Sitting of 19 February 1918

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

HIS MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH.
The VICE-CHAMBERLAIN of the HOUSEHOLD (Lieutenant - Commander Dudley Ward) reported His Majesty's Answer to the Address, as followeth:
"I have received with great satisfaction the loyal and dutiful expression of your thanks for the Speech with which I have opened the present Session of Parliament."

PRIVATE BUSINESS.
Belfast Harbour Bill,
Read a second time, and committed.
Brentford Gas Bill,
Cannock Gas Bill,
Hampton Court Gas Bill,
To be read a second time To-morrow.
Lancaster Corporation Bill,
Read a second time, and committed.
Liverpool Gas Bill,
To be read a second time To-morrow.
Londonderry and Lough Swilly Railway Bill,
Read a second time, and referred to the
Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Londonderry Corporation Bill,
To be read a second time upon Thursday.
London United Tramways Bill,
Longwood and Slaithwaite Gas Bill,
To be read a second time To-morrow.
Rotherham Corporation Bill,
Read a second time, and committed.
Sheffield Corporation (Consolidation) Bill,
Yeadon and Guiseley Gas Bill,
To be read a second time To-morrow.

COLONIAL REPORTS (ANNUAL).
Copy presented of Colonial Report, No. 954 (Uganda, Report for 1916– 17) [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

IRISH LAND PURCHASE FUND.
Paper laid upon the Table by the Clerk of the House:
Accounts of the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt in respect of the Capital and Income of the Irish Land Purchase Fund in the year ended 31st March 1917, together with the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General thereon [by Act]; to be printed. [No 12.]

STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE.
Mr. Vaughan-Davies, Sir Thomas: Esmonde, Mr. George Faber, Sir Arthur Fell, Lord Claud Hamilton, Sir Charles. Nicholson, Mr. John O'Connor, Mr. O'Grady, Sir Samuel Roberts, Mr. Eugene Wason, and Mr. J. W. Wilson nominated Members of the Select Committee on Standing Orders. [Mr. Vaughan-Davies.]
COMMITTEE OF SELECTION.
Sir John Barlow. Mr. Boland, Mr. Bowerman, Sir Daniel Goddard, Colonel Hamersley, Mr. Laurence Hardy, Mr. Holmes, Sir William Priestley, Sir Samuel Roberts, Mr. Robinson, and Mr. William Nicholson nominated Members of the Committee of Selection.—[Sir Daniel Goddard.]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
  WAR.

    CYPRUS.
    Mr. KINGasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Cyprus Convention of 1878 is in part or in whole still operative, and whether it became inoperative in any particular in or since September, 1914?
    The MINISTER of BLOCKADE (Lord Robert Cecil): I would refer the hon. Member to the Order in Council issued on 5th November, 1914.

    PERSIA.
    Mr. KINGasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the suspension of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, as announced to the Persian Government, implies that this country renounces its claim to any zone of influence in Southern Persia; whether any Persian territory now occupied by British troops will be evacuated during or after the War; and whether, in future financial relations with Persia; no financial adviser or Controller will be imposed upon or removed from Persia but full recognition as a sovereign independent State will be given to Persia?
    Lord R. CECIL: As regards the first part of the question, I must leave the hon. Member to draw his own conclusions from the announcement to which he refers. The answer to the second part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the last part, the question would appear to depend on the conditions which any lending Power may decide in the future to attach to such financial advances.
    Mr. KING: Inasmuch as the Noble Lord means me to draw my own conclusions, does that imply that he has absolute confidence in the conclusions that I draw from his answer?
    Lord R. CECIL: Certainly not.
    Sir J. D. REES: What advantage results from imputing unfriendly motives to His Majesty's Government towards the Shah; and is there any foundation for it?
    Lord R. CECIL: No; none whatever. His Majesty desires to live on the friendliest possible terms with the Persian Government.
    Mr. KING: Is the Noble Lord aware that we all have the same opinion?

    EX-KING CONSTANTINE.
    Mr. LYNCHasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Greek Government has decided to discontinue the monetary allowance to ex-King Constantine?
    Lord R. CECIL: I understand that no such monetary allowance has ever been paid to King Constantine.
    Mr. LYNCH: I will return to this to find wherein consists evasion.

    OVERSEAS TRUST.
    General CROFTasked the Under secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether members of the Overseas Trust receive confidential information from the Government with regard to the sailings of ship, etc; whether his attention has been called to the fact that, on the occasion of the capture of German coal-laden steamers by the British Fleet, Mr. Kroller, a member of the Overseas Trust, gave instructions for a statement in his journal "Het Vaderland" to the effect that the British had to return these ships; whether he is aware that within three hours a telegram from Berlin arrived to precisely the same effect; and will he say what action he proposes to take?
    Lord R. CECIL: The Netherlands Overseas Trust do not receive such information from His Majesty's Government as to the sailing of ships. I have no information regarding the latter part of the question.
    General CROFTasked the Under secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the fact that a Mr. A. G. Kroller is a member of the Overseas Trust; and, seeing that Mr. Kroller is the proprietor of the Dutch journal "Het Vaderland," which has from time to time made attacks upon the British Empire during the War, will he say what action he proposes to take?
    Lord R. CECIL: I am aware that Mr. A. G. Kroller is a member of the Netherlands Overseas Trust. If he were not he would not, as a shipowner, be bound by the rules and regulations of that body, made in agreement, with His Majesty's Government. Mr. Kroller is understood to be the proprietor of the Dutch journal mentioned, but this question is apparently based on a misapprehension of the position. The Netherlands Overseas Trust is a purely Dutch organisation which has entered into certain engagements with His Majesty's Government—engagements which have been carried out with good faith on both sides. Unless it is fairly representative of the whole Dutch commercial community it would not have the necessary authority to perform its functions.
    General CROFT: Is the Government aware that Mr. Kroller, through his organ, "Het Vaderland," has again and

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    again attacked the Allies, and especially the British Empire, and will he take note of that fact?
    Lord R. CECIL: I will certainly take note of any fact my hon. and gallant Friend brings to my notice, but I think if he looks at my answer he will see that we must leave to the Dutch, to some extent at any rate, the people to whom they will entrust these important functions.
    Sir F. FLANNERY: Is my Noble Friend aware that this Mr. Kroller is a partner in the firm of W. H. Muller, a German firm founded by a German and with full German connections?
    Lord R. CECIL: I know he is a partner in the firm mentioned.

    RUSSIAN PRISONERS OF WAR.
    Mr. G. FABERasked the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether supplies are no longer being sent to Russian prisoners of war; and, if so, whether the cessation of such supplies is due to the action of the Government or to that of the Russian Prisoners of War Help Committee?
    Lord R. CECIL: The Government is entirely and solely responsible for the action taken. The question of supplies to Russian prisoners of war has been frequently brought before the Government, and for a long time it has been their duty to represent to the Russian Prisoners of War Relief Committee the increasing difficulty of providing supplies for this purpose. Recently it was felt that, owing to the change of circumstances that was likely to result from political events, the necessities of these poor people would, in most cases, become less, and it was decided that, apart from exceptional cases, no further food could be allowed to leave this country for such a purpose. I understand that even the exceptional relief has now been discontinued.

    EAST AFRICAN EXPEDITION.
    Colonel YATEasked the Undersecretary of State for War whether, considering that it is entirely in the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief in East | Africa to give the temporary rank of
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    brigadier-general to colonels commanding, column equivalent in strength to a brigade, intimation of this will be conveyed to Lieutenant-General Van de-Venter with a view to the grant by him of the temporary rank of brigadier-general to the colonels who were in command of such columns with an antedate from date of appointment?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Mr. Macpherson): It is within the discretion of a Commander-in-Chief to recommend temporary rank, but it can only be granted by the War Office. Lieutenant-General Van de Venter is well aware of this

    ARMY RESERVE (PROMOTION).
    Colonel YATEasked the Under-secretary of State for War how many officers from the Reserve have received promotion under the recommendations of the Churchill Committee?
    Mr. MACPHERSON: The number is 270.

    ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS (TERRITORIAL FORCE).
    General CROFTasked the Under secretary of State for War whether the Committee appointed to inquire into the pay and treatment of the officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps, Territorial Force, have now reported; and, if not, will he say when the Report is expected?
    Mr. MACPHERSON: Yes, Sir, the Committee has reported, and the Report was published as a Parliamentary Paper (Cd. 8643) in January last.

    WOMEN'S FORAGE GUARDS.
    General CROFTasked the Under secretary of State for War whether his attention has been called to the failure of the Forage Committee to provide the promised uniform and equipment to the Women's Forage Guards; whether he is aware that in consequence much sickness has been incurred owing to these guards being exposed to the weather without the provision of suitable clothes; and what steps he proposes to take to remedy this, state of affairs?
    Mr. MACPHERSON: These Forage Guards were engaged for guarding hay during the winter months. It was not found possible to obtain uniform for them at first at short notice, and they agreed to take up guard duties in their own clothes until uniform could be provided. Unforeseen delay occurred in its provision, owing to materials not being obtainable, and some hardship was occasioned to some of these guards in consequence, but the amount of sickness was slight. The period of engagement of these guards expires on the 28th instant, when they will be disbanded. All are now in possession of uniform.

  COURTS-MARTIAL.

    ALLEGED COWARDICE OR DESERTION.
    Mr. SNOWDENasked the Undersecretary of State for War whether the medical testimony as to the condition of a private soldier on trial by field-general court-martial for alleged cowardice or desertion is given on oath; whether he can produce a single case from the records at the War Office where such evidence has been sworn to at the court-martial proceedings; and whether he is prepared to state that a private soldier has any means of showing by cross-examination of the military doctor or by independent medical evidence that the alleged cowardice or desertion arose from his physical or mental condition due to shell-shock?
    Mr. MACPHERSON: The medical testimony as to the condition of a private soldier on trial by field-general court-martial for any offence cannot legally be given otherwise than on oath or affirmation in lieu of an oath. If unsworn evidence were given at the trial the proceedings would thereby be invalidated. There are records of the character indicated in the question, but it is not in the public interest to produce them. I am not only prepared to state that a private soldier has the fullest right of showing by cross-examination of the military doctor or by independent medical evidence that the alleged cowardice or desertion arose from his physical or mental condition due to shell-shock, but I am advised that it would be contrary to the most elementary rules of procedure by which courts-martial are governed to deny this right to the
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    soldier, and that if this were done in any case the proceedings would thereby be invalidated and that they would not be confirmed, or if confirmed would be quashed.
    Mr. PEMBERTON BILLING: Does not the very fact that these prisoners are suffering from shell-shock render it impossible for them to put up a reasonable defence, and would the hon. Gentleman consider the advisability of allowing them a prisoner's friend at these courts-martial?
    Mr. MACPHERSON: I have on more than one occasion stated that the most extreme care and caution are taken in every case of suspected shell-shock.
    Mr. KING:Is care taken at the time to have the accused examined by a medical man to see what is his condition mentally and physically.
    Mr. MACPHERSON: Every possible care is taken in that direction. I have already told the House and my hon. Friend that where there is the least suspicion of shell-shock every possible medical advice is obtained.
    Mr. WHITEHOUSE: Then why have they been shot in such cases?
    Mr. MACPHERSON: I strongly resent that statement. The hon. Member knows as well as I do that it is quite untrue.
    Mr. WHITEHOUSE: As the hon. Member has misunderstood my question, may I ask him whether it is not the fact that one case has been brought to his notice where the sentence was executed on a soldier who in the past had been suffering from shell-shock, and whether his record does not show it? That is all that I said.
    Mr. MACPHERSON: The hon. Gentleman must withdraw what he has said, and until he has done so I refuse to answer him.
    Mr. WHITEHOUSE: I wish absolutely and unreservedly to withdraw anything that I said which gave a wrong impression.
    General CROFT: And withdraw yourself !
    Mr. WHITEHOUSE: I withdraw wholly any insinuation to which my remark was open, and I wish, with great respect, to repeat my question, and to say that was the only question I wished to put.

  DEFENCE OF THE REALM REGULATIONS.

    AGRICULTURAL WORKERS, CHESHIRE.
    Mr. ANDERSONasked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been called to a leaflet circulated among the agricultural workers in the Frodsham district of Cheshire and bearing the imprint of O. C. Kemp, printer, Frodsham, warning them that any man who is concerned in industrial trouble or merely threatens to stop work will be liable to be called up immediately for the Army; and if he will state by whose authority this leaflet has been circulated?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Sir George Cave): My hon. Friend has asked me to reply to this question. I am informed by the chief constable that this leaflet was printed and circulated by a private person. It was, of course, issued without any authority.
    Mr. ANDERSON: Is any action to be taken in regard to a private person who uses the Military Service Act for his own personal purpose?
    Sir G. CAVE: At present I have only a telegram which gives inadequate particulars, I am making further inquiries.

    "HERALD" NEWSPAPER.
    Mr. ANDERSONasked the Home Secretary whether he has now made investigation into the circumstances in which the police at Richmond, Yorkshire, entered the shops of newsagents and demanded the names and addresses of all subscribers to the "Herald" newspaper; whether he will state the warrant for such an inquiry in connection with a periodical which has not been made the subject of prosecution or conviction for any offence; in view of the fact that the reading of periodicals of any character whatever is not a criminal offence and does not even afford evidence of the holding of opinions identical with those expressed in the periodical, whether he can explain the object of such procedure and by whose instructions it was undertaken; and whether it has been or will be pursued in other places?
    Sir G. CAVE: I have received a report on this subject, and I find that a copy of the paper in question containing certain seditious statements having been shown by a civilian to a soldier on duty, the local
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    police, at the request of the Assistant Provost-Marshal, made inquiries at a shop and at the railway bookstall. The inquiries were properly made and were not of the nature described in the question, and I are satisfied that the police did not exceed their duty.
    Mr. ANDERSON: What inquiries did the police make?
    Sir G. CAVE: I am sure that they made inquiries from the newsagents who have this paper for sale.
    Mr. HOGGE: As it is a matter of common knowledge that great numbers of Members of this House subscribe to this paper, would my hon. Friend think it wise to inquire as to their names and addresses?
    Sir G. CAVE: I think that I could guess them.

    NEWSPAPER ARTICLES (PROSECUTIONS).
    Captain CARR - GOMMasked whether any of the articles written about the Higher Command of the Army and Navy appearing recently in the "Daily Mail" and "Weekly Dispatch" newspapers were submitted to the Law Officers of the Crown?
    Sir G. CAVE: These articles are under the consideration of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
    Mr. G. LAMBERT: Why has the Director of Public Prosecutions not yet made up his mind in this case, whereas he has made up his mind in the case of Colonel Repington's article, which was written three weeks later?
    Sir G. CAVE: These articles were not submitted to the Press Bureau, but the attention of the Director of Public Prosecutions was called to them later, and he has not consulted the Law Officers about them.
    Mr. ANDERSON: These articles may have contained information useful to the enemy. Will the Home Office, before taking action, consult with the Director of Propaganda?
    Mr. BILLING: If a prosecution is entered on, will not the defendant be a member of His Majesty's Government?
    Mr. LLEWELYN WILLIAMSasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether the facts concerning the publication by the "Daily Mail" on 8th January last of the sinking of a hospital

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    ship near Swansea by a German submarine, although the Press Bureau had refused permission for the publication, were placed before the Law Officers of the Crown; and, if not, whether he will now take steps to obtain the opinion of the Law Officers as to the feasibility of a prosecution under Regulation 18 of the Defence of the Realm Act, so as to ensure proper respect for the decision of the Censor and equality of treatment for all newspapers?
    Sir G. CAVE: As I informed the hon. and learned Member on the 18th January, this information, which was published by the newspaper mentioned on the morning of the 9th January, was released to all newspapers at noon on the same day. As the statement was true, and its publication anticipated by a few hours only the authorised issue of the news to the public, it was considered that a prosecution, even if successful, would not be likely to result in the infliction of a substantial penalty, and the case was accordingly not submitted to the Law Officers. The facts were brought before the conference of newspaper proprietors, who dealt with the matter.
    Mr. WILLIAMS: Is it not an offence against the Regulations under the Defence of the Realm Act to ignore the refusal of the Censor to allow publication? Is it not a fact that the "Daily Mail" published this article in spite of the refusal of the Censor?
    Sir G. CAVE: My hon. and learned Friend is attributing to the Press Bureau greater powers than it possesses. If the publication is a breach of the Regulations, a prosecution- can be taken.
    Mr. WILLIAMS: Was not this an offence under Regulation 18?
    Sir G. CAVE: That, of course, is a question. I have given the answer which explains why there was no prosecution.
    Mr. WILLIAMSasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention has been directed to an article which appeared in the month of January in the "Daily Mail," and written by Mr. Lovat Fraser, in which the High Command were attacked; whether the Law Officers of the Crown have been consulted as to the practicability of a prosecution of the editor, printer, and publisher of the "Daily Mail," and of the writer of the article, under Regulation 27 of the Defence of the
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    Realm Act; and, if not, whether, having regard to the prosecution of other newspapers and writers, he will now lay the facts before the Law Officers for their opinion?
    Mr. G. LAMBERTasked if Mr. Lovat Fraser's article attacking Sir William Robertson, which appeared in the "Daily Mail" of 21st January last, was submitted to and passed by the Censor; and, if not, whether any action is to be taken?
    Sir G. CAVE: I understand that the Director of Public Prosecutions has referred this matter to the Law Officers for their opinion.
    Mr. LYNCH: Is this case, in which no information was given to the enemy, but in which a certain policy has been advanced by fair arguments, one in which it would be just to set the law in motion?
    Sir G. CAVE: That will be for the Law Officers of the Crown to say.
    Mr. WILLIAMSasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that the article which appeared in the "Morning Post" on 11th February by Colonel Repington appeared on the same date in the "Yorkshire Post" and the "Liverpool Courier"; and whether it is proposed to prosecute the editors of these two newspapers under the Defence of the Realm Act?
    Sir G. CAVE: My attention was yesterday called to the fact that this article appeared, with certain modifications, in the papers named. The modifications in the article as it appeared in the "Yorkshire Poet" were very substantial, while those in the "Liverpool Courier" were less so. Neither article was submitted to the Press Bureau. As the "Morning Post" case is sub judice, it is undesirable that I should at the present stage express any opinion as to the action of the other newspapers, but the matter will be considered after that case has been disposed of:

    POSTERS IN GERMAN.
    Mr. BILLINGasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether posters printed in the German language are subject to censorship before they are permitted to be placed on the hoardings of this country?
    Sir G. CAVE: There is no general censorship of posters, but they may come

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    within Regulation 27 c. My attention has not been called to any poster in the German language, and if the hon. Member knows of any such poster I shall be glad to have information about it.
    Mr. BILLING: Is it not a fact that some of the posters published in the East End are in perfectly good German?
    Sir G. CAVE: I am not aware of that.
    Mr. BILLING: Will the right hon. Gentleman take steps to employ somebody, either under the Government or outside, who is acquainted with the German language?

    14TH HAMPSHIRE REGIMENT (PRIVATE G. TIZARD).
    Sir BERTRAM FALLEasked the Under-Secretary of State for War if he can give any information regarding Private George Tizard, No. 15030, 8th Platoon, B Company, 14th Hants, who was posted as missing after an engagement in France, 3rd September, 1916; and if any pay or money for effects are due to his next of kin?
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the WAR OFFICE (Mr. Forster): I fear we must presume death in this case, and any money due will be issued to the father.

  MILITARY SERVICE.

    RUSSIAN SUBJECTS.
    Major NEWMANasked the Under-Secretary of State for War (1) what is the present position of Russian subjects resident in this country who have been called up for service or who are liable for service as not having availed themselves of the option afforded them of leaving this country; whether the accredited representative of the Bolshevists in London has stated that, though of military age himself, he was no longer liable for military service; have any British subjects been recruited in Russia for service in the Army she has since disbanded under the terms of the Military Convention now denounced by the Bolshevists; (2) the Minister of National Service what steps he is taking to ensure that all Russian subjects of military age who may be released from service in the British Army or not called up for service now that the Military Con-
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    tion between the two countries has been denounced by the dominant faction in Russia are employed strictly on work of national importance at Army pay or are held liable to immediate repatriation?
    Mr. W. THORNEasked the Minister of National Service whether it is the intention of the Government to recruit any more Russian subjects of military age who are in this country; and what attitude the Government intend taking up in regard to Russians who may want to come to this country?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY of NATIONAL SERVICE (Mr. Beck): It has been decided in present circumstances to discontinue the recruiting of Russian subjects of military age in this country. His Majesty's Government do not know of any cases in which British subjects have been called up for service in the Russian Army, but it will be understood that it is impossible to speak with certainty on this point. With regard to the other points raised in these questions, I cannot add anything to the reply given yesterday by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department in reply to the hon. and gallant Member for Ludlow.
    Major NEWMAN: Can the hon. Gentleman tell me what is the position of Russian subjects who have been called up for service and who are now serving in our Army?
    Mr. BECK: I would like to have notice of that question.
    Mr. BILLING: Does the Ministry of National Service propose to call upon these aliens to do any work of national importance in this country?

    CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS.
    Mr. SNOWDENasked what number of men employed under the Committee on Employment of Conscientious Objectors have been allowed to take up exceptional employment under the new rules published in December last?
    Sir G. CAVE: Of the 120 men who, as I informed the hon. Member yesterday have been deemed by the Committee on Employment of Conscientious Objectors, to be qualified for exceptional employment, 32 have now submitted to the Committee proposals as to the employment which they desire to take up. Of

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    these proposals, 24 have been approved by the Committee, 7 are still under consideration, and I has been refused.

  VOLUNTEER FORCE.

    FUTURE OBLIGATORY TRAINING.
    Sir WILLOUGHBY DICKINSONasked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether it is proposed to turn out of the Volunteer Force many thousands of men. who responded to the original appeal of the Secretary of State and took the Volunteer oath but are not in a position to undertake the regular number of drills laid down, after they were sworn in, by the Act of 1916; whether he is aware that many have bought their own uniform and given much time to training and drill; and, seeing that it would be in the interests of the nation that these men should have the right to take part in Home defence in case of invasion, whether he will permit them to remain either as reserves or as supernumeraries to the establishment provided they undertake to serve until the end of the War?
    Mr. MACPHERSON: It has been decided that, with the exception of a comparatively small number of men who will be retained to perform definite duties, such as guards, etc., no Volunteers will be kept in the force after 31st March next who have not undertaken to serve until the end of the War and to perform a certain programme of training.
    I am aware that many Volunteers have bought their own uniform, and have given much time to training and drill, and I hope that all who are physically eligible will be prepared to undertake the very moderate training obligations referred to.
    The syllabus of training laid down is the least that the military authorities consider should be performed by any man who is to render useful service as a soldier in the event of invasion. The increasing reliance that is being placed upon the Volunteer Force makes it specially important to do everything possible to increase its efficiency.
    Sir W. DICKINSON: Can the hon. Gentleman say the number of men who are being turned out of the Volunteer Force by this Order?
    Mr. MACPHERSON: I am afraid that I cannot say until April 1st.
    Mr. BILLING: Is it not the fact that only those have been turned out who could have left by giving fourteen days' notice, and that it was found utterly impossible to carry on the force upon those lines?
    Mr. MACPHERSON: I must ask for notice of that question.

  ROYAL ARTILLERY (CAPTAIN'S PAY).
  General CROFTasked the Financial: Secretary to the War Office whether his attention has been called to the fact that the pay of captains in the Royal Artillery is the same under the new scheme as in. 1914; and whether, in view of the fact that the principle has been admitted that officers' pay should be increased, he will now consider the necessity of increasing the pay of captains in this branch of the Service?
  Mr. FORSTER: The principle underlying the new scheme is that an officer's pay should be brought up to a certain level, irrespective of the arm of the Service to which he belongs. I am afraid I cannot go beyond this.
  General CROFT: Is no consideration going to be given to the case of captains in the Royal Artillery? After all, the same principle applies to them as to any other class of officers.
  Mr. FORSTER: The principle is that the pay of officers below a certain level should be raised. It is not a general increase of the pay of all officers, but only of certain officers whose pay is below a certain sum.

  ARMY CHAPLAINS.
  Colonel LESLIE WILSONasked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether a clergyman who occasionally visits a military camp in the capacity of chaplain is entitled to draw chaplain's pay, lodging, fuel, and light, and servant's allowances while he continues to draw his. own stipend and live in his official residence?
  Mr. FORSTER: Speaking generally, the answer is in the negative; but if my hon. and gallant Friend has any particular case in view, I shall be glad to have further information.

  TEMPORARY MALE CIVILIAN CLERKS (WAR BONUS).
  Colonel Sir FREDERICK HALLasked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether the case of temporary male civilian clerks referred to in an answer he gave to a question on the 15th January has now been considered by the Conciliation and Arbitration Board of Government Employers; whether, in consequence of the increased cost of living, an additional war bonus has yet been granted;.and, if not, when this will be done?
  Mr. FORSTER: So far as I am aware, no decision has yet been reached.
  Sir F. HALL: Did not the right hon. Gentleman, on 15th January, reply to me that the question was being gone into and that a decision would be given very shortly, and under the circumstances can he not expedite the matter?
  Mr. FORSTER: I am afraid that it does not rest with me, but with the tribunal that is considering the matter. I acknowledge that I did on 15th January say that I hoped that a decision would be announced very shortly, and I share my hon. and gallant Friend's disappointment.

  AVIATION GROUND, AYRSHIRE.
  Mr. SHAWasked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether he can state, approximately, the amount of the expenditure up to date upon, or in connection with, the scheme for an aviation ground in Ayrshire; whether roads and a railway were built, hutments erected, and land reclamation undertaken; whether proper engineering advice was taken before the site was selected and the expenditure incurred; and whether it is proposed to proceed with the scheme?
  Mr. MACPHERSON: In answer to the first and second parts of the question, the amount expended on works services under the control of the War Office was about £400,000. Roads were built, hutments erected, and land reclamation undertaken. A temporary railway was made for part of the way, and a scheme for extension considered but refused on account of engineering difficulties. The answer to the third part is in the affirmative. Any question as to the future of this establishment should be addressed to the representative of the Air Board, as that Department is now in control.
  Sir J. WALTON: Before the work was begun was the advice of expert civil engineers sought, and was the expenditure submitted to and sanctioned by the Treasury?
  Mr. MACPHERSON: I am not sure about the last part of the question, but the answer to the first part is in the affirmative.
  Mr. HARCOURT: Approximately, how long have these works been in operation I Were they not in operation for over a year, and has not this £400,000 been absolutely thrown away?
  Mr. MACPHERSON: These works were, I believe, in operation for over a year. So far as the War Office are concerned, they went upon the most explicit and most expert advice.
  Mr. HOGGE: Is it not a fact that whereas my hon. Friend has stated that the cost to the War Office was £400,000, the entire amount of money wasted was £1,000,000?
  Mr. MACPHERSON: No. I am perfectly certain that my hon. Friend exaggerates largely.

  ARMY OFFICERS' PAY.
  Colonel YATEasked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether he will consider the question of the treatment of serving officers who have completed their service for pension, and are retained in the service on account of the War, in being compelled to serve on a less rate of pay than that drawn by officers who were retired before the War and who are now drawing their pension in addition to their pay; and what steps the Army Council proposes to take to place all officers who have completed their service on an equal footing'
  Mr. FORSTER: I think the hon. and gallant Member is referring to officers who are retained beyond the age limits nominally applicable. Liability to such retention during war has always been a condition of the officers' service. I may point out that by such retention they may earn a higher rate of pension, whereas a retired officer recalled gets no increase of pension for the additional service rendered. It is not proposed to alter these arrangements during the present War.
  Colonel YATE: Has not the time come when the Army should be treated as a whole, and the same principle as is applied to the men should be applied to the officers?
  Mr. FORSTER: When the rules which apply to the men do apply to the officers in other respects, then I think that there would be of course a logical case for giving equal treatment. In this case, as my hon. and gallant Friend knows perfectly well, there is no definite period for which officers engage, and there is a definite period for which men engage.
  Colonel YATE: In the case of quartermasters and others who are promoted from the ranks and earn the maximum pension in a certain time and can get no more, is it not fair that they should be allowed to draw their pensions and their salaries?
  Mr. FORSTER: No; I do not think so. The circumstances differ fundamentally.

  ENEMY ALIENS.
  Mr. KINGasked how many women of enemy alien nationality are interned; and whether any of them are employed on work of national importance?
  Sir G. CAVE: Seven women of enemy nationality have been interned under Defence of the Realm Regulation 14 b. All except one do work of public utility.
  Mr. KINGasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will state what useful work is being attempted by the 29,000 civilian interned aliens; whether he is aware that early in the War many of these offered to do work of national importance but were refused, and that later on being asked to volunteer to do such work they have declined, largely owing to the menaces offered to them; and whether he will consider giving to those interned aliens who are of good will, and especially to those who have married British women and have sons in the Army, such offers of pay and protection as will encourage them to do useful work in the national crisis?
  Sir G. GAVE: I am informed that about 5,000 civilian interned aliens are employed on useful work in the camps and about 2,000 have been placed out on licence for agricultural and other work outside. The number of men so employed is steadily increasing, and every effort is made to get
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  the men employed. The total number of the interned is also being reduced by repatriation in accordance with the agreements which have been reached on that point.

  BRUSH-MAKING INDUSTRY (WAR PRISONERS).
  Captain CARR-GOMMasked (1) what financial profit has been made out of the Government brush-making industry started for war prisoners in the Isle of Man; and how many prisoners are being employed in it; (2) what representatives of the brush-making industry were consulted by the Government before the brush-making factory for war prisoners was started in the Isle of Man?
  Sir G. CAVE: I think that the points, raised in these two questions can best be dealt with at the interview which, as I informed the hon. and gallant Member on the 30th January, I hope to arrange shortly with the Brush Manufacturers' Association.

  CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT BILL.
  Mr. DUNDAS WHITEasked whether it is proposed to reintroduce the Criminal Law Amendment Bill this Session; and, if so, whether at an early date?
  Sir G. CAVE: I am unable at present to make any statement.
  Mr. BILLING: When will the statement be made, as quite a large number of people are interested in it?
  Sir G. CAVE: I cannot say.
  Mr. KING: Is the hon. Gentleman' aware that there is the very strongest feeling among the prospective women voters of the country that this question ought not to be taken up until they have had an opportunity of voting for Members of Parliament?

  NAVAL AND MILITARY PENSIONS AND GRANTS.
  Sir CHARLES NICHOLSONasked the Pensions Minister if any steps have been taken to increase the pensions of widows of men who have fallen in previous wars; and whether any steps have been taken to increase the pensions of men who have been disabled in previous wars?
  The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY Of PENSIONS (Colonel Sir Arthur Griffith-Boscawen): I must refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave to the hon. Member for East Edinburgh on the 14th instant.
  Sir C. NICHOLSONasked the Pensions Minister whether increased allowances are to be made for the motherless children; and whether the Treasury has been approached on the subject and, if so, with what result?
  Sir A. GRIFFITH. BOSCAWEN: Certain proposals have been submitted to the Treasury, who now have them under consideration.

  MERCANTILE MARINE.

    SHIPS LOST IN 1917.
    Sir OWEN PHILIPPSasked the, Parliamentary Secretary to the Shipping Controller how many British merchant ships were lost in 1917; and what was the corresponding fall in cargo imported?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY of SHIPPING (Sir Leo Chiozza Money): The net loss of British vessels of 1,600 tons gross and upwards in the year 1917 was 598. Making due allowance for the date at which the losses in 1917 occurred, the British tonnage available in 1917 was 20 per cent. less than in 1916. The fall in cargo imported into the United Kingdom in British vessels in 1917, as compared with 1916, was, however, only about 2 per cent.
    Mr. CHANCELLOR:Can the hon. Gentleman give the total tonnage represented by 20 per cent.?
    Sir L. CHIOZZA MONEY: No; I am sorry I cannot.

