Sitting of 25 March 1914

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.
Private Bills (Petitions for additional Provision) (Standing Orders not complied with),—Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Reports from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the Petitions for additional Provision in the following Bills, the Standing Orders have not been complied with, namely:—
Middlesbrough Corporation Bill.
South Suburban Gas Bill.
Ordered, That the Reports be referred to the Select Committee on Standing Orders.
Corn Exchange Company (Mark Lane) Bill,
Port of London Authority Bill,
Riddings District Gas Bill,
As amended, considered; to be read the third time.
Fishguard and Rosslare Railways and Harbours Bill (by Order),
Kidsgrove Gas Bill (by Order),
London Electric Railway Bill (by Order),
Consideration, as amended, deferred till Friday.
Market Rasen Water Bill,
Ordered, That it be an Instruction to the Committee on the Market Rasen Water Bill to inquire whether the collecting, taking, and user of waters from the Bully Hill Farm Spring and the Little Ash Holt Spring, as proposed by the Bill, will or may prejudicially affect the River Rase and the existing public or private sources of supply in the district, whether from wells or underground sources or from streams or other surface waters, and that they have power to insert in the Bill such Clause or Clauses as they think necessary for limiting the quantity of water which the Company may collect, take, and use.—[Mr. Stanier.]
Mold and Denbigh Junction Railway Bill,
Reported, with Amendments; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
Southend Gas Bill,
Reported, with Amendments [Title amended]; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

PUBLIC RECORDS.
Copy presented of Seventy-fifth Annual Report of the Deputy-Keeper of the Public Records [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
SHOPS ACT, 1912.
Copies presented of Orders made by the Council of the county of Worcester, and confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, with regard to certain classes of Shops in the urban districts of Redditch (two) and Stourbridge [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
IRELAND (AVERAGE PRICES).
Return presented relative thereto [ordered 9th March; Mr. Newman]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 162.]
NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT.
Copy presented of Regulations made by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue under Section 108 of The National Insurance Act, 1911 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No.163.]
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE OBSERVA- TORY.
Copy presented of Report of His Majesty's Astronomer at the Cape of Good Hope to the Secretary of the Admiralty, for the year 1913 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
DESTRUCTIVE INSECTS AND PESTS ACTS, 1877 AND 1907.
Copies presented of Orders numbered D. I. P. 92 and 93, respectively, issued during March, 1914, declaring certain areas described in the Schedules thereto to be infected with Wart disease of potatoes and to be infected areas for the purposes of the Wart Disease of Potatoes (Infected Areas) Order of 1914 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.
  ROYAL NAVY.

    INDIA (CONTRIBUTION).
    Mr. FELLasked the First Lord of the Admiralty what is the sum to be contributed by India towards the upkeep of the Navy during the present year?
    The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Churchill): The sum to be contributed by the Government of India during the current financial year towards the upkeep of the Navy is £164,000.
    Mr. FELL: Is not that the same sum as last year, and does the right hon. Gentleman consider it adequate?
    Colonel YATE: Has the question yet been settled whether the vessels of the Indian Marine are to be armed or not?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: I must have notice of that question.

    MERCHANT STEAMSHIPS (GUNS).
    Mr. MIDDLEMOREasked whether the guns mounted in trading steamships are regarded as being intended for the purpose of self defence; whether the use of the guns for that purpose would not in fact constitute an offensive act; whether the commanding officers of the vessels in question are commissioned officers in His Majesty's service; and, if not, what would be their position in International Law in the event of the guns being used against a hostile commissioned ship, whether commissioned regularly or by letter of marque?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: The guns that have been mounted in some merchant steamships are intended for the purpose of self defence in certain contingencies. These guns if used for self defence would not constitute an offensive act in the sense that the vessel was taking the offensive. The officers commanding the vessels so armed might have commissions as officers of the Royal Naval Reserve, but their position on those vessels would be the same as that of other masters of merchant ships. The intention of this part of the question is not understood. Defence on the part of a belligerent is not in any way contrary to International Law, and therefore the master of a merchant steamship defending herself would not be liable to any special penalty. It may be added that the issue of letters of marque was abolished by the Declaration of Paris.
    Mr. MIDDLEMORE: Am I to understand that if one of these captains in question fires in self defence he would not, in case of capture, be regarded as a privateer?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: I think that that is the effect of my answer; but it is a legal question, and I could not, as a layman, attempt to answer such a question without consulting the authorities at my disposal

    INSUBORDINATION AMONG CREWS.
    Mr. MIDDLEMOREasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is prepared to make any statement as to insubordination among the crews of His Majesty's ships "Zealandia," "Newcastle," and "Chatham"?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: The report in regard to certain regrettable occurrences on board His Majesty's ship "Zealandia" was only received on Monday, and it is not possible to make any statement on the subject at present. No report of any insubordination on board the "Chatham" has been received. Some case of insubordination occurred amongst the stokers on board the "Newcastle" in December last. Five stokers were punished with sentences of from fourteen to twenty-one days' detention. It was considered by the Commander-in-Chief, China, that the first lieutenant was to blame for his treatment of the stokers as a whole, and he was removed from the "Newcastle." The Board approved of the action of the commander-in-chief.

    CADETS (PROMOTION).
    Mr. MIDDLEMOREasked what is the approximate average percentage of boys entered as naval cadets who rise, respectively, to the ranks of lieutenant, commander, captain, and rear-admiral?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: The system of common entry has hardly been established long enough to make any very accurate calculation as to the percentage of cadets to reach the rank of lieutenant. An approximate figure, however, is 80 per cent. I am advised that it is not considered desirable to give the remaining information asked for, as figures based on the average promotions of past years might prove very misleading for the future.

    H.M.S. "MINOTAUR."
    Lord C. BERESFORDasked whether His Majesty's ship "Minotaur" is due for paying off in May of this year, and arrangements were being made to send out her relief crew; whether, on account of the Coronation of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan on the 10th November next, the ship's company will have to remain in the ship until after that date; and, if so, why the ship's company cannot be relieved at their proper date?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: The recommissioning of the "Minotaur" has been postponed for six months for reasons which appeared to the Admiralty adequate, and generally for the convenience of the Service. The period of two years for the length of a commission is not a rigid one, and is constantly varied to meet Service requirements.

    ROYAL NAVAL MUSEUM, GREENWICH.
    Lord CHARLES BERESFORDasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the Admiralty have given orders to dismantle Greenwich Museum; whether they are going to distribute its contents between the various naval and marine establishments; whether they are acting ultra vires,, as they are only tenants of these buildings, seeing that the Greenwich Hospital trustees are the owners; and whether he is aware that the museum was formed by His Majesty King William IV. before the Admiralty took over the building?
    The CIVIL LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Lambert): I can only refer the Noble Lord to the answer given yesterday by my right hon. Friend the First Lord to the hon. Member for Canterbury.

    CANADIAN SHIPS.
    Mr. FREDERICK HALL (Dulwich)asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he adheres to the statement made by him last year that the three ships provisionally promised by the Canadian Government as a contribution to the Imperial Navy were absolutely necessary for whole world defence; in what respect, if any, the circumstances which justified the statement at the time have altered since; and whether, had the Canadian Parliament endorsed the proposed contribution, the Naval Estimates for next year would have contained provision for the same number of ships as in fact estimated for?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: I have nothing to add to the full statement I made to the House on Tuesday, the 17th March.
    Mr. F. HALL: Is the House to understand that these ships are necessary?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: I have nothing to add to the full statement which I made on Tuesday, the 17th March.
    Mr. F. HALL: On an important matter like this, can I not ask the First Lord of the Admiralty to give a definite reply to, my question?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: I have nothing to add to the full statement which I made on Tuesday, the 17th March.

    "DREADNOUGHTS" (COMPARATIVE STATISTICS).
    Mr. ARTHUR LEEasked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will state the number and names of completed ships of the "Dreadnought" type that Great Britain will have in Home waters on the 1st of July, 1914, on the 1st of July, 1915, and on the 1st of July, 1916; and the, number and names of completed ships of the "Dreadnought" type that will be possessed by Germany, Austria, and Italy, respectively, at the same dates?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: I must refer the hon. Member to the Return standing in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for North St. Pancras for the numbers and names of completed "Dreadnoughts." The number which will be in Home waters on the dates mentioned will depend on circumstances.
    Mr. LEE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Return in question gives no indication as to the dates of completion of ships, and therefore does not give the information which I desire? Further, is he aware that I am only asking him to bring up to date the information which he gave in answer to a question by my Noble Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Lord C. Beresford) a year ago? May I also ask on what grounds he has given similar information to an hon. Member sitting behind him, the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for War (Mr. G. P. Collins), whilst refusing to give that information to one sitting on this side of the House?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: It is certainly not my desire to discriminate at all between Members on this side and Members of the other side of the House. If the hon. Gentleman will furnish me with the question and

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    answer of my hon. Friend who sits behind me I will compare them with his question, and see whether it is proper and fitting that similar information should be given him. I make no distinction in that matter at all. With regard to the general question, I must in the main assert the sufficiency of the documents circulated in the regular course by Return to the House for dealing with the progress of foreign fleets. I supplement that to as full an extent as possible from time to time when statements on the Navy Estimates are made. When the time comes for a further statement on the Navy Estimates I will deal fully with the topic in which the hon. Member very properly takes an interest.
    Mr. LEE: Has the right hon. Gentleman any objection to bringing up to date the information which he afforded last year in answer to a precisely similar question, in order that we may have the facts before us prior to the Debate?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: I have some objection to committing myself to the dates when ships will be finished. Sometimes, if I take a sanguine view, it is found to be falsified; if, on the other hand, I indicate that certain delays have occurred, it gives more information to foreign countries about the progress of our ship-building than we are able to obtain from any foreign parliament with regard to their progress.

    Hague Conference.
    Mr. GORDON HARVEYasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he can make any further statement with regard to the next Hague Conference; and whether any steps have yet been taken to nominate a British committee to consider proposals to lay before the conference?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Acland): The position at present is that a reply is being given to the proposal of the Government of the United States of America to which I referred in the answer to the hon. Member for the Blackfriars Division of Glasgow on the 23rd of last month. This reply is generally favourable to their suggestion as to the preparation of the programme of the conference. But, as it is understood that other suggestions on the same subject may shortly be made, His Majesty's Government have not at this stage come to any final decision as to the composition of the body to which this work
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    should be entrusted. With regard to the second part of the question, a definite scheme for setting up a national committee at an early date is under consideration.
    Mr. BARNES: Has the Government taken into consideration, or are they willing to take into consideration, the question of popular representation, or representation of organised labour, on the national committee?
    Mr. ACLAND: I do not know if it has been considered, but we shall be very glad to consider anything the hon. Member may put to the committee.

    Gilbert Islands (Phosphate Monopoly).
    Mr. HIGHAMasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will state what is the rate of royalty paid by the owners of the phosphate monopoly in the Gilbert Islands; what amount was yielded by it in the last completed year, and when that rate was fixed; and, in view of the poverty of the natives and the direct taxation levied upon them, whether he can see his way to increase the royalty levied upon so profitable an industry?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for the COLONIES (Mr. Harcourt): The royalty fixed in 1901 was 6d. a ton, but it has been raised to 1s. a ton as from 1st July, 1912. The amount received by the Protectorate Government during the financial year ending 30th June, 1913, was £4,423, based on the old 6d. rate, and £4,743 has since been paid in respect of the same financial year on account of the additional royalty. I cannot admit that the taxation of the natives is excessive.

    Nigeria.
    Colonel WILLIAMSasked what steps are being taken by the authorities of Nigeria to prevent the carriage of spirits by Government railways up to points so close to the boundaries of Northern Nigeria as to make the smuggling of spirits into that prohibitory area a matter comparatively easy to accomplish?
    Mr. HARCOURT: The carriage of trade spirits by the Nigerian railway is prohibited beyond Ikirum, and recently through rates on such spirits beyond Ibaden have been abolished, and local rates between Ibadan and Ikirum have been raised to 50 per cent, over the highest class rates.
    Sir GILBERT PARKERasked on what grounds Mr. Willoughby Osborne, some time Chief Justice of Southern Nigeria, was relieved of his duties; whether he has been given another appointment; and if so, what?
    Mr. HARCOURT: On the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria the two Supreme Courts were to be replaced by one, and Sir Edwin Speed (hitherto Chief Justice of Northern Nigeria) having been selected for the post of Chief Justice of the new Supreme Court, it became necessary to retire the other Chief Justice (Mr. Osborne) on pension. I have not, so far, been able to offer Mr. Willoughby Osborne another appointment.
    Sir G. PARKER: May I assume from that reply that it is the intention, if possible, to give Mr. Osborne another appointment?
    Mr. HARCOURT: It would perhaps be unfair to express an intention that I might not be able to fulfil; but it is certainly my hope that I may be able to do so.

    Somaliland.
    Colonel YATEasked whether the posts at Sheikh and Burao, in Somaliland, are now occupied by British garrisons; and, if so, in what strength?
    Mr. HARCOURT: According to my latest information there were 350 camel constabulary and 200 Indian contingent at Sheikh, but one company of the constabulary has been called in by the Commissioner to Berbera in consequence of the recent Dervish raid. There is no garrison at Burao.
    Colonel YATEasked what is the strength and composition of the present garrison of Berbera; whether the official quarter only is defended; whether the water supply of that quarter can be easily cut, and whether the native town, which is three-quarters of a mile distant, is practically undefended; and what steps it is proposed to take to protect the supply and to prevent the native town being harried by further raids?
    Mr. HARCOURT: The present garrison consists of 260 Carnatic Infantry, with one company of the Camel Corps. I have no knowledge of the actual disposition of the troops in the town itself, but, in order to minimise the possibility of a recurrence
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    of a raid, outposts are being established at suitable places in the neighbourhood, and steps are being taken to obtain 200 additional troops from Aden, pending the arrival of the new draft of 200 men for the Indian Contingent, which is due within two months.

    Government of East Africa (Nairobi).
    Mr. DENISON-PENDERasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has received any complaints of changes introduced by the Government of East Africa in the official town-planning arrangements for Nairobi whereby settlers were induced to build on sites near public buildings, which were afterwards erected elsewhere?
    Mr. HARCOURT: I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave to the hon. Member for Brentford on the 18th of March. I have received no other complaints.

    Australia (Marriages with Foreigners).
    Mr. TOUCHEasked whether, under any recent legislation in Australia, a woman retains her nationality even when she marries a foreigner?
    Mr. HARCOURT: I am not aware of any such legislation.

    Parliamentary Vote (Soldiers).
    Mr. DOUGLAS HALLasked the Secretary of State for War whether, in view of the possibility of a General Election, he will take steps to see that troops are not removed, as frequently has happened heretofore, from one constituency to another in such a way as to make it impossible or difficult for soldiers who have the Parliamentary vote to record it in the constituencies in which they are qualified to vote?
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the WAR OFFICE (Mr. Harold Baker): Moves of troops are arranged some time in advance on a definite programme fixed to meet military requirements, and I cannot undertake to modify such arrangements to meet circumstances that cannot always be foreseen.
    Mr. DOUGLAS HALL: Arising out of that question, may I ask the hon. Gentleman if he is now Secretary of State for War?

  BRITISH ARMY.

    FIELD GUNS.
    Mr. JOYNSON-HICKSasked the Secretary of State for War whether the figures in the official Field Service Pocket Book, 1913, page 245, giving the range of the French field gun at 9,000 yards, Austrian 6,800 yards, Krupp 6,600 yards, and Sweden 7,650 yards, are correct; and, if so, how do they compare with the range of the British field gun?
    Mr. BAKER: I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply I gave yesterday to a question put to me by the hon. and gallant Member for the Andover Division.
    Mr. JOYNSON-HICKS: Does the hon. Gentleman know that that reply in no way answers the question on the Paper, and will the hon. Gentleman find out the reply and let the House have it in due course?
    Mr. BAKER: I do not agree with the hon. Member. I think it is an answer.

    ROYAL FLYING CORPS.
    Mr. ORMSBY-GOREasked the Secretary of State for War whether he can now give an answer with regard to the stoppage of flying pay due to an officer who recently had an accident at the Royal Flying School, about which he is inquiring into?
    Mr. BAKER: Flying pay automatically stops after a certain period of leave and sick leave. The question of a gratuity or pension would depend upon the report of a medical board as to the degree of the officer's injury. In the case in question this point has not yet been determined, but the officer will receive every consideration compatible with the regulations, and will not suffer by any deferring of the decision as to whether he should be entitled to gratuity.
    Mr. LEE: Are we really to understand that when an officer of the Royal Flying Corps is injured in the discharge of his duties of flying that his flying pay is stopped at once?
    Mr. BAKER: Only after a certain period.
    Mr. LEE: Is the pay stopped for any period if he is still disabled by an accident met with in the discharge of his duty?
    Mr. BAKER: The question of pension and gratuity comes in.
    Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the flying pay of this officer was stopped from the very day that the accident took place, 3rd February, and continued stopped during February and March?
    Mr. BAKER: I will make inquiries into that, but I hardly think that is so.

    QUARTERS AT FARNBOROUGH.
    Mr. SALTERasked the Secretary of State for War when he proposes to begin the cottage building at Farnborough for which he is taking £10,000 in this year's Estimates; and how many he expects to build?
    Mr. BAKER: It is intended to obtain tenders as soon as possible after 1st April. There will be forty-five quarters.

    BOYS' BRIGADES AND SCOUTS (CAMPS).
    Lord C. BERESFORDasked the Secretary of State for War whether application was made for a boys' camp to be held at Portsdown Hill, near Fort Purbrook, from 10th April till 13th April; if so, whether by the regulations an agreement has to be prepared, and a charge of 1s. a day for every twenty-five boys or under made; whether 1s. is charged for an Inland Revenue stamp on the agreement; and whether the Army Council can see their way to waive such charges when applications are made for the use of War Department land by Boys' Brigades and Boy Scout troops?
    Mr. BAKER: Inquiries are being made. I will communicate the result to the Noble Lord.

    MILITARY AND LABOUR DISPUTES.
    Mr. KELLAWAYasked on how many occasions the military have been called out in connection with labour disputes during the past seven years; whether any officers resigned in connection therewith; and, if so, how many?
    Mr. BAKER: During the last seven years there have been approximately twelve such occasions. I am not aware that any officers resigned.
    Mr. CROFT: Will the hon. Gentleman state how often the military were called out by the Unionist party in the previous Administration in riots?
    Mr. BAKER: I do not know.
    HON. MEMBERS: "Not once." "Never."

    DISCHARGED SOLDIERS (INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION).
    Mr. JOHN WARDasked the Secretary of State for War whether he has received the Report of Sir Edward Ward's Committee on the subject of the industrial education and employment of discharged soldiers; whether he can state the date on which the Report was signed; and for what purpose, if any, he is delaying the issue of the Report as a Parliamentary Paper?
    Mr. BAKER: This Report, which is dated 29th January last, has been received and, as has already been explained to the House, it is not intended to issue it until Sir Matthew Nathan's Committee, to which it has been referred, has made its Report.
    Mr. JOHN WARD: Are we to understand that the Committee is really purposely delaying this Report being issued—and understood—to the public and the Members of this House?
    Mr. BAKER: Oh no, not at all.

    NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS RECOMMENDED FOR COMMISSIONS.
    Mr. JOHN WARDasked the Secretary of State for War whether he can give the list of warrant officers and staff-sergeants in the Cavalry, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Army Service Corps, and Infantry who have been recommended by their officers for commission, and have been unable to secure such promotion?
    Mr. BAKER: If the hon. Member is referring to the operation of the new Regulations published on 1st January last, the answer is that only two candidates have expressed a desire to attend the first examination, which will shortly be held. There is every indication that a much larger number will present themselves at the October examination.
    Mr. J. WARD: Mr. Speaker, the hon. Member has not, as he will see, answered my question at all. It is not those who have expressed the desire to attend an examination that I asked for. What I asked for was the number of staff-sergeants and others who had been recommended by their commanding officers for a commission?
    Mr. BAKER: It was somewhat difficult to discover what the hon. Gentleman did want; but he might put another question down.

    Land Values (Inland Revenue v. G. M. Hunter).
    Mr. PRETYMANasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can now say whether the Commissioners of Inland Revenue will accept the judgment given by Mr. Justice Scrutton in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. G. M. Hunter?
    The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER (Mr. Lloyd George): I would refer the hon. Member to the reply on this subject which I gave him on Wednesday last.

    Mineral Rights Duty (Brine).
    Mr. PRETYMANasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer when the appeal to the Courts, mentioned by him in his reply in the House of Commons in June, 1912, as to the liability of brine to Mineral Rights Duty is likely to be heard; and whether, up to the present time, any Mineral Rights Duty has been demanded upon this mineral?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Delay has been caused by the necessity of selecting a typical area with regard to which the question of brine being a mineral within the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, could be raised as a clear issue. Such a selection has now been made, and it is hoped that the case will be ready for hearing in the next revenue paper. Mineral Rights Duty on brine has been demanded in certain cases where returns have been made.
    Mr. PRETYMAN: Does the Chancellor of the Exchequer really suggest to the House that it has taken two years to select the average, and is he aware that he answered me in June, 1912, to the effect that there was a question of legality, and that no duty had been collected pending the decision of the Court?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I accept the hon. Gentleman's statement, but I do not recollect it. The case is now being proceeded with.

    Royal Engineers (Post Office).
    Mr. DOUGLAS HALLasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Secretary of State for War and the Postmaster-General have recommended that the time spent by members of the Royal Engineers in the service of the Post Office

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    shall count for civil pension; whether the fact that this period does not count for civil pension prevents a number of expert postal telegraphists joining the Royal Engineers; whether, at the present moment, there is a shortage of telegraphists in the Royal Engineers; and if he can now see his way, in view of the fact that service with the Post Office does not count for military pension, to allow it to count for civil pension?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: The answer to the first three parts of the question is in the affirmative. I am unable to propose an alteration in the existing law under which service with the Colours cannot count for Civil superannuation, but arrangements are under consideration which, it is hoped, will remove the difficulty in this case in future.

  NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT.

    SECOND MATE'S CONTRIBUTIONS.
    Lord NINIAN CRICHTON-STUARTasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can state whether the contributions under the National Insurance Act paid by a second mate of a vessel are forfeited if the second mate, having a first mate's certificate, should temporarily act as first mate during a voyage?
    Mr. WEDGWOOD BENN (Lord of the Treasury): If the Noble Lord has in mind a specific case perhaps he will furnish me with particulars.

    CERTIFICATES OF EXEMPTION.
    Lord NINIAN CRICHTON-STUARTasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that Mr. J. Oliver Morgan, of Awelfryn, 8, Palace Avenue, Llanelly, has been threatened with compulsion as to the payment of his national health insurance contributions, although exempt; and what steps he proposes to take in the matter?
    Mr. BENN: My right hon. Friend is informed that the insured person referred to applied for the necessary certificate of exemption on the 15th January last, and that the certificate was issued to him on the same day. I am making further inquiry into the circumstances of the case, and will communicate with the Noble Lord.

    EXCESSIVE SICKNESS AND DEFICIENCIES.
    Colonel BURNasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will say what has been the cost up to date of the inquiry of the Departmental Committee into excessive sickness and deficiencies under the National Insurance Act?
    Mr. BENN: The figure referred to is approximately £1,800.
    Mr. ORMSBY-GOREasked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury how much it would cost to make an inquiry into the question of excessive sickness and deficiencies in Wales under the National Insurance Act similar to that which is being made in England and Scotland; and whether he will consider the desirability of the conditions in Wales in these respects not remaining unknown to the public?
    Mr. BENN: I am sending the hon. Member a copy of the terms of reference of the Sickness Benefit claims Committee, which are limited to England. Both the Scottish and the Welsh Insurance Commissioners are taking steps to obtain full information as to sickness benefit claims in those countries.
    Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: May I ask the hon. Member when the report of the Welsh Commission on this matter will be published?
    Mr. BENN: I should like notice of that question.
    Mr. WALTER GUINNESSasked whether the evidence given before the Departmental Committee on excessive sickness and deficiences under the National Insurance Act has yet been printed?
    Mr. BENN: In accordance with the usual practice the evidence referred to is being printed for the convenience of the Members of the Committee.
    Mr. W. GUINNESS: Will the evidence of the Departmental Committee be published?
    Mr. BENN: We shall consider that question when the evidence is complete.

    MEETINGS ON LICENSED PREMISES.
    Mr. ORMSBY-GOREasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will state why the Welsh Insurance Commissioners have forbidden friendly societies, which

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    are approved societies under the National Insurance Act, to conduct their meetings and business on licensed premises; whether he is aware of the resentment existing among friendly societies in Wales against this interference with their liberty and former custom; and why this interference is not made by the English Insurance Commissioners upon approved societies in England?
    Mr. BENN: The regulations referred to in the first part of the question were made with the unanimous approval of the Welsh Advisory Committee, on which approved societies operating in Wales are fully represented, and my right hon. Friend is not aware of any such general feeling among these societies as the hon. Member suggests. I have fully and frequently explained in the House why similar regulations have not been made in England.

    PANEL CHEMISTS.
    Mr. HAMILTONasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Government will guarantee the payment in full of the bills of panel chemists under the National Insurance Act for the year 1913?
    Mr. BENN: I would refer the hon. Member to the Prime Minister's reply to a similar question by the hon. Member for Salisbury on the 26th February.

    MEDICAL BENEFIT.
    Mr. F. HALLasked whether officers, apprentices, and sailors on British ships on long voyages are provided by the shipowners with medical attendance; whether it is compulsory for such persons to be insured; and, if so, what medical treatment do they obtain in return for their contributions to the national insurance funds?
    Mr. BENN: The answer to the first two questions is in the affirmative. As regards the last part of the question, insured persons in the mercantile marine are entitled to medical benefit in Great Britain in respect of any period during which the owner of the ship is not liable under the Merchant Shipping Acts to defray the expenses of medical attendance and medicine, and the contributions both of masters and men on foreign-going ships are reduced in consideration of the periods during which they do not require benefit under the Insurance Acts.
    Mr. F. HALL: May I ask the hon. Gentleman if it is not the fact that many of these sailing ships may have voyages of eighteen months before they get back again to this country, and if it is right that the men should have to pay their insurance contributions during that time, considering that they cannot possibly get any benefit?
    Mr. BENN: Their contributions are rated according to the benefits to which they are entitled and which they receive.
    Mr. F. HALL: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that sailors under these conditions have to pay as a rule about £1 2s. a year for which they cannot get any benefit?
    Mr. BENN: I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman that they cannot get any benefit.

    Swine Fever (Serum Treatment).
    Mr. STANIERasked the President of the Board of Agriculture whether the serum treatment on swine is carried out by the German Government to prevent swine fever; and, if so, to what extent, and if any results have been published?
    The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of AGRICULTURE (Mr. Runciman): I am informed that the answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. The second part therefore does not arise.
    Major HOPEasked the President of the Board of Agriculture whether, if the inspectors of the Board of Agriculture had delayed diagnosis of swine fever in the herd of pigs belonging to Mr. Stewart, of Burnrigg, Prestonpans, until such time as all the pigs had died from the disease, no compensation would have been payable to Mr. Stewart; and if he will state if there is any limit to the time which may elapse between first notification by an owner of disease in his herd and diagnosis by officials of the Board of Agriculture?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The nature of swine fever is such that animals may die of the disease without showing diagnostic symptoms; there is not, therefore, and cannot be, any certain limit to the time which may elapse between notification of suspected disease and diagnosis by the Board's inspectors.
    Major HOPE: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman, seeing the great amount of money and expense involved to the owners,

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    owing to the dilatoriness of the officials, he will see that inquiry is made and compensation given by the Board of Agriculture?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: I am afraid I cannot admit the hypothesis on which the question is put. I cannot admit that the Board's officers are dilatory.

    Tuberculin.
    Mr. STANIERasked the President of the Board of Agriculture whether the Board have published any information to the public regarding the standard of quality of tuberculin used for stock; and where the tuberculin can be procured?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: I may refer the hon. Member to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Departmental Committee on the Export of Live Stock, 1912 (Cd. 6032). The quality of tuberculin is not discussed in other publications of the Board. The Board are prepared to advise stock owners who inquire where tuberculin of good quality can be obtained.
    Mr. C. BATHURSTasked if, in the opinion of the expert advisers of the Board, it is advisable for stock owners to have their cattle tested for tuberculosis with any tuberculin other than that manufactured at the Pasteur Institute in Paris?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: I understand that reliable tuberculin may be obtained from other sources than from the Pasteur Institute in Paris.

    Delhi (New Capital).
    Mr. JOYNSON-HICKSasked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether the Secretary of State has received a unanimous resolution from the annual meeting of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce protesting against the excessive outlay of public funds on the new capital city at Delhi; and whether large funds will be needed during the next few years in furtherance of the industrial, commercial, and railway development of India?
    The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for INDIA (Mr. Charles Roberts): The answer to both parts of the question is in the affirmative. The Secretary of State sees no reason to apprehend that the requirements of industrial expansion in India will be hampered by the building of the new Imperial capital.
    Mr. JOYNSON-HICKSasked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether he can now state approximately what is to be the amount of money to be expended on the new capital city of Delhi?
    Mr. C. ROBERTS: The Secretary of State has learnt from the Viceroy that the estimates for the new capital, as approved by the Government of India, amount to £5,113,000. But, in addition to this, there is a provision of £1,000,000 as a reserve for unforeseen expenditure. The estimates include purchase of land, cost of buildings, and communications, water-supply, sewerage and drainage, parks and public improvements, electric light and power, and salaries and contingencies of various kinds.
    Mr. JOYNSON-HICKS: Does the Secretary of State not consider that these millions could be more advantageously expended in the development of the resources of India than in this experiment?
    Mr. C. ROBERTS: The Secretary of State considers that such expenditure is justified.

    Irish Agricultural Organisation Society.
    Mr. F. HALLasked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that the principal activity of the Agricultural Organisation Society is directed to the establishment of co-operative trading societies, the object of which is to divert into other channels the business now being done by private traders; and whether he will direct the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury so to revise the conditions attaching to the Grants to the Agricultural Organisation Society as to safeguard the interests of private traders in the application of these Grants, and will lay the amended conditions upon the Table of the House at an early date, or, in the alternative, will discontinue the Grants after the expiration of the present financial year?
    The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith): I am aware that the Agricultural Organisation Society is largely engaged in the organisation of co-operative societies of farmers for the purchase of agricultural requirements and disposal of produce; and the Grant made from the Development Fund to the society for that, among other purposes, is clearly covered by the words "organisation of co-operation" in Section

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    1 (1) (a) of the Development and Road Improvement Funds Act, 1909. So far as I am aware, the society does not give pecuniary assistance to the co-operative societies or organise or advise such societies for non-agricultural purposes. If, however, the hon. Member can show that the society is taking such steps, the question of an Amendment of the present conditions of Grant will be carefully considered.
    Mr. C. BATHURST: Is it not a fact that this is purely a propagandist body, and that as a result of its activity traders in rural districts are benefiting in consequence of the increasing circulation of money in their districts?

    South Africa (Deportation of Labour Leaders).
    Mr. KEIR HARDIEasked the Prime Minister whether he will invite the Law Officers of the Crown, when considering the constitutional rights that His Majesty's Government have of intervening in the case of the nine British subjects deported without trial by the South African Government, to consider that the Government is now inviting the co-operation of the Government of the United States in bringing to justice the alleged murderers of the late Mr. Benton, and of the Government of Portugal in connection with the arrest on Portuguese territory of Mr. Bowskill, and whether these precedents warrant representations being made to the South African Government in the case mentioned above?
    The PRIME MINISTER: We do not think it necessary to consult the Law Officers of the Crown. The cases cited do not appear to form precedents for guidance in the South African case.
    Lord HUGH CECIL: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether any steps have been taken or can be taken to represent to the South African Government how very widely the Indemnity Bill departs from the ordinary standards of civilised legislation in making it retrospective?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I must have notice of that.

    Diseases of Animals Acts.
    Mr. STANIERasked whether the Board will publish their Reports of proceedings under the Diseases of Animals Acts at an early date; and whether he is
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    aware that five months elapsed between the date the Report was submitted by the Secretary and the date when the Report was published?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: The Report was laid in dummy on the Table of the House yesterday, and I hope that copies will be available for the use of hon. Members next week. The publication of the Report last year was, as I explained to the House, unfortunately delayed by the long illness of the assistant secretary of the Animals Division, and of the chief veterinary officer of the Board.
    Mr. STANIER: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Permanent Secretary to the Board of Agriculture signed the document on the 7th of April, 1913, and it took from that date to the 7th of September, 1913, to publish it?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: I am not aware of those facts. I will inquire into them if the hon. Member wishes it.

    Worn-Out Horses.
    Mr. FELLasked if there are inspectors at London, Goole, and Southampton for the purpose of inspecting the worn-out horses now being shipped to ports in. France; and of the 500 horses exported last year were, in fact, so inspected?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: The answer to both parts of the question is in the affirmative.

    Johne's Disease.
    Mr. C. BATHURSTasked whether the Government workers at the Royal Veterinary College have modified the prescription of or, in the opinion of his expert advisers, in any way improved upon the vaccine which, as the result of the discoveries of Dr. F. W. Twort and Mr. G. L. Y. Ingram, was prepared two years ago for the diagnosis of Johne's disease, and, if so, in what respect; and whether he will consider the desirability of calling the test substance prepared at the college Johnein, after the discoverer of the bacillus, rather than Johnin, which conveys a wrong impression of its origin?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: I am advised that the question whether a reliable test agent for the diagnosis of Johne's disease has been discovered is still doubtful. The results of the investigation undertaken on behalf of the Board by the Royal Veterinary College will be published when the facts have

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    been sufficiently ascertained. The nomenclature of scientific discoveries is not under my control, but I will convey the hon. Gentleman's suggestion to the authors of the word "Johnin."
    Mr. C. BATHURST: In fairness to these two discoverers, will the right hon. Gentleman authorise the Government investigators to take these two gentlemen into their confidence?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: The position of those two gentlemen has often been discussed in this House, and I am afraid I can add nothing to the information already given.

    Eltham Palace.
    Mr. HINDSasked whether the dwelling-house and grounds adjoining Eltham Palace belong to the Crown; if so, what is the rent derived from the same; the date and duration of the lease; whether any portion of the palace now being restored at public expense, or any easement from same, are comprised in such lettings; if any arrangements are in contemplation for admitting the general public to view the palace; whether he will consider the desirability of terminating at the earliest opportunity the present letting of the house so as the better to enable this historic palace, and the moat and grounds surrounding it, to be enjoyed by the nation who are bearing the expense of the restoration; and what is the estimated total expenditure now being incurred in the restoration?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: The house and grounds adjoining the Eltham Palace Hall belong to the Crown, and with the hall itself are comprised in a lease granted in 1862 for a term that will expire at Michaelmas, 1919, at £140 per annum. The lessee is under obligation to allow the public to have access to the hall at reasonable times and he is not responsible for repairs to the hall. The future disposition of the premises on the expiration of the present lease will be considered in due course. The estimated total expenditure now being incurred in the restoration of the hall, the moat walls, and the approach bridge over the moat is about £6,000.

    Foot-and-Mouth Disease.
    Mr. FIELDasked whether any decision has been arrived at respecting the opening of certain British ports for Irish live stock coming from uninfected areas for immediate slaughter?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: I regret that I am not yet in a position to add anything to the answer which I gave to a similar question addressed to me by the hon. Member for North Monaghan on Monday last.
    Sir JOHN SPEARasked if the right hon. Gentleman can now give the full result of the researches of the Committee that went to India to investigate the nature of foot-and-mouth disease in cattle and to seek a remedy?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: I understand that the Report will be available shortly, but I regret that I cannot yet name a date.
    Mr. C. BATHURST: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that he gave me exactly the same reply a few weeks ago, and the Report has not been published yet?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: Yes, Sir. The preparation of the Report is not in my hands, and I have no control over it.

    Agricultural Education Conference.
    Mr. C. BATHURSTasked if, in view of the increasing importance of women's work in connection with agricultural and horticultural instruction, he will consider the advisability of placing a representative of Swanley Horticultural College, or some other collegiate institution for the education of women in rural industry, upon the reconstituted Agricultural Education Conference, or, alternatively, receive a deputation from the above college on the matter?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: I recognise the importance of providing adequate facilities for certain kinds of agricultural education for women, and it is proposed that this should be the first subject referred to the Agricultural Education Conference for consideration and report. I do not think it necessary to enlarge the constitution of the conference, which will, however, for the purposes of this first reference, be empowered to co-opt additional members. I have no doubt that a similar power will be given and exercised whenever subjects of special interest to women are under consideration.
    Mr. C. BATHURST: Do I understand that the additional members may be ladies?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: Certainly.

    House of commons (Ventilation).
    Mr. DOUGLAS HALLasked the hon. Member for St. George's-in-the-East, as representing the First Commissioner of Works, what is the annual cost of ventilating the House of Commons; and what is the number of officials employed in that duty, and the individual salary of each official?
    Mr. BENN: The total of Sub-head D, warming, ventilating, and lighting, for 1914–15 is £26,800, but it is impossible to apportion this sum between the different services concerned.

    Ancient Monuments (Inspectors' Report).
    Mr. CARR-GOMMasked whether the Report of the Inspector of Ancient Monuments for the year 1913 is published; and, if so, where it is obtainable?
    Mr. BENN: The report is obtainable from Messrs. Wyman, or through any book-seller, at the price of 6s.

    Horse Buying (Ireland).
    Mr. LARDNERasked the Vice-President of the Department of Agriculture (Ireland) what foreign Governments are in the habit of buying horses in Ireland; and how many horses were acquired by each of these Governments and by the British Government during the year 1913?
    Mr. T. W. RUSSELL (Vice-President of the Department of Agriculture, Ireland): The following statement shows, according to the returns received in the Department, the names of the foreign Governments who are in the habit of acquiring horses in Ireland, together with the number of horses exported on behalf of each during the year 1913:—

    Foreign Government.

    No. of Horses.

    Italy

    …

    …

    …

    2,092

    Belgium

    …

    …

    …

    1,355

    Netherlands

    …

    …

    …

    748

    Switzerland

    …

    …

    …

    642

    Greece

    …

    …

    …

    505

    France

    …

    …

    …

    497

    Germany

    …

    …

    …

    179

    Norway

    …

    …

    …

    6

    6,024

    The Department have no means of showing the numbers of horses acquired in Ireland on behalf of the British Government.

    Coroners (New Regulations).
    Mr. HIGHAMasked the President of the Local Government Board what are the new Regulations which have been issued to coroners which make it necessary for the holding of inquests in every case where the deceased may not have been attended by a regular practitioner?
    The PRESIDENT of the LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (Mr. Herbert Samuel): No Regulations have been issued to coroners. The Regulations recently issued to registrars of births and deaths do not have the effect suggested, or in any way diminish the discretion of the coroner as to whether an inquest is or is not necessary.
    Mr. HIGHAM: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the coroner at Halifax intimated that in consequence of these Regulations he has no option but to hold an inquest in every such case?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: No, Sir, I am not aware of it.
    Mr. HIGHAM: I will send the right hon. Gentleman a report

    Bathing Regulations (Poor Law Institutions).
    Mr. HILLSasked whether the right hon. Gentleman will draw up model Regulations for bathing healthy inmates in workhouses; whether the Regulations for bathing lunatics and idiots in workhouses framed by the Lunacy Commissioners, and recommended by the Poor Law Board in a circular of 1870, are suspended by the new Order; whether under the new Order the Codes for bathing lunatics, idiots, and infants will require the approval of neither the Local Government Board, nor of the Lunacy Commissioners, nor of the guardians, nor will even be sent to the Local Government Board for examination; and whether he will make an amending Order providing for the express approval of the Local Government Board both to the Regulations and Codes?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: The Regulations framed by the Lunacy Commissioners in 1870, to which the hon. Member refers, were never binding upon Poor Law guardians. They were only recommended for their consideration, and a similar recommendation is included in the circular which accompanied the new Order. The Regulations referred to are not suspended by the new Order. As I

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    pointed out in the answer which I gave the hon. Member on the 16th instant, the bathing of sick persons, lunatics, and infants will under the new Order be subject to the directions of the medical officer who is responsible for their care and treatment. If new Regulations are made by the guardians they will be sent to the Local Government Board, and may be disallowed by the Board. All those Regulations which have so far been submitted under the provisions of the new Order either reproduce or improve upon the recommendations contained in the Minute of 1886. In the circumstances I see no reason for taking the course suggested in the question.

    Tuberculous Cows.
    Mr. ASTORasked whether local authorities have power to seize tuberculous cows exposed for sale for food purposes, but have no power to seize tuberculous cows supplying milk for human consumption; and whether he will say why the Local Government Board regard tuberculous milk as less dangerous to human beings than tuberculous meat?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: The hon. Member is under a misapprehension. Under the Tuberculosis Order issued in 1913 by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, the local authorities have power to cause a cow giving tuberculous milk to be seized and slaughtered.

    Manchester and Salford Housing Reform Committee.
    Mr. MONTAGUE BARLOWasked whether he has had his attention called to the conference recently convened by the Manchester and Salford Housing Reform Committee for the purpose of calling public attention to the shortage of houses in the city and suburbs; whether he can give the facts as to the actual shortage of houses now existing; and whether he can suggest any method of dealing with the shortage?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the other part of the question the particulars received from Manchester in connection with the housing survey now being undertaken show an existing shortage of about 3,000 houses. I will communicate with the local authority on the subject. I have at present no information from Salford.

    Steamship "County of Devon" (Abandonment).
    Mr. MONTAGUE BARLOWasked the President of the Board of Trade whether the circumstances of the abandonment in the North Atlantic of the steamer. "County of Devon" have been brought to his notice; whether at the time the vessel was carrying a heavy deck load of timber; whether the carrying of a deck load of this nature to ports in the United Kingdom is forbidden at this time of the year; whether any of the crew were washed overboard or injured; whether the vessel sustained serious structural damage through the carrying away of her deck load; and whether a Board of Trade inquiry is to be held in this case?
    The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of TRADE (Mr. Burns): The Board of Trade have received reports as to the abandonment of the s.s. "County of Devon" while on a voyage to Rotterdam, and from these reports it appears that the vessel was at the time carrying a deck load of heavy timber. Deck loads of this nature may not be brought to the United Kingdom during the winter months. The master and some members of the crew are reported to have been injured; and the vessel is stated to have received serious structural damage through the deck load going overboard. A formal investigation has been ordered.

    Merchant Vessels (Alien Ownership).
    Mr. MONTAGUE BARLOWasked whether he has made further inquiries into the cases of the steamers "Ranzani," "Florence," "Bodo," and "Tasso," which, though flying the British flag, have been manned by crews wholly composed of aliens and alleged to be of alien ownership; whether he is in a position to give any further information respecting these cases; and whether any steps are being taken in preventing colourable British ownership in the case of merchant vessels?
    Mr. BURNS: Two of the vessels mentioned in the question, the "Ranzani" and the "Florence" are no longer registered British vessels. The "Tasso," which is still registered as a British ship, opened an agreement at Piraeus in August last and the crew were then of foreign nationality. I have no information as to the manning of the "Bodo," which is

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    registered at Nassau. Where there is doubt as to the title of a ship to be registered as a British ship, the case can be inquired into under Section 51 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1906.
    Mr. M. BARLOW: Can the right hon. Gentleman say when the "Ranzani" and the "Florence" ceased to be British ships?
    Mr. BURNS: No, but I shall be happy to give the hon. Member the dates.

