Sitting of 5 May 1921

Preamble
The House met at a quarter-past four of the clock. The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
PRESTON'S DIVORCE BILL. [H.L.]
A Bill to dissolve the marriage of George Elystan Crompton Preston, of Longford, in the County of Longford, with Edith Preston, his now wife, and to enable him to marry again, and for other purposes. Presented, on Petition, and a copy of the Proceedings in, and of the Decree of Divorce of, the King's Bench Matrimonial Division of the High Court of Justice in Ireland: Delivered (on oath): Bill read 1ª.
TENDRING HUNDRED WATER AND GAS BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3ª, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

THE WHITSUNTIDE RECESS.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl who leads the House whether he has any statement to make regarding the general business of the House?
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIR'S (EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON): My Lords, it does not appear that we have very much business before us next week, so far as the Motions or Bills now on the Paper extend, and I see no reason why we should not be able to adjourn on Thursday next. If that be so, I should hope the vacation may extend until Tuesday of the week but one after—that is, until Tuesday, May 24—and therefore, unless anything intervenes to interfere with those plans, I should hope to be in a position to move on Thursday next that we adjourn for that period.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I think the statement which the noble Earl has just made will be received with satisfaction by the House.

THE ALLIED CONFERENCE.
MARQUESS OF CREWE:My Lords, I may I now ask the noble Earl whether be is in a position to make any statement regarding the recent Conference and the conclusions which, so far as one can judge from the daily Press, have been there arrived at?
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, I think that your Lordships would probably desire, as indeed you have a right, to have as full a statement as it is possible to make about the proceedings of the Allied Conference that has been sitting in London during the past five days, and the deliberations of which concluded this morning. Seated as we have been at that Conference, for many hours of each of these five days, and having only concluded, as I remarked just now, our work at 11 o'clock this morning, it has been difficult for me, in the short interval since then, to prepare an exhaustive account of our proceedings. At the same time, it strikes me that what your Lordships really require is a summary of the situation, and a narrative of the steps by which we have reached the result that I am about to announce, the nature of the decisions themselves, and the consequences that may he expected to ensue; and, if I correctly interpret your wishes in that respect, I will endeavour to the best of my ability to satisfy them.
The Conference that has just adjourned was summoned to bring to an end the long period of argument, negotiation, hesitation and delay in the carrying out by Germany of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, a process which reached its culminating point when the German Foreign Minister made the speech, with which we are all familiar, at the Conference in London a few weeks ago. At eleven o'clock this morning, the Conference having separated, the Prime Minister handed to the German Ambassador in London a document, the words of which I will read. I will then proceed to explain and comment upon its terms. This is the document in question—
" The Allied Powers, taking note of the fact that in spite of the successive concessions made by the Allies since the signature of the Treaty of Versailles, and in spite of the warnings and Sanctions agreed upon at Spa and at Paris, as well as of the Sanctions announced in London and since applied, the German Government is still in default in the fulfilment of the obligations incumbent upon it under the terms of the Treaty
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of Versailles as regards (1), disarmament; (2), the payment due on May 1, 1921, under Article 235 of the Treaty, which the Reparation Commission has already called upon it to make at this date; (3), the trial of the war criminals as further provided for by the Allied Notes of February 13 and May 7, 1920; and (4), certain other important respects, notably those which arise under Articles 264 to 267, 269, 273, 321, 322 and 327 of the Treaty, decide—
" (a) To proceed forthwith with such preliminary measures as may be required for the occupation of the Ruhr Valley by the Allied Forces on the Rhine in the contingency provided for in paragraph (d) of this note:
" (b) In accordance with Article 233 of the Treaty, to invite the Reparation Commission to prescribe to the German Government without delay the time and manner for securing and 'discharging the entire obligation incumbent upon that Government and to announce their decision on this point to the German Government at latest on May 6:
"(c) To call upon the German Government categorically to declare within a period of six days from the receipt of the above decision its resolve (1), to carry out without reserve or condition their obligations as defined by the Reparation Commission; (2), to accept without reserve or condition the guarantees in respect of those obligations prescribed by the Reparation Commission; (3), to carry out without reserve or delay the measures of military, naval and aerial disarmament, notified to the German Government by the Allied Powers in their Note of January 29, 1921, those overdue being completed at once and the remainder by the prescribed dates; (4), to carry out without reserve or delay the trial of the war criminals, and the other unfulfilled portions of the Treaty referred to in the first paragraph of this note.
"(d) Failing fulfilment by the German Government of the above conditions by May 12 to proceed to the occupation of the Valley of the Ruhr, and to take all other military and naval measures that may be required. Such occupation will continue so long as Germany fails to comply with the conditions summarised in paragraph (c)."
I will now proceed to offer a few remarks in elucidation of the Declaration I have just read. It is now just two and a half years since the Armistice was signed and hostilities terminated. It is nearly two years since the Treaty of Versailles was signed in June, 1919. It is one and a quarter years since that Treaty was ratified in January, 1920. During this time repeated attempts have been made to induce the German Government to fulfil its obligations, and, on our part, to interpret the demands made upon her in a reasonable and equitable spirit. Conferences have taken place successively at Paris, Brussels, Boulogne, San Remo, Spa, and London. To two of these, at Spa and London, the Germans were admitted to plead their cause or state their case. At each stage the Allies have been willing to grant, and

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have granted, postponements, relaxations, modifications, delays. A point has now been reached at which all must realise, firstly, that essential portions of the Treaty, to which reference has been made and which I will presently explain in greater detail, remain unfulfilled; secondly, that the German Government has either not the power or the will, possibly it may be deficient in both, to carry them out.
We have, therefore, arrived—I am speaking now of the Powers in Conference —at the unanimous conclusion that there must be an end to this long and infructuous and exhausting suspense. It is bad for the Allies, because their just claims continue to be disregarded; is bad for Germany herself, because she can never regain the confidence of Europe Os long as she continues to play fast and loose with her obligations; and it is bad for the world, because it is impossible in these conditions that either the political, the financial or the economic equilibrium of mankind can be re-established. In order to justify these demands, let me indicate to you the main respects in which Germany is in default, and here I will follow the same order as in the document I have read.
Firstly, I take disarmament. During the last sixteen months the Allies have made numerous demands, notably at Boulogne in June, 1920, and at Spa the same year, and at Paris in January, 1921, to meet the difficulties, in sonic respects the real difficulties, of the German Government in respect of disarmament, and they have, on several occasions, extended the time limits fixed by the Treaty. Nevertheless the German Government, in the case of the military clauses, is still in default in the following matters. Firstly, the organisation of the German Army does not conform to the text of the Treaty in certain respects. An excessive personnel is still employed in different branches of the Army administraton. Secondly, excessive quantities of war material still remain in the hands of the Army authorities and civil population. The Army has been reduced under the terms of the Treaty from 200,000 to 100,000 men, but there has not been a corresponding reduction in arms and equipment, and the Germans have also refused to accept the equipment table for all units prescribed by the Commission of Control. Thirdly, the armament of certain fortresses on the Eastern frontier and North Sea coast is still in excess of the
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quantities authorised by the Treaty. In three land fortresses in the Eastern ports of Germany there still remain 556 guns. Fourthly, the police force is still many thousands in excess of the numbers authorised. Fifthly, the unauthorised military forces and societies, the Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria and Wurtemburg and East Prussia are still in being and armed.
In Bavaria alone these forces are 320,000 strong, with 240,000 rifles and 2,800 machine guns. It is true that the German Government promulgated only a little while ago, under pressure from the Allies, a law declaring these forces illegal, but the law has been quite inoperative. No administrative action has been taken to carry it out, no date has been fixed for the dissolution of these organisations, no time limit has been named for the surrender of arms and equipment. The Bavarian Government snaps its fingers at the Federal Government and the Federal Government laughs in its sleeve at the impotence of Europe.
A word more as to this particular organisation, the Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria and elsewhere. Of course, it may be said that these forces in their totality do not for a moment constitute a real military danger and that in some respects they are, in the localities where they exist, a guarantee for the presence of internal law and order. I am prepared to concede something in that direction. But, on the other hand, it is equally clear, in the first place, that their numbers are greatly in excess of any possible needs, either of those localities or of the country as a whole, and, in the second place, that if they are allowed to continue indefinitely they may form the basis of a national army and be a real aid to possible future mobilisation, and that in this way they may become, even if they are not now, a real military danger. It is not surprising that France and Belgium, for instance, who are in such a very different position from ourselves, look across their open frontiers with some anxiety and sonic apprehension upon the existence of a potential military force of this description. Moreover, the Statutes of these societies are specially drawn up so as to maintain the spirit of military discipline. Further, we have the teachings of history to warn us, and it is of supreme importance to prevent Germany from repeating the familiar tactics of Prussia in the years from 1806 to 1813. For this

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reason it is imperative to fix the time limit for the disarmament, disbandment and ultimate disappearance of all these unauthorised military or semi-military forces. Such a time limit was fixed at the Paris Conference in January, 1921. It has been completely ignored. Not a single step has been taken in that direction by the German Government in the interval. Further delay in the matter cannot be tolerated.
The second heading was that of reparation. This is an exceedingly difficult and complex matter, not only involving abstruse financial calculations but entailing also a careful examination, both of the existing and of the potential resources of Germany in the years that lie ahead. I had given to me a memorandum by the Treasury summarising the whole case as regards reparations, but I confess to your Lordships that it was so technical and abstruse in its character, as well as ex tended in its length, that I should hesitate to pass it on in tote to your Lordships, or to ask you to spend so much of your time in listening to me. What I have done, therefore, is to endeavour, in plainer and less technical language, to summarise the situation, because it is around this question of reparation and the figures that are now imposed that the greater part of the controversy will turn, and it is upon the satisfactory solution of that question more than any other that the future good relations with Germany and the recovery of Europe in the main depend.
Let me first remind your Lordships of the position laid down in the Treaty. Under the Treaty of Versailles Germany accepted the responsibility of herself and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals had been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her Allies. The Treaty provided that the amount of damage for which compensation was to be given by Germany should be determined by an inter-Allied Commission called the Reparation Commission. The duty of the Commission was to consider the claims of the Allies and to give the German Government a just opportunity of being heard. The findings of the Commission were to be notified to Germany on or before May 1, 1921, and were conclusive as to the amount of Germany's obligations.
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After very laborious work for many months in examining the claims formulated by the Allies, the Reparation Commission came to its conclusion and notified Germany that it fixed the total amount of the damage at £6,600,000,000 gold. In addition Germany was liable to pay the cost of the Armies of Occupation and of sums which Belgium had borrowed from the Allies up to November, 1916, with interest. Against these liabilities Germany was entitled to set off amounts paid in kind and the value of certain State property in conceded territories. These amounts were to be determined by the Reparation Commission, and for present purposes it is enough to say that the total for which Germany will have to make provision may be taken broadly speaking to be £6,600,000,000 gold.
The Treaty further provided that bonds payable on May 1, 1921, should be lodged with the Reparation Commission for £1,000,000,000 gold. Germany was entitled to some credits against this for payments in kind already made, but there was undoubtedly a sum of not less than £600,000,000 gold due from her on May 1, 1921. That is the debt that you often see described in the papers under the denomination of so many milliards of gold marks. The Reparation Commission called upon Germany to pay £50,000,000 on account on March 23, and to make proposals for the payment of the balance before May 1 last. Germany made default. She neither made the payments required nor proposals for payment of the balance. This, therefore, was the position so far as the Treaty liabilities of Germany were concerned on May 1, 1921.
Before, however, I pass on to tell the House how the Allies propose to deal with this situation, I think I ought to remind noble Lords of the many opportunities which have been given to Germany to make her own proposals to the Allies. Since last summer repeated efforts have been made at Spa, Brussels and London to arrive at an agreed basis of reparation. I will not weary the House by recapitulating the details of these various proposals. Suffice it to say that ten months have been spent in untiring attempts to settle this reparation liability by a voluntary agreement. The Allies have always recognised that it would be an advantage to all Europe that the amount and method of payment should be settled quickly and by consent.