    FRENCH MERCHANT STEAMSHIPS.
    Mr. HOUSTONasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Shipping Controller whether he can state definitely that every French merchant steamer has now been requisitioned by the French Government for national and allied purposes; and, if so, can he state the date on which the last French steamer was so requisitioned?
    Sir L. CHIOZZA MONEY: I understand that the French Government has sanctioned a decree providing for the requisition, as from 1st March, of all
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    French merchant vessels in France, in the foreign colonies and Protectorates, and in foreign countries
    Mr. HOGGE: Can my hon. Friend say whether British-owned ships are used by the French at Blue Book rates, while the French use their own ships for commercial purposes?
    Sir L. CHIOZZA MONEY: We are not responsible for the use of ships by the French Government.

    ATLANTIC TONNAGE (UNOCCUPIED SPACE).
    Mr. HOUSTONasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Shipping Controller whether the Controller is aware that in nearly every steamer arriving from North and South America there is a large amount of unoccupied space, amounting in some instances to thousands of tons; whether he is aware that many of the steamers so arriving with empty space in them were originally constructed for the purpose of carrying live stock in their shelter or cattle decks; whether he is aware of the shortage of meat in this country and the inadequate supplies of chilled and frozen beef and mutton; whether he will consider the advisability of importing live cattle in these shelter or cattle decks even if an equivalent weight of maize or wheat should be short-shipped; and whether arrangements will promptly be made for the importation of live cattle?
    Sir L. CHIOZZA MONEY: Steamers arriving from North and South America are fully loaded down to their marks with cargo, chiefly dead-weight cargo, of the first importance. A proposal to import live cattle, in place of a certain quantity of grain, has already been discussed between the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Shipping, but the decision has been to give priority to cereals.
    Mr. HOGGE: Can the hon. Gentleman say why the importation of live cattle is always stopped by Sir Thomas Robertson, representing the Board of Trade and the Board of Agriculture?
    Sir L. CHIOZZA MONEY:I think my hon. Friend had better address that question to the Board of Agriculture or the Board of Trade.

    INCREASED CARRYING CAPACITY.
    Mr. HOUSTONasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Shipping Controller whether before the War every 100

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    tons net register of shipping which came into this country brought in 106 tons of goods; and, if so, whether he can explain the arrangements and methods which have been made and used by means of which every 100 tons net register of shipping coming into this country now bring in 150 tons of goods?
    Sir L. CHIOZZA MONEY: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The large increase in the weight of goods imported in relation to net tonnage entrances is due partly to the heavier character of the cargoes required for war purposes as compared with those imported under peace conditions, partly to a careful selection of vessels with the best dead-weight cargo-carrying capacity for importing work and their concentration upon the shorter routes, where their advantages secure the maximum effect in increasing imports, and partly to the use of passenger vessels, with poor cargo capacity in relation to their tonnage, for the transport of troops, etc., with their consequent exclusion from net tonnage entrances.
    Mr. HOGGE: Is it the case, in spite of what the Leader of the House said, that this increase took place before the Ministry of Shipping was set up and was due to the facts which my hon. Friend states?
    Sir L. CHIOZZA MONEY: It certainly occurred in some measure before the Ministry of Shipping was set up, but my hon. Friend must remember that the Shipping Controller had to contend with many new difficulties.
    Mr. HOGGE: Then the Leader of the House was entirely wrong.
    Sir L. CHIOZZA MONEY: No, Sir.

    JAPANESE SUPPLIES (FOOD AND MUNITIONS).
    Mr. HOUSTONasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Shipping Controller whether Japanese merchant steamers have been used for bringing supplies of food and munitions of war to the United Kingdom and France; if so, can he state how many Japanese steamers, other than those owned by the Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaishi, have arrived in British or French ports during the twelve months ending 31st December last and their gross register tonnage; and whether he can state the amount of cargo discharged in United Kingdom and French ports by these Japanese steamers?
    Sir L. CHIOZZA MONEY: The answer to the first part of the question is In the affirmative. With regard to the remainder of the question, the net tonnage of Japanese steamers arriving in United Kingdom ports with cargo in 1917 was 185,482, and their number was forty-four. The remainder of the information is riot-available.

    MERCHANT VESSELS COMPLETED IN 1917.
    Mr. HOUSTONasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Shipping Controller whether he can state the number of purely merchant steamers of 1,600 tons gross register and upwards, quite apart from war vessels, which were built and completed ready for sea between 1st January, 1917, and 31st December, 1917, and the total gross register tonnage of same?
    Sir L. CHIOZZA MONEY: During 1917, 200 British-built merchant steamers of 1,600 tons (gross) and upwards, aggregating 1,067,696 tons (gross), were completed and brought into service.
    Mr. HOGGE: Can the hon. Gentleman assure us his are the right figures, and that the figures given by the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, which were all different, are wrong?
    Sir L. CHIOZZA MONEY: The figures which I have given do not agree with the figures given by my right hon. Friend opposite because they refer to 1,600 tens gross upwards, whereas the figures given to him on the authority of the Shipping Controller referred to all vessels. I do not know to what other figures my hon. Friend refers.
    Mr. HOGGE: Will the hon. Gentleman see that they all give the same figures?
    Sir L. CHIOZZA MONEY: So far as I am aware, no statement has been made on this particular subject except by my right hon. Friend opposite, and confirmed by the Leader of the House.

    UNION CASTLE FLEET.
    Mr. BILLINGasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Shipping Controller what proportion of the Union Castle fleet has been taken over by the Government; and how many of the vessels of the fleet

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    still remaining under the direct control of the company have been torpedoed since August, 1914?
    Sir L. CHIOZZA MONEY: The whole of the Union Castle fleet has been requisitioned by His Majesty's Government. Since August, 1914, five vessels of this company's fleet have been lost by enemy action.

  ENEMY AIR RAIDS.
  Sir WILLIAM BARTONasked the Prime Minister whether, in the event of a raid causing injury to or death of cotton operatives whilst following their employment, the Government will accept responsibility for payment of any compensation or damage to which the employer of such operatives or the owners or occupiers of cotton mills may be liable?
  The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER (Mr. Bonar Law): His Majesty's Government would not be justified in relieving private employers of any liability which may rest upon them under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, in respect of injury by accident sustained by workmen arising in the course of, and out of, their employment in the circumstances indicated in the question.
  Sir W. BARTON: Are the employers to be responsible under the Workmen's Compensation Act?
  Mr. BONAR LAW: I think that may be legally so.

  M. LITVINOFF.
  Major HUNTasked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the fact that M. Litvinoff is advocating a revolutionary movement in this country, he can now say whether he will be prosecuted or interned?
  Lord R. CECIL: My right hon. Friend asks me to answer this question. I have nothing to add to the reply given by the Home Secretary on the 14th instant to the hon. Member for Hertford, and to the reply given yesterday to the hon. Member.
  Major HUNT: Is it the fact that M. Litvinoff has sent round a document, signed by himself, to the trade unions, advocating revolution, and stating that a
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  social revolution is absolutely necessary if a lasting peace is to be secured, and is that sort of thing to be allowed in the case of an alien when it is not allowed in. the case of any of our own people?
  Lord R. CECIL: I am afraid I can only repeat the answer I have given. I really have nothing to add to what I have-already said on the subject, that the matter is being considered.
  Mr. BUTCHER: Will my right hon. Friend say whether M. Litvinoff can claim protection on the ground that he is an accredited agent of the Russian Government, and is he, in fact, so accredited?
  Lord R. CECIL: No, Sir; I think not.
  Mr. BILLING: Will the Noble Lord say whether the Government or the Foreign. Office have any particular reason for affording this man protection to enable him to make speeches in this country,, and whether he is to be permitted to pursue this course before the Government does take action?
  Lord R. CECIL: I can only say again. that the matter is receiving consideration.
  Mr. BILLING:Will the Noble Lord say that the Government will not permit him to make any further speeches until they have arrived at a decision, provided that it is during the War?
  Mr. D. MASON: Will the right hon. Gentleman inform the House whether or not the gentleman referred to does make revolutionary speeches?
  Mr. KING: Will the right hon. Gentleman read the admirable speech which he delivered yesterday?

  HOUSE OF COMMONS (PEERS).
  Mr. LYNCHasked the Prime Minister whether any provision exists in the British Constitution which enables any British subject to be a member of two Parliaments within the British Possessions; and, if so, whether he will introduce legislation enabling Peers of the Realm to become eligible for membership of the House of Commons?
  Mr. BONAR LAW: A Member of the House of Peers cannot be also a Member of the House of Commons, but so far as I am aware there is nothing to prevent a

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  member of a Dominion Parliament being also a Member of the British House of Commons. The answer to the last part of the question is in the negative.
  Mr. LYNCH: What I want to know is can a Member of the House of Peers be a member also of the Dominion Parliament?
  Mr. BONAR LAW: That is a matter for the Dominion. I fancy he could.

  AUSTRALIAN CITIZENS.
  Mr. LYNCHasked the Prime Minister whether he will consult the representatives of Australia in order to be guided by the sentiment of the Australian people with reference to any action of the British Government which may tend to create class distinctions between Australian citizens?
  Mr. BONAR LAW: The course suggested in the question has been and always will be adopted by the Government.
  Mr. LYNCH: Why set up a House of Lords in the Dominion when a House of Lords is tottering here?

  "EMPIRE" (DOMINION OPINION).
  Mr. LYNCHasked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the necessity of respecting democratic ideals during the War, he will consult the authorities of the Dominions separately as to their acceptance of the word "Empire" as defining the nature of the political associations of all the British condominiums; and whether, if the advice of any one of the Dominions be adverse to the use of this word, he will discourage the use of the word Empire in this respect in all State documents?
  Mr. BONAR LAW: The answer is in the negative.

  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S MISSION TO AMERICA.
  Mr. LYNCHasked the Prime Minister whether he will state the reasons which led to the early return of the Attorney-General from the United States?
  Mr. BONAR LAW: The return of my right hon. Friend the Attorney-General has not been hastened. On the contrary, he has found it possible to prolong his stay in America beyond the time which he anticipated when he sailed.
  Mr. LYNCH: May I ask this question entirely without prejudice: Was his recall in association with the alleged interview which was published in the "Boston Post"?
  Mr. BONAR LAW: I can answer entirely without prejudice that he was not recalled.
  Mr. KING: Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the statement which was issued by the Embassy at Washington, which gave colour to the idea that he certainly was returning home in advance?
  Mr. BONAR LAW: I have not seen any such statement, and I do not think any such statement was issued or exists. My information is entirely to the contrary.
  Mr. KING: As it appears in the "Times"— [HON. MEMBERS: "Order, order!"]
  Mr. BUTCHER: Am I right in supposing that the alleged interview in the "Boston Post" was entirely fictitious?
  Mr. BONAR LAW: My right hon. Friend has said so, and I should have thought any sane man who considered it would have known that.
  Mr. KING: Has the right hon. Gentleman read it himself, and, if so, has he not discovered internal evidence that part of it was authentic?
  Mr. BONAR LAW: I have read it myself, and I put myself in the category of sane men.

  MINISTER FOR PROPAGANDA.
  Captain CARR-GOMMasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether Lord Beaverbrook will carry out his duties as Minister for Propaganda at the office of the Chancellor of the Duchy, or whether a new building is to be set apart for him; and, if the latter arrangement is made, whether Sir John Bradbury's Committee will inquire into the staff of the Minister of Propaganda before it is housed in a new office?
  Mr. BONAR LAW: I understand that negotiations are proceeding with a view to obtaining suitable accommodation. The answer to the last part of the question is in the affirmative.

  VOTERS' LISTS (NATIONAL FOOD REGISTERS).
  Sir F. HALLasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer on what grounds the information contained in the National Food Register is not to be used for supplying particulars required by registration officers for the purposes of compiling the lists of voters under the Representation of the People Act; whether he is aware that the withholding of this information will cause additional work, and, owing to the shortage of labour, it will be practically impossible to obtain the canvassers required; and whether, under the circumstances, he will request registration officers and those appointed under the food control to supply each other with the information desired in order that the work may not be duplicated?
  The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY of FOOD (Mr. Clynes): I have been asked to reply to this question. The hon. and gallant Member presumably refers to the local register which has been set up in connection with the sugar distribution scheme. I stated on 13th December, in answer to the hon. Member for West Newington, that forms of application for tickets under that scheme were not intended for use by any other Department. It is not proposed to vary this decision, in view of the fact that Parliamentary registration officers are, under the Representation of the People Act, given access to the National Register compiled under the National Registration Act, 1915.
  Sir F. HALL: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman if it will not facilitate matters in any case when Parliamentary agents and agents of the Food Controller are in the same building, if they each had access to the various lists; otherwise they would be duplicating the work?
  Mr. CLYNES: My answer indicates that a pledge on the part of the Government has been given. My hon. and gallant Friend sometimes criticises the Government for not keeping their pledges, but I hope on this occasion he will not criticise when they have kept it.

  FOOD SUPPLIES.

    LIVE CATTLE IMPORTS.
    Mr. HOUSTONasked the President of the Board of Agriculture whether, in view of the shortage of meat in this country and the difficulties in obtaining supplies of frozen or chilled beef and mutton from abroad, he can arrange for the removal or rescission of the prohibition to import live cattle from North and South America, which would be slaughtered on arrival in the abattoirs already in existence for this purpose, where every precaution is taken against the importation of foot-and-mouth disease; and whether he is aware that in nearly every ship arriving from North and South America, owing to the heavy nature of the cargo carried, there is ample space for the carriage of live cattle?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the BOARD of AGRICULTURE (Sir Richard Winfrey): No prohibition on the import of live cattle for slaughter from North America has ever existed, though on occasions the entry of cattle from certain States has been prohibited owing to the existence of foot and mouth disease. As regards animals from South America, the Order of 21st September, 1915, allows landing for slaughter of animals brought from a number of countries, including Argentina and Uruguay. The Board have no knowledge whether vessels coming from North and South American ports have space available for animals, but any reference in the matter to those concerned with shipping has met with a reply that there was no available space.

    DISEASED MEAT (SMITHFIELD MARKET).
    Major HUNTasked the President of the Local Government Board whether a very large quantity of diseased cow-beef has been forwarded to Smithfield Market, London, recently and offered for sale on behalf of the Ministry of Food; whether the animals were mainly suffering from advanced tuberculosis and were in a very wasted condition; whether others revealed signs of pleurisy and in many cases the flesh was in a dropsical condition, very flabby and very shiny; whether, as the offals of these animals must have revealed complete evidence of their diseased condition, he will state what became of them; if condemned at the time of slaughtering, why were not the carcases

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    also examined and condemned; and, if sold to butchers, will he give the names of the principal buyers?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (Mr. Stephen Walsh):The answer to the first three parts of the question is in the affirmative, but I am not aware whether the carcases were offered for sale on behalf of the Ministry of Food, nor have I any information as to the offals of the animals. From inquiries which I have caused to be made I gather that the animals were slaughtered at Birkenhead, and I am informed that, owing to shortage of staff and the illness of the meat inspector, no proper examination of animals at the time of slaughter was made in Birkenhead during the early part of last month. In respect of the names of those to whom the carcases were sold, we are not in possession of the information, but further inquiries are being made.
    Mr. W. THORNEasked the President of the Local Government Board whether, on the three days on which large seizures of tuberculous and diseased meat, ex Birkenhead, were made on Smithfield Market in the three weeks ending 26th January, the offals of these animals were consigned to a firm in Aldgate Market, but when on examination their condition became apparent they were deposited in that portion of Aldgate Market which is situated without the jurisdiction of the health department of the City of London Corporation and that, while the evidences of the disease were apparent to all, the proprietors defied the officials to seize the goods and conducted the sales within the boundaries of the City of London, actually taking payment in the presence of the officials; whether he will give the names of the firms to whom the offals were sent and indicate to the borough of Stepney the necessity of a keener inspection than that which was exercised?
    Mr. WALSH: I have communicated with the local health authorities of Stepney and the City of London, but they have no knowledge of the circumstances mentioned in the question. As to the defiance of the officials alleged in the latter part of the question, the health authorities of Stepney possess no knowledge nor have they any knowledge of offal being sold within the borough. The slaughter-houses of Aldgate and Stepney are visited daily by the meat
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    inspector during killing hours, and the authorities are fully alive to the necessity of constant inspection.
    Mr. T. WILSON: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that a considerable number of beasts suffering from tuberculosis were condemned at Birkenhead and sent to London?
    Mr. WALSH: I hardly know how these particular facts or alleged facts arise out of the question, but if my hon. Friend will put a question down making it a matter for inquiry, I will go into the whole of the points.
    Major HUNTasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food whether in the employ of his Department there is a person with a German name who was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment twenty years ago at Smith-field Market for the Rotten Row conspiracy, in which the offence consisted of an evasion of the laws to protect the public from tuberculous and other diseased meat; whether he is aware that the same person was, a few years later, ejected from premises in Smithfield for a similar offence; that he then became meat buyer to J. Lyons and Company, and was stated in evidence, in the prosecution of that firm for supplying putrid meat to the troops at the White City, to have been the buyer employed on their behalf; whether this person is in Government employment; and, if not employed at the Ministry of Food, will he cause inquiry to be made in other Departments so as to prevent this person from exercising any control over the national meat or food supplies?
    Mr. CLYNES: The answer to the first and fourth parts of the question is in the negative; the remainder does not, therefore, arise.
    Major HUNTasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food whether he will give the name of the person who supervised the slaughtering of the tuberculous, dropsical, and diseased cattle on behalf of his Department at Birkenhead recently, and forwarded by the officials of his Department to the Central Market, Smithfield, London; whether he is aware that if any individual farmer and butcher had forwarded such goods he would have been sent to gaol without the option of a fine; and whether, in view of his admission that his Department was

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    offered the services of the late chief inspector of meat at Smithfield and considered itself sufficiently well equipped to dispense with such expert assistance, he will exactly explain how it was that tons of this stuff arrived in London which, but for the staff trained by the late chief inspector at Smithfield and maintained in efficiency by the City of London Corporation, would have been distributed in the form of sausage meat and piece-board meat?
    Mr. CLYNES:I have already pointed out that the Ministry of Food are not directly concerned with the sanitary inspection of meat, although the Food Controller is considering the advisability of exercising a closer control over public and private slaughtering. The slaughtering of cattle is at present supervised by their owners, who in this instance forwarded the meat to Smithfield after the carcases had been passed by the local authority's inspectors at Birkenhead.

    SUGAR.
    Mr. T. WILSONasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food if he is aware that in many thousands of working men's families a portion of the sugar received under the rationing scheme has been saved for the purpose of preserving rhubarb and fruit; and will he say whether sugar so saved is or will be considered hoarding?
    Mr. CLYNES: It has been publicly announced that sugar proved to have been saved from weekly rations will not be regarded as hoarding, and that, if the purpose of this saving is for jam making, it is immaterial whether the fruit to be preserved is grown or purchased by the preserver.
    Mr. WILSON: Will the hon. Gentleman see that all local food committees are acquainted with that fact?
    Mr. CLYNES: Certainly.
    Mr. BOWERMANasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food if he is aware that an application made by the Town Clerk of Deptford on behalf of a resident of that borough, whose doctor certified that his patient required extra sugar in the invalid food supplied to him, has been refused by the Ministry; and whether further consideration will be given to this and similar appli-
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    cations, with a view to authorising food officers to grant permits for reasonable additional supplies of sugar per week for invalids upon the production of medical practitioners' certificates?
    Mr. CLYNES: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. Extra sugar is only necessary and only granted in cases where invalids are unable to swallow, and have to be fed by tube with concentrated nourishment. The place of sugar as a condiment can be taken by glucose or saccharine.

    RAILWAYMEN ("DOUBLE-END" DUTY).
    Mr. BOWERMANasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food whether consideration has been given to a communication addressed to him by the Town Clerk of Deptford on behalf of a number of railway engine drivers and firemen, who are liable to what is known as "double-end" duty, involving absence from home for thirty-six hours, and who, having to provide themselves with food for that period, are at present unable to make such necessary provision; and, if so, will he state the result of such consideration?
    Mr. CLYNES: The Food Controller has received the communication referred to, and has also received representations on the same subject from other sources. He hopes that the introduction of local rationing schemes will in part remedy the difficulties in question. He understands that the railway companies are themselves taking the matter up, and he is issuing a circular to food control committees calling attention to the necessity of making provision in special cases in which rail-waymen away from home find difficulty in securing necessary food.

    REFRIGERATED MEAT.
    Major HUNTasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food what was the reason for excluding from the Advisory Committee on Live Stock and Meat Supplies any representative of Labour in that section which deals with imported and refrigerated meat while making the representation of the home-killed trade include all interests; whether, when it was suggested that there should be added to the Committee Mr. George Milligan, of the Liverpool Dock Labourers' Union, who enjoys the confidence of all the cold-storage workers of the port of Liverpool, and a Mr. J. Terret, who is the

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    most prominent trade unionist in the refrigerated industry of Smithfield Market, London, and was a witness before the Departmental Committee on Food Prices, it was objected that both these men would use their position on the Committee to attack the profiteering of the American Beef Trust; whether the Ministry of Food was appointed to stop profiteering; and whether the real reason is that both these men have successfully exposed the muddle of refrigerated shipping and blundering over cold-storage arrangements?
    Mr. CLYNES: No suggestion was ever received that Mr. G. Milligan or Mr. J. Terret should be appointed to the Central Advisory Committee on Live Stock and Meat Supplies, nor is that Committee directly concerned with the cold storage and refrigerating industry. The suggestion that the appointment of these two gentlemen was objected to in the interests of American firms is wholly without foundation.

    HOARDING.
    Mr. DIXONasked if any householder who has been in the habit of buying a pig or part of a pig off a farmer, for salting down for home consumption, is still able to do so, or will this be considered food hoarding?
    Mr. CLYNES: A householder who acquires pork for salting down for home consumption is subject to the ordinary rules in respect of hoarding—that is to say, the quantity of pork in his possession at any one time must not exceed the quantity required for ordinary use and consumption in his household.
    Mr. DIXON: Does that apply to bacon as well as pork?
    Mr. CLYNES: Certainly, under any system of rationing, to work equitably, it must do.
    Mr. BILLING: Is it in order for a householder to buy a complete live pig?
    Mr. CLYNES: My answer has indicated that it is not, and will not be, in order under a rationing scheme.
    Mr. ARTHUR RICHARDSON: Does that apply to a farmer who has been in the habit of killing his own pig?
    Mr. CLYNES: It applies not to the farmer who produces his own food, but only in his capacity as one who sells it.

    RATIONS (NAVY AND ARMY).
    Colonel L. WILSONasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food when it is proposed to issue Regulations so as to prevent officers and men of the Navy and Army who are drawing rations from public sources from also using rationed articles of food at hotels, clubs, and restaurants; and, when these Regulations are issued, whether they will apply to every district?
    Mr. CLYNES: This question is still under consideration. Regulations on the subject will be issued at an early date.

    TEA.
    Mr. W. THORNEasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food whether the Food Controller, through the Ministry of Food, has taken tea from various growers and importers with the object of getting cheaper tea to the consumer; whether he is aware that this tea has been sold on account of the Ministry of Food to be retailed eventually at from 2s. 4d. to 3s. 8d. per lb.; and whether, if this tea had been left in the growers' and importers' hands and the Ministry of Food had not taken a large profit, this tea could have been purchased by the consumer at a very much lower price?
    Mr. CLYNES: The answers to the first and second parts of the hon. Member's question are in the affirmative. In reply to the last part of the question, it is not the case that the tea if left in the growers' and importers' hands could have been purchased by the consumer at a lower price, nor is it the fact that the Ministry are making a profit in the sense indicated in the question.

    MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT (MEALS IN LONDON)
    Mr. HOWARDasked whether Members of Parliament residing in districts outside London and the home counties and those on service abroad will be provided with food and meat cards to enable them to obtain meals in London when attending this House?
    Mr. CLYNES: Any person resident outside the London and home counties who conies into that area will be able during the first four days of his stay to obtain butter and margarine at restaurants, clubs, and hotels without formality, and meat meals on producing his National

    619
    Registration Card and signing a declaration If the stay is longer than four days it will be necessary for him to take out an emergency card for butter and margarine and meat for the period of the visit in order to obtain such meals. An emergency card must in all cases be taken out if it is desired to buy butter and margarine or meat from retailers. Members of Parliament on service abroad will be in the same position.

  GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (OFFICE ACCOMMODATION).
  The following question stood on the Paper in the name of Captain CARR-GOMM:
  61. To ask the First Commissioner of Works whether the Cabinet Committee on Office Accommodation have received any application from the new Minister for Propaganda for more office accommodation.
  Captain CARR-GOMM: When I gave notice of this question there was only one Minister of Propaganda, but as there are now two, will the right hon. Gentleman in his answer say whether the latter part applies to both cases?
  The FIRST COMMISSIONER Of WORKS (Sir Alfred Mond): The answer is in the negative.
  Mr. BILLING: Is there any truth in the rumour that Carmelite House has been taken for this purpose?
  Captain CARR-GOMMasked how many demands for the new sets of buildings in London are now awaiting the sanction of the Accommodation Committee of the War Cabinet?
  Sir A. MOND: I regret that I do not understand what the hon. Member means by "demands for the new sets of buildings"

  WELFARE OF BLIND (ADVISORY COMMITTEE).
  Mr. ANDERSONasked the President of the Local Government Board whether the proposed Advisory Committee to consider schemes for the welfare of the blind will have power to consider the taking over, consolidating, and adminis-
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  tering of the whole of the charities and bequests given for the benefit of the blind; whether it will have power to suggest schemes for paying adequate pensions to all incapable, aged, and infirm blind persons; and whether its terms of reference will be such that it could apply to Parliament for a grant of money so to improve the income of the wage-earning blind that they may be able to live in decency and self-respect?
  Mr. WALSH: The Advisory Committee has been appointed to advise the Local Government Board on all matters relating to the welfare of the blind. The particular questions referred to by the hon. Member are matters within the competence of the Committee, and they are fully empowered to advise the Local Government Board to apply to Parliament for any Grant which may be necessary to give effect to any of their recommendations.

  RUSSIAN SUBJECTS (DEPENDANTS' ALLOWANCES).
  Major NEWMANasked the President of the Local Government Board whether, now that the military convention between Russia and this country has been denounced by the former, he will say whether his Board will continue to pay separation allowance to the wives and dependants of men who left the country ostensibly to join the Russian Army, since disbanded; and could he see his way to maintain such dependants by means of a local tax levied weekly on their well to-do compatriots who arc still allowed to undertake trade and business in London and elsewhere?
  Mr. WALSH: As my right hon. Friend previously informed the hon. and gallant Member, the allowances to which he refers are only paid when the dependants are necessitous, and for the present and until the position is less obscure it is proposed to continue the existing arrangement. I do not think that the suggestion contained in the latter part of the question is a practical proposition.
  Major NEWMAN: When the position becomes less obscure, will the hon. Gentleman see to it that English wives of Russians are not left destitute?
  Mr. WALSH: That is a point that would receive the very fullest consideration from the first.

  SEAMEN (CHEAP RAILWAY FARES).
  Mr. T. WILSONasked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that, owing to circumstances over which they have no control, a large number of sea faring men are landed at ports other than those they signed on from; and whether he will arrange for these men to travel from the port at which they are landed to the port they signed on at at cheap railway fares?
  The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the BOARD of TRADE (Mr. Wardle): Arrangements are already in operation under which seamen discharged before a superintendent of a mercantile marine office may obtain, if their ship has been diverted by a naval or transport authority, a railway warrant to their usual port of discharge without payment; and any other seamen discharged before a superintendent of a. mercantile marine office may obtain railway tickets to enable them to travel to their home port at the old fare without the 50 per cent. increase.

  PUNISHMENTS (ROYAL NAVY).
  Mr. SNOWDENasked the First Lord of the Admiralty if there is any Government publication containing the punishments authorised to be inflicted upon men serving in the Navy; what are the powers of a commander of a warship in regard to the infliction of summary punishment; what is the nature of the punishments that a commander can inflict; whether a sailor has any right to demand a naval court-martial; and whether sailors or petty officers are entitled to sit upon naval courts-martial?
  The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Dr. Macnamara): The authorised punishments in the Navy are Specified in Section 52 of the Naval Discipline Act and 757 of the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions. The commanding officer can, under Section 56, Sub-section (2), deal with any offence not capital which is triable under the Act and not committed by an officer. He has full power to award certain minor punishments. Certain other more serious punishments awarded by him have in certain cases to receive the prior approval of the nearest flag officer, or the prior approval of the Commander-in-Chief of the station or senior officer, or the prior approval of
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  the Admiralty. No rating has any right to demand a naval court-martial, except chief petty officers, petty officers, and non-commissioned officers of the Royal Marines, who are charged with offences which, if proved, would justify their being disrated. Naval ratings are not entitled to sit on naval courts-martial.

  FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY.
  Mr. HOGGE: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the First Lord of the Admiralty has returned from his duty, or is absent on that or other business 1
  Mr. SPEAKER: That does not arise out of the question.
  Mr. HOGGE: May I move the Adjournment of the House, in order to call attention to a matter of urgent public importance, namely, the absence of the First Lord of the Admiralty from this country?
  Mr. SPEAKER: That does not seem to me, on present information, to be a matter for the House to discuss. The right hon. Gentleman is away, I presume, on public business
  Mr. HOGGE: On that point, Mr. Speaker, the House is not aware that the First Lord of the Admiralty is away on other business than Admiralty business, attending to railways, and other matters like that.
  An HON. MEMBER: Never mind; he is getting on with the War.
  Mr. HOGGE: We have a right, surely, in view of what is happening, to have some explanation from the Government as to what is happening?
  Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member has not asked for any; he can put down a question on the subject.
  Mr. HOGGE: How can I put a question down when the First Lord of the Admiralty is not here to answer it?
  Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member has not asked whether the right hon. Gentleman is absent on public business or private affairs.

  SIR CECIL SPRING RICE.
  Mr. BILLING: On a point of Order. I should like to ask you, Mr. Speaker, whether if I give private notice of a ques-

  623
  tion to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs asking whether he has any details regarding the death of the late Sir Cecil Spring Rice, and whether a post-mortem has been held, you would not consider it of urgent public importance? I would like to ask you whether, having regard to the fact that it is largely due to the information supplied by Sir Cecil Spring Rice that the Bolo and Caillaux trials took place in France, and his visit to this country might have been detrimental to certain people, a post-mortem is not necessary, and whether the Government will not take some action in the matter?
  Mr. SPEAKER: Unfortunately, that is not a matter of urgency. The hon. Gentleman may put a question in writing. As to the question of a post-mortem, I presume that would be a matter really for the Canadian or United States law.
  Mr. BILLING: Am I in order in suggesting that it is a matter which requires a suggestion from this Government, in view of the position held in the United States by Sir Cecil Spring Rice?
  Mr. SPEAKER: That is a question which the hon. Gentleman is quite entitled to put down.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.
  SUPPLY.
    ARMY ESTIMATES, 1918–19.
      SUPREME WAR COUNCIL.

        PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT.
        Order for Committee read.
        The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Lloyd George): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
        In moving that you do now leave the Chair, I have a statement to make to the House on a matter in which not merely the House of Commons but the country are very deeply interested. In doing so, I would like to say that I hope, whatever may be said to-day, this matter will be treated as a question of policy, and not of personalities. If there has been any delay or apparent hesitation in the announcement of any decision by the Government it is not because there is any doubt in their minds in regard to that policy, but because they were very anxious that the decision, when it was announced, should be free from any element of complication about personalities. The Government were extremely anxious to retain the services of Sir William Robertson as Chief of Staff as long as that was compatible with the policy on which they had decided, in common with the Allied Governments, after prolonged consultation at Versailles. It is a matter of the deepest regret to the Government that it was found to be incompatible with that policy to retain the services of so distinguished a soldier. If the policy be right, no personalities should stand in the way of its execution, however valuable, however important, however distinguished. If the policy be wrong, no personalities and no Government ought to stand in the way of its being instantly defeated.
        What is the policy? I have already explained to the House—I am afraid rather imperfectly on the last occasion, but to the best of my ability—what is the policy of the Government in this respect. It is not merely the policy of this Government. It is the policy of the great Allied Governments in council. There is absolutely no difference between our policy and the
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        policy of France, Italy, and America in this respect. In fact, some of the conclusions to which we came at Versailles were the result of very powerful representations made by the representatives of other Governments, notably the American Government. That policy is a policy which is based on the assumption that the Allies hitherto have suffered through lack of concerted and co-ordinated effort. There was a very remarkable quotation in yesterday's "Manchester Guardian," which, if the House will permit me, I will read, because I think it gives the pith of the whole controversy:
        "Some great soldier once said that to find the real effective strength of an alliance you must halve us nominal resources to allow for the effect of divided counsels and dispersed effort"
        Our purpose and our policy has been to get rid of that halving of the resources of the Allies, so that, instead of dispersion of effort, there should be concentration and unity of effort. There is a saying attributed to a very distinguished living French statesman, which is rather cynical—that,
        "The more he knows of this War, the less convinced he is that Napoleon was a great soldier, for the, simple reason that Napoleon had only to tight coalitions all his life."
        I ventured some time ago to make an excursion into the general history of the War, in order, without blaming anyone, to point out what the Allies have suffered in the past from lack of co-ordination of effort. You have only to look at 1917, to find exactly the same set of circumstances inevitably affecting, or rather diminishing, the power of that concentration which otherwise would have been possible, in order to counteract the efforts which were made by the Germans, and to counteract the collapse on the Russian front. Anyone who examines closely the events of 1917, as well as the events of the previous year, will find plenty of argument for some change of machinery in order to effect greater concentration than has hitherto been achieved in the direction of the Allied resources. That is the reason why, after the Italian defeat, the Allied Governments, after a good deal of correspondence and of conference, came to the conclusion that it was necessary to set up some central authority, for the purpose of co-ordinating the strategy of the Allies. At the last Conference at Versailles it was decided, after days of conference, to extend the powers of that body.

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        In discussing the action at Versailles, I am necessarily hampered by the Resolutions arrived at, not merely by the military representatives, but by the separate Governments, that it was not desirable to give any information in regard to the general plan which was adopted. But I think I can, within these limits, make quite clear where controversy has arisen, and ask the judgment of the House on the action of the Government as to the merits or demerits of the dispute. The general principle laid down at Versailles was agreed to whole-heartedly by everybody. I will come later to where controversy arose. There was no controversy as regards policy, but only as to the method of giving effect to it. This obviates the necessity for me to discuss the plan itself, because the House may take it that as far as the plan itself was concerned, there was, and there is now, as far as I know, the most complete agreement. Had there not been, I am sorry to say I could not have gone into it; but it is not necessary. There was agreement as to policy. There was agreement that there must be a central authority, to exercise the supreme direction over that policy. There was agreement that the authority must be an Inter-Allied authority. There was complete agreement that the authority should have executive powers. The only question which arose was as to how that central authority should be constituted. That is the only difference. There was no difference about policy; no difference about the plan; no difference about executive powers; no difference about it being necessary to set up an Inter-Allied authority with control; and no difference about its having executive powers. The only difference was as to how that central authority should be constituted. That was the whole issue. In my judgment—and I will give the facts later—agreement was reached at the Conference, even in regard to that.
        4.0 P.M.
        Let me give the stages of discussion at the Conference. Several proposals were put forward. We sat for days, and examined those proposals very carefully. I am sure that no one went there with a preconceived plan in his mind. Everybody went with a full desire to find the best method, and not to advocate any particular proposal. All these various proposals were, one after the other,
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        rejected, until we came to the last. I will explain these various proposals, because I can do that without in the least giving, away the plan of operations. The first proposal was favoured in the first instance by the French and the British General Staff. I do not think the American— that is my recollection—or the Italian Staffs took quite the same view; but the French and British Staffs were in favour of the proposal by which the central body should be a council of chiefs of the Staffs. That was the first proposal. I want to show that the very proposal over which controversy raged later was examined at that Conference, and it was the first proposal examined. It was most carefully considered, and I will give the House the case put forward for it, as I want the House to hear on what grounds it was recommended.
        It was essential that each of the representatives should be in intimate touch with his own War Office. He must know the man-power, the state of morale, the-medical equipment, shipping, and Foreign Office information, and nobody could know this so well as the Chief of the Staff. Therefore, the new body ought to consist of the Chiefs of the Staffs. It was also naturally felt that there were serious constitutional objections to any system which implied that an Inter-Allied body was to come to decisions affecting the British Army. That is the case which was put forward for a body consisting of Chiefs of the Staffs. The Council examined that very carefully, and discussed it; and let me point out to the House of Commons that this was not a discussion between politicians, but a discussion where all the leading generals were present. The Commanders-in-Chief were there, except the Italian Commander-in-Chief; the French, British, and American Commanders-in-Chief and the Chiefs of the Staffs, as well as the military representatives at Versailles, and the representatives of the Government. It was a free discussion, where generals took part with exactly the same freedom as Ministers. There was no voting; in fact, there was no question of voting. I have no hesitation in saying that, on examination, the proposal completely broke down, and was rejected on the ground of its being unworkable.
        I will give the House the reasons why it was regarded as unworkable. The first reason was that the members of the

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        Council felt that the members of the new Executive body which was going to have this great control over co-ordinating the forces of the Allies must not only know about their own armies and their own fronts, but must also be informed of the conditions on all fronts and in all the armies of all the nations, because you are not dealing merely with the British Army, you are dealing with four great armies, and you have to get information from every quarter. Versailles has become a repository of information coming from all the fronts—from all the Armies, from all nationalities, from all the Staffs., from all the Foreign Offices—and that information is co-ordinated there by very able Staffs; and I have no hesitation in saying that they have information there for that reason that no single War Office possesses, because you have information from all the fronts co-ordinated together.
        What is the second reason? We felt that this Executive body, in face of the serious dangers with which we have been confronted this year, must be in continuous session, in order to be able to take decisions instantly required. Nobody could tell where a decision would have to be taken. The men who take the decision ought to be within half-an-hour's reach. Eight hours, ten hours might be fatal. We felt it was essential that whatever body you set up should be a body of men who were there at least within half-an-hour of the time when the Council would have to sit, in order to take a decision. Nobody knows what movement the Germans may make, There may be a sudden move here or there, and preconceived plans may be completely shattered by some movement taken by the enemy. Therefore, it was essential that the body to decide should be a body sitting continuously in session.
        The third reason was this: Not merely have they to take decisions instantly, but they ought to be there continually sitting together, comparing notes, and discussing developments from day to day, because a situation which appears like this to-day may be absolutely changed to-morrow. You may have a decision in London, and telegraph it over to Versailles, but by the time it reaches there you may have a complete change in the whole situation. Therefore, we felt it was essential that these men should be sitting together, so that whatever change in the situation took place they could compare notes,
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        discuss the thing together, and be able to come to a decision, each helping the other to arrive at that decision.
        There is a further reason. A Council of Chiefs of the Staffs involved the creation of another and a new Inter-Allied body conflicting with Versailles. This point was put by the American delegation with very great force, and it became obvious to everybody there the moment we began to examine the proposal—although on the face of it it looked very attractive—that the functions which the Executive body was to exercise could not be properly performed by a body of Chiefs of the Staffs stationed" in the various capitals. On the other hand, if the Chiefs of the Staffs sat in Paris, it meant that the Governments would be deprived for long periods of their principal military advisers, at a critical time, and at a time when action on other vital matters on other fronts might be required. Therefore, I have no hesitation in saying that the moment it came to be examined— although we examined it with the greatest predisposition in its favour—it was found to be-absolutely unworkable, for the simple reason that the moment the Chief of the Staff went to Paris, he would cease to be the chief military adviser of the Government, and either Versailles would have to be satisfied with a deputy who could not act without instructions, or the Governments would have to be satisfied with a deputy who was not their full military adviser. For that reason, the Supreme Council rejected that proposal with complete unanimity. I think I am right in saying that the proposals were withdrawn. It was felt even by those who put them forward that, at any rate, without very complete changes, those proposals were not workable.
        Then it was suggested by the French Prime Minister that it would be desirable for each national delegation to think out some other plan for itself, and to bring it there to the next meeting, and that was done. It is very remarkable that, meeting separately, and considering the matter quite independently, we each came there with exactly the same proposal the following morning, and that proposal is the one which now holds the field. I hesitated for some time as to whether I should not read to the House the very cogent document submitted by the American delegation, which put the case for the present proposal. It is one of the most powerful documents—I think my

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        right hon. Friends who have had the advantage of reading it will agree with me—one of the ablest documents ever submitted to a military conference, in which they urged the present course, and gave grounds for it. I think it is absolutely irresistible, and the only reason I do not read it to the House is because it is so mixed up with the actual plan of operations that it will be quite impossible for me to read it without giving away what is the plan of operations. I only wish I could. I hesitated for some time, being certain if I read that to the House of Commons, it would not be necessary for me to make any speech at all, because the case is presented with such irresistible logic by the American delegation that I, for one, do not think there is anything to be said against it, and that was the opinion of the Conference.
        What happened? We altered it here and there. There was a good deal of discussion. It was pointed out that there was a weak point here, and a weak point there. Then someone suggested how to improve it. It took some hours, but there was not a single dissentient voice so far as the plan was concerned. Everybody was free to express his opinion —not merely Ministers, but generals. The generals were just as free to express their opinions as the Ministers, and as a matter of fact Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig did call attention to what we admitted was a weak point in the proposal. I think he called attention to two points. We soon realised that there were weak points, we promised to put them right, and some of the time occupied was time occupied in adjusting the arrangements arrived at at Versailles to meet the criticisms of Sir Douglas Haig. They were points in regard to the Army and the Army Council, constitutional points, not points that went to the root of the proposal itself. I want the House again, at the expense of repeating myself, to recollect that this passed the Versailles Council without a single dissentient voice as far as all those who were present are concerned, and, as far as I know, it was completely accepted by every military representative present. I reported to the Cabinet as soon as I returned the terms of the arrangement. I am not sure that it had not been circulated beforehand. I rather think it had, and then I made my report to the Cabinet. Sir
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        William Robertson was present, and nothing was then said or indicated to me that Sir William Robertson regarded the plan as either unworkable or dangerous.
        Therefore, I think I was entitled to assume that, although some of the military representatives at the beginning of the Conference would have preferred another plan, that they, just like our-selves, had been converted by the discussion to the acceptance of this plan. There was nothing to indicate that anyone protested against the plan which was adopted at Versailles. During the week— that is, the week after I returned from Versailles—the Army Council considered the arrangement, and made certain criticisms from the constitutional point of view. I considered these very carefully with the Secretary of State for War, who has throughout put Sir William Robertson's views before the Cabinet with a persistent voice, and I considered very carefully with my colleagues all these constitutional points. Having considered them, we made certain arrangements, with a view to meeting the constitutional difficulties of the Army Council. I will give substantially the arrangements which we made, and which I understood from the Secretary of State for War completely removed the whole difficulties experienced by the Army Council in the carrying out of the arrangements. I was naturally anxious that this arrangement should be worked whole-heartedly by the whole of the military authorities, whether here or in France. I was specially anxious that the Commander-in- Chief, who is more directly concerned in the matter than even the Chief of Staff, because it affected operations, perhaps, primarily in France, should be satisfied that the arrangements that were made were such as would be workable as far as he was concerned. Therefore, before I arrived at this arrangement, I invited him to come over here. I had a talk with him, and he said that he was prepared to work under this arrangement. I will give the arrangement:
        "The, British permanent Military Adviser at Versailles is to become a member of the Army Conicl—"
        That is, in order to get rid of the constitutional difficulty that someone may be giving an order about British troops who is not a member of the Army Council. He was, therefore, made a member of the Army Council. That was agreed to on all hands.

        641
        "He is to be in constant communication with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and is to be absolutely free and unfettered in the advice he gives as a member of the Board of Military Representative; at Versailles."
        It would be idle to send a man there simply with instructions in his pocket that he is to agree to certain things and to nothing else. If he goes there, he must go to discuss with his colleagues, who are equally free and unfettered, to consider the facts, and to give advice according to what he hears from the others, as well as on the facts submitted to him—
        "He is to have the powers necessary to enable him to fulfil the duties imposed upon him by the recent Versailles decision. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff is to hold office under the some conditions and with the same powers as every Chief of the Imperial General Staff up to the appointment of General Robertson, remaining the supreme military adviser of the British Government."
        I want the House to take in that fact. It was part of the arrangement that the Chief of the Staff was to remain the supreme military adviser of the Government—
        "He is to accompany Ministers to the meetings of the Supreme War Council as their adviser, and is to have the right to visit France and consult with any or all of the military representatives of the super me War Council."
        What does that mean? It means that the representatives at Versailles must have the most perfect freedom to discuss plans and to recommend plans. If the Commanders in Chief do not approve of them—because, by the arrangement they were to consult, and be in constant communication with, the Commanders in Chief—or, if there was any difference of opinion among the various representatives, the Governments were to decide. There is no derogation of the power of the Government—none. In that case, who is to advise the Government? The advice to the Government would be given by the Chief of the General Staff, so that if there were a meeting of the Supreme War Council to decide differences of opinion between either the military representatives or the Commanders -in-Chief, the Government decide upon the advice of the Chief of the General Staff. Do not let anyone imagine that differences of opinion are going to begin now. I do not want to go into the matter, but difference of opinion is inevitable. It is no reflection upon them. They are men of independent mind, they are men of strong character; they are men of definite opinions, and, of course,
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        there are differences of opinion, and when there are differences of opinion now, there is no one to decide but the Government, and the Chief of the Imperial Staff is still to be the supreme adviser of the Government in any differences that may in these circumstances arise. That is the position as far as the decision at Versailles is concerned.
        We were under the impression that all the difficulties, the constitutional and technical difficulties, had been completely overcome by this document, which had been shown to Sir Douglas Haig. Sir William Robertson, unfortunately, was away at the time—I think he was at Brighton—I am sorry now to learn that he was ill. At any rate, he was away, otherwise he would have been present at the Conference. We were under the impression—I certainly was under the impression—that the last of the difficulties had been removed, and, having been removed, as I was under the impression that Versailles had become the more important centre for decision, the Government decided to offer the position to Sir William Robertson. It was only afterwards that, at any rate, I realised that Sir William Robertson was unwilling to acquiesce in the system, and that he took an objection, not on technical grounds or on constitutional grounds, but on military grounds, to the system which Versailles had decided unanimously to adopt. I certainly had not realised that he took that view. We offered him, first of all, the position at Versailles. He could not accept it. We then offered him the position of the Chief of General Staff, with the powers adapted to the position which had been set up at Versailles. That, I am sorry to say, he also refused. He suggested a modification of the proposals, by making the representative at Versailles the Deputy of the Chief of Staff. We felt bound, after consideration, to reject that proposal, for two reasons. It involved putting a subordinate in a position of the first magnitude, where he might have to take vital decisions, under instructions given him beforehand, before the full facts were known, before either had heard what the other representatives had got to say, before he even knew what alternative plans might be put forward by the representatives, or by altering those instructions after consultation with the Chief, who was a hundred miles away, and who was not in touch with the every-

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        day developments, or with the arguments that had been advanced at that particular Conference — an impossible position for any man to take up.
        The second reason is this: If you send a deputy there, the representative of the British Army would be in an inferior position to any other member of the Council, and he could not, therefore, discuss things on equal terms. We felt it was, essential that the British representatives should be equal in responsibility and authority to the representative of any other country on that body. I know it is said that General Foch was put on that body. General Foch is within twenty-five minutes of Versailles, and, if any emergency arose, within twenty-five minutes he could be present. That is not true of any other Chief of Staff. He can be at his office in the morning, and in twenty-five minutes he can be at Versailles. There is no other Chief of Staff to whom that would be in the least applicable. Travelling under any conditions from here to Paris involves time, and it is not so easy to do it now. You have got to consider a good many things when you consider what time you can go. You cannot say, start now and be there in eight hours. In a war that makes all the difference—it is vital. Therefore, we considered that it was a totally different position.
        The French felt so strongly that you cannot do your business by deputy that they took away the man they had, and put General Foch there. They knew that you cannot have deputies acting on the Board. You have to get the man himself, whoever he is, to take the position. I am sorry to take up the time of the House, but I want to give a very full explanation, as full as it is compatible with not giving away information to the enemy. Sir William Robertson came to the conclusion that, under the conditions laid down, he could not accept either position, and the Government, with the deepest and most genuine regret, found itself obliged to go on without him. We had to take the decision, and it was a very painful decision, of having to choose between the policy deliberately arrived at unanimously by the representatives of the Allied Powers, in the presence of the military advisers, and of retaining the services of a very distinguished and a very valued public servant.
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        When it came to a question of policy of such a magnitude, we were bound to stand by the arrangement to which we had come with our Allies. Let me say at once that I do not wish in the least to utter a word that would look like a criticism of the decision of Sir William Robertson that he could not see his way to carry out the arrangement. There is not a word to be said about the decision to which he came. It is better that it should be carried out by those who are thorough believers in the policy concerned. With great public spirit, he has accepted a Command which is certainly not adequate to the great position he has occupied, and I wish there had been something else that would be more adequate to his great services. I would like to say just one word about Sir William Robertson. He has had a remarkable and a very distinguished career, and he is now in the height and strength of his powers; in fact, they are only in the course of development. He has great capacity and great strength of character, he is a man of outstanding—and, if I may say so, as one who has been associated with him for two or three years—not merely outstanding, but a most attractive personality. During the whole of those two years, so far as our personal relations are concerned, not merely have they been friendly, but cordial. During the whole time of this final controversy not a bitter word has been said on either side, and at a final interview—where I did my best to urge Sir William Robertson to take one or other of these alternatives—we parted with expressions of great kindliness. It is a matter of very deep regret to me. All the hesitation that has taken place has taken place because the Government were trying this and trying that, in order to secure Sir William Robertson's acceptance; and although I knew it was laying the door open to the criticism that the Government did not know its own mind, I preferred that to anything which would lay us open to the charge that we were in the least hustling Sir William Robertson. I do not regret that the delay has taken place.
        I have always recognised the difficulties in the way of securing co-operation between Allies. There are practical difficulties— genuine practical difficulties. You have to reconcile the unity of the Allies with the unity of the Army. There were some friends of ours who undoubtedly had honest misgivings that the

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        arrangement we made, whereas it might secure the first, was imperilling the second. That would be a misfortune. You would not help the former in that case, and I fully realised that. Let me say this, if the House were to accept the Government's explanation to-day, I would not regard it as a mandate not to take all the necessary steps compatible with the main purpose of Allied unity to remove every legitimate cause for anxiety on that score. Quite the reverse. I propose to invite from the highest military authorities suggestions for the best means of removing any possible anxiety in the mind of anyone that in any scheme put forward in order to secure concert and combined action between Allies, you are not doing something to impair the efficiency and command of your own Army. Therefore, we shall certainly pursue that course, and if any suggestion comes from any military quarter to make the thing work even better from that point of view, certainly not merely shall we adopt it, but we shall seek it, and we mean to do so.
        There are other difficulties, not merely practical difficulties—there are difficulties due to national feeling, to historical traditions. There are difficulties innate in the very order of things. There are difficulties of suspicion—the suspicion in the mind of one country that somehow the other country may be trying to seek some advantage for itself. All these things stand in the way of every Alliance. There are also difficulties due to the conservatism of every profession—I belong to a profession myself, and I know what it means—the conservatism of every profession, which hates changes in the traditional way of doing things. All these things you have always to overcome when there is any change that you make, and they ought not to be encouraged too much on these lines. I agree that reasonable misgivings and reasonable doubts ought to be removed. If there be real difficulties, those ought to be examined and surmounted. But suspicion, distrust— those ought to be resolutely discouraged among Allies. Trust and confidence among the Allies is the very soul of victory, and I plead for it now, as I have pleaded for it before.
        We have discussed this plan, and re-discussed it with the one desire that our whole strength—our whole concentrated strength—should be mobilised to resist and
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        to break the most terrible foe with which civilisation has ever been confronted. I ask the House to consider this: We are faced with terrible realities. Let us see what is the position. The enemy have rejected, in language which was quoted here the other day from the Kaiser, the most moderate terms ever put forward, terms couched in such moderate language that the whole of civilisation accepted them as reasonable. Why has he done it? It is obvious. He is clearly convinced that the Russian collapse puts it within his power to achieve a military victory, and to impose Prussian dominancy by force upon Europe. That is what we are confronted with, and I do beg this House, when you are confronted with that, to close down all controversy and to close our ranks.
        If this policy, deliberately adopted by the representatives of the great Allied countries in Paris, dose not commend itself to the House, turn it down quickly and put in a Government who will go and say they will not accept it. But it must be another Government. But do not let us keep the controversy alive. The Government are entitled to know, and I say so respectfully, to know to-night whether the House of Commons and the nation wish that the Government should proceed upon a policy deliberately arrived at, with a view to organising our forces to meet the onset of the foe. For my part—and I should only like to say one personal word—during the time I have held this position, I have endeavoured to discharge its terrible functions to the utmost limits of my capacity and strength. If the House of Commons to-night repudiates the policy for which I am responsible, and on which I believe the saving of this country depends, I shall quit office with but one regret—that is, that I have not had greater strength and greater ability to place at the disposal of my native land in the gravest hour of its danger.
        Mr. ASQUITH: There was an observation made by my right hon. Friend in the middle of his speech in which I hope and believe we shall all concur— that is, that in the discussion he has initiated we shall regard such matters of controversy, if such there be that arise, not as in any sense dependent upon personalities, but as dependent upon policy. Sir William Robertson, he has truly said, has set a great example, for at this

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        moment, after all that has happened, he has, in the spirit of a loyal soldier, placed his services at the disposal of the Government, and accepted a post which for the moment—so I assume from my right hon. Friend—is the only one, however inadequate to his great ability and talents, which they had at their disposal. I trust we shall be all ready in our different degrees to imbibe his spirit as far as we can.
        I cannot help wishing that the speech which we have just heard from the Prime Minister had been delivered a week ago. Exactly a week ago, on the first night of the Session, on what seemed to me an appropriate occasion—the Debate on the Address—I put two questions to the Government. The first was in what respects and to what extent the functions of the Versailles Council had been enlarged; the second was whether any change had been made, or was contemplated in the status and functions of the Commander-in-Chief or of the Chief of the General Staff. To the second question I received no answer; and in regard to the first, I was told, beyond the vague admission that the Council had assumed executive functions of an undefined kind it was undesirable to say more, inasmuch as any further disclosure might give useful information to the enemy. I may add—because it is an illustration of the spirit and the methods by which in some quarters even now, with an acute crisis in the War, political controversy in this country is carried on—that it is in the knowledge of everybody that for my temerity in putting these questions I was assailed, not, indeed, by my right hon. Friend, but by some of the most strident organs of the Government in the Press, as sounding a note of national dissension, as importing in a crisis of the War into our proceedings of the House of Commons a taint of party controversy, as a pacifist without the courage so to avow himself—and, indeed, as a Bolo in a thin disguise. Such is the fashion in which some important and, I believe, widely circulated organs of the Press are now conducted under the auspices, if we are to believe current rumour, of those, or some or those, who, since the Debate last week, have become the trustees and custodians of our propaganda.
        Mr. KING: Rewards for services!
        Mr. PRINGLE: Improperganda!
        Mr. ASQUITH: I am glad to say all that is now changed. A week ago humble, obvious, relevant inquiries of mine were brushed aside, in the public interest, but they are now answered by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, at any rate with a welcome increase of implicitness and lucidity. All these things concern the House of Commons. There is another matter in regard to which I also feel bound to point out the contrast between last Tuesday and to-day. I think I am speaking in the. recollection of the House—of the whole House and the country—when I say I gathered the impression that in what had been decided on and set on foot at Versailles, and was being carried into effect here, the Government had the full approval and assent of its military advisers. We now know that in what was going on in this country at that time with regard to the carrying out of the policy, so far as Sir William Robertson was concerned, that was not the case. If I am wrong, I shall be corrected.
        The PRIME MINISTER: I certainly never knew that Sir William Robertson had any objection in principle; quite the reverse. I thought that they were purely constitutional difficulties connected with the Army Acts and Army Orders, and that we had met them. I certainly thought,.and so did ray colleagues, that we had completely removed all those difficulties, and that there was nothing else left. It was only afterwards that I understood Sir William Robertson regarded the whole arrangement from a different point of view.
        Mr. ASQUITH: I am very much surprised to hear that, and since my right hon. Friend has made that interruption, may I ask is it not a fact that on the Monday Sir William Robertson intimated that he could not possibly assent to the proposals which were then put forward, and that Sir Henry Wilson had already been sent for, with a view to suceeding to his place?
        The PRIME MINISTER: That was only a proposal made on the Saturday, when Sir Douglas Haig came over. The proposal made on Saturday was that Sir William Robertson should, under the new-arrangement which I read out, be the representative at Versailles, and Sir Henry Wilson should be Chief of the Staff, and I believe that Sir Henry Wilson was seen by the Secretary of State on Monday. I

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        knew nothing about that interview till a day or two afterwards, but that was the proposal.
        Mr. ASQUITH: Of course, I know nothing of these matters. Certainly my right hon. Friend will agree with me here that the impression on my mind and on the mind of the House, and on the mind of the country—and reflected, I think, in every section of the Press—was, when the right hon. Gentleman made his speech on Tuesday last, that there was complete agreement between him and the military advisers of the Government. Am I to understand that to have been the case?
        The PRIME MINISTER: I have really stated the whole of the facts. We really thought, when we met the Army Council on these technical and constitutional points, that the last difficulty had been removed, and it was a great surprise to me that resistance developed rather on the ground of policy upon which Sir William Robertson finally refused this position.
        Mr. ASQUITH: I will come to that presently. My right hon. Friend said on Tuesday last that he had complete agreement.
        Mr. G. FABER: You are not a cross-examining counsel.
        Mr. O'GRADY: Men are dying at the front while this is going on.
        Mr. ASQUITH: There is another point which I wish to mention with regard to last week's Debate. I pointed out then that, when the proposal and plan of the Versailles Council was presented to this House in November, it was presented as a body which would have no executive authority, and we gather from the speech of the Prime Minister that it has now clothed itself, for certain purposes, with executive functions. I am not going into the question whether the Council was or was not right in doing so. I am quite prepared to accept their decision on that point, although I think the reason which was given and the only reason—namely, that the European situation had in the meantime changed by the collapse of the Russian Army, and by the consequent transfer of large forces from the East to the West—was a consideration which might have been foreseen in November, when the Council deliberately agreed to renounce all executive functions. But I am not quarelling in the least with the decision unanimously come to by
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        the Council in that respect. I think it is a relevant question and a matter of general and, indeed, international interest to point out in passing the remarkable statement—I do not know whether it is true or not—which appears in the Press to-day as coming from Washington. This is the exact substance of it:
        "The United States will refrain from political participation in the Conference, and will confine itself to sending a political observer, who will express no opinion and take no action, but confine himself 'o reporting on its proceedings to the Government."
        I presume that is the case as far as the United States is concerned. [An HON. MEMBER: "In what paper was that?"] I take it from the "Times."
        The PRIME MINISTER: The Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the Staff are there.
        5.0 P.M.
        Mr. ASQUITH: But this is a question of policy, as distinct from the question of administration. I understand so far as questions of policy arc concerned, that the United States will not now or, as at present advised, hereafter participate in the Conference, but appoint an observer, who will report to them. As I have said, I am not in the least degree concerned to quarrel with, or even to discuss, the decision of the Council for certain purposes—purposes, I imagine, speaking only, of course, from conjecture, mainly relating to the operations of the War, and securing that there should be a greater degree of joint action and farther executive power in the Council than there has been before. They may have been perfectly right in that contusion. The only question with which we are here concerned to-day, arising out of the statement which has been made by the Prime Minister, is our own position in relation to that matter. I gather from him, and I have no doubt it is the case, that everybody is agreed upon what I may call the question of policy, and that the difficulty which arose, whether at the moment or shortly afterwards, was as to the machinery by which that concerted action should be exercised. That, I think, is agreed. In regard to that I venture to make two observations. In the first place, that it is essentially a military question; and, secondly, that it is essentially a domestic question. I am speaking now of the machinery.
        My right hon. Friend has pointed out to us truly that the position in France is

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        a totally different thing from the position here. General Foch, the Chief of the French Staff—who is also, I think, not only a member, but the President of the permanent military body at Versailles: it does not matter whether he is at Paris or Versailles, because they are practically the same place—is in complete daily and intimate contact with his Staff, with his Cabinet and with his Council. He has, therefore, incidentally this double part—that, in the Council itself, he speaks both as Chief of the French Staff and as the French representative there, and in giving orders to his commands it does not matter to them whether the orders proceed from him in the one capacity or in the other. It is quite clear that to carry out the arrangement—and I am assuming that it is an arrangement which everybody wants—our position is a totally different one.
        The Chief of the General Staff here obviously cannot transfer himself and his Stall and the whole of his apparatus to a foreign country. Obviously he cannot do that. On the other hand, if you had in the Versailles Council, charged with these new executive powers, a British representative who is neither the Chief of the General Staff nor his deputy, nor representative, you may be—and this I imagine must have been in Sir William Robertson's mind— running this risk, that for a purpose which we all agree to be of supreme importance, namely the unity of control among the Allies, you might be purchasing that advantage at the sacrifice of unity of control in the British Army. Our relations with the French always have been, and I hope always will be, of perfect amity and reciprocity. It is not even a question of principle, in the sense that the principle is a matter of policy. It is a question of workability and military efficiency, of which, after all, in the long run perhaps the soldiers are better judges than the politicians. But if I am right in assuming that Sir William Robertson took the view, in accepting the principle of the Council altogether, that it was a workable arrangement, it being impossible for the Chief of the General Staff to be permanently located at Versailles, that he must in fact do his duty to the Government, and carry out his duties here, then a proper method of carrying the thing out was that the British representative on the Versailles Council, when the Chief of the
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        General Staff could not be present, as obviously he could not always, should be a deputy responsible to him.
        The contention which seemed to have appealed to him at first sight as possible and reasonable was that in that way you could avoid any of the evils of dual authority in the councils of the British military organisation. The right hon. Gentleman has not told us, and I do not. question his not having done so, whether Sir William Robertson's position in that respect had the support of other military authorities here. If he does not like to answer the question I certainly will not press him, but it is a matter of common knowledge that it has a very wide support among eminent military authorities in this country and elsewhere. I cannot help thinking that in a matter of this kind— which does not in the least degree impinge upon what the Prime Minister has truly, and I think forcibly, said is of vital importance, namely, the complete co-ordination and the constant intercommunication in regard to military policy of all the Allies at the Versailles Council, and I will develop the argument, if you like, though no one has had anything to say to the contrary—it is a purely domestic concern for us what is the best mechanism, and that you should not have two kings of Brentford with a nebulous indeterminate line of demarcation between their respective functions and authorities. If, as my right hon. Friend has said, the Chief of the General Staff must be in the long run the supreme adviser to the Government, the person who represents us at this permanent military junta at Versailles should be a person subordinate to him—his deputy and his representative. There is no question here to be decided on polemical grounds, and I hope the discussion will not be conducted on those lines. It is simply a question of administration and of military administration, and, as I think, it is mainly a domestic question as far as we are concerned. Sir William Robertson, as far as I understand it, took that position, and it is because he would not abdicate from the position that the Government felt, I am sure with the greatest possible reluctance, obliged to dispense with his services. I think I have stated the position fairly as far as that is concerned.
        I do not ask the House—for though I have every respect for it, I do not think we are an adequate tribunal to determine matters of this kind—

