Sitting of 7 January 1915

Preamble
The Earl of DONCASTER (D. Buccleuch and Queensberry)—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

THE CONTINGENCY OF INVASION.
THE DUKE OF RUTLAND: My Lords, in rising to call attention to the instructions issued to the Lords Lieutenant of certain counties with reference to invasion and to ask His Majesty's Government for further information on the subject, I can assure the noble Marquess the Leader of the House and his colleagues that I have not the slightest wish to cavil at any of the provisions which they may have laid down, but I cannot help thinking that the time has come when these instructions should be somewhat consolidated and more force given to them in order to make them effective. Furthermore, I do not think that these instructions have yet gone thoroughly round to all the Lords Lieutenant, who may be called upon to act in a sudden emergency and under possibly somewhat critical conditions. Therefore I feel that I need make no apology to your Lordships for bringing the subject forward to-day.
One might fairly divide this subject under two heads—first, the question as far as it affects those counties which have already received the instructions, limited though they may be, from the Home Office on the subject of raids and invasions; and, in the second place, the question how those instructions affect counties which march with and touch the coast counties and the Lords Lieutenant of which have received no specific instructions on the point. If I may take first those counties the Lords Lieutenant of which have received certain notifications from the Home Office and the War Office with respect to county defence in case of raid or invasion, I would point out that those instructions, though excellent in themselves so far as they go, do not, as far as I can make out, give Lords Lieutenant any very great power to act except in certain circumstances. In fact, it appears to me that the position of a Lord Lieutenant who may be called upon to act is a somewhat difficult one. Lords Lieutenant, as far as I know, only proceed in carrying out their duties under some ancient Act of Parliament, and
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no actual power is given to them to put into operation the instructions they receive from the Government.
In the first place, may I call your Lordships' attention to paragraph 2 in the instructions headed "E," which Lords I Lieutenant hare received. It runs—
"The Government are of opinion that considerations of secrecy should not preclude full consideration by local emergency committees of the purposes for which they are to be organised."
It must be obvious, I think, to every one that that is rather a Gilbertian statement, because if the local emergency committees are not to know for what purposes they are organised they cannot be of much use. But that is a minor matter relatively, because no doubt they would act to the best of their ability. As a matter of fact, the whole of the orders and instructions which have been sent down to what I may call the scheduled counties require, in my opinion, to be consolidated, and more effective power should be given to those in authority in the counties. The Lords Lieutenant and the authorities in the scheduled counties are told that they must destroy a certain amount of grain in certain circumstances; that they must remove stock, and may deal with the civilian population, and, if necessary, pull down buildings, and so on. All that is quite right. But it is a little doubtful under what power they would proceed in those matters. It is also a little doubtful who would issue the necessary orders. At the present moment, I, for one, have not the slightest idea under what definite and final authority the county committees would act if they were forced to put the instructions into operation. If you write upon the subject to the governing bodies in this country, what happens? You may write to the Home Office; you are then very likely referred to the War Office; the War Office refers you to the Army Council; the Army Council ends up by referring you to the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the Committee of Imperial Defence probably hands you back again to the Home Office. That has been done in certain cases.
What I want to call the attention of the Government to is the absolute necessity, if we are to have proper organisation for home defence, that there should be a central authority capable of dealing once and for all with the matter. Power should be delegated by them to the military authority

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in each district, who in turn should appoint in each county—I do not care whether it is a coast county or whether or not it has received these orders—an officer who is able to get hold of the peculiarities, physical and otherwise, of the county, and who should be on the spot to answer all military questions with respect to the defence of the county and to issue instructions thereon. We should know then whom to go to for information. At present there exists a happy-go-lucky state of affairs, and the matter is one which, in my opinion, requires immediate attention. It is not as if we were going to be given six months notice of a raid, so that we might make the necessary preparations. These things come a good deal quicker than that, as we have, unfortunately, reason to know; and preparation now would be a most valuable thing to make. As a matter of fact, it would cost nothing to be prepared; whereas it may cost a great deal if we are not prepared. Furthermore, it may cost a great deal not only in money, but in lives. Although it may seem a small thing that steps of an adequate nature have not been taken to repel a raid or invasion, still I think we have had a lesson lately which rather does away with any idea of that sort. In fact, it is the duty of the Government now to go a little further and to render assistance to the authorities in the counties with respect to this very grave question.
I turn next to those counties which have not yet received any orders from the Home Office, but which actually impinge on and march with the coast counties which naturally would be the first to be affected in this matter—counties such as the one which I have the honour to represent at this moment, which touches a coast county of the first importance. In respect of this I would like to say that at the request of my Territorial Associations and other bodies I wrote to the authorities and inquired whether I should organise a proper system of defence, especially with regard to the movement of the civil population, stock, and so on, and I received instructions not to do so. I have no doubt that other noble Lords who are Lords Lieutenant could give similar; instances. What is the result of this? Only the other day the police authorities brought to me an urgent request to state, for the information of the emergency committees of Lincolnshire, what exactly my county could do with respect to receiving
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and housing and feeding several hundreds of persons who might be moved off from Lincolnshire into Leicestershire, what camps we could form for them, what provision could be made for the movement of cattle, and so on, and what forwarding methods we could employ. As we have received no instructions in Leicestershire to act and have no power to act, naturally the answer I had to send was that we regretted extremely that we could send them no information on the subject. Surely that is not a wise way of being prepared for a possible serious emergency? I sincerely hope that the Government will see their way to issue simultaneous orders to practically all the counties throughout the kingdom, so that they may be in a position to deal with the civil population, with stock, and with the food supplies, and, if necessary, with the military side of the question. It should not be left to individual coast counties to be placed under these orders, because they are very much hampered by not being able to deal with the counties next to them, the authorities of which may have had no instructions on the subject.
I trust that the Government will see their way to put into execution as soon as possible some scheme whereby there may be a central authority to at any rate inaugurate' matters connected with home defence, and that they may also see their way to appoint a military control in each county to whom the authorities may make instant request for information and advice. Those military authorities would naturally be under the Northern Command in the case I am thinking of. This should not be a difficult matter to arrange, considering the number of men who are now under arms. There are a great number of officers perfectly competent to undertake this duty. At this moment I frankly say that if a sudden necessity arose in the county of Lincolnshire and civilians had to be sent away from the coast, which is not very far from one part of Leicestershire, it would be a very difficult thing for my county to know exactly how to deal financially with that case. Except under certain and very rare circumstances, the nonscheduled counties have no financial power to deal with this matter at all. Furthermore, the present state of things is adding to the grave danger of not being prepared—the greatest danger we could possibly have in this country. It is a stock danger. We

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have never been fully prepared, and we are continuing that system now. Surely it is time that we should change it. The question of invasion is not one which I wish to harp upon. I do not for a moment believe that any great danger exists. But certain things will occur; they have happened, and they will happen again. Lives will be lost, and it is to minimise future loss of life that I am so anxious that His Majesty's Government should gravely consider the question of home defence.
I have not touched on the delicate and difficult question of aliens. That was fully dealt with in your Lordships' House last night. At the same time I should like to call attention to a notice issued within the last two days by the Home Office to chief constables throughout the country with regard to innocuous aliens. That notice, in my opinion, requires some explanation. It is to the effect that chief constables are to send to the Home Office the names of all aliens under supervision in their respective counties who they may think are innocent or unoffending people. The question at once arises, If those persons are unoffending and innocuous and harmless now, does it follow that they are going to pursue that blameless life in the immediate future if they are let out? And supposing that any of the aliens whose names are sent up by chief constables as being in their opinion at the moment not likely to be in any way a danger to the State should at any time develop dangerous tendencies, is the unfortunate chief constable concerned to be held responsible or is the Home Office going to take the blame as having issued this circular? Chief constables are placed in an extremely difficult position, especially as at this moment I do not quite know how they are being enabled to exercise full control over the districts to which they are appointed. I should like a little more information from the Government with respect to the question of whether or not the Home Office really has any power of interfering with the decisions of the police bodies in various counties as regards the detention of aliens, or whether this is merely a suggestion that they have sent down.
I should also like to know whether the military authority is in any way under the control of the Home Office with respect to aliens of any sort or kind in the respective
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districts in which they are in command. One hears so many accounts of dangerous aliens, Germans and Austrians, who have been moved out of their districts at the direct wish and order of the police authorities, but who are, at the instance of some authority in London, replaced again in the positions which they originally held inside what we should call the danger area. I understand that the noble Marquess who leads the House says that it is the military authority who gives those orders. Does the military authority act under the suggestion of the Home Office in those circumstances? I cannot believe that any military authority would deliberately interfere with the arrangements made by the local police for the defence and protection of the county, and I should like a little information on that point. Various circumstances, especially on the East Coast, have arisen which in my opinion render it highly advisable that some distinct notification should be made as to what definite powers the local police authorities have with respect to the detention, and so on, of aliens. It is useless to blink the fact that a great many pieces of useful information with respect to the troops and the Navy leak out from time to time and get across the water, and it is with the object of minimising this as far as possible, even at the expense sometimes of hardship to some of these aliens, that I strongly urge the Government to take stringent steps to deal with what is perhaps one of the gravest dangers this country has to face at the present moment.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (THE MARQUESS OF CREWE): My Lords, I have no doubt that the House will not be sorry that the noble Duke has raised this question, which is one of interest to the whole country—of especial interest, no doubt, to some districts, but of universal interest to no small extent. It was decided, with regard to this question of the steps that ought to be taken by the civil population in the event of a hostile landing on our shores, that the best method to work would be through the Lords Lieutenant of counties, who historically have a position in the county over which they preside which marks them out as the best people for the purpose. Accordingly some instructions were issued so long ago as the middle of October to the various Lords Lieutenant. Those instructions were sent

