Sitting of 30 March 1914

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.
Private Bills (Standing Orders not previously inquired into complied with),—Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the following Bills, referred on the Second Reading thereof, the Standing Orders not previously inquired into, which are applicable thereto, have been complied with, namely.—

Norwich Electric Tramways Bill.

Metropolitan and Great Northern Railway Companies Bill.

South Suburban Gas Bill.

Ordered, That the Bills be committed.
Private Bills [Lords] (Standing Orders not previously inquired into complied with),—Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the following Bill, originating in the Lords, and referred on the First Reading thereof, the Standing Orders not previously inquired into, which are applicable thereto, have been complied with, namely:—
Abertillery and District Water Board Bill [Lords].
Ordered, That the Bill be read a second time.
Private Bill Petitions [Lords] (Standing Orders not complied with),—Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the Petition for the following Bill, originating in the Lords, the Standing Orders have not been complied with, namely:—
Shropshire, Worcestershire, and Staffordshire Electric Power Bill [Lords].
Ordered, That the Report be referred to the Select Committee on Standing Orders.
Corn Exchange Company (Mark Lane) Bill,
Read the third time, and passed.
Port of London Authority Bill,
To be read the third time To-morrow.
Riddings District Gas Bill,
Read the third time, and passed.
Leyland Gas Bill,
Mold and Denbigh Junction Railway Bill,
As amended, considered; to be read the third time.
South Metropolitan Cemetery Company Bill [Lords],
Read a second time, and committed.
London Electric Supply Bill (by Order),
Second Reading deferred till Monday, 20th April.
Northern Junction Railway Bill (by Order),
Second Reading deferred till Thursday.
Lurgan Gas and Electricity Bill (by Order),
Second Reading deferred till Friday.
Middlesex County Council (Western Road and Improvements and Finance) Bill (by Order),
Second Reading deferred till Thursday.
Wesleyan and General Assurance Society Bill [Lords] (by Order),
Second Reading deferred till Friday.
Land Drainage (Rippingale) Provisional Order Bill,
Read the third time, and passed.

GERMAN IMPERIAL AND STATE NATIONALITY LAW (MISCELLANEOUS, No. 3, 1914).
Copy presented of German Imperial and State Nationality Law, 22nd July, 1913, and Memorandum thereon [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
COLONIAL REPORTS (ANNUAL).
Copy presented of Report, No. 796 (Bermuda, Annual Report for 1912) [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
CROWN COLONIES AND PROTECTORATES (INDIAN POPULATION).
Copy presented of Return showing the total Population and the Indian Population, separately, in various Colonies and Protectorates [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (SCOTLAND).
Copy Presented of Nineteenth Annual Report of the Local Government Board for Scotland, 1913 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD FOR IRELAND (HOUSING CONDITIONS OF THE WORKING CLASSES IN DUBLIN).
Copy presented of Appendix to the Report of the Departmental Committee appointed to inquire into the Housing Conditions of the Working Classes in the City of Dublin [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

BOARD OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES.
Copy presented of Agricultural Statistics, 1913, Vol. XLVII., Part II., Return of Produce of Crops in England and Wales, with Summaries for the United Kingdom [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
Copy presented of Annual Report of Proceedings of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries under the Tithe, Copyhold, Inclosure, Commons, Land Drainage, and other Acts for the year 1913 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT.
Copy presented of Regulations, dated 21st March, 1914, made by the National Health Insurance Joint Committee, entitled the National Health Insurance (Medical Research Fund) Regulations, 1914 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 171.]
PREVENTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT BILL.
Order for Second Reading upon Friday. 17th April, read, and discharged:—Bill withdrawn.
SUMMARY JURISDICTION (MATRIMONIAL CAUSES) BILL.
Order for Second Reading To-morrow read, and discharged:—Bill withdrawn.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

  San Thomé and Principé (Repatriated Natives).
  Mr. LYTTELTONasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can yet state the number of natives repatriated from the islands of San Thomé and Principé to Angola during 1913?
  The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Acland): 2,071 natives, 1,371 males and 700 females, were repatriated from San Thomé to Angola during 1913. I am not at present able to state the number repatriated from Principé.

  National Defence (Striking Force).
  Mr. NEWMANasked whether, in consequence of the possible employment of the military and naval forces of the Crown on active service in Ireland, a temporary re-estimate has been made necessary of the striking force available in the case of sudden European emergency; whether information on this point has been sought by a Power of the entente; and whether assurances have been given that the combined naval and military operations for the subjugation of Ulster have been abandoned?
  Mr. ACLAND: The answer to all the parts of the question is "No."
  Mr. NEWMAN: May I ask for your direction, Mr. Speaker, with regard to the putting of supplementary questions?
  Mr. SPEAKER: There are 149 questions on the Paper, and I would ask the House to restrict itself to putting only those supplementary questions which are absolutely necessary, because it is hard on hon.

  799
  Members whose names come later on the Paper if they are prevented from asking their questions.

  Hague Conference (Correspondence with United States).
  3. Mr. BARNESasked if the right hon. Gentleman can yet publish the correspondence with the United States in respect to The Hague Conference, and if he can make any further declaration of the intention of the Foreign Office re representation of organised labour on the National Committee?
  Mr. ACLAND: As regards the first part of this question it would not be convenient nor in accordance with the usual practice to publish an incomplete correspondence while negotiations on the subject are still pending. As regards the second part, I will show the hon. Member the list of the subjects which will be discussed by our Committee, and will consider with him how best to secure full consideration for the views of those whom he represents upon them. But the responsibility for formulating policy upon these subjects must rest solely upon His Majesty's Government, as it must do in all matters of policy, and the British Delegation will consist of experts in the questions of international law that come before the Conference, and will have no political representation upon it.

  Mexico.
  Mr. NEWMANasked if the right hon. Gentleman has any information relative to the attack on the city of Torreon by a force of the Constitutionalist party; and what measures are being taken for the protection of British lives and interests in that part of Mexico?
  Mr. ACLAND: I have no information with regard to an engagement at Torreon beyond what is stated in the Press. As regards the protection of British lives and interests I refer the hon. Member to the reply given to the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds on 26th February, to which I have only to add that, according to a recent report from the British Vice-Consul at Gomez Palacio, which is only a few miles from Torreon, the general in command of the Federal forces has stated that he will use every effort to protect foreigners in Torreon, and that President Huerta has
  800
  recently issued a fresh and urgent instruction to all commanders in the field for this purpose.

  Northern Epirus.
  Mr. NEWMANasked if the right hon. Gentleman has any information relative to severe fighting between the forces of the Epirote provisional government and Albanians in Northern Epirus?
  Mr. ACLAND: The answer is in the negative; we have heard of one detachment of Albanian gendarmerie having been ambushed and had sixteen casualties, but of no other fighting that resulted in casualties.

  British Indian Troops
  Sir GEORGE SCOTT ROBERTSONasked what is the number of British-Indian troops stationed on the northern shore of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea west of the India frontier?
  The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for INDIA (Mr. Roberts): The number of British-Indian troops stationed on the northern shore of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea west of the Indian frontier is: 464 officers and men Indian Infantry.

  Leeds University.
  Mr. STANIERasked the President of the Board of Agriculture whether the Board has declined to make to the agricultural section of Leeds University any Grant for investigating the injury done by the smoke nuisance to crops; and, in view of the importance of the investigation, whether it will be carried out by any other body?
  The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of AGRICULTURE (Mr. Runciman): Grants have been made to Leeds University for three years in aid of the investigation to which the hon. Member refers, but the Advisory Committee on Agricultural Science have recommended that no Grant should be paid after the end of the current financial year. The Board are not aware that the investigation is to be carried on by any other body.

  Cattle-testing Station (Pirbright).
  Mr. STANIERasked whether the right hon. Gentleman can give the charges made at the Pirbright cattle-testing station

  801
  for housing and feeding, and for inoculation and examination for the different diseases?
  Mr. RUNCIMAN: A fee of £6 per head is charged for the tuberculin test, and £5 per head for immunisation against red-water, and £10 for the tuberculin test and immunisation combined. This fee includes all charges for testing or immunisation and for feeding and attendance during thirty-one days. If an animal is to be kept for a longer period than thirty-one days at the station to suit the convenience of the owner an additional charge at the rate of 30s. per week is payable.

  Tuberculous Cattle.
  Mr. C. BATHURSTasked upon what date it is proposed to bring into operation the amended Order of the Board in reference to bovine tuberculosis?
  Mr. RUNCIMAN: I cannot say at present.
  Mr. C. BATHURSTasked whether, in accordance with the arrangement made a year ago with the Treasury, the sum of £60,000 will be available there m during the current year for the payment of compensation to stock owners whose cattle are slaughtered as tuberculous in the interests of public health; and what proportion of such compensation and the cost of administration will in future be payable out of local rates?
  Mr. RUNCIMAN: The Estimate of £60,000 was necessarily, in the absence of any trustworthy evidence, based upon conjectural assumptions, some of which have not been justified by experience. The Estimate for the coming financial year is £20,000. I am not prepared at present to give a definite answer to the second part of the question.

  Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act, 1906.
  Mr. C. BATHURSTasked to how many prosecutions by local authorities under the Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act, 1906, the Board gave its assent in the year 1913; how many applications for such assent were made; and in how many cases convictions resulted?
  Mr. RUNCIMAN: During the year 1913 twenty-three cases of suspected offences under the Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act were brought to the notice of the
  802
  Board; in thirteen cases the Board consented to prosecutions, and in two cases convictions resulted.

  Foot-and-Mouth Disease.
  Mr. FFRENCHasked if the right hon. Gentleman has seen a resolution passed by a meeting of farmers, largely attended, at Kilmore, South Wexford, which is a tillage district where a number of farmers stall-feed and finish their cattle, asking that cattle for immediate slaughter from unrestricted areas, of which Kilmore is one, may be landed at foreign wharves in Great Britain as American cattle are; and what is he prepared to do in the matter?
  Mr. RUNCIMAN: I have received a copy of the Resolution to which the hon. Member refers, but in view of the great difficulty which has been experienced in suppressing the epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease in the South of Ireland, I regret that I do not see my way at present to allow the importation of live animals from Wexford to be resumed at present. I would point out the case of American cattle is not analogous. Animals are not admitted into Great Britain from South America, and North America, according to my information, has been entirely free from foot-and-mouth disease for several years.
  Mr. FFRENCHasked if the right hon. Gentleman is aware that dissatisfaction prevails amongst Irish farmers because they are not allowed the same privilege that British farmers possess in marketing their cattle; is he aware that they are quite prepared to submit to restrictions within a 15-mile radius of the place where foot-and-mouth disease exists and give every assistance in stamping out the disease, but that outside the infected area they claim the privilege to ship their cattle from open ports to the British markets; and whether he is prepared to admit the justice of this claim?
  Mr. RUNCIMAN: The restrictions imposed upon the importation of Irish cattle into Great Britain in consequence of foot-and-mouth disease in Ireland are similar to the restrictions imposed upon the importation of British cattle into Ireland, in consequence of foot-and-mouth disease in Great Britain. The precautionary policy of the two Departments in this respect is the same; I have more than once explained to the House the principles on which it is based, and I am more

  803
  than ever convinced by the experience of the last two years that it is the right policy.
  Mr. FFRENCHasked the Vice-President of the Department of Agriculture (Ireland) if he has seen a resolution, passed by the Ballykelly Farmers' Association, stating that no foot-and-mouth disease has been found in any place in their district where Cork calves were located, and calling on his Department to remove the restrictions, and further requesting that, where no disease exists, no restrictions should be imposed on the removal of cattle to the port of embarkation, and that, in so far as the Irish Department of Agriculture is concerned, that Irish farmers should be placed on an equal footing with their competitors in England and Scotland; and what does he propose to do in the matter?
  Mr. T. W. RUSSELL (Vice-President of the Department of Agriculture, Ireland): The Resolution referred to has been received. The difficult task of tracing the calves from Cork that were distributed from New Ross and Waterford has unavoidably proved a lengthy one, and it has been desirable meanwhile to maintain the local restrictions. The situation in the matter is, however, now about to be reviewed with the object of seeing whether these restrictions can be withdrawn. The restrictions on exportation are necessarily governed by wider considerations. At present the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries would not regard the position in relation to foot-and-mouth disease in Southern Ireland as sufficiently secure to allow of animals from that part of the country being admitted to Great Britain, but as the hon. Member is no doubt aware arrangements for shipping animals for slaughter from north of a line running from Drogheda to Oran-more, county Galway, have now been adopted.
  Mr. FFRENCH: Why not Wexford county?
  Mr. RUSSELL: I have already given facilities in Wexford which will obviate any difficulty until the Department is in a position to relieve them permananetly.
  Mr. LYNCHasked whether, in view of the fact that county Clare has been free of foot-and-mouth disease for fifty years, and that all suspected cattle bought in
  804
  markets outside Clare have been located and quarantined, the Department will see fit to remove any restrictions at present imposed so as to enable the fair to be held at Scariff on 3rd April?
  Mr. RUSSELL: It is regretted it has not yet been found possible to complete the difficult task of tracing the calves distributed in Clare and Limerick that had come from the infected neighbourhood in Cork. Withdrawal of the restrictions is, therefore, not practicable at present, but as Scariff is a little outside the scheduled district, the holding of a fair there on 3rd April will be allowable. No cattle, sheep, goats, or swine can, however, come to the fair from inside the scheduled district.
  Mr. MOONEYasked the Vice-President of the Department of Agriculture (Ireland) if his Department have issued an Order opening the ports of Dundalk and Belfast for the export of cattle; whether under this Order it is possible to move cattle from Newry to either of these ports for shipment, while they cannot be shipped from the port of Newry; and if he can state the reason, if any, why the port of Newry is kept closed?
  Mr. RUSSELL: The Order referred to has been issued by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries after consultation with the Irish Department. It applies to the ports of Dundalk, Belfast, Londonderry, and Sligo. In making the arrangements covered by such Order it has only been possible to select a few ports from which to resume shipments at the outset. The four chosen are those most conveniently situated in all the circumstances. It is regretted that Newry could not be included, but as soon as the occasion allows its case will be further considered. Meanwhile, the case of the other ports opened is, of course, available for persons in Newry desiring to effect shipment.
  Mr. MOONEY: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer the last part of the question? If Newry is not to be in the same position as Belfast and Dundalk, and is to be shut while they are open, I want to know why.
  Mr. RUSSELL: That cannot be answered in reply to a question.
  Mr. DUFFYasked the Vice-President of the Department of Agriculture (Ireland) whether he is aware that

  805
  the inhabitants of Loughrea and the stock owners who supply the live stock for the fair which is to be held during the month of April regard the Regulations issued lately in the county of Galway as certain to prevent the export of live stock; whether he is aware that the Order issued is equivalent to a prohibition of sale, which will involve the loss of many thousands of pounds; and whether, in view of the fact that for the last thirty-five years this district and county have been entirely free from foot-and-mouth distemper, he will arrange that normal conditions may be resumed in order to provide facilities for sale and transit at the approaching April fair at Loughrea?
  Mr. RUSSELL: The Order of the Department which prohibits the movement of animals from south of a line running from Drogheda to Oranmore is the result of an arrangement with the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, who made it a condition of their allowing shipments of Irish live stock to be resumed that no animals from the southern half of Ireland should be exported. Animals from Loughrea Fair cannot be moved for export, but the position of owners of live stock in the Loughrea district and in other parts of Ireland south of the dividing line is no worse in this respect now than before the passing of the Order. But for the Order no stock from any part of Ireland could be shipped to Great Britain.
  Mr. DUFFY: Do I understand that no Order was issued by the Department in connection with the late fair, prohibiting the railway company from carrying stock not intended for export?
  Mr. RUSSELL: This question refers to the future, and not to the past.
  Mr. DANIEL BOYLEasked why the ports of Ballina and Westport have not been opened for the export of live stock simultaneously with Sligo; and when the restriction on these ports will be removed?
  Mr. RUSSELL: In making arrangements to resume shipments under certain prescribed conditions it has been possible to select only a few ports for this purpose at the outset. The four chosen are those most conveniently situated in all the circumstances. It is regretted that Ballina and Westport could not be included, but, as soon as the occasion allows, their case will be further considered.
  806
  Meanwhile, the use of the other opened ports is, of course, available for persons in Ballina or Westport who may desire to effect shipments.

  Government Leases.
  Major MORRISON-BELLasked the right hon. Gentleman, as representing the Office of Woods and Forests, whether, on the renewal of the lease of the firm trading at Nos. 18–19, Pall Mall, the Government raised the rent of their tenants from £118 to £820; and whether the Government had in any way assisted this firm to build up their business and goodwill?
  Mr. RUNCIMAN: Nos. 18 and 19, Pall Mall, were held under a lease granted in 1833 for a term of eighty years, expiring 5th April, 1913, at rents amounting in the aggregate to £118 17s. per annum. As part of the arrangement for rebuilding the premises, a new lease has been agreed to be granted from that date for a term of eighty years at a rent (after the first year) of £820 per annum, which is the reasonable value of the site. I am not aware that the Government have granted any special assistance to the firm who have taken the new lease.
  Major MORRISON - BELLasked whether, as a condition of the renewal of the lease of the Carlton Club and in addition to the raising of the annual rent from £677 to £2,400, the Government exacted the surrender of the lease at the lower figure, which still had nineteen years to run, equivalent to cash payments of over £32,000, besides insisting on expensive alterations to the outside of the building, now estimated to cost over £20,000; and whether, in consequence, the official statement that no fine was payable requires some modification?
  Mr. RUNCIMAN: As part of the arrangement for the new lease the club agreed to surrender their present lease and to replace the Caen stone in the elevations of the building with Portland stone. An adequate allowance for the surrender value of the old lease was made by the Crown agreeing the rent to be paid under the new lease. My statement that no fine was payable is correct.
  Major MORRISON-BELL: Could the right hon. Gentleman say whether that statement is a Ministerial half-truth?
  Mr. RUNCIMAN: No, Sir, it is the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

  Metropolitan Improvements (St. Martin's-le-Grand and Gresham Street).
  Mr. DICKINSONasked the hon. Member for St. George's-in-the-East, as representing the Fist Commissioner of Works, whether, in view of the opinion expressed by the traffic branch of the Board of Trade in the last Report that a road from Newgate Street to Finsbury and Bishopsgate may probably become necessary on the completion of the new St. Paul's Bridge, and that a road in that position would do much to lessen the congestion of traffic in Mansion House Place, he will consider the desirability of so arranging the south end of the new Post Office buildings that no interference with Wren's church, St. Vedast, in Foster Lane, need arise in the event of the road in question being made at some future time; and whether he will confer with the authorities concerned with metropolitan improvements before deciding on the plans of the proposed buildings?
  Mr. WEDGWOOD BENN (Lord of the Treasury): In view of the very considerable surrenders of land already agreed to for the purpose of street improvement in St. Martin's-le-Grand and Gresham-street, the First Commissioner has not found it possible, with due regard to the public interest, to take account of the scheme for a new thoroughfare on the south side of the site. Moreover, the First Commissioner understands that the Corporation has in fact no intention of constructing a new street at this point.

  King Edward Memorial (Shadwell Park).
  Mr. HOAREasked whether any further steps have been taken with reference to the completion of the Shadwell Park memorial to King Edward VII.?
  Mr. BENN: The conveyance of the land has been completed, but progress depends on the success of the Committee in raising the necessary funds.
  Mr. HOARE: Is the hon. Member taking steps to bring the authorities together?
  Mr. BENN: No such steps are necessary. The land is available. It is only a question of getting the money.

  House of Commons (Ventilation).
  Mr. DOUGLAS HALLasked the hon. Member for St. George's-in-the-East,
  808
  as representing the First Commissioner of Works, if, in view of the inquiry now being made into the ventilation of the House, he will immediately take steps to have the last annual cost of ventilating the House separated from Sub-head D in such a way as to give Members the opportunity of forming a conclusion as to whether they get adequate comfort for the amount of public money expended?
  Mr. BENN: Perhaps the hon. Member will bring his suggestion to the notice of the Ventilation Committee.

  BRITISH ARMY.

    TERRITORIAL FORCE.
    Colonel BURNasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether Civil servants who join the Territorial Force are only allowed one week's pay when they serve their country by attending the annual camp for fifteen days, in order that they may become thoroughly efficient?
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Mr. Montagu): Civil servants in the Territorial Force attending fifteen days' camp receive special leave with full Civil pay in addition to Army pay, rations, and allowances for one week, and they can receive full civil pay for the whole period by devoting a week's ordinary leave to camp. Alternatively, they may take one week's special extra leave without pay.
    Colonel BURN: Does the hon. Gentleman consider this encouragement on the part of the State is likely to assist the recruiting of the Territorial Force?

    Beef Trust of Chicago.
    Mr. BOWERMANasked if, with one exception, the companies comprising the Beef Trust of Chicago have paid no income Tax for a period of about ten years although their aggregate overturn in this country is nearly £20,000,000 per annum; if the matter has been before the solicitors' department at Somerset House for about eighteen months; and whether any proceedings have been taken against the companies in question, and, if so, with what result?
    Mr. MONTAGU: The facts of the case are not quite as stated, but the matter has received, and is continuing to receive, the careful attention of the authorities.

    Customs Watchers.
    Mr. FREDERICK HALL (Dulwich)asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether, under a recent order, Customs watchers have been deprived of payment for overtime; if, under the same order, Customs officers on the establishment are given an annual allowance of £13 to compensate them for loss occasioned by the new arrangements; if, previously to the making of the new order, both classes of officers were treated in the same way as regards overtime pay; what is the rate of pay of the Customs watchers; and if he will state the reasons for the alteration made?
    Mr. MONTAGU: The circumstances are not such as the question appears to suggest. As the matter is rather complicated, I propose, with the permission of the House, to circulate a detailed answer with the Votes. [See Written Answers this date.]

    Small Holdings.
    Sir JOHN DEWARasked the Secretary for Scotland if application was made by crofters at Ebost, in Skye, to the Board of Agriculture over two years ago for small holdings on the farm of Ebost, tenanted by Mr. John Taylor; if Mr. Taylor renounced his lease last November, and the estate has relet the farm to the two sons of a neighbouring farmer; if the necessity of more land for the applicants for this farm is very pressing; and if, under the circumstances, he will urge the Board of Agriculture to take immediate steps to see that the farm of Ebost is made available for small holdings?
    The SECRETARY for SCOTLAND (Mr. McKinnon Wood): The Board of Agriculture prepared a scheme for new holdings on the farm of Ebost, but found that the landlord had sub-divided the land while the scheme was in preparation. I cannot yet say what effect this will have upon the scheme. The Board have several other schemes in the Island of Skye for the settlement of applicants.

    Herring Curing (Conditions of Labour).
    Mr. CATHCART WASONasked the Secretary for Scotland if he will have a report from his fishery officers from the Moray Firth to Shetland, detailing the conditions under which the girls engaged in the herring-curing operations pursue their avocation, and also the
    810
    accommodation provided for them by steamers and railway trains taking them to and from their work?
    Mr. McKINNON WOOD: As the matters to which my hon. Friend refers do not fall within the sphere of the fishery officers' duties, the answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. Questions as to the conditions under which work is performed in curing stations should be addressed to the Home Secretary, as these stations are subject to inspection by His Majesty's inspectors of factories, and questions relating to the accommodation provided in steamers and railway trains should be addressed to the President of the Board of Trade.
    Mr. ROBERT HARCOURT: Has the right hon. Gentleman no authority in the matter at all?
    Mr. McKINNON WOOD: No, it is a question for the Home Secretary.
    Mr. CATHCART WASONasked the President of the Local Government Board if he will have an inquiry made into the conditions under which the girls engaged in herring-curing operations pursue their work at Lowestoft and Yarmouth, especially with reference to housing and sanitary conditions?
    The PRESIDENT of the LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (Mr. Herbert Samuel): I assume that my hon. Friend's question relates to workplaces. If so, it should be addressed to the Home Secretary.

    His Majesty's Prisons (Nurses).
    Mr. JOWETTasked the Home Secretary if he will give the House a Return of the number of trained and certificated nurses in the prisons of Great Britain; the kind of training that these nurses receive, and the hospitals where they are trained; the number of sick cases that go through the prisons' hospitals in the course of the year; how many of these cases are cases of infectious disease; what training for maternity is necessary for the attendants in the women's prisons where confinements take place; and what provision for nursing is made in the men's prisons?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. McKenna): Among the male staff of the prisons in England there are 123 hospital warders

    811
    and nine pharmacists. These have been specially selected on account of their previous hospital experience acquired mostly as members of the Royal Army Medical Corps and as sick berth stewards in the Royal Navy, and they are also given special training after joining the prison service. All members of the female staff are given instruction in nursing, and those who show special aptitude or have had previous experience are selected to act as hospital officers. Further, the prison governors are authorised to engage a nurse from any local nursing institution if necessary in any case of special difficulty. This includes any maternity case, if there is no officer on the staff of the prison capable of dealing with it. Full statistics of hospital cases are given in the Prison Commissioners' annual reports. In 1912–13 there were 8,615 male and 2,780 female prisoners admitted to hospital for treatment or observation. The number of infectious cases was fifteen.

    Poisons and Pharmacy Act, 1908.
    Major ARCHER-SHEEasked the Home Secretary whether any action has been taken by the Pharmaceutical Society to carry into effect the provision contained in Section 4 (b) of the Poisons and Pharmacy Act, 1908, with reference to the bylaws enabling Army dispensers and apothecaries' assistants to register under the Pharmacy Acts as chemists and druggists; and whether he is aware that a recent decision of a Departmental Committee had characterised the previous neglect to carry out the provisions of Section 4 (b) of the Poisons and Pharmacy Act, 1908, as constituting a serious grievance of four years' standing?
    Mr. McKENNA: I am informed that no steps have been taken by the Pharmaceutical Society to frame by-laws under the provisions referred to in the question. As I stated in reply to a similar question in February of last year, and as is indicated by the Report of the Departmental Committee mentioned in the question, the subject is not free from difficulties; but the society are promoting a Bill, which has been introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Stepney, for the purpose of establishing a register of qualified dispensers which, I am advised will, if passed, go some way to remove the grievance complained of.

    Inebriates Bill.
    Mr. C. BATHURSTasked what is the estimated extra amount of reformatory accommodation which will be required under the Inebriates Bill; what is the estimated prospective charge which will be thrown upon local authorities under Clause 36; and what proportion is the Treasury prepared to contribute towards maintenance under Clause 34 of the Bill?
    Mr. McKENNA: I fear it is impossible to frame any exact estimate of the accommodation or of the cost. The increased powers given to the Courts may lead to an increase of the number of inebriates sent to reformatories; but the committals will generally be for shorter periods, and the Bill provides other modes of treatment which may in some cases render reformatory treatment unnecessary. I am not yet in a position to say what the Treasury contribution will be.
    Mr. C. BATHURST: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he will be prepared, for the guidance of local authorities, to give some indication as to the Treasury contribution before the Bill is further considered in the House?
    Mr. McKENNA: As soon as I am in a position to give an indication I will do so, but I cannot give such a pledge as the hon. Gentleman asks for.

    West Ham Union (Contralto Singer).
    Mr. WILLIAM THORNEasked the President of the Local Government Board whether his attention has been called to the case of Edith Clark, a girl aged fourteen, an inmate of the West Ham Union; and, in view of the excellence of her contralto voice, will he give full power to the West Ham Board of Guardians to undertake her musical education?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: The matter is receiving my sympathetic consideration, and I have already arranged for one of my officers to confer with a deputation from the board of guardians on the subject.

  NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT.

    SANATORIUM BENEFIT.
    Mr. GODFREY LOCKER-LAMPSONasked the President of the Local Government Board whether his attention has been called to the recently issued annual report of the Jewish board of guardians, in which it is stated that there is no large increase in the total number of beds

    813
    in sanatoria available for Jews under the National Insurance Act, and that the provision of domiciliary treatment in the borough of Stepney simply means being attended by a panel doctor; and will he say what action he proposes to take in the matter?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: I have received no representations with respect to any lack of accommodation in sanatoria for the persons referred to in the first part of the hon. Member's question. Any question relating to the domiciliary treatment of insured persons should be addressed to the representative of the Insurance Commissioners.
    Mr. G. LOCKER-LAMPSON: Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the Report?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: Yes, Sir.

    DISTRICT HEALTH COMMITTEES.
    Mr. WILLIAM THORNEasked whether the National Insurance Commissioners have power under Section 61 of the Act of 1911, and Section 31 of the Act of 1913 to allow expenses to delegates attending district health committees?
    Mr. BENN: The answer is in the negative.

    RAILWAY PORTERS (LONDON TERMINI).
    Mr. BENNETT-GOLDNEYasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will ascertain at which of the principal London termini of the various railway companies in London, porters or out-porters in attendance upon passengers either receive no wages or pay to be so employed; if porters or out-porters so employed are insurable under the National Insurance Act; and whether the railway companies concerned pay the employer's contribution?
    Mr. BENN: I am informed that the Board of Trade have no means of obtaining the particulars asked for in the first part of the question. If the hon. Member has a specific case in mind, perhaps he will be good enough to give me particulars of it.

    INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS.
    Mr. RUPERT GWYNNEasked the Prime Minister if he will consider the advisability of remedying the inconvenience caused to Members of this House, as well as to the public, by having
    814
    no direct representative of the Insurance Commissioners in this House to explain the rules and regulations they make from day to day, and answer questions regarding their actions?
    The PRIME MINISTER: My hon. Friend the Member for St. George's-in-the-East ably represents the Insurance Commissioners in the House, and he or the Commissioners will be pleased to explain any points in connection with the matters referred to.
    Mr. RUPERT GWYNNE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in however able a manner the hon. Member for St. George's-in-the-East may answer questions in this House, he has no direct authority to speak for, or on behalf of, the Insurance Commissioners?

    SCOTTISH RAILWAY COMPANIES.
    Mr. FREDERICK WHYTEasked the President of the Board of Trade (1) whether he can now state the result of his representations to the Joint Committee, Perth general station, of the Caledonian, Highland, and North British Railway Companies on the subject of deduction from wages of arrears under Part II. of the National Insurance Act; and (2) whether the Caledonian Railway Company in the Glasgow district, when the umpire decided that certain classes of their workmen, painters, joiners, plumbers, slaters, and others, were insurable under Part II. of the National Insurance Act, demanded payment of all arrears due since the commencement of the Act; that the men refused to consent; that on appeal to the Board of Trade through the Labour Exchange the men were held to be justified in their refusal; and that the company thereupon withdrew their demand; and whether he will draw the attention of the Perth general station Joint Committee to this decision and ask them to withdraw the notice of which complaint has been made?
    The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of TRADE (Mr. Burns): I am not yet in a position to make a definite statement with regard to the matter, but I should mention that no such decision as that referrerd to in the second question has been given by the Board of Trade.
    Mr. F. WHYTE: Is my right hon. Friend taking any further action to have the matter speedily settled?
    Mr. BURNS: Yes, Sir.

    Yarmouth Fish Trade.
    Mr. CATHCART WASONasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if his attention has been directed to the fact that the girls engaged in the fish trade from Yarmouth North to Balta Sound work under extremely unsatisfactory conditions; that no shelter is provided for them, little provision for meals, and that it is impossible for them to keep their feet dry when at work, and that in consequence a severe strain is thrown on the sickness benefit provided by the National Insurance Act during the quarter of the year when they return from work; and if he will ascertain if there are means, short of a strike, of improving their position?
    Mr. BENN: The representations conveyed to my right hon. Friend are receiving careful consideration.

    Milk and Dairies Bill.
    Mr. CHARLES BATHURSTasked the President of the Local Government Board when the copies of the Milk and Dairies Bill will be available to Members of this House and to agricultural organisations, whose members will be affected thereby?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: As the Bill has not yet been introduced copies cannot be made available. I am not yet able to name a date for its introduction.

  MERCANTILE MARINE.

    SIDE-LIGHTS.
    Major WHITEasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will consider the desirability of adopting and enforcing standard shades of red and green glass for the side lights of merchant Ships?
    Mr. BURNS: Standard shades of red and green glass for the side lights of merchant ships have been in use for many years. I am sending the hon. Member a copy of the instructions to surveyors which deal with this matter.

    HOSPITAL ACCOMMODATION.
    Mr. PETOasked the President of the Board of Trade whether 100 oceangoing vessels only have been fitted with separate hospitals for seamen since the issue of the Board's official recommendations on this matter in January, 1912; whether he will consider the necessity of
    816
    introducing legislation for the purpose of enforcing these recommendations; and whether he has received a resolution urging this from the Council of the British Medical Association?
    Mr. BURNS: I understand that the number of seagoing cargo vessels which have been fitted with seamen's hospitals since the issue of the Board of Trade notice on the subject in January, 1912, is 112. About 32 per cent. of the vessels of this description built in 1913 were so fitted, as against about 17 per cent. in 1912. The Board of Trade received last February a letter from the British Medical Association, stating that the council noted with satisfaction the action of the Board of Trade in the matter, and trusted that the Board would, in due course, make it compulsory to provide proper hospital accommodation on ships. The question of the possibility of legislation on the subject will not be lost sight of.

    MANNING.
    Mr. HAMILTON BENNasked the President of the Board of Trade whether, as regards the figures supplied for the years 1912 and 1913 of seamen failing to-join their ships after signing agreements to do so, he can state, out of the total number of seamen engaged at the different ports in the United Kingdom, what proportion of these seamen were engaged in liners and coasting vessels in regular trades where the employment of seamen is continuous; and whether he is able to give the actual percentage of failures to join in the case of seamen who have signed articles to serve in foreign-going cargo vessels only?
    Mr. BURNS: No statistics showing the failure of seamen to join coasting vessels are available, nor are there any statistics showing separately the failure of seamen to join liners and cargo vessels.

    STEAMSHIP "TITANIC" DISASTER.
    Colonel YATEasked the President of the Board of Trade whether the fund raised in connection with the "Titanic" disaster is administered by the Public Trustee or by whom; whether any balance sheet or statement of expenditure of the fund has been, or will be, published; and whether any permanent fund has been formed for the relief of sufferers from future disasters at sea?
    The ATTORNEY-GENERAL (Sir John Simon): I have been asked by my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade to answer this question. I am informed that the "Titanic" fund is being administered under the control of a Mansion House Committee, acting through an executive sub-committee of which the Public Trustee is chairman. The first account of the fund was submitted to the Mansion House Committee in March last year, and communicated to the Press on the 19th March, 1913. A further account will be submitted in May next, and will no doubt be communicated to the Press in due course. So far as I am aware, no such fund as is referred to in the latter part of the question has been established.

    MASTERS AND MATES (EXAMINERS).
    Major ARCHER-SHEEasked the President of the Board of Trade the qualifications required of applicants for positions as examiners of masters and mates at the different seaports; what are the minimum and maximum salaries of these examiners; what number of years does it take on an average for an examiner to reach the maximum salary; and what are their rates of superannuation in proportion to salary on reaching the retiring age prescribed by the Board of Trade?
    Mr. BURNS: Applicants for positions as examiners of masters and mates are all required to have had experience in command of foreign-going ships, and must be between twenty-five and forty-five years of age. The rates of salary vary in different districts, but the lowest salary in any district is £200, and the highest salary in any district is £400. At present it takes from five to eighteen years to reach the maximum salary, according to the district in which the examiner is serving. The examiners are subject to the ordinary rules as regards superannuation, and on the average the present staff of examiners will have completed twenty-eight years of pensionable service at the age of sixty-five. When the Merchant Shipping (Certificates) Bill, which is now before Parliament, becomes law, I hope that it may be possible to minimise the inequalities in the positions and prospects of the examiner which now exist?

    Agricultural Labourers (Wages).
    Mr. BENNETT-GOLDNEYasked the President of the Board of Trade what is the average weekly wage of agricultural
    818
    labourers, both including free cottages and other payments in kind and without, in Oxfordshire and Norfolk, respectively; and if he can say what is the highest and the lowest weekly wage paid for agricultural adult labour, without any allowances for cottage rent or other benefits, in Oxfordshire, Norfolk and Somerset?
    Mr. BURNS: Full information as to the total earnings of agricultural labourers, including free cottages and other payments in kind, was obtained in 1907 and published in Cd. 5460. The average earnings in a full week at that time for ordinary adult agricultural labourers was 14s. 11d. in Oxfordshire, 15s. 4d. in Norfolk, and 17s. 3d. in Somerset. The corresponding average weekly cash rates, exclusive of all extra payments and allowances, were 13s., 12s. 7d., and 14s. 1d., respectively. Since 1907 there has been an upward movement in wages, and the most usual cash rates (exclusive of extra earnings and allowances) are now from 13s. to 14s. in Oxfordshire, 14s. in Norfolk, and 14s. to 17s. in Somerset. Particulars as to the extra earnings and allowances at the present time are not available.

    Labour Exchanges (Nurses).
    Dr. CHAPPLEasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will state what precautions are taken by the Labour Exchanges in finding employment for nurses against sending to sick persons untrained, undertrained, or incompetent, and dangerous nurses; whether certificates of training at recognised hospitals are demanded by the Exchange before nurses are recommended for or found employment; what kind of certificates are recognised; what hospitals or institutions are deemed competent to issue certificates; and whether, if State registration and a public register of trained nurses would enable the Labour Exchanges to protect the sick against danger and imposition, he would favour legislation to this end?
    Mr. BURNS: The function of the Labour Exchange is to place persons offering employment and those seeking it into communication with one another. It is for the prospective employer to decide as to the suitability or otherwise of the persons whom he desires to engage, and to indicate to the Exchange the nature of the qualifications required. It is no part of the function of the Labour Exchange to pronounce upon or to recognise the validity

    819
    of certificates of any kind, but if an employer states that he requires applicants to possess a certificate of any particular kind, this, with all other available information, is notified to the applicants by the Exchange, and every effort is made to submit only those applicants who have the qualifications desired by the employer.
    Dr. CHAPPLE: May I ask if a prospective employer requires a "trained nurse" and applies to an Exchange, how is that Exchange to determine whether a nurse requiring a situation is trained or not?
    Mr. BURNS: The Labour Exchange superintendent would have to exercise his discretion on that point.

    Members of Parliament (Public Companies).
    Mr. W. THORNEasked the Prime Minister whether he will have a Return made giving a list of present Members of the House of Commons who are members of the board of directors and shareholders of the following companies—namely, Armstrong, Whitworth and Company, John Brown and Company, Nobels Explosives Company, Harland and Wolff, Thomas Firth and Sons, Coventry Ordnance Company, William Beardmore and Company, Cammell, Laird and Company, and Vickers, Maxim and Company?
    The PRIME MINISTER: Lists of the directors and shareholders of the companies referred to are open to inspection at Somerset House. The preparation of the Return would involve a considerable amount of work, and, as the information desired is already available, I trust that my hon. Friend will not press to have the Return made.

    Cabinet Changes.
    Mr. NORMAN CRAIGasked the Prime Minister whether, in view of recent events, it is proposed to make any, and what, changes amongst Ministers of the Crown in regard to the departments respectively controlled by them?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I will make a statement on this subject at the end of questions.

    Unemployment.
    Mr. ROBERT HARCOURTasked the Prime Minister if he is now in a position to give any account of steps which have been taken, in accordance with representations by a deputation of Members of Parliament, to arrange the times when Government contracts are given out, with a view to minimise the fluctuations of unemployment, or if a statement on the subject will be made by the Minister who replies on the Debate on the Motion of the Member for West Leeds on Tuesday?
    The PRIME MINISTER: Yes, Sir. Certain Departments were in the first instance consulted on the subject, and, as the result of the replies received, a Committee is being appointed to consider whether any, and, if so, what steps might be taken with a view to regularising the total demand for labour from time to time by the adjustment of the distribution of public contracts.

    Duchy of Lancaster.
    Mr. RUPERT GWYNNEasked how long a time it is intended should elapse before steps are taken to secure the representation of the Duchy of Lancaster in this House?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I am unable to say, but I would point out that there are recent precedents for the Duchy not being represented in this House.

  ROYAL NAVY.

    ARMED MERCHANTMEN.
    Major WHITEasked the First Lord of the Admiralty who is directly responsible on board ship for the upkeep and efficiency of the guns and the drilling of the guns' crews on armed merchantmen; what are the additional emoluments of those to whom this extra responsibility is entrusted; and whether the gun-layers and guns' crews are paid extra for their services whilst those in charge of the guns receive nothing?
    The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Churchill): The responsibility mentioned in the first part of the question rests with the officer detailed by the company for the purpose. No extra emoluments will be paid to him, but service in charge of the guns will be allowed to count towards qualification for his training fee in place of annual or biennial naval training. The gun layers and guns' crews will receive extra pay for their services.

    ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE.
    Colonel BURNasked the First Lord of the Admiralty what increase in the number of cadets and establishment at the Royal Naval College is intended in view of the extra accommodation provided for in the Navy Estimates this year?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: The increase will be considerable with consequential additions to the establishment; but I cannot yet give exact figures.

    SUBMARINES (AIR-LOCKS).
    Major WHITEasked the First Lord of the Admiralty if air-locks have been adopted by the Admiralty for submarines; and, if so, whether the system adopted is based in any way on the patent No. 22,936/95, of Mr. Truss?
    The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Dr. Macnamara): Air-locks are fitted in some of the older submarines, but these are entirely different in principle from the patent of Mr. Truss—which I would observe bears the number 15,033/05—and are not based in any way on it. The patent, the number of which the hon. and gallant Gentleman quotes, refers, I understand, to another branch of invention altogether.

    BOARD OF ADMIRALTY.
    Mr. GRETTONasked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many times the Board of Admiralty met as a Board last year; has the Board of Admiralty met as a Board this year; and, if so, how often?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: There were twenty-four formal meetings of the Board last year, and there have been three this year.
    Mr. AMERYasked whether any Members of the Admiralty Board have offered to resign in the last three weeks; and, if so, on what grounds were the resignations tendered and withdrawn?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: No resignation of any member of the Board of Admiralty has been offered or tendered to me on any occasion during my tenure of office, except such resignations as I have requested in circumstances with which the House is acquainted.

    H.M.S. "ZEALANDIA" (STOKERS SENTENCED).
    Mr. OUTHWAITEasked what is the offence for which certain stokers of the "Zealandia" have been sentenced to two years' imprisonment?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: The men were tried on two charges: 1. Making a mutinous assembly. 2. Wilfully disobeying the lawful command of two of their superior officers when ordered to fall in on the quarter deck. Several points of law are being examined by the legal authorities, which must be disposed of before I can deal with the case.
    Mr. OUTHWAITE: Does the rule as to obedience extend to stokers?

    HARVEY STEEL TRUST.
    Mr. F. HALLasked what is the value of work entrusted by the Admiralty, in each of the three years ended 31st December, 1913, to firms connected with the Harvey Steel Trust; and whether the contracts relating thereto were given as the result of open tender?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: I presume the hon. Member refers to the Harvey United Steel Company, which was founded in 1901 to acquire the assets relating to the use of certain patent rights for treatment of steel. The Harvey patents expired in 1905, and other patents owned by the company expired in 1909, and royalties lapsed from those dates. From public information it would appear that the company began to return its capital in 1905, and apparently was wound up voluntarily in 1912. No Admiralty contracts for the years referred to by the hon. Member appear to have been subject to any royalties on licences granted by the Harvey Company.

    Post Office Employés (Holt Report).
    Mr. BENNETT-GOLDNEYasked the Postmaster-General whether he has yet had an opportunity to arrange with the Prime Minister for a day to be fixed for the discussion of the Holt Report, which has given and still gives so much cause for dissatisfaction amongst the employés of his Majesty's Post Office?
    The POSTMASTER-GENERAL (Mr. Hobhouse): I understand that the Prime Minister is not yet in a position to make any statement on this subject.

    Torquay Post Office.
    Colonel BURNasked the Postmaster-General why the vacancy for the position of assistant superintendent at the Torquay Post Office has remained unfilled since the 21st September, 1913; and whether, in view of the inconvenience already experienced, he will take steps to see that the post is filled without further delay?
    Mr. HOBHOUSE: It has, I regret to say, proved impossible to promote a local officer at Torquay to the position of assistant superintendent. Difficulty has been experienced in selecting a suitable officer from another office, but I hope that it will be possible to fill the vacant appointment shortly.

    Hanley Post Office.
    Mr. JOHN WARDasked the Postmaster-General whether he is aware that Miss N. Griffiths, who entered the Post Office service at Hanley on the 17th June, 1912, as a girl probationer has been retained on half-time duties as a telephonist since September, 1912, at the rate of 5s. per week; whether the usual rate for such employment is 7s. per week; whether probationers, in the regulations respecting their employment, are promised that their services will be retained if they satisfy the Civil Service Commissioners as to their character and physical and educational fitness for the situation; and whether, in view of the long period of half-time duty, he will direct that this officer be placed on full-time duty and the current rate of pay given?
    Mr. HOBHOUSE: Miss Griffiths was engaged as a temporary girl probationer in June, 1912, but since September, 1912, has been employed either as part-time telephonist at wages of 5s. a week or as temporary full-time telephonist at wages of 10s. a week. Wages of 5s., not 7s., a week are those proper to a girl at Hanley under eighteen years of age acting as part-time telephonist for four hours a day. Miss Griffiths is at present acting as a temporary full-time telephonist and will be considered in due course for a permanent appointment.

    Horse Breeding (Ireland).
    Mr. LARDNERaskd the Vice-President of the Department of Agriculture
    824
    (Ireland) whether his Department have any knowledge of the fact that foreign Governments have for some years back been purchasing all the mares suitable for breeding which they can get in Ireland; and whether there is any foundation for the fear that the stock of mares for Home breeding purposes will soon become seriously depleted if some action is not taken to encourage owners of mares to retain them in this country?
    Mr. T. W. RUSSELL: The following were the total numbers of stallions, mares, and geldings exported from Ireland on behalf of foreign Governments during the seven months, June to December, 1910, inclusive, and during each of the years 1911, 1912, and 1913:—

    —

    Stallions.

    Mares.

    Geldings.

    Total Horses.

    Seven months June to December, 1910

    1

    1,022

    534

    1,557

    Year, 1911

    2

    2,434

    1,314

    3,750

    Year, 1912

    —

    3,428

    1,885

    5,313

    Year, 1913

    2

    3,847

    2,175

    6,024

    No record of the numbers of horses exported on behalf of foreign Governments was kept prior to June, 1910. The Department do not apprehend serious consequences of a permanent character following the export that has taken place. On the contrary, any increase in the demand for and price of horses is bound to stimulate horse-breeding.

    Navan Post Office.
    Mr. PATRICK WHITEasked the Postmaster-General whether it is the practice at Navan post office when people whose business occasionally calls them away by a train leaving before their morning letters would be delivered at their residence in the ordinary way, and who call at the post office for them, to be charged a fee of 3d.; and, if so, whether he will abolish this charge?
    Mr. HOBHOUSE: It is the rule throughout the country to charge a fee of 3d. to any person who calls at a post office for letters received by a mail in connection with which there is a delivery at the applicant's residence, and I do not see my way, in view of the labour involved in compliance with such requests, to abolish the fee.

    Sheffield Telephone Exchange.
    Mr. POINTERasked the Postmaster-General whether his attention has been called to the case of Miss Major, employed in the Sheffield exchange, whose record was endorsed for malingering although the family doctor certified her unfitness for work; whether he is aware that the Department's medical officer declares he has made no adverse report concerning Miss Major; and whether he will cause full inquiry to be made?
    Mr. HOBHOUSE: This case has already been fully investigated. In the opinion of the medical officer to the Post Office Miss Major should have resumed work sooner than she did, and she was accordingly warned, for her future guidance, against giving rise to the suspicion that she absented herself from duty on insufficient grounds. I see no reason for reopening the case.

    Telegrams to Ulster.
    Mr. STEWARTasked whether the Post Office officials in London have the authority to refuse to transmit telegrams addressed to Ulster?
    Mr. HOBHOUSE: As is stated at page 88 of the Post Office Guide, the address of a telegram should be sufficiently full to enable it to be delivered without difficulty; and counter clerks would be right to refuse to accept telegrams addressed simply to "Ulster," unaccompanied by the name of a telegraph office. They have no authority to refuse telegrams for Ulster which are properly addressed.
    Mr. STEWART: Will the right hon. Gentleman inquire whether any telegrams have been refused?
    Mr. HOBHOUSE: Certainly.

    Elementary School Teacher (Pension).
    97. Mr. PETOasked the President of the Board of Education whether his attention has been called to the case of Mr. H. J. Sparkes, a teacher of thirty-three years' service, who retired in 1911, and who is without any pension or means of subsistance; and when he will be in a position to deal with this and other cases of persons who have devoted their life to education and are left in extreme poverty and without any recognition whatever from the State?
    The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of EDUCATION (Mr. Pease): The teacher referred to in the hon. Member's question retired on 31st December, 1911, after thirty-two and a half years' service. He was not engaged in teaching between 27th February, 1897, and 1st March, 1904, and he did not accept the conditions of the Elementary School Teachers (Superannuation) Act, 1898. I am unable to state whether any funds will be available to meet cases of this kind until I have received the Report of the Committee which is inquiring into the cost of the improvements effected by the Act of 1912. I hope to receive the Report very shortly.

    Land Valuation.
    Mr. MOUNTasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that valuations are now being made under the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, of churches and churchyards; and whether he expects to get any revenue as a result of such valuation?
    Mr. BUTCHERasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the Valuation Department of the Inland Revenue are sending out notices to rectors and vicars of parish churches throughout the country requesting them to state the names and addresses of the persons in whom the churches and graveyards of their several parishes are now vested; whether he can state by virtue of what statutory or other authority this is being done; and whether there is any legal obligation on such rectors and vicars to answer the questions so put to them?
    Mr. MONTAGU: I would refer the hon. Members to the reply which my right hon. Friend gave the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for the Andover Division on the 5th instant. With regard to the last part of the hon. and learned Member's question, I would explain that there is no legal obligation on rectors and vicars, where they are not owners of churches and graveyards, to answer questions which will assist in the valuation of these properties, but it is generally the case that where information is sought for the purposes of the State, it is freely given so far as it is available by the persons requested to furnish it without the need of compulsory powers being obtained and exercised.
    Mr. BUTCHER: Is there any statutory authority for putting these questions to rectors and vicars?
    Mr. MONTAGU: I can assure the hon. and learned Member that there is no legal obligation to answer the questions.