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        I do not ask the House to pronounce its opinion one way or the other on this question; but I am sure the Government realise that they are taking upon themselves a great responsibility in discarding, on a question of that kind, a system which has been devised with the greatest strategical and technical authority.
        I see that this question is represented in some quarters as though it were a dispute between civilian and military authorities. That I consider to be totally untrue. As far as I am concerned, I have always maintained, and shall always maintain in the highest possible degree, that the civilian authority must be supreme. We had a very critical moment, when I was Prime Minister and encumbered by an exceptionally heavy burden of difficulties and responsibilities. I felt it my duty to take upon myself the office of Secretary of State for War, for the very purpose of establishing that civilian authority must be supreme. It was supreme, and I am glad to think that I never had one moment of friction or difficulty with the military authorities themselves. It is not a question, and ought not to be a question, as between civilian and military authority. Whatever be the position of the Chief of Staff, he must in the long run take his orders from the head. Whatever the decisions of this Versailles Council may be, they must in the long run, as far as this country is concerned, be subordinated to the considerations of policy and determinations of policy made by the British Government.
        I do not believe that in any quarter there is any disposition whatever to sacrifice or to surrender our ultimate freedom of action. But I must admit that there is a certain amount of not unnatural, but indeed of legitimate, disquietude in the public mind with regard to these affairs. In the course of the last two months, or a little more than two months, we have lost, from the chief posts of strategic and technical advisers and authorities in the Navy and in the Army, two men like Sir John Jellicoe and Sir William Robertson, both of whom enjoyed, as everybody in this House will admit, in a pre-eminent, a rare, and even a supreme degree, the confidence both of the country and of their own Services. One of them is now, as far as we know, altogether out of State employment; the other, carrying with him vast strategic knowledge which is probably hardly rivalled by any other
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        officer in the Service, has gone to the Eastern Command. In both cases, as we understand, the withdrawal was an enforced retirement. I am speaking subject to correction. In both cases, though of course it may be a coincidence, it was preceded by a hostile Press campaign, virulent and unscrupulous. I am not sure that the country will feel that such losses have adequate compensation in the fact that Lord Derby remains at Whitehall, and that the conduct of our propaganda at home is entrusted to Lord Beaverbrook.
        I have done nothing to embarrass those in power in the vigorous and effective prosecution of the War, with a view to the earliest possible attainment—I am in entire sympathy with my right hon. Friend —of a peace which will secure the high purpose of the Allies, and adequately protect the future of civilisation. But it is in the best interests both of our country and of our cause that the voice of Parliamentary criticism, at once animated and restrained by patriotic anxieties, should not be silenced. In that spirit only, and with that object entirely, I have spoken as I have to-day.
        Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I am sure the House will have listened to-day with unfeigned satisfaction to the statement made by the Prime Minister. It would be quite idle to attempt to disguise the fact that, both in this House and outside, last week has been a week of something like national anxiety, when the minds of all of us have been disturbed by the rumours and the uncertainties of a complicated and obscure situation. My right hon. Friend will doubtless himself feel that it would have been better that a week ago, and on the first opportunity, he should have taken the House more fully into his confidence. I do not say that every doubt which may have passed through our minds is or could be removed by the much fuller and much more convincing statement that we have heard to-day, but I say for myself, and I think I shall express the general opinion, that after hearing the considered statement made to-day not one of us would take the responsibility of challenging the decision which the Government have come to. Some of us might possibly think that had we been in their places there is yet some other via media, some alternative, which was not fully explored and which might have been examined further with perhaps fruitful and beneficial results; but no man with any responsibility, after

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        hearing to-day's statement, after seeing the care and unanimity with which these arrangements were reached, would do anything to imperil the understanding arrived at among the Allies or make the task of the Government more difficult in giving effect to it.
        Having said so much, I want to say something to which I find it more difficult to give expression. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Asquith) has alluded to attacks in the Press upon distinguished officers serving the State, either in the Navy or in the Army. Such attacks are not only deplorable in themselves, but they are cowardly, and the men who make them are not only acting in a way in which a patriotic citizen would not act in war-time, they are acting in a way in which gentlemen do not act at any time. I feel most strongly that it is the duty of my right hon. Friend, or of anyone, to do his utmost at all times and in all cases to protect the men who are serving under him. We recognise, as the right hon. Gentleman has asserted, that the Government has a responsibility which it cannot devolve upon any adviser. If I may say so, that is why I am here and not there. The House has asserted that a civilian Minister must take the responsibility for accepting the advice which the military officers give, and it is not sufficient, if that advice is subsequently disapproved by the House, to say that he acted upon military advice. It has been laid down that he is entitled to reject the advice. I accept that position. The Government is entitled to reject it. I think they will not ever do it lightly, but they are entitled, if any soldier or sailor, however high his position, however great his service, is unable willingly to accept and loyally to pursue the policy which they think necessary, to dispense with his services. That is no reflection on the officer. It is the plain duty of the Government, and as long as they retain him in their service there must be no ambiguity about their support.
        Let me say one word on the other side. That imposes a corresponding obligation upon the soldier and the sailor. I do not want to hear rumours started at the expense of some high officer, which public report attaches in some way to Downing Street. I think it deplorable that such things should be possible. But neither do I want to hear rumours that military officers disapprove the policy of the Government which they are serving, which
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        public opinion attaches to Whitehall, and no one could listen to the speech of my right hon. Friend, and the particularity and the persistency with which he questioned the Prime Minister, without wondering where my right hon. Friend got his information, and whether such a brief ought ever to have come into his possession. There is a corresponding obligation for loyalty and secrecy in the War Office and the Admiralty. Although it is painful to me to say it, the War Office does not observe the obligations of secrecy as faithfully and as completely as every other office of which I have experience. It is the duty of the Government, on the one hand, to see that there shall be no ambiguity as to their own support of the. officers whom they have chosen and maintained in power. On the other hand, it is also their duty to see that there is no ambiguity about the loyalty of the service which the Government and this country expect from those who discharge high functions in any service in the State.
        I now come back to the position of the Government, and I am going to say to my right hon. Friend, quite frankly, where I think half his trouble lies, and what is at the root of half the anxiety, the uncertainty, the disturbance of and which has affected the country for the last week or ten days. The Government has a great function to perform at any time, and most of all in war. The Press have a great function to perform at any time, and a function of special responsibility in war. But the functions of the Press are not the functions of the Government, and the functions of the Government are not the functions of the Press, and it is not possible, without misconception and misunderstanding, that they should be combined in the same person. What is the function of the Government? Three great newspaper owners are members of, or are intimately associated with, the Administration. Their papers are found from time to time to contain matters which the Government repudiates with energy; and I, for one, say at once, with truth and with sincerity, you will never persuade the public that a member of the Government or a person connected with the Administration can conduct a campaign in his newspaper contrary to the policy of the Government of the day. It ought not to be possible for him to do it, and you will not persuade the public that it is possible. My right hon. Friend and his Government have surrounded themselves quite unneces-

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        sarily with an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust because they have allowed themselves to become so intimately associated with these great newspaper proprietors. I tell my right hon. Friend what everyone is saying in the Lobbies, outside the House, where men meet, but what I think it is now time for someone to say publicly and as a responsible man in this House. You cannot escape misconception, you cannot escape trouble of this kind as long as you try to combine in the same person the functions of a director of a Press which asserts its independence and a member of a Government who owes loyalty to the Government. You cannot do the two things. As long as you have the owner of a newspaper as a member of your Administration you will be held responsible for what he writes in the newspaper. You would not allow a colleague not the owner of a newspaper to go down and make speeches contrary to the policy of His Majesty's Government or to attack men who are serving His Majesty's Government You cannot allow them, instead of making speeches, to write articles or to permit articles to be written in their newspapers. My right hon. Friend and his Government will never stand clear in the estimation of the public, and will never have the authority which they ought to have, and which I desire them to have, until they make things quite clear, open, and plain to all the world and sever this connection with the newspapers. There is time to do it. It can be done without offence and without reflection on any of the gentlemen who are concerned. They have undertaken public work at the request of the Government, but in my opinion the Government ought never to have requested men who are already pledged in another direction and who could not abandon their old positions to take upon themselves new ones. It is no reflection on the gentlemen themselves to say, "We are going to relieve you and the Government of a quite impossible situation, in which it has been shown that misunderstandings and misconceptions do arise and in which it is clear that they will arise again and again. You will regain your freedom, and we shall cease to be held responsible for that in which we have neither part nor lot "I beg my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the members of this Cabinet, for it concerns them all, to take in good spirit the observations that I make.
        The PRIME MINISTER: Hear, hear!
        Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: As I say, it is not very easy to express without offence to anyone and not partially or one sided— I have offered my criticisms and advice pretty freely all round—the things which needed to be said and which, I repeat, men are saying and will continue to say with increasing force unless you cut away the root of the evil. If you do not cut it away, then I say to my right hon. Friends on that bench, "This lurking suspicion, these ambiguous double and incompatible obligations, will slowly sap your influence and strength and destroy the Government which we wish to see strong to wage this War and to carry our country through to a successful issue" I have finished all that I wanted to say, but there is perhaps one question that I might ask before I sit down and which has not been put by my right hon. Friend opposite. It is whether the Government have yet made any appointment to represent us at Versailles, and, if so, whether they are in a position to give us his name?
        The PRIME MINISTER: I quite forgot to mention in the course of my observations that Sir Henry Rawlinson has been appointed to represent us at Versailles. We consulted the Field-Marshal with regard to the best man, in his judgment, to hold the position. It concerns him very materially, because most of the work will be work in connection with his forces in France. Very largely on his recommendation Sir Henry Rawlinson has been appointed, and he has to-day accepted the position.
        Colonel Sir HARRY VERNEY: It is nearly three years since I had the honour of addressing the House, and I feel like asking for that indulgence which is given to new Members. For nearly the last two years I have been at General Headquarters in France, and I hasten to say, whatever else I do, that I do not represent—and Heaven forbid that I should ever attempt to represent— the Regular soldier. I cannot help hearing what they are saying, and I cannot help knowing their views about this House. The Prime Minister, who has just gone out, has obtained from everyone at General Headquarters gratitude for what he has done, and they realise the patriotism which has always been at the bottom of all his actions, but I can assure right hon. Gentlemen opposite that when on Sunday the news came of the dismissal of Sir William Robertson there was an outburst

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        of angry indignation such as was certainly quite new to anything that had happened at Headquarters for two years. It was not merely an outburst against the policy of the Prime Minister. Neither they, nor I, nor anyone there could tell what was the reason that actuated the dismissal of Sir William Robertson The outburst was entirely owing to the way in which the thing was carried out. I believe I am right in saying that everybody was convinced that it was started by an intrigue. They believed that it was helped by a discreditable and dangerous alliance with the Northcliffe Press. I believe the opinion was expressed in a phrase used to me by a distinguished general yesterday in France, "It looks like a dirty business." And I agree.
        Major W. GUINNESS: Like the last speaker, I owe an apology to the House because I have not listened to its Debates or opened my mouth in it for nearly two years. I am, therefore, necessarily out of touch with personalities and with currents of opinion, but I want to say how this matter looks to us who are in France. First, I should like to endorse what the last speaker has said as to the extraordinary indignation which was felt at what was considered in France to be the dismissal of Sir William Robertson owing to an intrigue. I think that indignation was very largely ill-founded, because in France we do not know the facts. The Government, however, have only themselves to blame. They have brought it on themselves by this extraordinary Press campaign, at which they must have connived, because otherwise they would have stopped it. On the merits of the case, after what I have heard this afternoon, I think that Sir William Robertson's resignation was probably inevitable. It seems very generally to be forgotten that the Inter-Allied War Council, whatever it may have been in its inception, is not now merely the concern of this country, but stands for what is left in the world of civilisation and liberty. In view of the inefficiency and the waste of effort from which we have suffered owing to the division of our resources and the inconsistency, too often, of our plans in the past, it seems to me indisputable that in some way greater co-operation and closer liaison had to be produced.
        If in our military alliance one partner, by its resources and sacrifices, had stood out beyond the others a generalissimo
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        would have been possible and desirable. This, from the first, has been the case with our enemy, owing to the predominance of power possessed by Germany, but with us it has been otherwise. Each one of the four great Powers of our Alliance is doing its utmost to win the War, and no one Power, by its military resources and effort, has been singled out for predominance or for leadership. In our case, therefore, the identity and the very nationality of a generalissimo would have had to have been a deliberate creation and not a natural development. Under these circumstances, a generalissimo inevitably would have created jealousy, from which the German unity of command is absolutely free. If singleness of person in command is unobtainable, unity of purpose and pooling of resources can only be obtained by a permanent Council with plenary powers. The decisions of such a Council necessarily must bind the General Staffs of the Governments which are bound by them, and to that extent curtail their powers and freedom. Per feet unity of military control which we sometimes see demanded in this country is irreconcilable with proper co-operation whether you have a generalissimo or an Allied Council to deal with, and the fact that General Foch can fill a double part is merely a geographical accident, and does not apply to any other Chief of the Staff, because it is obvious that the Versailles Council can only sit in one place at once. In the War the democracies which are paying the price must have the ultimate control of their objects and ends, and if Sir William Robertson felt that he could not work smoothly under these conditions, then the House and the country at large, and I am sure the Army when it realises it, must see that his resignation was inevitable, and reflects in no way either on him or on the Government.
        I have inflicted these views humbly on the House to show that in what I now want to say I am not actuated by any hostility to the objects of the Government, very much as I wish to criticise their methods. The feeling which undoubtedly exists throughout all ranks of the Army in France to-day, and I believe also among the public in England, on the subject of Sir William Robertson's resignation is due to the previous attacks upon him in the British Press. They remember the attacks on previous victims. They, remember that those attacks

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        took the form of a balloon to see how the wind was blowing. They knew if the wind were favourable that the result would be the same in this case, and as they had foreseen this ever since tine Northcliffe Press started this campaign, there is a very natural feeling of disgust at what is believed to have been caused by a newspaper intrigue. I believe that this matter has brought about a good deal of unrest and uneasiness in the Army. Remember what has happened in the last few weeks. First of all, we had an attack on the policy of concentration on the West Front, and we were told that our efforts should have been diverted to cutting the Anatolian communications of Turkey. There may have been reason to break down Turkey when she barred the way to the Black Sea and when the Black Sea ports were urgently needed for the shipment of wheat from Russia and for the unloading of munitions of war for our Allies. Under present conditions, in the Ukraina the elimination of Turkey from the War has become so secondary an object as to be almost negligible as compared with the all-important task of smashing Germany on the Western Front.
        Our Army in France, which has to fulfil that task, is undermanned and overworked. That is why the fruits of the Cambrai offensive were not reaped, and, though the Army does not complain of being undermanned and overworked, it is filled with disgust when it sees that it is proposed still further to divert our forces apparently in response to a newspaper agitation. Then we read an attack on the War Office, because all those employed in the War Office are not cripples. This may be good journalism and appeal to sentimentalists who do not have to be administered by the War Office, but I think that most of as will feel that the best brain is not always found in a mutilated body, and that it is fitness of mind, and not inefficiency of body, which we must look for in Whitehall. Then we had the last of all, and, I think, perhaps most mischievous of all, an. attempt to stir up feeling between the old professional Army and the New Army —the Territorial. It was actually stated that there had been a rule that no New Army or a Territorial soldier could ever become a general, and after this statement had been written up for some time it was asserted that the War Office at last, no doubt in obedience to the Press campaign, consented to waive this restric-
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        tion. That is absolutely unfounded and most mischievous. It has caused a lot of feeling between various classes in the Army in France, and it is absurd, because it is absolutely untrue, to the knowledge of everybody serving in France, who knows that from the beginning of the War there were brigadiers promoted out of the Territorial Forces in the New Army, and it is most mischievous if it means that in future men are to be promoted not according to efficiency or qualification, but merely according to what particular category they happen to be in.
        Most people who have been both in: Gallipoli and in France will not question which force was more efficiently run. I do not think that there is any question; that in Gallipoli, generally speaking, the rank and file were fully equal to the drafts that are going out to the Army in France to-day, and if the Army in Gallipoli was mismanaged and squandered and muddled' away, as it was, it was not because of the human material, but because of the leading, because of the battalion commanders and the senior officers in the Territorial Forces which very largely went out to Gallipoli. I say this as a Territorial myself, and I think that if you want proof that you must have professional control, and cannot learn soldiering in a few months, as seems to be the idea of those who are agitating in the Press, you have only got to compare what has been done by discipline and organisation in France with the new levies with what was done in Gallipoli with equally good material less well organised and led. The lamentable effect of all this ill-informed newspaper attack and the unreasonable criticism of the General Staff is that they have distracted attention from the real issue, and it is hardly realised that the question at issue is not one between personalities, but one between rival policies, either of running our alliances in watertight compartments or of pooling our resources and our control.
        I urge most strongly, in the interests of discipline in the Army, that these attacks on individuals and on classes of our Army should cease, and, if this cannot be achieved by the spontaneous action and loyalty of the Press, I urge, that it may be brought about by the strong hand of the Censor. This House is vitally affected in this matter. The Army judges the House of Commons by the distorted accounts which it reads of our proceedings, and it judges the politicians by the

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        mischievous newspaper intrigues which are still allowed to take place. You never hear the word "politician" mentioned in France except in conjunction with a very opprobrious epithet, and when one reads in the newspapers accounts of the proceedings in the House of Commons one gets the impression that we are a collection of freaks, because certain newspapers, for their own ends, magnify the speeches of the mischievous, and the public wrongly takes those opinions as being not merely the accidents of public election, but as the general mentality of the House. I hope that no more will be heard of these newspaper campaigns against individuals. Above all, I hope that no more will be written of the rival personalities and military qualities of Sir William Robertson and Sir Henry Wilson. What the Army in France ask is that they should be left alone, that they should be allowed to work out their own plans—not interfered with more than is unavoidable by public clamour in this country. The country will remember the generosity and the patriotism which prompted Sir William Robertson to accept his new post rather than continue his old responsibilities under conditions to which he could not agree, and this patriotism makes it certain that he must wish with all of us that nothing may be said or done to-day to add to the difficulties of his successor at the War Office.
        Mr. TENNANT: I wish to ask my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of War whether he will consider a proposal, which I think would meet with the general acceptance of the House, that he should defer his statement on the Army Estimates to-day and make his statement tomorrow, when the question, as I understand, will be proceeded with, because I think that I am not misinterpreting the views of the House when I say that, after the very important statement by the Prime Minister to which we have listened, ton. Members are not so ready to adapt themselves to matters of administration to-day, and would prefer not doing so until to-morrow. If my hon. Friend would agree to that course, I think that it would fall in with the views of hon. Members.
        The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Mr. Macpherson): I am glad to be assured by my right hon. Friend that it is the general feeling of the House that I should postpone my statement until tomorrow. I, of course, assume that the
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        House will agree to the Speaker leaving the Chair to-day, and, if that be so, I shall be most happy to consult the wishes of the House and make my statement tomorrow.
        Mr. F. WHYTE: I wish to add one word to what fell from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham. He spoke very much in the same position as I, as one who on the whole believes that the Government have adopted the right policy both at Rapallo and at Versailles, but that on more than one occasion they have risked the success of that policy by entrusting its advocacy to the meanest instruments at their disposal. That has a very close bearing on the. relations of the Government to this House. If the Government desires the confidence of the House it must show that it is prepared to throw itself on the support of the House, and that it is not relying upon the unseen but none the less great power exercised by certain organs and certain syndicates in the Press. My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer the other day professed some scepticism as to the alleged public displeasure which had been aroused by the recent appointment by the Minister of Propaganda. I think, after hearing the speech of one of his predecessors in the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, he can hardly believe that that was a mere idle illusion of mine. For I am quite convinced that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham was expressing an all but universal feeling in this House and throughout the country that the Government is engaging unworthy servants to carry out its services, and that the more it relies upon the unseen influence of the Press the less it will be able to rely upon the open confidence of the country and of the House of Commons.
        I say that because I believe in the Rapallo and Versailles policy. I hope to see it carried out to a success, but it is not surprising to any of us, who have watched the course of the intrigues which have so often besmirched our policy, that so many people in this country who otherwise would have been its supporters are found now to be its opponents. And in another respect the Prime Minister seems to be unaware of the power which his policy in itself carries with it, apart, from any extraneous support that he may receive from other instruments. Take, for instance, his general declaration of war

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        aims. That, as we know, achieved a unity of public opinion in this country which, perhaps, no public declaration has achieved since the original simple declarations made by our Government at the very outbreak of War, and yet with that unanimity still before us, with that achievement of having all public opinion, with the most insignificant exceptions, in favour of the declaration which he made of our war aims, he proceeds to entrust the propaganda of this country to two agents who are the objects of universal distrust throughout the country. Let there be no mistake as to what I mean on this point. I do not suggest that there are not large sections of the country who believe, and perhaps rightly believe, that Lord Northcliffe, in the "Times," has done the country great service at one time or another throughout the War, but, as was pointed out by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham, the kind of service which a newspaper and its proprietor can render is totally different from that which we ask of a Minister of the Crown, and when those two views are confused by the appointment of a great newspaper proprietor to a public office, then the Government is inviting trouble, both for itself and for its policy, and it is because I believe that the Versailles policy and the declaration of war aims of the Government are proceeding upon the right lines that I appeal to it to drop these most unworthy instruments.
        6.0 P.M.
        Sir C. HOBHOUSE: I wish to say one word, and one word only, upon one part of the statement made by the Prime Minister. I am not going to touch upon personal controversies, which have been the subject before the House, but I do want to say a word upon the question of the executive powers of this Supreme Council of War. When in last November the Prime Minister stated that they were not to have conferred upon them any executive power, he was stating what I am bound to say, having read the almost synchronous declaration of M. Painlevé who was then the French Prime Minister, either a fact or an opinion, which was in contradiction to the fact of the opinion stated by the French Prime Minister, because in words which were quoted in the Press of this country Monsieur Painlevé stated that the powers of the Conference would be expanded, not by the appointment of a generalissimo, but they would be expanded
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        so as to realise, by other means, powers. which had been apparently denied to a particular generalissimo. To-day we know that the Conference is to have executive power, and I want to know what is the meaning of executive power. I take it that executive power means the movement, disposition, and control of troops, or some of the troops. The Prime Minister has told us, not to-day but the last time he spoke, that this executive power was to be exercised by nominees of the Supreme War Council—not by a generalissimo but by the nominees of the Supreme War Council. That, I take it, means that there are to be four, one for each Allied power, sitting side by side— four nominees of the Supreme War Council, and those four men are to exercise executive control. Whether or not the General Staff of this and other countries have agreed to a proposal of this sort, I wish, speaking as I am, after a constant study of military questions and with some personal knowledge of military subjects, to at once put in a caveat against any command by a committee of men, however experienced and however able. I do not think that there is any great military commander known to history who has not, at some time of his life or another, called together a council of four, and who has not subsequently expressed his regret that he had called that council of four together, that he had listened to the advice of such a committee, and that he had never put on record that he had made a mistake in accepting their decision. No committee can act save by way of compromise between individual opinions. In civil life government by compromise is possible, and is easiest and quickest, but compromise in military affairs is impossible, because the result is immediate, it is decisive, and it is irretrievable. If you take the mind and method of one man, and set against it the mind and method of somebody else, you court disaster, and it is better to have a bad plan vigorously carried out, than a better and a good plan carried out with hesitation.
        What is meant by the proposal is, I think, that the power shall be exercised by the nominees of the Allied nations sitting, or who will sit at Versailles. I am quite certain that you are depriving, by that means, the Commander-in-Chief in France, either of the French or the British line, of half his resources, and you will leave him, at a moment when he. and no one else, can

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        and must take a decision, and he will not be certain whether his decision will be supported with the forces necessary to carry it into effect. There is, of course, one alternative. You may appoint a permanent chairman or head of your committee of nominees, and, if you do that, it is almost certain that the person to be so permanently appointed as chairman of this body will be the French military representative. He will be, as we know, the head of the French General Staff, having his offices within twenty-five minutes of Versailles. You could not appoint anybody else, if you are to have a head; and you will then have arrived at what the French have always looked for, namely, the appointment of a French head to lead the forces in France—who will, indeed, be technically generalissimo and will have supreme power. There is no alternative between any such appointment but chaos and disaster. I do not know whether the representative of the War Office feels that he is in a position to answer the question which I have put to him. I do not believe that there is any escape from the dilemma which I have presented to him, and I am quite certain that if such a course is proceeded with, if it is adopted by the Government now and proceeded with, hereafter it will inevitably lead us not merely in France, but on other fronts where our forces are disposed, to irretrievable defeat and disaster.
        There is one other word, and only one other word, I wish to say. Our position in this War is quite different, from the military point of view, from that of any other nation engaged. We have three fronts separated from each other by such conditions of distance and climate as to make it essential that all the reinforcements or reliefs should be provided in advance of any possible accident in the campaign of the particular front. If you have an officer in France either supreme over or representative of the Imperial General Staff, he will be hampered in his consideration of the Eastern Front by his want of knowledge of what is happening upon the Western Front, or the subordinate at home, who is in charge of these Eastern Fronts, will not be able to give him that assistance which he ought to have, because his superior in France has already commandeered all the proper resources and reserves. None of the other Allies can have this difficulty and dilemma
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        presented to it. In France you find a single Commander-in-Chief. [An HON. MEMBER: "There are the forces of America!"] The forces of America are not large comparatively. [An HON. MEMBER: "There are the French in Italy!"] In. Italy there is the French force, but it is easily reinforceable from France. It does not serve under the conditions of a month's journey to Palestine, or perhaps two months' journey to Mesopotamia. That is the real difficulty. You must provide your reinforcements in advance and before accident or any possible disaster occurs, otherwise you cannot reinforce in time to prevent what may from a defeat become a disaster. These seem to me to be considerations to be taken into account in setting up this new official body in France, and I would beg the Under-Secretary, when he makes his reply, to give an answer to the question which I have asked in the first part of my remarks, and give consideration to the suggestions which I have made in the second part.
        Colonel C. LOWTHER: It was not my intention to take part in the Debate, but I am induced to do so because of the speech delivered by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain). It was a speech of which the House approved. It was a sincere speech, an honest speech, a speech, let me say, delicately and most happily handled, but I think, none the less, that from the very beginning it was a dangerous speech, and if the House will allow me I will explain why I am of that opinion. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Prime Minister himself and the Government were in a hopeless position when they gave high office to two controllers of important newspapers. He argued that the Prime Minister could never possibly allow any of his colleagues to go to their constituencies, or to any constituency, to make speeches at variance with his own opinion, and therefore, for the same reason, he could not allow newspaper proprietors either to write articles or to inspire articles contrary to his (the Prime Minister's) opinions. Why? Does the right hon. Gentleman mean to say that all the colleagues who differ from the Prime Minister have never held views at variance with those of the Prime Minister, before they became his colleagues, and before they accepted office under him? The Chancellor of the Exchequer has made a most interesting speech in my

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        own Constituency, which was totally at variance with the opinions of the Prime Minister, and with many of the opinions he holds to-day. It will be in the recollection of the House that Lord Northcliffe only a few weeks ago refused office, as he could not honestly bring himself into line with all the colleagues of the Prime Minister at that time. He expressed great admiration for the Prime Minister himself, and for a. great deal of his general policy, but he could not find himself in harmony with every member of his Administration. Surely, now that Lord Northcliffe has accepted high office under Lord Beaver-brook, they will act with all the loyalty required, and not only in their newspapers, but in their speeches, they will write and speak in accordance with the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] Why not? Does the right hon. Gentleman disagree with that?
        Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: My hon. and gallant Friend is proving my point. He fails to see my point, which was that it was impossible for the Government to dissociate itself from articles which appeared in the Press owned by a member of the Government.
        Colonel LOWTHER: The right hon. Gentleman mistakes my point, which has no reference to articles which have appeared in the Press already, and before these Gentlemen had accepted office. I think the right hon. Gentleman misunderstood me. What I meant to point out was that, of course, Lord Northcliffe and Lord Beaverbrook would not be responsible in respect of articles contrary to the policy of the Prime Minister which appeared before they held office, and from the very moment they accept office what happens to the Government is that the Government is stronger, provided that they have the whole-hearted loyalty of those two members. I see no reason why newpaper proprietors should not take office. I do see a reason, however, for dispensing with the services of a colleague who fails to support the Prime Minister either by word of mouth or by newspapers.
        Colonel ARCHER-SHEE: I should like to say a word in reference to the policy of the proposal of having an International Council which will give orders to our Commander-in-Chief in the field, for that is what has now developed from the establishment of the War Council at Versailles. The history of this proposal really dates
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        from the battle of the Somme. During that battle there was a proposal to place all the British forces under the command of a generalissimo—I believe, General Nivelle—but at the time that policy was not adopted. It was very much objected to, I think, by the Army Chiefs, and at any rate it was not adopted. When in November the Italian forces were driven back the Prime Minister went to Paris and made the speech which the House will remember in which he more or less deprecated the work carried on by the British Army and suggested, if he did not actually say so, that the generalship of the British Army was inferior to those of our Allies. He himself suggested, I believe, the establishment of a War Council at Versailles which should act as a better means of liaison between the Armies. At the time that War Council was established the House will remember that there was an agitation in this country against it upon the very ground which I am now speaking about, namely, that this Council would have executive authority over our Commander-in-Chief, but the House was assured, and the country was assured, that this Council would not have those powers and that it would be merely of an advisory character. The next suggestion is that the Council must have executive authority, and we are informed to-day that executive authority was actually passed at a meeting of all the Powers. We are not informed, and it is quite impossible for us to find out, whether the Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies in France was whole-heartedly in favour of having executive powers conferred on this Council.
        Merely as a member of the public I should like to say that it seems to me that the establishment of executive powers and the handing over of the supreme authority over our forces to any Council or Committee, the majority of whom are composed of friendly Allies but at the same time not British people, is entirely wrong. I cannot believe that that is the right policy, and I believe that there are large numbers of people in this country whose faith in the Government has been severely shaken by the adoption of that policy. If a decision is taken by that Committee and if they have, as they are currently reported to have, control over the whole Reserves of the French and British Armies, that decision as to where to employ those Reserves will be come to by a Committee three-fourths of whom at least do not belong to our Army. I do not believe

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        that is a good policy, because I believe that our Army has always fought far better under their own Commanders-in-Chief than under the command of any outside person. This is the first time, I believe, in our history that our Army has been placed under a Council or Committee. I, for one, think that that has shaken the confidence of a very large number of people who have hitherto, like myself, supported the Government.
        One other point has been brought up in this Debate, and that is the question of the appointments of Lord Northcliffe and Lord Beaverbrook. I do not know anything of Lord Northcliffe, but I do know that Lord Beaverbrook was responsible for making the statement that the British troops had deserted the Canadians at the second battle of Ypres, and that that statement was circulated in Canada by Lord Beaverbrook and I believe—he told me so himself—that General Sir. S. Hughes came over to England on account of that statement. I say that to make a man capable of making a statement like that, which I venture to say was a gross libel on our troops, and absolutely inaccurate, Director of Propaganda in this country, on top of having been smothered with honours before, is to my mind also a matter which does not inspire one with trust in the Government. There are several other things which I regret to say make one's trust in the Government considerably shaken of late. There are the very fluid ideas which the Prime Minister seems to have upon war aims, and also the way in which we are recognising and allowing the Bolshevist Government to be represented in this country, and by doing so are alienating, I believe, what will be the best opinion of Russia in the future.
        Mr. PRINGLE: There are three questions for consideration in this Debate. There is, first of all, the question of the expediency or desirability of setting up a Supreme War Council at Versailles, and, secondly, the position of Sir William Robertson in relation to the plan which had been adopted, and, in the third place, the methods whereby the existing critical political situation has been produced. Very little has been said in the course of the Debate upon the first of these questions. A number of very relevant and pertinent questions have been put by my right hon. Friend
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        the Member for Bristol (Sir C. Hob-house), and I am surprised that there is no member of the Government present to offer a reply to the very important interrogations which he has put as to the position of that Council in relation to the British Forces. I hope myself to elucidate the position somewhat. The Prime Minister's speech was a great advance in the matter of lucidity on anything that he has previously said in relation to this. subject, but still he has left a number of important questions obscure. In the first place, he spoke in a very vague and indefinite way as to the procedure which would be followed in case of differences. He did not dismiss as improbable the possibility of differences arising on the Council, and, indeed, said that they are bound to arise, because you have on it men of independent minds and of strong character. He went on to tell us how the differences are to be dealt with. If such differences arise, then the matter is to be referred to the respective Governments, and they have to decide the matter, apparently in consultation with the respective Chiefs of the Staff of those Governments. Is this a possible method of waging war at all? Has anybody ever heard of such a method of waging war out of Bedlam, because that is really what it amounts to.
        There is a case for a generalissimo, undoubtedly there is a case for a generalissimo. You then do get unity of command, and even if this War has failed to produce a Napoleon on the Allied side, that is no reason why, for the purpose of securing unity of command, you should not appoint the best general available. But you have failed to agree upon a general, and, having failed to agree upon a general, you have set up machinery for the purpose of controlling warfare, a thing such has never been set up in any country before, and such as I believe will prove in practice to be absolutely unworkable, and which, as my right hon. Friend opposite said, is bound to land us in ruin and disaster. I want to know whether this impression which I gathered from the Prime Minister's speech is a true account of the method of the working of this body. This is not substituting for your Napoleon an executive committee, but it is substituting an executive committee subject to an appeal to four other Governments, who may also disagree. That is not securing unity of command,

