Sitting of 22 February 1916

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.
Alexandra (Newport and South Wales) Docks and Railway Bill, Beighton and District Gas Bill, Cardiff Railway Bill, City of Dublin Steam Packet Company Bill, Colonial Bank Bill, Folkestone Gas Bill, Metropolitan Electric Tramways Bill, Northwich Urban District Council (Gas) Bill, Plymouth and Stone-house Gas Bill, Saint John's Church (Kingston-upon-Hull) Bill, South Metropolitan Gas Bill, Tynemouth Corporation Bill, Uxbridge Gas Bill, Wakefield Corporation Bill,
To be read a second time upon Thursday.

IRISH UNIVERSITIES ACT, 1908.
Paper [presented 21st February] to be printed. [No. 23.]
NEW WRIT.
For the County of Worcester (Mid or Droitwich Division), in the room of Major the Honourable John Cavendish Lyttelton (Manor of Northstead).—[Mr. Bridgeman.]

VOTE OF CREDIT (APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT, 1914–15).
Copy presented of Appropriation Account of the sums granted by Parliament beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament to pay the expenses on measures taken for the security of the Country; for the conduct of Naval and Military operations; for assisting the Food Supply, and promoting the continuance of trade, industry, business, and communications whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, the financing of the purchase and resale of foodstuffs and materials, or otherwise; for relief of distress; and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war, in the year ended
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31st March, 1915; together with the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General thereon [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 24.]

CIVIL SERVICES AND REVENUE DEPARTMENTS, 1916–17 (VOTE ON ACCOUNT).
Estimate presented showing the several Services for which a Vote on Account is required for the year ending 31st March, 1917 [by Command]; referred to the Committee of Supply, and to be printed. [No. 25.]
CIVIL SERVICES AND REVENUE DEPARTMENTS (ESTIMATES, 1916–17).
Estimate presented for Civil Services and Revenue Departments for the year ending 31st March, 1917, with Memorandum by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury [by Command]; referred to the Committee of Supply, and to be printed. [No. 26.]
INTERMEDIATE EDUCATION (IRELAND).
Copy presented of Amended Rules as to the Constitution and Procedure of the Registration Council made under the Intermediate Education (Ireland) Act, 1914 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
FOREIGN TRADE AND COMMERCE.
Copy ordered "of Accounts relating to the Trade and Commerce of certain Foreign Countries and British Possessions for each month of 1916."—[Mr. Runciman.]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
  WAR.

    PRIZE COURTS.
    Mr. KINGasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make any statement about the position created by the offer of this country to give to the United States representation upon certain Prize Courts of appeal?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir E. Grey): I am not sure to what offer the hon. Member refers, but if his inquiry relates to the point raised in the question asked by the hon. Member for Walsall in this House on 28th October last, I would refer him to the statement made on that occasion.

    PEACE PROPOSALS.
    Mr. KINGasked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether he has information as to the alleged offer of separate peace terms to Belgium; and whether he can give the House any information on the subject?
    Sir E. GREY: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply returned by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to the hon. Member for Coventry on the 17th instant.

    CONTRABAND COMMITTEE.
    Commander BELLAIRSasked what is the composition of the Contraband Committee; and what are its chief duties?
    Sir E. GREY: I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to my statement in the House on 26th January last (see OFFICIAL REPORT, cols. 3128–3129).
    The description of the composition of the Contraband Committee and of its working occupies more than a column of the OFFICIAL REPORT, and can hardly be repeated in answer to a question.
    Commander BELLAIRS: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware he then stated that there are two naval members of the Committee and that there has been a different statement made by the chairman of the Contraband Committee, to the effect that there is only one such member? There is a good deal of difference between one and two.
    Sir E. GREY: Certainly, there is a difference. If the hon. and gallant Member had put down in his question that that was the point he had in mind, I would have inquired into it. I believe the statement I made is correct, but, as the point was not raised in the hon. Member's question, I have not looked into it.
    Colonel YATE: Does a naval member of the Committee mean an officer of the Royal Navy, or does it mean an official of the Admiralty?
    Sir E. GREY: When I made the statement undoubtedly I was dealing with the representation of Departments. I understood there were two members representing the Admiralty, or nominated in some way by the Admiralty, on the Committee.
    Colonel YATE: There is no officer of the Royal Navy on that Committee?
    Sir E. GREY: I understood there was at least one officer of the Royal Navy. I thought the two representatives of the Admiralty included one naval officer. However, I cannot be sure about it, and, as doubt has been thrown on my statement, I should like to inquire into it. If a question is put down I will answer it.
    Mr. MACMASTER: Who are the members of the Contraband Committee?
    Sir E. GREY: If the hon. Gentleman will refer to my statement on the 26th January he will see I stated who was chairman of the Contraband Committee—an hon. Member of this House. I cannot give all the names offhand, but if a question is put down as to the actual names I will give an answer.

    DANISH PORTS (EXAMINATION OF CARGOES).
    Commander BELLAIRSasked whether our Consular officials in Denmark are encouraged to visit the ports and shipping to ascertain what is done with cargoes?
    Sir E. GREY: Yes, Sir; so far as local conditions permit.
    Commander BELLAIRS: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware my information is that the Consular officials are prevented by the Legation from visiting the ports? Will he inquire as to that?
    Sir E. GREY: Yes, I will inquire. It is a statement about which I have no information before me.

    STRAITS SETTLEMENTS (ORE EXPORTS).
    Mr. MURRAY MACDONALDasked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether

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    duties are imposed on exports of some classes of ore from the Straits Settlements; and, if so, whether he will give a schedule of the duties?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for the COLONIES (Mr. Steel-Maitland): No Export Duties on the exportation of ore from the Straits Settlements are imposed. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman has in mind the royalties on tin and tin ore and other ores imposed in the Federated Malay States. These royalties are at differing rates and cannot be summarised briefly, but the rates will be found in the Manual of Statistics relating to the Federated Malay States, a copy of which I will place in the Library of the House.

    RUSSIA AND CONSTANTINOPLE.
    Mr. OUTHWAITEasked whether the British Government has entered into a commitment to support Russia's claim to Constantinople; and, if so, whether it had any bearing on the Dardanelles Expedition and on the present operations in the Near East?
    Sir E. GREY: I must refer the hon. Member to the reply returned by me on 13th May last.

    ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS.
    Mr. ELLIS DAVIESasked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether it is the intention of the War Office that medical men now holding commissions in the Royal Army Medical Corps, being under forty-five years of age and unfit for foreign service, shall resign the same on the expiration of their present agreement of service?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Mr. Tennant): Temporarily commissioned officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps under forty-five years of age and unfit for foreign service are not permitted to retain their commissions after the period of service for which they engaged has expired. No further commissions are being given to men under forty-five years of age unless they are physically fit for active service. It is hoped by these methods to set free men who are physically capable of undertaking general military duties and who have hitherto been employed in war hospitals in this country or have been engaged in private practice.

    DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT.

      CASES IN IRELAND.
      Mr. GINNELLasked the Under- Secretary for War when the competent military authority in Ireland decided to treat the use of the Irish language as an offence under the Defence of the Realm Act; why the decision is carried out in detail instead of by public proclamation; and whether he can arrange to have it announced in the speeches of recruiting officers and in posters on their vans and motor cars?
      Mr. TENNANT: No such decision as is alleged in the first part of the hon. Member's question has been given, and accordingly the other parts of the question do not arise.
      Mr. GINNELL: Will the right hon. Gentleman explain how he reconciles that answer with the fact that the police in the county of Cork arrested Mr. Chavasse, an Englishman, subjected him to indignity, stripped him of his clothes, insulted him, called him a blackguard, a Sin Feiner, and a German spy, and told him that an Englishman had no right to speak the Irish language in Ireland?
      Mr. TENNANT: Anyone has a right to speak any language he chooses—even to speak the German language is not an offence against the law of the realm. But if the hon. Member will give me particulars of the case, I will certainly have it inquired into.
      Mr. GINNELL:I have given them. Will the right hon. Gentleman inquire?
      Mr. TENNANT: Yes.
      Mr. GINNELLasked the Under-Secretary of State for War the dates, respectively, of the arrest and imprisonment of Mr. Terence MaeSwiney, of his being served with the text of the charge against him, and of the trial; what the charge was; how long he was imprisoned before trial; and the result of the trial?
      Mr. TENNANT: Terence MaeSwiney was by order of the competent military authority arrested and lodged in prison on the 13th January last. On the 15th February he was served with summonses charging him with making a seditious speech and having in his possession a cipher code. He was on the same day brought up at Cork Police Court and allowed out on bail to appear on the 21st February. He was in prison from the 13th January to the 15th February.
      Mr. GINNELL: Can the right hon. Gentleman explain how it is that Mr. MacSwiney has never been served with any charge whatever?
      Mr. TENNANT: There is no requirement to serve a charge on a person arrested under the Defence of the Realm Act.
      Mr. GINNELL: Can a man in Ireland be imprisoned without any charge?
      Mr. TENNANT: A man can in this country and in any part of the United Kingdom.
      Mr. GINNELL: It is very wrong!
      Mr. GINNELLasked, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty whether it is with the knowledge and approval of the Admiralty that the Englishman acting as coastguard on Lettermullen Island, in the midst of Irish speakers, though twenty years there, cannot speak Irish, and now threatens people with the Defence of the Realm Act unless they speak English, which many of them do not know; and whether, to avoid conflict with the people, this interference with their language will be stopped?
      The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Dr. Macnamara): This matter has been inquired into and there would appear to be no foundation whatever for the allegations contained in the question.
      Mr. GINNELL: To whom was the inquiry addressed; was it to the man accused?
      Dr. MACNAMARA: I cannot say offhand. I have read a long Report, and can say that the suggestion the question contains that this man could only speak English and insisted upon everybody else speaking English is, according to my information, quite without foundation.
      Mr. GINNELLasked if he will state how long Mr. MacCabe, of county Sligo, has been in prison on a charge of which he has been acquitted by a Dublin jury; whether he is still in prison; awaiting trial by what Court; and on what charge?
      The CHIEF SECRETARY for IRELAND (Mr. Birrell): MacCabe was arrested on the 6th November last under the Defence of the Realm Regulation and detained in custody. On the 4th February
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      he was acquitted on one of the charges brought against him, and on the 18th February was discharged, the Crown having decided not to proceed with the remaining charges.
      Mr. GINNELL: Was not that decision due to the fact that they had no evidence against him?
      Mr. BIRRELL: No, Sir.
      Mr. GINNELL: If they had, why did not they go on?
      Mr. BIRRELL: There was some reason for dissatisfaction in the former, case.
      Mr. GINNELLasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland for what purpose members of the Crimes Special Branch of the Irish police are now in plain clothes in Sligo, Mayo, and Galway, having regard to the freedom of those counties from crime, as shown by the Assizes; will he inform the House by whom, known to the police, explosives have been placed on two recent occasions on the property of the Marquess of Sligo; why the order not to prosecute was issued from Dublin Castle; and whether it is by his direction men watching suspicious movements of the police are now being threatened with the Defence of the Realm Act?
      Mr. BIRRELL: There are no members of the Crimes Special Branch of the Royal Irish Constabulary in the counties named in the hon. Member's question. No evidence has so far been obtained by the police in the matter referred to in the second part, and there is no foundation for the allegations in the third and fourth parts.
      Mr. GINNELLasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether it is with his approval and under what law Claude Uasal Chavasse, B.A., of Christchurch, Oxford, has been arrested, imprisoned, and fined in Ireland for answering a policeman in the Irish language in the neighbourhood of an Irish college where Irish is generally used by all except the police; if this was the blunder of subordinates, whether he will prevent its recurrence; and, if any police are deemed necessary in such places, whether he will see that the men sent there understand Irish?
      Mr. BIRRELL: The person referred to, who is an Englishman, having failed to answer to the best of his ability questions

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      reasonably addressed to him under No. 53 of the Defence of the Realm Regulations, was arrested by the police but not imprisoned. By direction of the competent military authority he was prosecuted at Macroom Petty Sessions on the 9th instant when he was fined £4 and £l costs. It is understood that he has appealed. It is not considered that the incident requires any change in the present police arrangements of the locality.
      Mr. GINNELL: Will the right hon. Gentleman explain the conduct of the police towards this English gentleman in stripping him, abusing him and imprisoning him for a whole night in the black hole?
      Mr. BIRRELL: I do not think that that account of this Englishman's treatment is justified by the facts.
      Major NEWMAN: May I ask the name of the Irish college where Irish is always spoken?
      An HON. MEMBER: Ballinageary.
      Mr. GINNELL: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that the general use of Irish in the neighbourhood of an Irish college is an asset to the district and to the college? [Laughter.] This is no laughing matter. It must be perfectly obvious, must it not, that the speaking of the Irish language in the neighbourhood of an Irish college is an asset to the district and the college, and a legitimate asset? That being so—
      Mr. SPEAKER: That is a matter of argument.

      BRITISH SUBJECTS.
      Mr. E. DAVIESasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many natural-born British subjects, if any, have been interned without trial under the Regulations made under the Defence of the Realm Act?
      Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALDasked the number of British subjects arrested and imprisoned without trial under the Defence of the Realm Act?
      The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. Herbert Samuel): In reply to these questions I would refer my hon. Friends to the answer which I gave yesterday to the hon. Member for North Salford.

    MILITARY SERVICE.

      EXAMINATION OF RECRUITS (MEDICAL FEES).
      Mr. RENDALLasked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether the scales for payment to medical men for examining recruits (Southern Command Order 507, dated 13th March, 1915), set forth that for a whole day, defined as six working hours, and the examination of from thirty to forty recruits the payment of £2 is ordered to be made; that in certain towns the doctors declined to examine more than thirty-one recruits per day, and for this work have been paid the full fee of £2; that in other places doctors worked from nine to twelve hours, and in one case (Dr. Weaver, of Yeovil) 226 recruits were examined in fifteen consecutive hours, yet for these long hours and far greater number of examinations only the same fee of £2 is being paid as for the examination of thirty-one patients; whether there is dissatisfaction; and will he order the payment of £2 for each six hours' work and get his medical advisers to put these matters on a businesslike footing?
      The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the WAR OFFICE (Mr. Forster): If a few recruits are examined in a day, the fee is 2s. 6d. a recruit. £2 is the payment for a full day's work. In view of the evil results of hurried examination it is not considered desirable to hold out to doctors pecuniary inducements to examine more than thirty to forty recruits in one day. I am not aware that the profession is dissatisfied with these arrangements.

      HOME DEFENCE.
      Mr. KINGasked the Prime Minister whether it is intended to reintroduce the Military Service Bill which was left un-passed at the end of last Session?
      The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith): No, Sir, there is no present intention of reintroducing this Bill.
      Mr. PRINGLE: Is it necessary? Will these men not come under the existing Military Service Act?
      The PRIME MINISTER: I cannot add anything to the answer I have given.
      Mr. AINSWORTH: Is the Government aware that hundreds of thousands of men who have given their services and are prepared to give their services to the country

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      for Home defence are seriously affected by any delay on the part of the Government to deal with the question and give them a military status under the War Office?
      The PRIME MINISTER: No, Sir.

    OPERATIONS IN EGYPT (DISPATCHES).
    Colonel YATEasked the Under-Secretary of State for War when the dispatches relating to the operations in Egypt during the past year will be published?
    Mr. TENNANT: The hon. and gallant Member is presumably referring to the operations which took place in the neighbourhood of the Suez Canal in the early part of last year. These operations were fully described in six long official communiqués issued in February and March, and there is no additional information to be published.
    Colonel YATE: Was that information published in the "London Gazette"?
    Mr. TENNANT: I think so, but I cannot be certain at this distance of time. It was certainly published in the Press.
    Colonel YATE: Will the right hon. Gentleman see that the dispatches are published in the "London Gazette"?
    Mr. TENNANT: I will endeavour to do so, but I cannot give a promise.

    THIRD WESTERN GENERAL HOSPITAL.
    Mr. HAYDN JONESasked the Under-Secretary of State for War what was the cost per patient bed per week of the Third Western General Hospital for 1915, what the medical staff consisted of, the amount paid as remuneration, and how many members of such staff carried on private practice?
    Mr. FORSTER: I regret that the Army accounts are not kept in such a form as to admit of arriving at the weekly cost of a hospital per bed. This hospital, which is an administrative unit composed of many different buildings, contains 2,000 beds. It has a staff of some thirty-two medical officers, who draw the Army pay of their ranks; and of these nineteen are local members of the profession, to whom it is open to pursue private practice.

    NATIONAL RESERVE (BOUNTY FOR RE-ENLISTMENT).
    Mr. STEPHEN WALSHasked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether, in response to an appeal from the officer commanding, many members of the 1st class National Reserve, 5th Manchester Regiment, enrolled themselves on the 3rd September, 1914, in the Territorial battalion for immediate active service, that they left England six days later for Egypt, and have since been through the campaign in Gallipoli; and whether, under such circumstances, the Department will favourably consider the claim of such members for a similar bounty as has been paid under paragraph 2, Army Order 28, dated 19th September, 1914?
    Mr. FORSTER: The whole subject of these gratuities has been very carefully, considered on many occasions, and I am afraid I cannot agree to any reopening of the question.

    ARMY PAY CORPS, WOOLWICH.
    Mr. CROOKSasked the Financial Secretary to the War Office whether his attention has been drawn to the case of the male civilian clerks in the Army Pay Corps, Woolwich, whose wages are 35s. per week; whether these men petitioned for a war bonus of 4s. a week, which was not granted; whether he is aware that since then four or five new paymasters have been appointed at £5 5s. per week and several female superintendents at £3 3s. a week, and have had to be taught their work; that while the male civilian clerks get no pay for overtime lady clerks and supervisors are paid; and whether he will reconsider the claims of these men for some concession?
    Mr. FORSTER: The facts are as stated, but it should be added that the ladies and gentlemen appointed to higher positions had superior qualifications for higher duties. The rate paid to male civilian clerks for routine clerical work is considered sufficient.

    EMPLOYMENT OF WOUNDED AND INVALIDED SOLDIERS.
    Mr. CHARLES DUNCANasked the Postmaster-General whether, at the Northern Division Post Office, London,

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    there are about sixty wounded and invalided soldiers employed examining parcels going to Germany for British prisoners there, and that they are only paid 1s. a day, with 1s. 9d. a day subsistence money; and whether he will take steps to give these men more adequate remuneration, in view of the fact that they are allowed nothing for lodging expenses?
    Mr. FORSTER: I find, on inquiry, that these men are either provided with billets paid for by the public in the ordinary way, or are living at their own homes and are in receipt of consolidated allowances intended to cover lodging. It appears, however, that in some cases these allowances have been issued at incorrect rates, and this is now being adjusted.

    ROYAL MARINE ARTILLERY HOWITZER BRIGADE (PROMOTION).
    Mr. HOGGEasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he will undertake that no artificial barrier will be placed in the way of the promotion of any officer in the Royal Marine Artillery Howitzer Brigade simply because he has joined for the period of the War?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: I am afraid my hon. Friend is under a misapprehension. No barrier is placed in the way of officers as regards promotion Officers are promoted according to their merits and the requirements of the Service.
    Mr. HOGGE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in this particular brigade mentioned in my question no officer who has joined temporarily for the period of the War is entitled, by order, to rise above a certain rank?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: That is by order?
    Mr. HOGGE: Yes.
    Dr. MACNAMARA: The question of promotion in the Royal Navy and Marines is naturally one for the Naval and Marine authorities. I will, however, look into the point. I am quite certain there is no barrier, and that officers are promoted according to their merit and the requirements of the Service.
    Mr. PRINGLE: Will the right hon. Gentleman inquire into the special circumstances of the case? Undoubtedly the information is given that promotion is withheld.
    Dr. MACNAMARA: I will certainly do that.
    Colonel YATE: Are temporary lieutenants holding appointments as adjutants in the Royal Marine Artillery eligible for promotion as captains?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: I should like to have notice of that question.
    Mr. PRINGLE: No, they are not.

    NAVAL AND MILITARY SERVICES (PENSIONS AND ALLOWANCES).
    Mr. ANDERSONasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty whether his attention has been drawn to the case of the late Harry Hull, of Gillingham, Kent, who served in the Navy for nearly nineteen years, was a petty officer, secured the Good Service Medal, and was officially recognised as of superior ability and very good character; whether the sailor, after being knocked overboard from His Majesty's Ship "Duncan" and undergoing treatment in the Royal Naval Hospital, Chatham, was invalided, owing to a form of paralysis, out of the Service on a pension of 8s. 3d. a week; that in order to keep his wife and child he tried to work in Chatham Dockyard, but after ten days was found insensible in a boiler which he was cleaning out; that he was sent without the knowledge of his wife to Medway Infirmary under a wrong assumption that he was insane; that he was taken home by his wife and died on 6th February as the result of falling downstairs; that the widow has since been informed by the lady visitor from the Patriotic Fund that nothing can be done for her; and whether the Admiralty will have the facts investigated with a view to something being done for the widow and child?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: The late Harry Hall was invalided from the Navy with a life pension of 8s. 3d. a week. In accordance with our practice, so far as opportunity offers in the cases of men discharged on small pension, light work was found for Hall in Chatham Dockyard. He collapsed while at work in the machine-shop. (He had not at any time been employed inside a boiler.) No trace of any injury could be found. He was incoherent and rambling, and could give no account of himself. He was taken to the Medway Union Infirmary. Directly intimation of his death reached us the matter was taken in hand. The necessary forms of inquiry

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    have been sent to the widow with a view to the assessment of pension to herself and child. Such pension will, of course, be payable as from the date of death. On inquiry I find that the Patriotic Fund cannot trace any record of the case having been brought to their notice at all.

    IRISH POST OFFICE (USE OF IRISH LANGUAGE).
    Mr. GINNELLasked the Postmaster-General if he has ascertained whether the recruiting, taxing and other Departments of Government in Ireland concur in the use that is being made of the Post Office in the West of Ireland against the Irish language, imperatively ordering Irish speakers to speak English and, if unable, refusing to attend to them unless they find an interpreter; will he say under what law peaceable Irish taxpayers are denied the common right of the postal service; and, if he disapproves of this conduct of those public servants, what remedy he proposes to introduce at all such places in the western counties as Maam Cross?
    The POSTMASTER-GENERAL (Mr. J. A. Pease): If the hon. Member will furnish me with particulars of any case in which an Irish person unable to speak the English language has been unable to gain attention at an Irish Post Office, I shall be pleased to inquire into the matter.
    Mr. GINNELL: I will do so.

    MUNITIONS.

      CENTRAL CONTROL BOARD (LIQUOR TRAFFIC).
      Mr. AGG-GARDNERasked the Minister of Munitions if, in view of the fact that in only three districts out of sixty in the counties of Berks, Wilts, Somerset, and Gloucester an increase of drunkenness was reported at the last brewster sessions held in these counties, and that the three districts referred to were under the control of the Central Control Board, he will use his influence in the interests of temperance to persuade the Central Control Board to suspend the Order recently announced for placing further portions of these counties under its control?
      The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY of MUNITIONS (Dr. Addison): I see no reason for taking the
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      step suggested in the question. The Orders referred to are based on requests of the military authorities.

      SHRAPNEL SHELLS (COST OF. PRODUCTION).
      Mr. MACMASTERasked the Minister of Munitions what was the cost of the production of the ordinary Artillery shrapnel shell just before the War; what is the cost now; and what is the cost of production in France of the corresponding shrapnel shells used by the French Army in the .75 gun?
      Dr. ADDISON: In regard to this question, I am glad to be able to inform my hon. Friend that great reductions in the prices of most natures of shell have been obtained. In regard to ordinary shrapnel, owing to its special nature the prices have remained practically stationary, notwithstanding the increased cost of labour and material. After prolonged negotiations on the basis of actual and precise estimates of cost as ascertained by the Cost Accounting Department in national and other factories and with the assistance of local committees, an agreement has been arrived at whereby a reduction in prices in many natures of shell of from 25 per cent. to 30 per cent. has been obtained. This arrangement will secure a saving, as compared with former prices, on the June shell supplies of about £400,000 per week. I should like to take this opportunity of acknowledging our indebtedness to the officers of the Finance and Contracts Departments, and those concerned with the local organisation, for the services they have rendered to the State in this matter. I have no information with regard to the last part of the question.
      Mr. MACMASTER: What was the price of production of individual shells before the War and at what time did this reduction take place?
      Dr. ADDISON: I think it is undesirable to state that.
      Sir R. COOPER: Is the House to understand from the hon. Gentleman's answer that there is a reduction of pre-war prices of shells?
      Dr. ADDISON: There is a reduction on the price previously paid during the course of the War to the extent mentioned in the reply. As a matter of fact, there is also a reduction on pre-war prices as well.
      Mr. MACMASTER: Is it not a fact that the price of production of the corresponding French shell used for the .75 gun is about one-third the cost of production in this country?
      Dr. ADDISON: That is not quite correct, and, besides, the hon. Member must remember that the French shell is quite different in many respects from ours. All these things must be taken into account when you are comparing one with another. As a matter of fact, you are comparing different things, and the comparison is unfair.
      Mr. PRINGLE: Is there not a difference between the cost of labour here and in France?
      Dr. ADDISON: Very great.

      LEAVING CERTIFICATES (UNDERPAYMENT).
      Mr. ANDERSONasked the Minister of Munitions whether his attention has been drawn to the case brought before the Manchester Munitions Tribunal on 3rd February in which a woman, employed as a driller by a firm of electrical engineers, applied for a certificate enabling her to leave her employment on the ground that she was not being paid a reasonable wage; whether he is aware that the woman affirmed that her wage never exceeded 12s. 4d. a week, though she worked a normal week of 50½ hours with 8¾ hours overtime in addition; whether he is aware that the leaving certificate was refused; and whether he will issue instructions making it easy for workers to obtain leaving certificates in all cases where there is gross underpayment, or enforcing a general minimum wage for all women munition workers?
      Dr. ADDISON: My right hon. Friend agrees that the wages paid in this case are inadequate and he proposes as soon as possible after advice from the tribunal to be set up under the Munitions of War Amendment Act, to issue directions to deal with such cases. With regard to the particular facts to which my hon. Friend draws attention, I am informed that the woman's original application to the firm for a certificate was made, not on the ground of wages, but on her being required for work at home; and that the munitions tribunal refused a certificate on the firm offering to consider the question of increase of wages after one week if she returned to her work and showed proficiency. As regards the last part of
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      the question, I would refer to Section 5 (5) of the Munitions of War Amendment Act, which will come into force on Monday next, and under which munitions tribunals in dealing with certificates will be required to consider whether the conditions of the Fair-Wages Clause have been observed.

    LABOUR EXCHANGE STAFFS (WAR BONUS).
    Mr. GEORGE GREENWOODasked the President of the Board of Trade whether, having regard to the fact that the employés of the Post Office received a war bonus some months ago, he can see his way to grant a similar bonus to the staff of the Labour Exchanges, seeing that the work, which is of national importance, has considerably increased and the purchasing power of the wages depreciated?
    Mr. GEORGE THORNEput a similar question.
    The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of TRADE (Mr. Runciman): The Board of Trade have submitted the question of the grant of a war bonus to the clerical staff of their Labour Exchanges and Unemployment Insurance Department for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, and have received a reply intimating that their lordships cannot regard the conditions of appointment or service in the Department as justifying any departure from the general decision of His Majesty's Government; that a case has not been made out for throwing upon the taxpayer at the present time the heavy additional burden which would be involved by the grant of a war bonus to the subordinate staff in the civil establishments. This reply has been communicated to the officers concerned. A further memorial on the subject has been received from the Federation of Labour Exchanges and Unemployment Insurance Clerks' Associations, and this is under consideration.

    PAPER IMPORTS.
    Major NEWMANasked the President of the Board of Trade whether in arranging for the distribution of the imports of paper among paper users the Licensing Commission will ascertain any stocks of paper now held by newspaper firms and others, and regulate the distribution of such imports of paper as may be allowed accordingly?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: An inquiry into the stocks of paper at present held in the United Kingdom is at present in progress; but the precise use to be made of the information so obtained will be determined when this is completed.
    Major NEWMANasked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in prohibiting, except under licence, the importation of paper-making materials, the Government have considered the damage and ruin that may be caused to the many thousand journeymen printers in the United Kingdom; whether he is aware that these firms, by reason of the nature of their trade, are unable to keep in stock any large quantity of paper, and will consequently, unless they know whether the Committee will allow them to obtain the paper, be totally unable to undertake or tender for printing work; and whether, seeing that the effect of this restriction will divert to foreign countries work now done in this country, he will say what action he proposes to take?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: I greatly regret the dislocation to trade which must inevitably result from even a partial prohibition of any class of imported goods, and the hon. Gentleman will realise that the decision to prohibit the import of one-third of the paper-making materials hitherto imported was only arrived at by the Government under stress of urgent need of the nation for tonnage and after careful consideration of all the circumstances. I have no doubt that the Royal Commission which has been recently appointed will do all in their power to lessen the inconvenience and hardship which must in some cases result from the prohibition.
    Major NEWMANasked the President of the Board of Trade whether, having regard to the advance in the price of paper for printing by nearly 50 per cent., to the fresh restriction now placed on the importation of paper, and to the fact that business will in the future, in the purchase of paper, be on a cash and not a credit basis, the Government intend to extend to journeymen printers a moratorium in respect of rent, rates, and taxes?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: No, Sir.
    Major NEWMANasked the President of the Board of Trade whether the proprietors or directors of any leading newspapers, with the exception of the
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    "Daily News," were invited to take a seat on the Commission to licence the import and distribution of paper?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: Mr. Parke, who is the gentleman referred to in the hon. Member's question, was nominated by the Newspaper Proprietors' Association, and this nomination was conveyed to me by Lord Burnham, who informed me that Mr. Parke's name had been unanimously agreed upon as an expert representative of the newspaper branch of the paper trade. The Commission is formed on an expert and not on a representative basis, but in order to secure experts who have the full confidence of the others in their respective branches of the paper trade I consulted the various trade associations. With the exception of Sir Thomas Whittaker and Sir Rowland Bailey, practically every member of the Commission is the nominee of a trade association.

    ZEPPELIN RAIDS (COMPENSATION).
    Mr. NEWDEGATEasked the Prime Minister whether he can make arrangements that compensation shall be given to persons suffering loss by Zeppelin raids out of German investments in this country?
    The PRIME MINISTER: Arrangements have been made for State insurance against air raids, and I do not think that the question calls for further consideration at present.
    Sir R. COOPER: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider whether the Government might not properly do something to relieve cases of hardship arising from the recent raid in the Midlands, where it was less contemplated that the necessity for using the State insurance would ever be required?
    The PRIME MINISTER: That question was answered yesterday.

    EXTRA FORCES OF POLICE (IRELAND).
    Mr. GINNELLasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether there are extra police stationed in any county in Ireland now, imposing a burden on the rates; if

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    so, in what counties, how many in each, at what cost, and on account of the prevalence of what crimes as shown by the Assizes of 1915?
    Mr. BIRRELL: There are extra forces of police in the counties of Clare and Galway, nineteen men in the former and two head constables and sixty-four men in the latter. The present rate of cost to the ratepayers of these counties is £836 and £4,000 a year respectively, but is diminishing. The extra forces are stationed in these counties under the authority of a Proclamation of the Lord Lieutenant declaring the counties to be in a state of disturbance and to require an additional force of police. At the Assizes in 1915, 104 serious crimes committed in Clare and 210 in Galway were reported to the judges. The extra forces are required for the protection of the persons and property of obnoxious persons as well as for the prevention of crime.

    EXTRA FORCES OF POLICE (IRELAND).

      Bacterised Peat.
      Mr. KINGasked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Agriculture whether a scheme to adopt on a large scale the results of Professor Bottomley's investigations into bacterised peat has been adopted by the city of Manchester; whether this scheme has the approval of the Board of Agriculture; and whether the products will be available for agriculture generally or are only for local purposes?
      The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the BOARD Of AGRICULTURE (Mr. Acland): The Board are informed that the Corporation of Manchester intend to experiment in the manufacture of bacterised peat. They are satisfied that the experiments proposed are desirable. It is understood that in the first instance the material will be tested locally, and if the tests prove satisfactory arrangements will doubtless be made for placing the product on the market.
      Mr. KING: I suppose that it will be open to other municipalities or private persons to take up the same system, and that there is no exclusive right given to Manchester?
      Mr. ACLAND: It is entirely a matter between them and Professor Bottomley.