    Food Stuffs Imported, 1913.
    Mr. F. HALLasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what was the amount of the revenue derived from duties on food stuffs imported into this country in 1913?
    Mr. MONTAGU: My right hon. Friend gave figures for the last completed financial year in answer to the hon. Member's question of the 14th August last. My right hon. Friend will be able to give further figures when he has made his annual financial statement.
    Mr. F. HALL: May I ask whether, in the forthcoming Budget the Chancellor of the Exchequer will consider the advisability of taking these taxes off and putting them on—
    Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Gentleman should give notice of that question.

    Civil Service (Ex-Soldiers and Ex-Sailors).
    Colonel YATEasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that ex-soldiers and ex-sailors who enter the Civil Service are at a disadvantage as regards age as compared with other members of the service; that this is a constant source of dissatisfaction; and whether he will make provision in the proposed Bill to amend the Superannuation Acts for ex-soldiers and ex-sailors to count their Colour service towards promotion and pension?
    Mr. MONTAGU: My right hon. Friend cannot agree that ex-soldiers and ex-sailors who are specially permitted to enter the Civil Service above the usual age are thereby placed at a disadvantage. The answer to the last part of the question, as my right hon. Friend has previously stated, is in the negative.

    Purchase of Silver.
    Mr. RUPERT GWYNNEasked (1) the Under-Secretary of State for India what purchases of silver were made for the Government of India during 1913, from whom the purchases were made, the dates at which the purchases were made, and the price paid on each occasion; and (2) what portion of the bills and transfers
    828
    in India sold by the India Office during the last twelve months, realising £30,700,000, represented the Home charges; for what purpose was the balance required; and, if to purchase silver bullion, how much is accounted for under that head?
    Mr. C. ROBERTS: I am circulating the information with the Votes.—[See OFFICIAL REPORT, Thursday, 26th March, cols. 570–571.] Of the sum of £31,200,000 (approximately) now expected to be realised by the sale of council drafts in 1913–14, £21,650,000 is the amount budgeted for towards meeting Home charges (on account of revenue, capital, and miscellaneous purposes) in 1913–14; £1,415,700 represents additional Home expenditure in 1913–14 on capital account, including discharge of debt; £4,528,200 represents payment for silver purchased, and £2,150,000 a remittance from India of profits on the coinage of rupees to be added to the Gold Standard Reserve. The balance is to be used towards meeting the Secretary of State's general requirements after the 31st March, 1914.

    Land Purchase (Ireland).
    Mr. NEWMANasked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been called to the address to the county grand jury delivered by Mr. Justice Dodd, at Cork, on the 18th instant, in which he states that some tenants are withholding their rents in order to compel their landlords to sell their estates, and thus affording further evidence of the need for the passing into law of the new Land Bill; and whether, in view of the desire of all classes of the agricultural community in Ireland that the policy of land purchase should be completed, it is the intention of the Government to proceed this Session with the Bill now before the House?
    The PRIME MINISTER: My attention has not been called to the address referred to otherwise than by the hon. Member's question. As regards the last part of the question, I can only refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave him on the subject on the 26th ultimo.
    Mr. STEPHEN GWYNNasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland when the Erasmus Smith Board estate, at Renmore, Galway, is likely to be reached by the Estates Commissioners in its order of priority; and whether he can do anything to accelerate the redivision of land in this congested area?
    The CHIEF SECRETARY for IRELAND (Mr. Birrell): Having regard to the position of this estate on the principal register of direct sales, and to the prior claims of other estates, the purchase agreements in respect of which were lodged at an earlier date, the Estates Commissioners are unable at present to say when this estate will be dealt with. The Commissioners have no power to deal with this estate out of its order of priority, but when reached it will be dealt with as rapidly as possible.

    National Schools (Ireland).
    Mr. HUGH BARRIEasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether he is aware that in 1908 a Treasury Regulation was issued limiting the number of masters in the two higher grades of national schools, though it violated the Commissioners' rules and caused financial loss to a certain number of highly qualified teachers who had been certified; whether the Treasury has now conceded the claims of these teachers, but only gives effect to them as from 1st April, 1913, thus leaving them without the increment to which they were justly entitled for the years intervening; and what action does he propose to take in the matter?
    Mr. BIRRELL: No new Regulation in regard to this matter was made by the Treasury in 1908, but in that year the Commissioners of National Education found it necessary to issue a notice to managers and teachers calling attention to the existing Regulation on the subject. As regards the last two paragraphs of the question, I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given to the question asked on this subject by the hon. Member for Mid-Armagh on the 19th February.

PANAMA CANAL TOLLS.
Mr. LEIF JONES: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a question, of which I have given him private notice, namely: Whether there is any truth in the allegations reported in the Press that the action of President Wilson with regard to the question of the Panama Canal tolls is the result of an understanding between the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government, under which the latter undertook to assist the President's policy with regard to Mexico?
Mr. ACLAND: There is no foundation whatever for these reports, and I am glad to be able to take as early an opportunity as possible for saying so.

GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND BILL.

  CIVIL AND MILITARY FORCES.
  Mr. OUTHWAITEasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if his attention has been drawn to publications recently issued urging soldiers to refuse to support the civil authorities in the case of their being called upon to do so in connection with strike disturbances; and does he propose to take any action in the matter?
  Mr. McKENNA: My attention was called to certain passages in a newspaper read in the House by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke, but I do not think they call for action on my part?

  EXCLUSION OF ULSTER.
  Mr. W. THORNEasked the Prime Minister if he is aware that the Irish Trades Union Congress, held in Dublin on Tuesday, 24th March, which represented the vast majority of organised workers from all parts of Ireland, passed a resolution protesting against Ulster being excluded from the Government of Ireland Bill, and demanding that no Home Rule Bill should be passed which leaves out any portion of Ireland; and if he will give an assurance that this demand will be complied with?
  The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith): The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the latter part, I have nothing to add to or to take away from what I have recently said in the House on this subject.

  ARMY COUNCIL MEMORANDUM.
  Mr. BENNETT-GOLDNEYasked the Prime Minister whether the officers who have been informed officially of its contents, as well as those who have seen a copy of the Memorandum given to Brigadier-General Gough by the Army Council, dated 23rd March, and initialled J. S.,J. F., and J. S. E., are to believe what they are told in the last paragraph

  831
  of that Memorandum, or whether they are to understand that they are not to rely upon the guarantee therein contained?
  Mr. JAMES HOPEasked whether His Majesty's Government have any intention of using the forces of the Crown in Ireland or elsewhere to crush political opposition to the policy or principles of the Government of Ireland Bill?
  Mr. ASTORasked if the statement contained in a recent White Paper, dated 23rd March, that the Government had no intention whatever of using the forces of the Crown to crush political opposition to the policy or principles of the Government of Ireland Bill, was drafted on the supposition that it conveyed the decision which the Cabinet had come to upon the day named, or the view which it was believed was held by the Cabinet as the result of previous deliberations?
  Mr. F. HALL (Dulwich)asked whether the Government repudiate in its entirety the guarantee given to the Army on its behalf by the Secretary of State for War that they would not be used for political purposes; and, if so, has the decision been officially conveyed to the officers whose return to duty was thereby secured?
  The PRIME MINISTER: The points raised in these questions can be all dealt with in the Debate this afternoon.
  Mr. JAMES HOPE: Will the right hon. Gentleman give a special answer to question 49?
  The PRIME MINISTER: They will all be fully answered.
  Mr. CASSELasked the Prime Minister whether there is any, and, if so, what precedent for giving either to officers or men of regiments called in to aid the civil authority in maintaining law and order the option of disappearing from their regiments because they are domiciled in the district in which they are called upon to act?
  The PRIME MINISTER: It is, and has been for a considerable time past, the
  832
  accepted policy and practice that, as far as possible, troops shall not be employed in aid of the civil power in districts with which they have any territorial connection.
  Mr. CASSEL: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer my question. It has no relation to the particular regiments that are to be used, but it asks whether there is any precedent for giving the officers in a regiment that is to be used the option of disappearing?
  The PRIME MINISTER: It means, as I understand, if it is pointed out that there are such officers and men, the regiment will not be employed.
  MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE: May I respectfully ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the Black Watch were not used in Dundee, in their own recruiting district, about eighteen months ago, in spite of the protest of all ranks?
  Mr. SPEAKER: The Noble Lord should give notice of that question.
  Mr. CLOUGHasked the Prime Minister who are the members of the Army Council, what are the emoluments that accrue to the individual members of that body, and under what Vote the Army Council may be criticised?
  The PRIME MINISTER: The names of the members of the Army Council will be found on page 5 of the monthly Army List, and the amounts of their salaries are given on page 89 of the Army Estimates. An opportunity of criticising any action of the Council is afforded by the discussion on Vote 12.
  Mr. WALTER GUINNESSasked the Prime Minister whether non-commissioned officers and men are to have the opportunity, authorised in the case of officers by the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War of 16th December, 1913, of being removed from the Service in the event of their desiring to choose which order they would obey?
  The PRIME MINISTER: Both officers and men would, in the case supposed, be dealt with under the King's Regulations.
  Mr. WALTER GUINNESSasked the Prime Minister whether, prior to the meeting of the Cabinet at mid-day on Monday, 23rd March, he discussed with the Secretary of State for War what explanations should be given to General Gough in order to remove the misunderstandings which had led to resignations in the 3rd Cavalry Brigade?
  The PRIME MINISTER: The answer is in the negative.
  Mr. GUINNESS: Did not the right hon. Gentleman meet the Secretary for War at least three times in the previous two days, and are we to understand that the question of the reinstatement of these officers who had resigned was never even discussed?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I am not prepared to give answers as to private conversations.
  Mr. GUINNESSasked whether the Cabinet have now repudiated the principles of military duty laid down in the Memorandum of the 16th December, 1913?
  The PRIME MINISTER: No, Sir.
  Mr. W. YOUNGasked the Prime Minister what steps he proposes to take with reference to Lord Esher's letter stating that under certain circumstances half the officers of the London Territorial Force would resign their commissions; whether this information was in the first instance communicated privately to His Majesty's Ministers, or sprung on them first through the medium of the Press by Lord Esher; whether, considering Lord Esher's special position, His Majesty's Ministers regard this letter as a threat to them if they carry out their policy with regard to Ireland; and what steps they propose to take with reference to Lord Esher?
  Mr. WEDGWOODasked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been drawn to a letter by Lord Esher stating that half the officers in the London Territorials would resign if Regular troops were ordered from Aldershot to Ireland; whether he will regard this as in the nature of a threat from Lord Esher to induce the
  834
  officers under his influence to resign; and, if so, will he take steps to relieve Lord Esher of his duties as President of the Territorial Force Association and permanent member of the Committee of Imperial Defence?
  The PRIME MINISTER: In reply to these questions, Lord Esher's letter, which I much regretted to read, was an expression of his opinion as to what might happen in certain circumstances. I did not and do not read it as a threat, and I do not consider any action with regard to it necessary.
  Mr. CROFT: Does not the right hon. Gentleman think it desirable, in the interests of the Territorial Force, that all doubt on this question should be immediately put an end to?
  The PRIME MINISTER: That is a matter of opinion.
  Mr. HAROLD SMITHasked the Prime Minister when he, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, respectively, first became aware of the addition of the last two paragraphs to the statement issued by the Army Council on 23rd March which was contained in a recent White Paper?
  The PRIME MINISTER: As I have already explained, neither I nor the other two Ministers of the Crown referred to became aware of these two paragraphs till after the letter had been handed to General Gough.
  Mr. HAROLD SMITH: Will the right hon. Gentleman be more precise? Will he say if several of his colleagues had seen the paragraphs before he made his speech in the House on the same day?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I think not; in fact, I am sure not.
  Viscount HELMSLEY: Did the document, as considered by the Cabinet, contain paragraphs which, though different in verbiage, were similar in meaning?
  The PRIME MINISTER: Not as ultimately settled by the Cabinet.
  Viscount HELMSLEY: Or as considered by them?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I am not going to answer any question as to what was done in the Cabinet.
  Earl WINTERTON: Why answer any questions at all?

  IMPORTATION OF ARMS.
  Mr. CASSELasked the Prime Minister whether the Proclamation relating to the importation of arms and ammunition into Ireland will now be withdrawn, in view of the decision that it is illegal; and whether all persons injuriously affected thereby will be compensated?
  The PRIME MINISTER: No decision has been given that the Proclamation is illegal. The latter part of the question does not, therefore, arise.
  Mr. CASSEL: Does the right hon. Gentleman say that the restriction will still continue to be enforced notwithstanding the decision?
  The PRIME MINISTER: No decision has been come to on the point of law.

  SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS.
  Mr. NEWMANasked the Prime Minister whether he has now been afforded the opportunity of considering the reception given to the Government proposals to amend the Government of Ireland Bill in Ireland itself; and whether, in the resumed Debate on the Second Reading of the measure, they are to be considered as being still in existence?
  The PRIME MINISTER: The answer to both parts of the question is in the affirmative.
  Mr. NEWMANasked whether the Government have, since the adjournment of the Debate on the Second Reading of the Government of Ireland Bill, come to any decision, and, if so, what, with regard to the alterations dealing with Customs and Excise and the Post Office, made necessary by the amendments to the Bill recently put forward?
  The PRIME MINISTER: No, Sir; these matters are still under consideration.
  Mr. DAVID MASONasked the Prime Minister whether, with a view to an amicable settlement of the Irish question. His Majesty's Government will appoint a Committee of this House, composed of men of all parties, to draw up and report to the House of Commons a scheme for the purpose of settling the points now in dispute?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I fear my hon. Friend's suggestion is not a practicable one.

  ARMY DEPOTS (ULSTER).
  Mr. GODFREY LOCKER-LAMPSONasked the Prime Minister whether he will lay before the House copies of the Reports received by the War Office to the effect that raids upon depots of arms in Ulster were apprehended?
  The PRIME MINISTER: The reports are confidential, and I am not prepared to lay them on the Table of the House.

  NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS.
  Mr. NORMAN CRAIGasked the First Lord of the Admiralty to whom the Vice-Admiral of the Third Battle Squadron made application for field guns for practice on shore at Lamlash, and by whom such application was granted; whence the field guns were drawn to comply with this application; whether it is in accordance with the usual practice for a Vice-Admiral to make such an application otherwise than through the Admiralty or with the knowledge and approval of the Admiralty; whether the field guns in question were under the control of the Army Council; and how was it that the Vice-Admiral made application for guns controlled by the Army Council without the knowledge of the Admiralty?
  The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Churchill): Battleships in Home waters do not usually carry field guns, but draw them from store when proceeding on foreign service, or on occasions when bodies of men are likely to be landed for exercise, ceremony, or other purposes. These guns are, of course, naval guns, and the approval of the Admiralty is given on.

  837
  each occasion. In this instance the application was treated as a matter of routine, and approval given by the proper authority without my personal knowledge. I need hardly add that in my opinion it was a perfectly proper application for the Vice-Admiral to make and for the Admiralty to grant.
  Mr. NORMAN CRAIG: Would the right hon. Gentleman indicate what he meant by the proper authority having sanctioned the application; and whether his reference to foreign service implied that the taking on board of these field guns was appropriate to an occasion of foreign service?
  Mr. EYRES-MONSELL: What orders were given to bring on board ammunition for these guns; and why was ammunition wanted for exercise or ceremony?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I presume that when guns are taken on board ship on any occasion the ammunition for them is taken on board, too. [HON. MEMBERS: "Ceremony!"] If it is not, it certainly ought to be. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] If it is desired that I should answer questions, it is better that one question should be put at a time, and that I should be permitted to give my answer without a fire of interruptions. I am endeavouring to answer several now. The hon. Member who asked the question asked who was the proper authority. I am not quite certain what official settled it, but it was settled as a pure matter of routine without my knowledge. I have already said that if I had had any responsibility for this I would gladly assume it, gladly. [An HON. MEMBER: "All right, don't bite."]
  Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: May I ask whether, when an Admiral commanding a Fleet asked to have guns of this character placed on board for exercise in bad weather it is customary also, as a matter of routine, always to supply ammunition?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: As a matter of fact, in this case nothing but absolute routine was followed.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I am not sure that the right hon. Gentleman has answered my question. Is it customary
  838
  in all such cases to supply ammunition, and to put ammunition on board at the same time as the guns?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: No, Sir; I cannot answer on the spur of the moment whether that is so, but the whole matter was settled many stages lower down in the Admiralty than that which I at present occupy, consequently I am not acquainted with the details. The Admiral telegraphed home that he would like to have the guns on board, and a subsidiary authority dealt with it and met his request.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Will the right hon. Gentleman be kind enough to ascertain the facts and communicate them to us?
  Mr. W. THORNE: Put the question on the Paper.
  Mr. CHURCHILLwas understood to assent.
  Lord CHARLES BERESFORD: Since when has the complement of one division of guns to every battleship, that is two guns, been removed from the complement? I understood the First Lord to say that they had not their proper provision on board.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: The Noble Lord is full of knowledge on these subjects, but is not always quite up to date. It used to be the practice always to carry the guns on board, but I am advised that of late years the guns have only been taken on board for distant cruises, and they were not on board the Third Battle Squadron at the time the Admiral telegraphed for them, otherwise he would not have telegraphed asking that they should have been put on board. [An HON. MEMBER: "Is Lamlash a distant cruise?"]
  Lord C. BERESFORD: Why ask for four guns?
  Mr. NORMAN CRAIGasked the First Lord of the Admiralty what orders, actual or contingent, were issued in respect of all ships of whatever type under Admiralty control in regard to movement, offensive, defensive, or precautionary, by reason of the existing situation in Ulster?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: The orders given in this connection to His Majesty's ships were: Firstly, to two flotilla cruisers of the Patrol Flotillas (since relieved by two flotilla cruisers of the same class) to convey a company of the Bedfordshire Regiment from Kingstown to Carrickfergus, and then to remain in Belfast Lough, keeping in touch with the military authorities. Secondly, to a destroyer of the Fourth Flotilla to proceed to Dublin Bay with a view to embarking the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief if he should desire to do so. Thirdly, to the Third Battle Squadron and eight destroyers of the Fourth Flotilla, as to which I have already made a full statement. Fourthly, to two cruisers of the Training Squadron to call at Kingstown in case they might be required to transport to Dundalk the troops. This was cancelled when land transport was found to be available. These were the whole of the orders given, and the hon. Member will be able to judge whether they were actual or contingent, and whether the movements to which they related should be properly described as offensive, defensive, or precautionary.
  Viscount HELMSLEY: Was it a matter of routine to summon the Admirals to London?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: No, Sir, certainly not. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why did you do it?"]
  Mr. FELLasked if the orders to the squadron to proceed to Lamlash were communicated by wireless telegraph; if so, on what date were the orders sent; if these orders were countermanded by wireless telegraph, and on what date; and where the ships were to embark the field guns mentioned by him?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I would refer the hon. Member to the statement I made on the 25th instant in reply to the Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth.

  ULSTER COVENANT.
  Dr. CHAPPLEasked whether permission has been given to the promoters of the covenant being signed in Britain to use any British post office in Stirlingshire
  840
  as a place for its safe custody, to which anti-Home Rulers are invited to repair for its signature?
  Mr. HOBHOUSE: No such permission has been given. If the hon. Member will indicate the office which he has in mind I will have inquiry made.

  MAJOR-GENERAL SIR C. MACREADY.
  Mr. JOHN WARD: I wish to ask the Secretary of State for War a question of which I have given him private notice, namely: Whether Major-General Sir C. F. N. Macready, Director of Personal Services, with his aide-de-camp, paid an official visit to Sir Edward Carson at Craigavon on the 24th March, and, if so, what was the nature of the business transacted on that occasion; and whether the Director of Personal Services has made any report to the War Office relating to the visit, and, if so, what was the nature of the report?
  The PRIME MINISTER: I think notice ought to be given of that question.
  Sir EDWARD CARSON: I can answer the question, Sir.

  RESIGNATION OF COLONEL SEELY, SIR J. FRENCH AND SIR S. EWART.

    PRIME MINISTER ACCEPTS SECRETARYSHIP OF STATE FOR WAR.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: May I ask the Prime Minister whether Sir John French and Sir Spencer Ewart have withdrawn their resignations?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I regret to say that Field-Marshal Sir John French and General Sir Spencer Ewart have felt it their duty to persist in their desire to be relieved of their offices. They wish me to make it clear that they are in entire accord with the statement which I made to the House on Friday, and which, perhaps, I may repeat. They intimated their wish to retire, not because of any difference between their view and that of the Government as to the conditions under which the Army serves or should be employed in aid of the civil power, but because, having initialled the Memorandum which has been published, and which, as the House knows, has been handed to General Gough, they

    841
    thought that course incumbent upon them. That is the ground, and the sole ground, of their retirement.
    I quite understand, while it is deeply to be deplored in the public interest, the decision at which these gallant officers have arrived, I cannot speak too warmly or too greatly of the nobility, loyalty, and devotion to duty with which they have served, and, I hope, will continue to serve the Army and the State. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War has, to my infinite regret, informed me that he thinks it right to take the same course. He will, as is customary with a retiring Minister, make his own statement to the House. In the circumstances, after much consideration, and with not a little reluctance, I have felt it my duty, for the time at any rate, to assume the office of Secretary of State for War. His Majesty has been graciously pleased to intimate his approval. I shall therefore, as I am advised in accordance with law, retire from this House until, if it please them, my Constituents sanction my return.
    Colonel SEELY: The Prime Minister has told the House that I have tendered my resignation as Secretary of State for War, and perhaps I may be permitted, in only one or two words, to make a personal statement on the matter, in view of the exceptional circumstances of the case. When a Minister leaves his colleagues, it is, as a rule, on a difference of policy or of principle. There is no difference, as the House knows, between me and my colleagues on any point of policy or of principle. But the circumstances are these: It did appear, although I did not wish it to appear, as Secretary of State for War, and, although it was not my intention, that a bargain had been made between His Majesty's Government on one side, and an officer or group of officers on the other, as to the services which they would render to the Crown. Such qualified services could never be accepted, irrespective of any particular issue, and although, as I have said, it was not my intention, nor indeed the intention of Sir John French or the Adjutant-General, who initialled
    842
    this particular document with me, it did so appear, and I do not wonder that this House, irrespective of party, resented that there should be any such bargain in appearance indeed, if not in fact.
    It was for that reason I pressed upon the Prime Minister—and when I say that I pressed it upon the Prime Minister, I ask the House, irrespective of whatever has been said elsewhere, to believe me that I did press it, and I do press it, and desire it to be carried out—that I might he permitted to resign my office, in order that it might not ever appear that any Minister of the Crown had made a bargain with any of the Crown's servants as to the terms of service under which they should serve. But I was not alone in this matter, and I had to consider whether it would not be possible that the Army should retain the services of our most brilliant living soldier, Sir John French, and of the Adjutant-General, who has served the Army so well. Sir John French has thought it his duty in these exceptional circumstances—peculiar and indeed ironic as they are—to resign his position, and, although the position may be difficult to defend logically, it seems to me quite clear that, when those who worked with me so loyally and so well surrender their place and its emoluments, the Secretary of State for War should surrender his place too.
    It seems to me that there was no other possible course, and I have, therefore, insisted to the Prime Minister that I may be permitted to resign my appointment; and in the course of a very short time I shall have returned the seals of office which were handed to me nearly two years ago. I made a statement in the House last week, and it would ill become me to go over that ground again; but, before I finally relinquish the office which it has been my honour to hold, I feel bound to say this: Great issues, perhaps, are raised at the present time—great issues which it may well be must be faced. It may be that our whole Army system may have to be recast, but on that I do not wish now to say anything. I do not wish to deal with the present situation. It would not be proper for me to do so. But 1 want to say this—

    843
    and I may be permitted to say it, as one who has been the spokesman of the Army in this House, and the head of the Army under His Majesty for the last two years—that I do not forget, and that I think the House of Commons does not forget that, apart from the present issues involved, the Army has served us loyally and well in all climes, in good times and in bad times, and has suffered and fought in our cause. Beyond this I only want to say this one thing: I resign my office as Secretary of State, but I retain my position, which I value even more, as a Member of the House of Commons, and I hope that it may be possible for me in the time to come to support the Prime Minister, to whom I owe so much, and the causes for which he stands, and especially the cause of Ireland, while at the same time I shall have the Knowledge that I have tried—and I hope the House will believe me when I say I have tried—to serve faithfully with those with whom I have associated, and to see fair play to the British Army in a difficult time.
    4.0 P.M.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: I wish to ask a question which arises from the statement made by the Prime Minister. He must 4.0 P.M. agree with me that it would be impossible to take the Home Rule Bill in his absence, and, I assume, therefore, that he will either delay taking the Seals of Office until after the Debate is over, or that he will postpone the Home Rule Bill?
    The PRIME MINISTER: The question of taking the Seals of Office is immaterial. I have already accepted the office, and I am no longer entitled to sit in this House.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: Does the right hon. Gentleman really mean that, at a time like this, the Second Reading of the Home Rule Bill is to be taken when he is not here to give his assistance to the House in the discussion that will take place?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I do not think I would be of very much assistance to the House. I have already made my speech on the Second Reading, but I shall be close at hand and in communication with
    844
    my Friends. I have taken this step with the greatest reluctance, and only in deference to what I believe to be a great public emergency.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: I do not deny the advantage of the course which the right hon. Gentleman has taken, but I am quite sure that it is in the highest degree wrong, at a time like this, when we are depending upon the Prime Minister himself for an explanation of the proposals which he has made in regard to Home Rule, and I can only say that nothing could be more improper than that the Bill should be discussed in his absence.
    Mr. T. M. HEALY: Is the right hon. Gentleman's decision that he must resign in accordance with the decision of Mr. Gladstone when he assumed the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I have taken the best advice.
    Mr. SWIFT MacNEILL: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that when, in 1873, Mr. Gladstone, as Prime Minister, assumed the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, he consulted the Law Officers of the Crown, and they gave very favourable opinions, all of which are recorded in Lord Morley's book, and that Mr. Gladstone had no hesitation in retaining both offices?
    The PRIME MINISTER: The Law Officers of to-day differ very much from the Law Officers of that time. They are all of one opinion now.

HOUSE OF COMMONS (STRANGERS' GALLERY).
Mr. FELL: I rise to a point of Order. I beg, Mr. Speaker, to ask your decision as to an incident which occurred on Friday last after the conclusion of questions, when a demonstration was made against certain visitors and strangers who were present in the Gallery, and which was described in a Radical newspaper in these terms:—
"At this point several Noble Lords who had been seated in the Peers' Gallery rose and left the chamber. Their departure was greeted by loud mocking cheers by Members on the Nationalist benches."
What I wish to ask is whether it is permitted by the unwritten rules which govern our proceedings in this House to make party demonstrations, either friendly or hostile, in regard to strangers or visitors leaving the galleries of the House?
Mr. SPEAKER: In answer to the hon. Gentleman, I have to say that no such demonstrations are permitted. At the same time, it did not occur to me that what took place on Friday was in the nature of a demonstration. The hon. Member will remember that the whole House practically rose to leave when it appeared that the Prime Minister was not in a position to make his statement. The hon. Member for Bradford rose, and I am sorry to say that the greater part of those here left, and those up in the Gallery rose at the same time. So far as I could see, that was the only reason of the so-called demonstration. There were a large number of strangers in the Gallery, and on their departure from the House a large number of Members who had been sitting below rose and looked up to ascertain what was the cause of the commotion.

BILLS PRESENTED:
  ANCIENT MONUMENTS AMENDMENT BILL.
  "To amend and extend the Ancient Monuments Consolidation and Amendment Act, 1913, in order to give greater security to all monuments of unquestioned national historical importance." Presented by Mr. BENNETT-GOLDNEY; supported by Mr. Noel Buxton, Mr. Grant, Mr. Price, Sir Mark Sykes, and Mr. Llewelyn Williams; to be read a second time upon Wednesday, 15th April, and to be printed. [Bill 151.]
  LICENSING BILL.
  "To put certain restrictions on the sale by holders of wholesale licences of beer and stout in retail quantities, as defined by Section 110 of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910, to be consumed off the premises." Presented by Mr. BENNETT-GOLDNEY; supported by Colonel Burn, Captain Knight, Mr. John Lyttelton, and Mr. Touche; to be read a second time upon Wednesday, 15th April, and to be printed. [Bill 152.]
  COAL MINES BILL.
  "To amend the Coal Mines Act, 1911." Presented by Mr. Secretary MCKENNA; to be read a second time to-morrow, and to be printed. [Bill 153.]
TUESDAY'S SITTING (ROYAL ASSENT).
Resolved, That this House do meet Tomorrow, at Half-past Ten of the clock in the morning; that Mr. Speaker, so soon as he has reported the Royal Assent to the Bills which have been agreed on by both Houses, do suspend the Sitting until a Quarter before Three of the clock; and that the Business of the House (including Private Business) from that time be disposed of as if the House had met at a Quarter before Three of the clock.—[Mr. McKenna.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 1) BILL.
  Order for Third Reading read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the third time."—[Mr. McKenna.]
  Mr. F. E. SMITH: Hon. Gentlemen in all parts of the House will not dispute the seriousness of the statement which the Prime Minister made to the House a few moments ago. He has announced the disappearance, at least for the moment, from the Army of two officers of the highest distinction, and officers who, by reason of their rank and ability, it will be extremely difficult to replace. He has announced also the resignation of the Secretary of State for War. I have sat in the House with the Secretary of State for War for

  867
  some eight years, and I had some acquaintance with him before, and I can say, with great sincerity, that I regret the fact of an interference, which I hope may only be temporary, in his career. However much we may disagree, as many of us disagree, with his policy, we have always at least found in him a direct and sincere opponent, and I can assure him that many of us on this side of the House at this moment extend our sympathy to him. I hope it may be possible in all parts of the House to discuss the subject arising for our consideration to-day with the minimum of party feeling. I certainly will try to do so, not that I pretend, or ever have pretended, that at proper times and seasons I may be more lacking than other Members of this House in the ordinary weapons which are employed in party contests, but I think everybody in the House realises that, however badly we may think of the steps that the other side have taken, all of us must realise this, that we stand almost at the parting of the ways in our national affairs, and I ask the indulgence of the House—and I think I will get it—while I attempt to trace, in the spirit I have indicated, the various steps by which we have arrived at the grave position we are here to discuss to-day. The date to which I ask the attention of the House is that of the 14th March. On that date it would be wrong to say that all hopes of settling the Home Rule controversy had been abandoned in any part of the House.
  What was the position on that date? A debate had taken place in this House on the Thursday, and a speech was made by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition which was described only three days ago by Lord Morley in the House of Lords as an "olive branch." It was a debate, it is very important to notice, in which very few Members on the Back Benches had an opportunity of addressing the House at all. It was, from the very nature of the emergency, almost entirely confined to the Front Benches, and by universal admission the Back Benches did not enjoy that opportunity which, in moments of great crises, they would be ill-advised indeed if they surrendered to those who sit on the Front Benches. Let this also be observed, that in the House of Commons, at that very time, there were Members sitting on that side of the House, as undoubtedly there are Members sitting on this side of the
  868
  House, who sincerely believed that the two parties were not so far removed from one another in that stage of the controversy as to cause them to despair of accommodation. I take the case of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Aberdeen (Mr. Pirie), one of the more avowed and active supporters of the Government in this House, who has, nevertheless, with great sincerity and pertinacity, adhered to a very intelligent method of dealing with this controversy. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that there are many of us on this side—at least, I know of some on this side—who in a large measure share his view. I remember that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kingston (Mr. Cave) made a speech in that Debate which might have been made equally well by the Member for Aberdeen. And I may point out that only a day or two later the hon. Member for Shetland (Mr. Eugene Wason) wrote a letter to the "Times" in which he stated that what appeared to be the crucial question between the party leaders was the question of the time limit, and that that was a subject which, it appeared to him, still admitted of discussion in the hope of a settlement. That being the case—I speak with some knowledge of what many of my hon. Friends behind me think—I say that, whatever other view was taken of the position as it existed on the 14th of this month, nobody, certainly no statesman, was entitled to assume that for the moment a settlement had hopelessly and irrevocably passed.
  What took place? The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty made a speech at Bradford. I am not entering for the moment into the question whether, in a great controversy between the parties, the right hon. Gentleman could not justify the speech which he made there, if you are going to put it on an acute controversial basis; but I say the moment chosen was the moment of all others in this great controversy when it was the duty of one in high position, whose speech would be widely read and discussed, to do something rather to assuage rather than to arouse violent discussion. What was the tone the right hon. Gentleman took? He said there may be evils worse than the shedding of blood, but I submit that while there are few evils worse than the shedding of blood, there is no evil worse than the shedding of blood in civil war. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that we are

  869
  going to put these grave matters to the proof. I take the starting point of my brief historical examination. On the 14th March, when these grave matters were to be put to the proof, a letter, which was printed in the White Paper, was sent to General Paget. That letter has been read to the House, and I need not reread it, but I assume, unless told to the contrary, that the contents of that letter were known to the First Lord of the Admiralty at the time he spoke at Bradford of putting these grave matters to the proof. He knew that the letter had been sent to General Paget giving General Paget certain instructions, and we all heard the description—and I assent to it—which the Prime Minister gave of the instructions sent to General Paget, that modest and unobjectionable precautions were alone indicated, and to that extent the military operations considered in the letter of the 14th were of the most trivial character, only requiring the movements of about four companies of troops. The first problem which I find of great difficulty is, that at this date, the 14th March, when General Paget, who is an extremely capable officer, received the modest instructions, to use the Prime Minister's expression, they thought it necessary that he should come over to London in regard to those instructions. We have been informed by the Secretary of State for War that he summoned General Paget to come over to London.
  The first question I ask is this: If, on the 14th, the letter to General Paget contained the tenor of his instructions, and if it contained the whole tenor of his instructions, why did the Secretary of State for War send to General Paget on the same day to come over to London to discuss the operations, which, we are told, were so modest and so unobjectionable? The inference is, I am bound to state it, that it was desired to give General Paget instructions which it was not convenient to put in writing. The letter of the 14th contained all that was necessary to indicate dispositions so modest that any competent captain in the British Army would have been able to carry them out. Under those circumstances General Paget comes to this country, and if I may may illustrate how unnecessary his coming was on the present view of the instructions which were given to him, I need only quote what was said in the House the other day by the late Secretary of State for War:—
  "It was not anticipated that any attempt was contemplated by responsible Ulster leaders, but by evilly disposed persons other than they?"
  870
  Thus at that time the only enemy, or possible enemy, if I can dignify a movement of that kind in that way, was not the Ulster Volunteers, and not any movement for which the responsible Ulster leaders were responsible, but a movement by evilly-disposed persons other than they. Let us observe that at that time there was no disorder, and there were no reports of disorder. I invite the right hon. Gentleman specifically to say whether the Government at that time had one expression of apprehension from a single magistrate in Ireland, or from any authority in Ireland, that movements of this kind were anticipated. As the part played by my right hon. Friend the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson) in these matters has been called in question by the House, I may point out that the Attorney-General in his speech made only a few days ago paid a tribute as just as it was belated to the sincerity of my right hon. Friend's desire, and to the extent of his influence in order to carry out that desire, that there should be no outbreak or disorder or lawlessness of the kind we are now discussing. I am not dealing with larger objects which are not immediate and relevant. That being the case, General Paget came over on Wednesday, the 18th March, and he had an interview with the late Secretary of State for War. I can only found myself in this matter upon the newspaper reports, which in such a case are extremely unreliable. I find from the Press it is stated that the First Lord of the Admiralty with the late Secretary of State for War met General Paget, and I have no reason to assume, unless he tells me it is so, that that report is inaccurate. I believe, and at least so it is said in one of the newspapers, that the right hon. Gentleman was present at a luncheon at which General Paget and the late Secretary of State for War were present.
  The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Churchill): No.
  Mr. F. E. SMITH: I accept that at once, of course. When General Paget was over in this country the right hon. Gentleman also saw him, and had a discussion with him. The question that arises now is what took place either between General Paget and the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty, or at the official interview between General Paget and the late Secretary of State for War, at which I understand the right hon. Gentleman was not present. That is the first question on

  871
  which, I say plainly, no light whatever has been thrown in the whole course of our Debates, and observe how important it is that the House should be told with the most complete frankness what took place on that occasion. It is important for these reasons, that I am certain there is nobody in this House, wherever they may sit, who, in the spirit of the last observations which fell from the late Secretary of State for War, is not anxious to do justice to those officers, and who is not anxious that they should not be blamed or criticised unless you can point to some definite act which they have committed and say "in this respect they were guilty." Before the House can arrive at any conclusion they must know what took place at the intereview between the late Secretary of State for War and General Paget. Observe the information which we have on that point, and the inference which the possession of that information makes it necessary for us to draw. It is admitted that General Paget is an intelligent and distinguished officer; it is admitted that he is accustomed to give orders and that he is accustomed to receive orders, and it is admitted, above all else, that he can understand the plain meaning of plain words, and I make this statement, that if he could not understand what the late Secretary of State for War said to him on matters of such gravity he is unfit for high office. He continues to hold high office. The Prime Minister has told us in one of the earlier Debates on this subject:—
  "General Paget was instructed to do absolutely nothing, except carry out the modest operations described in the letter of 14th March."
  That was the first account that was given to the House of the interview between General Paget and the late Secretary of State for War, that he was instructed, and was only instructed, to carry out the modest operations referred to in the letter of 14th March. I ask, is anybody in the House under the belief that that was a true and exhaustive statement of what took place? It is a circumstance which is perhaps significant that on the very day that this interview took place between General Paget and the First Lord of the Admiralty orders were given to the Fleet by the First Lord of the Admiralty, those orders which have already been communicated in discussion in this House. What was ordered on that date? A Battle Squadron with ten destroyers received orders from the First Lord of the
  872
  Admiralty. It is true, we are informed, and, of course, accept the statement, that those orders were given pursuantly to a decision arrived at by the Cabinet a fortnight earlier, but the coincidence of dates is noticeable. On the very same day that instructions were given to General Paget, of which we do not know the tenour, and of which a full account has been denied to us, on that same date, orders were given to the Fleet, and it is at least plain, and I desire not to exaggerate, that the Prime Minister had not those orders in his mind when he made the statement to the House. I understand that some sixteen ships, including the destroyer, and I follow the exact language of the First Lord of the Admiralty, were to be moved
  "in proximity to the coasts of Ireland in case of serious disorders."
  Or in other words, sixteen ships were to be moved in order to support four companies. That is the balance of maritime power. In the statement which the Prime Minister published to the Press on the Sunday, he made this statement:—
  "As for the so-called naval movement they simply consisted of the use of two small cruisers."
  I make no other accusation against the Prime Minister than this: That whoever it was who was responsible for giving this very important order to the Fleet on the same day that the important conversation took place with General Paget the responsible person was not the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister had not that order in his mind when he made that statement. This I suppose, was another stage in the process, inopportune as I have suggested it. was, of "putting these grave matters to the proof." A further stage was reached on the following day, when General Paget went to Ireland and summoned his officers, as he did on the 20th March. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has produced a detailed account of what took place at the meeting between General Paget and the officers. It is known that four other accounts are in existence. It would be very surprising if there were not more, as it was a very serious occasion. Those four other accounts which are in existence substantially confirm on every material point the report which my right hon. Friend produced. My right hon. Friend has given the most complete proof of his good faith in this matter by offering to place this Report with the name of the officer at the disposal of the Prime Minister, if he cares to have it. When

  873
  first my right hon. Friend made that statement in the House there was a great disposition in many parts of the House to call it in question, and there was a great disposition to suggest that it might not be an authentic and reliable account. Am I not entitled a week later to point this out that during the whole of that week, when this Report has been printed with every circumstance of publicity in the public Press, and when during the whole of that week the Government have had the opportunity of putting it to General Paget or eliciting from him his alternative statement, or of inviting front him a specific contradiction of any allegation grave enough in this matter to require specific contradiction, that after that week has passed not a single contradiction of any material point has been put before the House of Commons, and I put it to all fair-minded men in any part of the House, are we not entitled at the conclusion of that week, and are we not bound to take the view that this statement read out by the Leader of the Opposition in substance fairly represents what was stated by General Paget to the officers on that occasion.
  What then, is the position at that moment? We have an accomplished and intelligent general, who has received orders from the late Secretary of State for War, and who has seen the First Lord of the Admiralty only the day before, and he calls together his officers, and he places before them the result of the instructions that he has received. What did he say? He said that active military operations were to be begun in Ulster. I pause to ask this question: Whatever other point a soldier may make a mistake about, whatever subtleties or sophistries might deceive him, is any soldier on earth likely to make a mistake where the Secretary of State for War had told him that active military operations were contemplated? Any one of us hearing the head of the Army talk to and being bound to him by ties of subordination—any layman might misunderstand the sequence of events and confuse a casual reference to active military operations, but it is inconceivable that an intelligent general, fresh front his conversation with the First Lord of the Admiralty and with the late Secretary of State for War, the conversation taking place on the very day when orders are given that sixteen ships are to be moved, could be in the slightest doubt as to whether he had been told that active military operations were contemplated. Let the House
  874
  observe one small phrase occurring in each report, which is very illustrative of the general effect of the conversation. It was that "the whole country would be in a blaze by Saturday." That phrase has been represented, I think in not a very happy explanation, as meaning that "the Press would be in a blaze on Saturday." Surely a less ingenious explanation was never suggested. Fancy a general calling together the senior officers of a brigade in order that he might make to them the important and earth-shaking announcement that "the. Press would be in a blaze!" And the next statement, and this it is agreed was a Cabinet instruction, was that officers domiciled in Ulster were to be allowed to disappear if they gave their word of honour that they would not fight for Ulster. Fight for Ulster?
  This means fight for the few "evilly disposed persons other than" the Ulster Volunteers, who, and who alone, were at the time the instructions were given, supposed by the Government to be likely to cause disorder. And you are to invite your officers and your generals that they will give their word of honour that in process of carrying out their word they will not take up arms on behalf, not of a volunteer army, but of evilly disposed persons. It is trifling to pretend—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] This is quite a different point from arguing the question whether the Government were justified in making a serious military movement. If they had come to the House and said, "It is true that in the exercise of our responsibility as the custodians of public order we have decided upon a belligerent move," they could have supported their conduct by grave and powerful arguments. They might have been right or wrong, but it would have been a tenable and intelligent position which a strong and even a patriotic Government might conceivably have taken up. But to take these steps as far as the land and maritime forces are concerned, and then to say that they were moving four companies against a few casual depredators, and that no other instructions were given, is to trifle not merely with political opponents, but with the whole House of Commons. The Prime Minister says that this movement did not possess the slightest strategic importance. I am as ignorant of strategy as most people in this House are, but I am informed on very high military authority that on this point the Prime Minister is entirely

  875
  wrong, and, if I use the information which has been given me as I understand it, I think the House also will see that he was entirely misinformed. Assume that these movements were in the nature of insignificant police precautions, what is the first thing that would have been done? It is clear that the military force in Belfast would have been retained in Belfast. If you were going to take police precautions, you would keep the soldiers in Belfast. That is obvious. You could only evacuate Belfast as part of a strategical scheme because the position on a strategical military basis had become untenable. On the police basis not a soldier would be moved from Belfast, but on the military basis they would be moved at once. Take the other move. Think how convenient the presence of the soldiers in Belfast would have been from the point of view of dealing with a few evilly disposed persons; hut, if you were moving them for strategical reasons, it is quite obvious that the force would have been "mopped up," to use a homely expression, if there was any belligerent movement at all, and the first thing a general would have done would have been to move the troops from Belfast.
  Then take the movement to Holywood and Carrickfergus. Holywood is on the south side of Belfast Lough, and Carrickfergus is on the north side. The joint occupation of both places controls the entrance to and the exit from Belfast. From the strategical point of view it controls the two railway lines from Belfast to the north-cast, and would give to any force the complete stragetical command of Belfast. Take then the other movement—the advance, if an advance was to be made in force, from the south of Ireland to the north. I am informed that Ulster is a very difficult country to invade from the south. There are only three main lines of advance. The principal line from Dublin is through Dundalk and Newry. Both places were the first and the most conspicuous objectives of the movements that were made. The Prime Minister has attempted an explanation of this. He says that there were some guns at Dundalk, but Dundalk is in Leinster, and not in Ulster at all. It was as safe from evilly-disposed persons as if the guns had been in the Tower of London, and if protection was required there was at the very moment when these movements were made a complete brigade of Field Artillery in
  876
  Dundalk. Troops were also pushed on to Newry. But there were no arms at all there. The Prime Minister says that Newry is an outpost of Dundalk. That is not so. It is ten miles away from Dundalk. But it is an important railway junction, and one that any general making a strategical scheme for the advance of troops in large numbers from the south to the north would at once seize. The second main line of advance is through Monaghan and Cavan. That advance is through a district which is predominantly Nationalist in its sympathies, and would, therefore, be friendly and require no particular attention. The third main line is across Lough Erne. This is the western advance. The key of this advance is Enniskillen, and Enniskillen was seized. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why seized?"]
  Mr. CHURCHILL: By how many men?
  Mr. F. E. SMITH: Those are fair questions. Why seized? The answer is that a force went there, as I am informed, with ball cartridge, and, beyond all controversy, arrangements were made that other men in much larger numbers should immediately follow if there was the slightest trouble. The First Lord asks how many men went there. I answer that by saying that unless General Paget invented instructions, or was so unintelligent that he was capable of misunderstanding the lucid explanation of the First Lord of the Admiralty, and, when he addressed his officers and told them that they were going to move north, why did he add, "I fear, the men will not move?" Move where, if they were not going to move north? Did it mean that the proposal that they should move had been made in that direction? If that is true, and if the Cavalry were sounded in order to know whether they would move, what is the use of asking me how many men were sent in the first place in a preparatory step? I speak upon this point, as any layman must, with hesitation, but I put it to the House that if these first posts had been reinforced, as no doubt they would have been, the whole of Ulster would have been strategically commanded. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] I quite agree. If the Prime Minister had come to the House last Monday and said, "We, representing the Sovereign Government in a civilised State, have come to the conclusion that we are prepared, because we are strong enough and justified, to assert the undoubted right—quite undoubted by my right hon.

