Sitting of 26 October 1915

Preamble
The Lord FISHER—Took the Oath.

RETURNS, REPORTS, &c.
Miscellaneous, No. 17 (1915)—Correspondence with the United States Ambassador respecting the execution of Miss Cavell at Brussels:
Home Production of Food (England and Wales)—Final Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries to consider the Production of Food in England and Wales:
Agriculture (Scotland)—Statement showing for the year ended 31st March 1915 the financial position in respect of each land scheme on estates taken over by the Board of Agriculture for Scotland from the Congested Districts Board:
Colonial Import Duties, 1915—Return relating to the Rates of Import Duties levied upon the principal and other articles imported into the British Self-Governing Dominions, Colonies, Possessions, and Protectorates:
Board of Education—
1. Statistics of Public Education, 1913– 1914, in

I. England and Wales;

II. Wales (with Monmouthshire);

2. Regulations for the Training of Teachers for Secondary Schools (in force from 1st August 1915):
Diseases of Animals Acts—Report of Proceedings as regards Ireland for the year 1914:
Dependants of Deceased Sailors and Soldiers—Scheme for Allowances:
Presented (by command) and ordered to lie on the Table.
Destructive Insects and Pests Acts, 1877 and 1907—Orders, declaring areas described in the schedules thereto to be infected areas for the purposes of the Wart Disease of Potatoes (Infected Areas) Order of 1914—

1. Eight Orders, numbered D.I.P. 255 to 262 inclusive, dated 12th October 1915;

2. Order, numbered D.I.P. 265, dated 16th October 1915:

Shops Act, 1912—Orders made by the under-mentioned Councils and confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, affecting certain classes of shops within their respective areas—

1. County of Stafford (Urban District of Willenhall);

2. County Borough of West Bromwich (Two Orders);

3. City of Bradford;

4. Urban District of Fleetwood (Two Orders):

Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) and ordered to lie on the Table.

SERVICE FRANCHISE BILL. [H.L.]
A Bill to make provision for the representation of Soldiers and Sailors in any new Parliament that may elected during the War or within a period of twelve months after its termination—Was presented by the Lord Willoughby de Broke; read 1a; to be printed; and to be read 2a on Wednesday the 3rd of November next. (No. 167.)
LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS) BILL.
  LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (TRAMWAYS AND IMPROVEMENTS) BILL.
  Returned from the Commons with the Amendments, agreed to.
NAVAL AND MILITARY WAR PENSIONS, &c., BILL.
Returned from the ('Commons with several of the Amendments agreed to: Several others agreed to with Amendments and with consequential Amendments to the Bill, and several others disagreed to, with Reasons for such disagreement: The said Amendments and Reasons to be printed and to be considered on Tuesday next. (No. 166.)

POSTAL AND TELEGRAPH RATES (STATUTORY LIMITS) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and to be printed.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: I understand that there is no business before the house for to-morrow, and if it is your Lordships' pleasure we propose that this Bill should be taken on Thursday and should then be passed through all its remaining stages.
Bill to be read 2a on Thursday next (The Viscount Allendale). (No. 165.)

INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) BILL. [H.L.]
Amendment reported (according to Order), and Bill to be read 3a on Thursday next.

VOLUNTEER BILL. [H.L.]
[SECOND READING.]
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE MARQUESS OR LINCOLNSHIRE: My Lords, I ask you to give a Second Reading to this Bill. Independently of its principle, which I hope the House will accept, the Bill has three things in its favour. It is very short, it has been drawn by a master hand, and it is perfectly intelligible. It is composed of four clauses. Clause I provides that it shall be lawful for His Majesty to accept, for purposes in connection with the present war, the services of any Volunteer corps which is duly affiliated to the Central Association of Volunteer Training Corps and whose services are offered through that association. Clause 2 empowers the Army Council to make regulations for the purpose of carrying the Bill into effect, and provides in particular that the Army Council may by those regulations make provision, in relation to Volunteer corps whose services are accepted under this Bill, as to their organisation, their duties in case of invasion, and the other duties for which their services may be accepted, and also the appointment and promotion of officers, the enrolment and terms of conditions of service of members, and the maintenance of discipline. Clause 3 provides that an officer or member of a Volunteer corps whose services have been accepted under this Bill shall, when he, or the corps of which he is an officer or member, is attached to or otherwise acting as part of or with any Regular forces or any part of the Territorial Force, and in such other circumstances as may be prescribed by regulations under the Bill, be subject to military law as an officer or soldier respectively. Clause 4 provides that an officer or member of a Volunteer corps whose services have been accepted under this Bill shall not be liable, as such, to serve outside England and Wales unless he voluntarily accepts liability for that purpose.
This morning I was fortunate enough to have a conversation with the secretary of the Scottish Association, which is

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recognised by the War Office, and that association wishes, if your Lordships please, at a later stage to be included within the scope of the Bill. Lord Rosebery is the president of this association, and I am authorised to state that he and the association are in entire accord with the principle underlying this Bill. Your Lordships will remember that fifteen months ago, at the outbreak of the war, a great flame of patriotism burst out all over the country: young men flocked to the Colours, and everybody, whatever his age or the position he occupied, was anxious to do what is called "his bit." In consequence of that a large number of Volunteer corps, comprising men who had passed military age, were started all over the country, but it was thought at the time—I suppose wisely—by the military authorities that these independent corps might in some way interfere with the recruiting of the new Armies, a million men having been called for to meet the then emergency. These Volunteers were at that time a mass of detached units, and as such would not have been of any great service to the country. It was necessary that something should be done in the matter, and, as always happens in England, the right man came forward exactly at the right moment to do what was wanted, and that man was Lord Desborough. My noble friend worked early and late, and was fortunate enough to secure General Sir O' Moore Creagh, V.C., late Commander-in-Chief in India, as his military adviser; Mr. Percy Harris, of the London County Council, who was one of the initiators of the movement, as his hon. secretary; and Mr. Charles J. Stewart, the Public Trustee, as hon. treasurer. These men set to work and got the disjointed units into one great whole. They started county regiments in almost all the counties in England, and these were helped to a great extent by the various Lords Lieutenant. They showed the men where to get arms, clothing and equipment, and at the present moment they have succeeded in getting together a Force, a quarter of a million strong, of men who, without any expense to the country, are ready to come forward and sacrifice their lives if need be, in the case of raid or invasion, for the protection of their homes, their wives, their children, their King, and their country.
It has now been felt that this great mass of armed men ought not to be allowed to
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continue without some sort of recognition being afforded to them. Some people may say, What do you mean by recognition? What sort of recognition do you want? I believe I am speaking for all the Force when I say that they do not want any recognition whatever of the silent, patient patriotism which has brought them together and made them attend drills and make themselves, as may of them are, first-rate marksmen. All they want is to be placed under military discipline and military law when their services are required, as shown in this Bill. These men are perfectly prepared for the present to run their own show. They are not asking the Government for money, or for arms, equipment, or transport; still less do they ask for military honours, or distinctions, or smart uniforms. Neither do they wish in any way to be a nuisance to the War Office, or to plague men who are up to their necks in important business. They can manage their own affairs perfectly well themselves. All they want is that recognition to which their patriotic conduct., in my opinion, fully entitles them. All of us who belong to Volunteer corps make an offer to the King, to the Government, and to the country of a Fourth Line. A little over a quarter of a million strong, we offer ourselves freely, without reserve, without restriction, entirely of our own free will, without any solicitation, and, above all, without any compulsion of any sort, description, or kind. We make this offer for what it is worth to His Majesty's Government, and we hope and believe that our offer will not be made in vain.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a—(The Marquess of Lincolnshire.)
LORD DESBOROUGH: My Lords, I rise to support the Bill the Second Reading of which has just been moved by the noble Marquess. Although this Bill has not been introduced by the Central Association of Volunteer Training Corps it is certainly one for which they bespeak the kind consideration of His Majesty's Government. In the first place I should like to say that it has been the one aim and object of the Central Association of Volunteer Training Corps, as it is of every patriotic man at the present moment, not to add anything to the great burdens which now rest upon the over-worked War Office. In fact, the object of recognising the Central