    Sorting Clerks and Telegraphists (Salaries).
    Mr. DOUGLAS HALLasked the Postmaster-General if he is aware that many sorting clerks and telegraphists who are in receipt of the maximum salary of their grade earn more than would be paid to them if promoted to be overseers; and if, under the recommendations of the Holt Committee, this condition of affairs is made more common, and promotion to the overseers' class will entail a loss of income to many of the officers promoted?
    The POSTMASTER-GENERAL (Mr. Hobhouse): It is the case that at the maximum of the sorting clerk and telegraphist scale the total emoluments of a sorting clerk and telegraphist who chooses to work much overtime, not infrequently exceed the minimum (without overtime) of the overseers' scale. The Holt Committee's recommendations will have the tendency which the hon. Member suggests.

    Post Office Employés (Holt Committee's Recommendations).
    Lord NINIAN CRICHTON-STUARTasked how the sum of £85,120, the estimated cost in the immediate changes in pay for sorting clerks and telegraphists under the Holt Committee's recommendations, is arrived at, having regard to the fact that the principal recommendations affect only the maximum pay of the male sorting clerks and telegraphists, of whom not more than 30 per cent. are in receipt of the maximum pay?
    Mr. HOBHOUSE: My right hon. Friend regrets that he is not yet in a position to furnish the particulars asked for by the Noble Lord, as certain of the proposals with regard to the pay and conditions of service of sorting clerks and telegraphists arising out of the Holt Committee's recommendations are still under discussion with the Treasury.

    Motor Traffic (Dogs Killed, Metropolitan Area).
    Mr. C. BATHURSTasked the Home Secretary how many dogs were killed and injured by motor traffic within the Metropolitan area in 1913?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. McKenna): This information is not available, and could not be obtained with any approach to accuracy.

    Shops Act.
    Mr. F. HALLasked if complaints have been received from a number of small traders as to the injurious effect upon their interests of the compulsory closing provisions of the Shops Act; if, in particular, complaint has been made of the injustice of allowing certain businesses, such as tobacconists and confectioners, to remain open, while others of an equally necessary class have to close; and if the Government propose to introduce amending legislation to deal with the matter?
    Mr. McKENNA: Some representations have been received from small traders as to the effect of the weekly half-holiday provisions, but except in one or two cases no complaint has been made in regard to the exemption allowed to the trades specified in the Second Schedule. I have no reason to think that there is any general dissatisfaction among small traders, and I do not contemplate the introduction of any amending legislation at present.
    Mr. F. HALL: Is it not a fact that Members of the Government have admitted the harshness of this Act, and have stated that it is only the want of time which precludes bringing in an amending Bill?
    Mr. McKENNA: The statements have not been brought to my notice.
    Mr. F. HALL: I shall have pleasure in bringing them to the notice of the right hon. Gentleman.

    Telephone Service.
    Mr. GOLDMANasked the Prime Minister whether the Government will give a day for the discussion of the administration of the telephone service; or whether, in the alternative, he will give two days for the discussion of the Post Office Estimates?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: My right hon. Friend, who has asked me to answer this question, will bear the hon. Member's suggestion in mind.
    Mr. GOLDMAN: Will the right hon. Gentleman at least give us one day clear to the Post Office Vote, having regard to the fact that last year we only got half a day?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I will convey that suggestion to my right hon. Friend.
    Sir G. PARKER: Will he also convey to the Prime Minister the expressed desire of hon. Members to have a day for the discussion of the grievances of the Post Office staff?

GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND BILL.
  ARMY COUNCIL AND TROOPS: OFFICIAL PAPERS PRESENTED.

    MOVEMENT OF WARSHIPS.
    Mr. HAYES FISHERasked the Secretary of State for War (1) whether the new conditions as to war service involving the disappearance of officers according to their domicile have yet been published in any Army orders; whether the domicile of every officer serving in Ireland has been or will be shortly ascertained; (2) whether he will state to the House what were the consequential and supplementary movements indicated by General Sir Arthur Paget when he interrogated certain officers as to their willingness to proceed to Ulster; and (3) whether an order was issued to the officers at the Curragh to the effect that they would be given twenty-four hours in which to decide whether they would be prepared to proceed to Ulster; whether it was intimated to them that if they refused they would be dismissed from the Army; whether this order was issued with the knowledge and approval of the members of the Army Council?
    Mr. JOYNSON-HICKSasked whether the order to General Gough to return to duty or any memorandum of such order was committed to writing; and, if so, will he communicate it to the House?
    Mr. BAKER: My right hon. Friend will have an opportunity of replying to these questions in the course of the Debate this afternoon.
    Mr. HAYES FISHER: At the same time, can the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War, looking to the fact that the Prime Minister has endorsed this new rule of service in the Army, see also that the domicile of non-commissioned officers and privates is also ascertained beforehand?
    Major WHITEasked the cost of the movement of troops into Ulster during the last ten days; and on what Vote the expenses of these movements will appear?
    Mr. BAKER: The cost of the movement of troops falls upon Vote 6. It is impossible at present to state the expense due to the movements to which the hon. and gallant Member refers.
    Major WHITE: On what Vote will this be borne?
    Mr. BAKER: Vote 6.
    Major WHITE: Will the hon. Gentleman ask the Secretary of State for War, in view of the fact that these movements and this expense have been incurred for purely party purposes, consider the desirability of their being paid out of the Liberal party funds?
    Mr. JOYNSON-HICKSasked the Prime Minister whether the instructions given to General Sir A. Paget, prior to his interview with the officers of the Cavalry brigade in Dublin, were submitted to him; and, if so, were they in writing?
    The PRIME MINISTER: The answer is in the negative.
    Mr. JOYNSON-HICKS: May I ask the Prime Minister whether the White Paper includes all the documents he specifically promised yesterday respecting the Memoranda of the Secretary of State for War, or the Chief of the General Staff, as to oral instructions given to General Sir Arthur Paget, and which must have been given, and which are in existence, and in regard to which the Prime Minister answered yesterday "Yes," and said it would be published? —
    The PRIME MINISTER: If they were in existence, certainly.
    Mr. JOYNSON-HICKS: I beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon. He promised yesterday he would give that statement in the White Paper. May I ask why it was not published?—
    The PRIME MINISTER: They were oral instructions.
    Mr. JOYNSON-HICKS: I beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon. May I read the question? [HON. MEMBERS: "No!" "Order, order!"]
    Sir GILBERT PARKER: Are we to assume that the memoranda of these con-

    377
    versations, instructions, or orders were not preserved when given orally?
    Mr. GOULDING: Another debt of honour!
    Mr. BUTCHER: May I ask whether these instructions were submitted to the Army Council before they were issued to Sir Arthur Paget?
    The PRIME MINISTER: No, Sir, as far as I know.
    Sir HENRY CRAIKasked the Prime Minister if he is willing to appoint a Commission to draft a scheme of devolution applicable to all parts of the United Kingdom, on the understanding that, until such scheme, modified as may seem fit, has been adopted by the Imperial Parliament, those counties of Ulster which desire it shall remain outside the scope of the Government of Ireland Bill now before the House?
    The PRIME MINISTER: This is a matter which can be more suitably dealt with in the Debate on the Second Reading of the Government of Ireland Bill next week. I would also refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave yesterday to my hon. Friend the Member for East Aberdeenshire.
    Mr. F. HALLasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland over how long a period has information been obtained by the Government as to the organisation and development of the Ulster Volunteer Force; and what was the first occasion on which the attention of the War Office was called to the matter and information furnished to it, so as to enable any necessary plans to be devised for meeting by force the opposition of Ulster to Home Rule?
    The CHIEF SECRETARY for IRELAND (Mr. Birrell): The Irish Government has been informed of the progress of this movement since its inception. The War Office has also had from the beginning its own sources of information.
    Lord CHARLES BERESFORD: I desire to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty a question of which I have given him private notice: Whether a battle squadron was ordered to proceed home with dispatch from Spanish waters; whether the order was cancelled by wireless one night during the passage home of this squadron; whether a flotilla of destroyers was ordered to proceed with dispatch to Lamlash or the North of Ireland; whether the
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    order was cancelled by wireless during the passage of these vessels to their destination; whether His Majesty's ship "King Edward VII." and her sister ships were ordered to embark field guns; whether these orders were subsequently cancelled; whether he will state to the House what was the emergency which necessitated these orders being given; whether he will state to the House why the orders were countermanded; and whether the orders were given originally by the Board of Admiralty as a Board or by his own authority?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: It was decided a fortnight ago by the Cabinet that a naval force comprising a Battle Squadron with attendant vessels should be stationed at Lamlash, which is a convenient and usual station for them to conduct their exercises from, and where they would be in proximity to the coasts of Ireland in case of serious disorders occurring. On Saturday night, when it was clear that the precautionary movements of troops to the various depots had been carried out without opposition, it was decided that this movement could be delayed until the Easter leave period was over. If the House is interested in the subject, I will read the telegraphic orders by which these movements were effected:—
    Copy of telegram from the Admiralty to the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Third Battle Squadron, dated 19th March, 1914:—
    "Send 'Britannia' to Gibraltar and proceed at once with remainder of squadron at ordinary speed to Lamlash. After clearing Ushant, you are yourself to proceed in your flagship to Plymouth, handing over command of squadron temporarily to the Rear-Admiral. From Plymouth you are to come to London and report yourself at the Admiralty, subsequently rejoining the squadron overland at Lamlash, whither your flagship is to proceed in the interval. Report time you expect to arrive in London."
    Copy of telegram of Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, H.M.S. "Iron Duke," dated 20th March, 1914:—
    "The Vice-Admiral, Third Battle Squadron, has been ordered to proceed with his squadron to Lamlash. Two divisions of the Fourth Flotilla are to join the squadron at Lamlash on Monday, 23rd March, and follow temporarily orders of Vice-Admiral."
    These orders, which is the point in the question, were issued in the regular way by the Board of Admiralty on the direction of the Executive Government. I have inquired about the field guns, as to which the Admiralty gave no instructions, and I find that the Vice-Admiral asked for them for exercising his men on shore at Lamlash if the weather was bad.
    Mr. HAMAR GREENWOOD: Arising out of the answer, I beg to ask the right hon. Gentleman how it is that these official and secret orders got literally into the hands of the Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth?
    Lord C. BERESFORD: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman for an answer to the question why these orders were suddenly countermanded?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: I have said that when it was found that the precautionary movements of the military in Ireland had been effected without opposition from the army of 100,000 which has been raised to resist the authority of the Crown and Parliament—[Interruption].
    Mr. SPEAKER: I would ask the hon. Member for Denbigh Boroughs (Mr. Ormsby-Gore) to restrain himself.
    Mr. CHURCHILL: Then it was decided that the movements could be suspended until after the Easter leave has been completed.
    Lord C. BERESFORD: Am I in order in answering the question of the hon. Gentleman opposite? It is a personal matter.
    Mr. SPEAKER: The Noble Lord is entitled to give an explanation.
    Lord C. BERESFORD: I should like to give an explanation. This is a very serious charge. The information of which I asked for corroboration from the First Lord was got by me from the public Press. It is really a question of my honour. It is a repetition of what the First Lord once before charged against me—that I was a sneak and a skulk, and that I went upstairs to get my information. I will tell the House that I have had no information on the question of the movements of the Fleet, although I have had a great deal of information on the question of what the officers and men intend, under certain circumstances, which affect their conscience and their honour. I have had no information from any officer or man in the Fleet as to the movements of the Fleet mentioned in the question I asked just now.
    Sir G. PARKER: May I ask if we are not right in interpreting the right hon. Gentleman's answer to mean that a squadron was ordered to Lamlash primarily not for the Easter manœuvres but for the purpose of supporting any military operations in Ulster? [An HON. MEMBER: "He said so."]
    Mr. AMERY: Will the right hon. Gentleman state whether he expected and hoped that purely precautionary measures to look after stores would lead to fighting and bloodshed?
    Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member must form his own judgment upon what has transpired.
    Mr. CHURCHILL: As the question has been asked perhaps with your permission, Sir, and with that of the House, I may repudiate that hellish insinuation. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw."]
    Mr. SPEAKER: The First Lord of the Admiralty must see that that was hardly a proper epithet to apply. I hope he will see his way to withdraw it.
    Mr. CHURCHILL: With very great respect, Mr. Speaker, the hon. Member asked whether it was true I had hoped that these precautionary measures would lead to fighting and bloodshed. I have been in this House for fourteen years, and in that time I have never been asked from the Chair to withdraw any expression which I have used, although I have been in many stormy Parliamentary scenes. Of course, if you say the epithet "hellish"—although appropriate to the fact—[HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw"]—if you say that that expression is in the circumstances not within the limits which are tolerated in free debate, and cannot be permitted, then I must regretfully, but with respect, bow to your ruling. But I earnestly trust, Sir, you will permit it to be used.
    Mr. SPEAKER: The First Lord must see that I could not permit an expression of that sort to be used. Whatever indignation the First Lord may feel at the suggestion made, I think on reflection he will see that it would be impossible to permit an expression of that sort to pass.
    Mr. CHURCHILL: After your ruling, Sir, and the expressions with which it is accompanied, I withdraw the expression "hellish."
    Sir J. WALTON: Will you allow the suggestion and the insinuation which was made to remain?
    Mr. SPEAKER: My duty is to see that Parliamentary language is used. I regret very much the suggestions which are thrown across the floor—I will not say from one side but from both sides—in this rather exciting time. My duty is, as I conceive, to see that the language used is

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    proper Parliamentary language. It is obvious that language of the sort which has been used under what I would call very provocative circumstances, cannot be allowed to remain, because if a Minister of the Crown uses language of that sort, other Members will think that they are free to use similar language. I hope that this incident may now, at all events, be allowed to be considered closed.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: With reference to to-day's Debate, there is a suggestion I should like to make to the Prime Minister. It must be evident to everyone that there are many gaps in this Paper which require to be filled up before there can be adequate discussion of the subject. I shall only name one or two of the questions which I think must be answered, and as I understand that the Secretary for War is going to speak immediately afterwards, I shall be quite satisfied if he takes note of them and answers them in the course of his speech. First, is there any addition, as is reported in the Press, to the letter that was given to General Gough, and, if so, what are the terms of that addition? Another question is in reference to the promise given by the Prime Minister that the Memorandum of the verbal instructions given to General Paget would be included in the White Paper. They are not here, and I ask the Secretary for War to fulfil that pledge by reading them in the course of his speech. I wish to know, also, whether the War Office will now communicate the authentic version of Sir Arthur Paget's address which he himself gave to his commanding officers, and which was the cause of the resignations? The only other question I wish to ask now is whether or not the letter sent by General Gough on behalf of the officers was communicated to the War Office before they dismissed General Gough and the two colonels of the regiments?

STANDING ORDERS.
Resolutions reported from the Select Committee;
1. "That, in the case of the Metropolitan and Great Northern Railway Companies Bill, Petition for dispensing with Standing Order 128 in the case of the Petition of Holders of Ordinary and Preference Stocks in the Metropolitan Railway Company, the Standing Order ought to be dispensed with."
2. "That, in the case of the London County Council (Tramways and Improvements), Petition for Bill, the Standing Orders ought to be dispensed with:—That the parties be permitted to proceed with their Bill, on the condition that Tramways No. 1 and No. 3 are struck out of the Bill:—That the Committee on the Bill do report how far such Order has been complied with."
3. "That, in the case of the Butterley Company Bill [Lords], Petition for Bill, the Standing Orders ought to be dispensed with:—That the parties be permitted to proceed with their Bill."
4. "That, in case of the Hull and Barnsley Railway Bill [Lords], Petition for additional Provision, the Standing Orders ought to be dispensed with:—That the parties be permitted to insert their additional Provision if the Committee on the Bill think fit."
5. "That, in the case of the Newcastle-upon-Tyne Corporation, Petition for Bill, the Standing Orders ought to be dispensed with:—That the parties be permitted to proceed with their Bill, on condition that the consent of the Northumberland County Council is obtained to the construction of Tramway No. 2:—That the Committee on the Bill do report how far such Order has been complied with."
6. "That, in the case of the Edenbridge and District Gas Bill [Lords], Petition for Bill, the Standing Orders ought to be dispensed with:—That the parties be permitted to proceed with their Bill."
7. "That, in the case of the Yorkshire Electric Power Bill [Lords], Petition for Bill, the Standing Orders ought to be dispensed with:—That the parties be permitted to proceed with their Bill, on condition that Clauses 3 and 6 to 12 (inclusive) are struck out of the Bill:—That the Committee on the Bill do report how far such Order has been complied with."
Resolutions agreed to.

MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS.
That they have passed a Bill, intituled, "An Act to provide for the acquisition by tenants of Small Holdings in respect of which the rent received by county councils includes instalments of capital expenditure." [Small Holdings (Tenants Acquisition) Bill [Lords.]
CONSOLIDATION BILLS.
That they communicate that they have come to the following Resolution, namely:—That it is desirable that all Consolidation Bills in the present Session be referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament.
NOTICES OF MOTION.
  ROYAL NAVY (NEW CONSTRUCTION).
  To call attention upon this day two weeks to the operations of the Naval building ring, and to move a Resolution.—[Mr. Ramsay Macdonald.]
  EXPERIMENTS ON LIVING DOGS.
  To call attention upon this day two weeks to the undesirability of continuing experiments on living dogs, and to move a Resolution.—[Colonel Lockwood.]
  FOOD SUPPLIES IN WAR TIME.
  To call attention upon this day two weeks to the question of the grave problem of the provision of food supplies in time of war, and to move a Resolution.—[Captain Campbell.]
BILLS PRESENTED:
  MERCHANT SHIPPING (No. 2) BILL.
  "To amend the Law relating to the manning of Merchant Ships." Presented by Mr. BARNES; supported by Mr. T. P. O'Connor, Mr. Wilkie, Mr. Penry Williams, Mr. John Ward, Mr. Yeo, Mr. M'Ghee, and Mr. Charles Duncan; to be read a second time to-morrow, and to be printed. [Bill 139.]
  MIDWIVES (SCOTLAND) BILL.
  "To secure the better training of Midwives in Scotland, and to regulate their practice." Presented by Mr. BARNES; supported by Mr. Ainsworth, Mr. Arthur Henderson, Mr. Robert Harcourt, Mr. Duncan Millar, and Dr. Chapple; to be read a second time to-morrow, and to be printed. [Bill 140.]
  REGISTRATION BILL.
  "To shorten the period of qualification for and to facilitate the registration of persons entitled to vote at Parliamentary, municipal, and local government elections." Presented by Mr. GOLDMAN; to be read a second time upon Wednesday, 15th April, and to be printed. [Bill 141.]
  CHILDREN BILL.
  "To provide for the more effectual treatment and prevention of destitution and sickness among Children, and to regulate the hours and conditions of labour among Children." Presented by Mr. GOLD-STONE; supported by Mr. William Thorne, Mr. Jowett, Mr. Thomas Richardson, Mr. George Roberts, Mr. Snowden, and Mr. Stephen Walsh; to be read a second time to-morrow, and to be printed. [Bill 142.]
  POLICE (WEEKLY REST-DAY) (SCOTLAND) BILL.
  "To facilitate the grant to members of the constabulary in Scotland of one day's rest off duty in every seven." Presented by Mr. REMNANT; supported by Mr. Clyde, Mr. Mackinder, Sir Henry Dalziel Sir William Priestley, Mr. Touche, Major Archer-Shee, and Mr. George Roberts; to be read a second time upon Monday, 6th April, and to be printed. [Bill 143.]
  DEATH REGISTRATION AND BURIALS BILL.
  "To amend the Law relating to the Registration of Deaths and to Burials." Presented by Mr. RADFORD; to be read a second time upon Thursday, 2nd April, and to be printed. [Bill 144.]
  ENGINEMEN'S CERTIFICATE BILL.
  "To provide for the compulsory certification of locomotive engine-drivers and motormen on railways." Presented by Mr. THOMAS; supported by Mr. Hudson, Mr. Wardle, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, and Mr. Barnes; to be read a second time tomorrow, and to be printed. [Bill 145.]
  PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION BILL.
  "To provide for the Prevention of Corruption of Persons holding Office under the Crown." Presented by Mr. GRETTON; supported by Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. Norman Craig, Mr. Hewins, and Mr. James Hope; to be read a second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 146.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY.
  CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 1) BILL.

    COLONEL SEELY AND THE CABINET.
    Order for Second Reading read.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."
    The SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Colonel Seely): Mr. Speaker, in view of the statement which I shall feel it my duty to make at the conclusion of my speech, I beg to ask the indulgence of the House in explaining to them not only my knowledge of the facts connected with this correspondence, but also my personal share in this matter, and I shall hope to make the story as complete as I can, and I can assure the House and hon. Members in all quarters of the House that I hope to conceal nothing and to tell the whole story. If I may deal seriatim and as briefly as possible with the different points in the Memorandum, I will deal first with the meeting I had with the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief in December. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Adjutant-General represented to me that, owing to attempts which had been made in many quarters to subvert the discipline of the Army —I make no complaint on one side or the other for the moment—it was desirable that special steps should be taken in order to ensure that that discipline should be maintained. At their suggestion, I accordingly summoned the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief of the six commands in the United Kingdom, and I laid before them the document which is here printed. The General Officers Commanding-in-Chief accepted the statement that I had made to them, and promised me, naturally enough, that they would do their best to ensure that there was no indiscipline in the Army, and that if and when any officers should attempt to resign their commissions rather than obey a lawful order to support the civil power, that they would take the action which I had then informed them I had decided it was my duty to take. From that day until the recent occurrences—what we may call the Curragh incident—there has been no resignation of any Regular officer. Fourteen cases occurred of retired officers who wrote to the War Office saying that they must qualify their promise to serve on mobilisation. They were informed by the

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    Army Council that the Army Council could not accept any qualified service.
    I pass now to the second of the documents here printed. Owing to information received by the Government I considered it necessary to take special steps, as Secretary of State for War, to safeguard certain depots, namely, Omagh, Armagh, Enniskillen, and Carrickfergus, from the possibility of attack by evilly-disposed persons. I was then, and am now, aware that any such attempt would be discountenanced by the responsible leaders of the Ulster movement. Such was my information. But I also knew, from information placed before me, that there was a very real possibility that in the present disturbed state these very important places—here may I say that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour) has not per-haps quite realised how important a place a depot of army stores on mobilisation is—might be attacked. I therefore caused to be issued, in the name of the Army Council, who, of course, were fully cognisant of these movements, the necessary instructions which are contained in the second document, and I need hardly say, as has been stated by the Prime Minister, with the full authority of the Cabinet who had considered this matter. Sir Arthur Paget came over to London to discuss with us the best manner of carrying out these movements. [An HON. MEMBER: "What date?"] I cannot carry in my head the exact date, but it was a few days afterwards. It is not material to the point. It is after the 14th, and it would be about the following Wednesday or Thursday. I will verify it in the course of the Debate.
    Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: Was he summoned to come over?
    4.0 P.M.
    Colonel SEELY: He was summoned to come over, and so far as my recollection serves me he was anxious to come over in order to discuss it. That is not a material point. Obviously, he would be desirous to discuss this important movement of a precautionary nature, and we were anxious to discuss it with him. It appeared to us and to him that although these movements were of a purely precautionary character, there was a possibility that a state of excitement might be caused which would result in civil commotion in all parts of Ireland. We, therefore, took the necessary steps to support these movements. We did not, therefore, think it likely, but we thought it possible, and the General
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    Officer Commanding would have failed in his duty if he had not represented to me, as he did, that he must be quite certain that he would be able to safeguard these vital points from possible attack. I would ask the Leader of the Opposition if he would interrupt me if I fail to answer the questions he put to me, as they were given to me at such very short notice, and, therefore, I may miss them in the course of the statement I have to make. Sir Arthur Paget then returned to Dublin. The moves were carried out. There was no opposition or difficulty.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: One question I put was that the Memorandum to the Chief of the General Staff as to the oral instructions given to Sir Arthur Paget should be communicated to the House.
    Colonel SEELY: The Prime Minister has no recollection of making that statement.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: May I read it? I asked—
    "May I ask the Prime Minister whether the state went will include the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War to the Chief of the General Staff as to the oral instructions given to Sir Arthur Paget?
    The Prime Minister: Yes."
    The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith): That is the first Paper.
    Colonel SEELY: I think I can clear this up completely. I can assure the House I wish to tell them the whole story. With regard to the officer in question, the only instructions were those contained, as the Prime Minister says, in this Paper—the only instructions to me. All other instructions were, as they ought always to be, verbal instructions. With regard to the movements, there were no written instructions, but there were constant conferences between myself, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Adjutant-General and Sir Arthur Paget in regard to the movements which must be taken in the event of these attempts to safeguard, as we hoped successfully, Omagh, Armagh, Carrickfergus, Inniskillen and Dundalk, where the guns were, and in order that the movements to safeguard them should be adequately supported in the event of their being opposed. My answer to the right hon. Gentleman then is that there are no other written instructions to Sir Arthur Paget. So far as I know—in fact, I must know if it were so—I made no memorandum —and, indeed, it would be ridiculous that I should—of the consultations I have had with Sir Arthur Paget, together with the

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    Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Adjutant-General with regard to these movements. If there be such a memorandum it was not prepared by me, and if there be such a memorandum prepared by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, I am sure there is nothing to conceal about it. The situation is perfectly clear. We desired to safeguard those places, we desired to make sure that they were safeguarded, we were most anxious to avoid any chance of a collision. Sir Arthur Paget himself was most anxious to take any and every step to avoid any provocative action, and so informed me and so informed his officers. As I say, Sir Arthur Paget returned to Dublin. The movements were carried out and every order was punctually obeyed. The next matter which appears in these Papers is the telegram from Sir Arthur Paget, which is printed as the third of these documents, saying that the officer commanding the 5th Lancers, states that "All officers except two, and one doubtful, are resigning their commissions to-day. I much fear same conditions in 16th Lancers. Fear men will refuse to move."
    Mr. BONAR LAW: One question I asked was if the right hon. Gentleman would repeat to us the version given to him by Sir Arthur Paget of his instructions to his officers?
    Colonel SEELY: We have not got to that point yet. That is not in the sequence of time. I received on the evening of 20th March this telegram from Sir Arthur Paget. I summoned the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Adjutant-General to my house when I received it, and we dispatched the telegram that is printed below. In that telegram, as hon. Members will see, we stated that the senior officers should come at once to London, that they should be relieved of their command, and that officers were being sent to replace them. It appeared to us from the telegrams received—I think the House will agree it was likely that we should make that assumption—that these officers had deliberately defied the lawful order of Sir Arthur Paget and had defied his authority. The officers arrived in London, and with them came this document which is printed, the letter from General Gough to the head-quarters of the Irish command.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: Was that communicated by telegram?
    Colonel SEELY: No, it was not. I do not see how it could have been. It shows conclusively that there had been a complete and honest misapprehension of the statement made by Sir Arthur Paget to a meeting of officers which he held. I had better now state what Sir Arthur Paget himself says was the concluding portion of his statement to the officers, who consisted of the divisional generals, and the brigadier-generals in his command, except those who did not arrive because of the distance, for instance, the general at Cork. This is what he telegraphed last night to say was his recollection of the substance of what he said: "Sir Arthur Paget felt that the outcome of precautionary movements might be misinterpreted and lead to a situation demanding further action, and he felt that the time had come when he must ascertain upon what general officers and others he could rely."
    HON. MEMBERS: Is that all?
    Colonel SEELY: That is all I have obtained by telegraph from Sir Arthur Paget, and it is all I received last night by telegram from Sir Arthur Paget with reference to the statement by his military secretary to my private secretary. I hope the House will appreciate how difficult it is to keep pace with these rapid movements of telegrams and men, and will excuse us for not having printed this, seeing that it only arrived late last night. I have seen Sir Arthur Paget since that episode. I saw him the other night after the Debate—on Monday after the right hon. Gentleman spoke. I asked him if he could explain this complete discrepancy. Or may I put it this way, in order to make the House clearly understand what the discrepancy was in the mind of this General Officer Commanding and these officers? These officers believed that there was a plan to treat Ulster as an enemy's country, and to overwhelm her with a surprise attack. That was their honest belief, and that belief I imagine must have been largely fostered —I make no charge—by the wild rumours that flew about as we had foreseen they would, as a consequence of these moves, firstly: that 200 warrants were out to arrest all the leaders, of which there was not a shadow of foundation, which was published widely throughout the Press; and, secondly, that there was a secret movement to move instantly and disarm the-Ulster volunteers. There was not one

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    shadow of a shade of foundation for either of these suggestions. They never occurred to me, they never occurred to the Prime Minister, and they never occurred to any Member of the Cabinet. But we knew that directly we moved to safeguard these depots wild rumours would fly about, and that is the justification, and I submit the absolute justification, of my action as Secretary of State for War in accepting the suggestion of Sir Arthur Paget and of all competent soldiers, that we ought to be prepared for a state of disorder following upon these necessary movements. They believed that that was the intention. Sir Arthur Paget has informed me that he cannot understand how they could have obtained that impression from anything that he said, and he recounted to me—it is very difficult to state accurately hearsay evidence, but I will give it to the House as well as I can—he stated to me before he left that he had made it clear to the officers that these were precautionary movements, that they might have to be supported, that there was no intention whatever of taking the initiative, as General Gough thought, in suppressing Ulster, and that what was necessary was to secure that the movements should be carried out.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: I certainly do not want to interfere with the right hon. Gentleman's speech, but we wish to have it as clear as possible. The right hon. Gentleman heard the version of Sir Arthur Paget's address to his officers which I gave. Did he not take the precaution of asking Sir Arthur Paget to give him in writing, as well as he could remember, his account of what he actually had said. Now will he kindly explain the difficulty that has arisen with the officers, seeing they had written to Sir Arthur Paget that their whole difficulty was that they thought they were to be asked to engage in initiating operations against Ulster, if Sir Arthur Paget had stated to them that there was no such intention?
    Colonel SEELY: I will deal with both points. The first question is, Did I ask Sir Arthur Paget whether his letter, which the right hon. Gentleman read out, purporting to come from an officer who was present I think, formed an accurate version of what he said? Sir Arthur Paget had to return immediately to Ireland. I asked him whether that did represent accurately what he said. He told me, "No; it certainly did not." Parts of it, he said,
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    were not an inaccurate version of parts of what he said. I put it, as far as I can recollect, in the way he put it to me. But parts of it were obviously wholly inaccurate. What General Paget said was this, and I repeat it again. He told the officers, first, that the movement that had to be made was with the object of safeguarding these depots and Government property, and that it was necessary for him to make sure that he could support this movement. With regard to the phrase which the right hon. Gentleman says was used, "in a blaze," he told me hat he said there might be a blaze, certainly a blaze in the Press. I do not wish to strike any controversial note, for the moment is a very serious one to me, and I only wish to tell the whole story as completely as it can be told. The next point is this: The officers being here, are interviewed by the Adjutant-General. They explained to the Adjutant-General that they had no idea that they were only going to be asked to support the civil authority and to maintain law and order. Indeed, General Gough went so far as to say that had he been ordered to Belfast he would have gone without question. It was only because of a misapprehension he had obtained from something said making him think that there was to be some attack upon Ulster in order to crush her by force of arms before she was ready—I wish to be absolutely fair to all parties—that he sent this message which is here printed. The Adjutant-General, who is charged with the discipline of the Army under me, and under the highest authority, considered that the explanation of these officers was satisfactory.
    The Chief of the Imperial General Staff also interviewed General Gough. Those two high officers of the Army Council together brought General Gough to my room, where Sir Arthur Paget was present. I told General Gough that it was reported to me by the Adjutant-General and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that he was prepared to obey all lawful orders. He replied that he was prepared to obey all lawful orders. I said to him, "How has this difficulty arisen?" and he said, "Because we thought we were going to be asked to coerce Ulster, and that an immediate movement was to be made in which we were to take the initiative." "That, it would seem to me," said General Gough—I paraphrase his words; I could not take them down at the time— "that seemed to us to go outside of the lawful orders which

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    we are bound to obey." I then put to him the substance of what is printed at the conclusion of this document, and I would ask hon. Gentlemen to turn to it. I said to him, "It must be made clear that His Majesty's Government must retain their right to use all the Forces of the Crown in Ireland or elsewhere to maintain law and order, and to support the civil power in the ordinary execution of its duty." But I said to him, "With regard to your second question—well, it is quite clear that it is your duty to go anywhere in Ireland or elsewhere in support of the civil power whenever it is attacked. I can tell you clearly—since the situation already has been made irregular I think it proper to tell you clearly—that His Majesty's Government have no intention whatever to take advantage of the right to protect the civil power whenever attacked, or however attacked, in order to crush political opposition." In other words, I put it to him that they would not be expected to shoot down enough people who have shot nobody else in order to make the rest submit to a law of which they disapprove and I would ask my hon. Friends on this side, and in all quarters of the House, whether there is one man in this House who demurs to that statement? To this General Gough agreed, but he said, "There have been so many misunderstandings already, would it not be better that this clear statement should be put in writing to me?" I said to him—
    Mr. JOHN WARD: Did he dictate the letter?
    Colonel SEELY: I said to him, "I consider that it is not only desirable but necessary that we should have this in writing, and I propose to put it in writing." Now I must ask the indulgence of the House if I give them an account of my personal movements and actions which led up to the decision which I have felt obliged to take. After seeing General Gough I went to the Cabinet. I told them what I have now told the House, and I added that as I had not had time to draw up any statement of what I had said, I would ask the Adjutant-General to make a rough draft for me to consider. At one o'clock I had arranged to see His Majesty at Buckingham Palace to report to him how matters stood, and may I say here, Sir, that I think it proper to say that any suggestion which has been made outside—none has been made in. this
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    House—that His Majesty took any initiative of any kind in this matter is absolutely without foundation. A situation of grave peril to the Army had undoubtedly arisen, and I reported at frequent intervals to His Majesty, who is Head of the Army, how matters stood, and I wish emphatically to repeat the statement I have made—
    Mr. WEDGWOOD: What is initiative?
    Colonel SEELY: I do not wish any misapprehension. I use the word in its broadest sense. His Majesty took no initiative of any kind.
    Mr. WEDGWOOD: What is initiative?
    Colonel SEELY: I have nothing more to say. I returned from the audience that His Majesty was pleased to grant me to the Cabinet, which was then broken up. I found that in my absence they had discussed the draft which the Adjutant-General had prepared of what I had said, and what is was proper for me to recall as a record of what had taken place, and as a record of what was proper for us to say. I had only a moment, and the Prime Minister had but a moment to give me, and this draft has been altered in various particulars. I do not regard it as a complete document—indeed, in form it did not appear to me to be so. I understood that I, as Secretary of State, was charged with the duty of making a statement to these officers in accordance with the decision to which I had come at half-past eleven, and, accordingly, I proceeded to fill up that statement in order that it might conform to the statement I had made and to the statement which I thought it was right to make. These two paragraphs are found at the concluding portion of this Paper. I then sent the document over to the War Office. In the meantime I would ask the House to observe this: I had received a letter from the Adjutant-General enclosing a letter from General Gough, which is printed as the last document but one. The letter did not seem to me to be material—indeed, to be quite frank, I paid little attention to it, for this reason, that General Gough had never seen the document which I was considering, and could not have the least idea of what was in it. Therefore, any idea that might be gathered from the form of this Paper that after General Gough had protested we drew up this document in order to meet his wishes would be an inaccurate statement, because General

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    Gough had not seen the document, and could not have seen it, when he wrote that letter.
    I come to the next point. After General Gough had received this document which I had drawn up, he asked Sir John French—a fact of which I only became aware this morning—whether this document meant—and as there is no copy of this document in the possession of Sir John French or the War Office we can only state the general purport of it, and I hope I state it accurately—he asked whether the document meant that he would not be called upon to order his brigade to take part in the coercion of Ulster in order to compel them to submit to the Home Rule Bill, and across that document Sir John French wrote, "I should read it so." I am quite sure—indeed, I know—that what Sir John French—whose loyalty and help to us in this crisis I desire to acknowledge to the full: this great soldier to whom the honour of the Army is dear, but who at the same time is determined to see that discipline is maintained—meant by that was a reassertion of the last two paragraphs. No possible blame in this matter can attach to Sir John French or to any member of the Army Council, for, be it observed, that the Army Council itself, or those members of it who signed the document — namely, Sir John French and Sir J. S. Ewart—did not know that this was not a Cabinet document, so they are absolved from all possible blame in the matter. Moreover, if blame is to be apportioned—and I now come to the question of blame—no possible blame can attach to Sir Arthur Paget. He has acted throughout with a loyalty and a determination to do his duty that are beyond all praise, and I desire to say that he has the full confidence of the Army Council, and of all those who work with him.
    Now comes the question of where the blame, if blame there is, does really rest. Blame does rest, and it rests upon me; and I will tell the House for what. I added to a document, which the Cabinet had considered, my version of what I thought should be said. I have said, and I repeat, that I did not apprehend that the Cabinet had seriously considered this document, and regarded a document of this kind as a matter of vital concern. I see now that it is—not at all because I recede by one inch from the principles laid down in the last two paragraphs; and I would ask any hon. Gentleman of this
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    House to give me any reasons why I or anybody else should recede from these two paragraphs which are perfectly clear, and give the Army the absolute right and duty to support the civil power whenever it is attacked—but because it does appear that an officer asked for conditions, and that his conditions were accepted. I did not so understand it, but I can see quite clearly that, taking it broadly, that impression can be given, and if I have given that impression, however inadvertently, even if my intentions, as I assure the House they were, were honestly to do my duty in this matter, I have been gravely to blame.
    Now, before I conclude, let me add one word. The Army Council are greatly concerned in this matter. They did not sign as a body this actual document, for, as is proper, any three members of the Army Council, any two and the Secretary of State, may send an Army Council letter, or make an Army Council decision, always assuming that they are carrying out the general policy of the council, as is the custom whether in Cabinets or in Governments or in any other society of men. But they ask me to say this, and I do say it most emphatically, in order that their position may be clear, that nothing that has been said to any of these officers detracts in any way from their power and their duty, to employ all forces of the Crown, should they be required, which are under their control, in accordance with the principles laid down in the Army Act and in the Manual of Military Law, and they wish me to emphasise this without any qualification whatever as their considered judgment, and I will read the words, although they are on the Paper. This is what they ask me to read and state, as their considered judgment without any equivocation whatever, from which they will not recede:—
    "His Majesty's Government must retain their right to use all the forces of the Crown in Ireland, or elsewhere, to maintain law and order, and to support the civil power in the ordinary execution of its duty."
    I hope that I have made the position of the Army Council quite clear, and I have now only to say this. I have misled my colleagues in the Cabinet inadvertently, and with honest intentions. They thought that the document which they had prepared was final. I did not know that. Had I been present at the discussion, none of this misunderstanding would have occurred. I am not going to excuse this, but the House will realise how great the pressure of work has been in a crisis which

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    has been of very real magnitude, and that owing to my absence, this misapprehension occurred. But that does not alter the fact that I am to blame, and gravely to blame in my judgment, and for that reason, while I ask the House to believe that throughout this difficult business I have acted with the sincere desire to be loyal to my colleagues, and to see fair play to the Army, I have felt it my duty to ask the Prime Minister to accept my resignation of my office. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"]
    Mr. BALFOUR: My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition naturally, and I think rightly, desires to reserve his right of intervening in this Debate until the course of this discussion has developed somewhat further, and he asked me, therefore, to say a few words upon the statement just made by the Secretary for War. I will not pretend that after that statement that I understand clearly the exact sequence of events, or that I understand how it happened that this extraordinary misapprehension occurred in Ireland on the part both of the generals and of the officers concerned. Nor do I even understand exactly what occurred between the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues in the Cabinet. Others who have listened to the right hon. Gentleman's statement may be more fortunate than myself, but I confess that I am left still in some obscurity as to the vital points of this most difficult case. Everybody must listen with sympathy to a statement from any Member of this House, and perhaps most of all from a Minister of the Crown, who gets up to say that innocently, and, indeed, with the best intentions, he has yet made what is in his own judgment a great error; and that sympathy must be redoubled when the speech ends, as the speech of the right hon. Gentleman did end, in the statement that he had handed in his resignation to the Prime Minister. I do not know whether that does mean that the right hon. Gentleman is no longer, or will shortly cease to be, a Member of the Cabinet and a Secretary of State, or whether it only means that he has let the Prime Minister understand that since, owing to what he deems to be an error of his, the Government has been placed in a difficulty, he puts his resignation in the hands of the Prime Minister, to be accepted or not, as the Prime Minister and the general feeling of the country, as the Prime Minister sees it, may consider proper.
    Colonel SEELY: The words I used, with all respect to the right hon. Gentleman, were that I asked the Prime Minister to accept my resignation.
    Mr. BALFOUR: I am still left in doubt, and I think that the House is still left in doubt, as to whether the right hon. Gentleman is still, for all practical purposes, a Minister of the Crown at this moment or not.
    The PRIME MINISTER: He is.
    Mr. BALFOUR: In that event my sympathy with the right hon. Gentleman, so far as his admission of error is concerned, remains quite undiminished. Of course, I need waste no sympathy on his resignation if it has not been accepted. I suppose that I shall be followed by the Prime Minister. May I ask just one or two questions, though they are not all the questions which I think can be asked, about a matter, which seems to me to be extraordinarily obscure, after all the explanations in the Papers and the redoubled explanations which have been given to us from that bench. We are asked to believe to-day, as we were asked to believe on Monday, that there were no military operations in the proper sense of the word at all, that it was simply a question of increasing the guard at certain places where there are stores, either of guns or ammunition or whatever it may be, and that that was absolutely all that the War Office contemplated when they sent for General Paget to this country, and when they sent General Paget back to Ireland; and that out of that innocent and natural action all this trouble has arisen. We are asked to believe that the movements of the Fleet, countermanded when these important military operations could not be carried out without provoking a great conflagration, were merely a part of the routine of so far increasing these guards and garrisons. That really is a statement which, after all, is almost incredible. Has there been any case where the soldiers of the Crown have not been welcomed in the ordinary course of their duty in Ulster? Has there been any case where there has been any friction between the forces of the Crown and the population of Ulster? And unless the operations are going to be so carried out as to be of a provocative character, what possible ground was there for supposing that these friendly relations would be more interrupted in the course of these reinforcements than they had been when troops had been moved from