      Post Office (Theft by Assistant Sorting Clerk).
      Mr. O'GRADYasked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been drawn to the case of a man named Cooper, now serving a term of imprisonment in Armley Gaol, Leeds, for committing a theft while assistant sorting clerk in the Post Office; whether at the time the theft was committed, Cooper had to maintain a wife and five children on 24s. a week, and that he had previously borne a good character; and whether, in view of the fact that Cooper has developed serious heart trouble since being sentenced, and laid fourteen weeks in gaol awaiting trial, he will consider the possibility of counting this period in the sentence of six months' imprisonment?
      Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: I have carefully considered this case and regret that I do not find any sufficient grounds for recommending a reduction of the sentence.

      Breach, of Factory Act, Leeds.
      Mr. ANDERSONasked the Home Secretary whether he proposes taking any further action in respect of the case brought before the stipendiary magistrate at the Leeds Police Court against the Kirkby Bank Screw Company, Limited, for five admitted breaches of the Factory Act; whether it was admitted that girls of thirteen were being worked overtime without the firm having been granted an emergency order, and that an official of the War Office interfered and sent a letter to the firm with the object of preventing a successful prosecution by the lady factory inspector, and that on the strength of this letter the stipendiary magistrate reproved the lady factory inspector for having brought such proceedings and dismissed the case; whether the name of this official of the War Office will be published; and whether the Home Office will take steps to inform this official that it is no part of his duties to interfere with laws for the protection of the health and efficiency of young girls?
      Mr. SAMUEL: The firm pleaded guilty, but the magistrate dismissed the charges under the Probation of Offenders Act, and there is no further action which can be taken in regard to the case. The facts of the case are as stated in the question. As regards the letter ascribed to an officer of the War Office, which is said to have influenced

      577
      the magistrate in his decision, I have communicated with the War Office, and I am informed that they are making inquiries. I may mention that before the proceedings in this case were instituted the War Office and the Ministry of Munitions were consulted, and both Departments agreed that the overtime employment of such young girls was not necessary, and would not in any circumstances have been countenanced by them; and these views were brought by the inspector to the magistrate's notice. I do not know the magistrate's reasons for taking the course he did, but it is plain that if such excessive hours as were worked in this case by young girls of thirteen are tolerated the health of munition workers must be impaired, and the output of munitions impeded.

    NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT.

      DISTRICT INSURANCE COMMITTEES.
      Mr. TYSON WILSONasked the Comptroller of the Household, as representing the National Health Insurance Commissioners, if he is aware that it has been decided that the continuance of district insurance committees in the county of Lancashire is undesirable; and if he will state whether this decision applies to all district insurance committees in Great Britain and Ireland?
      The COMPTROLLER of the HOUSEHOLD (Mr. Roberts): The activities of district insurance committees have in many areas been suspended in the interests of economy. The action taken, which is without prejudice to the future, has the strong support of the insurance committee for the county referred to in the question.
      Mr. WILSON: Is the intention to suspend the whole insurance itself, or, if not, why is there differentiation between county and county?
      Mr. ROBERTS: Some regard must be had to the circumstances of each area.

      COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION.
      Mr. BOOTHasked the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster if he is aware that the appointment of a Treasury Committee to examine the finance of the health insurance scheme has been received with approval by the workers generally; whether any meetings have been held; whether the matter is considered urgent; and whether the meetings will be open to the public?
      The CHANCELLOR of the DUCHY (Mr. Montagu): The Committee was appointed in response to representations made by a comprehensive and influential deputation of approved societies of various types, and I have reason to believe that its appointment has been generally approved. The Committee has, I am informed, already held three meetings and is proceeding with its labours as expeditiously as possible. The question of opening its meetings to the public is one for determination by the Committee itself, but I understand that, following the usual practice, it is deliberating in private.
      Mr. BOOTH: Will the public be admitted only when evidence, is taken and not during the discussion, or will the evidence be printed and available for Members of the House before legislation is proposed?
      Mr. MONTAGU: A question of that kind ought to be determined by the Committee itself.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
  Ordered, "That the Proceedings on Government Business be not interrupted this night under the Standing Order (Sittings of the House), and may be entered upon at any hour though opposed."—[The Prime Minister.]
  The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith): I beg to move,
  "That, until the House otherwise determines, and so far as the House does not otherwise determine, on every day on which the House sits

  (1) Government Business do have precedence;

  (2) At the conclusion of Government Business Mr. Speaker shall propose the Question, That this House do now adjourn, and, if that Question shall not have been agreed to, Mr. Speaker shall adjourn the House without Question put not later than one hour after the conclusion of Government Business if that Business has been concluded before 10.30 p.m., but if that Business has not been concluded, not later than 11.30 p.m.;

  (3) If the day be a Thursday the House shall at its rising stand adjourned until the following Monday;

  (4) Any Private Business set down for consideration at a quarter-past Eight o'clock on any day shall, if Government Business is concluded before that time, be taken at the conclusion of Government Business, and, for the purposes of the preceding provisions of this Order, shall be deemed to be Government Business;

  (5) All Select Committees, including Committees on Private Bills, shall have power to sit on Friday, and, if the House adjourns from Thursday or Friday till the following Tuesday, on Monday, notwithstanding the adjournment of the House;

  (6) Whenever the House adjourns from Thursday to the following Tuesday Members desiring to give Notice of Questions for Oral Answer on a Tuesday or Wednesday may send Notices of such Questions to the Clerks at the Table, and any Notices of Questions so received by them before Five of the
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  clock on a Friday or Monday shall be accepted as Notices of Questions for Oral Answer on the following Tuesday or Wednesday, respectively, and be printed and circulated with the Votes;

  (7) Whenever the House adjourns from Thursday to the following Tuesday, Members desiring to give Notice of new Clauses and Amendments to Bills may send such Notices to the Clerks at the Table, and any such Notices received by them before Five of the clock on a Friday or Monday shall be printed and circulated with the Votes."

  The Motion standing in my name embodies the Resolutions under which the House did its work during the last Session. I think they were found to work smoothly. As hon. Members will remember, various alterations were made in the course of the Session at the request of private Members. In regard to the time at the disposal of private Members, the Government gave last Session seven full days for discussion of Motions. There were six Adjournment Motions before various Recesses. During the Session the House sat 154 days, and on forty-seven of these days private Members took the opportunity of raising topics on the Adjournment Motion at the end of business. So that in practice I think the working of the Resolution was found not to be inconsistent or incompatible with considerable liberty of discussion on the part of private Members. I gather from the Order Paper that there are very few suggested Amendments of the Resolution, no doubt in consequence of the experience to which I have referred. I will, by anticipation, say in regard to the first Amendment which stands in the name of the hon. Member for North Somerset (Mr. King)—to leave out the words "The House otherwise determines and," and insert the words "the thirty-first day of March"—that I do not propose to assent to that Amendment, because the House will remember that I acceded to an appeal which was made by hon. Members, and the House has already resolved that the Motion which suspends the activity and the liberty of private Members shall not be continued, without the assent of the House, after the 31st March. Two of my hon. Friends suggest that at whatever time Government business comes to an end, the Speaker shall not put the Motion for the Adjournment until 11.30 p.m.
  Mr. PRINGLE: No, no!
  The PRIME MINISTER: That is the effect.
  Mr. HOGGE: Not later than 11.30 p.m.
  The PRIME MINISTER: In other words, suppose Government business was over at six p.m., there would be five and a-half hours before the Speaker need put the Adjournment Motion.
  Mr. HOGGE: If the House so desires.
  The PRIME MINISTER: I will not say if the House so desires, but if hon. Members so desire. I do not think that is a proposal which the House would be disposed to approve. In regard to the Amendment in the name of the hon. Member for North-West Durham (Mr. Aneurin Williams), I will agree to that. These are the only points of substance which, so far as the Notice Paper indicates, are intended to be raised. I think the House will agree, after the experience of last Session, that the arrangement now proposed, which is merely a repetition of what took place last Session, is required by the condition of things in which we live, and is not an undue infringement or usurpation of the rights and liberties of private Members.
  Mr. HOGGE: The Prime Minister has referred in anticipation to the Amendment which stands in my name and in that of the hon. Member for North-West Lanark (Mr. Pringle). I would like to remind my right hon. Friend that the Government have many expedients to hand by which they can put an end to any unnecessary discussion. There is the fact that the House can be counted out. On Thursday night last week the House could have been counted out, and would have been counted out, and the Address in reply to the King's Speech would not have been finished until Monday this week had it not been for those of us who have been referred to just now in criticism from the Front Bench.
  Sir G. YOUNGER: There were others besides you.
  Mr. HOGGE: There were not enough of the others. But we will leave that point. It only emphasises the fact that it is within the power of the House to stop a discussion if the House so chooses. The reason this Amendment was put down was simply to get an assurance from the right hon. Gentleman again at the begin-
  592
  ning of the new Session that in cases where the point to be raised was of sufficient importance, and that it could not be covered inside the hour, the Government themselves would agree to move the Adjournment before the last Order, as they did frequently last Session. If the Prime Minister will give us that assurance, so that we can get it on record, as we did last Session, I shall not press the Amendment.
  The PRIME MINISTER: If it was so last Session, we will do so again.
  Mr. HOGGE: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman.
  Mr. ASHLEY: I quite recognise that if Government business goes on until eleven o'clock it would be unnecessary and absurd to ask the House to sit beyond 11.30. It does occur to me that there may be occasions when there are important matters to be discussed, and if the Adjournment takes place about dinner hour or somewhat later the Government might give the House more than an hour to discuss matters of importance. I should be glad if the Government could see their way, while retaining the 11.30 limit, as it stands, to change the hour in the Motion to two hours, when important matters could be discussed. If the matter was unimportant and not of public interest, the House could be counted out and the Debate would come to an end. If the matter is of public importance I think that one hour is too short a time.
  Major NEWMAN: I would like to support the Amendment of my hon. Friend. I have a Motion on the Paper to leave out "one hour" and to insert "two hours." When there are important matters to be debated I am sure that it is worth while to give this extra time. For instance, yesterday the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Walthamstow (Sir J. Simon) raised an important point. He was able to raise it and have it debated, because he had the opportunity. But suppose that he had not had the opportunity, and had had to raise it on the Motion for Adjournment, it would have been quite impossible to have had the matter debated in an hour, and the matter would have been bound to be slurred over. Therefore I think that it would be better on these occasions to allow two hours rather than one hour. I would also like to say a few words about another Amendment of mine, to which I attach importance, from the personal point of view—
  Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member must wait until his Amendment comes on.
  Mr. BOOTH: I desire to raise a point with regard to private Bill legislation. I would ask the Leader of the House, if he can see his way, to repeat the advice which he gave last Session. I drew attention then to the fact that possibly contentious types of Bills might be discussed in Committee upstairs and a considerable amount of expense incurred, and that then the Government would be unable to find time for them to be fought out on the floor of the House, as had taken place two or three years previously, and the Prime Minister answered a question of mine on the subject. If I may read the Prime Minister's answer, I do so in the hope that the course then adopted will be adopted again. I think that the experience of last Session was that it was a wise decision. It is really requisite that the Chairman of Ways and Means should have the power, when he came to the conclusion that certain Bills would be contentious and would be fought on the floor of the House and that the Government would be unable to give time, of pointing that out to the promoters of the Bill and getting them either to withdraw some contentious Clause or, failing that, drop the Bill altogether rather than waste time. The Chairman of Ways and Means did give that undertaking, but he gave it at the request of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister's answer to my question was as follows:
  "I refer my hon. Friend to my answer on the 3rd February last, where I stated that if particular private Bills raised questions of a public character and of a contentious nature, the Government would naturally feel disposed to prevent further progress. He will see that I do not include Bills where the contentious matter is of a private nature and domestic to the Bill. It is of course not easy prima facie to determine whether a particular Bill is or is not of the latter description, but where doubt exists the question could be settled on a Second Reading debate and I am sure the House would be disposed to be guided by the view which would probably be then expressed by the Chairman of Ways and Means."—[OFFICIAL, REPORT, 17th February, 1915, col. 1141, Vol. LXIX.]
  I think that that met with the approval of everybody concerned.
  The PRIME MINISTERindicated assent.
  Mr. RONALD McNEILL: There is a matter which the Prime Minister would, perhaps, be good enough to consider. I have not put down an Amendment. As it stands, the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman provides for notice of questions for Tuesday, in the event of the House adjourning from Thursday to Tues-
  594
  day, but no provision is made for what has become the more common practice of adjourning from Thursday to Monday.
  The PRIME MINISTER: I will deal with the Amendments.
  Mr. McNEILL: I do not think that there is any Amendment on this point. Therefore I would like to have this point cleared up. As the Motion stands now, when the House adjourns from Thursday to the following Monday, notice of questions for Monday will have to be given at the Table of the House on Thursday, whereas if the House sits on Friday questions can be handed in until five o'clock on the Friday afternoon for the following Monday. Therefore if, as is probable, we shall not sit on the Friday, I would suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that questions for Monday night be received up to five o'clock on Friday by the Clerk of the House. It follows from that that a question for Tuesday should be received up to five o'clock on Saturday, giving two complete days. At all events, whether the second point be conceded or not, I venture to suggest that notice of questions for Monday should not be required to be given before the House rises on Thursday evening, but might be received on Friday afternoon.
  Mr. HOLT: I do not quite understand—perhaps I did not hear the Prime Minister quite distinctly—what the position will be after the 31st of March. Will another Resolution then be necessary in order to carry this matter over the 31st of March, or am I to understand that the House will have the opportunity of discussing the proposal? Again, as regards the application to that part of the Session which comes after the 31st of March, personally I do not like that the discussion on the Adjournment should be taken in substitution for direct Resolutions by Members, because it is a very inconclusive way of bringing a matter up, and we are never able to take a Division. I do not think that that is satisfactory. It would be much better that private Members should discuss proposals on a Resolution which would confine the discussion to one point on which we could take a Division, and I should like to know if after the 31st of March we shall have a reasonable opportunity of getting back the rights of private Members, if we want to have them?
  The PRIME MINISTER: The Resolution passed the other day deals with private Members' business, and, unless the

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  House otherwise decides, private Members' rights will be resumed, but that will arise again. I do not propose to make any change in that. With regard to the various points raised, I gladly renew to the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Booth) the assurance which I gave last year, and in the terms which I stated last year. I think the discretion exercised by the Chairman of Ways and Means gave great satisfaction. With regard to the points raised by the hon. and gallant Member opposite (Mr. Ashley), he must remember that this Resolution does not take away the power given by the Standing Order to secure the support of forty other Members to raise a Motion for the Adjournment on the terms of a Resolution, which would come on at a quarter-past eight o'clock. That power is untouched by this Resolution. Therefore, whenever there is a matter which requires more extended discussion, it could be raised by the familiar and normal procedure of securing the support of forty Members, if the Speaker thinks that it is a "definite matter of urgent public importance." I do not think you need do it in any other way, and in that respect the right of Members to discuss matters which arise publicly is preserved. I hope I have satisfied the hon. Member for East Edinburgh with regard to his point. [Mr. HOGGE indicated assent.] Looking at the experience we have had during the last Session of the working of this Resolution, I believe we have the right to think and say that we have provided, as I stated a few months ago, for discussions as they arise, and which do not form part of the Government programme.
  Mr. ASHLEY: May I ask your ruling. Mr. Speaker, in reference to what has fallen from the Prime Minister? Supposing the Government business stops, and the House is counted out at 7.30 p.m., does not the raising of a Motion at 8.15 p.m. on a matter of urgent public importance, with the support of forty Members, fall to the ground? What I suggested was that the Government should give two hours for the discussion of any matter which it is necessary to discuss if it be important.
  Mr. SPEAKER: If the House is counted out at 7.30 p.m. the discussion cannot be taken at 8.15 p.m. If forty Members are anxious to bring the matter on at 8.15 it is not likely they will be absent at 7.30 p.m.
  The PRIME MINISTER: I propose to deal with the suggested Amendment of the hon. Member opposite (Mr. R. McNeill) by inserting in the sixth paragraph the words "Monday or."
  Mr. McNEILL: I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman.
  Mr. LOUGH: If questions or Amendments are put down on the Friday will they be in the Paper on the Monday? [An HON. MEMBER: "Not necessarily."] If the House sits on the Friday and an Amendment or a question is put down on that day it can be dealt with on the Monday, and, therefore, I believe it is the intention of the Prime Minister to leave the House more liberty for notices to be put down on a Friday before five o'clock.
  The PRIME MINISTER: I think it will meet the view of my right hon. Friend if at the end of paragraph (6), before the word "Tuesday," the word "Monday" be inserted.
  Amendments made: In paragraph (6), after the word "following" ["Whenever the House adjourns from Thursday to the following Tuesday"], insert the words "Monday or."
  In the same paragraph, after the word "a" [Questions for Oral answer on a Tuesday or Wednesday"], insert the words "Monday or." After the word "following" ["following Tuesday or Wednesday"] insert the words "Monday and."
  In paragraph (7), after the word "following" ["Whenever the House adjourns to the following Tuesday"], insert the words "Monday or."—[The Prime Minister.]
  Mr. COWAN: If the House is sitting on the Friday, will it be possible to put down questions for Monday?
  The PRIME MINISTER: It can be done under the ordinary Rules.
  Mr. SPEAKER: The Amendment standing in the name of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Enfield (Major Newman) seems to put military Members in a worse position in regard to their questions by delaying them three days, whereas they could be asked and answered earlier in the ordinary way.
  Major NEWMAN: I was not aware of that.
  Mr. BOOTH: Will the Chairman of Ways and Means act upon the suggestion of the Leader of the House?
  The CHAIRMAN Of WAYS and MEANS (Mr. Whitley): I shall, of course, endeavour to carry out what appears to be the desire of the House in the way that was adopted last Session.
  Question, "That this Resolution, as amended, be the Resolution of the House," put, and agreed to.
  Resolved, "That the Proceedings on Government Business be not interrupted this night under the Standing Order (Sittings of the House), and may be entered upon at any hour though opposed.
  That, until the House otherwise determines, and so far as the House does not otherwise determine, on every day on which the House sits—

  (1) Government Business do have precedence;

  (2) At the conclusion of Government Business Mr. Speaker shall propose the Question, That this House do now adjourn, and, if that Question shall not have been agreed to, Mr. Speaker shall adjourn the House without Question put not later than one hour after the conclusion of Government Business if that Business has been concluded before 10.30 p.m., but, if that Business has not been so concluded, not later than 11.30 p.m.;

  (3) If the day be a Thursday the House shall at its rising stand adjourned until the following Monday;

  (4) Any Private Business set down for consideration at a quarter-past Eight o'clock on any day shall, if Government Business is concluded before that time, be taken at the conculsion of Government Business, and, for the purposes of the preceding provisions of this Order, shall be deemed to be Government Business;

  (5) All Select Committees, including Committees on Private Bills, shall have power to sit on Friday, and, if the House adjourns from Thursday or Friday till the following Tuesday, on Monday, notwithstanding the adjournment of the House;

  (6) Whenever the House adjourns from Thursday to the following Monday or Tuesday Members desiring to give Notice of Questions for Oral Answer on a Monday or Tuesday or Wednesday may send Notices of such Ques-
  598
  tions to the Clerks at the Table, and any Notices of Questions so received by them before Five of the clock on a Friday or Monday shall be accepted as Notices of Questions for Oral Answer on the following Monday and Tuesday or Wednesday, respectively, and be printed and circulated with the Votes;

  (7) Whenever the House adjourns from Thursday to the following Monday or Tuesday, Members desiring to give Notice of new Clauses and Amendments to Bills may send such Notices to the Clerks at the Table, and any such Notices received by them before Five of the clock on a Friday or Monday shall be printed and circulated with the Votes."

  Colonel LOCKWOOD: May I ask the Prime Minister to state the business to be taken on Thursday?
  The PRIME MINISTER: The Committee stage of the Consolidated Fund Bill and the Naval Prize Procedure Bill—Second Reading, and, if possible, other stages.

SUPPLY.— [21st February.

  SUPPLEMENTARY VOTE OF CREDIT, 1915–16.
  Resolution reported,
  1. "That a supplementary sum, not exceeding £120,000,000, be granted to His Majesty, beyond the Ordinary Grants of Parliament, towards defraying the Expenses which may be incurred during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1916, for General Navy and Army Services in so far as specific provision is not made therefor by Parliament; for the conduct of Naval and Military Operations; for all measures which may be taken for the Security of the Country; for assisting the Food Supply, and promoting the Continuance of Trade, Industry, Business, and Communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, the financing of the purchase and resale of foodstuffs and materials, or otherwise; for Relief of Distress; and generally for all expenses, beyond those provided for in the Ordinary Grants of Parliament, arising out of the existence of a state of War."
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution."
  Sir RYLAND ADKINS: I desire to refer to a matter which was discussed yesterday, although I approach it from a somewhat different position than that occupied by my right hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Sir J. Simon) and my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Captain Amery). My right hon. Friend gave the House yesterday a number of remarkable and striking cases in which the methods of recruiting which have been recently used were obviously open to strong criticism. The House generally was impressed by the fact that in some way or other the legal position of civilians has been impinged upon, and that those who were seeking, and very properly, to get as many persons as possible to join the Colours, were going beyond the powers given by Parliament, and were giving rise to widespread uncertainty and misapprehension. I do not propose to adopt precisely the epithets or suggestions which were made by some of the speakers yesterday. I am not here to impute any motive, and certainly not any evil motive, to those who are working for recruiting in the War Office or out of it. But it is quite possible for zeal that is not according to knowledge to bring about a state of things almost as serious as that brought about by the methods which were described with such vigour, and apparently with such strong feeling, by the hon. Member for North West Lanarkshire (Mr. Pringle). I am glad to see the Under-Secretary of State for War present. I rise for the purpose of asking him whether it is not possible to clear up the uncertainty which now exists, and to remedy the mistakes which have been unwittingly made, by action which he can take in Parliament, and by action which can be taken by the War Office itself. In the first place, it will be abundantly clear that there is in many places great misunderstanding and uncertainty as to the position of men who have been certified as medically unfit to serve since the 15th of August last, or who may have had their papers rejected on medical grounds. I could give the House instances of persons well affected towards recruiting who are really quite uncertain, in view of the various circulars and various discussions, whether employés of theirs who have already been up once have or have not to go up again.
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  My first request to the War Office is that they ought now, without any further delay, issue a circular to all the Home Command, from whom circulars have been ordered to go to recruiting officers in all parts of the country, calling attention to the fact that all persons rejected after 15th August on medical grounds are outside the Military Service Act and cannot under any circumstances be enlisted against their will. That really requires to be done. I think those of us who are concerned with recruiting almost every day of the week, and who come in contact with this problem, will be the very Members of this House who are most aware of the uncertainty prevailing, and who would be most grateful to have that uncertainty once and for all resolved and put right. The second point which I put respectfully to the Government and the House is this: I think now, after yesterday's Debate, it will become widely understood why there has been this difficulty in connection with applications for armlets. Personally, I am not disposed to blame the War Office for wishing to give this particular dignity of an armlet only to persons who are either totally unfit medically for any kind of military service or to those who are prepared to take any kind of service in the Army, but who are not at the moment in a position for health reasons to take it. I do not blame them. The point was raised yesterday by my hon. Friend the Member for Derby (Mr. Thomas) that armlets had been promised to all persons who were certified medically unfit during what was known as the Derby campaign. I understood from my right hon. Friend that no such promise was made. However that may be, and I do not know enough about it to take up the time of the House, I assume that the War Office in this particular matter are agreed that they are not under any obligation to give armlets, and that therefore they are entitled to make what conditions they like within the law in connection with the offer of armlets. I understand their view to be that an armlet is not to be given to everyone who was certified medically unfit between last August and the present time, but only to those of such persons who are willing to come up again and be re-examined and attested, subject to the decision which the doctor's examination dictates.
  4.0 P.M.
  If that is the case so far, there is much to be said for it, but I am sure, after

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  yesterday's Debate, every Member of the House will agree that there have been a number of cases where men who tried to obtain armlets have had it so put to them have felt compelled to be attested again, and have been if not told, and I am afraid in some cases they have been told they would become conscripts if they did not, have not had the alternatives fairly put before them. I would ask my right hon. Friend, on this second point of new procedure with regard to armlets, whether it would not be possible to make it perfectly clear that in the case of any person who comes up seeking an armlet re-examination by a doctor is demanded before such armlet is given, and that it should be clearly laid down that it must be explained to such person that if he submits for that second examination he is thereby submitting himself for attestment, and has become a Reservist unless the doctor says he is utterly unfit for any kind of military service. That ought to be made perfectly clear to him. It is not a case of going up again to be re-examined simply. By submitting himself he is thereby submitting himself for attestment. That ought to be made perfectly clear. Still more clear, if possible, ought it to be made that any man so coming up who declines to submit himself when he knows what is involved should never have it hinted to him that he is liable to be conscripted if, since the 15th August, he has been certified medically to be unfit. That undoubtedly has happened, and wherever it has happened it has given rise to a great deal of discontent and anger and to a sense of grievance, and it has affected the national spirit, which, in the interests of as large an Army as this country is capable of supporting at this moment, we all want to preserve. The third point is this: A circular has gone out—the yellow circular quoted yesterday—calling upon people to report themselves. It would have been very much better if that circular had not been sent to anyone who has already been certified medically as unfit. But everybody who knows the rush that took place at the end of the Derby scheme knows perfectly well that there were hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of men who had their applications marked "medically unfit," and who have medical certificates, and yet who are not known to the War Office to have them. Could not my right hon. Friend and his advisers have sent out
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  with that circular a slip saying, "If you have been already medically examined and certified as unfit, this does not apply to you. You are to let the recruiting officer of the district know that has happened to you, and give him proof that you have been so certified"? If that were done at once it would do a great deal to meet the case. It would show that the War Office are doing, as I am sure they are, everything they can to observe in spirit and in letter the Military Service Act and the various operations of which this House has approved.
  The next thing I want to ask is this: A notice went out yesterday, or is going out to-day, to men who have not attested or enrolled stating that they must report themselves on the 4th March. There is no doubt a great deal to be said for that. But it ought to be made clearer than it is to these men that, while they are being summoned now, there is still open to them, until the 2nd March, the right and opportunity of voluntarily attesting. It is too late, I understand, to have anything put upon that notice with regard to the alternative of voluntary recruiting; but I would ask my right hon. Friend to state in his reply—because he will be reported, and his statement will be known throughout the country—that that opportunity for voluntary enlistment is open until the 2nd March. I hope he will be able to tell the House that the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, either by posters or by some other methods, are keeping that fact before the eyes of the public in order that everybody who receives the summons to report himself on the 4th March may also have present to his mind the fact that he can still enlist voluntarily if he chooses and put himself in line with his friends who have already enrolled. I ask these things, which I hope the Government and the House will not think unreasonable, because I think we should all be sorry if the difficulties incident to a great movement of this kind did really affect its efficiency or give rise anywhere to a conviction of ill-treatment or injustice. The Military Service Act, while it may be bombarded on grounds of logic from almost every point of view, did represent the conclusions to which the vast majority in this House came in a very difficult matter, and it has certainly had acquiescence, sometimes reluctant, sometimes cordial, in all parts of the country. That acquiescence surely depends upon its being administered with scrupulous care, and, on the

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  other hand, upon the critics making adequate allowance for the very great difficulties which the War Office are under in dealing with a voluntary system and a partially compulsory system, and with all the details connected with the administration of recruiting in this country.
  There are two or three other matters which I think would promote recruiting, and which I will mention in a sentence. One has reference to persons who have obtained medical certificates improperly. There are rumours that some certificates have been purchased. It is suggested that in some cases they have been got by that which approaches fraud. One can well understand any Government Department which has information pointing in that direction being anxious to overhaul such cases, and if possible to put people through their facings a second time. But if the War Office know of such cases, by far the best way is to bring them as soon as possible to the test of a civil tribunal. There is no civil tribunal throughout the country which could not be trusted to deal, not only fairly but firmly, with any case where a man got exemption by fraud. The feeling of the country is not such as would allow that to be looked at as a light offence if it is properly proved. But it is of the greatest importance that all such cases, if suspected, should be investigated, and, if proved, punished, not by administrative order or by any modification of administrative methods, but by the decision of a civil tribunal as quickly and as clearly as possible. There was a very interesting announcement a day or two ago with regard to giving bounties to soldiers who have served the time for which they enlisted and whose re-enlistment is desired. I think that would have the unanimous support of the House. Everyone knows that experienced soldiers, are of more value than ever at the present stage of such a war as this. I would ask my right hon. Friend whether any proposal of that kind ought not to be made retrospective. Scores and hundreds of such men who finished the period for which they enlisted some time ago have re-enlisted without any bounty whatever. If it is thought desirable to offer a bounty to soldiers whose original time has just come to an end, surely the bounty ought to be given as readily, if not more readily, to those who, without any prospect of a bounty, have gone back to fight after having served their full time.
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  My last point is with regard to the question of badges. Some of us who have sat on advisory committees and tribunals are struck with the difference between what happens in one place where men are employed and what happens in another. I am not thinking so much of actual munition factories as of various factories throughout the country which are engaged on Government contracts. I do not know who it is who decides how many men in any such factory are to have badges, and therefore to be outside all recruiting. If it is the Ministry of Munitions, I should have been glad to have seen a representative of that Department present. But I understand that all the different Ministers are on cordial speaking terms with one another; therefore anything I say on this point will no doubt be repeated with all the persuasiveness at the disposal of my right hon. Friend. It makes it very difficult to secure the number of men who want to go and who ought to go when you have one factory where badges are given indiscriminately and another in the same neighbourhood where a much stricter view is taken. It is very unfair to employers who have let their men go if other employers get undue advantage in this particular. Badges ought to be given only with the concurrence of some thoroughly qualified inspector who knows the local conditions and the character of the factory, and not merely upon the statement of the employer, which may be very different according to the employer's enthusiasm or want of enthusiasm for work other than that connected with the War. These matters have a direct bearing upon recruiting. All of us who wish to see as many persons enlisted as is best for the country wish to see it done by methods which are fair all round. For these reasons I hope my right hon. Friend will reply to the questions I have put, and that he will be able, either to-day or at some early date, to inform us that the War Office are extending these bounties, that they are making it clear that they will go to the civil tribunals where cases of fraud are suspected, and that they will so regulate matters with the Ministry of Munitions that the whole question of badges shall be dealt with on a basis which is equitable all round.
  Colonel HENDERSON: I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for the constructive criticism he has made upon this question as opposed to the destructive criticism which we had yesterday. I listened

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  to yesterday's Debate with attention, and I have this morning read most of the speeches delivered. I find on the whole that misunderstanding exists because it has not been realised that the granting of armlets is a privilege which men who have voluntarily come forward asked for in order that they might demonstrate to their friends that they were prepared voluntarily to do their duty. It will be remembered that in the course of yesterday's Debate my right hon. Friend quoted from the Army Order of the 16th December, explaining the circumstances under which armlets would be issued. There was an explanatory notice in the Press of 27th December. I endeavoured to obtain that notice, but unfortunately I was not able to get yesterday a copy of any paper which included it. I have a copy of that now, and I think it will do a great deal to clear up the question of armlets if I may be permitted to read its contents. It is dated 25th December, and states:
  "ARMLETS FOR THE MEDICALLY UNFIT.
  1. It has been decided to issue khaki armlets of the same pattern as those issued to men accepted for Army Reserve B under the Group System.

  (i.) To men who have presented themselves since the commencement of the War for service either by way of direct enlistment or under the Group System, but who have been rejected on medical grounds, and

  (ii.) Until further notice to men who present themselves for direct enlistment but are rejected on the ground that they are medically unfit for immediate service with the Colours.

  2. To qualify for an armlet—
  this is the important point—
  it will be necessary for all men who have been already rejected on medical grounds to present themselves again for medical examination unless they are able to produce Army Form B 2505 (A) or Army Form B 2512 (A) showing the date and cause of their rejection.
  3. Men rejected on medical grounds will be divided into two classes:

  (a) Men who on examination have been certified as medically unfit on account of organic disease, and

  (b) Men who have been rejected on account of eyesight or some slight physical defect.

