Sitting of 15 March 1922

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.
Bristol Corporation Bill,
As amended, considered; to be read the Third time.
Jarrow Extension and Improvement Bill (by Order),
Second Reading deferred till Monday, 27th March.
Land Drainage Provisional Order (No. 1),
Read a Second time, and committed.

TRADE DISPUTES REPEAL BILL.
Sir F. BANBURY: I beg to present a petition in favour of the Trade Disputes Repeal Bill from the Scottish Trade Protection Society.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
  RUSSIA.

    GENERAL WRANGEL.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHYasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Government has any information controverting the reports of the activities of General Baron Wrangel in organising a force among the Russian emigrés and refugees in the Balkans and elsewhere, and especially upon Serbian soil; has he any information of the objects of such a force; and whether he can state the present whereabouts of Baron Wrangel?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME (Secretary, Overseas Trade Department): I have no information regarding General Wrangel's activities in the Balkans or elsewhere.
    2154
    The second part of the question therefore does not arise. General Wrangel was reported to have arrived in Sofia on 27th February.
    Colonel WEDGWOOD: Has the hon. Gentleman seen a telegram in the newspapers stating that there were 20,000 troops organised?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: No, I have not.
    Sir HARRY BRITTAIN: Is this a question to be raised in this country?
    Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY: When a question is addressed to the Foreign Office, why is no explanation given when the Under-Secretary does not reply?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: I am an Under-Secretary.

    MRS. STAN HARDING.
    Sir H. BRITTAINasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what reply, if any, has been sent by the Foreign Office with regard to the refusal of Russia to make any reparation for the outrageous treatment of Mrs. Stan Harding on the plea that similar treatment has been meted out to Russians in this country; and whether, seeing the false impression created in this country by this statement, he will take steps to make the denial equally public?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: His Majesty's Government do not consider that any useful object would be attained by pursuing this matter further with the Soviet Government. Mrs. Stan Harding's claim for compensation, together with the claims of other British subjects, will, of course, be pressed when the time comes for a full and final settlement of private claims. With regard to the second part of the question, surely the hon. Member does not consider it necessary to publish a statement that the treatment of persons arrested by His Majesty's Government is not in any way similar to that practised by the Soviet Government.
    Sir H. BRITTAIN: This case was taken up by the Government as a case of outrageous treatment of a woman. Are the Government going to allow the matter to rest where it is? They took it into their hands because it was a special case.
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: I cannot accept that presentation of the case. I think it is a very serious case, and strong representations have been made. My hon. Friend knows that there are other people who have suffered at the hands of the Soviet Government very seriously, and all these cases have to be pressed at the appropriate time.

    SOVIET OFFICES, LONDON.
    Mr. GWYNNEasked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that the Soviet Republic of Russia have established a headquarter office at 43 to 47, Moorgate Street, in the City of London; whether he can state for what purposes this headquarters has been set up; whether the many occupants have intentions other than that of trading under the agreement of 1921; and whether he will cause full inquiries and a report to be made and so allay the growing feeling of disquiet on this matter?
    Sir J. NORTON-GRIFFITHSasked the Lord Privy Seal whether the British Government have received any information with regard to the purchase by the Soviet Government of extensive offices in Moorgate Street for the sum of £350,000; if so, for what purposes these offices have been acquired; and is it or is it not to be the official Soviet headquarters where British investors can apply for information regarding pre-War investments?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN (Leader of the House): I understand that these premises have been acquired for the use of the Russian Trade Delegates who have been admitted to this country for the purpose of facilitating trade with Russia. The acquisition of office premises is not inconsistent with the objects or conditions of their admission, and on the information at present before me, I see no reason for any action by His Majesty's Government.
    Sir J. NORTON-GRIFFITHS: Will my right hon. Friend kindly give me a reply to the latter part of my question?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I do not know what is the extent of the business to be done by these people, or the extent of these offices. I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the office itself.
    Sir F. BANBURY: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether he considers that there is any chance of the doctrines of the Soviet Republic being accepted in the most enlightened constituency in the country?
    Mr. SPEAKER: The right hon. Gentleman can better answer that question himself.

    WEI-HAI-WEI.
    Mr. STEWARTasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what the position is now in regard to Wei-hai-wei; whether it is to be handed back to China and become a closed port; and, if so, whether some compensation will be awarded to the British owners of property, which such a course will materially reduce in value, or whether Wei-hai-wei will become an open port and free to all comers for the purposes of trade and residence?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: On 1st February, at a plenary session of the Washington Conference, the Lord President of the Council announced that the rest of the Shantung Province having been restored to the complete sovereignty of China under suitable conditions, Great Britain proposed to hand back Wei-hai-wei under like suitable conditions. At the same time, he said that he had no doubt arrangements could be made for the continued use of the place as a sanatorium or summer rest of ships of war, and that His Majesty's Government would be largely guided in the necessary arrangements by the example of the Sino-Japanese negotiations regarding the Kiaochow leased territory. Subsequently in a letter of 3rd February to the chief Chinese delegate, the Lord President mentioned certain matters of detail which must be settled to the satisfaction of both His Majesty's Government and the Chinese Government before the transfer could be effected. The matters referred to in the hon. Member's question, the precise status of the port and the safeguarding of property rights were amongst those mentioned in the Lord President's letter.
    Mr. STEWART: The transfer has not yet taken place.

  MEXICO.

    BRITISH CLAIMS.
    Major CHRISTOPHER LOWTHERasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that all claims for losses suffered by individuals since 1910 in Mexico were by a decree of that Government to be lodged by 31st January last; that all foreign claims were to be examined by mixed commissions; that, in view of the fact that the Mexican Govern—ment has agreed to the conditions stipulated in this respect by the Foreign Office, there is no reason why British claims should not be at once examined; and why there has been no appointment of British commissioners?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: Negotiations have been in progress with the Mexican representative in London for the conclusion of an agreement for the submission to an arbitral tribunal of all British claims against the Government of Mexico, and I hope shortly to communicate to the Mexican representative a draft of the agreement containing certain modifications of the original proposal of the Mexican Government.
    Major LOWTHER: In view of the fact that the Mexican Government agreed to all the stipulations made by His Majesty's Government so long ago as last October, why has there been this enormous delay?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: I should like notice of any specific point. The whole of the delay has been caused in order to arrive at agreement.
    Major LOWTHER: I beg to give notice that I shall raise this question on the Adjournment to-morrow night.

    BRITISH CHARGÉ DES ARCHIVES.
    Major LOWTHERasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the chargé des archives in Mexico City receives £3,000 per annum free of tax; whether any other chargés des archives receive similar salaries; whether this gentleman's salary was brought to the notice of the Geddes Committee; and what are the reasons which actuate His Majesty's Government in continuing to employ this gentleman in such a capacity, in view of the fact that the Mexican Government have requested
    2158
    his recall on the grounds that he is hindering the re-establishment of friendly relations between the two Governments?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affrmative. No other officer is employed by His Majesty's Government in an analogous position. Information as to all salaries paid by the Foreign Office was available to the Geddes Committee, but, so far as I am aware, their attention was not specially drawn to this one The Mexican Government have apparently been under the impression that the officer in question was opposed to the establishment of more cordial relations between the two countries, but there is no foundation for this belief, and it has not been thought advisable for His Majesty's Government to replace an officer who has done valuable work under very difficult conditions.
    Major LOWTHER: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in the Foreign Office list there appear at least two or three other charges des archives? How does the hon. Gentleman reconcile that with his answer?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: I am not aware of that, and I understand that the position of this officer is quite different from that of many others.
    Lieut.-Colonel ASHLEY: What possible justification can there be for paying £3,000 free of tax to an officer like this, in view of the financial position of the nation?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: The payment made to these officers must depend upon the work which they have to perform. The cost of living has been very high in these cases and countries.
    Lieut.-Colonel ASHLEY: Is the work that this gentleman does more important than that done by many important Members of the Government, who receive a good deal less?
    Major LOWTHER: I beg to give notice that I shall at an early date raise this question on the adjournment.

    AZERBAIJAN AND GEORGIA.
    Major BARNETTasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Soviet republics of Azer-

    2159
    baijan and Georgia are officially represented in this country; whether it is proposed that they shall be represented at the Genoa Conference; and, if so, by whom?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: The answer to the first two parts of the question is in the negative. The third does not therefore arise.
    Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY: Has our recognition of the Georgian Government been terminated owing to the change of Government in that country?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: That does not arise out of the original question.

    WEST AFRICA (IMPORTS OF SPIRITS).
    Mr. ORMSBY-GOREasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any decree has been promulgated by the French Government in Dahomey, French Togoland, or French Occidental Africa to give effect to the prohibition or control of the importation of trade spirits into Africa, in accordance with the Convention of St. Germain, dated 10th September, 1919; whether any representations have recently been made to the French Government that the differential treatment of this subject by the British and French Authorities in the Gold Coast and French Togoland, respectively, has not only resulted in serious loss of revenue to the British Colony and British mandated territory, but has led to smuggling and other abuses; whether steps will be taken forthwith to ensure that British and French action in this matter are on all fours; and what quantity of spirits, trade and other, are known to have been imported into Lome during the year 1921?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: A decree for this purpose, dated 15th May, 1921, was promulgated by the Governor-General of French West Africa on 24th December, 1921. Inquiries are being made as to the applicability of the Regulations laid down by this decree to Togoland. Representations have been made to the French Government with the object of securing that the obligations imposed upon the local administrations by the Treaty of 1919 shall be inter-
    2160
    preted on similar lines in the British and French Colonies. The particulars asked for in the last part of the question have not reached me, but I will endeavour to obtain them.
    Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in a recent report on the financial condition of the British African Colonies this is singled out as an example of the unsatisfactory fiscal arrangements that obtain in the Gold Coast?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: It is most important that this matter should be settled, and settled on the same lines.

    BALKAN STATES (RAILWAYS).
    Sir H. BRITTAINasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether there has been any recent improvement, and, if so, to what extent, in the transit of privately-owned goods wagons across the frontiers of the Central European and Balkan States?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: I have no information, but will make inquiries of Sir Francis Dent, the President of the Commission for the distribution of the rolling-stock of the former Austro-Hun-garian monarchy.

    TURKEY (PUBLIC DEBT).
    Mr. RAPERasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs why the administration of the Ottoman public debt should have priority and a privileged position over and above civilians with respect to the question of claims?
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Mr. Hilton Young): I would refer the hon. Member to Article 236 of the Treaty of Sèvres, from which he will see that the suggestion conveyed by the question is not justified by the terms of that Treaty, to which he is presumably referring.
    Mr. RAPER: Are we to understand that the Government are now carrying out the Treaty of Sèvres, although not yet signed?
    Mr. YOUNG: That does not arise out of this question.
    Mr. RAPERasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is aware that, owing to the crippled financial condition of British claimants, and the refusal of His Majesty's Government to make an advance, the effect on our trade is disastrous, as indicated by Constantinople Customs returns, which show that whereas before the War our share of the import trade into Turkey was from 38 to 40 per cent., the percentage of 1919–20 came down to 29 per cent., and during 1921 has steadily declined for the port of Constantinople, at all events, to under 20 per cent., until in August last the total of American imports into Turkey cleared at the Constantinople Custom house exceeded ours, we taking second place; and will His Majesty's Government agree to make an advance to British civilian claimants?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: While I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the hon. Member's figures as given in the first part of the question, the matter is being investigated by the Board of Trade. As regards the last part of the question, the decision can only rest with the Treasury, whose attention I will not fail to call to this matter.

  ROYAL NAVY.

    PRIZE MONEY.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKEasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty whether, in making the distribution of prize money in April next, he can see his way to begin the distribution with the ex-naval ratings so as to alleviate the distress these men, in many cases, are suffering owing to unemployment?
    The CIVIL LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Commander Eyres-Monsell): As stated in the reply to the hon. Member for Portsmouth on 1st March, arrangements will be made to begin distribution to ex-naval officers and men at the same time as to those still serving. Having regard to the very large number of individuals to be paid—over 400,000—it will obviously be possible to deal with only a section of the claimants at a time, and the order in which applications from ex-service ranks and ratings can be received will be announced in the Press as soon as practicable.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Do I understand that the Admiralty decline to accept the suggestion in the question, namely, to begin the distribution with ex-naval rating?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: It will take a very long time, as it is—about nine months—to distribute all this money, and if it is not done in the way most acceptable to the accounting branch, it will take a great deal longer. It cannot be done as suggested.

    HYDROPHONE STATION, RAME HEAD.
    Mr. FOOTasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty whether he is aware that the wire attachment in connection with the hydrophone station which was established at Rame Head during the War, on being disconnected, was not recovered or only partially so, and that in consequence the hook-and-line fishermen frequently fouled the wire with their mooring warp and grapnel, which are thereby lost; whether he is aware that this causes serious loss to the fisher men; and whether the Admiralty is prepared to remove the wire and compensate the fishermen for the losses they have sustained?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: Inquiries are being made into this question, and I will communicate the result to the hon. Member as soon as possible. I may add that no claims or complaints in connection with this alleged obstruction have been received at the Admiralty.

    ROYAL DOCKYARDS.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHYasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty how many workmen and officials, respectively, were employed in the Royal dockyards at home and abroad in March, 1914; how many are employed now; how many of the workmen are established men; and how many of the officials are permanent?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: The numbers of workmen and officials employed at the dockyards at home and abroad were:—

    Workman.

    Officials.

    March, 1914

    51,970

    2,304

    25th February, 1922

    56,327

    3,555

    Of these numbers, 14,500 workmen are borne on the established list and 2,547 of the officials are permanent. These figures relate only to the numbers employed in Vote 8 departments. It will

    2163
    be appreciated that the number of officials is not entirely dependent upon the number of workpeople employed in the dockyards, but is also to a large extent dependent upon the amount of material in the yards (which is now two or three times as large as it was in 1914) and other factors.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: In view of the fact that these figures show there are more than twice as many employed although we have a smaller Navy, can the hon. Gentleman say what is being done to reduce the number?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: These figures are in course of being reduced and this does not represent the number at the present moment. A census of the numbers in the dockyards is being taken on 3rd April, and the possibility of making further reductions will be kept in view.

    OFFICERS (ADMIRALTY).
    Mr. AMMONasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty the number of naval and marine officers, including retired officers, in all Departments of the Admiralty in April, 1914, who received £2,000 per annum or over, inclusive of allowances; the number to-day and how many of them receive over £3,000 per annum; the corresponding figures in the case of civil servants, including technical and professional appointments, such as the Director of Naval Construction and the Civil Engineer-in-Chief, and reckoning cost-of-living bonus in all cases; the amount by which the remuneration of the First Sea Lord exceeded that of the Secretary to the Admiralty in 1914; and the corresponding amount to-day?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: As the reply is somewhat long, I propose, with the hon. Member's permission, to circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following is the reply:

    April,1914.

    At present.

    Number of naval and marine officers (including retired officers) in receipt of £2,000 or over, inclusive of allowances (not exceeding £3,000)

    3

    17

    Ditto over £3,000

    1

    3

    4

    20

    April, 1914.

    At present.

    Number of civil servants in receipt of £2,000 or over (not exceeding £3,000)

    2

    4

    Ditto over £3,000

    Nil

    Nil

    —

    —

    2

    4

    In April, 1914, the First Sea Lord received: salary, £1,500 and a furnished residence, and the Secretary received a salary (including house allowance) of £2,000. At present the First Sea Lord receives: salary, £3,000 and a furnished residence, and the Secretary receives a salary of £3,000. Naval members of the Board also receive the half pay of their rank to which they are entitled, whether they are serving or not.

    ROSYTH DOCKYARD.
    Mr. WALLACEasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty whether a decision has yet been reached regarding the transfer of a portion of the established men at Rosyth to southern dockyards?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: It has been decided that in cases where established men are redundant at Rosyth, those under 50 years of age are to be given the option of re-transfer to southern yards or discharge with any allowances for which they may be eligible under the Superannuation Acts; those over 50 years of age who are redundant will be discharged—also with superannuation allowances. It is already certain that a number of established men will be redundant, but that number depends upon questions not yet settled.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Does this mean that the established men at Rosyth are coming to Devonport, although the number of the establishment there is going to be reduced?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: It might mean that in the end.
    Mr. WALLACEasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty how many men have been discharged from Rosyth naval base since 1st February; and how many dismissals have taken place at Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport during the same period?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: 1,043 workmen have been discharged from Rosyth Dockyard since 1st February. The numbers discharged during the same period at Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport are, respectively, 148, 369, 250; the rate of discharge at these three yards will be considerably increased as from the 18th instant. These figures relate only to Vote 8.
    Mr. WALLACE: Is the present rate of discharges at Rosyth, which has been going on since 18th February, to be continued, and is the same rate of discharges being observed at Devonport and other yards?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: All the discharges are to be continued, until we get down to the proper number.
    Mr. WALLACE: Is the hon. Gentleman aware of the very serious conditions arising at Rosyth on account of these discharges and the number of evictions that are taking place, and will he not take into, account the idea of proceeding at a slower rate?

    NUMBER OF OFFICERS SERVICE IN SHORE APPOINTMENTS OR UNDERGOING COURSES.

    RANK

    On 18th March, 1914.

    On 18th February, 1922.

    Shore Appointments.

    Courses.

    *Shore Appointments.

    Courses.

    Admirals-of-the-Fleet

    …

    …

    0

    —

    1

    —

    Admirals

    …

    …

    7

    —

    7

    —

    vice-Admirals

    …

    …

    5

    1

    5

    —

    Rear-Admirals

    …

    …

    18

    4

    17

    —

    Commodores

    …

    …

    5

    —

    4

    —

    Captains

    …

    …

    78

    14

    114

    36

    *These figures include:—(a) One Admiral and two Captains on Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control for Germany. (b) The Director of Royal Indian Marine, who is a Rear-Admiral and acts as Rear-Admiral, Bombay.

    TRAWLERS AND DRIFTERS.
    Major ENTWISTLEasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty how many vessels of the Strath, Castle, and Mersey type steam trawlers respectively, and how many steel and wooden built drifters the Government have on hand for sale either at the present time or in the future; and how many of such vessels they have on hand which are not to be sold?
    Viscountess ASTOR: Is it not true that Rosyth is a mushroom dockyard?
    Mr. WALLACE: No.

    SHORE OFFICERS.
    Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHYasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty how many admirals-of-the-fleet, admirals, vice - admirals,' rear -admirals, commodores, and captains, respectively, were employed on shore, including service in the Admiralty, in March, 1914; and if he will state the corresponding figures for March of this year?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: As the reply is in tabular form, I propose, with the hon. and gallant Member's permission, to circulate it in the OPFICIAI, REPORT. I may add that the figures for March, 1922, are not yet available. The figures for 18th February, 1922, the latest available date, have therefore been given.
    The following is the reply:
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: As regards the first part of the question, the following remain for sale by the Admiralty:

    "Strath" type trawlers

    …

    8

    "Castle" type trawlers

    …

    61

    "Mersey" type trawlers

    …

    34

    Steel drifters

    …

    11

    Wood

    …

    33

    As regards the second part, 23 trawlers and 45 drifters are, for the time being,

    2167
    retained for naval service, but it is in contemplation to reduce this number. I may add that the sale of these trawlers and drifters is progressing satisfactorily considering the present market conditions.
    Major ENTWISTLE: Have not announcements been made by the Government from time to time that certain ships were not for sale, and, in breach of these announcements, have not these ships been put up for sale, to the considerable disadvantage of trade, and involving considerable cost and damage?

    HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP "ENCHANTRESS."
    Captain Viscount CURZONasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty whether the Admiralty have come to any decision with reference to the recommendation of the Geddes Committee relating to His Majesty's Yacht "Enchantress"?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: I would refer my noble and gallant Friend to the reply of the 22nd February to the hon. Member for Central Hull.
    Viscount CURZON: Does not that reply, in fact, mean that the Admiralty have decided to dispense with the services of this vessel?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: She is being paid off at the end of this month and laid up, in accordance with the terms of the previous reply.

    RETIBEMENTS AND PROMOTIONS
    Viscount CURZONasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty whether, in view of the very great anxiety felt by all naval officers with regard to their future, he can make any announcement as to what special scheme for the retirement of officers surplus to requirements which may be necessary, and also as to the promotion of officers of the rank of lieut.-commander.
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: I regret I am not yet in a position to make any announcement.
    Rear-Admiral ADAIR: Is it not the case that these promotions are now three months overdue and is it not high time something was done?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: That is the case, and nobody regrets more than
    2168
    myself that the matter has not yet been settled.
    Viscount CURZON: Is the hon. Gentle man aware—
    Mr. SPEAKER: Sir Thomas Bramsdon.
    Viscount CURZON: Am I not entitled to put a question?
    Mr. SPEAKER: The Noble Lord seems to think that a question is not complete without two supplementaries. It is very unfair to other hon. Members, whose questions are later on the Paper.
    Viscount CURZON: On a point of Order—
    Mr. SPEAKER: Sir Thomas Bramsdon.

    EAST INDIES STATION (COMMISSIONS).
    Sir T. BRAMSDONasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty whether, in view of the official interpreta-Section II, paragraph 6, or Article 1338 welfare requests, Goanese or Seedies of the East Indies station are considered eligible for the grant of commissions as officers in His Majesty's Navy on that station; and, if not, why they are permitted to hold the ratings of chief and petty officers, Royal Navy, observing that whilst serving in these ratings they are, under the powers of the Naval Discipline Act, the King's Regulations, and Admiralty Instructions, Appendix XV and Article 218, classified as the superior officers of all white naval ratings of leading-seaman rank and below?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. As regards the second part of the question, it is desirable to provide a certain number of higher billets for native ratings in order to encourage efficiency. No difficulty ever arises in practice as native ratings are never put in charge of white ratings.

    DRAFTING OFFICE, PORTSMOUTH.
    Sir T. BRAMSDONasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty why, in view of the directions contained in Section II, paragraph 6, of Article 1338 of the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, Volume II, 1921, a paymaster-commander is borne for duty in the drafting office at Portsmouth, in addition to an executive-commander and a lieutenant-commander; whether in view

    2169
    of the urgent need for economy, this is justifiable; and whether the same applies at the other two port drafting offices?
    Commander EYRES-MONSELL: A paymaster-commander is borne for duty in the drafting office at Portsmouth, and paymaster lieutenant-commanders in the drafting offices at Chatham and Devonport; the officer at Portsmouth was only recently promoted to his present rank. The appointments have been made subsequent to the promulgation of the instructions contained in Section II, Clause 6, Article 1338, King's Regulations, and they are considered necessary.

  UNEMPLOYMENT.

    INSURANCE AND RELIEF EXPENDITURE.
    Mr. HANNONasked the Minister of Labour the present weekly expenditure upon unemployment insurance and the total weekly expenditure of boards of guardians on unemployment relief?
    The MINISTER of LABOUR (Dr. Macnamara): The average weekly amount paid in unemployment benefit and dependants' grants in Great Britain and Southern Ireland for the four weeks ending 22nd February was £1,298,000, between a fourth and a fifth of which falls upon the Exchequer. I am informed by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health that figures are not available showing the weekly expenditure of the boards of guardians on relief of unemployment as distinct from the total expenditure on relief of the poor.

    MINERS, CORNWALL.
    Mr. FOOTasked the Minister of Labour the amount which has been paid out of funds administered by his Department by way of unemployment relief and benefit to the Cornish miners?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: Precise figures are not available, but I am having an estimate prepared, which I will send to my hon. Friend as soon as possible.
    Mr. FOOTasked the Minister of Health the amount which has been expended out of local funds, and out of national funds, for which his Department is responsible in relief of the unemployed Cornish miners?
    The MINISTER of HEALTH (Sir Alfred Mond): It is estimated that some £5,000 has been expended by the Redruth Guardians in the relief of miners. There has also been an increase of expenditure in the Penzance Union of £600 in 11 months, most of which is for the relief of the miners. It is understood that a more substantial sum has also been expended in relief by voluntary agencies. Grants are being made by the Unemployment Grants Committee in respect of works of a total capital value of over £26,000 which are being carried out by the local authorities in areas where there are large numbers of unemployed Cornish miners.

    BENEFIT PERIODS.
    Mr. T. THOMSONasked the Minister of Labour whether the Government is going to introduce legislation to extend the periods for which benefits are payable under The Unemployment Insurance Act, 1921, in time for their new proposals to be operative by the 5th April next, when existing benefits begin to expire?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: As I told my hon. and gallant Friend a week ago, the whole matter is now receiving the careful and anxious consideration of the Government.
    Mr. THOMSON: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that within three weeks of Parliamentary time, these benefits expire and is it not possible to do something within that period?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: Of course I realise that in three weeks the extension of benefit may first begin to be exhausted.

    INSURANCE BENEFIT.
    Mr. T. GRIFFITHSasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that, owing to the long holidays now in vogue on account of slackness of work, workmen covered by the Unemployment Insurance Act are being penalised with regard to payment of benefit; whether arrangements have been made that in estimating the holidays for which a man shall not be paid benefit the average holidays during the previous three years is taken as the criterion; whether he is aware that on this method, where it is shown that the average holidays amount to five days and during this year they actually amount to nine days, the man

    2171
    cannot receive benefit for the balance of four days on account of the waiting period of a week; whether he has received a resolution from the Sheffield Local Employment Committee and from any other committees to the effect that benefit should be paid for all unemployed days other than statutory holidays; and whether, in order to secure fair play all round, he will consider the advisability of adopting this principle?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: I have received representations in the sense of the question put by my hon. Friend The authoritative decision in this matter rests with the Umpire, who has decided that, in the case of workpeople suspended from work over a holiday period, benefit is not payable for the holidays customary at the particular establishment at which they are employed, unless the period of suspension lasts for at least 12 consecutive week-days in addition to the holidays. The length of the customary holiday is a question to be determined by the facts in each particular case, subject to an appeal to the Courts of Referees and if necessary to the Umpire.

    HOME-CRAFT TRAINING.
    Colonel NEWMANasked the Minister of Labour whether he has any information to give the House with regard to the scheme which has been in operation for some time past for the training and, when trained, the providing with outfits, as domestic helpers, of women who have been thrown out of industrial employment; how is the scheme financed, by public or private funds; how many women have been found employment; and are any conditions laid down as to wages and hours of work of women for whom employment is found?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: The Home-craft Training Scheme for unemployed women is conducted by the Central Committee on Women's Training and Employment, who have allocated to this work £100,000, from heir grant from the National Relief Fund. In addition, the Ministry of Labour have contributed a grant of £50,000. Needlework is among the subjects taught and the women make outfits which they may buy at cost price at the end of training. Seven thousand women have been, or are being, trained under the scheme. All new entrants have for some
    2172
    time past been required to undertake to enter domestic service at the end of training, and the great majority are known to do so. The Committee have laid down no conditions as to wages or hours of employment.
    Colonel NEWMAN: Has a mistress who wants to obtain the services of one of these domestic helpers to go to the Employment Exchange to get a domestic helper?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: If the vacancy is notified at the Employment Exchange, she would go there to get an applicant, and I confess I do not see why she should not.

    JUVENILES (REGISTRATION).
    Mr. GILBERTasked the Minister of Labour whether juveniles who attend continuation schools in London have to attend at Employment Exchanges in order to register for employment; and whether his Department can arrange that the registration shall be done in the schools, so that the juveniles can get employment while they are in attendance at school?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: Since August last arrangements have been in operation under which juveniles attending day continuation schools in London register for employment at the schools, and do not attend the Employment Exchanges for this purpose. The reply given to my hon. Friend on 22nd February stating that these juveniles register at the Exchanges was, I regret to say, inaccurate.

    SOUTHWARK.
    Mr. GILBERTasked the Minister of Labour the number of unemployed registered for the borough of Southwark for January and February of this year, giving the figures for males and females; and can he give the trades which the greatest number of unemployment applies to?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: In the area of the Borough Exchange, which is that which most nearly coincides with The Borough of Southwark, there were 11,360 males and 4,291 females registered as unemployed at 31st January, compared with 11,058 males and 3,859 females at 28th February. The principal trades affected in the case of men were building, engineering and ironfounding; printing, bookbinding; transport service, including dock labour. In the case of women, the

    2173
    trades principally affected were printing and bookbinding; hotel, lodging-house and domestic service; manufacture of food and drink.

    BENEFIT (EXTENSION).
    Mr. R. YOUNGasked the Minister of Labour whether those applying for an extension of unemployed benefit are required to sign a document undertaking to accept work, other than that to which they have been accustomed, on fair terms and conditions; and whether such an undertaking nullifies the conditions laid down in Circular U.I.A. 518, Clause 9 (a), (b) and (c) wherein unemployed persons are not expected to accept work offered to them where a stoppage of work exists or at a lower wage or less favourable conditions than that which habitually obtains in the localities in which work may be offered to them, etc.?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: As already stated in the House on 17th February, the six week's extension of unemployment benefit is not to be granted to persons who are not prepared to accept on fair terms and conditions work other than that to which they have been accustomed but which they are reasonably capable of performing. This special condition does not apply to "covenanted" benefit under the permanent provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Acts, which remains governed by Section 7 of the 1920 Act, quoted in Clause 9 of the Circular U.I.A. 518 referred to by my hon. Friend.

    TRADE UNIONS (EXPENSES).
    Mr. HANNONasked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware of the very high percentage of total expenditure included under expenses and management in the balance sheets of certain important trade unions; and whether, in the interests of trades unionists themselves, arrangements can be made whereby fully itemised balance sheets should be issued?
    Mr. YOUNG: I have been asked to reply. The hon. Member does not state to which trade unions he refers, but in any ease there can be no general answer to the question whether the percentage of expenditure on management is high or not; that must depend on the particular circumstances of each union. As regards
    2174
    the second part of the question, it is for trade unionists themselves to consider whether arrangements of the kind indicated are practicable or desirable.

  HOUSING.

    SUBSIDY.
    Major Sir KEITH FRASERasked the Minister of Health if he will consider the question of extending until 1924 the period during which the housing subsidy for new houses will be given to local authorities, thus placing England and Wales on exactly the same terms as Scotland?
    Sir A. MOND: I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the answer which I gave on this subject on 1st March, of which I will send him a copy.

    BUILDING SCHEMES.
    Mr. TREVELYAN THOMSONasked the Minister of Health (1) whether he is aware that the total number of men employed on State-assisted housing schemes fell from 138,334 in October to 101,235 in February; what further steps he proposes taking so that all available unemployed labour may be fully utilised in building houses which are still most urgently required;
    (2) whether, having regard to the fall in the cost of houses to about £400, he will now sanction the requests of local authorities to build more houses where both labour and materials are available, even though this involves the erection of more than the limited number of 176,000 houses fixed last year?
    Sir A. MOND: These questions raise issues with which I dealt fully in the course of the Debate on Monday evening, and, as I then explained, I do not propose, in view of the large amount of work in hand, to ask the House to agree to any general extension of the housing scheme. There is, however, a small margin of the 176,000 houses in hand which I am using to sanction the erection of further houses by local authorities in special cases.
    Mr. THOMSON: Will the right hon. Gentleman reply to the last part of Question 39, where I specifically ask if

    2175
    he will see that houses are sanctioned to employ fully all available labour in the building trade?
    Mr. SPEAKER: I observe that the hon. Member himself took several pages of the OFFICIAL REPORT a day or two ago to put that very question.
    Mr. THOMSON: I did not get a satisfactory answer.

    RENT RESTRICTION ACT.
    Mr. HANNONasked the Minister of Health whether his attention has been called to cases in which landlords of housing property in towns have intimated to their tenants their intention to evict them on the expiration of the Rent Restriction Act, 1920, unless a very substantial increase in the existing rents is agreed to; and whether, in view of the continued depression in trade and the difficulties which still attach to the housing problem, he will consider the advisability of introducing a Bill to extend the Rent Restriction Act for a further period of one or two years?
    Sir A. MOND: I have not heard of any cases of the kind referred to in the first part of the question. As the Act does not expire until June, 1923, the question of its continuance or otherwise has not yet arisen.

  NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE.

    MEDICAL BENEFIT.
    Colonel BURNasked the Minister of Health if he is aware that the approved societies are proposing to undertake the cost of medical benefit under the National Health Insurance Acts out of the surpluses accumulated during the past years; and what changes in the control of medical benefit this will entail?
    Sir A. MOND: I am proposing to introduce at an early date a Bill under which the cost of medical benefit which has hitherto been met by a direct Exchequer grant over and above the normal statutory proportion will be transferred to approved societies in respect of the period ending on 31st December, 1923, and will be met out of their accumulated funds, in which are included the surpluses disclosed at the first valuation and not used for the provision of additional benefits. The Bill will not entail any changes in the control of medical benefit.

    INVESTMENT ACCOUNT.
    Mr. WALTER SMITHasked the Minister of Health what is the amount standing to the credit of the National Health Insurance Funds Investment Account; and whether such moneys can be used to meet the economies suggested in the Geddes Report, rather than make additional financial demands on individual societies, some of which are less fortunately placed than others?
    Sir A. MOND: I assume that the question refers to the total investments of National Health Insurance Fund moneys made by the National Debt Commissioners, in accordance with Section 54 of the 1911 Act. The amount in question is, approximately, £61,000,000. The hon. Member is doubtless aware that these moneys are held in trust on behalf of the individual approved societies and the various subsidiary funds and accounts of which the National Health Insurance Fund is constituted. There are no moneys in the fund which can be used for any other purposes than those of the individual societies and accounts of whose credits the fund is made up.
    Mr. SMITHasked the Minister of Health what is the average rate of interest received by the Ministry on the National Health Insurance Funds Investment Account; and to what fund is the balance credited as the outcome of such investment?
    Sir A. MOND: The average rate of interest earned on the investments of National Health Insurance Funds is at present, approximately, 5 per cent. Under the Regulations as to the investment of funds by the National Debt Commissioners under the National Health Insurance Acts, the balance of the interest earned on any securities held by them, over and above the sums required to be credited by way of interest allowed by the insurance departments to approved societies, the Deposit Contributors Fund, the Navy and Army Insurance Fund, and other funds and accounts, remains credited to the Income Account (in the books of the National Debt Commissioners) constituted under these Regulations, and is used to make good losses realised when any holding or part of a holding in any security purchased on account of National Health Insurance Funds by the National Debt Commissioners is sold or paid off.
    Mr. SMITHasked the Minister of Health what is the total collective sum standing to the credit of approved societies in the National Health Insurance Fund Investment Account bearing interest credited to societies at the prescribed rate of 4 per cent, per annum?
    Sir A. MOND: The total collective sum standing to the credit of approved societies in the National Health Insurance Fund Investment Account, bearing interest at the prescribed rate of 4 per cent, per annum at 31st December, 1921, was, approximately, £32,000,000.

    CONTRIBUTIONS (MAXIMUM NUMBER).
    Mr. NEWBOULDasked the Minister of Health whether, in view of the fact that a member who entered insurance on or before 1st July, 1918, is required to make 80 contributions between that date and the 4th July, 1920, before he becomes entitled to benefit under the Act, and whereas the maximum number of contributions possible is 79, he proposes to amend the Prolongation of Insurance Act in order to provide that an insured person who has paid the maximum number of contributions possible between the said dates shall become entitled to benefit?
    Sir A. MOND: The maximum number of contributions possible in respect of the period between 1st July, 1918, and 4th July, 1920, was 105, and not 79 as stated by the hon. Member. It is true that the maximum number would be less in the case of a person who ceased employment before the 4th July, 1920, but it is only in the extreme case of a person whose insurance would have ceased during the first week of the operation of the Prolongation of Insurance Act that the requirement of the payment of 80 contributions could not have been satisfied. No such case has yet been brought to my notice, but if the hon. Member can send me particulars of such a case, I shall be pleased to consider whether any action is possible.

  PEACE TREATIES.

    SILESIA (BRITISH TROOPS).
    Colonel Sir A. SPROTasked the Prime Minister why British troops are still retained in Silesia; and when they are to be withdrawn?
    Sir P. LL0YD-GREAME: Under the Treaty of Versailles (Section 6 of the Annex to Article 88) the powers of the Plebiscite Commission in Upper Silesia terminate when the parts of the area allotted to Germany and Poland have been placed under German and Polish administration. This cannot be done until the economic convention for the administration of the industrial area, now being negotiated between Germany and Poland under a chairman appointed by the League of Nations, has been concluded. It is hoped that those negotiations will be completed shortly. It will then be possible to withdraw the Plebiscite Commission, and with it the allied troops, including the British contingent.

    POLAND.
    Captain WEDGWOOD BENNasked the Prime Minister whether this country is committed to any guarantee securing the frontiers of Poland beyond the provisions of the Versailles Treaty?
    Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME: The answer is in the negative.
    Captain BENN: May we take it that no such provision will be inserted in the Anglo-French Pact? May I have an answer?

    ARMIES OF OCCUPATION, GERMANY.
    Colonel WEDGWOODasked the Prime Minister whether the United States. Government have demanded from the reparations pool the cost of maintaining, their troops in Germany; and whether His Majesty's Government are in agreement with this demand, seeing that it will tend to hasten the evacuation of the Rhineland by Allied troops and the reconstruction of Germany?
    Mr. YOUNG: The Allied Finance Ministers, during the recent Conference in Paris, received a memorandum on this-question from the unofficial representative of the United States Government on the Reparation Commission. They replied that, in their opinion, it would be desirable that the question should be dealt with by means of communications-addressed to the Allied Governments by the United States Government through diplomatic channels. I am circulating in the OFFICIAL REPORT a copy of the American memorandum, and the reply of the Finance Ministers.
    Colonel WEDGWOOD: In this matter, are we working in collaboration with the American Government in making this demand?
    Mr. YOUNG: I do not follow the question.
    Colonel WEDGWOOD: Are we supporting the American Government in this demand?
    Mr. YOUNG: A question of that character will certainly require notice.
    Lieut.-Colonel ASHLEY: Is the cost of the American troops greater than that of the French and English troops?
    Mr. SPEAKER: Notice should be given of that question.
    The memorandum and reply mentioned are as follow:
    16, Rue de Tillsitt,
    Paris.
    10th March, 1922.
    MEMORANDUM FOR THE FINANCE MINISTERS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY AND BELGIUM.
    I have this morning received a cable from Washington instructing me to point out to you that the United States Army costs up to 1st May, 1921, amount to approximately $241,000,000. The Allied Governments, with the possible exception of Great Britain, have received their Army costs in full up to 1st May, 1921, and the English Army costs are apparently to be met in full in connection with the present arrangements. In view of the foregoing, the Government of the United States expects to obtain full payment of the costs of its Army of Occupation, with interest from 1st May, 1921, before any part of German payments is distributed for reparations or other purposes.
    With reference to current costs I am requested to state that the Government of the United States will insist upon full payment, but that, if assurance of payment is received, it anticipates no difficulty in arranging the practical details of making the payment.
    (Signed) R. W. BOYDEN,
    United States Unofficial Delegate,
    Reparation Commission.
    LETTER TO MR. BOYDEN.
    The Finance Ministers of Belgium, Great Britain, France and Italy to Mr. R. W. Boyden, the Unofficial Delegate of the United States of America on the Reparation Commission.
    11th March, 1922.
    SIR,—We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the Memorandum placed before us by yourself under date of 10th March, regarding the payment of the costs of the American Army of Occupation.
    Your communication has received our most serious consideration. You will find enclosed te text of the arrangement signed at Paris to-day. A special article has been added to this document in order to meet the points with which the Memorandum is concerned. While we have thus safeguarded all rights of the United States of America, whatever they may prove to be, we are of opinion that inasmuch as we are acting under the Treaty of Versailles, to which the Government of the United States of America are not a party, the question is one which concerns our respective Governments, and should be raised directly through diplomatic representations made by the Government of the United States of America to the Allied Governments.
    We have the honour to be,
    Sir,
    Your obedient Servants,

    (Signed)

    R. S. HORNE.

    C. L. DE LASTEYRIE.

    C. THEUNIS.

    C. PEANO.

    TURKEY (GOVERNMENT OF INDIA'S RECOMMENDATIONS).
    Mr. GWYNNEasked the Prime Minister in what form the Viceroy published in India the recommendations of the Government of India regarding the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres and the settlement of the Turkish peace; whether it was in the form of a viceregal Proclamation or a Press communication; and, if the former, whether he will, as soon as possible, have a copy laid upon the Table of the House?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The Government of India published the text of their telegram to the Secretary of State as a Press communiqué.

    EX-SERVICE MEN (MINISTRY OF LABOUR).
    Major ENTWISTLEasked the Minister of Labour if, in making reductions in the ex-service temporary staff of the Ministry, he will take into consideration the claims to retention of disabled men and men with good Army records?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: It is the practice in all cases in the Ministry of Labour, when making reductions in the temporary ex-service staff, to give preference, in the matter of retention, to disabled men over non-disabled, and to men with overseas service over those who only served at

    2181
    home, subject always, of course, to the primary consideration of efficiency. Due regard is also had to service records.
    Major ENTWISTLE: Will the right hon. Gentleman inquire into the case of the Controller of the Appointments Department, to see whether that is in accordance with the principle which he has laid down?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: The Controller of the Appointments Department was appointed some time, and I should say he is fully covered by what I have said.

    TRADE BOARDS.
    Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. NORTON-GRIFFITHSasked the Minister of Labour whether he has further considered the question of the abolition of trade boards in view of the widespread opinion in the country that the stringency of their regulations tends towards increasing unemployment; and whether he proposes to take any steps in the matter?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: My hon. and gallant Friend is no doubt aware that last autumn I appointed a Committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Cave, to inquire into the working and effects of the Trade Boards Acts and to report what changes, if any, are desirable. This Committee has taken evidence from a great number of employers and workers and I expect shortly to receive its report.

    HOUSE OF LORDS REFORM.
    Sir J. NORTON-GRIFFITHSasked the Prime Minister whether the scheme of House of Lords reform promised by the Government includes any proposal likely to meet the need for responsible representation of the Dominions at Debates on Imperial and Dominion affairs; and whether, in view of the many disruptive elements now existing in the Empire, he will consider the desirability of such representation in a reformed Second Chamber;
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I must ask my hon. and gallant Friend to await the introduction of the Government's proposals.

  IRELAND.

    FREE STATE CONSTITUTION.
    Sir W. DAVISONasked the Prime Minister if he will assure the House that the Constitution of the Irish Free State when drafted by the Provisional Government will at once be submitted to Parliament, so that the said Constitution may be approved by Parliament and, if necessary, amended before being submitted to the Irish electorate for acceptance?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for the COLONIES (Mr. Churchill): No, Sir. The Constitution must necessarily be submitted to Parliament before the Free State is established, but I cannot undertake that it will be so submitted before it is submitted to the Irish electorate.
    Sir W. DAVISON: Will the right hon. Gentleman say how the full freedom of Parliament to deal with the Irish Constitution, promised by the Prime Minister, will be secured if the Constitution is first submitted to the Irish electorate? It is a very important matter, and I think we ought to know.
    Mr. CHURCHILL: It has been repeatedly said that the Constitution will be drafted in Ireland by the Irish, just as the Canadian Constitution was prepared over there, but the ultimate Bill ratifying that Constitution will have to receive the assent of Parliament.
    Sir W. DAVISON: But is it not an outrage on the freedom of Parliament if it is not asked to approve the Constitution before having it submitted to the Irish electorate, after which it will have no control, except to take it or leave it?
    Rear-Admiral ADAIR: Does this not really mean that this Constitution will be arranged by Sinn Feiners and rammed down the throats of this House in the same way as the Treaty Bill?

    ROYAL IRISH CONSTABULARY.
    Lieut. - Colonel ARCHER - SHEEasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether he has had under consideration the cases of men who have served in the Royal Irish Constabulary and have been disbanded, some of whom are Irishmen with families; and whether, in view of the fact that these men are in some cases starving and unable to obtain employment or assistance, special steps may be

    2183
    taken to bring them to England, and, if possible, to settle them overseas where they so desire?
    The CHIEF SECRETARY for IRELAND (Sir Hamar Greenwood): The only classes of men serving in the Royal Irish Constabulary who have as yet been disbanded are the Auxiliary Division, all of whom are being paid in full up to the end of this month, and in many cases to a much later date, the British recruits, all of whom have been sent back to this country and are in receipt of a pension of not less than £46 16s. per annum, and the Veterans Division and other temporary classes, all of whom were given free warrants to their homes and a gratuity of not less than £10. I am informed that 75 of the latter class were, at their own request, given travelling warrants to places in Ireland, and I assume that it is to some of these the hon. and gallant Member's question refers.
    Lieut.-Colonel ARCHER-SHEE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there are several of these men, Irishmen, in Dublin who are unable to get any public assistance, or unable to get employment, and does he consider that this is a generous way to treat these loyal servants of the Crown? Cannot he take some steps to get them over to this country?
    Sir H. GREENWOOD: I am not sure that bringing them over to this country would help them. If the hon. and gallant Gentleman will submit any particular case to me I will see what can be done, but I have no public money to assist cases, however hard.
    Lieut.-Colonel GUINNESS: Is it not the duty of the right hon. Gentleman to get public money for this class of case? Is he aware that these men are only debarred from getting employment in Ireland because of their loyal service?
    Lieut.-Colonel ASHLEY: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that some members of the permanent Royal Irish Constabulary have been discharged; and— referring to the present question—would he give special consideration to those who have given evidence against criminals and secured their conviction, and now go in fear of their lives?
    Sir H. GREENWOOD: As to that, every member of the regular Royal Irish-Constabulary in Ireland will, I hope, be disbanded this month, and special preparations are being made to provide for those men whose lives are in danger and whose families are boycotted.
    Lieut.-Colonel ASHLEY: Can I send the right hon. Gentleman cases?
    Sir H. GREENWOOD: Yes.
    Lieut.-Colonel ARCHER-SHEE: Will the right hon. Gentleman take immediate and urgent steps to get money from this House with which to remove these men out of danger? Their lives are in danger, and they are also starving.