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But ten months have passed without any concrete result. No real effort has been made by Germany to put forward any offer commensurate with her responsibility.
The Reparation Commission has accordingly now settled the total amount which, as I have said, is approximately £6,600,000,000 gold. The Allies, of course, recognise that if the strict terms of the Treaty were to be enforced and the payment of this full sum to be demanded within thirty years by equal annual instalments, with interest as provided by the Treaty, the burden would be greater than Germany could bear. In order to make this payment within the thirty years annuities of over £6,600,000,000 gold a year would have to be made. On the other hand, the Allies are entitled to receive from Germany the full amount which it is within her capacity to pay. But in the rapid recovery that awaits her, her future capacity is likely to be very In itch greater than her present capacity, and it is, of course, not easy to fix in advance exactly what her future capacity is likely to be. If she regains her place in the world's trade as an exporting country her ability to pay debts overseas to the Allies will be greatly increased.
We have, therefore, adopted a system which is intended to provide a relatively low present payment and a means of receiving in future an increase corresponding to her increased capacity to pay. The Allies have agreed to call upon Germany to pay £100,000,000 gold per annum and, in addition, sums equal to 26 per cent. of her exports. These sums will be applied, so far as they go, to payment of interest and sinking fund on three series of bonds which will be created by Germany.
The first series of bonds will he for £600,000,000 gold requiring for interest and sinking fund £36,000,000 gold a year. These bonds will be issued by July 1 and handed by Germany to the Reparation Commission, by whom they will be dealt with on account of the Allies. The second series of bonds will be created, amounting to £1,900,000,000 gold with interest at 5 per cent, and 1 per cent. for sinking fund, and will require for their service £114,000,000 gold per annum. These bonds will be issued on November 1 next, and the Reparation Commission will also receive these bonds and deal with them for the Allies. The third series of bonds will
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not be created at once. They will only be issued when the amounts payable by Germany are sufficient to provide interest and sinking fund. These bonds will no doubt be issued from time to time and finally the full total, £4,250,000,000 gold, will be issued.
It is to be observed that the first and second series of bonds ought to be covered out of the fixed annuity of £100,000,000 and the percentage of exports, even though the exports remain on a comparatively small scale. But as Germany's recovery proceeds her exports may be expected to increase and the amount she is able to pay will be correspondingly enlarged. The plan provides for a Sub-Committee of the Reparation Commission being set up which will be known as the Committee of Guarantees, to which will be entrusted the supervision, without administrative interference, of the revenues which Germany will be assigned to secure the bonds. This Committee will, in the first instance, consist of representatives of Allies only, but it is hoped that, as the bonds become distributed and pass into the hands of neutrals, representatives of Neutral Powers will also join this Committee. So much for the financial proposals to deal with the reparation issues.
I now come to the third heading in the Allied Declaration—namely, that dealing with the question of the trial of war criminals. This question, in itself so interesting in its reference, for instance, to our own experience, has been much overlaid and, indeed, almost forgotten in recent times, but it is so important in its bearing upon the conclusions which we have now reached that I think your Lordships would like me to give an exact account as to how the position as regards war criminals stands. By Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles the German Government recognise the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war, and they undertook to hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers all persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war who were specified either by name, or rank, or office, or employment which they held under German authority.
In accordance with this Article lists of accused persons were prepared by the principal Allied and Associated Govern-

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ments, and after careful investigation of the evidence available in each case a final list was prepared and presented to the German Government in 1920. The German Government represented that grave political difficulties would ensue if the Allied and Associated Governments insisted upon the surrender of the persons accused, and they proposed that these persons should be tried by the Supreme Court at Leipzig. A Commission was set up to examine this question, and ultimately it was decided that trial at Leipzig should be accepted in the first instance in certain selected cases taken as test cases, to decide the bona fides of the German Government, the rights belonging to us and ceded by Germany under the Treaty not being abrogated but only held for the time being in suspense.
Accordingly, in May, 1920, a shorter list of forty-five names, as compared with several hundreds in the original list, was prepared and handed to the German Government. To this list His Majesty's Government contributed seven names. We picked out the worst and what appeared to us to be the most scandalous cases. It might have been expected that the German Government would have taken immediate steps to effect the arrest of all those persons so as to ensure their trial. Instead, they said that three of the number could not be proceeded against, either by reason of their being out of the country or by reason of their whereabouts being unknown. That is particularly to be deplored in the ease of two of those officers who are charged with the gravest crime. It is stated by the German Government that warrants for their arrest have been issued, but have not been executed at present. The German Government is proceeding with the trial of the remaining four persons. I do not think I need trouble the House with their names.
Having received the list of the accused persons the German Government next represented to the Allied Governments that difficulties were being experienced in obtaining evidence against the persons accused, and at Spa, in July, 1920, it was accordingly arranged that the Allied Governments should collect and provide statements of the evidence against the persons whose names appeared in the short list and transmit them direct to the Attorney-General at Leipzig. It was further arranged that to avoid delay the
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Attorney-General at Leipzig was to be at liberty to communicate direct with the chief Law Officer of each of the Allied countries—in our case the AttorneyGeneral—for any further information which he might require to enable the charges to be established. His Majesty's Government immediately put in hand the completion of the evidence against all the persons whom they had named, and in October, 1920, a printed volume, containing complete evidence in the cases in which we are concerned, was delivered to the German Ambassador in London for transmission to the Attorney-General at Leipzig. With the information before them contained in this volume it became the duty of the authorities of the German Government to devote their attention to dealing with these cases.
But during the ensuing months numerous communications were received from the German authorities at Leipzig relating to cases which, although in the longer list which had been put on one side, were not in the short list handed to them in May, 1920. Inasmuch as from this correspondence it appeared that the German Government was devoting its attention to cases which had not been submitted to it for trial, thereby intentionally or unintentionally causing delay in those cases which had been submitted to it for trial, it was decided, as a result of a Conference held in Paris, to inform the German Government that requests for information with regard to persons whose names appeared in the longer but not in the shorter list could not be complied with, and a Note to this effect, identical in terms with one delivered to the French Government, was presented to the German Ambassador in London in January last.
It was at the same time decided to force the hand of the German Government and to compel them to proceed with the trials by arranging to take here the evidence on oath of British witnesses who were unable to proceed to Leipzig; and arrangements to give effect to this decision were immediately put in hand. On February 23 last two representatives of the German Government arrived in London to confer with the Attorney-General as to the procedure to be adopted in securing the evidence of the British witnesses. They were informed that it was our intention to arrange for the examination in London, at as early a date as could be fixed, of those

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witnesses who were unable to proceed to Germany to give oral evidence at the trial, arid the attendance of as many witnesses as could make the journey to Leipzig would be secured. Preparations for obtaining the evidence of all the witnesses were put in hand, a large number of further witnesses were traced, and statements taken from them. These statements were, in due course, communicated to the German Government. On April 26 and subsequent days all the British witnesses who were unable to proceed to Leipzig attended at Bow-street Police Court before the Chief Magistrate and gave evidence on oath. The German Government and the accused German persons were legally represented," and an opportunity was given to them to put questions to the witnesses. Your Lordships will remember reading the account in the newspapers at the time.
The main trials of the four persons out of the seven named by the British Government, against whom the German Government is now proceeding, will commence on four dates in the course of the present month. Arrangements have been made for the attendance at those trials of about fifty-five British witnesses. His Majesty's Government will be represented before the Supreme Court at Leipzig by two members of the English Bar, and the Foreign Office have been requested to apply to the. German Minister of Justice to admit His Majesty's Government as a party to the proceedings in order that they may have a right of audience at the trials. I have given this rather full account for the reason that I indicated at the beginning—namely, that I do not think that these facts are at all generally known. I think I have said enough to show that, making full allowance for the difficulties in the way of taking evidence by which the German Government may be confronted, they have shown only a modicum of readiness and good will in the matter, and have been continuously guilty of evasion, procrastination, and delay.
In the document handed by the Prime Minister there was a fourth heading alluding to certain other important respects in which Germany had failed to fulfil her Treaty obligations. I will not weary your Lordships by recapitulating these, but I will mention two only of their number from which we in this country are especially the losers. The first is this. The German Government, in flagrant defiance of their obligations under. Articles 321, 322,
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327 and 273 of the treaty, and in spite of continuous protest, have steadily discriminated against British shipping lines by the refusal of time grant of licences to carry emigrants and of the supply of bunker coal. Secondly, the German Government, in defiance of the provisions of the Clearing Office system, Article 296, have not restrained their nationals from suing British firms for the direct recovery of pre-war debts, which, under the Treaty, British firms can only pay through the Clearing Office.
These are the grounds of the action which the Allied Governments have felt compelled to take. I think your Lordships will agree that they are sufficient; and, indeed, that the Allied Powers have shown exemplary patience in the matter. But, at length, that patience is exhausted, and the hour has struck. Accordingly, the members of the Reparation Commission, who returned to Paris to-day, will this evening hand to the German representative accredited to them the terms of their findings as regards reparation, to which I have referred. And, as I said, this morning the main document of the intentions of the Powers was handed to the German Ambassador by the President of the Conference here. Six days are given, as you will remember, to Germany to announce her intention to carry out the conditions that I have read without further boggling or delay. Otherwise, the Powers will proceed to the occupation of the. Ruhr Valley, and to such military and naval measures as may be required, and all the preliminary steps are being taken should that eventuality arise.
Now, my Lords, you may ask for a word or two about the possible— I hope it is not more than possible—occupation of the Ruhr. And the question may be asked, Why the Ruhr? The Ruhr Valley, which is an area rather larger than the County of Durham, with a total population of about 4,000,000 and a mining population of about 400,000, has been selected because it is the great coal-producing area of Germany. It produced in 1913, 110,000,000 tons of coal, and, in 1920, 80,000,000 tons, in addition to 23,000.000 tons of coke; and last year the Ruhr coal output was sonic 65 per cent. of the total German production. It has been more, I believe, at earlier dates. Further, in 1919, the Ruhr produced sonic 325,000 tons of iron and steel, or about two-thirds of the

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total German production. All Germany south of the river Main and west of the Elbe is completely dependent, front the industrial point of view, on the Ruhr, and the rest of Germany is dependent upon it to a lesser degree. In addition to the iron and steel industries which I have mentioned, there are also important cement, paper, and textile industries in the Ruhr valley. Before the war it was, as your Lordships know, the great arsenal of Germany. Some idea of the importance of its industrial output may be gathered from the fact that 25,000 15-ton trucks are loaded daily in the Ruhr, or twice the daily goods traffic of the Northern Railway-of France.
As regards the political, as distinct front the physical, aspect of the case, let no one in your Lordships' House imagine for a moment that any of the Powers, and least of all Great Britain, wants to be involved in the costly, thankless, and speculative task of the occupation either of the Ruhr Valley or any portion of Germany. We have other uses for our soldiers and for our resources. The last thing that we dream of is the renewal of strife in any form. We have enough to do with recovery and looking after our own, in many cases, gravely imperilled interests at home. Neither, I must say in fairness, do I think that it is the desire of Frenchmen—at any rate, it is not the desire of the French statesmen whom I have seen and with whom I have had the privilege of associating during the past few days—to be involved in any such occupation. Even if they were forced to occupy they certainly have no intention of staying there. We have received over and over again the most explicit assurances upon this point. The Governments of Italy and Japan both take our view of the matter.
Indeed I may say with truth that we all view the step, should it become necessary, with profound reluctance. I hope myself that it will not take place at all. It will not take place if Germany is now brought to a position in which she will look facts in the face and endeavour sincerely to fulfil her obligations. And if it does take place, it will, I trust, be only a temporary measure of occupation. But we came to the conclusion, after considering every possible alternative, that it is a necessary threat in order to make Germany understand that she cannot trifle any longer with the patience of Europe and (I may
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add at this stage, because it is a very interesting factor) of America also—your Lordships have read in the newspapers the replies of the American Government, to the German appeals, declining to pay any attention to them—that the patience of Europe and America is exhausted, and that Germany will have, I do not say to bow to the commands of the conqueror, but to fulfil her pledged word under the Treaty which she has signed.
In arriving at these conclusions the Allies have been absolutely united. It has not been an easy path to tread. The financial difficulties alone, which have employed the ablest experts of the day for hours at a time on successive days, have been enough to daunt the bravest spirit. Further, your Lordships must bear in mind, as we continually had to bear in mind, that the points of view of the various countries, notably France and ourselves, are not necessarily the same. I need not expatiate upon that theme, but the conditions of the two, the risks run by the two, are entirely different. We have a very sensitive public opinion of our own to meet in England. It is not the same public opinion as exists in France, but just as we have to consider our own public opinion here—and, I hope, have considered it—so you may be quite sure, and you must realise, that any French Government in its position before the Chamber has to consider very seriously the state of public opinion of its own constituents and of the members of the Chamber, the Deputies, who represent it.
Making due allowance for these differences of approach, I have not, during the last two years, attended any Conference which was more united in its resolution or which separated in a spirit of warmer accord. I am hopeful from such indications as we have had, that the German Government may realise the seriousness of the situation and may conform its own attitude to it. I hope that this long period of higgling and haggling, of obstruction and procrastination on the one side, and of parleying, and treating, and waiting on the other, may now come to an end, and that all of us, Germany included, may before long be allowed to turn our united attention to that which should be the supreme object of us all—namely, the regeneration of the Europe to which we belong.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Earl for having given so full an account of the recent negotiations and conclusions of the Allied Conference. I am sure we are to be congratulated that the Leader of the House and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is a noble Lord who is able to give so balanced and so lucid an account of the very complicated and difficult matters with winch he has just dealt. I have no desire to go back in any way to the terms of the Versailles Treaty, or to criticise those terms, except to this degree, that they have to be considered in so far as they may have to some extent caused those continual evasions and procrastinations on the part of the German Government, of which the noble Earl has, most justly no doubt, complained as causing some part of the difficulties which have confronted Europe during the last two and a half years.
The noble Earl first dealt with the matter of disarmament. On that subject the statement which lie made struck me as not only very complete but as thoroughly fair. When he has spoken of the necessity of the reduction of the amount of war material and of the arms which Germany has continued to retain, I feel sure that he enlisted the general sympathy of your. Lordships' House. I have always felt that this was, at any rate, one matter on which no consideration whatever ought to be shown to the German Government or the German people. They being the main culprits in the war, there can be no excuse for their retention of arms to any degree which can make them still a great military power. And if His Majesty's Government and the Allies have been thoroughly stiff on this matter of disarmament, I feel that they are to be congratulated upon it. It is true of course, as the noble Earl has stated, that for purposes of internal order and what might be described as police purposes in the unsettled circumstances of Germany, it may be necessary to retain a strong, although not a large, military force. But I would very much rather see that regular force maintained at somewhat greater strength, than the retention of a number of arms and munitions of war liable to be used by irregular forces of the kind which the noble Earl has mentioned.
It is, of course, to be remembered that practically no artillery is retained, although I confess I heard with surprise, and with
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something like horror, of the number of machine guns which the German Government have still retained at their disposal. Still, so far as the menace to the neighbouring countries is concerned—and I am sure we all agreed with the noble Earl that the position of France in this matter has to be regarded with much sympathy, because we ourselves are, of course, immune from any danger owing to German armaments—the fact that the Germans possess no artillery must make the revival of the German Army into a formidable military force a very remote, indeed one hopes an impossible matter. There seems to be all the more reason, as one might point out in dealing with the later portions of the noble Earl's speech, for avoiding as far as possible exciting that feeling which, as he mentioned, after the battle of Jena brought about in Germany a military revival in an unexpectedly short space of time, and on a formidable scale.
As to the matter of reparations, the noble Earl mentioned the gross sum of £6,600,000:000 which the Reparation Commission has decided to be the sum due from Germany a less sum than at any rate some of the Allies were disposed originally to claim, and a larger sum than other critics believed it was possible for Germany to pay. But what we are concerned with at the moment is the method of payment, and that method of payment, I take it, is designed to be as elastic as possible. The fixed sum, if I apprehended the noble Earl rightly, is £100,000,000 a year plus 26 per cent.—that is to say 25 per cent. plus 1 per cent.—on all the German exports. On that the noble Earl did not tell us by what process that 26 per cent: on German exports is to be collected. I assume that the German Government will be held responsible for its collection and for the correctness of the sum, but the noble Earl did not precisely describe to us the machinery by which the collection is to be made. Probably he did not desire to enter at this moment into complete detail.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I would just say, not in correction but in supplement, that that is left in the hands of the Sub-Committee of the Reparation Commission to which, in a sentence, I referred.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I am much obliged to the noble Earl for that explana-