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through the medium of the Home Office, but it would be wrong to regard them as in any sense Departmental. As our organisation of business in this country exists it is obviously necessary, in cases of emergency, for some particular Department to undertake a duty of this kind; but there is nothing in the ordinary functions of the Home Office which specially marks them out for this duty, which is closely bound up with military considerations, and which, therefore, has to be dealt with at a great emergency such as that in which we are living with the best machinery which it is possible to produce at short notice. Those instructions were found to be capable of some modification, and I think they were further modified towards the end of that month, and further, again, in the form of a confidential paper to which the noble Duke opposite has alluded, which was issued in the course of November.
It then became an important question for consideration by the Government what degree of publicity it was advisable in the general interest to give to instructions of this kind. Nobody wanted to give an impression to the public, who are not in a position to follow closely all the multiplied questions involved, that a landing by a hostile force on these shores was imminent. On the other hand, it was equally undesirable to encourage a condition of local apathy and indifference, in which people would shut their eyes to the possibility of something of the kind occurring. It is important to remember, and I think it will easily be remembered by those who have followed the frequent discussions which we have had in this House on the subject of invasion—the discussions which were so often initiated by the noble and gallant Field-Marshal whose presence on the Cross Benches we so greatly miss in this House (Lord Roberts)—that even those who were most sceptical about the probable landing on these shores, either in time of peace or in time of war, of four or five hostile army corps, never denied for a moment that a raiding force which might be of considerable dimensions might conceivably, either in time of profound peace or, as we are now, in a condition of war, be landed on these shores, create a large amount of local disturbance, and do a large amount of local damage, more especially if the troops composing that force belonged to a country which was prepared to ignore and neglect what we have believed to be the
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proper conventions of the conduct of war and principles of humanity and enlightenment.
As this balance existed between possible panic and possible indifference, we have thought that the question ought to be regarded as one of a reasonable insurance to be taken against risks rather than the kind of precautions which might be taken by a town which was imminently expecting to be besieged; and it was also desirable that plenty of time should be given for taking the particular local precautions suitable to each place which might possibly become the subject of such an attack. It is important to bear in mind that if an attack of this sort occurs, the prime object of the forces that defend the country must be to crush the hostile force. That is the primary consideration. The interests and the fears of the civil population, of course, have to be borne in mind; but with regard to them, the important factor is that their presence and their possible demoralisation should in no way hamper the military forces of the Crown, whose business it is to defeat or destroy the hostile landing force. I do not propose—and the noble Duke opposite only touched on the very fringe of the subject—to enter into the question of how an attack of this kind would be met by the military forces of the Crown, but I can assure the House that this subject has been the object of the closest attention of the War Office ever since war was declared. But as regards the effect on the civilian population, the plan that has been adopted has been to appoint, under the direction of the Lord Lieutenant, local emergency committees to work out details in the different localities. I do not think that the noble Duke quite laid sufficient stress on the profound differences which exist between different localities in this regard. He desired that we should issue a series of detailed instructions of universal application, holding, as I gathered he did, that the purely general instructions which had been issued were not sufficiently precise to give proper guidance to those responsible in the different districts.
THE DUKE OF RUTLAND: I hardly meant that. What I meant was that a universal communication should be made to the different counties so as to bring them all into line and enable general preparations to be made, which I believe would save money and time in future.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I think I see the noble Duke's point. As a matter of fact, it has not been thought desirable, after full consideration, to issue general instructions for the formation of these committees to every county in the United Kingdom. I am not in a position to state which particular counties have been included and which have been omitted. It is not considered desirable that we should do so, nor is it considered desirable that I should enter into any detail on the particular instructions given to different localities. But I should like to bear testimony to the remarkable amount of public-spirited work that has been done by people, from the Lords Lieutenant downwards, in the different localities in this regard. No time or trouble has been spared by many people in giving their best energies to the consideration of these difficult questions; and difficult they are owing to the fact which I have just described—that in different parts of England the needs vary and the possibilities of action also vary. And I should also be quite wrong if I did not pay a tribute to the care which Mr. Arthur Balfour has taken, he having been one of the people who have devoted special care to this in concert with the central authority here, and his services, as I need not tell the House, have been of the greatest possible value in regard to it. On the whole, we have thought that it was wiser to trust to this public spirit and to the play of local energy in a quiet way rather than to a great amount of public discussion and of ventilation of views in local newspapers.
The plan adopted was gradually to communicate the desired arrangements to local residents—people of different kinds carrying weight in the particular places in which they lived—then gradually to make the proposed arrangements more public, and finally to issue, as has been done in certain cases, local proclamations by the Lord Lieutenant and the local authorities. I am very far from saying that local experience may not lead to a number of further modifications in the arrangements that have been made. On that point I would ask the noble Duke opposite to believe that he must not suppose that no other arrangements will be made, and that the particular objects which he has in view—for instance, with regard to his own county—may not in due time be brought about. I am quite certain that the authorities will be grateful
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to the noble Duke for any advice he can give, particularly on the point he mentioned with regard to the movement of population in certain events from coast counties to contiguous counties which up to now have not been included in those in which regular committees have been formed or to which regular instructions have been issued.
The noble Duke made, towards the end of his speech, a similar request to that which was made by a noble Lord on the other side of the House in the course of yesterday's debate on the subject of alien enemies, for the institution of a new central authority to be solely responsible for this particular work. It cannot be denied, I think—we have to make the best of it—that from one point of view this is a subject which comes within the purview of the Defence Committee; from another and purely military point of view it falls within the province of the War Office; and also from a different point of view, more especially with regard to the precise arrangements which have to be made on a small scale in different localities, the county police authorities are those through whom it is necessary to work. That may seem unbusinesslike, but I cannot help feeling that we have to make the best of that situation and endeavour to work through those different authorities in combination as best we can; and so long as the general result is coherent and rational, so long as there is no undue passing forwards, backwards, or otherwise of papers, and, speaking generally, so long as the system works with tolerable general smoothness and success, I think that in time of emergency it is as much as we can venture to expect can be brought about. As I ventured to say yesterday in the other connection, I am by no means sure that the constitution of an entirely fresh ad hoc authority for a matter of this kind would have the results which some noble Lords seem to hope in the way of bringing about smooth working, absence of friction, and general felicity all round. The different Departments that are involved have their different experiences, they have the habit of intercommunication, and so long as matters proceed without serious difficulty or friction, it may be wiser—I will not put it higher than that—to work through them rather than to attempt to invent an entirely new authority.
Quite at the end of his speech the noble Duke travelled away from his Question altogether on to a subject which we were

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discussing yesterday. I hope he will not think me discourteous if I do not attempt to repeat now what I ventured to say yesterday afternoon on that subject. But this much I can say, and I am glad to have the opportunity of saying it, that if anybody supposes that a chief constable is likely to be held responsible in the damaging sense in which the noble Duke used the phrase—I mean that he would be severely blamed if an error was made with regard to the release from custody of a particular alien supposed to be innocuous but who afterwards proved to be of a dangerous character—I can assure him that would not be the case. The responsibility, as I said before, rests with the military authorities. They use to the utmost the local knowledge of individuals, which, as everybody knows, bearing in mind what the operations of the detective branch of our various police forces are, is of a kind which is possessed by the police forces to an extent to which it is not possessed by anybody else. That knowledge is used by the military or the naval authorities, as the case may be, for the purpose sometimes perhaps of clearing a man's character but in a number of other cases for pronouncing him to be a suspicious character who ought not to be at large, or, if at large, should be kept under close observation. But it would be altogether a mistake to suppose that any further responsibility than that rests upon the police authorities in the particular counties, and I should like to say quite distinctly and categorically that the Home Office do not interfere in any way in dealing with individual cases in the counties of that kind.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, this question of home defence and the possible action of Lords Lieutenant and the committees beneath them at a time of emergency may be invested with such tremendous significance that I should like with your Lordships' permission, to carry the matter a little further than it has been left by the speech of the noble Marquess the Leader of the House. I think, if I may say so, we ought to express our gratitude to my noble friend the Duke of Rutland for having brought this subject before the House and for the able and temperate manner in which he stated his ease. I should like to admit straight away that I think this matter of home defence has been carried a good many stages further than the point at which it stood when we last met to discuss the subject
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at the end of the month of November. At that time there was no general idea as to what the duty or functions of civilians would be in the case of invasion—either those civilians who wanted to take up arms and fight, or those who for various reasons were incapacitated from fighting. At that time there was no force recognised as existing under the rules of war which the former could join, and there was very grave general doubt as to what it would be possible for the latter to do.
Your Lordships will remember that in the debate which we had in this House all sorts of questions were put as to whether a civilian ought to use arms, and, if so, under what conditions; were people to sit at home and wait fur the enemy to come; were they to destroy their carriages and vehicles, or were they to hand over their horses to the police or the military authorities; and, if they meant to fight, where were they to procure arias and what ought they to do. During the six weeks that have intervened a great change has been made for the better. The Lords Lieutenant have received, and have been acting upon, the instructions which have been so abundantly referred to to-day. Emergency committees have been formed in the whole, I think, of the scheduled counties. May I say, in passing, that I do not quite understand on what principle the schedule has been constituted. I happen to be residing at present in what is a maritime county, the county of Hampshire, but that is not included in the schedule, though I should think that it was eminently suitable to be there, while an inland county like Hertfordshire is included. What may be the explanation of what appears to me at first sight to be an anomaly I do not know. Further, in the interval, the rights of the civil population to take up arms in their own defence in the event of invasion have been admitted and an organised force has been created for the purpose. But I think a good deal more remains to be done.
I will first take the case of the Lords Lieutenant, their action, and the action of the committees which they have constituted. I spent this morning in reading the instructions, so far as they have been made public, of all the Lords Lieutenant of the eastern counties from Northumberland in the North down to Kent in the South. These notices or proclamations, whichever may be the right word to apply,

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vary a good deal both in the degree of preciseness of the instructions they give and in their general character. The great majority of them give general instructions as to the joining of local volunteer corps by those who wish to fight, and as to the attitude that ought to be adopted by peaceful civilians who wish to remain at home. All of them, I think, refer to the constitution of these emergency committees, and they also say, with some indefiniteness, that in an emergency you should go to the local police, who, acting under the military authorities, will tell you what you ought to do. That, broadly speaking, applies to the whole of the notices which I have read. Others go further and give the names of the emergency committees and the addresses of their chairmen. That has certainly been done in one case or at the most two cases. Others again—and this is a very small class—give the most detailed instructions as to the use of particular roads, the removal or destruction of live-stock, the use of cellars or trenches in the event of bombardment or of attacks from the sky, the treatment of public buildings, and the uses of motors and vehicles of transport in general. By far the most detailed of these proclamations is the one which has emanated from a right hon. gentleman who sits in the House of Commons, Sir Courtenay Warner, who is Lord Lieutenant of the, from this point of view, most important county of Suffolk. All these instructions seem to be very good in their way, but I must say that the great variety that they present lends in my view much force to the contention of my noble friend behind me that some co-ordination is required, some codification, if I may use the word, of the law which is being applied on the matter. I understood the noble Marquess to argue against publicity. The only ground on which I think publicity could have been successfully contested was that if it had been resorted to at an earlier stage it might have tended to produce alarm and possibly panic—
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I stated that the principle upon which the authorities had gone was that of gradually bringing about publicity. It was not thought desirable in the first instance to publish everything which could quite well be published since, for the reason which the noble Earl has mentioned; but it would not be accurate to say that I argued against publicity as a principle.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: No doubt the process adopted by the Government in that respect was entirely wise. But whatever might have been the chance of creating a panic three months or two months ago, nobody can pretend that the issue of any instructions of this kind would create the faintest new apprehension in the minds of anybody, and the question is whether the moment has not now arrived when something like publicity has become both wise and necessary. The noble Duke read out a passage from the instructions which he had received, and he read it out almost as if it was a matter of knowledge to the House, but those of us who are not Lords Lieutenant—by far the larger number—have not seen the document and know nothing about it. And yet that document affects not only Lords Lieutenant but also the whole of the civil population.
Really when we talk about publication may we not refer, if we want a precedent, to the almost parallel case that occurred in the history of this country a hundred years ago? At that time the whole country was watching for the descent of Napoleon Bonaparte, just as at the present moment we are anticipating a possible attempt on the part of the German Emperor. The whole of the forces of the country, particularly of the maritime counties, were organised to meet that attempt. We remember well the picture of Mr. Pitt organising the forces of Kent at Walmer Castle against the foe. In the year 1801, long before matters had become as serious as they did in 1803, 1804, and 1805, the Duke of York, who was then Commander-in-Chief, issued an order to the Generals under his command throughout the country dealing with every aspect of what might happen in the case of invasion—houses, roads, animals, the civil population, the fighters, and so on. That is a historic document. Nobody brought against it the objection at the time that it was likely to produce panic. If that was done one hundred years ago I can see no particular reason why it should not he done again now.
And is there not a further reason for greater publicity? When an attempt is made, when Scarborough or Hartlepool is bombarded, what is the good then of going to somebody to ask what are the instructions? The poor people at Scarborough who went out into the streets at eight o'clock on the morning of December 16 had no time to go to the

