for the lives of the men?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: I think the whole of the facts will come out in the inquiry which is to be held.

    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL.
    Mr. LIVINGSTONEasked the Lord Advocate whether his attention has been drawn to a speech delivered in Glasgow, on 14th March, by the Lord Justice Clerk in which approval was expressed of a proposal to create a Court of Criminal Appeal for Scotland, and in which the present provision for the revision of criminal sentences in Scotland was declared to be unsatisfactory; whether His Majesty's Government propose to introduce legislation on the subject; and, if so, at what date such legislation may be expected?
    Sir J. GILMOUR: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second and third parts, I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave on the 17th February in reply to a question by the hon. Member for Govan.

  ITALY AND GERMANY (REPARATION COAL).
  Mr. LOUGHERasked the Secretary for Mines whether he has any official information showing that the German Government has recently concluded an agreement with the Italian Government under which a quantity of German coal will be supplied to the Italian State Railways over a period of years; if so, if he will say whether such an arrangement involves reparation coals; and whether data are available giving the quantity which will be sold upon a commercial basis?
  The SECRETARY for MINES (Colonel Lane-Fox): Yes, Sir. The agreement is made under the procedure contemplated

  249
  by the London Protocol of August, 1924, in accordance with which reparation deliveries may be made on commercial conditions. Under this procedure, if the agreement is approved by the Reparation Commission and Transfer Committee, who, I understand, have not yet considered it, the deliveries will be charged against Italy's current share in the Dawes Annuity. The whole of the deliveries provided for in the agreement, namely, a minimum quantity of 170,000 tons per month, are to be made on a commercial basis.
  Mr. BATEY: Will the Secretary for Mines state whether this agreement is in addition to the 8,500,000 tons or reparation coal which we have received from Germany?
  Colonel LANE-FOX: I think I must have notice of that question.
  Mr. BATEY: But that is the question.
  Mr. J. JONES: Before the right hon. Gentleman replies, may I ask him if he realises that the effect of the commercial terms about which he talks mean longer hours and lower wages for the German miner, where he can cut the ground from underneath the feet of the British miner, and you have agreed to it?
  Mr. CONNOLLY: Is it not a fact that the London Protocol modifies Section 9 of the Peace Treaty and the amount of the reparations and can he say what amount of reparation coal is being supplied to Italy at the present time?
  Colonel LANE-FOX: Obviously I ought to have notice of that question.

  COAL PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION, FRANCE.
  Mr. LOUGHERasked the Secretary for Mines whether he will furnish statistics showing the coal production of France for 1913 and 1924, respectively, and the consumption of coal in France and the imports of foreign coal into that country for the same period; and whether his Department has considered any measures and can make any recommendations to assist coalowners and coal exporters in meeting the competition which is being directed against the coal export trade of this country?
  Colonel LANE-FOX: The quantity of coal consumed in France in 1913 was approximately 70½ million (metric) tons, of which 43 million tons were raised at French mines and 26 million tons were imported. In 1924, the corresponding figures were 74 million tons, 44 million tons and 30 million tons. These figures cover Alsace-Lorraine and include the coal equivalent of coke and patent fuel. The point raised in the last part of my hon. Friend's question falls within the scope of the extensive inquiry now being carried on by the Committee on Industry and Trade.

  COAL INDUSTRY.

    SAFETY MEASURES.
    Sir F. HALLasked the Secretary for Mines whether his attention has been called to the statement recently made by Mr. A. J. Cook, the secretary of the Miners' Association, to the effect that the services of colliery managers and officials have been dispensed with by coalowners for advocating the adoption of safety measures in the pits for which they were responsible; and if he has had any reports from the inspectors of mines on this subject?
    Colonel LANE-FOX: No, Sir; I have not seen the statement referred to; nor have I had any reports from the inspectors on this subject.
    Sir F. HALL: Can the Secretary for Mines say whether there is any truth in the statement referred to in the first part of my question?
    Mr. T. WILLIAMS: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in any case where the services of a manager are dispensed with for the purpose mentioned in the question, and he reported the matter to an inspector, that would condemn him for ever from obtaining another post?
    Colonel LANE-FOX: In reply to the second question, I should certainly say no. In reply to the first question, I can only repeat that I have had no such cases reported to me by the inspector.
    Sir F. HALL: If I send the Secretary for Mines a statement to that effect, and he finds any truth in it, will he take the necessary action against those responsible for making such a statement?
    Colonel LANE-FOX: I shall be glad to inquire into any case which the hon. and gallant Member may send to me.
    Mr. MORGAN JONES: Is it not desirable in the public interests that these officials should be taken into the employment of the State rather than remain in private employment?
    Mr. SPEAKER: That does not arise here.

    MINING EXPERIMENTS.
    Sir W. SUGDENasked the Secretary for Mines if he is considering, with a view to further application elsewhere, the arrangements arrived at by two groups of employers and employés to experiment upon certain mines of difficult commercial yield and capacity; and if, with full protection to the rights of trade unions and masters' federations, he is prepared to give facilities elsewhere should he be fully satisfied?
    Colonel LANE-FOX: Local agreements of the sort, which I assume that my hon. Friend has in mind, are matters for settlement between the employers and the workmen, and are not dependent, as he appears to suppose, on any special facilities granted by me. Nor is it for me to initiate such experiments.
    Sir W. SUGDEN: If these two experiments are successful, will the hon. and gallant Gentleman give facilities for their being tried in other parts of the country where the same difficulties arise?
    Mr. SPEAKER: That is a hypothetical question.

    OUTPUT (UNITED KINGDOM AND AMERICA).
    Mr. WARDLAW-MILNEasked the Secretary for Mines what are the comparative figures in 1913 and 1924 respectively, of the output of coal per man employed in the United Kingdom and the United States; and to what extent the difference can be attributed to the working of thick or surface seams in the United States?
    Colonel LANE-FOX: The output of coal in this country was 264 tons per worker in 1913, and about 224 tons in 1924. In the bituminous coal mines of the United States of America the corresponding figures were 747 tons in 1913, and 717 tons in 1923, the latest year for which particulars are available. The greater
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    average thickness of the American seams and their lesser average depth undoubtedly play a very large part in the explanation of this difference, but I have no means of estimating its importance in figures.

  TRANSPORT.

    EXCURSION TRAINS (ACCOMMODATION).
    Mr. GROVESasked the Minister of Transport whether he is aware of the usual discomfort of passengers travelling by excursion trains resulting from the lack of seating and lavatory accommodation on the various railway services; and will he take steps, by legislation or otherwise, to compel all railway companies in the United Kingdom to provide adequate accommodation for all travellers?
    The MINISTER of TRANSPORT (Colonel Ashley): My information is that railway companies do what they can to provide adequate seating and lavatory accommodation on excursion trains, and I do not contemplate the introduction of legislation on the subject. If the hon. Member will furnish me with particulars of any case he has in mind where he considers that there has been any avoidable remissness in respect of the matters to which he refers, I will bring them to the notice of the railway companies concerned.
    Mr. GROVES: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that weekly excursion trains leave Liverpool Street with no lavatory accommodation and ten people standing up in a compartment?
    Colonel ASHLEY: If the hon. Member will kindly write to me on the subject and give me the facts, I will certainly inquire into them.
    Mr. MACKINDER: Will the right hon Gentleman consider taking an excursion from Liverpool to Bradford some day on the old "Languid and Yawning" railway?

    CYCLES (REAR LAMPS).
    Mr. PENNYasked the Minister of Transport whether his attention has been called to the remarks of Mr. Justice Branson on 13th March at the York Assizes, when a motor cyclist was indicted for manslaughter by running down a

    253
    cyclist from behind; and whether, in view of these accidents, he will consider the desirability of introducing a Bill to make it compulsory for all cyclists to carry red rear-lamps, red reflectors, or some other distinguishing mark which can be readily detected by an overtaking driver?
    Colonel ASHLEY: My attention has not previously been drawn to the remarks of the learned Judge, With regard to the second part of the question, as I have already stated, the regulation, including lighting, of road vehicles will fall within the scope of the contemplated Bill.
    Mr. PENNY: Can the right hon. Gentleman say on what date he intends to introduce this Bill?
    Colonel ASHLEY: I think that must be a matter of surmise.

    INQUIRIES (COST).
    Mr. HERBERT WILLIAMSasked the Minister of Transport the cost to date to the railway companies, both directly and indirectly, through the Railway Clearing House of the preparation of the new railway classification of goods by merchandise trains, and of the inquiry for the purpose of determining the standard nett revenue in accordance with the Railways Act, 1921?
    Colonel ASHLEY: I am not in possession of the information desired by my hon. Friend.

    MOTOR SILENCERS
    Mr. TREVELYANasked the Minister of Transport whether he is aware of the increase of the nuisance caused by the omission to use effective silencers on motor-cars; and whether he can take any steps to modify the nuisance?
    Celonel ASHLEY: I have not received any information which would lead me to accept the suggestion contained in the first part of the question. As regards the second part, I would remind the right hon. Gentleman that, under the regulations contained in the Motor Car (Use and Construction) Orders, 19)4 and 1912, the provision of an effective silencer is required on a motor car. The enforcement of the law is a matter for the police.

    OMNIBUSES.
    Mr. NUTTALLasked the Minister of Transport the number of omnibuses licensed for the carriage of passengers in the County of London, giving the number owned or controlled by the London General Omnibus Company and its associate companies?
    Colonel ASHLEY: The number of motor omnibuses licensed by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis during the twelve months ended 28th February last was 5,474. Of these, 4,269 were in respect of vehicles owned or controlled by the London General Omnibus Company and its associated companies. I have no information, however, regarding the proportion of this figure which relates to vehicles licensed in substitution for vehicles withdrawn from service.
    Mr. WADDINGTONasked the Minister of Transport whether, as the compensation of passengers in the event of accident is compulsory upon all tramway undertakings, he will take steps to have a similar obligation imposed when omnibus licences are issued?
    Colonel ASHLEY: I am not quite sure of the exact point to which my hon. Friend's question refers, as both omnibus proprietors and tramway undertakings are subject to the ordinary liabilities at common law in respect of compensation to passengers in the event of accident. Perhaps he will communicate with me further.
    Mr. B. SMITH: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider whether cab owners, in putting their cabs before the Commissioner of Police, should also take a guarantee of compensation under the Act?
    Colonel ASHLEY: Yes. I think that is a matter for consideration.

    PUBLIC SERVICE VEHICLES (LICENCES).
    Mr. WADDINGTONasked the Minister of Transport whether he is aware that in several industrial areas there is great confusion caused by competition between various omnibus services and tramways; that there are other similar areas where the services are not adequate for the public convenience; and will he consider the setting up of licensing authorities to cover wide areas similar to the joint electricity advisory authori-

    255
    ties, and to have such licensing authorities representative of both local authorities and private undertakings, with a view to a co-ordination of omnibus and tramway services throughout the country?
    Colonel ASHLEY: I have under consideration certain alterations in the law with regard to the licensing of public service vehicles in the contemplated Road Vehicles Bill.
    Mr. PALIN: Would the Minister receive a deputation from the municipalities concerned, seeing that there is approximately £70,000,000 involved in this question?
    Colonel ASHLEY: Of course, I am always ready to receive any representations. Perhaps the hon. Member will communicate with me privately on the matter. Primarily it is a matter for the local bodies.
    Mr. T. WILLIAMS: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that a private inquiry among all the local authorities, with all the essential facts at their disposal, would point to the necessity for a change in many of the decisions he has recently come to in these cases?
    Colonel ASHLEY: That does not arise out of this question.
    Mr. PALIN: Surely the Ministry would welcome information that would enable it to escape such a very serious responsibility?
    Colonel ASHLEY: Yes, and that is why I asked the hon. Member kindly to communicate with me privately.

  EGYPT.
  Mr. SPOOR (by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any information as to the truth or otherwise of the statement in the Press this morning regarding the political crisis that has arisen in Egypt, and whether the Government propose taking any action in the matter?
  The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Ronald McNeill): Official telegrams from Cairo confirm Press reports, and state that
  256
  Ziwar Pasha tendered the resignation of his Government to King Fuad as the Chamber had elected Zaghloul Pasha as President and two Zaghloulists as Vice-Presidents. His Majesty refused to accept the resignation of the Ministry, and dissolved Parliament. The reply to the second part of the question is in the negative.
  Mr. SPOOR: Having regard to the commitments we have in Egypt, and having regard to the undoubted fact that we still have considerable influence in the internal policy of that country, will this House have some opportunity of considering the whole question?
  Mr. McNEILL: The telegrams to which I have referred were only received this morning, and it is rather premature to put a question of that sort.
  Captain BENN: Will the Government take an opportunity of explaining to the House how the negotiations with the Egyptian Government are proceeding, and what the policy of the Government is?
  The PRIME MINISTER: Of course I will consider that.
  Mr. T. WILLIAMS: May I ask what steps the Government are going to take if Ziwar Pasha and his confederates insist upon their resignation being accepted?
  Captain BENN: May I ask the Prime Minister whether he does not consider that the House of Commons is entitled to a statement of the Government's policy?
  The PRIME MINISTER: The House of Commons is always entitled to a statement of Government policy, and in due time, of course, will get it.
  Mr. DUFF COOPER: In view of the fact that we have granted independence to Egypt, is it not now the duty of His Majesty's Government to leave them to settle their own policy in their own way?

NOTICES OF MOTION.
  CONDITION OF WORKING CLASS.
  Mr. WINDSOR: I beg to give notice that, on this day fortnight, I shall call attention to the destitute and impoverished condition of the working class in this country, and move a Resolution.
  BITISH SHIPBUILDING.
  Lord FERMOY: I beg to give notice that, on this day fortnight, I shall call attention to the position of British ship building, and move a Resolution.
  INDUSTRIAL PEACE.
  Lord COLUM CRICHTON-STUART: I beg to give notice that, on this day fort night, I shall call attention to the necessity for confidence between those engaged in industry, and move a Resolution.
  POOR LAW.
  Mr. DENNISON: I beg to give notice that, on this day fortnight, I shall call attention to the question of the abolition of the Poor Law, and move a Resolution.

COAL SUPPLIES.
Mr. BECKETT: I beg to move,
"That leave be given to bring in a Bill to enable municipal authorities to act as retail distributors of coal; and for other purposes incidental thereto."
I bring forward this Bill because at present the supply of coal, more especially to those people who are obliged to buy it in small quantities, is extremely unsatisfactory. I hoped when I put the Bill down that we should be able to treat this as a non-controversial matter. There is nothing in it that brings any pressure or compulsion of any sort upon municipal authorities. The position as I see it is that where retail distributors for any purpose whatever, either through inefficiency or through greed, are failing to supply the public with one of their staple necessities it is the duty of the local authorities to do it, and the local authority should be empowered by the House to do so. The accusations which are being constantly made in the Press of all parties, from many political platforms, from almost every consumer, and especially the small consumer, are of two kinds. They say, first of all, that there is a very remarkable difference between the price which they have to pay for coal when they get it in their homes and the price it costs when it is dug out of the pit. One of the chief comments which, perhaps we on these benches have to make on the present system is that, although goods are produced by low
258
wages by people living at a low standard of living, by the time they reach the consumer they have always risen to a price not justified by the wages and conditions given. People doing that work to-day in Cumberland and Durham, a coalfield which I know slightly, are producing good household coal at from 18s. to 20s. a ton. By the time it gets to London, after the mine owner has received his profit, the collier has received his wages, and the landlord has received his rent, it is under 20s. a ton. It goes at that price on to ships at the seaboard in Durham and Northumberland. It comes to London and it miraculously arrives at something upwards of 55s. or 60s per ton.
We also find, on investigating it more closely, that not only are the prices at which coal is retailed exorbitant, but in addition to that the quality varies very greatly. When the retail distributors are doing in the winter, when they find the demand is great and we have to take whatever they will supply us, we suddenly find that Derby Brights have a good deal more slate and stone in them than they have in the summer or in the time when they are not so busy. Not only are Derby Brights produced at the pit-head for something like 19s. 3d. a ton, but they are actually sold on the London Coal Exchange at from 27s. to 29s. a ton. Between their sale on the London Coal Exchange for 27s. and their delivery to the cellar of the consumer there is an increase up to 51s. a ton. It seems to me, after very careful study of the evidence supplied by the Conference held by the Minister of Mines last year, that we have two great basic charges to bring against the retail distributors of coal. The first is their inefficiency. They have dozens of carts, they are wasting dozen's of men's labour, they have no proper stores to keep supplies of coal in the summer, they have a small ring or group of eight or ten people who put prices up whenever the opportunity occurs, and what with their inefficiency in handling the trade, the lack of competition and the greed of the people engaged in the industry, great cities like London, Birmingham, Newcastle, Huddersfield and others, and especially the poor people of those cities, have to suffer terribly. We want the House to give local authorities the right to say to private enterprise, "If you cannot do

259
your job, if you cannot pay proper wages, give a proper supply, and run your industry efficiently the local authority is going to do it instead." That is what the Bill is intended to do as far as the retail of coal is concerned. May I end with one quotation to give hon. Members some opportunity of seeing the kind of unscrupulous hands that the coal supply of London is in at present. This is taken, not from a Labour journal, but from the London Coal Market Report. It says:
"There is little or nothing to report in the retail section of the market. When, however, the volume of orders has increased to appreciable dimensions a revision of prices for the public will at once come forward."
In other words, in the cold weather when the poor are starving, put up the price and pull down the quality.
Major COLFOX rose—
Mr. SPEAKER: Does the hon. and gallant Gentleman rise to oppose the Bill?
Major COLFOX: Yes, Sir. I oppose the Bill, not because the price of coal is
not very high—most people have suffered from the price of coal—but because I can see no reason for supposing that if this Bill became law the price would be reduced in the least. Nor has the hon. Member given the smallest idea of how the price can be brought down. I oppose the Bill in the interest of the consumers, because the price cannot be brought down by it, and also in the interest of the ratepayers, because if the local authorities are allowed to deal in coal, or any other commodity for that matter, experience teaches us that we may expect them to make a substantial loss in their trading transactions. That loss must be made up from the ratepayers' pockets presumably, and therefore the ratepayers will suffer. Since both the consumer and the ratepayer must seriously suffer if the Bill becomes law, I beg the House to refuse its First Reading.
Question put,
"That leave be given to bring in a Bill to enable municipal authorities to act as retail distributors of coal; and for other purposes incidental thereto."
The House divided: Ayes, 136; Noes, 237.

Division No. 58.]

AYES.

[4.0 p.m.

Adamson, W. M. (Staff., Cannock)

Groves, T.

Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan)

Alexander, A. V. (Sheffield, Hillsbro')

Grundy, T. W.

Pethick-Lawrence, F. W.

Ammon, Charles George

Guest, J. (York, Hemsworth)

Ponsonby, Arthur

Applin, Colonel R. V. K.

Hall, F. (York, W.R., Normanton)

Potts, John S.

Attlee, Clement Richard

Hall, G. H. (Merthyr Tydvil)

Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring)

Baker, J. (Wolverhampton, Bilston)

Hardie, George D.

Riley, Ben

Barker, G. (Monmouth, Abertillery)

Hayes, John Henry

Ritson, J.

Barnes, A.

Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (Burnley)

Roberts, Rt. Hon. F. O.(W. Bromwich)

Barr, J.

Henderson, T. (Glasgow)

Robertson, J. (Lanark, Bothwell)

Batey, Joseph

Hirst, G. H.

Robinson, W. C. (Yorks, W.R., Elland)

Beamish, Captain T. P. H.

Howard, Captain Hon. Donald

Rose, Frank H.

Bellairs, Commander Carlyon W.

Jenkins, W. (Glamorgan, Neath)

Salter, Dr. Alfred

Benn, Captain Wedgwood (Leith)

Johnston, Thomas (Dundee)

Scrymgeour, E.

Broad, F. A.

Jones, J. J. (West Ham, Silvertown)

Sexton, James

Bromley, J.

Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)

Shaw, Rt. Hon. Thomas (Preston)

Brown, James (Ayr and Bute)

Jones, T, I. Mardy (Pontypridd)

Shiels, Dr. Drummond

Buxton, Rt. Hon. Noel

Kelly, W. T.

Short, Alfred (Wednesbury)

Clowes, S.

Kennedy, T.

Sitch, Charles H.

Cluse, W. S.

Kirkwood, D.

Smith, Ben (Bermondsey, Rotherhithe)

Clynes, Rt. Hon. John R.

Lamb, J. Q.

Smith, H. B. Lees (Keighley)

Compton, Joseph

Lansbury, George

Smith, Rennie (Penistone)

Connolly, M.

Lawson, John James

Snell, Harry

Cove, W. G.

Lee, F.

Snowden, Rt. Hon. Philip

Dalton, Hugh

Lunn, William

Spencer, George A. (Broxtowe)

Davies, Evan (Ebbw Vale)

MacDonald, Rt. Hon. J. R. (Aberavon)

Spoor, Rt. Hon. Benjamin Charles

Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)

Mackinder, W.

Sprot, Sir Alexander

Day, Colonel Harry

MacLaren Andrew

Stamford, T. W.

Dennison, R.

March, S.

Stanley, Hon. O. F. G. (Westm'eland)

Edwards, C. (Monmouth, Bedwellty)

Maxton, James

Stephen, Campbell

Garro-Jones, Captain G. M.

Mitchell, E. Rosslyn (Paisley)

Stewart, J. (St. Rollox)

Gibbins, Joseph

Montague, Frederick

Sutton, J. E.

Gillett, George M.

Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C.

Taylor, R. A.

Gosling, Harry

Morrison, R. C. (Tottenham, N.)

Thomas, Rt. Hon. James H. (Derby)

Graham, Rt. Hon- Wm. (Edin., Cent.)

Murnin, H.

Thomson, Trevelyan (Middlesbro, W.)

Greenall, T.

Naylor, T. E.

Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton, E.)

Greenwood, A. (Nelson and Colne)

Oliver, George Harold

Thorne, W. (West Ham, Plalstow)

Grenfell, D. R. (Glamorgan)

Palin, John Henry

Thurtle, E.

Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)

Paling, W.

Tinker, John Joseph

Trevelyan, Rt. Hon. C. P.

Wedgwood, Rt. Hon. Josiah

Wilson, C. H. (Sheffield, Attercliffe)

Varley, Frank B.

Welsh, J C.

Wilson, R. J. (Jarrow)

Viant, S. P.

Westwood, J.

Windsor, Walter

Wallhead, Richard C.

Wheatley, Rt. Hon. J.

Wright, W.

Walsh, Rt. Hon. Stephen

Whiteley, W.

Warne, G. H.

Wignall, James

TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—

Watson, W. M. (Dunfermline)

Williams, David (Swansea, E.)

Mr. Beckett and Mr. J. H.

Watts-Morgan, Lt.-Col. D. (Rhondda)

Williams, Dr. J. H. (Llanelly)

Hudson.

Webb, Rt. Hon. Sidney

Williams, T. (York, Don Valley)

NOES.

Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-Colonel

Fielden, E. B.

MacRobert, Alexander M.

Agg-Gardner, Rt. Hon. Sir James T.

Forestier-Walker, L.

Maitland, Sir Arthur D. Steel-

Alexander, E. E. (Leyton)

Forrest, W.

Makins, Brigadier-General E.

Alexander, Sir Wm. (Glasgow, Cent'l)

Fraser, Captain Ian

Malone, Major P. B.

Allen, J. Sandeman (L'pool, W. Derby)

Frece, Sir Walter de

Manningham-Buller, Sir Mervyn

Allen, Lieut.-Col. Sir William James

Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E.

Margesson, Captain D.

Ashley, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Wilfrid W.

Gadie, Lieut.-Col. Anthony

Marriott, Sir J. A. R.

Ashmead-Bartlett, E.

Ganzoni, Sir John

Meller, R. J.

Astor, Maj. Hn. John J. (Kent, Dover)

Gates, Percy

Meyer, Sir Frank

Balfour, George (Hampstead)

Gault Lieut.-Col. Andrew Hamilton

Milne, J. S. Wardlaw-

Balniel, Lord

Gee, Captain R.

Mitchell, S. (Lanark, Lanark)

Barclay-Harvey, C. M.

Goff, Sir Park

Mitchell, Sir W. Lane (Streatham)

Beckett, Sir Gervase (Leeds, N.)

Gower, Sir Robert

Morrison-Bell, Sir Arthur Clive

Benn, Sir A. S. (Plymouth, Drake)

Grace, John

Murchison, C. K.

Bennett, A. J.

Grant, J. A.

Nail, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Joseph

Berry, Sir George

Greene, W. P. Crawford

Nelson, Sir Frank

Blades, Sir George Rowland

Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Sir H.(W'th's'w, E)

Neville, R. J.

Blundell, F. N.

Gretton, Colonel John

Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield)

Bourne, Captain Robert Croft

Gunston, Captain D. W.

Nuttall, Ellis

Bowyer, Captain G. E. W.

Hall, Lieut.-Col. Sir F. (Dulwich)

O'Connor, T. J. (Bedford, Luton)

Boyd-Carpenter, Major A.

Hall, Capt. W. D'A. (Brecon & Rad.)

O'Neill, Major Rt. Hon. Hugh

Brass, Captain W.

Hammersley, S. S.

Oman, Sir Charles William C.

Brassey, Sir Leonard

Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry

Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William

Briggs, J. Harold

Harland, A.

Owen, Major G.

Briscoe, Richard George

Harrison, G. J. C.

Penny, Frederick George

Brittain, Sir Harry

Hartington, Marquess of

Perkins, Colonel E. K.

Brocklebank, C. E. R.

Harvey, Major S. E. (Devon, Totnes)

Peto, G. (Somerset, Frome)

Brooke, Brigadier-General C. R. I.

Haslam, Henry C.

Pilcher, G.

Brown, Brig.-Gen. H. C. (Berks, Newb'y)

Hawke, John Anthony

Pilditch, Sir Philip

Buckingham, Sir H.

Headlam, Lieut.-Colonel C. M.

Power, Sir John Cecil

Bull, Rt. Hon. Sir William James

Henderson, Capt. R. R.(Oxf'd, Henley)

Pownall, Lieut.-Colonel Assheton

Bullock, Captain M.

Henderson, Lieut.-Col. V. L. (Bootle)

Price, Major C. W. M.

Burman, J. B.

Heneage, Lieut.-Col. Arthur P.

Raine, W.

Burton, Colonel H. W.

Henn, Sir Sydney H.

Ramsden, E.

Butt, Sir Alfred

Henniker-Hughan, Vice-Adm. Sir A.

Rawlinson, Rt. Hon. John Fredk. Peel

Cadogan, Major Hon. Edward

Herbert, S. (York, N.R., Scar. & Wh'by)

Rawson, Alfred Cooper

Caine, Gordon Hall

Hogg, Rt. Hon. Sir D. (St. Marylebone)

Reid, Captain A. S. C. (Warrington)

Campbell, E. T.

Holbrook, Sir Arthur Richard

Remer, J. R.

Cautley, Sir Henry S.

Holland, Sir Arthur

Remnant, Sir James

Cazalet, Captain Victor A.

Holt, Captain H. P.

Rice, Sir Frederick

Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord H. (Ox. Univ.)

Homan, C. W. J.

Richardson, Sir P. W. (Sur'y, Ch'ts'y)

Charteris, Brigadier-General J.

Hope, Capt. A. O. J. (Warw'k, Nun.)

Roberts, E. H. G. (Flint)

Christle, J. A.

Hopkins, J. W. W.

Roberts, Samuel (Hereford, Hereford)

Cobb, Sir Cyril

Hopkinson, A. (Lancaster, Mossley)

Robinson, Sir T. (Lancs., Stretford)

Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D.

Horlick, Lieut.-Colonel J. N.

Ropner, Major L.

Cooper, A. Duff

Hudson, Capt. A. U. M.(Hackney, N.)

Ruggles-Brise, Major E. A.

Couper, J. B.

Hudson, R. S. (Cumb'l'nd, Whiteh'n)

Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth)

Courtauld, Major J. S.

Huntingfield, Lord

Salmon, Major I.

Courthope, Lieut.-Col. George L.

Hurst, Gerald B.

Samuel, A. M. (Surrey, Farnham)

Craig, Ernest (Chester, Crewe)

Hutchison, G. A. Clark (Midl'n & P'bl's)

Sandeman, A. Stewart

Craik, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry

Jackson, Sir H. (Wandsworth, Cen'l)

Sanders, Sir Robert A.

Crookshank, Col. C. de W. (Berwick)

James, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. Cuthbert

Sanderson, Sir Frank

Crookshank, Cpt. H. (Lindsey, Gainsbro)

Jones, G. W. H. (Stoke Newington)

Sandon, Lord

Davies, A. V. (Lancaster, Royton)

Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth)

Savery, S. S.

Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)

Kennedy, A. R. (Preston).

Shaw, Lt.-Col. A. D. Mc. (Renfrew, W)

Davies, Sir Thomas (Cirencester)

Kindersley, Major Guy M.

Shepperson, E. W.

Davison, Sir W. H. (Kensington, S.)

King, Captain Henry Douglas

Simms, Dr. John M. (Co. Down)

Dawson, Sir Philip

Kinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement

Sinclair, Col. T. (Queen's Univ., Belfst.)

Drewe, C.

Knox, Sir Alfred

Skelton, A. N.

Eden, Captain Anthony

Locker-Lampson, G. (Wood Green)

Slaney, Major P. Kenyon

Edmondson, Major A. J.

Loder, J. de V.

Smith, R. W. (Aberd'n & Kinc'dine, C.)

Ellis, R. G.

Looker, Herbert William

Smith-Carington, Neville W.

Elveden, Viscount

Lord, Walter Greaves-

Smithers, Waldron

England, Colonel A.

Lougher, L.

Stanley, Col. Hon. G. F. (Will'sden, E.)

Erskine, Lord (Somerset, Weston-s.-M.)

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh Vere

Steel, Major Samuel Strang

Erskine, James Malcolm Monteith

Luce, Major-Gen, Sir Richard Harman

Stott, Lieut.-Colonel W. H.

Evans, Captain A. (Cardiff, South)

Lumley, L. R.

Stuart, Crichton-, Lord C.

Fairfax, Captain J. G.

Macdonald, R. (Glasgow, Cathcart)

Stuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)

Falle, Sir Bertram G.

McDonnell, Colonel Hon. Angus

Sugden, Sir Wilfrid

Fanshawe, Commander G. D.

MacIntyre, Ian

Tasker, Major R. Inigo

Fermoy, Lord

McNeill, Rt. Hon. Ronald John

Thompson, Luke (Sunderland)

262

263

Thomson, Sir W. Mitchell- (Croydon, S.)

Watson, Sir F. (Pudsey and Otley)

Windsor-Clive, Lieut.-Colonel George

Tinne, J. A.

Watts, Dr. T.

Wise, Sir Fredric

Turton, Edmund Russborough

Wells, S. R.

Womersley, W. J.

Vaughan-Morgan, Col. K. P.

Wheler, Major Granville C. H.

Wood, E. (Chest'r, Stalyb'ge & Hyde)

Waddington, R.

Williams, A. M. (Cornwall, Northern)

Wood, Sir S. Hill. (High Peak)

Ward, Lt.-Col. A. L.(Kingston-on-Hull)

Williams, C. P. (Denbigh, Wrexham)

Yerburgh, Major Robert D. T.

Warner, Brigadier-General W. W.

Williams, Herbert G. (Reading)

Warrender, Sir Victor

Wilson, Sir C. H. (Leeds, Central)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—

Waterhouse, Captain Charles

Wilson. R. R. (Stafford, Lichfield)

Major Colfox and Commander

Williams.

Bill read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House, for Thursday.

BUSINSS OF THE HOUSE.
Ordered,
"That the Proceedings on the Second Reading of the Consolidated Fund (No. 1) Bill have precedence during this day's Sitting."—[Commander Eyres Monsell.]

GUARDIANSHIP OF INFANTS BILL.
Reported, with Amendments, from Standing Committee A.
Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
Minutes of the Proceedings of the Standing Committee to be printed.
Bill, as amended (in the Standing Committee), to be taken into consideration upon Thursday, and to be printed. [Bill 122.]

MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS.
That they have agreed to—
Borough Councillors (Alteration of Number) Bill, with an Amendment.

CRIMINAL LAW BILL,
"to amend the Criminal Law (including the Law relating to the administration of criminal justice and to the prevention of crime); and for kindred purposes," presented by Mr. RHYS DAVIES; supported by Mr. Morgan Jones and Mr. Cecil Wilson; to be read a Second time upon Tuesday, 7th April, and to be printed. [Bill 123.]
EMPLOYMENT OF BRITISH SEAMEN BILL.
Order for Second Reading upon Thursday read, and discharged; Bill withdrawn.

SELECTION (UNOPPOSED BILL COMMITTEES (PANEL)).
Mr. WILLIAM NICHOLSON reported from the Committee of Selection; That they
264
had discharged the following Member from the Panel appointed to serve on Unopposed Bill Committees: Mr. Hayes; and had appointed in substitution Mr. Robert Richardson.
Report to lie upon the Table.

SELECTION (STANDING COMMITTEES).
  STANDING COMMITTEE A.
  Mr. WILLIAM NICHOLSON reported from the Committee of Selection; That they had added the following Ten Members to Standing Committee A (in respect of the Former Enemy Aliens (Disabilities Removal) Bill): Mr. Allen, Mr. Batey, Mr. Bennett, Sir Burton Chadwick, Major Crawfurd, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Mr. Duncan, Sir Sydney Henn. Captain Arthur Hope, and Major Alan McLean.

  STANDING COMMITTEE C.
  Mr. WILLIAM NICHOLSON further reported from the Committee; That they had added the following Eleven Members to Standing Committee C (in respect of the Fire Brigade Pensions Bill and the Statutory Gas Companies (Electricity Supply Powers) Bill): Sir Burton Chadwick, Mr. Clarry, Sir Henry Cowan, Lieut.-Colonel Vivian Henderson, Mr. Haydn Jones, Mr. Godfrey Locker-Lampson, Mr. Laugher, Mr. Paling, Captain Alexander Reid, Sir James Remnant, and Lieut.-Colonel Watts-Morgan.
  Mr. WILLIAM NICHOLSON further reported from the Committee That they had added the following Member to Standing Committee C: Sir William Joynson-Hicks.

  SCOTTISH STANDING COMMITTEE.
  Mr. WILLIAM NICHOLSON further reported from the Committee; That they had discharged the following Members from the Standing Committee on Scottish Bills (added in respect of the Poor Law Emergency Provisions Continuance (Scotland) Bill and the Public Health (Scot-

  265
  land) Amendment Bid): Captain Howard and Captain Wallace; and had appointed in substitution: Colonel Sinclair and Sir Victor Warrender.
  Reports to lie upon the Table.

  LEEDS CORPORATION BILL.
  Reported, with Amendments [Title amended]; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

  CONSOLIDATION BILLS.
  Report from the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills, in respect of the Law of Property (Consolidation) Bill [Lords], the Settled Land (Consolidation) Bill [Lords], the Trustee (Consolidation) Bill [Lords], the Administration of Estates (Consolidation) Bill [Lords], the Land Registration (Consolidation) Bill [Lords], and the Land Charges (Consolidation) Bill [Lords] (pending in the Lords), brought up and read.
  Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 68.]

  CONSOLIDATION BILLS (UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGE ESTATES BILL [Lords]).
  Report from the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills, in respect of the Universities and College Estates Bill [Lords] (pending in the Lords), brought up, and read.
  Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 69.]