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tion. I suppose that later on particulars as to the mode of collection will be communicated to the peoples of the different countries. But one matter upon which I should like to be informed is this. What is the relation of this 25 per cent. of exports to the 50 per cent, export tax specially applicable to this country? The noble Earl did not mention that, and I did not quite follow from what he said whether that 50 per cent. tax—which, from what we are informed, has not so far proved highly productive to the revenue of the country—is to be abandoned in favour of this new duty. But perhaps, if the noble Earl says anything in reply, he will explain what is the relation between the two taxes.
Nor was it quite clear, from what the noble Earl said, when the three series of bonds which would be issued for this purpose would be dealt with by the. Commission on the account of the Allies. I was not quite clear what the process would be of placing those bonds on the markets of the different countries, how far they would be brought into competition with the national and other securities of those countries, and how far the amount of issue in each particular case would be allocated according to the desires of the financial authorities in each separate country.
On the matter of reparation there is only one other point to which I wish to allude. The noble Earl said nothing about the possibility of, some form of reparation in kind. We have seen discussed in the public Press of the different countries the possibility of some actual reparation in France by German labour and material. It always seemed to me that that would be a difficult process to bring about. because the choice might appear to be between on the one hand importing a very large number of German free workmen into France, under German control, who might constitute something like a colony there for some considerable period of residence, not under French control, in a manner which would be unpalatable to the inhabitants of that country, and on the other hand introducing German labour under something like servile conditions, or at any rate under those conditions of rigid control which were applicable in former days to the Chinamen in Africa, about whom, the noble Earl will remember, so much controversy was raised. Therefore, I quite understand the difficulty which must have
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confronted the French in agreeing to anything of that kind, but it did appear to many of us that there was there an avenue towards obtaining a considerable amount of reparation, measured in terms of money, without the trade disturbance which, as we all know, would be caused by a great increase of German exports, very probably competitive with the manufactures of the Allies' own countries.
The noble Earl then passed to the matter of war criminals, and he complained, I have no doubt with justice, of the manner in which the Germans had refused to face the question of the trial of war criminals. Certainly, so far as this country is concerned, the outcome, whatever it may be, is very different from that which was held out at the notable Election in 1918, when the promise that all German war criminals should be punished so highly exhilarated the electors, or a great part of the electors, of this country. The event, whatever it, may he, has not borne out the hopes of anything like a general punishment of German war criminals, whether they were those more highly placed who were concerned in such outrages as the death, or one might say the, murder, of Captain Fryatt, or those who, I understand, are likely to be placed on their trial as guilty of the odious ill-treatment of British prisoners in the different camps.
When it is complained that all these criminals are not forthcoming it does not seem to be surprising that those who knew they were likely to be called upon to give an account of their actions should retire over the frontier to Switzerland, or sonic other country, from which I suppose they are not liable to be brought back by extradition. I am afraid it is the case—the noble Earl will correct me if I am wrong —that people subject to these charges cannot be extradited from neutral countries, and it cannot be amazing that several of them at any rate are not forthcoming in their native land.
The noble Earl mentioned two other failures on the part of the German Government to maintain her obligations—namely, the discrimination against our shipping lines and the bringing of suits for pre-war debts against British subjects, which have tended to pile up the case for action against the German Government. It certainly does seem that in these matters, and in some others, the German Government has shown a certain stupidity in failing to

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recognise the opinion not merely of their late enemies but of all Europe, and it shows that their mode of regarding life has not altogether changed since the days before the war, when the German Government was what we so well knew it to be.
The last matter which the noble Earl dealt with was the possible occupation of the district of the Ruhr. He expressed a strong hope that such an occupation would not take place. I entirely agree with him. I believe such an occupation would be an unmitigated misfortune for every one concerned; for the Allies generally, for France, and for the future of Europe. The noble Earl believed that nobody, in fact, desired to occupy the Ruhr, and that the French statesmen with whom he has been conversing have no such wish. I can well believe it, although I am afraid that there is a strong body of opinion in France which would look with pleasure and excitement on such an occupation, feeling that it would do something to wipe out the humiliation of the occupation by German troops of so large a portion of France. What strikes an outside observer is that it would be very easy to get into the Ruhr, but exceedingly difficult to get out. If such an occupation takes place, it is very hard to see what is to bring about its termination, and that, of itself, is one of the strongest arguments against A. It is difficult to see how the occupation of that wealthy and populous district can, in itself, assist reparation and the obtaining of the sums of money required for reparation.
The noble Earl, wisely, as I think, regarding the whole thing as hypothetical, and as we hope unlikely, did not enter into much detail on the subject, and did not deal with the question, with which we at any rate must be deeply concerned, as to what is to be the disposal of the products of that district if it is occupied by France. That must be a matter of most serious consideration for us, and it is one which, probably, the noble Earl would think it is unwise to discuss, or attempt to develop at this moment. It is a matter, however, which must be borne in mind in emphasising, as we must, the distaste from many points of view we have for such a possible occupation.
The noble Earl concluded by some words on the position as between France and ourselves, and the need which French statesmen are under of hearing in mind
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French public opinion. I am glad he laid stress on that fact, because it is one which we all have to bear in mind. Just, as Governments here have to bear in mind our public opinion, so French statesmen cannot always act on what they might consider to be, in the abstract, the best lines, but are obliged to consider the opinion of the (bomber, and, behind that, the opinions of the different Parties in France. One thing I most sincerely hope. It is that, even if the peoples of the two countries and the statesmen of the two countries cannot always see entirely eye to eye on these matters (and there is no use in denying the fact that during these negotiations it has been very difficult for the two countries to see altogether eye to eye) yet that nothing has occurred, or will occur, to break the strong and enduring bond of friendship which, as we trust, will continue between France and ourselves.
LORD PARMOOR: My Lords, before the noble Earl replies might I ask one or two questions upon matters of fact. I think he stated that to liquidate the debt of £6,600,000,000 in thirty years would take £400,000,000 annually. He said that was a liability which Germany could not bear at the present time, and that all the liability she was to be asked to hear at present was £100,000,000 a year plus 26 per cent, of her foreign trade. What I want to ask is: Will the difference between the £400,000,000 and the £100,000,000 plus 26 per cent. of the foreign trade be an accumulating liability against Germany? I ask for this reason. We all desire a final settlement—I agree with what the noble Earl said about the final settlement of this question—but it seems to me very difficult to have a final settlement if you leave the figures under such conditions that a liability is mounting up against Germany which, according to the noble Earl's view as I understand it, it would be impossible for Germany to meet. If he would give any further information on that point, I should be very pleased, because I am one of those who think that the settlement of this matter is of essential and immediate importance, and to no country more than to England itself.
I would also ask one question concerning the Ruhr district. The noble Earl showed that the Ruhr district is really the heart of German industrial life. No one questions that; 65 per cent. of the total coal production and a large amount of German

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industrial life arc dependent on the Ruhr district. We shall all heartily hope that his anticipations will be fulfilled and that no occupation of that district will take place, but if it does, as suggested in the questions asked by the noble Marquess, are there guarantees that the industrial life of Germany will not be interfered with? Of course, if it is really a question of payment for reparation becoming impossible, it is no good asking for an impossibility, and as a great part of the wealth of Germany depends on the industrial life of the Ruhr district, if that district is occupied without sufficient guarantees the consequence is obvious. I do not wish to dwell upon a matter of that kind, but to ask the noble Earl how far it has been considered.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition for the general character of his observations. He put to me some very pertinent questions to which I could, at any rate in part, reply. But I think, in a matter of so much importance as this, it is very desirable that I should only reply after full consideration and after access to sources of information which I do not happen to have brought with me this afternoon. The House will remember that we concluded our labours only at eleven o'clock this morning, and my time since has been occupied in preparing myself for this debate. I hope, therefore, that both noble Lords will allow me to reserve my reply. I shall be very glad to give it on sonic future occasion, if they will give me the opportunity.

TREATY OF PEACE (HUNGARY) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, I am sorry to have to trouble your Lordships a second time in the same afternoon with questions arising out of the war and the still unrecovered peace of Europe, but all of us view with a good deal of satisfaction the settlement, one by one, of these troubled issues, and we shall be glad to see one more of the Treaties concluded at the termination of the war—the last, indeed, but one, the exception being the Treaty of Sevres—finally disposed of. The question may be asked why,
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the Treaty-making power and Treaty-ratifying power being outside the hands of Parliament, a Bill is wanted at all in the case of this Hungarian Treaty. The answer is that it is required for two reasons: firstly, for the liquidation of certain Hungarian property in this country and the payment of certain British debts due to Hungarians; and, secondly, because certain expenses are involved in respect of the payment of salaries of the Arbitral Tribunal in Hungary. These are the reasons why, before ratifying this Treaty, we have to carry a Bill through Parliament.
Another question may be asked, or rather another complaint may be made of the long and (I quite agree) unconscionable delay that has taken place in the production of this particular measure. The Treaty of the Trianon, as it is called, was signed in June, 1920; it was ratified by the Hungarian Government, under strong pressure from the Powers, in November, 1920; and it is only brought to its final stages here at the beginning of May, 1921. I had fully hoped that this Bill might be introduced and proceeded with in December last, before Parliament separated, and it certainly was not from any reluctance on the part of the Government, or from any want of pressure on my own behalf, that it was not then taken. But when the new session began, as your Lordships know, a certain number of days had, under our rules, to be assigned to financial business before Easter, a certain amount of business had to be discharged, and, in spite of the pressure that 1 was constantly exercising, I was not successful in persuading my right honourable friend the Leader of the House of Commons to find a place for this Bill. I deeply regret the delay, and I have made this explanation to indicate that neither the Government nor the Foreign Office has any responsibility for it.
There has been a similar delay, I believe for somewhat similar reasons, in the case of France. When we have ratified this Treaty, as I hope we shall do in the course of the next few days, France is the only great Power remaining with her part unfulfilled, and so anxious was I to feel assured that there would be no further delay in France that I took the opportunity of the presence of M. Briand here to ask him about the matter. He told me that it was only owing to an accident that the Bill had not been taken in France before he came to our shores last week; that it

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would be proceeded with immediately upon his return; and that ratification by France would therefore follow almost immediately upon our own. So much for the minor question of the reasons for the Bill and of the delay in introducing it.
Now I Come to the Bill itself. The question of building up a new Hungary was not one of the least difficult of those that confronted the Conference at Paris. We all remember the old Austro-Hungarian Empire as it has existed through our lives. It was universally known to be an artificial system, the result partly of historical accident, and partly of political expedients, which it was generally recognised depended more or less upon the frail thread of the life of an aged sovereign. The war came and precipitated the catastrophe. It gave the last push to a fabric already tottering to its doom. During the war the artificial unity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was only maintained by the military support of Germany, one might almost say by the military dictation of Germany, and before the war was over the atoms had commenced to fly asunder, and the States now known as the Successor States, already drunk with the wine of self-determination, which was so freely offered to them on all hands, had begun to separate themselves arid to create a national existence of their own.
Thus, my Lords, when the Conference met at Paris it was confronted with the Austro-Hungarian Empire already in dissolution, with a number of fragments almost irrevocably severed from one another by antagonisms of race, by antagonisms of religion and of interest, and out of this débris it was the duty of the statesmen assembled at Paris to build a new Constitution for South-Eastern Europe. This was the task that confronted the members of the Conference at, Paris Racial unity, political unity, geographical unity, and economic unity, all these principles had to be borne in mind, and where they clashed the best available compromise had to be effected between them. Such, summarised in a few words, was the crucible from which the new Hungary emerged.
As regards Hungary herself. Hungary is a country wit eh has been united to us, or at all events drawn to in the past, by many ties of cotillion friendship and regard. The character of her people, t he nature of her institutions, and the spirit of her aristocracy, have always been re-
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girded as closely analogous to our own. Further, Hungary, as recent debates have shown, has many friends in this House, who have on more than one occasion pictured to us in moving terms what she has lost and suffered both during the war and after. I attach becoming weight to those considerations. No one desires to be over-hard upon Hungary now, but, looking into the evidence of the ease, I cannot find that the guilt of Hungary in entering the war was any less than that of her accomplices, or that her conduct of the war was any more mild, and after the war was over she could not hope, for the sake of old memories, to escape the penalties which they have suffered. In a sense the very considerations that I have named render her culpability to some extent more marked.
What is the result? You now have a Hungary with a population of seven and a half millions of people, nearly seven millions of whom are of the Magyar race. As regards her new neighbours, gone is Croatia, with its two and a half millions of Yugo-Slays; gone is Slovakia with its two million Slovaks; gone is Eastern Hungary with its predominantly Rumanian population. It was inevitable that these elements in the former Hungary should join with their brethren in the neighbouring countries, and form the new States to which I have referred.
Of course it was not possible for the Conference at Paris to make a clean cut everywhere. Populations, perhaps in those parts of Europe even more than elsewhere, are inextricably intermingled and interlaced. You have, for instance, a population of one race in the big towns and a population of another race in the country districts that surround those towns, and the Conference was confronted at each stage with the difficulty of drawing this tortuous and sinuous line between the areas. In these circumstances they proceeded, broadly speaking, upon the lines that I have named. For instance, as regards those parts of I Hungary which have gone to Rumania and here I found myself exclusively upon the Magyar statistics which do not always err upon the side of reliability— there are 2,826,000 Rumanians and 500,000 Germans who are quite ready to accept the Rumanian rule, as against a ntinority—a very large minority, I admit— of 1,675,000 Magyars. Take again the Yugo-Slav case. There you have an overwhelming majority of Yugo-Slavs.