    CONSTABULARY FORCE FUND.
    Captain REDMONDasked the Chief Secretary if it is the intention of the Government, on the disbandment of the Royal Irish Constabulary, to wind up the constabulary force fund and distribute it amongst the subscribers, or, alternatively, is the Government prepared to return to each subscriber the amount actually paid by him into the fund?
    Sir H. GREENWOOD: I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the reply which I gave to the hon. Member for York on the 7th March.

    SHOOTING, MILFORD.
    Lieut. - Colonel ARCHER - SHEEasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has any information in the case of Charles Herbert Burns, who was shot dead by the Irish Republican Army at Milford, County Donegal; whether he is aware that the murder of this ex-soldier has been justified on the part of the Irish Republican Army on the ground that it was by lawful authority; and if he can say whether any representations have been made to the Provisional Government; and whether any arrests have been made by their authority in connection with this matter?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: According to the evidence given at the coroner's inquest in this case, Burns was challenged and ordered to put up his hands by a picket of the so-called Irish Republican Army consisting of four men, who were under orders to attend at Milford Fair and to hold up and disarm all unauthorised

    2185
    persons found in the possession of firearms, and when challenged he put his hand to his pocket and drew a revolver, whereupon one of the four men fired and wounded him fatally. I am not aware that the so-called Irish Republican Army has made any statement in the matter; but the coroner's jury, consisting of six Protestants and six Catholics, none of whom, I understand, is a member of the Irish Republican Army, found that the man who fired did so in the execution of his duty. In view of the peculiar circumstances existing at the time and in the area where this unfortunate and regrettable event occurred, and in view of the finding of the coroner's jury, His Majesty's Government do not propose to take any further action in the matter.

    PUBLIC SERVICES (TRANSFER).
    Colonel NEWMANasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, when and if the Irish Treaty (Agreement) Bill becomes law, the cost of such Irish services as education, health, out-of-work donation, and police will be automatically transferred to the Provisional Government or will there be an appointed day for the transfer of any or all of such services; and which Government is finding the pay, at £3 10s. per week, of the members of the Irish Rpublican Army and from what sources are the necessary funds drawn?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: In reply to the first part of the question, it is proposed to provide by Order in Council under Clause I (2) of the Bill for the transfer of the various Irish services on dates to be agreed with the Provisional Government. I hope that, in the case of the great majority of the services, the transfer will be effected at the beginning of next financial year. As from the date of transfer, responsibility for the cost of the transferred service will automatically pass to the Provisional Government. In reply to the second part, I have no information as to the rate of pay of members of the so-called Irish Republican Army, nor as to the sources from which the necessary funds are drawn, but I can assure the hon. and gallant Member that no part of such expenditure will be met out of moneys provided by Parliament.

    DIPHTHERIA (SCHICK TEST).
    Colonel WEDGWOODasked the Minister of Health whether he knows anything of an unofficial and informal Conference called by his Department to consider the Schick test; whether his Department offered to bear the cost of the test and treatment, and suggested to the medical officers present that they should test the children in the institutions under their care; whether the children in the Holborn workhouse schools have already been inoculated; whether the Lambeth guardians are now contemplating the same; and under what authority is he carrying out these experiments on children?
    Sir A. MOND: The answer to the first, third, and fourth parts of the question is in the affirmative. At the conference referred to it was stated that, in order to assist local authorities desiring to use the test to secure reliable material, my Department would be willing to bear a portion of the cost in a limited number of cases. As regards the last part of the question, I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the answer which I gave yesterday to the hon. Member for the Dartford Division (Mr. Mills).
    Colonel WEDGWOOD: Are the Ministry of Health pursuing these inquiries at the expense of the children of the workhouse?
    Sir A. MOND: We are not pursuing any inquiry at all. We are assisting local authorities, who desire to use a method of diagnosis which has proved of the highest value in this country and other countries, and to adopt the best and most reliable methods of doing so.
    Colonel WEDGWOOD: Therefore you are inoculating the children—
    Mr. GILBERTasked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that the children attending the Norwood schools of the Lambeth board of guardians have been treated with the Schick cure for diphtheria; that such treatment was given without the consent of the guardians; will he state if such treatment has the approval of his Department; and also will he state of what the treatment consists and from what country it originates?
    Sir A. MOND: I understand that in the presence of an outbreak of diphtheria in these schools the medical officer thought

    2187
    it necessary to ascertain, by the application of the Schick test, the extent to which the children in the schools were liable to infection, and that this was done as a matter of urgency without the consent of the board of guardians. The answer to the third part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the last part, I will send my hon. Friend a description of this treatment and of its origin.
    Mr. AMMON: Is it to be understood that the helpless children of the poor are being used to experiment upon?
    Sir A. MOND: Not at all; there is no question of experiment! It is no more a question of experiment than if the hon. Gentleman went to his doctor and got a prescription. It is a question of applying an approved method of diagnosis for a very serious outbreak of diphtheria, a method which has proved of infinite value in other countries and in this country where it has been tried by the medical officers of health.
    Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: Why is the Labour party always against medical progress?
    Mr. AMMON: We are against being experimented upon!

    ELECTORAL REFORM.
    Captain BENNasked the Minister of Health whether he has prepared any report on electoral reform for submission to the Government?
    Sir A. MOND: Yes, Sir; I have, on my own initiative, had a report on various methods of electoral reform prepared for the information of the Government.

    MILITARY FORCES, INDIA.
    Lieut.-Colonel Sir F. HALLasked the Lord Privy Seal whether the Government have considered the serious statement made recently by the Commander-in-Chief in India to the Legislative Assembly at Delhi as to the inadequacy of the present military forces, owing in part to their inefficient and defective equipment, to deal with the grave state of disaffection and sedition which has arisen throughout the Indian Empire; is he aware that in the same
    2188
    speech Lord Rawlinson protested against any further diminution in strength of the British and native forces in India; what reduction has been made in the strength of the Army in India compared with 1914; whether this reduction has been made on the understanding that the equipment of the Army would be correspondingly improved; and what steps have been taken by the Government to meet the dangers apprehended by Lord Rawlinson?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: A summary of Lord Rawlinson's speech to the Legislative Assembly has been telegraphed home; he neither asserted, nor even suggested, that the present military forces were inadequate to deal with any internal situation likely to arise. The reductions made in the Army since 1914 are as follows: The British strength in 1914 was 77,672, and in 1922 70,340. The Indian strength pre-War was 155,395, and in 1922 is 147,483. This reduction was made on the understanding that the equipment of the Army would be correspondingly improved. Though the improvement in equipment is not yet complete, considerable progress has been made.
    Sir F. HALL: Considering that there has been a reduction of 10 per- cent, of white troops in India since 1914, when will the new and improved equipment be ready for delivery to the whole of the troops?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I cannot say.
    Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: Can my right hon. Friend say when the Committee of Imperial Defence is likely to arrive at a decision on the question of the Indian Army?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Recent events have interrupted the progress this Committee was making, and some of us who are sitting on it are very busy men, and it is rather difficult to find the time that is necessary, but I hope the Report of the Committee to the Cabinet will not be long delayed.

    MILK.
    Sir ALFRED YEOasked the Minister of Health what stops he proposes to take, in connection with the proposed milk legislation, to obtain the opinion of the whole of the distributing trade in the interest of clean milk, as a very large

    2189
    section in the retail trade have not been consulted; and, as they form the greater portion concerned, will they have an opportunity of stating their case before any further steps are taken?
    Sir A. MOND: I shall be glad to consider the views of any responsible organisations representing the retail trade. I gather that the particular organisation with which the hon. Member is connected is apprehensive that it is proposed to require compulsory bottling for all milk, and I am glad to have this opportunity of saying that I have never contemplated such a provision.

    PUBLIC ASSISTANCE (DISQUALIFICATION).
    Mr. JOHN GUESTasked the Minister of Health if he is aware that some doubt has arisen as to whether a person who has received relief or a loan from the board of guardians is disqualified for election on the parish or district councils or the board of guardians; and if he will make a statement on this question in order to remove doubt and misapprehension at the forthcoming local elections?
    Sir A. MOND: I am not aware that any doubt has arisen on this point. Section 46 of the Local Government Act, 1894, provides that a person shall be disqualified for being elected or being a member or chairman of a council of a parish or of a district other than a borough or of a board of guardians if he has within 12 months before his election or since his election received union or parochial relief. I am advised that the question whether the relief was or was not given by way of loan is immaterial.

    PENSIONS APPEALS TKIBUNALS.
    Mr. J. GUESTasked the Attorney-General the number of entitlement cases dealt with by the Final Appeals Tribunal, sitting at Leeds, for the six months ending 28th February, 1922, together with a statement showing the number of such cases which have been rejected during that period?
    The ATTORNEY - GENERAL (Sir Ernest Pollock): I must refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave
    2190
    yesterday to a similar question addressed to me by the hon. Member for Working-ton. I cannot undertake to give the figures asked for, for the reasons stated in that answer.
    Mr. GUEST: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that the reply he gave yesterday is no answer at all, and that the fact that the Ministry are refusing to give these particulars is strengthening the belief in the country that these Appeal Tribunals are not doing their work in a fair fashion?
    Sir E. POLLOCK: No, Sir; I am not aware that the answer I gave is no answer, and I think that the hon. Gentleman himself would deprecate having any such question put to him as a justice of the peace—and the same applies to his colleagues—over the area for which he is a justice.
    Mr. GUEST: There is no analogy!
    67. The hon. Member further asked what qualifications are required to fit an ex-service man for service on the final Appeals Tribunal; and by what method of selection they are called upon for this work?
    Sir E. POLLOCK: The schedule to the War Pensions (Administrative Provisions) Act, 1919, provides that the service member of a Pensions Appeal Tribunal shall be
    "a disabled officer who has retired or been demobilised from His Majesty's Forces during the present War while suffering impairment; or a disabled man who has similarly been discharged or demobilised."
    I am informed that an ex-officer member adjudicates only in appeals made by disabled officers, their widows and dependants, and that an ex-non-commissioned officer or man adjudicates in appeals made by disablel non-commissioned officers and men, their widows and dependants. The schedule to the Act provides that the appointments shall be made by the Lord Chancellor. I am told that members are selected from waiting lists of applicants who have applied direct to the Lord Chancellor, or whose names have been submitted to the Lord Chancellor by the Joint Substitution Board (Treasury and Ministry of Labour) or other body.
    Mr. GUEST: Would the Minister be prepared to give consideration to nominations or suggestions from ex-service men's associations?
    Sir E. POLLOCK: I cannot answer that question.
    Major M. WOOD: Are these men appointed permanently or for individual cases?
    Sir E. POLLOCK: I think they are appointed to hear a succession of cases over a period of time.

    PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER.
    Colonel NEWMANasked the Minister of Health whether he is aware of the difficulty experienced by persons desiring to be put on the municipal or parliamentary register in filling up the intricate forms now provided for the purpose; and will he say why it would not be possible to issue one form with a simple explanation on it instead of two with a complicated method of filling up as at present?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. Shortt): I have been asked to reply. I am not aware that any difficulty is experienced in filling up the present forms of claim to be registered as a parliamentary or a local government elector, but I will consider whether a single form could be adopted for the purpose.

    RUBBER-GROWING RESTRICTION SCHEME.
    Sir WALTER de FRECEasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the Dutch rubber planters are willing to join in the rubber-growing restriction scheme if the extra duty on Java and Sumatra teas, making it Is. as against 10d. for British green teas, is remitted; and, if so, what is the attitude of his Department?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: No proposal of the nature indicated in the question has been made. The second part, therefore, does not arise.
    Colonel WEDGWOOD: May we take it that the Government have no sympathy with restriction on the production of rubber?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: There is, I think, a good deal to be said on that subject. My
    2192
    hon. and gallant Friend had better reserve his exultations till we have the opportunity of discussing the matter.

    ROYAL AIR FORCE (RESERVE OF OFFICERS).
    Sir H. BRITTAINasked the Secretary of State for Air whether he is aware of the methods now being adopted by France for the creation of a reserve of officers for her air force; whether anything of a similar nature is being carried out in this country; and what is our total number of reserve officers in this arm of defence?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for AIR (Captain Guest): I am aware of the general organisation of the Air Service in France, but the methods adopted there are not altogether applicable to a country which depends on voluntary enlistment and not on conscription. I am glad to say that the scheme of organisation of our Air Force Reserve is complete, and the Regulations will be promulgated shortly. A commencement of the manning of it will be made this year with the short service officers who will be passing to the reserve on the completion of their period on the active list. I am not in a position as yet to give the numbers asked for.

    FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE.
    Mr. JAMES WALTONasked the Minister of Agriculture if he is aware that after the slaughter at Wellington, Durham, of three beasts affected by foot-and-mouth disease belonging to the cooperative society, the head, feet, and offal were destroyed and the remaining parts were certified fit for human consumption and sent into another district for the purpose; whether he is aware that at Denaby and Mexborough, South Yorkshire, two butchers who killed beasts which had only been in contact were compelled to destroy the whole carcases at financial loss to themselves; and if he is prepared, under these circumstances, to indemnify them for the loss sustained?
    Major BARNSTON (Comptroller of the Household): I have been asked to reply. The decision as to whether carcases of slaughtered animals are fit for human consumption lies with the

    2193
    medical officer of health for the district. With regard to the last part of the question, the Ministry has no power to grant compensation in the case of animals whose slaughter was not ordered by the Ministry.
    Major STEELasked the Minister of Agriculture whether he can indicate how long it will be before the Ashford cattle market is opened again for the sales *of store stock, provided there are no fresh outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in the neighbourhood; and is he aware that the present restrictions are causing the slaughter of a large number of calves and young pigs which should be kept for rearing and fattening?
    Major BARNSTON: I have been asked to reply. Ashford cattle market is situated near premises on which an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease occurred about a fortnight ago. I* am therefore unable to give any indication as to when it will be possible to re-open this market for the sale of store cattle. The answer to the last part of the question is in the negative. The Ministry bas, however, issued an Order under which farm sales are authorised under certain conditions, and this, I hope, will afford some relief generally.
    Lieut.-Colonel A. MURRAYasked the Minister of Agriculture whether a Committee, Departmental or otherwise, is to be set up to inquire into the working and administration of the Diseases of Animals Act; and, if so, will he state the terms of reference to the Committee?
    Major BARNSTON: I have been asked to reply. It is proposed to set up a Departmental Committee whose terms of reference will be:
    "To inquire into the origin and circumstances of the recent outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease and into the policy and procedure which was pursued in dealing with the disease, and to report whether any alteration of the methods of administrative control hitherto adopted or any amendment of the existing law is necessary or desirable."

    SUPERPHOSPHATE.
    Mr. J. WALTONasked the Minister of Agriculture whether he is aware that prices of most articles of agricultural produce have fallen to the level of, approximately, only 30 per cent. over
    2194
    those obtaining in 1914 and that super-phosphate, largely used by farmers as a fertiliser, is still 90 per cent. above pre-War prices; whether, notwithstanding this relatively unfavourable position for farmers, the manufacturers of this fertiliser are seeking to inflict further burdens upon agriculture by attempting to induce the Board of Trade Committee to impose a duty on imported superphosphate equal to 33⅓ per cent. of its declared value; and whether he will taken any necessary action on behalf of agriculture to prevent raw materials of the industry being artificially increased in price?
    Major BARNSTON: The statistics of market prices collected by my Department indicate that prices during February of the principal agricultural products taken together were about 80 per cent. above the average of the three years 1911–13, while prices of superphosphate were about 70 per cent. above the average of those years. As regards the latter part of the question I may remind my hon. Friend that no Order can be made applying Part II of the Safeguarding of Industries Act to any article except after public inquiry by a Committee constituted for the purposes of the Act, and such a Committee would be required to report on the effect which the impostion of the duty would exert on employment in any industry using goods of the class in question as material. I understand that representations with regard to super phosphate have been made to the Board of Trade, but that no prima facie case for reference to a Committee has been established.
    Mr. LAMBERT: May we take it that the Government do not intend to impose a duty of 33⅓ per cent. on imported superphosphate?

    CANADIAN CATTLE EMBARGO
    Mr. SUTTONasked the Minister of Agriculture whether he is aware that the removal of the embargo on Canadian cattle would be of great benefit to the people in this country, as the wages of the workers are constantly being reduced, considering the number of unemployed persons in the country; and whether he will reconsider his decision on this question and put the recommendations of the

    2195
    Royal Commission into operation at once by removing the embargo?
    Major BARNSTON: I have been asked to reply. The answer is in the negative. My right hon. Friend does not agree that the removal of the embargo would be of great benefit to the people of this country, or that it would contribute to the solution of the unemployment problem.
    Lieut.-Colonel MURRAY: When can we have an opportunity of discussing that question?
    Major BARNSTON: Obviously that is a question for the Leader of the House.
    Lieut.-Colonel MURRAY: Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman convey my request to the Leader of the House?

    DISEASED CATTLE (IMPORTS).
    Mr. CAIRNSasked the Minister of Agriculture if he is aware that cattle is coming into this country from Canada and other parts abroad diseased; that diseased meat is being used as food in this country; and will he prevent such cattle entering this country and such meat being used as food?
    Major BARNSTON: I have been asked to reply. The reply to the first two parts of the question is in the negative, and the last part, therefore, does not arise. I may explain that on arrival at the ports cattle are subjected to inspection for contagious diseases by officers of the Ministry of Agriculture, and that, after slaughter, the carcases of such cattle are inspected by the sanitary authorities.
    Mr. CAIRNS: Does the hon. and gallant Gentleman mean that there is no disease in these cattle, and, if so, will he not take the embargo off?

    CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS.
    Sir WILLIAM SEAGERasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether he is aware that, in the instructions issued by the Civil Service Commission on 24th February, 1922, concerning the forthcoming Civil Service examinations, paragraph 3, it states that no candidate who attended the examinations
    2196
    for appointment to the clerical class in November and December, 1920, or in March, 1921, will be eligible for admission to this competition; and whether, in view of the injustice to many candidates who were unsuccessful in the above-mentioned examination, he will cancel the Clause which precludes them from again sitting for this competitive examination?
    Mr. YOUNG: The regulation referred to is in accordance with the recommendations of Lord Lytton's Committee who in paragraph 40 of their Third Interim Report recommended, "that a further examination for the clerical class should be held at which would be eligible to compete all ex-service men who entered the Government service on or before 30th June, 1921, provided always that they did not compete at the recent examinations." I regret therefore that I am unable to accede to the request in the latter, part of the question
    Sir W. SEAGER: Will the hon. Gentleman give sympathetic consideration to those cases whose chances of obtaining the necessary knowledge were seriously interfered with by the War?
    Mr. YOUNG: I would remind the hon. Member that the procedure by way of Investigation Boards is specially designed to meet their case and we have no other procedure.

INDIA (MR. MONTAGU'S RESIGNATION).
Mr. T. P. O'CONNOR: I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely, "the serious lack of coordination in the action of His Majesty's Ministers which brought about the resignation of the Secretary of State for India."
The pleasure of the House having been signified, the Motion stood over, under Standing Order No. 10, until a quarter past Eight o'clock this evening.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: May I ask, Mr. Speaker, whether you can give us any guidance as to the scope of the Debate which you will allow on this Motion? Will it be eligible to any hon. Member to attack or defend the general

2197
policy of the Government in respect of India or the East or any other matter, or will the Debate be strictly confined to the alleged lack of proper co-ordination in the Government.
Mr. SPEAKER: I think I indicated on Monday last that this would not be an occasion for an argument on the policy of His Majesty's Government, in one direction or another. I think the utmost that would be open would be for the hon. Member to ask a simple question of the Government whether the policy, in India or in the Near East previously announced, has been deflected in any degree by what has happened in the last few days.
Sir J. D. REES: Will the hon. Gentleman who obtained the Adjournment of the House be able and willing to keep out of the Debate the Turkish and Armenian questions.
Mr. SPEAKER: That remains to be seen. In that direction I will give my best assistance both to the hon. Member for the Scotland Division of Liverpool (Mr. O'Connor) and to the hon. Member for East Nottingham (Sir J. D. Sees).

CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL,
Reported, with Amendments; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
NEW WRIT
For the Borough of Leicester (East Division), in the room of the right hon. Sir GORDON HJSWART, K.C. (Lord Chief Justice of England).—[Mr. McCurdy.]
NEW MEMBER SWORN.
LESLIE FREDERIC SCOTT, Esquire, K.C, for Borough of Liverpool (Exchange Division).

REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE (No. 2),
"to alter certain dates prescribed by the Representation of the People Act, 1918, in connection with the registration of electors, and to prevent increases in
2198
postal rates for printed packets being reckoned for the purpose of any limit on the amount of the expenses of candidates, at elections, and to amend Section fifty-four of the Local Government Act, 1888," presented by Mr. SHORTT; supported by Sir Ernest Pollock and Sir John Baird; to be read a Second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 51.]

BREAD ACTS AMENDMENT.
Mr. INSKIP: I beg to move, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the enactments relating to the provision of Regulations for the making and sale of bread, and for preventing the adulteration of meal, flour, and bread."
This Bill has for its object to repeal provisions contained in existing Acts, which, under present circumstances, constitute a real hindrance to the proper administration of the law. By the Bread' Acts of 1822 and 1836, both of which cover London and the country generally, it is provided that it shall be illegal to mix with flour any other flour, the object being to prevent the practice of adulterating wheat flour with other cereals to the prejudice of persons who deal in them. These Acts were passed at a time when there was no method of aerating except by introducing flour or yeast. The position altered entirely when self-raising flour was invented, and from that time-forward the provisions of the Bread Acts were lost sight of. They came under attention again in connection with an inter-Departmental Committee which sat last year, and since that time they have been the subject of much discussion in certain circles in connection with the self-raising flour industry.
I am asking the permission of the House to make these few observations on this Bill in order that the House, should it give me leave to introduce it, may be good enough to allow the Measure to go through its remaining stages without any opposition or criticism except in regard to any verbal Amendments which may be necessary. There have been recent discussions between millers and bakers as to the purity of flour, and in that connection it has been found desirable that certain obstacles associated with this obsolete enactment.

2199
should be removed. It is an offence punishable by fine for anyone to possess, or sell, or expose for sale self-raising flour. Hon. Members know that in every household in the land and in every baker's shop this offence is now being Committed, and a common informer may recover a penalty not exceeding£20 by giving the necessary information. Hon. Members will understand the serious results that might be produced if prosecutions were enforced, and unless this Bill goes through it may be that needy gentlemen will undertake the business connected with that of common informers in this connection whereby a lucrative living may be obtained without undue expenditure. The Clauses of the Bill which I propose to introduce with the leave of the House have received the assent of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health, and have been carefully drafted to preserve his powers under the Adulteration of Food and Drugs Act. Those powers will be preserved intact and confirmed and strengthened, and the only result of my Bill will be to get rid of obsolete and objectionable provisions, and to make it easier to prosecute those who attempt to adulterate wheat flour. I hope, therefore, that leave will be given to introduce the Bill.
Question put, and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Inskip, Sir William Pearce, Mr. Clynes, Mr. George Roberts, Sir Godfrey Collins, Mr. Hailwood, and Mr. Waterson.

BREAD ACTS AMENDMENT BILL,
"to amend the enactments relating to the provision of Regulations for the making and sale of bread, and for preventing the adulteration of meal, flour, and bread," presented accordingly, and read the First time; to he read a Second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 52.]

DYESTUFFS (IMPORT REGULATION) ACT (1920) REPEAL.
Mr. REMER: I beg to move,
"That leave be given to bring in a Bill to repeal the Dyestuffs (Import Regulation) Act, 1920."
It may be that some hon. Members who cheer think that I have changed my
2200
opinion. I am still in favour of protection of efficient industries, but I will not allow this Act to be foisted upon me as an example of protectionist legislation. I am not in favour of any form of protection for mere profiteering purposes, but only for the purpose of preventing efficient industries from being driven abroad to foreign countries. This Act is mere prohibition, importation being by licence; it does not provide real protection. I submit that the dyes industry which was introduced into this country during the War and by this Act has been proved beyond any manner of doubt to be a thoroughly inefficient industry. British Dyes, Limited, have charged monstrous prices for very inefficient material, and, in spite of that fact, have been unable to make any profits. Some years ago an Act of Parliament, known as the Patents Act, was introduced by the present Prime Minister, then President of the Board of Trade, and was passed, and one of the industries which was established in this country as the result of that Act was a factory to make what is known as synthetic indigo. That factory is now owned by British Dyes, Limited. They charge 2s. per 1b. for this synthetic indigo, whereas the same material can be purchased from abroad at 8d. per 1b.
If protection be necessary for the dye industry, why is it not also necessary for the materials which are made from dyes, such as dyed goods, dyed yarn, and dyed silk? I will read a letter which I have received this morning, and which shows conclusively, I think, the reason I am asking leave to introduce this Bill. A well known firm in Manchester—I am prepared to give the name if I am asked to do so—applied to the Dyes Advisory Committee on 6th February for a permit to buy one ton of lythol red B.M. powder from Germany at 9s. per ton. This was refused, and they were told to use an English substitute, monolite red, at 16s. per ton. This made a difference on the actual cost of their manufacture, which was known as lake colour, of£798. One ton of dyes makes 9| tons of dry lake colour, and the difference, at£84 per ton, is£798. The letter goes on to say:
"What these people do not realise and refuse to see is that the consequences were: (1) Our customer bought abroad, and we lost the business altogether; (2) our workpeople would have had a full three weeks' work, and we have been on short time since

2201
October; (3) to people like ourselves, aniline dyes of high class are our raw material as much as coal; and (4) they have absolutely killed our foreign business which took forty years to establish."
Yet, in spite of that fact, the goods which they are manufacturing are allowed to come in free, and there is no protection whatsoever. There is a still more important reason why I am asking to introduce this Bill. The administration of the Act has been deplorably bad. Licences have not been given to substantial people in the trade, but to men of straw, who have made enormous profits by illicit importation. I say, further, that the administration of the Act gives an unfair advantage to trade competitors who are on the Licensing Committee and who get information as to their competitors' business. The Act has given no protection at all to the consumers of dyes. It has produced dear dyes and bad dyes. British Dyes, Limited, have been very badly managed. The people who have been put on to the directorate by the Government have been the wrong people. Whatever other methods may be adopted to protect the dye industry, this is the wrong method. Therefore, for these reasons, I ask leave to introduce this Bill.
Lieut.-Commander ASTBURY: As a calico printer and as a large consumer of fine dyes, I think that I have at least as great a qualification to speak on this question as my hon. Friend who has just resumed his seat, and I am going to offer the most uncompromising opposition to this Bill. I have only 10 minutes in which to speak and I would ask hon. Members to give me a fair hearing, because I am not going to indulge in any windy rhetoric; I am simply going to give the House facts. I am opposing this Bill, first of all, on behalf of the consumer; secondly, on behalf of the producer; and, thirdly, on behalf of those classes which, if this dye industry be encouraged in this country, will be given work. I am going to deal with the position which has been raised. I know that in Manchester there is a very small minority who cry out against this Licensing Act. I would refer hon. Members to the speech made by the Chairman of the Calico Printers' Association at the last annual meeting. They had had a disastrous year, and he seemed to put it all down to the fact that they
2202
had not been able to get sufficient dyes to carry out their work. I say, quite unequivocally, that that was simply used as a political weapon in favour of Free Trade and was nothing more and nothing less. When I tell hon. Members that I have never been on short time in my works; that I am working full time today, and even working overtime; that I am booked up to the end of this year; and that I have to purchase the same dyes as the Calico Printers' Association and others have to buy; and that I have never had the slightest difficulty in getting both from the home and foreign producer what dyes I want, I think the House can take my word for it.
Wherever application is made by a consumer to the Licensing Committee for a dye, if that dye is not produced in this country, he gets his application granted at once. In the case of an agent making application for dyes, very probably his application is not granted at first, because an agent does not make application for the dye asked for by the consumer, but in order to get in a big stock of dyes which he thinks the consumer in the future may want, with the result that if those dyes are not required he puts them on the market and floods out our own producer. It is complained that the Committee are not carrying out their functions properly with regard to the consumer. I would ask of the House just for one moment to look at the composition of the Committee. There are three dye users, three independent members, and two other members. Therefore, in order to get a majority, they have simply to get one independent member on their side.
I want to put another proposition before the House, because complaint is made that we are not progressing fast enough with the manufacture of dyes. There is a colour Rhodamine 6G. Before the War that colour was sold at 11d. per 1b. in this country. During the War I myself paid 140s. per 1b. for it. [HON. MEMBERS: "To Levenstein."] No, to some Jew who had in a supply of it from Germany. To-day there is in this country a firm which is making that colour. I am buying it, and it is equally as good as the German colour. Hon. Members talk about producing dyes here. Anyone who knows anything about the dye trade knows that, if a new dye be invented in the biggest German works, it is three

2203
years before they put that dye on the market. It has to go through all sorts of tests as to light and atmosphere, and, until they can get the colour perfect, they will not put it on the market. Our manufacturers now, while trade is slack, are trying to perfect these colours. What is going to happen if you repeal this Act? To-day, Germany with the depreciation in her mark, is offering colours which we can produce in this country at a price much below our price, but for other colours, which we cannot produce, she is asking an extortionate price. If you kill the industry in this country, she will ask the same extortionate price for the colours that we can produce.
It has been said that goods have been sent from Manchester to be printed and dyed in foreign countries. That is absolutely untrue. There was always a small amount that used to go to Mulhausen for special purposes, but I will give some figures for exports which will prove what I am saying. For two months in 1921 the total exports of printed and dyed goods were 7,032,600 square yards, and for the two months of 1922, 13,981,700 square yards. The total of exports for the two months of 1921 was 121,227,100 square yards, and for the two months of 1922, 126,371,500 square yards. The Continent has sent us 578,000 square yards more of dyed and printed cloth, but we have sent the Continent 6,849,000 square
yards of dyed and printed cloth more than in the two months of 1921. Trade is improving in the dyeing and printing trades in Lancashire, but if this Bill is to be repealed we fear that in the future this country will go out as a colour-producing country, and we should then have to rely solely on ex-enemy countries for our colours. I would ask the House to remember the War. At that time those of us who were in this trade spent many sleepless nights, never knowing when we might have to close down our works because we could not get the colours that we ought to have been able to produce in this country. Colour is the least item of expenditure of all in a works. As I have stated before in this House, the total expenditure for colour on a manufactured piece of 150 yards of cloth is only 3 per cent., and I say without the slightest hesitation, as a producer, that I would pay 2s., 3s., or 4s. a pound more for my colour, and, if it were genuine, it would not make the slightest difference in my sale price, spread over the huge production which a works turns out. I therefore offer uncompromising opposition to this Bill, and I hope that the House will divide and will not allow it to be introduced.
Question put, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to repeal the Dyestuffs (Import Regulation) Act, 1920."
The House divided: Ayes, 115; Noes, 197.

Division No. 49.]

AYES.

[4.18 p.m.

Adamson, Rt. Hon. William

Entwistle, Major C. F.

Lawson, John James

Adkins, Sir William Ryland Dent

Fildes, Henry

Lunn, William

Agg-Gardner, Sir James Tynte

Finney, Samuel

Lyle-Samuel, Alexander

Ainsworth, Captain Charles

Foot, Isaac

Macdonald, Rt. Hon. John Murray

Ammon, Charles George

Frece, Sir Walter de

Maclean, Rt. Hon. Sir D. (Midlothian)

Asquith, Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry

Galbraith, Samuel

MacVeagh, Jeremiah

Banbury, Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick G.

Gange, E. Stanley

Marriott, John Arthur Ransome

Barrand, A. R.

Gilbert, James Daniel

Mitchell, Sir William Lane

Barton, Sir William (Oldham)

Glanville, Harold James

Moreing, Captain Algernon H.

Bell, James (Lancaster, Ormskirk)

Graham, D. M. (Lanark, Hamilton)

Mosley, Oswald

Benn, Captain Wedgwood (Leith)

Graham, W. (Edinburgh, Central)

Murray, Hon. A. C. (Aberdeen)

Bramsdon, Sir Thomas

Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)

Myers, Thomas

Briant, Frank

Grundy, T. W.

Newbould, Alfred Ernest

Broad, Thomas Tucker

Guest, J. (York, W. R., Hemsworth)

O'Connor, Thomas P.

Bromfield, William

Halls, Walter

Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William

Brown, James (Ayr and Bute)

Hancock, John George

Rae, H. Norman

Cairns, John

Hayday, Arthur

Ratcliffe, Henry Butler

Cape, Thomas

Hayward, Evan

Redmond, Captain William Archer

Carter, W. (Nottingham, Mansfield)

Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (Widnes)

Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring)

Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord R. (Hitchin)

Hinds, John

Roberts, Frederick O. (W. Bromwich)

Cowan, D. M. (Scottish Universities)

Hodge, Rt. Hon. John

Robertson, John

Davies, A. (Lancaster, Clitheroe)

Holmes, J. Stanley

Robinson, S. (Brecon and Radnor)

Davies, Alfred Thomas (Lincoln)

Hopkinson, A. (Lancaster, Mossley)

Rose, Frank H.

Davies, Evan (Ebbw Vale)

Irving, Dan

Royce, William Stapleton

Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)

Jones, J. J. (West Ham, Silvertown)

Sexton, James

Davison, J. E. (Smethwick)

Jones, J. T. (Carmarthen, Llanelly)

Short, Alfred (Wednesbury)

Edge, Captain Sir William

Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)

Sitch, Charles H.

Edwards, C (Monmouth, Bedwellty)

Kennedy, Thomas

Smith, W. R. (Wellingborough)

Edwards, G. (Norfolk, South)

Kenworthy, Lieut-Commander J. M.

Spencer, George A.

Edwards, Major J. (Aberavon)

Kenyon, Barnet

Stephenson, Lieut.-Colonel H. K.

Edwards, Hugh (Glam., Neath)

Kiley, James Daniel

Sutton, John Edward

Swan, J. E.

Walton, J. (York, W. R., Don Valley]

Wintringham, Margaret

Sykes, Sir Charles (Huddersfield)

Waterson, A. E.

Wood, Major M. M. (Aberdeen, C)

Thomas, Rt. Hon. James H. (Derby)

Watts-Morgan, Lieut.-Col. D.

Young, Robert (Lancaster, Newton)

Thomas, Brig.-Gen. Sir O. (Anglesey)

Wedgwood, Colonel Josiah C.

Young, W. (Perth & Kinross, Perth)

Thomas, Sir Robert J. (Wrexham)

Wignall, James

Thomson, T. (Middlesbrough, West)

Williams, Aneurin (Durham, Consett)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—

Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton, E.)

Williams, Col. P. (Middlesbrough, E.)

Mr. Remer and Mr. Alexander Shaw.

Thorne, W. (West Ham, Plalstow)

Wilson, James (Dudley)

Walsh, Stephen (Lancaster, Ince)

Wilson, Rt. Hon. J. W. (Stourbridge)

NOES.

Adair, Rear-Admiral Thomas B. S.

Goff, Sir R. Park

Pease, Rt. Hon. Herbert Pike

Archer-Shee, Lieut.-Colonel Martin

Grant, James Augustus

Peel, Col. Hn. S. (Uxbridge, Mddx.)

Ashley, Colonel Wilfrid W.

Greene, Lt.-Col. Sir W. (Hack'y, N.)

Pennefather, De Fonblanque

Astor, Viscountess

Greenwood, Rt. Hon. Sir Hamar

Perkins, Walter Frank

Atkey, A. R.

Gretton, Colonel John

Perring, William George

Baird, Sir John Lawrence

Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. Frederick E.

Pollock, Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Murray

Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley

Gwynne, Rupert S.

Pownall, Lieut.-Colonel Assheton

Balfour, George (Hampstead)

Hacking, Captain Douglas H.

Pretyman, Rt. Hon. Ernest G.

Barnes, Rt. Hon. G. (Glas., Gorbals)

Hallwood, Augustine

Randies, sir John Scurrah

Barnett, Major Richard W.

Hall, Lieut.-Col. Sir F. (Dulwich)

Raper, A. Baldwin

Barnston, Major Harry

Hall, Rr-Adml Sir W.(Liv'p'l, W.D'by)

Raw, Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. N.

Bartley-Denniss, Sir Edmund Robert

Hallas, Eldred

Rees, sir J. D. (Nottingham, East)

Bell, Lieut.-Col. W. C. H. (Devizes)

Hambro, Angus Valdemar

Reid, D. D.

Bellairs, Commander Carlyon W.

Hamilton, Major C. G. C.

Remnant, Sir James

Benn, Sir A. S. (Plymouth, Drake)

Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry

Richardson, Sir Alex. (Gravesend)

Benn, Capt. Sir I. H., Bart. (Gr'nw'h)

Harris, Sir Henry Percy

Roberts, Rt. Hon. G. H. (Norwich)

Betterton, Henry B.

Henderson, Lt.-Col. V. L. (Tradeston)

Roberts, Samuel (Hereford, Hereford)

Bigland, Alfred

Hennessy, Major J. R. G.

Rodger, A. K.

Borwick, Major G. O.

Herbert, Dennis (Hertford, Watford)

Roundell, Colonel R. F.

Bowles, Colonel H. F.

Hills, Major John Waller

Rutherford, Colonel Sir J. (Darwen)

Bowyer, Captain G. W. E.

Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy

Samuel, A. M. (Surrey, Farnham)

Brassey, H. L. C.

Hood, Sir Joseph

Sanders, Colonel Sir Robert Arthur

Britton, G. B.

Hope, Sir H. (Stirling & Cl'ckm'nn, W.)

Scott, Leslie (Liverpool, Exchange)

Brown, Major D. C.

Hopkins, John W. W.

Scott, Sir Samuel (St. Maryisbone)

Burdon, Colonel Rowland

Horne, Edgar (Surrey, Guildford)

Seager, Sir William

Burn, Col. C. R. (Devon, Torquay)

Horne, Sir R. S. (Glasgow, Hillhead)

Shaw, William T. (Forfar)

Butcher, Sir John George

Hotchkin, Captain Stafford Vere

Smith, Sir Malcolm (Orkney)

Campbell, J. D. G.

Hunter, General Sir A. (Lancaster)

Sprot, Colonel Sir Alexander

Campion, Lieut.-Colonel W. R.

Hunter-Weston, Lt.-Gen, Sir Aylmer

Stanley, Major Hon. G. (Preston)

Carew, Charles Robert S.

Hurd, Percy A.

Starkey, Captain John Ralph

Carter, R. A. D. (Man., Withington)

Inskip, Thomas Walker H.

Steel, Major S. Strang

Casey, T. W.

Jackson, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. F. S.

Stevens, Marshall

Cecil. Rt. Hon. Evelyn (Birm., Aston)

Jesson, C.

Stewart, Gershom

Chadwick, Sir Robert Burton

Jones, Sir Evan (Pembroke)

Sueter, Rear-Admiral Murray Fraser

Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J. A.(Birm., W.)

Joynson-Hicks, Sir William

Sugden, W. H.

Chamberlain, N. (Birm., Ladywood)

Kelley, Major Fred (Rotherham)

Sykes, Colonel Sir A. J. (Knutsford)

Clay, Lieut.-Colonel H. H. Spender

Kidd, James

Thomas-Stanford, Charles

Coats, Sir Stuart

King, Captain Henry Douglas

Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South)

Cobb, Sir Cyril

Kinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement

Thomson, sir w. Mitchell-(Maryhill)

Cohen, Major J. Brunel

Lane-Fox, G. R.

Thorpe, Captain John Henry

Colvin, Brig.-General Richard Beale

Larmor, Sir Joseph

Tickler, Thomas George

Cope, Major William

Lister, Sir R. Ashton

Townley, Maximillan G.

Cory, Sir J. H. (Cardiff, South)

Lloyd, George Butler

Townshend, Sir Charles Vere Ferrers

Cowan, Sir H. (Aberdeen and Kinc.)

Lloyd-Greame, Sir p.

Turton, Edmund Russborough

Craik, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry

Locker-Lampson, G. (Wood Green)

Waddington, R.

Curzon, Captain Viscount

Locker-Lampson, Com. O. (H'tlngd'n)

Walters, Rt. Hon. sir John Tudor

Davidson, J. C. C. (Hemel Hempstead)

Lorden, John William

Ward, Col. L. (Kingston-upon-Hull)

Davies, Thomas (Cirencester)

Lowe, Sir Francis William

Waring, Major Walter

Davison, Sir W. H. (Kensington, S.)

Lowther, Maj.-Gen. Sir C. (Penrith)

Wheler, Col. Granville C. H.

Dawson, Sir Philip

M'Lean, Lieut.-Col. Charles W. W.

White, Col. G. D. (Southport)

Dean, Commander P. T.

McMicklng, Major Gilbert

Williams, C. (Tavistock)

Dewhurst, Lieut.-Commander Harry

Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J.

Willoughby, Lieut.-Col. Hon. Claud

Dockrell, Sir Maurice

Magnus, Sir Philip

Wills, Lt.-Col. Sir Gilbert Alan H.

Erskine, James Malcolm Monteith

Malone, Major P. B. (Tottenham, S.)

Wilson, Field-Marshal Sir Henry

Eyres-Monsell, Com. Bolton M.

Middlebrook, Sir William

Wilson, Colonel Leslie O. (Reading)

Falle, Major Sir Bertram Godfray

Mildmay, Colonel Rt. Hon. F. B.

Wilson, Col. M. J. (Richmond)

Farquharson, Major A. C.

Molson, Major John Elsdale

Wise, Frederick

Fell, Sir Arthur

Moore, Major-General Sir Newton J.

Wood, Hon. Edward F. L. (Ripon)

FitzRoy, Captain Hon. Edward A.

Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C.

Wood, Sir J. (Stalybridge & Hyde)

Flannery, Sir James Fortescue

Morrison, Hugh

Wood, Major Sir S. Hill-(High Peak)

Ford, Patrick Johnston

Morrison-Bell, Major A. C.

Worthington-Evans, Rt. Hon. Sir L.

Forrest, Walter

Murray, C. D. (Edinburgh)

Yate, Colonel Sir Charles Edward

Fraser, Major Sir Keith

Murray, William (Dumfries)

Younger, Sir George

Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E.

Nail, Major Joseph

Gardner, Ernest

Newman, Sir R. H. S. D. L. (Exeter)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—

Gibbs, Colonel George Abraham

Nicholson, Brig.-Gen. J. (Westminster)

Lieut.-Commander Astbury and Sir W. Pearce.

Gilmour, Lieut.-Colonel Sir John

Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield)

Resolution agreed to.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Sir D. MACLEAN: I wish to ask the Leader of the House what his intentions are with regard to the Motion standing
2206
in his name to suspend the Eleven O'clock Rule for two matters, and how far does he intend to go? Does he intend to take Vote A to-night, or what does he really mean to do?
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I had hoped that the whole of to-day would have been available for making progress with the Army Estimates, but I suppose there is going to be a Motion for the Adjournment of the House, and obviously we cannot get very far to-night. 'We ought to get Mr. Speaker out of the Chair. I do not propose to proceed with any other business after eleven o'clock except to get Mr. Speaker out of the Chair, and I will give another day for Vote A and Vote 1. If we get Mr. Speaker out of the Chair before 8.15 we shall proceed with Vote A.
Commander BELLAIRS: I wish to ask a question in reference to the course of the Debate in the event of the Motion for the Adjournment being carried. It will be remembered that the Debate was postponed from Monday until Wednesday in order that we might hear what was put forward by Lord Curzon in the House of Lords. It is the regular salutary rule that we may not refer to what took place in another place. I wish to ask whether we shall be allowed to quote on this occasion without abrogating that rule?
Mr. SPEAKER: The salutary rule is that speeches delivered in one House of Parliament should not be replied to in the other House, and that is a good rule for obvious reasons. I think, however, that that has never been taken so strictly as to mean that reference cannot be made to statements of Ministers in another House. If I were to hold that, it would make discussion impossible on the matter with which we have to deal. That is the way in which I shall apply the rule.
Lieut.-Colonel ARCHER-SHEE: With reference to the Debate this afternoon, in view of the fact that it is going to be curtailed by a Motion for the Adjournment, would it not be possible to have a general discussion on the whole question of the army on Vote A as has frequently been done?
Mr. SPEAKER: Yes, it does not require my permission, nor, indeed, the permission of the Chairman. A discussion on Vote A is always of the fullest possible character, and any matter referring to the Army is in order. If anything, it is wider than the opportunity on the motion to get the Speaker out of the Chair.
Ordered,
"That the Proceedings on the Motion, That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair (for Committee of Supply), and the Proceedings of the Committee of Supply be exempted at this day's Sitting from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House)." —[Mr. Chamberlain.]