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Association of Volunteer Training Corps was to relieve the War Office of the enormous correspondence which arose from the remarkable outburst of patriotism to which the noble Marquess alluded. When war broke out there rose up in almost every hamlet throughout the country men who were longing to employ their spare time at any rate in preparing themselves to the best of their ability for the duty which might fall upon them of defending their country. This involved upon the War Office an enormous amount of work, and seeing that the association with which I am connected had already received from almost every part of the country the free and spontaneous offer of these different corps to affiliate with us, the War Office, by a Letter dated November 19, 1914, appointed us as the association which should have the power of affiliating corps, and decreed that these corps, if they did affiliate, should be recognised and given the power to fight for their country. Since that recognition there was a Letter—Letter E—issued by the Home Office to certain Lords Lieutenant, in which it was plainly stated that it was the duty of every man at this crisis in his country's history, if he was of military age and not otherwise debarred, to enlist in the Army, but that if he was not of military age or otherwise debarred it was his duty to join the nearest Volunteer corps which was affiliated to the Central Association. If he did that, he would be allowed to take up arms in case of invasion for the defence of his country; but if he did not do it, such arms as he might have in his possession would be taken away from him and he would be set to perform such menial tasks as might be allotted to him.
The War Office Letter of November 19 was loyally accepted throughout the country, and we proceeded to organise these corps. The Volunteers in the different hamlets were formed into platoons, the platoons into companies, and the companies into battalions; and finally, when appealed to, the Lords Lieutenant of no less than thirty-eight counties came forward and consented to start what were practically county Volunteer corps. In most of the counties of England and Wales there is now a large body of Volunteers officered and drilled without any aid from public funds. Whatever merits we may have, the only article 'we have received from the Government up to the present time is a
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small piece of ornamental red flannel with the letters "G.R." upon it; but seeing that every man who wears it has the right to bear arms for his country the mark is, I venture to say, one of distinction. Having got so far in the organisation, there came to the Central Association from all over the country, from those who were entrusted with the defence of the various military districts, requests for the services of these men. Both in Scotland and in England there are a large number of places where Volunteers, having been asked to do so, are carrying out important duties, in some cases guarding railways, in others protecting aeroplanes and places where munitions are stored.
There are now in the defences North and South of London no fewer than 5,000 Volunteers digging trenches and performing at no cost to the country other work of an important military character. These men, under the instructions of the General Officer Commanding the Defences of London, have already become very competent in the execution of their duties; some of them are already in control of working parties, and others have performed important duties in assisting in the carrying out of these defences. They are gradually qualifying themselves, should there be an attack upon London, not only to man the trenches but to act as guides to the Regular troops who would be employed in the defence of those trenches. This organisation of 5,000 Volunteers could be carried a good deal further, many of the men being competent engineers. The work that they have already performed has elicited the encomiums of commanding officers. These duties of a voluntary character are going to be largely extended, so that when the time conies the men may in certain sections be able to assist the large body of civilian or even of military labour which it may be necessary to employ upon these defences. This work, as I have already pointed out, has been carried out at no expense to the country; and the fact that the Volunteers have been asked to perform these duties shows that to a large extent they have already fitted themselves to carry them out.
But the difficulty that now arises is the authority which the Volunteer has to carry out these duties of guarding railway lines and bridges. Although he has the

9
right to fight, through having been recognised by the War Office Letter of November 19, he has no status entitling him to carry out the duties of guarding bridges and so on. In fact, only last week we received a letter stating that men of the Norfolk corps who were out guarding railways had become frightened and were unwilling to continue this work unless they were given a status. In the first place they were told that they would invalidate their insurance policies. Whether there is any truth in that I do not know. Secondly, they were told that if anything untoward happened, if they injured themselves or anybody else, they would have no protection whatever from the law. Therefore I hope that His Majesty's Government will look with favour upon this Bill. As the noble Marquess in charge of it explained, we do not ask for money. But we do ask that Volunteers who are called upon to perform military duties should at all events have the protection of the law and be given a status. In the second place, although they are quite willing to provide their own arms and equipment they should not have to incur extra outlay in the way of travelling expenses and so on.
I should like to add that a more statement by the Government, that they thought that in the near future the services of these men would be required for the performance of these various duties would be of enormous assistance to the Volunteer movement. There has been spread among these men a fear that their services may not be required. The letter from the Secretary of State which appeared a few weeks ago did a great deal to allay that apprehension. In that letter the men were thanked for the great services they had rendered to the country, both in providing officers and men from their own ranks to the Regular Army and in enormously assisting recruiting throughout the country. Still the time has come when, without in any way wishing to rush the Government, it is absolutely necessary for the success of this movement that the men should be informed that if they me called upon to perform these duties they will be given some protection under the law. Only the other day I was informed that, owing to the large number of munition works springing up all over the country, there would be great calls upon this Volunteer force. The Police are to a large extent getting depleted through
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enlistments in the Army, and otherwise. The services of special constables are manifold, but are not adequate to the duty of guarding such vulnerable points as munition works and places of that character. Therefore I venture to think that if the Government could hold out some hope to Volunteers that their services would be likely to be required for the carrying out of this work, and that, if they were so required, the men would he given every protection, it would prevent, a great many men who are thinking of doing so from resigning after having drilled for a year and some months, and it would call back to the movement a great many men who have qualified themselves and would be willing to serve again.
The noble Marquess alluded to Scotland. All I will say on that matter is that it has been the one idea of the English and the Scottish associations to work together and to carry on the movement with unanimity and absolutely on the same lines. Therefore we should welcome the inclusion of Scotland in this Bill, so as to enable the two associations to continue to work together in the future. One other point. Suppose a very large number of men join the Colours in the near future or are called upon to do so. These Volunteer corps are equipped in many eases with drill-halls; the members are quite qualified as elementary drill officers, and could be usefully employed in drilling and bringing to a certain state of efficiency men earmarked for service but who could not for the moment join the Colours. I think that with a little encouragement the Volunteers at their various depots might, under military supervision, perform very useful service in this direction. The days are getting shorter. It was much easier to drill in the summer with open fields, but drilling now in all these centres, with so many men to handle, will not be easy when winter comes on. Therefore the drill-halls will be very valuable. I am sure that if these Volunteers think that they are wasting their time and that their services are not likely to be wanted, and that if they are wanted they will not be protected in the pert formance of their duties, our numbers will fall off—as, indeed, they are falling off—and the whole movement will be very much discouraged. Therefore it is with much pleasure that I support the Second Reading of this Bill.
THE PAYMASTER-GENERAL (Loan NEWTON): My Lords, it is evident from the reception of the two speeches which we have just heard that the sentiments expressed are in accordance with the general feeling of the House, and there is every reason to suppose that they are in accord with the general feeling in the country. Everybody, I take it, is in agreement as to the potential and actual value of this Force, and Lord Kitchener himself has publicly testified to its value and to his appreciation of the whole movement. I think I might add that everybody, without exception, recognises the patriotic spirit which has animated the members of this Force, and it is important not to forget that this patriotic feeling has not been encouraged by any artificial stimulus of any kind whatsoever. It certainly appears to me that not the least of the services which this Force has rendered has been that of example. The spectacle of these men performing their allotted task, many of them men of considerable age, and prepared, as the noble Marquess said, to die in the defence of their children, or, more correctly perhaps in the case of many of them, in the defence of their grandchildren or great-grandchildren, has in all probability exercised a much more beneficial effect upon recruiting than those pictorial inducements which confront us on every public building and hoarding and in every public vehicle, and which represent, so far as I am aware, a very considerable amount of expenditure. The noble Marquess informed us that this Bill had been drawn by a master hand. It is, at all events, one of an extremely modest and reasonable character. The noble Marquess did not ask for money or for arms, or even for decorations. He merely asked for recognition, and I am happy to be able to assure him that the War Office willingly assents to the Second Reading of this Bill. At the same time it should be understood that it may be necessary to introduce certain Amendments in Committee; and, further than that, it should be understood that the War Office is not called upon to put it into force immediately. That is all I think it is necessary for me to say on the subject. I will conclude by expressing the hope that if the noble Marquess behind me succeeds in passing his Bill through this House, he may be more fortunate in another place than I have been when I have found myself in a similar position.
LORD GRENFELL: My Lords, as one connected with a Volunteer corps of this nature I desire to say a word or two in support of this Bill. When I was first asked to join in organising in Northamptonshire the corps to which I belong, I had, first, to consider what the military value of the corps would be, and, secondly, whether it might not be filled or partially filled by those who wished to avoid their proper duties in the service of the Crown. As time went on, and as I watched the organisation, I felt myself able to join and to do my best to promote the efficiency of the corps. The corps in Northamptonshire consists very largely, in the first place, of men over military age who wish to serve their country, and, in the second place, of men working in the boot factories whom, although of military age, it was impossible to urge to join the Army as they were engaged in the carrying out of very important Government contracts; at the same time it was considered an advantage that they should be educating themselves for the military service of the Crown. As time went on the corps increased in numbers and in efficiency, and the War Office proviso, which is accepted by the men, prevents any one of military age evading service in the Army by joining the corps. These men are already doing military duty in the county of Northamptonshire, and I consider it will be to the general advantage if this Bill becomes law.
LORD HARRIS: My Lords, to those of us who have had a good deal to do with the raising and organisation of this Force it is very satisfactory to hear that the War Office, subject to certain Amendments which they may presently introduce, take no exception to the passage of this Bill. But the noble Lord the Paymaster-General added a warning which, whether intentional or not, may convey rather a disappointing effect. He said that it must be understood that the War Office do not undertake to put the Bill into force at once. What these Volunteer corps naturally aim at before anything else is that they should be recognised as part of His Majesty's Army. That, I take it, is what my noble friend Lord Desborough meant when he harped upon status. At present these men are combatants when they have on the brassard; that is all. They wear a dress which is uniform in many cases, and when they