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    that barrack to this barrack, or in the daily intercourse between the forces of the Crown and the population of Ulster?
    That is not all. The right hon. Gentleman has seen General Paget several times. He saw him before the difficulties arose, and he saw him after the difficulties arose, and he had telegraphic communication with him between those two periods. The words used by the officer—this is at the bottom of the second page—as reported by General Paget himself, talk of "duty as ordered" and "active operations." On the words "active operations" the officers asked for explanation from the man who used those words or from the man who, they thought, used those words. If General Paget did not use those words, all he need have said was, "No active operations are contemplated. The words 'active operations' are wholly uncalled for. Nothing is going to be done except to strengthen a guard here and there. If you took my speech to you as meaning anything more than that, you are under a complete misapprehension, or I expressed myself badly. I did not refer to active operations in Ulster. If I used those words, I used them mistakenly." Sir Arthur Paget never suggests that. He does not tell the officers concerned that they misunderstood him. He sends their documents, without note or comment, to the War Office, and, if there was a blunder, I cannot conceive why it was not put right in a moment. Indeed, it is impossible, even after the right hon. Gentleman's statements and after all the facts known to the public and the Press at this moment, that anything would ever make the historian believe that something more was not in contemplation.
    In view of the operations of which the right hon. Gentleman speaks, why on earth should he send for General Paget in order to consult with that officer as to how he would add to a garrison here and there? Was that a military operation beyond General Paget's competence, without consulting the high military authorities at the War Office, and without going to the right hon. Gentleman himself for instructions and advice. It really is beyond all the powers of credulity, however patiently exercised, to imagine that there was not at one moment in the mind of the Secretary of State and in the minds of all those Members of the Government who knew what the Secretary of State was thinking of, in the mind of Sir Arthur Paget after he saw the Secretary of State, in the minds of the officers after they had heard
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    Sir Arthur Paget, something that might, and very likely would, provoke a great blaze in Ulster and set the country on fire, being planned by the Government, and all these precautions, all this movement of troops and ships had something to do with it. Remember, there was no question of secrecy in this matter. Undoubtedly other brigadier-generals consulted with their officers and talked with them. I am informed that the general commanding a brigade of Infantry spoke to his officers, and took the line of saying that officers and men ought to obey any orders given them, and reassuring them by saying that it was so arranged that the provocation must come from Ulster, and that they would never be expected to fire upon Ulstermen except in self defence.
    It is the idea that there is this manœuvring to compel the Ulstermen to take the offensive that so deeply stirs, as I think, the heart and conscience of the country. If you are only going to relieve a garrison here and there, why was a brigade of Cavalry brought into question at all. I do not profess to know anything about these things from a technical point of view, but merely to add a certain number of Infantry to certain guards over stores in any country—mark you, grave as the tension is, there has never been anything unfriendly passed between His Majesty's troops and the population—to say that you must have all these eminent generals coming over here, that they must make speeches to their officers, that you must call in Cavalry brigades and Horse Artillery—[An HON. MEMBER: "And battleships."]—yes, and a battle squadron—with all these things, I say, there can be no comparison between the preparations and the avowed object. Though the right hon. Gentleman, I know quite sincerely, told us he desired to leave no, corner of this dreadful question unexplored in the light of his speech, he has left that history utterly untouched.
    Colonel SEELYdissented.
    Mr. BALFOUR: I do not now understand the position of the right hon. Gentleman or of the Government in regard to the last two paragraphs of the White Paper, about which all the difficulty seems to have occurred. The right hon. Gentleman, I gather, says that he adheres to those two paragraphs, and I imagine from his explanation or his gloss of these paragraphs, that they were assented to by

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    Sir John French. Does the Government agree to those last two paragraphs? Did the Prime Minister see those two paragraphs before they were put in? I suppose not. I suppose that no colleague of the right hon. Gentleman saw them.
    The PRIME MINISTER: No.
    Mr. BALFOUR: Very well; I ask no further questions as to that. Does the Government agree to these two paragraphs? I suppose they do. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Then why have we still the great pleasure of dealing with the right hon. Gentleman as Secretary of State for War? I do not know what the Prime Minister is going to say about these two paragraphs, or how he is going to reply—and I say that in no critical spirit —or how he is going to deal with the extraordinary and difficult problems which have been raised, I think very unnecessarily raised, by this most unhappy business. These two paragraphs may or may not represent the considered opinion of the Government. They represent the considered opinion of the Secretary of State for War. They presumably do not represent the opinions of the Government, or, at least, if they do, they are not the opinions which the Government At this stage of the proceedings desire to avow. But, in truth, they represent the facts. It is the Secretary of State for War who has brought up, by personal contact and by his own direct opportunities of information, with the real circumstances of the case, and it was he who saw that to compel the Army to take any part in its turn in compelling Ulster to accept the Home Rule Bill, would be absolutely to destroy our whole system. I gathered from the speech of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Leicester, the Leader of the Labour party, which he made on Monday last in answer to me, and from some speeches made by other hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway, that they think, for the moment apparently, that there is a difference of principle dividing this House upon these doubtful and difficult questions. I do not believe that there is any difference. There may be very great and vital differences among us as to how in certain cases principles shall be applied. I do not believe myself that there is any fundamental difference of principle. I believe that everybody agrees with the Prime Minister that the Army may be called in, and ought to be called in,
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    in cases of necessity to support the civil power in preserving order, in preventing anarchy, and in stopping mob rule. I do not believe that there is a Member of the Labour party below the Gangway who denies that.
    Mr. J. WARD: Hear, hear—so long as you apply it indiscriminately.
    5.0 P.M.
    Mr. BALFOUR: I am now trying to say what I believe is the opinion of the whole House. We all think that, when it occurs, it is the most lamentable of all necessities. I believe we all agree with the Prime Minister that the necessity has sometimes occurred, though more rarely in this country, I think, than in any other country in the world. It has occurred in this country, and with two successive Administrations in which he was a responsible Minister. It may occur again, and, lamentable as it is, when that necessity occurs it may be, and it is, the duty of the military power to give such assistance as may be required to the civil power to prevent all society from sinking into anarchy. I think we are all agreed upon that, and Gentlemen below the Gangway are with us in that principle. But, also, are not we ail agreed that there is a point at which in connection with great political issues those principles break down? Can anyone doubt that? I was very much interested in something that fell from the hon. Member for Leicester on Monday. I think it was my right hon. Friend near me who mentioned the case of the British officers and the American Colonies, and who pointed out, what we all know, that at that time many officers of all ranks, and men, I have no doubt, too, did not think that they ought to be asked to enforce the law on the American Colonies. The right hon. Gentleman says, "Oh, yes, everybody admits now that the American Colonies were right." Was that so? They were not thought right at the time. How does he know, when history comes to be written, that Ulster will not be thought to be right? For my own part, if the question before the House was whether there was greater justification for the American Colonies or for Ulster, I should not hesitate to say that, and I do not think that it is arguable, that the provocation which you are giving to Ulster is incomparably greater. [An. HON. MEMBER: "What provocation?"] What provocation? I do not want to discuss the whole of the Home Rule Bill, but I venture to say there are two things you

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    are going to do. You are going apparently by force, if you can, to compel this relatively homogeneous population of the North-East of Ireland—are you not going to pass the Bill? —you are going to compel them to leave the assembly under which they are, and to go under the heel of another assembly. You are going to do the greatest of all wrongs, which is to transfer by force a population from a Government which they like, to a Government which they abhor. Nobody who looks into the American case, and I am not going to discuss it in detail, can pretend for a moment that any claim made by Great Britain in 1774, I am not talking of earlier periods, that any claim made by the Government of Great Britain in 1774 practically interfered with the liberties of those Colonies at all. There were no practical wrongs. The practical wrong you are going to do to this people is of the most vital description and touches every hour of their lives, and interferes with all their self-government. You are not only going to transfer these people by force and put them under another Parliament, but you are going to deprive them of their proper representation in this Parliament. When the right hon. Gentleman asked me where is the provocation, I said there never was a provocation given to the American Colonies at the opening of the war comparable with this.
    I now go back to the hon. Member for Leicester, who took it as so obvious that the American Colonies was one of those cases at which, evidently, you had to break down the ordinary rule under which an Army could not be asked to deal with politics; that he brushed aside, and said, everybody now admits that the American Colonies were in the right. It is quite clear to the House that you have now, and, as I think, by your most criminal policy, forced upon people who never wished to be troubled about politics, the necessity of deciding in which way their higher duty goes. The difficulty of this problem must always be enormous. It has proved enormous in our own history. It troubled men's conscience for generations. There was a whole school of politicians, the extreme Tory school of those days, a Tory and High Church school, at the end of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th century, who took the full doctrine of the hon. Member for Stoke (Mr. J. Ward), who is their true lineal descendant, and they preached what is called the doctrine of non-resistance. They said, whatever the Government of the
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    day decides must be carried out, and the Army are necessarily bound to obey in all causes the rulers of the day, and it is always inconsistent with the subject's duty to resist the forces of the law. That was the accurate doctrine of non-resistance—never accepted, violently repudiated, of course, by the Whig party of that day, and never accepted by the moderate Tories.
    Mr. J. WARD: There was no franchise then. The difference is plain. Only a very small aristocratic section of the community had any right or voice in the government of the country.
    Mr. BALFOUR: I do not see that that makes any difference. The point is, may not a Government in their folly raise questions on which soldiers, as well as civilians, have to ask themselves, does not this go outside, drive us outside those ordinary canons of conduct by which, in ordinary moments, we ought to be guided in obedience to the civil magistrate? That question has cropped up in every country of the world at different times, and has always found a solution in different cases, and the wisdom of every wise Government is not to compel that question to be discussed. Of all the great sins against the community which I might think in my partisan feelings that the Government have been guilty of, the greatest is that they have forced this question—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"]—and at this moment, putting the Army on one side, and not touching the immediate problem on which the right hon. Gentleman has sent in his resignation, but thinking merely of the civil population—is it not undoubted, can anybody doubt who knows anything about it that the population of Ulster are as loyal to the Crown and to the Constitution of this country as they have been brought up under it, and that they have the same ideals of liberty as you have—[HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"]—that their doctrines are those all lovers of liberty preach—[HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"]—and upon which you have specially prided yourselves.
    Mr. J. HOGGE: Free speech in Belfast?
    Mr. BALFOUR: It is on men like that and not merely upon men and officers of the Army you compel attention to these tremendous and difficult problems. The Government in their folly have compelled this attention to be concentrated upon these great questions, and the Secretary

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    of State for War has come, in my opinion, to the only conclusion which any man acquainted with the facts can come, namely, that you are attempting in this House legislation which the conscience of this country will not stand. It is really pitiable to hear Gentlemen say, I dare say quite honestly, that this is an aristocratic intrigue—[An HON. MEMBER: "It is true all the same!"]—and I know not what besides; they really should open their eyes to the facts. Is it so incredible to them that any man of British birth should hate firing upon other men of British birth in Ulster, because they want to preserve the liberties which you have given them? Is that an incredible proposition? Are those who hold it to be accused of necessarily and consistently, therefore, saying that if a town is in the hands of a mob the soldiers are to stand idly by and look on? Such statesmanship never was tolerated in this House before, and never will be tolerated, I believe, in the future. This is not a new question. The Prime Minister is a historian, and has studied these things. He has studied the opinion of statesmen like Burke and of great jurists of the past. Who has ever before confounded these two things, who has ever said that the rules applicable to one are applicable to the other? There is no comparison between them, and you have only got to look into your own hearts to know that there is no comparison between them. I do not know what the fate of these peccant paragraphs may be. Apparently they were never seen by the Cabinet, and they are the pure creation of the genius of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. He has resigned on them, but he has resumed office in spite of them, and let me say at once, I think he was right to resign, and I think the Government were right to have him back, because he has told the truth to the country in words which are unmistakable. Behind him and behind the Army Council the whole Army will take them as their charter. After those words have once been written, printed and published, after the Minister who wrote them declares he still holds by them, the idea that after that you are really going to attempt at the point of the bayonet to force your disruptive legislation on the population of Ulster is utterly and hopelessly incredible. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Bonar Law) begged me to move the rejection of the Bill, and I desire to do so in the ordinary form.
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    Question proposed, to leave out the word "now," and to add at the end of the Question the words, "upon this day six months."
    The PRIME MINISTER: There is one preliminary observation which I should like to make before I deal with the substance of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, and that is to associate myself with what was said by my right hon. Friend who sits beside me (Colonel Seely), in regard to what I think are the most unfair, inconsiderate and improper attempts to bring the name of the King into this matter. They are not made upon one side only. They proceed, I regret to say, in different senses from different quarters. I am entitled, as chief responsible Minister of the Crown, to say, and I soy it with the fullest conviction and assurance, that from first to last, in regard to all these matters, His Majesty has observed every rule that comports with the dignity of the position of a Constitutional Sovereign. However strenuous, however exciting our Debates may be, I hope we shall continue in all quarters to recognise that the Crown in a constitutional country is beyond and above the range of party controversy. The right hon. Gentleman, in the course of his speech, drew a parallel and emphasised it by much argument, some illustration, and a good deal of rhetoric, between the position of the American Colonies and what he called the coercion of Ulster. I think it is quite time that we got to close quarters with this so-called coercion of Ulster. It affects not merely the military, but the political aspects of the situation. The right hon. Gentleman spoke with horror of men of British birth firing upon other men of British birth who were simply rising in defence of their ancient and traditional rights and privileges. What is the actual situation? We have offered to every county in Ulster, which chooses to go to the ballot box, the opportunity of excluding itself from the operation of our Bill—[HON. MEMBERS: "Six years."]—during such time as will admit of two opportunities to pronounce upon it. What is the alternative offer made by the Leader of the Opposition? That you should have a Referendum here and now, one single consultation of the electors of the United Kingdom, and if that goes adversely to his party and in favour of our Bill he will admit, on the part of the party opposite, that we are morally justified in coercing Ulster. Let us deal, not with phrases, but

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    with facts. The coercion of Ulster—if he meant by that the interposition and the operation of military and naval force—is a thing which will never happen, and can never happen, if Ulster takes advantage of the opportunity that we have offered.
    Lord HUGH CECIL: Not six years hence?
    The PRIME MINISTER: Why should the verdict of the electors of the United Kingdom be of less weight six years hence than it is now? After all, we are not dealing with things that are going to happen six years hence; we are dealing with things as they are. I am very much struck in listening to the right hon. Gentleman by the extraordinary disparity, in scale and in temperament, between the presentation which he has made of the supposed shortcomings and evil designs of the Government and that which is offered to us every day by the organs of his party outside. What is the case he presents? That there was a plot, an intrigue, a conspiracy engineered behind my back, and behind the backs of most of my right hon. Friends sitting beside me, by two or three dark and sinister spirits who managed to secure the guilty connivance of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War—a plot to undertake aggessive and provocative operations in Ulster! Is that really believed? [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes!" "It is true!"] Let us see what the evidence is. Here we have in these papers an official letter from the War Office, dated the 14th March—that is before the Bradford speech was made—I think it was the same day—in which there is set out, with perfect explicitness and in detail, the operations which, in the opinion of the Army Council, were necessary in order to protect from possible disorder and rioting certain military positions in Ulster. Is the plot supposed to have been then engineered? Is it really believed that that letter, written on behalf of the Army Council, was the first step in these provocative operations? I want to know. Is there anything there which goes in the least degree beyond what I have told the House repeatedly was the sole and undivided object of His Majesty's Government in making these comparatively small movements of troops in Ulster, to occupy places which, as I pointed out before, were of no strategic value, and which no general in his senses would have occupied if he had thought of aggressive operations —movements which were intended, as this
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    letter shows, solely and entirely for the purpose of protection, not, as I believe, against organised or concerted operations on the part of the Ulster volunteers, but against possible risks to which, with an excited population, places and property of this kind are always exposed?
    Mr. BONAR LAW: Cavalry and Horse Artillery?
    The PRIME MINISTER: There were no Cavalry or Horse Artillery engaged in the operation at all.
    Lord CHARLES BERESFORD: Battleships?
    The PRIME MINISTER: Nor were any battleships engaged in the operation at all. The utmost assistance which the Navy afforded in this very moderate and modest military operation was to send two small cruisers to assist in the movement of troops from one point to another. That operation was ordered, as I have said, as far back as the 14th March. It is quite true that in the following week General Paget was summoned to this country and held a consultation with his military superiors at the War Office. It is a most extraordinary illustration of the kind of constitutional topsy-turveydom of the times in which we live. While the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Sir E. Carson) and his friends have been allowed to organise, equip, and parade a force which we are told amounts to something like 100,000 men, no one saying "Nay," no one as far as we are concerned taking any offensive notice, if we send for our general and take him into consultation here it is said at once that this is an intrigue and an outrage. Could absurdity be carried further? We were perfectly entitled to summon General Paget. We were perfectly entitled to consult with him and with the naval authorities also, having regard to all these possible sources of danger and combustion, as to what steps might be necessary to be taken to preserve the public peace in the North of Ireland. I do not apologise for doing it. I say that it was a natural and perfectly proper step, and if the same circumstances occurred I should certainly do it again.
    Then General Paget went back. He had been instructed to do nothing, absolutely nothing, beyond carrying out these modest and necessary operations described in the letter of the 14th March. He took

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    his brigadiers and divisional generals into consultation, apparently upon the question whether these movements might be attended with excitement and possibly resistance, and in that case what steps it would be necessary to take. Was that provocative? Was that anything but a precaution which every reasonable general in similar conditions ought to and would take? When the right hon. Gentleman mentions, as he did just now, Cavalry and Horse Artillery—certainly there was no necessity to use either the one or the other for the purpose of these limited operations; but if they had been met, as it is possible they might have been, with resistance or opposition, and if anything like a state of public disorder had arisen in any part of the province of Ulster, or in the South or West—it applies to every part of Ireland—it might of course have been necessary to move the Cavalry regiments. General Paget did what every prudent general would have done under these circumstances. To treat that as an act of provocation, or an invitation to these gentlemen in Ulster to rebel, as luring them out of their attitude of, shall I say, belligerent quiescence into one of active warfare, seems to me one of the most grotesque propositions I have ever heard. So far the matter seems to me hardly to admit of argument at all. How can any rational man, whose mind is governed by the ordinary rules of evidence, assume, or even pretend to assume, that in these facts there was anything in the nature of provocative or aggressive action?
    I now come to what took place after General Paget had addressed his generals. There is undoubtedly—it would be unfair to deny it—a discrepancy of evidence as to what on that occasion was actually paid, and I think it is extremely probable, in fact, I am sure it is true, that there was, on the part of some of those, at any rate, whom General Paget addressed, an honest misunderstanding of what he said. It is quite clear from the perfectly fair and reasonable letter which was written by General Gough on the 20th March that there was a notion among them that was described, or what they thought they had heard described as "active operations" might mean, in the language of the fourth paragraph of their letter, the "initiation of active military operations against Ulster." They were uneasy upon that point. The word "initiation," the House will observe, is underlined. That is a point which
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    really is very important—"the initiation of active military operations." They felt uneasiness upon that point. They did not get what they regarded as adequate assurance. Thereupon, they took a step which, I think, is very much to be regretted, namely, the sending in of their resignations. They were summoned to London. I want for a moment to bring home to the House what took place after these officers came to London. It is here, really, the serious question of to-day's Debate arises. They came to London. They were interviewed; at least, they presented their case to the Adjutant-General at the War Office, as did General Gough to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War. I think I am not going too far when I say that they realised, and everybody realised, that there had been a misconception of what General Gough had said to them, and what the General required them to do.
    On Monday last, two days ago, after these interviews had taken place, the matter was considered by the Cabinet. In the course of our deliberations we received from the War Office from the AdjutantGeneral—my right hon. Friend, as he has told us, was, for the moment, away, as he had to attend His Majesty—we received from the War Office a draft of the letter which it was proposed on behalf of the Army Council to hand to General Gough on his return to Ireland to resume his duties. That draft was carefully considered by the Cabinet. As it left our hands it contained in substance, and, I think, texually, the first three paragraphs of the last of the documents in this White Paper. Let me point out—for I want to make this perfectly clear—because it lies at the very root of the matter—that when that letter was submitted to the Cabinet and settled by them, they had no knowledge whatsoever that General Gough had sent to the Adjutant-General on the same morning the letter which immediately precedes it in this White Paper. That is all-important, as the House will see, and for a reason which I will make perfectly plain before I sit down. We had not seen it, nor had my right hon. Friend received it, for it only reached him, I think it was, after the termination of the proceedings of the Cabinet. We had no notion of any sort or kind that any such letter had been addressed by General Gough to the Adjutant-General. In dealing with the matter as it then presented itself to us, we had authorised the Army

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    Council to supply General Gough with a written statement such as is contained in the first three paragraphs of this communication, and which, as the House will observe, carefully abstains from giving any kind of assurance of any sort, and states in the plainest and most explicit terms, and I think in language to which no exception can be taken by anybody who realises what is the constitutional position of the Army in relation to the civil power, as to what the duties of these officers would be. So far as we were concerned we thought that was an end of the matter.
    My right hon. Friend has stated most candidly and most manfully that the letter of General Gough was handed to him, but, as he said, he did not pay much attention to it. That was not what influenced his mind. Having regard, however, to the statement he himself had made to the officers in the course of the morning, he added to the document as settled by the Cabinet the two concluding paragraphs. I am not going to criticise with any minuteness or any severity the language of those paragraphs. The first one is quite innocuous. The second might be read in a number of different senses. I am not going to criticise. What I am going to say is this—but, first of all, I should complete my narrative by saying that when I spoke to the House as I did on Monday—and I am sure the House will believe, after some experience, that I do not, at any rate in matters of fact, mislead them—when I spoke to the House on Monday, when I said either expressly or, perhaps, by implication, I forget which, in answer to an interruption, that those officers had returned to Ireland without any condition I was speaking what I believed to be the truth. What was the truth so far as the document as settled by the Cabinet was concerned? I want to make my position and that of my colleagues perfectly clear on this point. Later in the day, after the Debate was over, or at least after that part of the Debate was over, and when I had gone back to my own room, I received a typewritten copy of this document as it now appears. I read it. Of course, I was at once struck by the addition of these two paragraphs. I sent for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and said to him, "How is it that this, which was never approved by the Cabinet, has been inserted in the letter?" He told me, in very much the same terms as those in which he has to-day told the
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    House, how it had happened. I began to argue the matter, when he said, "It is too late, the letter has been handed to General Gough, and he has taken it away with him to Ireland." I must add this to my own personal narrative, that even then I was not aware, nor, I think, were any of my colleagues in the Cabinet—in fact, I am sure they were not—of this letter of General Gough, written on the same day, Monday, and which appears in the White Paper, in which General Gough expressly asks the question—a very different question, let the House observe, from that which he had raised in his letter of 20th March. Let me point out in what the difference exists. It is very vital. On 20th March General Gough and the officers on whose behalf he spoke were under the impression, which had been created in their minds by the address of the Commander-in-Chief, that they were about to be called upon to take part in some form of military duty. The expression, the House will see, is "Duty as ordered"— the words are put in inverted commas— "'Active operations' in Ulster." They were, therefore, under the impression that they were or might be, immediately or within a very short time, called upon to undertake duty of that kind. Thereupon they asked the question, and said, "If such duty consists in the maintenance of order and the preservation of property, all the officers will be quite prepared to undertake it, but if the duty involves the 'initiation'" —the word which is underlined, as showing the emphasis and importance which they attached to it—"if it involves the 'initiation' of active military operations against Ulster, then the officers named would respectfully prefer to be dismissed." That is a very different demand from the demand preferred in General Gough's letter of 23rd March. Let the House observe how the position has shifted in the meantime. It is no longer a question of what is the character or the duty or the operations in which we are to be immediately ordered to take part; it is purely a prospective question which deals with the future, and, to some extent, everybody must admit, a more or less remote contingency! The question is this: "In the event of the present Home Rule Bill becoming law, can we be called upon to enforce it on Ulster under the expression of maintaining law and order?"
    Mr. WALTER GUINNESS: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the two

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    paragraphs put in were substantially the same as the matter struck out of the original draft?
    The PRIME MINISTER: No, Sir. They were quite different. This is the draft document submitted to the Cabinet and revised by them. It is not really a very material point, but the hon. Member may assume that what was struck out by the Cabinet went, in some respects, further than what was actually put in.
    Mr. W. GUINNESS: Did it deal with the same subject?
    The PRIME MINISTER: It dealt with the same subject-matter, but that is not really material to my argument. What I am pointing out to the House is this, that in this letter of General Gough, brought for the first time to my knowledge and to the knowledge of my colleagues as lately as yesterday afternoon, we found a request, or, indeed, a demand, made by an officer in a responsible position in the Army for an assurance to be given to him as to what will or will not be required of him by the Government in a hypothetical contingency. I do not think it is right to ask officers what they will do in an event which has not arisen and which may never arise, and I do not believe that General Sir Arthur Paget did. He may have been so misunderstood, but I do not gather from General Gough's letter of 20th March that it was that sort of question that he was contemplating. It looks to me as if he were contemplating immediate operations. But I am strongly of opinion—and I hope I shall have the general assent of the House when I say this—that neither is it right to ask an officer in advance what he may or may not do in a contingency which has not arisen and the circumstances surrounding which are left entirely to the imagination. If that is true, still less can it be right for an officer to ask the Government for any such assurance.
    Mr. AMERY Mr. AMERY rose—[HON. MEMBERS: "Order, order!" and Interruption.]
    The PRIME MINISTER: Circumstances may arise to all of us Officers of the State, in whatever position we hold, as to what our duty is. We must decide it according to our consciences.
    Mr. AMERY: Will you deny that there was—[HON. MEMBERS: "Order, order!" and Interruption.]
    The PRIME MINISTER: And so far as my colleagues and I are concerned, so long as we are responsible for the government of this country, we will never assent to a claim—
    Mr. AMERY: You have assented to it—[HON. MEMBERS: "Order, order!" "Name, name!" and Interruption.]
    Mr. SPEAKER: I must ask the hon. Member for South Birmingham not to keep interrupting. He made a speech yesterday, and he had a good opportunity, and the least he can do now is to listen to the reply.
    The PRIME MINISTER: So long as we are responsible for the government of this country, whatever the consequences may be, we shall not assent to the claim of any body of men in the service of the Crown, be they officers or men—it makes no difference for this purpose—to demand from the Government, in advance, assurances of what they will or will not be required to do in circumstances which have not yet arisen. The new claim, as a claim, if once admitted, would put the Government and the House of Commons, upon whose confidence the Government depend, at the mercy of the Military and Navy. If the issue is once raised, I myself have very little doubt as to what the verdict of this country will be.
    I want to say one word, and one only, in conclusion, as to the position of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War. He made a statement to-day which I am sure must have enlisted the sympathy of Members in all quarters of the House, whatever their political feelings. He told the House, and told it with perfect, sincerity and truth, that recognising as he did that he had committed an error of judgment in the conditions with which he supplemented the agreed decision of the Cabinet, he felt it his duty to tender his resignation. My right hon. Friend did that, as I and everybody who knows him, know with perfect sincerity. I am not going to accept his resignation, not because I do not think the step which he took involved an error of judgment—I agree with him that it did—but because in the case of errors of that kind, in times of great stress and anxiety, when a man is oppressed, as the right hon. Gentleman has been oppressed, with responsibility more arduous and anxious than really occurred to any of us, when we value, as we all do, strenuous and effective

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    co-operation in all great causes in our common work, I think it would be not only ungenerous, but unjust, to take any such action. My hon. Friend retains the confidence and the affection of his colleagues and his political friends. He acquiesces loyally and fully in the judgment which on behalf of the Government I have announced to the House. If there be any criticism to be passed on what has taken place in regard to this transaction, I beg the House, in the latter part of this transaction, to bring back its attention to the point from which we originally started, which was so much emphasised by the right hon. Gentlemen opposite, namely, that in all these matters the real question is whether or not the considered will, judgment, and authority of the people shall prevail.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: This Government has set, in its time, many precedents, but I do hot think in the whole history of this House there has ever been a resignation of a Minister which has not been received not only with sympathy, but with seriousness in all parts of the House. That is not the case to-day. We have heard of people being thrown to the wolves, but never before have we heard of a man being thrown to the wolves with a bargain on the. part of the wolves that they would not eat him. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister has shown, as he always does, what an accomplished Parliamentarian he is, and how accurately he gauges the strength and sincerity of the hostility which from time to time is directed against his Government. We all saw the revolution in progress yesterday, and now all that is needed to put it all right is to say that the Minister is willing to say he will resign, but nobody means him to take any such course. No Government was ever in such a position as that in which this Government stands this afternoon, but no Government, fortunately for this country, has ever tried to resemble this Government. One of the difficulties is that we do not understand any better now, after two Ministers have spoken, than my right hon. Friend did when only one had spoken, what the position of this whole matter is. I think the difficulty arises from this, that this Government have got into the habit, and I think it is not a good habit, that whenever they are dealing with any question of fact the Horse can be in no certainty that the real position is being put frankly before them. This is an error of judgment which conies from pressure of
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    work, I have no doubt. Now I ask the House to remember all this hinges upon our not having been told the exact position of affairs. It all hinges on that. I ask the House to contrast the statement made by the Secretary for War on Monday with the information contained in the White Paper which we have to-day. This is what he said on Monday with regard to the question of the officers:—
    "Information was received at the War Office on Friday evening from General Sir Arthur Paget that some officers in his command had informed him that in certain eventualities they would be unable to carry out instructions which it might be necessary to issue."
    At the time he made that statement he had received this telegram from Sir Arthur Paget:—
    "Regret to report brigadier and fifty-seven officers prefer to accept dismissal if ordered North."
    Now another thing on the same point. With regard to the dismissal of the officers, this is what he said:—
    "The Army Council requested from Sir Arthur Paget by telegram to forward a statement of the circumstances of the case, and to direct the senior officers concerned to report themselves to the Adjutant-General at the War Office."
    Not a word about dismissal; and the Prime Minister—and here I must at once assume that he knew nothing about the facts—the Prime Minister was asked the question:—
    "Will the officers be reinstated?"
    and he answered—
    "It is not a question of reinstatement, because they have never been dismissed."
    Colonel SEELY: They never were.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: Never dismissed? Let me read the White Paper:—
    "They should be relieved of their commands."
    As ordered by the War Office—
    "And officers are being sent to relieve them at once."
    And they have never been dismissed? [HON. MEMBERS "No!"] Let us get to the bottom of this.
    Sir HARRY VERNEY: Read on.
    Mr. BONAR LAW"The resignation of all officers should be refused."
    I hope we will get quietly at this. I want all the facts. Does the Prime Minister associate himself with that observation?
    The PRIME MINISTER: They were not dismissed.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: The words of the White Paper are that the War Office sent a telegram to General Sir Arthur Paget that they should be relieved of their commands, which I understand means dismissal.
    HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!" and "Read on!"
    6.0 P.M.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: Not dismissed from the Service—I do not suggest that, but dismissed from their commands. And the Prime Minister denies it. Take another example of the way in which the country is treated. In his statement, issued on Sunday, the Prime Minister used these words, "There is a widespread impression"—he will remember the substance—"that there is to be an inquisition of what the officers' views are in certain eventualities," and he says there is to be nothing of the kind! How does he explain the resignations of the officers in the Cavalry Brigade in the Curragh on any other understanding than that this question was put to them and that it was their answer to it which caused all the trouble? Again he makes a statement which the facts prove to be absolutely inaccurate. That is not all. In the same communication the right hon. Gentleman says this:—
    "As for the so-called Naval movements they simply consisted in the use of two small cruisers."
    And he said that when the First Lord of the Admiralty tells us this afternoon that a Battle Squadron had been ordered to Belfast.
    The PRIME MINISTER: The First Lord never said anything of the kind. The only two ships that were moved were the two cruisers. The subsequent movement of the Battle Squadron to Lamlash could not take place for a very long time.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: The First Lord of the Admiralty said, and boasted of it, that these ships had been ordered to Lamlash in order to be ready for Belfast if the emergency arose. He told us there was no movement of ships in connection with it or ordered, except these two vessels.
    The PRIME MINISTER: I said there were no movements of ships in connection with these movements of troops into Ulster, and my communication was entirely confined to that.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: The right hon. Gentleman is quite wrong.
    "As for the so-called Naval movements, they consisted only in what I have said."
    Now we have got what was in the mind of the right hon. Gentleman. He did not include orders in this communication to the country. It is only actual movements. We have a wonderful Government, and we
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    may be sure of this, that when the facts come out in connection with to-day's statement, we shall probably find that the memories of right hon. Gentlemen have deceived them, precisely as they did on Monday. The case of the right hon. Gentleman again to-day is that there were only movements of troops necessary to protect the stores, and all the rest of it. I am not going into the evidence to which I alluded on Monday, but it is quite easy to prove that that statement does not meet the facts, and does not represent the situation as we all know it. The real truth is—and no other explanation fits the facts—that the Government decided on a great demonstration, military certainly, and naval, as we find out to-day, in order to snake an impression upon the people of Ulster. The First Lord of the Admiralty was very indignant at the suggestion that they had the idea of provoking an outbreak.
    The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Churchill): What is the suggestion?
    Mr. BONAR LAW: I will give the right hon. Gentleman something better to interrupt than he has got now. He used an adjective in regard to it which does not exaggerate, but if the right hon. Gentleman really had such an idea so far from his mind as he now suggests, and we must accept his word for it, then I refer any hon. Member of this House who heard his answer to the question of my Noble Friend behind me, in which he taunted the Ulster Volunteers with not having interrupted the movement of His Majesty's Forces. He said in almost these words, as far as I can recollect them, that they had countermanded the order because these 100,000 men had not interfered with His Majesty's troops when they went into Ulster. This whole dispute as to what was really intended turns upon General Paget. I read out in this House a note taken down by an officer who heard it—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, Oh," and "Name!"]—which was corroborated. If they deny it I am quite ready to give the right hon. Gentleman the source of my information. It was taken down by this one officer, and corroborated by three others who heard it. I asked the right hon. Gentleman to give us what Sir Arthur Paget himself said, and he has absolutely declined to do so. We must therefore assume that the statement which I have read is correct until they give us an alternative version to set against it. How does Sir

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    Arthur Paget's statement agree with their story? First of all, both the Prime Minister and the Secretary for War tell us it was all a misunderstanding, and that the officers did not understand General Paget. That is not possible. This was the misunderstanding, as they tell us, that the officers thought General Paget wanted them to do something more than the ordinary duties of preserving law and order, but they had to come to London to find that out, and then it was all put right. Here is the fact: These officers in the letter, which the Prime Minister says is a highly proper one, referring to Sir Arthur Paget's speech, used these words:—
    "If such duty consists of the maintenance of order and the preservation of property, all the officers in the Brigade, including myself, would be prepared to carry oat this duty."
    It goes on:—
    "If the duty involves the initiation of active operations"—
    and so on. What follows? One of two things. Either that the whole statement of the intention of the War Office is inaccurate or that General Paget did not know what the intentions of the War Office were. There is no getting away from that. If General Paget knew, the moment he got that letter, he would have said, "It is all right; I am asking nothing more," and he would have wired to the War Office that the whole incident was at an end. That proves that, whether he was right or wrong, General Paget believed that he had received orders which meant an outburst in Ulster the moment he carried these orders into effect. What about the Cavalry and the Horse Artillery? The Prime Minister says it is only for subsequent operations, but even that will not do. For what did General Paget telegraph to the War Office? Not that this Cavalry Brigade, which, the Prime Minister tells us, he never thought could be used against the volunteers, for he says that he trusted that they would not be interfered with; it was only small parties that he feared. This Cavalry Brigade was to be sent to Ulster to deal not with the volunteers, but with small bodies whom Sir Edward Carson was trying to prevent engaging in the kind of operation suggested. He has said so. Even that explanation will not do, because Sir Arthur Paget, in telling of the resignation of these officers, actually uses these words:—
    "Prefer to accept dismissal if ordered North."
    How does that coincide with the statement they had given that they were only think-
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    ing about it as a possible necessity in the far distant future, when Sir Arthur Paget himself wires that they have in substance resigned rather than be ordered North to fulfil the duty which he tells us they never intended to fulfil? I do not believe that the Prime Minister knew all that was going on. Now I am going to read an extract from the letter of a young officer—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!" "Hear, hear," and "Anonymous again!"]—connected
    with the Infantry Brigade. [An HON. MEMBER: "Name!"] There is no mystery about how we get these letters. The House will understand. Hon. Gentlemen opposite will see that it is inevitable that these letters should come. This letter comes from a near relative of an hon. Member on this side of the House, who sent it to me, and that is the whole mystery. It may or may not be accurate. I admit that. I have nothing for it but the fact that this young officer wrote it as an account of what Sir Charles Ferguson said to him. It is very important, and I ask the Prime Minister to send to Sir Charles Ferguson and find out whether or not he did use language like this in addressing his officers, for it was this kind of language that induced them instantly to resign their commissions. This is what was said to this young officer:—
    "The idea of provoking Ulster is hellish."
    It is quite in order to say it when applying it to an idea, not to an individual. The idea is hellish. This is what Sir Charles Ferguson is reported to have said on advice which presumably he got from the War Office:—
    "Steps have been taken in Ulster so that any aggression must come from Ulsterites, and they will have to shed first blood."
    [Cheers.] Hon. Members actually cheer that. Has anyone ever heard of an agent-provocateur? Was there ever anything in the world more wicked, if it is true, whatever the design, than to provoke these people in Ulster, so as to be able to deal with them? The words do not admit of any doubt of it. [HON. MEMBERS: "Read."] I say that I have given my authority for them and the Prime Minister can verify them; but, so far as the words go, they admit of no doubt. [HON. MEMBERS: "Read the whole."]
    Sir T. WHITTAKER: They mean the opposite of what you say.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: Then I will read them, and the right hon. Gentleman will

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    see how they mean the opposite of what I say:—
    "Steps have been taken in Ulster so that any aggression must come from Ulsterites."
    The right hon. Gentleman means that the Ulster people themselves have taken these steps.
    Sir T. WHITTAKER: That obviously means that nothing would be done by us until Ulster—[Interruption.]
    Mr. BONAR LAW: The right hon. Gentleman is quite right. It obviously means "Nothing will be done by us until we have provoked Ulster." [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] This whole subject has raised many wide questions, but there is one point which formed the end of the right hon. Gentleman's speech to which I must allude, and that was his treatment of General Gough. I have always found the right hon. Gentleman live up to the traditions of the position which he occupies in regard to the treatment of the servants of the Crown. I do not think that he has been fair to General Gough in this incident. [HON. MEMBERS "Oh!"] I will explain why. General Gough did not raise this question at all. The right hon. Gentleman himself admits that they had not a right to do what the War Office did, and I do not think there is a man in this House who believes that was started by General Paget without instructions from the War Office. I at least do not believe it. The right hon. Gentleman himself has admitted that was a question which they had no right to put to General Gough—a question as to what he would do in certain eventualities. They did put the question. He himself has in substance said in these documents that if he had been ordered to Ulster he would have gone without any hesitation. They put the question to him about the future, General Paget nominally, but the War Office really. He gives an answer, the only answer which on his conscience he could give, and, having given it, not on his own initiative at all, not by his own desire, but, the issue having been raised in plain terms, will you or will you not fight against Ulster—not to keep order but to fight against Ulster—I put it to any hon. Member in this House who thinks, as General Gough does, that they have no right to engage in civil war against Ulster. What else could he do if he goes back to the Army after it has been raised but make it
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    perfectly plain that his position on this question is not in doubt, and that the War Office must know that it is not in doubt. No other course was open to him.
    I would like to leave this specific question, and say a little about the broad issues raised, although I should be glad myself to leave them where they were left by my right hon. Friend the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour) on Monday, and in his additional remarks to-day; but while he was speaking a reference specially was made to my action in connection with this matter. I want to say this at the outset. I have never for a moment under-estimated the seriousness of all that was being done in Ulster and by us in assisting her. I have never underestimated it, and perhaps some Members of the House may remember that quite lately I pointed out the seriousness of it and felt sure that the bench opposite would agree with me. It was only a question of responsibility, and upon whom that responsibility rested. Precisely what happened yesterday, and precisely what has happened in the Army, are the very things which I can honestly say I knew must come unless something happened to stop the collision which seemed to be inevitable. What the right hon. Gentleman does not take into consideration is this: He made on Monday a very eloquent peroration about the duty of obeying law and constituted authority. I listened to him, and I could not have given the answer given by my right hon. Friend if I live to be a hundred. The only answer that occurred to me was that the peroration could have been directed with precisely the same force and the same justice by the Prime Minister of England, and indeed it was by the King, to General Washington, or by President Lincoln to General Lee. It could have been directed against them with equal force.
    My right hon. Friend said to-day that there was not a difference of principle among us on this matter. There is a difference which comes almost to that, but it is not a difference of principle. The right hon. Gentleman never for a moment will argue that resistance is justified. It is always that the constituted authority must be obeyed. I put to him this question: Is there such a thing as civil war at all? His speeches would lead us to suppose that there was no such thing, and that it could not be contemplated. If he admits that there is such a thing as civil

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    war, then I ask him—and perhaps the next time he speaks on this subject he will do it—to give a definition of what civil war means which would not include what is happening in Ulster to-day. He will find it utterly impossible to give such a definition. Let us get rid, therefore, of the preliminary ground. Everyone must admit that there are circumstances when all the ordinary laws of society are broken down and nobody can contemplate such a position without a degree of horror, which I think is not yet realised by a great many Members in this House and people out of it. Therefore, the question is not whether obedience to constituted authority is a duty under all circumstances. Nobody maintains that. Let us, therefore, look at the question whether or not it is justifiable under existing circumstances. I wish to put my position in regard to Ulster clearly, because I feel that I have a certain amount of responsibility in regard to it. Before I occupied my present position, and when I could speak without thinking as carefully as I do now—[Laughter]—I do not pretend to speak very well, but I do my best—I said this in this House:—
    "I do not think I am disloyal, and I do not want to be shot, but I say this with absolute deliberation:"—
    This was after my argument that Ulster was justified in resisting under present conditions—
    "If the people of this country decide that they will wake the experiment of Rome Rule, then— and here I must part company with some of my hon. Friends in this House, and I must certainly part company with some of those who supported me in the constituency I represent—I should say that 1 believe in representative government, and, however much you dislike it, you cannot compel the United Kingdom to keep up the present arrangement against their will."
    From that view I have never wavered, and over and over again in this House and out of it, and by a definite offer only a week ago or less, I said to the Prime Minister: Make certain—and surely, in face of all this trouble, it is worth while making certain—that you have the will of the country behind you, and, so far as the Unionist party are concerned, we will absolutely cease all unconstitutional opposition to the carrying of your measure. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"] Well, what more do you ask? Yesterday I was only able, because I was engaged, to listen to part of the speech of the hon. Gentleman below the Gangway, but I found it very interesting, for I like the idea of a new French Revolution led by an hon. Gentleman whom we know so well, and who sits on the Labour
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    Benches. I heard some of the speeches, and what was the substance of them all? It was that there is one law for the rich and another for the poor. Now, examine it. Who are the people who would be shot down by our soldiers if this civil war broke out? There is no city in the world which is more democratic than Belfast, and I believe that if this issue of Home Rule were removed we could not long count upon them as our supporters in the way we count upon them now. [Laughter]. Hon. Members surely do not think mean enough of me to suppose that I am willing to encourage civil war for the sake of a few more Ulster Members!
    I say that there is no more democratic community in the world, and that these volunteers are a more democratic army than has ever existed in the world, not excepting Cromwell's own New Model in the time of the Civil War; and when you say, "You are afraid to shoot down the rich," I say that there is no case in which soldiers could be employed where it would be more certain to be shooting down the working classes than it would be if you sent such an expedition to Belfast. They say—I think I heard the hon. Member for Stoke or somebody say—"Tom Mann; look what he got!" or "Sir E. Carson, "my right hon. Friend the Member for Trinity College, "Look how he gets off!" But is that the fault of my right hon. Friend? Over and over again he has challenged the Government to take action against him, and he has done it rightly for this reason. I would never say, for a moment, that this Government, if they believed in their conscience that this country was behind them have not the right to enforce this with Horse, Foot and Artillery. I do not deny it if they think they have the right. But I say that anything more criminal than to allow this organisation to go on for two years and then threaten it I cannot imagine. My right hon. Friend challenged the Government to take him up. Why did they not do it? The hon. Member for Stoke says that the precedents given by my right hon. Friend of previous Parliaments does not apply, because they were not democratic. Why did not the Government take him up? Because they knew the country were not behind them, and because they knew that if they took that action it would be evident that the country was not behind them, and that their only chance of carrying the Bill was by getting it through