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        and by no stretch of imagination could it be so described. If the people of this country and the House of Commons are going to allow this to pass now without expressing any opinion upon it, then I think the House of Commons is going to be false to its trust and is committing a deliberate breach of duty, and that it will deserve all the condemnation of politicians which have been visited upon their heads, as we have been told by the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite, by the mass of the soldiers in the field. This seems to me to be the capital question involved. Probably no notice will be taken of the questions put by me, but I hope that some responsible statesman who sits on the Front Bench opposite will rise and put these questions and endeavour to secure an answer from the Government. I have shown from the Prime Minister's own admission that these differences, which may be frequent, will necessitate an appeal, and we are entitled to know whether the situation will be as it is thus described, for if so, you are certainly going to have chaos instead of unity.
        There are one or two other questions which I think are of some interest. When the Prime Minister was dealing with the offer which was made by the Government to Sir William Robertson, he said that they offered this post to Sir William Robertson because it was the more important post. Is that the view of the Government? Are the appointments which they have now made to the respective posts of a military member of the Versailles Council and the Chief of the Staff based upon the Government's view of their relative importance? Are we to understand that General Sir Henry Rawlinson holds a relatively more important post than General Sir Henry Wilson? I do not know whether my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary can answer this question. I think we are entitled to know whether it is so from some member of the War Cabinet.
        Mr. MACPHERSON: I think what the Prime Minister did say was that Sir Henry Wilson was supreme military adviser of His Majesty's Government, and Sir Henry Rawlinson would have a position of great individual responsibility at Versailles.
        Mr. PRINGLE: I do not think my hon. Friend has met my point. When the Prime Minister was dealing with the position of Sir William Robertson he said
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        that the Government offered the post at Versailles on the ground that that was relatively the more important position.
        Sir C. HOBHOUSE: May I remind my hon. Friend that the Prime Minister said the military representative in Paris would prepare plans and recommend plans independently of the Staff in England?
        Mr. MACPHERSON: If I may intervene, the Prime Minister, I thought, wished the House to infer that General Sir Henry Rawlinson was to have a most important post in Versailles, with independent responsibility.
        Mr. PRINGLE: I quite agree it is a very important post. It is important in dealing with a situation of this kind to determine the exact scale in the hierarchy which each individual officer holds. Undoubtedly the Prime Minister made his statement with reference to Sir William Robertson with a view to giving the impression in this House that they were conferring a great honour upon Sir William Robertson. It is a simple question now which is the greater post?
        Mr. MACPHERSON: He had the choice.
        Mr. PRINGLE: That is not answering the question, and I know well my hon. Friend is not in a position to answer the question. [An HON. MEMBER: "Then why do you ask it?"] I thought I said that I did Dot think he was in a position to answer the question, and I opened my speech by a protest against the absence of any person who could really give us information about this series of important questions. I think, in the course of the Debates on the Army Estimates, the House is bound to insist on knowing what the exact position is. There is another question. We have been told by the Prime Minister in a mysterious way that the powers of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff are going to be reduced, that they are going to be restricted to the powers formerly enjoyed by all other Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff except Sir William Robertson. Well, naturally, we want to know to whom the powers withdrawn from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff are going to be given. These are very important powers. He has not said to whom they are going to be given. Are they going to be given to Sir Henry Rawlinson or this body in Paris, or are

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        they going—and Heaven forbid !—to be given to Lord Derby? I do not believe for a moment that anybody in this country would sanction the granting of powers to Lord Derby which had to be withdrawn from Lord Kitchener. I think we should get an answer to this question from the Government. I do not wish to enter in any detail into the exact position of Sir William Robertson in these transactions. I am perfectly impartial with regard to the position of Sir William Robertson, because I do not know Sir William Robertson. I have never seen him, except when he "was under the Gallery of this House, and have absolutely no relations with him. Consequently, I cannot be subject to the reflection made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham, that some people were acquainted with War Office secrets through official channels.
        I do not think the position in regard to Sir William Robertson has been made clear to this House. I have endeavoured to ascertain it, first of all, from the statement of the Prime Minister, and, secondly, from the criticism put forward by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife. We gather that Sir William Robertson objected very strongly to the plans adopted, on account of the objectionable or the impracticable machinery whereby they were to be carried out. Now obviously that was in its essence a military question. It was not a question of policy. I believe that on all questions of policy the civil authority should undoubtedly be supreme, but here we have, upon a technical question—and I think the House should realise it—Sir William Robertson, who is a soldier, and who naturally has high ideas of discipline, holding such strong view-s that he prefers; to sacrifice his high position of Chief of the Imperial General Staff rather than assent to a change in machinery which he believes to be disastrous to the prosecution of the War by this country. I think that is a very serious situation, and it if a situation into which the House of Commons is bound to inquire further than it has yet done. It is not sufficient to say that the responsibility is the Government's. The House of Commons has itself a responsibility. It has the responsibility to inquire into the decisions of civilian Ministers, and if it is not satisfied that they have given true and complete ex-
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        planations of what has been done, then it is the duty of the House of Commons to withdraw its confidence, and if the House of Commons does neither of these things —neither insists upon information nor withdraws confidence—then the House of Commons shares in all the responsibility to the full in what has been done.
        That is the situation, and no denunciation of Press campaigns will get you out of that. To my mind, we have had no real explanation of the crux of the trouble between Sir William Robertson and the War Cabinet. Hints have been given, but nothing more, and the House of Commons has been content to be bluffed by the irrelevant rhetoric of the Prime Minister's peroration. That is the situation. I think there are some people who are not so content. I think there, are some who desire to make a protest, and we wish to say that, so far as we are concerned, we have no part or lot in that decision—a decision which, we believe, is going to have disastrous results. We have heard a great deal about attacks, but it is useless for the right hon. Member for West Birmingham to get up in this House and speak as if this were a new thing. It is not a new thing. It has been the fundamental vice of this Government since it began. It was the vice of this Government when the right hon. Member for West Birmingham was a member of it. He knew the manœuvres by which the present Prime Minister was able to eject his predecessor. He was present at the Unionist meeting on the Sunday in Edward Square, when a resolution was passed about the action of the Press. He knew all these things. He knew the disgraceful manœuvres whereby the late Prime Minister's position was undermined, and it is idle for him to rise now in an attitude of indignation and speak as if it were new. It is old to everybody who has watched the current of tendencies in this House. I say it is a disgraceful situation. We have been governed by a system of Press intrigue outside, and corruption in the House, and the sooner it ends the better. It is all very well for hon. Gentlemen to talk here about the ability of the Prime Minister. We all recognise that he has magnificent Parliamentary tactics, that he has great energy. He has all these things, but there is one thing more important, and that is that in this great crisis of our country's fate a man of character should be Prime Minister of the British Empire.
        Commander BELLAIRS: The Leader of the Opposition in his speech referred to the loss of services and enforced departure of Sir John Jellicoe and Sir William Robertson. But this is not the first case during this War where there has been an enforced departure and loss of services. Under the right hon. Gentleman himself we changed the First Sea Lord three times, we lost General Murray, we changed the High Command in France, and we changed the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. In regard to the point which has been raised by nearly every speaker, the criticism of distinguished officers, in the main I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham, but there are limitations to his argument, for there is all the world of difference between the criticism of a Commander-in-Chief of an Army in the field and the criticism of an officer serving at the War Office who is responsible for giving advice to the Government. There is all the world of difference between the criticism of an admiral commanding a fleet and the criticism of an admiral serving at the Board of Admiralty. This was so well recognised in the House that up to the 'sixties in the last century the admirals at the Board of Admiralty used to be Members of this House. In nearly every case the Sea Lords were Members of this House, and subjected to criticism at all times. But if you criticise the Commander-in-Chief of an Army, or the Commander-in-Chief of a Fleet, you undermine the discipline of that Army and the discipline of that Fleet. At all times, I am afraid, in the history of this country Commanders-in-Chief of Fleets and Commanders-in-Chief of Armies, whether we have a Press or not, were subjected to very strong criticism indeed.
        I think that deals with the chief substance of the remarks of my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham. He then passed on to the Press. There are, of course, three great newspaper proprietors in this Government now—Lord Rothermere, Lord Northcliffe, and Lord Beaverbrook—but I do not see why those newspaper proprietors, if they are chosen on personal grounds, cannot divorce themselves from their position in the Press. At any rate, it is the claim of Lord Northcliffe, very much like a claim once made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that he did not read the newspapers—that he did not read any of his
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        own newspapers when out in the United States. He was too busy. At any rate, in theory, I do not see why it should be an impossibility for the proprietor who has his newspaper as a going concern to divorce himself from inspiring that paper. Now, where is the limitation to be drawn? I believe Lord Harcourt is part proprietor of the "Morning Post."
        Mr. MORRELL: That has been disproved by Lord Harcourt's owe statement. He was only in the position of a trustee. He has no personal interest whatever.
        Commander BELLAIRS: I accept that, and withdraw my observation. I only used it as an illustration of what may easily occur. There are a number of proprietors of the "Times" newspaper. I believe Lord Northcliffe is only the predominant partner, and, in fact, many people, despite Sir John Ellerman's disclaimer, will believe he is a great financial backer of that newspaper. I am certain that it will be impossible, or if it were possible it would not be desirable to exclude newspaper proprietors from the Government of the country. I want to get to the chief point connected with the newspapers which revolve around the personality of the Prime Minister. At one moment he is charged with being dominated by Lord Northcliffe, at the next moment he is charged with inspiring the Northcliffe Press, and therefore of dominating the Northcliffe Press. Those who make those charges must agree upon which horse they are going to ride; they cannot ride circus fashion on two horses going in opposite ways. It is certain they ought to agree upon that point.
        The Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil), in his speech the other day, toyed for some time with the suggestion that the Prime Minister was inspiring the newspaper Press. Hs then went on to formulate a very remarkable doctrine. He said it was the duty of the Government to control the newspaper Press—more than ever when the newspaper Press happened to be in the right, because otherwise the charge would be brought against the Government that they were being controlled by the newspaper Press. That is a very remarkable doctrine. I have the quotation in my pocket. It simply means, I think, that we are to sacrifice the liberties of the Press

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        altogether, that they should have no part nor lot in criticism of this War. In another part of his speech, which showed the mentality of the Noble Lord, he proceeded to argue that whenever there was a difference of opinion between the Government and their chief military advisers the Government ought to resign. What would be the upshot of that? No Government would dare to have a different opinion, and we would be under a government of generals. I quite agree that at certain times in the history of the world the government by generals has been very good. In the last days of Athens and Rome a government by generals was good; in the Cromwellian period the government by generals, except where hampered by the Parliamentarians, was good, but that was because there was a certain type of general who was also a statesman. That type has been reproduced very remarkably in South Africa in General Smuts and in General Botha. These, however, are of a type which has entirely passed away except in their case. We now specialise. The people who form the Government of the country serve long apprenticeship except when they perhaps happen to come from Balliol, or belong to the prolific progeny of the great Sir Robert Cecil, better known as Lord Burghley.
        My argument mutatis mutandis applies to sailors as well. If the Government must resign when they have a difference of opinion with their chief advisers, it must also apply in the case of the Navy. Only a few days ago we had a very remarkable speech from Lord Jellicoe. He said the sailors were handicapped because they were unable to express their ideas in council, and he had suffered from that handicap. I do not know which is most to be pitied, the statesmen who, sitting in council round a table endeavouring to extract ideas from a sailor unable to express his ideas, or the sailor in great labour in the council chamber bringing forth nothing The statesman must endeavour to extract ideas from that sailor, because the statesman is ultimately responsible. That is the position. If we accept the idea that sailors and soldiers are solely responsible, we get back to the position taken up by Sir Robert Walpole, who in 1741 pleaded in this House that as he was neither admiral nor general, had nothing to do with either the Army or
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        the Navy, he therefore could not be responsible for the conduct of the war. That is a position we could not possibly accept from a democratic Government.
        In reference to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Lanark, I want to say two things. I followed him in the Debate in November. I then said that inevitably executive power would have to be given to this Supreme War Council and their Staff at Versailles. I think the Government might just as well have frankly met the situation then. It has now. My hon. Friend asks: "Are we to be under the control of a council?" The hon. Member for West Bristol asked the same thing. My answer is that General Foch must have the ultimate decision in regard to what is done at Versailles. That is absolutely inevitable. We cannot fight under a council of war. We had to set up a War Cabinet. As it only meets at intervals of one month we had to have people with the power of executive decision sitting continuously because war changes just as the moon changes. If we had refused to do this, what would be the position? We should have been at loggerheads and had a severe difference of opinion with America, with Italy, and with France—all three. We would have been saying to the world that we agree that after this War we shall have what they call a Council of the Nations, with perhaps one armed force, but we will not pool our armed resources under one general while we are at war. That would have been an extremely illogical position! In reference to what my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Central Finsbury said—he is not here now—we have fought under a Council, which is a bad system. I believe Marl-borough had the disability of fighting under a Council. We have actually fought under a German general in China during the Boxer Rebellion. We pooled our resources with those of the other nations under a German commander, Field-Marshal Waldersee. So it would be rather extraordinary if we were not willing to put our forces at the disposal of a French general with such a record as General Foch. I am curious about the mentality of those who are opposing these proposals of the Government. Do they think the original system was perfect? Can they suggest a better system than the one I have mentioned—of the Allied War Staff, with General Foch having the final

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        decision in his hands? In 1915 we had a speech from the Leader of the Opposition in which he pointed out the difficulties under which they laboured, and which had been much accentuated by the increase in the number of the Allies. He referred to the advantages which the Germans possessed in having Hindenburg, or whoever was the general then, as the supreme adviser of their War Council—because the Germans have a War Council, too. The right hon. Gentleman then said:
        "With the Allies, on the other hand, every important step has, naturally and necessarily, been taken in consultation and concert between three, and latterly four, different Powers. With the best good will and the most genuine common purpose there must be differences of angles and in points of view in an operation of that kind."
        What is the position to-day? We have, I think, six nations fighting on the French Front. We have three nations fighting on the Italian Front. We have seven nations, including Greece, fighting on the Salonika Front. It is obvious that to reconcile them we have to have some such body as this Allied War Staff under the Supreme War Council.
        If I may say so, the public are sick and tired of having the War in Europe sacrificed to peace at Westminster. That is what has been done in the past. I know that the Leader of the Opposition models himself on Sir Robert Peel in believing in compromise. As, however, a speaker pointed out earlier in the Debate, war has nothing whatever to do with compromise. It is the most extreme of all courses. Sir Robert Peel played his part during peace for the preservation of internal peace, whereas we have to play our part in a war which has nothing whatever to do with a particular faculty in "which Sir Robert Peel was supreme. There is only one admission I desire to make in connection with the Prime Minister. There was a lack of frankness in his statement in November. There was a lack of frankness in his speech last week. There was no lack of frankness from the French and from the American sides. Had he imitated their method of dealing with the matter he would not have been cast into the difficulties in which he was involved. He would have won out very easily at the very outset—I am certain of that—as he has won out to-day. I do, however, contend this, that his mistake has been a mistake in the choice of words—in believing, perhaps, that language was given to conceal thought. But a mistake in the choice of words is as
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        nothing compared with a mistake in the choice of the means of action. He has done the right thing if he used the wrong words !
        Mr. WHITEHOUSE: I only desire to ask the indulgence of the House for a, very few moments whilst I refer to a matter connected with Army administration arising out of an incident which took place to-day at Question Time. I have myself frequently acknowledged, and have always been very sensible of, the extraordinary patience and courtesy which the Under-Secretary for War displays in this House and the tact with which he discharges the very exacting duties which fall upon him. I hope that he will not think, on this occasion, that I have altered my view in that respect when I say that I think that at Question Time to-day he did me less than justice and himself rode away very easily on the excitement that it is possible to call forth in this House—rode away without really making clear what the point was that I was putting to him. I will endeavour, in order that no misconception may remain in this matter, to make clear what I tried to put to him in the form—perhaps the unsatisfactory form—of a question in this House. The House will remember that a discussion was taking place, and questions were being addressed to the Under-Secretary in regard to the procedure observed in cases where soldiers were condemned to death for cowardice, or desertion, and were executed, who had at some previous stage in their history been, invalided as suffering from shell-shock. The hon. Gentleman said—I am sure quite truly—that the most careful investigation was made in all such cases. Then I put the question to him, "Why, under such circumstances, are the men executed who have suffered from shell-shock?" The question was quite brief, but the hon. Gentleman at once repudiated, with great heat, what I assumed he had taken to be a general allegation that no proper care was exercised in these matters, and that soldiers were shot under such circumstances without proper inquiry being made.
        Mr. MACPHERSONindicated assent.
        7 0 P.M.
        Mr. WHITEHOUSE: The hon. Gentleman confirms that point. I immediately rose and at once repudiated that I intended, by my supplementary question, to make any general allegation or insinuation of that kind. I think I made that

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        clear. I then went on to put a question— I hope more clearly—how it was that, in certain cases, where a man had deserted and had been executed, it was possible for that man to be executed when, at some previous period of his military career, he had been invalided home suffering from shell-shock? My object in putting that question is not only to make my own meaning perfectly clear, but to ask the representative of the War Office whether a Regulation cannot be issued under which it would be impossible for any soldier to be sentenced to death who has previously been invalided home suffering from shell-shock? I only wish to remind the hon. Gentleman of one case which made a great impression in this House, and it was the case of a private in the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, who at the age of twenty-one Buffered the death penalty, while five months previously he had been invalided home.
        Mr. MACPHERSON: What was the reply given to that question?
        Mr. WHITEHOUSE: It was a case put by the hon. Member for Blackburn.
        Mr. MACPHERSON: Were the facts stated in the question put to me?
        Mr. WHITEHOUSE: The question was put by the hon. Member for Blackburn, and the hon. Gentleman will remember that it has been the subject of discussion since. Replying on that day, the Undersecretary for War said, after having been asked if he would have an inquiry made into the case,
        "No, Sir, I am not prepared to interfere with the discretion of the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, who only confirms the proceedings in cases of this character after the fullest consideration."
        Mr. MACPHERSON: The hon. Member infers that the statement contained in the question was a matter of certain fact, and I beg leave to dispute that.
        Mr. KING: Why did you not dispute it then?
        Mr. WHITEHOUSE: I only cited the facts set out in the question, and I have given the reply of my hon. Friend, so that I am in no way misrepresenting him. I want him to make such things impossible even after the most careful and sympathetic consideration. On the 14th December my hon. Friend was asked
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        whether he would take steps to secure that no soldier would be executed by order of a court-martial for cowardice who has been seriously wounded or invalided on account of Shell-shock? and his reply was as follows:
        "If my hon. Friend will refer to the Rules of Procedure governing courts-martial held in the field, he will realise that I am not in a position to give effect to this proposal. I can assure him, however, that it is within my personal knowledge that the most careful consideration is given by the Commander-in-Chief to all the circumstances, and especially to those suggested in the question."
        For my own part I did not make before, and I do not now, any suggestion that these cases are not subject to the most careful inquiry. The point at issue is a very simple one. I believe that such cases should never occur, and that where a soldier has been invalided home suffering from shell-shock or other serious illness, if on a subsequent occasion he is sentenced to death it should be made impossible by regulation for that sentence to be carried out. I hope my hon. Friend will not read into my inquiry anything except what I have stated.
        Mr. LYNCH: I have listened to this Debate with profound discouragement, not so much from any sense of disappointment as to the manner in which the case was put forward either for the Government or for the Opposition, but for a reason which lies very much deeper. It is that I recollect that these discussions, are so much of the nature of Byzantine quarrels which were taking place while the Turks were beating at the gates of the city; and now, when this very capital is endangered, we are having these futile discussions between men whom I declare to be incapable men. Months ago it was clear to most thinking men, or at any rate it was clear to me, because I was the first to bring it up in the House, that unity of command was an essential to success. The Prime Minister some months ago in this House also said that unity of command is essential to success; but mark the true import of that word ''essential." If unity of command did not obtain, then since it is essential, success will not be attained. Want of success means failure, defeat, and eventually this country will come under the heel of German domination. That is a clear and logical issue, and logic in this sense has no other meaning than the foreseeing of the march of events.
        The Prime Minister, in opening his speech, quoted from a French statesman,

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        who expressed the whole matter in the witty and epigrammatic way of which the French have the secret, when he said that his opinion of Napoleon had successively declined, because he now saw what it meant to fight against coalitions. Those witty words should have warned the Prime Minister. He ought to have seen that he is reversing the conditions under which Napoleon was successful, because, whereas that great genius won because his opponents were guided by an Aulic Council, the right hon. Gentleman has been busy setting up an Aulic Council in Versailles. While the Germans have been acting, pressing forward their well-thought plans, the Allies have been debating, discussing, hesitating, drifting, setting up an Aulic Council. I will, in order to shorten my remarks, as well as to point a moral, refer to one great historic instance of a leader who could lead. Recently I looked back again into the book with which we were all familiar—" Cæsar's Commentaries. "My idea in reading that book again was that I should have the opportunity afresh of appreciating the character of that man, and comparing him with our great ones, the Prime Minister and the Loader of the Opposition, and I was struck by this fact, which I have also noticed in reading the words of Napoleon, that all their plans seem mere common sense, and also by this fact, that, having determined that a certain course was the best, they proceeded to put it into execution. Common sense! Yes; but by comparison we rise at once to genius. Contrast this with what we have done. After months of hesitation the Allies have arrived at a decision which they believe to be just and yet they hesitate and tremble and drift, and separate with no definite decision at all.
        The Prime Minister to-day said that at first it was intended by the Allies to set up a Council which should be supreme in executive power, and he said that the arangement at first seemed to be good, but afterwards it had to be set at naught because of the powerful arguments advanced by the Americans. We all have great respect for the practical genius of the Americans, but on this particular occasion I am inclined to think the Prime Minister must have done the Americans some injustice in translating their reasons for our benefit, because if one supreme rule were necessary in Versailles the next logical step would naturally be that that principle must be laid down just as
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        the cardinal point of an engineer's plan, and all the other details made to swing round that as the fixed point. Instead of that, when he meets with difficulties, he revises his plans and removes the essential, and the ground on which he abandons the plan which he built up and which alone could have brought that unity of command which is essential, was that the Chief of Staff in London would either be subordinate to the Chief at Versailles, or the Chief at Versailles subordinate to the Chief in London. Was there ever a campaign in which the Commander-in-Chief exorcised the command of armies abroad in which that problem has not been presented. Has there ever been any campaign where victory has been obtained where that problem has not been solved? In this matter the difficulties which has cropped up and which has Seemed mountainous to the Prime Minister and the Government are mainly difficulties of their own creation, just as the timid voyager along a road sees ghosts at every step and becomes terrified by the, creatures of his own imagination. I will not say to great minds, but to minds of ordinary calibre, honest in their makeup and accustomed to clear and definite decision, none of these problems are things of first-class magnitude.
        It has been decided to obtain unity of command. That is essential. Therefore every consideration should naturally have gone by the board until that was definitely and unalterably fixed. "But in the solving of this problem difficulties crop up on questions of amour propre, questions of procedure, question of reputation, questions of vanity between officer and officer. Faced with these petty difficulties the Prime Minister ha? fallen and failed. A man fit to lead, finding himself in that position, would have said to these recalcitrant generals, "We, as representing the Government of this country, have decided upon that course, and you as the very repository of discipline must either obey or go. "If the Prime Minister had adopted such an attitude even before these bolstered-up reputations of Sir William Robertson, or Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the country itself would have rejoiced, feeling that it had a leader who could lead and who did not seek to know the cue of his policy by reading the leading article of the paper that leads him. The Leader of the Opposition, correctly as I think, criticised the policy of the Prime

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        Minister upon that one vulnerable point, but when he proceeded further and gave an indication of the policy which this country would have if he were again to succeed to office, I disagreed with him. If this country is so bankrupt of intellect and leading power that there is no other alternative than ringing the changes upon two sets of incapable men, then in that case, as I have said over and over again, it matters little what decisions they come to, the Germans will take care of the future.
        We must get completely out of that atmosphere of hypnotism, of minds tied up in the meshes of Parliamentary intrigue, of backstairs politics, of the chicane of the corridors, and of all that which may be considered Parliamentary ability, but which in face of the great exterior problem inevitably means defeat. As an alternative the Leader of the Opposition threatens us with this policy. His policy would have been to retain Sir John Jellicoe, and to have retained Sir William Robertson, in face of failures tested in the best way, tested in the only possible way by men who are really practical— tested by actual results. Instead of getting rid of men who have proved themselves either to be expensive or disastrous, we would, for the sake of certain party loyalty, or in order to keep the country in a kind of false optimism, sacrifice the true, real, and deep interests of the nation, merely for the susceptibilities of these great men. Nothing could be more fatal than the pursuance of that policy, and nothing could be more fatal than to resolve on the other alternative of superseding the present Prime Minister by the Leader of the Opposition. But our problem lies deeper than these mere questions of tactics, these mere questions of party, mere questions of Parliamentary cleverness which is so different from real masculine ability, which tells in history. We must find the leaders who are capable of solving what I insist on again and again is not the problem of this House, but the great external problem—leaders, both military and political, who will form for us great, real, valid plans, and having formed them, in the character of engineers will proceed to realise them with iron determination, and carry out their plans step by step, meeting every difficulty, not by reference to the motives which have governed us here, but by
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        reference to the real essential character of the external problem. In that way alone lies victory.
        Mr. MORRELL: I intended to wait until I had heard what the Under-Secretary for War had to say upon the question which has been raised by my hon. Friend (Mr. Whitehouse), but perhaps it would be more convenient that I should make my remarks now before he speaks. I desire very respectfully to make a protest against the way in which the Under-Secretary treated my hon. Friend this afternoon. This question of the death penalty is, as we all realise, most difficult and most controversial, and a question which necessarily arouses strong feeling in every direction. I can make allowance for any strong feeling which the Under-Secretary may have experienced as the result of a question of which he mistook the meaning this afternoon, but he went further than showing strong feeling. As I understood the hon. Gentleman, he deliberately used his position in order to excite prejudice and clamour against my hon. Friend. I desire to protest against his action in doing that. It seems to me intolerable that Ministers when they are asked perfectly proper questions by a Member of this House—and my hon. Friend was asking a perfectly proper question—should reply, or refuse to reply, in the way the Under-Secretary refused this afternoon My hon. Friend explicitly got up and said that he withdrew any general insinuation. He merely asked for information. The Under-Secretary, with every expression of indignation and in order to excite prejudice and clamour, and with the utmost insolence, refused to answer that very proper question.
        Having expressed myself on that point, I should like to say a few words upon the. general question in regard to which I, like many others, have taken a deep interest. There is an impression abroad that in the past, at a certain stage of this War, death sentences were carried out with frequency at the front. There were a great many. I am not now accusing anyone of inhumanity; far from it; but when such an impression exists in the country, as I know of my own certain knowledge, it is the duty of Members to make inquiries on the subject, and I will never admit the attitude of the Government which says that this is no concern of ours, as the Under-Secretary has said.
        Mr. MACPHERSON: Never!
        Mr. MORRELL: Yes, the hon. Gentleman said that these matters are no concern of Members of this House, and that we have no right to make inquiries into them. It is suggested that we are in some way reflecting upon the humanity or wisdom of the Higher Command when we do so. We make no reflections upon the humanity of officers of the Army. I am certain that every sort of care is taken under the Regulations to see that humanity is shown where humanity ought to be shown. Of course, everyone admits the humanity and wisdom of the great mass of officers of the Army; but there is the system, and we are entitled to call attention to it, just as we were entitled to call attention to the question of field punishment. I remember the sort of controversy we had with regard to the question of field punishment No. 1. He took up exactly the same attitude—"It is not your business. I refuse to answer the question." He took up the same attitude that he took up this afternoon.
        Mr. MACPHERSON: Absolutely untrue !
        Mr. MORRELL: The hon. Gentleman says it is absolutely untrue. I can prove it from the OFFICIAL REPORT. I can prove that when I put questions to him on this matter he replied to me in the same sort of attitude, and I regret very much that he did so. We made full inquiry into these cases. There were serious cases, and then at last, when there had actually been a case of death occurring as the result of field punishment, we had the. Regulations altered, and a great improvement was made. The hon. Member to-day suggested that there was no truth in the statement that men had been executed at the front after they had been wounded or had suffered from shell-shock. He suggested that because the cases which had been put forward by the hon. Member for Blackburn had not been officially admitted that, therefore, the cases were untrue. If the cases were not true, why were not inquiries made into the facts and denials given at the time? These cases were put forward with the greatest particularity and detail. They were cases on which the hon. Member for Blackburn had personal information. What was the reply—I am sorry that the hon. Member could not be here to-night, otherwise he would have dealt with the matter himself, and would have borne out what I am saying—the reply of the Under-Secretary was, in effect, "We cannot make in-
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        quiries into these cases. "There was one case of a soldier of twenty-one who had suffered from shell-shock and who was afterwards shot on active service for deserting. He was executed on the 29th August last. He was only twenty-one years of age, and five months before he had been invalided home suffering severely from shell shock. Those were the allegations made.
        Mr. MACPHERSON: That is the same case.
        Mr. MORRELL: It is only one of a great many cases. I do not know why the hon. Gentleman takes up that attitude. It is an extremely offensive attitude, as if we were not making a fair case against him. He really does us an injustice, because this is a very serious matter. He need not sit there making these remarks of an offensive character in an undertone. I will give him another case which was referred to by the hon. Member for Blackburn on the 6th November. This was the case of a private in a Lincolnshire Regiment, who was only nineteen years of age, who had shown great gallantry in the field and who had been over the top twice just prior to desertion. Those were the facts alleged by the hon. Member for Blackburn. At the time of his desertion he was undergoing field punishment No. 1 for two hours daily, and the allegation was that it was in a place which was exposed to shell fire, and because of this exposure he ran away. The question was asked whether the hon. Gentleman would ascertain if this boy was sent to France the week before for court-martial, and, in the event of sentence of death being passed upon him, would the hon. Gentleman see, in view of his youth and past fighting record, that the death penalty was not carried out. What was the reply of the Under-Secretary? He said he could not intervene in any way. His words were:
        "It is impossible for me to attempt to influence the Court. …The extenuating circumstances suggested would probably form the subject of a plea in mitigation of sentence which would receive the due consideration of the Court and of the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief.…" —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th November, 1917; col. 1954, Vol. 98.]
        Then he went on to say that all these cases were investigated by the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief. Those are two cases out of the numerous cases which are known to have occurred. I can give the hon. Gentleman personal knowledge, because I have spoken to soldiers about it. Everybody knows there have been cases

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        and that there may be cases again in which men suffer the extreme penalty who have in the past been invalided home in consequence of shell-shock. No doubt they are examined by the doctors and that the medical evidence is carefully weighed, but even doctors, especially in cases of this sort, are liable to err. I think we may ask two things at least. They have been frequently asked of the Government in this matter. I will make two proposals to the hon. Gentleman and ask him to bring them before the proper authorities instead of taking up the attitude he does now. In the first place, we are entitled to ask that in no case shall a man suffer the extreme penalty who has previously been found to be suffering from shell shock unless under completely exceptional circumstances and after special inquiry, different from the ordinary inquiry and trial by court-martial. That is the very least we can ask. What hitherto has been the answer given on that point? My hon. Friend the Member for Hanley (Mr. Outhwaite) asked on the 14th December for an assurance
        " that no soldier shall be executed by order of court-martial for cowardice who has been seriously wounded or invalided on account of shell-shock."
        What was the answer he received? The Under-Secretary said:
        "If my hon. Friend will refer to the Rules of Procedure governing courts-martial held in the field he will realise that I am not in a position to give effect to his proposals."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th December, 1917, col. 149D, Vol. 100.]
        The suggestion was that the rules of procedure governing courts-martial should be altered. That is the point we are entitled to bring before this House and ask that the matter should be inquired into. I ask the Under-Secretary again whether he cannot hold out the hope that the rules of procedure governing the courts-martial may not be altered in the way I have indicated, so as to see that where a man has been previously wounded or invalided home through shell-shock he shall have exceptional treatment before he is liable to suffer the death penalty, as so many men have hitherto suffered it. The hon. Gentleman seemed to suggest this afternoon that there were no cases in which such men had suffered the death penalty. This is what he said on the 14th December:
        "I had occasion the other day to look into one particular case submitted to the War Office, and I was pleased to see that before the trial,
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        and after the sentence and before execution, the man was examined by a medical board."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th December, 1917; col. 1499, Vol. 100.]
        That, at any rate, is an admission that this, was a case in which a man who had been invalided home suffering from shell-shock was executed in the way suggested. The request we make is that there should be an alteration in the rules in that particular. There is a second request, which seems to me more important than the first. It has often before been made, but we have never hitherto had a satisfactory answer. The Under-Secretary has promised to inquire into it, and if he tells me that he has inquired into this matter and that the Regulations have been altered, I will not pursue the question. The point is this: Again and again the Government have been asked to give some assurance that where a man is on his trial for his life at the front he shall always be entitled to have his case presented for him by a soldier friend; in other words, that he shall not be left alone to stand his trial without advice in this supremely critical moment. A question on this was put to the Under-Secretary on 14th December, and he said:
        "I am in communication with General Officers Commanding Overseas with regard to this matter, and I will, in turn, communicate with my hon. and gallant Friend as soon as possible."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th December, 1917; cols. 1498– 9, Vol. 100.]
        Has he communicated with him? Has anything been done in this matter, and can he give us an assurance that no man will suffer the death penalty except after a trial at which he is to have the same benefit of advice and help as every prisoner has at a civil trial for his life in this country? It is a very grave matter that a man who is on trial at the: front for his life, for whatever cause, should have to conduct his own defence without any help and without any support, as I understand soldiers may have to do under the present Regulations. I have been present at courts-martial myself, and I am far from saying that there is any deliberate unfairness—of course there is not. Everybody knows how the trial is conducted, and I admit that every attempt is made to treat the prisoner fair. But I can well understand how a man at a court-martial would be cowed or alarmed at the situation in which he found himself, and that owing to the military discipline which is observed by a military court-martial, it would be very difficult for him to put completely before the Court the extenuating.

