Sitting of 20 July 1916

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.
REVENUE DEPARTMENTS (SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1916–17).
Estimate presented of further Sum required to be voted for the service of the year ending 31st March, 1917 [by Command]; referred to the Committee of Supply, and to be printed. (No. 103.]
PUBLIC WORKS LOANS BILL.
Return presented relative thereto [order 19th July; Mr. McKinnon Wood]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 104.]
PUBLIC SERVICES IN INDIA (ROYAL COMMISSION).
Copy presented of Report of the Royal Commission appointed to examine and report upon certain matters in connection with the Public Services in India [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

CALEDONIAN CANAL.
Paper laid upon the Table by the Clerk of the House:—Copy of One hundred and eleventh Report of the Commissioners of the Caledonian Canal [by Act]; to be printed. [No. 105.]
Great Central and Sheffield District Railways Bill [Lords].
Reported, with Amendments [Title amended]; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
  WAR.

    ALLIES' CITIZENS (DEPORTATION).
    Mr. KINGasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has now obtained information from the British Embassy in Paris concerning the Durk-heim Commission on Aliens in France, concerning the policy of the French Govern-
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    ment on the repatriation or deportation of allied citizens, and concerning the permission given to Russians in France to proceed to America?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Lord Robert Cecil): Inquiry has been made of His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, and as soon as a reply is received I will inform the hon. Member.
    Mr. KING: Will the Noble Lord inform the House also, because I have another question on the subject?
    Lord R. CECIL: Of course. I shall inform the House if the hon. Member thinks it necessary.
    Mr. KING: I do.
    Mr. KINGasked whether the Japanese Government has asked that Japanese subjects in the British Empire of military age should be returned to Japan to join the Japanese Army; and whether the Japanese Government has been asked to deport British subjects of military age now in Japan?
    Lord R. CECIL: The answer to both parts of the question is in the negative.
    Mr. KINGasked whether the Portuguese Government has asked that Portuguese subjects in the British Empire of military age should be returned to Portugal to join the Portuguese army; and whether the Portuguese Government has been asked to deport British subjects of military age now in Portugal?
    Lord R. CECIL: The answer to both parts of the question is in the negative.

    FOODSTUFFS FOR BELGIUM.
    Mr. PRINGLEasked, in view of the admitted facts that the importation of foodstuffs by the Neutral Relief Commission makes Belgian products available for the Germans, and the distribution of these foodstuffs is being used as a means of obtaining forced labour in Belgium, what action the Government propose to take?
    Lord R. CECIL: I cannot agree that the facts alleged are admitted, and there is consequently no ground for suggesting that His Majesty's Government should change their policy.
    Mr. PRINGLE: Has the Government not admitted that the distribution of foodstuffs has been used as a means of obtaining forced labour, and has Dot the Foreign Office issued a communication to the Press to that effect?
    Lord R. CECIL: I do not think so. If the hon. Member reads the communication I do not think he will come to the conclusion that it means that.
    Mr. PRINGLEasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether he can state, for the period from 31st October, 1915 to 30th June, 1916, the amount distributed by the Neutral Relief Commission in Belgium by way of separation allowances and other similar charges on behalf of the Belgian Government, the value of foodstuffs, etc., distributed by way of relief to the civil population, and the value of foodstuffs sold by the Commission; how payment is made for the purposes of the exchange in respect of these sales; and whether and, if so, to what extent goods are exported from Belgium as payment for the goods sold by the Commission?
    Lord R. CECIL: The total expenditure of the Relief Commission in Belgium from the 31st October, 1915, to the 31st May, 1916, was £6,471,399 12s. 3d. As regards values of foodstuffs, I am having copies of all the Relief Commission's published Reports placed in the Library of the House, where they can be consulted for such information. For the most part, the Commission does not operate exchanges in respect of money received by it in Belgium from the sale of foodstuffs, but it does do so to a comparatively small extent by receiving outside Belgium moneys for transfer to persons in Belgium, the moneys thus received being devoted to the purchase of foodstuffs outside Belgium, while equivalent payments are made in Belgium out of the proceeds of the sale of foodstuffs to the persons to whom the money was to be transferred. The answer to the last part of the question is in the negative, with the possible exception of small amounts of articles, such as lace, which the Commission has occasionally been able to export and sell for the benefit of its funds.
    Mr. PRINGLE: Can the Noble Lord say the exact amount of the proceeds of the sale of foodstuffs in Belgium?
    Lord R. CECIL: No, Sir; I cannot answer that without notice.
    Mr. PRINGLE: But it is on the Paper.
    Lord R. CECIL: I am very sorry I did not notice the inquiry as to the specific amount.

    PRESS MESSAGES.
    Mr. LYNCHasked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the importance of establishing between this country and the United States complete confidence and cordial relations, he will advise the abolition or modification of the present censorship on news?
    Lord R. CECIL: I do not think that there is any reason to suppose that the censorship as now exercised in regard to Press messages to the United States of America is at all likely to interfere with the confidence and cordial relations between the two countries The censorship is established for military reasons and its abolition or modification cannot be recommended except on military grounds.
    Mr. LYNCH: May I ask if the Noble Lord heard the Prime Minister remark the other day that it was necessary there should be the freest interchange of opinion?
    Lord R. CECIL: I do not think there is anything inconsistent in what I have just said and what the Prime Minister said.
    Mr. LYNCHasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether news which has already been passed by the Censor in regard to circulation in this country is liable to a further censorship before publication in Australia; and whether, in view of the importance of maintaining complete mutual confidence, he will advise the relaxation of the regulations of the Censor with reference to Australia, and encourage a free draught of public opinion, to and from, between this country and the Dominions generally?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for the COLONIES (Mr. Steel-Maitland): Telegrams received in Australia are subject to censorship there. I see no reason for suggesting any alteration of the existing system.
    Mr. LYNCH: But the question specifically asks, is there a censorship in addition to the censorship exercised with reference to this country?
    Mr. STEEL-MAITLAND: In reference to what the hon. Member is asking, at any rate reports of proceedings in this House are not subject to any censorship.
    Mr. LYNCH: Yes, but that is only part of the question. I ask a specific question, and I ask for a precise answer. In addition to the censorship exercised with regard to news in this country, is there a censorship intervening before that news reaches Australia?
    Mr. STEEL-MAITLAND: I will make quite certain and let the hon. Member know.

    CYPRUS.
    Mr. ANNAN BRYCEasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether when the offer of the cession of Cyprus was made to Greece it was made a condition that the burden of the tribute was to be transferred to that country?
    Lord R. CECIL: The answer is in the negative.

    TUBERCULOSIS TREATMENT (IRELAND).
    Mr. P. MEEHANasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is aware of the need for adequate provision for patients in advanced infectious stages of tuberculosis in Ireland; whether he is aware that the effectiveness of the work of the local committees is seriously hampered by such cases spreading infection; and whether immediate steps will be taken to secure proper provision for such cases?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. Herbert Samuel): The importance of securing the isolation of patients in an advanced stage of tuberculosis has been duly recognised by the Irish Local Government Board, who have lost no opportunity of bringing the subject to the attention of the county councils. The matter, however, is complicated by the necessity of affording accommodation for such cases in reasonable proximity to their homes, as well as by difficulties of finance and management which would result from the establishment of numerous specialised institutions. The
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    recommendation which the Board have addressed to all county councils has proceeded on the lines of the utilisation of the union isolation hospitals for this purpose by means of their transfer from the boards of guardians to the sanitary authorities, and their subsequent adaptation for the reception of advanced tuberculosis patients. This suggestion is receiving attention.
    Mr. MEEHANasked the Home Secretary whether the Local Government Board have yet adopted a scheme for the domiciliary treatment of tuberculosis patients in Ireland; if he is aware that the Local Government Board suspended the domiciliary part of schemes adopted by county committees in Ireland pending the preparation of an All-Ireland scheme; and whether, in the event of an All-Ireland scheme not being put into operation at once, the Local Government Board will permit county committees who have adopted domiciliary schemes of their own to put such schemes into operation at once?
    Mr. SAMUEL: Domiciliary treatment of tuberculous patients is being carried out under the schemes of a number of county councils, but the Irish Local Government Board have advised the councils to proceed tentatively in this matter, pending the complete organisation of their dispensary arrangements. In a few instances the Board, in accordance with instructions from the Treasury by whom half the net cost of approved schemes for the treatment of tuberculosis is recouped, have taken exception to a monetary allowance for the purchase of ordinary subsistence for a tuberculosis patient under domiciliary treatment.
    Mr. MEEHAN: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the domiciliary treatment of patients cost 10s. as against a much larger amount per week for sanatorium treatment; that there are a number of cases in Ireland which are fit for home treatment; and whether this scheme of the Local Government Board will be put into operation at once?
    Mr. SAMUEL: I will bear in mind what the hon. Member has said.

    COUNTY INSPECTOR, COUNTY CARLOW.
    Mr. MEEHANasked the Home Secretary whether Major Price, who is

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    acting as intelligence officer at Army headquarters, is still county inspector of Carlow and drawing the salary of that office; if he will state who is at present performing the duties of Major Price as county inspector, and what salary is such person receiving for such duties; what salary Major Price receives as county inspector and the total amount of all payments made to Major Price from military sources since his appointment as intelligence officer; and if Major Price since his appointment as county inspector of Car-low never performed any of the duties of that office while receiving full salary from the date of his appointment?
    Mr. SAMUEL: Major Price's position continues to be as explained, in reply to the hon. Member's question of the 23rd March last. Pending Major Price's release from military duties the supervision of the county of Carlow has been entrusted to the county inspector of the adjoining county of Wicklow, who is in receipt of his ordinary rate of pay only. Major Price's annual pay as county inspector is at present £370, with the usual allowances for lodging and servant. From the date in August, 1914, on which he took up military duty to the end of last month he has drawn about £526 in subsistence allowance, this being a charge on military funds. The reply to the last part of the question is in the affirmative, as Major Price remains an officer of the constabulary, receiving no military pay.
    Mr. MEEHAN: Has he ever performed any duties in the county for which he receives his salary?
    Mr. SAMUEL: No, I understand he has not taken up his active appointment.

    SHOP-WORKERS' HOLIDAY
    Mr. ANDERSONasked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that practically the whole of the shops of the country kept open on Whit Monday, the shop workers foregoing their holiday without extra remuneration; and whether the Government will recommend that, in lieu of Whit Monday, Tuesday, 8th August, should be observed as a holiday in the distributive trade.
    Mr. SAMUEL: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave to the hon. Member for West Carmarthenshire on Monday last.
    Mr. ANDERSON: Seeing that these shop workers on the last occasion worked without any extra remuneration at all, cannot the Home Office recommend to employers on this occasion that, if they do work the extra day, they should at least be paid for it?
    Mr. SAMUEL: I will consider that suggestion.
    Mr. T. DAVIES: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that most of those working in shops had the extra holiday?

    NATURALISED BRITISH SUBJECTS.
    Mr. R. MCNEILLasked the Home Secretary if he can say whether Mr. Sehmer, of Toat Farm, Pulborough, was one of the three naturalised British subjects of whom the late Home Secretary stated on the 9th of June, 1915, that an Order in Council to cover those cases was then being obtained; whether he is aware that Sehmer, a German naturalised shortly before the outbreak of war, is connected with the family of that name owning one of the largest armament factories in Germany; if he will ascertain and state the result of the inquiry about this man promised by the late Under-Secretary of State for War on the 19th of May, 1915; if he will say whether Sehmer has ever been interned under the Order in Council referred to; if he is aware that Sehmer is now residing in a house facing the sea at 21, South Terrace, Littlehampton; and whether, having regard to the circumstances mentioned, it is proposed to allow this man of hostile origin and association to remain uninterned?
    Mr. SAMUEL: Mr. Sehmer, by reason of his German origin, could be dealt with under the Defence of the Realm Regulation 14B if there was reason to think that, for the purpose of securing the public safety or the defence of the realm, it was necessary to place restrictions upon him. Mr. Sehmer has not been interned under this Regulation and the consideration which has been given in his case by the proper authorities has not disclosed any reason for interning him. Mr. Sehmer is not residing and has not resided at Littlehampton; he has only been there for short visits while his British-born wife and family were staying there recently for a few weeks. I understand that my right

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    hon. Friend the Secretary for Scotland communicated with the hon. Member as to the inquiry referred to.
    Mr. McNEILL: No.

    DISTURBANCES IN IRELAND.

      CASES UNDER CONSIDERATION.
      Mr. FIELDasked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been directed to the shooting of Malachy Brennan by soldiers in Capel Street; whether he has received statements of fact concerning this case; and whether he will have a public inquiry into the matter?
      Mr. F. MEEHANasked whether an impartial inquiry will be held into the action of a company of one Sherwood Foresters, under command of Captain Jackson, in destroying property to the value of £15 on the night of the 13th May last while in forcible possession of St. Clare's Hall, Manorhamilton, county Leitrim, having regard to the fact that a number of independent witnesses are prepared to give sworn testimony that the damage was done while the military were in sole possession and that it could not have been done by outsiders; and whether the temperance society to whom the property belonged will be compensated for the damage sustained?
      Mr. WATTasked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether he is aware that the Bedfordshire branch of the Farmers' Union wrote to his Department calling attention to the fact that one of their members had been threatened with arrest for protesting against the destruction of his crops by soldiers, when immediately adjoining was grass land which could have been utilised, and giving full particulars of the name of the officer and his unit, at the same time stating that they had been unable to get any satisfaction from the officer commanding the Signal Service Training Centre at Woburn; and, if so, will he say what action was taken by his Department in dealing with the Farmers' Union and in dealing with the officer involved?
      The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the WAR OFFICE (Mr. Forster): Inquiry into both these matters has been instituted,
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      and to save time and to avoid delay the hon. Gentlemen will receive the results by letter as soon as they are received.
      Mr. FIELD: Will there be any publication of the proceedings at the trial?
      Mr. FORSTER: As soon as information is received it will be sent out.
      Mr. F. MEEHAN: Will independent evidence be taken?
      Mr. FORSTER: I cannot answer that.

      RELEASE OF PRISONERS.
      Mr. F. MEEHANasked when the five prisoners arrested at Manorhamilton on the 14th May by the military, who had no connection with the recent disturbances, will be released?
      Mr. SAMUEL: It is not desirable in the public interest to give information beforehand about the release, or recommendations for release, of individual prisoners.
      Mr. WHITEasked if all or any of the four Boylan brothers (Edward, John, Joseph, and Peter), natives of Dunboyne, county Meath, have been released; what was the crime they were arrested for; and if the fact that they were prominent members of the Gaelic Athletic Association had anything to do with their detention?
      Mr. SAMUEL: A prisoner named John Boylan was released on the 18th instant. I have no information about the other three; they do not appear to have been interned.
      Mr. BYRNEasked when the Irish prisoners are likely to be released; and if he has any further recommendations from the Advisory Committee?
      Mr. CULLINANasked for the number of cases of interned Irish prisoners inquired into by the Advisory Committee; how many they have recommended for release; and how many have actually been discharged from prison?
      Mr. SAMUEL: The Advisory Committee inform me that they have now dealt with between 1,200 and 1,300 cases. They have so far recommended to me the release of 860 men and two women. Releases are taking place daily, as the necessary arrangements can be made, and the number actually discharged up to the present time is about 500.
      Mr. ASHLEY: Why is there always such a long delay between the time when the Committee recommend release and the Home Secretary taking action?
      Mr. SAMUEL: I sign the orders for release the moment I receive the recommendation from the Committee, and sometimes it takes a litle time to make the transport arrangements.
      Mr. ASHLEY: Does the right hon. Gentleman know that that "little time" generally means a fortnight or three weeks?
      Mr. BYRNE: Could some announcement not be made to the relatives of the people who have been released?
      Mr. SAMUEL: I am afraid that would only be inviting a demonstration.
      Mr. OUTHWAITE: In view of the fact that it will take several months to go through all the cases at the present rate cannot something be done to expedite matters when so many releases are taking place?
      Mr. SAMUEL: I think the hon. Member is under a misapprehension. I hope that all the cases will have been dealt with in a few days from now.
      Mr. BYRNEasked when P. T. Daly, Arthur Griffiths, Shaun T. Kelly, and William O'Brien (Dublin Trades Council), Irish prisoners, are likely to be released?
      Mr. SAMUEL: The cases of these four prisoners are tinder the consideration of the Advisory Committee, and I have not yet received any recommendation with respect to them.
      Mr. BYRNE: Will the right hon. Gentleman speed up the Advisory Committee in regard to these four gentlemen, as they are due to attend a Labour Congress which takes place next month?
      Mr. SAMUEL: If the hon. Member will be good enough to write me particulars about the conference I will see if any exceptional steps can be taken.

      DISFIGURING CAPTAIN PHILLIPS' RESIDENCE, CORK.
      Major NEWMANasked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that on Wednesday of last week a portion of the residence near Macroom, county Cork, of Captain Phillips was disfigured with tar, the emblems of the Irish republic painted on it, and shots fired; and whether,
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      beyond the recruiting activities of Captain Phillips since the outbreak of War, there is any reason assigned for the occurrence?
      Mr. SAMUEL: The occurrence described in the question has, I regret to say, taken place, and probably for the reason stated. The police have made inquiries, but have not yet been able to discover the perpetrator.

      REPUBLICAN DEMONSTRATIONS (CORK).
      Major NEWMANasked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been called to the inconvenience to the public and damage to Government property, the result of republican processions and demonstrations in the city and district of Cork; whether he is aware that during the past week the windows of the recruiting offices in the city of Queenstown have been broken, parties of soldiers made the objects of hostile demonstrations, and constabulary pelted; and will he say what action do the Irish Government propose to take to put an end to such disturbances?
      Mr. SAMUEL: As regards the incident in Cork on the 13th instant, I would refer to the reply which I gave yesterday to the question of the hon. and gallant Member for Bury St. Edmunds. Again on the 14th instant in Cork, during a parade of some youthful demonstrators, three police were struck by eggs or oranges thrown by persons in the crowd, which dispersed immediately on the police being ordered to draw batons. On the same day, at Queenstown, members of a crowd of 500 which had assembled to welcome released prisoners hissed in passing some military officers and pulled down a recruiting notice. No windows were broken on the occasion. The police are taking steps to prevent such occurrences in future.
      Major NEWMAN: Is there any place in the British Empire outside Ireland where such processions would be allowed?
      Mr. SPEAKER: That is a question which the Home Secretary cannot be expected to answer.

      PUBLIC TRIAL FOR WOMEN.
      Mr. BYRNEasked the Home Secretary if he can give any reason why the Government refuse to give Miss Molony, Miss Ryan, and Miss Kearney, Irish prisoners, the right of trial by judge and jury; if he will say why they are not granted the same right of legal defence as that granted in every civilised country in

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      the world; and if he will say what the Government have to fear by allowing women a public trial?
      Mr. SAMUEL: I have nothing to add to the reply I gave the hon. Member on the 17th July in answer to a similar question.
      Mr. LYNCH: Have the Government considered this question not from the narrow but from a broad point of view?
      Mr. SPEAKER: That is a matter for argument.

      EXHIBITING PICTURE POSTCARDS (SINN FEIN LEADERS).
      Mr. CULLINANasked why Mr. James Hogan, stationer, of Tipperary, was arrested by the police and detained in the military prison from the 5th to the 8th instant on a charge of having exhibited in his window picture postcards bearing photographs of Sinn Fein leaders, in view of the fact that exactly similar postcards have been permitted to be exhibited in stationers' windows in Dublin and other cities and towns throughout Ireland; and if he will explain why this trader has been subjected to exceptional treatment?
      Mr. SAMUEL: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave to his similar question on the 18th instant.
      Mr. CULLINAN: The right hon. Gentleman has not replied to my question. I ask him again if he will explain why this trader has been subjected to exceptional treatment while other people all over Ireland are allowed to display those postcards in their windows without any interference from the authorities; and whether this is a case of over-officiousness on the part of the military authorities?
      Mr. SAMUEL: I do not know that this trader was subjected to exceptional treatment. The action was taken by the police on the order of the competent military authorities. I will communicate with them and ask for a further explanation, and then I will write to the hon. Member.
      Mr. CULLINAN: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the fact that on the particular date upon which this man was arrested for displaying these postcards in his window similar postcards were being sold and displayed all over Ireland?

      ROYAL COMMISSION (REPORT).
      Lord HUGH CECILasked the Prime Minister whether an opportunity will be
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      given to discuss the Motion relating to the Report of the Royal Commission on the rebellion in Ireland, of which notice has been given by a large number of Members?
      The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith): I have consulted my colleagues, and we think that in view of the urgency of other business it is not possible to give an opportunity at present; but if there is anything in the nature of a general desire for such a discussion, we shall of course, in accordance with the usual practice, do our best to satisfy it.
      Lord H. CECIL: May I ask the Prime Minister whether he is aware that the House of Lords have already had an opportunity of discussing this Report, and does he not think it very desirable that this House should also have an opportunity?
      The PRIME MINISTER: I am most anxious that we should have an opportunity.
      Mr. DILLON: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman, whether he can ask the Commissioners, without further delay, to publish the evidence on which they base the Report?
      Mr. GWYNNE: Could not the right hon. Gentleman arrange to take this discussion on a Friday as an extra day?
      The PRIME MINISTER: I do not think that would be convenient.

      PORTOBELLO BARRACKS (DEATHS OF MESSRS. SKEFFINGTON, M'INTYRE, AND DIXON).
      Mr. DILLONasked the Prime Minister when the promised public inquiry into the circumstances under which Mr. Sheehy Skeffington was murdered in Portobello Barracks will take place; whether he can give the names of the Commissioners who are to conduct the inquiry; and whether the reference will be wide enough to include the cases of Messrs. M'Intyre and Dixon and the fate of all prisoners taken in Portobello Barracks while Captain Bowen-Colthurst was in a position of authority in those barracks, the extent of responsibility of other officers for the murders, how it came to pass that Captain Bowen-Colthurst was retained in a position of responsibility in view of the evidence given as to his mental condition, and who was responsible for continuing Captain Bowen-Colthurst in

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      authority for nine days after he had murdered three men and after these murders had been reported to the military authorities in Dublin?
      The PRIME MINISTER: I have been in communication with Mrs. Skeffington this week, and I propose to set up such an inquiry as soon as the machinery can be settled, as to which I should like to communicate with my hon. Friend. The inquiry would be wide enough to embrace the matters referred to in the question, though I am not to be supposed to admit the accuracy of some of the suggestions which it contains.

      SHOT BY REBELS.
      Major WALTER GUINNESSasked the Prime Minister whether he will publish a Return showing in detail the cases of unarmed men, women, and children shot by the rebels in the recent fighting in Dublin, giving the circumstances, and specifying in each case whether it was reported through the police or the military authorities?
      The PRIME MINISTER: Yes, Sir, I will arrange that this shall be done.

      MARTIAL LAW.
      Mr. BYRNEasked the Prime Minister when martial law in Ireland will be withdrawn?
      The PRIME MINISTER: I fear that I can at present add nothing to the many answers I have given on this subject.
      Mr. LYNCH: Does not the right hon. Gentleman's answer run counter to his own words that no considerable portion of the population of this country can be coerced by another?

      NORTH KING STREET AFFAIR.
      Mr. BYRNEasked the Prime Minister if he is aware of the indignation in Dublin caused by the refusal to hold a public inquiry into the North King Street murders; if, to satisfy the demands for justice, he will call for the evidence submitted at the inquests of the victims and the jury's verdict on the same; if he will say why the Government refuse an open inquiry; and if he is aware that the refusal to accede to this request is looked on with suspicion by the Irish people?
      The PRIME MINISTER: I have nothing to add to the answer which I gave to the hon. Member for East Mayo on Monday last.
      Mr. BYRNE: Will the right hon. Gentleman take steps to obtain a copy of the verdict of the coroner's jury into the North King Street murders? Is he aware of it?

    NATIONAL TEACHERS (IRELAND).
    Mr. PATRICK WHITEasked the Home Secretary whether he has received numerous communications urging the absolute necessity of paying Irish national teachers a war bonus in order that, having regard to the prices of food, they may have reasonable means of sustenance for themselves and their families; and whether he will recommend the Treasury to pay their salaries monthly?
    Mr. SAMUEL: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As stated by the late Chief Secretary in reply to a question of the hon. Member for North Wexford on the 1st March last, I fear there is no prospect of a war bonus being granted to the Irish national school teachers. As regards the latter part of the question, I have, arranged to see a deputation of the teachers on this subject tomorrow.
    Mr. P. MEEHAN: Have the the teachers in England received a war bonus?
    Mr. SAMUEL: That question should be addressed to the President of the Board of Education.
    Mr. WHITEasked whether any, and, if so, how many teachers, male and female, respectively, got a war bonus added to their salaries from Imperial or local funds?
    The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of EDUCATION (Mr. A. Henderson): The salaries of teachers on the staffs of schools under the Board's jurisdiction are not paid directly out of Imperial funds; and I have no information as to the extent to which the local education authorities and governing bodies of schools have granted war bonuses to the teachers in their employment.
    Mr. WHITE: I did not ask to what extent, but if any teachers had received the bonus?
    Mr. HENDERSON: I have already answered that part of the question by saying that I have not the information.
    Mr. FIELD: Will the right hon. Gentleman ask for the information and give it to those Irish Members who require it?
    Mr. HENDERSON: I will consider that.

    ROYAL IRISH CONSTABULARY (DEPENDANTS).
    Major NEWMANasked whether the widow and dependants of a noncommissioned officer or private of the Royal Irish Constabulary, who has lost his life during the recent rebellion in Ireland, are on the same footing as those of a non-commissioned officer or soldier of the Regular Forces killed on active service for the purposes of pension or gratuity?
    Mr. SAMUEL: No, Sir. The widows and children of members of the Royal Irish Constabulary killed on duty are qualified for pensions and allowances under the Constabulary Acts, and awards have already been made accordingly, but, in view of the special circumstances under which members of the force have recently lost their lives, it is proposed that the sums payable under the Acts should be supplemented by special grants, and a supplementary estimate will be submitted to the House of Commons for this purpose.

    PRICES COMMITTEE.
    Mr. WINGasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will take measures to limit the price of foodstuffs, as already applied to wool and other articles of use, with a view to the reduction of the present prices of articles of consumption?
    The FIRST COMMISSIONER of WORKS (Mr. Harcourt): This question is at present being examined by a Committee. I am sending my hon. Friend a copy of the reference.

    MEAT SUPPLY (BACON).
    Mr. W. THORNEasked the President of the Board of Trade the quantity
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    of bacon which has arrived in this country during the last twelve months fit for human consumption and which has since been disposed of for soap boiling and kindred purposes; if he is aware that in recent weeks the wholesale prices of meat were fixed by the American trust at 1s. 0½ d. for hinds, 10¾ d. to 11d. per 1b. for forequarters of beef, and 1s. 1d. for over-age River Plate lambs; that at the time of these high prices the prices in the United States of America were 6¾ d. to 7d. per 1b. for hinds and fores; if he is aware that even with a freightage charge of ½ d. per 1b. meat prices in this country remain excessive; and if he proposes to take action?
    Mr. HARCOURT: In the year 1915, 326, 169 tons of bacon were imported into the United Kingdom, and in the six months ended 30th June, 1916, 208, 836 tons. I am not in a position to say how much was used for other purposes than food. I am informed that the highest wholesale price in London for chilled hindquarters of beef was 11⅜ d. per pound on 29th May; for chilled forequarters, 9½ d. on 7th June; and for River Plate lambs, 1s. 1d. on 16th June. On 2nd June, chilled hindquarters were 1s. 0½ d. per pound and chilled forequarters 10¾ d. in the United States. The freight rate from the United States is, I understand, about l½ d. per pound. The present London price for chilled hindquarters is 9d. per pound, for chilled forequarters 7d. per pound, and for River Plate lambs 10d. to 10½ d. As the fall in prices is likely to continue, I do not consider it necessary to take any special steps at the present moment.

    PATENTS AND DESIGNS ACT.
    Mr. PETOasked the President of the Board of Trade when legislation may be expected to give effect to the intention of the Government to deal with the question of the keeping alive of British patents applied for during the War?
    Mr. HARCOURT: The whole question as to the nature of the Amendments which may be desirable in the Patents and Designs Act is now undergoing examination. Amongst the matters which are being examined is the position of patents which, owing to circumstances arising out of the War, the patentee has been unable to develop.
    Mr. PETO: Can the right hon. Gentleman give us any hope that this matter will be dealt with at an early date?
    Mr. HARCOURT: Yes, I can.

    BREAD AND FLOUR.
    Mr. LEWIS HASLAMasked the President of the Board of Trade (1) whether he will take steps to stop entirely the importation of chemically bleached flour from the United States, the consumption of such flour being illegal in that country; if necessary, will he introduce a legislative measure to attain the object indicated; and (2) whether the experts engaged in connection with his Department have yet arrived at any definite conclusion as to the method which should be adopted to ensure that the public shall obtain the most wholesome and nutritious quality of bread and flour when demanded?
    The PRESIDENT of the LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (Mr. Long): My right hon. Friend has asked me to reply to this and the following question. My predecessor in 1913 introduced a Bill with the object of enabling my Department to deal with the bleaching of flour and kindred questions. The Bill made no progress, however, and I do not think the present is a suitable time for initiating legislation on the subject.

    HORTICULTURE (IMPORTATION OF BULBS).
    Mr. CROOKSasked the President of the Board of Trade whether the licence to admit by parcel post consignments of bulbs from other countries is having an injurious effect on the home trade, inasmuch as trade can now be done directly with Dutch nurserymen which was formerly done at home; and whether further consideration will be given to the whole matter with a view to safeguarding the interests of the horticultural trade of this country?
    Mr. HARCOURT: Instructions have now been given to the Customs to treat imports of bulbs from Holland and Scandinavia through the post as covered by the general prohibition of importation imposed by the Proclamation of the 10th May.

    EXCESS PROFITS DUTY (TRANSFER OF TONNAGE TO AUSTRALIA).
    Mr. HOUSTONasked the President of the Board of Trade whether the British steamers recently purchased on behalf of the Australian Commonwealth, have been or will be transferred from the register of the United Kingdom to that of Australia; and, if the transfer is effected, whether these steamers will be relieved from the payment of Excess Profits Tax and Income Tax to the British Exchequer?
    Mr. HARCOURT: The registry of these vessels has not been transferred to Australia, and I am not in a position to say whether the transfer will or will not be made. The question as to taxation is a matter for the Treasury.

    BRITISH STEAMERS IN BALTIC.
    Mr. HOUSTONasked the President of the Board of Trade the number of British steamers which were in the Baltic on 4th August, 1914, giving their total net and total gross registered tonnage; and how many British steamers, up to his latest returns, have escaped from the Baltic, giving their total net and total gross registered tonnage, and the date of his latest return?
    Mr. HARCOURT: There are no official returns regarding the British vessels in the Baltic, and it would not be expedient to publish any figures at the present moment.