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    without allowing the people of this country to realise what was being done in their name.
    I have only one other aspect of this to look at, and that is the question as it affects the Army. All through, in thinking about this effect on the Army is what has alarmed me most. I think I am right in saying that, in the many scores of speeches which I have made on Home Rule in the last three years, I have only referred twice in any way to the Army. Once was at Dublin, when I felt things were getting pretty acute, because it seemed to me at the time that the Prime Minister was going straight back on his Ladybank speech—and even then my only reference to it was a very indirect one, to point out that there could be tyrants in the name of democracy just as in the name of the King —that James II. tried to carry out his tyranny by means of his Army, and he found that the Army broke in his hands. That was the only reference until last week, and I do not think anyone can say that that was a reference which suggested to any officer that it was his duty to take the action which some of them have taken. Nothing could be really further from the truth than the idea that the Army officers represent the aristocracy.
    Mr. J. WARD: Of course they do.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: Of some regiments it may be true, but it is not true of the Army generally. I think this whole —trouble has arisen from two causes. All politicians—men who make politics their life and their profession—gradually get into a habit of looking upon it as a game more or less, and they do not probably as a rule have as strong convictions as they did when they entered on their political career. I think that general human weakness applies with unusual force to Members of the present Government, and I really believe that all this trouble has arisen because, through that human weakness to which I have referred, they did not believe it possible that the men of Ulster had convictions as strong as they have shown themselves to possess. They never did believe it, and, now it has come upon them, they do not know what to do. It is the same thing as regards the Army. The Chancellor of the Exchequer—who I am sorry is not here—I think it was he, perhaps it was the First Lord—spoke about the aristocracy and their hangers on. I am just as little an aristocrat as the
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    Chancellor of the Exchequer himself in every way, but I think there is something which he has not learned which I hope that I have—I am not sure, but I hope—and that is that there is a distinction between aristocrats and gentlemen. I quite realise the use hon. Members are speaking of that—he has not realised the distinction between aristocrats and gentlemen, that there are many aristocrats who-are not gentlemen, and that there are many poor men of all grades of life who, are gentlemen. What he has not realised is that there is some work which gentlemen, whatever their rank in life, will not do, and he has come up against the Army, and finds that no inducement of self-interest will make them do the political work of the Government when they think that is dishonourable. It is all nonsense about the aristocracy.
    But there is something more. Perhaps the hon. Member for Stoke knows as much about this as I do. I am told that the feeling among the men and non-commissioned officers is stronger even than it is among the officers. [An HON. MEMBER: "Will they go on strike?"] The whole feeling is that the Government, without the consent of the country—[Interruption]—that is my feeling, and if I am wrong they can set it right to-morrow—are trying to do something which the Army will not be their tool in doing. A great deal of analogy has been talked about strikes. The Member for Derby said. there was too thin a distinction between civil war and putting down strikes. I cannot see the connection, and I will tell the House why. Soldiers are never used to put down strikers because they are striking. They never would be used for that purpose by any Government. I can repeat what my right hon. Friend said, that no member of a responsible Government would ever use troops in connection with a strike if it were possible to avoid it. The analogy is not there. This would be the analogy, not if the whole population of Ulster practically rose up in revolt against the thing which they think, and I think, you have no right to do, but if the majority there were beginning to intimidate the minority—if the Protestants were beginning to act unfairly to the Catholics. That is the analogy. Let that be done tomorrow, and I will support the right hon. Gentleman in sending troops into Belfast to prevent that unjust tyranny being used over a minority. Before I sit down, I would like to put this to hon. Members on

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    the Labour Benches: In judging whether an officer or any other man is doing what is right or wrong let them put themselves in his place.
    There is a suggestion that this outbreak, or whatever you call it, in the Army is the result of a political intrigue by our party. I can only say that there is not a word of truth in it. It not only came on everyone of us as a surprise, as complete a surprise to me at least as to the Prime Minister, except with this difference, that I always felt sure something of the kind must happen some time from the very nature of the case. We had no part in it, and, what is more, if I could see any way of avoiding it, I would avoid it to-morrow, because apart altogether from higher motives—and I do think in a question of this kind one is actuated by more than party interests—apart altogether from that, nothing can be worse for the whole future of this country than the idea that the Army is taking any part. They are not doing it in my opinion, and if you were to ask either officers or men, if they refused to obey the orders of the Government, they will tell you—at least the officers will; that is my experience—that they have a great contempt for politicians of all kinds, and especially for Front Bench politicians. Soldiers I have met have been men interested in their career, and so far as my experience goes they care nothing about politics. From the nature of their duties they know that they have to serve both parties, and until they give up the Army or go on half-pay it is unwise to take an active part in political action. Put yourselves in the position of an officer. He believes in his heart and conscience, as I do, that the Government are doing this thing without the consent of the country; that in pressing it forward without the approval of the country they are as much a revolutionary committee as President Huerta, who is governing Mexico. That is really my position, and unless I believed it I would not feel justified in the course I have taken. This is the position in which the soldier is placed. He has got to decide whether or not he will obey constituted authority or refuse to do something which is against his conscience. It is a conflict which, as some philosophers have said, is always a most terrible one. It is a conflict, not between right and wrong, but between might and right. If I were in his place, holding the views I do, and if I were asked to take part in an expedition against Ulster, I would
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    resign my commission, if I were permitted to do so. If that permission were refused, and I was told that I should be court-martialled, then I do not know whether I should have the courage to do it or not, but I feel that in that case it would be my clear duty to say, "Very well, if you choose to do it, I prefer to be shot rather than to shoot innocent men." That is the position in which the soldier stands.
    Sir H. DALZIEL: The private, too?
    Mr. BONAR LAW: I said "soldier" and that includes both.
    Mr. J. H. THOMAS: During a strike?
    Mr. BONAR LAW: I tried to point out the difference, which probably, as I was often interrupted, is not very clear.
    Mr. WEDGWOOD: Conscience!
    Mr. BONAR LAW: That is the position in which you are placed. In my belief the Government know as well as I do that the position in which this matter is left is fatal either to the Army or to the country. They have told us all about the manœuvring of Ministers; they have not told us what is the position of General Gough and his fellow officers. Now I would say this to the Government: That this whole difficulty is really due to the political situation to which we have come through the clash of parties in this House. I say, therefore, that any responsible. Government, much more than the Opposition, though we feel the responsibility also, has a duty, and that such a duty as has never rested on anybody rests on the Prime Minister to find some way of saving the nation from an impossible position.
    Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD: I am not quite sure that the House understands what was the purpose of the right hon. Gentleman in making the speech he has just delivered. It was divided into two sections. The first section was thoroughly provocative and typical of his somewhat sleight-of-hand methods of controversy. The second part was apparently an attempt to undo and unsay everything he has said in Ulster, with the single exception of the extract that he quoted from some earlier speech of his when he was still outside and off the Front Opposition Bench. If what he has said about Ulster—it does not matter in its words, and it does not matter how accurately he has

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    weighed his words—both here and in the country, meant anything at all to a soldier, it was an encouragement to the soldier to take the action that has been taken in this case. What is the use of the right hon. Gentleman coming here and telling us this afternoon that he was surprised when certain things happened in the Army? The right hon. Gentleman values himself at too low a valuation. If he was surprised, and I accept his statement, there is only one hon. Member in this House who was surprised, and that is the right hon. Gentleman himself. There is, however, one thing he has not unsaid. He has told us that a soldier can have a conscience when he is directed to put down riotousness in Ulster, but he has been very careful to tell us that the soldier's conscience ought to permit him to put down riotousness when it is associated with strikes.
    Mr. BONAR LAWindicated dissent.
    Mr. G. D. FABER: Nothing of the kind.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: What I said was, that conscience would make it my duty to put down the same sort of thing in Lister just as much as in connection with a strike.
    Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD: If the right hon. Gentleman said that—
    Mr. BONAR LAW: I did.
    Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD: If the right hon. Gentleman says that, I accept it. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman does not want to get out of his own words. I certainly do not want to put words into his mouth on a serious matter like this, but he did say, when he was dealing with the Army and with the question of conscience in Ulster, in reply to an interruption of my hon. Friend the Member for Derby (Mr. J. H. Thomas) in regard to strikes:—
    "But I say that there is a distinction between strikes and civil war in Ulster."
    It is upon that that I made the remark about the right hon. Gentleman. If it is unfair I shall not pursue it, but I am bound to say that anybody who reads the extract from the OFFICIAL REPORT to-morrow morning will draw the same conclusion from it as I have done. Let me give an example of what may happen. Supposing we were to circulate the bare cold words and sentences which will appear in the OFFICIAL REPORT to-morrow morning as an electioneering leaflet, without a single word of comment, I am prepared to let it go. [HON. MEMBERS: "You will?"] Let me
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    repeat what I say, that if the extract from the OFFICIAL REPORT, without a word of comment, but precisely word for word what the right hon. Gentleman said, were circulated as an electioneering pamphlet, it would certainly be responsible for hundreds of working-class votes being taken away from hon. Members opposite.
    Let me take the first part, the provocative part, of the right hon. Gentleman's speech. It is not my duty, and it is not my custom, to say a word regarding attacks made upon my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, but I must, as a Member of this House, protest against the comment made upon a statement of his about the movement of the ships and troops. The statement, to take it for what it was worth, was this: "We assumed that there might be disturbance when the troops were moved up to protect these depots." Had they not a right to assume that, for otherwise the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman opposite and the actions of the right hon. and learned Member for Trinity College (Sir E. Carson), which told us that at some time or other something was going to happen, were all humbug and fraud. When is it more likely to happen? When, if the information before the Cabinet is right, there was going to be an attempt made, by somebody, authorised or unauthorised, to raid these depots where there are arms and ammunition. Surely it was only the ordinary duty of the Cabinet to say, when they moved up these troops, that that might be selected as the time, and that they must make preparations so that it would not spread. The right hon. Gentleman, after describing the effect, went on to say it did not happen, and therefore the plans that were made in preparation lest it should happen were not carried out. What is the comment of the right hon. Gentleman on that? He says that the First Lord taunted the volunteers for not fighting upon that occasion. I say that that sort of recklessness does not, at any rate, become any occupant of the Front. Bench, be it the Government or the Opposition Front Bench. His next example was equally bad. The right hon. Gentleman knows the English language as well as any Member of this House. He read an extract from an anonymous letter. By the way, I think that as the writer has remained anonymous, the general ought also to have remained anonymous, and a good soldier ought not to have his name appear in all to-morrow morning's newspapers as being charged by an anonymous writer.
    Mr. HAMAR GREENWOOD: It is against the King's Regulations.
    Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD: I know nothing about the King's Regulations. I have not had the benefit of the knowledge or training which the hon. Member has had. What was the statement? I was unable to take it down, but this is the gist of it: That steps have been taken that Ulster shall shed first blood, or that the Government have taken steps to provide that, if blood is to be shed at all, Ulster is to shed it first. What does that mean? It means that the Government have taken precautions that the Army shall not be used to initiate any offensive operations against Ulster. I am perfectly willing to admit that the sentence is capable of a double meaning. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] What do hon. Members opposite think of a responsible Member of this House who, knowing that the sentence is capable of a double meaning, insists that it is only capable of the one meaning? That was the provocative part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, and there cannot be the least doubt that it was thoroughly provocative. The other part of the speech was more praiseworthy and peace-loving. I do not quite know what it means, but its tone was so very depressing and depressed that one felt, in looking at the benches opposite, how solemn they were becoming and how silent, and how apparently they tired of what was being said.
    7.0 P.M.
    There are two sections of the subject before us this afternoon, but they are being discussed together when they ought to be separated. The first is this: Have the Government, has a Member of the Government, has Sir Arthur Paget, or has anybody else been making some mistakes that have led to-misunderstandings? I am willing to consider that, I am willing to discuss it, and I am willing to pass judgment upon those who are guilty of mistakes; but I am not willing to discuss that and that alone in connection with the business which is now before us. We are not going to allow hon. Gentlemen opposite to ride off upon that false issue. The issue that is before us is whether generals, as exemplified by General Gough, are going to impose conditions upon a Government before they do their duty as soldiers. I say nothing whatever against their resignations. They have a right to resign if they like, but that is another question altogether. I say nothing against their
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    asking their superior officers what is meant under certain circumstances for the purpose of getting information to which they are perfectly entitled. I am entitled, they are entitled, everyone is entitled who is going to take any responsible action, to know exactly what is wanted. But they are not entitled to go to the Government, through their Department or through their superior officers, and say, "If the Home Rule Bill is carried, we want you to say to us that you are not going to ask us to enforce the Home Rule Bill under any shape or form in the orders that you may issue for us," and that is what they have done. We are told that this is merely a misunderstanding and that they are willing to face riotousness and so on, and do their duty. I say they are not. The whole intention of this move is to make that impossible. What is the use of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Balfour) talking about soldiers refusing to shoot men who simply objected to be turned out of the constitutional ambit of this country? What does he imagine is going to happen? Does he imagine that a number of devoted Ulstermen are going to march on some field, with bands and banners, and to declare that they are opposed to Home Rule, and that somewhere behind a hedge bounding the field there is a British regiment with shot in their guns and ball cartridge in their rifles, and that as soon as these devoted Ulstermen declare that they are going to stand by the Constitution and by the Union, some officer—Sir Arthur Paget, perhaps—is going to give the word to shoot? Is that his idea, or does he think that as soon as Home Rule has passed through this House and Ulster declares that it is not going to accept it, then a body of troops is going to be marched into Ulster, villages are going to be laid waste, and country and town occupied by the troops? There is not a single man of common sense but knows that this is the only way a collision can happen—that the Ulstermen will take the initiative themselves and will begin to break the law. They say, "When did any Government ever ask soldiers to shoot a striker as a striker?" Whoever said they did. That magnificent thin cob-web argument appears in the "Times" this morning. Do they mean to tell us, are they telling their friends in the Army, with whom they are in communication, that it is the intention of anybody or any

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    section in this House to shoot Ulstermen as Ulstermen? I say their inaccuracy has reached a colossal proportion which even I am unwilling to believe possible.
    Mr. CROFT: Have Members of the coalition also been receiving letters from these officers?
    Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD: I regret exceedingly to say that, as far as I am concerned, we have not, otherwise I should be able to give more accurate information than apparently hon. Members opposite can. I am exceeding sorry that we have received no communication whatever, doubtless because we do not belong to the party which receives the political allegiance of these revolting officers. Hon. Members tell us that this is not merely an officer's question, but that non-commissioned officers and the ranks also joined in. I do not know very much about military men. I have a good many friends who are officers in the Army, whom I meet and with whom I profoundly disagree in nearly all political questions. We remain friends nevertheless. But those friends of mine who are officers, if they take up the line of refusing to act, the whole life of the Army, the whole tradition of the Army, the whole spirituel of the Army is such that they will weaken the Army in doing its duty. The complaint that we bring about the Army is this. I believe we have neglected the Army too much. I think that has been an oversight. I was never more convinced of that than I have been in the last three or four weeks. There is nothing that is more galling to one who sees what is going on outside at present than to feel that the Army cannot be trusted to enforce law and order either in Ulster or elsewhere. It is a thing that we must consider in future. We talk about the Army as being aristocratic. We sometimes use a more offensive word than that and say that it is largely snobbish. I think that is not quite fair. It certainly is aristocratic in its feeling, in its ideals, and in its general outlook, and what I feel is that if we had been far more careful in preventing the Army from being officered from these classes, if we had been more careful to increase the pay of the officers, so that more democratically-minded men could go into its higher offices we should not be in the unfortunate position that we are in.
    Mr. HARRY LAWSON: May I suggest. to the hon. Member that the great majority of officers are far poorer than the Labour Members.
    Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD: I am not going to enter into that discussion. I know the conditions under which officers particularly in Cavalry regiments, say, the 5th Lancers, and so on, have to live, and I know the frequent statements made in the Press, which are perfectly accurate, about the difficulty of officers living. I know that a great many of them are poor, because anyone who has come across them, as I have, in their messes, and in large companies of them in India, knows exactly what a very heavy struggle these very deserving men have to go through, but that is not the point. Even then, that does not change the remarks I made regarding the general mental attitude of these men. It is not a question of poverty. The fact of the matter is that they look down upon us very often, and their relations to the classes with which they associate themselves are nearly always the relations of the patron to the one receiving his charity. That being the case, it is the essential fact to remember and not the question whether there is any debt at Scott's or King's, or whether they have a large banker's balance that they can draw upon. The point that we come to in this connection is simply that those officers who have given trouble in Ireland have given trouble not on a question of conscience at all. They have not given trouble on the question of military duty. They have given trouble because they do not agree in political opinions with the majority of this House. In one of those naive confessions that the right hon. Gentleman is constantly making, and several of which he has made this afternoon, he said the Army officer knows no politics. I was very much surprised, but I said nothing. I was perfectly certain that before he went very far he would reply to his own statement, and within two minutes of laying down this innocent dictum, he said, "The reason why these Gentlemen are opposing you is that they know you have no mandate from the country." The right hon. Gentleman is wisely otherwise engaged.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: Was the hon. Member addressing me especially?
    Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD: I was commenting upon the right hon. Gentleman's innocence, which seemed to embarrass him so much that he turned

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    away—at least, that is how it appeared to me. He told us that the Army officers knew no politics—it was a very amazing statement for one who knows a fair number of them. But he immediately went on to say that the reason that they were opposing us now, and were not willing to carry out certain orders in Ulster, was that they were convinced that this House had not received a mandate from the people for carrying out Home Rule.
    Mr. BONAR LAW: That seems much more damaging to the hon. Member than it seems to me. What I said was that they were not party politicians, which surely does not imply that they take no interest in what is going on!
    Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD: I do not mind the right hon. Gentleman correcting himself, but he has certainly not got out of the difficulty, because there is surely no more characteristic badge of party political opinion than that statement. It is only a statement made by party politicians for party purposes. This is the point—that these gentlemen are acting not as soldiers, and not as conscientious objectors, with whom the party opposite has certainly had no patience in days gone by. They are acting as politicians—they are acting as party politicians they are acting as a sort of standing military committee of the National Union of Conservative Associations. Supposing the trouble had been with my hon. Friends opposite. Supposing the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bonar Law) had been on this bench, and they were doing something which compelled my Friends, because of their conscientious objections, to arm themselves with wooden guns as a preliminary to arming themselves with real ones. What would these Army officers have done then? That is the test of the whole thing, and no one who has read what they have said, no one who has discussed the matter with them, as I have done on many occasions and under many circumstances, can come away from the discussion without being conscientiously and honestly convinced that the real trouble with them is that they and we disagree on matters of party politics. They say they are not willing to coerce Ulster. That is perfectly true, but they are perfectly willing to coerce this Government.
    There is another point that I want to bring before this House. General Gough acts, I think, as a Unionist. He is a very brave and good soldier, but, like all of us, he has got his human weaknesses, and I
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    believe he holds very strong opinions regarding Home Rule, and he acted—I think the proof is there—as a politician and not as a soldier in this case. In this connection I want to ask the House to consider this matter: If General Gough came over as a soldier to receive assurances from the Government, how was it that those assurances hardly reached General Gough's hands when they appeared in the Conservative Press of the country? I cannot help thinking that General Gough came over for scalps, and, having got them, he exhibited them, in public in places where he knew the fact would be advertised for the purposes of the party to which he owes his political allegiance. I have heard it said, on what I think is fairly good authority, that he immediately resorted to a well-known Conservative club and exhibited the paper to anybody who cared to see it. I wish to know if that is so. [An HON. MEMBER: "The Constitutional Club."] A very curious thing is this: Whether that is true or not, this document was published and pretty accurately published, and the terms in which it was published indicate that it was shown to somebody for the purpose of being published. Moreover, we listened to speeches in this House yesterday, and among others to that of the hon. Member for South Birmingham (Mr. Amery). The hon. Member knows more about all these communications than anybody ought to know outside the Government. Take this that appeared in the "Times" this morning from the Dublin correspondent with reference to the interview at the War Office with the recalcitrant General:—
    "The proceedings at the War Office were very stormy. Sir John French, whom the officers saw, criticised their action as meriting the severest punishment, and it was only the intervention of Lord Roberts that restored a better feeling. Finally they were presented with a document of many paragraphs written in legal phraseology, and setting forth the conditions on which they would or would not undertake to serve in Ulster.
    General Gough said: 'We are plain soldiers, and we do not understand all these legal terms. We are plain men and want things put plainly. Will you sign the following guarantee?'
    General Gough then read: 'Do we understand we are not to be asked to hear arms against Ulster or to enforce the present Home Rule Bill, and can we return and tell our officers so?'
    After further argument General French wrote at the bottom of this sentence: Yes! This is so,' and signed it.
    Three copies of the document were made, and it was deposited with the legal representative of General Gough, Colonel MacEwen, and Colonel Parker."
    How do these things get out? I am perfectly certain that hon. Members on all sides of the House must unite in condemning these leakages, and the methods taken to make them public. Where do we stand

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    now? As I understand it, the Government repudiates the last two paragraphs of this statement that has been handed to General Gough. It does not hold itself responsible for them. It says it did not sanction them. It is perfectly true that the War Minister says he agrees with them, but, nevertheless, so far as the Government is concerned, it does not associate itself with them, and, so far as this document is an undertaking, the Government say it is an undertaking minus the two paragraphs, but minus the two paragraphs it is no undertaking at all. It is simply a statement handed to General Gough of what his duties are as a soldier, so that the effect of the Prime Minister's speech this afternoon is to tell General Gough that that document must be docked of these two final paragraphs. That puts him exactly where he was immediately before he wrote the letter of 20th March. He has received no reply to that letter, and he has received no guarantee which he can hitch on to that letter. General Gough has been told, therefore, that he is a soldier, and must do the duties of a soldier, or resign his office. That is all I need say on that point. I believe that is the position, and the only possible position, in which the matter can be put, and, in any event, if I am wrong, having made that statement, it surely calls for a reply on behalf of the Government.
    As I said at the beginning, we must not allow our minds to be diverted by what Sir Arthur Paget did, or anybody else did, in reference to this unfortunate blunder and misunderstanding. The thing this House has got to settle now is: Is it going to submit to the interference of soldiers, or is it not? If it is not, then we have to go on with our business, and our business is to pass the Home Rule Bill as quickly as we possibly can, get it inscribed on the Statute Book under the provisions of the Parliament Act, and then we will take the consequences whatever they may be. I am bound to say that I sympathise with the Government in its position this afternoon. If that position, which was revealed in the White Paper, had been the Government position, the Government could not have lived for twenty-four hours. I am delighted that that is not the Government's position. The discussion this afternoon makes it clear once more that we have got to brush aside these superficial accidents, and that we are going to take our stand again against the agitation which has been
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    manufactured by hon. Gentlemen opposite. They lost the support of the House of Lords, and they fell back on the support of Army officers who share their political opinions. They confess even now that there is to be a distinction between officers and soldiers doing their duty in Ulster and officers and soldiers doing their duty during the time of a trade dispute. [An HON. MEMBER: "NO!"] They have repeated to-day, through the words of their own Leader, that there is a distinction between the position in Ulster and the position during a strike. They say that it is a matter of conscience in Ulster. Then let them take that stand. We will see to it in the country that their position is perfectly well understood. They cannot get out of it by magnifying these mistakes and these blunders. They have got to face the consequences of their own action, and if their action had been successful, it would have meant that the Army would have overridden the decisions of this House, and, so far as we are concerned, we shall never submit to such action.
    Lord C. BERESFORD: I would like to emphasise what the Prime Minister said to-day, and what one of the Radical papers said last night, that the cardinal error in this deplorable business was the asking of the officers, first of all, if they would undertake certain duties. Never was such a thing done before. You give officers orders, and you see that they carry these, orders out. The hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. Ramsay Macdonald) and others are surprised that these officers were asked by the Government if they would undertake certain duties under certain circumstances, and I feel that the Government require to give them an answer to the question, Why did these officers conic over here? Under certain conditions those who live in Ulster were to be excused from serving, while others said, "If we are to be called upon to enforce the Home Rule Bill in Ulster we shall decline." The cardinal mistake of the Government was in asking the officers whether they would undertake certain duty. By that cardinal mistake, the Government have brought the whole thing on themselves. The Secretary of State for War knows that you do not send for officers of the Army and Navy and say to them, "What are you going to do under' these conditions?" You give them orders, and if they do not carry them out the refusal is at their peril. Yes, but circumstances may arise, common to us all, in

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    which a man's conscience and honour goes before his duty in the Service, and he takes the risk, sacrifices his career, is liable to be tried by court-martial, and is liable to be punished. That is discipline. But it is never discipline to send for an officer and ask him whether he is going to carry out a certain order. That bench [the Treasury] is to blame for the whole thing. There were preparations no doubt. It is reported that the Fleet was ordered to go to certain positions, and that field guns were to be taken on board. Do you suppose that was to increase the guard for a few rifles and stores? Of course, there was something more behind it. The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well, with all his ingenuity and his quibbling, if I may say so, that there was more behind it.
    Colonel SEELYindicated dissent.
    Lord C. BERESFORD: The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head. Why did he ask these officers to go back under certain conditions? It was prejudicial to discipline and brought the whole of this thing about, and a deplorable thing it is. I do not mind what hon. Members below the Gangway say about the aristocrats of the Army. They are just as proud of the British Army as I am. Is it worth their while, then, to throw all this abuse on the officers? Have the officers ever done anything to the men? Are not the officers beloved by the men? Are not there many of them in both Services in such a position that the men would go to the devil for them? That being so, why try to throw at them this small, mean, contemptible lie that the officers are going to try to influence the men? I guarantee there is not one single one of those officers who would make any effort to shake the allegiance of his men to the Crown. The hon. Member for Leicester laid it down that the Army is to be subservient to the country. I absolutely agree. We do not want military government or naval government. We want government by the people. This mistake which has occurred I look upon as deplorable, because, whatever line you take, you will have some of the Service one way and some another way, but the Service has got to obey definite orders, and they have not got to be asked what they are to do under certain circumstances. You are to blame, and nobody else, for what has happened, and if the Secretary of State for War is true to what he said, he will insist on his resignation. He will not let it appear for one moment that there
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    was anything of such a nature as, "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." He will insist that his resignation is accepted.
    He has not only made the cardinal and vital error of asking officers and men what they would do if ordered in certain circumstances, but he made the error which he has himself confessed to-day. I am very much puzzled with the position of those officers now. They, having been asked their opinion, came over here and gave it, and. then they got a letter absolving them and telling them— which was altogether wrong, in my opinion—that they would not be required to act in certain circumstances. Now the Prime Minister tells us that that is not the fact, that that is not the opinion of the Government, but it is distinctly the opinion of the Secretary of State for War, and that is another reason why he should insist on his resignation The Prime Minister now says that the important clauses of that letter are scratched out. Then in what position are those officers, having been asked what they would do, if they were employed under Home Rule and having given their answer in good faith? The Prime Minister says that there was a misunderstanding. There is a very big fog over the whole affair. We should know from some Member of the Government in what position those officers are? Are they now on active service under their old conditions under which they should be that they must resign and be tried by court martial if they refuse to, obey an order? Or are they still in command of their regiment, on the understanding contained in the documents given to them, that they were relieved from being employed in Ulster? The Leader of the Unionist party—my leader—was laughed at for saying that there was a great deal of difference between an aristocrat and a gentleman. He was perfectly right. There are many aristocrats who are the most unbounded cads. There are many men on the lower deck and men in the barrack room who are the most chivalrous. gentlemen. They may not have been born wealthy, but they have got all the characteristics that make a gentleman—chivalry, sense of duty, good conduct, unselfishness and gallantry.
    Do not try to make out that the officers are all rich and aristocrats. We have tried, and I personally have tried for many many years in this House, to get men promoted from the lower deck, and many other officers have done the same. An

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    enormous amount of our correspondence is concerned with looking after our old comrades and our old shipmates. We do not forget them. They do not forget us. Do not try to revile us. It is not worthy of the Labour party. They know that it is not true. It is only because they are a little bit excited over this question that they do so; and, believe me, we are just as keen as they, that the naval and military forces of the Crown should remember that they are the servants of the people, and on no conditions are they to dominate politics. On the other hand, if such a thing as civil war comes about, what becomes of all the sympathy and patriotism, good comradeship and loyalty, that keep the Services together now? It all disappears. The whole reason of it, the links of the chain that holds together, disappear. There are two sides. Each side is violent and vengeful in what they believe is for their conscience, and their belief in what is right. That has nothing to do with strikes. There is no great sentiment in strikes. That is the weapon adopted by workmen when there is a dispute in some great trade. Whoever said a word against trade unions? No sensible man ever did. Look at their history. Before the advent of the trade unions the workmen of this country did not get a fair share of the output. [An HON. MEMBER: "They do not now."] Possibly. They certainly did not in the old days. Certainly the workmen have benefited by the trade unions, and as long as the trade unions keep command of the working people and do not let syndicalism and that sort of thing get hold of them, they will always be respected, and do good for the working man.
    But strikes! It is not for strikes that the soldiers and sailors are used. Soldiers and sailors, each loathe and detest policing. But when they are called in, it is simply to protect life and to protect property, and to prevent injuries, which are the last thing that hon. Gentlemen on those benches want. That sort of thing does not help a strike. Burnings and shootings do not help a strike in any way, but trade unions can help a strike. But again I would emphasise that the cardinal mistake was made when the Government asked officers what they would do if they received certain instructions, and I ask the Prime Minister, or any hon. or right hon. Gentleman who is going to reply, to tell me what is the position of those officers
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    who go home with a definite written understanding, which the Prime Minister has now repudiated? Are those officers now to be tried by court martial? Have they the option of resigning? Because they cannot be in two positions at once. They either remain under the written guarantee that was given to them, or if that is repudiated by the Government, the Government must now turn round and say to those officers, "Obey your orders or resign." That is the position. There should be no dealings whatever with any officer or any men, asking them what they are going to do in certain circumstances. It is like an admiral who makes a signal and then gives his reasons for making it, and everybody says "What a silly reason," whereas, if he gives his orders, everybody can understand them, and they can be carried out, and that is what ought to be done in the Services.
    The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir Edward Grey): The Noble Lord opposite has enunciated a great deal in general terms of what seems to me exceedingly sound doctrine, both as to the separation of the naval and military services from all policies and as to the way in which orders ought to be given and orders ought to be received. I have no quarrel with the doctrine or general statement which the Noble Lord laid down on those points with very great technical authority, backed by his own personal experience. I cannot agree that it follows from what he said, that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War should take his advice with regard to insisting on his resignation. He expressed a strong opinion that he thought that my right hon. Friend was bound to insist on his resignation. I did not quite gather why.
    Lord C. BERESFORD: May I explain why? First, he made a cardinal error, which he confessed, in adding to the document, and, second, he consulted officers as to what they were going to do under certain circumstances.
    Sir E. GREY: The Noble Lord's statement is that my right hon. Friend ought to insist on his resignation because he made two errors as to what actually took place. My right hon. Friend knew what actually took place, and as to the extent to which he committed errors there is his own statement before the House, to which I have nothing to add. Taking my right

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    hon. Friend's own statement laid before the House, what ought to be the motive and the considerations which regulate his own personal decision? I think one and only one thing—the public interest: no personal consideration, but the public interest. By that I trust that my right hon. Friend will regulate, in consultation with the Prime Minister, any decision to which he comes. I agree that the questions involved in this are larger, I suppose everyone realises now, than ever was supposed when this question was first raised. Surely, after the Debate of yesterday, and after such speeches as we have had from the hon. Member for Leicester this afternoon, no one in this House, and least of all no one on the Opposition side of the House, is doubtful how large this question is, and also that it will become larger and more serious and more dangerous the longer it is kept up. In what I shall say I shall endeavour, by again restating the position of the Government, to clear up the facts as far as we can clear them up, and not to lead to contention or keep the question open, but to bring it to a close. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition made a point which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour) also made when he said, "What did the Government really intend in this matter?" What it intended was expressed in the written instructions of the 14th March, which is contained in the White Paper, and for which the whole Cabinet is responsible, not in its actual terms, but it was, in the way the Secretary of State for War put it, perfectly accurately, the instructions for which the whole Cabinet is responsible. It is assumed—and I believe with all sorts of imputations and motives—that the Government really intended to go beyond that, and that they had much more in their mind. That is absolutely untrue.
    What is the test of the Leader of the Opposition as to this question? He said that what tile Government really intended depended on what General Paget said. I understand that there is no written record of what he said. I know no more than what the Secretary of State has told the House of what General Paget told him. But I do not mind what General Paget did say. If General Paget said, or thought, that more was intended by the Government than I have said was intended, it was due to an honest misunder-
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    standing on his part. If he did not think so, and if his words conveyed to others what the others understood from his words, that more was intended, then there was an honest misunderstanding on their part. I will say no word which would put any responsibility or blame whatever upon General Paget. If there was a misunderstanding on his part, it was an honest misunderstanding. I will say nothing which would create difficulty between General Paget and the officers who heard him, because if there was a misunderstanding on their part, it is on their responsibility, and it was an honest misunderstanding. We should have the whole text of General Paget's speech, and we can only have his recollection and the recollection of others of what he actually said. But even if we had the whole text of whatever he said, it would come simply to this, that on the part of somebody there was a misunderstanding, say an honest misunderstanding, of the intentions of the Government, which were what the Prime Minister declared them to be, and what the written instructions which are existing textually, dated 14th March, declared were the intentions of the Government.
    Mr. DUKE: In the letter which General Gough wrote to the War Office from the headquarters, Irish Command, General Gough appears to quote as words having been used to him by Sir Arthur Paget, the words: "Active operations in Ulster," and up to now there has been no disclaimer from Sir Arthur Paget of that quotation, and no explanation of it in the statement of the Prime Minister.
    Sir E. GREY: I will come to General Gough's letter subsequently, and deal with it as a separate thing. I take next, as indication of the intentions of the Government, what the right hon. Gentleman opposite quoted as being the words of Sir Charles Ferguson, the officer:—
    "Steps have been taken in Ulster so that any aggression must come from Ulster."
    Those, I understand, were words used orally. The right hon. Gentleman gets them from a source of which he can only tell us in general terms, and they are not Sir Charles' version of his own words, but the version of somebody who heard them. On those words, the right hon. Gentleman puts the construction that Sir Charles Ferguson deliberately conveyed to a subordinate officer, not merely that steps have been taken in Ulster, but that these are the actual words:

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    "Steps had been taken to provoke Ulster." To the words of Sir Charles Ferguson, taken literally in their meaning, I have no objection to make. They are very much in accordance with things I have said continually in my speeches in the Recess, that if violence was offered it would be met by force. To say the meaning of that is to provoke Ireland is absolutely untrue. Is it the case that people are seeking to find provocation on behalf of Ulster, attributing statements of intention to the Government, and acts to the Government, which are provocative to Ulster, and which have no foundation in fact? I take, for instance, what I am told is so current and so firmly rooted in Ulster at the present moment, that no denial is accepted, that warrants had been issued for the arrest of certain persons. For that there is not an atom of foundation of truth. There has been no such intention; no warrants have been issued, and there is no foundation whatever for that statement becoming current throughout Ulster. If there be provocation, and if provocation arises in that way, is the Government to be held responsible for provocation because of statements of that kind The policy of the Government as stated in the first paragraph of the letter of the 14th March is the real one. We had apprehensions that any movement, however purely defensive on our part, might lead to disturbances.
    Hon. Members have expressed, sometimes, incredulity that there should have been really such an apprehension on our part. But have we not reason for it? I do not say that with regard to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College (Sir E. Carson). So far as I have read his speeches, he has not used language to indicate that he himself would do anything, except everything he could to prevent an actual outbreak. But he is not the only person who has made speeches. I remember very well in the autumn, when a discussion was going on as to a possible conference between right hon. Gentlemen opposite and the Prime Minister, how it was frequently stated in the Press that "the sands were running out," and that if we did not summon a conference, if we did not soon come to an agreement before the end of the year, or at any rate before Parliament assembled, it would be too late and an outbreak would occur in Ulster. I knew from some of the reports which were
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    put before us what might possibly happen, but, in becoming a party to the decision of the 14th of March to send further troops to the North of Ireland for purely defensive purposes, I remember very well going through, in my own mind, the kind of objections to it that might arise, that it might be misconstrued and thought to give provocation. I overruled that on the reports we had of the completely defenceless position of certain important depots and so forth, and the temptation—not necessarily to the leaders of this movement in Ulster—in the state of feeling to someone who would really like to make an attack. I think no Government ought, in the present state of things in the North of Ireland, to be exposed to that risk, and for that reason, when it was decided to make these movements which have been made recently, in making them it was absolutely necessary, as I consider, for my right hon. Friend to give such orders as to warn the officers, who had to carry out those instructions, that they must be prepared, whether it was probable or improbable, to-take such precautions as could be taken to ensure that if an outbreak or misadventure did occur—and it might be caused by the slightest incident, as we have been told—they should be ready to meet it.
    It is urged by hon. Members opposite that we sent too large a force, and took too many precautions for the object we had in view. I have heard in this House sometimes reproaches addressed to the Government for doing something with too weak a force when the object was simple, protective and defensive, and it was said that the very weakness of the force might be an incentive to some other responsible persons. That is the real dimension and extent of the intention, the real policy, with which the Government undertook the operations which have attracted so much notice. Now I come to the serious question which is raised by the letter of General Gough, dated the 20th of March, and which contains the terms "duty as ordered," to which I can see no possible objection whatever, and "active operations." We cannot judge of the words without the context before us. In any event the mere movement of troops is an active operation. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"] Then you must have the context. There is nothing which gives the context. These are mere quotations in General Gough's letter from what he heard said. You get five words: "Duty as ordered" and "active operations" from an address by General Paget—five words which

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    General Gough records in the letter. It is quite clear there was a misunderstanding.
    Mr. SANDYS: It is quite evident from the way this letter is written that General Gough knew when he wrote it that the context would be in the knowledge of those to whom it was addressed.
    8.0 P.M.
    Sir E. GREY: Then the context would be different from what I have said would be the policy of the Government. But it is not so. General Gough goes on in the next sentence to show that he is in doubt as to what is meant. He says:—
    "If such duty consists of the maintenance of order and the preservation of property, all the officers in this Brigade, including myself, would be prepared to carry out their duty."
    That means, if you examine the letter closely, that General Gough thought that that was the possible construction of what General Paget had said. But another possible construction is, of course, perfectly true. It is at least the case that General Gough thought the duty he was prepared to carry out was a possible construction of the instructions he had received. I appeal to the Noble Lord opposite that the proper and efficient way of answering General Gough's statement would have been to say at once, "With regard to this paragraph, 'such duty consists of the maintenance of order and the preservation of property,' is the duty which your officers are to carry out. That is the proper construction of the orders given to you. We have nothing more to do with those who are prepared to perform that duty. Resume your command." Just remember what the Secretary of State said. He had not that letter before him when he sent his instructions to relieve the officers of their commands or their resignation should be refused. He had not that letter before him. When did he get it? It was brought over when the officers came over. The statement is that he ought at once, having received that letter, not to have sent to the officers at all. He never got the letter at all till the officers came over with it. He summoned them, having nothing before him except that they were unable to obey their orders. He sent for them to come over here. He then gets that particular letter, and it is quite clear that there has been a misunderstanding, and that misunderstanding was cleared up. I understand the hon. Member for Leicester to say with regard to that letter that he differentiates it entirely from the subse-
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    quent letters—that is to say, that in carrying out these particular instructions, to say "I want to know actually what the orders are and what I am intended to do" is a perfectly legitimate question. In the first letter from General Gough there is no question about the future, as the right hon. Gentleman opposite says. It is a question about the actual orders he had received verbally as to the actual meaning and scope of them. I now come to the further letter which General Gough wrote on the 23rd March. That is a letter which does seem to me to make conditions not only about the future, but about policy, and as such it is a letter to which no Government could possibly reply by making conditions or anything in the nature of conditions. As to the particular responsibility for what appears in the Paper, as a reply to it of course the Secretary of State for War has told the actual story. For the last two paragraphs of that reply he himself, and not technically the whole Army Council, he himself and Sir John French were responsible. [An HON. MEMBER made a remark which was inaudible.] It is a question of whether the whole Army Council is concerned. I am thinking of people outside the Army Council, and it is a question whether the whole Army Council sent that letter or the three whose initials appear on the document. As regards the Cabinet, the Cabinet are responsible for the first three paragraphs, absolutely responsible, as the Prime Minister has said. When we were responsible for those three paragraphs, which remain our considered opinion, and which there is no reason for us to alter in any way now, we had not even got General Gough's letter of the 23rd March before us, and when the first draft was made the Secretary of State for War had not General Gough's letter before him.
    Let us come to what happened between the Cabinet and the Secretary of State for War If you come to the question of what is the meaning of those two paragraphs, you must read them together, and if they are to be construed, as I think they ought to be construed, that if the civil authorities should be unable to keep order under any circumstances in Ulster, and should a single policeman be attacked, there is nothing in these two paragraphs to prevent the Army, or to relieve the Army or anyone in the Army of his obligation to give full assistance. Then as regards the actual meaning, I do not say much more—
    Mr. J. WARD: What does General Gough say?
    Mr. AMERY: What does General French say?
    Sir E. GREY: I will come to that. When my right hon. Friend said he stood by those, that is the sense in which I understand he does stand by them. Why do we not endorse them and accept responsibility for these two paragraphs? Because they appear in this Paper, apparently as an answer to a letter from General Gough making conditions, and because the Prime Minister stated that General Gough's return to his command was unconditional, and because we say the same to-day. His return was not the subject of any bargaining with regard to the future or the policy of His Majesty's Government. General Gough, whom I do not know personally, we all know has the reputation of being a most gallant and courageous officer, who has attracted the admiration of all who know him by his public record. When the Noble Lord opposite asked me what his position was now, his position is that which the Prime Minister has stated. [An HON. MEMBER: "Has he resigned?"] He is in his command now—it is perfectly well known to General Gough, or will be to-morrow, what is the actual answer of the Government, and what is the position. We stand by the first three paragraphs of the answer of the Government to General Gough, and we are responsible for nothing else. Our view of those two paragraphs is what I have stated, but I do wish to remove this misapprehension. If General Gough thinks those two paragraphs are an answer in the negative to his question in that letter—
    "In the event of the present Home Rule Bill becoming law, can we be called upon to enforce it on Ulster under the expression of maintaining law and order?"
    —if he thinks those two paragraphs are an answer to his question in that letter, then I say definitely he must understand that he has put a question in that letter to which no Government can give an answer, not even the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition.
    Lord C. BERESFORD: Why did you ask him?
    Sir E. GREY: His question was, in the event of the present Home Rule Bill becoming law—
    "Can we be called upon to enforce it on Ulster under the expression of maintaining law and order?"
    He puts it quite unconditionally. The right hon. Gentleman opposite has told us
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    that there are conditions, though he says and emphasises not present conditions, but there are possible conditions, in which a Government would be justified, even I think his Government, in not answering that question; but I go further than that, and I say that is not a question which an officer should put. At the end of what I have to say I will explain why.
    First, let me say one word on a question on which the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Bonar Law) and the Member for the City of London dwelt so much, that of the iniquity of coercing Ulster at all. Under present conditions, I have had in my mind a great distinction between the use of force to keep order, and to protect against possible attack, and the use of force to coerce. I have never contemplated that the question of the use of force to coerce the submission of Ulster to the operation of the Home Rule Bill could possibly become a practical question for one moment. We have contemplated nothing but the use of force, and I think I have said we would use force if a Protestant majority in any part of Ulster attacked a Catholic minority, as we would in the South of Ireland if it was a Catholic majority attacking a Protestant minority, and we would do it to protect Government property or the person of Government officials if they were attacked. The right hon. Gentleman does not differ from that, and, in fact, he endorsed it in part of his speech. When we come to the question of the coercion of Ulster, and to compel them to submit to the operation of the Home Rule Bill, I would say this: If, finally, under all conditions, it becomes absolutely impossible to get the will of this country and to make the will of this country as to the way in which the Irish question is to be settled, prevail by agreement, then, of course, there will be nothing else for it but the use of force, but I trust, and I still believe that that time will not come.
    I look with the greatest reluctance, and I must say with the greatest loathing, to the prospect of having to coerce even a minority, and those of us in this House who in the old days consistently opposed coercion for the other parts of Ireland cannot be expected to look forward with anything but the greatest dislike to lending ourselves into anything which would mean coercion for the other parts of Ireland. I still hope that may be avoided by some agreement, but I will not go into that to-night. The speech which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition

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    made the other day on the Vote of Censure, if that is to be discussed, I think the proper occasion will be on the Home Rule Bill next week. I will not introduce it here. The particular method he suggested may not be applicable, but the mere fact that he made a suggestion is a reason for continuing the discussion on our part and not closing it. Therefore, if the House wishes to know with regard to the policy of the Government if we are prepared to use force in the first sense in which I stated it, then I say we are prepared to use it to whatever extent it may be required. If it is a question of force to coerce Ulster eventually to accept something to which they are bitterly opposed, that is a contingency which cannot arise until after some time, and which we still intend to labour to avoid. I cannot help remembering when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London speaks of the iniquity of coercing Ulster, or almost as he put it, the rebellion of Ulster, I think he did not use the word "rebellion," but that is roughly what he meant, against the Home Rule Bill, which he does not qualify by any question of whether the Home Rule Bill came after an election, or before an election, I cannot help feeling what I have felt again and again about the right hon. Gentleman's speeches about Ireland, the one-sidedness of them. Surely that sort of language, used with regard to the reluctance of Ulster to accept the Home Rule Bill, must be what is in people's minds when they justify the resistance of Ireland nearly one hundred years back. It has a double edge.
    I may say, finally, again returning to the general observations—if an officer puts a question about policy, and asks for conditions in regard to the future, as the Prime Minister said explicitly, officers ought not to ask questions, and supposing the officer asks those questions, they are questions to which he must be told no Government can give an answer, and even though in regard to their own policy they are prepared to give the answer which he wants—it is an answer which, in the public interest, they ought not to give. First of all, I think it is not in the interests of the discipline of the Army that officers should ask such a question. It is quite true, of course, that if a conflict arose on a question of policy as regards orders between the Government of the day and the Army, it might bring us very near a revolution. There is one thing which
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    would certainly bring us to a revolution, as I think the House must realise, and that is, if any British Government ever allowed itself to be put in a position where it could be imputed to it that it had taken its policy from, or allowed its policy to be influenced by, the politics of officers in the Army. That would be a certain road to revolution. That is why I say I believe that this has arisen originally out of a perfectly honest misunderstanding, and I doubt whether General Gough himself could have realised the fire that he was kindling—perhaps he does now after the Debate in the House—by putting what I dare say what appeared to him a perfectly innocent question. We consider that if this incident is to be closed, as I trust it may be, it must be closed on the note that there is no question raised by the Army in respect to the orders given them, and that as regards policy, the policy is that of the Government, which is not influenced by the Army, or attempted to be influenced by the Army. It is because we believe that on that note the incident is to be closed, that we have laid these Papers before the House, and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War has given the very frank explanation that he has of his own part in the matter, and the Prime Minister has given an equally frank and authoritative statement of the position of the Government.
    It being a Quarter-past Eight of the clock, and there being Private Business set down by direction of the Chairman of Ways and Means, under Standing Order No. 8, further Proceeding was postponed without Question put.