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 1) BILL.
  Order for Second Reading read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

  GENEVA PROTOCOL.
  Mr. ARTHUR HENDERSON: Having taken part in the framing of the Protocol, and therefore being one of its authors, I willingly accept the responsibility of saying something in its defence in this Debate. The House is aware that the Protocol owes its origin to the action taken by the French and British delegations, headed by their respective Prime Minister, at the fifth Assembly of the League of Nations. For me to pretend that I am not seriously disappointed and perturbed at the course which events have taken with regard to the Protocol would be sheer affectation. Those of us who took part in the work at Geneva, work that was done in the interests of world peace, were entitled to expect that that work would have been considered of sufficient importance to receive the impartial and dispassionate consideration of Parliament in an untroubled and unprejudiced atmosphere. But what is the position at the moment? Is it not true to say that a situation has been created which renders discussion of the Protocol as a question of high politics—and not only of high politics, but also as a question affecting the destinies of generations yet unborn—practically impossible? Has not the Protocol been seriously damaged, if not destroyed? Take the pronouncement against the Protocol by the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary, whom we are all pleased to see back in his place, in the name of the Government at the Council of the League. Before Parliament was given the opportunity of considering the matter, the blow which aimed at killing the Protocol was delivered at Geneva.
  The Government, in my opinion, have taken a very serious step indeed in declaring against the policy embodied in the Protocol and by encouraging a return to
  292
  the discredited and dangerous policy of separate and limited alliances and undertakings. That is what the proposal which has emanated from the Government in favour of special arrangements in order to meet special needs really amounts to. No other construction can be placed upon the speech delivered by the right hon. Gentleman at the Council of the League, coupled with the latest proposal of the five-power pact made by the German Government. The situation, as it seems to me, has been rendered much more difficult and confused by the uninformed criticism, and even the misrepresentation, so freely indulged in against the Protocol during the past few months.
  Having said this, I feel hound to confess that the actual position of the Protocol at this moment is very difficult to visualise. Has the cremation taken place? Are the ashes awaiting burial, have the last rites been performed, and are the speeches to be delivered in this Debate anything more than funeral orations? I confess that I do not know. Perhaps the Foreign Secretary will be good enough to inform the House exactly where the Protocol stands. I notice that the Press, in the interview with the right hon. Gentleman on his return from Geneva, have attributed to him, in his interview with the French Prime Minister, the statement that they:
  "shod a few tears over the tomb of the Protocol."
  I hope that the right hon. Gentleman has been misreported. If he has been correctly reported, then I must say that I refuse to subscribe to the view that the principles set out in the twenty-one Articles of the Protocol are dead and done with. I do not make this statement because I am interested in the authorship of the Protocol. I make the statement because I remember with great satisfaction that the representatives of no fewer than 47 nations decided, with striking unanimity, to recommend the Protocol to their respective Governments and peoples. They did so because they realised that experience had revealed gaps and limitations in the Covenant which, in the opinion of the authors of the Protocol, could very well be dispensed with. They did so, also, because they felt that if war was to be averted, sanity and reason must be substituted for brute force by the more general applica-

  293
  tion of the principles of arbitration, security, and disarmament.
  What, may I ask, is the purpose of the Protocol? The purpose is defined in the closing words of the Resolution proposed by the then British Prime Minister, and seconded by the French Prime Minister. The words are:
  "It is to settle by pacific means all disputes which may arise between States."
  The Protocol, therefore, embodies a system of arbitration which no international dispute, whether juridical or political, can escape. It lays down as a foundation condition of international intercourse that all disputes shall be settled by pacific methods. It defines and prescribes the sanctions which may be applied against any State which fails to observe its obligations. It cites the criteria for deciding which is a covenant-breaking State. The Protocol recognises the fact that as there can be no disarmament without security and arbitration, so there can be no security or arbitration without disarmament. History demonstrates that armaments of themselves do not prevent war; on the contrary, they enormously increase the danger of war. When the mad race and competition in armaments creates an atmosphere of suspicion, jealousy and antagonism, war at last becomes inevitable.
  Whatever may be the faults or deficiencies of the Protocol, and however much Members of this House may consider that the Protocol requires revision, its authors can claim that it does recognise, however much may be said to the contrary, that the first essential is to get rid of war as an instrument of policy. When we took the course we did we realised that militarist mentality has dominated the minds of the people of the respective nations so long that it would not be an easy task to transfer the spirit that has operated in the minds of the nations, nor would it be easy to unbuild the powerful military machines of the world. To do that successfully, we must, at least, provide satisfactory means whereby international disputes of every kind and description can be peaceably dealt with and, if possible, settled.
  Arbitration, obligatory and universal, in our judgment was the only alternative method to the appeal to force. True, that represents a departure from the old
  294
  atmosphere of hatred and suspicion. The right hon. Gentleman said at Geneva:
  "Brute force is what the nations fear, and only brute force can give security."
  To deliver the nations from that false, dangerous and discredited doctrine is the aim of the Protocol. May I remind the House that the application of the principle of obligatory arbitration is no strange and novel idea. It is already embodied in the Covenant of the League, to be applied in certain international disputes. Under the Covenant, members of the League of Nations are already pledged to submit every dispute not settled by negotiation, either to the Permanent Court of International Justice for arbitration, or to be mediated upon by the Council of the League. Under the Protocol, if there is failure to make a friendly arrangement in any dispute, provision is made for arriving at a final solution in the form of a decree of the Permanent Court of International Justice, an arbitral award, or a unanimous decision of the Council of the League. To one or other of these solutions the parties, under the terms of the Protocol, are pledged to submit.
  The great object of the Protocol is the prohibition of aggressive war, which it seeks to achieve in this way, regarding aggressive war as an international crime. The Protocol provides the means whereby the risk of international conflict may be greatly diminished as a result of the settlement of international disputes by legal, peaceable and constitutional means. Surely, it follows that if more comprehensive and, as I think, more effective machinery for dealing with disputes is provided, so, naturally, we expect the disputes to be less dangerous and not more dangerous. Yet in spite of this provision for the fuller application of the principle of arbitration, it has been objected to the Protocol that it actually increases the danger of war. That I cannot admit for I want to make it absolutely clear that the Protocol creates no new obligation in this respect. What the Protocol does, is to provide the nations with the very means which we hoped all peace-loving nations would naturally use to the full in order to avoid war. It was not a theoretical admiration for the principle of arbitration which animated the framers of the Protocol, but

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  the practical and urgent need of seeking to organise the world for peace.
  It may be objected, and with a measure of truth, that in seeking to make the application of the principle of arbitration universal, the Fifth Assembly travelled much beyond the point to which many of the nations are prepared to go at the present moment. It may also be urged that the application of the principle should be more gradual. This course has been suggested if only that the nations may be educated and taught to think and move in that direction. Whatever may be said for adopting the method of a more gradual approach to universal arbitration, I cannot agree with the words used at Geneva by the Foreign Secretary that the objections to universal and compulsory arbitration might easily outweigh what he described as its theoretical advantages. I am certainly not convinced that any policy embodied in the proposed special arrangement in order to meet special needs, which he has suggested, or the five-Power Pact, is one that will accustom the nations to think and move more speedily in the direction of universal arbitration, or so effectively, as the Protocol would assist the nations to do.
  It seems to me that the utility of the methods laid down in the Protocol are entirely disregarded in the statement made in the name of the Government at the Council at Geneva. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Protocol fosters the idea that the main business of the League is with war rather than with peace.
  The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Austen Chamberlain): Hear, hear!
  Mr. HENDERSON: The right hon. Gentleman acknowledges that. Of course, if you omit the provisions for arbitration and emphasise those defining the sanctions, you may justify that charge, but you are misrepresenting the purpose of the Protocol. We hoped that if the nations used arbitration there would be no need for sanctions, and we believe that most nations would use arbitration if they accepted the Protocol, just as they have accepted the Covenant. In view of the criticism to which the Protocol has been subjected on this point,
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  I cannot emphasise too strongly the fact that the Protocol is only supplementary to the Covenant. It is not a new and independent instrument. The British Delegation made this position clear at Geneva, especially in their responsibility for accepting the sanctions. May I quote some words which I ventured to use at Geneva?
  "We are remaining within the terms of the Covenant. We are undertaking no new obligation. We do not see how any power which has signed the Covenant, and which intends to carry out honourably the pledges it has given, can hesitate to subscribe to Article 11 of the Protocol. Surely loyal and effective co-operation in support of the Covenant is what may confidently be expected from every member of the League of Nations."
  And I also said:
  "What we wish to proclaim to the world is that we are determined to join hands and assist each other loyally and effectively in punishing the aggressor."
  This, we considered, would be pooled security, whereby the might of nations would become the servant of international justice. Further, apart from arbitration—which is, I admit, the foundation of the Protocol—we make provision for the reduction of armaments. In this connection the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary used words at Geneva which it is difficult for me to understand. He said:
  "Nor is anything of importance accomplished in the cause of peace and disarmament."
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN indicated assent.
  Mr. HENDERSON: The right hon. Gentleman accepts that statement. When he used those words, he must have known that the date of the Disarmament Conference had been definitely fixed. He must have known that disarmament was an integral part of the Protocol scheme. He must have known that, although the Protocol might be signed and even ratified the operation of the Protocol was deliberately and of set purpose suspended until the Disarmament Conference had completed its work and adopted a scheme of disarmament. Thus in the Protocol we linked together machinery for peaceful settlement, pooled security and reduction of armaments. On this point I may observe that the Government in the references which have been made at Geneva to their limited plan are abso-

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  lutely silent. Will the right hon. Gentleman, when he speaks, inform the House how his alternative policy will help forward the idea of disarmament? Do the Government believe in and desire disarmament? The Protocol was an attempt to fulfil our obligations under the Covenant and under Article 5 of the Treaty of Versailles, which places upon us this responsibility of taking measure for the progressive reduction of armaments. Was this "to be obsessed with the idea of war"? Was not this, I would ask, an essential step in organising the world for peace?
  But I go further. It should be noted that the Protocol forbade private war. It is one thing to say, "You must not fight for your own hand." It is quite another thing to say, "You must arbitrate," but the Foreign Secretary does not seem to have appreciated this distinction. His policy is to make special arrangements in order to meet our needs. The policy of the Protocol is to provide a workable scheme for avoiding war in all circumstances. The chief value of the Protocol would be that the nations would give up the appeal to war in their own separate interests. That they would further agree to arbitrate is, as I have shown, an immense step forward in the organising of peace, but the first step which the Protocol endeavoured to secure was the abolition of war and—I want to lay emphasis on this point—the abolition of war as an instrument of jealousy or ambition. This surely was building upon the true foundations of peace.
  I now desire to notice one or two of the criticisms against the Protocol, about which too much has been made during recent weeks. Some critics appear to think that the Fifth Assembly, when they framed the Protocol, had entered upon an entirely new and untrod path. Such, however, is not the case. The Fifth Assembly simply carried to their logical conclusion the aims of the authors of the Covenant. We had for our guidance the years of experience since the establishment of the League of Nations in January, 1920. We used the evidence accumulated by Committees of the League which had discussed the same problem of disarmament and security (luring the preceding years. Practical men well-acquainted with military difficulties had reviewed the problems and we had access
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  to all the evidence available to them. The British Delegation was able also to use the practical experience of the statesmen of other countries. All this, and not merely some theory, led to the framing of the Protocol.
  We were driven to adopt the Protocol because experience during the past four years had demonstrated the limitations and defects of some of the articles of the Covenant. Moreover—and this is very important—a measure of insecurity, real or imagined, had been revealed, causing grave discontent and unrest in several countries, and had threatened Europe—this is important to all of us—with a new competition in armaments. It should also be kept in mind that the League, which was an experiment in 1919, is now securely established, and it is only right that it should be prepared to extend its useful work. The League of Nations, through its Assembly and its Council, be it said to their credit, have with deliberation and determination, endeavoured to secure a stronger guarantee for world peace. Nor is it correct to say, as has been said, that the Protocol was ill-considered, ill-conceived, and hastily constructed. The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was elaborated on the initiative of France and Great Britain. This work was undertaken as the result of inquiries and investigation which continued for years. The Draft Treaty was accepted by France and several other countries, probably because they had realised that no disarmament was possible without a corresponding increase in the sense of security. For various reasons the Draft Treaty was unacceptable to a large number of States, members of the League, including our own country. The main objection was that it placed an emphasis on military assistance according to pre-arranged plan, and fixed the automatic application of partial alliances which were thought by many to be inconsistent with the ideal and the spirit of the League of Nations.
  But the alternative to the Draft Treaty, the Protocol, was consonant with the experience on which this former document was based. For instance, the Draft Treaty combined only two principles, security and disarmament. It omitted to notice the fact that nations complained of injustice, and were without adequate and recognised means for

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  expressing their claims. Thus the Protocol sought to carry matters a step forward by combining the three great principles of arbitration, security, and disarmament. Therefore, arbitration is the new principle, and may be regarded as the very foundation of the structure. This, I may say, has actually been used as an abjection to the entire scheme. It is said, we should not be under the obligation to submit disputes to arbitration. But the Government's own statement at Geneva admits that the British Empire has not only favoured arbitration in theory, but has largely availed itself of arbitration in practice. If this be correct, if this country has found it such a useful instrument, should it not encourage its general application?
  We say to the Government: "Take the next step. Make the promise to accept the principal of universally compulsory arbitration. Surely we have nothing to lose by the submission of our case in any dispute in which we may be involved." The obligations we have already undertaken in the Covenant of the League are fairly definite on this point. But in the opinion of the League itself—this is very important—those obligations require to be strengthened. If the Government will examine the Covenant in the light of experience, they will find the reasons for the proposals made in all the articles of the Protocol. It may be said that nations are not prepared to go so far or so fast, and that the obligations under the Covenant are sufficient for the time being. At any rate, so far as this country is concerned, our reply to such objections is this: that no fewer than 17 nations have already signed this very promise in accepting the Protocol, and the representatives of 47 nations at the Assembly of the League recommended the Protocol to their Governments. As I have said at the beginning, we recommend this scheme to the Government and to the people. Indeed we are prepared to assert that the great majority of the people of Great Britain are willing to support arbitration for the settlement of international disputes, whether that arbitration be in the Protocol or out of it.
  It is difficult for us to understand the view point that the Covenant is sufficient and that we should not seek to improve upon it. Much water has passed under the Bridge since the right hon. Gentle-
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  man the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) accepted the Covenant in 1919. The world has not been standing still since those clays. Many nations desire to develop the potentialities of the Covenant in order that it may be used so as to provide security, and a more equal sense of security to all the nations, large or small, especially those nations which join the League of Nations. But it is actually claimed that the gaps in the Covenant were purposely left open, and its authors may be ready to say that it is still the last word in constructive statesmanship_ But it is right for me to remind them that it is the League of Nations itself which is the best judge of either the success or the limitations of the Covenant they are called upon to work, and, after five years' experience and discussion, the League of Nations Assembly reached the conclusion that the Covenant needs to be supplemented, on the lines of the Protocol, if the purposes of the Covenant itself are to be effectively fulfilled.
  Another objection, and a very important objection, one that has been very much canvassed against the Protocol, is that it would make the British Navy the tool of a non-British body. I believe somebody said it was going to be committed to a non-British body to hawk it round the world. This objection was fully considered during the framing of the Protocol last September. At that time I was able to show that such objections could be met by reservations. I stated that in accepting the obligatory jurisdiction of the International Court, the British Delegation proposed to make a reservation to the effect that disputes arising out of warlike operations undertaken by the British Empire in support of the League shall not be referred to the Permanent Court for settlement. Our aim was to make it clear that we did not desire that the Permanent Court should become a body for controlling military or naval operations. This, as I have already said, was made absolutely plain at Geneva, and I venture to ask the House to bear with me for a moment while I quote a few of the things I ventured on that occasion to say. This is on the question of the right of other people to move our Navy into the different seas of the world:
  " I come now to the questions of the reservations which the British Government

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  will feel themselves obliged to make in accepting the obligatory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court and this new procedure of compulsory arbitration. These observations relate to disputes arising out of warlike operations in which the British Empire may in the future be involved. Let there be no misunderstanding. In the view of the British Government, it is not conceivable that the British Empire should be at war against the Covenant or against the stipulations of this new Protocol. We, therefore, only envisage the case in which we are engaged in warlike operations on behalf of the Covenant, and with the approval of the Council or the Assembly of the League. We are sure that in such a case as this, it would be necessary and desirable in the general interest, as well as in the particular interest, of Great Britain, that the British Fleet should be able to operate with the freedom that may be required to secure the rapid success and termination of the sanctions.
  We propose, therefore, when we accept the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court to make a reservation to the effect that disputes arising out of warlike operations undertaken by the British Empire in support of the League shall not be referred to the Permanent Court for settlement. It will be observed that a similar reservation appears in Article 4 of the project which is laid before the Committee. These reservations do not appear to us in any way to limit the value of what we are doing to-day. No one desires"—
  and this is the important point—
  "that the Permanent Court should become a body for controlling military operations. Its purpose, and the purpose of these new arbitration arrangements we hope to set up, is to prevent war altogether, by securing the peaceful settlement of disputes. We believe, therefore, that in safeguarding the liberty of action of the British Fleet—which, above all things, it is necessary for us to safeguard—we are rot acting contrary to the general interest of the nations of the world."
  I claim that the Protocol clarifies the obligation already existing under the Covenant, but the method and extent of the loyal and effective co-operation remains the prerogative of Parliaments and their Governments. There has been a great amount of misunderstanding on this point. I desire to make it quite clear, that when the British Navy is called into action under this project, and the extent to which the British Navy is going to be used, are both matters solely for the decision of the British Government of the day. The British delegation would not agree to any other position than that any decision regarding the use of National forces must be taken by the
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  Governments of the States concerned. Neither the Permanent Court nor the Council of the League have any control whatsoever over the forces of any particular country.
  There is another objection, about which we have heard a great deal since last September. I refer to what is known as the status quo objection. Here I am prepared to admit there may be a more substantial reason for hesitation. Criticism on this point usually refers to frontiers as defined by treaties, especially the Treaty of Versailles. What is our reply to this very formidable objection? Our reply is—and I want to quote the words of the Covenant, not from the Protocol, but from the Covenant itself:
  "The Covenant expressly recognises, in Article 19, the right of the Assembly of the League of Nations to bring organised public opinion to bear on treaties which have become inapplicable, and international conditions which militate against the peace of the world."
  On this provision of the Covenant, the Fifth Assembly did not go back It, is quite true, it did not go forward, though I admit, personally, I should have liked to have seen it go forward. I reminded the Assembly that Lord Bryce, in his great work on international relations, says:
  "Any guarantee of a strays quo ought to be accompanied by ample provisions for an examination of the existing causes of discontent and their removal."
  If Article 19 of the Covenant is not sufficient, that, surely, must be an argument for the revision of the Protocol and the amendment of the Protocol, which, unfortunately, so far as we know, is not the policy of His Majesty's Government. But, as I have already said, the Protocol creates no new obligation to the use of armed force to maintain the status quo established by the Treaties, And let it not be supposed that this objection, which is held to be fatal as against the Protocol, is not equally valid as against the proposed Five-Power Pact, and, so far as we know, against the policy of special arrangements in order to meet a special need. A permanent arrangement of the kind contemplated in the Pact is not, in our view, a guarantee of European peace. I agree that it would be disastrous for the League of Nations to become committed to the doctrine that

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  the determinations of the Peace Treaties are fixed and final. I said so to the League at Geneva in these words:
  "The League cannot afford to give the impression that it is content to permit the permanent stereotyping of the wrongs of the past."
  If it be true to say, as some critics say of the Protocol, that it involves us in the possibility of war to maintain the territorial arrangements imposed by the Treaties, is it not equally true to say that this danger will continue to be with us eve: if the Protocol be destroyed? The right way to meet this danger is to provide for a change in the status quo by peaceable methods, and the only change that the Protocol makes in the position is that it lays it down that you will not change the status quo, you will not alter the boundaries, if you accept the Protocol, by means of force. On the contrary, the Protocol does definitely and, in our opinion, unmistakably, limit the possibilities of war arising from this cause.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Can the right hon. Gentleman interpret the Protocol to mean that, under it, any existing boundary of Europe might be subjected, at the will of anyone concerned, to immediate compulsory arbitration?
  Mr. HENDERSON: I do not say that that is the position at all. I have already told the House that, with regard to Article 19 of the Covenant, we have neither gone back nor forward. We have left it, and I do not mind saying here, that whoever goes to deal with this question, I hope will realise what a thorny subject it is if they are going to alter Article 19. But it is there, and that is as far as I am prepared to go. We did not interfere with it in any way, but it does not, in my opinion, stereotype, as has been said, the whole of the boundaries of the world. The House will remember that in his speech, delivered at the League of Nations Assembly, the present Leader of the Opposition emphasised the importance of the entry of Germany into the League. This has a great deal to do with the Protocol. It has far more to do with the Protocol than many people imagine. We strove might and main to get Germany included in the League while the sittings of the Fifth Assembly were going on.
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  For reasons into which we need not go here, it was not possible; but we continue to assume that Germany will presently be a member of the League. In fact, we hope—and I trust we will not be disappointed this time—that Germany will be admitted a member of the League at the next Assembly. If Germany be admitted, then, in our opinion, that admission, and not a separate Pact, in which Germany is a partner, is the best basis for security in Europe. It would be a disaster if Germany were led to accept the idea of a Pact as an alternative to membership of the League, or as a substitute for membership.
  5. 0 P.M.
  With the entry of Germany into the League, it will become all the more obvious that the principles of the Protocol must become the common law of the world. I am not at all disposed to think that the right hon. Gentleman has succeeded in actually killing the Protocol. The Council of the League, at its meeting on 13th March, after the right hon. Gentleman's speech had been made, decided that the Protocol should be the chief item on the Agenda of the Sixth Assembly. When the British delegation next September have to meet the representatives of possibly over 50 other States, Members of the League, they will find, in my judgment, that the Protocol is not dead. The fuller reports which have come to hand since the close of the last Council meeting go to support the idea, that this instrument has not yet been finally disposed of. The British Government at the next Assembly will have to present some definite proposal; they will have to provide an alternative, and their alternative will have to go very much beyond the declarations which the right hon. Gentleman made at the Council of the League. I think that the House is entitled to know what the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman are likely to be As I understand from reading his speech—I have read it more than once—his policy is, first, the abandonment of the Protocol, and, secondly, to supplement the Covenant by making special arrangements in order to meet special needs.
  For the reasons already given, I consider the Government policy profoundly mistaken, and one that is much to be regretted, especially that part of it which involves the rejection of the Protocol. Valid arguments for re-examination and

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  amendment of some of the provisions of the Protocol there may be, but I fail to find any justification whatever in anything the right hon. Gentleman has said for the drastic and dangerous course he has adopted of rejecting outright the policy contained in the Protocol. The criticisms made against the Protocol in the Government statement at Geneva can all be met, if it is proved to be necessary, by an amendment of some of its provisions. Some are really repetitions of criticisms which have many times been refuted already, and they certainly do not constitute grounds for rejecting the principles upon which the Fifth Assembly was not only agreed, but unanimously agreed.
  What. is the real policy put forward by the Government as an alternative to the Protocol? It is difficult to understand all the implications and the real inwardness of the phrase that I have just quoted,
  "Special arrangements in order to meet special needs."
  I desire to make it unmistakably clear, on behalf of the Labour party, that we at any rate are resolutely opposed to any separate pact of a militarist and permanent character which would help to divide the world into armed camps. But if it is said that, in view of the delay which must now inevitably arise before the Protocol can be carried out and disarmament can begin: if, as an immediate and transitional step towards a more general agreement on the lines of the Protocol, some special arrangement is necessary, that suggestion would be worthy of examination. But let me point out that an essential condition of any such special arrangement of a temporary and transitional character must be that it is made within the Covenant. I fail to see how any such plan could be acceptable to the members of the League unless it is also based upon the principles set out in the Protocol. Such a plan must carry forward the idea of arbitration, of security, and of disarmament. No partial and limited arrangement to meet special circumstances and special needs would be acceptable on any other grounds. If agreement on these three ideas of arbitration, security, and disarmament is the object of the Government's policy, with Germany in the League, it appears to me that there is no need for a partial pact,
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  for they would all be secured inside the Protocol.
  May I therefore ask the right hon. Gentleman to take the House into his confidence? Will he tell the House what is in his mind, especially with regard to this suggested Five-Power Pact? Does it include the idea of obligatory arbitration? Are all the States to be included in this special arrangement going to agree to accept obligatory arbitration for all disputes with their neighbours, taking the Permanent Court of International Jurisdiction as a suitable basis? Does his plan include sanctions? Will he say what measures of a military or naval character are to be applied in case of conflict, and when and by whose authority they are to operate? Will his plan include tests to decide what constitutes aggression? What are the provisions or tests which are to be applied for the purpose of deciding against whom the sanctions are to be applied? What is to be the connection between the Government's policy of
  "special arrangements in order to meet special needs,"
  and the great problem of disarmament, which was so integral a part of the Geneva scheme?
  I submit that until the Government return a clear answer to these questions the House cannot judge fairly between the Government's policy and the policy embodied within the Protocol. May I remind the House that in these matters we are dealing with principles that are not merely of national, but of international significance. Surely, then, it is necessary and wise to try to obtain the consent of all parties in the House to the policy pursued by Great Britain in relation to these momentous issues, which may involve the entire future of the League of Nations. Yet, important and far-reaching as they undoubtedly are. Parliament has not so far been informed of the Government's intention. All that the House knows is that the Foreign Secretary came back from Geneva satisfied that the Protocol had been disposed of. We have not yet been told the plan that the Government mean to pursue. Great questions involving the lives, the liberties, the destinies of whole nations, are not to be dealt with in this way. The Government must be reminded that the issue with which they are dealing

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  is literally one of life or death to millions of plain people. In conclusion, I wish to say—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] I do not understand why there should be that exclamation. There has been no Debate on this subject. I am the only Member of this House who was present at the framing of the Protocol. For months the papers have been full of criticisms, and especially criticisms levelled against some who had the responsibility placed upon them of representing this country at the Fifth Assembly, and surely they will not deny me this single opportunity of speaking and not try to be a little offensive. I want to say that in my opinion France has adopted a proper attitude towards the Protocol. M. Briand at the recent Council meeting said:
  "My Government remains definitely attached to the Protocol, but it does not refuse to enter into any discussion for improving it."
  Then he continued:
  "Convinced that only the adherence of the nations to a common Protocol can induce them to renounce the competition in armaments, and convinced that if the principles on which the Protocol rests are abandoned, the nations will gradually revert to their old habits and to solutions by force, France remains faithful to the signature which she was the first to give with the object of sparing herself and other nations the horrors of war, from which she suffered so terribly."
  I trust that our Government, even now, will be prepared to reconsider their decisions and to act with the French in the offer which they have made. Let them jointly, at the Sixth Assembly, do their best to improve upon the work which we endeavoured to do at Geneva last September. In my humble judgment such a course would commend itself to the majority of the British people. I apologise for having detained the House at such length. I apologise because many hon. Members may feel that already the Protocol has passed into history. I felt, therefore, that I had a moral obligation to discharge, and I thank the House for its indulgence.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I also must ask the indulgence of the House, for I have a great deal of ground to travel and not very much voice to use in my work. I have listened with interest and with attention to the statement just made by the right hon. Gentleman. I observed
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  that he was careful throughout, except in one or two special passages, to emphasise the fact that he spoke as one of those who had represented this country at the last Assembly of the League, and as one of the joint authors of the Protocol, not on behalf of a party which was then holding the responsibilities of power and had decided to ratify the Protocol, nor on behalf of ex-Cabinet Ministers who since they left office have come to any such conclusion. A second reflection occurred to me as he spoke. The right hon. Gentleman thinks that this Government dealt with insufficient respect with the Protocol of which he was part author. I suppose that in his eyes that which was in the mouth of a Labour representative but a choleric word will become in the mouth of a Unionist Administration rank blasphemy. But the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues had to consider an international agreement arrived at in a similar way in an earlier Assembly, supported by France and by a large number of other nations. They did not hesitate to bring a free judgment to bear upon it or to express in clear though measured language their inability to recommend it for our acceptance. I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman took with him to Geneva a copy of the document which my predecessor, as Foreign Secretary, had addressed on 5th July to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in regard to the proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance.
  "No greater calamity "—
  said the British Government—
  "to the cause which they have at heart can be imagined than that any scheme adopted by the League should, when submitted to the test of reality, fail owing to defects which ought to have been foreseen in advance."… "We must ask these questions: Are the guarantees contained therein sufficient to justify a. State in reducing its armaments? Are the obligations to be undertaken towards other States of such a nature that the nations of the world can conscientiously engage to carry them out?"
  Did the right hon. Gentleman ask himself those questions when he was a party to the framing of the Protocol? Did he apply to the Protocol those tests? I am afraid they were forgotten. I am sorry to trouble the House with one more quotation. Of this proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance my predecessor wrote on behalf of the then Government:
  "It is the considered opinion of the British Naval Staff that a Treaty such as

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  is proposed will, if properly carried out, necessitate an increase in the British naval forces."
  Did His Majesty's Government consult their naval advisers and receive an assurance from them that that objection did not apply to the Protocol?

  GENESIS OF GENEVA PROTOCOL.
  I think it is worth while to consider for a moment what was the genesis of this Protocol. Its origin can be traced back to the negotiations which took place between the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and M. Herriot earlier in the year. In the course of the Franco-British Memorandum which was issued during that hurried visit to Paris which, as the right hon. Gentleman will remember, he paid in July, 1924, and which saved from the danger of premature wreckage the proposals of the Dawes Committee—in that Memorandum there occurs the following passage:
  "The two Governments have likewise proceeded to a preliminary exchange of views on the question of security. They are aware that public opinion requires pacification. They agree to co-operate in devising, through the League of Nations or otherwise, as opportunity presents itself, means of security and to continue the consideration of the question until the problem of general security can be finally settled."
  They agreed—the right hon. Gentleman who was then Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary and the President of the Council of Ministers in France—that they would together go to the Assembly of the League of Nations and open a discussion of this great problem of security. Well, Sir, they did so. They came, they saw, they conquered. They made speeches which were received with immense enthusiasm by the Assembly. I am told the right hon. Gentleman's speech sounded even better and was even more enthusiastically applauded when it had been translated from the English in which it was delivered info the. French language. Nothing could have been better, until the gentlemen themselves and the Assembly which they had addressed began to reflect upon the speeches, and then it was at once apparent to everyone that the two Prime Ministers in their joint friendly gesture were irreconcilably opposed, one to the other, in the advice which they were tendering to the
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  Assembly. Then followed some hours—I think one or two nights—of hectic, feverish movement in search of a formula, and presently a formula wars produced and I suppose the two Prime Ministers thought that when, with the help of very active and very clever friends, they had reached a formula upon which they could agree, they had really agreed about something of substance. But it was evident even then to skilful observers that, even at the moment when they thought they were most agreed, they were as far apart "as poles asunder," and that the principles which underlay and inspired the policy of the right hon. Gentleman were neither believed in nor accepted by the Leader of French opinion and the representative of France.
  The right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken has made it plain that the idea of the British Government was that you could supersede individual pacts or regional agreements by one vast universal scheme of international insurance. That was the policy of the British Government, but that was never the policy of the foreign Governments with which they were negotiating. Never for one moment did those Governments mean to abandon the local alliances or regional pacts into which they had entered, if the Protocol were accepted. On the contrary, they regarded the Protocol as something which might give additional security to the world, I do net doubt, but also as something which must be followed, as it had been preceded, by special, subsidiary or complementary- alliances and agreements. The two distinguished visitors, both busy men who could ill be spared from their own countries, having with the aid of friends and with much burning of midnight oil patched op a formula, returned to Paris and to London and left their representatives to put into the form of an international agreement the opposite ideals which were embodied in the formula upon which they had agreed. The deputations went to work, and in some six weeks' time in that Assembly there was undertaken for the whole world a piece of legislation, with which it is impossible to compare, in its extent or importance, even the largest project which could come before a domestic Legislature like our own, and that agreement, that leglislative project, was framed, discussed and passed in less

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  time than we should take over an Electoral Reform Bill whether in Cabinet or in the House of Commons
  Is it wonderful that in those circumstances, when we came to examine it, we found it apparently so full of danger, we found its principal causes and effects apparently so little appreciated and so little foreseen and its obligations so great for an Empire of such a peculiar character as our own, scattered in every portion of the world, based primarily upon sea power and not upon land power as was the case of most of the nations who were there assembled—is it wonderful when we came to consider this document we found it impossible to recommend it to Parliament? The right hon. Gentleman has complained that we announced our decision not to recommend it before we had consulted Parliament. Was it a more serious step to take to declare our decision not to recommend it, than to do as he did and to recommend it, to be a party to it, without having given Parliament the least information of what he was doing or the obligations he was undertaking. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman was present at the beginning of that Assembly.
  Mr. HENDERSON: Yes, the whole time.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Then at least the right hon. Gentleman, before he went out might have come to this House and told the House in broad outline what policy he meant to pursue, and, if he did not think it worth while to do so, it doer not lie in his mouth to condemn us for having made our position clear at the League of Nations Council meeting—which adjourned the consideration of the matter to suit our convenience—when we had, in fact, reached our final conclusion as to the reasoned form of our objection only a few days before that Council meeting resumed. I do not propose to go at length into the objections to the Protocol. I have too much other work to do. But I beg the House to observe that the right hon. Gentleman himself is not a whole-hearted and unconditional supporter of the Protocol. The right hon. Gentleman laboured a great deal the point that he and his fellow representatives of Great Britain had preserved full liberty to the British Government and
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  Parliament of free action in any emergency. There is a passage in the report of one of the committees which is a rather interesting gloss upon the observations of the right hon. Gentleman. In the report of M. Benes he goes so far in agreement with the right hon. Gentleman as to observe that it is true that it remains with our Government to decide what they will do, but it is no longer left to them to decide what they ought to do. Here is the passage:
  "In view of the foregoing, the gist of Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2, might be expressed as follows: Each State is to judge of the manner in which it shall carry out its obligations, but not of the existence of those obligations. That is to say, each State remains the judge of what it will do, but no longer remains the judge of what it should do.'"
  You observe that the right hon. Gentleman's complete liberty means that you have a liberty not to discharge your obligations, but that there is no doubt that the others have a right to impose the obligations on you. That is not quite the liberty that might have been inferred from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. But the whole terms of the Protocol, as shown in the declaration which I made in Geneva, are framed, not with a view to a naval Power, and not with proper regard to the interests or the necessities or the position of a naval Power; they are framed for the special purposes of States with land forces and land frontiers about which they are anxious. The right hon. Gentleman says it would be easy to deal by Amendment with all the criticisms which His Majesty's Government had made of the Protocol.
  Mr. HENDERSON: I said those alterations that were proved to be necessary.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: He said that it would be possible to deal by amendment with all the alterations which might prove to be necessary. We made some study of the Protocol from that point of view. If the right hon. Gentleman will do the same, he will find that very little remains of the Protocol when he has made the necessary alterations; and when, to the necessary changes, you add the reservations which the right hon. Gentleman would have put in for his Government, and the reservations which other representatives would have put in for their Governments when signing, I

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  venture to say that the Protocol would be seen to have shrunk to a very small document indeed, and one which would not have materially increased the security of the world. I am really not sure what the right hon. Gentleman himself thinks of it. At one moment he declares that we undertake no new obligation, at another moment that it is merely the logical conclusion of the Covenant.
  I profoundly distrust logic when applied to politics, and all English history justifies me. Why is it that, as contrasted with other nations, ours has been a peaceful and not a violent development? Why is it that, great as have been the changes that have taken place in this country, we have had none of those sudden revolutions and reactions for the last 300 years that have so frequently affected more logically minded nations than ourselves? It is because instinct and experience alike teach us that human nature is not logical, that it is unwise to treat political institutions as instruments of logic, and that it is in wisely refraining from pressing conclusions to their logical end that the path of peaceful development and true reform is really found.
  After all, what is our crime? The signature of the Covenant is barely six years old, and we are to be condemned by the right hon. Gentleman because, with only six years' experience to guide us, we are not prepared to re-write the whole document or to super-impose upon it a vast structure which might easily destroy both Covenant and League. There has been a good deal of talk of late in this country about the safety and security of St. Paul's Cathedral. A great many experts have been consulted, and not all of them, I understand, have taken the same view, but, as far as I know, no expert, however eminent, has thought that the security of that building would be promoted by putting another dome on the top of the existing dome, and, whatever their differences have been, they have all agreed that it is by underpinning the foundations that the building will be best preserved. That is cur view in regard to the Protocol. We do not think that it would add to the strength of the League or that it would add to the security given by the Covenant.

  EFFECTS OF THE PROTOCOL.
  The right hon. Gentleman spoke at one moment as if we were opposed to the objects of the Protocol. It is not with the objects that we find fault. Speaking on behalf of His Majesty's Government, I expressed our full concurrence with those objects at the beginning of my declaration at Geneva. It is not with its objects, but with its effects that we quarrel. The right hog. Gentleman thinks that it would have promoted security and thus have led directly to disarmament. What evidence did he bring to bear for either of those theses? Our own experts advised us that we should be unable to fulfil the obligations which it would have imposed upon us without increasing our existing forces. I suspect that some other nations would find themselves in the same position.
  Then I wonder whether the late Government gave much thought to the effect of the Protocol, or of the adoption of the Protocol, upon the policy of the United States of America. As far as I know, the United States have made no official declaration in regard to the Protocol, but I have tried to inform myself as to the trend of American opinion, and, unless I am wholly mistaken, the Protocol would have been viewed rather as a possible cause of war than of increased security for peace across the Atlantic. And what about European opinion? I say, without fear of contradiction, that those Powers most immediately concerned would not have felt that their security was so guarded against dangers by the Protocol, had we signed and ratified it as it stood, without alteration, as to have been content to treat that as a settlement of the question of security and proceed to disarmament at once. The Protocol, without subsidiary pacts, would not have been accepted in those quarters which think themselves threatened as a guarantee for their safety of a kind justifying them in disarming. As I have said, in the eyes of the right hon. Gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition, the Protocol was to supersede and render unnecessary any special pacts. In the eyes of those with whom he was negotiating, the Protocol was not only to have been preceded by pacts, but was to have been accompanied or followed by pacts.
  His Majesty's Government find themselves unable to sign the Protocol. They

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  find themselves in that respect in the same position as the great Dominion Governments and the Government of India. They do not think that it is apt to promote security and, by promoting security, to lead to disarmament, but they do feel, as the right hon. Gentleman said, that they have an obligation to contribute if they can to that great aim, and they believe that it is in the power of this country and this Empire to do it. But, before I come to deal with that aspect of the case, let me just remind the House of what are our existing commitments.

  OUR EXISTING OBLIGATIONS.
  We have, as a member of the League of Nations and a signatory of the Covenant, the obligations of every member of the League and signatory of the Covenant to every other State within the League, and we propose loyally and faithfully to observe them. Those are obligations of general, of almost universal, application, but we have other obligations which are partial and local. We have an interest in the eastern boundary of France and Belgium, which is more direct, more vital, and to which we are more closely pledged by our signed word than to the general obligations common to every signatory of the Covenant and member of the League.
  The right hon. Gentleman an the Leader of the Opposition dealt with it in a passage which I have already read. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon in an aide-memoire handed to the Italian delegation at Cannes said:
  "Great Britain nevertheless has always felt that it was a point of honour on her part to stand by the Treaty (i.e., the Anglo-American Treaty of Guarantee). The understanding which it contained influenced French policy in certain important respects during the negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles; and Great Britain therefore considers herself hound in honour to renew her pledge…
  Great Britain's pledge to stand by France against an unprovoked attack by Germany upon French soil is the first measure necessary to ensure the stability of Europe and to divert the German people from dreams of revenge."
  The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition addressed a letter to M. Poincaré soon after he came into office. He wrote to this effect:
  "There are many people in France who imagined that with the complete defeat of
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  Germany they would automatically be freed for ever from a menace which I fully realise was real. Some thought that in order to obtain absolute security the frontiers of France should be extended to the Rhine. They were disappointed in this expectation; they were offered, instead, a joint guarantee by Great Britain and the United States of America; with the abstention of America this offer itself lapsed, and the French people have since then, with some justification, been seeking …"
  That is the question of security. The need of security for France is great. Her right to expect something from us in that respect is recognised. Our interest and our duty to contribute to provide that security is recognised, and is the common policy of us all. That is something on which I agree with the right hon. Gentleman. There is nothing I more earnestly desire than to find a basis for a national policy in which we can all agree, and in which we can all heartily co-operate. These declarations give us a special interest in the Western frontiers of Germany. All history points the same way. All our greatest wars have been fought to prevent one great military Power dominating Europe, and at the same time dominating the coasts of the Channel and the ports of the Low Countries. Our ancestors fought Spain in her heyday. Our grandfathers fought Napoleon. We ourselves only a few years ago fought Germany. The issue is one which affects our security. It is an issue which we have never shirked and never can afford to shirk. But that is not all. There are at this moment our treaty obligations. There are Articles 42 to 44 of the Treaty of Versailles, Articles which deal with the left bank of the Rhine, and the demilitarised zone on the right bank. Article 42 says:
  "Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine, or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east of the Rhine."
  Then in Article 43 we read:
  "In the area defined above the maintenance and assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manœuvres of any kind as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilisation are, in the same way, forbidden."
  Article 44 says:
  "In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43 she shall be regarded as committing a

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  hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world."
  The French text gives it more correctly, and says:
  "as seeking to disturb."
  We or the Dominions have, therefore, a direct Treaty obligation to maintain these articles. The peace of the world and the peace of the British Empire depends upon the observance and maintenance of that Treaty provision.

  THE GERMAN PROPOSALS.
  I come now to the German proposals, to which allusion has already been made in Debates in this House. I think now that I can, without injury to any prospect that they may contain, speak with greater frankness than I felt myself able to do before I went to Geneva. If I can do so, I am quite certain it is my duty to this House to do it. The German proposals are very properly put in a somewhat liquid shape. They have not been subject to any precise or rigid definition. They are put forward as a possible basis for discussion, not as a thing to be taken or left, or as an agreement already put into a form in which it might be signed. They did net, in the first instance, come to me fully. They came to me under circumstances of secrecy, of attempted secrecy, which, I have already admitted, caused me to feel some suspicion about them. I am convinced—and I say so in my place here—from what has passed since, that the German Government are making a sincere and an honest attempt to lead to a better state of things; and it is in the hope that we may assist to carry that effort to a fruitful conclusion that we have engaged in our serious discussion of their proposals. Very broadly I would outline the German suggestions as follow: Germany is interested in the establishment of a special Treaty foundation for a peaceful understanding with France. Germany is prepared to consider a comprehensive arbitration Treaty, to enter into a mutual Pact with the Powers interested in the Rhine. Similar arbitration Treaties might be concluded with other States which have common boundaries with Germany if those States desire. Further, a Pact expressly guaranteeing the present territorial status on the Rhine would be acceptable to Germany. The Pact might further guarantee the fulfilment of the Articles
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  I quoted a moment ago from the Treaty of Versailles.
  The House, I think, will agree with His Majesty's Government that it is a signal advance that such proposals should have reached us even in a vague form, and on her own motion, from Germany. If I understand them rightly, they amount to this: that Germany is prepared to guarantee voluntarily what hitherto she has accepted under the compulsion of the Treaty, that is, the status quo in the West; that she is prepared to eliminate, not merely from the West but from the East, war as an engine by which any alteration in the Treaty position is to be obtained. This not only in the West but in the East, she is prepared absolutely to abandon any idea of recourse to war for the purposes of changing the Treaty boundaries of Europe. She may be unwilling, or she may be unable, to make the same renunciation of the hopes and aspirations that some day, by friendly arrangement or mutual agreement, a modification may be introduced into the East, which she is prepared to make in regard to any modification in the West.
  Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but this is very important. It is the first time we have had any official account of this significant offer. I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman if I understand Germany as prepared to accept voluntarily the boundaries of the West. She does not demand any reconsideration or revision of those boundaries? Do I understand that she makes the same declaration in regard to the East, or is that subject to arbitration?
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: No, Sir. My right hon. Friend rightly understood, if I rightly understand, what Germany is prepared to do in the West. In regard to the West she is prepared to renounce all desire of change, and to enter into a mutual Pact to guarantee the existing situation. In suggesting arbitration in the East, she does not propose or suggest that her Eastern frontiers should become subject to such treaties of arbitration. She is prepared to say that she renounces the idea of recourse to war to change the frontiers in the East. She is not prepared to say, in regard to the frontiers in the East, that she renounces the hope some day to modify some of their pro-

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  visions by friendly negotiation, by diplomatic procedure, or it may be, for aught I know, by recourse to the good offices of the League of Nations.
  Mr. J. RAMSAY MacDONALD: May I ask whether it is convenient for my right hon. Friend to say now whether in any way this proposal is linked up with a proposal that she should join the League of Nations or otherwise?
  6.0 P.M.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I am coming to that. That was broadly the position when I left London to confer with M. Herriot in Paris, and to attend the Council Meeting of the League at Geneva the other day. What were the instructions which I carried with me from His Majesty's Government for the purposes of my interview with M. Herriot, and with the other Foreign Ministers whom I met at Geneva? They charged me with a message which, I frankly say, it was personally not wholly agreeable to me to deliver. I see that sometimes I am accused of being pro-French. I have seen it stated, and I told M. Briand that I was accused at Home of being in his pocket. I thought he looked a little regretfully at the size of his pocket and wished it were larger, so that he might have me more safely deposited. But though I have, and I confess it, deep sympathies with the French people, a great appreciation of what France has done for the world and, incidentally, for ourselves, I owe to France the frankness of a friend, and the very fact that I used that frankness will, perhaps, carry a conviction that would not come from one who was not known to be as warmly her well-wisher as the present Foreign Secretary is.
  What was the message I gave? I had to tell M. Herriot, and the other Foreign Ministers, that His Majesty's Government were unable to sign the Protocol. I had to add that, whilst we appreciated all that was involved for France in the failure, through American abstention, of the Anglo-American Pact of Guarantee, yet after what had occurred in Cannes, and after what had occurred in the troublous years that followed, it was not within the power of a British Government to offer to the French Government or the Belgian Government a ere-sided Pact of Guarantee of their frontiers directly pointed against Germany
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  But I told them, and I told others, that we attached the highest importance to these German suggestions, that we thought they should be examined most carefully in order to see whether they did not, in fact, open the door to a new and better state of things, and close 'the door not merely on actual military operations, but on that war-like atmosphere which has endured ever since the Peace of Versailles. I found myself in agreement with the representatives of all the foreign Governments whom I met that these proposals could not be lightly turned down or rejected, that we must examine them carefully and see what advantage could be drawn from them, that we must work with good faith and good will in the hope that we might make them the basis of a real security and a real peace. I found myself in agreement on certain broad principles. Any agreement that we might make should be made, in the words of the Declaration which I read at Geneva:
  "Any arrangement into which we might enter should be purely defensive in character, it should be framed in the spirit of the Covenant, working in close harmony with the League, and under its guidance if possible."
  It is equally obvious that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, our obligations could not be extended in respect of every frontier. That is one reason, the main reason, why we rejected the Protocol. It was because it was a universal extension of our obligations of the most serious kind. But we thought that what we could not do in every sphere we might properly undertake, and advise our people to undertake, in that sphere with which we were most closely connected. But it must be made quite clear that in trying to underpin the Covenant and to stabilise peace in the West, we were not licensing or legitimising war elsewhere; that to enter into fresh engagements of a mutual character turning into a friendly agreement, voluntarily made on both sides, what is now a peace imposed by the victors on the vanquished—that that must not be held to be an encouragement to those who were defeated yesterday to try and reopen conclusions in other spheres. On the contrary, we held that by the mere fact of stabilising peace in the West you would give an additional guarantee to the frontiers of the East.
  After all, who is it who has an interest in disturbing those frontiers? No country

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  has a greater, a profounder interest in stabilising peace, or in promoting good relations with her great neighbour, than Poland; and no one, no impartial person, who can judge Germany's interest with a clear mind, unclouded by prejudice or passion, can fail to see that Germany can gain no real advantage, and no additional security by attacking her Eastern neighbour. Time and friendly adjustment, the force of economic ties and obligations, the free play of commercial interests, should lead those great nations to cultivate an ever-growing an ever-closer friendship, once they can get away from the atmosphere of yesterday and turn to what should be the attitude of the future.