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police and ask for the address of the chairman of the emergency committee. While they were in the streets the bombs were falling upon them. Therefore I submit that the case for publication—not publication inconsistent with the public interest, but the broad publication of the general lines on which people are to proceed—is not merely justifiable, but, in the circumstances, has become almost necessary.
The noble Duke behind me talked about the happy-go-lucky system that at present exists at any rate in the counties with which he is acquainted. He seemed to think that seine greater concentration of military authority was required, and that there should be some central body to which the Lord Lieutenant himself could turn, and I understood him to say that while Lords Lieutenant have instructions they have not any powers. If that be true, as I believe it is, may I not say, if you have your local man, if he is the man to be appealed to in these circumstances, if he is to discharge these responsible duties, give him the power. That is what was done a hundred years ago. The whole business was then in the hands of the Lords Lieutenant. Pitt was a Lord Lieutenant as Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports and had the power then, and I submit that from the analogy of a century past you may derive some useful guidance.
One other point. It was not touched on by the noble Duke behind me, but it is immensely important and directly germane to the subject which we are now discussing. I said at the beginning that when we were dealing with this matter six weeks ago nobody had any clear idea, if they wanted to fight, how they were to fight or where they were to go to. Now, as I understand, the Government are going to rely upon the Association of Volunteer Training Corps organised by the great energy and admirable patriotism of my noble friend Lord Desborough and other noble Lords sitting on both sides of the House. But this raises a most important issue. I understand from what I read in the newspapers that this association and these corps are to be an outlet for the energies of those who are beyond the military age, those who, perhaps, have been rejected when they tried to join the Regular Army, and I imagine also, though I am not quite clear on this point, the great industrial army of men of military age and of good physique who are necessarily deflected front the Army by the
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necessity of digging coal, or running railways, or making guns and ammunition and uniforms and boots. I suppose that is the class of person who will belong to these volunteer training corps. Of course, they will not be allowed to include anybody who ought to join the Regular Army; they will not be allowed to be a refuge for shirkers.
The point that I understand has been reached is this. The Government have given recognition to these corps in so far as they have authorised them to wear a particular armlet and to provide themselves with a particular uniform, but all other accoutrements, equipment, arms, and ammunition are to be provided by themselves or by wealthy people subscribing on their behalf. This is a point about which I should like some assurance from the Front Bench opposite. This force, even if it contains, as I have seen in the papers, a million of men, will be useless when the emergency conies unless it is in touch with the military authorities, unless it is under military control, unless it acts in co-operation with the regular military forces of the country. Not only that, but it might constitute a great danger because it might fail to be recognised as a combatant force by the enemy, who might make its existence an excuse for acts which we have seen elsewhere. I hope, therefore, that it will be made perfectly clear that this force, which may play so valuable a part in our home defence, will only be allowed to exist, from the military point of view, under the control and in the conditions which I have ventured to, indicate.
There remains the question of the noncombatant civilian, the man who does not want to fight, or, for one reason or another, is incapacitated from fighting and who, under the general instructions issued by the Lords Lieutenant, is told he ought to sit at home. Now, should a raid occur do we imagine that those people are all going to sit at home? They have not had much encouragement from the example of Belgium to sit at home. The poor wretches who sat at home in Belgium, for some fanciful reason of a shot here or an accident there, were taken out of their cottages and cellars, set up in rows, and shot down. Those lessons have eaten into the hearts and minds of our people, and however excellent it may be for the Lords Lieutenant

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to issue instructions to all the good people to sit at home, what will be the case when a raid is announced by telegram one morning? What happened at Scarborough? A lot of people flocked to the railway station to get away. So that if a considerable force lands you will have a stampede of people rushing away into the interior. All I would ask is whether the Government, in the arrangements they are making, will contemplate the possibility of this occurrence and perhaps make some provision or issue some orders for the transport of these fugitives, if they are found to be in great numbers, by rail or by road, and very likely the determination of some localities, free from the range of the operations of the military, to which they can go. The point is a minor one, but perhaps not altogether unworthy of consideration.
THE EARL OF DURHAM: My Lords, I had not meant to intervene in this debate, but the noble Marquess has so skirmished round the question put to him by the noble Duke that we have derived very little information from his speech. I much prefer what the noble Earl opposite said—namely, that we should have no secrecy in this matter. I may say that I am Lord Lieutenant of one of the counties which have had active experience of what a raid means—I refer to the bombardment of Hartlepool. There was no indication given by the Germans that they intended to bombard Hartlepool; it was a sudden operation which occurred about eight o'clock in the morning, and they killed about 110 people there besides doing immense damage to property. Under the instructions submitted to the noble Duke opposite—I do not know how or by whom—the Lords Lieutenant were told not to inform the country, not to tell the emergency committees what to do, and not to call out a special constable until an invasion had taken place. That is an absurdity. How were we to know at the Hartlepools that this bombardment was not a preface to a raid or invasion? The noble Marquess referred to instructions as emanating from the Home Office. I know it was stated in one paper that they came from the Foreign Office. Evidently they came from all Departments, and consequently we do not know which to obey.
I received a document called "E," confidential. A week afterwards I was
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asked to destroy that and replace it by another document "E." The noble Marquess talks as if the Government had I made up their mind that different modifications were necessary in different counties. But it took the Government two months to find that out; yet it did not take us two days. The first emergency committee that I called together were, I venture to say, business men and sensible men. I told them that it was my duty to put those instructions before them, but I said, "I hope you do not intend to pay any attention to them." That was the most applauded part of my speech. I said to them, "Use your common sense in your particular district. Instruct your special constables beforehand what their duties are, and tell them that if timid men or frightened women come and ask what they are to do in a case of bombardment—what they are to do with their sheep, and carriages, and so on—they must tell them at once. It is no use telling them at the last moment when there is a bombardment." That was only common sense. I certainly cannot see the object of this secrecy. In my opinion there should be no secrecy at all in this matter. Other noble Lords have issued instructions very different from mine. Mine were rather pompous proclamations, but they did not give away the Government's case. Lord Nunburnholme's proclamation comprised the greater part of Form "E," which was marked "Confidential."
LORD NUNBURNHOLME: The latest communication from the Home Office said that we could go as far as saying what I did say.
THE EARL OF DURHAM: I think that was after the bombardment?
LORD NUNBURNHOLME: Yes.
THE EARL OF DURHAM: A noble friend of mine opposite, Lord Harris, also issued instructions. I liked them very much indeed, except on one matter which rather hurt my feelings. I do not know whether my noble friend's knowledge of geography was as weak as it professed to be, but he talked about the "great loss of life on the Yorkshire coast"—he was reported to have done so, at any rate. I happened to be in London on the occasion of the bombardment and I went to my club to find out

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what had occurred. I found a group of officers there, amongst whom was a General officer who is on Government service now. He said, "My knowledge of geography is not very great, but I think I am correct in saying that the Hartlepools are south of the Humber." That was a General officer.
I venture to say—and I do not think any one will contradict me—that a young man who has joined the Army since the commencement of the war and who happens to be on the staff, say, in the Northern Command—in the County of Durham—can give instructions to me, the Lord Lieutenant, to the chief constable, and to all time emergency committees and the 1,300,000 inhabitants as to what we are to do. I have no power or status to remonstrate with that young officer's orders. The only authority we have we are told is historical authority. That is no use now. We want a little more practical authority. The Government, who quite rightly always try to get as much as possible out of a Lord Lieutenant, ask us to do a certain thing, but I submit that we should have more power and authority. Why, I cannot even go about my own county without being held up by a special constable whom I have myself appointed. It is a necessity that the inhabitants of this country should know what they have to face. I can assure you that in the County of Durham the inhabitants behaved with the greatest courage and coolness at the time of the bombardment. They were not frightened; and they are not at all frightened when I tell them that there may possibly be yet another raid.
LORD HARRIS: My Lords, I apologise to my noble friend opposite for not having referred to the County of Durham, but for the sake of brevity I referred to the loss of life "on the Yorkshire coast." I have not had the unhappy experience of my noble friend, and perhaps it will be some comfort to your Lordships to know that in one county we have not very much to complain of as regards the measures taken by the Government or the liberty we have been given to make such arrangements as we could. I do not, quite understand what was suggested by the noble Duke, that Lords Lieutenant should have given to them some legal power which they have not got now. I confess I have not found any difficulty whatever as regards that. Every
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suggestion I have made has been accepted with the greatest good will, the greatest self-denial, and the utmost patriotism. I have to deal with at least three General Officers Commanding and two Admirals, and I have not found the slightest difficulty. The emergency committees and the nearest military authority and the executive officer, who is almost invariably the police superintendent, are all How in the closest touch; and I should hope, if the crisis arose, that the necessary action would ensue very promptly. As a matter of fact, the emergency committees when the crisis arrives are not executive. Their functions at present are to prepare, and they have been preparing I think on the whole very sensibly for what is to take place if an unheralded landing is attempted. I wish the noble Marquess, when he extended his thanks to Lords Lieutenant and to these committees, had carried his thanks down a little lower—I am sure he would have done so if he had thought of it—to those who may be affected by the operations that are to take place if an attempt is made at landing.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: Hear, hear.
LORD HARRIS: I am glad of the opportunity of bearing witness to the admirable tone which has animated the whole population who may be affected by these operations. They affect their domestic life, and they affect their property very materially. They have accepted all the instructions issued by the emergency committees with the utmost readiness and the utmost patriotism. I do not mean to say that they are not desirous of arguing as to whether or not this or that operation is feasible and whether it is the best. But, on the whole, they have accepted generally all the instructions which the emergency committees have issued as regards the removal or destruction of stock, the removal or destruction of transport, horses, or goods in the most admirable spirit; and I am glad to have the opportunity of bearing witness to that attitude which I think is highly creditable to our nation.
I entirely agree that the secrecy which has been imposed, the confidential character of the communications that have been made to the Lords Lieutenant, was excessive. That is a matter of opinion, I quite admit; but I do not think that the

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British character is one that is liable to fright. I think that if we had taken the general public into our confidence earlier they would have been better prepared. I think they are prepared to some extent now. It has got generally known what are the operations to be carried out. In fact, in a good many cases the local orders are out. If the strict directions of the Home Office had been carried out it would have been quite impossible to convey to these emergency committees any instructions except by word of mouth. A Lord Lieutenant would have had to call his emergency committees together at some central place and to tell them by word of mouth what to do. Your Lordships know from experience that it is absolutely ridiculous to suppose that these gentlemen would have carried away in their heads the precise instructions which the Lord Lieutenant, who had had the opportunity of reading them all from a paper, had got in his mind; and it was only after argument, and with help from Mr. Balfour, that consent was given to our conveying these instructions to the emergency committees. That sanction having been obtained the rest was simple. The emergency committees, with a great deal of sympathy, I think, have taken their neighbours into their confidence without any sanction from the Lords Lieutenant or the Home Office, and the result is that in every area practically the whole of the population now know what is to take place in the event of a state of emergency being declared.
Although I may be hopeful in thinking that everything would work smoothly when that state of emergency was declared, I think I am justified in saying that our state of preparation now is infinitely superior to what it was in the beginning of October; and although great hardships may ensue and although there may be great loss which will not be covered by any remuneration from the Government, still I am sure that this effect will be secured—namely, that, to use an expression of my own in the brief announcement I made to the county, "Our coast will be rendered as inhospitable as possible to the enemy should he be successful in landing." My noble blend the Duke of Rutland said he wished that permission had been given for certain instructions to be published broadcast. Well, he has been very unfortunate if he has not received—perhaps he has not—an official communication which is the
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result of the combined efforts of the Home Office and the War Office. After much cogitation these Offices have authorised the Lords Lieutenant to circulate, amongst other things, this salutary admonition to householders—that should a shell come in at the front door it would be safer for them to go out at the back. That is one of the warnings which result as the combined efforts of the Home Office and the War Office—and, a noble Lord informs me, the Admiralty.
I had a previous experience of an attempt to warn the public. I prepared a voluminous manifesto, far more voluminous than that which caught the eye of my noble friend opposite. I was somewhat pleased with it; I thought it rather a successful effort; and I sent it, as instructed, to the Home Office for the consideration of the Minister. When I got it back I felt somewhat as I used to do when I was at Eton and got back my copy of verses with a good many five-barred gates in blue pencil indicating false quantities and other errors I had introduced. Most of my manifesto was objected to. In particular I had expressed the pious hope that "under God's Providence a landing would never take place"; and it was suggested to me that it would be, perhaps, better not to introduce an expression of that kind as it might be providential that a landing should take place as occurred in 1588. Those are my experiences of having tried to warn the public with which I am more immediately concerned. They have not been successful. I honestly and humbly think that His Majesty's Government might have been a little more liberal in the permission they gave to the Lords Lieutenant as to the advice they might offer to their counties. The result has been these very jejune paragraphs which have been referred to to-day, and which differ materially according to the construction which the Lords Lieutenant put cm the authority they had received as regards publication. So much as regards the civil population in connection with an attempt at an unheralded landing.
One other subject has been referred to, more especially by the noble Earl who leads the Opposition to-night, and that is as regards volunteer movements. As to that I support the noble Earl most cordially in hoping that His Majesty's Government