  PRIVATE BUSINESS.

    GLASGOW CORPORATION (CELLULOID) BILL (By Order).
    Read a second time, and committed.
    Ordered, That if the Local Legislation Committee, when the Glasgow Corporation (Celluloid) Bill has been committed to them, shall report to the Committee of Selection that the Bill should in their opinion be referred to another Committee, the Committee of Selection shall there-upon refer the Bill to the Select Committee nominated by them upon the London County Council (General Powers) Bill, who shall consider and report the Bill to the House:
    Ordered, That such of the petitioners as pray to be heard by themselves, their counsel, agents, or witnesses be heard on their petitions against the Bill if they think fit, and counsel heard in support Of the said Bill against such petitions.—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]

  CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 1) BILL.
  Postponed Proceeding resumed on Amendment to Question, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—[Colonel Seely.]
  Which Amendment was to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this clay six month s."—[Mr. Balfour.]
  Question again proposed. Debate resumed.
  Mr. EDWARD WOOD: I am sure that those of us who heard the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who spoke last will have listened to it with great interest and with a measure of agreement. Upon the part, with which I find myself in agreement, I will say a word presently. There are one or two other points to which I should like to call attention first. I confess that I am quite unable to follow all the niceties and subtleties that we find ourselves compelled to attempt if we are to appreciate all the various interpretations which right hon. and hon. Members opposite have put upon the White Paper issued to-day. To my mind, all the subtleties to which we have listened this afternoon may be reduced to one comparatively simple question, and that is, in what sense, if any, are we to understand that the two paragraphs in the final communication in the White Paper, or anything like them, will stand in the minds of General Gough and the other officers? That really is the one point of this discussion, and that is the point upon which I think the House is still unenlightened, even after the speeches of three right hon. Gentlemen on the Treasury Bench. I draw attention to the point for this reason. It would appear to be quite clear that on this matter either the policy of His Majesty's Government has undergone a change or the officers who felt it their duty to do a certain thing three days ago have changed their minds to-day. I think we have a right to be told whether those officers have changed their minds or whether the Government has changed its
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  policy. The right hon. Gentleman drew a considerable distinction between the two letters from General Gough. I do not wish to pursue that point beyond saying that to my mind and to the minds of ninny of my hon. Friends the distinction exists only in the right hon. Gentleman's imagination. As far as I can understand it, the position of these officers, be it right or be it wrong, has been identical throughout. As far as I can judge, their position has been unchanged, and for aught I know it remains unchanged at this moment. That is a mere statement of fact.
  I want now to come to one or two rather more general considerations. The Debate yesterday, to most of which I listened, seemed to me to proceed upon two main lines of thought. The first, which was a perfectly intelligible one from the point of view of hon. Gentlemen opposite, was that it was necessary for them to find somewhere a scapegoat for these proceedings. In the first place, they attempted to find as their scapegoat the various officers concerned. But the officers concerned, I think, have been absolutely exonerated by the conditions under which they were affected by the proceedings. I do not know whether hon. Members opposite will take the "Westminster Gazette" as an impartial witness in this matter. Here is what that journal said last night with regard to the principles which ought to govern the relations of the Government to the Army:—
  "The first of these is that there can be no argument with officers in the Army about the orders issued to them, and from this it follows that to ask officers what they would do in conceivable circumstances which has not yet arisen is to put both them and the Government in a radically false position. If an officer's private judgment is thus challenged, we cannot complain because he claims to exercise it, or appeals to his conscience against an order which he is asked not merely to execute but to endorse."
  I confess that that is actually my view. I presume that that is the view of hon. Gentlemen opposite. If so, I think that they will be unjust to place the blame on the shoulders of the officers in this matter. Then they will blame us, the Opposition. As one right hon. Gentleman below me said this afternoon, it is really difficult to take that kind of accusation seriously. Do hon. Gentlemen opposite mean to say seriously that sixty out of seventy-two officers are really prepared to resign their commissions, their careers, and their pensions at the instigation of a few political wirepullers? No! that, I think, is a sort of statement that hon. Members themselves would be ashamed to make when

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  they have had time to consider it more. This afternoon we have seen a scapegoat chosen in the person of the War Minister. I think he has been treated a little bit harshly. I think, if he felt it his duty to resign, that there were perhaps others who might have felt it equally their duty to share that course with him. If Ministers on the whole, as I understand, do disapprove absolutely of the course that he permitted himself to pursue, I can hardly conceive how, in a vital matter like this, he can be thought to retain the confidence of those with whom he has habitually worked.
  There is another matter that is even more important. It is that line of thought that hon. Members opposite have had up till now. We have heard a great deal this afternoon of this, namely, that the question of Ulster and the Ulster difficulty is indistinguishable from the ordinary questions which may be involved in a strike or a trade disturbance. I do not wish to argue that beyond saying that the real difficulty surely consists in the fact that in strikes the Army, or the soldiers, are sent to keep order, and are only sent when order has been interfered with, and they only use force if force on the other side has been used so that property and life are in danger. That is not what right hon. Gentlemen have been doing in this case of Ulster. There they took the earliest opportunity, as we have heard, and as has been admitted, to send troops into the province. I will draw the attention of hon. Members to the difference in practice which exists in the way the right hon. Gentlemen opposite deal with labour disputes and with Ulster. In the case of a labour dispute in South Wales, as I remember very well, the First Lord of the Admiralty sent soldiers down. He was, however, careful to keep the soldiers out of sight, and what I may call out of harm's way, in order to avoid any possible danger of collision between the military and the civilian portion of the population.
  Mr. EDGAR JONES: That is not trite.
  Mr. E. WOOD: With all respect to the hon. Member who interrupts me, I heard the First Lord of the Admiralty say that in this House when he was blamed. I remember very well hon. Members on this side of the House, and, indeed, in every quarter of the House, blame him because it was supposed that he had held back the military a longer time than was wise in the interests of the preservation of order.
  Mr. E. JONES: The First Lord's statement was not correct!
  Mr. E. WOOD: If the position of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Merthyr Tydvil is that he knows more as to what was the disposition of the military than the First Lord, who was then Home Secretary, and responsible, of course, I have no more to say.
  Mr. E. JONES: I was there; it is in my Constituency.
  Mr. E. WOOD: I heard it on the highest authority, namely, that of a Minister of the Crown, who was responsible for these movements. There is a marked distinction between the way in which the Government treats Ulster and the way in which they treat labour disputes in this country. I have only one more word to say. It is in the nature of one or two general observations along the line of thought suggested by the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary. I adhere, and shall be willing to subscribe—and, indeed, I believe all my hon. and right hon. Friends will do the same—to those doctrines as to the obedience and allegiance of the armed forces of the Crown that were laid down by my Noble Friend (Lord C. Beresford) who spoke a short time ago. It is, I conceive, the undoubted duty of officers and men to obey orders. If they cannot obey orders, they must resign their commissions and take the consequences. It is perfectly true, as my Noble Friend pointed out, that the whole of this muddle, which everybody who has any imagination to look beyond the immediate result must deplore—is due to the way in which it has been handled by the Government, and, of course, principally by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. While saying that I would go a step further. I would say that wise statesmen will always avoid bringing those matters in when these questions may be raised to the test, and for the reason that, as the right hon. Gentleman has just said, these matters are grave, are indeed graver than any others that we are usually called upon to discuss in this House.
  It is because I feel that the average man in the country is feeling at the present moment—I do not draw a distinction between either party very much in this matter, for I feel that both parties have in this Irish controversy mismanaged and bungled it for the last two years—and will be disposed to lay a greater share of the responsibility for that upon the shoulders

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  of the Government—because they are, of course, primarily responsible—because I feel that, because I feel that the Foreign Secretary who preceded me, I think really felt something of that too, that I and others who feel with me would welcome—if it is not yet too late—those sentiments and those advances towards consent that I was able to notice in his speech. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Lloyd George) must surely by now admit this: whether the Government Bill be good or bad, you cannot get a settlement of the question by any scheme that involves anything like the coercion of Ulster. If that be true, as you—I speak to the right hon. Gentlemen opposit—know in your hearts it is true, why not put your pride on one side and come down into the arena and set to work frankly with us? I think I can say that there are lots of goodwill on these benches. Why will you not set to work to seek to make a national settlement, which will, not only be a settlement, but really national, and, because it is national, have the best and fairest chance of being permanent. If the right hon. Gentleman is going to take part in this Debate, let him use time arts at his disposal to persuade hon. Members on all sides of the House to set to work, to put their heads together in no party spirit, but in that spirit which I have hinted at, and I venture to think he will then do a better day's work for his country than he would if he toured the country making speeches, one a week, like those he made last week at Huddersfield. Really, the right hon. Gentleman cannot be pleased with his speech at that moment. I do not suppose he is really very pleased with it now, but the right hon. Gentleman would have something to boast about in years to come if he was able to point back to a national settlement of this Irish question and to say that that was largely his work. I hope he will attempt to do that, and that he will forgive my impertinence in saying that that is the feeling of a great many people who are tired and sick unto death of these party squabbles on questions that ought not to be party questions, and that if he did suggest such a settlement there are many on this side of the House who would be only too ready and willing and glad to consider it.
  Mr. MOLTENO: I am glad to hear from the lips of the hon. Member who has just sat down that he is agreed that it is the duty of Army officers to obey the orders
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  of their superiors. That is rather reflecting upon the statement made by the Front Bench opposite that in certain circumstances officers may pick and choose as to whether they will obey or not. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition only a few minutes ago told us that in his opinion the Army is not obeying because it thinks the Government have no mandate. That is conditioning the obedience of the Army. I do not understand that the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down does that.
  Mr. WOOD: I was careful to say that they had the alternative of resigning, and that was the opinion of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition also.
  Mr. MOLTENO: And of taking the consequences of disobeying and making trouble in the Army. I did not rise really to deal with that question, but I want to deal with the question as a whole, because it appears to me we are really face to face with the gravest issue this Parliament has had to deal with, and indeed, which any Parliament in this generation has had to deal with, because it takes us back to the fundamental principle upon which our Constitution and Army is based. Let me say at once how much I welcome the language of the Prime Minister and of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs upon this subject. They have laid down principles which are the principles we wish to see adhered to in these matters. As I said, we are face to face with this very great and fundamental question. Are we, the representatives of the people in this country, to be free, without any interference whatever, to make such laws as we may think best for the peace, order and good government of this country? That is really the fundamental question with which we are faced to-day. This is not a new question. It is quite true, in this House, we thought it was settled almost centuries ago, and that this House had that liberty and freedom. What is the position to-day? The position really is this, that we have officers in the Army—I will not say the Army itself—but officers of the Army claiming to decide what measures of ours it will carry out and what it will refuse to obey. That is absolutely clear from the second letter of General Gough, in which he asked that if the Home Rule Bill becomes law he wants to make a condition. I say we are challenged by this section of the Army as regards our right

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  to make laws which we consider right and proper for the peace and good government of this country. We understand these Army officers are under the impression that they have gone back on conditions. We see it stated in the morning papers that General Gough has stated that the object of his journey to London has been achieved. I should like to quote his words; they are very serious indeed. He is reported to have said:—
  "The object of our journey to London is performed. We have brought hack the written assurance that the troops under my command shall not be used to enforce the present Home Rule Bill."
  That is the impression General Gough apparently is under and conveyed to the troops under his command, and, indeed, we see that there has been a triumphal progress on the part of General Gough. That is a very serious state of affairs. It is a state of affairs which cannot be allowed to continue, and must be put an end to in everybody's interest as soon as possible. What is the position of the Army? Ever since the Revolution it has been laid down that no army can be maintained without, the consent of Parliament. The Army is considered as the instrument of the House of Commons. It is entirely controlled by the House of Commons, and it cannot be maintained by any other authority in this country, and we cannot consent, consistently with our duty to our constituents, to any terms short of implicit obedience to orders and absolute obedience to the orders of superior officers. These are the terms on which the officers of the Army have accepted service in the Army and have obligations to the Government of this
  country. It is only necessary to look at the Army (Annual) Act—the very foundation of the Army—in order to understand that control over a standing Army which this House has always jealously guarded since the time of the Revolution. I should like to remind the House of the language—and I do not think it is unmeaning language—of the Army Act. Section 9 says:—
  "(1) Every person subjected to military law"—
  and I should like to mention that the term "subject to military law" includes officers as well as men—
  "who commits the following offences: that is to say, disobeys in such manner as to show a wilful defiance of the authority of any lawful command given personally by his superior officer, in the execution of his office, whether the same is given orally, or in writing, or by signal, or
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  otherwise, shall, on conviction by court-martial, be liable to suffer death, or such less punishment as in this Act mentioned; and
  (2) Every person subject to military law who commits the following offence: that is to say, disobeys any lawful command given by his superior officer, shall, on conviction by court-martial, if he commits such offence on active service, be liable to suffer penal servitude, or such less punishment as in this Act mentioned, and if he commits such offence not on active service, be liable, if an officer, to be cashiered, or to suffer such less punishment as in this Act mentioned, and if a soldier to suffer imprisonment, or such less punishment as in this Act mentioned."
  It ought not to be necessary to refer to this Army Act, but the reading of it enforces the serious offence committed if Army officers disobey orders, and proves the serious position in which these officers place themselves if they refuse to obey orders. The Army officers are bound in duty to carry out orders given to them. If they have been put in a false position on account of the questions put to them, I suggest that that option ought to be withdrawn, and there should be no option of the kind left to them. it ought to be assumed that an officer will do his duty. I understand this alternative has now been withdrawn, and yet this fundamental position is challenged by the Leader of the Opposition. I was glad to hear him considerably modify the attitude he adopted on Monday, when he gave an unqualified support to the argument that a soldier had a right if he thought fit to disobey the orders of his superior officer. [An HON. MEMBER: "And take the consequences."] The Leader of the Opposition said:—
  "The House knows that we on this side have from the first held the view that to coerce Ulster is an operation which no Government under existing conditions has a right to ask the Army to undertake, and in our view, of course, it is not necessary to say that any officer who refuses is only fulfilling his duty."
  That is a very serious statement to make, and if that is not an inducement to officers not to obey their superior officers, I do not know what is. The party opposite has attempted to seduce the Army from their obedience. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"] The language which has been used by hon. Members opposite could have no other meaning. The Leader of the Opposition says these men are actually doing their duty by refusing to obey the orders of their superior officers. The right hon. Gentle-

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  man has read two statements to us made by officers, which could only have been made by those officers under the seal of confidence. [An HON. MEMBER: "No."] These letters had been used for political purposes, and hon. Members had been able to produce statements made by officers in the Army in regard to matters of the most confidential character affecting the discipline of the Army. I will refer again to the Army Act. There it is clearly laid down that this is a very serious offence not lightly to be committed. The 7th Section of the Army Act, which deals with mutiny and insubordination, provides that
  "Every person subject to military law who commits any of the following offences; that is to say (1) causes or conspires with any other person to cause any mutiny or sedition in any forces belonging to His Majesty's Regular Reserve, or Auxiliary Forces, or Navy; or (2) endeavours to seduce any person in His Majesty's Regular Reserve, or Auxiliary Forces, or Navy, from allegiance to His Majesty, or to persuade any person in His Majesty's Regular, Reserve, or Auxiliary Forces, or Navy, to join in any mutiny or sedition shall, on conviction by court-martial, be liable to suffer death, or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned."
  Therefore the offence which these officers have committed is a most serious one, punishable in some cases, by death. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"] Hon. Members jeer at that remark, but I say it is a very formidable matter that communications of that sort should be made to Members of the Opposition to be used for political purposes. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] That is the whole object, intention, and use. The attempt to use the Army in this way, as has been done so frequently by hon. Members opposite, is utterly unconstitutional, and in other times what the Leader of the Opposition has said might easily have cost him his head. Why was Strafford condemned and executed? Simply because he urged the King to appeal from Members of Parliament to the Army, and that is the very offence for which he suffered death. In other times the right hon. Gentleman would have been impeached for conduct of this character. The House of Commons is the authority which pays the Army, and we want to be assured that the Army is ready and prepared to do its duty. There is no such dispensing power known
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  to our Constitution as the right hon. Gentleman has endeavoured to put before us, that the Army should decide whether the country has been consulted. The House of Lords told us that we have not consulted the country, and now this is exactly the language used in regard to the Army. If the Army is to decide, then we are back to the old Pretorian Guard state of things, which one would have thought was absolutely intolerable at this time of day. Our Constitution is not a mere welter of changing opinions which anybody may set aside when he thinks he can get support to do so. Our Constitution is laid down pretty clearly and distinctly by Statute law, and I should like to read the language of a Statute which is still the law of the land on these matters. It says:—
  "The laws of England are the birthright of the people thereof and all the Kings and Queens who shall ascend the throne of this realm ought to administer the Government of the same according to the said laws."
  Naturally, if Kings and Queens are subject to the laws which we make, smaller people in the Army are obliged to obey those laws. The Statute law further says:—
  "And all their officers and Ministers ought to serve them respectively according to the same."
  That is the Statute of William III., 12 and 13, chapter II. There it is clearly stated that it is the duty of every person in the realm to obey the laws of the land. Only recently we settled the succession to the Throne of England in this House. All are subject to the laws duly passed by Parliament, and yet here we have four generals questioning the authority of Parliament and setting themselves up as a junta to decide whether the laws of the land are binding upon them. In the past there have been occasions when there might have been some danger of a successful general being in a position to defy the law, but even the most successful general has never made an attempt of that kind. What happened to the Duke of Marlborough? He was promptly dismissed. The great Duke of Wellington when he came back from Waterloo took his place as a civilian in the subordinate ranks of the Cabinet. When the Army in the time of William III. showed signs of restiveness, this House actually disbanded them. The King pleaded that his own veteran guards

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  might be retained, but Parliament said "No," and the Army was reduced to 7,000 men, and this was done at a time when Louis XIV. had 450,000 men under arms, and twice attempted the invasion of England. That is what our ancestors did, and they would not tolerate anything of this kind. Surely we are not going to be any the less courageous in asserting the authority of this House. We have recently had on the Continent the great Zabern affair, but this case is much worse, because that occurred in a little village. This is an attempt by our political opponents through the Army to seize the Empire by the throat and dictate to this Imperial Parliament what laws it may or may not pass. I said before that no question ought to have been put to any officer, and I say the situation in which we now find ourselves is really an impossible one. We cannot agree that it should go on for an instant longer, and we ask that it should be set right at once, and that this should take precedence of everything, the Home Rule Bill and every other question. We can no longer sit in this House and do justice to our constituents if we are subjected to the dictation of military officers. I say that our duty has never been more clear than it is to-day as the representatives of the people of this country. In the language of the Statute to which I have already alluded, it is to see that:—
  "The laws of England are the birthright of the people thereof, and all the Kings and Queens who shall ascend the throne of this Realm ought to administer the Government of the same according to the said laws, and all their officers and ministers ought to serve them respectively according to the same."
  9.0 P.M.
  Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: Whilst I agree for the most part with the constitutional maxims laid down by the hon. Gentleman opposite and absolutely agree that this House and the civil power cannot, and must not, be dictated to by a military authority in this country, I do indignantly repudiate two of his main arguments and two accusations which he made. The first was that these officers had disobeyed orders. These officers have not disobeyed orders. If they have, then it is absolutely criminal on the part of the Government that they have not court-martialled them. It is being thrown about the country in the Radical Press that these officers have disobeyed orders. If they have, why is it that they have not been court-martialled or brought before a civil court. I think that
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  the character of these officers ought to be cleared in more certain language than it has been cleared, and that this stain that is being cast upon their character, especially by hon. Members below the Gangway, should be removed. We, on this side of the House, are represented as anxious for officers, non-commissioned officers, and men to disobey the orders of their superiors. I say that is an absolute misrepresentation. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said that if they do so, and he thought it might be their duty to do so under certain circumstances, they will be shot. I feel the position. I am in the Territorial Army, and I am subject to military law. If I am called out by the Government I shall either have to receive the bullets of my fellow countrymen in Ulster or be shot by the troopers in my own regiment. That is the alternative I have put before me. That is the position in which the Government places the soldiers of this country. We have either to go and be shot in the streets of Belfast in an attempt to carry out their policy, or else we have got to be shot under the Army (Annual) Act, which, of course, must always remain part of the fundamental constitutional principles of this realm. We have got to face those two alternatives. It shows the position in which we are. The Government, by one of the worst blunders that has ever been made in administration, has not only produced all this rhetoric and all these columns in the Press on both sides, and has not only imperilled the chances of a peaceful settlement, which last Thursday looked nearer than it had ever looked before, but it has brought about this grave crisis in the history of the British Army and in the history of this country. I say that the blame must fall upon whoever is responsible for these blunders. Take the general question. Was it not a criminal blunder to order a Battle Squadron from Spain, to put the whole of the Infantry Brigade of Ireland under question and answer, and to summon generals over from Ireland for conference at the War Office, and to tell them to go back and instruct regiments of Cavalry, Horse Artillery, and the like? Was not that a blunder, an administrative blunder, of the very worst kind? They say it was not meant to be provocative; but the plain man would say that it was obviously provocative to call out this vast mass of force. Was

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  this force wanted? Was there any possibility of wanting a Battle Squadron in order to protect four magazines of stores and rifles in the North of Ireland. It is absurd on the face of it. It is one of the greatest blunders that have ever been committed by any Board of Admiralty or any War Office in this country. It has led to this great misrepresentation, and it has quite rightly brought the Secretary for War to his knees in this House this afternoon. Of course, it was a ridiculous spectacle—
  Sir F. BANBURY: He was not on his knees. It was all arranged beforehand.
  Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: He comes down and announces to the House of Commons that he resigns, and then, of course, his resignation is not accepted. Is there any precedent for that? Usually, if a Cabinet Minister resigns and he is immediately reinstated, the country and the House are not told. The matter is quite rightly kept quiet. All this was done simply for window-dressing purposes in order to divert attention from the gross blunders that the Secretary of State for War has committed in the last week, and to endeavour to stir up a little rather cheap sympathy for the position of a Minister who resigns, and who is at once reinstated.
  Sir F. BANBURY: And who accepted reinstatement.
  Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: And who accepted reinstatement after he said—[HON. MEMBERS: "Has he?"]
  Sir F. BANBURY: The Prime Minister said so. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Yes he did; he said he was still a Minister of the Crown.
  Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: We were told this afternoon that he was still Secretary of State for War. How he can accept reinstatement, saying, as he does, that he stands by those two paragraphs the Government have just thrown over, I cannot possibly understand. No doubt the standards of Ministerial uniformity and Cabinet agreement are not the same in this Government as in former Governments. The most serious thing in the whole of this crisis has been this cross-examination of officers. Nothing has done more harm to the Army than that. The first training I ever underwent I remember being given a general order by my superior officer and
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  thinking that, as I did not know very much about it, I had better leave it to my sergeant to do very much as he liked. I put to him one or two questions, and he told me it was not his business but mine. It got round to the superior officer that I had not given explicit orders, and I was had up and given a good talking to. Is it not absolutely iniquitous, in dealing with matters of this kind, to have officers of regiments in Ireland cross-examined as to where they live, and where they are willing to serve in a particular direction under certain circumstances. These hypothetical questions were put to colonels, majors, captains, and subalterns. Two instances in which they were asked were quoted in this House on Monday by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition; one was a quotation from a letter from an officer in a Line regiment stationed at Curragh. Hon. Members must have seen, in the Press, that the officers of the Norfolk Regiment were questioned at Holywood Barracks, and that those of the Suffolk Regiment were questioned at the Curragh. Certain alternatives were put before them. I say alternatives ought not to be put to officers. Orders should be given them, and, if they did not obey, they should abide by the consequences. But that is not the attitude of the Government, and the course they have taken is the one thing that will ruin the British Army. They had no right to cross-examine officers as to where they agreed with their policy, and as to what they would do, or not do, in the event of certain things happening. The only result of such a policy is to ruin discipline in the Army, to ruin, in fact, the traditions of the British Army, and if that is the way in which the affairs of the Army are to be conducted I can only say it is the very worst thing that could have happened. I understand that this examination of officers is going on to-day in this country, and that in various brigades and divisions these questions are being asked. It is absolutely unfair to the officers.
  Mr. WEDGWOOD: Are the questions being asked by the order of the Army Council?
  Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: That is what 1 should like to know. If they are not being asked by such orders, the person who is to blame for putting them should be brought to book at the earliest possible moment. I want to ask some representative of the Government if General Gough's letter asking a hypothetical question—I profoundly

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  regret he wrote asking such a question—stands alone? I believe there is some explanation of it. Was it written in answer to letters previously sent to General Gough? If we could get the whole correspondence which gave rise to that letter it would afford some explanation not yet forthcoming. Here you have in General Gough, one of the most thoroughly disciplined and most highly-respected officers in the Army, who, in the last few days, has been as much worried as the Secretary for War. When hon. Members opposite jeer at him, and talk about him as being a Tory partisan, they should remember the position in which he has been placed in the last few days. We ought, in fairness to him, to find out the exact circumstances in which he wrote that letter. Was he asked to write the letter, in order that he might get an assurance?
  Mr. MacCALLUM SCOTT: He himself states the circumstances in his letter, for he says:—
  "On thinking over the points raised by the Secretary of State this morning, a question has arisen in my mind"—
  Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: Yes, but what were those points? What took place at the interview with the Secretary for War? That is what we want to get at, and it is what we have been trying to find out. It is clear he wrote that letter because he understood from the Secretary for War that he would get the sort of answer that has been given by the right hon. Gentleman. He wrote it so that he might get an answer which he could take back to his troops, and which, of course, justified him in using the language which he did use. It is perfectly clear that the language used by General Gough to his officers in Ireland was justified by the last two paragraphs of the Memorandum given to him by the Secretary of State. There is one very serious result of this blunder which has been somewhat overlooked. A General commanding a brigade has communicated to his officers a document signed by three members of the Army Council, including the Secretary for War and Sir John French, telling him a thing which has to be withdrawn two days later. Is not that disastrous to the discipline of the Army? Is it not utterly destructive of the discipline and traditions of the Army? What will be thought in future of documents signed by the Army Council, of orders sent by it, or of communications received from it? It is hardly possible to exaggerate the magnitude of this blunder
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  which the Government have committed, and I think the Government, if only on that ground, deserve a Vote of Censure from this House and from every lawful authority in the country for the way in which it has behaved. I want to deal with the second great blunder they have committed in the extensive movements of troops and battleships, and in the orders issued in regard to sending troops over from this country. Of that we have had an utterly inadequate explanation, and it looks exactly as if a coup d'état had been contemplated without the Cabinet's knowledge.
  Mr. WEDGWOOD: What about the knowledge of the Army?
  Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: It seems to me this movement of troops was contemplated without the sanction of the Cabinet. We have yet to learn that the Board of Admiralty as a whole ever sanctioned the sending of battleships from Spain to Ireland. Taking the speeches of the First Lord of the Admiralty and all his movements during the past week, is there not ground for grave apprehension which ought to be allayed by him or by some authoritative Member of the Government? There has been more going on in this matter than has yet appeared. These large movements of troops which were contemplated were obviously of a provocative nature. If they were not of a provocative nature they, at any rate, must have had some other purpose than merely supporting and strengthening the garrisons of the four towns where there are stores. It is utterly inexplicable why it was done. Was it done in order to create a demonstration? In this House a more moderate tone prevailed last Thursday, and hon. Members on both sides were endeavouring to come to a peaceful settlement. But that did not suit the extremists on those benches; it did not suit the First Lord of the Admiralty, who is well known to be a most extreme man, and who is known throughout the country as the man who wanted to be revenged for not being allowed to speak in the Ulster Hall. It is perfectly well known that the First Lord of the Admiralty, acting with the extremists of the parties in this House, has been longing for some demonstration of this kind, so that the agreement, which looked as if it were within measurable distance of being accomplished, should be done away with altogether, and that the full policy should be proceeded with. What was it he said?:
  "It is time to put these matters to the proof."

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  The bringing of the Battleship Squadron from Spain to the North of Ireland was putting these matters to the proof. It is perfectly clear that the blunder is a criminal one. As a matter of policy, it has been a most disastrous thing in the interests of the Army, in the interests of the Constitution, and in the interests of a peaceful settlement of this question. I hope the House will not calmly acquiesce in the blunders of the Government over this incident, but will censure them heavily.
  Mr. M'CURDY: I desire to deal with only one point raised by the speeches of the hon. Members who have preceded me. The hon. Member for Denbigh Boroughs (Mr. Ormsby-Gore) commenced his speech by referring to what he was pleased to call "the basest slander" upon the officers in this matter, which was the statement that they had disobeyed orders. Whether or not they disobeyed depends upon a point which may be regarded either as a point of law or a point of conscience, and which is this: It is common ground between everybody in this House that an officer in the Army is not entitled to disobey the lawful orders of the Government. Is he then entitled to accept service, and, when a lawful order is given, to defeat the object for which his commission was conferred upon him by immediately resigning? The first two material documents that appear in the correspondence laid before the House are those of the 14th March, which details instructions given to the forces in Ireland, and the telegram of the 20th March, which shows the action taken by certain officers upon the receipt of those instructions:—
  "Officer commanding 5th Lancers states that all officers except two, and one doubtful, are resigning their commissions to-day. I much fear same conditions in the 16th Lancers. Fear men will refuse to move."
  If there is one thing that to my mind is wholly satisfactory in this somewhat unsatisfactory business, it is the perfectly frank and straightforward character of the communication of General Gough, dated 23rd March. He asked in a perfectly blunt and straightforward way one question. He said, "You have explained to us that it is our duty to maintain law and order. We do not intend to be used to enforce the Home Rule Bill, and we ask, if that Bill becomes law, is that one of the laws we shall have to enforce under the head of law and order?" I do not for one moment think that that letter is the letter
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  of a man who would accept the position implied in the argument of the hon. Member for Denbigh Boroughs, that while it would be mutiny, punishable with death, for an officer to say "I decline to obey orders," yet, with his tongue in his cheek, he could wait until the disliked order is given, and then, by prompt resignation, defeat the order so given. If it were the case of an officer in the Navy, there would be no difficulty about the matter at all. It is some comfort to my mind, when I consider what I regard as a spirit of the most gross disaffection which appears to be prevalent among the military forces of the Crown, to think that the same thing does not apply to the Navy.
  Lord C. BERESFORD: The same thing would occur in the Navy to-morrow if the Government were to ask the officers their opinion as to what they would do.
  Mr. M'CURDY: I am much obliged to the Noble Lord. I will deal with that point in a moment. The point I am dealing with is with regard to the right of an officer to resign. So far as the Navy is concerned, it is not merely a question of what is honourable; it is a plain question of law which was decided so recently as the year 1892, when the Lords of Appeal considered the very question whether, in any circumstances, a naval officer was entitled to resign his commission except by permission of His Majesty. One of the Lord Justices said:—
  "Under the Naval Discipline Act, under no circumstances is a naval officer entitled to resign his commission except by permission of His Majesty. Any other view would, in my opinion, be destructive of the discipline and of the efficiency of the Service."
  Lord C. BERESFORD: It is the same in the Army.
  Mr. M'CURDY: I am very glad indeed to hear that the Noble Lord agrees with my view as to the duty of an officer in the Army. It is not quite accurate to say that it is the same in the Army, because the case of a naval officer depends upon the language of the Naval Discipline Act, and for a corresponding provision with regard to the Army we should have to go upon some other ground. We have had it now laid down by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and if I may respectfully say so, most justly and admirably laid down, that it is not right or fitting that questions should be asked of officers either in the Army or the Navy with regard to their views either as

  477
  to the present or future policy of the Government, or as to what their action would be if the future policy of the Government were this or that, and, further, that if such questions are asked it is fit and proper that no answer should be given. With that I agree. The object of my rising has been attained, if General Gough, when he reads the speech of the Foreign Secretary to-morrow, and considers his position in view of the interpretation now placed by the Government upon the letter which he received from the Secretary of State for War—
  Major ARCHER-SHEE: It was from the Army Council.
  The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Mr. Tennant): May I interrupt my hon. Friend and point out to the hon. and gallant Member that it was particularly stated, both by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War and by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that no one was responsible for this document dated 23rd March except the Secretary of State for War, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Adjutant-General.
  Major ARCHER-SHEE: As this is a very important point, may I ask the hon. Member if it is not the case that the Secretary of State for War said that anything which was signed by the Secretary of State for War and two members of the Army Council was the dictum of the Army Council itself?
  Mr. TENNANT: It is perfectly true, as is stated by my right hon. Friend, that it is within the power of the Secretary of State and two members of the Army Council to give Army Council decisions, but my right hon. Friend was careful enough and chivalrous enough to say that he alone with the two officers who signed this letter were responsible for it.
  Mr. M'CURDY: I am very glad that the Noble Lord (Lord C. Beresford) agrees with the proposition I have put forward, that it would neither be lawful nor honourable for officers, either of the Navy or the Army, to continue in service with in his mind a mental reservation that as soon as he was called upon to perform a lawful order he intended to evade it by resignation. My object in rising will have been fully performed if, when General Gough and the other officers, who have now seriously to consider their position as
  478
  officers in the light of the statement made by the Government today, take, as I am sure they will take, the same honourable view as that taken by the Noble Lord of the duties of an officer under these circumstances, and the country and this House may feel confident that if General Gough and his officers, on full reflection, and after considering the speeches which have been made by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary to-day, decide to retain their commissions in the Army, they do so, not merely as men who are prepared to obey all lawful orders which may in future be given them, but as men who have no intention of evading that responsibility whenever orders, owing to any Act of Parliament which may hereafter be passed, and which may be now within reasonable contemplation of parties, turn out to be orders which are against their judgment or their conscience.
  Mr. WALTER GUINNESS: I think the House is left in a state of very grave perplexity by the Ministerial declarations today. We have been told quite frankly that the Cabinet have thrown over the War Secretary. We have not been told quite how far they have thrown him over. This has put the officers in a very unfair position. I think we all sympathise with the letter which was read out from General Gough, that he was a soldier and not a lawyer, and I really do not know how a soldier is to be able to make up his mind on this question if the Government change their opinions every twenty-four hours, and if they go back on their written and signed word. We know that the Cabinet has gone back on the decision of the Secretary of State for War and General French. There is very strong evidence that they have gone back on their own opinion, because I understand that in another place this afternoon the Lord President of the Council said that the last two paragraphs of the letter of 23rd March were drafted by the Secretary of State for War in consultation with him, and these two paragraphs summed up what was believed apparently by the President of the Council, who was present at the Cabinet meeting, to be the opinion of the Council. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman can say whether it was in consultation.
  Colonel SEELY: The situation is for me a very difficult one, and I throw myself on the indulgence of the whole House. I shall be asked a great many questions, no doubt,

  479
  in the course of this Debate, and I think surely it would be better if I asked the House to accept that from me in this peculiarly difficult position, and if I make no statement until I have fully considered the full bearing of the case. I think it will be better.
  Mr. W. GUINNESS: It really is not an outrageous question to ask the right hon. Gentleman to answer "Yes" or "No" on a question of fact. I hope he will think the matter over, and be able to give his answer on the question of fact, which is all I ask, during the course of this evening. The Government have thrown over the last two paragraphs of the letter of the 23rd March, the opinion of the Army Council, and apparently of the Lord President of the Council. How much more have they thrown over? Have they thrown over the contents of the Memorandum of 16th December, because, after all, the subsequent correspondence really bears out the maxims laid down in that original Memorandum? That original Memorandum said that the troops were "justified in contemplating refusal to obey" orders under certain circumstances. That meant that soldiers were entitled to use their minds, and to argue whether an order was to be carried out or not. Has that position been thrown over? Has that letter been repudiated by the Army Council. I think that letter absolutely justified the action of the officers. I think it is fair to ask what opportunities now will be given to them to resign. It was distinctly laid down in that first letter that they were to have an opportunity of tendering their resignation and at the cost of their career, for their conscience sake, being dismissed the service, and I think they are entitled to a definite answer in view of the repudiation of the solemnly signed decision of the Army Council as to what their position is at the present moment. These officers, after all, thought after the language which was used to them, not that they were to be used to suppress disorder but to provoke disorder. The right hon. Gentleman clearly recognised the distinction between suppressing disorder and provoking disorder in his original Memorandum. He said that soldiers would be justified in contemplating refusal to obey, if it was a matter of massacring a demonstration of Orangemen who were causing no danger to the lives of their neighbours, so he said they would be justified in refusing to provoke
  480
  disorder. Is that still the position? I think it was very natural that they should ask for a definition of "active operations." They knew there was no question of protecting life in Ulster which was likely to arise in the present time because, owing to the splendid discipline of the Ulster volunteers, no life was threatened. The officers stated distinctly that they did not mind doing police duty, and therefore there was no question of their contemplating disobedience to those orders which could lawfully be given to them.
  I think we ought also to have some statement as to the position of the noncommissioned officers and men. If officers are to have the right of resignation or dismissal, obviously that same right ought to be extended to the rank and file. This correspondence is manifestly incomplete. We find references in the latter part of it to letters or to interviews of which no details are printed in the earlier portion. We find, for instance, references not only here, but admitted references in the statement of General Gough to these officers, references to the willingness of the Army Council to allow officers to disappear if they are domiciled in Ulster. How did these instructions originate? There is not a single word in regard to leave or the opportunity of disappearing, to use the expression of the War Secretary, being given to the non-commissioned officers and men, according to domicile, in this correspondence, or any statement in the interview given by the right hon. Gentleman. That is not the only discrepancy and gap. What was the object of asking the Cavalry if they would obey orders if, in truth, there was no intention of sending anything but Infantry up to Ulster? The Government surely cannot be so foolish as to ask these fishing questions if there was no intention of using the Cavalry, and if the whole military operations were to be carried out by these Infantry companies they were sending up to guard the arsenals in Ulster. Hon. Members opposite have rather evaded, if I may say so, the details of this White Paper as to the position in this particular case, and they have tried to enlarge the Debate on general principles. I do not think that we on this side are in the least afraid of these general principles, because we have pointed out the distinction between civil war and war against a foreign enemy for years past.
  The argument which has been brought forward from the other side has been that

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  troops must be used in aid of the civil power to maintain order in the case of trade disputes and the riots which occasionally arise therefrom, and that if you are justified in using troops in such riots, you are therefore equally justified in using them in Ulster. I think that that is an example of sophism which, I believe, is known as a sorites. You get somebody to admit something which is obviously true, and you lead up by imperceptible steps to something which is manifestly false. In this case the difference between a riot from political motive and civil war is quite frankly only a matter of degree. If in this country you ever had a strike which was backed by a considerable portion of the people, say, one-half, however much you might theorise about the use of the Army, it would be absolutely impossible to use it, and that is exactly the case to-day in Ulster. You cannot theorise. You have to face the facts. You have got to recognise that the Army are citizens, and that when people are equally divided on any question, you must allow them to use their rights as citizens and to stand out if their conscience will not allow them to perform military service. The duty of the Government, if they wish to coerce Ulster, was to do it long ago, and the reason they did not do so was that it did not suit their political speeches. They liked to go up and down the country and say that Ulster was bluffing, and that people there were cowards. The trouble has recoiled on their own heads, and I think the country will see that this difficult and disastrous state of affairs is due to the action of the Government in sacrificing public safety to their own party convenience.
  Sir G. PARKER: I rise to a point of Order. I beg to ask whether in the circumstances we ought not to expect a Member of the Cabinet to be present who can answer questions of such great gravity as are being addressed to them. The Secretary of State for War has asked the consideration of the House, which we willingly give to him in the circumstances. He thinks that he should not be expected to answer a question such as has been asked by my hon. Friend (Mr. R. Guinness) in relation to statements made in another place in direct contradiction of or, at any rate, supplementary to statements made by Members of the Cabinet here this afternoon. As the guardian of the liberties not only of the Front Benches, but of the back benches, I would ask you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, whether some
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  Member of the Cabinet able to answer the questions which are being put should be present at this time?
  Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. Whitley): That is not a matter of order. I have no doubt that the hon. Member will recognise that it is desirable that the Minister who replies should deal with questions together and not separately when they are asked.
  Colonel SEELY: In the absence of my colleagues for the moment I will say at once that in order not to cause any inconvenience to the House, if any point arises in the Debate upon which I can properly answer I will answer it at once, but I still say with great respect that it would be desirable I should make no general statement at present.
  Mr. W. GUINNESS: I asked how instructions were given that officers might disappear?
  Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: The Minister who replies is in the habit of taking notes of questions asked during Debate for the purpose of dealing with them when he replies.
  Mr. W. GUINNESS: The right hon. Gentleman has just said that he will answer specific questions. He did not answer my question, and I am afraid it may be missed. I wish to know how the instructions came to be given as to officers disappearing?
  Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: It would obviously make regular Debate impossible if an hon. Member, when he puts a question, were to expect an answer at once.
  Mr. HOLT: There are one or two points I wish to put before the House. First of all, with regard to the position of General Gough. I think it is perfectly clear that he might reasonably suppose that the last letter in the Paper was an answer to his letter. I hope also it will be made perfectly clear to General Gough what the view of the House of Commons is, so that he should not retain his commission under any misapprehension. I am sure that, whatever our views may be on the subject, we shall all like to be fair to that officer. We do not wish him to retain his commission under any misapprehension of what the conditions are. If he does not wish to retain his commission on the conditions laid down, I am sure we

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  should all be glad to hear that he has resigned. General Gough describes himself as a soldier who knows nothing about law, but I would point out that the first thing he did when he got the letter was to deposit it with his own lawyer. Is it not a rather curious thing that the plain, blunt gentleman who knows nothing about lawyers or legal phraseology goes straight off to his solicitor as soon as he gets the document? It is quite unnecessary to disclaim any knowledge of law when you are in immediate communication with your solicitor. I turn to another point, which is the more general aspect of this case, as to what can actually happen in Ulster. The first possibility—I do not speak of it as a probability, because I quite believe that it will not happen—is that the Ulster volunteers will make an unprovoked attack upon their Nationalist, fellow citizens. I understand from the Leader of the Opposition, and I think that everybody will agree that he made his point, quite clear, that if an event of that sort took place it would be the duty of the Army to resist it by force, to support the civil power and to put down unprovoked aggression oil the Catholics. That, I think, is admitted.
  Putting- that aside what is the next thing that the Ulster volunteers can do? The first act that will take place next in Ulster after the passing of the Home Rule Bill, assuming now that the concessions offered by the Government are not accepted and that the Bill passes as it stands, is the erection of polling booths at which the elections shall take place. What is going to happen? Is there going to be an attack upon the working men by the Ulster volunteers, and if an attack is made upon these working men, are the military to come to the aid of the police in stopping it? And if it is the view of hon. Gentlemen opposite that they ought not, then it appears to be the case, according to them, that any mob in the country which disapproves of the holding of an election may at any time prohibit the holding of that election. It is either one thing or the other. I submit that no serious people will say that the police and the Army are to stand by and see a mob preventing the holding of an election. We are not going to permit anything of that sort. I do not understand that hon. Gentlemen opposite seriously contend that. If they do, let us understand how far they go. Let us understand the position—a mob of violent
  484
  people may prohibit at any time the holding of an election in any place where they do not approve of it. A great many small boroughs might be disfranchised under that system. The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down told us that the distinction between a political disturbance and a. strike disturbance is very fine. The distinction is perfectly simple. It is civil war when the object of the disturbance is favourable to the party opposite, and it is all the other thing when the object is not favourable to that party. That is the whole point, and every consideration submitted to the House always leads to the same conclusion, that it is possible to use armed forces in their interests, but it is-not possible for the armed forces to be used in somebody else's interests if they do not approve. That is the whole thing.
  We are not going to put up with this doctrine. They must see that that doctrine is a challenge to the existence of ourselves and of every progressive party in this country. If we are going to submit to that we might just as well give up being in politics altogether, let every single election go uncontested, save them the trouble and expense, and be their humble and obedient servants. We are not going to be anything of the sort. We are going to have an equal position before the law. We are going to have an Army which will obey the orders of Liberal and Conservative Governments equally. We are going to have an Army which will operate against Ulster precisely as it would operate against Munster. If we cannot have an Army of that character we will have no Army at all. If we arc told that we have got to choose between an Army which will obey the Conservative party in a different spirit and manner from that in which it obeys the Liberal party or have. no Army at all, we will take the risk of no Army. I do not believe myself that there is very much risk in that, and there are certain solid advantages when you come to the Budget which we should have in the shape of remission of taxation. But hon. Gentlemen opposite may as well understand this, that no section of the Liberal party in this House or in the country will put up with an Army which is not going to act for our side precisely as it acts for them.. This is all part of the same plan. The party opposite have been beaten at the poll. They used to rely upon the House of Lords. The House of Lords was crushed because it was not prepared to, accept the verdict of the electors. Hon.