  4. Men under heading (b) above as a condition of being given an armlet will be attested and passed to the Army Reserve. Men under heading (") above will not be attested, but their names will be registered. Men under both heads (a) and (b) will be free to return to their civil occupations, but men under (b) will be liable to be called up at any time for medical examination and for immediate service in any occupation for which, as soldiers, they may be liable, and for which they may be considered suitable by the military authorities."
  That, as I have said, is dated 25th December, and was in the Press on 27th December. This medical re-examination in order to obtain an armlet was in force long before the Military Service Bill was before this House. I freely admit that recruiting officers have made mistakes in different parts of the country, but they have a great deal to do, and I would like to remind the
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  House that a lot of work is put upon them by this House always demanding returns, and hon. Members have failed quite to grasp the point. It is perfectly clear, however, that if a man can produce a medical certificate showing that he has been rejected as medically unfit, and if that certificate is dated since 15th August last and is properly signed by an authorised person, he is exempted under the Act.
  Mr. S. WALSH: Not exempted, but excepted.
  Colonel HENDERSON: At the same time, if a man requires an armlet, he must submit to this further medical examination. Circumstances have altered since the Derby scheme was started. Men are to be grouped for different purposes, for general service abroad, for general service at home, for garrison service abroad, and for garrison service at home, and for sedentary occupations. It will, therefore, I think, be admitted by anybody who thinks at all on the matter that, with this final medical examination, a man who was not fit for general service abroad when he first presented himself may, and very likely will be, fit for some other service, such as garrison service at home or abroad. We find that the right hon. Gentleman and those associated with him yesterday were apparently very anxious to assist men not to serve their country. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] I understand from yesterday's Debate that every excuse was supported by them.
  Mr. WHITEHOUSE: The Act of Parliament!
  Colonel HENDERSON: The right hon. Gentleman and his Friends, as I say, have shown hostility to the Military Service Bill from its very inception. Possibly they have a right to do so; but, in my opinion, the right hon. Gentleman himself and his Friends must have known from a very early date—certainly from the date that the green form was first introduced—what was coming. He should be the last person to grumble when it did come. I cannot help thinking that if a man offers himself for enlistment, or did originally offer himself for enlistment under the Derby scheme he thereby signified his willingness and desire to serve his country in the way he was best fitted to do. The hon. Members who spoke yesterday seemed to desire that a man who had any excuse should not serve if it could possibly be helped. It is

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  perfectly clear—or it should be now—that a properly signed medical certificate of rejection since 15th August entitles a man not to be called up compulsorily, but if he wants an armlet it is necessary for him to submit himself for this further examination. There have been irregularities on the part of recruiting officers, but those can be remedied now. The hon. Members who yesterday criticised the action of the War Office would do much better if instead of ventilating these faults of the recruiting officers they had indicated them to the War Office, and those matters could have been put right. Instead of airing these things in this House, and giving the impression to the people both of this country and of the Allied countries that there was a certain section—there may be a certain section, but I believe it is a very small one trying to avoid military service, it would have been better to do what I suggest. I believe throughout the country as a whole men desire to serve in that capacity in which they are best fitted to serve. It is a mistake to ventilate these supposed grievances in the House of Commons instead of taking them direct to the Department concerned. This course I do not believe is in the interests of the country as a whole.
  Military clerical labour was criticised by the hon. Member for Mid-Lanark yesterday. He forgets that there are men to be taken for what is known as sedentary occupations. It may be, and very likely will be, that a man takes the place of another who is fitted for more active work, for fighting in the trenches or elsewhere. The man who does the clerical work, who is on the office stool, is just as much a soldier as the man who is actually serving with the Colours. I have as much respect as any other man, for the man who is willing to relieve another, for the man who has signified his willingness to serve in the most advanced position, but failing to do that is prepared to serve in the drudging task of office work. I hope these few remarks will have cleared up one or two points which were raised yesterday; that some misinterpretations will have been removed by what I have said.
  Sir H. DALZIEL: I would like to add one word to the appeal made by my right hon. Friend (Sir R. Adkins) to the right hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary. I can assure him that this is not a question of what our views may or may not have been in regard to the Military Service Act.
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  I think my hon. Friend opposite who has just spoken has probably made a mistake in that. The question is: Is injustice being done to men who are patriotic enough to have offered their services to the State? From evidence placed before me, I have not the slightest doubt that injustice is being done. Men applied and were rejected and have offered their services again, and many of them have been forced into the Army because they thought the power rested with the recruiting officers. I do not think the question was so much a question of the Department of the right hon. Gentleman as it has been the unwise action of some of the local recruiting officers. Therefore, I would support the appeal of my right hon. Friend that a clear statement should be made directly to the recruiting officers, stating that what they are doing is not in accordance with the wishes of the War Office, and that it should be stopped. I would go further, and suggest that these men who have been falsely induced under the circumstances to join should be released. In many cases these men are of no advantage to the country or to the Army. I know one case which makes the whole thing absolutely concrete. Someone I knew had a man engaged in his service who was rejected. He took him back into his employment. That man went forward again and was forced into the Army. He is now in hospital at the expense of the State. I know another similar case, that of a man engaged in service who was rejected by the military authorities and went back again to his situation. He also is now in a military hospital. I shall be glad to give the right hon. Gentleman the facts of the cases. Those two men having offered themselves and been rejected, and having re-entered civil employment, were forced into the Army, and are now, at the expense of the country, being kept in a hospital. Of course they are no good at all. I therefore urge that circumstances like that should be inquired into. Such procedure does not add strength to the Army. The right hon. Gentleman does not want men of that kind, who after a week or two have to go into hospital. I am sure that he is as anxious as we are to see that right and justice is done in this matter.
  There is just one other small point I wish to mention to the Under-Secretary. That is the question of raw youths being sent out right into the trenches without, in my opinion, sufficient training. I have

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  brought this question privately under the notice of the right hon. Gentleman once or twice, and he has been good enough to look into the different cases I put before him, practically of boys in my own Constituency, but he took quite a different view of the result of his inquiry to what I did. Here is an extract from the letter that my right hon. Friend was good enough to send to me upon the cases I brought before his notice:
  "Four of the live men in question had served for two months and twenty days, whilst the fifth had served two months and thirteen days. The conditions of training were 'very good.' All live men were reported to be in good physical development."
  That may or may not have been so, but it depends largely upon the age of the boys, which in these cases was not very high. The right hon. Gentleman knows that what I wish to put before him for consideration is whether it is really right that boys after eight weeks' training should be sent right up into the trenches; whether they should be sent, whilst to his knowledge and my own other men have been training here for about fifteen months and have not yet been sent to the front. We must not be surprised if people outside cannot understand that sort of thing. They see boys after six or seven weeks sent off to the front, and they see in another regiment men at home after fifteen months of training, and apparently in a good healthy condition. It is not surprising if they cannot understand the matter. I presume it is due to the system by which the Army is supplied, drafts being more required for some regiments than others. I do not wish to raise unnecessary discussion in regard to this matter, but I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not dismiss this question from his mind, but will consider whether it is not possible to employ men who have been training for fifteen months before boys who have been training for only a few weeks.
  Mr. WALSH: Before this very large amount of money is voted I should like to ask the attention of the right hon. Gentleman to one or two points of administration on somewhat different lines to those to which reference has already been made. First of all I would draw attention to the very unsatisfactory way in which the separation allowance is being administered at the present time. May I just remind the House that a Committee sat in February of last year, and upon the result of its deliberations payment began to be made first from 1st March, 1915. The special
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  object that Committee agreed upon was that the separation allowances when paid should, as far as possible, leave the dependants in a similar standard of comfort as they possessed before the soldier enlisted. Everybody agreed that that was a very desirable object to secure, but I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that the administration in the last five or six months, especially in the area of which I can speak definitely, has been anything but satisfactory. The process before the last few months was that, if there were grown-up members of the family and there was more than one soldier, the second soldier could make an allotment in favour of an adult member of the family, and a certain allowance was made upon that. That should go some way towards meeting the object that the Committee itself had agreed upon. I hear a right hon. Gentleman say that many of them are getting a great deal too much.
  The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Mr. Tennant): I did not.
  Mr. WALSH: Not the right hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary of State for War, but a right hon. Gentleman on the opposite bench, who need not be specially named, who said that some of them are getting a great deal too much.
  Sir F. BANBURYindicated assent.
  Mr. WALSH: Well, a vast number of cases do not come in the definition at all. A particular case has come under my notice—although indeed there are scores—where a father and, in fact, all the grownup members of a family have gone to the front. They were earning between them, as shown by proved records of weekly wages, £4 16s. The father makes an allotment to the mother and the children. It had been possible before for the two sons to make allotments to the grown-up members of the family, but within the last five or six months, whether owing to the War Office itself or because of powers unfairly usurped by regimental paymasters, it has now been laid down that, unless these soldiers definitely paid over the money to the grown-up members of the family in whose favour they have made the allotment, no allowance can be made. In this case there is a positive loss of at least 50s. in that family. There are seven dependants—the mother and six others—and to say that we are doing our best to leave the dependants in a standard of comfort similar to that which they

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  enjoyed before the War broke out, is to play with language. There are scores of that kind of case. The pension committees, the pension officers, have in numerous cases recommended these for the full allowance of 9s. a week. In scores and scores of cases not a single penny except the soldier's 3s. 6d. a week has been paid. Need we wonder recruiting has not been as brisk? I myself have been on scores of recruiting platforms. I have found a terrible difficulty, not indeed in speaking to meetings as to the great necessity of British people rallying to the support of their country, but in getting over the tremendous fact that the families of the working people were being left not at all in the reasonable standard of comfort we hoped they would be, but in a positive state of penury and semi-starvation. Surely when we are voting hundreds of millions of money we can afford to be fair-minded towards these cases. I pointed out a case to the Financial Secretary between two and three months ago, giving names, wages, dates and regiments. I have been told in these last few days it is not now the practice of the War Office to pay this kind of case. It was the practice of the War Office for very nearly twelve months. I wonder upon what ground this has been done. There can be no reason for this, and I raise this point because it is a very sore point indeed with the vast mass of working-class families, that where every grown-up member of the family has gone to the War, only one allotment, and only one allowance can be made. That is the practice to-day, and I am sure it is not at all a practice this House would like continued.
  I would ask another thing. In the case where a soldier makes the compulsory allotment to his wife, there is not very much delay, speaking broadly, in the payment of the allowance, but in the case of the mother and those in whose cases speculative opinion can come in there is very serious delay. I have cases in my own knowledge where five and six months have elapsed and the allowance has not been paid. The grown-up boy, who, in many cases, is almost the sole support of the household, has gone to the front, leaving his mother and small brothers and sisters dependent upon him. The allowance of 3s. 6d. is generally paid, but all kinds of inquiries and an almost insuperable delay take place before the mother can receive the money to which she is properly en-
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  titled. At the most it could not be more than 9s., and it even gets down to 2s. or 3s., and in many cases for six months and over nothing at all has been paid. I know perfectly well, as everybody must know, that when there are hundreds of thousands of investigations, there must be a vast amount of clerical work, and increase your staff however you may you cannot cope with it as quickly as could be wished; but I do not think there is any reason at all for the intolerable delay taking place in many cases. Everybody recognises the immense amount of work, and that we must do all we can to assist, but those who move about among working people and get upon platforms, helping all we can, find our task made very much greater because of this kind of difficulty, and it is not in any spirit of carping criticism that I ask the right hon. Gentleman to give all the attention he can to the matter. I know how tremendous is his task, and we will help him all we can, but we do want some consideration paid to those members who move about among vast masses of people and find their difficulties greatly increased because of the delay that is taking place in those Departments for which the War Office is responsible. It may be delay in the Regimental Paymaster's Office, but, whatever the case, the fact remains that there is this delay, and we ought to do our best to overcome it.
  There is one other point Why should the wife, the mother and the children at home be penalised in their allowances because of the wrong-doing of the soldier at the front? I have had many cases brought to me in which they are. An hon. Member near me says they are not, but I do know they are, and have been, and, indeed, very serious inroads are made in the weekly allowances previously payable to the wife and children because of some wrong-doing on the part of the soldier at the front—at least, that is put forward as the case—but I really cannot see why the wife and the children at home, who can in no way be responsible for that, should be penalised in their allowances which, at the best, are none too high, and when we are dealing with millions of money in this way we ought at least to consider those who have no help at all except these payments. If they could go out to work; if they could sell their labour in the commercial and industrial world, it would be vastly different but it is upon the women and children

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  who cannot find that employment that the burden falls most seriously, and I think we ought to remodel our action in that respect. Those three special points I do most respectfully urge upon the attention of the right hon. Gentleman's Department. I have put the matters without any malice or bitterness at all, but they are matters with which everyone of us is concerned. Everyone of us finds every day, and almost hour by hour, we are up against these particular facts, and I do ask the Department to take these matters into special consideration.
  Mr. GEORGE LAMBERT: The Prime Minister yesterday, in his very lucid speech, gave us the sum total of the expenditure upon the Army, Navy, and munitions together. I would like to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he could give us the details for the Army, Navy, and munitions separately. I believe that would show, at any rate, that, so far as the naval service is concerned, it is for the great services it is performing to the country, relatively a very cheap service. But I wanted to address one or two questions first to my right hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for War. I must say that, had not the statement come from the Prime Minister yesterday, I should have been very much startled to hear that the War Office was pursuing the austere virtue of economy. In all my experience War Office waste and extravagance hits one in the face, and I have a case here—a very small one—which has come under my special notice because it deals with a matter in which the War Office is engaged in my own parish. It is a very small matter—a question of sending hay from a stack to the station. I have made rather careful inquiry, and, if the House will allow me, I will just give the procedure of the Department which is now exercising economy. On 20th January two supervisors arrived and a hay-press. On 2nd February six men arrived, and on 7th February a traction engine. It was only last Saturday, 19th February, that they were able to get from four to five tons of hay from the stack to the station two miles away. I am perfectly convinced that, if you take the cost of putting this hay from the stack on to the truck, it is as much as the hay is worth. Do let the War Office trust some of the local people to do this work for them, instead of sending men from all parts of the country to teach the Devonshire people how to put hay upon a truck.
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  I believe there is to be a very influential gathering of Ministers at the Guildhall or Mansion House to advocate economy. I suppose they will want Members of Parliament to go to their constituencies and advocate economy; but how can I have the face to do this, when this glaring example of Government waste is going on before their very eyes? The thing is ludicrous. But I want to go a little deeper into this, and I would like to ask who is really responsible. I understand that there are two Ministers responsible now for the expenditure at the War Office, outside the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I am sure we should have done very differently if the Chancellor of the Exchequer were responsible. But I understand the Secretary of State for War is responsible, and that there is also some kind of responsibility attaching to the President of the Local Government Board.
  Mr. TENNANT:No.
  Mr. LAMBERT: He is Chairman of a Committee—
  Mr. TENNANT: I do not think it is fair to saddle a Minister who is engaged in making an inquiry into the expenditure of the Department, with the administrative defects, if there be any, of that Department.
  Mr. LAMBERT: My right hon. Friend has precisely interpreted the moral which I propose to point out. To my mind it is impossible for any Cabinet Minister to go into a Department and conduct an inquiry into its administration. You must put the responsibility upon the executive officer who is responsible for the office, and there is no other way out of it. When I was at the Admiralty there were several kinds of inquiries by various gentlemen, but you must put the responsibility upon the executive officers concerned, and I understand that he is the Secretary of State for War. It is quite impossible for one busy Cabinet Minister to supervise another. Now I understand that the Home Secretary is going to supervise or inquire into the expenditure of the Admiralty. That again is an entire delusion, and no one knows it better than the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Apparently the only Cabinet Minister whom the Government can rely upon is the Minister for Munitions. Although the Prime Minister said yesterday that the system was working admirably, in my judgment it is not a good system, and I could use very much

  615
  stronger language about it. In my opinion the head of the War Office should be able to be called to account by the House of Commons. I do not in the least endorse the criticisms that have been levelled at the right hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary of State for War, because many times he has had to defend an impossible policy, and he has done it with very great adroitness; and I am sure that many Ministers would have found themselves in much greater difficulties than the right hon. Gentleman found himself in in dealing with those matters. Not only is there the administration of the financial side of the War Office, but there is also the strategic side. There was an Order in Council issued on 27th January which stated that:
  "The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, shall be responsible for issuing the orders of the Government in regard to military operations."
  What does that mean? Does it mean that the Secretary for War is supplanted in this matter?
  Mr. TENNANT: He has delegated certain duties.
  Mr. LAMBERT: But is the Secretary for War responsible? If it is a question of dual control it will mean chaos.
  Mr. TENNANT: The Secretary for War is the Minister responsible to Parliament and I, as his representative, am responsible in this House. I think the right hon. Gentleman will realise that the Secretary for War can delegate certain duties to certain officials under his authority.
  Mr. LAMBERT: That is not quite the point which I am putting to the House. Here is an Order in Council published in the "London Gazette" dated 27th January, which runs:
  "His Majesty by and with the advice of his Privy Council is pleased to order and it is hereby ordered as follows: The Chief of the Imperial General Staff . … shall be responsible for issuing the orders of the Government with regard to military operations."
  That is not a delegation by the Secretary of State for War to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, but it is an Order of the King, if not of the Government itself. Who really is responsible for the movement of the troops? Is it the Chief of the Imperial General Staff or the Secretary of State for War? It may not be wise to give me an answer, but it does seem to me that such a question as that might well be cleared up with advantage to those of us who do not quite understand the proceedings. At the Admiralty, as the Chan-
  616
  cellor of the Exchequer knows full well, all orders go out on the responsibility of the First Lord, but here at the War Office you are going to have two gentlemen—I have not a word to say against either of them—the Secretary of State for War and the Chief of the Imperial Staff, and they are both responsible for issuing orders to the troops. It seems to me that that is reducing the status of the Secretary for War more or less to a civilian position. The Secretary for War had recruiting taken from him and he has now had the movement of the troops taken from him; and if he is only to have civilian duties it seems to me that a civilian might well be appointed to perform those duties.
  I have listened with very great interest, as we all have, to the Debates that have taken place here since the House met, and great complaints have been made as to the lack of air defence and the scarcity of shipping. I am not sure that justice has been done in every case to those who are responsible for the aircraft defence of the country. I should like to have the statistics of the number of aircraft that have been built during the last five or six years. It seems to me that we have been attempting to do too many things with our aircraft, for we have been sending them to Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Salonika, and East Africa, and if you strain the powers of our aerial defence and offence to this gigantic extent, of course you cannot have the aircraft here as well to defend our own shores. The very last thing I want to do is to criticise a Government of which the Prime Minister is the head, and-whom I was proud to follow in days gone by, but it does seem to me that we are straining our resources to a great extent. I know there is a good deal of dissatisfaction because air raids are not met and because hostile aircraft are not driven off. I had the good or the bad fortune to be at Walmer on Sunday, and I must say that the aeroplane, which came along at about sixty miles an hour, swooped down, dropped its bombs, and went away again at a very high speed. It is pretty difficult, unless our aircraft are constantly in the air, to be able to deal with a raid of that description, and if it can be done, of course no one will be better pleased than I shall be.
  With regard to the question of shipping, I wish to put this to the Government. It is not so much a matter of bad management in requisitioning, though undoubtedly there has been a great deal

  617
  of waste, but it is a question of using ships for expeditions all over the world. I wonder how much of our shipping was taken up in the Gallipoli Expedition. I understand that freights have gone up from 12s. 3d. per ton for wheat from the River Plate to 150s. per ton. I put this point to a miller friend of mine in Devonshire, and he told me that that increase meant as much as 3¼d. upon a 4-lb. loaf. Now there is plenty of wheat in Argentina and America, but it cannot be brought here because you have requisitioned the ships for all these various side shows, as I will venture to call them. I suggest that the Admiralty is not so much to blame in this matter, because the real cause is that the Government themselves are overstraining even the great resources of the British Empire in this matter. We cannot go on supplying the Allies with naval power, money, shipping, and munitions and at the same time maintain our great Army in Flanders and conduct campaigns in all the theatres of war in the world. I say it cannot be done, and it has not been done with much success up to now.
  There is one point I wish to make with regard to the Navy. We have heard rumours of German naval activity, and we are threatened with an outburst of submarine war against our merchantmen. If this really occurs I shall be much surprised if it does not make the strain on our shipping far more severe than it is at present. [An HON. MEMBER: "Unless the Navy deals with it!"] I feel sure the Navy will cope with the submarine peril, but the Navy cannot do everything all at once. I am profoundly grateful—and in this I am sure I am voicing the sentiments of everyone in this House and the country—to the Navy for having overcome the submarine menace of last year. If there is a great recrudescence of this submarine activity we must expect a scarcity of shipping. The Germans are a very resourceful people, and I expect they have been utilising for the last six months their resources with some advantage. I do not wish to make any reflection upon the President of the Board of Admiralty—far from it—but I do wish to say, and I say it on my responsibility as one who has been a member of the Board of Admiralty for something like ten years, that I really regret that the Government is not making more use of a man who, I believe, is the greatest naval strategist of the day.
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  We know full well that Admiral Lord Fisher is no longer responsible for the conduct of the War, because he disapproved of the expedition to the Dardanelles, and we know that he was right. [An HON. MEMBER: "How do you know?"] I do not want to join in any intrigue, and I wish to speak out quite openly in this matter, because it is so vital to this Empire that you cannot afford to lose the genius or the brains of a single man. There is no doubt in my mind that it is almost a disaster that the Admiralty have not at the present moment in some responsible Department the services of this eminent man. You cannot afford to run any risk. Naval disaster—which God forbid that we should have—would be irrevocable, irretrievable, and fatal, and I put it to the Government that they should use the best brains of the country for the service of the nation.
  5.0 P.M.
  Mr. ASHLEY: I should like to thank my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the War Office for the Order which came out last Saturday giving a much more generous interpretation of the allowances to be made to dependants. I think it will go very far, in fact, quite far enough, to remedy the undoubted grievance which existed. I happen to have come back after having been ten days in my Constituency, where there are a very large number of soldiers, besides a large convalescent camp, and I should like the hon. Gentleman to take this opportunity of contradicting publicly from his place in this House certain absurd stories and scandalous misrepresentations as to what the War Office is prepared to do for disabled soldiers. All up and down the country—I do not think it is only in Lancashire—stories are being told, and one hears them not only from civilians but also from soldiers, that soldiers have been thrown on to the streets when disabled by disease contracted while on active service, and that no compensation is given to them by the War Office. It is said that compensation is only given to soldiers who have been discharged incapacitated from wounds. I understand that is an absolute travesty of the truth, and that the War Office, whatever it has done in the past, is prepared in the future to give compensation on the same scale to any man permanently disabled and incapacitated from any cause arising while on service. If while serving his country he

  619
  is incapacitated, he is to be given adequate compensation whether his incapacity arises from wounds or from illness. I should like the hon. Gentleman to state publicly exactly what the position is, because these stories going about, as he will understand, are prejudicial to recruiting, cause discontent in the ranks, and thereby prevent us from carrying this War as soon as possible to a successful conclusion.
  Mr. HOGGE: I hope that my right hon. Friend will be able to deal in his speech with a matter which is troubling a number of us who are interested in the question of soldiers' and sailors' separation allowances. I am glad that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is here, because he also knows about this point. The War Office is the spending authority, but as a matter of fact over £2,000,000 have been forthcoming from other sources and have been paid for the War Office. Can the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Under-Secretary of State for War say whether the War Office or the State intends to refund that money which was collected for another purpose, or whether they are going to allow that money which has been paid in that way to perform for them what this House said ought to be performed in the payment of separation allowances? My right hon. Friend knows exactly to what I refer. There is a fund, amounting to over £5,000,000, which up to 30th June in this year will be depleted at any rate to the extent of £2,500,000 or £3,000,000, by money which has been paid for the War Office. Will that money be refunded to that fund, so that it will be available for the objects for which it was got together when the occasion arises? If my right hon. Friend can reply to that point, he will ease the minds of a number of us.
  Captain CLIVE: I want to raise two points which have not been referred to, connected with the subject of canteens in France. Perhaps I may shortly describe to the House how these canteens are being provided. At the outbreak of the War, at the instance of the War Office, a very remarkable amalgamation took place between two separate bodies who had previously competed with each other for the supply of canteens. One was the Canteen and Mess Co-operative Society, which did not trade for profit, but which gave back the whole of its
  620
  profits to the soldier, and the other was the firm of Dickeson and Company, who made what contracts they could with commanding officers of battalions, and who made what profits they could for themselves and their shareholders. These two bodies, antagonistic in all their methods of business, agreed at the outbreak of the War, in a patriotic spirit which we all admire, to settle their differences and to work harmoniously together, and they now form one body, which has been given the title of the Expeditionary Force Canteens. Perhaps I may say, just to show how well they deserve of the country, that their turnover in France alone is something like £3,000,000 a year. They thus bring back from France something like £3,000,000 of the soldiers' pay, which, in view of the exchange, is quite an appreciable amount. In the case of the Mediterranean it is something approaching £2,000,000. The benefit they confer on the soldier is very great indeed. They employ in France alone something like 1,200 men.
  I want, first, to ask the Under-Secretary of State for War as to the treatment that has been meted out to these men. A request has been made over and over again that they should be enlisted, not to get Army pay, but enlisted in an honorary capacity and temporarily for the period of the War. There are many reasons why this should be done. One of the chief is that in the more recent development of the canteens they have been brought up very close to the firing line—one within my own knowledge has been within 1½ miles of the trenches—and many of them are subject to shell fire and aeroplane attack. If any of these 1,200 men get killed or wounded, they or their widows are apparently not entitled to any sort of benefit. That is one of the main reasons why I suggest that they should be enlisted for their own sakes, but there are several other reasons from the point of view of administration. These men periodically ask for leave, and, when it is refused, they take advantage of their civil agreement and in many cases—on the whole they are a most loyal body of men, and I do not want to say anything disparaging to them—they give a month's notice, return to England, and then, after a spell at home, they very likely ask for reemployment. That surely is not satisfactory. The non-enlistment of these men really means a perpetual stream of men travelling to and from France, with no more serious object than that of a unique experience, at great expense and trouble

  621
  to all concerned. They have to go on supply ships round by Havre, report themselves in London, and it takes a long time to get them back again. If they were given leave as soldiers, they would go on a troopship and be able to return in seven days. It is an important matter from the point of view of discipline. In peace time a large number of canteen employés are soldiers, but that, very properly, is not allowed on active service.
  I suggest that these civilians who are engaged for this work should be subject to military discipline when they are out at the front. It is just as important that discipline should be maintained among them as if they were soldiers. I believe, though I cannot vouch for it, that the enlistment of these men has been strongly recommended by the Commander-in-Chief in France, and that it was permitted in the Dardanelles. I have no written facts to corroborate what I say, but the report I have is that the medical officer in the Dardanelles reported very strongly in favour of canteens as a means of maintaining the men's health. The canteens do not only supply beer, but also groceries and a hundred and one more luxuries which are not included even in our liberal rations. There was more sickness in the Dadanelles than there has ever been in France, and it was strongly recommended that these canteens should be encouraged, and the employés there were allowed to be enlisted. I do urge upon the right hon. Gentleman, for all these reasons, that the same arrangement should be made in France as was made with great success in the Mediterranean.
  Mr. TENNANT: They were enlisted in the Mediterranean.
  Captain CLIVE: They were enlisted in the Mediterranean, but hitherto their enlistment has been refused in France. Furthermore, they are now being asked if they are willing to enlist for the Regular Army. It is now being endeavoured to recruit them under the Derby scheme. Surely it is hard that men who have been actually under fire should be treated as shirkers, and should not be given credit for the good work which they have done. The other point which I wish to raise is quite a different one. It has to do with the provision of huts for canteens at two places, Rouen and Etaples. When the Expeditionary Force Canteen was first formed it was sent out to conduct business in any hutments, tents, or buildings which
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  could be procured on the spot, and as the organisation grew it commenced building proper hutments out of its own funds—that is to say the position was created whereby canteen hutments were paid for by the soldier. The officials of the organisation represented this matter to the War Office in April, 1915, and after considerable delay it was decided that the Government would provide canteen hutments in France in exactly the same way as the Government provide canteen premises in barracks in England. It was stated at the time that the item would be included in the Army Estimates and would be dealt with through the ordinary channels. It very soon became clear that if it was left to the Army to provide them there would be great delay. Therefore, with the approval of the Inspector-General of Communications in France, it was suggested that the Government should authorise the Expeditionary Force Canteens to put up their own huts subject to the approval of the local representatives of the Board of Works, such huts to be paid for by the Government. They were, in fact, to act as agents for the War Office, and make the best terms they could. They endeavoured to put them up by contracts made in France. At Rouen and Etaples, in spite of asking for tenders for some time, they were unable to obtain tenders in France, and they therefore got leave to obtain tenders over here in England. The history of those places is really a remarkable one. The lowest tender was accepted on 21st September. It was agreed that the Government would convey the materials from the South-West India Docks to the nearest point to each site of erection in France, and would also convey the necessary workmen. The general work of constructing the huts in sections was done on the quay at King's Lynn; these various fittings were made in various parts of the country. On 1st October it was suggested, owing to the congestion at the South-West India Docks, that the huts should be shipped direct from King's Lynn, but the War Office refused that. On 7th October there was an opportunity of chartering a vessel, and the contractors offered to transport the huts if the Government would allow the cost of freightage. This offer was submitted to the War Office and was refused. There was no other opportunity of sending them, and on 3rd November the offer was renewed and accepted, but then it was found that, owing to the delay, the ship

  623
  which could have been chartered for the purpose was no longer available. Instructions were then Bent to convey the huts overland to Newhaven, where they were to be shipped in supply ships, but difficulty arose there and finally, on 4th January, the huts were delivered in France—ten weeks after it had been reported that they were ready—ten weeks, in the winter time. The whole point of getting the huts was to have the canteens properly housed, instead of their being conducted under canvas in winter time.
  The Etaples huts stand on a somewhat different footing, because they have not yet been delivered. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will see his way to deal with that matter. They have been ready for delivery since the 18th of October. On 25th October the War Office asked for their weights and the number of trucks that would be required. Negotiations proceeded from time to time, and there were numerous interviews, but nothing was done, and on 10th December the contractors were again asked to give the weights of the huts and again they supplied the information. On 18th December they received instructions to communicate with the Embarkation Officer at the South-West India Docks, who had been directed to arrange for their shipment. On the 22nd that officer said he had no such instructions. On the 24th the contractors were again told to communicate with him and to quote the number of a War Office letter. [⅕⅓8/3 15:12:15.] Even that had no effect, because the Embarkation Officer said he could not receive goods by rail. Between 30th December and 24th January repeated representations were made. I will not weary the House with the whole of the long story. On 12th February the first but was despatched from King's Lynn, and two days later notice came from the Embarkation Officer to the effect that he did not know when the but could be shipped, and no more must be sent until further instructions had been received. In the meantime another but had been loaded into trucks at King's Lynn. A further point I should like to remark upon is that men had to be sent out to erect the huts at Rouen and because those at Etaple were not delivered the men had to be brought home for a time and then sent out again. It has been estimated that the delay has already cost £400, and, apparently, the end of the expense has not yet been reached.
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  The climax is really rather dramatic. A telegram was received yesterday to the effect that all the tents at Etaple had been blown down and it was impossible to replace them. It asked what was the position as to the huts. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will see that there is a case of urgency, and, although the winter is half over, surely it is worth while making an effort to get the huts sent. I would like to add finally that, although I have gone into these cases in some detail, they are not the only instances in which difficulties of this nature have arisen between the Expeditionary Force Canteens and the War Office. The Expeditionary Force Canteens are doing wonderfully good work out there. The two managers, the manager of Messrs. Dickeson and the manager for the Canteens and Mess Co-operative Society, are really doing this work gratuitously; they are getting no additional salaries. They are being paid by their own firm, but they are doing this work in France entirely gratuitously, free, and for nothing. Therefore instead of hampering them everything possible should be done to assist them in carrying on the work they are doing in the interests of the soldiers, and such assistance should be given as expeditiously as possible.
  The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the WAR OFFICE (Mr. Forster): Perhaps the House will allow me to say the few words I have to say now, and will accept my apology for not having been here when my hon. Friend the Member for Ince (Mr. Stephen Walsh) spoke. I was at the time attending a Committee at the War Office. I understand my hon. Friend raised two points in regard to allotments and the issue of separation allowances, and he referred to certain cases in which the separation allowance was described as not more than a miserable pittance. I think the cases he had in mind were those of allowances to dependants—to a wife in one case and in another case to the mother of a soldier.
  Mr. WALSH: The term "miserable pittance" was applied mainly to the cases of the mother's allowance; it has never been more than 9s., and very often it is not more than half that.
  Mr. FORSTER: My hon. Friend will bear in mind the basis of calculation of these separation allowances. They are calculated on the degree of dependence which existed prior to the man's enlistment. I admit that in some cases it does