    THERMIT, LIMITED.
    Mr. HOUSTONasked the President of the Board of Trade the nominal amount of the share capital of Thermit, Limited; how much of that share capital has been issued; how much is held by British-born subjects resident in the United Kingdom and how much by aliens resident in Germany; the names of the directors and manager of the company; whether this company enjoys the protection of British patents which prevent other British companies or firms from carrying out similar operations; and whether Thermit, Limited, is able to carry out work of a special nature which cannot equally well be carried out by a firm or company composed of British-born subjects engaged in similar work?
    Mr. HARCOURT: The nominal capital of Thermit, Limited, is £50,000, the whole of which has been issued and was held by or on behalf of Germans resident in Germany. The directors of the company before the War were Karl Goldschmidt, Hans Goldschmidt, and E. Stassfurth, resident in Germany, and R. Stutz, a naturalised British subject resident in this country. Since the War the business has been managed by Mr. Stutz subject to the supervision of a controller appointed by the Court on the application of the Board of Trade. The company owns certain patents in respect of all of which licences can be granted by the Board of Trade to British firms and licences have been granted to one British firm. The shares of the company were vested in the public trustee under the provisions of the Trading With the Enemy Amendment Act, 1916, and he has recently entered into an agreement to sell the whole of those shares to a British company.
    Mr. HOUSTON: Can my right hon. Friend say whether this company will be wound up, seeing that it is an entirely enemy company?
    Mr. HARCOURT: I am not quite sure what the exact process will be, but a sale of shares to a British company has been arranged.
    Mr. BUTCHER: Has this company been under the consideration of the Advisory Committee of the Board of Trade?
    Mr. HARCOURT: I think so, but I should not like to say so off-hand. I will tell the hon. Member later.

    GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND.

      AMENDING BILL.
      Mr. BUTCHERasked the Prime Minister whether the final draft of the Bill for amending the Government of Ireland Act, 1914, has been submitted to the right ton. and learned Member for Dublin University and the hon. and learned Member for Waterford, and assented to by them, respectively; and, if not, whether it is the intention of the Government to submit the final draft of such Bill to those Gentlemen and to obtain their assent thereto before its introduction?
      The PRIME MINISTER: As I stated yesterday, the Government have been and continue to be in communication with both
      1178
      the hon. Members referred to. Until the Bill is introduced I cannot make any more definite statement.
      Mr. BUTCHER: Could not the right hon. Gentleman answer this definite question: Whether it is the intention of the Government to introduce this Bill without first securing the approval of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson) and the hon. and learned Member for Waterford (Mr. J. Redmond)?
      The PRIME MINISTER: I am afraid that I cannot add anything to what I have said.

    PRIZE MONEY.
    Colonel YATEasked the Prime Minister whether, considering the injustice that is being inflicted on the officers and men of the Royal Navy owing to the delay in the distribution of prize money and the numerous and intricate points involved in the preparation of the Bill necessary for the purpose, he will now appoint a special Committee to collect the required information and draft the Bill necessary to deal with the matter, so that the Bill may be introduced without further delay?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Dr. Macnamara): The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to this question. The distribution of prize money is not being delayed because the Bill has not been prepared; in fact, a draft is already in existence. Even if the proposed Bill were passed to-morrow it would not expedite the distribution. That cannot take place until the close of hostilities, and the net amount available for distribution is actually known. As a matter of fact, the points requiring decision have recently been discussed between representatives of the Admiralty and the Treasury, and the conclusions arrived at are now under the consideration of the departments concerned.
    Commander BELLAIRS: Can the right hon. Gentleman say why the prize money cannot be distributed until the close of hostilities? It used to be.
    Dr. MACNAMARA: In the old days this prize money was given to the captor, but the Board of Admiralty decided that it would be more equitable to divide it over the whole Fleet, and we cannot therefore proceed to divide it until the close of hostilities.
    Mr. ASHLEY: Will the representatives of those who die before the money is distributed get their share?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: Certainly, that is one of the points, with a great many others, which we have got to consider.
    Colonel YATE: Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that his argument is perfectly futile? If a Bill were drafted and the question settled it would be easier for everybody, and easier to get the names of those entitled to it?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: I am very sorry to think that I have given a futile answer, and most of all to the hon. Member.

    COST OF WAR.
    Sir E. CORNWALLasked the Prime Minister whether the leakage and wastage involved in the sudden expenditure of several millions sterling a day on the War has now been checked; and whether he has taken, or proposes to take, any special steps to co-ordinate and regulate the expenditure for war purposes by the various Government Departments?
    The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER (Mr. McKenna): Considerable fluctuations in the daily rate of expenditure on the War are inevitable, but I have no reason to think that such fluctuations have involved leakage and wastage, as implied in the question.
    Sir E. CORNWALL: Does the right hon. Gentleman not consider, although in the early days of the War, when the expenditure was sudden, great waste took place, that now the time has arrived for greater economy, and should not regulations be introduced into the whole of the spending Departments connected with the War?
    Mr. McKENNA: I should be glad to see greater economy introduced, if possible, in the whole of the spending Departments.
    Sir E. CORNWALL: So would the House of Commons.
    Mr. KINGasked the Prime Minister whether he will explain at an early date the reason why the War expenditure of this country, from causes beyond the control and foresight of the Government, has risen from five to six millions a day?
    Mr. McKENNA: The estimate of £5,000,000 a day was an estimate of total expenditure, not only war expenditure, and correspondingly the figure of £6,000,000 a day relates to recent total outgoings. The statement made by me was not, as has been suggested, a surprising announcement made casually in debate, but was no more than a reminder of the figures of Exchequer issues that are published week by week and are the subject of comment in the Press.
    During the last seven weeks the total Exchequer issues have been in round figures £300,000,000. On the one hand this includes a large payment for dividend on War Loan and Exchequer Bonds early in June, and on the other does not include certain payments not yet brought into account, the actual outgoings for the period being, in fact, just over £6,000,000 a day.
    The unforeseen and unforeseeable causes which raised the rate of expenditure to this height during the period in question were mainly, first, the rate at which American securities were sold to the Government for the purpose of regulating the American exchange, and secondly, the rate at which the advances made to Allies and Dominions were drawn upon. The concurrence of these two causes led to the exhaustion of our borrowing powers under the War Loan Act, 1915, earlier than was anticipated.
    Mr. KING: Has the right hon. Gentleman seen some of these newspaper comments upon his words, and were not these newspaper comments very inaccurate?
    Mr. McKENNA: In view of the fact that some of these newspaper comments expressed surprise at the announcement, whereas they themselves have commented week by week upon the figures, I am bound to say I did feel a certain amount of astonishment.
    Mr. LOUGH: Can these purchases of American securities and payments on loans really be called expenditure at all?
    Mr. McKENNA: I was arguing the question and explaining why my borrowing powers had been exhausted earlier than I anticipated. These borrowing powers I have to exercise in order to meet issues. These issues were made earlier than was anticipated. Whether my right hon. Friend considers them properly as

    1181
    expenditure or not is immaterial to that argument. I had to make the issues, and therefore I had to borrow.
    Mr. OUTHWAITE: May we look forward to the continuance of that expenditure at the rate of £6,000,000 a day, and are we to expect to drop back to the former expenditure?
    Mr. McKENNA: I certainly hope the expenditure will return to what I prefer to regard as normal.

    HIGHER EDUCATION.
    Mr. LYNCHasked whether any opportunity will be given to the House to discuss the Interim Report of the Consultative Committee on Scholarships for Higher Education; and whether any opportunity will be given to discuss the proposals now under the consideration of the Government for the entire revision of the system of education in this country, particularly in regard to the growing importance of education in science?
    The PRIME MINISTER: An opportunity for raising these matters was given on Tuesday.
    Mr. LYNCH: Will the right hon. Gentleman refer to the matter a little more closely, in view of the fact that the scheme I have in view is a large national scheme of education, far more magnificent than any scheme which is in the Report?

    BUTTER FROM HOLLAND.
    Mr. LUNDONasked whether the Government have subsidised, are subsidising or intend to subsidise, in any way whatever, directly or indirectly, Dutch butter manufacturers or exporters of Dutch or other foreign butter to Great Britain; and, if so, to what extent per hundredweight of such butter as they may have exported, or may export, from Holland or elsewhere to Great Britain?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply returned to the hon. Member for West Cavan on the 12th instant.

    OLD AGE PENSIONS.
    Mr. W. THORNEasked the Prime Minister if he is aware that at the national conference of the representatives of the National Free Church Council, friendly
    1182
    societies, trade temperance societies, trades councils, representing 3,000,000 of people, held on 1st July at Newcastle, passed a resolution urging that immediate action should be taken by the Government to alleviate the conditions of the old age pensioners who are suffering under the present increased cost of living, and protesting against the inequalities and penalties imposed on thrift and personal provision for old age by the administration of the Old Age Pensions Acts, 1908 and 1911, and further urging such amendments to the Acts as would enable an old age pension to be paid to every person insured under the National Insurance Acts on attaining the age of seventy years who, for at least twenty years up to the date of the receipt of any sum on account of a pension, had been a British subject and had his residence in the United Kingdom; and to enable all provision for old age made through registered frendly societies, trade unions, employers' provident funds, and benevolent institutions to be exempt from calculation as income in any application for a State pension; and if he intends taking any action in the matter?
    The PRIME MINISTER: Yes, Sir. I have seen these resolutions. I would refer my hon. Friend to the statement I made yesterday to a deputation from the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, of which he was a member.

    LORD HALDANE'S VISIT TO BERLIN.
    Major GUINNESSasked the Prime Minister whether he will now publish Reports and correspondence relating to the visit of Lord Haldane to Berlin in February, 1912?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I regret that the conditions governing this matter have in no way changed since I replied to a question on this subject put by my hon. Friend the Member for the Luton Division on the 24th November last.
    Major GUINNESS: Have not the documents in question been shown by Lord Haldane to some of his friends, and is it not unfair to him to withhold them from publication in view of the unfavourable conclusions drawn from the policy of concealment?
    Mr. PRINGLE: In view of the expressed desire of Lord Haldane that the matter should be dealt with publicly, cannot the Government modify their view?
    Mr. GWYNNE: When will we get the Papers?
    Sir F. BANBURY: Is it not the fact that Lord Haldane has expressed a desire that these Reports and communications should be made public as soon as possible, and, if that is so, will the right hon. Gentleman oblige his Friend?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I will consult my Noble Friend on the subject.
    Mr. LEIF JONES: Is it not the desire of Lord Haldane that these Papers should be published, and if they are being held back is it not for other reasons?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I will consult him.

    COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL PROBLEMS.
    Mr. HAZLETONasked the Prime Minister why no representative of Ireland has been given a place on the Committee appointed to consider the commercial and industrial problems arising after the War?
    The PRIME MINISTER: The Committee was not formed on any basis of national or local representation. No question therefore arises of including representatives of the various parts of the United Kingdom as such.
    Mr. J. REDMOND: Does the right hon. Gentleman not think that Ireland is entitled to representation upon this Committee?
    The PRIME MINISTER: The appointments were not based on national considerations at all, but rather upon the personal qualifications of the various members.
    Mr. REDMOND: In view of the industrial condition of Ireland, surely Ireland ought to be represented?
    The PRIME MINISTER: If the hon. Member will suggest somebody from Ireland, I will consider it.

    DARDANELLES AND MESOPOTAMIA (PAPERS).
    Sir H. DALZIELasked the Prime Minister whether the Army Council and the Board of Admiralty were consulted before the pledge was given on behalf of
    1184
    the Government that the Dardanelles Papers would be laid upon the Table of the House?
    The PRIME MINISTER: No, Sir; neither of these bodies were formally consulted.
    Mr. SWIFT MacNEILLasked the Prime Minister (1) on what grounds, in reference to the Dardanelles and the Mesopotamia Expeditions, information, however confidential, not useful to the enemy, has been withheld from the House of Commons though admittedly in the possession or procurement of the Government; and (2) whether he is aware that the withholding by the Cabinet of information relating to the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia Expeditions on the ground not that it might be useful to the enemy but that it is confidential has produced grave discontent among the relatives and friends of the men who have perished in these expeditions, in the belief that such information though in the power and procurement of the Cabinet is withheld to shield the incompetence of individuals; and whether a full disclosure of the circumstances, except so far as they are calculated to give useful information to the enemy, will forthwith be made to Parliament as the grand inquest of the nation?
    The PRIME MINISTER: With regard to these questions, I think the matters they raise are controversial, and can best be dealt with in debate.
    Mr. MacNEILL: Is there not a distinction, which he has drawn himself, between confidential information and the secrecy of the Cabinet? Is not confidential information withheld for the first time from the House of Commons by the Government? Why are we treated like children in this matter?
    The PRIME MINISTER: Because it is confidential.

    TRADING WITH THE ENEMY.
    Mr. BUTCHERasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will issue a White Paper giving a list, with all proper particulars, of the firms and companies which the Advisory Committee to the Board of Trade have dealt with under the recent Trading With the Enemy Amendment Act, and stating in each case whether the firm or company has been ordered to be wound up or has been

    1185
    permitted to carry on business, with the reasons for so doing, or has been otherwise dealt with?
    Mr. HARCOURT: A summary of the cases dealt with by the Advisory Committee under the Trading With the Enemy Amendment Act, 1916, has now been presented. The names of the firms or companies as to which an Order has been made under Section I of the Act are published in the "Gazette" and have been laid before this House, but I do not think it desirable to publish a list of cases in which no such Order is made. If my hon. Friend desires to know the particulars of any individual cases I shall be happy to communicate them to him.
    Mr. BUTCHER: Would it not be much more convenient to Members of this House and the outside public to have a complete, list of these firms and companies instead of hunting through some dozens of numbers of the "Gazette"?
    Mr. HARCOURT: I think I can explain to the hon. Member in private why the present course is the most desirable.

    PETROLEUM SUPPLIES (ASTRA ROMANA COMPANY).
    Major HUNTasked the President of the Board of Trade (1) what British companies are interested directly or indirectly, and to what extent, in the shares and profits of the Astra Romana Company; (2) if he has any information to show that any portion of the Astra Romana Company's output of benzine, kerosene, or other petroleum products has been delivered to or disposed of in Germany during the War; and (3) if he can state the names and nationality of the persons who at the outbreak of war were directors of a petroleum company in Roumania called the Astra Romana Company; and who are the principal shareholders of this company?
    Mr. HARCOURT: I have no official information as to the directorate of the Astra Romana Company, which is registered and carries on business in Roumania. I understand that the Shell Trading and Transport Company is interested in the Astra Romana Company to the extent of 2,740,000 lei out of a total capital of 60,000,000 lei. It has also an interest as the owner of 40 per cent. of the
    1186
    capital of the Bataafsche Company which in turn controls the Consolidated Company which owns capital to the value of 37,600,000 lei in the Astra Romana Company. I have no knowledge of how the products of the company have been dealt with during the War.
    Major HUNT: Can the right hon. Gentleman not say what profits of the Astra Romana Company were derived from the sale of products to Germany during the War, and what action the Government propose to take in respect to trading with the enemy and to bring to account those firms who have been guilty of trading with the enemy?
    Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member had better hand in that question.

    POST OFFICE (EX-SOLDIERS AND SAILORS).
    Colonel YATEasked the Postmaster-General whether it is really his intention to contravene the arrangement that 50 per cent. of the total appointments in the Post Office should be kept open for ex-soldiers and sailors and to introduce a new rule by which, as a permanent arrangement, only one-fourth of the places in connection with vacancies shall be found for ex-soldiers and sailors; and if so, on what grounds he justifies this treatment of the men who have responded to the national call in favour of those who have not?
    The ASSISTANT POSTMASTER-GENERAL (Mr. Pike Pease): There is no intention of departing from the arrangement of assigning half the vacancies for postmen to ex-soldiers and sailors. At the present time the majority of the vacancies due to time-expired soldiers and sailors are being allowed to accumulate, so that they will be available at the end of the War, but instructions have been given that a number not exceeding one-fourth of such vacancies may be assigned at once to disabled men who have been discharged with satisfactory certificates.
    Colonel YATE: May I take it that the speech of the Postmaster-General the other day was not correctly understood?
    Mr. PIKE PEASE: Every effort will be made to give opportunities to ex-soldiers

    1187
    and sailors to obtain employment in the Post Office. I have had conversations on repeated occasions with my right hon. Friend on the subject and he is quite as anxious as the hon. and gallant Member opposite (Colonel Yate) to afford these facilities.

    MAIL SERVICES.
    Mr. CATHCART WASONasked the Postmaster-General whether, in view of the fact that the passenger servive between Scrabster and Stromness is practically suspended and in view of the cost of conveying the mails from Stromness to Kirkwall, he will take into consideration the abandonment of the present mail service and endeavour to arrange with the Admiralty for the use of a drifter on reasonable terms?
    Mr. PIKE PEASE: I am considering this suggestion with others which have been made by the hon. Member respecting the Orkney mail service, and will write to him.
    Mr. WASONasked the Secretary to the Admiralty if he is unable to permit ordinary mails being carried on Admiralty drifters, will he confer with the Postmaster-General as to whether it would be possible to arrange for the Post Office to have the use on reasonable terms of a drifter for conveyance of mails?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: The Admiralty have no drifters available for this service. They are all required for war duties.
    Mr. WASON: Are not the Admiralty in this matter treating these districts extremely badly?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: It is not our business. These representations must be made to the Postmaster-General.
    Mr. WASONasked the Secretary to the Admiralty whether, in view of the fact that the Admiralty run a mail steamer from Scrabster to Loughake twice daily in summer and once in winter and the public inconvenience caused, he will reconsider the conveyance of mails from Scrabster to Loughake thence by drifters?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: It is regretted that the Admiralty cannot undertake the conveyance of the civil mails.

    NAVAL PRISONERS.
    Mr. ASHLEYasked the First Lord of the Admiratly how many German naval officers and men have been taken prisoners by us; and how many of ours have been captured by the Germans?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: The figures are as follows:

    Officers.

    Men.

    German

    …

    136

    2,056

    British (including Royal Marines)

    …

    45

    364

    These figures are exclusive of the officers and men of the Royal Marines and Royal Naval Division taken prisoners in land operations.

    DARDANELLES (NAVAL OPERATIONS).
    Commander BELLAIRSasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the "Queen Elizabeth" and a battle-cruiser were hazarded in the mine-field in the battle of the Dardanelles on 18th March, 1915, while several battleships were lost; whether sixteen months have elapsed without any dispatches being published in regard to this failure, and that this failure to publish dispatches is unprecedented in our naval and military history and has not occurred in this War in regard to any of our military operations; and what are the confidential reasons which prevent the Commander - in - Chief's dispatch being made public?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: It is not proposed to publish any dispatch other than that contained in the Supplement to the "London Gazette." of the 16th August, 1915.
    Admiral of the Fleet Sir H. MEUX: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that his answer is viewed with a great deal of dissatisfaction throughout the Naval Service?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: If that is so, I can only regret it. It is the only answer I can give.
    Commander BELLAIRS: Is the Admiralty aware that there is no precedent whatever for the withholding of this dispatch?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: I am afraid I can, add nothing to my answer.

    CHIEF WRITERS (ROYAL NAVY).
    Mr. FLAVINasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether an immediate increase in the numbers of commissioned and warrant writers can be made so as to allow fully qualified and highly recommended chief writers to obtain promotion to warrant rank before reaching the age for pension, and by this means to retain the services of efficient and reliable men which otherwise are lost to the State?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: During the last eighteen months five officers have been promoted to commissioned writer, and the number of warrant writers has been increased from fifteen to forty-seven, the total number of officers of this branch having thereby been increased from fifteen to fifty-two. Twelve promotions to warrant writer were made on the 1st May It is not contemplated making further promotions at the present time.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Can the right hon. Gentleman say how many men have been taken from outside?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: Not without notice.
    Mr. FLAVIN: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the average age of the warrant writers promoted was forty-one, and does he expect the same amount of efficiency at the age of forty-one, when a man has done twenty years' service?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: I cannot say, without notice, what the average age is.
    Mr. FLAVIN: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the average age. of a man when he joins is twenty-one, and does he think that after twenty years' service he will find the same amount of efficiency at forty-one as he would if the men were promoted at from twenty-five to thirty years of age?
    Mr. FLAVINasked the First Lord of the Admiralty the numbers of chief writers who have served in the Royal Navy for upwards of twenty and fifteen years respectively, who are recommended and in all respects eligible for warrant writer, but have not yet. been promoted to that rank?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: The number of chief writers who are now serving and have been recommended as being in all
    1190
    respects eligible for the rank of warrant writer, but not yet promoted to that rank, is as follows:

    Having served upwards of 20 years

    46

    Having served upwards of 15 years (not included in above)

    71

    Mr. FLAVIN: Are there not between 100 and 150 men eligible for promotion at the present time?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: There are 117 who have been recommended for promotion.
    Mr. FLAVIN: When will the promotion take place?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: As opportunity arises.

    NAVAL TEST MOBILISATION, 1914.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKEasked the First Lord of the Admiralty the date on which the Fleet was mobilised for the summer manœuvres in 1914, and the date on which it was intended to demobilise?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: The test mobilisation in 1914 was arranged for the period 15th July to 25th July, 1914.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Then the question cannot arise that the Fleet was mobilised on the 1st and 2nd August, because the Fleet was already mobilised?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: What does arise is the answer I have given, namely, that it was intended to demobilise on 25th July, 1914.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: If the right hon. Gentleman will allow me
    Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member has had a very plain answer to a specific question. I ask him to ask the next question.

    NAVAL LEAVE.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKEasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he will consider the possibility of giving some leave to those men of the Fleet who have been on active duty since the outbreak of war?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: I can only repeat to my hon. Friend the fact that leave must depend upon the exigencies of the Service. The process of relieving men as circumstances permit is still proceeding.

    ARMED TRAWLERS (SINKING BY GERMAN SUBMARINES).
    Commander BELLAIRSasked the First Lord of the Admiralty what were the circumstances under which three armed trawlers were sunk by large German submarines, and where the fight took place?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: It is not in the public interest to give the particulars asked for.
    Commander BELLAIRS: With reference to the last part of the question as to where the fight took place, cannot the right hon. Gentleman give an answer to that, seeing that the Germans must know where the fight took place?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: I will inquire about that.

    SHERIFF CLERK (LANARKSHIRE).
    Mr. WATTasked the Lord Advocate whether he. is aware that a Committee on minor legal appointments in Scotland reported unanimously in 1911 that as vacancies occurred in the office of sheriff clerk the claims of sheriff clerk deputes should be favourably considered in filling up the same; whether this recommendation was adopted in the recent appointment of the sheriff clerk of Lanarkshire; and whether no suitable man was found among the sheriff clerk deputes to promote to the position?
    The LORD ADVOCATE (Mr. Munro): The answer to the first part of my hon. and learned Friend's question is in the affirmative, to the second in the negative. The claims of sheriff clerk deputes are always carefully considered in making appointments to the office of sheriff clerk, and this was done before the appointment referred to in the question was made.

    MUNITIONS.

      MESSRS. DOULTON'S WORKS, PAISLEY.
      Mr. WATTasked the Minister of Munitions whether the 100 munitions workers who were discharged from a controlled establishment at Doulton's works, near Paisley, three months ago, and who were stated by the Minister of Munitions to be holding themselves in readiness for future work, have yet been called upon to do this work; and, if not, will he say how
      1192
      it is that munition workers are being advertised for in the West of Scotland at the present moment, while these 100 workers and others are suspended for months?
      The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MUNITIONS DEPARTMENT (Dr. Addison): I understand that at the end of January, on the expiration of a contract, Messrs. Doulton discharged between fifty and sixty women who had been engaged on that contract. The contract was not renewed, but the firm were given an order for munition work of a somewhat different character, for which they did not consider that the women who had been discharged would be suitable. The firm deny that they gave any undertaking that the women should be employed by them on future work. I do not know whether the women in question have registered at the Labour Exchange, and I consequently do not know how many of them are now in employment. Large numbers of women are required for munition work in the West of Scotland, and if the women discharged by Messrs. Doulton will register their names at the Labour Exchange they should have no difficulty in obtaining suitable work.
      Mr. WATT: Will my right hon. Friend please repeat his answer so that I shall know whether my supplementary is relevant?

      NATIONAL SHELL-FILLING FACTORY.
      Mr. SNOWDENasked the Minister of Munitions if a number of discharged soldiers have recently been employed at the National Shell-Filling Factory in Middlesex as labourers; if so, what rate of wages was paid to them; if these men have been dismissed; if women have been put in their places; if so, what rate of wages is paid to the women; and if it is known what has become of the men who have been dismissed?
      Dr. ADDISON: A certain number of discharged soldiers are employed at the factory to which my hon. Friend refers. It is, of course, necessary from time to time to dismiss men as unsuitable; so far as is known of the men who have been dismissed lately, three appear to be discharged soldiers. These men received 8d. an hour. A certain number of women are employed on lighter kinds of labourers' work, and receive an average wage of 28s. per week. I cannot say whether any of these women are doing any work formerly done by the three men in question,

      1193
      but I will inquire. I have no information as to the point raised in the last part of the question.
      Mr. SNOWDEN: Are we to understand that it is not the fact that these wounded soldiers have been discharged and their places taken by women?
      Dr. ADDISON: As far as I know they are not wounded. They are discharged soldiers, but whether wounded or not is not quite clear. Women are doing the work which these men previously did.

      ST. PAUL'S BRIDGE.
      Sir WALTER ESSEXasked the Minister of Munitions whether he has requested the authorities who have in hand the purchase of property necessary to form the approaches to the proposed St. Paul's Bridge to suspend such action during the War, as has been the course imposed upon other local authorities having in hand constructional and other schemes involving expenditure of money?
      Dr. ADDISON: The Ministry take no action in regard to requesting the suspension of the purchase of property, but only in regard to the construction or demolition of buildings. I am unable to trace any communication with the authorities in question.

      CANNON CARTRIDGE FACTORY, WOOLWICH.
      Mr. BRYCEasked the Minister of Munitions whether the system of six-day and seven-night shifts for women workers is still in force in the Cannon Cartridge Factory at Woolwich; whether he has yet received the Report of the Committee appointed to investigate the conditions of female labour at Woolwich; and, if so, whether he will lay it before the House?
      Dr. ADDISON: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. I am not aware of any such Committee as that referred to in the second part, so that the third part does not arise. The question of the hours of labour in the Cannon Cartridge Factory and at Woolwich generally is, as I have already stated, receiving most careful consideration with a view to making any necessary reductions. Representatives of the Home Office and of the Health of Munitions Workers' Committee are associated with the Woolwich authorities in dealing with the matter, but, as my hon. Friend will understand, every effort is being made to deal with the matter as expeditiously as possible.
      Mr. BRYCE: It is now a great number of weeks since I called attention to the case of these poor women in the cordite factory at Woolwich. It was promised that investigation should be made in regard to it. Cannot my right hon. Friend say anything about it?
      Dr. ADDISON: There has been a full and detailed investigation. I have told my hon. Friend the result of it.

      ADVISORY COMMITTEES.
      Mr. BRYCEasked the Minister of Munitions (1) if he will state the names of the members of the Advisory Committee on appliances for protection against gas attacks; and (2) if he will state the names of the members of the Advisory Committee on trench warfare?
      Dr. ADDISON: It is most undesirable to publish the names of the scientific and other experts who are assisting the Government in these and other kindred matters.

      IRISH ORDERS.
      Mr. BYRNEasked the Minister of Munitions if he will state the value of orders for munitions given to Ireland since the outbreak of war and the amount spent on munitions in Great Britain; and if he will say when it is proposed to place further orders for munitions with Irish engineering firms?
      Dr. ADDISON: I regret that at the present time I do not feel at liberty to give my hon. Friend the information asked for in the first part of his question, but I may refer him to a letter addressed to the Member for Waterford on 26th June by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War. This letter was published in the Irish Press, and I am sending a copy of it to the hon. Member. Various extensions of munition work are in hand in Ireland as in Great Britain.
      Mr. FIELD: Is it a fact that in Great Britain holidays are prevented owing to the pressure of munitions work, and is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in Ireland the workers want employment in munition work?
      Dr. ADDISON: There is no question of providing employment. It is a question of getting the work done where it can best be done.
      Mr. BYRNE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a number of engineering firms in Dublin are closing down for want of orders?
      Dr. ADDISON: I was not aware of the fact, but I will inquire.
      Mr. FIELD: If we give the right hon. Gentleman the information, will he give us the work?

      MESSRS. RICHARDSON, LIMITED (ABERDEEN).
      Mr. W. THORNEasked the Minister of Munitions whether he is aware of the discontent among the employes working at Messrs. Richardson, Limited, Aberdeen, in consequence of the methods that are being adopted by the mill manager, Mr. Simpson, in connection with both men and women who are working in the various mills; if he is aware that the manager in question called into his office the girl weavers and told them that if they left the National Union of General Workers he would increase their wages, and if they were not prepared to give up the union they must leave the works, and he gave them until six o'clock on the day in question to decide; and whether, in the interest of harmony and good feeling between the management and their employes, he intends taking any action in the matter?
      Mr. FORSTER: Messrs. Richards, Limited, who, it is presumed, are the firm referred to, are War Office contractors. No complaint against them of the nature referred to in the question has been received by the Ministry of Munitions or the War Office. Inquiry will be made into the matter.

    CAPTURED SUBMARINE IN THAMES.
    Mr. J. D. GILBERT(by Private Notice) asked the Secretary to the Admiralty whether it is the intention of the Admiralty to exhibit a captured German submarine in the Thames; and, if so, what opportunity the public will have of seeing her?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: The Board of Admiralty propose to bring a captured German submarine of the mine-laying type—"U.C/"—up the Thames to lie alongside Temple Pier and to be on view to the public—in much the same way as
    1196
    the aircraft, torpedoes, and guns were exhibited on the Horse Guards Parade. It will be on view at this pier for a fortnight, beginning Wednesday, 26th July. I ought perhaps to say that it will not be possible to go on board. As a matter of traffic regulation, from the point of view of the police it is considered necessary to control admission to the pier and to charge a small admission fee. The charge will be 6d. from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m., and 3d. from 1 p.m. to 9 p.m. Parties of children from schools and institutions will be admitted in the mornings, by arrangement, at a charge of 1d. a head. The hours of admission will be 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. every day (including Sundays). The proceeds will be devoted to Naval and Merchant Service charities, with a contribution to the Police Orphanage, and the amount and its distribution will be made public in due course.
    Mr. CHURCHILL: Is there no means of making use of this weapon against the enemy?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: I am afraid it might be mistaken for an enemy, but I will note the point.
    Mr. FIELD: Could it not be exhibited on the terrace of the House of Commons free of charge?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: I presume the hon. Member means "off" the terrace, not "on" the terrace. I do not think it possible, but I will have the point considered.