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have the brassard added they hope they will be recognised as combatants in the event of then being involved in battle or meeting with an enemy force. But with the brassard off—indeed, with the brassard on—I do not think the War Office would admit that they are at present a part of His Majesty's Army. In the case of my own county I have insisted on every man making a promise that lie would obey the orders of his superior officers in the spirit of the system of discipline maintained in His Majesty's Army, and to that extent, and to that extent only, the officers have control over them. The officers themselves have not His Majesty's commission. They have an appointment. I think in some cases it has been given by the Lord Lieutenant, but I am doubtful whether the Lord Lieutenant, being His Majesty's representative, was authorised to give an appointment of that kind. In my own case I have been careful in the wording of the appointment to avoid any reference to myself as Acting Lord Lieutenant. I have simply done it as commandant of the corps. These men have no claim, as I conceive, at present to regard themselves as part of His Majesty's Army, and I have warned them that they must realise that. If the first clause of this Bill becomes law, then in the case of any man or corps being accepted by His Majesty I take it we may hope that that man or that corps will become part of His Majesty's Army. That is certainly the aim of the noble Marquess who introduced this Bill. I think it is the desire of my noble friend Lord Desborough. I am perfectly certain it is the hope of many of the officers and men who belong to this Force. But the warning of the noble Lord opposite might mean that although this Bill became law—
LORD NEWTON: I had in mind chiefly the difficulty of arming these men.
LORD HARRIS: Then I understand the noble Lord to mean that if this Bill becomes law the putting into effect of Clause 1 will not be refused by the War Office—officers and men will be recognised under Clause 1—but that the War Office must not be expected forthwith' to proceed, under the subsequent clauses of the Bill, to make regulations on the basis of the old Volunteer Acts. I speak with sonic experience and authority on this matter. I had for four years, when I was at the War Office, the primary responsibility
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for the administration of all the Auxiliary Forces, so that I have a great deal of sympathy with the Regulars at the War Office. I know perfectly well the pressure that is brought to bear by outside influence for money to be supplied for Volunteer forces, and the very great difficulty that the Regular officers at the War Office have in refusing money under that pressure. I have that in my mind, and can quite understand the hesitation that has marked Lord Kitchener and his advisers in this matter. I sympathise with them through it all, and I fully realise the difficulties in connection with arming and equipping these men. But the primary object of the noble Marquess who introduced this Bill, and of Lord Desborough, and I am sure of the officers and men of this Force, is that they should be recognised as part of His Majesty's Army, and I hope we may construe the speech of the noble Lord the Paymaster-General and his explanatory interruption as meaning that if the Bill becomes law there will be nothing to prevent Clause 1 being put into operation as soon as officers and men are ready to accept it, and that under it they may expect to be recognised as part of His Majesty's Army.
THE EARL OF ESSEX: My Lords, the ground has been so completely covered by previous speakers that very little has been left for me to say, but I should like, in a few words, to extend my support to this Bill. The Bill will remove a grievance under which Volunteer corps have suffered ever since their inception—namely, want of proper acknowledgment from the authorities. This movement is the most extraordinary that I have known throughout my life. The popularity of it and the growth in numbers and in strength' of these corps have been unprecedented. At one moment the strength of the corps was something like 350,000 strong. Since then there has been a certain amount of depletion, caused by dissatisfaction with the way in which things were going and uncertainty as to whether or not the corps were to be allowed to exist. I am glad to hear from the noble Lord the Paymaster-General that His Majesty's Government look upon this Bill with a favourable eye and consent to its Second Reading. This is one of the most useful Forces that we could possibly have, not only in regard to the present but in regard also to the future. In case of invasion, which we all hope will

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not take place, this Force would be of great use, not only in helping the Police but in assisting the military in guarding bridges, munition works, and vulnerable spots that are at present guarded either by special constables or Regular soldiers. The Volunteer training corps could undertake a great deal of this work. The noble Marquess who introduced the Bill said that we do not ask for arms. Nor do we at the present moment. But I must say that if it comes to a case of invasion—I know that I am here treading on somewhat dangerous ground, because, as a friend told me the other day, it is as much as your life is worth to mention the word "arms" at the War Office—it will be, in my opinion, absolutely necessary to arm these men so as to enable them adequately to guard the places placed under their protection. But that is not a question for the present. I simply mention it in the hope that, if we do get the recognition for which we ask, the issue of arms will follow as a natural sequence. I give my cordial support to the Second Reading of this Bill.
LORD SYDENHAM: My Lords, this Bill is of a modest character; it is, perhaps, the most modest Bill ever brought into your Lordships' House. But it is mainly, practically I may say, an enabling Bill, and our experience of enabling Bills frequently is that they prove futile in operation. I hope from what has fallen from the noble Lord the Paymaster-General that that will not be the fate of this Bill, but that under its operation the War Office will give real encouragement to this most patriotic and useful body of men. I was under the impression that the Volunteer Act of 1863 was still in force. If it is, it does seem to me that the War Office already possess very large powers for dealing with the questions now before us. The Volunteers of last year have proved their value in a large number of different ways. In addition to the services which Lord Desborough has described, I should like to add that they have, besides acting as most useful recruiting agents, formed training bodies for non-commissioned officers and for officers, and the Admiralty has used some of their members for service on the coast. In the Isle of Man, where Home Rule prevails in such matters, they are styled the Loyal Manx Volunteer Corps, and they actually perform guard duty at the Douglas Detention Camp
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for prisoners and when so employed receive uniform at the public expense and a shilling a day.
But the only charter from the War Office possessed by this Force at present is the letter of November 19, 1914. That charter merely recognises the Central Association, and it promulgates rules largely prohibitory and, as it seems to me, distinctly of a discouraging character. One of those rules was found after a short time—as, indeed, it seemed on the face of it—to be ultra vires, and was soon afterwards withdrawn. The result of this treatment has been that there has been a diminution in the Force, and there is real danger that this most valuable body of men may be still further reduced in numbers. In the ranks of this Force there are many men of real value, capable of rendering any kind of service, provided it does not involve violent physical exercise —a body like that could set Regulars and others free from many duties for more important work. I therefore hope that the Government will take this question up in earnest. The main question is that of the status of these men. It is absolutely necessary, as Lord Desborough said, that they should have some legalised and understood status, and that they should not be, as they are now and have been for some time, really at the mercy of caprice. Unless their position is regularised it is not possible for them to do what they wish—namely, serve their King and country to the best of their ability.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I do not wish this discussion to close without giving a word of welcome to this measure and of congratulation to my noble friend opposite (Lord Desborough), to whom more than to any other living man the country owes it that these Volunteer training corps have been called into existence. The noble Marquess behind me recommended his Bill on the ground that it was a short and intelligible Bill. He might have added that it was not only short and intelligible, but also a Bill conceived in an extremely moderate and reasonable spirit. These corps have, as we all know, for a long time greatly desired that some measure of official recognition should be extended to them, and I am very glad that the time has come when they are to receive it. It is impossible to give them too much credit for the way in which, without any recognition up to the

