Sitting of 2 August 1923

Preamble
The House met at Eleven of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
  NAVAL AND MILITARY PENSIONS AND GRANTS.

    APPELLANT'S FRIEND.
    Mr. BROADasked the Minister of Pensions whether he will arrange that, in cases of appeal to the appeal tribunal where the appellant is too ill to attend and a domiciliary visit is necessary, at least one week's notice of the visit shall be given, so that the appellant may have the opportunity of arranging for a friend to be present to submit arguments in support of the appeal?
    Colonel GIBBS (Treasurer of the Household): Rule No. 31 of the Statutory Rules and Orders governing the procedure of the pensions appeal tribunals provides that when, owing to illness, an appellant is unable to attend before the tribunal, and a member of the tribunal visits him and takes down the evidence, reasonable notice of the visit shall be given. In practice one week's notice of the intended visit is given not only to the appellant but to the area officer of the Ministry of Pensions, and, where the appellant is an inmate of an institution, the medical superintendent of the institution.

    ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE (NOTICES).
    Mr. BROADasked the Minister of Pensions whether, in all pension offices, a notice is displayed in a prominent position informing the pensioner that if he has any cause for dissatisfaction he has the right to appeal to the committee for advice and assistance; and, if not, whether he will issue instructions that a notice to this effect in large type shall be shown in every whole and part-time area office?
    The MINISTER of PENSIONS (Major Tryon): All officers in the local offices of
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    the Ministry are instructed to inform applicants who make complaints that, if they so desire, their complaints may be put before the War Pensions Committee, and notices to the same effect have also been exhibited in all local offices where the committees have asked that this should be done.

    HIGHBURY HOSPITAL, BIRMINGHAM (FIRE).
    Mr. MACPHERSON(by Private Notice) asked the Minister of Pensions whether the Committee which was appointed to inquire into the cause of the fire at Highbury Pensions Hospital, Birmingham, and to make recommendations for the prevention of fire in the future at Ministry hospitals, has yet reported, and, if so, will the Report be published?
    Major TRYON: I have just received the Report of this Committee, and am arranging for it to be published.

  EX-SERVICE MEN.

    MENTAL CASES.
    Mr. ROBERT RICHARDSONasked the Minister of Pensions whether he will cause an arrangement to be made providing for application to an appeal tribunal on the part of an ex-service man confined in an asylum who is discharged by his petitioner under Section 72 of the Lunacy Act, not having been proved to be dangerous and unfit to be at large, against the decision that he is liable to be detained under threat of loss of pension or allowance?
    Major TRYON: The hon. Member does not appear to appreciate that it is by virtue of the patient's classification by my Department as a "Service patient" that the relatives have the power to insist on his removal against the considered advice of the medical superintendent. In such circumstances, it is the practice to inform the relatives that if the man is again returned to the asylum the question of family allowances and, in extreme cases, classification may have to be considered afresh. This is a reasonable procedure which is exercised with the greatest discretion and solely in the interests of the patient's treatment and prospects of recovery. While I am always willing to inquire into any case which the hon.

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    Member may bring to my notice, I am quite unable to accept his suggestion of a formal appeal to a tribunal in cases of this nature.
    Mr. RICHARDSON: Does the right hon. Gentleman think that an asylum is a place where these people should be incarcerated, many of them being neither dangerous to themselves nor to others, but who are there amongst people who are both? Is there any hope of these people coming back to normality if they are associated with other inmates who are worse?
    Major TRYON: It is perfectly obvious there would be very much less chance of these unfortunate men returning to normality under the hon. Member's proposal. They must have medical treatment, and they are treated as service patients whom it is the duty of the State to look after, and the hon. Member's suggestion that 6,000 certified people should be let loose without any proper medical care is one that has never before been suggested.
    Mr. RICHARDSON: I am not asking that these people ought not to have some medical treatment, but my point is that they are in the wrong place, that they ought not to be there, and their future be very much prejudiced by their being in an asylum.
    Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member id making a speech.

    TUBERCULOSIS (VILLAGE SETTLEMENTS).
    Mr. PEASEasked the Prime Minister whether the Government have decided to give any, and, if so, what, financial assistance to village settlements for tuberculous ex-service men?
    The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Baldwin): My right hon. Friends the Minister of Health and the Minister of Pensions have investigated the work of the two village settlements which have been started in this country for the benefit of tuberculous persons. They are satisfied that much useful work has been accomplished, but, as these settlements are still in the experimental stage, it is too early to say whether they will be permanently successful. In the circumstances, the Government are of opinion that there is a good case for some
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    financial assistance from the Exchequer towards the extension of the settlements, so as to provide additional accommodation for tuberculous ex-service men, and to enable the experiment to be tried on a somewhat larger scale. When the House reassembles, it is proposed to submit a Supplementary Estimate of £20,000 for the purpose of grants providing 25 additional cottages for ex-service men and their families at each of the existing settlements.

    RETURNING OFFICERS (REMUNERATION).
    Mr. GILBERTasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he fixes the rate of remuneration for returning officers at Parliamentary Elections; and what is the scale of pay made to these officers for this work?
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Sir Wm. Joynson-Hicks): I have been asked to reply to this question. The scales for remuneration of the returning officers at Parliamentary Elections are fixed by the Treasury under Section 29 (4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1918. The existing scales are laid down in detail for England and Wales by No. 1151 of Statutory Rules and Orders for 1922, and for Scotland by No. 1152/S52 for 1922.
    Mr. GILBERT: Will the right hon. Gentleman kindly send me a copy of those Orders?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: Yes, certainly.

    LONDON CLUBS (MUSIC AND DANCING LICENCES).
    Captain Viscount CURZONasked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that the London County Council propose to ask him to make it compulsory for clubs habitually used for music, dancing, or plays to obtain a licence; and, if so, whether he can assure the House that no such order will be made until Parliament has had an opportunity of reviewing all legislation regarding the licensing of such plaes and of hotels, and of considering the way in which the London County Council has administered the existing regulations upon hotels in the same connection?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. G. Locker-Lampson): My right hon. Friend has not yet received any representations from the London County Council on this subject, but if, as I understand, the proposal referred to involves an alteration of the existing law, no action could be taken by the Home Office without the authority of Parliament, and opportunity for discussion would arise as a matter of course.

  EDUCATION.

    FREE-PLACE PUPILS.
    Mr. EDEasked the President of the Board of Education in how many schools his Department has, during the past 12 months, drawn the attention of the governors or local authorities to the ad mission of a number of free-place pupils in excess of those allowed by the regulations of the Board; and the number of such free-place pupils alleged to be in excess?
    The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of EDUCATION (Mr. Edward Wood): The Board have communicated with 72 schools. The excess of free places involved was about 500.
    Mr. EDE: Will the right hon. Gentleman take into consideration the representations of the local authority in regard to the poverty of the district?
    Mr. WOOD: Yes, we have regard to all the relevant factors, and arrive at a decision after considering them.

    SUPPLEMENTARY TEACHERS.
    Mr. EDEasked the President of the Board of Education how many supplementary teachers were recognised for the first time during the year ending 3lst March, 1923; and will he state in full the qualifications as to age, education, training, and medical fitness that are demanded from a supplementary teacher on her first appointment?
    Mr. WOOD: I regret I do not possess the information asked for in the first part of the question. With regard to the second part, I may refer the hon. Member to the last paragraph of the reply which I gave him on the 28th June last.
    Mr. EDE: Will not the right hon. Gentleman consider the advisability of getting into touch with the number of these teachers who are newly appointed, in view of the large number of unemployed teachers fully qualified?
    Mr. A. V. ALEXANDER: Is it not a fact that every supplementary teacher employed has to be separately approved by his Department? Therefore, why is it that he cannot give the total number?
    Mr. WOOD: I do not think that is so—
    Mr. ALEXANDER: It is the regulation.
    Mr. WOOD: Even so, I do not think I can give this information without asking the local authorities for a lot of rather detailed figures, which means considerable labour to put upon the staff unless it be necessary.
    Mr. EDE: Is it not the fact that the only qualification for these teachers is that they are women over 18 years of age who have been successfully vaccinated and have been approved by His Majesty's Inspector as proper persons to teach?
    Mr. WOOD: No; I think if the hon. Gentleman will look at the Code, he will see that there is some more qualification required than that.

    ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS (STAFFING).
    Mr. EDEasked the President of the Board of Education in how many instances during the past 12 months his Department has complained of the over-staffing of public elementary schools; in how many instances his Department has complained of the under-staffing of public elementary schools; in how many cases of over-staffing his representations have had the effect he desired; in how many cases of under-staffing his representations have had the effect he desired; and the net increase or decrease in the number of certificated teachers employed that would have resulted had all his representations, been carried out by the local education authorities?
    Mr. WOOD: As the answer to the question is rather long, I will, with the hon. Member's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT. I may, however, say that in the last few months the representations made to local education authorities against carrying reductions of staff

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    too far have been more numerous than those asking whether further reductions are not practicable.
    Following is the answer prepared:
    The Board have, during the last 12 months, been discussing with local education authorities, in correspondence and through their inspectors, the question whether a modification of their staffing arrangements is called for either to secure greater efficiency, or to givve effect to those considerations of economy to which attention is called in the Prefatory Memorandum to the Code; but it would be misleading to assume that in all these cases the representations made to local education authorities amounted to complaints. The last part of the question is hypothetical, and I cannot possibly make a numerical estimate of what might have been the result if the Board had proceeded by way of specific demands instead of by the ordinary method of discussion. My latest information is that the number of certificated teachers employed in the schools was less by about 600 on the 30th June, 1923, than on the same date in 1922.

    TRAINING COLLEGES (STUDENTS).
    Mr. MORGAN JONESasked the President of the Board of Education whether he is aware that recently several thousands of students have completed their training at the training colleges for teachers and have left; that the great majority of these trained teachers will be unable to find employment in present circumstances; and whether, in view of the public money expended upon their training, and of the necessity for encouraging entrants into the teaching profession, he can take steps to secure that advantage shall be taken of their training by their employment in schools where there is an insufficient staff of teachers and classes consisting of from 60 to 70 children?
    Mr. WOOD: I am fully alive to the difficulties of the present situation, but I am not yet able to judge what proportion of the teachers leaving training colleges this year will be unable to obtain employment within a reasonable time. I have no doubt that local education authorities are anxious to give employment to young teachers, and when occasion arises will use their services for the reduction of excessively large classes.
    Mr. JONES: Pending the employment of these people, could not some method be adopted to provide unemployment pay?
    Mr. WOOD: I have no power to provide that under existing legislation.
    Mr. JONES: Why does not the right hon. Gentleman seek power?
    Colonel Sir C. YATE: Has there been any reduction in the number of these training colleges?
    Mr. WOOD: No there has been no reduction in number, but the hon. and gallant Gentleman will be aware that some little time ago I issued a regulation on the matter.
    Sir C. YATE: Is the number likely to be reduced?
    Mr. ALEXANDER: Is it not a fact that these training college students have to sign an agreement to serve for two years after leaving college under a penalty if they do not do so? Therefore, is it not incumbent under the agreement for the Government to provide employment for them?
    Mr. WOOD: I cannot provide employment if employment does not exist.
    Mr. ALEXANDER: Then will the right hon. Gentleman cancel the agreement that these teachers must serve for two years, or return some part of the cost of their training?
    Mr. WOOD: The hon. Gentleman is under a misapprehension. There is no compulsion on anybody to go through a training college, and if they do go into a training college under present conditions, neither I nor anyone else can guarantee them immediate employment
    Mr. JONES: These people give an undertaking when they emerge from college they will serve two years; should not that be taken into consideration?

    NON-PROVIDED SCHOOLS, RAMSGATE.
    Mr. MORGAN JONESasked the President of the Board of Education whether he can make any statement as to the action taken with regard to the condition of the non-provided schools in Ramsgate; whether he is aware that in

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    four departments of these schools three classes are taught in one room and in the other three departments two classes are taught in one room; that these classes are sometimes between 50 and 60 in size; that in one of these departments, between December, 1921, and July, 1922, there were three heavy falls of plaster from a ceiling 25 feet above the children's heads, and that at present there are 46 cracks in the same cealing; and whether, in these conditions, where old buildings have been either dangerous to the safety or health of the children or the efficiency of instruction, the Board will continue to approve, and itself press for, such action as will bring them more nearly up to the standard at which the Board aims?
    Mr. WOOD: Five of the schools in Ramsgate have been specially visited by His Majesty's Inspector and a member of the Board's architect's staff. I have not yet received their joint report, but I need hardly say that I shall give it careful consideration.

    LATVIA (FINANCIAL POSITION).
    .Mr. HANNONasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is in a position to give any information as to the financial position of Latvia; the amount of the Latvian rouble note circulation to the end of the financial year 1920–21 and at the present day; the note circulation of lats and the percentage of gold backing; and the cost of living figures to-day and two years ago?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: My hon. Friend will find some information about Latvian circulation and gold reserves in the "Monthly Bulletin of Statistics of the League of Nations." The latest return of the Bank of Latvia was published in the "Economist" of last week. I am not aware of any official cost of living figures for Latvia.
    Mr. HANNON: Are there not signs of prosperity at the present moment in Latvia?

    OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITIES (RETURNS).
    Mr. CHARLES BUXTONasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether he will take steps to obtain and
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    publish annual returns from Oxford and Cambridge Universities in the same form as those now published in respect of other universities in Great Britain under the auspices of the University Grants Committee?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: I have requested the University Grants Committee to take such steps as appear practicable to obtain from the university authorities at Oxford and Cambridge returns which will be as nearly comparable as circumstances permit with those annually supplied to the Committee by other grant-aided university institutions, and published in the Committee's Blue Book. The hon. Member will, however, appreciate that the conditions at Oxford and Cambridge differ in certain material respects from those which prevail at the other universities, and that, as the records and accounts at the two ancient universities have not hitherto been kept with a view to returns on the lines which are required by the University Grants Committee, a little time may elapse before properly comparable figures for Oxford and Cambridge can be pro vided.

    OLD AGE PENSIONS.
    Mr. SEXTONasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury if his attention has been called to the case of William Aimer, an old age pensioner, awarded 10s. per week and at present an inmate of the Turner Memorial Home, Liverpool, and whose son-in-law willingly contributed 11s. per week, which, in addition to his pension, made up the necessary fee charged by the institution of £1 1s. per-week, and in consequence of which Aimer's old age pension has been reduced to 6s., necessitating the son-in-law paying the difference; and if, in view of this voluntary action of the son-in-law, who is quite willing to continue contributing on the original scale of 11s. and the benefit derived by the said William Aimer in the home, he will take steps to restore Aimer's pension to the 10s. per week?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: The value of the free maintenance received by Mr. Aimer in the Turner Memorial Home, i.e., the full value of maintenance there less the amount contributed by him from his old age pension, is required by law to

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    be taken into account as means in determining the rate of old age pension (if any) to which he is entitled. In these circumstances I have no power to intervene.
    Mr. SEXTON: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman to answer the question I have put down? Is he aware that the son-in-law has contributed the difference between the pension and the £1 1s. required by the institution, and is quite prepared to go on doing so? Will the right hon. Gentleman take steps to see that the pensioner has his 10s. restored? It is now reduced to 6s., because, in point of fact, the son-in-law has paid the difference between the 10s. and the £1 1s.?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: That, I believe, is perfectly true, but the fact that the son-in-law contributes to this institution does not remove from the pensioner the effect that he is getting benefit from the institution, and the total amount of his income has to be taken into consideration.
    Mr. SEXTON: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the son-in-law can refuse to contribute any balance—that there is no obligation on him to do it?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: I think that is correct. There is no obligation on the part of the son-in-law, but the law as regards old age pensions makes us take into consideration the total benefit the pensioner receives.
    Mr. SEXTON: Then is not this a case where "the law is a hass"?
    Sir ROBERT NEWMANasked the Minister of Health whether he has any statistics to show what the cost would be to the Exchequer if, in calculating the means of aged persons claiming old age pensions, the value of free housing accommodation was excluded; and, if he has no such statistics, will he consider the possibility of obtaining an estimate of the amount?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: I regret that this information is not available, nor could it be obtained except at an expenditure of time and labour which I do not think would be justified.

  GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.

    LAW CHARGES.
    Mr. HANNONasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury how the sums of £6,000, £1,250, and £3,000, included in the Civil Service Estimates for 1923–24 for law charges connected with the administration of the Merchant Shipping Acts, Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Acts, and Crown Lands Act are made up; and whether these sums include any payments to the Law Officers of the Crown or the Treasury solicitor which may be reclaimed from other Departments?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the BOARD of TRADE (Viscount Wolmer): I have been asked to reply. As the answer is rather long, perhaps my hon. Friend will permit me to circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPOET.
    Mr. HANNON: May I ask the Noble Lord whether his right hon. Friend will not recognise the necessity of giving more details of this expenditure in the statement of the Estimates?
    Viscount WOLMER: I will see that that is conveyed to my right hon. Friend.
    Following is the answer:
    The sums referred to, amounting to-£10,250, which compare with a similar provision in the Estimates for 1922–23 of £12,000, represent a provision based on previous experience of law charges which may be incurred during the year for

    (a) Formal investigations into shipping casualties, including payments for the detention of witnesses for such investigations, prosecutions, for offences under the Merchant Shipping Acts, etc.;

    (b) Applications to the Court for prolongation of patents, appeals to the Court in respect of the registration of trade marks, and proceedings for the rectification of the register;

    (c) Expenses of investigating claims to foreshore adverse to the Crown.

    Any of the matters referred to may involve payments to the Law Officers of the Crown, and would remain a charge on the Board of Trade Vote. In all cases these proceedings are conducted by the solicitor to the Board of Trade.

    DISPOSAL AND LIQUIDATION COMMISSION.
    Mr. HANNONasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury the salaries paid to the four civil servants acting on the Disposal and Liquidation Com mission; the Votes on which these salaries are borne; how the allowances of £1,380, provided in the Civil Services Estimates, 1923–24, are apportioned; the nature of these allowances; and the nature and amount of other allowances, if any, to these civil servants borne on other Votes?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: There are only two civil servants who are members of the Disposal and Liquidation Commission, and these are the two joint secretaries. One who acts, in addition, as accounting officer receives £2,200 per annum (no bonus), and the other receives £1,800 per annum, plus bonus £200. The War Office Vote bears £1,500 in each case and the bonus, and the Commission Vote bears £700 and £300 respectively, the two latter sums forming part of the £1,380 referred to in the question. The remainder of the £1,380 borne on the Commission Vote is made up by allowances to the assistant secretary of £300 (now increased by £250 formerly borne by the War Office Vote) and £75 to the private secretary of one of the joint secretaries. The allowances are for performing duties superior to those appropriate to the substantive salaries of these civil servants, who are not in receipt of any other allowances.

    TAXES STAFF.
    Mr. RHYS DAVIESasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether the established taxes staff has already a full complement; if not, will he state the additional number required; and whether the temporary clerks at present employed in the Department will automatically be established to fill the posts they already hold, or whether it is pro posed to fill their posts with writing assistants or others who may pass an examination?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: There are 2,022 vacancies in the authorised clerical establishment of the taxes branch. Some of these vacancies will be filled by the appointment of temporary clerks who have qualified at the examinations held under the Lytton scheme in 1920 and 1922. The method of recruitment to be adopted when this source is exhausted is still under consideration.

    NURSES' REGISTRATION.
    Dr. CHAPPLEasked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that, in regard to existing nurses under Section 3 (2) (c) of the Nurses' Registration Act, 1919, a new rule first came into operation on 7th July, 1923; that the words enabling persons who within a period of two years after the date on which the rule to be made first comes into operation grant to an existing nurse the right to apply for registration up to 7th July, 1925; and whether, seeing these points are in dispute, and in view of the continuing hardship to bona fide nurses that is arising from a misinterpretation of the Statute, he will consult the Law Officers of the Crown upon the subject?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY of HEALTH (Lord Eustace Percy): The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second and third parts, my right hon. Friend is unable to accept a construction based on a mis-quotation of the Statute, and sees no necessity to consult the Law Officers on the matter.
    Dr. CHAPPLE: Might I ask the Noble Lord whether the General Nursing Council read the words "a rule" instead of "the rules" which they are required by law to do, and, if so, will he consult the Law Officers of the Crown as to whether the words "when a first rule comes into operation" are different from the words "when a rule first comes into operation," and will he consult the Law Officers upon the point, in view of the fact that a large number of nurses are suffering a grievous injury, and many more may suffer from the misconception of this Clause?
    Lord E. PERCY: As far as I can understand the hon. Gentleman he is merely repeating his original misquotation.
    Dr. CHAPPLE: Will the Noble Lord say what is the misquotation?
    Lord E. PERCY: Yes. I will. The hon. Member has converted the plural in the Statute into the singular.
    Mr. SPEAKER: I think this matter had better be pursued in private.
    Dr. CHAPPLE: On a point of Order. Might I ask the Noble Lord whether,

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    according to the law since 1850, the plural does not include the singular and vice versa.

  IRISH FREE STATE.

    MURDERED BRITISH OFFICERS (MACROOM).
    Captain FOXCROFTasked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has yet received any information from the Irish Free State with respect to the discovered bodies of two British officers murdered at Macroom?
    Captain DOUGLAS HACKING (for Mr. Ormsby-Gore): The Free State Government have no information regarding this matter, and my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary regrets that the information which the hon. and gallant Member was good enough to supply, as a result of the answer to his question on 12th July, was not received until too late to enable the Free State Government to complete their inquiries into it in time for this question. As soon as he receives any information from the Free State Government, he will communicate it to my hon. and gallant Friend.
    Captain FOXCROFT: Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman make most determined efforts in that direction, because the relations and friends of these murdered officers are very anxious in regard to this question.
    Captain HACKING: We are making every effort. Yesterday another wire was sent, and an acknowledgment came only this morning. Every pressure that is possible is being used.

    BOUNDARY COMMISSION.
    Mr. MOSLEYasked the Prime Minister whether, after the Irish election, His Majesty's Government will constitute the boundary commission under Article 12 of the Treaty with the Free State, and will appoint a British representative; whether, in the event of the Government of Northern Ireland persisting in its refusal to appoint a representative, the commission can function; and, if not, what steps His Majesty's Government proposes to take in order to implement the pledges to the Free State?
    The PRIME MINISTER: In reply to the first part of this question, I must point out to the hon. Member that the
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    Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, which was signed on the 6th December, 1921, were, on the 5th December, 1922, embodied in the Irish Free State (Constitution) Act. This Act was passed into law by the Imperial Parliament, and His Majesty's Government are bound thereby. The second and third parts of the question are hypothetical.
    Mr. MOSLEY: Can the Prime Minister state whether, in the event of the Northern Government refusing to appoint a representative, the Commission can function?
    The PRIME MINISTER: No. Sir, I cannot.
    Mr. MOSLEY: Has the right hon. Gentleman taken the opinion of the Law Officers as to the position of His Majesty's Government in regard to this matter?
    Captain WEDGWOOD BENN: Does the right hon. Gentleman's answer mean that if the Northern Parliament refuse to appoint a representative our pledges fall to the ground?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I have nothing to say beyond what I said in my reply.
    Mr. MOSLEY: But what does that mean?
    Dr. CHAPPLE: Can the right hon. Gentleman say if Northern Ireland is in any way bound by this Treaty?

    KENYA (NATIVE RESERVES).
    Mr. RILEYasked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies what are the arrangements which at present exist for safeguarding the native reserves of land from encroachments in Kenya Colony, for providing regular education and encouraging the natives in agriculture?
    Captain HACKING: On the first and last parts of his question, I would refer the hon. Member to the answer given to the questions of the hon. Member for Dundee on the 30th July. Elementary education of the natives is in the hands of the missionaries, but the whole educational policy of the Government of Kenya will be examined by the Governor on his approaching return to the Colony.

    PALESTINE (IMMIGRATION).
    Captain FOXCROFTasked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, since the declared policy of His Majesty's Government contemplates the gradual development of self-governing institutions in Palestine and in view of the continuous importation into that country of numerous immigrants, some of most undesirable character, against the wishes of an over-whelming majority of the native population, His Majesty's Government will grant to the native inhabitants some real control over immigration into their own country?
    Captain HACKING: I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to Article 84 of the Palestine Order in Council, 1922, from which he will see that the question he raises has not been lost sight of by His Majesty's Government. I am not in a position to make any further statement on the subject.
    Captain FOXCROFT: Is it not a fact that no steps have been taken to give the Palestinians power to control this immigration except in an advisory capacity.
    Captain HACKING: If my hon. and gallant Friend will read paragraph 84, which I have quoted in my answer, he will see exactly what has been done in regard to this matter.

  SCOTLAND.

    COMMISSARY OFFICE.
    Mr. WILLIAM GRAHAMasked the Solicitor-General for Scotland what proposals have been made or are in contemplation by the Scottish Office and the Treasury with regard to the Commissary Office, Edinburgh, upon a vacancy occurring in the office of commissary clerk; if he is aware that any proposal to transfer the commissary office to the Sheriff Court would be opposed by the legal profession and the public; and whether the practice of filling the office of commissary clerk by a political appointment will be discontinued?
    The SOLICITOR-GENERAL for SCOTLAND (Mr. F. C. Thomson): No decision has been taken on the matters referred to in the hon. Member's ques-
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    tion. A decision will be taken when a vacancy arises, and all relevant considerations will then be taken into account.
    Mr. GRAHAM: Will the Solicitor-General for Scotland give us some promise in favour of discontinuing the practice of making political appointments, in view of the manner in which the Department has acted in the past?
    The SOLICITOR-GENERAL for SCOTLAND: All relevant considerations will be taken into account should a vacancy occur.
    Mr. W. GRAHAMasked the Solicitor-General for Scotland if he can state the reasons for refusing a separate scheme of establishment to the commissary office staff; whether he is aware that this has caused dissatisfaction amongst the staff; and, considering that the commissary office is distinct from the sheriff court, whether the Scottish Office and the Treasury will reconsider their decision, in view of the importance of the work done in the commissary office, and the fact that it is analogous in many respects to the Principal Probate Registry in London?
    The SOLICITOR-GENERAL for SCOTLAND: The bulk of the work in the commissary office is local, and precisely similar to the commissary work performed by the sheriff clerks and their staffs in other counties. Mainly for this reason it has been thought desirable to apply to the commissary office in the pending re-organisation the same system of grading, etc., as is proposed for the sheriff clerk service. It does not appear to the Government that anything is to be gained by shutting off the commissary office in a watertight compartment. The representations of the staff have been carefully considered, but no reasons have been shown justifying a modification of the decision reached.

    SMALLHOLDERS (SARK TOWER).
    Dr. CHAPPLEasked the Under- Secretary to the Scottish Board of Health whether he is aware of the difficulties under which 15 smallholders are struggling at Sark Tower, in Dumfriesshire, due to delay on the part of the Board of Agriculture in fulfilling its undertakings; that several of these holders, though they entered in 1916, have not yet been pro-

    1703
    vided with a water supply; that several steadings are unfit for stock; that after complaints during a period of six years officials made a visit, and on behalf of the Board gave certain undertakings in regard to water supply and buildings, none of which have been fulfilled; and will he cause immediate inquiries to be made?
    Captain ELLIOT (Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Health, Scotland): I am aware that certain questions have arisen in relation to the water supply and the condition of certain of the buildings and that these questions have been discussed by representatives of the Board with the holders. I will gladly cause inquiries to be made.
    Dr. CHAPPLE: Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman say whether he was able to visit any of these small holdings recently in Dumfriesshire?
    Captain ELLIOT: I am afraid the presure on my time has been too great to enable me to do that, but I hope to do so during the Recess.

    KINTAIL DEER FOREST (ARBITRATION).
    Major McKENZIE WOODasked the Under-Secretary to the Scottish Board of Health whether he is now in a position to state the amount of the expenses arising from the arbitration on the Kintail deer forest claim and the total cost to the public of the compulsory substitution of sheep for deer on the estate?
    Captain ELLIOT: The proprietor whose claim for compensation was sustained has not yet intimated his claim in respect of his expenses, and in consequence the information desired cannot yet be given.

    BUILDING MATERIALS (PRICES COMMITTEE)
    Major WOODasked the Under- Secretary to the Scottish Board of Health whether he will make representations in the proper quarter with a view to the appointment of one or two representatives of Scottish local authorities on the Committee on Supplies of Building Materials in consideration of the special interest of these authorities in the question.
    Captain ELLIOT: I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the reply given yesterday to a question addressed
    1704
    to me on this subject by the hon. Member for Moray and Nairn, of which I am sending him a copy.

    LONDON TO SOUTHEND (TELEPHONE TOLL EXCHANGE).
    Captain MARTINasked the Postmaster-General whether, in view of the large number of subscribers and its near proximity to London, he will consider as to putting the telephone line from London to Southend on the toll exchange instead of it being a trunk call as at present?
    The POSTMASTER-GENERAL (Sir Laming Worthington-Evans): Southend cannot be served through the toll exchange until additional circuits necessary to afford a no-delay service are avail able, and the provision of these circuits is dependent upon the completion of the new arterial road between London and Southend.
    Captain MARTIN: Is the right hon Gentleman aware that something like 15 miles from the town there is no through connection?
    Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: Yes, I am aware of that. Certainly there are some gaps in the roads and bridges which have not yet been completed, and until that is done, we cannot get on with the other work.

    INSURANCE COMPANIES.
    Captain AINSWORTHasked the President of the Board of Trade whether the City Life Assurance Company was registered under the Companies Acts or the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts, 1893 to 1913; and whether he can state, for the benefit of policy-holders generally, whether the Industrial Insurance Commissioner is satisfied with the stability of all the similar companies so registered from the Prudential downwards?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: The City Life Assurance Company, Limited, was registered under the Companies Acts. With regard to the second part of the Question the Industrial Assurance Commissioner can make no general statement. The valuation returns of the companies are periodically published, and are there-

    1705
    fore available to the public. The statutory powers of the Commissioner apply to cases in which a valuation made as at 31st December, 1924, or a later date is unsatisfactory and to cases in which a valuation, whether made before or after the passing of the Industrial Assurance Act, discloses a deficiency.

    MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT (SUSPENSION).
    Captain AINSWORTHasked the Prime Minister if he will appoint a small Committee to inquire into the conditions which should govern the suspension of Members of Parliament, both from the point of view of duration and payment of salary?
    The PRIME MINISTER: No action can be taken at this stage of the Session, but before the House meets again after the adjournement, I will consider the desirability of setting up a Select Committee to consider Standing Order 18, and to make recommendations as to its Amendment.
    Lieut-Colonel J. WARD: Does that mean that the Committee are going to consider the question of the payment of Members? If so, I would like the right hon. Gentleman to include in the terms of reference to the Committee the question of whether the present salary of Members of the House of Commons is sufficient?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I am afraid that part of the hon. Member's question could not be debated by a Committee considering the operation of Standing Order No. 18. With regard to the other considerations, we can only discover that, after studying the Standing Order as it now exists.

    IMPERIAL CONFERENCE (AGENDA).
    Lieut-ColonelSir J. NORTON-GRIFFITHS asked the Prime Minister whether he can give the House any information as to the agenda of the forthcoming Imperial Conference?
    The PRIME MINISTER: It is proposed that, as in 1921, the opening meeting of the Imperial Conference should include statements as to the general position on the main issues of Imperial policy, and that these preliminary statements should
    1706
    be followed first by a review of foreign affairs since the Conference of 1921, and consideration of present problems and future policy; secondly, by discussions on naval, military and air defence, including a review of the naval situation resulting from the Washington Conference, and arrangements for future co-operation in all branches of defence.
    At some stage of the proceedings, attention will be devoted to questions of principle referred to the Imperial Conference from the Imperial Economic Conference, including Imperial air and wireless communications, and probably certain economic questions of special importance.
    Australia has also suggested for discussion the question of marriages with foreigners and certain other questions connected with nationality and naturalisation.

    DUTCH EAST INDIES.
    Mr. MORELasked the Prime Minister if any discussions have taken place between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Holland in regard to certain projected naval strategical works in the Dutch East Indies; and will he inform the House of the nature of these discussions?
    The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Amery): I have been asked to reply. No such discussions have taken place.

  RUSSIA.

    TREATY NEGOTIATIONS.
    Mr. MORELasked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the desirability of reaching a friendly understanding with the Russian Government on the subject of the claims of British subjects, and in order that such other differences as exist or may arise between the two Governments may be approached under circumstances of normal international intercourse, he will, now that the Russian Government has intimated its intention of signing the Straits Convention and is understood to have fulfilled the conditions laid down by His Majesty's Government in the recent exchange of notes, consider the advisability of opening informal discussions with that Government, with a view to exploring the ground for the

    1707
    negotiation of a general Peace Treaty as foreshadowed in the Trade Agreement; and, if His Majesty's Government cannot see their way to adopt this course, will he inform the House of the reasons therefor.
    The PRIME MINISTER: I have nothing to add to the answer which I gave the hon. Member on the 18th June last.

    BRITISH CLAIMS.
    Captain AINSWORTHasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Soviet Government has, at any time, expressed a readiness to meet the monetary claims of British subjects who lost everything in the revolution and, if so, on what lines?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Ronald McNeill): The answer is in the negative.