  625
  appear to operate harshly, with the result that it excites a feeling of natural compassion for those who suffer, as many do, in these hard cases. But, speaking broadly, I think the House of Commons will agree that we should make a great mistake if we departed from the basis of calculation, which must be the degree of dependence prior to the War. The War Office have accepted that view, and therefore it only remains to ascertain the degree of independence which must govern the rate of the separation allowance. The machinery for calculating it has been set up, and the House knows quite well that the Pensions Committees and Pensions Officers, having come to a decision as to the degree of dependency, the separation allowance follows. I am afraid I cannot hold any hope that any departure can be now made in the method of calculating these allowances. Then my hon. Friend complained of the intolerable delay which has occurred in a number of cases.
  Mr. WALSH: In that class of case particularly. The allotment is paid readily, but in many cases the allowance has to be waited for for as long a period as six or eight months.
  Mr. FORSTER: My hon. Friend will realise that nearly all these cases are cases of difficulty. In many of them the information given by the soldier or by the dependant is either not clear or it is not accurate. The delays in a great many of the cases which I have investigated myself have arisen from one or other of these causes, but I hope my hon. Friend will accept my assurance that I am doing everything I can to expedite the issue of all these allowances. The House will believe me when I say I am convinced there is not the slightest wish or intention on the part of anybody to hold up these allowances. There was a time no doubt when the pay office was, to use a colloquial expression, "snowed under." The pressure of work was gigantic; the expansion of business was enormous, and the staff, while it had every desire to cope with this work, was untrained and often exiguous. Arrears consequently accumulated, and one knows when the work of an office is thus increased how difficult it is to deal with arrears. I regret that in a large number of cases there have been delays, but it is not due to the pay office; it is the inherent difficulty of the problem which undoubtedly makes it difficult to come to that ready decision which we
  626
  would like to see in all these cases. I can only add we are doing everything we can to secure a quicker decision in these matters, because we are all anxious these separation allowances should be issued at the earliest possible moment. Then my hon. Friend raised the question of the deprivation which is suffered by the family of a soldier who has the misfortune to be imprisoned. He pointed out truly enough that in the case of a man being sent to prison for more than a certin period the allotment ceases and the family have to live on the Government portion of the allowance only. My hon. Friend will realise that that is because the man's pay is stopped, and there is no money from which the allotment can be drawn. I am not quite clear whether my hon. Friend's suggestion is that it would be desirable or proper under these circumstances that the State should take upon its own shoulder the payment of the amount which a soldier had contributed before he went to prison. I am afraid, however, I cannot hold out any hope of that being done. That is one of the misfortunes—and it is a misfortune—which I am afraid accompanies imprisonment of the breadwinner even under ordinary conditions. I think these are the main points advanced by my hon. Friend.
  Mr. WALSH: My first and most important point was as to the change in the method of administration, in so far as the separation allowances are paid to a wife and dependent children. In the earlier part of the year it was possible for a second soldier from the same family to make an allotment to an adult member of the family in addition to the allotment made by the husband, and the allowance was thereupon made by the regimental paymaster. Now, however, they will not, under any circumstances, pay such an allowance unless the second soldier has actually handed over the money to the dependant in whose favour he has drawn the allotment. That is a case which I have been discussing with the hon. Gentleman for a month or two. There are other cases as well.
  Mr. FORSTER: I do not think, as a matter of fact, there has been any change in the system.
  Mr. WALSH: Oh, yes, there has!
  Mr. FORSTER: Perhaps my hon. Friend will allow me to assure him that I will look into the question, and that it

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  shall have my fullest consideration. Then my right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Lambert) raised other questions, most of which my right hon. Friend the Under-Secretary for War will deal with when he speaks later on. But there is one question he mentioned on which I should like to say a word or two, and that is the question of hay purchases, and the fuller employment of local machinery. My right hon. Friend says, very truly, that no soldier can teach the Devonshire farmer anything about shifting hay, loading, and so forth. It may be that in some case he has in mind there has been regrettable delay leading, unhappily, to waste of money; but I do not think you can judge a system by individual failures here and there. I suppose it is unavoidable in a war of this kind where you are buying on the enormous scale. When you are conducting any business on the enormous scale upon which we are conducting the Army at the present moment, there must almost inevitably be failures here and there. If my right hon. Friend will give me particulars privately—
  Mr. G. LAMBERT: I gave them publicly.
  Mr. FORSTER: I will have the case looked into with a view to preventing a repetition of that kind of thing as far as possible. My hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool (Mr. Ashley) raised a question of great importance with which we shall have to deal more fully on a Motion of which notice has been given, when we get the Speaker out of the Chair on the Army Estimates. He raised the question of the men who are walking about the country suffering from disease which has been incurred in the course of their military service. He mentioned the fact that there seems to be a prevalent belief that nothing is done for these men except those who are suffering from wounds.
  Mr. ASHLEY: That is so.
  Mr. FORSTER: If that belief is prevalent, I am very glad my hon. Friend has given me an opportunity of saying at once, point blank, that that belief is wholly unfounded and erroneous. I hope the fullest possible publicity may be given to what I am saying now, in order that the painful impression may be removed at the earliest opportunity. I may add in this connection that my attention has been called to a statement made—I forget
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  by whom—that the men who were actually suffering from and who have been invalided out of the Army on account of what is known as trench feet are to get no pension, no gratuity, and no financial help. That is absolutely devoid of all foundation of any sort or kind. It is a complete misstatement.
  Mr. ASHLEY: Can the hon. Gentleman give us in two words what the position exactly is? That will meet the case.
  Mr. FORSTER: I was going to state the terms of the Royal Warrant in a very few words. Disability pensions and so forth are granted to non-commissioned officers and men discharged as unfit for further service, on account of wounds or injuries or sunstroke received in action, or in the performance of military duty, or on account of blindness caused by military service, or by disease due directly and wholly to military service. So that men who are suffering from wounds, injuries, sunstroke, blindness, or disease, get pensions under the Pay Warrant, the qualification being—I do not want to hide or cloak anything—that the wounds or injuries must have been received in connection with or in the performance of military duty, and the disease must have been directly and wholly due to War service.
  Captain CLIVE: If the disease is aggravated by War service, will not that count?
  Mr. FORSTER: No, Sir. The disease must be caused by and incurred in the military service, so that the cases of the kind to which reference has been made of men who are suffering from trench feet are absolutely covered.
  Mr. ASHLEY: Would tuberculosis be covered?
  Mr. FORSTER: Certainly, if it is due wholly and directly to service.
  Mr. ANDERSON: Is not this the point, that in the case of troubles like rheumatism or consumption or nerve shock, the man who is discharged has no absolute right to a pension because of them; that the matter is referred to a medical board, and that the pension depends upon the report of that medical board, so that if the board says that the man's consumption was merely aggravated by his service, the man is not entitled to a pension?
  Mr. FORSTER: My hon. Friend has stated the position exactly. It depends upon the finding of the medical board,

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  which is, of course, always subject to an appeal to the higher medical authorities. It depends upon their finding whether the disease is wholly and directly due to military service. If it is, the man gets a pension; if it is not, I am afraid he does not. I do not want to go into this matter at great length as I propose to deal with it in a few days' time, if I have to speak. It is within the province of my right hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for War, but if I have to speak I propose to deal more fully with the whole question later.
  Sir COURTENAY WARNER: Will the hon. Gentleman make some reference to what took place in the Debate the other day on the question of the Royal Warrant with regard to this particular subject? There was almost a pledge given that the Royal Warrant would be modified.
  Mr. FORSTER: Oh, no, my hon. Friend must not think there was any question of a pledge to modify the Royal Warrant. The pledge was that the administration should be sympathetic. There was no question of a pledge. I, who spoke then, was certainly not in a position to give any pledge to alter the Royal Warrant. I should like the House to bear in mind that the Royal Warrant really only carries out the policy of the Government. The actual wording of the Royal Warrant is, of course, a matter for the War Office, but the policy is the policy of the Government. I could not give any pledge to extend its scope without the sanction of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and of the Cabinet, so that I could not have been in the position to give the pledge to which my hon. Friend refers.
  Sir C. WARNER: I never asked the hon. Gentleman to give us any sort of pledge, but I thought it was understood in that Debate that some representation might be made so that the system might be made rather wider to the extent of asking the Prime Minister to alter the Royal Warrant.
  Mr. FORSTER: Oh, yes, that we have done. Both my right hon. Friend and I myself have drawn the attention of the higher authorities to the matter. It is a matter, of course, for the Government to decide, and neither he nor I could give an undertaking. So far as the language of the Royal Warrant is concerned it would follow the policy which the Government adopted. I hope that what I
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  have said will remove the apprehensions which my hon. Friend (Mr. Ashley) assured me are so prevalent, and I would reserve anything further that I have to say until a later occasion.
  Captain Viscount DUNCANNON: Before the Under-Secretary of State for War proceeds to answer the questions that have been raised, I should like to raise a point with regard to the air defences with respect to the recent Dover air raids, and to express the hope that the right hon. Gentleman may be prepared to make some statement upon the subject, for, as he may be aware, there are many reports in circulation, reports which have gained currency outside as well as inside this House. I have only to take as an instance the speech which was made by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Canterbury (Captain Bennett-Goldney) yesterday. These reports are bound to cause great public concern as to the efficiency of our defences concerned, not only as in this case, Dover, but all over the country. For the moment I would only refer to that particular case. As the right hon. Gentleman is aware, I have during the past few weeks ventured to make constant representations to him on the subject, and if I have done so privately and not across the floor of the House, he knows that-it is because I do not wish to make any public statement which might be prejudicial to the public interest. The result of those representations has been that .the Under-Secretary of State for War provided me with an authorised statement by the War Office to be made public in Dover. Unfortunately that statement did not pass the censorship there, but, none the less, I hope he will see his way himself to make from his place in this House a reassuring statement on the subject. He will surely not think that it is in the public interest that these unauthorised and uncontradicted statements should constantly be made without any official reply on behalf of the Government.
  Mr. TENNANT: Hear, hear!
  Captain Viscount DUNCANNON: Can we not, therefore, have a candid Ministerial statement on the whole subject, so that we may be assured that it is the intention of the Government that there will be an improved state of affairs with regard to our air defences? If I might venture to say so with all respect, I would say that the speech made last week by the right hon. Gentleman did

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  very little, if anything, either to meet the criticisms made here or the very real and genuine concern which is felt all over the country. It is true that the right hon. Gentleman told us that divided control in certain directions had come to an end. But that, on the face of it, and without any more, is not, perhaps, necessarily reassuring. Will he not, therefore, not only tell us that divided control has come to an end. But that we are about to see a different and an improved state of affairs? I should also like to ask the right hon. Gentleman if he will answer a question on quite another matter, namely, a report which I have seen in the "Times" this morning, which conveys the impression that our troops are insufficiently provided with trench mortars in France. Will the right hon. Gentleman be in a position to say whether the impression created by this report is a correct one or not?
  Mr. R. C. LAMBERT: Perhaps I may be allowed, as a member of the Board of Control dealing with canteens, coffee-stalls and so on, to supplement what was said about it by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Ross Division of Herefordshire (Captain Clive). I think the time has come when the attention of the House should be drawn to what I can only call the wasteful method under which we are forced to carry on this work. I was appointed to the Committee last July, and we have spent many hours anxiously attempting, so far as we can, to carry on this work which is necessary for the welfare of the soldier. We have paid a visit to France, and we have had impressed upon us over and over again the urgent need that huts should be built in time for the coming winter. So long ago as August the Base Commandant informed us that it was absolutely necessary that these huts should be erected and should be ready before Christmas, and we promised that, so far as we could do it, they should be put up. What has been the result? So far back as 18th October the huts were ready. There has been no fault that could be found with the contractors, but in one way or another from that time to the present, so far as the huts were concerned, difficulties have been put in the way of transporting them over to France, and even now at this very moment they are still in England. When we come to consider that they are built out of public money, that they are de-
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  teriorating day by day as they are left in the sidings or on the quays, and that the soldiers have to go all this time without the accommodation which is necessary for them, it is nothing short of a scandal that the attempts which are made by the Board of Control should be thwarted in the way they have been. I do not want to speak with too great vehemence. We all recognise that in time of war there are great difficulties which have to be overcome, and of course I have to make every allowance for them, but I really think it is time public attention was drawn to the way in which these matters are delayed, so far as I can see, through no reasonable cause, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be able to give us an assurance that, at all events so far as these huts are concerned, these interminable delays will come to an end, and that the Board of Control will be enabled to carry out the work which it is authorised to perform. Everyone is anxious to give the War Office all the assistance he can, and we are anxious to see that our soldiers who are fighting our battles in France should be provided with those comforts and necessaries which they require, but when we get, after all our efforts and all the endeavours that we have made to expedite things, a telegram such as we received yesterday, stating that the tents, the substitute for the huts, have all been blown down in the late gale and that the officials are at their wits end to know what is to be done—these very tents which were to have been replaced by the huts which are still somewhere in England—we are justified in asking for a public explanation of what seems to me, at all events, to be an intolerable scandal.
  Mr. TENNANT: Perhaps it might be convenient if I were to deal with the Dover case first. The hon. Member (Mr. Bennett-Goldney) made a somewhat startling, and indeed dramatic, statement last night when I was absent on official duty, and it is desirable, I entirely agree with my Noble Friend, that the kind of rumour—for I think it is nothing more than rumour to which he gave currency—should receive the earliest contradiction. It is impossible for me to give an account in great detail of what actually occurred, because there are conflicting statements as to that, but I can at least assure the House that some of the statements made by the hon. Member are wholly without foundation. In the first place, I should like the

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  House to realise that on the date in question when aeroplanes—I think there were two of them—did come to Dover, the Admiralty were in charge of the defences. Possibly my Noble Friend might think it desirable to pursue further inquiries through that Department if he is interested in the historical question as to what actually happened. Army aeroplanes were ready, although it was not our primary duty to attack hostile aircraft at that time. I understand that the hon. Member stated that the mess to which the officers had gone for their luncheon was two miles away from the particular spot where the aeroplanes were kept. That is a mistake. It is not two miles, it is 200 yards, which is a very considerable difference. He also stated, I understand, that the pilot went up armed only with a Winchester rifle. What really happened was that the pilot went up in an aeroplane which belonged to a squadron in course of formation, and was not yet armed; but as the machine which was there belonging to that squadron was a very powerful machine the commanding officer allowed him to go up, and I do not know whether there was a rifle or not, but I believe there was. These statements show how extraordinarily far from the true facts the description given by the hon. Member was.
  Mr. RUTHERFORD: I suppose there was a rifle there?
  Mr. TENNANT: The point is that the Admiralty were in charge at that time, that the aeroplanes were kept by the War Office and did in fact go up, and did in fact give chase to the hostile aircraft, but everyone knows that it is not possible to catch an aeroplane unless you start on very good terms with it, and in this case the aeroplane belonging to our countrymen did not have a fair chance and did not catch it. But to say that the whole thing was in the muddle in which it was stated to be by the hon. Member is not only wholly contrary to the facts, but is, I think, a wrong thing to do, and is calculated to spread despondency and depression among the local inhabitants, and indeed among wider circles than that.
  My Noble Friend (Viscount Duncannon) went on to ask me whether the statement which is attributed to me in the "Times" to-day is an accurate statement of the condition of affairs with regard to trench mortars at the front. I can assure him that the statement I made at Question Time yesterday was different from that which
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  is given currency to in the "Times" newspaper, and all I have to state is that we have had reports from time to time about trench mortars from the Commander-in-Chief at the front, and endeavours are made to carry out the policy which the Commander-in-Chief desires, and if my Noble Friend will look at the OFFICIAL REPORT he will see the correct answer which I gave.
  Sir G. YOUNGER: Is it not a fact that large quantities have been sent out lately?
  Mr. TENNANT: Yes. My hon. Friend is correctly informed. Very large numbers of trench mortars have been sent out in the quite recent past.
  If I may go to my right hon. Friend opposite, I would say to him that the interruption which he was kind enough to allow me while he was speaking was quite an accurate one, though perhaps it was not complete. I am dealing now with the question of the Order in Council which he read to the House as to the distribution of duties between various members of the Army Council. I stated that it is true that the Secretary of State is the officer responsible, and his responsibility is not at all altered, but every member of the Army Council has certain duties to perform, and those duties are distributed among the various members of the Army Council by Order in Council. The particular Order in Council which he read to the House is a new distribution of functions among the various members of the Army Council, and particularly one including the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, but there is no shifting of responsibility. The responsibility remains the same. The Secretary of State for War is the officer responsible to the country for the actions of the Army Council, and I am his representative here, and therefore I am responsible in this House.
  Sir H. DALZIEL: Does my right hon. Friend mean by that that the Chief of the Imperial Staff takes his orders from the Secretary of State for War or from the Cabinet?
  Mr. TENNANT: I would rather say I think the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in time of great emergency, like the present, will take his orders from the War Council, of which the Secretary of State for War is a member. I think that is the fairest way to look at it, and the proper way in which it should be described.
  Mr. G. LAMBERT: Do I understand my right hon. Friend correctly to say that the responsibility of the Secretary of State for War is not in any degree impinged upon by this Order in Council?
  Mr. TENNANT: I think the answer to that is in the affirmative, as I indicated in my interruption, and as I stated further in my further reply.
  My hon. Friends (Captain dive and Mr. R. C. Lambert) have mentioned the question relating to canteens. I can assure both hon. Members that we at the War Office have nothing but gratitude and praise for the services of the patriotic men who have been doing this duty of providing canteens for the troops at the front. It may be said, "It is a very odd manner in which you repay them and show your gratitude." My answer to that must be that we have to consider first of all the provision of men at the front, and to provide men with everything which they require—first of all in the way of food, clothing, ammunition, guns, and munitions of war generally. It is common knowledge that there has been very great strain upon the tonnage of this country, and if the huts which were requisitioned for the canteens were unfortunately delayed I think the House will have to put that down to the great difficulty of finding tonnage in which to send them abroad. But since my two hon. Friends have brought these facts to my knowledge I will make it my special duty to inquire into the present condition of things, and see whether we could not at this late hour make some endeavour to see that these huts are properly sent out and established. But I hope my hon. Friends will realise what great difficulties we have to cope with. It is sometimes impossible to get that expedition which one would desire.
  Captain CLIVE: Our complaint is that there was so much indecision and that opportunities to send them out were refused, and it was only agreed to afterwards when it was too late.
  6.0 P.M.
  Mr. TENNANT: We always regret indecision, but sometimes new facts arise and a different situation is created by something which has happened recently and sometimes one has to alter one's opinion. I have even known hon. Members in this House do that. The hon. Member asked whether these men could not be enlisted. I have ascertained that that policy is now being adopted, and it will
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  be put into force and the men will be allowed to join the Army and retain their position in the canteens so long as they are considered indispensable. I am sure, however, that my hon. Friend will not desire that the most able-bodied men who are not indispensable should be retained for providing comforts for the troops when their services might be used to greater advantage to the State by fighting at the front. I come now to the matters raised by my hon. and learned Friend (Sir Ryland Adkins) and I desire to express my gratitude to him for the very moderate and reasonable tone in which he addressed his observations to the House. I have made it my duty, in the short interval which has elapsed between yesterday and to-day to ascertain more particularly the position in regard to the medical examination of persons who have already been medically examined and rejected for the Army. I think my hon. and learned Friend and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Berkshire (Colonel Henderson), were quite correct when they said there had been a good deal of confusion of mind on this subject. While we have always asserted, and I have stated quite definitely—although it does not really need me to say it, because he who runs may read the Act of Parliament—that a man who has been medically rejected since 14th August last is outside the scope of the Military Service Act. Some people seem to think that the War Office has been embarking upon the policy of endeavouring to strain that Section of the Act. I should like to say that that is not really so. All that has been done has been this—when a man who has been rejected comes and demands an armlet he is asked if he will be medically re-examined, and told that if he is at all fit for any of the various types of duties in the Service he will be asked to be re-attested and join the Reserve, so that in future, should there be occasion to require his services, we shall knew where to put our hands upon the man who has undertaken these duties.
  My hon. and learned Friend asked me whether I would issue instructions that the men who have been rejected in the manner described are outside the Act of Parliament. I will certainly engage to do so. I will go further, and I will have it stated in that Order that these men who have been so medically rejected, properly medically rejected by a proper authority, cannot be enlisted against their own will. They will be asked, if they wish an armlet,

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  whether they will not agree—for many of them, most patriotically, are anxious to do their duty and their proper service to the country—to be put in a class and attested, and be considered soldiers of the King. I think that is not an unfair method of dealing with any subject of His Majesty. My hon. and learned Friend also wishes to have it made clear that this submission to a second examination must mean re-attestment. I think that ought to be explained to him. I do not know that it has not been done.
  Sir R. ADKINS: In some cases it has not been understood.
  Mr. TENNANT: I think it has been in nearly all cases, but my hon. Friends will realise that they only hear of the cases of complaints. The cases where we have failed are brought to my notice, but there are thousands and tens of thousands of cases where the machinery works quite smoothly and harmoniously, and we never hear anything. Another point raised by my hon. and learned Friend was that there should be a slip accompanying the yellow form.
  Mr. RENDALL: Before the right hon. Gentleman proceeds, I would like him to make one point clear. He has now made it clear that the men who have been rejected by the doctor since the 14th August are not to come under the Act. What I want to know from him is, What is the position of those men who have been persuaded by the recruiting officers and made to believe that they were compelled to be re-examined? There are men who have been made to understand that they must be re-examined, and they have submitted to re-examindtion and have gone before the tribunals, and now find that they were not compelled to be re-examined. These men want to be put in the same position as those men who have refused to be reexamined. Will the right hon. Gentleman agree to do that?
  Mr. TENNANT: I much regret that there should have been any mistake of the kind, and I will give my hon. Friend this assurance, that I will engage to examine the cases. I hope there are not many of them, for if there are a very large number it will take a great deal of time, and there is not much time left. I will, however, engage to look into them, and where it is proved to a competent authority that the kind of improper influence has been used which has been described by the hon Mem-
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  ber and my right hon. and learned Friend (Sir J. Simon) yesterday, that man should certainly be placed in the position he was in prior to the re-examination. With respect to the yellow form—and I would point out that it is an old form—my hon. and learned Friend asked whether I would not issue with the yellow form a slip stating that it is not applicable to those who have been medically rejected. I will see whether that cannot be done. Let me say this to the House, by way of caution, that it is not the intention of the War Office or the Government to issue to any man who has been medically rejected this yellow form, because it is inapplicable to him. But it stands to reason that where you have to deal with hundreds of thousands of men mistakes will occur. I am informed that in the case of the Territorials the associations kept no accurate record of those whom they rejected as medically unfit. Therefore it is obvious that a large number of persons who have been medically rejected will receive these yellow forms, but if they are accompanied with this statement on the slip I think the difficulty ought to be overcome. There is a difficult point arising out of the notice which is sent to those who become Reservists on 2nd March, and my hon. and learned Friend desires that it should be stated in anything that we issue that they do not become Reservists on 2nd March if they will attest prior to 2nd March. I do not know really that anything is required to inform a man of that fact. He might know—everybody knows it—that it is still open to a man to attest voluntarily if he so desires, and if he does so the Act will not apply to him, but if he does not do so the Act will apply to him.
  Sir R. ADKINS: I quite realise that it will be impossible at this stage to put out a printed note with the notice, but if the right hon. Gentleman will point out now that men are still able to attest voluntarily up to 2nd March it will have a very good effect in remote districts, where people think that an official form is binding upon them and do not realise that it does not apply to them if they take the last chance to avoid it.
  Mr. TENNANT: I understand that my hon. and learned Friend does not wish me to issue anything official from the War Office, but merely to state now, which I do quite frankly, that there is still time for men to attest voluntarily and go into their proper groups until 2nd March.
  Sir G. YOUNGER: There are huge posters all over the country telling everybody that very fact.
  Mr. TENNANT: In rather bad colour, and embodied in language which I am sure my hon. Friend would not have invented. I do not think my hon. and learned Friend need be very apprehensive that the depth of ignorance is so great as he has pictured.
  Sir R. ADKINS: If the right hon. Gentleman will refer to the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee in case anything more can be done that will satisfy me.
  Mr. TENNANT: I shall be very glad to do that. I have been asked about badges by my hon. and learned Friend. All that I can say is that I shall have great pleasure in conveying to the Minister of Munitions the statement which my hon. and learned Friend has made and in drawing his attention to the lucid statement of my hon. and learned Friend. Whether my right hon. Friend will be able to carry out the desires expressed in that lucid statement I really cannot say, and I am sure he would not expect me to say so.
  Sir R. ADKINS: Cannot the War Office support charges, if they believe them to be true, of loose badges being used in a certain number of factories and mills, which is very unfair to other factories and mills where they are patriotic?
  Mr. TENNANT: I will ask the Minister of Munitions to do that if it is possible, but you must remember the difficulty of co-ordinating all these things over very large areas in this country. Anything like uniformity is, of course, very desirable, and every effort is made to co-ordinate and get something in the nature of uniformity of treatment, but to get it absolute is almost beyond one's dreams. There is one other point, and that is in regard to bounties to re-engaged men. I think it is proper that the House should undertake the responsibility of finding the money, and I will ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will agree to that. I hope that that may be possible. My right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy asked me, with regard to the men who have been medically rejected, whether I will deal with this in a large-hearted manner, and in a manner conducive not only to the best interests of the State, but also to the dignity of a great Department. We do not want by any method at all, however straightforward and proper, or
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  by any trickery such as we have been accused of, to obtain the services of men who are really not going to be of value to the State. I am sure that the House must realise that that is not the policy of the Government. I hope that the House will believe, and anyone who knows me will realise, that such charges are very repugnant to me, and anyone who knows Lord Derby knows that charges of that kind are most repugnant to him.
  Sir H. DALZIEL: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider the question of striking off the half-crowns, so that recruiting officers would not be quite so keen in getting rejected men?
  Mr. TENNANT: Does my right hon. Friend mean the 2s. 9d. which is given to the men?
  Sir H. DALZIEL: No.
  Mr. TENNANT: The half-crown which is given to the recruiting officer?
  Sir H. DALZIEL: Yes.
  Mr. TENNANT: That has been reduced to a shilling, I am glad to say, for a very long time. Whether it is advisable to withdraw it altogether is a matter of policy which we shall have to consider. My right hon. Friend went on to complain, not improperly, that some very young soldiers were sent to the front after receiving only a very short training, and he asked whether it would not be possible for the War Office to send out, as drafts to regiments requiring reinforcement, men who had been for as long as fifteen months in training rather than those who had only received two or three months' training. I will tell him what the policy is. When the War broke out it was decided that no troops should go out to the front who had not been trained at least for a considerable number of months, and none were sent out who had not been trained as units. But it is one thing to train a man individually as a draft to go in and serve in a well composed, well trained unit, and quite another thing to train the whole of the unit. While it takes six months at least to train a unit and put it into ship-shape, it does not take anything like that period to train an individual man to take his place in a well trained unit. I think that the case put by my right hon. Friend was that some men were sent out after between two and three months.
  Sir H. DALZIEL: Two months and twenty days.
  Mr. TENNANT: That was no doubt because the regiment to which they belonged had had very rough treatment and was greatly in need of drafts. Of course, it is not possible for us to say, "Here is a Yeomanry regiment; it has been training for eighteen months. It is spoiling to get out. Let us take drafts from that Yeomanry regiment and send them to reinforce the Black Watch." You cannot do that. I do not say that it has never been done. It has, but it is not a thing which I think the House would encourage the War Office to undertake on a large scale. Neither regiment likes it; neither the Black Watch nor the Yeomanry. And when we were proposing to fill up some gaps in the Welsh Division with some regiments from quite a different part of the country there was a great deal of outcry. And again, I think, when it was proposed to send some Welsh Yeomanry away from their units, not as units but as reinforcements, there was another great outcry and the thing was not carried out. So really it comes to this. If one regiment sustains a severer number of casualties than another it has to depend on the third line unit at home, or the reserve at home or the new home battalion to find drafts, and, if drafts should only happen to have had two months and twenty days' training, that must be considered, or at any rate was considered, when there was a great shortage of men for reinforcements as a sufficient amount of training to send them out with, in the hope that when they got out to their units at the front they would receive a certain amount of additional training. They are often used, especially young officers, in schools behind the line for training, and they are doing very good work by this means. I do not like, and I do not think that it would be easy for me, to give an undertaking that in no case in the future shall we send out drafts who have been only trained for two months and twenty days. We do not want to do it. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will realise that. But we are sometimes driven into such a corner that we have to do it, and, if I were to give that undertaking I should only be hampering the authorities and should not be serving the best interests of the country, and I might have to come to the House afterwards and say, "I am very sorry I have to stand in a white sheet. I have not been able to carry out the promise which was given."
  Sir H. DALZIEL: I did not ask for a definite undertaking.
  Mr. TENNANT: I quite understand. I can assure my right hon. Friend that we do not like to send out drafts insufficiently trained, and it has never been done unless there was something in the nature of urgent necessity. I hope that my right non. Friend may consider that that is as far as I can carry it.
  Sir R. ADKINS: Will the right hon. Gentleman refer to the War Office being ready to have recourse to the Civil Courts where there has been false representation for the purpose of obtaining medical certificates?
  Mr. TENNANT: It has come to our knowledge, and I cannot help thinking that we should not have heard of it unless it were true, that a certain number of men, the worst type of men in this country, anxious to avoid military responsibility, had persuaded somebody else, whose conscience was not very lively, to represent that his name was the name of the first person; in other words he made a false representation, personating the other man, the second man being a man well known to have heart disease of a very advanced kind, and doing this for a consideration. This was said to have been done, I do not know in how many cases, but at any rate in a number quite sufficient to let us know that it had been done. We are anxious to have some method of seeing that such cases of fraud are properly dealt with. Take the case of A saying to B, "You have heart disease; you go and represent me and bring me back a certificate of exemption or rejection and I will give you half a crown or five shillings." It is extraordinarily difficult to prove that it was done in that manner. Unless you have got absolute chapter and verse evidence for it, you cannot do it. So when my hon. and learned Friend says, "Would not it be wise to refer such cases to Civil Courts," I would say, certainly that would be the proper thing to do, and we shall certainly do so where we have evidence. But it would be perfectly futile without a sufficient amount of evidence. I can assure him that that will be done in any case where it is possible.
  Major GODFREY COLLINS: I do not desire to follow the right hon. Gentleman in the subjects which have been brought before us this afternoon. I wish to make some observations with regard to the

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  Prime Minister's speech yesterday, and to remind the House of what is the main problem before us at the present moment. It is to vote a large sum of money to bridge the gap between a daily expenditure of £5,000,000 and a revenue of some £750,000. To bridge that gap we must maintain our credit and face the situation. I do not say that the Government have concealed the true financial position from the country, but I do say that they have not revealed the true financial situation to the country during the last eighteen months. I will endeavour to make that good. I have no desire to strike a note of pessimism. There is no necessity for so doing. Our credit can readily be maintained if the Government only desire to govern. As confidence is the basis of credit, the House of Commons looks to the Government to repay that confidence which has been so generously conceded to them during the last eighteen months. This ever widening gap between our daily expenditure of £5,000,000 and our revenue can only be bridged in two ways, either by the reduction of expenditure or the increase of revenue by taxation or by loan. The Prime Minister in his speech yesterday quoted many figures and dealt with various Votes of Credit. I think that I am within the recollection of the House when I say that that speech gave one the impression that the Government had during that period properly estimated the cost of the War. But it omitted to draw attention to the fact that only eight or nine months ago the Government estimated the deficit for the year at about £860,000,000, while the actual deficit has been nearly 50 per cent. increase on that figure. I am entitled to make that point after the impression created in my mind by the Prime Minister's speech yesterday.
  Speaking last week in this House the Prime Minister said that on 1st January this year this country would be faced for a generation by the serious strain which the War places upon our resources. But are we not also entitled to ask the Prime Minister to point out, not what was the position on 1st January this year, but what will be the position in twelve months to come? The late Chancellor of the Exchequer told us, some months ago, that even if the War were at end our commitments for the next six months would be as great as for the last six months during the War. So, therefore, if the War were to last only another three months, our National
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  Debt on the 1st January next year "will show nearly 50 per cent. increase on the figures for January this year. The Prime Minister is constantly urging economy and referring to the financial situation. I only wish he had pointed out the position then, rather than the position of 1st January, 1916. In that speech the Prime Minister also referred to our military operations in other spheres of the War-Greece, Mesopotamia, East Africa, and the Cameroons—which he described as comparatively minor incidents. They are minor in their main issues, but they are not minor in cost of men, money, or munitions. In that connection may I refer to the remarks made earlier in the afternoon by the right hon. Gentleman the ex-Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Lambert)? He drew attention to the great-cost of military operations in war, and also to the position of the Air Service in this country; and I think that in the Debate last week the First Lord of the Admiralty stated that every factory was occupied in making either guns or machines. The point I make upon that is that if we have to defend those distant parts to which I have referred, with machines and guns, how can we so readily defend the Midlands of this country? That observation applies not only to the defence of our Midlands, but of our merchant ships that are crossing the seas. If any representative of the Admiralty were here, I should like to ask whether every merchant ship leaving our ports to-day has cannon on board? Many of our ships have been sunk in certain quarters during the past few months without the facts having been stated to the public. We are dissipating our energies in every part of the globe, and how can we expect to defend the Midlands or provide proper guns for merchant ships to defend themselves against attack? Perhaps later on in the Debate I may have a reply to that question.
  May I remind the Minister who referred to the opertions in those theatres of war as minor incidents, and may I remind the House, of the terrible toll upon life caused by those minor incidents? For every 100 men we have lost in Flanders we have lost forty in those minor incidents. Last week we discussed the shipping problem, the main cause of which is to be found in our numerous expeditions, that have led to the shortage of tonnage, and it is also the main cause of the rise in the