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will give us some advice. They have given us no advice as to what the civil population is to do in the event of a landing; they have left that to the unfortunate Lords Lieutenant to indicate if they choose. 'Personally I have indicated nothing as yet, but when I have been asked to I have pointed out that the orders mean the devastation of the countryside and as an obvious corollary to that it seemed that the civil population had to move. When I have been asked where they are to go, there I have been done, unless it is a general indication of "going to the West"—not in the mournful way in which the expression has been used lately on the Continent. No doubt there may be some difficulty for the Government to say where the civil population are to go. But as regards Volunteers, they are bound to take this matter into consideration and deal with it in a more precise way than they have done hitherto.
I do not say one word as to what has been done by my noble friend Lord Desborough and his Committee. They have acted in a most patriotic way. But I think that, having trusted the Lords Lieutenant as regards the preparations to be made against a landing in so far as the civil population is concerned, it has been rather a slur that the Lords Lieutenant have been passed over as regards the volunteer corps being formed in their counties and a preference given to a body of gentlemen assembled in London. I think we could have been of more use to the Government than the Committee. I do not see how the Committee is to know precisely the gentlemen who are raising this corps; whether they are reliable, what opportunities they have for obtaining officers for the corps, and what chances they have in the particular neighbourhoods where they are trying to raise it of getting that support which is obviously necessary if the Government are not going to assist with anything in the shape of arms, uniform, or money. I think the Lords Lieutenant, if they had been trusted in the first place, could probably have taken the matter in hand and dealt with it more precisely and in a way that would have produced a force more regular than this one. At present this body is liable to get a great deal out of hand, I should think. I suggest very humbly to the Government that the movement has now assumed such volume that it is absolutely essential that they should deal with it,
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not as one huge force, which it is at present, under very little control I should think, but break it down to smaller units; and in all probability they will find that the county is the best unit. That, is only a suggestion which I venture to make. But I think it is obvious front what we see in the papers that the Government will have to deal with this body in a more precise and resolute way.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT HALDANE): My Lords, I shall not detain your Lordships for more than a few moments because there is other business to which the House has to proceed, but some things that have been said in this debate call fur comment, so far as I am concerned of a friendly kind. I think the noble Lord who has just spoken has shown us exactly how the business which he undertook ought to be performed. He has dealt with it in a concrete fashion, not sparing himself the labour of going into details; and he has somewhat generously disregarded the letter of the instructions while observing the spirit. That is what must be done in a case of this kind.
I was cognizant of the original genesis of this kind of instruction. I say "original" because this matter was considered long ago in peace time in the days when I was at the War Office, and we were then anxious not to discuss it in public because in times of peace it might have had an alarming effect. As times change circumstances change. The obligation of secrecy, which I think was a very real One then, has become much less real now; and I agree with the noble Lord and the noble Earl who spoke before him that the British public are very sensible; they get accustomed to these situations very rapidly. As we know, there was no flurry or disturbance after the recent raid; people took things in a most sane fashion; and I believe they are ready to take these instructions in a proper fashion, and more detail could be given than has been the case. The reason why it was done as it was in the first instance was that the thing had been handled from the point of view of a central authority, which cannot deal with the localities in the differential manner which is required and therefore can only lay down general principles. Well, the principles have been too general; and the personages entrusted in the matter have

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been requested to consider the instructions given as of a confidential character. That was almost inevitable in the early stages. But I think the speeches to which we have listened to-night show how these things work out when the spirit and not the letter of the instructions is looked at.
I desire to say, speaking for myself, that I agree with the mode in which the noble Lord (Lord Harris) has discharged the duties which devolve upon him in the county of Kent. I think that this debate has been an instructive one, and it has been valuable that the noble Duke who raised it should have done so; and I think your Lordships see some of the reasons why the counties have been treated on different footings, the interior counties from the coast counties, and, I would say, some of the Southern counties from some of the Eastern counties. These things have been done for military reasons, reasons which will change as time goes on. Meantime things have been said in the course of this debate which I can only say to your Lordships will have our consideration. I hope that any formal manifesto or other instruction which indicates any change of method or plan will be communicated without so much secrecy, and that we shall attain our end, which is to prepare the minds of the people for that which they have to do, without creating any sort of scare.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, I did not want to revert to the subject raised by the noble Duke, but in spite of what the Lord Chancellor has said we who live in the interior counties are placed in a position of great difficulty. We are quite sensible of the fact that the problem which confronts maritime counties is entirely different, but no one will deny that there are problems that have to be faced by us in the inland counties. My noble friend, in the course of his speech, told us that an application had come to his county from the neighbouring county of Lincolnshire, and I understand that he was left without any instructions of any sort, kind, or description. The same position as a matter of fact daily happens in my own county. I am continually asked, "What are we to do?" The question has become one of such an acute character, and so many requests are made by men residing up and down the county,
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especially as they know that within a short distance from where they are living active steps are being taken, that we should have some instructions. It is only natural that questions should be asked by people as to whether they were to do anything. If we were only told to-day by a responsible member of the Government that there is nothing for us to do, and that different sorts of problems may arise in different counties, we should know where we are. I submit that we want something further and something clearer and more definite than we have got at the present moment.
Personally I do not know whether I have placed myself in the wrong, but the matter got so acute that I had no other option but to summon a meeting of county councillors and leading men throughout the county, and I am glad to say that a representative from the General Officer Commanding at York attended that meeting. I had to apologise to those present for not having received any definite instructions, and to explain that I was acting entirely on my own account in summoning the meeting. That seemed somewhat to surprise the representative of the General Officer Commanding at York, and on the following morning he sent me a copy of these confidential instructions. Whether I have received them in an official capacity or not I do not know. At any rate I have received them, and have been allowed to show them to other people. Whether we were entitled to do so I do not know, but we have formed a committee to deal with these problems. It is obvious that there may be a big influx of population from the coastal counties, and we have a very large industrial population of own own. As your Lordships are aware, a great number of men have joined the Army and our population consists of a large number of women and children who ought to have some guidance and to be told what to do. We have taken the matter upon our own shoulders and are proposing to act. But it would be a matter of great relief to us—and I believe there are many others situated in a similar position—if some clear and definite instructions could be received from those in authority, instead of waiting to see what may turn up. I do hope that as a result of this debate something more clear and distinct will be issued, not only for those who reside in coastal counties, but for those who have to face these problems in the inland counties.

WAR RISKS AND STATE COMPENSATION.
LORD SOUTHWARK: My Lords, I rise to call attention to the Prime Minister's reply to the letter of Mr. Walter R. Rea, M.P., in relation to the loss of life and destruction of property caused by the bombardment of Scarborough, Hartlepool, and Whitby by the Germans; and to ask for further information. In doing so, I should like to say that as President of the London Chamber of Commerce I had the honour two or three weeks ago—that is to say, before the bombardment—of introducing to my right hon. friend the President of the Board of Trade an influential deputation consisting of members of the London Chamber, of the Corporation of London, and others largely interested in the trade and prosperity of London. We urged upon Mr. Runciman that the State should assume entire liability for all losses sustained to property through either aircraft or bombardment. Mr. Runciman, who received us very kindly, said that he could not agree to this, but he invited us to prepare an outline of such scheme of insurance which he promised to consider carefully and sympathetically.
Since then, as you all know, the bombardment has taken place with cruel and disastrous results as to loss of life and damage to property in the towns I have named. This has been followed by a very kind and sympathetic letter from the Prime Minister to the Member for Scarborough, in which he states that—
"The Government have resolved to provide relief from the Imperial funds in respect of damage to persons and property sustained in the recent bombardment."
My special object to-day is to ask His Majesty's Government whether by that letter the country is to understand that His Majesty's Government intend that all future losses sustained through aircraft or bombardment will be fully borne by the State. The matter is one of a serious and important character greatly affecting the Commercial stability of the country, and it ought not to be left in even temporary doubt.
As many of your Lordships are aware, the Fire Insurance Companies positively decline to take any further risks. To avoid making any inaccurate statements to the House I have taken steps to secure reliable information. After repeated deliberations the Fire Offices' Committee (which includes
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all the established tariff companies) decided that the insurance of property against damage from enemy aircraft was outside their province and could not be covered by the Fire Companies. Insurances to a considerable extent have been effected at Lloyds, but facilities for covering large mercantile risks are non-existent at, the present moment. The whole machinery by which commercial and personal property is guaranteed against a common danger has broken down in regard to the risk of loss arising from enemy aircraft or warships. Commerce and property must be protected against all such incidental risks, or trade will be hampered and the sense of security weakened.
I would like to remind your Lordships that amongst other things we have to remember the liabilities of trustees and the questions that arise through mortgages on property. So far as I am concerned, I am dealing to-day only with the question of losses to property. As regards loss of life and damage to persons, that is a more complicated and difficult question and requires very careful consideration. Damage to property arising from war risks cannot be adequately covered. But loss of life and personal damage cases can be, and in the majority of cases are, covered by insurances with the leading life and accident companies and in other ways. It is an entirely different question and ought not to be mixed up with the property question. I am not going to deal with that now. Personally I urge that there ought not to be any shadow of doubt upon the subject. This is not a personal but a national question. We know not when or how the next disaster is going to take place. We cannot say whether the property attacked and damaged will be private, public, or mercantile. The other day I heard a large wharfinger say that he wanted to insure for £700,000. It is a terrible thing to think that such a loss could fall on a company or individual and that it should be an individual loss.
I look upon all these damages from aircraft or bombardment as a national loss, and we ought all to take our share in meeting the liability. I never felt that there was a question more clear or one that ought to be accepted immediately; and I believe the Government would have the entire approval of the country if, in addition

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to doing the good work they have done in finance, they would say that they were going to take over this liability for the State. If this liability is taken over by the State it will, of course, cost the State nothing unless the disasters take place. If disasters take place and the State has undertaken to pay the liabilities, there will be no question of premiums, organisation, complications, or expenses of any sort beyond those incurred by the tribunal called upon to deal with the individual claims as they arise after each disaster. If the question of damage by aircraft and bombardment was dealt with by such a tribunal as the Railway Commission with expert assessors, or 1w the Admiralty Court which deals with compensation questions, I think in that way general satisfaction would be given, and it would be only fair and right.
In speaking to various people I have heard only one or two objections. One was to this effect, "Oh, I am insured; let others do the same." That is all very well, but one cannot now insure even if one wishes. Another objection was that what was being advocated would not be acceptable to those who live away from the coast, in the Midlands or elsewhere at a distance. I treat neither of these objections as serious. The man who lives away from the coast, in the Midlands or elsewhere, ought to be very thankful that he is not living in a neighbourhood which he considers dangerous, and I would remind any one who raises the objection that he is living away from the coast that aircraft travel a great distance and might even be found in these localities which are thought to be Safe. But, as I have said, I do not treat the objection seriously. I have a good opinion of my fellow-countrymen, and I cannot believe that any right-minded citizen would desire to shield himself under the excuse that as he is not in danger himself those who are living on the coast and thus in danger should take all the liability themselves. This is such a practical common sense question that I cannot conceive that His Majesty's Government requires much time to make up its mind upon it. The financial arrangements hitherto made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government in regard to the war have been carried out so satisfactorily that I feel I can appeal to His Majesty's Government to go one step
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further and adopt what I think would be a wise, fair, and reasonable policy, a policy which would relieve the public mind and do a great deal to maintain the commercial stability of the country. I hope that my noble friend Lord Beauchamp, who is going to reply for the Government, will be able to give a favourable answer to my Question.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (EARL BEAUCHAMP): My Lords, I think that in the first place your Lordships would wish an expression of concurrence with the feelings of the country generally of deep sympathy for those afflicted towns which suffered so greatly from the senseless and wanton bombardment from the German ships, deep sympathy with them in the loss which they suffered both of civilian life and of civilian property. But I am afraid that beyond that I am not very likely to receive the approval of my noble friend behind me, because I am unable to tell him that His Majesty's Government have yet been able to publish the exact lines upon which they propose to proceed. The noble Lord himself has studied the subject quite sufficiently to know that it is surrounded with difficulties and also with perplexities; and in those circumstances I do not think it is unreasonable that His Majesty's Government should ask for further time before they make public the exact details of the relief they propose. But I think, in view of some of the expressions which fell from my noble friend behind me, that I should remind your Lordships of the terms of the letter to which he referred. My right hon. friend the Prime Minister said—
"The Government have resolved to provide relief from the Imperial funds in respect of damage to persons and property sustained in the recent bombardment."
I can assure your Lordships that without any undue delay His Majesty's Government will make public the exact details of their proposals.
THE EARL OF DURHAM: My Lords, arising out of the noble Earl's speech I should like to point out that the bombardment took place on December 16. From that date until January 4 His Majesty's Government had not sent down any assessors to discover what damage had been done. This is causing very great inconvenience to the poorer population

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who have suffered by the bombardment. They naturally do not like to repair their houses, which in some cases have been only slightly damaged, because they say "The Government assessor will come down and find our house in proper repair and will then say, 'We cannot recompense you; we do not know what damage has been done.'" In the Hartlepools I know for a fact that employers of labour are very much perturbed at the fact that His Majesty's Government have not sent down any assessors, although the Prime Minister very rightly promised in his letter that compensation would be afforded by His Majesty's Government. This is a letter I have received from the Chief Constable of the County of Durham, under date January 4, 1915—
"I have made inquiry in the two towns and find that no instructions have been received from the Government; but both our borough councils are taking steps on their own account to inquire as to the amount of damage done."
The people in the Hartlepools would be glad to hear that His Majesty's Govern, merit will send down assessors, or, if they do not, that they will accept the statements made to them by the local authorities who have been inquiring into the damage done.