    PEACE TREATY (TURKEY).
    Mr. LEACHasked the Prime Minister whether, seeing that the Treaty of Peace with Turkey does not provide for the payment of reparations, will he state on whose initiative they were omitted; and will he consider following now the same course with Germany in the trading and commercial interests of this country?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I would refer the hon. Member to pages 833 and 840 of the Blue Book on the first phase of the Lausanne Conference, which was published early this year. With regard to the second part of the question, there is no parallel between the cases of Turkey and Germany.
    Mr. LEACH: Will the right hon. Gentleman guarantee that in the West Riding of Yorkshire the payments from Germany are not made in textile goods?
    Mr. SPEAKER: Notice had better be given of that question.

    INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE.
    Mrs. WINTRINGHAMasked the Prime Minister whether a woman delegate
    1708
    is to be appointed to represent Great Britain at the Fifth Session of the International Labour Conference in October?
    The MINISTER of LABOUR (Sir Montague Barlow): I have been asked to reply. As the Government have not yet received a reply from the industrial organisations with whom they are in correspondence as to the composition of the delegation, I regret that I am not in a position to reply to the hon. Member's question. The composition of the delegation will be announced in the Press as soon as possible.
    Captain BENN: Does not the right hon. Gentleman see the desirability of making up his mind at once whether one woman at least shall be a member of this Delegation?
    Sir M. BARLOW: I am afraid I can add nothing to my answer.
    Lieut.-Colonel J. WARD: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us with what industrial organisations he has been in communication?
    Sir M. BARLOW: The National Confederation of Employers' Organisations of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress.

    LOCAL NATIONAL TAXATION.
    Mr. BRUFORDasked the Prime Minister if it is the intention of the Government to bring in a Bill to revise the present system of adjusting the burden of local and national taxation; and, if so, when such Bill will be presented?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: If by an adjustment of the burden of local and national taxation my hon. Friend means, as I suspect, a substantial increase in the present amount of Government subventions to local authorities, the answer must be in the negative. The Government have, however, had under consideration for some time proposals for improving the machinery of rating and valuation, and my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health hopes during the Recess to obtain the considered views of the various associations of local authorities and other interests concerned upon these proposals, which will be circulated to them in the form of a draft Bill.
    Mr. W. GRAHAM: Will the right hon. Gentleman, before these steps are taken, call for a Report from Lord Meston's Committee on percentage grants which bears very closely on this problem.
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: I am quite sure that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health will do so.
    Mr. HURD: May not that Committee be asked to make an interim report, seeing how vitally the matter it is dealing with affects this problem?
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: I will communicate with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health, who is responsible for the details of this matter.
    Mr. HURD: Yes, but the report is being held up. This investigation is one of the most important assets of the problem.
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: I am quite sure my right hon. Friend will communicate with Lord Meston with a view to expediting the Report.

    DOCKERS' DISPUTE (UNEMPLOYMENT PAY).
    Mr. W. THORNEasked the Minister of Labour if he is aware that the managers of the Employment Exchanges at Stratford and Canning Town have been instructed not to pay any of the men working at the various wharves who are not dock workers; that some of the men were not shut out until 9th July, and that the insurance officers have been instructed not to pay the men after 5th July; and if he will take action in the matter?
    Sir M. BARLOW: The insurance officer has decided that persons normally employed at the London Docks, within the area of the general dispute, whether dock workers or otherwise, are in general disqualified for unemployment benefit as from the 5th July under Section 8 (1) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1920. When special circumstances apply to particular cases, these circumstances are taken into account by the chief insurance officer, and, if the claimant is dissatisfied with the decision, his remedy is to appeal to the Court of Referees.
    Mr. THORNE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in all these cases
    1710
    his decision has been the means of driving these people to the Poor Law authority? Would he like my opinion on that decision?
    Sir M. BARLOW: I am always to glad to receive communications from the hon. Member on any subject.
    Mr. THORNE: You will not be on this question.
    Sir M. BARLOW: The hon. Member must really discriminate between the decision of the Minister and that of an independent arbiter set up by Act of Parliament for this express purpose, and, as the hon. Member knows, subject to a right of appeal.
    Mr. THORNE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that these men are not dock workers or transport workers at all, and yet they have been cut right away from their pay?
    Mr. MARCH: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there are a large number of casual carmen who are not connected with the dock strike, but who, because of the strike, cannot get either work or unemployment pay?

    WAGES (REDUCTIONS).
    Mr. W. THORNEasked the Minister of Labour the number of wage earner and wealth producers who have received reductions in wages and salaries during, the year ending 31st March, 1923; what was the total of those reductions during the same period; the estimated number who had wage reductions; and the total estimated amount of such reduction from 31st March to 22nd July, 1923?
    Sir M. BARLOW: In the industries for which statistics are compiled by the Ministry of Labour, the total number of wage earners whose wages were reduced in the year ended 31st March, 1923, so far as reported to the Department, was nearly 7,400,000. The aggregate net reduction in the weekly full-time rates of wages of these workpeople during that period was approximately £3,000,000. Statistics are not yet available as to the effects of the reductions from 31st March to 22nd July, 1923, but from the former date to the end of June nearly 2,000,000 workpeople are reported to have had their rates of wages

    1711
    reduced by about £230,000 per week. Particulars are not collected as to reductions in the remuneration of salary earners. It should be noted that the figures quoted relate in the main to organised groups of wage earners, and do not include agricultural labourers, domestic servants, police, shop assistants, clerks, or Government employés, as to whom complete statistics are not available.
    Mr. THORNE: Does the figure of £3,000,000 mean £3,000,000 a day?
    Sir M. BARLOW: No, a week.
    Mr. THORNE: Rubbish!
    Mr. LANSBURY: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell the House how it comes about that, with these continual reductions of wages and the reduction in the cost of production, trade comes to be in its present parlous condition?

  TRANSPORT.

    ROAD GRANTS (RURAL AREAS).
    Sir THOMAS HENDERSONasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport when a definite statement may be expected in regard to an increase in the grants to the Road Fund in rural areas?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY of TRANSPORT (Colonel Ashley): I would refer the hon. Member to the answer given to the hon. Member for the Exchange Division of Manchester on 30th July, of which I am sending him a copy.
    Mr. HURD: Can the hon. and gallant Gentleman say when this money will be available for the districts where the roads are still in a very bad condition?
    Colonel ASHLEY: I should hope fairly shortly, but we must wait until we have all the applications, so that we may know how much can be allocated in proportion to the needs of the various districts.

    LONDON TRAFFIC BILL.
    Sir WILLIAM BULLasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport whether it is the intention of the Government to introduce a London Traffic Bill in the Autumn Session?
    Colonel ASHLEY: The Government have decided to introduce a Bill on the subject of London traffic in the autumn. The Bill will follow the general lines of the suggestions made to the Royal Commission on London Government in the evidence given on behalf of the Ministry of Transport.

    PALACE OF WESTMINSTER (CRYPT CHAPEL).
    Mr. LANSBURYasked the First Commissioner of Works whether he will arrange that the Crypt Chapel may be open for inspection to visitors to this House during such hours as the House is open to the general public?
    The FIRST COMMISSIONER of WORKS (Sir John Baird): I will discuss this proposal with the Lord Great Chamberlain.

    THAMES DEFENCES.
    Sir ROBERT HAMILTONasked the Financial Secretary to the War Office the number of men stationed at the Gravesend Fort, and the nature of their duties; and whether the fort is reckoned as an integral part of the defences of the country?
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the WAR OFFICE (Lieut.-Colonel Guinness): There are two forts in the neighbourhood. New Tavern Fort is at present empty and disused, and the question of its disposal will be taken up when decisions have been given on the general question, now under review, of coast defence policy. Shornmead Fort is used to house men of the Royal Engineers Training Battalion, who are sent there from Chatham for musketry. There were 186 men there on 1st July last. The coast defence arrangements at present authorised do not reckon either fort as an integral part of the defences of the country.

  INDIA.

    ELECTIONS (CANDIDATES).
    Colonel WEDGWOODasked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether the Government of India has recommended that candidates in the forthcoming Indian elections should not

    1713
    be debarred from being candidates by reason of the fact that they have been in prison for more than six months; and, if so, what action His Majesty's Government propose to take to meet the wishes of the Viceroy?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for INDIA (Earl Winterton): The Government of India have made proposals for the modification of the rule in question which are not precisely of the character suggested by the hon. and gallant Member. My Noble Friend, who has sought the advice of the Standing Joint Committee on Indian Affairs, has decided that an amendment in the sense proposed ought not in any case to be made without an affirmative resolution of both Houses, according to the proviso to Section 129A of the Government of India Act. He is, therefore, reserving the matter for further consideration, with a view to deciding what recommendation, if any, should be made to Parliament when it reassembles.
    Colonel WEDGWOOD: May I ask why the Secretary of State referred this matter of the alteration of the Rules to the Standing Joint Committee, when he did not so refer the alteration of the Rules abolishing the residential qualification?
    Earl WINTERTON: My Noble Friend referred this question to the Standing Joint Committee, because he thought that the alteration proposed was one of principle, and, therefore, it was in accord with what was laid down, both in the Act and in the Rules, that he should refer it to the Standing Joint Committee in order that he might have the advantage of their opinion upon it.
    Colonel WEDGWOOD: Do I understand that it would be impossible for Pandit Motilal Nehru and C. R. Das to stand for the coming election in India?
    Earl WINTERTON: The hon. and gallant Gentleman must put down a question if he wants an answer on a specific case. I cannot state off-hand what is the position of these people; the hon. and gallant Gentleman is probably more familiar with it than I am.

    SIKH SITUATION.
    Sir C. YATEasked the Under-Secretary of State for India what is the present condition of affairs as regards the
    1714
    Sikh situation in the Punjab; and whether, considering that the religious movement has now developed into a political movement, what action has been taken against the agitators and revolutionaries who are directing the latter?
    Earl WINTERTON: A new Prabandhak Committee has recently been elected. It is understood that extremists predominate upon it, but its first meeting has not yet been held. The recent abdication of the Maharaja of Nabha has caused excitement among a certain number of Sikhs, and much inflammatory matter has been published in the Press. The necessary precautionary measures against possible violence have been taken, and I have no reason to suppose that any persons who have committed offences in this connection are escaping the consequences.

  UNITED STATES.

    LIQUOR REGULATIONS.
    Viscount CURZONMasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make any statement as to the present position of the negotiations with the United States upon the liquor question?
    Mr. McNEIL: I am afraid it is not yet possible to make any further statement on this subject.

    ELLIS ISLAND.
    Viscount CURZONasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has yet had the opportunity or has taken steps to inter view those British citizens recently re turned from Ellis Island who describe their treatment there as worse than a Bavarian prison; and whether he can make any further statement on the matter?
    Mr. McNEILL: No request for an interview has yet been received. As I told my Noble and gallant Friend some days ago, I should be glad to receive Mr. Mordaunt at the Foreign Office should he so desire, and any information from those British subjects who have had experience of Ellis Island would receive careful consideration.
    Mr. THOMAS: Will the hon. Gentleman make inquiries of the American representatives as to the character of this individual, and whether he was warned in advance; and will he enter into negotiations with the American Government to at least ascertain the truth, in view of the ill-founded statements which are often made?
    Mr. McNEILL: We are making inquiries. I cannot be certain whether they include this individual case, but inquiries are being made generally.
    Sir A. SHIRLEY BENN: Cannot arrangements be made by which steamships will not take emigrants out to America, when the law of America prevents them from being landed?
    Mr. McNEILL: That very aspect of the question is being considered.
    Sir H. BRITTAIN: Is it not fair to recollect that these additional emigrants have not been invited by the United States, and are not wanted, and that the Minister in the United States who is responsible for this matter says that in the very difficult circumstances they are doing their very best?
    Dr. CHAPPLE.: Do these considerations apply to the exportation of liquor to the United States?

    ROYAL NAVY (REQUISITIONED RUM).
    Mr. GRATTAN DOYLEasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is aware that certain rum requisitioned by the Admiralty for the use of His Majesty's Navy in 1917 has not yet been fully paid for; that litigation has been proceeding ever since May, 1918; that, notwithstanding the contentions raised by the Admiralty, in reliance upon which they have withheld payment of the balance claimed, judgment has been given in favour of the claimants on three separate occasions, by Mr. Justice Salter on 12th February, 1920, by the War Compensation Court on 7th November, 1921, and by the same Court on 4th July, 1923, the last being in a test case selected by the Admiralty themselves; and that, although this judgment was given by the tribunal appointed by the Government under the Indemnity Act, 1920, for determining questions of this character, the Admiralty have given notice of appeal to
    1716
    the Court of Appeal, which must necessarily delay for a long further period the settlement of the numerous outstanding claims; and whether, seeing that this amounts to a denial of justice to those persons who, at inconvenience and loss, unreservedly placed their stocks at the disposal of His Majesty's Government in war-time, and that the test case selected by the Admiralty has been decided against them, he will give directions to have the appeal withdrawn and all outstanding cases settled on the principles now so definitely laid down?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Major Boyd-Carpenter): Yes, Sir; the facts are substantially as stated, except that it is incorrect to say that the Admiralty selected the test case. Full payment has been, or is being, made of any sums awarded by the Court, and payment to the full extent which the Admiralty considers to be fair has been made or offered in every other case. Having regard, however, to all the circumstances of the case, and to the heavy additional expense to the Exchequer involved if the claims of all persons concerned in the commandeering of the rum referred to were to be met on the basis recently awarded by the War Compensation Court, the Admiralty, after careful consideration, does not see any reason to forego its right of appeal in this matter.

    COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE (REPORT).
    Viscount CURZON(by Private Notice) asked the Prime Minister whether the Report of the proceedings of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which is to be published as a White Paper, will be the full verbatim report?
    The PRIME MINISTER: No, Sir; the Paper circulated contains the recommendations which have been made by the Committee.
    Viscount CURZON: I may say that I have since seen the White Paper, but only this morning. Is the Prime Minister aware that in paragraph 41, on page 12, allusion is made to the evidence given before the Sub-Committee, and will it be possible for him to place such evidence at the disposal of Members of this House?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I will consider that point.

    RENT AND MORTGAGE INTEREST RESTRICTIONS ACT.
    Sir KINGSLEY WOOD(by Private Notice) asked the Minister of Health when he proposes to publish the reprint of the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act of 1920 with the Amendments made by the new Act?
    Lord E. PERCY: In view of the important change made in the Bill by the substitution of an entirely new Clause for Clause 3 of the Bill as introduced, and of the very few references to the provisions of the earlier Act which remain in the new Act, I think there would now be no advantage in publishing the suggested reprint, and that to do so would be a needless waste of public money.

NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

  GOVERNMENT DECISIONS.
  Captain BENN: May I ask the Prime Minister whether he can now make a statement on the relations of the Navy and the Air Force?
  The PRIME MINISTER: The reference to the Committee which was appointed to consider national and Imperial defence included, among other things, the question of establishing some co-ordinating authority for the Navy, Army and Air Force, whether by a Ministry of Defence or otherwise, as well as the relations of the Navy and Air Force and the standard of strength of the Air Force for home defence.
  The final Report dealing with the whole reference will be presented in the autumn, but in the meantime the finding of the Committee upon the strength of the Air Force for home defence has already been adopted by the Government and submitted to Parliament, and the Government are now able to lay before the House the Committee's recommendations, which they have also adopted upon the relations of the Navy and the Air Force and upon the co-ordination of the defence forces.

  I.—RELATIONS OF THE NAVY AND THE AIR FORCE.
  This particular branch of the subject was referred to a special Sub-Committee consisting of Lord Balfour, a former First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Weir, a
  1718
  former Air Minister—both of them being specially conversant with the difficulties of inter-departmental relations—and Lord Peel, a member of the present Cabinet. Sixteen witnesses were heard before the Sub-Committee and 19 memoranda were submitted to it. The consideration by the Sub-Committee of the evidence, like the consideration by other authorities on previous occasions, have led them to a conclusion—a unanimous conclusion—in favour of the principle of a single Air Service.
  The Admiralty were rightly concerned to maintain the absolute control over all the fighting equipment in the Fleet which is essential to its efficiency. They also urged that reconnaissance at sea requires the technical braining of a naval officer. The Special Sub-Committee, while unable to meet the views of the Admiralty to the extent of destroying the principle of a single Air Service, consider that they have dealt by suitable provisions with these detailed objections, and, in particular, have secured for them the absolute control afloat and the professional reconnaissance to which I have referred. The reasons in favour of a single Air Service which have had weight with the Government may be summarised as follow:
  In the first place, the Air Service, though it must have intimate relations with the other Armed Forces at sea and on land, and must be familiar with their requirements, differs in its conditions essentially from both. On the other hand, aircraft, whether they are flying above the sea or elsewhere, are, broadly speaking, governed according to the same main principles. In the second place, the whole science of air power is in a condition of rapid development. The application, therefore, of experience, both as to personnel and as to material, wherever that experience can be obtained, whether at sea or on shore, is vital to success in either case. We cannot afford to break up the lessons of this experience. In the third place, it is clear that, in certain contingencies, the shore-based air forces and the air forces of the fleet may be called upon to act together. Such common action may be very difficult without a unity of method in both Services.
  Efficiency, therefore, prescribes common knowledge, common training,

  1719
  common material provision, and a common service. Economy points in the same direction. From this last point of view, the conclusion against the duplication of training schools and aerodromes and building plant is evident.
  For these reasons, the conclusion of the Sub-Committee and of the main Committee that there should be a single Air Service must, in the opinion of the Government, be accepted, subject to the conditions which are necessary to meet the detailed objections urged by the Admiralty.
  The recommendations of the Sub-Committee for this purpose are contained under 13 heads, dealing with liaison between the two Services, provision of material, inclusion in Naval Estimates of the charge for the Fleet Air Arm, integrity of the strength of the Fleet Air Arm, discipline and status of air officers and men when afloat, number and position of attached naval officers, and special reservation of air reconnaissances and spotting to the Navy. To these the main Committee have added a further recommendation, permitting to attached naval officers the retention of their uniform, a point which was strongly urged on behalf of the Admiralty.
  If these recommendations be examined, it will be seen that, by their provisions, the permeation of each Service with a knowledge of the requirements of the other would be achieved, and the administrative difficulties dealt with, without destroying the unity of the Air Service. It is impossible without experience to pronounce a final judgment on these arrangements. The Government are, however, confident that both Services will do their utmost to make them successful.
  In respect of this division of the subject, the Report of the Sub-Committee, together with a covering note of the main Committee, has been laid on the Table, and will be distributed immediately.

  II.—THE CO-ORDINATION OF THE DEFENCE FORCES.
  Upon the recommendations of the Committee, the Government have decided as follows:
  It is undesirable and impracticable to supersede the Ministerial heads of the
  1720
  three Fighting Services by making them subordinates of a Minister of Defence. The alternative plan for an amalgamation of the three Service Departments is equally impracticable. On the other hand, the existing system of co-ordination by the Committee of Imperial Defence is not sufficient to secure full initiative and responsibility for defence as a whole, and requires to be defined and strengthened.
  Under the existing system, the Committee of Imperial Defence—an advisory and consultative body—inquiries into, and makes recommendations in regard to the issues of defence policy and organisation which are brought before it. The power of initiative lies with the Government Departments and with the Prime Minister. This system, though invaluable up to a point, does not make any authority, except the Prime Minister—who can only devote a small part of his time and attention to defence questions—directly responsible for the initiation of a consistent line of policy, directing the common action of the three, or any two of three Services.
  The detailed provisions founded on these conclusions for strengthening the position of the Committee of Imperial Defence and its Chairman, and for securing the joint advice of the chiefs of the three staffs, is also contained in the Papers now being laid on the Table.
  Captain BENN: Does the inclusion of an item in the Navy Estimates for the provision of aircraft mean that the Navy will have an independent source of supply, or will have independent advice as to design?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I do not think so. But I should be very glad if detailed questions could be postponed, because the final details of this statement were circulated only last night.
  Lieut.-Colonel J. WARD: Is this organisation intended only for peace, or also for war?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I hope it will be adaptable to both.
  Viscount CURZON: Will the Final Report to which the right hon. Gentleman has alluded be published before Parliament comes to consider the matter later on?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I am afraid I cannot answer that question to-day.
  Major Sir BERTRAM FALLE: Can the right hon. Gentleman reassure us on the point of the 140 officers and 1,000 men who have been retained in the Navy, that they will not be discharged before the House meets again?
  The PRIME MINISTER: Everything possible will be done to secure them employment.
  Sir FREDERICK BANBURY: Will the right hon. Gentleman postpone the day which he has promised to give for the discussion of this Report in the Autumn until the full evidence has been before the House, so that the House may be able to make up its mind on the whole question?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I do not know whether my right hon. Friend means will the evidence be published? I can give no pledge about that.

  ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE (SUMMER RECESS).
  Motion made, and Question, "That this House, at its rising this day, do adjourn till Tuesday, 13th November," put, and agreed to.—[The Prime Minister.]
  CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA BILL [Lords].
  Read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Tuesday, 13th November, and to be printed. [Bill 214.]
  THERAPEUTIC SUBSTANCES BILL [Lords]
  Read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Tuesday, 13th November, and to be printed. [Bill 213.]

  MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS.
  That they have agreed to,
  Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill, without Amendment.
  Amendments to,
  Town Councils (Scotland) Bill [Lords],
  Stoke-on-Trent Corporation Bill [Lords], without Amendment.

RUHR AND EUROPEAN SITUATION.
  ALLIED POWERS AND GERMANY.

    PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Commander Eyres-Monsell.]
    The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Baldwin): I propose, with the permission of the House, to open the Debate by reading a statement identical with one to be read in another place. Upon that the Debate will proceed, and if I be fortunate enough to secure the permission of the House, as I shall have exhausted my right of speaking, I propose to intervene later.
    On 7th June last the German Government, having considered the replies of the Allied Governments to their first Note of 2nd May, communicated to the latter a further Memorandum containing revised proposals for dealing with the questions of Reparations and the Ruhr. The German Memorandum appeared in the Press of 8th June.
    Communications then passed between the Allied Governments with the object of ascertaining and elucidating their respective points of view, and the French and Belgian Governments in particular exchanged opinions with His Majesty's Government on the subject.
    A month later—on 12th July—a statement was made in both Houses of Parliament as to the position assumed by His Majesty's Government, and the necessity of action was strongly emphasised, in order to terminate a situation that was fraught with peril both to the peace of Europe, and to the interests of all the parties concerned. Certain propositions were submitted by His Majesty's Government as the bases of any such action, and the statement ended by recommending definite steps to the Allies. His Majesty's Government held that the proposals contained in the German Note of 7th June deserved to be examined and replied to, and that such reply should, if possible, be an Allied reply. Further, inasmuch as the French and Belgian Governments were indisposed to take the initiative in formulating an answer, His Majesty's Government said that they would themselves assume the responsi-
    1770
    bility of framing a draft reply, which they would forward for the consideration of their Allies.
    In pursuance of this intention, His Majesty's Government drew up a draft identic reply which they forwarded on 20th July, with a covering Note, to the Allied Governments of France, Belgium, Italy and Japan. In this draft reply, they dealt with the various proposals contained in the German Memorandum of 7th June. They expressed their opinion that, while nothing should be done that was inconsistent with the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, advantage would be derived from an examination by impartial experts, in co-operation with the Reparation Commission, into Germany's capacity for payment. As to the question of the guarantees offered by the German Government, His Majesty's Government went on to point out in the draft reply that the economic value of any such guarantees must largely depend upon factors of which the German Memorandum had made no mention, such as the stabilisation of the mark and the balancing of the German Budget; and that no guarantees could be effective unless provision were made for some form of international control of German financial administration. The draft reply ended by advising the German Government, if it desired a resumption of inquiry, to withdraw without further delay the ordinances and decrees which had organised and fomented the policy of passive resistance, and unequivocally to disavow the acts of violence and sabotage which had in some cases accompanied it; and it expressed the belief that such an action on the part of Germany would involve a reconsideration by the occupying Powers of the conditions of their occupation, and a gradual return to the normal features of industrial life in the Ruhr.
    In the covering Notes with which the draft reply was sent to the Allied Governments, His Majesty's Government gave fuller explanations of the views which they held on all these points, and they urged upon their Allies that inter-Allied discussions should be opened with as little delay as possible, whether by Conference or otherwise, for the purpose of elaborating a comprehensive plan of a general and final financial settlement.
    The replies of the Allied Governments

    1771
    have now been received. The Italian Government have not so far returned a written answer, but have expressed themselves as in general agreement with the views and proposals of His Majesty's Government. The French and Belgian Governments have returned independent replies.
    His Majesty's Government have devoted the most careful and anxious consideration to these replies, and, while fully conscious of the friendly language in which they are couched, and of the cordial spirit by which they are inspired, they regret not to find in them the material for sending the Allied answer to the German Note to the despatch of which they attach so much importance—indeed, the draft reply submitted by His Majesty's Government is not mentioned in the French and Belgian replies. Nor do these Notes appear to hold out any definite prospect either of an early alteration of the situation in the Ruhr, or of the commencement of the discussions about Reparations, to both of which His Majesty's Government had eagerly looked forward. It is apparent that many weeks, if not more, might easily be consumed in the preliminary interchange of opinions between the Allies on the lines that are now foreshadowed by the latter before any effective step could be taken for terminating the present situation.
    His Majesty's Government cannot too often repeat that, while regarding the interests of their Allies as bound up with their own, and while shrinking, as they have done throughout, from any action that might be thought indicative of Allied disunion, they yet hold firmly the view that the problem now before all of them cannot be evaded; and that, while the Allies may be occupied in exchanging views in a spirit of unabated friendliness on this or that detail of this or that proposal, the European situation, carrying with it all prospect of the Reparation payments to which the Allies are equally entitled, may sink into irretrievable ruin.
    In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government have decided to lay before Parliament with the least possible delay the papers which record their own views and endeavours, and they are inviting their Allies to agree to the publication of the Notes or statements on their part to
    1772
    which reference has been made and which are required to explain the situation as a whole. His Majesty's Government entertain the hope that the publication of these papers may assist in determining the real dimension of the problem with which the Allies are confronted, and may convince the world of the imperative necessity of prompt and united action to deal with it.
    12 N.
    Mr. J. RAMSAY MacDONALD: I am sure that the House has listened with profound interest, and in some respects with profound disappointment, to the statement that has just been made. The profound disappointment relates to the replies that have been received by the Government from our Allies. I venture to hope that the omission of all reference to our suggested Note in the reply to the German Government's Note by the French and Belgian Governments is not more than an oversight. That a Note of that character, raising matters which no Government can afford to overlook now, and which lie at the very foundations of the problem which is now facing all the Governments of Europe, should not receive even a sentence of reply, is a matter of profound disappointment, I am sure, to this House.
    We are discussing this subject under most inconvenient conditions. I do not blame the Government exactly, but yet this is the last chance that we shall have of considering our relations with our Allies, and, if we do not discuss that matter now, we shall have no opportunity apparently of discussing it before the autumn. The House ought not to adjourn without expressing its views, at any rate in a general way, upon the situation with which we are now faced. But how can we do it without papers? The right hon. Gentleman may have gone as far as he possibly could. He has given us a certain amount of information, but not nearly enough to enable us to explore this delicate and difficult subject in the way that the House of Commons ought to be able to do before it separates for its holiday.
    There is one general point of satisfaction, and I express it with the greatest pleasure. Our Government at last has determined to devise a policy of its own and to pursue it. As I understand it, in general terms that policy expresses this:

    1773
    That this country has and must have views and interests which it must express and protect. Otherwise, we have no foreign policy at all. Further, that our conception of an alliance is a co-operation in which common aims and policy are defined by discussion and are pursued by concurrence, and not a combination which any one of the partners can claim to control by its own will and in its own interest. I think that that is both reasonable and proper, and, in so far as the action which has been inaugurated by my right hon. Friend since he became Prime Minister, carries out that general conception of British policy, I think he can depart on his holiday—[Laughter]—I hope that my description will prove a little more accurate than seems likely—but in any case he can depart with the assurance that the vast body of the House of Commons, the great mass of opinion in the House of Commons, is behind him in carrying out that policy. There is one question I would like to ask. I noticed, in listening to the statement, that the period of time between 8th June and 12th July was hardly referred to at all. Within that period, I understand, we addressed questions to the Governments of France and Belgium. I wonder if the Prime Minister will be in a position, when he replies, to fill some of the details into that very short paragraph at the opening of his statement.
    The position in which we find ourselves is this—and I hope that we shall not lose the opportunity which this new position gives us of reconsidering the whole of our position. We have been pursuing a certain policy, to my mind, and to the minds of my hon. Friends, a negative policy. That is perfectly clear from the Debates which have taken place on this subject since the House began this Session. We are now going in for a positive policy. We have tried negation, we have remained quiescent, we have been tranquil, we have, in fact, looked on, and the result is the conditions with which we are faced to-day. Now the Government have made up their minds to pursue a policy in a positive way. Before I pass to one or two questions about this policy and to find out exactly what it is going to be, I should like to say this, and I hope we shall get a pledge from the Prime Minister on the matter. It is a long time between the
    1774
    beginning of August and the middle of November, and during that time affairs may get a little more difficult and critical than they are even now. I think we ought to have a very definite assurance that, should circumstances arise, the Government would call this House together, so that no great step could be taken and no large commitment made without the full consent of this House, which otherwise could not carry with it the national strength that it should. On Monday, I indicated that request in the form of a question which I put to the Prime Minister. On Tuesday, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) put it more categorically. To-day, I repeat it. We hope to receive a definite pledge that, with full information before us and in the event arising, this House will be summoned to discuss the situation if the Government considers it requires to take some new step.
    The first point in the new departure must be this. We must end all trust in secrecy. That phase of diplomacy ought to have been finished with the War; that volume ought to have been closed with a bang. No Government conducting the foreign affairs of this country ought now to trust to secrecy, because the ways of secrecy are the ways of evil. We know the gentleman whose deeds do not belong to the light, and, although the preliminaries of the agreement must be carefully explored, quietly explored, between those responsible for Foreign Offices and Governments, nevertheless the limitations of secrecy ought to be very strictly defined, and they certainly ought not to go to the length of determining what is to be the great policy of the country, as under present circumstances that policy may determine whether this country is to exist as a large European Power and a successful economic Power, or not. For instance, we have already seen in the French Press how evil secrecy is in the tittle tattle that is being published and the bad rumours that are getting circulated. The way in which the French public are being misinformed in what we are doing and what we propose to do is only possible when no clear official statement is made as to where we stand, what we want, and what is our policy. The security of the nations depends upon publicity and not upon secrecy.