ORDERS OF THE DAY.
  SUPPLY.
    ARMY ESTIMATES, 1922–23.

      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS' STATEMENT.
      Order for Committee read.
      Mr. SPEAKER: Before the House enters upon the question of Supply, I ought to say that the proceedings to-day must be taken as entirely exceptional. The Estimates in detail have not yet been presented to the House, and I think it is right that I should not overlook a matter of that kind, although it has been explained to me what are the exceptional circumstances. I, therefore, take the opportunity of letting the Departments concerned know that, in another year, we shall expect the old custom to be complied with, and the whole of the Estimates to be laid before the House before moving the Speaker out of the Chair.
      The SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Sir Laming Worthington-Evans): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
      I was going to apologise to the House for having to make this Motion before the full book of Estimates was before the House. As you, Sir, have said, this is a very exceptional year, and I hope it will not occur again. The reason for the delay is the fact that the Geddes Committee was sitting until a month or so, perhaps two months ago, and after it had sat and reported the Cabinet had to consider the recommendations of that Committee, and it was quite impossible for the Department to get out the details of the Estimates which are required if the book is to be presented. To-day, therefore, I am contenting myself with asking for a Vote on Account of£28,000,000, which represents between four and five months' expenditure for next year. Besides the usual Estimates for next year, I have circulated a White Paper summarising the main conclusions of the Geddes Committee, and showing in broad outline the action I propose to take in regard to their recommendations. That paper has been in the hands of hon. Members for two days, and I hope it will have furnished
      2232
      them with material to enable them to raise any point which I may omit to notice in my opening speech.
      The net total of the Army Estimates for next year is£62,300,000, but in this total I have included£7,000,000 for terminal charges, that is to say, for expenses directly arising out of the Great War which still remain to be paid, and I have included also£3,550,000 for charges arising out of the reductions in the Army, including compensation to officers and men whose services are prematurely disposed of and the cost of transport Home of units which may be abroad and of their pay during the period of disbandment. Allowing for these two special and nonrecurring items there is left£51,750,000, which is the Estimate of the normal, current charges of the Army for next year.
      Hon. Members may like to know at once how my Estimate compares with the recommendations of the Geddes Committee. The Geddes Committee recommended that from a provisional figure of£75,000,000£20,000,000 should be knocked off and that the Estimates should be presented for£55,000,000 for this year. But the£55,000,000, they were careful to point out, did not include the terminal charges of£7,000,000, nor did it include any allowance for the necessary charges for compensation and expenditure in connection with the reduction of the personnel of the Army. But, on the other hand, it did include the expenditure in the Middle East and certain other expenditure which in future will not be administered by the War Office, and therefore is not included in my£51,750,000
      If the necessary adjustments are made—I have set them out on page 4 of this White Paper—it will be seen that this year's Estimates are reduced by£16,500,000, as against the£20,000,000 recommended by the Geddes Committee. But these two figures, the£16,500,000 and the£20,000,000, are not really comparable, nor can I compare them—I do not intend to do so—because although the Geddes Committee recommended a reduction of£20,000,000 the reductions that they made in definite figures amounted only to£5,500,000. I do not know how they arrived at the difference between the£5,500,000 which they specified in detail and the£20,000,000 which they recommended. I doubt, as a matter of

      2233
      fact, if, after certain necessary corrections are made, their £20,000,000 exists at all. I think myself the total of their recommendations should not exceed £16,500,000. But my reductions and theirs are difficult to compare, because I have made reductions in some items and I have had to refuse to follow their advice with regard to other items. Moreover, my £16,500,000 includes £1,500,000 estimated to be raised from Germany towards the cost of the troops in occupation of the Rhine which will in future be appropriated in aid of Army Votes.
      Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY: Will that amount cover the cost of the Army on the Rhine?
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: No, of course not. It cannot possibly cover it. What it represents is the amount of marks provided by Germany practically for local purposes, and that is actually provided by Germany in cash. It is on account of Army charges, and therefore in future it will be appropriated as an Appropriation-in-Aid of the cost of the occupation. I do not propose to go through each of the recommendations of the Geddes Committee. I have set out a summary of them in the White Paper, and I have also set out opposite each of the recommendations a brief statement of the action I propose to take in relation to them. Later in the Debate, if hon. Members find that the information contained in the document is not sufficient, I shall be very glad to answer any questions upon it. I shall have to make a large draft on the patience of the House even to do what I propose to do.
      I propose to explain the effect of these reductions upon the strength of the Army and to review the main liabilities for which the Army is required, so that before the Vote is taken the House may have an opportunity of considering whether it is necessary and justifiable to take the risks which these reductions entail, bearing in mind, as they will, the financial and economic position of the country. Vote A will provide for a total establishment of 152,836 of all ranks, compared with 201,127 last year, a reduction from last year of over 48,000 officers and men. I am speaking of British troops, exclusive of British troops upon the establishment in India. To these figures must be added the Colonial
      2234
      and native Indian troops borne upon the Army Estimates, namely, 10,200, and the additional numbers of officers and men in course of reduction and Indian troops employed in the Middle East, which pass presently to the administration of the Air Ministry. The total of these is 51,964. The troops in the last category are only temporarily on the strength of the British Army. Some will be disbanded and some will be administered either by the Air Force or the Colonial Office. These three categories give a gross total on Vote A of 215,000 all ranks.
      Lieut.-Colonel FREMANTLE: Will my right hon. Friend make clear which are the Colonial and native Indian troops? Native Indian—presumably those not in the Indian Army.
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: No. I am dealing only with the troops for which we have to pay—that is for the British establishment. If my hon. and gallant Friend will look at the third page of this Paper he will see the second category, Colonial and Native Indian Troops, 10,200. It is those only that I was speaking of. The previous establishments are set out on the White Paper I ought to warn the House that while the total will not be varied the distribution of the numbers between the various arms, and especially on the regimental establishment, is not finally settled and there may be some variation between the final settlement and the figures in this Paper. There is a total reduction of British troops exceeding 48,000. This must not be compared with the reduction of 50,000 advised by the Geddes Committee, because the Geddes Committee took not the Estimates of last year but a provisional Estimate which was drawn up in August last as the basis on which they worked. I cannot go so far in reduction as the Geddes Committee advise. Out of the 50,000 that they advise I am suggesting that there should be a reduction of 33,600, so that the real comparable figure is 33,600 against 50,000 of the Geddes Committee.
      I propose to tell the House how these reductions will affect the fighting strength of the Army, and then I propose to show the reductions which we suggest in the staffs and the auxiliary and ancillary services, for we are doing our best to make good as rapidly as possible in order to preserve the actual fighting units of the Army. As regards the Infantry, the

      2235
      reductions call for the disbandment of 24 battalions. These 24 battalions have been chosen as to 12 battalions by the disbandment of the six regiments recruited in whole or in part from Southern Ireland, and as to 10 battalions by the disbandment of the third and fourth battalions of the five British regiments which have four battalions, we shall disband the third and fourth battalions of the Royal Fusiliers, the Worcester Regiment, the Middlesex Regiment, the King's Royal Rifle Corps and the Rifle Brigade. This will account for 22 battalions. There are still two battalions remaining to be selected. I am anxious to avoid disbanding any of the English county regiments if it is possible to do so, but I cannot at the moment say where I am going to get the other two battalions from. I have, however, added to the establishment of each of the infantry battalions at home, 64 privates, so that while the number of battalions is reduced, the actual bayonet strength of those at home will be increased.
      As regards Cavalry, hon. Members will remember that last year four cavalry regiments were disbanded. The further reductions require that the equivalent of five additional cavalry regiments shall go. I am extremely anxious to make this reduction without destroying completely the identity of any single regiment, and a scheme is now being examined by which it may be possible not only to retain in some measure the identity of the existing regiments, but to bring back to the Army List the four whose disbandment has been carried out. Broadly speaking, there are two ways of reducing the cavalry. One is by disbanding individual regiments and the other is by amalgamating two regiments, so that each may contribute one or more squadrons to the amalgamated regiment. It will be remembered that the Geddes Committee recommended that eight cavalry regiments should be disbanded. I shall fall short of their recommendation by three regiments with whose services I cannot see my way to dispense.
      With regard to the Artillery, the reductions necessary are equivalent to 47 batteries of Medium, Pack and Field Artillery. There will be left sufficient artillery for four divisions, together with the Army brigades. Corresponding reductions will have to be made in the other arms of the Service. The Royal Engineers and the Royal Corps of Signals will lose about
      2236
      12 per cent. of their establishment. The administrative services, including the Royal Army Service Corp, the Royal Army Medical Corp, the Dental, Ordnance and Veterinary Corps, the Royal Army Pay Corps, and the Corps of Military Accountants will also suffer very heavy reductions. When these heavy reductions have taken place the establishment of the British troops, exclusive of those upon the Indian establishment, will come down to 152,836 of all ranks, a reduction of 48,000 compared with last year's Estimates and a reduction of 20,000 compared with 1914. But behind the Army in 1914 there was the Reserve and the Militia, then called the Special Reserve. In 1914 there was a Reserve of 146,000 men and a Militia or Special Reserve of 55,000 men. To-day we have a Reserve of 65,000 men but no Militia, so that our enrolled strength is infinitely weaker than in 1914.
      Mr. ASQUITH: There is no Special Reserve.
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: No. Of course, we have to remember that we have a potential reserve of war veterans who, in the event of real necessity, will no doubt be available in large numbers. I am proposing to strengthen the Reserve by the special enlistment of Key men, and to restart the Militia. I have taken in the Estimates £1,000,000 for the Militia. The Geddes Committee advised that the Militia should not be reformed, but the shortage of technical men both in the Army and in the Reserve would prevent the quick mobilisation unless provision is made to secure these technical men in the Militia.
      The House would like to have placed before them some sort of picture of what the Army will consist when these reductions are carried out. In order to present that picture I must remind them of the nature of the duties of the regular forces. The primary duty of the Army is to protect our overseas territories and to support the civil power in the maintenance of law and order throughout British territory at home and abroad. The size of the Army has been regulated by our overseas commitments and by the necessity of maintaining units at home, so as to provide drafts and reliefs for the units abroad and to maintain law and order at home. It is a mistake to suppose that the Army at home bears, or ever did bear, any relation to the requirements of

      2237
      a European war. The elimination of the German menace does not in itself enable us to reduce the numbers maintained at home.
      The reduced Army of the future will consist of the Household Cavalry, 20 regiments of cavalry of the line, 162 batteries of artillery, 124 infantry line battalions, and 10 Guards' battalions, together with the auxiliary and ancillary services. This total includes the British forces on the Indian establishment. Our normal requirements on the reduced scale for garrisons abroad, including India, will require that there shall be abroad 11 cavalry regiments, leaving 11 at home, 82 batteries of artillery abroad and 80 at home, 62 line battalions and one Guards' battalion abroad, and 62 line battalions and nine Guards' battalions at home. In this distribution the troops on the Rhine and in Silesia are treated as if they were at home. I will show to the House now units maintained at home will compare if tested by their ability to form an expeditionary force with the units which were so maintained in 1914. We shall be able to organise units at home into a striking force of which one infantry division and one cavalry division, complete with personnel and equipment, would be capable of mobilisation and ready for embarkation at home stations within 15 days. A second infantry division would be available as soon as the technical personnel was made available. When this personnel can be drawn from the Militia, the second infantry division would be ready within a short time, but so long as special enlistments from amongst ex-service men are required there might be a delay of two months.
      The third and fourth infantry divisions would be complete in all arms after four months, but here again special enlistment would be required unless and until the Militia can find the technical personnel. Besides these four divisions there will be a few units over, which would go towards the formation of a fifth division. In 1914 we had one and a half cavalry divisions and six infantry divisions ready for active service within 10 days of mobilisation. No doubt the removal of the German menace enables us to be content with a striking force less immediately ready to take the field; but I will not conceal from the House that risks must be run if the reductions proposed are to be carried out, as time must
      2238
      be taken in enlisting the technical personnel, without which a striking force is incapable of mobilisation. The greatest need is, however, to have a reserve of all arms capable of being used to reinforce troops abroad wherever they may be required. This reserve is provided, and while delay would be incurred in despatching a fully equipped expeditionary force as we knew it in 1914, we could send reinforcements, battalion by battalion, should it be necessary at a very short notice.
      I have told the House what the reductions mean to the fighting arms of the Service. I propose now to deal with the reductions in the staffs and the administrative services. With regard to the staffs we abolish two of the Home Commands. The Irish Command will go, and the troops in Northern Ireland will become an Area Command and form part of a British Command. The London district will cease to be a separate Command; the whole of its administrative work will in future be done by the Eastern Command. The military staff of the War Office, notwithstanding the great additional work which has been thrown upon it in carrying out and preparing to carry out the reductions in the Army, is being reduced from 366 officers this year to 259 in the course of next year. The staff of Commands is being reduced from 1,615 officers to 814. These figures refer to staff appointments. There are, in addition, attached officers on regimental pay doing duty at the War Office, and there is a gradual reduction being made in their numbers also. We have also made considerable progress in the reduction of the ancillary administrative services. The personnel at Woolwich Arsenal, Enfield and Waltham Abbey on the 1st April, 1921, was 17,125; on the 1st April next it will be 13,200, and we estimate that by 1st April, 1923, it will be down to 9,550. During the year, we have thrown up for disposal national factories at Acton, Gretna, Lancaster, Queen's Ferry, Watford and Teddington.
      Heavy reductions have also been made in the Army Ordnance Service. Since the 1st April, 1921, 21 temporary ordnance depôts have been closed, and the Central Ordnance Depôt at Aintree will have been completely evacuated by the end of the financial year. A saving of seven officers, 24 other ranks, and 1,300 civilians has resulted.

      2239
      5.0 P.M.
      There is also a reduction in Army Veterinary Service and in remounts, and the contemplated reduction in the mounted troops and the proposed abolition of the boarding-out scheme of horses for the Territorial Army will enable further reductions to be made. Five depôts will be closed and the personnel will be reduced from 3,000 in the current year to 1,250 in the next year, with an estimated saving of about £250,000.
      The Royal Army Service Corps is being greatly reduced. A saving in personnel of 310 officers, 5,639 other ranks, and 4,845 civilians will be effected in the course of the year. Medical and dental services have fallen by 189 officers and 1,909 other ranks. In this connection I should say that of these medical officers 180 are serving in garrisons which did not exist before the War, but in spite of the reduction I am glad to be able to report that the health of the Army continues to be very good. The number for admission to hospitals for preventible diseases during the present year has reached a lower level than during any time in the history of the Army. In the month of December last it reached the remarkably low figure of 2½5 per thousand.
      With regard to the Dental Corps, we are not filling up the establishment with regular officers until we can be sure of what establishment is required in present conditions. We have reduced the number of equipped beds in hospitals in Great Britain by 4,000, but owing to conditions in Ireland we have had to increase the hospital beds there by over a thousand. Steps are being taken by joint action with the Admiralty, the Air Force and the Ministry of Pensions to concentrate patients where economies can be effected and reduce the number of hospitals.
      I have been looking into the very heavy expenditure of the Finance Department of the War Office and of the Army Pay Corps, and the Corps of Military Accountants. In the current year these three administrative services have cost approximately £1,900,000. Next year's Estimate will show a reduction of £800,000 down to £1,100,000, and it is certain that some further saving can be obtained by combining part of the work of the Pay and Record Offices. Each of these has hitherto compiled its own set
      2240
      of records; in future they are to work together and work on the same records.
      The Estimate provides for a reduction of 535 of all ranks in the Corps of Military Accountants. An examination has now been made to see whether still further reductions cannot be made, but it must be remembered that there is still a great strain upon the Pay Department. The number has been reduced from 50,000 at the highest peak of burden during the War down to 2,000. The final settlement of War accounts and the enormous correspondence of discharged and demobilised men about their accounts has prevented further contraction.
      I have given these details with regard to reductions of the administrative service because I am anxious that the House should realise that we are not making economies merely by cutting off fighting units from the Army, but that we are doing our best by a detailed examination of every administrative service to bring down the ancillary services to a minimum consistent with the efficient working of the machine.
      I will deal now with a proposal that was referred to the year before last by my predecessors with regard to commissions given from the ranks. We have had to modify the proposals which were then put forward. It was originally proposed to find a separate school for the non-commissioned officers to whom commissions were to be granted, but that would entail a large capital outlay, and we are now proposing to send a class of 35 of these candidates to the Royal Military College at Sandhurst next term with the view to being trained to take their place as officers. The intention is that they should live with and share the life of other gentleman cadets, except as regards the curriculum, which will have to be modified. For instance, the gentleman cadet spends two years at college, but the non-commissioned officers will take a shorter course of one year, because they will have already acquired a considerable professional knowledge in their regiments as non-commissioned officers.
      I now propose to turn to the Territorial Army, and tell the House of the effects of reductions upon the Territorial Army. When the Territorial Army was reconstituted by my predecessor in 1920, the full scheme involved an expenditure of £7,250,000, but in order to bring the

      2241
      general Army Estimates within the total assigned to them we found it necessary to reduce this figure to £5,600,000. Some of the units contemplated in a complete scheme have never been raised, and I do not now propose to raise them. This will save £425,000. I am then faced with finding reductions which will give an equivalent of £1,175,000. The best method of finding this, I can assure the House, has been very carefully considered. In the first place, I laid it down as a principle that none of the fourteen Territorial divisions were to be disbanded. The Territorial Army is essentially territorial; that is to say, it should cover the whole country, and to select one division for disbandment would mean to select one part of the country and to give it no opportunity of expressing the military spirit which is common to every county. To destroy a division would destroy in a particular area the great national asset which the territorial represents without in any way relieving any other part of the country from the quota of Territorials which it ought to maintain. I also laid down as a principle that we must keep the actual fighting units intact, and reduce the number of ancillary units as low as possible, if necessary abolishing them altogether. Every possible effort has also been made to confine the reductions to the counties which have suffered least from the recent amalgamation of battalions. Then every endeavour has been made to avoid any reduction in the period of training. Lastly, it was necessary to provide that the Territorials should take some part in the defence of this country against air attack, and I propose as a start to create half a group of Air Defence troops with the Territorial Army with an establishment of 220 officers and 2,708 other ranks.
      I will now indicate the lines upon which reductions will be carried out. In the first place, all artillery batteries will be on a four gun basis. This will conform to the establishment of the Regular artillery. The two extra guns will be retained in charge of the units wherever storage is available, so that on mobilisation batteries could readily be brought up to the six gun basis. The reorganisation on this four gun basis will entail certain reductions in establishment. As regards the infantry, the reductions necessary are minor, and the House will be glad to hear
      2242
      that no more units will have to be either disbanded or amalgamated. The establishment of each battalion, however, will be reduced by 7 officers and 43 other ranks, leaving an establishment of 21 officers and 637 other ranks.
      Colonel Sir C. YATE: How many for service abroad?
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: My hon. and gallant Friend knows the conditions of service in the Territorial Army, and if he will permit me I will not discuss them at the moment. The greater part of the reductions will fall on the Signals, Medical, Veterinary, and Army Service Corps. Nine units of the Corps of Signallers will be disbanded; 20 general hospitals and 7 casualty clearing stations will also be disbanded, and each Territorial division will have one field ambulance instead of three. Eighteen veterinary units will also be disbanded. The divisional trains and the cavalry divisional train of the Army Service Corps will be organised on the mechanical transport basis, which will necessitate a considerable reduction in personnel, while the establishment of divisional ordnance companies will be reduced. These reductions will give something more than three-fifths of the £1,175,000 which has got to be found. The remainder I am finding by reducing the pay and bounty allowances to officers and men.
      With regard to officers, it is proposed to abolish the mess allowance of 4s. a day hitherto allowed at annual and weekend camps. The Territorial officers will thus be in the same position as Regular officers, and will receive Army rations as a free issue, and instead of a messing allowance there will be a grant in aid of officers' messing of £1 for each officer attending camp. I also propose to reduce the provision of post-War grants for officers' expenses, that is the incidental expenses connected with the performance of their military duties. The amount hitherto allowable on this account will be reduced by about half, and the sum divided among the associations and administered by them. The compensation of officers, when the reductions are in force, will be much better than before the War. For example, the pay and allowances of a captain in 1914 for 15 days' camp were £14 15s. 7d. In 1922, after the reductions I have pointed out,

      2243
      the captain would receive £21 14s. 4d., together with Army rations worth about 25s. As regard the man, it is proposed to reduce the bounty below £5. I hope to secure in this way a saving of £65,000 next year, finally rising to over £200,000 a year.
      Lieut.-Colonel CROFT: That is not contemplated for any serving man?
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: For new entrants and for men who extend their service, but not for those now serving during their present term. This reduction is, of course, unpleasant, but even then the man will be better off than he was before the War. Lastly, I come to a proposal of the Geddes Committee that the permanent staff of the Territorial Force should not cost more than £500,000. After careful inquiry, I am convinced that we cannot reduce to this extent without endangering the training and the utility of the Territorial Army. The number of non-commissioned officer instructors will be reduced as far as possible, and we are proposing to dispense with the services of the brigade majors, excepting the four belonging to the London Territorial Brigade, and these reductions will amount to about £200,000 a year, as against the £500,000 asked for by the Geddes Committee. I do not believe we can go further than that without endangering the military life of the Territorial Army.
      The War Office has done a great deal in effecting reductions, and I appeal to those Members of the House who are connected with Territorial associations to turn their attention to the expenses of management of those associations. There are several associations which raise and administer not more than 1,000 men. One association has an office and a secretary for administering 100 men. The North of Scotland has already cut down expenses by amalgamating several of these associations, and if this example could be followed I am sure that considerable reductions would be made. Recently I had the advantage of discussing this question with representatives of all the Territorial associations, and a sub-Committee of the associations has been set up to consider the question of reducing administrative expenses. I believe that these reductions in the Territorial Army will be accepted
      2244
      in a right spirit by the Territorial Army as a whole. They have been effected without endangering in any way the framework upon which the Territorial Army is built. It is still capable of expansion when more money is available. I would like to express to the House how valuable has been the help given to the War Office by the presidents and chairmen of associations throughout the country.
      I have told the House the general lines of the reductions proposed. These reductions will mean that many regiments and battalions which have had a glorious history in the life of the nation will no longer form part of the Army. No one realises more accutely than myself how distasteful it is to bring to an end the life of regiments whose annals reach back over two centuries. In those two centuries the British Empire was built, and in its building the officers and men of many of these famous regiments nobly played their part. I am sure the House will join with me in an expression of gratitude to the gallant officers and men who to-day uphold so well the traditions of their regiments, and hon. Members will deeply sympathise in the disappointment that all ranks must inevitably feel when they realise that the unit to which they have devoted their lives is no longer to exist.
      I want to say a word or two about the effect upon the individual officer and man of the disbanding of so many units of the Army. As regards the officers, it is proposed that the whole Army shall bear equally the reduction, by which I mean that it will not follow that every officer in a unit which is disbanded will be retired. On the contrary, steps will be taken to ensure that the most efficient and capable officers will be offered an opportunity of remaining in the Service. We propose to revert to the pre-War standard of medical fitness, and officers who do not answer that test will be called upon to retire. We are calling for lists of officers whose retention in the Service is the least necessary. These lists will be supplied, in the first instance, by the officers commanding the units, and they will go through the regular channels for the observations of the senior commanding officers. From those lists will be chosen those who are to be called upon to retire. Those who are called upon to retire will be offered compensation according to

      2245
      rank and length of service. The compensation will be not merely what they are entitled to under the terms of the present warrant, but will have an additional element due to the fact that the retirement is compulsory. The exact terms are being considered now, and I hope that very shortly I shall be able to make an announcement upon the subject. The other ranks, so far as is possible, will be offered the right to transfer to other units, but of course the services of a large number will not be required and compensation will be offered to them also in addition to their strict rights.
      I feel sure that the House would wish that in the case both of officers and men whose military careers are terminated through no fault of their own, even in these days of financial stringency the terms offered should be not merely fair, but liberal. The Army has not had a pleasant time lately. Every cry for reduction means an added anxiety to the serving soldier. I wonder whether the House and the country realise what difficult and uncomfortable times the Army has been passing through during the last year or two. Officers and men have been moved about, often two or three times in the year, unable to stay in any one station sufficiently long to enjoy the amenities to which they are reasonably entitled. Duties in Ireland, Silesia, and Constantinople have caused constant strain and discomfort, but, notwithstanding the youth of most of the rank and file, they have behaved with the steadiness and discretion of seasoned soldiers. It has been impossible, owing to the constant moves that have been necessary, to prevent the separation from their families of married officers and married soldiers. I only hope we may soon be able to get the troops into their proper stations and add something to their comfort.
      I have been able to put before the House proposals for very substantial economies. Compared with the current year, after eliminating non-recurrent charges and charges for the Middle East, the economies are £21,000,000. I could not possibly have done this without the loyal and whole-hearted support and cooperation of members of the Army Council and the military and civilian staffs at the War Office. If there had been any stone-walling, if, indeed, there had not been a full appreciation of the
      2246
      financial necessity for drastic reductions, it would have been impossible for any Secretary of State to produce these results. But the Army Council and the staff have worked hard at the enormous mass of detail which goes to make up these £16,500,000. No one can know how great the labour has been, and I am sure the House will join in expressing recognition of the debt owed by the public to the Army Council and to the staff.
      I have said already that these reductions cannot be made without running certain military risks and the House and the country should know, at least in broad outline, what these risks are. Obviously it would not be in the public interest to go into too great detail, but I think it is possible to indicate rather than appraise the nature of the risks. The Army is not, and never has been, raised on a scale of readiness for a European war, so I will not contemplate that eventuality, but the Army may be called upon to reinforce the forces of the Crown in India should the Native Army and the British troops there—now eight regiments of British Cavalry, 45 battalions of British Infantry and Artillery, tanks and other arms—prove insufficient. The General Staff have pointed out that in certain eventualities reinforcements much in excess of our future establishments may be required. This is a risk we shall have to run, hoping that by sound policy and wise administration that course will be justified. In Egypt we now have two regiments of British Cavalry and nine battalions of British Infantry, with Artillery and other arms. We hope that our policy of associating the Egyptians more closely with the Government of Egypt will make it possible to reduce the troops stationed there, but again there is the risk that if our policy fails—I have no reason to suppose that it will not succeed—it might in certain eventualities be necessary to send reinforcements. We have also commitments in Constantinople and on the Rhine with which the House is familiar. I do not anticipate that the troops employed there are not sufficient for the pacific purposes we have in view, but the General Staff are right in calling attention to the possibilities which might require heavy reinforcements. I will not deal with Iraq or Palestine, as my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary has already explained to the House the policy we are there pursuing.

      2247
      The fact is that the Government have had to make a choice between the maximum of safety—which it is the business of the General Staff to advise upon—and the equilibrium between financial and military risks which it is the duty of the Government to determine. After making every effort by peaceful, unadventurous and steady policies to eliminate them, we can only make ample provision against all military risks by maintaining the Army on a scale which would endanger the financial stability of the country. I do not pretend, therefore, that we have insured against every possible contingency. If we try to do so, we shall only provoke the still greater danger of overburdening the taxpayer and causing economic and financial disaster. I therefore recommend these Estimates as the lowest we can secure in the present state of world uncertainty, and yet as the highest we are justified in asking the taxpayer to support, in the present state of the country's finances.
      Sir DONALD MACLEAN: The House is indebted to the Secretary of State for War for the lucid, though lengthy, statement which he has made. Nobody will complain of its length because it was necessary, especially in view of the absence of anything approaching Estimates, to make a statement of very considerable length and detail. Mr. Speaker made a very proper observation, as the guardian of the rights and interests of the House against the encroachment of the Executive, when he protested—I do not think that is at all too strong a word—against a Vote on Account being asked for in the absence of the usual Estimates which were laid in pre-War days. These should have been laid certainly last year. I do not complain of their not being laid in 1919, but in 1920 and 1921 there was no excuse. If it had been done last year, the approximate cause which the right hon. Gentleman gave us to-day, for not producing them this year, namely, the Geddes Committee of Inquiry, would not have operated to prevent them being laid with the Vote we are being asked for to-day. I wish to ask my right hon. Friend if he can tell us when he proposes to take Vote A, and if before Vote A we may hope to have the Estimates laid before us. Are we to have them, even before the Budget?
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: It is very difficult to say. They are very complicated, as my right hon. Friend well knows. I think it will be three or four weeks before they are ready, and we must have the Vote long before then.
      Sir D. MACLEAN: I appreciate that it is necessary to have Vote A in a comparatively short time. I may take it then, that within a month, at any rate, we shall have the Estimates properly laid before us. I do not see why we should not, because, looking at the Geddes Report, one sees that a considerable amount of detail has already been given, and must be in the hands of the War Office not only in skeleton form, but practically filled in. All that has to be done is to make the alterations which have been indicated in the course of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, and which were previously foreshadowed by Ministerial speakers, and then present the Estimates at the earliest possible moment. As the right hon. Gentleman has stated, those in Opposition desire that these Estimates should be laid at the earliest possible moment, and we shall press for that until it is done.
      I join with the right hon. Gentleman in what he has said regarding the sympathy which we must all feel for men of all ranks who have to make the best of a breach of association not only personal to themselves, but as inheritors of the great traditions of great regiments in the Army. We all appreciate that, but I am quite certain that these men realise as we do, the vital necessities for the great reductions which are being made. Naturally each thinks that some regiment should be chosen, other than the one in which he happens to serve. There is another matter in regard to which I should like to express our sympathy and appreciation, and that is, the exceptionally arduous conditions under which what is practically a young army, has had to render service during the past year. They have been called upon at short notice to serve in Ireland, and in the Middle East, and indeed I suppose in the Far East, under very trying and difficult conditions, and it is gratifying to have the assurance of the right hon. Gentleman that neither in discipline, in general bearing, nor in efficiency in the discharge of

      2249
      their duties, have they been in the least degree unworthy of the best of their predecessors.
      There are two great factors which must dominate any reduction in the armed forces. The first is the question of what my right hon. Friend calls commitments, but which I prefer to call policy. I quite agree that the duty of the soldier is to carry out professionally the policy which is laid down for him by the Government of the day. He has nothing to do with the framing of the policy, but he has, as far as he can, to fit in the arm of the service with which he is associated with the carrying out of the requirements and policy of the Government of the day. No matter what little snips you may make here and there, or what great cuts you may make in another direction, it all comes back to the question of the policy on which you are moving, and on which you require the Army to carry out your pledges. There is another great fundamental factor mentioned in the speech of my right hon. Friend. It is the urgent national necessity for the saving of money. It might be assumed that that has nothing to do with military operations or with strategy or tactics, but that is a very short-sighted view. A sound financial position is an absolute necessity to the continuance of effective warfare. I may be wrong when I say that this was one of the greatest sources of our strength, but I suggest that we could never have carried the operations of the last war to a successful conclusion had it not been for the tremendously, the overwhelmingly superior financial position of this country. I very much doubt if we could have carried it through had we not possessed the great financial resources which were behind us.
      I would say, therefore, to soldiers who would criticise these reductions that in looking at the situation as a whole they should bring that consideration into very serious account. We as taxpayers and civilians look at the matter from a point of view which we cannot expect the soldier entirely to share, and so I would suggest to the soldier that, looking at the whole military situation, he should give that factor due weight in stating what he requires or what he suggests the country should do. It is because our financial position is so serious that we not only urge upon the Government and their military advisers to make the reductions now fore-
      2250
      shadowed as swiftly as possible, but we say that they must go still further. It is an unpleasant thing to say, but it is true. What about the vast sums to which we are already Committed? I shall not weary the House by repeating those great figures which often and often I have brought before them. We know what they are, and they are reflected in the overwhelming taxation which the country has at this moment to bear. One has not to look far in order to get support for that position. I find support for it in the Geddes Committee's Report. On page 4 the Committee say:
      "In our opinion the time has come when the Government must say to these Departments how much money they can have and look to them to frame their proposals accordingly."
      The right hon. Gentleman has said we are taking risks. I daresay we are, but you will have to take even greater risks, if you are going to bring your financial position back into the state which will enable any defensive operations to be carried out for a sufficiently long time to be successful, should that horrible eventuality arise in the future. You must get your financial position right and take very great military risks to do so. As to the basis which I have laid down for my argument, there can be little or no doubt. If you were to take the advice always of professionals, on any aspect of life, as to what risks you were going to take, you would never cease adding to your insurance. I think it was Lord Salisbury who said that one would be put in the position of being asked to garrison the moon against a possible attack from Mars. That, I think, is the way in which he expressed his view on the points so often urged as to insuring against risks. Coming down to one or two of the points with which the right hon. Gentleman has dealt, I must say that I do not quite follow him as to the amount of the real saving effected. Towards the end of the speech he referred to a sum of £21,000,000.
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: That is, compared with last year.
      Sir D. MACLEAN: I will look into it, but one of the disadvantages under which we are labouring, in the absence of Estimates, is shown by the fact that I cannot find it in any one of the three papers which have been submitted to us. If hon. Members wish to follow this

      2251
      matter, they will have to look at page 79 of the Geddes Committee's Report. They will find there that the Estimate for 1921–22 was £77,815,000, compared with this Estimate for this year of £62,200,000. I do not know where the £21,000,000 comes in there.
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: I tried to make a comparison, excluding non-recurring, that is terminal charges, on both sides, and also charges which will arise from the reduction of the Army, such as compensation and so forth. Taking what might otherwise be called the normal annual charges of the Army, it is £21,000,000 less than last year.
      Sir D. MACLEAN: I cannot say I quite see where it conies in, but I want to put a few questions to my right hon. Friend on the point of the terminal charges to test what is the real reduction. He will agree with me, I am sure, in this, that the real reduction is on current expenses and not on terminal expenses.
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON - EVANS: Hear, hear.
      Sir D. MACLEAN: There we are on common ground. If he will look at page 79 in the Geddes Report, he will see that in 1921–22 the terminal charges were £10,155,000. On page 2 of the Vote on Account itself he will see that the terminal charges of the War are put in at £7,000,000, a reduction of £3,155,000. I put it to him that his reduction—
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: That has nothing to do with it.
      Sir D. MACLEAN: The right hon. Gentleman said his net reduction was £15,500,000, but the result of my endeavour to clutch some clue in this tangled maze is that he is claiming credit for at least £3,000,000 more than he is entitled to, and he must make some effort to explain that to me, because I am sure I am not the only person in the House who does not understand it. I would like to take my right hon. Friend to what is, after all, a very fair test point of his reduction, and that is the war staff. I gather that the war staff of the year 1922–23 is to be 1,266, War Office staff.
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: On Vote A, page 2, the right hon. Gentleman will find the military staff.
      Sir D. MACLEAN: I am not including the civilian staff.
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: The military staff at the War Office is to be 259 officers, 108 other ranks, a total of 367 all ranks. I explained to the right hon. Gentleman that those are officers holding staff appointments and that there may be some attached officers in addition.
      Sir D. MACLEAN: I was using the word "Staff" wrongly. I was speaking about the War Office.
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: I was talking of military staff, War Office.
      Sir D. MACLEAN: I mean soldiers engaged in the War Office. In 1914–15 they numbered 942.
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: Where did the right hon. Gentleman get that from?
      Sir D. MACLEAN: On page 12 of the right hon. Gentleman's own memorandum it says the staff at the War Office in 1914–15 was 942.
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: That is not staff at the War Office, but "Staff and War Office."
      Sir D. MACLEAN: Anyhow, I am comparing one figure with another. In 1914–15 the figure is 942, and in 1922–23 it is 1,266, comparing like with like. Is that right?
      Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: Yes, but it is not the War Office only.
      Sir D. MACLEAN: Now we have less men for which this money is sought than we had in 1914–15. We have, as the Report says, Germany out of action and a broken Europe. It is perfectly true that we have a disturbed India and a disturbed Egypt and, let us hope, an Ireland which is getting less disturbed than it was, at any rate, at this time last year. The words of the right hon. Gentleman on that occasion were:
      "Can the number of troops in Ireland be reduced? Is there any legitimate economy to be made there? I am constrained to answer; 'No; not until the cause of the trouble is removed, not until the people of Ireland cease to make illegitimate war upon this country.'"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th March, 1921; col. 1290, Vol. 139.]
      What I want the right hon. Gentleman to explain to us—and it is quite im-

      2253
      possible to get at it, as far as we are concerned, until we have the Estimates—is why it is that in the coming year, with less men, with a far less threatening position the world over, we have for the Staff and the War Office an increase of over 300 compared with 1914–15, and it costs us £1,334,000, as compared with £457,000 in 1914–15. That is one of the test positions that we take, and it shows that I was not very far out when I said that what we want is not only the reductions to be made by the right hon. Gentleman, not only the reductions suggested by the Geddes Committee, but something much further, before we can get down to the financial position which I have suggested or claimed is at the basis of all real, effective, military action. After all, the only real way of making such reductions as the nation must have is by a change of those commitments and policies which the right hon. Gentleman says are causing us to retain these great forces, for fear of what may happen in India, for fear of what may happen in Egypt, for fear still of what may happen in Iraq, and for fear of what may yet happen in Ireland. It is the policies of the Government that have been the cause of this huge military expenditure, and until those policies are altered you will never get the finances of the country in a sufficiently sound position to justify such vast expenditure.
      6.0 P.M.
      Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WILSON: May I claim the indulgence of the House for my maiden speech? I feel sure I can trust to the kindness of hon. Members to let me off easily during the many slips I am quite sure I shall make. May I make my first one by trying to explain, if I may, who it is I am? I was born in what is now euphoniously called the Irish Free State, and I lived there for 20 years. We were then under the tyranny of the Union, but I lived in the greatest friendship with my neighbours. I was rooted in Ulster, and I have been a soldier for 41 years, serving one Queen and two Kings of the British Empire. The net result is this, that I am intensely loyal to the Crown and intensely proud of the British Empire, and any remarks that I may make to the House will be made in that spirit. The Estimates that have been laid before the House are to a great extent based on the Report of
      2254
      the Geddes Committee. May I say that we are one of the only great Powers who have a voluntary army, and that to have a voluntary army has many advantages, but it has one great disadvantage, that in the nature of things it solves no military problem? If you have a great many volunteers you may have a great big army, but if you have very few volunteers you will probably have a very small army. The size of the Army being that which the number of volunteers willing to join makes it, the size of the Army has no relation to war. I think I can prove that by saying that in 1914 we entered a war with six divisions, and in order to win that war we had to raise a total of nearly 80. It is perfectly obvious, therefore, that the six divisions of the voluntary Army had no relation whatever to the war into which we were plunged. But at that time there was no reason why we should have an army fit to fight the Germans, because, so far as my recollection goes, the Government of the day did not think that it was probable that we might have to fight Germany. If, therefore, any money had been put into an army to be ready to fight the Germans, and we were not going to fight them, the money would have been wasted. I remember, I think it was the present Prime Minister, as late as 23rd July, 1914, seven days before the great German army got on the march, assured this House that there was very little danger of war. I have made these observations because the Geddes Committee, broadly, base their reductions of the Army on two hypotheses, both of which are false. The first was that the German peril having passed, there was no necessity to keep an army to face it. There never was an army facing it, and there should not have been, seeing that, in all probability, we were not going to war. So far as I know, we never raised one man, kept one horse, or moved one wheel-barrow because of the danger of a war with Germany. Therefore, to take as a hypothesis that the Army was kept to face Germany, and, the German danger having passed, the Army could be reduced, is a false deduction from a false basis. The second reason that the Committee gives for the reduction is that with modern inventions and modern arms a modern army is a much more formidable thing than a prehistoric army. That is so, and the Committee go on practically

      2255
      to say that one company of infantry now can do the work of four companies of infantry in old days, and, therefore, now we can abolish three companies of infantry, and be as strong as we were. That seems to me to be a false deduction from a false basis. In the case of European wars, I imagine our enemies will have the same arms and armaments as we should have.
      Therefore, there would be no gain in that respect, and in savage wars it is a very curious thing that modern inventions have, on the whole, made the enemy much more powerful than ourselves. It is a curious thing. I was calculating only the other day—I may be quite wrong—that if to-day India were asked to carry out Lord Roberts' famous Kabul to Kandahar march, India would ask for at least three times as many troops as Lord Roberts had in 1878. It is true that in these frontier fightings we have had in the last 18 months, we have employed, and have had to employ, far more troops than we had before these modern inventions gave the enemy such an advantage. The reason is that the mountains and the deserts do not change and they preclude the civilised people from using to the full advantage the modern inventions. On the other hand, the long-range rifle, and the wonderful eyesight of the natives, make them able to pick off individuals at 2,000 yards, whereas in former days they had difficulty in doing it at 20 yards. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State has told us what it means to the Army if these Estimates are passed, and he mentioned figures, which I venture to repeat, but which I would not myself have made public. If these Estimates are passed, Great Britain and Ireland can produce in 15 days one division and a cavalry division, and then for the second division she has to wait for anything between another 15 days and six weeks, and for a third and a fourth division she has to wait months. I mention that now, but I would like to come back to it in a few minutes.
      May I now state, as briefly as I can, what liabilities we are under? England, Ireland, Egypt, India, and now, I am afraid I must add, Hong Kong—those were all present in 1914; they are all present today. But, in addition to those, we have
      2256
      now the Rhine, we have Silesia, we have Constantinople, we have Palestine, and we have Iraq, in addition to what we had in 1914. There are two more liabilities which are quite new, which we had not in 1914, so far as I know—a pact between this country and France, and a pact between this country and Belgium. In addition to that, may I mention two things which, to me, render the situation infinitely more dangerous than it was in 1914? As a result of the War, and as a result of the Peace Conference following the. War, Europe, which in 1914 chiefly consisted of great Empires, has now been broken up into a number of small States. That in itself is an experiment, perhaps not for me to criticise; but when I add that there are at the present moment in Europe and the quite Near East 11 States with no access to the open sea, and five more with only access to the Black Sea, making a total of 16 States without access to the free, warm water, how anybody can imagine that a vast country, for example, like Russia, with a population of 150,000,000, with all her free, open seaports all the year round taken from her, will not break out to the sea, whether Esthonia is guarded by the League of Nations or not, I cannot imagine.
      There is another thing which, to me, shows a dangerous state of affairs in Europe. In 1914 we had these big Empires. People said at that time—and said truly—that it was because of these big Empires we had big armies; and we had big armies in 1914. As a result of the War, the German Army, which stood in 1913 at 800,000 strong, is now 100,000 strong, and the Austrian Army, which stood at 400,000 strong, is now 30,000 strong. Yet, in spite of that, there are as many armed men in Europe at the present moment as there were in 1913. I have the figures of the armies of all the States, and the increase in the number of armed men in these small States is simply terrifying. In addition to that, we have in Europe at the present moment, practically every sound man, and many that are not, between the ages of 20 and 50 trained to arms. Who, then, says, and who can say, that the state of Europe is more peaceful than it was in 1913? Take our liabilities. England—it is only six or eight months since we had to call up the whole of the Reserve, and make I an ad hoc army. Ireland—who will say

      2257
      what is going to happen in Ireland? Egypt—who will say what is going to happen in Egypt? In 1913–14 Egypt was profoundly quiet. India—who is brave enough to say what is going to happen in India? In 1913–14 India was profoundly quiet. Hong Kong—who will say what is going to happen in Hong Kong? In 1913–14 it was profoundly quiet.
      In addition to those old liabilities, the dangers of which have enormously increased, we have the Rhine, Silesia, Constantinople, Palestine, Iraq, a pact with France, and a pact with Belgium. Who says our liabilities have not increased? Yet in 1914 we could put six divisions in the field in 9½ days. Now we can put one in 15 days, two in 30 or 50 days, and a third and fourth months hence. I wonder if this is the right moment to reduce the fighting troops of Great Britain? The right hon. Member for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean), in his speech, seemed to think that the soldiers in their advice paid no attention to finance. I wish it were true that we had not to pay attention to the 6s. in the £ which the policy of His Majesty's Government put on this country; but, unfortunately, we pay 6s. in the £ just as much as he does, and, therefore, finance is very much present to our minds.
      So far as my judgment goes, nobody knows what is going to face us in the near future. We all know that our liabilities are enormously increased and we have just been told that our power to meet them has been immensely reduced. It has always seemed to me that the primary duty of an army is to prevent war. I know of no cheaper way of conducting the business of a State than by conducting it in a state of profound peace, and one of the ways of doing that is to have an army of sufficient strength to prevent war. But if you cannot, either from reasons of policy or other reasons, prevent war, then the next duty of the army is to win the war. To win a war is a terribly expensive thing both in men and in money. Therefore it is infinitely cheaper to have a force which will prevent war rather than to have a force which if it has to go to war even can win the war. There is, however, a third possibility, and that is to have an army not sufficiently strong to prevent war and not sufficiently strong to win war, but just sufficiently weak to lose the war.
      2258
      That is a most terrible catastrophe that can happen to an Empire. In my judgment, if the Estimates now placed before the House are passed, if the reductions contemplated in the fighting forces are carried out, we will be in the position of that third army, just ready, in spite of everything it can do, to lose the war.