  877
  Friend the Member for Trinity College (Sir E. Carson)—which every civilised Government has to assert order at all costs; we have made strategical movements, and we are not going to apologise to the House of Commons for them," there would have been no question between us at this moment. [Laughter.] But he did not do so. I do not say that we should have thought that the Prime Minister was right in so doing, but it would have been a straightforward and intelligent position. I do not put it higher than this: If an attempt was made in force to seize the decisive stragetical positions in Ulster, I say, though I know it will be received with extreme disfavour on the other side, that my right hon. Friend would have justified everything which has been said on the other side of the House to the disparagement of himself and of the Ulster Volunteers if he had allowed that movement to be carried through. He would have been bluffing, and the men under him would have been bluffing.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: Does the right hon. Gentleman mean that if strategical movements had been made in force His Majesty's troops would have been attacked?
  Mr. F. E. SMITH: Surely the right hon. Gentleman has supplied a very opportune illustration of the statement attributed to General Ferguson and not up to the present contradicted! I should have thought the right hon. Gentleman would have been better occupied than in finessing for the firing of the first shot. I do not mean any more than the right hon. Gentleman himself to consider or to contemplate the case of firing the first shot or of taking the initiative in an attack; but I do say you would have been bringing together bodies of men at these strategical positions, and that it was almost certain that a collision would have occurred. Even if it may be your duty ultimately to do that, the movement at that time was premature and provocative. The scheme, I am prepared to admit, was Napoleonic, but there was no Napoleon. We cannot reproduce the success of General Botha, which the Labour party appear to admire more in this part of the world than in South Africa, unless you have at your disposal General Botha and his burghers; and in the particular case they were not forthcoming. So much for the plan which the Government had formed. I put it to the House that this, at least, is clear. A movement was in
  878
  contemplation at that time. I do not think that the Prime Minister did know about it. I have not the slightest difficulty in accepting his statement that he thought modest operations upon a small scale were in contemplation with the object of safeguarding stores. But that was not the real nature of the movement. After all we have heard, we know that that was not the real nature of the movement. I listened with great interest to see whether the right hon. Gentleman would tell us today that that was the object with which he sent the troops, and that that was the object with which General Paget was instructed to find out whether the officers would march to the North of Ireland.
  I come now to the new issue which we are told is to be the great issue of politics in the near future—the Army against the people. I make this preliminary observation about that new cry, which was stated in those terms for the first time by the First Lord of the Admiralty. The right hon. Gentleman is the head of the sister Service, which is bound to the Army by close ties of blood, association, tradition, history and sympathy. It comes ill from the head of one great belligerent Service that he should be the first to start a political campaign which is to set the people against the other belligerent Service. I would suggest a few difficulties in the course of this new campaign. Those who are behind—or, as it is a military subject, to use a military metaphor—the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers on that side of the House are apparently enthusiastic in this new campaign. But is it not a campaign which, from the nature of the facts and the history of occurrences, is going to maroon the Front Bench? Let me test that. The late Secretary of State for War has told us that he still places his services, as I am sure he will, at the disposal of the Government. Is the late Secretary of State going to take part in this new campaign of the Army against the people, or the people against the Army? Will he not find his platform style a little cramped? "The people against the Army"—and the Army not taking one step in which they were not aided and abetted by the right hon. Gentleman when he was Secretary for War! Another question requires an answer—Is Lord Morley going to take part in this new campaign? Is the Cabinet at large? I distinguish the Cabinet from the general Members of the party, because I

  879
  believe that the Members of the party are entitled on this matter to observe their own independent view—and I have not the slightest doubt they will. If we take the case of the Cabinet, I will undertake to show to the House that on Monday, before the significance of this matter had been appreciated by the Government, before the outbreak behind and the comments on the military had illustrated to the Government, the temper and disposition of their followers, that the whole Cabinet was as deeply committed to this policy as was the Secretary of State for War. I will also undertake to show that they were well advised when they tried to keep the Secretary of State for War. It was not a particularly generous act. It was the act of men who ought to have been in the dock, and therefore they wanted to keep him out of the dock. I will prove this incontestably when I come to dates and documents.
  Let me ask, first of all, in order to clear the ground as to who are going to take part in this new campaign, ask the question—for had we not better, all of us, make up our minds upon the elementary point?—were these officers wrong at all? That is the first point. No one, I suppose, would think it right, or anything but abominably wicked, otherwise to try and inflame the country against the Army and to declaim against the officers as an aristocratic class, wholly apart from the rest of the nation, deserving of scorn, public contempt, and castigation, and deserving that their places should be taken by other officers—because if you are going to democratise the Army, I presume it means that you are going to get rid of the present Army in order to have a more democratic one! Is it not fair therefore—indeed, is it not a matter of common prudence and justice?—to decide before you expel these men—because if you are going to democratise the Army substantially, others are involved—whether they have done wrong? If so, what is that wrong? Let us have it defined. Let the right hon. Gentleman tell us plainly to-day, if he can, wherein have these officers done wrong. Let us have it specifically stated in terms. [An HON. MEMBER: "They cannot do it."] The lowest criminal is entitled to that. Surely an officer who has fought for his country is at least entitled that he should be informed before he is broken, and—before what he cares much more for—before he is held up as a target for contempt before his fellow
  880
  countrymen, that he should be told what he has done wrong? I will inquire into this by stages.
  Let us have the first possible case in which it may be suggested that the officers did wrong. They were asked a hypothetical question by General Paget. The very Army Order which was issued and published in this House on Friday shows that the mere asking of that question was grossly improper, and was a breach of discipline. I do not believe that, apart from that Front Bench opposite, there is a single Member of this House, wherever he sits, who believes that General Paget invented that question. Fancy a general officer going to his brigadier-general and asking him a question which he must have known to have been of a speculative and dangerous character? Who will believe that he would invent a question of that kind? If General Paget had invented that question he ought to have been dismissed his command the next day. [An HON. MEMBER: "He knows too much."] General Paget has not been dismissed. He cannot be dismissed. The Government are not in a position to dismiss him because General Paget did what he was told. He was told to ask a question grossly improper, unprecedented, and subversive of discipline in the Service, and publicly recanted by the Government last Friday. What is the result of this question when you analyse it? These officers received an order. They were ordered to exercise an option. It was the only order that was given to them. It was put in terms more wounding to the feelings of any oldier than any offer of this kind or any order of this kind could be put. In what terms was it couched? Either you obey this order—a contingent order—or you accept dismissal—with loss of pension, with loss of pay, with loss of prospects, and with loss of all that for which these men had sacrificed their lives. Some men give their lives to politics, some to business, some to high philanthropic causes; these men had given them to the Army. It was their career. The Government go to them and ask them a hypothetical question, saying, "We will take your money away from you if you do not say you will obey this, which is a hypothetical order, in the future." That is the result of it!
  Let there be no misunderstanding—their pensions were to be forfeited, they were to be dismissed the Service, and if they were dismissed the Service they lose their pensions. The position in which these officers

  881
  were to be placed was this: they were either to say that in the future—before the occasion had arisen—you shall do certain things or you shall lose your prospects, pay, and pension. They exercised their option. Were they wrong? Was it a wrong thing to do? There is no one in this House can say it was wrong. Why, the First Lord of the Admiralty himself, when he spoke last in the Debate on Wednesday, plainly contended that if that order, or that option, had been given to him and to his colleagues on the Front Bench opposite, that they would, if necessary, have done precisely as these officers did.
  Mr. CHURCHILL Mr. CHURCHILL nodded assent.
  Mr. F. E. SMITH: The right hon. Gentleman is candid enough to agree with that, and indeed there is no one who has ever taken His Majesty's commission and served His Majesty who would answer the question differently. I leave that with the assurance that the non-commissioned officers of the Army would not have given a different answer to this question. Therefore I notice there is one serious gap in what I may call the primary strategical deployment of the new campaign of "The Army against the British People." Up to the present—by universal assent, by the admission given to me most candidly by the right hon. Gentleman across the floor of the House—before you can develop your indictment, you must have a criminal—up till now there is no criminal. [An HON. MEMBER: "Oh!"] If the hon. Member opposite disagrees with me, he also disagrees—which is not uncommon in these days—with his own Front Bench. Perhaps hon. Members opposite are coming to the conclusion that the time when the Secretary of State for War has gone is an opportune moment for others to follow? If, then, my argument has been followed, it will allow me to say, I think with substantial justice and fairness, that in the general view of the House, up to the present at least, these men had done no wrong.
  Let me test that further by taking the case of General Gough. I, like my right hon. Friend who spoke the other night, have never spoken to General Gough in my life. I know nothing of him, except by reputation, but I will make bold to say this: From first to last in this matter General Gough has been most vilely ill-used. The Leader of the Labour party—whom I am sorry not to see in his place—
  882
  made a specific statement about General Gough in the course of these Debates. He said that he was informed on respectable authority that General Gough had gone straight from these Debates to a Tory club and exhibited as a trophy—
  An HON. MEMBER: No, he did not say that.
  Mr. F. E. SMITH: It is reported in the OFFICIAL REPORT. He said he had exhibited a trophy which he had obtained from the War Office.
  Mr. JOHN WARD: It was a statement in the "Times."
  Mr. F. E. SMITH: The hon. Member for Stoke is, I think, in error. No Member of this House, even if I assume that the statement appeared in the "Times," or any other paper, would think it right to repeat it in the absence of a gentleman who cannot defend himself in this House. The statement reflected upon General Gough. The Leader of the Labour party stated in this House that he was informed on respectable authority that General Gough had gone round to a Tory club and had flouted this trophy! General Gough has stated himself since that he never belonged to a Conservative club, and had never been inside a Conservative club in his life. So far from going from the War Office to a Tory club to exhibit this trophy, as the Leader of the Labour party stated, he drove straight home to his mother's flat, and had just time to catch his train back to Ireland, and caught it. It is not surprising to discover that two days after this contradiction had publicly appeared, the "Daily News" published the statement in its leading article as if it were a fact and without the slightest doubt! Let us take the next step: take General Gough's case. I take him as a test case. Was he or was he not right in the letter which he wrote, and which has been published in the White Paper? I am not going to read that letter. I will only call the attention of the House to the clause in which General Gough says:—
  "They were invited to take duty involving the 'initiation' of 'active military operations' against Ulster."
  Following that is a number of officers by regiments who respectfully, under protest, preferred to be dismissed. That is the letter he wrote. The Prime Minister has said of that letter that it was a very fair

  883
  and reasonable letter. It is useful to know that, inasmuch as by the letter declining the initiation of active military operations, the doctrine of absolute obedience under all circumstances, at any rate, has at least undergone very considerable modification. That is a fair and reasonable letter. The next step is that General Gough is ordered to the War Office. In the telegram which conveys this information, there is a passage—and I commend it to the attention of these protagonists in this new campaign of the people against the Army, as follows:—
  "I fear the men will not move either."
  Are they co-conspirators? Are they part of this aristocratic movement?
  Mr. J. WARD: You have no authority to say that.
  Mr. F. E. SMITH: The hon. Member for Stoke asks me where I get the authority to say that?
  Mr. J. WARD: Had the general consulted them?
  Mr. JOWETT: The officers were given an option!
  5.0 P.M.
  Mr. F. E. SMITH: I follow the hon. Members. The omission was: not only ought the officers to have been asked, but the men, too, ought to have been asked the question. Sir, the discipline of the democratised Army will add a few fresh pages to the records of military history! I suppose it will not be disputed that a competent general should know something of the temper of the men, and no one will pretend—the Government will not—that the general was not making a fair statement when he stated the facts at the War Office. He said the men would not move. Under these circumstances General Gough is summoned to London, and an important interview takes place between him and the ex-Secretary of State for War. It is reported in column 398 of the OFFICIAL REPORT. The importance of this interview may be very shortly explained, because I claim that what the Secretary of State for War said before the whole seriousness of this had been realised shows in the plainest possible way that at that important meeting of the Cabinet the Cabinet were plainly informed upon and understood these two conditions, and that every Member of the Cabinet knew of them. Now what took place? We got from the
  884
  late Secretary for War what took place. He has not given any memorandum of the conversation, but I take his own account, and I accept it verbatim. He says:—
  "I said to him 'it must be made clear that His Majesty's Government must retain their right to use all the forces of the Crown in Ireland or elsewhere to maintain law and order, and to support the civil power in the ordinary execution of its duty.' But I said to him, 'with regard to your second question"—
  That is General Gough's second question, which was this:—
  "Does that mean that we should have to take the initiative in Ulster?"
  Mark what the Secretary of State for War said:—
  "It is quite clear it is your duty to go anywhere in Ireland or elsewhere in support of the civil power whenever it is attacked. I can tell you clearly—since the situation already has been made irregular, I think it proper to tell you clearly—that His Majesty's Government has no intention whatever to take advantage of the right to protect the civil power whenever attacked, or however attacked, in order to crush political oppositions."
  That is the objection to the paragraph. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"] The hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs shakes his head, but it is the whole case. What took place here is: General Gough said to the ex-Secretary of State for War, "If you had ordered me to go to Ulster I would have gone; if you had ordered me to support the civil powers in the ordinary execution of duty I would have supported it; but I want to know does that cover the initiating of active military operations in Ulster?" and in answer to that the ex-Secretary of State for War did repeat to him verbatim the very condition which has been the one point on which they have split in the negotiations that took place. What happened? Someone may say that involved the ex-Secretary of State for War, but how does it involve the Cabinet? The ex-Secretary of State for War himself made that perfectly clear, because he went on: "General Gough asked for it in writing, and I said, 'It is not only desirable but necessary we should have it in writing.'" There was no offence for asking for it in writing. Nothing fresh is added to the written guarantees, and nothing is added by the facts that it is in writing except merely as a mere matter of record. What happened next? The right hon. Gentleman says:—
  "After seeing General Gough I went to the Cabinet."
  The Cabinet were sitting waiting to hear, and what was the one subject which must have been engaging the attention of the Cabinet. What was the one question upon which they were waiting information

  885
  from the Secretary of State for War? They were waiting there to know how they were going to deal with these resignations, and what did the ex-Secretary of State for War tell them. He said:—
  "I went to the Cabinet. I told them what I have now told the House."
  And does anyone suppose that the ex-Secretary of State for War would give them a perfunctory or inaccurate version? He has remembered sufficiently clearly to tell us what I have read out to the House. He was going to his colleagues, and he was deeply concerned to know how they would deal with the crisis. Does anybody suppose that he would not tell them everything, especially in view of the statement of his—
  "I told them what took place."
  He told them the terms of the bargain, and he told them the promise and assurance which he, as representing the Cabinet and the Government, had given to these officers of the Army. He told it all then, and the Cabinet had it before them. What is the next step? General Evart brings round a Memorandum. The ex-Secretary of State for War, being pressed for time, could not wait, and General Ewart brings round a Memorandum to the Cabinet which contains the record of this conversation, and we hear from the Prime Minister himself that General Ewart's recollection of the conversation was that the ex-Secretary of State for War had gone even further than the ultimate Memorandum, and that is the Memorandum which is laid before the Cabinet when the ex-Secretary of State for War left the Cabinet to go to Buckingham Palace. Does anyone think that when the ex-Secretary of State for War explained what these conditions were before he went to Buckingham Palace that anyone of his colleagues told him that these conditions were inadmissible, or had warned him that the conditions he had given, and had admitted to General Gough, were not binding on the Cabinet? What is the next step? When he was away there was of course discussion on these points at the Cabinet. We are told, for reasons I am perfectly prepared to admit may be a binding course, and supported by precedent, that documents laid before the Cabinet cannot be produced. It is much to be deplored that considerations of etiquette and precedent should deprive us of the instruction and use of that document, but we know this, that when the Secretary of State for War
  886
  came back from Buckingham Palace to the Cabinet meeting he had a moment or two of conversation with the Prime Minister.
  Both the Prime Minister and the ex-Secretary of State for War told us what took place at that interview. I will tell the House what must have taken place if the present views of the colleagues of the ex-Secretary of State are right. The Prime Minister must have said to the ex-Secretary of State, "Here is this Memorandum; we cannot agree and will not agree to the conditions, and whatever you pledge us in your conversation with General Gough, you must not pledge us to here." Does anyone think the Prime Minister did that? The Prime Minister knew that General Gough had verbally insisted upon assurances. He knew that his colleague at the head of the Army had pledged what soldiers must think was the honour of the Government, and had verbally told him that his condition was admissible and necessary, and that it must be given in writing. The Prime Minister knew all that, and it is suggested that, having come to the conclusion at that Cabinet meeting that this, which was the consideration on which General Gough had gone back, could not be given, he never informed the Secretary of State for War that that was the decision of the Cabinet! No one in the world will ever believe it, but this, which is clear enough in itself, is made infinitely clearer by what happened immediately afterwards. I think the position of the ex-Secretary of State for War was a serious one. I have chosen my words carefully when I now say I think the position of Lord Morley is incomparably graver Lord Morley never left that Cabinet meeting. He took part in all the discussion. If the decision was taken at that meeting that the Cabinet would not agree to this condition of which they were informed, Lord Morley knew it. He knew the conclusion the Cabinet had arrived at. What happened?
  The First Lord of the Admiralty gave us his account of what took place, and Lord Morley had given his. The First Lord of the Admiralty says when Lord Morley came into the room when the ex-Secretary of State for War was opening a box, and as he was in the room when the box was opened, he thought it was his duty chivalrously to accept the responsibilities for what the ex-Secretary of State for War did. I am myself unacquainted with what I may call the telepathetic standards of principles,

  887
  and I should be very interested to understand whether any person in the world is going to believe, or would believe, that Lord Morley, because he was in a room when a box was opened, but not consulted, is responsible for every ill-advised and unwarranted act which his colleague does. A few hours before the true version of the facts was being placed before the House of Lords, I am willing to recognise this, that Debates in both Houses were taking place very close upon one another, and I do not want to put it any higher than this, that an hour or two before the First Lord's statement Lord Morley had stated what was evidently the truth, that he had assisted to draft this very paragraph. What is the position? The Cabinet are not bound we are told, but on the contrary, they expressly refused to assent to the only conditions on which General Gough would return, and to the only condition on which he did return. We are told the ex-Secretary of State for War was unaware of the views of his colleague, because he was called to Buckingham Palace, and he went to a draftsman, that master of scholarly and precise English, who knew the views of his colleagues, and this draftsman helped him to draft this record of his disobedience to his own colleague. But that does not conclude the matter.
  The Prime Minister, who from first to last appears to know nothing of these matters, was specifically asked a question by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London(Mr. Balfour) on this very point. My right hon. Friend asked, "Does the Government agree to these last two paragraphs? Did the Prime Minister see these two paragraphs before they were put in? I suppose that no colleague of the right hon. Gentleman saw them," and the answer was "No." But, Sir, I observe this, and it would be the only possible defence of Lord Morley, and I myself confess frankly, while Lord Morley is an ornament to any Government I cannot conceive how, if he helped, having been at the Cabinet at which the late Secretary for War was not present, to draft these paragraphs, how he can sit in a Cabinet which has thrown the ex-Secretary of State for War over. Nor as far as Lord Morley was concerned, was this a mechanical performance. I think I can satisfy the House of that by reference to a fact which probably may have escaped notice. On behalf of the Government
  888
  Lord Morley went to the House of Lords in order to declare the policy of the Government in the novel and difficult position which had arisen. What does he do? He actually copies these two paragraphs and reads them in the House of Lords as the policy of the Government—paragraphs which have split the Cabinet, paragraphs on the strength of which the ex-Secretary of State for War has temporarily, at least, lost his political career. The spokesman of this same Government goes down to the House of Lords, and, when invited to give the policy of the Government, he does so in the very words of these two paragraphs. Let me read them: This is an extract from the speech of Lord Morley conveying the message the Government had to give:—
  "The Government must always retain the right to use all the forces of the Crown to uphold law and order and to support the civil power and authorities though we have no intention as things now stand of taking advantage of that right against any opposition to the principles and policy of the Government of Ireland Bill,"
  So that the Cabinet, which could never have agreed as a point of principle to these two conditions being given to General Gough—whether verbal or in writing is obviously immaterial—had the extreme misfortune to be represented in the House of Lords by a colleague who had agreed to them, who had helped to draft them, and who thought they were so important that he took a copy of them, and was so pleased with the copy he had taken that he read it out to the House of Lords; and Lord Morley continues to be an ornament of a Government which has jettisoned the ex-Secretary for War. Observe, Lord Morley had drafted these paragraphs as conditions, and he sat silent in the House of Lords when twice the Lord Chancellor, being pointedly asked, was invited to state whether or not these officers had gone back unconditionally. He knew they had gone back conditionally, and yet Lord Morley sat silent when the Lord Chancellor said they had gone back unconditionally. What happened two days later? Lord Haldane felt it necessary, in order to put himself right with the House of Lords, to say:—
  "I have always been scrupulous that I should not mislead your Lordships on a question of fact, and I wish to apologise, because on Monday I stated that these officers went back unconditionally, but I have learned since that they went back conditionally."
  Lord Morley sat there, knowing they had gone back conditionally, and he allowed that statement to be made. Lord Morley did not, in fact, contradict that. If the right hon. Gentleman opposite says that Lord Morley did not hear what took

  889
  place, and if Lord Morley tells me he did not hear it, I would unreservedly accept it; but that is somewhat unusual, and I have no reason to suppose that Lord Morley is incapable of hearing what took place. I have only one observation to make in conclusion. The House has listened with the greatest possible indulgence to what I am quite sensible has been a long demand on the patience of hon. Members. I would like to ask, Does the statement made by Lord Haldane in the House of Lords last Monday, or does it not, represent the policy of the Government?—
  "No orders were issued, no orders are likely to be issued, and no orders will be issued for the coercion of Ulster."
  Or is Lord Haldane to be thrown over too? Is not the truth of this whole matter that on Monday the Cabinet were prepared on any terms to prevent the resignation of these officers; that on Tuesday there came the speech made by the new Leader of hon. Gentlemen opposite the hon. Member for Stoke (Mr. John Ward) raising the issue of the King and the Army against this House? Well, if the hon. Gentleman declares that that is the battle-ground on which he is prepared to fight, I do not know how many hon. Members of this House are prepared to follow him in that quarrel. In the meantime we know that the Prime Minister has most expressly dissociated himself from an attack which I will take leave to say—because I do not wish to speak of this provocatively—that one should think and think again before attacking in this House one who cannot answer for himself or defend himself. [HON. MEMBERS: "Lord Morley!"] Do hon. Gentlemen suggest that that is a parallel case? What is the Treasury Bench here for if it is not to defend their colleagues? Is that not an analogous Case—
  Mr. POINTER: What is the Opposition Front Bench for except to defend the King? [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw!"]
  Mr. F. E. SMITH: I am sorry that the hon. Member has made that observation, but I am sincerely anxious on this point. It is a subject of heated party controversy, and I do not think, in all the circumstances, I have been unduly provocative. I should be glad if the Debate concluded, as far as I am concerned, without passing beyond that. I venture to add, with the greatest sincerity, that while I have given this recital of the last few weeks, while I have put forward the events to which we on this
  890
  side of the House attach grave significance, I do believe that a time has come when men of all parties in this House would be well advised to consider, not where one party is drifting, but where we are all drifting. We shall not arrive at a conclusion upon this point by long historical arguments and recriminations. Nobody will ever persuade us on this side of the House that we have not been justified in the things we have done. I admit they were very difficult to justify. No one will ever persuade hon. Gentlemen opposite that they, equally on their part, and carrying the historical question back to a remoter date, were not justified in what they have done.
  These events will be decided by the historian, and he will care little to hear us proclaiming with a loud and obsolete voice that the beginning and end of all the difficulties in which we are involved has been merely your subjugation to the Irish Nationalist party; he will care less to hear you say that the principal responsibility rests upon the shoulders of those who have inculcated and preached the doctrine of insurrection. What he will say is that the whole House of Commons, all of you who ought to have been the trustees, not for any part, but for the nation as a whole, "You inherited from the past a great and splendid possession, and where is it now?" As far as I am concerned, I can only say—and I believe, as far as many who sit on this side of the House are concerned—late as is the period at which this controversy has now arrived—I believe many of us are willing that it should be conducted in those later stages, even though the mischief be irreparable, with a deep sense of responsibility and an anxious desire to see, even while the water runs under the bridges, whether nothing can be done by the House of Commons to retain some memory of the patriotism and traditions of the past.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: The right hon. Gen-man has delivered a speech which is a fine specimen of his argumentative powers, and I confess that while I was listening to the latter part of it—I do not mean the last passage, in which he struck a different note, but I mean the latter part of his argumentative attack upon the Government—I could not help feeling impressed with how easy it must be for a very distinguished lawyer to procure the conviction of an innocent man. I daresay my experience during that portion of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, in which

  891
  he tried to prove that the Government assented to the full terms of the letter given to General Gough, was shared by any colleagues on this Bench, who, of course, know all the circumstances, and who cannot fail to have followed with deep interest the way in which the most disconnected and most irrelevant topics were woven together with the utmost skill to point to a conclusion which our minds reject as false, and even as monstrous. What is it that the right hon. Gentleman sets himself to prove? That the Cabinet as a Cabinet was responsible for the last two paragraphs of the letter given to General Gough, and he said that they knew all along that General Gough was insisting upon those two conditions. There is not a word of truth in that. I am not at liberty to go into any discussion of what takes place in the Cabinet. Every-one knows that that would be entirely improper. No record is kept, and inviolable secrecy, necessary in the interests of the State, surrounds those proceedings. It would be a great mistake to suppose that the Cabinet was occupied to any extent either of its time or its attention with General Gough and his affairs.
  We received the statement on the general situation from the Secretary for War, who then was summoned away. We sent for the document which he said the Adjutant-General had prepared. The document did not arrive in time to be read to the Cabinet. The Prime Minister, who knew the mind of the Cabinet, took the document, and with his own hands cut it down to the limits of the first three paragraphs printed in the White Paper. I was present at the time and saw the Prime Minister striking out all the other paragraphs—and there were a great many—except these three, and then he handed them to the Secretary of State. How can the right hon. Gentleman think it worth while to charge against us, a body of men whose characters are not unknown to the House, that we would deliberately throw over a colleague to whose action we were thus pledged? Nothing but the fact that my right hon. Friend the Member for the Ilkeston Division (Colonel Seely), on his own responsibility, and after the document had left the hands of the Prime Minister, added the two last paragraphs himself, nothing but that fact has caused a separation from him which we all regret to-day. As to Lord Morley, the
  892
  right hon. Gentleman's statement certainly amounted to a very serious charge. He charged him, not with speaking obscurely, but with not speaking the truth. He said that, although he knew these conditions had been exacted by General Gough and had been put into the document by the Secretary of State, and although he approved of them being put in, yet he sat still during the debate on the first day and listened to his colleague, the Lord Chancellor, innocently and ignorantly stating that General Gough had gone back unconditionally. There is no truth or justification for that.
  I shall not undertake the defence of Lord Morley in this House, because it is unnecessary, and because he has already this afternoon dealt with his position in another place where it is appropriate that he should be attacked, and where he has every opportunity and facility of defending his position. The case is substantially as I stated to the House the other night. Lord Morley remained in the Cabinet room with the Secretary of State for War, not for the purpose of approving any War Office action, or any decision of the Secretary of State for War, or of aiding in that decision, but for the purpose of learning what he had to say in the House of Lords when that body assembled very shortly afterwards. The right hon. and learned Gentleman states, as the lynch-pin of his argument, that Lord Morley actually copied out the two appended paragraphs, and restated them to the House of Lords. That is cited by the right hon. and learned Gentleman to prove that Lord Morley was an effective and responsible assenting party to the addition of those two paragraphs as a War Office document, but it proves with much greater clearness the fact that he was obtaining these paragraphs for the purpose of the statement which he was to make in the House of Lords, and he was not interfering in any way with the decision at which my right hon. Friend the Member for the Ilkeston Division had arrived. I think it is a great pity that the fine speech of the right hon. and learned Gentleman should have been so much occupied with endeavouring to prove trivial matters of apparent inconsistency or discord between Ministers, the offensive part of which I do not think he believes himself, and which, in fact, and on the merits and in substance, have no foundation and no justice and no reality whatever.

  893
  I pass to the more serious part of the right hon. and learned Gentleman's speech, that connected with the military operations. Here again I must make an observation. The House must be impressed with the great contrast between the kind of statement that people have the face to make here, and the presentation of the Opposition case as found in the London newspapers. One of the great hindrances which the party opposite suffers from, and which retards their progress towards political convalescence, is the fact that they are swayed and influenced, and, if I may use the word in no offensive sense, intoxicated by the powerful newspapers on which they feed. When a respectable Conservative wakes up in the morning and goes through all that long series of newspapers, beginning with the "Times" and ending with the "Daily Express" and "Pall Mall Gazette," it is not to be wondered at that his judgment is distorted and that he arrives at the House of Commons inspired with the highest indignation and a sense of approaching triumph. It is not until he has listened to the speeches of his leaders that some measure of moderation and sobriety is instilled into his mind. The right hon. and learned Gentleman, in his reference to the military movements and to the Irish situation, had the very greatest need to prove two things, neither of which were true. First, he had to prove that we were almost on the verge of making peace about the Irish question, when these unfortunate movements took place. Secondly, he had to prove that these movements were themselves the first step in an insidious but deeply laid strategic scheme for grasping the vital key positions for a general advance on Ulster. The House can judge pretty well of the first of those two tasks, and, from its scanty relation to the facts, they can judge to some extent of the relation in which the second of those two charges stands to the actual truth.
  I should state the position somewhat differently from the right hon. and learned Gentleman. To have heard him speak one would have supposed that our difficulties about Ireland were nearly settled on or before 14th March. What was the case? I must go back upon this subject, in order that our position may be fairly placed before the country. On the 9th March the Prime Minister made his offer to the Opposition of the exclusion of the Ulster counties by majorities for a six
  894
  year period. That offer made it perfectly clear that there must be two General Elections before any Ulster county could be compelled to come within the ambit of a Home Rule Parliament. After that statement was made, if it were accepted by the Opposition as the basis for discussion, there could no longer be any question about Ulster being coerced by this Government into submission to a Home Rule Parliament, or having to accept until two General Elections had taken place any position or any arrangement different from that they now occupy, and under which they now prosper. That is the basic fact, and from which all argument should start this afternoon. After that offer had been made, it is quite clear that it was not the Ulster question which lay between us, but much wider and much larger and much graver issues, to which I will refer before I sit down. It was clear that it was no longer in the cause of Ulster's liberties, civil and religious, that these dangers were to be incurred by the Opposition, and that these tests were to be placed before the country. It was because Ulster, no longer concerned with her own affairs, was seeking to bar the way to the whole of the rest of Ireland, and was seeking to influence the destinies of British politics. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] How was that offer received? The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition gave—I am not quoting him, but the gist and tenour of his speech was to give—his right hon. Friend, who sits beside him (Sir E. Carson), a blank cheque. Ulster had to be satisfied by the Government. Unless Ulster was satisfied, any resistance she might offer, whether justified or not, he would support with the whole strength of the Unionist organisation.
  Mr. BONAR LAW: That is quite untrue. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"]
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I really do not want at all to misrepresent the right hon. Gentleman. [An HON. MEMBER: "You cannot help it."] I do not wish to misrepresent him, but that was the impression which his speech created on this side of the House. I am quite content, however, to base myself—the House knows his attitude—upon the action of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dublin University. He got up at once and said that he would not even put this great offer before an Ulster Convention. He spoke no word of appreciation or of kindly consideration of an offer which had cost much

  895
  to many who sit on this side of the House, at any rate. He said that he would not even put it to a Convention, and in a speech the tone of which I greatly regretted—[Laughter.] I regretted it not for the right hon. Gentleman's sake, but because I was wounded and grieved deeply to find that this offer, on which so many of us had pinned our hopes, was so unceremoniously repulsed and rejected. But the right hon. and learned Gentleman proceeded the next day to write a letter to some division of his army in Ulster, the very next day after the Prime Minister's speech, when all great issues as we know depended on that speech, and all the hopes on both sides of the House were attached to the proposal that had been made, and this is what the right hon. and learned Gentleman wrote:—
  "It is clear to my mind that so far as our preparations are concerned, the pronouncement of the Government, if anything, necessitates a still more forward movement. This year will be exceptional, and will really be the climax of all that we have been aiming at. We are going to make good in action all we have been saying and preparing for during the past two years."
  Then the right hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. F. E. Smith) rises this afternoon and tries to make out that we were on the verge of a settlement. I regretted that letter of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dublin University as one of the most cruel and violent blows struck against the peaceful settlement of this controversy, and the fact that it should have been written the very day after the Prime Minister's speech was taken struck in my heart a note of despair, and made me realise more than anything how hopelessly difficult it is to attempt to arrive at a good solution of these difficulties as long as the right hon. and learned Gentleman and his Friends have in their minds that they have only to bully to prevail. It was on that basis, and not on the basis of happy and hopeful progress towards agreement, to which the right hon. and learned Gentleman has referred; it was on the basis of the attitude of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dublin University and of the repulse of our efforts at conciliation that the measures of the Government have been considered. In the first place, the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has referred to a speech which I made at Bradford. I will come to that later, but for the moment I am going to deal with the military measures which were decided on. There surely never could be any stronger case than was presented to the Govern-
  896
  ment for safeguarding the various depots scattered about in Ulster! As early as January of this year my right hon. Friend the Member for the Ilkeston Division asked me to supply a ship for the protection of Carrickfergus Castle. Carrickfergus Castle contains over 85 tons of small arm ammunition. I do not know whether I am revealing military secrets to another force, but it contains 85 tons of ammunition, and rumours had been rife that an attack might be made—
  Sir E. CARSON: What I wanted to ask was whether the ship was to be sent to meet wooden gums?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: The right hon. and learned Gentleman will destroy his prestige if he makes silly interruptions. The rumour was that these places, very weakly defended, or hardly held at all—probably by only a dozen men—might be attacked. I answered my right hon. Friend the late Secretary for War by saying that I knew a fair offer was going to be made to the Opposition which I had every reason to believe would remove the question outstanding from the military arena, and in the interval I would not send a ship unless I was directed to by the Cabinet. After the repulse of that offer, we were forced to consider the position at these small depots. The Ulster preparations are, of course, notorious, and the right hon. Gentleman when he rose just now was only concerned to repudiate the idea that they were not effective preparations.
  Sir E. CARSON: You said that.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: The Ulster preparations are notorious. We have been told repeatedly in the columns of newspapers and by Conservative speakers what a great army has been created there, with all the courage of the old Covenanting Ironsides, the organisation of Germany, the heroic self-sacrifice of Japan, and so forth. We had received police reports from many parts of the disturbed districts, and we had also received military opinions and military advice as to the insecurity of these depots. What was the position? Carrickfergus Castle, with 85 tons of ammunition, held by 15 or 20 men only; a weak battalion in the Victoria Barracks, Belfast, of 500 or 600 men, with about 30 tons of ammunition in their possession, in the narrow streets of that city; at Omagh, a small garrison of 80 or 100 men—I am giving the figures from memory; I have not verified their exactitude—and there, again,

  897
  we had about 30 tons of ammunition. At Armagh the position was practically the same. At Enniskillen we had another store of ammunition of about the same size, while at Dundalk there were 18 guns of Royal Artillery. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of this as a great defence, but these guns were quite unprotected by any military escort, and the military authorities impressed upon us the temptation they would offer—supposing there was any truth or substance in the statements which are made and which had been made so often from that quarter of the House—they impressed upon us that this was a place which it would be wrong to leave unprotected. It was a different case to the small depots, where the temptation, if not to the headquarters staff of the Ulster Army, was a temptation to various bands or portions of this force which might get too excited and break out of all reasonable control. We decided it was our duty to remove that temptation. There were two methods by which we could have removed it. We could have evacuated Omagh, Armagh, and Dundalk, and have brought the ammunition and guns back to Dublin or the Curragh. That was the course recommended by our military advisers. Viewed as a purely military measure, if we had intended to make a general advance upon the province of Ulster, the withdrawal of troops and ammunition from these isolated detached points of no straegic value, would have been the right and proper course to adopt. Although we have done our best to treat seriously the movement of the Ulster Volunteers, we felt, unhappy as are the times, that the situation in which we stand is not yet such that His Majesty's Artillery and munitions cannot be left at those regular places, or that we were forced to adopt a measure of military concentration. Therefore, we decided to reinforce those places and to reinforce them to this extent, that they would be beyond the reach of mischievous enterprise, and that they could not be reduced or captured unless they were the object of serious operations.
  The next question which we considered was whether or not our measures would cause an outbreak, and on that we had to take into consideration the opinion of Sir Arthur Paget. On receiving the letter of the 14th, Sir Arthur wished to come over to London and discuss with us, among other things, what he considered would be the effect of these movements. Sir Arthur took a very serious view of them. He thought they would create intense excite-
  898
  ment and so might bring on a great crisis. Of course, the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition would have agreed with Sir Arthur Paget if he had been told that there was grave danger of creating a serious situation, because he informed us at the beginning of the Session how explosive was the Ulster situation that a word, an accident, or a mere inquiry by a policeman might precipitate the crisis. The right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken told us this afternoon how serious the danger really was, because he said if the Ulster headquarters staff had come to the conclusion that these movements were really of a strategic character, they would have immediately attacked the British troops marching on to those points. We did not take so serious a view of the situation as Sir Arthur Paget. In fact we did not know then what the right hon. Gentleman has told us this afternoon, or that it had gone so far as that. But we inquired of the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant what was his opinion of the effect of these movements of troops in Ulster, and the right hon. Gentleman, after full consideration, said he did not consider that they would be viewed as provocative. He said that any interference with the drilling of the volunteers, or any attempt to arrest the leaders, or to deprive the volunteers of their arms, would, he thought, precipitate a crisis, but he did not consider that the movements of troops, who, we have always been assured, would be welcome in Ulster—always at any rate until this afternoon—he did not consider that the movements of troops to these depots, where troops have in almost every case been quartered for a long time, would be viewed as provocative. We acted on his advice, and, in the event, he has proved to be right. We felt there was a risk, and we considered, as the Foreign Secretary said, that in the circumstances the risk had to be run.
  I wish to make three points quite clear in regard to what followed and to the instructions which were given by the Government. Sir Arthur Paget received no orders or instructions for any movements of troops other than the precautionary movements which I have explained to the House. The movements were assented to in principle by the Cabinet, and their details were approved at a conference presided over by the Prime Minister between Members of the Cabinet, the principal members of the Army Council and Sir Arthur Paget. No one in the Government believed that these precautionary

  899
  movements would lead to bloodshed, but, as I have said, Sir Arthur Paget took a very serious view, and, at any rate, thought it was necessary to take into full consideration all possibilities. As Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, Sir Arthur had full discretionary power. If new circumstances arose, if the depots were attacked, or if the columns marching to reinforce them were resisted, he had full discretionary power to make such dispositions of the forces under his command as the emergency might require, and he was told that, if necessary, large reinforcements would be sent to him from England. Six contingencies, separate or in combination, had to be borne in mind by the General. A military Commander may be excused if he makes preparations which afterwards are found to be unnecessary, but he is not to be excused if he does not take all measures of reasonable prudence to guard against, not only what is dangerous, but what may possibly become dangerous as a consequence of the action he is going to take.
  6.0 P.M.
  Sir Arthur Paget had to consider, firstly, the possibility of armed opposition to the small bodies of troops that were moving to reinforce the depots, secondly, attacks on those depots themselves or on the Artillery at Dundalk; thirdly, the blowing up or destruction of railway lines; fourthly, the outbreak of serious conflict in Belfast between the Protestant and Catholic elements, following upon the proclamation of a provisional Government or else arising out of the general excitement; fifthly, he had to provide against widespread sporadic disorder in the South and West of Ireland, requiring the use of large numbers of troops to protect the scattered Protestants against the reprisals which might be made upon them by the Catholic population. That was a consideration he had to take into account; sixthly, he also had to bear in mind the possibility of an organised warlike movement of Ulster volunteers, under their responsible leaders, and to provide for the concentration of military forces. Until the right hon. Gentleman spoke this afternoon I am bound to say that that was not a consideration which had entered into my mind or into the minds of my colleagues in the Government. But it was present to Sir Arthur Paget's mind, and the right hon. Gentleman has shown that it was a real contingency against which provision had to be made by the military
  900
  commander. So much for the precautionary movements which Sir Arthur Paget was authorised to make, and the contingent preparations against the results and consequences of those movements. When Sir Arthur Paget discussed these precautionary moves with the Secretary of State and also earlier in the year, he naturally raised the question of the possible disaffection of officers, and the Secretary of State gave him orally, for his guidance in individual cases, should they occur, the following two principles: First, that officers ordered to act in support of the civil power should not be permitted to resign their commission, but must, if they refused to obey orders, be dismissed from the Army; and, secondly, that indulgence might be shown, in cases where it was asked for, to officers who were domiciled in Ulster. There was no intention on the part of the Government or of the Secretary of State, or of any other Member of the Government, or of the Army Council, that those two rules, which were given to Sir Arthur Paget for his guidance in case of great emergency arising, should be put as a hypothetical question to the whole body of officers in the Irish command, nor did Sir Arthur Paget intend to do so, nor, as he states, did he do so. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"]
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Where has he said so?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I say that Sir Arthur Paget did not intend to put a hypothetical question of this character as a test and as a trial to the whole body of officers in the Irish command.
  Mr. BONAR LAW Mr. BONAR LAW rose—
  Mr. CHURCHILL: It will save time if you allow me to continue. Nor, as he states, did he do so. He denies altogether that he put a pistol at their heads.
  Mr. BONAR LAW: May I put a question to the right hon. Gentleman? I have on three separate occasions urged upon the Prime Minister that he should give to the House Sir Arthur Paget's statement of what took place. Why do the Government not do so?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: The statement which I have just made I make after having had an opportunity of communicating with Sir Arthur Paget. It is admitted that a misunderstanding on the point arose.
  Mr. BONAR LAW: Rubbish!
  Mr. CHURCHILL: Do I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say "Rubbish"?
  Mr. BONAR LAW: Yes.
  Lord ROBERT CECIL: What are the questions referred to in the Memorandum issued in the White Paper?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I now propose to deal with the point about which a great deal has been made out of doors and something in this House on the last occasion when we discussed this subject, but which the right hon. Gentleman who spoke last has not seen fit even to repeat this afternoon. It has been repeatedly stated that Sir Arthur Paget said that provocation would come from Ulster, and on this has been founded the charge that steps have been taken to arrange for or foment—[An HON. MEMBER: "What about Fergusson?"]—such provocative action on their part. This imputation is a deliberate untruth. The Members of the Government who attended the conference in London were deeply impressed with Sir Arthur Paget's evident sense of humanity and forbearance. He repeatedly assured us that he would, in no circumstances which could arise, allow his troops to fire upon the Orangemen until the troops had been fired at for some time and had themselves suffered effective loss. He impressed this point on the generals, who met him in conference on the Friday morning, in order to make clear to them the gulf which existed between the precautionary moves and the grave consequences which might follow from them. It is an extraordinary instance of the perversity which can be effected of truth by malice and rumour that this statement of Sir Arthur Paget's that the troops would themselves submit to be fired on for some time by the Orangemen before they made any reply, should have actually been perverted into the diabolic falsehood that some method was to be adopted to provoke the Ulstermen. To sum up on these three points: while Sir Arthur Paget had discretionary power to take any action which sudden and grave emergency might require, he had no directions from any quarter to take any action outside the precautionary moves for guarding the depots, and no orders were ever issued by him, except stand-by orders, for any purpose or plan outside those movements. That is the first statement I make.
  Mr. HARRY LAWSON: What were the stand-by orders?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: Secondly, Sir Arthur Paget was never directed to subject the officers under his command to the test whether they would be prepared to declare themselves willing to undertake active operations against Ulster, nor did he intend at any time to force that alternative upon them.
  Lord ROBERT CECIL: What questions did he ask?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: The Noble Lord is very insistent. He must not suppose that I am in the witness box, and that he is cross-examining me.
  Lord ROBERT CECIL: May I remind the right hon. Gentleman that the Prime Minister told us at Question Time that these questions, which were on the Paper, would be answered in the course of the Debate. I venture to ask the right hon. Gentleman what are the questions alluded to in the third paragraph of the Memorandum of 23rd March, which runs as follows:
  "This is the only point it was intended to put to the officers in the question of the General Officer Commanding"
  I think the House has a right to know what those questions were.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I have stated to the House what we ascertained to be the intention of Sir Arthur Paget. It is admitted that a misunderstanding arose. The third point which I make is this: So far from his lending himself to any scheme to provoke wantonly a collision with the Ulster volunteers, Sir Arthur Paget resolved to observe every conceivable precaution which courage and humanity could suggest to prevent a collision, and in this he has acted in the fullest harmony with what he knew were the wishes of the Government. I have explained Sir Arthur Paget's deep anxiety, both before the movements were made and while they were being effected, and I have explained that the Government did not take so serious a view. We felt that between these small movements we were ordering and all further military movements there was a great gulf fixed. Past that gulf events would have to occur of a character totally different from anything which we have now to consider. Nothing could span the gulf between the precautionary movements and the contingent preparations which were made except a deliberate, aggressive and unprovoked attack upon British soldiers marching in His Majesty's Dominions. If

  903
  that had happened, I say without hesitation that all the other measures which we had prepared to take would have been absolutely appropriate and necessary. I confess to the House that I slept tranquilly through these proceedings, because, in the first place, it does not seem to me probable that when men can vote themselves out of the operation of a Bill they dislike they will run the awful risk of making an unprovoked attack upon British troops; secondly, it is clear that the Ulster leaders would put themselves hopelessly in the wrong by such an action; and, thirdly, we believed that they had among them some competent military men who could point out to them that none of these moves were of a strategic character, with a single exception of the battalion which was moved out of Belfast to Holywood, in order that it should not be entangled in those narrow streets.
  Therefore, the Government felt no grave anxiety similar to that felt by Sir Arthur Paget while those moves were taking place. But we were bound to be prepared. We were absolutely bound to be prepared, and, still more, were the generals who were charged with the direct responsibility. I do not quite understand the line which is taken by the speakers and by the party opposite in regard to the measures which the Government take to maintain law and order. So extraordinary is the position we have reached that the doctrine is seriously put forward that the only force which it is legitimate to use is rebellious force. To organise an army of 100,000 men, to equip it with all the ancillary services, to divide it into its brigades and divisions, to have its aeroplanes and its telegraphs, and its despatch riders all supplied—[An HON. MEMBER: "And gallopers"]—its headquarters staff, and all its aides-de-camp and appurtenances—to raise that army and keep it on foot, and to proclaim that you intend, in the words of the right hon. Gentleman, which I read to the House,
  "to make good in action all that we have been saying and preparing during the last two years."
  —to take steps like that is regarded as patriotic, virtuous, innocent, noble, loyal! But for a Government to move a few hundred Infantry to protect their ammunition places—[An HON. MEMBER: "And battleships"]—and to take precautions to support and protect those troops if they are attacked by this great army—that is a
  904
  fiendish, treacherous, vile conspiracy directed against the life and religion of a free people. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition is not entitled to use the argument that no force could be used in any circumstances against Ulster, because he told us if a Referendum were to take place—he did not even make any restriction as to the number of persons who might vote—but if, by a bare majority on a Referendum Home Rule were affirmed, he said we should be justified in coercing Ulster, not merely to avoid attacking us, not merely to keep the law, but, indeed, to accept the Home Rule Bill.
  That is the right hon. Gentleman's doctrine. It is a harder doctrine than we have maintained on this side of the House with regard to the Army and Navy. But against armed rebellion, if it occurs, force is certainly justified, and it is a duty, and a sacred duty of Ministers while they assume the responsibility of Government—it is their absolute duty—to take all necessary measures in their power and at their disposal to cope with armed rebellion. I think it is a great mistake to try to deal with this subject only by analogy with strikes and labour disputes, although there is a very valuable branch of the argument which may be opened up there. A much truer analogy is to be found if we keep our eye still steadily fixed on Ireland. Apply the doctrines of the Conservative party to a new case. Let us assume that the hon. and learned Member for Waterford (Mr. John Redmond) were to raise an army. [A laugh.] The Noble Lord (Earl Winterton) has not seen the Irish troops in the field or he would not raise an unworthy laugh. Suppose the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. John Redmond) were to raise an army, as I dare say he could do, by holding up his hand, of 100,000 men. Suppose he were to be supported by large subscriptions from this country, and suppose there were lying about, as there are, over the South of Ireland, large depots filled with ammunition in the midst of a population under the influence and control of the hon. and learned Gentleman. Suppose it was believed that he was likely to make a forward move, in the words of the right hon. Gentleman, against these depots, would it not be thought right and proper that we should reinforce them? If it were thought, on military authority, that the troops marching to reinforce them might attack, would it not be right and proper to

  905
  consider what other bodies of troops were available to go to their aid? If that issue had arisen with the Cavalry brigade at the Curragh, there would have been a good deal less difficulty than has actually occurred. I have seen a great number of cartoons in the newspapers which took this form. A British soldier is represented speaking to an Irish Nationalist, and saying, "Do you think I am going to fight for you?" It is a favourite point with the right hon. Gentleman, but what is the answer which the Nationalist is entitled to make? It is a very simple one. "Will you let me fight for myself?" What is the comment which the Imperial Government is bound to make on that? We are bound to say, "No, you shall not fight for yourselves; you shall be obliged to confine yourselves to constitutional action," and we are bound to make sure that constitutional action is not frustrated by lawless violence.
  I leave the question of military movements and come to the political issues between the great parties. I withdraw no word which I spoke at Bradford. I was convinced by the behaviour of the Leader of the Opposition and the right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Carson) that there is no settlement possible while one side believes that it can go to any extreme with impunity and that the other side will certainly give way if sufficient violence and offence is used. I desire, like most other Members in this House, a settlement of this question. But I am sure one will never be reached as long as the opinion is rooted in the breasts of the Opposition, and particularly of the Opposition from North-East Ulster, that we fear them or fear any consequences which may come to us while we pursue our legitimate constitutional path. I am told that the Bradford speech was provocative. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Carson) is a good judge of provocation. What is the provocation that we have borne? I am not speaking of speeches. Speeches are a very mild form of provocation compared with the offence which has been offered to us during the last two years. We have been confronted with an avowed conspiracy to defy Parliament and the law, leaving a great army practising preparations for rebellion and for the setting up of a provisional Government, which would be an outrage against the realm and the Empire. What of the seduction of the Army? What of the double manœuvre by which Parliamentary government is to be
  906
  subverted? I mean that the hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Carson) is to raise a rebellion in Ulster greater than the police could cope with, and the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bonar Law) and his associates are to create a state of opinion in the British Army which will prevent it being used. These are the political methods with which we are confronted. And then they talked to us of provocative speeches. I am going to make—it is my right to do so—a definite charge against the leaders of the Opposition in both Houses of attempting, and as far as is in their power effecting, the seduction of the Army. I am not going to deal with newspaper incitements. They are numerous, they are innumerable, patent, open, repeated, and flagrant. But neither is it in my power to deal with that immense process of private and social subordination. I am going to confine myself to the public utterances of men who, if parties changed, would be called upon to occupy positions of the greatest responsibility. I take the latest utterance of the Leader of the Opposition. Speaking on the 23rd of this month he said:—
  "The Home knows that we on this side have from the very first held the view that to coerce Ulster is an operation which no Government under existing conditions has a right to ask the Army to undertake. And in our view of course it is not necessary to say that any officer who refuses is only fulfilling his duty."
  There was a young subaltern officer whose letter was published by his father in the "Pall Mall Gazette" last week, who took a different view of what the duty of a soldier should be. He wrote:—
  "I have decided to stay on for the following reasons. Although as you know my sympathies are absolutely with Ulster, I think that at a time like this the Army most stick together. If we once start to disintegrate the service, then goodbye to the Empire and anything else that happens. Moreover, in case of strike duty, the men whose sympathies are fairly obviously with the strikers, have to carry on and do their duty so that now it is up to us to do the same."
  That is the kind of officer who, according to the Leader of the Conservative Party, is failing to fulfil his duties—the kind of officer who is, to use the language of the newspapers, "demeaning himself by doing the dirty work of the Liberal party." That is the kind of officer who the Leader of the Opposition suggested could not be a gentleman, for no gentleman would do such work. But the question is more serious, and we must go back to an earlier period. This process of seducing the Army from its allegiance to lawful authorities has been going on for a long time, and it first took, as far as I am aware, the public form of statements by responsible Unionist leaders in