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  price of foodstuffs in this country. It is a strange thing in these days that when men are being so destructive, Nature has been so abundant. The harvest in 1915 was abundant, though bread stuffs are high in price here on account of the shortage of tonnage brought about by these numerous expeditions. In one port alone in the Mediterranean, in December last, I counted ninety-two merchant ships. Is it an exaggerated figure to say that one expedition alone probably takes from three to four hundred ships; yet we wonder at the increased cost of living, which not only affects this country but affects the position of France, Italy, and other countries. In his speech last week the Prime Minister held out no hope of reducing expenditure. I do not know whether we are to have fresh expeditions, but I do urge right hon. Gentlemen to curtail our liabilities abroad. Finance during the last eighteen months has not been the great factor in this War, but, as this struggle develops, the power of finance will grow apace. And in that connection may I quote the words of the Prime Minister bearing upon the point I am about to make, and justifying every protest that my hon. Friends and myself have made during the last eight or nine months in regard to the power of finance in this War? These are the words of the Prime Minister:
  "When we try to get the perspectives as we ought to do in their true relative proportions, with the various interdependent and related duties which the War casts upon you, this is one that ought to bulk at least as largely as any other."
  Surrounded as the Prime Minister is by men who press the military point of view upon him that statement is a very valuable one, and shows that the power of finance is bound to determine the future conduct of this War. In his speech, yesterday, the Prime Minister referred to the Committees which are inquiring into economy at the Admiralty and in the War Office. The right hon. Gentleman knows too well that any economies, however large they may be, must be small in comparison with our daily expenditure. Our expenditure is determined by the Cabinet itself. The policy which they shape or determine is the policy which sends these Expeditionary Forces abroad, fixes the size of the Army, and the pay. The responsibility rests solely with the Cabinet. I hope that in the months to come some steps may be taken to reduce the growing expenditure of this country. I would make, passing reference to the appeals which the
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  Government have made to the public to curtail their personal expenditure. Previous demands have been made by the Government which have ended largely in failure. I fear that the coming campaign will have a like effect. The question I would ask is this: Why did the public turn a deaf ear in this matter to the appeal of the Government? There seem to be two reasons. One is financial. The public witness the pouring out of money in every direction. The public do not realise that that money is borrowed money. They see contractors, shipowners, and others making large profits, and they say to themselves, "If the necessity for economy is so great, why is this state of affairs permitted to continue?" They see and hear of waste in the Government Departments; but a deeper, and, in my belief, a much more far-reaching reason is this, that they have had no lead from that bench during the last eighteen months in regard to personal economy.
  Is it not hypocritical on our part to come here and urge economy while there is no reduction on that bench? The main thing to do is for every man to reduce his personal expenditure, and I hope that before many months are over, if this campaign of economy is to be launched, that the Government will give some lead to the country in this matter. The country will admire personal sacrifice and personal lead from that bench, and, if any reduction is made, I hope at the same time some steps may be taken to provide that, where men are largely or wholly dependent on their salaries, they shall receive exceptional treatment during these days. The Prime Minister received a deputation a short time ago, and he said that all economies are "mere flea-bites." They can be flea-bites, or they can be made drastic. I do not know whether it will be necessary now or later to introduce some form of compulsory saving; we may be driven to that in the near future; but I hope it will not be necessary, and that the Government will take steps, by drastic taxation or by restriction of imports, to attain their object in that and other ways. May I for a few moments turn to the other side of the question of expenditure, which is at the rate of £5,000,000 a day? The gap which we have to bridge is between our daily expenditure and our daily revenue. During the last eighteen months taxation has only been sufficient to pay the interests of debt, pensions, and a miserable pittance towards the cost of the War. I would

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  not be in order in going into figures on that subject, but there has been no taxation in proportion to the income of the country and the expenditure of the country.
  Mr. SPEAKER: This is not the opportunity for discussing taxation. The opportunity will arise when the Finance Bill is reached. We are at present engaged in voting money for the Services, and later on we shall have to consider how to raise it.
  Major COLLINS: With all respects, I would point out, Sir, that we have had six Votes of Credit during the year and only one Budget; therefore we have only had one opportunity of making our protest that the War is carried on with borrowed money instead of levying a very heavy toll upon and asking for more willing sacrifices from the people. I wish, if I may, to make some passing reference to these points. This £120,000,000 is to bridge the gap between our revenue and our expenditure, and if taxation had been higher to-day there would have been no necessity for this Vote of Credit.
  Mr. SPEAKER: I am sorry to stop the hon. Member, but this is really not the opportunity at all to discuss that. As a matter of fact, we had two Budgets last year, but it has always been the practice of the House, until recent years, to put into one Bill—the Finance Bill—all taxing enactments That is the opportunity for considering the general financial situation, and to consider how the money is to be raised.
  Major COLLINS: We had only one Budget last year levying increased taxation. By the time the Budget is introduced the financial year will have ended and the record of the Government on taxation proposals will have passed. If I may remind you, Sir, there was an Amendment put down to the Address last week in which it was hoped that we would get an early opportunity of raising this subject. If we have to wait until the Budget I am afraid we shall not get that opportunity. I shall implicitly follow your ruling, and I only wish that on this occasion I had the opportunity of showing that the Government have failed to raise money by taxation and have allowed this country to live during the last eighteen months in a world of financial delusion.
  Mr. ANNAN BRYCE: There is one point which has not been raised in this Debate, and which I think it would be of some advantage to have elucidated, and that is the question of the powers of the Committees which the Prime Minister mentioned yesterday have been set up since last August to help to control expenditure. His statement yesterday did not appear to me to be quite consistent as regards two parts of it with regard to these Committees. He said he did not think it would be wise to commit the control of expenditure which had been parted with by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Committee on Retrenchment, and that that had been restricted to criticism of civil expenditure. His words were:—
  "Because it was felt that supervision and interference and inquisition by an outside body with the spending Departments during the stress of war might hamper and paralyse the efficient conduct of the administration."
  Later on he said:—
  "The Finance Committee of the Cabinet discussed and considered the matter with great care all through the summer and the autumn of last year, and as a result of their deliberations, for some time past, in the three great spending Departments which are concerned with the prosecution of the War that is, the Army, the Navy, and the Ministry of Munitions—we have had established and installed Committees—a Committee for each Department—composed of outside persons, men who have had great business experience and authority—in the case of two of these Departments presided over by Cabinet Ministers who have no connection whatsoever with the actual conduct of the Departments themselves."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st February 1916, col. 458.
  What is the distinction in power and function and logicality between the Retrenchment Committee on civil expenditure and these Committees with which the Prime Minister has gilded the pill of the £420,000,000 Votes of Credit? We are told the Retrenchment Committee, being outsiders, were not the proper people to control economy in administration, but then these new Committees are also composed of outsiders, and how is it desirable that they should do so? What are the functions of those Committees? There now seems to be an enormous number of Committees, something like a hundred, I think, and I suggest to the Chancel lot-that it would be a good thing to print a list of those Committees with their functions for the information of Members who would not have to trouble Ministers at Question Time. What are the functions of these Committees? Is the proposed expenditure submitted before it is incurred, or do they merely criticise it after it is incurred? In the former case they might be of some value, but why did not the Retrenchment Committee get that work?

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  If they only criticise after the expenditure is incurred, why cannot that be done by the Committee of this House on Public Accounts? Surely that would have been the better way. It is the business of the House of Commons, and why should outside persons be brought in to do work which should be performed by the House of Commons? There has been a desire expressed on various sides, by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kirkcaldy and others, that we should have Committees appointed not by the Government, because that would be no good, but by the House of Commons to examine and control these various questions. The Prime Minister does not like that idea, and I can quite understand that. It has, however, been found very useful in France, and I do not see why it should not be useful here. At all events, the Committee on Public Accounts, is of some value, and why should it not do this business? What do these new Committees do, and what is their object and powers?
  There was a good deal of talk with regard to the question of responsibility. It is very interesting no doubt, but it appears to me to be rather a waste of time to discuss the question. There is theoretical responsibility, but no practical responsibility. If you arc low down in the service, in the Army or the Navy, you probably do incur responsibility, that is to say, a risk of dismissal or supersession follows failure to do your job properly, but the higher up you go, the less the risk becomes. We know perfectly well that Cabinet Ministers and Under-Secretaries, and generals in high positions like field marshals, no matter how many blunders may be committed, never feel any evil results. It has been admitted, and in fact we have had nothing else but mistakes during the course of the War, except in the operations of the Navy. In all the other fields of war: diplomacy, administration, Army, and so on, there have been very bad failures. The Dardanelles was admitted to be a scandalous failure. The Prime Minister took full responsibility for it, and nothing has happened to anybody. He intends, as he told us, to go on to the end of the War, and I have no doubt his intention would be justified, for so far as one can see at the moment, there is no possibility of any change taking place. Therefore I think the discussion on responsibility raised by the late Civil Lord to the Admiralty was an academic discussion about
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  which it is not worth while bothering the House of Commons. I should deprecate this question of responsibility for anything that happens being raised again at all.
  Mr. HOLT: This question of national finance and expenditure seems to me so serious in all its bearings, and particularly on the future conduct of the War, that I propose to put some of my views before the House. There could be no more important question. It is quite plain, if we go on spending money at the rate we are spending it at the present time, our power to stay during the War is going to be very materially diminished. And very great and extravagant expenditure will have an important bearing on the power of national recuperation, which will be very seriously diminished thereby. I submit, therefore, that there is no subject to which the House could better devote its attention. It may not be a fascinating subject, but it is one of the utmost gravity. I do not believe myself it is possible to make wisely any very large retrenchment in expenditure, not connected with the War. You may even have what appears to be substantial retrenchment, as, for instance, ten or twenty or even thirty millions in the Civil Service, but that is practically nothing compared with the expenditure on the War. I do not believe you can make such retrenchment without doing the nation a great deal of harm. As to the question of private economy to which the hon. Member for Greenock (Major Collins) referred in his very excellent speech, I feel inclined to think that there is a great deal more private saving going on than many people suppose. The large trading concerns with very large profits have no alternative at the present time except to lend those savings to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I believe that all the classes who have been in the habit of being in possession of money have done a great deal of saving. From the information I get, and this applies to all classes, the people who have been mostly engaged in extravagant expenditure are people who are very unexpectedly much better off than they ever were before. It is very natural that they should succumb to the temptation either of having a new piano or buying furs for their lady friends the first time they ever have the opportunity of doing so. Of course, they should not do it, but one cannot help sympathising with the person who, finding himself in the position of

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  comparative affluence for the first time, takes advantage of the opportunity of launching forth into some such expenditure.
  A good many people seem to have very extraordinary ideas as to what economy is. It does not consist in merely reducing the expenditure of money. For instance, a man who refuses to have his premises painted and who allows them to decay is not practising real economy. As regards a man's personal expenditure, it is not economy to cut it down in such a manner as to render him less fit to perform his work. When we come to try and make any large economy, I think we really must turn our attention to the expenditure on the War. That is where the money is going, and it is the only direction in which we can look for any substantial saving. The Prime Minister told the House that he did not anticipate that the daily expenditure on the War was going to increase. May I ask if, in making that statement, he took into account the expenditure necessitated by the additional million men to be raised under the Derby scheme, and upon whom there has as yet been no expenditure? If we are not to exceed the daily average of £4,400,000, and at the same time provide those extra men, then there must be very considerable curtailment of expenditure in other directions to compensate for the necessary consequences of raising those extra men. I do not know that in all respects Government Departments, as regards details, have been quite so extravagant as might have been anticipated. When we consider the extent to which they had to resort to improvisation and to the expansion of their business by about twenty times that which they performed before, it is not surprising to find, and we must not blame people if there has been wasteful expenditure. I do not think that anybody in any walk of life could expand his business to the same extent, and have failed to have adopted wasteful methods.
  7.0 P.M.
  What I think the Government ought to have done under the circumstances was to have supplied all the Departments concerned with a much greater amount of brains at the top. As far as I have been able to see what is going on, there has not been any addition to the thinking power at the top at all commensurate with the addition to the total amount of business
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  proposed to be carried on in the Departments. That has a great deal to do with our troubles. As far as I can judge, most of the officials in the Government Departments are being most horribly overworked, and they are not having enough time to sit down and think properly; yet careful, quiet thought is of the essence of doing any business economically and successfully. I believe that a great deal of our trouble has arisen from the fact that there has not been enough quiet, deliberate thought and planning in advance, simply because all the officials are absolutely overwhelmed with the pressure of things that must be done on the spur of the moment. The Government have not put enough people in the highest places to do the thinking in the way in which it should be done. I heard what the Prime Minister said about the various Committees. These Committees are all very well in their way. They are probably doing their work as well as they possibly can, and will no doubt, in due course, effect savings which in any other circumstances would be substantial, but which, having regard to the volume of expenditure, will probably be almost infinitesimal. The fact is we are not going to get any substantial reduction in the amount of the expenditure on the War except by people who are in a position to question policy. If you ask a Committee to overhaul the details of expenditure in connection with operations which have been decided upon, they can probably do very little. If you are going to do anything really effective you must be allowed to bring before you the persons responsible for the policy, and ascertain from them whether certain expenditure is or is not really necessary to carry out the policy upon which the Government has embarked, and also whether that policy is really worth the money.
  There are a great many things in this War which it might be exceedingly well to do, but we cannot do everything. When you come to consider what is to be done, you have to weigh the good against the best. If you ask the heads of the Army or of the Navy what they would like to have to carry on the War, there are very few things they could not quite truthfully say would assist in bringing the War to a conclusion. But they cannot have everything. That is quite impossible. If you are going to do any good, you must do it through a body which is capable of weighing the pros and cons of alternative

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  policies, discarding the good in favour of the best and concentrating on the best. One thing must strike everybody, and that is that our expenditure for the military operations in which we are engaged is simply colossal when compared with that of any of the other belligerents. It may be necessary that it should be so, but even apart from the fact that other belligerents are paying their soldiers very much less per diem, I feel convinced that the Germans are not spending anything like as much as our people are spending on fighting. I do not believe the Russians are, I very much doubt if the French are. There may be some reason, but I suspect that our Army produces less military result per £ sterling than any of the other belligerent forces. That is a point upon which it would be very interesting if we could get a little more information.
  I want to ask the Treasury Bench for information as to certain items of expenditure. It is matter of common knowledge, of which anybody connected with the shipping business must be aware, that during the last eighteen months, through-out which time this War has been essentially a war of trench fighting, a prodigious number of horses and mules have been brought into Europe from all parts of the world. What on earth are all those animals doing? What are they for? Are they really necessary? The matter does not end with the flooding of Western Europe with horses and mules. When you have done that, the next thing is that an enormous quantity of food for these animals has to be brought in, and one of the main causes of the difficulty with regard to shipping has been the tremendous demand made for bringing food for the horses and mules which have been brought over for the Army—animals which, apparently, as far as an ordinary man can judge, are not, under the present circumstances of the War, particularly required. We are to-day in this position, that the supply of food for the peoples of Europe is materially impeded by the necessity of bringing in these enormous quantities of fodder for horses. I think we might have a little more information on this subject. There is another point upon which information would be interesting. Every shipowner knows from his own experience that immense masses of material are being brought into this country for the manufacture of munitions of war—articles which are not found in Germany and cannot be produced there.
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  If our Munitions Department really require for the purposes of the War anything like the mass of material which they are bringing into the country, then the Germans must be in a very bad way for munitions. It would be very interesting if we could have some sort of account from the Government or be satisfied that some sort of inquiry had been made as to whether we really require all these things, which we are told are absolutely necessary for the carrying on of the War, and if we could be told why, if they are necessary for us, Germany apparently can get on very well without any of them.
  I want to speak about another very serious matter connected with the War. I think the Government ought to make to the House a frank statement about the naval position in the Mediterranean. It is a very serious matter. Steamship owners have been given to understand that the Mediterranean is so far unsafe by reason of enemy submarines that it is desirable that they should adopt the Cape route. Obviously, if the Mediterranean is rendered unsafe by submarines, the whole motive for holding Egypt and the Suez Canal has disappeared. The sole motive for going to Egypt originally was to secure to England the passage through the Suez Canal, and if we are prevented from securing that object it does not seem to me that there is very much advantage to us in possessing Egypt at all. We have lost the real object of possessing Egypt. The general impression among shipowners is that the difficulty in the Mediterranean is due to the want of professional competence and skill on the part of the Allied Navies. We have heard a great deal about what we are to do for the Allies on this, that, and the other occasion. I think we ought to be told what the Allies are doing for us in the way of keeping the Mediterranean reasonably free for the passage of our ships, or whether the Government intends to take any steps at an early date to make the Mediterranean as safe as the neighbourhood of the British Isles is at present. This is a very serious matter, because the loss of time involved by the diversion of shipping to the Cape route will accentuate all the difficulties in regard to food supplies and munitions of war. We ought to have a perfectly frank statement from the Government on this subject. I would remind my right hon. Friend that in these Votes we are providing for a very large sum of money—in the aggregate about £400,000,000—to be paid to our

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  Allies. If we are going to pay them these large sums of money, we ought to know what they are doing for the money, and we should be given an opportunity of considering whether it would not be better to have rather less Ally and rather more money. We ought to be in a position to consider frankly and openly whether these gentlemen to whom we are paying these enormous sums are worth the money or not.
  My hon. Friend alluded to the question of expeditions. This question of foreign expeditions is very interesting. We had first of all the Gallipoli Expedition, and then we had the Mesopotamia Expedition. I would remind the Chancellor of the Exchequer of what the Prime Minister said on this subject on the 2nd November last. This is what he said about Gallipoli:—
  "The chances of success, as it seemed to us, and to those on the spot, were not only great, but preponderant."
  This is what he said about Mesopotamia:—
  "General Nixon's force is now within measurable distance of Bagdad. I do not think that in the whole course of the War there has been a series of operations more carefully contrived, more brilliantly conducted, and with a better prospect of final success."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd November, I915, col. 519, Vol. LXXV.]
  I do not know what the experience of other hon. Members is, but I must confess that I cannot imagine any other position of authority and responsibility which a gentleman would be allowed to retain after having made on his own confession two such appalling miscalculations and errors of judgment. That is the confession of the Prime Minister himself. Are we really, without any information whatever as to what is going on, going to vote million after million of money to a Government, the head of which admits, in respect of the prospects of success of these expeditions, two of the very worst possible miscalculations that have probably ever been put on record. These are things which make, or ought to make, any ordinary plain person have very grave doubts as to whether the Government are to be trusted with the conduct of this War. I really submit to my hon. Friends that we in this House have duties to our constituents, one of which is to see that we are put in possession of sufficient information to be satisfied that the Government are competent to carry this War to the successful conclusion which every one of us means to obtain. What about the expeditions to Salonika and Egypt? They are vastly expensive. I wonder if there are many
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  enemies anywhere particularly close to them. Really, from what is going on, it looks as if the enemy induced us to plant our forces in these remote places and has then quietly gone back, leaving us to wait until later on. I think we ought to have more information. The fact is, if we are going to have a gigantic Army, we cannot afford to play a waiting game. The two policies are destructive. There was our original policy which we formed before the War and upon which we started the War, namely, that we should have a small Army and a triumphant Navy, and play a waiting game—a war of attrition. Now we have adopted the policy of a very large Army on the Continental scale, on top of the Navy, which no Continental Power has ever had, and we cannot afford to wait. You must push on with the War very much more rapidly than you are doing unless you are going to die from exhaustion. You must have one policy or the other—either that of a long war, with a comparatively small daily expenditure, or the policy which Germany adopted but did not succeed with, that of a war with a very large force, with a great expenditure, deliberately intended to be over in a very short period. Everybody in the House, and, I believe, everybody in the country, wants to see this War brought to a successful conclusion. What is more, I believe we all are determined to see it brought to a successful conclusion. But I must say I think we ought to have much more clear and decisive evidence than anything before us at the present time that this Government are the people who are going to bring it to a successful conclusion. The House of Commons ought to insist upon that information before they agree to part with the money.
  Major NEWMAN: The hon. Member who has just spoken has alluded to our expedition to Salonika. If he had happened to be connected with it, he would, I think, have found that there are enemies round about that place. He also told us that he wondered what on earth we and the Army wanted with so many mules and horses in the Western part of Europe. Again, I would say, that if he had been like some of us, a soldier in the trenches, or in the field, and had been waiting for a cooker to come along with his dinner, and that cooker was drawn with four mules, he would be the last man in the world to suggest that the mule was not wanted when it was a question of, no mule no dinner. Latterly there has been a lot

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  of talk about waste and extravagance, especially in the Army. In a great war like this where we have raised enormous Armies, and raised them quickly, there is bound to be extravagance and waste. If we were to get behind the scenes in the German or the Austrian armies, or the French or the Russian armies, I say unhesitatingly that we should see that there was there too serious extravagance and waste. In every country in Europe where the nations are at war there have been debates about extravagance in the Army—in the German Reichstag, in the French Chamber, and I have no doubt in the Russian Chamber, too. You cannot help it. What we can do, and what we have been doing in this House, is to point out small points of extravagance; to bring them to the notice of the Under-Secretary for War, or other Minister responsible, and let him try to put the matter right. The right hon. Gentleman has admitted that some of the suggestions made to him are, at any rate, useful. Any suggestions we may make that tends not alone to economy but to efficiency must be useful. It stands to reason that where a square peg is put into a round hole it is uncomfortable for the peg itself, and the state of things typified by that illustration tends to a loss of efficiency and economy.
  I should like to point out one or two cases where, to my mind, the square peg has been put into the round hole, so that in the future that mistake might be avoided. There has been and always is a great competition for the comfortable places at home. Everybody wants to get into that portion of the Army and to stay there. A little while ago I was listening to a lecture at Aldershot by a great expert. He was telling us how in the most neat and efficient manner to kill Germans. We were told exactly what to do and almost exactly how the Germans would fall upon our bayonets. The lecturer had invited questions, and at the end a young officer alongside me got up and said, "I would like to know, sir, how I can be transferred from the Infantry back into the Army Service Corps?" The Army Service Corps before the War was not a branch of the Service very highly thought of. It is perfectly well known now that there is a very long waiting list for the Army Service Corps, especially amongst the officers. It is difficult to get there, but the work there is much more agreeable than trench work, and the Army Service
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  Corps is now a nice and popular service. Take, again, the Mechanical Transport Section with a pay of 5s. a day, which, I believe, has now been stopped. I wondered on seeing some of these men exactly the difference between the skill required to conduct these motor lorries along a road in Belgium and France and the work in the trenches, flinging bombs at any moment against the Germans, not at 5s. a day, but at the pay of the ordinary soldier, 1s. a day.
  There is another very popular round hole at the present time. That seems to be the Flying Corps. The other day there passed me, and probably other Members of the House, a Highland band, behind which were young fellows marching, dressed in the very tasty uniform of the Army Flying Corps. Behind them again came what looked to be a batch of recruits that were going to join the Flying Corps. I looked very carefully at the men as they passed. Five or six seemed to be ordinary postmen in ordinary postman's uniform, and the others were men who could not under any circumstances be expected to make good flying men. For this purpose you want a smart, active young fellow, not too heavy, and besides that he should be a good tiptop mechanic, perhaps men who, it may be, at present are driving ladies' motor cars. What is needed here is young men who can keep the machines fit for flight. You do not want anybody who has got a little bit of influence to get himself dragged into the Royal Flying Corps! You do not want anybody with a little influence here and a little pull there to be allowed to get into that corps, with its smart uniform and buttons. By the time some of these men are fit for flying, or by the time they are efficient mechanics, the War will long be over. We have to remember, of course, that the Army now is no longer on a voluntary basis. The Army is under a compulsory system, whereas before it was right that the man should have a choice of corps. Those days are gone. Now, without bias or favour, these men, having been put into the Army Reserve, after attestation, ought to be simply sent where they are wanted. If they are wanted in an Infantry regiment, send them there; if in the Flying Corps, send them there. Send them wherever they are wanted without bias or favour.
  There is another point which has been brought before the notice of the House.

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  A great many men who were not physically fit, especially at the beginning, presented themselves for active service, and managed to get themselves posted to units. All honour to them for coming forward. They came forward, as they said, "to do their bit." These men are an expense to the country. They are not able to earn their pay as soldiers. Some of them have gone abroad and broken down. They have been put into the Home Service, but again have been unable to do the ordinary work of a soldier. We are very sorry for them. We in the Army did our best for them. I remember the case of a man in my own command. He was a constituent of mine. He attested and joined, but how on earth he ever got through I do not know. He evidently had consumption of a fairly advanced type in the throat. We sent him away. Everything possible was done for him by the medical men. He was sent to hospital, and again, after a spell of work, again to hospital. He was examined before the medical board, and then for weeks and weeks he was kept, like Mahomet's coffin, suspended between heaven and earth, not knowing from morning to evening what he was going to do. The man had a big family besides. That is one particular instance out of hundreds, and, perhaps, thousands. How are we to deal with them?
  I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State that there should be instituted something in the nature of clearing camps, where, without any undue delay, or, at any rate, without any red tape, the commanding officer, or whoever it might be, could send men of this type, who obviously at the time were not fit to do their work—men who had fallen out once or twice in the last march, men who unfortunately get very heavy colds which turn to bronchitis, men with black teeth and flat feet. These should be sent to clearing camps and carefully examined medically and surgically and sifted out. Some of them, with a little attention, may be perfectly able to go back to their work, whilst those who are not fit for the work of the soldier might be able to do munitions work. Others might be sent to do clerical work and so on. At any rate, why should not at this crisis ways and means be adopted to meet these cases? We then should not be wasting the country's money and putting men to
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  jobs they cannot do. From my own experience, I very thoroughly agree with what the Secretary of State said about the training of recruits. It is ridiculous, unwise, impolitic, and wrong to send a recruit to the front under a year's hard training. The recruit himself does not want divisional, brigade, and other training of that sort. He requires to know how to shoot and use the bayonet, how to form fours, and how to get his feet hard for marching; and then if his heart is in the right place, a good and decent fellow who goes out to join his unit will do his work in a businesslike way. I trust the views I have put before the House will be of some service to the Under-Secretary.
  Question put, and agreed to.

  SUPPLEMENTARY VOTE OF CREDIT, 1915–16.

    VOTE OF CREDIT, 1916–17.
    Resolution reported,
    2. "That a sum, not exceeding £300,000,000, be granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary Grants of Parliament, towards defraying the Expenses which may be incurred during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1917, for General Navy and Army Services in so far as specific provision is not made therefor by Parliament; for the conduct of Naval and Military Operations; for all measures which may be taken for the Security of the Country; for assisting the Food Supply, and promoting the Continuance of Trade, Industry, Business, and Communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, the financing of the purchase and resale of foodstuffs and materials, or otherwise; for Relief of Distress; and generally for all Expenses, beyond those provided for in the ordinary Grants of Parliament, arising out of the existence of a state of war."
    Question, "That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution," put, and agreed to.

WAYS AND MEANS [21st February]
Resolutions reported,
1. "That, towards making good the Supply granted to His Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1916, the sum of £120,000,000 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom."
2. "That, towards making good the Supply granted to His Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1917, the sum of £300,000,000 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom."
Resolutions agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in upon the said Resolutions by the Chairman of Ways and Means, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Montagu.

WAYS AND MEANS [21st February]

  CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 1) BILL.
  "to apply certain sums out of the Consolidated Fund to the service of the years ending on the thirty-first day of March, one thousand nine hundred and sixteen
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  and one thousand nine hundred and seventeen," presented accordingly, and read the first time; to be read a second time tomorrow (Wednesday), and to be printed. [Bill 2.]
  The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.
  Whereupon Mr. SPEAKER, pursuant to the Order of the House of this day, proposed the Question, "That this House do now adjourn."
  Question put, and agreed to.
  Adjourned accordingly at Half after Seven o'clock.

WAR.
  CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES.
  CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES.
  VALUATION DEPARTMENT.
  VALUATION DEPARTMENT.
  EXCHEQUER BONDS (DIVIDENDS).
  EXCHEQUER BONDS (DIVIDENDS).
  MILITARY HOSPITALS (BRITISH SOLDIERS).
  MILITARY HOSPITALS (BRITISH SOLDIERS).
  BOXING CONTESTS FOR SOLDIERS.
  BOXING CONTESTS FOR SOLDIERS.
  NAVAL AND MILITARY SERVICES (PENSIONS AND ALLOWANCES).
  NAVAL AND MILITARY SERVICES (PENSIONS AND ALLOWANCES).
  ARMY CLOTHING (ROYAL COMMISSION).
  ARMY CLOTHING (ROYAL COMMISSION).
  MILITARY SERVICE.
    EXAMINATION OF RECRUITS (MEDICAL FEES).
    EXAMINATION OF RECRUITS (MEDICAL FEES).
    ENLISTMENT UNDER AGE.
    ENLISTMENT UNDER AGE.
  MUNITIONS.
    CENTRAL CONTROL BOARD (LIQUOR TRAFFIC).
    CENTRAL CONTROL BOARD (LIQUOR TRAFFIC).
  METROPOLITAN POLICE.
  METROPOLITAN POLICE.
  WAR BONUS.
  WAR BONUS.
  LIVE STOCK (TRANSIT).
  LIVE STOCK (TRANSIT).
  INVOICE CERTIFICATES.
  INVOICE CERTIFICATES.
  FEEDING PIGS (SCOTLAND).
  FEEDING PIGS (SCOTLAND).
  COTTON GROWING (EGYPT).
  COTTON GROWING (EGYPT).
NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT.
  COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION.
  COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION.
  Trinity College, Dublin.
  Trinity College, Dublin.
  Education Grants (Ireland).
  Education Grants (Ireland).
  Small Holdings (Lindean Estate, Selkirk).
  Small Holdings (Lindean Estate, Selkirk).
Preamble
Appeal Committee—First Report from; read, and agreed to.
VISCOUNT MERSEY.
The Right Honourable John Charles, Baron Mersey, having been created Viscount Mersey of Toxteth, in the County Palatine of Lancaster—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
LORD RATHCREEDAN.
Cecil William Norton, Esquire, late Captain, 5th Royal Irish Lancers, having been created Baron Rathcreedan of Belle-hatch Park, in the County of Oxford—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
The KING'S Answer to the Address of Tuesday last reported by the Lord Steward (L.Farquhar).
SWANSEA HARBOUR BILL. [H.L.]
To be read 2a on Tuesday the 7th of March next.

RETURNS, REPORTS, &c.
Colonies (Annual)—No. 874. British Guiana (Report for 1914–1915):
Navy (Supplementary Estimate, 1915–1916)—An estimate of the further sum required to be voted for the Navy for the year ending 31st March 1916:
Local Government Board—Forty-fourth Annual Report for 1914–1915—
Part I.—Administration of the Poor Law, the Unemployed Workmen Act and the Old Age Pensions Acts—
Special Work arising out of the War—Prevention and Relief of Distress; Reception and Accommodation of War Refugees;
Distribution of the Gifts from the Dominions and Colonies, &c.;
Part II—Housing and Town Planning;
Part III—A. Public Health and Local Administration;
B. County Council Administration;
C. Local Taxation and Valuation:
Ministry of Munitions—Health of Munition Workers Committee. Report on Canteen Construction and Equipment:
London Traffic—Report of the London Traffic Branch of the Board of Trade, 1915:
Presented (by command) and ordered to lie on the Table.
Diseases of Animals Acts, 1894 to 1914–Order, No. 9697, dated 12th February 1916, defining a Foreign Animals Quarantine Station at Whale Island Pier, Portsmouth Harbour, for the purposes of the Foreign Animals (Quarantine) Order of 1896.
Local Government Board (Ireland)—Orders made by the Board under the Poor Relief (Ireland) Acts—

1. Amending Article 31 of the Union Accounts Order, 1915;

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2. Modifying the provisions of section 9 of the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act, 1847, as respects the Unions specified in the Order, for purposes in connection with the present war;

3. Abolishing the office of Schoolmaster of the Workhouse of the Roscrea Union;

4. Varying Article 33 of the Board's General Order of 18th December 1882, for the purpose of the appointment of a Medical Officer of the Workhouse of the Kilamallock Union:

Irish Universities Act, 1908—Statute VI. for University College, Cork:
Piers and Harbours (Provisional Orders, Session 1916)—Report by the Board of Trade of their Proceedings under the General Pier and Harbour Act, 1861, and the General Pier and Harbour Act, 1861, Amendment Act:
Shops Act, 1912—Order made by the County Council of the County Palatine of Chester and confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, affecting certain classes of shops in the Urban District of Marple:
Greenwich hospital and Travers' Foundation (Capital and Income Accounts, 1914–1915)—Accounts of the receipt and expenditure of the capital and of the income derived from the lands and other property held for the benefit of Greenwich Hospital, and the Foundation of Samuel Travers, Esquire, for the year ended 31st March 1915; together with the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General thereon:
Intermediate Education (Ireland) Act, 1914–Amended Rules as to the Constitution and Procedure of the Registration Council:—
National Insurance Acts—

1. The National Health Insurance (Special Employers' Custom) Order (Scotland) 1915 (No. 2), dated 24th January 1916;

2. The National Health Insurance (Appointment of Representatives of Insured Persons on Insurance Committees) Amendment Regulations (Scotland) 1916, dated 4th February 1916:

Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) and ordered to lie on the Table.