    SALE OF COCAINE TO SOLDIERS.
    Sir J. LONSDALE(by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is now in a position to say what steps are proposed by the Government to deal with the sale of cocaine?
    Mr. SAMUEL: The sale of cocaine to any member of the Forces is already prohibited by Order 40 of the Defence of the Realm Regulations. Further steps, however, are necessary to put a stop to the illegitimate traffic in this drug which is now prevalent, and I am proposing to obtain at once an extension of the Regulations to enable the Government to control the sale of the drug generally.
    Colonel NORTON GRIFFITHS: Did not the right hon. Gentleman promise to

    1197
    take active steps in reference to the matter some time ago, in answer to a question of mine?
    Mr. SAMUEL: It has taken a little time to elaborate the form of the Regulation. It is completed, and I am awaiting a meeting of the Privy Council in order to secure its enactment.

    Land Purchase (Ireland).
    Mr. BOLANDasked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that the Estates Commissioners promised to send an inspector, before the end of June, to make inquiries in the case of Mr. Jeremiah Sullivan, a tenant on the Francis M'Carthy estate, Castlecove, near Caherdaniel; and can he state when the promised visit will take place, seeing that so long a time has now elapsed without anything being done?
    Mr. SAMUEL: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. Owing to illness the inspector was not able to visit the property during the month of June as anticipated, but he will visit it during the present week.

    Estate Improvements (Ireland).
    Mr. BOLANDasked the Home Secretary what steps, if any, have been taken or are about to be taken by the Congested Districts Board to carry out the promised improvements on the estate of Mr. Daniel O'Connell, Darrynane, county Kerry?
    Mr. SAMUEL: I am informed that the Congested Districts Board did not make any promise that the O'Connell estate would be dealt with in an exceptional manner. They will undertake the improvements on the estate as soon as they can do so, having regard to their resources, the staff available, and the claims of other estates.

    Intermediate Education Board (Ireland).
    Mr. BOLANDasked the Home Secretary whether he is now in a position to state the result of his inquiries as to the action of the Intermediate Education Board for Ireland in introducing a new system of written examination in experimental science; can he state when the Board came to this decision; and what steps, if any, were taken to secure the assent of the Department to the proposed change?
    Mr. SAMUEL: The change referred to was adopted unanimously at a meeting of the Intermediate Education Board on 9th December last, the representative of the Department of Agriculture being present. Since the hon. Member's question of the 11th instant I have not had an opportunity of consulting the Board, whose next meeting does not take place until the 4th August. The Board do not record their reasons in the Minutes.

    Leprosy.
    Mr. BURGOYNEasked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been called to the case of Miss Meredith, owner of the house which formed a central feature of a legal action, Humphries v. Miller and others, before Mr. Justice Darling on 15th to 18th May last; whether he is aware that the, then tenant, Mr. Humphries, has left the house with furniture in it, and that, in view of the fact that the case investigated was leprosy, no one could be induced to take it out and sell it for arrears of rent now due, and that no agents who had been approached by the trustees for the owner will put the house upon their books; whether he is aware that counsel suggested only sentimental damage was being suffered by the trustees and owner; and if, in the circumstances and in view of the fact that the jury decided from this case that leprosy was infectious and contagious, he will consider the desirability of scheduling leprosy as a notifiable disease?
    Mr. LONG: My right hon. Friend has asked me to reply to this question. My attention has been drawn to the case referred to, but I have not complete information on the details referred to. The question whether it is desirable to make the disease notifiable is under consideration. I may add, however, that the number of cases of this disease in this country is extremely small.

    Education (House of Lords Debate).
    Sir G. TOULMINasked the President of the Board of Education whether his attention has been called to the debates in another place on the subject of education; and whether he will consider the distribution of the OFFICIAL REPORT of the Debates there, and in this House on Tuesday, to directors of education and the chairmen of local education authorities?
    Mr. A. HENDERSON: The discussion, both in another place and in this House,

    1199
    has already obtained such publicity that I hardly think it necessary or desirable to take the unusual course suggested in the question.

    Bradford Local Education Authority.
    Mr. GOLDSTONEasked the President of the Board of Education whether he is aware that the Bradford Local Education Authority have come to an agreement with the spinners of the city under which children are to be allowed to leave school full-time at the age of thirteen, and that such agreement will have the effect of immediately releasing between 3,000 and 4,000 children of thirteen years from school attendance while children at present in half-time employment are to continue in such employment and are to become eligible for full-time exemption at thirteen; whether he is aware that such agreement is a contravention of the local attendance by-laws; and will he say what action the Board of Education proposes to take in the matter, having regard to the fact that the school attendance by-laws for Bradford, as approved by the Board, fix fourteen years as the age for total exemption?
    Mr. HENDERSON: I am aware of the arrangements made in Bradford, which are substantially as stated in the question, and the ultimate object of which is the permanent abolition of half-time. The hon. Member's estimate of the numbers affected appears to be based on the assumption that all the 1,024 children aged thirteen who are not at present half-timers, and all the 2,737 children of thirteen who are, will become whole-timers and commence work forthwith. It is probable that a considerable proportion of the 1,024 children and some, at any rate, of the 2,737 children will remain in school. Further, it should be remembered that about 2,500 children would, but for this arrangement, be entering the mills as half-timers at the age of twelve in the course of the year. Under the arrangement the interruption of their education will be postponed, at any rate, till the age of thirteen. There was considerable ground for thinking that an increase in the supply of juvenile labour owing to the emergency created by the War was necessary, and it appeared both to the Board and to the local education authority, after most careful consideration, that it was worth while to make some temporary concession
    1200
    in view of the prospect of terminating thereby, even in a single area, the grave evils of half-time education. With regard to the last part of the question, I may remind my hon. Friend that it is within the discretion of the local education authority to refrain from prosecuting for non-attendance at school in circumstances which constitute a reasonable excuse for such non-attendance, and the Board are of opinion that a temporary relaxation, in accordance with a definite arrangement, in the administration of the by-laws is, in the interests of education, better than their permanent alteration.
    Mr. GOLDSTONE: Is it a fact that in the first instance this local education authority declined to lower its leaving age, but that subsequently, owing to pressure from the Home Office, there was a change made?
    Mr. HENDERSON: That is not within my knowledge, and the question ought to be addressed to the Home Office.
    Mr. WHITEHOUSE: May I ask whether it is the policy of the Board now to offer to reduce the statutory age of thirteen in order to get rid possibly in some employments of the half-time system?
    Mr. HENDERSON: Each case will be considered on its merits, and, if I think that I can do a deal, whereby I am going permanently to abolish the half-time system, I will take it very seriously into my consideration.
    Sir W. BYLES: Are the Bradford children being exceptionally treated, or will the same rule apply to all children?
    Mr. HENDERSON: The Bradford children are being treated according to this agreement.

    Small Landholders (Scotland) Act, 1911.
    Major CHAPPLEasked the Secretary for Scotland the cost to the most recent date available of all transactions under the Small Landholders (Scotland) Act, 1911, including the cost of administration?
    Mr. MUNRO: The cost of operations under the Small Landholders Acts during the financial year 1914–15 as appearing in the Account of the Agriculture (Scotland) Fund is shown in the Appropriation Accounts for that year

    1201
    immediately following the Account of the sum voted for the administrative expenses of the Board of Agriculture for Scotland. Similar Accounts for the previous two years of the Board's operations are given in the Appropriation Accounts for 1912–13 and 1913–14. I regret I cannot undertake to have a single comprehensive statement prepared just at present.

    Glasgow Town Council.
    Mr. BOLANDasked the Secretary for Scotland whether certain districts are being annexed to the municipal area of Glasgow, and, in consequence, the wards are to be rearranged for a general municipal election for all the wards in 1917; and whether, in view of the fact that the Irish Nationalist minority of 120,000 in the city is at present unrepresented by a single member in the Glasgow Town Council, steps will be taken in the rearrangement of the wards to secure that adequate representation will be given to this minority?
    Mr. MUNRO: I am aware that the Glasgow Boundaries Act, 1912, makes provision for the redivision of the city into wards in 1917. Section 10 of the Act provides that the division is to be made by three Commissioners, one of whom is to be appointed by the Secretary for Scotland, and that before making the division the Commissioners are enjoined to hear all concerned for their interests.
    Mr. HOGGE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in Scotland we neither want the exclusion of counties nor the exclusion of municipal wards?
    Mr. MUNRO: That is a matter of opinion.

    Lanarkshire (Sheriff-Clerk).
    Mr. WATTasked the Lord Advocate whether he has recently made an appointment to the vacant office of sheriff-clerkship of Lanark; if so, who was appointed to that position; was it an appointment from outside or was one who had been bred to the business of a sheriff-clerk advanced to the post; what was the salary attached to the position; and was any reduction made in it on this appointment on account of war-time retrenchment?
    Mr. MUNRO: Mr. Robert Guy, writer, Glasgow, was recently appointed sheriff-clerk of Lanarkshire at a salary of £1,100
    1202
    per annum. At the time of his appointment Mr. Guy was in practice as a law agent. The salary paid to Mr. Guy's predecessor was £1,200.
    Mr. SNOWDEN: Was this appointment made as a reward for political services, and, if not, why has a new departure been made in the practice of the right hon. Gentleman?
    Mr. MUNRO: I do not think any new departure has been made. Each application is considered on its merits. I understand that Mr. Guy was regarded as a most efficient man for the public service.
    Mr. WATT: Was the appointment made on the direct representations of the Secretary for the Colonies, and are Conservative agents all to get good jobs like this?
    Mr. MUNRO: The appointment was made upon my recommendation, after considering all the relevant facts.
    Mr. PRINGLE: Is it the share of the Unionist party in the spoils of the new Government?

NEW MEMBER SWORN.
The right hon. Harold John Tennant, for the County of Berwick.
MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS.
That they have passed a Bill, intituled, "An Act to authorise the construction by the Clayton Aniline Company, Limited, of branch railways for the conveyance of traffic between their works and the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway; and for other purposes." [Clayton Aniline Company (Railways) Bill [Lords.]
CLAYTON ANILINE COMPANY (RAILWAYS) BILL [Lords.]
Read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
  Colonel LOCKWOOD: Can the Prime Minister state the order of business for next week?
  The PRIME MINISTER: On Monday we shall propose a Vote of Credit;
  On Tuesday, the Report of the Vote, and also, if opportunity offer, the Second Reading of some small Bills on the Paper.
  Sir E. CARSON: Can the right hon. Gentleman say when there will be any statement made upon the Resolutions adopted in Paris? I am not pressing it.
  The PRIME MINISTER: I hope at the end of next week or the beginning of the week after.
  Mr. JOHN REDMOND: Can the right hon. Gentleman now fix a day for the introduction of his Irish Bill, and can he give the House any explanation of what seems an unaccountable delay, extending now over three weeks of Parliamentary time since the House reassembled, and is he not aware that these constant delays and postponements are seriously jeopardising the chance of settlement?
  The PRIME MINISTER: No one is more anxious than I am for the early introduction of this Bill. I have already said that we intend to introduce it next week.
  Mr. PRINGLE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in one of the morning papers to-day there is an account of the exact stage reached by the Cabinet in their deliberations, and is this not contrary to the recent Regulations made under the Defence of the Realm Act?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I imagine it is purely imaginary.
  Mr. PRINGLE: Did not the Regulations strike even at imaginary reports?
  Mr. LOUGH: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us what will be the amount of the Vote?
  The PRIME MINISTER: It will be circulated to-morrow.

DARDANELLES AND MESOPOTAMIA.
  PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT.

    COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY.
    The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith): Before the House proceeds to the consideration of the Resolution which is at the head of the Orders of the Day in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson), I should like, with their permission, to make a very short statement. Both in regard to the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia the Government promised, as the House is aware, but subject to important reservations and limitations, to circulate and lay Papers. In both cases, for reasons which I stated to the House two days ago, the publication of such Papers, except in an incomplete and therefore misleading-form, is, for the moment, I will not say vetoed, but strongly protested against by our naval, military, and diplomatic advisers. The Government, as I told the House, felt bound to act upon that advice: but at the same time we recognise, both in regard to the Dardanelles, which is a closed operation, and to Mesopotamia, which is by no means closed, there is widespread and legitimate anxiety, which cannot and ought not to be allayed by a general assurance that all these matters will be inquired into after the War. It is not, therefore, to us a matter of surprise, still less of complaint, that my right hon. Friend's Motion has been put down. On the other hand, in the critical phase which our military operations have now reached, and in view of what is in prospect in that sphere, I should very much deprecate, on behalf of the Government, a Debate which gave the impression to the world outside that we are in any way divided among ourselves. In regard to Mesopotamia in particular, the Government, while hoping and believing that adequate and ample provision is now being made for all the requirements of our troops and of the campaign, have no desire to conceal past shortcomings in these respects, still less to screen those who are, as they believe, directly responsible.
    My right hon. Friend's Motion proposes the setting up of two Select Committees,

    1237
    one to inquire into the conduct of the Dardanelles operations and the other into the conduct of the operations in Mesopotamia. We are not without precedents in this matter. There are only two to which I may ask, for a moment, the attention of the House. The first was that of the Walcheren Expedition in 1809. The House of Commons determined to have an inquiry into that expedition immediately after its close. The inquiry was conducted in what must seem to us now rather a peculiar fashion, not by a Select Committee, but by the whole House. The House sat and the debates lasted without intermission from the end of January to the 17th March, 1810, "absorbing" as the historian Alison says, "nearly the whole time, both of the Government and of the country, at the very moment when the concentration of national thought and energies was required for the prosecution of the gigantic campaign in progress on the Continent." It was that precedent which was invoked, forty years later, at the time of the Crimean War, when Mr. Roebuck proposed his famous Committee to inquire into the condition of the Army in the Crimea. I will not go into the Parliamentary history of that inquiry which led to the downfall of the Government, the setting up of a new Government, the resignation of the new Government, and the return to that Government of the Minister who had originally resigned—complications which I hope we shall not follow. A Committee was appointed, and I see from the historian that it asked 21,421 questions, and, in obedience to its instructions, two special Commissioners were sent out to the Crimea. After the lapse of a year their Report was laid before Parliament, containing animadversions on the conduct of certain officers, who then applied for the opportunity of exposing errors detected in their reports. The demands of the officers were granted. A new tribunal of seven generals was appointed to inquire into the matter, and, after an inquiry lasting three months, each of the assailed officers was absolved from the blame imputed to him by the Commissioners and, finally, a Report was issued attributing the sufferings of the Army in the Crimea to the want of transport and the insufficient discharge of its duties by the Treasury. That, perhaps, is not a very encouraging precedent, but it is the latest occasion on which the House of
    1238
    Commons has appointed a Committee during the course of a war to inquire into the conduct of operations.
    4.0 P.M.
    The kind of difficulties to which that Committee was exposed would accompany any similar instrument of inquiry to be set up now. In the first place, a very great burden would be laid upon the officials of the various Departments concerned, whose time ought to be given mainly to the daily conduct of the War in preparing, collating, compiling, and presenting the Papers and other materials which are necessary for the proper conduct of such an inquiry. In the next place—this, of course, bears very much on the question of Mesopotamia, and to some extent, to a very large extent, on the question of the Dardanelles—the gallant officers concerned—admirals, generals, and others, are to a large extent dispersed over the field of operations. Some are now in command in the Red Sea, in Mesopotamia itself, in Salonika, and in other distant spheres. It is quite out of the question that they should be called home from the discharge of those duties in order to give evidence before any tribunal which might be set up in this, country, and, indeed, the Roebuck Committee, when they had to deal with a similar problem, as I have pointed out, sent out Commissioners in order to interrogate the officers themselves in the places where their duties were then being carried on. In pointing out to the House those difficulties I am not deprecating inquiry, but I am only showing that an inquiry conducted in the middle of a war like this must be conducted with great discretion and subject to very severe limitations, and above all, with strict and scrupulous determination that it shall not interfere with the active conduct of operations in the field. Those are the difficulties which are impressed very much upon us, which I am sure the House will recognise to the full. But having put those considerations forward, and asking the House to give them due weight, I wish to say on behalf of the Government that, in the special circumstances in which we stand, both as regards the Dardanelles Expedition and as regards the operations in Mesopotamia, the Government think it right, feeling compelled under expert advice to postpone the circulation of Papers, to institute two separate inquiries with regard to these two sets of transactions.

    1239
    We do not think that Select Committees of this House would be the best instrument for the purpose. The House of Lords contains a number of eminent men who have occupied administrative and other posts all over the Empire, who could certainly contribute, and ought to contribute, a useful element to any body of investigation which might be set up. I go further, and I hope that I shall command the assent of the House when I say that outside this House and outside the House of Lords, there are others, competent people, whose assistance might very well be invited and invoked. To give but one illustration, our Australian fellow subjects took a very large and a glorious part in the operations in the Dardanelles, and I think that I should only be responding to the general sentiment when I say that any body of inquiry into that particular field of operations would be felt to be incomplete if it did not include some representative of Australia. Those seem to us to be objections to entrusting these inquiries simply to Select Committees of the House of Commons. I think that they will generally be felt in the country. We think further that the inquiring bodies, whatever we may call them, Committees or Commissions, should be small bodies. They should certainly have power—they must have power—to sit in secret. [An HON. MEMBER: "When necessary!"] When necessary. The reasons which make us chary and compel us to defer to the advice of our naval and military authorities in not circulating Papers, obviously apply to the proceedings of these Committees. There must be a number of considerations—in fact a very large number of considerations which will perpetually operate—which will make it necessary in order to have full information freely disclosed (which is all-important for the success of the Committee) that their deliberations should be carried on under the veil of confidence and secrecy.
    Mr. J. REDMOND: The whole of them?
    The PRIME MINISTER: Not necessarily the whole, but in very large part. They would be unduly hampered and, indeed, fettered in every direction if they cannot have the veil of secrecy. If the Government cannot disclose all that they ought to know they would be without the materials from which alone they could form a sound and complete judgment. We think that on both these bodies the two
    1240
    Houses should be represented—the House of Lords and the House of Commons. As I have said, for reasons at which I have hinted, we think that it will not be desirable to confine their composition entirely to membership of these two Houses. I believe that in assenting to inquiries upon that basis and under those conditions the Government will be meeting the general desire of the House of Commons and of the country, which is legitimately concerned about what has been done, and at the same time, which is equally important, that the conduct of these inquiries will not in any way hamper or fetter our military and naval operations. An inquiry which led to anything in the nature of paralysis, or even temporary suspension of necessary military or naval action, however important in itself, the House will agree is entirely contrary to the public interest. We must make that an elementary and fundamental condition of any inquiry that takes place. I hope and believe that the proposal which I put forward on behalf of the Government will be felt in all quarters of the House and the country to meet the necessities of the case, and I trust that what certainly would have been a partial, and I am afraid must have been a somewhat painful, discussion of naval and military details may be avoided. I ought to add this, before these bodies—by whatever particular name you call them, these instruments of inquiry—are brought into existence we should desire, and we are very anxious to submit to the House and to take the judgment of the House on the names of those who are to take part in the inquiry. I think that this is essential.
    Sir H. DALZIEL: Before the Committees are formed?
    The PRIME MINISTER: Yes.
    Sir E. CARSON: And the terms of reference?
    The PRIME MINISTER: Certainly.
    Colonel GRIFFITHS: Are the Committees to be set out?
    The PRIME MINISTER: Certainly.
    Mr. BURDETT-COUTTS: Are they to have compulsory powers?
    The PRIME MINISTER: We cannot have that without an Act of Parliament.
    Colonel AUBREY HERBERT: Are the men who have been responsible for what

    1241
    has happened in Mesopotamia going to remain in their responsible positions, while the inquiry is sitting?
    The PRIME MINISTER: You cannot condemn anyone unheard. If there is a prima facie case of incapacity the Government would not hesitate to act. We have done so in more than one instance. I should be prepared to accept the reference suggested by my right hon. Friend in his Motion, which, I think, is founded on the Roebuck precedent, but, if anybody desires to suggest any Amendment to those terms of reference, we shall be glad to consider it; at any rate, the matter will not be finally settled until the House has had an opportunity of considering both the names of the persons to whom this great duty is going to be entrusted and the scope of the reference.
    Mr. ASHLEY: Do I understand that these bodies will not have power to send for Papers and witnesses?
    The PRIME MINISTER: They cannot have compulsory powers without an Act of Parliament unless you confine it to this House or the House of Lords, and I think for reasons which I have given, to which everybody will assent, that it is desirable to have latitude to introduce persons who are not Members of this House or of the other.
    Mr. MALCOLM: Cannot we get an Act of Parliament?
    The PRIME MINISTER: If any difficulty arises I would not hesitate to propose it, but I believe that all the evidence can be secured by voluntary procedure.
    Colonel HERBERT: Have not the Government got sufficient evidence already before them to be able to move with regard to the men who are responsible?
    The PRIME MINISTER: My right hon. Friends around me think, and I dare say that they are right, that perhaps the best way to do it would be to bring in a Bill which would clear up everything—the names of the Commissioners, the scope of the reference, and the compulsory powers with which they ought to be endowed. I believe that that would meet the general wish. The Government are prepared to bring in a Bill for that purpose.
    Colonel YATE: Will the whole Commission be able to go out to Mesopotamia?
    Sir E. CARSON: I think that it will be generally agreed that there was no other course left to those of us who are very much concerned about public feeling in relation both to the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia but to put down the Motion which stands in my name to-day. Having regard to the decision which the Government have come to on the recommendation of their military advisers that Papers could not be produced, it would be, I think, futile after the statement of the Prime Minister, to proceed to debate the question. So far as I am concerned, I was prepared merely to show reasons why the Government ought not, and I think could not, refuse an inquiry. I do not think that anybody demanding an inquiry ought in advance to try to condemn any particular individuals or Departments. I had studiously framed my observations, which now will never be heard beyond my own household for all future time, with that object. Nobody could, I think, after the statement of the Prime Minister, attempt to go beyond the limit which he has prescribed when it was put upon such broad statements, such broad grounds of State policy as he has put the matter before us. And may I say for myself that as regards the military advisers of the Government, and the views that they take upon this matter, there is nobody who has greater confidence in General Robertson, who is now the chief military adviser of the Government, than I have, who had many opportunities of seeing him when I was a member of the Cabinet, and nobody can come in contact with him without knowing that he was a man of great judgment, great determination, and, above all things, a man who could not be influenced by politicians?
    I have only one or two observations that I should like to make. May I take it from the right hon. Gentleman's statement that he is satisfied, and that the Secretary of State for India is also satisfied, that everything that is possible is being done with a view to remedying what seems, from the correspondence that one has seen, to be a very disastrous state of affairs in Mesopotamia? I think we ought to have some statement about that. I can assure you I have seen individuals, in relation to this question, who called upon me to give me information at first-hand, and who have really been almost tortured by the accounts they have received of the way matters have gone on in Mesopotamia. Whether it was unavoidable is a question

    1243
    which will have to be decided by the Commission which is being set up, but I do feel, and I am sure the whole House feels, the very gravest anxiety lest matters there may be allowed to drift. We have heard nothing, almost, since the surrender at Kut—which was dismissed in a few words in the course of debate in this House—we have heard practically nothing of the expedition; we do not know what it is doing, and we do not know what is the policy in relation to it now. Some of us have hopes, I may say, that it has been so strengthened in co-ordination with the brave Russian attempts, which I should like to acknowledge, that have been made in the same quarter, that we may look forward to the real accomplishment of what was originally intended. Whether that is so or not I do not know.
    But, above all things, we do want to avoid this, after months of suffering, even under the best conditions, in a climate like that of Mesopotamia, particularly at this time of the year, that there should not be again an evacuation, and that all the toil and suffering meanwhile should have been lost. We feel that it will be the duty, and that it is the duty, under the circumstances, of the Government to make up its mind, if it has not already done so, as to whether they are really and genuinely going on with the operation, or whether the matter has been left, as it was in the case of the Dardanelles, to drift on, nothing being done. That is the first matter that I should like to be assured about. There is another: So far as I am concerned, I have never been able to ascertain under which Office this expedition now is. I think we were told some months ago that it had been transferred to the War Office. I have asked supplementary questions from time to time, the answers to which seemed to me to show that it was not the War Office who were responsible, but the India Office. I do hope that there is not a divided responsibility in the matter, and that one Department, whether it be the War Office or the India Office, will have the whole responsibility thrown upon it to remedy the defects which have existed so long, and be answerable to this House if there are any further faults in the management of this expedition. I have nothing further to say. So far as I am conscerned I shall not pursue the matter which I have put upon the Paper, but I will only add this, that I hope that the Bill may be prepared and brought in at once, and put through
    1244
    all its stages at once, and that public confidence may be restored by a real and thorough investigation of these matters. ["Move, move!"]
    Several HON. MEMBERShaving risen——
    Mr. SPEAKER: I must point out that there is no Question before the House.
    Mr. CHURCHILL: On the point of Order. May I suggest that my right hon. Friend the Member for Dublin University should withdraw the Motion he has on the Paper, and then it may be convenient that the Prime Minister should move the Adjournment of the Debate to enable Members to express their opinions?
    Mr. SPEAKER: If the Motion for the Adjournment of the Debate were proposed, the discussion would not be confined to this one topic. I am quite prepared, however, to allow any hon. Member who wishes, to ask questions, for I think that is perfectly legitimate; but if hon. Members are going to get into a regular Debate on the matter, then we must have some Question before the House.
    Sir HENRY DALZIEL: On the point of Order. May I ask if the object will not be served on a Motion for the Adjournment of the House, limiting the Debate entirely to the announcement of the Prime Minister, without raising general questions which are going to be inquired into? It does appear to me that Members ought to be allowed to offer their opinion on the Prime Minister's proposal.
    Mr. DILLON: Would it not be far more convenient if the right hon. Member for Trinity College, Dublin, moved his Motion in order to give Members who desire to do so an opportunity to express their opinions, and then the Motion could be withdrawn?
    The PRIME MINISTER: Perhaps, on the whole, it would be best that I move the Adjournment, on the understanding that the Debate is confined to the statement I have made. I move "That the House do now adjourn."
    Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."
    Sir H. DALZIEL: I have only a very few words to say on the proposal of the Prime Minister. After the statement which my right hon. Friend has made, it is, of course, obvious that we could not support the proposal of the right hon.