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present time, they have come forward and played their part, They have undertaken, from motives of the purest patriotism, a good deal of very onerous work, sometimes very rough and arduous work, They have done that, as your Lordships have been told, without any pay, without any allowances, without any recompense of any kind.
It was suggested just now that in the earlier days of the movement it was looked upon rather askance by the War Office authorities. I think that is quite possible, because in the earlier days of the war the War Office authorities were naturally occupied almost entirely with the idea of raising recruits for the Regular Army. But if there ever was any misgiving of that kind in the mind of the military authorities I think it has entirely passed away. Indeed, I think that my noble friend on the Cross Benches (Lord Sydenham) was amply justified when he told the House that not only had these Volunteer training corps not stood in the way of recruiting, but that they have actually rendered valuable service in promoting recruiting, notably in such a matter as that of the formation of schools which could be attended by young officers. This Bill is a permissive Bill, and it will rest with the War Office to decide when and how it shall be put into operation. My noble friend Lord Harris took some exception to what was said by the Paymaster-General when he informed the House that the Secretary of State for War could not give an undertaking that the Bill would be put into operation at once. But I think any noble friend (Lord Newton) was justified in putting in a reservation of that kind, because it is quite obvious that not only will the Bill itself— some of the provisions of which we think will need amendment—require a good deal of attention, but the regulations to be issued under the Bill will necessitate very careful consideration indeed.
LORD HARRIS: Clause 1 has nothing whatever to do with the regulations.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: At any rate I feel sure that, although the War Office may alert be able to undertake that this Bill should be made use of at once, there is no idea of relegating it to a dim and distant future. The whole question will be considered by the Government in a spirit of entire good will towards these corps which have rendered so important a service to the country.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: Before the noble Marquess in charge of the Bill replies, I should like to ask whether there is any reason why the proposed operation of the Bill is confined to England and Wales. I understand that there are some thousands of this body enrolled in Scotland and that some of them, at any rate, are being actually employed by one Government Department. It seems to me, if I am correct in that belief, that it is rather extraordinary that the Bill should be confined to England and Wales.
THE MARQUESS OF LINCOLNSHIRE: My Lords, I should like to say a word of respectful thanks to His Majesty's Government for the way in which they have received this Bill. I also desire to express the gratitude that we feel to the noble Marquess (Lord Lansdowne) who is leading the House this evening for the sympathetic and generous words which he used regarding the Volunteer Force. It is impossible to say how much good those words will do, and we are under a deep obligation to him for having uttered them. I feel certain that the reception which the Bill has met with on all sides of the House will be a great inducement to some hundreds of thousands of brave men to persevere in their patriotic endeavours.
On Question, Bill read 2a., and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

THE BALKANS
EARL LOREBURN EARL LOREBURN rose to ask whether the despatch of troops to Salonika was determined upon by His Majesty's Government with the approval of their highest naval and military advisers; and whether His Majesty's Government can give an assurance that full provision has been made for the communications of this force and for its supplies of men and material to the satisfaction of their naval and military advisers.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, the Question which stands in my name on the Paper refers to a matter which has caused sonic anxiety to a good many people, certainly to myself. I do not ask anything in regard either to the policy of sending an expedition to Salonika or to the general policy of this country in the Balkans. Those are very important subjects, and a statement will certainly have to be made

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about them before very long; but, as I understand it, His Majesty's, Government deprecate any present debate upon those subjects, both in this House and in the other House, and I cannot doubt that they have solid reason for desiring that there should be sonic delay in discussing those matters. No one can desire less than I do to cause embarrassment, and therefore I shall not advert to any question of that kind.
My Question is directed to an inquiry in regard to the safety of, and the proper supplies to be furnished to, our troops. What I desire to know is whether the highest authorities sanctioned this expedition upon military grounds. Have the Government satisfied themselves in regard to their ability to provide for communications and for sufficient supplies to the force? Have they satisfied the military authorities upon those subjects and also that this is a practicable military operation? There are reasons for asking or information on these points, upon which I do not in the least desire to dwell, but they cannot be absent from the minds of those who have thought about recent events. We have witnessed the disappointments of the Dardanelles enterprise. We do not know whether that was commenced with the advice, without, the advice, or against the advice, of the naval and military authorities. Is this new venture to be a repetition of that enterprise? These are reflections upon which one desires to be as reticent as one can, but of which it is impossible not to feel the effect.
Nobody will doubt for a moment that His Majesty's Ministers are as anxious as anybody can be for utmost security for the men. But it is right that we should be reassured after what has happened that this new enterprise has been thought out beforehand, and that everything necessary for its success has been prepared. I cannot suppose that help was promised to Serbia, as it was by Sir Edward. Grey, without means being thought out for supplying it. It will certainly remove anxiety from the public mind if we can have a definite assurance that that has been done. Therefore, my Lords, without superfluous comment I ask my Question, and in doing so I would add that the greatest danger which this or any other country can suffer from is the danger of unpreparedness and indecision.
THE EARL or CROMER: My Lords, I fully recognise the force of the argument which was brought forward the other day by the noble Marquess (Lord Crewe) to the effect that there are certain aspects of the diplomatic and military situation which it would not be to the advantage of the public to discuss at, present. But I cannot help thinking that there are other aspects as to which discussion would be not merely innocuous but also of great advantage to the public interest. For my own part. I make a great distinction between discussions on the past, as to which I think recriminations are not only ungenerous but perfectly futile, and criticisms in regard to the present which may be of use in the future. I am perfectly certain that His Majesty's Government have not deprecated discussion in this or the other House of Parliament in order to shield themselves from criticism. They are not, I feel convinced, actuated by any such unworthy motives. At the same time I cannot help thinking that they rather over-rate the harm which may be done by Parliamentary discussion, and that they also under-rate the importance of the consequences which in a democratic country like ours are perfectly certain to ensue if Parliamentary discussion is stifled or discouraged. What have been those consequences? The consequences have been that all criticism and discussion has been transferred to the Press, and there it has been carried on by many men of great ability, but who, after all, are not nearly so responsible as members of either House of Parliament, and who for the most part write anonymously.
I hear it constantly insinuated that many of these Press critics are indiscreet and even unpatriotic. I venture to submit that those accusations, whether true or false, are really nothing to the point. The question is not whether a criticism is discreet or indiscreet, but whether it is true or false. That is the main point. I have been for close on half a century more or less behind the scenes of political life, and I think I may say that during that period I have had my share of newspaper abuse. I am speaking of the Press in England; the conditions in countries such as India and Egypt are totally different. I have known many cases in which Press criticism has caused a great deal of personal annoyance, and even sometimes done temporary harm to the public interest;

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but I cannot remember a single case of Press attacks against a Government or an individual which have done any permanent or serious harm provided that Government or individual had in the end an adequate answer which would satisfy reasonable and broad-minded people that the attacks were captious and unreasonable. But woe betide the Government or the individual so attacked who has no such answer. They are likely eventually to go under, and they deserve to go under. I cannot help thinking that a good deal of the criticism and friction which undoubtedly exist at present would have been avoided had not the Government at the commencement of this war thrown a veil of such impenetrable mystery over their opinions and plans of action.
Let me instance one case in point, the question of compulsory versus voluntary service. I am not, of course, going into the merits of that case, but merely mention it to illustrate my point. It was quite certain that on that subject there would be a wide divergence of opinion in this country. The main facts of the situation from the very first were perfectly clear. At one end of the scale there was a certain body of influential opinion which had declared positively for compulsory service long before the outbreak of war. At the other end of the scale there was another section of influential opinion—I do not know how numerous—which was entirely opposed to compulsory service on any conditions and under any circumstances. Between those two extremes there was a large mass of public opinion who were undecided, who did not like t he remedy, but who were perfectly prepared, I believe, to adopt it if they could be shown that it was absolutely necessary. In these circumstances it appears to me that it was the duty of the Government from the very first to make a perfectly clear statement of what they wanted, and to declare with boldness that if they did not get under the voluntary system a certain number of recruits within a certain time they would resort to compulsion. We have never had any clear statement on the subject. We had a number of half-hearted perfunctory statements, the main object of which always appeared to be to avoid giving a definite opinion on the main issue involved. Then there were, a number of—shall I call them?—whispers that the democracy would not stand compulsory service, and
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would not stand a good many other things. I have been a moderate Liberal all my life, but I do not suppose that any one would class me as a democrat. At the same time I have more faith in democracy than appears to be entertained by many of its most stalwart advocates. The feeling that is uppermost in the minds of the democracy is that they want to win this war, and I believe they would have stood almost anything if only the Government had come forward and told them what they wanted and informed them frankly what the situation was. And that is what has never been done.
What has been the result of this reticence on that particular point? The result was that a dangerous and mischievous agitation was got up which seemed likely to degenerate into a class warfare, the sort of thing we want most to avoid at this moment. That danger has happily passed, because the Government have now done what they ought to have done many months ago. They have put the whole matter of recruiting into the hands of a member of this House, Lord Derby, who has a business head on his shoulders and inspires universal confidence. I hope that before long he will tell us exactly how we stand. But I think it is not an unreasonable criticism to ask why all this valuable time has been lost, and why some action of this kind could not have been taken months ago.
We are now threatened with a considerable divergence of opinion on at least two other subjects of vital importance. Within the last few weeks the whole character of the war has manifestly changed. The Germans, it is true, still occupy a portion of France and practically the whole of Belgium, and they have checked the Russian offensive which originally looked very promising. On the other hand it should not be forgotten that they have entirely failed in their two main objectives. They have not crushed the Russian Army; they have not penetrated to Paris or to the coast of the English Channel. What, therefore, have they done? They have carried out a. programme which has been always dear to the hearts of Pan-Germans; they have transferred the main operations of the war to the East. In these circumstances no one expects for one moment that His Majesty's Government should divulge all their strategical plans and indicate the forces that are engaged, or precisely what they intend to do. But I do think they