BLOCKADE POLICY.
LORD SYDENEAM LORD SYDENEAM rose to move to resolve—
"That this House considers that, in conformity with the principles of International Law and with the legitimate rights of neutrals, more effective use could be made of the Allied Fleets in preventing supplies, directly conducing to the prolongation of the war, from reaching enemy countries."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, in less than nineteen months of war at least ten million casualties have occurred, and the sum total of suffering, sorrow, and destruction which the war has brought defies all possible estimate. It may fairly be said that all the belligerent Powers are moving at different speeds towards bankruptcy, and perhaps also towards revolution. There seems to be no immediate prospect of any such striking military success as would bring us peace on the only terms which the Allies could accept, while looking back one sees that the handling of some of our military strategic problems has left much to be desired. Surely, my Lords, it is inevitable in such circumstances as these that we should ask ourselves whether we are making the best and fullest use of the tremendous weapon of our Sea Power on which we trusted, and which was held up to us as the justification of our small prewar military establishment. We entered upon this war under many and grave disadvantages, but we had ready to our hand naval strength absolutely and relatively far greater than at the beginning of any war of the past. It is still upon the Grand Fleet in the North Sea that the whole of the military operations of the Allies must ultimately rest, from Flanders and France to Salonika, and from Riga to Mesopotamia; and unless the Central Powers can reverse the naval balance, the Armies of the Allies can be reinforced and supplied to the fullest extent that their national resources will permit. So far the advantages which we possess are many and manifest, but our naval strength has not been hitherto so used as to bring the utmost pressure to bear upon the enemy. The political historian of the war will have to explain why this was not done, and I think he will come to the conclusion that the reasons are to be sought in psychological causes.
The late Government were well aware of what naval strength implied. On June 12,

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1907, the Foreign Secretary wrote these words to Sir Edward Fry, who was head of our delegation at The Hague:—
"For her ability to bring pressure to bear on her enemies in war Great Britain has to rely upon her Navy alone. His Majesty's Government cannot, therefore, authorise you to agree to any Resolution which would diminish the effective means which the Navy has of bringing pressure to bear on an enemy."
It is impossible to state the case better than that, and any one reading those words at the time might have felt assured that the effective handling of the Navy could safely be counted upon in any war in which we might engage. Your Lordships will note the words "rely upon her Navy alone," which implies that it was then considered quite out of the question that we could bring military pressure to bear upon any European enemy. It was all the more necessary on this hypothesis that the means of exerting the fullest maritime pressure should be most carefully studied in time of peace, and that any limitations arising from International Law or the just claims of neutrals should be taken into the fullest account in advance. Was that ever done? In the same letter the following passage occurs—
" His Majesty's Government are ready and willing for their part, in lieu of endeavouring to frame new and more satisfactory rules for the prevention of contraband in the future, to abandon the principle of contraband altogether, thus allowing the oversea, trade in neutral vessels between belligerents and neutrals on the one hand and neutrals on the other to continue during war without any restriction, subject only to its exclusion any blockade from an enemy's port."
I do not in the least criticise this view. It could fairly be argued, at that time especially, that the contraband list might be abolished provided you could establish and maintain an effective blockade of the enemy's ports.
Since 1907 there have been great developments of submarine warfare which have altered the conditions of all blockades and raised many new questions of great importance which could not at that time be wholly foreseen. In 1909 the disastrous Declaration of London was forced upon the House of Commons, but was most wisely rejected in your Lordships' House. Any one who examines this amazing document might imagine that it was drawn up by a great military Power with a view to hampering the operations of a great naval Power in war. Its principal features
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were two. First, it made the doctrine of continuous voyage very difficult, if not impossible, to apply. Secondly, it set up an entirely new list of articles which were never to be made contraband in any circumstances. Among those articles were raw cotton, which is essential for small arms and heavy guns; oil seeds, nuts, and copra, most important as fat-containing products used for making nitro-glycerine; metallic ores, on which the making of guns and munitions absolutely depends; and rubber, which is vital for some forms of motor transport and for other military requirements.
When war broke out the unratified Declaration of London was put in force with some modifications and with calamitous results. It crippled the action of our Navy for more than seven months and put a stop to the "effective measures of bringing pressure to bear on an enemy," which seven years earlier the Foreign Office had declared it would never abandon. It also had the effect of starting the adjacent neutrals on a new form of commerce from which they have derived immense profits. Clearly the psychology of the Foreign Office had not changed up to 1914, and it may be said that these seven months were gravely injurious to the cause of the Allies. After the battle of the Marne the Germans perfectly realised that their plan of a short and sharp campaign had failed, and they set themselves with great skill, energy, and success to accumulate necessary stores of all kinds. It is clear that in 1907 His Majesty's Government thought that a war with Germany was highly improbable. I do not altogether blame them for that view. There was much "peace talk" in the air just then, and it was not very easy to believe that a nation which was prospering exceedingly in commerce and industry would risk all by forcing war upon Europe when it was not in the slightest danger of being itself attacked and when all the other great Powers were eager for the preservation of peace. It was also fondly believed at that time that Hague Conventions were things which would be binding on all the Powers who subscribed to them.
But in the years following 1907 there were strong reasons for a complete change of view. Between the visit of the noble and learned Viscount (Lord Haldane) to Berlin and the outbreak of war lie two and a-half years. The intentions of Germany were made plain to the Government in 1912.

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And if no naval or military preparations were possible in that time—as I do not admit—there was at least ample time to re-study the whole question of the handling of the Navy from the point of view of war with Germany. The first step in any such study would naturally be to look up international precedents. It would be found at once that the great French Wars were of very little use, because all the naval conditions differed; besides that, neither England nor France adhered to any of the principles of International Law. The main object of Napoleon was to prevent our goods reaching the Continent, and our main object, while cutting off all French supplies, was to insure the ingress of our goods by means of our own and neutral shipping. The Continental system of Napoleon required the conquest of Europe for its success and eventually brought Napoleon into conflict with Russia, which was the first step in his downfall. His Berlin and Milan Decrees flagrantly violated every principle of International Law; and our Orders in Council, which were issued as reprisals, were equally illegal from the international point of view. Thus it can be said that the French Wars could supply no guidance, and until the American Civil War there was very little to be learned on this subject.
The action of President Lincoln when the Northern States were fighting, just as the Allies are fighting now, for national existence does, however, supply international precedents of the utmost importance. Briefly, what the Federal Government did at that time was this. It proclaimed a blockade of the whole Confederate coast; it boldly extended the doctrine of continuous voyage, and made foodstuffs and everything that the Confederate States needed for carrying on the war absolute contraband. The practical effect, though not the technical effect, of that was to set up a long-distance blockade, which included neutral Mexican ports, our Port of Nassau in the Bahamas, and also our Port of Bermuda. In the leading case, that of the "Springbok," which came before the Supreme Court of the United States, it was decided that the ship was legally captured because, though she was bound for Nassau, the presumption was that her cargo was to be transhipped there for Matamoros or for some Confederate port. Nassau is more than 1,000 miles from Matamoros and 150 miles from the nearest point on the
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Florida coast, and Bermuda is 800 miles from Charleston; but Rotterdam is only 150 miles from Emden and about 200 miles from the mouth of the Elbe.
As an ignorant layman I feel that I am on dangerous ground in dealing with any question of International Law, but I want to put two questions to noble and learned Lords. First, did President Lincoln violate International Law or did he adapt its principles to meet the needs which arose from the application of steam to navies? Secondly, did not our acquiescence in the measures of President Lincoln, even when the blockade of the Southern States was miserably ineffective, constitute a valid international precedent? If these questions are answered as I believe they must be, then surely it is open to us to modify the practice of International Law to meet the new conditions of the present time without in any way invalidating or violating its principles. But I am afraid that these important questions could not have been adequately studied at the Foreign Office in the two and a-half years of grace allowed to it; and the result of this neglect was, as I have said, that in a modified form the Declaration of London was all that was forthcoming when war broke out in August, 1914. On March 11 last, when it began to be realised that this measure was futile, we issued Orders in Council after public anxiety had been plainly and loudly expressed. We then made the mistake of announcing those Orders in Council as "reprisals" against, the German plan of indiscriminate murder at sea, which came into operation on February 18. As our measures were necessary in any case if we were to win the war, we ought, instead of announcing them as reprisals, to have declared simply that the Allies were going to assert their fullest maritime rights. Since March 11 we have made successive additions to the contraband list, generally after public demand.
What have been the effects of our policy up to the present time? In his very clever but unconvincing speech on January 26 Sir Edward Grey said—
"What we want to do is to prevent goods reaching or coming from the enemy country, and that is what we are doing. We want to do it, and we believe that under the Order in Council it is being done."
In the same speech Sir Edward Grey said that the work of carrying out the Orders in Council had been entrusted to the Contra-

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band Committee, but he did not tell us what instructions had been given to that Committee, nor did he appear to realise that the whole responsibility for the actions taken by that Committee must rest with the Foreign Office and the Government. I note that in that debate the chairman of the Committee said significantly—
"I think that a great deal more might be done."
And he indicated that the difficulty lay in the uncertainty of the action of the Prize Courts. My Lords, the vital question is this. Are supplies necessary to the pro-longation of the war still reaching the enemy or are they stopped, as Sir Edward Grey said the Government believed was "being done"? Our contention is that large supplies of most important commodities continue to reach the enemy every day.
Sir Edward Grey complained of "reckless figures" and "reckless statements," and he spent some time in demolishing inferences which had been made from inadequate data. I will try to be very careful not to fall into that error in any figures which I shall lay before your Lordships. The real point is this. Are neutrals adjacent to the enemy country receiving goods essential to the enemy in quantities far in excess of their own home needs? Holland normally imports 824 tons of meat monthly and exports 5,300 tons, but in November last Holland imported 8,024 tons of meat. Holland is a great meat-producing country with an immense surplus for export purposes, yet it seems to have been necessary for her in one month to import nearly ten times her normal amount of meat. Denmark is another great meat-exporting country, yet during the war Denmark has taken to importing meat on a very large and abnormal scale. It cannot be supposed that the Dutch and the Danes are eating more meat than they did before the war, and there cannot be any doubt where this large quantity of meat has gone.
Last month I gave some striking figures showing the abnormal exports of cocoa from this country. Those exports reached the maximum in November last. Since then I am glad to say the exports of cocoa from this country have fallen, but in January last the figures were still nearly six times the normal, and it is quite clear that most of this cocoa has gone into Germany. The Dutch Government prohibited
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the export of cocoa butter on October 22, but the export of manufactured cocoa to Germany proceeds steadily. A Dutch merchant, writing from Amsterdam at the end of December last, said—
"Now already there are exporters here to Germany of a stuff consisting of about 10 per cent of cocoa powder, 40 per cent, of sugar, and 50 per cent. of cocoa butter. Therefore the food question in respect to cocoa has not become more difficult for Germany, and it would have been more to point if Great Britain had stopped the import to Holland of cocoa beans altogether.",
This seems obvious, and it is difficult to understand why it was not foreseen. I have laid stress on cocoa because it contains nearly 50 per cent. of fat, and fat is a vital commodity not only for food but for some industries and for the manufacture of nitro-glycerine, of which Germany needs immense quantities for the war. All this has been pointed out by our leading chemists, but I am afraid up to the present without result.
Materials used in the manufacture of explosives were made absolute contraband on October 12. That was a very wise step. But oleaginous seeds, nuts and kernels, together with animal, fish, and vegetable oils were only made conditional contraband, which seems a most extraordinary proceeding. I am told that one member of the Government said that he had been informed that linseed oil did not contain glycerine. I think it must have been the same member of the Government who at another time said he believed that sheeps' wool was used for ammunition. As regards cotton there was another fallacy arising from that half-knowledge which is always dangerous, and this fallacy proved infinitely advantageous to the enemy. The approximate normal annual fat consumption of Germany is about 2,966,000 tons,of which nearly half has to be imported. Dr. Waller has calculated that, even if it is assumed that the consumption of fat by the population is halved, that the industrial consumption is reduced by one-third, and that, the home production is undiminished, at least 332,000 tons of fat would have to be imported, and I think myself that this figure is very much under the mark. But if that figure or anything like it were true, there was here a very powerful means of bringing pressure to bear on the enemy, but I am afraid it has been neglected. There is an article known as hard soap which goes freely into Germany from Holland, and which is made

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up of fatty substances which can easily be separated; and, as I have said, great quantities of fat go into Germany in the form of cocoa, much of it from this country. The export of linseed oil from the United Kingdom suddenly sprung up to five times the normal last year, and in three months 31,855 tons were exported from this country to Holland. The Dutch official figures of the export of linseed oil to Germany in 1915 show an excess above the normal of 68,566 tons; and, very curiously, the curves of the exports of linseed oil from the United Kingdom show a very close correspondence with the curves of the Dutch exports of linseed oil to Germany, so that there can be no doubt where most of this oil has gone. The German Government is apparently diverting fat from the food of the population in order to make nitro-glycerine, and great efforts are being made to import fat-producing substances. Those efforts have had much success, and we have helped them both directly and indirectly.
I could give many more figures but I do not wish to weary your Lordships, and the all-important question of ores will be dealt with by my noble friend Lord Devonport. The great fall in the German exchange shows that Germany must be purchasing largely in outside markets, and this goes to confirm all the other evidence on that point. Incidentally it seems to me that the great attraction of all these supplies to neutral ports for enemy use may be helping to raise prices in this country, and the large tonnage employed in the carrying of these supplies which eventually reach Germany must help to raise freights to this country and thus indirectly to raise prices also. Recently the Foreign Office issued a White Paper which lucidly explains the measures which have been taken, but it makes one statement which seems to me quite misleading. The Paper points out, in paragraph 15, that—
"It is necessary to satisfy the Prize Court of the enemy destination of cargoes."
But it goes on to say that—
"All this applies as much to goods seized as contraband as it does to those seized for breach of blockade."
An eminent lawyer who has given special study to this subject writes to me that this sentence is "meaningless, because the law contained is not the law of blockade or anything like it." I believe that view is right. Under International Law, as hitherto
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understood, breach of effective blockade justifies capture whether the goods are contraband or not, and whether they are enemy goods or neutral. Our Prize Courts used to hold that a ship could be captured at the beginning of her voyage if there was strong presumption that she intended to run a blockade. Is it possible that the instructions given to our Contraband Committee embody the confusion of ideas shown in the White Paper to which I have referred? If that is so, it would explain much which it is very difficult to understand.
I believe that our Orders in Council as they stand, though they are open to criticism in several respects, are not at variance with the principles of International Law adapted to meet present conditions, and if they fail to secure the objects which the Prime Minister contemplated the reason is that they are not enforced on definite lines intelligible to us and to neutrals. The noble Marquess the Leader of the House said the other day that the stoppage of cotton was not brought about by making cotton contraband, but by the operation of the Orders in Council. If that is so, and if cotton, copper, and rubber are now stopped, then evidently the same process can be applied to all supplies which are necessary for the prolongation of the war. Cannot the Government decide what the vital supplies are, concentrate their efforts upon stopping those supplies, and leave immaterial commodities alone? I believe there has been a great deal of discussion about coffee. Coffee is a delightful beverage, and I have no doubt that the Germans enjoy it and would feel the absence of it; but compared with cocoa it is absolutely immaterial. The real difficulty seems to be that the psychology which produced the Declaration of London is still alive and potent for harm.
We have heard very much of the "rationing" process, but we have never been told how it is now being applied; and it is quite certain from the figures that I have given, and from many others that I could give, that neutrals have received and are receiving multiple rations. The Foreign Secretary said—
"You have still got to let through to neutral countries the things which they really require for their own consumption."
I am quite certain that every one of your Lordships will thoroughly endorse that view. But Sir Edward Grey did not state

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whether the goods allowed to the Netherlands Oversea Trust, to the Danish Chambers, and to the other bodies with whom we have secret Agreements are rigidly regulated on this process; and it seems certain either that they are not so regulated, or that a very large number of goods escape the operations of these various trusts. I believe that the Netherlands Oversea Trust is a thoroughly well-organised institution, but it must, be uncommonly leaky. I understand that it sells to customer No. 1, who makes a declaration and sells to No. 2, who makes another declaration; so the process goes on, and the goods get divided up into many hands and at last the obligation is entirely forgotten, and a great deal of the articles get across the frontier into Germany. Up to the end of September the Netherlands Oversea Trust inflicted fines amounting to no less than £45,000, and they have imposed more since. I cannot evaluate fines in terms of goods, but, considering the high prices that prevail it might be profitable to accept a fine, as it only goes to Dutch charity. Therefore you do business and charity at the same time. In addition, smuggling prevails to a great extent and we have no means of stopping it. As the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, truly said the other day, "the temptation to carry on business of this kind is enormous; there are vast profits to be made; there is corruption on every side." If large accumulations of supplies not required for home consumption are allowed to exist in adjacent neutral countries they will infallibly go across the frontier unless the neutral Government takes strong measures to prevent it.
I come back to the point that surplus imports into neutral countries must be checked, and I contend that this can be done in full conformity with the principles of international Law applied to our present conditions. What I venture to press on the Government is this: Ration rigorously. Make all essential commodities needed for the prolongation of the war absolute contraband, as did the United States fifty-five years ago, and use your Orders in Council as it is said they have been used in the case of the very important item of cotton. If there is a breach of blockade, if the cargo is contraband, and if, further, the neutral country to which it is bound has already received full normal supplies, then the Prize Court will have the strongest presumption
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of enemy destination. Our Prize Courts have great traditions and old-established customs, and I believe they could be trusted now as they were in the days of Lord Stowell. No one, I am sure, would wish for a moment to deal harshly with neutrals, but I do not think that Sir Edward Grey laid sufficient stress upon the rights of nations who are fighting for their existence and bearing cruel sacrifices of life and treasure. Napoleon said "there are no neutrals," and he acted consistently upon that principle; but since the great French Wars I do not think any neutral has greatly suffered, except this country at the time of the American Civil War. Then great hardships were inflicted upon a portion of the population of Lancashire, and those hardships were borne with admirable fortitude and patience.
Partly because of those seven months of practical inaction, and partly because of our laxity since, there is a doctrine springing up that neutrals have the right to make immense profits by passing seaborne supplies to the enemy. It seems to me that this is a doctrine which ought to be sternly repudiated. Neutrals have every right to claim that their normal trade should proceed with the least possible interruption and that their necessary home supplies should be fully maintained. No one will deny that right. It has been suggested that if we do not allow neutrals to make full profits out of this new war trade which they have set up we shall convert them into belligerents. In war we must always cake risks, but that is a risk in which I really do not believe. Belligerency in some cases would be disastrous to the neutral and perhaps advantageous to ourselves. I will quote a few words on this subject from a Swedish Liberal periodical of some importance—
"Is there really any sane person who cannot see that Great Britain, in case of conflict, would completely cut us off from all supplies? Is there really any normal individual who does not realise that Sweden would risk her existence as a free country by joining voluntarily in the war? True, we must uphold the law of nations and maintain our rights in these critical times to cover our own normal requirements, and this, judging from British declarations, would not meet with in-surmountable obstacles; but what we will be obliged to give up is our demand for the right to export to Germany. Every child will understand that we cannot maintain this export, and an attempt to do so must inevitably lead to a conflict with Great Britain…. Does any one now really mean to say we are bound to declare war against Great Britain on the grounds of a disputed right to supply Germany with goods?"

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That is sound common sense, and I do not believe that any Swede, Norwegian, Dutch-man, or Dane is ever likely to forget the ruthless disregard of all international obligations which Germany has shown and the many indignities which Germany has inflicted upon most neutrals, including the United States themselves.
If the Government, in full concert with our Allies, will take a firm stand on definite and intelligible principles, publicly announced, I believe the difficulties of the Foreign Office in dealing with neutrals will diminish. In all matters of commerce uncertainty and apparent caprice give rise to the maximum of irritation. On Tuesday last the noble Marquess the Leader of the House said, most truly, that the phrase "war of attrition" was "liable to produce a dangerous misapprehension." I am not sure that that misapprehension has not been produced already. As regards this blockade question and other matters there seems to be a tendency in some quarters to assume that if we carry on as we are now doing we shall eventually win the war in some way which nobody understands. That is a dangerous delusion. We can win the war only by striking hard blows such as that which our supremely gallant Ally the Russians have just delivered in Armenia. That was a blow which in a moment altered the situation in the Middle East and will re-act powerfully throughout the Near East. Such a great success as that may not be within our grasp at the present time, but we can and must increase the pressure to be brought to bear on the enemy in the coming months. In the interests of the whole world and of the future progress of humanity it is vital that this war should be brought to an end as soon as possible on terms which will secure Europe against a fresh outburst of German frenzy, while at the same time righting the wrongs of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro. Every week brings its fresh tale of slaughter and adds to the terrible burdens which all the warring Powers must bear in the future. It is because I am convinced that it lies within the power of the Allies, by making more effective use of their Fleets, to hasten the end of all this appalling loss and suffering that I venture to move the Resolution which stands in my name.
Moved, to resolve, That this House considers that, in conformity with the principles of International Law and with
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the legitimate rights of neutrals, more effective use could be made of the Allied Fleets in preventing supplies, directly conducing to the prolongation of the war, from reaching enemy countries.—(Lord Sydenham.)
LORD BERESFORD: My Lords, Lord Sydenham has made a most interesting speech and brought to the notice of your Lordships the vast amount of commodities which are entering Germany and enabling her to carry on the war. If your Lordships will allow me I will venture to make some suggestions as to how to prevent those commodities getting into Germany to the extent that they are doing at the present time. The one absorbing thought in the public mind is how we are to win this war. The Government wish to win the war just as everybody else in the country does, but there are some doubts as to whether the Government are going the right way to achieve that end. It is with regard to this that I shall venture to make some criticisms, not at all to embarrass or to harass the Government, but to do my level best to help them to do what everybody wants—namely, to win the war. I am firmly convinced that if we had had an effective blockade and had made-enemy goods absolute contraband at first, the war would now have been over—that is to say, had we asserted our legal maritime rights by International Law and effectually used the Fleet. Now we have only a "sort of blockade" carried out by Proclamations, Orders in Council, Agreements, and Committees, and it is not clear who controls that blockade. Is it controlled by the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade, or the Contraband Committee? It would be very interesting to know who is in control.
Instead of ships going to a Prize Court they go before the Contraband Committee. The Navy is employed sending ships to the Prize Court, and the Contraband Committee apparently are employed in letting them, or the greater portion of them, go. In other words, the Contraband Committee arrogate to themselves the functions of the Prize Court. How do the Contraband Committee find out whether the ships should go to the Prize Court or not? This could only be ascertained by them from the ships' manifests, the charter parties, the bills of lading, or the ships' papers. It is perfectly certain that in the case of an enemy such as we are opposed to all these may be forged.

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Therefore it is a paper blockade instead of every ship that is sent in being searched as it ought to be. International Law instituted the Prize Court to decide the validity of capture, and I should like to know from some of the learned lawyers in this House whether it is under International Law that a Committee such as the Contraband Committee can allow vessels to go or give orders of any sort with regard to the destination of vessels. The Order in Council of March 11 was said to be instituted "to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany." That is a definite statement. Had that policy been turned over to the Navy to enforce, the Navy could have carried it out; and I maintain that by this time the war would have been over. It was mentioned in the other House that if the Navy were given these powers they would become something like pirates or buccaneers; but if I commit a murder, a forgery, or any other crime, the policeman does not arrest me on proof or evidence but on suspicion. That is what the Navy does. It arrests a ship on suspicion. It sends it to the Court, and it is the Court, and not a Committee, which should adjudicate under International Law as to whether or not the ship should be put on the contraband list. If the Cabinet would settle a definite, policy, then the Navy could enforce it.
There are a great number of extraordinary contradictions in the Orders in force at this moment. I will read one to prove it. In the Order in Council of March 11 it is stated that—
"Every merchant vessel which sailed from a port other than a German port after March 1, 1915, having on board goods which are of enemy origin or are enemy property may be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port. Goods so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the Prize Court."
There is nothing about a Committee there. That is a definite Order. I want to know whether it is true that a late Order to the Fleet states—
" It is decided at present not to detain enemy goods unless there is proof of destination."
How on earth are the officers and seamen of the Fleet to find out proof of destination? It appears to me the most extraordinary Order that ever was given; and it is these contradictions in the Proclamations and Orders in Council that confuse the Fleet. They really do not know where they are. There is nothing definite as to what is to happen with regard to these vessels, except
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that we are told there is a Contraband Committee which has powers above the Prize Court. Since August 4, 1914, there have been seven Proclamations and Orders in Council, most of them contradictory. I submit to your Lordships that a war has never been won yet by Proclamations and Orders in Council. It is won by fighting; and that is what we have to do—to use every effort we possibly can to bring the Germans to their knees and win the war. The first effort is to have a blockade thorough and complete, made out according to International Law.
With your Lordships' permission I will state another most extraordinary example of these Proclamations. The Proclamation of October 29, 1914, withdrew the list of conditional contraband of September 21, 1914, and an extensive increase was made in the list of absolute contraband. At the same time the Declaration of London Order in Council, No. 2, 1914, was published which annulled and replaced the earlier Order in Council of August 20, 1914. The Proclamation of December 23, 1914, again withdrew the previous lists of contraband and fresh lists of absolute contraband were published. Some extremely clever lawyer might snake that out, but I am absolutely certain no seaman could understand it; and that is the sort of Rules and Orders that govern the Fleet at the present moment. The Government should have a definite policy and turn it over to the Navy and let them enforce it.
To the lasting credit of your Lordships' House you saved the Empire by rejecting the Naval Prize Bill, which was clearly an effort of all the military Powers against the great sea Power. Everything in that Declaration was directly against this country; it was an effort, as I maintain, of the military Powers to reduce our naval force if we went to war. The Government appear to be trying to get round the decision of the Legislature by Orders and Proclamations, and so endanger the Empire again. I make bold to make that statement. By the Order in Council of March 11 the British Empire abrogated the Paris Declaration of 1856, the London Declaration of 1908, and the fourteen Hague Conventions. But, as the noble Lord said, the Order in Council of March 11 was clearly a "reprisal"; the words of it were—
"Whereas such attempts on the part of the enemy" [that is, the murderous piracies they Committed] "give to His Majesty's Government the unquestionable right of retaliation."

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The American Government naturally object to reprisals; they have said so, and I think all the neutrals object. The sort of blockade we have at present is in the nature of a reprisal. And may I say that when war was first declared the United States Government at Washington sent down to the Southern planters to say that England was certain to make cotton contraband of war, as America had done in the Civil War. She then brought about circumstances in England that starved the operatives in Lancashire, and England never made any protest at all. But in addition to the United States Government giving this intimation, the Chambers of Commerce and the Federal and State Agricultural Societies all warned the Southern planters that cotton would be contraband, and they recommended them to put their ground under other crops. Had we made cotton contraband at once we should have had the enormous advantage of stopping Germany from importing the principal ingredient of high explosives.
Orders in Council and Proclamations may, and do, run contrary to the law of nations. As far as I can gather the effect of our extraordinary proceedings is that we are helping the enemy and irritating neutrals. We have entered into arrangements with Holland and Denmark which might have been made provided we had no Fleet at all; but as we have a Fleet I cannot conceive how those arrangements are to our advantage. There is no question that an enormous amount of commodities, particularly things necessary for the manufacture of munitions of war, get into Germany by means of neutral countries. I do not think anybody can deny that all blockades should be impartial; we should not have special preferential advantages for a favoured few.
I believe that to end this war we shall have eventually to make an absolute blockade. But look at the enormous difficulties we have thrown upon ourselves. If we had declared a blockade at first according to International Law no neutral could have said anything. We have, however, allowed neutrals to create an enormous volume of trade and to make large contracts, and when an effective blockade is established will not those neutrals rightly ask, "Why did you not do that at first?" So that I conceive you may have grievous difficulties, but they will all be difficulties of your own creating. If we had but recog-
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nised long ago that everything allowed by the rules of civilisation must be done to smash our enemy the war would have been over by now. That is my firm belief.
As to our exact position, it is well to be plain spoken. The Army in Flanders know perfectly well that we allowed fatty compounds, cotton, and metal ore to go into Germany. The Army in Flanders know perfectly well that most of the ammunition fired at them now need not have been there provided we had stopped the commodities that made it. They also know that this is not the way to conduct a war. What do we see every day? We see thousands of the finest manhood the world has ever produced. Where are they going? They are going to fill up the casualties in the ranks. How were those casualties caused? By shot and shell—through cotton, fatty compounds, and metal ore getting into Germany. Do your Lordships think that this is calculated to increase the morale of the Services? This is not the way to win the war. These commodities should be stopped, no matter what risks we run or what we do in order to bring the war to finality. The proposals that have been and are beingmade—all these Committees, and Proclamations, and Orders in Council—may be statesmanship, but they are not war and are not likely to end the war.
What is the explanation of all our difficulties? I am not going to make any recriminations—they are not wise or necestry at the present time—but one must look back. The explanation is that the Foreign Office prepared for peace, not for war. The Declaration of London, The Hague Conventions, all that class of legislation—what was it made for? It was made on the supposition that the great British Empire was never going to war. I hope I shall not be impertinent when. I say, What an absurdity. This great Empire always going to be at peace, always going to he neutral! It is impossible. But look what happens when you do go to war if you make all your arrangements for peace. The result is what has happened now—you are totally unprepared in every particular, and you are handicapped, shackled, manacled by all these Declarations and Hague Conventions, and all the while you are losing all this splendid manhood. The Fleet could grip Germany by the throat; the Fleet could hold her and smash her, but you are not letting the Fleet do what it could to end the war.