  907
  the autumn of last year. On 18th November Lord Lansdowne, who, as an ex-Secretary of State for War, should of all other men have been particularly careful, because he would have special influence in the Army, said:—
  "But what about seducing the Army. The fault, if fault there be, lies not with us, for I know of no Unionist who has ever used language which could be interpreted as inciting the Army to do anything but their duty."
  The right hon. Gentleman's colleague, working very closely with him, told us only yesterday what was his duty. He would be only fulfilling his duty if he refused to obey the orders of his superiors. Lord Lansdowne continues:—
  "The fault lies with those who have announced, not ambiguously, that they intend to use force in Ulster. It has been prompted not by us, but the question is one of the effect which will be produced upon the Army of this country if they are called upon to use violence against their fellow subjects in Ulster. That is a question which, with or without Mr. Churchill's permission, is being asked at this moment wherever thoughtful men are discussing the problem of Ulster."
  The right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken used this langauge the day before:
  "When the Attorney-General said he would meet force with force, what he meant was that he and his Friends would place at the disposal of the Nationalist party, which kept him in office, as the result of a corrupt bargain, the forces of the English Crown. He said to the Government: 'Try it if they dare!' He said the instrument would break in their hands, and he said it would not be their fault if the Government succeeded."
  Even earlier than that the right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Carson), on 12th July, said:—
  "The Government know perfectly well that they could not to-morrow rely upon the Army to shoot down the people of Ulster. The Army are with us, and for this reason, that the British Army have never been guilty of treachery."
  [Cheers.] Every cheer on these sentiments is an admission of the charge I am making. The Prime Minister had to deal with the statement of Lord Lansdowne, and he did so at Leeds in language with which the House is familiar. I will only read the operative sentences:—
  "In many of the recent utterances, even of responsible statesmen like Lord Lansdowne, there is, expressed or implied, what I described some time ago as the whole gospel of anarchy.' If you once lay down that the individual Citizen has in his own bosom a dispensing authority which entitles him to offer armed resistance to the law of the land, and, further, that the servants of the State, be they soldiers or police, be they officers or men, may discriminate at will between the binding force of the various orders which from time to time they receive from those above them—I say it, and I say it with all scleamnity—once accept such a doctrine as that, do not he blind enough to suppose that its application will be confined to a particular case."
  After a serious warning of that kind, the Leader of the Conservative party spoke at
  908
  Dublin—not far from the Curragh. This is what he said:—
  "I ask him [the Prime Minister] to turn his mind to the history of the great Revolution. Then the country arose against a tyranny. It was the tyranny of a king, but other people besides kings can exercise tyranny, and other people besides kings can be treated in the same way."
  I am not in the least quarrelling with the sentiments. I am pointing out that this is part of an organised campaign to seduce the Army. He said:—
  "In order to carry out his despotic intention the King had the largest paid Army which had ever been seen in England. What happened? There was no civil war. There was a Revolution and the King disappeared. Why? Because his own Army refused to fight for him."
  I am not going to base my interpretation of these statements upon any Liberal opinion or upon my own opinion. It is quite clear what they mean, and what they were understood to mean. I will take Conservative opinion. Lord Derby, speaking at Blackburn a few days later, said:—
  "There is one matter on which to a certain extent I am in agreement with Mr. Asquith, and that is as to what would be the duties of His Majesty's troops if there was armed resistance. I myself have served, as probably have many of you in this room, for some time in the Army. You may have served in the Auxiliary Forces, but we were both bound by the same law that binds those who are serving at present. That law was that we have no politics in the Army. and, right or wrong, we have got to do what we are told."
  Lord Selborne, speaking two days later, said:—
  "He would never hear, at the time of this crisis or any other crisis, the suggestion that it could be the duty of the Army to refuse to obey orders. The duty of a soldier, be he efficer or private, was obedience to lawful commands."
  It is quite clear that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Conservative party, in his campaign for the seduction of the Army, was rebuked even by friendly critics of his own party. The last of these quotations with which I shall burden the House was Lord Roberts' letter written to a correspondent, and published in the newspapers on 9th March. In that letter he said:—
  "In answer to your inquiry, I am advised on high authority that the British Covenant cannot possibly be held to conflict with the military duty of any officer or man of the Territorial Force…"
  What are the terms of the Covenant?
  "I of shall hold myself justified in taking or supporting any action that may be effective to prevent it [the Home Rule Bill] being put into operation, and more particularly to prevent the armed forces of the Crown being used to deprive the people of Ulster of their rights as citizens of the United Kingdom."
  Here you get this Field-Marshal, who has commanded the largest British Army in the field, signing the Covenant and asking

  909
  others to do so, and urging that any means which may be effective should be taken to prevent the Army from obeying its orders? If this has been done by the leaders, what have the followers been doing. I do not know whether the hon. Member for the Ludlow Division of Shropshire is in his place. I have here a document furnished to me from the War Office, of which I will read the last paragraphs. I am quite ready to lay the document on the Table if it is desired. This document was sent out with "Mr. Rowland Hunt's compliments." It is addressed to the sergeant-major of a battalion of Grenadier Guards quartered in London, and is one of similar documents sent steadily during the last two or three months to officers and non-commissioned officers of regiments in different parts of the country. The hon. Member for the Ludlow Division writes on House of Commons notepaper. After a long recital in very violent terms of the ordinary party points in this controversy, the hon. Member concludes by saying that
  "British officers will certainly refuse to lead their men against the loyalists of Ulster, so that if there is any bluff it comes not from Ulster, but from Mr. Redmond and his obedient Servant the Prime Minister of England. It is to be hoped that British officers will find means of letting Mr. Asquith know that they will resign if the Home Rule Bill is sent to the King for signature before it is submitted to the people. Every loyal Territorial officer will have no difficulties about resigning, and surely should do so to prevent civil war in Ireland, and to prevent the King from being placed in an impossible position."
  The document also states that the Nationalist papers described the "soldiers of the Yorkshire and Berkshire regiments as 'little wretches,' and compares them with the pigs of the same breeds in Tipperary. Yet these are the little wretches whom Mr. Redmond is going to compel the Prime Minister to use to make war on Ulster—to coerce and shoot down most loyal subjects of the King." I am well aware that the sentiment is highly approved of by hon. Members opposite. I am not dealing with the sentiment with which we are familiar. The point I am making is that that is not the kind of document which should be sent by a Member of this House on House of Commons notepaper to a sergeant-major of a battalion of Grenadiers. I have been reproached for saying that the issue which is now being raised is the issue of the Army versus Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken said with great force, "What wrong has the Army done?" If fault there be, it is not the fault of the Army. The fault lies there [pointing to the Opposition Benches] with the Unionist party.
  Mr. F. E. SMITH: What, fault have the Army officers up to the present time committed?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: My charge is not directed against the Army officers. [An HON. MEMBER: "Yes, it is."] My charge is directed against the Leaders of the Conservative party, and I say that the fault, if fault there be, of raising this issue of the Army against Parliament lies with them, because they have been trying to force an election a few months earlier by creating a state of rebellion in one part of His Majesty's dominions, and trying to paralyse the use of the Army against that rebellion. This is what I call bringing the Army into politics. What did the right hon. Gentleman say only on Saturday night? He said:—
  "The Unionist Party under the circumstances came to the conclusion that one of those supreme crises had arisen in the history of the nation which justified men, grave as the responsibility was, in appealing from the despotism of a corrupt Parliament to the arbitrament of the sword."
  I pause to admire the martial spirit of the right hon. Gentleman in appealing to the arbitrament of the sword after he has assured himself and made quite certain, as he tells us, that the sword of the Army will not be available for use against him. No doubt it was a very exhilirating picture to raise in the minds of the Junior Imperial League he was addressing—the picture of the gallant Covenanting Orangemen hunting the Nationalists into their quarters in Belfast, and the picture of the British Army, with its Lancers and Artillery chasing and hunting Radicals and Labour men in this country. I am taking the right hon. and learned Gentleman severely at his word. I am saying that when he says lie will appeal from a corrupt Parliament to the arbitrament of the sword, he is saying in almost the same identical words what we have said: That the Conservative party are now raising the issue of the Army versus Parliament. More than that, not only is the Army being used as a political weapon, but we are told that its use has already been effective. Sir Edward Clarke, in a letter to the "Times," said:—"What is the good of troubling about the concessions now? The Home Rule Bill is dead. The events of the last few days have killed it." The "Morning Post" says in so many words:—
  "The Army has killed the Home Rule Bill, and the sooner the Government recognise the fact the better for the country."
  What about raising the issue of the Army versus Parliament? It is not speeches

  911
  which make the issues at General Elections, but events—the strong drift of circumstances. The Conservative party have raised this issue, and nothing can lay the issue now except a general settlement of the vexed question outstanding between parties with regard to Ireland. If that issue is not laid, if it proceeds, as it must proceed, to be one of the great controversies of our public life, then it is quite certain that the Army will itself be shattered just as the veto of the House of Lords was exploited and then shattered. We have tried to the best of our ability during our tenure of office sedulously to exclude politics from the Army. We have never made political opinions or inclinations any test or witness for high command during all these eight and a half years. We have continued to appoint to the greatest positions of trust and confidence in the armed forces both by land and sea men who, it was known, held opinions totally different from those whom we represent. But I say that is should be a point of honour with naval and military officers, in consideration of these broad principles of British public life, to keep themselves sedulously excluded from any connection with politics, and to resist altogether attempts to tamper with the impartial discharge of their duties. It is their duty to obey the orders which they receive—[HON. MEMBERS: "So they do"]—and in doing so they may also have the confidence that no order will be given which it is not right and fair to ask them to obey.
  The right hon. Gentleman in the last few words of his speech made some remarks of a more friendly and conciliatory nature. He spoke to the House solemn words of warning. We are well aware of the grave dangers towards which we are now moving, but we have made a great effort towards conciliation. Our effort has been scorned and spurned. If the party opposite desire to move forward to meet the great advance which has been made the step rests with them; it does not rest with us. And any step which may be made by them, or may be made by the Ulstermen, to meet their fellow-subjects in the rest of Ireland, will not be received in any spirit wanting in generosity or wanting in a reasonable desire to effect a settlement. If that spirit supervenes in our Debates a happier prospect may be in store for us than that which we now see. But while we are confronted with a refusal even to
  912
  consider fairly the great efforts which we have made towards a settlement, while every proposal which we make for a settlement is simply twisted into a weapon for frustrating the whole policy of Home Rule and breaking down the whole working of the Parliament Act, we are bound to move forward. In spite of every threat that may be urged against us, and in spite of the dangers which those threats, if they are carried out, must necessarily entail, whatever the consequences and whatever the risk may be to ourselves, while we are resisted in the spirit which has been shown, we have no other choice and no other intention but to go steadily on.
  Captain TRYON: In considering the closing sentences of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, we had better not inquire too closely into what was the name of that distinguished man who deserted in an historic instance from one side to the other. But I would say this to our opponents on the other side: I have served myself in the Army, and I do not think that anybody who has not done so knows what it means to a man who has served in the Army to hear these grave questions of discipline treated with laughter by Members on the other side of the House. The discipline of the Army is a matter of vital importance to this country. We have heard a great deal about the effect of the Army upon Parliament. I would ask hon. Members opposite to consider for a minute the effect of the action of this Parliament upon the Army. We all know the origin of these speeches that were made the other day against the British Army. We know that, thanks to the "Westminster Gazette":—
  "We hear that the Labour Members have all received correspondence from the country that leaves them in no doubt that they can increase their representation in the House of Commons with such a battle-cry."
  I cannot help thinking that in a grave time for our nation like this the Labour party might think of something more important than a battle-cry at the General Election. Several years ago most of us present took part in a General Election. In 1906 the Liberal party were returned. They were about to bring in a period of universal peace. So happy was the world to become because a Liberal Government had been returned to Westminster that armaments were to be reduced, expenditure cut down, and the world was to live very happily together. If those who carry their mind back to that day were to come back

  913
  to this House from abroad and listen to the Debates, they would realise into what a state the country has got under the guidance of the present Government. May I say that we are all agreed with the new Army Order which was solemnly read out to the House. The first statement is that these officers never ought to have been asked the question which they were asked. The second is that they ought not to have asked for assurances. But I would point out that they would never have asked for assurances if they had not previously been asked questions; and may I say that I do not think any officers of the Army are likely to ask for assurances from the present Government again, because when they get them initialled by a Cabinet Minister, for all they know, the Cabinet may be at luncheon and the assurances may be of no use!
  What is it that those who are proposing to fight the next election on the Army against the people are asking for? What was the paragraph which was so objectionable to hon. Members on the other side? It was this: They claim the right too Crush political opposition to the policy and principle of the Home Rule Bill by the Army. We should prefer to find a more peaceful solution. If the Labour party are really going to go to the country and to demand the use of the Army to force the Bill upon any section of this country, are the party that used to ask for the right to work going to ask for the right to shoot? What we want is not a General Election which would be fought in a way that would do infinite harm to the Army and, as I believe, no good to the Liberal Government in the end, even if they did win a General Election. We think that the Government ought to find a way out of the great difficulty in which they have placed our nation. We see no reason why the Labour party should make this bitter attack upon the officers of the Army. What is the charge against the officers in the Army? That they have refused to be the instrument of the Labour party in shooting down the working classes of Belfast. Is that what is complained of? Do the Labour party suggest that if the present class of officers were withdrawn from the Army and men were substituted who had risen from the working classes, those men would be any more willing to be their subservient instruments in this great national civil war which may come upon us?
  914
  We believe that another course ought to be adopted. I will not go now at any length into the varied military combinations which we have had in this country. There are times when the operation of war is rendered particularly difficult by the combination for effective action between the Army and the Navy. I would suggest that when these operations are being made Cabinet Ministers should not involve themselves in the military operations concerned by making provocative speeches at the time that these military operations are in progress. We are told that the power of the Army may be used to settle the Home Rule question. I have heard various cases where similar difficulties have arisen, and where these difficulties have been solved without the use of arms, and I offer them with respect to hon. Members opposite for their consideration. After the great war in the United States, the war which is generally called the War of Independence, it was proposed to start a new Parliament, but the people of New York State objected to come into that Parliament. They did not, do what the party of progress would do. They did not threaten them with troops. They did not try to force the union upon them with the people of the other States; but they said that the fate of New York State must be decided by the people of that State. They did not send armies against New York State: they sent one of the greatest men who ever lived, they sent Alexander Hamilton. He went to persuade the people of New York State that it was their interest to join in this new Parliament. After prolonged interviews, they accepted that position, and they went into that Parliament.
  I say to hon. Members opposite that if their policy is a good one it would be better to try to persuade the people of Ulster to go into this new Parliament and not to send troops against them. Those who are familiar with the history of our Colonies will know that the history of British Columbia was a somewhat parallel one. They came, when they wished to come, into the Dominion. There is the case of Newfoundland now. They stay out, and will be left out, until they wish to come in. There was the case of the Western Australian State. Is there anybody on the other side of the House, however much he shouts against the Army now, who will suggest that the Western State of Australia should have been compelled by force of arms to come into the

  915
  Commonwealth Parliament when she did not want to come in? Was it not better to wait until Western Australia wanted to come in and then let her come in? There was the case within the last two or three days of Rhodesia. The great mass of white people in South Africa wish to have a Union Parliament, as they have, but they are not going to compel Rhodesia to come under their Parliament. Rhodesia is to remain out until it wishes to come in. Why cannot you do the same by Ulster? There is a much better case in Natal, which I commend to the attention of hon. Members opposite. The new Union Parliament in South Africa was to be set up. The people of South Africa abandoned the principle of Home Rule. They gave up their little local parliaments. They desired to have a Union Parliament, and they called it the Union Parliament to mark their idea that its principle was the principle of union, the policy which we advocate. But the people of Natal were allowed to vote whether they would come in or not. Nobody suggests, and hon. Members opposite would not suggest that Natal ought to have been compelled by force of arms to come into the Union Parliament.
  Think what a strain hon. Members opposite would have placed upon the British Army in South Africa if they had told the British Army that they had got to compel the British people of Natal to go under the Union Parliament, which was mainly Dutch in its majority, and that they would be forced to do so by the Army. Is if not better to let the people of Natal, as was done, settle for themselves whether they would go in or not? There was another case which afforded a similar instance to this case, in which there was a suggestion of using force. I need hardly say that that was a case in which the present Liberal Government were concerned. That was the case of Scutari. When the people of Montenegro were extending their national boundaries as a result of the war, the question arose as to whether Scutari was to go under their Government, just as Belfast does not want to go under this Dublin Parliament; and His Majesty's Government, with the Powers of Europe, intervened to oppose the placing of this one single town under the Government under which they did not wish to go, and as I do not suppose that the Government was bluffing, it is only fair to assume that if they had not been able
  916
  to obtain what they wanted they would have used the Navy—I suppose that very few troops were available—in cooperation with other Powers, to prevent Scutari from passing into the hands of Montenegro.
  7.0 P.M.
  But the Liberal Government might have been in rather a difficult position, because they might have wanted to use battleships, and the question might have arisen whether those ships should be sent South to enforce one principle and save the people of Scutari, or whether they should not be sent North to enforce exactly the opposite principle on the people of Belfast. That is one case where there has been a possibility of the use of force; and when the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs tells us with regard to this question that force may have to be used, I ask him and hon. Members on the other side whether it would not be better to let the people of Ulster decide the fate of Ulster rather than to endeavour to compel them by force of arms to go under a Parliament which they detest? We have now been in this Parliament for, I suppose, four Sessions, and it depends on what happens in the next few weeks whether this Parliament will be known in history as the Parliament which brought about civil war in this country. I am, of course, completely opposed to Home Rule, but I do say that if civil war arises, it will be because the Government have refused to allow the people of Ulster the right to decide their own fate. I cannot help thinking that in this great crisis, and with these great issues at stake, the Government would be well advised not to fight a General Election on the cry of the Army against the people, but to see whether the people, for whom they profess to speak, might not be allowed to settle this question by their votes.
  Mr. BRACE: No one who has listened to the debates upon this very serious matter can fail to realise that the House of Commons and the nation and the Government are faced with questions of great responsibility. For us to attempt to leave the Army out of our discussions in connection with Ulster and Home Rule has been made quite impossible by the action and conduct of the Leaders of the Conservative party in the House of Commons, and their Press outside. Speaking from the Labour standpoint, we are sick and tired of Parliament giving up its valuable time day after day and week

  917
  after week, to discussions of this character, when great measures of social reform are failing to get recognition in this House for want of time and opportunity for their consideration. I know that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has given an undertaking to introduce an amending Bill for our great mining industry, yet here we are, well into half the Session, without the Bill being introduced, the House of Commons having to give up all its time to the consideration of Ulster and the question of the Army. We have heard some talk about an arrangement. The Labour party desire to see a settlement by arrangement if possible, but that arrangement must be in conformity with the principles not only of the Home Rule Bill but the principle of the Parliament Act as well. When we fought the election upon the Parliament Act, we fought it to determine, as we thought, once and for all, the right of the people to govern in their own way through their own House of Representatives. I am sorry to say, and it is much to be regretted, that the issue of the Army has now been raised. We cannot help ourselves. Whether we like it or not, the country will raise it. In meetings we have been addressing quite recently we have found not only that there is great feeling amongst the masses, but there is fierce feeling amongst the masses, at this attempt to bring the Army in to overawe Parliament, which is the House of the people.
  As a Labour party leader, I have been much distressed in mind as to the future. We have to conduct great campaigns where many more people are interested than the Army which has been created for Ulster. My own organisation has a membership of 700,000. If it is to be the Army versus the people, the first thing we shall have to do is to go and organise to protect ourselves, and when we go and organise we shall be put into prison because of a violation of the law. Yet the masses of the people will ask: "By what right are Labour leaders to be imprisoned for attempting to deal, as they have done, with the Army, getting their sympathy and support on behalf of the working classes, if other leaders in this country are to be allowed to do just what they like." In 1915 this country will be faced by very serious Labour questions. It cannot help itself. In 1915 the Miners' Conciliation Board's agreement will terminate; in 1915 the Minimum Age Act will terminate, and will
  918
  have to be renewed with substantial amendments; in 1915 there will be a great forward movement to improve the condition of the great army of labour; side by side with this, the whole programme of the railway workers will be reaching its culminating point; and, in addition to that, the transport workers are preparing to make a great step forward. That is the kind of conditions in which the precedents that are being established in these days will come home with enormous and destructive power. Suppose I have to address a great demonstration, as I probably shall if I am alive, and the workmen are being moved to great passion, not only because of the feelings created in connection with their programmes, but because of the want of food after a stoppage of some months. Their passions will develop into the channel of wanting to wreck vengeance on somebody or something, the police force will not be sufficient to deal with them, and the military will be brought out.
  Are we to be at liberty to go to the rank and file of the Army, the privates, the corporals, and the sergeants, who are of our class, and say to them, "It is now a part of the British Constitution that you men may please yourselves and act according to your conscience. We are going to have a bit of a row here, therefore we ask you not to interfere;" and then the common soldiers say, "Very well, you can do just what you like, and we will not interfere with you." That would be the beginning of the end of this country. It is because we prefer to move along the lines of constitutional and evolutionary reform rather than risk revolution that we are aghast at this doctrine that is being preached and is being practised in these days. It is impossible for anybody to say that the question of the Army has not been raised. It has been raised, and it has been raised by the very people who, one would have thought, would have been more than careful not to raise it. Now that they have raised it it is bound to be a great issue at the next election, whether we like it or not. The Army as at present constituted is officered from among members of the aristocracy. They are men of great courage, men who have always been prepared to risk their lives in defence of their country. We are ready to recognise that. But when the officers of the Army think that they are a class and a caste, and not members of the nation and officers and servants of Parliament, to carry out Parliament's orders, then we must be sure,

  919
  when labour wants a reconstituted standard of living, that the Army is a democratic Army and an Army which is approved. Consequently, the issue raised in this Debate has made it compulsory on our part that, in future Debates in connection with the Army, the Labour party must take an active part in an endeavour to mould the Army and establish it upon more democratic lines.
  We shall want in future to have an Army constituted—practically as well as theoretically—so that the right of way shall be clear for the private soldier to work his way up to the very highest position that is offered in connection with the Service. If we are to do that, we shall have to create conditions in which they will feel that they can make a career in the Army. Therefore, salary will have to be considered, and a lot of nonsense connected with Army work will have to be abolished—all the nonsense, for instance, about expensive uniforms for purposes of the Service. If we open the way in the Army for men of the rank and file, I verily believe that there is plenty of brain knowledge available. I believe that if all the officers resigned to-morrow, there would be no difficulty in equipping the Army with officers from among the sergeants and sergeant-majors, men of high standard and intellectual capacity. But it is the cost of running the Army with its officers that makes it almost impossible, or practically impossible, for the private soldier to work his way right up to the top. The masses of the people are asking very serious and very disturbing questions. When we come down to this House and hear these Debates we do get to understand something of what lies behind the questions discussed, but the masses of the people do not understand, and to my great regret I have to say that there is a profound conviction prevailing that the laws of this country, while theoretically the same for rich and poor, are not administered in that spirit. No State can live with that belief prevailing among the masses of the people. I have never made myself responsible for any such doctrine. I know the danger of the doctrine. I know what it is to have to lead men in unpopular movements; I know what it means to rouse the passions of men; I know how fierce bodies of men can become, how easily passion can be aroused. Consequently I leave that temperament and spirit at rest as long as possible.
  920
  But the action of hon. Gentlemen and right hon. Gentlemen opposite has aroused that spirit, and there is a belief prevailing in this country to-day that there is a different application of the law to the rich as compared with the poor. There is another feeling prevailing, and it is that an attempt is being made to overawe and to influence Parliament through sources that ought not to be possible. I was pleased to hear the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister make the statement that His Majesty did not intervene. If His Majesty had interfered, we could not have helped making it a—[HON. MEMBERS: "Order, order!"] Surely I am entitled to say that. I said nothing disrespectful of the King. I wish to state very clearly the issue that has to be discussed, and I am expressing my thankfulness that that is not an issue for the next General Election. I have always held that the symbols of our nationality—the Throne, the Flag, and the military and naval forces, ought to be outside party political controversy altogether. The people are saying, and I am saying, that we can neither allow Court, nor Army, or anybody else to interfere with Parliament in the exercise of its rights to make its own legislation, in its own way. I would prefer to wait for many years to see the programme and policies that I support being brought into operation rather than I would take any risk such as we have heard being talked about. The Home Rule Bill was a subject before the electors, and, so far as the electors of Great Britain are concerned, they have settled it. They will not make it another issue. This question of the Army is a serious issue. The Labour party knows what lies before them in dealing with great bodies of the people, and they are afraid. The Conservative Opposition of this House have raised issues that cannot be put down without the labouring people coming to the conclusion that there is going to be an appeal to the forces which the Army represents. I know that is not so; but how are you going to get great masses of the people to know that in face of the quotations that have been made this afternoon? They are startling and staggering in their newness, and they are a cancellation of all law and order, so much so, that I am very nearly coming to the conclusion that the Labour party is the only party here which can claim to be representative of law and order.

  921
  The hon. Gentleman who spoke last said something about the conditions in the Memorandum from the War Office, and he thought that the Army officers had a right to be aggrieved because the War Minister attached his signature to two clauses which had to be withdrawn. I am bound to say that I am sorry for this misconception. There has been some very bad muddling, there is no doubt about that, and muddling that would not be tolerated in a trade union. I was amazed to know that any such thing could happen in a Government Department in this country, as to have two clauses added to a Cabinet Memorandum. It is no wonder some people talk about a business Government. May I say, and with all seriousness, that if that Memorandum with the two clauses signed by the War Minister and by the two representatives of the Army Council was part of a Cabinet document, the Government would not have lived twenty-four hours. We could not, as a Labour party, have allowed any such conditions to be laid down. The Noble Lord opposite, who is always interesting, I daresay is of opinion that the Labour party have no principles. Hon. Members opposite in their moods of gayness are disposed to say that about us. The Labour party have very fixed principles, and not the least of them is the establishment and carrying into active operation the Parliament Act. We are looking forward to the time when we shall have a Labour Government in power, and we do not want obstacles at the other end of the corridor to prevent us carrying out the advanced legislation which we shall propose, and endeavour to put on the Statute Book. To no section of the British people is the successful carrying into operation of the Parliament Act more necessary than to the Labour people. When hon. Members think that we are not prepared to take risks in voting for certain Motions that they put forward because of a fear of interfering with the actual realisation of what the Parliament Act means, they are very apt to conclude that the Labour party are not very consistent in their principles.
  The Labour party, as well as the party opposite, know where they are off to, and they know that they are not going to attempt to defeat the Government upon non-essentials, but let the Government make itself responsible for something of a fundamental character affecting the rights and liberties of the democracy of Great Britain such as was embodied in that
  922
  Army Order, and Government, or no Government, the Labour party would have gone unanimously into the Lobby for the defeat of the Government that would allow anything of that kind to be put into operation. I say, and with all emphasis, that the Army must be the instrument of the people. The action of the Army officers has frightened the labouring people. We have come to the conclusion that the Army officers are not to be trusted in a crisis when principles and the welfare of the democracy would be at stake, and, consequently, we shall learn this lesson from this controversy, that we must democratise the Army, and in future we must concentrate upon that fact. When we go to the country at the next General Election hon. Members, say what they may, will find that the issue, one of the issues, if not the real issue, will be as to whether the Army or Parliament is to prevail in enacting laws for the Government of this great and free people.
  Mr. SANDYS: The hon. Member who has just addressed the House, speaking on behalf of the Labour party, let us into some of the secrets, I think, of the party, and the influence, no doubt, which they were able to bring to bear upon the Cabinet in its latest consideration of this question, as I think he said that if the Labour party came to the conclusion that the Cabinet as a Cabinet had been interfering in this matter, they would not tolerate the Cabinet or support them for another twenty-four hours. I do not think I should be wrong in saying they will have an opportunity later on in this Debate of showing whether they are determined to give effect to the statement of the hon. Gentleman. I do not want to anticipate anything, but we generally understand that a statement has been made which will afford us another opportunity of seeing how much sincerity there is in any of the statements which come from hon. Members below the Gangway opposite. I quite agree with the hon. Member that the position is extremely serious. I am almost inclined to agree with his statement that it is the beginning of the end. He objects strongly to the policy of placing before any of the military forces of the Crown any suggestion that an alternative can be presented to them at any time when they are called upon to execute an order. But that doctrine is not one which is brought forward from these benches. It is a doctrine which was brought forward for the first

  923
  time in the history of the Army by the late Secretary of State for War.
  Therefore, if the hon. Member objects to that principle, let him show his resentment not against us, but against the Government. He desires an Army on a more democratic basis than that which we possess to-day. I am strongly in support of any proposals of that kind, and so far as I am concerned, I think I gave personal evidence of my own views last year, when I introduced into this House a Bill for national service in the Territorial Force, in which I made special provision that all commissions should be granted to the ranks. But if the hon. Member really desires a democratic Army of this kind, I would like to remind him that it would be practically impossible to put any proposals of that kind into effect until he and his Friends will support the principle of national service, of universal service, for every able-bodied man in the country. I have seen some remarkable changes which have taken place in the views of the Labour party during the last few days, and it seems to me they are coming round to this extraordinary position, that they are supporting the principles of a scheme of national service, and that now, by this ironical turn which events have taken, they are coming to be upholders of a proposal which only a short time ago they regarded as one of the most dangerous that could be suggested.
  As one who has served in the Army I do desire from the bottom of my heart that this dangerous situation should be brought to a close at the earliest possible moment. I am not merely thinking of the position in this country, with which I shall deal later on, but I am thinking a great deal about our position abroad, about our reputation in the eyes of foreign countries, which I cannot help thinking must be grievously suffering by these disastrous events of the last few weeks. I am thinking of our position as the Mother Country of this great Empire holding out an example, as we ought to do, in all these Imperial matters, to the Dominions beyond the seas, and I cannot help thinking, above all, of the serious blow which the events of the last few days must have dealt to our position in India. In this country we are chiefly concerned with the events which are taking place in these islands. The
  924
  situation is impossible when any GOVernment—I do not care to what party it belongs—that is in power has lost its undisputed authority over the armed Forces of the Crown. That constitutes, in my view, a most serious and dangerous situation. Although for the moment we are not feeling the actual effects of it, we are really existing in a state of anarchy, for that is what it amounts to when any Government has lost its full authority over its armed forces. And unless some decisive step is taken by the Government to recover its prestige and to restore that which it has lost by its own blunders and mismanagement, then this country, I fear, must drift eventually to that which we all hope may be avoided—a state of civil war.
  The Government and the Cabinet, by a series of unpardonable blunders, have brought us to this situation, and I say the Cabinet with deliberation, because I do not think it is part of our duty to examine into the exact position which was occupied with regard to these matters by one member of the Cabinet or another member. I do not think we are concerned with those domestic relations between the various Members of the Government. I still hold with the theory of the collective responsibility of the whole Cabinet; I believe in their joint responsibility; and I am convinced that once we diverge from that wholesome constitutional doctrine, we shall enter into very grave difficulties. I do not know how far the Prime Minister was aware of these events. In the speech which was made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Walton (Mr. F. E. Smith) he brought forward, as it seemed to me, incontrovertible evidence that the whole of the Cabinet were really privy to these matters. I do not care whether the Prime Minister knew or not. If he did not know, it obviously was his duty to know, and consequently he must accept the full responsibility for what has occurred. I do not attach any importance to those new Orders which were issued last Friday. They are a mere repetition of what we who have served in the Army knew perfectly well without any new Orders being issued with all this solemnity by the right hon. Gentleman last Friday, as if this was a complete solution of the crisis. We have known all this ever since we joined as second lieutenants. The novelty is the first Order, in which the State lays down the very salutary principle that

  925
  questions are not to be put to soldiers—and, of course, it applies to all ranks—as to how in certain contingencies they would or would not act. Such an Order ought never to, and would never have been necessary until it was made necessary by the action, not of the Army, but of the Government. These new Orders will not restore the authority or prestige of the Government. If the Government really wish to place themselves in a proper position in their relationship with the armed forces of the Crown, it is their duty to clear up this situation from the first. The events of the last week really turn on the orders issued by the Secretary of State to General Paget and the orders transmitted by him to the officers under his command. Until we know exactly what occurred—and it is absurd for the Government to pretend that they cannot place this information at our disposal—the situation of difficulty, crisis, and uncertainty will continue. It is absurd to think that they can conceal what actually happened when Sir Arthur Paget interviewed his officers. What was said on that occasion was known to some fifty or sixty men who were present. By this time it is known throughout the whole Army. Do you think there has been any other topic of conversation in officers' mess, barrack room or canteen, since this discussion originated? Everybody throughout the whole of the Army knows what occurred on that occasion. It would be to everybody's advantage, whatever mistakes were made, that the Government should now make a clean breast of the whole matter.
  It is most unfortunate that these orders, upon which so much depended, and upon which the whole difficulty has turned, were verbal orders at the start. The Secretary of State for War, in his original speech, said that they were verbal orders, "as they always should be on these occasions." Why? I cannot see why, unless it was that this matter had been very carefully considered for weeks and months beforehand, and the Government were leading these officers, and especially General Paget, into a trap from which there was no escape whatever. What is the position of officers in regard to the execution of orders given by their superiors? During this controversy my mind has gone back to an episode which is one of the worst stains upon British history, and which has come down to us under the name of the Massacre of Glencoe. Here orders
  926
  were issued by the Royal authority, signed, it is said, though there is some dispute, by the King's own hand—orders of fire and sword against the chieftain of the Clan of Macdonald and his men. Those orders were transmitted from the civil authorities to the high military officers who were in command of the troops in Scotland at the time. Those high military officers transmitted the orders to their subordinates, who were charged with their execution. The orders were carried into effect by those subordinate military officers, and thirty-eight Highlanders of the Clan of Macdonald perished at the hands of the troops. For a long time this terrible event was unknown, but gradually the news penetrated into England, and to the Continent. There was an outburst of indignation, not only in Scotland, but throughout the whole of England, which shook the King upon his Throne. A Parliamentary Commission was appointed to inquire into the whole question. The responsibility, so far as the Sovereign and the high officials of the State were concerned, was glossed over. There was "an honest misunderstanding." Where did the retribution fall? It fell upon the subordinate officers who carried out the deed. No excuse was accepted from them that they were carrying out the orders which their superior officers had given them. To Captain Campbell, of Glenlyon, who was the man particularly concerned, it was made perfectly clear that he should have resigned his commission and subjected himself to a court-martial rather than obey orders which were contrary to his conscience and his honour. The Commission reported that these officers should be tried for murder, and they escaped the charge and certain condemnation only by flying the country. The names of these men, whom the Labour party would hold up to us as ideals in their military conduct, have come down to posterity not as models of military discipline, but as men who brought dishonour and disgrace upon the profession to which they belonged.
  I want to put before the House what would have happened supposing events had turned out differently in Ireland. Supposing that General Gough had been willing to play the part of Captain Campbell of Glenlyon, that an outbreak had been provoked, and that not thirty-eight Highlanders, but a large number of persons had perished as a result of this movement of troops. On the Monday after those events had taken place the Press

  927
  would, indeed, have been in a blaze; there would have been against the Government an outcry which would have resounded from one end of Great Britain to the other. We know perfectly well what would have happened. I know what would have occurred in this House. The Members of the Government would have made very similar speeches to those which they actually made on Monday. They would have said that there was an honest misunderstanding, that General Paget and the officers under him had grossly exceeded their orders, that that was no responsibility upon the Government, that the responsibility rested upon the officers in Ireland, who had entirely misunderstood the orders which had been transmitted by the Secretary of State for War. The Prime Minister, in those weighty phrases of which he is a master, would have assured us that the examination of those events should be made before the proper military tribunal, and that punishment should be awarded to the guilty. That is the reason why these were verbal orders, "as they always should be," as the Secretary of State added. I can imagine the satisfaction with which the Prime Minister would have acquitted himself of this public duty.
  I am sorry to detain the House, but I wish to deal for one moment with the attitude taken up by the Labour party. From some of their speeches we might imagine that if there was one thing which the British officer and British soldier enjoyed it was being employed upon strike duty. Let me assure them that every officer and man in the British Army, from the General to the latest joined recruit, regards anything in the shape of strike duty as the most loathsome task he can possibly be asked to perform. I agree with Labour Members that on these occasions the military should be employed only as a last resort, and that these matters are far better settled by the civil forces at the disposal of the authorities. There are other points of view which must occur to everyone, but I object to such employment of the military from a military point of view, because it creates between the Army and the industrial population ill-feeling which it should be the duty of every patriotic citizen to avoid if possible. I object to it because it places officers and men in a position of responsibility and difficulty which can hardly be overestimated or exaggerated. I object
  928
  to it, also, unless it is absolutely unavoidable, because it is a sign, not of strength, but of weakness. This has been especially the case in regard to the present Government, who have on a great many occasions—I do not know how many, but on far more occasions than has ever happened before—called in the military for this work.
  What is the attitude of the Labour party on the question? I have heard many speeches made by Labour Members. and this is in effect what they have always said: "We believe that it is wrong to employ the troops to shoot down strikers who have been goaded to desperation by injustice." The hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. Ramsay Macdonald) wrote a letter to the "Times" a day or two ago, in which he said that the Ulster movement was analogous to a strike. Taking these two statements together, that it is wrong to shoot down strikers and that the Ulster movement is a strike, the Labour party have arrived at the extraordinary conclusion that therefore the Government should employ troops to shoot down people in Ulster. That is obviously false reasoning. Either the premises are wrong or the conclusion is wrong. If in their premises the Labour party are right, obviously they are wrong in their conclusion that it is the duty of the Government to employ troops to coerce Ulster. Their position appears to be so fundamentally unsound that it is really not capable of argument at all. It is the duty of the Government to restore its prestige and authority with the armed forces of the Crown. The disgraceful speeches which have been made in this House and on the platform against the Army will destroy such authority as the Government still possess. The position is becoming intolerable. Speeches such as the right hon. Gentleman made this afternoon will goad the Army and the Navy to desperation. We are told that the armed forces of the Crown are the servants of the Government. Supposing any ordinary employer of labour made these outrageous attacks upon the men who are in his employment—attacks upon their character and reputation, do you think—
  Mr. CAWLEY: What attacks, quote?
  Mr. SANDYS: It is perfectly obvious that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon was an attack upon the Army. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!" and "No, no!"] It was an attack, first of

  929
  all, upon the statements which have been made upon the speeches which have been delivered, and upon the letters which have been written by prominent Members on this side. [An HON. MEMBER: "Quite right, too!"] I would like to point out to the hon. Member opposite these statements which were made in regard to the Army. We point out—and everybody knows—that if this country is involved in civil war the armed forces of the Crown will inevitably be rent in twain. That always occurs in the case of civil war. The particular attack which the right hon. Gentleman delivered upon the Army this afternoon was to the effect that it had been seduced from its loyalty by a political party. [An HON. MEMBER: "Hear, hear!"] If what he said was not a reflection upon the Army I do not know what is.
  Lord ROBERT CECIL: Otherwise there was no point in the observation.
  Mr. SANDYS: That is my answer to the hon. Member. It is absolutely essential that this position should be brought to an end at the earliest possible moment. It is doing, as it has done, damage to our reputation upon the Continent, and it is seriously injuring our prestige throughout the British Empire, especially in India. I fear unless this tension is brought to a close at the earliest possible moment we shall drift into a disastrous civil war.
  Mr. MacCALLUM SCOTT: We have passed through a memorable and exciting week. During that week a larger number of illuminating speeches have been delivered in this House than I have heard delivered during the whole time I have been here. I think it a notable circumstance that of the speeches the most significant and the most epoch-making of them—if I may so describe it—came almost entirely from the benches opposite, and from the two benches in front of me. I think one of the consequences of these debates will be a change in the political nomenclature of this country. It is becoming clear that the constitutional party no longer sits upon these benches opposite. Indeed, it is clear that the constitutional party, the party which has made the greatest sacrifices for the Constitution, and which has maintained the Constitution against great temptations, is the party which hon. Members opposite have been accustomed to denounce as the revolutionary or anarchistic party—the
  930
  Labour party. I have watched for some years the manner in which the leaders of the Labour party have resisted the syndicalists and the revolutionary movement which has acquired considerable strength in the lower rank of the party. They have fought gallantly, and with much at stake.
  Members opposite often sneer about what Members of the Labour party and others will do for £400 a year. The Members who resisted that movement in their own ranks were risking not merely their £400 a year, not merely their position as Members of this House—they were risking their position as leaders of their class. They had all at stake; they resisted this movement, which it would have been easy to foment; they resisted it because they believed that our civilisation, that our government, that our democracy, can only be maintained by respecting and maintaining the Constitution against violence from whatever quarter. The hon. Member who has just sat down has referred to attacks upon the Army. I am not. here to attack the Army. What I propose to say tonight, if I may venture to say so in all sincerity, will be in defence of the Army and of the officers who have been attacked. The hon. Member, however, is mistaken when he attributes the attacks on the Army to this quarter of the House. I heard the Noble Lord the Member for Hitchin (Lord Robert Cecil) the other day say that Members in this quarter of the House believe that there was a conspiracy against representative government on the part of the Army. We do not believe so.
  Lord ROBERT CECIL: Hear, hear.
  Mr. MacCALLUM SCOTT: So far as I can judge, I see, as yet, no evidence of such a belief, but there is a conspiracy, and hon. Members sitting on the benches opposite are the conspirators! The hon. Member for Dundee himself said that they are engaged in a deliberate attempt to suborn the Army—I do not say all, many of them are not—but speeches have been delivered, incitements have been made, practically attempting to seduce the Army and to endeavour to induce the Army to disobey constituted authority and lawful orders. But, as I said, my object to-night is, in the first place, to say that I think the officers have been placed in a cruel position during these Debates. They have been liable to fire from two sides. They have been liable to fire from the newspapers, and from certain hon. Members opposite who

  931
  have addressed incitements to them—[HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"]—to be disloyal to the Constitution—[HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"]—and to endeavour to overthrow representative government. They have also been liable to attacks from Members on this side and from the Liberal Press—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—who have believed accusations made against the Army by hon. Members opposite, and who believed that hon. Members opposite had succeeded in the object which they set out to accomplish, namely, to foment rebellion in the Army. I say I think these officers have been cruelly ill-used and misused, and in two ways.
  I do not absolve even the Members of the Government, which I follow, in this matter. I say the officers have been misused and scandalously misused by these incitements which have been addressed to them, and they have also been placed in a cruelly false position by the blunders of the Government. The initial blunder was addressing to the officers a question which was grossly improper, and the accompaniment to that question was in its nature an ultimatum. I think it is unfortunate that we do not know the official version of the question which was put to these officers. Some effort ought to be made to give us the words of General Paget's recollection of the question which was in an oral manner—probably conversationally—addressed to these officers. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for that information, and I think it is a request which he is entitled to make. Not only he, but the House, is entitled to make it. It is the only way of completely clearing up the difficulty. A blunder has been made. It has been, as I believe, retrieved; but in order to retrieve it absolutely, in order to make a clean cut, the only sure and certain way is that the blunder must be clearly delimited in the first place, then its full nature will be understood. In the absence of an official version, the only version which we have before us is that which was submitted in an anonymous letter from some officer to whom the question was presumably addressed. I think four lines from that officer's letter give the exact nature of the question and the ultimatum:—
  "Officers who are not prepared to undertake active operations against Ulster for conscientious or other scruples were to send in their resignations and would be dismissed the Army."
  8.0 P.M.
  I do not cavil at the words "active operations." If the Army, in the observance of
  932
  its legal duty, is called upon to resist violence, to resist attacks upon constituted authority, and to protect property and life from rebellious attack, that is "active operations." That is clearly within the bounden duty of the Army if legally called upon. But, in the first place, the inquisition as to the private views of the officers and the threat with which it was accompanied, the threat of dismissal in the event of preferring to disobey orders when the option was given to them—these two things are subversive of discipline and incompatible with it. They are more than that. They are incompatible with the dignity which ought to attach to the position of an officer. I do not see how a man in such a position—that is in the position of an officer—can consent to take his orders in the form of an ultimatum. He expects to receive his orders, and if it is within the scope of his duty, to perform them. I make no scruple to say that if I, Home Ruler as I am personally, and prepared to enforce Home Rule by all legal means, if I had been in the position of these officers, in a situation like that, faced with an inquisition such as we must believe to be the case, I would have tendered my resignation, with the others, and accepted my dismissal, and I think it is by no means impossible that a number of those officers who did so were, in their private opinions, Home Rulers and political followers of the Government. I do not say so; I have no knowledge; I do not speak on behalf of the officers. There is no one entitled in this House to speak on behalf of the officers, except the Secretary of State for War, unless elected for the purpose. I speak not on behalf of them, but as a politician who is anxious not only to secure the enforcement of the policy he believes to be right, but is anxious to see justice and right done to all classes of the community, and to all classes of public servants, and especially to a class of public servants such as soldiers of all ranks who may be called upon to render such dangerous service. Leaving the inquisition for one moment, we come to the letter which was written by Brigadier General Gough. As the Prime Minister has already said, it is a perfectly fair and reasonable letter in the circumstances. There is no dispute about that. Why was that letter written? I think hon. Members opposite are largely responsible for that

  933
  letter being written, and largely responsible for the misapprehension and for the uneasiness and unrest existing in the mind of General Gough when he wrote that letter. An inquisition had been made, first as to his private views, and as to whether he was willing to obey certain orders, and in the circumstances he was naturally desirous of finding out what the nature of the orders were, and what their possible consequences would be.
  A monstrous myth has been created and fostered for their own purposes by some Members of this House that the Government intended to use the Army for illegal purposes, not for the purpose of maintaining order and defending civil authority, and protecting life and property, but for the purpose of initiating warlike proceedings and military operations against a quiet and peaceable people—a new massacre of Glencoe, I think the hon. Member who has just sat down suggested. That myth has been created. It has undoubtedly caused unrest among many people, and undoubtedly among many officers, and in these circumstances it cannot be denied that the inquisition having been made, Brigadier-General Gough was justified in the letter he wrote endeavouring to ascertain whether the orders which he was to carry out were for the protection of the civil authority, and the resistance of violence, or were orders for the Army to perform some illegal operations in the initiation of active military operations against a peaceable portion of the United Kingdom. And now we come to the second blunder which is made; the first blunder is one that is still wrapped in mystery, the exact dimensions of which have not been delimited, and about which we do not know the exact nature of the responsibility. The second blunder has been thoroughly cleared up and explained. It was the blunder in the documents sent to General Gough. The ex-Secretary of State for War has made a very frank and very manly statement of what I believe to be all the material circumstances connected with that blunder. I am convinced that there is not the slightest foundation for the attacks which have been made by several speakers, who cast doubt upon the honesty and sincerity of that statement by suggesting that it was merely offered to cover up some iniquitous criminal plot. The two paragraphs at the end of this letter contained, so far as I could read them, nothing that is false in substance. That was not the blunder. The blunder
  934
  did not consist in the fact that the paragraphs were an inaccurate statement of the law or the intentions of the Government.
  The blunder was not a blunder of substance but of form, in putting in a statement of that kind in a letter addressed to officers who were negotiating with the Government. It gave the appearance as if a treaty was being made by superior military authorities with subordinate military authorities. That also was subversive of discipline and largely destructive of discipline. It was a grave and serious blunder which has brought grave and serious consequences to all those connected with it, but I do not know there is anyone on this side of the House who disputes in the abstract these two paragraphs as a statement of what is true. Hon. Members opposite agree with that and that the new Army Order of Friday is simply a repetition with some additions of the matter contained in the peccant paragraphs. The whole point is that it was proper to make a statement of that kind in an Army Order addressed to the whole Army at large as a statement of its duties and responsibilities, but it was not proper to make it in a document addressed to individual officers as a result of negotiations in which it might have the appearance of being a treaty or a bargain. These blunders were grave and serious. They gave the Opposition an unexampled opportunity, which I venture to say will never occur again, of which they might have taken advantage if they had amongst them a man on their Front Bench able to take a statesmanlike view of the situation and permitted to do so. It was a gross blunder, but after all it was only a blunder, and it has been completely thrust into the background by the new issue which has been raised by hon. Members opposite—not by all of them, but by some of the most influential and able of them. It is hardly necessary to give further quotations after the many quotations that have been given by my right hon. Friend. I will only give one, and that is from the language used by the Leader of the Opposition. He claimed to speak for the officers, and he claimed to speak on behalf of the Army and to express their views with regard to the present Government. He said:—
  "Put yourselves in the position of an officer. He believes in his heart and conscience, as I do, that the Government are doing this thing without the consent of the country; that in pressing it forward without the approval of the country they are as much a revolutionary committee as President Huerta who is governing Mexico. That is really my position, and unless I

  935
  believed it I would not feel justified in the course I have taken. This is the position in which the soldier is placed."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th March, 1914, col. 433.]
  What right has the Leader of the Opposition to make that statement on behalf of the Army? That is an accusation against the Army—that is a foul and vicious charge against the Army. That statement will be memorable in the history of this country. I think it will stand on record against the right hon. Gentleman. I think it is a fatal sentence for his future career. It will hang round his neck like a millstone. It will make it impossible for the man who uttered that sentence, who gave that direct incitement to the great military forces of this country to rebel and overthrow the Government, simply because those on the Opposition benches described it as a revolutionary Government, to occupy the highest position in this country, and to be responsible for the control and maintenance, and for the discipline of the forces of this country. I have referred to the myth which hon. Members opposite have created, as to the intentions of this Government to make an illegal use of the Army, not for the purpose of defending the civil government and suppressing violence, and protecting lives and property, but for the purpose of active operations to compel people to give their consent to a measure which they hate. There is a great deal of misconception—popular misconception—I do not say it prevails here in this House, or that it prevails in the minds of those hon. Members who seem by their own words to entertain it—as to what is the use which the Government could make of the Army. To my mind the importance of this White Paper lies not so much in the narrative of the blunder as in the preliminary memorandum on the legal position of the Army, and the use that might be made of it in civil affairs. I find it laid down that a soldier is entitled to obey an order if that order is reasonable in the circumstances, and I find it laid down that in certain circumstances a soldier, in fact and in law, is justified in contemplating refusal to obey. It is denied that a soldier is justified in refusing to obey any lawful order, and it is not denied that a soldier is justified in refusing to obey any unlawful orders. The soldier is in a cruel position, and as Lord Haldane once said, he walks between two precipices. There is the precipice of martial law, and if he refuses to obey an order he may be tried by martial law. If
  936
  he obeys an order which is illegal, he is liable to be prosecuted in the ordinary Courts of law, and no orders will save him from the consequences of his act. The soldier in civil affairs is in the same position as the ordinary citizen. Any Member of this House or the general public in the event Of civil disturbance, riot or disorder or rebellion may be called upon to assist the civil authorities, and can be punished if he refuses to do so. The soldier is in no different position, save in this, that he happens to have a uniform and lethal weapons in his possession.
  It is obvious, in these circumstances, that the Army is not a weapon which may be used indiscriminately at the choice of any Government for the purpose of positively enforcing the law or taking the place of the ordinary civil authorities. There are two very good examples in the case of the passive resistance movement and the attempt to organise some resistance to the Insurance Act on the part of some employers. No doubt those two movements considerably embarrassed the Government, but it would have been quite illegal and impossible for the Government to have called out the military and used it to enforce the payment of the education rate, or to march into an employer's office and take the money out of his till to pay his insurance contribution. You have to rely on the ordinary civil authorities for the enforcement of the law, and on such protection as is afforded to those authorities against any violence which may be directed against them from any quarter. As I read over that Memorandum and reflected upon all that it involved, and as I considered the tactics of those who are leading this movement in Ulster, I came to the conclusion that we are faced in this matter of Home Rule, not by soldiers' weapons, but by lawyers' weapons. The law is obscure and difficult, and no effort will be spared by the able lawyer who leads this movement to entangle us and trip us in legal difficulties and pitfalls. I have never concealed my opinion from the beginning that the whole of these martial operations in Ulster and all this talk of provisional government and drilling is a piece of gigantic bluff. [HON. MEMBERS: "Shame!" and "Why send the Fleet there?"] I think it was clearly admitted in the House the other day by the hon. Member for the City of London that it was all bluff. He referred to the movement of a few troops to strengthen certain depôts in Ulster, and he asked why

