Sitting of 27 June 1923

Preamble
The House met at a quarter before four of the clock, The EARL OF DONOUGHMOKE on the Woolsack.

FELIXSTOWE DOCK AND RAILWAY BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
CROYDON CORPORATION BILL. [H.L.]
BROADSTAIRS AND ST. PETER'S URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL. [H.L.]
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE): My Lords, I beg to move the Resolution standing on the Paper in my name. It is not an unreasonable Motion. The Session is getting on, and there are House of Lords Bills which have to be considered in another place before they receive the Royal Assent.
Moved, That Standing Order No. 143 be considered in order to its being dispensed with in respect of the said Bills, and that the Bills be now read 3a.—:(The Earl of Donoughmore).
On Question, Motion agreed to, and Bills read 3a accordingly.
Bills passed, and sent to the Commons.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 5) BILL.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 7) BILL.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (CALNE WATER) BILL.
MARRIAGES PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion which appears in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That the Order made on the 26th day of April last, "That no Provisional Order Confirmation Bill brought from the House of Commons shall be read a second time after Thursday, the 14th day of June next," be dispensed with, and that the Bills be now read 2a—(The Earl of Onslow.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and Bills read 2a accordingly, and committed.

STRENGTH OF THE ARMY.
THE EARL OF MIDLETON THE EARL OF MIDLETON rose to call attention to recent reductions in the British Army and to the reductions proposed in the British force in India by Lord Inchcape's Committee, and to ask the Secretary of State for War if he can make any statement on the subject.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, I make no apology for asking your Lordships' attention to the question of the great reduction that has taken place in the Regular Army and also to the reduction which, under the proposals of Lord Inchcape's Committee, are shortly to be considered—I hope they have not been already decided upon—with regard to the British troops in India. Many members of this House remember to what an extent Parliament was occupied in the early 'nineties with the question of the strength of the Army and the absolute necessity for bringing the force up to some standard which would accord with what was to be demanded of it. The effect of those debates was very stimulating on successive Governments, and I am bold enough to say that but for the attitude of Parliament and the Government towards the Army during those years our position when war was declared in 1914 would have been such that we could not have maintained the very limited forces we were able to put into the field over the period which bridged the difficult months before Lord Kitchener's Army was ready to fight.
However much we should like to feel that the great outbreak of war in 1914 should absolve us for many years to coma from any danger, nobody who looks at the present state of Europe will come to the conclusion that this country can afford to allow its military forces to decline to a much lower level than that at which they had been kept for ten

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years before the war. I do not want to introduce extraneous matters, but I am certain that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, if he were in his place, would be the first to recognise that however wise our foreign policy may be—and the present Government have pursued a most equitable and sedative course in foreign policy—we have no right, with so many nations in Europe who have tasted blood and seem anxious for disquiet rather than for setting aside troubles, to go to sleep in this matter. What was the state of our Army in 1914?—and it must be remembered that the figures I am going to give were not regarded as satisfactory in that day. I remember a debate in 1912 which occupied your Lordships' House for many hours, in which it was pointed out that the establishments then were not full and that it was absolutely necessary for the Government to take an exceptional course in order to fill them—especially in regard to munitions—in view of impending peril. The language used was language of restraint, and but for one speech, to which I do not propose to allude, I believe steps would have been taken then which would have greatly facilitated Lord Kitchener's course when he was called to the War Office two years later. In 1914 the Army consisted of 168,500 Regulars. The Army Reserve, thanks to the three years system inaugurated by the late Field-Marshal Earl Roberts about ten years before (the results of which were still felt in a greatly increased Reserve after it had been abandoned) was 147,000, and the Special Reserve, known as the Militia and liable for foreign service, was 63,000. The total, therefore, was 378,000, no inconsiderable number for a nation which did not call itself a military nation. These 378,000 men were above and beyond the 76,000 white troops in India.
How do we stand to-day? Instead of 168,000 Regulars we have 147,000 men with the Colours, a reduction of 21,000. Instead of 147,000 Reserves we have 84,000 men, a reduction of 63,000. And the Special Reserve has melted away; it does not exist. Therefore, the total of our available forces to-day is 231,000 men against 378,000 in 1914, a reduction of nearly 150,000 men, which, put into other language, would have meant the loss of the Channel ports, probably the loss
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of the war. In the present state of Europe we cannot view that reduction with equanimity. I go further and say that however we may regard it, we cannot regard it as a Departmental matter, to be settled by the exigencies of finance and without regard to the general needs of the Empire.
When we apply that last criticism to the white troops in India your Lordships will feel that I have some reason for occupying your time to-night. What has happened in India? India had 76,000 white troops in 1914, and they were, as they have always been, the backbone of Indian defence. Between 1914 and 1922 that establishment was reduced to 68,000 men, a reduction of 8,000 men. Last autumn the then Government, as I think wisely, prevailed on Lord Inchcape to make a pilgrimage to India in order to examine the whole subject of Indian finance which had led to deficits on Indian Budgets of, I think, £70,000,000 sterling in three years. It was none too early. I do not believe that there is anybody in this House who does not feel a full measure of gratitude to Lord Inchcape for the services which ho and his colleagues have performed both to British and to Indian finance by the unsparing zeal and great knowledge devoted to reductions, which, in my opinion, should have been carried out by the late Government.
But I cannot help regretting that in so technical a matter as the Army the late Government did not attach to Lord Inchcape's Committee someone who, from past experience of War Office and Army finance, could have acted as an expert adviser to him, so to speak, in dealing with so technical a question as the Indian Army. If the noble Lord were here I should like to ask him—for he is perhaps the most experienced administrator in the shipping world—what he would feel if the ablest member, in other matters, of your Lordships' House were appointed to examine and cut down by ten or twenty per cent. the expenditure of one of the great companies which he controls, without assistance from a single human being with shipping knowledge, or calling evidence from various experienced persons. Such a thing would never be contemplated for a moment. I have to complain also that the Report of Lord Inchape's Committee has not been circulated to Parliament, although it can

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be obtained by purchase, so that members as a body have no cognisance of it.
If I go for a moment into details it is because I have a suggestion to make which I think would have obviated to a large extent the reductions which Lord Inch-cape proposed. The state of expenditure on the Indian Army called loudly for interposition in some form. The white troops in India cost £5,000,000 a year before the war, without counting the administrative services. To-day, they cost £11,000,000, and on that extra expenditure has hinged one of the main difficulties with which the Indian Government have had to contend. This was one of the main drawbacks to agreement in the new Assembly, for expenditure on the Army was more obvious than any other item which could be reduced and should be reduced. Nothing is easier. It does not need a man of Lord Inchcape's experience to say: Cut down so many troops and you will have so much less expenditure. Anybody can do that. Many of your Lordships find the expenditure on your estates excessive. You can, if you like, cut down timber to the tune of £1,000 or £3,000 in a year, and thus reduce expenditure. But this is not economy; it is the sacrifice of capital, and what is needed in regard to the Army, both in India and in this country, is an endeavour to get a sovereign's worth for every pound which is spent.
The Inchcape Committee did admirable work in attacking the staffs. The General Headquarters Staff in India in 1914 numbered 98. The four commands were formed between 1914 and 1922, largely to reduce the demand on Army Headquarters. None the less the Army Headquarters Staff, which numbered 98 in 1914, had swollen to 166 in 1922. The other staffs had risen from 203 to 278, although they are the staffs of an Army largely decreased in numbers. Lord Inchcape's Committee have now proposed that every Infantry battalion should be reduced by 140 or 150 men, that three Cavalry regiments should be sent home, and a brigade of Field Artillery and, I think, of Horse Artillery, should also be dispensed with. In other words, the Army, which numbered 76,000 before the war, was reduced to 68,000 in 1922, and is now, so far as I can see, to be reduced to under 60,000, at a time when all the circumstances of India make it desirable that we should keep a full, efficient and
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rapidly reinforcible Army. Everybody knows that the frontier may cause trouble in India at any time. Equally, everybody knows that, owing to the better arming of our opponents, losses will be on an unprecedented scale as compared with previous operations, and I do not think it is saying too much in this House to add that, given trouble on the frontier, there is more danger of internal trouble than there was in 1914. Consequently, I look upon this reduction as a matter of the highest danger, and I deprecate particularly the reduction by 140 or 150 men of the Infantry battalions.
The Inchcape Committee state that there is a peace establishment of 1,020 and a war establishment of 840. Why should the peace establishment be in excess of the war establishment,? It should be reduced to the strength of the war establishment. That is just the point upon which I think a man who had been accustomed to the mobilisation of troops would have been able to assist Lord Inchcape. Why is the war establishment below the peace establishment? There are always a number of sick in India and you base on your war establishment the whole of your hospitals in the field, the whole of your followers, and the whole of your supplies. Out of 50,000 Infantry you cannot expect to have more than 40,000 on the front at a given moment, and you naturally make your arrangements on the basis of 40,000, keeping those who are sick at the base, with a small nucleus for immediate reinforcement. Under the new arrangement only 800 men out of 840 will go to the front, and there is no possibility of reinforcing them from home under seven or eight weeks. In a European war a regiment which has been eight weeks in the field without reinforcement would be reduced to a skeleton. We cannot tell what will be the exact losses in any frontier operations or in larger operations, but depend upon it, they will be such that long before the extra drafts arrive two regiments will have to be knocked together to do the work of one.
I look upon this as a most dangerous proposal, and I do not believe that it is necessary. What is going to be gained by it? A million of money annually, which is no despicable sum. But this very subject was under the consideration of the Committee appointed by your Lordships' House last year. I know I shall be told

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that all these reductions have been considered and assented to by the Commander-in-Chief in India. I speak with the utmost respect of Lord Rawlinson's opinion, but I take leave to say that in the course of thirty years' experience of the War Office and the India Office I have never found an opinion given by one soldier which was not disavowed as soon as he left office by the man who took his place. I could produce evidence enough to keep your Lordships for two or three hours of vital questions on which we have had advice from one distinguished soldier which has not been ratified by his successor, but I think it is quite enough to say—and I ask for the assent of the House to this proposition—that so important a question should not be decided on the opinion of any one soldier, however eminent.
The Joint Committee on Indian Affairs, appointed by this House and the House of Commons last year, took this subject into special consideration. They came to the conclusion that a large reduction might be made in the cost of the Indian Army by reconsideration of pay. I do not know whether your Lordships are aware that the cost of the private soldier, and indeed most other ranks, is now very nearly treble what it was in 1914. In 1914 it came to £76 per man. It is now £200 per man, to take the ordinary soldier, and in some cases the difference is much higher. These great additions were made when Mr. Winston Churchill was Secretary of State, shortly after the war, at a time when every public office was vieing with its neighbour to see how largely it could spend the country's money. Unfortunately, Mr. Winston Churchill, although in other respects a most admirable Secretary of State, did not inherit from his father those economic doctrines of which, my noble friend sitting near me will remember, a great deal was heard some years ago. I believe that plunge has put a staggering difficulty upon his successors, and a staggering deficit on the Indian Revenues, and I have no doubt whatever, from the opinion given to me by many commanding officers, whom I have taken the trouble to consult, that the private soldier at present receives pay out of all proportion to the rise in prices which has taken place since his pay was altered before.
Your Lordships must remember that Mr. Churchill was dealing with a different
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state of facts than exists at present. You probably know that if you are going to keep the greater part of the Army abroad in unhealthy climates it is so unpopular a service that you have to pay men more highly to come in, and so long as Mesopotamia and Palestine and other destinations were kept full the difficulties of filling up the ranks were excessive. But that has come to an end. The Joint Committee had the advantage of examining my noble friend Lord Peel, and they came to this conclusion, which they presented to your Lordships—
"The Committee understand that the increase in pay was deemed necessary by the War Office on account of the increase granted in this country at that time—[1921]—and was adopted by the home Government under abnormal conditions without any formal consultation either with the India Office or with the Authorities in India. The Government of India had no alternative but to accept it, although there was already a serious deficiency in the revenue as compared with expenditure."
I think that presentment, by twenty-one Members of the two Houses, deserved more attention from the Secretary of State for India than it apparently received. It is not a chance expression of opinion. I do not know anything which can be less justified, in the extraordinary proceedings which followed the war, than a charge of this kind, which has been a trap and a trouble to Indian Viceroys and the new Indian Assemblies, and which has been put upon India, to use the considered language of the Committee, "without any formal consultation either with the India Office or with the Authorities in India."
I feel very deeply that this proceeding should never be repeated, and that we have a right to ask the Secretary of State whether we may not be allowed to go back upon it. It is a well-known fact—I had to deal with Army finance for twelve years while I was at the War Office—that pay may be altered by warrant with regard to any fresh entrants to the Army, and with regard to anyone in a rank to which he has not at the time been promoted. In other words, if it were not so, a private having entered at 2s. a day, or now at a much higher rate, would have the right to claim that the pay given to a Field-Marshal should not be altered until he had left the Army. To delay in meeting this question is impossible. Over 30,000 men have entered the Army since and