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Then take the much-discussed and sometimes disputed case of the Czecho-Slovaks whom Hungary has had to hand over to Slovakia. Here, again, I ant quoting from Magyar statistics. There are 1,692,000 Slovaks in the area to which I refer. There remains in that area a minority, a smaller minority, of 850,000 Magyars. So interlocked and interspersed were these elements that it was impossible for the Conference to separate them. Then take the mountain population of Ruthenia, of whom there are three to four hundred thousand in the Carpathians. They wore a people cruelly oppressed for generations by the Hungarian Government in the past. They have been taken away and, with the security of a Diet and an autonomy of their own, they have been plated under the protection of the new Czeclio-Slovakian State.
Such were the main cuts, to use a rather unconventional phrase, which were made by the Peace Conference in the Hungary of the past. The decision of the Peace Conference in each of these cases was fully justified on the principles which have been accepted by the League of Nations. The Hungarian case against these decisions was based merely on appeal to history—that is, the right of conquest in the past—and on appeal to economics. To the former contention the Peace Conference made the sufficient reply that a state of things, even though it has lasted for a thousand years, has no right to continue when it is clear that it is contrary to justice, and that the Hungarian claim was not only contrary to justice but contrary to fact, for, as I have shown, the non-Magyar populations of Hungary had already, before the end of the war, declared their independence of the Hungarian Monarchy, and had exercised the right of self-determination before the issue at Paris came to be solved.
Again, it is, I hope, unnecessary to assure the friends of Hungary, of whom I know there are sonic in this House, that the Hungarian case on all these questions was not neglected simply because Hungary had made the great mistake and become an enemy Power, or because no Hungarian Delegation was present in Paris when the questions were examined. Volumes and piles of Treaties and documents and evidence representing the Hungarian case were submitted to the Peace Conference, and the very fact I named just now, that in every case it was Magyar figures and statistics that were relied upon,
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is a proof, I think, of the fact that their case enjoyed full consideration. I remember being present in Paris when, at a later stage, the Hungarian Delegation, headed by a most able man, Count Apponyi, came to the Conference chamber and he delivered, at great length, a speech in Several languages—because one language followed the other—in support of the Hungarian case.
Finally, the case came at a later stage to London, and was referred to a Conference of Allied Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, over which I was presiding a little more than a year ago at the Foreign Office. And there it fell to my lot to make that particular proposal, which was afterwards announced to the Hungarian Government in a letter by M. Millerand, at that time the Prime Minister of France—the proposal by which we allowed the Boundary Commissions, set up under the Treaty, the right of reporting to the Council of the League of Nations any injustices that they might. find in the matter of frontier delimitation, which it might be thought desirable to do anything to remove. The actual words were these—
" Where the frontier, as indicated in the Treaty, does not correspond exactly to the ethnic or economic conditions, the Boundary Commission may address a report to the Council of the League of Nations, and the latter may offer its good offices."
The League of Nations will, I think, be a very suitable body to act as a mediator in such cases; but, even had the League of Nations drawn up the original frontiers instead of the statesmen of Parris, I doubt, seeing that these frontiers are based upon the very principles of ethnic unity and economic convenience, which are the bases of the action of the League of Nations, whether the frontiers would have differed very materially, if at all, from those which were there laid down.
So much for the territorial and geographical features of the Hungarian Treaty. A few words I would like to add, if I may, on the political provisions. And, among these, I would call attention to two or three. Firstly, I should like to invite your Lordships' attention to the provisions with regard to the protection of minorities; because even in the re-constituted Magyar Hungary there are, as is well known, considerable racial, religious, and linguistic minorities, whose interest it was our desire to protect. Articles 54 to 60 were specially

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introduced into the Treaty for this object. I will read only a few lines from them—
" Hungary undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Hungary without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.
All inhabitants of Hungary shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion, or belief whose practices are nut inconsistent with public order or public morals. …
All Hungarian nationals shall be equal before the law, and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights, without distinction as to race, language, or religion.…
Hungary will provide in the public educational system in: towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Hungarian nationals of other than Magyar speech arc resident, adequate facilities for ensuring tint in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children through the medium of their own language —"
although the Hungarian Government, make such Magyar language obligatory in the said schools.
Further, in the last of these Articles to which 1 am referring, Hungary agrees that these stipulations constitute obligations of international concern, to be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. The Article goes on—
"They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.''
Moreover, in Articles 44 to 47 of the same Treaty the States of Yugo-Slavia and Rumania accept the same obligation. All the Successor States have now ratified their Minority Treaties, and therefore Hungary is in a position where she must carry out her obligations in this, respect.
LORD PHILLIMORE: Will the noble Earl say whether that includes CzechoSlovakia?
EARL CURZON OF:KEDLESTON: Yes, Czecho-Slovakia is not mentioned, I think, in the Articles to which I refer in this Treaty, but my impression is that CzechoSlovakia is one of the Successor States that have ratified a Minority Treaty, and is therefore bound.
The second point to which 1 should like to refer is the reparation clauses, about which some suspicion has been, I think unjustifiably, entertained. The reparation clauses in the Treaty are modelled on the corresponding clauses in the Austrian Treaty. The amount of reparation to be paid will be fixed by the Reparation Commission, which will prescribe the time and manner of dis-
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charging by Hungary, within thirty years of the dating from May 1, 1921, of the debt to be assessed by the Commission. The Commission, after May 1 in this year, have from time to time to consider the resources of Hungary, and after giving her representatives a just opportunity to be hoard they have discretion to extend the date and modify the form of payment to be made. That is Article 164.
The Hungarian section of the Commission does not, of course, come into existence until this Treaty is in force, and therefore I cannot say anything of what they may determine. I have no doubt they will consider not only the damage for which compensation has to be paid, but also the great diminution of territory and revenues which has taken place, and the necessity of the economic; reconstruction of Hungary herself. And if they treat Hungary in the same spirit in which they have treated Austria, I do not think the friends of Hungary will have any very great cause of complaint. In the ease of Austria, as we know, it is more than likely that the reparation clauses will not be enforced.
Several NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: But Hungary, I would point out, is in a much better position than Austria. She is self-supporting in the matter of foodstuffs; she is by no means a bankrupt concern; she has not to buy, as Austria has, everything abroad, with a currency steadily depreciating. She can feed her own people and employ them as well. When the area of Pees is restored to her she will have her own coalfield, and a very good one too. Therefore, she will be in a much better position than her formerly more powerful neighbour. It is impossible, of course, to drop the reparation clauses altogether. That would be tantamount to admitting that Hungary does not share equally with her Allies the responsibility and guilt of the war.
The third point to which I should like to devote a word is that which has more than once been mentioned in this House—namely, the difficulties that have arisen between Hungary and her neighbours and the desirability of closer economic union between them. If your Lordships look at the economic clauses of the Treaty, and particularly Article 207, you will sec that provision is made for assisting in the

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mutual co-operation of Hungary and her neighbours in regard to the exchange of products indispensable to their industry or trade. The Peace Conference was very sensible of the necessity for maintaining or re-establishing the natural trade routes of Central Europe and for endeavouring to bring together neighbouring States in such co-operation as would, without infringing their complete rights of sovereignty and their full powers of determining their own policy, enable us to meet the serious shortage both of raw materials and manufactured articles due to the devastations of war.
That is why paragraph 6 was incorporated in Article 207 —in order to meet Hungary's complaint that nothing was being done to save her from the alleged intention of her neighbours to boycott her. It is there laid down in so many words that—
" negotiations shall be undertaken, on the initiative of any of these States, within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty with a view to the conclusion with any other of the said States of separate Conventions in conformity with the provisions of the present Treaty, and in particular of Articles 200 to 205.
" At the end of this period any State which has requested such a Convention without succeeding in concluding it may apply to the Reparation Commission and request it to accelerate the conclusion of such Convention."
Apart from this general provision, the same Article includes, special provisions with a view of securing to Hungary adequate supplies of coal from her neighbours, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland.
This is as far as the Allied Powers thought they were justified in going, without an unwarrantable interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States. Here I should like to say that in supporting such efforts as these for mutual co-operation between these States, His Majesty's Government was thinking exclusively of the economic necessities of the States concerned, and that the absurd suspicion which has been spread abroad in some quarters as to the proposed artificial re-creation of a political Danube Confederation, which the sovereign States were unwilling to accept, is totally void of any substance whatsoever so far as British policy is concerned.
It only remains to add that it is in accordance with these provisions that the forthcoming Conference at Porto Rosa, to which I referred if a recent debate, is about to be held. In that Conference all
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the Successor States, including Poland—I was asked the question the other day—will be represented, and Great Britain, France and the United States as well. Our delegate will be Sir Francis Dent, who was formerly Chairman of a Commission for the distribution of rolling-stock in Central Europe. The programme, as it is at present arranged, includes the examination of the possibility of framing Conventions for the exchange of essential commodities, for the facilitation of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication, and for the acceleration of goods and passenger traffic.
Such are the main provisions of the Treaty of Trianon. For my own part, I am far from being despondent as to the future of Hungary. She possesses even within her restricted borders, considerable resources of her own. She has an active and high-spirited population. She has Parliamentary institutions which are genuine. The debates in her Chamber, if you read them, are free. The Parliament does its business on the whole well. She has at the present moment a singularly capable Finance Minister who is pushing through the requisite legislation to stabilise the finances of his country. The present Government—that over which Admiral Horthy presides—has weathered several storms. It must be remembered that it succeeded a Communist Government, a Soviet Government, a Bolshevik Government if you like so to call it, which had by its actions excited universal horror and detestation.
It was not, therefore, surprising that in the earlier months of Admiral Horthy's régime recourse was had to measures of repression and of reprisals, and that there is still a large measure of Government control. Nevertheless, our information is that these repressive measures are being steadily relaxed, and certainly in the attempt—the forlorn and calamitous attempt— that was recently made by the ex-Emperor Carl to return to the country, the hungarian Government handled the situation well, observed a correct attitude, and, I think, emerged from what was a very difficult situation without any loss of dignity and with an increase of self-respect.
The best thing that we can do for Hungary, if I may say so, is to ratify the Treaty without delay; to give such support as we can to her Government so long as it deserves it; and to use what-