  GERMANY AND LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
  Then one other thing. It is essential to such an agreement, in my opinion, and in the opinion of all with whom I have spoken, that Germany should enter the League of Nations, taking her place as she would assuredly do in the Council of the League, on a footing of equality, both of obligations and of rights, with the other great and small nations. I know that Germany has raised objections to particular Articles. We discussed them at a Council meeting of the League the other day, and we replied. The real answer is that it is of the essence of the League, without which there is no League, that all the nations within the League are equal, owing equal obligations, possessing equal rights. If you once begin to make exceptions in the obligations, you of course at the same time make exceptions in respect of the rights, and the equality which lies at the root of the League, which is of the essence of its spirit, would be destroyed, and the League itself would be paralysed and defeated. Let me add one other word about this proposal. As I understand, as I can well foresee, no fruitful issue can come of it, unless we can deal successfully and expeditiously on the one side and the other with the remaining obligations of disarmament and with the evacuation of the Cologne area. But it is no part of the German proposal, and no condition, that the period of occupation fixed for the remaining zones by the Treaty of Versailles should be shortened or altered in any way.

  FUTURE OF EUROPE.
  I hope I have made the conditions clear as I see them. I venture to put to the
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  House the choice which I believe lies before us. Ever since peace was signed, no less than when war was still being waged, Europe has been ranged in two camps, divided as were the combatants in the War. Fear, haunting, restless, brooding fear, haunts the councils of every nation and the homes of every Continental people—fear that warps the judgment and deflects the policy, which leads to irritating acts, to fresh provocation, which renews day by day the offences of the War, the bitterness of the War, the rancours of the War. If this continues, sooner or later Europe will march to a new Armageddon. It will not be in my time, it may not be in the time of most of those whom I am addressing, but unless you can get away from this atmosphere of fear and suspicion, from this attitude of armed camps, then, if not in my time, in my children's or my grandchildren's time, Europe will be given up to a new struggle, and a generation which has to pay the penalty of that unnecessary war will judge harshly the statesmen of to-day who failed to take in time the measures by which it might be prevented.

  BRITISH POLICY.
  Sir, the statesmen of this country have some responsibility. Our policy, not wholly through our own fault, has been wavering and inconsistent. Our influence—no one can move as I have done amongst the statesmen of Europe, and of more than Europe, and not feel it—has lost something by our hesitation and our inconsistency, but a new chance is coming to us. I see in these proposals the possible dawn of a better day. Without our help nothing will be done. Without our help we shall march surely though slowly to a new disaster. With our help the war chapter may be brought to a close, and a real triumph of peace may begin. The British Empire, detached from Europe by its Dominions, linked to Europe by these islands, can do what no other nation on the face of the earth can do, and from east and west alike there comes to me the cry that, after all, it is in the hands of the British Empire, and if they will that there shall be no war there will be no war.
  Marquess of HARTINGTON: While I altogether dissociate myself from the sentiments expressed by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen above the Gangway, I

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  are their feelings of disappointment at the general tone and character of the Note which the Foreign Secretary read at Geneva. I do not pretend for one moment that the Protocol was immediately attainable, and I do not see how this Government or any Government of this country could have ratified it. There are several reasons why they could not have done so. It is admitted that it was far from being a perfect document, and the need for substantial amendments was universally admitted, and there is the much more important objection that the Dominions are opposed to ratification. I do, however, very greatly regret that the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary should so uncompromisingly have shut the door, or tried to shut the door, in regard to any further discussion of this subject.
  If the Foreign Secretary bad contented himself with stating his objections which everyone realises, he would have found complete agreement in this country and on the Continent of Europe, because his objections to Clauses 7 and 8 are universally agreed to be perfectly sound. If he had stated his objection, and if he had said that while there might be some possibility of arriving at some agreements, he could not agree to it at this time, and if he had been content with the best possible arrangement that could be made, there would not have been one voice raised against him. By taking up such an extremely hostile attitude the Foreign Secretary has placed himself in a state of isolation and a state of not very splendid isolation.
  Even now I do not actually understand what is his position. He stated at Geneva that he held fast by the principles of arbitration, security, and disarmament. He also voted that the Protocol should be the main subject for discussion at the next meeting of the Assembly in September. He further stated that he is fundamentally opposed to the Protocol. Those two statements contradict one another. The right hon. Gentleman may be opposed to every detail of the Protocol, but ho cannot be fundamentally opposed to it without being fundamentally opposed to the principle of arbitration, security. and disarmament upon which the Protocol is based. I realise that the Protocol cannot be ratified now, and we are
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  in a different position to any other country in the world. I am fully prepared to agree that at the present moment some such pact as the right hon. Gentleman has suggested is the best solution, but I do hope that the pact which we are contemplating will not be regarded as a final arrangement or the ultimate end of our European policy. If it is, then we have quite definitely taken a step back, and we shall have laid the foundation for a new war. There was a time when this country could afford to pursue a policy of isolation. I for one, and I am sure most hon. Members are of the same opinion would have been heartily thankful if it were possible for us to pursue that policy now. As a matter of fact, it is not worth discussing now, and we have to recognise, however we may desire to keep clear of European entanglements, it is utterly impossible for us to do so.
  In the past there have been times when we have sought alliances with one Power or the other or with a group of Powers on the Continent of Europe. That policy has been more or less successful at different times but it has always led sooner or later to another war, and that risk is complicated at the moment and will be more complicated in the future by the new difficulties which have arisen since various parts of the British Empire have grown up into self-governing Dominions. After all we have to remember that the Dominions object to the Protocol but I would like to ask, is it really the Protocol they object to or is it the possibility of being asked to go to war in regard to someone else's quarrel? Is it not possible that that difficulty may hold good equally in any pact or alliance we may make.
  I know that the policy of making Treaties has its uses but it never succeeded in averting war for more than a certain number of years. Until comparatively recent times the certainty of war at intervals did not threaten the whole fabric of civilisation nor was the burden of preparing for war an intolerable burden although it brought many Governments to their fall. War did involve whole populations, but the burden of preparing for war in past years did not involve the crushing burden which it must involve in the future. We talk about disarmament but is any substantial reduction of armaments likely to be possible for some years to come? Unless we can

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  adopt some different basis for our national policy we shall be forced to incur great expenditure for airships and one thing and another, and this kind of thing is bound to grow, and unless we find some other means we shall be compelled to continue to bear the burden of preparing for war, a policy which bears so heavily on the whole of our trade and commerce and tends to make unemployment an absolutely insoluble problem. I am not a Radical who refuses to face the facts, and so long as armaments are necessary I shall not vote against them, but it does seem to me that there ought to be some limit to the extent to which we can go in regard to any vast increase in armaments.
  The question I want to put to the Foreign Secretary is whether he is really convinced that the Protocol is absolutely unattainable. Are we afraid of the far-reaching commitments which the Protocol contains, and is it the view of the Government that it might involve us in wars here, there and everywhere which would otherwise not be the case. Have we not such commitments already, and shall we be able to keep out of any war that may occur on the Continent of Europe or elsewhere? Constantly in our history there has occurred a war which has not concerned us in the very least, but it has eventually led to another war, and sooner or later to another war, and we are bound to be involved in the end. I believe it is probable that never again can there be a serious war on the Continent of Europe from which we shall be able to remain permanently aloof.
  So long as there are wars of any magnitude, either on the Continent of Europe or elsewhere, we shall never be able to do anything else but go on increasing our gigantic burden of armaments. We are afraid of the principle of arbitration and of giving up our right to go to war because we feel that we may be put upon and stripped of our assets by unjust judges. We feel that there is no international Court we can fully trust in matters of life and death for us. There must be reservations. We stand to lose too much and we cannot allow ourselves to be arbitrated out of our vital trade routes. For example, our Dominions cannot agree to lose their right of control of immigration, and there must be reservations. Even with these reservations, is it so impossible for us,
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  after all, to contemplate a very considerable extension of the system of arbitration? One cannot make even reasonable concessions to an enemy. That is a lesson which my right hon. Friends behind me have not always learned, and it is fatal to make concessions to an enemy.
  Once a demand has been made in a hostile spirit, even if it is reasonable it has to be refused. The path of concessions is too easy and smooth a path for it to be safe, and always ends in a downward slope. Once a bird has shown the white feather it is as good as dead. The white feather refers to feathers on the side of the tail which are only visible when the tail is no longer held stiffly erect. Under such circumstances a nation will have to fight, and it will not fight on ground of its own choosing. The case is not quite the same when it is a question of making concessions to an international Court, because then you can go vastly further in making concessions.
  These important reservations are allowed for arbitration. Can there be any doubt that the most disastrous possible judgment of an international court subject to the reservations I have suggested would be a thousand times less disastrous than the most successful possible war. For these reasons I think we ought to keep the door open for a further extension of the system of arbitration. I hope, therefore, that the right hon. Gentleman will not do anything, either when he replies to-night or at Geneva next September, that will close the door further than it has already been closed with regard—I do not care so much about this particular Protocol, but to something on the lines of the Geneva Protocol, that is to say, an all-embracing rather than a partial settlement. I should like, therefore, to ask the right hon. Gentleman three definite questions. In the first place, is this pact to be framed so that it will be capable of expansion, so that it will be open to other Powers to join later? If so, I think the friends of the Protocol can give it a very hearty welcome as a stepping-stone, and the only kind of stepping-stone which we believe can ultimately make for the peace of Europe and of the world. If not, I still feel, even after what the right hon. Gentleman has said, that it will be definitely a step in the wrong direction If it is going to tend to solidify a pact

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  between a certain number of Powers exclusive of others, there is a tremendous danger of the Powers being divided into two camps.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The agreement is not a pact of one set of Powers directed against another set of Powers, but is a pact of Powers interested in particular directions out of which trouble has arisen in the past, or might arise in the future, mutually guaranteeing one another in the possession of their present territory and against the danger of war.
  Marquess of HARTINGTON: I am very much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman. I understand that part, but I say that the pact deals with troubles which are visible at the moment. There have been very many troubles in the world's history when people have thrown up their hands and said that there was going to be no more war, that all possible causes of dispute had been settled. I would ask whether, later on, it will be possible for other Powers to join in this pact, so that it will tend to become all-embracing rather than merely local. Then I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is prepared to consider the possibility of going as far as the Dominion of Canada has gone, and, by the way, the reply of the Dominion of Canada, was far less hostile than some others. I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is prepared to consider accepting compulsory arbitration by a permanent Court in justicional disputes in a comparatively small class of cases. We have made reservations about the questions which are really likely to damage us severely, and I think it would be a definite gain to have the principle of compulsory arbitration accepted as regards the comparatively unimportant class which remains outside. My last question is this: September is not so very far off now; do the Government intend to call an Imperial Conference or otherwise to take means at once to discuss this question with the Dominions? Just as in the case of the Protocol, we must have their agreement about any pact into which we may intend entering. It would be fatal if we were to enter into obligations without having the fullest consultation and agreement with the Dominions. Unless
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  steps are taken at once to consult the Dominions on this subject, there is a, grave risk that next September at Geneva we may be in the position of having to ask for further time in order that the matter may be kept open. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will reply to-night to these three questions, and I hope and believe that his reply will dispel finally and absolutely the entirely wrong impression which, however, does exist, that the attitude of the British Government on international affairs is, "Give us an armed truce in our time, O Lord, and let the next generation look after themselves."
  Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: No more important question has been discussed in the House of Commons than that which has been raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. A. Henderson) to-day. It is a question on the solution of which may depend the future of civilisation, and, therefore, it is very vital that the House of Commons should shoulder its responsibility with the Government in the settlement of this very grave issue. I agree with the Noble Lord the Member for West Derbyshire (Marquess of Hartington) in the appeal which he has made to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary not to turn down the principle of arbitration at the coming Assembly at Geneva. I am afraid I must also agree with the Noble Lord that a good deal of what was said by the Foreign Secretary went far beyond what was necessary in order to criticise the-Protocol. It did create an impression, certainly in Europe, and I think in this country also, that the Government were rootedly hostile to the application of the principle of compulsory arbitration. I do not think my right hon. Friend really meant to go quite as far as that; at least, I hope he did not but it is no use discussing the question of the Protocol on a false issue.
  It is not an issue of whether we are for-or against arbitration. Some very good friends of arbitration—men who have devoted a lifetime to the principle of arbitration—are opposed to this interpretation of it. They think that it would be attempting arbitration in circumstances which would not give arbitration fair play. They think that, under the guise of an arbitration pact, the Protocol is a military convention to sustain the status

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  quo. Nothing could be more likely to provoke war than that, and, therefore, I would not like it to be assumed that, because some of us criticise the Protocol, we are opposed to the principle of arbitration. On the contrary, we would like to see the principle of arbitration boldly applied. As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary pointed out very truly, this was a compromise between the position taken by the late Foreign Secertary and M Herriot, the result being that by the Protocol the French view prevailed, and, instead of a general treaty which would settle disputes by arbitral methods, there would be established something which is purely a variant upon the old French policy of a guarantee of Eastern frontiers. The French Press have claimed this as a moral triumph for France, and one paper exclaims, in very pharasaical language, that it hopes that "the light will one day dawn upon the eyes of England."
  There is a real test of whether the Protocol applies the principle of arbitration or not. I listened with very great care to my right hon. Friend the Member for Burnley, and I listened with exceptional attention when he came to deal with the matter of the status quo. There is one objection to the Protocol which I think is fatal. The Protocol does not refer to arbitration a single question which is likely to provoke war in Europe. I make that statement, and I ask anyone in reply to point to a single question which is likely to provoke war and which is to be referred under the Protocol to arbitration. My right hon. Friend started by saying that all questions were to be referred, but that is not so. All questions are to be referred subject to the Treaties. I will give a few tests, and they are vital tests. We must take care that we do not commit ourselves to the status quo under the guise of arbitration. Some of our French friends claim a moral triumph. I should like to ask them, is there a single question on their Eastern frontier between them and Germany that they would be willing to refer to arbitration under the Protocol?
  I am not talking of Alsace-Lorraine. The German Nationalists say they are going to claim Alsace-Lorraine, and, certainly, the French would not refer that to arbitration. Would they refer the question of the Saar? Would they refer
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  the question of Reparations? I ask any one to quote the opinion of any French statesmen that indicates that they are willing to refer any of these matters. Take the question of Reparations. The Dawes Report now is at its lightest. It is going to grow till the burden is double, treble. There is no doubt at all that it is going to have a great effect upon the wages of the workmen in Germany and upon their hours of labour. That is clear. It has already had an effect. The time will come when there will be a revolt amongst the workmen in Germany, and they will stand it no longer. I have never had the slightest doubt about that. Now I come to the question of policy, and I am only discussing it from that point of view. Supposing that a Government in Germany is established which voices the view of both Nationalists and workmen—because you will have a combination of both—will the French Government agree that that question should be settled by arbitration under the Protocol? Will they refer the question of the Saar under the Protocol? Will they refer the question of evacuating the bridge-heads of the Rhine under the Protocol, or the question of disarmament? Is there a single question which is likely to provoke conflict between France and Germany that these gentlemen in France, who claim a moral triumph for the great principle, would refer to arbitration under the Clauses of this document? Not one.
  But the East is more serious. With regard to the questions between France and Germany, I am very hopeful that there will be no conflict. The French peasant has had enough of war. His losses have been so colossal that he will not voluntarily go to war for the Saar, or the bridge-heads of the Rhine, or Reparations, and therefore I am hopeful, although not altogether confident. That is not the case with regard to the East. The Eastern frontiers are throbbing with trouble from the Bosphorus to the Baltic. Every European frontier is marked in red, but the frontiers of Central and Eastern Europe are a deeper red than any. There is none of these borderlines that has not been fought over for centuries. There is not a tract of territory in regard to which any country cannot claim precedents for saying that it belonged to them at one time, and there have been conquests and reconquests. There

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  is a tangle of races there and a general inextricable mix-up, as anyone knows who has ever been trying to decide whether a particular territory ought to belong to Czechoslovakia or Poland, or Hungary or Roumania or Yugo-Slavia or Poland. There you have questions of racial pride and racial and religious antagonism. There is no mix-up of races, records, and religions like it outside Gehenna. That is the position in Eastern Europe.
  Take all the questions that are likely to provoke war, and where does the Protocol come in? I am all for arbitration. You do not get it here for any questions that matter. Begin with Constantinople—furtive eyes gleaming at it from North and South, and envious eyes watching them. The Protocol does not touch it. Bessarabia—trouble fermenting, armies gathering. I do not know whether Roumania is prepared to save the Protocol. I have no doubt the is one of the 47. Is she willing to refer her dispute to arbitration and to the Protocol? There are disputes between her and Hungary; will she refer those? Czechoslovakia was prominent in promoting this Protocol and has taken a leading part in it. She always does when France asks her. I should like to ask are they prepared to refer the disputed questions of boundaries between them and Hungary to arbitration? I remember territories there which they claim for Czechoslovakia. Statistics in Central Europe are like the statistics of a Tariff Reform controversy. They can prove anything. A Hungarian deputy has been returned for that very territory. Are they willing to refer that to arbitration? The worst of all is Poland. Poland is sad, because the Protocol has not been recognised by Britain, and she also is claiming a moral triumph. What has happened there? Alsace-Lorraine provoked a war in Europe. Poland has five Alsace Lorraines-Eastern Galicia, White Russia, Vilna, the Corridor, Silesia-she is not satisfied and she now wants to add a sixth, Dantzig. That is exactly the way she annexed the other places. She is annexing them now by pillar-boxes. That is the beginning.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The right hon. Gentleman is talking very rashly. I am grateful to him for giving me the oppor-
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  tunity of dissociating myself from what he has said.
  Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I do not know whether it is to Danzig or the rest that the right hon. Gentleman refers. Does the right hon. Gentleman deny that Poland annexed Vilna in spite of the protests of the League of Nations, annexed Galicia in spite of the protests of the Supreme Council, that she has annexed part of White Russia, where the majority of the population is Russian, beyond the Ethnographical line drawn by the Supreme Council? Does he say the decision in Upper Silesia is one which he would be prepared to go to war in order to maintain? I should like to know which of these statements he is challenging. With regard to Dantzig, ho knows perfectly well that Poland is persisting with regard to the Post Office policy in spite of the ruling of the British Commissioner who represents the League of Nations, and it has now been referred again for consideration. But she did not accept the decision of the League of Nations—
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: There has been no decision by the League of Nations, but the Council, which has probably given more study to the subject than the right hon. Gentleman, thought it was desirable that there should be an opinion from the High Court before they themselves took a decision
  Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: The right hon. Gentleman has misquoted me. What I said was the decision of the British High Commissioner who represented the League of Nations.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: No, you said the League of Nations.
  Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: If I said that, it is wrong. I certainly thought I said the decision the British High Commissioner took of this question. [HON. MEMBERS: "You said so."] I thought I did. Does anyone imagine that Russia, when she recovers, will accept these decisions as final? If so, I ask, is Poland, who is in favour of the Protocol, prepared to refer these questions to arbitration? If not, what is the good of it? There is no question which threatens the peace of Europe at present which, under the Protocol as it is drafted, would be referred to arbitration. What

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  is the good of it? See what would happen. Let us look at it. It is all very well to say that Great Britain would have the choice as to how she would carry out the decision of the Court of Arbitration. Britain stands by her word in these matters, and if she signs a Protocol to say that she will accept the decision of a Court of Arbitration, and that she will do her best to enforce it, she will do it. That makes it all the more necessary that we should examine very closely what the Protocol means. What would happen in a case of that kind?
  Suppose Russia on her recovery—and revolutionary countries when they recover are apt to be very extreme nationalists; that is the history of the past—suppose there is a reaction in favour of nationalism and Russia claims back her lost territories. She says, "I want White Russia." The question then is referred to the Council of the League, and they appoint a Court of Arbitration. The first thing that happens is that the Treaty of Riga, which was accepted by us, very un fortunately, in March, 1923—we had re fused to accept it up to that point; we never accepted those boundaries, never ratified them, never endorsed them till March, 1923—that Treaty debars us. Poland says: "That is the boundary. If you want to refer questions of the interpretation of the Treaty of Riga, we are quite willing to refer it to arbitration." Russia will say: "There is no question of interpretation. Tinder the Treaty of Riga, these territories are undoubtedly assigned to you. But we want to test the question of whether it is right that millions of Russians should be under Polish rule." What happens? We are bound, if we sign the Protocol, to use our strength for the purpose of making war. Is that really what we want? It is just a variant upon the policy which the French, one Government after another, have pressed upon us—an attempt to engage us with the whole of our strength in supporting the status quo not merely upon the West but upon the East as well. It is a booby trap for Britain baited with arbitration. I am certain the right hon. Gentleman does not want that. France is naturally obsessed with the question of security against this very menacing Power on her eastern frontier. I am not surprised. She has been obsessed since
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  1871. She is obsessed at the present moment after her victory, and I run not surprised.
  I wonder how many hon. Members have taken the trouble to read this Blue Book which was issued by the late Government? I very respectfully urge that they should read it, containing a document dealing with the question of security. Let them read what France proposed in 1917 in the middle of the War. They proposed it, first of all, to Sir Edward Grey. They afterwards proposed it to Lord Balfour when Foreign Secretary. They did not give the full proposals, but, after the revolution in Russia, the Russian Government published the actual proposals made by M. Doumcrgue on behalf of the French Government to Russia. What is the proposal? The western frontier of Germany to terminate at the Rhine, and that the Rhine should be the means by which France would curb Germany. The Russians said. "We are quite prepared to agree if you give us a free hand on our western frontier." The French Government then made this declaration, that they were prepared to give complete liberty to the Russian Government on their western frontier, but there was no question of Poland then. "Peace at Warsaw" meant a Russian peace. Russia fell. Poland is substituted. A free hand has been given to Poland. What is the result? This is the real menace to European peace. It is no use shutting our eyes to this fact. The real menace to European peace is the fact that out of 27,000,000 people in Poland, 9,000,000 are, there by force of arms—Russians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Germans—most of them there in spite of the protest of the League of Nations and of the Supreme Council. Does anyone imagine that that is going to be accepted by Russia and by Germany once they are restored in power? And when that moment Collies, what is our position? I do hope that whatever happens in the way of arbitration, we are not going to base arbitration upon those explosive treaties in the East of Europe, and the acceptance of those annexations, which would be fatal.
  7.0 P.M.
  The right hon. Gentleman has just been telling us what we ought to do. I agree with the Noble Lord who spoke last that it is not enough merely to set the Protocol

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  on one side. You must go beyond
  that, and the right hon. Gentleman to-night has stated clearly what is his attitude with regard to the community on the western frontier of France. He rather indicated that he was personally in favour of the revival of the Tripartite Treaty. He did not state the Cannes proposals quite fairly. They were conditional upon France agreeing to a pact being established throughout the whole of Europe and also upon disarmament. However, that is rejected. It is no use entering into that at the present moment. The right hon. Gentleman agrees that is something that can never be revived. He now states the proposals put forward by Germany for a Five-Power pact, and I am very delighted that he takes a friendly view of that proposal. Germany is prepared, as I understand, to accept the status quo in the West. She undoubtedly looks forward to arbitration, and the action of the League of Nations for the revision of the injustice which has been perpetrated on her eastern frontier, and I sincerely trust that the Government, with the whole of their strength, will endeavour to put that through. That is not inimical to a general pact of arbitration. In fact, it is a very good start. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary pointed out to the Noble Lord that it is not a pact directed against other nations. It is a pact dealing with the frontiers of those particular nations, and, therefore, it is all helpful to a general agreement. Surely the League of Nations would not interfere with the possibility of arrangements between two or three groups of nations to settle difficulties amongst themselves. On the contrary, by the Covenant of the League it was provided that where there are agreements of that kind, they should be registered. If it were an agreement for the purposes of aggression against other countries, that is a different thing, but in the Five-Power Pact, there is nothing of that kind contemplated. Quite the reverse; they are settling their own frontiers, their own difficulties, and that is very helpful in making the League of Nations a more effective instrument.
  I hope, with the Noble Lord, that when the Foreign Secretary goes to Geneva he is going to be armed, and that he will not allow it to be said, as it has been said, that the British Government have com-
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  mitted themselves to opposition to arbitration. I do earnestly hope that the Government will take the lead in framing a more general treaty of arbitration for the purpose of settling international disputes by some more effective method than an appeal to the savagery of war. A treaty of arbitration, to be effective under present conditions, must have two characteristics. The first is, that all questions that are likely to provoke war in Europe should be included. Unless you do that it is no good. It is simply a snare. It is simply a method of encouraging forces of their own behind arrangements and treaties which the conscience of this country repudiates. [An HON. MEMBER "What about the Versailles Treaty?"] That was a very anxious and difficult time, and we always did the best according to the difficulties we had to meet. Whatever it is, it is not a question whether the Treaty of Versailles was wise, or that of Riga was right. It is a question that whatever treaty has created conditions which will provoke war, nations should settle it by judicial methods and not by methods of war and violence. That is what really matters. Therefore, I think as the first condition of any treaty all questions that provoke war should be included.
  What is the second? This is vital. It is that the tribunal to which these questions should be referred must be a tribunal that commands confidence. Now what is the tribunal under the Protocol? I wonder how many gentlemen who support the Protocol have read it. Well, I have read it very carefully, I can assure the House, not merely once but twice and three times. I have gone through it with a sincere desire to support it, because it contains arbitration, and I honestly cannot. At any rate, I can assure my right hon. Friends I am criticising as a sincere believer in arbitration. Let me show the character of this tribunal. The tribunal at the present time in the dispute between Poland and Russia would be a tribunal appointed by a body which has shown itself at the moment to be more partial to Poland than it is to Russia, more partial to Poland than it is to Germany, and do not let us make any mistake as to the position.
  It is a disagreeable thing to say, but there is no doubt at all that the decision

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  on Upper Silesia has broken confidence in the League of Nations. I could have gone info that, but I do not wish to do so. There is no doubt at all that the method with which that was engineered has created profound distrust in the League of Nations, in Germany and in Russia. Russia is naturally suspicious. All revolutionary countries are. There is no more suspicious person than the idealist who has become a doctrinaire. Suspicion is the hall mark of orthodoxy. I have discovered it. There is no doubt at all Russia is full of suspicion, but she has reasons. You do not want to patch the Covenant of the League. You want to restore confidence in the League. Take Vilna. The League of Nations says, "You must not go to Vilna." The Poles sent 20,000 troops there. They say, "We are not responsible for them. They went against our will. They annexed Vilna." And it has now been accepted by the Council of Ambassadors. As to Galicia, the Supreme Council said to Poland, "You must not go to Galicia and annex these 4,000,000 of Ukrainians." The Poles went along under a French General and nothing happened. The Supreme Council stopped Galicia's army that was approaching. The Poles went on and marched, and, when a telegram was sent to the General, he said he had not received it. Afterwards, he said, "I have lost my code, and I do not know what your telegram means." Meanwhile the army advanced, and Galicia was conquered. You really cannot expect Germany and Russia to have confidence in a body which at the present moment is dominated in that way.
  Everybody knows that on the Silesian question Britain and France agreed not to interfere in the decision. Britain kept her word in the letter and the spirit. France kept her word in the letter. You must first restore confidence in your tribunal, and in any pact of arbitration you must have the parties concerned represented, Russia, Germany, and it is vital you should have the United States of America. If you do that, then you have an effective Treaty of Arbitrations. That is essential, because, if you had another war, then God help the children of men. It would consume European civilisation. I do earnestly entreat the Government between now and September not to be satisfied with dropping tears over the Protocol. Having satisfactorily
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  got rid of a proposal which was a sham treaty of arbitration, let them take the moral lead in Europe, set up a Treaty and insist upon having a Treaty of Arbitration that will make it impossible to draw the sword except to enforce justice.
  Mr. RAMSAY MacDONALD: I will not attempt to follow the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) either in his very wide roaming over European affairs, or in the intention of the speech we have listened to. I do not quite know what was the purpose he had in his mind. If it was to help those who have been unfortunate enough to be the inheritors of certain peaceful negotiations in which he played, at any rate, not an inconspicuous part, I do not quite understand it. I have never heard a more complete, and I was almost going to use the adjective violent, indictment of the Treaty of Versailles, and various minor Treaties that were drafted after it, carrying out its spirit, than I have heard from the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon. Until a week or two ago he was telling us that nothing was more mischievous than for men in authority to raise suspicions in Europe by hinting that the Treaty of Versailles might be made a subject of arbitration. When my right hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. A. Henderson) made a statement in Burnley that it was necessary to consider the results of the Treaty of Versailles, the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs, speaking in this House on the 27th February of last year, said:
  "I have known Ministers who have committed indiscretions, though not as serious as this, and I know it is not always easy to keep an experienced team together in, order. I am not at all sure that I did not give trouble once or twice to my chief. I think he used to scan my speeches with a good deal of anxiety and a good deal of relief at the end when there was nothing that would call for the attention of the House of Commons. But this is undoubtedly a very grave indiscretion."
  [HON. MEMBERS: "Read on!"]
  "When you are making speeches about domestic politics, well, the matter is explained. It is something which is amongst ourselves. When a statement is made which affects 33 Powers—suspicion, very touchy, very ready to believe that we are out for some mischief against their interests—nobody knows better than my

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  right hon. Friend what embarrassment that must be to the Foreign Office."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th February, 1924; cols. 615–616, Vol. 170.]
  I quite agree that an impulsive member of a party is an abominable nuisance, especially to his leaders; but when an ex-Prime Minister shows his tremendous capacity to behave like a bull in a china shop, as the right hon. Gentleman has done this afternoon, it is not merely a party concern but a European problem.
  Now I turn to the business of the Debate. I take, first, the question of the German offer. This is the first time we have heard of it in anything like detail, and before one can venture to make final commitments, one way or another, of course, one has to see what exactly it amounts to, and what field it covers. As I understand it, the offer only amounts to this, that Germany will guarantee certain territories, that is, the Western boundaries, and that as regards the Eastern boundaries she is willing to refer any problems arising out of them to arbitration. As far as I can make out, that is the beginning and the end of the proposal.
  There are two comments that arise out of that. First of all, what is our part in it? The Foreign Secretary said, very emphatically and with a great deal of emphasis, that we were to play some leading part in this Pact. What is it? Are we going to guarantee it with horse and with foot? Are we going to get any quid pro quo. I think we ought to get an explanation as to what relation Great Britain and the British Empire has to bear to this agreement, which is primarily between Germany and France and France's allies, and perhaps Belgium, regarding certain boundaries the Western boundaries, made quite definite, and the Eastern ones being left the subject of arbitration.
  The second observation is somewhat serious. If this be the best we can do, certainly let us do it. As far as I am concerned, I shall do everything I can to make it easy for the Foreign Secretary to do that, but do not let us live under any delusion as to how much we are doing when we have done it. We have hardly touched the causes of war in Europe. The causes of war in Europe have been well summarised in the speech of the right hon. Member for Carnarvon
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  Boroughs, who has told us some of the fruits of them. The mere fact that Germany is going to agree now to recognise the Western frontier, and is going to ask for arbitration on certain points of the Eastern frontier, hardly touches the big problem of European security. It undoubtedly gives France security for the time being—I admit that—and I think that is a very important thing, but if that be all we can do at this present moment in 1925—if the only thing that the British Government can do is to give France security from Germany in respect of territorial boundaries—then it is an exceedingly small thing, and it Las not advanced Europe to the least extent in the direction of a permanent and a secure peace
  We have to remember that this Pact is subject to the weaknesses of all Pacts. It is a Pact that leaves all the outside dangers of war unprovided for. It there is going to be a war in Europe again, I doubt very much if that war will arise from a direct conflict between France and Germany over boundary problems. I do not think that is at all a likely event, If there is to be a war again, it will come because the larger Powers of Europe—we need not go on mentioning them—have formed friends with the smaller Powers, with the less-secure Powers, with the less-settled Powers, with Powers that we regard as being confined in the Balkans. Having made friends with these smaller Powers, groups have been formed, not definite, not put on paper, not emphasised as alliances, but groups of real military and political consideration have been formed, and something will happen between those Powers outside those groups, and the moment something happens outside, then percussion goes on inside and the Pact comes to an end. Because questions have been raised which creates antagonisms not on the subject-matter of the Pact but on things with which the Pact had nothing to do, then the old historical enmities come into play and Europe is once more in the throes of war.
  That is one of the big problems that we have to face. That is one of the big problems that this Government or whoever forms a Government will have to face, provided they wish to take a much wider step than merely securing temporary peace by temporary arrange-

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  ments. If that is the best we can do, well I hope that the blessing of Heaven will rest upon our labour, because to a certain extent it is good; but unless the Pact is of the nature of something that will grow by its own impetus, in the nature of something that will grow by the law of its own being, into something that is wider, more comprehensive and universal, then the Pact is just the old Pact—we may say it is defensive or what we like—and the Pact will just grow as time goes on into the old-fashioned thing, which will eventuate in the balance of power in some shape or form, and no peace will be secured. This Pact is not going to get us nearer to disarmament.
  I would like to know the scope of the arbitration. I was not quite clear on that point. Perhaps it may be made clearer. Is it a general arbitration Treaty that it is proposed Germany should make with France, and to which I assume we shall be a party, or is it that on these specified problems of boundary, East or West, particularly the East, arbitration will be applied? Is the principle of arbitration and the method of arbitration going to be applied merely to the specific subject-matter of the Treaty or is it going to be a general commitment on the part of both Germany and France as far as other questions are concerned?
  There is another important consideration. When I hear objections to the Protocol on the ground that if you read this Clause or that Clause or the other Clause you are committing yourselves to risks to which you ought not to commit yourselves, I am left unmoved. The important thing we have to do now, is not to apply paper logic politics but to apply what I might call political common sense to the situation. To that extent I associate myself with the Foreign Secretary when he objected to logical deductions from certain premises. What is so essential in Europe now, and I think I shall carry the House with me in this, is to try to change the military mentality of alliances as the basis of security, until the mentality of the State becomes one that trusts to a, reference to an Arbitration Court of all questions that if allowed to develop without assistance will eventually become causes of war.
  The advantage of the Protocol over the Pact is that the former gets the nations of Europe into the habit of thinking of
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  arbitration. Give us 10 years of the working of the Protocol, and we will have Europe with a new habit of mind. I hope that is not too idealistic. if one had time, and the House would care to undergo the exercise, it could be shown that nothing is clearer in the evolution of the civilised mind than that at certain critical moments the masses have been open to a new suggestion of method, and when that method was advocated every logical objection to it was contained in its statement to the ordinary mind, but when the method was put into operation the logical objection disappeared, the common sense came out at the top, and habits were established which were unshaken. It is a fundamental reason in favour of the Protocol, that it is going to make the nations of Europe consider a new system of security, and to scrap for ever the old ideas of military pacts and military alliances.
  There is no use in hon. Members on that side or any other side coming and preaching to me about French security. We have discussed the problem of French security with Frenchmen, with Czechoslovakians and everybody else, to an extent and with a thoroughness that I believe very few Members of this House realise. I believe that France has to get that psychological frame of mind which is described as a feeling of security, but when we admit that, that is only the beginning of our trouble, because, when we admit that, I am not going to say to France or anybody else "Give me your programme, tell me what you want and I will agree to it because I am in favour of giving you security." We must then admit that the feeling of security is essential. Security is not essential. Security is a fiction of the mind. The great delusion of the militarist is that security is a thing that is shaped like a gun, that can be worked by someone at the end of it. That is where he always goes wrong. That is where he misleads the nation. Given the need of security, we have to work out a programme. We have to work out the substantial thing that gives security.
  The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reminded us quite properly that in order to defend British policy and the British position in Europe we have fought Spain and fought France and we have fought Germany. Have we got to the end of it yet? I was reading Bolingbroke's.

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  Instructions to his Ambassadors at the end of a certain war, and in that you will find whole pages of the same instructions that could be lifted out and put into the Foreign Office now as drafts of instructions or of dispatches or something which serves a similar purpose. We fought France, and we rendered ourselves for the time being secure. Germany then appeared. We fought Germany, and we were the victors. Now are we going to allow the opportunity to pass? We have now got the chance of adopting the old line of security, which is based on compacts and armed forces. It does not matter what words you give to it, that is the meaning of it. That means that in the course of a generation there will be another conflict, or we can take the position that considerable risks on paper must be taken, and that those risks can only be justified by the creation of a habit of mind which would mean that, at the end of a few years, the European nation would automatically, just as we do as individuals, whenever matters that would have been the cause of war 20 years ago arise, go to Court and have them settled there in the same way as we settle our differences when we go before a Magistrate or a Judge.
  My colleagues and I worked for that ideal. We found the draft treaty of mutual assistance left to us as an inheritance. I do not like—I confess that some of my friends quarrel with me about this—the mere changing of things because a party of a different colour has come into office. I think that one of the great accusations that will be brought against my right hon. Friends is that they are a little bit too hasty in making those changes, but that is a matter perhaps for another day and another Debate. After having carefully studied that agreement, I said that it would not do, that it was on the old lines, that it was going to damage this country, not in 1925 or 1926, but perhaps in 1940 or 1950, and on that account I should advise my colleagues to turn it down. I was comforted very much, when I came to that decision, by the fact that our predecessors in office had come to the same decision, so that it was not exactly a party decision. Now I find that they have changed their mind, and there is a sentence towards the end of the Foreign Secretary's speech in Geneva
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  which indicated that that was the right hon. Gentleman's intention, but I will not take that up now. I will put it in this way. There is a sentence which I read to mean that. I read it more than once, because I was surprised to find it in the document to which I refer.
  I will not now go into detail, but let me give the House this assurance. This Protocol, as it emerged from the Committees 1 and 3 at Geneva, was never intended to be a gospel. Our colleagues did not imagine that this was a thing done by the British Government and that it was a somewhat casual thing. It was nothing of the kind. I did not quite recognise the description of my adventures in Geneva as retailed by my successor. Here and there I recognised sober events dressed in somewhat romantic language, but here and there I did not recognise anything at all. The situation at Geneva was such that the whole existence of the League of Nations I believe, its reputation and authority, depended upon some idea being started, some proposals being made alternative to that draft Treaty of mutual assistance. We knew what we wanted. We had made up our minds after careful consideration. Not long ago we divided the question of arbitration from everything else. My right hon. Friend is still in the depths of darkness in that respect. He thinks that he can propose an arbitration treaty and that it is all right. I do not think so. It must be embedded in a large expression of European policy that meets the essential needs of the nation at the moment. Therefore we have security, arbitration, and then disarmament. The question was, how were those three to be embodied in one instrument? That was all.
  French interests are not always the same as ours. I have said so in public several times and in private very often. But France has got no interest so diverse from ours that France and ourselves, approaching the problem in a friendly spirit, cannot find agreement upon it. I am profoundly convinced of that. It may take us six months to find agreement. That does not matter. I am certain that agreement is there if the situation be properly handled on both sides. This was not a mere evolution of good will like the pentecostal peace that we read about in the Acts of the Apostles. Not at all.