    1775
    I do not know whether the Prime Minister is in a position to answer this question, which may seem to be an aside, but which is not. One or two French papers just now are beginning to give currency to a rumour that we are engaged in secret conversations with Spain against the interests of France in North Africa. Is that true, or is it not? If we are engaging in conversations with Spain, as I can very well imagine that we are (if it is necessary, why not?) if our interests are involved, why not discuss them? But there is no harm—there would be no harm—in conversations, the subject of which and the scope of which are made clear to everybody who cares to read and who can read. But there is infinite harm, more harm to-day than at any time in our lifetime, in conducting conversations, the subject and scope of which are religiously and carefully kept out of the public Press. We have nothing to hide, nothing to conceal, and nothing to be ashamed of. We are not, I hope, conspirators in Europe. I hope we are a nation looking after its own interests in such a way as to offer no menace to any other nation that happens to exist alongside of us.
    The first task of the Government is to make the outlook clear. However bad it may be, let us know what it is, let us understand what the problems are and where the difficulties are. That has been done to a very considerable extent by the statement to which we have just listened. For instance, it is perfectly clear that France is in the Ruhr not for the purpose of getting reparations. No sane man can hold to that view now. There was a very significant remark in one of the rather melancholy sentences of the statement to which we have just listened, which said that in the Note we have informed France and Belgium that, if they would agree with us upon a common reply to the German Note, we were prepared to make a representation to Germany that, as far as the Government could do it, passive resistance ought to be condemned or stopped or whatever is the proper word to express the responsibility of the German Government for what is taking place in the Ruhr. No reply. No notice taken of it. Therefore, we are forbidden—if that is the last word—from assuming that if France could get a guarantee from the German Gov-
    1776
    ernment that passive resistance would be condemned, she is prepared to reconsider the conditions of her occupation of the Ruhr. That is also wiped off the possibilities of the situation.
    Are we not compelled to come to the conclusion that the French policy in the Ruhr is a policy that is prompted rather by war-like feelings, feelings that have been handed over from the War, feelings that were unsatisfied as a result of the War, and that, in a sentence, it is an attempt to continue war after formal peace has been declared? That is being carried on under conditions that are peculiarly favourable. The military situation of France is unchallengable—she is absolutely master. There is not a State and there is not a combination of States that can successfully challenge the present military position of France. Moreover, as far as we are concerned, the French economic position is extraordinarily powerful. It was stated by the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) the other day when he read that interesting and illuminating extract from an official publication, that France was building herself up economically. The idea that France is a devastated country to-day is an idea that belongs to the nursery and not to the House of Commons. This country to-day is far more devastated than France herself is. France is economically self-contained on account of the economic roots of its life being dug into its own soil. Its industry and work have been made the subject of great trusts and organised monopolies, the capital expenditure upon which has been enormous. Every other picture is a misleading picture. To-day, its unemployed can be counted almost by a few repetitions of the fingers of your hand. Its economic position is stronger than it was before the War except in one respect and that is in regard to its Budget.
    That is very important. I do not intend to pursue inquiry as to the reason, but there is no doubt that if a country like France is anxious to balance its Budget it would not have very much difficulty in balancing it. Certainly, if our Government had the same economic advantage that the French Government now have for the purpose of raising national revenue, I venture to say that the Chancellor of the Exchequer who is to present our Budget next year would be

    1777
    a very much happier man than he is likely to be. It is enough to leave it there, I think, for the purpose of laying down as clearly as possible in a short statement, what is the exact position of France in relation to carrying on the policy that I have just indicated. She is in an extraordinary advantageous position, because the key points in carrying out that policy are, first, military strength, and, secondly, economic strength. And France holds them both. Consequently, it is in a very favourable and fortunate position for once again raising the problem—can one nation crush out another? Whilst that is being answered by events, we are suffering. Why should we suffer? Why should an Ally like France ask us to suffer? What is wrong, what is unfriendly in our Government going to France, in connection with the occupation of the Ruhr-, explaining our position to France, and asking France to consider us as well as herself, in carrying out a common policy? I hope that even now this question of whether a nation can crush out another, and whether one people can crush out another people, will be answered in the 20th century, as it has been answered in all the centuries preceding it, with a strong and a mighty "nay." That being so, I hope that France even now, and Belgium, are going to meet us in an accommodating way to devise with us a policy which will lead to the reconstruction of Europe. When we begin, quite clearly, the policy of reconstruction, when the British Government begins the policy of European reconstruction, what is the start?
    Lieut.-Colonel J. WARD: Is the hon. Member really entitled to assume from the Prime Minister's statement that the Government are going any further with their policy?
    Mr. MacDONALD: If I am going wrong, the Prime Minister, I am sure, will correct me. I am certain that the Prime Minister will not allow me to assume things which are not in the statement. I am trying to say what is the meaning I attach to the statement. When the Prime Minister replies I am certain that if I am putting more emphasis upon certain things in the statement, perhaps after my own liking and after my own desires, he will correct me and put the perspective a little bit more accurately than I am doing it now. I am giving
    1778
    my view of the statement, and I am giving my view of the real meaning of the new policy and the departure made by the Government within the last few weeks. The first thing we have to do in the policy of reconstruction is to come to a settlement with Germany. Along with that we must come to an agreement with France and the other Allies regarding inter-Allied debts. The two cannot be separated. It is impossible to separate one from the other, and my conviction is that, whatever Government is going successfully to pursue the policy, the beginning of which is indicated in the Note which has been read to us, must keep these two things in the forefront and pursue them both simultaneously.
    We have to settle with Germany and come to an agreement with France and Belgium and our other Allies regarding War debts. In doing that, might I beg the Government to re-explore the whole question of reparations. We have been talking about reparations, I think, in a somewhat unfortunate way, and even now the expression that is so commonly used is this, "What can Germany pay?" That is only a very small part of the problem. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] Certainly, a very small part of the problem. Will hon. Members refuse to accept this as another part of the problem—how best can it pay in the interests of the nations receiving the payment? Germany could pay in made ships, and we asked it to pay in made ships, we compelled it to pay in made ships. Supposing you could undo that. Supposing you had had an example given you by another nation of what yourself did regarding the shipping reparations policy, and supposing to-day, instead of discussing in a general way our European policy, this House was asked by the Government to consider whether we would accept made ships in reparations payment, would we accept them?
    Mr. A. M. SAMUEL: They would run them against us.
    Mr. MacDONALD: You can have it either one way or the other. If your general policy is such as to put Germany in a superior economic position against yourselves, then accept the result of your errors without complaint. I am afraid the hon. Member is rather dragging me off the main issue, and I do not want to

    1779
    be dragged to one side. Surely it is perfectly plain that, if since the peace we have been pursuing a policy which, week after week, and month after month, has been increasing our economic and industrial difficulties, then it is time to revise the whole policy, not only in respect to one point, and to bring it back to what we would call a sound economic basis, leaving out hot feelings and putting in calm heads to take their place.
    Sir F. BANBURY: The question is, "If we have been."
    Mr. MacDONALD: The point I want to bring out is the point of reparations, and to appeal to the Government not to regard the question of reparations as having been settled by merely asking what can Germany pay. There is this to be taken into account. We had a speech from the right hon. Member for Hillhead (Sir E. Home) yesterday, who said, quite truly, that in certain circumstances if we are not very careful we are going to begin the industrial peace with Germany punished, broken, smashed, apparently, and yet, oddly enough, in a superior position to compete with us in neutral markets. I am very glad to hear that, because that is what we have been saying for some years. It is perfectly plain, it is perfectly simple, that if you crush a country which has got economic facilities and industrial capacity, and if that country, with great factories, well-equipped factories and good industrial brains, has been so crushed that its currency is debased, as the mark now is, and, secondly, if its working people are broken, if they are made subservient and have lost their sense of individual dignity, then, given those circumstances, the more you crush that country the more effective does it become as a competitor as against foreign countries. Apparently some hon. Members do not agree. When a settlement does come—as it must come sooner or later, for it cannot be postponed for ever—when we have agreed to our reparations, when we have agreed to the conditions in which Germany is going to enjoy industrial peace, then it is my most profound hope that this country will not then discover that it has got to go through a second economic crisis entailing a new and vast amount of unemployment.
    1780
    What I would suggest is a complete revision of what I might call our programme of reparations, of our conception of what reparations should be made, so that the reparation payments should be related, not merely to the capacity of Germany to pay, but to our needs and our conditions, and the conditions of France, Belgium, Italy and all the others, in the markets of the world. The moment that the impedimenta of the present circumstances of the world are taken off, it may be possible, if this policy is not carefully considered, that the very fact that we impose reparation burdens on Germany will be a benefit to Germany when she comes into the open markets of the world, unless the obligations are imposed on sound, economic lines, not by feelings but by very careful considerations of what the best policy ought to be.
    I would ask the Government whether they could tell us what policy they propose now to pursue? What do they propose as a next step? Do they intend to go on with an attempt to appoint this expert Commission, either as a Commission independent of the Separation Commission or as an adjunct and a sort of assistant to the Reparation Commission? Moreover, what are they going to do to counteract this vital lapse of time? We know that the Ruhr was occupied on the 11th January, and this is the beginning of August. During all this time, as the late Prime Minister said more than once in this House, Germany's jugular vein has been cut, and the blood has been pouring out of her, with the result that exhaustion is very near at hand. If we desire to keep that country in existence, for economic and political reasons, have the Government any plan by which, while that blood is still flowing, a complete agreement can be come to with our Allies? Have the Government any proposal to make, any plan to put into operation to keep things going in the meantime, so that wreck and ruin may not come? We are frightfully handicapped now.
    Two great critical events have happened since peace came. One was the 1918 election, which resulted in a most fatal way for this country. Policies were pursued, seeds were sown, and we are reaping the harvest to-day. One of the sheaves of that harvest was presented to us by the Prime Minister half an hour ago—a dead-

    1781
    lock between this country and its late Ally. The next critical event was the occupation of the Ruhr, when we refrained from taking action and allowed things to drift. Now, for the third time, we have an opportunity of making our position clear, and the great enemy which we now have is the enemy of time. Unless the Government can devise something to keep things going in the meantime, then the pourings out from Germany's cut jugular vein will mean that we may be defeated in the end, however good our intentions may be.
    The next thing required at present more than anything else is the stabilisation of the mark and the balancing of the German Budget. I am told that credits to the extent of £1,000,000—only that and nothing more—would reflect marvellously on the economic conditions of Germany to-day. Two things are required—credits for coal and credits for imported food. The Government would be very wise to keep things going, to bolster them up in that way—if the information which I have received on quite good authority is found to be correct—because the economic condition of Germany is of the utmost importance to us both on political and civil grounds. There may be hostile industrial combinations centering round the furnaces, iron and coal deposits of Germany and France in the engineering and iron industries, and we may have to face a vast combination of internationalists who regard us first of all as fair prey on the European market. The next thing which this country cannot allow to happen, while standing by indifferently, is that the politics of Central Europe should go to wreck and ruin. Let us look at our own interests. Surely we have an interest in keeping the government of Central Europe from the Junker to the right on the one hand, and the Communist to the left on the other. In whichever direction the pendulum swings they are both reactions—the extreme right and the extreme left—which mean the destruction of order and constitutional government. That is a problem to which we ought not to be indifferent.
    Looking at Europe, as we must look at Europe—because we share very largely the responsibility for the condition of Europe to-day—and trying to do our best to put the nations and the peoples of
    1782
    Europe once again upon the broad highroad of peaceful perambulation, we cannot overlook the fact that, if things go on as they are going on, the pendulum has got to swing violently either in the one direction or the other, and to whichever side it does swing it is all to the bad for this country and will lead to the complete prostration of Europe. Therefore, whatever memories and feelings the word "Germany" may bring, we had better be reasonable and objective in mind now, and realise that a broken Germany is going to pull Europe behind it for many years down the road of impending ruin. I am only putting these questions. If the Prime Minister finds that he cannot answer them we will trust ourselves to him—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"]—in answering questions, certainly. I think there is no doubt about that. If the Prime Minister gets up and says "I cannot in the public interest answer these questions," then that is an end of it for the moment so far as I am concerned.
    The further question which I want to put is this. Do the Government propose to take any steps to get Germany included now in the League of Nations? It is of the greatest importance that the German State, if the conditions can be arranged, shall now take its place among the other States of the world federated in the League of Nations. I believe that there are difficulties in the way. Little delicacies have to be faced and overcome, but, nevertheless, I hope that our Government is going to make its position clear, that if Germany does apply for full honourable membership, membership of equality of the League of Nations, our Government are not going to boggle about anything but are going to support it with all the power that they can command. It is sometimes said that France will object. I hope that France will not object. But suppose that France does object; it is only another of those unfortunate differences, some of which, even more serious than this, have been referred to in the Memorandum read to us half an hour ago. We have to take up our stand, not in opposition to France, not in antagonism to France. We have to take up our stand and our attitude, with France and all the other nations, on the understanding that we believe sincerely that it is our duty to do so, and if France objects that certain things can-

    1783
    not happen, because they can happen only by unanimous agreement, then it is better that we should make our position clear.
    These are all the observations which I desire to make to-day. I welcome the new departure. Like others, I have not had time to study the details of what has been placed before us, but taking the general lines which the Government are going to follow positive policy, I welcome it. There are difficulties. We have been too long making mistakes, and we must come out of mistakes to wisdom through difficulties. That is always the way. We recover ourselves through difficulties. But I feel certain that, if the Government go straight on, steering the ship carefully and skilfully but with courage, they will in time get through the difficult position in which they find themselves, and they will be more respected, rather than less respected, because they are making their position clear, and if the storms blow about them for a short time the best way to get into the calm deep waters of peace is to go straight on until they have passed through those storms.
    Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The Leader of the Opposition has made an interesting and a grave speech, as befits a very grave occasion: but the speech itself invites almost as many questions, if it were permissible to put them to him, as he has put to His Majesty's Government. What, I should like to know, are we to understand from the observations of the hon. Gentleman is the attitude of himself and his party to our demand for reparations from Germany? The hon. Gentleman used an illustration which, if it had any meaning at all, could bear this meaning only, that it would be better for us at once to make up our minds not merely not to ask for reparations, but to refuse them if they were offered.
    Mr. MacDONALD Mr. MacDONALD indicated dissent.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN:I will give way in a moment to the hon. Member. I do not want to misrepresent him; I want to get light.
    Mr. MacDONALD: The right hon. Gentleman must not misrepresent me, because I did not say that. I simply said that if you put the question to yourself, "What can Germany pay?" that is not the solution of the whole problem of
    1784
    reparations—[HON. MEMBERS: "Ships!"]—I said you must choose your forms, and one of the forms you would not choose now was payment by completely made ships—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] Of course, I do not want to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but he must take it from me that the remarks I made did not mean that no form of reparations was possible, but that we had not yet sufficiently considered what the best form was, and it was that for which I put in a plea.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Now we nave the hon. Gentleman's explanation, which I am very glad to have heard, I think the House will agree with me that his observation meant very little. I thought he seriously put forward his argument about the Ships as a contribution to the solution of the reparations question. He said that if we had to decide the question again to-day, would we not refuse to take those ships. Why should we? If you say, "If you could have sunk all the enemy's marine, and prevented them from building any more, that would have been better than taking ships," perhaps it would. But were those ships going out of existence merely because we could not take them? They were going into competition with ourselves, and it seems to me that the hon. Gentleman assumed that Germany will trade only with foreign countries if she has reparations to pay. She will do all the trade she can in any circumstances. If it be large and profitable, and just in proportion as it is large and profitable, the Allies, who suffered at her hands, are entitled to exact reparations' from that source.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: In what form are we to take reparations? I should like to ask that question.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I hope the hon. and gallant Gentleman will permit me—I have never interrupted him—to continue my observations.
    Mr. PRINGLE: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman a fair question? [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"]
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I hope the hon. Gentleman will allow me to make my observations. I am not answering either of the hon. Gentlemen, who have not yet spoken. They will have an opportunity of making their own speeches. Perhaps

    1785
    I might conduct my conversation through you, Mr. Speaker, with the hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, without turning aside to answer all the questions which other and inquisitive hon. Members may put. I really want the Leader of the Opposition to consider where his argument logically leads him. Is it a good thing for us that we have got to pay £30,000,000 or £40,000,000 a year to America? No. Then why is it a good thing for Germany that she has got to pay reparations to us? To listen to the arguments against exacting reparations, one would really suppose that the most fortunate country in the world is the one which has the largest external debt, because it follows as a logical and inevitable consequence that it will do the largest and the most flourishing international trade.
    I come to another observation of the hon. Gentleman, from which I wish, if I may, to disassociate myself. The hon. Gentleman, if I rightly understood him—and this time the matter is so grave that I would beg his attention—suggested to the Government that this country should advance credits to Germany to sustain her at the present moment. I trust and I know, that the Government will do nothing of the kind. I hope that the day of loans from the Government is ended, and that other Governments will get the loans they need in the money markets of the world, and from private investors. But, in any circumstances to propound that policy in the conditions of to-day is surely the most amazing—
    Mr. MacDONALD: I only meant it from private investors.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I am greatly relieved to hear that. I need say no more about it, because the hon. Gentleman did not make the suggestion which I thought he had made.
    Mr. MacDONALD: I meant by exactly the same means as money has been advanced through the League of Nations to restore Austria.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: That is surely quite a different thing. That is an international loan, guaranteed by the respective Governments, in certain proportions. To make that proposal to-day would lead us, where? I observed a speech of the hon. Gentleman, not made
    1786
    in this House, but reported in the papers a few days ago, in which he said that the only hope of the maintenance of European peace rested with himself and his friends, and, with the help of God, they would secure it. I trust that the hon. Gentleman will have all the help that can be given, because his unaided suggestions did not contribute to this very laudable purpose. Just consider. He invites the Government to guarantee a loan to Germany. For what purpose? To keep her going. That is, to encourage her; to lend our assistance directly to frustrate French policy; to range ourselves, openly and actively, on the side of Germany in the attempt to defeat it. That would be indeed a grave decision to take. The situation as it is is grave enough, and I think none of us will go for our holidays with any very happy reflections on the statement which the Prime Minister has made to us to-day.
    Before I come to that, may I make a request to the Prime Minister? The Leader of the Opposition denounced secrecy in diplomacy. I think that the denunciation of secrecy in diplomacy is claptrap. I have never heard of Labour Members, when they had a little diplomacy to do in their own party, or in trade unions, inviting the Press to come and listen to their confidential discussions in order that no tittle-tattle should get about as to their respective actions. If you want to do business, you must be able to explore the ground privately, to put forward suggestions without prejudice, and, failing agreement, to resume your old position without having it injured by public discussion throughout. It is only in that way you will come to terms. The Prime Minister has said that he proposes, in any case, to lay Papers defining the attitude of the British Government in these negotiations, and that he hopes to receive the assent of our Allies to the publication of further Papers emanating from them. Is there any longer any reason why the proposals which were made by the then British Government, in the summer of last year, should not be laid before the House and the world? In our part of the history of this question, a very long history, we have had two sets of negotiations, one in January and one in the last month. The Papers of the January one have been laid, and the Papers of this

    1787
    last month are to be laid; yet the Government insist on wrapping in obscurity the Papers of long ago—
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: And the November Papers.
    Mr. PRINGLE: Why were they not published at the time?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: They were not published, for a very good reason. The Conference was not at an end, and the Government had by no means abandoned hope that out of those proposals there might yet be found a method of agreement with the other Allied Governments. In any case, they are now history, but they are an important part of the history, and I submit to my right hon. Friend that it would really be in the national interest that those Papers should be given to the House of Commons and the country.
    1.0 P.M.
    I said that the statement which the Prime Minister made was a very grave one. We listened to it, I suppose, without surprise, but not without, at any rate, so far as I am concerned, very considerable anxiety. Will the House consider for a few moments what a vast change has passed over Europe, and over the relations between ourselves and our Allies in the course of the present year. It is an open secret that the French Government wished to go into the Ruhr long before they went there. It was the opinion of the then Government—as it was the opinion of the right hon. Member for Central Glasgow (Mr. Bonar Law) and his Government, as it is the opinion of the Prime Minister and his colleagues to-day—that the Ruhr enterprise was one which every British Government should do its utmost to prevent. At any rate, as long as the Coalition Government—which is not popular, and which has to carry the weight of many accusations—was in power, the Ruhr was not entered. Then came the January Conference. Our Government made proposals. They were rejected. We left the conference room. We left the other three Allies without our counsel or help, and we forfeited any method of influencing their subsequent decision. I think it was most unfortunate. Hitherto, there had been a very close association of ideas between the Government of Italy and ourselves. There had been a very close association of ideas between the Government of Belgium and ourselves, and I
    1788
    think it was a great misfortune that this Conference continued among those three Powers with Great Britain unrepresented, unable to make any observations as the Conference went on, and unable in any way to influence their decision. The late Prime Minister adopted a policy of warning the French against the results of their enterprise but, when it appeared to him they were determined to carry it through, of promising them a benevolent but passive attitude on the part of this Government. There has been a new development. The passive attitude has given way to an active one. Has it made our relations better? Has it carried us nearer to a solution? I wish I could think so. We on both sides of the Channel have paid homage to the Entente. But what is the Entente to-day? In what sphere of politics does the cordial Entente of a few years ago direct a common policy and secure a common action? It is a profound, a most regrettable and a most dangerous change in the European situation and one which affects our interests, not merely in Europe but in other places far beyond European bounds.
    I am afraid that since January the French Government and our own have drifted steadily further apart. Is my right hon. Friend quite sure that he took the best method of dealing with an extraordinarily difficult situation? It is obvious what is the objection to the policy which the British Government is pursuing. It is not to condemn the policy that I state it, but to an understanding of the situation, I think it is necessary it should be stated. It is quite clear that this policy, while it fails to restrain France, irritates France, and while it fails to secure relief for Germany, encourages Germany. That is a very dangerous policy to pursue, and I read with some anxiety a passage in a communication from the Paris correspondent of the "Times" yesterday. He describes French policy as it exists to-day—
    "However things fall out it is thought"—
    that is, it is thought in Paris—
    "they will turn out to the advantage of the French. Either Germany gives way, in which case the French consider payment may yet he assured and will have been assured by the operations in the Ruhr, or Germany breaks up and in that case France is not only secure, but can obtain compensation for herself."

    1789
    A little later the same correspondent says:
    "There should be no illusion on this score. A bargain might have been possible had it not been too conspicuous some time ago, but now the die is cast and if Germany will not give way neither will France."
    That comes from a source which the Government cannot say has been unfriendly to them in their conduct of foreign affairs. The hon. Gentleman opposite asked for more publicity. I regret that there was as much. I regret that the first stage in the new negotiations should have been a public statement of the defniteness and solemnity of that which the Prime Minister made to the House on 12th July. If you want these negotiations to succeed, if people have got into a position from which it is very difficult for them to recede with credit to themselves or their country, it is not well to begin by a public statement of what you require of them as a first step to private conversation with them to see how far you can agree. I assume, however, that the statement, which was one of great gravity, had been carefully considered. The Prime Minister in that statement said the Government
    "are convinced that an indefinite continuation of this state of affairs is fraught with grave peril. Germany herself appears to be moving fast towards economic chaos which may itself he succeeded by social and industrial ruin."
    Again he said:
    "It is not too much to say that the recovery of the world is in danger and that the peace for which so many sacrifices were borne is at stake."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th July, 1923; cols. 1586–87, Vol. 166.]
    Those are very grave statements to make, and they are not in my opinion exaggerated. What I should like the Prime Minister to do this afternoon is to assure us that, before the statement was made—before he entered on the new development of his policy, of which that statement was the first indication—he had carefully considered, not only what was to be done in the event of his securing an agreement with France, Belgium and our other Alles, but what the course of the British Government should be if we failed to secure that agreement? It is now evident we have failed to secure the agreement. I do not know whether the Prime Minister will feel in a position to answer at once the question of the hon. Gentleman opposite, "What are you now going to do?" If he considers it
    1790
    would be contrary to the public interest to make such a statement at this moment, I shall accept that, as I am sure will every Member of this House. We all know that the right hon. Gentleman speaks with a heavier responsibility than lies upon any one of the rest of us, but, if he cannot tell us what the policy of the Government is, at least I would beg him to reassure us so far as to tell us that the Government, before they embarked upon this policy, had carefully considered and clearly determined what they would do in the event of such an answer as they have now received. Then we can go away for three months' holiday, and we shall at any rate feel that the Government are not drifting rudderless on the ocean, but are pursuing a clear and definite policy amid all the perils of the time.
    Mr. ASQUITH: This Debate has assumed a somewhat discursive character and it has been adorned already by two nautical perorations. I do not propose to follow the right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken or my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Mr. J. R. MacDonald) into many of the considerations, interesting as they were and important as they were, which appear to me, with all deference to them, to have little relevance to the particular circumstances of the case. I am going to submit one or two questions to the Government, as I presume we are all entitled to frame separate interrogatories. The first shall be this: Can my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister give us the assurance for which I asked a couple of days ago, that, if and as soon as there is anything in the nature of a grave new development in what is at present an inchoate and most nebulous situation, the Government will exercise the power which the law gives them of summoning Parliament and placing the situation before us, and will not take a grave and it may be irrevocable decision without the advantage of Parliamentary discussion? I make that appeal, not only in view of the obvious gravity of the situation, but because of the extremely embarrassing conditions in which we are embarking on this discussion to-day. I have never known a similar case. The real question, as far as there is a real question, is, What course ought to have been adopted, or should now be adopted, by way of reply, to the only public document we have got, namely,

    1791
    the German Note of the 7th of June? That is the only document which as yet we have before us. I understand, and we all understand, from the statement made by the Prime Minister, that he is prepared next week, or in the near future at any rate, to publish some parts of the correspondence which has taken place between our Allies and ourselves. He referred to the consent of France and Belgium being necessary to the publication of some of those documents.
    The PRIME MINISTER: Their own replies.
    Mr. ASQUITH: I do not know why. These things are not love letters, intended only for the eyes of two persons, the writer and the person to whom they are addressed. These things are part of a continuous negotiation between statesmen on matters vitally affecting the interests of Europe and the world. I know, as a matter of courtesy, it is the custom to ask foreign Governments for their consent as to the publication of correspondence or particular documents. Yet I cannot for a moment admit that there is a right of veto on the part of any Power to prevent the publication of documents which are integral links in a chain of negotiations, I hope, therefore, when the documents are published it will be in a complete form. I agree with one remark of the right hon. Member for West Birmingham (Mr. A. Chamberlain) that a great deal of nonsense is talked about secret diplomacy. The old-world diplomacy, which is now in such disrepute, in its most secretive moods, never, I think, abstained from the publication of documents of this kind, and the result is—I will not blame the Government for a delay which was probably inevitable so long as we get the documents in due course—the House of Commons now about to separate for a long time is debating this question to-day, without any authentic knowledge whatever of what has been going on. The Prime Minister made a summary, and I need hardly say I am perfectly certain it is an accurate summary, though necessarily not an exhaustive one, of what has taken place, and this brings me to what I think is the only other question I wish to put to the Prime Minister. I feel quite incapable of going into these large ques-
    1792
    tions, any one of which has been debated time after time on the floor of this House, as to the character of reparations, the mode of payment, the relation between reparations and Allied indebtedness and so on—I feel quite incapable of adding anything to what has been said on these subjects—but what we want to know is, what does the change of policy which the right hon. Gentleman adumbrated in his statement really mean?
    That is the question which I put to my right hon. Friend, and I am not putting it in any critical or hostile spirit. But I think, in the absence of all documents, to leave each man for himself and the House as a whole to draw inferences as to what had actually taken place, is not right. I do not see why any reluctance should be shown to satisfy our perfectly legitimate curiosity for some more definite and explicit statement of what the Government really propose to do, in the event of this Allied disagreement, which, if it has not already taken place, appears to be within measurable distance—what steps they propose to take, and what, with a little more detail, is the real character of the independent communication, if they have one in their mind, which it may become their duty to make to the German Government. We shall be greatly reassured, before going away, if the Prime Minister will give us some information on those lines. For my part, I deliberately suspend my judgment, as I think we are entitled to do, as to the wisdom of the course which is being taken, not because I am suspicious, or unduly suspicious; still less because I agree with those who think it is the duty of the Government to look on with folded arms, in an attitude of absolute passivity, while Europe is going to rack and ruin; but because I am satisfied that if we are to get, as I hope we may get, in this matter in the future, as we have had to some considerable extent in the days gone by, a general unanimity of view among the people of this country, it can only be by the Government taking this House completely and at once into their confidence.
    Colonel GRETTON: Everyone who has heard the Debate so far must agree with the right hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) in deploring that a subject so grave and critical should have to be dis-

    1793
    cussed, under the circumstanced of to-day, without full and complete information at our disposal, but beside the right hon. Gentleman is sitting another Member, the Leader of the Opposition, who has no doubt as to where the policy of the Government is leading us, and the hon. Member for Aberavon (Mr. J. R. MacDonald) expressed his almost complete approval of all the steps which have yet been taken, and pointed out some of the steps, at any rate, which he would desire to be taken, to complete the process which he desires to see carried out. No one will complain that the hon. Member for Aberavon takes the line to-day which he has done. He has never been the friend or supporter of a French Alliance, or even of an Entente. In the period during the War he always advocated a cessation of hostilities, and the building up of an understanding with Germany at the expense of France at the earliest possible moment, and it is significant also that the hon. Member has made suggestions to-day which, if they are carried out, would undoubtedly provoke and widen the breach, which has already perhaps gone too far, and which would intensify the deadlock and promote a real breach of understanding with the Government of France. What can be more insidious than the proposal that an international loan should be made for the benefit of Germany? It could only result in strengthening her opposition to the French policy and action in the Ruhr, and the hon. Member must have known when he made it that the French Government at present is absolutely opposed to the admission of Germany into the League of Nations under present conditions, and that to bring forward such a proposal could only be to create friction.
    Mr. MOREL: Why should France be the dictator? What is the basis of the argument?
    Colonel GRETTON: I am not concerned to argue it. That fact exists, and when you are conducting diplomatic negotiations, it is surely most unwise, reckless, and leading to a breach of understanding if proposals are deliberately brought forward to which, it is known beforehand, objection will be taken. The position undoubtedly is becoming very grave, and I must express the opinion, for what it is worth, that the position of the British Government in dealing with European
    1794
    questions has been made considerably worse owing to the episodes during, and final ending of, the negotiations at Lausanne. There the British representatives abandoned one position after another, and it was only with the greatest difficulty, and by accepting almost everything that the Turkish Government brought forward, that the peace was concluded. Undoubtedly, what happened there has shaken the firmness, the determination, and the foresight of the representatives of the British Government in negotiating with foreign nations. I am quite sure that the Prime Minister, when he replies, will say, as he has said before, that his strongest desire in foreign policy is to have a firm understanding with France and full co-operation with Italy. That is just what is not being accomplished now, and it is because that is not being accomplished that we all feel such great anxiety.
    What is the alternative? Serious steps have been taken, and we cannot stand still without danger. It is quite clear that the Government now are drifting into a breach with France. That is not the desire of the people of this country, for wherever one goes among the general public, in the country or in this City, one finds almost universally expressed surprise and failure to understand how this Government should hesitate to support France in extracting the full reparations from Germany that she has engaged to pay. No one can understand how any British Government should desire to let Germany off those payments which are certainly due in justice, and which she has agreed to make. There are certain influences at work to make things easy for Germany, and those influences are very largely financial. To some extent they are also political. No doubt there are hon. Members accustomed to sit on the benches opposite who Could give a very full explanation, from their own knowledge and experience, of what those political influences are, but I would deal only with one or two of the financial considerations. There has been in London and elsewhere, as in every country in the world, a large speculation in German marks, investments in German securities represented by marks, and there is no doubt that if the mark, as it inevitably must do, disappears as a unit of value—it has practically gone now, and it can

    1795
    never recover—there will be great financial strain and perhaps failures in certain places.
    Moreover, the result of this sale of German marks in foreign countries is the acquirement by German financiers of large credits in those countries, in exchange for worthless paper marks, and I am told on the most excellent authority that this process has gone so far in the United States of America that the German financiers now hold to their credit a Very considerable proportion of the War profits in the United States. The lowest amount at which the German credits in foreign currency are placed is equal to £400,000,000 of our standard.
    Mr. MOSLEY: Mr. McKenna says £200,000,000.
    Colonel GRETTON: No; £600,000,000 is the statement given by Mr. McKenna in a recent speech, and even higher estimates have been made, but I do not believe even those figures are sufficiently high; and in these circumstances, when Germany admittedly holds enormous credits abroad, having transferred her realisable securities and a large part of her currency to foreign countries, what folly, what madness, to talk of making a loan to Germany, in order to enable her to pay her way! There is no doubt that a large amount of sterling stands to the credit of German financiers in the City of London, difficult to trace, not always put forward in the names of tho3e responsible for the handling of these very large sums, but the money is there, English money, or the money of other countries, billed in London, with whom the Germans desire to trade. It is difficult to trace, but when I make inquiries, people well acquainted with the City of London all agree that the sum standing to the credit of German financiers in the City of London is a very large sum.
    Mr. J. JONES: The same in Berlin, with English financiers.
    Colonel GRETTON: No. That is worthless That has all been lost. Let us examine for one moment what is Germany's capacity to pay. We are told that Germany can pay nothing, that there must be a long moratorium, and that then she can pay very little. What is Germany's capacity to pay? Her capacity
    1796
    to produce, and what can be levied in the form of taxation and in duties on imports and experts. The German powers of production have enormously increased, and that is confirmed by all the information I can get. I was talking recently to a very competent person, a man with great knowledge of Germany, who had travelled the length of Germany on business, and everywhere he found new factories erected. All these factories were fitted with the most modern, the most-economical and efficient machinery—all money spent since the end of the War. He found all the workpeople—there is very little unemployment there, 7 per cent. is the latest figure—engaged working in industries, putting forth their energy to produce, and getting good value from the efficiency of machines in the factories. He was told—and this confirms a great deal of other information—that the German manufacturers, producers, and financiers have entered into a federation to control prices and markets. They are not competing, but are merely quoting prices, which are world prices, or very little below world prices. They are accumulating stocks. When the reparation question is settled, they are prepared to enter into a stern and devastating competition with this country, particularly, and all the countries of the world. In five, years, one of their prominent men told my friend, they will make England the poorhouse of the world.
    Travelling through the engineering and industrial areas of this country, he found no development. Furnaces were not at work, vast quantities of machinery were standing idle, new factories constructed during the War were unoccupied or derelict, and in those works which he entered he found a great deal of slackness and idleness among the workmen, and no such industrious intensity which characterised every place where he saw work going on in Germany. What can we do in such conditions as these. Germany, at any rate, has enormous foreign credit. She has absurdly low taxation at home, and business is very largely relieved of its debenture and mortgage interest. The one thing requisite to Germany's full prosperity and Germany's industries is the operation of the transport system, and that is State-managed and very largely State-owned. If managed on principles of private enterprise, Germany would be well equipped to sweep the