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might make some general statement showing at all events, what I believe to be the case, that what I may call the centre of gravity of the war has been transferred for the time being from the West to the East, and give some general indication of how they intend to meet the situation, without going into details which might do harm.
Let me in connection with this point allude to one other thing. I know perfectly well the very onerous duties which are now being performed by my noble and gallant friend Lord Kitchener, for whom have the greatest personal regard and respect; but considering the importance of the noble Earl's position and considering the public feeling which everybody knows exists on this subject, I cannot help thinking that the noble and gallant Field-Marshal might have found time to come down to the House and tell us a little of what he thinks. The noble and gallant Field-Marshal has been singularly parsimonious in his utterances in this House, and although he has been frequently complimented on his important speeches I must candidly say that his statements have never contained much more than we could read in the daily newspapers. It cannot be too clearly understood that this House and certainly the country will no longer listen with much patience to these typical official statements of the kind to which we were accustomed in the past. We want something rather more, something to show that there is a real grasp of the situation, and something to give us the general outline of what is intended to be done to meet it. A very general impression exists that there has been what the Germans themselves call an absence of "directive" in the war—that is to say, that the measures we have taken are isolated steps rather wanting in cohesion, and that there has been no proper or real appreciation of the relative importance of events. I hope that impression is incorrect: but it exists, and will continue to exist in growing volume unless some of His Majesty's Ministers come down to this or the other House and give us some indication of the state of things and of their intentions so far as they can divulge them without, doing harm to the public interest.
I suppose it, is possible that there May be some people outside this House and the other House of Parliament who wish to upset the Government. If there be any such people, I wish as earnestly as I can
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to dissociate my self entirely from them, and I doubt, whether there is a single member of your Lordships' House who does not feel the same. But in point of fact the whole situation is much too grave to allow that old Party ties or personal feelings or personal wishes should for one moment weigh in the scale. They must all be put aside. But for all that, and notwithstanding that every one recognises the truth of that very homely proverb of Abraham Lincoln that it is not the right time to swap horses while crossing a stream, there is a very strong feeling in the country, particularly amongst thinking politicians, that it, is quite impossible to conduct the war efficaciously with a Committee or a Cabinet, call it what you like, of twenty-two persons, many of whom are engaged in work wholly unconnected with the war itself. There is also an opinion that that evil cannot be rectified or that want of efficiency remedied merely by having a War Committee of the Cabinet, sitting outside the Cabinet but responsible to them, and liable to have their opinions overruled by the Cabinet. What I think is urged is that, we should have, not a change of Party particularly—we have a Coalition Government, though I think it Was a mistake ever to have had one, but that is gone and it is no use talking about that— but a small, strong Executive body chosen without any reference to Party, and chosen from men representing the best talent in the country in financial, political, naval, military, and Eastern affairs. That, I believe, is the opinion of a very large number of people. I do not, of course, for one moment expect any member of the Front Bench opposite to state now what the Government intend to do about that, but I do most earnestly press upon His Majesty's Ministers that a very strong opinion exists about it, and I think they would do wisely to take the matter into consideration and take an early opportunity of stating what they intend to do.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I noted with satisfaction the admission made by my noble friend who has just sat down that, if we on this Bench appear sometimes to be a little secretive or a little reluctant to give full information to your Lordships' House, our action is not to be attributed to any desire to screen ourselves. My noble friend is much too well versed in public affairs to be ignorant, of the undoubted fact that there are

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moments when it is impossible in the public interest that questions relating to the conduct of a great war should be freely discussed in Parliament. We have to think not only of the effect of what may be said upon our enemies, but, what is not less important, of the effect at certain moments upon our Allies; and I can assure my noble friend that if we have been a little slow to respond to the invitations that have from time to time been made to us it has been solely from the conviction that we could not speak as fully and frankly as we should desire for reasons of that kind.
I might strengthen my argument by reminding the House of what happened not many nights ago. We had a short discussion, in the course of which Lord Morley of Blackburn addressed your Lordship. Ho, too, complained that the House was not taken sufficiently into our confidence, and he mentioned several points upon which personally he would have been glad to have information. What were those points? The number of troops that were likely to be employed in these Balkan operations; the terms upon which we expected to obtain Russian cooperation; the terms upon which we expected to obtain Italian co-operation; and, finally, what was the prospect of obtaining Greek and Rumanian adhesion. I venture to say that upon every one of those points it would, particularly at that moment, have been absolutely out of the question to make a. full and complete statement to the House without giving to the public information which we had no right to give.
I will not attempt to follow my noble friend who has just spoken—and I know he does not expect me to do so—into the question, not perhaps strictly relevant to the Notice upon the Paper but one of great interest to all of us, as to the proper strength of an efficient Cabinet. I will take my courage in both hands, however, and I will tell him that up to this point I agree with him—that personally I am strongly of opinion that the efficiency of any body of that kind is apt to vary inversely with its numerical strength.
I pass to the interrogatories which the noble and learned Earl below the Gangway (Lord Loreburn) addressed to us just now. He wishes to elicit whether we have been advised that the operations in progress or in contemplation in the Balkans are
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practical military operations, and whether we have been told by our naval and military experts that that is their opinion. There is an impression in the minds of some people—I am sure it does not exist in the mind of the noble and learned Earl—that we civilian politicians are in the habit not only of devising great strategical plans and combinations of our own but of imposing those plans upon the persons to whom we ought to look for advice upon naval and military problems. I suppose that most of us have indulged in the amusement of making plans of our own, but I can assure the noble and learned Earl that neither ill this Government nor in any Government with which I have been connected has it been the practice, nor has it been possible, for amateur strategists to impose their plans upon the responsible professional advisers of the Government of the day. And I will add this, that in this Government in particular it is specially unlikely that anything of the kind should have occurred. The present Cabinet includes among its members Load Kitchener, who was called. to the office of Secretary of State for War almost by public acclaim. Lord Kitchener is present at every meeting of the Cabinet; he is a party to all its decisions, and it would be almost grotesque to suppose that he allowed himself to be deflected from his course by the pressure of his civilian colleagues. Quite apart from that, the present procedure of the Government—I mean its procedure by Committees and Councils—is of a kind which gives far greater opportunities to the military and naval experts of asserting themselves and making their views known than was the case in the days when I first entered public life.
There is another general consideration which your Lordships would do well to bear in mind. These great problems which from time to time confront the Government of the day are as a rule what I might describe as mixed problems—that they are problems into which not only political but military and naval considerations enter, and it seems to me just as necessary, having that in view, that the expert advisers of the Government should have opportunities of considering the political aspects of the case as that the civilian members of the Government should take into account the naval and military side of the problem. In deciding whether an operation shall be undertaken at all, or