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    Member opposite. But I desire to point out to the House two things: The proposal of the Prime Minister is not the same as the proposal of my right hon. Friend. The proposal of the Prime Minister moves the seat of authority in this House to the Government Bench. The proposal of the Prime Minister means that a Commission is to be appointed which is to be nominated by the Government itself in the first place, and which can subsequently be approved by Members of this House. That is a very different thing from the proposal of my right hon. Friend. In the first place, members of the Government themselves are charged in regard to these two expeditions. Their action will be under investigation as well as the action of generals, admirals and others. I put it to the House that it would have been better if this House itself had appointed the tribunal which is going to inquire into the action of Ministers, rather than Ministers themselves appointing tribunals outside this House, and nominated by them Let me point out that the advantage of a Committee of this House making inquiry is that this House has full control. After all, this House is responsible to the country, and need not go to outside gentlemen, who represent no constituents at all. There are to be men on this Committee who are to be nominated by the Government, and who are responsible to no one but the Government. I say that ought not to be, in a matter of this kind, when thousands of lives, as we contend, have been wasted by maladministration. I say that Members of this House ought to be the supreme authority. They have to answer to their constituents as to why they allowed these awful blunders to be perpetrated which my right hon. Friend described as "criminal negligence." I therefore regret that this House is parting with its authority in this matter.
    There is no advantage in the tribunal proposed by the Prime Minister that does not belong to a Select Committee of this House. What guarantee have we as to the length of time this tribunal will take? We have no control. It may go on year after year, and you may find that the very men charged with losing thousands of lives, and with criminal negligence in the field, in charge of other men and other lives. I say that is wrong. The Government itself is to nominate this tribunal, and it may, if it chooses, take no action with regard to the Report presented. I regret that the
    1246
    Government, in this case, have the nominating of the jury that is going to try it. I think the House ought to have the empanelling of Members of this House, and that the Committee of Inquiry ought to be under the full control of this House. If a Select Committee were set up, why should it not be entrusted with that power? No Member of this House, belonging to any party, would ever allow to be published what was useful to the enemy. If you can trust an outside tribunal, why not trust a Select Committee of the House, whose members would be under the control of the House? While I welcome the announcement of the Prime Minister, I regret very much indeed that he has not adopted the suggestion of my right hon. Friend opposite, because it does seem to me that then this House would be in full control. I have been told that this House would have the opportunity to approve the reference and to approve the men to be nominated: but hon. Members know how difficult it is, especially in the case of gentlemen outside this House, to raise objection to any name, nor have we the authority and machinery in the case of men the Government can nominate from outside. Therefore, this House is parting, in my opinion, with an important power. What argument have you against a Select Committee of this House which would not apply to the tribunal proposed to be set up? In the one case, the Government nominates it and controls it; in the other case, the House of Commons would have supreme authority, and the members of the Committee would be under our control. I beg respectfully to register my protest against the proposed tribunal.
    Mr. CHURCHILL: I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Trinity College, Dublin, that it would be quite impossible for him to persist in his Motion after the decision of policy which the Government has announced. For my own part, so far as I have any claim to speak in this matter, I am, in principle, quite content with the course the right hon. Gentleman has announced. At the same time, I must say that I regret that it has not been found possible to publish the documents, as was originally intended and promised by the Prime Minister, in the name of the Government. In consequence of that decision of the Government as to the publication of these documents, I wrote to the Prime Minister and submitted a series of Papers with which he was very familiar, and I suggested that

    1247
    other parties no doubt would wish to submit papers to Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, to collate and discuss in regard to points to the publication of which objection might be taken by the various parties concerned. The right hon. Gentleman fell in with the suggestion, and I believe a considerable amount of work was done on the Papers. But I noticed very early in those proceedings a dilatory and obstructive tendency, and that culminated after several weeks in a perfectly clear indication that the Government were not going to allow the publication of the Papers. On that, Sir, I wrote a letter to the Prime Minister, which I must ask the indulgence of the House to permit me to read:
    "13th July, 1915.
    My dear Prime Minister,
    I have your letter of the 12th for which I thank you. I had already learned that the Government had decided to depart from their undertaking to lay upon the Table the Papers relating to the genesis and conduct of the Dardanelles and Gallipoli operations. I cannot agree that this decision is justified in the public interest. The pledge of the Government was freely given by the Colonial Secretary, speaking with your full and direct authority. The circumstances of the case, the nature of the documents, and their bearing on the course of the War must have been present in your mind, although perhaps there were some which you had overlooked or forgotten. The pledge to publish was not given at my request, though as you know I have always wished that the whole truth should be made known to the Nation, and to the Dominions and that nothing essential should be concealed. It was given to the House, and we have been left for more than six weeks in the expectation that it would be fulfilled. I do not think that in these circumstances it ought to be departed from on any vague and general ground. Papers have been submitted to you by me, and I understand by other persons affected. There may be passages in these Papers which affect allied or neutral Powers. Certainly they are few and far between. There is no reason why they should not be omitted or expressed in a different way by mutual agreement. There may be technical matters which, if desired, could be suppressed without impairing in any way the proper presentation of the facts of the case. It is unfair to the House—I do not speak of individuals—that objections founded on a few passages, or documents which are not material, and would not be claimed as material to the case by the persons concerned, should be used as a bar to prevent any publication at all. It was foreseen by the Colonial Secretary when giving his undertaking that some reservation of this kind might be necessary, and he guarded himself accordingly. It is of course imperative that any publication of documents or records should not be one-sided. But I am sure that if the Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence were authorised to discuss the passages to the publication of which objection is now taken with' the principal persons concerned, there would be no difficulty in arriving at an agreement which would enable a publication to be made on which a true judgment could be formed. At any rate, this method ought to be tried before the Government repudiate a definite pledge given to Parliament in a matter in which they are themselves concerned.
    Yours very sincerely,
    WINSTON CHURCHILL."
    I thank the House for permitting me to read that letter because it expresses very
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    clearly the view which I have taken on this matter. The right hon. Gentleman has, since the day that letter was written, made a new departure, and has proposed to the House the production of legislation to set up two inquiries into the respective operations of Mesopotamia and the Dardanelles. There are only two points in regard to those inquiries which I would venture at this stage to urge. The first is that as much should be taken in public as possible, and that a Secret Session should only be resorted to where special conditions arise. The second is that the references should, so far as possible, be detailed and precise, because otherwise the inquiries which are needed for the information of the country to enable the country and the Empire to form its opinion on grave matters may easily be sprawled out and ramble over the immense and almost limitless tangle of the conduct of this great War. I think that the questions at issue ought to be precisely formulated to those bodies. I believe it would be possible to formulate them in a very searching manner which would enable Parliament to judge of how far there is blame and where it rests, and I believe that this could be done with great advantage, and that searching inquiries could be completed in a reasonable space of time. Therefore, I press that very strongly upon the right hon. Gentleman, and I trust that he and his colleagues, with the Secretary of State for War, may consider it. After all, these are very serious and vital matters, and if an Act of Parliament is to call bodies into being which are going to investigate the conduct of the Government and of all its members in relation to the whole great interlaced field of the European War during 1915, I do not believe any result will issue or that any Report will issue from those bodies in time to give the country information during the course of the War; whereas, if the inquiry is localised on to certain points, however searching and however precise, it will be possible to get broad and definite conclusions within a reasonable time. I should welcome from the Government some expression of opinion in regard to these matters.
    Sir FREDERICK CAWLEY: As I have given notice of a Motion on this subject, I only rise to say that I agree with the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir E. Carson), and I think it would be absolutely futile to debate the question after

    1249
    the remarks of the Prime Minister. I should like to assure the Prime Minister that the Motion I put down, which was supported by Friends of mine on this side of the House, was not put down in any light or frivolous manner, but because we thought that in doing so we were only voicing the opinions of the country. There has been and there is great anxiety as to the Mesopotamia campaign, and that anxiety has been heightened by the result of the Dardanelles campaign. That campaign, as everybody will admit, was most disastrous and humiliating, and there is an idea in the country, rightly or wrongly, that some of the people that might be held responsible in regard to that disaster have still commands in which they may again repeat the disasters that occurred at the Dardanelles. I am sure that the country will welcome the fact that the campaign in the Dardanelles is to be inquired into. As regards what my right hon. Friend has said about a Select Committee, I do not altogether agree with him, because, although the House is generally supposed to select such a Committee, and the names are generally read out, yet those names are really the nominations of the Government Whips; whereas, in the case of this Committee which the Prime Minister proposes to form, I think we, as Members of this House, ought to exercise at least a very close scrutiny of the names that are brought forward of those who are not in this House or in the House of Lords. I think, perhaps, that scrutiny will not be so invidious as if we were commenting on one of our colleagues, and therefore I think that it is far more likely that the House would really criticise the names of those members of the Committee who are proposed and who are outside this House. I have nothing further to say except that I am very glad that the Prime Minister has taken the course he has announced.
    Colonel HERBERT: I think most of us cordially welcome the statement of the Prime Minister. I can speak only for myself, but I know there are a considerable number of hon. Members who share my opinions, and I have deprecated, disliked, and feared discussion on the Mesopotamia question in this House, but it did not seem possible to me to remedy the disastrous condition of things under which we are suffering now without debate in this House, and it was only for that reason that I was in
    1250
    favour of discussion. We are governed by one single-minded purpose, and that is, first of all, to help our men in Mesopotamia, and secondly, to see that we do not in future suffer either from the continuation or repetition of the ferocious economy of one Department of the Indian Government. With regard to the first, we can rest content when we know that it is now in the hands of Sir William Robertson. With regard to the second, I myself cannot feel that the statement of the Prime Minister is completely satisfactory. What we want to do is to have that responsibility fixed, and fixed soon. This Motion falls into two parts, one dealing with the question of Mesopotamia, and the other with the question of the Dardanelles. The glory and the tragedy of the Dardanelles is past, and I am quite sure of this, if our dead, who are now at rest in the Dardanelles, could look down and see what is happening here, they would not wish for any discussion of their fate that might affect the fortunes of their comrades who are fighting in Mesopotamia. I hope that the Prime Minister will be in a position before long to give us the assurance that those responsible people are no longer going out in positions where they can do us the harm they have done us in the past.
    Mr. MacCALLUM SCOTT: I desire to ask a question, and I propose to lead up to it by a few remarks about the subject towards which the question is directed, and that is with regard to the Dardanelles. I have given some time to the study of those operations with such material as was available for that purpose. It is true that we have not had Papers or documents published, but we have some material to go upon. We have the very full statement of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, who was First Lord of the Admiralty at the time, which he made on, I think, the 15th November last in this House, as to the general course and genesis of those operations, and as to the methods by which they were carried out, and the details of which were not contradicted, or even any doubt hinted at by any person in authority in this House But we have more than that. We have got the statement of the Prime Minister, delivered, I think, on the same occasion, or perhaps a little earlier in the same month, passing a certain judgment upon personal responsibility with regard to those operations. After the most careful study which I have been

    1251
    able to make of everything that has been divulged in this House or out of it with regard to these operations, I have come to the conclusion that in the matter of policy, in the matter of the major strategy of the War at this particular place, the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty at that time was right and Lord Kitchener was wrong. I do not say that in any sense as attacking Lord Kitchener on general grounds. I am a supporter of the policy which Lord Kitchener pursued with regard to this War. I believe that he laid the foundations of the machine that is going to win the War, and laid them broad, deep and strong, but it would be far from my desire to endeavour to contend that in every respect and in all details Lord Kitchener was never wrong.
    Mr. RUTHERFORD: Is it in order in this Debate to proceed to criticise individuals? I thought it was ruled just now that the discussion was to be confined to the limits laid down by the Prime Minister. Is it not very inconvenient, if we are going to have a Commission, to proceed to discuss individuals whether alive or dead?
    Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: That is a matter upon which the Chair must rely on Members of the House. The actual Motion before us is for the Adjournment; but it was understood that the Debate should be strictly confined to discussion of the Prime Minister's statement.
    Mr. SCOTT: It was far from my intention to enter into a broad discussion of the responsibilities and the reasons. I merely wished to indicate my general conclusion as to the right hon. Gentleman's freedom from blame, and to make that a reason for a certain demand upon the Government with which I propose to conclude. I think that if the policy recommended by the right hon. Gentleman at the beginning, of a joint naval and military assault upon the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, had been adopted, victory would have been secured within a very short time and the whole course of the War would have been altered. If that is a conclusion which it is possible to form on the material at our disposal—
    Mr. J. SAMUEL: We have not seen it.
    Mr. SCOTT: You have seen the material which has been given in the House. At any rate, I do not intend to argue it in detail; I simply state that that is the con-
    1252
    clusion to which I have come. If it is possible to come to that conclusion on the material at our disposal, does not that have an important bearing upon the future of the War? The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Churchill) at the present time bears the odium of that defeat and of that disaster. The finger of scorn is pointed at him. He is blamed for it. If it possibly be true that he was right and that others were wrong, has it not any important meaning to the people of this country, to the Government, and to the conduct of the War in the future that that should be known, and that the person who was right should have his due share in the conduct of these operations in the future? This is a chapter which is closed. These operations were finished nearly a year ago by the last big assault at Suvla Bay. There is no military operation in continuance of them. There is no military operation depending upon them. Why, then, cannot the details be made public? I completely fail to understand the reason—which has not been given, but which is said to exist—for the refusal to publish the details of these operations in such a form that the House and the country may be able to judge as to the responsibility for them. I therefore desire to ask the Prime Minister whether the reasons for secrecy prevail in regard to the Dardanelles operations in the same way as they prevail in regard to the Mesopotamia operations which are not yet concluded? The Prime Minister knows, because he has said so in the House, that an intolerable wrong and injustice is being inflicted upon the right hon. Gentleman who had the conduct of these operations as the head of the Admiralty at that time. There is every reason, on the ground of honour, on the ground of chivalry, and on the ground of justice, for making these investigations public. It will require the most overwhelming reasons for holding them in secret or for refusing to publish the details. I did not gather that the reasons were overwhelming. The Prime Minister did not say that the military authorities put their veto on it. He said the contrary—that they have only expressed a desire that they should not be public.
    The PRIME MINISTER: No!
    Mr. SCOTT: Perhaps I have been mistaken. I am glad to have elicited that. I thought the words which I caught from

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    the right hon. Gentleman were "the military authorities, I will not say veto, but have expressed a strong desire that these should not be published."
    The PRIME MINISTER: They could not veto it.
    Mr. SCOTT: I do not want to quibble about terms. I think the military authorities responsible for the War, if they thought that this would hamper them, could veto it and could resign if the details were published in spite of them. They could give their veto; but I understand from the right hon. Gentleman that they have not given their veto.
    The PRIME MINISTER: No, the hon. Gentleman may understand nothing of the sort. I said that they could not veto it. Of course, they cannot veto anything. The Government is responsible and the Government alone. But they expressed the strongest possible protest in the interests of the conduct of the War, and their protest was shared by the naval and diplomatic advisers.
    Mr. SCOTT: In regard to an operation which is completely closed, on which no operation depends, and in regard to which no reason for secrecy is visible to the ordinary man, when one has merely the dark saying that they protest against it, one cannot resist the conclusion that there is someone desiring secrecy in order that he may shelter himself at the expense of other people.
    Colonel Sir MARK SYKES: I had not intended to intervene in this Debate, and, indeed, on matters of detail it would be quite impossible for me to speak, because I am an employé of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, the Secretary of State for War. But I thought there was one point to which I might direct attention, and that is the general tendency of this Debate and the effect that it may have upon the enemy. I cannot help calling to mind the situation as it was in Mesopotamia and the situation as it is to-day. That situation must be present in the enemy's mind. In July, August, and September, 1915, I suppose that there was no field of operations where everybody justifiably felt greater hope or greater satisfaction. Perhaps I may take the opportunity, as I happened to see it at the time, and many sad things have happened since, to state to the House what was the situation then. It was Force D, minute, almost lilliputian, but it felt itself, against anything except
    1254
    overwhelming odds, invincible. I should imagine that there was no other force in the field where there was more splendid cooperation than existed between the various commanders of that force. We have heard mention in the House of the trench and the non-trench population in France. There was no trench and non-trench population in Mesopotamia. The Staff and the regimental officers were absolutely as brothers. That one little force met the enemy on six occasions—on occasion the enemy was superior in one arm in the proportion of seven to fifteen, in another arm two against three, and in another arm one against thirty—and always emerged victorious. There was courage, decision, and immense hope. More than that, its action diverted very large forces down to Mesopotamia, which enabled our Allies in the War to make progress which they might perhaps not otherwise have been able to make. More than that, it conquered an enemy province and a half, and holds it today. These are things we should not forget with regard to that little force which is now dispersed, some of them at Kut, and so on. It did an immense work.
    That was the picture which one saw there then. The picture we have now is not so happy. We have had a sad and terrible surrender. It is well that we should not minimise a thing which the enemy has not minimised. We must remember that in the surrender of Kut the Turkish Army had the greatest success that it has had since it surrounded Peter the Great at Pruth in 1711; and to find an English surrender of that magnitude I think we have to go back to somewhere about 1781. As we see the correspondence which comes from Mesopotamia we cannot help having the feeling that people regard that force possibly as disheartened, and from what one reads in the Press there is a certain amount of anger and dissension here in England. What I hope will emerge from this Debate and be the feeling in the mind of the enemy is that that force is not disheartened, and that in England Government, people, and Parliament are absolutely united to avenge the surrender of Kut and to go on. I believe that in Mesopotamia we have an enemy which used to regard us with fear, but who now regard us with something like contempt. I hope that from this Debate and the appointment of this Committee there will come the feeling that this is not a Committee appointed merely to reap vengeance on one particular official who happened to hold

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    office and who inherited forty years of tradition and red tape which led him into evil ways; that it is not welcomed because it may mean some discredit to the Government, which, being a Coalition, has not so many friends as it might have: but that the Committee is appointed only to enable us to carry on the War, to get the victory; that the united purpose of this House and the Government is to co-ordinate our military brain and to pull together; that Mesopotamia is one part of a harmonious whole; that we are going on; that we have a purpose: that we have an intention; and that we mean to carry it out. If that emerges from this Debate, if that is the impression which this Debate leaves on the enemy's mind, the enemy will remember the crimes he has committed. He will remember the massacres of the Armenians; he will remember the starving Lebanese; he will remember that there is no peace between us and any of our enemies until wrongs have been avenged; he will know perfectly well that once this country is united and determined, though it may punish people who have gone astray, it is going on with its purpose; and he will pass from contempt to the feeling that he himself is going on not to victory, but to failure.
    5.0 P.M.
    Mr. BURDETT-COUTTS: I would just like to say a word in explanation of the interruption which I made on the question I put towards the end of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, which I think, produced one of the most remarkable and rapid changes ever made in a proposal by a responsible Minister, or that I ever heard in this House. I do not say this in any invidious spirit to the right hon. Gentleman, but I say it for the purpose of expressing my pleasure at having at last found some definite virtue in a Coalition Government. I noticed that the right hon. Gentleman was surrounded by colleagues who immediately said some mysterious words to him which led to this dramatic change in his proposal.
    The PRIME MINISTER: What dramatic change?
    Mr. BURDETT COUTTS: The dramatic change from an inquiry without compulsory powers to an inquiry with compulsory powers.
    The PRIME MINISTER: Oh!
    Mr. BURDETT-COUTTS: I will venture, if the right hon. Gentleman does not appreciate the difference—with apologies, to any Members of the House who do completely understand the difference—to explain. In any inquiry dealing with a force which is restricted by decipline, and still more by esprit de corps, the compulsory powers take the whip off; they relieve him of the responsibility of coming forward of his own motion. They compel him to come forward. No doubt he will tell the whole truth when once he has come forward. Otherwise, the effect in the Army, in view of the discipline of the Services, is perfectly well known to be such as would tend to prevent any complete evidence being obtained. I only make this reference in order to make quite certain that these compulsory powers will be given to the body which is constituted by this proposal.
    Sir NORVAL HELME: I rise to ask the Prime Minister if we are correct in understanding that information will be welcomed by the tribunal that is to be set up respecting the conduct of the campaign either in Mesopotamia or in the Dardanelles? My reason for asking the question is that yesterday, when Lady Horsley heard of the lamented death of her husband, who sacrificed his life in the public-service—having left Egypt to go to Mesopotamia to overlook the medical interests of the expedition there—she, desiring to contribute so far as she was able to that inquiry, entrusted me with letters and extracts from her husband's letters bearing upon such matters as transport, medical supplies, the lack of water, and so on, in respect to that important enterprise. Seeing we are to have this inquiry conducted, I rose to say how anxious I was that there should be a clear understanding given to Members of this House, or to the public generally having information bearing upon the conduct of that campaign, that that information Would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government; that we should have the opportunity of putting such facts as come within our knowledge before the Government. I do not presume, under present circumstances, to say more. I feel, however, it is right that I should acknowledge the indebtedness I feel to Lady Horsley in the sad circumstances. If in the Debate to-day any facts in the correspondence of her late husband could be of use to or at the service of the House, she was anxious that it should be, if the public interest: was thereby aided.
    Mr. MALCOLM: There is one thing I have heard hon. Members in the course of their speeches say—that is, that they want to discuss the names and terms of reference on the floor of this House. I think, however, it absolutely essential, when men are dying by hundreds and when parents are mourning by thousands, that that Committee should be set up at once. If we are going to wait until we have gone through all the processes of a Bill, the discussion of terms of reference, and then the passing of the Bill, very likely indeed we may be leaving the thing too late, and we should have done better with a less ambitious project. I want to ask the Prime Minister—and I am afraid I shall have to ask him one or two questions—but shortly—when he thinks he will be able to set up his Committee, or Commission? It is so very, very important that we should have it a full-going concern, certainly before Christmas! I want to ask the Secretary of State for India, whom I see in his place, what is going to happen to the Report of the Vincent Commission? There you have had men working and slaving away in the tropics since last March, and there has been got together a great deal of valuable evidence, much of which will not, unfortunately, be able to be got from the same people again, because they are dead. What is going to happen to that evidence? Is it all going to be useless, or cannot it be worked upon? Cannot some of these crying injustices, these crying cases of negligence, be dealt with before the Royal Commission, or whatever it is, with all its paraphernalia, is set up, and goes over the whole ground again?.
    The letters we get show that this matter brooks of no delay. It is no good waiting for Reports It is no good waiting for documents now. The Secretary of State for War, if he goes round any of the hospitals in this country, will find wounded and tattered documents in all of them who are suffering as few men have suffered. You do not need documents. The men will themselves tell you what they have gone through, and you can form your own judgment. The day before yesterday the Prime Minister told us that he, had satisfactory information from the Tigris that all was going well. The Secretary of State shakes his head. Well, I think it was the Prime Minister who said that the information was satisfactory at the present time We had satisfactory statements, in December last, from Sir
    1258
    John Nixon. We had satisfactory statements from General Aylmer, if I remember aright, in March. Neither were borne out by the facts. Those in possession know it now. We really do ask whichever it is—and for the life of me I do not know which it is, whether the Secretary of State for War or the Secretary of State for India—but I do beseech one of them, with the knowledge at his hand, to make a statement now, or in the very near future, as to the present condition of things on the Tigris. We want, for instance, to know about the light railway. On Tuesday the Prime Minister said this was the pivot of the alleged shortage. So it is. We want to know whether those at general headquarters in Mesopotamia asked for that light railway from Simla in 1914, and why it was refused. We want to know how it is getting on now, and whether it is being pushed forward. We want to know about transport, about hutting, and about tents. I receive letters now saying that the hot weather has begun, and that there is an immense shortage of tents. I saw a man who got back the other day. I asked him about the huts. He said he saw no huts, and he left at the end of April. Yet in the middle of April the Under-Secretary for War told us that the hutting was getting on as well as circumstances would permit. We do want to know about the arrangements.
    I want also to ask whoever it is that is responsible, either the War Office or the India Office, to look into the question of drugs and dressings in India, and to consider the arrangements made by the Army Finance Department in India about the drugs and dressings. They have to provide three years' non-perishable stock in India, either in the field units or the depots, and one and a half years' supply of drugs. These things could only be got, as everybody will understand, from the India Office, or from the Indian provinces. The Director-General of the Indian Medical Service—and this is really the initial cause of the shortages—long ago pressed upon the Army Finance Department that it would be difficult in the case of a big war to get these drugs and dressings from England, and this owing to one or two specified reasons, owing possibly to the partial loss of the command of the sea, owing possibly also to the fact that in a big war England would need all the drugs and dressings that she could lay her hands upon. So the Director-General of

    1259
    the Indian Medical Service made an application to Simla, to the Army Finance Department, to help in an enterprise of taking a disused carriage factory in Madras for the manufacture of medicines, and so on. Five years before the War the Army Finance Department set its face against this project and tried to starve it out. It would have nothing to do with it. It would have starved it out had it not been for this concern being able to supply local Governments and civil Departments with drugs and medicines, and they were thus able to make the thing a success. What I want is this: that the Department should not be so parsimonious in this matter. They should really have helped this manufactory so that the Indian service might have been served, and not look for overseas supplies from here, which it is rather difficult to obtain at the present time. Many of us have seen Sir William Meyer's budgets for 1913–1916, and it is very ominous and disquieting, as facts are at the moment, to see—and the Indian papers are full of it—and it is difficult to understand, why his budget for Army services and for medical stores should be higher in times of peace than in the last few years. I do not profess to understand it. I confess it is difficult to understand why Sir William Meyer's budgets for 1913–1916, and his estimated budget from 1916–17, should be lower in time of war than in the time of peace. It needs explanation. Possibly one will be forthcoming. I should, however, like whoever speaks now or any other time on this question to give us an explanation of these two or three points which I have tried to lay before the House of Commons.
    Colonel YATE: I should like to support and express my pleasure at hearing the tribute which has been paid to-day to the gallant conduct of the troops at the commencement of the Mesopotamia campaign. Those troops, and especially the Indians, carried the earlier part of the campaign through with magnificent bravery. The Prime Minister has already called attention to it, and we shall all remember it. What we have to think of now is, what happened after the first phase of that campaign. I join heartily in what has been said by the hon. Member who has just spoken, and I hope all those questions to which he has referred will be specially inquired into. I am glad to see the Secretary of State for India present. I will
    1260
    specially ask that instructions may be issued in this Bill for the Commission to inquire into the reality of the reports that were received by him from India on the actual state of affairs that existed at the time. I happen to have by me here a letter from an Officer in India who wrote to me in August last in perfect astonishment on receiving the papers of the 27th July, containing the reply which was given by the Secretary of State for India to a question put in this House by the late Sir George Scott Robertson, as to the adequacy of the hospital accommodation and hospital comforts for sick and wounded in Mesopotamia. In that reply the information given from India was what my friend writing to me describes as "a magnificently worded prevarication and a crying shame." I think there should be an inquiry into those things to see whether there is any truth in that, and who is responsible. The right hon. Gentleman ended his reply by saying there was ample hospital accommodation and a good supply of comforts for the sick. The whole campaign this officer describes as:
    "One long tale of hopeless inadequacy in the equipment of the hospitals and the ration arrangements for the troops, and to say that all the things done were done for the whole force is criminal Bar possibly a few privileged persons at the base, no one has seen half he items quoted."
    Possibly those things arrived at the base, but those who bore the burden and heat of the day at the front never saw those things, and the reply read in this House gave a quite erroneous idea to the country as to how the campaign was going on. I trust sincerely this will be inquired into. I hope the Commission will be given full powers, and that it will be directed to sit in Mesopotamia itself. I think it most important it should see the places and get information from men on the spot. I trust the Prime Minister will put this in the instructions.
    Mr. ANNAN BRYCE: The hon. Member for Croydon (Mr. Malcolm) asked some pertinent questions of the Secretary of State for India, and I should like very much, when the Secretary of State for India replies, if he will reassure the House as to the present hospital accommodation provided. I understand that several organisations, one in particular, offered, so long ago as April last, a hospital for Mesopotamia to the War Office, to whom it was understood at that time that the conduct of affairs in Mesopotamia had been handed over. It was refused by the

    1261
    War Office. They said that ample hospital supplies could be furnished by them. The organisation was not satisfied, and pressed them again, and they then said that they would require a request from the Government of India before they could grant anything. The Viceroy was applied to, and he sent forward a request by telegram to the War Office to accept the offer which was made by this organisation. The War Office suppressed that request of the Viceroy, and again refused to accept this hospital unit. I want to know from the Secretary of State whether they were justified by the facts in refusing to accept that offer. Is the hospital accommodation provided in Mesopotamia sufficient now? The hon. and gallant Member who spoke last talked about the misleading information which was given earlier in the course of the War with regard to these supplies. Officers who have lately come home, and letters from India, describe in the most moving terms the misfortunes that arose from the want of that accommodation. After the actions of Ctesiphon and Wadi, and on the 21st January at Es Sinn, there was provision only enough for 150 or 200 wounded, whereas the number of wounded to be provided for was 11,000. The result was there was no hospital ship, or even hospital boat, but there were some berths fitted up without any beds and without any mattresses, so that the unfortunate wounded, to the number of thousands, had to lie on floors, exposed to drenching rain, and many of them died before reaching Basra before their wounds were dressed. A number of them died when they were touched, they were so absolutely exhausted. Many of them lost their nets and died from wounds, being poisoned in the absence of dressing. I know a case of an officer who had a very simple wound, which might have been easily cured by the slightest attention, but who lost his leg because he was unable to have his wound dressed before he reached Basra after five days. The accounts given of the misfortunes that occurred during this time are absolutely appalling, and if the facts were known to the public there would be such a cry of indignation that no white-washing Commission, such as I believe this is going to be, would assuage the anger of the people.
    Colonel NORTON GRIFFITHS: I want particularly to draw the attention of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War to one or two important points. The ground I meant to cover has already
    1262
    been covered by my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, but I wish to press upon the Secretary of State for War, as the Prime Minister is not here, the belief which I have that the country to-day is most anxious for immediate action. Can the Government state to-day when and in what manner it proposes to act, and whether it will bring in the Bill next-week? If so, could it be passed through all its stages in one day, which I think is possible. If that is done I am sure it would ease a lot of anxiety prevailing throughout the country. The next thing I would desire to press upon the Government is with reference to the remark made by the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir H. Dalziel). He stated that this House was responsible to the constituencies for past deeds. I venture to suggest it covers a much greater responsibility. We have had Australian troops partaking in this campaign, and I am very glad to hear that the Prime Minister proposes to include somebody representing Australia on the Committee. I would go further and ask the Prime Minister to consider the advisability of asking the Australian Government to nominate a member for that Committee, because, after all, we are responsible not only to the people of this country but to the Empire, and particularly Australia, who sacrificed many of its men there. One little point, and an all-important one, is this: I have heard in several quarters that a lot of tents in Mesopotamia are what are called bell tents. I think I know that part of the world as well as most people, and it is absolute murder to put a man into a bell tent at this time of the year. It is certainly next to murder. You want a recognised Indian tent, and I will press that point on the attention of my right hon. Friend. The question of light railways has been pressed, and I hope that will also receive most earnest attention. But the crux of the whole position is that the country to-day wants to know who is responsible. Have you divided responsibility? Is the India Office responsible to the War Office, because, if so, may I remind the House what really happens in such a case? Something is wanted urgently by the Indian Government, and the India Office send the requisition over to the War Office, and so you have divided control, which must always mean delay, if not disaster. I am perfectly sure I am voicing the opinion of the majority of people in this country and of Members of this

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    House when I say we should all like to see direct responsibility put under that great leader Sir William Robertson. I know there is a very strong feeling on the point. I have gone round the House on both sides, and Members have said what a pity it is not so. Would the Secretary of State, therefore, tell the House and the country who is responsible? Is Sir William Robertson directly responsible, and, if not, will the right hon. Gentleman see that the Government so arrange it?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Mr. Lloyd George): I rise rather to answer questions that have been addressed to the Prime Minister and myself in the course of the discussion. With regard to the introduction of the Bill, the Prime Minister wishes me to give an undertaking on his behalf that the Bill will be introduced on Monday next. Of course, it is obviously important that the Committee should be set up as soon as possible, and that it should get to work as soon as possible. The House will then have full opportunity of discussing, not merely the provisions of the Bill, but the constitution of the Committee or Commission, as the case may be.
    Mr. CHURCHILL: Two Committees.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: The two Committees—their constitution, their terms of reference and their powers. The hon. Member for Somerset asked a question, and since then it has been pressed home by other Members who have taken part in the discussion, as to what is going to happen in the meantime. It is said, and said very properly, you cannot wait until the end of an inquiry before you redress evils which are acknowledged to exist in the conduct of affairs in Mesopotamia. That is perfectly right. However prompt and businesslike the Commission may be, it is bound to take some time. There is no intention unduly to protract the proceedings. I agree entirely with what has fallen from my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee (Mr. Churchill) that you cannot have a sort of roving inquiry into all that has happened in the course of this world-wide War. It must be a definite, a searching inquiry, within definite limits into the definite operations and within definite areas, but even with the best will in the world, and the best chairman in the world, it is bound to take time. Meanwhile you have got to see that the force is properly
    1264
    equipped, and the state of things complained of by my hon. Friends cannot possibly recur, assuming what they have stated are facts. Of course, those matters have got to be looked into. The difficulty has undoubtedly, to a very large extent, been attributable to the fact of the peculiar relations between the Governmen of India and the Government of this country. It is a very old and complex story, and very difficult to unravel. I should not like to lay down here exactly what those relations are. The Government of India is not under the War Office here; it has its own responsibility and its own Commander-in-Chief and its own organisation, and the bulk of the force in Mesopotamia was an Indian force.
    Sir J. D. REES: Originally.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I think the bulk are now Indians, at any rate three of the five regiments are Indians, and it is obvious that even in the direction of operations by Sir William Robertson it was considered very much better that the base of supply should be in India, because there you have an organisation accustomed to fit out Indian troops. That is the position at the present moment. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Robertson, is responsible for the direction of the military operation. He is responsible for the policy of the expedition at the present moment, and I agree with what the hon. Member has said as to the great qualities of that distinguised soldier. But as far as supplies are concerned, the base was in India, and the Commander-in-Chief there was responsible for those supplies. Now I come to the present arrangement. When he was short of anything he asked the War Office here to supplement his deficiency, and, after going into the thing very carefully, I can say, without hesitation, that every requisition that he sent home has been honoured. [An HON. MEMBER: "Since when? "] Since the time when Sir William Robertson became responsible. Whatever requisition he sent out, and whatever requisition was made upon the War Office here, has been honoured. The same thing applies to the care of the sick and wounded. The responsibility remained with the Commander-in-Chief in India, but he was informed that any assistance the War Office could render him they would only be too glad and would regard it as an obligation.
    Mr. BRYCE: May I call the right hon. Gentlman's attention to the fact which I