    1797
    world of trade and commerce, and be far richer, more prosperous and more powerful than before the War.
    Pursuing this question of the industrial and economic conditions of Germany, they have deliberately, by their policy of inflation, crushed out and ruined, probably beyond repair, the bourgeoise and the middle-class people with small incomes and pensions. On the other hand, the working people are getting enough to live upon and clothe themselves, and, owing to their housing policy, enough to pay their rent—
    Mr. J. JONES: It is not true.
    Colonel GRETTON:—and the industrial magnates, federated with the manufacturers and financiers, are making enormous profits, a large part of which they are putting into their industries, equipping themselves for the coming economic struggle. They know full well that this reparation question has to be settled, and that reparations have to be paid, and they want to know and be sure what their obligations are. The German Government cannot pay reparations; the only people who can pay reparations are the people who can control the German industries. Why do not we act at once on these facts, and support France in exacting the fullest payment that Germany can pay, and which we know well they can pay and they expect to pay when they are forced to it. The policy of this Government has been to leave France to pull the chestnuts out of the fire, and to exact reparations, and now France is disheartened by new proposals for setting up a Commission of Experts. What can these experts do? What are their estimates really worth? They are guesses, and you cannot expect them to come up against the real questions, and make the hardest bargain, and that is the way to ascertain what Germany can pay. By our present policy of leaving France in isolation, we are prolonging the occupation in the Ruhr, and encouraging the resistance of Germany. If it be the policy of this country, as has been advocated this afternoon, that time is of great importance in this matter, the way to apply time to this problem is to bring all the pressure we can upon Germany to settle this question of reparations quickly, have no more moratorium and delay, but apply that pressure at once,
    1798
    and so put an end to the crisis and all questions of doubt and hesitation.
    I go further. Germany has always endeavoured to escape her obligations. In the first place, a capital sum was mentioned and accepted, and the annual payments were laid down. Germany said, "We cannot pay; we must have a moratorium; we must pay less." Experts agreed, and a lesser sum was fixed, and then she tried to escape again. Germany will never keep one of her engagements, and her proposals at the present moment are worth no more than those made before, unless there are substantial guarantees, on which you may lay your hands to enforce the payments, which can be made by the German magnates, because the German Government has no money at all. Why should we not go to the ports of Germany and superintend the collection of the Customs and Excise? There are not many of them. If the amounts collected were put into the coffers of the Reparation Commission, it would soon bring the German people and the German Government to settle this question. I think those who make complaints about the occupation of the Ruhr have very little knowledge of what was in the Treaty of Versailles. It was laid down that that occupation was permitted, and the only question was whether the default made by Germany was sufficiently grave to justify that part of the Treaty of Versailles being put into operation.
    It was held by France and Belgium that the defaults were sufficiently grave. Our Prime Minister at that time, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Central Glasgow (Mr. Bonar Law), stated that though he did not assist in that Occupation he hoped it would succeed. I must confess that I view with the very gravest alarm the course which is being pursued by His Majesty's Government. The method of negotiation is by a kind of Press controversy, and the exchange of Notes of a highly controversial character. That is not the way the old diplomacy was conducted, or indeed any method of diplomacy can be successfully carried on. Diplomacy is not a matter of controversy, and the writing of one dispatch to score off another, with criticism of the arguments put forward. The old methods of diplomacy were by way of conversation and the exploration of ways to see what

    1799
    ground of agreement and disagreement might exist, and when something was agreed upon as common ground, when, I say, that was found, or nearly found, then was the time to commit something to paper. I trust there may be some reversion to the old methods, and that a very serious attempt will be made to ascertain what ground of agreement can be found; and that the difference which exists between the British and French Governments, which is viewed with alarm by the British people, will be bridged over. What hope is there for the peace of the world? What hope is there for the peace of this country except by a complete understanding with France on which may be based economic and financial agreement? Reparation from Germany is not the main question. If we have a breach with France what are we going to do? Are we going to ally ourselves with Germany? God forbid. I think the British people will have something to say very definite and very decisive to any Government which appeared to establish an alliance or an agreement with Germany at the expense of our old friends and Ally France!
    Lieut.-Colonel MOORE-BRABAZON: This is a subject upon which there are considerable differences of opinion, as is sometimes the case with members of one family, and it seems to be developing into something in the nature of the Irish problem which is ever with us, and which appears to be insoluble. I differ very much from the view put forward by the hon. and gallant Member for Burton (Colonel Gretton). He takes up to my mind what I call the "Morning Post" view. Frankly, I disagree every day with the "Morning Post" in every single particular except the date! But I like the "Morning Post" in this respect, that it does put forward its view with the idea of trying to help the country. In that respect I have a sneaking regard for it, although, as I say, I think it is always wrong. But there is another thing in respect to the point of view of the French which I think should be made clear to the people of this country, and that is the influence of the "Daily Mail." As is known to many people the "Daily Mail" is published in three places, Paris, London and Manchester, and there is an agreement that the leading article shall be
    1800
    the same in all three publications. Those who are familiar with France know that any paper in which there is published anything against the French Government brings on itself enormous trouble and the conduct and distribution of the paper over there becomes practically impossible. The "Daily Mail," after all, is a commercial proposition, so that we have this result; that one of our most influential English papers has its policy directed from Paris. I consider that that is a very grave disadvantage, and a thing which never should be allowed to happen in respect to a country like ours.
    What is it that this paper advances every day with a sickening monotony accompanied by letters from its readers? It is the theory that France is in favour of reparations whereas we are not. Could anything be more fallacious than that? The whole point of French policy is to keep a weak Germany—nothing else! Our desire is to get reparations if we can, but at all costs to get trade restored. The sooner that is made clear to the people of this country the better it will be. I agree with some of those who take the view that the operation of Germany from the point of view of the mark has been one of the most colossal swindles we have ever witnessed on a big financial scale. It is absolutely amazing. The advantage that has accrued from a commercial point of view in the reduction of their debentures, and their loans throughout the whole country is enormous. One of the most extraordinary things is the disappearance of capital from Germany across the border, and I think that is a lesson to some hon. Members here who favour socialistic ideas with respect to capital to see how liquid capital really is. If we are desirous of getting reparations they will not be got in Germany so much as from other countries outside Germany. The suggestion has been put forward in this respect that we should tax the German peasant, but the German peasant has an extremely poor standard of living. One can only judge the wealth of a country by the standard of living of its inhabitants, and meat once a week and no milk does not make a rich country. Because the industrialists have swept all the available wealth out of Germany to put forward a proposition that you should tax

    1801
    the pence of the workpeople seems to me to be the height of absurdity.
    The whole policy of the late Coalition Government on the Ruhr might be likened to the Mad Tea-party in "Alice in Wonderland" where you had the Mad Hatter in control. But the country at the last election said very clearly that they did not want the Mad Hatter in control. They chose the Dormouse. What has been the result of the Dormouse policy? The Mad Hatter, anyhow, kept France out of the Ruhr; when the Dormouse arrived the French went in. The consequence we see in the crisis today. We do not know what is the policy of the present Prime Minister, but I maintain that in respect of these very difficult questions that those in charge of this country are in the position of Alice still in Wonderland. I am one of those who would welcome a very much more vigorous policy by this country over this question. It is a very urgent question. One cannot frame policies on this question or take steps years ahead. It is a matter of weeks. Take the question of food in the Ruhr to-day. The German Government sent food into the Ruhr and it is being paid for in marks. But there will come a time, as the exchange gets worse and worse, when the farmers will cease taking paper marks in exchange for the produce which they are sending into the Ruhr. If the time ever comes when the farmers will not take German notes, and no produce goes into the Ruhr, then passive resistance there must collapse. I should like to know what is our policy relative to the position of passive resistance? We do not approve of the Ruhr adventure, but are we in favour of the passive resistance policy adopted by the Germans? If we are, then they can keep up passive resistance. If we are in favour of crushing passive resistance, then for no more than three weeks could it possibly remain, because of the impossibility of the German people being able to buy goods to feed their people in the Ruhr. I want to ask the Prime Minister under what terms does he think France can ever withdraw from the Ruhr? Although I take up on this matter firstly a pro-English point of view, I do think that we should see the German side of this matter. To start with, as a solution, I am prepared to grant to France complete security against aggression she
    1802
    may possibly ask for, and I think that is all we should be asked to give to France.
    Lieut.-Colonel CROFT: What do you mean by complete security?
    Lieut.-Colonel MOORE-BRABAZON: That is for them to decide. The French nation have done themselves no good by their adventure in the Ruhr. After the War we found Germany splitting up into pieces, but the French occupation of the Ruhr has knit that nation together in a way that we thought was practically impossible two years ago. This building up and coming together of the German nation has taken place under the guise of getting protection against Germany. What I say is that there must be a breaking point which must come if you are going to pursue this policy of weakening Germany still more, and the time must come when the country will go bankrupt, with revolution and every form of civil war breaking out. Is that going to be an advantage to France or to this country? Personally I fail to see how it can be any advantage. When we see at last our Government tentatively taking a line of its own in the solution of this great European problem, I ask hon. Members, and especially everybody sitting on this side of the House, not to take any view but that of giving the strongest support to the Prime Minister, leading this country to come again into European politics, because what is going on now cannot continue without inflicting great injustice and misery upon all the peoples of Europe.
    Mr. MOREL: The speech to which we have just listened is a refreshing experience after the one that preceded it, which to me seemed to be a very perfect compendium of the "Morning Post" view, with a little of the "Daily Express" thrown in. The Leader of the Opposition expressed the view of all of us when he said that we were prepared to support the policy of the Prime Minister as we understand it, although we are acting, of course, under the difficulty we have pointed out of having no papers. Nevertheless we are prepared to support the policy of the Prime Minister as we understand it, and we believe in the sincerity of his promise to make a great effort to bring the intolerable state of affairs in Europe to an end. It remains true, nevertheless, that the

    1803
    whole of this controversy and the Debate to-day accentuates the fact that the whole of this controversy is being carried on in a perfect fog of unrealities which is inimical to the success of the Prime Minister's policy.
    We are living in an atmosphere of mystification and equivocation in regard to the whole of this discussion. Just as an example I would mention that we seem to be looking upon the devastated areas of France as if they were a howling wilderness, whereas two-thirds of them have been rebuilt, and at the present time life in them is pursuing its normal course. Again, we talk as though France was groaning under an intolerable burden produced by the necessity of restoring the desolated areas, whereas, as a matter of fact, France was never more prosperous. Vast sums of money have been made by French industrials out of the rebuilding of those devastated areas. Many French industries and French agriculture are really booming to-day, and the French citizen is taxed more lightly than the citizens of any other country in Europe. In proof of this I need only mention that France at the present time is able to issue loans to foreign countries and she has just issued a large loan to Poland.
    Again we talk as if Germany had paid no reparations at all, but that is quite a fantastic statement, because Germany has been making reparations for the last four years, and ever since the Treaty was made which mulcted Germany in payments unparalleled in modern times, besides imposing upon her a great mutilation of her territory and a huge war indemnity. What is the danger? It is not reparations. The issue which is facing Europe to-day is not reparations, because the time has long gone by when it was a question of being able to wring hundreds of millions more or less out of Germany What we are faced with to-day is the problem whether the whole economic edifice of Europe is going to crumble before our very eyes and ruin us in the dust which it will make. And yet we go on talking about reparations. Surely it must be patent to every man of common sense in this House and out of it that for every penny we have got for reparations up to the present time we have had to pay
    1804
    1s. out of our own pockets in doles to the unemployed.
    2.0 P.M.
    It must be patent to every man of common sense that in pursuing this will-o'-the-wisp of Reparations as at present conceived it means the industrial ruin of Germany. We have been pursuing it at the expense of British trade, British industry, the British producer and consumer, and the British working men. The real crux of the impolicy of the past four years and the real crux of the situation to-day is that we have shut our eyes and closed our hearts to the human issue in this matter. The puzzle which confronted statesmanship when the last guns ceased to growl was not to mulct our late enemies in enormous sums, but to cooperate with them in rebuilding and reconstructing Europe, and because we did not do that we are faced with a great human tragedy much bigger, more profound and more dangerous than the economic and financial dislocation which that tragedy involves. I know that in some quarters, in this House and outside, it is still extremely unpopular to deal with the human issue in this great controversy, and it is still regarded as unpatriotic to cease to hate the ex-foe with whom you have made peace. Is it still regarded by some section's in this House as disgraceful to speak decently of former foes. These sentiments are not going to deter us on this side of the House from touching the human issue, because it is a cardinal article of our faith that between branches of the great human family there is no real inherent hatred, but rather an association not only economic in all those matters which are common to humanity.
    What is the spectacle with which we are faced to-day? That is the tragedy of the situation. We have a people to whom only men of little minds will deny the epithet great, a people great in intellect, great in its achievements, great in its virtues as in its defects, lying agonised at our feet. For centuries our sons and their sons have competed in honourable emulation in scientific research, in arts and crafts, in exploration and in commerce. For centuries we have drunk deep at the wells of learning of these people. It is only two decades ago that we began to drift apart owing to an accumulation of errors and miscalculations on each side, exacerbated by news-

    1805
    paper poison on both sides, and further complicated by an unhappy incompatibility of temper between our respective rulers. It was only then that we began to drift apart and ceased a friendly intercourse which has spanned a thousand years. This people to-day is humbled in the dust. It is mutilated in its territories. Deprived of three-fourths of the raw material of life, its life is destroyed, its middle classes are broken and despairing, its working classes are going along the same road, and for these people stricken to the very heart we have not one generous word!
    Is this worthy of our greatness? The time was when we prided ourselves upon our capacity, after we had fought a man and beaten him to shake hands with him. The time was when clemency of victory was the rightful boast of our statesmen, and our leaders were in that cause prepared to confront the buffets of temporary unpopularity. Is our attitude to-day compatible with our repeated pledges? How many times during the War, and especially during its later stages, were we urging the German people in the words of the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) to adopt a real democratic constitution which would make it much easier for us to conclude a broad democratic peace with them? How often did we repeat over and over again that we were not fighting the German people, that the destruction and disruption of Germany had never been a war aim of ours from the beginning, and that what we wanted was that the German people should throw aside their military caste and despotic Government and become a democracy with which we could work? Such utterances are not to be wiped off our national record. They are indelible. Is such an attitude compatible with our national interests? Is there any Member of this House, wherever he may sit, who can contemplate with equanimity the establishment on the Continent of Europe of a great military hegemony coupled for the first time in the history of the world with a great economic domination of iron, steel, and coal and raw material? Can anyone contemplate with equanimity such a military-economic hegemony in Europe. If so, not only is he utterly blind to all the teachings of history, but he must be suffering from temporary aberration. If we continue to close our
    1806
    eyes and shut our hearts to this great human tragedy, may not that tragedy be the forerunner of another tragedy?
    Mr. BECKER: Did I understand the hon. Member to say earlier in his speech that if Germany were let off her war debts, and if the Ruhr question were settled, trade would revive in England?
    Mr. MOREL: The exact words I think I used were that for every penny piece we had got from Germany in reparations we had paid out a shilling in unemployment doles and loss of trade. We are sincerely disposed on these benches to support the Prime Minister in his general purpose and in his policy as far as we understand it, but may I indicate that in my belief the chief danger from which the Prime Minister's policy is suffering as at present disclosed is this, that so far—and I say so far advisedly—this controversy is being narrowed down to a difference of national interests as between France and ourselves. So long as it is narrowed down to that point of difference of national interests the success of the Prime Minister's policy is very unlikely, and I say that for two reasons, first because confined within those limits the case the present British Government is putting forward, while it is thoroughly legitimate and sound, suffers from weakness produced by precedent action of the Coalition Government. Several Members have accentuated that statement to-day. Secondly, the invasion of the Ruhr has been spoken of as though it first took place in January of this year. It was nothing of the kind. M. Poincaré put the keys of the Ruhr in his pocket when, with the blessing of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs, he sent French troops to occupy the ports of the Ruhr—Düusseldorf, Ruhrort, and Duieburg—not in January, 1923, but in March, 1921. That was the beginning of the invasion of the Ruhr, and that invasion was carried out, as I have said, with the blessing of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs. Further, that occupation of the ports of the Ruhr was the outcome of the London Ultimatum of March, but in May there was another London Ultimatum, also with the blessing of the right hon. Gentleman, pitched at Germany's head, and what did that ultimatum convey? It conveyed that, if the German Government did not, without reserve or condition, undertake

    1807
    to fulfil their obligations as to final reparations, which included the payment of a fantastic sum of £6,600,000,000, the Valley of the Ruhr would be occupied until those obligations were fulfilled.
    Lieut.-Colonel CROFT: Hear, hear!
    Mr. MOREL: I am delighted to fed that that statement is being cheered by the hon. and gallant Member.
    Mr. PRINGLE: It was only bluff.
    Mr. MOREL: What I want to point out is that the principle that it was legally and morally right to occupy the Ruhr militarily in the event of Germany's default was implicitly admitted by the Coalition Government, and that is the real reason why this Government has found it impossible to challenge the legality of the French action. That is the Achilles' heel. If we confine this controversy merely to the narrow issue of an Anglo-French difference on the matter of policy, I am afraid the Prime Minister's object will not be fulfilled. I am dealing with the realities, upon which few speakers in this Debate on the other side of the House, with the exception of the hon. Member who spoke before I did, have touched. I am dealing with the realities, and I am facing the facts as they are, as I think this House and this country should do, because nothing is more dangerous, and nothing may well prove to be more disastrous, than that this country should abruptly and suddenly be brought face to face with one realities of the situation. Such conditions lead to the sweeping of the public off its feet, to panic, to rash decisions, and, as we know from experience in the past, to war. The facts are these: We have opened a momentous debate with France, and I use the word "debate" in the widest sense of the term. We all want that debate to have a peaceful conclusion, but we shall be driven, and we are driven now, to go on with that debate. We cannot drop the debate, we cannot leave it suspended in the air; it has to be gone on with, and, if we are going to pursue it as we are pursuing it now, on the narrow basis of an Anglo-French conflict of opinion, then there is very grave risk of the debate not having a peaceful termination. Both sides are taking into account that great possibility, and both sides are preparing for such a dread possibility.
    1808
    It would be criminal to hide that truth from the country, and it is our duty to proclaim it. I am unalterably convinced that the Prime Minister will not succeed in his policy, and that this debate will not have a peaceful termination, unless the rest of the world, and especially the United States of America, can be led to participate in our Debate with France. The rest of the world, and especially the United States of America, will not participate effectively in our Debate with France so long as that Debate presents itself as an Anglo-French controversy as to the best method of wringing further sums from Germany. If we desire the effective participation of the world, and again I say especially of the United States of America, in this great Debate of ours with France—which is tantamount to saying that we desire, as we do desire, that that Debate shall have a peaceful termination—then, somehow or other, the Prime Minister must raise the whole of this controversy out of the rut of a mere national interest on the one hand, and out of the rut of so-called reparations on the other, must place it on that higher and bigger plane to which it properly belongs, and must treat it as a great human issue, which not only involves the economic destinies of Europe, but which involves the fundamental moralities of international relationships.
    I should now like to touch upon one or two specific points which arise from the Prime Minister's statement to-day. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Mr. J. R. MacDonald) has already touched upon the question of Germany joining the League of Nations and being on the Council of the League. There are two vacancies in September, and one of those ought, in my opinion, to be filled by Germany, because it is obvious now to any man who studies the subject that, until Germany is in the League of Nations, you will never have an effective instrument for the reconstruction of Europe. I suggest that the British Government should make it quite clear that if Germany applies—and you can hardly expect any German Government to risk the affront of applying and being refused—that if Germany applies to be admitted to the Council of the League she will have the support of the British Government.

    1809
    Then I should like to accentuate another point upon which my hon. Friend touched—the point of time. How near Germany is to complete collapse it would be impossible to dogmatise about, but all those who are best informed realise that that collapse is imminent, and may come at any moment. The whole population is underfed, and, undoubtedly, unless Germany can, from some quarter or other, get short credits for food supplies, we may have the whole of Central Europe in an uproar within the next few weeks. Why our Government should not participate in providing such short credits I really fail to sec. If we set the example, it would be one which would be followed. The world is not yet dead to all sentiments of pity and justice, and a gesture from us would galvanise those sentiments into life. Above all I, for my part, much regret—and here I speak on my own responsibility, and do not commit my friends around me, although I have no doubt the majority will agree with my view—I much regret that, as I understood the Prime Minister's statement—if I have misunderstood him I stand open to correction—a portion of the Prime Minister's proposed reply to Germany consists in demanding that the German Government should rescind its decrees, its ordinances, concerning passive resistance.
    Lieut.-Colonel J. WARD: You do not agree with the resistance, do you?
    Mr. MOREL: If the hon. and gallant Member will contain his impatience for a moment, he will see exactly where I stand in the matter. Neither this German Government, nor any German Government which could conceivably follow it, could stop passive resistance in the Ruhr. That passive resistance comes from the breasts of the population, which has been traditionally anti-militarist from the beginning. The Westphalian miner has been so much opposed to militarism that, in the days of the old German régime, it was realised that it was a much better policy not to station troops in the Ruhr. The ordinances of the German Government are not the causation of passive resistance, but the consequence of determination of the working-class population of the Ruhr to resist dictation at the point of the bayonet. If the German Government had taken any other action than the action it actually did take there would have been chaos on the Ruhr and
    1810
    not passive resistance, but active resistance, and assuming the German Government withdrew the ordinances now chaos and active resistance would supervene in the Ruhr. I hope the Prime Minister will think twice and three times before he urges upon the German Government a course which would drive any German Government to suicide and which would let loose riot and bloodshed on a large scale in the Ruhr.
    I believe it should be said here in this House—and it can be more fittingly said by a back bencher than a front bencher—and I wish to place on record my belief in this respect in this House, as I have done outside its walls, that the stand made by the working class population of the Ruhr is the greatest demonstration of moral force as against military violence which history records. In the face of the most extreme provocation, despite petty insults and humiliations and vexations on every day, despite daily tyrannies, the closing of the schools, the commandeering of the hospitals, the holding up of traffic, telephones and telegraphs, the plunder of private property, the pillaging of pedestrians in the streets, cruel whippings in prison, the complete dislocation of civic life; without counting these wholesale, cruel expulsions carried out with a revolting cynicism shameful to those who ordered it—despite all this, the working class population of the Ruhr has kept its head and has maintained its resolve, and I say for my part that I am proud to think that any population in Europe, whatever its nationality, whatever its circumstances, should have proved the power of the human will over the sword. I am persuaded that the example of the working class population of the Ruhr will ring down the ages, as I am persuaded that at this moment the attitude of the population and its persistence in that attitude is the only thing that stands between the world and the establishment of a military and economic domination by a single power in Europe with the aftermath of war and of destruction which such a domination would infallibly entail.
    Lord COLUM CRICHTON-STUART: I am rising to address the House for the first time and I therefore crave that indulgence which I have often known given to other young Members. In my official life I have spent a good deal of my time in correspondence with the hon. Member

    1811
    who has just spoken, and I was always then, as I am now, deeply impressed with his sincerity, but I put forward the view that he does not correctly express the view of the great mass of the people of this country. The Leader of the Opposition said, as I think truly, that the great mass of the Members of this House are behind the Prime Minister; but another frame of mind also exists in this House. There is a distinct cleavage of opinion between those who more or less constantly are the supporters and the friends of French policy and those who are equally consistently the critics of France. I believe that the mass of public opinion outside this House will not accord with the two frames of mind of which I have spoken. Rather, the public incline to commend France for the amount of success which can be laid to the credit of the Ruhr policy, but on the other hand they feel a growing anxiety when they realise the general economic losses which have already been suffered as the result of that policy, and will be suffered, so long as that policy continues, in a growing degree. Public opinion was fairly convinced that the desire of the German Government and of the German people, before the occupation of the Ruhr, was to evade the payment of reparations, and they have been impressed very deeply by the change of tone which has been shown in Germany since the occupation of the Ruhr took place. Before the occupation there was a series of offers by Germany of payment of reparations. In none of those offers was the word guarantee ever mentioned. There was a second series of offers, and there, in two places, guarantees were offered in addition to certain sums which were mentioned and which differed from each other. First the magnates of the Ruhr offered to guarantee a certain part of the money which was said to be forthcoming, and then, secondly, the German Government themselves put forward an offer, which is now under discussion. That, I think, profoundly impressed the public.
    The action of France in the Ruhr has produced a very marked change in the attitude of Germany towards the payment of reparations. There is now in Germany a realisation of the absolute necessity that they shall be paid. Public opinion in this
    1812
    country also realises that it is of paramount importance that now that a certain degree of success has attended the policy of occupation in the Ruhr, that occupation should come to an end as soon as possible. A modification of the Ruhr policy, even in the minds of the best friends of France, appears now to be possible. It must be clear to the German people that though the occupation was to end to-morrow it would always be possible for the occupation to be renewed. Germany may be considered now to have learned a lesson.
    In the announcement made by the Prime Minister, the most unsatisfactory part appeared to me to be that in which reference was made to the omission by France of any mention of the suggestion put forward, that we should use our influence with the German Government to induce them to desist from supporting passive resistance in the Ruhr. In spite of that, it appears to me that no real change in the policy of His Majesty's Government would produce any better results than to continue in the line the Prime Minister has indicated. The further we move from the side of France the less chance there is that the occupation of the Ruhr will come to an end. If His Majesty's Government use their influence, in a series of separate negotiations with Germany, to induce the German Government to withdraw their official recognition and support of passive resistance, the position of His Majesty's Government will, if they succeed with Germany, be materially strengthened in approaching France in another and separate series of negotiations to induce France to begin to modify to some extent the policy of the Ruhr occupation.
    The attitude of Germany to passive resistance in the Ruhr seems to be the first obstacle to be removed. It is a point of honour with the French. His Majesty's Government will surely rather take the side of France in that respect than urge upon France the other alternative, which is for France to accept the proposition of Germany that passive resistance has been a success and that French policy has been defeated by that means. If His Majesty's Government is able to put before France the satisfaction of the withdrawal of German official support for passive resistance, together with other offers in the form of more definite guarantees, of

    1813
    bigger guarantees than have so far been offered, His Majesty's Government will be in a position to test the sincerity of France, because, if these offers are on the whole generally reasonable, if they are reasonable in the estimation of His Majesty's Government, it is probable that the whole of the nations of the world will also agree that they are reasonable. If France then refuses to consider the offers and makes no further sign than she has made hitherto, then it will be clear to our own people, and I am sure it is not clear yet, that there is a sinister and selfish motive behind the policy of France in the Ruhr. As a result of that, what is most important will be achieved by the Government, namely, that there will be behind the Government a unanimous public opinion besides the almost unanimous opinion of this House.
    The PRIME MINISTER: I should like to congratulate my Noble Friend the Member for Northwich (Lord C. Crichton-Stuart) on having got through so happily what is the most trying ordeal in the life of a young Member of this House, and on having made so interesting and important a contribution to the Debate. I hope that it will not be long before we may hear him taking part in Debate again.
    I fully appreciate the remarks which fell from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) when he said how difficult it was to conduct a Debate in the absence of the documentary evidence which is essential to a full under standing of so much that we are discussing to-day. But I can assure the House, and I hope they will agree with me, that it is only the circumstances of time itself that has defeated my desire to place everything I could before them to-day and the fact that the House is rising rather earlier than it has done in recent years, and that the latest part of this important correspondence was only received two or three nights ago. I have done my best in the statement which was prepared, and which I read, to give as much as was possible to show the course of the negotiations during the last couple of months, and I am afraid that with that to-day we must be content.
    I think it would be of some use to the House if I began by filling up the gap to which the hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Ramsay MacDonald) called our attention during
    1814
    his speech. He said he was curious to know what had occurred between the 7th June and the 12th July. Let me say this here. Some criticism has been passed to-day in the course of the Debate, on the late Prime Minister on the ground that in January last he took up a passive rather than an active line on the occasion of the proposed entrance into the Ruhr. It is always, perhaps, more easy after the event to say what a man should do. He was in an extremely difficult position, and think, having regard to the facts of the time, he took the right course and the course that I think would have been taken by many of his old and his present colleagues For, after all, what was it he did? He might easily have precipitated a breach in the Entente. He stated in the most explicit and precise terms what his objection was, and he gave his reasons for that objection, but, at the same time, he strained to the uttermost his well-known affection for France and his loyalty to the Allies and prepared to wait for a time a spectator of events, knowing quite well that such an action must have exposed himself to the criticisms to which he was subject and to which naturally he is subject to-day. It was quite obvious that that passivity could only be temporary, and had he remained in office he must have brought that period of passivity to a close. So it was that when I succeeded him I felt at once that the time had come to make an attempt to move forward and to bring, if possible, to a termination, a state of things which appears to everyone in this House to hold within it the seeds of unhappy and possibly terrible events in the future. Therefore, we lost no time, and immediately after receiving the German Note of the 7th June we issued, within six days, a questionnaire to our Allies to elucidate certain points upon which it was necessary that we should have information before we could see clearly on what lines we could proceed with the greatest hopes of success in replying, or suggesting a reply to the German Note. It was on the 13th June that we issued that questionnaire. It was not until the 3rd July that we received a reply from Belgium and until the 6th July that we received a reply from the French. Without delay, we prepared a covering Note to our Allies, a Note which covered a draft

    1815
    reply to Germany which we had hoped might, at any rate, have been taken as the basis of a reply from the United Allies. We had the two Notes ready to be despatched by the 20th July. On the evening of the 30th July we received the French and Belgian replies, which were translated and circulated to the Cabinet on the 31st July, which was only the day before yesterday. Therefore, I think the House will agree that, whether our procedure was right or not, no time has been lost by this Government in the last two months in taking, at any rate, preliminary steps which seemed good to us to find a way out of the impasse into which we had drifted.
    There was one good thing about our actual passivity. I think it showed with utmost clearness how ardent our desire was to maintain the old relationship with our Allies. We sacrificed something to prove that. We also allowed time to elapse to prove whether our contention or the contention of our Allies as to the efficacy of the method of attaining the common end which we have in view, was justifiable or not. While that has been to the good, there has been one bad thing about this delay. The silence of Great Britain has led many people, not only in the world at large but in Great Britain, to overlook the interests of our country. We must remember that we are allies, that our interests are no less and no more than those of France and Belgium, and that as Allies we have an equal right to declare our views; but it cannot be expected amongst allies any more than amongst friends that we should always regard a thing from the same point of view. When a difference arises between allies, as between friends, it is far better and far more honest to state frankly where the differences arise and what the reasons are for them, knowing that by that method you are more likely to come to an ultimate agreement than if you try to hide them and gloss them over.
    I must say, although I sympathise with a great deal of what was said by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Burton (Colonel Gretton) that it is a little surprising to find an hon. Member holding the views which I know he does, and a Member of what I may perhaps term the extreme right falling into the
    1816
    same mistake that hon Members who sit on the extreme left have always fallen into, and that is in assuming that when a difference of opinion arises between this country and another it must necessarily be this country that is wrong, and the other country that is right. I deprecate from the bottom of my heart in a discussion of this kind such phrases as pro-French and pro-German. They only confuse the issue and they cause irritation. If we are to be pro- anything, let us be pro-British.
    On this point I think I ought to make a few observations, not in detail, but speaking generally and broadly—regarding rather the wood than the trees—on the Ruhr position, and what it means, so that both our own people and our Allies may understand where the real difference of opinion comes. We regard the Ruhr policy as not well calculated to achieve the common end which we have in view. Our Allies regard it as a good method to achieve that end. That is a perfectly honest and genuine difference of opinion as to methods, whereas we both agree that what we want is to secure the payment of adequate reparations, and that as soon as may be. The reason that I doubt the wisdom, or am certain of the unwisdom, of the Ruhr occupation is, that in my view it postpones, by its very length, the payment of reparations, and it is hurting, directly and cumulatively, through the progress of time, the trade of this country and the trade of the world. There has been a good deal of nonsense talked on this subject by people who imperfectly comprehend it, but I think that no one will controvert the few statements that I propose to make.
    It would be untrue to say to-day that the cause of the unemployment that we have in this country is due primarily to the Ruhr occupation. That is an exaggeration on the one side. The Ruhr occupation is an unhappy symptom of the diseases which are inherent to-day in so many nations of the world. The direct cause of the unemployment is due to the impoverishment of the world, which has made it so difficult for countries and individuals to afford to make the payment for goods whch they want, or to find means of making those payments. But it is true to say that the occupation of the Ruhr is now beginning to be felt in the trade of the world, and that the longer it lasts the more heavily and grievously

    1817
    will it be felt, and for this reason, that there is no isolated unit in the industrial life of the world. To take the old threadbare analogy of the machine, the trade machine of the world, you stop a part of it from functioning and the whole suffers. You have a contraction of trade in the Ruhr going on, as we know, to-day, and the result of that contraction is felt on the wires between Liverpool and Calcutta and between Liverpool and Valparaiso. India, supporting one of the largest populations of any country in the world, with a good monsoon and every prospect of enjoying favourable terms of exportation, finds that neither with her jute, her hides, her seeds or her rice has she her accustomed markets in Central Europe. The reaction of that is two-fold and means the cessation of progress and prosperity in India. It means that India will be poorer than otherwise she would be, and it means that Lancashire suffers. In the same way, the inability of Germany now to take nitrates from Chile is bringing the Chilian national trade to a deadlock, and we find that, as the situation gets worse, the difficulty of providing credits for the payment of imports into Germany is beginning, or soon will begin, to tell on our own coal trade, because at this moment the Germans are seeking to find means of financing the import trade into Hamburg for coal. Similarly, the reaction will go right across the world to Australia. You will find the same thing happening with the importation of Australian wool into Germany.
    That is what is happening, and we are told by some superficial observers, "Oh, yes, but it is a very good thing for British trade." But it is not a good thing for British trade. The few orders here and there that we may be getting are no compensation for the orders that we are losing in international trade. And what else is going on? The liquid capital of Germany is being reduced—her gold—and her industrial shares are passing into the hands of foreigners. All of which will make it more difficult to get reparations when the time comes, and meantime Belgium has to watch the docks at Antwerp becoming less and less occupied. Where is this leading to? The circumstances are unprecedented, and there is no one who can foretell what the result will be of a collapse or a surrender, which some of our friends tell us is a necessary
    1818
    preliminary to the recovery of reparations. It has been said in this House to-day that our action is strengthening German resistance. We want to do nothing to strengthen German resistance, because we know well that the longer Germany resists the more hopeless will be the position afterwards. We want a settlement and quickly, but what is going to happen if and when the collapse of Germany comes, a collapse the nature of which no one can foresee?
    We know one thing, that whatever it means it will mean less reparations. We know another thing, that it will mean a longer time before Germany's financial system can be restored. And I fear very much another thing, that if it be a collapse or a surrender that is caused by a feeling that anything is better than a continuance of what is going on now, then what will happen will be that Germany will sign an agreement, and she will default again, and we must look forward to an endless chain of events similar to those of the last few years. It is because we feel that so strongly that the Government are using every endeavour, and have not yet given up hope of success to secure such unity among the Allies as may lead to a quick and a final settlement. If, however, a settlement were made—and I only want to say a word or two about this because it has been alluded to to-day and is often on the lips of men—you may he faced in the future with a very strong industrial Germany. You cannot have it both ways. You must either have a broken country that will pay no reparations, which will leave the trade of the world in such a state that it will become the work of a generation to make good and find new fields of industry, or you must have a Germany that will be powerful industrially and that will pay adequate reparations.
    3.0 P.M.
    There is no choice between those, but let us remember this, that just as Germany may prosper and just as she may be charged with reparations so in proportion to those reparations will she have to have an export trade, and one of two things will happen. Either we shall have again some of the most serious competition which we have ever had to face or else such an increase in the trade of the world throughout the world that the amount of exports which will arise to