  937
  all this enormous preparation in reserve, why call out the Cavalry, why call out the Navy, if your only object was to protect those depôts? Who would resist them? Why anticipate any opposition to the troops amongst a peaceful population, who had never shown any tendency to resist them or offer them any violence?
  You talk as if the drilling of 100,000 men was a mere irrelevancy and of no consequence, and could not have any of the consequences which appear to have been anticipated. I am inclined to take that view. I do not believe that when the Protestants of Ulster are finally faced with the consequences of the threats that they have made they will take it upon themselves to fire upon and shoot down British soldiers. I cannot believe that they will take it upon themselves to make violent assaults upon the civil authorities or make attacks upon life and property. If they do, I see no reason to doubt that the Army would perform its duty and resist those attacks in spite of all the inducements and seductions that have been held out to them. Ever since the Veto of the House of Lords was limited hon. Members opposite have been casting about for some other power independent of the people and the representative authority, to put in the place of the House of Lords. In the first place they sought as a substitute for the House of Lords His Majesty. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Why, direct appeals were addressed to His Majesty that he should abandon his high constitutional position and place his veto at the disposal of the Conservative party, even as the House of Lords had done in the past. I have here a little book entitled "Conservatism," said to be written by Lord Hugh Cecil, and I find in it this passage:—
  "It may be a dangerous doctrine, but it is perhaps true, that Conservatism ought to take up the task of preparing public opinion for the idea that the Monarchy should openly take an active part in politics."
  I am glad to think that these traitorous and disloyal attempts have been unsuccessful. I see no reason whatever, and not the faintest shadow of a reason, for doubting that throughout the whole Of his reign up to the present time His Majesty has been guided by the soundest of constitutional principles. Having failed in that attempt, the party opposite make a desperate bid to substitute for the Veto of the House of Lords and for the constitutional veto of which they have been deprived, the unconstitutional veto of armed force. I believe they will fail in that as they failed
  938
  in the other, and as they have failed in all their attempts. The Noble Lord the Member for Hitchin (Lord Robert Cecil) the other day said that hon. Members were raising such old cries and old issues that he almost imagined that he was listening to debates in the time of Stafford and the Stuarts. The hon. Member himself appears like some apparition from the past, some henchman of the Stuarts, who has strayed into a modern representative assembly. But in the past, when that battle was fought out, it was the Parliamentary forces which won, and I have no doubt whatever that at this time of day it will be the Parliamentary forces and the people. It is a crisis, it is a dangerous crisis, but we at any rate on this side of the House and the people of this country may look forward to it with equanimity knowing that we have at the helm one on whose calm judgment and on whose resolute will we can rely with absolute and implicit confidence.
  Mr. STANLEY WILSON: The only remark that I will make with regard to the speech of the hon. Member who has just sat down is that he seems discontented with both parties. He has severely criticised his own Government; he has severely criticised the Leader of the Opposition; and the only thing that I can recommend him to do is to form a party of his own which will suit himself and one or two upon those Benches. We find ourselves to-day in the most extraordinary position in which this House of Commons has ever been placed. It is without precedent I believe. We have seen the Government shedding itself of various Members very rapidly. The Cabinet is now short of three of its Members. Mr. Masterman and the Prime Minister, who has gone to-day, are outside the House when they ought to be in it, and the Secretary of State for War has to-day resigned his office. I am sure I speak for every Member of this House when I say that we all felt sincerely sorry for the Secretary of State for War. He has accepted what was inevitable. He has stood by the two Generals who signed the now famous letter with him, and it was the only course that was left to him as an honorable man. I have listened to the speech that was given us to-day by the First Lord of the Admiralty. He told us to-day what happened with regard to the paragraphs that were inserted in the letter that was given to General Gough. Since he has spoken, I understand Lord Morley in another place

  939
  has given a very different description of what happened with regard to those famous paragraphs. I cannot help saying that to my mind it was a sad spectacle to see a Minister, who is responsible for one of the armed forces of the Crown, standing there at the Table aiming a serious blow at the Army, of which he once was a member.
  It is not we who have dragged the Army into the political arena. It has been dragged in by hon. Members opposite. It has been dragged in by the Government. They have tried to make the Army do their dirty work, and they have failed, and it is because they have failed in their desires that we are now to have an election cry, so hon. Members below the Gangway say, "The Army against the people." That has been re-echoed from the Front Bench by the First Lord of the Admiralty. The whole reason of the Army being dragged into the political arena is the fault of the Government. It is they who asked the officers in Ireland a hypothetical question, which they had no right to ask. No officers have disobeyed any orders that have been given. They were offered on behalf of the Government two alternatives: either marching into Ulster and doing what was expected to bring about a civil war there, or of resigning their commissions, and being dismissed from His Majesty's Service. It will redown to the credit of those officers that they accepted the second alternative offered by His Majesty's Government. Because they accepted that alternative that was offered to them they are accused in this House and on the platforms outside of taking part in politics, of standing in the way of His Majesty's Government and of refusing to obey orders, orders which were never given to them. For this, according to what we have been told to-day by the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Army is to be smashed. Everybody knows that the Government were warned in the fullest possible manner what the feelings, not only of the officers, but of the men themselves were. They were warned nearly two months ago now in the House of Lords by Lord Roberts, and they were warned years ago by Lord Wolseley. Both of them told Members of the Government that it would place a serious strain upon the loyalty of our Army if they were used to coerce Ulster.
  Speeches have been made outside which I think are a disgrace to the Members of
  940
  this House who made them. I will refer only to the speech which was delivered on Friday last by the Patronage Secretary (Mr. Illingworth) at Blackburn. He used words, which have been reiterated again in this House by the hon. Member who has just sat down, accusing us of dragging in His Majesty's name, and accusing us of trying to overawe Parliament by inciting the Army to sedition and mutiny. That charge was made on Friday by the Patronage Secretary, and it has been made again to-day at that desk by the First Lord of the Admiralty. I say that there is not a single word of truth in it, and that such statements are nothing but a tissue of lies. Everybody knows that nobody can prevent officers of the Army and soldiers having their own views, and nobody can say that they are doing any harm or any wrong as long as they obey the orders that are given to them, and the officers and men would have obeyed if the orders had been given. [An HON. MEMBER: "How do you know?"] I have the common sense to know what soldiers of His Majesty the King will do if they are ordered. All they did was to accept the alternative that the Government offered to them, and it was the Secretary of State for War himself, by offering these officers this alternative, who has dragged the Army into the political arena.
  The speech of the hon. Member for Stoke (Mr. John Ward) a few days ago was an attack both upon His Majesty and upon the Army. It was a speech which was cheered by hon. Members below the Gangway to the echo, and in consequence of it the hon. Member for Stoke was made an honorary member of the National Liberal Club. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] At any rate, there was a suggestion that he was to be made an honorary member of that club for having had the pluck to say what every one of them thought. On Thursday afternoon I went out of the House after Question Time, and an hon. Member who sits on those benches came up to me in the Lobby when I was speaking to a Press correspondent there. I happened to say to him, "We seem to be nearing the end. It looks like a General Election in the very near future." He replied to me, "I do not care how soon it comes. We have got a splendid cry now, 'The Army against the People.'" I turned to him and said, "You are a clever man. Do you think that would be a particularly fair cry?" He said to me, and I took down at once the words that he

  941
  used—[Laughter]—you will not laugh and cheer when I have finished:—
  "What is fairness to me? I have no principles with regard to politics."
  "What I want is a winning cry, and the cry of 'The Army against the People' is a good enough one for me."
  If I am challenged with regard to that, I am prepared to give the name of the hon. Member who made that statement. I have no wish to hide myself behind the privileges of this House. If necessary, and if I am further challenged, I am prepared to make the statement outside, and to take the responsibility of any action. But I should strongly recommend hon. Members opposite not to challenge the statement I have made. It is a true statement. I thank goodness that the hon. Member who made it speaks English with a strong foreign accent. The Prime Minister asked us to believe that neither the Government nor any Member of the Government, ever contemplated any aggressive operations against Ulster. They really must think the House of Commons is extremely credulous. We are bound to believe the evidence of our own eyes, and nobody can possibly believe that a whole division of troops, and a brigade of cavalry, with artillery, as well as a battle squadron sent to Lamlash—nobody could possibly believe that the Cavalry and Infantry were to be moved into Ulster for anything but aggressive operations. The very movement of these troops into Ulster was an aggressive operation in itself. Who could possibly say that a division of troops was necessary for the guarding of the stores? Cavalary are not used to guard stores, nor are field guns wanted. The battle squadron was sent to Lamlash, the First Lord of the Admiralty has told us, not because there was an outbreak in Ulster, but in case of an outbreak in consequence of the movement of troops there. But nobody who looks at the facts that face them can possibly doubt it was the intention of certain Members of the Government at any rate, if it were not the intention of the Cabinet as a whole, to force the situation, to force an outbreak in Ulster, and to coerce Ulster before the Home Rule Bill had been passed into law. I venture to say that an outbreak was only prevented—that the movement of these troops (for they were on the verge of being moved) was only prevented by the officers at the Curragh accepting the alternative which the Government offered them of sacrificing their careers, and being dismissed from the service. Had it not
  942
  been for this there is no question that at the present moment our country would be engaged in civil war. The First Lord of the Admiralty said, at Bradford, that there were worse things than bloodshed. Yes, there are worse things than bloodshed in the eyes of the Government, and one of the worst things is to face the electors at the poll at a General Election.
  Mr. LLEWELYN WILLIAMS: It is always refreshing to hear a speech from the hon. Member who has just addressed the House. By the conventions of public life in this country, one is not able to attend—as one used to before one became a Member of this House—public meetings addressed by hon. Gentlemen opposite, and, therefore, one does not know the character of the oratory which is used in order to induce the electors to send Members who sit on those benches back to this House. But whenever I hear the hon. Gentleman—and I wish we could hear him oftener, not by way of interjection, but by way of debate—I feel at once that I hear the authentic views of the Tory party as expressed by the ordinary common or garden individual sitting on those benches. That is the spirit of the speeches with which the country will be ringing during the next four or five, or it may be twelve, months, until the General Election comes upon it. The speech was full of the most confused, and therefore most successful, political thinking. It was full of discrepancies. One argument was used at one moment and another argument at the very next moment. At one time the speaker quoted Lord Roberts in the House of Lords, with approval; he quoted what he said about two months ago, that an order to the English Army to march upon Ulster would mean the ruin of the English Army. He also quoted, with approval, that infamous letter written by another field-marshal in 1892 to the Duke of Cambridge, in which he said that the Army would revolt against any attempt to coerce Ulster. The speech quoted these things with approval in one breath and in the next breath turned round to hon. Gentlemen on this side, and accused them of being the people who had dragged the Army into politics. I should like to draw attention to a speech very much more moderate in tone, and therefore more powerful, a speech which was addressed to us earlier in the day by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the Walton Division (Mr. F. E. Smith). As far as I could gather the right hon. Gentleman had three charges

  943
  to bring against the Government, and I will take them in their historical sequence, rather than in the order in which they were made.
  The first charge was that the very movement of troops into Ulster, from the 14th to the 21st of this month, was provocative and was meant to be provocative to the loyalists of Ulster to oppose this force by violence, and to bring about civil commotion and civil war. An hon. Member sitting on the back benches opposite emphasised that and said that, in his view, what the Government wished to do by sending troops into Ulster was to have a repetition on a larger scale of the massacre of Glencoe. That is the charge that lies at the back of the mind, I will not say of all hon. Gentlemen who have spoken from those benches, but of a great many people who have been writing in the Press, and of some people who have been speaking in this House. I confess I felt great sympathy with the First Lord of the Admiralty the other day, when the hon. Member for South Birmingham (Mr. Amery) threw a certain remark across the floor of the House to him, suggesting that that was the diabolical motive the Government had in their mind when they sent those troops into Ulster. Although my right hon. Friend used what was termed unparliamentary language, it was not a whit too strong to describe the sinister and diabolical suggestion made by the hon. Member. I have no doubt we shall hear it again, not only here but in the Press. But if such a charge were true, then the Government are not fit to occupy the position that they do to-day. What was the massacre of Glencoe to which it has been compared? It was the assassination of innocent and unarmed people at dead of night in their beds. That is the sort of thing that the Government are said to have been planning after the 14th March. I see that the hon. Member for South Birmingham assents to that proposition. Therefore we have it on the high authority of the hon. Member that what the Government meant to do after the 14th March was not merely to safeguard and protect ammunition and stores belonging to the Government in the province of Ulster, but to use that as a mask for a second Sicilian Vespers, a second St. Bartholomew, or a second massacre of Glencoe. That is seriously suggested as being the plan, or rather the plot, of a Government in a civilised
  944
  country, and we find hon. Gentlemen of education and position who have the audacity and hardihood in the House of Commons to lend their authority to such a suggestion as that.
  Let me ask the House for a moment to consider the position with which the Government was confronted on 14th March. I am not going over the ground which the First Lord of the Admiralty traversed earlier this afternoon, nor to repeat the extracts he read from the letter written by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson). What happened on 14th March was this: After their efforts to make a reconciliation or effect a settlement had been repulsed in this House and in the letter written by the right hon. and learned Member for Dublin University, the Government came to the conclusion that the only thing that could have affected the mind of the right hon. Gentleman in acting as he did was that the time had come at last for actions to take the place of words. What had been going on for the last eighteen months or two years? We have been told that 100,000 men were enrolled as volunteers in this Ulster army. We know that eighteen months ago certain gentlemen and noble men of high standing and influential positions in this country had been nominated to form a provisional government if and when Home Rule passed into law. We know now that in all probability, at all events in the ordinary course of things, unless some accident or cataclysm happens, that Home Rule will become the law of the land in June or July of this year. We know, too, that it has been the policy of the Tory party for the last six months to bring about a dissolution in May. Therefore, when the right hon. and learned Gentleman rejected the offers of settlement and refused to discuss them as a basis of settlement, it was only to be expected, indeed, it was only natural, that the Government must come to the conclusion that he was opinion that the time had come for him to take a forward move as he suggested in his letter.
  Not only that, but we also know that for eighteen months, under a great retired Indian General, these 100,000 men have been drilled day and night, and that ammunition and stores have been poured into Ulster. Everything is ready. Even the ambulance corps, under the direction of great ladies, is ready in Ulster. Under these circumstances is it to be wondered

  945
  at that the Government came to the conclusion that it was time for them to safeguard and protect the ammunition, stores and property of the Government in the various depots in Ulster. That was all that the Minute of 14th March purported to do. It is said it was only a cloak for a bigger undertaking, that it was meant to enable the Government to have an excuse to send Cavalry brigades to Ulster and the Fleet to the coast of Ulster, that it was only a pretence, the real object of it being to provoke Ulster into taking some rash step, and that that rash step would be used as an excuse to massacre the innocent and loyal people of that province. Where is the evidence of that? I have listened to all the Debates last week and this week, and I have listened in vain for the slightest bit of evidence that would be sufficient to convince anybody in a court of law that such a fell and sinister design animated the Government. It was only natural, indeed the First Lord of the Admiralty to-day and last week admitted that it was right, that the Government should take into consideration a possible eventuality. It was only proper that they should believe that the right hon. and learned Member for Dublin University was not altogether bluffing during the last two years. We on this side of the House have been denounced by hon. Gentlemen opposite—for what? For not taking the Ulster case seriously. We have been told that we have accused them of bluffing, and they have told us that they were not bluffing, and the right hon. and learned Gentleman has told us that they are in serious earnest. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Worcestershire (Mr. Austen Chamberlain) said to his Constituents last autumn, with that originality of phrase which always distinguishes him, that,
  "The sands were running out"
  All through last autumn the "Times" newspaper, and all the other Tory organs, told us that we were "on the brink of civil war." The Prime Minister was denounced on platforms and in the Press because he was postponing the day when he was going to make his suggestions for settlement. We were told that he was "playing with fire," and that it would be almost impossible, even with the devoted services of the right hon. and learned Member for Dublin University, to keep Ulster in restraint until Parliament met. Indeed, we have been told this afternoon by the First Lord of the Admiralty that so serious a
  946
  view was taken even among the military authorities in Ireland as long ago as January last, that the Secretary for War asked the First Lord of the Admiralty to send a cruiser to Carrickfergus. Only a few weeks ago the right hon. and learned Member for Dublin University, and the senior Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour) went down to the City of London, the heart of this great Empire, and held a meeting, and there he said that it was not days, but perhaps hours, that would remain before a great conflagration would be ignited in Ulster. That was the real condition of affairs, as we were told by the Leader of the Opposition on the first day of this Session. It is not worth while going over all the evidence, but the evidence is ample to show that hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, and their great and powerful Press behind them, spent all the months of last autumn and the early months of this year in trying to impress upon the Government and upon their supporters in this House and the country that we were on the brink of civil war, and that unless something were done, and that at once, some unhappy accident might occur in Ulster to set the whole thing ablaze.
  That was the condition of affairs which the Government had to take into account when they were sending these troops, as a precautionary measure merely in the first instance, and to safeguard the Government stores and ammunition in the Ulster depots. Therefore, they had to take into account all this inflammatory language. and to say to themselves "there may be something of truth in all this, and we as a Government, responsible for the protection of life and property in Ireland, responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Ireland, must also see to it that not only shall enough troops be sent to Ulster to safeguard the stores, but there shall be ready at hand, ready for any emergency, a sufficient number of troops to do the work of the Government there.' That is why a certain portion of the Fleet was sent to Lamlash, in case the movement of troops in Ulster might, by an unhappy accident, lead to the greater conflagration which has been prophesied for so many months. Can any hon. Member really, looking at the thing with an impartial mind, deny the absolute right and the bounden duty of the Government to do what they did? They never sent an unnecessary force to Ulster. Immediately they found that this movement of the

  947
  troops to secure the stores was not attended by any difficulty, the whole of the rest of the forces kept in reserve were allowed to remain quiescent.
  9.0 P.M.
  We are now told that something terrible happened at the Curragh on 20th March, when General Paget put certain questions to the officers. Let me remind the House what happened here the night before. The 20th of March was a Friday. The night before there was a great Debate in this House, and the Leader of the Opposition made one of the few conciliatory speeches which he has ever made. I was delighted to hear it, because I thought an end might be put to these unhappy controversies. The Prime Minister answered the right hon. Gentleman in an equally conciliatory spirit, and then the right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Carson), the prospective leader of the hypothetical rebellion in Ulster, commenced by saying:—
  "I had intended to intervene at a later stage of this debate, but in consequence of many things which have happened, and not least of all in consequence of what I might call the trifling with the subject by the Prime Minister"—
  who had only the week before offered the exclusion of Ulster—
  "and the provocation which was endorsed by the First Lord of the Admiralty last Saturday, I feel that I ought not to be here but in Belfast."
  What did the right hon. Gentleman mean when he said that his place was in Belfast and not in this House? He meant to imply, as I thought, and as I think everyone who heard him thought, that the time for action had come, and the time for wordy warfare was at an end. The trifling of the Prime Minister put a termination to the situation. He must go now to Ulster; there to be surrounded by his bodyguard and his covenanters and his wooden guns and whatnot. His place was at the seat of war. Do hon. Members think that such a declaration as that, made by the leader of 100,000 armed men, with a provisional government behind them, a declaration by so powerful a man as that, did not have its effect on the Government? I should have thought it was a matter which must have affected any Government and must have affected the mind of General Paget in Dublin the next day. I do not know what General Paget said to his officers at the Curragh. We have no correspondents among brigadier-generals. We are never made the
  948
  recipients of their confidences. I do not know, but on the very face of it, the version given of that declaration or speech or address, whichever it was, of General Paget, at the Curragh, on 20th March, given by the Leader of the Opposition, is not complete, and I question whether it is correct. I think the right. hon. Gentleman (Mr. F. E. Smith) said that the matter had been discussed by this time in every officers' mess and in every canteen in the country, and that everyone knows what General Paget said. All I can say is that I have heard versions of what the gallant officer said to his men, and not even the most truculent Member of the Opposition would say that the actual words which General Paget is reported to have used could have been placed in his mouth by any Cabinet Minister. Therefore, whatever were the words which were used by General Paget on that occasion, it did not pretend to be a verbatim version of orders and instructions which he had received from the Government. It was simply a gloss which the gallant officer quite honestly put on his instructions.
  I have now to part company with some of my hon. Friends on this side. It is suggested that the Government did something wrong when they asked, if they did ask, General Paget to find out what the sentiments of his officers on this matter were, and it was supposed to be a high crime and misdemeanour to ask an officer to answer a question as to what he would do under certain hypothetical conditions. I think, in fairness, the House ought to try and remember again what the condition of things was on Friday, 20th March, when this incident occurred at the Curragh. For months we had been told that we could not rely on the Army. Lord Roberts told us in the House of Lords that it would ruin the Army if it was asked to move against Ulster. He quoted also the words used by Lord Wolseley in 1892. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. F. F. Smith) quoted with approval the words which were used by Lord Roberts in the House of Lords. Lord Roberts is the most distinguished English soldier alive. He has led the greatest Army that England has ever put into the field. He is a man with enormous and well-deserved influence with every officer in the Army. He has been thanked time and again by Parliament for his services to his King and to his country, and he was pensioned by this House on account of his service. When he in his place in the House of

  949
  Lords uses language of this sort, is it not perfectly patent that it must have enormous influence on the feelings of the Army?
  Mr. HAROLD SMITH: Will the hon. and learned Member allow me to remind him that Lord Roberts only echoed what Lord Wolseley said many years ago.
  Mr. L. WILLIAMS: If the hon. Member had listened, he would have found that I said so. That only makes the position much worse. Lord Wolseley in a letter to the Duke of Cambridge—I am 10th to say anything about him because he is dead. Lord Roberts lent his great influence and name and distinction in this matter, and they must have enormous effect upon opinions in the Army, especially among officers. Not only that, but the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson) went further, and told us last autumn that he had received pledges and promises from many of the most distinguished officers in His Majesty's forces that they would not act against Ulster. [An HON. MEMBER: "Some of the chief officers."] I have not the exact words, but the speech will be in the recollection of hon. Members. That, therefore, was the position with which the Government was faced in issuing the order of 14th March. They knew that gentlemen high in the confidence of officers of the Army, noblemen like Lord Roberts, and great newspapers which have also enormous influence—though they do not seem to me always to realise how great it is—all those great persons and institutions were preaching, I will not say sedition—but saying as the exponents of the views of the Army that the Army were not prepared to carry out the instructions of His Majesty's Government in case of the Home Rule Bill becoming law. Under those circumstances, I ask any impartial and unbiassed man here to consider what is the elementary and fundamental duty of any civilised Government? I do not say that they ought to put the officers under an inquisition, but it is perfectly right—I do not care who disputes it—when a General Officer of the great rank of Sir Arthur Paget, Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Forces in Ireland, comes over to see the Secretary for War that that Minister should ask him whether those sentiments which have been ascribed to officers in the Army are really the sentiments entertained by them. I do
  950
  not defend for a moment the actual way in which the questions were put. I do not know what questions were put, and I do not want to know. All I am concerned with is that the Government has a right, under those circumstances, when great personages have been saying that the Army could not be relied upon, when the Leader of the Opposition in Dublin at the end of last year said that the same fate—I will not say that—insinuated that the same fate would befall this Government if they tried to use the Army against Ulster as befell James II. when he used the Army against the people—I say that in these circumstances any Government would be lacking in its elementary duty if it did not find out in time what the sentiment of the Army was, in order to ascertain whether the Army was disaffected and riddled with sedition, and whether it would be disloyal, as the champions of the Army had said it would be.
  I wish to say a few words about the blunder, the inexcusable blunder, and the only blunder, of which, not the Government, but a Member of the Government, was guilty of last Monday. On 23rd March what happened, as I understand, was this: Brigadier-General Gough and two fellow officers came over from Ireland. They had a conference with Sir John French, the Minister for War, and the Adjutant-General, at the War Office, if you are to believe what the Press next day said. I think I saw it stated in the London "Times," and in some other papers as well, that General Gough brought over the letter which has been described by the Prime Minister as a proper letter, in which the officers inquired whether they were to be asked to initiate military operations in Ulster. The newspapers at the time said Sir John French absolutely refused to give any assurance of any sort or kind, and I venture to say—and I think all hon. Gentlemen will agree—that that was a perfectly proper attitude to take up. Then, for some reason or other, we are told that Lord Roberts, whose views had been made known on this subject two months ago, and who has signed the Covenant, came on the scene.
  Whether it was the influence of Lord Roberts or not, I cannot say, but the then Minister for War did a thing which he ought to have refused to do. He gave certain verbal assurances. These verbal assurances were sufficient for the purpose of Brigadier-General Gough. He left

  951
  apparently satisfied. But then, on thinking over the points raised by the Secretary for War, General Gough determined to have these assurances put in writing. He wrote the letter to the Adjutant-General which is now printed in the White Paper. The Adjutant-General sent the letter to the Minister for War at the Cabinet meeting, and we have been told that that letter reached the then Secretary for War at about half-past one. But before he got the letter the Adjutant-General had put his version of the verbal assurances which were given by the right hon. Gentleman at the morning conference in the form of a draft memorandum. That was discussed by the whole Cabinet, but, unfortunately, before the discussion was finished, the Secretary for War left to attend upon His Majesty. When he came back the Cabinet was in the act of dispersing, and, therefore, this letter of General Gough was only seen by the Secretary for War, and by him alone. It was never seen by anybody else. Then we have been told a story which would be almost incredible were it not vouched for by the Secretary for War himself and by his colleagues. In spite of the fact that the Prime Minister handed over this document to the Secretary for War, as being the considered judgment of the Cabinet, that Minister sits down and adds these two offending paragraphs. To my mind, there is nothing very objectionable in these two paragraphs but for two things. Because when a declaration was made by Lord Morley in the other House in almost identical terms there was none who saw any offence in them—that is to say, most of its would be perfectly willing to agree to those concluding paragraphs as a statement of the Government's policy. But the venom lies not in the words themselves, but in the context. It is a letter addressed by the Army Council to a subordinate officer, a brigadier-general, not even afield-marshal, or anything like that, in which the brigadier-general is allowed to make terms as to the conditions of his loyalty to his King. I say it is a blunder, and that is why my right hon. Friend has had to resign his office. After the right hon. Gentleman had added these two paragraphs, he sent the document across to the War Office, to Sir John French and the Adjutant-General without telling them, as far as I can ascertain, that the whole thing was not a considered Cabinet document. There was no mention made
  952
  of these concluding paragraphs which were added to a Cabinet document by the right hon. Gentleman without the authorisation of the Cabinet itself. But there is even worse than that. The Prime Minister said on Wednesday that he only saw the two concluding paragraphs of this document late that afternoon, after the Debate was over, and after he had gone to his room. Then he got a typewritten copy of this document as printed in the White Paper. He sent for the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War, and asked what it meant. Even then the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War did not remember until the last moment that he ought to show this letter that he had received from General Gough at half-past one, before he drafted the concluding paragraphs. This is the letter, and it is the most serious thing of all:—
  "Dear General,—On thinking over the points raised by the Secretary of State this morning the question has arisen in my mind, and it will undoubtedly be one of the first questions asked by my officers when I see them, viz., in the event of the present Home Rule Bill becoming law, can we be called upon to enforce it on Ulster under the expression of maintaining law and order?"
  And the greatest offence of my right hon. Friend must be not having shown that letter to the Prime Minister or to any of his colleagues, and, having added those two concluding paragraphs addressed to General Gough, it must have looked to Sir John French and to the Adjutant-General, as it must have occurred to General Gough himself, that the only and inevitable conclusion which could be drawn from it was that those concluding paragraphs were written in answer to the question contained in Brigadier-General Gough's letter. That seems to me to be the worst part of the blunder. It was a perfectly honest blunder, and, I have no doubt, inadvertent. Still, it is an inadvertence that we cannot tolerate in an officer high in the service of the State, especially at this most critical time.
  The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Walton told us this afternoon that officers know nothing of politics and that the Army has no politics; and we have heard repudiated with scorn the suggestion which was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, as a vague rumour, in this House last week, that this letter to General Gough was flaunted about in the Carlton or some other Tory club. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Walton got virtuously indignant over the very suggestion that General Gough had anything

  953
  to do with any Tory club, and said that he had never been a member of any Tory club and had never been inside the portals of one. The hon. Member for South Birmingham, it may be remembered, explained the matter on Tuesday last. The Prime Minister on Wednesday stated that neither he nor any one of his colleagues, except the Secretary for War, knew of the existence of this letter from General Gough which I have just read, until Tuesday afternoon. On Tuesday afternoon, the hon. Gentleman who is not, as far as I know, an officer in the Army, who has no post in the War Office, and is not even the Leader of the Opposition, told us the whole story. He told us first of the Conference in the War Office. He told us then of a letter being written that General Gough was not satisfied with the verbal assurance that had been given to him, and that thereupon General Gough wrote this very letter, whose very existence was unknown to the Prime Minister until a few minutes before the hon. Gentleman was speaking; that he wrote this letter to the Adjutant-General, and received a reply to it, that that reply was not satisfactory, and it was sent back, and then Sir John French—I do not think he mentioned Sir John French's name—but there was an alteration or addition made to it, and that satisfied General Gough, who went back triumphantly to the Curragh, having killed Home Rule and smashed the Government.
  The hon. Gentleman did not say that, those are my words, but the hon. Gentleman did say all that I have stated that General Gough was not satisfied with verbal assurances, that he wrote a letter and got a reply to it, that he was not satisfied with that, and got an answer which satisfied him, and went back to Dublin on that Monday night with the written assurance in his pocket; and the hon. Gentleman became virtuously indignant against this terrible Government. I would like to ask the hon. Gentleman if General Gough be the mere soldier that he is held out to be, if he is innocent of all participation in politics, and in party politics especially, how did the hon. Gentleman get posession of all these facts almost before the Prime Minister knew the whole of them if General Gough did not talk with either him or any other Tory Member in this House? It is idle to pretend that these gentlemen are not keen politicians. The very facts that I have enumerated show that General Gough—it may not be to his discredit, but it is to the discredit of his
  954
  friends in this House, who hold him out to be absolutely innocent of party politics—when he is in actual communication and conversation with hon. Gentlemen opposite in order to defeat the Government. I have tried to examine as well as I can the real facts of the situation. With regard to the two charges against the Government, the movement of troops and what happened at the Curragh Camp, I say that they cannot be held responsible. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"] As regards what happened last Monday, lamentable though it is, it was a blunder made not by the Cabinet, but by a member of the Cabinet, who is no longer a member of the Cabinet, and therefore has purged his offence. The Cabinet itself cannot be held responsible, because they have deliberately given a united judgment on the matter. I am quite sure all who know him will agree that it was by inadvertency and in all honesty that the late Secretary for War acted as he did, and he purged his offence by resigning his office. I have only to say, in those circumstances, that the Government have done two things: They took the very first possible opportunity to repudiate what had been done by making those Army Regulations last Friday, which swept the slate clean. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"] So far as their relations with General Gough and the other officers are concerned, they are now exactly as they stood a fortnight ago. I have already stated that Lord Morley, according to the First Lord of the Admiralty, did read, I will not say the ipsissima verba, but very nearly the exact words used in the House of Lords. There can be no doubt in these circumstances that the explanation given by the First Lord of the Admiralty is the true explanation.
  Mr. CAVE: But Lord Morley has said that he helped to draft the document, which represented the opinion of the Cabinet.
  Mr. L. WILLIAMS: I do not dispute it. If the hon. and learned Gentleman had listened to me, he would have seen that my suggestion is that what really happened was that Lord Morley drafted a paragraph which he thought represented the mind or policy of the Government. As I said before, there is nothing, in my humble opinion, that was against the proper policy that was to be pursued by this Government in connection with Home Rule; but the real offence in those two paragraphs is, first of all, that it was not

  955
  an Army Regulation addressed to the whole Army, but it was in the shape of a letter addressed to a single officer, General Gough, and therefore it looked as if it were a sort of treaty between the Government on the one hand and General Gough on the other.
  Mr. F. E. SMITH: Lord Morley knew that as much as the late Secretary for War. He said so to-day.
  Mr. L. WILLIAMS: If Lord Morley said so I did not hear him, but if the right hon. Gentleman vouches for it—
  Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. Whitley): Hon. Members cannot embark upon the discussion of a speech made in another place.
  Mr. L. WILLIAMS: We will all be able to see to-morrow morning what was said, but I quite understand that not only would it be irregular, but it would make it almost impossible to conduct Debates in this House if we referred to what happened in another place, and then only upon hearsay evidence. There is one phase of this unhappy controversy that arises, namely, that, whatever there may have been in the past, we may hope that hon. Gentlemen opposite who have equal responsibility for the good government of this country with any of us sitting on this side, will help to see to it that the Army henceforth shall be above and beyond politics. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] A very serious position has been raised, whether inadvertently or whether by design I am not going to stop to inquire, but it is one of the most serious issues that has ever been raised in this House. We live under a dynasty which has held its great office for over two hundred years by Parliamentary title. The Army is in a peculiar degree the creature and the weapon of the King; he is the personal head of the Army, and it will be a monstrous thing that a Parliamentary King should fail to have an Army that would obey his own Parliament.
  Mr. CAVE: The hon. and learned Gentleman opposite began his speech by making a wholly unprovoked attack, and, I think, a very undeserved attack, upon my hon. Friend the Member for the Holderness Division (Mr. Stanley Wilson). After this onslaught, I listened with pleased anticipation, expecting that the hon. Gentleman would give us a very much more instructive speech than that
  956
  which he had criticised. I listened to him, and with all respect, I do not think he has added to the information of the House or the defence of the Government. He criticised the Minister who tendered his resignation, a resignation which, I think, does him credit, but that is a matter that can be left to be settled by the hon. Gentleman with the ex-Minister concerned. But I must refer to the attack which he made on my right hon. Friend the Member for Dublin University, in which he wholly misrepresented the facts. The hon. and learned Gentleman did not scruple to say that the Member for Dublin University went to Ireland last week for the purpose of commencing what the hon. Member called warlike operations, or something of that sort. Nothing could be more untrue, and I call as a witness for the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University the Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon), who said last week that he knew and admitted that the Member for Dublin University was going to Ireland for the purpose of preserving the peace. I set that statement against the charge against the hon. and learned Gentleman. Let me go back to the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty. Surely it is almost impossible for those who heard that speech to say that it was an answer to the very grave indictment of my right hon. Friend, because the First Lord of the Admiralty absolutely left out a great number of points, and to those to which he did refer he furnished no answer whatever. Let me take the points in order. The first point in the indictment was that the Government last week had initiated active military operations in Ulster. Is that denied or not? [An HON. MEMBER: "Of course it is!"] The hon. and learned Gentleman opposite devoted a great deal of his speech to proving that the operations were both reasonable and necessary, and I think the First Lord spent a great part of his speech in the same process. They do not see the point. The point is this. These things were done, these preparations were made, as we prove to-day by particular facts which cannot be contradicted, and yet the Government in the person of the Prime Minister came down to the House and told us that no such preparations were intended or commenced, and that there was nothing but the moving, I think, of four companies to certain parts of Ulster for the purpose of protecting the ammunition and stores. That, I venture to say, was not the fact.

  957
  I have no doubt the Prime Minister was misled, and was not told those facts, but that explanation cannot possibly be true. The facts speak for themselves. There was a provocative speech by the First Lord of the Admiralty at Bradford, of which he can only say it was made in a moment of despair. I should rather have thought it was made in a moment of bad temper, because the proposals which he claims to have inspired in the Cabinet, and which were made by the Prime Minister on Monday, were not at once accepted. That was followed by the meeting of what may be called a Junta of the Cabinet, of which we were told last week. Then came the orders at the War Office to General Paget who was, you will remember, brought over here for the purpose of those conferences at the War Office. It was shown to-day by my right hon. and learned Friend, that if the only intention was to protect the stores and ammunition, no such visit to this country would have been needed for a moment. No one can, I think, help believing that at the conferences at the War Office specific instructions were given to General Paget to do the very thing which he did immediately he went back to Ireland. We have not been told what happened at those conferences or what were the orders actually given to General Paget.
  The Government have been challenged more than once by the Leader of the Opposition to tell us what General Paget says he said and what questions he says he asked, and that question has always been evaded and has never been answered. I am persuaded that what he said appears in the letter read at that Table, and in other letters which entirely confirmed that. The fact that the inquiries were addressed to officers of Cavalry and Artillery, and the movements of sixteen vessels of war, of which the First Lord of the Admiralty furnished not a word of explanation to-day, those facts show that active operations were intended, and were, in fact, actually begun. This was done while negotiations were pending for a settlement of that question, which we all desire to see settled if possible, this terrible question of Ireland. The First Lord seemed to deny that negotiations were still pending. He is wrong. An offer was made by the Prime Minister, and a counter offer was made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson). No reply has been given to the counter offer. We on
  958
  the back benches, as my right hon. Friends pointed out to-day, have never been heard on either side of the House on this question, and the Foreign Minister himself said last week that the matter was still open and the offer was not closed. Therefore, I think the case is clear that these operations were undertaken in the midst of these negotiations, and I believe—I speak for myself—the intention of those who took those steps was this, to get a grip, a military grip, of the whole province of Ulster, so that then negotiations might take place, but no longer free negotiations so far as Ulster was concerned, but negotiations under the shadow of the sword.
  I believe that is the real meaning of the operations which were taking place. If that is right, I cannot imagine anything more unfair or anything less likely to inspire confidence in the other parties to those negotiations. There is more than one parallel in the history of these matters with certain parts of the history of the United States. Someone sent me only the other day an incident in the history of 1861, at the commencement of the American Civil War, in which something very similar occurred. When the differences had begun the State of South Carolina, which was one of the earliest to secede, claimed Fort Sumter, which that State had built and maintained, and sent to Washington a deputation to negotiate with the Federal Secretary for the surrender to South Carolina of Fort Sumter. The Federal Secretary kept them for some time in negotiation, but while he was negotiating he was fitting out an expedition to go to Fort Sumter and reinforce it for the benefit of his Government. At the last moment, the day before he sent the expedition to Fort Sumter, he wrote to the intermediary:—
  "Faith as to Fort Sumter fully kept. Wait and see."
  That was at the very time when a squadron had received instructions to sail. It is in that sense I believe that faith was kept last week with the province of Ulster.
  The second point my right hon. and learned Friend made, and which has never been clearly answered to-day, was this: Were the soldiers wrong—did the soldiers, did the officers, whose conduct has been attacked, do anything wrong at all, and, if so, what wrong did they commit? The First Lord never said "Yes" or "No" to that, and, so far as I know, no Member has given a plain answer to it. Just let me consider

  959
  that point, because I think it is of great importance that we should be agreed on it, if we possibly can. There has been some confusion in the Debates as to what the duty of a soldier in this country is. As against the King's enemies he has practically but one duty, that is to obey the orders of his superior officers.
  Mr. J. WARD: Who are the "King's enemies"?
  Mr. CAVE: The King's enemies, we all know, are anybody who may invade us, or anybody against whom we may be fighting. [HON. MEMBERS: "Rebels!"] But it is no duty of the British soldier to make war upon the King's subjects. [HON. MEMBERS: "What about rebels?"] As regards the King's subjects, the question always arises in this way. When a chief constable or magistrate finding himself unable to keep order and to prevent breaches of the peace, requisitions military aid, then that aid is sent to the spot, but the officer commanding the troops has an absolute discretion, as provided by the King's Regulations, whether he will permit the troops to fire or not, and even the junior officers and men have a personal responsibility in the matter. The position of the soldier in that case is extremely difficult. He is in this peril, that if he refuses to fire he is subject to military penalties, whereas if he fires and is found to be unjustified in firing, he is subject to serious civil penalties. The law puts him in that very difficult position. The rule is put, in the letter of last December, by the late Secretary of State for War, somewhat too strongly and too widely, I think. That communication said:—
  "The law clearly lays down that a soldier is entitled to obey an order to shoot only if that order is reasonable under the circumstances."
  I agree with some of my hon. Friends that that was not a correct statement. The soldier who declines to shoot when ordered takes a serious responsibility, and he ought to be satisfied that there was absolutely no lawful and proper reason for giving the order.
  Mr. C. EDWARDS: May be lawfully refuse to go to the district where disturbance is anticipated, apart from shooting?
  Mr. CAVE: Certainly not. There is of course the grave exception of civil war, which creates itself; because, it being the duty of the soldier to obey the proper authority, if that authority is
  960
  divided, a difficulty may arise as to the power to which allegiance is due. That only happens when there is actually existing civil war, and I need not refer to that further. If that is the rule, consider in what position these officers were placed. The Commander-in-Chief in Ireland told them that military operations against Ulster were contemplated. and he asked them whether in that event they would take part in those operations. He told them that if they preferred not to do so they could send in their papers the next morning, and they would be dismissed the Army. There is no doubt about the substance of that communication. It appears in writing in several letters. In the very letter quoted from the Treasury Bench today, from a young officer in Kildare, it is stated that the commands in question were sent to the regiment in writing. The officer copied down the writing, and mentioned the words which were underlined. So that there must exist somewhere a written document containing these very orders. I do not. think that that document ought to be refused to the House. By the way the same young officer of whom the First Lord spoke, I thought, very fairly, referring to this very question, said:—
  "This we are all agreed, is the greatest outrage that has ever been perpetrated on the British Army."
  The First Lord accidentally omitted to quote those words. See what the meaning of that question was. It called upon these officers to say whether they would take part in what were called "military operations" against Ulster, and incidentally to say that, if they were called upon to obey the civil authority, and to use their lethal weapons against the people, they would not refuse to do so. It called upon them to surrender the very responsible discretion which the law imposes upon every officer in their position. A more improper demand to make upon a British officer I cannot conceive. I think that General Gough gave a proper reply. In saying that I am not reflecting upon those officers who preferred to carry on and not to resign. They had a difficult choice, and no doubt it required moral courage to take that particular line. I am not reflecting in the least upon them. But I submit that the letter of General Gough was a perfectly proper letter, and one to which no possible objection could be taken. This part of the letter has not been read yet:—
  "If such duty consists of the maintenance of order and the preservation of property, all the officers in

  961
  this brigade, including myself, would be prepared to carry out that duty. But if the duty involves the initiation—"
  a word which he underlined—
  "of active operations against Ulster, the following numbers of officers by regiments would respectfully, and under protest, prefer to be dismissed."
  No objection can be taken, I believe, to that answer. The Prime Minister took none; the late Secretary of State for War took none. I believe it was a wholly proper answer for an officer to make. No order was ever disobeyed. There was no threat to disobey any order, either to go to Ulster, or to do anything else—absolutely no threat at all. All that the officers did was to say: "You ask us to make this difficult choice. You give us the option of surrendering our discretion or of throwing up our career and our income, and being dismissed from the Service. We have felt it our duty to choose the latter alternative." It is monstrous that an answer like that should be made the subject of attacks upon the Army. That was blunder Number One. I will say no more about it. Most of us are agreed that the inquiries had better not have been made. I will refer now to the later blunders which were made by the Cabinet, or by several Members of it. The letter to which I have just referred was reported to the Cabinet. They must have had it before them. They have said that there was a misunderstanding by the officers of the effect of the inquiries addressed to them. The proper course would have been to say, "Very well; those inquiries were wrong. We withdraw them altogether, and we wipe out the whole matter from the record." What was done? It was discussed in the Cabinet, and the Cabinet itself, every member who was present, agreed to give some assurances to the officers. The whole Cabinet took that line. The two paragraphs to which afterwards exception was taken were added, we are told, by the late Secretary of State for War. It is clear that the responsibility was not his alone, even so far as the Cabinet are concerned. Lord Morley stated in another place the substance of those paragraphs as representing the policy of the Cabinet as a whole. Lord Morley, I understand, says, not that he was present in the room when some box was opened, and that he thought he must make himself responsible for what was in the box, but that he himself settled those two paragraphs and altered some of the words in them. He says, as I understand, that he thought then that the paragraphs represented the mind of the Cabinet, by whom
  962
  the matter had been discussed, and he intimates, as I understand, that he thinks so still. If that is so, I venture to think that a great injustice was done to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite in attempting to throw the whole responsibility upon him. The responsibility rightly attaches not to him alone, but to the Cabinet as a whole.
  What happened next? There was a storm in the House, a storm which meant a loss of votes in this House and possible disaster to the Ministry. That, of course, was a very serious matter. There was another long confabulation on the part of those concerned, and they came to the conclusion, which most people had reached earlier, that they had better not have given any assurance to officers in the Army. What was done then? What might have been done was this: the Government might have said, "A promise ought not to have been given to officers in the Army, but the promise was given by our colleague, who was responsible for the conduct of the Army; that promise binds us as a Government; we will not repudiate it as regards the particular individuals to whom that promise was given, but no such assurance will be given in future." The Government preferred another course. They repudiated their own colleague, and declared that these two paragraphs were not to be binding upon the Cabinet. Resignations were handed in. I want to call the attention of the House to what happened after the resignation of the War Minister and the two generals, and especially to what happened on Friday last, because it has not been referred to. It seemed to me to be another change of front on the part of the Government, because if the House will look carefully at the new Army Order, and read what the Prime Minister said when he gave it out to the House, they will find that the very assurances that were in the two paragraphs in question, and which were repudiated by the Cabinet, were relived on Friday last.
  10.0 P.M.
  The new Army Order consisted of three paragraphs. The first was a censure upon the late Secretary of State for War. The second paragraph was a further censure upon him and on Lord Morley, and, I think, upon the Cabinet as a whole. The third paragraph laid down the duty of
  "every officer and soldier to obey all lawful commands given to them … either for the safeguarding of public property or the support of the civil power in the ordinary execution of its duty."