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there have been five to ten thousand promotions made. Yet my noble friend came to the Committee, and the attention of the Secretary of State for War was called to the matter, and every effort was made to ask them to deal in time with the question, which means £4,500,000 out of the £6,000.000 increase under which the Indian Army is labouring. I believe that the £1,000,000 a year which Lord Inchcape was forced to consider, as the sole means of meeting the necessary deficit, or one of the means, could have been provided by putting in force an operation which was already belated.
I do not want to read from this Report, but it is obvious that Lord Inchcape's Committee believed that the Government would deal with the matter, because in their conclusion on the military side they carefully avoided saying anything with regard to possible increases of pay. I hope that before the debate ends Lord Peel will tell us why it is that no attention has been paid to so important a provision. I particularly appeal to the Secretary of State for India. I do not know whether your Lordships have ever noticed that the Secretary of State for War, who is the natural protector of this country with regard to Army finance, has had a very difficult position, because for years past no Secretary of State for War has been allowed adequate time, or much more than a few months, in which to learn the duties of his office. Lord Lansdowne took office in 1895, and between then and the time when Lord Haldane vacated office, namely seventeen years, there were four Secretaries of State. In the eleven years which followed there have been eleven. General Seely took office till 1914. Mr. Asquith followed when General Seely resigned. Lord Kitchener was appointed for the war, and on his death Mr. Asquith took office again. Mr. Asquith handed it over to Mr. Lloyd George, who in turn handed it over to my noble friend, and when my noble friend went to Paris he handed it to Lord Milner, who at the end of the war had had enough of the War Office and of Government generally, and handed over that office to Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill was wanted at the Colonial Office, and he handed over to Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, who again went about his business
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after November last, and my noble friend, obsessed by every other kind of policy, was brought in.
These changes, I venture, to tell your Lordships, are highly detrimental to the efficiency, and fatal to the economy of the Army, and I mention them because I think the line of least resistance has been taken in these events—the cutting down of troops who are necessary, and who should not be dispensed with, instead of economising and bringing us back nearer to the state of facts when we had for £28,000,000 half as many troops again as we now have for £61,000,000. This is not a departmental question. It cannot be settled by the ipse dixit of any one administrator or any one soldier, however eminent. I ask the Secretary of State for War whether these changes have been submitted to the Army Council and have the Army Council given a considered judgment upon them. I ask the Secretary of State for India whether, before they are carried out, he will undertake that the Imperial Defence Committee is consulted, and that the Imperial Defence Committee will advise the Cabinet whether or not we can afford to dispense with a strength in India which successive administrators have felt was necessary to the safety of the country.
LORD SYDENHAM: My Lords, the Question which the noble Earl has raised is one of extreme importance, and is particularly opportune at the present time. I shall confine the very few remarks I shall make entirely to the Army in India, though I should like to follow the noble Earl on the much wider field over which he has ranged. We have for some time been whittling away our military force in India, and it is very difficult at the present moment to form an exact opinion as to how we stand. The noble Earl has made that clear, and has shown how very serious has been the reduction of our white troops in India. We began by destroying a number of fine Cavalry regiments, to which exception was taken in this House at the time. After a number of other snippets at the military forces we now come to the recommendations of the noble Lord who went to India, and who wielded the axe with very great vigour—and not with quite sufficient discrimination, in my humble opinion.
From the vague and much too rosy speech of the Under-Secretary of State

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for India in another place the other day it was very difficult to glean any light upon the subject. We were not told whether the latest reductions recommended by Lord Inchcape's Committee had been finally approved or not. The reduction of rank and file in English battalions is, of course, a very uneconomic form of reduction, because you maintain expensive machines and you do not keep them doing the full work of which they are capable. In addition to that, there are the large reductions of the three British Cavalry regiments and a brigade division of Artillery, and possibly a Horse Artillery battery, to which the Noble Earl has referred. I agree with him that if these reductions are carried out it will be a most serious matter for the safety and security of our great Dependency of India.
Some years ago, when Lord Kitchener was planning his great redistribution of the military forces in India, which involved the reduction of a large number of the smaller stations, and the concentration of the bulk of our forces on or near to the North-West Frontier, he sent me a most interesting memorandum, which was very closely argued, and the gist of which was that, owing to the efficiency of the Police, of the great great railway systems, and of the telegraph systems, internal defence had now become a matter of secondary importance. Whatever might have been said in those days, that certainly does not apply at the present moment. The Indian Police have shown admirable loyalty in very difficult circumstances; but the force is growing less efficient, and it must deteriorate still more. The efficiency of the Indian Police, like that of the native Army in India, depends almost entirely upon the personal characteristics of its British officers, and the most experienced officers of the Police are now passing away from India. Out of 270 officials whose retirement has now been sanctioned 65 are Police officers. The Under-Secretary of State said that he had 600 fine applicants for this force, but what he did not say was that out of more than 2,500 officers retired, by reduction, from the Indian Army, only six, I believe, were willing to serve in the Police Force, and they were not considered quite suitable for that force. Therefore his applicants, on whom he
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prided himself, must have been young men, who had no knowledge whatever of present conditions of the service in India, and who, when they went to India, would be of little use for five or seven years.
Nearly every Legislative Council in India has shown marked hostility to the Police Force, and that reacts upon the Police Force throughout India. In the Punjab, which is the most troubled Province of India at the present moment, and is at all times a storm centre, there has lately been a sudden reduction of 4,000 Police in obedience to the wishes of the Legislative Council and against the advice of the Inspector-General. I understand that now the authorities are busily at work trying to recruit those men again, or to get hold of others. Wholesale discharges on a scale like that must shake the confidence of the whole force throughout India, and must tend to make it unpopular. And there is a very curious tendency, which I am sure your Lordships must have noticed in all the late troubled years. It has been more and more necessary to employ troops on what are purely police duties—duties which, in other days, the police showed themselves perfectly capable of performing. That is an unfortunate thing on all accounts, but it does point to an increasing need of troops in India.
At Amritsar, when the Moslems and Hindus were engaged in one of their customary conflicts, both parties asked that troops might be sent to restore order. The little British garrison at Malapuram having been withdrawn, the Moplahs were easily persuaded that British rule had ended, and proceeded to act accordingly. The Moplah rebellion, which was discussed, if not planned, in London some time before it actually broke out, was the direct result of unchecked agitation among a most fanatical people. We have had many previous experiences of the same kind. That rebellion could easily have been prevented by police measures taken in time, but it was only possible to put it down by employing a large number of troops, at very great expense, and with the loss of thousands of Indian lives. The moral of that is that Regular troops are required in India now more than ever, and that it is most undesirable that tens of millions of Indians should never see a British soldier, as now happens.

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The large total reduction of Cavalry is, I believe, a very grave mistake. Cavalry is by far the most effective force for dealing quickly, and for dealing mercifully, with risings of all kinds. And where roads are non-existent it may be quite impossible to use armoured cars which are sometimes a good substitute for Cavalry It is also now quite clear that however useful aircraft are for some purposes they cannot be used except in most exceptional cases in dealing with civil disturbances. I beg your Lordships to remember that the internal defence and the external defence of India must be considered together. You cannot separate them because they act and react upon each other. The Afghans would never have invaded India in 1919 if they had not fondly believed that the rebellion in the Punjab and elsewhere would cut the railways and so cripple the action of our forces on the frontier. And that very nearly happened.
I most strongly support all that the noble Earl has said, and I hope that the noble Viscount will give in full all the information for which the noble Earl has pressed. I hope he will also tell us whether the reductions were considered in the first instance by the Imperial General Staff and it would be very useful if he would let the House know how many troops, British and Indian, will remain to the several Provinces after the Field Army of India has been mobilised. I think it would be useful also if he would tell us whether the wireless system in India is now complete and efficient. I can assure my noble friend that any information of that kind which he can give will be most welcome to many of us who know India and who have been regarding the present reductions with absolute dismay. I hope that the noble Viscount will also give the undertaking for which I understood the noble Earl to ask, that the whole question of the defence of India will be reconsidered by the Committee of Imperial Defence in the light of the changed conditions with which we are now faced. If he would give that undertaking I think it would go far to allay a great deal of the very grave anxiety which is now undoubtedly felt.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: My Lords, the noble Earl who asked the Question and the noble Lord who has just sat down started from a common theme—the inadequacy
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of the present white Army in India, if reduced, to the circumstances of the times. That is a very important question and one that cannot be neglected. But it is not to be disposed of by saying that the numbers are less (and will be still lower) than they were some years ago under the old system. The white Army in India has, no doubt, been there since the date of the Mutiny partly to preserve internal order. It was also organised for another purpose. Lord Kitchener reorganised the Indian Army for another purpose—to cope with the possibility of a Russian invasion. That has entirely gone and, consequently, the standard of that Army, its dispositions and its numbers have had to come under review. The noble Earl who introduced this Question referred to the Report of Lord Inchcape's Committee and to this extent was sympathetic with it, that he said, in effect: "We must all recognise the urgent need for economy in India. If you do not have economy you will have increased unrest. If you satisfy people in India on the head of economy there will be somewhat less fear of your having internal disturbance to deal with."
Then the noble Earl went on to develop the remedies for this situation. He had a main remedy and he had a subsidiary remedy. I will touch upon the subsidiary remedy, as I understand it, first. He asked: "Why cut down the numbers of the troops you have when you might get your million of economy very easily by a reduction in their cost?" And I think he took the reduction of cost in the form of a possible reduction of pay. Speaking for myself, and as one not without experience of this matter, I am unable to say whether you could get the troops you now have in India if you reduced the terms of pay. I am talking of the white troops. Your Lordships must remember what is the character of the British Army in India. It is an Army that is raised here It serves a certain number of years with the Colours, and then comes back to the Reserve. There are certain battalions which are there and which, in course of time, having completed their term of service, return to this country. The soldiers in these battalions have to be raised on the same footing as the soldiers here, and they have to receive certain allowances while they are in India because of the distance, the difficulties of the task, and their separation from their wives and families.

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It has never been an easy thing to make sure of your recruiting for the British Army. The noble Earl and I have had a fairly long experience of that difficulty, and we both know that it is a very uncertain matter how many men you will get by offering certain terms. At the present time I believe that it is not very easy to get recruits in this country, and if you reduce the terms of pay below what they are at the present time I for one do not feel that I am in a position to predict that you will get either 68,000 or 60,000 or any other given number for your Services in the white Army in India. Therefore I should not assent to that sub-proposal without a great deal more knowledge than I possess and without a very great deal of consultation with the Adjutant-General in this country, whose business it is to raise these troops and to know on what terms he has a prospect of getting them.. Therefore I think that your Lordships can offer no useful opinion on the question as to whether on reduced terms you could get the soldiers you want for India, and I pass to the larger and wider proposition of the noble Earl.
The noble Earl said: "You are reducing the Army and reducing it on a very large scale." The noble Lord who followed him emphasised that whittling away, as he called it, and the danger of the situation. The question of the size of the Army you must keep in India is one which has to be determined by situations which vary with circumstances. As I said before, the Russian menace has passed and that has affected the position to some extent, but, of course, you have to keep a considerable Army there to provide for the possibility of internal disturbance. That may in time cease to be a necessity, but it is still a necessity to some extent. What is the size of the Army that you require? The noble Earl says that he consulted many commanding officers upon this subject and that the opinion of those commanding officers varied. It is quite true that Lord Rawlinson, the present Commander-in-Chief in India, has assented to a reduction based on the principle which was laid down by Lord Inchcape's Committee. But I think that Committee did no more than this. They drew attention to certain very expensive aspects of the Indian Army, and they said: "We think that there is room for economy here." But
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they left it to the Government of India and the Commander-in-Chief, as indeed they were bound to do, to say whether these economies could be carried out.
When Lord Reading and Lord Rawlinson agree that certain economies can be carried out and pronounce on the shape in which they can be effected, much importance is to be attached to the pronouncement, because, so far as the Commander-in-Chief makes that pronouncement, he must be taken to have made it after considering the military situation and the kind of Army which is requisite. It is of no use saying that there are divergent opinions among commanding officers on a question like that. In these modern days we do not work by taking the opinions of isolated officers, asking what they think and comparing one opinion with another. That was the old condition of things which gave us a great loss in efficiency. In India, as in this country, matters are now worked out by a General Staff which does not vary in the same way as individuals vary. It goes on altering its position from time to time, but only after substantial periods of working upon a common problem. That was the method which every great military nation in Europe had adopted before the war and which we had adopted seven years before that war took place. It enabled us to investigate these problems upon a basis of continuity which cannot otherwise be obtained, and with an aggregate of military knowledge brought to bear which cannot be attained in any other fashion. Presumably that has been done in India.
I do not know, because I am not informed, what steps the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General took before they consented to accept the reduction, but I presume that they made the sort of inquiry that would be made here as to the purpose for which the Army was wanted, as to the number of troops which would be required to fulfil that purpose, and as to the character and quality of the troops which would be required. If that was done, and it was the outcome of a scientific investigation of that kind, then I for my part attach much more importance to it than to the opinion of this or that isolated officer who, as the noble Earl said, may differ from some other isolated officer who forms