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  The greeting was cold and critical, but that changed. I am not going to pursue the whole story, but an essential part of the story, which the Foreign Secretary ought to have told, was that weeks after that, weeks after I had gone and had been forgotten in Geneva, weeks after the hard struggle of those two Committees, when they got down to the uninspiring heart breaking details at the bottom, my right hon. Friend came up with his colleagues and his Protocol, and then the whole of the League decided to recommend the Protocol for the acceptation of the Governments.
  One must not belittle such an achievement. It was a great hope in international affairs, and I was profoundly sorry that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should have made at Geneva the speech which has been circulated in the White Paper. I think that it did him an injustice. I know that it did this country an injustice. I have had to defend it, to explain it. It was a very great pity. The Canadian Resolution was much more hopeful and much more helpful. What was in our minds about this? We have never said that this was to be done in the proposed forms straight away. I know that there are serious problems in this Protocol, but I maintain that it is a splendid foundation for consideration, and for negotiation for change, and it is in that spirit and conception and with that idea that I am sorry on account of the attitude which the Foreign Secretary has taken at Geneva. It will come again. There will be no security except on those lines. Not in those words and not in those clauses, but on those lines. You can have your sectional agreements and arrangements, you can, as the occasion demands, pacify France to-day and Germany to-morrow and please Poland the next day and smooth down Dr. Benes the next day. It is only for the time. That will go on until you turn down that policy, or you run on until you fall down, and then destruction is going to overtake you. Only along the lines of a combination of those three great essentials, security, arbitration and disarmament, is there a hopeful chance of a successful termination of our difficulties.
  I am rather tired of these details, because if a Committee had been appointed by the Government, right hon. Gentlemen and some of us here could have gone through the Protocol in order to
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  try to make a good settlement. Ninetenths of the points made by the right hon. Gentleman at Geneva would have been eliminated, because nine-tenths were—if I may use House of Commons language—none of them Second Reading points at all, but purely Committee points. But there is one thing about which I want to warn hon. Members. It is said that you are committed to much more by the Protocol than by the Covenant. I doubt it. Technically, in one respect, you arc, and that is that, under the Protocol, you refer to the arbitration of the Council of the League of Nations certain things which, under the Covenant, if not settled unanimously by the Council, are left unsettled, and may therefore be the subject of war. Under the Protocol you close that up, and you make no events or situations outside the scope of the arbitration provided for in the Protocol.
  Has the House really considered its obligations under the Covenant? The thing that alarms me most of all, if you are ever going to war under the Covenant, is that it is uncertain. You do not know what you are committed to The definitions in the Covenant are so vague, that if a crisis were to arise next week, and the Foreign Secretary met the representative of France, and they began to discuss what their commitments were under that Covenant, I venture to say the Foreign Secretary would be at one end and the French representative would be at the other. Both would be absolutely honest in their intentions to carry out their obligations under the Covenant, and there would be more ill-will created by that perfectly honest disagreement about the weight of our burdens, than if we had been enemies for a large number of years. That is one of the difficulties of the Covenant, and it is one of the difficulties which everyone will have to face, as soon as it comes to the actual details of the relations between France and ourselves.
  There are many other points upon which I do not think I need dwell in detail, but there is just one which was made by the right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Carnarvon (Mr. Lloyd George) who said how cheap the whole thing was. He asked, what provision has been made in the Protocol for arbitration, say, about Constantinople, or about territorial lines in the Eastern corners of Europe—none. The

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  Protocol approaches it from a totally different point of view. The Protocol makes provision for the arbitration of every difficulty that is reaching a war stage. If Constantinople comes into that position, it is provided for ill the Protocol. If the boundaries of the East enter that position, arbitration is provided for in the Protocol; and so on.
  Mr. A. CHAMBERLAIN: Surely it was not understood by Czechslovakia that her boundaries were liable to be challenged, and to be subject to arbitration the moment the Protocol became law?
  Mr. MacDONALD: That is not the way it will work. That is the difficulty. I am sorry that my right hon. Friend—I have no grievance against him—was not here when I was agreeing with him most cordially that you must not apply logic to politics. That is not how the thing will work. The Protocol is not a complete machine—that is one of the mistakes constantly being made. It is part of a general machine, to which we have already committed ourselves. I do appeal to the right hon. Gentleman, and I appeal to this House—and the very excellent speech which was delivered by the hon. Member for West Derbyshire (Marquess of Hartington) gives rue hope—that between now and September we will go on with this, and not bang the door against tins great experiment, this floe idea. I wonder if, by September, it will be possible for us to try to create an international platform for considering this question of the Protocol, so that when the Government go to Geneva in September, they will not go there saying, "If you make your compacts on these lines it will be part of our duty to upset them." It is a horrible position, and, so far as I am concerned, I hope it will not be adopted, but that we shall go to Geneva on a platform which will -secure international security and disarmament. I can assure this House that is the problem which my friends put forward, and did their best to find, at any rate, an effective solution in the Protocol.
  Lord HUGH CECIL: Everyone, I think, will share with the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down the feeling of admiration for the motives that have inspired the Protocol, and of re-
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  joicing that it was possible to get so universal and so cordial a support to the principle of peace, and the moral rejection of war as was shown when the adopted. But I want to lay before the House the view that the Protocol is a far less serviceable instrument than the Covenant for the purposes for which it was designed, that is, for the purpose of security and the purpose of disarmament. My objection is not an objection of detail; it is an objection that goes to the root of the Protocol, as I distrust profoundly the method of compulsory arbitration. I speak throwing an emphasis on "compulsory." I do not, myself, believe that, at the present stage of European civilisation, compulsory arbitration is a means for peace.
  What is the problem of peace? I suppose everyone will agree that the great Powers of Western Europe form the serious menace to the peace of the world. That is to say, the machinery of the Covenant, and even before the Covenant was invented, the old machinery of the Concert of Europe-was not wholly inadequate for preserving the- peace between the smaller Powers. The anxiety of lovers of peace is how to preserve the peace between the great Powers of Western Europe. That is the problem, and in that sense it is regional, and not universal. If you can secure peace there, the rest of your task is relatively easy, and the machinery of the Covenant would usually be adequate for the purpose.
  When we say peace, we mean, of course, that you put an end to international war. There are a certain number of quarrels which might lead not only to international, but to civil war. Those are, obviously, beyond your machinery altogether—tremendous questions of principle, such as cause a civil war even within a community, because, plainly, no diplomatic apparatus, no treaty, whether a protocol, pact or covenant, would be adequate to restrain a certain degree of human passion, such as occasioned, for example, the great-Civil War in America. But our problem is to get rid of international wars, that is, wars which really arise out of conflicts of interests between the nations concerned. I believe arbitration to be only a very subsidiary instrument in preventing those conflicts. What is the

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  weakness of arbitration? The weakness is, first of all, that in respect to a true conflict of interests, it is inappropriate altogether. Arbitration means, I suppose, the judicial decision of the dispute; but there can be no judicial decision of a true conflict of interests, because there is no common basis.
  Let me take a case out of Europe, because it is less controversial, and, unlike the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), I do not want to be a bull in a china shop. Let me take the case—a very improbable one—of a dispute arising about the Monroe Doctrine in America I take it purposely, because it is so utterly unlikely. Suppose a dispute arose, and came before the Court of Arbitration. It could not, really, get to work at all, because there would be no common basis. The United States would say, "We stand by the Monroe Doctrine." The other contending Power would say. "That has no meaning to us; it is only a doctrine of the supreme interest of the Government of the United States in the American Continent. That has no meaning to any body except the United States. There is no common basis for a judicial decision to be made at all." Accordingly, you could only get a judicial decision if you allowed the Court of Arbitration to say, "We wilt consider whether your Monroe Doctrine is a sound international principle." That amounts to denying the sovereignty of the individual State You cannot go to a State and say, "We the Court of Arbitration, or League of Nations, or any other authority, are a better judge than you are as to what are your essential interests, and what are your rights in that respect." Because that is to go with the authority of a superior, and destroy the independent authority of the State concerned.
  8.0 P.M.
  The Covenant proceeded on two great principles—the need of civilisation to avoid war, and the still unchanged resolve of the signatories of the Covenant each to maintain its own individual sovereignty. It is exceedingly difficult to adjust those two principles, but the Covenant did it, I think, by the very judicious, and, it seems to me, eminently practical machinery of Article 12, which
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  secures a delay of three months. The
  Covenant does not deny that every nation is to be the judge in its own cause, in its own final and essential interests, and is therefore perfectly sovereign. What it does says is, "You shall at any rate refer the matter to the Council or to arbitration, and you shall wait three months after the Report." That is a different procedure essentially from an authoritative judicial decision imposed by compulsion on the conflicting States. It does not deny, whereas compulsory arbitration does deny, the sovereignty of the States. That is one objection. You agree in general that you will go to arbitration, but you do not contemplate the particular dispute, which is hid in future time. You engage beforehand that you will accept the decision, as of a superior, of the compulsory court. That is quite a different thing from an agreement made pro hac vice, when the quarrel had arisen, when you consent of your own free sovereignty to put that particular dispute before an arbitral court.
  There is a second great objection to arbitration in the interests of peace. It aims at a just decision. That sounds like a paradox. Justice is very well for small disputes, but when you are entering on a great dispute about which the contending parties passionately care, there is nothing more unfavourable to a peaceful solution than to attempt an appeal to justice. Everyone knows that in his personal experience. If you want to bring together two old friends who have quarrelled and are really very angry with one another, the stupidest thing you can do is to talk about the justice involved in the point. The various leaders of political parties now within hearing of my voice—or who might be—who have from time to time to adjust quarrels among their own political friends, would be the last to make an appeal to considerations of justice. You can conceive what would happen. I want people to imagine what compulsory arbitration would be when feeling was deeply heated upon a question which was of vital national interest. It would be exactly the same thing as happens in a quarrel between friends. If you propose to have arbitration in a quarrel, you know what will happen. In the end the quarrel will be more heated between the original com-

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  batants and there will be added an independent quarrel with the unhappy person who has intervened.
  Very much the same thing would happen if you applied compulsory arbitration when two nations were in a great passion with one another. Of course it would be said that the tribunal was unfair, that Mr. So-and-so, the eminent jurist, was deeply prejudiced, and that probably he was financially interested. There would be no limit to the unfair and angry things that would be said. The Treaty would not stand the pressure. People would not consent to adhere in a matter of that kind to the decision of the arbitrator. If you take another line and say "Do not let us consider the justice of a dispute, but is it worth while to plunge Europe into war?"; if you work diplomatically and not judicially, you have a far better chance. It is not merely an abstract proposition to say that according to the 'Covenant, the League of Nations is not a sovereign, a super-State, settling with authority disputes in other States. It is a Council of States. It should always act as a peacemaker and not as a judge. It should go with friendly counsels, with diplomatic methods, talking people round, bringing the pressure of public opinion to bear on them.
  It is in that way that you will avoid war, and not by going with the hand of authority and saying that this or that shall be submitted to compulsory arbitration. My objection to the machinery is, that it seems to imply that even the most vital of disputes, things which must stir passions, are to be sent compulsorily to arbitration. I am sure that that will not make for peace. I am sure that it is an unsound way. And it is changing profoundly and in principle the character of the League of Nations. The Covenant of the League is essentially that it has set up the League of Nations as the home of friendly goodwill, as the honest broker, to use Bismarck's phrase, which brings everyone together. So I deprecate any effort to make the League of Nations a judge, to build upon the machinery of arbitration.
  Let me remind the House that where you had a complete system of constitutional organisation, and a very renowned tribunal in America before the Civil
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  War, the decisions of the Supreme Court, so far from making peace, were among the most aggravating circumstances that led to war; so far from it being true that they made for peace where feeling was really deeply aroused, they actually aggravated the situation. So I welcome the statement of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, that the Government are aiming at another path towards peace. I noticed all through the Debate that there were antitheses—either you have arbitration or war. There is a third alternative. It is the alternative of diplomatic, friendly understanding and appeal, and that is a better plan than arbitration or war. Indeed, the Covenant is quite sufficient as it stands. If people keep their word, Article 12 will adequately preserve the peace, of the world. Let me read it—
  "The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration, or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators, or the Report by the Council."
  If people keep that Article, peace is perfectly assured. The danger is that the nations will not keep that agreement. What is the problem? It is to buttress up that, to make it stronger. I do not know how the intended pact will turn out. Such an arrangement might be a powerful buttress to the Article, especially if it quotes this and other Articles of the Covenant so as to snake it clear that what the Powers are doing is not something different from the Covenant, or alien to its spirit, but setting up practical machinery which may strengthen it where it is weak. That is, to strengthen it not in form but in practice, so as to be sure that people will not break their word in respect of it. I am very sanguine that the League will be a great and effective instrument for the peace of the world. I am sanguine, because as I see it, it builds itself, not merely on considerations of moral appeal, but also on the recognition of a new reality, and that is the close inter-dependence of the great civilised Powers upon one another. War has always been a crime but it is increasingly becoming a blunder. As the League, and the friends of peace working through it, can always, if given time, appeal to this consideration, that no quarrel is really

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  worth a war between civilised people, I am persuaded that if we can preserve for the four Great Powers of the West an assured peace, we shall lay the foundation upon which will gradually grow up a sense of security, and we can lay aside the burdens of armaments which are no security for peace. From the League we get security, from security disarmament, and we do not need the Protocol which will be a danger rather than an additional help in the cause of peace.
  Captain CAZALET: When hon. Members rise to address the House for the first time, I realise with what sincerity and earnestness they plead for indulgence. I intend to follow the example of my elders and betters, and to plead for that indulgence now. In the course of the various Debates to which I have listened in this House, it has sometimes been suggested by hon. Members opposite that we on these benches are not as interested in the cause of peace as they are. I contend such a suggestion will not stand the barest examination, for this reason if for no other. Most of us on this side of the House have had our fair share in the experience of war, and that alone must of necessity make us regard it as the greatest possible calamity, both general and personal, that can befall the human rase. To me it is incomprehensible how anyone who underwent active service in the recent War can be anything but a confirmed pacifist for the rest of his life. One thing is certain. The dangers and discomforts of the trenches during the War were not the monopoly of any one section of the community which had the misfortune to inhabit those trenches; nor to-day are good intentions or peaceful proclivities the sole monopoly of any one political party.
  The few remarks which I wish to make fall under two heads: first, the Protocol; and, secondly, various aspects of the political situation in Europe. I realise that among certain sections of the community the Conservative party is thought to be less enthusiastic in regard to the League of Nations than the Liberals or the Socialist party. This idea, again, is a complete travesty of the truth. It is one which every sincere believer in the League should do his best to controvert. The very basis of the League is its nonparty and non-political character. It is, therefore, conceivable, nay, it is probable,
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  that the rejection by the Government of the Protocol may be regarded as evidence in support of this theory. Therefore, I welcomed the speech of the Foreign Secretary this afternoon, because I think that what he said ought to be an end to any misunderstanding on that point.
  I have no intention of examining in detail any of the objections to the Clauses of the Protocol, but one wonders, in passing, how many hon. Members of this House would be able to define accurately the word "Protocol," and how many hon. Members opposite, even those who took an active part in the framing of the Protocol, really believe that the British Empire as a whole could accept it in its present form. It is easy to draw attention to the weak points in the Protocol. It is as easy to pick holes in it as to criticise the League itself. For instance, to draw invidious distinctions between what are domestic and internal affairs and what should be submitted to compulsory arbitration, raises a question of great difficulty. It needs no genius to point out that without America economic sanctions would be a farce. It is obvious that the burden of carrying out these sanctions must fall chiefly on our shoulders and, it is equally clear, that if we accept this burden our self-governing Dominions are neither willing nor prepared to share in the burden. If the world were governed by theoretical propositions founded upon academic formula:, then the Protocol might be a very weighty contribution towards the peace of the universe. The world being what it is, the only chance of the Protocol succeeding, even if it should be adopted, is that it should never be brought up against a crisis nor have its clauses put into execution.
  There is one criticism which has already been made which I should like to emphasise. It is that if the Protocol is adopted, it would tend to stabilise existing conditions in Europe and make the actual conditions of the Covenant itself more rigid and less flexible in their interpretation. It has been said with considerable truth that the adoption of the Protocol would make it more difficult for the United States to join the League of Nations. Too much can be, and, perhaps, has been, said on this point. At the present moment the League, without the assistance of the United States, has con-

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  ferred very considerable benefits on the peoples of Europe and elsewhere, and, in my humble opinion, even if the United States never does join it, I do not think that fact will prevent the League from carrying on its work for the good of mankind. That work will be neither prevented nor impeded; it will be only slightly impaired. The close and intimate relationship between this country and the United States, bound together, as we are, not so much by hoops of steel as of gold, is a worthy and substantial, if not a completely adequate compensation for America's non-participation in The League itself. There is no one factor in world politics which is of such vital importance as the union of the Anglo-Saxon races. The Protocol, if put into execution, might tend to strain this relationship, and a break between this country and the United States would be of far greater consequence than any situation which is likely to accrue from the refusal of America to participate in the League at the present moment. On this account alone, I think the Protocol presents such grave difficulties that it is very doubtful whether its acceptance would produce any adequate compensation.
  It is pertinent to ask: If the Government are going to drop, or have dropped, The Protocol, what have they put in its place? I suggest it is no use deciding on a particular policy if we do not feel ourselves able to carry it out. It will be of no benefit to this country, or to any other, that we should get the reputation given to a certain notorious French statesman, of whom it was said "He has made up his mind and he does not know what to do." Great Britain appears to me to be in a position totally different from that of any other Power as regards Europe. She has less direct interest, beyond a general desire for peace and prosperity, and she is less tied by local considerations. Nevertheless, and perhaps in consequence her indirect influence is in the reverse proportion. Without our active co-operation, I do not believe a settlement is possible. We hold the balance between the contending interests, and therefore it is vital that we should use our position with the utmost caution and the strictest impartiality, even though
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  such an attitude should incur for us that temporary unpopularity which strict justice usually receives.
  Turning to the situation in Europe, here again it is easy to criticise the Treaty of Versailles and to say that it is to blame for all our troubles. I think it is arguable that from the point of view of practical politics, the Treaty of Versailles was the best possible compromise which the victorious Allied Powers were able to arrive at in the aftermath of the Great War. Nevertheless it has left some very anomalous and to say the least of it, some very inequitable situations in Europe to-day. We have already heard references to the question of Bessarabia and the Hungarian minorities: then there is the question of Bulgaria and her promised outlet to the AEgean and finally we have the biggest problem of all, the sore and vexatious question of Poland and its frontiers about which we have heard so much. These danger zones in Europe might, I think, be compared to cracks in the wall of a house which has experienced a severe earthquake. The house has been subject to that which some of us know to our cost is called "structural alterations": these cracks however have been merely plastered over without any steps being taken to ascertain whether they penetrate to the foundations or not. The action of the Treaty of Versailles in regard to these places is comparable with the action of a high-handed, incompetent, expensive and militant architect. There is only one cure—frank and open discussions, if possible under the aegis of the League of Nations, a more liberal interpretation of Article 19 and an immense amount of good will on all sides.
  I have travelled in all these countries since the War, but only wish to say a word or two in regard to Poland, as I think on the solution of that problem very largely hangs the question of peace in Europe. I fear I am unable to follow the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) into the consideration of all the AlsaceLorraines which he has conjured up in Poland, and I admit I am not competent to contend with him on those various points. After the unrivalled experience he has had in dealing with these subjects, he must obviously know what he, is talking about. I have only travelled there, and discussed these

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  questions with those who know more about them than anybody else both in this country and in Poland. I feel this should be said on behalf a Poland because she is the most sensitive nation in Europe. I would refer the right hon. Gentleman back to the partition treaties of the eighteenth century when Russia, Germany and Austria did not merely take an Alsace-Lorraine, but vast portions of the Polish Kingdom until they finally extinguish Poland from off the map of Europe. I also call attention to the Russian attitude in regard to Poland before the War. If the right hon. Gentleman were to visit those parts which were under Russian domination before the War, he would realise the appalling tyranny of that deliberate attempt to exterminate every trace of Polish nationality, and exactly the same state of things was to be found in the German parts of Poland. Look at the legislation initiated and carried through by Bismarck to Prussianise some of those portions of Poland to which the right hon. Gentleman referred.
  He mentioned also the question of Vilna. I do not know whether he is aware that the majority of the population in Vilna is not Polish. The whole question of Lithuania and Poland, to say the least of it, is difficult; I only wish to say that there is another side to the story than the one which the right hon. Gentleman presented to the House this evening. Lithuania and Poland are in many respects like Wales and England, and, curiously enough, at the time when the right hon. Gentleman was Prime Minister of England, the President of Poland was a certain gentleman called Pilsudski, who was a Lithuanian, and their Ambassador and eventually Foreign Secretary was Prince Sapieha, also a Lithuanian. I merely mention these facts to assure the House that when I say there is another side of the question there are solid facts to prove that statement. When you speak of the Eastern boundary of Germany, the problem is difficult enough, but when you begin to tackle it by calling it the Western frontier of Poland, then you immediately raise a tornado of excitement. Of all the countries which emerged or rather were resurrected as a result of the Great War, Poland is by far the largest, the richest, and the most important, and the possibilities of her
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  industrial development are of the first magnitude.
  There is a real bond of sympathy between this country and Poland, to which we should be especially alive at the present moment, when still fresh in our thoughts is the memory of that magnificent and generous tribute paid to our ex-service men by the first of all artists and the most renowned of all Poles, M. Paderewski. I deprecate the immediate conclusion formed by some people that, because one wishes well to Poland, therefore one is of necessity pro-Pole and consequently anti-something else. I am perfectly willing to be designated pro-Pole, but I am first and foremost pro-peace.
  Now whatever may be your views as regards the Treaty of Versailles, no one can deny that Germany will never willingly acquiesce in a situation which she regards as unjust, and another consideration which I think the nations and peoples of Europe should clearly understand is that, treaty or no treaty, the people of this country will never eight about a small obscure portion of Europe, about which they know nothing, concerning which they care less, and in regard to the ownership of which it is possible to advocate different points of view. Poland is rich in population and in natural resources, and no one wishes to deny her full and free facilities for the export of her goods, but in exactly the same proportion as the preservation of a contented Poland is essential to the peace of Europe, so also the existence of an aggrieved Germany is a perpetual stumbling block to that end. If anything should happen to Poland—and if my right hon. Friend had his way, I do not think there would be any china left in the shop at all—Europe would be engulfed in a tragedy and in a cataclysm comparable only to the recent War, and in which Great Britain would inevitably be included.
  I would, therefore, humbly and diffidently urge that Poland, on the crest of her popularity and on the eve of a great industrial development, should make terms with her Western neighbours which would assuage the grievances which Germany feels, rightly or wrongly, but which would in no way endanger her own national security. It is incalculable what harm would accrue if Poland is unwilling or unwise enough not to

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  pursue some policy along these lines: Germany refuses to enter the League, France, in honour bound to Poland, cannot enter a Four or Five-Power Pact, as the case may be, and England is unable to give to France and Belgium that guarantee of security with out which armies and armaments must inevitably increase. I believe that some arrangement is possible between Poland and Germany without entailing too great a sacrifice, on either side, of dignity or domains. I would humbly suggest—it was put forward in the "Observer" last Sunday—that, should any alteration or rectification of frontier be required, Germany should compensate Poland in cash. I would even go so far as to suggest, that in order to get a solution of Poland's Western boundaries, Germany should do her best to guarantee the Eastern frontier of Poland. Even if a sacrifice is entailed, the reward of a settled and peaceful Europe and amicable relationship with her neighbour and her best customer is a condition of affairs for which it is worth paying a very considerable price.
  I cannot, personally, think that the acceptance of the Protocol will further the solution of these problems. Let us use the Covenant, especially Article 19, as we have it to-day, and let us get rid of these plague spots of discontent in Europe, for then only will the nations of Europe feel themselves to be in a position to fulfil that condition which is the primary and fundamental basis of peace, namely, disarmament. I apologise for taking the attention of the House for so long. My only excuse is the importance of the Debate and the earnestness and sincerity with which we, on these back benches, regard this subject, especially, if I may say so, we who represent that section of the community which fought in the last War, which might be called upon to fight again, but which is determined that no possible channel shall be left unexplored that will prevent a similar calamity from overtaking this generation or a generation yet to come.
  Mr. COVE: We have listened with very great pleasure to the maiden speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Chippenham (Captain Cazalet), and I think I can, on behalf of the House, congratulate him both on the manner of
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  the presentation of his case and upon a great deal of the matter which it contained. I want to say, however, that he raised one or two points with which I desire to deal very briefly. The second point he raised was that the probability was that the Protocol would prevent America coming into the League of Nations. I do not think that would be the case at all. I believe that there is a sincere desire in America to further the cause of peace and to increase the effectiveness of the machinery for peace. I do not wish the House to rely merely upon my opinion. I have in my possession a speech which was delivered by no less a person than Viscount Grey, on 4th November, at Croydon, and printed by the League of Nations Union, in which he said, in regard to that point:
  "I see many people who criticise the Protocol saying that it will make the United States look less favourably on the League of Nations than it does now. I believe that is absolutely the reverse of the truth. I do not say that the Protocol will make the United States more likely to join it, but I do say this—and I am sure of it—that if the League of Nations is allowed to lie dormant the United States will despite it. If we make it a real effective means of preventing armaments and securing peace in Europe, the United States must not decide to join it, but they will respect it."
  Therefore I do not think that we need fear that the Protocol will make the United States less inclined to associate itself with the League of Nations. The next point to which my hon. Friend referred, and it is a point which has been raised over and over again, both in Debate, I think, and outside this House in the newspapers, and particularly has it been often repeated and emphasised by the newspaper to which the hon. Gentleman referred—I speak of the "Observer." A week or two ago that paper said:
  "The whole object of the chief authors of the Protocol was to establish security in Europe by mutual guarantees to maintain rigidly the entire status quo of that Continent, west and east upon the Versailles basis."
  I cannot contemplate that as being the effect of the Protocol. If there is any truth at all in that criticism, it might be more relevantly made against the Covenant itself. The Protocol does not, at least, do anything more than the Covenant to stereotype the status quo. The Protocol just recognises that Europe is not ripe yet to settle frontier questions

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  by judicial procedure and by compulsory arbitration. It does say this:
  "You shall not go to war to alter frontiers."
  It leaves the rectification of the frontiers to the method of conciliation provided for in the Covenant. Article 19 of the Covenant says:
  "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of Treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."
  Then the machinery of Article 15 of the Covenant is brought into effect to prevent wars due to any desire to rectify frontiers in the country of Europe. Therefore, the Protocol, although it does not, as a matter of fact, submit to judicial and compulsory arbitration frontier questions may agitate Europe and cause war. The Protocol does not take away the power that resides in the Covenant itself to consider this matter in order to prevent war; but it is curious to me to find how many people now are interested in this matter from the point of view of not stabilising the status quo, who a short time ago were pleading that the frontiers of Europe should be regarded as sacred.
  We had an instance to-day in the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George). A few months ago in this House he said that revision was one of the most dangerous words that could be used. Many have repeated that in regard to the frontiers of Europe. Now they come along and say, if we are going to get the status quo stabilised in the Protocol, then that is a damning reason why the Protocol should not be ratified. I want to refer before I sit down to the speech made by the right hon. Gentleman the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Geneva itself. He said:
  "The aggressor is at liberty to select his own date for picking a quarrel. Until that date arrives he may distribute his Army as he pleases—provided only that he neither mobilises them nor adds to them. When the distribution is as favourable to his design as he can hope to make them, he starts the dispute. Immediately the military position becomes temporarily unalterable. His troops, which are more or less in the right position for attack, may (indeed must) be kept there till he wants to use them. The troops, on the other hand, of his prospective victim are (by supposition) in the wrong position for defence. But there they must be kept, or the victim may
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  find himself charged with a breach of the Protocol."
  When I read that, my first impression was what a hopeless outlook upon humanity is embodied in these words! What an acute appreciation of what I may call subtle diabolical scheming on the part of some of the nations of Europe. I ask myself the question whether these words embody the capitalist morality of Europe? I cannot find anything in the Protocol to justify the events given in this imaginative description of a situation by the Foreign Secretary. Even if there were, the victim has an immediate and automatic check which he can apply in the dispute. The victim, so-called, can appeal to the League for arbitration, and that fact immediately secures him automatically the protection of the League. I myself do not think we can get security, disarmament and arbitration by considering them apart. We must take them one with the other. Arbitration, security, and disarmament! So far as I can see in the Protocol the disarmament provided is a far better kind of disarmament than will be provided by merely considering economy. Here you have disarmament, organically and progressively related to the growing sense of security, and to the processes and practices of peace.
  There is only one great automatic check provided for in the Protocol. No nation in future has to go to war. Hon. Members may say that that would affect the sovereignty of our nation. I would be prepared to give up a great deal of national sovereignty in order to avoid the horrors of war. It is useless for those who criticise the Protocol to say that we are giving up -our Navy, and are simply throwing ourselves into the arms of foreigners, while all the time we should be represented on the body governing this matter by the responsible Minister for Foreign Affairs, or the Prime Minister, or some other Minister directly responsible to the Government of his country All the time we shall be directly interested and consulted step by step in anything that might be done. I would like the House to say quite definitely that war and preparedness for war have not procured us peace, and that the time has come when we can relegate certain questions to judicial procedure in the permanent Court of International Justice,

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  and that those questions which we cannot send there shall be settled by the machinery already provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations, with the automatic, infallible test that the aggressor is the nation, not that refuses to submit to arbitration, not merely that refuses to accept a judicial decision, but that fires the first shot, that takes up arms; that that nation is the aggressor which is not prepared to submit to a curtailment of its power of war, to give up the right of private and individual war and hand over to the collective consciousness the future destinies of itself and the nations of the world.
  Commander COCHRANE: This is the first time I have had the honour of addressing the House, and I hope the House will forgive me if I limit my remarks strictly to one part of this very wide subject, the question of disarmament. I think the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Aberavon (Mr. B. MacDonald) followed the sequence of Protocol, arbitration, disarmament. I certainly got the impression from his speech that disarmament would be a simple matter when we came to it. Nobody in this House, I think, is opposed to the ideal of disarmament, and on that point. I should like to associate myself with the remarks of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Chippenham (Captain Cazalet), who spoke just now, that those who have seen something of war have no desire to sec it repeated. On the general question of the scale of armaments, I certainly accept the view that no country in modern times has ever obtained complete security. The degree of security must always depend on the financial resources of the country, amongst other factors. On the other hand, I believe there is a great desire in every nation for security, that it goes deeper than a mere idea of patriotism. I think it is almost an instinct in the people of every nation to uphold their national liberties and customs, and I believe that if disarmament is carried beyond the point to which a nation is ready to go you will create an atmosphere of suspicion in which the possibility of an outbreak of war will be even greater than it is under present conditions. Open rivalry in armaments is most unfortunate, but, after all, the rivalry is open, the danger can be weighed, and I
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  do not think you will improve the position if you have a state of suspicion and hatred. If proposals for mutual disarmament are pushed beyond the point to which the interests of nations will allow them readily to go, if by the extraneous power of a disarmament conference a nation is placed in the position of feeling that its safety depends on its rivals' strict adherence to an international agreement which can be readily broken, then I believe you will set up a most undesirable state of tension amongst the nations of the world.
  The Washington Conference was a great success, and for two principal reasons, I think. In the first place, at that time the nations had an excess of armaments as a result of the recent War; and, secondly, and I think perhaps this is the most important point, immediately the Washington Conference met the delegates had before them definite, practocal, concrete, proposals for disarmament which were easily understood by everybody. Take the question of the limitation of the displacement of cruisers to 10,000 tons. No doubt it will be possible to build a cruiser of 11,000 tons and pass it off as coming within the agreement, but it will be quite impossible to build a cruiser of 20,000 tons and to assert that it complies with the Washington agreement. In that way, I think, a definite practical step in disarmament was taken, but obviously the scope of these definite proposals is limited, and I think there is a great danger in adopting impracticable proposals for disarmament.
  Purely as an illustration I would suggest that there is a proposal for the abolition of submarines. I do not wish to argue this from the naval point of view, but from what I think is the broader point of the political consequences which, I believe, would ensue. Undoubtedly it would be perfectly simple to scrap all existing submarines by means similar to those adopted at the Washington Conference, but the first danger would arise, subsequent to the agreement, on the question of whether vessels which were then being constructed were or were not submarines. A submarine, I think hon. Members will agree with me, is a vessel which is capable of being navigated under water. Then obviously a vessel which has an open hatchway, or indeed even an open funnel, cannot be submerged, and so could not be classed as a submarine. I

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  do not wish to pursue this rather technical point, but I think perhaps I may sum it up in this way, and what. I say with regard to submarines applies with equal force to almost every form of armament. The definition of a, submarine which would be suitable to an Act of Parliament, where subsequently it would come under the acute review of the law courts, and where its exact meaning could be determined, would be inadmissible in an agreement for disarmament where the interpretation must rest, entirely on the good faith of the signatories. I would suggest that if an agreement has been reached for the abolition of submarines—I do not care whether it is reached by independent agreement or under the League of Nations—in the course of years it is probable, in fact it is almost certain, that complaints will be made through the League of Nations that this or that country is making secret preparations to build and produce submarines. If reports of that sort are received by the League of Nations, what can they do? To my mind there is only one course for them to take, and it is that they must endeavour to obtain information to prove or disprove those allegations.
  That information cannot be obtained at Geneva, and, therefore, it would be necessary to set up an International Commission to visit the countries concerned to try and establish the truth of those statements about secret armaments which had been made. The point is whether such a Commission could in fact establish the truth on this matter. Let me again take the submarine merely as an illustration. There is no part of the construction of a submarine which is not peculiar to that vessel. The hull is built of steel plates similar to that of a merchant ship. It is true that those plates are bent to a different shape, but the suspicious curvature of a steel plate is a sufficient basis for an allegation of bad faith against a friendly government.
  It seems to me that that is the position to which we should ha reduced once you go beyond the point to which nations are to proceed in the way of disarmament and you must have suspicion. You will have reports made to the League of Nations that this or that country is preparing secret armaments, but no Commission and no amount of reports will get rid of the horrible fog of suspicion.
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  After all, Governments may be able to control the growth of armaments, but they cannot control the growth of suspicion. Strongly as I feel in regard to disarmament, I feel equally strongly that this is a matter in which we ought to proceed with the greatest care. I believe the difficulties in the way of successful disarmament are enormous.
  As another example, perhaps I may go hack to the Washington Agreement. That agreement, in its main clauses, I believe was and is still most successful, but there was one proposal in it with regard to capital ships under which it was laid down by the Treaty that those ships should not have their armaments increased. The Navy Board of the United States wished to increase the elevation of the guns of their capital ships in order to increase their firing range, and had there been no agreement they would have made that small alteration, and as far as this country is concerned all that would have happened would have be-en that we should have received information of the change. Of course, it would have been registered in the technical department of our Admiralty and that would have been the end of it.
  9.0 P.M.
  A doubt arose as to whether this proposal of the Navy Department in America was a contravention of the Washington Agreement, and hon. Members will
  recollect that during the past month this question of the elevation of the guns on the United States battleships has been canvassed backwards and forwards by the authorities in this country. The Committee of the Senate in America thought so-and-so, and we have even had the views of the President of the United States upon it. Fortunately, the relations between us and the United States are such that we need not treat this incident as a matter of much importance. In my view this small question of the elevation of the guns in American battleships has received a prominence out of all proportion to its importance on account of the doubt as to whether it was really in accordance with the Washington Agreement or not. For these reasons I do feel that there are great difficulties in regard to this question of disarmament, and I wish to register my strong protest against the idea that disarmament is easy, and

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  that the only obstacle is some lack of good faith on the part of the Government.
  Mr. DALTON: I congratulate the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Commander Cochrane) who has just sat down upon a maiden speech which I think we all appreciate as showing considerable technical knowledge, and emphasising a number of difficulties which must undoubtedly be present in any scheme for disarmament. Although most of us cannot claim the same competent inside knowledge on this subject as the hon. and gallant Member, yet those of us who most clearly realise those difficulties regard the fact that they exist as a specially strong reason for setting to work with care, but without delay, to endeavour to work out settlements and solutions of the various difficulties to which the hon. and gallant Member has drawn our attention.
  The Debate has ranged over a very wide ground, and I propose to deal very briefly with one or two points which have perhaps not been touched upon so fully as certain others. I gather from the statement we have had from the Government that the foreign policy of this country is at the present moment in a very liquid condition, that the Protocol has been turned down, and that an attempt is being made to form some sort of Pact and to include in the consideration of this question three, five or possibly seven nations. Therefore, it is still possible that our remarks may have some influence on the future policy of the Government. It is with that hope that I will refer to one or two points connected with the Protocol. There has been considerable misunderstanding of the Protocol, which, in the form in which it was drawn up under the Labour Government, is now dead. Nevertheless, it is very likely that, whatever settlement is reached, the principles of the Protocol and a great number of its separate parts may be brought together in some new scheme of policy.
  There is just one word that I should like to say with reference to the Dominions. We have been told that the Dominions are opposed to the Protocol. We have not yet had the opportunity of reading in detail the grounds of their opposition, but I notice, with reference to the Dominions, that the Secretary of
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  State for Foreign Affairs, when speaking at Geneva, referred to the objections to compulsory arbitration which he entertained having been increased through the weakening of the reservations in Article 15 of the Covenant, which were designed to prevent any interference by the League in matters of domestic jurisdiction. I put down a question yesterday, and I was asked to defer it till to-day, because the point which it raised would be dealt with in the Debate. It was not dealt with in the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and I would like, at any rate, to get the question on record, in the hope that it will, at least, be pondered, if not answered. The question which I put down was to ask whether the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had taken the advice of the Law Officers before making this statement, and further, whether this statement of his was not in direct contradiction to the statement made by Sir Cecil Hurst, the Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, during the debates in the Fifth Assembly.
  Sir Cecil Hurst then stated that in his judgment the Protocol did not in any way weaken the power of the Dominions to control matters of domestic jurisdiction, and, in particular, immigration. Indeed, it appears to me that the "White Australia" policy, which, speaking for myself, I regard as an absolutely inevitable policy, which could only be broken down in the event of war in which Australia and other parts of the Empire were defeated—an event which I hope is not within the region of contemplation—it appears to me that that policy and the power of Australia and other Dominions to control their own immigration would be made very much stronger under the Protocol than it is at the present time under the Covenant, simply because, under the Protocol, as has been pointed out by a recent authoritative writer on the subject, either party to any dispute can demand from the Court of International Justice a decision on any question of international law; and, if there be one point more than another in international law which is perfectly clear, it is that every State has full power to decide what persons shall be admitted to its territory. In other words, every State has, under international law, complete

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  control over its own, immigration—whom it will admit and whom it will not admit.
  Under the Protocol power is given, as I have said, to any party to such a dispute—Australia, for example, or any other part of the Empire—to seek a decision from the Court, which would be legally binding and decisive, and which any person who has made any study of international law, however slight, would know in advance would be in favour of Australia, or whichever other Dominion might be concerned. I hope, therefore, that this argument against the Protocol will not be. used again unless it be supported with some further evidence, and, in particular, with some competent legal opinion contrary to that expressed by Sir Cecil Hurst and other authorities on this subject.
  I only wish to deal with one other matter, and that is the general question of disarmament. It appears to me that the relation of disarmament to the Protocol has not been at all clearly apprehended by many who have spoken and written about it since it was first published to the world and discussed at Geneva. The right hon. Gentleman who still, I believe, leads the Liberal party, asked this afternoon whether the question of disarmament could be submitted to arbitration. He also said that he had read the Protocol. If he had read the Protocol, and if, in particular, he had read the last Article of it, Article 21, he would have seen that disarmament is the hinge upon which the whole door swings. He would have seen that no obligations are binding upon any State which signs the Protocol in favour of a State which has not disarmed to the extent laid down, and, therefore, it is true to say—at any rate, using the word "arbitration" broadly—that disarmament questions can be referred to arbitration, because the Council of the League has to draw up a plan and all the nations concerned have to agree to carry out that plan.
  I am amazed when I hear it said, as I have in this House this afternoon, and at other times, that our military, naval and air advisers, when asked to advise about the Protocol, have stated, and apparently have convinced the Ministers whom they advised, that our obligations would be so increased under the Protocol that we should be compelled to increase
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  our armaments. Them also, and the Ministers whom they advise, I, in turn, would advise to read the Protocol, and particularly to read Article 21, because it is perfectly clearly laid down in Article 21 that the Protocol does not come into effect at all, that none of the obligations, none of the sanctions, none of the machinery, none of the resort to arbitration comes into effect at all except as a result of disarmament. If disarmament fails, the whole Protocol falls to the ground.
  I had the pleasure of discussing this matter with a leading Australian public man shortly after the meeting of the Assembly, and he said—and I quote him because it seems to me that his view is the common-sense view, which is very seldom heard in these discussions—he said he was well aware of certain difficulties in the Protocol, certain objections of detail; but he said:
  "I shall support the Protocol because I want the Disarmament Conference. If I can get the Disarmament Conference, and if the Disarmament Conference succeeds, the gain of disarmament will greatly outweigh these other difficulties. If, on the other hand, either the Disarmament Conference is not held, or if it is held and does not succeed, then we do not, indeed, get the gain of disarmament, but neither do we get anything else in the Protocol, and, therefore, none of the objections to the other parts of the Protocol have any application at all."
  That is an aspect of the matter which does not seem to me to have been at all adequately or frequently considered. In so far as I am, as I think I may honestly claim to be, a supporter of the Protocol, though willing to believe that it is capable of amendment as to detail, I certainly take that attitude primarily on the ground that it holds out the hope of general all-round disarmament. If we are not to have that, if the loss of the Protocol is also to mean, not merely the postponement, but the loss of the Disarmament Conference which was arranged for at the last Assembly, then I hope that our Government in this country will make some effort to promote, or at any rate support other people in framing, some alternative scheme for all-round disarmament.
  The hon. and gallant Member who spoke last referred to the Washington Agreement. If the Washington Agreement did no more, it at any rate proved