  963
  That phrase, "in the ordinary execution of its duty," struck me on Friday. I knew I had heard it before. I found it in the first of the two repudiated paragraphs, and I find the second of the two repudiated paragraphs involved in the speech afterwards made by the Prime Minister, because what the Prime Minister said was this:—
  "It is altogether untrue that the Government, or any Member of the Government, have contemplated active operations of an aggressive character in Ulster' or any operations which now or in the future would impose upon the Army any duty or any service which is not amply covered by the terms of this Order."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th March, 1914, col. 785.]
  In other words. "We give the House the assurance, the very assurance which we withdrew from the officers." I thought, I think still, that the expression was used for the purpose of inducing certain officers to withdraw their resignations. It had not that effect, but I think it is rather too much for the Government, having now reasserted these very principles, to endeavour to throw dust in the eyes of the House, and to endeavour to induce the House to believe that it was we, and not they, who are responsible for those principles.
  There is only one other point to make. After this series of blunders—propositions made and withdrawn and made again,—I should have thought that there was hardly another blunder which the Government could commit. There was one, and they have committed it. They have raised a cry that the issue before the country now is "The Army against the People." It is a dishonest cry. It is an unpatriotic cry. It is one which the First Lord told us today may lead to the destruction of the Army. He threatens us that unless we come to his terms he will, at any cost, continue to press that issue. As regards the First Lord himself, it does not surprise me so very much. When he was Home Secretary, and it was his duty to defend the judges in this House, he raised the cry of "the judges against the people." Now he is Minister of Defence, he raises the cry of "The Army against the people." I think he is quite ready to raise to-morrow the cry of "The Navy against the people." In all his zigzag career which we have watched with so much interest there is no great institution in this country which he has not at some time attacked.
  He initiated the cry, so far as any responsible person is concerned. The
  964
  Chancellor of the Exchequer adopts it with delight, and talks about the risk of a "military despotism" in this country. That is absolute nonsense. I regret to say that the learned Attorney-General opposite has given the cry the sanction of his approval. It is a very unfair cry. It is one the Army has not deserved of the party opposite—that they should attempt to set the people against that force. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord attempts to ride away upon this reply: He says that we raised it. [An HON. MEMBER: "Hear, hear."] Is that what the right hon. Gentleman said the other night? He did not say: "You Tories are trying to set the Army against the people." He said that recent events, the resignation of General Gough. and the request of the officers for assurances had raised that issue. He simply to-day ran away from the allegations he made the other night. He makes the charge against the leaders of my party that they are engaged in attempting to seduce the Army. He not only made the charge, but he tried to support it by evidence. What was the evidence with which he tried to support this charge? He quoted speeches in which some of my right hon. Friends said that the Army should not be used for the purpose of coercing Ulster. Nor should it. He also quoted speeches in which other of my right hon. Friends said that although that was so, soldiers must obey all lawful commands, and that none of us would say anything for the purpose of seducing a soldier from his duty. Instead of proving, he disproved his charge, and I say a more unfounded charge was never made in this House.
  Mr. C. EDWARDS: I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman, what about the quotation from the Leader of the Opposition, in which he said that if in certain circumstances officers resigned, they would only be doing their duty?
  Mr. CAVE: I need not reply to that. My right hon. Friend is going to speak, and I leave him to deal with it. The First Lord of the Admiralty went further, and pointed to the Covenant as supporting his charges. The charge is made against Lord Roberts—the greatest soldier of our time—that he had attempted to seduce soldiers from their duty. Sir, the Covenant is a signed declaration of the intention to take any steps—which I read to mean any steps consistent with

  965
  honour—to prevent this crime being committed in Ulster, and I think that when honourable men sign an undertaking of that kind you are bound to read into it the words which I have put. I say quite plainly—and there is nobody here who would not say the same—that it would be a dishonourable thing to attempt to seduce soldiers from their duty. I, myself, have been asked by more than one, especially by retired officers, my advice upon the point, and I always told them that their duty to the King and the Service is paramount. They must do and say and sign nothing that would interfere with that duty. The Attorney-General asked us the other night to take his word of honour that he and his colleagues had no thought of what he called unprovoked butchery in Ulster. I ask him to take my word for what it is worth, that neither I nor any of my Friends have ever had the least intention or thought of persuading or endeavouring to persuade one soldier in this country to recede from any part whatever of his duty as a soldier. I want to know this. Is this cry of the First Lord—which I call a dishonest cry—this cry of the Army versus the people—going to be sanctioned by the whole of the party opposite? Does the learned Attorney-General endorse that cry? Does the Foreign Minister? Does the Prime Minister? I do not think any one of them would; and, Sir, I say this, if they do not endorse this false cry, they ought to say so in plain words and repudiate it. But if they do, and thereby, as the First Lord prophesied, bring about the possible ruin of our Army, they are guilty this time not of a blunder but of an infamous crime against the country.
  Mr. BONAR LAW: I must apologise to the House for rising immediately after the speech of my hon. and learned Friend, and I think I might fairly say that if it had been possible I should have been quite ready to leave our case as it is left by the speech to which we have just listened. But, Sir, as the House knows, I, on behalf of the party to which I belong, gave a pledge that if the Government would introduce into this House their proposals in regard to the Home Rule Bill, we should facilitate them in getting their financial business. It is possible to continue this Debate under our rules to any length, but that pledge is binding upon us, and I am sure my hon. Friends behind me will respect it and allow the Debate to end tonight at a reasonable hour. Now I wish at
  966
  the outset to associate myself with what was said by the Prime Minister about the resignation of Field-marshals Sir John French and Sir Spencer Ewart. I am sure that everyone in the House regrets the loss to the nation and to the Army caused by the resignation of these officers. I am sure, also, that it must have been a difficult decision for them, and no one can have thought that they were acting wrongly in taking so long a time to make up their minds. They must have felt that their resignations now at a critical time like this might be damaging to the Army, but finally they have decided to resign, and I have no doubt that what influenced them was the feeling that in the long run what is best for the Army is that the heads of the Army should not do anything contrary to the personal honour, and that if there was any doubt the scale ought to weigh against the interests of these distinguished officers.
  We listened this afternoon to a speech which covered a good deal of ground by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and I shall endeavour to reply, as well as I can, to some of the points which he raised. My right hon. Friend near me, in commenting upon the speech, made by the First Lord at Bradford dwelt upon the fact that it was made at the time when, as the House knows, the Prime Minister himself declared that he would be no party to closing the door to any prospect of settlement. The First Lord told us this afternoon that the offer which they had made to Ulster was that they should have the right to vote themselves out of the Home Rule Bill. No such offer has ever been made by the Government. On the contrary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Trinity College said at once to the House and to the Prime Minister that if such on offer were made he would at once submit it to those whom he represented in Ulster. The right hon. Gentleman opposite went further and stated that I had taken up the position that whatever Ulster did, be it right or wrong, we would back them in their resistance. I have never taken up such a position, and, what is more, the First Lord immediately afterwards made a statement which showed that at the very moment he was imputing that position to me he knew I had never taken it up.
  Mr. C. EDWARDS: Mr. Speaker—
  Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member has no right to interrupt in that way.
  Mr. BONAR LAW: I say that he knew that I had never taken up that position, because he said immediately afterwards in another place, and in order to found another charge against me, that I had stated that if the opinion of this country were declared in favour of the policy of the Government, I should consider that they were justified in enforcing their Bill. That shows, therefore, perfectly clearly that I never have taken up the position that we would support Ulster, right or wrong. The position now taken up not only by me, but by my hon. Friends, is that we believe that Ulster is right, and that believing she is right until the people of this country have given a definite decision on the point, we shall support her in maintaining her right. The right hon. Gentleman gave a quotation from my speech which does put me in a difficulty. He said that I had said that the Government would be justified in coercing Ulster to enforce the Bill. As a matter of fact, the Prime Minister cross-examined me on the subject, and I believe he put the question to me, "Would we be justified?" and I said "Yes." That, Mr. Speaker, is on record. I am not ashamed of it, and I am going to qualify it.
  I had made on many occasions a declaration of what my view on that subject was, and these declarations had reference, not to the rights or duties of the Government, but solely to our position. What I intended by that interruption was to say that if the Government secured the support of the people of this country, then I and we would not be justified in supporting or encouraging the resistance of Ulster. That is a different thing. Whether or not the Government are justified is a, matter for their own conscience, but I do say this, that if they get the support of the country, then the responsibility is shared between them and the people of this country, and they would be in an entirely different position from that in which they stand to-day, when they are trying to force it through, and when, as I believe, they know that the majority of the people of this country are against it. Now whether or not Ulster should resist, even though the people in this country gave a decision, is not a question for me at all. It is a question for Ulster, and I am not going to enter to-night into any discussion as to whether revolution would be justified under such circumstances. I shall not enter into it to-night for this
  968
  reason, that, so far as I am concerned, I believe in representative government, and speaking as a British Member of the House of Commons, believing in representative government, if the decision of the people is given in favour of the Home Rule Bill, then I shall not be responsible for encouraging resistance against it.
  The next charge which the right hon. Gentleman made against us, and partly against me, was that the leaders of the Unionist party, and the men who, if there is a change of Government, would assume office, had engaged in a conspiracy to seduce the Army from doing their duty. That is the charge, and the House heard the evidence on which it is supported. I shall examine that evidence. In the first place, he quoted something which was done by my hon. Friend the Member for the Ludlow Division of Shropshire (Mr. Rowland Hunt). My hon. Friend occupies an interesting and almost unique position in this House. He has displayed always a straightforward honesty which has won my respect at least, and I think the respect really of every Member of the House; but I would remind the House that my hon. Friend repudiated the leadership of my right hon. Friend who preceded me, and, much to my regret, he has taken the same course in regard to my leadership. And not only has he done that, but I am informed that he has actually recommended the farmers in Shropshire to vote against the policy for which I stand. Is it not, therefore, a little hard to seek as a proof of the conspiracy of the Unionist party the action of an hon. Member of this House who has stated that he is going to vote against that party? Leaving my hon. Friend, the right hon. Gentleman gave the evidence of five individuals, and this was in proof of a conspiracy by the leaders of the Unionist party. He quoted in support of his view the speeches of three Members of that party, two of whom have never been in the Cabinet, though possibly they might be in a Cabinet in the future; and in proof of the conspiracy he quoted two Members of the Unionist party who are amongst our leaders and who were Members of the last Unionist Cabinet. His proof, therefore, is that three said something which bears out what he said, and two said exactly the opposite. The three whom he accused were Lord Lansdowne, my right hon. Friend who opened the Debate this afternoon (Mr. F. E. Smith), and myself. I shall

  969
  only deal with myself. The others are well able to take care of themselves.
  What is the ground on which he based that charge so far as I am concerned? He quoted words which I used in the House the other day to the effect that in my opinion the officers who had resigned had done their duty. That was the charge. But remember these words were used after the event more than that. What was it that I said? Did I say that these officers would be doing their duty in refusing to obey any command? On the contrary, I had read out to this House a document which showed that these officers were presented with an option; they had to do certain things which were against their conscience or to be dismissed the Service. They decided to be dismissed the Service, and I said that in taking that decision they were fulfilling their duty. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that I implied that any officer taking another course would not be doing his duty. I neither said nor implied anything of the kind. If any officer thought that the Government were entitled to do what they were proposing to do that officer would be fulfilling his duty in obeying the order, and not taking the alternative presented to him by the Commanding Officer.
  What was the other question the right hon. Gentleman gave of mine? He quoted quite correctly, so far as I could follow him, a statement I had made that tyranny is sometimes exercised by other people than kings. I had added as an historical fact that King James II. tried to exercise his tyranny by means of the Army, but failed because the Army refused to be made an instrument in carrying out that tyranny. Where is there a word of seduction of the Army in quoting that? It is really as if one were to take up the view that history, on a subject which is controversial, ought never to be mentioned. In calling attention to that analogy there was no intention of influencing the Army; it was intended to warn the Government. The right hon. Gentleman said it was made near and for the Curragh—a suggestion that it was intended to influence the officers. I will give him a better reason for influence on the officers, if they were influenced by any political speech. In my belief—although I have no evidence of it—the suspicion of the officers was raised by the speech of the right hon. Gentleman at Bradford, and it was that, if any political speech, that influenced them in the course they have taken. Then the right hon.
  970
  Gentleman went on to allude to Lord Roberts as one of the leaders of the Unionist party as proof of this conspiracy—and he did it in a characteristic way—he said Lord Roberts had joined this conspiracy because he signed the Covenant. He then read the words of the Covenant quite correctly:—
  "And more particularly to prevent the armed forces of the Crown being used to deprive the people of Ulster of their rights."
  And in giving his interpretation of that, he characteristically said Lord Roberts had urged the soldiers to disobey orders. Why, these words just express what has been the motive of the main body of the speeches of all of us on this question—not that officers or soldiers should not obey orders, but that the people of this country should be so influenced as to prevent the Army being used. My hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Cave) spoke of the cry which they are going to raise, and described it as a dishonest cry. That does not prove either that it will not be raised by hon. Gentlemen opposite or that it may not be effective. But I will draw my own moral from the great display of spirits which was seen in this House last Tuesday. It was not that they believed in their cry, but they thought they had got something, and were ready to welcome anything which would prevent them fighting the next election on the Home Rule issue. I am not afraid of that cry. The real question which, when they get the opportunity, the people of this country will decide is whether or not the Army ought to be used to coerce Ulster. That is the question, and no amount of sophistry will prevent the people of this country from seeing it in that light and giving their decision according to whether or not they agree with it. In this connection I should like, although it has already been put as well as it can be put, to say a word or two about the position of these officers. We have, at all events, gained something. The First Lord of the Admiralty was challenged by my right hon. Friend to say if these officers had done anything inconsistent with their duty. He refused to say that they had, and I understood him to say that they had not.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I made no charge against the officers.
  Lord ROBERT CECIL: What about the "Daily News"? [HON. MEMBERS: "What about John Ward?" and "What about the "Morning Post"?]
  Mr. BONAR LAW: That is interesting, and if it only concerned the right hon. Gentleman I should leave it there. I wish now to put to the House, so that we may try to really get to the bottom of the matter, what is it they think these officers have done wrong? They were given two alternatives, one to do something which they thought they ought not to do, and the other to be dismissed the Service, which meant for all of them the loss of their careers, and for many of them the loss of their livelihood. [An HON. MEMBER: "Ancient history."] They had the alternatives put before them. What breach of discipline, what insubordination was there in accepting an alternative which was put before them by their superior officers? So far I do not think there is a man in the House who believes that the officers were guilty of any insubordination of any kind. But there has been a suggestion that they were guilty inasmuch as they made conditions with the War Office. Now examine that. What is their position? Take General Gough and his brother officers who came to London. They had accepted an alternative which was given to them. They had accepted dismissal from the Service. They came to the War Office. They did not ask to be sent back. They were free agents, as free agents as any Member of this House at that time, because they had accepted dismissal. It was the War Office themselves that wanted them to go back. Being free agents, had they not the right and was it not their duty to make sure that they would never again be put in the same position of difficulty? Remember, they might in the future have been put in that position without the option of an alternative which had now been given to them. They ran that risk. All that they said to the War Office was this: If we go back—if you want us to go back—it must be on the clear understanding that we shall never again be asked to do that, rather than agree to do which we prefer to be dismissed the Service. Is there any man in the House who will say that that was not the position which the officers—every one of them—were perfectly entitled to take, and which all of us would have taken in their place? That is all that I am going to say on that subject.
  But the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Churchill), though he spoke after my right hon. Friend, had very little to say about his speech. He dismissed the main part of it as triviality, which is a very easy way
  972
  of meeting a speech which you are unable to answer. Let me examine two of those trivialities. The first of them was the contention by my right hon. Friend that the whole of the Cabinet and not the poor unfortunate Gentleman who has been sacrificed to save the others were up to the neck in the crime for which the right hon. Gentleman has suffered. He made the charge and he proved it. I am not going in any detail into his evidence, but I will remind the House of this: The late Secretary for War, as he himself told us, had an interview with General Gough, and discussed with him the conditions on which he would go back, that he agreed with General Gough that in order to prevent future misunderstandings those conditions not only might be in writing, but ought to be in writing. After this interview with General Gough he comes up to the Cabinet, as he himself told us, and said that he told the Cabinet all that had happened between him and General Gough. So far, therefore, as the whole point at issue is concerned every Member of the Cabinet who heard the right hon. Gentleman was as much committed to the policy he had adopted as the right hon. Gentleman. But there is something more. Lord Haldane, in the House of Lords, gave as the policy of the Government precisely the conditions for which the right hon. Gentleman has had to resign. These are the words of Lord Haldane. We all knew him in this House. No one, I think, had a greater respect for his abilities than I had, but conciseness of language is not generally one of his qualities. For once in his life he says, what apparently he means, and says it in a way that no one can misunderstand, which suggests to me that the words had been selected after conference with someone else, perhaps the Prime Minister. These are the words:—
  "No orders were issued, no orders are likely to be issued, and no orders will be issued for the coercion of Ulster."
  Precisely the condition for which the right hon. Gentleman has left his post. And what about Lord Morley? We heard what he said in the House of Lords the other day. But I have here what professes to be a verbatim report of what he said today, and I ask the House to listen to it:—
  "I have no difficulty in making a plain and unvarnished statement"—
  We have heard words like that before, but Lord Morley fulfils his promise:—
  "After the Cabinet dispersed on Monday, 23rd March. I stayed behind to ascertain from Colonel Seely particulars for my answer to questions to be put to me that

  973
  afternoon in your Lordship's House. Colonel Seely was occupied on the draft Army Council Memorandum, and he showed me the proposed paragraphs the 'guilty' and peccant paragraphs,' as they have been called. I did not perceive then, and I do nut perceive now, that they differ in spirit and substance either from the previous paragraphs already sanctioned by the Cabinet, or from the words I had myself used in this House in reply to the Noble Marquess. My answer to that question was sanctioned by the Cabinet Colonel Seely told me on this occasion that he regarded the two paragraphs as representing accurately what the officers from the Curragh had been given to understand, and were a necessary addition to make the Memorandum complete. I made one or two very slight verbal alterations, not in the least affecting the general tenour, and Colonel Seely initialled them".
  We have one of two things. Lord Morley was present at the Cabinet. He is a man everyone, I think, will feel of very unusual intelligence, even for a Cabinet Minister—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!".]—or for a Member of the Opposition Bench. I do not mean any reflection. He is a man of very unusual ability, and he is less likely than most to misunderstand what he hears. We have one of two things—either Lord Morley's statement is false, or every Member of the Cabinet is in precisely in the same position. The second triviality to which the right hon. Gentleman refused to give his attention was the discrepancy between the utterances of Ministers and the facts as we know them. That seems to hint perhaps unimportant. It does not seem unimportant to me. For if we are really in this position, that no statement of fact on this subject made by a Member of the Government carries conviction unless it is corroborated by independent evidence, then that is a new situation for a Government and for the House of Commons. Since the right hon. Gentleman the late Secretary of State for War has resigned, I am not going to refer to his discrepancies. But I shall take one or two others. First take the White Paper. I am afraid that what I am now going to say is not only dull but it is difficult to follow, and I ask the House to give me their indulgence. In one of these telegrams the War Office relieved the Colonel of the 16th Lancers from his command. Yet there is nothing whatever in any one of the telegrams presented to this House to show that that officer had resigned. The only reference to the 16th Lancers is contained in the following words:—
  "Officer commanding 5th Lancers states that all officers, except two and one doubtful, are resigning their commissions to-day, and much fear same conditions in the 16th Lancers. Fear men will refuse to move."
  And later:—
  "Regret to report brigadier and fifty-seven officers Third Cavalry Brigade prefer to accept dismissal if ordered North."
  974
  How could they dismiss that colonel until they knew he had resigned, and how did they know he had resigned? It may be that it was only an accidental omission, but some telegram is missing. It may have been left out by accident, but it may have been left out because there was something compromising in it. I ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, who represents everybody, will he, in answer to a question or by some other means, read out to the House to-morrow or circulate as a White Paper that telegram through which the War Office knew that this colonel had resigned? Will he do so? [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer!" and "Read it out!"] Hon. Members do not follow. There is nothing in the dispatches presented to this House to show that the colonel of the 16th Lancers had resigned; yet they dismiss him. Something must be omitted. I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he will present to the House the telegram which is missing?
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I saw the telegrams. They appear to be quite insignificant. I cannot give documents on the spur of the moment, but if the right hon. Gentleman would put down a question the Prime Minister will be consulted on the subject, and I have no doubt that he will endeavour, as far as possible, to meet the wishes of the right hon. Gentleman.
  Mr. BONAR LAW: The question will be put to-morrow. Let us take the discrepancies of the First Lord of the Admiralty himself. In regard to Lord Morley, he said:—
  "Lord Morley never revised or examined these paragraphs, or took any decision upon them."
  I have read what Lord Morley said. He added:—
  "I made one or two very slight alterations not in the least affecting the general tenour."
  The House will remember that the First Lord of the Admiralty in his speech on Wednesday night pointed to the difficulty of getting statements made in this House to correspond with statements made in the other House. He said—I am going to do him full justice—
  "They might not agree in minute detail."
  Who cares about minute detail? That is a difficulty which will inevitably arise if you are concocting a story; but it is a difficulty which will never arise if you are always telling the exact truth as you know it. There is a proverb which says—it would not be Parliamentary were I to quote it exactly—that those

  975
  who start to concoct stories must have good memories. The First Lord of the Admiralty found that out on Wednesday. In the course of his speech he told us in regard to the sending of the Battle Squadron to Lamlash that it had no connection whatever with precautionary measures in Ireland. He forgot that almost a few sentences after he told us that the sending of that fleet was countermanded because the precautionary measures had been successful. And now I come to a much more important person—the Prime Minister of this country. I am quite sure that whatever vices they attribute to me, hon. Gentlemen opposite know that I should prefer to make this charge in the presence of the Prime Minister. It is not my fault that he is not here. He is a very old Parliamentary hand, and I quite admit that, so far as I can judge, he is the only Member of the Cabinet who could be trusted in the War Office at present. It would have been perfectly easy for the right hon. Gentleman to announce the resignation of his right hon. Friend and yet to make arrangements which would have made it possible for him to be here not only to-day—and, indeed, since he was here at the beginning, I do not see why he is not here now—but till the Home Rule Second Reading Debate had concluded, and in my belief his not doing so is really contrary to the interests of the country at present, and is, in my opinion, disrespectful to the House of Commons. The House will remember that the right hon. Gentleman has been challenged in regard to those statements. Only on Friday I said to him that we would expect an explanation to-day. We have not got it, and he could have given it quite easily before he went away this afternoon. These arc the two statements made by him which, as we now know, are entirely contrary to the facts. He said this first:—
  "The third misapprehension is to some extent the result of the second. It concerns the recent action of officers of the Army at the Curragh and elsewhere. There is a widespread impression abroad that the Government contemplates instituting a general inquisition into the intentions of officers in the event of their being asked to take up arms against Ulster. No such action is intended."
  A defence of this has been made in the Press. I hope, for the honour of the Prime Minister, he will not make the same defence. The defence is that he was speaking only of the future, but if the House will look at his words, he says there is a misapprehension as the result of what happened at the Curragh.
  976
  The misapprehension was not due to the future. It was due to the present, and if that is the defence of the Prime Minister, then I have only this to say, that though it may be literally true, it can have no other effect, and can have been intended to have no other effect, than to deceive the people. The second statement, which is not in accordance with the facts, was this:—
  "As for the so-called naval movements, they simply consisted in the use of two small cruisers to convey a detachment of troops to Carrickfergus."
  11.0 P.M.
  They "simply consisted in the sending of those two small cruisers." One day last week the First Lord of the Admiralty told us that a whole Battle Squadron, with its attendant flotilla, had been ordered to Lamlash for the express purpose of being ready to deal with trouble if it arose in Ireland. It was the knowledge gradually circulating that this had been done which had created the impression. I did believe that the Prime Minister knew nothing about it, but the First Lord of the Admiralty, in the presence of the Prime Minister, told us not only that he knew about it, but that on the Saturday he gave the First Lord instructions to countermand the movement. This, then, is the position. The Prime Minister of this country says that there were no Naval movements except those two cruises on the Sunday, when he had himself on Saturday countermanded the moving of a whole battle fleet, and that was a movement, remember, which had already begun. I do hope that the Prime Minister has some explanation to give of this discrepancy. He has had an opportunity of explaining it. I hope he will not fail to do it. If he does not explain it, this, at least, must be evident to every Member of the House—that he must indeed have been in a terrible strait when he took action so inconsistent, as I believe, with not only his position, but of his character. Now, if the House will indulge me for a moment. I should like to examine the central position of the trouble in the Army. We cannot judge of these occurrences until we have the statement of General Paget as to the communication which he addressed to his officers, and as to the instructions which he received from the War Office, which justified him in giving that address to his officers. Over and over again we have asked for this statement, which has invariably been declined. The Government refuse to give it. I ask the House to consider what the position is. The Prime

  977
  Minister told us in plain words that General Paget had no verbal instructions of any kind in addition to those contained in the letter of the 14th March. On the strength of instructions to send reinforcements to make secure munitions of war—a purely police duty—on the strength of those instructions, and nothing else. General Paget, first, tells his officers that what he is going to do will set Ulster in a blaze by Saturday—[HON. MEMBERS: "The Press."] That was the late Secretary of State for War. When General Paget says that, I should be very glad to see his letter.
  Colonel SEELY: I said that that was what General Paget said to me.
  Mr. BONAR LAW: We are justified in asking that, in an important matter like this, the actual statement of General Paget should be communicated to the House. On the strength, remember, of these instructions for police duty, General Paget says to any officers domiciled in Ulster, "You may disappear." In the third place, he makes an inquisition into the views of all the officers under his command as to what they will do in eventualities which have not arisen. In addition to this, although there is no conclusive proof of it, it is evident from the White Paper, I think—and we cannot get conclusive proof until we have General Paget's statement—that the Cavalry Brigade expected to be ordered North at once, because, in reporting the resignations of these officers, General Paget does not say that they have resigned, but that they
  'prefer to accept dismissal if ordered North."
  He speaks also of the men refusing to move. On the strength of these police instructions General Paget took action which almost destroyed the Army. Is it not evident to every Member of this House that, if he was capable of doing that, he ought not to have been left in his command for a single hour after the War Office knew what he had done? Is not that evident? If the Government had taken the obvious course of repudiating the action of General Paget, none of this trouble would have happened. That is admitted. My Noble Friend behind me the Member for Portsmouth asked why when General Gough sent in his letter saying that they were ready to do everything they were now asked to do, General Paget did not at once send in his resignation? The Foreign
  978
  Secretary, whom I am sorry not to see present, said that he could not understand why that course had not been taken. Of course, the explanation is that General Paget did not understand his instructions. The moment General Gough came to London and explained the situation—at that moment all that was necessary to set the whole matter right was to say that "General Paget has never received such instruction; you go back," and the whole incident is at an end! That was all that was necessary. Why did not they take that course? There is one possible explanation, and it is the explanation which I heard hinted at just now in an interruption: These gentlemen were so interested in General Paget's career that for the sake of it they were willing to make every sacrifice. For the sake of General Paget's career—the general who, on their statement, ought not to be in a position of command—for the sake of General Paget they have lost the services of General French and General Ewart, and for the sake of General Paget they ran the risk of destroying the Army, and for the sake of General Paget have made themselves ridiculous. None of these cross-statements about what happened would have occurred, nothing of it would have arisen, but for the unselfish desire to save this officer. In addition, they have lost one colleague, and one would think must lose two others, whatever else happens. On that supposition was there ever such a display of self-sacrifice? It would be difficult enough to believe if it were the action of one man. But here we find twenty Gentlemen all willing to sacrifice the Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, their colleagues, and themselves, for the sake of General Paget! Such self-sacrifice was never known in history before. We have here a score of St. Sebastians who are willing to be the target of undeserved arrows—all for the sake of the career of General Paget! Here is one explanation.
  An HON. MEMBER: Do you accept it?
  Mr. BONAR LAW: I for one do not accept it. There is another possible explanation. They have all from the beginning insinuated—and it was never done so completely as by the First Lord of the Admiralty this afternoon—that the whole thing rests upon General Paget—that it is all his fault. They have insinuated it, but they have not dared to say it.

  979
  They dare not say so, because they knew if they did General Paget will be compelled in self-defence to tell the truth.
  An HON. MEMBER: Has General Paget told anything but the truth?
  Mr. BONAR LAW: I am glad the hon. Member interrupts. He asks has General Paget told anything but the truth. No; he has told nothing. But he may perhaps tell something. I do not believe there is any Member of this House—not one—who doubts that we are having now a repetition by the whole Government of the action of some of their colleagues in another connection last year. What we complained of chiefly at that time was not what their colleagues had done,—it was quite pardonable, in my opinion, and I said so at the time; it was not proper, but I said it was quite easily understood, and I said it was quite pardonable—but what was not pardonable, or so easily pardonable, was the action they took in concealing from the House what they had done. It is the same now. The Government are concealing something. What it is we do not know. How can we know? What they are concealing we do not know, but we do know they are ashamed of it.
  Colonel SEELY: I do not wish to Interrupt the course of this Debate, except to say two things. The first is with regard to Lord Morley. I think I might be permitted to make a personal statement to the House of my knowledge of the subject, since there is no other Member of the House who can possibly know the facts, for we were alone together; and the second is, although I did not intend to take any part in the general Debate, I want to say one word or two in respect to the execution of the agreement. With regard to Lord Morley, the suggestion is that he was a party to the agreement made between myself as Secretary of State, Sir John French as Chief of the Imperial Staff, Sir John Ewart as Adjutant-General, and a certain group of officers—[HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"]—that is the suggestion—[HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"]—and that Lord Morley was involved. The House will bear with me, because this affects Lord Morley, for whom everybody in all quarters of the House has so great a respect, and he cannot very well speak for himself in this matter. I know very well what Lord Morley has stated, but I wish to make this further statement. It is suggested that Lord
  980
  Morley in some way knew that he was to be a party to this agreement. There is not the shade of a shadow of foundation for that statement.
  Mr. BONAR LAW: No such suggestion was made.
  Colonel SEELY: I am in the recollection of the House. The hon. and learned Member for the Kingston Division (Mr. Cave), as well as the right hon. Gentleman, implied that Lord Morley had definitely stated, as he will see when he reads the OFFICIAL REPORT to-morrow, that Lord Morley was equally concerned in this matter with me, and he went further and said that for that matter the whole Cabinet. I do wish to make it clear that Lord Morley is not involved in this matter. I have said that as a matter of policy there is no difference between myself and my colleagues, but that the House in all quarters did resent what appeared to be a bargain between one set of officers and the Executive which put them upon a qualified engagement of service—a limited loyalty. That was not intended, as I stated earlier to-day, by either Sir John French, Sir Spencer Ewart, or myself, but it did so appear. The governing point I rise to make is: Did Lord Morley know that General Gough had written that letter in which he said that he wanted to be able to tell his officers something definite which has given the impression of the bargain? Sir, Lord Morley knew nothing whatever about it, and I hope that definite statement of mine will now close this incident so far as the question of arrangements with the officers are concerned as to any share of responsibility of Lord Morley. With regard to the second point as to concealment. If anyone in this House knows what has been going on about the movements in Ulster that is myself. I urged long before these movements were taken that it would be wise to take steps to protect those particular places where large stores of arms and Government property were collected. I know all about what was proposed, and I myself was responsible for having proposed those movements. There is nothing whatever to conceal. There was no plot whatever. We thought it necessary, in view of the information conveyed to us, to remove so great a temptation, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson) will not deny it—I defy him to get up and deny that it was a temptation to his people—
  Sir EDWARD CARSON: May I say, Sir, that I felt no temptation?
  Colonel SEELY: Very wisely the right hon. Gentleman does not permit me to finish my sentence—I defy him to deny that these large stores of arms were not a great temptation to many of the men under his command.
  Sir E. CARSON: May I say, Sir, that no man ever told me it was a temptation?
  Colonel SEELY: That is a very qualified denial. We know full well that here was a force organised, drilled, and wanting more arms, and there were arms in large numbers. I had urged before that they should be better protected, and I had been I told that to protect them would precipitate a crisis. [HON. MEMBERS: "Who by?"] On all sides—by all men I can assure the House that everything is now known of what we intended. Our object was, and, so far as I know the minds of those who only four hours ago were my colleagues, still is to avoid bloodshed in Ulster or elsewhere, and that we acted as the Executive is bound to act in order to protect Government property and to secure law and order.
  The ATTORNEY-GENERAL (Sir J. Simon): The hour is late, and I only propose to occupy a very short time, but the speech which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition has made is one which requires to be dealt with. It divided itself into two parts, and each of those parts illustrated the general course of the Debate. In one part of the speech he was concerned in trying to fit together a great number of odds and ends in order to support, if he could, two propositions neither of which happen to be true. There are, I quite admit, matters in the events of the last week which are very fair subject for criticism, and, it may very well be, adverse criticism from the point of view of hon. Gentlemen who take the other side, but the two things which the right hon. Gentleman and his Friends set out to establish, by fitting together these odds and ends and by filling up any gaps there may be by saying the Government are concealing something though they do not know what it is they are concealing, are these: First, that there was some plot which was engineered, if not by the Cabinet, by some Members of it to take action in Ulster which was designed and which was calculated to promote an outbreak. Second,
  982
  that the explanation of what are called the peccant paragraphs is an afterthought, and a mendacious afterthought. With reference to the first, I have to say tonight that anybody who will really rid his mind of party prejudice and will consider that what has happened here was a discussion with generals of great position in the Army as to what should be done. should on that fact alone see the extreme improbability, and I should have thought the utter impossibility for such suggestions being put forward and being ever accepted. How it is consistent with the high compliments which right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite pay to General Paget, Sir John French, and General Ewart, with that attitude, to say, "Oh, yes; but there are certain Members of the Cabinet, we do not exactly know who or how many, who were engaged in careful discussion with these military persons in order to set on foot a plot which was calculated to provoke an outbreak,"—how on earth right hon. Gentlemen who speak in this language of high praise and deserved praise of the patriotism and good faith of our great soldiers can say that passes my comprehension. Let me point this out further. The powers of the First Lord of the Admiralty may be very great, the powers of my right hon. and gallant Friend the late Secretary of State for War may be very large, but does anyone suppose that the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War between them could carry through a plot designed and calculated to provoke an outbreak—[HON. MEMBERS: "They failed."]—without that design being open and discovered to General French, General Ewart and General Paget? Is it, going to be suggested that the two Ministers were acting alone? In point of fact, they were not acting by themselves, because, as I said on a previous occasion, I was associated with them, and I say now that Lord Crewe also was associated with them. How it could be suggested that two or three Ministers of the Crown are going to perpetrate such an infamy without the soldiers, with whom they were consulting, knowing what they were about I cannot imagine.
  I do not profess to have any sort of military judgment or skill in this matter. But speaking for myself, it did appear to me—and I should have thought it would appeal to many persons in this House with no more skill on military

  983
  matters than I have—that it was a very difficult matter to decide with any confidence—if you are going to try and protect certain exposed quantities of ammunition at scattered places—which of two or three possible alternative courses would be the least provocative. But there was one thing obviously wrong, and that was to leave the ammunition where it was, unguarded, offering from day to day, if there were persons who were disposed to take a violent course, a temptation which it might be difficult for them to resist. The great offence which we did commit was apparently that we came to the clear conclusion that that ammunition should not be left as it was, but having to choose between a method by which such ammunition might have been packed and moved from the place where it was to somewhere else, or sending a reasonable body of persons to protect it we chose the latter instead of the former course. Allow me to point out what would have been the attack which would have been made upon us if it could have been said: Here the Government are moving quantities of ammunition, it may be by rail, it may be by road, inside the province of Ulster. It would have been demanded of us, "What is the meaning of moving the ammunition? It must be a preparation for some violent course?"
  Colonel YATE Colonel YATE rose—
  Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member is not entitled to interrupt. The right hon. Gentleman is not bound to give way.
  Sir J. SIMON: The right hon. Gentleman Opposite quite courteously asked about the further arrangements, naval and military, which were suggested. We have explained to the House again and again, and if it has not been believed, it will not be believed now, because I repeat it—we have explained again and again that our advisers—the Chief Secretary for Ireland and others assured us that these steps could be taken without any serious disturbance. We thought it right,—I think everybody thought it right to recognise that there must be risk—be it small or great—and to be ready to deal with that risk when it arose.
  I now come to the second proposition which the right hon. Gentleman was so very anxious to establish. There again, of course, if hon. Gentlemen opposite take the course of saying, "We do not believe anything that anybody says," there is nothing
  984
  more to be said. I am content for the moment, if the House will allow me, to remind them of what on this matter has been said by the Prime Minister. I have to say that, if they do not accept what he says, and if they say that the argument is not proved by what he says on the matter of fact, then we have nothing more to say. The Prime Minister has stated in the clearest terms that everything that he did and everything that the Cabinet did with relation to this draft Memorandum was done in the belief and with the full assurance that it was not the answer to any request that was made or to any demand that was made, but that it was believed by him and by us to be the drawing up of a document which, as we gathered from my right hon. Friend (Colonel Seely), it was thought right that General Gough should have. Does the House really think it proper to obscure that vital distinction? Everybody who read that White Paper and who saw General Gough's letter, followed, as it was immediately, by this Memorandum, must have supposed from the connection of those two documents that the one was a demand and that the other was an answer to that demand. If that were the truth it would be intolerable, and it is precisely because that was never intended and never designed by the Prime Minister or by the Cabinet, that the Prime Minister made the statement in the clear terms in which he did.
  I say again that, without going through the details of what he said about it, right hon. Gentlemen opposite can take their course. They may choose between two things, but let them, before they choose, observe this: the Prime Minister, in the statement he made on this matter, was speaking of something within his own personal knowledge, and with which he had been dealing a short time before, in which he himself, with his own hand, made the corrections on the face of the draft. They may say which they please. If they are prepared to take the Prime Minister as the witness of truth, I say their accusation on that head is unarguable; and if they refuse to accept the Prime Minister as the witness of truth, then I say we on this side will not argue with them. I come now to deal with the other half of the right hon. Gentleman's speech. Why, Sir, this Debate began as an attack to be delivered on the Government, and has ended with an apology offered by the Opposition. [HON. MEMBERS: "What about Lord Morley?] It began with a

  985
  speech for the prosecution—a very able and well-constructed speech, everybody will agree—delivered by the right hon. and learned Gentleman from that side, and a thing has happened which I have never known in any tribunal before. When the other main advocate of that side comes to wind up the matter, though speaking from the same side of the House, he delivers a speech for the defence. Observe the difficulty in which the right hon. Gentleman finds himself placed. He has offered some explanations to-night of some of the things he has been saying. I am not quite clear whether he withdraws what he said or whether he affirms what he said—at any rate, he told us that in some respects he wanted to explain or qualify what he said. That was fair enough. But the explanation suggested that what he has been saying is really due to the fact that unfortunate questions have been put, or suggested to have been put, to officers, and that they have been put in a position of embarrassment, will not do, and for this simple reason that, whether it is a wise course or a foolish course—for my own part I say frankly I think it deplorable that any questions should have been put of a hypothetical character—[HON. MEMBERS: "They were. Is it denied?"]. I say, however that may be, the Leader of the Opposition really cannot give that as the explanation of what he has been saying about the Army, for what he has been saying on this. subject goes back to a meeting at Blenheim, which took place in July, 1912, and on that occasion the right hon. Gentleman said that in their opposition to our proposals the Unionist party
  "shall not be guided by the considerations: we shall not be restrained by the bonds which would influence us in an ordinary political struggle."
  The right hon. Gentleman says so now, but does he not see now that what he has been saying from that time forward does bear the construction that he has assured those whose business it is to act without distinction of party for the causes of law and order—he has, in fact, been saying to them, "This is no ordinary political issue. This is not a matter which divides parties in the ordinary sense. This is something which goes quite outside any controversy of that sort, and we of the Unionist party are not going to be restrained by any influences such as would restrain us in an ordinary political struggle." Let him just see how that has been developed. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Carson),
  986
  so recently as 22nd September last, has worked it down to this. He said publicly to these very Covenanters who gathered there in Antrim, "We have pledges and promises from some of the greatest generals in the Army." We are entitled to point out, and the country is entitled to know, does he approve of that? The right hon. Gentleman was actually driven to this resort. He said "it is true that among those whom the First Lord of the Admiralty had quoted were some who had never been Members of a British Cabinet, and he said he had quoted two people who had been Members of a Unionist Cabinet, and those are the two people who said they disapproved of this kind of appeal to the Army." I should think they did. How does it come about that Lord Derby, devoted as he is to the right hon. Gentleman's opinions—all of them—need to go out of his way and say: "In this respect I agree with the Prime Minister?" The Prime Minister had just put his view. How did it come about that Lord Derby was moved to say that if it was not that Lord Derby perfectly well knew, both from his past responsibility as a statesman and his past experience in connection with the Army, that what in fact was being said, and being said in the name of the Opposition, what a thing which was disintegrating the impartial loyalty of the forces of the Crown? Who was the other ex-Cabinet Minister whom the right hon. Gentleman grasps so warmly as coming to his aid in this matter? It was Lord Selborne, who has been at the head of the Navy. Does anybody mean to say that Lord Selborne, a distinguished Unionist leader, anxious as every Unionist leader is entitled to be, anxious to make the best of such opportunities as he has, and to use them in order to advance his cause, would have spoken in terms of reprobation of the use that was being made of the Army if he did not feel that there were some people in the Unionist party who are going too far? What is the next element in the explanation—in the apology? There was a reference to James II. Now, the right hon. Gentleman asks us to believe that he was merely overwhelmed by historical erudition, and that this was merely a piece of interesting recollection of what happened in the time of James II., and had no reference at all—
  Mr. BONAR LAW: I said nothing of the kind.
  Sir JOHN SIMON: Do I understand from the right hon. Gentleman that when he called attention to the fact that in the time of James II. the Army changed its allegiance it had no moral for the Army in its present position.
  Mr. BONAR LAW: If the hon. and learned Gentleman turns to the speech, he will see that when I called the attention of the Prime Minister to it, I intended to warn the Government.
  Sir JOHN SIMON: You warned the Government. I would remind the right hon. Gentleman and the public of what happened in the time of James II., and under circumstances of great political stress. The Army deserted the allegiance to which it was thought it might adhere. In order that there may be no doubt of the real use that is made of these ancient historical parallels, let me remind the right hon. Gentleman of another thing. He said, I think, on the 24th February, on the Vote of Censure in this House:—
  "For the first time for more than 250 years one of the great political parties in this country has solemnly declared that it will assist Ulster in resisting by force what the Government mean to do."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th February, 1914, cols. 1706–7.]
  Mr. BONAR LAW Mr. BONAR LAW indicated assent.
  Sir J. SIMON: Let us just see how far that is going. I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman approves of that which has been suggested both inside this House by one of his followers, and outside, namely, that a fund should be started to compensate officers and men who refuse to discharge their duty in Ulster. When the right hon. Gentleman finds himself faced, as he was in the course of this Debate today, with those extracts, he finally explains that the hon. Member for the Ludlow Division (Mr. Hunt) is a person he might safely repudiate because of his simple honesty.
  Earl WINTERTON: What about your simple honesty?
  Sir J. SIMON: I should have thought that, even if regard was had to nothing but the obvious interests of those who are trying to carry the Home Rule Bill, that would have been sufficient to show that we are not likely to engage in conduct which, to our knowledge, is likely to cause an
  outbreak. Accuse us, if you like, of being politically wrong, accuse us if you like of being administratively foolish, but surely you cannot suggest that our folly goes that length, when you are always telling us that the first shot that was fired by our forces would fall upon our heads and destroy us. Surely you cannot at the same time assume that we are engaged in a plot to bring it about. There is no length to which we would not go in order to avoid such a terrible calamity, and I think that we have shown it—[HON. MEMBERS: "The Bradford speech."]—but any idea that covenanters are to be entitled to prepare on a large scale for operations of a forcible character, and that if we move a limited number of troops to protect ammunition we are guilty of provocative action—[HON. MEMBERS: "Battleships!"]—that idea cannot possibly commend itself to those who look at this matter without political prepossessions, and I do not think that it commends itself to the body of people in this House. I say, in conclusion, that if no other justification was necessary it would be enough to say that, while we are prepared to take any and every step to reduce the possibilities of outbreak to a minimum, we think that it is quite right and necessary to let these Ulster volunteers know that it is, and was, our fixed intention to use the forces of the Crown, if need be, to prevent the usurpation of law by force. I trust that no such terrible consummation may arise. But meantime let the House observe what were the circumstances in which this Debate started, and let the House now observe whether there be any answer from those who actually add to the injury which they are doing to the British Army by the patronising airs with which they claim that they are the only patriots.
  Mr. McKENNA Mr. McKENNA rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."
  Question put accordingly, "That the Bill be now read the third time."
  The House divided: Ayes, 329; Noes, 251

  Division No. 57.]

  AYES.

  [11.50 p m.

  Abraham, William (Dublin, Harbour)

  Agnew, Sir George William

  Armitage, Robert

  Acland, Francis Dyke

  Ainsworth, John Stirling

  Arnold, Sydney

  Adamson, William

  Alden, Percy

  Baker, Harold T. (Accrington)

  Addison, Dr. Christopher

  Allen, Arthur A. (Dumbartonshire)

  Baker, Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.)

  Adkins, Sir W. Ryland D.

  Allen, Rt. Hon. Charles P. (Stroud)

  Baring, Sir Godfrey (Barnstaple)

  Barlow, Sir John Emmott (Somerset)

  Goldstone, Frank

  Manfield, Harry

  Barnes, George N.

  Greenwood, Hamar (Sunderland)

  Markham, Sir Arthur Basil

  Barran, Sir John N. (Hawick)

  Greig, Colonel J. W.

  Marks, Sir George Croydon

  Barran, Rowland Hurst (Leeds, N.)

  Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward

  Marshall, Arthur Harold

  Beale, Sir William Phipson

  Griffith, Ellis Jones

  Mason, David M. (Coventry)

  Beauchamp, Sir Edward

  Guest, Hon. Major C. H. C. (Pembroke)

  Meagher, Michael

  Beck, Arthur Cecil

  Guest, Hon. Frederick E. (Dorset, E.)

  Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.)

  Benn, W. W. (T. Hamlets, St. George)

  Gwynn, Stephen Lucius (Galway)

  Meehan, Patrick J. (Queen's Co., Leix)

  Bentham, George Jackson

  Hackett, John

  Middlebrook, William

  Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine

  Hall, Frederick (Normanton)

  Millar, James Duncan

  Black, Arthur W.

  Hancock, John George

  Molloy, Michael

  Boland, John Plus

  Harcourt, Rt. Hon. Lewis (Rossendale)

  Molteno, Percy Alport

  Booth, Frederick Handel

  Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose)

  Mond, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred

  Bowerman, Charles W.

  Hardie, J. Keir

  Money, L. G. Chiozza

  Boyle, Daniel (Mayo, North)

  Harmsworth, Cecil (Luton, Beds)

  Montagu, Hon. E. S.

  Brace, William

  Harvey, A. G. C. (Rochdale)

  Mooney, John J.

  Brady, Patrick Joseph

  Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, West)

  Morrell, Philip

  Brunner, John F. L.

  Harvey, W. E. (Derbyshire, N.E.)

  Morison, Hector

  Bryce, J. Annan

  Haslam, Lewis (Monmouth)

  Morton, Alpheus Cleophas

  Buckmaster, Sir Stanley O.

  Hayden, John Patrick

  Muldoon, John

  Burns, Rt. Hon. John

  Hayward, Evan

  Munro, Rt. Hon. Robert

  Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas

  Hazleton, Richard

  Murphy, Martin J.

  Buxton, Noel (Norfolk, North)

  Helme, Sir Norval Watson

  Murray, Captain Hon. Arthur C.

  Byles, Sir William Pollard

  Hemmerde, Edward George

  Nannetti, Joseph P.

  Carr-Gomm, H. W.

  Henderson, Arthur (Durham)

  Needham, Christopher Thomas

  Cawley, Sir Frederick (Prestwich)

  Henderson, J. M. (Aberdeen, W.)

  Neilson, Francis

  Cawley, Harold T. (Lancs., Heywood)

  Henry, Sir Charles

  Nicholson, Sir Charles N. (Doncaster)

  Chancellor, Henry George

  Herbert, General Sir Ivor (Mon., S.)

  Nolan, Joseph

  Chapple, Dr. William Allen

  Hewart, Gordon

  Norman, Sir Henry

  Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S.

  Higham, John Sharp

  Norton, Captain Cecil W.

  Clancy, John Joseph

  Hinds, John

  Nugent, Sir Walter Richard

  Clough, William

  Hobhouse, Rt. Hon. Charles E. H.

  Nuttall, Harry

  Collins, Godfrey P. (Greenock)

  Hodge, John

  O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)

  Collins, Sir Stephen (Lambeth)

  Holmes, Daniel Turner

  O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)

  Compton-Rickett, Rt. Hon. Sir J.

  Holt, Richard Durning

  O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool)

  Condon, Thomas Joseph

  Hope, John Deans (Haddington)

  O'Doherty, Philip

  Cornwall, Sir Edwin A.

  Horne, C. Silvester (Ipswich)

  O'Donnell, Thomas

  Cotton, William Francis

  Howard, Hon. Geoffrey

  Ogden, Fred

  Cowan, W. H.

  Hudson, Walter

  O'Kelly, Edward P. (Wicklow, W.)

  Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth)

  Hughes, Spencer Leigh

  O'Kelly, James (Roscommon, N.)

  Crooks, William

  Jardine, Sir J. (Roxburgh)

  O'Malley, William

  Crumley, Patrick

  John, Edward Thomas

  O'Neill, Dr. Charles (Armagh, S.)

  Cullinan, John

  Johnson, W.

  O'Shaughnessy, P. J.

  Dalziel, Rt. Hon. Sir J. H. (Kirkcaldy)

  Jones, Rt. Hon. Sir D. Brynmor (Swansea)

  O'Shee, James John

  Davies, David (Montgomery Co.)

  Jones, Edgar (Merthyr Tydvil)

  O'Sullivan, Timothy

  Davies, Timothy (Lincs., Louth)

  Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth)

  Outhwaite, R. L.

  Davies, Sir W. Howell (Bristol, S.)

  Jones, J. Towyn (Carmarthen, East)

  Palmer, Godfrey Mark

  Davies, M. Vaughan- (Cardiganhire)

  Jones, Leif (Notts, Rushcliffe)

  Parker, James (Halifax)

  Dawes, James Arthur

  Jones, William S. Glyn- (Stepney)

  Parry, Thomas H.

  Delany, William

  Jowett, Frederick William

  Pearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek)

  Denman, Hon. Richard Douglas

  Joyce, Michael

  Pearce, William (Limehouse)

  Devlin, Joseph

  Kellaway, Frederick George

  Pearson, Hon. Weetman H. M.

  Dewar, Sir J. A.

  Kelly, Edward

  Pease, Rt. Hon. Joseph A. (Rotherham)

  Dickinson, Rt. Hon. Willoughby H.

  Kennedy, Vincent Paul

  Phillpps, Col. Ivor (Southampton)

  Dillon, John

  Kenyon, Barnet

  Phillips, John (Longford, S.)

  Donelan, Captain A.

  Kilbride, Denis

  Pirie, Duncan V.

  Doris, William

  Lamb, Sir Ernest Henry

  Pointer, Joseph

  Duffy, William J.

  Lambert, Rt. Hon. G. (Devon, S. Molton)

  Pollard, Sir George H.

  Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)

  Lambert, Richard (Wilts, Cricklade)

  Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H.

  Edwards, Clement (Glamorgan, E.)

  Lardner, James C. R.

  Pratt, J. W.

  Edwards, Sir Francis (Radnor)

  Law, Hugfi A. (Donegal, West)

  Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)

  Edwards, John Hugh (Glamorgan, Mid)

  Lawson, Sir W. (Cumb'rld, Cockerm'th)

  Price, Sir Robert J. (Norfolk, E.)

  Elverston, Sir Harold

  Leach, Charles

  Priestley, Sir W. E. B. (Bradford, E.)

  Esmonde, Dr. John (Tipperary, N.)

  Levy, Sir Maurice

  Primrose, Hon. Neil James

  Esmonde, Sir Thomas (Wexford, N.)

  Lewis, Rt. Hon. John Herbert

  Pringle, William M. R.

  Essex, Sir Richard Walter

  Lough, Rt. Hon. Thomas

  Radford, G. H.