THE NAVAL POSITION.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, would ask you to observe the form of my Notice—
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they will make a statement on recent naval operations and on time present naval position.
I am obliged to put the Notice in that form because there is still no representative of the Admiralty on the Front Ministerial Bench. I must say I think this persistent refusal of His Majesty's Government to appoint a representative of the Admiralty here is gross discourtesy to your Lordships' House and a real public inconvenience. I am sure that the noble Marquess who leads the House will, with his usual courtesy, endeavour to put the information given to him by the Admiralty into the form most interesting to your Lordships' House. He knows that in asking him to do that we on this side do not for one moment wish to press him to tell us anything that could by any possibility be against the national interest. But for whatever he can say we shall be most grateful. The nation follows the
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doings of the Fleet with just as great an interest and pride as it follows the doings of the Army; and my noble friend who sits behind ale (Lord Curzon) only refrained from alluding to the doings of the Fleet yesterday because he knew that I was going to have an opportunity of speaking for my Party to-day.
I do not know how far the noble Marquess will be able to take up the points on which I shall touch in turn, but I should not like to sit down without taking note of some of the occurrences of the past few months for which the Admiralty or the Navy have been responsible. I shall not again go into the question of the naval expedition to Antwerp. The time will come when we shall have to thresh it oat to the bottom on the floor of this House. All I will say now is that the more I have learned of that expedition the more sure I am that it ought not to have been entrusted to the Admiralty and that the Naval Brigade was not the force that ought to have been used.
Turning to the battle off the Falkland Islands, there we have every reason to congratulate the Admiralty on the strategical conception which made that victory possible and the Admiral and his squadron on the mariner in which that victory was achieved. The Admiralty acted on one of Nelson's great maxims, that the best thing to do was to annihilate the enemy. I. hope all our countrymen understand that so thoroughly was that maxim carried out that it is not going too far to say that Admiral Von Spec and his German squadron had no chance whatever, humanly speaking, against Admiral Sturdee and his British squadron, just as Admiral Cradock in his turn had no chance whatever with his squadron against Admiral Von Spec, and his squadron. The measure of Admiral Sturdee's success off the Falkland Islands is the measure of the blunder that the Admiralty made in furnishing Admiral Cradock with a squadron so wholly incompetent for the task that he was set to carry out in the Pacific. The moment has not vet come to follow that matter out either. We shall have to follow it out in time; but it is almost inconceivable that it should have been the same authority that armed Admiral Sturdee with his squadron and that armed Admiral Cradock with his squadron, both to perform the same task.

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I do not know whether the noble Marquess will be able to tell us anything about the loss of the "Bulwark" or the "Formidable." So far as the public know, the "Bulwark" was lost by an explosion in the magazine. I do not think we have been told whether that explosion was due to an accident or whether it could possibly have been due to what I know has often been a source of anxiety in all Navies, and that is the chemical decomposition of powder. So far as we know, the "Formidable" was lost by submarine attack somewhere in the Channel. I do not know whether the noble Marquess will be able to tell us anything about that. I have heard a rumour, to which I do not personally attach any credence, that she was not torpedoed but that she also was lost by an explosion in her magazine. Personally I do not believe that, but as the rumour exists I mention it in order to give the noble Marquess an opportunity of dealing with it if he is able.
I pass to the raid by our cruisers, submarines, destroyers, and airships on the German harbour of Cuxhaven. I do not ask to be told anything about that raid—either its object or its success or otherwise—which is not entirely in harmony with national interests; but I should not like to sit down without expressing the extraordinary admiration I feel, not only for the individual skill and daring of the men engaged on the water, under the water, and in the air, but also for the professional skill with which all their operations were co-ordinated and made part of one whole.
Then I pass to the East Coast raid. Lord Durham has told us to-night that there was no sort of panic. Well, I do not think any of us who knew our countrymen thought that there would be a panic. I hope that the Government will take that lesson to heart and believe that our people are not given to panic, that our people are worthy of being thoroughly trusted, and that it is the worst possible policy to base any tactical or political action on the supposition that our people could be frightened into panic. All they want to know is the whole truth about everything, however unpleasant that truth may be. The more His Majesty's Government take them into their confidence the
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more resolute they will be in their support. But I have seen an old heresy awakened from the dead by this raid, and that is that the proper place for Sir John Jellicoe's Fleet is doing a sort of patrolling work up and down our coast. Nothing could be worse policy, or more dangerous, or more suicidal. I do not know where Sir John Jellicoe and his Fleet are, and I do not want to know; but I do know that his, only and sole task is to destroy the German Fleet if it ever comes out. It is not his business to try and prevent a raid of this kind.
I want to say something about the possibility of preventing a raid of this kind. Given a German squadron of fast powerful ships which leaves Wilhelmshaven secretly after dark one night and arrives at a spot on our coast chosen by itself, which, as we know, may have no military significance whatever, and arrives at that spot before dawn and leaves with the utmost speed on its return journey within less than an hour after dawn—then I say that it can only be by a fluke if that raiding party be intercepted on its way back; and I hope the British public will understand that. It is no kind of reflection on Sir John Jellicoe, or on the Admiralty, or on any of the Admirals acting under the Admiralty and not under the orders of Sir John Jellicoe, that such a raid as this is possible.
I pass to an incident which occurred much earlier in the history of the war—I mean the escape of the "Goeben" and the "Breslau" from the Straits of Messina, with all the political consequences which have ensued. I do not think, so far as we can see, that those political consequences are going to be particularly grievous for the Allies, though I think they may be very fatal for some friends of Germany. Still there is no doubt that that escape was an incident of real naval and political importance. The Admiralty have evidently thought so too, because we have been told in the newspapers that in the first place they held a Court of Inquiry into the conduct of the British Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, Sir Berkeley Milne, and that he was completely exonerated. Subsequently a Court-Martial was held on Admiral Troubridge, and he in his turn was acquitted with honour by his fellow-officers who sat on that Court-Martial.

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Now it is quite clear that the Admiralty would not have ordered the inquiry into Sir Berkeley Milne's conduct in the first place, and the Court-Martial on Admiral Troubridge in the other, if they did not think that there was something that required explanation, and unless something had happened which in their opinion ought not to have happened. Now we know that the one distinguished officer has been exonerated by the Admiralty itself, and the other completely acquitted by a Court-Martial. I do not think the Government can leave the question there. I should like to know, even now, something more about it. I am quite sure that the time will come when we shall have to go into that matter even if the Government are not able to help us in going into it now.
That leads me to another point to which I specially wish to draw the noble Marquess's attention, and I confess it is one to which I attach very special importance. I always understood when I was at the Admiralty, and I am told now, that it has been an invariable practice of the Navy that if ever one of His Majesty's ships has been lost, either in peace or in war, a Court-Martial has been held on the surviving officers of that ship. If the captain survived the Court-Martial was on the captain; if the captain was lost the Court-Martial was on the other officers if there were any survivors, and even on the crew. Now in this war we have lost, among ships of importance, the "Cressy," the "Aboukir," the "Hogue," the "Hawke." the "Monmouth," the "Good Hope," and the "Formidable." In the case of the "Monmouth" and the "Good Hope" there could be no Court-Martial because we lost every officer and man; but there have been survivors—I am thankful to say many survivors—in the case of the "Cressy," the "Hogue," the "Aboukir," the "Formidable" and the Hawke." Perhaps the "Formidable" is too recent a case for me to use as an illustration, but not so the "Cressy," the "Hogue," and the "Aboukir." I have seen nothing of any Court-Martial on the surviving officers or men of those cruisers. Why? Why should a practice which I believe has never been suspended, which has been invariable during two or three centuries—why should that suddenly be suspended in this war? I think the practice was most salutary and most fair to the naval officers and men themselves, most helpful for the maintenance of the
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high tradition of the Naval Service, most useful to the nation in order that in each case it might know why one of His Majesty's ships had been lost. Therefore I ask, and shall press hereafter if not now, for an explanation why a Court-Martial has not been held in these cases. Of course, nothing would satisfy me more than to hear that those Courts-Martial are going to be held. If they are, I rather regret the delay, but I am very glad of the decision.
I should not like to sit down without briefly reviewing the work of the Fleet since the war began. It is a review which will be very short though the field it will cover is not less than immense. The doings of the Army are constantly before the public. It is only now and again that the doings of the Navy similarly appear. Yet, my Lords, I believe the death-roll of the Navy is very nearly as high as the death-roll of the Army. Of course, the number of wounded in the Army is enormously greater than the number of wounded in the Navy, but it has been the melancholy, and I believe unforeseen, experience of the Navy in this war that when a ship has been lost the greater proportion of her crew has been lost too. The Navy has kept the people of these islands and of the whole Empire at work and with food in their cupboards. The fact that the war has only partially interrupted the normal life of industry and of the family wherever the British flag flies is due to the work of the Navy. It is due to the Navy that greater movements of troops have taken place under the British flag in connection with this war than I think have ever taken place before in the history of this country or in the history of the world; and, as far as we know, those movements of troops have taken place not only without the loss of a single ship but without the loss of a single life. All that is due to the Navy. It is due to our Fleet also that the only thing the German Navy has been able to do in the way of a raid has been this killing of civilians in the coast towns of Durham and Yorkshire, a feat which never could have had any possibility of any military value whatever. The German object could only have been one of two—either to create a panic in this country, which is a very likely idea on their part as they clearly know nothing whatever about the character of our people; or they may have thought it necessary to keep up the spirits of their own population by the exhibition of this naval activity. Of