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another opinion. We have had too much in the Army in this country of things going on according to individual opinion.
The noble Earl spoke of the number of successive Secretaries of State that there had been at the War Office. It is an excellent tiling to be for a long time at the War Office—at least, I think so—but it is not the only thing. You have to fall back upon your skilled advisers of the General Staff—a great and continuous organisation which works out problems in consultation with the Committee of Imperial Defence. In that way the Army, Navy and Air Force come together to some extent under a common roof, and I hope they will do so still more in the future. But the outcome of all this is that the real opinion which governs is the opinion of the General Staff which has worked the matter out. The General Staff is not, as some people think, a mere particular body created for war. There is an Imperial General Staff—or there used to be, and I think it still exists—and the General Staff in India is just a branch of the parent tree. Those who serve on it have been trained here. One of the first and most prominent in this connection was Field-Marshal Lord Haig who went out to India, I think in 1909, as Chief of the General Staff there, and worked out a good deal of the preliminary material upon which the reforms were based. Since that time he has been succeeded by people who have been trained in his traditions, and who know the organisation which he went there to put into operation. That is an organisation which belongs to the Imperial General Staff of this country, a General Staff which is considering these matters all over the Empire in different forms, and which affords a continuity in policy that would not otherwise be attained.
Therefore, if the noble Earl opposite and the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India say: "We indeed attach great importance to the recommendations of Lord Inchcape's Committee, but we did not commit ourselves to those recommendations without consulting the General Staff, and the General Staff, through the Commander-in-Chief, and the Governor-General have assented to them," then I for one shall attach very much importance to that pronouncement.
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It is not a case, as I have said, in which these things can be done, or are done to-day, in a hurry. The system has become completely revolutionised from what it was twenty years ago. These are matters which are studied in a fashion in which they never were studied before, and they are studied under the œgis of the Committee of Imperial Defence which pronounces on the broad questions which arise, and which contains within itself, or can contain within itself at any moment, representatives of the Foreign Office, of the India Office, of the Colonial Office and of all the various Departments which are concerned with the probability of war. When you get to internal matters then the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff in India become the important people to tell you what the reserve forces are which you require to bring into, operation.
No doubt there are very grave questions which do arise. Aircraft in India has been mentioned in the course of the discussion. I do not yet know whether aircraft are as efficient a means of dealing with border tribes as are troops of another kind, possibly Cavalry and, anyhow, Infantry. I will say why. Aircraft drop bombs, and naturally drop them on the villages where there are nests of rebels. They go there, and they drop the bombs, and on whom do they fall? Not upon the fighting men, but upon their wives and children. If there is anything which the inhabitants of Northern India have distinguished themselves for it is this, that with exceptions—such exceptions as there were in the Mutiny, and such an exception as there was the other day—they have been chivalrous as regards the wives and children of their opponents. When they have committed outrages they have been outrages against men, generally policemen or soldiers; but if you begin to bomb them then you attack their wives and children, and you cannot expect them to pay the same regard to the wives and children of your own people as has been the case hitherto.
I am speaking here at an immense distance from India, and with very little direct information on the subject, but I am not speaking merely on my own impression of the subject, and I should wish in future to be more satisfied than I am at present that aircraft, though they may be useful, should be the main

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way of resisting these frontier aggressions. That I have mentioned only because it is an instance of the difficult kind of question you have to take account of in dealing with the military problem for internal India. But that problem is one which obviously comes more within the competence of the Indian General Staff, who are better acquainted with the conditions, than that of anybody here. I have referred to it as an illustration of how much we have to depend upon the opinion of those in India. They may make mistakes. They have made them in the past, and I dare say they will make them again. But I think they are less likely to make blunders than we are in laying down policies, because we have not the knowledge of the circumstances and not the acquaintance with the military conditions in India which are required before you can form a judgment. Therefore, I await with interest what is to be said by the two noble Lords opposite who represent the two Departments concerned, and I shall hope to hear that their policy is, for better or for worse, to place reliance upon the only people whom it seems to me can give them reliable advice.
LORD INCHCAPE: My Lords, the noble Earl has mentioned my name in connection with the Committee of which I had the honour to be Chairman. In what I shall say I shall detain your Lordships only a few minutes. In 1913–14 the expenditure on military service in India was 29,84,41,000 rupees; in 1922–3 the estimate was 71,37,82,000 rupees, but owing to the troops in India being fewer than expected, the actual expenditure for that year was less than the estimate. Practically all the recommendations of the Committee have been concurred in by the Viceroy, the Governor of India, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Army Council. Except one or two recommendations in connection with military expenditure which are under the consideration of the War Office, I think the whole of the recommendations of this Committee will be carried out in toto.
In my humble judgment, it will be a fatal blunder to overrule the Government of India. During the last five years the expenditure in that country has exceeded the revenue by no less than 100 crore of rupees, the consequence being that they
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have had to borrow every year in order to balance their Budget. By the economies recommended by my Committee and the doubling of the Salt Tax India will just scrape through in the year 1923–24. The Commander-in-Chief, Lord Rawlinson, is perfectly satisfied that internal safety and external defence will be secured by the Army he proposes to maintain, and in my opinion, judging from what I saw in India during the five or six months I was there, it will be a great misfortune, almost a disaster, to impose on India a larger military expenditure than that which those who are responsible for the safety of the country consider necessary. I am a great believer in the man on the spot, and I hope the Government here will support the Viceroy of India and the Commander-in-Chief.
THE SECKETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (THE EARL OF DERBY): My Lords, I thank the noble Earl most sincerely for having put this Question on the Order Paper. It is especially gratifying to me to be able to give him an answer, because it was under his auspices that I first served my apprenticeship in the War Office. I have pleasant memories of that period. The debate has taken a slightly different turn from that which I had anticipated, and has been devoted more to the question of the reduction of the Army in India than to the actual state of the Army at home. I must leave that question to be dealt with by my noble friend the Secretary of State for India, but I would say one thing with regard to the reduction of troops in India, and that is that noble Lords must take into account the change that has taken place on the mechanical side of warfare. The noble and learned Viscount spoke about aeroplanes and their power in war. I am in agreement with him to a large extent. There is no doubt that for reconnaissance purposes aeroplanes must have a great superiority over Cavalry. In addition, you have armoured cars, which military authorities in India and at home have assured me are of the utmost advantage and mean an enormous saving in the number of men. You have also mechanical transport instead of horse and ox-drawn transport, and, therefore, although you may have a reduction of men, it does not follow that there is an equal reduction in the general efficiency of the Army. That is a fact that must be borne in mind.

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Lord Inchcape's Committee has made proposals for certain reductions, and those proposals are under consideration by the India Office and the War Office at the present moment. A number of the reductions will take place, but there is one reduction that I can tell the noble Earl will not take place. It will be some satisfaction, if not to him, at all events to the regiments concerned, to know that there will be no question of abolishing any of the three Cavalry regiments. I may also tell him, and he knows me well enough to understand that I should not say it unless I really meant it, that under no consideration would I as representing the War Office assent to any reduction unless I was fortified by the opinion of the General Staff that such reduction could safely be made. There I do agree with the noble and learned Viscount. The General Staff ought to be, and must be, the authority to which the Secretary of State for War, the Government and the country, must turn for military advice. The noble and learned Viscount said that when one soldier went out of office another soldier came in and generally disagreed with his predecessor. I have known that happen with politicians. When you give the authority of a body of military officers and it is said, "Those are not the right officers; I could find somebody who will disagree with them," I hope this country will always accept the advice of the General Staff as being the only military advice which the country ought to accept, whether it be in England or in India.
I view with great grief the reduction that has had to take place in the Army—the scrapping of Cavalry regiments, the scrapping of old and distinguished line regiments; the great reduction in the Artillery. They are all subjects for sincere regret. But you have to cut your coat according to your cloth, and it must be remembered that you cannot have these cries for economy and at the same time keep the Army up to the strength and size that you had before the war. The duty imposed upon me is to cut the coat according to the cloth, but to be quite certain that the coat is sufficient to cover the wearer; in other words, that the Army is sufficient for the work that may be imposed upon it. I am sorry that the Army should have to be reduced, but reduced it must be We have to try to get in our Army, organised to the highest
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pitch, the smallest number of men actually under arms with the maximum power of expansion in time of war. That means a big Reserve, and I freely admit that the two things I view as being most dangerous at the present moment in our military situation are the reduction in the number of men in the Reserve—that in time will gradually be made good—and the loss of the Reserve battalions. I should like to have substituted for them, had finances allowed, the old Militia battalions. Apparently, the noble and learned Viscount does not agree with me; we must agree to differ. We have to provide an Army sufficiently large to garrison our various ports all over the world, and provide drafts for them; and at the same time provide a small mobile force, an Expeditionary Force, which can be rapidly mobilised and sent abroad. Our Army has never been formed, and I do not think that it ever will be formed, to provide in peace time for a great European conflagration. We must try to have a nucleus so that we can extend it in time of war, if a war ever occurs again. In time of peace it would be folly to attempt to keep up any such Army as foreign nations maintain.
Your Lordships may be interested to see what reductions have taken place since the conclusion of the war. I will refer to Vote A, which gives the numbers of officers and men. The reduction in Vote A Estimates was, at the conclusion of the war, 1,975,000; in 1921, 184,000; and in 1922–23, 126,000; and there will be a reduction—I will not give the exact figures because, as I have said, a certain amount of discussion is proceeding between ourselves and the India Office—in the present year. The establishment of the Army outside India in 1914 was 186,000 all ranks. To-day it is 160,000. At the moment a point has been reached beyond which it is quite impossible to make any further reduction in the Army. In my opinion and in the opinion of the Government we have got down to the bone, and no further reduction of any substantial amount can be made so as still to leave the Army able to do that which the country expects of it. The Geddes axe fell on the Army with a recommendation for a reduction of 50,000 officers and men. The figures upon which the recommendation was based were overstated

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by 14,000, but in the endeavour to carry out the Geddes Report the number of officers and men reduced was 32,000, and there the reduction must cease.
I am very glad that this Question has been put, because it gives me an opportunity of saying, so far as any Government can say it, that finality has been reached. Nothing is more disturbing to the Army than not to know where it stands, and always to feel that any day a further axe may be produced and a further reduction made. Parents are loth to send their sons to be officers because they fear that there may be no future before them. I want them to feel assured, as the result of what I am now saying, that, so far as this Government, at all events, is concerned, there will be no further reduction, and the same excellent future in the Army, or perhaps a better future, is open to their sons as before the war.
The noble Earl spoke of economies in the reduction of pay. Do not let him for one moment think that this point has escaped the consideration of the War Office and of His Majesty's Government. The noble Viscount rather doubts whether we can make a reduction of pay and still get recruits. This will always be a question that can be decided only by results, but in my opinion there is not the least doubt that we can make a very substantial reduction in the pay of all ranks and still get those whom we require. The present rate of pay was undoubtedly fixed at a panic height, and I believe that a reduction which will still give to officer and man a wage which will not only be comparable to but proportionately greater than the sort of wage paid in civil life can be made, and a large reduction of expenditure effected in that direction. That point, however, is under consideration at the present moment. I wish to say that in no circumstances will such reduction affect any men who are in the Army now, so long as they are in the positions which they at present occupy.
If I may, I should like to qualify further my remarks about reductions of strength, because one is always rather afraid of being taken too literally I ought to have said that no reduction will take place in what I call the fighting Armies, but I do believe that reductions can and
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should take place in a number of the ancillary services; so that in that regard reductions may take place, though not of a very large and very drastic character. I do not want to bind myself, however, not to make reductions in these directions if I find they can be made without diminishing the efficiency of the Army. In conclusion, I should like to repeat what I said before, that there will be no reduction in what I call the fighting Army, and if there is any question of reduction in India, it can only be agreed to, so far as I am concerned, if I have the full authority of the Chief of the General Staff for believing that I can agree without the safety of the British Empire being in any way imperilled.
LORD METHUEN: My Lords, I should like to ask the noble Earl one question. I gather that he stated that the pay of the men will not be diminished. I should like to know if the pay of officers is to be reduced, because there is a very strong feeling among those entering and serving in the Army that their pay may be reduced at any time. May I assume that the noble Earl referred to officers as well as men?
THE EARL OF DERBY: The whole question is under consideration, but the noble Lord knows that next year there is some question of reducing the bonus that was given for the cost of living. According to the index figure of the year, that bonus is liable to reduction next year in the case of officers.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, I beg to congratulate my noble friend Lord Midleton on having given an opportunity to my noble friend the Secretary of State for War of making such a very important statement as he has made this afternoon. Your Lordships have heard every word that he has said and you know how full of information his speech has been. I particularly want to underline three statements which my noble friend made, and which I am quite sure will give your Lordships the greatest possible satisfaction. The first statement was that he would never consent to the settlement of such an important question as the strength of the British Army in India except on the advice of the Imperial General Staff. The second statement was that he was not prepared to accept