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  to sceptics that some kind of disarmament arrangement between great Powers was possible. It can no longer be said to be an absolutely fantastic notion that great Powers can willingly meet together and agree to limit their armaments. The United States, the Japanese, ourselves, the French and the Italians did agree to limit certain types of warships under that Convention. It is rather humiliating to be always having to follow the lead of the United States in well-doing, but, just as the Washington Conference was initiated from the American side, so it looks as though the next Conference is also to be initiated from the American side. If the British Government cannot get the credit of having been the first to initiate it, I hope they will vigorously back up any overtures that may come from President Coolidge and the American Government. It is very weary work waiting for other people to give a lead in this direction. I was much impressed by the concluding passages of the Foreign Secretary's speech, in which he referred to the suspicion and the fear that was still existing everywhere, to the persistence of the armed camps and to the danger of another Armageddon, although he, as he optimistically thought, might not live to see it. Those of us who share those feelings, even though we do not agree with the policy he is putting forward, hope he is going to act up to the latter part of his speech, and is not going to be content merely with this rather shadowy and ill-defined pact, or the policy that may grow out of it, but that he means to push forward with some vigour alternative solutions for those greater problems with which the Protocol sought to deal. In September, we are told, notice has been given that at the Assembly of the League the Protocol will be again in a prominent. position on the Agenda, and I very much hope he will be able to find some form of words which will justify him in going to that Assembly and saying that, although he still adheres to his first statement on the subject, that the Protocol in its original form was not a document which he could support on behalf of the Government, yet he comes forward with some alternative scheme which might very well take the form of large amendments of the Protocol even though there might be, in his own
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  words, very little of the Protocol left, at any rate, in the form in which it now is, but that he will endeavour to make some positive contribution to the prevention of those evils which he sketched so vividly and clearly in the concluding passages of his speech.
  Commander BELLAIRS: It was very good news for us all to hear from the Secretary of State of the much more favourable situation which has been created by the German offer. I hope some question of disarmament will be associated with the negotiations with regard to that offer, apart from the future Washington Conference, because anyone who has studied the matter must come to the conclusion that it is not merely security that governs these French armaments. There is no question in my mind whatever that the Germans for all practical purposes are disarmed at this moment. There is not a naval officer who believes that the Germans have not completely disarmed in regard to the Navy there is not an air officer who foes not believe that the Germans are completely disarmed in regard to the air, and we have not to ask any ether question about the Army but this, as to whether the powder factories are destroyed, and everyone of the powder factories has been destroyed except one. That is sufficient. We are very anxious in regard to our own armaments that the French should change some part of their policy, such as the idea of the French reporter of the Naval Budget of making the Western Basin of the Mediterranean a French lake. We want to see the horrors of submarine warfare done away with. After all, France, in common with the other nations, signed the Root Resolutions at Washington. Nearly four years have elapsed and those Root Resolutions for doing away with the horrors of submarine warfare are still unpassed by the French Legislature. The time has really come for speaking frankly. I do not altogether agree with the fault that was found with the Leader of the Liberal party for the plain way he spoke. It is very necessary in these matters where alliances are being sought that we should speak frankly with each other.
  The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Burnley (Mr. A. Henderson) rather astonished me in regard to the Protocol by saying there was no new obligation

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  involved in it. It seems to me that there may in spirit be no new obligations but there are really in practice very large obligations. For instance we are involved in sanctions in regard to trade and war by a majority of two-thirds on the Council. Under the Covenant one nation could object. Had it been a question of an issue with the United States, the mere fact that Great Britain is on the Council could have prevented that issue from arising. When once in a war, under the Protocol we have all to be unanimous before ever a nation can go out of the war, and the result is obvious, that the issues of peace and war, of taxation of trade, and everything, are taken out of the hands of the Parliament of this country and handed over to the Council of the League. The hon. Member who last spoke seemed to think that the position of Australia was strengthened. That is not the view taken by Australians. In fact the whole hornet's nest of the Pacific has been stirred up by the changes which have been made in the Protocol with regard to the immigration question and arbitration. Mr. Hughes had declared absolutely against arbitration on this issue. He made a speech dead against any domestic question of immigration being referred to arbitration during the recent American elections. I have also extracts from speeches of the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia, and they are dead against any question of arbitration on this question of the immigration of other races into Australia or New Zealand.
  I want to ask the House what they think would have been the first question to be asked us by the United States had this Protocol been sanctioned by Parliament? It would have been: what would be the attitude of this country in certain eventualities, and we should have found that there would be a great deal of suspicion in the United States. It is not so long ago when we were in alliance with Japan. Over and over again statements were made in this House by the Foreign Secretary that in no circumstances should our alliance with Japan involve us in assisting Japan against the United States. Yet the suspicion went on, and it was only allayed when the Washington Conference took place and the alliance came to an end, and from that moment the Americans started concentrating their fleet in the
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  Pacific, having no further suspicion of this country.
  I could wish the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) had been taking part in this Debate, because as far as I can make out, the Opposition are not united on this question. The right hon. Gentleman has been writing in "The Clarion" and he says:
  "Even the Protocol involves the risk of war and not the security of peace."
  The right hon. Gentleman out forward a plea for Anglo-American co-operation with which I cordially agree. I do not think anything we do at the League of Nations or anywhere else ought to interfere in the slightest degree with either the League of Nations in the British Commonwealth, or with the greater league of all the English speaking nations in which we take such pride. I believe the Protocol would create the very situation which Senator Lodge hoped would come about. He urged an alliance of America and Canada, Australia and New Zealand in one group on the immigration question. That brings me to the danger which I think the late Government were taking this country into—a European frame of mind. Over and over again I pleaded that we should take the Pacific outlook, that we should turn our gaze from Europe towards the Pacific. By concentrating their minds on the European attitude they were creating a danger which might have involved serious risks to the unity of the British Empire. But this Protocol has really been condemned, as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has pointed out, by implication in what was said by the Leader of the Opposition when Prime Minister, in the White Paper on the Treaty of Mutual Assistance in July, 1924, when he said that the Government
  "are persuaded, after careful examination of the draft scheme, that, if the obligations created by the Treaty be scrupulously carried out, they will involve an increase rather than a decrease in British armaments."
  Ho not only referred to the increased armaments which must result, but he referred to the Temporary Mixed Commission of the League of Nations for 1922, which stated that
  "in the case of armed assistance certain forces such as aircraft are the most readily available and therefore the most likely to

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  be asked for and to be effective in the initial stages of the war."
  That meant, of course, that in nearly every case, excepting a land-locked country like Switzerland, Britain would be called upon to be the policeman and schoolmaster of the world. There was another paragraph which condemned by implication what has taken place in the Protocol. The Leader of the Opposition said:
  "The draft Treaty further appears to involve an undesirable extension of the functions of the Council of the League. Under Article 16 of the Covenant the Council can only recommend action, while even under Article 10 it can only advise. By Article 5 of the draft Treaty the Council are authorised to decide to adopt various measures. Thus the Council would become an executive body with very large powers instead of an advisory body."
  My own belief is that when he went against the Treaty of Mutual Assistance he was advised and said he was advised by the proper officers in London, but that when he went to Geneva he was ruled by sentiment. It is very dangerous in foreign affairs to be ruled by sentiment and renders one liable to tumble into the same predicament as Dr. Guilliotine. He passed a Measure for the benefit of mankind through the French Parliament and it was under that Bill most of the victims went to what was called after him the guillotine. He died of a broken heart. I do not want the Leader of the Opposition to do that. I admit that the French sent one of the best delegations to Geneva that they possibly could send, and it overmatched the British delegation. The one aim and object of the French is to bring about a group of the United States of Europe as against Germany and Russia. Now the one thing that this country has fought against in these questions has been given by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and also the Leader of the Opposition. When we fought Philip of Spain, Louis XIV and Napoleon: when our Navy was founded by Offa, King of Mercia, to withstand Charlemagne, who had designs on this country, the one aim and object of this country was to prevent the United States of Europe becoming an accomplished fact. If we are going to fall in with that view, it will be dead against the policy which we have always pursued in the past. But the
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  Leader of the Opposition, having unloaded himself of his sentiments at Geneva, left the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Burnley (Mr. A. Henderson) in charge. We are all hearing about the pilgrimage of Child Arthur in Palestine. There was another pilgrimage by another child Arthur. The right hon. Member for Burnley is a great traveller. He went to Moscow and wanted to go to Stockholm to call a new world into existence, to redress the balance of the old. The history of that pilgrimage can be given in the three words "Moscow," "Doormat," "Geneva." In between there was the indiscretion of the election speech on the Treaty of Versailles when the right hon. Member stood for Burnley. The Leader of the Opposition rather brushed it aside by saying that he merely suggested the revision of the Treaty of Versailles. I have looked up the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Burnley at the election in which he said:
  "We must insist, as an absolute essential, upon the revision of the Treaty of Versailles with all expedition possible,"
  And then added that., as regarded
  "both the territorial and economic aspect of the Treaty of Versailles, that revision was not only essential, but very much overdue."
  I sympathised with the right hon. Gentleman when he made that speech, because he was only carrying out what was in the manifesto of the Labour party at the election of 1923. What does the Protocol do? It stereotypes and makes law for ever that Treaty as well as the Treaty stipulations with regard to Poland and other countries, so that we could never revise those treaties. I wish all Treaties would come up for revision from time to time at the League of Nations. But what I think was the great fault of the late Prime Minister when he went into details was this. He made the same mistake as President Wilson. President Wilson ignored the Republican Party, which was the minority party. In this case, in going to Geneva, the ex-Prime Minister ignored the majority party. He could very well have consulted and asked the Leader of the Opposition as to who should go with him, and then we should not have been tarred by this fact that we have for the second time turned down proposals to bring about disarmament and peace. Another point was that he ignored the War Staff. He took no one

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  with him from the Navy. The delegation found there a liaison officer, but he was not an officer of the War Staff. Lord Balfour took with him the Admiral of the Fleet who was in charge of the War Staff, a Rear-Admiral, two Captains and two Commanders, all belonging to the War Staff. It was only at the later date when the Lords of the Admiralty got alarmed at the reports coming from Geneva that they dispatched the Director of Plans. He was not dispatched by the Labour Government, but was sent by the Admiralty to see what he could do to save the situation.
  The other part I want to deal with is the way in which the Protocol interferes with the mobility of the Navy. As pointed out by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Navy is prohibited moving when once a crisis has broken out. We should not be able to move any ship to the Pacific under the Protocol for the defence of Australia and New Zealand, and therefore we should be very much hampered in regard to defending Australia and New Zealand. The League then under the Protocol sanctions can regulate our trade, our taxes and our Navy, and the issues of peace or war are taken out of our hands. We of this Parliament can do nothing beyond interpreting existing obligations under the Protocol. I submit that the Government are quite right in rejecting this Protocol, and they will receive the support of the great majority of the House.
  To summarise the points of the reasons why I am against the Protocol, I refer first to the tendency to break up the Empire, because the deviations of policy between this country, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. It would spoil the good feeling between this country and America, and it would tend to create united States of Europe with Germany and Russia hostile. It would also take out of the hands of Parliament the issues of peace and war, and the Navy would be called upon to do the work of the League at our own expense with the possibility of getting it from the nation that is named as the aggressor at a later stage. We should also be called upon to finance shipping and supplies, and so forth, for the work of the rest of the members of the League of Nations who are operating against the aggressor. For
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  all these reasons I echo the words of Demosthenes, in regard to this Protocol—
  "Will ye not beware, lest in seeking peace ye find a Master."
  Mr. HUDSON: The very interesting speech to which we have just listened, included, amongst other arguments, one that has been referred to by several speakers on the opposite side of the House, to which I take particular exception on account of its weakness. I refer in particular to the argument that the Protocol will stereotype the present position of things in Europe and will maintain the status quo. Those who take that point of view have failed to realise that the very fact that a number of nations have already agreed to the principles of the Protocol, is an indication that, at least, those nations have decided to deviate from the status quo. The bringing in of the principle of arbitration, and the more exact defining of the methods by which arbitration shall be pursued in all possible cases, is such an advance on the general conditions that exist in Europe to-clay, after past Treaties, and even under the Covenant of the League of Nations, that there is bound to be a gradual emergence from the position which we find in Europe at the present time. Once habituate the countries of Europe and other nations of the world to the principles of arbitration, and get them accustomed to the idea of submitting their disputes to an international court, and you bring into existence a new method, the end of which may take you very far from the general position in which Europe now finds itself. If hon. Members had given more attention to the implication of the Arbitration Clause than some of them appear to have done, less stress would have been placed upon the argument regard the status quo in Europe.
  I very much regret that the Foreign Secretary to-day has taken again pretty much the same line that he took in the speech that he made to the Council at Geneva. While rejecting the general principles of the Protocol, he has insisted that, generally speaking, he is in support of the principles of arbitration. I think he went so far as to say at Geneva that this country had given considerable indication of the practice of arbitration in the past. He further insisted at Geneva that

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  we had arrived at what would seem to be an unprecedented state of disarmament, or, at least, that we had arrived at a condition of disarmament which was possible within the limits of national safety. It is curious that that view should be held by the Foreign Secretary when recently in this House we have been discussing Estimates for armaments which everybody admitted were in excess of the Estimates that we considered prior to the War. More than £120,000,000 upon the three Services, embarkation upon new projects, including the Singapore base and an increase in our Aerial Force, are signs of the fact that we do not seem to have progressed anywhere near to the point where disarmament has been reduced to such a point as we felt to be necessary, taking into account the condition of national safety, say, before the War, at a time when our great enemy was then in existence, and when we were supposed to be constantly threatened by the menace across the North Sea.
  Unfortunately, the present position that we are involved in as a result of the attitude that the Foreign Secretary has taken is that there seems to be very little indication of progress towards disarmament in the immediate future. All the signs are in the opposite direction. Before I sit down I would like to ask one or two questions regarding the implications of the suggested Pact as it has come from Germany, especially upon this question of progress 'towards disarmament in the immediate future; but before I come to that point I should like to say a few words as to the great advantage, at any rate from my point of view, that the Protocol would have given us in the direction of establishing once and for all in Europe and in the world a method of arbitration for the settlement of our in ternal disputes. I dislike the Sanctions Clauses of the Protocol, just as I dislike the Sanctions in the Covenant of the League of Nations.
  I would argue that there has been very little advance, very little change, beyond a certain amount of definition, as between the general Covenant of the League of Nations and the terms of the Protocol, when we come to consider the question of sanctions for the application of armed force. While I dislike that side of the Protocol, it is my view that if the Arbitra-
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  tion Clauses had been given a real chance, in very rare exceptions would it have been necessary to apply the Sanctions Clause at all. Why is it that in the past nations have supported their statesmen in the prosecution of wars? They have done so, and I believe the rule is universal, because they have believed in every case that the opposing nation was the aggressor. The only means that they had of discovering who was the aggressor nation was the propaganda that their own statesmen had been responsible for setting up. I would remind the House of the well-known poem which was written with respect to the souls of five men who had died in the War—an Austrian, a German, a Frenchman, an Italian and a Britisher. Each one of them said:
  "I died for freedom, this I know,
  Because those who bade me fight have told me so."
  It has been the case in the past in Germany and in our own country. It was the case in the Boer War, the Boers believed that justice was on their side, and the people who supported the War here believed that the justice was on our side. If an international arbitral body could be set up and accepted beforehand by all the nations of the world to whom, as a general rule, all disputes might be submitted for arbitration, it would be extremely diffcult for statesmen in future, by biased propaganda, to carry their people into war in the way that they have carried them in the past, and I feel convinced that if the arbitration Clauses of the Protocol had been given a fair chance the world would have discovered in a comparatively short period the advantages of this method, and that war would have become practically impossible in our time. More than that, I have ventured to hope that if these Clauses had been adopted, even by such nations as were willing to ratify the Protocol up to a few weeks ago, the progress made would have been such that even a nation like America would probably have radically modified its views upon the League of Nations and upon the Protocol within a comparatively short time.
  As far as I can understand, although American opinion, probably, still remains opposed to participation in the League, a very considerable swing of American opinion has taken place towards the world court, and Americans

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  to-day are prepared to accept the world court and the reference of disputes between different countries to the world court, and I feel convinced that before many months, certainly before many years, a further modification would have taken place in American opinion. But for the present, at any rate, it would seem that the Protocol is jettisoned, although I believe that its principles cannot be jettisoned. The fact that we have got more than 40 nations, through their representatives, to agree to these principles, is a point which will never be got rid of. It is a new turning point in our international affairs. I believe that even under the Pact that has been suggested by Germany, towards which the Foreign Minister has expressed a considerable amount of sympathy in his speech to-day, you still be confronted with the necessity of finding a means to apply those same principles of arbitration within the Pact, if it is to be made of any value in the settlement of our international difficulties.
  There are one or two questions which I may put to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on this issue. Suppose that the Government will be successful in making with Germany and with France a tripartate or a five-nation pact, in what way are you going to carry out the provisions of that pact? The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has objected to the Protocol because, as he says, it organises war instead of organising peace. Is there to be no attempt under the proposed pact to organise war? What will be the position of the Government, say, regarding the western frontier of France under the terms of this pact if it be finally agreed to? Suppose it should happen—and I do not think that it is a wild supposition—that in the next 10 years that body of opinion in France that has constantly sought to make the Rhine the French frontier should become successful enough to drive the French into making an effort to make the Rhine the frontier, what would then be our position under the suggested five-nation pact? Would we, under the terms of that pact, be compelled to take up arms in order to befriend Germany against an attempt of France to make the Rhine the permanent French frontier? I put that for the sake of the argument in order to try to get from the representative of the Foreign Office an answer. Is it the case that
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  under the new pact you rule out entirely the probability of organising for war in future? If you still contemplate organising for war then I suggest that you should be more moderate in the attack that is made upon the Protocol, at any rate, upon this particular occasion.
  Another point. In what way will that pact help us towards disarmament? If the pact is signed as between Germany, Belgium, France, ourselves, and one other country the conditions then would not be materially different from what they are to-day. What is to prevent Britain to-day disarming at any rate so far as Germany is concerned? I agree entirely with the previous speaker in what he said about Germany being for all practical purposes entirely disarmed, at any rate, with regard to Navy and Air Force, and, with the exception of the one powder factory, with regard to the Army as well. There is nothing in Germany to-day to prevent this nation from disarming. There is nothing in France to-day to prevent France from disarming, but the fact is that although nearly six years have gone since the cessation of hostilities, Europe is more an armed camp to-day than it was in 1914. In what way is the pact going to hasten your progress towards disarmament? I submit that until the problem of disarmament is considered from the point of view of the world as a whole, and not merely from the point of view of sectional arrangements that may be made as between ourselves and two or three other countries in Europe, and until the world as a whole is taking as the unit no real expectation can exist in this House or elsewhere that progress can be made towards considerable disarmament, and it is because I believe that the Protocol has given new confidence in countries like France, in methods of arbitration as a new approach towards disarmament, and because countries like Czechslovakia were willing. in the coming June, had the Protocol been ratified, to come together in a new world conference for the consideration of disarmament that I thought that very great progress was going to be made.
  I hope that between now and September a very considerable modification will yet be made by the Government in their attitude regarding the Protocol. I am convinced that when the Secretary of

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  State for Foreign Affairs goes to the Assembly, as I hope he will go, on the occasion of its next meeting, he will be confronted by such arguments from the representatives of the League that he will not be able to continue the attitude which hitherto he has taken. He will be asked the question, as, indeed, I ask the question now, Why does he object so much to the idea of the Protocol with its sanctions, with its possible use of the British Navy, and, at the same time, accept the Covenant of the League of Nations? I submit that a very careful reading of the Covenant will bring home to him—if it has not been brought home to him, it certainly will be brought home to him at the next General Assembly, I believe—that under the Covenant this country is committed to use its armed forces as a result of international decisions that finally would be come to by the League. I agree the way those should be used is not exactly defined; but, at any rate, with regard to the use of the economic blockade, certainly the Covenant is very exact indeed; and this nation is committed to use the economic blockade by the terms of the Covenant alone.
  I feel that the Government to-day is at the parting of the ways, not merely regarding the acceptance or non-acceptance of the Protocol, but regarding the acceptance of the League or the nonacceptance of the League. You cannot pretend to believe in a League of Nations, to sink your own national desires, in order that, ultimately, you may get a great world opinion expressed to a world parliament, and continue all the time to insist upon retaining your national forces or national strength. The day must come when you will have to decide for a League, for an international body which will become all-powerful in the world, and I am quite sure, if we are to make the progress we desire to make towards disarmament and the development of a real international spirit, we shall have to think far less about our unfettered right to use the British Navy as we think fit, just as the Germans have had to think far less of their unfettered right to use the Prussian Army, as formerly they thought fit. All that point of view has to give place to something wider and something better, and I appeal to the Government, before they finally reject the
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  Protocol, to reconsider once more the great benefits that we might obtain by the application of the principles of arbitration, and, through that means, I believe the progress that so many Members of the House desire could be obtained.
  10.0 P.M.
  Mr. DUFF COOPER: We have had this evening a very pleasant and a very amicable Debate. We have heard a very great deal said in favour of the Geneva Protocol, but, in the interesting and eloquent speech which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Burnley (Mr. A. Henderson) read to us, there were no arguments put forward that I could discover in favour of the Protocol. He argued, as other hon. Members who have supported the Protocol have argued as the Noble Lord the Member for West Derbyshire (Marquess of Hartington) argued, in favour of arbitration, of disarmament, and of security. In so far as that was their argument, I submit that they were pressing at an open door. We are all in favour of security. We are all in favour of arbitration as opposed to war as a method of settling disputes, as everybody, except, possibly, the manufacturers of armaments, is in favour of disarmament. Upon those grounds alone, you cannot defend the Protocol. The criticism of the Protocol is that, although it set out to secure these ends, which we all desire, it would, in practice, fail to do so. I had hoped, I must confess, to have heard from the Liberal Benches a more impassioned defence of the Protocol than even from the Labour party. Liberal organisations and clubs throughout the country have been passing resolutions during the last month in favour of the Protocol, and some of us have been almost snowed under by avalanches.
  It, therefore, came as a surprise to me, as it must have come to many Members of the House, when the Leader of the Liberal party delivered the speech which he did this evening. Personally, I enjoyed the speech enormously. A bull in a china shop is always a good entertainment, and there was a breeziness and lack of discretion about the right hon. Gentleman which very naturally drove the Foreign Secretary from his seat, but which rather refreshed ether equally irresponsible Members. I think the House enjoyed the speech. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman the Member for

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  Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) enjoyed it himself; but he did not enjoy the best part of it, because he could not see it. The best part of the speech from our benches was the expression on the faces of the right hon. Gentleman's followers—the expression of consternation and of surprise—and I am afraid that those are the only benches that did not enjoy the right hon. Member's speech. I had hoped we should hear this evening, and I hope we shall still hear, a speech from the right hon. Member for the English Universities (Mr. Fisher), but I am afraid if we do it will disclose yet another spirit in that fissiparous unit the Liberal party. The defence of the Protocol has been so limited, that I really feel it is hardly right for Members upon this side to go on attacking what nobody has yet had the courage to defend. One is reminded of the old Latin proverb De mortuis nil nisi bonum, for we must recognise, so far as the Protocol is concerned, we are in the presence of a corpse. Personally, as I read the despatch which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs addressed to the League of Nations on the subject of the Protocol, I felt that, good as it was, and entirely as I agreed with every argument and every sentence of it, if I had been him, and desired to save myself the trouble of drawing up that despatch, I should have forwarded to the League of Nations a copy of what I consider an even more admirable document, drawn up by the Leader of the Opposition last year on the subject of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance.
  I have been at some pains to analyse that despatch, and have even tabulated all the arguments then brought forward by the right hon. Gentleman against the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and I can assure the House there is not one which does not apply to the Geneva Protocol. I have been waiting and hoping that the Leader of the Opposition would, upon some occasion, give us an explanation of the differences which really exist between the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol, and would have explained why he turned down the one so ruthlessly and so remorselessly and supports the other so whole-heartedly. He has refrained from doing so. The right hon. Member for Burnley gave only one argu-
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  ment against the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, so far as I understood—it allowed private pacts between countries. Apparently, he had not read the Geneva Protocol he signed himself, which also allows private pacts between countries. All the other arguments against the Treaty of Mutual Assistance equally applying to the Protocol have been touched on by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and by the hon. and gallant Member for Maidstone (Commander Bellairs), so that I really think it is waste of time to go over that ground. I only remind the House that the Leader of the Opposition based his criticism on two main questions which he brought to bear on the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. He said: Are the guarantees sufficient to justify a nation in disarming, and are the obligations such that it can conscientiously undertake to carry out disarmament
  Apply those same two criticisms to the Protocol and you must come to precisely the same conclusion as the right hon. Gentleman came to when he applied them to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. What are the guarantees under the Protocol? In what way is the Empire safer if we ratify the Geneva Protocol, and if we do not? In no way. What are the obligations that he undertakes? They are vague and they are unlimited. Therefore, one is forced to the conclusion, as the right hon. Gentleman himself was forced to the conclusion a year ago, that so far from this document enabling us to decrease our armaments it would compel us to increase them. There is one other point, and that is the question of the definition of the term "Aggression." That is, from the point of view of the arbitration Clauses of the Protocol, a fundamental plank of the whole document.
  The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said elsewhere some 10 days ago that all this talk about the difficulty of defining the term "Aggression" was a good deal of "my eye and Betty Martin." But where did the talk begin? It all started from the right hon. Gentleman himself, who embodied that argument in the document which he addressed to the League of Nations on the question of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. He then reminded the Secretary of the League that a

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  special Committee had been set up, a temporary mixed Commission, assisted by technical members of the Permanent Advisory Committee, to go into that very question and define exactly what was meant by "aggression," and that they had reported that it was impossible to define the term at all. The right hon. Gentleman, who was then Prime Minister, said that this proved the lack of that element of certainty and reliability which was essential if the nations of the world could really recommend, if the advisers of the League could recommend the members to accept that document as a basis of a policy of disarmament. He said it was essential.
  We are accustomed to the inconsistencies of the great, but really that the late Prime Minister should have described a year ago in a document, a State paper of the highest importance, addressed by him as the representative of this country to the League of Nations, as essential a matter which eight months later he described, when Leader of the Opposition, as "my eye and Betty Martin," is an example of the inconsistency of the great which I think really surpasses any with which we have been favoured in recent years. I prefer the view which he took of this matter as Prime Minister. It is important that we should realise that the definition of this term "Aggression" really strikes a blow at the whole substance of the Protocol. As the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr. Hudson) has said, every nation that has ever gone to war has thought that it was fighting a defensive war. But he did not go further, as I am prepared to do, and say that it is impossible, looking back on the wars of the past, to decide what countries were aggressive and what were not.
  Take the late War. At the time when it broke out we in this country were convinced that we were fighting a war of defence and that the Germans were the aggressors. The Germans were equally convinced that they were not the aggressors. The neutral Powers of Europe had very considerable doubts, and even all the people of this country were not convinced that we were fighting a defensive war. The Leader of the Opposition was not convinced of it. How, then, can we assume any certainty
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  in a matter of this kind? Take the great wars of the past. Take the Franco-Prussian War, a war which was made by the diplomacy of Bismarck to appear to be a war of aggression on the part of the French. We now know the whole history of the case. We know the story of the telegram which Bismarck manipulated, and that when he did it, be said it was most important that at the beginning of a war one should appear to be on the defensive. But the people at the time did not know that. The French Government played their cards badly and appeared to be in the wrong. The Germans played their cards cleverly and appeared to be in the right.
  Take another great war, the Crimean war. We have all the documents now; we know all the facts, and to this day there is no general consensus of opinion as to who was really responsible for the war. Some say it was the Tsar; some say it was the Turk; many say it was the Emperor Louis Napoleon; ethers say it was the vacillation of Lord Aberdeen; and only a few weeks ago there was published an extremely able book which seeks to prove that Lord Palmerston was really the villain of the piece. You can never decide justly who is the aggressor in any war. The whole of that system of deciding disputes, and the whole of that theory, which forms such an important part of the Protocol, should be scrapped before any other document of the sort is brought into existence. But even if all the arguments which I have mentioned against the Protocol were met, even if the guarantees were of a kind that did justify us in disarmament, even if the obligations were so clear and definite that we could conscientiously undertake to carry them out, if a definition of the term "aggression" were found that satisfy all countries as precise and clear, even then I would be strongly opposed to the ratification of the Protocol at the present time.
  We have heard a great deal this evening and recently about the danger of the bad old system of groups of Powers, but it has not yet occurred to anyone, in this House, at any rate, to say that the League of Nations, unfortunately, as it exists to-day, is nothing but a group of Powers. Members are so impressed by figures that there is often a danger of their not seeing the

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  League for the States. We are told that 47 have signed the Covenant and that 27 have ratified it. We all know that only a very few of those States really count at all. One of the big Powers could take on 20 or 30 of the others with its left hand tied behind its back. Your real idealist, if his ideals are to be anything but smoke, must also be a realist. He must understand what Powers count in the world and what Powers do not. In Europe there are five Powers that count three of them are members of the League and two are not. That is not a large proportion. In the rest of the world there are two great Powers of first rate importance. One of them is a member of the League and the other is not, and the Power that is not a member of the League is the larger, the wealthier, The more populous and the more powerful of the two.
  The right hon. Member for Central Newcastle (Mr. Trevelyan) said in a speech in this House last summer that the League of Nations was founded upon the rock, that all nations were equal in the councils of the world. The Secretary of State said something of the same tort this evening. With all due respect, I submit that if the League if founded upon the rock, that the United Stabs is the equal of Uruguay and that Albania and the British Empire count for the same thing in the councils of the world, then the League of Nations is founded upon nonsense. Realising that and the differences between the Powers, surely it is the bounden duty of those who really care for the League, who really believe in it, to leave no stone unturned, no avenue unexplored, which may make the League complete, which may make it really the League of Nations instead of a League of Nations. The ratification of the Geneva Protocol would undoubtedly have rendered it less probable rather than more probable that the United States would ever join the League at all. Personally, I believe that the ratification of the Protocol would have been the last, nail in the last coffin of the last hope of the United States ever joining the League
  Without the United States the League can never fulfil the function for which it was designed. We who criticise the Protocol are met with the answer, "What have you to put in its place? There it is.
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  It is, at any rate, a serious, an honest and a respectable effort to attain those ends which we all desire, the prevention of war and the settlement of disputes by arbitration." In the same speech, the Leader of the Opposition said, in reference to the Secretary of State for Foreign affairs, that he was the sort of man who would have said 100 years ago, "Duelling can never be stopped; honour must always be satisfied." I think that analogy of duelling suits particularly well the case of those who are opposed to the Protocol, rather than the case of those who support it. Duelling existed in this country 100 years ago to the extent that a Prime Minister of Great Britain thought it incumbent upon him to fight a duel in Hyde Park. To-day the thing seems almost incredible and quite absurd to us. How was that change brought about? Not, as the Leader of the Opposition seems to suppose, by legislation or by international agreement. It has only been brought about by a great and extraordinarily rapid change in the minds of men. That change has come about through no help of the legal power whatever, and this is the answer which I think the hypothetical Foreign Secretary of 100 years ago would have made to anybody who had told him that duelling ought to be stopped: "We cannot stop it by law; we can only trust to an improvement in the minds and consciences of people." He might have been laughed to scorn at the time, but history would have triumphantly vindicated that view. We believe, we hope and we trust that a similar change of mind may come over the world with regard to the greater problem of war. There seems at present little chance of that; there seemed little chance of such a change 100 years ago in the matter of duelling.
  We believe that great human institutions must be allowed to develop and grow just like human characters and human beings. They must be submitted to the beneficent influence of time. Six hundred years ago this House of Commons existed but, had it then been proposed that this House should carry out the duties which it carries out to-day—that this House should rule the country or fulfil one-thousandth part of the great obligations which it now undertakes—the proposal would have been absurd and had any attempt been made to bring it about,

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  the House of Commons itself would have collapsed under a burden which it was not then fit to bear. I do not suggest that the League of Nations will need 600 years to develop. Things move more rapidly nowadays but it is useless to imagine that so tremendous an experiment in human affairs, so vast, so complicated and so delicate a machine could be brought to completion and perfection within the short space of six years. Rome was, proverbially, not built in a day, and we who really believe in the League of Nations are trying to build something broader, something more lasting, more durable and more grand than Rome. We are endeavouring to build a city not made with hands, in which all the nations of the world can be free citizens, and we believe that only time can allow so magnificent a building to be completed, and consequently it is the duty of those who live to-day to make sure that the foundations are well and truly laid. We will not lay them upon the so-called rock of the equality of nations, because we know it is not a real rock, but a piece of painted cardboard, of stage scenery, which will collapse should any real work be placed upon it. We will lay them rather up in the agreements and understandings which already exist between nations. We wish to strengthen and extend those agreements and understandings in order to make them so many links in what will eventually be a great chain the circumference of which will include all the States of the world. We will base our structure upon that principle, and also upon the development and the growth, which must necessarily be slow, of the mind and the intellect of humanity.
  Mr. HERBERT FISHER: In the early part of his excellent and eloquent speech the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Duff-Cooper) addressed an invitation to me to intrude upon the attention of the House, and although I have some doubt of my ability to make myself audible owing to slight throat discomfort I, nevertheless, am not without hope that in the course of a very few minutes I shall be able to make my position upon this grave matter of discussion clear to the House. I confess that when a proposal comes to this country adopted by the universal voice of the League of Nations, I am disposed to treat it with very great
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  respect. Having regard to the composition of the League, to the hopes which are invested in it, to its great possibilities for good, I think that we should think twice before we disparage or reject a proposal which has been unanimously adopted in that Assembly, and I confess that I could have wished that the reply of the Government had been couched in a somewhat less critical and destructive vein than my right hon. Friend chose to adopt at Geneva.
  I could have wished that he had found it possible to have adopted the attitude which was taken by the Canadian Government, which, in a very much shorter dispatch, evinced what I regard as being a larger measure of sympathy and showed itself willing to consider further certain aspects of the Protocol with a desire to give them due weight, and, if possible, to see whether any advance could be made in the direction indicated. The Government of Canada expressed itself willing to consider further Clause 3 of the Protocol, under which the member States are invited to accept the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Justice in the case of justiciable disputes. I confess that, in view of the fact that under Article 26 of the permanent Statute of the Permanent Court of Justice it is possible for States to accept that jurisdiction, making ample reserves, as also that some 20 States have already accepted that jurisdiction with reserves, I should have thought it possible that the British Government might go some way in that direction.
  Again, the Government of Canada professed itself willing to consider further whether it was not possible to expand or to amend the provisions of the Pact dealing with non-justiciable disputes, and there, again, is a sphere of inquiry which might possibly be fruitful of results. Consequently, when the right hon. Member for Aberavon (Mr. Ramsay MacDonald) extended an invitation to the Government, and suggested that it might be desirable, in order to secure a certain measure of continuity in the policy pursued by the British Government at the Assemblies of the League of Nations, for the various parties in this House to get together and for the Government to take counsel with the members of the Labour party and with the members of the Liberal party as to the attitude to be adopted by the British delegation at the next Assembly of the League

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  of Nations, I confess that, when this suggestion was made, it had my sympathy. Indeed, I think we have exposed ourselves to the legitimate criticism of Europe by the abrupt changes of policy which of recent years have been pursued by our delegates at Geneva. There was the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with which the name of Lord Cecil was associated. That proposal engaged the very earnest attention of the Assembly of the League of Nations, and it was debated in every capital of Europe. It was understood—no doubt erroneously—to be the considered opinion of the British Government. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Aberavon (Mr. R. MacDonald) rejected it summarily and completely. The present Government similarly rejected the Treaty put forward by the Labour Government. I venture, however, to think that it would be of great advantage if before the next delegation goes to Geneva it could go with a national policy which will be understood in the Chancelleries of Europe as representing, not the point of view of one party, but the view of the British nation as a whole.
  Having said this, let me briefly indicate the difficulties I feel with regard to accepting the Protocol in its present shape, or at the present moment. When I went to the first three League Assemblies of the League of Nations at Geneva I took the view, which I have never varied since, that it was immensely to the interests of Europe that the members of the League should continue under the terms in the Covenant. These might be varied in small details, or elucidated where necessary, but there is great objection to tightening up the Articles of Association until all the Great Powers standing outside the orbit of the League have been brought within its membership. I find myself in entire agreement with the right hon. Gentleman the senior Member for the Oxford University (Lord Hugh Cecil) when he argued that the procedure of the Protocol by arbitration was not so well calculated to advance the real objects of the League of Nations as the procedure laid down in the Covenant itself, which is a procedure, not by arbitration but by conciliation. The diplomatic procedure of the Covenant, in all the great causes which were likely to lead to war, is far more likely to be efficacious
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  than the judicial procedure of arbitration. Quite apart from that, it is, think, inadvisable at the present moment to assent to the Protocol, in view of the difficulties which it will create for America, in view also of the difficulties with regard to it which are felt in our Dominions, and in view of the fact that Germany and Russia still stand outside the League.
  I am well aware of the course of events which led the late Government to adopt the Protocol. They adopted the Protocol because they felt it offered a chance of obtaining disarmament. It fell to me to preside over the first committee which dealt with the subject of disarmament at the League of Nations, and I soon became aware, as did my colleagues, that we could not advance a step in the direction of disarmament without raising the question of security. Our French friends said to us, quite frankly, "We are unable to disarm, we feel insecure, the Treaty of Versailles does not give us enough, the guarantee pacts have fallen to the ground, we must have something very much more efficacious even than Clause 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations if we are to consent to any considerable measure of disarmament." And it was because of French fears and French needs that Lord Cecil of Chelwood found it necessary to propose the arrangement which ultimately fructified in the treaty of mutual assistance.
  When the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Aberavon went to Geneva, nothing was further from his mind than the Protocol. That is quite obvious from his speech of 23rd June in this House, and it is quite obvious also from his opening speech at Geneva. The right hon. Gentleman took the view which I take, and which most people in England take, that nothing was to be gained by the apparatus of military sanctions. He was against all pacts. He thought that for a time, possibly, it might be necessary to offer a pact in return for a very substantial measure of all round disarmament. That was the view taken by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Aberavon, and I agree with him. But the right hon. Gentleman and his Friends soon found themselves exposed to the same steady, ineluctable, scientific pressure as had been brought to bear upon the British delegations in previous years,