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that no doubt they will be the best judges. But if that really was their object, then so far as we are concerned it is a hopeful sign.
Our position as an Opposition, as my noble friend said last night, is a peculiar one; and we cannot lay aside all responsibility because we represent a very large body of opinion in the country who want to know from time to time why it is that we give such whole-hearted support to the Government. My noble friend answered that question in part last night. I would supplement what he said by saying to our friends that one of the reasons why we support the Government is that we know that the Government are giving the whole of their support to the Board of Admiralty and to Sir John Jellicoe and the officers and men of the Fleet in the performance of the great task that lies before them. Not that we associate ourselves unreservedly with all the doings of the Admiralty. I have already made my reservations in respect of the expedition to Antwerp and the composition of Admiral Cradock's squadron; and I confess that I think that the private war of words which the First Lord delights in carrying on on his own account against the Germans is simply deplorable, and I cannot understand how his colleagues in the Cabinet can tolerate it. I certainly dissociate myself from that altogether. But to the Board of Admiralty as a Board we give our wholehearted support, and to Lord Fisher in his very special and immense responsibility. Above all, let me say on behalf of all the Party for which I speak that we have the most supreme and unwavering confidence in Sir John Jellicoe and the officers and men of the Grand Fleet, and not only in those officers and men but in the officers and men of the squadrons or flotillas not under his command, whether in British seas or in foreign waters.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, we cannot, I think, but be glad that the noble Earl opposite, who as a former First Lord of the Admiralty speaks with authority and experience, has been able, even in so thinly an attended House as this, to bring forward the subject of the Navy. One would have hoped that a large number of the noble Earl's supporters would attend to listen to his eloquent statement. The fact that at
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this moment the subject of the Navy in a debate in Parliament does not arouse precisely the same immediate interest as that of a debate on the Army is due entirely to the fact which was mentioned by the noble Earl and on which I will say a word in a moment—that the immediate doings of the Navy have been on a less dramatic scale than those of the Army. I have no doubt that to-morrow when the noble Viscount opposite brings forward his Motion on recruiting for the Army a far larger attendance will adorn the Benches opposite than I see at this moment.
The noble Earl repeated the complaint that has been made that there is no representative of the Admiralty in this House. For more reasons than one I share the regret of the noble Earl. Speaking generally, I think it is desirable that all the important Departments of State should have a representative in your Lordships' House, although, as I believe I pointed out when this question was under discussion before, there have been cases when the Party opposite was in power when no representative of the Admiralty has been in this House. I might, perhaps, mention this further point as an excuse on my own behalf for venturing to reply to the noble Earl. Since the institution of the Committee of Imperial Defence those who regularly sit on it, as I have now for a great number of years, obtain a certain general knowledge both of the Army and of the Navy in their technical aspects which Ministers before the institution of that body who did not fill either of the two actual appointments were not in a position to acquire.
Like the noble Earl, I do not propose in any way to argue the question of the expedition for the support of the besieged city of Antwerp. That is a question which, as he says, may very possibly become the subject of a more detailed discussion on a later date. Nor do I propose on the present occasion to add anything to what has already been said about the action off the Coast of Chile, which, as we know, resulted in the lamentable loss of important vessels of His Majesty's Navy. On the last occasion on which any public statement was made about the Navy it was made by my right hon.

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colleague the First Lord in another place on November 27, and since that statement the most noteworthy event that has occurred is that to which the noble Earl alluded, among others—namely, the action off the Falkland Islands. The circumstances of that action have been stated with a tolerable degree of freedom, and I need not supplement what was said by the noble Earl, except, of course, to add my congratulations to the Admiral for his brilliant performance. The noble Earl also alluded to the not less brilliant achievement of the Fleet and of the officers and men in various branches of the Naval Service in the raid on Cuxhaven. The more one considers and studies the actual feats of daring and skill which were performed in that raid the more profound does one's admiration become of the individual officers and men who took part in it.
The result of Admiral Sturdee's victory off the Falkland Islands is that only two German cruisers—the "Dresden" and the "Karlsruhe"—are left to carry out their commerce-destroying raids, and also two armed merchant vessels. Those are the only enemy ships now on the ocean, and without attempting to boast or to make any too sanguine a forecast, I think it is safe to say that their ultimate end is certain. The difficulties which confront ships of that kind in obtaining supplies and in particular in coaling are so marked that it is impossible to suppose, although they may be able to do a certain amount of damage to individual ships in the interval, that they can for long escape the fate of other ships of the same kind that have paid the penalty. It is a point to which notice cannot be drawn too often in connection with what the noble Earl said about the recognition dude to the Navy, how complete now is our maritime control over the whole world. I fancy that students of history would be unanimous in saying that there never has been a naval war in which the supremacy of the British Fleet all over the world has been obtained so rapidly and at such small cost as supremacy has been obtained in this instance.
Various events have recently made us think of the war against the United States which began in 1812, the last serious naval war in which this country was engaged. That followed the great series of successes
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of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th—all those marvellous victories which gave us the command of the sea. But, as the noble Earl very well knows, when it came to 1812 we encountered something of a serious setback. The Americans produced a class of frigate superior and more powerful than our own; and not only in a series of untoward naval actions, but also in the effect on trade in the country, our Navy for a considerable period was not predominant. Now, as I say, in an incredibly short space of time we have almost succeeded in obtaining that command and it is impossible to thank the Navy too heartily for what it has achieved in that respect. At the same time we must not forget, in the first place, to mention the ships of the Australian Navy, nor omit to note the assistance rendered both by French and by Russian cruisers, and also in the Pacific to such an extent by the fine Navy of Japan. Those are points which we certainly must not pass by.
As I was saying, the noble Earl—and I was grateful to him for it—drew attention to the vast silent service which is rendered by the Navy, and which in the press of the observation of other events we may be sometimes apt to forget for a moment, in securing the great flow of trade backwards and forwards and also in securing the sanctity of these shores. And it is important to remember one great naval revolution which the progress of science and invention has brought about—namely, that close naval blockade has now become a thing of the past. In all those great naval wars of the past the Fleet that had the command of the sea could blockade a port, leave its ships at a reasonable distance from that port, and thereby intern the inferior hostile fleet and command the naval situation. The invention of submarines has put a stop to all that. No such thing as a close naval blockade is any longer possible; and we have further to remember the most important fact that a flotilla, of submarines cannot be countered by the possession of a superior force of submarines of our own. A squadron of battleships is liable to be defeated and destroyed by a superior squadron; the same with cruisers, and the same even with destroyers. But when you come to submarines the mere fact that you possess a

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large number yourself does not, in fact, seriously limit the possibilities of danger arising from the hostile flotilla.
I was grateful to the noble Earl, speaking with the authority he does, for making it so clear that the kind of naval raid which was made upon our coast the other day cannot in existing circumstances be rendered impossible by any naval means. He stated that with the utmost clearness and with a conviction for which I was grateful, because it has apparently sometimes been hinted that something might have been done which would render a raid of that kind impossible. Perhaps I ought to apologise for using the word "raid," which has become something of a term of art in our recent discussions. A raid has of late been taken technically to mean a landing of a moderate number, say 10,000, or at the most 15,000, men on these shores; and according to the technical use of the word that term ought not to be applied to a naval bombardment such as that which took place the other day. But, on the other hand, we have heard the phrase used in this connection, and perhaps it is as good as any other. It has to be realised that there are no known methods of making an attack of this kind altogether impossible. If the enemy are prepared to go on making attacks on undefended towns it is impossible to say for certainty that they may not make them again.
As regards the information which we so freely hear is conveyed to the enemy from our shores, I can only say that if that information included statements that either Scarborough or Whitby was in any sense a defended town, as we have seen stated in some German publications, it was, as we know, of an altogether erroneous character. And perhaps I might say, in passing—and I say this with the most absolute confidence—that I am quite certain that no activities of German spies or any aliens had any bearing whatever upon this naval attack on Whitby, Scarborough, and the Hartlepools; and although I am not able to give my reasons for making that statement, I regard it as a matter of proved certainty. As regards the attack upon those towns reported to be justified in the case of Scarborough—or was it Whitby?—by the existence of a wireless station, all I can say is that that argument would make it justifiable for
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any of the forces of the Allies who entered Germany to deliver over to the fate of Magdeburg any German watering places which possess a: telegraph office or in which a soldier in uniform could be found. We know that nothing of the kind is likely to happen. Breaches of the conventions and proprieties of warfare by the enemy may be countered in some cases by severe dealing with individuals, but they are not to be countered, and certainly will not be countered by us, by anything in the nature of indiscriminate reprisals. But we can say with certainty, just as we believe it to be the case in the matter of the Belgian outrages, that such acts will recoil in the long run on the State that perpetrates them.
I should like to add my testimony, and I know- I can also add that of the Admiralty, to what has been said of the admiration to be felt for the calmness and courage with which the inhabitants of those bombarded places met the unexpected experience to which they were subject. It so happens that I have the testimony of a friend who visited Hartlepool immediately after the bombardment., who was full of admiration of the complete calmness with which the inhabitants of that town behaved. Before leaving this branch of the subject I desire to say that I heard with peculiar satisfaction the observation which was made by the noble Earl, again speaking with all the authority of his experience, that events such as these ought not to be allowed, and cannot be allowed, to interfere in any way with the main scheme of the naval defence of this country. Any suggestion of pinning the main Fleet to the coast in consequence of attacks or outrages of this kind would be in the highest degree unwise, and perhaps might be almost suicidal. And when the noble Earl says that he does not know where the Grand Fleet is, I can assure him that I am in precisely the same position. It is a question which I never ask, and I am inclined to think that none of my colleagues outside the Admiralty are any wiser than I am.
Perhaps I might say a word upon the steady growth which is taking place in our general naval preponderance. When the First Lord made his statement at the end of November he entered into some detail on this subject, and I have no wish to repeat in any way what he then said.

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Every month our Fleet in all its branches goes on getting relatively stronger, and that is a process which will steadily continue. It is also, I think, desirable to point out that the manning of the Fleet in all its different branches has been conducted with ease and with success in spite of the formation of the body to which the noble Earl alluded with some deprecation—namely, the Naval Brigade. When war broke out there were a large number of men available in the depots. We were therefore able not merely to make up the reserves of the nucleus crews but to man with first-rate skilled complements the ships which were building for foreign Powers which were taken over, as the House knows, in a great hurry when war broke out; and all the great forthcoming deliveries of new ships of all kinds, including monitors—a special kind of craft useful for particular purposes of warfare, as the House knows—the manning of all those is completely provided for as far ahead as it is necessary to consider. And in the last resort there remains the Naval Division, which has been used for other purposes, to which the noble Earl alluded, which so far as it is composed of seafaring inert can be utilised as another reserve.
The noble Earl spoke of certain losses which had taken place in the Fleet of late. He alluded, in the first place, to the lamentable explosion on board the "Bulwark." Although I do not know that it can ever be absolutely proved what the cause of that explosion was, the most generally held opinion is that it was the result of an accident and not a deterioration in the explosives; but I am only there giving a general impression of what I believe to be the best instructed belief. The noble Earl also mentioned the "Formidable" the loss of which we all so profoundly regret; and he mentioned a rumour which he said was prevalent in some quarters that that battleship had been destroyed not by a torpedo but by an internal explosion. The definite opinion of the Admiralty is that the "Formidable" was sunk by two torpedoes fired from a submarine; and I should like to tell the House that after the ship had been struck the captain signalled to another ship which was in the neighbourhood not to stand by but to keep off because he believed there was a submarine in the neighbourhood. That was a very gallant act, and worthy of the finest traditions of the British Navy; and I am sure it must be a consolation to
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those whose relatives were lost on that ship to know that they went down like heroes with their last thought for their comrades in the Fleet. We ought not to forget also to pay a tribute to the gallant conduct of those who assisted in the rescue of sonic of those who happily survived from the "Formidable," the fishermen who took on board some men from the ship's boats, a work of the greatest difficulty and carried out with the finest gallantry.
Then the noble Earl concluded his speech by touching on a subject of some difficulty, and one upon which I fully admit difference of opinion may easily exist. He inquired as to the holding of Courts of Inquiry and Courts-Martial in cases of the loss of ships. He asked whether, so far as possible, the result of such Courts might not be made known to the public, and he also desired that it should be laid down as an invariable rule that in all cases in which a ship was lost a Court-Martial should necessarily be held.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: I think I put it this way—What is the reason why the invariable rule has been departed from?
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: Precisely; but it comes to the same thing.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: I expressed my own opinion.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I am speaking, of course, without special technical knowledge, and I am subject to the contradiction of the noble Earl, or of any other noble Lord who is better informed than I am; but I confess it is a suggestion entirely new to me that during the whole of the naval history of this country, where a ship has been sunk in the course of a naval battle, a Court-Martial has been always held. I should like to ask the noble Earl—I do not press him for an answer at this moment—whether, if that is so, the holding of the Court-Martial has been confined to those actually on board the ship that was sunk, or whether it was held on the Admiral commanding the squadron or Fleet, as the case might be, to which the ship that was lost belonged? I am speaking, of course, of a naval action in which the ship is sunk by gunfire, as was the only way of sinking a ship in the past. If that is