    1265
    mentioned just now, that when a hospital unit was asked for by the Viceroy, the War Office said they would give it, and no assistance outside was wanted.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I do not know what particular case my hon. Friend refers to, but I think I can state generally that whenever there has been a requisition from the Government of India to the War Office, whether in respect of ordinary supplies or for the sick and wounded, it has always been honoured. I could give a long list of those cases, and in every case, as far as I can see, those requisitions have been complied with, and I understand that at the present moment there is a surplus available.
    Sir J. JARDINE: Do those requisitions include those for medical officers?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Certainly; several were requisitions for medical officers which have been honoured.
    Sir J. JARDINE: From this country?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Yes, from this country. Sometimes the assistance has been secured from the force in France, more especially, I think, with regard to assistant doctors—a class which, I believe, is peculiar to India, a class which has had its training in that country. Now, there is no doubt at all that that, in a way, is not a very satisfactory arrangement. The War Office has the responsibility for directing operations, the Commander-in-Chief has the responsibility for supplies, and the main responsibility for supplies must always remain with him, because the only possible base of supplies, so I am advised, must be India. We felt that if the War Office is to be responsible for the direction of the operations, it must also accept direct responsibility for the supplies as well, including the sick and wounded and the transports, and this arrangement has been come to with the Government of India, that whilst India remains the base for the force in Mesopotamia, and that force continues to be administered by the Commander-in-Chief in India, the Commander-in-Chief in India will receive his instructions from, and be responsible to, the Army Council in regard to all matters of personnel, administration, and supplies to the force in question; and further, that he be assisted by such officers as the Army Council may deem it desirable to appoint. The Government of India will use the resources of that country for meeting the needs of that force as far as
    1266
    possible without trenching on the supplies necessary for the maintenance of the force required there for defence. That is the decision arrived at within the last few days.
    Sir J. JARDINE: Is it the Commander-in-Chief and not the Government in India who is alone responsible?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: The Commander-in-Chief in respect of supplies to the force in Mesopotamia will be under the direct control of the Army Council henceforth, and not the Government of India. As the result of that, arrangements have been made to send out to India men representing the War Office to assist in the organisation of supplies for the force in Mesopotamia. The War Office will take responsibility for the transport, that being the main difficulty. As far as I have been able to ascertain, the supplies at the base at Basra are abundant——
    Mr. MALCOLM: Excessive.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE:—but the transport has broken down. There is no doubt at ail about it that the river transport is very difficult owing to the peculiarities of the navigation of the Euphrates. I am assured, at any late, that every steamer available in India has been sent out. At any rate, those who have looked into this matter have concluded that you cannot get any further assistance from India in that respect, and you must look very largely to construction in this country for the purpose of assisting. Very considerable orders have been given in this country for the construction of river steamers and all kinds of river craft. They are constructed in India as well, but in the main they have got to rely on this country. Arrangements have also been made for the purpose of constructing a light railway part of the way. Henceforth the Army Council will be responsible for transport and for the supplies as well as for directing operations. They are sending out officers for the purpose of looking into the matter, and the Commander-in-Chief will be bound to honour their requisitions.
    Mr. BRYCE: Where is the money to come from?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: As at present, the money comes from this country. The financial responsibility is ours. At the present moment India is only responsible for the ordinary establishment, and any extra expense in respect of the War falls

    1267
    upon the Treasury of this country at the present moment. The requisitions are made by India.
    Colonel HERBERT: I mean demands from Mesopotamia. Have they been refused in India?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: That I am not in a position to know, and that is a matter which will be investigated in the course of this inquiry. Whether requisitions have been sent from the Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia to the Commander-in-Chief in India and have not been honoured I cannot say, but in future requisitions from Mesopotamia will be made upon the War Office. If we can supply them from here they will be supplied, but if not from India. The responsibility will be entirely with those who organise supplies in other spheres of operations in this great War.
    Mr. GWYNNE: Can those in command in Mesopotamia now send requisitions without awaiting for the arrival of the War Office staff?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Certainly; they do so as a matter of fact at the present moment. Whenever they want anything which they cannot get from India they send to the War Office here. It is the difficulty of transport. The only thing I should like to warn the House about is that you cannot effect the change immediately, the great difficulty being a difficulty, not of supply, but of transport, and that must necessarily take time. Not merely have you to order your boats, but you have to get them out there, and it will take some time to put them together after they arrive there. Undoubtedly there has been a very considerable improvement. That is the Report we get from the Commander-in-Chief on the spot, and not merely the Commander-in-Chief in India. What I want to assure the House of is this, that the mere fact of our setting up a Committee of Inquiry to inquire into the past is not going to interfere in the least with the action of the War Office in doing its best to put matters right at the present moment. It will have its own officers in India as soon as we can possibly send them out. We have officers in Mesopotamia now, and we shall have full power to organise the staff complete. If there is anybody there whom the Army Council do not think should be there, they can be removed, and other men can be put in their places. The same thing applies
    1268
    to the organisation of supplies in India itself for the Mesopotamian Force. That is the answer to the question put to me by my hon. Friend.
    Mr. MALCOLM: What are you going to do about the results of the Vincent Report? What use will that be put to?
    Mr. BRYCE: When will that Report be published?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: The Vincent. Report has not arrived yet, and therefore we do not know what it is. We have, of course, our ideas as to what it is, but we have not seen it.
    Mr. CHURCHILL: Cannot you get it telegraphed?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: The Commander-in-Chief has his own observations to make upon it, and he is very anxious that they should accompany the Report. It will be here in a very short time, and it will be one of the first documents placed before the Commission.
    Mr. R. McNEILL: Will it be open to the military authorities on the spot in Mesopotamia to communicate direct with the Government?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: They communicate direct at the present moment if they want anything, but henceforth, not merely so far as the policy of the campaign is concerned, but so far as supplies are concerned, they will be directly responsible to the Army Council, and therefore there will be the same communication between them and this country as you. have between Salonika or France and this country. The responsibility will be the direct responsibility of the Army Council. The personnel will be under the Army Council and they can remove men and put others in their place; they can add to them, and the organisation will be completely under the control of the Army Council.
    Sir J. JARDINE: Will legislation be required to give these powers to the Army Council, seeing that at present the Governor-General of India has control under Act of Parliament over all civil and military establishments, and that the Commander-in-Chief is but a member of his executive council? Will legislation be required to divest the Viceroy of the powers he at present holds as to the disposition of troops and promotions in the Indian Army?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: The Army Council will have no control over the forces in India, The control of the Army Council will be over the forces in Mesopotamia and the organisation for the purpose of supplying the forces in Mesopotamia. Therefore, it will be quite unnecessary, so I am assured, to have any legislation in order to make that control absolute. As a matter of fact, the officials whom we shall send out will be officials of the War Office, and they will represent the War Office there. The Commander-in-Chief in India, within the limits of his resources, will have to honour requisitions made upon him in Mesopotamia. I do not know that there is anything further for me to say.
    Sir E. CARSON: Will the right hon. Gentleman allow me to ask one question? It may seem a very small question, but I have had a good many communications on the subject. Can anything be done to improve the postal arrangements, about which there has been great complaint? I have seen letters begging for some food to be sent out by post. I have seen other letters saying that for months nobody has had a single letter, although many have been sent, and I have had additional complaints of the postage to Mesopotamia being very seriously raised. I hope that those points will be inquired into.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Although it appears to be a small point, it is not really as my right hon. Friend knows. Everything that can be done for these gallant fellows who have shown such fortitude and endurance under such trying conditions undoubtedly should be done by the Government of this country. Therefore, I shall certainly look into that matter to see if something can be done to improve the arrangement.
    Colonel GRIFFITHS: May I bring to the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the fact, if there is any shortage—and I know there is—in light railway plant, light rails and sleepers, that there are many miles of light railways which could easily be taken up and thus save delay?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I am very much obliged to my hon. Friend——
    Mr. HOUSTON: There has been a light railway lying at Alexandria for many months.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I am very much obliged to my hon. Friend, and I have no doubt that will be a very valuable piece
    1270
    of information. There is no doubt at all that the military members of the Army Council were very strongly opposed to the publication of these Papers. The resistance to their publication, so far as the War Office is concerned, was initiated by them. I think it right to point out that Sir William Robertson was not responsible for either of these campaigns, and therefore, if he objected to the publication of the Papers, he was not doing it because he wanted to shield himself in the least.
    Sir H. DALZIEL: The Government was responsible.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: He was not there at the time, and, therefore, he came to a perfectly impartial decision on the subject entirely from the point of view of the public interest. That is why I am very glad myself that the inquiry is taking this course. After all, there ought not to be any difficulty in finding three or four gentlemen to whom you could entrust the most confidential information—men with sufficient discretion to know what you can publish and what you cannot publish. That is why I think it is very much better that the matter should be investigated by a Committee of this kind, and why I am very glad my right hon. Friend has pressed his case for an inquiry rather than for publication. There are circumstances which are not altogether to be found detailed in the Papers, but which can be investigated. The whole story is not in black-and-white, but those things which are not accounted for in any dispatch, letter, or telegram can be gone into by the Committee. Our first duty undoubtedly is to see that things are put right. Our second duty is to see, if anyone has been responsible for negligence, if anyone through his negligence has inflicted pain and torture upon the gallant men who have tendered their lives to their country, and who through their great deeds have made us proud of the race to which we belong, that those men should be held to account. That is important.
    Mr. R. McNEILL: Not only negligence, but also incapacity.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Negligence or incapacity. It is of the greatest importance that should be inquired into. It is important that an inquiry of this kind should not delay action. Subject to that, it is of the first importance that incapacity should be brought to account in the conduct of a war of this kind. Those two conditions I think have been

    1271
    completely met by the action which the Government have taken. The first action we have taken is to see that the responsibility is fixed here. My right hon. Friend the Member for the Kirkcaldy Burghs (Sir H. Dalziel) was very anxious that the House of Commons should have control. In future the responsibility not merely for the conduct of the campaign, but also for the transport and supply arrangements for the sick and wounded, will be with the War Office, who will be directly responsible to Parliament. Therefore, that condition ought to be satisfied by the arrangement we have made. That is the first thing which has been done. I believe there are conditions in Gallipoli also that ought to be investigated. I venture to express no opinion upon the subject, and therefore I do not follow my hon. Friend who sits behind me in what he said, but I do agree with him that the responsibility there should be upon the right shoulders. These matters, I trust, will be fully and fairly investigated by this Commission, and the Commission, I trust, will proceed to its task without any loss of time. As far as the Government is concerned, we propose that this Commission should be appointed immediately. I trust the House of Commons will not take the several days which my hon. Friend opposite seemed to consider that they ought to devote to the passage of that Bill. I hope that we shall be able to carry it through, possibly, in the course of a single sitting, so that we may proceed without any loss of time with this inquiry.
    Sir H. DALZIEL: Will the names be in the Bill?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Yes.
    Sir A. MOND: I have no doubt that the country will be very much relieved to hear from the Secretary of State for War that the appointment of this Committee will not interfere with immediate, energetic, and decisive action in the management of the affairs of the Mesopotamian campaign. It is amazing to the ordinary mind that such simple elementary matters of organisation should have required all these many months before being put into operation. The idea that a great Empire should conduct its war in watertight compartments in different parts of the Empire is one, of course, which would never have occurred to any ordinary human being. The idea that the health and life of British soldiers,
    1272
    their comfort and their medical treatment, should depend upon the views of economy of some Civil servant in India would never have occurred to anyone in this country, and I should very much doubt whether it would have been tolerated if it had. The financial arrangements of the Government of India, which have been undoubtedly to some extent the determining factor in the requisitions of the British Army in Mesopotamia, where British soldiers have been sent to fight and die, are intolerant in a time of war, and that it should have taken all this time to organise supplies and to transfer the responsibility from Government officials in India to the British War Office is, to say the least of it, astonishing. The right hon. Gentleman said that this matter was now in the hands of the House of Commons, because the War Office had taken it over. I do not understand this new doctrine with regard to the Government of India. I always understood that India was governed by the India Office in London, and that the Secretary of State for India, who was responsible for the government of India, was responsible to this House for what the Government of India did. If that is so, surely this House has had the same control in the past over what has been happening in Mesopotamia as it has to-day. It may not have exercised that control, but surely that is the case. Surely the Government of India is not some remote allied Power sitting in another country over which the Government here has no control. That is one of the points that I was going to ask in reference to this inquiry. Is the Committee going to inquire into the whole question of the policy and initiation of the campaign, and the responsibility of the Government and Cabinet here for deciding on the campaign, or is it to be limited to what are really minor details of transport of medical stores? Those are not fundamental questions at all. The fundamental questions are whether the campaign should ever have been undertaken, and who is responsible for it?
    6.0 P.M.
    Then, of course, we have the further question of finance. Now at last, apparently, all the finance for the campaign is supplied and controlled by the Treasury here, and that very much simplifies the situation, because under the dual system one can easily understand that great complication must arise. Surely these matters might have been arranged long ago. We have had no explanation why they have not been arranged until

    1273
    within the last few days. We are entitled to know why an imperfect and bad system which has worked badly in practice has been continued all this time, and why it has gone on until my right hon. Friend has become Secretary of State for War. We understand that Sir William Robertson became Chief of the Staff in February four months ago. I take it that his approval of the alteration has been sought and has been accepted. Why have we had to wait from February until the end of July before an alteration of this character in a vital campaign comes into operation? His explanation will, I hope, come before the Commission. I hope the terms of reference will be wide enough to cover all these points, and that they will not be merely confined to relatively small matters of detail. We do not want to pre-judge the resut of the inquiry, and I sincerely hope when the inquiry takes place and the Report is published that a great deal of public feeling which has been aroused in this matter may be pacified. I am afraid it is common knowledge that there have been many features of a painful character in this campaign. How much of this ought to have been avoided the inquiry may show. I thoroughly believe, and I am sure the House will believe, that, at any rate, now that the matter is going to be handled as it ought to have been handled from the beginning, under one central control, we must be in a better position to deal with matters such as supply, than under the more restricted methods and supplies which they have in India. No doubt India can supply better than we can some kinds of medical stores and light railways, and the delay that would occur by means of the difficulty of sending them out to India, after they were manufactured here, must be a serious obstacle in the promptness and rapidity which is so important. As to the light steamers which the right hon. Gentleman referred to and the difficulty of sending them across the sea, and the other difficulties which would, of course, arise, some of the difficulties might have been avoided if a little more time had been available, and if some people had been consulted who were not. I happen to know something about the taking out of the Nile steamers, and other steamers. They would not have arrived had they not been in the hands of a capable naval and civil engineer, who managed them in such a manner as to enable them to stand
    1274
    the ocean journey. I am glad to hear the reference to the steamers that have been ordered in this country. I understood that we knew more about the business than any other country in the world, especially about the question of the navigation of shallow rivers, and that our engineers knew more about it than any engineers in the world. It is the right thing to do, and I should like to know when are these steamers going to be delivered and why were they not ordered long ago? The obvious necessity for them must have been aparent many months ago. The continual lagging behind the needs of the time in this campaign has been one of the most painful features of it. The Government and the War Office in this matter have underestimated what was required and have continued in a most hand to mouth fashion, and only now are we getting into the position that these men who have gone through a state of things which is almost inconceivable with regard to climate and hardship will find those necessary evils mitigated in as great a fashion as we can do it. I am sure no one who has spoken, or anyone who has been through that campaign, has failed to feel the greatest admiration for the heroism and endurance shown by them in the most terrible circumstances, and it would be a shame if the courage and self-sacrifice of these men should not receive that most generous form of help which they deserve from the Government and the people, and that all that was possible should not be done for them.
    The SECRETARY of STATE for INDIA (Mr. Chamberlain): Some of the observations which my right hon. Friend has made oblige me to offer a few words in reply. I think that if he will look at the speeches of my right hon. Friend beside me in the reports to-morrow morning, he will not find any attempt on his part to disclaim the responsibility which properly belongs to the Secretary of State for India. I fully accept the responsibility which belongs to me in my Office for the doings of the Government of India. That does not mean that I want to do myself all the work of the Government of India. I venture to say that the work of the Government of India would be extremely ill done if any Secretary of State in London undertook the government of the country or the administration of its forces in that way. We each have our responsibilities. How far we have discharged them, how far I have discharged mine, and how far other people

    1275
    have discharged theirs, will naturally come under the review of the Committee which is to investigate the Mesopotamia affair, and I do not want to anticipate their decision or to attempt a defence now for myself or for the Government of India, or for anyone who has been attacked. The allegations are now to be brought under examination by a competent and impartial body, to whom all the documents necessary to the formation of an opinion, confidential as well as public, will be freely given.
    Mr. MALCOLM: Will the Vincent evidence be given?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Of course, all the evidence and Report. It is obvious that that Report and that evidence must be at the disposal of the Committee, and it must be one of the documents placed before them at once.
    Sir E. CARSON: May I ask a question? The Report of this Commission is only now, I understand, in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. Supposing that it shows incompetency on the part of somebody who was responsible for carrying out the operation, will the Government act on that report without waiting for the Report of this Committee?
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes. If we are satisfied that somebody is incompetent for his work, we shall, of course, have no excuse for saying that another Committee is going over the same ground, and until it has reported the incompetent man shall remain where he is. If incompetency is proved to our satisfaction—and I think my right hon Friend has made that clear—it will be our duty to act at once; that this inquiry is no excuse for delay where action is shown to be necessary and action can be taken. There is another observation, I think the opening observation of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, to which I must advert. The right hon. Gentleman is under the impression that in some way or other the financial niggardliness of the Government of India in these affairs has been the cause of the misfortunes which we deplore. That, I understand, is the right hon. Gentleman's impression. It has been suggested by Members I think in this House, and certainly outside this House, that it has been the view expressed that it is the financial member of the Council of India, Sir William Meyer, and his officials, who are responsible for the starvation of these people. I hope the House will
    1276
    remember in the first place, and also our other critics will remember, that whatever Sir William Meyer or others may have thought themselves, that the money which is spent on this expedition is not Sir William Meyer's money. It does not come out of the Indian Exchequer. Under a Resolution of this House it has to be paid by the British Treasury, and the Indian Government is only responsible for the forces sent over the sea—only for the ordinary peace cost of maintenance, and all the special expenditure of the War has been borne by the British Treasury, and therefore the Finance Minister of India had no interest of the kind that a Finance Minister has ordinarily in cutting down the expenditure. It was not his Budget which would be saved or upset. It was the Budget of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer who had to pay the cost for this expedition. But I am not going to confine myself to generalities of that kind. The Commander-in-Chief in India having these reports brought to his notice, authorised me to say if Sir William Meyer were criticised here, or wherever it has been done, that he had been fortunate in the assistance of Sir William Meyer had given him, and no financial difficulties had ever been thrown in his way. That at least I hope will dispose of these widely current rumours directed against a particular member of the Indian Government. If these forces have been starved it has not been done in the endeavour to save money by the refusal of supplies by the Government of India. That is one of the things which I wish to contradict. The House will be allowed to think of Mesopotamia without anything in the nature of palliation or excuse from me, but I would ask them to bear with me for a moment if I call their attention to what has been done by the Indian Government and what has been their responsibility during this War.
    I should not like this Debate to close, in which there has been a great deal of criticism heard about the Mesopotamia Campaign, without saying that it is not well to allow to go to the public or to the House itself the impression that Mesopotamia was the sum and substance of the contribution of the Indian Government to this great War. I beg the House for a moment to permit me to recall what the Indian Government has had to do and what it has done, and I think hon. Members will see it is no inconsiderable achievement. As the result of a decision of Lord

    1277
    Nicholson's Committee, the Secretary of State in 1914 approved of the recommendation to the Government of India which contemplated the maintenance of seven and one-third divisions of Infantry and five Cavalry brigades and Army troops being kept in a state of readiness to be mobilised for war at the shortest possible notice. In August, 1914, two divisions of Infantry and one of Cavalry were sent to the War in France. Two brigades of Cavalry were sent later. A small force was sent to Mombassa. This was raised a month later to the strength of a division. In October, when War was declared by Turkey, one division was sent to Mesopotamia, and it was rapidly increased to two divisions. In October and November a brigade of Cavalry and a division of Infantry were sent to Egypt. I give these facts and figures more freely because they do not represent the distribution of the forces at present. All these forces were transferred to their various destinations complete with ambulances and general hospital, and hospitals were established also in England and France. Everything asked for that was possible was given from India. At the same time three divisions on the Indian front were mobilised, and so within a little more than three months of the outbreak of the War, and actually in the field in the first six months of the War, there were nine divisions of Infantry and eight brigades of Cavalry all actively engaged in the various theatres of war. The Government of India has managed to achieve more than it has been asked to do, and I think it is right to make that statement. Bear in mind also that the problem of the Indian Army organisation has been a problem, above all, of the Indian frontier, and a great oversea expedition and a struggle of the class in which we are now engaged had never been contemplated by His Majesty's Government at home, nor had the Government of India ever been directly prepared for an event of this kind.
    Mr. CHURCHILL: The War Office did not contemplate the scale of operations.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I am not quite certain what is the portent of the observation of my right hon. Friend. I am inviting the House to consider what the Indian Government did. If there were some failures, do not think it was all failures; do not think, if some things went wrong in Mesopotamia, that Mesopotamia was all that they contributed to the operations
    1278
    of this great campaign. They, like ourselves, with infinitely less resources, had to improvise and organise for an effort larger than and different from any upon which they had ever expected to enter. I have not yet come to an end of my recital, if the House will bear with me for a moment. Within a few days of the outbreak of war 600 officers of the Indian Army, of all grades, were placed at the disposal of the War Office, and I think I may say that they have contributed not. a little to the organisation of the great Armies which are now fighting in France and elsewhere. During the first few months of the War India, whose forces were engaged at that time in China, Egypt, Mesopotamia, France, and in East Africa, had given not only all the organised units which she could at that time provide, fully equipped for the field, but she had also sent guns and set free British Infantry and British Artillery for use outside India, and she had supplied out of her own equipment to help to make good the deficiencies which existed here, as we all know, for a campaign on this scale.
    I do not think it would be fair to the Government of India to allow all that has happened here to-day, or that has made itself heard in recent times, to pass without a brief reference to the effort she has made. Remember that the country was not absolutely quiet. Remember that there was serious unrest at one moment in the Punjab, arising from the return of emigrants, not unconnected, I think, with German intrigue and conspiracy. Remember that there were German plots to provoke risings there and to land arms there, which required constant vigilance and watching, and remember that whilst India was sending these great forces abroad, although during three previous years there had been no operations of any importance on the North-West Frontier, there were, between 27th November, 1914, and 5th September last year, no less than seven serious attacks made on the North-West Frontier, all of which were effectively dealt with and severe defeats inflicted on the tribes without the necessity for a single movement of tribal camps. I hope the House will give the Government of India credit for the extent of the effort they have made. I hope they will recognise that there is another side to the picture than the one which has been mostly painted to-day, and

    1279
    that, without attempting to pass judgment on the merits which will be submitted to this tribunal, they will not let it go forth from the House of Commons that in a discussion of this kind there was not a generous readiness on the part of the House of Commons to recognise alike the efforts which the military authorities of the Government of India have made to come to the assistance of the Empire in this time of peril, as well as the bravery, fortitude, and endurance of the Indian troops who have fought so well.
    Commander BELLAIRS: The right hon. Gentleman has made a deeply interesting statement as to the efforts put forth by the Government of India. That statement commends itself generally to the sense of the House, but I would point out to him that there are one or two criticisms that can be made which do not in any way stultify what he has said, which, although being points of detail, are of importance. He has mentioned that these expeditions were never contemplated by the Indian Government, but surely the driving power which comes from the British Government should have made the Intelligence Departments in India contemplate those expeditions and think them out beforehand. The whole of the success which has attended German efforts in the past has been due to the fact that those who were responsible in each case planned out their expeditions beforehand during the years of peace. I have no doubt that the Germans would have been successful in this War but for the intervention of England, which they failed to take into account. The Secretary of State for War mentioned to-day, for instance, that we now, for the first time, contemplated a light railway. I believe that the advance on Bagdad was decided upon nearly a year ago. What I would like to know from my right hon. Friend is this: Has the Government of India taken sufficient powers under their Defence of the Realm Act to do what every nation but England has done in this War—that is, to tear up a light railway if it happens to be wanted elsewhere in the interests of the public service? If, for instance, we could get a light railway quicker to the sources of supply by tearing up a light railway in India, for heaven's sake let us do it, even if we have not the necessary powers, and indemnify ourselves afterwards.
    1280
    There is a point I have raised several times at Question Time, and also in Debate, in connection with the non-publication of dispatches in reference to the Dardanelles. We have never had, although this bombardment occurred sixteen months ago, the naval dispatches in regard to the battle of the Dardanelles of 18th March, 1915, when we lost several battleships, when the "Inflexible" was mined and various other damages were inflicted on our ships, all to no purpose. I have stated, without contradiction on the part of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, that there is not a single precedent for the withholding of dispatches in relation to naval or military battles. Perhaps the Navy considered it expedient to withhold them for a month or two, but I do not know of a single case except this case where the dispatches have been withheld for anything resembling sixteen months. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty absolutely avoided my question to-day as to what were the confidential reasons for withholding this particular dispatch. I submit that there are no confidential reasons, that the Service desires that this dispatch should be published, and that the reasons are simply those which are so often the true interpretation of such words as "the interests of the public service," namely, that they involve to a certain extent the reputations of some members of the present Board of Admiralty or members of a past Board of Admiralty. They say, "That is precisely what we are setting up an inquiry for—to inquire into the responsibility." As there are no confidential reasons, I do not see why we cannot have the publication of these dispatches, apart altogether from the Committee. As to these bombardments, nobody knew why they were carried out. They began in November, 1914, with the outer forts, and came to a conclusion with the disasters of 18th March, 1915.
    If the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for War were present I would ask a question—I do not know whether the Secretary of State for India can answer it, and I do not know whether it has been asked before. I want to know whether these two Inquiries will be upon oath? Perhaps the Secretary of State for India will convey to the Prime Minister the fact that it has been suggested that they should be on oath. Another question is whether, if they are small, as the Secretary of State for War suggested they would be, will they be assisted by naval and military

    1281
    advisers of known independence of judgment who are apart altogether from the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Government of India, so as to advise on technical points? I assume they will comprise Members of the House of Lords, the House of Commons, and outside people, who are not versed in the technical details of the Army and Navy. Again, before the names are submitted to the House, will the Government undertake that, as this Motion is in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Trinity College (Sir E. Carson), they will consult him as to the constitution of the Committees, so that we may be sure their members are not solely the nominees of the Government? The Motion of my right hon. Friend asked only for Committees of Inquiry into the conduct of operations. I do not quite know what that covers. The Secretary of State for War spoke of "definite limits." There is the point of the supplying of information in regard to the Mesopotamia Expedition on which the advance was carried out. The responsibility for that supply of information rests far more on the Government here than on the people there, because they were many miles from the Turkish positions at Bagdad, and information could only be collected outside and supplied to those in command of the operations in Mesopotamia.
    There is another question, raised by another speaker in this House, that is the inception of the operations, which is really the most important point of all. Will the inquiry cover the inception of the Dardanelles operations and the Mesopotamia operations? In those two expeditions we have the old question which lies at the base of the whole of military strategy—the question of predominant frontiers and subordinate frontiers. For instance, the Prime Minister recalled to the recollection of the House the old question of the Walcheren Expedition in July, 1809. At that time we had the main predominant frontier of Wellington's Army on the Tagus, but the operations of that Army were to a large extent paralysed by the very fact that the troops which should have gone to Wellington were withdrawn to carry out the disastrous Walcheren Expedition. There was the expedition into the Dardanelles, which is a point singularly unfavourable to military operations and to naval trans-
    1282
    port and landing; and, again, an expedition going 573 miles up a tortuous, shallow, and narrow river to Bagdad, both very unfavourable for keeping in touch with sea power. We have, again, the question of sending large bodies of troops to subordinate frontiers instead of to the main frontier. That is a question on which Committees of this kind would be well fitted to pronounce. There was the case when Napoleon was fighting against the Aulic Council, when he insisted upon this very point of the predominant frontier, while the Aulic Council supported their troops on the subordinate frontier. I suppose the Aulic Council was as near to a Coalition Government as we can get. The result in that case was disastrous to the Aulic Council. The Prime Minister has said in regard to the Mesopotamia Expedition—I think he said the same in regard to the Dardanelles, but of that I am not quite sure—that no other considerations had been allowed to override military considerations. That is a point on which such a Committee of Inquiry as this should undoubtedly have power to send for Papers and to examine persons. I am utterly against all inquiries of this kind taking great time in war. I think they divert men from their duties and they concentrate the minds of men on protecting their reputations when they ought to be thinking only of beating the enemy. But if we are to have an inquiry which is going to burke inquiry after the War, or the proper time for such a prolonged inquisition to take place, it must be a thorough inquiry, and it is for that reason that I have raised these points. I have here, as showing the time taken up, a quotation from what the Prime Minister said on Tuesday when he refused to lay Papers. He said:
    "Much time and trouble, which could with difficulty be spared from the business of war, have been given to the task."
    That is the task of looking through these Papers and seeing whether they could be published, and it is obvious that much more time and trouble will be given to the task of explaining and laying these Papers before Committees and of the actual men being haled as witnesses before these Committees. I regret that they are to be formed in the midst of the War, but since they are to be formed, and they necessarily will be used to burke inquiry after the War, let us make them as efficient as possible, though it may be that they cannot help doing harm.
    Sir J. D. REES: Of the dwellers in Mesopotamia there are two or three gathered together in this House two of whom have spoken. May a third be allowed to intervene at this stage, only for the purpose of expressing great satisfaction with the Secretary of State's defence of the Government of India It had been my intention earlier to deprecate attacks on the Government of India. I was sorry that one hon. Member made a veiled attack on my old fellow officer, Sir William Meyer, and another absolutely arraigned him. I think it will be found when the investigation is made that he will come out of it quite satisfactorily. But however that may be, when the Government give the Committee—a most satisfactory termination to the Debate—surely we can all wait and not condemn the Government of India collectively or individually until we know the result of this inquiry. In my Mesopotamian days there was a proverb among the Arabs, "Better an hour of justice than seventy years of prayer." That applies to the Government of India as well as to those who have suffered from faults and failures—and I admit they are severe—in this campaign. There must be justice for the Government of India and its officers, and I am extremely gratified at the statement made by the Secretary of State. It will give comfort to many worthy and admirable officers who are now suffering from the general feeling that they are at fault, which prevails on all sides, but which has not yet been substantiated. Another thing the right hon. Gentleman said which will give the greatest satisfaction in connection with that matter is that he entirely repudiated the contention of the right hon. Gentleman (Sir A, Mond) that the Government of India was in London. There was a time when that seemed likely to be the case. It is gratifying indeed that he has stated his intention of not favouring that position and leaving the Government of India where it rests by statute, with the Governor-General in Council.
    Upon the point of the conduct of the campaign I will say little or nothing, but when I heard the right hon. Gentleman (Sir A. Mond) and others saying, "Why not have got steamers from the Irrawaddy," the Irrawaddy and the Tigris are not exactly alike. I do not think steamers from the Irrawaddy would be suitable for the Tigris. I remember being stranded on the Tigris and being sniped at by Arabs
    1284
    on the bank, even in time of peace, and the House may imagine what are the conditions for transport in Mesopotamia where you grill by day and freeze by night, and where the whole country is as ill-suited for military operations of this character as it is possible for anybody to imagine. It is not fair to conclude that the officers of the Government of India, their soldiers and their generals, are entirely at fault under circumstances such as these. With regard to drugs I rather understood the Secretary of State for War to say that the normal process was for the Commander-in-Chief in India or the Stores Department to indent upon the War Office. Surely they never indented upon anyone in ordinary times except through the India Office. That there is a change now is quite satisfactory. I welcome it, but I do not think the Secretary of State was correct there.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I think my hon. Friend has misunderstood the Secretary of State for War. In ordinary times the Government of India indents upon the India Office. It does not indent upon the India Office now. Stores may be required to fill up the gaps caused by its expenditure, whether upon Mesopotamia or upon the Indian Force in East Africa or elsewhere. In these days the market is much less an open market than usual, so that vast quantities—I use the word in the widest sense—the whole supply of the country is commandeered by the great military Departments here. Accordingly for supplies which, in ordinary circumstances, might sometimes have been bought direct by the India Office for the use of the Government of India, we have been undoubtedly dependent on the War Office here during this War, because the War Office controls practically the whole supplies. They have done all they could. I take this opportunity of saying that since the change was made in February, with the complete goodwill of the military authorities in India as well as of myself as Secretary of State, the War Office have done everything they could to make good the deficiencies which disclose themselves.
    Sir J. D. REES: I am greatly obliged to my right hon. Friend. I will only express one wish as regards this matter. I hope it is not the case that the sentimental policy of limiting the supply of opium has led to any lack of the supply of the many useful derivatives of that valuable