    1819
    meet reparations can be absorbed nationally, and that is what we must hope to see. But where do we hope to see room and scope for such absorption? The largest potential market in Europe is Russia, and sooner or later that market will be opened, sooner or later the German exports will go largely into Russia, because in the past Germany has been the country most familiar with trading in Russia and most competent to conduct it. I see, in the future, that Russia may act as a shock absorber, to take from the world production of increased trade so much of the exports of Germany as will allow the German portion to be absorbed in the whole without causing us the apprehension to which I have just given expression. But, when the time comes—and I believe, as I said, that it will come, that Russia slowly begins to move in the domain of trade again—I do not believe myself that she can make much real progress until that stretch of Europe lying to the west of her is financially sound and whole. Therefore, with this settlement which we are seeking so earnestly and with a whole heart is not only wrapped up the financial stability of Central Europe but, in my view, financial stability, and all that goes with it and lies behind it, of all Europe from the centre eastwards.
    There is only one more thing I want to say before I sit down. I am sure the House will understand that at this moment, when the Government have to take into consideration the form of reply to the last Notes which they have only just received, it will be quite impossible for me to attempt to canvas the various lines upon which it might be possible for us to answer. I will only say this, and I will ask the House to believe me, that I realise to the full that the Government of the day, in dealing with these matters, is not merely the Government of one party, but is a Government which, for the time being, is speaking in the name of the whole nation, and that we shall not leave a stone unturned to do, what we have tried to do in our first Notes, and that is to bring together and to keep together the whole Allied forces; to secure from Germany what is due to us in justice; and to secure a settlement fully and finally at the earliest day possible. That will be our endeavour,
    1820
    and I may add that should at any time there arise any crisis in our relations—which, indeed, I pray God may not arise—I should not hesitate to call Parliament together at whatever time that might be.
    There is one more thing which I think I must say, because I think it is only fair to our own people and to our Allies, and because it is no mark of true friendship to refrain from pointing out where you can see that the real danger may lie. I have always acted on the assumption that the object of our Allies in pursuing their Ruhr policy is to secure reparations, as is our object. It has often been stated that there are ulterior motives. I do not desire to believe that, but if that be so, I would say just this. Deep down in every British heart, irrespective of party, lies a profound sense of what they believe to be right. It is a thing upon which they do not argue, but they feel it, and it is one of the most potent forces in our lives. It was the force that took this nation into the War, and the force that kept them there till the end. If the British people should feel, after a lapse of time, that the wounds of Europe were being kept open instead of being healed, there might then easily ensue the last thing in the world that I would like to see, and that would be an estrangement of heart between our people and those who take the opposite view. I hope, and I believe, that nothing of the kind will ever happen; but, as one who is and always has been a warm friend of France, who desires to and who means to work with her to the utmost limit of my power, I think it is only a mark of friendship to say what I have just said; and it is because I want that friendship to last that I want a rapid settlement of these troubles that are tormenting Europe to-day.
    Mr. MOSLEY: In the course of this Debate we have listened to two long statements from the Prime Minister of this country, but in the course of both those statements he has declined to answer the great question of this Debate, which has been put to him in several speeches from this side of the House, and which is, "What are you going to do next?" The Prime Minister indulged in a very interesting analysis of the economic situation, with which very few people on this side of the House, I imagine, would be found to disagree; although, from the speeches to which we

    1821
    have listened from the other side, there would probably be found a good many people to disagree with him among his own supporters. On this side, however, there are few people who will disagree with the economic analysis which was the entire feature of the right hon. Gentleman's speech. That analysis, and the unhappy spectacle of the little family quarrel, comprised the statement of the Prime Minister at this grave hour. I was happy, at any rate, that he did repudiate the doctrines of the hon. and gallant Member for Burton (Colonel Gretton). He accused him, in a taunt with which we are all familiar, of voicing the opinions of another country, and I was almost in hopes that the Prime Minister would say to his supporters, "You are the friends of every country but your own." That taunt would have had such a familiar ring. It would have been rather a solace to some of us who have suffered much from gibes of that nature. Apart from his analysis, and from the quarrel, which I welcome, with that die-hard element which I am afraid has too long impeded the progress of this country—apart from that stand on the part of the Prime Minister, which we all so gladly welcome, what has he told us of the next stage in the policy of this country? He said, in effect, that he had only just received these Notes, and this refusal of France to consider even the proposals of Great Britain, and that, consequently, he had not been able to formulate a policy. But did the Prime Minister go into this matter only seeing one move ahead? Did he not think out his policy in advance? Did he never envisage the prospect of the Prime Minister of France refusing to consider the proposal of the British Government to establish an inquiry into Germany's capacity and to revise the reparations schemes? Is this the first time that the dawn of such knowledge has appeared to the Prime Minister?? Did he think that France would immediately accede to his request, and did he seriously come down to this House to say that he had not thought out any other policy of any kind—to make this statement to us before the long Autumn Adjournment?
    In what a situation does it place this House? We are asked to adjourn until 13th November, and in the interval we
    1822
    may find the whole of the great economic system of Europe crashing and dissolving in a welter of blood, and we leave the Prime Minister of this country sitting on that Bench saying that he has not as yet formulated any plan or policy whatsoever to deal with the situation. So far, he has been pursuing a policy of trying to persuade France to adopt a more reasonable frame of mind. That is not a new policy. It is one which was adopted by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) and others, during the last four years. They have all tried to persuade France to take a reasonable view of the situation. The publication of the Papers and letters which have passed, and which the Prime Minister thinks is going to have such a great effect on world opinion, will merely inform the world of a point upon which we imagined it had already been informed, namely, that there is a disagreement of opinion upon the reparations problem between this country and France. That is the only concrete contribution to a solution of this question which the Prime Minister has announced in the course of this Debate. Clearly that is a situation which may be viewed with grave apprehension and with the greatest disappointment throughout the length and breadth of the land. If I may vary a familiar phrase, for some months past the mountains have been in labour, and even the ridiculous mouse, which bitter experience led us to anticipate, is stillborn.
    Lieut.-Colonel J. WARD: Still being born!
    Mr. PRINGLE: It looks as if it were very protracted labour.
    Mr. MOSLEY: Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will say if we are to have any inkling of any sort—

    ROYAL ASSENT.
    Message to attend the Lords Commissioners.
    The House went, and, having returned,
    Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to—

    1. Appropriation Act, 1923.

    2. Dentists Act, 1923.

    3. Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1923

    4. Education (Institution Children) Act, 1923.

    1823

    5. Agricultural Rates Act, 1923.

    6. Merchant Shipping Acts (Amendment) Act, 1923.

    7. Town Councils (Scotland) Act, 1923.

    8. Robert Gordon's Colleges and Aberdeen Endowments Trust Order Confirmation Act, 1923.

    9. Broadstairs and St. Peter's Urban District Council Act, 1923.

    10. Chelmsford Corporation Water Act, 1923.

    11. Croydon Corporation Act, 1923.

    12. Wakefield Corporation Act, 1923.

    13. West Somerset Mineral Railway (Abandonment) Act, 1923.

    14. West Hartlepool Corporation Act, 1923.

    15. Shropshire, Worcestershire and Staffordshire Electric Power Act, 1923.

    16. Wimbledon and Sutton Railway Act, 1923.

    17. West Riding of Yorkshire County Council (Drainage) Act, 1923.

    18. Chesterfield Corporation Act, 1923.

    19. Nottingham Corporation Act, 1923.

    20. City and South London Railway Act, 1923.

    21. Torquay Corporation Act, 1923.

    22. London Electric Railway Act, 1923.

    23. Chatham Corporation Act, 1923.

    24. Morley Corporation Act, 1923.

    25. Macclesfield Corporation Act, 1923.

    26. Stoke-on-Trent Corporation Act, 1923.

    RUHR AND EUROPEAN SITUATION.
    Question again proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."
    Mr. MOSLEY: I was trying to emphasise, as has already been emphasised, the urgency of the factor of time in this consideration. As I endeavoured to point out, prior to the reassembly of Parliament, the very gravest situation, an irreparable situation, may have arisen upon the Continent of Europe, and I was therefore trying to urge upon His Majesty's Government that whatever measures they may see fit to adopt should be adopted at the very earliest possible moment. So far, there is a grave suspicion that the Government of France have been playing for time, and that our Government have been
    1824
    playing into their hands in that endeavour. We find M. Poincaré engaged with one hand in smashing to pieces the last vestiges of our great European markets, while with the other hand he is throwing diplomatic bouquets to this country, and something more is required of our statesmanship than to catch those bouquets and to throw them back. That is the pastime which in the past has been called preserving the Entente, and it is a game the expenses of which are paid by the people who walk our streets in starvation.
    The French view is, that even if Germany collapses, if chaos supervenes in Europe, that is all for the benefit of France. Her problems, of security, will then be solved. There will be no more danger of a German menace. There is also the view that in this way, by a system of organised loot operating in chaos, she stands as much chance of getting reparation as in any case, and so the view is held that, whatever happens, France scores and England loses. She gets security, and as much reparation as she will ever get, and we lose our markets and our last chance of obtaining reparation from a coherent and ordered Government in Germany. Therefore, we cannot afford, as the French Government believe they can afford, to let the situation drift on until chaos and anarchy supervene on the Continent of Europe. What are the Government going to do in this situation? They have tried the method of persuading France to take a reasonable point of view, a method which, from the outset, was doomed to failure by one very simple consideration. It stood to reason that if there was to be any solution of reparations on the lines we desire, that is, a cessation of economic vandalism in Europe, someone had got to tell the French people that, as a result of their Ruhr intervention, they would obtain not more, but less, by way of reparation, and you always get back to that fundamental factor. To talk of all these formulae of a cessation of passive resistance, of invisible occupation, and all the rest of it—these are the formulae in which statesmen in difficulties wrap themselves like silkworms in their cocoons. They mean nothing. You always get back to the fundamental fact that, as a result of the Ruhr occupation, France will not get more, but less, and there is no French statesman who can go

    1825
    to his countrymen and enlighten them upon that point without being overthrown the next day.
    Therefore, a mere policy of trying to persuade France must always be doomed to failure, because no French statesman can afford to be reasonable. You have got to devise some policy which, in some way, saves the face of French statesmanship, or induces or compels the French nation to reason. As I conceive, there are two possible methods by which that might be done. The first is release France from inter-Allied debts, surrender your share of reparation, in fact do everything which the Government are refusing to do. That would mean that the occupation of the Ruhr had not broken the passive resistance of the German Government, but had broken the passive resistance of the British Government. We may well come to that. It may be a feasible policy. It may be possible to bribe the French out of the Ruhr. There is another policy, which has been urged time after time from these benches, and which the Government have always rejected, and that is the policy of mobilising world opinion, morally and economically, through the League of Nations, employing Article 11 of the League, and organising such an array of righteous force throughout the world that no one Power, however powerful, could afford to stand up against it. I believe those practical policies might be used in conjunction one with another with success—a measure of generous financial provision in conjunction with economic and moral pressure through the League of Nations. I very much doubt if this Government can use either method. They cannot be generous with their debts, or surrender their debts; their supporters will not allow it. The right hon. Member for the Hillhead Division of Glasgow (Sir R. Home) came down yesterday and conjured up a terrible picture of releasing Germany from its obligations, and said that Germany, by the policy of inflation, had put itself in such a position that it could challenge the industrial supremacy of Europe. As I listened to him, and heard the magnificent result of a policy of inflation, I was tempted to inquire why, during his tenure of office, he had pursued a policy of acute deflation. On
    1826
    some occasion I should very much like the right hon. Gentleman to enlighten us upon the point. With the views prevailing on those benches, we are unlikely to give any generous settlement on the lines of surrendering some of our claims to debt and reparation. There is also not much chance of the alternative policy being pursued. Many Members opposite do not believe in the League of Nations and certainly not in its being called into this dispute, and, in fact, in the statements made by the Prime Minister a few weeks ago and today there has not been one reference to the League of Nations, or any probability that the problem is likely to be handed over to its jurisdiction.
    What is the policy which this Government is likely to pursue before Parliament re-assembles? We have seen that policy adumbrated to a certain extent in the inspired Press. It is, apparently, if they are going to do anything at all, a policy of proceeding single-handed and trying to impose by various means, mostly by persuasion, the will of this country upon France. If we fail in that, we are, apparently, to do some separate deal with Germany. We are to muddle along in a single-handed fashion, trying to scrape what we can for ourselves out of the European mess. I believe that to be a policy full of peril. I believe it is a policy of stroking the nettle instead of grasping it, with the result that we are likely to be very badly stung. Supposing France said, "Any separate dealings with Germany are a breach of your obligations under the Treaty of Versailles, and we regard it as a hostile act," we may, in the irresponsible position of the back benches, envisage these prospects. What will happen then? This country may be put to the most humiliating diplomatic reverse in the whole of its history. That is a very dangerous policy fraught with peril. I believe that what appears the bolder policy, which has been rejected so consistently from the Government benches, the policy of bringing this matter forward under Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, instead of trying to impose our own will in a single-handed policy, is the only feasible policy, the sanest policy, the policy which holds out by far the greatest prospect of success. France could not say it is a hostile act. We have a friendly right under the Covenant.

    1827
    She must automatically consent to that inquiry, which, by the method of the old diplomacy, she is now frustrating. Directly the matter comes under the Council, it is in the light of day, and the country must defend its position, in front of the full glare of world opinion, to the nations of the world. You may say France may break her obligation under the Covenant, and, incidentally, the Treaty of Versailles, because the Covenant was part of that Treaty.
    But does anyone seriously suggest that the French nation is going to break with the world, to put themselves in an unreasonable and a hopeless position in an issue of this sort? She shows a particular anxiety at the moment not to do anything of the sort, an anxiety not to have a break, to play for time; above all, not to be isolated from that little country Belgium. When we observe her frantic efforts to keep Belgium on her side, can anyone say she would be prepared to break with every great country in the world. I do not believe France would pursue any such policy. I believe that, whatever be the motives of France, this represents the safest and most feasible policy of this country. She may accede to a League policy. She cannot accede to an English policy, and justify herself to her own people. No French statesman could possibly do that. The League policy no doubt holds out the best hopes of success whatever view we may take of the motion of M. Poincare. If he is a man who has been driven too far, and in reality knows in his innermost soul of the failure of his own plan, this gives him the chance to save his face with his own people. By the intervention of the machinery of the League of Nations he may be enabled to say to his people that his policy had succeeded, but that this intervention had robbed them of the fruits of victory—it would save his face. He might abuse us in public, but thank us in private. This would be a diversion and a distraction of which he may stand in need. Supposing on the other hand his designs are more sinister and he is aiming at the break-up of Germany—at smashing the economic position of Europe, well, then, in the face of such a criminal and outrageous design you would mobilise whatever police force there is in the world. There are other advantages.
    1828
    You are breaking away from all those ghastly traditions of Secret Diplomacy which over and over again have inundated the world with blood, by bringing the whole thing out into the plain light you are exposing it so that it may be publicly discussed. You are putting those who object into the position of defending their position. You are organising all the great and peaceful opinion of the nations which exists throughout the world, in every people, amongst the simple and ordinary people.
    I hope the Government will cease playing this sinister game of chess with France in which the destinies of millions of people are involved, and instead take their case into the high court of the world, and have it decided in what should be the great tribunal of the nations. There are two distinct and absolutely different methods of doing these things. There is the new method, the League method, and there is the old method by which diplomatists creep from Foreign Offices to Foreign Offices in the dark, and we find a handful of men taking great decisions which might affect millions of the people in privacy and secrecy. So we will in this way drift back to a system which may mean that the whole world may be ultimately aflame with war. I would beg the Government to break with these old vicious methods, and to try the new method which, at least, has never been tried, in the place of the old method which has been tried and found wanting; to come forward in the full light of day and to trust the will of the ordinary people of the world to fight their battle on the side and in the cause of peace. If they do that, they may yet emblazon the pages of history with the glory of their achievement.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I am very reluctant to intervene in this Debate. I realise what are the difficulties of any Government dealing with this problem. It is assumed, perhaps too readily, that the British Goernment can always take a course in reference to foreign policy on the same lines as they can in regard to their domestic policy. That is not the case. Anyone who had to deal with problems which involve the interests, traditions, and prejudices of four or five other countries knows how exceedingly difficult it is to pursue the policy

    1829
    which he conceives to be the best. In this particular problem you have got to carry along with you France, Belgium, and Italy; occasionally you have got to consider the United States of America, although they are not there to present their views. Each of these countries has got a different point of view. It has got a different interest in the problem of reparation. It has got a different fundamental view in regard to its attitude towards Germany, and having had several years' experience of trying to work well with these various countries, I am not disposed to go out of my way to blame any Government that fails to secure complete unanimity. I am not getting up for the purpose of doing so. What I am disappointed at is, that the Government have not taken the House of Commons and the country more into their confidence as to what they are going to do. I believe that to be the right course. When I listened to the speech of the hon. Member for Aberavon (Mr. J. R. MacDonald) I thought that he knew a good deal more than anybody else in the House of Commons. I assumed he did because there was nothing in the statement of the Prime Minister that justified in the least the assumpion which he drew in regard to the policy of the Government.
    So I thought the Leader of the Opposition might have been taker into the confidence of the Prime Minister, and be informed of what their policy really was His eagle eye seems to have discovered a definite policy. My perception is much too dim to discover anything approaching a definite policy. I am really at a loss to know, after listening twice to the Prime Minister, and with some inside knowledge of what the problem means, I am utterly at a loss to know what is the policy of the Government. So far as I can see, there is only one announcement which the Prime Minister made, and that was that he proposed to publish the whole of the correspondence if he had the assent of the Allies to that course. But what is the next step? That question was put by the Leader of the Opposition and by several other hon. Members. It has been put in the speech of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Harrow (Mr. Mosley). The Prime Minister in his reply has not given—if he will forgive me for saying so—the slightest indication to the country what the Government means to do.
    Major Sir KEITH FRASER: Wait and see!
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I should have thought the present Government would never have championed a policy of that kind, but, at any rate, what does it mean? In so far as the Prime Minister in his reply gave any indication at all as to his course of action, it was that he will continue his negotiations with a view to secure unity. Is it not really better that he should recognise the facts? [An HON. MEMBER: "Very much better!"] The French Government have definitely declared what is their policy. There has been no concealment. There is no secret diplomacy. The French Prime Minister has been very emphatic and has spoken with his usual lucidity and force upon the subject, and every time he has spoken he has made it as clear as words can make it what is going to be the policy, and that he does not propose to negotiate with Germany until she capitulates.
    The second point is, I think, more formidable. I never thought the first was insuperable myself; but the second point I consider to be an important one—that France will not leave the Ruhr until the last payment has been made. Monsieur Poincare has not deviated from that. Questionaires have been addressed to him. Notes have been sent. There have been conversations between the Foreign Offices, but Monsieur Poincare has never deviated from that. What more can you do? Having declared his policy in the French Parliament, and received the overwhelming support of his Parliament, and that Parliament having separated after a declaration of that kind, does the Government imagine that it is going by a process of sending some more Notes to make France deviate from a policy of that kind? She certainly could not do it. It is purely a question of the psychology of the thing. No Prime Minister who ever made a declaration of that kind to his Parliament could afterwards withdraw from it. Is it not far better that he should accept the situation, accept the declaration of France as to his intentions, and proceed upon that basis. The Government know perfecly well what the French policy is. The reply is, I understand, rather brusque, and it does not take any notice of our questionnaire or vouchsafes any answer, but it is perfectly clear that the French Government mean

    1831
    To adhere to their policy of occupying the Ruhr until the last farthing of reparations is paid.
    In view of that, what is our policy? I am very loth to press the Government upon something which I know must be a very embarrassing situation, but it is no use pretending. There were two things done to put them in that position, and which makes it very difficult for them to get out if it. The Government are more or less in the position France was in when she resfused to go in with us into Egypt. France afterwards tried to get back upon that, but she never did, and she was finally ruled out. We are now in the same position with regard to the Ruhr. We have allowed France to go in alone. We practically said to her, "We hope you will succeed." Now we are trying to go back upon that policy, and you cannot do it. Quite frankly, it is not fair to France. That is more or less the position Italy has been in. Italy approved of France's entrance into the Ruhr, but they have since realised their mistake, but the French flag is committed. It is all very well to say, "You French have made a mistake and you must withdraw," but the French flag is there, and the honour of the country is involved, and we must not overlook those questions which, although they appear sentimental ones, are really fundamental things which very often govern nations. What is the Government going to do in the face of that situation? First of all they allow France to go into the Ruhr.
    Mr. MOREL: You let France go into the Ruhr.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I am quite willing to enter into a discussion of that question when the proper time comes, but the position is absolutely different now. I never said that the occupation of the Ruhr was something which ought to be ruled out as a sanction. I never said it in the past, and I do not say it now. I say that there are conditions which, if Germany refused to carry out the Treaty of Versailles, and carry out the conditions fairly and favourably, the occupation of the Ruhr by all the Powers would be justifiable. But that is a different thing. Here was an occupation which was an illegal one, and which the Law Officers of the Crown would declare to be illegal, and which our representative on the Reparations Commission advised and declared to
    1832
    be illegal, but that is a totally different situation.
    Mr. J. JONES: You never protested against it.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I did protest against it from the very first moment, but you have to take the situation as it is now. [An HON. MEMBER: "Which you created."] I did not create it. During the whole time I had any responsibility France was kept out of the Ruhr.
    Mr. MOREL Mr. MOREL indicated dissent.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: The hon. Member was allowed to make his speech without interruption, and the reason was that no one took any interest in it. I hope, Mr. Speaker, that I shall be allowed to develop the point which I am making. My first point was that the Ruhr was entered by France with the consent of the majority of the Allies. The second mistake was that the proposal of Mr. Secretary Hughes was not adopted. It-was made a few days before the meeting in Paris, and it was obviously made with a view to influencing the policy which the Government have adopted. It has been adopted by Germany and by the Pope in that great document. It has been adopted by the Government, but it has been adopted six months too late. That is the position which has been created by these two fundamental mistakes, but here we are.
    Before we meet again one of two things may have happened. The first is the collapse of Germany and the other is the capitulation of Germany. What is our policy in face of either of those alternatives? We really ought to know, because Parliament may have separated. The Prime Minister says he will summon Parliament if any great decision is to be taken. Does he mean that before he declares the policy of this country he will summon Parliament in order to ratify it? What is the meaning of that declaration? Before a definite reply is given to France is Parliament to be summoned to consider it? If not, what is the object? If Germany collapses France is in possession of the Ruhr. She is in possession of the whole of the coal, the whole of the iron, and practically the-most important coal and iron deposits in Europe.
    Mr. J. JONES: That is what they are quarrelling about.
    4.0 P.M.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Take the second alternative, that is, capitulation. What does capitulation mean? It might mean that the coal and iron interests might combine, and there would be a formidable combination of French and German magnates in the same syndicate.
    Mr. J. JONES: And you want to go in.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I really ought to be allowed to complete my argument without these interruptions. What is our policy in regard to that? Do we propose to take any steps to stop it or to control it—for the protection of our own industry? I really think that before Parliament separates we ought to have some declaration from the Government with regard to what they mean to do in the face of this position. The situation is one of the most serious with which we have ever been confronted. No one can doubt that. Take the speech delivered by the President of the Board of Trade the other day, in which he practically predicted that six months hence we shall be worse off than we are to-day. Take the position with regard to the prestige of this country. Here is a question in which we are financially involved.
    Mr. JONES: Ah!
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Why not? We have got an interest in Reparations. I am not one of those who think that Germany ought not to pay fair reparation. I never have been. I believe she can do it. I believe the method of making her do it was indicated in the proposals we put forward in August last, and I again ask the Prime Minister a question which was put to him by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham (Mr. Austen Chamberlain), whether he will not publish the report of that Conference?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I intended to answer that question. I will look into it at once. My impression is that the time has come when it can be published.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I am very glad to hear that. This was part of the series of Conferences that ended in January. The August Conference was adjourned till November. The November Conference was adjourned till January; therefore it is part of the same transaction, and I believe the late Prime Minister did give
    1834
    a promise that the Report should be published. The House of Commons will see, when it is published, there was a proposal put forward which would have enabled Germany to pay, in proportion to her increasing prosperity, compensation for the damage which she inflicted wantonly upon the Allied nations, by means of proposals that there should be a levy upon her exports, that the amount should be paid into a separate account, into a clearing house in the name of the Allies, and after the amount had been collected in gold, in a very short time, if German exports increased, we should have been collecting a very large sum of money towards the payment of Reparations.
    Mr. JONES: In gold?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Yes, in gold, or the equivalent of gold. If hon. Members had taken the trouble to study this question—[Interruption]. My hon. Friend, I assume, pretended to know far more than I did, as otherwise he would not have risen to instruct me. But here you are. That money could have been collected if there had been agreement upon that point, and I ask the Government to see that that document is published. I am seriously concerned about the position into which we have got. Never in my recollection has the Government of this country got into quite the same position in reference to European policy. Here is a question which intimately concerns us, our trade, our commerce, our finance, our position in Europe. We are not consulted. The French Government, when we send them a Note, take no notice of the questions we put. Therefore, having regard to the effects upon our trade and upon our commerce, which are getting worse instead of better, and having regard to the position which we hold in Europe, and to the great part that we played in the War, I ask that, before this Debate concludes, the Government should take this House, and through this House the country, into its confidence, and state definitely and clearly what its policy is.

    TURKEY (PEACE TREATY).
    Captain WEDGWOOD BENN: Turning from the situation in the Ruhr to the Treaty of Lausanne, one cannot help being struck with the satire of the situation. The Germans and the Turks alike

    1835
    were our enemies. The Debate this afternoon has turned entirely upon extracting reparations from the Germans. The Turks were our enemies, and I have yet to learn from the Government that we intend to extract any reparations from them. It is almost an obsession with the Foreign Office to treat the Russians as pariahs because they refuse to acknowledge their debts. The Turks, however, refuse to acknowledge their debts, and they have put our traders in a position of inferiority in which they have not been for 350 years, but, as to reparations, we never mention them. As to arms, we say: "Pray take back the stores of arms which you have accumulated against us, or even seized from our own Allies. As to ships, by some oversight or excess of zeal on the part of our Navy some of your ships were seized; we beg you to receive them back"; and so far from adopting the attitude we have adopted towards Russia, on account of their treatment of a few of our nationals, the Turks, who have tortured and exterminated a nation, are begged by the Foreign Secretary to remember that old friendship which still burns in our hearts for them, and to come into the League of Nations. It only shows what a great deal of difference our material interests make to the moral attitude that we assume.
    I know that the Under-Secretary may say: "This is not the fault of the present Government. We have inherited the difficulties of the Turks, and, if you have any criticism or blame, you must give the criticism or blame to the right hon. Gentleman who has just resumed his seat." That is not a complete answer. It is a complete answer for him as an individual, I admit, because I cannot recollect, in the last Parliament, any particularly cordial assistance that he gave to the late Prime Minister; but it is not an answer to hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House, many of whom entered the House in 1918 on the nomination of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), and, moreover, many of whom rashly pressed on the then Government the very policy which was responsible for the disastrous results which we now see. We have, however, had, at least, a continuity of personnel in the Foreign Office. There is no change there. They have enjoyed one guiding hand for the last three or
    1836
    four years, and, whatever mutinies, revolts and revolutions have taken place in the party represented on these benches to-day, the Foreign Secretary has never, during that whole time, for one moment forgotten his duty to himself. And so it comes about that the same stately figure which brandished the Treaty of Sevres at the permanently humiliated Turk, came in, if I may be permitted the expression, on all fours to offer the Turks the capitulation of Lausanne. Let me recall for one moment the aims which we ourselves advertised as being those with which we engaged in war with Turkey. When we were asked by the United States what our aims were, we, if I may say so, let ourselves go. We were aiming at setting free the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks and turning out of Europe the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilisation. That was the reply of the Government. What have we got? I divide the results under two heads—the material and the moral results. As regards the material results I will say a word about trade and about what is, I believe, contended to be a great achievement, the freedom of the Straits, and on the moral side I want to say a word about the position of the smaller nations, the Greeks, Armenians and Bulgarians. On the material and the moral side—or perhaps some people would call it the material and the immaterial—first about trade. Of course we have only just had the papers. I realise the difficulties and we welcome the papers which have appeared to-day, though they were too late for us really to read them with any care. We have had to rely on newspaper reports and, of course, the earlier and very copious Blue Book which appeared in April. But as regards our traders, they have lost, as we understand, all the juridical privileges which they have enjoyed since 1583 and they find themselves not in a position to carry on trade on what I may call a Western method in Turkey but forced to pursue their ends by methods which I need not enumerate or describe, but which are-more suitable to a barbaric or Oriental country. In fact they have gone back 350 years in their status. I pause to ask the hon. Gentleman this question. What further humiliation could have been inflicted upon the trade of this country if the Turks had won the War instead of

    1837
    ourselves winning it? I cannot imagine that they could have done any more than to have put us back into that position.
    I pass to the second material question—the question of the freedom of the Straits. This freedom of the Straits was a battle cry, or watchword. I do not know who invented it. I think it was invented by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs. So potent was its force that many people accepted it as being an end desirable in itself without examining very closely what it really meant. As I understand it, there are three possible courses. First of all the Straits might be closed. I am speaking, of course, of warships. Commerce is not really concerned. That is the position which we ourselves advocated before the War and have supported even with our arms since 1840 or 1841. The second possibility was that the Black Sea might be demilitarised. That is a suggestion which, I understand, either was or might have been put forward by the Russian delegates at the Conference, and I imagine would have been a policy very grateful to this country, which desires to be rid of the enormous cost of supporting heavy armaments. The third possibility was the freedom of the Straits, or the open Straits, a policy which was forced upon the Turks against the wishes of the Russians, who were then and now are their allies. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will explain precisely what is the advantage which this country gains by the permission granted to our warships to have access to the Black Sea. It is clear that we have a vast tract of water, in addition to all the others, to police, and it is clear that the freedom of the Straits will supply for the First Lord of the Admiralty an argument for further expenditure upon our naval forces, and, of course, if we can go into the Black Sea people can come out of the Black Sea. Although at the present moment the matter is not material, some day we may find that this great boon of the freedom of the States has introduced the powerful naval forces of Russia into the Mediterranean to be a menace to Malta, Egypt or Cyprus. Our further relations with Russia we cannot forecast. The Foreign Secretary, in the course of the negotiations, appears to have done everything in his power to cold shoulder the Russian delegates.
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    We must put aside the prejudice which we have against the form of government in Russia and remember that, whatever we may think about these persons, they were representatives of a great nation who were our valued allies in the War, and a nation which has, both by land and sea, a far greater interest in the settlement of the Turkish question than any other nation in the world. They complained that they were not consulted. They said our representatives had time to consult everybody, but not to consult them. They even complained about his manner towards them, but that, I suppose, we must attribute to their untutored Muscovite minds. What we have achieved, as the culmination of a policy of four years, is what must have appeared to the students of 40 years ago to be impossible. We have reconciled the Russians and the Turks. The Russians and the Turks are sworn allies by a mutual pact, which they signed very largely as a result of the attitude of ourselves and other European countries. We have gained the right to go into the Black Sea; we have given access to the Mediterranean to the Russian Fleet if and when it becomes powerful; we have set up a new cause of friction with a country ten times the size and power of Turkey, and we have achieved a settlement about which I would like to ask, Does the Foreign Office expect that any settlement of the Near Eastern question can be lasting which is not assented to by Russia? I hope the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will be able to put a better face on the great achievement which has been secured, otherwise I am afraid we must relegate "The freedom of the Straits," along with "Homes for heroes," and "Hang the Kaiser," into the realm of war flapdoodle.
    Then I would enter into the other question of the small nations and their moral claims upon us. I will only say one word about Bulgaria. We have a Treaty obligation to Bulgaria to secure her an outlet, and that obligation we have not discharged. The position of Rumania and Bulgaria were urged as being one of the considerations in the mind of the Foreign Secretary when he declined to close the Straits, thereby giving the Russians a naval preponderance in the Black Sea. If any nation has cause to complain of the treatment we have given them, it is

    1839
    Greece. They have been used as a tool in a policy which has failed. They were sent in 1919, by the desire of all the Allies, to Smyrna. They were encouraged by ourselves to advance. In 1920, the then Prime Minister even went so far as to say that there was not the least doubt they would reach Angora if they were permitted to do so. Almost a year ago to-day, the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs, speaking in this House, used words about the Greek Army which represented it as a powerful and victorious force, but within six weeks Smyrna had fallen and the Greeks had to evacuate Asia Minor. This situation not only involved shame on ourselves and ruin for the Greeks, but it involved the greatest danger to the solidarity of the Empire. In September last when the appeal was sent to the Dominions there was the gravest danger of acute disagreement between ourselves and our great Dominions. Apparently, as far as one can learn from the Press, the matter was managed by a small junta consisting of the then Prime Minister, Lord Curzon, the right hon. Member for West Birmingham (Mr. Austen Chamberlain), Mr. Churchill and the Postmaster-General. This junta sent out a telegram to the Dominions, in flamboyant terms, to join in a new war with Turkey. Even Mr. Hughes, who is by no means a pacifist, said that Australia had no desire to enter into a filibustering expedition. Mr. Bruce, the present Prime Minister of Australia, said only a month ago:
    "very nearly a tragedy happened last year when Mr. Lloyd George came appealing to the Dominions to ally themselves with Britain's quarrel with Turkey."
    What we said at that time was a danger evidently was a very real danger, and a danger only just happily averted. The late Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs, apparently is under the impression that he is heir to the Gladstone tradition, but anyone who has followed Mr. Gladstone's career knows perfectly well that he never proposed to impose the moral sense of Europe upon Turkey, except by the concerted action of the European Powers. He said most distinctly that it was never his intention, single-handed, to attempt by force to impose that upon the Turkish Empire. So we find the Greeks used as
    1840
    the tool of the policy which has failed. She is ruined, and every fifth man in the country is a refugee. Some 500,000 Greeks under this Treaty are due to leave the place where they live, to leave their property, and join the starving throngs of refugees. One or two feeble suggestions were made during the negotiations that, by the League of Nations or some other means, we should provide for the protection of these unhappy people; but anyone who has followed the proceedings knows that any such suggestion had no sooner to be objected to by the Turkish delegate than it was hurriedly withdrawn by our own representative. I have received a letter from some British subjects who were engaged in business in Smyrna, and this is what they say:
    "To-day we are penniless. All we ask is justice. We may add that pioneer Britishers of Smyrna, whose descendants most of us claim to be, helped to build up the British Empire. In 1914 our boys volunteered for the Great War and we are proud to say that they did their share manfully."
    These correspondents have been, I understand, offered 6d. in the £ in respect of the losses which they incurred owing to the failure of our policy in Asia Minor.
    Before I sit down I want to say a word about the Armenians. The history of the Armenians during the War is very creditable to that ancient race. At the beginning of the War I understand that they were invited to join actively with the Turks and refused to do so. Later on they engaged on the Caucasus front in the military operations, and at one time there was an Armenian legion formed by the French. I saw something of it myself when I was in those parts. Armenia was actually a signatory to the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. To-day, for what have the Armenians to thank us? Nothing. Such of them as survive have got to make the best terms they can with their Turkish masters. All that they have got from us has been talk from the earliest stage of the proceedings when we began to make war declarations down to the latest moment. After America had refused to accept a mandate, which was in May, 1920, they had assurance after assurance that they would be protected. Sometimes it was Armenian Republic, and sometimes it was a tract set apart for them. There were many promises, but in this Treaty there is nothing. They are simply left to their fate.