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so, I can only say it is a surprise to me to be told, say in the case of a great victory when one or two ships were lost, that either the captains or Admirals of those particular ships were tried by Court-Martial; and whether that is so or not, I should like to point out that in the case of a ship which is sunk by a submarine, or even I think it may be said of one which is sunk by a mine, a ship of that kind is lost in an operation of warfare and therefore is not in pari materia with losses which occur in peace time by a ship being cast away or run aground, or by some mishap of that sort. I certainly had believed, and it appears to me to be a rational distinction, that a difference had been made in the past between the loss of ships by operations of warfare and losses which occurred through accident or mishap for which the commanding officer of the ship might presumably be to blame.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: I do not think any one thought of holding a Court-Martial on the captain of a ship sunk in a naval victory such as was Trafalgar; but if there had been a naval reverse, I think a Court-Martial would have been held on the Admiral. In the case of a single frigate action the captain was held responsible, and that corresponds with the loss of a ship by a submarine or mine now.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: That, no doubt, is a matter which the Admiralty will take into careful consideration. I am not able to tell the noble Earl precisely in what cases Courts-Martial have or have not been held, although, as he knows, some Courts of Inquiry and Courts-Martial have been held; the noble Earl alluded in particular to the escape of the "Goeben" and the inquiry which took place at which the conduct of two Admirals was inquired into. The "Hawke" was under the command of the Admiral commanding the Grand Fleet. What happened to the "Hawke" was not the result of independent action on the part of her commander; therefore the question as to who ought to be put on his trial would arise, I have no doubt, in each particular case. But, apart from that, there is the further question of what degree of publication ought to take place in cases where Courts of Inquiry or Courts-Martial are held. The view which the Admiralty take of that argument of the noble Earl is that during the progress of the war it is not expedient to publish
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the results of Courts of Inquiry; and I conceive that they founded their view largely upon this consideration—namely, that in time of war there are all manner of circumstances, some of which are almost certain to be involved in the evidence given for or against the particular officer, which, for reasons of public policy, cannot properly be published.
I feel pretty certain that so far as the particular case of the "Goeben" is concerned, although certain facts connected with the escape of that vessel might be published, it would not be possible in the public interest to publish everything which might come out at the Court of Inquiry. If that is so it is clearly not fair to the officers, or indeed to the public, that a truncated story should be told; and that, I think, is the main argument which causes the Admiralty to ask noble Lords and others who desire to be furnished with these details not to press for them during the progress of the war. There obviously can be no object in not publishing anything which in ordinary times would be published—the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry relating to the loss of a ship—except the fact that some damage may be done to the public interest thereby; and if a rule can be made and maintained that so long as, at any rate, the war at sea lasts there should be no publication of the details of these inquiries I believe that it would prove to be to the public interest and that no other interests would be prejudiced thereby. It is, of course, open to a particular officer who feels that a complete silence about a case is damaging him to make an appeal to have certain facts published, and I have no doubt that any appeal of that kind would be most carefully considered by the authorities. But the general rule is one which I venture to think it is reasonable should be made and maintained.
As I said when I entered on this subject, it is one on which there is, no doubt, much to be said on both sides. I dare say there is much to be said for the noble Earl's desire to try somebody by Court-Martial in all cases of loss. On the other hand, I think it might be argued that the effect upon officers—although I do not believe, knowing the spirit and temper of the Navy, that it is an effect which would be in itself formidable—of putting upon trial every man who meets with a mishap would be,

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except for that wonderfully bold temper of the Navy to which I was alluding, rather to encourage them not to take the kind of risks which are freely taken and ought to be taken in warfare, but which are sometimes taken in peace when they ought not to be taken. That is an argument which I confess I think has some importance. But I have no doubt that: the Admiralty will attach every weight to the arguments which have been used by the noble Earl on this subject, and if he desires to develop them to me or to any of the naval authorities privately I shall be very glad, I need not say, to convey them to the proper quarter—namely, to the notice of the Board of Admiralty. Whatever may be said about the representation of the Board of Admiralty in this House there is one respect in which the Navy always rather suffers in comparison with the Army in this Assembly. There are always a number of noble Lords in this House who have held high military positions and have seen a great deal of military service. It is only every now and then that we are similarly favoured among the non-official Peers in respect of the Navy. There have been times when there have been eminent Admirals in this House, but a debate of this kind does not now enjoy quite the same advantage which a general military debate does in your Lordships' House. I repeat that I am very glad that the noble Earl has opened up this subject, and I am quite certain that his observations will be appreciated not merely by the House but by the country, and I am glad to have had an opportunity of replying as well as I could to them.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, there are three observations only that I will make. The first is that it must have been a great strain upon the noble Marquess, although it has been a great pleasure to us, that he should be willing to deliver to us the interesting remarks to which we have just listened about the Navy. But it really is not fair that the noble Marquess, who is the most devoted and self-sacrificing pluralist I have ever known, should be called upon, in the space of two or three afternoons, to represent nearly every Government Department in this House, Willing as he is to do it, and willing as we are to listen to him, I do ask him to see whether he cannot get us a representative of the
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Admiralty in this House. There was a time, a few years ago, when the Master of the Horse occupied that position. No such discreditable anomaly, I hope, will be repeated. I am certain that among his colleagues, either in the other House or in this, the noble Marquess can find some one to represent the Admiralty here.
My second observation is that with the general spirit of what the noble Marquess said about Courts-Martial in naval cases we shall all agree; but I think that it would be going too far if he expected us on this side, during the progress of the war, to give an absolute pledge that in no case would we ask for the publication of the result of a Court-Martial in a case where a ship was lost. Be it remembered that a Court-Martial on the loss of a ship is a procedure from which the Navy is not averse. Rather is it one to which it is habituated, and any departure therefrom is more likely to be resented than approved of by the Navy.
My third point is about the "Goeben" and the "Breslau." The noble Marquess did not quite appreciate, perhaps, the point of my noble friend who sits behind me. My noble friend pointed out that the escape of these two ships with its vital and momentous consequences in the progress of the war was evidently regarded by the Admiralty as due to an error on the part of some one or another. Accordingly the conduct of two Admirals was investigated. Both of these Admirals have been acquitted, I believe on the ground that they were merely carrying out the instructions of the Admiralty. The implication therefore is that the blame, if blame there is, rests with the Board of Admiralty itself. That is a conclusion which is very widely drawn, and one of the reasons why my noble friend pressed for information was in order to give the noble Marquess an opportunity of dispelling any doubt. That opportunity he has not taken. But perhaps he may be able to tell us in a sentence if my version of the official procedure is correct—whether the verdict of the Court-Martial which acquitted Admiral Troubridge has been confirmed or not by the Board of Admiralty?
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I will inquire as to that. I am not certain.

MOTOR AMBULANCES AT THE FRONT.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: My Lords, the Question which I have put on the Paper relates to a simple series of facts, and is in these words—
To ask His Majesty's Government whether it is the fact that with the consent of the War Office some motor ambulances have been provided by private benefaction for special brigades through the British Red Cross Association; whether, on such cars being landed in France, they have been taken possession of by the Army Service Corps and devoted to the general service of the Royal Army Medical Corps; and if so, whether this course has the sanction and approval of the War Office.
The facts as given to me from private sources are these. Early in the autumn there was a great need for ambulance cars for the seat of military operations for the purpose of bringing the wounded back to the base hospitals with as much speed as possible. The demand exceeded the supply, which is not perhaps wonderful, and I for one cast no stones and lay no blame on account of what happened under what were unprecedented circumstances. But I am told that on the facts being made known to the friends of some of the regiments concerned they themselves got up subscriptions for the purpose of giving this service to the special units in which they were interested. I am informed by my right hon. friend Mr. Walter Long, whose son is in the Scots Greys—a regiment of Cavalry with which we in Scotland have many associations—that he approached the War Office to find out whether this procedure would have their consent, and he was definitely assured that individual units could not be given this privilege by themselves, but if cars were supplied for each of the three units making up the brigade, then that would have the consent and the approval of the War Office.
Accordingly, I am informed, the friends of the Scots Greys, the 12th Lancers, and the 20th Hussars, which made up one Cavalry brigade at that time, did provide ambulance cars for the service of the brigade. I am informed that others have been sent out, but in no single case has the car reached its destination. I want to point out to the House that, according
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to the information given to me, every condition laid down by the War Office was complied with, and these cars were sent out through the British Red Cross Association. I want to make it perfectly clear that I am not acting for the British Red Cross Association. I have had no communication with them; I have not been in any way prompted by them. I desire that nothing should be said which would cause conflict between that Association and either the Army Service Corps or the British Medical Corps. I am acting for the individuals who have supplied these cars and whose names I will give, if necessary—I do not want to mention them here, but I will supply them if I am asked to do so. Now, are these facts which I have stated correct? If so, is it fair that the property of private persons, subscribed under the sanction of the War Office for a definite purpose, should be taken from them and applied to other purposes which probably ought to have been provided for by the public funds? Even after the lapse of many weeks neither have these cars been delivered to the destination to which they were despatched nor has any compensation of any kind been offered.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I have made inquiry into this matter, and my noble and gallant friend the Secretary of State for War sends me this information which I think to some extent clears up the obscurity which appears to prevail. A considerable number of motor ambulances have been provided by private benefactors, and in a great number of instances the donors have stipulated that the ambulance in question should go to some particular unit, brigade, or other formation. The answer to such stipulation has invariably been that as far as possible the donors' wishes will be carried out, but that it must be distinctly understood that any such gifts can only be accepted on tile condition that they are available for the general service of the Army. Those ambulances which have been given for work with the Expeditionary Force have been so despatched. It is, however, obvious that the difficulties of the maintenance of an Army in the field make the special ear-marking of certain vehicles to certain units only, a practical impossibility. A vehicle requiring only slight repairs must necessarily be replaced by an efficient one and the

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damaged one when repaired must necessarily go into the general pool available for replacement wherever required. So that it comes to this, that while every effort has been made to carry out the wishes of the donors they have always been warned that it might be impossible to carry them out in particular cases.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: I cannot, of course, ask the noble and learned Viscount to press the matter further on this occasion. But I want it to be clearly understood that Mr. Walter Long has definitely stated to me that he got the distinct authority of the War Office; the names of the units were painted on the cars, but the cars have been taken for the general service of the Army Medical Corps, and no communication whatever has been made either to the donors or to the persons for whom they were intended. I am informed that one of the cars has not been paid for, and that the donors do not intend to pay for it until they get compensation.

NAVAL PRIZE FUND.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether the Treasury had arrived at a decision as to the system of bounty which it was announced On March 17, 1914, was to be substituted for naval prize money. The noble Earl said: My Lords, on March 17, 1914, the First Lord of the Admiralty announced that it was the intention of the Admiralty to abolish the system then in force of prize money and to substitute for it a system of Bounties. Accordingly an Order in Council was passed abolishing the system then in existence, but the new system was not set up. On August 31 I asked in this House a question on this matter, and Lord Wimborne answered—
"The old system has been done away with and a new one set up, but the exact form which it will take will be announced in due course."
Now here we are in January, 1915, nearly a year since the change was proposed, and nothing has been done. I am glad to think that the amount which I suppose at some time will have to be divided is considerable. So far as I am aware, however, no announcement has been made by the Admiralty, and we have to be content with the statement that "the exact form will be announced in due course." What we want to know is, when will "due course" arrive?
EARL BEAUCHAMP: My Lords, the Admiralty have placed before the Treasury a scheme for the establishment of a Naval Prize Fund and for a revised method of distribution in accordance with the decision embodied in the Order of His Majesty in Council of August 28 last. Under this scheme it is proposed to distribute gratuities on a scale generally corresponding to the old system of distribution to the ships' companies, but modified to suit the new conditions of the Naval Service. Up to the present time only a small number of prizes have been finally dealt with by the Court and sold, and it is not possible now to make any statement as to when distribution can be made or the amount of such distribution. I can assure the noble Earl that this question, which is complex and difficult, is engaging the close attention of the two Departments concerned—that is to say, the Admiralty and the Treasury. But after a close consideration of the question I think that I may say this, that everybody is agreed that periodical distribution, say every three months, is quite impracticable, and that some other method of distribution than that will have to be agreed to.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: That answer is not in words the same but is practically the same as that which I received on August 31 last, when the announcement was already several months due. Certainly the Admiralty and the Treasury seem to me to be proceeding at a very slow rate.