    1285
    drug in regard to the supply of the troops. I have no reason to suppose it is so, but I sincerely hope it is not. As the Government of India will be practically upon its trial before this Commission, because I think that is the case, I do not suppose anyone representing the Government of India will be upon it, and no one who was not very recently connected with the Government of India would be of any use upon such an inquiry. It is a new and a serious, perhaps an inevitable, situation, but I understand the Government of India will practically be upon its trial before this Commission, and I hope that fact will be taken into account in appointing some great pro-Consul or some suitable person who will be able to deal with so very serious a situation as that. I am extremely glad this matter has ended as it has. More has been said than I wanted said, and I am sorry so much has been said which amounted practically to an indirect attack upon the Government of India. The right hon. Gentleman has spoken up for that Government. He knows, as Lord St. Aldwyn said, that India is well administered, perhaps better administered than countries which look down upon bureaucratic administration, and I am sure the Government, the public service, and all those serving in that country will be grateful to him, as I am, for the generous and straightforward manner in which he has stood up to-day—it is somewhat difficult, because it is so easy to accept a scapegoat—for the public service and the Government which he represents so well.
    Mr. DILLON: The hon. Gentleman appears to me to be considerably more interested in the officials of the Government of India than in the soldiers who have suffered such horrors which some of us have got details of in the course of this Mesopotamian expedition. The one feature in the Debate that pleased me was the statement made by the Minister for War, that he would not wait for this Commission to report before dealing with what I am afraid is undeniable, the gross incapacity of some of the medical officers who are in control in Mesopotamia. I have not the slightest notion of mentioning any names, but, if the information which has been laid before me by some of the medical men is correct, the expression "criminal negligence," which was used by the right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Carson), is not a bit too strong to describe what is going on in Mesopotamia. I think it was
    1286
    disappointing that the Government did not more frankly admit the horrible abuses which, if all the information that has reached private Members is true, were in existence in Mesopotamia for such an enormous period. That is a thing which apparently no attempt has been made on behalf of the Government to explain.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I came here today prepared to make so much of a statement as could be made under the circumstances. But an inquiry was decided on. The inquiry is to examine into these very questions. I purposely, therefore, refrained from attempting to argue beforehand the very questions which will be submitted to this inquiry.
    Mr. DILLON: The point I rose to try and emphasise was that the inquiry will have no effect whatsoever in bringing relief to our soldiers in Mesopotamia. The inquiry is a matter which I regard, in the shape it has now taken, as one of remote futurity. I am an old enough Member of this House to remember many of these Commissions appointed to inquire into tangled problems such as this Committee will have to deal with and the subject is buried out of public sight for the next year at least, or probably a year and a half. If it is ever alluded to the Government will always say "a Statutory Commission has been set up and we have no authority over it at all, and they alone are the judges of the time they are to take and the method of their own procedure," and we hear no more about it until the War is over. That, therefore, has no bearing on the question of the abuses which have existed now in Mesopotamia for more than a year and which have not been remedied—I do not know whether they are remedied yet. I have had detailed statements laid before me which go to show that the medical provision made for the troops was absolutely scandalous. I do not think there is anything more atrocious in the records of the British Army, if these reports are not grossly exaggerated. It is not a question of one month or two months or six months. It has been going on for over a year. Hundreds of men, if I am rightly informed, have died whose lives could easily have been saved, and ought to have been saved, and hundreds of gallant British officers and soldiers have died in agony of the most horrible description owing to the fact that no adequate attempt was made to furnish them with drugs or with transport to take them

    1287
    down the river, and the supply of doctors and medical orderlies was deplorable and shockingly insufficient. There is this sinister feature which has not been alluded to before that that condition of things continued for months and months in spite of the fact that reports were sent in by some medical officers detailing all these horrors, and, if I am rightly informed, some of the men who took the most active part in making these reports and endeavouring vainly to draw the attention of the Government to the horrors which were going on have since been punished and snubbed for making these reports. I suppose that will come up before the Committee. If it is true it adds a fresh chapter to the horrors that have occurred in Mesopotamia.
    Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: If it is true it would be a scandalous thing. Such an allegation, if it is made, would certainly be considered by the Committee.
    Mr. DILLON: That has been stated to me, but I cannot say whether it is true or not. I suppose, however, that it will be a proper subject for investigation by the Committee. I hesitate to believe that all the statements made as to negligence, etc., in regard to the higher officials of the medical service are entirely without foundation. The supply of quinine was absolutely hopeless. We have it on the authority of some of the medical officers that they asked for permission to give quinine in adequate doses to the men, because it is well known to be most effective in protecting troops against malaria; but they were absolutely refused permission and ordered not to give any quinine. Where quinine was administered the sickness rate fell enormously. Anybody who knows anything about medicine knows that this is one of the most effective preventives against malaria. The same sort of thing has run through the whole expedition. The fact which has struck me most is that that condition of things went on for over a year, and it was only quite recently, when a row was made in this House, and the news of the state of affairs leaked out in this country, that any serious effort was apparently made to bring about a remedy. Quite apart from the wider issues which have to be dealt with in regard to the Mesopotamia Expedition and the Dardanelles Expedition, I maintain that this question of medical breakdown in connection with the Mesopo-
    1288
    tamia Expedition should be taken up separately by the Government, and referred to some separate form of inquiry, either a departmental inquiry at the War Office, or some sufficiently rapid inquiry, which would bring home to those who are responsible their full share of blame for the horrible neglect of these unhappy men, and that proper measures should be taken without waiting for the Report of the larger Commission, which I am afraid will not be available for more than a year. That is a point which I am extremely anxious to press upon the Government. With regard to the point upon which the Secretary for India took me up a few moments ago, I should be very happy to lay before him the information I have got.
    Sir H. CRAIK: I should like to have said a word or two before the Secretary for India left in regard to a point which I raised a day or two ago. I entirely agree with all that has fallen from the hon. Member for Mayo (Mr. Dillon) in regard to the scandal of this medical service. I speak with all the more feeling, inasmuch as many men in the medical service are constituents of mine, and I know from what they have told me how bad the state of things has been. Of course, we are all glad that such an inquiry as has been promised to us is to be opened, but I wish to express my great disappointment that the opening of this new inquiry is apparently to take place before the Report of Sir William Vincent and Mr. Redesdale is made public. They had two months of inquiry in March and April, and that report has been presented. Mr. Redesdale has left India and yet we hear no more of that Report. I am certain that I am speaking the wishes of the whole medical service of India when I say that that is a Report which ought to be at once made public, and that it ought not to be submitted simply to the inquiry which is now to be reopened. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Chamberlain) informed me that he was obliged to submit it to those whose conduct was dealt with in the Report. I do not see the slightest reason that that should be done. Charges were made, and those officers were able to refute them if they could. The matter was referred to a judicial Committee for its verdict, and if we are not to have the finding of that Committee until those findings have been submitted to and commented upon by those incriminated, I do not see why we should have had any Commission at all. Six months have new elapsed, and now because a new

    1289
    inquiry is to be opened, we are told that the Report will not be published, and that the results of the inquiry will be subject to further consideration. I am certain, and I speak now as an old Civil servant, that the right hon. Gentleman is going through an unnecessary process in submitting the judicial report of this judicial Committee to the officers incriminated. The matter ought to be made public first of all, and it is only by its being made public that we shall have a full consideration of the steps that may be necessary in order to relieve the torture and misery from which our soldiers are suffering.
    Mr. PETO: I want to draw attention to two points which have not been made sufficiently clear. The right hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. Churchill) is rightly anxious that the reference to this Commission should be extremely definite, and should be definitely limited to certain points. I am entirely in agreement with that, because we do not want the Commission sitting, as the hon. Member for Mayo suggested, for, perhaps, eighteen months, or, perhaps, until well after the termination of the War, and with no results achieved. On the other hand, it must be absolutely essential—the right hon. Member for Swansea (Sir A. Mond) was the only hon. Member who raised this point—that the reference should include inception and conduct of the whole of this campaign. I wish to quote what the Prime Minister said yesterday, with regard to the more detailed matter of the shortage of medical comfort and of food itself. He said:
    "The urgency of relieving General Townshend was such that it was thought right—I am not sure it was at all an imprudent act—to push on the troops ahead, in advance of the transport, in the hope that his relief might be speedily, or, at any rate, timely effected."
    That shows quite clearly that in the mind of the Prime Minister the fact that we had a gallant garrison beleaguered in Kut, which held out during a siege of unprecedented length, caused such urgency for the relief of that garrison that that was in some measure responsible, and not those who in the government of India or in the War Office had the conduct of affairs in hand; but that somehow it was this misfortune of the beleaguerment of the garrison at Kut that was the cause of the trouble. We cannot have anything approaching the truth unless the whole inception of this expedition is considered, divided into various questions of the original expedition to Mesopotamia, the
    1290
    advance to Kut, and the advance from Kut to Bagdad with the utterly inadequate troops, under command of General Townshend. Unless all these things can be investigated, and a finding arrived at upon them, this Commission will serve no useful purpose. That brings me to the second point. The hon. Member for Lancaster told the House, and the Prime Minister in particular, that he had been entrusted by Lady Horsley with certain letters from Sir Victor Horsley, dealing with specific points which would be the subject of this inquiry. Sir Victor Horsley is one of that magnificent army of Englishmen who have given up their lives in the service of their country, and he cannot possibly be a witness before this Committee. It is of the utmost importance—and I am thankful that it is to be so—that the Commission should be invested with powers to send for Papers and persons. We must remember that there is another person—and in this case the principal factor in the whole of these operations, namely, General Townshend himself—who cannot possibly come before the Committee to say what part he had in the initiation, the inception, and strategical and tactical plan which resulted ultimately in the surrender of the garrison under his command at Kut. That fact, obviously, will leave the inquiry incomplete, and it can only be filled in one way, and that is by providing that this Committee or Commission to be set up shall have powers to compel persons who have Papers bearing upon these matters to produce them before the Commission. I think it is only in that way that we can have even a partial representation of what are the real facts of this very mysterious matter, on which we have already had a White Paper which arrived at no conclusion. I refer to the responsibility for the advance from Kut, which resulted, owing to the unsuccessful effort to relieve the garrison, in the surrender of the garrison at Kut, and the taking prisoner by the Turks of General Townshend himself. We know that there is documentary evidence as to who is responsible or who is not responsible. We have a White Paper repeating endless telegrams from one Department of State to another, which finally fails to discover this document, which it is common knowledge not only exists, but must have been before some of those who were largely, if not entirely, responsible for the strategy and tactics of the campaign.

    1291
    I regret that in the Prime Minister's speech the other day the only reference he made to General Townshend was the one which I have read to the House. It is true he said that the earlier part of the expedition was most skilfully and ably conducted, but there was no personal tribute to General Townshend such as I think the House and the country would have welcomed, and I feel bound, before this Debate closes, to point out that this Commission has been appointed to inquire into a matter where obviously in the nature of the case, what I regard as the principal witness can give no oral evidence at all. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that the scope of the reference to the Commission should not only be such as to include inquiry into the responsibility for the initiation of the various stages of the campaign, but that it should be quite clear that every particle of evidence that is in black and white should be brought before the Committee so that we may have a finding which is in accordance with the facts of the case.
    Motion for Adjournment negatived.

    ISLE OF MAN (CUSTOMS) BILL.
    Read a second time, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House for Monday next.—[Mr. Rea]

    PUBLIC WORKS LOANS BILL.
    Order for Second Reading read.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—[Mr. McKinnon Wood.]
    Sir F. BANBURY: I suppose that it is necessary to provide this sum of £1,700,000, but it is a rather large sum at the present moment.
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Mr. McKinnon Wood): Yes. I think that it is necessary, as a maximum
    1292
    sum. It is only half what it was last year, and about a quarter of the sum which was provided before the War.
    Question put, and agreed to.
    Bill read a second time, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House for Monday next.—[Mr. Rea]
    The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

    PUBLIC WORKS LOAN (REMISSION OF DEBT).
    Committee to consider of authorising the remission of certain debts in pursuance of any Act of the present Session relating to local Loans [King's Recommendation signified] upon Monday next.—[Mr. Rea]
    Whereupon Mr. SPEAKER, pursuant to the Order of the House of the 22nd February, proposed the Question, "That this House do now adjourn."
    Question put, and agreed to.
    Adjourned accordingly at Four minutes after Seven o'clock till Monday next, 24th July, pursuant to the Order of the House of 22nd February last.

    PETITIONS PRESENTED DURING THE WEEK.
    The following Petitions were presented during the week and ordered to lie upon the Table:—
    MONDAY.
    Sale of Intoxicating Liquors during the War.—Petitions for prohibition; from Dalbeattie, and Donside.
    THURSDAY.
    Sale of Intoxicating Liquors during the War.—Petition from Wemyss, for prohibition.
WAR.
  VOLUNTARY ALLOWANCES TO EMPLOYES (INCOME TAX).
  VOLUNTARY ALLOWANCES TO EMPLOYES (INCOME TAX).
  BUYING OUT DISTILLERIES.
  BUYING OUT DISTILLERIES.
  TREASURY BILLS.
  TREASURY BILLS.
  AGRICULTURAL SHOWS (IRELAND).
  AGRICULTURAL SHOWS (IRELAND).
  FINANCIAL ADVERTISEMENTS.
    PUBLICATION IN PROVINCIAL NEWSPAPERS.
    PUBLICATION IN PROVINCIAL NEWSPAPERS.
  GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (WOMEN EMPLOYES).
  GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (WOMEN EMPLOYES).
  ACUTE MENTAL CASES (ROYAL NAVY).
  ACUTE MENTAL CASES (ROYAL NAVY).
  MILITARY SERVICE.
    CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS.
    CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS.
    NON-COMBATANT CORPS.
    NON-COMBATANT CORPS.
    ABSENTEE (SHEFFIELD).
    ABSENTEE (SHEFFIELD).
    TRENCH BADGES.
    TRENCH BADGES.
    FINAL DISCHARGE OF SOLDIER.
    FINAL DISCHARGE OF SOLDIER.
    COURT-MARTIAL CASES.
    COURT-MARTIAL CASES.
    MECHANICAL TRANSPORT SERVICE.
    MECHANICAL TRANSPORT SERVICE.
    ATTESTED MARRIED MEN (WAR OFFICE WORK).
    ATTESTED MARRIED MEN (WAR OFFICE WORK).
    MEDICAL BOARDS.
    MEDICAL BOARDS.
    SOLE PROPRIETORS OF BUSINESSES.
    SOLE PROPRIETORS OF BUSINESSES.
    FRIENDLY ALIENS.
    FRIENDLY ALIENS.
    MEN CALLED TO COLOURS (CIVIL LIABILITIES).
    MEN CALLED TO COLOURS (CIVIL LIABILITIES).
  GERMAN AND BRITISH PRISONERS.
  GERMAN AND BRITISH PRISONERS.
  TERRITORIAL FORCE (BANDS).
  TERRITORIAL FORCE (BANDS).
  HOSPITAL ACCOMMODATION.
  HOSPITAL ACCOMMODATION.
  PROGRESS OF WAR.
  PROGRESS OF WAR.
  HARVEST (SOLDIERS' ASSISTANCE).
  HARVEST (SOLDIERS' ASSISTANCE).
  DISTURBANCES IN IRELAND.
    PUBLIC INQUIRY.
    PUBLIC INQUIRY.
  ARTIFICIAL MANURES AND FEEDING STUFFS (PRICES).
  ARTIFICIAL MANURES AND FEEDING STUFFS (PRICES).
  AIR INQUIRY.
  AIR INQUIRY.
  SALONIKA (LEAVE TO OFFICERS AND MEN).
  SALONIKA (LEAVE TO OFFICERS AND MEN).
  GERMAN PRISONERS.
  GERMAN PRISONERS.
  CANADIAN FORCES (BOYS UNDER MILITARY AGE).
  CANADIAN FORCES (BOYS UNDER MILITARY AGE).
  WOOL.
  WOOL.
  TOOTING MILITARY HOSPITAL.
  TOOTING MILITARY HOSPITAL.
  SHOEBURYNESS (GOVERNMENT ENGINEERING WORKS).
  SHOEBURYNESS (GOVERNMENT ENGINEERING WORKS).
  POOR LAW SCHOOLS (HOSPITAL ACCOMMODATION).
  POOR LAW SCHOOLS (HOSPITAL ACCOMMODATION).
  GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (GERMAN FIRMS).
  GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (GERMAN FIRMS).
  TERRITORIAL FORCE IN INDIA.
    DEATHS FROM HEAT STROKE.
    DEATHS FROM HEAT STROKE.
  LIGHTING REGULATIONS (BICYCLES).
  LIGHTING REGULATIONS (BICYCLES).
  ABLE-BODIED PAUPERS.
  ABLE-BODIED PAUPERS.
  NAVAL AND MILITARY SERVICES (PENSIONS AND GRANTS).
  NAVAL AND MILITARY SERVICES (PENSIONS AND GRANTS).
    UNRECEIVED ALLOWANCE (SLIGO).
    UNRECEIVED ALLOWANCE (SLIGO).
  ECONOMIC CONFERENCE IN PARIS.
  ECONOMIC CONFERENCE IN PARIS.
  CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE.
  CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE.
  PRICES COMMITTEE.
  PRICES COMMITTEE.
  MAINTENANCE OF LIVE STOCK ORDERS.
  MAINTENANCE OF LIVE STOCK ORDERS.
  VACANT LAND.
  VACANT LAND.
  Ceylon (Assessments).
  Ceylon (Assessments).
LORD ANSLOW OF IVER.
Tonman Mosley, Esquire, C.B., having been created Baron Anslow of Iver, in the County of Buckingham—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
LORD ROUNDWAY OF DEVIZES.
Charles Edward Hungerford Atholl Colston, Esquire, having been created Baron Roundway of Devizes, in the County of Wilts—Was(in the usual manner) introduced.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDER (No. 3) BILL.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 5) BILL.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 7) BILL.
Reported, without amendment, and re-committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Tuesday next.

SHROPSHIRE, WORCESTERSHIRE AND STAFFORDSHIRE ELECTRIC POWER BILL. [H.L.]
RHODES ESTATE BILL. [H.L.]
Reported, with Amendments.

CLAYTON ANILINE COMPANY (RAILWAYS) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a Amendments made passed, and sent to the Commons.
Public Services in India—Report of the Royal Commission appointed to examine and report upon certain matters in connection with the Public Services in India:
Presented (by command) and ordered to lie on the Table.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (AMENDMENT) BILL. [H.L.]
The evidence taken before the Joint Select Committee from time to time to be printed, but no copies to be delivered except to Members of the Committee, and such other persons as the Committee shall think fit until further order. (No. 75.)
Universities (Scotland) Act, 1889 (Ordinance of University Courts of St. Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen, and Edinburgh, General No. 4 (Regulations as to Preliminary Examinations))—Petition that this House will not take any step to prevent or delay the above-named Ordinance from coming into force; of the General Council of the University of St. Andrews; read, and ordered to lie on the Table.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT (IRELAND) PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 2) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment, and to be read 3a on Tuesday next.
PIER AND HARBOUR PROVISIONAL ORDERS BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order), and committed.
OUTPUT OF BEER (RESTRICTION) BILL.
Amendments reported (according to Order), and Bill to be read 3aon Tuesday next, and to be printed as amended in Committee. (No. 76.)

THE ROYAL AIRCRAFT FACTORY.
LORD MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU LORD MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU had the following Notice on the Paper—
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they are prepared to circulate the recent Report upon the Royal Aircraft Factory; what steps will be or have been taken to carry out its recommendations, and what alterations, if any, have been made in the higher staff at the factory.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have been in communication with the noble Earl who presides over the Air Board, and I learn from him that this particular Report upon the Royal Aircraft Factory is under the consideration of his Board, and that it would be convenient to the noble Earl and to the Board if we took the discussion at a later date. I do not wish to stand for more than a moment between the House and the important debate which is to follow, but I would remark that there are matters of great importance connected with this question, and that I am postponing the discussion for the reason I have given, and not because I could not make out to-day what would seem to be an overwhelming case.

THE MESOPOTAMIAN EXPEDITION.
THE EARL OF WEMYSS THE EARL OF WEMYSS rose to call attention to the Mesopotamia Expedition, particularly to the advance on Ctesiphon; and to move to resolve—
That in the opinion of this House a full Inquiry ought to be held into the whole conduct of the campaign, especially in relation to the transport arrangements and the provision for the wounded.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, in moving the Resolution which stands in my name I feel that I labour under a double disadvantage, because I have not only to crave that indulgence which is, I believe, never refused to those who address your Lordships for the first time, but I am also aware that the subject I am venturing to introduce is not only one of first-rate importance but also one which requires great delicacy of handling, and which, therefore, might more fitly have been undertaken by some one with a wider experience of your Lordships' House than I can claim. In introducing this subject, I propose to limit the scope of my remarks to the period which closes with the fall of Kut. To discuss events that have happened later, and that may still be happening, would be to incur a risk of touching on subjects which for military reasons it would be better to avoid. Further, I should like to say that I do not consider it part of my duty, as it certainly is not my wish, to try and fit the blame for anything that may have occurred on to individuals. My task is to point out the conditions which I think demand an Inquiry, and to leave to the members of that Inquiry the more invidious task of apportioning the credit or the blame. Subject to these two reservations, I do not think that any member of the Government can resent, or even regret, this subject being brought forward at the present time.
Ever since the Mesopotamia campaign started it has been a subject of debate, and since the curtain fell on the tragedy of Kut so many rumours, allegations, and accusations have, like swarms of poisonous flies, gathered round this question, that anything that can clear the air of some of them must be to the public advantage. It would be very easy to make capital out of the conduct of the Government about the Papers. The remarks of the noble Marquess last Tuesday would not make it
836
any more difficult, but I do not think that this is a subject to treat in that way, particularly as, for my part, I entirely believe in the good faith of the Government in this matter; and I am prepared also to believe that the military authorities were right in stopping the publication of the Papers, and that probably the only mistake that was made was in promising to publish them at all.
The subject of Mesopotamia is, I think, one of the most depressing you can possibly speak about. Before we plunge into the gloom of it, can we find any bright side, are there any assets that we can place on the credit side of the undertaking? We have the gallant, the skilful defence of Kut by General Townshend, and we have the gallantly of the troops of all ranks engaged in it. Just as the evacuation of Gallipoli will probably be the model in military text-books for operations of a similar kind, so the great defence of Kut will rank amongst the classic sieges of military history. But I do not suppose that evacuations, however successfully conducted, or unsuccessful defences, however prolonged, are the aim of our ambition or the ultimate goal of our military strategy. And as regards the gallantry of our troops, to dwell on that is to gild refined gold. But surely the greater the gallantry the greater the pity that lives so heroic, so urgently needed elsewhere, should have been spent in useless endeavours in an Expedition the policy of which was so doubtful, the prospects of which were so precarious, and the conditions of equipment of which are alleged to have been so unsatisfactory.
Why did we go to Mesopotamia at all? Our Armies were in the making. We were lighting the German Empire. We did not inherit the Mesopotamian Expedition; it was not forced upon us; we sought it out. Strategists, from Napoleon downwards, have laid it down as a military axiom that you should concentrate on your main effort, that you should not weaken it by what in modern days we call "side shows." But there are exceptions to every rule. Besides, in the vortex that the catastrophe of this war has created, many things have been swept away, and it may be that Napoleon's axioms have been submerged with them. Anyway, I am prepared to believe that for the original Expedition, not the later more ambitious and very mysterious development to Baghdad, a very good case

837
may be made. The Prime Minister, in his speech on November 2, used these words—
"The object was to secure the neutrality of the Arabs, to protect the oil-wells, to safeguard our interests in the Persian Gulf, and generally to maintain the authority of our Flag in the East."
I am prepared to endorse every word of that. I am prepared to go even further and to say that I believe that not only could this original Expedition have achieved those results, but that, entrenched either at Basra, at Fauna, or at some other place with greater strategic advantages, improving its position, organising its transport, gathering together all it needed and all it lacked, it might have been a potential force of enormous value, the moment for using which might by this time have already come. It is not Baghdad as an objective that we criticise; it is the Expedition that attacked Baghdad. I think the original Expedition was to be justified. How did it come that it was subsequently extended? It is all wrapt in mystery.
Before we try and fix the responsibility on anybody, I think I ought to deal briefly with the White Paper. After all, it is the only Paper we have, so we ought to make the most of it. But I do not think it necessary to take up your Lordships' time very much with it. It deals with the question whether General Townshend protested against the extension of this Expedition to Baghdad. The question seems to depend on a rather mysterious document which is called "An Appreciation." It is quite obvious that Lord Hardinge never saw this Appreciation, which is supposed to be an argument by General Townshend against the advance to Baghdad. Nobody accuses anybody of suppressing this document, but it is a curious thing that it should have been mislaid; and it is a remarkable fact that, although it has not reached the authorities in India, it has been fairly widely read in this country, and those who have read this Appreciation know that what is reported in this Paper does not fully, or even accurately, represent what General Townshend said. I think there is not the smallest doubt—it is not a case of rumour, but one of common knowledge—that General Townshend did object to the advance. He says here, after having explained what he had done—
"I consider that this pointed out the risk sufficiently, and was all, in my opinion, that a subordinate commander could do. It would be contrary to discipline to protest in the full sense and meaning of the word."
838
It is quite clear that General Townskend objected to the advance. It is equally clear that, having lodged the protest which he thought right, he did his duty as a British soldier, and I believe nobody could have carried out his impossible task better than he did.
Who, then, is responsible? It is a most unfortunate coincidence that the advance on Baghdad should have synchronised with the obvious failure of the Dardanelles Expedition. There are a great many people who do not believe that this was a coincidence. They think that the advance was a gambling venture on the part of the Government, that having lost at Gallipoli, they tried to get home by plunging at Baghdad. That is the common opinion. For myself, I do not hold that opinion. I believe that if it were true, there is no judgment which history or their contemporaries could pass on them that would sufficiently condemn the Government. I believe, on the contrary, that the mistake was that they did not connect the Dardanelles Expedition with the advance on Baghdad; that as long as there was the chance of the Dardanelles Expedition succeeding, there would have been a chance of the advance to Baghdad coming off; but that the moment that failed, the Expedition ought to have been abandoned.
In the same speech that I have quoted of the Prime Minister's he used these words in defending the Dardanelles Expedition—
"If the Dardanelles Expedition had not taken place, the Mesopotamian Expedition might have been swept out of existence."
Surely, my Lords, if there was a risk of the Mesopotamian Expedition being swept out of existence if the Dardanelles Expedition had not taken place, there was an infinitely greater risk of its being swept out of existence when the Dardanelles Expedition had taken place and had failed. As long as that Expedition had not materialised, as long as it was merely a threat, the Turks had to keep their whole forces to guard against it; but the moment the Expedition had failed, they were able to throw their whole forces into the field. Therefore it seems to mo that the time to give up this Expedition was when the Dardanelles Expedition had failed.
It seems to me a most extraordinary thing that nobody, either in the Cabinet or on the General Staff, seems to have realised, even if the Expedition got to

839
Baghdad, what must have happened to it afterwards. I believe the great Moltke said that he could land an Army Corps in England; his difficulty would be how to get it away. Surely the same thing applied to the Baghdad Expedition. General Townshend had at his disposal, I believe, a force of 11,000 men and some artillery. At the battle of Ctesiphon he was confronted, besides the force he expected to find, with an unexpected force of four divisions of well-equipped Turkish troops. Surely, my Lords, a more mad undertaking than for an Expeditionary Force of 11,000 or 12,000 men to advance 500 miles up the river against the full forces of the Turkish Army, equipped in the completest and fullest way, could not possibly be imagined.
I am prepared to make this concession. Supposing we are told by the Government that they were assured by their military advisers in this country as well as in India that this Expedition was feasible, then, of course, one must accept it although one may be astonished to hear it. Anyway, for the sake of argument, let us admit that the Expedition was feasible. I do not suppose that anybody ever had to argue a case in which he could afford to be more generous in making concessions than I am able to be this afternoon. But supposing this Expedition was feasible, supposing that somehow or other they had been able to get into Baghdad and had been able to remain there, surely the only way in which this could have been really brought about would be by the Expedition being the most perfectly-equipped of its kind that it is possible to conceive. If you have these side shows, at all events see that they are as perfect as they can be made in every way. I say, and I say without fear of contradiction, that those who were responsible for this Expedition neglected nothing that lack of foresight and lack of organisation could effect to eliminate any possible chance of success that there might have been.
The question of this Mesopotamian Expedition resolves itself in the main into one of transport. One would have imagined, knowing about the activity of Germany in regard to the Baghdad Railway, that even before the war began some scheme of a Mesopotamian Expedition would have been pigeon-holed somewhere in India, or at all events that when the campaign began active steps would have been taken. There were outside Basra all the materials,
840
sleepers and rails, even, I believe, fifteen locomotives, left by the Germans; and the India authorities did nothing to make any use of this railway. Baghdad is, I think, 574 miles from the sea by river; it is half as far by land. Well, if they neglected the railway—which is now, I understand, being built—one would have thought that at all events they would have taken measures to make the river transport effective and complete, that they would have known what boats would have been required, that they would have known where to have got them, and that they would have taken steps to collect them. They have dockyards at Bombay and Calcutta, and they have a dockyard at Basra. At all events, for the first fifteen months they did nothing at all at any of these places. The boats they got were commandeered from England, and many of them sank on the way. The river above Kurna is at most times of the year very difficult to navigate, and boats which draw more than 3¼ feet of water are unable to navigate the channels; yet nothing appears to have been done. No boats that were of any good were obtained, and the few that were have been so overworked that the boilers of some of them have not been cleaned for eighteen months, and it is only natural that the transport arrangements altogether broke down. You had an enormous glut of stores and things collected at Basra; you had a dearth of everything else everywhere else.
But I think it would be wrong to put the whole thing down to lack of transport. General Townshend's force was armed, I am told, with artillery so obsolete and antiquated that if it had not been for the loss of prestige he might just as well have handed them over to the Turks. At the beginning of the war all the aeroplanes at Sitapur were commandeered and sent to France; they were replaced by some which were unfit for France, and which I believe were sent from Egypt. At the battle of Sheikh Saad there was no telephonic communication of any sort or kind. The Divisional General could not communicate with his brigadiers, and the brigadiers could not communicate with the commanding officers. In the battles which took place in January, particularly in the battle on January 21, when it was all important that the troops should get across the river, the sappers had no materials of any sort or kind with which to make a bridge; they had not even the cable necessary to make a flying bridge to cross the river. Balloons were refused.