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        cricumstances. The least we can ask is that in this supreme moment affecting a man's life he should have the advantage of the help and support of a prisoner's friend who knows the rules and who knows what may be said on the man's behalf. There are the two practical points I put to the hon. Gentleman. I ask him to-night not to put us off with the sort of reply, the unworthy tone of reply, with which he answered my hon. Friend this afternoon. I ask him, seriously, whether on these two important matters affecting this great and difficult question he cannot give sonic better reply than he has given hitherto?
        Colonel YATE: We have heard a great deal lately in this House about death sentences at the front. If the question of the rules and regulations regarding courts-martial at the front is to be reconsidered, I would ask the Under-Secretary to consider whether power should not be given to a court-martial to inflict corporal punishment, in cases where it is fit to do so, instead of the death sentence? All punishments at the front must be deterrent and must be quick. At present courts-martial can only in these cases inflict the death penalty. Cases might arise in which the court-martial, if it had the power to inflict corporal punishment, would do so.
        Mr. OUTHWAITE: The hon. and gallant Member (Colonel Yate) has used a phrase which is at the bottom of a great deal of our concern in this matter. He says that sentences at the front must be quick.
        Colonel YATE: Deterrent and quick, or rapid.
        Mr. OUTHWAITE: They must be deterrent and they must be rapid. It is the rapidity with which the trial takes place and the sentence is carried out that is the underlying cause of the concern some of us feel in this matter. I will show presently why that is so. I am very sorry that the Under-Secretary should have in any way prejudiced this question by his replies to-day. At any rate, on one occasion in the past he did not adopt that attitude. I asked him a question on the subject, and, if my memory serves me right, he said he would be glad, if representations were made on this subject as to what could be done, to consider them.
        Mr. MACPHERSON: Hear, hear!
        Mr. OUTHWAITE: It is only fair to the hon. Gentleman to say that. I am sorry that he has fallen from grace. In the past it has been the custom of this House—because I have asked questions on the subject—to howl down the Member who raises it. That is a monstrous thing to do. I can tell the hon. Gentleman and the House that there is no question among the people as a whole to-day upon which they feel more concerned and more strongly than the carrying out of death sentences, not because of anything said in the House, but because of the stories told by the soldiers themselves,. and because of statements made by the men who have to carry out these death sentences—the horror of them ! So it is peculiarly a question which must not be dealt with in any spirit of acrimony at all. When the hon. Gentleman made the statement that he would be glad to consider any suggestion, I spoke to an hon. Member of this House who is a great medical authority and asked him what could be done. He said there was one thing that can be done. The medical history of the man can be inquired into. The hon. Gentleman spoke of the case being submitted to a medical board. That seemed to me, from the conversation which I had, to be useless. What my Friend said was that it is essential, in a case like this, that a neurologist should be consulted, and that the past history of the man should be gone into. I asked him whether there is a certainty that if a man has once suffered from shell-shock and has been turned out, apparently cured, having got over the symptoms, there will not be a recurrence of these conditions at any moment when the man comes under the same circumstances again under which he suffered shell-shock before? He said, "No; a man may become involuntarily—we will use the term, although it is not the correct one— a coward. His nerves have gone; there is a recurrence of all the symptoms, and he will desert and run away." Therefore, it seems to me that the only way in which this matter can be solved with, safety is to determine that no man who has suffered from shell-shock shall ever be executed by sentence of a court-martial. The number is so small that I cannot understand, except for the cast-iron Regulations of the War Office, why this should not be done. The number of men who come before a court-martial who have suffered from shell-shock and

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        returned to the front is not a very great number, and the exercise of this discretion—I will not call it humanity—cannot surely affect the discipline of the forces.
        Yesterday, I had a letter from one of my Constituents, who gave the case of his son. He had been suffering from shell-shock. In the father's belief he has not recovered properly, but he is now ordered out on active service. There is the case of a man, it seems to me, who is likely, as soon as he comes under shell fire again, to revert to his old condition. He is no coward, but he may be quite well sentenced to death for cowardice, and I want to know whether in a trial of that kind the medical history of that man in this country is inquired into, or whether, in accordance with the dictum laid down by the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Yate), the whole thing has to be deterrent and quick, without any such examination and inquiries being made. It is very wrong, it seems to me, for the War Office not to recognise in this matter the new conditions that exist, the greater strain there is on the nerve system under modern warfare, and that the old Regulations must be revised, particularly in this matter. We have not had, I think, from the War Office, or the hon. Gentleman, sufficient assurance that this has been done, and this matter must be pressed until we get that assurance. It is particularly terrible, I think, that boys of nineteen who have suffered from hell-shock should be executed. I do not believe any British lad should be executed by sentence of a court-martial at all, so long as we are fighting in the interests of an Ally—that is to say France—who does not send her soldiers to the trenches until they are twenty. Why we should not have the same concern and exhibit the same consideration for British youth as the French exhibit in this matter for French youth I have not been able to discover. Youths are the bravest and recognise danger the least, but at the same time their nerve system has not been thoroughly established, and they are most likely to suffer an absolute derangement of nerves through the conditions imposed upon them, and which they have to undergo in a modern war. I know one case which has been brought up before this House of a boy being shot by sentence of court-martial within a month of being turned out of the hospital to which
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        he had been sent, suffering from shell-shock, after being blown up by a mine. It was the case, the hon. Gentleman will remember, of an East End boy.
        I do hope, therefore, the hon. Gentleman will not think this matter is raised in any contentious manner without there being evidence fully to justify it, and I am constrained not to attack the hon. Gentleman because I bear in mind that he did ask for proposals to be made. For that reason I particularly rise to support the arguments used, and the proposals made by my hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. Morrell) who brought forward specific proposals, to which I hope effect will be given. I desire to support him also in the question of the proper representation at the court-martial of an accused man. I cannot imagine a more difficult position for a boy of nineteen to be placed in than to be under trial by court-martial, with the penalty of death hanging over him for cowardice, having to conduct his own case and base his case upon the condition of his nerves, and the fact that he has been suffering from shell-shock. If ever there was a case that required expert advocacy and evidence it was that, and I should say the position of such a boy or man would be almost hopeless under present conditions. I would remind the hon. Gentleman of a statement he made at the time the Military Exemptions Bill was before this House, when he said that one of the reasons why it was necessary was that in the past a number, and I think he said a large number, of officers who had shown themselves, we will say, not to have the nerves necessary for their position had been permitted to resign or retire and return home on the grounds of being medically unfit. That shows that concern and some sympathy was shown towards one section of the Army, and I think an extension of that proper humanity and recognition of facts can well be shown as regards all members of the Army without in any way influencing its discipline. As a matter of fact, I think it will make for discipline, because it will remove a feeling of wrong, and injustice, and inhumanity which certainly has been aroused as regards these executions that have taken place.
        8.0 P.M.
        Major HUNT: I want to take this opportunity of bringing up the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, as I think the hon. Gentleman refused to answer any

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        more questions about it. I want to point out to him that his statement that Colonel Browne would not have been given a commission if it had been known who he was is really no more nor less than absurd, because he was actually gazetted as late lieutenant, Royal Irish Fusiliers. In addition to that, the doctor he saw at the War Office knew him perfectly well, and General McCready himself, when he saw him in France, sent him from transport work into the fighting line. The hon. Gentleman's other statement that Colonel Browne's actual fighting career did not extend much more than a year is surely disposed of by the fact that he was actually fighting from May, 1915, to June, 1917, and I would really call the hon. Gentleman's attention to his sneer at Colonel Browne when he said that Colonel Browne has not been otherwise than wounded when on duty. I do not see how he could very well be wounded except when he was on duty. The accusation, or implied accusation, that he was wearing four gold bars to which he was not entitled can be met by the fact that if he was not entitled to those gold bars it is the duty of the War Office to put a stop to it. As a matter of fact, when an officer is put into the casualty list he is compelled by Regulation to put a gold stripe on his sleeve. I was rung up by a very distinguished officer purposely to tell me this, and to say that the officers in France were very much annoyed about it, because they thought that some of them might very well be sneered at in the same way, and told that they had no right to wear gold bars because they had been only slightly wounded. As a matter of fact, Colonel Monteagle-Browne was wounded five or six times altogether, and, I suppose the hon. Gentleman will admit, he went on fighting and refused to go back because there were so few officers in the regiment when he had been wounded. I think, therefore, that was a very mean sort of sneer to make against an officer who, according to the general's account, whatever else he is, is a gallant man. As regards the report of Colonel Browne being unfit to command in the field, so far as I am able to make out— at all events he never saw that report—it really comes to be boiled down to General MeCready's letter that
        "Perhaps Browne may not be quite up-to-date in his training,"
        He had not joined long then, and it is possible that he may not have been quite
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        up-to-date in his training, but it certainly looks as if they know he had served before. The War Office had to go back eighteen years to bring an unproved charge of cribbing in an examination which was not competitive. What happened was that some figures fell out of" Colonel Browne's pocket, and they were not anything to do with the lessons that day. The charge of cribbing was never proved. Lieutenant Browne, as he was then, saw General Abadie about it, and he was quite satisfied, and said nothing-more was to be said about it. I think it shows how very weak the case must be against Colonel Browne if you have to go back eighteen years in order to produce an unproven charge of cribbing. I wonder how many Members of the House of Commons have never done any cribbing. But the most serious charge that the hon. Gentleman made against this officer was very unfairly put by him. If he had put it fairly the House would have seen that there was nothing in it. The cheque of which the Under-Secretary makes so much was cashed before the date fixed, and that was due to the delay of a telegram. If that delay had not occurred nothing of the sort would have happened. Even the solicitor who was employed to-get the money from Colonel Browne wrote to say that that officer had been unfairly treated, while the officer to whom the money was lent did his best to help Colonel Browne and told the colonel commanding that the letter was a private one and ought not to be shown. Added to that, the colonel of the regiment had to admit that Colonel Browne had no dishonourable intention. So that really the only charge against Colonel Browne is that he borrowed £25-from another officer at a time when he was hard-up Surely the mere fact of borrowing £25 does not justify turning an officer out of the Army. How many other officers have done it? Why should a man's life be ruined in this way on such a flimsy pretext? Here is a man who served right through the South African War. He gained both riband and five bars and Was praised for his work during the two years of that war. It must be admitted that the report of his general could not have been more favourable, and it was not until he went into rest billets, after two years' fighting, and when he came under a new brigadier that he got these adverse

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        reports. Even the general who sent him home, and who inspected his battalion, pronounced it "well turned out." Yet after a few minutes' conversation between three generals this officer was sent home, and instead of the War Office taking the trouble to go into the case and give him another chance they summarily kicked him out of the Army, for that is what it really amounts to.
        There is no Commander-in-Chief now to whom any officer can go to make a personal appeal as was the case in former days. But I really cannot see why the present Secretary for War should not go into these matters for himself and endeavour to see that justice is done. I quite admit that the present Secretary for War does not try to teach the Field-Marshal strategy as Lord Haldane did. But there is no reason why he should not do his best to have justice done in these cases instead of allowing himself to be bound by the red-tape of the Adjutant-General. I think I am justified in reading a letter sent to Colonel Browne by a man who served under him as sergeant-major and who is now an officer. It is to the effect that it is with extreme regret the writer has heard of the action of the Army Council in removing Colonel Browne from the Army, and he adds:
        " I had the pleasure of serving under you in the 9th Munsters as Sergeant of C Company and Company Sergeant-Major of A Company, and I am sure I am justified in saying that during that time you showed the greatest consideration for your N.C.O's and men. With regard to the charge which suggests that you were intolerant to Roman Catholics, I am a Roman Catholic myself, and I have never known you to put the slightest obstacle, either in my way or in the way of any of my co-religionists in the practice of our religion. Whichever way the case goes I am certain that in the hearts of the old 9th Battalion you will always be remembered by the title you so excellently deserved, "A fearless leader of the fighting Munsters.' "
        That shows that the imputation against Colonel Browne, that he could not get on with his men, is far from true. This officer has not been allowed any inquiry into his case. That is all that is asked for. Surely it is only fair that an officer with his record should be granted an inquiry into alleged offences which have been raked up by the Under-Secretary for War and which I submit have been shown to be untrue. I cannot understand why an officer should be treated in this way. If a man murders a woman he has a chance of a fair trial. Yet this officer who has risked his life in War for his country
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        has no such chance! I do not believe the War Office would dare have done this in the case of a Canadian or Australian. It it very bad for the Array that this sort of thing should be allowed, and that an officer should have no chance of proving that he has been unjustly punished. The men hear of these things, and how do they reason? Is it not natural they should say, "If you treat a colonel in that way and with this sort of injustice: what chance has a mere sergeant or a private? That is the way the men look at it. I am not blaming the Under-Secretary, because I know he has to do what he is told, but I do blame the Secretary for War, because he has the power to see that justice is done, and he ought to give an officer a chance when there is any doubt as to whether he has been fairly treated. It is all very well to stick tight to red tape and to show the iron hand, but it is only done in cases where an officer has no powerful friends. Look at the case of the general who was sent home from Palestine. I suppose he was inefficient, or he would not have been sent home. But it has never been proved that Colonel Browne was inefficient; on the contrary, he is known to have been an efficient and gallant officer. Yet compare the way in which he is treated with the treatment of the general sent home from Palestine. I think this is a very bad case, and I hope the hon. Gentleman will try and see that something is done to give this officer a chance of proving that he has been unfairly treated. All we ask is that his case should be reconsidered.
        Mr. MACPHERSON: I should like to make a few observations, in answer to one or two of the points which have been put forward this evening. I told the House earlier in the Debate that I proposed tomorrow to deal at greater length with same of the points that have been raised, and the points which, I understand will be raised later on in the course of the discussion. But my hon. Friend (Mr. Whitehouse) took the opportunity of getting up to make a personal explanation, and I feel that I ought to stand up as soon as possible and accept that explanation in the spirit in which it was made. Of course, I have no desire to think that he meant what I thought he meant at the time, and I am only too willing and anxious to accept the explanation which he has just given. It is perfectly true there is a great deal of feeling with regard to the point which was the subject

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        of question and answer, namely, the death sentence and execution of boys who are serving at the front. I think when you say boys you are apt to introduce prejudice because, although there may have been one or two who were under the age of twenty, so far as I can gather you could not properly describe those who have been so unfortunate as to meet this unhappy fate by the name of boys. The hon. Member (Mr. Morrell) took me to task because he thought that in my answer or my refusal to answer the question of the hon. Member (Mr. Whitehouse) this afternoon I was attempting in a full House to introduce prejudice and clamour. I can assure him that I had no such intention. I feel just as strongly as he does on this point. I feel that the officers who sit upon the courts-martial, the Judge Advocate-General who deals legally with the case, the various doctors who may be summoned at any given moment when any plea of insanity or shell-shock is put forward, and the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief and his advisers who ultimately decide the fate of these unhappy soldiers are just as humanitarian as any hon. Member who sits upon that bench, and they feel these implications of in-humanitarianism made in a place where they, cannot contradict them, and the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief detests nothing more than to have to sign the death sentence of any man. The imputation which has been running through the series of questions which have been put on this point is that we give no quarter to a man who may at any time have happened to suffer from shell-shock. I have made, and shall continue to make, investigations with regard to the facts stated in the various questions, and I have not yet been able to come across a single case where a. man who was proved in the past to have suffered from shell-shock, or was proved to have been wounded, has suffered the death penalty after being sentenced to death. I make no imputation against the hon. Member. I should think he has found me more cases than any man in the House, and I have always found him, so far as those cases are concerned, to be eminently reasonable and anxious and willing to verify his particulars, but with regard to these cases about which he has put down a question, I dispute the facts. However, if I can find an opportunity within the next week I shall personally investigate those two special
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        cases. The hon. Member went out of his way to take me to task for the rude and offensive way in which I answered questions.
        Mr. MORRELL: Not all questions only one question. I was referring to the answer to the question of my hon. Friend this afternoon.
        Mr. MACPHERSON: I an) very glad the hon. Member makes the position quite clear. I explained to the House in his absence that I was more than willing to accept the explanation which the hon. Member (Mr. Whitehouse) had given. The hon. Member (Mr. Morrell) went back into ancient history and recalled the time when there was a discussion in this House about field punishment No. 1. I am sorry the hon. Member (Mr. O'Grady) is not in the House. I think his version of my part in that transaction would have been entirely different from that which the hon. Member (Mr. Morrell) has placed before the House. I have no recollection of his taking any considerable part in the alleviation of this particular form of punishment.
        Mr. MORRELL: The hon. Gentleman's memory is quite at fault. I may have made no impression on him, but I addressed the House at considerable length two or three times. I took as much part as the hon. Member (Mr. O'Grady).] think I took it up before, and he will find that again and again and again I asked questions on the subject.
        Mr. MACPHERSON: I can assure the House that the hon. Member with whom the War Office was in closest touch through myself and General Childs was the hon. Member (Mr. O'Grady).
        Mr. MORRELL: That is not true either. I went to see General Childs on that very subject with the hon. Member (Mr. O'Grady).
        Mr. MACPHERSON: In any case, the hon. Member (Mr. O'Grady) was in more direct communication with the War Office and with me than the hon. Member was. I am glad to hear that the hon. Member (Mr. Outhwaite) took a temperate and very moderate line this afternoon. He quite probably sees the difficulty, and I think he would be the last person who would wish to see the whole of the French system of recruiting adopted in this country.
        Mr. MORRELL: Can the hon. Gentleman give me an assurance with regard to nerve-shock, and with regard to prisoners' friends?
        Mr. MACPHERSON: I can give an assurance with regard to the care with which we examine men who are suffering from shell-shock, and my understanding, and I am sure it is the understanding of the whole Army, is that any man who requires treatment will always obtain it. It is that sort of suggestion which is so cruel and so hard when made in this House against men who have no opportunity to defend themselves, and who are just as humane as those who sit upon that bench. I know how bitterly and sorely those fellows feel these nagging suggestions that they are not capable of any feeling of humanity at all. Their humanity would compare favourably with that which is perfectly prepared to keep back men, conscientious objectors or otherwise, in this country—
        Mr. MORRELL: Is not this raising prejudice? I repudiate that suggestion. It is one which ought not to be made.
        Mr. MACPHERSON— and are perfectly prepared to see one man go five times into the trenches, having been five times wounded.
        Mr. MORRELL: That is not true. It is a base suggestion. You ought to be ashamed of yourself!
        Mr. W. THORNE: You ought to be ashamed of yourself as well!
        Mr. MORRELL: Scandalous!
        Mr. KING: I Leg to move to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof the words "the treatment of soldiers suffering from shell-shock and neurasthenia has been and remains inadequate."
        I shall endeavour in my remarks to keep my temper. It is rather difficult in these days, but, on the whole, I believe, whatever I have succeeded or failed in in this House, I have not often lost my temper. I do not deny that I may have had very good ground for losing it, but I am going to try not to fall into temptation. I have had the good fortune, though I drew no number in the ballot yesterday, to find my Amendment the only one which can be moved to-night. The Debate to which we have listened is very
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        good evidence that the treatment which is given to our soldiers who have suffered from nerve or shell-shock, whether before or after they get into hospital, is inadequate. I am not at all sure that the hon. Gentleman, who I understand will give us a full statement upon this subject to-morrow, would not agree that in the past our provision for shell-shock cases has been inadequate. At any rate, I must say a few words on the subject, to which. I have given considerable attention, in. the hope that something may arise out of it to better the state of affairs. It is perfectly obvious from the Debate, from the admissions made from that bench, and from the tone taken up on that bench— in some respects it is quite admirable, though in others it is irritating—that we have not understood the terrible conditions of men who suffer from this unbalancing of the nervous system and the brain function which we call shell-shock In support of what my hon. Friends have said, I beg to refer the Undersecretary to the case with regard to which I have had some correspondence with him, and which I have mentioned in questions and speeches in this House. It is the case of a young man who volunteered at the very outset of the War, went to France a year later, and went through several serious battles, and who eventually was sent to hospital with. what was considered a slight attack of shell-shock. He was returned to duty, and though he reported sick, he was sent back to the line. When ordered to go into action—this is the charge made against him—he left the ranks and got into a dug-out where he was found some hours afterwards. It is admitted that he had been suffering from shell-shock, and that he had applied to the doctor, who sent him back. He was taken and charged with desertion, and he was condemned to death. His sentence was promptly reduced to ten. years' penal servitude. When he began to serve that sentence ho broke down and was placed in hospital. Now he has been brought to the 1st London General Hospital, and on two occasions his parents have been summoned because he was thought to be in extremis. He has been in the mental ward and in the padded room, and they are now offering him his free discharge. It would have been offered to him in the presence of his father, but his father, quite rightly and with the support of the head of the institution, protested that if anything was

        705
        said to recall to him the terrible conditions through which he had come it would be probably disastrous to his existence.
        I have verified these facts, having seen all the papers. He is unable to remember anything that happened at his court martial. When he was in a better state of mind than at present he wrote to his father, and said that his mind was a blank on the subject. He does not know whether anyone was there as his friend or his defender, or what evidence was given. That man was condemned to death. I do not want to make any accusation of inhumanity, but that one story alone has convinced me that we have to grapple here with a terror of war which is beyond us in its difficulty and its horror and its possible effect. The matter was brought to the mind of several Members the other day when a soldier came and was received by certain persons in the Lobby. He was a soldier on leave, and apparently healthy, but he began talking in a strange way, saying that he must see a Member from Birmingham before five o'clock, because he was ordered to go into the line at five o'clock to fight the Germans. At one moment he seemed reasonable and sensible, but the next moment he was giving signs of mental aberration. I say without passion that the method of treating these cases, whether at courts-martial or when men report sick to the doctors, has been in adequate, and you must do everything you can to prevent injustice, scandal, ill feeling, and discontent. I pass from that aspect of the question simply with the request that, if possible, the hon. Gentle man will again reconsider what pre cautions should be taken, on what lines men suffering from shell-shock should be treated, and whether they should be sent anywhere near the firing line until they have been under observation for a very considerable period.
        I will now say something about the treatment of shell-shock cases in hospital. Here, again, you come upon a problem the gravity and difficulty of which it is impossible to exaggerate. I make every allowance for the baffling circumstances surrounding this problem. There are hundreds of cases, and there will, perhaps, be thousands of cases on your hands before the War is over. How has the War Office treated this matter? They provided far too late special hospitals for treatment. In too many cases they have been treated with
        706
        ordinary patients or as special cases in general hospitals, and they are still being treated in that way to a far too large an extent. Then there is a number of shell-shock men still in hospital in London, where they are subject to the disconcerting influence of air raids, by which they are likely to be thrown back seriously. At any rate, as far as possible, shell-shocked men should be treated in hospitals outside areas where air raids may take place.
        The present policy of the War Office in a large number of cases is practically that of putting these men into lunatic asylums and treating them with the staff of the asylums and making them in most respects lunatic asylum patients without the security and the privileges which lunatics and their friends possess. There is very strong feeling in the country against these men being in lunatic asylums at all. Of course, there would be a still stronger feeling if they were certified as lunatics, but the War Office will not be a party to certifying them as lunatics without the very strongest reason, yet they are treating them in the same way and putting them in lunatic asylums on the certificate of one medical man and the commanding officer. I would like that the hon. Member, if possible, should refer to-morrow in his statement to this point, to which I attach great importance. You do not send even a pauper lunatic to an asylum on such evidance as suffices in the case of the soldier. The pauper lunatic and his friends have the right under the Act of approaching the Commissioners to get the lunatic out, and the right to have constant reports so as to safeguard the liberty of the lunatic. The patient has rights under the Act which prevent him being kept in beyond the time that is absolutely necessary, but in the case of the shell-shocked man who is still under Army discipline there is no process by which he can be got out. This complaint may be raised in quite a number of cases, because the shell-shocked men who may be mentally deranged have lucid intervals, and the periods of delirium and delusion and profound exhaustion and depression are recurrent, just as the symptoms of lunacy are not always constant, but are recurrent. Therefore, the liberties and rights of these men must be thought of. As one who believes that even in wartime there is some sense in the liberty of the subject, and in the right of freedom I do appeal to the hon. Gentleman in this connection.

        707
        One more point. There has recently been a Conference held in the War Office at which a section of the medical profession was represented, and there was a proposal in reference to this system. These men should be handed over as soon as possible to the Pensions Ministry. That is the right policy. I know what the feeling in the War Office is— these men may get well and go back to the Army, do light work, gradually get on to heavier work and the War Office will always be against letting men out of their clutches if they can avoid it; but as to shell-shocked men I say give them first a chance of getting well. That can be done by sending them out of the Army to the Pensions Ministry and allowing the Pensions Ministry to do the work which already they have begun, though it has not progressed far enough, of putting these men into convalescent homes in the country, where work appropriate to their faculties and health can be obtained, and where, under conditions not of asylum life but of home life, with work on the land and open-air treatment, they would be restored to civil life much more quickly, with much less cost to the State and with much greater happiness and success for the poor patients themselves. I trust that the hon. Member may give me some assurance on these points in the course of his statement to-morrow.
        Amendment not seconded.
        Original Question put, and agreed to.

        SUPPLY.— ARMY ESTIMATES, 1918–19.
        Considered in Committee.
        [Mr. WHITLEY in the Chair.]
        Motion made, and Question, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again,"— (Mr. Macpherson)— put, and agreed to.
        Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.

        NATIONAL EXPENDITURE.
        Ordered, "That a Select Committee be appointed—
        To examine the current Expenditure defrayed out of moneys provided by Par-
        708
        liament and to report what, if any, economies consistent with the execution of the policy decided by the Government may be effected therein:
        To make recommendations in regard to the form of Public Accounts, the system of control within the Departments and by the Treasury, and the procedure of this House in relation to Supply and Appropriation, so as to secure more effective control by Parliament over Public Expenditure; and to have power to appoint from outside its own body such additional persons as it may think fit to serve on any Sub-Committee which it may appoint with the view to the preparation of such recommendations:
        Ordered, That the Committee do consist of twenty-six members:
        Committee accordingly nominated of Mr. Adamson, Mr. Arnold, Sir Frederick Banbury, Mr. Blair, Mr. Boland, Major Godfrey Collins, Mr. Percy Alfred Harris, Mr. J. M. Henderson, Sir Charles Henry, Mr. Holt, Mr. Home, Mr. Haydn Jones, Mr. Leif Jones, Mr. Keating, Mr. Lonsdale, Mr. Marriott, Mr. James Mason, Mr. Mooney, Sir Samuel Roberts, Mr. Herbert Samuel, Mr. Scanlan, Colonel Weigall, Colonel Sir Robert Williams, Mr. J. W. Wilson, Mr. Tyson Wilson, and Mr. Wilson-Fox.
        Ordered, That the Committee have power to send for persons, papers and records:
        Ordered, That the Committee have leave to report from time to time:
        Ordered, That Five be the quorum."— [Mr. Towyn Jones.]
        The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.
        Whereupon Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. Whitley), pursuant to the Order of the House of the 13th February, proposed the Question, "That this House do now adjourn."
        Question put, and agreed to.
        Adjourned accordingly at Thirteen minutes before Nine o'clock

WAR.
  SPIRITS RETAINED FOR CONSUMPTION.
  SPIRITS RETAINED FOR CONSUMPTION.
FOOD SUPPLIES.
  GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS (LABOUR).
  GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS (LABOUR).
  BREWING.
  BREWING.
  ROYAL MARINES (OFFICERS' PAY)
  ROYAL MARINES (OFFICERS' PAY)
  OFFICER PRISONERS (FIELD ALLOWANCE).
  OFFICER PRISONERS (FIELD ALLOWANCE).
  1914 STAR.
  1914 STAR.
  ADMIRALTY EMPLOYES, DEVONPORT (PAY).
  ADMIRALTY EMPLOYES, DEVONPORT (PAY).
  NAVAL AND MILITARY PENSIONS AND GRANTS.
  NAVAL AND MILITARY PENSIONS AND GRANTS.
MILITARY SERVICE.
  CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS.
  CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS.
  OVERSEAS SOLDIER.
  OVERSEAS SOLDIER.
  OFFICERS' FAMILIES GRANT.
  OFFICERS' FAMILIES GRANT.
  WOMEN'S AUXILIARY ARMY CORPS.
  WOMEN'S AUXILIARY ARMY CORPS.
  MILITARY HOSPITALS (OPERATIONS).
  MILITARY HOSPITALS (OPERATIONS).
  INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION COUNCIL.
  INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION COUNCIL.
  MERCHANT SHIPBUILDING, 1917.
  MERCHANT SHIPBUILDING, 1917.
  BAVARIAN CHAMBER.
  BAVARIAN CHAMBER.
  Reformatory Schools Grant (Ireland).
  Reformatory Schools Grant (Ireland).
  Board of Works Loans (Tenant's Liability).
  Board of Works Loans (Tenant's Liability).