DEFENCE FOECES (ORGANISATION).
Lieut.-General Sir AYLMER HUNTER-WESTON: I beg to move to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof the words,
"in order to determine the most economical and most efficient method of directing and administering our Army, it is desirable that the Government should set up a Commission or Committee to consider how the resources of our country can best be utilised for defence; to consider how the operations and administration of our sea, land, and air forces shall be co-ordinated in war and peace; and to make recommendations as to the best form of directing organisation both in the Government and in the Ministries and Departments concerned."
I feel sure I am expressing the feelings of everyone in this House when I congratulate the hon. and gallant Member for North Down (Sir H. Wilson) on an excellent speech which has arrested the attention of every Member of the House during the all too few moments he has been speaking. I believe that only once before in the history of the House have we had a Field-Marshal amongst our Members. For that we have to go back to the time of General Wade, the pacificator of the Highlands—
Lieut.-Colonel A. MURRAY: Pacificator?
Sir AYLMER HUNTER-WESTON: Whose name still is kept in remembrance by the roads that he made. He was made a Field-Marshal during the time he was in this House, but I think it is particularly appropriate that we should have the present Field-Marshal in the House because it was in the precincts of this very Palace of Westminster, at a dinner given to him by Members of this House, that the Prime Minister in one of his most brilliant and eloquent speeches made the announcement that His Majesty had been graciously pleased to bestow the baton of a Field-Marshal on Sir Henry Wilson. In that speech he referred to the great services Sir Henry had rendered to the State, and I feel sure that we who have heard him

2259
to-night here will feel that the great services he has rendered to the State as a soldier during his long career in the Army will be equalled by the services he will render to the State within the precincts of this House as a politician and a statesman. Though he is what is popularly called the baby Member of Parliament, he is not a baby as a politician, and no baby statesman, for he has sat in the council of the Empire with the War Cabinet during the greater part of the last part of the War. He was told by the Prime Minister in the speech to which I have referred that he had arrived at his position in spite of the gift of humour. It sometimes is a dangerous thing to have a too highly developed sense of humour, but I think we may say that in this House a sense of humour will be very much appreciated, and we shall rejoice to have certain glints of humour to lighten up the dull debates to which we have to listen. I therefore wish to congratulate the hon. and gallant Gentleman on his brilliant speech and to hope that he will often be a participator in our debates.
Turning from that, and regretting, as I do greatly, that I cannot follow my Hon. and gallant Friend in the line he has taken owing to the fact that I have unfortunately put down a Resolution and therefore must confine myself to that Resolution, may I say that I trust we shall have other opportunities of talking on the all-important subject that he has brought to our notice on Vote A. I shall confine myself to the Resolution which stands in my name. I wish to begin by emphasising the fact that the Army Estimates to-day cannot now be adequately considered if the Army be looked upon as being in a watertight compartment. Our Army Estimates can only be properly and intelligibly considered if they are looked upon in relation to the Estimates for the other Services of the Crown which are necessary for the defence of our Empire. It is for this reason that I would, if I might, appeal to the Government to consult with you, Mr. Speaker, to see whether in future years it might not be possible for some Parliamentary procedure to be found by which the Estimates for the Imperial Defence Committee can be taken before the Estimates of the three fighting Services. If we were able to do this, we should be able on the Estimates of the Imperial
2260
Defence Committee to have a general discussion of our defence requirements as a whole, and then subsequently to confine our remarks to details as applied to each of the three fighting Services on the Estimate for that fighting Service. As, owing to the courtesy of the Government, the Opposition are given the choice of subject of Debate in Committee of Supply, might I appeal to those concerned to see that later in the Session we get a day for the discussion of the Imperial Defence Committee Vote, which is, I believe, in the Treasury Vote, so that we may be able to talk over the larger matters of Imperial Defence which are so absolutely important to the well-being of the country and of every individual in the country?
So long as the Army and Navy were the only Services it was quite possible and quite logical to keep these Services separate. Between the sea and the land there was a logical line fixed. But between the sea and the air, and between the land and the air, there is no such division possible. Aircraft are, and will be, increasingly necessary to the adequate prosecution of war both on sea and Iand. Without them we are blind, and against certain hostile attacks defenceless. We cannot make our ordinary proper modern reconnaissance without them. We cannot direct the work of our artillery. We have only anti-aircraft guns to protect us against the disastrous physical and moral effects of a hostile air attack. Protection from the air has become an absolute necessity both for the land and the sea forces, and the method of the utilisation of our flying machines has a very important effect on the other Services. The Air Force must have a direct effect on our Estimates of the future, both as to land and sea.
Take an extreme case. If, as advocated by some, the Ministry of Air is abolished, and you have the Air Force divided between the Army and Navy, it is evident that the Estimates for the Army and Navy must be increased by the amount necessary to provide for the flying requirements of each Service. I think, however, it is unnecessary to elaborate this point further, for the Geddes Commission has brought very prominently to the attention of the whole nation the fact that in order to get economy and efficiency in these Services we must first of all consider the pro-

2261
blem of defence aa a whole. I think, therefore, that everybody will concede my first point, which is that any revision of the Army must be accompanied by, and indeed preceded by, a revision of the whole of our defence organisation, taken as one. But it will be said, "Why should we have any revision at all?" Have we not won the War? Is not that proof that all is for the best, in this the best of all possible defence forces? We have won the War it is true. We have emerged successfully, but at what a cost! The higher commanders know that on more than one occasion it was only by a miracle that we pulled through.
We won, but at what a cost! We have lost countless millions of treasure. Far more than that we have lost the flower of the younger generation. Make no mistake about it. The most enterprising, the most go-ahead of our race, the potential leaders of the future, are lying amongst the dead, and the nation is irreparably poorer for their loss. Is it not, then, our duty to take stock of our resources, to consider how our man-power and our manufactories can best be utilised in case there should be another national emergency? Ought we not to see how we can utilise our great and terrible experiences so as to prevent the recurrence of such losses? Can anyone, however ignorant on the one hand, or however self-complacent on the other, believe that our defence forces and our Army is so perfect as not to need revision? To give specific cases would never do. It would be going into controversial matters, but anyone who has anything to do with the Army during the War will know of specific cases in which the great machine creaked, and creaked badly. To say that our Army and defence forces require revision implies no censure, either on those who devised the machine before the War or on those who worked it during the War. No praise can be too high for the work done in every theatre of the War. The more one knows of pre-War conditions the more full must one be of admiration for the work done for the army by the Esher Commission, and for our defence forces as a whole by the Committee of Imperial Defence under the three premiers who are still in this House, and by the able secretariat that assisted them. But for the able review which was made of our Army and our directing organisation by the Esher Commission
2262
and the consequent institution of the general staff and the logical organisation and allocation of duties in the War Office and in the commands, it would have gone very hardly with us. I am not alone in considering that there would have been a very great possibility of our losing the War.
That review was taken in 1904. How different now are the conditions to what they were then. What an immense evolution, if not revolution, there has been in our pre-War ideas of administration, in our pre-War ideas of the necessity for preparation. Is not then a fresh review necessary? Is it too much to ask for a review of our organisation for defence in the light of the experience we have gained during the War? We have had in the past many such reviews, and every periodical review has had good results. After the outbreak of the Crimean War we did away with that curious anomaly which existed up to then of having in our supreme Governmental organisation a Secretary-at-War as well as a Secretary of War. At the sime time we did away with the great division that had existed for centuries in the two branches of our land forces. We had, on the one hand, the infantry and the cavalry and, on the other, the engineers, the artillery and all the ordnance services, one serving under the commander-in-chief and the other under the Master-General and the Board of Ordnance, and they served under completely different conditions with separate administrative services. Each of these two great branches had separate Army Medical Services. The infantry and cavalry had an "Army Medical Service" and the others had the "Ordnance Medical Department." No doubt the same arguments were adduced against any amalgamation of those two branches of the medical services in those days as are brought forward now to prove the impossibility of any proposal made to amalgamate the medical services of air, land and sea into a Defence Force Medical Service.
I have already adverted to the very great good that was done to the Army by the Esher Triumvirate which sat in 1904, nearly 18 years ago. Should we not have a similar but a far more comprehensive review now after a lustrum of war which has enlarged our experience, broadened our outlook and

2263
developed our idea of our national duty and national necessities in war to a much greater extent than was done in the previous century. Are we to ignore all this vast experience, are we not to examine our defence machinery thoroughly and systematically, without hurry but without delay, in view of the experience which we have gained? The epoch-making changes which have occurred since 1904 have rendered all our arrangements for defence before the War out of date. The air has brought problems of the greatest difficulty, complexity and controversy into our conception of the proper directing organisation of our Defence Forces.
I know there are many special points now being dealt with by Sub-Committees of the Committee of Imperial Defence and other Committees. There is the Committee that was announced the other day to go into the question of how far it was possible to amalgamate the Administrative Departments of the three fighting services. We understand that there is to be a Committee to consider the possibility of getting something in the nature of a combined brain. These Committees are of the greatest value as providing data for the Committee which we want which will co-ordinate the whole of this vast mass of information which has already accumulated. All these small Committees may be necessary, but we do want a comprehensive Committee which will deal with the defence problem as a whole. The most difficult and the most arresting problem that such a Committee would have to deal with would be the problem of the relation of this new element of war, the air, with the older sister services. This makes it imperative that there should be such a revision. If it be agreed that such a review of our system is necessary, then any such review must take a broad aspect, and not merely look at one service only but it must embrace the whole of our defence problem. To achieve that we must decide how that revision can best be carried out.
There are several alternatives. There is, first of all, the alternative of this review being carried out by each Department within itself. That is, in the case of the Army, that this revision should be carried out by the Army Council. The members of the Army Council are far too hard worked to be able
2264
to take up duties of this sort which would require months of concentration. They have their own strenuous and responsible work in looking after their own great Departments, and therefore they cannot undertake such a revision as I have indicated, and if they did undertake it they could not do it in the way we want, and therefore I think this may be ruled out.
Then there might be a review by a Cabinet Committee. If you call members of the Army Council busy men, what epithet are you to use in reference to Cabinet Ministers? Under our present system the heads of great Administrative Departments, in addition to looking after all the manifold work of their Departments, have to spend much time at Cabinet Meetings and give much thought to the great problems of government of our Empire as a whole. Therefore a Cabinet Committee cannot do the work which is required. The Cabinet should consider the results of the consideration of the Committee which I have suggested when it has presented its Report in a concise and easily digestible form.
There is another possibility. You might have a sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. I would point out, however, that the members of this Committee are already doing work which is of the greatest advantage to the State. By the constitution of the Committee of Imperial Defence the Prime Minister has the power of calling to its deliberations any man whom he considers would be of value to the State, and it is therefore possible for the Prime Minister to call to an Affiliated Committee certain eminent men who could devote time and thought to this subject, and who would be of such standing that their findings and recommendations would command universal confidence.
There is the fourth alternative of either a Royal Commission or an independent Committee such as the Esher Committee, to which I have already adverted, and which did such excellent work. An independent Committee or Commission is absolutely necessary, but as to whether that Committee should be affiliated with the Committee of Imperial Defence, or whether it should be a Royal Commission or an independent Commission on the lines of the Esher Triumvirate does not matter. The essential thing is that it should be untrammelled in its work. It should consist of a few carefully selected

2265
men of eminence in the State whose ideas and recommendations will command confidence. They should be able to devote the necessary time and thought to the subject, and they should be judicial minded and not partisans, and the chairman should be in the nature of a statesman who is not in office and who has time to devote to the subject.
I know the pressure of work in the Department which is so ably presided over by the Secretary of State for War, and I can quite sympathise with him in his reluctance to put any extra work on his Department at the present time, but a Commission such as I advocate, if it did its work properly, would have to study broad matters of principle for some considerable time, and they would not be able to deal with matters of administrative organisations in the Ministries of the fighting services until many a day has elapsed. The main thing is that a Committee of this sort cannot be delayed indefinitely. There is no one who has studied the condition of the world and who has listened to the eloquent speech made by the hon. and gallant Member for North Down (Sir H. Wilson), who can say that it is not necessary for us to take stock of what we have and to do our best to make the best arrangement for having our defences in the best possible order Three years and a half have elapsed since hostilities ceased. Although I know the difficulties, the review I have advocated ought not to be delayed much longer.
My presentation of this case has necessarily been rapid, and I have been obliged to omit many points and many arguments pertinent to this case. However inadequately I have put forward what I wish to put forward in the name of myself and those who think with me, I think I have shown, first of all, that the problems of the Army cannot be adequately considered unless they are considered as a part of our defence problems as a whole. Secondly, that a review of our organisation for defence by some independent Committee is necessary in the light of the experience we have gained during the War; and, thirdly, that the best method of carrying out this review is by a small independent Committee or Commission such as I have advocated. I know the splendid work that is being done by the Secretary of State for War, by the Committee of Imperial Defence,
2266
and by the Lord President of the Council, but far more is needed, and I beg the Secretary of State for War, who I know cannot possibly give a decision straight off over the Floor of the House, to urge upon his colleagues in the Government the imperative necessity of setting up such a Committee and getting it to work at an early date.
Major-General SEELY: I beg to second the Amendment.
I hope the Government will accept it, and act upon it without delay. It is particularly fortunate, I think, that the proposal which has been made by my hon. and gallant Friend should have been preceded by an extraordinary speech by one whom we have known under many names, but who is now known to us as the hon. and gallant Member for North Down. Of all the maiden speeches I have ever heard I think his was one of the best delivered and the most interesting, and I am sure the House will await with anxiety the next time he addresses us, although I hope he will not make our flesh creep so badly on the next occasion.
The speech of the hon. and gallant Member for North Down is the greatest proof of the necessity for carrying out the proposal of my hon. and gallant Friend. My hon. and gallant Friend proposes that we should set up a Commission—that has been often proposed and even promised before—in order to find out how best to consider the administration of our sea, land, and air forces, and how they should be co-ordinated in war and in peace. My hon. and gallant Friend said it was a peculiar thing about modern inventions that, so far from making one stronger, they tended to weaken. His argument in the first part was irrefutable, but the hon. and gallant Gentleman might also have said if one man is now worth what 10 men were worth before, it is equally true that one casualty is ten times more disastrous than before. He went on to say, in dealing with savage warfare—a matter which may come more immediately before us in the next year or two—that the same argument applies. I hold the view, which is shared by many better able to judge, that the development of our air power makes us far more powerful and not less powerful. I gave only the other day four instances in Mesopotamia, and only yesterday the Secretary for the Colonies gave an instance in

2267
Somaliland which is almost too good to be true, showing that the presence of two aeroplanes saved a whole expedition. I do not say that the view advanced by the Field Marshal in his speech is wrong, but I do suggest there is a powerful body of opinion who are as strongly in support of the view taken by my hon. and gallant Friend. If there is anything to bring the two together, it may well be that the Secretary for War will be impelled by his advisers to take the anti-air view and greatly increase the other forces, while an impartial reviewer, after listening to what is to be said on both sides, may think that on the whole the air view is the correct view and that money spent on increasing the other forces could be saved.
The same remark applies to the whole argument addressed to us by the hon. and gallant Field-Marshal. He pointed out that before the War we had so many regiments. Now we shall have fewer. He also pointed out, with perfect truth, that while the state of Europe is in some respects more favourable, it is in other respects far less favourable, from this point of view, that with such a number of small States the possibility of war is one which should have great weight with us. That was urged in an extraordinarily powerful memorandum by General Smuts. Reference has been made to the danger at Constantinople and at Hong Kong. The defences of those places is more completely bound up with the sea than with the land, but aircraft are essential and we want to increase our Air Force rather than our land force. In theory, under the arrangement set up by the Lord President of the Council, the Prime Minister should sit on the Committee of Imperial Defence. Once upon a time he did do so, and he adjudicated on these very matters. My hon. and gallant Friend will very well remember having attended many meetings of the Imperial Defence Committee presided over by the then Prime Minister. I have in mind the very good advice he gave us and which we acted upon. Now the Prime Minister cannot possibly do that. He is too much engaged on other affairs of State. There is not the remotest chance of any Prime Minister in our time finding an opportunity to do this co-
2268
ordinating work, to preside over the Committee of Imperial Defence, to listen to the arguments on both sides, and then to come to a decision.
There are two great causes of waste under the present system. One is the overlapping of services. If each service has its own parson and its own hospital, it leads very often to an absurd waste of money. The other great sources of waste is the employment of wrong weapons—the employment of land forces when we should employ air forces, or the employment of air forces when we should employ sea forces. I come to the next point. Can what my hon. Friend proposes be done successfully? Here I shall be on highly controversial ground in what I am going to say. Some people urge that it is no use setting up a Ministry of Defence, or adopting another plan which I will adumbrate presently, because, in point of fact, the deliberations of such bodies have done us no good in the past. We were, it is said, utterly unprepared for the late War, and we only muddled through it by luck and by the gallantry of our men. There has been a lot of loose talk about this. I am here to say that, in my judgment, and certainly in the judgment of the Germans, although everybody was more or less unprepared for the War, we were the least unprepared. We were better prepared for the War on the 4th August, 1914, than any other nation that entered into the War, and the reason why we were so much better prepared was because we had given it really more careful thought. It is true that there were times when we were desperately short of shells, of guns and of rifles, but that was not due to the fact that we lacked prevision. It was because we had planned for a war in defence of Belgium on a certain scale When the War broke out the British Empire was spending, approximately, £100,000,000 a year, and when the Mobilisation Order came, approximately, 1,000,000 men stood to arms. I may say, in passing, that the amount the British Empire was spending was a great deal more than was being spent by any other Power, including Germany. Our plan was, and I had a great deal to do with it, so that if anyone is in fault, I am the man to blame; I welcome criticism and am prepared to meet it, for I have presided over more Committees of Imperial Defence than anyone else—our

2269
plan was to keep these 1,000,000 men in the field and to put them in the right places, while our Navy was to keep the sea. In other words, the first problem was to defend the whole Empire from hostile attack, the next was to maintain our communications with a view to securing our food supplies and bringing reinforcements from over the water, and the third problem was to defend Belgium by helping France to do so. One detail was to catch all the spies. When war did break out we did a good deal in these directions, while our Navy put a strangle-hold on Germany from which she was never able to escape. Remember, no single hostile foot was ever put on any part of the British Empire, and that shows that we disposed of our forces in the right way. At the same time, we did give assistance in Belgium in time to prevent the Germans taking Paris. That was not done without thought.
When I first became Secretary of State for War the Field Marshal who has just addressed the House came and pointed out to me that if Belgian neutrality were violated it was extremely probable our Armies would not get in time to the places where they ought to be. With the consent of the Cabinet I asked four men who, between them, owned the great majority of the A1 steam tonnage of the world to meet me here in this House. They did so. I put to them the problem, and within a few months, with the aid of the Admiralty and of the War Office, they produced an entirely new plan involving an expenditure of a large sum of money for the transport of the Expeditionary Force by very ingenious means which enabled that force to reach its objective in a much lesser amount of time than would in the opinion of the best judges have made the difference between the fall of Paris and its safety. That is just one instance of what can be done by careful thought and prevision, and I claim this, that up till the declaration of war by the operations of the Committee of Imperial Defence presided over by the then Prime Minister, now the right hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) and attended constantly by the late Prime Minister, the Lord President of the Council (Sir A. Balfour) as well as by the Chief of the Army Staff, and the corresponding officers in the other Services we thought out our problem better than anyone else. We may have
2270
made great mistakes afterwards, as we made mistakes before, but at any rate we were enabled to get through the first three months of the War.
7.0 P.M.
What I ask is that we should revert to that practice and that we should stabilise it and make it stronger. I do not think anyone ought to support a Resolution of this kind, and least of all one who has been in the responsible position of Secretary for War as I have, without saying what he really means so that people can criticise his proposal. I think my hon. and gallant Friend who proposed this Amendment will agree with me that the proposal which I have ventured to put before the Secretary of State is one worthy of consideration, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will lay it before the Prime Minister. We want to get this co-ordination. Some people say: "Set up your Commission as proposed here, and direct them to consider how best to constitute a Ministry of Defence including the various Chiefs of Staff as well as Under-Secretaries for Land, Sea and Air." That would mean a great dislocation and probably great added expense, but still if the expense saved us from war that consideration surely would be a mere bagatelle. I do not believe in making too sudden changes in these matters. I think the far better plan would be to recognise the fact that exceptionally good work was done by the Committee of Imperial Defence under the then Prime Minister in the times preceding the War. Let us see how we can reproduce that and make it better. This Prime Minister cannot do it, and it is a thousand to one that the next Prime Minister will not be able to do it either. Let us have a Vice-President of the Committee of Imperial Defence, who should be the Lord President of the Council or the Lord Privy Seal, with not only the power but the duty to be informed of all estimates and all plans of the three fighting services, Land, Sea and Air, before those plans or estimates are passed. Let him pass them under review; let him have power to send for all persons and documents to find out the truth; and then let him have the power to decide, subject to the approval of the Cabinet, what is the best way to employ such available defensive forces as we have. Some will say that it would be best that the Chief

2271
of the Imperial General Staff, the First Sea Lord, and the Chief of the Air Staff should be members of the staff of the Vice-President of the Committee of Imperial Defence. There are difficulties about that, but the existing staffs would provide all the material that was required. You certainly then would not have any more expense in the direction branch, but you would have one man, not a soldier or a sailor or an Air officer, one man who would be what we used to call in the Army "a frock"; one of your politicians whom you must have under any system of Government, whose sole duty would be to co-ordinate those services and decide, instead of what happens now, as we know, when all these urgent questions are brought up by very tired Ministers before a very tired Prime Minister, who has not time to consider them, who does the best he can to dispose of them in a little time, but who has not the time to make the best decision nor to send for the right people to tell him all sides of the question. I earnestly commend this proposal to the Government, because I am quite sure, whatever my hon. Friends feel when they are cross about the defence forces, that the defence forces of this country have been the best guarantee for the liberty of the world that the world has ever had, and that by retaining them with due economy and on a sufficient level we shall be doing more for the freedom and happiness of the world than anything else we can do.
The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Lieut.-Colonel Sir R. Sanders): It will perhaps be for the convenience of the House that we should dispose of this question proposed by my hon. and gallant Friend as soon as we can, so that it will not deter those Members who may wish to speak on the broader questions. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ayr and Bute (Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston) gave us an extremely valuable historical survey of the various Committees that have been set up to deal with the matter of the defence of the country, to which my right hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Major-General Seely) added some very interesting details of more recent history. I think we are also indebted to the hon. and gallant Member and to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman for enforcing upon this House, and, through it, upon the country, the great import-
2272
ance of constantly reviewing the relations of the various branches of our defence forces to one another, but my hon. and gallant Friend and the right hon. and gallant Gentleman seem to differ as to what they want. I gather that by hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ayr and Bute wanted a repetition of the Esher Committee, while my right hon. and gallant Friend opposite wanted a permanent Grand Inquisitor, holding one of the high offices of the Government, who would inquire and give a report once for all, and who would survey all the Estimates and defence proposals.
Major-General SEELY: I spoke in support of this Amendment in favour of the appointment of a Commission, but one must explain what one means the Commission to do. I supported the Commission, but I said that I hoped they would set up a Vice-President of the Committee of Imperial Defence forthwith.
Sir R. SANDERS: I quite accept what my right hon. and gallant Friend has said. I can assure both my hon. and gallant Friend and my right hon. and gallant Friend that this is an Amendment with which the Government have great sympathy, but it is not one on which, I think, an immediate reply can be given. I am only entitled to say a word for the War Office, and I am sure everyone in the War Office will support me in saying: "Give us a little rest. We have just had the Geddes Committee and the operations of that Committee." We have heard, on the minor question of enonomy of administration, that Committees have been recently set up by the Cabinet, under the Minister of Health, to see how far the sea and air forces can be unified. That Committee has not yet given in its Report, but I think it will be something in the direction which my hon. and gallant Friend wants to have carried out. As to the Committee of Imperial Defence, so much has been said about it, that I do not think I need add anything. But I am not sure that any Committee could be set up which could do more than the Committee of Imperial Defence now has power to do. I think the Committee of Imperial Defence or some Committee appointed by it could carry out my hon. and gallant Friend's wishes.
Major-General SEELY: Not under the Prime Minister.
Sir R. SANDERS: Of course, that is a question of procedure, and I can only assure my right hon. and gallant Friend that the subject is one which will not escape attention, and that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War will give it sympathetic attention and discuss it with the Cabinet. I would suggest that we might now come to a decision on this subject so that the broad Debate on the Army Estimates can proceed.
Lieut.-Colonel FREMANTLE: I only want to intervene for one minute to endorse this proposal from the point of view of the ancillary services, especially as illustrated by my own medical service. Obviously, this proposal mainly concerns the ancillary services. You cannot obviously get any more close combination between the combatant services, but in the ancillary services it is more especially required. In that particular direction, I venture to endorse the remarks which have been made, more especially as I have made the same suggestions in regard to the medical service. In March, 1919, I suggested it primarily from the point of view of efficiency and economy. This has already been forgotten, and the danger is that the War Office, to whom this may be referred, may say that it has been already undertaken. It is true that it has been already undertaken in regard to certain obvious, crying opportunities for economy and for adjustment and collaboration, as, for instance, in regard to the general hospitals in a few noted cases.
There is a much larger question concerned. The whole question of recruiting the Medical Service, both men and officers, is much the same for each of these three Services, and that has not been tackled at present. It is the same in regard to the position of medical stores and the provision of hospital ships. Hitherto the Army and Navy have each had their hospital ships. This applies still more to the Services overseas. There are many points on which you could get a great deal of saving by virtue of the fact that you could interchange the officers and the men in the respective Services. The Naval Service, as a rule, is one particularly for the younger men, and the Flying Corps also, as regards the Medical Service, is one for the younger men, and it would be obviously an advantage if you could have men easily ex-
2274
changed from one to the other, when they passed the requirements of fitness and agility necessary for the more mobile Services as compared with the quieter and more stationary Services of the Army. I feel that it is in regard to these Services that there is a great need for an independent inquiry ab initio. Let us not be put off by the suggestion the hon. and gallant Member has just given us on behalf of the War Office. The War Office or other Offices may say: "Leave us alone for a bit; we have just had such great changes." That is just the very time when we want to get to work to make further changes in order that we may then settle down for a considerable time afterwards. It is just after the War that you want to make these great changes. You made them in the case of the Esher Commission, and you want to do the same kind of thing now. Although the Government may be jaded, there are those who can take on the work if necessary. Some officers may be unable to start another set of reforms, but it should be done now, whatever happens, and the sooner the better if it is to be done at all. While the wounds of war are still open and bleeding, we want to see that they heal correctly on the right lines, and it is in that light that I, for the Medical Services and, indirectly, for the ancillary auxiliary Services generally—the so-called non-combatant Services—support this suggestion.
Sir F. BANBURY: I think that the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for North Down (Sir H. Wilson) ought to be given great weight in considering any steps that ought to be taken in order to preserve the necessary strength of the fighting forces of this country. I am not always certain that a Committee may not delay matters, but it seems to me that, unless the proposal contained in this Amendment be accepted, we may run the risk of continuing with a reduced Army, such as is proposed at the present moment, until it is too late to remedy what I consider to be a very grave error. I have always been an ardent economist, and I am at the present moment an ardent economist. I was exceedingly glad to hear the hon. and gallant Member for North Down make the same statement, because I believe that the true economy is to have such an Army as will enable you, in the first instance, to prevent war, and, if you cannot prevent war, then to

2275
win the war. I have said over and over again that, in my opinion, if we had had a sufficiently strong Army in 1914, we should never have had the War, and I cannot conceive how it is possible that sane men—and I presume that most of us in this House are more or less sane—I cannot conceive how it is possible that sane men, knowing everything that has passed, can consent to the enormous reduction which is proposed in these Estimates. Therefore, holding as I do that true economy can only be carried out by having a sufficient force to prevent war, I shall support the proposal contained in this Amendment. I should like also to point out, to the few Members of the Labour party who are present, not only that the maintenance of a sufficiently strong army will save expenditure both in life and in money later on, but that an extraordinarily good education is obtained by those who serve in His Majesty's forces—not only mental education but physical education. Physique is improved, habits of discipline are learned, and I do not think you could do better for a young man between the ages of 19 and 21 or 22, than put him in the Army for a short time. I know that this Debate will come to an end at a quarter past eight, and so I do not want to take up the time of the House. I also know that it would be very difficult to press this Amendment to a Division. I do not know exactly what would happen to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, or to Mr. Speaker, if it were carried. I do not know whether you or Mr. Speaker would have to remain in the Chair all night, or would take advantage of the Eleven o'Clock Rule to say "Order, order!" and leave as hurriedly as possible. I have never seen an Amendment of this kind carried, and I am not quite certain what the result would be. I am a little disappointed that the hon. Baronet, with whom I have had the honour of being associated in bygone days, was not a little more enthusiastic over this proposal, because, as the hon. and gallant Member for St. Albans (Lieut.-Colonel Fremantle) said, this, if we are ever going to do anything, is really the time to do it. I do not wish to say anything unpleasant, but, if the War Office has been stirred up by the Geddes Committee, now is the time to go on with that stirring up. We should not
2276
let the matter simmer and get down into the state in which it was before. I am not at all sure that I agree with the Geddes Committee, or that they were the proper people to interfere with the Army, and, on such a very momentous and important question for a great Empire like this, after all we have gone through in the last eight years, suddenly—not because it was thought necessary, not because it was thought wise, but because money had been unduly spent in other directions—to attempt, I will not say to economise, but to reduce that item of expenditure which might be a saving in the maintenance of our Empire.
Major-General SEELY: We have not had any reply from the Government. I was hoping that the Secretary of State for War would tell us what he proposed to do about this business. My hon. and gallant Friend tells me that he does not wish to put the House to the inconvenience of a Division if some definite assurance can be given that some action will be taken during this Session; but, unless we get that, I know that a great many hon. Members would feel inclined to divide. If we could be assured, on behalf of the Secretary of State for War—who, I know, is engaged elsewhere—that some definite action would be taken towards ensuring co-ordination, I would ask my hon. and gallant Friend to withdraw his Amendment. Otherwise we shall be forced to go to a Division.
Sir R. SANDERS: I am not in a position to give an undertaking. I can only say that I will represent the matter as strongly as I can, and I am sure that my right hon. Friend and his colleagues will treat it sympathetically.
Major-General SEELY: The Secretary of State is now here, and perhaps he could tell us himself. We do not want to put the House to the inconvenience of a Division if he can assure us that some action in the direction of co-ordination will be taken. If, however, we are merely met with a vague statement which does not even admit the importance of the matter, we shall he forced to divide.
Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: There is not the least, question about the importance of this matter, and I do not deny that it is very urgent, where you are making reductions, to economise your force to the utmost by really good administration.
Major-General SEELY: On all three services.
Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS: On all three services. I have not the slightest doubt about that, and the Government are perfectly in sympathy with it. The first step we are taking, as the House has already been told, has to do with administration, in regard to which a Committee has been set up already. There is a great deal of duplication of administrative services, which may or may not be avoidable. In some cases I am sure that it is. It has been pointed out by my right hon. Friend that there are chaplains and doctors overlapping, and so forth. That is a matter which can be looked into, and will be looked into at once, with a view to economising in that direction. But what this Amendment does is something much bigger than that. It has been most ably supported, not this year only, but last year, and I was very sympathetic to it then. It has been absolutely impossible, however, this year to spare time to go into questions of this class; the staff have been fully engaged, I can assure my hon. and gallant Friend, at the War Office on their more immediate work. This, however, comes within the orbit of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and, as my hon. and gallant Friend who moved the Amendment realises, it is not in my power to say that the Government will set up a Commission or a Committee for the purpose indicated. All I can say is that the Committee of Imperial Defence are specially charged with the co-ordination of the three services. They are constantly having before them questions which bring up, for example, the use of the Air Force with the Navy, or the use of the Air Force with the Army, and I will make representations at once that the feeling of the House is apparent that further steps should be taken beyond the mere general statement that the matter is within the province of the Committee of Imperial Defence. I will represent to the Cabinet that the House would like specific action to be taken in the matter, and I need not say that I myself perfectly realise that, where you are cutting down forces, the one thing of which you must be sure is that you use to the best advantage those that remain, and that, where you have the three services, they ought to be treated
2278
as nearly as possible as one service. I cannot say that I will accept this Amendment, though personally I should like to say so, but I will represent to the Prime Minister and my colleagues the view of the House.
Sir AYLMER HUNTER-WESTON: In view of the right hon. Gentleman's statement that he will press upon the attention of his colleagues the very great urgency and importance of this subject, not merely from the point, of view of the co-ordination of administrative services, but of what is even more important, namely, the co-ordination of the brain of the general staff, so that we may get our defence forces applied in the very best way, and in view also of the definite promise that has been given to us across the Floor of the House that specific action will be taken, I beg to ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Main Question again proposed.
Sir ARCHIBALD WILLIAMSON: I should like to say a few words on the subject which is before the House, as one who was for some time associated with the Secretary of State for War at the War Office, and who is also able, perhaps, to take the view of the outside civilian as to the position in which we find our selves financially, and the effect that it has upon Army matters. I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on having been able to produce Estimates which approximate so nearly to the figures which the Geddes Committee set out as desirable. I know from personal experience how extremely difficult it is to make sudden cuts of large figures in a great organisation such as the Army and the War Office, but the reductions that have been made during the past few years, since the War, have been very notable, and I think it is as well that the House and the country should have before them in comparative form the figures for the last four years. In the year 1919–20, the total actual expenditure of the War Office was, in round figures, £411,000,000. In 1920–21 it was £164,000,000, and for 1921–22 the original and Supplementary Estimates to date, including the Middle East, amount to £116,000,000. The amount of the Estimates now laid before us by the right hon. Gentleman for 1922–23, including the Middle East, is £67,000,000. The House must note that these are enormous

2279
reductions and that the last reduction in anticipating this next year is in proportion the largest of the four. It takes time to effect these reductions because many services are entered upon the expenditure of which is spread over more than one year. For example, there are barracks for married soldiers. Married quarters in larger numbers are required by the present conditions. A scheme is commenced for building such barracks, but their erection and the expenditure on them extend over more than one financial year. Therefore it is very difficult, without scrapping work half done, to economise on that item. There are many other items of a similar class, and I can quite well appreciate the very great difficulty the Secretary of State, the Finance Member and others associated with him in the War Office have had in getting down the expenditure in the remarkable way they have succeeded in doing.
We are all taxpayers in one way or another, and we all feel the urgent need of cutting down the burden that falls on the industries and activities of the country. It is essential that these burdens should be mitigated and that we should cut off all unnecessary expenditure, even although some of it might be upon desirable things. Of course, there are items in the Budget of the Army which are desirable but not so essential as others. Such a matter as the education of the soldiers, which I have myself defended and advocated in time past, is a very desirable thing, but not so essential, perhaps, as some others. I could point to one direction in which I think the Secretary of State might go further. During the rise in prices of every commodity we increased very largely the pay of the soldiers, and I am inclined to think the right hon. Gentleman might again revise the pay of the Army. At present, as compared with civilian life, if all emoluments are taken into consideration and valued, they amount at present, for a married private, who may be compared with an unskilled labourer, to the equivalent of £3 16s. 1d. a week. If he is unmarried it amounts to the equivalent of £2 9s. 7d. a week. In the Royal Army Service Corps, which may be compared with more skilled labour, the emoluments of a married private soldier at present amount to £4 0s. 9d. a week, and if he is a sergeant to
2280
£5 17s. 1d. Those are figures which compare not unfavourably with what is being paid outside, and in view of the decreases in wages which we notice on all hands outside as the cost of living falls, I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman should consider, certainly if the cost of living falls any further, whether he should not review the matter of the pay of the Army so as to keep it at some -sort of relative level to the pay which a similar class of labour could obtain in civilian life.
Another point I should like to say a few words upon is the new developments in warfare, which absorb a comparatively large proportion of the whole Army. The result of having all these new styles of warfare—bombing, anti-aircraft, liquid flame, gas, chemical warfare generally, signals, tanks, and so on—is to take away from your total volume of men a larger proportion than you would have to take away if you had not all these new elements of warfare. In connection with that one finds that the proposal is to reduce the Territorials, and I feel a very great deal of regret that anything should be done to reduce them, because after all, they not only proved themselves very valuable in the War, but there is a great reservoir from which in time of emergency, by volunteering, you could draw certain numbers of men to fill the deficiencies in the regular Army. If the War was not large enough to bring it into consideration at all whether your Territorials should go abroad as Territorials, there might be a war, as there was in South Africa, where you asked Territorials to come forward and volunteer for oversea service and you took certain numbers of them into the regular Army for the time being. In that light I regret that anything should happen which would tend to reduce the numbers in the Territorial Army. It is true that recruiting for the Territorial Army after the Armistice was very slow, and up to the present time I suppose it has not been exceedingly active. But there are in this country, and always will be, a certain number of young men of martial spirit who require no pressure to come forward to train themselves, to a certain extent at any rate, so that they may be fit in case of emergency to take a share in the defence of their country in one form or another.

2281
We have increased the cost of the Territorial Army—we have given greater inducements—but it is possible to fall between two stools. You are either doing too much or too little. Some people have said we were giving too little, and consequently the policy was decided upon of increasing the payment to the Territorials. There is another view of it, and that is that there is a certain body of people who would be willing to come forward to be trained as Territorials even if they get nothing at all beyond their simple necessary travelling and maintenance expenses in camp. I wonder very much whether we get realy more Territorials by increasing the expenditure upon them as we recently did. I am not quite sure that we do, and if that is so, I regret that we do not try other means of recruiting the Territorial Army apart from giving them more pay. But whatever course is taken it is clear that you will require to allow a little time to elapse before a sufficient number of young men grow up and come forward to recruit your Territorial Army to the point at which you desire to see it. People were tired of the War, tired of soldiering, and very glad for a time to be removed from the atmosphere of drills and weapons of warfare. But in time we shall find that that spirit will revive, and that we shall get more and more men coming forward until we have a sufficiency to fill up our Territorial Army again to the figure at which it stood before the War.
Another point I should like to say a word about is the Government establishments, such as Woolwich. My experience is that the fewer Government works you have the better. They give you an infinity of trouble and I am not quite sure that they produce any better work or produce work as cheaply as private establishments. I know there are other sides to the question. There are specialities and there are times of emergency for which you must be provided. Possibly private works will not be fully equipped to deal with such emergencies. But whatever you do, reduce the Government establishments to a minimum. You had 17,000 people at Woolwich and at the end of the War you had the greatest difficulty in reducing the number. Even now I think you have 10,000 or 12,000 men working there, and you do not require any military weapons at all. You have
2282
these men doing all sorts of other things, doing work they have never been trained to do, which no doubt they can do well, but which they do very expensively. You made locomotives. I suppose it is hardly known what they cost, but certainly they cost a great deal more than they are worth. That is lamentable. It is not economical at all, apart altogether from the pressure which is brought to bear upon a Government Department by having thousands of workmen in its employment—an argument I should always use also against nationalisation of railways—you have this body of votes which is handled to compel you to do things which are uneconomic. It is not right. That ought to be reduced to the very minimum, and my experience at the War Office confirms me in the opinion which I held before I went there, that it is not a good system. If you can avoid it by all means avoid it and reduce to the utmost such establishments as those. You must have them to some extent. You must have a factory for your powder and you must have one or two other things of a similar kind. But reduce it to the very minimum, because to develop that system and to conduct it on a large scale is uneconomic and disadvantageous.
Mr. LAWSON: We welcome the reduction in the Estimates which the Secretary of State has announced, and in so far as the suggestion which was comprised within the limits of the last Resolution works in that direction of economy, we would give all support to the co-ordination of the forces to that end. I have listened to this Debate with some misgiving. I heard the gallant Field-Marshal present a very strong case with the certainty that is a characteristic of one who has held high position in the Army, and I noted, too, the remarkable amount of support he received when he painted that very black and terrible picture which must have weighed upon everyone's spirits while he was speaking. I know he spoke with infinite knowledge of his subject, but I could not help feeling at the end of his speech very much like the music-hall artist who used to hang his head and say, "What is the good of anything? Why, nothing," because it seems to me that that frame of mind fails to visualise what is the real position in the country to-day. I know it is not the result of hardness of heart, or anything of that

2283
kind, because it seems to me from what I have seen of these men that they are within their limits the most humane of men. I have sometimes wished from what I saw in the Army that some of the employers of labour would give only half the consideration to their workers that some of the officers in the Army gave to their horses.
I am well aware of the conditions on both sides. What is the situation? Here we have the frame of mind represented by the gallant Field-Marshal the Member for North Down (Sir H. Wilson), which speaks about ensuring the defence of this country, but which forgets what seems to me to be the cardinal facts. The Secretary of State for War has announced reductions in the Estimates. Every pound reduced in that direction means that that pound ultimately ought to go to the re building of the physical and mental condition of the people of this country. During the War the military leaders had to face the fact that there were hundreds of thousands of men who were physically unfit to serve, and that we had what was called a C3 nation. We ought to realise that not only was that due to bad housing conditions, but that those housing conditions are worse to-day, that overcrowding is more than ever it was, and that there is a state of unemployment and semi-starvation which will ultimately make the empire at its very heart very uncertain. Every penny that we can save in the destructive side of our life makes for the development of the other side. From the moment that you leave this House until you get to the most remote village in the country you see men who have served in the Army in a pitiable condition. Men who have defended this country cannot get the very means of life. Every board of guardians will tell you that men are asking not only for relief but for public shelter within the walls of the workhouse because they cannot find the means of existence elsewhere. That point of view ought to be taken into consideration by those who stand for the maintenance of strong armies and the maintenance of the sear let tunic spirit. What your army is to be depends a good deal upon the policy of the country. Those who stand for a strong army stand for the extension of our responsibilities in the sense of square miles, and the taking hold of a good deal of the earth's surface.
2284
I should like to know what is happening in regard to the educational system in the Army. Is it effective or not from the civilian point of view? I know what was attempted when the War finished. Many crude attempts were made to carry on educational experiments. I remember one gentleman lecturing on fish, and a soldier asked what a soldier wanted to know about fish. Another soldier drew attention to the fact that the lecturer had spoken about every fish in the sea, but that he carefully kept off kippers, and he supposed that was because if they got the tail end of one that was as much as they could get. Has there been any real attempt to develop the educational system in the Army from the civilian point of view, or has it been made part and parcel of the Army system? How will these new proposals affect the education in the Army in the future. If there is any man who needs to be kept in touch with the civic spirit it is the soldier. The system under which we keep men in barracks segregated has the effect of limiting men to a certain extent and unfitting them for civilian life. Therefore, if anyone needs consideration in that direction it is the rank and file soldier. I should like to know exactly what is going to happen, in view of the reductions that are to be made, to the amount that is given for the education of men who are to be fitted to become officers. Is the old system to continue of giving men opportunities of rising from the ranks and becoming officers?
Lieut.-Colonel POWNALL: The Secretary of State for War has dealt with that in his speech.
Mr. LAWSON: I should like to know whether that system has gone, or how far the opportunities for men being improved has been limited. To those who stand for a strong Army we say that the increasing destructive force at the present time is such that it ought to be taken into very serious consideration in the future building up of an army in this country. The Geddes Committee said:
"The units also from the point of view of fighting efficiency are far more powerful than they were in 1914–15. Owing to the introduction of machine guns, the fire power of an infantry battalion is given as six to eight times as much as it was before the War, and that of a cavalry regiment four times as much as it was before the War. The introduction of heavy artillery, gas and tanks have increased the fighting power out of all com-

2285
parison with the number of men engaged, and officers, who are intended to increase the efficiency of the Army have increased disproportionately to the men. Moreover, there has been added to the defence force of the Empire the very costly and highly specialised arm of the Air."
It is not only a question of building up the defence of the Empire and safeguarding the communications of the Empire, but it is a question of safeguarding the people of this country against the war mind,, in order that we shall move carefully along those paths which lead to the frame of mind that makes nations consider carefully the rights of other nations, while at the same time we improve the condition of affairs in order to produce men and women rather than blowing them into smithereens.
Lieut.-Colonel POWNALL: Perhaps I might deal with two points raised by the last speaker. Apropos of the question of economy, he has mentioned the greater fighting power of units at the present time as compared with their fighting power before the War, owing to the introductions of tanks, machine-guns, gas, etc. People are, however, liable to forget that that consideration applies equally to any potential enemy. A potential enemy would have the inventions of the last eight years, so that the fact mentioned by the hon. Member does not diminish the necessity of our having an adequate fighting power. In regard to the education of the soldier, one of the great difficulties in the past in regard to ranker officers was that they could not have the same standard as officers who had been to Woolwich and Sandhurst.
Mr. LAWSON: Why not give them the chance?
Lieut.-Colonel POWNALL: If the hon. Member had been present he would have heard the Secretary of State for War announce that they are to have that chance in future. I think my right hon. Friend said that 35 will be at Sandhurst in future, not for two years, but one year, as they already have a considerable amount of military knowledge. They will, therefore, acquire that polish that can only be acquired either at Woolwich or Sandhurst. It is an excellent idea, and I welcome it most warmly. It will give a chance which has been so extremely difficult in the past. It is an extremely difficult job for a man who
2286
has been in the ranks to get a commission in the Regulars and to make good there. I congratulate my right hon. Friend on his success in the extremely difficult task of making these very big reductions in the Army Estimates. He has spoken of the co-operation given to him by the Army Council and elsewhere, but I imagine that his own task has been very difficult. As a back-bencher who is keenly interested in Army matters, I want to congratulate him on the very successful way in which he has grappled with the great difficulties he has had to face, in the very short time that has elapsed since the first volume of the Report of the Geddes Committee was published.
It seems to me that there are one or two points where more economies might be effected without a loss of fighting power. He said it was his object to reduce ancillary services as far as it could be done. I have been at pains to compare the fighting forces now with what they were in 1914. The cavalry personnel will have this year just half the numbers it had in 1914. The artillery will be reduced by a third and the infantry is to be reduced by one-fifth. Therefore I think we might expect that there would be, if not this financial year, at any rate in the very near future, a considerable reduction, say from one-half to one-fifth, in ancillary services; but in 1922–23 the Royal Army Service Corps—which, I admit, rendered most invaluable service during the War—are to be increased from 6,300 in 1914 to 9,146, an increase of rather more than one-third. The Ordnance Corps, which works in close conjunction with the Royal Artillery, are to be increased from 2,400 to 4,200, an increase of well over 50 per cent., although the gunners are reduced by one-third. The Veterinary Branch is the most surprising of all, in view of the introduction of motor transport in the Royal Army Service Corps and the fact that the cavalry personnel is reduced. This branch is increased from 348 to 392, an increase of over 10 per cent. Then we come to the Pay Corps and the Accounting Corps. My right hon. Friend mentioned that there are a lot of post-War things to be settled. Adding the numbers of these two corps together—their work, to a certain extent, covers the same field— I find that the Pay Corps, which before the War numbered 744, will number