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  Members opposite have been latterly thinking that possibly the Army might make a second string to their bow. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw!"]
  Major ARCHER-SHEE: On a point of Order. Is the hon. Member in order in grossly insulting the armed forces of His Majesty's Government in this way?
  Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: I did not gather that anything of that-kind was said.
  Mr. HOLT: The observation I made was that hon. Members opposite had been thinking of using the Army as a substitute for the House of Lords. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw!" and "Untrue!"]
  Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: The hon. Member is entitled to state his opinion. Hon. Members may strongly disagree with it. We are here to listen to the different opinions.
  Sir F. BANBURY: If the hon. Gentleman had said that in his opinion hon. Members on this side had done certain things, we should have nothing to say. That would be only his opinion, to which we would not pay much attention. But he did not say so. He stated it as a fact.
  Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: Hon. Members are constantly stating things without stating in each case "this is my opinion," but we must be prepared to take it as the opinion of hon. Members.
  Sir F. BANBURY: May I ask whether the hon. Member made his statement as a fact or merely as his own personal belief?
  Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: The hon. Member expressed his own opinion, and I have stated so.
  Mr. HOLT: I will make the point quite plain to the hon. Baronet. I have listened to a great many speeches made by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on the opposite benches. From those, I and a great many of my hon. Friends cannot deduce any conclusions other than that it was the intention of the hon. Gentlemen opposite to use the Army as a means of preventing us— [Interruption].
  Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: I cannot have hon. Members constantly interrupting and rising to points of Order when they do not agree with the opinon that is expressed. The hon. Member is entitled to
  express his opinion.
  Sir W. BYLES: It is after dinner, Mr. Deputy-Speaker.
  Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: That is not a proper observation.
  Mr. HOLT: I was about to say—[HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw!"] I have nothing to withdraw.
  Mr. BUTCHER: On a point of Order, Sir. May I ask if the exceedingly offensive remark made by the hon. Gentleman opposite reached your ears in which he suggested that we on this side were not in a fit state to conduct these Debates? I ask whether that can be allowed?
  Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: The interjection of the hon. Gentleman did reach my ears, and I at once corrected him.
  Mr. G. D. FABER: On a point of Order, Sir. Is the hon. Member prepared to withdraw his offensive observation?
  Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: It is for me, if I think fit, to ask the hon. Member to withdraw. It was an interjection which he made without rising, and which I met with a distinct rebuke that such an interjection should not be made.
  10.0 P.M.
  Mr. HOLT: I was just coming to the conclusion of my remarks. The House of Lords has failed hon. Gentlemen and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, and I think the second string to their bow has cracked. I think they had better make up their minds finally to the fact that the decision of the majority of this House, determined by the will of the people, must be accepted. What is their position? The House of Lords was to decide whether we had a mandate from the constituencies. Next, the Leader of the Opposition comes and says quite clearly to-day that it was for the Army to decide whether we have a mandate from our constituencies or not, I always thought that, at any time, nobody except the representatives of the constituencies had to decide what is to be done. That is a most constitutional doctrine. It will be impossible to govern this country as a constitutional country until the party opposite have made up their minds that the persons duly and lawfully elected to represent given constituencies are entitled to act and speak on their behalf. That doctrine has got to be accepted by the hon. and right hon. Gentlemen, and whether it is the institution at the end of the corridor, or

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  whether it is the Army you choose to break down that doctrine, I am quite sure that they will be severely beaten at the poll.
  Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The hon. Gentleman, in his concluding observations, has laid down a doctrine which, I think, is scarcely in accordance with the practice of our Constitution. I am not one of those who have ever supported the view that Gentlemen sent here by the constituencies to take part in this great council of the nation were to act in respect of every question submitted to them on direct instructions from their constituencies as to the manner in which they should vote. I do not think that is true. Our Constituents, no doubt, form their judgment on broad principles, but the application of those principles is often a matter of great difficulty, sometimes a matter of insuperable difficulty, and a thing which, stated as a broad principle, appears to be reasonable, is shown to be unreasonable when you find it in the form of an enactment on the Statute Book. I do not press the doctrine of the mandate to such an extreme length as hon. Members opposite very often do. The hon. Member's contention is that once we are returned here, we are to be masters, without check or control. [An HON. MEMBER: "No."] Yes, I correctly state the views of hon. Gentlemen opposite There is a difference of opinion, but the majority agree that I am correctly stating their view of the Constitution, which is, that once we are returned here, for the term of our existence, what we say is to be law without check or control by any other chamber, and without reference to any change of opinion, or any movement of opinion, or any opinion at all that is made manifest in the country. No Member on this side of the House has ever claimed such a right as that. [An HON. MEMBER: "You exercise it."] You may say, and if you propose a solution of the difficulty, we shall listen to your argument, and consider fairly the solution you offer us. You may say that the check, when we are in power, is insufficient, or has been insufficient, or you may say did not exist, but you never have said that it ought not to exist. But now we have the hon. Gentleman seeking amidst the cheers and with the approval of his party, to claim not that that exists by accident if it be, but they claim that ought to be our Constitution, and that is the true interpretation of the Constitution.
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  That is a claim for single-Chamber Government, carried to its extreme, and the hon. Member who put it forward agrees with it. He followed the right hon. Gentleman on the Government Bench who declared that single-chamber Government was "death, damnation, and destruction."
  We are getting on, as the Prime Minister said the other day. The idea approved by Gentlemen sitting opposite is that once they get to this House, they ought to act in the most solemn manner, the most far reaching manner, without any regard either to opinion in any other branch of the Legislature, or the opinion in the country outside. That is not all that the hon. Gentleman claimed. The hon. Gentleman said that it was the determination of every part and every section of the party with which he is connected not to tolerate an Army which will not act for one side as it will act for the other. He could not in a single sentence more clearly have expressed the view which separates himself and his friends from us. We have never asked, we have never expected, we never desired, or could desire, that the Army should act for a party. [An HON. MEMBER: "Neither do we."] The Army has had, and ought to have, nothing to do with parties, and the earnest object of my friends and myself has been in all these anxious months to prevent the question arising of any party question affecting the discipline of the Army. The hon. Member went on to say, and we were told, Mr. Speaker, by your Deputy, that when he stated things as a fact we were to understand he was expressing an opinion, the hon. Member went on to state as a fact, but expressing in reality only an opinion, that it had been the hope and the intention of the Opposition to use the Army for some party purpose. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I knew that hon. Gentlemen opposite would cheer that statement, and I suppose that some of those who cheered it believed it, and I have not the hope that anything that I can say will do away with that misconception. An hon. Gentleman opposite very baldly at once informs me that nothing that I can say will do so. He refuses to accept my word in advance. Those are not the courtesies to which we have been accustomed in a House in which the hon. Member's ancestor was so distinguished and so generous an ornament as I, above all men, have reason to know. [HON. MEMBERS: "Name!"] I almost regret that I was led into this statement, but I

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  could only think of the kindness which the hon. Member's ancestor showed to me on my first appearance in this House. I regret, however, that I entered into controversy with him at all, and I hope that he will forgive me.
  The hon. Member opposite said that it had been our hope to use the Army. I say it solemnly, and for my Friends here, as well as myself, that the danger which has oppressed us and which has been never absent from our minds in these last months of controversy was that the Army might be brought into our Debate, and if I myself and others and my right hon. Friend the other day have made proposals which might involve the sacrifice of something which we held dear, and the abandonment of much that we were unwilling to give up, and if we have sought to find some task of compromise and some solution which all could accept, what influenced us most in every suggestion that we have made in every sacrifice that we have offered, and in every risk that we have taken for ourselves, has been the desire and the hope that out of our suggestions some solution might come which would prevent this question of the Army or the opinions of the Army, either as individuals or as an Army, ever being raised, as it has been raised, in an acute form, and ever becoming the subject of discussion, of public discussion, here or in the Army itself. So much I have felt bound to say because of the observations of the hon. Member, but I do not desire to follow him further. I, and I think all my Friends, welcomed the intervention this evening in our Debate of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He is a man who deals gravely with grave things and never unnecessarily stirs passion, and I would desire to follow in his footsteps as far as I can. He said, and I agree with him—who cannot?—and it must be apparent to any man who gives a moment's thought to it, how wide and far-reaching are the issues which our discussions and recent events have raised, how great the injury already done to our country without distinction of party, and no man will desire, any more than we will, to widen the area of that discussion or to raise delicate and difficult points where every word should be weighed in a passing debate, where we speak without careful preparation, and without the possibility of exactly measuring our language.
  I do not desire to travel outside the facts which are germane to the statement made
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  by the Secretary of State for War and to the debate which arises directly out of it. I must just comment on one observation of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He said that he was reluctant. to resort to coercion even of a minority. I do not quite know why he said "even of a minority." For my part, I would say frankly I am always reluctant to resort to coercion, although sometimes a Government has no choice as to whether they do so or not. He went on to say, with special reference to the observations of my right hon. Friend the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour), that for those who, like himself, remembered past history, my right hon. Friend's position in regard to Ulster and the coercion of Ulster was difficult to follow. Does the Secretary of State mean for one moment to suggest that there is anything comparable in the coercion that he admits he contemplates, in certain eventualities, of the great mass of people of all classes in the North-East of Ireland, with what is called coercion as practised by my right hon. Friend when Chief Secretary or by his successors? [An HON. MEMBER: "Why not?"] I will tell the hon. Member why not. You may quote the example of my right hon. Friend when the Ulstermen fire into the houses of those who disagree with them. You may quote the example of my right hon. Friend when they tar and feather women who disagree with them. You may quote the example of my right hon. Friend when they maim cattle. But until you can accuse the Ulstermen of these crimes—
  Mr. DILLON: We do. What about the shipyards?
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Until you can accuse Ulstermen of these crimes—[HON. MEMBERS: "What about the shipyards?"]—and prove that they have committed them—because some men fling accusations about very lightly—you cannot cite the action of my right hon. Friend as any precedent for the coercion that you are contemplating. I come now to the real subject-matter of our Debate. The Government profess that they have placed before the House a full and complete story of all that has taken place, that they have made a clean breast of everything that has passed, and that in the light of that confession their attitude is shown to be one wholly innocent of any provocation, and the measures which they contemplated to be what I might almost call peace

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  measures, or measures of precaution. They allege that all that they desired to do was to secure the protection of certain military depots in Ireland. If they had been civil establishments, that would have been a police duty and would have been discharged by the police. But being military depots, they naturally fell to the charge of the military, and the Government case is that they moved the military, the military being the natural force to employ in this case, just as they would have moved policemen to protect a town hall or a Government office. I cannot, in spite of what has been said, reconcile that with the statement which we have heard from the Government and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who said that the Government had a reason for grave apprehension. He said that in habitual and constant speeches, not from my right hon. Friend the Member for Trinity College, but from other Members of the Opposition, they had been warned during the autumn and winter that "the sands were running out." That is a phrase which I happened to use, and the Foreign Secretary took notice of it in a speech which he made shortly after. What I had in my mind was that feeling showed a growing and perilous state of tension, and that any blunder on the part of anyone, even the least responsible person in the world, might fire the train that was already there. [HON. MEMBERS: "Who laid it?"] I will answer that question if necessary. I am endeavouring to put a serious argument. It is difficult when a man feels as strongly as we all feel to speak calmly, and I do not want to be led away by interruptions into something which may anger and render more difficult the calm consideration of what has occurred.
  I had in my mind that a blunder on the part of anyone in that state of tension in connection with proceedings we have all witnessed might produce grave disaster. Was I wrong? Can it be said that when I used that phrase I was threatening? What right had I to threaten as to what action Ulster would take? No, I looked at all sides, and I said from this side, from the side of the Government, and from the side of Ulster, a single mistake by anyone might fire this train. Was I wrong? Somebody has blundered. The Government do not profess to know who—though we may think we know after their admission— somebody has blundered on the Government side, and that train has been fired—
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  [HON. MEMBERS: "What has happened?" and "A squib"]—and the grave circumstances which my Friends and I feared, have been produced, and these Debates are the consequence. That is not all. When the Secretary of State tells the House what he contemplated, I accept his word, as every Member of this House would do, but I find his descriptions of the intentions of the Government irreconcilable with the action which was taken by the Government. If he correctly interpreted the considered opinion of the Cabinet, then someone in high quarters has betrayed the Cabinet by taking action not sanctioned by them behind their backs. Here I must again say that the Government profess to have given us the whole truth. There is one essential part—essential as they have constantly said in their speeches to any appreciation of what has happened—for which they have been asked, not merely to-day, but previously. and which they have refused or neglected to give. What is General Paget's version of what he said to the officers of the Curragh?
  We are told, and we are asked to believe, that the only instruction given to General Paget are those contained in the documents of the 16th December and the letter of the 14th March. Where, in these instructions, did General Paget find the right to offer to the officers domiciled in Ulster, and desiring to be excused the Service, the opportunity of disappearing until the operations in Ulster were over? The Prime Minister said on Monday, I think, that that was the decision of the Cabinet. He said that a was intended to apply to all officers in all circumstances Where the troops acted within the United Kingdom, and yet when the Government professed to give us the whole of the instructions on which their servants and officers have acted, there is not one word about it in this document to show what the Government said to General Paget or what General Paget said to his officers. If the Government had merely contemplated the making secure against raids by irresponsible persons of certain magazines and stores in Ulster, they never would have told the general that he was to excuse from service officers domiciled in Ulster, and no officer domiciled in Ulster would have asked to be excused from such service. But that is not all. The First Lord of the Admiralty interjected an observation when the Prime Minister was speaking. He

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  said the instructions to General Paget had reference, not merely to the North of Ireland, but to the South of Ireland, and that troops might be required to move to the South as well as to the North.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I said the contingency might arise and might occur in any part of Ireland, in the South as well as in the North.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: That was not the observation which the right hon. Gentleman interjected in the midst of the speech of his Leader. If that were the case, if General Paget had been told to prepare to move his troops in all directions, and that officers domiciled where the troops were to be moved were to be excused the service, why was Ulster, and Ulster alone, mentioned by General Paget to his officers, and why was it only officers domiciled in Ulster who were offered the excuse from service? Another point on which I am wholly unable to reconcile the statements made by the Cabinet with the opinion of General Paget is this: The Prime Minister on Sunday, the 22nd, at some late hour of the night, apparently sent for the representative of the "Times" and conveyed to him for publication a message intended to reassure the public. In the course of that message he denied the rumours of extensive naval preparation, and said that the whole foundation for them was that two cruisers had been ordered to Ireland. We now know, and we have not to guess, on the authority of the First Lord of the Admiralty himself, that that statement was inaccurate at the time it was made. I say at once that I do not bring a charge. I do not complain, but I am sorry that the Prime Minister is not here. Nevertheless I cannot refrain because he is absent from commenting on these things. I do not accuse the Prime Minister of wilfully misleading the country in that statement. My inference is that he did not know, and that is the most serious thing of all.
  Mr. CHURCHILL:I have already told the House that the movement of the Third Battle Squadron was the result of a Cabinet decision taken more than ten days before.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I can conceive that he knew more than ten days before that certain proposals had been made for the disposition of the Fleet, but I say that it is not conceivable that when he
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  gave that statement to the Press on Sunday he knew what had actually occurred. What has actually occurred? He made his statement on the 22nd. On the 19th the First Lord of the Admiralty had issued orders for a Battle Squadron to proceed to Lamlash. Does the First Lord of the Admiralty tell me that when the Prime Minister said on Sunday that no movement of ships in connection with Ulster had taken place, or was contemplated, he knew that the First Lord of the Admiralty had on the 19th ordered a Battle Squadron to Lamlash to be in proximity to the coast of Ireland in case of serious disturbance occurring in Ulster? Did he know, when he spoke on the 22nd, that these orders, having been issued on the 19th, had been countermanded on the 21st by the First Lord because, as he said, the movement of troops had taken place without disturbance in Ulster? The honour of the Prime Minister is at stake, and it is the First Lord who staked it. [The PRIME MINISTER here entered the House.] Perhaps now I had better repeat my statement. I was dealing with the statement as to what were the intentions of the Government in the statement issued by the Prime Minister to the Press on Sunday. The Prime Minister communicated that statement to the Press on Sunday, and in it he said that there was no foundation for the rumours of naval movements in connection with Ulster having any foundation except that two cruisers had been sent to Belfast. I said that I was not for a moment suggesting that when the Prime Minister issued that statement he was trying to mislead anybody, but I said that was the gravity of the position, because it showed that the Prime Minister did not know what was being done. I asked: Did the Prime Minister know when he made that statement on Sunday, the 22nd, that on the 19th the First Lord, in pursuance it may be of a decision taken some little time before, ordered a Battle Squadron to proceed to Lamlash so that they would be in proximity to the coast of Ireland in case of serious disorders occurring.
  Lord ROBERT CECIL: Of Ulster.
  Mr. CHAMERLAIN: No, of Ireland. I am quoting the exact words of the answer of the First Lord. And whether he knew, when he made that statement, that on the 21st, the day before he disclaimed any movements of ships, except those two cruisers, in connection with affairs in

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  Ulster, those orders had been countermanded by the First Lord, because, as he said, the reinforcement of the positions in Ulster had been carried out without disorder? I said that in this matter the honour of the Prime Minister was at stake, and that it was his colleague sitting beside him who had staked it. I am reminded that to make my story complete, I should say that the First Lord stated that when the Prime Minister said no movements of the Fleet had taken place in connection with events in Ulster, except that of two cruisers, he knew both of the facts which we now know on the strength of the First Lord's answer to-day. I turn from that, which is an argument, in facts as known to us and as disclosed by the Government themselves, facts which are irreconcilable with the intentions of the Government given by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and with the statement of the Prime Minister as to what had actually occurred; and I come to that part of the speeches of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State which dealt with the actions of the officers who had been concerned in this matter.
  The Prime Minister said that in his opinion no one should ask of an officer in advance what would be his course of action in a future contingency, and no officer should ask of the Government what they would expect of them in regard to a future contingency. That is a statement which I do not think anyone in this House would dispute; and if in this case unhappy, most unhappy results have followed from the breach of the rule, as they have done, the blame must lie upon and must be accepted with all its consequences, by the party who has asked the question. The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State spoke of General Gough in terms of respect for his military services and character, but with a harshness, which, I think, was wholly undeserved, and an injustice which they will regret when they themselves come to consider calmly what has really happened. I know no more of General Hubert Gough than the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I have never set eyes upon him, and my only knowledge of him is such as is common to all the world as to both his own record in the Army and the distinguished records of the family from which he springs. The officers did not receive an order to ask no questions before they
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  decided what they would do; on the contrary, the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, fresh from conversations with the Secretary for War, and with the Army Council, acting on verbal instructions which have never been reduced to writing, went over to Ireland, called his brigadiers and commanding officers together, and asked them what they would do in certain eventualities. And he did not merely ask then what they would do. He gave them three choices: "You may agree to do whatever is required, or if you are domiciled in Ulster you may disappear until this is over, or you may send in your commission, and in that case you will be dismissed." Does any one allege—[a laugh]—Why do you laugh?
  Sir G. SCOTT ROBERTSON: I was not laughing at the right hon. Gentleman at all, but simply at a remark made by some one behind me.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Does anyone suggest that General Paget, fresh from the War Office and from his conversations with the Secretary of State for War, and with the Army Council, put these questions without any authority? It cannot be suggested, because the Prime Minister alleged on Monday that the officers were to have this choice, not merely in Ulster, but always, and thus General Paget had authority for them. Are you going to disown General Paget when he claims authority for the other questions? Arc you going to pick and choose? You cannot. When fresh from consultations with the Government and with the military authorities he carried their message to his troops—and their message to the troops was: "Are you prepared to act, or are you not?"—he invited their opinion and asked their judgment. He gave them a choice. You cannot blame the officers after that for asking exactly what their choice is. The Government say that General Paget's observations were misunderstood by his officers. They disclaimed, while refusing to tell us what he did say, certain phrases. But they have never claimed General Paget's authority to deny that he asked his officers whether they were prepared. to undertake active operations in Ulster. They say that all they wanted was an ordinary measure of precaution to protect Government stores. The officers concerned replied to General Paget, by General Gough's letter of the 20th, that if that were all they would do it. If General Paget had thought that his instructions

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  from the Government entitled him to say that that was all, he would have said so. There would have been no question of resignations—nothing that would ever have come before this House. But the fact that General Paget did not answer that question, but referred it to the Government for an answer, shows that he knew that the Government had commanded him to undertake something which was more than the mere protection of magazines, and forced him to require from his officers an assurance that they would undertake, not the protection of a magazine, but military operations, if they were called upon to do so, against the people of Ulster. I say this, in the first place, that I accept the Prime Minister's principle that no questions as to future contingencies ought to be put. I go further, and say that no questions ought to be put to officers under any circumstances as to future or immediate contingencies as to what men would do when they get an order, and I agree with the Prime Minister that officers ought not spontaneously and without invitation to ask the Government for explanations of its intentions in certain future contingencies. Now I appeal to hon. Gentlemen opposite who said very hard things of gentlemen in Ireland. Be fair. You cannot say, in the light of the facts that are known to us all, that they first asked questions. They were asked what they would do in certain contingencies. They asked to have those contingencies more particularly defined. They said that, being given a choice, if one thing was meant, they would be happy to do it; if another thing was meant, they would sooner take the ruin of their careers—dismissal from the Army, which you know is dearer to them than any party cry. They had that choice put to them. They tried to define it. They sent in their papers. If there was any mistake about what was asked of them, General Paget could have removed it at once, and the fact that he did not remove it shows that he was labouring under the same mistake, if mistake there was, as the Secretary of State. Then we come to the letter of 23rd March, on which the Prime Minister commented with very great severity. What is the origin of that letter? Is it a spontaneous, unprovoked question from General Gough? On the contrary, if you read the first words, he says:—
  "On thinking over the points raised by the Secretary of State"—
  The Secretary of State had summoned him to his presence. He had there spoken to
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  him, and he had raised points in conversation with him, and General Gough asked, as an officer who had gone through so much, and been so hardly tried, had surely a right to ask that he should know exactly what the Secretary of State meant by what he had said. That brings us to the last document. That is the document about which there is still a great deal of mystery. The draft of it, the House will observe, was prepared by the Adjutant-General, who had been present at the interview between the Secretary of State and General Gough. That draft, therefore, embodied the Adjutant-General's impression of what the Secretary of State had said, and it was subsequently taken to the Cabinet and rejected by them. Was General Gough not justified in desiring to have things made quite clear, and not he alone but the Adjutant-General? He drew up the draft, which was submitted to the Cabinet, which was the Adjutant-General's account of what the Secretary of State for War had said. I think General Gough was amply justified in asking to know exactly what the Secretary of State meant by the words which he had used.
  But that is not all. The Prime Minister' refused to produce, even while claiming to let the House fully into his confidence, the document which the Adjutant-General prepared as embodying what the Secretary of State had said. I think the House-and the country are entitled to know what was the Adjutant-General's impression of the conversation. We do not know either, because the Government have not produced it, what exactly were the amendments which the Cabinet made in it. The Prime Minister says they were substantially the first three paragraphs. But substantially is a blessed word which may cover a great deal, and, considering the whole history of this matter, we should like to see not substantially but exactly what it was. But even yet we are not at the end of the matter. What is the case with which the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State opened our proceedings to-day? It was that the Cabinet had set out the document which was given to these officers substantially in the form in the first three paragraphs of that which is published in the White Paper. Unhappily the Secretary of State had been, called away from the Cabinet and had therefore not known that this was a Cabinet decision, and after committing a grave error, for which he took full

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  responsibility, he had added two paragraphs on his own sole responsibility, and had accordingly, when the error was pointed out to him, offered his resignation. That is the account which the Prime Minister endorsed in a complete and ample record of all that occurred in regard to this momentous document. When I listened to the Secretary of State, I listened with the emotion which I think every one of us feels when in the opening sentences of his speech a Gentleman who occupies a prominent position in this House and in the Government intimates that he is going to conclude by announcing that he has ceased to be a Member of the Government, and that for some error that he has committed, or through some difference with his colleagues, he must resign the position that he fills. I listened not without emotion to the right hon. Gentleman's speech under that impression. When it was all finished, and when after the Prime Minister had spoken, what did we find? That the whole thing was a put-up job, and that it was a hollow comedy played by the Secretary of State, who, if he had asked to resign, knew while he was speaking that his resignation was not accepted.
  11.0 P.M.
  I have never seen a spectacle more humiliating than this drama of sentiment played out before a credulous and deceived House of Commons. I have to carry the story one step further. We now know from other sources of information that these paragraphs which two Ministers stated to-day to be the sole work of the Secretary of State for War and inserted by him only because he had not been able to be present during the proceedings of the Cabinet, were prepared by him in consultation with another member of the Cabinet who, I believe, was present throughout the proceedings. The Secretary of State, we are asked to believe, put this in because he was not present, and did not know what had passed. What about the other member of the Cabinet, Lord Morley, who has announced that he collaborated, and that he was present at the Cabinet? He could not have consented to put these paragraphs in unless they were, in his opinion, a fair interpretation of what the Cabinet had decided. We do not hear that he has resigned, and we know now that the Prime Minister does not accept the resignation of the Secretary of State. There are some things which no Prime Minister can afford to do, and if the present Prime Minister will permit me
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  to say so, I would say that he least of all, or. as little as anybody. They will not throw over a colleague for doing what they themselves had, in fact, if not in words, assented to. The Secretary of State for War and Lord Morley are pledged by the Paper which they gave. The Government may throw them over if they like, but if they are thrown over, if the word that they pledged is repudiated, as men of honour they cannot stay with the Government a day longer. And if they stay, then the Paper which they approve, and one of them initials, and the interpretation of that Paper which the Chief of the General Staff gave to General Gough and authorised him to read to his officers at the Curragh is a binding obligation alike on them and on their colleagues.
  Mr. CHURCHILL[who, on rising, was received with cries of "Resign!" and interruption from the Opposition Benches]: In ordinary circumstances in the regular course of our Parliamentary Debates succeeding one another from day to day, there is very little opportunity of judging of the character of individuals or of parties. But there are occasions when the temperature is raised. I dare say it may be raised very soon, so that you may, as you have so often done, interrupt the reply from the Government Benches.
  Mr. BONAR LAW: He is only doing that to avoid saying anything.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: Because having made the attack you are afraid to hear the answer.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: It is my earnest hope that my hon. Friends will hear what the right hon. Gentleman wishes to say; but when he makes that observation I beg to recall to his memory that he pointedly interrupted me in the midst of my speech.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I thought that the right hon. Gentleman got a singularly fair hearing. I was met, on rising to answer him, after he had made the most insulting charges that he could think, of—[Interruption.] Surely he would not deny that they were the most insulting charges. When I rose—[HON. MEMBERS: "Go on!"]—I am going to go on—from this bench to offer, not at undue length I hope, but with what I claim ought to be the fair liberty of debate in this House. [Interruption.] Hon Gentlemen and right hon. Gentlemen opposite always have this idea

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  that they ran bully the party on this side. When I rise to make the reply, which is proper and only courteous to the view which they represent, I am received with cries of "Divide!" If I am given full liberty of debate, I am going, in a few minutes, to make some observations in reply. I am going to take full advantage of fair liberty of debate in this House, but if I am shouted down it would not be for the first time. Let me draw the attention of the House to two of the charges of the right. hon. Gentleman. The first is an open charge of mendacity against those who sit on this bench. He said that whereas the Prime Minister stated on behalf of the Government that we never saw the letter of General Gough referred to, and never assented to the two last paragraphs of the statement, as a matter of fact we had all assented to it, and are now unable to get rid of the Secretary of State because we are involved. We have not only lied, but are unable to art fairly and in a straightforward manner because of the lie we have told. The right hon. Gentleman does not believe that charge. He knows perfectly well what are the conditions under which public life is carried on in this country, what are the decent—[Interruption.] I presume the right hon. Gentleman knows his own party; I presume he knows the extreme limits of what is right, fair, and proper in political affairs. He does not believe the charge for a minute. He said it in order to get a cheap party cheer, and in order to work up the feeling on an issue on which there has been quite feeling enough, and he so makes this charge that the Government have told a deliberate lie about this spatter. That brings me to his second charge. [HON. MEMBERS "Answer it!"]
  His second statement was also remarkable. He said that the resignation of my right hon. Friend was a put-up job. The two standing together, the accusation and the answer, furnish in combination what one may call a study in chivalry—alternative forms of chivalry. Here is the position. I quite admit that between one party and another they have plenty of right to be angry and vexed with us, especially this last day or two. They push party recriminations to extreme limits, to the utmost limits, but when a Minister or a Member of the House is, in his personal affairs and personal situation deeply concerned and deeply engaged, the House always shows a special attention and consideration. The personal action of my right
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  hon. Friend, apart from what was assented to by his colleagues, has been very accurately delimited in this Debate, and we are confident that though they indicated a divergence and a difference which we had not been able in all respects to cover, they are not such as should require him, or justify him, in this critical juncture to sever his connection with the Government, who trust him, and who are proud to work with him. Of course, one may expect a certain amount of sneers from Gentlemen who are our political opponents, but I think when the right hon. Gentleman described what took place to-day, after my right hon. Friend— we know his character here—made his frank and manly statement, as a "put up job," he shows one of the forms of chivalry as practised by the Opposition at the present time. I think for a right hon. Gentleman in the position of the ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer in a Conservative Ministry, a man who dealt with great affairs year after year, I think a rather snore refined and guarded manner of speech, when a question of the personal reputation and conduct of a Minister is engaged, would have been more becoming. He does no harm to my right hon. Friend, but the right hon. Gentleman might have taken a little higher ground.
  Let us compare the chivalry of the right hon. Gentleman in saying that this is a put-up job with the action of Lord Morley. Lord Morley's reputation in this House is well-known. For many a year he was an ornament of our Debates, and. his learning and intellectual elevation, his brilliancy of phrasing, and the range of his experience, constitute assets and qualifications which the Government value in the highest degree. Lord Morley came into the room while the Secretary of State was opening for the first time the box in which the letter of General Gough was contained. Lord Morley came into the Cabinet Room, deserted by the Cabinet, who had repaired to luncheon, to find out from my right hon. Friend what were the exact terms, the precise terms of the declaration he had to make in a few hours to the House of Lords. The difficulties which exist between the two Chambers are well known to the House at large, and the Government know the difficulties of ensuring that exactly the same declaration is made in every minute particular at one end of the corridor and the

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  other. We are practical men here, and we know the House of Commons very well. We know the conditions of public life here very well, and everyone knows that there are always possibilities of minor discrepancies which it is not really worth while importing into a serious argument or discussion. That is one of the great defects of the right hon. Gentleman's style of political argument. I read some time ago a description of it in which it was said that his method of argument was always trying to beat a very small bird out of a very large bush. Let me go on with my narrative. Lord Morley was present asking my right hon. Friend for what was actually to be stated in the House of Lords as a consequence of the Cabinet decision. He never revised or examined those paragraphs or took any decision upon them, and my right hon. Friend takes the sole responsibility upon himself, but Lord Morley at the other end of the passage, as he happened to be there when the box was opened, and when the case was raised—
  The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bonar Law) laughs. Sir, I dare say we shall yet see him the head of a Government in this country. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!" and "Never!"] I am young yet, and must not exclude that possibility. I can only wish for him in that day a colleague as loyal and as chivalrous as Lord Morley. Although he had not in any direct or effective manner been connected with the decision taken by my right hon. Friend, and although my right hon. Friend takes full responsibility for it, Lord Morley, as he was indirectly and remotely brought into contact with it, considered it right and proper to say that he takes full responsibility for it. I think the House will agree that these alternative studies in chivalry are not to the profit. of the right hon. Gentleman. Further, the right hon. Gentleman expects us to lay before him all the confidential correspondence and confidential documents in the possession of the Army Council and of the Cabinet. He expects that he should be provided, for the sole purpose of party controversy, with every detail of the discussions which go on within the secret circles—or semi-secret circles, I may say—of the Government and of the Army Council. We have gone to the fullest possible length in the documents we have
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  published. We have brutally selected the documents which most clearly reveal the position, concealing nothing because it was damaging, but laying before Parliament the whole of the material facts, of which Parliament has, I think, taken full note. The right hon. Gentleman endeavoured to make a formidable charge of breach of personal honour against my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: No. Twice over, before the Prime Minister came in and again in his presence, I said that I did not make any charge against him of wilfully deceiving.
  The PRIME MINISTER: I am quite sure you would not.
  Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: What I said was that it was inconceivable that the Prime Minister had this information which is now known to the House at the time he made that statement. It is the First Lord who alleged that the Prime Minister had it.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I am quite sure that I should be wrong if I tried to found an argument on saying that the right hon. Gentleman charged the Prime Minister with a breach of honour, because I am sure that he did not intend to do so. Therefore, I will not take advantage of the. verbal terms which he used to found any charge upon them at all. As to this Battle Squadron; on the 11th, this day fortnight, the Cabinet decided that a Battle Squadron with its attendant ships should be stationed at Lamlash, because that is a good place for them to be at to do their work, and also —I make no concealment—because they would be conveniently situated in case of grave disorder arising. Battleship squadrons go about their work in the ordinary and regular way. This particular squadron was at Arosa Bay. There was no urgency in the matter. This movement was not in any way directly connected with the special precautionary moves that have been described to the House; but, still, it did happen that the Battle Squadron was coming home—. [Laughter.] I hope. that that laughter does not base itself upon the assumption that I should be afraid to say that it was connected with them if that was the case. It happened that during the time that this Battle Squadron was on its passage these movements were taking place. The squadron was certainly allowed to hold

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  on its course steadily so long as it was not certain whether the movements would be effected, as we hoped and expected they would be, without bloodshed or serious military opposition. As soon as it was clear that there was no serious opposition and that the movements had been safely conducted, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister who knew exactly what had been happening—though I do not say that he kept the exact position of the squadron in his mind —suggested to me that it would be a good thing, as all had passed off satisfactorily, and there was great excitement and a great many sensational and lying rumours in the Press, to delay the movements of the Battle Squadron for another fortnight. Then it will go to Lamlash. There it will stay during the continuance of this crisis. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about the destroyers?"] They are merely an incidental feature. A Battle Squadron has its attendant destroyers and cruisers. As to a question put by the Noble Lord about field guns, if the vice-admiral on his own account desired to have this Artillery on board, these guns, which are usually taken when they are cruising in order that the men may work the guns on shore if the weather is too bad to put the ships to sea—
  Lord C. BERESFORD: They had their own complement on board; these were extra.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: The Noble Lord has a great deal of information, and more than I have on the subject. I can quite believe that there must be somebody who is giving him information. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"]
  Lord C. BERESFORD: If the right hon. Gentleman will read the Press he will be able to get the same information.
  Mr. CHURCHILL: I am going to examine the statements in the Press, and see whether they bear out the Noble Lord's statement, and when I have done so I will take the opportunity of making a statement in the House which will, I am sure, be very gratifying to the Noble Lord. I do not understand the position of the Conservative party in being so squeamish over these naval and military movements. Their complaint during the last two years has been: "You are not taking the great Ulster rebellion seriously enough." Over and over again we have been reproached in the harshest terms for not paying suffi-
  506
  cent attention to what is going on. We have been told: "Here is an army being drilled, here we are rebelling, and at any moment we may go off in a frightful explosion." Nobody more than the Leader of the Opposition has adopted this attitude. He said: "We have not a minute to lose." They could not wait till the financial business had been concluded. "If," he said, "a policeman had gone into the lines of the Ulster volunteers and had asked to count the number of rifles he would have precipitated a ghastly catastrophe that would have riven the British Empire to its utmost foundations!" Sir, we have never taken these statements at their full value. Still, very serious steps are on foot. Large forces have been raised, and every kind of assertion has been made as to their employment.
  When movements, however limited, however precautionary, however reasonable, however non-provocative in themselves, have to be made, it is necessary that contingent preparations should also be taken into account in case what we all hope and trust will be avoided were suddenly to break out upon us. That is the explanation of a great deal that you will read in the next few days in the newspapers of stores, and ships, and men, and guns, and ambulances, and pontoon sections, and so forth, that were taken into general consideration in case contingent movements should be necessary. That is the only explanation. I am not going to go back upon the subject which has been already dealt with. I have already spoken for twenty-five minutes, and in five minutes I shall conclude. But I should like before the House goes to a Division on the Consolidated Fund Bill to put before the House the great issues which have been raised by these dramatic and very remarkable events. As to the officers, I hope my hon. Friends on this side will not throw themselves into a mood which is in any way unfair to these young Cavalry officers in the difficult position in which they found themselves placed. If the alternative with which these officers conceived themselves to be confronted, and which they conceived themselves bound to decide upon in a few hours, had been put to Members of the present Government there would have been a mixed answer, and I think most people would have fallen back upon that truly Ministerial answer, "I decline

  507
  to answer hypothetical questions." I hope it will not be too readily. assumed that those officers were animated by a wrong spirit or by a base political or party spirit in discharging duties which must be removed, and which it ought and must he a point of honour with them to remove from the area of party politics. But when that question of the officers has been put aside and everything said that may be fairly said to reduce that action to its proper proportions, the fact remains that a great issue has been raised—of the Army versus Parliament. Well, we are content to let that issue, in so far as it has been raised, move forward steadily to its ultimate conclusion. Another issue has broken upon this issue—I mean the Army versus the People. Every effort has been made with the greatest dialectical skill by the right hon. Gentleman the Senior Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour) and by the Leader of the Opposition, who emulates his dialectical force without his dialectical subtlety, to show that it is always right for soldiers to shoot down a Radical or a labour man—[HON. MEMBERS: "Liar!" "Withdraw!" and Interruption]—and always wrong—[Interruption and HON. MEMBERS: "Rub it in!" and "With draw!"]
  I quite understand, of course, hon. Gentlemen opposite do not agree. If I were shouted down now there could be no greater tribute paid to me. [An HON. MEMBER: "That is what you were waiting for!"] As I say, great efforts have been made to show that when it is a Tory quarrel then the Army ought to act. But in any matter where Liberals are concerned, then, of course, no gentleman would ever demean himself by doing his duty to the Crown and Parliament. That, again, is an issue far-reaching, profound, unsettling in its evolution and in its presentment which I should have thought the party of property, law, and order would have been most ill-advised to raise in this country of the very rich, and of the large
  classes of moderately rich, and of the enormous overwhelming masses of the miserably poor. Those are the two great issues which have emerged at the present time, and they far overshadow and outweigh the actual local issues in Ulster, and require the special delicate consideration of the House. If those great issues are raised we, on this side of the House, are prepared at ally time, in any way, by any method, and at whatever cost, to meet them. I most earnestly ask, not only the party opposite, but the House at large, to end this Debate by considering for one second where it is we are actually drifting to-clay. It is a question which ought to be at the back of the mind of every Member of the House of Commons. The right hon. Gentleman said he thought politics were a game. At any rate, the stakes have been enormously increased in the last few weeks. I earnestly suggest that when we have got to a point when rebellion, organised, avowed, applauded, and stimulated is set on foot against the ordinary workings of our Legislature; when attempts to deal with that rebellious movement, if it should be necessary, are to be countered—sometimes by exciting speeches, sometimes by newspaper articles, and sometimes by social influences—when attempts are made to paralyse the Executive in dealing with rebellion by fomenting, stimulating, or suggesting mutinies or resistance in the Fleet and Army—[An. HON. MEMBER: "Never."]—I welcome anyone who says "Never"—when that has actually been reached in our sober, humdrum, prosaic British politics, it is about time for serious, responsible people in all parts of the House, and all parties, to see if they cannot do something to make the situation a little better.
  Question put, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."
  The House divided: Ayes, 314; Noes, 222.