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  and he had to consent to a document originating with the French, embodying the view of France and of the military party in France, a document the inner meaning of which to every Frenchman was that the British Empire should underwrite the whole peace settlement of Versailles. Do not let us disparage that ideal.
  Let me tell the House what the French view really is: there is a good deal of reason in it. The French say, in effect, "We have had a great and disastrous War in which you, the English nation, have been quite as fully engaged as we. You helped, with us, to bring about the victory, you are equally responsible for the peace settlement. We have got new republics in Poland, Czechslovakia, a new Kingdom of Yugo-slovakia, and Europe is insecure. It may be that many of these frontiers are badly drawn, it may be that the peace contains many injustices, but, after all, a bad frontier is not so bad as a war, and the minor injustices of Europe are far more tolerable than the renewal of a, great war, and is it not to your interest and to the interest of the people of Great Britain to say to Europe, We will guarantee this settlement, we will guarantee every part of Poland, Bessarabia, Yugoslovakia and Czechslovakia; and, if you join us in guaranteeing the new Europe, depend upon it, it will not be disturbed and Europe will have a generation of peace.'"
  That is the French argument, and I submit that it is one which deserves to be treated with respect. I cannot however think that the British people will ever take the view expressed in this argument. I do not believe that you would ever find the British people willing to underwrite the settlement in the East of Europe. They will say, "We are not responsible for Eastern policy, and we cannot underwrite a settlement which may through faults and errors of policy disturb peace, and in any case our interests are too remotely affected." For these reasons I suggest to the hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench who are in favour of the Protocol, the whole Protocol and nothing else but the Protocol, that they are really taking an attitude which is profoundly impregnated with French ideals and French policy, and is calculated
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  to commit this country to engagements which the British public will never really face.
  For this reason I greatly welcome the German offer. I believe that it does provide a real way out of a, difficulty which seemed almost insoluble. I disagree with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Aberavon when he argues that the security which France would obtain under such a guarantee which appears now to be sincerely offered by Germany is something which is not worth having. I think it is something very much worth having. I believe that the free and spontaneous offer by Germany recognising the existing frontiers of France and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine would be an immeasurable relief to France and I believe it would very largely contribute to the appeasement of Europe at a whole. For this reason I welcome the statement of the Foreign Secretary that he is anxious to promote the success of this German offer in every way possible. I think it is an offer which should imply the entry of Germany into the League of Nations and the acceptance by Germany of a place on the Council of the League of Nations, and that if a pact be formed it should be within the framework of the League.
  At the present moment the keys of peace do not lie in London, though London may make a great contribution; nor do they lie at Geneva. They lie in Paris, in Berlin, and in Warsaw—more particularly in Warsaw; and one of the reasons why I particularly welcome the German offer is that it provides for a separate settlement of the Eastern and Western question at this moment. I do not for a moment deny that some larger and more comprehensive settlement should be ultimately aimed at. I do not for a moment despair of the larger ideal which actuated the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Burnley (Mr. A. Henderson) and those who helped to frame the Protocol. I think that something on the lines of the Protocol may be eventually possible; but I hold very strongly that the first thing to do is to tranquillise France in respect of her own internal position, and the second thing to do is to induce Poland to take the only step which would really give to the new Republic an adequate measure of security, namely, to come into friendly relations with Germany, and to seek, in

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  friendly negotiations with her great western neighbour, a solution of the most difficult problem which at present confronts her.
  Mr. LEES SMITH: In concluding the Debate as regards this side of the House, although it is late and I desire to allow some minutes for the Prime Minister to reply, I should like, before he does so, to put to him two or three questions, which I hope he may deal with very shortly. The first is this: I think that one of the most important suggestions which has been made in this Debate was the suggestion by the Leader of the Opposition that some sort of national discussion might take place before the next Assembly meeting at Geneva. We should like the Prime Minister, either to-night or at an early moment, to give us his views on that proposal, and, in making up his mind, I hope he will recognise that the question we are discussing is not whether we shall accept the Protocol as it stands, but whether we shall accept the Protocol amended or whether we shall destroy it. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) made a speech, practically the whole of which amounted to an objection to this Protocol because there was a number of causes of war, due to the Peace of Versailles—for which he was more responsible than any living man—a number of the evils which he had left behind him, which this Protocol did not cure. I should have thought the deduction from that would be that the Protocol should be extended, enlarged and amended, and not that it should be abandoned and destroyed.
  The reason why, in spite of the criticisms which have been directed against it, we regard this Protocol as a good and even in some ways a wonderful instrument is that it has grasped what is to us the essential fact; that the only road by which we can eventually secure peace in this world is the road of compulsory arbitration. Strike out everything else, and still there remains the central feature of this instrument by which it has built up, with, I believe, a care and elaboration never before attempted, a graduated scheme for discussion, consideration, conciliation, and, finally, compulsory arbitration. Up to this moment that seems to be the main line of cleavage between the Government and those who sit on these benches. The
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  Foreign Secretary appears to have committed himself definitely, almost irrevocably, against this principle of compulsory arbitration. If he has done that it is most unfortunate. It is an attack not only upon the Protocol but upon the very heart of the League. It is an attack upon the Covenant, the very central feature of which is compulsory arbitration. Has the Foreign Secretary appreciated the fact that the main Clause of the Covenant is one by which in any dispute between nations any party can bring a dispute before the Council of the League, and that if the other members of the Council, who are not parties to the dispute, arrive at a unanimous conclusion, on the principle of the British jury, that verdict has to be accepted by all parties on pain of outlawry by the League? That is in the Covenant. When in the case of the incident between Italy and Greece, when Italy claimed that questions of national honour and vital interest were outside the Covenant, a body of jurists were appointed. They declared against Italy, and Italy accepted their verdict. This country ratified the verdict and the whole matter was made plain. That is why an attack upon compulsory arbitration is an attack upon the heart of the League. We on these benches take, quite specifically, the view that the only final method for the dethronement of war is for nations who are parties to a, dispute to be willing to submit it to some authority outside themselves which shall represent the general opinion of the civilised world. That, I believe, is the main cleavage between ourselves and the Government, and I hope it is not a cleavage so wide as the Foreign Secretary's note has made it appear.
  There is another question I should like to ask on which the statement of the Foreign Secretary was not, I think, clear. There is a very disturbing sentence in this note with regard to our attitude to this Court of International Justice. Are we to understand that the Foreign Secretary's objection to compulsory arbitration goes to the length that he is going to reject the arbitration not only of the Protocol but of the Court of International Justice as well? The Prime Minister knows the position. That Court deals with a comparatively limited set of questions capable of legal interpretation. All the questions it has had submitted to it

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  it has dealt with with great success. I believe now 32 out of the 55 nations in the League have agreed that any dispute, of the character with which the Court deals, in which they are involved can be submitted to the Court and they will accept its compulsory jurisdiction. France has accepted it. If this country were to accept, then I believe it is generally acknowledged that practically every other country would follow in our train and this great instrument would be complete. We want to know the attitude of the Government, and it certainly seems to me that if Great Britain says "No" to the acceptance of the verdict of this Court, Great Britain and Great Britain alone will undoubtedly have blocked the greatest step that has ever been taken towards the establishment of a régime of legal justice on this earth.
  In considering the suggestions which the Leader of the Opposition has made, might I ask the Prime Minister to bear this in mind: We have been listening the whole of to-day to attacks and criticisms directed against the difficulties and the risks which this Protocol involves, but I would ask, are there not greater difficulties and greater risks in any conceivable alternative to this Protocol? What are the alternative suggestions? The alternatives have been either a special Treaty or Pact of alliance with France or this five-Power Pact including Germany. On that point might I ask the Prime Minister a question which I believe is of very great importance. The Foreign Secretary told us what Germany pro- posed; that she would accept for ever her western frontiers, and he stated that she was willing to submit all questions regarding her eastern frontiers to treaties of arbitration. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Well, that is what I want to be clear about. It is necessary to be clear on that. Is it that Germany is going to accept arbitration on all questions regarding her eastern frontiers or does she, in fact, make certain exceptions in regard to matters of vital interest to her? We must know exactly what the position is. But this is what I wish to put to the Prime Minister: Whatever alternative we adopt it involves, I believe, difficulties and risks greater than those which the Protocol contains. Any special treaties of alliance are bound to lead you to sanctions in case they are broken, and to
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  military obligations more precise than those of the Protocol, but without disarmament, without arbitration, and without the hopes that the Protocol contains for a happier international order. Take some of the remarks of the Foreign Secretary and apply them to this five-Power Pact. The Foreign Secretary told us that he objected to the Protocol because the Dominions had refused to give it their adherence. Is he so sure that the Dominions will give their adherence to either the three-Power or the five-Power Pact? We have had some experience on that question. At the end of the Peace Conference, a Pact, a Treaty of Alliance, a Guarantee Treaty, was made between this country and France. The House will recollect that that Treaty was killed because the United States would not enter into it on their side. The House will also recollect that even before the Treaty was killed two of our Dominions, Canada and, I believe, South Africa, had already stated that they were not willing to become parties to the Pact, or to accept any of the obligations that it involved.
  The Foreign Secretary, both in his Note and in his speech, objected to the Protocol on the ground that it said so much about war and force. May I ask him a question? Are the obligations that will be involved in any pact or alliance going to be less onerous than those under the Protocol? What are the obligations of the Protocol? They are that we shall loyally and effectively cooperate in any sanction that may be imposed. Are we to be told that in any pact or alliance France will be satisfied with words so general as those? It is quite clear that any pact or alliance must mean conferences between the general staff. It must mean a military convention, and it must mean, as the Foreign Secretary indicated in his speech by his reference to the Channel ports, that for practical purposes the Rhine becomes the military frontier of this country. All the criticisms directed against the Protocol can be directed against the proposed pact.
  The Foreign Secretary said that the result of the Protocol was that we enlarged our commitments and that this pact would narrow our commitments. Is he quite sure that we can get any pact which is going to narrow our commit-

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  ments to the western front? The Polish Foreign Secretary was very active at Geneva. Our Foreign Secretary has seen him and knows his opinions. We know the speech that the Polish Foreign Secretary delivered three weeks ago, in which he stated definitely that any pact in which Poland was not contained would be a cause of war rather than of peace, and that France was precluded by her agreement with Poland from entering into any Guarantee, Treaty or Pact to which Poland was not a party as well.
  Our position, broadly, is this. We were touched, and even a little surprised, at the new idealistic note at the end of the Foreign Secretary's speech, in which he said, in words which I cannot imitate, that the last chapter of war had ended, and that he hoped that this country would initiate a new chapter in this world. As he knows, on these benches we respond to an appeal of that sort. We want to rid the world of war, but what we feel is this, that special alliances have never rid the world of war in the past, and that if you are going to trust to them alone, whatever our will may be, we shall find ourselves back on the path that led us to 1914. I am bound to say, in spite of that kind of speech this afternoon, that when listened to the Debate yesterday and the Debates that have been going on for some time past, we seem to be not very far from that path already. The speeches were very much the same as the speeches that used to be made in this House 15 years ago. There were the same enormous Estimates, the same race in armaments, the same competitive building, against Germany- then and against other countries to-day, the same argument that every body is building for defence and no one is building for war, and, finally, inevitably the same eventual result.
  11.0 P.M.
  The foreign policy of the Labour party is the League of Nations policy, and I am sorry that whenever we bring that up the Foreign Secretary always gives the same reply, which I think a very unsound one. He always says that the League of Nations is only an infant, and we are trying to impose on it tasks too heavy for an infant to bear. That is his argument. I believe that it is a mistaken argument. Now is the time, when the memories of the War are still vivid in men's minds, and when,
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  as the speech of the Foreign Secretary showed, the hopes that it was going to lead to the reign of peace have not been entirely killed, when the League of Nations has the best chance of establishing its supremacy over the minds of mankind. I do not believe that, if we let this chance go by, a better chance is going to come for some years ahead. We are convinced that, if you turn in the wrong direction now, you will do what he says—you will find yourselves in a path which will lead to final catastrophe and to the disappearance of our civilised life.
  The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Baldwin): I think that this very interesting Debate shows signs of drawing towards a not unnatural close, and before the end I think that perhaps I should say a few words—and they will indeed be few—in answer to one or two questions which were raised by the Leader of the Opposition, who, I regret very much, has had to go home, and by one or two other Members, including the last speaker, in the course of this Debate. I do not intend to say more than a word, although I should feel it discourteous on my part not to say a single word, about the speech of the leader in this House of the Liberal party, who was for so long Prime Minister of this country. But I may observe that while he was speaking I was reminded of the, lines of Matthew Arnold which he applied to Gœthe—
  "He took the suffering human race,
  He read each wound, each weakness clear;
  And struck his finger on the place,
  And said 'thou ailest here, and here' "—
  an unerring diagnosis, but an imperfect bedside manner. He was unable to suggest any method by which he might say to the patient, "Take up thy bed and walk." The Leader of the Opposition asked two or three questions. He asked, what is our part in it—meaning the pact—are we going to get a quid pro quo? It is a very small thing to guarantee the Western frontier. It leaves everything outside untouched, and he said that it will eventuate in a "fresh balance of power." These are early days in which to say in detail what our part will be. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, in his—if I may say so in his presence—most admirable and exhaustive speech, gave the House all the informa-

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  tion which was in his possession almost up to this morning, and it is perfectly obvious, if the House have regard to what he said, that they will see that we are now waiting to see what possibility there may be of the interested parties coming together.
  But, after all, what is our part in it? Our part is this: that, if success attend my right hon. Friend's efforts, our part will be to bring about a peace in Western Europe which has not existed from the day when the signatures were appended to the Treaty of Versailles. And what are we going to get out of it? We are going to get out of it whatever benefits may come from peace. It leaves all outside untouched, and the Leader of the Opposition says it will eventuate in a "fresh balance of power." I can say, in answer thereto, that were we advocating a tripartite pact directed against Germany, or any other Power, then, indeed, you would be heading straight towards some fresh balance of power. That was one of the reasons which made us feel it was impossible that we could support any form of pact other than a pact, which, in itself, should be a guarantee of peace and mutual security. The House must remember, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition knows perfectly well, and as those who sat with him in his Cabinet know, that the one disturbing factor in the West of Europe during these last years has been that feeling of apprehension, of nervousness, of want of security on the part of France, which has prevented any possibility of the laying aside of that warlike aspect of mind, which as long as it exist, will prevent any real return to peace, any peaceful mentality, and will effectually prevent what we, no less than hon. Members on the other side of the House, are most anxious to see, and that is disarmament.
  Hon. Members on the other side—and I give them full credit for their sincerity—believe that the signing of the Protocol must of necessity have led to disarmament and ratification. My right hon. Friend, (Mr. Chamberlain) in his speech this afternoon, gave it as his view, with which I am in complete sympathy, that the Protocol would not have been regarded in the West of Europe as giving sufficient security by itself,
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  and that the only security which would, in practice, have led to, or paved the way for, disarmament, would have been the Protocol plus some kind of pact. As my right hon. Friend says, no progress can be made in Europe until the mentality of Western Europe is changed, and that mentality can only be changed when the feeling of insecurity gives place to the feeling of security. If the present position of things were to be unduly protracted in Western Europe, what I fear, and what those who sit with me on this side of the House fear, is that, before long, the feeling of insecurity which has existed and which is growing, would get such a grip of men's minds in Western Europe that it would be impossible to shake it off.
  There is no doubt that a long maintenance of the state of things that has existed up to now—the occupation of the old enemy territory prolonged unduly—would lead to a very grave state of things in Europe and to a condition of affairs which it might pass the wit of man to remedy or to surmount. Therefore, it is that we have seen with some hope these proposals which my right hon. Friend put before the House, which have come rather unexpectedly and from a quarter which in some way gives us more reason to hope for the possibility of a permanent settlement than anything that has happened in Europe lately.
  If I may just at this point repeat what my right hon. Friend said, to clear up a doubt which, I think, was in the mind of the hon. Member who has just spoken, the position is this, and I would not go any further, because these are only the lines on which we are to try to find agreement: It is too early yet to say, when the parties can get together, what may come out of it. But we do understand here that Germany renounces the prospect, or any intention, of changing the frontiers in Western Europe. In Eastern Europe she has taken a great step forward towards peace, because she is prepared to declare that she renounces any prospect of changing the frontier by military force. That, of course, leaves it perfectly clear that in years to come she may try by diplomacy, by offering to arbitrate, in any one of half a dozen peaceful ways to effect changes in the Eastern frontier. She renounces—this is the important thing—any attempt to change the frontier by military force.

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  My noble Friend the hon. Member for West Derbyshire (Marquess of Hartington), whose speech I very much regret I was unable to hear, asked one or two questions. He asked if the new pact is inclusive or exclusive? There, again, it is too early to say what may result from it, but the view of the Government, I think, is this, and I think I shall not be misrepresenting them. We do not mind how inclusive is the pact. We cannot say yet who would come into it. The only thing I am clear about is that, however inclusive is the pact, we should not undertake any direct and mutual guarantee other than the one to which my right hon. Friend made allusion. We do not wish to extend our sphere in that way, although whatever countries it might be found possible to admit in an inclusive fashion, we should welcome them if it proved practicable.
  Another point he raised was, "are we consulting the Dominions"? Yes, we are, and we shall throughout keep in the closest possible touch with them. I am hoping myself—I do not know whether my hopes will be justified—that when we get into closer touch, the issues may be comparatively so simple that it may be possible to conduct negotiations by cable. There are great difficulties in having a Conference in the immediate future, and I doubt very much whether it will be possible for the Dominions to send over at this moment men of sufficient weight to take part in the deliberations and to pledge their own Dominions. But we have asked the Dominions that they will allow their representatives who are going to attend the Assembly at Geneva in the Autumn to come over to this country at a sufficient length of time before the Geneva Conference to enable us to communicate together, and try to arrange that we shall go together united to Geneva when the time come. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs wishes me to say he is not quite certain whether that message has actually gone; but if it has not gone, it is in preparation, and it has been decided by the Government that it should be sent.
  My right hon. Friend the Member for the English Universities (Mr. Fisher) complained of the method which my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary had employed in announcing our rejection of the Protocol, and said, I think, that it
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  "bordered on the brutal." I would like to put this to the House. I have always held that for this country, in dealing with foreign nations, it is of the utmost importance to make our meaning clear beyond any manner of doubt. I have not, myself, a long experience of high office, but I have been struck over and over again with the difficulties that come if, in the course of any negotiations, our Government have not been absolutely explicit in saying what they mean, and in saying directly, in answer to a question, "Yes" or "No." It is very difficult, in giving these direct answers, always to be as suave as one would like to be, but I am quite sure that, having regard to the old-established character of this country throughout the world, and the belief that we are a nation somewhat lacking in the higher graces cultivated by others, but a people whose word may be absolutely depended upon—I want to get back to that old reputation; and if I should suffer a little bit in my manners, I hope it will be made up to me in the trust placed in my word.
  There is one other thing to which I wish to refer. A great deal has been said in the Debate about arbitration. The Leader of the Opposition said something about it, and I think from the Liberal benches we have heard something about it. Those of us who were in the House—and I regret it was not a larger House—heard a very brilliant speech from my old Friend the Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University (Lord Hugh Cecil). I have been very interested in the faith that has been displayed from the benches opposite, and particularly by the last speaker, in the power of compulsory arbitration. He seemed to believe that, if you only got a document signed embodying compulsory arbitration, the nations of the world, whatever their past history, however different in nationality and religion, if you could only get them to agree to compulsory arbitration, there would be no more quarrels and no more war. I think that represents their ease very fairly, and I have every respect for that sentiment of hon. Members opposite. If they really believe in it, the test is a very simple one. How many members of the trade unions would sign a protocol to-morrow for compulsory arbitration in industry? If they do not believe that that would be a good thing for this country, I should like to

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  know how they believe that it would be a good thing for people of different nationalities, speaking different languages, having different religions, and having different histories. I regard as the first great step that has been taken in the last three years to bring back a real peace to Europe, the establishment of the Dawes Report, which I had the honour of starting when I was Prime Minister, and which was carried to a successful issue by the labours of the present Leader of the Opposition. The next step, I believe, will be the one which has been outlined to-day by my right hon. Friend, if we have the great good fortune to bring to a successful issue the overtures that have been made, on the one hand, by Germany, and, on the other, the soothing of the anxieties and nervousness of our old Ally.
  It has been asked in this Debate why we should play a part in this. I think my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made that quite clear. I think he made it quite clear, in the course of his speech, that there would be no prospect of our Allies even listening to overtures of this nature unless we were one of the contracting parties. It is an enormous responsibility which is thrown on this country, and I believe that the country will rise to the 'height of that responsibility. I was very pleased to hear the Leader of the Liberal party in this House, the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), express his approval without, of course, committing himself to the details, of our pursuing this path to the utmost of our being.
  The Leader of the Labour party, while obviously and quite naturally, regretting our attitude on the Protocol, said that if this were the only way out, he would give it his blessing. I regard the whole position of Europe as that of a great quaking bog, ready to let into its depths all the people on its margin. And I believe, if we can really get security and pacification in the West, we fill up at once half of that great quagmire, so that
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  we can advance along that portion, and gradually fill up and up and up, till that happy day has come when we may not only complete the pacification of the whole of Europe, but may get the whole of Europe, including portions of it of which to-day many of us have but little hope, into a united League of Nations.

  INDIAN AFFAIRS.
  Ordered, That so much of the Lords Message [19 th March] as communicates the Resolution, That it is desirable that a Standing Joint Committee on Indian Affairs of both Houses of Parliament be appointed to examine and report on any Bill or matter referred to them specifically by either House of Parliament, and to consider with a view to reporting, if necessary, thereon any matters relating to Indian Affairs brought to the notice of the Committee by the Secretary of State for India, be now considered.
  So much of the Lords Message considered accordingly.
  Resolved, That this House doth concur with the Lords in the said Resolution.—[Colonel Gibbs.]
  Message to the Lords to acquaint them therewith.
  The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

  ADJOURNMENT.
  Resolved, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Commander Eyres Monsell.]
  Adjourned accordingly at Twenty-seven Minutes after Eleven o'Clock.

UNEMPLOYMENT.
  JUVENILE EMPLOYMENT CENTRES.
  JUVENILE EMPLOYMENT CENTRES.
  BLANTYRE, CAMBUSLANG, AND RUTHERGLEN.
  BLANTYRE, CAMBUSLANG, AND RUTHERGLEN.
  LEGISLATION.
  LEGISLATION.
  KING'S NATIONAL ROLL.
  KING'S NATIONAL ROLL.
  CATERING TRADE (WAGES).
  CATERING TRADE (WAGES).
POST OFFICE.
  NEW OFFICE, MITCHAM.
  NEW OFFICE, MITCHAM.
  TELEPHONE SERVICE.
  TELEPHONE SERVICE.
  WIRELESS LICENCES (EXPERIMENTS).
  WIRELESS LICENCES (EXPERIMENTS).
  TELEGRAPH TRAFFIC, GLASGOW.
  TELEGRAPH TRAFFIC, GLASGOW.
  SUB-POSTMASTER, BUDLEIGH SALTERTON.
  SUB-POSTMASTER, BUDLEIGH SALTERTON.
  ESTABLISHED CLERKS, GLASGOW.
  ESTABLISHED CLERKS, GLASGOW.
  BORSTAL INSTITUTIONS (CAMP).
  BORSTAL INSTITUTIONS (CAMP).
  LICENSED PREMISES (CHILDREN).
  LICENSED PREMISES (CHILDREN).
  LIQUOR TRAFFIC (SUICIDES AND ASSAULTS).
  LIQUOR TRAFFIC (SUICIDES AND ASSAULTS).
  JURORS (EXPENSES).
  JURORS (EXPENSES).
  HOUSE OF COMMONS (INDICATORS).
  HOUSE OF COMMONS (INDICATORS).
  COMMERCIAL TRAVELLERS (TAXES).
  COMMERCIAL TRAVELLERS (TAXES).
TRADE AND COMMERCE.
  FOODSTUFFS (PROFITS).
  FOODSTUFFS (PROFITS).
  DYESTUFFS (IMPORTS).
  DYESTUFFS (IMPORTS).
  FUEL OIL (COAL EQUIVALENT).
  FUEL OIL (COAL EQUIVALENT).
  RUSSIA.
  RUSSIA.
  INDIAN TEA (EXPORTS TO RUSSIA).
  INDIAN TEA (EXPORTS TO RUSSIA).
SAFEGUARDING OF INDUSTRIES.
  CHEMICALS.
  CHEMICALS.
  APPLICATIONS FOR INQUIRY
  APPLICATIONS FOR INQUIRY
  SPIRITS.
  SPIRITS.
  EXCESS PROFITS DUTY.
  EXCESS PROFITS DUTY.
  DOUBLE TAXATION.
  DOUBLE TAXATION.
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.
  MINISTRY OF PENSIONS
  MINISTRY OF PENSIONS
  WOMEN (WAGES).
  WOMEN (WAGES).
NAVAL AND MILITARY PENSIONS AND GRANTS.
  FINAL AWARDS.
  FINAL AWARDS.
AGRICULTURE.
  FOREIGN BARLEY (TAXATION).
  FOREIGN BARLEY (TAXATION).
  PIGS (SLAUGHTER).
  PIGS (SLAUGHTER).
  WHEAT PRICES.
  WHEAT PRICES.
  LANDOWNERS AND SMALLHOLDERS.
  LANDOWNERS AND SMALLHOLDERS.
  SUGAR BEET.
  SUGAR BEET.
TRANSPORT.
  DISTRICT ROADS (GRANTS).
  DISTRICT ROADS (GRANTS).
  HEAVY MOTOR VEHICLES.
  HEAVY MOTOR VEHICLES.
  MOTOR OMNIBUSES, NORTHAMPTON.
  MOTOR OMNIBUSES, NORTHAMPTON.
  VALUATION (METROPOLIS) BILL.
  VALUATION (METROPOLIS) BILL.
  HOUSE OWNER'S LIABILITY (THIRD PARTIES).
  HOUSE OWNER'S LIABILITY (THIRD PARTIES).
  FOOD PRESERVATIVES (REGULATIONS).
  FOOD PRESERVATIVES (REGULATIONS).
  BIRMINGHAM CORPORATION ACT, 1919.
  BIRMINGHAM CORPORATION ACT, 1919.
  DURHAM MINERS (POOR LAW RELIEF).
  DURHAM MINERS (POOR LAW RELIEF).
HOUSING.
  STATISTICS.
  STATISTICS.
  TERRITORIAL ARMY OFFICERS.
  TERRITORIAL ARMY OFFICERS.
Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

LICENSING (SCOTLAND) AMENDMENT BILL. [H.L.]
VISCOUNT NOVAR: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to amend the law relating to licensing in Scotland, and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Viscount Novar.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; and to be printed.

LAW AGENTS (SCOTLAND) BILL. [H.L.]
LORD DUNEDIN: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to amend the law relating to law agents in Scotland, and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Dunedin.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; and to be printed.

PERFORMING ANIMALS (No. 2) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and to be printed.
PROTECTION OF BIRDS BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and to be printed.

LEGITIMACY BILL. [H.L.]
THE EARL OF MIDLETON: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Lord Chancellor a Question of which I have given him private notice—namely, whether the Legitimacy Bill, which nearly a fortnight ago was set down for to-day, was postponed last evening, without any public notice, until Thursday; whether the noble and learned Viscount is aware that Peers have been summoned for the purpose of debating that measure, and

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that it causes grave inconvenience that it should be postponed without notice; and whether he will undertake that, so far as Government Bills are concerned, such postponements shall be announced, and not simply be put on the Paper on the chance that Peers may discover them in the morning?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT CAVE): My Lords, I regret that the noble Earl and his friends should have been caused any inconvenience. I was not aware that any Peers had been specially summoned with reference to the debate on the Legitimacy Bill, and the cause of the postponement can, I think, be made quite clear to the House. For reasons which your Lordships all know, no Bills were taken yesterday, and the British Sugar (Subsidy) Bill was therefore adjourned until to-day. The passage of that Bill, for public reasons, is a pressing matter, and if your Lordships approve, the Bill should become law this week. I was sure that if the Second Reading of that Bill was taken and the Question in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Parmoor and the various other items which appear on the Paper were also taken, your Lordships would not have time conveniently to dispose of the Amendments on the Legitimacy Bill. Might I say for the general information of your Lordships that there will be time on Thursday to deal with the Committee stage of that Bill, and it is for that reason only that I asked that the Bill might be postponed? I think it is for the general convenience of the House that it should be postponed.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: My Lords, I should like to ask the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack whether he would acquiesce in the request of my noble friend that in future if a Bill is postponed, the fact shall be announced as it is in another place and not be left to appear on the Order Paper?
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): Perhaps your Lordships will permit me to reply to that observation of my noble friend? I will take care that the convenience of noble Lords is always consulted in these matters, so far as I possibly can. The Lord Chancellor has already explained that the circumstances of this last week were very exceptional, and I am afraid I
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must admit that I, unfortunately, and not through my own fault, was partly the cause of the confusion into which the business of the House was thrown. There were certain matters which ought to have been taken but were postponed entirely for my convenience, for which I express my thanks to the House. I will see that in future your Lordships receive due notice.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER CONFIRMATION (BLACKPOOL ORDER) BILL. [H.L.]
Commons Amendments considered and agreed to.

ADVERTISEMENTS REGULATION BILL. [H.L.]
Amendment reported (according to Order).
Clause 1:
Extended powers of making by-laws.
(2) In Section two of the principal Act the words "or to disfigure the natural beauty of a landscape" are hereby repealed without prejudice to the validity of any by-law in force and valid at the passing of this Act.
EARL DE LA WARR EARL DE LA WARR moved to leave out subsection (2). The noble Earl said: My Lords, this Amendment is in accordance with that which I moved on the Committee stage. I have adjusted it to agree with certain suggestions of the noble Lord opposite. I gather that it has the approval of the Billposters' Association. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, lines 20 to 24, leave out subsection (2).—(Earl De La Warr.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
EARL DE LA WARR EARL DE LA WARR moved, after subsection (2), to insert the following new subsection: "In the principal Act and in this Act the expression 'advertisements' includes any structure or apparatus erected or intended only for the display of advertisements." The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move the Amendment which stands in my name on the Paper.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 24, at end insert the said new subsection.—(Earl De La Warr.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 3 (Delegation of powers by county councils to rural district councils):
EARL OF DE LA WARE EARL OF DE LA WARE moved, at the end of the clause, to insert the following new subsection: "In the application of this Act to Scotland the expression 'district committee' shall be substituted for 'rural district council'." The noble Earl said: I beg to move the Amendment which I have placed on the Paper.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 39, at end insert the said new subsection.—(Earl De La Warr.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.

TOWN PLANNING BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order): Amendments proposed by the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills agreed to: Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

HOUSING BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)
LORD HUNSDON OF HUNSDON LORD HUNSDON OF HUNSDON, who had on the Paper an Amendment to move, after paragraph (a) of subsection (5) of Clause 90 (Loans to public utility societies), to insert: "Provided that the Public Works Loans Commissioners shall, in any such case, require in addition to a mortgage of any land or dwellings a further security of such value as they may think fit," said: My Lords, my reason for placing this Amendment on the Paper is that I happen to be Chairman of the Public Works Loans Commissioners who make advances under these Acts. In their opinion a matter has been introduced into this Consolidation Bill which has no place in any of the existing Acts. Therefore, although the Bill is of no particular interest to the Commissioners, it was my duty to give information to your Lordships upon the point. The public Works Loans Commissioners are a body of men who make these advances and whose duty it is to
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make themselves fully acquainted with all the provisions of these Acts. As your Lordships will observe, this is an entirely legal matter. I wrote, therefore, to the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor and placed my views before him, and before proceeding with this Amendment I should very much like to hear what his views are on the matter.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords the point which the noble Lord very courteously raised with me was that as the Consolidation Committee had framed the Bill it was not entirely in agreement with the law as it exists. I made inquiries and I found that the Consolidation Committee had considered the matter very carefully last year when a similar Bill was introduced into Parliament, and again this year. They had also taken expert evidence on the point, and in their considered opinion the Bill as it now comes before your Lordships represents the law as it stands. I have also considered the point, and I am bound to say that, although the question raised by the noble Lord was no doubt one that might fairly be mentioned to your Lordships, I think the Committee have come to the right conclusion. That being so, I hope the noble Lord will not move the Amendment which he has placed on the Paper.
LORD HUNSDON OF HUNSDON: In those circumstances, my Lords, I shall not move the Amendments of which I gave Notice.
On Question, Bill read 3a.
Amendments proposed by the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills agreed to.
Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

TOWN PLANNLNG (SCOTLAND) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order).
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.
Moved, That the Bill be passed.—(Lord Balfour of Burleigh.)
LORD MUIR MACKENZIE: Is not the noble Lord going to move that the Amendments be agreed to?
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: I understood there were no Amendments on this Bill. We have an Amendment on the Housing (Scotland) Bill, but not on the Town-Planning Bill.
LORD MUIR MACKENZIE: I beg the noble Lord's pardon; that is so.
On Question, Bill passed; and sent to the Commons.

HOUSING (SCOTLAND) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order).
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: I beg to move that the Amendments proposed by the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills be agreed to.
Moved, That the Amendments proposed by the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills be agreed to.—(Lord Balfour of Burleigh.)
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: Could we not know what the Amendments are?
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: They are purely drafting Amendments.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: Nobody seems to know what they are. It seems to be a curious way of doing business, but I am prepared to accept the statement of the noble Lord.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I do not think my noble friend really understands what the procedure of the Committee on Consolidation Bills is. It is to take the Bill as committed to them, and to see if it exactly corresponds with the existing law. That was the intention of the Consolidation Committee originally. Therefore these Amendments are, of necessity, nothing but drafting Amendments. They are to draft the Consolidation Bill in order that it shall exactly agree with the Bills that it consolidates. I hope my noble friend will see that no serious invasion of our liberties is being attempted under the guise of a Consolidation Bill.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: My Lords, I have always been suspicious of Consolidation Bills in the other House. I think it is necessary that we should know something about them lest some new
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provision should be introduced; but, of course, I accept the statement of my noble friend.
LORD MUIR MACKENZIE: My Lords, I should like to be allowed to state that the Amendments and the reasons for any possible difference of opinion upon the subject are in the form of a Report, and are already on the Table, so that the noble Lord, if he is interested in the matter, could have seen them.
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

BOROUGH COUNCILLORS (ALTERATION OF NUMBER) BILL.
Read 3a (according to Order), with Amendment and returned to the Commons.

TRADE FACILITIES BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Heading read.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, in moving the Second Reading of this Bill, I think I need only observe that so far as the principle of the Bill is concerned, it was fully discussed on the introduction of the parent Act in 1921, and the principle is agreed. The guarantees that are made in this Bill are only effective after consultation with a special Committee appointed by the Treasury, which has the responsibility of considering all the guarantees that are brought before it. If a loan is guaranteed it is specified that all the articles purchased shall be of British manufacture, and any contravention of this agreement is reported to the Treasury. The effect of such guarantees as have been entered into is that work has been performed which otherwise would not have been carried out at all. It is difficult to estimate accurately the number of men who have been given employment, but in the opinion of the Committee it is not far short of the mark to say that something like 100,000 men have been given employment by means of the work which has been undertaken as the result of these guarantees. I think I need only say, in conclusion, that the account of those guarantees will be laid

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before Parliament one year after the close of the present financial year. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Earl of Clarendon.)
LORD ARNOLD: My Lords, I do not think your Lordships would desire or expect that there should be any protracted discussion on this Bill. I will therefore try to emulate the noble Earl in his brevity. There are, however, one or two observations that I would like to make about it. There is no new feature in the Bill this year, and it is true that the Trade Facilities Acts have, I think, fulfilled the expectations which were originally formed of them. They have found a good deal of work, and have been of help in every way to industry. It is also true, and very satisfactory—I think I am right in saying—that the losses which have been incurred under these guarantees so far are quite small. I remember last year that the actual loss which had been incurred amounted to only £4,000. I believe that since then there have been one or two further losses, but probably I should be right in saying that the total does not amount to more than between £100,000 and £200,000. It is true that is not a small sum—I see my noble friend Lord Banbury listening intently—but at the same time I think he will agree that it is not a very large sum in proportion to the total transactions.
I must express regret that the reception which was given in another place to one or two points which were urged was not more favourable. There was a demand for a full inquiry into the working of the Acts, and we did not get very much encouragement for that. Then there was a very urgent demand pressed from more than one quarter of the House that in view of the large measure of assistance from the public credit which was given to various concerns there should be, for the taxpayers, some share in the assets. That, I am sorry to say was absolutely refused by the Government, though I venture to think the balance of argument really was strongly against the position the Government took up. Your Lordships might well be concerned with the effect which these Bills may have, or may be adjudged to have, upon the Government credit as a whole.
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Personally, I think the effect must be very small. There is all the difference in the world between borrowing for productive and for unproductive purposes. Every guarantee under these Acts is for an enterprise which may be termed productive, and actual assets are created.
I feel that it could well be argued that thereby the wealth of the country is increased, and therefore that its credit is increased, because, in the last resort, credit really depends upon taxable capacity. I think it may be argued that these various enterprises have increased the taxable capacity of the country, and, therefore, rather than diminishing credit, they have actually added to it. But there is the further point—which again I must state carefully, because I notice that my noble friend Lord Banbury is listening—that statistically these guarantees, quite apart from the fact that there are assets behind them, in proportion to our total national indebtedness cannot be accounted as of much consequence; as a matter of fact, they amount to somewhere about 1 per cent. of our total National Debt. I therefore feel that their effect on the credit of the country cannot be appreciable. I will not say anything more, because there is other business on the Paper, and this is a Money Bill which I am sure does not require long discussion.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

BRITISH SUGAR (SUBSIDY) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (LORD BLEDISLOE): My Lords, in submitting for your consideration the Second Reading of this Bill I desire to crave your Lordships' indulgence, partly because, although I am no longer new to Parliamentary life, I have never before had the conduct of any Bill through either House of Parliament, and partly because the passage of this Bill through your Lordships' House—a Bill which I know is of exceptional interest to many of your Lordships—is bound to be unduly rapid in order to enable it to receive the Royal Assent

629
before the end of the current financial year, and thus to secure for the benefit of producers and manufacturers of beet sugar the subsidy which it provides as from the first of October last.
I regard it as a special privilege to be allowed to submit this Bill for the sympathetic consideration of your Lordships. Convinced as I have always been of the truth of the saying of the late Lord Beaconsfield, that the nation which neglects its agriculture is bound to decay, I have for many years past ventured to criticise, possibly with temerity but always with sincerity of conviction, the apathy, the ignorance, the superficiality and, worse than all, the vacillation with which successive Governments of various political complexions have handled the agricultural problem in this country. But I recognise that in this Bill we have the first really constructive effort, for at least a generation, to place British agriculture upon a sounder footing, to ensure an ever-increasing home production of a most essential food necessity—probably second only in importance to that of bread—of which until recently none at all was raised on our own soil, and at the same time to provide lucrative employment both for agricultural workers and artisans in rural districts, especially during the winter months when unemployment, according to recent experience, has been so serious.
But this Bill has, from my point of view, a further merit which I desire to emphasise. I have long been convinced that there will be no real security for our rural industry unless and until there is some definite measure of agreement amongst all political Parties as to the fundamental principles and aims of a national agricultural policy which will ensure, on the part of successive Governments, continuity of administration according to a definite and well understood plan. His Majesty's Government lay no claim to the parentage of this measure. It rests entirely with the Labour Party, and we rejoice that it does so, because we hope it is a foretaste of that work of sympathetic collaboration between all political Parties, and also, I hope, between all sections of the agricultural community, by which alone a national agricultural policy can be successfully evolved and a sense of stability on the
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part of our rural population secured for the future. May I also say that the Labour Party have not been slow to recognise the national peril of a decadent and unproductive agriculture, and I for my part desire to thank them for their attitude towards our most fundamental industry, although unconvinced by some of the remedies they propose for its betterment.
A distinguished member of this House whom I am sorry to say I do not see present to-day, the noble Earl, Lord Denbigh, is the great pioneer of sugar beet industry in this country. I believe he began experiments on a part of his estate at least a quarter of a century ago. The late Lord Ailwyn was also keenly interested in the industry, and amongst other enthusiasts in this House are the Earl of Selborne, Viscount Ullswater and Lord Ernie. May I be allowed to make special reference to two persons whose persistent efforts have been largely responsible for the introduction of the present Bill? I refer to Colonel Courthope, the Member of Parliament for the Rye Division of Sussex, and Mr. Alfred Wood, the, most persistent and indefatigable secretary of the British Sugar Beet Society, a post which he has occupied for many years.
Your Lordships may be interested in the figures of consumption of sugar per head of the population in different parts of the world. The United States of America and the United Kingdom have a far larger per capita consumption of sugar than any other nation of the world, and, as I learned when I was Chairman of the Royal Commission on Sugar Supplies during the war, the consumption of sugar seems to vary to some extent according to climate and according to the prosperity, for the time being, of particular countries. Thus the United Kingdom consumption has fallen per capita from 77 lbs. before the war, to 74 lbs. last year. The United States consumption has risen from 80 lbs. in 1910 or 1911, to 103 lbs. last year. This, no doubt, is partly due to Prohibition, which, as your Lordships are aware, has the effect of negativing, or perhaps more accurately, reducing, the consumption of liquor, and that, for certain physiological reasons, tends to increase the proportion of sugar consumed. Germany, France and Italy are all much behind the United Kingdom and the United States in the