    1841
    The fundamental blunder was to suppose that once Russia had ceased to be an ally for the purpose of imposing peace on Turkey, which was, of course, contemplated when the division of Anatolia was arranged by the various agreements in 1915, you could possibly impose upon the Turks anything like the same terms. Even if we had been in accord with the French and Italians it would have been very difficult for us to impose the same terms without the assistance of Russia. But, so far from there being any unanimity between ourselves and our Allies, there was a policy of intrigue and searching after material interests by the various parties. The Italians had some agreement with the Turks. The terms were never disclosed in Parliament, so far as I know, but their explanation that they had no consideration whatever in return was not convincing. The French sent out the famous envoy, M. Franklin-Bouillon, who made a private agreement with the Turks, putting into Turkish territory lines of railway which made the Mesopotamia frontier accessible, so that they are able without passing through Syrian territory to send troops to the Mesopotamian front.
    The criticism which M. Franklin-Bouillon made of the policy of Clemenceau was that he had not profited from the peace sufficiently, particularly in the Near East. He regrets that his country had possessed herself of too few pledges, and had bargained badly. That was the spirit supervening on the old and more ideal conceptions with which we understood the War was fought. Within a few weeks of the time when the late Prime Minister was explaining to the House that, if desired, the Greeks could march victoriously and reach Angora, he met the French Prime Minister at Cannes and there was a communiqué, I have no doubt, with the usual phrase about complete unanimity being reached. But now we hear from the statement of M. Tardieu that even while at Cannes M. Franklin-Bouillon wrote that the following materials of war should be delivered to the Turks—10,000 Mauser rifles, 2,000 horses, 10 aeroplanes and so forth. This material, M. Poincaré said, had actually been delivered. This at the time when the Prime Minister was telling us that Greece, who had gone there at the
    1842
    invitation of the Allies, could, if they desired, victoriously reach the new Turkish capital. I am very far from saying that the blame, or perhaps the major part of the blame, for this unsatisfactory and humiliating state of affairs lies with ourselves, but we have to bear our share. When we asked why we could do nothing for the Armenians the late Prime Minister replied that we had enough responsibility on our hands, and we could not do everything.
    What were those responsibilities? First of all, we were putting down what we were pleased to term a rebellion in Mesopotamia. We were pursuing the Churchill policy of trying to overturn the Soviet Government by giving support in munitions and money to the White generals in 1919–1920. That was a very serious pre-occupation of our Government. We were arming the White generals against the Soviet Republic, and spending a great deal of money. I think it is calculated that, in cash and kind,£100,000,000 was spent in that way. What became of those munitions when the matter was ended? Those White generals all suffered a uniform fate; they were all defeated. In fact, it was almost the hall mark of any military adventure associated with Mr. Churchill that it should be unsuccessful. But when they were defeated, the hon. and learned Gentleman said the Turks seized the munitions which we had sent to the White generals, and used them against the Armenians. I put this statement to the hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary before, and he has not denied it. The Armenians say that we depleted the great arsenal at Kars of supplies which might have kept them fighting—becausethey can fight—for several years in order to hand over the munitions to our White General Allies in Southern Russia. When Sebastopol fell—I have forgotten who was our particular pal at that time—
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Wrangel.
    Captain BENN: When Sebastopol fell, the munitions fell into the hands of the Turks, who, of course, employed them both against the Armenians and against ourselves. No wonder that Lord Curzon himself describes the case as
    "one of the great scandals of the world."
    I assume that the hon. Gentleman will not deny that the materials, rifles, and

    1843
    guns, abandoned by the Russian Army of General Yudenitch, fell into the hands of the Turks to be used against ourselves. That was the statement of Marshal Franchet d'Esperey. Further than that, the "Times" stated:
    "The guns, rifles and ammunition and transport captured by the Bolsheviks from Denikin and Wrangel have for the most part gone to Mustapha Kemal. The Turkish troops surrounding Chanak to-day"—
    That was a year ago, when we were at Chanak—
    "are to a great extent armed by British rifles originally sent by us to the Crimea to fight the Bolsheviks."
    Lieut.-Colonel J. WARD: That is untrue.
    Captain BENN: The hon. and gallant Member has many sources of information. I am quoting the "Times," and I accept their statements. The hon. and gallant Gentleman says it is untrue, so there is a conflict of evidence. To sum up, the Treaty has at least this advantage, that the Arab races are free and are set up in their States. The hon. Member will doubtless add that, at least, the Treaty is a Treaty of Peace. I will say, as Benjamin Franklin said:
    "There never was a good war, and there never was a bad peace."
    The peace at least solves one of the reparation problems which are perplexing the world, but, on the other side, there are Bulgaria, Greece, and Armenia betrayed by the Allies, of whom we are one. Never, I suppose, was the moral prestige of this country lower in the Near East than it is to-day. Since the Armistice, and the great victory over Turkey, in 1918, we have spent over £29,000,000 on maintaining armed forces in that quarter to enforce the terms of peace.
    The negotiations have been a progressive concession to Turkish demands. The country which we routed, which was littered with our treasure and almost heaped with our dead, has won, and we have negotiated, with a diplomat whom Lord Balfour described at that time as "the head of a band of brigands," what I can only describe as a treaty of humiliation.
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Ronald McNeill): I regret that it is not possible now, within a few minutes of the rising of the House not merely for to-day but for a considerable time to come, to give any complete and coherent account of the Treaty as a whole, and I must content myself with merely taking up a few of the points which the hon. and gallant Gentle-man has raised and indicating, in so far as I disagree with him, my reasons for that disagreement. He said at the outset of his speech that he thought the peace was an unsatisfactory one, and he concluded by saying that it was a humiliating document. He said that no doubt I would defend the Government by laying the blame on the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), and he indicated that I personally was free to do so without inconsistency. I have no intention of doing anything of the sort, because I think the real defence of any unsatisfactory features there are in the peace—and I do not in the least deny there are such—lies in quite another direction. I should like to correct one expression of opinion of the hon. and gallant Gentleman. He said our prestige had never been lower in the East than at the present time. All my information is that notwithstanding all that has happened our prestige has never been higher. Prestige, after all, is comparative and, I might say, more or less fluid. It may be here to-day and gone to-morrow, but, as a matter of fact, I believe, in comparison with other nations at all events, that at the present moment our prestige stands very high in the Near East, and especially among the Turks themselves.
    Lieut.-Colonel J. WARD: Chanak did that.
    Mr. McNEILL: I cannot possibly follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman in his. references to all the aspects of this subject. He said that at an earlier period we had given assistance to various Russian white generals, and that the arms which we supplied to them had by a chain of circumstances, gone into the hands of the Turks. To deal with that would take me too far, but if the hon. and gallant Gentleman and the House will recall the circumstances which existed at that time, I think the action of this country in supporting these generals is susceptible of a very

    1845
    strong defence, especially if we remember that at that time there was no reason whatever to give preference to one party over another in Russia. The Soviet Government, which is now at all events the de facto Government of Russia, had then no more title to be considered as the Government of Russia than had the various generals whom we supported. So far as some of them are concerned, I think myself that Koltchak, at all events, was a patriot, so far as I am able to judge, and that he represented among the Russians much more accurately those who had been our Allies, and with whom we had fought side by side in the Great War, than the so-called Government which had in the meantime been set up at Moscow. The hon. and gallant Gentleman has pointed out a number of circumstances connected with the peace which he thinks unsatisfactory. I have said that I do not defend it by throwing the blame on any other party or individual. The real reason why the peace is not so satisfactory in some respects as we could have wished is due to all the circumstances which have taken place during the last four years. People forget that four complete years have passed since peace was signed with our principal enemies, that four years have passed before we have succeeded in signing peace with the Turks, and that that circumstance applies with the greatest significance to what has taken place at Lausanne.
    The world does not perhaps realise that now, for the first time, the Great War has been brought to an end, so that, really, for the first time since 1914, to put it in other words, the doors of the temple of Janus are shut. That is a matter of very great significance, and I would ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman, when he brings forward these various blots, as he thinks, on the Treaty, to ask himself this question: Would he have considered any one of them of sufficient importance to obtain them by a renewal of war. Hon. Members who, turning over the pages of the Treaty, or interested in one subject or another, complain of what has been done or left undone, must ask themselves whether they would have been content, in order to have it a more wholly satisfactory Treaty, to have seen the recruiting offices reopened, to have seen fresh armies sent overseas. Would they have been ready to vote the necessary
    1846
    credits in this House? Would they have been content to have seen the casualty lists again day by day? I do not believe they would. I am certain that the hon. and gallant Gentleman himself, and this House, and the country, when they know the facts, will share the conviction of the Government that, however imperfect this instrument may be, there was no point of policy in it which has been sacrificed which would have been worth gaining at the infinitely greater sacrifice which would have led to fresh memorials and cenotaphs.
    Remember, that when the actual fighting ended, the Turkish military power was as completely broken as was the German and Austrian power, and if we could then have made peace, no doubt we could have dictated the peace, and that is the peace that the hon. and gallant Gentleman desired to see. As I could easily show him, the complaints that he made could only have been remedied if peace had been a peace dictated to the Turks, and if we could have made peace when the fighting was ended with Germany and Austria, we might have got that result. But our peacemakers were too busy in Paris. That is the real point. I am not attempting by that to throw any blame upon the right hon. Gentleman who was conducting the peace negotiations. I do not see that it was possible under the circumstances for it to have been otherwise. You could not have carried on these negotiations at Paris and you could not have carried on these negotiations with a different personnel. All that time there was the continual hope that the United States would take a Mandate. As the hon. Gentleman knows, we hoped at one time the United States would have taken a Mandate, which would have been the best solution possible with regard to the Armenian question, but that was not possible, and during that period of four years, when our peacemakers were busy in Paris, a great movement was going on, to which the hon. Gentleman referred, namely, the movement which led to setting up a new Nationalist Turk Party in Asia Minor, which was in one sense a rebellious movement against their Government in Constantinople.
    Mr. NEW BOLD: Their Government? Yours!
    Mr. McNEILL: But it was a movement which, although as we now know, it was

    1847
    of vast significance, passed almost un observed in its first phase, and it was only after Kemal had established a very considerable power in Asia Minor, and had organised resistance to the Allies, that the Allied Powers began to realise what had taken place. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] There is nothing in the least wonderful about that.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: You drove people to such desperation that they took desperate remedies.
    Mr. McNEILL: Everyone has not, before the event, the wisdom which some have after the event. What is really the result—and this is really more important, if I may say so, than some of the points the hon. Gentleman has raised—what has been the result of that movement, and of the Peace which it has rendered necessary? It means that now, for the first time in history, the Turkish State is a compact nation with a national self-consciousness. For hundreds of years it has been, as I think the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs called it, a ramshackle Empire. Now, for the first time, it is compact in its territory, and, what is more significant, it consists solely of a country whose inhabitants are Turks. That is entirely a new feature in the history of the Turkish Empire, and it is a new phenomenon in the history of the world.
    It is from that point of view that this Treaty has its real significance. The hon. Member referred to the very important fact that, however imperfect in other respects this Treaty may be, vast provinces have been knocked off the Turkish Empire. Those provinces, inhabited by Christians and Arabs, have disappeared, and that which is left of the present Turkish State forms a small compact, homogeneous nation—homogeneous both in race and in religion. A new Turkey has been created, and that Turkey it is which has just signed this Peace. It is owing to those circumstances that we were no longer in a position at Lausanne to dictate a Peace, and we had to negotiate a Peace with the Turks on an equal footing, discussing every Clause and line, in the same way as we discuss Bills in this House. That is the reason why—I do not see why we should shrink from admitting it—we were unable to
    1848
    obtain some of the terms to which the hon. and gallant Gentleman referred, and which I quite agree with him it would have been very desirable to get. Let me take, one by one, other points. I do not understand, I must say, what he says about—
    Lieut.-Colonel J. WARD: Is there any reason why the hon. Gentleman should not state what is the real cause of the failure, namely, the desertion by France of her Ally?
    Mr. McNEILL: The only reason for not going further into the matter is that my time is very short, and that I do not want to be drawn unnecessarily into by-paths on this subject which, I am afraid, that might lead me into. But there are one or two points to which I am bound to refer. First of all, I do not understand the hon. and gallant Gentleman that the traders have been remitted to barbaric conditions. I suppose he refers to the abolition of the capitulations. These have come down from mediaeval times, when they used to be the general rule. They have been abandoned by other nations, and the Turks, in the pride of their new spirit of nationality, strenuously objected to them, and said, "We are just as able to carry on our trade, commerce, and social life on modern principles as are other of the nations, and we are not going to submit any longer to this system of capitulations imposed by others upon us." Therefore we have the abolition of the capitulations, both fiscal and otherwise, and in Constantinople and other parts of the country our traders will be on the same footing as they would be in Germany or France, that is, under the ordinary law of the country. I quite agree that it is an experiment, and it remains to be proved whether the Turks really are to be placed upon a footing of equality. It will be the worse for them if they fail in the matter. Their credit will fall, and they will find that foreigners and foreign capital will not be attracted to help them in their commercial developments. If foreigners find that this takes place, and there is no protection to life or property, that the system which has replaced the capitular system does not give equality and protection to the people, then it will be that foreigners will not go to Turkey, will decline to have any dealings with her, and the Turks will suffer. We shall suffer, too, undoubtedly. But

    1849
    to say that the making of this change is to relegate our traders to barbaric conditions appears to me to be entirely misstating the case.
    Then as to the Straits and Russia. Nothing can be further from the truth than to say that we forced the freedom of the Straits on Turkey, although they were supported by the Russians. In point of fact, there was not one single representative at the Conference who supported the Russian plan. The Russians tried to out-Turk the Turks. Their real object, their chief anxiety was to do anything that would be effectively hostile to ourselves and France, and they thought the best way to do that was to prove themselves friends, allies, and supporters of the Turks. But the Turks mistrusted them, and when the hon. Gentleman says we have accomplished this very strange work of making for the first time the Turks and the Russians friends and Allies, I think that was true in a sense, but there has been a growing estrangement, and the Russians have received no support from the Turks in regard to their policy with regard to the freedom of the Straits. If I had more time I could show that the establishment of the freedom of the Straits has always been our aim for merchant shipping. At all events, the regime which is now established is from our point of view entirely satisfactory. We have greater freedom than we had before for merchant shipping by night and by day, and we have sufficient freedom for our warships to go into the Black Sea.
    We have also established an International Commission which takes charge of the Straits and undertakes to report infractions of the Treaty to the League of Nations. Certain powers are given to ourselves, France, Italy and Japan to constitute a sort of international police, and they will take what ever action is considered necessary by the Council of the League of Nations in case there is any infraction of the terms of the Treaty. I agree with
    1850
    my hon. Friend that there has been a complete failure to carry out the promises made to the Armenians to provide them with a national home. That, however, has come about owing to circumstances over which neither we nor anybody else had any control. We believed that we were going to be so victorious that we should have been able to dictate peace. If we had been in that position we should have established a territorial national home for the Armenians. But that was the very cause of the nationalist movement amongst the Turks, and it was the one thing which gave power and influence to Mustapha Kemal, and in the Conference it was the one thing the Turks said that under no consideration, would they submit to.
    My Noble Friend Lord Curzon fought from first to last to obtain this national home for the Armenians, and throughout the discussions at Lausanne, wherever humane considerations were under discussion in reference to all sorts of causes, I think this country may take pride that it was our country and especially our Foreign Secretary who was the champion' of those causes. He did not always succeed, but at any rate he did his best. Although it is true that the Armenians have not got all we wanted to give them, there are the minorities provisions which at any rate secure some justice and equality for them. My hon. Friends will also find that throughout the Treaty large use has been made of the League of Nations, and we hope those provisions may do something at all events to mitigate any disappointment that may be caused through our having failed, in the circumstances I have mentioned, to obtain all for which we had hoped.
    It being Five of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Resolution of the House of 1st August, till Tuesday, 13 th November, pursuant to the Resolution of the House this day.

ROYAL NAVY.
  SINGAPORE BASE.
  SINGAPORE BASE.
  BATTLESHIP CONSTRUCTION (COST).
  BATTLESHIP CONSTRUCTION (COST).
  DOCKYARD EMPLOYES (SUPERANNUATION).
  DOCKYARD EMPLOYES (SUPERANNUATION).
  TUBERCULOSIS.
  TUBERCULOSIS.
BRITISH ARMY.
  DEMOBILISATION LEAVE.
  DEMOBILISATION LEAVE.
  ARMY RESERVE (W. BYRNE).
  ARMY RESERVE (W. BYRNE).
  MILITARY STRENGTH (INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS).
  MILITARY STRENGTH (INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS).
  FAIR WAGES RESOLUTION.
  FAIR WAGES RESOLUTION.
EX-SERVICE MEN.
  LAND SETTLEMENT, WALES.
  LAND SETTLEMENT, WALES.
  CONVALESCENT CENTRE, BLACKPOOL (INSTRUCTOR).
  CONVALESCENT CENTRE, BLACKPOOL (INSTRUCTOR).
NAVAL AND MILITARY PENSIONS AND GRANTS.
  TUBERCULOSIS.
  TUBERCULOSIS.
  TREATMENT ALLOWANCES.
  TREATMENT ALLOWANCES.
  EMIGRANTS.
  EMIGRANTS.
  COMMITTEES, WALES.
  COMMITTEES, WALES.
  SOUTH LANCASHIRE REGIMENT (CAPTAIN RICE).
  SOUTH LANCASHIRE REGIMENT (CAPTAIN RICE).
  LABOUR CORPS (CORPORAL E. MOGFORD).
  LABOUR CORPS (CORPORAL E. MOGFORD).
  APPEALS (PENSIONER FRIEND'S EXPENSES).
  APPEALS (PENSIONER FRIEND'S EXPENSES).
  EGYPT (TREATMENT OF PRISONERS).
  EGYPT (TREATMENT OF PRISONERS).
PEACE TREATIES.
  TURKEY (BRITISH CLAIMS).
  TURKEY (BRITISH CLAIMS).
  GERMANY (FOREIGN MISSIONS).
  GERMANY (FOREIGN MISSIONS).
  TURKISH LOANS.
  TURKISH LOANS.
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.
  WRITING ASSISTANTS.
  WRITING ASSISTANTS.
  FOOD DEPARTMENT (LEGAL EXPENSES).
  FOOD DEPARTMENT (LEGAL EXPENSES).
  TIMBER DISPOSAL DEPARTMENT (MONTREAL OFFICE).
  TIMBER DISPOSAL DEPARTMENT (MONTREAL OFFICE).
  ESTABLISHED CLERKS (SALARIES).
  ESTABLISHED CLERKS (SALARIES).
  OVERSEAS TRADE DEPARTMENT.
  OVERSEAS TRADE DEPARTMENT.
  TEMPORARY CLERKS (PAY).
  TEMPORARY CLERKS (PAY).
EDUCATION.
  RETRENCHMENT.
  RETRENCHMENT.
  SPECIAL SCHOOLS.
  SPECIAL SCHOOLS.
  DOMINION DEBTS.
  DOMINION DEBTS.
  TEACHERS' PENSIONS.
  TEACHERS' PENSIONS.
  LOSS OF S.S. "EL KAHIBA" (INQUIRY).
  LOSS OF S.S. "EL KAHIBA" (INQUIRY).
  ENEMY ACTION CLAIMS.
  ENEMY ACTION CLAIMS.
TRADE AND COMMERCE.
  IMPORTED TIMBER.
  IMPORTED TIMBER.
  ANGLO-RUSSIAN TRADE.
  ANGLO-RUSSIAN TRADE.
  SPECIAL CONSTABULARY, NORTHERN IRELAND.
  SPECIAL CONSTABULARY, NORTHERN IRELAND.
  MISSING MAN (MR. A. E. HAYES), LEIGHTON BUZZARD.
  MISSING MAN (MR. A. E. HAYES), LEIGHTON BUZZARD.
  STREET ACCIDENTS (MEDICAL FEES).
  STREET ACCIDENTS (MEDICAL FEES).
  LAW AND JUSTICE (ADMINISTRATION COSTS).
  LAW AND JUSTICE (ADMINISTRATION COSTS).
  METALS AND CASTINGS (GRINDING AND CLEANING).
  METALS AND CASTINGS (GRINDING AND CLEANING).
  ELECTRIC ACCUMULATOR WORKS (LEAD POISONING).
  ELECTRIC ACCUMULATOR WORKS (LEAD POISONING).
TRANSPORT.
  NON-SPLINTERABLE GLASS.
  NON-SPLINTERABLE GLASS.
  MANCHESTER-LIVERPOOL ROAD.
  MANCHESTER-LIVERPOOL ROAD.
  COMMERCIAL VEHICLES (IMPROPER DRIVING).
  COMMERCIAL VEHICLES (IMPROPER DRIVING).
UNEMPLOYMENT.
  COURTS OF REFEREES.
  COURTS OF REFEREES.
  BRITISH LABOUR, FRANCE.
  BRITISH LABOUR, FRANCE.
  COLLIERIES, BLAINA.
  COLLIERIES, BLAINA.
  ROAD WORKS, MIDLANDS (GRANTS).
  ROAD WORKS, MIDLANDS (GRANTS).
POST OFFICE.
  MAIL SERVICE, FAR EAST.
  MAIL SERVICE, FAR EAST.
  IRREGULAR SURCHARGE, ITALY.
  IRREGULAR SURCHARGE, ITALY.
  RELIEVING OFFICER, SWANSEA.
  RELIEVING OFFICER, SWANSEA.
  CENSUS RETURNS (OLNEY AND NEWPORT PAGNELL).
  CENSUS RETURNS (OLNEY AND NEWPORT PAGNELL).
  SMALL-POX AND VACCINATION.
  SMALL-POX AND VACCINATION.
  SANITARY INSPECTOR, WEETSLADE.
  SANITARY INSPECTOR, WEETSLADE.
  TUBERCULOSIS PATIENTS, LONDON (INSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT).
  TUBERCULOSIS PATIENTS, LONDON (INSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT).
  CHILDBIRTH (DEATHS).
  CHILDBIRTH (DEATHS).
  INEBRIATE INSTITUTION, LANGHO.
  INEBRIATE INSTITUTION, LANGHO.
HOUSING.
  BUILDING MATERIALS (PRICES).
  BUILDING MATERIALS (PRICES).
  APPROVED HOUSES.
  APPROVED HOUSES.
  KENYA (AFRICAN LABOUR).
  KENYA (AFRICAN LABOUR).
  IRISH FREE STATE (BRITISH OFFICERS' COMPENSATION.
  IRISH FREE STATE (BRITISH OFFICERS' COMPENSATION.
  COAL ROYALTIES, DURHAM.
  COAL ROYALTIES, DURHAM.
  VENEREAL DISEASE.
  VENEREAL DISEASE.
  SERVICE CANTEENS.
  SERVICE CANTEENS.
  RUSSIA (BRITISH CLAIMS)
  RUSSIA (BRITISH CLAIMS)
  COST OF LIVING (AVERAGE INCREASE).
  COST OF LIVING (AVERAGE INCREASE).
  TAILORS' AND GARMENT WORKERS' TRADE UNION.
  TAILORS' AND GARMENT WORKERS' TRADE UNION.
UNEMPLOYMENT.
  RELIEF SCHEMES SANCTIONED.
  RELIEF SCHEMES SANCTIONED.
  TEXTILE WORKERS.
  TEXTILE WORKERS.
  BUILDING TRADE.
  BUILDING TRADE.
Preamble
The House met at eleven of the clock, The EARL OK DONOUGHMORE on the Woolsack.

THE RECESS.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON had given notice to move to resolve, That this House on its adjournment do adjourn to 13th November, except for Judicial Business, but that if it appears to the satisfaction of the Lord Chancellor that the public interest requires that the House should meet at any earlier time during such adjournment, the Lord Chancellor may give notice to (he Peers that he is so satisfied, and thereupon the House shall meet at the time stated in such Notice, and shall transact its business as if it had been duly adjourned to that date.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OR THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, with reference to the Motion standing in the name of the noble Marquess the Leader of the House for summoning your Lordships' House if necessary during the Recess, it has been found that there is an Act of Parliament in the reign of George III, under which, with six days' notice, this can be done, and, therefore, the Government have decided not to move the Motion.

CONSOLIDATED FUND (APPROPRIATION) BILL.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I beg to move that Standing Order No. XXXIX. be considered in order to its being dispensed with for the purpose of taking the following Bill through all its stages, Consolidated Fund (Appropriation). This is the usual Motion with regard to the Appropriation Bill.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
Bill brought from the Commons, endorsed with the certificate from the Speaker that the Bill is a Money Bill within the meaning of the Parliament Act, 1911, and read 1a.
Then (Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended), Bill read 2a; Committee negatived; Bill read 3a, and passed.

AGRICULTURAL RAIES BILL.
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments, agreed to.

AIR POLICY.
EARL BEAUCHAMP: My Lords, I beg to ask the noble Marquess the Deputy Leader of the House whether he can make a statement with regard to the policy of His Majesty's Government in relation to the Air Force.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the reference to the Committee which was appointed to consider national and Imperial defence included, among other things, the question of establishing some co-ordination authority for the Navy, Army and Air Force, whether by a Ministry of Defence or otherwise, as well as the relations of the Navy and Air Force and the standard of strength of the Air Force for Home Defence. The final Report dealing with the whole reference will be presented in the autumn, but in the meantime the finding of the Committee upon the strength of the Air Force for Home Defence has already been adopted by the Government and submitted to Parliament, and the Government are now able to lay before the House the Committee's recommendations which they have also adopted upon the relations of the Navy and Air Force and upon the co-ordination of the Defence Forces.
First, the relations of the Navy and the Air Force. This particular branch of the subject was referred to a special Sub-Committee consisting of the Earl of Balfour, a former First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Weir, a former Air Minister, both of them being specially conversant with the difficulties of inter-Departmental relations, and Viscount Peel, a member of the present Cabinet. Sixteen witnesses were heard before the Sub-Committee and nineteen memoranda were submitted to it. The consideration by the Sub-Committee of the evidence, like the consideration by other authorities on previous occasions, have led them to a conclusion, a unanimous conclusion, in favour of the principle, of a single Air Service.
The Admiralty were rightly concerned to maintain the absolute control over all the fighting equipment in the Fleet which is essential to its efficiency. They also urged that reconnaissance at sea requires
1524
the technical training of a naval officer. The special Sub-Committee, while unable to meet the views of the Admiralty to the extent of destroying the principle of a single Air Service, consider that they have dealt by suitable provisions with these detailed objections and in particular have secured for them the absolute control afloat and the professional reconnaissance to which I have referred.
The reasons in favour of a single Air Service which have had weight with the Government may be summarised as follows:—In the first place, the Air Service, though it must have intimate relations with the other Armed Forces at sea and on land and must be familiar with their requirements, differs in its conditions essentially from both. On the other hand, aircraft whether they are flying above the sea or elsewhere are, broadly speaking, governed according to the same main principle's. In the second place, the whole science of air power is in a condition of rapid development. The application therefore of experience both as to personnel and as to matériel, wherever that experience can be obtained, whether at sea or on shore, is vital to success in either case. We cannot afford to break up the lessons of this experience. In the third place, it is clear that in certain contingencies the shore-based Air Forces and the Air Forces of the Fleet may be called upon to act together. Such common action may be very difficult without a unity of method in both Services. Efficiency therefore prescribes common knowledge, common training, common material provision and a common service. Economy points in the same direction. From this last point of view the conclusion against the duplication of training schools and aerodromes and building plant is evident. For these reasons the conclusion of the Sub-Committee and of the Main Committee that there should be a single Air Service must in the opinion of the Government be accepted, subject to the conditions which are necessary to meet the detailed objections urged by the Admiralty.
The recommendations of the Sub-Committee for this purpose are contained under thirteen heads dealing with liaison between the two Services, provision of material, inclusion in Naval Estimates of the charge for the Fleet Air Arm, integrity of the strength of the Fleet Air Arm, discipline and status of Air officers

1525
and men when afloat, number and position of attached naval officers, and special reservation of Air reconnaissance and spotting to the Navy. To these the Main Committee have added a further recommendation permitting to attached naval officers the retention of their uniform, a point which was strongly urged on behalf of the Admiralty.
If these recommendations be examined it will be seen that by their provisions the permeation of each Service with a knowledge of the requirements of the other would be achieved, and the administrative difficulties dealt with, without destroying the unity of the Air Service. It is impossible without experience to pronounce a final judgment on these arrangements. The Government are, however, confident that both Services will do their utmost to make them successful. In respect of this division of the subject the Report of the Subcommittee, together with a covering note of the Main Committee, has been laid on the Table and will be distributed immediately.
Next, as to the co-ordination of the Defence Forces. Upon the recommendations of the Committee the Government have decided as follows:—It is undesirable and impracticable to supersede the Ministerial heads of the three fighting Services by making them subordinates of a Minister of Defence. The alternative plan for an amalgamation of the three Service Departments is equally impracticable. On the other hand, the existing system of co-ordination by the Committee of Imperial Defence is not sufficient to secure full initiative and responsibility for defence as a whole and requires to be defined and strengthened. Under the existing system the Committee of Imperial Defence, an advisory and consultative body, enquires into and makes recommendations in regard to the issues of defence policy and organization which are brought before it. The power of initiative lies with the Government Departments and with the Prime Minister. This system, though invaluable up to a point, does not make any authority, except the Prime Minister, who can only devote a small part of his time and attention to defence questions, directly responsible for the initiation of a consistent line of policy directing the common action of the three or any two of three Services.
1526
The detailed provisions founded on these conclusions for strengthening the position of the Committee of Imperial Defence and its Chairman, and for securing the joint advice of the Chiefs of the three Staffs, is also contained in the Papers now being laid on the Table.