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responsibility for any further reduction of the fighting strength of the British Army. He guarded himself as to his freedom to accept reductions in certain of the non-combatant services.
THE EARL OF DERBY: I must just qualify that for a moment. I do not want there to be any mistake. The question of the reductions in India is sub judice at the present moment, and consequently there may be reductions to which, if the General Staff advise them, I may agree.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: I did not mean at that moment to refer to Indian reductions. I thought I had dealt with that point in saying that my noble friend would rot consent to any reductions in India except on the advice of the Imperial General Staff. I was referring to the strength of the British Army outside India, and he has told us that he has got down to the very bone, and that he is not prepared to accept responsibility for any further reduction of the, fighting men. Indeed, I am not surprised at that statement, when we consider the great reductions that have taken place—I do not say wrongly, because I agree with my noble friend that after such a war as we have had, and with such a load of taxation as this country is bearing, we are obliged to take risks, just as the Duke of Wellington took risks after the end of the Napoleonic struggle. But when it is considered that the Imperial obligalion and the responsibilities of the Army are not less to-day than they were before the great war, but are greater, it is indeed extraordinary how that little Army manages to fulfil, and with wonderful efficiency, such a vast responsibility. We cannot, however, conceal from ourselves that we are taking a risk, and I do not suppose that anyone in this country is more conscious of the fact than is my noble friend and his military advisers.
With regard to the reduction of the Army in India, Lord Inchcape, I believe, came into the House after Lord Midleton had begun his speech, and I gather from what he said that he did not quite understand what my noble friend was contending. My noble friend did not propose to impose upon the Government of India any military expenditure which they did not themselves think to be necessary. Nor did he want to cut down
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by one lakh of rupees the economies recommended by Lord Inchcape. Lord Midleton's point—and on this we hope to hear something from the Secretary of State for India—was that the reduction of expenditure on the Army should not have been in numbers but in pay, and from what my noble friend the Secretary of State for War has said, it does seem quite possible that economy might in the future be realised in the direction of pay rather than in the direction of numbers.
On that matter of pay, again I want to express, if I may, my very great relief and satisfaction that the Secretary of State for War took the line which I felt quite sure he would take, that in no circumstances whatever should faith be broken with the serving soldier, and that whatever reduction in pay might be necessary in the Army—and this would apply to the Navy and Air Force—that reduction would not be retrospective, but would only affect the prospects of men subsequently entering the Service. There have been rumours of a different decision, and I think the case would have been perfectly impossible of defence. Therefore, it is a great relief that the matter, once for all, is set at rest by the words of my noble friend. Of course, my noble friend the Secretary of State for India may say that we want a double economy—that we could do with fewer troops, and that if we pay less we get a double economy.
In that connection comes the greater importance of the main contention of my noble friend Lord Midleton, and of Viscount Haldane opposite, and the admission of ray noble friend the Secretary of State for War. This question of the number of troops required in India can no longer be settled by the obiter dictum of any Minister or of any soldier, nor can it, I venture to say, be settled only by the Government of India in conjunction with that branch of the Imperial General Staff stationed in India. I do most earnestly support the view of my noble friend, and what I understand to be the opinion of my noble friend opposite, that this is a matter in the first instance for the Imperial General Staff as a whole, and after that for the Imperial Committee of Defence, and that the final decision of the Cabinet can only come after the Imperial General Staff has spoken and the Committee of Imperial Defence has considered the question.

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With those decisions my noble friend and public opinion will be abundantly satisfied. We would not be satisfied if we thought for one moment that the Cabinet had neglected to consult those great authorities, for I think it can fairly be claimed now that the Committee of Imperial Defence is a great authority.
It has behind it the traditions of more than twenty years' work. Nobody knows better than my noble friend opposite what wonderful work that Committee did which bore fruit in the great war. I am sure that the present Government have not allowed the industry or responsibility of that Committee to lapse. Surely this question of the Defence of India is, of all questions, one which can be remitted to that Committee for final decision. On that point we should like a further explanation from my noble friend the Secretary of State for India, and, if I may remind him, I think my noble friend is also entitled to some little explanation of why that matter of the reduction of pay, to which the Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament drew attention last year, has apparently up to now been neglected; because if what my noble friend and the Committee advised had been done, there would have been material to the hands of Lord Inchcape when he went to India, on which he might have worked, and it might not have been necessary to make the recommendations which he has made as to the strength of battalion's, etc. If my noble friend the Secretary of State for India is able to supplement the speech of the Secretary for War with matter anything like so satisfactory as that we have already heard, Lord Midleton will be abundantly satisfied with the debate that he has raised, and public opinion will think he has done us all a great service.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (VISCOUNT PEEL): My Lords, on reading the Question of the noble Earl I did not think that he was going to deal in so much detail as he has done with Indian reductions, but rather with general Army questions. Indeed, on the whole question of the proposed reductions in the Indian Army I think he will excuse me from making a full statement to-night, because I am really unable to do it. He will understand that as these matters are under consideration by His Majesty's Government it would be impossible for
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me to deal with proposals not yet sanctioned. I was going to say, too, and apart from that conclusive reason, that I have another degree of unwillingness, and it is this, that this Question of the reduction of the Army in India is obviously, as the noble Earl pointed out in his speech, not merely an Army question but one which involves a great number of other considerations. It involves a full survey of the whole situation in India, and I should like, first of all, to deny the suggestion—I think it was made by the noble Earl—that there were dangerous reasons in the general situation in India why there should be no big reduction, because I think I can show that the situation is far more satisfactory than is indicated by those few phrases.
This question is mixed up with, and is part of, a great general policy of reduction throughout the whole of the Indian Services, and it would be entirely out of perspective if it were dealt with as a single question, apart from the reductions in all other public Services in India, and apart also from a full survey of the prospects of a more peaceful condition in India, not only internally but also on the frontier, and connected also with the question of possible, and, I hope, probable, peace with Turkey.
The only point, then, that I think I can definitely answer of those which have been put before me by these noble Lords is this. I cannot, of course, at this stage say what are the opinions of the Viceroy or the Commander-in-Chief in India. That would be an improper thing for me to do while these matters are still under consideration, but I will say that I think you have in India at the present time two generals of the very greatest distinction and capacity to give you advice on these questions. Anybody who is acquainted with the record of Lord Rawlinson knows how distinguished and capable a soldier he is. You also have as Chief of the General Staff in India General Jacob, an old Indian soldier, and, I believe I am right in saying, the Indian soldier who earned the greatest distinction in the war, a man who knows India from top to bottom, and whose advice is to be taken above a hundred stray opinions of other generals and gentlemen who may be consulted. And let me add that the opinions of these two men—with, of course, the Viceroy and the Government—are the opinions of those who are responsible

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for carrying out any changes that may be made, and who are responsible for the peace of India. Is it likely that these men, who have the primary responsibility for seeing that peace is preserved in that great sub-continent, will propose any ill-considered changes? I could not dream of suggesting, either to the Government or to this House, any military changes which the great military authorities and the Staff in India thought would present any danger to the peace of India.
There is only one other point in the speech of the noble Earl that I should like to answer, although I think the point was answered by the noble Earl, Lord Selborne. The noble Earl (Lord Midleton) suggested that when you are considering any question of the reduction of troops the simple way to do the thing is by reducing the pay of the British soldier, although almost immediately afterwards one of these two noble Earls—I cannot remember which—said: "Ah, but you must not reduce the pay of any serving British soldier, because that would be a breach of contract." Of course, it is a breach of contract. It is, therefore, by no means an easy way of dealing with the question, because, as has already been stated in the debate, the question of the revision of pay will come up next year, and nothing can be done till next year because these men have entered the Army on a certain contract, which cannot be broken.
THE EARL OF MIDLETON: When the noble Viscount says that nothing can be done, I would point out that 30,000 men have entered the Service since the recommendation of the Committee, and that everything could have been done in their case.
VISCOUNT PEEL: No, nothing could be done, because these men have entered the Army on certain conditions. It is quit" true that the noble Earl can, if he desires and thinks it wise, recommend that there should be a change in the pay of men entering the Army next year. Yes, but they do not go immediately to India, and before they reach India it is obvious that some time will have elapsed. And therefore it is quite clear that that will not be of any assistance to the financial condition of India at present.
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There is one more criticism of the noble Earl to which, in passing, I may allude. The noble Earl said: "are you reducing establishments? That is a most expensive way of reducing the Army"—the suggestion being, I suppose, that you should reduce cadres. I would point out to the noble Earl that there is one great advantage in reducing establishments and not cadres—and I am sure my noble friend will support me in this—and that is that it is much easier to fill up and increase establishments of existing units than to create other units, because if you abolish units you have to re-create them. The only other point I would mention is that when noble Lords are dealing with the Army in India I wish they would bear in mind that it is paid for by the Indian taxpayer, and that moneys are voted by an Assembly in that country. I hope, therefore, they will always remember the risk or danger of suggesting the imposition of any charges upon the people of that country which they think are either unnecessary or not in the interests of India.
THE EARL OF MIDLETON: My Lords, I rise to thank the noble Earl the Secretary of Stale for War for the most reassuring statement which he has made, and I take note of his undertaking that all these questions relating to India will be reviewed by the Imperial General Staff before the Cabinet decides upon them. I did not like to interrupt the noble Lord, Lord Inchcape, but may I say, with regard to the over-ruling of the Government of India, that I entirely agree; with what he feels in that respect? That was the reason why I pressed upon the noble Viscount last year that he should take up this question of pay, and that they should have it before them in view of the economies which were coming very shortly. That might have obviated other and, as I think, less eligible kinds of economy. I still regret that he did not use his strong position to get that question taken up last July, instead of in the present year.
VISCOUNT PEEL: The reason why I did not take it up was because I could not, owing to the fact that a definite contract had been entered into with these men.
THE EARL OF MIDLETON: There cannot be a contract with men who have not entered the Army. If His Majesty

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chooses to say: "I offer a different form of pay to these men from that received by those who are in India already," he is quite at liberty to do so.
VISCOUNT PEEL: At a certain stage.

"THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES."
LORD SYDENHAM: My Lords, I beg to ask His Majesty's Government whether it is proposed to issue any explanation of the statements and statistics published by the late naval attaché in Scandinavia in his book "The Triumph of Unarmed Forces."
I have put down this Question because I think it is necessary that some notice should be taken in Parliament of the very disturbing book referred to in it, and also because it is not possible now to raise questions of this class in another place. Your Lordships' House in 1915 and 1916 showed very marked anxiety as to what was going on in connection with the so-called blockade at that time, and we were always assured that very little was going through into Germany, and that what did go through did not much matter. In December, 1915, we had an important debate, lasting two days, and on many other occasions attention was forcibly drawn to the very large stocks of cotton, copper, cocoa, and many other necessaries, which were passing to the enemy through neutral countries. Those of your Lordships who took part in those debates knew a good deal of what was going on, but they did not know nearly all that has now been revealed, and, in the light of Admiral Consett's book, those debates now seem painful reading, because they were not successful in averting a terrible disaster.
The main facts which the author sets himself out to establish are four: (1), That Germany was liberally supplied through neutrals with food and necessaries of all kinds for prosecution of the war, the use of British coal being at that time peculiarly important; (2), that we were actually ourselves stinted in supplies, and even in tonnage, to keep this trade going through Scandinavia and Holland; (3), that it was not only a question of a blockade, but of an embargo stopping this lucrative trade through neutrals and that was purely, of course, a domestic
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matter; and, (4), that by all these means the war was prolonged at least eighteen months entailing the loss of hundreds of thousands of valuable lives and thousands of millions in treasure. Your Lordships, after reading the book, will decide for yourselves how far the author establishes those four propositions. I want to detain the House for a very few minutes longer, and I will only refer to a few of these transactions. Soya beans and copra, both of first class importance as oleaginous products, were brought to Germany from British Colonies in the Far East with British coal. Ceylon tea, which is a very bulky substance, was brought in large quantities to the enemy by the same means. Cotton, which was vital to the manufacture of propellants, and copper, which was essential to the rotation of shells, were both poured into Germany—literally poured. A single cargo of copper of 6,000 tons was consigned to a Swede at Malmo "for orders" and thence it went straight on to Stettin. I calculate that that cargo would have sufficed to make driving bands for 6,750,000 field shells; and your Lordships will see how extraordinarily important that amount of copper was for the purposes of the war.
The noble Viscount, Lord Devonport, stated in this House that in January and February, 1916, 20,000 tons of zinc passed from Rotterdam into Belgium. That zinc was invaluable for the inflation of Zeppelins and also, of course, for many other purposes. How did that zinc find its way to Rotterdam? Then the fishing fleet, which supplied the enemy with thousands of tons of good food, was equipped with gear and run with petroleum supplied from this country. Cement was poured into Holland to make fortifications on the Western Front. Under arrangements which we seem to have permitted beer was supplied to the Germans at a time when our supplies were short, of very poor quality, and very high in price. Factories in neutral countries supplying Germany with military necessities of all kinds were run upon British coal, as were the breweries which ministered to the thirst of the German soldiers. So also were the trains which conveyed these large supplies into Germany. In the control of coal alone we had a most powerful lever which was not used until it was too late. Now all this, and much more, was fully and faithfully