  Esslemont, George Birnie

  Low, Sir F. (Norwich)

  Raffan, Peter Wilson

  Falconer, James

  Lundon, Thomas

  Raphael, Sir Herbert H.

  Farrell, James Patrick

  Lyell, Charles Henry

  Rea, Rt. Hon. Russell (South Shields)

  Fenwick, Rt. Hon. Charles

  Lynch, Arthur Alfred

  Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough)

  Ferens, Rt. Hon. Thomas Robinson

  Macdonald, J. Ramsay (Leicester)

  Reddy, Michael

  Ffrench, Peter

  Macdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs)

  Redmond, John E. (Waterford)

  Field, William

  McGhee, Richard

  Redmond, William (Clare, E.)

  Fiennes, Hon. Eustace Edward

  Maclean, Donald

  Redmond, William Archer (Tyrone, E.)

  Fitzgibbon, John

  Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J.

  Rendall, Atheistan

  Flavin, Michael Joseph

  MacNeill, J. G. Swift (Donegal, South)

  Richardson, Albion (Peckham)

  France, Gerald Ashburner

  Macpherson, James Ian

  Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven)

  Furness, Sir Stephen Wilson

  MacVeagh, Jeremiah

  Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)

  Gelder, Sir William Alfred

  M'Callum, Sir John M.

  Roberts, Sir J. H. (Denbighs)

  Gill, A. H.

  M'Kean, John

  Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford)

  Ginnell, L.

  McKenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald

  Robertson, John M. (Tyneside)

  Gladstone, W. G. C.

  M'Laren, Hon. H. D. (Leics.)

  Robinson, Sidney

  Glanville, H. J.

  M'Laren, Hon. F.W.S. (Lincs., Spalding)

  Roch, Walter F. (Pembroke)

  Goddard, Sir Daniel Ford

  M'Micking, Major Gilbert

  Roche, Augustine (Louth)

  990

  991

  Roe, Sir Thomas

  Swann, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles E.

  White, Patrick (Meath, North)

  Rowlands, James

  Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)

  Whitehouse, John Howard

  Rowntree, Arnold

  Tennant, Harold John

  Whittaker, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas P.

  Runciman, Rt. Hon. Waiter

  Thomas, James Henry

  Whyte, Alexander F. (Perth)

  Russell, Rt. Hon. Thomas W.

  Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton)

  Wiles, Thomas

  Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)

  Thorne, William (West Ham)

  Williams, Aneurin (Durham, N.W.)

  Samuel, J. (Stockton-on-Tees)

  Toulmin, Sir George

  Williams, John (Glamorgan)

  Samuel, Sir Stuart M. (Whitechapel)

  Trevelyan, Charles Philips

  Williams, Llewelyn (Carmarthen)

  Scanlan, Thomas

  Verney, Sir Harry

  Williams, Penry (Middlesbrough)

  Scott, A. MacCallum (Glas., Bridgeton)

  Walsh, Stephen (Lancs., Ince)

  Williamson, Sir Archibald

  Seely, Rt. Hon. Colonel J. E. B.

  Walton, Sir Joseph

  Wilson, John (Durham, Mid)

  Sheehy, David

  Ward, John (Stoke-upon-Trent)

  Wilson, Rt. Hon. J. W. (Worcs., N.)

  Sherwell, Arthur James

  Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton)

  Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)

  Shortt, Edward

  Wardle, George J.

  Wing, Thomas Edward

  Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir John Allsebrook

  Waring, Walter

  Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glasgow)

  Smith, Albert (Lancs., Clitheroe)

  Warner, Sir Thomas Courtenay T.

  Yeo, Alfred William

  Smyth, Thomas F. (Leitrim, S.)

  Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan)

  Young, William (Perthshire, East)

  Soames, Arthur Wellesley

  Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney)

  Yoxall, Sir James Henry

  Spicer, Rt. Hon. Sir Albert

  Webb, H.

  Stanley, Albert (Staffs, N.W.)

  White, J. Dundas (Glasgow, Tradeston)

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Mr.

  Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West)

  White, Sir Luke (Yorks, E.R.)

  Illingworth and Mr. W. Jones.

  Sutton, John E.

  NOES.

  Agg-Gardner, James Tynte

  Coates, Major Sir Edward Feetham

  Herbert, Hon. A. (Somerset, S.)

  Aitken, Sir William Max

  Cooper, Sir Richard Ashmole

  Hewins, William Albert Samuel

  Amery, L. C. M. S.

  Courthope, George Loyd

  Hibbert, Sir Henry F.

  Anson, Rt, Hon. Sir William R.

  Craig, Ernest (Cheshire, Crewe)

  Hickman, Colonel Thomas E.

  Anstruther-Gray, Major William

  Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet)

  Hills, John Waller

  Archer-Shee, Major Martin

  Craik, Sir Henry

  Hill-Wood, Samuel

  Astor, Waldorf

  Crichton-Stuart, Lord Ninian

  Hoare, S. J. G.

  Baird, John Lawrence

  Croft, H. P.

  Hohler, G. F.

  Baker, Sir R. L. (Dorset, N.)

  Currie, George W.

  Hope, Harry (Bute)

  Baldwin, Stanley

  Dairymple, Viscount

  Hope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield)

  Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J. (City, Lond.)

  Dalziel, Davison (Brixton)

  Hope, Major J. A. (Midlothian)

  Banbury, Sir Frederick George

  Denison-Pender, J. C.

  Horne, E. (Surrey, Guildford)

  Banner, Sir John S. Harmood-

  Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. Scott

  Horner, Andrew Long

  Baring, Major Hon. Guy V. (Winchester)

  Dixon, C. H.

  Hume-Williams, Wm. Ellis

  Barlow, Montague (Salford, South)

  Doughty, Sir George

  Hunt, Rowland

  Barnston, Harry

  Du Cros, Arthur Philip

  Hunter, Sir C. R.

  Barrie, H. T.

  Duke, Henry Edward

  Ingleby, Holcombe

  Bathurst, Hon. A. B. (Glouc., E.)

  Duncannon, Viscount

  Jackson, Sir John

  Bathurst, C. (Wilts, Wilton)

  Du Pre, W. Baring

  Jardine, Ernest (Somerset, East)

  Beach, Hon. Michael Hugh Hicks

  Eyres-Monsell, Bolton M.

  Jessel, Captain H. M.

  Beckett, Hon. Gervase

  Faber, George Denison (Clapham)

  Joynson-Hicks, William

  Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth)

  Faber, Capt. W. V. (Hants, W.)

  Kerry, Earl of

  Benn, Ion Hamilton (Greenwich)

  Falle, B. G.

  Keswick, Henry

  Bennett-Goldney, Francis

  Fell, Arthur

  Kinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement

  Bentinck, Lord H. Cavendish-

  Fetherstonhaugh, Godfrey

  Knight, Captain Eric Ayshford

  Beresford, Lord C.

  Finlay, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert

  Kyffin-Taylor, G.

  Bigland, Alfred

  Fisher, Rt. Hon. W. Hayes

  Lane-Fox, G. R.

  Bird, Alfred

  Fitzroy, Hon. Edward A.

  Larmor, Sir J.

  Blair, Reginald

  Flannery, Sir J. Fortescue

  Law, Rt. Hon. A. Bonar (Bootle)

  Boles, Lieut.-Colonel Dennis Fortescue

  Fleming, Valentine

  Lawson, Hon. H. (T. H'mts, Mlle End)

  Boscawen, Sir Arthur S. T. Griffith-

  Forster, Henry William

  Lee, Arthur Hamilton

  Boyle, William (Norfolk, Mid)

  Gastrell, Major W. Houghton

  Lewisham, Viscount

  Boyton, James

  Gibbs, G. A.

  Lloyd, George Ambrose (Stafford, W.)

  Brassey, H. Leonard Campbell

  Gilmour, Captain John

  Lloyd, George Butler (Shrewsbury)

  Bridgeman, William Clive

  Glazebrook, Captain Philip K.

  Locker-Lampson, G. (Salisbury)

  Bull, Sir William James

  Goldman, C. S.

  Locker-Lampson, O. (Ramsey)

  Burdett-Coutts, W.

  Goldsmith, Frank

  Lockwood, Rt. Hon. Lt.-Colonel A. R.

  Burgoyne, A. H.

  Gordon, Hon. John Edward (Brighton)

  Long, Rt. Hon. Walter

  Burn, Colonel C. R.

  Goulding, Edward Alfred

  Lyttelton, Hon J. C. (Droitwich)

  Butcher, John George

  Grant, J. A.

  MacCaw, Wm. J. MacGeagh

  Campbell, Captain Duncan F. (Ayr, N.)

  Greene, Walter Raymond

  Mackinder, Halford J.

  Campbell, Rt. Hon. J. (Dublin Univ.)

  Gretton, John

  Macmaster, Donald

  Campion, W. R.

  Guinness, Hon. Rupert (Essex, S.E.)

  M'Neill, Ronald (Kent. St. Augustine's)

  Carlile, Sir Edward Hildred

  Guinness, Hon. W. E. (Bury S. Edmunds)

  Magnus, Sir Philip

  Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward H.

  Gwynne, R. S. (Sussex, Eastbourne)

  Malcolm, Ian

  Cassel, Felix

  Haddock, George Bahr

  Mallaby-Deeley, Harry

  Castlereagh, Viscount

  Hall, D. B. (Isle of Wight)

  Mason, James F. (Windsor)

  Cator, John

  Hall, Frederick (Dulwich)

  Meysey-Thompson, E. C.

  Cautley, H. S.

  Hall, Marshall (L'pool, E. Toxteth)

  Middlemore John Throgmorton

  Cave, George

  Hambro, Angus Valdemar

  Mills, Hon. Charles Thomas

  Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)

  Hamersley, Alfred St. George

  Morrison-Bell, Capt. E. F. (Ashburton)

  Cecil, Lord Hugh (Oxford University)

  Hamilton, C. G. C. (Ches., Altrincham)

  Morrison-Bell, Major A. C. (Honiton)

  Cecil, Lord R. (Herts, Hitchin)

  Hamilton, Lord C. J. (Kensington, S.)

  Mount, William Arthur

  Chaloner, Colonel R. G. W.

  Hardy, Rt. Hon. Laurence

  Neville, Reginald J. N.

  Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J. A. (Worc'r.)

  Harris, Henry Percy

  Newdegate, F. A.

  Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry

  Harrison-Broadley, H. B.

  Newman, John R. P.

  Clay, Captain H. H. Spender

  Helmsley, Viscount

  Newton, Harry Kottingham

  Clive, Captain Percy Archer

  Henderson, Major H. (Berks, Abingdon)

  Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield)

  Clyde, J. Avon

  Henderson, Sir A. (St. Geo., Han. Sq.)

  Nield, Herbert

  992

  993

  Norton-Griffiths, J.

  Samuel, Sir Harry (Norwood)

  Valentia, Viscount

  O'Neill, Hon. A. E. B. (Antrim, Mid)

  Samuel, Samuel (Wandsworth)

  Walker, Col. William Hall

  Orde-Powlett, Hon. W. G. A.

  Sanders, Robert Arthur

  Warde, Col. C. E. (Kent, Mid)

  Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William

  Sanderson, Lancelot

  Watson, Hon. W.

  Paget, Almeric Hugh

  Sandys, G. J.

  Weigall, Captain A. G.

  Parker, Sir Gilbert (Gravesend)

  Sassoon, Sir Philip

  Weston, Colonel J. W.

  Parkes, Ebenezer

  Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)

  Wheler, Granville C. H.

  Peel, Lieut.-Colonel R. F.

  Smith, Rt. Hon. F. E. (L'p'l., Walton)

  White, Major G. D. (Lancs., Southport)

  Perkins, Walter F.

  Smith, Harold (Warrington)

  Williams, Colonel R. (Dorset, W.)

  Peto, Basil Edward

  Spear, Sir John Ward

  Willoughby, Major Hon. Claud

  Pole-Carew, Sir R.

  Stanier, Beville

  Wilson, A. Stanley (Yorks, E.R.)

  Pollock, Ernest Murray

  Stanley, Hon. Arthur (Ormskirk)

  Wilson, Captain Leslie O. (Reading)

  Pretyman, Ernest George

  Stanley, Hon. G. F. (Preston)

  Wilson, Maj. Sir M. (Bethnal Green,S.W.)

  Pryce-Jones, Colonel E.

  Starkey, John Ralph

  Winterton, Earl

  Quilter, Sir William Eley C.

  Staveley-Hill, Henry

  Wormer, Viscount

  Randles, Sir John S.

  Stewart, Gershom

  Wood, Hon. E. F. L. (Yorks, Ripon)

  Ratcliff, R. F.

  Swift, Rigby

  Wood, John (Stalybridge)

  Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel

  Sykes, Alan John (Ches., Knutstord)

  Worthington-Evans, L.

  Rawson, Col. Richard H.

  Sykes, Sir Mark (Hull, Central)

  Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart-

  Remnant, James Farquharson

  Terrell, Henry (Gloucester)

  Wright, Henry Fitzherbert

  Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall)

  Thompson, Robert (Belfast, North)

  Yate, Colonel C. E.

  Rolleston, Sir John

  Thomson, W. Mitchell- (Down, North)

  Yerburgh, Robert A.

  Royds, Edmund

  Tobin, Alfred Aspinall

  Younger, Sir George

  Rutherford, John (Lancs., Darwen)

  Touche, George Alexander

  Rutherford, Watson (L'pool, W. Derby)

  Tryon, Captain George Clement

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Lord

  Salter, Arthur Clavell

  Tullibardine, Marquess of

  Edmund Talbot and Mr. Pike Pease.

  Bill read a second time, and committed to a Standing Committee.

  Bill accordingly read the third time, and passed.

  MOTOR TRAFFIC (STREET NOISES) BILL.
  And, it being after half-past Eleven of the clock upon Monday evening, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
  Adjourned at Six minutes after Twelve o'clock.

NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT.
  UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT.
  UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT.
  Customs Watchers.
  Customs Watchers.
  Old Age Pensions.
  Old Age Pensions.
  Land Purchase (Ireland).
  Land Purchase (Ireland).
  Secondary Schools (Ireland).
  Secondary Schools (Ireland).
  Omagh Assizes (Conviction of Engine Driver).
  Omagh Assizes (Conviction of Engine Driver).
  Clones Petty Sessions (Charge against Motor-Car Driver).
  Clones Petty Sessions (Charge against Motor-Car Driver).
  Estates Commissioners (Ireland).
  Estates Commissioners (Ireland).
  Church Outrage (County Cavan).
  Church Outrage (County Cavan).
  County and District Council Elections (Ireland).
  County and District Council Elections (Ireland).
  Importation of Arms (Ireland).
  Importation of Arms (Ireland).
GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND BILL.
  NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES.
  NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES.
  GENERAL SIR ARTHUR PAGET.
  GENERAL SIR ARTHUR PAGET.
  GENERAL GOUGH.
  GENERAL GOUGH.
  OFFICERS' RESIGNATIONS.
  OFFICERS' RESIGNATIONS.
  DUTY OF SOLDIERS.
  DUTY OF SOLDIERS.
  ARMY COUNCIL MEETINGS.
  ARMY COUNCIL MEETINGS.
ROYAL NAVY.
  SHEERNESS DOCKYARD.
  SHEERNESS DOCKYARD.
BRITISH ARMY.
  PURCHASE OF IRISH HORSES.
  PURCHASE OF IRISH HORSES.
  FRENCH AND GERMAN VOLUNTEERS.
  FRENCH AND GERMAN VOLUNTEERS.
  LEINSTER REGIMENT (RATIONS).
  LEINSTER REGIMENT (RATIONS).
  PENSIONS AND SERVICE.
  PENSIONS AND SERVICE.
  ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY.
  ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY.
  HORSES FOR MILITARY PURPOSES.
  HORSES FOR MILITARY PURPOSES.
  NORTH MIDLAND FIELD AMBULANCE.
  NORTH MIDLAND FIELD AMBULANCE.
  Metropolitan Police (Ex-Inspector Syme).
  Metropolitan Police (Ex-Inspector Syme).
  Criminal Lunatic Asylums.
  Criminal Lunatic Asylums.
  Land Valuation (Scotland).
  Land Valuation (Scotland).
  Island of Lewis (Uig Cottars).
  Island of Lewis (Uig Cottars).
  Small-Pox (Aberdeen).
  Small-Pox (Aberdeen).
  Imports and Exports (Ireland).
  Imports and Exports (Ireland).
  Dispute at Millwall.
  Dispute at Millwall.
  Demolition Order (Wrexham).
  Demolition Order (Wrexham).
  Land Drainage Act (Commissioners of Sewers).
  Land Drainage Act (Commissioners of Sewers).

BARONY OF ST. JOHN.
Committee for Privileges to meet on Wednesday next.
The Viscount CANTERBURY The Viscount CANTERBURY—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.
The LORD CHANCELLOR The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House, That the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificate from the Examiners that the further Standing Orders applicable to the following Bill have been complied with:

Ashington Urban District Council.

Also the Certificate that the Standing Orders have not been complied with in respect of the Petition for the following Bill:

Shropshire, Worcestershire and Staffordshire Electric Power.

The same were ordered to lie on the Table

LLANFAELOG WATER BILL. [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
SKEGNESS GAS BILL. [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
BRISTOL CORPORATION (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL. [H.L.]
The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES informed the House that the opposition to the Bill was withdrawn: The Order made on the 19th of February last discharged, and Bill committed.
CRYSTAL PALACE BILL.
Read 2a, and committed for To-morrow.
STONE GAS AND ELECTRICITY BILL. [H.L.]
  BENGAL AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY BILL. [H.L.]

    DIDCOT, NEWBURY AND SOUTHAMPTON RAILWAY BILL. [H.L.]
    COLONIAL AND FOREIGN BANKS GUARANTEE CORPORATION BILL. [H.L.]
    CLECKHEATON URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL. [H.L.]
    SOUTH BANK AND NORMANBY GAS LIGHT AND COKE COMPANY BILL. [H.L.]
    Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

EAST HAM CORPORATION BILL.
Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
BEDWAS AND MACHEN URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL.
  CHELSEA BOROUGH COUNCIL (SUPERANNUATION AND PENSIONS) BILL.
  Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and referred to the Examiners.

NATIONAL INSURANCE ACTS.
1. Regulations, dated 24th March, 1914, entitled the National Health Insurance (Time for Joining an Approved Society) Regulations, 1914;
2. Regulations, dated 21st March, 1914, entitled the National Health Insurance (Medical Research Fund) Regulations, 1914.
Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) and to be printed. (No. 40.)

SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS ON SUNDAY BILL. [H.L.]
Petition in favour of; of the residents of Tarvin.
HARBOUR, &c., BILLS, 1914.
Report of the Board of Trade on the Poole Harbour Bill [H.L.]: Laid before the House (pursuant to Order of this day) and to be printed. (No. 41.)
PAUPER CHILDREN (IRELAND) BILL. [H.L.]
A Bill to extend the operation of the Pauper Children (Ireland) Act, 1898—Was presented by the Lord Oranmore and Browne (for the Earl of Mayo); read 1a; to be printed; and to be read 2A on Wednesday next. (No. 42.)
GOVERNMENT ANNUITIES BILL. [H.L.]
A Bill to consolidate the Government Annuities Acts, 1829 to 1888, and the enactments amending those Acts—Was presented by the Lord Strachie; read 1a; to be printed; and to be read 2a on Wednesday next. (No. 43.)

CHANGE IN THE CABINET.
THE MARQUESS OP LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I understand that in the other House of Parliament an important statement has been made affecting the position of at least two of the noble Viscount's colleagues as well as that of two members of the Army Council. I think the House will probably be grateful to the noble Viscount if he will afford us the same information which has been given elsewhere.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (VISCOUNT MORLEY): My Lords, it is quite true that Field-Marshal Sir John French and General Sir John Ewart have been relieved of their offices in compliance with their fully-considered desire. They retire from their offices, not because they have any difference in their views from those of the Government as to the conditions under which the Army serves or should be employed in aid of the civil power, but because they had initialled the Memorandum in the White Paper which your Lordships have seen, and which Memorandum was handed to General Gough. Therefore they thought, this Memorandum having been initialled by them, that it was incumbent upon them to adhere to that engagement so given. To that point of personal honour—I am sure your Lordships will see that, as they are agreed in policy, it was a point of personal honour—to that point of personal honour, after long, close, and most straightforward discussion, extremely full and candid, the two Generals adhere. The regret of His Majesty's Government, and, I think I may add, of your Lordships' House and of the country, is deep and sincere, and it is not at all easy to express what we feel. We all of us realise the sacrifices which these two brave, tried, and eminent soldiers are making. It is a misfortune for the Government and for the State. But we respect that general susceptibility to points of personal honour of which to-day they furnish a high example.
Now, my Lords, to continue the communication for which the noble Marquess has asked, these officers are followed in their retirement by the Secretary of State for War, Colonel Seely. Colonel Seely feels bound in loyalty to them, who have stood by him through many difficult and trying passages—he feels bound to follow
756
them. We, Colonel Seely's colleagues in the Cabinet, all regret to the full the disappearance from among us, in this capacity at all events, of a colleague whose attractive personality, whose signal power—of which I, for one, have had good opportunities for judging—of attention to work, and whose gifts of fair and lucid exposition they know well in the House of Commons. We deplore his departure.
I have now a further announcement of the first moment and significance to make to your Lordships. The vacant post of Secretary of State for War is to be filled—I think, indeed, it is already filled—by the Prime Minister. Eulogy of colleagues, as many of you know, is very often to be suspected, but I believe I may say that your Lordships will all realise—yes, I make bold to say all—with true and general satisfaction that the Prime Minister, in such a moment, with as heavy cares as ever fell upon a Prime Minister, has undertaken such a task. I have sat for some years on the Committee of Imperial Defence with the Prime Minister, and have watched his patience and vigilance, his accuracy of mind, his grasp of detail, the close and steady desire on his part to know and to probe to the depths all the military and naval conditions of the United Kingdom and of the Empire; and I should almost say, did I not remember his enormous power in the House of Commons, that the Prime Minister is seen at his best on the Committee of Imperial Defence. I hope that this announcement at least will be received by your Lordships with cordiality and admiration.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Standing Order No. XXXIX considered (according to Order), and suspended for this day's sitting.
THE TRAINING OF MIDWIVES.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGHhad given notice to present a Bill to secure the better training of midwives in Scotland and to regulate their practice. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I think I shall be meeting the convenience of the House if I ask permission to postpone this Notice till another day. I propose to take it on Wednesday.

TOWN CHARITIES (EXTENSION) BILL. [H.L.]
Amendments reported (according to Order).
Clause 1, subsection (1):
Power to extend the area and objects of town charities in certain cases.
.—(1) The High Court may, by scheme made under their jurisdiction with respect to charities, and the Charity Commissioners may, by scheme made under the Charitable Trusts Acts, 1853 to 1894, provide that the benefits of a charity which are restricted to any municipal borough or to any parish or defined area within a municipal borough, may be extended, subject to such provisions as may be made by the scheme, to any area within or comprising the borough as constituted for the time being, or any adjacent or neighbouring parishes; and also where any charity the benefits of which are extended by the scheme is applicable in doles, that the charity shall be applicable for the relief of distress or sickness, or for improving by such means as may be provided in the scheme the physical, social, or moral condition of the poor in the area as extended.
VISCOUNT ST. ALDWYN: I have a small Amendment in this subsection. This Bill proposes, with certain safeguards, in the case of charities restricted to a parish in any municipal borough to extend the benefits to parishes adjacent to that borough, or to neighbouring parishes. I quite understand that it may be necessary to extend the benefits to some of the adjacent parishes to a borough, but I think it is going too far to extend them to neighbouring parishes outside the borough. I therefore propose to leave out the words "or neighbouring."
Amendment moved—
Clause I, page 1, line 13, leave out ("or neighbouring").—(Viscount St. Aldwyn.)
LORD PARMOOR: I accept the Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Bill to be read 3a To-morrow, and to be printed as amended. (No. 44.)

MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed and sent to the Commons.

THE ARMY AND ULSTER.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: My Lords, the momentous announcement made by the Lord President this afternoon does not allay our anxieties as to the past proceedings of the War Office. I therefore desire to ask him the first Question which stands in my name—Did the instructions given to Sir Arthur Paget at the War Office include one to offer to officers of the Army under his command the alternative of resignation, to be followed by dismissal from the Service, if, in the event of active operations in Ulster, they were not prepared to act to the utmost extent of modern war; and if not, what instructions were given on this head.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: My Lords, I had expected that the noble Viscount would have put the whole of his Questions together, but, as he desires it, I will answer them separately. The answer to this Question is that no instructions were given to Sir Arthur Paget to put any hypothetical question to the officers under his command.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: Will the noble Viscount explain what the words "active operations in Ulster" mean? Were those words used by Sir Arthur Paget when addressing his officers, and, if so, was he instructed to use them? If the noble Viscount will consult the White Paper, he will see that in the communications from General Gough to Sir Arthur Paget the words "active operations" appear in inverted commas. Therefore I would like to ask whether these words were used by His Majesty's Government.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: I have every desire to meet the noble Marquess. The Speaker in another place two or three days ago remonstrated against the practice of supplementary questions, and I would submit that we had far better get the answers to Lord Midleton's Questions on specific matters of fact and then deal with the point justly raised by the noble Marquess in the debate on Lord Selborne's Motion.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: I beg to ask the second Question standing in my name—Did the instructions given to Sir Arthur Paget at the War Office include one to offer to officers of the Army under his command domiciled in Ulster the

759
opportunity of absenting themselves from service without incurring any penalties until all operations of troops in Ulster had been completed; and, if not, what instructions were given under this head.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: The question of the proper steps to take, with regard to the officers domiciled in Ulster, in the event of the Army being called upon to act in aid of the civil power in that Province was discussed by the Secretary of State and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Adjutant-General with Sir Arthur Paget and the other General Officers Commanding in December last. It was then decided that officers domiciled in Ulster should be left behind with the details permitted to go on leave if their unit was ordered to support the civil power in Ulster. This instruction is in consonance with the rule that troops having any territorial connection, with a strike area for example, should never, unless quite unavoidable, be employed in that area during a strike. This rule should apply and would apply to all ranks. There was no alteration of this policy, of this maxim of military administration—no alteration in the course of the discussions with Sir Arthur Paget prior to the recent movement of troops. No further instructions were issued to General Paget under this head.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: I beg to ask the third Question standing in my name—Did the instructions given to Sir Arthur Paget at the War Office include one to threaten the officers commanding brigades and units in Ireland with trial by Court-Martial if they extended to any officers not really domiciled in Ulster the exemption offered to officers domiciled in Ulster of absenting themselves from service during the progress of military operations in that Province; and, if so, why was it thought necessary to cast such a reflection upon the honour of the officers concerned.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: No such instructions were given.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: May I ask the noble Viscount, if no such instructions were given, whether he is in a position to state that no such instructions were given by Sir Arthur Paget to the brigadiers?
VISCOUNT MORLEY: I think this would all come out better if we cleared the ground by answers to these preliminary Questions on the Paper.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: I beg to ask the noble Viscount the remaining Questions standing in my name—(4) Did the General Officers summoned by Sir Arthur Paget to Dublin on March 20 take down in writing and carry away with them the orders issued by the General Officer Commanding in Ireland. Did they, or any of them, issue a circular order based upon those orders to the officers under their command; and, if so, will His Majesty's Government lay a copy of that order on the Table of both Houses of Parliament. (5) After Sir Arthur Paget had at Dublin, on March 20, conveyed to the General Officers under his command the instructions he had received at the War Office and they had conveyed those instructions to the officers under their respective commands, was a time limit fixed within which the various officers concerned were to make their choice between the alternatives offered them under those instructions; and, if so, what was that time limit. (6) Did the General Officer commanding the Fifth Division at the Curragh address the noncommissioned officers and men of the battalions under his command, or of any of them, on the 20th, 21st, or 22nd of March, and, if so, what was the substance of the statement so made.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: It will be convenient if I answer these three Questions in a single reply. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief in Ireland has been requested by telegram to send full replies to these Questions of the noble Viscount's of which there are not precise details in the War Office, or were not this morning, and I shall be glad to communicate to the House the answers when we receive them.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: I beg to ask the noble Viscount the first Question standing on the Paper in my name—Have any officers of any rank in any command, regiment, or corps in Ireland refused to obey any order received from a superior officer; and, if so, what is the name of that officer and what is the order which he received.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: The answer to this very important Question is as follows. There has been no disobedience of orders in connection with the recent events by any officer or man in Ireland. I have to reply in this way instead of simply saying No, because there may have been—this is an unimportant detail, but there may have been—unimportant ordinary cases of breach of discipline which need not be taken into account. The conduct of the troops generally has been exemplary.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: I beg to put the second Question standing in my name—Did Sir Arthur Paget inform the General Officers under his command that the force to be employed in connection with Ulster would include—(1) a naval force; (2) a military force from England; (3) two divisions of His Majesty's troops in Ireland. Did he receive instructions from the War Office to give them this information.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: Sir Arthur Paget was informed by the Government that in the event of serious disorder in Ireland he could count upon adequate reinforcements to enable him to maintain law and order and to support the civil power in the ordinary exercise of its duty. He was not instructed either to give this information to General Officers under his command or to withhold it.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Did the adequate reinforcements consist of the three items named in Lord Selborne's Question?
VISCOUNT MORLEY: I should suppose that is true, but I would like to get authentic information.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: I should like to ask what reason had Sir Arthur Paget to imagine that there would be serious disturbance in Ulster. Also, if the object was only to protect stores, what was the reason for sending these great armaments and this large number of troops. I asked the noble Viscount the other day to explain what Sir Arthur Paget meant by Ulster being "in a blaze." He reproved me and told me that I should have waited, but no attempt was made in the discussion which followed to give me an explanation. It is utterly hopeless to expect from His Majesty's Ministers in the course of debate any straightforward answers. I therefore repeat the question now.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: I hope your Lordships will get answers in the course of the debate. But at this moment you had better hear what we have to say, be it much or be it little.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: The noble Viscount has said that the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief in Ireland has been requested to send full replies to Lord Midleton's last three Questions. Would he also inquire of Sir Arthur Paget, as to my noble friend's first Question, what actually did happen?
VISCOUNT MORLEY: I will certainly do my best to procure an answer to any fair question, and this does not seem unfair.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I beg to ask the Lord President of the Council what were the precise circumstances in which the Secretary of State for War consulted him as to the two paragraphs at the close of the Memorandum of the Army Council of March 23; whether he acquiesced in the appearance of those paragraphs; and whether they were seen and concurred in by any other members of the Cabinet.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: My Lords, I have no difficulty in making a plain, unvarnished statement. I assume that your Lordships all know the events to which the noble Earl's Question refers. After the Cabinet dispersed on Monday last, March 23, I stayed behind to ascertain from Colonel Seely particulars for my answers to the Questions which were to be put to me that afternoon in your Lordships' House. Colonel Seely was occupied with the draft from the Army Council, and he showed me the two proposed paragraphs, the guilty and peccant paragraphs. I did not perceive then, and I do not perceive now, that those paragraphs differed in spirit and substance either from the previous paragraphs already sanctioned by the Cabinet, or from the words that I had myself used in this House in reply to the noble Marquess opposite on the Monday; and my answer was sanctioned by the Cabinet. The noble Earl may refer to what fell from me in reply to the noble Marquess on Monday last. Colonel Seely told me on this occa-

763
sion that he regarded the two new paragraphs as representing accurately the substance of what the officers from Ireland had already been given to understand, and were a necessary addition to make the Memorandum from the Army Council complete. I made one or two very slight verbal alterations not in the least affecting the general sense, and Colonel Seely wrote down the words. They were more his than mine, but that is immaterial.
In this I admit—I make the confession to your Lordships—I joined in an offence against a sound Cabinet rule, and if there is a man in either House who is for the sanctity of Cabinet regulations, order, and practice, I am that man. I offended along with Colonel Seely—we both offended—against that rule, and that is all the offence to which I, at any rate, plead guilty. I did not recapitulate to Colonel Seely the Cabinet discussion. It is said, "You were at the Cabinet and heard the discussion; Colonel Seely was in attendance upon His Majesty; you knew what the Cabinet meant." I did not recapitulate the Cabinet discussion because the revised draft of the Army Council with some pencilled interlineations inserted in the Cabinet told their own story to Colonel Seely. Time was precious, and why should I recapitulate a discussion the results of which were plainly indicated in the pencilled memorandum which he had in his hand?
As to General Gough's letter, to which I beg your Lordships' attention—it is at the top of the last page of the White Paper—I was not in the least aware of the existence of that letter. Therefore, when I agreed to the two peccant paragraphs it was not in the least as a response to General Gough's letter. It was a completion, in Colonel Seely's own language—a completion and perfection of the memorandum. It ought not to have been done without the Cabinet, no doubt, but that is between me and the Cabinet. In answer to the other part of the noble Earl's Question, I have only to say that no other member of the Cabinet—I see numbers of idle stories—no other member of the Cabinet was present at this proceeding between Colonel Seely and myself. That is the answer to the noble Earl's Question. It is the best answer I can make, and it is a true answer.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I am grateful, and I am sure your Lordships are grateful, to the noble Viscount for the very candid explanation he has given of circumstances which have been the cause of some doubt and misapprehension. There is only one question arising out of his reply which I should like to put, although I must confess that I hardly expect to receive an answer. How comes it, if the noble Viscount approved of these paragraphs in consultation with the Secretary of State for War; if they seemed to him, as he told us just now, not to differ in spirit or in substance from that which was the accepted policy of the Government discussed only a little while before—
VISCOUNT MORLEY: And stated by me in this House on the Monday.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: And stated, as the noble Viscount says, by him in this House, which strengthens my point—how comes it, if that was the case, if the Government felt themselves impelled to withdraw these paragraphs and if the Secretary of State for War resigned, that we still have the good fortune to see the noble Viscount in charge of the Government Bench in this House?
VISCOUNT MORLEY: The latter point will be answered more or less satisfactorily perhaps to-morrow.
THE EARL OF SELBORNErose to call attention to the new Army Order announced to the House of Commons on Friday last, March 27, and to the circumstances which had led to its issue; and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I shall not attempt to-night to cover all the aspects of this grave subject which we are met to debate. I shall ask your Lordships to consider only what I will call the attempted coup détat and the Army Order issued by the Government last Friday. Last week the Prime Minister made two very important statements. The first was to The Times on Monday, the 23rd, and the second was in the House of Commons on Friday, the 27th. I knew the Prime Minister much too well in happier times to make it possible for me to doubt his word or impugn his honour for one moment, but it is the bare truth to say that the explanations furnished to him are quite incompatible with established

765
facts. I am glad to hear that the Prime Minister is to go to the War Office. I think when he gets there he will have the greatest surprise of his life when he finds what some of his colleagues really have been doing.
I ask your Lordships to consider what the Prime Minister said in his famous interview to The Times on the 23rd instant, and he could not have said what he did if he had been fully informed. In the first place, his description of the movements of the troops was this—
"The dispersal of small bodies of troops to give additional protection to arms, ammunition, and stores."
I will show you, my Lords, presently that that explanation is not compatible either with General Paget's statement or with the speech which Mr. Churchill made in the House of Commons last week. Then the Prime Minister went on to speak of the naval movement, and he said—
"It was simply the use of two small cruisers to carry a detachment of troops to Carrickfergus."
Now that statement is quite incompatible with Mr. Churchill's explanation about the movement of the battle squadron which he gave to the House of Commons on the 25th instant—a battle squadron, my Lords, which was moved aside from its ordinary path of routine work to go to Lamlash Bay, which carried on board the battleships an unusual equipment of field guns, and which, curiously enough, was suddenly checked in mid-ocean and the orders given countermanded, though at that moment the policy which the Government described—the occupation by small garrisons of certain old barracks—was being carried out. The only new thing that had happened had been the crisis in Ireland caused by the communication of General Paget to his officers. And lastly—and I would draw the noble Viscount's attention to this—the Prime Minister said to The Times that there was no inquisition intended into the intention of officers in the event of their being asked to take up arms against Ulster; but at the very moment that the Prime Minister made that statement such an inquisition had already taken place as the result of direct instructions to General Paget from the War Office.
Now I pass to the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons on
766
Friday last. At that time I say he had been misinformed. These were his words—
"It is altogether untrue that the Government or any member of the Government ever contemplated active operations of an aggressive character in Ulster, or any operation which now or in the future would impose upon the Army any duty or any service which is not amply covered by the terms of this Order,"
—"this Order" being the new Army Order. I am here to maintain that we have clear evidence of the contemplation of extensive operations. I would refer your Lordships again to the statement read out by Mr. Bonar Law in the House of Commons last week and by the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, here, which was the exact account of one who was present of what passed between Sir Arthur Paget and his officers. Sir Arthur Paget said that—
"active operations were to be begun against Ulster; that he expected the country to be in a blaze by Saturday; that he had been in close communication with the War Office, and that he had the following instructions from the War Office to convey to the officers."
Those instructions were that—
"officers domiciled in Ulster will be allowed to disappear and will be reinstated in their positions, but they must give their word of honour not to fight for Ulster."
I want to draw your Lordships' particular attention to these points—the words "active operations"; the words that Ulster would be "in a blaze"; the assurance of Sir Arthur Paget to those whom he addressed that he had been in close communication with the War Office; the still further assurance that the instructions that he was about to convey to the officers were given directly to him from the War Office to be conveyed to those officers; and, finally, the very remarkable expression used in connection with officers who are domiciled in Ulster. The condition of their release from service was that they should not fight for Ulster. How can anybody examine that statement of Sir Arthur Paget's and doubt for one single moment that something much more was contemplated in Ulster than the movement of four companies of Infantry to occupy four old disused barracks? My Lords, I ask you to remember this, that that statement has now been before the whole of the United Kingdom for more than a week. Has Sir Arthur Paget denied its accuracy? Is any Minister here on behalf of Sir Arthur Paget prepared to get up and say that that account is inaccurate? Therefore we may

767
take it as historically true, that whatever had passed between Sir Arthur Paget and the Government, Sir Arthur Paget conscientiously believed that these active operations were going to take place.
From the evidence of Sir Arthur Paget I pass to Mr. Churchill's speech in the House of Commons on the 25th instant. This is what Mr. Churchill said—
"On the 11th, this day fortnight, the Cabinet decided that a battle squadron with its attendant ships should be stationed at Lamlash, because that is a good place for them to be at to do their work, and also because they would be conveniently situated in case of grave disorder arising…. The squadron was certainly allowed to hold on its course steadily so long as it was not certain whether the movements—
that is, the movements of the troops in Ireland—
"would be effected, as we hoped and expected they would be, without bloodshed or serious military opposition."
Mr. Churchill added that as soon as it was clear that there was no serious opposition the movements of the battle squadron were delayed, and he proceeded to say—
"When movements, however limited, however precautionary, however reasonable, however non-provocative in themselves, have to be made, it is necessary that contingent preparations should Also be taken into account…. That is the explanation of a great deal that you will read in the next few days in the newspapers of stores, and ships, and men, and guns, and ambulances, and pontoon sections, and so forth that were taken into general consideration in case contingent movements should be necessary."
Is it not perfectly clear that Mr. Churchill mentioned all those things in order to discount the effect of the revelation that he saw was coming, and that he safeguarded himself by all these preliminary and conditional words about precautions and non-provocation.
But the words to which I wish to draw your Lordships' attention are the words about bloodshed and serious opposition. It is quite clear that Mr. Churchill at least had been contemplating the possibility of bloodshed and of serious opposition. The whole of this business of stores, and ships, and men, and guns, and ambulances, and pontoon sections, and so forth—why, my Lords, that is the whole paraphernalia of war. Nobody thinks of those things when four companies of Infantry are moving to guard arms, ammunition, and stores. Prom the answers given by the noble Viscount just now it is quite clear that he admits part of the statement of Sir Arthur Paget
768
to his officers. About part he has no information; as regards part he says that no such instructions were given by the Government. Sir Arthur Paget never said—he is not reported to have said—that he received these instructions from His Majesty's Government direct. He said that he received them from the War Office. And that brings me really to the centre of the mystery, for at the moment when Mr. Churchill was contemplating the whole of this paraphernalia of war and the possibility of bloodshed, when Sir Arthur Paget believed that he was about to be plunged into active operations in Ulster, Ulster was in the most profound tranquillity. When the King's troops were moved, how were they received? By bells ringing and the people cheering, as they always have been received in Ireland.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: In Ulster.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: As they always have been received in Ulster.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: In Ireland.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: Certainly in Ulster, and I hope also in Ireland. What, then, had Mr. Churchill in his mind? The Government profess to have been afraid of raids on these arms and stores. There has been nothing of the kind up to the present. Can the Government tell us what authority they had for believing that such raids were contemplated; why they thought that the attitude of absolute tranquillity, of absolute obedience to law which has hitherto distinguished the Ulster preparations, was suddenly going to be changed, and that there were to be raids upon these arms and stores?
Now comes Sir John Simon, and he lets in some light. He tells us what we did not know before, though we might have guessed it, that there was a Committee of the Cabinet to deal with this matter. He tells us that he was a member. We do not know, though we can guess, who some of the other members were. But it is very important that we should have reached that point—that there was an inner Cabinet, a junta of the Cabinet, that had this thing in hand. Sir John Simon said that on his word of honour neither he nor any of his colleagues contemplated any "unprovoked butchery in Ulster." Of course, they did not. None of us have ever suggested that any of our political opponents would be capable of

769
contemplating anything of tie kind. But what is perfectly clear from what has been told us by Sir Arthur Paget and in Mr. Churchill's own statement is that operations were intended that might have led to all the incidents of war, and that is the point. The incidents of war, of course, include loss of life, but that does not mean unprovoked butchery. It means the killing of men on both sides in fair fight, as will happen in civil disturbances just as much as in foreign warfare. That is the danger that we have been apprehending; that is the nightmare that has been inflicting itself upon our imaginations all this time—that there would be some action of the Government which would result in provoking this very conflict which they, just as much as we, must dread from the bottom of their hearts.
The Government told us that there had been a misunderstanding. Where? That is a question which has never been answered. There was no misunderstanding between Sir Arthur Paget and his officers. He has not contradicted the statement as to what he said to them. The Government repudiate part at least of what he said. Then the misunderstanding was between Sir Arthur Paget and the War Office. We ask the noble Viscount to tell us what really happened at the War Office on that fateful day when Sir Arthur Paget met the Secretary of State for War and some other of his colleagues. What instructions did Sir Arthur Paget then receive? Whom did he meet? Who talked to him? Was it only the members of the Army Council? Was it only the Secretary of State? Or was it the Committee of the Cabinet which Sir John Simon has told us was appointed to deal with this very thing? If the Government meant nothing but the movement of four companies of troops, how did they contrive to give this terrible misapprehension to the officer who was instructed to carry out their command? What really was the explanation of the misunderstanding, and who is responsible for it? Did the Cabinet as a whole really know nothing about it at all? Or are the noble Viscount opposite and his colleagues in the Cabinet the victims of a criminal blunder by a sort of Mexican triumvirate? The whole meaning of the action of the Government is unintelligible at present. Is it possible, I ask the noble Viscount, that what they really meant to do was to order the Constabulary to search for arms,
770
to take arms away wherever they found them, and that they meant to support that action of the Constabulary with all the Naval and Military Forces of the Crown, no matter what might be the consequences? At any rate that would be an explanation of these preparations, which have been denied but which have been amply proved.
I pass from the mystery of the contemplated coup d'état to the new Army Order which was issued last Friday. In the first place, I would suggest that there has been a mistake about the heading. The heading is "Special Army Order: Discipline." I think it ought to have been "Special Cabinet Order: Sanity." Let us take the first paragraph—
"No officer or soldier should in future be questioned by his superior officer as to the attitude he will adopt or as to his action in the event of his being required to obey orders dependent on future or hypothetical contingencies."
But, my Lords, since there was a British Army who has ever thought it right to put hypothetical questions to officers or men until this Government did it? This is a reflection only upon the Government, because it was on direct instructions from the War Office, as Sir Arthur Paget stated, that he went to these officers and did this very thing which the Government now condemn. He questioned his officers and told his Generals to question the officers under them as to the attitude they would adopt in certain future or hypothetical contingencies. Out of their own mouth are the Government condemned by this first paragraph of their new Army Order. It is nothing but a formal confession of a Government standing before the nation in the white sheet of penitence.
Now I pass to paragraph No. 2 of the new Army Order—
"An officer or soldier is forbidden in future to ask for assurances as to orders which he may be required to obey."
Any student of the Radical Press would believe that that is an Order necessitated by General Gough's conduct, and that it is a reflection upon him. What are the real circumstances under which General Gough wrote the letter of March 23 to the Adjutant-General to which the noble Viscount referred just now—I might almost call it that fatal letter, because I presume from what the noble Viscount has said, that it is entirely to the relations between that letter and the Cabinet Memorandum that all these resignations are due.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: I must inform or remind the noble Earl that that letter at the top of the last page of the White Paper was not known to me at the time that I was talking with Colonel Seely.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: I think we clearly understand that, but the noble Viscount will admit that this letter has played an important part in all this question. Now under what circumstances did General Gough write that letter? He made a request for certain explanations, but he made no request for any assurances precedent to obeying any order that he had received or any future orders. The assurances he asked for had nothing whatever to do with obedience to orders. The assurances he asked for were in connection with his resignation which he had put in on the direct invitation of the Government and which the Government were now pressing him to withdraw. It is very necessary, at this time of such gross misrepresentation of the conduct of the Army, to remember that General Paget went straight from the War Office. Under the instructions of the War Office he offered General Gough two alternatives. General Gough accepted that alternative which meant to him professional ruin and resigned his commission. The Government became convinced that there had been a misunderstanding, and they requested him to withdraw his resignation because there had been a misunderstanding. All that General Gough asked for was certain assurances lest there should be any further misunderstanding. He never asked for any assurances at all in connection with his obedience to any orders. Therefore that second paragraph in the new Army Order, though quite excellent and right in its purport, is no reflection upon General Gough.
We had an answer just now from the noble Viscount to the first Question which I asked him—an answer which will ring through the whole nation and through the whole world, an answer to the calumnies that have been heaped upon the Army by the Radical Press. The noble Viscount told us that the discipline of the Army had been exemplary, that no officer or man had refused to obey any order. Yes, my Lords, that is what the noble Viscount tells us now; but if you turn to the White Paper you will learn
772
that that is only a continuation of conduct which has never known a stain through all these trying months. For Colonel Seely says in the first Memorandum in the White Paper, under date December 16—
"During the past year there had not been brought to the notice of the authorities one single case of lack of discipline in this respect."
And now we know from the noble Viscount that there has been no refusal on the part of any officer or man to obey orders.
Therefore what was the situation that produced this extraordinary outburst in the House of Commons last week? The Government had made an incredible blunder—not the Army but the Government—and the sense of shame that supervened on that, the sense of danger to the life of the Government and to Party interests, deprived some of the supporters of the Government and some of their colleagues of all remaining scruples; and they hastened to do what they could to create a diversion and to find a new cry which would save them from the consequences of their own actions. Listen to what Mr. Churchill said on March 25. "A great issue has been raised, The Army versus Parliament," and, again, "The Army versus the People." My Lords, that issue has been most unhappily raised for the moment, but not by the Army, not by anything that the Army has done, not by anything that we on this side of the House have done, but entirely by those members of the Party opposite who have no scruple. Never since the days of Cromwell has the Army shown any doubt as to its proper function under our system. Never has it disputed in any degree that it is subordinate to Parliament, that it must take its orders from the King, or that the supreme governing authority in this country is the Government of the King. And as for the issue, The Army versus the People, why, my Lords, the Army and the nation are one. The Army is part of the nation; it is the blood and bone of the nation; and there could be no more conflict between the Army and the nation than there could be between Mr. Churchill's left hand and his body.
That was not all that Mr. Churchill said. He said that every effort had been made by Mr. Balfour and by Mr. Bonar Law "to show that it is always right for soldiers

773
to shoot down a Radical or a labour man." We are all somewhat highly strung. In this crisis it is difficult to say nothing that one would afterwards regret. But, my Lords, this comes from Mr. Churchill about the Party to which he once belonged; about his fellow-countrymen, because they differ from him; about Mr. Balfour, whom he was proud to call his friend and whom when he first came into the House of Commons he used to look on as a political father. I think that noble Lords on the Government Benches will acquit me of going beyond the mark if I say here and now that these words of Mr. Churchill's are a foul falsehood. I would say more. I would say that within our generation and within our time no speech more wicked has ever been made in the House of Commons.
Then I come to the third paragraph of the new Army Order—
"In particular it is the duty of every officer and soldier to obey all lawful commands given to them through the proper channel, either for the safeguarding of public property, or the support of the civil power in the ordinary execution of its duty, or for the protection of the lives and property of the inhabitants in the case of disturbance of the peace."
The noble Viscount, Lord Morley, the other day quoted words that I used at Derby on December 3. I was much obliged to the noble Viscount for quoting those words, and I should like to repeat them now. I said—
"I would never hear, at the time of this crisis or any other crisis, the suggestion that it could be the duty of the Army to refuse to obey orders. The duty of a soldier, were he officer or private, was obedience to lawful command."
That was what I then said, and I adhere to it and repeat it. Therefore I agree entirely with the wording and the meaning of the third paragraph of the new Army Order. But what soldier has ever doubted that? No doubt ever arose in the mind of any soldier that that was his duty. Why did I use the words which I have quoted? Because I knew that some of the supporters of the Party opposite would one day get up and say, when they found themselves confronted with the difficulties of the situation in Ireland, that it was we who had tampered with the discipline of the Army and that it was we who were responsible for the impasse to which they had come. Not only does that express my view, but I agree with Mr. Bonar Law when he said that if the policy of Home Rule were endorsed by the voice of the
774
nation at a General Election, or by means of a referendum, the Government would have authority then to impose it upon Ireland by force. I agree with that. But I ask you, What would be the value to Ireland of Home Rule so achieved? What would become of the unity of Ireland, of the peace of Ireland, and of the reconciliation of England and Ireland?
VISCOUNT MORLEY: That is quite different.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: Yes; but it is a very pertinent argument. There never has been a civilised community thrown out of a form of government which it loved at the point of the bayonet by the very men who wielded the power of that government, and made to subject itself to a form of government which it dreaded. There never has been such a case in history, and although we take the view I have stated about discipline in the Army we say that for the Government to impose Home Rule by force on the Covenanters would be one of the most horrible crimes in history. The doctrine that you are really contending for is the doctrine of the divine right of the majority for the time being in the House of Commons. Our fathers did not strip Charles I of divine right in order that we should be willing to put that moth-eaten garment on the shoulders of Mr. Devlin. The only authority which can decide this matter is the nation; and the root of your difficulty really is this, that you find that you have at least half the nation against you—I put it at more; you put it at less. And the same difficulty applies to us—I entirely admit it. That is why we have pressed you again and again to find out what the nation really does wish by means of a General Election or by a referendum; but you will not have either a General Election or a referendum. Sir Edward Carson has told you, in respect of your offer of the temporary exclusion of Ulster, that if you will give the men of Ulster the same power of deciding their own fate at the end of six years as you offer them now he will take that offer to his friends in Ireland. You have refused that. And in his last speech Sir Edward Carson put before you the alternative of devolution as the only way he could see out of the terrible impasse which we have reached. I speak only for myself, but I do believe, if the nation is permanently divided into two camps of approximately equal

775
strength in this great controversy, that the only way out is by a process of devolution. But what I am quite sure of is that you never can have any final settlement of this question except a national settlement; and I also am sure of this—that for one-half of the nation to try and trample on the deepest convictions of the other half, as you are doing, is the sure road to national disaster.
Moved, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to the new Army Order announced to the House of Commons on March 27, and to the circumstances which have led to its issue.—(The Earl of Selborne.)
EARL ROBERTS: My Lords, we are discussing a subject of the very gravest importance—graver, indeed, as regards potential disaster to the nation than anything that has occurred for generations. It is then with a very real sense of the seriousness of the situation that I rise to make an appeal to your Lordships and through you to the people of this country—regardless of class or political creed—to make an end of all these idle but dangerous and mischievous assertions, that the Army is implicated in any political conspiracy and that it is allowing itself to be used as the tool of one Party in the State. These baseless assertions are being freely made in the Press and in speeches by politicians, and it is sought to substantiate them by equally wild and slanderous charges of disobedience of orders and disregard of discipline. My Lords, there is not the smallest justification of any sort, kind, or description, for a single one of these indictments of the Army. Where they are not inspired by a reckless desire to secure a Party score, or by a malicious disregard of truth, they have their origin in complete ignorance of the Army—its sentiments, feelings, and conditions of life.
I can fairly claim to have some knowledge of these things, and I can tell you, my Lords, with all the conviction produced by 62 years of service in the Army—and I am sure that those of your Lordships who have had the honour of serving His Majesty will bear me out in this—that the soldier does not trouble himself about Party politics; indeed, he dislikes politics, and his indifference is even tinged with contempt for the unfortunate people engaged in political warfare, as men who are perforce bereft of individuality. That, believe me, my Lords, is the general feeling in the
776
Army; and if you add to that the sense of esprit de corps and almost inordinate pride in the Army, is it ever conceivable that soldiers would consent to engage in a political plot, or to assist one Party to secure a political advantage over its opponents? The thing is an absurdity. The man is not living who could seduce the Army to play so despicable a part.
And, my Lords, what are those charges of indiscipline and disobedience of orders? Your Lordships are fully aware of the facts of the deplorable situation produced by the ultimatum which was suddenly hurled at the troops in Ireland the week before last. I defy anybody to give me a solitary instance of indiscipline or disobedience. At the instigation of the Government—or so we must presume until it has been proved to be otherwise—the officers were asked to make their choice between two terrible alternatives. This option was unsought by them. It was deliberately given to them by the Government, acting through General Sir Arthur Paget as its mouthpiece, and they were given but the scantiest time in which to consider the momentous choice that they were commanded to make.
Now, my Lords, the all-important fact of what I have said—and it cannot be stated too often—is that in exercising the option thus forced upon them, there was obviously no semblance of disobedience of orders. But what of the choice that was put before these officers? Dismiss from your minds the ridiculous fallacy that officers of the Army are a wealthy and privileged class, and consider the nature of the option unexpectedly placed before them. They were to be ready to operate against the men of Ulster—loyal subjects of the King, flying the Union Jack—or to send in their resignations and be dismissed from, the Army with consequent loss of their careers and their pensions. This latter meant to all the break up of a home, the sundering of ties which had bound them for years—the ties of comradeship, love of regiment, and pride in the Army. It meant to all the loss of occupation and the waste of many years of strenuous endeavour; it meant to many—and, my Lords, I would draw your particular attention to this—the almost total loss of the means of livelihood. And yet the finger of scorn is pointed at the officers who chose this latter alternative. They are made the subjects of false charges, are accused of wishing to dictate to the Government, and are branded as conspirators.