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consumption of sugar. Germany's present consumption is 45 lbs. per head of population; curiously enough, a marked increase on her consumption before the war. Germany's per capita consumption is well within half that of the United States before the war, and exactly half of the present consumption in the United Kingdom. The consumption in France is now 47 lbs. as compared with 34 lbs. per head of population before the war, and that of Italy, which was only 10 lbs. before the war, has since increased to 18 lbs. The United States consumption is, in fact, eight times as large as that of Italy per head of the population.
But we are, at any rate, the second largest consumers of sugar in the world, and up to recently we have done nothing whatever to supply our own requirements. The present annual consumption of sugar in this country is over 1,500,000 tons. In 1913 677,000 tons of unrefined beet sugar and 920,000 tons of refined sugar cane and beet, were imported into this country. The beet sugar was imported from the Continent and the cane sugar from other parts of the world, but the bulk of the beet sugar came from Germany and Austria. The British overseas supplies are quite adequate, together with our own production, to supply all our national needs. Germany, as your Lordships are aware, has a very highly developed sugar beet industry which was assisted by the State for many years before the war, and it brought the naturally poor sandy soil of North Prussia into a highly cultivated condition, which was largely instrumental in enabling Germany during the war to withstand so long the Allies' blockade.
From the point of view of the farmer there are many advantages in growing sugar beet. The sugar beet industry is, in fact, an agricultural asset of the first importance. Experiments have long ago shown that excellent sugar beet can be grown successfully upon our own soil. The sugar content is, on the average, equal to that of roots grown on the Continent—that is to say, nearly 17 per cent. I wish that we could say the same with regard to the yield per acre. On the Continent, and particularly in Holland, a yield is expected of at least twelve tons to the acre. So far, we have not in this country passed an average of nine tons
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to the acre, but we have a long way to travel in the matter of experience, which Continental countries have, of course, been gaining for many years. Apart from the value of the sugar itself, sugar beet is a very valuable cleaning crop. It increases the value of all other crops with which it is grown in rotation. In Germany, it is estimated to increase the yield of rotation wheat by no less than 15 per cent. By introducing such a cleaning crop into our own agricultural rotation, the minimum figure at which cereals can be grown in that rotation would be substantially lowered. The double advantage of an increased yield and a lower cost of production per acre will undoubtedly encourage and develop arable cultivation.
But there are further advantages from the farmer's point of view in growing beet. Beet slices, which are a by-product of the beet sugar factories, are very valuable as a cattle food and are known to enhance the milking qualities of dairy cattle. Again, the tops which are removed before the roots pass to the factory, and which are deemed to be alone worth about 30 s. per acre, are an excellent food for sheep and pigs. All those who are acquainted with agriculture in Scandinavia will realise to what extent the Danes and the Southern Swedes feed their pigs, which are so competitive with ours in our own bacon markets, upon the tops of the sugar beet. It has been erroneously stated that the cultivation of sugar beet would supplant wheat. That is obviously not the fact, for it only takes the place of the ordinary root crop in the four-course or other rotation. On the other hand, it makes the production of wheat more profitable and economical. In fact, it tends, as has been found in other countries, to intensify wheat production rather than to diminish it
The sugar beet industry is, of course, primarily, but not exclusively, a rural industry. Labour on the farm should be increased as the result of inaugurating this new British crop, by about ten men for every hundred acres of beet grown. If only one-quarter of the sugar imported into this country at present were produced here, about 400,000 acres of beet could be grown upon British soil and, in addition, about 600 men would be employed regularly in each sugar beet factory during the winter months—that is, from October to February—when the

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demand for agricultural labour is at its lowest ebb. This should provide a useful outlet for any unemployed agricultural labour that there may be in the winter months. In addition, there are, of course. Subsidiary industries which are necessarily set in motion by the establishment of a new factory industry, notably those connected with the building, equipment and operation of the factories. Consequently, the firm establishment of the sugar beet industry in this country ought to lead to increased employment in many different directions. I need not remind your Lordships of the evidence in our possession as to the beet sugar industry which is contained in the Report of the Agricultural Policy Sub-Committee over which the noble Earl, Lord Selborne, presided. They emphasised in the strongest possible way the national importance of the sugar beet crop and the tendency which it is bound to bring about to develop intensive arable cultivation and the maintenance of a larger population in our rural areas.
I think I ought to remind your Lordships that the cultivation of sugar beet has been attempted for some time past in this country, though with scant success. As long ago as 1835 experiments were made in sugar beet growing in the United Kingdom, and in 1853 a small factory was actually established in Ireland. It operated for only two years. The first factory to be erected in England was erected in 1870 at Lavenham in Suffolk. This also was unsuccessful. In 1898 began the recent movement for the serious development of sugar beet as a new agricultural industry in the United Kingdom. The Central Chamber of Agriculture and the National Sugar Beet Association made great efforts in that year, and since, to enlighten public opinion as to the desirability of growing this crop. These two bodies, together with the Board of Agriculture and the Beet Sugar Pioneers' Association. carried out numerous and very instructive experiments in its cultivation in various parts of the country.
No tangible results were achieved for many years, because the farmer would not grow beet until he saw a factory actually in being, and the capitalist would not build a factory until he was quite sure that there would be a regular supply of
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beet in order to furnish it. The first factory erected in recent years was that at Cantley in Norfolk. This failed for a time, simply because a regular supply of sugar beet was not forthcoming. The factory was started by the Anglo-Netherland Sugar Corporation, and had the advantage of the best Dutch experience in order to give it a start. But neither our farmers nor their workers fully understood the handling of the crop, and for that reason the factory had to cease work for a period of five years. I am glad to say that for the last five years it has again been in operation and now promises to be a commercial success.
In 1913 a society was formed under the auspices of the Development Commissioners to administer a grant of £11,000 from the Development Fund for educational and organisation purposes in connection with the development of this crop. In 1915 the British Sugar Beet Society came into existence with the object of forming a company which would acquire an estate capable of providing the minimum quantity of beet required to keep the factory working. That factory is now in existence, though it has had a somewhat chequered career. It is established at Kelham in Nottinghamshire, and was completed in 1921. Unfortunately, it was erected at a time when building and equipment were at their highest cost and, as your Lordships are no doubt aware, although a large amount of Government money was forthcoming in order partially to finance it, the capital has had to be drastically written down, and for a time it was thought possible that the factory might have to be closed. It is, however, now in operation and promises to be a commercial success.
Three years ago, in 1922, the Government carefully considered the whole question of encouraging the raising of sugar at home, and in view of the urgent representations of agriculturists they remitted the Excise Duty, amounting to 19 s. 5d. per cwt., on home-produced sugar. This gave a much needed assistance to the industry, and may I say, in passing, that without some financial assistance, at any rate for a period of years, it would not be possible for a new industry of this kind to establish itself on a permanent basis. Even in Holland, a Free Trade country like our own, the industry

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received State assistance for many years before it became self-supporting. There is, I believe, no country where the sugar beet industry has been successful in establishing itself without State help in its initial stages. This seems to be some justification for the Government policy. I know that the noble Earl opposite, Lord Beauchamp, has put down a Motion for the rejection of this Bill. No doubt he is going to base himself mainly, if not wholly, upon adherence to the strict principles of Free Trade. Well, I have only just lately referred to my John Stuart Mill, and I am interested to learn, from an excerpt which I have in my hand, that he at any rate in relation to a nascent—baby—industry of this country, was quite prepared to extend such assistance as is now proposed towards its support in its early stages.
The difficulty in which we found ourselves last year was occasioned by the Government's decision to reduce the Customs Duty from 25 s. 8d. to 11 s. 8d. per cwt. This raised the whole question of the future of the industry in this country. The late Government, with the cordial support of the Conservative Party, decided to grant a subsidy on home-produced sugar for a period of years, and it is simply to implement this undertaking that the Bill now before the House has been prepared.
This brings me to the actual proposals of the Bill. Subsection (I) of Clause I provides that a subsidy shall be payable for a period of ten years from October 1, 1924, on a diminishing scale, set out in the First Schedule to the Bill, on sugar and molasses manufactured in Great Britain from home-grown beet. For refined sugar of a polarisation exceeding 98 degrees the subsidy will be at the rate of 19 s. 6d. per cwt. for the four years from 1924–25 to 1927–28 inclusive, at the rate of 13 s. per cwt. for the three following years, and at the rate of 6s. 6d. per cwt. for the three final years. For sugar of lower degrees of polarisation and for molasses, a subsidy on a descending scale will be payable at rates calculated on the basis of the scale which is already applied for the purpose of Customs Duty. These rates are set out in the First Schedule to the Bill, and probably it is not necessary for me to refer to them in detail.
To ensure that the main object of the Bill is achieved—namely, the assistance
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of the agricultural industry—it is provided in subsection 2 (a) of Clause 1, in conjunction with the Second Schedule, that the subsidy shall not be payable unless the price paid for the beet is not less than 44 s. per ton in respect of beets grown in the years 1924 to 1927. The House will note that the price of 44 s. per ton is only a minimum price, and only operates for the first of three periods, and your Lordships will probably be interested to know that in consequence of successful negotiations conducted by the National Farmers' Union with the various beet sugar factories already operating or about to operate, prices considerably in excess of this sum have been guaranteed—namely, on a three years' contract 49 s for the first year of the factory, and 54 s. for the two succeeding years. At those rates I think we are all agreed there is prospect, with favourable climatic and soil conditions, of making a commercial success of the production of sugar beet. The House will observe that the minimum rate in the Bill applies to beet of 15½ per cent. sugar content, and that the minimum price varies with the sugar content in every case. It is therefore of great importance to the farmer to increase the sugar content as much as possible. As I have already said, in all favourable localities sugar beet of higher contents than this can quite easily be grown, and in fact is being grown in my district up to 18 per cent.
One difficulty, of course, is that all the seed so far has had to be obtained from abroad, but efforts are being made under the auspices of the Royal Agricultural Society, with the assistance of the Ministry of Agriculture, to persuade seed producers in this country to produce as good seed as is being provided from abroad, which will be specially suitable for British conditions.
It may be asked what guarantee the farmers have of fair prices after 1927, in view of the fact that the Second Schedule to the Bill only provides for minimum prices for the first four years of the subsidy. The reply is, that the factories cannot exist unless the farmers are willing to grow beet. Farmers are, therefore, in a position to exact favourable terms from the factories.
Subsection 2 (b) of Clause I provides that the subsidy will only be paid if not less than 75 per cent. of the plant and

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machinery installed in the sugar factory was wholly manufactured in Great Britain. This provision is intended to ensure that the industry shall be, as far as possible, on a British basis. It was not possible to provide that the whole of the machinery should be manufactured in this country, as sugar beet factory machinery is highly specialised, and in some cases—for example, that of pulp-driers—it has been found quite impossible to obtain them from British manufacturers. Unfortunately, there are certain plans and designs connected with some of this machinery which we are not in a position to copy, except at a prohibitive price, because they are covered by Continental patents. We hope that in time, as the sugar beet industry becomes established, far more than 75 per cent. of the machinery will be British-made. The Ministry of Agriculture has, you will notice, in certain cases the power to direct that the provision relative to the 75 per cent. shall not, in fact, apply, and has already granted a dispensation in two cases. These are cases where binding contracts Lave already been entered into by existing factories, or by the owners of contemplated factories, who obtain machinery from Holland, and, of course, it would not have been possible for them to proceed with the erection or equipment of their factories if this dispensation had not been given.
Clause 2 provides that companies to which the subsidy is paid must send annually to the Ministry of Agriculture a proper statement of their accounts, and I am sure your Lordships will agree that, where public money is being devoted to such a purpose, it is only right that some sort of financial return should be available, either for Parliament or for the responsible Minister to see. It is interesting to notice that this clause is specially supported by the sugar beet companies, no doubt because at the end of the ten years they have it in mind, if it turns out from their accounts that this is not a profitable industry, that the subsidy may be renewed for a further period.
Clause 3, which establishes quite a new principle, so far as I am aware, in this country, provides that workmen employed in connection with the manufacture of sugar and molasses in respect of which a subsidy is payable shall be paid wages on
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the basis of the Fair Wage Clause which is applicable to contracts of Government Departments. This principle is very familiar now to Parliament, and, so far as I know, has always operated smoothly and beneficially. The Fair Wage Clause, however, will not apply in cases where the wages are paid at a rate which has been agreed upon by a joint industrial council in any particular factory, representing, of course, both the employers and the employed in that business. The House will doubtless agree that these provisions are reasonable, in view of the fact that a subsidy is being granted out of State funds to this industry. If any dispute on the subject of wages arises it is to be referred under Clause 3 by the Minister of Agriculture to the Industrial Court for settlement.
I am proposing, on the Committed stage of the Bill, to invite the House to insert an Amendment providing that the wages settled by the Industrial Court shall be recoverable by the workman, if necessary, by a legal process. As your Lordships are aware, under the existing system under which these Courts operate, although the Courts may arrive at a particular figure the workmen have no power to claim that figure as a matter of right. We propose to go further, and we are, as I say, embarking upon a new principle in this respect as regards this particular industry, by empowering the workmen to claim their adjudicated wages by legal process.
Clause 4 provides for the re-imposition of the Excise Duty, from which sugar manufactured from home-grown beet is at present exempt. The Excise Duty amounts, at the moment, to 9s. 8⅔d. The net cost of the subsidy to the Exchequer, after allowing for the Excise Duty, will therefore be 9s. 9⅓d. per cwt., representing, it is estimated, about £530,000 per annum in respect of the three factories which are now operating. It is only fair to tell the House that the sugar refineries have raised some objections to the methods by which the subsidy is calculated, first of all on the ground that the adoption of the Customs scale for the subsidy gives a definite bias to the manufacture by the new factories of white sugar, as distinguished from raw sugar; and also because the Government proposals will mean establishing in this

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country a new industry at the expense of an old one.
I hope it may not be necessary for us to re-discuss in this House this passing controversy between the refiners and the promoters of these new factories. If it is, it is quite possible, I think, to persuade your Lordships of the fairness of the treatment of the refiners. If there be any doubt about it, it is interesting to note that the chief sugar refiners in this country are themselves embarking upon one of these new factories, which indicates a possibly delayed, but none the less sincere, sympathy with the movement which we are inaugurating. In order not to weary your Lordships I am deliberately avoiding entering into this controversy, but I am quite prepared to do so, if desired. I may remind your Lordships that the output of the seven factories which are now in esse or are being erected will, it is estimated, provide no more than 3 per cent. of the whole of the sugar which is being consumed, and being increasingly consumed, in this country. So, after all, a large amount of the sugar is bound to be provided in the future from the same sources as in the past.
There is one point to which I ought to refer, and that is that the present process of manufacture of sugar is a continuous process, from the pulping or crushing of the beet right away through to the production of highly-refined white sugar. We believe that to be the right process now to encourage in this country, and that there is no particular advantage to be gained by producing the raw sugar in one factory and refining it in another. That, at any rate, is not the view of our chief competitors on the Continent, for wherever they put up a sugar plant nowadays they invariably provide for the continuous process.
As your Lordships know, in the eighteenth century the agriculture of this country was revolutionised, to the immense advantage of the nation, by the system of rotation cropping, of which the pioneers were successively the second Viscount Townshend and Coke of Norfolk, first Earl of Leicester. Is it too much to anticipate that we are on the eve of another beneficial and pacific agricultural revolution, of which the noble Earl, Lord Denbigh, will rank throughout the ages as the far-sighted pioneer? At any rate, it is in that hope
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and belief that I confidently submit this Bill to your Lordships' consideration. I trust that it will pass without opposition.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: May I ask, Is not this a Money Bill?
LORD BLEDISLOE: That is a matter for the Speaker of the House of Commons, and not for me.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Bledisloe.)
THE EARL OF BEAUCHAMP THE EARL OF BEAUCHAMP had given Notice to move, as an Amendment, That the Bill be read 2a this day six months. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I cannot help feeling that your Lordships' House has some small ground of complaint against His Majesty's Government for not having allowed this Bill to reach this House at an earlier stage. It was only on Thursday last that it was read a first time, and we understand that a Royal Commission is necessary in the course of the present week in order that it shall receive the Royal Assent. It is a Bill of considerable importance, and I think it would have been much better if your Lordships' House had been allowed a somewhat longer period in which to consider it.
May I congratulate the noble Lord who moved the Second Reading of the Bill upon the satisfaction he must feel in piloting it through your Lordships' House. For many years he has been interested in this matter, and therefore it may be a special pleasure to him that it has fallen to his lot to take charge of the Bill in this House. I am sorry, however, to disappoint him in the ground of my objection to this measure. It is on no abstract or theoretical ground that I ask your Lordships to give it a Second Reading six months from to-day. It is on the purely businesslike ground that this is a grant of public money to private companies on what, in my opinion, are unbusinesslike terms. There is no suggestion in the Bill for repayment such as that suggested by the Development Commissioners. After all, it is no new idea that public money should be granted for the assistance of the sugar beet industry. When the question was considered by the Development Commissioners they recommended that the sugar beet companies should pay interest at the rate of 5 per

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cent. upon the money which was lent to them, and I think it would have been very much better had a provision of that kind appeared in the present Bill.
It is perfectly true that the beginning of all these sugar mille is a very expensive business. Kelham cost at the beginning, I think, a million of money to which the Government contributed a considerable amount. Fifteen shillings in the £ was written off the value of their shares. When Cantley was started in 1912 it met with continuous bad fortune until two years ago, when it began to turn the corner. Last year it made a profit of £146,000, while this year there is some hope that, according to an estimate which has been made, the profit will be £200,000. In those circumstances, it would have been possible to ask these people who are going to benefit by a grant of public money to do something to pay it back, if only by way of interest.
In view of the fact that the profits at Cantley were so large last year and are expected to be still larger this year, this is a matter which might safely have been left to private enterprise. Investors of capital would have been attracted by the possibilities of making such large profits, even had it been some years before they recouped themselves. But so far as these factories are concerned, I am bound to call your Lordships' attention to the fact that in the past it was very largely a case of foreign capital having been invested. Mr. Johann Petrus van Rossum was largely concerned in the Cantley factory, and it is the same with the other factories which belong to the same company. I am all in favour of foreign capital coming into this country to help in the employment of British workmen; but I am not in favour of inviting foreign capital to come into this country and then giving it large subsidies. At Cantley there is a Dutchman in charge of the factory and Dutch machinery is used. At Ipswich it is said that Hungarians are employed.
I think, too, that the forecast of the noble Lord himself as to the employment which would be given by this scheme was somewhat optimistic. I understood him to say that there would be 400 men—or was it 600?—employed at each factory. If you multiply whichever figure is the
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correct one by six or ten factories the resultant employment will bear a very small relation to the amount of unemployment in the country. There is also this point, that in agricultural areas and in those districts where factories are likely to be built there is not so much unemployment as there is in the towns. Generally speaking, it is within the knowledge of your Lordships that the agricultural labourer is employed all the year round. The point in this case is that agricultural labourers who are already employed will be given this amount of casual labour—because it is only casual labour—during the time they are working on these roots, and that does not really afford any very great hope that there will le a large reduction in unemployment generally. As against that, we have to remember the number of men who are now working in the refineries and who may lose work in consequence of the erection of these other factories.
There is a long history connected with this matter with which I shall not burden your Lordships, but it is interesting to remember that this is a considerable reversal of the policy initiated by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain at the time of the Brussels Sugar Convention. People went over from this country to represent the Government of the day and to induce other countries to discontinue their bounties, to persuade them that their bounties were uneconomic and that it was much better for them not to put bounties on the sugar grown in their countries. At that time the anxiety was for the refiners who were to be found chiefly in Glasgow. This is a very considerable reversal of that policy, and I am not sure that it is an improvement upon it. We have always heard from noble Lords opposite of their anxiety to tax the foreigner. I have always thought that in the matter of sugar bounties we went a considerable distance towards taxing the foreigner in order to get cheap goods here from him. Foreigners raised money by their ordinary taxation, and then gave it in the form of bounties to growers of sugar. The people in those foreign countries had to find the money to pay those taxes and, having grown the sugar and having refined it—some of it was not refined but sent over here in its raw state—it was sent here a great deal more

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cheaply and we could get our sugar cheap because the foreigner received a bounty on the sugar he grew. That seems to me to be the only way in which we may really hope to tax the foreigner effectively.
The noble Lord explained to your Lordships the figures which related to the subsidy. It is a rather complicated matter, and I hope your Lordships will permit me to repeat those figures. The subsidy is to be 19 s. 6d. per cwt. From that we must take away the Excise Duty which is now payable on the sugar and amounts to 9s. 9¾d. To that we have to add a Customs Duty of 11 s. 8d. and the advantage which they get by the preference of 1s. 11 d. That makes a total of 21 s. 5d. a cwt. As far as I can see, sugar of a somewhat similar character to that which is likely to be turned out by these factories is now being sold in the London market at 32 s. 4d. a cwt. In those circumstances I thing the scale is very generous indeed, because, in addition, we have to remember that these factories are able also to sell the feeding stuffs to which the noble Lord referred and which are said to be very valuable for the stock of this country. The companies, therefore, will not only get the subsidy but the advantage of the feeding stuffs and they certainly ought to be able to pay some interest on the money advanced to them by the State at no great distance of time from now. I understand that the amount is to be £500,000 this year, and next year they expect to deal with a great deal more. Even when we have subtracted the amount of Excise Duty the burden on the Exchequer is likely to amount to something like £2,000,000 or £3,000,000. The more successful they are in growing sugar the worse it is for the taxpayer.
The reason I invite your Lordships to reject this Bill is based on grounds of economy. During the last few days there has been a discussion in this House upon the increse in the Air Force. We know that the Navy Estimates are larger, and I think the last Bill mentioned in your Lordships' House to-night entailed a loss of something like £200,000. These things go on, and it becomes more and more impossible for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give that relief to industry by a reduction of taxation which is the desire of every member of your Lordships' House. We all want to see a
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reduction of taxation, and it can only be done by the most rigid economy and by refusing to grant these large sums of public money in this way. But if we do make these grants of public money, the least we can do is to ask for a return on the capital that we invest. I would further point out the difficulty that this Bill raises to a further reduction of the Sugar Duty—an aim which certainly was the object of a good many members of your Lordships' House. We should like to see the Sugar Duty reduced, not only because of the constant use of sugar as an article of domestic consumption, but also because of its use as a raw material. It is a necessary ingredient in a number of articles which used to be made on a large scale in this country, and the more we can have of it in this country, and the cheaper it is, the better it must be for our trade, because there will be more people employed in making these secondary things. But the institution of this subsidy makes it more difficult than it was before to consider the question of further reducing the Sugar Duty.
Agriculture is not the first interest considered in this matter; indeed, it was only comparatively lately that the agricultural interest, represented by the National Farmers' Union, took a very deep interest in this subject. It was only in 1922 that they first began to press this matter upon His Majesty's Government. But if it had been a question of agriculture chiefly, I think His Majesty's Government might have found means to subsidise the raw material only, and not to penalise these manufacturers, the refiners, who are now working in Glasgow. It is quite evident that assistance to raw sugar is one thing, and the subsidy which is being given on manufactured sugar is another thing, because the latter assists the manufacturers of sugar as well as the producers of the raw material. This is just one section of agriculture which is being assisted.
In this House we are constantly hearing complaints of the present depressed condition of agriculture. I think we have some right to comment upon that fact. Even the Tariff Commission which was set up by Mr. Chamberlain declared against the taxation of wheat, on the ground that it was selecting one product of the agricultural community and giving special treatment

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to it, which amounted to favouritism, and was not going to help other sections of agriculture. This is oven more the case. There are far fewer people engaged in growing sugar beet than in growing wheat, and it is to this small section of agriculture that this assistance is going to be given. We may expect other interests to come forward and ask for similar treatment in the future. I know that my friends amongst the hop growers will not be backward in pressing upon a sympathetic Minister and Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture their claims to be assisted by subsidies or by some other means of the same kind.
The noble Lord challenged me upon the point as to whether in my opinion this was Protection or not, and he quoted a sentence from John Stuart Mill. Far be it from me to enter into any competition on a matter of that kind with so great an authority. I would say what I have ventured to say in many places before, that if you want to assist any industry subsidies are certainly a very great deal better than tariffs. With subsidies you see exactly the amount of money that is being spent by the country in assisting industry; the money goes direct to that industry, and does not percolate through into the pockets of other people. In those circumstances subsidy is a great deal better than tariff. If, on the one hand, you are to have a low subsidy and no Excise Duty, and on the other a high subsidy and payment of Excise Duty, which is the scheme" under this Bill, comparing the two the first alternative is certainly very near indeed to a system of Protection. I incline to think that is perhaps the reason why this Bill was introduced by the late Government.
I was reading that Protectionist newspaper the Scotsman on August 21 last, and I found that they said this:
"Whether protection should be afforded by subsidies or by a tariff is a point mainly of tactics. A Socialist Party will probably prefer the method of subsidies since it can be plausibly argued that a subsidy will not increase prices. But a subsidy is a concealed tax on the whole community; and taxation is unquestionably an important element in cost of production. It is illusory therefore to suppose that the effect of a subsidy will be different from that of a tariff, so far as concerns prices."
That, I suppose, explains why this Bill was originally proposed by the Government to which the noble Lords sitting on
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the Bench below me belonged last year. Indeed, I remember that their proposals were brought forward at a somewhat interesting moment in the electoral history of that Government. There was certainly one by-election pending at that time, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer made haste to announce his conversion to the system of a subsidy to sugar. I am glad to think, whether it was connected with that by-election or not, that the result did not meet with the success which His Majesty's then Government expected, for the bribe offered to the electorate was refused.
I think that this marks another step in that unfortunate direction in which, as it seems to me, the Labour Party is tending. It is not on those grounds that I am asking your Lordships to give this Bill a Second Reading this day six months hence. It is because His Majesty's Government, as it seems to me, have not sufficient control over the business in return for the money which they put into it. I should have preferred, if there was to be a grant of public money, that it should be granted either under the Trade Facilities Acts, or under the Development Commission, and I hope your Lordships will agree to my Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Leave out ("now") and at the end of the Motion insert ("this day six months").—(Earl Beauchamp.)
LORD ARNOLD: My Lords, I desire to give to this Bill general support qualified by certain criticisms. It follows that I oppose the Amendment moved by the noble Earl who spoke last. Quite frankly I do not understand his Amendment; at least, I cannot quite understand how it is consistently put down upon the Paper when only as recently as last Thursday the noble Earl informed your Lordships that this is a Bill to which there seemed to be offered no opposition. His next act is to put down a Motion on the Paper for its rejection. That seems to me a somewhat mystifying procedure. However, I leave that aspect of the matter for the moment, and I will deal with the economic points of the noble Earl as I proceed. The main provisions of this Bill have been very fully explained by the noble Lord who moved the Second Reading in an interesting speech, and I shall be mainly occupied, in the brief observations which I have to make, in stating—because

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there seems still to be some misconception about the matter—the position of the Labour Party in regard to this subject. I am happy to think that I can do it within the space of a few minutes.
First, in regard to the history of this subsidy. The noble Lord who moved the Second Reading outlined the facts broadly, but I think it is necessary to stress one or two details, because I do not think they are sufficiently appreciated When the Labour Party came into office the sugar beet industry enjoyed protection, because the Import Duty on sugar at that time was 25 s. 8d. per cwt., and there was no Excise Duty. In fact, the Excise Duty had been removed in 1922 with the express purpose of encouraging this industry. As a result, certain things had been done; capital expenditure had been incurred. Consequently it would have been impossible for the Labour Party, even if they had desired, and they did not so desire, to throw this industry over. To have done that would have meant considerable unemployment and loss. The noble Earl, in stressing the cost of this Bill, looked at the matter entirely on the debit side. He entirely left out of account the fact that in return for the subsidy you have a considerable saving in unemployment pay, a substantial advantage to agriculture, and undoubtedly valuable educational experience of which much may be expected in the future.
The next step in the history of this subsidy is the reduction made by the Labour Government in the Sugar Duty last year, a very big reduction, because the Sugar Duty was cut down from 25 s. 8d. per cwt. to 11 s. 8d.—a larger reduction in that Duty than was ever made by any Government in one year. It is clear that the protective assistance given to the industry was largely reduced, and the Labour Government was determined to reimpose an Excise Duty, and it did reimpose that Duty. In that respect—I should be very glad to have the noble Earl's attention on this point—it bettered the example of the last Liberal Government of which he was a member, because that Government refused to put on an Excise Duty although pressed to do so. That is the position. I say that the Labour Government was more virtuous in this matter, so far as Free Trade is concerned,
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than the last Liberal Government of which the noble Earl was a member. I was not surprised therefore, though I confess I had no idea what reasons he was going to advance, when he did not dwell at great length upon the protective aspect of this matter.
It came about that an entirely new-position had to be faced by the late Labour Government, and it was then decided to proceed by means of a subsidy along the lines of the present measure. I maintain that such a proceeding is not inconsistent with Free Trade and that it cannot rightly be represented as inconsistent with Free Trade. I am not going into a disquisition of the difference between a tariff and a subsidy, although it is a very tempting theme and a great deal can be said about it. But this measure is supported by strong Free Traders, and even such a rigid Cobdenite as Mr. Francis Acland, last year in the House of Commons encouraged the idea of a temporary subsidy for the purpose of assisting the sugar beet industry. As the noble Lord who moved the Second Reading has pointed out, there is not a single country in Europe where this industry is now in being where it has not been necessary for a limited period in the early stages to give some form of State assistance. Unless you do so the industry can never be founded. There are certain circumstances in which a temporary subsidy is a vital necessity, and I can quote no less an authority than the noble Earl, Lord Oxford, himself as approving the subsidising of an industry under certain conditions and circumstances.
THE EARL OF OXFORD AND ASQUITH: Under certain conditions.
LORD ARNOLD: I am glad to find there is no difference between us, and I hope that in future we shall hear nothing more about the Labour Party having departed from the strict path of Free Trade. I maintain that in the circumstances, having regard to the position of the Labour Government when they came into office and their determination to re-impose an Excise Duty, which they did, they had no other course than to proceed by way of a subsidy. There is only one further point on which I desire to say but a few words because the ground has been

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more than covered by the noble Lord who moved the Second Reading of the Bill. I should like to thank him, and the Government, for having accepted an Amendment in regard to the Fair Wage Clause, moved by the Labour Party in another place. In connection with that clause there is a further Amendment which was held over for reconsideration by the Minister of Agriculture, and I hope that when we reach the Committee stage we may come to an agreement on that matter.
Before I sit down I wish to say something about a provision in the Bill on which the noble Lord dwelt at considerable length. It is in regard to the provision that at least 75 per cent. of the plant and machinery installed in the factory for the manufacture of sugar and molasses shall be wholly manufactured in Great Britain. It is, of course, quite true that a very plausible case can be made out in that connection, but I believe it is open to very grave objections. I am not going into the fiscal argument and considerations more suited to a general discussion of that character. I will content myself with putting the practical point, that this clause will mean, I am afraid, that the industry will not have so good a chance as it ought to have, and as it could have, if this prevision were not inserted in the Bill. I do not think that the 25 per cent. which is left for purchase abroad is by any means sufficient to ensure that the industry will have the best chance. To say that is not to reflect in the least on the British manufacturer or the industry. These sugar beet industries abroad have been established for many years and the plant and machinery for them is made there with all the advantages which come from long practical experience and experiment. We are not yet in that position in this country. We may come to it some day, and I hope and believe we shall, but I do not think the time has come when a provision like that should be inserted in this Bill, because it will handicap seriously, possibly fatally, this experiment.
It is quite true that there is a qualification to which the noble Lord referred—namely, that in certain circumstances the Minister can practically contract out of this provision. I was a little disappointed to hear that this qualification
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had been put in chiefly for the purpose of dealing with one or two past happenings. I hoped it meant that the authors of it were themselves very unhappy about it and felt that it was necessary to insert it in order to meet the position which would arise in the future. The words of this qualification are:—
".! shall not apply in the case of any factory in respect of which the Minister thinks fit for any special reason to direct that they shall not apply.!"
That is one of the widest discretions I have ever seen in an Act of Parliament, and it is rather an astonishing proceeding to put in a provision and then put in also a discretion which makes the provision nugatory. I do not think the statement of the noble Lord was at all satisfactory on that point. I regret that this provision remains in the Bill. If the qualification is put in I think it would be better to delete the provision altogether.
Let me say this in conclusion, that although we are obliged to offer criticisms on certain points, nevertheless the main structure of this Bill is, as the noble Lord has stated—I should like to express my appreciation of what he said about the action of the Labour Government in this matter—the same as that for which the late Administration was responsible. We wish every success to the industry which this Bill is designed to assist.
LORD HARRIS: My Lords, I should like, if I may, to detain your Lordships for a very few moments on this interesting subject, though certainly not with the intention of supporting my noble friend, the noble Earl opposite, in his Motion to read the Bill a second time this day six months, nor yet of finding a solution for the evident differences that exist between the two Parties opposite, both here and elsewhere. I am only too thankful when I find a Ministry of Agriculture that is really desirous of helping agriculture to some extent. But I venture to offer one word of warning to your Lordships from a practical point of view, and I am tempted to do so because I remember very well that, during the war, when my noble friend Lord Selborne was equally enthusiatic as is the noble Lord on the Front Bench below me now concerning a scheme for the establishment of farm colonies, I pointed out from a practical

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point of view that it was going to be a failure; and, as your Lordships know, it was an almost total failure.
As regards this experiment, I am not speaking from my own experience, but I have had the opportunity of consulting a very eminent agriculturist who has been pursuing this subject for twenty years or more, and who, to assist in the matter, has himself grown sugar beet. He does not show the enthusiastic confidence displayed by my noble friend below me. I cannot help thinking that my noble friend has absorbed some of the enthusiasm of my noble friend Lord Denbigh, whom, in the same breath, I will congratulate upon his success, after many years of struggle and disappointment, in securing the assistance of the Government. There are several snags which this boat must either drive down or get round. In the first place, though I believe that on the Continent sugar beet is not grown more than once in five years, let us estimate that it can be grown once in four years. Then I am told that a well equipped factory will require the supply from something like 4,000 acres a year. That means that the factory must be able to depend upon at least 16,000 acres. Now 16,000 acres of sugar beet arable is a pretty big area. A great deal of that area will not be at a very convenient distance from the factory, and this will increase the cost of transport If you sum up in your own mind, thinking of any area of country that you well know, how many other kinds of cultivation are already going on and well established and are not likely to be interfered with, you can see over what a very large area indeed the 16,000 acres will have to be spread. That is one of the difficulties, and the noble Lord below me has not attempted to touch upon it.
Then, when the beet is grown, it has to be treated in rotation—that is to say, the factory cannot deal with, say, 80,000 tons all at once, but that quantity has to be divided in rotation. Since the roots have to be pulled at the same time, a certain proportion of them will have to wait for treatment. I do not know how that is going to affect the sugar content. It may have no material effect or, on the other hand, it may; but at any rate, the farmer who depends upon the sugar content has to wait until his particular crop has been treated, and he may have
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to wait a very considerable time. Again, there are a number of competing industries in the particular area in which these experiments have been carried out, and will continue to be carried out to some extent. You are on some of the very best potato land in England, worth £5 an acre, I am told. Some of these farmers are not going to give up growing potatoes merely to experiment with beet, and you may depend upon it that the area that will have to be included for each of these factories will be extremely large. I do not think that this has been taken into calculation.
As regards labour, I have always understood, and I am supported by my informant, that one of the reasons of success abroad has been the extremely cheap female labour that has been employed. This is imported labour. My noble friend below me held out hopes that ten men more, I think, per 100 acres were likely to be employed on the farm. Does he mean all the year round? This crop has to be rushed in, and when it is ready it has to be rushed out again. You will want a great deal of casual labour that is not upon the farm. You will have to get it from the towns. I sincerely hope that ten more men per acre are going to be employed, but this is going to put up the cost of cultivation very considerably. This is not cheap labour, and I doubt very much if the labour which you are going to get from the towns, whether male or female, is going to be anything like so economical as the labour which has been employed abroad and has been one of the factors in making the cultivation of sugar beet so successful there.
These are only two or three of the difficulties that have to be dealt with. For a good number of years past I have had to consider questions into which chemistry enters. You can prove anything by laboratory experiment, and so far there has been very little more than laboratory experiment in this matter. There is no question that we can grow beet, there is no question that some of it will contain the necessary sugar content and there is no question that it can be treated. I think that the difficulty you are going to meet will arise from the agricultural point of view, both as regards area and as regards labour. But I would no more think of opposing the Second Reading of this

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Bill than of opposing any other offer of assistance for agriculture that might be made by the Government, and I sincerely hope that this experiment may prove a great success.
LORD BLEDISLOE: My Lords, I thought just now that my noble friend Lord Harris was proposing to some extent to damn our Bill with faint praise, and it was a relief to me when he ended his interesting speech by stating that he proposed to support the Second Reading. I would venture to say to him that most of his neighbours amongst the farmers in East Anglia are definitely enthusiastic about the inauguration of this industry.
LORD HARRIS: Not in East Kent.
LORD BLEDISLOE: East Kent? I beg the noble Lord's pardon. At any rate, in those areas where there is a sugar beet factory or the prospect of one, I understand that the enthusiasm amongst farmers is considerable, and there appears to be no prospect, upon any information that we have, that so important a crop as the potato crop is likely to be in any way displaced to make way for sugar beet. The noble Lord will not expect me to enter into the different conditions which govern the production of different crops, but I think I should be able to convince him that the conditions differ to such an extent that one crop is not likely to displace the other.
I should like to thank the House for the reception, on the whole favourable, which has been given to this Bill. I am afraid that if I tried for many hours to convince my noble friend Lord Beauchamp as to the desirability of this Bill, at any rate from a Free Trader's point of view, I should fail most signally, but I should like to say to him that, so far as a loan is concerned as against an out and out subsidy, it would have been quite impossible to have persuaded the gentlemen who are now putting their money into these new factories to come forward if we had simply provided a loan, even at a low rate of interest, instead of that which may be regarded as the gift of a subsidy. I think I am right in saying that in all those countries where the sugar beet industry has been developed so
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successfully there has been a similar attitude taken up by the Government of the country, in providing financial assistance; and I am bound to say that, as I read John Stuart Mill and other eminent economists, there is no suggestion in their remarks upon this subject that a loan should be substituted for definite financial assistance on the part of the Government. The only other point mentioned by the noble Lord, to which I should like to refer, is that the sugar beet industry provides employment outdoors at one period of the year and in the factories during the other part of the year. In fact, it is seasonable employment of very high value, tending to change casual and ill-paid employment into regular and well-paid employment.
So far as Lord Arnold's criticisms are concerned, I do not think there is very much between us, but I would like to suggest to him that a large amount of this machinery which might be obtained from abroad, for the equipment of these factories, is undoubtedly produced by low-priced labour, and there is a strong feeling among those who desire to develop their factories in this direction, and among the workmen employed in those factories, that they should not be subjected to the unfair competition of goods produced abroad by lower wages than are paid in this country. After these remarks I trust your Lordships will allow this Bill to pass its Second Reading. So far as Lord Arnold is concerned, I will do my best to meet his more persuasive arguments in Committee.
THE EARL OF BEAUCHAMP: Perhaps your Lordships will allow me, in asking leave to withdraw my Motion for the rejection of this Bill, to thank the noble Lord for the answer which he has given me. I will not pretend that I am completely satisfied with the answer he has given, but probably if I spoke as long as he contemplated speaking to me, he would be as little convinced as I am. We had perhaps better be content to leave the matter there, and I ask leave to withdraw my Motion.
Amendment for the rejection of the Bill, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

THE GENEVA PROTOCOL.
LORD PARMOOR LORD PARMOOR rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can give information on the matters brought forward at the recent meeting of the Council of the League of Nations; and to move for Papers. The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the Question that I have put upon the Paper primarily raises a matter which is much discussed at the present time—namely, the question of the Protocol—but having been asked on behalf of the Government to explain what points I desired to call attention to in my Question, I supplied them with full notes of the speech that I was going to make, and therefore they know, adequately I hope, what are the points which I am going to raise. My notes were originally given to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, whose illness I regret. I believe that the noble Viscount on the Woolsack will answer my Questions.
The Protocol is not a British document in any sense. It is an international document of wide-reaching importance, the whole basis of which is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to comply with which all signatory States have already come under binding treaty obligations. The Protocol really embodies what I will call the No-More-War, or Peace, policy, a policy in which a common measure of right and justice shall be guaranteed to all peoples alike, irrespective of the power or force which they may have at their command. In other words, it is a policy of equality for all countries, whether great or small. It was unanimously adopted as a reasonable and peaceful proposal by all the States represented at the Fifth Assembly of the League at the Geneva meeting last autumn. The present Government have rejected it root and branch, as I understand, on the wide ground that a policy based on trust and not on fear represents, tinder present conditions, an impracticable idealism. This view I think was further enforced in connection with the Navy Estimates and the speech made on Saturday by the First Lord of the Admiralty.
Sound advice, in my view, was given to this House by the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, speaking in 1918, when he
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made a notable speech in favour of the whole League principle. He said:—
"My impression is that the democracies of the world are sick of the burden of heavy armaments, and that if there were found means of reasonably assuring international peace you would find that disarmament would follow almost automatically."
I think there is no doubt that that is the feeling in the world at the present time, and that to a large extent it was the basis of the unanimous approval given to the principle of the Protocol at Geneva. In fact, it was known that modern industrialism and war are really in their essence inconsistent. However, on the present occasion, as there is no question of amendment or improvement, I do not propose to discuss any matter of detail.
I think that the authority which there is behind the Protocol has not been appreciated. I have read several times the statement made by Mr. Chamberlain at Geneva, but I do not find any reference to the great weight of international authority and assent that stands behind the Protocol. It was directly initiated by the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain, acting in friendly co-operation and in respect of a common international policy. It was supported in an Assembly of exceptional authority. I do not want to dwell unduly upon this, but the speakers in favour were four actual Prime Ministers and two ex-Prime Ministers, four Foreign Secretaries and two ex-Foreign Secretaries, in addition to the leading representatives of the Latin-American Republics, a very important body in connection with the League, a ruling Prince of one of the Native States in India, and the leader of one of the great Parties in the Australian Parliament. It was after these speeches, which no doubt were all delivered in a common plea, that the resolution proposed by the Prime Minister of Great Britain and seconded by the Prime Minister of France was unanimously adopted. That is a very remarkable position in international affairs. In other words, the Geneva Protocol has a unique authority for everyone who regards the League and League policy as an essential condition in the government of modern international life.
In the case of Great Britain the Protocol denoted the culminating point