2287
1,890, including the accountants, an increase of two and a half times the personnel. The pay has been increased from two and a half to three times, but that should not be a reason for increasing the pay staff to that extent.
8.0 P.M.
A Committee has been investigating the question of pay and records and overlapping there, and I think it might be possible to have a further Committee dealing with the question of the Pay and Accountancy Corps. I have made inquiry into the Accountancy Corps, and my information is that there is a good deal of overlapping in the commands, as well as at the War Office, between these two branches of the service. There is an increase of 2½ per cent, times the pre-War establishment, and that rather suggests that there is overlapping in that direction which might be looked into. There is one other saving which I should like to hear about. On page 5 of the Vote on Account, Army Estimates, mention is made of a saving of £500,000 proposed by the Geddes Committee in regard to replacement of uniform and making uniforms last longer, a proposal put forward also in connection with the police and the Navy. My right hon. Friend says that it is not possible this year to make any such cash saving owing to the existence of War stocks, but it would be of interest if this question were gone into by the War Office to ascertain whether in some future years we cannot count on a saving of this nature, because a sum of £500,000 on our Army Estimates is a serious item, and it would be a comfort to the taxpayer to know that this amount can be saved.
Brigadier-General COLVIN: We all feel some apprehension that the reductions which are to take place in the Army may bring it below the safety line. I am glad to find that the Territorial Army is not to suffer very much. It is certainly the cheapest Army which we could possibly have. The suggestion has been made to-night that the pay of the soldier might be reduced, and also the pay of the territorial, but I hardly think that the time has come yet for that, though in future I think that reductions should take place in accordance with the decreased cost of living. What I am concerned about at present is the question
2288
of mobilisation, and what steps should be taken in order that mobilisation should take place rapidly. Before the War we had the National Reserve. It consisted of upwards of 200,000 men, most of whom joined up when asked to. It was a large organisation compared with the small sum of £45,000 which was allowed for it on the Estimates, and it would be a great Service now if there were some 200,000 men available when mobilisation should take place. In the old days it was divided into three classes. There was one class which volunteered for service abroad. It got retaining fees of about five or six shillings, capitation grant. There was another class which undertook service at home which received a smaller fee, and a third class which only registered without undertaking any obligations, and which obtained a capitation grant of 1s. These men were administered by the County Associations, and I trust that my right hon. Friend will consider the advisability of reconstituting this force.
In the Territorial Army I notice that the field ambulance will be one of the chief sufferers by the reductions. For a long time the War Office has been considering what duties' should be allotted to the Voluntary Aid Detachments who now come under the Territorial Army. I submit that great use might be made of the Voluntary Aid Detachment if they were told off to supply the material for some of these field ambulances. It would give them an object to look forward to and the supply stores would be handed over to them. We all know that when the War took place in 1914 great difficulty was experienced in finding men who had any knowledge of first-aid or ambulance service. We hastily requisitioned the detachment at the last moment. Great use might be made of the existing Voluntary Aid Detachment The women's detachment did their duties well. They turned out to be an extremely efficient body, and I am afraid that if they do not have some duties allotted to them they may disappear altogther.
Reference has been made to Territorial Associations and the possibility of being able to make certain reductions in the expenditure of them. I know that the Secretary of State for War appreciates fully the spirit in which the County Associations endeavour to meet all his

2289
wishes and even to anticipate them. I submit for his consideration the possibility of giving these Associations a block grant. The Associations are composed of men with great experience in all directions and I believe in many ways they could administer the grant themselves much better economically than if the money is allotted for a specific purpose to the Territorial Associations. I think that great use might be made of these Associations in the matter of remounts if it were left to them. Then on the question of cadets at present the cadets receive a capitation grant which is admittedly much too small. If the County Associations received a block grant for everything including cadets they might make such use of the money that they would be able to treat the cadets rather better than at present. The cadets are a force who are struggling very hard to keep afloat because the principle of voluntary financial assistance comes in their way and they might look to the Territorial Associations for assistance, and possibly if that method were adopted we might do much to encourage the cadet force.
Lieut.-Colonel NALL: As we have to adjourn at 8.15, I shall not have time to say all that I wish to say. Everybody who listened to the hon. and gallant Member for North Down (Sir H. Wilson) must be profoundly impressed by the extraordinary risk involved in the proposals contained in the Estimates before the House. I do not at present propose to go into the question except to say that there was one important fact which the hon. and gallant Gentleman did not mention. That was the fact that in Soviet Russia to-day there exists an army of over a million men, trained and armed and officered to a certain extent by Germans, standing there at the orders of the State which is by no means friendly to this country. But assuming that the reductions contained in the proposal are likely to be carried out in part if not entirely before the possibility of a change of Government becomes more acute I do want to say one or two words with regard to the reduction. I would ask the right hon. Gentleman, if he could, to say rather more definitely what sort of conditions are attached to the reduction in other ranks? Are men going to be selected to be discharged, or will certain permanent
2290
service men be discharged, or will a number of men be allowed to apply to terminate their engagement on personal or so-called compassionate grounds? With regard to the reduction of officers I understand from statements which have been made that the by no means popular system of dismissing by selection is the main method to be employed in reducing the number of officers. It is a system which, applied in the other directions of promotion, was never attended with very good results, and it is deplorable to feel that it is now to be the chief method by which these reductions are to be carried out. I would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether this system of dismissing by selection on confidential report is to be applied to field officers as well as to general regimental officers? Are officers of the rank of Major or Lieut.-Colonel to be selected for retirement in the same manner as, one understands, is to be applied to more junior officers, and will any steps to expedite or assist this business of reducing the number of officers take the form of reducing the retiring age limits whereby some of the more senior officers will be retired on pensions, thereby retiring those whose services, in any case, are not likely to be retained very much longer by the State, and also avoiding the discharge in their earlier years of some officers who show promise and whom it would be to the advantage of the State to retain in its service?
I asked the Minister in August last if he could state how many of the officers who were sent home on that first report on active service were still serving, and what steps were being taken to retire them. The answer was that the war records of all regular field officers will be carefully reviewed by Special Committee, and where the officers' record is considered unsatisfactory they will be called upon to retire. I want to know whether senior officers who were sent home with really bad reports are going to be retired before officers, probably generally with good reports, are discharged under this system of selection. I have one or two instances before my notice of officers who have been retained in the Service on the active list when their war record is well known by their comrades, when, one would think, looking over their records, that there was no possible ground for retaining them in the Service. I may

2291
mention one case, the case of an infantry major whose total Army service in any theatre of war was only one month in France when he was attached to a headquarters. He broke down in health, and was returned to England and employed as an Adjutant in a reserve unit during the years 1914–1915 and 1916. From 1916 to 1920 he was a Major for regimental duties. He was medically fit from 1914 to 1916, and again after the Armistice, and he was only one month in France during the whole War. I believe that he has failed for a senior officer's course, and that he is still in the Service. Is it fair to retain in the Service officers who are like that?
It being a quarter-past Eight of the Clock, and leave having been given to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 10, further Proceeding was postponed, without Question put.

INDIA (Mr. MONTAGU'S RESIGNATION).
Mr. T. P. O'CONNOR: I beg to move, "That this House do now adjourn."
It is only a overwhelming sense of public duty that has induced me to move the Adjournment of the House. The conditions in India are sufficiently serious to impose very great restraint upon every man with any sense of responsibility, but I felt, having given considerable and painful consideration to the question whether or not I was bound to put this Motion on the Paper, that it was my duty to do so. I am afraid I shall disappoint the House by saying that I am not going even to approach a personal attack upon my right hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Montagu). We have been old friends, and I hope will remain friends after this Debate. Nor do I mean to make any suggestion disagreeing with the general policy of my right hon. Friend in India. As a matter of fact, I am in entire sympathy with that policy, as are most of my friends. Nor am I concerned with the quarrel, the conflict between himself and his late colleagues. The terms of my Motion, I believe, permit the raising of that question, but I shall not raise it. The object of my Motion is to bring out the want of co-ordination, as revealed in the speech
2292
of my right hon. Friend, between different members of the Government, and especially between the late Secretary of State for India and his colleagues.
The publication by my right hon. Friend of the despatch from India I regard as a deplorable error of judgment, both in time and in terms. One effect, undoubtedly, of that publication and of the disappearance of my right hon. Friend from the Secretaryship of State for India has been to create a very perilous but at the same time a very unjust and inaccurate state of feeling in England. Undoubtedly the disappearance of so strong and ardent a friend of the liberties of the Indian people of a man who has given to them his time, his energy and his enthusiasm may very well be understood by them as approaching a desire on the part of the Ministry and this Parliament to go back on the reforms which my right hon. Friend has introduced in the Government of India. The speech of my right hon. Friend in Cambridge last Saturday certainly was calculated, though I am sure was not intended, to strengthen these misgivings among the natives of India, because, as my right hon. Friend put it, he was dismissed as a sop to what are called the Die-hards. That suggestion may or may not be true. I do not think it is a complete and adequate account of the situation. As I understood it, the reason of the disappearance of my right hon. Friend from the Secretaryship of State for India was that he was regarded, rightly or wrongly, by the head of the Government and his former colleagues as having made a deadly assault on the very just and proper principle of the collective responsibility of the Cabinet. The reason for selecting this particular moment for the publication of the despatch is admitted in the document itself. It begins:
"On the eve of the Græco-Turkish Conference, we feel it our duty again to lay before His Majesty's Government the intensity of feeling in India regarding the necessity for a revision of the Sevres Treaty."
Evidently, therefore, the object of the publication of the dispatch at the moment was to bring influence to bear upon the actions of our representatives at that Conference and upon the decisions of that Conference. I come to the terms which the document demands. They are: The evacuation of Constantinople; the suzerainty of the Sultan over the Holy Places; the restoration of Ottoman Thrace, including Adrianople and Smyrna.

2293
I think, if Constantinople is evacuated to-day, a great deal of the credit or discredit of that action would be due to the strong opinions and actions of my right hon. Friend. The suzerainty of the Sultan over the Holy Places would bring us into conflict with Powers; which we have set up as their guardians. The restoration of Ottoman Thrace would mean the giving back to Turkey of large Christian communities. My point at the moment is not these terms. My point is the manifestation in their publication and in their character of that lack of co-ordination between members of the same Ministry on these questions. I am disposed to vary the old saying: "Physician, heal thyself," with regard to my right hon.' Friend, and to say: "Co-ordinate thyself." My right hon. Friend has complained of independent and individual action by his colleagues without consultation with the Cabinet or even without its knowledge, and that is a charge from which I find it difficult for him to escape. I compare these terms, for instance, with the declarations of the Ministry of which he was quite recently a member. I do not quote the declarations of my right hon. Friend the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith), because he has ceased for some time to be a colleague of the late Secretary for India. I take the declaration of the present Lord President of the Council made on 11th July, 1918. On that occasion he said:
"His Majesty's Government are following with earnest sympathy and admiration the gallant resistance of the Armenians in defence of their liberties and honour, and are doing everything they can to come to their assistance."
I have several declarations here by the Prime Minister. I will read only one. It is a declaration made on 22nd December, 1920:
"It is no use our purchasing the way out of our own difficulties by betraying other nations, and we are not going to purchase the goodwill of this General (Kemal Pasha) by having the feeling in the hearts of these people that we have betrayed them for our own convenience. We would not get the thirty pieces of silver. Who is to pay the thirty pieces? … We should be the Iscariots of the East."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd December, 1920; col. 1899, Vol. 136.]
These declarations of policy were made, not by subordinate Ministers, but by the head of the Government, and, as far as I know, they were made in full consultation with the Government. My right hon.
2294
Friend was a Member of the Government when these declarations of policy were made, and if I mistake not he was actually seated in his place in the House when some of these declarations were made by the Prime Minister. If my right hon. Friend dissented from this policy I ask him why did he not express his dissent and why did he not resign at that moment?
My right hon. Friend, if he will allow me to say so, has the defects of his qualities. He is almost fanatical on the subject of Moslem influence in India. Like most men with these very strong and fixed ideas, I am afraid he is unable to see or hear or realise any other point of view. As we know from human history men of the kindliest feelings are capable of being obstinate, and sometimes even ruthless, in the carrying out of their convictions. It appears to me that this fixed idea of my right hon. Friend, with regard to Moslem feeling and what he considers the necessary results from Moslem feeling, has almost reached this point that if you carry his convictions, and his acts, and his words to their logical conclusion, the Turks, because Moslems, are therefore entitled to butcher Armenians, because Christians. That is an astounding doctrine. Even if I thought that was a fair representation of Moslem opinion in India, and I do not think it is—
Sir J. D. REES: May I ask your ruling, Mr. Speaker. If the hon. Member continues, either by quotation or in any other way, to present this case to the House, will an opportunity be afforded to those of us who totally repudiate it, to answer to-day, and is it not solely the question of co-ordination with which the hon. Member is supposed to deal?
Mr. SPEAKER: I think the hon. Member was reciting what he claimed to be instances of inconsistent action on the part of different Ministers. As far as that goes, he is merely reciting facts in support of his case that there has been want of co-ordination. So far, I have not heard him transgress the ruling which I gave earlier in the day—that the merits of the various policies were not open to discussion on the present occasion.
Mr. O'CONNOR: I was prepared for the interruption of the hon. Baronet. I know that temperamentally he has no sympathy with any of these Christian races in the East, but one great fact

2295
about them is that they are inflexible. They could have purchased their property, their liberties and their lives for centuries by abandoning their principles as Christians, but they have not the flexibility of my hon. Friend, which enabled him to be a Liberal Member in one House of Commons and a Tory in another. Within the limits of the ruling which you have laid down from the Chair, Mr. Speaker, I am prevented from, going into the policy involved in this question, but may I put a few questions to my right hon. Friend the ex-Secretary of State for India? He has called for the evacuation of Smyrna by the Greek troops, and that, of course, involves the entry therein of the army of Kemal Pasha. Does he know that one of the men who is a high official in the Angora Government is one of the men responsible for the massacres of Mouche and Bitlis? I could give a list of five or six Turkish prisoners whom we had to deport from Constantinople because we could not get them a trial for their crimes, and who were exchanged for our own prisoners. Several of these butchers concerned in organised massacres are among the leaders of the army which my right hon. Friend desires to replace the Greek army.
Mr. SPEAKER: The line which the hon. Member is following now would inevitably lead to a discussion on the merits of the policy proposed in the telegram sent by the Government of India. We have no evidence that the telegram published was endorsed by any of His Majesty's Ministers.
Mr. O'CONNOR: I hope I caught your ruling properly, Mr. Speaker. I need not tell you I shall endeavour, by every means in my power, to keep within it as closely as I possibly can. I think it would be within the limits of your ruling to make some observations on the effect of this despatch upon conditions in India. What is the very foundation of our Empire in India? I would regard with horror any removal of our power of keeping these distracted and divided races and creeds in order and to fulfil that Christian and sacred mission, our Empire must be based on the principles of equality, justice and liberty for all creeds and all races. I have a right to demand, and I do demand, from the Government in face of this
2296
challenge to them—as to the conditions and terms of which it is not my business to intervene—I do demand from the Government a clear and explicit statement that the policy, which many of their members have laid down again and again, is still fully adhered to and that they will not carry the principle of obedience to what is supposed to be Moslem opinion to the extent of abandoning the principle of the protection from massacre of the Christian people of the East. I ask them to give to the people of India the message, that the rule of this country everywhere will be based on the protection of the weak and the oppressed in every land.
Mr. A. WILLIAMS: I beg to second the Motion.
Mr. MONTAGU: I do not propose to take part in the Debate to-night on the interesting topic which my hon. Friend the Member for the Scotland Division (Mr. O'Connor) has raised, but I do ask the indulgence of the House for a few minutes while I deal with some of the very grave personal charges that have been made in the last few days against me. Perhaps I may first deal with the charge described by my right hon. Friend who leads the House as a minor charge, but which is, I think, the easiest to deal with. He says that I have complained of the statement which he made to the House announcing my resignation, and that I had no right to do so, because he had told me of its terms before he made it. Of course, what the right hon. Gentleman says is perfectly true. He had consulted me about the terms. I took no exception to them, but what did he expect? Did he expect that I should say to the right hon. Gentleman, "I have served with you for four and a half years, I have been in close and intimate relations with you and your colleagues; you might be kind enough, you might be generous enough, to put in one word of regret at the severance of this connection"? Would it have been any use to me if he had put it in at my suggestion? I took note of the fact of what he proposed to say. I left his room with a hope that he might say something, but of course I did not expect that he should tell me of the personal side of his remarks. I tell him now that I left his room, after what was, of course, a painful conversation, with immemorable recol-

2297
lections, unforgettable recollections, of his personal kindness, sympathy, and consideration. That attitude I shall always treasure, but I shall find it equally difficult to forget the scene in this House when, after four years of such close relations, that was all he could tell the House about our parting.
There is a time-table which my right hon. Friend gave to the House of the events in connection with the publication of this telegram. I make him a present of his time-table. As a matter of fact, he will find on inquiry at the India Office that I gave instructions verbally the very moment I saw the Government of India's telegram—I tell him that at this moment I do not remember the exact hour and date on which I saw it—at this moment, at the very moment when I saw that telegram, I gave verbal instructions that it must at once be circulated to the Cabinet. It is quite likely that, as he says—of course, I take it from him—delays occurred between my verbal instructions and the actual duplications of the telegram and its submission to the Cabinet, so that it was not till Saturday that they received the telegram. I do not think that that alters my argument at Cambridge, if he will forgive mo for saying so. It is true that before the Cabinet on Monday every single one of my colleagues had had, or ought to have had, that telegram in his possession for at least 48 hours—Saturday till Monday.
Now I come to the next and most serious charge, that I Committed the grave impropriety of referring to private letters and private conversation. Do not the right hon. Gentleman and the House understand that that is really my charge against the Government—that they said that. I had Committed a Constitutional outrage which unfitted me to continue as their colleague, that I had allowed this telegram to be published without consultation with them? And how do they deal with it? What action to they take? What does the Leader of the House do, what does the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs do to a colleague who has Committed this grave Constitutional outrage? Why, Sir, they deal with it entirely and absolutely by private correspondence and private conversation. That is what I complain of. That is the way in which it is done. This telegram was received by the Cabinet on Saturday. It was known by the Leader of the
2298
House and by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that I had authorised the publication of this telegram. Saturday, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday I was seeing my colleagues every day, and not one of them ever said to me—of course, not on Saturday or Sunday, but on Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday not one of them ever said to me—that I had Committed a grave Constitutional outrage. The only document, the only action that was taken was the private letter written to me by Lord Curzon. Let me ask my right hon. Friend this: Supposing I had gone to the public and said, "I Committed this Constitutional outrage, and the Government and no Member of the Government said anything," they would have said, "What a misrepresentation of the facts. Did not Lord Curzon write to you, and did not Lord Curzon tell you?" I had no choice.
Do look at it from my position. I have Committed a grave Constitutional outrage, not discovered, apparently, by His Majesty's Government until Thursday, when the Prime Minister returned to active business. During the whole of that time the only action taken by the Government is this private letter. I have never been given an opportunity, by those who believe so convincedly in the doctrine of joint Cabinet action, of confronting my colleagues or arguing my case to my colleagues. I saw the Prime Minister on Thursday. It was made plain to mo that I could no longer remain a Member of His Majesty's Government. Do have some thought of my position. You tell me I have Committed a Constitutional outrage, and the only action that you take—until you see the effect in the newspapers and what the Press tell you—the only action you take is by private letter, and then you tell me that I must not refer to that private letter at all. I say that I was justified, and could not avoid it. Remember this. I believed, and I cannot cure my mind of the belief, that this reason for my resignation was a pretext. I was there to prove that your action between that Monday and that Thursday was evidence that it was a pretext. Unless I took the only action that you have taken, Lord Curzon's private letter, and referred to it, I could not make my case, and, I say it with great respect and with great emphasis to the Leader of the House, that the fault lies in the methods of the Government, which

2299
dealt with what they say to-day is so grave a matter by no other method than a private letter and private conversation.
I have said, and I say it again, that, in my view, rightly or wrongly, the publication of this telegram was not a matter that I need bring before the Cabinet. It is obvious from Lord Curzon's letter that he took a different view. I shall never be able to understand, and I beg the House to see if they cannot get to-day some answer. Take an ordinary meeting of any Board of Directors, or of any Trade Union, or of any private business in the world, or any well-conducted affair. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the man primarily concerned in all this matter, knows that I have Committed a grave constitutional outrage, and he goes back to a Cabinet which is at that moment sitting, and, instead of saying one word about the grave constitutional outrage that I have Committed, he sits silent through that Cabinet, and contents himself with writing me a private letter that same evening. What is the explanation of that? Am I to raise it in the Cabinet? I do not think it is a Cabinet matter. He does. There is another Cabinet on Wednesday. By that time Lord Curzon and the Leader of the House had ample opportunity of acquainting their colleagues with the outrage that I had Committed. No reference is made to it at that Cabinet. What is the reason? Why is that which is alleged to be to-day so grave a constitutional outrage never mentioned by those people who are most affected by that outrage? Before passing from that, I would add that I agree with my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House that Lord Curzon could not have known on Monday, and I did not know that action taken at that Cabinet would be in time to stop the publication of the telegram. But I do say that, supposing a Cabinet discussion had taken place, and the Cabinet had decided that it was a grave constitutional outrage to publish this telegram, if a telegram had been sent to India immediately after that Cabinet: "Clear the line. His Majesty's Government takes strong objection to the publication of this telegram. If it is not too late, stop it." I believe, and I said on Saturday, it is an irony to reflect, that there was more than a chance that the
2300
publication, as it turned out, would have been stopped.
There is a more serious charge made against me than the fact that I referred to this private correspondence. I did not intentionally quote it, because I did not want the letter published. I had to refer to is because, as I have said, it was the only thing. But it is said I misrepresented it. Of course, that is the most serious charge, and I want to say about that that I do hope even my sternest critics in the House will acquit me of having done so intentionally, however low an opinion they take of my character, because the folly of intentionally misrepresenting such a document is obvious. It could not avail me, and I assure my right hon. Friend that I am profoundly sorry that for one moment there should have been any suspicion of a misunderstanding on that matter, and it never occurred to mc that there could be until I read my papers on Monday. Let me tell the House exactly how this very curious result occurred. It is said that I said Lord Curzon had asked in his letter not to bring this matter before the Cabinet. I made no such statement, and nobody who heard me at Cambridge on Saturday would think that I had. Let me convince the House by saying than it is all a question of punctuation, and let me ask the House first to consider an extended version of what I did say.
Will the House forgive me if I ask them to reconstruct the situation The point f was making to my audience was that on Monday, when Lord Curzon knew of this grave constitutional outrage, he did not think—something happened between then and Thursday which made him think—that I had done something which would prevent my continuation in office, because the ending of his letter was. for my purpose, the gist of his argument, which was, "Do not do it again," which clearly showed that he thought I was going to remain, and have an opportunity of doing it again. That struck me as the lamest and the most impotent ending to a letter which, on the face of it, is alleged to have come from a man who thought I was guilty of an unpardonable constitutional outrage, and in effect what I said to my audience was this—this is the extended version—
"Lord Curzon ended his letter with a request—a request to do what? Not to hand

2301
my resignation to the Prime Minister, not to recognise that it was impossible that I should continue in office with him; a request not to come with him to the Prime Minister, and discuss a matter which would render continuation in office impossible, but merely and only a request not to do it again."
The House will see, if hon. Members look at it from the point of view of that extended version, that what I did say was this:
"Lord Curzon ended his letter with a request"—
I was not quoting—
"What! Not to bring it to the Cabinet, but not to do it again or not to do it again without consulting him, or something of that sort."
The House will observe it was a clumsy, loose, regrettable, rhetorical expression, but if hon. Members will look at the verbatim report which is published in the "Times" and the "Daily Telegraph," I submit that they will see that the imposition of the word "what," after the request, with a note of exclamation afterwards, shows that I was rhetorically saying to my audience: "He made a request, a request, what!" Not to bring it to the Cabinet, but to do something else. At the risk of wearying the House I will say one thing more. Think of the grammar. Supposing I had intended to say that Lord Curzon made two requests: (1) not to bring the matter before the Cabinet; (2) not to do it again. The proper conjunction between these two requests, would be "and." "He made a request not to bring it to the Cabinet 'and' not to do it again." But the word I used was "but," and the "but" coupled with "what!" shows to any impartial reader that I was not quoting Lord Curzon, but explaining to my audience how futile the remedy he suggested was to the gross constitutional outrage with which I was charged. I go from that because what occurred between Monday and Thursday is a pretence to the question of publication. I do not want to make any use in this Debate of the terms of Lord Curzon's letter. I did not want it published. I thought it was a very foolish letter. But what the House must remember, and what Lord Curzon forgot, is that for the purpose of this matter, and for no other purpose, the Government of India cannot be correctly described as a subordinate branch of His Majesty's
2302
Government. India is a State member of the League of Nations. The Treaty of Sevres was signed on behalf of India independently as well as on behalf of Great Britain and the Dominions. I think it is the greatest folly to suggest that a great dependency dominion or whatever you like to call it, which has been given Dominion status for this purpose, a party to the original Treaty, should not be allowed to express its views as to modification. I say if it is allowed to express its views what is the use of hushing them up? It is no use doing it after the Conference. The only time to be of any use is before a Conference. I think, with Lord Beading, that the people of India were entitled to know, and the people of Great Britain were entitled to know, what is the fear of publication of the views that were being put forward by the Government of India on behalf of the people?
It is not true to say that they were dictating to the people of this country. It is not true to say that they were dictating to the Government of this country. It is not true to say that they sought to determine the terms of the Peace Treaty. What they did seek to do was to have their views given the fullest weight or authority and taken into the fullest consideration. Of course, they would be the first to recognise that their views would have to be harmonised with other and wider views. All I have got to say, as I have said in debate before on this aspect, is that India is entitled to a predominant share in the peace with Turkey, because there is no other country whose well-being is so intimately affected by that peace. There is no country which played so great a. part in defeating Turkey as India did. I do not believe it will hamper the British Government. I believe it will help it. I believe that if it can only be made clear that it was said all along that those views have to be taken into account with the other views, and would not necessarily determine the action of the Government, and if the Government could have found it possible to publish my telegram in answer they would have seen that I myself recognised that it was impossible for the Allies to fulfil all the terms.
9.0 P.M.
I have one last thing to say to the House. I am conscious of the right of the Leader of the House to say, as he

2303
said the other day, that if in my view the Government were not doing as I believe they should do, why did I not resign long ago? At the risk of being irrelevant, I should like to make good my case on that point. I did not raise the doctrine of Cabinet responsibility to which this Government has been carried as a charge against them. That was not my intention. I have been proud to be a Member of this Government. I rejoice in its achievements. I am proud to have taken some part in them. What I do object to is this: That this Government has exploited, above all other Governments, the doctrine of Cabinet responsibility and has used it as an excuse for asking for my resignation. Therefore I have no qualms on the ground of Cabinet responsibility, or its absence, in resigning from the Government. My reason for not resigning before was this: I fundamentally differed from my colleagues—and it is notorious—on their policy in the Near East; my colleagues treated me very considerately. I have been given one of the most difficult positions a man can have—the position of a Member of His Majesty's Government and the head of the Indian Peace Conference Delegation. I have used, I hope with moderation, and with a recognition of the difficulties, the right to freedom of expression on the affairs of the Middle East as they affected India. My position would have been untenable without that freedom. Moreover, rightly or wrongly, whenever I thought of resignation on this subject, I thought that resignation on this issue of any Secretary of State for India would have meant that he despaired of getting justice and just peace terms in conformity with our pledges, and that this would have had a disastrous effect upon the Moslem world. May I digress for a moment to say that I cordially agree with my right hon. Friend—and would emphasise it—that my resignation at this moment does not mean a rejection of the right of consideration of the terms put forward on behalf of the Moslems of India.
The third reason why I have never thought it necessary to resign till now was that until quite recently I had every right to think that I had the loyalty and confidence, not of some of my colleagues, but of all of them. Lastly, as I leave my work, may I say that the fascination of
2304
India's problems have obsessed me all my life—the Princes and the native States, each with their individual characteristics, the peoples of India, awakened and growing, often with ill-defined ideas; their races, their history, their views! A glorious conception I thought it was, and I think it is, of the British Commonwealth of Nations bound together by ties of freedom and mutual respect, and all its parts acknowledging no differences of race, or creed or constitutions or institutions, a country owing allegiance unswerving and devoted to one King Emperor, the grave dangers of being rushed on the one hand to chaos, and on the other being frightened to reaction, a record unparalleled in the history of the world for unselfishness and personal sacrifice of the British effort in India. I longed for nothing better than to devote myself so long as I could to these all absorbing prolems, and not to leave undone or half done at a most critical moment the work in which I gloried. I have parted this week from colleagues in the India Office and in India with whom I have worked for a term of years with uninterrupted accord, and I have laid down the proudest title that in my belief an Englishman can hold, the title of Secretary of State for India, which means the right in particular to serve the King, this Parliament, and India, and this is the unhappiest moment of my life.
Mr. THOMAS: Very briefly I want to submit to the House the views of the Labour party on this unfortunate question. Whatever view may be taken of the details, everyone will agree that this incident is unfortunate in the extreme. We recognise as Secretary of State for India the great work which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge has done, and the great contribution he has made to India, and the knowledge and experience he has brought to bear in his high office. In all this he has received no more whole-hearted support than from the members of our party, and we hope that the work he initiated will continue, notwithstanding his resignation. Secondly, we want to say that, as far as Labour is concerned, the revelations are at least a commentary upon the attack that has been made upon the Labour party. The one theme that has been dwelt upon in the country during recent months has been Labour's unfitness to govern. Only last week the Secretary of

2305
State for the Colonies said that he was not only proud to belong to this Government, which he stated was not only one of the best Governments ever known, but it was certainly the best of which he had ever been a member. On this subject he is at least entitled to respect, for he has sampled enough of them, and he knows all about them. Curiously enough, while he said that this was the best of all Governments, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge was also a Member of the same Government as the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and if we take the opinion we have heard expressed to-night and at Cambridge last Saturday by the right hon. Gentleman we shall be able to draw one conclusion, and that is that the trade unions could not be conducted on more loose lines than the Cabinet. In fact, if it was made public that the trade union executive was conducting its business in the same manner as has been made public by the speech of my right hon. Friend, there would indeed be justification for the statement of our unfitness to govern. I want to say frankly that I do not believe the explanation of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge is sufficient justification for quoting a private letter. I make no mistake about that, because I believe no graver injury would be done to public life or to any public man if a private letter, written under circumstances in which we all know private letters are written, is to be quoted.
Mr. MONTAGU: I understand the right hon. Gentleman's point of view, but my point is this: How much easier it would have been for me if I could have quoted the letter. The whole trouble has arisen because I could not quote it. It was a private letter and the whole of my case is that that is the way the Government ought not to have transacted its business.
Mr. THOMAS: My answer is that there was the opportunity and it is no use merely looking at the matter from a party point of view. There is a real constitutional issue involved. There was an opportunity to have come to this House of Commons and to have stated here the whole situation. That is why I am dealing with it now. I went into the other House yesterday and I heard Lord Curzon's statement. Having read my right hon. Friend's speech at Cambridge I felt that not only had a grave
2306
injustice been done, but also that it was a very serious thing that the construction, and I believe the only construction, that could have been placed upon his speech, namely, that notwithstanding the view of Lord Curzon on the matter, his Lordship had himself in the letter invited my right hon. Friend to deal with him privately in the matter, and not through the Cabinet. That was the view that every man reading that letter would take.
My right hon. Friend has explained that to-night, and he has intimated what was in his mind when he dealt with it, and I think the House generally is entitled to accept his explanation. On the other hand, the real view of the great mass of the British public is that when Lord Curzon spoke to my right hon. Friend on the morning of that Cabinet meeting, and heard from him for the first time that this telegram had been made public, he admitted that it not only shocked him, but, to use his own language, he considered that a very grave blunder had been Committed. If that was his view at that moment, what excuse or justification is there for Lord Curzon not immediately bringing it to the notice of the Cabinet? That, after all, is what the great mass of the British public want to know. It only shows, as I said earlier, that we at least have an example now, in the words of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, of how the business is conducted by this greatest of all Cabinets, and how they are prepared to act when matters of this kind are under consideration without attempting to deal, as they might have done, with the situation. This shows that whatever may be said in favour of a Coalition Government, nothing can be said for the absence of Cabinet responsibility that is revealed by the speech and the incidents we have already heard of.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN (Leader of the House): While in some difficulty in rising thus early, I feel that the House expects me to deal with what has been said. My difficulty arises from the fact that the hon. Member for the Scotland Division of Liverpool (Mr. T. P. O'Connor), who moved the Motion, was evidently attempting and struggling to express that which your ruling does not permit us to discuss. My right hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Montagu) was offering explanations.

2307
which I think were due to the House, as to his conduct and his speech. The real attack upon the Government, if attack there is to be, has only been mentioned in a sentence by the right hon. Gentleman who immediately preceded me (Mr. Thomas). That is my first difficulty. My second difficulty is that I have never been called upon to take part in a discussion so infinitely painful as that in which I am now engaged. There is one part of it, at any rate, on which I certainly desire to say the least that I can say, and it is upon that part which has reference to the private letter sent to my right hon. Friend by Lord Curzon, and the explanation which he has given of the use which he made of that private letter at Cambridge. The whole of the facts are before this House. The letter has been published, and the House will form its own judgment. To me at least it seems unnecessary that I should say a single word on the merits of that question as between my right hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire and my Noble Friend Lord Curzon. My right hon. Friend referred to that private letter without the consent of the writer, having, as he himself has told us, no desire that that letter should be made public. There are obvious reasons why a letter so written by one colleague to another should not be made public. It was not written for publication. I do not know exactly what the consequences of publication may be. My right hon. Friend must realise that one cannot challenge the honour of a colleague by reference to a private letter from him, and not by so doing call for and enforce the publication of that letter. That is all I am going to say about that lamentable incident.
I come now to what has been said by my right hon. Friend (Mr. Montagu) with regard to the opportunity which the Cabinet had of discussing this matter. Whatever my right hon. Friend says within his knowledge, let me say at once I accept. He says that at the first moment when he saw the telegram from the Viceroy, he gave directions for its circulation to the Cabinet. That I accept. But see what are the facts. The telegram was received in the India Office at 8 a.m. on Wednesday. The orders to circulate it were given on the Friday. I do not know how long it took to decipher the telegram, or what other matters occupied my right
2308
hon. Friend'e attention; but two days elapsed between the receipt of the telegram and the order to circulate it. It was not then marked for urgency, nor was there any intimation that the Indian Government wanted an immediate reply It was circulated in the ordinary course, by what is called the noon circulation on Saturday. The noon circulation on that day, owing to the multitude of papers, did not take place till 2.30 on Saturday afternoon. My right hon. Friend suggests there was time for the Cabinet to take the matter up. What time was there? At 7 o'clock on Saturday evening my right hon. Friend had authorised publication in a private telegram addressed to the Viceroy. My right hon. Friend says it was the obligation of everybody except the Secretary of State for India to bring this matter to the Cabinet, and that on the Secretary of State for India alone rested no obligation to raise the question. I am not going knowingly or willingly to represent my right hon. Friend on any point.
Mr. MONTAGU: I am very sorry to interrupt my right hon. Friend. My point was this: I did not think it was a matter for Cabinet discussion. I did not say it was everybody else's duty, and not mine. What I did say was that it was the duty of anybody who thought it was a matter for Cabinet discussion.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I accept the correction. My right hon. Friend circulated this telegram with a note which merely said—I am speaking from memory—"I circulate to my colleagues a telegram received from the Government of India." That is the way in which you give information to your colleagues. If the matter is of importance, or of immediate urgency, having circulated the telegram, you ask for the subject matter of the telegram to be taken into consideration by the Cabinet on an early day. My right hon. Friend did not do that. If the matter is of still greater urgency, or sometimes, if he thinks it is of less consequence, and that assent may be generally assumed, the common form adopted by all of us is to say, "I have received this telegram. I propose to send this reply, and I shall send it by such and such a date, unless before that date any Member of the Cabinet expresses his dissent." My right hon. Friend did not do that. The telegram which he had

2309
ordered on Friday—which was received in the India Office on Wednesday, which he had given orders to circulate on Friday, which was despatched to Ministers at 2.30 on Saturday, and which could not have reached the first of them till after that hour—was answered by my right hon. Friend before 7 o'clock the same day.
My right hon. Friend's defence, if defence there be, is not that he gave the Cabinet the opportunity to express dissent, but that he did not think it was a matter on which to consult the Cabinet at all. The answer had gone on Saturday to a private telegram, dispatched, or directed to be dispatched, by my right hon. Friend from the country. I cannot help saying that while he was in the country on that Saturday afternoon, as was I, he expected me to be aware at 2.30 of what he was doing. He does not consider that possibly I might be in the country too after a rather hard week. But that is a small matter, and I am almost sorry I mentioned it—no, I am not sorry, because, after all, it is of some importance, because every Member of the Cabinet does not receive a paper that is circulated the very moment it is circulated, or give it his immediate attention.
On Monday the telegram was in circulation, and had been read by all except the Prime Minister, who was unwell. I was presiding at the Cabinet in his absence, and Lord Curzon brought it to my attention. It was a telegram, he said, which it was obviously inexpedient, in the public interest, to publish. I said that I entirely agreed with him—that, of course, publication could not take place—and Lord Curzon then spoke to the Secretary of State about it. What is the Secretary of State's reply?
"But I have already authorised publication two days ago."
Did my right hon. Friend hint to Lord Curzon that there was any possibility of stopping that telegram? No. Did he tell Lord Curzon, what was in truth the fact, that he had authorised the sending of a private telegram which announced that an official telegram of a fuller description would follow on Monday? Had he given a hint that there was a possibility of risk in the matter, had he given a hint to Lord Curzon, Lord Curzon would have brought the matter
2310
up in the Cabinet then and there. As it was, Lord Curzon received this astounding communication from my right hon. Friend, and he received it with an exclamation of despair when he knew that the telegram had been authorised for publication. My right hon. Friend said, "Why did not Lord Curzon at once announce it to the Cabinet?" Would that have been a satisfaction to cay right hon. Friend? Would it have been a congenial task to Lord Curzon? The mischief had been done; the action to be taken rested in other hands, and Lord Curzon left it there. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister first knew of the publication when he read it in the London morning papers of Thursday. I am told it was in the evening papers of Wednesday, but we do not read all the newspapers, because we have not time to read beyond what is necessary, so that I had not seen the publication in the evening papers. My first hint of publication was when I read it in the morning paper of Thursday, as was the Prime Minister's. I will tell the House exactly what happened. The Prime Minister sent for my right hon. Friend (Mr. Montagu), and the Prime Minister came immediately from that interview to me. In all the time—it is now nearly a year—that I have been most intimately associated with him, I have never seen him so disturbed about any public incident as he was about the publication of this message at that moment. He said he regarded it as a grave national misfortune.
Mr. THOMAS: Was there not a Cabinet meeting on Wednesday?
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes, Sir, certainly there was, but let me finish what I am saying. He regarded it as a grave national misfortune, and he could not fail also to regard it as wanting in that loyalty from one Member of the Cabinet to another which is essential to the smooth working of Cabinet Government. Here was a telegram, the publication of which could not but gravely affect the conduct of affairs in the hands of the Foreign Secretary. There is no tradition of this country which justifies a Departmental Minister publishing a document of that kind without reference to the Minister immediately concerned, and, in a matter of this importance, without reference to the Prime Minister as well,

2311
if not to the Cabinet itself. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Thomas) asks me was there not a meeting of the Cabinet? There was, but the mischief had been done, and Lord Curzon would not make himself the accuser of my right hon. Friend. What was done was done; it could not be remedied. No Member of the Cabinet knew what had been done except Lord Curzon, and he only imperfectly, because my right hon. Friend had told him that he had authorised publication on Saturday, but did not tell him that in the same telegram he said he was to send an official message on Monday, and did not give him a hint that there was the slightest possibility of arresting its publication, and preventing the whole of this deplorable incident.
Mr. THOMAS: But you knew of it at the Cabinet?
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The right hon. Member is wrong. We did not know at the Cabinet on Wednesday. I must here call the attention of my right hon. Friend and of the House to another matter. He circulated the telegram, but he never circulated his reply, so we were left wholly without notice from him of the action which he had taken. When Lord Curzon spoke to him, he conveyed to Lord Curzon as clearly as words could convey it, that it was too late to revoke the action which he had taken on his own responsibility.
Mr. MONTAGU Mr. MONTAGU indicated dissent.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: My right hon. Friend shakes his head. He told Lord Curzon that he had authorised the publication two days before, but he gave no hint, and he had not an idea in his own mind—he confessed it to-night—that it was possible to recall that notorious telegram. For reasons not known to me, the Indian Government, who had pressed for immediate publication, held the telegram up for a day or two. My right hon. Friend took the whole responsibility of authorising publication. He neither consulted the Cabinet beforehand, nor informed the Cabinet that he had acted. The responsibility for that rests, not with the Cabinet, whom my right hon. Friend kept in the dark, but with my right hon. Friend himself. The right hon. Gentleman asked why no action was taken between his communication to Lord Curzon on Monday and Thursday morning. What
2312
is his description of the conduct of colleagues from whom he parted with regret, with whom he had worked so cordially, and whose reciprocal feelings to him I do not think he doubts. What is his description of their conduct? It is this:
"You did nothing until you saw the effect in the newspapers and what the Press told you to do."
I think I have already dealt with that. The Prime Minister acted—and it was for the Prime Minister and for no other person—at the first moment that he became aware of what had been done; and, as regards the action of the Prime Minister, I am content, without another word, to rest upon the universal consensus of opinion of all who have held high responsibility, and of all the chief organs of public opinion which follow our discussions and criticise our conduct. Whatever reproaches may be made against the Cabinet, the Prime Minister was right to accept the resignation which my right hon. Friend tendered. The hon. Member for the Scotland Division—
Mr. MONTAGU: Would my right hon. Friend forgive me for interrupting him once again, to my great regret? I gather from his statement that he understands that the Prime Minister did not know of my action in authorising publication until Thursday morning?
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: That is so.
Mr. MONTAGU: Has the right hon. Gentleman read Lord Curzon's letter?
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes.
Mr. MONTAGU: I must, in my own defence, say that, reading that letter, I am astonished.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: If my right hon. Friend will read it again, he will see that it correctly represents the facts as I have stated them. Lord Curzon, at the opening of the Cabinet—before the Cabinet had begun—came to me, called my attention to the telegram, and said: "It will not do to publish this." I said: "Of course, it will not."
Major ENTWISTLE: Why did not Lord Curzon tell you
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: It was before he had spoken to my right; hon. Friend. My right hon. Friend then knew that his action was challenged. He justifies himself for the action he had already taken