  Division No. 55.]

  AYES.

  [11.35 p.m.

  Abraham, William (Dublin, Harbour)

  Baker, Harold T. (Accrington)

  Booth, Frederick Handel

  Acland, Francis Dyke

  Baker, Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.)

  Bowerman, Charles W.

  Adamson, William

  Baring, Sir Godfrey (Barnstaple)

  Boyle, Daniel (Mayo, North)

  Addison, Dr. Christopher

  Barlow, Sir John Emmott (Somerset)

  Brace, William

  Adkins, Sir W. Ryland D.

  Barnes, George N.

  Brady, Patrick Joseph

  Ainsworth, John Stirling

  Barran, Sir John N. (Hawick)

  Brocklehurst, William B.

  Alden, Percy

  Beck, Arthur Cecil

  Brunner, John F. L.

  Allen, Arthur A. (Dumbartonshire)

  Benn, W. W. (T. Hamlets, St. George)

  Bryce, J. Annan

  Allen, Rt. Hon. Charles P. (Stroud)

  Bentham, George Jackson

  Buckmaster, Sir Stanley O.

  Armitage, Robert

  Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine

  Burns, Rt. Hon. John

  Arnold, Sydney

  Black, Arthur W.

  Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas

  Asquith, Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry

  Boland, John Plus

  Buxton, Noel (Norfolk, North)

  Byles, Sir William Pollard

  Henderson, J. M. (Aberdeen, W.)

  Nugent, Sir Walter Richard

  Carr-Gomm, H. W.

  Henry, Sir Charles

  Nuttall, Harry

  Cawley, Harold T. (Lancs., Heywood)

  Hewart, Gordon

  O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)

  Chancellor, Henry George

  Higham, John Sharp

  O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)

  Chapple, Dr. William Allen

  Hinds, John

  O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool)

  Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S.

  Hobhouse, Rt. Hon. Charles E. H.

  O'Doherty, Philip

  Clancy, John Joseph

  Hodge, John

  O'Donnell, Thomas

  Clough, William

  Hogge, James Myles

  O'Dowd, John

  Clynes, John R.

  Holmes, Daniel Turner

  O'Kelly, Edward P. (Wicklow, W.)

  Collins, Godfrey P. (Greenock)

  Holt, Richard Durning

  O'Malley, William

  Collins, Sir Stephen (Lambeth)

  Horne, C. Silvester (Ipswich)

  O'Neill, Dr. Charles (Armagh, S.)

  Condon, Thomas Joseph

  Howard, Hon. Geoffrey

  O'Shaughnessy, P. J.

  Cornwall, Sir Edwin A.

  Hudson, Walter

  O'Shee, James John

  Cotton, William Francis

  Hughes, Spencer Leigh

  O'Sullivan, Timothy

  Cowan, W. H.

  Jardine, Sir J. (Roxburgh)

  Outhwaite, R. L.

  Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth)

  John, Edward Thomas

  Palmer, Godfrey Mark

  Crooks, William

  Johnson, W.

  Parker, James (Halifax)

  Crumley, Patrick

  Jones, Rt. Hon. Sir D. Brynmor (Sw'nsea)

  Parry, Thomas H.

  Cullinan, John

  Jones, Edgar (Merthyr Tydvil)

  Pearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek)

  Dalziel, Rt. Hon. Sir J. H. (Kirkcaldy)

  Jones, H. Haydn (Merioneth)

  Pearce, William (Limehouse)

  Davies, David (Montgomery Co.)

  Jones, J. Towyn (Carmarthen, East)

  Pease, Rt. Hon. Joseph A. (Rotherham)

  Davies, Ellis William (Eilion)

  Jones, Leit (Notts, Rushcliffe)

  Philipps, Colonel Ivor (Southampton)

  Davies, Timothy (Lincs., Louth)

  Jones, William (Carnarvonshire)

  Phillips, John (Longford, S.)

  Davies, Sir W. Howell (Bristol, S.)

  Jowett, Frederick William

  Pointer, Joseph

  Davies, M. Vaughan- (Cardiganshire)

  Joyce, Michael

  Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H.

  Dawes, James Arthur

  Kellaway, Frederick George

  Pratt, J. W.

  De Forest, Baron

  Kelly, Edward

  Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)

  Delany, William

  Kennedy, Vincent Paul

  Priestley, Sir W. E. B. (Bradford, E.)

  Denman, Hon. Richard Douglas

  Kenyon, Barnet

  Primrose, Hon. Neil James

  Devlin, Joseph

  Kilbride, Denis

  Pringle, William M. R.

  Dickinson, Rt. Hon. Willoughby H.

  Lambert, Rt. Hon G. (Devon, S. Molten)

  Radford, G. H.

  Dillon, John

  Lambert, Richard (Wilts, Cricklade)

  Raffan, Peter Wilson

  Donelan, Captain A.

  Lardner, James C. R.

  Raphael, Sir Herbert H.

  Doris, William

  Law, Hugh A. (Donegal, West)

  Rea, Rt. Hon. Russell (South Shields)

  Duffy, William J.

  Lawson, Sir W. (Cumb'rld, Cockerm'th)

  Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough)

  Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)

  Leach, Charles

  Reddy, Michael

  Edwards, Clement (Glamorgan, E.)

  Levy, Sir Maurice

  Redmond, John E. (Waterford)

  Edwards, Sir Francis (Radnor)

  Lewis, Rt. Hon. John Herbert

  Redmond, William Archer (Tyrone, E.)

  Edwards, John, Hugh (Glamorgan, Mid)

  Lough, Rt. Hon. Thomas

  Randall, Atheistan

  Elverston, Sir Harold

  Low, Sir F. (Norwich)

  Richards, Thomas

  Esmonde, Dr. John (Tipperary, N.)

  Lundon, Thomas

  Richardson, Albion (Peckham)

  Esmonde, Sir Thomas (Wexford, N.)

  Lyeil, Charles Henry

  Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven)

  Essex, Sir Richard Walter

  Lynch, A. A.

  Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)

  Esslemont, George Birnie

  Macdonald, J. Ramsay (Leicester)

  Roberts, George H. (Norwich)

  Falconer, James

  Macdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs)

  Roberts, Sir J. H. (Denbighs)

  Farrell, James Patrick

  McGhee, Richard

  Robertson, Sir G Scott (Bradford)

  Fenwick, Rt. Hon. Charles

  Maclean, Donald

  Robertson, J. M. (Tyneside)

  Ferens, Rt. Hon. Thomas Robinson

  Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J.

  Robinson, Sidney

  Ffrench, Peter

  MacNeill, J. G. Swift (Donegal, South)

  Roch, Walter F. (Pembroke)

  Field, William

  Macpherson, James Ian

  Roche, Augustine (Louth)

  Fiennes, Hon. Eustace Edward

  MacVeagh, Jeremiah

  Roe, Sir Thomas

  Fitzgibbon, John

  M'Callum, Sir John M.

  Rowntree, Arnold

  Flavin, Michael Joseph

  M'Curdy, C. A.

  Runciman, Rt. Hon. Walter

  France, Gerald Ashburner

  McKenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald

  Russell, Rt. Hon. Thomas W.

  Gelder, Sir William Alfred

  M'Laren, Hon. H. D. (Leics.)

  Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)

  George, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd

  M'Laren, Hon. F.W.S. (Lincs., Spalding)

  Samuel, J. (Stockton-an-Tees)

  Gill, A. H.

  M'Micking, Major Gilbert

  Samuel, Sir Stuart M. (Whitechapel)

  Gladstone, W. G. C.

  Manfield, Harry

  Scanlan, Thomas

  Glanville, H. J.

  Markham, Sir Arthur Basil

  Scott, A. MacCallum (Glas., Bridgeton)

  Goddard, Sir Daniel Ford

  Marks, Sir George Croydon

  Seely, Rt. Hon. Colonel J. E. B.

  Goldstone, Frank

  Marshall, Arthur Harold

  Sheehy, David

  Greenwood, Hamar (Sunderland)

  Mason, David M. (Coventry)

  Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir John Allsebrook

  Greig, Colonel J. W.

  Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.)

  Smyth, Thomas F. (Leitrim, S.)

  Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward

  Meehan, Patrick J. (Queen's Co., Leix)

  Soames, Arthur Wellesley

  Griffith, Ellis Jones

  Middlebrook, William

  Spicer, Rt. Hon. Sir Albert

  Guest, Hon. Major C. H. C. (Pembroke)

  Molloy, Michael

  Stanley, Albert (Staffs, N. W.)

  Guest, Hon. Frederick E. (Dorset, E.)

  Molteno, Percy Alport

  Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West)

  Gwynn, Stephen Lucius (Galway)

  Mond, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred

  Sutton, John E.

  Hackett, John

  Money, L. G. Chiozza

  Taylor, John W. (Durham)

  Hall, Frederick (Normanton)

  Montagu, Hon. E. S.

  Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)

  Hancock, John George

  Mooney, John J.

  Taylor, Thomas (Bolton)

  Harcourt, Rt. Hon. Lewis (Rossendale)

  Morgan, George Hay

  Tennant, Harold John

  Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose)

  Morrell, Philip

  Thomas, James Henry

  Hardie, J. Keir

  Morison, Hector

  Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton)

  Harmsworth, Cecil B. (Luton, Beds)

  Morton, Alpheus Cleophas

  Thorne, William (West Ham)

  Harvey, A. G. C. (Rochdale)

  Muldoon, John

  Toulmin, Sir George

  Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, West)

  Murphy, Martin J.

  Trevelyan, Charles Philips

  Haslam, Lewis (Monmouth)

  Murray, Captain Hon. Arthur C.

  Verney, Sir Harry

  Hayden, John Patrick

  Nannetti, Joseph P.

  Walsh, Stephen (Lancs., Ince)

  Hayward, Evan

  Needham, Christopher Thomas

  Walters, Sir John Tudor

  Hazleton, Richard

  Neilson, Francis

  Walton, Sir Joseph

  Helme, Sir Norval Watson

  Nicholson, Sir Charles N. (Doncaster)

  Ward, John (Stoke-upon-Trent)

  Hemmerde, Edward George

  Nolan, Joseph

  Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton)

  Henderson, Arthur (Durham)

  Norton, Captain Cecil W.

  Wardle, George J.

  510

  511

  Waring, Walter

  Wiles, Thomas

  Winfrey, Sir Richard

  Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan)

  Wilkie, Alexander

  Wing, Thomas Edward

  Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney)

  Williams, Aneurin (Durham, N.W.)

  Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glasgow)

  Webb, H.

  Williams, John (Glamorgan)

  Yeo, Alfred William

  Wedgwood, Josiah C.

  Williams, Llewelyn (Carmarthen)

  Young, William (Perthshire, East)

  White, J. Dundas (Glasgow, Tradeston)

  Williams, Penry (Middlesbrough)

  Yoxall, Sir James Henry

  White, Patrick (Meath, North)

  Williamson, Sir Archibald

  Whitehouse, John Howard

  Wilson, John (Durham, Mid)

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Mr.

  Whittaker, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas P.

  Wilson, Rt. Hon. J. W. (Worcs., N.)

  Illingworth and Mr. Gulland.

  Whyte, A. F. (Perth)

  Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)

  NOES.

  Aitken, Sir William Max

  Eyres-Monsell, Bolton M.

  Macmaster, Donald

  Amery, L. C. M. S.

  Faber, George Denison (Clapham)

  M'Neill, Ronald (Kent, St. Augustine's)

  Anson, Rt. Hon. Sir William R.

  Falle, B. G.

  Magnus, Sir Philip

  Anstruther-Gray, Major William

  Fell, Arthur

  Malcolm, Ian

  Archer-Shee, Major Martin

  Finlay, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert

  Mason, James F. (Windsor)

  Ashley, Wilfrid W.

  Fisher, Rt. Hon. W. Hayes

  Meysey-Thompson E. C.

  Astor, Waldorf

  Fitzroy, Hon. Edward A.

  Middlemore, John Throgmorton

  Baird, John Lawrence

  Flannery, Sir J. Fortescue

  Mills, Hon. Charles Thomas

  Baldwin, Stanley

  Fleming, Valentine

  Morrison-Bell, Capt. E. F. (Ashburton)

  Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J. (City, Lond.)

  Forster, Henry William

  Mount, William Arthur

  Banbury, Sir Frederick George

  Gastrell, Major W. Houghton

  Neville, Reginald J. N.

  Banner, Sir John S. Harmood-

  Gibbs, G. A.

  Newdegate, F. A.

  Baring, Major Hon. Guy V. (Winchester)

  Gilmour, Captain John

  Newman, John R. P.

  Barlow, Montague (Salford, South)

  Glazebrook, Captain Philip K.

  Newton, Harry Kottingham

  Barnston, Harry

  Goldman, C. S.

  Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield)

  Bathurst, Hon. A. B. (Glouc., E.)

  Goldsmith, Frank

  Orde-Powlett, Hon. W. G. A.

  Bathurst, Charles (Wilts, Wilton)

  Gordon, Hon. John Edward (Brighton)

  Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William

  Beach, Hon. Michael Hugh Hicks

  Goulding, Edward Alfred

  Paget, Almeric Hugh

  Beckett, Hon. Gervase

  Grant, J. A.

  Parker, Sir Gilbert (Gravesend)

  Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth)

  Gretton, John

  Parkes, Ebenezer

  Benn, Ion Hamilton (Greenwich)

  Guinness, Hon. Rupert (Essex, S.E.)

  Peel, Lieut.-Colonel R. F.

  Bennett-Goldney, Francis

  Guinness, Hon. W. E. (Bury S. Edmunds)

  Perkins, Walter F.

  Bentinck, Lord H. Cavendish-

  Gwynne, R. S. (Sussex, Eastbourne)

  Peto, Basil Edward

  Beresford. Lord C.

  Haddock, George Bahr

  Pole-Carew, Sir R.

  Bigland, Alfred

  Hall, D. B. (Isle of Wight)

  Pollock, Ernest Murray

  Bird, Alfred

  Hall, Frederick (Dulwich)

  Pretyman, Ernest George

  Blair, Reginald

  Hambro, Angus Valdemar

  Quilter, Sir William Eley C.

  Boles, Lieut.-Colonel Dennis Fortescue

  Hamersley, Alfred St. George

  Ratcliff, R. F.

  Boscawen, Sir Arthur S. T. Griffith-

  Hamilton, C. G. C. (Ches., Altrincham)

  Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel

  Boyton, James

  Hamilton, Lord C. J. (Kensington, S.)

  Rawson, Col. Richard H.

  Brassey, H. Leonard Campbell

  Hardy, Rt. Hon. Laurence

  Rees, Sir J. D.

  Bridgeman, William Clive

  Harris, Henry Percy

  Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall)

  Bull, Sir William James

  Harrison-Broadley, H. B.

  Rolleston, Sir John

  Burgoyne, A. H.

  Henderson, Major H. (Berks, Abingdon)

  Rothschild, Lionel de

  Burn, Colonel C. R.

  Henderson, Sir A. (St. Geo., Han. Sq.)

  Royds, Edmund

  Butcher, John George

  Hewins, William Albert Samuel

  Rutherford, Watson (L'pool, W. Derby)

  Campbell, Captain Duncan F. (Ayr, N.)

  Hibbert, Sir Henry F.

  Salter, Arthur Clavell

  Campion, W. R.

  Hickman, Colonel Thomas E.

  Samuel, Sir Harry (Norwood)

  Cassel, Felix

  Hills, John Waller

  Samuel, Samuel (Wandsworth)

  Cater, John

  Hill-Wood, Samuel

  Sanders, Robert Arthur

  Cautley, H. S.

  Hoare, S. J. G.

  Sanderson, Lancelot

  Cave, George

  Hohler, G. F.

  Sandys, G. J.

  Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)

  Hope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield)

  Sassoon, Sir Philip

  Cecil, Lord Hugh (Oxford University)

  Hope, Major J. A. (Midlothian)

  Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)

  Cecil, Lord R. (Herts, Hitchin)

  Horne, Edgar (Surrey, Guildford)

  Smith, Rt. Hon. F. E. (L'p'l., Walton)

  Chaloner Col. R. G. W.

  Horner, Andrew Long

  Smith, Harold (Warrington)

  Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J. A. (Worc'r)

  Hume-Williams, William Ellis

  Spear, Sir John Ward

  Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry

  Hunt, Rowland

  Stanier, Beville

  Clay, Captain H. H. Spender

  Hunter, Sir C. R.

  Stanley, Hon. G. F. (Preston)

  Clive, Captain Percy Archer

  Ingleby, Holcombe

  Starkey, John Ralph

  Clyde, J. Avon

  Jackson, Sir John

  Staveley-Hill, Henry

  Coates, Major Sir Edward Feetham

  Jessel, Captain H. M.

  Swift, Rigby

  Courthope, George Loyd

  Joynson-Hicks, William

  Sykes, Alan John (Ches., Knutsford)

  Craig, Ernest (Cheshire, Crewe)

  Kerry, Earl of

  Sykes, Sir Mark (Hull, Central)

  Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet)

  Keswick, Henry

  Terrell, George (Wilts, N.W.)

  Craik, Sir Henry

  Knight, Captain Eric Ayshford

  Terrell, Henry (Gloucester)

  Crichton-Stuart, Lord Ninian

  Larmor, Sir J.

  Thompson, Robert (Belfast, North)

  Croft, H. P.

  Law, Rt. Hon. A. Bonar (Bootle)

  Thomson, W. Mitchell- (Down, North)

  Currie, George W.

  Lawson, Hon. H. (T. H'mts, Mile End)

  Thynne, Lord A.

  Dairymple, Viscount

  Lee, Arthur Hamilton

  Tobin, Alfred Aspinall

  Dalziel, Davison (Brixton)

  Lewisham, Viscount

  Touche George Alexander

  Denison-Pender, J. C.

  Lloyd, George Ambrose (Stafford, W.)

  Tryon, Captain George Clement

  Denniss, E. R. B.

  Lloyd, George Butler (Shrewsbury)

  Tullibardine, Marquess of

  Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. Scott

  Locker-Lampson, G. (Sallsbury)

  Valentia, Viscount

  Dixon, C. H.

  Locker-Lampson, O. (Ramsey)

  Ward, A. S. (Herts, Watford)

  Doughty, Sir George

  Lockwood, Rt. Hon. Lt.-Colonel A. R.

  Warde, Colonel C. E. (Kent, Mid)

  Du Cros, Arthur Philip

  Long, Rt. Hon. Walter

  Watson, Hon. W.

  Duke, Henry Edward

  Lyttelton, Mon. J. C.

  Weigall, Captain A. G.

  Duncannon, Viscount

  MacCaw, Wm J. MacGeagh

  Weston, Colonel J. W.

  Du Pre, W. Baring

  Mackinder, Halford J.

  Wheler, Granville C. H.

  512

  513

  White, Major G. D. (Lancs., Southport)

  Wilson, Maj. Sir M. (Bethnal Green, S.W.)

  Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart-

  Williams, Colonel R. (Dorset, W.)

  Wolmer, Viscount

  Yate, Colonel C. E.

  Willoughby, Major Hon. Claud

  Wood, Hon. E. F. L, (Yorks, Ripon)

  Wilson, A. Stanley (Yorks, E.R.)

  Wood, John (Stalybridge)

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Lord

  Wilson, Captain Leslie O. (Reading)

  Worthington-Evans, L.

  Edmund Talbot and Mr. Pike Pease.

  Bill read a second time, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House for to-morrow (Thursday).

  The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.
  It being after Half-past Eleven of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
  Adjourned at Thirteen minutes before Twelve o'clock.

NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT.
  SICKNESS BENEFIT.
  SICKNESS BENEFIT.
  Road Improvement Fund.
  Road Improvement Fund.
  British Museum.
  British Museum.
  Super-Tax Assessments.
  Super-Tax Assessments.
  Increment Value Duty.
  Increment Value Duty.
  Land Purchase (Ireland).
  Land Purchase (Ireland).
ROYAL NAVY.
  SOLENT NAVIGATION.
  SOLENT NAVIGATION.
  KIRKSTALL TRADE DISPUTE.
  KIRKSTALL TRADE DISPUTE.
  NAVAL ORDNANCE CLERKS.
  NAVAL ORDNANCE CLERKS.
BRITISH ARMY.
  WAR OFFICE CONTRACTS.
  WAR OFFICE CONTRACTS.
  Indian Medical Service (Pensions)
  Indian Medical Service (Pensions)
  Forest of Dean (Workmen's Cottages).
  Forest of Dean (Workmen's Cottages).
  Swine Fever.
  Swine Fever.
  Established Church (Wales) Bill.
  Established Church (Wales) Bill.
  Telephone Service.
  Telephone Service.
  San Salvador.
  San Salvador.
  British and Foreign Trade and Industry.
  British and Foreign Trade and Industry.
  Poor Law Relief.
  Poor Law Relief.

BARONY OF ST. JOHN.
Committee for Privileges met: Counsel heard to open the case on behalf of the Claimant: Evidence put in: Witnesses examined: Committee adjourned till To-morrow, at Two o'clock.
The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House, That the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificate from the Examiners that the Standing Orders have not been complied with in respect of the petition for additional provision in the following Bills:

Middlesborough Corporation.

South Suburban Gas.

The same were ordered to lie on the Table.

BRITISH GAS LIGHT COMPANY (HULL STATION) BILL. [H.L.]
  MABLETHORPE URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL. [H.L.]
    MEXBOROUGH URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL. [H.L.]
    Committee to meet on Tuesday next.
EAST HAM CORPORATION BILL.
Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
NEWPORT CORPORATION BILL. [H.L.]
King's consent signified, and Bill reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
SOUTH BANK AND NORMANBY GASLIGHT AND COKE COMPANY BILL. [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS ON SUNDAY BILL. [H.L.]
Second Reading (which stands appointed for this day) put off to Thursday the 2nd of April next.

MOVABLE DWELLINGS BILL. [H.L.]
[SECOND READING.]
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD CLIFFORD OF CHUDLEIGH: My Lords, the Bill to which I ask your Lordships to give a Second Reading today has been before this House on one or two previous occasions, and does not differ very much from the last Bill except in one or two particulars which I shall briefly mention. Possibly some of your Lordships may remember that the Bill when first before you, contained several clauses with regard to registration, and that when the Bill was referred to a Select Committee of your Lordships' House the Committee reported against the registration clauses, and those clauses were subsequently dropped. The present registration clause which, at the instance of the County Councils Association, I have inserted, is not that which originally stood in the Bill. The original clauses provided not only for registration but also for supervision, and contained requirements for a licence. The present one, instead of being based as the former one was more or less upon the Canal Boat Act, is modelled upon the registration which is required in the case of motor-cars.
The County Councils Association conceive that it would be a very great help in dealing with these vehicles to have some kind of list of them and some means of identifying them other than the name-plate, which is constantly being changed— a liability which would not be possible in the case of a registered number. On this point the decision of the Select Committee was very much less strong than it was with regard to the previous provision dealing with supervision and requirements for licence. As far as I have been able to make out from their Report, the Committee were influenced chiefly by the fact that registration of any kind is a certain amount of trouble and inconvenience; but they had, as a matter of fact, little or no evidence brought before them o show that there were any particular objections to registration in this form. In fact, the majority of the witnesses generally agreed that registration in this form would be a distinct advantage. The fee that is required under the Bill for this registration is only half a crown. There is no particular stress laid upon this amount. It might just as well be less. It is not meant to be burdensome.

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The whole object of the clause is that there may be a list and the means of identification of these various movable dwellings.
The Bill, then, in its main feature goes on to provide as follows: Recognising the fact that the bylaws which, as the law stands at present, it is quite possible for any local sanitary authority to make, are amply sufficient for the purpose if they were only made and capable of being enforced, the Bill goes on to provide that by-laws if made by a local sanitary authority may be enforced by the county council, either with the consent of the local sanitary authority or in default of their taking action; and if no bylaws are made at all under the Bill, then the county council— in default of the local sanitary authority, when called upon, making by-laws—have the power of making them. The second clause allows a county council to declare certain places, on the score of health, improper ones for encampment, and I intend to move an Amendment when the Bill goes into Committee empowering a local sanitary authority to oblige the county council to make such an order in respect of places for which they desire to have orders made, and in default of their doing so they must hold a local inquiry before they refuse to make such an order.
The third clause embodies the chief feature of the Bill, and that is that a county council may acquire land for the purpose of providing camping places for movable dwellings; and in the event of their having provided a sufficient number of such alternative encampments in substitution for the places that are being used now by such movable dwellings, they may make an order declaring certain places, or open spaces generally, other than those which they have provided, as unfit for the encampment of movable dwellings. And those orders may be enforced by the Police and by summary convictions, not only with regard to open spaces, but even with regard to private lands, on the broad ground that their use for such purposes as temporary encampments is a disadvantage and a nuisance to the neighbourhood and ought consequently to be forbidden. Then there come the usual clauses exempting naval and military encampments and dwellings used by public authorities and for agricultural purposes. I think this comprehends what is in the Bill as now introduced.
I have never been able to understand during the considerable time that I have
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been interested in this matter why a man who lives in a movable dwelling should at once be considered free from all those restrictions, both sanitary and educational, which are imposed upon those whom one cannot but consider more orderly members of society who live in permanent habitations. I can assure your Lordships that there are in certain parts of the country tracts where open spaces meant for the benefit and the delectation of the public are rendered an absolute nuisance and source of terror to the neighbourhood by persons who live from time to time in dwellings of this kind, and whose breaches of good order it is almost impossible to prevent in consequence of their constantly moving about and the defective machinery by which law and order are enforced upon them, and that this state of things is one which the more permanent members of the community look upon as neither fair to themselves in regard to the burdens which are imposed upon them nor generally in the interests of the public. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.— (Lord Clifford of Chudleigh.)
THE FIRST COMMISSIONER OF WORKS (EARL BEAUCHAMP): My Lords, it is not necessary for me to detain your Lordships at any length in expressing the general approval of His Majesty's Government of this measure. It is no doubt a useful Bill which will deal with a grievance more felt in some parts of the country than in others but which undoubtedly is felt as a real hardship in some parts, especially those near London. The Bill has been fully explained by the noble Lord and it is similar to the Bill which on previous occasions has been before your Lordships' House. The chief clause is permissive. It does not make any obligation upon county councils and I understand it has the approval of the County Councils Association, which the noble Lord represents in this House. In these circumstances I do not think it is necessary for me to do more than repeat the general approval of His Majesty's Government of this Bill, and say that it is possible that when we come to the Committee stage the Home Office may have one or two Departmental objections to make, purely on matters of detail, with regard to the system of registration proposed by the noble Lord. Otherwise we wish the Bill well.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I hope your Lordships will not think that we are showing any disrespect to the noble Lord and the House in not entering into a debate upon this interesting subject at the present moment. There are two good reasons for not doing so. In the first place, there are important matters which your Lordships desire to consider immediately; and, in the second place, this Bill has been in its main outlines before your Lordships' House as the result of a Report of a Select Committee of which I had the honour to be chairman, and which Report received the assent of your Lordships. In these circumstances it is not necessary to detain the House at this stage with any discussion. I congratulate my noble friend that he has brought the Bill forward, and that it has been received so favourably by the Government.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Tuesday the 28 th of April next.

CONSOLIDATION BILLS.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT HALDANE): My Lords, I rise to move that it is desirable that all Consolidation Bills in the present session be referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament. Your Lordships are aware that in past sessions a series of Bills for consolidating the law have been with great advantage passed through a Second Reading and referred to a Joint Committee and there investigated, and they have then come up for approval and been passed into law by both Houses. If your Lordships think fit to reappoint the members of this House to the Joint Committee which has done such good work, I am sure that we shall have further fruits from the process, especially if we have the advantage of the chairmanship of my noble and learned friend Lord Loreburn, who has done so much to assist in these matters. If the House approves, I should propose, when the time comes to submit the names of the Committee, to add that of my noble friend Lord Gorell, who has taken great interest in this subject.
Moved to resolve, That it is desirable that all Consolidation Bills in the present session be referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to; and a Message ordered to be sent to the Commons to communicate this Resolution, and to desire their concurrence.

THE ARMY AND ULSTER
VISCOUNT MIDLETON*VISCOUNT MIDLETON rose to call attention to the correspondence between the War Office, the General Officer Commanding in Ireland, and other officers, laid upon the Table of the House.
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, when we parted last night it was with the undertaking of the Government to lay certain Papers on the Table, and in the course of the brief discussion which took place it was made perfectly clear that the Papers which had been alluded to in another place were not likely to be as full as those which in the discussion here were, I think, admitted by the noble Viscount opposite to be essential to our proper understanding of the case. I am bound to say that the publication of the Papers which we have before us to-day has caused very great disappointment, and especially disappointment to those who are anxious not to attack the credit of the Government but to defend the credit of the Army. These Papers could not have been more carefully designed than they appear to have been to cover the credit of the Government by throwing discredit upon the officers of the Army. The noble Viscount will, perhaps, admit later that there is justice in the charge which I make. The Government have so put their case as to expose the Army to a degree of censure, and, as shown last night in the House of Commons, of obloquy, which is without parallel in the memory of the oldest member of this House, and which I think I can show even from the Papers themselves to be wholly unmerited, gratuitous, and unfortunate. Despite the attacks which were made, not one word was said in defence of the Army by its natural defender the Secretary of State for War or by any member of the Government.
I admit that these Papers carry us a little further than the point at which we had arrived before. On Monday night His Majesty's Government seemed to be animated only by that spirit which was once described, I think, by Lord Palmerston —"It does not much matter what we say provided we all say the same thing." In pursuance of that policy, both in this House and in the House of Commons the statements of Ministers began, not at the point where the instructions were given from which all these unfortunate episodes followed, but at the point—as if by a bolt

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from the blue—where the officers, having been interviewed by the General Officer Commanding in Ireland, had come to a certain conclusion. We pointed out here that that was an incomplete narrative, and we were told that there was an "honest misunderstanding." We endeavoured to advance that a little by asking what had been misunderstood. To-day we are given two documents—one a general circular to General Officers Commanding, and the other, which is specially designed on March 14 for Sir Arthur Paget; and we are led to believe by these Papers that these were the sole instructions on which Sir Arthur Paget made the remarkable address to the brigadiers on Friday last, which has caused so much consternation.
My Lords, I put this question as one which must be answered. Are those the only instructions? We want to know the gist of the oral conversations which went on in the interval. I have pointed out before in this House, and I take leave on this the most important occasion on which the difficulty has arisen, to again point out the absurdity of the system by which at present we have no representative of the War Office in this House. Now what has occurred? We are solely dependent on what the noble Viscount calls hearsay evidence—on what he can glean from somebody who was present as to what occurred. By the practice of the War Office for the last sixty or eighty years there has always been in this House some one who was entitled to be present at such an interview and to be able thereon to report to your Lordships' House. I have been an Under-Secretary as well as a Secretary of State. I have served my noble friend here (the Marquess of Lansdowne) as Undersecretary. The Under-Secretary is the only official in the War Office who has the right of entry to the Secretary of State's room without consulting his private secretary. He passes through the door at any moment he desires, and on every important occasion the Secretary of State calls in the Under-Secretary in order that he may hear and understand what has passed in any important interview. That practice has been by the present Prime Minister, for reasons which I will not too closely examine, departed from; so that, very naturally, when we endeavoured to elicit from the noble Viscount some information on this important question all he could say was that he would refer to the Secretary of
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State and enlighten us. I know he speaks under great difficulty in these circumstances. But these Papers bear on them internal evidence that the communications which have been published are not the only communications which passed between Sir Arthur Paget and the Army Council or the Secretary of State for War.
If your Lordships will turn to General Gough's letter, about which I must say a word presently, you will see that at page 3 General Gough says—
"With reference to the communication from the War Office conveyed to me verbally by the Commander-in-Chief this morning."
Now is the noble Viscount going to pretend that that was only a communication which had reference to the charge of stores and ammunition, for which the moderate body of troops that he mentioned required to be moved? General Gough goes on—
"The officers are of unanimous opinion that further information is essential … and that a clear definition should be given of the terms 'duty as ordered' and 'active operations' in Ulster."
Neither of those terms occurred in either of the communications from the War Office to General Paget. Where did they crop up from? Did they come out of General Paget's head? I have not had any communication of any sort or kind with General Paget since the beginning of these affairs, nor, as far as I know, has any noble Lord on this Bench. But I know General Paget to be a man of high integrity and high intelligence, and I cannot conceive any man either of integrity or intelligence perverting the instructions of March 14 and producing out of them what by the common consent of all the officers who heard the words was said to them as the wording of the communication of the War Office. General Gough proceeds—
"But if the duty involves the initiation of active military operations against Ulster. …"
Is that denied by the War Office? There is not a word in the subsequent letter which even challenges General Gough's interpretation of General Paget's remarks.
But apart from inside evidence, look at the outside evidence that these are not the only communications. The words "active operations" occur in every narrative in every journal which has published anything from any officer. It occurs in the communications made, not

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by General Gough only, but by the colonels to their subordinates. It occurs in the letters which have been published by the subordinates who have written to their parents, one particularly in the Pall Mall Gazette last night, asking for their advice—no, they had not the opportunity of asking their advice—but asking that they should not be condemned for the action that they had had to take. Then again, the amnesty for the officers domiciled in Ulster. That occurs in all the accounts of the interview, but there is no reference to it in the instructions from the War Office. Then, again, the period for giving up commissions. There is no reference to that in the instructions from the War Office, but, to the confusion I think of the War Office it is justified by the subsequent conduct by which men who had not been heard had been relieved of their commands before their accounts came in. All this points to something having been intended which is not in these instructions at all—what Sir Arthur Paget apparently called the "blaze on Saturday," which is also consonant with other indications which we have had.
My Lords, what about the instructions to the Fleet? Are those denied? I rather think not. What is the—as was well pointed out in the debates on Monday —what is the reason that a large force of Cavalry and Artillery was required in order to guard stores and ammunition? The whole thing is laughable. These paragraphs may have been written to publish or it may be convenient to publish them. That instruction of March 14 has all the appearance of having been written for outside consumption. It is utterly unconnected with the action taken by the Government. What occurred between Saturday and Wednesday to cause so vital a change in the instructions given by the Secretary of State? I hope the noble Viscount can deal with that when he rises. Therefore I say that the first gap to be made up in these Papers is the important gap in the interval between March 14 and March 20, on which date General Paget addressed the brigadiers. And now with regard to the second gap. We have no record of what General Paget said to the brigadiers. There are plenty of people in this House who have had experience of War Office procedure, and plenty of military officers who have had letters from the War Office.
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Can the noble Viscount, as a civilian who has not been in the War Office, conceive of a business of this kind having been carried through on the instructions from the Government and that the General Officer should make no report whatever to the War Office except the jejune statement that a number of officers had re signed. We have a right to have General Paget's account of what occurred. You have challenged the account furnished by the brigadiers. Let us have the General Officer's account.
How is it that the Secretary of State did not wait a moment after receiving the extraordinary telegram six days afterwards informing him that a number of officers had resigned? I put this question to the noble Viscount. It really is most material as to the conduct of the War Office. We have at the top of page 3 of the White Paper the statement, at 7 p.m., on the 20th, that the 5th Lancers and the 16th Lancers have all proved unable to comply, not with the orders given them, but with the suggestion given them; and lower down we have a letter from General Gough. Was that letter received at the War Office, or the gist of it, before the reply was made at midnight on Friday ordering General Gough to be relieved of his command? I should rather like to know the answer to that question. Was General Gough relieved of his command and a successor appointed before even his case or his excuses had been heard by the War Office? It is an unparalleled thing in the history of the Army. The officers of the Army are not the slaves of the Secretary of State. They have their rights as well as their duties, and you have not given them the commonest right which is given to other men. What did these officers ask? In this letter they asked for further information. They asked for a clear definition of "active operations." They stated that they were quite ready to undertake the ordinary service of maintenance of order, preservation of property, and the like, which was all that was demanded by the Government in their letter of March 14. Why, if they were ready to undertake all those services, did any difficulty occur? What more were they asked which they were unable to give?
Then as to the expression to which I called attention just now, "the initiation

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of active operations." Is that denied? There is a great deal of difference between a body of officers who say they will not take on a particular duty supposing that that duty involves action on their part in marching against an enemy who has not been declared, and putting down tumult of any description. But there was no tumult. Everything was absolutely quiet. They were not asked—and I beg the attention of your Lordships and of the public to this particular fact—they were not asked to support the provisions of a Bill which had passed. They were asked whether they would, in a certain contingency, begin active operations in support of a political project of the Government which had not got the sanction of Parliament; and then, without hearing them, before these explanations had come in, the Secretary of State for War at midnight— in his own name, not through the proper channel, the Adjutant-General—gives the verdict of the Army Council to a telegram which was received at twenty-six minutes past eleven, and proceeds to remove from his command and appoint a successor to one of the most well-known and distinguished officers in the British Army. I wonder whether the Prime Minister, who is a great lawyer and may even yet occupy some high judicial office—I wonder whether he would, if he held such an office, justify conduct by the humblest criminal who might be brought before him which he has now got to justify on the part of his own Secretary of State and the Army Council against a man whom he described as one of the most distinguished Cavalry leaders in the British Army, a man of very great and well-deserved influence in the Army, and who, I venture to say further, belongs to a family which for over a century has been renowned wherever British arms have been carried for soldier-like spirit, for courage, and for absolutely unswerving loyalty in the performance of duty.
I would make an appeal on behalf of the officers, not that I have any right to speak for them, but I believe the whole of your Lordships' House are jealous for the credit of these officers. I make this appeal that they seem to have been perfectly ready to carry out every duty which the War Office demanded of them in their letter; they refused no duty; they received no order which they were not ready to obey. The War Office was irregular in asking them a
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number of hypothetical questions backed by statements to which absolutely the refutation was furnished by the Lord Chancellor in his speech on Monday night. They were asked to undertake "active operations." Why were they not told what the Lord Chancellor told us—that no orders were likely to be issued, no orders would be issued, for the coercion of Ulster? Why were they not told that? Why were they left under the precise impression that what they were asked to do was to take on a campaign immediately against men who, if the first of these letters has any effect at all, were not engaged in any tumult or any trouble which called for the interference of the British Army? Is the Lord Chancellor, who has been responsible himself for the conduct of the Army for six years, going to allow this Government to go down to posterity as having forced a crisis of this kind on a number of officers by withholding a fact which he himself gave immediately the case was brought up? What the Government say was a "misunderstanding" has caused trouble such as has not arisen in the Army for over a hundred years, and which brands them with a stigma with which the Army has not been branded since 1688. So much depends on what the noble Viscount answers to this question that I will only sum up the points on which we require further knowledge.
Apparently General Gough received assurances from the Government before he consented to resume his command, but those assurances are not complete. We see it stated in the Press this morning— perhaps I may be pardoned for reading one extract—
"The general expressions used to General Gough were insufficient and further misapprehension might arise."
I do not think, after what has happened, that your Lordships will blame any officer for asking for some precision of language, and for having that precision of language under the seal, so to speak, of the Secretary of State and the Army Council.
"General Gough said, 'We are plain soldiers and we do not understand all these legal terms. We are plain men and want things put plainly.' He then asked for the following guarantee: 'Do we understand that we are not to be asked to bear arms against Ulster or to enforce the present Home Rule Bill, and can we return and tell our officers so?"
It is said that General French signed or initialled that statement. I should like to know whether that is correct. Also whether that supplementary statement of General French, if it was signed by him, carries with it the force of the Secretary of State for War and is supported by His Majesty's Government. That is the third gap in these Papers.
Without filling them, the gaps in these Papers are more remarkable than the explanations. You have first the omission of all that passed in the fateful conference last week between the War Office and General Paget; secondly, the account of General Paget, which we were promised, of his interview with the brigadiers; and lastly, the full measure of the terms on which General Gough undertook to resume his command. I hope also that the noble Viscount will go a step further and relieve our minds on the whole course of these events. That narrative, even if we got the whole of it, is possibly not complete. I am not certain that the noble Viscount knows the whole story. Certainly if he did, he would hardly—and the Lord Chancellor as well—have spoken as if these were isolated instances which had arisen owing to a misunderstanding. Gradually the plot is unfolding itself. The Fleet was to be moved. The Cavalry and Artillery were to be moved. The whole matter seems to suggest a complete catena of events. First comes the offer of the Prime Minister to Ulster, which was not accepted. Then on the identical day on which fresh instructions of this questionable character, because they were not full instructions, were sent to General Paget in Ireland—on that day the stormy petrels of the Government were let loose, and the First Lord of the Admiralty proceeded to make a provocative speech apparently for the sole purpose of rousing Ulster to give a reason for the carrying out of the rulings of the War Office. And after that excitement, which strangely coincided with the call to General Paget to come to London, we get these sealed orders, if I may call them so, issued to the Fleet, and issued also to General Paget, which we have not yet had. The noble Viscount knows that there must be a large gap which he has to explain.
Then comes the most strange thing of all. On Friday night, as I pointed out, without
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a moment's hesitation the War Minister and the Army Council relieve these officers. They were talking of courts-martial and punishments. On Saturday the minds of officers all over the country were roused by the publication of these statements, and on Monday the whole thing has turned into apologies, reinstatements, and not a question. No wonder the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack could not answer directly whether General Gough had gone back without conditions, because the conditions were not made by the Government. The conditions of General Gough had to be swallowed by the Government. I deeply regret that any officer had to come forward in these circumstances. Those of us who care for the honour of the Army, care far more that the Army, which will remain, should be vindicated than that His Majesty's Government, which may not remain, should lose caste. I say that this page, as it is left, will leave a black stain, perhaps the blackest stain which any of us have seen in our lifetime, because those who read these Papers cannot but get from them the impression that they are the attempt of an Administration to cover itself by allowing a stigma to be placed upon the honour of the Army.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (VISCOUNT MORLEY): My Lords, I hope your Lordships will believe that I am as sensible as any man in the House of the enormous importance and moment of the principles that are involved in this discussion. The noble Viscount said, and I hoped he would adhere to it, that in this connection he was animated by no desire to discredit the Government. I think his last ten minutes suggest a pretty good amount of discredit to any Government. What does he do? He charges us with a concocted plot. He gives a sketch of the machinery, provocative speeches, motions here and there, sealed orders and so forth. I am sorry the noble Viscount should have lent himself to that line of sinister hallucination. It is an hallucination. Though I do not represent the War Office, I am pretty cognisant of Cabinet operations, and I can only assure your Lordships that this is a complete illusion. There was no plot. There was no, what the noble Viscount called, catena of operations; nothing of the kind. I will in a moment describe to your Lordships, in the words of the man