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of a considered policy of friendly international co-operation. It followed the success of the London Conference. And may I say here that the position of the British Delegates, of whom I had the honour to be one, has been misunderstood or misrepresented? The British Delegates were not irresponsible agents. They were the accredited representatives at the Assembly of the British Government. They acted throughout in accordance with instructions received, and were in constant communication with the Foreign Office and the Foreign Minister. If it were in accordance with principle—perhaps the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack will answer this question—I wish that all these communications could be made public as part of the Papers dealing with this great question. There should be no room for mistake in a matter of this kind, because all the allegations made on the basis that the British Delegation were an irresponsible, instead of accredited, body have really no foundation whatever. The rejection of the Protocol, indeed, apart for the moment from the question of whether it is right or wrong, is the complete reversal of a carefully planned foreign policy.
Then the whole status and constitution of the Assembly of the League of Nations has not been adequately appreciated. Not only the British, but all the Delegations—and I think there were fifty-six countries originally represented—were representative Delegations, and I know that in many cases they were in direct communication with their home Governments. To the Assembly so constituted and to the Governments which they represented, the peace policy in the Protocol was not only not an unpractical idealism, but was greeted with enthusiasm as a real practical solution. Naturally, the small States were most insistent. To them the principle of the Protocol denoted the only possible basis of equality in an international community, in which right could be substituted for force as the governing principle.
There is one further misconception which I feel bound to correct. The League has no direct executive authority to interfere with the sovereignty of the constituent States—none whatever. So far as I know, no such authority has ever been claimed within the terms either of
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the Covenant or of the Protocol. Certain rhetorical and inaccurate statements of this character have no foundation, and should be known really to have no foundation by everyone who has studied the Covenant of the League and the basis on which the League has been established. I do not doubt—I think it has been very rightly stated by Mr. Chamberlain on behalf of the Government—that the issue raised by the statement read at Geneva is fundamental. It goes to the whole root of the League and League policy. The autocratic rejection of the Protocol will tend to imperil the whole future influence of the League. The League was founded on the basis of the influence of trust and confidence. I think trust and confidence are essential if international intercourse is to go forward on a League basis. The Protocol is rejected on the ground that a dominating influence is feared, and that we must distrust the plighted word of other countries. When I say "other countries" I presume it means the plighted word of all countries, although, on behalf of my own, I repudiate such a suggestion in the the strongest possible terms.
The speeches of the two Prime Ministers insisted throughout on the importance of a peace policy, and on the inseparable and inter-linked connection between arbitration, security, and disarmament. Of course, the whole goal of the Protocol is not perhaps properly expressed as "disarmament," but as the reduction of armaments to the level to which countries and States which are signatories of the Covenant have already undertaken to reduce them. I should like to quote a short passage from the speech of M. Herriot, the French Prime Minister, because that is sufficient without further emphasis on my part. M. Herriot said this—
"Arbitration, security, disarmament—the three words are, we hold, closely interconnected. Without real international solidarity we shall, we believe, never attain that international community which we passionately desire, which we are resolved to create, to perpetuate, to organise, conformably with the laws which govern life and being. Without international solidarity"—
I will ask your Lordships to mark these words—
"there will never be international peace. Through international solidarity alone shall we attain disarmament, which is our goal."
So much has been said about the attitude of the Dominions, to which I shall have to refer shortly, that while I am on this part of my subject I should like also to quote the opinion of Sir Robert Borden, who was the Conservative Prime Minister of Canada during the war, and the representative of Canada during the peace proceedings in Paris. He says this—
"I regard the Protocol as a brave and earnest attempt to bring about that general disarmament which is so necessary for the future peace of the world. The proposal to couple disarmament and compulsory arbitration, including in that expression the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, seems reasonable and feasible."
I adopt those words entirely. They are admirably expressed, and represent the true view of the Protocol. He says—
"There is much force in the view that the two"—
that is, arbitration and disarmament—
"must go hand in hand."
Again, the whole matter may be taken as summed up in the last paragraph of the resolution proposed by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, seconded by the Prime Minister of France and accepted with enthusiasm by the whole Assembly of the League at Geneva. It is impossible for me to convey to your Lordships the enthusiasm with which this resolution was accepted and endorsed. This paragraph expressed their desire to strengthen the security of the nations of the world by settling by pacific means all disputes which might arise between States. Then it rightly says that the goal is disarmament—a matter to which too little attention has been paid in the criticism directed against the Protocol.
Upon that point, might I call your Lordships' attention to Article 21 of the Protocol which shows clearly what was the opinion of those who framed and supported it? The Protocol was never intended to be regarded as a document complete in itself. It was never intended to be criticised in connection with the existing condition of armaments. On the contrary, the provision I shall read makes it clear that the whole Protocol becomes null and void unless at a world conference a reduction of armaments is carried out on the basis of the obligations already undertaken by the signatory States of the Covenant in Article 8. These are the actual words—
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"If within such period after the adoption of the plan for the reduction of armaments as shall he fixed by the said Conference"—
that is the world conference—
"the plan has not been carried out, the Council shall make a declaration to that effect; this declaration shall render the present Protocol null and void."
I do not believe it is fair to attempt to criticise the Protocol at the present moment on the lines suggested in Mr. Chamberlain's statement. No one supported the Protocol on that basis. Everyone who supported it supported it as a document opening the gates to a general reduction of armaments, and it was especially provided that if that general reduction of armaments was not carried out the Protocol itself should become null and void.
How does this matter stand in regard to a league or society or, as Mazzini would have called it, an association of nations? I think that the Covenant of the League or society implies that the signatory States have agreed to the principle of an international community cooperating in friendly intercourse and on a peace basis. I know perfectly well—I do not shut my eyes to the fact—that this position is criticised; but I would suggest that, so far as Great Britain is concerned, and so far as all the signatories to the Covenant are concerned, they cannot overthrow that position without at the same time treating with scant respect treaty obligations of a very solemn character which they have actually undertaken. The primary duty (it is in the first paragraph of the Covenant) which we and other signatories have undertaken is this—
".! to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security"—
how?—
"by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war."
This is not the expression of an idealism but of a practical duty imposed on nations undertaking treaty obligations in a solemn manner. The subsequent clauses are to carry out the obligations thus undertaken, and it is sought to carry them out in the great majority of cases by referring disputes to what might be called a third party decision so as to avoid resort to war.
Everyone who has studied such a league from the time of Grotius knows that the

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whole basis of what is regarded as the international community is a community which should be constituted on the same basis of law and order as has been already accepted in all civilised communities. It is not wonderful that, in order to make a regulation of this kind complete, the terms and provisions of the Covenant have been found to require adjustment. May I remind your Lordships of the provisions of Article 1 of the Protocol? It is not necessary to read more than a word or two in order to put the matter in the shortest possible manner:—
"The signatory States undertake to make every effort in their power to secure the introduction into the Covenant of amendments on the lines of the provisions contained in the following articles."
Immediately on my return from Geneva I received a letter from the Secretariat asking me to appoint a representative of Great Britain for this purpose—the object being that by reducing the Protocol and the Covenant to one document all the misrepresentations and difficulties which have occurred might be put on one side. I suggested the appointment of one of the most highly qualified international lawyers in this country. Of course I do not mention his name. He said he was prepared to serve, and negotiations had proceeded to a certain point when the late Government fell.
No one would recognise more fully than the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack the importance of a draft of this kind showing clearly how far the Covenant would have to be amended in order to comply with the Protocol. I want to ask him whether any further advance has been made in order that this information should be obtained. It is admitted by everyone that the first adjustment in the Protocol is the universal application of a judicial or third party decision. The objective, of course, is peace. That is the reason for this provision. It is only in this way that peace can be so assured as to give that security which a country like France desires.
The real question then is, should the League forward the constitution of an international community on a peace basis as a barrier against future war? That is the design and object of the Protocol If the answer is in the affirmative, then the British Government is in the unenviable position of opposing proposals unanimously accepted at Geneva as a
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sufficient basis for calling a world conference on disarmament, or rather on the reduction of armaments to the level fixed by the terms of the Covenant itself. If I may use language which comes from the United States, whose attitude I think has been much misunderstood, the principle of compulsory arbitration, with disarmament, is a foothold, and the only foothold, that will raise the world out of the war morass. Criticism of the provision for compulsory arbitration in the Protocol underlies practically much of the statement prepared by Mr. Chamberlain. He says that the objection of the British Government to universal and compulsory arbitration might easily outweigh its theoretical advantages. That is a very vague and inconclusive criticism. There is much more than theoretical advantage in universal arbitration or court decision. It is a practical advantage of a far-reaching character, and of infinite importance.
It is nothing less than the relegation of questions from the realm of force to the realm of right. It places all nations, small and great, on a basis of equality, it provides for conciliation and justice, and creates a desire to do justice as well as to claim justice. It formulates means of righting wrongs between nations without resorting to the greater wrong of warfare. Through preliminary conciliation it gives a means of explaining away misunderstanding—a most important provision. It invites co-operation, in the place of controversy, and unites higher forms under the guise of an international court, and points the way to the gradual building up of a recognised system of international law. This law, if I might quote from the admirable speech given in this House by the late Lord Parker, should become the common law of nations, and provide for the same measure of peace and security among the nations as the great system of common law has provided for peace between individuals of the same nationality. And no country has been more blessed in the direction of peace and order, under the provisions of this great common law, than our country of Great Britain.
Secondly, and I can deal with this quite shortly, the Protocol was criticised on the ground that it sharpens the sanctions. I purposely use the actual

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words in the statement. I need not remind your Lordships how often it has been pointed out that the sanction clause in the Protocol is, in terms, limited to the sanctions mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant. If the arguments on this point of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Buckmaster, and of Sir Frederick Pollock are not considered to be convincing, I can add nothing to strengthen them. The sanctions are not sharpened by the Protocol in any way. If they are sharpened at all it is by reason of another factor—namely, that unfortunately a certain number of countries have not yet become members of the League. In one sense no doubt it may be said that new responsibilities are created, but in reality they are reduced a hundredfold if the new policy is accepted. I agree with M. Briand's statement that the Protocol has erected an almost insuperable barrier to future warfare. If this is true, all minor criticisms sink into insignificance. No one disputes that security from war is the keynote of a progressive peace policy, and if this is secured under what M. Briand calls an insuperable barrier against war—and that was the general view at Geneva—then criticism such as we find on minor details carries little or no weight. You must recollect that so far as security is a matter of French national opinion—and they are the persons to judge—they have given their answer in the Assembly at Geneva. There the security offered by the Protocol was accepted by the Delegations of all the States as a sufficient basis for the summoning of a world conference on disarmament.
I often doubt whether it is necessary to go into a number of wide arguments upon this point. The security of the Protocol was only required to be sufficient to enable a world conference to be called with the assent of all the assembled nations at Geneva. The Protocol is only a step on the road to disarmament, and is there any man of any knowledge or experience in international affairs who will say for a moment that he doubts the security of the Protocol, at least so far as it is necessary to form the foundation for the calling of a world conference on disarmament? There can be, I think, but one answer to that question. I know that in discussions of this kind a retreat
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is often found in vague expressions, but the practical thing is this. The world conference was to be called almost at once. It was to have been called this summer; but perhaps that was too soon. But can it be suggested by any one cognisant of international affairs that the Protocol did not give security sufficient for that purpose? If the disarmament conference had failed, the Protocol itself would have become null and void.
I would wish to say one or two words especially on the question of disarmament. The initiative on disarmament under Article 8 of the Covenant is placed upon the Council of the League. I am sorry that the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, is not here to-night. He was himself the originator of an immense amount of this work, and he deserves every credit for the splendid way in which he worked in connection with the League of Nations. But after five years of constant research—five years of groping in the dark in some directions at least—a scheme was suggested which the whole Assembly was ready to adopt and accept. What is the answer? If you are to be guided by the League policy, they say, we are ready, on the basis of the Protocol, to go forward into a world conference on disarmament which, after all, is the goal of all persons who desire an ultimate peace settlement.
I do not desire to go into matters connected with another Question, as to German disarmament, which I have on the Paper, but on this point it is not only the Protocol which I should like your Lordships to bear in mind, but also two Treaty provisions to which attention must be called in order to make my point quite clear. In that part of the Treaty of Versailles which deals with German disarmament we find these words as the first heading:—
"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations. Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."
There never was the idea of what I may call unilateral disarmament. The inducement to Germany to disarm was properly stated in the forefront of the clauses which deal with German disarmament as the initiation of the limitation of the armaments of all nations. And to make this quite clear—your Lordships may have it in mind, but unfortunately it is not always

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referred to—there was the answer given by the Allied Powers at Paris to the objections raised to the Treaty of Versailles by Germany. Consider what this means on the question of disarmament and our honour in carrying it forward?
"The Allied and Associated Powers have already pointed out to the German Delegates that the Covenant of the League of Nations provides.!"
I will not read the whole of the words again—for the reduction of armaments.
"They recognise that the acceptance by Germany of the terms laid down for her own disarmament"—
Will do what?—
"will facilitate and hasten the accomplishment of a general reduction of armaments; and they intend to open negotiations immediately with a view to the eventual adoption of a scheme of such general reduction."
Those words were spoken more than five years ago, and they must appeal to every one as an honourable obligation. For five years attempts have been made to fulfil that obligation and now, for the first time, you have a unanimous Report of the League with the Protocol as the basis for going forward in the direction of disarmament.
What has been the attitude of Great Britain? Every other country assented, and Great Britain also assented at the time, but there has been a change of Government. Is this country, not as a matter of detailed consideration, but as a root and branch objection to the Protocol to close the door, the only door which so far has been opened, to carrying out our honourable obligation, honourably undertaken, that at the first possible moment we would take our part in a scheme for the general reduction of armaments? There is one other point. Here I agree in one sense with what Mr. Chamberlain says, though I entirely disagree with the inference, that so long as you have these armaments you will have fear by one country of another. I recollect that Viscount Grey of Fallodon stated that in his view, partly as regards present fear and partly as regards future fear, he attributed the war mainly to the huge over-grown armaments in Europe. I recollect, too, that the Earl of Oxford and Asquith, speaking on the same subject in Dublin, referred to conditions in which there would be stimulated naval and military activity so that no one felt secure. And now we have Mr. Chamber-
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lain himself saying that many countries—I do not know to which countries he refers—are in fear of brute force, and, therefore, require brute force for their defence.
The very object of the Protocol is to get rid of that brute force. Is it to be said that brute force is an essential condition in the progress of mankind at the present moment? I do not believe any one will attempt to substantiate a statement of that kind. If it is not, it is of the utmost importance to get rid of it: if it is not, surely Great Britain should not stand in the way of carrying out an obligation honourably undertaken in the Treaty and further confirmed in the passages I have read—namely, that the disarmament of Germany was to be followed at the first possible moment by a general disarmament of other countries.
There are one or two other points, not of detail but of general consideration, on which I must say a word. I am sorry to have to do so at this late hour owing to other matters having received the attention of your Lordships. I must say a word as to the attitude of the Dominions and India towards the Protocol. It is probably known to your Lordships that the British Delegates to the Assembly were Delegates of the British Empire, a rather curious difference because to the Council they are only the Delegates of Great Britain. But, in addition to that, several of the Dominions had independent representations. Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Ireland and India were all represented by their Delegates at Geneva as accredited agents of their Governments for the time being. There was not a step we took at Geneva without consultation with them, there was not a movement in which they were not in direct touch with us, and I know perfectly well from my own experience and knowledge that they were in constant communication with their own Governments. If you are to take the opinion as it was expressed through accredited representatives at Geneva, the Dominions and India were fully in accord and expressed their accord by voting for the terms of the Protocol.
I have no doubt that, as in this country and elsewhere, there is a measure of divided opinion. But consider the case

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of India. The Indian representative was Lord Hardinge, an ex-Viceroy, twice head of the Foreign Office and Ambassador to Russia and at Paris. Could you have a more experienced exponent of international questions or a person more able to represent the realities of Indian opinion? He was a convinced supporter of the Protocol, and not only that, his assistance was of vital importance to the whole British Delegation. We rejoiced to have assistance of that kind; and if you were to analyse the Protocol you would find in many directions critical amendments which we introduced at the instance of the Dominions or of India. One other illustration. Australia had, as its first delegate, Sir Littleton Groom, the Attorney-General. He, as a delegate, was in constant communication with his Government and took a prominent part in forming the Protocol. He was the Chairman of the first Commission to which was delegated the most important part of the work. I do not know—I do not wish to dwell too much upon this—how many hours I spent talking over difficult questions with Sir Littleton Groom.
But how does the matter stand? If you have these Dominion and Indian representatives at Geneva, if you realise that they are acting under instructions from their Governments, as they were, if you bear in mind that they are accredited agents, not irresponsible bodies, what more can be done as regards the ascertainment of the true Dominion or Indian opinion than to be guided by them, accepting and considering all the suggestions that they make? We finally rejoiced to find that they were in accord with us and were able, at the vote, to support the whole of the Protocol. I have already referred to the opinion of Sir Robert Borden, and will not do so again, but I must add that if the Protocol were represented to the Dominions in the same light as it was represented in the statement of Mr. Chamberlain at Geneva, I cannot imagine any of them giving other than a negative answer.
There is one point upon which I want the noble and learned Viscount to give me an answer. Will he lay upon the Table, or supply publicly in whatever may be the right form, all the negotiations which have passed between the present Government
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and the Dominions and India upon this point? It is no good merely seeing the answer to a letter. That brings nothing to one's mind. It all depends upon what the question is that was asked and the way in which the matter was brought to their notice.
I must refer also quite shortly to one or two other points, because so much weight has been laid upon them. It is said, quite truly, that some countries are not yet members of the League. That difficulty was present to our minds and it is for that reason that disarmament was relegated to a world conference, where America and Germany and Russia would have the same weight and the same opportunity of expressing their opinions as any other countries. But I should like to say that, when what was called the Treaty of Mutual Assurance was turned down by Germany, Germany proposed a No-War policy almost in terms the same as that which is contained in the Protocol at the present moment—in principle precisely the same—and it was while we were discussing the Protocol and when we knew that this was the opinion of Germany, that Germany made advances, which unfortunately could not be brought to fruition, towards joining the League.
In the same way, take the views of America. If there are two principles which you will find advocated in America they are compulsory arbitration and disarmament. Take the opinion expressed by Mr. Taft, ex-President, or the opinions expressed on the Republican side, or the opinions of Mr. Wilson, of Mr. Davis, or of any of the very numerous religious bodies in America. The one object at which they have always aimed is a No-More-War policy based on compulsory arbitration and disarmament. I have here quotations from America, but having regard to the hour I must ask your Lordships to accept that which I have stated.
There is a further curious incident. It is said that the Protocol stereotypes conditions. There is not a word in the Protocol to support a claim of that sort. Care is taken that there shall be no stereotyping of conditions. But I can go behind a mere matter of words. I am one of those who believe that the conditions left by the so-called Peace Treaties will require revision. There are

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only two ways in which we can nave revision: first of all by war, which would be an unthinkable evil, and secondly by assent. If you want assent and agreement, you will get it by encouraging the spirit of assent and agreement upon which the whole arrangement proposed by the Protocol is based.
One word only concerning what is known as the Japanese Amendment. I want to make this point quite clear. It is a matter in which I took a very large personal part, in co-operation with Sir Cecil Hurst. The terms ultimately adopted were settled by him and me, and if the document is still in existence it will be found that the draft was drawn by my pencil. This is what was said by Sir Cecil Hurst himself at Geneva, and disposes for ever, I think, of the difficulties of what is called the Japanese Amendment. He said:—
"It is the understanding of the British Delegation in accepting this amendment"—
that is the amendment actually in the Protocol at the present moment—
"that the text now adopted, which it is proposed to add to Article 5, safeguards the right of the Council to take such action as it may deem wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations in accordance with the existing provisions of Article 11 of the Covenant. We accept it because we believe that it does not confer new powers or functions upon either the Council or the Assembly. Those powers are already defined by the Covenant as it exists to-day and we do not add to them by this text."
Everybody knows the eminence of Sir Cecil Hurst. He is also a master of language, and that language expresses our view with admirable clearness, and at the same time disposes of all the objections which were raised, either through misunderstanding or misrepresentation, to what is known as the Japanese Amendment.
We were told, directly and indirectly, by mysterious paragraphs in newspapers and by all the ordinary sources of misinformation, that the Protocol would be buried at Geneva. Well, the burial service ended in a fiasco. The Protocol lives and is to be reconsidered at the next Assembly at Geneva. Whether we are party to it or not, and whether the Assembly will go on with or without us, is a matter for future consideration. I have said more than once that there is nothing sacrosanct in the details of these provisions. On the contrary, I feel quite
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sure that the document is capable of amendment and improvement. But in the interests of humanity and of everything that is included in the Christian doctrine of brotherhood and fellowship, I urge that if is a fatal error at this stage to condemn the Protocol root and branch. It is an honest attempt, worked out by men who gave, perhaps I may say, twenty-three hours out of the twenty-four for some weeks to start on its course a No-War policy, backed by the unanimous acceptance of the accredited Delegations at Geneva, not acting irresponsibly—that must be put on one side entirely—but acting as the accredited agents of their Governments and carrying out the instructions with which their Governments had entrusted them.
That seems to me to be how the position stands to-day. I wish well of any proposal which may possibly found a peace policy, and lead to the result of abolishing war in the future, but I do say this, that here you have the Protocol unanimously adopted, and whatever adaptation or alteration you may desire, or whatever you may consider possible in the direction of other pacts, I believe that the fundamental propositions in the Protocol are sound, and that if we are to have normal peace in the future it can only be by the institution of an international community, between the members of which disputes shall be settled under a system of law and order and without recourse to the barbarous arbitrament of war.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, no one can complain of the action of the noble and learned Lord in bringing this Question before the House. He took an active and responsible part in the preparation of the Protocol, and it is not surprising that, when it was rejected by His Majesty's present advisers, he should be disappointed, and should take an early opportunity of explaining to Parliament the arguments which weigh with him against that rejection. The noble Lord has indulged in some wide generalities about international solidarity, and matters of that kind, with which I do not propose, to-night, to deal. The field is far too wide for me to enter upon it at this hour, and indeed I shall have somewhat to compress what I have to say about the more concrete points which the noble and learned Lord has made in his speech.

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I must, however, make one preliminary observation before I endeavour to come to grips with the facts. Some parts of the speech of the noble and learned Lord appeared to mo to suggest that this country, or this Government, is in some way opposed to the principle of arbitration. If the noble and learned Lord, or any one, suggests that, I am sure there is no justification for it. This country, and indeed every Government of this country in turn, has set an example in the matter of arbitration from the day of the "Alabama." case and through subsequent years.
LORD PARMOOR: Universal arbitration!
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: And we have in that matter the best possible record of an evident desire to promote the principle of voluntary arbitration. In the second place, I think my noble friend rather suggested that we were opposed to, or at all events were obstructing, the reduction of armaments. If he suggests that, again I think he is wholly without justification. The Conference at Washington, at which the force in which this country has the greatest possible interest—I mean the Navy—was primarily concerned, and at which the British representatives, including the noble Earl, Lord Balfour—who is absent from his place to-night for a reason which we well know—took a decisive part, is fresh in the memory of all of us.
LORD PARMOOR: If I may interrupt for a moment, what I said was not what the noble and learned Lord suggested, but I was on the question of a world conference.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I was coming to that. A conference on disarmament does not depend in the least upon the adoption of the Protocol. An Article of the Covenant itself contemplates constant efforts by the League and the Council of the League for the reduction of armaments, and it is as much open to the Council to call such a conference together as it would have been if the Protocol had been adopted. It is quite true that there is an Article in the Protocol to the effect that if a conference on disarmament is held, and does not arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, the Council of the League shall declare the Protocol void, but how much
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simpler it is for the Council of the League first to call a conference on the reduction of armaments, and then proceed to consider whether something in the nature of a Protocol is possible.
We are represented, or at all events the Foreign Secretary is represented, as having said something at Geneva in opposition to the Covenant itself. There is no foundation for any such statement. We are bound by the Covenant. We fully adhere to it. It is not we but the noble and learned Lord and his friends who seek to alter it, and to introduce into it, by means of the Protocol, a number of clauses most of which were fully considered when the Covenant was being initiated, and deliberately rejected. Yet they are revived to-day in the hope of putting them into the Covenant. If, as the noble Lord appeared to suggest in the introduction of his speech, there was nothing in the Protocol which made any great change in the Covenant, I do not think the noble and learned Lord would be so urgent in pressing it upon our attention; but in fact I think I shall be able to show that the Protocol does make serious and substantial changes in the nature and effect of the Covenant itself.
Now let me put aside all exaggerated language and ask, as simply as I can: What was the duty of the Government, when they came into office, with regard to the Protocol? This document was, as the noble and learned Lord has said, adopted by the unanimous vote of the Fifth Assembly, but it was adopted not as an operative instrument, binding upon any Power represented at that Assembly, but as a draft or provisional document for consideration by each Government at home. In fact, I think I am right in saying that the noble Lord, and his colleagues, had instructions from the late Government not to sign the Protocol, in order that it might be open for full consideration when it came over to this country.
LORD PARMOOR: There was no question, of course, of my ever signing it, but so far as the Assembly went the acceptance was complete.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: Will the noble Lord allow me to continue? I am assuming that a general vote of the

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Assembly was cast for the adoption of the Protocol as a draft or provisional instrument. But, however that may he, it is quite plain that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and his colleagues must have examined this document when it came home, and, if they found it unsuitable to the policy of this country, they must have rejected it, just as they examined and rejected last year the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which had, in the same manner, been adopted at Geneva. The destiny of this country depended, I think, on the Government in power, whatever it might be, taking the right course on this matter, and I think our duty was absolutely clear.
First, it was surely the duty of the Government to consult our military and naval and air experts, as to the effect which the Protocol would have upon the defence of this country and of our Empire. For, after all, in spite of the generalities of the noble Lord, we have to consider the interests and the safety of our own land. I am somewhat surprised that no such consultation took place at the time when the Protocol was being negotiated. That doubtless would have been done by the late Government, had they remained in power, before they advised the ratification of the Protocol. At all events, we did, through the Committee of Imperial Defence, consult our experts, and they all of them condemned the Protocol, and their reasoning and their representations convinced us that the effect of this document would be to diminish the effectiveness for defence of our naval and military forces and, before long, to compel an increase, and not a reduction, of those forces. Were we to disregard their advice?
Secondly, it was our duty to consult the Governments of the responsible Dominions. The noble Lord has said—and, of course, I take it as absolutely true—that the representatives of the Dominions who were present at the Assembly of the League were favourable to the adoption of the Protocol. But, after all, they had no power whatever to hind their Governments at home, and I doubt whether they had time to obtain full instructions from their Governments. At all events they, like the other delegates present, only approved the Protocol as an instrument to be submitted to the Governments of the States concerned for
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adoption or for rejection, as the case might be. The noble Lord says: What more could be done? Well, what more could be done was this. We could consult the Governments themselves, and we did so, and, speaking broadly, with only one exception, I think—that of the Irish Free State—all the Dominion Governments disapproved the Protocol and advised that we should not accept or ratify it. Again, were we to disregard advice and opinion of that kind?
We did more. We considered, as we were bound to consider, the Protocol itself, clause by clause. Time does not allow me to attempt a detailed criticism of the several clauses of this instrument, but I should like to call the attention of the House to a few of its features. First, Articles 2 to 6 introduced the principle of compulsory arbitration—compulsory arbitration, as the noble Lord pointed out, on all points, even on the point whether the subject-matter of a dispute was, or was not, a matter of domestic concern; compulsory arbitration either through the Permanent Court of International Justice or through arbitrators selected, in default of agreement, by the Council of the League. That principle of compulsory arbitration is new in a document of this kind, and has always been rejected, not only by this country, but by the United States, which has always been favourable to arbitration as a principle. Indeed, I think I am right in saying it was condemned only last year in this House in a speech made by the noble Lord's Leader, the noble and learned Viscount who leads the Labour Party here. I am, and I think most of us are, strongly in favour of arbitration on all points which are suitable for arbitration.
But there are some matters—matters affecting the honour and the existence of a country—which are not suitable to be dealt with in that way, and which, I believe, no great Power, except under great pressure of circumstances, would agree to submit in all cases to arbitration. I do not think it would be safe for this country to give up its freedom by-agreeing in advance to submit all disputes which may arise to the arbitration either of the Council of the League or of persons selected by that Council.
Let me refer your Lordships to Article 7 of the Protocol, which provides

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that in the event of a dispute between any of the Signatory States, they will not, pending arbitration,
"make any increase of their armaments or effectives which might modify the position established by the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments,.! nor will they take any measure of military, naval, air, industrial or economic mobilisation, nor, in general, any action of a nature likely to extend the dispute or render it more acute."
Just see what that means. It means that if one Power is the aggressor and the other is in danger of attack, and if the aggressor so disposes his forces that he can make an immediate attack on the other and unprepared Power, the danger of war is there, but you forbid the attacked party, even though not the aggressor in fact, to make any preparation for defence, to move a company of troops or a ship, to get ready to resist the aggression which is threatened. Under that Article the Power whose liberty is in danger, which is liable to immediate attack, cannot move a man or a ship without becoming, under the provisions of this document, the aggressor in the dispute, and open to all the severe sanctions which are provided in it.
Take another point. Take our own Empire. Our ships are scattered over the seas. This means that if we have a dispute with any Power we cannot move a ship to the point of danger. We must leave them perhaps days or weeks away in point of time, and we cannot even take the elementary measures which, time after time, we have taken. I do not wonder that this was severely criticised by the experts whom it was our duty to consult.
Now consider the later clauses of the Protocol, especially those following Article 13. In my view the document multiplies the occasions for dispute and for the use of what are called the sanctions—sanctions which, as I think I shall be able to show in a moment, may even lead to war. In this document there are new offences—failure to arbitrate, movement of troops, and many more things which, of themselves, are treated as breaches of the Covenant and as bringing into operation these sanctions. So we would have not less but more occasions on which sanctions may be brought into operation and, when they are brought into operation, this document greatly intensifies the conflict which will arise.
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The Covenant rested, not wholly but mainly, on what are called economic and financial sanctions. But even the Covenant went very far, because Article 16 provides that—
"Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII, or XV, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and"—
mark this—
"the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not."
So that we are to prevent intercourse between the Covenant-breaking State and neutral countries. The Article goes on to state—
"It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenants of the League."
So that even the Covenant itself contemplated in terms the use of armed forces.
But the Protocol goes considerably further. Article 10 provides that:—
"Every State which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol is an aggressor."
Article 11 provides—
"As soon as the Council has called upon the signatory States to apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 10 of the present Protocol, the obligations of the said States, in regard to the sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant"—
I agree that refers to Article 16, including the naval and military sanctions in Article 16—
"will immediately become operative in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor.
"Those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the signatory States to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in resistance to any act of aggression, in the degree which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow."

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Your Lordships will see what that means in the next paragraph—
"In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Covenant the signatory States give a joint and several undertaking to come to the assistance of the State attacked or threatened, and to give each other mutual support by means of facilities and reciprocal exchanges as regards the provision of raw materials and supplies of every kind, opening of credits, transport and transit, and for this purpose to take all measures in their power to preserve the safety of communications by land and sea of the attacked or threatened State."
If that does not mean war against the country attacked and neutral States I do not know what war means
Take, next, Article 13 which makes the thing as clear as it can be. We are told there are none but economic sanctions in the Covenant but the terms of this Article are these—
"In view of the contingent military, naval and air sanctions provided for by Article 16 of the Covenant and by Article 11 of the present Protocol, the Council shall be entitled to receive undertakings from States determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which they would be able to bring into action immediately to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from the Covenant and the present Protocol.
"Furthermore, as soon as the Council has called upon the signatory States to apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 10 above, the said States may, in accordance with any agreements which they may previously have con-eluded, bring to the assistance of a particular State, which is the victim of aggression, their military, naval and air forces."
I challenge contradiction of the statement that these Articles show an intention to call upon and require the signatory States to come to the assistance of the League, by means of their naval, military and air forces, and that the result of so doing must needs be to put this country, or any country signatory to the Covenant which is called upon to attack in that way, in a state of war, not only with the State which is deemed to have offended, but with all those, other neutral States which do not choose to break off intercourse with that State. I see in those Articles a great danger, a real danger that the result of them may be not peace, but war.
Remember that there are signatory States all over the world. You may have a dispute breaking out in Eastern Europe,
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or in the Far East, or in South America, or even between the United States, not a member of the League, and some other Power. It may be the view of the Council of the League that one of the States engaged in the dispute is wrong and the other is right, and. we shall be compelled under this Protocol to accept that decision, although we have but one seat on the Council, and by that means we may be involved in hostilities of the most serious nature. Further, that may happen without the sanction of Parliament. It is rather strange that the Party of the noble and learned Lord, which claims to be a democratic Party, should propose to enter into an undertaking the effect of which, if it is signed, would be to withdraw from Parliament the power to declare or not to declare war, as the case may be.
There is only one other article in the Protocol to which I should like to draw attention; that is Article 14, which is in these terms:—
"The Council shall alone be competent to declare that the application of sanctions shall cease and normal conditions be re-established."
In other words, we cannot put an end to a state of war except with the sanction of the Council of the League. I call that a monstrous provision, because it withdraws from the Government of this country and from Parliament the right to be free in making peace.
Is there not some ground here for thinking that this document, if assented to by this country, would not really ensure peace, but might be a means of bringing about war? In support of that view I would like to read what was said by M. van Karnebeek, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs. In a recent speech he is reported to have said:
"His own preference had always been for the development of the League of Nations in such a way that the coercive element should not become the axis round which the whole system would revolve. The system of the Protocol was a move in the direction of force, and His Excellency feared that, if the League was to derive its authority from coercion, the strength and prestige which it derive from the consciousness of justice, which should be its principal foundation, might perhaps be weakened."
The fact is this Protocol, as has been said, marks the parting of the ways.
I have always been a supporter of the Loague of Nations as a body which, by mediation and by peaceful means, might,

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time after time, prevent the breaking out of war, and I sincerely believe that in that direction it has already done excellent work. But if you are going to abandon that view of the League of Nations, and to exalt it into a body that can bring in armed forces, and by those armed forces seek to compel peace, then you are entering upon a road the end of which you cannot foresee.
If that was our view of the Protocol, it was surely right that we should not keep the other States in suspense as to the action which this country would take. It would not have been a wise and right course for us to delay any announcement, or to endeavour to tinker with an instrument which, in its essence, we felt we were bound to reject. Nor do I think it would have been any good to proceed with the appointment, to which my noble friend referred, of a member on the proposed Committee which was to amend the Covenant by reference to a document which we did not propose to accept. I am sure we did the right thing in saying at once, and clearly, that we could not approve the Protocol, and would seek some other road to attain the object. That was the view which Mr. Chamberlain took at Geneva.
I think too little attention may have been paid to the concluding sentence of the declaration which was made by the Foreign Secretary at Geneva. He pointed out, as an alternative to the adoption of the Protocol, the possibility of the conclusion, in concert with our Allies, of one of those regional arrangements which are contemplated by the Covenant itself—arrangements of a purely defensive character, entered into and worked in harmony with the League. I have no time, nor is this the occasion, on which to develop that suggestion, but I have ventured to call your Lordships' attention to what the Foreign Secretary said in that connection. For myself I cherish an earnest hope that it may be the duty of this Government not to pledge this country to police the world, but, by some prudent and well-considered step, taken nearer home and within the range of our resources, to make some progress towards establishing a feeling of real security. With regard to Papers, I have only to say that I am afraid there are no Papers which can, in accordance with precedent
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and the interests of the public, be laid at the present time. I hope that the noble Lord will be satisfied with my assurance on that point, and will not press for Papers.
LORD PARMOOR: My Lords, of course I will not press the Motion for the production of Papers after what the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack has stated, but I should like to say one or two words in reference to what he said about the detailed provisions of the Protocol. I said at the outset that I did not propose to go into the detailed provisions and I only propose to say a word upon them at the present moment. While we were at Geneva we had a special representative sent to us from the Navy. We met the objections. Mr. Henderson, my colleague, explained more fully than I did, because he took the leading part in the Commission, why their views as regards Articles 7 and 8 were not justified. I have always felt as regards Articles 7 and 8 that, if they are capable of the interpretation which has been suggested, they ought certainly to be modified in the sense of it being made quite clear that they could not have any such interpretation.
The idea that the League, or the Council of the League, has armed forces at its disposal is quite a fallacy, if I may say so with respect to the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack. It was made quite clear, I think, in what I stated that any suggestion of an executive force being at the disposal of the League or the Council of the League was a complete misunderstanding. What, in fact, is done is something very different indeed. It is this. Members of the League undertake to support the Covenant of the League in reference to which they have undertaken obligations. What is called the economic section and the military section both exist in the Covenant, and exist at the present moment. All those fears which the noble and learned Viscount has suggested are fears which arise in connection with obligations that we have already undertaken, in terms, in the provisions of the Covenant itself, and what we desired to do in the Protocol was to reduce those commitments to a minimum.
When the noble and learned Viscount says they go direct to the question of

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disarmament, well and good. If that could be done, I should be an ardent supporter, but I do not think it can be done. It can only be done through the medium of the League and on the terms and conditions to which the Assembly itself has assented. That, of course, is the method of the Protocol. I do not want to go into other matters, except this: that it surely is a fundamental error, having regard to the terms of the Covenant, to suggest that a scheme, the objective of which is disarmament, will increase the risk of war or the size of armaments. Those are the two points to which the noble and learned Viscount referred. I do not wish to reargue this
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question at this time of night. The matter has been well put by Lord Buckmaster and Sir Frederick Pollock when they said that the fears expressed are entirely unfounded. I hope it will never be thought that these difficulties, if they arise at all, arise from the Protocol. They are fundamentally existent in the conditions of the Covenant itself. I thank the Lord Chancellor for the very courteous reply he has given me, and I hope that as the matter is better understood opinion will rally strongly in favour of the Protocol.
House adjourned at twenty minutes before eight o'clock.

MID-GLAMORGAN WATER BOARD BILL. [H.L.]
Petition for additional provision of the Mid-Glamorgan Water Board; together with proposed amendments annexed thereto; read, and referred to the Examiners.

STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE.
Report from, That the Standing Orders not complied with in respect of the Petition for Additional Provision in the
Royal Exchange Assurance Bill [H.L.]
ought to be dispensed with, and leave given to the Committee on the Bill to insert the additional provision.
Read, and agreed to.

LONDON AND NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY (GENERAL POWERS) BILL. [H.L.]
The King's consent signified, and Bill reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
ROCHDALE CORPORATION BILL. [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
ISLE OF WIGHT HIGHWAYS BILL.
Reported without amendment.
GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY BILL. [H.L.]
Reported, with an Amendment.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION (No. 1) BILL. [H.L.]
Reported without amendment, and recommitted to a Committee of the Whole House to-morrow.

CONSOLIDATION BILLS.
Second Report from the Joint Committee, being the Report on the Law of Property (Consolidation) Bill [H.L.], Settled Land (Consolidation) Bill [H.L.], Trustee (Consolidation) Bill [H.L.], Land Charges (Consolidation) Bill [H.L.], Administration of Estates (Consolidation) Bill [H.L.], and Land Registration (Consolidation) Bill [H.L.]; and
Third Report, being the Report on the Universities and College Estates Bill [H.L.] made, and to be printed.