2313
without consultation on the ground that Lord Curzon did not at once tell him or the Cabinet how wrongly he had acted. His action was challenged by Lord Curzon. Why did not he go to the Cabinet, and seek his justification, and ask for a verdict there and then? Knowing that his action had been challenged by one of his colleagues, why did he not circulate to the Cabinet the answer which he had sent to the telegram, which, as far as we knew, remained unanswered? My right hon. Friend cannot absolve himself from responsibility in this matter by trying to charge Lord Curzon with failing in his duty.
I was turning at that moment to the question which the hon. Member for the Scotland division has put. My right hon. Friend by Saturday had become convinced that the reason given for his resignation was a pretext, and that it was really because he was being sacrificed to the Die-Hard clamour and to the subservience of the Prime Minister and his colleagues to the Press. I am only going to make one comment on that. I am going to invite my right hon. Friend to read his letter of resignation, and say whether his Saturday's frame of mind, repeated here in this House on Wednesday, is compatible with the terms of his letter of resignation. It is an afterthought. It is not we who have changed; it is not the influence of the Press; it is my right hon. Friend who, deflected by his failure to find in any quarter a justification for the action he took, now reads into the decision of the Prime Minister and his colleagues a motive which, when it was first known, never suggested itself to his mind.
The hon. Gentleman (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) asks me—not in terms, but this is the form which I am going to give to it, with the permission of himself and the House—he asks me whether the resignation of my right hon. Friend indicates a change in the policy of His Majesty s Government. I deliberately avoid saying that there is no change since 1920, or 1919, or whatever was the date of some extract which he read. Circumstances have changed profoundly, and we have to act with our Allies, and take account of changed circumstances. But the point which is pertinent to this Debate is whether the acceptance of my right hon. Friend's resignation indicates change of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government,
2314
and to that I give an unhesitating negative. It was not because of the views of the Indian Government, it was not because of the expression of the views of the Indian Government by the Indian Government, that my right hon. Friend resigned. He resigned on a question of constitutional propriety and Cabinet responsibility, and because, in the exercise of that wide discretion which always has been and must be left to Ministers as to what questions they should consult the Cabinet about and what questions they should decide, departmentally, he had taken, in the opinion of the Prime Minister and his colleagues, a fatally wrong decision on this occasion.
I come to what, after all, is the theme of the hon. Gentleman's inquiry, namely, the question of Cabinet responsibility. I speak in the presence of one who has served for many years in the Cabinet, and who for many years presided over the Cabinet. I have some experience myself by this time, and I have consulted those who have much longer experience than I have. I say without fear of contradiction that it is quite impossible to lay down rules which shall define what matters may be settled outside the Cabinet without reference to the Cabinet, and what matters must be brought before it. Every Minister must exercise his own discretion. He must be judged, and must consent to stand or fall as he uses his discretion wisely or unwisely. But there is a certain class of question—questions of foreign policy occupy as a class a position different from any other—and I think the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) will certainly not dispute what I say when I add that, in respect of those questions, there is probably always a clear and more constant communication between the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister than on any other subject of Government policy, and it is by them decided which of those questions they should settle in conference between them, and which are of such a character and of such importance that they should be brought before the Cabinet. It is, of course, always possible for any Member of the Cabinet to request that a subject may be made a matter of Cabinet discussion.
In all these matters there is no difference between this Cabinet and any Cabinet in which I have sat, or in which

2315
those with whom I have consulted have sat. But there is one difference between Cabinets nowadays and Cabinets before the War. Their work is enormously greater and, accordingly, in order that it may be got through, they have to devolve it more frequently on Committees than was the case before the War. Before the War one Cabinet a week was the normal rule, and that was intromitted for a period while Ministers took, I hope, a not unearned and certainly not unneeded rest.
Nowadays I suppose a week seldom passes without more than one Cabinet. I have known weeks in which there was a Cabinet every day, or almost every day, and holidays have almost disappeared. Under these circumstances we have to do what everyone has to do. We have to devolve a part of the business which in more leisured times was conducted by the body as a whole. We established Cabinet Committees. The greatest of those Committees was established as far back as 1903. It is the Committee of Imperial Defence, and I allude to that especially because when it was established, and long after it was established, there was no machinery by which its decisions were automatically communicated to the Cabinet, or to those who were concerned. Now the doing of all Committees are reported to the Cabinet. Some subjects are referred to Committees to advise them. Some subjects are referred to Committees to settle on behalf of them. But in every case, be it for decision by the Cabinet, or be it for the information of the Cabinet, with the possibility of any member of the Cabinet raising a discussion on the subject, the reports of those Committees are communicated to the Cabinet.
There is no lack of co-ordination. No human foresight, no set of rules, no perfection of machinery can prevent occasional errors arising as long as humanity remains fallible. What is essential, painful though it may be, is that when one such grave error is made, the necessary consequences should follow to bring home to all that that is not a course which is permissible, and that on matters of great gravity, concerning interests intimately, almost primarily, co-equally, at any rate, concerning interests outside the Department of a particular Minister, to authorise on his own and sole responsibility a course of action which his col-
2316
leagues cannot approve, he must take the responsibility and the consequences of the responsibility.
Mr. O'CONNOR: May I put the question I invited the right hon. Gentleman to answer earlier in the day? Is it the policy of the Government to take adequate steps, in accordance with their promise, for the protection of the Christians in the Near East?
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I am not going to be led into a discussion which you, Sir, have more than once ruled would be out of order. The policy of the Cabinet is unaffected by my right hon. Friend's resignation. He did not resign on a question of policy. He resigned because his colleagues differed from him as to the propriety of his action in authorising the publication of a particular telegram. I have only one thing more to say. During many years my relations with the right hon. Gentleman have been intimate and cordial. If I thought that, by introducing other words into the statement I made in the House of Commons, I could have done anything to mitigate the pain of his position, or to give consolation to him, I hope he will believe that I should have done so. I am sure he does not now think—as his words at Cambridge would lead anyone to suppose he then did—that I deliberately courted a demonstration from the House against him. My right hon. Friend in the closing passage of his speech, told us once again how profoundly he was interested in India, how earnestly he has striven to servo her interests, and how deeply painful it was to him to sever his connection with that work. My right hon. Friend is not the only Minister who has had to resign. He is not the only Secretary of State who at a certain moment has found it is not compatible with his duty to remain in office. I sympathise with him, and I deeply deplore the misconception of his duty to the Cabinet and of the effect of his action on public affairs which rendered the severance of his connection with the India Office inevitable.
Mr. ASQUITH: As far as this personal and domestic squabble is concerned, I can assure the House that those of us who sit in this quarter of it adopt an attitude of passive and serene detachment. I would only say on that aspect of the

2317
case that I regard the procedure adopted by the late Secretary of State as incompatible with the elementary rules of Cabinet government. At the same time, I must express, not only for myself, but, I think, for a great number of those who sit behind me, extreme and sincere regret that a career which has been associated with so much good, remarkable, and, I believe, fruitful work in the interests of India and of the Empire, should for the moment have been checked. But I care nothing about these telegrams, these meetings of the Cabinet and so on. The incident has an importance which transcends all personal considerations. We have been accustomed during the last three years by right hon. Gentlemen who sit upon the Front Bench opposite to a succession of violent curves of policy, but none of them has been more complete and more clear cut than the curve which has taken place during the last week, when they have suddenly discovered and solemnly proclaimed to the world that there is such a thing as collective Cabinet responsibility. That is a most remarkable discovery. The relation between an individual Minister and his Cabinet colleagues is always a matter which must and does call for delicate handling. If a Minister on a matter of real importance finds that he cannot agree with his colleagues, or that his colleagues will not agree with him, there is only one safe rule—[An HON. MEMBER: "Wait and see!"]—and that is neither to wait nor see, but to resign his office.
I can speak in these matters with no inconsiderable experience. During the many years, more than any living man has had, that I have been at the head of a Government I have had the good fortune to have with me and under me gifted colleagues, some of them men of pronounced and irrepressible individuality. Nor can I deny that from time to time a certain amount of momentary embarrassment has been caused to the Administration by unforeseen and even unforeseeable ebullitions on the part of those talented and exuberant personalities. [HON. MEMBERS: "Name."] Everybody knows them; I will not specify names, dates or localities.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The locality was the Cabinet.
Mr. ASQUITH: No, I am speaking of ebullitions outside, sometimes within the
2318
Metropolitan area. Whether when I was at the head of the Government I was or was not a rigid and austere disciplinarian, I will leave it to others to say, but whatever admonition I may have felt it my duty, as I did from time to time, to offer in private or in the Cabinet, I never gave away a colleague in public. On the other hand, I would never, nor would any Cabinet of which I have been a member, or of which I have been the head, have submitted to the licence of reciprocal criticism and independent initiative which has been exercised during these last years by individual Ministers, and of which the Prime Minister himself set the first example. Let us look at what has been going on during the last two months. Ever since the scare of the February election—
10.0 P.M.
Mr. SPEAKER: It seems to me that the right hon. Gentleman is going seriously beyond what is possible within the terms of the Motion. The only justification for this Motion is what has occurred quite recently—within the last few days. It does not open up a general Debate, going back to January or February.
Mr. ASQUITH: With very great deference, the question is one of the lack of Cabinet co-ordination, and may I not give an illustration of the evils of the lack of Cabinet co-ordination which has recently occurred?
Mr. SPEAKER: If the right hon. Gentleman will read the Motion on which the Adjournment is moved, he will see that it says:
"The serious lack of co-ordination in the action of His Majesty's Ministers which brought about the resignation of the Secretary of State for India."
Mr. ASQUITH: I am going, if I may, and if you will allow me, to point out that this is not an isolated incident, but that it is a practice of which this is the climax and culmination. I am always most ready to bow to the ruling of the Chair, but perhaps I may be allowed to give an illustration beyond the one which is immediately before us. We are talking about Cabinet co-ordination. I am entitled to draw the attention of the House to the circumstance that this is not an isolated case, and to point out that it is part of a series of instances of continuous Cabinet disorganisation. We

2319
have had a number of Cabinet Ministers—I think six or seven—making various announcements as to the policy, the functions, the justification, and the future of the Coalition. To reconcile the one with the other would tax the ingenuity, I think, of the most ingenious theologian who has ever tried, in the art of apologetics, to harmonise Scriptural texts. There are some Ministers who cannot even say the same thing on the same subject twice in the course of a single week. The Lord Chancellor, for instance. I think that I am confining myself strictly within the limits of the Motion before the House. Take the case, for instance—this is an example of Cabinet dislocation and disorganisation—of one of the most distinguished of His Majesty's Ministers, the present Lord Chancellor. He told us in the course of two successive weeks that he regards my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr (Sir G. Younger) one week as a mutineer and the next week as the salt of the Tory party.
There is a rule or custom, which I believe prevails on the turf, with the details of whose procedure I do not profess to be more than superficially acquainted, by which when an owner runs more than one horse for particular stakes he is expected to declare in advance which of his team he expects to win. I am now on the point of Cabinet responsibility. Which is it going to be? Cabin boy, or salt of the Tory party, or the Centre party, which, to quote a phrase of my Noble Friend Lord Morley, is the dark horse in the loose box? This is a very serious question and this Motion arises out of a particular instance which, in itself grave if not of serious or lasting moment, affords an opportunity and a pertinent opportunity to put to the Government this inquiry. Now that they have revived, as they have for a particular purpose, the obsolescent, almost moribund doctrine of Cabinet responsibility, which of these warring and competing police is do they mean collectively to adopt and to pursue? The whole thing is merely an illustration and a demontration of the moral and political impossibility of attempting to govern by a Coalition which has no common cement of principle or of party. The moral which I draw and which I submit to the judgment of the House is this. We should get back once for all to the
2320
old straight way when people were divided by real differences founded on conviction and on principle, which have led to the observance for generations past of the practical doctrine of Parliamentary government and of full Cabinet responsibility.
Mr. O'CONNOR: My object in raising the Debate has been sufficiently answered and, therefore, I ask leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

SUPPLY.

  ARMY ESTIMATES, 1922–23.
  Postponed Proceeding resumed on Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair.
  Question again proposed.
  Lieut.-Colonel NALL: When the Debate was interrupted, I was asking for further information as to the manner in which the reduction in the number of officers was to be brought about. I quoted one example of the kind of officer, of whom fortunately there are only a few, who somehow or other has been retained on the active list since the Armistice, and I wish to mention one or two others. The second was the case of a major in the infantry with a total Army service in any theatre of war between 1914 and 1920 of four months in France from September to December, 1916. He was employed on the staff and then as a major on regimental duty at home. He was medically unfit most of that time He was passed fit after the Armistice and certainly recently was still on the active list. I understand that that officer, like the one whom I mentioned before, failed to pass the senior officer's course. The third case was that of a field officer whose total Army service in any theatre of war was only 20 months in France and Belgium. He was employed first in France as an adjutant and then at headquarters. He broke down and was sent home for six months' rest. Then he was employed for a second period as second in command of a unit. He was sent home a second time with a very bad report and then mentioned in dispatches. These three instances of officers who were totally unfit to fulfil their duty in war are from one regiment of infantry of the line. Are cases like that to be caught in the sieve now being applied, or will

  2321
  men like that be able to continue in the Service whilst younger men who have been recommended for accelerated promotion are by some mischance or some confidential report turned out of the Army and the State thereby loses their valuable services?
  One or two other questions relating to economy were not mentioned in the speech of the Secretary of State for War. One notices in the order for the reduction of infantry battalions some reference to the closing of the corresponding depots, but, so far, I have not heard in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman or seen in any communications to the Press an indication that the undoubtedly redundant depots up and down the country are to be reduced in numbers. In August last my hon. and gallant Friend the Financial Secretary to the War Office, in answer to a question, told me that there were then no fewer than 68 infantry depots in the United Kingdom, all with their prescribed staff, although some of them were stationed in the same place. How far can these depots be reduced in personnel and in total numbers, in addition to those already indicated by the reduction in battalions? It seems obvious that where two or three regimental depots, sometimes of the same arm, in other cases of different arms, are stationed in the same place, there ought to be concentration of command and of the ancillary services connected with those depots.
  What is to be done to effect some economy in the Army Educational Corps? That corps was created, no doubt, for a very excellent purpose. It has fulfilled the function formerly carried on by the pre-War Army schoolmaster. The pre-War Army schoolmaster was an excellent institution, and it is to be regretted that his services have in many ways been despised and that a most elaborate system has been created to carry on his functions at an enormously increased cost to the State. What economy is to be effected in that branch? I understand that the school of gas is to be closed. Why not close the much less useful school of education? One hears and sees accounts of various officers being sent off for a course at the Army School of Education. Is any real benefit conferred by carrying on such a system? I should like to know whether this is not another case in which further
  2322
  and quite considerable economy could be effected.
  Reference has been made to the question of Woolwich. It is most unfair and, indeed, most improper, that when we are considering the total figures of Army expenditure, the cost of such places as Woolwich should be included, although a great part of the staff and a great part of the work done there—last year, certainly—had no relation whatever to Army expenditure. I need not refer in detail to the building of locomotives and so forth, referred to in the Geddes Report. It is most misleading that the public or the House should be made to believe that certain details of expenditure are connected with armaments, when, as a matter of fact, a great deal of the expenditure went in entirely different services. I should like to see the civilian establishments in places like Woolwich very severely cut down. In fact, I would suggest that places such as that might be manned very much better by enlisting the personnel into the Army Ordnance Corps. I rather think that, on such a basis, by using military labour instead of civilian labour, economy would be achieved.
  I come next to a question which was referred to by the Secretary of State for War, and that is with regard to the Corps of Military Accountants. I think of all the post-War institutions in connection with the Army, no branch has received more kicks and knocks than the Corps of Military Accountants. Proposals to maintain that system, but to cut down the number of men engaged, are not really meeting the question. I ask the House to consider this matter. At the bottom of the chain of the Corps of Military Accountants is the sergeant or warrant officer with the unit. He is called the unit accountant, and his duties are very similar to those of the Army Pay Corps. The officers of the Corps of Millitary Accountants—the command accountant officers, the group accountant officers, and the station accountant officers—have very different functions to perform. It is their duty to supervise expenditure in order to report as to how economies can be effected, but what happens? These men are attached to various Commands; they are, in fact, under the orders and subject to the reports of the commanders of those Commands, and if they recommend any-

  2323
  thing very drastic they are immediately in the bad books of their commanding officers.
  Their work overlaps with the work of an entirely different group of men, namely, the local auditors, who are officers of the Exchequer and Audit Board. The Exchequer and Audit Board's local auditors are more properly associated with the Treasury, and they are charged with the duty of checking expenditure and ensuring that it is in accordance with Regulations. It is not their job to recommend any alterations or economies. It is merely their function to see that whatever expenditure is incurred is covered by some authority. However ridiculous or unnecessary it may be, if the authority be there their job is finished. I suggest that the recommending of economies which is now laid to the charge of the Corps of Military Accountants should be carried out on behalf of the Treasury instead of on behalf of the War Office, and that it could very properly be carried out by an amalgamation of the efforts of the group and station and command accountant officers, with those of the officers of the Exchequer and Audit Board. It is, of course, obvious that that amalgamation of effort cannot apply to those men referred to before, the unit accounting officers, and therefore, if this Corps of Military Accountants could, instead of being whittled down, be amalgamated with the Treasury side of the financial check, then the unit accountant would more properly be amalgamated with the Army Pay Corps and work in conjunction with that corps.
  I pass to the third point on which I want to say a word or two, the question of the Territorial Army. It was said by an hon. Member opposite that in these Estimates the Territorial Army was getting off rather better than could be expected. Big reductions are made in the Territorial establishment, but I would like to draw the attention of the House for a moment or two to what appears to me to be a series of curious discrepancies in those reductions. Let me begin with the Medical Service. Reference has been made to the reduction in field ambulances, and I will not go into that. I think it is a pity that only one ambulance should exist in a division. There are men who have had wide experience in this matter and who believe that three very small cadres for ambulances would be better
  2324
  than the proposed one ambulance. The same number of men could be divided into the three instead of being collected in the one. The really serious point m the reduction of the medical establishment, however, is the case of the general hospitals. It is well known how the general hospitals of the Territorial Army fulfilled a great work in the War, and in the present Vote the proposal is to reduce no fewer than 23 general hospitals down to three only, and to put those on a reduced establishment. There, again, men who have had very great experience in the organisation of the medical services do not appear to have had any say whatever in this very great alteration in the general hospital policy. I want to suggest that instead of the present establishment proposed, of 10 officers and 100 other ranks in a general hospital, it would be sufficient to have five officers, namely, one commanding officer, one registrar, one officer commanding surgical division, one officer commanding medical division, and one quartermaster, and 25 or 30 other ranks; and that one general hospital at least ought to be established in each university town, because it is in the university towns where we can get the best surgical and medical skill. At the present time, in those places the Territorial medical service has got the sympathy of the profession, and it is a profound pity to break with tradition and cut this service down to the three hospitals proposed. I would suggest that, instead of cutting these 23 hospitals down to three, at least it should be on the basis of one per divisional area, that is 14. Possibly a further reduction might be made, but, at least, it should be one cadre, on the lines I have suggested, for each divisional area.
  The next anomaly in this reduction in establishments is in the infantry. I will just mention in passing the field artillery, which is reduced to 101 men per battery. That is the absolutely rock-bottom limit which would enable the unit to train in camp. My own view is, with some experience of the matter, that an establishment of at least 110 men is necessary to train a battery. However that may be, we are down to the very rock-bottom limit of 101 men, but, for some reason which has not been disclosed, the infantry battalion is to have an estab-

  2325
  lishment of 637 men, although nearly every infantryman of any experience I have asked says that 500 men would have been enough. I do suggest to the War Office that a further economy in establishment can be obtained by reducing the infantry battalion establishment below this figure of 637. There is a further point which would lead to economy in the administration of the Territorial Army. I believe it is fair to say that the great bogey of many a commanding officer is the small outlying detachments, but I want to suggest that the number of detached headquarters which involve comparatively considerable expense can be very materially reduced. Is it really worth while taking a drill shed and a place for drill for 20 men? It should be nothing less than 35, or it might even be raised to 50; in the case of guns, nothing less than half a battery. I am quite sure on those lines considerable economies could be made in the Territorial Army Vote. The Minister referred, in regard to the cavalry, to the prospect of adopting a system which I for one have advocated for some time, that regimental identity should be retained, in spite of all the reductions that are taking place, by making the squadron the unit rather than the regiment. The regiment should be composed of so many of these squadron units. Why not apply the same thing to the Territorial Yeomanry? The yeomanry squadron has been reduced to the almost untrainable minimum of 76 or 78 men. Every mounted officer, every Member of this House who has served in a mounted unit, knows that 76 or 78 men is not enough to get really good training in camp.
  Therefore, I would suggest to the War Office it is worth while considering, before several remaining regiments of yeomanry have been converted to other arms, that many of these county regiments, instead of remaining as complete regiments of three squadrons of only 76 men each, might very well be reduced to a county squadron, and that three county squadrons should form a composite regiment. I am quite sure by that means further administrative economy can be effected. The main point about the Estimates of the Territorial Army is the fact that the country will retain, although on a depleted establishment, the cadre, the means of expansion for 14 divisions, which, at any rate for the next five or six years, can
  2326
  always be filled up in emergency from men who have war service and are trained for the work. I want to ask the War Office whether, with a view to expediting that completion of that war establishment—if ever the need should arise—they are going to revive the Territorial Force Reserve. It exists at present for officers, but I understand the creation of the Reserve as to other ranks has been deferred, for various reasons. I suggest the time has now come when it should be reconstituted, and many of the men who have in the past served in various regiments put on the reserve of their regiment before they lose touch with it. One hears some suggestions and opinions that the money expended on the Territorial Army would be much better spent on regular troops. I gave my opinion—for what it is worth—on the reduction of the Regular Army. I do, however, feel that it is a fact that the Territorial Army, reduced as it is, and reducible still as I believe it to be, is absolutely the most economical form of military expenditure which we can undertake at the present, because, for something under £5,000,000 per year, which indeed includes the cost of many Regulars attached to the force, the country is retaining this machinery, this organisation, which at very short notice will provide 14 divisions to take the field, while the same amount of money cannot in any other way produce the same military results.
  I hope that not only in this present case but in future policy relating to the armed forces of the Crown the Government of the day will resist the temptation to break up what after all was a very useful and very important part of our military machinery during the War. It is well worth the comparatively few millions it costs. It is well worth retaining the territorial organisation, the territorial spirit, the military mission as it were, among the people of the country. For my part I hope that in reducing the regular staffs attached to it the War Office will not go forth unduly to reduce the non-commissioned officer instructors but rather the officers, because, after all, the instructor is the backbone of the regiment. I feel that even as it is there is a tendency, when one sees that the brigadier is to be left in the division without a brigade-major, to pursue this course. Many people think that the brigadier will not be able to function.

  2327
  Whilst that is so, we are told in the speech to-day of the right hon. Gentleman that the instructors are to be reduced. I feel that that is not sound. I hope further that the Government and the War Office will make up their minds that the number of regular non-commissioned officers, and, of course, the regular adjutant, are really essential to the well-being of the Territorial Army and that, provided those branches of the permanent staff are adequately maintained and the right kind of men supplied, it does not matter how many of the others, or if all the other staffs, are abolished. I hope that this House, in considering these Estimates, will insist upon maintaining as part of our military machine the Territorial Force which in the early days of the War did so much, and if ever the time comes again will do the same again.
  Lieut.-Colonel OALRYMPLE WHITE: There is no one, I am sure, who listened to the speech of the Secretary of State for War and the impressive speech of the hon. and gallant Member for North Down (Sir H. Wilson) who is not conscious of the extreme gravity of the decision now before us. We agree that there must be large reductions of expenditure, and we all realise that there must be considerable reductions in our fighting forces. We are prepared to take large risks, but we are not prepared to court disaster. In the opinion of a great many people the reductions now proposed go very dangerously near that limit; most people were sorry to hear of a reduction of 24 line battalions and 47 batteries. The right hon. Gentleman said that 22 of these had already been chosen, and the other two were under consideration. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not remove one battalion from the two remaining Irish regiments, and so institute that expensive anomaly of a one-battalion regiment, because we already possess two of them and we do not want any more. I hope the right hon. Gentleman may see his way to save two more regiments and make the reduction 22 instead of 24. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman may be able to effect economies in other directions.
  I wish to deal briefly with the suggestion made by the late Financial Secretary to the War Office, in regard to reduction of pay. I understand that the present rates of pay are subject to
  2328
  revision in a certain number of years. I am not in favour of breaking contracts, and I would not approve of the Army pay being reduced. I do not, however, see why some new rate of pay should not be introduced for recruits or officers after a certain date. I admit it would be difficult to deal with all ranks on that basis. On the question of the Remount Department I have not any intimate knowledge, but I have been told that last year and the year before the establishment of officers was really excessive. The question of regimental depots has been mentioned. There I think the linking up of two or more regimental depots would be quite feasible and produce considerable economy. Certain regiments do not fill up territorially. For years it has been the case that nearly 50 per cent. of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry have been enlisted from outside the county. There probably is a case where the depot could be joined up with that of the Devonshire Regiment at Exeter. It would save the case of an expensive depot at Bodmin, and railway fares as well. Then there is the Corps of Signallers. I understand the right hon. Gentleman proposes to reduce that pretty drastically, and so perhaps there is not much to be done. I hope even now the right hon. Gentleman, not having made up his mind which are the two extra battalions to be sacrificed, will think the matter over and save them.
  Captain LOSEBY: I want to refer to the important question of promotion from the ranks. I believe what is proposed is, as far as peace times are concerned, a complete innovation; it is of tremendous importance to the Army. My right hon. Friend apologised for the fact that these men who are to have promotion from the ranks are not to be sent, as was apparently originally intended, to a separate cadet school, but are to be sent to Sandhurst, where gentlemen cadets are trained. I want to express an opinion that that is wholly to the good. It would appear to me one of the most important sides of the training of these young men, if they are to become successful officers, is that they should be happy officers, and it is necessary, therefore, to accustom them to the environment in which they will have to live. It would be fatal if they were to be marked out from the beginning of their career

  2329
  as being something apart. I therefore welcome the announcement of the Secretary for War, and I hope it will be followed by other experiments on similar lines. It is perfectly true that only 35 of these cadets are to be received this year, but it should be remembered that throughout the country there are now a large number of promoted rankers. That is not at all unreasonable, and it is a great mistake for those people who do want to see this experiment persevered in to overload these commissioned ranks at the present moment. There are some who believe strongly in this experiment which is being conducted by the Secretary of State for War, but who do not necessarily believe that this will mean an improvement in the personnel of the officer ranks. I am one of those who do not for a moment believe that that is necessarily so. I believe it would be hard to find more efficient professional men in any grade of life than you had in the Regular Army at the outbreak of the War, but at the same time I believe that if you could, as I am perfectly sure you could, absorb a certain number of young, ambitious men from the ranks, you would give them hope and ambition, and you would thereby immeasurably improve the moral of the Army. I hope that at no very distant date the Secretary of State for War will further extend this scheme, and in course of time will be able to reopen or extend to the ranks a certain definite percentage, say, 20 or 25 per cent., of the whole number of cadets annually received in Sandhurst. I do most respectfully and earnestly congratulate my right hon. Friend, and I trust that this experiment of his will become widely known.
  Sir C. YATE: Those who listened to the speech of the hon. and gallant Field Marshal earlier in the sitting must have realised the serious condition in which the country is in at the present time, and the seriousness of the warning he gave us that we should not reduce our Forces before the Government have reduced our commitments or the policy to which the country is already Committed. We have vast commitments which were enumerated by the Field Marshal. He showed us the danger this country was taking by carrying out the recommendations of a Committee like the Geddes Committee, which advocated reductions without any reference whatsoever to the policy of the country. I do hope the Government will
  2330
  consider the enormous risk that is being run if they reduce our troops below a certain level before the commitments of the country are equally reduced. As the Field-Marshal told us, there are more armed men and bigger armies on the Continent of Europe than before the War. Look at the difference between the state of Europe at the present time and the state of our own country. Here we are only able to send one division abroad in two or three weeks. I would like to know if a division is 15,000 or 20,000 men at the present time. The right hon. Member does not answer. A division is all we can send abroad in the first two or three weeks. It would take us two months to send another division, and Heaven knows how many months before we could send any more. Is that a safe position for the country to be in? I am sorry to see that we are going to reduce 24 battalions. I would much rather have seen the cadres kept up so that they could be reinforced and brought back within a short time. When once the cadres have gone, and the old traditions have gone, and the whole thing is broken up, it is very difficult to bring them back. I agree with the hon. Member who expressed the hope that the whole of these 24 battalions may not be reduced. We want to see retained any that can possibly be retained.
  Much has been said about the Territorial Army, and we say that a certain reduction could be made in that force without interfering unduly with its efficiency. The Secretary of State said that he intended to retain the whole of the Territorial Army—the whole 14 divisions. One hon. Member has pointed out that the Territorial Army is not available for foreign service. What we require at the present moment are men who are available for foreign service at a day's notice, whether it may be in India, in Egypt, or wherever it may be. We must have a certain reserve to reinforce our garrisons there. The Territorial Army cannot help in that, and, although it is the most economical force that we have, and we all desire to see it kept up all over the country, I do think it ought to be kept at a minimum at the present time, because the country, as we know, is not liable to invasion in the immediate future. I should like to see our Overseas Service kept at as high an establishment as possible. No mention

  2331
  was made as to whether any of the men in the Territorial Army were enlisted for foreign service. I think that in each Territorial battalion there should be, say, 50 or 100 men enlisted who would undertake foreign service at any time that might be necessary. I put a question with regard to that, but got no answer.
  There is another point that I should like to bring to the notice of the Secretary of State while I have the opportunity, and that is the absolute necessity at the present time, if officers are to be kept contented, that there should be some independent tribunal appointed to which officers who have a grievance can state their case, and which can report upon it to the Army Council. At the present moment, when an officer is aggrieved or an injustice is done to him, he can only refer his case to the man who, in all probability, has Committed the injustice. That should be altered, and an independent tribunal appointed for this purpose, before which an aggrieved officer can have an impartial hearing.
  Lieut.-Colonel MOORE BRABAZON: After the Debate that we have listened to on the Motion for Adjournment, I take it that we may assume that the Secretary of State for War, being a Cabinet Minister, is in agreement with his Government, and, consequently, a wholehearted supporter of the maintenance of the integrity of the Air Force. On that point I wish to say that the Air Force, which is taking over more and more of the responsibilities of the other Services, should, in my opinion, take over the anti-aircraft defences of this country. To hit an object moving at over 100 miles an hour, usually at a height of over 10,000 feet, moving in three dimensions, and also in the dark, is a ballistic problem which is very nearly insoluble.
  11.0 P.M.
  Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. James Hope): The remarks of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, so far as I have followed them, would be appropriate to Mr. Speaker going out of the Chair on the Air Estimates. I do not know whether he can connect it to the Army Estimates.
  Lieut.-Colonel MOORE-BRABAZON: These duties to-day are Army duties. My point is that they should come under the Air Ministry and not
  2332
  under the Army. I have pointed out the difficulty of defence taken on by the Army, and it is perhaps a matter of interest to know that the name given to the anti-aircraft gun in the Air Service has always been "Archie," and that was derived from the old popular song, "Archibald, certainly not," which shows how very deficient the shooting has always been against aircraft. Some duties I wish to point out which the Army have taken on, and which, I maintain, should not be their duties, are such things as the recognition of the nationality of the different machines, following out types as they change from day to day, and then the position of these anti-aircraft guns—where they should be placed. Those are all points which require much co-operation with the Air Ministry and have so little to do, I maintain, with the actual Army movement of troops, that I think a strong case should be put up for charging the control of antiaircraft defence from the Army to the Air Ministry.
  Considered in Committee.
  [Mr. JAMES HOPE in the Chair.]

  NUMBER OF LAND FORCES.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 215,000, all ranks, be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland at Home and Abroad, excluding His Majesty's Indian Possessions, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1923."
  Motion made, and Question, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again," put, and agreed to.—[Colonel Leslie Wilson.]
  Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.

  REPORT [10th March].
  Resolution reported,
  AKMY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1921–22.
  "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £4,900,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Charges for Army Services which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1922, to meet Expenditure not provided for in the original Army Estimates of the year, on account of Terminal Charges of the War."
  REPORT [27th February.]
  Resolution reported,
  CIVIL SERVICES AND REVENUE DEPARTMENTS SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1921–22.
    CLASS VII.
      MINISTRY OF HEALTH.
      "That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1922, for the Salaries and Expenses of the Ministry of Health; including Grants and other Expenses in connection with Housing, Grants to Local Authorities, etc., sundry Contributions and Grants in respect of Benefits and Expenses of Administration under the National Health Insurance Acts, 1911 to 1921, certain Grants in Aid, and certain Special Services arising out of the War."

  ELECTRICITY (SUPPLY) ACTS, 1882 TO 1919.
  Resolved,
  "That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of part of the parish or township of Wye, in the county of Kent, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 3), be approved."
  Resolved,
  "That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the urban district of Wigston Magna, the parishes of Blaby, Cosby, Countesthorpe, Croft, Enderhy, Glen Parva, Huncote, Narborough, Potters Marston, Thurlaston, and Whetstone, in the rural district of Blaby, the parishes of Aston Flamville, Burbage, Elmesthorpe, Sapcote, Sharnford, Stoney Stanton, and Wigston Parva, in the rural district of Hinckley, and the parish of Broughton Astley, in the rural district of Lutterworth, all in the county of Leicester, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 3—I.), be approved."
  Resolved,
  "That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the urban district of Cheadle and Gatley, in the county of Chester, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 3—II.), be approved."
  Resolved,
  "That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the urban districts of Haywards Heath and Cuckfield, and parts of the parishes of Lindfield, Cuckfield Rural, and Keymer Rural, in the rural district of Cuckfield, and part of the parish of Wivelsfield, in the rural district of Chailey, all in the administrative county of East Sussex, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 3—III.), be approved."
  Resolved,
  "That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the burgh of Johnstone, in the county of Renfrew, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 3—IV.), be approved."
  Resolved,
  "That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the burgh of Milngavie and part of the parish of New Kilpatrick, in the county of Dunbarton, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 3—V.), be approved."
  Resolved,
  "That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the urban districts of Bromyard and Kington and the rural districts of Bredwardine, Bromyard, Dore, Hereford, Kington, Leominster, Ross, Weobley, Whitchurch, and Wigmore, and part of the rural district of Ledbury, all in the county of Hereford, and for the amendment of the Hereford Electric Lighting Order, 1898, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 3—VII.), be approved."
  Resolved,
  "That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, amending certain Provisional Orders granted to the Electrical Distribution of Yorkshire, Limited, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 4), be approved."
  Resolved,
  "That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Elec-

  2335
  tricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the county borough of Preston, the urban district of Fulwood, and the townships of Broughton Lea Ashton Ingol and Cottam Woodplumpton Barton and Penwortham, in the rural district of Preston, all in the county of Lancaster, which was presented on the 17th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 18), be approved."—[Mr. Neal.]
  The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

  ADJOURNMENT.
  Resolved, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Colonel Leslie Wilson.]
  Adjourned accordingly at Nine Minutes after Eleven o'Clock.

TRADE AND COMMERCE.
  FISHING INDUSTRY (FRENCH IMPORT DUTIES).
  FISHING INDUSTRY (FRENCH IMPORT DUTIES).
  DYESTUFFS.
  DYESTUFFS.
  BRITISH TRADE IN THE ARGENTINE (GKRMAN AGENTS).
  BRITISH TRADE IN THE ARGENTINE (GKRMAN AGENTS).
BRITISH SHIPPING.
  AMALGAMATED MAKINE WORKERS' UNION.
  AMALGAMATED MAKINE WORKERS' UNION.
  WIRELESS WATCHERS.
  WIRELESS WATCHERS.
  VENEREAL DISEASE.
  VENEREAL DISEASE.
  TURKEY.
  TURKEY.
  ENEMY AIR RAIDS (COMPENSATION).
  ENEMY AIR RAIDS (COMPENSATION).
  GRETNA FACTORY.
  GRETNA FACTORY.
  REFRESHMENT DEPARTMENT, HOUSE OF COMMONS (GRANT).
  REFRESHMENT DEPARTMENT, HOUSE OF COMMONS (GRANT).
  ENTERTAINMENTS DUTY (GARRISON THEATRES).
  ENTERTAINMENTS DUTY (GARRISON THEATRES).
  INCOME TAX (EASTER OFFERINGS).
  INCOME TAX (EASTER OFFERINGS).
  TEA DUTY.
  TEA DUTY.
  HOME-GROWN TOBACCO (DUTY).
  HOME-GROWN TOBACCO (DUTY).
  CLUBS (LIQUOR DUTIES).
  CLUBS (LIQUOR DUTIES).
SAFEGUARDING OF INDUSTRIES DUTY.
  BRONZE POWDER.
  BRONZE POWDER.
  FABRIC GLOVE INDUSTRY.
  FABRIC GLOVE INDUSTRY.
  REVENUE.
  REVENUE.
PEACE TREATIES.
  GERMAN REPARATION.
  GERMAN REPARATION.
  UNITED STATES (ARMY OF OCCUPATION).
  UNITED STATES (ARMY OF OCCUPATION).
BRITISH ARMY.
  PRINCE OK WALES'S LEINSTER REGIMENT (ROYAL CANADIANS).
  PRINCE OK WALES'S LEINSTER REGIMENT (ROYAL CANADIANS).
  JORDAN (SOLDIERS DROWNED).
  JORDAN (SOLDIERS DROWNED).
  TERRITORIAL ARMY (REGULATIONS).
  TERRITORIAL ARMY (REGULATIONS).
  IRISH GUARDS.
  IRISH GUARDS.
  NAVY, ARMY, AND AIR FORCE ISTITUTES.
  NAVY, ARMY, AND AIR FORCE ISTITUTES.
  UNITED SERVICES FUND.
  UNITED SERVICES FUND.
ROYAL NAVY.
  ROYAL DOCKYARDS (REDUCTIONS).
  ROYAL DOCKYARDS (REDUCTIONS).
  OFFICERS' MARRIAGE ALLOWANCE.
  OFFICERS' MARRIAGE ALLOWANCE.
  BIGGIN HILL AERODROME.
  BIGGIN HILL AERODROME.
  DANGEROUS WOOL (DISINFECTION).
  DANGEROUS WOOL (DISINFECTION).
  WAGES AND COST OF LIVING.
  WAGES AND COST OF LIVING.
  GOVERNMENT AMMUNITION (CONDITIONS OF SALE).
  GOVERNMENT AMMUNITION (CONDITIONS OF SALE).
  CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, GREAT ORMOND STREET.
  CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, GREAT ORMOND STREET.
  NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (EMIGRANTS).
  NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (EMIGRANTS).
  MINISTRY OF HEALTH (DR. O'BRIEN).
  MINISTRY OF HEALTH (DR. O'BRIEN).
  STATE-MANAGED HOTELS, CROMARTY AND INVERGORDON.
  STATE-MANAGED HOTELS, CROMARTY AND INVERGORDON.
  IMAN OF SANA'A (COST OF MISSION)
  IMAN OF SANA'A (COST OF MISSION)
  JUDICIAL COMMISSION, IRELAND (CLAIMS).
  JUDICIAL COMMISSION, IRELAND (CLAIMS).
EX-SERVICE MEN.
  AIR MINISTRY.
  AIR MINISTRY.
  POST OFFICE STORES DEPARTMENT, LONDON (SPECIAL EXAMINATION).
  POST OFFICE STORES DEPARTMENT, LONDON (SPECIAL EXAMINATION).
POST OFFICE.
  MAILS, MALTA.
  MAILS, MALTA.
  CHARGES (REDUCTION).
  CHARGES (REDUCTION).
  CANDIDATES (MEDICAL EXAMINATION).
  CANDIDATES (MEDICAL EXAMINATION).
  CANADIAN CATTLE (EMBARGO).
  CANADIAN CATTLE (EMBARGO).
  BRITISH EMBASSY, PARIS (MILITARY STAFF).
  BRITISH EMBASSY, PARIS (MILITARY STAFF).
  MINERS' WAGES.
  MINERS' WAGES.
  NORTH BRITISH RAILWAY COMPANY.
  NORTH BRITISH RAILWAY COMPANY.
Preamble
The House met at a quarter before four of the clock, The EARL of DONOUGHMORE on the Woolsack.
LEGAL AND GENERAL ASSURANCE SOCIETY BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3ª, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
MILFORD DOCKS BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3ª, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

HOUSE OF LORDS OFFICES.
Order of the Day read for the consideration of the Second Report from the Select Committee.
The Committee reported inter alia:—
1. REFRESHMENT DEPARTMENT.
The Lord Great Chamberlain, as Chairman of the Sub-Committee on the Refreshment Department, stated that the Refreshment Committee had met twice, and considered the difficulty occasioned by the withdrawal of the £500 subsidy for the Refreshment Department. He informed the Committee—

(i) That in the opinion of the Refreshment Committee the maintenance of the Refreshment Department was an absolute necessity.

(ii) That the present arrangements could be continued if a sum of £250 could be found to take the place of the present subsidy of £500.

(iii) That in the opinion of the Committee this was the best course to pursue, and that the sum should be raised by asking all Peers to contribute some small sum, say, either 10s. or £1, for the purpose.

The Committee authorised the sending of a circular letter to all Peers asking for such a contribution.
2. APPOINTMENT OF THE LIBRARIAN.
The following Report from the Sub-Committee appointed by the House of Lords Offices Committee to consider the appointment to the post of Librarian in the House of Lords was laid before the Committee and was considered by the Committee:—
"Meetings of the Sub-Committee were held on Monday, February 20, and on Tuesday, February 28, 1922.
506
There were present at each meeting the Marquess of Crewe, the Viscount Haldane, and the Viscount Ullswater.
The Clerk of the Parliaments was in attendance upon the Committee.
Numerous applications (Lorty in all) for the post of Librarian were considered by the Sub-Committee.
After considering these applications your Sub-Committee felt some doubt as to the qualifications to which most weight should be given in choosing a Librarian.
Should preference be given to the possession of a distinguished literary reputation which should prove an attraction to the Library, even though there was no systematic library experience; or should preference be given to aptitude for the purely administrative work of the Library and to experience as a Librarian, unaccompanied by any specially distinguished literary achievements, but accompanied, of course, with literary ability and interest.
Your Sub-Committee feel that the Offices Committee should itself decide between these two distinct classes of qualifications, and, out of the forty applicants, the Chairman will submit to the Committee two names, one of a person possessing the former class of qualification, and the other of a person possessing the latter class of qualification.
This course will enable the Committee to make an appointment in accordance with their decision on the class of qualification they prefer.
A suggestion has been made to us that the Offices Committee should appoint a small Library Committee of Peers, to whom any questions relating to the general improvement and management of the Library could be referred by the Librarian, and who could give their assistance generally in matters relating to the control of the Library.
We think that this suggestion is well worthy of the consideration of the Committee."
The Marquess of Crewe, as Chairman of the Sub-Committee, put before the Committee two names representing the two classes of qualifications referred to in the Report.
Of the two candidates whose names were submitted, the Committee decided to appoint Mr. Charles Travis Clay, who is now the Assistant Librarian.
3. ROOM FOR GOVERNMENT WHIPS.
It was suggested that a room should be set apart for the use of the Government Whips, and the Committee approved of the suggestion if arrangements can be made with the Lord Great Chamberlain for the purpose.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE): My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now considered and adopted.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

PALESTINE: THE RUTENBERG SCHEME.
LORD RAGLAN: My Lords, I beg to ask His Majesty's Government the Questions standing in my name on the Paper—namely:—
(1) Whether what is known as the Rutenberg scheme for the development of the Jordan Valley has been sanctioned by the Government; (2) whether the owners and occupiers of the lands affected have expressed approval of the scheme; (3) whether the Government accept any responsibility for the success of the scheme; (4) whether the scheme will be carried out under Government control or supervision; (5) whether Jews working on the scheme will be afforded special protection, and if so, who will pay for it.
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND: My Lords, the Rutenberg scheme is the most substantial practical contribution so far made by Judaism to the restoration of prosperity to Palestine. The proposal, put shortly, is that the river Jordan should be dammed at the point where it leaves the Lake of Tiberias and the lake thus converted into a great natural reservoir. Turbines are then to be installed near the dam and the water power employed for the generation of electricity. The water after passing through the turbines will return to the old course of the Jordan. The scheme, as originally prepared, included, in addition to the production of electrical energy, an elaborate irrigation project, the effect of which would be to bring under cultivation large areas which are at present practically waste lands, used only for grazing at certain seasons of the year.
This irrigation project has not yet been taken up, as the Palestine Government feel that the time is not yet ripe to put it into operation. On the other hand, that Government has signed an agreement with Mr. Rutenberg to the effect that if he will form a company with a certain fixed minimum of capital, he will be given a concession for the hydro-electrical project. The agreement provides that the Memorandum and Articles of Association and other regulations and constitution of the company to be formed shall be subject to the approval of the High Commissioner for Palestine, in agreement with the Jewish Agency referred to in the Mandate for Palestine. The concession also provides for the limitation of the profits to be earned by the company,
508
and for control by the Government of the rates to be charged for electrical energy. The whole working of the company is, in short, to be under Government control and supervision. On the other hand, the Government has not accepted, and does not propose to accept, any financial responsibility for the success of the scheme. This answers the first, third and fourth points in the noble Lord's Question.
As regards the second point, the whole scheme has been very carefully examined by the Palestine Government and by the advisers of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the fullest provisions have been made for preserving the rights and interests of the owners of the lands affected. These owners have not, however, been directly consulted in the matter. The scheme is one which, His Majesty's Government and the Palestine Government are satisfied, will greatly benefit the whole of Palestine. The natural conditions, the level of the land and so on, make it necessary that the canals, the power-house and other works should be situated within a small area. It would obviously be contrary to public interest to allow the owners of the land in that area to impose an absolute veto on the whole project. There is not at present any evidence that these owners will desire to impose such a veto; but if the necessity arises land will have to be expropriated and equitable compensation given. The position is very much the same that arose in this country when the great railways were being built. It is common knowledge that at that time the owners of some of the lands over which the railways were to pass were bitterly opposed to the scheme and did their best to create difficulties. Vested interests, however, were not allowed to stand in the way of the common good, and I am sure that your Lordships will not wish that prejudices and vested interests, supposing such to exist, should be allowed to stand in the way of a scheme which will bring such immense benefits to the whole of Palestine.
LORD RAGLAN: May I ask the noble Duke whether the owners will be given an opportunity of appearing before an independent tribunal?
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND: I must have notice of that Question. Perhaps the noble Lord will ask me later. As regards the last part of the Question on the Paper, Mr. Rutenberg and his friends do

509
not propose to employ only Jewish labour on the works which are to be carried out. On the contrary, the scheme will benefit all inhabitants of the country, Jews and Arabs alike; it will give employment to large numbers of Arabs; Jewish and Arab labourers will work side by side on digging the canals, building the power-houses, installing the machinery and keeping the whole in running order, each class of labour performing the work for which it is most suited. It will be the duty of the Government, just as it is the duty of every constituted Government, to maintain public order and protect these and all other important public works from raiders and other irresponsible opponents of law, order and progress. This is provided for in a clause of the concession which runs as follows:—"The undertaking of the Company under this concession shall be recognised as a public utility body under Government control and all the installations and property of the undertaking shall receive protection as such and the company shall be entitled only to such rights to compensation for damage as are provided by law."