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We are now, curiously enough, very parallel to the position that we occupied in the great Napoleonic Wars. We hold the sea. There is no kind of war vessel of Germany afloat upon any water abroad; there is no German merchant ship afloat on the high seas. Why? Because we hold the sea, owing to the ceaseless vigilance of our seamen and owing to their being ready to smash the enemy whenever he comes out. We are in exactly the position that we were in after Trafalgar. Trafalgar did not win the war. Trafalgar cleared the ocean and enabled our cruisers and patrol ships to prevent any article of any sort getting into France; that was what won the war. We are in exactly the same position now, and I implore your Lordships to look this matter in the face and realise that we can end the war if the Government will only allow the Fleet to undertake its legal rights and assert itself according to International Law. I agree with Lord Sydenham in all that he said, but more particularly that we should inconvenience neutrals as little as ever we can. But I would ask this. Do not we hear a great deal about the rights of neutrals and very little about the rights of those at war? I wonder whether the neutrals have considered what would happen to them if (Germany were to win.
I have made some drastic criticisms. I do not think any public man in a crisis such as we are in now should make drastic criticisms unless he is prepared to make some proposals, and if you will allow me I will make a few proposals as to how I think this war might be won and won quicker than we are apparently able to win it at present. First, I would suggest that the Declaration of London should be formally and finally renounced by an official of the Government. I believe that Lord Lansdowne and Lord Crewe have both said in this House that the Declaration of London is no longer valid.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: Hear, hear.
LORD BERESTORD: But since they made that statement a member of the Government in the other House declared, with reference to belligerents selling ships to neutrals, that it was opposed to the Declaration of London. So that in the other House the Declaration is valid, but in this House it is not. I think that ought to be cleared up. It is these extraordinary contradictions that make the whole thing so
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confusing, not only to the Services but to every one else.
My second proposal is that all commodities going into Germany should be made absolute contraband. For my part I would not let anything go into Germany. The suggestion is made that the Germans should get luxuries—women's hats and women's frocks, I think, were suggested. If you let in women's frocks and women's hats they will cover a lot of other little things which will get in. I am not an economist, but the argument of economists is that the Germans will have to pay gold to get these things in. But if you let anything in you are sure to have a leakage. Therefore I would proscribe everything, and not let anything in, either luxuries or the reverse.
Thirdly, I would abolish the distinction between "absolute" and "conditional" contraband. I do not see the slightest use in keeping up these distinctions; they are all against us because they enable something to go into Germany, and that something may be prejudicial to us. Fourthly, I would suggest that the doctrine of "continuons voyage" which is now applied to blockade and some articles of contraband should be applied to all contraband. Fifthly, all enemy property in neutral ships should be confiscated. I know that this is contrary to the Declaration of Paris of 1856, but I maintain that we have abrogated that Declaration ourselves as far as the British Empire goes by the Order in Council of March 11; America was never a party to it; and the Germans have violated that Treaty as they have violated every other law of God and man since they went into this war. They have violated that Treaty by sinking neutral vessels if they thought that British goods were on board them. So that we are perfectly clear with regard to Germany.
Sixthly, I would make a far fuller use of the Prize Court. There is a Treaty with America of 1794; that is a long way back, but it would be useful now. Under Article 18 of that Treaty we could make all provisions contraband, only if we did so we must buy them. I think we should revert to that Treaty now. Seventhly, I would tighten the blockade, and do away with this divided control of Committees, Orders in Council, Proclamations, arrangements, etc. Have no divided responsibility but have one authority, and let the Cabinet declare what the policy is and turn it over

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to the Navy to enforce and carry out and we should end the war much quicker. If we go on as we are doing we shall have more disasters and more difficulties; they will keep on recurring, and the war will be prolonged indefinitely. Remember that every twenty-four hours means £5,000,000 sterling, and, more than that, the death of hundreds of the best the world can produce.
Now, who is to blame? Is it the sailors? Is it the soldiers? No. Their heroism may have been equalled, but it has never been surpassed in the history of this or any other country. Is it the people in the workshops? No. They are doing their level best. Is it the people who are prepared to pay anything, their last shilling? No. And there are no Party differences. Then what is it? I maintain that it is the conduct and control by the Government. You have a Cabinet of twenty-one amateurs, and they have usurped the Executive. You could not conduct a naval war with twenty-one Admirals; you could not conduct a military war with twenty-one Generals; yet here yon are controlling the greatest war the world has ever seen with twenty-one amateurs who know nothing whatever about it. What is the basis of success in war? Foresight. how can amateurs have foresight of what they do not understand? What you want is foresight, and, when you have got it, quick decisions and prompt action. The fact of the matter is we are not running the war; the war is running us. The management of the war has been even worse since the Coalition. A Coalition is a compromise. You do not win wars by compromise. As I said before, you win them by fighting. I may be taken to task about that, but I can prove it. How many Cabinet meetings were there on plural voting? What has that to do with the war? When the Registration Bill was brought in there was something about plural voting in it. That was a compromise. How many Cabinet meetings were there on the leaving of the Gallipoli Peninsula? Again, a compromise. You cannot control and manage a war like that with any success whatever. What has been the result? We have started too late in every campaign. We started the blockade too late; and we have not got a proper blockade yet. Everything is "too late." One of the Cabinet Ministers himself lectured the House of Commons for a quarter of an hour to the effect that everything was too late.
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"Everything," he said; and his narrative of actions that were taken too late filled half a page of Hansard. What is the result? Brilliant retreats. Yes, but brilliant retreats do not win wars. The Press and the public have forced the Government to undertake a number of matters that they had not begun at all. I will merely refer to cotton being made contraband, to German Reservists being stopped, to interning enemy aliens, and to taking up the question of munitions. And the Press and the public will vet force the Government to get a better blockade and stop commodities going into Germany.
It may be asked, What is your alternative? If your Lordships will allow me I will give a very good alternative. Instead of a Cabinet of twenty-one to run the war, have a War Council of five with no Departmental work whatever. I do not care who the five Cabinet Ministers are. Why I want Cabinet. Ministers is this. The Cabinet must always dictate the policy, whatever policy there is. Policy is made up of many matters. There is diplomacy, there is finance, there are such things as getting the men for the Army. That has nothing to do with the soldier or the sailor. That is a political question of a very grave and searching character. Let the Cabinet make out their policy, and then let them refer that policy to a General War Staff, which should be composed of the three best Admirals and the three best Generals young men who have proved themselves in the war, with an older man as chairman or president who knows something about war. The Cabinet's policy should be submitted to them.
May I put it to your Lordships in this way Take Constantinople. Supposing the Cabinet had sent their policy to a General War Staff. The General War Staff would have had orders made out showing what you wanted in transports, guns, horses, men, military and naval requirements, stores, ammunition, and everything necessary in order to make that policy a success and enforce it. You do not suppose that under such circumstances there would have been any Gallipoli Expedition. The experts whose duty it would have been to report to the Cabinet—who are supreme, and must always be supreme—would have shown the impossibility of embarking on what one of the Cabinet said was a "gamble." You must run risks in war; that is, in fighting. You can lose a division

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in order to win; you can lose a whole column of super-Dreadnoughts to win. That is in war. But when you are sitting at a table to calculate your risks, you do not, or you should not, gamble. On one side you should say, What do I gain if I win? and on the other side, What do I lose if I fail? And if the loss is superabundant over the gain, you would not carry out that policy. You would never have gone to Gallipoli and you would never have had all these subsidiary Expeditions if you had had a commonsense businesslike line of policy. I submit that five Cabinet Minister, should dictate the policy, and the experts should say how it is to be carried out, when it should be carried out, and exactly what is to be carried out. That is my alternative to your present scheme, which is sure to bring greater disaster and greater difficulties; because you have twenty-one men, none of whom know anything about war, who have usurped the Executive and are conducting the war instead of leaving it to the Admirals and the Generals of the State. I say that so long as we have civilian and political control of the Executive so long shall we have recurrences of disasters, so long shall we have an ineffective blockade, and so long will our enemy continue to receive raw materials for munitions and the war be indefinitely prolonged.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I am sure that I speak not only for myself when I express the pleasure and interest with which we have listened to the speech of the noble and gallant Admiral who has for the first time taken part in our debates. A few weeks ago a member of your Lordships' House, Lord Portsmouth, had on the Paper a Notice relating to the subject which we are discussing this evening. That Notice in some mysterious and, as it at first seemed, unaccountable manlier disappeared from the Paper, but it was freely rumoured in the Lobby that the explanation was to be found in the intention of those noble Lords who agree with my noble and gallant friend to produce their heavy naval artillery for the purpose of bombarding His Majesty's Government. Well, we have listened to the bombardment with great interest; and I shall have two or three words to say in reply.
Perhaps before I pass to the discussion which really arises out of the Motion on
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the Paper I may say one word as to the interesting suggestion with which my noble and gallant friend concluded his speech. In his view all our difficulties arise from the fact that the affairs of the country are in the hands of a numerically large Cabinet composed almost entirely of civilians. He told us what his idea was—a very small Cabinet, I think he said, of five members, advised by a carefully-selected professional staff who were to be untrammelled by Departmental work and who would be expected to deal with and to direct, the whole of the conduct of the war. We have made considerable progress in that direction, and I am not sure that my noble and gallant friend sufficiently recognises this. The conduct of the war at this moment is in the hands of a small Committee consisting of only five members. My noble and gallant friend obviously would not be satisfied with its composition because it comprises the civilian element which he so profoundly distrusts. But this, at any rate, I think I may say—that this small Committee, so far as the conduct of the war is concerned, has since it was first created certainly not been hampered by the interference of the civilian members of the Cabinet. My noble and gallant friend would like to cut his small Committee of five completely off from the main body. On that point I am bound to say I join issue with him. I think that so long as you have Cabinet Government at all in this country, it would be bad for all concerned that there should be no point of contact between the small body directly responsible for the conduct of the war and the larger body comprising the remainder of their colleagues. If, as my noble friend evidently believes, there have been mistakes during the present war, I doubt extremely whether he or anybody else would find it possible to establish that those mistakes were due to the great size of the Cabinet, or that they would have been avoided if a smaller body taken from within it had been entrusted with the supreme conduct of affairs.
I now pass to the Motion on the Paper. The noble mover desires the House to record its opinion that in conformity with the principles of International Law and with the legitimate rights of neutrals a more effective use could be made of the Allied Fleets in preventing supplies from reaching the enemy. So far as the object which the noble Lord on the Cross Benches

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has in view is concerned, I do not think he will find anybody in this House to differ from him. We all recognise that it is of the first importance that we should prevent supplies from reaching the enemy. That is not only the proper policy, but it is the only policy which can be pursued by a great maritime Power engaged in war with an enemy who has the advantage of fighting on inner lines. I, at any rate, am quite prepared to concede that this policy should be followed, and that it should be enforced unsparingly. But the noble Lord leaves us in no doubt that in his opinion we fall very far short of making that use of the Fleet which might have been made for the purpose of preventing supplies from reaching the enemy; and his Motion is, in effect, a vote of censure upon us for our failures in that respect.
My noble and gallant friend opposite (Lord Beresford) was still more emphatic in his statements. In his view—and it is a view that is held by many people outside this House—we have only to emancipate the Fleet and turn it loose to take whatever steps may seem good to it in order to bring this war to a prompt conclusion. In this House these things are said in temperate and courteous language. They are sometimes said in language of a very different kind. We have all, I suppose, seen caricatures representing the figure of John Bull tightly shackled in bonds of red tape, or of some gallant sailor held back by a Foreign Office clerk and prevented from doing the good work at sea which he is able and anxious to perform. All these complaints seem to me, I must say, to proceed upon a complete misapprehension as to the facts of the case. These attacks are invariably supported by statements directed to show that, owing to our failure to use our great naval power, quantities of indispensable supplies are constantly passing through neutral countries into the hands of the enemy. The way in which the charge is framed is almost always something of this kind. You take the imports of same neutral country for the year 1915, you compare them with the imports of the same neutral country for the year 1913, and then you suggest that the difference between the two figures—which, I admit, has often been very considerable indeed—is the measure of our culpable failure to prevent the enemy from getting what he requires for the purposes of the war. I venture to press
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upon your Lordships that all these figures and statistics require extremely careful scrutiny before you base any conclusions upon them.
The outbreak of this war led to a tremendous dislocation of trade all over the world. A great many of the principal sources of supply were suddenly closed. Mercantile credit was seriously affected. Shippers naturally declined to run risks. There was a period of chaos and confusion, followed after a time by a great rush of neutral traders to take advantage of the opportunities which were suddenly placed within their reach for doing a very large and lucrative business with the belligerents. It was in these circumstances that the Order in Council of March last saw the light. I do not suppose that anybody could have expected that that Order in Council would produce immediate effects. It was impossible that it should. For example, in some cases a period of grace was given, and I think properly and reasonably given, to traders who had entered into contracts before the issue of the Order in Council. But what became at once apparent was that there would be immense difficulty in distinguishing between those supplies which were passing legitimately into the neutral countries, and which were intended to meet their normal requirements, and those other imports which clearly were of a different character and which were obviously brought in for the purpose of supplying the enemy. At first we had not ready to hand the machinery for distinguishing these different sorts of imports. There were no doubt some cases where it was quite easy to do so. Your Lordships will probably carry in Your minds the case of a vessel called the "Kim," which was one of a group of vessels found to be carrying on board supplies to one of the neutral countries enough to meet the whole of their normal requirements for a year. In flagrant cases of that kind there was no difficulty, but in cases more upon the border line the matter was by no means so simple, and it is with these border line cases that the great difficulty arises.
We have had a great many figures produced during this discussion and outside the House. I do not propose to take up your Lordships' time with a very minute dissection of these figures. A great many of them are, however, certainly open to criticism. Some of the comparisons which

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are made are made upon altogether erroneous data. The Return for last year sometimes includes commodities which were not included in the Return for 1913. Again, Returns have sometimes been compiled with an obvious inability to grapple with the arithmetic of the case. I have seen one set of Returns which must have been prepared by somebody who did not know the difference between 20 per cent. and 120 per cent., and this error of 100 per cent. runs through the whole of the calculation. Then I have seen Returns which at first sight were very disconcerting, but which can be explained by the fact that they include great quantities of articles of various kinds which were sent into Belgium for the relief of the people of that country during the year 1915.
Them are, however, certain broad considerations which I should like your Lordships not to line sight of when you come to deal with figures of this sort. In the first place you have to reckon with the fact that one of the results of the war has been to divert a great deal of trade into new channels. The entrepôt business, for example, has passed from Hamburg to places like Rotterdam or Copenhagen, and you must expect to find in those neutral ports a great increase of business activity and of business transactions. Another disturbing element is to be found in the growth of new industries. The House probably knows that there has lately been an extraordinary development of the margarine industry in this country as well as in others. We obviously could not take a neutral country to task because it imported last year a larger quantity of margarine than it did in the year 1913. Again, there are articles which go to neutral countries, many of them from this country, only to come back here in a manufactured form. Cocoa is one of those articles, and was referred to when we debated this question the other day. There is one other consideration which should not be forgotten, and that is this. Although in many cases the excess going to the neutral country appears at first sight to be a large one when expressed in tons or hundredweights, the figure is really comparatively insignificant if you have regard to the total consumption of the same commodity by the country to which the goods are passing.
I should like to put in the further caveat that it is by no means the case that there has been anything approaching to a universal increase in the quantity of'goods
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passing to the neutral countries during the last year. Even if you take the bare comparison between 1913 and 1915 you will find that that, is so. For example, the figures of wheat and wheat flour going from all sources into the Scandinavian countries and Holland were—For 1913, 1,109,000 tons; for 1915, 1,101,000 tons. As your Lordships see, there is a slight falling off. If you aggregate the totals of wheat and wheat flour with the totals of maize, rye, barley, oil-cake, oats, and so on, you will find that the total for the year 1915 was 4,860,000 tons and for 1913 was 4,820,000 tons. The figure is almost the same; at any rate, there is no difference that need occasion any alarm.
But what is even more important is to remember that this filtration of goods to the enemy through neutral countries, which, of course, has been taking place, far from increasing is showing a very marked tendency to diminish owing to the measures of precaution which we have been able to take. If you are to make a fair comparison in regard to t]hese figures it is quite obvious that you ought not to compare the figures for the whole of the year 1915 with the whole of the year 1913, but that you should take the figures month by month during the year and see how the matter was progressing as our precautionary measures began to operate.
Let me take one or two illustrations. Take the import of cotton to Scandinavia and Holland. The figure for 1913 is 73,000 tons; the figure for 1915 is 310,000 tons. That is a very alarming figure— an increase nearly fourfold. But if you make the comparison as I conceive it ought to be made and compare the year, not as a whole, but month by month, you will find—I put it in this way for convenience sake—that in the last six months the figure for 1915 was 52,000 tons and for 1913 was 19,000 tons, an increase, but quite a slight increase compared with the total amount of cotton consumed. Take lard and you find that the same thing is true. If you compare the whole of the year you find what looks like a fourfold increase in the quantity of lard going to Denmark in 1915 as compared with 1913. But if you dissect that you will find that whereas the whole figure for 1915 was 15,000 tons, in October Denmark took only 364 tons, in November 267 tons, and in December 170 tons—a steady diminution, ending in a very small amount indeed.

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I have here a list of articles which were allowed to enter freely into Scandinavia and Holland until the Order in Council of March, 1915, with a comparison of the imports for the last quarler treated percentage of the average during the three preceding quarters With a single exception the figure for the last quarter shows a diminution, and in the majority of the cases the percentage has fallen to about half of the average of the three earlier quarters of the year.
One word about the things which pass on from neutral countries to the country of the enemy. The noble Lord who moved the Resolution before the House referred several times to the export of oils and oil-bearing seeds. We all know how extremely important it is to prevent these things from reaching the enemy. Consider first the case of oils and fats going through Holland to Germany. In order to avoid giving troublesome figures I will put it as a percentage. Take the figure 100 as representing the whole of the exports from Holland to Germany for the year 1915. Eighty-three per cent. out of the 100 is chargeable to the first half of the year and only 17 per cent to the latter half. The figures for the months of November and December taken together represent only 1 per cent. out of the total of 100 per cent. for the year. The conclusion, I think the noble Lord will agree, is obvious—this particular business was dwindling steadily and dwindled almost to nothing by the end of the year. In the case of oil seeds, it is much the same. Taking again 100 as representing the total export for the year, no less than 93 per cent. is chargeable to the first half and only 7 per cent. to the last half of the year 1915. In the month of December these particular exports had disappeared almost entirely. If you take a large group of exports from Holland to Germany in 1915, consisting mostly of these oil seeds and fatty substances, while the total for the year is 273,000 tons the total for the months of November and December is only just over 1,000 tons.
What is almost more important is that the figures for the past month—the month of January, 1916—show, I will not say a universally satisfactory picture, but certainly that the improvement upon which I have insisted is still continuing. I have had put together the totals for the four countries, the Scandinavian countries and Holland, in regard to four important groups
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of imports and I will give to your Lordships the figures as they compare. The comparison is between the figures for the month of January, 1916, and the normal monthly figure based upon the three years 1911–1913. I take first animal oils and fats. The normal figure is 3,529 tons, the figure for January is 2,878 tons—well below the normal. In regard to mineral oils and fats the normal figure is 47,317 tons, and the actual figure for January 43,130 tons—again well below the normal. Vegetable oils and fats, normal figure about. 10,000 tons; the figure for January, 8,000 tons. Corn and grain, normal figure 207,205 tons; January figure, 187,000. Fodder of various kinds, normal figure 191,551 tons; January figure, 142,912. Those figures are not unsatisfactory. I think they show that at any rate we are not on the down grade in this respect, and I am able to say hat the experienced officials who are watching the progress of these imports are of opinion that at this moment practically no commodities of military importance are now being imported in quantities appreciably above the amounts legitimately required for home consumption. And with regard to such leakages as may still be taking place, I am able to assure the House that we are taking all possible precautions.
I hope that when I dwell upon these aspects of the ease your Lordships will not think that I am satisfied that everything is exactly as it should he, or that there is no possibility of a reappearance of this very dangerous leakage; but as to that I should be wanting in frankness if I did not tell the House that in my opinion it is idle to expect that we shall ever be able to seal hermetically the whole of the channels through which leakage of this kind takes place. There are difficulties of various kinds in the way. In some cases they are physical difficulties. Those are the difficulties which we have had to encounter in the case of that movement of iron ore from Scandinavia to which Lord Devonport referred the other day and to which he will no doubt refer again. All I can say is that, although it is unfortunate that any imports of this kind should elude us, the amount which actually gets through bears a very small proportion to the total amount, of iron ore used in Germany. I think Germany has been in the habit of importing about 14,000,000 tons of iron ore and of producing herself about 32,000,000 tons.

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Quite apart from cases of this kind, there are two very serious difficulties or classes of difficulty of which We shall alWays have to take account. There is, in the first place, this— I think the noble Lord on the Cross Benches referred to it— that however well disposed the neutral Governments may be to us, however sincere and honest in their dealings may be the various associations and groups of traders with whom we have made these Agreements, you have always got arrayed against you a great army of utterly unscrupulous people bent upon getting rich and getting rich by the large profits which they are making, and past masters of every art by which it is possible to elude your precautions—people who, without scruple, resort to the falsification of documents and, to every kind of ingenious trick for concealing the true nature of a ship's cargo and its destination; and there can be no doubt that as our measures of precaution become more stringent so will their efforts to defeat us become more persevering and probably more skilful. We are determined to do what we can to defeat them, but it must always be a very difficult task.
But the great difficulty of all is the difficulty which arises from our obligation to deal fairly and considerately with the neutral Powers. I have never concealed my opinion that it would be not only grossly unjust to brush aside contemptuously the representations which they make to us, but that it would be the height of folly on our part if we were to set to work deliberately to outrage neutral opinion at a time like this. It is not a bad thing in times like this to put yourself in your opponent's place. If we do that we shall realise that these neutrals are independent communities engaged in a trade which is prima facie a perfectly lawful trade. We are obliged in self-defence to attempt to put them, as it were, upon a kind of allowance in regard to the importation of a great many commodities upon which they rely. We are obliged in self-defence to intercept their ships, to take them into port, to search them, to delay them—and delay may mean the loss of a market. When all has been done we may find that our suspicions were not well founded. If we take them into the Prize Court we may find that the Prize Court is not content with the evidence which we are able to tender. Can we
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be surprised that in these circumstances there should be a good deal of difficulty in dealing with the neutral countries? I venture to say that it is a duty incumbent upon us to spare no pains to ease the situation by treating them with the utmost consideration, and with every desire, so far as we can, to mitigate the hardships which we are obliged to inflict upon them. When we have done that, when we have shown them that we are ready to do all in our power to meet them fairly, then I think we can appeal to them with irresistible effect to put themselves in our place, to remember that while they are fighting for their commerce, we are fighting for our existence as a nation and in defence of a great cause, which is the cause of the neutrals as well as our own, and to help us to discriminate between that commerce which is perfectly legitimate and those excrescences upon their trade which are really contrived for the sole purpose of enabling our enemy to carry on the war by methods which I will not attempt to stigmatise.
I have given your Lordships some account of the methods which we have employed, and I think I am entitled to ask whether those who criticise us really have anything much better to propose. For myself I approach these questions with an entirely open mind, and I think I may say for my colleagues as well as for myself that if anybody is able to show us a better way of arriving at the common object we shall certainly not be too proud to consider, or if necessary to adopt, it. Under our present system we stop everything we can from reaching the enemy. We put into the Prize Court everything that we can put in with a reasonable chance of obtaining a decision in our favour. We keep constantly in view the normal requirements of the neutral countries, and in order to make it easier to meet those requirements we enter into these Agreements which have been discussed in this House with great associations of neutral traders or even with smaller groups of such traders, and we hope that as the result of these Agreements we may gradually be able to bring about a state of things under which we shall be able to go into the Prize Court with so strong a presumption against a cargo which is not innocent that we may look forward confidently to a verdict in our favour.

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In all the intricate inquiries and investigations which operations of this kind involve we have received invaluable assistance from the Committees which have been set up for the purpose of aiding His Majesty's Government. There are a good many of them. May I mention the Contraband Committee, presided over by a well-known Member of Parliament, Mr. Pollock, and the War Trade Department, in connection with which my noble friend Lord Emmott has rendered such splendid services. On all these Committees are serving a number of men who are doing an immense amount of arduous and thankless work, in most cases, so far as I am aware, without any remuneration, and I think they are entitled to the utmost gratitude of the public. The noble and gallant Admiral spoke just now rather impatiently of Committees, and I think he suggested that we should get on much better without any and that they naturally lead to delay and confusion. I do not believe we could get on at all without the kind of investigations and the kind of advice which these Committees are able to afford to us. We could only get on without them if we could make up our minds to allow the Navy to run amok and to stop every ship that it met on the high seas and that could possibly be carrying a cargo ultimately intended to find its way to the enemy. But there is one thingshould like to say with regard to these Committees. It has been said already elsewhere, but it may as well be repeated. It is a great mistake to suppose that these Committees are in any sense under the thraldom of the Foreign Office. The principal Committee—the Contraband Committee—unless I am mistaken, has only one representative of the Foreign Office upon it as compared with a number of representatives of the other Departments.
But I will administer one grain of comfort to my noble and gallant friend. We propose to take a step which will, I think, considerably facilitate the operations of these Committees. We mean to put the whole of this blockade business— "blockade" is the convenient way of describing it—in charge of a single Minister, who will be of Cabinet rank, and who will he entrusted with the general co-ordination—I think that is the popular word at the present day—of all this business.
LORD BERESFORD: Hear, hear.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: I am glad that my noble and gallant friend welcomes that announcement. That, then is our policy. I have rather looked forward to this debate, because I have always hoped that during the course of it we should get a clear indication of the alternative plan proposed by our critics; and both the noble Lords who have spoken have vouchsafed to the House some rather important information as to that alternative I have dealt already with the plan for getting rid of the big Cabinet and substituting a little one. I pass from that. But the suggestions made are, I understand, mainly of this kind. It is suggested that we should greatly increase our contraband list, that we should do away with the distinction between absolute contraband and conditional contraband, that we should largely extend the doctrine of continuous voyage, and, finally, that we should establish a blockade fulfilling all the requirements of the text-books.
Let me say two or three words with regard to each of these. My noble and gallant friend knows that our contraband list is already a pretty long one. I have not the slightest objection to increasing its length if it can be shown that there are other articles which ought to be added to it. What governs the situation, I think, is this. The German Government has now virtually appropriated all commodities for Government use, and we have therefore a perfect right to increase our contraband list. I am rather disposed to agree with my noble and gallant friend when he suggests that in these days there is really not very much point in distinguishing between absolute contraband and conditional contraband. The distinction is rather obsolete in these days; it dates from the time when it was possible to distinguish sharply between supplies which were intended to reach the army of the enemy and those which were intended to reach the civil population. I do not think that in these days you can maintain that distinction very clearly, and therefore upon that point my mind is quite open.
With regard to the extension of the doctrine of continuous voyage, I am under the impression that at this moment all our proceedings are based upon an extension of that doctrine, and I think we have gone at least as far as the American Government went at the time of the war

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between the North and South, when there was undoubtedly a new departure in regard to the doctrine of continuous voyage. I do not myself see how we are to go very much further in that direction.
Then we come to the blockade. What I want to know is what we are going to blockade. Clearly my noble and gallant friend has not in his mind merely that we should blockade the German ports. To do that would be to blockade a very small section of the coastline. Are we then to establish a blockade of neutral ports? The noble mover shows by the terms of his Motion that he is a stickler on the rights conferred by International Law. I think he would find that international lawyers would have something to say about a blockade directed not only against enemy ports but against the neutral seaboard as well. But is it not fair to add this further observation I Supposing that you get your revised contraband list, your extension of the doctrine of continuous voyage, your new form of blockade, whatever it is to be, you will still have to count with the Prize Courts, you will still have when you take a ship into Court to produce evidence sufficient to establish the fact that the goods on board her are destined for the enemy. I do not imagine that the noble Lord on the Cross Benches would suggest that we can do without the Prize Courts, but so long as the Prize Courts are there it is surely necessary to satisfy them with adequate evidence. The noble Lord who moved said that in his opinion the Prize Court may be trusted. I quite agree. But I do not think I should trust them to disregard the evidence; and we come back to this difficulty in the end—that evidence must be forth coming. I dare say as the debate proceeds we shall receive further explanations upon this point. But at any rate we hold that our plan, whatever its faults—and I am far from desiring to assert that it is perfect —has accomplished some very satisfactory results, which I have tried to put before your Lordships. I think we have done enough to show that we scarcely deserve to be stigmatised, as we were by a noble Lord behind me (Lord Devonport) the other day, as nerveless, feeble, and stupid.
LORD DEVONPORT: I do not know from what the noble Marquess is quoting. I admit the word "nerveless," but I do not think such a word as "stupid" fell from my lips.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: The noble Lord is quite right. The word "stupid" did not fall from his lips, but this is what he said. He said we were "utilising our power of the Navy with feebleness, nervelessness, and no apparent comprehension of what its power meant and what it could achieve." That is a long phrase which can he conveniently compressed into the one word "stupid," and I do not think I did the noble Lord any injustice. I suggest to the noble Lord that our "nerveless" policy has killed the German export trade and that it has seriously crippled the import trade of Germany. Some of the most important branches of that trade have dwindled and finally erased. In the case of cotton, wool, and rubber we have, I think, succeeded in excluding imports altogether; and with every month that passes the pressure which we are able to put upon our opponents is increasing. You have only to read, as I sometimes do, extracts from the German and Austrian newspapers to see what the economic conditions of those countries are. Prices are not a bad criterion. The prices of a great many of the most necessary commodities are doubling and trebling; and I need not dwell upon the downward progress of the German mark, itself a very significant phenomenon.
My Lords, I own that I sometimes wish that the people of this country could, let us say for a fortnight, have a little experience of the kind of conditions prevailing in Germany and in Austria at the present time, of the kind of discomfort, of the kind of economic pressure which those countries experience. If that experiment could be tried I am satisfied that two results would happen. In the first place, we should no longer hear all this talk about the Government of this country sitting with folded hands and doing nothing; and in the next place our people would realise that they could, almost without turning a hair, submit to a great number of sacrifices before they approached to the kind of plight to which our much-derided efforts have brought the people of our adversaries.
EARL LOREBURN: My Lords, the noble Lord on the Cross Benches(Lord Sydenham) and the noble and gallant Admiral have undoubtedly given voice to an opinion which is shared by a good many people in this country, but for my part I must

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express my pleasure that the noble Marquess (Lord Lansdowne) did not comply with the suggestions which they made. I believe they are dangerous suggestions in the interests of this country, and would not be effective for the purpose that they desire. Lord Sydenham, in his Motion, paid homage to International Law and also expressed the view that we ought to attend to the legitimate rights of neutrals. He asked certain questions as to what the progress was or might be of International Law upon a critical point. I do not wish to enter upon that. It is an almost interminable subject. But this much I think I can say. International Law relates much more to history and to treaties and to the usage of nations than to anything which is recognised as law, and for my part I have always preferred to speak of it as International Custom rather than International Law. But the suggestions which have been made by noble Lords would certainly depart from any custom that has hitherto been recognised amongst nations; and while admitting that changed circumstances require a change in the administration of the law, I think if we were to follow the advice of the noble Lords it would be a very grave departure from what has been hitherto recognised. I wish to see stopped from going into Germany everything that is of military value, but I am very much afraid of striking blindly and disregarding our own true interests.
The basis of what has been said by the noble Lords who support this Resolution is this. They believe that by pressure on the part of our Navy we can bring this war to an end. I do not think that any one has said so from the Treasury Bench either in this House or in the House of Commons; and I do not believe that any of them will say so. It is a very serious thing, knowing how anxious everybody is to see a termination of this horrible conflict, to hold out expectations that by the profuse use of one weapon you would be able to bring about what many people desire. I have grievous doubts. I admit that I am not a person of experience in naval or military matters, but I did not understand Lord Sydenham to pledge his great reputation to the belief that we could bring Germany to her knees by the methods he himself prescribes.
LORD SYDENHAM: Shorten the war.
EARL LOREBURN: Yes; but that is a very indefinite thing. I believe, on the contrary, we should bring ourselves into the most serious difficulties with neutrals. Consider what the position is as regards the neutrals. Two countries or a variety of nations make war. All the neutrals are disturbed at once in their trade and commerce. They have their rights. The nations that are belligerent are not entitled to take the sea and to blockade the land without regard to the interests of Powers that are perfectly innocent. We have been neutral very often, and we have been very vigilant in insisting upon our rights as neutrals. I trust hereafter that we shall be, I will not say neutrals, because I do not wish any wars at all; but if there are wars I trust we shall be neutrals, and we shall expect the same consideration that we are bound to give to neutral nations now.
Lord Lansdowne has told us that we cannot seal Germany hermetically to prevent trade from going in and coming out. The reason is that there are sovereign States—Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and also the United States—which have well ascertained rights. What the extremists—if I may be permitted so to call them—claim is this, that we should put these nations upon a sort of commercial diet, not only with regard to food but with regard to the trade and business they carry on; that, we should prevent more than what we consider to be the average supplies they want from entering their country—not merely prevent munitions from going through, but prevent, any commodity from going through. That was the claim of the noble and gallant Admiral. It is a complete novelty in International Law. No doctrine of continuous voyage that I have ever heard of has contemplated anything of the kind. There is such a thing as national pride, which is quickly kindled and very hard to quench, and it is notorious that we have had serious difficulties with some of these neutral countries already.
We are ourselves largely dependent upon neutral countries for food, for markets, and for that matter for munitions. But leaving those items out, take shipping itself. At this moment, there is a veryserious shortage of ships in this country. A considerable number have been taken by our Government for our own use. For every hundred ships that were available for the general