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ever influence we have with the neighbours of Hungary to be inure accommodating in their relations with her. On the other hand, the best thing that Hungary can do for herself is to desist from political intrigue, to enlarge the borders of freedom to her own people, to cultivate good relations with her neighbours, and to proceed with the development of her own resources. It is quite in the power, as I see it, of the Magyar race to work out a new salvation for themselves in a few years time. If that be so, the war, from which they have suffered so much and for which they have been called upon to pay so heavy a penalty, may before long be a painful but forgotten dream.
Moved, that the Bill be now read 2ª.—(Earl Curzon of Kedleton.)
LORD NEWTON: My Lords, the speech delivered by the noble Earl the Leader of the House was marked by his customary lucidity and eloquence, but I confess I can only regret that it Las not altered the opinions which I previously expressed as regards the character of the Treaty. I do not propose to waste the time of the House in recounting the objections which I have already made here. But there arc certain questions dealt with by the noble Earl upon which l desire to make sonic comment. First of all, I must again draw attention to the question of the delay in the ratification of this Treaty. I have no hesitation in saying—and I believe everybody will agree with me—that the delay in the ratification of this Treaty has been little less than disastrous.
That opinion has been expressed by no less important a personage than Mr. Balfour who, a short time ago, occupied the position of the noble Earl at the Foreign Office. The other day Mr. Balfour expressed the opinion that no greater calamity had occurred in Europe than the delays with regard to the various Treaties. His Majesty's Government, at all events, have at last fulfilled their part of the bargain, but there is still delay on the part of the other Powers. The Treaty requires, in order to come into force (if I am not mistaken) the ratification of three great Powers. We are about to ratify. The Italians, I understand, have ratified. The Japanese, I believe, are in process of ratifying, and my noble friend has assured the House this afternoon that the French are about to ratify. My opinion
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is that although the French are about to ratify they are going to attach fresh conditions, and to insist on certain guarantees which, I confess, appear to me to be quite unwarranted. I trust, if this is the case— I hope I am misinformed— that this policy will receive no support, from His Majesty's Government, that, if necessary, the ratification will be carried on by the other Powers, and that no attention will be paid to the demands of the French.
I have observed with some surprise that in another place the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expressed the opinion that the Treaty was conceived in no spirit of anger or vengeance, and said that he hoped and believed the new Hungary had every prospect of a splendid and prosperous future. This expression rather reminds me of that of Lord Beaconsfield after the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin. When Turkey had lost the greater portion of her European Provinces, Lord Beaconsfield congratulated Turkey on the concentrated form of territory which she was now about to enjoy it, seems to me that to congratulate the Hungarians, anti to wish them a happy and prosperous future, is, in the present circumstances, as if you were to congratulate and wish a prosperous future to a man with whom you hail been engaged in a desperate struggle, whose leg you had out off, whose arm you had cut off, whom you had made bankrupt, and to whom you announced, in spite of that, that you intended in future to take from him further money if possible.
I am satisfied in my own mind that no spirit of anger or vengeance animated His Majesty's Government. I firmly believe that His Majesty's Government are well disposed towards the Hungarian. Nevertheless, the fact remains, and has been pointed out by the noble Earl himself, that the population of the country has been reduced from 18,000,000 to 7,000,000; that two-thirds of its territory- have been taken away; that its economic prosperity, at all events for the present, has been, if not entirely destroyed, very seriously impaired; and that millions of Magyars and German-speaking Hungarians have been transferred, quite contrary to the principle of President Wilson— the principle of selfdetermination— to other countries, without being allowed to express any opinion on the question themselves.
The defence that is made with regard I to this policy—and it has been repeated

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by my noble friend this afternoon—is that the Allies were not responsible for the disintegration of Hungary, because it all took place before they intervened. We are given to understand that the country was in such a state of decomposition that its component elements, so to speak, all fell apart, and that they assorted themselves automatically in the territories of which they have now become subjects. I am, of course, quite prepared to admit that there was grave discontent in Hungary on the part of the subject population. At the same time, I am not in the least convinced that these people have, even now, got what they wanted.
It would take a great deal to make me believe, for instance, that the Croatians are delighted at being placed finder the rule of Belgrade. We know that a large portion of the population of Transylvania bitterly resents being placed under Rumanian rule, and I do not exactly see the propriety or advantage of transferring German-speaking Hungarians to Austria, because the chances are that in the future they will only form part of a larger Germany. Again, take the case of CzechoSlovakia. I am very much disposed to think that if the. Slovaks had the opportunity they would be only too glad to return to Hungarian rule to-morrow. I read in a Slovak paper, published at Vienna, that up till the middle of February no fewer than 232,000 Slovaks had been put in prison by the Czech Government. That hardly sounds as if they had greatly improved their lot by passing under the domination of the Serbs.
I will pass to another point raised by the noble Earl, the question of reparations. It seems to me that when you talk about exacting reparation front Turkey, or Bulgaria, or Hungary, you are really playing with words. Who seriously expects to get any large contribution from those countries? We are expecting to get indemnities from Germany, but I do not think anybody seriously believes that we shall get anything substantial from the countries that I have mentioned. Take, for instance, the case of Austria. What happened in Austria? After the Peace was signed an enormous horde of officials of all countries descended upon Vienna, and, I believe, occupied the whole of the gigantic War Office, and no less a sum than 7,600,000 gold crowns was voted by the Austrian Government in order to pay for
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those people. The total revenue of Austria, if I am not mistaken, is only £14,000,000 sterling and their, expenditure is £35,000,000 sterling. Therefore, that unhappy country has a deficit of £21,000,000 sterling. Yet, in those circumstances, we actually sent a vast horde of people to Vienna, who caused almost intolerable expense and ended by reporting that there is nothing to be got out of Austria.
Warned by that, I should hope that the idea of sending a large Commission of a similar character to Budapest will be abandoned. I am inclined to believe that if any such work is necessary it will be perfectly well performed by the officials upon the spot. I would go further and maintain, as far as Hungary is concerned, that I do not see why any reparation should be exacted from Hungary at all. Hungary is a country which has been treated more severely than any of our ex-enemies, as I have already pointed out. Apart from the enormous losses of territory, population, and revenue, the unfortunate Hungarians have suffered from a Bolshevik régime, and they have also suffered what was worse—from a prolonged Rumanian occupation which, I believe, cost them something like £100,000,000 sterling, or infinitely more than the German occupation cost Belgium. As a matter of common sense and justice the idea of exacting reparation from Hungary might profitably be abandoned.
I desire to say one word with regard to the economic relations of these various States. There is no more fruitful subject of regret than the internecine economic struggle which goes on between these different countries. It has been constantly deplored by official spokesmen. Whose fault is it? These new Successor States were created at Paris. No undue liberty would have been taken had certain conditions been enforced upon them, and if they had been tied down to a kind of economic union such as prevailed in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is always represented that this would have been an insult to these States, but it seems to me it would have been an ordinary procedure dictated by common sense. After all, these Successor States are in the position of minors, children, who come into an inheritance, and if a minor comes into an inheritance you do not allow him or her to have complete disposal of it, but naturally prevent them from disposing of it accord-

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ing to their own will. I observe that considerable hope is attached to the coming Conference of these Successor States and Poland at Porto Rosa. This Conference is to be attended by representatives of the Great Powers, and I hope that the representatives of the Great Powers will be less scrupulous than at Paris and will insist upon an economic unity of some kind.
There is a great deal to be said—I am not going to say it, as l observe Lord Bryce is present—on the question of Transylvania. The state of that country is thoroughly unsatisfactory. Not only have large numbers of Magyars been trans-funned against their will into Rumanian subjects, but they are, by all accounts, badly treated. Their property has been confiscated, many of them have been exiled, their schools and Universities have been closed, and the population generally subjected to considerable ill-treatment. I should like to re-echo the wish expressed by Lord Bryce, that the condition of Transylvania will be investigated by an International Commission.
There is only one other point to which I desire to refer. It is one to which the noble Earl made no allusion: In consequence of the prolonged delay of ratification a valuable portion of Hungary is still occupied by the Serbs, and it is a portion of Hungary which happens to be about the only district left in which there is any coal. The Serbs, not content with taking the Hungarian coal, have also set up a Bolshevist administration in defiance of the Supreme Council and everybody else. These people have been there so long that I am afraid it will be no easy matter to turn them out, and they have threatened that if they are obliged to evacuate this valuable territory they will not do so until they have destroyed the coal mines on which the prosperity of that district depends. I should like to ask for an assurance that steps will be taken by the Powers to see that this evacuation is carried out satisfactorily.
If the questions I have touched upon are dealt with satisfactorily then this admittedly severe and hard Treaty will at all events be mitigated. I am not ashamed to plead once more that Hungary should be treated, as far as practicable, with humanity and justice. In spite of what the noble Earl has said I maintain that Hungary is the least guilty of our ex-enemy Powers. The secret history of
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the war has shown that Hungary did not desire to embark on the war, and would have been only too glad to escape from it had there been an opportunity. At all events, the last thing they wanted to do was to fight this country. From my own official knowledge I know that they treated. British subjects better than any other Power, and we owe them something, if only for that. The curious thing is that in spite of all they have gone through these people still retain a most profound and pathetic trust in this country, and the sympathy they feel is not a sympathy between two aristocracies but a genuine admiration for British institutions. Of all the Powers we are the one Power with which they would like to resume commercial relations, and it is not only in the interests of this country but, in the interests of Europe and civilisation generally that Hungary should be restored to some measure of her former power and prosperity.
VISCOUNT BRYCE: My Lords, this Treaty is submitted to us as a fait accompli. It is too late to make any change in it though I believe that if the country had known what was being done in Paris we should have been able to evoke public opinion and have prevented a Treaty like this from ever having been concluded. Unfortunately the country was given no opportunity of knowing what was being done, and we are presented now with a Treaty which is impossible to change. There is nothing left except to call attention to, and enter an unavailing protest against, the harshness and injustice which this Treaty displays. In saying this I am not bringing any charge against the Foreign Office. These things were done at Paris. The main decisions were taken there, although, no doubt, some of the later decisions were taken in London—and now the Foreign Office is expected to defend what has been already done.
I have no complaint to make of the tone in which the noble Earl spoke this afternoon. I feel sure that the sympathy he expressed was genuine, and I believe that if the whole of these negotiations had been left to the Foreign Office we should have had a very different Treaty. The Foreign Office may have had comparatively little part in it, but it is obliged to make the best defence it can. What in the world were the causes of the action which Paris took? A good many things have been revealed as

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to what was done by the Council of Four, and the Council of Ten; revelations which have been sometimes more interesting than discreet. But no one has carried any lamp into these dark corners in which the fate of Hungary was decided. We do not even know what Power it was that exerted its influence to bring about this Treaty, or from what motives it acted.
I read with care what was said in another place in defence of this Treaty, but I could really find nothing of substance in it. The defence seemed to me always to evade the material points and it practically reduced itself to this: that the Allied Powers knew best what was for the good of Hungary and of the world. It was urged also that the questions were very difficult. With the latter statement we all agree. But I think that those who remember the other decisions of importance which were arrived at by these two Councils, and those who see how many of those decisions have already been proved by their results to have been unwise and pernicious, will not be disposed to attach very much weight to the argument that this Treaty comes to us with the authority of those who were assembled in Paris.
Hungary was surely entitled to some more respectful and sympathetic treatment. Hungary is one of the oldest kingdoms in Europe; far older not only than such mushroom states as Prussia and Bavaria, not to speak of Austria, which only came into existence quite lately; but older than old kingdoms like Portugal and Norway, one of the real old great kingdoms of Europe. She has been inhabited by an exceptionally high-spirited and liberty-loving people. She has played a great part in the world, and has striven for many centuries, and on many occasions, for her liberties against the Hapsburgs, and, as the noble Earl has very properly remarked, and as Lord Newton has also pointed out, she has always had the warmest feelings for this country.
In no country did Englishmen receive so warm a welcome. I well remember how in 1866, immediately after the conclusion of the war between Prussia and Austria, although Prussia had then been trying to get the. aid of Hungary, although she had sent Klapka, one of the heroes of 1849, into Hungary to raise a Hungarian force to attack Austria before that country submitted after the battle of KÖniggratt, there was no sympathy in Hungary for Prussia. The feeling expressed was entirely for
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England, and the hope was always added that if it ever happened to Hungary in the struggle for her liberties, in Which, under the leadership of Deák, she ultimately succeeded, she should have the sympathy of England. I need not tell your Lordships that during the war—I think my noble friend, Lord Newton, referred to this point—there was no country in which British prisoners of war were so well treated. In many cases they were even allowed to go about on parole—a favour which I think was nowhere else extended to British prisoners.
Let me again repeat that I am not aware of any foundation for the allegation that Hungary took a leading part in bringing about the war. That has been constantly stated but upon no sufficient evidence. Ou the contrary, there is evidence to show that Count Tisza, in the consultations which were held before the outbreak of the war, when the ultimatum to Serbia was being considered, did his best to dissuade the strong action that was taken and did all that he could as one man, Prime Minister of Hungary, to prevent the war from being then suddenly entered upon. The truth was that it was a small and mischievous camarilla, in Vienna, in close conjunction with the Germans, whom we have to thank for the war, and not the public opinion or the statesmen of Hungary.
What is it that has now been done to Hungary I do not think the treatment accorded to her could he appreciated without looking at a map. I cannot expect your Lordships to carry in your minds the frontiers of Hungary and the position of the various nationalities that inhabited the territory of the old Hungarian kingdom before the war. This House is not well fitted for the display of a map. I will only say, in the briefest way possible, that the territory of Hungary has been reduced by rather more than one-half and her population has been reduced by a great deal more than one-half, and that from two to three millions of Magyar-speaking Hungarians have been handed over to alien rule. I admit—of course, everybody must admit—that it was impossible to maintain the old Hungary. There were large parts of the Hungarian kingdom which were inhabited by races with a distinct nationality of their own and it was only right that they should be delivered from Magyar control and allowed to join those new States with which they had linguistic and ethnic connection.