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES INTRODUCED.
His Royal Highness Edward, The Prince of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (Duke of Cornwall and Rothesay, Earl of Carrick, Baron of Renfrew, Lord of the Isles, and Great Steward of Scotland), having been created Prince of Wales and Earl of Chester was, in his Robes, and wearing the Collar of the Order of the Garter, introduced in the following order—
DEPUTY GENTLEMAN USHER OF THE BLACK ROD, Captain T. D. Butler.
GARTER PRINCIPAL KING OF ARMS,
Sir Alfred Scott-Gatty (carrying the Patent).
The Lord Balfour of Burleigh.
The Marquess of Crewe.
THE DEPUTY EARL MARSHAL,
Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Edmund B. Talbot.
THE LORD GREAT CHAMBERLAIN,
The Marquess of Lincolnshire.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL,
The Earl of Crawford.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL,
The Earl Curzon of Kedleston.
THE CORONET OF THE PRINCE,
On a Crimson Velvet Cushion, borne by
The Honourable Sir Sidney Greville.
The Duke of Beaufort.

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE OF WALES
(carrying his Writ of Summons).
The Duke of Somerset.
ATTENDING UPON HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS,
Lord Claud Nigel Hamilton.
His Royal Highness, standing, presented his Letters Patent to The Lord Chancellor at the Woolsack, who delivered them to the Clerk of the Parliaments; and the same were read at the Table.
Then His Royal Highness, at the Table, took and subscribed the Oath required to be taken by the Act of the 21st and 22nd Victoria, cap. 48; after which His Royal Highness was conducted to his Chair on the Right Hand of the Throne.

MESSAGE FROM THE KING.
His Majesty's Answer to the Address of Tuesday last reported by the Lord Steward (V. Farquhar) as follows—
"I have received with great satisfaction the loyal and dutiful expression of your thanks for the Speech with which I have opened the present session of Parliament."

INCOME TAX BILL. [H.L.]
A Bill to consolidate the enactments relating to Income Tax—Was presented by the LORD CHANCELLOR, read 1a, to be printed, and to be read 2a on Tuesday next.
SOLICITORS (QUALIFICATION OF WOMEN) BILL. [H.L.]
A Bill to remove disqualifications on the ground of sex or marriage for admission of persons as Solicitors and their acting and practising as Solicitors under the Solicitors Acts—Was presented by LORD BUCKMASTER, read 1a, to be printed, and to be read 2a on Tuesday, March 5.

THE INTER-ALLIED WAR COUNCIL.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, I rise to ask His Majesty's Government a question, of which I have given private notice, arising out of the debates that took place here and in another place on Tuesday last, which, as your Lordships will remember, were concerned to a considerable extent with the composition and functions of the Council at Versailles and its relations to the Army Council and military concerns generally here. Since then, that debate has had the sequel of the change effected in the position of the Chief of the General Staff by his transfer to an appointment in this country, and I have no doubt that His Majesty's Government will be prepared to give your Lordships such information as can properly be given upon these various subjects.
It was noted in the debate of which I have spoken that a definite change was being carried into effect in the functions of the Supreme War Council at Versailles since the Prime Minister, on his return from his visit to Paris, described them in another place. That change was stated by the noble Earl the Lord President, in reply to a question of mine, to involve the assumption of certain executive functions, if functions connected with the disposition of troops could properly be so described; but in another place the information given was less defined. It appeared that the Prime Minister did not entirely separate in his own mind a request which was made for information on military administration from questions which certainly were never asked as to military plans, and in his reply he spoke of the decision come to at Versailles as involving a military decision of the first magnitude. On that the Prime Minister

39
was asked whether Sir Douglas Haig and Sir William Robertson had approved of the changes that were contemplated, to which he replied that all the representatives approved. Here, the noble Earl the Lord President replied to the same effect—I think in general terms—that he understood that the military representatives had not disapproved of the change.
Well, my Lords, those replies were evidently given under a misapprehension, because it soon became clear that one very important military representative—namely the Chief of the General Staff—did not approve of the contemplated changes. As to what were the views of the British Commander-in-Chief in France we have not seen any statement in the Press. It appeared that the objection taken by Sir William Robertson to the new arrangements was that he considered them unworkable, and, he holding that view, it was hardly possible that His Majesty's Government or my noble friend opposite, the Secretary of State for War, could have desired him to undertake the functions connected with these new arrangements either here or in France, and either in the first or the second place, to control this particular machine in which he did not believe. Then we understand that the special powers which, in view of the demands of the war, were given to the Chief of the General Staff under the Order in Council of January 27, 1916, have been withdrawn; and I have no doubt that we shall hear from His Majesty's Government whether the position has now been returned exactly to what it was when, in Lord Kitchener's time, that change was made. The effect, I understand, is to restore to the Secretary of State, as presiding over the Army Council, the power to give direct instructions to the Commanders-in-Chief of our Armies abroad—that is to say, that he is to act as the channel of communication, and not the Chief of the General Staff, who so acted under an arrangement which had been previously found to be most convenient.
Then the notice which was published—it was published yesterday, and we saw it in the morning papers—states that the Government thought it right to offer to Sir William Robertson the choice of becoming he Military Representative at Versailles or remaining C.I.G.S. under the new conditions. I should like to ask His Majesty's Government this question, whether that
40
choice represents the original offer that was made, whether it represents in fact a single transaction, or whether the offer of the post at Paris was made independently and subsequently after Sir William Robertson had pointed out that in his opinion the position of the Chief of the General Staff at home was rendered impossible in view of the new relations between Whitehall and Versailles? I have no doubt that His Majesty's Government will find no difficulty in answering that question.
I further ask whether it is the fact that the relations between Sir Henry Wilson, the new Chief of the General Staff, and the Military Representative in Paris (whose name, I think, has not so far been announced) will be precisely the same as those which it was contemplated would exist between Sir William Robertson and Sir Henry Wilson, if Sir William had remained in London and Sir Henry had remained in Paris? I would also ask, Is the Military Representative at Versailles subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff in London—which, as the noble Earl will see, represents a quite intelligible position of the relations between the two, whatever the merits of such an arrangement might be—or are the two officers to be regarded in all respects as equal; or, in the third place, do they deal not with the same set of things but with different sets of things? Are the functions separate and distinct? If they do not deal with the same matters, what is the future relation of the C.I.G.S. to the Commanders-in-Chief—in particular, of course, the Commander-in-Chief in France? To whom will, in future, the Commander-in-Chief in France directly look for instructions given on behalf of the Government?
It is quite clear that in all these matters the last word must be with somebody. In one sense the last word is with his Majesty's Government, as we all agree it must be, but the last word but one must be with some military personage, and it is not clear, from anything that I have vet seen issued, with whom that responsibility will rest. From some of the accounts we have seen, describing the presumed functions of the Military Representative at Paris, it seems as though all that will be left to the Chief of the General Staff here is that he should be a sort of morocco-bound edition in one volume of the Adjutant-General, with his functions regarding discipline; the Quartermaster-General, with his functions regard-

41
ing supplies; and the General or Field-Marshal commanding the Homo Forces; and that he would be abstracted from direct relations with the Armies in the field and have nothing whatever to do with the fighting army.
This particular difficulty, which we all recognise to be a difficulty, clearly affects us in an entirely different way from that in which it affects the French Army. The arrangements in connection with the Versailles Council are not the same with regard to the French Army. General Foch is the principal French representative on the Supreme Council and is also the Chief of the Stall in direct relations with General Petain, the Commander-in-Chief in the field. It is therefore only so far as the Flanders front is concerned of the British Army that this difficulty applies, out of which so much has naturally been made owing, as I cannot help saying, to the singular delay in giving full explanations to Parliament which His Majesty's Government have apparently thought to be necessary. But those simple arrangements, which hold good in France, are forbidden to us by geography. It may be, of course, that a complete unification of all the forces is a necessary military act. I could quite understand that it might have been thought desirable to appoint a General-in-Chief of all the Armies in the field if there had been any outstanding personality—such as the Duke of Wellington in 1814; or as Count von Moltke in 1870. If in their war with France the Germans had had any allies fighting with them it could be quite understood that such a man as von Moltke might have been appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the fighting forces on that front, or possibly of all Europe. I cannot help thinking that there are many persons who would regard such a plan, if it could have been effected, as preferable to the existing plan which, I confess, as we see it and as it has been described, seems to give the appearance of independent action to our Commander-in-Chief and to the British Army, while in fact it debars them from exercising anything which can be described as independent action on a large scale. I trust that I have not gone over the border line and in any sense asked questions of noble Lords opposite which could be said to have anything to do with military plans. These matters of administration, highly interesting and important and quite possibly affecting the ultimate fortunes of the
42
war, are not, in themselves, secret. The better they are the more advisable it should be that the Germans should know precisely in what they consist.
But before I sit down, there is one kindred topic which it is impossible to pass over altogether on an occasion like this. It is a singularly unpleasant subject in itself. I allude to the coincidence, which has been so freely noticed everywhere, of a series of Press attacks, the last of them on General Sir William Robertson with the fact of his transfer to another post—a post of some dignity and importance, but not, in itself, surely comparable to the position of Chief of the Imperial General Staff. We are told that it is a coincidence—we hear of the long arm of coincidence. On this occasion it seems to be a very muscular as well as a long arm in its effect. Your Lordships will know the old superstition of the wax figures which were prepared by ill-wishers to individuals and which were slowly melted, the melting being accompanied by a wasting disease in the unhappy subject of the spell. I am afraid wax figures of eminent Statesmen, distinguished Admirals, and not less distinguished Generals are regularly kept in certain newspaper offices. They do not themselves waste away, but their careers waste away with a sort of sinister sameness and certainty, for which it is not, in the opinion of the public and in my own opinion, easy to account. In the words of a well-known quotation, "It is wonderful how these things get into the papers." I do not profess or pretend to unravel cause and effect. What is said, by whom, and where, and how, which causes certain newspapers, in dealing with the careers of individuals, apparently to anticipate the desires and to enforce the resolution of Downing-street I do not pretend to say. There are certain historical puzzles which have never been solved. What exactly brought about the murder of Thomas Becket, and who was entirely responsible for it, remains a matter of some historical doubt. I will not pursue this question further, except to say very gravely that the effect of all this on the public mind is simply deplorable.
Several NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I can think of nothing which is more likely to shake the faith of the people of this country

43
than suspicions of this kind unless those suspicions can be completely swept away. It is an odious subject to allude to, and I hate doing it, but I think that it is the duty of men who take part in public affairs to express frankly their opinion on a matter of this sort.
Lastly, I am anxious to say that I have no intention of introducing any question of the personal merits or comparative qualifications of the distinguished soldiers whose names have been brought before the public within the last few days. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for War has before now expressed in almost glowing terms his confidence in, and his high opinion of, Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig, and I have no reason to suppose that his personal opinion of those officers has in any way altered. Sir William Robertson has gone where he has been ordered, and the only doubt, I am certain, that affects the public mind about him beyond general admiration for the soldierly course which he has taken in going where he is ordered, is the doubt as to whether in this new post sufficient scope will be given for his great powers both as an organiser and as a leader of men. Certainly none of us, I am sure, has the smallest intention of instituting any comparison between him and the highly accomplished and most capable officer who has gone to succeed him as Chief of the General Staff. We all hope that Sir Henry Wilson's tenure of that office will be as successful as it possibly can be, and that he will be able to witness a continual turn to the good of our fortunes in the war. I trust that His Majesty's Government will be able to reply fully to the questions which I have asked, because I am certain that the whole House is anxious to know more about matters which have become a subject of so much public comment and criticism, and which have awakened definite uneasiness in the public mind.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (THE EARL OF DERBY): My Lords, before I actually deal with the questions that the noble Marquess has put to me, I desire to say that I associate myself absolutely with what he said with regard to the attacks that are made on men holding responsible positions, especially in the Army and Navy, and who, by the rules of those two Services, are unable to defend themselves in the public Press. There is not the least doubt that nothing is more
44
conducive to loss of discipline in our Army and Navy than the bandying about of the names of distinguished commanders and questioning their merits or their demerits. But there is more than that. I intend to speak to a very personal point of view to-day. The position of the holder of any post like mine is made even more difficult than it would be under ordinary circumstances when you have these attacks. They make one reluctant to do even what one thinks right, because one may fear that one may he involved in some intrigue. I am going to put my case as fairly and as fully as I possibly can before your Lordships' House to-night, and I hope that at the end I may at all events be acquitted of being a participator in any action except such as I thought absolutely right and justifiable.
To go to the actual question with regard to the position at Versailles, there is a feeling on the part of some people that what has taken place at Versailles does not conduce to the good conduct of the war, whilst on the other hand there are those who strongly support it. For my own part, I strongly support it. I was in favour of it in the beginning, and from what I have seen of its work I have no doubt that in many respects it has brought about most excellent results. It was essential that we should have some co-ordinating authority. If we had been one Army belonging to one nation, or if our Allies had occupied in relation to us, or we had occupied in relation to our Allies, the same position that Austria does to Germany, then I do not think that it would have been necessary. But we are four Allies—Italy, France, America, and ourselves—each keeping our own Armies as a separate entity, yet at the same time desirous of bringing about such co-operation that there may be practically one mind and one thought directed towards the prosecution of the campaign on the Western front. To my mind, therefore, such a body is essential. Originally it was advisory, but by the resolution unanimously come to at the last meeting of the Supreme War Council certain executive powers were given to it. This decision was arrived at unanimously by the Powers represented. One's hand is a little tied behind one's back, because there are certain things one cannot say, but with regard to the scheme there was absolutely no question of dissension either on the part of the civilians or of the soldiers. Sir William Robertson

45
could almost claim, I think, to be the originator of the scheme; therefore your Lordships will, I hope, take it from me I hat there was no doubt about it whatsoever.
As to the administration of the particular scheme, however, it was obvious that there would have to be some executive body which would be able to deal with it. The composition of this executive body was put before the Supreme War Council, and its decision upon it was made there and then. I am not, as your Lordships are aware, a member of the War Cabinet, and I do not attend these conferences. My duty, therefore, is, when these conferences come to resolutions which affect our Army, to act as the agent and to bring any decision that they may come to into line with the Constitution which rules our forces. The scheme, which had necessitated certain executive action being taken by the executive as a whole, required that there should be on that executive some representative who had the legal authority to issue orders to the Commanders of British troops. The Permanent Military Representative, now the Chief of the General Staff and then at Versailles, had no such part, and therefore, when this decision of the Supreme War Council was taken, we had to consider in what way he could be given such powers as would bring him within the Constitution, and to declare at the same time what the relationship was to be as between London and Versailles.
With a view of arriving at this the Prime Minister put forward, on behalf of the War Cabinet, a scheme for consideration. There was no doubt whatever that that scheme brought the whole arrangement within the powers of the Constitution. And although I cannot give all of it, because there is one portion that is confidential, I think I can give enough to enable your Lordships to see that the power left in the hands of the Army Council was a real one. In the first place the Permanent Military Representative at Versailles was to become a member of the Army Council—part and parcel of it. The Chief of the General Staff was to continue to be the supreme military adviser of the Council. The Permanent Military Representative at Versailles was to be in constant communication and consultation with the Chief of the General Staff, but, as he was a member of a body who were discussing many plans, he was given free and un-
46
fettered liberty to express his views and to discuss those plans. When any advice is formulated by this body, acting as a whole, it has to come home to the Chief of the General Staff for the purpose of being brought before the War Cabinet, and for the Chief of the General Staff to advise the War Cabinet on. There are other provisions to deal with the case of a dispute—let us say, between Sir Douglas Haig and the Council at Versailles; there are ample opportunities given for Sir Douglas Haig to appeal against any such decision, and the War Cabinet, or even the Supreme War Council, would then have to consider it.
It seemed to me then, as it seems to me now, that by this change—the altering of the Order in Council which has been mentioned, and which brings the Chief of the Imperial General Staff back again, if I may say so, into the Army Council, and not having powers which were given to him outside the Army Council; and at the same time the bringing in of the Military Representative at Versailles as his colleague, both of them subject to the Army Council, both of them under me, and with me responsible for them—the control of the Military Representative at Versailles would have been adequately met, and any question regarding the safety of our Army was adequately safeguarded.
The two positions, however, being altered, the position at Versailles being somewhat increased and the position of the Chief of the General Staff being somewhat diminished, it was thought, only fair by the Prime Minister that Sir William Robertson should be given the choice of going to Versailles, if he so wished. He declined to go to Versailles; and, having declined that, he remained as Chief of the General Staff. He was then asked whether as Chief of the General Staff he would continue in his office subject to the conditions laid down. Now some people have said—I have seen it stated—that the question of the reduction of his powers by the cancelling of the particular Order in Council was the reason of his resignation. That is not the case. Sir William Robertson absolutely agreed, without the slightest dissension, to that alteration being made.
LORD BUCKMASTER: He has denied that he has resigned.
THE EARL OF DERBY: I will come to that if I may.
LORD BUCKMASTER: You used the word "resignation," but he denies that he has resigned.
THE EARL OF DERBY: I do not really know, then, what word to use—the alteration in his post. He said that he could not see his way to remain as Chief of the General Staff and accept the relationship which he was asked to accept as between himself and Versailles. I do not think it is a fair way of putting it to say that Sir William Robertson was asked to take either post and refused both. He did not do that. Literally it is true, but he declined to take either post because he thought that the particular scheme was not a workable one.
Now, it is as well to say at this moment what he proposed in its place. He proposed—and, mind you, this is the sole difference of opinion—that on this executive Council he should be our representative. Now, I should like to inform your Lordships that that particular proposal of his had been carefully considered at the Supreme War Council, and had been unanimously turned down, not only by our own people, but by the soldiers and statesmen of all the other countries. It was, therefore, an impossible position; and, from our point of view here, the impossibility was increased by the geographical position that exists. If you are going to have a man in France who may have to take a sudden decision, it is obvious that this man must be in France; and though in France you have General Foch as Chairman of this particular executive, you must remember that it would be quite impossible for our Chief of the Imperial General Staff to be absent from this country for more than a short time. Our Allies are waging only one war; they are waging the war on their own fronts. We are waging more than one war. We have Mesopotamia, we have Palestine, we have East Africa; and it is essential that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff should be at home and at the hand of the Government to advise them at any moment.
I had been carefully through this scheme. I had been through it with military advisers and with civilian advisers, and I had come to the conclusion that it was a perfectly workable scheme. I have always expressed—and I still express—the greatest possible confidence in Sir William Robertson, in his judgment as a strategist; and the high opinion which I have always held of him is enhanced by the courage that he has
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shown in adhering to the decision at which he arrived. But here was where, if I may say so, my personal difficulty came in. A scheme proposed and accepted by the whole of the Allies could be upset only by the whole of the Allies. I approved of that scheme. I believed then—and I believe now—that it is a perfectly workable scheme; and the only alternative that was put in front of me was Sir William Robertson's position of "accept my terms or lose my services." A complaint has been made that some delay has occurred in settling this matter. I plead guilty to being the cause of that delay; because I did all that I possibly could to get Sir William Robertson to accept a scheme which, as I have said, I considered perfectly workable. He did not see his way to do this. Now, it seems to me that it then became a question of principle against personality. In the very last speech that I made in a public place I praised Sir William Robertson in every way. I then emphasised one fact—and I emphasise it now—that, whoever the soldier be, the civil authority has to be, and must always remain, supreme; and if the civil authority, acting, as they did in this case, in uniformity with the Inter-Allied Conference, says that a certain thing is to be, then in my opinion no soldier ought to be able to put the alternative either of keeping his services or of reversing the decision arrived at. In the end, therefore, I held to my scheme. I held that I was right, and I hold that I am right now. And when the Government appointed—as they did appoint—Sir Henry Wilson to be Chief of the General Staff, and Sir Henry Rawlinson to be our representative at Versailles, I accepted it because I believed, and shall continue to believe—and I know that in this respect I have Sir Douglas Haig's own opinion—that, given good will (as it will be given), although there may be difficulties ahead, it is a workable scheme, and we are all determined to make it work.
But meanwhile I felt that my strong advocacy of Sir William Robertson had put me into a somewhat ambiguous position, and I placed myself unreservedly in the hands of the Prime Minister by asking him whether he would accept my resignation. He has asked me not to resign. I believe that my colleagues agree with that. I am staying, but through no love of office. Nobody would like to be in office now if he could help it. But, having set my hand to a paper, and having agreed to a scheme, which I still think is a good and a workable

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scheme, I have to make good by seeing that scheme through. I believe that I can make good. I know that, under this scheme, no danger whatsoever can come to our Army in France. But if I do not make good, and if there is any reason in my mind for thinking that an alteration ought to be made, then it will be my duty at the earliest opportunity and in the most earnest manner to bring the matter before the War Cabinet, and if necessary before your Lordships' House.
LORD BUCKMASTER: My Lords, I feel certain that all your Lordships appreciated the evident anxiety of the noble Earl to give to the House all the information that was in his possession, that he lawfully could give, for the purpose of clearing up a very difficult situation; and I feel satisfied that it was unnecessary for the noble Earl to assure your Lordships that, if he retained the difficult office that he now holds, the sole reason that actuated him was a sense of public duty.
But though I listened attentively to what the noble Earl said, I found myself unable to think that he had cleared up the real difficulties by which this situation is surrounded. He said that the scheme which has led to the removal of Sir William Robertson from the great office that he held was a scheme which was practically originated by Sir William Robertson himself; and that, so far as I can understand, the reason why the country is deprived of services which I think everybody agrees it will be difficult to replace, is because of some disagreement as to the best method of carrying out a scheme upon which there was common consent. That certainly is a new and illuminating light upon the situation. But it seems rather difficult, if the fundamental question is whether or no the uncontrolled power is to remain in the hands of the Chief of the General Stall here, or whether that authority is to be shared and divided with some other authority at Versailles—if that be the fundamental principle at the back of the scheme, it seems quite impossible to understand how there could have been any difference in the method of carrying it out which could have led Sir William Robertson to be removed from the great office that he held.
My Lords, I think that the noble Earl found himself so restricted by the necessarily confidential character of the informa-
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tion in his possession that he was not at liberty to place before your Lordships matters that might have made this subject yet more clear. I feel that myself, and appreciate his reticence; but, of course, it prevents the possibility—it may be a good thing that it should—of anything like careful and critical investigation of the actual circumstances that have led up to the present position, and therefore I do not propose myself to embark upon them. One thing remains, and one thing seems clear. The scheme as disclosed may involve—nay more, I think, my Lords, must involve—this, that General Haig may at some critical moment find himself the subject of two different orders, and that he may not know—
THE EARL OF DERBY: No, no.
LORD BUCKMASTER: Then it must mean this, that the Chief of the General Staff is shorn of the whole of his authority. There can be no other alternative; and if that is the case it seems impossible that Sir William Robertson ever can have approved the scheme, and the reason why he is unable to carry it out becomes perfectly plain. I do not, however, propose to investigate this closely, for the reasons that I have already given. There is no doubt that the country has been startled, and rightly startled, by what has happened. They find that they have been deprived of the services of a man of whom the Secretary of State for War can honestly say that he has the highest possible opinion of his judgment as a strategist; and at this moment, when strategists may not be too plentiful and the need for their work was never greater, it certainly is a calamity, which it is impossible to measure, that by some means the country should have been deprived of the services of a man with such qualifications. Of course, there is more than that. It is not merely that Sir William Robertson commanded, as undoubtedly he did, the confidence of the noble Earl and of all the authorities with whom he was brought in contact; he had obtained to a peculiar degree the confidence of the people of this country. The outstanding merit of his career, the fact that he had succeeded to the great position to which he had attained from humble circumstances, unassisted by any favour or power—that fact has impressed itself indelibly upon the mind of the people, who, if slow to form impressions, are yet slower to give them up.

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Now, my Lords, Sir William Robertson's position it certainly is undesirable further to question or to canvass, and what I want to say is a few words about the way in which this startling change has been brought about. If the Government made up their minds that there was some proposal of theirs the execution of which they regarded as essential for the efficient carrying on of this war, they were bound to carry it through without regard to the personal position of any man who stood in their way. To remove a man of the eminence of Sir William Robertson would always be a difficult and very delicate task. It would require courage, but it would be a courage that the country would appreciate, were they quite satisfied that the action that preceded his removal had been merely prompted by those considerations that I have mentioned. It is impossible, however, in the circumstances that have happened, that any such confidence could be felt, and the reason is this.
Let us go back and see what within a few short weeks has been the unhappy history of this controversy. In the first place, we find that the Prime Minister makes a speech at Paris which certainly does not over-eulogise either Sir William Robertson or General Haig. He suggests that there should be some change of authority, and this leaves upon people's minds the impression that there has been an attempt at this Conference to supersede the whole of their authority by the creation of a person in the nature of a SuperGeneral—a person called by a phrase which I very much dislike, namely, a Generalissimo. The Prime Minister comes back and says that this had never been in the contemplation of the Conference, and had never been in their thoughts at all, and for the moment confidence is restored. After a while what is it that happens? There begins a most spiteful and personal attack upon Sir William Robertson in the Press. It begins in the Weekly Despatch; it is taken up in the Daily Mail—I have not pursued its course, but I have no doubt that it could be found to have been further followed in the Evening News. It was not finally adopted by The Times. That may have been because of the courage of the staff of The Times, or it may have been that they felt that public opinion was running so strongly against them that they did not desire to continue the campaign.
Now, my Lords, it is notorious that every
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one of these newspapers is under the control of Lord Northcliffe. That is a matter of no moment at all, if Lord Northcliffe were wholly dissociated from the Government; but if you find that Lord Northcliffe is the man whom the Government delights to honour, and that the Government is one which he delights to insult, it becomes quite impossible for people outside to understand how this campaign can be continued in the newspapers when he can stop it by lifting his finger, even if he had not lifted his finger as a signal that it should begin, and yet at the very climax that he should be further appointed to a position of honour and confidence under this very Government. It is that which people cannot understand, and I must say I do think it needs some explanation. The Government position would be perfectly plain if they had said at once. "We disapprove of these attacks. It may be that you are at liberty to make them, and there is no power in law by which you can be restrained." That would be right. But they should instantly have said to Lord Northcliffe, "In these circumstances you can have nothing to do with the Government, for attacking a great Government servant who cannot defend himself." Lord Northcliffe, again, was perfectly free to follow this course if he thought—and there was no reason to doubt that he did think that the course he was following was good for the country; but, once more, he had no right to retain the office of confidential relationship in which he stood to the Government. And, my Lords, I think some people, when they saw the statement recently in the newspapers that he had consented to act in a new capacity, may have wondered in what position of humiliation the Government approached him with the offer.
Then, last night in another place, a statement was made, in answer to a question, that the issues of the Daily Mail are before the Public Prosecutor for the purpose of considering what steps should be taken. My Lords, was there ever such a farce? Do the Government take three weeks if they are going to raid the offices of a Labour paper? Did they take three weeks to prosecute Colonel Repington and Mr. Gwynne? The Public Prosecutor is one of the most diligent and active, officials in the Government, and I will undertake to say that you could obtain his opinion and his direction within twenty-four hours if you so desire, and that if it really were the

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intention to take proceedings against this paper it could have been done before the mischief it had effected had had time to circulate. These are the things which make the people uneasy. They find themselves quite unable to understand how papers, so notoriously influenced by a man who apparently possesses in such a complete and supreme degree the confidence of the Government, can be permitted to go on in this manner, while other papers that have no influence (whose very names I have never before heard) are subject from day to day to severe penalties for matters which must, after all, constitute a far less grave offence.
Let me add one word in conclusion. I sincerely hope that neither the noble Earl (Earl Curzon) should he think fit to answer, nor the noble Viscount (Viscount Milner) who sits beside him, will think it is consistent with his dignity to repudiate the idea that he knew anything about this matter or had any control over it. I have never heard any man, not even the most acrid critic of the Government, ever suggest anything whatever of the kind. But, although the principle of divided responsibility in this new Government has been so divided that there is nothing left, the noble Earl will realise, I am certain, that he is a member of the Government, and that every one of these actions cannot possibly be put against the charge of one man alone. They must b actions for which the Government take responsibility, though the individual members may not be the people who are individually responsible. I sincerely trust that the noble Earl will be able to say something—and his ingenuity and his resource are great—which will put some explanation on this matter that people outside can understand. At the present moment they feel that Sir William Robertson has not really been removed as he should have been because he stood in the way of the carrying out of the Government scheme, but he has been removed through the instrumentality of newspaper attacks—newspaper attacks similar to those which they believe struck down Admiral Jellicoe just as they were directed against Lord Kitchener. Feeling the difficulty in which this country stands and the peril that lies before us, they will not be reassured unless the Government can give them some confident promise that these actions, which in my opinion have disgraced English journalism, shall not be repeated.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON): My Lords, the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition addressed your Lordships at the beginning of these proceedings with his usual moderation, with perfect good taste, and with an admirable sense of fair play. I have personally nothing to criticise, although I may have something to answer, in what fell from his lips. The noble and learned Lord who has just spoken has addressed your Lordships' House in a rather more polemical vein. He was not uninterested—indeed, he was deeply concerned—in the realities of the case which is under examination in your Lordships' House this afternoon. He complained that certain matters still remain obscure. He asked tae to clear up certain difficulties which existed in his own mind, and which he was under the impression would remain in the minds of the public after the proceedings of this afternoon. I will endeavour to the best of my ability to satisfy him in these respects.
But he went a little beyond that, and a good deal of his speech was devoted, not to the examination of the particular military issues raised by the decisions of Versailles or by the conduct of Sir William Robertson here. He was inclined to throw—indeed, he deliberately did throw—responsibility for much that he finds regrettable and even deplorable in recent events upon the Prime Minister and upon Lord Northcliffe. I do not conceive it to be any part of my duty to stand here in defence of what Lord Northcliffe or Lord Northcliffe's papers may have written. I have no knowledge of his degree of responsibility for what appears in his newspapers; and when the noble and learned Lord speaks, as he did—as he confidently did—of the confidential relations that prevailed between Lord Northcliffe and His Majesty's Government, these are relations of which I, at any rate, have no cognisance whatever.
Then the noble and learned Lord alluded to one particular incident in which a reference had been made to the Public Prosecutor with regard to articles that had appeared, I think, in the Daily Mail, and the noble and learned Lord seemed to suggest that there had been some delay—whether deliberate or accidental, I do not know; he almost suggested it was deliberate—in making that reference, and he said, Why do you spend three weeks in taking this action? My Lords, the noble and

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learned Lord was quite misinformed as to the facts. My recollection—and my noble friend Lord Milner will correct me if I am wrong—is that in that case, as in others, the moment a writing appears which is thought by the Government to be open to the suspicions of which I speak, reference is made at once. Reference was so made in this particular case, and it was because we were advised that there was no case for prosecution that we were unable to proceed.
LORD BUCKMASTER: Will the noble Earl forgive me? The statement in another place was that they were now under consideration.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord is referring to something that has happened since the articles of which I am speaking.
LORD BUCKMASTER: I should like to explain to what I did refer. I referred to an answer which I saw reported in one of the papers this morning to a question in another place last night. It might have been that the answer was misreported—I cannot say—but the answer I saw was that they were under consideration.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I do not know to what the noble and learned Lord is referring.
LORD BUCKMASTER: To the articles in the Daily Mail.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Which articles?
LORD BUCKMASTER: The articles, as I understand, against Sir William Robertson.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I think it must be some other articles. I thought that the noble and learned Lord was alluding to certain articles which appeared in the Daily Mail between three and four weeks ago, to which reference was made at that time. As to anything which has transpired during the past few days I cannot speak, not having read the answer given in the House of Commons to which the noble and learned Lord refers. I will endeavour to supplement the observations that were made by my noble friend the Secretary of State for War, and give the
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noble and learned Lord the further information that he desires. Let me say this, that I think any member of your Lordships House is quite entitled to ask that this situation, complex and obscure as it must inevitably be in some respects because of the reticence that has to be observed, should be made as clear as the exigencies of the public service render possible.
I think I need only allude in a passing sentence to one portion of the speech of my noble friend the Secretary of State for War—to that section of his speech in which he vindicated his personal conduct. No one who knows him would suspect him of any lack of loyalty to any officers serving under him. Every one of us knows that he did his best to retain the services of Sir William Robertson for the Army Council and for His Majesty's Government, and no one could imagine for a moment that, as regards the change in the position of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and modification of the Order in Council, my noble friend was animated by any desire to magnify the authority of the office which he himself holds. As he told us, he is sincerely convinced that the scheme agreed upon at Versailles is not only a practicable scheme, but is the best in the circumstances, and, whatever officer works in the responsible position of Chief of the Imperial General Staff, you may be sure that my noble friend will do his best to carry it into successful operation.
In the few remarks I have to make, I will endeavour to treat the case in its broadest aspect. It is quite true that this matter has got tangled up and overlaid with all sorts of minor, petty, personal, and trivial issues. I, for my part, will do my best to keep it clear of all those seaweeds into which it has got emmeshed. Here let me say that I most entirely endorse the language employed by the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition in relation to Press attacks upon important men. When politicians are the subject of these attacks nobody very much minds, least of all the politicians themselves. It is part of the business of public life. They have the opportunity to reply, and liberal discount is made by readers for any such invective of which they are made the victim. It is quite different in the case of officers who are serving their country in either of the great combatant services. For my part, I think the kind of attacks that have been made upon more than one distinguished