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service of the country before the war there are now only sixty-seven, according to the statement of the President of the Board of Trade, and, of those, twenty-one to twenty-four, varying from month to month, are neutral ships. Here I am bound to quote a sentence from what Mr. Runciman said as to what would be the effect if we were to estrange the neutrals and deprive ourselves of the advantage of their shipping. He said—
"In the whole of the countries of the Allies we are dependent to an enormous extent upon the services of neutral shipping. If out of these sixty-seven ships we drove away from these ports the twenty-one to twenty-four which are neutral, we should starve."
And he added that it would he a question of not having food enough, and not having minerals with which to make our munitions, and not having timber with which to prop our mines. No doubt much of the shortage of ships that we feel at the present time is due to the deplorable policy of Expeditions all over the world. Which have brought us so much loss both in lives and in prestige.
LORD BERESFORD: Hear, hear.
EARL LOREBURN: We must remember that we rely on neutrals not only for our supplies of food but also for these ships. I know that those who take a strong view say that there is no fear of the neutrals doing anything, that they have stood so much ill-usage from the Germans that they will not think of resenting milder treatment from ourselves. I think that is a very dangerous risk to run. We have allowed them, as the noble and gallant Admiral pointed out, to make their contracts and arrangements for a great many months in the expectation that we should take a particular course, and if we were to come down now and interfere with that there is every reason to believe that they would show their resentment in an active way. They could half ruin us without going to war at all; and if we pressed the naval restrictions so as to alienate them and make them withdraw their commerce and their shipping we might be proved to have shown that form of insanity which precedes utter destruction.
I Wish to say a few words upon the effect which the blockade hitherto has had upon the Germans. I hope that I may be wrong, but I do not believe that this method of
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pressure by the Fleet will appreciably accelerate the ending of the war. We have had a food blockade of Germany for a considerable time. What has been the result? There has been great inconvenience, no doubt, as the noble Marquess tells us, but I have seen a number of people who have been in Germany and they all tell me, and I have no doubt they tell the Government the same, that whatever inconvenience and discomfort it may cause there is no chance of reducing Germany by starvation. I wonder if the Government will tell us whether they think there is any chance of doing so. We ought to look at realities, and not at the figments that we see constantly quoted in the Press or hear upon platforms. The Germans have seventy per cent. of the food they consume in their own country. It is perfectly certain that there will be a constant leakage notwithstanding our best efforts. It was so in the Napoleonic Wars, and it will be so also in this war. All that we have really succeeded in doing besides creating this discomfort in Germany and if I am wrong I shall be glad to be corrected—is this. We have enabled the Government of Germany with the blockade in the background to get their people willingly to submit to restrictions which without such pressure would have been found intolerable even in Germany, and they have used the fact that we have been stopping food supplies as an argument to unite the German people in a way in which they were never united before. They have been enabled to enforce thrift and stop waste and extravagance, whilst what we have been doing has been merely making speeches about economy, and not even showing an example of how it should be carried out, My belief is that the food blockade has not done anything—and I do not think the noble and gallant Admiral would say that it had done anything—to accelerate the ending of the war, nor do I believe that it will do so.
LORD BERESFORD: What I put before the House was the question of stopping the supply of commodities required for making munitions.
EARL LOREBUEN: I should heartily agree with the noble Lord that we ought to stop that if we can. The difficulty of doing so is the difficulty of the neutrals to which I have already referred. There is one other matter to which I wish to

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advert, and that is the effect that this policy has had upon those who are our Allies and friends, especially the policy of restricting food. I will say nothing about Belgium, because a good deal has been done successfully I hope, and certainly our Government have done their best, to give assistance in that direction. But I think I ought to take this opportunity of referring to the conditions in that part of Poland and Russia which is under occupation by German troops. When the German advance took place the Russians, for military reasons, destroyed everything they could. They destroyed the houses, the crops, the cattle, and everything else; and something like a million refugees tried to escape eastward with the Russian troops but were caught up by the Germans and were obliged to march back again. They are, I believe, in a frightful state at the present time, the half of them who are supposed to have survived. In addition to that the whole of the district, which is not very-populous but still contains millions of people, is in the utmost state of destitution. They are afraid of famine and disease, and the Germans have expressed their willingness to the American Relief Committee to help in every way they can by the distribution of food and by respecting the local food supplies. Sir Edward Grey, who I know is one of the most humane men that there are, has refused to allow— I have a copy of the letter here; it has been published—has refused to allow food supplies to enter that country except upon the condition that the Germans shall prohibit the export of native food supplies and guarantee that they shall not be drawn upon to maintain the occupying Armies, and so forth. I quite agree that those restrictions would seem to us reasonable and natural, but the situation is this. The Germans say they are not able to supply certain elements of food because they have not got more than sufficient for themselves. If we refuse unless we can get conditions which the Germans may not be willing to give, what will be the consequence? The consequence will be that these people, who are our friends and Allies—I believe they can be counted in millions—will be "between the devil and the deep sea," the Germans declining to help them saying they are not able, and ourselves declining to help them because we cannot get guarantees the performance of which
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we could never ensure. Therefore these unhappy refugees will be allowed to perish of famine and disease. I take this opportunity of pointing that out to His Majesty's Government. I designedly say very little about it because it is easy to say things that may cause embarrassment instead of furthering the purpose that one has, but I do ask the members of the Government who are here to be kind enough to inquire into this and see what they can do to prevent these wretched people, they being our Allies and our friends, from perishing by the most miserable of all deaths. I do not believe that the tightening of the naval pressure will bring us nearer to the end of the war. We have all been watching it for eighteen months in the hope that some light might appear. But the work of slaughter still goes on, and I believe there is no short cut to the end of this war. It was the Governments and not the nations of Europe that were responsible for the commencement of it, and it is the Governments and not the nations of Europe that are responsible for its continuance. Their only way of averting immeasurable disaster to the entire Continent of Europe is by bringing the war to an end soon.
LORD DEVONPORT: My Lords, I am afraid that the noble and learned Earl, in the views which he has just enunciated as to the effect which our naval pressure may have upon future operations, will find very little support in the country. At all events, I am amongst those who believe that by naval pressure and by naval pressure alone ultimate success in this war will be attained by this nation. I am not attempting to suggest that the land forces will not contribute an enormous deal, but there is a large body of opinion in this country that holds the view that without the full effective force of the Navy being used the war will not terminate as satisfactorily as it otherwise would.
The noble Marquess (Lord Lansdowne) in dealing with the critics, of whom I suppose I must rank myself as one, asked for an alternative; he inquired what the alternative was that we had to proffer to what the Government themselves were doing. My reply—and it will, perhaps, not be considered satisfactory—is that we are entitled to expect that the Government should carry out the policy that in the House of Commons and here we have been

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led to believe was their policy. The Government led us to suppose that they were heart, and soul devoted to a particular policy. Our complaint is that as the days go by and events occur we find that they are not acting upon their expressed and declared policy. Therefore the first thing to be made clear is that when the Government not only adumbrate a policy but declare it to be their policy we expect to see it being carried out.
We have had the advantage of a debate in the other House on this subject. When Sir Edward Grey was speaking for the Government in that debate he laid open the principles of the Government's policy in relation to blockade, and I think in what I shall state now I shall correctly summarise those principles. In the first place he said that neutrals were only getting the supplies necessary for their own consumption. We have been told that many times. It was not reasserted to-day by the noble Marquess. I have noticed with a great deal of pleasure that he is always very frank in admitting that what the Government desire to effect is frequently thwarted in many ways. He referred to-day to the unscrupulousness of persons who endeavour to take every advantage they can to make money. Well, human nature is human nature and has always to be taken into consideration, especially in a time like this which I do not over-describe as "golden." Sir Edward Grey then said that goods destined to the enemy are being stopped; and, in the third place—and this was the most extraordinary statement of all—that no ships at all are going direct to German ports. It is with those three Statements that I desire to deal.
First with regard to neutrals only getting the supplies necessary for their own consumption. We are endeavouring to bring that about by the system of "rationing," as it is termed, and the Agreements incidental thereto. But, as the noble Marquess has said to-day, there are obviously many difficulties to contend with; and it is also quite obvious that neutrals are receiving supplies far in excess of their domestic requirements and that Germany is getting the benefit of that to the neutrals' great pecuniary advantage and to this nation's great detriment. Figures have been adduced by the noble Marquess which are, as he will agree, very difficult to follow, and we shall have to look at them. I dare say they will do what figures mostly do, they will prove a good deal. But I am
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not seriously affected by the figures; the facts stand out and cannot be controverted. In my judgment, as regards the Agreements with the various neutral bodies of traders, the weak points or some of them are these. In the first plane, very large quantities of goods which reach neutral countries do not pass at all through the hands of these organisations that are supposed to be the strainer through which they go. Take the Netherlands Oversea Trust as a type. The quantities of goods going into Holland free of the Netherlands Oversea Trust are prodigious; yet. we are asked to believe that these organisations which have been set up are sufficient in themselves to prevent abuses occurring. I will show in a moment or two what gross abuses take place. Another weak point is that many ships that are held up by our patrols hold English Consular certificates issued by Consuls abroad. They are reported to London, and the instruction, I am told, comes back from London to allow them to proceed. I am not objecting to that; I suppose it would be only a matter of courtesy. But I warn the Government that a great amount of this leakage is taking place through that method, through these ships being certified on the other side and getting; a leniency of treatment that is not accorded to ships that have not the Consular certificate.
So long as we persist with these Agreements—and I am quite prepared to accept the noble Marquess's assurance that we could not get on without them—I think we are entitled to take every step to see that they are observed. We have no representatives abroad specially placed there to watch and conserve our interests. It is notorious that even some of these traders with which our Agreements are made have broken the law, and are only too ready to break the law upon the first occasion. There was a case reported in the London newspapers a few days ago of one of the leading men in these bodies of traders who had committed an offence before and had repeated it, and I think he was subjected to a fine of £1,000 or something like that. But we ought to have some one on the spot, representing us and being permanently there, seeing that these Agreements, which are founded on the basis that the neutrals are only to get supplies necessary for their own consumption, are observed. Take the town of Rotterdam, which I used to know very well some years ago. There are English firms there of the greatest repute, old-established firms of

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splendid status. It would not be difficult to get some advice from them as to the type of men who should be there to protect our interests, and I offer that as a suggestion to His Majesty's Government.
I now come to the second point—that goods destined to the enemy are being stopped. That is what the Government told us in the debate a few weeks ago, a statement which I have already traversed in this House in connection with the importation into Rotterdam of ore cargoes which pass on to Germany. As to the fact, I think the Government would hardly question it. It is so obvious that it must be so. There are no facilities in Holland for dealing with iron ore. I do not want to traverse the ground I covered three weeks ago, but as this is material perhaps I may be allowed to repeat what I then said on this point. There are no blast furnaces in Holland; there are no coke ovens; there is no coal, at all events none commercially possible to be used for the treatment of iron ore. Therefore I say that the Government cannot really question the fact, and I doubt very much whether they do question it. In his reply—it was not really a reply—the noble Duke (the Duke of Devonshire), whose courtesy at all times we all recognise, quoted the figures before the war and since the war, and said that the average quantity of iron ore imported annually into Holland during the three years 1911–13 was approximately 5,500,000 tons, nearly the whole of which used to go into Germany. That is good presumptive evidence that what is going through now goes to Germany, and there is not a doubt about it. The Government spokesman upon that occasion said that every possible precaution was being taken to stop the traffic. That is comforting to this extent, that it shows that the Government recognise that this traffic is illegitimate and is a traffic that ought to be stopped. Then he went on to say that in so far as the vessels carrying ore are in neutral waters we cannot under the rules of International Law stop them with our cruisers. Of course, we cannot; but if the suggestion is that these ships can make their long voyage and keep within neutral waters the whole way, I venture to differ from it, and I think I can dispose of it in a few words.
Take the ships that come from Norway. There are the two great ore ports—one is Kirkenaes, right on the very top of Norway; and the other is Narvik, a little
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lower down. Ships coming from Norway to Rotterdam must pass the mouth of the Skager Rack, and that is sixty miles across; they are certainly out of territorial waters then. I have studied the chart, too, of the whole coast line right away down to Rotterdam; and in several places I am certain that owing to shallow water the ships would have to travel outside neutral waters. Then take the other ships that bring so much ore that come from Sweden. They come from the Gulf of Bothnia. The two great ports there are Lulea and Oxelosund. It is perfectly impossible to get through the Baltic and keep in territorial waters all the way. Beyond that the Government themselves claim that they have got well hold of this iron ore traffic in the Baltic, for Mr. Runciman used these words in the House of Commons on January 10 last—
"Germany had for some time a certain amount of traffic in the Baltic, which we were not able to place under naval control. We have since signally interfered with her traffic. Our submarines have almost stopped the supply of ore which came from Sweden. At all events, we have so diminished those supplies that the German ironworks have been short of the main necessities of that manufacture for some months past."
If the Government succeeded in stopping those vessels going to German ports in the Baltic, surely they can stop them when they leave the Baltic from the selfsame ports on their road to Rotterdam.
The noble Viscount opposite, Lord Midleton, speaking the other day in the debate on the Address, referred to certain statements I had made, and said that the figures I had given ought to be refuted if they were not correct, or, if they were supportable, then the Government ought to admit them. I said that from the commencement of the war to December, 1915, 300 of these cargoes of iron ore had arrived at Rotterdam and gone on to Germany, and that the total weight of these cargoes was in round figures 1,500,000 tons. The noble Duke who replied for the Government gave figures for the year 1915. He stated the quantities as 650,000 tons for the whole of that year, and said the divergence between his figures and mine was so great that it was impossible for any reconciliation between them to be possible. For the purpose of comparison I have adjusted my figures to the noble Duke's period-namely, 1915. For that period I arrive at the total of 1,000,000 tons, whereas the noble Duke's figure is 650,000 tons.

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As the noble Duke has been good enough to challenge my figures I am going to take the liberty of challenging his, and I do so on the basis of a good authority—namely, on a Foreign Office statement. I have a letter here from the Foreign Office. It is dated January 21 last, and is addressed to a friend of mine in reply to a protest against this importation of iron ore into Holland. The Foreign Office state—
"The imports of iron ore into Holland in 1915 (April to December) were 657,000 tons … but no statistics are at present available to show what quantity of iron ore reached Holland during 1915 from Spain and sources other than Scandinavia."
So we have two lapses in these figures. The Foreign Office give practically the same figure as was given by the noble Duke for 1915, but the Foreign Office figure is only for nine months—April to December—and expressly does not include imports of iron ore which reached Holland during 1915 from Spain and sources other than Scandinavia. Therefore before we get to close grips about figures I suggest that the Government should revise theirs. Of course, the Government figures are official. And so are mine; they are formed from official information from Rotterdam. There is published daily at Rotterdam an official Shipping Gazette, the equivalent of our Lloyds Gazette. It sets forth the movements of shipping in the port day by day, and it is from this source that I have extracted my information. It is quite easy for the Government to verify it. They can ask their Consul at Rotterdam to check the figures. I will be very happy to hand the Government my list, which gives details of every ship that has gone into Rotterdam since the beginning of the war. With regard to the weights, the Customs have the weights and record them in kilos., which I have taken the liberty of transposing into tons.
There are two subsidiary points on which I think we ought to have some reply. Hematite ore and magnetic ore— magnetic is the ore that comes from Sweden and Norway—were both made conditional contraband in September, 1914. A month later hematite ore was made absolute contraband and has remained so ever since, but no change has been made in the status of magnetic ore. Now this is the quality which is going so largely into Holland and Germany by every means, and it seems rather extraordinary that it should not be declared absolute contra
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band. Again in connection with the Netherlands Oversea Trust, some of the ores go through its control—a very small percentage. I do not know why that should be. Certainly all these ores that come from Scandinavia pass free, and do not go through its control at all. I think those two points are possibly susceptible of an explanation.
I come now to the third point in the statement made by Sir Edward Grey, that no shipments were going through the German ports at all. I do not know on what foundation he makes that statement. In the debate on the 26th of last month I gave a record of the ore cargoes that had gone into German ports, either Baltic ports or North Sea ports, during the eight months from May 1 to December 31 last. They reached the enormous number of 557, and the contents of the shipments amounted to over 2,080,000 tons. I do not see why this trade should continue, but it is continuing at this very moment. I have here the figures for this last month of the ships going to the German Baltic and North Sea ports. The shipments amouunts to the very large figure of 105,000 tons for the month of January and up to February 5. Mr. Runciman claimed, in the statement I read just now, that we Lad succeeded in dealing with this traffic in the Baltic; but in view of those figures I think there remains something to be done.
Here is a fresh point in connection with these ores going into Rotterdam. I have ascertained that since the beginning of the year there has gone direct, not this time to Germany but to Belgium, no less a quantity than 20,000 tons of zinc ore. It has gone to Liége direct from Rotterdam. There have been no less than fifty boats carrying this zinc ore. It is transhipped to small steamers that take the water route to Liége. At Liége there is one of the biggest spelter producing companies on the Continent, La V. A. Montagne Compagnie. This company has passed into German control, as has, unfortunately, the major portion of Belgium. This zinc ore which we allow to go into Rotterdam goes openly—there is no concealment about it at all—to Liége, and there it is converted into spelter and sent in some cases to Ruhrort, where Krupp's furnaces are, and circulated all over Germany. In addition to this zinc ore making spelter for munitions purposes, a fine grade of

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zine ore which comes from Gothenburg in Sweden is the very quality the Germans require to use in connection with the preparation of hydrogen gas, and that is the gas with which they inflate the Zeppelins. So it should be, I am sure, a matter of concern to the British Government, now that they have this information—and they have it not from me only but from other sources—that they should set themselves to overcome the difficulty of preventing this zinc ore going into Rotterdam to enable German Zeppelins to pay their too frequent visits here.
The last matter with which I will deal is in connection with the Prize Court procedure, and I want to say a word or two with regard to its working in relation to ships seized or detained. Sir Edward Grey, in the same debate in the House of Commons, said—
"If there is reason to suppose that a cargo is not destined for bona fide neutral use, then undoubtedly it ought to be put in the Prize Court."
And he went on to explain that this would be settled by the Contraband Committee. So in effect the Contraband Committee decides in the first place whether a ship, or any part of its cargo, shall be put in the Prize Court, or whether it shall be released and allowed to go forward. But Sir Edward Grey also mentioned the interesting fact that the Government reserve to themselves an overriding power over the Contraband Committee. That is to say, the Contraband Committee decide that such and such a ship should be detained. If the Government think it should not—for good reasons, no doubt—the Government will prevail. But it comes to this, that you have two bodies, neither judicial, standing as it were as a sort of winnowing machine for the legitimate work that I claim, as the noble and gallant Admiral did, should be the exclusive executive work of the Prize Court. Here is the Contraband Committee doing the sifting, the winnowing, deciding what ships and cargoes shall be detained, and so on. It is not a judicial body. It is quite true that it has an eminent lawyer at its head. The Solicitor-General was at its head at one time, and Mr. Pollock is at its head now. There is also one representative from the Board of Trade, one from the Home Office, and so on. Although it is not a judicial body it has functions taking precedence over Prize Court decisions. I think myself—and here I am in agreement with the noble and gallant
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Admiral—that once a ship is found to have contravened our legitimate rights under International Law the Prize Courts alone should determine the case. They are better able than any non-judicial Committee to infer from the facts and the surrounding circumstances what the real ultimate destination is or what are the real circumstances connected with the goods.
I have a case here to illustrate how dangerously and how badly the existing system is working. I am going to quote the case of the steamship "Esrom," which sailed at the end of last year from New York destined for Copenhagen. She sailed under the Danish flag. She was held up by the patrols and taken into Lerwick, where she was handed over to the boarding and Customs officials and there searched, and she was found to be full of contraband. A part of the cargo was discharged at Lerwick, where the facilities are very poor; there is very little quay accommodation there to handle cargoes. The ship was then sent south to Hull for the remainder to be discharged. When the ship got to Hull there were taken out of her, amongst other things, 1,000 tons of copper, which is, of course, absolute contraband. Then a writ was issued against the ship, and the charges were set forth in the writ. I have a copy of the writ here, and your Lordships will be able to appreciate the serious gravity of the charges against this ship. She was charged on the ground that "she belonged at the time of capture and seizure to enemies of the Crown," and that "the cargo was contraband of war and/or enemy property." Of course, were the ship the property of enemies of the Crown the property would be a fortiori enemy property. The worst was that she was sailing under false papers. False papers embrace such things as false description of goods, false consignee, and false destination. Attached to this writ—which is the common form, I understand—is a schedule of the goods that were seized. They included lubricating oil, vegetable wax, broom-root, which I believe is used for making dyes, all sorts of oils, machinery, coffee, and so on.
But the 1,000 tons of copper are not scheduled in the writ or mentioned at all. Why was that? For the very best of all reasons—the copper was not seized, the copper was not detained. The progress of the copper to its ultimate—which I believe to be an enemy—destination was accelerated by the action of the Registrar

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of the Prize Court. But long before it reached the Registrar there would stand between the Registrar and any decision he would make, first of all the Contraband Committee, and secondly the possibly overriding Committee of the Government. I want to know why a ship charged with all these serious crimes as against Sea Law—there is only one other crime you could possibly add, and that is the crime of piracy—I want to know why these 1,000 tons of copper were not seized. Their money value alone was £100,000; copper is about £106 a ton to-day. Yet this copper was never seized, never, detained, although it was taken out under the eyes of the Customs and put on the quays Hull, and it has since gone forward to its destination. A person who thought this very strange endeavoured to get action taken, and this is the reply he received from the Customs at Hull—
"The 1,000 tons of copper have not been seized as prize, and I have no power to detain them."
Those goods, as I say, have gone forward. There was an application made by summons to the Registrar of the Prize Court to allow the goods to go forward, and he made an order accordingly. Why he made the order I cannot say. It was certainly not within his province or jurisdiction to make the order, because the goods were not within the purview of the Prize Court. I entirely fail to understand where his jurisdiction came in. But he made the order and indicated the route by which they should go, and they went by the Wilson Line to their destination. I want to know which of those bodies gave the order that these 1,000 tons of contraband copper should be allowed to go forward.
Although I am a critic, I endeavour to be a fair critic. Perhaps at times my language is not so modulated as it should be, but that is temperament and excess of zeal. But I feel that there is room for improvement in what outside people call the "tightening up" of our blockade. We ought to bear in mind—indeed the noble Marquess (Lord Lansdowne) reminded us of it in a speech he made before the recess—that every day this war is continued it costs us not only money but great sacrifice of life. He at that moment was preaching the same moral that I am endeavouring to convey now—that we ought to use every power we control to bring this war to an end. Only by utilising the full power and strength of the British Fleet do I think this can be accomplished.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD BUCKMASTER): My Lords, the Motion before the House is framed in careful, I think I might say in studiously careful, language. It seeks, in the first place, to preserve in all respects the rights of all people, according to International Law, and subject only to that provision does it require that a more effective use should be made of our Fleet. I cannot help thinking that the two parts of the Motion pull one against the other, and that the noble Lord who moved it will find, when he looks a little more closely into the matter, that the constraint that he has put upon his Resolution by its first sentence will prevent the latter part of the Resolution from becoming of great value.
The noble Lord asked that somebody should make a statement as to the way in which International Law was used to-day, and whether or no Abraham Lincoln exceeded his rights under International Law in what he did in the great war of 1861. Let me say this to begin with. I agree with the noble and learned Earl (Lord Loreburn) that International Law may be a term misused in application to the law that applies in the Prize Courts, but it is a convenient phrase, and I will use it to cover what is no doubt a series of constitutional usages adopted from time to time in the various Prize Courts as applicable to the rules of the sea during war. I have myself always taken the view that you cannot define this branch of International Law merely by examining the cases in which it has been discussed. Cases are nothing but illustrations of a principle, and the principle itself that underlies them may be a living and a growing principle capable of change and adaptation from time to time owing to the changing conditions of society and commerce. I therefore have no hesitation at all in saving that Abraham Lincoln was quite right when he extended the then existing principles of International Law so as to make them cover the doctrine of continuous voyage as it was applied to contraband coming into America.
The principles of International Law are flexible, and are capable, like all living principles, of growth and change. Yet I trust your Lordships will permit me to say that I think we cannot in this great struggle be too sensitive in considering what those rights really are. After all, we entered this struggle in part animated

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by a feeling of resentment at the grossest and most flagrant breach of the law of neutral people that has been known to history, and We should certainly have lost when this war ends if it could be urged against us that under the stress of necessity, because we thought we could get an advantage, we had used the power that we possessed to infringe in even a small degree the legal rights of neutral people. I would rather that it should be recorded that the rights of neutral people on the sea are never so safe as under the protection of the power of the English Fleet, and that they should be able, when the war is over, to contrast what we have done with what would have been done by Germany had she the power that we possess.
May I say a few words as to what are, in fact, the principles of International Law which govern the whole of this controversy? I cannot help thinking, from what has been said by both Lord Devonport—who, I am sorry to see, has left the House—and by the noble and gallant Admiral, that some little confusion exists in the minds of people who criticise the Government as to what these rights may be. Roughly speaking, the power of any belligerent nation to stop goods on the high seas depends either on the goods being contraband or conditional contraband, or upon there having been a blockade declared. That is a rough statement. Goods are not contraband merely because they happen to be of a character which an enemy can use; they are contraband when they are of that character and consigned to the enemy country. If we found a perfectly fair and legitimate transaction between Holland and the United States of America in which the United States were sending to Holland something which is contraband of war so far as Germany is concerned, we should have no right to stop it—that is, if the transaction was in fact a perfectly fair and honest transaction between two neutral traders and the goods were to be consumed in a neutral country. Therefore when Lord Devonport spoke, as he did just now, about a cargo of copper and assumed that directly he had proved that the cargo was copper he consequently had proved that we had the right to stop and seize it, he overlooked the most essential feature in the whole case. The fact that the cargo was copper should no doubt cause us to be unusually anxious and suspicious
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as to what its real destination is, and should cause us to inquire with the utmost vigilance as to all the circumstances attaching to the ship's papers and the commercial documents by which the title to that cargo is shown; but if, on the most elaborate investigation, you are unable to produce any circumstance of suspicion as to the cargo you have no more right to stop it than if it were a cargo of wood or anything beyond suspicion. The noble and gallant Admiral thought that if the Fleet had its way it would be able to tighten the band that is now around Germany, and he seemed to have been led to think that the Fleet could stop anything of that character sailing on the high seas.
LORD BERESFORD: No.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am glad the noble Lord makes that admission. But directly he denies that, he opens the loophole for exactly the transactions of which Lord Deyonport has spoken—that certain goods which we wish to keep from the Germans may be the subject of legitimate and fair trade transactions between neutral countries which we cannot stop. I think what the noble and gallant Admiral said is quite right, that there is no reason whatever for maintaining the difference between absolute and conditional contraband. The difference was that in one case you stopped commodities if shipped to the enemy country, and in the other case where they were destined for the use of the enemy's forces or Government. At the present moment it is indifferent, because since March 11 our policy has been to stop the importation of everything into Germany, contraband or not contraband—nothing that has an enemy destination shall, so far as we can allow it, be permitted to enter; nothing that has an enemy origin shall be allowed to depart, so far as we can prevant it. Therefore the whole of the discussion about contraband and the suggestions which the noble and gallant Admiral threw out as to what should be done in place of what we are doing now, so far as it relates to contraband, can be disregarded.
Whether we declare something which is conditional contraband to-day absolute contraband to-morrow really makes no difference. The only difference it makes is this, that if the property is contraband you can confiscate it when you stop it;

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and if the vessel is carrying more than half contraband of what she is earrying altogether, you can confiscate the vessel itself. It consequently follows that if You make any article contraband you place an additional reason before the consignors why they should not deal with it. But as far as the actual arrest of the commodity is concerned, we exercise to-day just the same power to interfere with all articles destined to Germany that are not contraband as those that are. There is no real difference between the two. The Order in Council of March 11 in effect blockades the German coast; but that we cannot blockade it as we blockaded the French coast in the days of Napoleon is due to obvious geographical difficulties. It is no use asking us to place round Germany the same girdle that You could put round France or Spain. There are difficulties in the way. Therefore our blockade, impartial as it is and mist be, and effectual as it is too, is more difficult to enforce against Germany, situated as she is geographically, than against any other European Power.
We have applied the doctrine of continuous voyage to the principle of blockade. We have said that if articles are going into a neutral port destined for Germany they should be stopped at the neutral port. I am certain the noble and gallant Admiral will realise what an advance that is. The ordinary principle of blockade is to blockade the enemy ports. We say, "Yes, but in addition to that we will blockade the neutral ports if the goods that are going in there can be ascertained and established to be goods intended to be passed on to Germany." But there is this that must be remembered. If any question arises with regard to the exercise of our powers, either in attempting to confiscate contraband or to stop goods that are not contraband, there is one tribunal and one tribunal only before which it can be tried—the Prize Court; and that Court is bound to administer the law of nations applied to the particular cargo that has been the subject of seizure. It is no use saying, when you have seized a particular cargo that on investigation proves to be innocent, "Ah, yes; but a number of other cargoes of this kind have slipped us, and we do not believe they were innocent. The sum total of your cargoes cannot be innocent, because the sum total represents more than you need. We do not believe, therefore, that this cargo is innocent." That is not
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sufficient. It simply means that our attempt to keep the blockade perfect round that neutral port has failed. It cannot, entitle you to do more than to stop the particular cargo proof of the absolute destination of which is established before the Prize Court; and it is there that our difficulty lies. It is precisely because of this that we have entered into the arrangements which have been derided with the groups of traders in the neutral places. The Netherlands Oversea Trust is an example. It is said, "The goods we will consign to you we will pass as consigned to an honest consignee, and we trust you, in your turn, not to allow any of these goods to be transhipped to Germany. If you are treated as a fair neutral you must behave as a fair neutral too." And although such an Agreement has been made the subject of considerable criticism, I cannot myself see how it is possible to effect what we all desire to effect—the arrest of the flow of goods from neutral countries into Germany—by any means other than those. The noble and gallant Admiral says, "Let the Fleet have its way; the Fleet will stop everything." But then you must stop all goods, not only going into Germany, but goods that neutrals are entitled to have.
LORD BERESFORD: The Fleet would only have them brought before the Prize Court.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Yes, and that leads me to my next point. I am sure your Lordships do not want me to disclose here what steps we take with regard to the control of ships on the sea. One thing, at least, is obvious. The old rule by which you boarded and examined your prize when you took her can no longer apply. For one very simple and obvious reason. If a German submarine came by when you were doing it both you and your prize would be torpedoed, and it is clear that we have no right, to submit a neutral vessel to such a risk, and no neutral has the right to expect, that we should be subjected to such a risk. Therefore the vessels must be brought into port. Then comes the next part.
The noble and gallant Admiral and Lord Devonport complained bitterly of what happened at the Contraband Committee. I do not suppose anybody has ever been effusive about a Committee. A Committee generally consists of able, hard-working people, who do a great deal of work, whose

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recommendations are generally disregarded, and who get no thanks for the work they do. Now, what does this Contraband Committee do There are two ways in which you can make the necessary preliminary investigations before you put a ship in prize. The old way was that the captain of the boat who seized the prize looked at the papers; if he liked them, the ship went on; if he did not, he took the ship and put it in the Prize Court. But to-day I venture to say it would be impossible to throw upon a naval officer the duty of examining the papers and at the same time call upon him to accept the responsibility of saying whether the ship should be let go or be taken prize.
LORD BERESFORD: Hear, hear.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If he cannot do it, who is to do it?
LORD BERESFORD: The Prize Court.
THE LORD CHANCELLORWhat, put an innocent ship in the Prize Court? The result of such an action would be that you would be hit in heavy damages, and the whole value of your seizure would be destroyed. One of the greatest things that have happened in this war is that we have hardly put an innocent vessel into the Prize Court; and if we were seizing innocent vessels and throwing them into the Prize Court, not only would there not be a Prize Court large enough to deal with the work, but multiply it as much as you would you could not enable it to do it. But you would instantly destroy the justice and wisdom of seizure, which I venture to submit we enjoy at present despite the criticisms that have been uttered.
Nobody knows better than I do the fairness of the noble and gallant Admiral. We have known each other in another place, and I am sure he will give consideration to what I say even if he does not accept it. I say that no man on board a boat could possibly examine these documents. I will tell you why. Because part of the reason that leads one to doubt the commercial documents which on their face are generally in order is the history either of the cargoes or of the consignees or consignors, and that history cannot be present to anybody except people who have got a careful record of what the consignor has dealt in before, what his names are, who the consignee is, where the branches of his firms may be, and what are the
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ramifications of the business; and those matters have to be investigated, not after you have put the vessel into prize, but before you determine whether you can do it or not. I would be glad to know, as between the gallant officer on the vessel that boards the prize and the Committee that sit with an eminent lawyer at their head, a man who gives his whole time to this work and who has sacrificed his practice to do so—the real question you have to settle being a question of legal evidence —which is it that the noble and gallant Admiral would desire? I feel quite satisfied that any officer in the Navy would say at once, "It is odious and impossible to ask us to do this." We must have somebody to look into it, and the Committee is the best means. That is, I suggest, a matter for consideration with regard to the Committee.
I do not desire—there is no reason why I should—to complain of the criticisms that are made against, the Government. I know quite well what is happening. Every man's mind in this country is sore. He sees that we are in the face of this tremendous struggle, and he keeps thinking "Is not there something more that can be done to bring it to an end?" Thus he thinks that in this respect and in that respect the Government have been a little lax; and as he cannot possibly know what is being done, and as sometimes appearances are against the Government although the realities are in their favour, it is not unnatural that he should complain and say that more activity and more energy would produce a better state of affairs. I beg the noble and gallant Admiral to believe that though we may be civilians, though we may be amateurs, there is no one of us who is not anxious to do the uttermost in his power to bring this war to an end, and, further, to receive suggestions from other sources as to the means by which that end may be accomplished; and I certainly trust that he will not think that we have neglected the great opportunity that lies to our hand in the Fleet, or been negligent in the use of those opportunities, or, above all things, that we have attempted to belittle or disparage the immeasurable services which the Fleet has rendered.
Further debate adjourned till to-morrow, and to be taken first.
House adjourned at Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Four o'clock.