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I agree, therefore, that it was quite right to set up a Czecho-Slovakia, and that there was a very strong case for letting the people of the Slovak country and the north-west mountainous part of Hungary such as the country around the Tatra range, to go to Czecho-Slovakia with which they had a natural affinity. Geography and ethnology suggested that, and, similarly, I quite agree, and I think everyone who knows the country will agree, that more than half of Transylvania was properly allotted to Rumania, because in the southern and some of the central parts of Transylvania the bulk of the population was Roman in speech and Orthodox in religion.
With regard to the Ruthenes the ease is quite different. The Ruthenes are not the same as the Slovaks or the Czechs, although they are a branch of the Slavonic race. The Ruthenians had long been in close historical connection with Hungary. I have never heard any facts brought forward to show that the Ruthenians were substantially discontented with Magyar rule or had any desire to be taken from Hungary in order to be allotted to the new State of Czecho-Slovakia. I believe that at this moment the Ruthenians would like to be consulted on the question, and the probability is that if something in the nature of a plébiscite were taken, the Ruthenian population would declare it their will to go along with Hungary rather than wish Czecho-Slovakia.
It is, of course, perfectly true, as the noble Earl has observed, that in many parts of Eastern Europe—and the same thing holds good in many of the Balkan countries also—the populations of different speech and race are so closely intermixed and interlaced that it is impossible to place every community under a government of its own race. We must abandon that as hopeless. My case here is that the Conferences at Paris have gone very far beyond that. They seem to have thrown overboard the principles of nationality and self-determination in cases where it was perfectly easy to apply them. Take, for instance, such a case as that of the Szeklers, a population of about 500,000 persons, pure Magyars in every respect and not intermingled with the Rumanians. They are a, compact mass living by themselves in a mountainous country between the frontiers of Moldavia and the Hungarian cities of Koloszvar and Maros Vasarhely.
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What reason was there why the frontier should not have been so drawn as to bring the Magyar parts of Transylvania up to the Szekler country, for that region of Transylvania is very largely Magyar. If there were difficulties in doing that, why was not something in the nature of a corridor made which would have enabled them to be in communication with the Magyar population of Northern Transylvania? Or why were not autonomous institutions given to them instead of subjecting this purely Magyar community to the alien and unwelcome rule of the Humans, who have already shown how they are going to use the power unfortunately given to them? I might carry this thing into further detail and show your Lordships how cities like Koloszvar and Arad and Nagy Varad, cities which are almost entirely Magyar, have been given to Rumania merely on the allegation that the rural population in the neighbourhood is to some considerable extent Human. It means that the intelligent, cultivated, well-educated and commercial population of the cities from which light flows out into the country, and from which the peasants gain such civilisation and culture as are obtainable, is given over to the backward population, the higher elements are sacrificed to the lower, and the whole country suffers by having those elements from which progress would proceed being subjected to an alien rule which is likely to leave them down lower than they were becoming under Hungarian rule.
The city of Pressburg has been given to the Czecho-Slovaks, I believe, upon the ground that they ought to have access to the Danube. It is perfectly right that they should have access to the Danube and should have the fullest right of using that great river for the purposes of navigation. But it was not necessary for those purposes to take away territories inhabited chiefly by Magyars and give these over to the Slovaks. The two great Universities of Pressburg and Koloszvar have been taken away from the Magyars. They have lost practically all their forests which were one great source of wealth. The forests lay all along the high mountain country which stretches in a semi-circle round the great Hungarian plain, enclosing it on the North and East. All these forests have been taken away from Hungary and hardly any woodland region of importance now remains to her. In the same way she has lost a great deal of her minerals. To make these

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changes is to destroy her chances of economic recovery and of developing her manufacturing industries.
I will not take up your time by referring to the letter in which M. Millerand, on behalf of the Allies, stated their case for these changes in the distribution of territories. It comes practically to this, that the Allies could not be troubled to investigate the matter more carefully. What it said in substance was this. "Since we cannot leave Hungary as she was we will do nothing to give Hungary what she ought to have. Because we cannot make a perfect system without making some changes we will take away from Hungary many territories which, upon our own principles, she ought to retain."
It is said that provision will be made for protecting minorities. Now, my Lords, we have some evidence of the way in which minorities are likely to be protected. The Humans, having been called upon, at the end of the war, to drive out Bela Kun and his Bolsheviks; insisted upon retaining a country not theirs. They were allowed by the Allies to retain large parts of Hungary even before the terms of the Treaty had been settled. They immediately proceeded to act with the greatest severity in the territories occupied. They seized the Church property, closed the schools and are now, I believe, compelling children to go to Human schools even when private Hungarian schools have been opened for their benefit. Every effort is being made to expunge the Magyar language and to substitute Human for it. A whole series of petty persecutions— religious persecutions, racial persecutions—has been carried on ever since the Humans have been in the country.
I dare say your Lordships will remember that more than a year ago some of us called the attention of the House to a petition or a memorial signed by the three heads of the three religious communities in Transylvania, Catholics, Calvinists and Unitarians, all pleading for the interference of the Powers to prevent the oppression and injustice to which their religious bodies were being treated. This oppression has gone on, I fear, ever since. I then ventured to ask the Government whether they would not appoint a Commission to investigate the matter, and I see that Lord Newton expresses a hope that that will be done. I should like to know from the Government
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whether, if they are not satisfied with the information which they received, they will have sonic Inquiry in order that we may know whether at this moment any protection is being given to the minorities mentioned in the Treaty. I feel sonic doubt whether it will be found possible to enforce the protection which the Treaty offers to minorities. We are told that the Leanne of Nations will do it. Has the League the power to do it, or has it the requisite support of the Great Powers of Europe in this matter? All this future is very misty and it may be years before any effective protection is given to those now suffering from the changes which this Treaty sanctions.
I can find only one excuse that has been given for the extraordinarily severe treatment meted out to Hungary, and it is that the Hungarians did before the war abuse their power and oppress, in sonic respects, the subject populations which belonged to the territories of the Hungarian Crown. That is true of all the Powers of Central and Eastern Europe. What' the Hungarians did in those days is not so bad as what the Prussians did in Posen, and far less than what the Czars did in Poland, and what the Humans are doing now. You may go so far as to say that there has been no racial tolerance beyond the Rhine, and I do not see why Hungary should be the only country that is made to suffer for mistakes committed by her rulers among others.
What the Powers are doing is trying to remedy old grievances by creating new ones. These things, as Lord Newton has said, are being done in the teeth of the principles avowed by the Powers when they. entered upon the task of reconstructing Europe. I am not now referring merely to the Fourteen Points of Mr. Wilson. All the Powers ayowed themselves to be entering upon the task of reconstruction with every desire to meet the reasonable wishes of subject populations, and to endeavour to bring about a state of things in which there would be fewer grievances, more contentment, and therefore a tolerable security for peace. These principles have been entirely neglected. If the Powers cared less for justice than for some supposed interests of their own, or if they were so weary of the long and painful task of re-settling the shattered world as to determine to cut things short and do injustice, they might, at any rate, have been expected to care for peace and the prospects of the future.

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I frankly welcome the hope that the noble Earl expressed that Hungary would still recover itself. I do not despair of Hungary. After all, that which makes the greatness of a country is the spirit of its people; and the spirit of the Hungarian people is not broken. But we cannot but fear that the provisions which are embodied in this Treaty will create a rankling sense of injustice, an anger, and a bitterness that will lock for the first chance of redressing the wrongs that the Treaty inflicts. Unjust settlements seldom last. Can any one believe that the arrangements embodied in this Treaty are calculated to create peace? They are more likely to sow the seeds of future war, and that at a time when peace is the supreme need of the world.
LORD PHILLIMORE: My Lords, as I gave some slight assistance to my noble friend, Lord Newton, in pressing forward this question of ratification, I should like to take this opportunity of saying that did not do so because I felt I that the Treaty was a good one, but because I felt that, the Treaty having been concluded, it was best for Hungary that it should be ratified as soon as possible, and that tier soil should be free from occupation by Armies of other nations. I remember that when the Treaty of Versailles came before your Lordships' House the noble Earl, Lord Curzon of Kedleston, expressed, or seemed to show, some feeling of surprise—at which did not wonder—that so very few noble Lords addressed the House on that occasion. If I remember rightly, only Lord Buck-master and Lord Bryce did so. I had thought of saying something, but I felt appalled by the task; I felt that it was hopeless at that stage endeavouring to undo anything that that Treaty had done, and that criticism at the moment would do more harm than good. I feel the same about this Treaty, but I should like to add one or two words, because I cannot think that these boundaries will remain aad stand the test of time.
Everybody knows that the difficulty of dividing according to races or languages, or religion, in Eastern Europe ism insuperable. Whatever you do, you must have what may be called an alien element in every country. In those circumstances I believe far the wisest thing would have been to separate whole provinces, such as the kingdom of Slavonia, from Hungary, and not to cut through ancient
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divisions where people, after all, had got associated with each other in local government and local management. And if I may apply that principle, I apply it in my mind chiefly to the invasion of Hungarian territory from the north—to the addition of large parts of Hungary to Czecho-Slovakia, as it is called. From such information as I have I share the doubt whether Slovaks are so very anxious to be—what they really will be—because they are an inferior race—under, I will not say the domination, but under the supremacy of the Czechs, and how far they will prefer that to being under the supremacy of the Magyars.
Be that as it may, the addition of a large part of Northern Hungary to this new modern creation, Czecho-Slovakia, has the effect of taking a large number of Magyars away from the country with which they have been associated historically and nationally and ethnically ever since Hungary was a kingdom. Bohemia has a very highly respected history. Moravia is a recognised province; the minion of Bohemia and Moravia is, I believe, ancient. Bohemia with Moravia might be a very respected kingdom. Czecho-Slovakia, with all respect to it, reminds me rather of a hyphenated parvenu and a profiteer, at the expense of her neighbour, Hungary. It is useless, I know, saving all these things, because the Treaty is made, and the best that can be clone now is to get a stable condition. But I would urge upon His Majesty's Government four ways in which they can make the burden a little easier for Hungary, and a little less likely to create a permanent soreness, which will make the unrest of Eastern Europe certain.
First of all, the noble Earl made a valuable suggestion, if I may say so, with regard to the Boundary Commission. I hope those Boundary Commissioners will exercise their powers largely and always in favour of Hungary, so that the boundaries of Hungary can be extended. as far as those Commissioners will allow it. Secondly, I am not personally in favour of any of those clauses by which one nation interferes with another and binds another nation to respect the minority of its own people. I wonder what we should have thought, if we had been beaten in the war, and we bad been told to respect minorities in England, Ireland, Wales or, perhaps, Jersey. I am not in favour of them, but, if they are

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there, let them be enforced all round. And I trust that, as the noble Earl has said there are corresponding minority clauses with respect to Rumania and Serbo-Croatia, there are—though the noble Earl did not seem satisfied about them—similar clauses with respect to Czecho-Slovakia, and I hope His Majesty's Government will do its best to see that those clauses are enforced.
The third thing is reparation. I venture to agree with the noble Earl that we cannot drop the claim for reparation. As a technical claim, as a claim to show that we were right in the war and Hungary was wrong, we must keep it on foot. But I trust that it will be a mere formal judgment for damages and not followed by execution, and that Hungary- will not be further pressed in that matter, even though she be, as she certainly is, much richer than Austria. And the last, and I think perhaps the most important, is that His Majesty's Government should use all its powers to see that the evacuation by the Serbo-Croatian forces and any other forces that there may be there, is not only prompt but is effected without doing damage, and that, as soon as possible, and as safely as possible, Hungary shall recover at least up to the extent of her new boundaries.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, I perhaps ought, out of respect for the noble Lords who have addressed you with so much authority, to say a few words in reply. The speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Bryce, delivered with his usual fulness of knowledge and experience, was, of course, a very formidable attack upon the Treaty itself. It was not an attack on the Bill now before the House. It was not an attack upon the Foreign Office in London. It was an attack upon the statesmen who, in Paris two years and more ago, drew up this Treaty. I am no more familiar than the noble Lord with all the various reasons and considerations that prevailed with them on that occasion. But I must confess that I see some danger in a situation where, a decision of this sort having been arrived at after consideration far more careful than any of us could possibly give to the case, any noble Lord, even with the great authority of the noble Viscount, is at liberty to come down to this House and sketch out how he would have made the Treaty and how
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he would have settled the boundaries of Hungary. I dare say I might occupy your Lordships for half an hour in giving you my idea of how the boundaries should have been drawn. But it is vain, and at this period of time, it is futile to do so.
To one general observation of his, however, I should like to object, and that is where he says that this Treaty was composed in the teeth of the principles upon which the League of Nations is founded and which were advocated by President Wilson. The Hungarian Treaty was placed before, was examined by, and was accepted by President Wilson, and really what the noble Viscount means I do not quite understand. He takes a particular area in which there is a minority, an admitted minority of Magyars, who are handed over, for reasons which I have endeavoured to explain, to a new State in which there is a very much larger element of another population, and the noble Viscount calls that a violation of the principles of the League of Nations. Surely, if things had been left as they were, if it was not the majority but the minority that was allowed to prevail and they were to be left under Hungary, that would be a much greater violation of the principles for which the noble Viscount contends than anything that has happened in this Treaty.
VISCOUNT BRYCE: As the noble Earl has appealed to me perhaps he will allow me to explain what I meant. I had endeavoured to show the House that I conceive, as everybody, I think, conceives who embraces the principles of nationality and at the same time understands the conditions of Central Europe, that it was necessary to take large territories away from Hungary, that a great part of Transylvania, part of Northern Hungary and part of South-western Hungary had to be taken away from Hungary. All the criticism I have ventured to make was that in doing so many areas were taken from Hungary which need not have been taken, but could have been left to her, if a more careful examination of details had been made, and if more attention had been given to the geographical and historical conditions which had connected these parts with the Hungarian race, and had not connected them with the other races to whom they now have been allotted. I hope I have made clear to the noble Lord what I meant.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I am very glad to hear the noble Viscount attenuate to so remarkable a degree the force of the criticisms to which we have listened.
VISCOUNT BRYCE: I thought I had made clear from the first what I have now said.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I am glad I have given the noble Viscount an opportunity to make it clear. But even taking him on his own ground, as I understand he was not so much enunciating a general principle as he was applying criticism to particular cases. Taking his own eases in a sentence or two, he referred to the Szeklers, that small community of people admittedly and wholly. Magyars, away in Transylvania, and he said: "Because these people are Magyars what an outrage to sever them from the Magyar population of Hungary.'' He did not tell your Lordships that this small community of 500,000 people, hidden away like an islet in Transylvania, cannot possibly be connected by any means whatever with Hungary, and that it was impossible to construct an ethnic corridor between them and the Magyars of Hungary.
Then take the other case of Pressburg. It was a very difficult case. It was most carefully examined. At the same time as a matter of fact Pressbarg has a predominating non-Magyar population. Admittedly there is in the neighbouring area a population which was largely—I dare say even more than largely— almost exclusively Magyar, which had to be handed over. What is the present position and condition of that area? I believe the people are content. I believe they are satisfied with their present position.
LORD NEWTON: Not in Pressburg.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: No; in the Magyar area to which I refer. Take the case of Ruthenia. The noble Viscount was very confident that the Ruthenians were dissatisfied with their present position. He may have superior information to that which comes to me, but that is not our information at the Foreign Office. They have been given autonomy. They have a separate existence. It is true it is part of the Czecho-Slovakian State, but I have no reason to suppose that they are burning to go back to the country or the
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Government by which they were so consistently ill-treated in the past.
The only other point to which I need refer I think is the question which was put to me by more than one noble Lord and which certainly is of great importance with us now that the Treaty is about to be ratified—the evacuation of Pecs and the Baranya by the Yugo-Slays. I think it is very likely that the Yugo-Slays have utilised their period of occupation of that country to behave in an oppressive way. I dare say they found it attractive to be in possession of the coalfields and, for all I know, they may have taken steps to render their occupation as long as they could conveniently make it. But now that the Treaty is about to be ratified that must come to an end. The Ambassadors' Conference in Paris have already addressed a note to the Yugo-Slav Government warning them that the Treaty is about to come into force and expressing the hope that the arrangements for evacuation are complete. I do not think a reply has yet been received, but have no reason to believe, that the reply will be unfavourable, or that the evacuation will be delayed. Should there be any intimation of that character, I need hardly assure my noble friend that every pressure will be put upon them by His Majesty's Government.
On Question, Bill read 2ª and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