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reported at the time by a most able naval officer working under very great difficulties. It must have been known at the Foreign Office, at the Admiralty, and at the Board of Trade, and it was really vital information for the use of the Government which was directing the war at that time Admiral Consett was actually reprimanded because he sent some of his reports by the shortest route in order that any delay might be avoided.
His Majesty s present Government have not the smallest responsibility for these most disastrous proceedings, but I think they might wish that something should be said, if possible, in mitigation of the charges in this book—charges which are made with very great moderation. If this is possible, I submit to your Lordships' House that it is eminently desirable. One charge, that of a trade in paper currency, has been explained already in another place as a transaction merely required for purposes of the Red Cross; but that, of course, was in 1918, and it was after all this trading to which I have referred had long been stopped. I say nothing about what might have been done to check the financial operations in neutral countries of the banks which were at the time financing all these operations in favour of Germany.
I think it is now clear that the Declaration of London was the fons et origo of the whole torrent of terrible evils. One effect of this most deadly instrument was to exclude the essentials of modern war from the list of contraband, to confer immense additional advantages upon the Germans, and to paralyse our blockade for a very long period. If the rejection of the Declaration, which will stand to the lasting credit of your Lordships' House, had been effective we should not now have been suffering under an almost intolerable strain. Thus, at a time when our sea power was at its zenith and when the British Navy was supremely efficient, the tremendous weapon lying ready to our hands was blunted in advance while the Germans, of course, proceeded at once to tear up the Hague Convention. This trade with Scandinavia and Holland resulted in terrible losses to ourselves and to our Allies which reacted throughout the whole of Europe and are reacting to this day. I hope that His Majesty's Government will see their way in the interests of the national honour
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to issue such explanations as may be possible or, if not, to institute some inquiry into these transactions, which appear, from what we now know, to be as discreditable as they certainly were disastrous to the national cause. I beg to ask the Question which I have placed upon the Paper.
THE CIVIL LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW): My Lords, it is not considered that any good purpose would be served by reopening this intricate and difficult subject. I am aware that Admiral Consett was never in sympathy with the policy of the Government when he was naval attaché at the Scandinavian capitals. But I hope the noble Lord will agree with me that it is an improper proceeding for an exservant of the Crown to make use of knowledge which he acquired in his official capacity on which to found an attack on the Allies' blockade policy during the war. I am content to leave the book in question to the verdict of history and to those who are familiar with the difficulties with which His Majesty's Government and the Allies had to contend in respect to the blockade or Germany, especially before the entry of the United States into the war.
VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON: My Lords, I should like to say a word or two on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Sydenham. I have not read Admiral Consett's book. My sight is so bad that I am really shut off from the reading of books. I can read a certain amount of the current news of the day, enough to keep in touch with some questions, but I have not read the book in question and many other books that I should like to read. I know nothing about it except what Lord Sydenham has said in his speech this afternoon. So far as I remember, I do not think that if the whole story was told by the publication of Papers the Government which was in office at that time in the early years of the war would have anything to lose by such publication. The fact is that when you are engaged in war the man on the spot with a particular duty to perform—and Admiral Consett was one of these—is perfectly right to be zealous to do his utmost, but he takes in only the point of view of the man at one particular spot. Unless there is at the centre some

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mind which can take in much more than the view of the man on the spot and see all the consequences which are likely to ensue from action which the man on the spot advocates—well, in this case we should certainly have lost the war.
I will give your Lordships an instance. After the United States came into the war—I was not in office at that time—it was quits easy to prevent all these things going in through neutral countries; you simply rationed neutral countries. But if we had attempted to do that in the early stages of the war we should have had such trouble with the United States that it would have been fatal to the future of the Allies in the war. Another instance came to my notice after the war was over, when I happened to go to the United States where I was for about three months in 1919. An American, a man of great intelligence and considerable business position in the United States, said to me: "You know it was very fortunate that Great Britain and the Allies did not declare cotton contraband in the autumn of 1914. The cotton States were suffering very much, and if cotton had been declared contraband the consequences would have been very unfortunate." The question of whether we should declare cotton contraband in the autumn of 1914 was discussed by the Cabinet. It was a very grave question, and we same to the conclusion that on the whole we had much better not declare cotton contraband.
I said to the American friend who was talking to me: "Well, my opinion was at the time that it was better for us not to declare cotton contraband, but I should like to know exactly what would have happened." What I was afraid of at the time was that if we took a very arbitrary line about the import of goods into neutral countries the United States might have adopted the measure of convoy-that is to say, they would have said that copper or cotton going from the United States to a neutral country was entitled to enter that neutral country, and that we had no right to stop it going to a neutral country. If that had happened either we must have fired on the American convoy, which would have meant war with the United States, or we must have given up our blockade, because if we had let goods go through from the United States we must have given up our blockade.
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My American friend said: "No, I do not think that was the real danger. I do not think that is what would have happened. What I think would have happened was this. There was a very strong party in the United States early in the war working on purely pacific lines, neither anti-British, nor anti-Ally, nor anti-German nor anti-anything, but which, in the war, were very strongly in favour of putting an embargo on the export of munitions of war from the United States." That would have been fatal in the early days of the war to the cause of the Allies. It would have made no difference to Germany. The anti-Allied elements in the United States were, at that time, of course, in favour of such a measure, because it told against the Allies. My friend said: "If you had caused serious trouble with the United States over contraband it is quite possible that is what would have happened in the early days of the war." We could not have protested against it. It was perfectly within the rights of the United States. They would have been breaking no international law whatever if they had chosen to put an embargo on the export of munitions.
But what would have been the consequences of that I Does Admiral Consett discuss that sort of possibility in his book? The noble Lord has read it. Is there any evidence in the book that he was aware of the difficulties with which we had to deal, and not merely difficulties but the dangers which we ran? If the correspondence in the Foreign Office was published as to what went on with the United States, especially in the early days before the United States entered the war, I think people would become aware of this—that there are many things pointed out to us now which were considered at the time to be mistakes, or which appear now to have been mistakes, but which, if we had adopted them, would have led to other indirect consequences which might have been fatal to us in the war. One of the things which was essential to us and the Allies in the early days of the war was that we should not have serious trouble with the United States—the great neutral Power of the day. It would have hampered our operations. It was a very difficult matter to avoid that serious trouble. I think we went as far as we could in the early

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days of the war in applying the measure of blockade, and we avoided that great danger.
There are three dangers, as I look back at the war, with which we had to deal in the early days. One was that we might have serious trouble with our own Moslem subjects in the Empire. Another was that the wires which Germany could always pull in Russia might excite suspicion of us there and lead in the early days to most serious consequences. The third was that we might have had serious trouble with the United States. The Government in power in the early days of the war avoided successfully and completely all those three great dangers, any one of which, if it had not been avoided, might have been fatal to our success in the war. I would ask people who read books of this kind, written by a man on the spot, rightly zealous for his own particular job in the war, to bear in mind that everybody committed mistakes in the war. The Germans no less than other people made mistakes in the war. There are many things which it seems to have been a mistake not to do which, had they been done, would have exposed us to one of those great risks which I have indicated. Had we made the mistake of doing anything to produce serious trouble of that kind with other countries in the early days of the war it would have been absolutely fatal to the future course of the war from our point of view.
THE EARL OF DENBIGH: My Lords, the remarks which the House has listened to so far seem to me to deal almost entirely with the question of imports into neutral countries of goods from the United States, but one of the strongest indictments which is brought by Admiral Consett in his book is the trading with neutral countries for the benefit of the enemy which went on from our own country. When one looks at the figures which he quotes of imports from our own country—those millions of pounds of cocoa, those large shipments of cotton, and all the other items which go to make up the necessary stores that an army in the field requires, to say nothing of what the population of Germany required at the time—when one realises the immense profits which these brought, to our own people, and when one remembers more particularly also the coal which
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went abroad in very large quantities, it makes one rather ashamed of some of the profiteers in our own country who made money out of the war while men were being killed. I should like to know from the noble Viscount opposite, or one of the members of the late Government, whether it was not possible to do something to check the trading which went on from cur own shores, and what, steps were taken for the purpose of preventing these goods from reaching the enemy through neutral countries.
LORD SYDENHAM: My Lords, I should like to say only one word in reply to the noble Viscount. Admiral Consett does deal at some length with the difficulties, the great difficulties, that the noble Viscount's Government experienced with the United States, but the whole question seemed to me at the time, and I said so in this House, to be comprised in this—that all we had to do was to follow precisely and in detail the policy which the Northern States adopted towards the Southern States in the Civil War. I think the noble Viscount will remember that the whole cotton crop of the United States for the year was offered to us, and was offered to us at a, pries which would have been extraordinarily profitable if we had bought it. Moreover, had we done that it would have prevented the Germans from making an enormous amount of explosives.

GAS REGULATION ACT, 1920 (SPECIAL ORDER).
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion which stands in my name.
Moved, That the Draft Special Order proposed to be made by the Board of Trade under Section 10 of the Gas Regulation Act, 1920, on the application of the Ipswich Gas Light Company, which was presented on the 7th June, and published, be approved.—(The Earl of Clarendon.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

PALESTINE.
LORD ISLINGTON LORD ISLINGTON had the following Notice on the Paper:—
To ask His Majesty's Government if Papers can be laid on the Table showing

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(1) Budget accounts in Palestine during the past year, (2) a report of the recent Elections in Palestine; if His Majesty's Government can now publish the various correspondence and Papers dealing with our engagements and commitments in Palestine; whether, in view of the recent Election being declared void by the Government and a new Advisory Council subsequently nominated by them being rejected by the Arab community, His Majesty's Government are now prepared, in the light of the present situation, to reconsider their present policy.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I make no apology for again raising this question of Palestine, but I will make my observations as brief as possible. The main matter involved in my Question on the Paper is in substance a repetition of a Question that I asked my noble friend the noble Duke, three months ago. I think it is really important that Parliament and the country should clearly be informed as to the reasons for events in Palestine which those who are following them can only regard as increasingly serious and grave. I hope the noble Duke will be able to give a more favourable reply to the Question than that which he gave three months ago.
Since the last debate on this subject-in this House, on March 27, much has occurred in Palestine, and from, the somewhat scanty and infrequent information available to the public through the Press it is quite clear that the hostility of the people of Palestine to the Zionist policy in that country has definitely developed and hardened. One cannot be surprised at this attitude. It has been repeatedly said in this House that you will never be able to persuade the Arab and Christian populations of Palestine, who form the large and preponderating majority of the people of that country, to assent to a Zionist system of Government, and unless you are prepared materially to modify the present system His Majesty's Government will find themselves obliged to shoulder the responsibility of forcing on the native community a form of Government that they greatly dislike. They will have to be prepared to face consequences which have invariably ensued in whatever part of the world such attempts are made in these days.
An Election has recently taken place in Palestine. The Arab Congress rejected
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that Election, and although prolonged to nine months, with every effort that is coupled with the prolongation of an Election in all countries to induce people to vote, in the three districts of Jaffa, Samaria, and the southern district, almost the entire Arab and Christian population refused to take any part, in the other two districts only a partial number took part. The reason why these people refused was quite clear. It was because they would not accept the form of an Election, however fair it may be, which places them at the end of it in an entirely ineffective position in regard to the Executive authority in the country; especially in view of the fact that the Executive authority was influenced by a Zionist policy, by Zionist officials, and by those who are enthusiastically pledged to a Zionist form of government in the country.
So few took part in the Election that the Government itself had to declare it void. Another attempt was made to set up a form of Government by nomination—the Advisory Council. The Advisory Council on paper looked very favourable to the Arab and Christian community, but again realising that they would have no effective power, that it was purely an advisory council, that the Executive could vote them down whenever they desired, they have refused that form of Government as well. Whilst the resignations have not actually taken place on the part of those who were nominated to the Advisory Council, I understand that they have all refused to serve upon it.
That is the present situation, and all such situations, when they develop on these lines, are coupled with rising political passions and discontent by those who feel they are suffering a grievance. You have practically arrived at a deadlock, and the administration of Palestine to-day can only be described as that of a Zionist bureaucracy carried out under the instructions of the British Government. This constitutes an arbitrary form of Crown Colony government, new and quite unprecedented in the long and hitherto honourable history of British colonial development; and it must be obvious to His Majesty's Government, as it has become obvious to every one who examines this question, that the present situation cannot really be maintained and that there must be some modification. In the debate which took place last March