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whether one operation is preferable to another operation, or whether, as the war goes on, it is desirable to modify the plans originally arrived at—these are all questions which should be considered not only from the purely naval and military point of view, but from that of the broad moral and political considerations with which they are connected. But I should like to enforce this further point, which is that whatever the opportunities you give to your naval and military advisers, the ultimate responsibility for the decision must rest with the Government, and not with them. I have heard that question discussed more than once in your Lordships' House, and so far as I am aware the view has always prevailed, and I think rightly prevailed, that no Government can be allowed to shelter itself behind the advice of its military and naval experts.
Let me now say a word with regard to the Salonika Expedition. I can quite enter into the apprehensions which possess the mind of the noble and learned Earl below the Gangway. I can quite understand that having before him our commitments in the Western theatre of war, the position in which we find ourselves in the Gallipoli Peninsula, our interest in Egypt and in other possessions of the Empire, it should be to his mind profoundly distasteful that matters should be complicated by our entering into new entanglements in a new theatre of war.
EARL LOREBURN: I never said that or anything about it. I deliberately abstained from expressing any opinion, because I am not in possession of the facts. I did not wish to say for a moment that the action taken was right or wrong, or to discuss the policy. I wished merely to know whether you have sufficient military and naval opinion to justify you in commencing the enterprise. That is the only point I am on.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSD0WNE: Surely I did not mishear the noble and learned Earl when I thought he told the House that he remembered how we had become involved in an entanglement in Gallipoli, and that he was afraid we might inadvertently find ourselves involved in a new entanglement of the same kind.
EARL LOBEBURN: Yes, I did say that.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: did not impute anything to the noble and learned Earl beyond that, and that is the argument to which I wish to address myself for a moment. I can quite understand, if I may put it in this way, that the noble and learned Earl and others should dislike the idea of anything that might be described as the dispersal of effort on our part at a time when we are making so many efforts in different parts of the world. Well, in what circumstances has this little British force been sent to Salonika? I should like to recall to your Lordships' memory the position in which, let us say in the month of September, the Central Powers found themselves in the different theatres of war in which they were engaged. In the Western theatre they had made no progress for a long time: they had, indeed, been successfully attacked and pushed back at several points. On the Russian front their advance, at first so triumphant and overwhelming, had received a serious check, certainly at some points. The Italian forces were pressing their offensive hard, and in the minor and remoter theatres of war, Mesopotamia for example, success was resting with our arms. That being the situation the Central Powers very naturally looked about them to discover some new direction in which to seek for a decision satisfactory to themselves, and their choice fell, as it obviously was likely to fall, upon a great attempt to make a push to the south-east through' Bulgaria, threatening our forces in Gallipoli, threatening Constantinople and perhaps Egypt, to say nothing of vaster aspirations which perhaps lay behind. And that great project became doubly attractive to the Central Powers from the moment that, most unfortunately, Bulgaria threw her influence on their side. To such a thrust to the southeast there was one obstacle and one obstacle only. The key of the situation lay in the north-eastern corner of Serbia, and accordingly we found Serbia threatened by a formidable concentration of troops on the enemy frontier. It is impossible to think or speak of Serbia without paying a tribute to the wondrous gallantry with which that little country withstood two separate invasions and has lately been struggling against a third. She repelled the two first invasions by an effort which I venture to think will form one of the most glorious chapters in the history of this great war.

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It was in these circumstances that Serbia made a direct appeal to us for help. I do not think the noble and learned Earl will differ from me when I say that there is not a man in this country who, if there had been a good chance of coming to the rescue of Serbia, would not have risked a good deal in order to do so. But it was not only Serbia that invoked our co-operation. Greece was bound to Serbia by geographical propinquity, by common interests obvious to all, and by Treaty obligations. Moreover, it was only through Greek territory that help could possibly reach the Serbian people. It was only by the use of Greek ports that a base could be provided for any movement intended to take the pressure off Serbia. In these circumstances the good will of Greece was obviously of the first importance to us, and we had at that time every reason to feel assured that we had that good will. M. Venezelos was still in power, and it was at his instance that we undertook to provide a force for the purpose of enabling Greece to fulfil her Treaty obligations to Serbia. It was in compliance with that twofold appeal that we sent such troops as were available to Salonika. It was a small force, because only a small force could be collected at the time. The French Government, on their side, despatched the force which is now on the spot, and which is apparently at this moment engaged with the Bulgarian enemy on the eastern frontier of Serbia. At the same time, a larger British force was prepared for service in South-Eastern Europe, and transport was taken up for the purpose of conveying it to its destination.
I suggest to your Lordships that those steps, incomplete no doubt, and taken with great promptitude, because promptitude was of the utmost moment, were the only proper steps which could be taken at the moment to relieve the position in Serbia. Those steps were taken after full and deliberate consultation on the part of the Cabinet with its military and naval advisers. But, as I said a moment ago, the small British force sent to Salonika—I think 13,000 in round numbers—was regarded as the precursor of a larger force which was put under orders at the same time. The noble and learned Earl may perhaps desire me to tell him how we propose that that larger force when it arrives shall be used. My answer to that is that the use to which that force is put must depend
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upon the situation which exists when it arrives upon the scene. The noble and learned Earl spoke of the "new enterprise," and he asked me whether it was a practicable military operation. I cannot answer that question, because the character of the new operation or the "new enterprise," if the noble and learned Earl so likes to call it, has not been decided, and cannot be decided until we know more of the situation in South-Eastern Europe.
Events have moved and are moving very rapidly in that part of the world. There have been two quite recent developments which profoundly affect the military as well as the political situation. The first of those developments is to be found in the change of attitude of the Greek Government. We all know that M. Venezelos resigned; we all know that Greece has arrived at the deliberate conclusion that her Treaty engagements with Serbia do not require her to go to the rescue of that country in the present momentous crisis. That is one fundamental change which the situation has undergone. But apart from that—I say it with great regret—I am afraid we must admit that the progress of the campaign in Northern Serbia has been such as to render it highly improbable that the Serbian Army will be able to withstand for any great length of time the attack to which it is exposed from the Austro-German forces in the North, aided, as it is, by the stab in the back which Serbia is receiving at the hands of Bulgaria. Therefore my answer to the question, "What are we going to do with the larger force?" is that the military plans must depend upon the military situation; but I may add that upon this point the Allies are of one mind. These matters have been discussed, and both the French and the British Governments realise that when further reinforcements reach the Eastern Mediterranean it will be necessary to take careful stock of the position. It will be necessary that the military and naval advisers of both Governments should consult and should endeavour to come to a conclusion, and it cannot be until those consultations have taken place that we can be in a position to say that we intend to use the British force either for this purpose or for that. What we shall endeavour to use it for will be to counter the movement of the Central Powers across Bulgaria, but the precise mode of countering that attack must obviously

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be left for further and very careful examination. The discussions are at this moment proceeding with regard to this point, and I may add that the General whom we have just sent out to the South-Eastern Mediterranean, Sir C. Monro who, I think, arrives in that part of the world to-day, has been instructed to report as soon as possible his opinion upon all the aspects of the case. Therefore when the noble and learned Earl asks me, as he did just now, whether I can give him a general indication of our intentions, or, as he said in a later passage in his speech, whether I can describe to him the general outline of the "new enterprise," I am obliged to tell him that I can do nothing of the kind; that that is a question which, is being considered by those who have the best right to consider it.
At the moment it is quite impossible for me to add to the noble and learned Earl's knowledge on the subject; but I can assure him that lie need have no apprehension that in this matter or in any other matter of the kind we are likely to be led into precipitate action owing to some hurried impulse or some vague sentiment or desire to achieve this object or that. At every step we shall take the best naval and military advice which is obtainable, and that advice will have reference not only to what the noble and learned Earl calls the "new enterprise,'' but also to all subsidiary questions relating to the safeguarding of the communications of our forces and to the supplies of men and material. That is all the answer which I am able to give to the noble and learned Earl. I trust that he will at any rate acquit me of a desire to avoid any of the points merely because of any undue tendency to reticence or concealment.
Loan ST. DAVIDS: My Lords, I had not intended to say anything this evening. I do not want to put any questions to the Government, and they may be quite sure that I shall not say anything that would be indiscreet in delicate circumstances. I have only risen because of a remark that was made by the noble Marquess himself. Lord Lansdowne said that it was only possible to go to the help of Serbia through Greece. If that is so, the Government do not seem to have been very wide awake in the early stages
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of the war. From the beginning of the war they must have known that to supply even ammunition to Serbia they ought to take every precaution. The noble Marquess has said that there was no other way except through Salonika. Well, there ought to be. There ought to be a way into Serbia through Durazzo; and if there is not I should like to know why the Government have not made one. When the Serbian Army went to Durazzo in the first Balkan War they went at the worst time of the year, when the mountains were covered with snow; and they had the Turkish and Albanian Armies opposing them. The route was difficult, but there was a route. The Serbians went to Durazzo to build a railway. The route is mountainous and difficult. Any one who has read descriptions of Albania knows what the route must be. But I would remind the Government that from Durazzo into Serbia is only about the same distance as from Salonika into Serbia, and the Government have had fifteen months during which they might have made necessary arrangements. I am sufficiently a railway man to be reluctant to say how much railway you could have built in that fifty or sixty miles in fifteen months, but I am certain that if at the beginning of the war the Government had considered this thing seriously—and surely they ought to have considered seriously the question of relieving Serbia if they had built plenty of shed accommodation for stores at Durazzo and had pushed things on they might have had a railway going for twenty or thirty miles into the mountains; and if they could not have taken a railway the whole way, they ought at any rate to have got a good motor route by this time. I do not say that by a motor route you could provide for an army of a million men, but you could take upon it arms and ammunitions for a small affair like the Serbian Army. The Albanians could not make the resistance to movements through their country that they could at the time of the first Balkan War. Then they had arms and ammunition, and were organised. But now a great part of this particular part of Albania is under the influence of Essad Pasha, who is not anti-Serbian and who would work for the Allies; and you also have a position in Albania at the present time when the Albanians could not get the arms to equip any force. They are surrounded by Montenegro, Serbia, Greece,