PUBLIC HEALTH (TUBERCULOSIS) BILL.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): My Lords, in moving that the House do now resolve itself into Committee, I should like to say one word on the subject of the White Paper to which attention was drawn by the noble Lord, Lord Strachie. I promised him I would look into it, and I would like to inform the House that the Paper was placed on the Table on April 4, so that it was in the possession of the House, though not actually on the Table, when the debate on the Second Reading of the Bill took place.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Earl of Onslow.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE in the Chair.]
Clause 1:
Further provision with respect to arrangements for treatment.
1.—(1) Where the council of any county or county borough has, before the passing of this Act, made arrangements for the treatment of persons suffering from tuberculosis (including persons insured under the National Health Insurance Acts, 1911 to 1920) at or in dispensaries, sanatoria, and other institutions in accordance with the scheme approved by the Local Government Board or the Minister of Health, or, in the case of Wales, under an agreement made with the King Edward the Seventh Welsh National Memorial Association and approved by the Welsh Insurance Commissioners or the Minister of Health, that council shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to have made adequate arrangements for the treatment of tuberculosis so long as such scheme or agreement, with such modifications, if any, as the Minister may On the application of the council from time to time approve, continues in operation. For the purpose of the foregoing provisions an application made by the King Edward the Seventh Welsh National Memorial Association with the approval of a council shall be deemed to be an application of the council.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: The first two Amendments standing in my name are purely drafting. The object of all my Amendments to this Clause is to set out more clearly the position in Wales.
Amendments moved—
Clause 1, page 1, line 13, leave out from (" Health ") to (" that ") in line 17
Clause 1, page 1, lines 19 and 20, leave out (" or agreement ").—(The Earl of Onslow.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
LORD O'HAGAN LORD O'HAGAN moved, in subsection (1), after "modifications" to insert "and extensions." The noble Lord said: At this late hour I shall best consult the convenience of the House if I state briefly the reason for my Amendment and ask for an assurance upon a point already mentioned to my noble friend. As to the Amendment it is unfortunately probable that in many instances the alterations required in existing schemes and arrangements for providing institutional and dispensary treatment will be in the nature of extensions. It is feared that the word "modification" does not cover "extension" and that therefore alterations required on this latter ground are not provided for. Perhaps my noble friend can give me an assurance on this point. The other matter is this. In this clause there does not appear to be any safeguard that in the consideration
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of these schemes, or in the modification of existing schemes, the National Health Insurance Committees will have the right to make representations. The functions which are now being handed over to county councils and borough councils regarding institutional treatment have been discharged hitherto by the sanatorium benefit sub-committees of the county health insurance committees, and, as I have had the honour of serving on one of the county insurance committees for some years, I have been asked to raise this point. These committees have been in existence for nearly ten years and, as a result, they naturally are more fully cognisant of the requirements of the counties in regard to institutional treatment and dispensary treatment than the county councils or borough councils, or any other body, and it does not seem unreasonable to ask that when these arrangements are made, and when the schemes are about to be modified, that they should have the right to make representations. Take for instance the County of Essex. At the present time formal agreements have been entered into between the national health insurance committee and the county council and the borough council of East Ham providing for 82 beds. On March 31 of this year, I understand, there were no fewer than 180 patients receiving treatment, and of those about 86 were ex-Service men. Additional provision has been made, by an arrangement with the county council and the East Ham Borough Council, for 57 beds. The insurance committee provide the balance of 41. This clause, it would appear, does not ensure that the additional accommodation which is required at the present moment shall be continued in the future. I think this is an illustration showing why the bodies I have described should be given the right to make representations when these schemes are being approved by the Ministry of Health, or are being modified, and why my Amendment is necessary.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 20, after (" modifications") insert ("awl extensions").—(Lord O' Hagan.)
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: Perhaps I had better take first the last point raised by my noble friend. He said that when any modifications of schemes are being considered at the Ministry (being proposals from the local authorities) the insurance committees should have the right to make representations. I do not think it is necessary to make that a statutory right.

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If insurance committees have anything to say on these matters their opinion would, of course, be most welcome to the Ministry. I can assure the noble Lord that any representations received from the insurance committees would have the most careful consideration, but I do not think it is necessary to make that statutory by including it in the Bill. Obviously representations from such bodies would be most opportune.
As for the Amendment of the noble Lord, I venture to suggest that it is unnecessary. The clause provides that arrangements for treatment shall be deemed adequate if they reach a certain minimum standard. It is clear that any extension of the arrangement must raise the standard above the minimum, and such extended arrangements would, therefore, be not merely adequate, but more than that, according to the standard laid down by Clause 1. Moreover there is nothing to prevent a council extending its scheme, of course with the approval of the Ministry of Health, if it chooses to do so. It is only where it desires to modify a scheme—that is to say, make some alteration in the character of the arrangements— that the approval of the Minister is necessary in order to secure that the modification made is not such as to reduce the standard below the minimum. In these circumstances I hope the noble Lord will consider that his point is met.
LORD O'HAGAN:I am much obliged to my noble friend. I am sure the committees concerned will be glad of the definite public assurance given by the noble Earl that they have the right, and that it is desirable that they should exercise it, to make representations on the occasions to which I have referred.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments moved—
Page 1, lines 22 to 23, leave out (" For the purpose of the foregoing provisions") and insert (" In the application of this subsection to Wales an agreement made with the King Edward the Seventh Welsh National Memorial Association, and approved by the Welsh Insurance Commissioners or the Minister of Health shall be treated as equivalent to a scheme approved by the Minister of Health, and")
Page 1, line 24, leave out from (" by") to (" Association ") in line 25, and insert (" that "). —(The Earl of Onslow.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 2, 3 and 4 agreed to.
Clause 5:
Joint committees.
5.—(l) For the purpose of facilitating co-operation between county councils and county borough councils, in the exercise of the powers conferred upon them by any enactment to make arrangements for the treatment of tuberculosis, the Minister may, by order, with the consent of the councils concerned, make such provision as appears to him necessary or expedient, by the constitution of joint committees or otherwise, for the joint exercise by such councils of their powers in relation thereto, and any such order may provide how, in what proportions, and (nit of what funds or rates, the expenses incurred by such councils are to be defrayed, and may contain such consequential, incidental, and supplemental provisions as may appear necessary fur the purposes of the order.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW THE EARL OF ONSLOW moved, in subsection (1), after "of "["such councils of their powers in relation thereto "] to insert" all or any of." The noble Earl said: This Amendment has been suggested by the Association of Municipal Corporations, and I understand that it will be acceptable also to the Association of County Councils. The object is to enable the Minister, with the consent of the councils concerned, to constitute a joint committee of county councils and borough councils for the general exercise of any of the powers of the councils in relation to the treatment of tuberculosis. It was pointed out that it may be desirable for councils to combine in the exercise of certain of their powers in relation to tuberculosis, although they might not wish to have a joint committee for the exercise of the whole of their powers. Consequently, it is thought desirable that the clause should be as elastic as possible. The Ministry has no hesitation in agreeing that this Amendment is desirable.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 16, after (" of ") insert (" all or any of ").—(The Earl of Onslow.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 5, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 6 agreed to.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW THE EARL OF ONSLOW had an Amendment on the Paper to insert a new clause after Clause (6). The noble Earl said: It is proposed to insert this clause in accordance with an undertaking which was given by my right hon. friend in another place. I should perhaps preface what I have to say- by stating that there are one or two alterations to the clause as it appears on

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the Paper. These alterations are thought desirable by those who have promoted the clause. One of the alterations is purely drafting. I will, with your Lordships' permission, read the clause as I propose to move it. It will read—
Further provision with respect of treatment of seamen.
7.—(1) The minister may by order constitute an advisory committee for the purpose of assisting the council of any county or county borough in making arrangements for the treatment of any persons suffering from tuberculosis who are masters, seamen, or apprentices to the sea service or the sea-fishing service.
(2) An order under this section may provide

(a) For the representation on the said committee of any society approved under the National Health Insurance Acts. 1911 to 1920, more than three-fourths of whose members are such masters, seamen and apprentices as aforesaid, and of the council of any county or county borough having a substantial number of such masters, seamen and apprentices resident within their area, and may contain such other provisions as may appear necessary to the minister for giving affect to the order; and

(b) if the governing body constituted under subsection (6) of section forty-eight of the National Insurance Act, 1911, as amended by section twenty-seven of the National Health Insurance Act, 1918, agree to contribute, out of the special fund referred to in the said subsection (6), towards the expenses of the said committee, for the appointment by the governing body aforesaid from among their own members of representatives on the said committee of all such societies as aforesaid.

(3) An order made under this section may be revoked or varied by another order so made.
The terms of the amended new clause have been agreed to by members of the House of Commons who are more particularly interested in the requirements of the seamen. The object is to constitute a Committee which will pay special attention to their case and secure adequate treatment for those suffering front tuberculosis. The councils will be expected to provide for such treatment, and there is no reason to anticipate that they will not do so; but the proposed Advisory Committee may perform a useful function in seeing that tubercular seamen are properly dealt with. Subsection (2) provides for the constitution of the Committee, and subsection (2) paragraph (b), contemplates the possibility that the body formed to administer what is known as the Lascar
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Fund may possibly desire to appoint members.
Amendment moved—
After clause 6 insert the said new clause.—(The Earl of Onslow.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
Schedule agreed to.

PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE.
LORD WEARDALE LORD WEARDALE had a Question on the Paper ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the urgent necessity of action within three months of the 5th September, the date of the next meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, and the subsequent election of the Judges of that body; and whether the Government is prepared to ratify the project for the Permanent Court of International Justice as formulated by the Advisory Committee of Jurists.
THE FIRST COMMISSIONER OF WORKS (THE EARL OF CRAWFORD): My Lords, Lord Weardale asked Lord more to put this Question on his behalf, but I have just intimated to the noble and learned Lord that Lord Curzon has been called away to meet a Foreign Minister who has to leave London to-night, and he asked that the Question should be postponed until Tuesday.