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It is needless to say that when the necessaries of warfare were so lacking, all the comforts which are so generously and rightly given in France were absent from our troops in Mesopotamia. Tobacco could not be obtained; it could not even be bought. And this is the Expedition of which the Prime Minister spoke in these words—
"I do not think that in the whole course of the war there has been a series of operations more carefully contrived, more brilliantly conducted, and with a better prospect of success."
I think these latter words are remarkable, because this excursion into the realms of prophecy is, as far as I know, the solitary departure of he Prime Minister from that attitude of static expectation which he has impressed on the British public with such monotonous insistence.
I have spoken about the lack of transport. I now come to what, in my humble judgment, is far the worst part of this business. When we see that all the material part of the warfare was hung up because stores could not come forward, because reinforcements could not come forward, what was likely to happen to those who were wounded or who fell sick on the way? There was no provision for them of any sort or kind. I think if there is one thing that redeems the horrors of the awful war in which we are engaged it is the wonderful way in which the wounded in the main theatre of warfare have been cared for, the promptitude, the skill, the tenderness with which all cases are treated. I think it reflects the greatest credit on everybody, from the members of the Government to the youngest stretcher bearer. When we hear of the great attack made on July 1, and when we see on the following evening ambulances rolling into London bringing men who were wounded the day before, we feel what a, wonderful organisation it must be that brings this about. We think of this, and when we hear of what goes on in Mesopotamia we rub our eyes and ask, "Is it the same Government carrying on the same war? Or are we back in the days of the Crimea before the advent of Florence Nightingale?" Think of those wounded men left out sometimes for twenty-four hours in the bed of the river, exposed to the pitiless rain, carried down in barges, if they were lucky, exposed to all the elements, without proper attendance, without proper anything.
I have here a mass of letters dealing with this question. It is very difficult to
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make a selection. I think I shall probably not be doing amiss if I read an extract from one letter which seems to me to epitomise the savings in hundreds of others, and also give you an account of what happened at one typical battle. This is what this gentleman, for whose credit I can absolutely vouch, writes—
"I saw men by hundreds coming down the River Tigris on open boats, with one blanket in biting cold and rain, with not oven a field-dressing sometimes, with limbs shattered and rifles as splints, puggarees for bandages and sometimes puttees, and with no sanitary accommodation of any sort or kind."
Then I will take the battle of Ctesiphon. It ake that for several reasons, in the first place because the battle of Ctesiphon was reported by some one high in authority as being a case in which the arrangements for the wounded were satisfactory. It is, as regards the lack of medical appliances, about an average case; indeed, it is rather better than the average. At the battle of Ctesiphon there was medical accommodation for 500. Arrangements for 2,100 were improvised, but they were quite inadequate. The total number of wounded was 4,500. One wounded officer said that after the battle of Ctesiphon there was not sufficient chloroform. An officer commanding a brigade at Ctesiphon was wounded on November 21; he had no food from six p.m. on the 21st until twelve noon on the 24th, except two cups of tea not supplied by the medical authorities. His wounds were dressed on the 22nd, and not again until the 26th. He was for many hours with both legs out of action and in a transport cart not intended for wounded at all and jolting all the way. He is ready on reaching England to make a statement on the subject. There was a letter from a subaltern in which he said that he lay without help for thirty-six hours, and after his wounds were dressed they were not touched again until he got to Bombay. He adds—
"The Turks are full well equipped, and the doctors provided with the last word in medical outfits from Paris. At the battle of Ctesiphon two bargeloads of wounded were abandoned and were tended and sent down by the Turks."
I cannot help thinking, my Lords, that amongst the many surprises of this war the Turks have presented one of the most remarkable. I do not allude only to their martial revival, though that in itself is sufficiently remarkable. But we have been accustomed to look down on the Turks, we have shuddered at the Turks, we have

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prayed for the Turks. The Turks are supposed to have been Germanised, to have adopted German methods, but in both the Dardanelles and in Mesopotamia they have in warfare revived that chivalry which the Germans have made impossible. Alike in their humanity to the prisoners and in their treatment of the wounded our enemies who fight under the Crescent have shown an example to those who fight under the Cross. And, my Lords, it came to this—I am ashamed to say it—that in Mesopotamia the best hope for an English wounded soldier, and what his friend could most wish for him, was that he should fall into the hands of the Turks. And yet, apart from our moral superiority, one would have expected that the Turks, being defenders, would have been less provided with medical materials and nursing than we, who ought to have properly organised and equipped the aggressive Expedition we were conducting.
The noble Marquess, two days ago, told us that he heard that things were satisfactory now in Mesopotamia as regards medical comforts. I hope this may be so. But I know that on May 6 the following report was sent from Mesopotamia from a hospital there—
"The sick and wounded wore lying on the ground in tents, with no mosquito nets. In the cases of men who were helpless, their faces and arms were so literally black with flies that you could not see any skin at all. There was no milk, not even tinned."
That was written on May 6. And when one remembers that the condition of the wounded at Ctesiphon was described as satisfactory, and when one heard from India that the arrangements for the wounded were satisfactory at a time when men were arriving at Bombay with their wounds untouched since the battle, dysentery cases lying side by side on the ship with bullet wounds, and when at one time over 400 men arrived at one hospital covered with vermin, one hopes, but one cannot feel confident, that the noble Marquess may not at some future date have to modify his statement.
I think I have said enough to show that the treatment of the wounded in Mesopotamia amounted to a scandal. I should be sorry, quite apart from any Inquiry, if I had any direct or indirect responsibility for anything that had happened there. I think the worst part of this thing is that these horrors seem to rob sorrow even of
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its consolation. Grief for those who have fallen in battle is softened by pride in the glory of their deaths, but there can be little lining to the clouds that darken those homes where pride is blurred and grief embittered by the knowledge that those who are mourned might still be alive if parsimony or criminal carelessness had not refused them the roughest elements of that medical science and care which has saved so many thousands of lives in France.
My Lords, I am going to make an appeal to the Government. I do not know what they are going to do about giving an Inquiry. My noble friend's remarks the other night seemed to be couched in that spirit of polite evasion of which practice has made him a past master. If they are not going to give an Inquiry, I am going to make this appeal to them. I hope that in answering my case to-night they will not do anything to extenuate or to gloss over the scandals which everybody knows have taken place. I do not think the Government realise the rage and the exasperation with which our soldiers in Mesopotamia read the debates in Parliament here. They get the newspapers—it is about all they do get—and when men, at the end of their tether almost, maddened by the monotony of their existence, withered by the heat, tortured by torments which we cannot conceive, their memories haunted by recollections of what they have gone through and to which their friends have succumbed—when these men read that in the House of Commons the Prime Minister has said that he was afraid that in some respects the medical organisation "had not been fully successful," or when they read of the noble Marquess getting up in your Lordships' House and saying that he believes that there has been "a slight hitch" in the transport, is it wonderful that they break down, that they feel that that Government of the country for which they are fighting cares more for its Parliamentary position than it does for the lives of men?
There is one other point. The men in Mesopotamia may not be exposed to the dangers to which the men in France are, but they have no respite, no rest from the monotony of their existence. I wonder—although it has nothing to do with this question—whether some arrangement could not be made by which they might be relieved at times and given a chance of

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leave, like that which our soldiers in France enjoy.
Two things are required in Mesopotamia. One is that everything possible should be taken out of the hands of the India Government, in which no confidence is felt at all, and put into the hands of Sir William Robertson, in whom every confidence is felt. The other is that an Inquiry should be held at once. These men want an Inquiry because they believe that the very fact of an Inquiry being instituted will do a great deal to remove all of which I have complained.
I have nothing more to add. I do not know whether I shall be considered to have touched on subjects which it were better to avoid, or whether it will be said that I have washed our dirty linen in public. In my opinion it is better to wash your dirty linen in public than to wear it indefinitely in public. The time for clearing up this subject is long overdue. I move for this Inquiry, not with a desire to find a scapegoat, but rather in the faint hope that some of the things which are, alleged may be found to have been exaggerated, and that at all events a good excuse may be found for a great many of them. Above all, I move for it in the confident belief that the ventilation of the subject will render for all time impossible the recurrence of scandals which, whatever be the result of this war, will be a blot on our otherwise magnificent share in the conduct of it.
Moved to resolve, That in the opinion of this House a full Inquiry ought to be held into the whole conduct of the campaign in Mesopotamia, particularly the advance on Ctesiphon, the transport arrangements, and the provision for the wounded.—(The Earl of Wemyss.)
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF CREWE): My Lords, in ordinary circumstances, after the powerful indictment of the noble Earl opposite, I should not have intervened until some other speakers had had an opportunity of developing the propositions advanced. But, as I shall explain in a moment, there are reasons which make me desire to take part in the debate at the first possible opportunity. But before I say anything else I hope I may be allowed, not so much to congratulate my noble friend opposite on his eloquent speech, as
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to congratulate the House upon the marked reinforcement in our strength which his advent here has given us, and to express the hope that his intervention in our debates will be frequent.
It is desirable, particularly in view of the fact that the Prime Minister has made a similar announcement by this time in another place, to state that we are prepared to accede to the suggestion of my noble friend opposite in the following terms. We propose to institute an Inquiry into the conduct of the operations in Mesopotamia, including the transport, supply, and medical services. That, I think, covers all the ground on which the noble Earl has touched. The Inquiry will be conducted by a small body, and the names of those who are to compose it will be announced in Parliament before a final decision is reached. It will be necessary for this body to sit in secret, for precisely the same reason that has made the publication of Papers impossible—a purely military reason. I ought to add that a similar body will inquire, with precisely the same scope, into the operations at the Dardanelles.
It is right that I should state to the House how it is that we have not asked the country to engage in this Inquiry before, because we have known that by many such an Inquiry was sought. It must be borne in mind that to carry on an investigation of this kind during the progress of the war throws a very heavy extra burden of work upon a number of officials already worked almost to breaking point. It must also be remembered that when the conduct of two great operations comes under discussion it may be necessary to obtain the evidence of many naval and military officers who are actively employed or engaged in different parts of the world. Those objections will, I am sure, forcibly strike all members of the House, but in the circumstances we feel that they ought to be overridden and that the Inquiry ought to be held. That being so, it seems almost necessary to defer the detailed discussion on a great number of points raised by my noble friend in his speech, because those matters will form the actual subject-matter of the Inquiry which is to be held forthwith, and to attempt to pre judge them in debate would be the reverse of assistance to those who are to be responsible for the Inquiry, and could in our opinion have no useful result.

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There are, therefore, only one or two points in my noble friend's speech on which I desire to say a word. I am compelled to pass by all those incidents connected with the transport and medical services to which he alluded in more than one moving passage. All that I can do is to touch on subjects which do not fall within the ambit of the proposed Inquiry. The first of those is the question of policy, with which the noble Earl opened his observations—as to how we ever came to go to Mesopotamia at all and engage in what he colloquially described as a "side show." There is no need, I think, to labour this point greatly, because among the concessions which my noble friend was so generous to make was included that of not attaching blame to the inception of the Expedition to Basra. He was quite aware of the circumstances which, in our opinion, made it imperative to reassert in the critical moments of August, 1914, our paramount position in the Persian Gulf. Our position there has long been recognised. As long ago as 1870 the Duke of Argyll, then Secretary of State for India, spoke of the years of peace that had followed the establishment of our supremacy in the Persian Gulf. Then in 1903 my noble friend Lord Lansdowne made the memorable statement in this House that an attempt by any other Power to establish a naval base or a fortified port anywhere in the Persian Gulf would be regarded as a grave menace to British interests, and one which we should resist with all the means at our disposal. And later, in 1907, the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke in a somewhat similar sense.
It must be remembered, my Lords, that in August, 1914, although we were not at war with Turkey, and did not become so for many months, the Turks in Asia had shown no little sign of restlessness. At Baghdad and the neighbourhood many threats had been uttered against this country, and the property of British subjects had been forcibly seized. It was also known that a strong movement was on foot, no doubt under German inspiration, to induce the proclamation of a Jehad, a Holy War, against us. It was absolutely necessary for us also to support the interests of our tried and faithful friends, the Arab chiefs on the Gulf, such as the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and of Koweit, not to mention some others on the Arabian Peninsula itself. We were also bound to protect as far as possible, those valuable oilfields in which
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not long ago we had acquired an interest of much importance to our naval oil supplies. We thought it our duty, therefore, to take the power of striking a blow in this region, without exhibiting hostility to Turkey, with whom we were still at peace.
But events developed, and at the beginning of November we found ourselves at war with Turkey. Our preparations had been carefully made, although without perpetrating any act which could be said to have had a shadow of hostility against Turkey, and on the following day—November 6—we landed at Fao in the face of some resistance. Two brigades was the force available, and with those two brigades, after some sharp fighting, Basra was occupied on November 22, 1914. We all know, because it is a common observation of the Arabs themselves, that they decline to be affected by anything they do not actually see, and our presence there in that force may have saved, and as we believe did save, the Empire from the near approach of a great disaster. It was always possible that if we had not then shown our strength Islam, as a whole, might have been deflected against us. It was impossible to foresee what the effect on Persia and on the Arabian Peninsula would have been if Islam so far East had declared itself as hostile to the Allies. It seemed highly possible that Afghanistan—and, in passing, I desire to pay a tribute to the rational and honourable conduct of the Amir of Afghanistan all through this war—in fact, it could hardly have been avoided—that Afghanistan should also have gone against us. Further than that, we had also to consider the position and prospects of the great Moslem population of Africa, which, in turn, might easily have been roused against us and our Allies. From those dangerous possibilities, in our judgment, we were altogether saved by the prompt move to the head of the Persian Gulf.
That brings us practically to the end of the year 1914. There was a single Division at that time in Mesopotamia. The quantity of river transport at the disposal of the force was small, and for the time being there could be no question, with a moderate force with no easy means of locomotion at its disposal, of anything like a further advance. I have no desire to follow further the progress that was made through the times when a second Division came partly from Egypt and partly from India, and up

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to the time when, in the summer of last year, the occupation of Amara was authorised, or the various steps by which the advance was made, first to Kurna, then to Amara, which was occupied in June of last year, and then the further advance, first on the Euphrates and afterwards up the Tigris, since all those are bound to become part of the subjects of the forthcoming Inquiry. It is by no means easy to sever the different considerations, political and military, and in turn keep those distinct from such questions as the management of transport and supply. Jut it may, I think, be assumed that the inquirers, in considering the conduct of the operations, will have to bear in mind the various cognate considerations.
There is one other point, not mentioned by my noble friend but I think arising out of his indictment, on which I desire to say a word. It does not seem to have been sufficiently realised by all that the conduct of this Mesopotamian Expedition has formed a comparatively small part of the tax which has been made upon the resources of India. Some have spoken as though the Government of India, and the administrators, civil and military, of India, had nothing to do but to manage this Mesopotamian Expedition, just as at the beginning of this century Great Britain was solely occupied with the management of the South African War. This is far, indeed, from being the case. It must be remembered that at the very beginning of the war—in the month of August, 1914—India sent two Divisions of Infantry and one brigade of Cavalry to France. In September a Division was sent to Mombasa for the East African Expedition—and with regard to the East African Expedition perhaps I may say this, by way of parenthesis, that although the troops were supplied from India the whole conduct of, and the whole responsibility for, that campaign has from the first rested with the authorities here and the War Office, and that India has not undertaken any responsibility with regard to it—and in November another Division and another brigade of Cavalry were sent to Egypt. All these units, making a large force in all, were absolutely complete with all their transport, with ambulances, indeed with all that an Expeditionary Force can demand or require. In addition to that, the large force which is normally kept on the North-West Frontier of India had to be maintained at its full strength.
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It is also fair to mention that, entirely apart from these demands upon India, a large number of Indian officers on leave and employed in one way or another here, to the number, if I remember rightly, of from 600 to 700, were taken and used, quite necessarily used, for such purposes as the formation of the New Armies. But what was necessary and what was gained by the Empire as a whole had the effect of denuding India of much of its strength. The same applies to the medical service. The medical service in India was largely stripped of its membership for service in the field and hospital service in Europe. These things I think it is reasonable to bear in mind, and I have no doubt that they will continue to be borne in mind. It is also true that practically all the British troops in India were withdrawn, being replaced by other British troops less experienced than those who came away and formed some of the Divisions which have fought with such great distinction in Europe. It should also be borne in mind that between December, 1914, and September of last year there have been no less than seven separate attacks, some of them very formidable, on the North-Western Frontier of India, and the arrangements for meeting those attacks have been carried out with the efficiency which we are accustomed to associate with the Frontier fighting of the Indian Army. I could mention one or two instances of almost extraordinary promptitude in meeting formidable attacks which were made. At Aden, which as everybody knows is under the Government of India, the situation also demanded not a little watchfulness and care. And in addition to that, the internal situation in India—one, as the House knows, from time to time of no little anxiety—has thrown a heavy strain on the military resources, particularly in details of organisation, of India. I may also mention, as an instance of the difficulties with which the India Government has had to cope, that within two years there have been four Directors-General of Medical Service. Two of these have been called on to do most important work in Europe, and the health of another broke down. In speaking of the failure of arrangements, these are considerations which ought not to be ignored in fairness to those into whose conduct it is desired to inquire.
I should like also to add that when considering the possible shortcomings of individuals it will be necessary for us at

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any rate to consider the system under which these individuals work. It will be necessary, before passing a final judgment on presumed or proved shortcomings and deficiencies of civil and military officials in India, to consider in particular the whole system of military organisation there, and the particular difficulties under which they may have been found to labour during these crowded and critical months. Somebody will at some time have to inquire how far the concentration of work and responsibility upon one or two individuals may be held to be responsible for difficulties that have occurred. I will not attempt to develop that subject further now, but I throw it out as one which will also have to be borne in mind before a final verdict can be pronounced. I will say no more now, my Lords. His Majesty's Government entirely recognise the claim for fuller knowledge which has been so frequently put forward by my noble friend. That claim we are prepared to respect in spite of the objections—which I desire once more to mention, because they are formidable—to instituting such an Inquiry as this during the actual progress of a great war.
THE EARL OF CROMER: My Lords, the statement made by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House, that the Government accede to the suggestion for an Inquiry, has very materially altered the whole situation. Nevertheless there is one subject to which no allusion was made by the noble Earl, but which was, however, hinted at by the noble Marquess, and which is of great importance and has a distinct bearing upon this Mesopotamian fiasco. The other day, in dealing with Irish affairs, the noble Marquess (Lord Crewe) exhorted us not to indulge in recriminations with regard to the past, except in so far as they might afford some useful lesson for our guidance in the future. That is a sentiment in which I cordially concur, and I am about to draw attention to a very important matter as to which the recent past does, I believe, furnish us with a very useful lesson for our guidance in, I think I may say, the near future.
I am going to say a few words upon the reforms which were carried out a few years ago in the central military administration of the Government of India. It is a difficult and delicate subject to handle, because it is impossible to do so without in some degree questioning the judgment of a very
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distinguished and eminent soldier who was a valued and great personal friend of mine, with whom I was associated in public and private life for many years, and whom the whole nation now mourns—I need hardly say that I allude to the late Lord Kitchener. Nevertheless, the subject is of such vital importance to national interests that I do not think any consideration for the living, and—a point which touches me more nearly—any respect for the memory of the dead, ought to tie our tongues to such an extent as to prevent our discussing it. I have no sort of wish to indulge in those recriminations to which the noble Marquess alluded the other evening. I have not been for more than half a century behind the scenes of Government without knowing how very easy it is to make serious mistakes in dealing with political and military affairs. Moreover, I have made too many mistakes myself not to be very chary in criticising those of others. I should like, therefore, to preface my remarks by saying that even if Lord Kitchener made an error in judgment in introducing certain reforms a few years ago, as I think he did, that fact does not in any way obliterate or to any extent obscure the very eminent and distinguished services he rendered to his country in other and different directions.
When Lord Kitchener was appointed Commander-in-Chief in India he stayed in my house at Cairo on his way to India, and I then had full opportunity of discussing with him the military administration of the Government of India. The impression I brought away with me from those discussions was that my late and very gallant friend was about to commit what is a very great error in an Anglo-Indian administrator—I mean the error of forming a very decided opinion upon the Indian question before he had got to India. That is a mistake which has been made, within my recollection, on two or three occasions, and whenever it has been made it has generally been followed by very disastrous consequences. Let me allude to an incident within my own personal experience which shows, not indeed what did happen, but what might have happened by following this procedure. I remember very well that in 1880, when I was appointed Financial Member of the Governor-General's Council, I had the good luck to be staying in the country for two or three days at a house where Mr. Gladstone was a guest. I was then a young man, and

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Mr. Gladstone, I need hardly say, was considered one of the highest financial authorities in this or any other country. I therefore hung on his words and treasured all his observations. With regard to finance, Mr. Gladstone urged upon me strongly to take immediate steps to reduce the cash balances of the Government of India. When I got to India I inquired into the matter and found that Mr. Gladstone was entirely misinformed as to the facts, and that if the Government had followed out his plan the consequences might, and probably would, have been disastrous. I merely mention that to show what a great mistake it is to form a decided opinion on Indian subjects of that description until one has been in India and studied the facts thoroughly.
I need hardly remind your Lordships who are acquainted with India affairs that when Lord Kitchener took up the post of Commander-in-Chief there were two soldiers on the Governor-General's Council the Commander-in-Chief, who had executive command, and the Military Member of Council, who performed the functions generally discharged in this country by the Secretary of State for War. In my day, now a good many years ago, the system worked very well, and with no more friction than generally attends the working of Government departments. When I was told by Lord Kitchener that the system when he went out was working badly—whether that was the fault of the system or of the people working it, I cannot say—I accepted his high authority that this was so, and that some reform was required. I cannot admit, however, that the actual reforms carried out were judicious.
The main reform that was introduced was, as your Lordships are aware, the entire abolition of the Military Member of Council, and thus practically the whole administration of the Army in India, in all its various departments, was thrown upon the shoulders of the Commander-in-Chief. Even in normal times that arrangement was, I think, open to considerable objection. It had been for many years a sort of unwritten law in India that if the Commander-in-Chief was an officer of the English Army the Military Member of Council should be an officer of the Indian Army, and vice versa. The reason for this was that in order to deal with Indian military affairs experience both of Indian and English military affairs was necessary. For obvious reasons,
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on which I need not dwell but which history teaches are sound enough, an Asiatic Army commanded by Christian and European officers is a delicate instrument with which to deal. It was also wisely thought necessary that the Viceroy should have constantly at his elbow an officer who had resided long in India, who spoke Hindustani, who had gone through the mill of military work in India and was fully acquainted with the customs, prejudices, and feelings of the native, soldier—points which I need hardly remind your Lordships are of vital importance. Under the new system which was introduced under Lord Kitchener's auspices this safeguard was not entirely abrogated, but was very much weakened. In the first place, there was no absolute guarantee that there would be an officer with Indian experience in the Governor-General's Council. The Viceroy, who necessarily himself would be unacquainted with Indian detail and probably also with military affairs, instead of having two advisers on whom to rely, could only rely on one; and I must say that the result of having had to rely on one adviser appears to have been extremely unfortunate.
There is another point, at which the noble Marquess the Leader of the House hinted, and that is that the new system threw upon one individual a great deal more than he could possibly do—it overwhelmed him with work. I have no wish to rake up again the embers of a rather heated controversy which took place on this subject some years ago. I do not think it is either necessary or in the least desirable to go into the question of who was right and who was wrong; but I claim that this change of system, this very important change which was introduced under Lord Kitchener's auspices should be judged by its results, and while it would certainly be a great exaggeration to say that the fiasco in Mesopotamia has been entirely due to that change, I cannot help thinking that the change has very largely contributed to it. Although, as I say, I do not want to rake up again old controversies, I do think that what has happened in Mesopotamia affords the most complete vindication of the attitude taken up by the noble Earl opposite (Lord Curzon), the then Viceroy, in opposition to this drastic reform. I do not for the moment suggest that there should be any immediate change. A change just now, while we are going through this national crisis, would be undesirable; but I am of opinion that the whole matter should be

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very carefully considered at the first possible opportunity after the war. I do not say that we ought to go hack in detail to exactly the same system that previously existed, but I hold strongly that we ought to go back to the essential part of that system—that is to say, that the Viceroy in the future should have two military advisers at his disposal instead of one.
There is one other matter to which I wish to allude. The other day I was reading a very important article in The Times, apparently from the pen of a well informed writer. Among other things he said that the Council of the Viceroy had virtually ceased to exist, that instead of being summoned every week at least, as was formerly the case, they are now very rarely summoned, that in fact the members of Council had degenerated into mere heads of Departments. And he said this—
"The Council had no share in the decision to send Indian troops to Europe, and we should very much like to know whether it was ever invited to consider the proposal to advance to Baghdad."
I do not deny or confirm that statement. Whether true or not, it is undoubtedly a very serious statement, for it must be remembered that India is not governed by the Viceroy but by the Viceroy in Council. To set aside the Council now, as is alleged in the article which I have quoted, would be, I will not say unconstitutional because the word does not apply to a country where there is no Constitution, but it would certainly be out of harmony with the spirit of the Government of India Act. This statement in The Times must be either correct or incorrect. If, as I trust is the case, it is incorrect, then it ought to be contradicted; if it is correct, it certainly discloses what I think I may call a serious state of things, and no time should be lost in putting the matter right. Both of the subjects to which I have ventured to call your Lordships' attention—namely, the question of the central military organisation of the Government of India and the position of the Viceroy's Council—are of such importance that I hope, in a future which I trust will not be very remote, they will receive the earnest attention of His Majesty's Government
THE DUKE OF SOMERSET: My Lords, the noble Earl who initiated this debate has in his eloquent speech touched on several matters that I had intended bringing forward, so that it is necessary for me
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to say but very little. On Tuesday last the noble Marquess who leads the House made, I thought, a rather weak speech in excuse of the state of affairs in Mesopotamia. The reason stated by him for not producing Papers on the subject was that it had been found that for military reasons it would be wrong to produce them. The noble Marquess went on to say that Papers relating to the failure as to transport, supply, and medical service might also help the enemy; at any rate, that is what I understood from him. Now this is rather too much of a good thing. It is, I think, safe to assume that the Turks know all about our want of transport and the state in which our wounded were, because the Arabs would probably inform them of it. Then we were told that the Report of the Commission in India had not arrived. Could not that have been telegraphed? That would have been quite possible, I should think, especially when it is most important to us here to be informed on many points on which we are still ignorant. I also understand, from what the noble Marquess said a short time ago, that a great many people blame the system of Government in India. Men who have been assisting in the Government of India for years tell me that, though the system may not be perfect, the men who were administering it were not by any means perfect, and that this accounts for a great deal of the failure.
With your Lordships' permission I should like to read a letter which I have received from an officer who has served in Mesopotamia. I do not know the gentleman, but he wrote to me having seen by the newspapers that I had mentioned the subject in this House on Thursday last. This officer writes—
"My regiment arrived in Mesopotamia from France early in January, and was sent up the Tigris the same day, arriving at the Front just after the battle of Wadi Creek. We passed Sheikh Saad the previous day. There were numbers of wounded still unattended to and with apparently no one to attend to them lying out in the mud on the bare decks of boats, with pouring rain and bitter cold—as it was throughout January and most of February. They were sent down by boatloads without the slightest attempt at proper care, and no one, or next to it, to attend them in the boat. There was an inexplicable and unpardonable and cruel lack of doctors, medical stores, and bandages. A great friend of mine in the I.M.S. was through all the Mesopotamian campaign up to and including the battle of Sheikh Saad (in the first week in January). After,

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and greatly owing to the strain of this, his health gave way, and he was invalided home with me to England on the same ship. He told me that, when the Relief Force marched out of Amara, the officer commanding the Force, whose name you doubtless know, told him and the officers of his ambulance that he did not consider that the Turks would put up a show between there and Kut, which he expected to reach quite easily, but that he was allowing for 800 casualties. At Sheikh Saad there were, I believe, between 4,000 and 5,000. My friend told me that it was utterly impossible for him and the few other doctors to cope with this. They were short of everything—of doctors and material—and felt like throwing themselves into the Tigris at the appallingness of their impossible task….The attack at Hannah on January 19, in which I took part, was equally terrible. Some thousands of wounded lay all night in the soaking rain, bitter cold, and deep mud, between our line and the Turks, the result of a murderous frontal attack. An armistice was fortunately granted us the next day by the Turks to collect these men—and there was the same tale of few doctors and deficiency in stores. In one boat a padre went down in charge of the wounded. I myself was severely wounded at the attack at Es Sinn on March 8. This time the arrangements were better; more doctors had been sent from the base, but yet too few, and there seemed a sufficiency of dressings. What was short was stretchers. We had to be taken in twenty miles across the desert, covered by a rearguard retreating before an attacking enemy—a rearguard famished for water after they had performed an unsuccessful attack with heavy loss the day before. I will not ask why we did not succeed, why we sat three hours before a position lightly held until the enemy had brought up his reinforcements and shattered us when at length but too late, we were ordered to attack. The journey hack for the wounded was performed in ordinary mule transport carts, no other form of ambulance being available. A few of the worst cases were taken on stretchers. But all the other ' worse cases '—stomach wounds—had to go in the carts (fourteen hours of it), with the result that a large percentage died on the way in. There must have been hundreds of cases of ' died of wounds ' which would have been saved, particularly in January, if there had been at all adequate medical arrangements."
I have read this letter to your Lordships as it shows the awful state of affairs as far as medical matters were concerned.
LORD SYDENHAM: My Lords, there is one point to which I should like to allude which has not yet been spoken of, but which has a very important bearing on the subject we have been discussing. It is not generally known that when war broke out in 1914 the medical transport and supply services of the Army in India were notoriously deficient—deficient, that is to say, to make proper provision for the number of Divisions it was intended and expected to put in the field. In the Tirah Expedition of 1897 the transport proved quite insufficient, and in the small Expeditions of 1908, again, the medical arrangements
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proved insufficient although the number of wounded was very small. It is, I believe, a fact that for the Mohmand Expedition trained bearers for seven doolies only were found to be available. But in 1911 the then Commander-in-Chief reported in full detail to the Government of India on the deficiency of the medical supply and transport services, calculated on the basis of seven Divisions in the field and two in reserve, which at that time was the accepted standard of strength. I think it best not to state the figures which the Commander-in-Chief gave on that occasion, but I may tell your Lordships that they were very large figures indeed. In 1912 the Nicholson Committee assembled at Simla to report on this and some other matters. I lone not seen the Report of that Committee. It was probably under consideration when the war broke out. In any case, nothing had been done to make good the deficiencies which were pointed out clearly in 1911; and when the greater part of the Army of India had gone to France and to these other places to which the noble Marquess referred the conditions were as unfavourable as possible for undertaking operations on a really large scale.
LORD BERESFORD: My Lords, the granting of an Inquiry by my noble friend opposite has entirely altered the situation so far as this debate goes, and as the whole ground has been so admirably covered by the brilliant speech of my noble friend on my left (Lord Wemyss) it is unnecessary to enter further into the details of the terrible blunders and mistakes made in Mesopotamia. But there are one or two things which I think ought to be said, independent of the Inquiry. Nothing could be said too laudatory of General Townshend. I know him intimately. He began life in the Royal Marines, and we went across the desert together for the relief of Gordon. He is a man of extraordinary ability; he has the pluck of the race, and I do not think in history anything has been more pluckily carried out than the three engagements he entered into and his magnificent retreat for three days, being fired at all the time, and then remaining besieged for over five months. It was not the enemy that beat him; it was famine and bad management.
I want to call attention to the fact that all these officers, including General