GERMAN REPARATIONS.
VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON: My Lords, in continuation of the question which I asked last month, and in consequence of the answer then given by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I beg to ask him if he is able to make a statement on the policy of the Government with regard to German Reparations concerning which he stated that negotiations with the Allies were proceeding.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON): My Lords, I am glad to say that I am now in a position to make the statement which I foreshadowed three days ago. On June 7 last the German Government, having considered the replies of the Allied Governments to their first Note of May 2, communicated to the latter a further Memorandum containing revised proposals For dealing with the questions of Reparations and the Ruhr. The German Memorandum appeared in the Press of June 8. Communications then passed between the Allied Governments with the object of ascertaining and elucidating their respective points of view and the French and Belgian Governments in particular exchanged opinions with His Majesty's Government on the subject. A month later, on July 12, a statement was made in both Houses of Parliament as to the position assumed by His Majesty's Government and the necessity of action was strongly emphasised in order to terminate a situation that was fraught with peril both to the peace of Europe and to the interests of all the parties concerned.
Certain propositions were submitted by His Majesty's Government as the bases of any such action and the statement ended by recommending definite steps to the Allies. His Majesty's Government held that the proposals contained in the German note of June 7 deserved to be examined and replied to and that such reply should, if possible, be an Allied

1527
reply. Further, inasmuch as the French and Belgian Governments were indisposed to take the initiative in formulating an answer, His Majesty's Government said they would themselves assume the responsibility of framing a draft reply which they would forward for the consideration of their Allies. That brings us up to the point at which the matter was left when we last discussed it in your Lordships' House.
In pursuance of this intention His Majesty's Government drew up a draft identic reply, which they forwarded on July 20, with a covering Note, to the Allied Governments of Franco, Belgium, Italy and Japan. In this draft reply they dealt with the various proposals contained in the German Memorandum of June 7. They expressed their opinion that, while nothing should be done that was inconsistent with the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, advantage would be derived from an examination by impartial experts, in co-operation with the Reparation Commission, into Germany's capacity for payment. As to the question of the guarantees offered by the German Government, His Majesty's Government went on to point out in the draft reply that the economic value of any such guarantees must largely depend upon factors of which the German Memorandum had made no mention, such as the stabilisation of the mark and the balancing of the German Budget; and that no guarantees could be effective unless provision were made for some form of international control of German financial administration. The draft reply ended by advising the German Government, if it desired a resumption of inquiry, to withdraw, without further delay, the ordinances and decrees which had organised and fomented the policy of passive resistance, and unequivocally to disavow the acts of violence and sabotage which had in some cases accompanied it; and it expressed the belief that such an action on the part of Germany would involve a reconsideration by the occupying Powers of the conditions of their occupation and a gradual return to the normal features of industrial life in the Ruhr.
In the covering Notes with which the draft reply was sent to the Allied Governments His Majesty's Government gave fuller explanations of the views which
1528
they held on all these points, and they urged upon their Allies that inter-Allied discussions should be opened with as little delay as possible, whether by Conference or otherwise, for the purpose of elaborating a comprehensive plan of a general and final financial settlement.
The replies of the Allied Governments have now been received. The Italian Government have not so far returned a written answer, but have expressed themselves as in general agreement with the views and proposals of His Majesty's Government. The French and Belgian Governments have returned independent replies.
His Majesty's Government have devoted the most careful and anxious consideration to these replies, and, while fully conscious of the friendly language in which they are couched and of the cordial spirit by which they are Inspired, they regret not to find in them the material for sending the Allied answer to the German Note to the despatch of which they attach so much importance—indeed, the draft reply submitted by His Majesty's Government is not mentioned in the French and Belgian replies. Nor do these Notes appear to hold out any definite prospect either of an early alteration of the situation in the Ruhr, or of the commencement of the discussions about Reparations, to both of which His Majesty's Government had eagerly looked forward. It is apparent that many weeks, if not more, might easily be consumed in the preliminary interchange of opinions between the Allies on the lines that are now foreshadowed by the latter, before any effective step could be taken for terminating the present situation.
His Majesty's Government cannot too often repeat that while regarding the interests of their Allies as bound up with their own, and while shrinking, as they have done throughout, from any action that might be thought indicative of Allied disunion, they yet hold firmly the view that the problem now before all of them cannot be evaded, and that while the Allies may be occupied in exchanging views in a spirit of unabated friendliness on this or that detail of this or that proposal, the European situation, carrying with it all prospect of the Reparation payments to which the Allies are equally entitled, may sink into irretrievable ruin.

1529
In those circumstances His Majesty's Government have decided to lay before Parliament with the least possible delay the Papers which record their own views and endeavours, and they are inviting their Allies to agree to the publication of the Notes or statements on their part to which reference has been made and which are required to explain the situation as a whole. His Majesty's Government entertain the hope that the publication of these Papers may assist in determining the real dimensions of the problem with which the Allies are confronted, and may convince the world of the imperative necessity of prompt and united action to deal with it.
VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON: My Lords, the statement made by the noble Marquess is so grave that beyond emphasising its gravity I do not know that I can usefully say anything or whether much good purpose can be served by a debate. But on a statement so grave it may be very natural that your Lordships should wish to have a debate. I understand that there is a Motion already on the Paper by the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, and if ho is prepared to move that Motion, I assume that a debate will take place upon it. I would therefore submit for the convenience of the House that we should come to some understanding now, whether, if the noble Earl does intend to move his Motion, we should have a debate upon that, or whether we should reserve one comments on the, statement that we have heard made until we can have the Papers before us.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: My Lords, the noble Viscount obviously does not exaggerate when he says this is a grave matter. My view, however, does not completely coincide with his on the further point, because I think that the wisdom of Parliament may contribute, by discussion, to the solution of grave matters, and it has been the habit of this country, when confronted with grave topics, to discuss them in Parliament. I therefore intend either at this stage or when I move my Motion [to move for Papers relating to the negotiations as to the Ruhr occupation] to make some general observations upon the present situation in the Ruhr, and upon the statement which the noble Marquess has just, made. Whether I make those general observations upon the question
1530
which has been asked by the noble Viscount or substantively upon my own Motion, is a matter of complete indifference to me. I am in the hands of the noble Marquess upon that point.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I am in the hands of the House in the matter. The noble and learned Earl has a Motion down upon the Paper which he is quite entitled to move, and which, as I understand from what he has just said, he contemplates moving. It is clear that to some extent the House will be at a disadvantage, because it will not have the Paper upon which the whole matter turns. We hope to publish those Papers as soon as possible, but naturally we are, to a large extent, dependent in that respect upon the answers that come to the requests that we are addressing to our Allies, to permit the publication of the Papers which relate to them. Should, however, the noble Earl move his Motion, I shall, of course, be ready to answer his questions or to give such information as is in my power, although, for the reasons that I have named, the discussion will necessarily be of a truncated and imperfect character.

TOWN COUNCILS (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]
Order of the Day read for the consideration of Commons Amendments.
Moved, That the Commons Amendments be now considered.—(Viscount Novar.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

TOWN COUNCILS (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  [The references are to Bill No. 39.]
  Clause 1, page 1, line 15, leave out subsection (2) and insert the following new clause:
  Amendment of s.49 of 63 & 64 Vict. c. 49.
  (".Section forty-nine of the Town Councils (Scotland) Act, 1900, which relates to the taking of polls in contested elections, shall have effect as if the following proviso were added at the end thereof:
  "Provided always that, where the council are satisfied that it is necessary in order to afford to all electors such reasonable facilities for voting as are practicable in the circumstances, they may by resolution passed not later than one month before the issue in any year of the notice referred to in section forty-two, extend the hours prescribed by the last-mentioned Act for the keeping open of the poll, so, however, that the poli shall not commence earlier than seven o'clock in the forenoon and shall not be kept open later than nine o'clock in the afternoon.")
  Clause 4, page 2, line 19, at end insert the following new clause:
  Amendment of s. 52 of 63 & 64 Vict. c. 49.
  (".Section fifty-two of the Town Councils (Scotland) Act, 1900 (which relates to the declaration of the election of town councillors), shall have effect as if the words 'eight of the clock' were substituted for the words' four of the clock.'")
  Moved, That this House cloth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments—(Viscount Novar.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

PEERS WAR MEMORIAL.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD THE EARL OF CRAWFORD had given Notice to ask His Majesty's Government if before proceeding with the scheme to remove the statue of Queen Victoria, they will submit the matter to the Offices Committee of this House, and to His Majesty's Office of Works; and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I hope my Motion may commend itself to the Government, and I will therefore merely move it formally, and not elaborate the case which I have to make.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, the noble Earl asks me if before proceeding with the scheme to remove the statue of Queen Victoria, His Majesty's Government will submit the matter to the Offices Committee of this House and to His Majesty's Office of Works, and I understand that he with-holds any observations which he proposes to make until I have answered the Question. I will endeavour to answer the Question that is upon the Paper.
I do not think that it is necessary to consult the Offices Committee of the House upon the subject for the following reason. I find on looking into the matter that the reference to the House of Lords Offices Committee, which instructs them as to the duties which they are to perform, is to consider the House of Lords offices; and it was in accordance with that aspect of their business that I remember myself bringing before the Offices Committee a few years ago the question of certain alterations which were contemplated with regard to the residence and offices of the Clerk of Parliaments, with a view of turning them into a residence for the Lord Chancellor.
1532
Similarly, I find that during the present year there has been before the Offices Committee a question dealing with the opening of an entrance from one set of Committee rooms to another. Those are matters which clearly fall within the scope of their reference. On questions of decoration, I find the House of Lords Offices Committee does not intervene and has not been consulted, and there is a full statement of the principles which regulate the matter in a Report which I have, and to which any noble Lord can have access, of the evidence taken before the Select Committee on the Palace of Westminster, on which the noble Earl, Lord Beauchamp, sat in the year 1907. Any noble Lord who will look at that Report will see that there was a discussion on this very question, and the principles which, as I conceive, are the correct ones were laid down very emphatically by the then First Commissioner of Works, Mr. Lewis Harcourt, afterwards Lord Harcourt.
There is another leason for which it seems to me that the Offices Committee is hardly the best body to adjudicate upon a matter of this description, and it is this. I have attended many meetings of that Committee. There may be present eight or ten, possibly twelve or fifteen, out of a total number of, I think, something like forty noble Lords who are members of that Committee. It is clear that, with this sparse attendance, a decision may be arrived at on a very momentous subject that need be in no degree representative of the real sentiment of the House. And, if it be said that the House has the chance of considering and, if necessary, reversing the opinion of the Offices Committee, while that is true, the matter again, if brought up in your Lordships' House, might be decided by the vote of a number of Peers which need not necessarily be at all representative of the general sentiment of your Lordships' House. I will come in a moment to what I conceive to be a much better method by which the views of the latter can be ascertained.
Then the second part of the noble Earl's Question is whether the Government will submit the matter to His Majesty's Office of Works. They did so. I had a correspondence, which I have here, in the year 1919, with the Office of Works, before the

1533
noble Earl was connected with it, and when the head of that Department was Sir Alfred Mond.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: What was the date
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: May, 1919.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: Of course that was before the proposal to move the statue?
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Not a bit of it. The correspondence was about the proposal. I had a correspondence with Sir Alfred Mond on that very subject. And I took advice at that time. He asked me whether I would bear in mind the interest that the Office of Works had in the matter. I took the advice of the Clerk of Parliaments on the matter, and I replied that—
"The only two matters in respect of which the First Commissioner of Works is likely to be concerned in the erection of the proposed War Memorial in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords are (a) if any expenditure is entailed upon the public purse which will not he the ease——"
That was with reference to the proposed Memorial in the Royal Gallery——
"(b) if any structural safeguards are required in consequence of the erection of the monument, as to which the Office of Works will, of course, be consulted in due course."
That I believe to be—and I took trouble about the matter—a correct definition of the degree of voice in the case which is officially possessed by the Office of Works.
Before I come to the proposal that I have to make, let me acquaint your Lordships with the actual sequence of events that has occurred in the history of this case. The subscriptions for the Memorial first began to be collected at the beginning of 1919. It was then that the Committee, of which I was the Chairman, held several sittings; it was then that we addressed the first appeal to your Lordships; it was then that in that appeal was mentioned, with as much argument in its favour as I could give, the suggested site in the Royal Gallery, which has been compared, in some quarters, to that of a sanctuary or a shrine. That suggestion was put before your Lordships, and the letter containing it was circulated to every member of your Lordships' House.
The subscriptions then began to come in, and it was in the course of the inflow
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of those subscriptions that many noble Lords came to me and said that they did not approve of that site, which they thought too remote, too secluded, insufficiently before the eyes of your Lordships in the daily discharge of your business. Then it was that the suggestion was made for a transference from that site to the larger one in the Princes Chamber. As I indicated the other day, the first step to be taken was to secure the approval of the Lord Great Chamberlain, who is responsible for the fabric of this House, and who warmly supported the proposal. The next step was to approach His Majesty the King, and I have his written assent, to which I made reference the other day.
The next step—and to this I call attention—was to inform your Lordships, and I thereupon wrote this letter, which was sent to every member of your Lordships' House. I do not know if all received it, but it was sent:
"November 27, 1919.
"My Lord,
"You will be interested to learn that 420 Peers have now promised or subscribed a total sum of £6,960 towards the above object. The subscription list will presently be closed. Since the issue of my last circular letter His Majesty the King has graciously signified that he is willing that, in view of the scale and importance of the projected Memorial the large marble group, with the seated figure of Queen Victoria in the centre, that now stands inside the Princes' Chamber, should be re moved to a position at the head of the Royal Staircase in the Victoria Tower, and that the site thus vacated should be placed at the disposal of the Memorial Committee. This gracious act on the part of the Sovereign will enable the War Memorial to be erected on the finest site in the building, where it will he seen daily by the Peers, and will fitly commemorate the glorious participation of their Order in the recent war.
"The Committee will meet shortly to consider the form of the Memorial and the selection of a sculptor. In the meantime may I urge on any Peer who still desires to subscribe to forward his contribution without delay to the Assistant Librarian, House of Lords.
"I have the honour to remain,
"Your Lordships' obedient servant."
After the issue of that letter to every Peer it is impossible for any noble Lord to contend that your Lordships have not been taken into full consultation in the matter.
And after the circulation of that letter I did not receive a single objection from any Peer. On the contrary, quite a number of Peers came to me and expressed their gratification at the proposed change of site, at the substitution of what they thought a much nobler framework for the suggested statue, and, as I said the other day, one of the most eloquent in the expression of those sentiments was the late Lord Harcourt. It was naturally therefore and inevitably that we proceeded upon that basis. Sir Thomas Brock came here and saw that site. The sculptors who were suggested by him were invited to give designs for that site. They came here, they spent hours here, and the whole proceedings, over three and a half years, rested upon the assumption that that site would be chosen. Not one single voice of disapprobation has been raised in the interval.
The first hint of any disapproval that I encountered was from the noble Earl, Lord Crawford. I mentioned to him in the month of November, 1921—I have the correspondence—a year and a half ago, that we were proceeding with that suggestion and the noble Earl at that time expressed his personal regret that that statue should disappear, for the reasons ho named the other day. But he suggested no reference to the Offices Committee. He did not suggest that I should desist from the proposal. Ho made no concrete suggestion of any sort whatsoever. Thus I think your Lordships will see that those of us who have been engaged in the matter have had the fullest ground for proceeding in the manner we have done.
Now we come to the present situation. The noble Earl made a powerful speech the other day in which he indicated his personal views of dislike to seeing the features of this structure as they were originally set up in any way interfered with. His views, I believe, are entertained by a number of other noble Lords. If there is one thing upon which we shall all agree it is this, that a matter of this sort which, as all artistic matters do, raises rather sharp differences of opinion, should be settled in accord with the general sentiment of the House. That fundamental principle I lay down. I have indicated the reasons for which I think a reference to the Offices Committee would be highly undesirable
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and, indeed, contrary to precedent. I have indicated the degree of concern which, as I am authoritatively informed, the Office of Works has in the matter. The real tribunal and the only tribunal that can settle the matter is the House of Lords itself, and, while I think I have shown conclusively that the Committee and I have been thoroughly justified in every step we have taken up to the present moment, clearly neither the Committee nor I have the slightest desire or right to foist upon the House of Lords a decision of which it disapproves.
It seems to me that much the best solution would be this: that instead of referring the matter to Committees which are necessarily small in number and the decisions of which may provoke dispute later on, the best tiling to do would be to refer it to the House of Lords, and I propose, with your Lordships' consent, to circularise the House of Lords again and to send a letter to every Peer indicating briefly the history of events as they have passed, pointing out that a difference of opinion has arisen as to the site of this monument, and asking noble Lords to record their individual opinion. I am quite content to accept the opinion of the majority in whichever direction it goes; and, indeed, let your Lordships remember that the suggestion of the site in the Royal Gallery was mine, and should the House of Lords decide against the site in the Princes Chamber that was not my suggestion and no one will more readily bow to it than myself since I was responsible for the other suggestion. That is the proposal that I submit to your Lordships, and I hope you will agree not only that it is fair and equitable, but that it is the only really practical way of settling this rather difficult and delicate matter.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: My Lords, I shall not detain your Lordships for more than two or three minutes. I should like to say this, in the first place. I bring this matter up again at the instance of an enormous number of Peers sitting in all quarters of the House. I have spoken to many and a still larger number have spoken to me, and I have been surprised at the weight, the mass, and, above all, the influence of the opinion, the growing opinion, against the mutilation of the statue of Queen

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Victoria in order to erect a War Memorial in its place. I shall not traverse what the noble Marquess has said. I merely safeguard myself by saying that the Office of Works is concerned. The Office of Works is the guardian of the structure of this palace. Nobody but the Office of Works can put a nail in or take a nail out. Nobody except the Office of Works is competent to advise your Lordships upon this matter which raises enormously difficult questions not merely of architecture and engineering, but of architectural and artistic propriety. I will give your Lordships one case in point.
With regard to the Offices Committee, I think this case ought to go to the Offices Committee as well as to a plebiscite. None of your Lordships has been formally consulted about the proposal to remove the statue of Queen Victoria. It has never been to the Offices Committee, and I think it ought to go to the Offices Committee or, at any rate, to some body representing the House as a whole. This is the only memorial to Queen Victoria, so far as I know, which was erected by the taxpayers as a whole. It is, therefore, essential that Parliament in one form or another should give its verdict upon the proposal to remove it. The Offices Committee is a microcosm of the House. The Office of Works is the Department upon which this House is entitled to call for advice and I think they should examine this question and advise the House upon the matter which is now to be submitted to them.
When I was First Commissioner of Works I assure your Lordships that every structural question was submitted to the Lord Great Chamberlain, who in turn, brought those questions before the Offices Committee. The civil servants' bench in this House was put up when I was First Commissioner of Works. The question had to go to the Offices Committee because the structure was affected. It can be removed in two hours without making any mark upon the structure of this House. But that was a matter which I most scrupulously referred to the Offices Committee, because it is the only Committee which can deal with this kind of question. I will not elaborate it beyond saying this. I should have preferred that this matter should go for revision to the Office of Works and to the Offices Committee of this House; but if the noble
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Marquess, Lord Curzon, prefers a plebiscite it is not for ma to take objection. I would, however, make this observation. Seven thousand pounds out of the £8,500, or whatever it is, that is now in the possession of the Committee was collected on the strength of the letter recommending the embrazure site at the end of the Royal Gallery. Seven thousand pounds was collected upon that selection of site to which the King had, as was announced, given his approval and which, as Lord Curzon himself then mentioned, in his opinion at any rate was the best available site in the House. I subscribed on those terms and all my friends did so. We may have forgotten, I certainly had forgotten, that it was ultimately proposed to change the site to that in the Princes Chamber.
Therefore, the proposal that your Lordships as a whole should pronounce a verdict upon this is one to which I am quite agreeable, though I should much prefer the smaller degree of publicity that would be involved by referring the question to the Offices Committee. But the case must be stated fully to the Peers, and I think that the Offices Committee, in the first instance, should draw up the statement to be submitted to your Lordships, and that they should not do so until the only relevant Department, the only Department with technical knowledge, experience and equipment to advise, has recorded its views upon this subject; that is, His Majesty's Office of Works. I hope that this can be done, and, if so, I shall be content to leave the decision as indicated by the noble Marquess, Lord Curzon, to the Peers as a whole, who, I hope, will give very close and earnest attention to this matter, because if a mistake be made it will be one which as years go on will cause your Lordships increasing regret.
EARL BEAUCHAMP: My Lords, evidently at this stage of the Session your Lordships are in a difficult position in dealing with this matter. None of us wishes that further delay should take place; indeed, it is desirable that the matter should proceed without further delay. The noble Earl who has just spoken has accepted the suggestion which was made by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House, and I am sure that we are all obliged to the noble Marquess for having made such a suggestion. But will he allow me to say that it seems to

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me hardly fair to members of your Lordships' House, especially to those who have not had the advantage of hearing the speeches which have been made by the noble Earl who has just sat down, that they should not hear both sides of the question? If such a letter as that which is in the mind of the noble Marquess is sent out it will presumably have the nature of an ex-parte statement.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Oh, no. I could meet that point. It will not. That is the last thing I desire. Clearly, if the case is to be put it must be put fairly. For the reasons I named, and because the House is now rising, I think it undesirable that the matter should be referred to the Offices Committee, but I am prepared, in drawing up the letter, to send my draft to the noble Earl opposite, as representing the Opposition, and that he should consult the noble Earl, Lord Crawford, and that the letter shall not go out until they are satisfied that it presents both sides of the case with perfect impartiality.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: I suggest that the Office of Works, as the technical authority, should be responsible.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Oh, no. Your Lordships have raised this money, or rather, on behalf of your Lordships, I have had the privilege of raising it. This matter is one for your Lordships. It has nothing whatever to do with the Office of Works until structural alterations are required, in which the staff of the Office of Works would have to be imported. I should decline to set a precedent which I think would be most unfortunate. I have gone, I think, to the limit of reasonable concession by the suggestion I have made, which is absolutely fair and impartial, and I do invite your Lordships to accept it.
EARL BEAUCHAMP: My Lords, I was saying, when I gave way to the noble Marquess, that I cannot help feeling that a great many members of your Lordships' House would be glad to know what the opinion of the Office of Works is upon the subject. They might not be influenced by that opinion on the one side or the other, but in these difficult matters affecting taste and art one is, I think, particularly glad to have the advice of
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the experts. I am very grateful to the noble Marquess for the suggestion he has just adumbrated. We should all be glad, if we could have it in some shape or form, of the advice of experts upon this question. If, however, the noble Marquess will allow the letter to become a matter of private correspondence between the noble Earl and himself and myself, I think we shall probably be able to arrive at some arrangement.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

GERMAN REPARATIONS.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD rose to ask for information upon the negotiations relating to the Ruhr occupation; and to move for Papers. The noble and learned Earl said: My Lords, the Motion which I have upon the Paper no longer corresponds with the needs of the moment, or no longer completely corresponds with them, inasmuch as the noble Marquess has made a statement which covers part but not the whole of the matters to which I desire to direct the attention of the House. But before I proceed to those matters I must make it quite plain, though I have already made an observation upon this point, that I do not and cannot assent to the view that because an international affair is grave it is a matter to which no useful contribution can be made by your Lordships' House. I would point out in that respect, first of all, that that is not the view which at this moment is being taken in another place, where the matter is being discussed in a debate to which, as I understand, the Leaders of all Parties are likely to contribute, and, in the second place, that it is not the view which is taken in any other country in Europe, where these matters are being made the subject of recurrent Parliamentary debate.
I should be sorry, indeed, if at a moment like this your Lordships were to adjourn without some discussion of the extraordinarily grave situation in which this country and Europe now find themselves. It is extremely important to observe that we are about to separate for three and a half months. Who can tell what will have happened in three, and a half months? Who can tell in what situation Germany will be, and what the situation in the Ruhr will be? To part without a single observation being made

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which may tend, if not to influence the Government, at least to inform the Government how your Lordships' minds are working, would, I think, be a disaster of the first magnitude.
It is a little important to observe the history of this matter. Let me summarise a few of its leading stages before I attempt an analysis of the extraordinary position in which we now find ourselves. The policy of the late Government was a clear policy. It was skilfully and tenaciously pursued by the noble Marquess, expressing as he did the views and the wishes of his colleagues It was the policy of carrying out the Treaty of Peace, while at the same time, in the later days of the Government when that possibility had become doubtful, of persuading the French that the steps which have since been taken would be prudently avoided. Whatever else may be said of the policy of that Government, at least we produced this result. We did not reach any open breach with our French Allies, and we succeeded in persuading them not to occupy the Ruhr. That was the situation when the late Government fell.
The next stage which requires consideration arose with the advent to power of Mr. Bonar Law. Mr. Bonar Law shared the views and expressed the policy of his predecessors—namely, that the occupation of the Ruhr would be an economic and political misfortune. He expressed that view with his usual clearness and lucidity. We had been criticised, not by the noble Marquess but by some of his colleagues to-day, for our failure to maintain relations as friendly with our French Allies as our critics thought to be desirable and possible. We were conscious that that criticism was an unfair and unjust one, and the sequence of events since we laid aside office has abundantly justified the claim which we put forward, that nothing had been neglected by us which could, consistently with the objects of the policy which we conceived to be fundamental, attain the maximum of good relationship between ourselves and the French.
But when once the decision was taken to go into the Ruhr, Mr. Bonar Law, with his usual sagacity, adopted a very clear conclusion. He expressed it in the speech which he made in the House of Commons. In the course of that speech he indicated a belief, indeed, that the Ruhr policy
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would not succeed, but almost hoped that it might, because he saw how disastrous to the Entente and the general cause of Europe would be a failure in a step so definite and so serious taken by one of our Allies. Then he used some remarkable words. It may be said, he stated, that to have no policy—and we hardly have a policy on the matter—is bad, but to take a step, perhaps disastrous, would be not only bad, but would be worse. Therefore, Mr. Bonar Law's policy was a clear one. It was, in effect: "We disapprove of the policy of the whole occupation of the Ruhr. Politically and economically we believe that occupation to be disastrous, but at the same time it is a course which has been decided upon by our Allies, and I propose to say or do nothing which in any way may increase their difficulties. "In other words, Mr. Bonar Law went into entrenchment when the French decision and French action was taken.
A wholly different policy has been adopted with the disappearance from the scene of the experience and sagacity of Mr. Bonar Law, and whatever else is in doubt this at least is clear, that the policy which has been acted upon is not a policy for which Mr. Bonar Law ever made himself responsible, and I very much doubt whether it is a policy for which he would ever have made himself responsible. What is it that has been done? The Government, making every arrangement by which publicity and notoriety should be given to its intentions, announced that the time had now come when this country could no longer remain inactive in the situation which had arisen in the Ruhr. Two Ministers, Mr. Neville Chamberlain and Mr. Amery, during the week-end before the noble Marquess made his statement in this House, announced in most positive and explicit terms that the time had now arrived when this country proposed to take a part in the discussions, when we could no longer disinterest ourselves alike from intervention and, it may be, from action.
Thereupon a Note was framed, and this Note was duly despatched to the French Government. The noble Marquess acquainted this House with the terms of that Note some two or three weeks ago. In the short and informal debate which followed I alone of your Lordships expressed the opinion, and made the clear

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prediction that there was not the slightest chance of that Note being accepted by the French Government. That prediction was unfavourably received by members of His Majesty's Government, and yet it seemed to me to be absolutely elementary to any one who had studied the psychology of the French nation or the present political situation in which M. Poincaré finds himself.
What was the Note? It was a Note which proposed a number of definite steps to the French Government. The noble Marquess will not quarrel if I say that by far the most definite of the proposals made to the French Government was that the Allies should join in a Note to be presented on behalf of them all in answer to the German Government. We have actually received to-day from the noble Marquess the information that after all these weeks of discussion and consideration the French Government have not even made the slightest reference to what was the main and fundamental proposal in the communication addressed by us to them.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: That is not so. I think the noble and learned Earl has not quite correctly represented what I said. I do not blame him for he has not seen the Notes. What I said was that we had sent to the Allied Governments a draft of the proposed identic reply to the German Government with a covering Note elaborating and explaining the suggestions contained therein. The French and Belgian replies, which we have received, comment at great length upon our exposition of the case in the covering Note. What I said was that they did not allude to the draft identic reply we submitted.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: I am much obliged to the noble Marquess for his statement. The addition he has now made clears the matter somewhat, but even in the form in which he now makes the statement it is a surprising circumstance that the sending of this joint identic Note should not be referred to in the formal answer. When I ventured to warn your Lordships two or three weeks ago that there was not the slightest prospect of these proposals being agreed to by the French Government and asked what the policy of the Government was, I was led to a conclusion which seemed
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to be elementary by certain considerations which, I think, cannot have escaped the attention of His Majesty's Government.
In the first place, from the moment that the French nation went into the Ruhr, it was obvious that the honour, prestige and determination of the whole nation was involved in that attempt. It was most desirable to persuade them, if you could, not to go to the Ruhr, but no one who has studied what has been said by French statesmen and by French journalists, and what has been said in the debates in the Chamber, can have any excuse for the delusion that the whole French nation were not behind M. Poincaré in his Ruhr policy. I observe that Mr. Bonar Law, in the speech to which I have already referred, plainly pointed this out. He said that we must apply ourselves to the Ruhr situation and the consequent European difficulty with the knowledge that the whole French nation is behind the French Government in their occupation of the Ruhr. It is necessary to add that every week that has passed, so far from weakening, has in my judgment strengthened this attitude, and if at this moment a decision of the French people was taken, or a decision of the French Chamber, an overwhelming majority would be disclosed in favour of the policy of M. Poincaré.
I shall be asked: To what do these arguments tend? And it is my purpose to attempt to make that plain. When, a week or two ago, I pointed out that it was certain that the French Government would not accept the proposals of His Majesty's Government, I asked what His Majesty's Government intended to do. Even then it seemed clear that it was madness to revive the question at all before the whole world unless a clear policy underlay its revival; and not only a clear policy but a useful policy. In other words, nothing at all could be urged on behalf of the course of indicating to the whole world that the moment had now arrived at which we must take some independent step, when we should assert the rights of this country, unless upon a rebuff, which could have been foreseen and which ought to have been foreseen, we had a clear policy which was better that the Bonar Law policy of accepting under protest that which was done.