TRIAL BY COURT-MARTIAL.
EARL LOREBURN: My Lords, I desire to ask the Leader of the House whether His Majesty's Government intend to propose an amendment to the Defence of the Realm Act so as to enable British subjects to require a trial before the ordinary Courts of the land when available.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, the answer which I have to give in reply to my noble and learned friend is in the affirmative. The House remembers, I am sure, the discussion which took place on November 27 last on the amended Defence of the Realm Bill, as it was when it came up to this House, in which several noble and learned Lords of the greatest weight and authority on both sides of the House took part, all objecting to the particular

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provision whereby it seemed possible that British subjects might, in contravention of some of the most ancient and honoured Statutes under which we live, be tried by Court-Martial and put to death. We pointed out then that to the best of our belief no actual hardship was likely to be inflicted upon individuals, but I am not sure that that defence will be regarded as altogether complete, and His Majesty's Government, having considered the matter, will be prepared, when Parliament is sitting in a manner which enables a Bill to be passed into law, to introduce a Bill modifying that provision. Whether the Bill will be introduced in this House or in another place I am not able to tell my noble and learned friend at this moment. Nor can I say anything as to its actual terms; but he can take it from me that a measure in that. sense will be introduced. And I should hope that, just as I argued before that to the best of our belief no innocent person was likely to be damnified by our proposed legislation, I in turn express the hope on this occasion that no guilty person will profit by the amended legislation which we propose to introduce.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: My Lords, I should like to give notice that the action of the Government cannot be expected to pass without comment. No doubt an occasion for full discussion will arise when the Bill is introduced, but at the outset I would like to remind the noble Marquess that this Act to which Lord Loreburn takes exception was passed by the Cabinet, sanctioned by the military and naval authorities, and received the assent of the Law Officers of the Crown, and this particular part of it passed unanimously through the House of Commons. The Act has been in operation for a month, and no abuse can be alleged in respect of its operation. There has been a Court-Martial or two. There was the Court-Martial on Lody, who was a foreigner, but no one will dare allege that that trial was anything but most fair and most complete in all particulars. It is true that this is not the occasion to elaborate the subject, but the noble Marquess has given no explanation whatever for stating that the Cabinet has changed its mind.
When the House last rose, six weeks ago, the Government gave way on this point owing largely to the fact that the noble and learned Earl, Lord Loreburn, had caught them at a most inconvenient hour. I
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believe that the House as a whole would have supported the Government, but owing to the difficulty caused by the fact of the House of Commons rising the following day, the Government gave way in this sense, that the Lord Chancellor gave a pledge to abrogate for a time the Act which was then passing through this House and which has since received the Royal Assent. He gave that pledge without consulting his colleagues, because it was obvious that the matter was sprung upon the Government. No one expected such violent opposition from any quarter of the House, and the Lord Chancellor gave a pledge that until Parliament reassembled the Act, so far as concerned individuals convicted by Court-Martial, should be abrogated. Well, Parliament has reassembled, and, as I interpreted that pledge, the pledge has now expired; and if any person, British subject or foreigner, is tried and convicted by a Court-Martial to-morrow under the Defence of the Realm Act the military authorities are entitled to execute him.
EARL LOREBURN: My Lords, I desired to maintain silence, but the noble Earl constrains me to speak. This Act to which he refers was introduced into this House at 11 o'clock at night, and the next day it was passed through all its stages before 7 o'clock. I took the only opportunity that I had of drawing attention to this defect., and the noble Earl is kind enough to think that I took advantage of the opportunity that I had—
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: I did not mean that.
EARL LOREBURN: He did not mean anything except what was perfectly courteous, I am quite sure. I have no more to say as to that. The noble Earl's proposition apparently is this, that whereas the Government have seen reason to agree to act in the way which Lord Halsbury, no mean authority; Lord Parmoor, no Mean authority; Lord Bryce and myself recommended, and think that a man being tried for his life ought to be tried by a Judge of the land and by a jury when available, the noble Earl proposes that in the interval between restoring that power the Government shall practise the right to have a man executed under the system we condemn. Therefore I must ask the Leader of the -House or the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack whether we are

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to understand that until this Amending Bill is brought in people will not be deprived of their lives by sentence of a Court-Martial under the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act. I presume that the undertaking continues?
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE THE MARQUESS OF CREWE nodded assent.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, I ought, perhaps, to say one word lest my silence may convey an improper implication. On the last occasion when the subject came up and when my noble friends Lord Halsbury and Lord Parmoor expressed the views that they did, I observed a judicious silence. I propose to do so On the merits of the question now. But it is only fair to let the noble and learned Earl know that, having had some idea that he was going to use his persuasive powers, which we know to be abnormal, on His Majesty's Ministers in the interim, and having a suspicion that if he did direct those batteries on them they would sooner or later give way, I consulted the Leader of the Opposition, Lord Lansdowne, on the matter; and I must frankly tell my noble friend opposite that from the remarks that were made by Lord Halsbury and Lord Parmoor on the occasion to which he refers he would not be wise in deducing the conclusion that men of the highest authority and weight on our side are not altogether averse from the course that he is going to pursue. I do not say how far their opinions would influence the conduct of my noble friend and those who sit on this side of the House, but I detected in his few remarks a strain almost of belief that because the Government had agreed to this introduction of an Amending Bill its passage into law was certain. I should not like the noble Earl to carry away that impression; and without making any observations as to my own opinion on the matter, I have out of courtesy to him thought it desirable to let him know the fact.

INOCULATION OF SOLDIERS.
LORD TENTERDEN LORD TENTERDEN rose to call attention to the inoculation of His Majesty's Forces against typhoid, and to ask His Majesty's Government for information as to whether inoculation is compulsory, and whether soldiers are involved in any penalties or disabilities if they refuse to submit to inoculation.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I do not bring this matter forward in order to engage upon a controversial argument at this moment, but because it has come under my notice that very harsh and arbitrary treatment has been dealt out towards soldiers—a treatment which is incomprehensible to those who, like myself, have been assured by Lord Kitchener and Parliament that inoculation in His Majesty's Forces is not compulsory. I feel that I should not be doing my duty as a member of this House if I did not point out to your Lordships the very disastrous effect that this question is having upon recruiting in the Army.
I have in my hand many letters from soldiers complaining of the hard treatment which has been dealt out to them because, as conscientious objectors, they have refused to submit to inoculation. In the cases which I shall instance in order to prove my contention, I do not propose to give the names, as I do not consider that that would be quite fair to most of the men, but if any noble Lord desires to have the names I shall be pleased to hand them to him. Here is an extract from a regimental order stating that inoculation would be classed as an important consideration in the case of (1) non-commissioned officers' promotion; (2) men for company and regimental employment; and (3) men for week-end passes. I understand that the officers are to report to the orderly room twice a month with regard to the men—thereby, of course, making these marked men. Another letter is to the effect that soldiers not willing to be inoculated were threatened that their leave would be stopped. They were told that they were not entitled to their pay as they were not doing their duty properly as soldiers, and were accused of being afraid. The writer of that letter has been twelve years in the Army and through patriotism and loyalty re-enlisted on the outbreak of war, leaving a wife and child.
According to another letter Christmas leave was threatened to be stopped, and men not inoculated could not get a pass on Sunday. This writer was requested by the sergeant to take a Christmas pass to one of the men but to ask if he was inoculated, and if not to bring the pass back. Another soldier writes as follows:— "Twenty of us have bad our Christmas leave stopped for refusing to be frightened into allowing ourselves to be inoculated."

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I have instances which I could equally well verify showing how men have declined to enlist upon being told that inoculation had to be undergone. One father said that he had a son in Canada, a soldier, and two more wishing to enlist in England, but he would not consent to their joining under the present regulations. Another soldier states that he was told that he must be inoculated in order to see service abroad, and that if he and his companions refused now it would be of no avail as they would be inoculated on the boat when making the passage. Is such a procedure to be carried out? Another case is of a corporal who says that the doctors informed him that inoculation was made compulsory by a new Army Order issued on January 2. I have not heard of this. Another one writes from France that on refusing to be inoculated he was at once placed in close arrest for a few days, afterwards in open arrest, and is now awaiting a Court-Martial, charged with not complying with an order given by a superior officer. The General himself has told him and others that there is no case of conscientious objection at all. Others have been told that if they were not inoculated they would not get their leave.
The writer of another letter says that nearly all his company resisted inoculation, but most of them eventually yielded solely because passes were otherwise refused. Another says that those who went out at the beginning of the war are being granted a few days' leave, but he, having refused inoculation as he had had previous experience of it, has been held back. He points out that it may well be that he may never get another chance of seeing his friends ! This kind of treatment does not coincide with what we are told by the War Office. They say that inoculation is not compulsory, but if these methods are continued it is perfectly evident that inoculation is made as compulsory as it could possibly be. Men are refused promotion it is said, which is a very serious thing for them; and they have been badly treated in many ways by having their passes stopped and by being made to do disagreeable work. And this simply because they refuse to be inoculated. There is a further case to which I should like to draw your Lordships' attention. On December 22, in West Hartlepool, a civilian was arrested and imprisoned for nearly the whole of a working day simply because he distributed leaflets pointing out that anti-typhoid inoculation
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is not, according to Lord Kitchener and Parliament, compulsory in the Army. I ask, therefore, Is inoculation compulsory or is it not? If it is not, I submit that the Government should issue orders to stop this kind of thing going on. They should make it impossible that these men should be so unfairly treated, and should give some compensation to the men for the very harsh treatment which they have received.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, by the practice of the War Office inoculation against enteric or typhoid is not compulsory for any soldier, and it is possible for a man to go to the Front without having been inoculated. At the same time the medical authorities are convinced of the benefit of inoculation, and the position of the Department is to use all efforts to persuade men to be inoculated, while preserving the rights of the conscientious objector. In the circular letter dated October 7, 1914, which contains the only instructions that have been issued to the military authorities, it is pointed out that disease is a great danger on active service; that it is the duty of soldiers to guard themselves against it; and that if they do not do so they risk their chance of seeing service, as men who have adopted this precaution may be selected in their place. A particular case which was mentioned in the House of Commons occurred at Bedford in November last where inoculated men were taken for the 4th Camerons in preference, as there were sufficient men available to make selection possible. Anti-typhoid inoculation has been made compulsory in the American and French Armies.
A case which has figured prominently is that of Corporal Nichols, 3rd Battalion, Reserve City of London Regiment, who died at East Finchley on November 6, 1914. The case was raised in the House of Commons, and the cause of death was given, after telegraphic inquiries, as "pneumonia," but when the death certificate came into the possession of the Department it was seen that the cause was given as (i) Anti-typhoid vaccination (ii) pneumonia. The case has been investigated and submitted to Sir William Oster, who considers that death was due to an eight-mile march which the man took after inoculation, and not to the inoculation directly.

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My Lords, it comes to this, that the highest medical men are convinced that inoculation is a very simple safeguard against enteric fever, and while the authorities do not make it obligatory in the sense of using compulsion, they lay stress on it that a man who wishes to see active service is at an advantage if he submits to inoculation over a man who will not, and who thereby, in the view of the medical authorities, risks the health of the Army
LORD TENTERDEN: I thank the noble and learned Viscount for his reply, but I do not think that it quite answers my Question. The noble and learned Viscount says that inoculation is not compulsory, but that does not satisfy me, because if it is not compulsory men should not have their leave stopped and undergo the hardships to which I have referred for refusing to be inoculated. If inoculation is not compulsory then the law admits of conscientious objectors, and men cannot be
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forced to submit to inoculation. If you stop a man's leave or promotion, what is it but making this compulsory? It is perfectly evident that—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I would remind the noble Lord that by the Standing Orders he is entitled to make a brief explanation, but he cannot make a detailed reply.

SUSPENSORY ACT, 1914, AMENDMENT BILL. [H.L.]
A Bill to amend the Suspensory Act, 1914, by providing that the operation of the Welsh Church Act, 1914, shall be suspended for the same period as the Government of Ireland Act, 1914—Was presented by the Duke of Devonshire; read I, and to be printed. (No. 26.)
House adjourned at ten minutes past Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Three o'clock.