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and the Adriatic Sea. They could not get an ounce of ammunition if you did not lot any through. I do not know what the Government have done, but if in the fifteen months since the beginning of the war they have not made any preparation for a route into Serbia viâ Durazzo I say they have not deserved well of the country.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: My Lords, the speech to which we have just listened is an indication that such Questions as have been put by the noble and learned Earl are prone to carry us rather further in debate than I am sure the Government would desire. Nothing could have been more friendly than the first two speeches which were addressed to the Government, and the noble Marquess recognised that fact in his reply. But the point which I would put to your Lordships is that the importance of a debate of this character is not merely what is said in it, but the fact that such a Motion should be put upon the Paper at all. I am not criticising the noble and learned Earl. But look at the position. The noble and learned. Earl has held the highest position in this House, and he asks a Government largely composed of his late colleagues whether the despatch of troops to Salonika was determined upon by his Majesty's Government with the approval of their highest naval and military advisers; and, further, he seeks an assurance that full provision has been made for the communications of the force. I do not think that in our Parliamentary records, except in moments of great trouble, we could lay our hands on any suggestion made by a responsible person so fatal to the confidence which we desire to rest in the Government as the suggestion that they are about to embark upon a most important military operation against the wish of, and without full consultation with, their naval and military advisers.
I think your Lordships must look upon this as the second or third occasion on which some attempt has been made to influence the course of the war by discussion in this House, without the smallest desire on the part of those who have brought matters forward to impair the confidence which is to be shown in the Government. I remember two very remarkable speeches made ten months ago by two of my noble friends who now sit on the Government Bench in which they
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desired through your Lordships to move the Government to organise the country in the matter of recruiting and the getting of munition workers, and also in relation to providing the sinews for a second year of war. I quite agree with Lord Cromer that it would be ungenerous and futile at this moment to go back on the course of those debates and to the many months which elapsed before the late Government were able to put into full operation the suggestions then made. We had a somewhat similar experience, three months ago with regard to the question of retrenchments on which your Lordships unanimously adopted a Motion which resulted in a Committee being appointed, and in the last few days we have seen its recommendations, which were accepted by the Government, thrown over at the first sign of opposition. I only allude to those things for the purpose of pointing out that they all argue a desire on the part of those outside the Government to press the Government to consider the manner in which the war is being conducted, and I really think that mere force than has been given to it up to now lies in the suggestion of Lord Cromer that the main cause of this want of confidence is not any feeling in regard to the individuals who compose the Government, but the impossibility of working satisfactorily under the system in which the Government is now carried on.
My noble friend Lord Lansdowne, with his usual skill, talked of the advantage of Committees of the Cabinet and of the large infusion of military and naval opinion which was possible through those Committees; but he pointed out with irresistible force that in the last resort the ultimate responsibility for decisions must rest with the Government. I would ask your Lordships, who, like myself, can only have outside information, what is the confidence we can feel in a system which one day tells us that there was a meeting of the Defence Committee at which some members of the Cabinet were present; the next day that there was a meeting of the War Committee or Council with some members of the Cabinet, and some who were not members; the third day that there was a meeting of the Dardanelles Committee; and the fourth day that a sub-committee of the Cabinet met in Downing-street, enterprising newspaper critics giving us the names of two or three

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of those who walked in on that occasion. Such a continual shifting seems to argue a want of continuity, and, secondly, we have no security whatever, however these Committees are composed, that when their decisions are brought to the Cabinet as a whole they will not be overruled.
I pin my noble friend Lord Lansdowne to that remarkable admission of his that we are not to take it that the decisions come to in the presence of and in consultation with the naval and military advisers must, or indeed ever can, rule the decisions of the Government. What I would press is that the Cabinet of twenty-two—an unknown number in the whole history of this country—is not a carrying out of the will of the country; it is the reversing of what I believe most of us think was the will of the country last May, which was that the most eminent and useful members of any political Party should be brought together to conduct the war, not that they should be brought together in various small batches to sit on various Committees and then refer to a much larger body who could not have heard half of the arguments. That seems to me a most unfortunate position of affairs, and one which strikes at the root of the confidence we ought to feel.
I should like to say that I am not now designing to attack any individual or to suggest that any individual who is consulted ought not to be consulted, but I think what you want is a small Committee, that is to say, a Cabinet which is responsible, which is chosen not by offices but by men. It is commonly said that the Cabinet might consist. of the First. Lord of the Treasury, the Lord Chancellor, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the high Secretaries of State, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, but that would not be a body particularly well calculated to carry on the war. Lord Cromer said just now that the pivot with regard to the war had shifted to the East, and it happens that with the exception of Lord Kitchener, who is outside all political considerations, not one of those men I have named happen to have any acquaintance with the East. But there are sitting in this House four members of the Cabinet not holding the offices to which I have referred, three of whom have a great acquaintance with Asia and a fourth with Africa—therefore men whose opinions would be of great value in that particular case.
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I desire to occupy your Lordships' attention for but one moment longer. I happen to differ from my noble friend Lord Cromer with regard to the Coalition, I want to see the Coalition outlast the war, to see it re-establish conditions under the most difficult circumstances which will occur in this country when the war is over. But if it to be a Coalition it must he the focussing of all the best opinions of all Parties, not merely a collection of gentlemen who in normal times would be the best to carry on the Civil Departments or the most expert in Parliamentary discussion. My observations have been made not with a desire to criticise, but because I want the Government to take the course now, when it is not too late, that will most strengthen their deliberations and enable them, in this most tangled condition of our diplomacy and this great strain of our military affairs, to retain, as I think they ought to retain, the confidence of the country.
THE EARL OF CROMER: With the indulgence of the House, might I offer a remark with reference to what fell from Lord St. Davids as to making a railway from Durazzo? Perhaps I am the only member of this House who has travelled from Durazzo to Serbia. The noble Lord's suggestion may be a possible one, but I can only say that a more difficult country through which to make a railway could hardly be imagined.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, my noble friend has asked me to say a word or two in reply to the speech which we have just heard from the noble Viscount opposite. I do not complain for a moment that our debate this evening has travelled rather far from the somewhat circumscribed issue which was raised by the Question of the noble and learned Earl. He himself, if I may say so, adhered strictly to the terms of his Question. But even one who has been a short number of years in your Lordships' House, as I have, knows perfectly well the licence that is assumed by noble Lords, and when I heard the strength of the Cabinet and the road to Durazzo discussed on this Question I realised once again that I was in the House of Lords.
The speech of Lord Midleton was, as he assured us at the end, obviously characterised by a desire to add to the public

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confidence which, he says, ought to be felt in the Government that is conducting a great war at this period of supreme emergency in our history. But I thought he put a rather strained interpretation upon the terms in which the Question of the noble and learned Earl was couched. Whether the noble and learned Earl in putting the Question implied distrust, as the noble Viscount seems to think, it is for him, and not for anybody else, to say. I do not myself imagine for a moment that that was in his mind. It seemed to me that in putting his Question he asked for the kind of information which any member of your Lordships' House or of the House of Commons might reasonably desire to obtain, and it was in that spirit that the noble Marquess behind me answered him. However, I do not desire to lay stress on that, because the noble Viscount in explaining his attitude towards Lord Loreburn's Question went on to say that he really only put that aspect of the case because he wanted the Government to consider the manner in which the war had better be conducted. And then he passed certain criticisms upon the Government as at present constituted.
In some of these respects I think the noble Viscount has been misled by inaccuracies in the Press. He alluded to the fact that some days you read in the newspapers of the assembling in Downing-street of the Committee, or a sub-committee, of Imperial Defence; on another occasion of the meeting of the Dardanelles Committee; on another occasion of the meeting of the liar Committee, and on another occasion of the meeting of a sub-committee of the Cabinet. Surely the noble Viscount has been long enough in public life to know that to these kind of statements in the Press you must not attach too much credence. As a matter of fact I believe it has never been the practice of Cabinets to communicate the composition or the work of their sub-committees to the Press. Whether that is or is not a wise procedure I cannot say, but undoubtedly in the case of the present war we may be held, from the speech of the noble Viscount, to have suffered from it. As a matter of fact all these Committees and sub-committees which he imagines and of which he reads notices in the Press do not, in the form that is suggested by the Press, exist. There has been, at any rate during the time I have been in the Government, a single Committee
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which has been particularly instructed to direct its attention to the prosecution of the war. When the Government was first formed the military operations that were then uppermost in our attention were the Dardanelles operations. The Committee thereupon began to be called the "Dardanelles Committee." Presently, as the war assumed a wider range the general control of the war passed into the hands of that Committee. You may call it what you like—it is a Committee of the Cabinet, but it is for all essential purposes a War Committee. It sits in consultation with the military and naval advisers of the Government, and, whether it be well or badly composed, it endeavours faithfully to discharge its duties.
Another point raised by the noble Viscount was the responsibility of this Committee to the Cabinet. He has a much longer experience of Cabinets than I have, but unless he would propose to dethrone the Cabinet altogether I suppose he would allow that the responsibility, in the last resort, for all actions of the Government must rest on the Cabinet as a whole. It is therefore not only not unnatural but inevitable that the proceedings of the War Committee should go for confirmation to the Cabinet. But if he raises the question that it would be intolerable if advice given upon the responsible opinion of the military and naval authorities were liable at any moment to be, and he seemed to indicate has been, overthrown by a Cabinet largely consisting of civilians, may I say that he misinterprets the situation as it exists. No such situation has arisen in my experience, nor is it conceivable that it should arise. If you depute particular functions to ten or twelve men it is hardly likely that any Cabinet of twenty-two would assume the responsibility of overthrowing their opinion, particularly if it is based on expert and professional advice.
Then as regards the size of the Cabinet itself. If the noble Viscount were to come to Downing-street and enter those precincts which he once frequented and were to make there the speech which he made to-day against a Cabinet of twenty-two members, I can well conceive that his observations might be received with a certain amount of chastened applause even within that chamber. I will not put