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Nothing would seem to me to have been at once more undesirable and less fruitful than to have taken a step which has indicated to the whole world not merely that we are not content with the Ruhr situation but that we intend to do something which we have not done in the past. Either positively or negatively there is to be a reversal of the policy of this country. If you do not mean that, it was the height of futility to have still further exasperated France and puzzled French opinion by sending to them proposals which everybody knew would be unpalatable to them. Therefore I drew this inference, that when this Note was sent to France—quite obviously a new direction in our policy—the intention had already been formed of dealing with the situation upon two alternative hypotheses. The Government must have contemplated the situation upon the hypothesis that the policy would succeed. Had it succeeded no difficulty would have arisen; but it is equally clear that they must have addressed their mind to the contingency that that policy might fail. And the question which I asked a fortnight ago and which I propose with great respect to ask again to-day is, now that it has failed, what is the course which is to be adopted?
France has declined to assent to the numerous proposals which were made by His Majesty's Government. What does the Government now propose to do? Parliament is to separate for three and a half months. The most vital consequences may depend, and must depend, upon the decisions which are to be taken. Ministers have told us that England is no longer to be disregarded, that steps are to be taken. What are those steps? Are they to be taken without the knowledge of Parliament in these three and a half months? Are we to have no indication as to what effect is to be given to this step which I have shown must in logic be in the mind of the Government? They could not possibly have addressed this admonition or this recommendation to the French Government without having some scheme in their minds in the event of that recommendation not being adopted. It has not been adopted. What is the scheme of the Government?
Pressure in a grave international matter is not the custom of this House or, in the main, of another place, and
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there is a universal and a most reasonable desire in such difficult circumstances not to embarrass he Government. But although that feeling must receive its due weight, it was not we who forced this situation. It was not your Lordships, it was the Government who took the view that, as a development of their policy in dealing with France, it was necessary to make this proposal to the French nation. If nothing is to be done upon its failure, it would have been far better that private conversations should have taken place between the distinguished member of this House who represents us in Paris and the French Government, or between the noble Marquess and the French Ambassador in London, and that they should have attempted to discover by means of those private discussions whether or not an accommodation upon these lines were within reach. In such a case there need have been no advertisement to the world of a new orientation of British policy, there need have been no speeches upon provincial platforms by Cabinet Ministers announcing that the time had now come when Great Britain no longer intended to be ignored in the discussions of Europe. Discreet and private conversations should have taken place in Paris or in London, and we need not have advertised to the whole world the further lamentable stage which has been reached in the disagreement upon vital policy between this country and our Allies.
It is not for me, it is not for any of your Lordships who are not officially concerned, to offer advice or to indicate a policy. I notice, however, in the statement made by the noble Marquess, to which I listened with the deepest attention, that the only operative part of it was the concluding paragraph. All the rest was narrative; it dealt either with the earlier stages of the controversy or with the contents of the French and Allied replies. The last paragraph and the last paragraph alone was operative. And what did it say? It said simply this, that as the result of all that had happened His Majesty's Government had reached the decision to attempt to obtain consent to the publication of the Papers. Of expression of intention, of indication to the country of policy at a moment when we are to lose sight of the Government

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for three and a half months, there was not one word. All we know is that the Government are going to try—but are not at all sure whether they will succeed—to obtain the consent of the international correspondents to the publication of the letters which have been exchanged between them. We know nothing else, and we are to go away for three and a half months with no other suggestion or indication of what further steps the Government may intend to take.
It is extremely difficult for anyone who has not had the responsibility of carrying on these discussions, as has the noble Marquess, for the last nine months to make any suggestion at all, but inasmuch as no one has a right to criticise upon such matters unless there are some respects at least in which he thinks that certain things ought to be done or that certain things ought to be omitted, I ask leave very shortly to indicate my own general view upon the grave situation in which Germany, France, Europe and ourselves are found at this moment. My view is, and was, that, first of all, every attempt should have been made, consistently with maintaining friendly relations between the Allies, to prevent the Ruhr policy in limine, to prevent the French from going into the Ruhr at all. But that policy failed, and the moment it failed a wholly new situation arose. I will venture to tell your Lordships what I think the attitude of this country should have been in relation to that situation. We ought to have realised that whatever happened the step so taken was irrevocable until it brought its own lesson or its own vindication. Had the noble Marquess who represents this country in Paris been consulted at any single moment—I mean, of course, consulted upon this specific point; naturally he was consulted generally—I cannot doubt but that there has not been one day since the French occupation of the Ruhr became an established fact on which he would not have informed His Majesty's Government that the whole tenacity of the French nation was committed to the maintenance of that policy and the carrying out of that experiment either to success or failure.
Assuming, as I have assumed, that such would have been and must have been the advice given by all who understood the psychology of the French nation, what inference ought to have been drawn from
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it? Surely, the inference was that this occupation had created a wholly new situation, that it had revolutionised the facts. The argument of diplomacy had been exhausted in the attempt to prevent France from occupying the Ruhr. The moment the argument of diplomacy had failed there was nothing left to be done. No one in this country could be mad enough to suggest that we should attempt by any application, in any shape or form, of force to prevent that policy of occupation proceeding to its ultimate consequence, be that consequence good or bad. No one has suggested it; no one could suggest it. But the moment you exclude that suggestion—and common sense must exclude it—you are left with no other course to explore except the diplomatic one. The diplomatic argument failed on the day when Mr. Bonar Law left Paris, on the day when M. Poincaré definitively rejected the British proposal. From the moment of that failure the policy of this country must have been plain and, I think, ought to have been consistently pursued, and that was a policy based on the realisation that the French were committed to this attitude and that nothing but the logic of events would bring, on the one hand, instruction to them, or, on the other hand, instruction to us.
We have not adopted this course. What remains at this moment? Are we to keep in Germany, in the months that are in front of us, our Army of Occupation? I said at a very early stage in these discussions that our Army was to-day placed in a most humiliating situation. I do not choose to multiply, because I think no useful public purpose can be rendered by multiplying, the evidences of that humiliating situation, but they are known to many of your Lordships who have relatives or friends with that Army. In the second place, we still have a representative on the Reparation Commission. What useful function is he performing? Is he performing any function at all? What is the purpose of our retaining a member upon the Reparation Commission? I myself have not the slightest doubt that the true policy of this country at this moment is not to address representations to the French nation which we have no means at all of enforcing, and which they most evidently have not the slightest intention of accepting at our hands. M. Poincaré said

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recently: "We will accept in this matter interference from no nation. "Their attitude is plain. When you are confronted with an absolutely unyielding attitude of that kind, and when you are powerless to interfere, surely your right policy is to say: "Well, you have chosen to do this. You believe it will bring you economic and political salvation. Pursue it, and it is the determination of the event, and of the event alone, which can prove whether you are right or we are right."
That is a matter in which in one particular very considerable injustice has been done to the French people. At the time the Treaty of Peace was made, when I, too, was a member of the Government, it was known to all of us that the French had in mind two objects. The first was financial reparation, and the second was security. The agreement made between President Wilson, the representatives of this country, and the representatives of the French Government, gave the French what they believed to be security; in other words, the Anglo-American pact to come to the aid of France in case of further aggression at the hands of Germany, undoubtedly tranquillised and soothed real French apprehensions. That pact ceased to have, in the French opinion, effective value the moment it became evident that the American nation was not prepared to follow Mr. Wilson's guidance in this matter. Thereafter, the French were left with inadequate prospect, as they thought, in the matter of Reparations, and with no protection at all in the matter of security.
Now, my Lords, there is much ground for the view that the intervention, and the continued intervention, of the French in the Ruhr is based at least as strongly upon a desire for security as upon a desire for money. Whether they are right or wrong, who can tell? I have always doubted, and I doubt now, the usefulness of the course that the French have adopted, but I am far too experienced in such matters to be dogmatic upon it. I observe that all schools of thought in France take that view. While I think that events will prove they are wrong, I am not sure. Who can be sure? What is the calculation upon which it is based? It is, if you choose, harsh, cold and calculating. Some critics have even said it is worse. But our purpose is not to
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describe, but to understand it, and it is clear what the purpose is. It is this: If you cannot obtain Reparations from the German Government at least you shall render the German nation helpless for a considerable period of years—at least you shall, by perhaps the disruption of the German nation, make it certain that France will have nothing to dread from Germany in the years which lie before it.
To understand this attitude one must at least realise what France suffered in the late war at the hands of Germany, and one must appreciate that she has completely lost the security given to her by the Treaty of Peace—namely, the joint pact of America and this country to protect her in case of aggression. I have ventured to enter upon this consideration of the question for one object and one object only, and it is to make it plain to your Lordships that France is not going to deviate in any degree from the position which she has taken up. I knew that perfectly well two or three weeks ago, when the noble Marquess read to your Lordships the terms of the British declaration, and it was that knowledge which led me to say that there was not the slightest chance of her accepting the British proposals. I was right.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Why do you say that?
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: I assume that if there was any point in the French reply to which the noble Marquess thought it worth while to direct attention, as being an acceptance of the British proposals—
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Obviously I cannot refer to Papers which I have not yet had permission to lay before Parliament.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: Not only did the noble Marquess refer to them but on several points he indicated the tenor of them.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: The Papers to which I referred were Papers for which I and His Majesty's Government are responsible, and which we, in the exercise of our authority, have the right to lay before Parliament.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: The noble Marquess will really have to forgive me for saying that that is not quite right. He could not possibly have derived from any Papers which His Majesty's Government had addressed to the French Government the general statement which he made, that the French and Belgian Governments had not, in fact, accepted the suggestions that this country had made to them. That can only have come from the French and Belgian communications. I cannot recall the exact language, but I think your Lordships will bear me out, and we shall sec when we read a report of the statement to-morrow whether I am right or wrong. I derived from the noble Marquess's speech the clear impression that the reply of the French nation to the document presented on behalf of His Majesty's Government was an unfavourable reply. The noble Marquess naturally would not go into details, but he certainly left upon my mind, and I believe upon the minds of your Lordships, the clear impression that the French reply was not an acceptance of the proposals addressed to them by His Majesty's Government.
In these circumstances the course which in my judgment this country ought to adopt is a plain one. We ought to give the French every chance for their policy, inasmuch as we have no means of effective interference. We ought no longer to address Notes which increase their difficulties and may involve us in the lamentable responsibility of its being supposed that we are encouraging Germany. I was, I confess, a little astonished to hear for the first time from the noble Marquess that in our proposed Note to Germany we had taken the responsibility of advising that country to desist from passive resistance. It seems to me a difficult responsibility to propose to assume. If you thought the occupation was wrong, as I understand His Majesty's Government thought, it is somewhat difficult to see how, logically, one can advise the German Government in such a matter, and one rather wonders whether the assumption of the task of giving advice in such a matter would be wholly wise.
Be that as it may, I think the conclusion must be plain, first, that henceforth we should recognise that the French occupation is an accomplished fact, an I
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that the whole European situation changed the day they went there; secondly, we ought to recognise that we have no power to alter the situation; and, thirdly, we should recognise that the French nation is unquestionably determined to carry that occupation out to its logical conclusion. Our course then is clear. We ought to do nothing more in the matter at all, except that I think that we ought to withdraw our Army of Occupation and our representative from the Separation Commission. In that way we shall escape all responsibility for what is going on, and make it possible for the French Government to make their own experiment with the certain knowledge that if they succeed the success is theirs, and if they fail the failure is theirs.
I have made these observations to-day because I myself feel, as every member of the House must feel, the alarming circumstances under which to-day Parliament disappears for three and a half months. Decisions of the utmost importance not only may be taken, but must be taken, within the next weeks, even possibly within the next days. By a singular series of unfortunate accidents, not even to-day, the last day before we part, have we available for discussion and consideration the documents which have been exchanged between this country and France. I have avoided every single word of criticism of the noble Marquess, greatly as I differed from some parts of the policy which has been adopted, but I have always realised the devotion and the care and the skill which the noble Marquess himself has brought to bear upon these negotiations, and I know from some experience the difficulties which he has had to encounter. But I do most earnestly hope that the decision has now at last been adopted that this experiment, be it wise or unwise, has been undertaken definitely, that it will not be abandoned, and that its results are clear; and I hope it will be realised that it is not in our power to control or to deflect it.
THE LORD SPEAKER: The noble and learned Earl has given notice of a Motion for Papers. Does he wish to persist in that Motion?
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: No, I do not intend to press that.
VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON: My Lords in two things I agree with what the noble and learned Earl has said. The first is that it is inevitable, in a situation so grave, that there should be a desire, both in this House and in another place, not to separate without discussion on the situation. In fact, both this House and another place might even feel that, as deliberative Assemblies, in a situation so grave as this, they were almost stultifying themselves and abdicating their functions if they separated without any discussion. But, on the other hand, though that is a perfectly natural feeling, it is exceedingly difficult to embark upon discussion of the situation, precisely because it is so important and so grave, without having full documents before us.
There are really being placed before the world two alternative policies—the policy of His Majesty's Government, set out, I gather, in the communication to the Allied Governments; and the policy which is being pursued by France and Belgium, and which, I presume, is more or less the subject of their replies. But we cannot pronounce upon those two alternative policies, the world cannot judge upon them, without having them fully before us. I understand, of course, that His Majesty's Government cannot publish the documents without the consent of those with whom they are engaged in confidential discussion. And therefore we are in this position: Parliament is on the eve of separating. It is naturally anxious to discuss this very important question. It has not at this moment the material before it which enables it to have a really fruitful discussion. So far as I am concerned I feel that the difficulty of taking part in this debate at all is that one has no desire except to say what may influence the situation favourably, and that, without fuller knowledge, it is impossible to know what the effect of comments upon the situation may be.
I agree with the noble and learned Earl on another point which he raised, when he spoke of the French point of view of future security, after they found themselves deprived of the security which undoubtedly would have been given them had the Franco-American and Franco-British Treaties remained in force. I have more than once elaborated that point as strongly as the noble and learned
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Earl has done this afternoon, and I do not wish to go over it again. I would only sum it up by saying that, looking at the thing from a French point of view, undoubtedly the disappearance of those two Treaties must have knocked the bottom out of the Peace, and that it is very natural that France should be feeling anxiety and apprehension with regard to the future. With those two Treaties gone and the Treaty of Versailles left, which she herself at the Peace, I understand, considered to be insufficient unless the Franco-American and Franco-British Treaties also held, I quite agree with the noble and learned Earl that in any criticism of French policy, and in all the discussions, we ought to give the fullest weight to that great disappointment of French expectations over the Peace.
But there, I think, I part company with the noble and learned Earl. I do not wish to use this occasion to repeat criticisms of the Coalition Government, but I must put it on record that I cannot accept his claim for the Coalition Government that its policy was always clear and consistent I have criticised it so often outside that it is not necessary for me to repeat those criticism" now. I would, however, observe that I believe the head of that Government did, at one time, indicate that there were conditions under which that Coalition Government might consent to the occupation of the Ruhr. And I would observe further that if we are really anxious to preserve good relations with France, to reconcile the two points of view, the speeches and writings of distinguished members of the Coalition Government since they left office have surely not been calculated to preserve that accord and common policy which is really essential to the interests of Europe. I do not want to elaborate that point, because my object is not to attack a Government which docs not exist, or, indeed, to raise any controversial matters.
With regard to the noble and learned Earl's criticisms of the policy of the Government, it is of course for the noble Marquess opposite to deal with them. I was not listening to the noble and learned Earl in any controversial spirit; I was listening with great anxiety to get any light thrown upon the situation which might be helpful for the future. I do not know that I can throw much light upon it. I regard the statement we have had

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to-day from the noble Marquess as very grave, very disappointing, though perhaps many of us were prepared for disappointment. It looks as if it were becoming more and more difficult to reconcile the policies of the British and French Governments and of the Belgian Government, too, or to keep those Governments together. Public opinion is going to take a hand in this matter. Things cannot go on as they are without public opinion being deeply stirred, and I think it is very desirable that, just as some of us here try to understand the French point of view, so in France they should try to understand the point of view of British opinion.
We have before us a very grave prospect of unemployment for the winter. We have arranged to pay our Debt to the United States. That is a business transaction into which we have entered with the good will of people who wish to carry out their obligations. Very large sums of money are owed us by our Allies. We know the financial position of our Allies to be difficult, and we are not pressing for those sums of money. But our own financial situation is one to cause us anxiety. We are in need of German Reparations if such Reparations can be obtained. We admit the prior claim of France for the devastated regions; but we do wish to see the maximum of Reparations obtained from Germany because we have an interest in receiving what payments may be available to us. And the difference between us and France is, in my opinion, this. It is that we believe that the policy they have embarked upon is going to destroy the hope of Reparations both for themselves and for us. Then, it is further postponing, to put it optimistically, the recovery of Europe upon which foreign trade depends.
Just think of what is the world situation in trade, on which we depend so much. China is in chaos. Russia has ceased to be an economic unit of any value to the world for commercial purposes. If Germany follows suit, a glance at the map of Europe and Asia will show the enormous area which will drop out of commercial operations. And we shall not be the only sufferer, though we shall undoubtedly be one of the greatest sufferers from that condition of things. We are suffering from it now At this
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moment, looking at it purely from the material point of view, we are paying our Debts; we are not asking for Debts to be paid to us; we are seeing our hope of Reparations from Germany destroyed, as we think; and we see the prospect of increasing injury to and shrinkage in world trade. With bad times before us public opinion here may become very restive. But it is not even that on which I would lay the most stress. What I feel so strongly is that if the French have future security in view, as I think they must have, this particular policy in which the Allies cannot be united, which really resembles the old policies which were pursued after victorious wars, is one as to which all the lessons of history go to prove that it will certainly not make for security in the long run and will produce future wars. That is the situation, as I believe, from the point of view of British public opinion.
It is, therefore, not only disappointing, it is indeed a very grave prospect that the answers to His Majesty's Government, so far as we can gather from the statement of the noble Marquess opposite, hold out so little hope of agreement and no hope at all, I gather, of speedy agreement. Things are so shaping that the question in our minds, or in the minds of some of us, is this: Is not Europe, instead of recovering from the great catastrophe of the great war, drifting towards another catastrophe which may be still more searching, still more far reaching, more deep, more sweeping and more lasting in its consequences even than the great war itself? There are forces at work in the world which are working for disorder, for disruption, for the breaking up of society. The present condition of international affairs is playing into the hands of those forces. It is not possible for His Majesty's Government alone to retrieve the situation. It cannot be done by disunion; it can only be done by union. So far as I am concerned, I recognise, especially in that statement of His Majesty's Government that they have counselled the Germans to abandon passive resistance that His Majesty's Government have gone a very long way to try to meet French views.
I listened to the speech of the noble and learned Earl in the hope of finding out any policy by which the situation might be saved. It cannot be saved by

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a sort of duel between the British and French policies. I agree that we cannot secure union by participating with France in a policy which we believe is bound to lead to disaster. I agree that we cannot do that, and that union can only be secured by the French making every possible effort to meet the views which His Majesty's Government have put forward. But let us remember that the catastrophe is not going to be averted simply by saying that the French are wrong and we are right. If that is the only outcome that there can be of the situation, then the prospect is really very grave.
In regard to the concrete steps of withdrawing our Army of Occupation and our representative from the Reparation Commission, I have nothing to say against those steps if they are taken to mark that we cannot agree with the policy of the French Government. But I think it would be a pity to take those steps so long as there was any hope of agreement, because it would be really almost washing our hands of any further attempt to secure agreement. But supposing those steps were taken as the noble and learned Earl suggests, are they going to help us to avert a catastrophe? So far as I could gather from the noble and learned Earl, the policy which he thought we ought to adopt besides taking those concrete steps was simply to sit still, to make no attempt to modify or alter French policy, and await the result. We could do that with equanimity if it were not that the collapse of Germany and the collapse of trade, the collapse of Europe almost, might be the result of that particular policy, and that is what we are trying to avert. That is why I think it is essential that we should put forward an alternative policy in the way in which it may be most easy for the French Government to meet us. How far that has been done we can judge only when the Papers are put before us.
Then it may be said: If you have put an alternative policy forward and the French have put forward their policy and all that His Majesty's Government have been able to do has been to state those two policies and to say: "There is the difference"; how are you better off? Well, the chance may be but a slender one, but I think the situation is becoming
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so grave not merely for France, Belgium, Great Britain and Germany, but for every neutral country in Europe, that these alternative policies ought to be put before the world. Events may happen which may so impress the public not merely in this country but in other countries that it may be felt that the public opinion of the world must for its own sake, for the sake of every country at any rate in Europe, take a hand in bringing about a settlement of this situation.
I cannot exaggerate what I feel about the gravity of things after the statement of the noble Marques". I feel that it is impossible to deal with it adequately without the meeting of Parliament. Grave events may happen before the three and a half months' adjournment is over, and I ask at once, and I should like a reply upon the point from the noble Marquess opposite, that His Majesty's Government, if they find that the crisis develops rapidly and that important decisions of policy are necessary, will take the steps which I understand are within their power to summon Parliament at an early date.
THE MARQUESS QUEZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, the concluding question of the noble Viscount is one to which I give an immediate reply. Under the powers which exist by Act of Parliament it is possible to summon Parliament after its adjournment with little or no delay, and I need hardly assure the noble Viscount, or the House, that should matters take a grave turn, which I do not myself anticipate, those powers will be utilised in order to give both Houses of Parliament an opportunity of expressing their views upon the matter. With a good deal, and indeed with the greater part, of what fell from the noble Viscount who leads the Opposition I was in entire agreement, and with no statement of his more than this, that the House is placed in a position of extreme, though inevitable, difficulty by being called upon to-day, on the Motion of the noble and learned Earl. Lord Birkenhead, to discuss a situation of undoubted gravity without the Papers which alone can acquaint the House with what has passed. I carry this sentiment so far as to say that the greater part of the speech of the noble and learned Earl, Lord Birkenhead, would not have been delivered had he been in a position to read the Papers which I hope will be laid.

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I shall personally indicate in one or two particulars how far from the mark in these respects his speech, perhaps for no fault of his own, was. There is another respect in which I should like to express my sincere regrets, and it is this. Certainly owing to no action or inaction on our part, matters have reached the present point at the very moment when Parliament is separating for the Recess. As will be shown when the Papers are laid, during the past six weeks or two months, and, indeed, during the whole of the summer, every effort has been made by His Majesty's Government to expedite the solution of affairs, and when the dates are seen of our Notes or our Despatches it will be recognised that any delay that there has been has certainly not been due to any failure upon our part.
I said just now that had the Papers been in the possession of your Lordships a considerable part of Lord Birkenhead's speech would not have been delivered, and I may allude to one point in particular in which—although he did not state it—he rather assumed that there had been some reluctance or some inability on our part to take up with France the question of her security. That point was not developed at length by the noble Viscount, Lord Grey of Fallodon, because, as he said, he has on more than one previous occasion explained his views on the matter to your Lordships. But so far from any such charge, if a charge were made, being tenable against the Government, the very reverse is the case, and at every stage in these proceedings not merely I personally, in my conversations with the Ambassador, but His Majesty's Government, in their statement which will be published, and which you will see, have indicated their willingness at this stage, or at any future stage that may suit the French Government, to take up the question of security with the latter. And if it has not been taken up, it has not been due to any action on our part; it has been due to the express view of the French Government that it has nothing to do with the present question, and that they do not wish it to be taken up now. Therefore on that point our shield is unsullied, as the Papers will show. No difference of opinion between us, in so far as there is difference, has either arisen or been in the smallest degree aggravated by any discussion of, or failure to discuss, the question of security.
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I find some difficulty in ascertaining what is the precise object of the speech of the noble and learned Earl, nor do I accept, nor will the Papers corroborate, the history of events during the past six months as imagined by him. He defended the action of the late Government of which he and I were members, and to that extent, of course, I am not concerned to dispute him. He also approved and defended the action of Mr. Bonar Law in the line that he took at Paris, and in the exposition of it that he afterwards gave in Parliament here. He then seems to have assumed that, having followed that policy for a certain period, there ensued a sharp revulsion in which we absolutely turned away from the course we had hitherto pursued, and adopted a line that, in the opinion of the noble and learned Earl, was certain to lead to irretrievable disaster. That is not in the smallest degree a true description of what passed. The policy of Mr. Bonar Law is one which, being in cordial agreement with it, we have consistently followed.
But, my Lords, there came a time when the pursuit of that policy was confronted with conditions to which no sensible man could shut his eyes. Those conditions have been summed up, if I may say so, with great power by the noble Viscount who has just spoken. He drew us a picture of Europe as it has been developing before our eyes during the past six months. What did we see? We were told that France was going into the Ruhr to obtain Reparations. We saw no Reparations being paid. We saw the chance of any Reparations being forthcoming whittled away and destroyed before our eyes. We said: That is a question that concerns not France or Belgium alone: other people have Reparations. We have Reparations, and the whole basis of our policy has been and continues to be, that this being a question that affects us is not to be determined by the action of one isolated country, or two countries alone: It is a question that affects the whole of the Allies. It is a European question. It is an international question. It is a question in which, with due regard to the interests of our own country, we cannot stand on one side and leave France or Belgium to carry out whatever military policy they may desire. I speak not merely of our right to interfere—and that right to interfere rests not only upon our share of

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Reparations, but also upon the rights that we possess in respect of the payment of inter-Allied Debts, to which the noble Viscount referred, and which is a matter of supreme importance and cannot be set on one side as if it did not exist. Not only do we possess this inherent and indefeasible right, but what did we see going on?
We saw a situation in the Ruhr not clarifying but deepening in obscurity and gloom from week to week. We saw Germany—not because we looked at it through German spectacles in the smallest degree—falling to pieces, rotting to ruin, lapsing into irreparable decay, and carrying with it all prospects of economic recovery not merely for Germany but for Europe. And when we looked at our own position at home—I could, if it were necessary, elaborate this at great length—we saw that which is passing in the Ruhr telling upon almost every industry in this country, and, after a few brief moments or weeks of activity, due to the purchase of coal from this country when the situation in the Ruhr first began, we saw the dark hand of this tragedy clutching at the throat of almost every industry in this country; and if we do not see it now we shall see it in the course of the winter. As the months pass we shall know exactly what the continued occupation of the Ruhr by France and Belgium has meant. It is an occupation the effect of which will be felt in almost every cottage in this country.
That was the situation, and because we took note of these circumstances, because we felt it our duty in these supreme interests to take action and intervene, we are taunted by the noble and learned Earl with having reversed our policy and adopted an action which, in one of the most extravagant moments of his oration, he described as one of madness. In what did this madness consist? The mad action was to make one more effort, one amongst scores for which I have been responsible, to bring to bear on this terrible situation the united action of the Powers of Europe. Is there anything mad in that? Is there anything wrong in that? The noble and learned Earl spoke as if we knew that the course of action we were proposing was unpalatable, and as if we were entirely wrong to exasperate France. I wish he would wait to see the terms of our Note and the terms of the
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draft reply. I think he would be much astonished. He accused us of encouraging Germany, and then the noble Viscount, who spoke later, so far from saying that we have encouraged Germany, said that we have actually given her good advice (which I have constantly given), to desist from passive resistance. That the noble Earl describes as encouraging Germany.
Our idea was, and we thought there was a good chance of success—I am not certain that that chance has altogether disappeared—that we ought to take the chance, if it were possible, to deliver a reply to the German Note, assuming that that Note was deserving of reply, as everybody agreed that it was. When I made that suggestion to the Ambassadors it was not turned down as impracticable; it was welcomed by them. They said: "By all means let us see if we cannot return a conjoint answer"; and, as they were unwilling, or felt themselves precluded by their previous policy from taking action themselves, they were only too glad that the responsibility should be assumed by us. We thereupon drew up this reply, and, so far from expecting that it would not be noticed or that it would be rejected, I had myself very sanguine anticipations that it would be seriously regarded, that it might perhaps be amended, but that in some form or another it would go. The House must wait to see the reception it has met with. Since I came into the House I have heard that the reply from Italy, which I mentioned in my previous speech as not having arrived, has come in and is now awaiting me at the Foreign Office. The noble and learned Earl assumes, because the replies of France and Belgium are not encouraging, that, therefore, the policy has failed. I do not draw that deduction for one moment. I cannot tell what may happen in the next month or so, but the suggestion that we have done something provocative to France, exasperated her, and brought failure upon her own shoulders, has not a shadow of foundation.
Now we come to the present position. Here the noble and learned Earl gives us his own policy which, I think, was fairly summarised by the noble Viscount in his concluding remarks. The noble and learned Earl would have us recognise that we have made a deplorable failure; that

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France does not mean to be deflected from her course, and that all we have to do is to sit still and do nothing and withdraw such evidences of interest in and responsibility for the continental position as we have hitherto displayed. Is that a feasible or a wise proposition? The noble and learned Earl says: Take your representative away from the Reparation Commission. I wonder if he really has studied the matter.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: Yes.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Very well, he will know that twelve months' notice has to be given of such retirement, and does he contend that any perceptible difference in the situation will be made by giving that notice now? In his desire that we should do nothing provocative has he reflected, if we announced the withdrawal of our representative to-morrow, upon the effect that that would produce upon the French? Does he remember that the Reparation Commission is charged not only with Reparations in respect of Germany but in respect of Austria and Hungary and other countries? Are we to desist altogether from participation in the regulation of these affairs because in certain respects France cannot agree with us? I say this definitely, that to withdraw, or give notice of the withdrawal of our member from the Reparation Commission would in my judgment be an unwise step. It would be attended by no good result and it might possibly do a great deal of harm.
The second suggestion of the noble and learned Earl was that we should withdraw our Army of Occupation from the Rhineland. Here again, if he will look at the Treaty which no doubt he has in mind, he will see that we are there under the Treaty, and that the occupation of the Rhineland by the Allied Forces is the one and only guarantee under the Treaty which we possess, and in which we share, for the fulfilment by Germany of her obligations. We who have signed the Treaty cannot possibly run away from the implications which it carries. It would be an abnegation of our duty and render it impossible for us to exercise that influence in carrying out the terms of the Treaty which we now possess. I could argue the matter on many other grounds. I could successfully show, if it were
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necessary, that the presence of our Forces there, so ably commanded as they have been, has had a most quietening effect on the situation on the border and in Germany itself. I could show that our presence there has been warmly welcomed and appreciated by all the parties concerned, and I believe if we were to follow the advice of the noble and learned Earl and announce on behalf of His Majesty's Government that we were going to withdraw our Forces tomorrow, that that decision would be received not only with regret but almost with dismay in every international quarter. It is not a policy—it may be the rival policy of the noble and learned Earl—which we are at all disposed at the present to adopt.
I will make only one other observation. The noble and learned Earl rather reproached us with failure to conduct these very difficult matters by means of friendly conversations in the Foreign Office and elsewhere. I ask him to believe that there has been no failure in that respect. If he were aware of the hours that have been devoted to these conversations, recorded most faithfully afterwards, he would certainly not bring any charge against His Majesty's Government of having failed to adopt that particular instrument of conciliation. But difficult matters cannot be unravelled or conciliated by conversation alone. No one knows better than he that when we reach a certain stage matters have to be put down in print, and this brings me to a point which to my mind is of supreme importance.
The noble Viscount, Lord Grey of Fallodon, said just now with great truth that public opinion is going to take a hand. How true that was! And not only is public opinion going to take a hand, but public opinion has a right to take a hand. What has been the position in this country as regards public opinion? Owing to the extreme reserve which we have adopted here, owing to the secrecy which has overhung the conversations to which I have referred, public opinion in this country is most imperfectly informed as to what either the actions, or the attitudes, or the policy of His Majesty's Government are or have been. I think the reverse is the case in France. We all know that the Press methods that prevail in Paris are rather different from those in

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England, and that with the Prime Minister in France making constant speeches, with a well-informed Press giving every day full accounts of every idea that floats over the Quai d'Orsay, we know very well that the French side of the case and the French policy have a thousand opportunities of being heard from day to day and from week to week, while owing to the greater reserve that we practise in this country the same opportunities have not been presented here.
What, then, is the first stage The first stage is the laying of these Papers, and they will be as complete as the willingness of our Allies to publish can make them, in order that the country may know exactly where we stand, where the difference lies between us and them, and what are the forces or influences ranged upon the opposite side, and that public opinion may then assist us in dealing with this exceedingly grave and difficult situation. It is unfair, before the Papers have been laid, and before we have had the advantage of that assistance, to ask us what we are going to do next week or next month. If that question be put now, I do not know, I cannot answer. I myself have made, and His Majesty's Government have made, many struggles to preserve united action. That is the policy in which I have firmly and consistently believed and from which I hesitate to depart, and I should not like to admit even for one moment, although that policy has not so far been successful, that all chances of its being more successful in the future have disappeared. Your Lordships will, I think, understand that I have had to speak under great reserve this afternoon and that I would gladly have taken the House, had I had a right to do so, into even greater confidence than I have done.

KENYA: INDIAN VICEROY'S SPEECH.
LORD STANMORE: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Earl Beauchamp I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in his name upon the Paper—namely, to ask the Secretary of State for India whether his attention has bean drawn to the Press accounts of the speech made by the Viceroy on proroguing the Indian Legislature, and in particular to the statement that if the Government of India had to submit to the division of His
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Majesty's Government Regarding Kenya, its submission was, with due respect to His Majesty's Government, under protest, and whether such a statement, as reported in the Press, accurately reflects the relations between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (VISCOUNT PEEL): My Lords I am obliged to the noble Earl for raising this Question and for giving me the opportunity of clearing away some misapprehensions that may exist as to the intention of the Viceroy's speech. I have received verbatim extracts of the more important passages in the speech, to which I am giving publicity. It will, I think, simplify matters if I read to your Lordships now the actual text of the passage relating to the Kenya decision to which the noble Earl has referred. It is this:—
"We are conscious that there were important aspects, perhaps not sufficiently understood by us, which His Majesty's Government were called upon to weigh and determine, and we fully appreciate and acknowledge their whole-hearted efforts to arrive at a fair and equitable conclusion. They have announced their decision and the Government of India must consider it and arrive at its conclusions. If submission must be made, then with all due respect to His Majesty's Government it can only be under protest."
Before I go on to answer the last part of the noble Earl's Question, I should like to recall that the particular passage to which he calls attention is not, of course, the whole, but only a part, of the Viceroy's observations on the Kenya decision. The Viceroy laid stress or the advantages to which India can look forward as a consequence of the settlement; but in doing so, he reiterated what already has been made plain by His Majesty's Government, that on certain material points it was not possible to meet the wishes of the Government of India. The general balance of his observations will, I think, be more clearly appreciated from the verbatim extract which I am giving to the Press.
Now with regard to the particular passage to which the Question relates, I realise that there has been some doubt as to its interpretation. The passage has been taken to imply that it was open to the Government of India to consider whether or not they should submit to

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His Majesty's Government's decision in this matter. I will make it clear to your Lordships that I myself had no doubt that the Viceroy could have had no intention of making himself responsible for such a doctrine. Still, it is common knowledge that doubt has been expressed, both by members of your Lordships' House and others; perhaps not unnaturally, when we consider how compressed were the Press reports of his speech and what prominence was given to this particular utterance.
I have been in communication with the Viceroy on the matter, and his reply shows quite clearly that the interpretation which I should have placed upon his words is the right interpretation. The passage, taken together with its context, is intended to imply that until the Government of India have received the actual text of the documents containing the decision of His Majesty's Government, they could not judge what further action they might be at liberty to take or how far it might be open to them to make further representations as to details of importance. The Viceroy has made it perfectly clear to me that there was no idea whatever on his part, or on that of his colleagues, of challenging a decision communicated to them by His Majesty's Government.

BRITISH EMPIRE EXHIBITION (1924 ) INCORPORATED (MEMORANDUM AMENDMENT) BILL. [H.L.]
Committee of the Whole House (which stands appointed for this day) put off to Tuesday, November 13, next.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION.
The Royal Assent was given to the following Bills:—

Consolidated Fund (Appropriation),

Dentists,

Expiring Laws Continuance,

Education (Institution Children),

Agricultural Rates,

Merchant Shipping Acts (Amendment),.

Town Councils (Scotland),

Robert Gordon's Colleges and Aberdeen Endowments Trust Order Confirmation,

Broadstairs and St. Peters Urban District Council,

Chelmsford Corporation,

Croydon Corporation,

Wakefield Corporation,

West Somerset Mineral Railway (Abandonment),

West Hartlepool Corporation,

Shropshire, Worcestershire and Staffordshire Electric Power,

Wimbledon and Sutton Railway,

West Riding of Yorkshire County Council (Drainage),

Chesterfield Corporation,

Nottingham Corporation,

City and South London Railway,

Torquay Corporation,

London Electric Railway,

Chatham Corporation,

Morley Corporation,

Macclesfield Corporation.

Stoke-on-Trent Corporation.

House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.
House adjourned at twenty-seven minutes past three o'clock till Tuesday, 13th November, a quarter past four o'clock.