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Townshend, have been reduced to less than half-pay. Why is that? General Townshend received £200 a month when he was in command of this force. He maintained the credit of the British name before the whole of the Mahomedan world. Yet now, because he was unfortunate enough to have to surrender, be is reduced in pay from £200 a month to £83. I say this is a scandal. If it is the rule, it ought to be altered immediately. General Townshend has a little money. But how hard it is for all the other Indian officers who are reduced in the same proportion after the magnificent work they have done for the nation. Another point, Will my noble friend assure us that the divided control between the India Government and the Home Government no longer exists? We know what always happens with divided control. A great many of the mistakes, shall I call them?—they were not done intentionally, but they were very terrible for our men—were due to divided control between the Home Government and the India Government.
There is another matter which only has to be mentioned to have it altered. Will noble Lords believe that at this moment the whole of the troops in Mesopotamia are fed on 4½ d. a day each? Many of these troops went from France, where they had 10 d. a day. The climate in Mesopotamia is particularly trying to the physique of the men, independent of the fighting and all they went through. In the old wars a very large percentage of the wounded died, but in this war a very large percentage recover. This is simply because they are well fed at the Front. If a man gets below what he ought to be in spirits and health and is wounded, he is much more likely to die than a man who is well fed. I hope that my noble friend will at once look into the question of the 4½ d. a day ration for these men. I understand that this is the result of divided control. The British Government wanted the men to get 10 d., and the India Government, so I am informed, thought they ought to remain at 4½ d. because this was the scale in that country.
My noble friend on the left (Lord Wemyss) reminded me before I rose to speak that he did not pay any tribute to the wonderful work of the doctors with this army. There were cases in which there was but one doctor with 1,000 wounded.
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I am not going to enter into that, because of the Inquiry; but do let us pay a meed of honour to these doctors and their assistants. Think of it—one barge with a steel deck and 1,000 men huddled together, no sanitary arrangements, no covering, one doctor and one orderly, and five days going down the river! I pay this tribute—my noble friend asked me to do so as he omitted it, but I should have done it anyway—to these doctors, and I am certain that noble Lords on the Front Bench opposite are as proud of these men as we are.
The noble Marquess, in the course of his speech, made a very grave admission. He said that at the beginning of the war India was bled white, that the doctors and guns and millions of rounds of ammunition were sent away. That being so, if the political necessity required an Expedition to Baghdad the Government certainly ought not to have embarked upon it until they had everything ready to make the movement a military success. We know that India sent us supplies at a moment when we were short of guns, ammunition, and medical stores. Therefore we must be quite fair in arguing this point. We must remember that India did help us in France and Egypt. But that does not absolve the Government, whether it was the Home Government or the India Government. Somebody must be held responsible for the loss of lives through want of preparation and organisation, and this Inquiry ought to bring somebody to book.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: My Lords, I do not rise to travel over the ground which has been already so admirably covered by my noble friend who introduced the Motion, still less to quarrel with the decision of the Government, though one cannot help wishing that, having made up their minds to give an Inquiry, they had been willing to do so not at the eleventh hour but many weeks ago. I rise to put two questions to my noble friend opposite, and in doing so perhaps I might say a word on what fell from Lord Cromer with regard to the responsibility for these mistakes. What we are really interested to know is, first and foremost, that what has been complained of in the past has now been set right as far as it can be.
My noble friend Lord Wemyss brought the whole of this story up to as late a date as May 6, and one of the worst cases which

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he read to your Lordships was dated practically two months ago—and it takes almost that time for the post to bring the tatters. But really nothing fell from the noble Marquess as to the steps taken to repair those mistakes. It is alleged, and I believe cannot be gainsaid, that at that period there was still a lack of transport, a lack of barges, a considerable insufficiency of doctors, because three Divisions went out without hospitals at all, although two, I think, were caught up by their hospitals afterwards. Still there was a great deficiency. There was still at that time, I am told, a deficiency of quinine and of bandages. There were too few menials to look after the camps and keep them clean, and there was a total absence of the Comforts which it has been well said have been most generously provided in France during the campaign.
The noble Marquess ought to have been able to tell us one by one to what extent these deficiencies had now been made good, for in this matter the outside public have to be reassured. This Committee may find out many matters which involve individuals, or future differences of organisation. But nothing that this Committee can do will prevent these men suffering for the next three months, and what we desire before this debate terminates is that either the Under-Secretary or some one on the Government Bench should tell us—what I am convinced they can tell us—that so far as human power enables it to be done the necessary orders have been given to render the position of our troops in this part of the world satisfactory. That is the first point.
The second point is this. I am sure that the noble Marquess will realise that there is a complete chain of responsibility in this matter in India. I do not wish to associate myself for a moment with those who outside have treated the Indian participation in this campaign as if it had been on the whole a shameful episode in our military history. I believe that the demands made upon India have almost exceeded those made on the United Kingdom pro rata. The fact of having transferred nearly the whole of the British troops in the Indian Army to France, of having called upon India to carry on a, campaign in East Africa and to send troops to Aden, and then, on the top of that, to put this enormous Expedition in Mesopotamia, would undoubtedly place a strain on any military system, poised as India is, under which it might well have broken
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down. I agree with my noble friend Lord Cromer to this extent, that it is possible that the organisation of the military system in India has not stood the strain of the change which was made some years ago. On the other hand, I think it is only fair—as I see my noble friend Lord Morley in his place—to say that Lord Cromer has not quite accurately stated that for which responsibility has to be taken in 1905, because our plan, right or wrong, was to leave two Members representing the military element in the Council. We felt that to put the whole mass of the work on the Commander-in-Chief would be a very unwise step. But two or three years later my noble friend (Lord Morley) thought differently. Instead of, as I think he might have done, strengthening the Supply Member and making him responsible for the whole of the supplies, leaving the Commander-in-Chief responsible for the whole of the personnel, he went to the opposite extreme and abolished the Supply Member, leaving the Commander-in-Chief in sole charge—not, I think, an arrangement that could stand the strain of a campaign.
On the other hand, there is one thing in which the whole House will agree, and that is that no organisation which was economical and adequate in time of peace could possibly, without a great deal of amplification, have been made equal to the enormous strain which has been put upon India in this campaign. When we look at the War Office here, which has been expanded to perhaps three times its size, we see how that stands. But we have not had a single word from the noble Marquess as regards this chain of responsibility. The Secretary of State, the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief, and those below them—so far as we gathered from the noble Marquess's speech not one of those authorities, not one link of that chain, is going to be held accountable by the Government for one of the greatest failures of which we have known in our military history. I think that is deplorable, because, whatever the Committee may decide, it is on the links of that chain that a great deal of the present work is going on. All the work which has to be done in Bombay will be done by the same men as before, and unless the Government institute immediate changes the necessity for which must have become apparent during these operations I do not see how we can expect that the campaign will be

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carried on in the future as both Houses of Parliament would desire it should be. I hope that we shall have something from the Government on these two points. I did not understand from the noble Marquess whether there is any limit to the period during which the investigation will last. Is it the desire of the. Government to obtain a Report with the object of amending what is now amiss, or is it simply their desire, amending it themselves, to have a Report on the past for their guidance in the future? That is a point on which we are not informed.
I promised, when I rose to address your Lordships, that I would not trouble you with further incidents of these troubles which have been brought before us. I have in my possession I dare say a larger number of documents than any other member of the House showing the utter breakdown of all the preparations for the campaign. We have, in season and out of season, urged the Government in this matter. I have made this appeal to them before. Will they not give a little more credence to what reaches us on this side of the House from outside sources, rather than depend entirely on the optimistic official accounts that all is well, such as were served up to them last November before some of the worst of the tragedies mentioned by Lord Wemyss occurred. Only in February or March did they send out this Commission, which, as has been pointed out, has not been instructed to report by telegraph. We are all on the same side in this matter, and I would urge, even now at this late hour and up to the end of the war, that those of us who are equally interested with His Majesty's Government in seeing that these operations are carried on to the best advantage and with the least sacrifice of human life, should be listened to rather more freely than we have been, not only with regard to this Expedition but with regard to other portions of the Campaign which have been, I am sure not intentionally but to a large extent, hid from the public, and which are only dealt with now under great Parliamentary pressure.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (LORD ISLINGTON): My Lords, I rise before the conclusion of this debate to endeavour to answer one or two of the points which have been raised. In the first place, I would like to say to the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Beresford) who put
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certain questions about the pay of those of our troops who are now prisoners that I am not in a position at this moment to give him an answer, but I will make inquiries and inform him of the result. I understand that it is in accordance with ordinary practice. As regards the other point he raised, I gathered that he complained of the value of the ration—4½ d—which is being allowed to the troops in Mesopotamia as inadequate. There, again, I cannot give any useful answer. I can only say that a very recent telegram which I saw within the last forty-eight hours contains this satisfactory announcement, that all the troops in Mesopotamia are on full rations now, with the exception that there is a shortage at present of vegetables and of milk; the latter is being made up as rapidly as possible by the despatch of preserved and tinned milk.
LORD BERESFORD: Does that mean that they get the 10 d. instead of the 4½d.?
LORD ISLINGTON: I am not in a position to answer that. I can only say that all the troops, so we are advised by an official telegram, are now on full rations with the exceptions to which I have alluded. There was a point raised in the eloquent speech of my noble friend Lord Wemyss about which I would like to say a word. I do not know that he indicated that it was his opinion, but the opinion is widely held outside that the advance from Kut-el-Amara to Baghdad was undertaken rather for political reasons.
THE EARL OF WEMYSS: I distinctly said not in my judgment, but in the public judgment.
LORD ISLINGTON: Then I beg the noble Earl's pardon. But you say it is a widespread opinion outside?
THE EARL OF WEMYSS: Yes.
LORD ISLINGTON: I think it is important that a few words should be said upon that particular charge which is brought against His Majesty's Government. I will allude to it as briefly as possible, but it is necessary to go somewhat into detail to make the position clear. Between September 29 and the date of the occupation of Kut, in the middle of October, there took place a continuous stream of correspondence between the Government of

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India, His Majesty's Government, and the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia, Sir John Nixon, and it was upon the original suggestion of the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia, who considered himself in a position to open the road to Baghdad, that this consultation between the authorities took place. The General Office Commanding in Mesopotamia expressed his confidence at that time that he could beat the Turks, that he could occupy the town of Baghdad without any addition to his present force, reinforcements only being required to maintain the position when won. In view of General Nixon's opinion, His Majesty's Government at that time constituted a special Inter-Departmental Committee, and upon that Committee, as the House may remember—
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: To what date is the noble Lord referring?
LORD ISLINGTON: The date would be subsequent to October 3, in the early days of October. This Inter-Departmental Committee, consisting of representatives of the India Office, the Foreign Office, the War Office, and the Admiralty, was constituted with a view of advising the Government as to whether the conditions, after looking at all sides of the question, would allow of the advance. Telegraphing a few days after the report of this Committee, the Government of India expressed the opinion that the occupation of Baghdad presented no difficulty, provided a guarantee could be given that a complete Division should arrive in Mesopotamia as reinforcements within two months. It was on these conditions that the Government of India recommended the advance to Baghdad. On the strength of the advice of the General Officer Commanding, of the Government of India, and of the Committee to which I have alluded, His Majesty's Government decided to reinforce General Nixon with two Divisions, which was more than General Nixon had asked for in order, as he thought at that time, successfully to open the road to Baghdad; and on October 23 a telegram was despatched by His Majesty's Government sanctioning the advance if General Nixon was satisfied that the available forces were sufficient for the needs of the operation. I have given a brief story of the facts, and out of it I desire to make three points. I do so on account of the allusion that the noble Earl made in his speech to opinions that are widely held outside as to the reasons
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which influenced the Government in making this advance. I think the three points that come out clearly from these facts are, first, that the advance was not pressed from home on either the Government of India or on the General Officer Commanding, General Nixon. In other words, the initiative of the advance from Kut-el-Amara to Baghdad came from the military authorities on the spot. Secondly, I venture to say that this point comes out, that the charge that political considerations were allowed to overrule the advice of the competent military authorities is therefore unfounded. The third point is that the decision was not taken in a hurry. It was taken only after the very fullest consultation by all the authorities who were competent to give an opinion in this country, in India, and on the spot; and it was not taken until all those authorities were unanimous in their opinion that the advance might be made.
I will not at, this juncture go into the reasons—I do not think there would be any profit in it—which influenced those several authorities in making this further advance to Baghdad. There were, as must be obvious to your Lordships, very important militaryreasons and very important political reasons; but that the decision was unwise and unfortunate subsequent events have shown. The charge that may be brought against the Government is not one of insistence upon the military authorities, but rather one of acquiescence in their decisions. It is, of course, a most difficult and invidious task—more so for any one on this Bench—to allot the responsibility or blame for the advance to Baghdad. General Nixon undoubtedly believed that he could carry out the operation successfully, and advised that he could do so with the reinforcements I have mentioned. General Townshend, who was in command of the actual force which undertook the operation, never questioned, in any official correspondence to which either the Government of India or His Majesty's Government had access at the time, his capacity to do so.
That General Nixon underrated the difficulties is now apparent; but it may be said in his defence that his previous successive and successful occupation of important towns in the lower reaches of the Tigris and of the Euphrates may have influenced his mind to the extent that he would be able to continue those successes further north. Undoubtedly at that time the intelligence at his disposal was sadly

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inaccurate, and though other information received through other channels was opposed to his information, and in due course was, of course, passed round, so strongly was he in the belief that the information available to him was correct, that he did not take full account of the information coming from other sources. I frankly admit that the offensive power on the part of General Townshend on the one side was miscalculated, and also that the defensive power of the enemy on the other was miscalculated. But it is not for me—it would be ill taste, I think, for anybody on this Bench, certainly at this juncture—to apportion the blame between General Nixon, the Government of India, or His Majesty's Government. That will have to be determined by the dispassionate tribunal of public opinion when all the facts, which now must be necessarily incomplete, are known.
Reference has been made to the terrible deficiencies that undoubtedly existed in many departments throughout Mesopotamia. But now that there is to be an Inquiry instituted to look into all the past, it will be unnecessary for me to deal with that. I would like, however, to say, in reply to remarks which Lord Midleton made in connection with information and advice which have come from the Benches opposite and which have not, in his judgment, been sufficiently taken account of here, that in accepting the noble Earl's proposal for the institution of an Inquiry His Majesty's Government have undertaken, at this juncture when everybody is engaged at the very highest pressure and when all the Departments and all public men of experience are working from morning to night, no light matter. It will be difficult, I have no doubt, to find those who will well carry out the investigation, and I think this is a point that I might urge in reply to the noble Viscount when he makes these complaints.
The noble Viscount very properly put a question as to what is being done to remedy the deficiencies. That is, of course, a matter of the deepest interest to everybody in the country. I am sure that there is nobody on this side who does not feel in complete accord with the noble Earl in his eloquent and moving sentiments concerning the terrible suffering that has taken place throughout the past eighteen months in Mesopotamia. Much of that suffering was undoubtedly due to inherent difficulties,
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physical and climatic, but it might have been mitigated had there been greater precaution and greater care exercised. But what is of urgency now is that these deficiencies should be removed at the earliest possible moment, and I hope that what I am now going to state to the House will to a certain extent have the effect of allaying the very natural apprehensions in the minds of noble Lords. Since March there has been sent out to Force D in Mesopotamia a complete General Hospital (No. 33), with 36 officers and 201 of other ranks. In addition there have been sent out 210 medical officers with 625 of other ranks. There have been sent out 609,000 yards of mosquito curtain—
A NOBLE LORD: When was that sent?
LORD ISLINGTON: The whole 609,000 yards have been shipped; some has arrived, and some is on its way. This mosquito curtain was requisitioned. The demand was made on December 4, 1915; the order was given on January 1; and the contract date for delivery was from January to April. I give those details merely to show that the interval between the demand and the order being transacted in the India Office was fairly precise. There have also been sent out 97,500 goggles, 23 sets of electric fans for hospital, 2,244 ceiling fans, and 10 ice machines. Eight hospital ships are under construction and 16 are under order. Then to India, to help the outflow from Mesopotamia and in addition to what I have already enumerated, there is one General Hospital and one Station Hospital, with 78 officers and 314 of other ranksmotor ambulance with four officers, and 180 of other ranks; 129 Royal Army Medical Corps officers and 222 of other ranks, and 198 lady nurses. Those are the figures of staff and of articles that have been sent to Force D since March.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: With regard to the stores, can the noble Lord tell us what proportion have gone up the river. I have heard of immense consignments of supplies which have been sent to Basra, dating back to February, not any of which has yet reached the troops
LORD ISLINGTON: I am not in position to answer the noble Viscount with regard to the distribution from Basra. Of course, the most important difficulty in the whole of this campaign is the

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transport difficulty. But that is not the only one. One of the great difficulties is the necessity of requisitioning for these articles months and months before they are wanted. Further precautions are being taken with a view to removing the difficulties as far as possible of transport.
The transport difficulty has given rise to the most formidable of all the difficulties, and the main reason is that only a certain class of ship is suitable for the work upon the river. It must be a ship of very shallow draught, and indeed the levels of the river alter so with the seasons that the same ship, I understand, cannot be serviceable and navigable all the year round. It has been found necessary to ship the craft in parts for erection on the spot, or else, in cases when they have been sent out under their own steam, to strengthen them specially for the voyage, and even when that course has been taken I am afraid there have been considerable hisses. Great efforts have been made in India and here to meet these demands. I will give particulars of the extent to which these demands have been met since August, 1915. Of paddle steamers 12 have been asked for from England, six at the time of the first demand and six early this year. Of the first six, two have arrived in Mesopotamia, two are now on their way, and two are still under construction and will probably be completed in the next month. The number of paddle steamers arranged for from India is, in all, 32; of these, 16 have reached Mesopotamia. Of stern wheelers, three were asked for from England. August 16 is the date of the original demand. Two of these have arrived in Mesopotamia, and the third will be converted and sent out early next month. Four have been supplied from India, and five more will be provided from there. Then as regards tugs. Of the eight tugs originally ordered from India, all have been sent out. Since then, at different dates in January and February, 37 more have been asked for; 17 of these should be ready next month, and the remainder will be ready in September, October, and November. Five tugs have since been sent from India, and four remain to be sent. Of barges, 38 have been sent out from England and 59 from India. A supply of about 86 will be built by the end of October. As regards launches, 56 of all kinds have been sent out from India and 52 remain to be supplied. Arrangements for the foregoing have been made largely in the Store Department of the India. Office.
LORD BERESFORD: Were not half of the barges lost?
LORD ISLINGTON: I will not say that half of them were.
LORD BERESFORD: I think the number lost was 50 per cent.
LORD ISLINGTON: In addition to the foregoing, the Admiralty have sent six Thames paddlers out, and a considerable number of motor-boats, motor lighters, and barges. Seven paddlers were also sent from Egypt. There have been later demands for tugs, paddle steamers, and launches, and every effort is being made, to meet these demands at the earliest possible date.
The noble Viscount complains that when supplies get to Basra they fail to be distributed to their proper destinations, and that the troops are still suffering in their stations up the river. I may say that the Government have that matter very closely under their attention. They have appointed a supply officer of high rank to go out to India, with, I suppose, a competent staff, and it will be his duty to look after and control matters of supply in that country and Mesopotamia, and I hope that when he gets to work with his staff improvements will be made which will remove any further doubt that our troops are not being properly attended to and properly cared for I am sure it is a matter of the deepest concern to us all that every possible step should be taken at the earliest date to prevent all avoidable suffering to our troops who have fought so brilliantly.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I am sure you will all agree that the noble Lord has spoken in very proper language of the sufferings of the troops and the necessity there is to see that those sufferings are not allowed to recur. I do not rise to make a speech, but merely to put one or two questions. It is a matter of immense astonishment to us all to find how utterly ill-prepared the Government of India have turned out to have been. I quite understand that they were to a large extent drawn upon to provide for the field of operations in Europe, but, even so, the account given by the noble Lord who has just sat down is astonishing. They do not even seem to be able to provide a competent supply officer to see that things are forwarded from Basra to the Front, and we

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have had to send one out with a staff from England. It is astonishing to hear that everything else has had to go from England. Take the case of the mosquito nets. One would think that in the supplies of the Government of India there must have been thousands and thousands of yards of mosquito netting available for an Expedition of this kind; certainly it was not required in Europe, and I do not understand why it was not existing in India. What really interests us and what we want to know is, not what efforts have been made at the eleventh hour to put things right in Mesopotamia, but how far these efforts have been successful. The noble Lord who has just sat down has told us of the satisfactory number of supplies which are now being sent out. What we want to know is how much has arrived. The noble Lord said he did not know. Why does he not know? He has only to telegraph, and he could know in a moment.
LORD ISLINGTON: I think the noble Marquess is asking a very unreasonable question. They have been shipped from this country. As to the precise dales when the ships departed, I could not tell him across the floor of the House. But I can find out.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I did not expect the noble Lord to know that. But what we want to know is the condition of the troops at the Front. We want to know what deficiencies there are now in respect of these necessary supplies and comforts. That the noble Lord can find out. The War Office and the India Office must know. They are in telegraphic communication with the Front now. One would have thought that in anticipation of this debate the Government would have come down to the House fully charged with all the necessary information. One short telegram to ask what deficiencies there were in these essential matters at the Front and what the condition of things there was now, would have been sufficient.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: May I interrupt the noble Marquess to say that I think that course has been taken, and the information supplied. It has been mentioned, if not in this House, at any rate in the other, that a Commission consisting of Sir William Vincent, Colonel Bingley, and Mr. Ridsdale have been for some months in Mesopotamia examining into the position
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of affairs there. Their report is now on its way to England. But before the report was delivered they went to Simla. The very question to which the noble Marquess desires an answer having been put to than, we have heard from Simla that they were satisfied as to the present position in Mesopotamia on the points to which the noble Marquess alludes.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am very glad to hear that the Government of India is satisfied. I do not want to say anything which is in any degree offensive, but still we have lost some confidence in the Government of India. The confidence which your Lordships' House and the country have is not the same with regard to the Government of India as it was a few months ago, because of the experience we have had. The noble Earl tells me that the Commission has stated that they are satisfied. But what we want are the facts. We should have liked to know the facts.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: It was not the Government of India who were satisfied. I was quoting the opinion of the independent Commission of Inquiry.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Am I to take it from the noble Earl that he is satisfied within reasonable limits that the necessary supplies for the troops are now with the troops at the Front? Is he satisfied of that? That is the question I want to put. I am quite sure the noble Earl has told me what is absolutely accurate, and that the Commission have reported that they are quite satisfied—
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I do not want to be misunderstood. This is the exact language that was used. The Viceroy has stated, in a letter recently received, that he inquired of Sir William Vincent and General Bingley whether there was anything in their Report which required prompt action, and he was informed by them that there was not, and that they believed everything possible was now being done.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: That, I candidly admit, is a very comforting assurance, and I am glad that I was the means of getting it from the noble Earl. That is what we want to know—namely whether the troops are thoroughly equipped now, and whether in all respects the great

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deficiencies, which the Under-Secretary has confessed, have been made good. As regards the apportionment of the blame, that must wait, of course, until this Committee or Commission has reported, but I hope that when that time comes the Government will not indulge in the kind of language which was used by the noble Lord just now. He was speaking then, not of the deficiencies in supplies but in respect of the policy of the Expedition to Baghdad which has been the matter of criticism in to-night's debate, and he said that he did not think it would be proper for him to assign any blame. It is the business of the Government to assign blame if their subordinates have erred It may be that the blame is in very high quarters. I do not know how that may be. When we have the Report of the Committee I hope that we shall then know who is to blame, and that there will be no reluctance on the part of His Majesty's Government to see that those who are responsible are visited with the condemnation they deserve.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: My Lords, may I be allowed to raise a point which I forgot to put when I last spoke. It deals with a vital matter. The force in Mesopotamia was not given, and is not being given, adequate rations. I have it on the best authority that a correspondence has been going on for many weeks between the authorities at Simla and Force D in Mesopotamia regarding the rations for British troops. The General Officer Commanding Force D can grant nothing in the way of pay or appointments, nor arrange anything in the way of rations or, clothing, without the consent of the authorities at Simla. The ration for the British soldier in Mesopotamia now costs 4½d. a day. Every authority, including the Financial Member of the Government of India, agrees that it ought to be raised to something near the equivalent of the value of the ration which the soldier receives in France—namely, 10 d. The result of this delay in coming to a decision is not only that the force must be less efficient than it should be, but the Government is open to the charge of inhumanity, and of feeding improperly the soldier when fighting in a desperately bad climate. This is a case which urgently calls for a telegram from the Secretary of State saying "Settle this matter, and forward the information by telegraph to Mesopotamia."
LORD ISLINGTON: I am not in a position to say more on this subject than I said just now. I believe I am right in saying—but I speak with reservation—that the ration in Mesopotamia is the same in quantity as the ration in France. The first demand was, I believe, to have a considerably higher one. But I will make inquiries, and if I find I am incorrect I will communicate with the noble Viscount or inform the House.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: Perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to put a Question down for Tuesday nest, as to what is the result of his investigation?
LORD ISLINGTON: Yes.
LORD BERESFORD: Did I understand my noble friend the Under-Secretary to say that General Townshend never pointed out any objections to the advance to Baghdad? I know he did. He pointed out that strategically, politically, and tactically it was a mistake. It may not have come to the Government here, but I think it only fair to the gallant General that I should inform the House that he did make a statement saving that he thought it would be unwise to go forward with the force he had at that moment, both with regard to men and with regard to supply, transport, and rations.
LORD ISLINGTON: What I said was that neither His Majesty's Government nor the Government of India had any information of a criticism on the part of General Townshend prior to the advance in regard to the inadequacy of his force. The fact was never in the possession of His Majesty's Government or of the Government of India.
LORD BERESFORD: But he might have sent a statement to his General, and the Government did not receive it.
On Question, Resolution agreed to.

THE ORDER OF THE BATH.
LORD LATYMER LORD LATYMER rose to ask His Majesty's Government how alterations in the Statutes of the Order of the Bath are made; whether such alterations are made public, and, if so, in what way.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, it will be within the recollection of many of your

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Lordships that I have on several occasions called attention to the injustice and disabilities from which the Royal Marines have suffered. There are still many things that ought to be readjusted with regard to this fine body of men. At the present time, however, I will refrain from taking up the time of the House on the subject, but some day I hope I shall be able to obtain a Committee of the two Houses to inquire into all their grievances and find out how the case stands.
It had been my intention again to bring up an injustice that had been done to the Royal Marines by the careful omission of their name from the Statutes of the Order of the Bath, thereby preventing any of them ever obtaining the G.C.B., which is open to all other branches of His Majesty's Forces and to civilians. But before doing so I thought I had better make certain of my ground. I accordingly applied for a copy of the Statutes of this Order, but was informed that they were only circulated amongst members of the Order. Therefore I called at the Lord Chamberlain's Office and asked that I might be allowed to look at the Statutes, and permission was kindly granted to me. To my great delight I found that by a Statute recently passed the injustice of which I have complained had been removed, and that the Royal Marines are now able to obtain the G.C.B.
But the putting right of this matter has not been made public in any way. Not only do the general public know nothing about it, but I am positive that it has not come to the knowledge of the Royal Marines. The noble and gallant Admiral, Lord Beresford, who is not now in the House, told me himself that he had not heard of this. I have put my Question on the Paper to-day because I consider it is important that when by a Statute of the Order a really encouraging matter like this has been effected the fact should be made known, so that it may get to the knowledge of the Marines who
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are now fighting our battles. I hope I shall not be told that the Statute appeared in the Gazette, because as a matter of fact very few people read the Gazette, certainly the Marines do not. I must say that it is to me extraordinary that there should be this strange mystery about the Statutes of the Order. I can see no reason for it. It is not as though the Order of the Bath were a kind of secret assembly of people like Freemasons. Every Order of the Bath is given for public reasons, and given publicly. Whatever other people may be entitled to know of the Statutes, I certainly think that members of both Houses of Parliament ought to be acquainted of them.
LORD SANDHURST: My Lords, the reply to the noble Lord's Question is that all changes in the Order are made by Statute at His Majesty's pleasure. As a matter of practice, if any alteration is desired—such as, for instance, occurred recently to provide for the admission of General officers of the Royal Marines into the Military Division of the First Class of the Order, or the constantly recurring question in war time of making provision for additional members—the Secretary of State concerned would advise the King that such a step was desirable, and, if His Majesty by using his own discretion and in accordance with his prerogative consented, the Statute instituting the change would accordingly be drawn up, signed by the Secretary of State, finally receiving the King's Sign Manual. The Statutes of the Order are not made public. Copies, however, are issued to all members on appointment, in accordance with a clause in the Statutes. But the placing on the Paper of this Question by the noble Lord has removed any doubt that there may have been as to the position of officers of the Royal Marines.
House adjourned at twenty-five minutes past Seven o'clock, till to-morrow, half-past ten o'clock.