CASTLECONNELL SHOOTING.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I rise to ask His Majesty's Government whether they will state the terms of reference to the Military Court of Inquiry now sitting in reference to the Castleconnell shooting, and whether the findings of the Court will be made public.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD BIRKENHEAD): My Lords, the Court of Inquiry which has been held into this matter was a Court of Inquiry in lieu of inquest convened under the Restoration of Order in Ireland Regulations, No. 81, to inquire into the deaths of Sergeant Hughes, Royal Irish Constabulary, Cadet Pringle, Royal Irish Constabulary, and Mr. O'Donovan. Such a Court has all the powers and all t he duties of a coroner's court, and the certificate of its finding is forwarded to the

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Registrar of Births and Deaths in the same way as the certificate of the finding of a coroner's court. It is in the power of the President of such a Court to hold the Inquiry in camera; but the usual practice is to admit the Press and the relatives of the deceased with their legal representatives, and this was what was done in the present case. It is considered that the admission of the Press and the relatives gives ample publicity, and in the present condition of Ireland, the free admission of the public would cause grave danger to the witnesses and members of the Court. Your Lordships are aware that more than one member of a Court has been assassinated in the course of the last few months. Nothing is known regarding the suggestion' that the Press reports were censored. They may have been examined by the President of the Court to ensure that no names were mentioned; but they certainly gave a full and accurate description of what took place and of the evidence given.
The facts, as shown by the evidence, are as follows:—Information was received by the Officer Commanding the local company of the Auxiliary Division, Royal Irish Constabulary, that an ambush was being prepared in the locality, and that suspicious characters were frequenting the bar of the Shannon Hotel at Castreconnell. This information was borne out by the fact that, for three successive nights the telephone wires from Castleconnell were blocked, and on one occasion were cut. He, therefore, determined to carry out a patrol. The patrol consisted of two officers and twelve cadets in mufti, armed with revolvers, and one officer and twenty cadets in uniform, armed with rifles and two Lewis guns. The total strength of the party was therefore thirty-five. The orders were that the plain clothes party were to split into small groups, enter the bar casually and 'ask for drinks, see who was there, and, if they suspected any persons, hold them up and search them. The remainder of the force in uniform were to wait outside the town for fifteen minutes, and then enter and hold up and search all men in the streets.
It appears that, unfortunately, the orders given to the plain clothes party were not completely understood, as the first four who entered the bar, instead of mixing with the occupants and ordering drinks at once produced revolvers and ordered them to put their hands up. They
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were met with a blaze of revolver fire, driven out of the bar, and the door slammed against them. The rest of the plain clothes party then surrounded the bar, firing through the doors and window, and it was at this point that Cadet Pringle was killed, as he was firing into the bar through the window. The uniform party had by this time heard the firing and driven up. A Lewis gun was then brought to bear on the door and a party of cadets stationed in the yard to resist any attempt by the occupants of the bar to break out at the back. After a minute or two, two men rushed out of the door at the back, and ran straight through the party in the yard, making for a toolhouse in the corner. They were fired at both as they were approaching the party and after they had run through them. One of the two fell wounded just as he reached the men who were firing at him, the other, who was O'Donovan, fell after he had passed through them and was half-way to the hen house. It was subsequently found that he had been struck by six bullets, three of which entered from the front, one from the right side, and two front the back. These two were followed by a third man, who came out with his hands up and stopped still immediately on coining out of the bar.
The officer in charge at once ordered "Cease fire," and no more firing occurred. The man who had fallen wounded in the yard then got up, and he and the unwounded man who had surrendered were placed side by side facing the wall with their hands Up, guarded by a cadet with a revolver. It will be obvious that this is the most convenient and the safest way of keeping men for a short time in custody with a single guard, as if they desire to attack the guard they have not only to lower their hands but also to turn round before doing so, thus giving the guard a moment's additional time in which to resist attack. Having placed his prisoners under guard the officer in charge of the cadets then searched the bar, and found a dead body which afterwards turned out to be that of Sergeant Hughes. After having searched the bar, the officer took his two prisoners to the lorry. As soon as firing had ceased and they had seen the uniforms of the cadets in the yard, both had stated that they were police, but they were not believed; and it was not until one of them was recognised by the driver of the lorry that their identity was established.

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The evidence of the two survivors of the three police who were inside the bar is to the effect that they were stationed at Westport and had three hours' leave, which they spent in cycling to Killaloe and Castleconnell. They were, of course, in plain clothes, as it would be impossible for three police to go out alone in uniform; equally, of course, they were armed with revolvers in case they should be recognised as police and attacked. At Castleconnell they went into the bar of the Shannon Hotel for a drink. They were standing in the bar chatting to O'Donovan when three or four men in plain clothes entered the bar, drew revolvers, and ordered them to put up their hands. They naturally assumed that their assailants were members of the Irish Republican Army, who had spotted them as policeman, and at once opened fire. In all the circumstances their action was perfectly correct; indeed, throughout the whole affair these three policemen behaved with the greatest courage and determination., and worthily upheld the traditions of the Royal Irish Constabulary. Subsequently to this their evidence corresponds with that of the cadets who were attacking the bar.
The above is a summary of the evidence given by members of the Crown Forces on both sides. There are, of course, the inevitable discrepancies which must arise when a number of people, who at the time of the occurrences which they are describing were labouring under great and natural excitement, are relating the same occurrence from different points of view; but the story which they relate is consistent and bears every appearance of proof. In addition to the evidence given by the members of the Crown Forces evidence was given by Mrs. O'Donovan, by a niece of Mr. O'Donovan's, and by the housemaid.
The housemaid states positively that she saw through the kitchen window the unwounded prisoner and Mr. O'Donovan walking across the yard to the wall with their hands up, and that afterwards she heard shots and saw O'Donovan lying dead. She had previously heard cries of "Bring him out," and as the prisoners went up to the wall she heard an officer whom she identified, say "Face the wall." The officer in question admitted that while the firing was still going on, and before the three men ran out of the bar, he had shouted, "Bring them out," or "Fetch them out"; and also that he had subsequently ordered the unwounded prisoner
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and the wounded prisoner to be brought up to the wall as already described and had ordered them to face it.
Evidence was given that Mr. O'Donovan was about 5 ft. 10 in. in height and of stout build, and that the wounded constable was 5 ft. 9½ in. in height and of stout build. Both the wounded and the unwounded constable each stated positively that each of them was placed against the wall side by side with the other and not with Mr. O'Donovan, and it is indeed quite clear from their evidence, and from that of the others present in the yard, and from the nature and direction of the wounds which O'Donovan received, that, he cannot have been shot in the back against the wall, but that he was shot, as stated, while running towards, through, and away from the party of cadets who were guarding the back entrance to the bar. In these circumstances the Court came to the conclusion that the housemaid was honestly mistaken in stating that she saw O'Donovan placed against the wall with the unwounded prisoner; and that what she saw, in fact, was the wounded prisoner, who was of very similar height and build to O'Donovan, placed against the wall with the unwounded prisoner. Neither Mrs. O'Donovan nor her niece saw anything of what took place in the yard. Their evidence related mainly to the finding of his body and was in no way inconsistent with the evidence of the Crown Forces.
I add the actual findings of the Court because I think your Lordships would be desirous of hearing them. They were received only this afternoon, and the apology which I have already offered to the noble Marquess for the delay may be repeated, but he will, I think, be very willing to accept it when I tell him that it was founded upon the extreme urgency and pressure upon those responsible for the work. The findings of the Court were as follows—

" (1) That the detachment of G. Company, Auxiliary Division, Royal Irish Constabulary, was engaged in a legitimate and properly organised operation.

" (2) That the orders issued by Captain and 2 /DI W. P. Wood were so framed as to show the intention of avoiding unnecessary bloodshed.

" (3) That the first shot was fired by the police.

" (4) That the two civilians who were first captured and also Constable Talbot were not ill-treated.

" (5) That considerable excitement prevailed; that the fact that Constable Talbot, who remained

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with the party in the passage who had accepted his surrender, was not injured shows that there was no intention of any unauthorised shooting. That there were other Auxiliaries in the yard who had not seen what had occurred in the passage and who fired not knowing the circumstances, and that Mr. O'Donovan and Constable Morrison were wounded by this firing.

"(6) That Captain and 2/D.I. Wood gave the orders to cease fire as soon as he knew that Constable Talbot had surrendered, and that this order was obeyed.

" (7) That proper precautions were taken to protect Mr. and Mrs. O'Donovan and the female employees of the hotel.

" (8) That the Court are of opinion that whilst the evidence of Miss Margaret Wade was given in good faith she can only have had a partial view of what occurred and was mistaken in saying that she saw Mr. O'Donovan and Constable Talbot together. On this point the evidence of the two constables is conclusive.

" (9) That the statement which appeared in the Press to the effect that the Auxiliaries returned, accused Mr. O'Donovan of harbouring rebels,' took him out and shot him, was incorrect and was entirely unjustified, and is further disproved by the position of the wounds.

" (10) The Court find—

(a) That the deceased Denis O'Donovan, male, aged 46, married, agent for Murphy's Brewery, was residing at the Shannon Hotel, Castleconnell, at the time of his death. That the deceased Donald Pringle, male, aged 31, single, cadet, Auxiliary Division, Royal Irish Constabulary, was residing at Lakeside Hotel, Killaloe, at the time of his death. That the deceased William John Hughes, male, aged about forty-five, married, Sergeant, Royal Irish Constabulary, was residing at the police barracks, Newport, at the time of his death.

(b) That all the deceased died at about 20.00 hours on the 17th April, 1921, at Castleconnell, County Limerick.

(c) That the cause of death in each case was shock and hemorrhage following gunshot wounds. That the deceased lied after receiving the wounds.

(d) That the shots which caused the wounds were tired in the case of Denis O'Donovan and William John Hughes by a party of 'G' Company, Auxiliary Division, Royal Irish Constabulary, and in the case of Donald Pringle, by a party of Royal Irish Constabulary; that the shots were tired during an encounter between two parties of Crown Forces at Castleconnell, County Limerick, on April 17, 1921. That the encounter occurred through each party mistaking the others for armed civilians."

The constitution of the Court which dealt with this matter has not been, and indeed could not have been, impugned.
The care with which they devoted themselves to the Inquiry will equally, I think,
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not be questioned. The proceedings of the Court and its findings were very carefully reviewed both by Colonel Cameron in command of the forces in the Limerick area and also by General Macready. It has never been suggested that either of these officers is lenient towards indiscipline, but neither of them finds in this case any cause to suggest that there was any lack of discipline on the part of the Forces concerned. On the contrary, all the evidence tends to show that, notwithstanding the very great excitement which naturally prevailed, the cadets were under complete control and ceased fire the moment that they were ordered to do so.
As regards the statement in the letter from the brother of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parmoor, it does not appear from the tenour of that letter that he was an eye-witness of any of the material incidents. The only material evidence, that of the housemaid, who was an eyewitness, and of Mrs. O'Donovan and her niece, has been fully heard. It does not appear necessary to ask Lord Parmoor's brother to return to Ireland to give evidence and to re-open the. Court for the purpose of hearing such evidence. The Government could not, in considering the points put to them, consent to the taking of his evidence on commission in England, with the result. that no opportunity of asking any questions in the face of the Court would be afforded. The extracts from his letter which Lord Parmoor read show that, as is not unnatural in the case of a man of peace suddenly and unexpectedly introduced into a terrible scene of war, his observation and judgment are by no means to be implicitly relied on, and it would be unfair to the Court to ask them to receive Ins evidence without an opportunity of checking it themselves by cross-examination.
The whole affair is unspeakably unhappy. It is one of the saddest and most terrible losses this struggle has brought about. But it is a useful illustration of the state of affairs at present existing in Ireland, where the so-called:Irish Republican Army is waging a war of assassination against the Forces of the Crown, with the result that the police are at any moment liable to be attacked and murdered by men who a-re apparently ordinary, peaceful citizens in plain clothes. Such a further instance is contained to-day's papers. A party of eight police were ambushed and

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murdered. I think that case also illustrates the manner in which the very numerous slanders against the discipline and decency of the Crown Forces arise and are spread, and how very difficult they are to combat.
I have more than once pointed out in this House that the utmost concern of those who take part in these outrages is to use their extensive and very expert propaganda for the purpose of spreading the idea that a particular outrage is the result of indiscipline, and in many cases illegal violence, by the Forces of the Crown. I would most earnestly impress upon noble Lords, and upon the public, how vital is the duty which on every one of us lies to take no part in furthering the purpose of this propaganda, by forming premature opinions and giving premature expression to them. Such a course, besides being deeply wounding to those upon whom lies the. duty of maintaining law and order in Ireland, will make the carrying out of that duty still more difficult.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, while thanking the noble and learned Lord for the answer which he has given, perhaps I may be allowed to say that, of course, I agree with him to the utmost extent in deploring and condemning the appalling campaign of assassination which is being carried on in Ireland. I took no part in bringing any charge against either
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the cadets or the Royal Irish Constabulary upon the recent occasion when this incident was under discussion. I have merely put this Question because I thought, and I still think, that it is in the public interest that the matter should be cleared up. I share with the noble and learned Lord great admiration for the gallantry with which the duty of maintaining law and order has been carried out by the Forces of the Crown in Ireland, although I cannot refrain from saying that there are certain incidents which I deplore very much, just as he does I am sure, and I earnestly hope that they may be brought to an end. In this particular case it is quite clear that there was a most dreadful mistake—a certain variation of the original orders which led to a dreadful mistake, and these lamentable consequences. I have nothing more to say, except to share with the noble and learned Lord his deep regret at what has occurred.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: I beg to move that this House do now adjourn until Tuesday next.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at a quarter before eight o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS.
[From Minutes of May 5.]

CONSOLIDATION BILL PROCEDURE.
A Message ordered to be sent to the Commons to acquaint them that this House has come to the following resolution—namely,
That it is desirable that all Consolidation Bills in the present session be referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament, and to desire their concurrence.

NORTH BRITISH RAILWAY ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1ª; to be printed; and (pursuant to the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899) deemed to have been read 2ª (Lord Stanmore), and reported from the Committee, and to be read 3ª on Tuesday next.
LEICESTER CORPORATION BILL.
  BURNLEY CORPORATION BILL.
    CROYDON CORPORATION BILL.
    Brought from the Commons; read 1ª; and referred to the Examiners.
HEALTH RESORTS AND WATERING PLACES BILL.
To be read 2ª on Tuesday next (Lord Emmott).