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it more strongly than that. But when he goes on to advocate that the functions of the twenty-two should be conferred upon a very much smaller number, he raises an issue of greater importance upon which a very great deal may be said, and upon which also I think he would find certain converts in Downing-street. That aspect of the case, is one which I happen to know is under the consideration of the Prime Minister at the present moment. More it would not be possible or desirable for a Cabinet Minister to say, but the full force of the considerations which the noble Viscount has so temperately urged is before us. Although Lord St. Davids did not ask for a reply—in fact, he said he was not putting a question—I may inform him that the question of the road from Durazzo into Serbia, difficult as Lord Cromer said it would, be, is one that has not escaped the attention of His Majesty's Government.
LORD WILLOUGHBY DE BROKE: My Lords, the noble Earl who has just sat down made a very interesting remark which I should like to answer. He suggested that it would be well for Lord Midleton not to believe everything he saw in the newspapers, and that an old political hand like the noble Viscount certainly would not be deceived in that manner. Those who have the experience of public life that Lord Midleton possesses will be able to discriminate between the different classes of news—the class to which credence can be attached, and that which ought to be passed by. But the general public, in the absence of any but the very meagre information that we have received from official sources in Parliament, unhappily are forced to form their conclusions about all and sundry from what they see in the newspapers. The debate to which we have listened this evening has been very useful; and as an ordinary member of the general public I welcome it very much indeed, because it will do nothing but good. Our conversations about policy and the position of the Government are not likely to deflect the Germans one iota one way or the other from the course they have determined upon. These questions which are asked—and which will be asked—are not dictated, I can assure your Lordships, with the object of destroying the Government, but of destroying the Germans.
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The noble Earl, Lord Cromer, advised us just now not to swap horses in the middle of the stream. I do not know whether that doctrine is considered to be of universal application, but it rather seems to me to depend on what sort of horse a man has beneath him. If the horse is standing in the middle of the stream and seems as if he is going to lie down, the best thing is to get on to another if one offers. I do not want to introduce a note of levity into this debate, because it is too important. The speeches of Lord Lansdowne and Lord Curzon will be extremely valuable to the public, and I am grateful to both noble Lords for having made them. We have heard something from Lord Curzon which will be read with attention by all those who are taking an interest in the manner in which government by twenty-two rulers is carried on. He has also thrown an interesting sidelight on the opinion that some have that this is a very unwieldy number. We have also had some interesting observations from Lord Cromer, to which weight is bound to be given coming whence they do, as to how the Administration might be altered with advantage.
But from the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, we have had an exceedingly grave admission with regard to the state of affairs in our relations with Serbia. The public has been told in almost every speech which Cabinet Ministers have made since the war began that we were out to defend small nationalities. Every variety of reason has been given for this war, most of them belonging to the category in which is included the idea that we are fighting against something called Prussian Militarism, against one set of ideas and in favour of another set of ideas. But the thing we have had drummed into our ears in, I think, every speech of the Prime Minister is that we are out to support the legitimate claims of small nationalities. If that is so, all I can say is that I hope we shall make a better success of it in the future than we have done in the past. You cannot help people taking an interest in the war and asking questions; they would not be responsible members of the British public if they did not do so. If going through Serbia and linking up with the East was, in the words of Lord Lansdowne, a great project attractive to the Central Powers, and if we have only been able at present to undertake the

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defence of Serbia with a very small force—and that, if I am correctly informed, in an exceedingly difficult country— the public will want to know why the defence of Serbia and a proper military preparation for that purpose was not decided upon long ago. It would be interesting to know at what date the idea of making plans to help Serbia came before the Cabinet for discussion. We are told that we shall have to content ourselves for the present by sending a small force only to the support of Serbia. Then we are told that a larger force is going to act as military needs may dictate. Everybody will be exceedingly thankful to hear that. We are glad indeed to learn that General Monro to report at the earliest possible date, and there will not be wanting those in this country who hope that that officer has been given at least a comparatively free hand to deal with the situation as he finds it. I do not associate myself for a moment with those who are of opinion that this kind of operation is undertaken by the Government without their having sought the best military or naval advice. But may I just say, with regard to the Eastern situation, that what gives rise to anxiety is the feeling which the people have that we are living from hand to mouth and that there has been no definite cohesive plan.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: Might I ask the noble Earl, Lord Curzon, in view of his correction as to newspaper accounts—for which I thank him—whether it is not possible to ensure that at all events correct statements should be given to the newspapers of such important matters as meetings of these Special Committees? A statement of every Cabinet meeting is sent officially to the Press. In any case I am sure my noble friends opposite must have sufficient influence with the Censor to be able to prevent injurious information on important topics reaching us.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Tha is a question for the Prime Minister, and if have no doubt lie will read and attach due weight to what the noble Viscount has said on this matter.
EARL LOREBURN: My Lords, if this discussion has gone beyond the terms of the Question it is because there has been so much, I will not say suppression, but
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concealment of what is going forward and so little information given to the public. In those circumstances it cannot be a matter of surprise that some curiosity should be expressed when the opportunity arises. The noble Earl, Lord Selborne, has very properly, if I may say so, expressed himself on that subject. Nothing could be more disadvantageous than this concealment, and that is no doubt the reason why the debate has travelled a little beyond the subject-matter of the Question on the Paper.
I asked certain questions as to whether certain precautions had been taken in regard to a particular expedition and for the future well-being of the men themselves. The noble Marquess's answer (for which I thank him), though most considerate, did not really answer the questions that were put; and the only conclusions that can be drawn—well, I would rather that every one drew his own conclusion from what has been said with regard to the forethought taken and the preparation made for a situation which must have been foreseen. I need hardly disclaim any intention of desiring to oppose or give trouble to the Government in the state of things in which we are. I do not care in the least who is in the Government provided the business of the country is carried on so as to ensure a successful issue of this war. That is all I am thinking about.
The real point at the bottom of the public uneasiness with regard to preparations is as to our troops in the field. Many things are said, and communications constantly come from men at the Front to their friends in this country. I want to have the country reassured and the men themselves reassured that the highest military advice is taken well beforehand and is acted upon, and that proper preparations are made in every way for the purpose of doing everything possible to support the men who are risking their lives every day. That is my purpose in asking these questions. As I interpret it, the speech made by the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, does not disclose a, wholly satisfactory state of things. It does not bring to my mind the conviction that there are plans well thought out beforehand by an able circle or group of men who are carefully considering these matters. It seems to me that we are liable to surprises. It may be that the remedy lies in the direction

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which has been pointed out from the other side of the House. But to be unprepared or wanting in decision is a very fatal thing. I think there ought to be constantly sitting a body thoroughly competent and not encumbered by numbers, in order to carry out this most dangerous and delicate business in a satisfactory way.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Standing Order No. XXXIX to be considered on Thursday next in order to its being suspended for that day's sitting.
House adourjned at Seven o'clock, to Thursday next, half-past Ten o'clock.