777
It is high time for the sake of the nation, no less than for the sake of the Army, that these perversions of the truth should cease, and that the Army should be allowed to disappear from the political arena, into which it has been thrust, much against its own wish or expectation. I know what I am speaking about when I tell your Lordships that the Army as a whole had so little considered the political situation, and the atmosphere in which it has its being is so devoid of political elements, that it has never conceived the possibility of finding itself entangled in this manner. It has, indeed, often surprised me to mark the air of personal detachment with which the Army has regarded this great political struggle; but so it has been, and I say no more than the truth when I state that the Government's ultimatum was like the springing of a mine to the Army.
I need say little more, my Lords. My desire has been to nail to the counter once and for all the lies that are being told as to officers having disobeyed orders. If any further justification of their action were needed, surely it is to be found in the unexampled and unprecedented course taken by the Government in offering alternatives to the officers. For what, my Lords, does this portend? What is the irresistible implication arising from this course? Why this departure from custom? Surely the only reason and true reason is that the Government realised that they were going to make demands on the Army which they had no right to make, and which the constituted authorities, as revealed in the Army Act and the King's Regulations, gave them no excuse for making. These authoritative works lay down in the most detailed manner what the duties of the military forces are. They are very precise as to the manner in which those duties are to be performed and the penalties for non-performance; they cover the whole field of the possible and even improbable uses to which the Army can be put. What duties, then, did the Government intend asking of the Army that led to this novel step? What was contemplated? Obviously something that was not legislated for in the Army Act or the King's Regulations. My Lords, I can discover only one answer to this question, and that is in Chapter I of the Manual of Military Law, where the following words will be found:—" English Law never presupposes the possibility of Civil War and makes no express provision for such contingencies."
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT HALDANE): My Lords, in the two speeches to which we have just listened there is allusion to one fact which gives me satisfaction. Both of the speakers doubtless realised that a new and serious issue has been raised—the issue between the Army and the People, as the noble Earl calls it; that is to say, the issue whether the Army is to be the instrument of the State or whether it is to be the subject of a political battle such as has been known with disastrous consequences in times gone by. I realise that noble Lords who sit on the Opposition side of the House are beginning to be aware of the seriousness of the question which has been raised. There has been going on for weeks and months a tornado of articles in the journals which support their policy, speeches made in both Houses, in Covenants, documents to which the signatures of important people have been appended, which have suggested that it is an open question whether the Army ought to do its duty in coming to the support of the civil power. No less than that has been raised, and it is time that your Lordships should realise the consequences which inevitably attend speeches of this kind. I entirely agree with the noble Earl and the noble and gallant Field-Marshal that it is no part of the Army's duty to enter into politics. It is wrong to bring the Army into politics in any way. I have known the Army, I have lived with it, I have got to care for it, and I say that no more splendid body of men exists in this country, animated, officers and men alike, with a desire to do their duty. They do not raise questions. It is only when from outside they are given incitements that we have such incidents as have happened lately. A large number of officers raised a big issue at the Curragh.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I repeat what I have said. They have not disobeyed orders, it is quite true; but they have raised questions about orders which may be given to them.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Oh, yes, they have. They have raised questions about orders which may be given to them, and they have even gone so far as to ask for guarantees.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Your Lordships keep saying "No, no," but there is the evidence in the Papers.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Well, take the letter of General Gough himself, one of the most honourable of officers. It has got to this, that he asked for a guarantee.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: After you had offered an alternative.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: He asked for a guarantee that he should not be given certain orders; nothing short of that. I say that is deplorable. That incident at the Curragh is a very serious symptom of the consequences of what has been going on as the result of appeals made in the Press and by distinguished individuals. And, my Lords, is it after all very much to be wondered at? The noble Earl spoke of a plot. He spoke as though, absolutely for no reason at all, precautionary movements had been taken. But we have read in the newspapers for months of a great armed force being raised and drilled in Ulster, upon which every encomium has been lavished by military correspondents and of the formidableness of which we have been assured. I suppose it is suggested that it is the duty of the Government to do nothing, to take no stock of its resources, with proceedings of that kind going on. I make these observations as a preliminary to what I am going to say.
I do not blame your Lordships for raising the question which you have raised. On the contrary, I think it is the duty of an Opposition to examine most closely into the proceedings of the Government of the day. It is not merely its right, it is its duty; and I admit at once that there are many things which have been deserving of searching questioning in the past. But in order to understand these things we must look at the genesis of them. In order to understand the feeling which has arisen about these matters we must really
780
see what was the beginning. Undoubtedly there has been a suggestion made that when the time for action came, when one great political Party was seeking to put a political decision into operation, the Army might be found refusing to carry out the behests of the Executive of the day. Any one who raises that point touches upon one of the most sensitive points in the English conscience. There are few things which have entered more deeply into the people's minds, few things which are more characteristic of our nation, than what are called the conventions of our Constitution. One of these conventions has been, and has been for a long time, that the Army is not to be a power which can set itself up against the orders of the State. My Lords, there were great controversies over this matter which were set at rest a long time ago. At the time of the Revolution settlement, Parliament laid it down that the maintenance of a standing Army in time of peace was unlawful, and that remains the law of the Constitution to this hour. It is only on sufferance that an Army exists from year to year. Every twelve months the maintenance of the Army has to be renewed; an Act has to be passed suspending the action of that part of the Bill of Rights which makes the keeping of a standing Army in time of peace illegal. More than that, the other House exercises scrutiny over every penny for the Army, and the money for the Army comes from Votes in the House. The people, through their representatives, therefore regard the Army as an institution which exists only within these limits, and there are few things on which they are more sensitive than the insistence of maintaining that principle.
I became aware of a consciousness in the mind of the noble Earl who spoke first of the difficulties that would arise if any suggestion of questioning these principles came before the public mind. I do not wonder that the noble Earl was uneasy. As I say, I have known and cared for the Army, and the last thing I should wish to see is the question of the Army thrown into the arena of political controversy. I am certain that if this constitutional principle came again into question, there would arise about it such a combination of forces—Labour men, Liberals, and all sorts of people of whom you do not hear—as would make the hidden sense of the nation, the private feeling of

781
the people, felt with an emphasis that would put an end not only to that question but to a great many other questions at the same time. I do not desire such a question to be raised. I know that the people are talking of some different constitution for the Army, alarmed at the events of the last few days. I feel perfectly sure of this, that any attempt to reform the Army and make it what is called a democratic Army would be an attempt attended by the most enormous difficulties. It would take fifteen years probably to put the Army upon a different footing and a large expenditure of public money, and then I do not think you would get anything like the splendid service we get from the present generation of officers. That is why I regard it as almost a political crime to bring the position of the Army into controversy. That is why I feel strongly, almost intensely, the evil effect of the articles which I have read day by day in the Conservative and Unionist journals, and the speeches which have been made and the suggestions in written documents, which point to this—that the position of the Army and its duty of obedience to the Executive power is in some way an open question.
I come now to the questions of a more detailed kind which have been raised by the noble Earl, because what I have said especially bears on them. The noble Earl seems to suggest that without any necessity the Government have been making preparations for some active operations of an aggressive character against Ulster designed to overawe and to put down manifestations of feeling against the Home Rule Bill, and that that constitutes a plan which was sanctioned, if not by the whole Cabinet, at least by some Committee of the Cabinet. My Lords, nothing of the kind took place. There has been what I spoke of before—illegal drilling in Ulster, utterly illegal raising of troops—the spectacle of which the Government gazed upon with patience because they thought it better not to take certain steps. But it became their imperative duty, at all events, to see that they had instruments at their hand which would enable them to preserve law and order if a conflict took place. I say it was the duty of the Government to do that in view of what had taken place, and I say these movements were only reasonable precautions.
782
To what does all this amount? Lord Selborne gave us a close and full analysis of all that had taken place, and he constructed his story. I should like to ask him one single plain question. Does he think that in the days of these drillings in Ulster, of the raising of a force of 100,000 men the military excellence of which we have heard so much, it was the duty of the Government to do nothing? Does he think that we should be worthy of the name of a Government if we had done nothing and not taken the necessary precautions in such circumstances? The question has only to be put to answer itself.
VISCOUNT RIDLEY: It is true.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: What is true?
VISCOUNT RIDLEY: The noble Earl's story is therefore true.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The logic of the noble Viscount astonishes me. Because I say it was our duty to take some precaution against these menaces, therefore the story of the noble Earl is true. The story of the noble Earl was that we did what I said he stated we did—that we organised a large active operation for coercing Ulster and putting down opposition to the Home Rule Bill. There is not a word of truth in the suggestion that we did anything of the sort, or that we did more than take the proper precautions which it was the duty of any Government to take in the conditions which have come into existence in the last few months.
When the noble Earl came to details it was extraordinary. He spoke of the battle squadron, and he spoke of it as if the sending of that battle squadron to Lamlash Bay constituted the beginning of a naval demonstration. The battle squadron was sent to Lamlash Bay because that was a very convenient place for it to lie by. It was sent to Lamlash Bay as part of the preventive measures, and it was a very proper place for that squadron to be sent to.
A NOBLE LORD: Then why was it withdrawn?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It was withdrawn as soon as it was found that the troops had been peaceably moved from Dublin to Ulster; and that was the only reason why it was withdrawn. Then the noble Earl spoke of the other naval movements. Two small cruisers and, I think, a torpedo destroyer went to assist the movement of troops from one point to the other. That is all that took place. I think the imagination of the noble Earl ran riot. He suggested a military junta, an Inner Cabinet, which consisted of my right hon. friend Sir John Simon and other peaceable people, who apparently set themselves to devise a plot or plan to make a movement against Ulster which certainly might not have been within the knowledge of their colleagues in the Government. Does the noble Earl really think these things occurred?
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: Yes.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Then the experience of the noble Earl must be different from any experience I have had. Plans of that kind could not remain unknown to the Cabinet for a day, and they would have been interfered with and stopped in a most summary fashion. Nothing of the kind ever happened. I do not propose to speak of that Committee of the Cabinet, because my noble friend who leads the House, and who, I hope, will speak to-morrow, may be able to give your Lordships some information about it in detail beyond what it is necessary for me to enter upon at this moment. All I have to say, and I say it in the most pointed way, is that the Cabinet had nothing whatever to do with anything except that those comparatively small preventive measures should be undertaken.
The noble Earl went on to other topics. He went on to speak about the new Army Order, and he asked why it was issued. It was issued because it was necessary to define what the precise position of the officers and soldiers in the Army is, and it is a useful Order because it explains the duties of the officers and men in this precise way. That was the reason for the Army Order, and it has put things on a basis from which we can make a fresh start. Then the noble Earl proceeded to discuss the general question of Home Rule. I will not enter into that. I do not think this is the occasion for a general discussion
784
of the policy of Home Rule. What we are here to discuss to-day is whether or not the notion is to be tolerated that the Army should depart from the true Army spirit of which we have heard so much during the last week.
The situation in which we stand to-day is this, and simply this—that the steps taken were the proper and the necessary steps which always ought to be taken by a Government which is responsible if conflict comes about between the civil authority and persons who desire to create a disturbance. Whenever you find a movement such as has been going on in the way of raising these troops in Ulster, and these illegal drillings, and things of that kind, then inevitably it becomes the duty of the Government to take preventive measures. The only measures we have taken have been preventive measures on the basis of which I have spoken. Some gallant officers appear to have got it into their heads that something more was intended, and I do not wonder at it. It is enough to read the headlines in the Press, even if you do not give much attention to politics. The noble and gallant Field-Marshal said that the officers in the Army did not concern themselves with politics. Many of them do not, and that is why if a continuous stream of misrepresentation is poured out on them they cannot prevent their minds and imaginations being touched by the unreality which is represented in the Press.
I think that nothing more deplorable has happened than the way in which these unfortunate officers have been misled by the suggestions made to them in some of the organs which support noble Lords who sit upon the Opposition side of the House, and which are responsible in a large measure for what has recently happened. It may well be that there have been faults in this matter—faults, I dare say, upon both sides. I said to your Lordships the other day that the sooner we got to the end of this incident the better. I say it again to-day; and I say it in the interests of the thing which concerns me most—the Army. It is very bad for the Army to be brought into public discussion in the way the Army has been. No men are less deserving of the kind of misrepresentation and misunderstanding which has been poured upon them perfectly

785
freely, and poured upon them from both sides—that they are taking a part in political affairs which would lead them away from their duty. During the last three days I have seen much of two colleagues of mine on the Army Council with whom it was my privilege to be closely associated—Sir John French and Sir Spencer Ewart. Two more admirable examples of the Army spirit, and what it ought to be, it has never been my privilege to know. They are men permeated with a sincere desire to do what is right; and if to-day they have resigned their offices, they have done so, not on account of any difference of view about policy which has arisen between them and the King's Government, but because they felt, there having been a misunderstanding, that it was well in the interests of the Army that they should—I hope only temporarily—withdraw from giving their active services in this connection.
A good deal of discussion has been lavished upon the terms of the document which on March 23 was given to General Gough after being partly settled by the Cabinet. But there is another document about which we have heard very little; yet the first document cannot be read without the light cast by the second document. General Gough asked for a guarantee—to use his own phrase—from Sir John French later on in the day, and Sir John French gave it. Sir John French imagined, and was right in imagining, that he had what justified him in believing that he was directed to take this course. He had before him what gave him ground for thinking that it was expected that he should give these explanations to General Gough in the form in which they appear in the White Paper laid before Parliament. I said before, and I say it again, that when my noble friend the Lord President of the Council saw that document he knew absolutely nothing of General Gough's letter. It had not come over to the Cabinet, or, if it had come over to my right hon. friend Colonel Seely, he had not opened it or considered it. My noble friend knew nothing about that letter, and it is that letter which must be read in juxtaposition with that other document, and it gives that other document an entirely different character.
I ask your Lordships whether it was possible for any Government which respected itself, or any Government which
786
respected the rule that officers must not bargain about orders, to let these documents go. I think it has been a very unfortunate circumstance that things were done in the way they were done, but they were not done through the fault of the members of the Cabinet, who were simply doing their duty in defining in precise terms what the policy of the Government was. The documents as they have appeared have led to a misunderstanding which it is desirable should be eradicated. It is with a view of eradicating this misunderstanding, with a view to putting matters on a new footing, with a view to restoring confidence in the Army and to seeing that there shall be no bargaining about orders in the future, that we have taken the steps we have taken. The Prime Minister has assumed a heavy burden, but it is a burden that we are all desirous he should take upon himself if his strength will bear it, because we think that in that way better than in any other we can bring back a condition of things honourable to the Army and one which I believe the Army has never in the least had it in its head to depart from.
EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble and learned Viscount who has just sat down that what is called the Curragh incident is a deplorable one, but I think he may be reminded that that incident would never have arisen had General Paget not received certain orders from the War Office which he may or may not have misinterpreted and misunderstood. I think it is deplorable also that the noble and learned Viscount, appreciating the Army as he does, should not have used his great influence to check the shabby attacks which have been made on honourable men whose only crime is that when what they conceived to be an option was put before them they made the choice least favourable to their professional prospects.
There has been a great deal of talk about conspiracies. These gentlemen have almost been called mutineers. Now the word "conspiracy" implies some arrangement designed to surprise the persona against whom it is directed. Were the Government surprised to find out that a large number of officers in the Army serving in Ireland are Unionists or that they are honourable men? Were the Government surprised to learn that the insults which the Nationalist Members

787
and the Nationalist Press have levelled at the Army for thirty years have borne some fruit? I cannot understand what surprise there can have been about it; and if nothing has happened which might not have been expected to happen, what reason is there for this talk about conspiracy and things of that kind? The plain truth is that the Secretary of State for War or the Army Council tried to bluff some of the officers of the Army, and when they failed ignominiously it was necessary to get up a cry to cover their retreat, and the cry has been raised that it is a case of The Army against the People.
I entirely agree, if it is to be put as the plain issue whether the Army is to be the master or the servant of the Legislature, that there is only one answer. We should sink to the level of a South American Republic if the Legislature were to be dominated by the Army. But does it follow, because the Army is to be the servant of the Legislature, that it is to be its slave? There are countries in which that doctrine holds good, of course. If I may speak with all respect of the German Emperor and his magnificent Army, that is the doctrine which the Kaiser himself has preached over and over again. He has told his troops many times that they are to know no will but the will of their War Lord—not the will of the Legislature, but his will, and whether in peace or war they are to obey any orders, however outrageous, implicitly. I believe the same principle was followed with his Albanian bodyguard by the late Sultan of Turkey, Abdul Hamid, and the principle he adopted kept him in power a great many years. But I am quite sure that the methods adopted by those potentates are methods unsuited to English Radical politicians in the 20th century. Their theory was the exact reverse of Cromwell's, that the authorities may do what they like and still claim obedience. But that has never been an accepted doctrine in this country.
Discipline is essential and obedience is essential; but Colonel Seely, in December last, told the Service that there were circumstances in which obedience was not to be expected. He apparently has been thrown over since then if Mr. Runciman and Mr. Acland are correctly reported in The Times to-day. One of them speaks of "orders being implicitly obeyed"; and
788
the other of "compulsory obedience." Does that mean that no officer and no soldier may exercise his reasoning power? that no officer and no soldier may possess a conscience? that no officer and no soldier may exercise the right which is possessed by every working man in the country of terminating his contract of service in the prescribed manner? That has not been the practice in this country in bygone years. Allusion has been made previously in these debates to the officers who, during the war with the American Colonies, were allowed to go upon half pay instead of serving there against men whom they believed to be in the right. Among those officers was no less a man than Sir Ralph Abercromby, who in three expeditions thereafter held the post of Commander-in-Chief. I suppose there have been two occasions since those days when the country has been in difficulties as great as those in which it is now. There was the occasion of the great Mutiny among the seamen in 1797; and the crisis of the Reform Bill in 1832. It is a matter of history, I believe, that in 1797 there were doubts and fears about the attitude of the Army towards the sailors. The Executive shrank from commanding the Army to assist the civil power against the mutinous seamen; and the sailors in consequence got better terms than they might otherwise have received. At the time of the Reform Bill there were many tumultuous meetings, but I do not think that after what was called the Peterloo massacre, a dozen years before, the military forces were ever employed in connection with them.
At the crisis of the Reform Bill a remarkable speech was made in the House of Commons. After Lord Grey had resigned it was suggested that the Duke of Wellington might form a Government. History says now that even he could not rely upon the troops, and for that among other reasons he shrank from the endeavour; and on May 11 in that year a Mr. James, who was the Liberal Member for Carlisle and an ardent reformer, made a speech to this effect—
"I have heard that the Duke of Wellington is again to be Prime Minister and we are going to have the fighting Duke and a military Government. If the soldiers forget themselves, if they are to take part with a violent faction—if the soldiers forget their duty as citizens of this free country and take part against the people—I know that swords and cannon and bayonets, aye, and dungeons, cannot compel this House to vote supplies or compel the people to pay taxes."

789
The language, of course, is rather inflated, but the point is that the fact of soldiers having duties as citizens of a free country as well as soldiers was accepted without question on both sides of the House of Commons even in those exciting times. Sir Robert Peel followed the hon. gentleman in the debate. He took exception to what he called the hon. Member's inflammatory appeal to the determination of the people, but he made no reference whatever to the doctrine that the officers and men of the Army had duties as citizens, and it appears to have been accepted without question by both Parties in Parliament. At the same period, as is well-known, people who might have been required to act as special constables, people whose duty in aid of the civil power—if I have understood the Lord Chancellor rightly on previous occasions—was no less binding on them than similar duty is on military men, were refusing to have anything to do with supporting the civil power against the reformers.
The truth is that in this whole matter the Government have acted as politicians and not as statesmen. Politicians treat men as tools and think they can turn them on like a fire hose to do what they want at any time. Statesmen remember that their subordinates on whom they may have to rely for carrying out their policy are men of like passions with themselves, and they take account of what their policy may involve. It is the part of statesmen to look ahead and consider what may happen; and the whole trouble in this connection has arisen because the Government have refused to listen to anything they did not like to hear. They were warned long ago that the men of Ulster would resist being put under a Nationalist Parliament. The Ulstermen were ridiculed; the Covenanters were told that they were a mere burlesque of an Army; and there were all sorts of cheap gibes at "wooden guns" and the paraphernalia with which they learned their drill. But now the Government have learned that although these Ulstermen—who, like the officers of the Army, were supposed to be the tools of an aristocratic conspiracy, though it is the rank and file who are the soul of the movement—that although the Covenanters are a "burlesque of an Army" with nothing but "wooden guns," we are perilously near to Civil War. Lord Wolseley warned predecessors of this Government years and years ago of the dangers which a Home
790
Rule policy would bring to the Army. Lord Roberts repeated the warning, to mention no others. But for the Government to have listened would have estranged Mr. Redmond, whose votes have kept them in office; so they shut their eyes and closed their ears, and now, to cover their blind folly, they take refuge in a shabby electioneering dodge. When the history of all this is written I do not know which will be accounted greater, their folly or their meanness.
LORD SYDENHAM: My Lords, I rise for a few moments in order to support what has been so well said by the noble and gallant Field-Marshal. I speak on behalf of the Army only because the Army has suddenly, entirely against its own wishes and most undeservedly, been flung into the whirlpool of Party politics. I have served for more than thirty-three years in the Army, and nobody could be more jealous of the honour of the Army than I am. I hold very strong views as to the duties of soldiers, and I believe in implicit obedience to all orders given by constitutional authority and falling within the scope of the Army Regulations. In spite of what the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack has said about questioning orders, I am quite certain that he will admit, as we all must, that in the complicated arrangements of human affairs times may come when all honourable men would be expected to consult the dictates of their consciences, whether they are Ministers of the Crown or officers or privates of the Army.
So far as the Army is concerned, no such question has arisen for many years. The reason of that is, as the noble and gallant Field-Marshal pointed out, that the Army Regulations are clear on the subject of the duties of the Army in home territory, and never has there been any demand made on the Army which seemed to go beyond the assigned duties of the Army Regulations. But surely the position in which the officers at the Curragh found themselves was one of real difficulty. It cannot be denied that they had abundant reason to believe that an immediate attempt of some kind was going to be made to overawe Ulster by force. A violent speech had been previously made in the country by a responsible member of His Majesty's Government, a speech in which it was announced that "these grave matters must be put to the proof." My Lords, what proof was meant?

791
Certainly the proof was not meant to be a General Election; and, so far as I can see, there remained only one other kind of proof—the proof of Civil War. And besides that, every subaltern in the Army would know perfectly well that the military measures which were about to be taken did not, and could not, imply only the protection of a few stores of ammunition.
We have been assured that the whole thing was a complete mistake, but common justice to the Army demands that we should put ourselves in the position in which those officers found themselves and see what was the inevitable point of view to them. It appeared quite plain to them that they were going to be asked to do something which was never contemplated in the Army Orders under which they had served so well and so long. They certainly thought that they were going to be required to fire on the National Flag held by loyal men whose only offence was that they strongly objected to be placed under the rule of an Irish Parliament. That or resignation, with all the painful consequences to which the noble and gallant Field-Marshal has alluded, was the only alternative which presented itself to them. I earnestly hope that such an alternative will never again be placed before the gallant officers and soldiers of our Army. But the noble Viscount and the late Secretary of State for War, in the Memorandum of March 23, concisely redefined the duties of the Army in home territory. That definition, as we all know, has been cancelled since, but it has reappeared in somewhat new phraseology. This new Army Order appears to me in certain aspects to be quite superfluous; but the reaffirmation embodied in Paragraph No. 3, and prefaced by those curiously irrelevant words "In particular," which have nothing whatever to do with the context, seem to me to be of a somewhat irritating character from the point of view of the Army. This definition makes no change in the duties of the Army for the preservation of public order, and every officer and soldier will carry out those duties, now freshly defined, just as he has done in the past and always would do.
But what is the greatest danger which arises out of the present painful position? It is this. On platforms and in a section of the Press it will be proclaimed far and wide, and not in our own country only, that the
792
Army opposed its will to the will of the people as represented by a majority in the House of Commons; that the Army supported the classes against the masses; and that the Army is therefore a danger to public liberty, as liberty is understood by the majority of the moment. My Lords, there is not one word of truth in any one of those wild allegations. But they may be believed, and if they are believed then the warnings which the noble Viscount the Lord President of the Council gave us last week will certainly be abundantly justified. What are the facts? General Gough wrote on the 20th—
"If such duty consists in the maintenance of order and the preservation of property, all the officers of this brigade, including myself, would be prepared to carry out that duty."
In other words, General Gough's views of the duty of the Army coincide exactly with the views of the noble Viscount and the late Secretary of State for War as laid down in the historic document of March 23.
It is not true, and it has been so stated with emphasis by the noble Viscount to-day, that any officer has shown any sign of indiscipline throughout this unfortunate business, or has shown the least tendency to refuse to carry out orders. But do not let us forget that His Majesty's Government have passed their final and considered verdict upon the whole of the proceedings of these officers, and that that part of the White Paper has not been repudiated. His Majesty's Government have said that they are "satisfied that the incident has been due to a misunderstanding," and with that verdict I am quite certain every member of your Lordships' House will most cordially agree. There have been rather too many honest misunderstandings of late, and those honest misunderstandings have not all been on the side of the Army. The very deplorable position in which we find ourselves has been due to the initial honest misunderstanding of the nature and character of the forces which have opposed the subjection of Ulster to an Irish Parliament. One thing is at least certain, and one thing we can look back upon as having been satisfactory in what has happened during the last week. His Majesty's Government will not turn Ulster into a La Vendée. The Prime Minister gave this assurance on Friday. He said, after reading the new Army Order—
"It is altogether untrue that the Government or any member of the Government ever contemplated

793
active operations of an aggressive kind in Ulster, or any operations which now or in the near future would impose upon the Army any duty or service which is not amply covered by this order."
That is a clear and explicit statement, and the only pity is that it was not issued a week before. But there is another assurance which I am sure we should welcome, and from the very sympathetic language of the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack I am sure we can count upon that assurance. It is this. That the Government will be just to the Army, and will do all in its power to discourage that campaign of misrepresentation which seems already to have been begun. My Lords, no class question of any kind arises out of the recent proceedings, and the preaching of antagonism between the people and the Army which exists for their protection can only lead to irretrievable disaster to our Empire.
LORD ST. AUDRIES: My Lords, I do not propose to deal with this question from the point of view of the plots and stratagems of the Government. They really are too subtle and too tortuous for the mind of a simple soldier. There is one thing we soldiers do want, and that is a definite copy of the instructions which were given to Sir Arthur Paget. I have known Sir Arthur Paget for a great number of years. We were subalterns together in the Brigade of Guards thirty-seven years ago. He is not only a distinguished soldier but is essentially a man of the world. You will never make me believe that that man, after several interviews with the Secretary of State for War and the Prime Minister, went from London to Dublin, forgot his instructions on the way, and made a new speech out of his own head. What I am surprised at is that he did not insist on having a written copy of his instructions, and after all we have heard about clear thinking in the Army I really do think that it would be a good thing in the future if, when important matters of this kind have to be decided, the War Office gave a written copy to the officer concerned and kept a written office copy for themselves. Then there is Sir Charles Fergusson. We were brother-officers in the Grenadiers for many years. He is a particularly clear, level-headed man, and no one will make me believe that he gave any instructions to the officers under him other than those he received from General Paget. The
794
evidence about the option and so on is completed by the very fact that the Government have felt it necessary to issue the new Army Order which has been referred to in the debate this evening. Unless the option had been given it would have been entirely unnecessary to issue that Order.
The whole trouble is due to the conduct of the War Office in acting against the spirit and letter of the King's Regulations. They had no right to give these officers an option. What you give to officers and to men in the Army is not an option but an order. It is an entirely new departure to have these options given to officers. I may say that all through this winter I have impressed upon every civilian audience which I have addressed that the first duty of a soldier is to obey orders; and, much as they may dislike it, if soldiers are told to go to Ulster, to Ulster they must go. Of course, the whole responsibility for the bloodshed, for the strain on the discipline of the Army, and for the bitter feeling afterwards must rest on the Government and on the Government alone. But if a soldier is told to so, he must so. Now the Government have given me away to my old constituents, for, according to them, instead of a soldier going where he is told to go, he is to be asked to go—at any rate that was the position up till last Friday. There is nothing that soldiers hate worse than being called out in aid of the civil power. It is not their job, and they do not think it is the job for which they enlisted. But never during my experience have I known one single soldier decline to go out in aid of the civil power. If it comes to the point where the Government have to use force, I say the Government must take the responsibility of it; they cannot divest themselves of that responsibility by giving an option to the officers or soldiers. It is impossible; it is unknown to the military law.
I do not know whether it has ever occurred to the Government, but there are two sides to this question of option. Take the question of option at the Curragh. A great number of officers took the option of the Government and decided to resign or be dismissed. But there are many officers in the British Army who cannot afford to do that. They may be poor men; they may have wives and families,

795
or parents, dependent upon them. Their profession may be the only thing that they have in the world, and it is practically impossible for those men to take the option. Has it never occurred to the Government that those men are liable to the odious charge of volunteering for Civil War in Ulster? It is a charge to which all those officers would have been liable, and a charge to which undoubtedly some of them would have been subjected. That is a position in which no Government and no War Office should ever put an officer.
Discipline in the Army is a very difficult and delicate matter. I was not adjutant of a battalion of Guards for more than five years without finding that out. Discipline in the British Army is not kept up by fear of punishment, by threats, or by bullying. Discipline is kept up, partly no doubt by training, but a great deal more by tradition, by esprit de corps, by the confidence, the respect, yes and the affection, which exists between officers and men; and, above all, perhaps, by the unswerving belief in the absolute justice and good faith of those highest in authority in the Army. The Government have gone far towards shaking that discipline. They have done it by giving anoption to officers which they did not, because they could not, give to the men. They have shaken it by giving a pledge to the officers and afterwards repudiating it. Well, shaking the discipline of an Army is a very grave matter. It is easily shaken, but it takes very many years to restore it. I will not say that the evil has gone as far as it might have gone; but at all events I do say that in that very ill-considered action of first giving an option, then giving a pledge, and then repudiating that pledge, the Government have done a great deal to harm the discipline of the British Army. Soldiers do not understand that sort of treatment.
I need not say that I am a strong Party man, but I have always in the House of Commons in past years put the Army beyond the Party; and I must confess that I have not always been thanked for doing it. I wish to protest against the mischievous attempt which is being made to stir up strife between the Army and the country, and I protest equally against both sides. I protest against the Army being made heroes on the one hand because
796
of what they have done at the Curragh and its supposed connection with the Home Rule Bill; and I equally protest against their being made scapegoats on the other. I do not know whether the people of the country understand it, but the Army cares nothing about politics. It is a very hard thing to tell the politician, but I will say quite straight that the Army is willing to let him strut about and crow on his little straw heap and make as big a fool of himself as he likes, and as long as he does not interfere with the Army or its welfare the Army does not care twopence about him or his views.
The position to-day is not as it was in the old days. I recollect that in the old days the noble Marquess, Lord Lincolnshire, when he was a captain of the Blues on full pay, sat in the House of Commons as the Liberal Member for Wigan. He was followed in that distinguished and honourable position by his two younger brothers successively, and they were also captains on full pay in the Grenadiers. In those days we used to go on platforms while we were on full pay, and make speeches. That, of course, has all been done away with now, and quite properly. I think it was wrong. Nowadays the Army does not care about politics. It is too much occupied in keeping up its efficiency as the best and finest trained Army in the world according to its size to bother about your politics, your twists, turns, and dodges, here and there. I protest also against the phrase which has been used by some Unionists, and, I think, in some Unionist newspapers, that the Army has wrecked the Home Rule Bill. The Army has done nothing of the sort. To say that the Army has done so is to do the Army a very bad service indeed. If the Home Rule Bill is in a worse position now than it was ten days ago, that is only because the Government took the disastrous course of offering an option to the officers at the Curragh instead of telling them to go and sending them, as they should have done. Soldiers do not understand all this sort of thing, and they resent it very deeply.
Now I come to what is said on the other side of politics—that it is a question of The Army against the People. That statement is, perhaps, on the whole even more mischievous. Has anybody refused an order? No. The noble Viscount who spoke this afternoon said that discipline

797
had never been better, that nobody has refused to obey an order, that no section or unit of the Army has refused to go to Ulster. This cry is raised solely because certain officers have exercised a right of option which in my opinion ought never to have been offered them. But it was offered to them by the Government, and they accepted it in all good faith. Because of that we are told there is going to be a great struggle between the Army and the people, that there is going to be a great political cry to that effect at the next Election. Incidentally the people are always dragged in. Either it is "Land for the People," or "The People's Budget," or something like that. Now it is going to be, we hear, "The Army and the People." I do not think that cry is likely to catch on.
We are told that it is intended to democratise the Army. Personally I do not know how you are going to do that. Are you going to confine it exclusively to members of the Radical Party? Are you going to have outside your recruiting offices, "No Unionist need apply"; or are you going to make it democratic in the sense of blood and breeding. Are you going to limit the income of an officer to £25 or £50 a year? In that case you will have to pay him a much higher salary. I might admit that there is something to be said for a salaried Army. I know of one which is allowed to say and do what it likes outside the House, in the public Press, and elsewhere, as long as it marches into the right Lobbies when it is wanted. I do not think you would find that sort of salaried Army useful for repelling a foreign foe, though it might be useful in forcing the carrying of a measure against the will of the people of the country. There is another kind of democracy, and that is to give to each regiment the right to elect its own officers. If you did that I can tell you exactly what would happen. If each regiment balloted for its own officers, in nineteen cases out of twenty they would elect their present officers. But I know a regiment that would not, and it is not very far from here. I think that if they balloted for their officers you would find a great change on the Front Treasury Bench.
I deprecate this attempt to stir up strife between the people and the Army. A great many people in the country—and no one more than the noble and learned
798
Viscount on the Woolsack—have been doing their best in past years to make the Army efficient and popular, and I think to a great extent we have been successful. No one has done that for Party reasons. No one has allowed the Army to be treated up to now politically. Surely that would be a great mistake when we have got so far in popularising the Army. I can say from experience that the Army is more popular in the country now than it has been for generations past. Surely it is a great national mistake, merely for the sake of a small supposed Party advantage, to start this mischievous cry which must end in rending the Army. As to the matters we are discussing, I am bound to say, in view of what has taken place during the last ten days, that the Army has been very badly treated. I am sorry to say so, but as an old soldier speaking in your Lordships' House I should not be doing my duty unless I expressed my opinion.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I think it would have been a great pity had we not had the advantage of the speech which has just been delivered by my noble and gallant friend. Indeed, if I may in one sentence sum up the full effect of the discussion this afternoon it would be that we have had a vindication of the Army. We have had distinguished soldier after distinguished soldier protesting against the slanders which have been uttered against the Army. And, above all, we have had, in answer to the Question put to him, a statement by the Lord President of the Council that the Army had not disobeyed any orders, and that no man or officer of the Army had been in any sense insubordinate. That is the most important result of this evening's discussion, and I think it will be known throughout the length and breadth of the land that the character of the Army has been amply vindicated. I do not know that the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack said that himself—perhaps he did not wish to repeat what his colleague had said just before him. But when the noble and learned Viscount came to deal with this subject he did not take what the officers had said and done themselves, but what outsiders had said and done. He went back to the old Party game. It was what the "right hon. gentleman" or "noble Lords opposite" had said, and not—what is really important—what the Army itself had said and done.

799
But the noble and learned Viscount did make one observation about the Army which I think must have astonished all your Lordships. He said that the officers had raised certain issues. Raised certain issues! Not a single issue, as far as I know, was raised by the officers. The people who raised the issues were the Government. They sent to Ireland, by Sir Arthur Paget, certain questions which had never before been heard of in the Army and which were for the first time put to the officers. The officers were given this awful alternative, and they preferred to be dismissed. They were dismissed, or rather they were removed from their commands. Then the Government raised another issue. Because they wished to reinstate the officers they proceeded to ask them to go back. The officers, having resigned, naturally said when asked to go back, "Upon what terms?" That was not raising a new issue; it was a very natural and reasonable observation to make. "You kicked us out. Now you want us to go back. Upon what terms are we to go back?" That is what any reasonable men would have said. Then the Government explained, and ever since they started explaining they have been wabbling to and fro in the most pitiable condition, until finally a poor Minister, who, I suspect, was not responsible, has wabbled out of office.
Then the noble and learned Viscount went on to speak of the condition of Ulster. That is the second point which has emerged from to-night's discussion—namely, that the Government have at last realised what the condition of Ulster is. All the disbelief of these last two years when the Government did nothing has disappeared. They have become convinced of the reality of the unpopularity of their Home Rule Bill in Ulster. Nothing has been more striking than the deafness which the Government have assumed towards all the information which reached them from Ulster. We had no better means—not so good, I should think—of ascertaining what was the feeling in Ulster, but to us it was quite apparent how very serious the movement in Ulster was. That movement was not, I may say, a movement amongst the upper classes. No doubt there were some of the upper classes concerned in it, but they were not one-tenth more anxious to avoid Home Rule than the working classes. It was a popular movement from the top classes to the
800
bottom classes in Ireland opposed to Home Rule. The Government have found it out. In the light of all previous scoffs at the preparations of Ulster's resistance, it is very humorous to observe the extent of the expeditionary force which the Government thought necessary to prepare in order to force Home Rule upon Ulster. That was one of the valuable answers to the Questions put by my noble friend this afternoon. When the noble Viscount the Lord President was pressed as to this enormous expedition, the naval force and the military force from England and two divisions of His Majesty's troops in Ireland, he did not commit himself absolutely to it, but he said it was probably true that that force had been considered necessary by the Government in order to enforce their wretched policy upon Ulster. What becomes of Government by consent which is supposed to be a Liberal shibboleth? You cannot have the form of Government which His Majesty's Ministers prefer agreed to by Ulster except with the assistance of a naval force and a military force from England and two divisions of His Majesty's troops in Ireland!
Arising out of that observation I must pause for a moment to say one word about the Fleet which was engaged. Here was a battle squadron which was necessary to impose this policy upon Ulster. I wonder whether the Government reflected upon the drastic character of their preparations? Just conceive what a Fleet is used for. A Fleet is used to bombard; it possesses heavy guns to bombard an enemy's positions. So that apparently it was contemplated that it might be necessary to use the heaviest artillery to bombard positions in Ulster. I do not know whether the noble and learned Viscount and his colleagues lightly thought of laying Belfast in ashes, or what they really intended; but your Lordships will admit that it shows in the most clear manner how formidable the task was which the Government found they had undertaken when they required weapons of this tremendous description in order to enforce their policy.
Now, these officers were suddenly presented with this ultimatum. I think some of them had only two hours in which to make up their minds. They were asked to say whether they would carry out this policy or would prefer to resign. They did not refuse to carry out the policy, but said they would prefer to resign, and they did resign. Is it surprising

801
that they preferred to resign? Is it surprising that British officers disliked giving an order to fire upon the working-classes of Ulster? Because that is what the policy of the Government was. They intended to fire upon the working-classes of Ulster in order to carry out this policy on the instructions of men who were notoriously disloyal and who have got the Government under their control. These officers had to remember that they had fought in South Africa side by side with many of those Ulstermen, and had reckoned them amongst their most loyal comrades. On the other hand, the men who were urging the Government to put Ulster under their heel were the very men who had rejoiced at our defeats in South Africa. Is it but natural that when they were asked whether they would fire upon their previous comrades they should refuse to do so? They did not disobey orders. They said they would rather sacrifice the whole of their careers than do this. There was no word of praise from the noble and learned Viscount for the men who had taken what one might almost call such an heroic course when they had to make this decision in a moment of such difficulty.
Let us consider for a moment what would be thought by the noble and learned Viscount's colleagues and by his followers if one made an analogy in England. Supposing a number of workmen belonged to a trade union which was engaged in an industrial struggle and the Government proposed to pass an Act to the effect that they must-leave the trade union and pass under the jurisdiction of another organisation which they did not want to pass under. If these working men prepared to resist that by force and then the Government ordered His Majesty's troops to make preparations to fire upon these men because they would not abandon their trade union and would not pass under an organisation which they hated, would he be surprised if the officers shrank from carrying out such an order as that? And yet that is precisely the kind of order which he and his colleagues desire to inflict upon the gallant and loyal officers of our forces in Ireland. In whose name did the Government propose to take this drastic action? Forsooth! in the name of the people.
I see that all the violent speakers of the Government kept to go down into the
802
country are talking now about this being a struggle between the Army and the people. One of the most astonishing things about the conduct of public business now is the difference in the tone of the speeches which are made in your Lordships' House and the speeches made by noble Lords' own colleagues in the country. There is a gentleman of the name of Illingworth—I think he is the Chief Liberal Whip. He goes down into the country and delivers most violent speeches. They are never repudiated by His Majesty's Government in this House. Yet I confess I wonder they allow subordinate members of the Government to use language of that kind; or I should wonder if it did not happen that they allow their own colleagues to do the same thing. I see that in a recent letter the Chancellor of the Exchequer has declared that unless the Government are supported "we shall be enslaved by a military despotism." Can there be a more grotesque, a more inaccurate, a more false statement than that? Yet this is from one of the colleagues of noble Lords opposite, one of the gentlemen of whom, I believe, they are proud. And they do this in the name of the people—the people whom they dare not consult, the people whom they will not consult, the people whom they shrewdly suspect are not in favour of the particular view which they are putting forward.
We listened with great interest to the changes in the personnel of His Majesty's Government which have been the consequence of the present crisis. The noble and learned Viscount pronounced a eulogy—a very well deserved eulogy—upon the energy and public spirit of the Prime Minister in undertaking the double duty of First Lord of the Treasury and Secretary of State for War. I am very glad that the Prime Minister should become Secretary for War. It will probably give him a knowledge of what goes on in that Office which in recent months he does not seem to have possessed; and though I am very glad that we should have so distinguished a Secretary of State, I could not help noticing that one of the results of the particular methods in which the Government have solved the crisis is that they have lost their Secretary of State for War in a way which will avoid a by-election.
LORD EMMOTT: There will be a by election.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: For the Prime Minister's seat?
LORD EMMOTT: Yes.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Why should he risk his seat?
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: He has taken another office.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am very glad to hear that the electors of East Fife will be consulted as to their view about recent events. The more by-elections we have the better we shall be pleased. What we desire is to ascertain the feeling of the country. But we want, not a by-election, but a General Election when the country will be able to show once and for all what view it takes of the proceedings of which we have lately been witness. The only result up to now of the wabbling of His Majesty's Government has been that they have lost two of the most distinguished officers of the Army from their counsels in the War Office. That is a matter to be profoundly regretted, but at least it is not a matter of surprise when we consider the position in which those gallant officers were placed. I earnestly hope that the time may not be far distant when we shall have the opportunity again of reckoning them in the immediate service of the public.
There is one further point I desire to make before I sit down. I want to ask the Government categorically whether they will grant us a little more information. The noble Viscount the Lord President told us that the Government were calling for a report from General Sir Arthur Paget as to what exactly passed in Ireland. We hope that that report will be as full as possible, and will tell us precisely what he did say to his officers and what orders he actually issued. But that is not sufficient. We want to know who is responsible for these blunders. We want to know exactly where the misconception arose. I ask His Majesty's Government whether they will tell us in substance exactly what passed between Sir Arthur Paget and the Army Council in that important interview which he had in London before he went back to Ireland. It may be that Sir Arthur Paget got his instructions, not from the Army Council only, but from the Army Council and the Secretary of State, and, indeed, other members of His Majesty's Government. We want to know exactly what passed,
804
and we are not alone in asking for that information.
I always take care to read the Radical newspapers, and I read a passage in the Daily News, one of the valued organs, I believe, of the Party opposite, in which they declared that the House of Lords were quite right in demanding this information. The Daily News said—
"The difficulty of a documentary rendering of these conversations must be admitted, but it is not insuperable. On the other hand, an accurate account of these conversations is indispensable if Parliament and the country are to have adequate information upon which to judge the events of the last few days."
This was written immediately after the crisis burst upon us; so that from both sides of politics the same opinion inevitably emerges. But we can never thoroughly understand where the responsibility lies until we know exactly what passed in the War Office; exactly what the oral instructions were which were given to Sir Arthur Paget on that occasion. The Government had better make a clean breast of it. Nothing is more undignified than having information gradually wrung out of a reluctant Government. Already they have been obliged to go from point to point. They had better go the whole course at once and take Parliament into their confidence, even if it is necessary to shed a colleague or two more in the process. That cannot be helped. Let them make a clean breast of it, and then they will have done their utmost to repair the hideous blunder which has lost them valuable colleagues and plunged the Army into the condition of confusion in which it is now found.
The further Debate adjourned till To-morrow.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed by the Lord COLEBROOKE.

CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 1) BILL.
Brought from the Commons, endorsed with the Certificate from the Speaker that the Bill is a Money Bill within the meaning of the Parliament Act, 1911, and read 1a: Then (Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended): Bill read 2a: Committee negatived, and Bill read 3a, and passed.
House adjourned at Twelve o'clock midnight, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.