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officer in journals which have been named this afternoon are reprehensible in the highest degree. I know of no excuse. They seem to me to be utterly deplorable; and when the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition said that their effect on the public mind is deplorable, he used language which in my judgment—
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: Why do not the Government stop them?
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: If the noble Lord will allow me to proceed—is fully justified by the circumstances of the ease. The noble Lord who has just interrupted says, "Why do not the Government stop them? "Not five minutes ago I endeavoured to point out to the noble and learned Lord opposite the circumstances in which the Government have sought to act, but were unable to do so because of the legal advice which had been given to them.
Now, if I may, I will pass on to the main question before your Lordships' House. I agree with the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition that this is not a question that has to do with the merits of individuals; nor is it a matter which has to do with—and I hope your Lordships will absolutely sever it from—any question of military strategy. This is not a question of the Western Front against the Eastern Front, or of one plan of military operations rather than another. It is a question of broad military principle as to the conduct of the war. Now we may look at that principle, and form our opinion upon it, from two points of view. There is first the home aspect of the principle. No one in your Lordships' House will deny—it has been admitted by every speaker in the debate, and I remember that the principle was stated in the most effective language by Lord Buckmaster in a speech which he made some three weeks ago—that the civil power is supreme, and that it is the Cabinet which is responsible for the general conduct of the war. That duty and responsibility they accept; it can be devolved on no one else, and if the Government are satisfied that a change is required, either in the High Command or high official position—as has more than once happened in the course of the present war—it is for them to assume responsibility, to act, and to defend their conduct if it be impugned. I need not waste another sentence upon that.
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Now I come to the foreign aspect of the case, and here the principle for which the Government have been contending is that of greater unity of military control. For this, of course, some sacrifice of independence is required by every one of the parties to the Alliance. Towards that goal we have been steadily moving during the whole period for which I, at any rate, have been in office. Had we attained it earlier in the day the Alliance might, I think, have been spared some of the reverses which, owing to the superior advantages, resources, and acumen of the enemy in this respect, have fallen one after the other on some of the weaker of our Allies. We have been groping our way—slowly, perhaps to a single, united, co-ordinated, as against an isolated, dispersed, and incoherent military control. The first decisive step that was taken in this direction was the agreement that followed upon the Rapallo Conference, and took effect in the constitution of the Supreme War Council at Versailles. I need not, I think, say anything in exposition of that stage, because it was fully explained in another place and in your Lordships' House, and I think the principle of the constitution of that Council met with general, if not universal, agreement. The second stage was attained at Paris in the proceedings a fortnight ago.
The noble Marquess was quite right in saving that a new situation had developed, and that from it a new scheme, or a new form of the old scheme, emerged. The facts are well known to all of us. A great blow is believed to be impending in that quarter. We are in the midst of the hush that may precede the hurricane. It was deemed essential by the Allies that some authority should be constituted which should deal with the situation if it did arise, should concentrate forces, move forces and direct forces to the point of danger wherever it might occur. It was also necessary that the decisions of that body, however constituted, should be speedy, and that the actions taken upon them should be prompt. This was no new or startling development of the situation. It had long been foreseen. It was inevitable. I think that we may describe it as common sense; and upon this principle—upon the general scheme, as I think my noble friend more than once described it—all the Allies and all the military advisers of the Allies were agreed. There was no difference upon that whatso-

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ever. Let the House be quite clear upon that.
But while every one, both military and civil, was agreed upon the principle, it was quite possible to differ upon the machinery devised to carry that principle into effect. The question at once arose, What should that authority be? My noble friend the Secretary of State for War alluded to a plan which was put forward at the meeting of the Supreme Council in Paris—put forward, I think, under the auspices of the French—under which it was proposed that the new authority to exercise these powers hould be composed of the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the various Allied Powers. That was a proposal which, as we know, found much favour from our own military adviser, Sir William Robertson. When that proposal was put forward it was adversely criticised by the representatives of all the other Allies, and you can quite understand for what reasons it was so treated. In the first place, the United States could not send their Chief of General Staff because he is thousands of miles away across the water. Italy could not spare her Chief of General Staff, because he is wanted in their own country. We could not spare ours for the reasons stated by Lord Derby—namely, that our Chief of General Staff is our daily adviser, not merely upon France or Flanders, but upon every aspect of the war in every theatre of war, as he comes to the Cabinet table every morning. Further, it became clear, as the matter was more examined, that the creation of this new body as suggested, composed entirely of the Chiefs of General Staffs, would really dislocate rather than facilitate the movements of the machine, because it would be creating a new body whose relations with the military body of experts already existing at Versailles might be very difficult to compose. In these circumstances this proposal—I hope that I make myself clear, the proposal that the new authority should consist of the Chiefs of General Staffs of all the Allied countries—was dropped by common consent.
Then the Council had to find an alternative. There is one alternative which they did not discuss, for the reason that it had been already condemned. It is the alternative mentioned by the noble Marquess, Lord Crewe—namely, that there should be a single command, a single Generalissimo, of all the Allied Forces. To that there is the outstanding objection, mentioned by him, that there does not happen to be
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among the Allied Forces any individual possessing the commanding military personality and reputation which would render his choice equally acceptable to all the Powers. There are other objections which will easily come into our minds, but which, as the matter was not pursued, it is unnecessary for me to mention this afternoon. But the objections to a single commander, to a Generalissimo, did not, it must be clear to your Lordships, apply to a single authority and to a central control, and therefore it emerged, by a natural and almost inevitable process, that the body to be entrusted with these powers of acting in an exceptional emergency should be the body already existing at Versailles and consisting of the military representatives of the various Allied Powers.
The only change that was made in the composition of this body was that, for the purpose of sittings to discuss and to decide upon the matters of particular importance to which I refer, General Foch, the French Chief of General Staff, was substituted for the General—General Weygand by name—who is the French representative upon that body. Let me be quite clear upon this point. For all ordinary purposes General Weygand remains the French representative upon that body just as General Wilson was recently, and General Sir Henry Rawlinson is now, exactly under the same conditions, our representative upon that body. But for the exceptional circumstances which may arise from time to time General Weygand is replaced by General Foch as French representative. I think that the reason for that is obvious. It was not merely a compliment to General Foch's position and service during the war, but it was due to the fact that General Foch is on the spot, and it was really unreasonable and unnecessary to require General Weygand to refer for authority to his Chief of General Staff when that Chief of General Stall, being on the spot, could come there and give the authority himself. It was obvious that such a solution would really promote promptitude both of decision and of action. I think that I am right in saying that this is the only change that has been made in the composition of this body to whom these powers are to be given.
This proposal was accepted in conference by the whole of the Allies without dissent. It was not protested against at the time by General Robertson. General Robertson had already expressed his view in favour of the other solution, that of the Chiefs of

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General Staffs, and he did not, for reasons best known to himself, think it necessary to protest against this decision, which was accordingly unanimous. As regards Field-Marshal Haig, who also was present and had already been consulted upon the matter, he, as the noble Earl the Secretary of State has told us, has declared that this is a scheme under which he is perfectly prepared to work. You may say that this is a system of divided control. Yes, it is to a certain extent. If power of any sort must be given to Paris to act in the exceptional circumstances to which I refer, there is a certain division of authority; but, on the other hand, it is nothing like the division of authority that would have ensued had your representative at Paris been obliged to refer before coming to a decision, or before acting upon that decision in common with his colleagues, to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff at home. You can imagine, my Lords, how much more fruitful in delay that, division of authority would have been. It would have destroyed all corporate action and authority at Paris at the very moment when in all probability it was most essential.
This scheme which was decided upon by the Allies at Paris may have been a good or a bad one. I do not think that it is necessary for me to give an opinion—my opinion would be quite worthless upon the point—but it is undoubted that it was a far better scheme than anything which preceded it, and it also is the fact that it was unanimously accepted by the whole of our Allies, and by none with greater insistence or urgency than the Americans, who are now entering with such force into the war. This decision left two posts to be filled—the post at Paris and the post in London. I have explained, and I hope clearly defined, the nature of the post in Paris. As to the post in London, some question has been raised as to the modification of the Order in Council under which Sir William Robertson assumed office in the month of January, 1916. I very well remember those circumstances. They were quite exceptional. A power was given under the Order in Council to General Robertson which had been enjoyed by none of his predecessors. I remember having often heard it stated that the powers so given were anomalous and illogical in themselves and undoubtedly they placed the Army Council and the Secretary of State for War in a somewhat difficult position. But your Lordships will observe that the
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need for modification of those powers arose out of the altered circumstances in Paris. The Military Representative in Paris could not carry out orders while the Order in Council remained. I do not think I need labour the point, because, as my noble friend Lord Derby more than once stated in his speech, Sir William Robertson at no stage took objection to the suggested modification of the powers of the Chief of General Staff. To that he attached no importance, and any idea that an attempt was made to derogate from his position or prestige in this respect, or that such an attempt, if made, was resented by him, is, I can assure your Lordships, without any foundation.
There being these two posts, about which I hope I have been clear. Sir William Robertson was offered the choice of either. I must say that I hoped myself very earnestly indeed that he would accept the Paris post; and, in proportion as I heard him and others argue that for certain purposes greater power was now concentrated in Paris, so did I hope that he, with his great authority, experience, and influence, would be willing to fill that rôle. He did not. As regards the place at home, his reasons were equally clear for refusing. I will state in a moment what those reasons were. But let me say one word about the resignation. I confess that I think the point made by the noble and learned Lord (Lord Buckmaster) is without real substance. I see that Sir William Robertson says in the papers that he did not resign; but if two posts are created, or re-created in a new form, and the officer filling one of them in the old form declines to accept either, I must confess it is very difficult to describe his action by any other word than that of "resignation." And if the word "dismissal" is used, I must most emphatically and earnestly repudiate the idea that at any moment there has been, or could be, on the part of the Government, any parting in an abrupt or imperious way with an officer of the character, service, and distinction of Sir William Robertson.
Sir William Robertson's reasons for refusing either or both of these offices were, I think, perfectly clear, and entirely honourable to him. He refused the post at Paris because he thought that our Military Representative there should be either the Chief of the Imperial General Staff under the proposal that I have before described, or that he should be a deputy of the Chief of the General Staff, subordinate to, and

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taking his orders from him. The geographical difficulties in the way of that being done have already been referred to. And he refused the home appointment because he could not accept responsibility for executive action which was not his own. He was not content, as regards Paris, to accept a position which has been accepted and is being acted upon by the Military Representatives of all the other Allied Powers—of America, of Italy, and, with the slight modification that I have mentioned, of France. And as regards the position at home, I do not presume to dictate for a moment the action of an officer such as General Robertson. If he was unable to continue to fill the post of Chief of the Imperial General Staff at home, unless he had supreme, absolute, and unfettered control in France, well, we cannot dispute his judgment in that respect, and he was entitled to act upon it. What I do submit to your Lordships is this, that in these circumstances the Government had no other alternative but to accept the resignation of General Robertson.
One point let me make clear before I conclude. It is a point, I think, which was made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Buckmaster, about the position of Sir Douglas Haig and the extent to which his powers might be affected by the decisions that have been arrived at. It is a perfectly fair point, and I believe I can answer it. I think it might be inferred from the acceptance of the scheme by the Field-Marshal that no such diminution or disparagement of his authority was really involved. The question put by the noble and learned Lord was, Will the Field-Marshal Commanding in France remain under the orders of the Chief of the Imperial Staff here to the same extent that he was before? The answer to that is in the affirmative. The relations between him and the Army Council, including the Chief of the General Staff, remain the same as they were before, except in so far as they are modified, if they are modified at all, by the modification of the Order in Council. And be it remembered that the Commander-in-Chief in France has never been in the habit of receiving orders from the Chief of the General Staff here as to the movements of his troops. That is a matter in his own hands, and in his own control.
LORD BERESFORD: Will it be now?
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Yes. I was just going to answer that question. He will retain exactly the same control over his troops as he does now. The only difference in the position is that the military authorities in Paris will have at their disposition certain troops from the Allied forces which they can either add in certain contingencies to the troops of the Field-Marshal commanding the British troops, or take away and send to another point where they may be required. That is the only difference in the situation, and I hope that the noble and learned Lord will now understand how and why it is that the Field-Marshal commanding in France has been in a position to accept this scheme.
LORD BUCKMASTER: I understand that he is deprived of the control of his reserves.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: No.
LORD BUCKMASTER: Then I do not see what the Council does.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: If I find it a little difficult to go into this question of the reserves—
LORD BUCKMASTER: I thought that was what the noble Earl had said.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I do not think I used the word.
LORD BUCKMASTER: I thought you did, but I beg your pardon.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I thought I had made myself clear, but if I did not, and the noble and learned Lord requires any further elucidation, I will endeavour to give it to him. I have only to say, in conclusion, that the decision of His Majesty's Government involved no disparagement of or loss of confidence whatsoever in Sir William Robertson. I have had the honour of sitting in the same council chamber with that distinguished General for more than two years, and he has continuously shown there an organising capacity, a courage, a force of character, and an independence of judgment which have enabled him to render invaluable assistance to the Government and to the State. We all of us know that General Robertson is a great soldier. I have had

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the opportunity of seeing that he has also been a great servant of the State; and nowhere has Sir William Robertson acted with greater loyalty than in this willingness, in the circumstances which I have described, to accept the Command to which he has been appointed. Sir William Robertson, though he leaves for the time being our service in Downing-street, carries, away not merely the esteem and admiration of his colleagues but the gratitude of the whole community for what he has done.
We have to accept the situation in the form in which it has developed and to go on with the war; and I think it would be a great misfortune if we allowed ourselves to be diverted from the strenuous prosecution of the war by the pursuance of personal or political controversies. There is not, so far as I am aware, any crisis. Sir William Robertson had acted in a perfectly legitimate way in the conscientious discharge of what he felt to be his duty in the circumstances; and in view of what passed at Paris and of our agreement with our Allies, I hope I have successfully shown to your Lordships that His Majesty's Government acted with a full sense of responsibility, and in the only manner that was open to them, after the obligations into which they had entered at Versailles.
LORD BUCKMASTER: Will the House permit me to verify the quotation that I made? I am sure that the noble Earl will be glad to know exactly what transpired. A Question was asked of the Home Secretary, whether Mr. Lovat Fraser's article, attacking Sir William Robertson, which appeared in the Daily Mail of January 21 last, was submitted to and passed by the Censor; and, if not, whether any action was to be taken? The answer was, "The article in question was not submitted to the Press Bureau; it is under the consideration of the Director of Public Prosecutions." May I add that I appreciate that, with the many cares on the mind of the noble Earl, he would not remember a thing so small as that?
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: But I do remember it perfectly. My recollection is this, that the reference was made something like three weeks ago.
LORD BUCKMASTER: My point was that this matter had been for over three weeks before the Public Prosecutor, and that, had it been desired to proceed, his answer could have been obtained certainly
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in three days. I understood the noble Earl to say, in answer, that the matter had been considered and dealt with by the Public Prosecutor, and that it was no longer under his consideration. But the answer is that it is under the consideration of the Public Prosecutor.
THE EARL OF DERBY: May I say that I do not know why that answer was given. As a matter of fact, the question was submitted at once to the Public Prosecutor, and he intimated that he did not think a prosecution would lie.
VISCOUNT CHAPLIN: Who gave the answer in the House of Commons?
LORD BUCKMASTER: The home Secretary, the person responsible for prosecution.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: My Lords, I do not propose to carry on further the discussion in which the noble and learned Lord has just taken part; but I do not think that it will be an impeachment of the fullness and the frankness of the explanations of the two noble Earls who have spoken from the opposite side of the House if I say that even after those explanations the whole subject appears to me to be left in a very unsatisfactory position. We all agree as to the great loss which the country is going to sustain by the withdrawal of Sir William Robertson, but we are left absolutely without any hope by the Government that his services may be retained, or used, in the main and critical position in which they have hitherto been at the disposal of the country. In these discussions about the Press, everybody is agreed that attacks on Generals and Admirals are greatly to be deprecated; but we have heard nothing from the Ministerial Bench to justify us in hoping that steps will be taken which will prevent this sort of thing going on in the future.
Several NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: Please do not let it be supposed that I am impeaching either the ability or the efficiency of the distinguished owners of various journals who are at present serving in the Government. I am the last man to wish to say a word in this House deprecating the action of the Prime Minister in calling to his assistance all the ability which he can

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command at the present moment. But is it not obvious, if every month some fresh newspaper proprietor is added to the ranks of the Government, that it is impossible to suppose that the Government are going to spend their whole time prosecuting their own colleagues? We have hardly opened our papers during the last few days without seeing that some gentleman whose distinction has been in connection with the Press has been given a post in which the most intimate knowledge might come to him personally. It is absolutely impossible that a man should stand in two different capacities—knowing on the one side, and not being held responsible for what appears in his newspapers on the other side. I hope that it will be clearly understood that all newspaper proprietors who are honoured, or who make the great sacrifice of their time in order to serve the Government at this critical moment, will at the same time enter into honourable undertakings that they are not responsible for what is going on in their newspapers. Nobody ever asks that a man should give up his private business when he joins the Government; but nobody has even supposed that a gentleman holding a great position in the commercial world—such as the noble Lord, Lord Rhondda, held before he joined the Government—would at the same time that he was a Minister be responsible for the great commercial operations which he had hitherto controlled. I am aware that Lord Rhondda has given up an immense amount of private work in order to carry out a most difficult, and, perhaps, thankless task. Therefore I am not saying it in any way as a matter of attack. I say merely that the two things are incompatible, and that it is absolutely impossible for the two postions to be held at the same time.
I desire to say a few words only on two points; became I feel that it will be necessary for us to return to this discussion, with fuller information, on another occasion. I see one very grave point which I will mention for the consideration of the Government. I wonder whether your Lordships noted that in his speech the Secretary of State for War told us he had to act simply as the agent of the Government? Sir William Robertson and his colleagues had to go to Versailles. Sir William Robertson and other members of the Government sit on the Army Council. The Secretary of State for War, who is supreme over Sir William Robertson, whose business it is, not to dictate policy, but to
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collate the opinions of his military advisers and to give the orders on which the Chief of the General Staff acts—the Secretary of State for War is neither aware of what has taken place in France, except at secondhand; nor is he aware, except at secondhand, of what has taken place at 10, Downing-street. I look upon the position as an impossible one. Nothing is more likely to lead to these complications, which involve—temporarily only, I hope—the loss of one of the greatest military intellects which has ever been employed in the public service in my lifetime, than the fact that Sir William Robertson was present and had to take, perhaps, one idea of what the result of the colloquies at Versailles would be, and the Secretary of State for War hears only some days afterwards and at second-hand what has taken place. I can see how these things have arisen; but I urge the noble Earl the Leader of the House, who is a great master of efficiency, somehow or other to sweep away an arrangement which is altogether inefficient.
The Secretary of State for War requires, and should have, a seat on the War Council. Let me compare his position with that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has an immense amount of work in the House of Commons. He happens to have had no previous military experience; and he certainly is not in daily touch, as is the Secretary of State for War, with military affairs. Yet the Chancellor of the Exchequer is expected, giving a sort of byproduct of his time, to be present at the War Council, while the Secretary for War told us only this evening that he acted as agent of the Government to convey the decisions taken by the Council at whose meetings he was not present.
THE EARL OF DERBY: I must contradict, if I may, the noble Viscount. As regards Paris, that is perfectly true; but as regards the War Cabinet, I attend every one of its meeting and am present throughout when any matters connected with the military situation are under discussion. I do not, naturally, stay for the discussions regarding other Departments, which do not concern me. But whenever there are discussions on military matters, I am there from beginning to end.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: If that is so, I think it is unlucky that the noble Earl was not also present at Versailles, because

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I imagine that matters had gone too far before they reached him for him to intervene. After all, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. We are in the presence of a very serious difficulty—the great difficulty of which Lord Curzon told us—that there is to be a certain division of control; and I will only say, in passing, that division of control affects this country far more acutely than it does Italy, or France, or America, which is not yet so fully engaged in the war, and is not responsible for so large a front as we are. That in itself give us cause for anxiety. The noble Earl said that if Sir William Robertson's own plan had been adopted, of a Chief of Staff who should be at the same time at Versailles and in London, which he pointed out was impossible, there might be differences between London and Versailles. My fear is that there may be difficulties between Versailles and Paris and St. Omar. If the time comes when we are allowed to discuss matters in Secret Session, I may be able to supply the Government with some information which even they may not have at their command.
Another cause for anxiety is this. Lord Derby gave us in the most frank manner a statement as to how it was that Sir William Robertson had to give way, or to withdraw, or resign, or whatever the proper expression may be. I dare say he may remember a remark which I think was made by Lord Macaulay—namely, that if Mr. Pitt had succeeded his elder brother and become a member of this House during all the European complications, it would have been almost the same as if the Duke of Wellington had been withdrawn from the Peninsula in order to become the Governor of Chelsea Hospital. I believe that nine Englishmen out of every ten feel that the withdrawal of Sir William Robertson and sending him to a minor command in Great Britain is one of the most lamentable and unfortunate episodes that could possibly have occurred. I do not think any member of this House can remember any man who, previously comparatively unknown, has for so long a period commanded so very great an amount of public confidence, and the testimony to whom we have heard this evening makes it appear to us absolutely necessary that by some means or other he should be recalled to office.
My Lords, I am not going to say any more about these attacks, but I confess I do agree with the sentiments of approval which your Lordships expressed when Lord
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Buckmaster, a few moments ago, said, "Practically yesterday we had attacks on Lord Jellicoe, and he went; to-day on Sir William Robertson, and he goes "; to morrow it may be Admiral Beatty and Sir Douglas Haig. We do not want to exhaust the whole of our military and naval experts—names of men in whom the Army and the Navy have confidence. I do not believe anybody desires it less than the Government. But it ïs simply because these subjects fill us with profound anxiety—not so far as I am concerned with suspicion—lest the best is not attempted to be done, that we desire to reserve judgment as to whether the step which has been taken is a wise one, and we ask the noble Earl the Leader of the House not to shut his mind to the possibility that at an early date we may return to this subject. If he desires that such discussion should not take place publicly, I am quite certain that your Lordships would be equally glad in Secret Session to put before the Government such information and advice as your Lordships may have in order that there may be no repetition of the difficulties which certainly have been the subject of profound disappointment to the country.
LORD BERESFORD: My Lords, I viewed with great anxiety the resignation of Sir William Robertson, but I am far more anxious since hearing the speeches of Lord Curzon and Lord Derby, because they both admitted that this new scheme is to be divided military control. With divided military control you are going to lead straight to chaos. We have not been told who is to be senior and who is to give the orders. There is to be a Chief of the Staff in London, there is to be Lord Derby, there is to be some information which is to be referred from the officer at Versailles to the Chief of Staff and Lord Derby, and on other occasions, although Lord Curzon was not very clear about it, the officer at Versailles is to give the orders; that is to say, for fighting. He has to have charge of the reserves or to be able to shift the reserves, French or English, where he likes. You are going to have divided control. Sir William Robertson left—whether he was dismissed or resigned I do not enter into—but he has left. He is a man in whom the whole country has had confidence, and yet at a time when we are going to enter upon the greatest battle of the war—that is the moment, when you are (Tossing the stream, that you select for changing horses.

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I think Sir William Robertson was perfectly right to leave To an officer who is asked to undertake any plan that he does not think is sound, which he believes will lose his Army or his country, there is only one of two alternatives. He must refuse to undertake that plan. He should resign, and if the Government do not agree with him, the Government are absolutely right to get rid of him. Let me take my own case. It comes to the same thing, although it was in peace time, and therefore not so important. When I was in command of the Channel Fleet, the Fleet was divided into three. There were three Naval controls. I expostulated again and again, and said it would be fatal in time of war. I also complained about the trade routes, and I told the Government, again and again, that our danger would be our food supply in time of war. The Government did not agree with me, and they were perfectly right to dismiss me. The way they dismissed me was most ignoble, and I felt it keenly, and so did the Service, but when you are dismissed as a soldier or a sailor your first duty is self-abnegation. The only point to which I will now refer is the fact that things I then prophesied have come true—namely, in the matter of food. I am sure that Sir William Robertson will not blame the Government if we have, as I think we shall have, disaster, if they stick to their present plan. Why should not Sir William Robertson have his deputy at Versailles? General Foch has, and I believe all the other Governments have their deputies at Versailles.
Lord Curzon made a great point that the Allies wished this scheme. Yes, but we have to think of ourselves. If this appointment is so necessary, why could not the Chief of the Staff be sent to Versailles? Let him remain there if he is to give these orders. He was a big man, but the Government could have ordered him to go there, and that arrangement would have been very effective. In my humble opinion Sir William Robertson was absolutely right to decline altogether to take either one of these positions where there was dual military control. I look forward with the gravest anxiety to this new disposition. I think you will have confusion. I think you will have what you have got already—great want of confidence among the soldiers in the trenches owing to this cowardly Press campaign. The noble Lord shakes his head. I have seen many officers and many men who read in the evening what
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you read in the morning and they see that so many thousands of men have been massacred by bad leadership, according to this Press campaign. I am amazed that the Government do not say this has got to stop. We shall have it again. I was subjected to it for months. There was no abuse too great. Questions concerning my seamanship and ability were put in the most ruffianly way in the Press before I was superseded. I did not care a bit. It was peace time. It makes a great difference in war time. You saw the same thing in the case of Admiral Jellicoe. It is a disgrace that some noble Lords who own this Press and are in the Government should have the power and should blackguard these officers in the way they do, when these noble Lords are in the Government and see the Prime Minister every day. I ask your Lordships if it is not a disgrace which ought to be stopped. My noble friend Lord Curzon smiles, but he knows perfectly well I am right. As one who knows Sir William Robertson very intimately I can say that no words that have been spoken from that Bench can be too great in praise of that officer. He has come out with flying colours now. According to all the principles of fighting he was perfectly right, if he did not like a plan, to say he would not undertake it. The Government were also perfectly right to dismiss him if they did not agree with him. I have ventured to cite my own case, and I hope that Sir William Robertson will not have his fears realised as mine have been with regard to the food supply.

THE CHAIRMAN OE COMMITTEES.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, I beg to make the Motion standing in my name.
Moved, That the Lord Kintore (E. Kintore) be appointed to take the Chair in all Committees of this House in the absence of the Viscount Hutchinson (E. Donoughmore); that the Lord Kintore do take the Chair in all Committees of the Whole House unless where it shall have been otherwise directed by the House; that the Lord Kintore do also take the Chair in all Committees upon Private Bills and other matters unless where it shall have been otherwise directed by the House.—(Earl Curzon of Kedleston.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

THE MINISTRY OF FOOD.
VISCOUNT CHAPLIN VISCOUNT CHAPLIN rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can give approximately the total cost of the Ministry of Food from the time of its establishment up to the present time. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I have not the slightest intention of raising any debate on this Question, but there are two things I want to say. The first is to express my regret to the noble Lord the Food Controller that I should have selected to-day quite inadvertently, because, owing to my lack of knowledge of the practice of your Lordships' house. I was under the impression that the Question would be reached at half-past four. If I had known that it was to be delayed I would certainly have sought some other opportunity of raising the matter instead of keeping the noble Lord here all this time. The other thing is that I have received numbers of communications from all parts of the country from people who were under the impression that I was going to raise the whole question of our food supply to-day. Many have reached me since I came to the House, and two more since I left for a few moments a short time ago. I swish to state publicly to-night that a Motion on this subject of which I have given notice is on the Paper for Wednesday, February 27, when I hope to move the Resolution which appears in my name. All I have now to do is to ask the Question as it stands on the Paper, on which I desire to have the information if I can get it. Again, I say that I regret that I should have unfortunately selected this opportunity of asking the Question.
THE FOOD CONTROLLER (LORD RHONDDA): My Lords, the Question on the Notice Paper asks the Government if they can give approximately the total cost of the Ministry of Food from the time of its establishment up to the present time. The cost from December, 1916, when the Ministry was formed, to the end of December, 1917, including both months, is practically £153,000. But if I left it at that I think I should give the House an entirely wrong impression as to the cost of the Department at the present time. This is a new Department. Naturally, at the outset, before our activities really came into anything like full operation—they have not done that vet, I may say—the cost was small, but it has been growing ever since. I think, perhaps, it would be more in
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accordance with the wishes of the noble Viscount if I tell him the cost for December last. The expenditure during that month was £42,000. That includes salaries, the cost of investigation, incidental expenses, and the Food Campaign. The cost has naturally been gradually increasing over the whole of the past twelve months since the Ministry was first established, and it will certainly continue to increase for some little time to come.
VISCOUNT CHAPLIN: Likely to increase?
LORD RHONDDA: It is likely to continue to increase for some time. Increasing expenditure will be incurred for instance in connection with the rationing scheme. It is impossible to estimate the increased cost until we know how far the organisations set up with local authorities will have to be increased. It is hoped—and I trust this is not merely the expression of a pious wish—that all direct and indirect administrative costs will be covered by margins received in connection with the sale of commodities. The cost may appear to noble Lords to be high, and as I say it is a growing cost, but it is small on the immense business that we do—on turnover if I may so describe it—in obtaining supplies and in distributing the food for 45,000,000 people, which involve an enormous sum. I have no close estimate of what the food consumption would amount to in value for the whole country, but it probably exceeds £700,000,000, or at the rate of over £60,000,000 a month, and, having regard to that, the expenditure on the administrative expenses of the Food Ministry is considerably less than one-tenth of one per cent. It must be remembered that the expenditure of the Ministry covers not only the case of commodities purchased for retail, but also the controlling of maximum prices and distribution, in addition to the enforcement of orders and propaganda. It may interest the noble Lord to know that the cost would have been considerably larger were it not for the fact that a number of business men give their services to the Department free of remuneration. The staff is, of course, a very large one at present. The headquarters staff of the Ministry of Food amounts to 3,500, of whom 2,500 are women. Of the 560 responsible positions at headquarters, 65, or 11 per cent., are filled by Civil Servants, and about 45 per cent. by business men.

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Sixty of these business men receive no remuneration; they are voluntary. Eighty, or about 14 per cent. of the positions are filled by women, one of whom is a Civil Servant. The noble Viscount has just stated that he proposes to-morrow week to raise the whole question of the policy of food administration, and if there is any further information he requires on that occasion, with regard to the expenditure and the constitution of the staff, I shall be very happy to give it.
VISCOUNT CHAPLIN: I am greatly obliged to the noble Lord.

A PERSONAL EXPLANATION.
LORD BERESFORD: My Lords, on the Motion for the adjournment, I should like to make a personal explanation. On January 17 I made certain statements to
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your Lordships about Mr. Laszlo, which were based on information that I regarded as authoritative and bona fide. Amongst those statements I said that Mr. Laszlo had been in communication with Count Luxburg. I now find that this statement is incorrect, and I beg to express regret that I made it. I think it is my bounden duty to do so, both with regard to Mr. Laszlo and your Lordships' House.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn, and I suggest that after our sitting to-morrow your Lordships should adjourn until Tuesday of next week.
House adjourned at fifteen minutes before seven o'clock.