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the noble Duke gave little satisfaction, but, later the noble Marquess the Deputy-Leader of this House summarised the position and told us that he regarded it as being under two heads. He said it was a question of honour connected with previous pledges, and a question of policy,
It is apparent to an increasing number in this country—it has long been apparent to me—that a distinct pledge was given of independence to the Arab community in Palestine. It is true that subsequent to that pledge an undertaking was given in a Declaration to endeavour to establish a Zionist Home in Palestine, but that was conditional on such policy not interfering in any way with the "civil and religious rights of the Arab and Christian community." It must be admitted that every effort has been made on the part of His Majesty's Government during the past four years through their Executive officers in Palestine to establish a Zionist system of government in that country. They must see, to-day, that you really cannot reconcile these two conflicting points in the Declaration and the Mandate—namely, the establishment of a Zionist system, in the shape of a Zionist Home, and at the same time undertaking in no way to interfere with the "civil and religious rights of the Arab and Christian community." May I remind your Lordships that as recently as 1018 a Proclamation was issued in the vernacular in every village in Palestine making it clear that as far as Great Britain was concerned they would undertake to establish a system of Government which was acceptable to the people of the country?
In the debate last March my noble friend Viscount Grey of Fallodon truly said that in the minds of many people there is still doubt; and there are, of course, numbers of people in this country who have not had the opportunity of some of us of going exhaustively into the different correspondence and Papers that are now extant on this question. My noble friend made an appeal to the Government to issue a White Paper giving all the correspondence which led up to our commitments in Palestine. The noble Duke said he would have to get the assent of King Hussein and that, subject to its being not opposed to the public interest, he would do his best to
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issue such a White Paper. I hope the noble Duke will be able to tell us, for the benefit of those who desire to have their doubts set at rest on this point, that such a Paper will be issued. I am credibly informed that King Hussein himself would welcome the publication of such a document, provided, of course, that matters dealing with the Sacred Places, which do not come into this controversy, were excluded from the Paper. So much for the pledges.
Lord Salisbury then said that he deprecated what he called a zig-zag policy. He added that the policy of the late. Government, once adopted, became the policy of the country, and that it was the duty of the successors of a Government to refrain so far as possible from reversing the commitments made by their predecessors. That is a perfectly sound doctrine with which in the majority of cases we all agree. Ordinarily, especially in foreign affairs, matters determined by one Government should be adhered to on continuous lines, so far as possible, by their successors. But I venture to say that occasions have arisen, and do arise, when experience shows that a continuity of policy is against the public interest and opposed to the welfare of the Empire. There have been many instances of this in our history, and we have certainly had a number of examples in the last few years. Nor can I think of any instance where adherence to policy will be to a greater and graver degree opposed to the Imperial interest than the continuance of the policy as laid down and prescribed at the present moment in Palestine.
Let me, if I may, examine for one moment the position. It is apparent to all, I think, that the vast majority of the people in Palestine will not accept the present system. No clearer illustration could have been given than that of last month, and I do not think that any amount of cajoling or bullying is likely to reconcile the Arab community to this scheme. Then may I ask His Majesty's Government how they are going to maintain this system? There is only way of maintaining a system which is disliked and discredited by the people of a country, and that is by force. Sooner or later, and I believe sooner than many people realise, this country may be

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landed in the very grave predicament foreshadowed by my noble friend Lord Grey in the solemn warning which he gave to His Majesty's Government three months ago, and we may find ourselves in the impossible position of having driven an otherwise friendly and peaceful people into a frame of mind of such exasperation and hostility to the Government that only by force of arms can order be maintained. That will mean that a British military garrison and a British recruited and controlled police will have to be employed to put down the violence that may occur, and against the very people whom we, the British nation, have gone to that country to support and to assist, according to our pledges, towards self-government.
If such an untoward occurrence takes place—and it is within the range of possibility in the present atmosphere of Palestine—when once the people of this country, who at present have very imperfect information and interest on this subject, come to realise what a crisis will arise, is there any shadow of doubt as to the opinion, that they will form of, or the verdict that they will pass on, a Government whose policy has been responsible for such an event? I appeal therefore—and I am speaking in no hostile spirit, still less, of course, in any Party spirit on this question, because it is far too grave a matter, a matter, indeed, of the highest, Imperial importance—I appeal most urgently to His Majesty's Government to take this matter seriously in hand, to regard it as a question of high Imperial policy, to extricate it once and for all from the meshes of the Departments who find it at present thrown backwards and forwards between them. I have a shrewd suspicion that this matter has been left to too great an extent in the hands of Departments and has not come under the corporate consideration of the Cabinet. I urge upon my noble friends, the noble Duke and the noble Marquess, to take the course of bringing it before the Cabinet and having all the facts before them.
The issues that are involved in this question do not rest with Palestine alone. As your Lordships are aware, a Treaty is under negotiation between the British Government and King Hussein the main object of which is to invite the constituent Arab States to come into a Federation. I have said before, and I will not repeat
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it at any length now, that I believe that the federation of those isolated States is the only possible solution of the future of the Arab communities. But it must be a Federation of Independent States. You have independence now in Iraq, in the Hejaz and in Transjordania, where free Governments are enjoyed, but I understand that under this scheme the condition of the inclusion of Palestine in the Federation is that it should still live under the Zionist system of administration. This has been a secret Treaty, as all such negotiations must be, but for some reason or other the substance of it has within the last week been published by Proclamation in Jerusalem. That Proclamation indicates to the people of Jerusalem and Palestine the maintenance of the status quo as regards Zionist policy in Palestine. But the Mandate, as I have already said, is so ambiguously phrased that I am given to understand that when King Hussein read it in the Hejaz he construed it in exactly the opposite direction, and thought that it would mean that Palestine, along with the other areas, would enjoy independence as a constituent part of the Federation.
This reservation regarding Palestine is obviously a very dangerous indication for the future. It cannot possibly be doubted that if we establish a Federation of the Arab States and insist upon a Zionist system of Government being implanted in one of those States, and that by no means the least important, it is only a question of time before the other States will find these influences coming over their borders, before Zionism will find its way, with all its activities, into those Arab countries. Is it unreasonable, as, I see, is suggested in the public Press to-day, that the Arab people should refuse a situation which gives them no power in their own country, and should wish to have nothing to do with a Treaty which binds them to a Zionist system under the projected Federation? The people of Palestine have rejected what one can only describe, if one looks into if, as nothing more nor less than a paper Constitution, where all the power is out of their hands and preserved to an autocratic bureaucracy predominantly Zionist. This is a very grave aspect of the mutter, and full of potential danger. Again I ask His Majesty's Government to pause a long time, and to consider in all its bearings

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a policy, for which they will have to shoulder the responsibility, of founding an Arab Federation, based as it must be on Zionist influences and those influences alien and utterly unacceptable to the Arab community and its aspirations
We are constantly being told that this country is pledged to this Mandate in the face of Europe. I will again point out, without fear of contradiction, that this Mandate has never been ratified. The Sevres Treaty has never been ratified, upon which the whole basis of the Mandate depends. I doubt myself whether a great deal of what has been done in Palestine during the last four years, if it came before an impartial legal tribunal, world be found to be legal in many respects. When you say, "in the face of Europe," what is the view of the Powers of Europe in regard to this Zionist Home? The views of France may be doubtful, but I question whether France would ever undertake such an enterprise. We all know that Italy is strongly opposed to it, and so is Spain. You might go through all the Powers of Europe and I suspect that the only one Power which would be found in favour of it would be Soviet Russia.
What about the United States of America? The American Government three years ago sent a Commission, known as the King-Crane Commission, to investigate the whole situation in Palestine. Some of my noble friends have repeatedly asked for the publication of their Report. It has been published in the United States. It is a very long and exhaustive Report, but from the first page to the end there is one point which comes out quite clearly in their investigations, and it is their conviction, from all they heard and saw, that the Arab community will never accept the Zionist system of Government in Palestine.
In the face of all this, why do His Majesty's Government allow this question to drift, and to mingle with it so much subterfuge, so much ambiguity? It certainly is not in order to comply with the request of Jews who have lived for years in Palestine, because they have never asked for it. It is solely on account of the demand made by an outside political Jewish organisation, which I believe by no means represents the Jewish community throughout the world.
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In all the speeches I have made on this subject, and I am ashamed to say they are now becoming rather numerous, I have never suggested by any hint any antagonism or hostility to the Jewish race. My whole case in this matter has been that you cannot impose upon a native people an alien form of government, and that this Zionist form of government is an aggressive political organisation, which desires to take on the government of a people where, through their people, they are in no wise represented.
The only people in Palestine to-day who, I suppose, really desire the Zionist system of government, are those Jews who have been immigrated in the last few-years from Eastern Europe, and it does seem to me passing strange that His Majesty's Government, representing this great country, with its great Colonial and Imperial traditions, should be persisting in an enterprise which is so subversive of our Imperial interests in that country. I admit that the position to-day is a difficult one for His Majesty's Government, but it is not insuperable. The Government are not responsible for, this. Many members of the Government were the strongest opponents of this before they were in office, and therefore with perfect consistency His Majesty's Government can take a strong line on this matter. They have to choose between two things—namely, our Imperial interests on the one side and disappointing the ambitions of a political section of the Jewish community living outside Palestine, on the other.
Can there be any hesitation really as to the course that should be pursued? I admit that it requires courage and determination, but surely His Majesty's Government, on behalf of this country, possess a sufficient amount of courage to carry through this project. I know it is argued, and I have seen it in the Press, that this is a fictitious agitation. The answer to that in Palestine is perfectly conclusive. The Arab Congress represents the whole Arab community in that country. It is also suggested that the agitation is kept going from here. There has been no agitation in this country. The question was brought up at the Elections, and a good many candidates who spoke in regard to this, I have no doubt, when the matter was explained

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to their electors, received considerable support. My complaint is that in this country there has not been enough publication. I am convinced that if the whole facts of the case for the last four years in trying to establish this Zionist Home were known to the people of this country, and it was known that the Arab community were bitterly opposed to it, and rightly regarded that a pledge had been made to them of independence, the volume of opinion would be so strong as to compel any Government sitting on that Bench to modify the present situation.
His Majesty's Government, I know, have two very difficult problems before thorn. They are different in many respects, but they have a certain similarity. They have to deal with the difficult question of Kenya and with the difficult question of Palestine, and I hope they are going to deal with them. To this extent they are the same—namely, that the problem resolves itself into one of conflict of races. There is only one way in which, in our modern times, you are going to solve these most difficult problems of race, and that is to insist upon it that a Government is formed and constituted appropriate to, and effective for, the people in the country over which that Government is formed. That must be, I believe, the cardinal principle in Kenya Colony for Africans, and undoubtedly it should be the cardinal principle on which you should conduct your course in connection with Palestine.
If you lay down that principle, you can banish once and for all these ambiguities, these subterfuges, which really are regarded by many people now as duplicities, which are being used on behalf of the scheme, and in their place you can come forward with a straightforward policy—a policy on the main, sound lines of British constitutional development—and tell this country, and tell the world (because the world is looking on at this, and the world will respond to it) that, as trustees of the Arab State, you are going to fulfil your pledges and to insist upon granting to them a proper and a fair national form of government. If you do this you will get the general approbation, I believe, of everybody, except those who are keen partisans on the other side. You will certainly restore the prestige and influence of Great Britain in the Near
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East, which has been so seriously impaired, largely by this very policy. In conclusion, I beg His Majesty's Government to give this matter consideration, to deal with it, and to deal with it at once, before they have to face what may be a serious catastrophe.
VISCOUNT MILNER; My Lords, it is with considerable reluctance that I rise to address you on this occasion, because it was only this morning that I became aware that this subject was to be brought up here to-day. I have not had any opportunity of preparation or of reference to documents, and I feel very strongly that, on a matter of this importance, it is dangerous to speak without preparation, because one might unwittingly utter words on the spur of the moment which would have a bad effect, perhaps a seriously bad effect, in the country about which we are speaking. You may ask why in that case I address you at all. Well, on the last occasion when the noble Lord who has just sat down advanced the very strong views which he holds about Palestine, and which he has expressed to-night with so mach eloquence, almost vehemence, I was in bed, and I had not an opportunity of speaking. However great my disadvantage in this discussion to-night, I do not feel that I ought to avoid speaking, because my convictions on the subject are quite as strong as those of the noble Lord. My views are entirely opposed to his, both as to policy and as to facts, and I am not aware that the view for which I stand has had any expression in this House, except to some extent from His Majesty's Government.
I differ so much from the noble Lord that I am glad to begin by emphasising the only points on which I agree with him. The first is that I am convinced that, as he has said, this is a grave matter of Imperial policy. I think it would be a very grave matter indeed, and would have a very disastrous effect on our prestige throughout the East, if we were to adopt what I believe the noble Marquess the Deputy-Leader of the House has called a zig-zag policy on this question, still worse if the Government were to allow itself to be hustled into a total reversal of policy, which undoubtedly is a course which a strong section of opinion in this country, supported by a vigorous agitation in the