JEWISH IMMIGRANTS IN PALESTINE.
LORD RAGLAN: My Lords, I desire to ask His Majesty's Government whether the unemployed Jewish immigrants in Palestine are being formed into labour battalions, and if so, how these battalions are being employed, and at what rates and from what funds they are being paid.
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND: My Lords, the High Commissioner informs me that unemployed Jewish immigrants are not being formed into labour battalions. In July last it was decided as far as possible to replace Egyptian labour by Palestinian labour on work required for the Army in Palestine. The Egyptian Labour Corps were therefore relieved and Palestinians took their place. No additional cost to Army funds was involved. Your Lordships will, I am sure, agree that the step taken was in the economic interest of Palestine. The High Commissioner and the Palestine Government are fully alive to the possible economic dangers of unrestricted Jewish immigration. The present restrictions are severe and their severity has been increased by a recent decision under which all applications from intending immigrants of what may be termed the labouring classes have in the first place to
510
be referred to the Palestine Government. The latter will decide in each case whether a particular immigrant can be admitted without danger of unemployment.
LORD RAGLAN: Do I understand that these battalions are paid from Army funds?
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND: No additional costs to Army funds are involved. No further expenditure could be paid out of Army funds without an additional Vote.

IRISH FREE STATE (AGREEMENT) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (VISCOUNT PEEL): My Lords, may I first be allowed to say that I have received a communication from the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack to the effect that he very much regrets that, through indisposition, he is unable to come down to your Lordships' House this afternoon, but that he hopes to be able to attend to-morrow? Last December your Lordships came to a very notable and very momentous decision. You approved the Articles of Agreement between His Majesty's Ministers and Delegates from the South of Ireland. You signified your assent and approval, not in any hasty manner but after prolonged discussion and debate covering some three days. During the course of that debate this Agreement and the policy that led up to it were exhaustively canvassed and discussed. I think I have never myself heard an instrument submitted to more close and critical examination than that particular instrument. It was presented to your Lordships by the Lord Chancellor. The noble and learned Viscount never pretended that he was thoroughly satisfied with every Article in that Agreement, nor did he pretend that there were not portions of it which, if he had had his way, might not have been different. He did, however, present it to your Lordships as the best that could be done, after long conference, in the very difficult circumstances that then obtained.
When that instrument was presented, the batteries of criticism were unloosed and for some three days there rained down fire and hail upon it. The Agreement was

511
attacked from almost every conceivable angle and point of view. It was described by some as a surrender, and it was even criticised by others, who approved generally of the Agreement, as having been made at the wrong time. That is a very old argument in political controversy, one which is as old as Parliaments and which I think will probably survive them. The Agreement was penetrated and criticised by the legal acumen of some of the most distinguished lawyers of the day, and then something remarkable happened. When it came to the Division, and when the lists were counted, it was found that, in spite of all this attack, criticism and condemnation, your Lordships gave your approval by a majority of something like four to one. I should be rash if I were to attempt to interpret the motives and views which guided your Lordships—
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: How many abstentions?
VISCOUNT PEEL: I have not the figures—but I think I may say that what your Lordships felt was that, although there was much cogency in the arguments advanced against the instrument, yet you were confronted as practical statesmen by the necessity for action, and among the alternatives presented you accepted this one as the least difficult of several very difficult courses. The approval of that instrument constituted a great change in the situation. Before the approval of that instrument, it had been the act of His Majesty's Ministers, but by that solemn assent, given by your Lordships on that occasion, you did, I think, take your share in that responsibility and signify that in the opinion of this House you did assent to that instrument. What does this Bill, which we have before us to-day, do? It does really no more than give legal authority to that instrument then approved of.
LORD CARSON: It does a great deal more.
VISCOUNT PEEL: It is, in effect, the necessary and legal consequence, you may say, of the action then taken by your Lordships. It confirms and puts into legal form what your Lordships did then by Resolution. Now let us see what is the history of the situation since that decision was taken.
LORD CARSON: Hear, hear.
VISCOUNT PEEL: First of all, under Article 17, and in accordance with that article, a Provisional Government was set up in the South of Ireland. But we shall all admit that such a Provisional Government is in itself an anomaly. It was a Provisional Government recognised by our Government here, but yet unsanctified by law, and how are you to expect a Government so constituted, not resting on the sanction of law, to have full force and authority unless it has attained that sanction? Let me give an example of what has happened and does happen in such a situation. As your Lordships know, certain outrages and lawless acts have been committed in Ireland. What was the attitude, and what could be the only attitude, of the Provisional Government under those circumstances? They had to reason with the perpetrators. They had to expostulate with those charged with criminal acts. They were unable, in their comparatively weak position, to exercise that direct action of authority which is the right and duty of Governments. Again, how is it possible to expect that a Government so conspicuous, shall I say, in its legal weakness, can feel sufficient confidence in itself and in its own authority properly to execute the duties of Government? This confirmation is done by this Bill.
But, as the noble and learned Lord has said, I think the Bill does more than that. It also proposes to set up a Constituent, Assembly—an Assembly before which the new Constitution of Ireland, when it has been drawn up and approved by the Provisional Government, will be placed for assent and criticism. It has, perhaps (shall I say?) another object, and that is to secure a Parliament not elected during the heat of the conflict with this country, but a Parliament whose eyes are more directed towards the rebuilding and reconstruction of the Irish social state than to the practice of another Parliament of heaping higher the fire of fury against this country.
There has been much criticism of the Provisional Government because they did not hold an Election at an earlier period. There were many ill this country also who thought that the postponement of that Election might have an unfortunate effect upon the acceptance of the Treaty. Under

513
this Bill, if it become an Act, the Election is not to be held later than four months after the Bill becomes an Act. I think there are a good many advantages in the postponing of this particular Election. Recalling past Elections, one can remember that the beaten party has generally attributed its ill success not to the failure of its arguments but to the fact that the Election was taken at an unpropitious moment, when it was not well prepared to put its arguments before the country. This at least is avoided by the delay. No one can deny that when the Election comes the decision will be taken by the people of Ireland with the fullest consciousness of the decision they are about to make.
I think your Lordships will admit that under a Parliamentary system and a Parliamentary Government it is a very dangerous thing to have Parties divided on what I may call the Constitutional line; that is to say, to have a Party in the Government which wants to alter or change the existing system of Government. It is much more suitable to the genius of Parliamentary institutions that Parties should be divided on social, economic or other lines of division, and not on the line of division which, in the minds of one Party, produces a lack of interest in current economic and political questions. It may be that the result of this long discussion and the Election, if, as we hope, there is a large majority for the settlement, and the Republican Party are unsuccessful, will be to do something to do away with the necessity, or the reason, for having in that new Parliament a Republican Party; and that there may be the more legitimate and proper forms of Parliamentary controversy resting on the basis of ordinary domestic and economic divisions and quarrels.
But there is another, and perhaps more important, reason. Suspicion, I suppose, is easy to arouse in any country, and suspicion, certainly under present circumstances, is not always difficult to arouse in Ireland. And those who are opposed to this settlement might find it easy to attack the good faith of the British Government by saying that, after all, they did not mean what they had intended to do, and that they might withdraw as easily as they had granted them these new privileges. But the advantage is that they now have under their eyes the process going on; they now see buildings, institu-
514
tions, and public offices being handed over to the new Government, being taken possession of by the new Government. They have, therefore, before their eyes the full sight of the good faith with which the British Government is acting, and it does not become possible for anybody to suggest, however suspicious he may be, that there is a danger of the Government departing from the pledges it has given and the promise that it has made.
There is also the great advantage, that, if you had had that Election at once or very shortly, it would have been taken on the Agreement itself. By postponing the Election you will have not only the Agreement but the actual Constitution—the full body and form of the Constitution—arising, as it were, out of the Agreement. So that when the Irish people come to exercise their vote and arrive at their decision, they will have the whole story before them. They will have, not only the Articles of Agreement, but the actual, solid, written form of the new Constitution, on which they can pronounce, and, with full knowledge and full understanding, they will be able to judge of the details of the Constitution under which they may desire to be governed.
Your Lordships know that there is a Party—a large Party perhaps, in the South of Ireland—a Republican Party. You may say, in fact, that the larger number of them consider that they are governed by a Republic. It is true that that Republic has never been recognised, and never will be recognised, by the British Government. But if that is so, and if in their own minds they have the feeling that they have a Republic, and that they are Republicans, surely it becomes of great importance, if that Republic is to be altered and a new Government is to be brought in, that that should be done by the very votes and by the assent of those who have most strenuously supported and maintained this Republic. Old political writers spoke of a Social Contract in some remote period of the past as the ground of political obligations. But here you have a new Social Contract, not based upon some imaginary period in the past, but actual and living, based on the present and on the votes of the people, voting with full knowledge of what they are about.
I think I must pause here to deal with the point which was raised a few days ago by the noble and learned Lord, Lord

515
Carson. He said, in effect: "Will not this new Constitution, when drawn up by the Provisional Government, be presented first to this Parliament for the criticism of your Lordships and of another place, before it is presented to the Irish Parliament, because, supposing this Constitution is first criticised and accepted by the Irish Parliament, how difficult it will be for the Houses of Parliament over here to amend or to criticise." And he proceeded to say that that might be some reflection on the powers of Parliament. If there is one thing certain about this Constitution, and a thing that will most help it to be properly worked and to be accepted, it is that it should be absolutely clear in every particular that it is not an article of British manufacture, but that it is wholly Irish, and that even the finishing processes have not been introduced in this country.
But is there really so difficult a dilemma as the noble and learned Lord has suggested? This Constitution, so presented, must be within the Articles of Agreement. No doubt the Provisional Government in Ireland will fully assure themselves, before they present it to the people or to that Parliament, that it does so come within the Articles of Agreement. If it does, and the British Government, also assuring themselves of this, present it to your Lordships for approval, what advantage would there be in introducing these Amendments? Supposing it be secured that it is within those Articles of Agreement, why should we trouble ourselves about the details of an arrangement which must be far more interesting to the Irish than to ourselves? Parliament, of course, can do what it likes, but, if the Constitution of the Irish Free State, so drawn up, is regular and legal, and comes within the terms of the Articles of Agreement, it would be very much better to leave the whole of the execution and the working out of it to the Irish themselves.
May I refer to another point that was raised, with reference to Amendments to the Treaty itself? After all, what was this Treaty, and this Agreement? It was arrived at after five mouths of discussion between the representatives of the delegates of the South of Ireland and the British Ministers, after long and almost interminable conferences, and was naturally the result of compromise, arrangement, discussion, of acceptance of one Article here and rejection of another there; in fact, of a general balance produced as the
516
result of those long discussions. How dangerous would it be if Amendments to some particular part of it were passed, or even explanations, because, supposing Amendments or explanations were introduced—let us say in your Lordships' House—it is clear that the road would be fully open, and it would be claimed by Ministers on the other side that they also had the right to explain and to amend. And you would have the spectacle of this Agreement, settled and arranged after these long discussions, again being settled and arranged after a series of discussions between the Parliament here and Ministers there, and there would be an almost endless chain, backwards and forwards, of Amendment, explanation and co-explanation. In fact, you would have commentary on the text, and then gloss and commentary on the commentary, until finally, I suppose, in the mass of emendations, commentaries and glosses the original Treaty would probably vanish for ever.
There is one other point, as I am on that subject, to which I must allude, because it was raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carson. It is as to the date upon which the Ulster month—that is to say, the period within which Ulster has the full right to contract itself out of this Constitution when it is made—begins to run. He suggested that that month might run from the passing of this Bill into an Act, and I said that I would ask that the matter should be carefully considered. The Government, I understand, are clearly of the view that no other construction could be put upon those Articles than that the Ulster month begins to run not from the period when this Bill becomes an Act, but from the period when the Bill constituting the Irish Free State and the Constitution is approved by Parliament. I might add that there is this additional point, that though I believe the Irish Ministers indicated that they took the opposite view—that the period began to run from the first Act—yet they entirely agreed to abide by the interpretation that was put upon it by the British Ministers, and the British Ministers, acting on advice no doubt have come to the conclusion I have indicated.
LORD CARSON: Will the noble Viscount tell me who it was that agreed?
VISCOUNT PEEL: Certainly; the Provisional Government.
LORD CARSON: The Provisional Government! But I am talking of Ulster.
VISCOUNT PEEL: Yes, but I am talking about the Provisional Government.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: Will the noble Viscount say whether this is a legal interpretation, or whether it is the opinion held by Ministers?
VISCOUNT PEEL: h is the opinion held by Ministers, acting, no doubt, upon the best legal advice they can take.
LORD CARSON: Every lawyer I have spoken to has taken the other view; and I have spoken to many.
VISCOUNT PEEL: If the noble and learned Lord is dissatisfied he will, perhaps, put that point to-morrow to the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor.
LORD CARSON: Yes.
VISCOUNT PEEL: I thought that was a convenient point at which to interpolate into the general course of the argument I am presenting to your Lordships the answers to those specific questions. Now, having approved of this Agreement, the question I have to ask your Lordships—and I think it is a very grave one—is this. After having expressed your approval, has anything happened which should lead you to consider that you ought to change your opinions on the approval of that Agreement? This is a point I address to those critics who, while approving of the Agreement, thought His Majesty's Government had gone rather far in some of the proposals. Your Lordships will observe that, after you met in December, when that Agreement was submitted to the Dail Eireann it was passed by an unexpectedly small majority, and I think that showed that if there was to be an Agreement and if those Articles of Agreement were to be passed, the British Government had rather nicely gauged the feeling in another country and that they had not gone for acceptance one whit too far.
NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear.
VISCOUNT PEEL: But I think the same thing may be said of the other signatories to the Agreement. What happened?
518
As soon as the other signatories to the Agreement got over to the other side of the water they were greeted with charges of having surrendered and of being traitors—precisely the charges which, with that rich vocabulary of vituperation which some noble Lords possess, were addressed to those who signed the document over here. It is rather interesting, therefore, to see that both sets of signatories were greeted with almost exactly the same form of attack when they either got back to their own country or presented the document to their fellow countrymen.
We are only too well aware that during these last few months many terrible and horrible crimes have been committed—crimes which have roused in my countrymen great disgust and abhorrence. But the question I have to ask your Lordships is this: Is there the slightest evidence that in any way the newly set up Provisional Government has connived at, assisted, or done otherwise than attempted to deal most severely with those crimes that have been so committed? I think the whole of the evidence is the other way, and that, though it is extraordinarily difficult, if I may say so respectfully, to get the same opinion out of two Irishmen on the state of Ireland, this is one point on which, I think, there is more agreement than on any other, and that during these months and under great difficulties the Provisional Government have been doing their best to govern and to maintain what order they can. It is only fair to say here that the Provisional Government is beset with the greatest difficulties. One of the chief of those difficulties is that among their sharpest critics, among their chief opponents—and it is an experience of which we have constantly recurrent examples even in this fortunate country—are their old allies. Those are the people who very often place the greatest stumbling blocks in the way.
It is a difficult matter for men inexperienced in government, as these are, to turn suddenly to the difficult work that has been put into their hands and deal with new and difficult problems of government; but it becomes a thousand times more difficult when they seek to reorganise and produce some sense of order in a country that has been so demoralised as that country has been for the last two or three years. Nevertheless, I understand from those most conversant with the subject

519
that the Provisional Government is attacking these difficult problems with great energy and is gradually, but slowly perhaps, gathering strength and support.
Let me now turn for a moment to a very difficult matter connected with the position of Ulster, because I am certain we all feel that, even if peace or a settlement was procured in the South of Ireland, it would be deplorable if that peace were purchased at the expense of the good feeling and the friendship of our friends in Ulster. They have, of course, as your Lordships know, the fullest right of maintaining the powers they obtained under the Act of 1920. They have the fullest privilege and right—it is more than a privilege; it is a right—of separating themselves entirely from the Government that is to be set up under the Articles of Agreement. Their position in that respect is thoroughly safeguarded. They have the full right to refuse to join that Government when it is established. They have, if I may say so, one small advantage even over the people in this country, because they manage, and have the right to manage, their own affairs and are able to come here and deal most fully not only with Imperial affairs but with all our domestic affairs.
Trouble has arisen, no doubt, over the boundary question. I do not think need deal with the history of that question, because the noble and learned Viscount gave a full explanation on a previous occasion. Nor need I state how it was that these Articles appeared in the Agreement itself, since the reason for that was also given by the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack, and he, as one of the signatories of the Treaty, is able to speak with the fullest authority. It would be absurd, therefore, of me to add to or subtract from anything he has said. I think I am correct in stating that the anxieties of Ulster have arisen not so much from the insertion of this particular Article in the Treaty as from some of the unauthorised interpretations that have appeared of the Article in various quarters. They have been alarmed, I understand, at the extension which they think might be given to that particular Article in relation to the question of boundaries. This is, of course, a thing of which I must speak with reserve and caution, because I understand that it really is a matter—and solely a matter—not for the interpretation of the Government but of the Chairman of the Commission.
LORD CARSON: Why not make it clear now?
VISCOUNT PEEL: The noble and learned Lord says: "Why not make it clear now?" I will give him an answer at once. If I did so, I should immediately be infringing the rights and duties of the Chairman when he is appointed. But the fears of Ulster—and I want to deal as squarely with them as I can—seem to me to rest upon a number of assumptions. They rest, first of all, upon the assumption that all the decisions of the Tribunal are to go against Ulster, and in favour of the rest of Ireland. They seem to assume that there are no homogeneous Protestant populations to the south of that line which, under the operations of the Tribunal, might be transferred north of the line. They seem to assume that the Boundary Commission is not a Boundary Commission, and that the term Boundary Commission has no meaning. They assume, further, that this Chairman, when selected, will not act with that average amount of intelligence and common sense which you would expect from a man selected to deal with so important a business. They also seem to have forgotten, or to attach no meaning to, the words of limitation in the Article regarding the question of "economic and geographic conditions" which, read with the other words, have so clear a limiting effect.
It seems, therefore, that their fears rest upon a great pile of assumptions which put before them dangers which they apprehend could happen. It is of the very gravest disadvantage that the Conference between the Prime Minister of Ulster and Mr. Collins should have failed or broken down on this point, but the Government still hope that some arrangement may be reached at a later date before that Commission is set up, and that when the Commission is set up its Chairman may merely have to accept and confirm an arrangement already made, rather than himself act as an adjudicator and arbitrator. The last observation I make on that matter is that for those who are interested in a united Ireland by the combining together of Ulster and the rest of Ireland in one country, it would be a most unfortunate thing if all homogeneous populations were removed from the Ulster boundary, and Ulster thereby became so far reduced that it formed one homogeneous block which would be more unwilling than ever it has

521
been to enter into an arrangement with the rest of Ireland.
I think we must all agree that during the last few months—I am passing away from the boundary question now—the position of Ulster has been vastly strengthened. She has shown, under great difficulties and not without some provocation, great dignity and self-restraint. She has done her best not to lay any stress upon those grounds of bitterness which it would have been so easy to exaggerate. She has shown a great and high degree of self-sacrifice in refusing any temptation to obstruct the grant to the rest of Ireland of greater rights than she possessed of self-government herself. There is no question that in the minds of the people of this country she has thereby confirmed the strength of our friendship, and established a position of great moral and political strength.
Is there any reason, therefore, why your Lordships should not persevere in the determination to carry out the Agreement? Let us look at one or two of the alternatives which might take place, and see what are the risks and dangers that might occur to this country. Supposing—unfortunate as would be the supposition and unlikely as I think it is that Ireland repudiated her bargain. In that ease she would, I think, be swept entirely bare of that sympathy which she received from the great Dominions. She could hardly expect to receive any sympathy from those Dominions if she refused a position, of which they themselves are proud, of being one of the great associated territories and nations of the British Empire. She would have proclaimed to the world generally that her desire was not for complete self-government, but was for definite separation from the British Empire. She would have given out to all Irishmen in all the Dominions that they were themselves aliens within the Empire. How much sympathy would she thereby have lost by showing that she refused to recognise those limitations which the proximity of Britain necessitates should be made in the interests of Britain's legitimate demands for security? I understand that no such anticipations may be entered into, and that all the recent information received by the Government from Ireland is that there is a slow but certain movement by the people of the country away from Mr. de Valera and the Republicans and towards the acceptance of the Articles of Agreement.
522
There are other alternatives. Supposing this Agreement is accepted, and supposing it unfortunately happens that that good will which we hope may begin to be established between this country and Ireland does not result, what are the dangers that may be apprehended from ill will on the part of that country under its new Constitution? It is very often useful not only to look at the size of countries, but to examine their relative populations. I think it was Sir Robert Giffen who pointed out, in a very interesting essay, the immense difference in the distribution of power in Europe that had been caused by the relative changes in the populations of the different countries, and if you look at the beginning of the Union at the time of Pitt, when he was afraid of the action that might be taken by a separate Parliament in Ireland, you will find that then the proportions of population were something like two to one in the two islands. This has changed to about nine or ten to one, so that the relative importance of the two populations has enormously altered, and has altered, as far as numbers go, certainly in favour of the people of this country.
You have also this security. So close is, I will not say the economic dependence of Ireland, but the economic interest and connection of Ireland with this country, that something like ninety per cent. of her trade is done with this country, and even if you have some divergence of sentiment yet the tremendous unity of interest is so close that, of itself, it is sonic security against any results from ill will in that country.
We have been familiar for so long with the Irish question that we have become somewhat too much obsessed with it. We have had an Irish Party in our Parliament for many years with unusual and unequal power because it has been able to exert a balance between the different Parties in this country, and it may be that these problems and questions have been brought so closely to us that we have tended somewhat to exaggerate the importance of the Irish question in the economy of these islands. It may be that when we are able to deal with our own affairs in our own Parliament without these Members the Irish question will be relegated to its real place in our considerations; that it will not bulk so largely in all our political arrangements or cause such a great disturbance amongst our Parties and political business.

523
The situation is now, or will be for the future, wholly changed. For the future, as it has never been in the past, the searchlights of history will be turned in this matter not on England and the British people but on the Irish people themselves. Their testing time, not our testing time, will come, and we shall look—the people of this country will look—with great sympathy, but not, I think, without some relief, upon them while they are engaged in the task of reconstruction and rebuilding in Ireland. It has generally been a matter of criticism or complaint that the Irish have almost too keen an historical sense, and one would wish that in some ways we could shorten their memories. It may be that when the pressure of the present struggle is removed and a new range of subjects and interests fills their minds, when all the fresh problems coming from the division of Parties and interests in that country supervene, that these new matters will make old memories indistinct, will make t hear forget the Treaty of Limerick and blur even the masterful figure of Oliver Cromwell.
I do not wish to prophesy because prophets are of no use unless they are melancholy; they have a monopoly of melancholia. I should like, however, to be allowed to speculate, I think it may be an advantage to Ireland if, in the years to come, she is no longer able to attribute her shortcomings in her own country, from whatever causes they arise, to the exceptional stupidity of successive British Governments. I think it may be of some advantage to her if, in the future, she can no longer lean upon the mighty arm of England but has to rely on the strength and manliness, and experience, of her own sons. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2ª.—(Viscount Peel.)
LORD SUMNER: My Lords, with your Lordships' indulgence, I venture to intervene at this stage of the debate. The place, I am conscious, is far more prominent than any which my position in your Lordships' House would entitle me to occupy, and it is certainly more prominent than any I should have desired to take of my own motion. But this Bill involves many extremely complicated questions of constitutional and administrative law, and it has been suggested by those to whose
524
better judgment I feel I ought to defer that I might be of some assistance to your Lordships by intervening at this stage. If that be so—I am quite unable to tell whether it is so or not—I should not think it right, from any diffidence of my own, to refuse to place before your Lordships any assistance that I can possibly offer.
Before I proceed, however, I wish to say what I do not doubt expresses the united feeling of your Lordships' House, that we regret the indisposition, which we trust is purely temporary, that prevents us from having the benefit of the presence of the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor. May I also be allowed to say that we congratulate ourselves on the fact that the introduction of this Bill has been placed in the hands of the noble Viscount. He has never introduced a measure into this House without discharging a most difficult task with very great success. He propitiates us at the outset by a conciliatory introduction; he accepts criticism with good temper and he takes defeat, if any defeat occurs, in good part. I trust, therefore, that this happy accident may render this debate perhaps less lurid than the subject might have led us to expect it to be.
Before I come to the actual provisions of the Bill, may I draw attention to two or three observations which the noble Viscount made in the course of his speech? He explained that this Bill is the necessary consequence of the vote which your Lordships and another place passed last December in approbation of the Treaty, and he then proceeded to treat it as a necessary, almost a harmless, consequence of the proceedings on that occasion. I am not aware that anything further was necessary to approval of Parliament to the Treaty than the Resolutions which were passed, which said that the Treaty was approved. I am not aware that there is one word in this Treaty which says anything at all about the particular legislation required to give effect to it, unless it be the reference in Article 11 to "the passing of the Act of Parliament for the ratification of this instrument." We are told that this is not to be the Act of Parliament in question, and for that purpose, therefore, the introduction of this Bill was not necessary at all.
Then, with a little more exordium of that kind, he proceeded to explain to us that

525
the Bill sets up a Constituent Assembly—an expression which I do not find anywhere, either in the Treaty or in the Bill, and which we can only extract by speculation from its provisions. And after that, he proceeded to pass a eulogy upon the arrangements in contemplation with regard to the passing of the Constitution of Southern Ireland which, I must say, filled me with amazement. By a fortunate circumstance an interval of time, not longer than four months after the passing of this Act, is anticipated for the steps which are to be taken for the assembling of that Constituent Assembly and for the issue of its deliberations. That interval, so fortunately, so providentially interposed, will have the result of calming the temper of Southern Ireland, of preventing anyone from saying that the occasion is not a propitious moment for an Election, and it will further give to the people of Ireland, who have for so long been struggling to give expression to their ardent desire for moderation and for a constitutional settlement, an opportunity of adopting a Constitution not made in England, but of wholly Irish, or rather of wholly Southern Irish manufacture, and we may then expect that, from that fortunate concurrence of events, those better days will dawn which were the subject of a prophecy, which the noble Viscount disclaimed as prophecy, because be regards prophets as melancholy persons among whom he cannot class himself, but nevertheless painted in glowing colours, only less attractive than the tints, which were devoted to his picture of the state of Ireland as it is to-day.
I have no intention of following the noble Viscount in his prophecies, or anybody else's prophecies, melancholy or merry. Personally, I have no use for prophecy, least of all official prophecy, and I think it will be very much better for us not to flatter ourselves that, as the proportions of population change, the consequences pointed out by Sir Robert Giffen may be expected to follow; not to flatter ourselves that when Ireland governs herself we shall hear no more about her; not to imagine that the people of Southern Ireland will do better when they learn no longer to lean on the mighty arm of England—though I thought the portion of our anatomy with which they had concerned themselves was our back—and that when these happy things have happened, the fortunate results of the last six or eight
526
months of politics will all be gathered in. I will ask your Lordships to consider what I conceive to be the meaning of this Bill. If I express myself in terms which are rather blunt, I hope I may also manage to make them rather plain; and if at last plain language can be introduced into the arrangements that have been made, and are being made, with Ireland, I cannot think that the public welfare of either island will be the worse for it.
At the present moment the Government of Southern Ireland is being carried on by the Provisional Government headed, as I understand, by Mr. Collins; and if I speak of Mr. Collins when I should say the Provisional Government, I hope I may be pardoned, for I intend no reflection on his colleagues, whose past, I do not doubt, is as distinguished as his own. For some reason, however, the personality of Mr. Collins has been so attractive or picturesque that it has caught the public imagination, and the Government of Southern Ireland is represented to us to-day, and, I imagine, to a good many of the inhabitants of Southern Ireland, as the Government of Mr. Collins. Mr. Collins was until comparatively recently, and may, for all I know, still be Minister of Finance in the Republican Government of Ireland. Whether he holds that office still I do not know, but I should very much like to know what other office he holds, in virtue of which he is governing and is to carry on the government of Ireland. Under the existing law the Government of Ireland is carried on, subject to various Statutes of which the Act of 1920 is the latest, by Ministers of the Crown. Is Mr. Collins, in any sense of the word, a Minister of the Crown, or is he to be so? He is at any rate, I suppose, a Minister of the Crown, who has not yet gone through the ceremony of taking the Oath of Allegiance, as other Ministers do.
Mr. Collins and his Government are a revolutionary Government. Mr. Collins and his Government are carrying on such government as Southern Ireland is blessed with, and are carrying it on without any legal authority whatsoever. I am not here making any random assertions. Your Lordships have, no doubt, familiarised yourselves with the discussion in another place. This Bill was there introduced—if I may be permitted to say so, very ably—with the frank avowal from the beginning that the present Provisional Government

527
of Ireland had no legal powers and no legal rights, and that the necessity for this Bill was that of investing them with some legal powers and some legal rights. Indeed, when the Motion for the approbation of the Treaty came on in your Lordships' House last December, I remember being struck by the speech of the noble Marquess who leads the House, in which he explained to us, as if he were explaining part of the ordinary machinery of Government in the British Empire, that what was to be done was to set up a Provisional Government, and to hand over to the Provisional Government the government of Southern Ireland; and that then there would be an Indemnity Bill. It was as though the system of government, which takes the place of the statutory and constitutional regulation of our lives, was that Ministers should hand over the powers which had been placed in their hands by law to persons recently in arms against the Crown, and then conic to Parliament and say: "There may be some illegalities in what we have done; these illegalities may be more or they may be less; there will therefore be, in the ordinary course, an Act of Indemnity, so that we and our instruments, at any rate, shall not suffer."
That is the position, and I agree that a position like that, whatever may be said of those who brought it about, is a position which it is urgently necessary to regularise. The noble Viscount said, I think very truly, but using a new adjective in this connection, that the Government of Mr. Collins was unsanctified by law. I am not aware that it is sanctified by anything at all, but it certainly rests upon no foundation of law, and the sooner whatever Government is carried on in Ireland does rest upon some foundation of law the better. It is an unprecedented position in the British Empire that a considerable portion of these islands should be governed, so far as it is governed at all, by Ministers who have no legal authority, who have no legal force, and who derive their present power from a precarious and scanty majority in an Assembly, which is at any rate not recognised by the British Constitution. How is this to be done? It is done in a form which is not only novel but appears to me to be highly inconvenient, and I venture to say deliberately inconvenient.
Of course, I know that as soon as a lawyer gets up at this box, and says a Bill is not in proper form, he provokes at once
528
an expression which was heard in these discussions not long ago. He is accused of being a constitutional pedant. Well, anybody can call me a constitutional pedant that likes, but when I believe that the course taken is a breach of the Constitution and an invitation to future difficulties, instead of the closing of old ones, at the risk of pedantry I think it my duty to point out the difficulty that I foresee.
This short little Bill contains one subsection which says that the Treaty "shall have the force of law as from the date of the passing of this Act"; that is to say, that the instrument which reached its fruition in the small hours, I think, of December 6, in circumstances which still remain in dispute, is to be for the present at any rate an Act of Parliament, expressed as no Act of Parliament ever was before, dealing with a variety of subjects which require the greatest precision of statement, and dealing with them in a mariner which leaves a great deal to the imagination. That is one thing. The other thing which it does is to provide that "for the purpose of giving effect to Article 17. …Orders in Council may be made transferring to the Provisional Government established under that Article the powers and machinery therein referred to." That is the real business part of the Bill. Let us see how all that is done. Under the Treaty, by Article 17, it was provided as part of the Agreement that when the Provisional Government was established the British Government should "take the steps necessary to transfer to such Provisional Government the powers and machinery requisite for the discharge of its duties." That, and that alone, is the limit that is placed upon the powers which this Bill is to confer upon His Majesty's Government, to legislate for the administration of Southern Ireland.
The Bill does not define, the Treaty did not define, what the duties of this Provisional Government are, but I suppose they are administrative duties, such as any Government calling itself by that name will have to carry on in the twenty-six counties, and the powers and machinery which are to be transferred are such as His Majesty's Government at present possess in law, and which they require legal authority to transfer to somebody else. That is to be done by Orders in Council. Hitherto, the government of any large tract of these islands has been decided upon within the walls of Parliament by carefully framed legislation, passed

529
through all its stages in both Houses, subjected to the examination of experienced and careful men, and when it issues in the end it has taken the form of a carefully constructed Act of Parliament.
The government of Southern Ireland, during the interval of the Provisional Government will, under this Bill, be carried on under powers transferred by His Majesty's Government, without consultation with Parliament, without the knowledge of Parliament, at dates that they select for themselves, in instalments exactly as they please, and they may or they may not extend beyond the limiting words, namely, those "requisite for the discharge of its duties." If they do, Parliament will have no opportunity of interfering to prevent it, and this is what is called placing Mr. Collins in the position of having an authority which at least rests on law, and which will enable him to do in his distracted country that which, without it, he cannot do, or has not hitherto succeeded in doing. Piecemeal there are to be doled out to him by His Majesty's Government powers given by themselves, with which he is to carry on his authority in Southern Ireland, and this is supposed to be attractive to a population whose principal grievance, so far as I can make out, has been hitherto that it was governed from England.
The constitutional method would have been to bring these matters before Parliament, to defend them in the presence of legislators of both Houses, and to seek a formal statutory Parliamentary authority. I understand the excuse to have been—I do not think anyone will call it a justification—that if it were not done in this way, and if the Orders in Council were to lie upon the Table and be subject to the approval or disapproval of either House or both Houses of the Legislature, the result would be that there might be delay in the transfer of much-needed powers to Mr. Collins, which would hamper him in the performance of his duties.
Another excuse is that after all it is not for long, and that the error, if error it be, is but a little one. Let me examine that for a moment or two. These Orders in Council either are drafted at this moment or they ought to have been drafted by this time, and considering how little the officials connected with the Irish Government have had to do with the actual details of Irish Government for the last two months, I cannot believe that there is, or
530
has been, any difficulty whatever in preparing these Orders in Council. If there is any delay it is entirely due to the fault of His Majesty's Government in not acquainting themselves beforehand with the details to lay before Parliament. There would be no difficulty in laying these Orders in Council upon the Table now, and circulating them to your Lordships, so that in Committee it would be possible to examine them and see whether they do or do not require the criticism or amendment of either House of Parliament.
But of course the advantage of doing it in the way in which it is to be done is the same advantage as is accorded to the new constitutional divergence, which has marked this transaction from the very beginning. That is to say, Parliament is not consulted until the end of the process, instead of Parliament being taken into the confidence of Ministers from the very beginning. I do not know that I ought to appeal to the House to consider what Mr. Gladstone would have done. He is one of those figures of the past not very much remembered now, but what would Mr. Gladstone have done? In connection with Home Rule what he did was to introduce elaborate measures in the House of Commons at the outset. This is a Home Rule Bill for Southern Ireland, to be passed in this omnibus shape, to be carried out by His Majesty's Government without direct examination in Parliament, which in troubled times is very much easier for them than the ordinary constitutional method. I cannot believe that that is a right way of proceeding.
Allow me to turn to another matter. To my mind the great blot upon the Bill as it stands is that, instead of taking the opportunity of clearing up ambiguities, of which there are so many in the Treaty, and instead of taking the opportunity of completing it by enacting clearly and in detail those things which the Treaty does not deal with at all, the apparently easier course has been taken of putting off those difficulties and saying either that they will settle themselves, or, at any rate, that perhaps somebody else may have to settle them. The formula adopted is to say: "Here is the Treaty, and not one jot or one tittle of it can be altered." The Bill can be altered. I think it is admitted by the Government that the Bill can be altered by others than themselves.

531
The Bill has been altered twice already, once virtually at the bidding of Messrs. Collins and de Valera, who discovered that the only way of solving an awkward Parliamentary situation was to postpone the whole thing until June; whereupon it was also discovered that it would be a very fortunate thing not to have that Election at once—as the Bill had said, "as soon as may be"—and on the other occasion when there were introduced into the Bill some further words enlarging the powers to be taken to make Orders in Council by words which certainly seem to be very ample, though I do not dispute that in certain connections they are quite common:—
"Any Order in Council under this section may contain such incidental, consequential, or supplemental provisions as may appear to be necessary or proper for the purpose of giving effect to the foregoing provisions of this section."
If the power of legislating for Southern Ireland without further consultation with Parliament needed amplification it has got it by amendment of the Bill. And I take it there is no doubt that, whatever sanctity may attach to the text of the Treaty, to its very dotting and punctuation, does not attach to the Bill itself. As the Government can alter it, I suppose any other Amendments may be proposed and carried. It is an opportunity of which I trust your Lordships will think it right to avail yourselves.
But, as the Bill stands, it contains a number of deliberate ambiguities which are a great misfortune in the circumstances in which we have to deal with Southern Ireland. I will not take your Lordships through an instrument which is so familiar to you, but let me draw attention to one or two. Take, first, the point that arises on the fact that it is called a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland—a term which is retained in the Schedule and therefore becomes the enactment of the Legislature. There is also the point which arises upon the form of the Oath which members of the Irish Free State are to take, though there is no repeal of any other of the Statutes with reference to the taking of oaths, and therefore all other officers who have to take oaths by Statute will have to take the old Oath of Allegiance, seeing that there is no authority for any other.
I am perfectly well aware that His Majesty's Government have all along maintained—and, I do not in the least doubt, with perfect sincerity and resolution—that they never will recognise the
532
Irish Republic, and that they never will admit that Ireland has the right to say: "We are out of the Empire now, and we are only going to come in upon our own terms." But, unfortunately, the use of this language has given to the constitutionalists of Southern Ireland an argument to which they hold with great tenacity, and I am quite sure that your Lordships will agree that nothing could be more unwise than that we should under-estimate our opponents and deride their arguments, merely because we do not agree with them. May I point out that they say that these words recognise the Republic? I do so for the purpose of showing that, until you clear away the ambiguities of this instrument, and place your legislation on some basis that is free from doubt, you provoke disputes, you exacerbate quarrels, you invite trouble, and you are throwing away the most valuable opportunity to make peace while there is still time.
They say that no Treaty could be made between one part of the United Kingdom and another, even though it be a part of the United Kingdom which enjoys that modified form of union to which the Act of 1920 reduced it. They say that no Treaty can be made between two such parts, and that in any arrangement that may be come to between the inhabitants of one part and the Government of the whole there could be no question of allegiance to the Sovereign, unless it arose out of some doubt as to the real position which they occupy within the Empire.
Their argument therefore is this:—"Ireland is a separate, unconquered, independent nation, and always has been so. Ireland has set up a Republic for herself. Mr. de Valera was and Mr. Griffith is" (at least I think so, but I am not quite sure that I distribute the offices correctly) "the official head of that organisation. Nothing can destroy the Irish Republic except the power which created it—namely, the vote of the people. If the vote of the people, when it is taken at the next Election, is for entering the British Empire as the Irish Free State, then its President, justified by the vote of the people, will be able to bring it within the British Empire upon the terms of the Treaty. If it does not, it will remain out." And, as I understand, both sides in the discussion in the Dail say that till then they will remain out of it. That is, of course, absolutely opposed to what His Majesty's Government have

533
always contended. But have they not used language which was calculated, unfortunately, to lead to these unfounded expectations, and have they not gravely prejudiced the possibility of a settlement going through without the most serious difficulty, by allowing the matter to remain in doubt in any way?
There is a little more. If you attend to the arguments of their constitutionalists, their professors, their King's Counsel, and their historical students and so forth, you will find that they say this:—"This is a Treaty, and the faith which we swear to His Majesty is in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain, and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations." Not for nothing was the term "the British Empire" discarded; not for nothing was the common citizenship of Ireland with the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations referred to; not for nothing is the faithfulness to be in virtue of her adherence to and membership of that group. They say that it means that no Treaty lasts for ever; that any Treaty may be annulled by its being denounced by one of the parties to it; that those words recognise their right to secede if they please; and that there is no power whatever to prevent them from seceding if they choose. And they say that this adherence to the British Commonwealth if it came to an end by Ireland's retiring from it, would ipso facto relieve those who had taken this Oath from their duties under it.
They say that there is a further advantage about this. They say: "if we are still in the British Commonwealth of Nations, then we are entitled to be Members of the League of Nations," an institution with which, perhaps, your Lordships are not so familiar, except from outside, as you should be, because I do not think we have hitherto appreciated that it was likely to touch us at all near home. They refer to Article 12 of the Covenant, which says—
"The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report of the Council."
Very sensible! Then Article 13 provides that—
"The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which
534
they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration."
Disputes as to the interpretation of the Treaty are declared to be among those matters which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration.
Then there is this provision in Article 16—
"Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State—
and sundry other penalties of the same kind.
Their argument, therefore, is that if they exercise what they claim to be their right to retire from this Treaty, their right to do so is expressly made a subject suitable for arbitration or determination by the Council of the League of Nations; that if this country were to take the view which President Lincoln took in 1861 and resort to war and decline to go to arbitration on such a subject, there would be brought down upon our heads immediately all the penalties of Article 16, and we should be ipso facto "deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League." I do not desire it to be supposed that I think that there is a word of foundation for that. I do not desire it to be supposed that I am prophesying that there will be any necessity to deal with that situation; but I deplore the fact that, by adopting this method of getting a so-called delegation into a room where conversations take place, which only become known to a limited extent outside, and by arriving at an Agreement which nobody seems to be very well pleased with, as I gather from the noble Viscount, and which at any rate was signed at last under circumstances that have been the subject of controversy, you have entered upon and perpetuated those very misunderstandings, which have led to so many of our difficulties in the past.
Two of these gentlemen—I forget which they are, but I think Mr. Barton is one and Mr. Duggan another—said they were brought to sign by being threatened with war. On the other hand, judging by the explanations given in another place in the course of the recent debate, I understand

535
that our position is that it would never have done to break off the negotiations at that stage. We had gone much too far; we had, in the words used, allowed our arms to rust; we had dispersed a large part of our forces. So far from any threat of war being possible it was the other way about, and if the Irish delegates had thought there was a threat of war their remedy was to have called the bluff. Whatever be the truth as to that, the unfortunate thing is that here is a document which, before it is given the force of law, ought to have been rewritten in intelligible and unmistakable terms, and rewritten in those terms by agreement with the other side. Then we should have known where we were.
Why was it not done? I pass over the advantage that I pointed out—the Parliamentary advantage of getting the Bill through. I understand that as we put all our chances upon Mr. Collins it is considered to be our business to do nothing that can hinder his chances. We have backed Mr. Collins. He has been selected as the person who can deliver the goods. The date of delivery is postponed. The discount to be paid for immediate delivery might be very large. At any rate, it is to Mr. Collins and his friends that we are told to look. Therefore, if we were to introduce any Amendments into the Treaty, first of all, Mr. Collins would be prejudiced in his Election controversies with Mr. de Valera—such is the position into which we have got ourselves—and, in the second place, if we proposed Amendments Mr. Collins would claim to introduce Amendments also. That is to say, that the Imperial Parliament, which legislates for the whole of the United Kingdom at present, except that part of its powers which have been delegated to the Parliament of Northern Ireland, is not to be allowed to legislate without Mr. Collins and his fellow members of the Provisional Government having a corresponding right to say what is to be in the instrument. That seems to me to be an absolute negation of the hitherto accepted doctrine of constitutional law. But, again, that is constitutional pedantry, and I quite recognise how very difficult it would be to ask Mr. Collins now to cross a "t" or to correct the spelling of a word in this instrument. And I do not forget what happened last December.
May I draw your Lordships' attention to one or two other deliberate ambiguities
536
or omissions. Among the duties which I suppose the Provisional Government has to discharge under the Treaty is the ordinary administrative duty of collecting Taxes, and I suppose there is also the ordinary administrative duty of paying the local obligations of the State. I should be glad to know that this is wrong, but I am assuming at present that among the powers transferred to the Provisional Government there will be included the power of collecting the Taxes in Ireland, and, as the power of collecting the Taxes would then be transferred away from the Imperial Government and they could not exercise that power any further, I suppose there would be transferred to the Provisional Government the power and the duty of paying such things as old age pensions and other pensions in Southern Ireland. But Mr. Collins is not responsible to any Parliament unless it be to this Parliament. There is no Parliament in Southern Ireland, because the Parliament which was elected has not taken the Oath of Allegiance and, until June or whenever it is, there is not to be any other to take its place. In the meantime, Mr. Collins will be occupying the difficult position of being a theoretically responsible Minister, responsible, if to anybody, only to the two Houses of Parliament at Westminster—an Assembly which, I suppose, it would cost him his office, certainly his office in Ireland, to recognise.
Under Article 5 of the Agreement the Irish Free State has to assume liability for the service of the Public Debt of the United Kingdom. It is not said what that means exactly; but it is said that if the amount cannot be determined by agreement it is to be determined by arbitration. Surely, if that has the force of law it is perfectly fruitless as it stands. It does not say who are to agree; it does not say when they are to agree; and it does not say what arbitration there is to be when the arbitration takes place. How many arbitrators are there to be? In case of dispute is there to be an umpire who can decide? What powers will the arbitrators have with regard either to the definition of their functions, or to the taking of evidence, and what not? Did you ever hear of a practical arbitration clause to be put into force in the business of life, which did not say how many arbitrators there were to be, who were to appoint them, and how they were to exercise their powers? The thing cannot work as it stands. It