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Press, is trying to promote. That is one point of agreement between myself and the noble Lord—my conviction, equal to his conviction, of the Imperial importance of the question. But there is another point of agreement. He has expressed the hope that all the documents bearing on this question may be published. I must sincerely hope they may. It is not, perhaps, worth while discussing this, because, if the documents are published, that will settle the question between the noble Lord and myself, but I hold strongly that, if the documents were published, it would be proved that we had not broken faith with the Arabs, though the noble Lord holds that it would be proved that we had done so. With all the strength in my power I second the request of the noble Lord that, if it is by any means possible without serious injury to public interests in other respects, all the documents in these matters should be published.
My interest in the question of Palestine arises from the fact of my having paid two visits to that country, one shortly after my Mission to Egypt three years ago, and one last year. On the second occasion I was there for a considerable time, I must say that my own experience of what was going on there makes me feel a sense of absolute bewilderment when I read these extraordinarily pessimistic pictures of the effect of our policy in Palestine and the position of affairs there. When I was last there the Moslem and Christian agitation against the Zionist policy—which was supposed to be identical with the policy of His Majesty's Government—was in full swing. Wherever I went I was confronted with deputations got up by the association which works these things—deputations denouncing the Balfour Declaration, and advocating a reversal of the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine. To all those deputations I listened with respect, and from all of them I tried to elicit what were the grievances under which the Arab population was suffering, and what cases they were able to bring-forward in which the supposed pro-Jewish tendencies of the bureaucracy had led to injustice to the Arab. In no case except one—which the complainant himself stated had been rectified when it had been brought to the notice of the High
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Commissioner—was any alleged injustice established.
Another thing that struck me very much about these representations was that they were all identical, not only in substance, but in words. I listened to the very same speech half a dozen times in different parts of the country. That is not, to my mind, characteristic of a genuine agitation. It suggested to me very strongly the idea that these verbally identical speeches had been supplied to the different speakers from a common source. What I want particularly to impress upon your Lordships at the same time is that there was other evidence, as far as the country generally was concerned, of a state of quiet and tranquility, and I could not see any signs of that growing hostility to the Administration which, in the opinion of the noble Lord, is going to compel us to increase our forces in Palestine. If, in fact, the feeling of hostility to the Government is growing as strongly as he represents, it is very curious that it has been found possible continuously to reduce the garrison of Palestine.
One of the strongest arguments which I hear and one which is constantly used in this country now against the policy of the Government in Palestine, and even for our abandonment of that country, Is the enormous burden which it is supposed that this occupation in discharge of out-duty as Mandatory there is going to impose upon this country. One would naturally think that if things were going from bad to worse that burden would be a growing burden. What are the facts? Not only has the force in military occupation been enormously reduced, until now there is hardly any military occupation at all and the security of the country is almost entirely provided by the constabulary, but this great burden of expenditure on Palestine of which we hear so much is in steady course of reduction. The total cost of that country to the British taxpayer three years ago was £4,000,000, in the next year it was £2,500,000, in the present year it is £1,500,000, and there is every reason to suppose that in another year it will have fallen below the million. My personal conviction is that before long Palestine will cease to be a financial burden upon this country at all.
That is on the point of the grave consequences which it is supposed would

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result if His Majesty's Government were to pursue the policy which has hitherto been pursued. May I say a few words about the policy itself? I was a party to the Balfour Declaration. I do not believe that the Balfour Declaration is inconsistent with any pledges which have been given to King Hussein or to anybody else. It is my conviction that when all the documents are published it will be clearly established that in the promises which we made to King Hussein a distinct reservation was made of the country about which we are now speaking. Still, as I say, let that be decided by the documents themselves when they appear. At any rate, the Government which made the Balfour Declaration was under the impression that it was free to make it and that it was under no obligations inconsistent with it, and whether the policy of that Declaration is actually embodied in a legally valid Mandate or not to-day, it is quite certain that it has received on a number of occasions the express approval of other Powers, our Allies in the great war. Whether it is approved by popular opinion in those different countries I cannot say, but I think it, would be tonally impossible for the Government either of the United States, or of France, or of Daly to dissociate itself entirely from the policy of that Declaration. Personally, I believe the policy is a sound one and that, steadily persisted in, it will lead to good results.
But I am speaking of the policy of the Balfour Declaration as it has been interpreted by His Majesty's Government in the White Paper which was laid on the Table of this House last year and which has been, so far as I know, honourably and straightforwardly carried out by the Government in Palestine. I am not speaking of the policy which is advocated by the extreme Zionists, which is a totally different thing. Let me say that when I was in Palestine, as often as I was confronted with Arab eloquence denouncing British policy, it was never the declared policy of His Majesty's Government; it was never the policy of the White Paper; it was never the interpretation which we have put upon the Balfour Declaration which was attacked, nor was it anything that had been done which was attacked. It was always the interpretation which the speaker chose to place upon our policy. If was not what we had said was
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our policy but what he said was our policy which was attacked; and it was not anything which had been done but something that he asserted we were going to do.
What has been done, as a matter of fact? The noble Lord repeatedly used the expression: "The Zionist Government of Palestine." I do not know what that means, unless he is referring to the fact that there are a certain number of Jews, not. I believe, all of them Zionists, in the Administration. Certainly anyone would think from the tone of his speech, if not from anything that he actually said, that there was an anti-Arab and pro-Jewish bias in the Government of that country. I believe that this is not the case. There was one thing which I heard with great satisfaction when I was in Palestine and heard from all quarters there, even from the most extreme advocates of the Arab cause, and that was that the High Commissioner was scrupulously fair in holding the balance as between Arab and Jewish interests and, indeed, between all interests concerned in that country. I believe that the British Administration as conducted in Palestine to-day is free from the taint of any partisanship whatever, and I believe that we have only to go on steadily with the policy of the Balfour Declaration as we have ourselves interpreted if in order to see great material progress in Palestine and a gradual subsidence of the present agitation, the force of which it would be foolish to deny but which I believe to be largely due to artificial stimulus and, to a very great extent, to be excited from without.
The symptoms of any real and general dissatisfaction among the mass of the Arab population with the conditions under which they live, I think it would be very difficult to discover. And, indeed, why should they be dissatisfied with the, conditions under which they live? What possible injury has been inflicted upon the Arab population by the influx of the 20,000 or 25,000 Jews who have come in since the Peace? There is plenty of room in that country for a considerable immigrant population without injuring in any way the resident Arab population, and, indeed, in many ways it would tend to their extreme benefit. I venture to express the hope that His Majesty's Government will adhere to the policy

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which was adopted by their predecessors four years ago, the results of which have in many respects been highly satisfactory.
I can imagine few contrasts greater than the condition of Palestine as I saw it between three or four years ago and as I saw it last year. The progress made has been really extraordinary. You may say: "Well, that is only material progress, and in gaining the affections of the people you have made no progress at all." I very much doubt even that, but what I am certain of is that no country could make the material progress that Palestine has made in recent years if it was really convulsed by those feelings of deep political excitement and hostility to the Government which we are asked to believe do exist in Palestine to-day.
The last word I should like to say is this. I am, and always have been, a strong supporter of the pro-Arab policy which was first advocated in this country in the course of the war. I believe in the independence of the Arab countries, which they owe to us and which they can only maintain with our help. I look forward to an Arab Federation. I cannot imagine how any fair-minded Arab can fail to recognise either the sincerity of British policy with regard to his race, or the enormous advantages he has derived from British assistance, but if the Arabs go the length of claiming Palestine as one of their countries in the same sense as Mesopotamia or Arabia proper is an Arab country, then I think they are flying in the face of facts, of all history, of all tradition, and of associations of the most important character—I had almost said the most sacred character. Palestine can never be regarded as a country on the same footing as the other Arab countries. You cannot ignore all history and tradition in the matter. You cannot ignore the fact that this is the cradle, of two of the great religions of the world. It is a sacred land to the Arabs, but it is also a sacred land to the Jew and the Christian, and the future of Palestine cannot possibly be left to be determined by the temporary impressions and feelings of the Arab majority in the country of the present day.
There are about 700,000 people in Palestine, and there is room for several millions. There is something far more
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important than the present population of Palestine, and it is all that is involved in Palestine for millions and millions of the human race. I am convinced that the Arabs will make a great mistake, and I believe the Arabs with the best political brains are perfectly well aware that they do make a great and fatal mistake, in claiming Palestine as part of the Arab Federation in the same sense as are the other countries of the Near East which are mainly inhabited by Arabs. My firm conviction is that you cannot have either an Arab Government in Palestine or a Jewish Government in Palestine, but that you must have in that country some neutral Power which will keep the balance between the different races, and which, without allowing any injury to be inflicted on the Arabs, will allow the Jews also to settle in the vacant spaces of their ancient home as long as they provide, as they are willing to provide, the means of developing those districts, and enabling them to support an adequate new incoming population. You must always have regard for the great Christian interests of Palestine, interests not, confined to the Christian population of the country, but which affect the Christianity of the whole world. To hold the balance even between these various interests—to administer fairly what is, in a sense, and must always remain, not an Arab country or a Jewish country, but, if I may use the word, an international country in which all the world has a special interest—I think some Mandatory Power will always be required.
It is a high trust which has been committed to this country, and it is a matter of honour, I think, for us to discharge it in such a way as will make the world recognise that that trust has been well placed. I think we have only to go on (steadily disregarding the present agitation) with the policy of establishing not a Jewish Government of Palestine but a Jewish Home there which will receive as many Jews as the country can reasonably support while at the same time taking care, as we have, I believe, taken care, that the interests of the Arab population do not suffer—we have only to go on steadily in the policy which has already been laid down, and I think it will not be many years before Palestine, instead of being, as we are

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told it is going to be, a great burden to this country, will become a source of strength and credit to us.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE): My Lords, before I deal with the more general topics which have been raised in the course of the debate I will answer the specific Questions on the Paper. I should like, however, in the first place, to express, my appreciation of the speech to which we have just listened from the noble Viscount, who has considerably eased my task to-night. The first Question the noble Lord asks is whether the Budget accounts in Palestine during the past year can be laid before the House. After the debate on March 27 last I telegraphed to the High Commissioner and asked for the information. The Appropriation Account for the year in question is not yet available, but it will be laid on the Table as soon as it is received. The Appropriation Account for the year 1921–22 could be given if that would be any satisfaction to the noble Lord, and I shall be glad to lay it on the Table of the House or communicate with him privately. Then the noble Lord asks for a Report of the recent Elections. That Report was laid on the Table of the House on June 8 last and is now in the hands of your Lordships.
He also raises a question which has been frequently discussed—namely, the desirability of publishing the various correspondence and Papers dealing with the engagements and commitments of His Majesty's Government in Palestine. I informed your Lordships on the last occasion that I would consult with my colleagues and the Foreign Office as to whether it was possible to lay these Papers. I much regret to say that we have come to the conclusion, in addition to the reasons which I gave last March, that it is contrary to the public interest that these Papers should be laid, and I am unable to accede to the request of the noble Lord. The other part of his Question relates to the recent Elections and the failure of a large portion of the population of Palestine to take part. There has been a considerable degree of misapprehension on that subject. Under the Constitution which was framed last year arrangements were made for holding an Election on a plan which was well-known o the inhabitants of Palestine—
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the plan of a secondary Election—and it was hoped that it might have enabled a Legislative Council to be elected which would have been of material assistance and value in the government of the country. However, for reasons which have been stated this evening, a large portion of the inhabitants of Palestine refused to take part in it. I regret that decision, and I think their action was unwise and unfortunate.
In consequence of the failure of the Election, efforts were made to obtain an advisory body which would act in that capacity to the Government of the country. A thoroughly representative body of Arabs agreed to serve, and the constitution of the council was largely extended from the original Advisory Council in order to secure a greater representation of all classes in the country. I regret that for various reasons it was represented to the Arab members that they would be subscribing to the Constitution which was originally proposed. That is a complete misconception, and I am afraid that, possibly for other purposes, efforts were brought to bear upon those who had originally agreed to serve in order to prevent them doing so and to make the government of the country a little more difficult.
It must be clear to your Lordships that even if the Arabs are unwilling and refuse to take part in the Constitution which has been framed, it is our duty as the Mandatory Power to continue the government of the country. Full provision is made for this in the Order in Council, and it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to give every support to the High Commissioner in carrying out the government according to the instructions in the Mandate. Later on, I hope that perhaps some of the prejudices which surround this question may be dissolved and that the people of Palestine will be ready to take an active part in the administration of their country.
May I refer for a few moments to some of the more general questions which have been raised during the course of the debate? I hope your Lordships will fully appreciate the position in which His Majesty's Government is placed to-day. We occasionally hear, even from responsible quarters, the Balfour Declaration discussed, criticised, possibly

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sometimes defended, as if it was something which we could cither take up or lay aside just to suit our own convenience. The noble Lord who introduced this Question to-night seemed to be under the same apprehension. At the risk of detaining your Lordships for a little time, I am afraid I must ask you to consider the position in which we find ourselves to-day as regards the Mandate. The Mandate is not merely a national obligation, it is an international obligation, and the Balfour Declaration was the basis on which we accepted from the principal Allied Powers the position of Mandatory Power in Palestine. The British Government accepted the position of Mandatory for Palestine from the principal Allied Powers at the San Remo Conference in April, 1920. In assigning the Mandate to Great Britain the Conference laid down that:
"The Mandatory Power will be responsible for putting into effect the Declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the British Government in favour of the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people, subject to the conditions included in the Declaration itself."
That was the Declaration and the policy confirmed by the Mandatory Powers.
We hold the trust not in the first instance from the League of Nations but from the Conference of the Allies. The next step was to obtain the approval of the League of Nations to the actual terms of the Mandate. A draft Mandate was submitted to the League of Nations in December, 1920, and a revised draft early in the following year. For various reasons the League of Nations did not find it possible to take the draft Mandate into consideration at once, but in October. 1921, the President of the Council of the League wrote on behalf of the League to the British Prime Minister, inviting His Majesty's Government to continue to carry on the administration of the territories committed to their charge in the spirit of the draft Mandate until such time as the position should have been definitely regularised. The next step was taken when a final decision was reached by the Council at their meeting in July, 1922. On that occasion the Council passed the following Resolution:—
"In view of the Declaration that has just been made and of the agreement reached between all the members of the Council, the
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Articles of the Mandates for Palestine and Syria are approved. The Mandates will enter into force automatically and at the same time as soon as the Governments of France and Italy have notified the President of the Council of the League of Nations that they have reached agreement upon certain particular points in regard to the latter of these Mandates."
That is, in regard to Syria. So far as our Mandate in Palestine is concerned, we have the direct and full approval, in the first place of the Allies, and in the second place of the League of Nations.
When we talk, perhaps rather lightly, of altering our Mandate and reversing our policy, I ask your Lordships seriously to consider the position in which we should be placed. No doubt it would be possible for this Government, or any other Government, to go to the League of Nations and resign the Mandate. I am not familiar with the procedure, but I believe that such a step is provided for. Your Lordships must remember, however, that if we do that we lay down the whole of the Mandate. It is not possible for us to say that we wish to reserve certain portions of the Mandate and dispense with others. If we resigned that position of trust it would be for the League of Nations to determine what new arrangement should be put in force. It amounts, in fact, to this, that if we are compelled to admit the impossibility of carrying on the obligations placed upon us we shall have to retire altogether. That is a serious position, and I ask those who criticise our action, as they are fully entitled to do, and those who criticise the Balfour Declaration, to consider what steps they would take and what suggestion they have to make to the Government for replacing this arrangement. I know the position is not an easy one, but we should be taking a grave risk, not only in regard to Palestine but in regard to our relations with other Powers, if we resigned that trust, which has been deliberately placed upon us and which has been confirmed by the League of Nations.
I may leave that portion of the subject and refer for one moment to a point upon which I have already touched lightly, namely, the organisation and the means by which we propose to carry out that Mandate. Obviously, we must have a very wide discretion in our interpretation and in the methods by which we are going

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to discharge the obligations placed upon us. The late Government, I think very wisely, arrived at the conclusion that the most satisfactory method to adopt was to establish by successive stages various degrees of self-government. Your Lordships are aware, or can acquaint yourselves from Papers which have been published, what those proposals are. We never intended that this should be necessarily a final instalment of self-government. In fact, it was a first instalment, and we hoped, in accordance with the policy which has been pursued in many other parts of the world, that we could gradually extend the principle of self-government with a view ultimately to arriving at responsible government for that part of the world. The late Government adopted that policy, and we have done our best to carry it into effect. It was carried out under British auspices and by British administration, and I must say that I am completely mystified when I hear such observations as so freely-fell from the noble Lord who asked this Question when he referred to Zionist domination and Zionist bureaucracy.
What are the facts? If we look at the numbers—I quote from the Paper circulated on March 12 this year—we find that of the thirty-six persons at present holding the highest administrative posts in Palestine, thirty-three are Christians, and only three are Jews. Of the thirty-three Christians, two are Christians by religion but of Jewish extraction. But even if we add those two to the number of Jews, we shall have a proportion of only five Jews out of thirty-six officials.
LORD ISLINGTON: Can the noble Duke tell us the posts which these five Jews occupy?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: The thirty-six officials are holding the highest offices in the administration. Taking the total of officials of every kind, 680 posts were held by Jews, 630 by Mahomedans and 1,250 by Christians. Again I may mention that of the ten officials who it was suggested should be members of the Legislative Council, eight were Christians and two were Jews. I think, therefore, that when we hear this easy flow of language regarding Jewish domination and Jewish bureaucracy, I have some claim to say that we have to look at facts as they are.
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May I trouble your Lordships with two quotations from the White Paper published in June last year? The first is this:
"It is also necessary to point out that the Zionist Commission in Palestine, now termed the Palestine Zionist Executive, has not desired to possess, and does not possess, any share in the general administration of the country. Nor does the special position assigned to the Zionist Organisation in Article IV of the Draft Mandate for Palestine imply any such functions. That special position relates to the measures to be taken in Palestine affecting the Jewish population and contemplates that the Organisation may assist in the general development of the country, but does not entitle it to share in any degree in its Government."
Again:—
"When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance."
Again and again it has been stated that the intention from the beginning has been to make a National Home for the Jews, but every provision has been made to prevent it from becoming in any sense of the word a Jewish State or a State under Jewish domination.
We hear of criticisms that can be directed against it, but I venture to say that when we get away from vague generalities we have had no case brought to our notice of anything like oppression or domination exercised by the Jews.
LORD ISLINGTON: Can the noble Duke give us specifically the five offices occupied by Jews?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: I am afraid that I cannot at the moment. Well, my Lords, we certainly realise that a heavy responsibility is placed upon us, but I need hardly inform you that we watch with the greatest care and anxiety the position in Palestine. The High Commissioner arrived in London last night.

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I have not yet had the pleasure of seeing him, but I hope thoroughly to discu6s the situation in all its bearings, and I hope, if I may venture to address an appeal to those who have taken an active part in this question, that they will use their influence—I believe it will be in their best interests—to urge their friends in Palestine to act in a constitutional manner, and to avail themselves of those opportunities of taking their share in the development of the country. What Palestine needs to-day is a period of quiet development, and I am quite, sure that the enthusiastic account which Lord Milner was able to give us, from personal knowledge and personal experience, will be amply justified. I am informed that the five Jews mentioned by Lord Islington are the High Commissioner, the Attorney-General, the Director of Commerce, and one or two other of the District Officers. I hope I have been able to satisfy your Lordships that the policy which we are carrying on is strictly in accordance with the Mandate which has been placed upon us, and that we are endeavouring to discharge those functions to the best advantage not of any one section of the community in Palestine but of all sections in that country.
VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON: My Lords, I will not attempt at this late hour to traverse the whole field opened up by the speeches to which we have listened. I would only reinforce one or two points which I have made before. One of the points raised by Lord Milner, who made such an interesting contribution to the debate, was with regard to the publication of Papers. I can quite understand that there may be Papers which cannot be published in their entirety. In time of war there are things said or done relating to purely strategic matters, or owing to the exigencies of war, which but for those exigencies would not have been said or done, and which after the war is over have no consequences at all, and which had better not be published after the war is over, because they would only revive memories that had better be allowed to die out. I fully understand that the Papers may not be published in their entirety, but when things have been said during the war which really do impose obligations upon us in time of peace, after the war is over, I think it is a great pity that it should be found
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impossible not to take out of the Papers which exist anything which really is regarded or can be regarded as a pledge, in order that we may judge how the matter stands.
The noble Viscount, Lord Milner, in his speech, said he did not believe there were any conflicting pledges. It is part of the case of the other side that the pledges do conflict, and they publish passages which they say are authentic. You can only decide that question by the publication of the actual documents themselves, and I would like to see an end put to this controversy as regards conflicting pledges by the publication of such Papers as it is possible to publish. Now I must say that the situation in Palestine, as far as we know it, has about it some elements which entirely justify Lord Islington in bringing the matter before your Lordships. Of course, if what Lord Milner said turns out to be true in the future, we shall be only too glad. We want to see this thing disappear. But we have to set against the favourable forecast which Lord Milner gave us, very confidently and very rightly if he feels confident, the solid fact that we have tried to get people representing over 90 per cent. of the population of this country to take some share in the government, and so far they have absolutely refused. It is a solid fact which the noble Duke admitted and which he deplored.
That really does give rise to great apprehension. I understand that at present—I think it is admitted—the Arab in Palestine is not anti-British in feeling. Therefore we have not yet reached that point when we have to deal with irreconcilable people; but I am sure that if things do drift and become worse, and if instead of the hope's of Lord Milner being realised the fears and apprehensions of Lord Islington are justified, and His Majesty's Government finds itself face to face with the necessity of using force and spending money on a considerable scale to fulfil the obligations we have undertaken in Palestine, there will be something which will fall not far short of Consternation in this country. It is not my business to deprecate a change of Government, but if things do develop in the way in which Lord Islington fears they may develop, I think His Majesty's Government might find itself in such difficulty, and face to face with

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things so disagreeable to this country, that its position might be shaken. It there is to be a change of Government, I should very much regret to see it brought about in that way by external trouble.
I cannot say that I feel easy in my mind as to the future. We have had hopes held out to us before that things would get better, but so far as we can judge from overt action of the Arab population they seem to get more irreconcilable. Although I think there is certainly some force in the statement made that a certain amount of this feeling is encouraged and fomented from outside, we have to bear in mind that, so long as the feeling is there, if it leads to untoward results the results will be the same whether they are fomented from outside or spontaneous from within.
The situation is, I agree, as everybody has said, really a very difficult one. I welcome the latter part of the speech of the noble Duke, in which he pointed out that there had been some misapprehension as to what the Zionist policy meant. I have had some experience of that since I last spoke in this House. I have been bombarded with various documents, coming from the organisations which put forward the Arab case, continually referring to Zionist policy, and saying how impossible it is ever to reconcile the Arabs to Zionist policy. But those documents do not define what the Zionist policy is. It is becoming a phrase, which is evidently used by people who are so accustomed to using it that they feel quite sure what they mean by it, and that, what they mean by it is the same thing as that which the Government mean by it. On the other hand, I have had represented to me from the other side, from a source at any rate not unfavourable to the Zionist movement, that when I spoke in this House and said that Zionist policy meant a Zionist Government, it was not in accordance with the facts; that the pledges which have been given by the Government of this country with regard to Zionism do not mean or imply a Zionist Government of the district; and that it, is a misunderstanding to say that the aim of the policy now pursued by His Majesty's Government is to establish a Jewish Administration or to expropriate Arabs from their land.
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That last thing I should have hoped was not believed anywhere. I should have thought there was no question in any way of ousting the Arabs.
But that has suggested to me this. There is no getting past the fact that the Balfour Declaration was made, and also that it was received with a good deal of sympathy, by myself among others, at the time when it was made. Now we are in great difficulties with regard to that pledge, and the problem really is how can the Balfour Declaration be reconciled with itself; that is to say, how can you reconcile the Zionist policy of the Balfour Declaration with doing no prejudice to the religious or civil rights of the population of the country. That is the real problem. It is quite easy with regard to religious rights, because, whatever Government there is, I suppose nobody contemplates that there would be any prejudice to those. But civil rights are a very different matter. If this Zionist policy is to mean a Zionist Government it means a predominantly Zionist element in the Government, when over 90 per cent. of the population is really Arab. That is really not consistent with the civil rights.
What I would urge is that the noble Duke opposite should take advantage of the presence of Sir Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner, in this country to confer with him on this subject. I have never attacked Sir Herbert Samuel's actual acts of administration; I do not know that they have been attacked, even from the Arab side, or that he has been accused of unfairness or oppression. But that is not the only question. We must not drift into the position of saying to the Arabs who refuse to take part in the government of the country: "You have got a very good Government, but you are a very unreasonable people." That is the sort of argument that we have used before with regard to some other cases. It is always satisfactory to the people who use it, but it never has the least effect upon the people who are discontented with the Government. It is not mere acts of government, it is the question of their own share in the Government, and the spirit of it, that matters.
If, while Sir Herbert Samuel is here, the noble Duke, in conference with him, could really work out some more definite plan in the sense of not implying Zionist Government of the district, or Jewish

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administration, while yet preserving what, I think, everybody would like to see preserved for the Jews—an opportunity of founding their own University, for instance, of founding their own home of Jewish culture inside a State which is mainly Arab—if the noble Duke can work out with Sir Herbert Samuel some clearer view of the policy, which will show how Zionist policy can be interpreted in such a way as to bring it more into harmony with the civil rights of the people than they believe at present to be possible, I hope the opportunity of making some step in that direction will be used. I really
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feel that, unless it can be proved, to the satisfaction of the leading Arabs, that the Zionist policy does provide for the Arab population, the vast majority of the inhabitants of the country, an opportunity to take a real share in the Government, and that the spirit of the Government will not be predominantly something which is not Arab—unless that can be done, I do fear that there will be serious trouble in the future.
House adjourned at twenty-five minutes before eight o'clock.

Preamble
CITY AND SOUTH LONDON RAILWAY BILL.
LONDON ELECTRIC RAILWAY BILL.
WIMBLEDON AND SUTTON RAILWAY BILL.
BIRKENHEAD CORPORATION BILL.
WEST RIDING OF YORKSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL (DRAINAGE) BILL.
NOTTINGHAM CORPORATION BILL.
BARNSLEY CORPORATION BILL.
Report from the Committee of Selection, That the following Lords be proposed to the House to form the Select Committee for the consideration of the said Bills, namely,
V. Hood,
L. Wharton,
L. Erskine,
L. Raglan,
L. Lamington (chairman);
agreed to; and the said Lords appointed accordingly: The Committee to meet on Tuesday the 10th of July next, at eleven o'clock; and all Petitions referred to the Committee, with leave to the Petitioners praying to be heard by Counsel against the Bills to be heard as desired, as also Counsel for the Bills.

WEST SOMERSET MINERAL RAILWAY (ABANDONMENT) BILL. [H.L.]
The Chairman of Committees informed the House that the opposition to the Bill was withdrawn: The Order made on the 25th of April last discharged, and Bill committed for Tuesday next.

BASTARDY BILL.
To be read 2a on Tuesday next (Viscount Astor).
HAWKSHEAD MISSION CHAPEL CHARITY BILL.
LUCAS'S HOSPITAL CHARITY BILL.
TANCRED'S CHARITIES BILL.
Committee of the Whole House (which stands appointed for To-morrow) put off to Tuesday next.