537
would be no contradiction of the Treaty to provide at any rate for the British Government's side of the matter and to say how and when the British Government is to enter upon this agreement, with what powers, and so forth. But it is preferred to leave that in a state of ambiguity.
On the other hand, under Article 8, there is a provision which counts in the population of Ulster in reckoning the number of troops that Southern Ireland may raise, even although Ulster has exercised its option and has come out. That may not have been intended, but it is clear to my mind, because "Ireland" means, in this instrument, the island, and the provision is that the proportion allowed to Southern Ireland is to be the proportion winch the population of Ireland bears to the population of Great Britain. On the other hand, under the financial clause when Ulster has gone out the Irish Free State still has to assume liability not for a portion of the Public Debt of the United Kingdom proportionate to the twenty-six counties, but, so far as I can make out, proportionate to the whole island of Ireland. If these things were intended. I think they must be a surprise. If they were not intended, the sooner the ambiguities are cleared away the better.
I do not propose to say much about Article 11. I do not feel that I have any right to endeavour to present any case on behalf of Ulster that would prejudice or anticipate the observations that will be addressed to your Lordships by those noble Lords who are entitled to speak for Ulster, but I do make two observations briefly and very earnestly. The first is that the sooner Ulster is put out of her pain the better. I cannot believe that any good is served, and I am quite satisfied great mischief will be done, if the question as to whether there is to be an alteration in the boundary of a grave or of a trifling kind is kept dragging on until that distant date when Southern Ireland has had an Election, has adopted (by popular vote if you please) at the polls a complicated Constitutional Bill, and has then succeeded in satisfying the Imperial Parliament that that Bill should become an Imperial Act. During that time the inhabitants on the other side of that line, to a depth which we cannot anticipate, will be unable to tell whether they will come under the Southern Government or not.
538
I say that the sooner they know that the better. I appreciate the difficulty that His Majesty's Ministers have in telling us what they think the words mean. I appreciate their argument that it is for the Commission to decide. But let me point out that the Commission is not a judicial Commission, and that it is assumed that the construction of the words would be decided by the Chairman—that is to say, that, if the two representatives of the two parts of the island will not agree, it is then assumed that the right to modify the Act of 1920 is to be conferred upon an unknown and an unnamed person, who is to have the task of interpreting of obscure words and is to be subject to no appeal, and, as far as I can make out, is to be entirely guided by such right reason as may descend upon him.
Why should not His Majesty's Ministers tell us what they mean? I thought Ministers were responsible to Parliament. I do not contend that they can alter the meaning of the words by saying what they think they mean, but they have already made it quite plain here, and I think in the other House, that Mr. Collins's extreme interpretation has taken them by surprise, and I cannot help thinking that no such idea as that entertained by Mr. Collins dawned upon your Lordships when you approved the Treaty last December. Why should not they frankly say not only that we cannot know, but that Southern Ireland cannot know, and that so far as they are concerned they do not believe the words mean what they have been said to mean, and that they certainly never intended that they should have that meaning. It would be of great assistance to the distinguished gentleman who is to occupy this position of interpreting this instrument. I do not know to whom he is to turn (unless it is to his solicitor) if he does not get some guidance of this sort, because the words are so framed that you would think at first sight there was no doubt about them, but when you look at the matter you see that is is arguable. I therefore entreat the noble Viscount to come out into the open and let us know.
Another thing I entreat the Ministry to do is to recognise that when you give these words, "from the passing of the Act of Parliament for the ratification of this instrument," the force of law you have passed an Act of Parliament which ratifies this instrument. I do not believe that

539
legal opinion, for what it may be worth, can in any considerable proportion be cited for the proposition that enacting that this Treaty shall have the force of law does not in itself ratify the Treaty. What else does it do? It gives it the force of law, but it does not ratify it. How can Parliament hereafter refuse to ratify it after it has turned it into an Act of Parliament? It would be very much better to face the fact, especially as I gather that it was Mr. Collins' view from the beginning, and he has only consented—after the Treaty is concluded and after it has been approved—privately with His Majesty's Government to take a different view.
I know it has been said—I think the late Attorney-General has expressed the opinion—that that refers to the constituent Act. I have the greatest possible respect for any opinion of his, as I have the greatest possible regard, as so many of us have, for hint, and I express no opinion about the view of a distinguished lawyer until I have seen the reasons he gave for it, and until I have seen the facts and circumstances under which his opinion was taken. All I can say is that according to my poor understanding of the matter the words are too plain, and if the matter should come to decision by a Court of Law you have to face the fact that the opinion of the Attorney-General will not avail at all, and nor will an agreement with Mr. Collins avail. Give this the force of law, and any Court that has to interpret it has to decide for itself whether, when this Bill has been passed, the Ulster month begins to run or not. I trust that the Government may see their way to making some concession there.
This is a copious subject, and I have trespassed on your Lordships time far too long already. We have been told that opposition, at any rate, cannot, shall not, alter this Bill. I want to put to your Lordships what I conceive, speaking only as a lawyer, to be the actual position. If your Lordships choose, there is no legal power whatsoever which will prevent you from throwing this Bill out, and the Bill will then, for the session, be dead. I have been told that it was said in another place that with the death of the Bill the Treaty would die, and the Government would die—a dreadful prospect! Let us, however, have full credit for what we do, and if we have to claim credit for
540
ourselves—because few others are disposed to give it to us—let us, if we think it right, pass the Second Reading. Let it be remembered then that in an instrument so covered with blemishes we might have found reason for rejecting it, but, in the public interest, we thought we ought not to do so.
Speaking for myself I can only say that last December I felt that then, and not on any subsequent occasion, was the time to decide whether that Treaty should be approved or not. We may deplore that there ever was a Treaty at all. We may think that the negotiations should have been conducted to a happier issue. We may anticipate unfortunate consequences, but I do not myself see how this House, having approved that Treaty, under whatever apprehensions or misapprehensions as to it meaning, can now refuse to recognise that the Treaty ought, in due course, to be ratified by this House in a Statute. The honour of England is at stake. I do not see that it is necessary to consider whether the fate of Ministries depends upon it or not. If the word of this country has been pledged by those who were in a position to pledge it, I take it to be our duty to implement that pledge; and speaking for myself—I have no title even to advise any of your Lordships—I think we cannot rightly hesitate to pass the Second Reading.
But that ought to be on some sort of understanding and terms. If the Treaty is respected, if no word of it is altered and no word of it even explained, if we refrain from an attempt to better it though it were to the manifest advantage of both sides, still anything that has to be provided in order to carry it out, the machinery that is requisite though not prescribed by its words, remains to be supplied by Act of Parliament and, therefore, remains open for discussion and amendment. I venture to appeal to His Majesty's Government and to all sections of the House, whether they regularly support the Government or not, at this late moment to take what I believe to be the grave and the responsible view of the situation. You ought not to go on, warned in time, with your eyes open, insisting upon the last letter and word of an imperfect and ambiguous instrument, and try to carry it through by calling it an Act of Parliament, which it will be only in name in so grave a conjunction of affairs, when you have an opportunity of amending

541
and clearing it up, although you have to accept suggestions, and may I say without offence assistance, from this side of the House. I noticed that when I alluded earlier in my speech to an endeavour to assist the Government in this matter one of the Ministers by his appearance seemed to say to himself: Timeo Danaos.
It is entirely wrong that these proceedings should be conducted by Orders in Council. You have done enough to unloose the bonds of the British Empire by the way you have paltered with the Oath of Allegiance, the terms of the Treaty and the position of Ireland; and you will make a further wide breach in our constitutional practice, take a further step to enthrone the Executive on the shoulders of the Legislature and deprive it of its just rights of control over the Executive, unless you insist that Parliament shall see these Orders in Council and approve them before they become law, and become the instrument in the hands of Mr. Collins by which he is to carry on an interim Government.
I believe you will propagate dissension and provoke strife unless you close the dispute, one way or the other, about the boundary question, and unless you make it quite clear, by Ministerial declaration or otherwise, that Parliament retains its control over this Commission by at least nominating the Chairman or having his name submitted to Parliament. Unless you make it clear that Parliament retains to the end its right of amending or rejecting the Constitution as ultimately framed, you will have done your worst to constitutional government in this country and will have shaken the ordinarily accepted fabric of the British Empire very seriously. I trust I may be forgiven for having occupied so much of your Lordships' time, and I desire to conclude with what I hope is a word of peace, though it may not be accepted as such, and that is to entreat that in Committee we shall be allowed to combine our forces in order to try to amend this Bill and make it a more workmanlike instrument.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I am not going to attempt to follow the noble and learned Lord in his masterly criticism of the constitutional aspects of this Bill. I must say that his logic seemed to me to be as incontrovertible as it was merciless, and I think every member of this House will feel that it is a great misfortune that the noble and learned
542
Viscount who usually sits on the Woolsack should not be able to be in his place to-day. We greatly regret the cause of his absence and extend our sympathy to him in his illness, but it is almost a Parliamentary misfortune that he should not have had the opportunity of listening to the arguments of the noble and learned Lord who has just sat down. May I express a hope that some member of the Government will make it his business to call the Lord Chancellor's attention, as soon as possible, to what has been said by the noble and learned Lord, so that he may be prepared when the debate closes to deal thoroughly with the very serious points that have been raised.
To us laymen certain things have become abundantly plain. The speech to which we have just listened shows that the Bill involves not only a very serious disturbance of our domestic affairs but a grave tampering with the very foundations of our constitutional system, and I am afraid that I must add that the speech delivered by the noble Viscount who introduced the Bill makes it plain that, so far as this stage of the Bill is concerned, Parliament is to have no sufficient opportunity of effectually criticising its provisions. I do not think that was by any means the understanding between His Majesty's Government and the Houses of Parliament when these discussions first began. On the contrary, we were led to believe that we should have full opportunities of criticising and dealing with details.
I do not want to weary the House with quotations, but I should like to remind you of what was said by no less a person than the Prime Minister in the House of Commons last October. He was asked whether the terms of settlement were to be open to revision and alteration by Parliament. What was his reply? He said—
"The whole of the terms will be submitted to Parliament on the assumption that there is a settlement and every provision will have to be ratified by Parliament even to the smallest detail."
Many of us certainly took that as meaning that there would be an opportunity not only of commenting upon the details but, if necessary, of modifying them by Amendment. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, who has taken a conspicuous part in these discussions, said about the same time—
"I think it may be found that the Agreement will stand a good deal of knocking about from all quarters."

543
And, finally, the Lord Chancellor in this House described the Treaty as an "imperfect and fallible document" the Articles of which will require to be supplemented. We now find that this knocking about of the details of the Bill is to be so tender that not a word is to be altered or a syllable added, even by way of elucidating the plain meaning of the Bill.
I wish here to ask a question which I hope will be answered before the debate closes. If these discussions of details are impossible now, will there be any further stage at which they will be admissible, and if so, at what stage and by whom may such discussion be conducted? As for the debate in which we are now engaged, I may be asked, if nothing is admissible in the way of amendment or alteration, what is the use of taking up the time of the House in criticism? I am perhaps sanguine, but I still venture to hope that criticism during this debate may serve a useful purpose hereafter, and I will tell the House why. We understand that at a future time we shall have before us a Bill embodying the new Constitution of the Irish Free State. I noted particularly what fell from Lord Peel with regard to that Constitution. He told us—I think I quote him accurately—that it was to be wholly Irish. He does not contradict me—
VISCOUNT PEEL: If I may interrupt the noble Marquess for a moment, I said that so long as it is within the four corners of the Agreement it is obviously better that it should be dealt with entirely by the Irish themselves.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: I think "wholly Irish" were the words the noble Viscount used, and he warned us against any attempt to put before the Irish people any constitutional proposals of British manufacture, because he said that would be enough to damn them in the eyes of the other side. The question I want to ask is this. This Constitution is, I understand, to be framed finally by the Irish Government, but is it or is it not to be framed in consultation or communication with His Majesty's Government? Are His Majesty's Government to be consenting parties to it? If so, is their consent to be something more than a merely formal consent? I hope this question will be answered, if not now, at any rate at a later stage. But until I am told the contrary,
544
I shall assume that His Majesty's Government will be consulted, will be a consenting party, and that their consent will not be given unless they are satisfied that upon the whole the scheme of the Constitution is a sound and proper one, and not calculated to do injustice to any persons who will be affected by it. If I am right in my surmise, then I express the hope that His Majesty's Government, although they may be able to do nothing at once, will at any rate pay some attention to our arguments, and that they will make it their business to remove, or to attempt to remove, any blots which we are able to point out in the scheme, and to make good any obvious omissions.
Let me indicate one or two of the blots and the omissions which seem to me to be obvious. One of these blots is what seems to me to be a signal neglect in this Bill of any attempt to protect the rights of minorities. It has never been the custom of this country to hold to the doctrine that minorities must suffer. On the contrary, we have been the protectors and advocates of minorities. We have had a case quite lately. Have your Lordships noticed the Agreement which has lately been imposed upon Egypt by His Majesty's Government? Let me read you half a dozen words from that Agreement—
"The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt:—

(a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt;

(b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect;

(c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities"—

If we are so solicitous for the protection of minorities in Egypt are we to have no solicitude for the protection of minorities in Ireland?
Let me cite another authority of a different kind. I do not know that it will appeal to the whole of the House, but it certainly ought to appeal to some members of it. There was a great conference—I think it was called at Liverpool in the autumn—a conference of the Unionist Party. Several distinguished members of the Government were present at it, and I

545
should like to call your Lordships' attention to the fact that the resolution which pulled together the whole of the rather conflicting elements which were present on that occasion contained this proposition. The conference advocated "a solution of the Irish question consistent, first, with the supremacy of the Crown; secondly, with the pledges given to Ulster; and thirdly, with the safeguarding of the interests of the minority in Southern Ireland." So that this great official meeting unanimously carried a resolution in which the protection of Unionists in Southern Ireland was put upon the same plane as the supremacy of the Crown and the pledges given to the province of Ulster. I hope those who took part in that great Liverpool meeting will not forget the policy to which they then committed themselves.
Apart from that resolution, I am not at all sure that the Sinn Fein leaders themselves, in principle, are not quite prepared to agree to the policy of safeguarding minorities. There have been communications between His Majesty's Government and Messrs. Collins and Griffith. A letter was published over Mr. Griffith's signature giving the most satisfactory assurances as to the intention of the Irish Free State to give the Southern Unionists their full share of representation and the amplest protection for their interests. I believe it was on the strength of that letter that the Prime Minister in the House of Commons not long ago announced that—
"Written assurances have been given by the Plenipotentiaries that they are to take into full consultation the representatives of the Southern minority."
The Prime Minister added—
"I am convinced that the leaders of the majority in Ireland mean to do in all their power to make it not merely possible for the minority to live there, but to make it as attractive as possible for them to continue their citizenship amongst them."
It will require considerable effort to make life in some parts of Southern Ireland altogether attractive, but I am quite ready to believe that when the Sinn Fein leaders use that language they are sincere. I believe they really wish to make good those aspirations, but the question we have to consider is not the bona fides of Messrs. Collins and Griffith, but whether, when the time comes, they will be able, to use a hackneyed expression, "to deliver the goods"; and it seems to me there is the greatest doubt in the world whether, with all the good will in the world, these gentle-
546
men, considering their environment, are likely to be able to give effect to all the fair words that they have used throughout these discussions.
As far as the Bill before your Lordships is concerned, the important question of compensation is dealt with in a single passage only. There is a clause which secures compensation for any officials who may be deprived of their offices under the new régime. That is well and good, but is it not rather striking that if a dismissed official is to be guaranteed compensation there is no compensation, so far as this Bill is concerned, given to the man who has had his house burnt over his head, or to the woman whose husband has been mercilessly butchered, in order to carry out some local vendetta. I think it is evident from what has been said to us that, although there is nothing about cases of that kind in this Bill, it is the intention of His Majesty's Government, or of the Irish Free State Government, at some stage or other, to deal with the question of compensation.
We have heard a good deal about it. The noble Viscount on the front bench told us something about it the other evening. I own I was not entirely reassured by what he had to tell us. There seemed to be some awkward gaps in the story. For example, he told us, I think—we were certainly told—that there was to be no compensation for any injury done since the truce, except such compensation as could be obtained at the hands of the Irish Courts. It is a matter of common notoriety that after the truce a number of abominable cases of crime and outrage occurred in different parts of Ireland. Why are the sufferers from those outrages to be handed over to the tender mercies of the local Courts? Will the noble Viscount lay his hand on his heart and say he feels absolute confidence that, at the hands of those local Courts, people injured in this way are sure of getting the satisfaction to which they are entitled?
Another omission from the Bill is the question of the risk of double taxation in Ireland. That is a very serious point, so serious that when Parliament had before it the Bill of 1920 clauses were specially inserted, in order, at any rate to a certain extent, to secure people resident in Ireland from the terrible confiscatory oppression to which they would be liable if this power of double taxation were left to the Irish

547
Parliament. If it was necessary to make that good in the case of the Act of 1920, why is it less necessary to make it good now? I cannot help believing, and I cannot help hoping, that we shall be told that this is a point which His Majesty's Government will make it their business to watch with close attention.
Yet another omission is the question of land purchase. As the noble Marquess said the other evening, His Majesty's Government are pledged up to the eyes on this question of land purchase. There was an answer given by the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack to Lord Oran-more and Browne, in which the most emphatic assurance was given that His Majesty's Government recognised this obligation and that they considered themselves bound to deal with this question concurrently with the Home Rule proposal. Why is it to be allowed now to slide back again? I am glad to see the noble Viscount (Lord Peel) making a note of that point, because it seems to me to be an extremely serious one for the future of Ireland, and the question which I want to ask is: Are we going, in regard to all these and similar points, to give absolute carte blanche to the Irish Government, or are His Majesty's Government going to watch the case and, at the proper moment and in a proper way, insist upon justice being done to the parties concerned? What I venture, with great deference, to suggest is that, by agreement with the Irish Free State representatives or in some other way, some kind of a Court or Commission might be set up for the express purpose of dealing with all cases of hardship of this kind, and of adjudicating equitably between the parties concerned. I cannot see that there would be anything derogatory to the dignity of the Irish leaders in giving their adhesion to a perfectly reasonable proposal of that kind.
I want to say one word about a question which was dealt with so effectually by the noble and learned Lord—namely, the question of boundaries. I cannot help thinking that that question has been very unfortunately handled by His Majesty's Government. I really almost wonder why they found it necessary to stir that wasps' nest at all. Just consider what has happened. The boundary question was settled with all solemnity by the Act of 1920. The Ulster Parliament was opened by His Majesty, the question of boundaries was
548
regarded as finally disposed of, and I cannot conceive that anyone should be surprised to find that Ulster felt very bitterly at having this question reopened, and reopened without previous consultation with her. I am quite ready to admit that the boundary line of the Six Counties is not a good boundary line. I believe it to be impossible to get a good boundary line for the reserved portion of Ulster. I recollect the Conference which sat at Buckingham Palace, I think in 1916. It was summoned by His Majesty the King. Two Unionist leaders were present, two Liberal leaders, two Irish Nationalists and two representatives of Ulster, and the Conference was presided over by Viscount Ullswater, the then Speaker of the House of Commons, with all the dignity and skill which characterised him. That Conference ended in a failure, not for want of good will; on the contrary, the atmosphere was one of entire good will and desire to find a solution. But it broke down, I verily believe, because the problem was insoluble.
The same difficulties were before His Majesty's Government when the Act of 1920 was framed, and, with their eyes open, knowing the puzzles, the geographical and ethnographical puzzles of the case, they adopted the Six County line. Why could not it be left there? You give up the Six County boundary, and you take instead a hopelessly vague formula, directing the Commission to take into consideration "economic and geographic conditions," and also the wishes of the population, although what population is meant we are not told. I say that is not a formula that has a proper place in an Act of Parliament. Even as an instruction to Commissioners it would be, to my mind, very vague and unhelpful. But to put that into an Act of Parliament, and to say that those principles are to be given effect to seems to me utterly hopeless. You may appoint a Commission to find out what the geographical features of a country are, where the rivers run and the mountains are situated, but to turn loose at the present time a Commission to gauge the wishes of an irascible and highly-strung population seems to me something like midsummer madness.
I think you are riding for a fall over this Boundary Commission, and I do venture to support what was said by, I think, the noble and learned Lord—Can you not do something now to put Ulster out

549
of her pain on this? Is there really any sufficient reason why you should not make it clear that, while you desire to bring the parties together and obtain an adjustment of these boundary disputes, you do not intend to impose that solution unless it is acceptable to the parties? I cannot see why you should not have your Commission of Inquiry and your independent Chairman, but if the result is to lead to proposals which are distinctly distasteful to either side I really do not see why you cannot make it clear that you have no intention to go back to coercion on that one particular point.
One word more about the boundary question. Are your Lordships quite sure that this policy of what I call segregation is a wise policy? Given a country with a composite population like Ireland, is it a wise thing to endeavour to segregate the different kinds of people, the different kinds of religions, the different kinds of race, and to shut them up in watertight compartments? I believe that it is a mistake. I believe it is very much better that you should leave a certain admixture of races both in Northern Ireland and in Southern Ireland. The besetting sin of Irishmen is intolerance, and I think that by sorting them carefully and herding them together you will only make them more intolerant than ever. I am one of those who look forward to the ultimate coming together of the whole of Ireland. I believe that it is in that direction that we have got to look for any permanent solution of this Irish question. That was the policy of the Act of 1920, and it was to my mind the best feature in the Act. But I believe that you will delay the time when this uniting of different parts of Ireland will take place by this plan of watertight compartments. What all the best Irish opinion is absolutely sincere about is the hatred of partition and the desire to bring about the union of the whole of Ireland. I think it a great pity to do anything which runs counter to that current of opinion.
I hope that before this debate ends we may be given some assurance that at the proper time our suggestions will be considered and discussed on their merits. At this moment our choice is between this Bill and a reversion to the state of chaos and disorder which has been a disgrace to the United Kingdom for some time past. I remain myself an unrepentant Unionist, but, although our treatment of Ireland has at different times promised to be extremely
550
successful, although Ireland has thriven, has become richer and more prosperous under British Government, I recognise that the policy of the Union has been thrown overboard, and that we have now launched our ship on a current which leads in an altogether different direction. But whatever one may feel about this, I cannot help believing that when you come to measures of this kind in which great questions of principle are involved, whether you are dealing with India or with Ireland, when you have gone a certain distance there is no turning back. You cannot deal with these measures as if they were mere experiments which you could adopt for a time and then lay on one side if they do not happen to be wholly successful.
I am afraid I must say with great regret that there is nothing for it but for us to see this thing through and to do what lies in our power to make the policy work successfully. One can only hope that out of this welter of crime and misery there may emerge a better state of things in Ireland, and that amongst the new leaders in that country there may come to the front men who will show themselves not unworthy to take their place amongst illustrious Irishtnen. That we have to see. But of this I feel sure that if your Lordships were on this occasion to reject this Bill you would extinguish the only slight ray of hope which, as far as I can see at this moment, illuminates a melancholy and depressing horizon.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: My Lords, I wish to utter a few sentences only, but they are directed to a question which is rife. I have listened with the utmost pleasure to the speech of the noble Marquess. The wise tone of his peroration recalls many speeches which he made as Leader of the House, and yet that peroration was hardly consistent with the first three-quarters of his speech. What is the situation with which we are dealing to-day? This is not an ordinary Bill for conferring a Constitution on some dependency of the Crown. It is not even such a Bill as we have negotiated on occasions with Colonies which have risen to a high status. It is a Bill to ratify what was, in effect, a Treaty for putting an end to civil war. The situation before we came to the question we are now considering was one of actual civil war and of bitter, brutal strife in Ireland, and this Treaty is the instrument by which it has been settled.

551
I have never reproached the Government for not having been able to do this earlier than they did. I have always felt that their difficulties were immense. I am one of those who were in the other House in 1886 and who voted for the Home Rule Bill of that date. It was a measure negotiated between Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Parnell. I have never regretted that vote, and I have often wished that the measure which was then brought forward could have had effect. But looking back on it to-day, I feel that I cannot reproach those members of the Unionist party who said that more time must be given before they could embark upon such a policy as that to which the noble Marquess referred in the concluding words of his speech. It was a very difficult question; it was a speculative question whether Home Rule would have worked out then. That was the view which the majority of people in this country took and that was the view on which they acted. Some of us thought otherwise, but we have no right to complain if the majority, for anything so sudden, desire more time to consider it.
What has been the consequence, the inevitable consequence, with a people permeated and penetrated with the spirit of nationality which exists in Ireland? Things have gone from greater to greater difficulties. There was a time before the war when possibly the Liberal Government might have made a settlement on the footing of the Act which was passed then; but although that was true then it is not true now. Every ten years that have passed have made the situation more difficult, and since the war the recrudescence of the spirit of nationality that has taken place all over the world has made the situation more difficult than ever. The Government finally could not make any complete end to the matter at all. I voted for their Bill which became the Act of 1920, and I am glad it did, because it accomplished one great thing—it took Ulster for the time being out of the question, or partly out of the question. By that Act the Ulster question was put on a footing which enabled one to deal with Ulster separately. That was a great thing accomplished, and it was worth while passing that Act if only to accomplish that.
But the noble Marquess seemed to me to be dealing with the situation as if it had remained unchanged from that time, whereas the situation has changed pro-
552
foundly. The appeal which the noble Marquess made to us in the first two-thirds of his speech is, I venture to submit to him, not an appeal concerning the situation as it is now but a situation that once was. He speaks of the past. We are concerned with the present, with the very bitter and very difficult present. There was civil war. I never abused the Government for resorting to the utmost strength they could put in the field to vindicate life and liberty in that civil war. I have never abused them even for using the Black and Tans, bad as the Black and Tans were in many respects, because I felt that things in Ireland had got to a stage in which you were face to face with nothing short of a conflict which could only be settled in one way. If that situation had continued then I would have said that probably the only resource for the British nation was to put forth all its strength and to bring matters to an end.
Fortunately, however, a settlement was made; a Treaty was negotiated. Whenever you settle a civil war in that way the instrument by which you settle it is more analogous to a Treaty than it is to a contract between private persons or to any Statute, and that is where I feel that, in the argument of the noble Marquess and of the noble and learned Lord who preceded him, the basic fallacy of the criticism of this Bill lies. I agree with the noble and learned Lord and with the noble Marquess that there are many points in this Bill to which one could take great exception if one were looking at it and construing it as an ordinary measure. But it is not an ordinary measure. It is a Bill for giving effect to a Treaty. You cannot touch the substance of that Treaty. You can touch very little of it even if you think that in certain points the provisions are bad; it is not in your power.
A great deal of reference was made to Mr. Collins as if he was the person with whom we had to deal. But Mr. Collins has, perhaps, a more difficult task even than His Majesty's Government. He and Mr. Griffith have to settle with a very difficult set of people in Ireland and to settle with them as best they can, and this Treaty is the very minimum with which they can get along. If you do things which the noble Marquess seems to suggest, if you reconsider the provisions, and, indeed, attempt to make provision outside what stands in the Treaty, what will

553
happen? You will make the task of Mr. Griffith and Mr. Collins an impossible one, and we shall fall back into the old welter. I dread what is the only alternative to accepting what has been negotiated, and that is a state of civil war in which we shall have no choice but to pour out blood and treasure in order to bring it to a successful conclusion. That would be an appalling calamity. Our only alternative to-day is to accept the bargain made. Whether it be a good bargain or a bad one is secondary to the question whether it is a bargain which will give us the substance.
The noble Marquess made several criticisms. He said that no provision had been made for the safeguarding of minorities. Did anybody ever, in making a Constitution of this kind, under circumstances analogous to these, venture to provide for the safeguarding of minorities? If you want to do irreparable injury to those minorities in the future, put provisions into the Statute by which they are to be protected. There is only one way to protect minorities, and that is to encourage the people with whom you are dealing to live together as a whole, and to look to the majority for the fair treatment of the minority. You did not venture to protect minorities when you were setting up the Constitution of South Africa, and experience has shown that you had no necessity for doing so. You have never tried, when you have worked successfully, to put in protective provisions when you have been dealing with people whom you regard as equals. In the case of Egypt—I am not here to defend the negotiations about Egypt—the situation was a very different one from that which the Government had to face in dealing with Ireland, where the Treaty was a settlement of actual warfare.
The noble Marquess said that the Constitution was one which was to be shaped by the Irish themselves. When have we given a Constitution to a new Dominion without leaving it to that Dominion practically to settle what the Constitution was to be? There are, of course, great basic principles which are always observed. There is supervision in the interests of the Empire as a whole. Let me recall to your Lordships' memory two cases. I will take that of Canada first, for it is the one which is taken here, and is one which the noble Marquess himself knows well. The Canadian Constitution was the outcome of
554
Resolutions passed in Quebec in October, 1864—Resolutions that were incorporated almost verbatim into Lord Carnarvon's Act of 1867, which made the Canadian Dominion.
Take the next case, that of Australia. In the case of Australia the Constitution was worked out line by line by the Australian people themselves, so much so that although they put in a provision which interfered with one prerogative of the Crown in the administration of ultimate justice, and although that provision was objected to by the Government to which the noble Marquess belonged it was nevertheless felt that we ought not to object to it, because, otherwise, we should be creating such unrest in Australia that the whole scheme might go to ruin. These are comparatively small cases compared with the one that we are dealing with here. Here we are settling civil war with the greatest difficulty.
The Government has made an instrument which may be, in many respects, a very imperfect instrument. I listened to some of the criticisms of the noble and learned Lord who spoke just after the representative of the Government, and I thought that he made some formidable points showing how the Government might have improved this Bill in many respects. But in the main, and on the whole, they have produced a Treaty. The noble Marquess suggested points with regard to which that Treaty ought to have been better, and referred to things which might be done in the Statute which is to give it vitality. He would bring about those improvements, but the first question I ask is: What will be the effect of the settlement on Ireland? It is difficult enough now to carry that settlement through, and if these new elements are introduced I would not give much for the prospects of the settlement becoming law.
Between the line of argument taken in the first part of the noble Marquess's speech and what he said at the conclusion of that speech, I think there is a gap and a gulf. The last part of his speech had the true note, but effect can only be given to the tone of that note if this country is prepared to treat itself as having got rid of a calamitous situation, got rid of it in some ways unexpected, but got rid of it by an Agreement which may not be a perfect Agreement but still is an Agreement which, in substance, appears to effect the purpose.

555
My own earnest hope is that that Agreement may receive effect, and I for one shall certainly support the Government by both voice and vote, if it comes to a vote, in giving effect to a measure without which I see no light for the future.
THE EARL OF ARRAN: My Lords, I do not propose to criticise the measure which is now before your Lordships' House, because the matter has gone so far that I believe it is impossible for England to retrace her steps, and I can only hope that the Treaty will be attended with the success which its most earnest admirers anticipate. But I think all your Lordships will agree that this is a great revolution, and, as in all other great revolutions, there must be people who will suffer. In this case I believe that it will be the poorer Southern Irish loyalists who will suffer. The noble Marquess has already touched on this question, but I venture to go further, because I should like to allude more particularly to the poor Southern Irish loyalists whose future I believe to be so black.
I trust that your Lordships will not think that I am basing my opinion merely on inherited theories. I have lived all my life in Ireland, and so attached was I to the country that when, in order to relieve congestion, I sold practically the whole of my home, I went so far as to buy another place in Ireland, where I settled down and made my residence. I did my utmost to overcome the prejudices in which I had been brought up. I did my utmost to become a Home Ruler. I went into the society of that part of the community in Ireland which hated, and hates, English rule, and I tried to gather their ideas. I came to two conclusions, and those were: first, that the vast majority of Irishmen outside the Six Counties hate England and anything to do with England, and that their ultimate aim is complete independence; and, second, that if any measure such as this were to pass there would be no room for any Irishmen who not only did not agree with those views, but would not give them their full support.
Believing as I did that some measure of this sort was bound to come, and believing also, as I still believe, that Irish residence is impossible for a loyalist, I made my home elsewhere. But there are many thousands of Southern Ireland loyalists who are not in so fortunate a position, and
556
whose whole stake is situate in Ireland. Unless they are able to realise their stake in that country, which means the whole of their livelihood, I see nothing for them but to starve. I do not allude to what is still erroneously known as the Irish landed gentry. Most of us are in a fortunate position under the Wyndham Land Act as we have been able to realise five-sixths, nine-tenths, and nineteen-twentieths of our property. We can go when we like; we run no financial risk. But the people to whom I allude are the poorer Southern Irish loyalists; the farmers, doctors, solicitors, small business men and the shopkeepers. It will be difficult for them, if they find they cannot live in Ireland, to leave the country except to face starvation in another land.
Long before my time and ever since I have known Ireland it has been an accepted fact amongst the lower orders of Home Rulers in Ireland that when some measure of independence came the property of Irish loyalists was to be divided among them. They still believe this and are determined that this belief shall be vindicated. I know that some arrangement has been promised by which Southern Irish loyalists shall receive their fair need of representation, but these people cannot be saved by any legislation. They will be subject to that local persecution of which all of us in Ireland are well aware, and to the invincible weapon of the boycott. If the boycott has proved to be invincible, as it has been in many cases, how much more invincible will it prove when the Government and the police themselves are drawn from the ranks of those who sympathise politically with the boycotters?
While it is said that Irish loyalists will have proper representation I foresee great difficulty in getting Irish loyalists to stand for the Southern Parliament; and my reason for saying so is this. Although I no longer live in Ireland I think every Irishman will support me in saying that there is no chance of any Irish loyalist being returned to the Irish Parliament unless he stands on the coupon of Mr. de Valera, the coupon of the Irish Transport Workers, or the coupon of the Irish Free State Government. Everyone will agree that no loyalist can stand on the coupon of Mr. de Valera. But will it be any easier for loyalists to stand on the coupon of the Irish Free State? I will read two short extracts from reports of speeches of two leading members of the Irish Provisional Government.

557
On January 7 of this year Mr. Boland, in the Dail Eireann, asked Mr. Collins whether in his opinion this was a final settlement of the question between England and Ireland. And Mr. Collins said—"It is not." Mr. Collins is reported to have added—
"The Treaty had been brought back. It had brought, and was bringing, such freedom to Ireland in the transference of all Governmental powers, but above all in the departure of the British armed forces, that it had become safe and simple and easy and courageous to stand now for what was surrendered in July because the British armed forces were still here. They could not beat the British out by force, so the Republican ideal was surrendered. But when they had beaten them out by means of the Treaty, the Republican ideal, which was surrendered in July, was restored. Every one knew then, and it is idle and dishonest to deny now, that in the event of a settlement some postponement of the realisation of our full national sentiment would have to be agreed to."
I call your Lordships' particular attention to the fact that Mr. Collins spoke of "the postponement of the realisation of our full national sentiment," and not its abandonment.
Then Mr. Duffy, a signatory of the Treaty and, I believe, Foreign Minister in the Irish Government, is reported to have said—
"The Irish people would be in a better position to resist aggression and increase their power than ever they were before. It would be the duty of those who framed the Constitution to frame it according to the wishes of the Irish people, and to relegate the King of England to exterior darkness, as far as they can; and they can."
I think it would be extremely difficult to find any Irish loyalist who would stand on the coupon of a Government which held such opinions as these. It is said that for the protection of loyalists there is to be a Second Chamber. My knowledge of Ireland tells me that no Second Chamber nominated by the Governor-General would dare for a moment to throw out legislation which, had been sent up to it by the elected representatives of the Irish people.
There are other reasons why many of the Irish loyalists want to leave the country. They may be sentimental but I think they should be respected. I do not wish to reopen old wounds, but there are some wounds so deep and so recent that it is not a question of reopening them. We cannot forget the means by which the present Irish Government has won its way to power. We have lost brother officers, comrades, relations, friends. Is it to be
558
wondered that many of us wish to go? It may be said that there is no precedent for enabling Irish loyalists to leave the country. I happened to be reading yesterday the history of the American Revolution, and I came across an account of the evacuation of Philadelphia which seems to me to be in many ways an excellent instance of the position of the loyalists in Ireland.
It had become known that after the departure of the British Army an Oath of Allegiance to the United States would be exacted from all private citizens under pains and penalties of extreme rigour. Sir William Howe, the previous Commander-in-Chief, had somewhat lightly advised a deputation of loyalists to make their peace with the adversary, and throw themselves on the tender mercies of Congress, but these poor people knew only too well what that resource was worth. They were in an agony of distress and alarm; and Sir Henry Clinton, the new Commander-in-Chief, as the person responsible for the honour of England, assured them that no one who desired to sail would be left behind. Every one of those loyalists in spite of the difficulty of moving them and of getting transport was taken away by the British Navy. That is a precedent, I think, for what might happen now.
There is another section of Irish loyalists whose claim on your Lordships' attention, and also on the attention of this country, is even greater than that of the Southern Irish loyalists. I mean the Irish Constabulary. Through no fault of their own—they are unconquered—they represent a conquered force, and those who live in Ireland remember the awful meaning of the words Vae victis. They have been loyal to their Oaths of Allegiance, they have done their duty at all costs and through all dangers, and many of them are now marked men. Things are not forgotten. I venture to hope that your Lordships will remember these men when there is an opportunity of enabling those who wish to go to leave the country.
It may be said that the expense, at a moment like this, will be too great, but I venture to suggest to your Lordships that if an inquiry is instituted by your Lordships' House it will be found that the expense is far less than is anticipated. First of all, we are not asking for compensation in money so much as that an arrangement should be made and observed that

559
their businesses, their stock and the value of their farms shall be sold at their proper value, that they shall be able to realise what these things are really worth. That would be sufficient for those who wish to go to enable them to go. In the second place, we must remember that out of the 350,000 Southern Irish loyalists—I believe that is supposed to be the figure—a great many are children, and that it would be unnecessary to provide for all these 350,000 per capita. On the contrary, it would be necessary only to enable their parents to go; and their parents would be responsible for the welfare of their children as they are now, and that would reduce the numbers enormously. In the third place, we must remember that there are a great many Irish loyalists who have been so embittered by the treatment they have received from England during the last thirty years that they are willing to adopt political views which they have hitherto opposed, and to remain in Ireland. We cannot blame them. England has not shown them that fidelity which would give her the right to ask for an unending fidelity in return.
I know that what I suggest may be a difficult matter, but I believe that, however serious the difficulty, something, and something great, ought to be done for these men. England owes them a debt of gratitude which she can never repay, a debt for their loyalty during days of difficulty and danger of which those who have not passed through them can form no conception. I venture to hope that your Lordships will insist upon something being done to try and repay men the gravity of whose position is due to one thing alone—to their loyalty to the Empire and to their fidelity to the Crown.
LORD CARSON: My Lords, I beg to move that the debate be now adjourned.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
Debate adjourned accordingly till tomorrow.

WYE ELECTRICITY SPECIAL ORDER.
VISCOUNT PEEL: My Lords, I beg to move the nine Motions standing in my name on the Paper, with regard to Special Orders under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919.
Moved, That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of part of the Parish or Township of Wye, in the County of Kent, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 3), be approved.—(Viscount Peel.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

WIGSTON MAGNA, BLABY AND DISTRICT ELECTRICITY SPECIAL ORDER.
Moved, That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the Urban District of Wigston Magna, the Parishes of Blaby, Cosby, Countesthorpe Croft, Enderby, Glen Parva, Huncote, Narborough, Potters Marston, Thurlaston and Whetstone, in the Rural District of Blaby, the Parishes of Aston Flamville, Burbage, Elmesthorpe, Sapcote, Sharnford, Stoney Stanton, and Wigston Parva, in the Rural District of Hinckley, and the Parish of Broughton Astley, in the Rural District of Lutterworth, all in the County of Leicester, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 3-I.), be approved.—(Viscount Peel.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

CHEADLE AND GATLEY ELECTRICITY SPECIAL ORDER.
Moved, That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the Urban District of Cheadle and Gatley, in the County of Chester, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 3-II.), be approved.—(Viscount Peel.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

HAYWARDS HEATH AND DISTRICT ELECTRICITY SPECIAL ORDER.
Moved, That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of

561
Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the Urban Districts of Haywards Heath and Cuckfield, and parts of the Parishes of Lindfield, Cuckfield Rural, and Keymer Rural, in the Rural District of Cuckfield, and part of the Parish of Wivelsfield, in the Rural District of Chailey, all in the Administrative County of East Sussex, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 3-III.), be approved.—(Viscount Peel.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

JOHNSTONE ELECTRICITY SPECIAL ORDER.
Moved, That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the Burgh of Johnstone, in the County of Renfrew, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 3-IV.), be approved.—(Viscount Peel.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

KILPATRICK ELECTRICITY (EXTENSION TO MILNGAVIE AND DISTRICT) SPECIAL ORDER.
Moved, That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the Burgh of Milngavie, and part of the Parish of New Kilpatrick, in the County of Dumbarton, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 3-V.), be approved.—(Viscount Peel.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

HEREFORD ELECTRICITY (EXTENSION) SPECIAL ORDER.
Moved, That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919,
562
and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the Urban Districts of Bromyard and Kington, and the Rural Districts of Bredwardine, Bromyard, Dore, Hereford, Kington, Leominster, Ross, Weobley, Whit-church, and Wigmore, and part of the Rural District of Ledbury, all in the County of Hereford, and for the amendment of the Hereford Electric Lighting Order, 1898, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 3-VII.), be approved.—(Viscount Peel.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION OF YORKSHIRE, LIMITED, ELECTRICITY SPECIAL ORDER.
Moved, That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport, under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, amending certain Provisional Orders granted to the Electrical Distribution of Yorkshire, Limited, which was presented on the 7th day of February, 1922 (H.C. 4), be approved.—(Viscount Peel.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

PRESTON CORPORATION ELECTRICITY SPECIAL ORDER.
Moved, That the Special Order made by the Electricity Commissioners under the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1919, and confirmed by the Minister of Transport under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, in respect of the County Borough of Preston, the Urban District of Fulwood, and the Townships of Broughton Lea, Ashton Ingol, and Cottam Woodplumpton, Barton, and Penwortham, in the Rural District of Preston, all in the County of Lancaster, which was presented on the 21st day of February, 1922 (H.C. 18), be approved.—(Viscount Peel.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at five minutes past seven o'clock.

Preamble
Lord Napier of Magdala—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his brother.
Lord Rossmore—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

TRAFFORD PARK BILL. [H.L.]
  GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY BILL. [H.L.]
  Report from the Committee of Selection, That the Five Lords appointed a Select Committee on the Halifax Corporation Bill [H.L.] and other Bills do form a Select Committee for the consideration of Trafford Park Bill [H.L.] and the Great Northern Railway Bill [H.L.]; read, and agreed to: All Petitions referred to the Committee, with leave to the Petitioners praying to be heard by Counsel against the Bills to be heard as desired, as also Counsel for the Bills.
SHEPTON MALLET WATERWORKS BILL. [H.L.]

  SOUTH WALES ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANY BILL. [H.L.]
  Report from the Committee of Selection, That the Five Lords appointed a Select Committee on the Colne Valley Water Bill [H.L.] and other Bills do form a Select Committee for the consideration of Shepton Mallet Waterworks Bill [H.L.] and the South Wales Electrical Power Distribution Company Bill [H.L.]; read, and agreed to: All Petitions referred to the Committee, with leave to the Petitioners praying to be heard by Counsel against the Bills to be heard as desired, as also Counsel for the Bills.
  Chester Gas—(Petition for Bill).
  Croydon Gas—(Petition for Bill).
  Examiner's Certificates of non-compliance with the Standing Orders referred to the Standing Orders Committee on Tuesday next.
  Torquay Corporation (Electricity).
  Petition of the Corporation of Torquay, under their Common Seal, praying for leave to introduce a Bill to provide for the transfer of the electricity undertaking of the Urban Electric Supply Company, Limited, at Newton Abbot, in the County of Devon, to the Corporation; to extend the area for the supply of electricity by the said Corporation, and to make further provision in regard to their electricity undertaking; together with a copy of the proposed Bill annexed thereto; read, and referred to the Examiners.

SUMMER TIME BILL. [H.L.]
Report of Amendment (which stands appointed for this day) put off to Tuesday next.