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best able to certify them, exactly what the operations have been.
As to the Fleet, the noble Viscount talked about sealed orders. There were no sealed orders so I am told. It was decided a fortnight ago by the Cabinet that a naval force comprising a battle squadron with attendant vessels should be stationed at Lamlash, which is a convenient and usual station for them to conduct their operations from, and where they would be in proximity to the coast of Ireland in ease of serious disorders occurring. On Saturday night when it was clear that the precautionary movements of troops to various depôts had been carried out without opposition, it was decided that this movement could be delayed until the Easter leave period was over. I have here—I will not trouble the House with them, but to show that I am anxious to deal in good faith with the House I have them here— the telegraphed orders, but they are technical and perhaps I may leave them.
Now as to the Army and the retirement of officers and so on, I am not going to answer the noble Viscount in my own words. With the permission of your Lordships I will read a Memorandum prepared for two reasons—one for the House of Commons, and the other for me if I may be permitted to recite it to the House. This is the connected story told by Colonel Seely himself of all these transactions. I hope it will not be tedious; it ought not to be. There was an interview with the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief on December 16, 1913. By General Officers, as the noble Viscount will understand, is meant the six officers in the United Kingdom, not merely in the Irish Command. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Adjutant-General represented to the Secretary of State early in December that so many efforts were being made to seduce officers and men from their allegiance that there was a real danger of indiscipline in the Army. At the suggestion of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Adjutant-General Colonel Seely summoned the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief and read to them the statement which is printed first in the White Paper now in your Lordships' hands. The General Officers Commanding-in-Chief undertook that they would do their best to secure discipline.
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From that time up to the present crisis no officer of the Regular Army had tendered his resignation. Fourteen retired officers who would be required on mobilisation had written qualifying their ability to serve. These officers were all informed that the Army Council could not admit the right of any officer to decide in what part of the world he would serve.
I pass now from December 16 of last year to the memorable date of March 14 this year. This letter which is in the Paper was written to Sir Arthur Paget in consequence of the danger to be apprehended from leaving such large stores of rifles and ammunition and other Government property at the depôts at Omagh, Armagh, Carrickfergus, and Enniskillen. Omagh is the depôt of the Enniskillen Fusiliers, and the headquarters of the 3rd battalion of that regiment. Armagh is the depôt of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the headquarters of the 3rd battalion. Carrickfergus contained the arms of the Royal Irish Fusiliers. It was considered that these necessary movements might cause excitement in all parts of Ireland, and that precautionary steps should be taken to secure the maintenance of law and order. It was also decided to send a battalion to protect the battery of Artillery at Dundalk, which had no Infantry with it. Sir Arthur Paget came to London to consult as to the carrying out of the necessary movements and the precautions to be taken. His only written instructions are contained in these documents. A telegram from Sir Arthur Paget was received by the Secretary of State on the evening of March 20—that is to say, last Friday, Colonel Seely summoned the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Adjutant-General and despatched a telegram at midnight which is printed below. In the meantime a further telegram from Sir Arthur Paget was received. It was believed from the latter of Sir Arthur Paget's telegrams that his authority had been defied, and arrangements were therefore at once made to appoint officers to take the place of those who had been summoned to London, should their explanations be unsatisfactory, as from the telegram it was assumed they would probably be.
On the arrival of these officers they were interviewed by the Adjutant-General, and the letter of General Gough to the headquarters of the Irish Command, which is

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printed, was laid before the Adjutant-General. From what these officers said it appeared to be undoubtedly the fact that they were under the general belief, honestly held, that they were being called upon to decide whether they would at once be prepared to take the initiative in crushing Ulster. Their impression seemed to be that it was the intention to treat Ulster as an enemy country and to overwhelm the people with a surprise attack. It is understood that Sir Arthur Paget did not make his statement—his statement to these officers on Friday, the 20th instant— from written documents, but he has furnished the following statement of the concluding portion of the remarks which he made to the meeting of Divisional and Brigade Commanders held on March 20 in Dublin. It was a statement made to the Adjutant-General by Major-General Kincaid-Smith, Military Secretary to General Sir Arthur Paget, on Sunday, March 22. This is it: "Sir Arthur Paget felt that the outcome of the precautionary movements might be misinterpreted and lead to a situation demanding further action, and he felt that the time had come when he must ascertain upon what General Officers and others he could rely." That is the statement which the Secretary of State received on Sunday night. It is impossible, Colonel Seely says, to say how this genuine misapprehension arose, but there is no doubt that it existed. One Cavalry brigade had not been ordered to move and disobeyed no order. They felt that they were placed in a cruel dilemma. General Gough's statement seemed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and to the Adjutant-General in London to be satisfactory. He was brought by those officers to the Secretary of State's room, and General Sir Arthur Paget was also present. On the report of the Adjutant-General it was decided, with Sir Arthur Paget's full concurrence, that General Gough and his commanding officers should be ordered to rejoin their commands. This was at the interview in the Secretary of State's room, there being present the Secretary of State, General Sir Arthur Paget, and General Gough.
General Gough stated that it was difficult for him to make his officers understand the position in the absence of any written document, and he begged that he might be permitted to have some formal document in his possession to
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read to his officers. The Secretary of State left for the Cabinet Council, and requested the Adjutant-General to draw up a form of words similar to that which the Secretary of State had used. In the absence of the Secretary of State at the Palace, the Cabinet considered the document which had been partially prepared by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Adjutant-General. The Cabinet altered it in various particulars, and on the Secretary of State's return the Prime Minister handed this document to him, amended and considered by the Cabinet.
EARL CUEZON OF KEDLESTON: The noble Viscount is speaking of a document which was altered and passed by the Cabinet and returned to the Secretary of State for War. Is that the last document that is printed in the White Paper?
VISCOUNT MORLEY: That is so; that is the document which was handed to Colonel Seely, who had been called away from the Cabinet, by the Prime Minister. The Secretary of State was not sure that the Cabinet were going to send for this document. He understood that the document was not in any way formally approved by the Cabinet, as indeed in form it appeared to be incomplete, and that he had full authority to deal with the matter as he thought best in his position as Secretary of State for War. In the meantime a letter was handed to him from the Adjutant-General, enclosing a letter from General Gough which is printed on the last page of the White Paper. The Secretary of State did not consider General Gough's letter material, for it had no reference to the document which he had not yet seen. The Secretary of State accordingly continued to draft a form of words—in consultation, he mentions, with myself—which he considered stated clearly the policy of the Government and of the military authorities. These are the two paragraphs —to which I call your Lordships' careful attention—with which the White Paper concludes. They are vital to what I am going to say.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: Do I understand that Colonel Seely added the two last paragraphs to the document which the Cabinet had passed?
VISCOUNT MORLEY: Yes, that will appear by and by; but that is so. The document was shown to General Gough, and he accepted it, containing those two last paragraphs. It has since transpired that General Gough asked the Chief of the Imperial General Staff—this is the purport of General Gough's letter—"Did this document relieve him from liability to order his brigade to assist in enforcing submission to a Home Rule Bill?" The Chief of the Imperial General Staff wrote on the document, "I should so read it." Of this fact the Secretary of State was not aware, but he considers that Sir John French meant to maintain the position stated in the last two paragraphs of the document handed to General Gough. In these circumstances the Secretary of State realises that he unwittingly misled the members of the Cabinet and also the two members of the Army Council in signing the document to General Gough. He asks me to state—he has himself by this time stated it in the House of Commons—that he desired to act throughout in a spirit of loyalty to his colleagues and with fairness to the Army; and he realises, especially in view of General Gough's letter to the Adjutant-General and of his apparent acceptance of the document handed to him as in agreement with his request, that it would appear that the absolute right of His Majesty's Government to use all the forces of the Crown in support of the civil power has not been sufficiently safeguarded. In these circumstances my right hon. friend has tendered his resignation to the Prime Minister. [Opposition cheers.] I am sorry that that announcement should be so received, because Colonel Seely, as all who know him must admit, has laboured amidst tremendous difficulties, and has endeavoured to be both loyal to his colleagues and to the Army.
My right hon. friend wishes me to add that the Army Council desire it to be stated that nothing that has passed deprives them of the right and duty to direct all troops to obey all lawful commands as laid down in the Army Act and the Manual of Military Law; and the Army Council adhere in its entirety to the following abatement, "His Majesty's Government retain their right to use all the forces of the Crown in Ireland or elsewhere to maintain law and order and to support the civil power in the ordinary execution
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its duty." Now, my Lords, I have to convey in a sentence—a very important one—that the Government have decided that these last two paragraphs, the history of which I have told you, on Colonel Seely's authority and in a measure on my own, are to be considered as not operative. In this statement, which does great credit, I think, to the candour of the writer of it, the kernel of what the noble Viscount seeks to make good in filling out these Papers is very clearly explained. There may be gaps. An ingenious man may find gaps. But this is what Colonel Seely himself meant to be, and this is, a frank and full record of all that is really germane to the topics which are now agitating your Lordships' House, the Army, and the country. If your Lordships regard this as a mistaken step, following what is admitted by Colonel Seely to have been a mistake on his part, that cannot be avoided. We have so decided, believing that in that decision we are carrying out the true spirit of military force, and that we are doing no more than taking ground which has really up to now, to the best of my belief, since the old Civil Wars, been common ground between the two great Parties in this country.
The occasion is far too serious—the material consequences may be very serious —for me to attempt to make any sort of personal or Party reference, but if I might I would ask the noble Marquess whether he agrees with the language used in the House of Commons on Monday by his colleague in the leadership of his Party, Mr. Bonar Law. These are his words—
"To coerce Ulster is an operation which no Government under existing conditions has a right to ask the Army to undertake, and in our view it is only necessary to say this, that any officer who refuses is only fulfilling his duty."
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: Well, a few of your Lordships may applaud that. But this House is adorned and strengthened by great soldiers, soldiers of fame and authority, and I wonder whether any one of them will get up and say that an officer in these circumstances is fulfilling his duty. And I would fortify myself in pressing that point by something else that Mr. Bonar Law said a few days before— namely, on the 19th If a referendum were now taken, in advance—if we agreed to a referendum to-morrow, and the answer

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given by the people of the United Kingdom were in favour of our present proposals— Mr. Asquith asked Mr. Bonar Law whether he would go the length of coercing Ulster. Mr. Bonar Law said—
"Not on our part."
Mr. Asquith proceeded—
"Well, is he prepared to say that we shall be justified in doing it?"
Mr. Bonar Law—this is from the Official Report—indicated assent. Therefore I would implore noble Lords opposite not to use the phrase "coercion of Ulster" as a phrase beyond argument. The Leader of their Party in the House of Commons agrees that if the majority in the country, whether by referendum or by General Election of the ordinary kind, were in favour of the present Bill and policy, there would be justification for what is called "using force in Ulster." The duty of a soldier, be he officer or private, is obedience to lawful commands.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: "Lawful."
VISCOUNT MORLEY: Lawful! Surely there is no quibble about the word "lawful." By a "lawful command" is meant a command imposed by any lawful authority. That cannot be disputed. Then a word or two from Sir Edward Carson himself. Sir Edward Carson said—and I do not know anything much more remarkable or, if I may say so, more to the credit of Sir Edward Carson, than that he should have boldly said this—
"I have said before, and I say now, and in doing so I am merely associating myself with what fell from Lord Derby last night—I say this, that it would be a bad day for the country if the Army under any circumstances were to refuse to obey the lawful orders of those who are put in command over them. Of course they must; but it is for that very reason that statesmen and politicians ought to look ahead; it is for that very reason that statesmen and politicians ought to know to what their acts lead. No one will blame the Army for shooting upon Ulstermen, but the country will hold the Government who puts forward that Army as responsible."
The noble Viscount on the Cross Benches was good enough to say the other night that he agreed with me that it would be a great misfortune if the state of the Army or great questions affecting the Army, were to be made topics of sharp Party debate. I submit to your Lordships that that is still a sound view. By all
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means find what fault you like with the Government; direct as many sarcasms as you choose upon their vacillations; say, if you like, that a blunder has been committed, but take care that in the discussion of these questions you do not let loose violent sentiments and violent feelings which will be more destructive to the best interests of the country than anything that has happened for many a day.
Lord Ampthill the other night charged me, in language which was not too full of courtesy, with having accused some members of the Party opposite of having aided and abetted avowed law-breakers. One of the terms of the Ulster Covenant is resistance to the law, not to-day but in certain contingencies. That is part of the contract of the Covenant. It is the object and purpose of this mutual contract and engagement called the Covenant. Is it denied, my Lords, that many leading men of great repute in the Party opposite have aided and abetted or promised moral support in language sometimes implying more than moral support to the Covenanters? Let me read one single sentence. What do the British Covenanters say They say—
"We declare' … to prevent the Forces of the Crown being used to deprive the people of Ulster of their rights."
That may be a perfectly good object. I do not presume to-night to say a word upon that. But do not let me be taunted by noble Lords with having said—
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: The noble Viscount has omitted the governing words "without an appeal to the people."
VISCOUNT MORLEY: I do not see how that affects the matter what it is subject to.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: It only shows that the noble Viscount does not appreciate our position in the least.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: I am sorry if I do not. I have no desire whatever to disparage the attitude of a British Covenanter. It is a most deplorable thing that in this country at this time of day great bodies of Englishmen, important Englishmen, and Scotsmen, are taking sides in one of the most hateful set of circumstances in the world—a great passionate sectarian struggle. Ireland—and

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I am told I ought to add Russia—Ireland seems to be the last place in which the spirit of the old sectarian struggle between Protestant, Catholic, and so forth, remains; and I say it is to me a deplorable thing that in this country at this time of day there exists a willingness to take part in a sectarian battle.
Lord AMPTHILL and the Marquess of LANSDOWNE rose together, but the former gave way.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, it is, perhaps, not very easy for us to comment upon the remarkable statement which the noble Viscount has just made to the House. He quoted in extenso a long document from the Secretary of State for War, describing in considerable detail the incidents which we are considering this evening, and he ended by the dramatic announcement that Colonel Seely had tendered his resignation, which I understand has been accepted by the Prime Minister.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: I did not say it had been accepted.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: Then I understand that the matter is still in suspense, and that he is still at this moment Secretary of State for War. What we did gather from the noble Viscount's speech was that Colonel Seely had parted company with his colleagues only at the end of this long journey. He shares with them to the full the responsibility for the policy of His Majesty's Government, for the movement of troops, for the attempt, not really disputed, to apply some form, at any rate, of coercion to the Province of Ulster, and we gather that it is only when we come to the two last short paragraphs of the concluding document in this White Paper that Colonel Seely ceases to be in agreement with his colleagues.
Now, my Lords, I must say that it is a little surprising to us that those particular paragraphs should have been, as we understand they have been, annulled by His Majesty's Government. Let me remind the House of what they contain. The first of them runs thus—
"His Majesty's Government must retain their right to use all the forces of the Crown in Ireland, or elsewhere, to maintain law and order and to support the civil power in the ordinary execution of its duty."
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What is there in that paragraph to which the colleagues of Colonel Seely can take exception and that they desire to delete from the record? Then I come to the next paragraph—
"But they have no intention whatever of taking advantage of this right to crush political opposition to the policy or principles of the Home Rule Bill."
Whether that was a judicious or an injudicious sentence to add to the Memorandum I will not pause to inquire, but I do say, given the fact that this sentence finds a place in the Memorandum, that to strike it out now is a most suggestive, and, I would say, sinister excision. If the paragraph is to disappear, are we then to infer that His Majesty's Government still have it in their minds that they may take advantage of this "right to crush political opposition to the policy or principles of the Home Rule Bill"? If that is really what you mean it does seem to me that the pretension is a most serious one and one which we have a right to look upon with the utmost alarm. The mutilation of this document is also rather remarkable when we call to mind the words spoken by the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack when he informed us, with evidently the greatest possible satisfaction, that the whole of the incident as between His Majesty's Government and the officers was now at an end, and that a satisfactory understanding had been arrived at. What has become of the understanding? Apparently the one part of it which gave some comfort and reassurance to these gallant officers is to disappear. I must say that a more disconcerting announcement I can scarcely conceive.
May I for a moment go back to the question which my noble friend Lord Midleton discussed with so much effect at the beginning of this debate? He expressed our feeling of dissatisfaction with the manner in which this case has been presented to us. I confess that, having listened to what fell from the noble Viscount last night, I was not very much surprised when I found that the Paper laid on the Table failed at many points to give us a complete account of these occurrences. Let me remind the noble Viscount of what was said by my noble friend behind me as to the gaps in this narrative. There is, in the first place, a very serious gap at the point where Sir Arthur Paget visited the War Office and received the instructions upon

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which he subsequently founded his instructions to his brigadiers. It is quite idle to suppose that Sir Arthur Paget went to the War Office merely to receive a kind of réchauffé of the instructions given to him in December. Obviously not. New events were developing, but we are in entire ignorance of what passed in that memorable interview.
Then comes the second gap—what passed on the occasion of the interview between Sir Arthur Paget and the brigadiers? The noble Viscount gave us what seemed to me an extraordinarily imperfect account of that interview. He read us what I think he said was the concluding paragraph of a Memorandum relating to that interview. I gathered from the noble Viscount's statement that the only object Sir Arthur Paget had in view was to ascertain which of the officers he could rely upon in view of apprehended trouble in Ireland. But we know that a great deal more than that happened at the interview. We have had read in both Houses of Parliament accounts, written by gallant officers who were present, of what they understood to have been said to them on that momentous occasion; and I must say that the internal evidence afforded by those accounts leaves no room in our minds for doubt as to the practical correctness of their impressions. Is it conceivable that any one of those gallant officers should have invented that ominous phrase to the effect that Ulster was likely to be ablaze on a given Saturday? Is it likely that any of them could have invented that extraordinary pledge that officers having family ties with the Province of Ulster should be allowed to disappear for a time? Again, is it likely that any one of them could have invented the, as I thought, extremely tactless and offensive warning that officers who dishonestly represented themselves as being connected with Ulster would be dealt with severely by the military authorities?—not a very pleasant intimation to be made to men of undoubted honour. Here, again, I say we are left without any full or sufficient account of what really took place.
But what is very much to the point is that the accounts which have been given in both Houses of Parliament of that interview are entirely borne out by General Gough's letter printed in these Papers— General Gough's letter of the same date. Your Lordships will remember that in that
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letter he dwells upon the shortness of the notice given to him and his brother officers, and he quotes, and quotes in inverted commas, a sentence from which it appears that he and his brother officers were dissatisfied with the definition given of the term "duty as ordered," and also with the reference to "active operations in Ulster." It is remarkable that in all these accounts of these interviews that phrase "active operations in Ulster" constantly recurs; and it is to my mind absolutely beyond doubt that these officers were told that what they had to be prepared for was active operations in the Province of Ulster.
Then came the moment when General Gough was summoned to the presence of the Secretary of State, on the 23rd. Here, again, we learn that no written document is forthcoming; but we should very much like to know what is meant by the reference to a draft letter which occurs in General Gough's Memorandum, the last document but one in the White Paper. Evidently that draft was not satisfactory to General Gough. He evidently took exception to it, and he asked the pertinent question whether, under the terms of the draft, if the Home Rule Bill became law he and his brother officers might be called upon to enforce it on Ulster on the pretext that they would only be "maintaining law and order." It was apparently in consequence of that remonstrance by General Gough that the concluding document of the White Paper was, I was going to say concocted, under the somewhat singular circumstances described to us by the noble Viscount. I mean the document which was considered by the Cabinet in the absence of the Secretary of State, which was drawn up by the Adjutant-General, altered by the Cabinet, and finally passed by the Prime Minister, but which had these two fatal paragraphs added to it subsequently by the Secretary of State. Does the noble Viscount dispute that?
VISCOUNT MORLEY: Not passed by the Prime Minister. I did not say that.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: I thought the noble Viscount did say that it had been seen and approved by the Prime Minister.
VISCOUNT MORLEY: No; the first part of it, down to the previous paragraph before the last two.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: But that the two final paragraphs were not approved by him?
VISCOUNT MORLEY: No.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: Well, my Lords, we now learn that there was more behind, and that the document even as worded with the two extra paragraphs did not seem entirely sufficient to General Gough; and the noble Viscount will no doubt have noticed very categoric statements in the newspapers to the effect that the actual announcement made by General Gough on the strength of these two paragraphs was the specific announcement that the troops under his command were not to be made use of for the purpose of coercing Ulster under the plea of law and order. So that I gather that if a settlement has been arrived at as between the superior military authorities and the officers under their command, it has been distinctly upon the basis that the troops are not to be employed in order to compel the Protestants of Ulster to submit to a Home Rule Parliament in Dublin. What the effect upon the minds of these officers who have been lulled into a sense of security by these announcements will be when they find that the ground is cut from under their feet I will not for the moment pause to inquire.
We have heard a great deal during this debate about misapprehensions on the part of various people. Now of one thing I feel absolutely convinced. I believe that these gallant officers understood perfectly well what was in the minds of His Majesty's Government when they were approached upon this subject. I believe Sir Arthur Paget did not misunderstand the Secretary of State. I believe the brigadiers did not misunderstand Sir Arthur Paget; and I believe the regimental officers did not misunderstand the brigadiers. These gallant officers are not diplomatists and may not always be able to appreciate at its exact value some dexterous phrase devised for the purpose of slurring over a difficulty; but they are intelligent enough to know what is the real inwardness of this preparation for a movement against Ulster. Sir Arthur Paget knew perfectly well that what was being proposed to him was something more than a measure of precaution for the protection of Government stores and magistrates in
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the execution of their duty. The first interview of December, 1913, must have given him a pretty shrewd idea of the kind of thing which was in the mind of His Majesty's Government. That frank and sincere speech which he delivered in the month of February at the Corinthian Club shows that he realised what was impending; and his speech to the brigadiers on the 18th instant makes it abundantly clear that he knew what was likely to happen. My Lords, would General Gough have gone the length of sending in his resignation if he had been in any doubt upon these points? Would His Majesty's Government have gone the length of appointing a successor to him if they had thought there was room for a misunderstanding? Would—and here I am only referring to what is commonly rumoured—would distinguished officers in high employment at the War Office have intimated, as I believe some have intimated, that they might find it necessary to give up their appointments if this disastrous policy is persisted in by His Majesty's Government?
All of these officers realised what His Majesty's Government contemplated, and I will tell the House what I believe they did contemplate. They contemplated a coup d'État in the Province of Ulster. I do not suggest for a moment that they desired, to use the words of Colonel Seely's Memorandum of December last, to bring about the massacre of a demonstration of Orangemen. The massacre of a demonstration seems to me to be rather a difficult operation, but we know quite well what is meant. But what His Majesty's Government did intend was, I. believe, something of this kind. They intended to bring about what I think can be fairly enough described as the subjugation of Ulster, not by violent and forcible methods, but by occupying in overwhelming strength every coign of vantage in the province, so that the Loyalists of Ulster would find themselves effectually paralysed and throttled. These gallant officers would have nothing to say to this policy, and the Government I think realised, probably too late, that they had themselves blundered seriously when they accepted that policy. The result has been that to a great extent they have retreated from their original intentions. I entirely disbelieve that the trivial movement of troops which the noble Viscount explained to us last night—the movement of, I think he said, four companies in different parts

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of Ulster—had any correspondence with the much larger plan of operations which at one time they intended to set in motion. The noble Viscount told us that we were labouring under an hallucination. Was the warning of the officers of the Cavalry Brigade an hallucination? And let me repeat a question which I think my noble friend behind me asked. Was the movement of the ships of war an hallucination? Perhaps some one who will speak later in the evening for His Majesty's Government will tell us why it was that the 4th Division left Southampton on the 20th of this month and by whose orders, and why those orders were cancelled and the 4th Division recalled? Is it conceivable that a great naval movement of this kind pointed to nothing more than the paltry little manœuvres to which the noble Viscount referred last night?
Then we come to the policy of the Government as regards these gallant officers. I must say I thought when I came down to the House and read these Papers that His Majesty's Government had seen the error of their ways, and that they were not going to persist in compelling these officers to undertake the odious task of coercing their loyal fellow-citizens in the Province of Ulster. But after the announcement that has been made to us to-night, after the resignation of the Secretary of State because these paragraphs go too far for His Majesty's Government, so much too far that he has thought it necessary to send in his resignation—I really do not know where we are in regard to this matter. One thing is perfectly clear, that when the noble and learned Viscount told us the other evening that these officers had been ordered to return to their commands and had thought fit to obey orders, that was by no means a sufficient account of what really did take place. The officers thought fit to return to their commands because they were led to believe that the misgivings which they entertained were unfounded, and that they might safely return to their military duties.
The noble Viscount towards the end of his speech dwelt at some length upon the seriousness of contemplating that in any circumstances officers placed as these officers were placed should consider themselves at liberty to decide whether they will or will not obey the orders given to them by their superiors. I
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think the noble Viscount asked me whether I was in agreement with a passage in a speech delivered by Mr. Bonar Law in which he dealt with that question. I have seen the speech; I am familiar with it; and I am in agreement with my right hon. friend's views. When the noble Viscount apparently commits himself to the doctrine that this implicit and unquestioning obedience is due by an officer of the Army to whatever orders are given to him by his superiors, may I ask him to look for a moment at a sentence which occurs in Colonel Seely's Memorandum of December 16, and which I will read to him. Colonel Seely says—
"I first deal with the legal question. The law clearly lays down that a soldier is entitled to obey an order to shoot only if that order is reasonable under the circumstances."
Does that give no discretion to the soldier? But I should like to cite another passage from the same authority. What of the famous intimation that officers connected with the Province of Ulster were to be allowed to disappear from the scene during the progress of hostilities? Is not that an admission that there are circumstances and conditions in which you cannot impose upon an officer the duty of blindly obeying whatever orders are given to him by his superiors? If I may say so I would reply to the noble Viscount's question by saying that it seems to me that there are some things which even the most faithful servant of his King and his country cannot do and is justified in refusing to do, and one of those things is to wage war on loyal and blameless citizens of his country. Sooner than this these officers are ready not to disobey orders but to abandon their profession and any prospects and advantages which their profession might afford to them. I say more. I believe that the country will applaud them for their action in this matter. I believe the country will realise that by their conduct they have saved us from a great catastrophe. In spite of the emasculation of this Paper, after all that has taken place I do not believe the Army will be employed to coerce the people of Ulster into submission to a Home Rule Parliament, and it is due to the conduct of these officers that this is so. The episode has been an unfortunate one, and it has ended unhappily for the Secretary of State for War, but I honestly believe that it will prove to be most disastrous of all for noble Lords who sit on the Bench opposite and for their colleagues.
THE LORD CHANCELLOE: My Lords, I listened with some concern to certain of the observations made by the noble Marquess at the conclusion of his speech. He knows, as I know, what a delicate thing the mechanism of the Army is, and how important is the doctrine of obedience to orders. I do not dissent from the view that there may be circumstances in which an order is not a lawful order. I do not dissent from the proposition that there is a limit which must be put to the doctrine of discipline. But I do say this, that this debate which we have just had is not a debate which will make it easier for those who desire to maintain the spirit in which alone an Army can hold together. The very essence of it, whether you are dealing with privates, subalterns, officers, or the Divisional General under his Commander-in-Chief, right through is obedience to orders; and that orders should be questioned or examined is a doctrine which I venture to say is incompatible with the maintenance of an efficient Army under our or any other system. I do not for a moment believe that the noble Marquess meant to challenge that general proposition, but what I do say is that there were certain observations of his in which he approved of words used by Mr. Bonar Law in the other House which do not make things more easy in the future for those who entertain strong views as to the only way in which an efficient Army can be preserved. I am quite aware that the noble Marquess himself, with his experience of the Army, takes high and right views of the general question; but I think it is one of the greatest misfortunes of this debate, and indeed of the whole discussion on this episode, that it cannot be without its effects on Army discipline.
Now, my Lords, I come to the substance of the case made to-day from the Opposition Benches, and I wish to begin by asking the indulgence of the House while I make a personal explanation. I stated on Monday that the officers, and particularly General Gough, had gone back unconditionally, and, as I explained, I meant by that not merely without conditions stipulated for by them but without conditions imposed by the other side—no conditions at all. I believed, and I had good reason to believe, that what I said was true, because it was carrying out the decision in which I had taken part. The Prime Minister made the same statement
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in the other House, and, so far as we knew, it was exactly so. Indeed, what falsified it did not occur until after the period when we could possibly have had knowledge of it. I am always anxious to be scrupulously accurate in any statement of fact I make to the House, and I very much regret that I was inaccurate on Monday; but the reason was that I was speaking to the best. of my belief, that I had excellent grounds for so speaking, and that I was in ignorance of facts which transpired which my noble friend has detailed to the House this afternoon.
This is not merely a matter of formal importance. It touches that other question to which I have just alluded. I hold very strongly that the position of an officer in the Army is this, that he should not bargain about his duties but should do his duty as an officer and obey commands. It may be that such a situation may arise—I concede this to the noble Marquess—that he feels he would rather be dismissed from the Army than carry out a command against which his moral sense revolts. It may be that he wishes to resign and is prepared to take any consequences. Well, that is a situation which must be met by finding out what the situation is, and if it turns out, as I think it turned out in this case, that the officer in question had misapprehended his instructions and that there were no such instructions as would have made him desire to take that very extreme and exceptional course, then to my mind his proper course was to go back to his duty, and the proper course was to send him back to his duty. As to the nature of the instructions being insufficient, I am of opinion that an officer ought not to resign beforehand in anticipation merely because of speculation as to a hypothetical situation. If he exercises that extreme right at all it should only be when face to face with actual commands which he feels that he cannot obey. I took the view that General Gough's misapprehensions had been removed, and I was under that impression for excellent reasons, and that he had gone back on the footing of which I spoke. I understood from the Prime Minister that there were no conditions of any sort or land. There may be people who can say when they have heard the story of the two documents which appear on page 4 of this Paper, that they do not amount to conditions. I do not take that view. I do not think you can

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look at these things in the critical way that a lawyer looks at the interpretation of documents. You must take them broadly as to what they mean; and I think the last two paragraphs of that document undoubtedly did convey to General Gough that there had been something like a bargain.
The ground upon which we have taken a strong view about these last two paragraphs is not the ground which the noble Marquess seems to suggest—that it was some change of counsel, that it was because there was some desire to say that these were not proper views to express: the views, namely, that we had no intention whatever of taking advantage of this right to crush political opposition to the policy or principles of the Home Rule Bill. It was because we had a quarrel with the idea that it was right for an officer to bargain about the terms of his opposition in advance. It is because we strongly hold that an Army can only go on the footing I have described that we felt that these two paragraphs were inadmissible, and that they might well give rise to the idea that we were bargaining about the position which an officer ought to occupy. I hope I have made quite clear the very material distinction I draw in this matter. This is a vital thing, and what had happened was that my right hon. friend, not having been present—it was unavoidable—during a short period of the Cabinet discussion at which the document was considered and so much of it as was to go forward sanctioned, thought he was doing no more than carrying out what was natural by adding the two paragraphs which came in there. It was an error of judgment about which he himself has expressed his opinion. I need not say any more about that, except that he did it in perfect bona fides and believing he was doing the best thing under difficult circumstances. I think there can be no doubt about that.
Certainly the Army Council is in no way to blame. They thought, and thought with reason, that when they got the document containing these two paragraphs their only duty was to carry it out; and that relates to what Sir John French did the other day when the question was put to him later in the day and he initialled the paper. He merely thought he was carrying out a Cabinet decision. I think that the Cabinet and the Government would have been open
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to very grave censure if they had passed this position just as it stood and let even some appearance—I do not think any one believed there was a reality—of bargaining appear about this matter. I am sure General Gough, than whom there is no more distinguished officer for sense of duty in the Army, would have been the last to have held that there was any appearance of bargaining about it. That is the whole story as I understand it. It is the whole explanation of what has taken place, and I have told your Lordships why it makes me additionally regret that on Monday I was not aware of the facts now alluded to, and that I gave your Lordships to understand there were no conditions. I think it is most important that there should be no conditions, and to me it is unfortunate that conditions should have been there.
Now I come to the other part of the case. The noble Marquess will have it that behind all this there has been some great change of policy, and that what the Government meditated was a coup d'État. When you make statements of what we have in our minds and what we intended to do, there is only one course we can take. We can say what was in our minds, and we give you our word—you can accept it or not—but it is our word and we stick to it. Never from beginning to end was there any intention on our part—I take the noble Marquess's words—to bring about "the subjugation of Ulster by occupying in overwhelming strength every coign of vantage in Ulster." What we did think was that there were places in Ulster where the forces of law and order would be at great disadvantage in the case of an uprising, and we thought it right to take the precautions which have been described with regard to these points. But to say that four companies, the small details of Infantry— to say that the slight preparations which were made were preparations which any sane person would have thought sufficient if he were setting out on a campaign for the subjugation of Ulster, is not consistent with common sense.
Now I come to the next point. The noble Marquess has asked about two gaps which he says occur in the narrative of the noble Viscount. First of all, there is the period down to Friday, the 20th instant; and then there are the events of Friday, the 20th. Down to Friday,

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the 20 th, there are no more documents to come, and the only thing that could be given would be accounts of conversations. No doubt there were many conversations, but your Lordships know what conversations are. I may say that only one set of instructions went from the Government, and only one set of instructions was given by my right hon. friend, and that was on the footing of which I spoke. How the misunderstanding arose it is difficult to tell, but I am pretty much convinced that it must have been on the other side of the Channel. I do not know whether many of your Lordships have been present at military conferences, but I have. Many matters are discussed and hypothetical questions put, and a great deal of technical military discussion takes place before a conclusion is come to; and in a time when there is great excitement, when the papers are pouring forth appeals, when every kind of story is afloat, it is not to be wondered at if an explanation is applied to the context which was not intended, and an impression gets about which is translated into language which goes far beyond anything the presiding officer intended to convey. Something of that sort must have happened. No doubt certain phrases were used. The hypothetical case of active operations might have been referred to; but I am sure, if it was, it was referred to by General Paget, not that he was asking them to actually embark on active operations at the moment, but that he only referred to it in the case of future events that might arise. I feel certain that the misunderstanding has arisen very much from something of the kind which I have put to you.
The noble Marquess also referred to the expression "your draft letter," mentioned in General Gough's letter of March 23. That is in a letter addressed to the Adjutant-General. There is no doubt that at that time the Adjutant-General was trying to put something in writing. There is no doubt he was not thinking of bargaining, or of conditions at all. He was only thinking of preparing something which might be a useful record of what the instructions really were. And the draft letter referred to is the first part of the document which afterwards became the last of the documents set out here. That was prepared in rough draft by the Adjutant-General and
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was not seen by Colonel Seely until afterwards, and it was a document which was cut about during a Cabinet discussion.
Another topic to which the noble Marquess referred was the effect upon General Gough and the other officers of the decision which has been taken to-day. That, of course, I agree is a difficult matter. According to my view of the light in which it presented itself to General Gough, the difficulty was that the orders were not orders actually given on the occasion to which they took exception, and they have gone back with the impression that that was so. It has not been thought right that officers should raise questions upon hypothetical matters which had not arisen and which they had no grounds for supposing would arise. I am sure that General Gough is too fine a soldier and thinks too highly of his sense of duty—of which I have previously spoken—to put a meticulous construction, such as lawyers might, upon a document. [Laughter.] I do not know why your Lordships laugh. I am drawing a distinction between the way in which lawyers look upon a document and the way in which a document of this kind ought to be regarded by soldiers; and I am speaking with some knowledge of the way in which both would look at a document. There is a further considerable difference between the two, and it is because I wish to insist upon this considerable difference that I am taking this point. I say this is not a document which any officer would wish to regard as a contract between himself and his commanding officer, and I am sure that is the view General Gough would have about it, whatever view other people may have about it.
That is all I have to say. I think the position which has arisen is a very unfortunate position. It was bound to be so. But I do feel that from whatever point of view you look at it, whether from the point of view of the Government or of the Opposition, it is a matter for regret that these things should have come into discussion, and it cannot but have a materially bad effect upon the organisation of the Army. My intervention in the debate has been in the hope that at least I might do something to convey to the Army itself that what we have done we have done with a strong sense of what is the position of the Government—a position which should never be lost sight of.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, there are two points in the speech of the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack in which I am sure we shall entirely agree with him. The first is his almost concluding observation that we are in a very unfortunate position. Yes, my Lords, indeed we are; and I believe the great majority of this House have a very clear idea where the responsibility for this misfortune lies. The second point on which we readily agree with the noble and learned Viscount is in the acceptance of the personal explanation he has offered as to a phrase he employed on Monday last, when he said that General Gough had gone back with no conditions, either suggested by others or himself. We know him to be incapable of misleading this House, and we entirely accept his account of the circumstances in which he in this House and, as I understood him to say, the Prime Minister in the other House, gave that assurance. But those are only small matters, and the three points upon which I wish to comment are the three larger issues raised by the speech to which we have just listened. The first is the point arising out of the omission of the two paragraphs in the document at the close of the printed Paper. I believe I am correct in saying, although this House appeared hardly to notice it, that when the noble Viscount read out in the Memorandum his history of that part of the transaction he told us that those two paragraphs which Colonel Seely inserted, and which he was afterwards obliged to disavow, and for introducing which he had felt bound to tender his resignation to the Prime Minister, were paragraphs which were drawn up in consultation with the noble Viscount himself. Am I not right in saying that the noble Viscount said so?
VISCOUNT MORLEY: Yes, quite true; from Colonel Seely's Memorandum.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Colonel Seely states in his Memorandum that these two paragraphs were actually drawn up by him in consultation with a Minister than whom there is no greater master of words and language in this country; a Minister who had been present at the Cabinet Council while Colonel Seely was at the Palace; and who presumably knew what the mind of the Government was at that moment. So I
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say with all respect to the noble Viscount, if I am correct, does not a half-share, perhaps more than a half-share, of the responsibility for Colonel Seely's action rest on the shoulders of the noble Viscount? If there is a question of resignation, as to which we have heard in the other House, can it be that shortly we are to be bereft of one of our greatest ornaments? The noble Viscount has given no indication of his intention to resign; and for our own sakes I hope he will not. But it is worth noting that although Colonel Seely has resigned the Prime Minister has not accepted his resignation. I have the latest information from the other House, and it is that the Prime Minister has told the House that Colonel Seely is still Secretary of State for War; therefore it is a mere nominal resignation intended to cover the Government's position, which in consequence of the incidents in the other House last night is no longer tenable for themselves.
But surely the disappearance of those two paragraphs raises a much greater issue than the degree of responsibility of the noble Viscount or his colleague the Secretary of State for War. It raises the important question of what is the position at the present moment of General Gough. General Gough came over here and had these interviews, the nature of which I need not recapitulate, but your Lordships will remember that he took back these papers, the two documents, with him—firstly, the document which is printed here; and, secondly, the supplemental paper signed by the Chief of the Staff, Sir John French. He took them back with authority from the Army Council so to inform the officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade. In other words, he has not been acting on his own initiative in making public the assurances that he received; he has been acting on instructions from the highest military authority in the land. Well, General Gough is back in Ireland with these instructions; he has read them out; we know from the newspapers that he has communicated them to his officers. They look upon him as rather a hero for having won these terms. Is he suddenly to learn in the newspapers to-morrow that the governing part of the assurance which he has received has been withdrawn? All that the noble and learned Viscount can tell us on this point is that it is a very difficult matter; that General Gough, who has a great sense of discipline

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and knowledge of military affairs, must be satisfied with the assurance that the contingency with which he has been dealing is a wholly hypothetical one; and that when that situation arises the assurance will probably hold good. I must say that is a very unsatisfactory position for these officers. Because Colonel Seely has blundered, or because the Army Council has blundered, or even because the Cabinet has blundered, are these officers who have staked their everything, who have been willing to ruin their professional careers, who felt bound to make these great sacrifices in order to obtain this assurance that they would not be called upon to do what their whole soul would revolt against —is everything that has happened in the past few days to be wiped out, and are these officers to be left in the state in which they were before?
One other point arising out of this. What is the position of His Majesty's Government? They have withdrawn the two paragraphs. Well, you have only to look at the document as it now stands to realise that, with those two paragraphs eliminated, it is of a rather formidable, and, to use the phrase of the noble Viscount, of a rather sinister character. I think we need some information as to whether the policy of the Government is to be taken as laid down in this mutilated document, and whether in withdrawing these two paragraphs they are held to repudiate the views stated in the last. I particularly ask that question, with all deference to the noble Viscount, because it was he who in his speech on Monday last assured us that it has not been contemplated, it is not contemplated, and it will not be contemplated to use the Forces of the Crown against Ulster. If that represented the views of the Government at that time, why do they cut out this paragraph here? This paragraph says the same thing in official language. We want to know, therefore, whether in receding from the paragraph they have receded from the statement of their views that was made by the noble and learned Viscount from the Woolsack.
The next point—I can deal with it quite briefly—is the question of what passed at the famous interview at Dublin, the interview between General Paget and the General Officers. I venture to say that here, too, the House is left in a very unsatisfactory position. My noble friend behind
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me, Lord Lansdowne, summarised with his habitual skill the evidence inside and outside in favour of that version of what passed, which everybody knows more or less to represent the case; and I rather gather that the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack just now felt himself constrained to admit that the words "active operations" must have been used. Indeed, it is quite obvious that they were. But may I not put this question, with all respect, Why should we not have a full statement from Sir Arthur Paget as to what he did say? When we came to this part of the speech of the noble and learned Viscount all he told us was this, that the Government themselves did not know what had passed, that they only had a summary of the concluding part of the statement of Sir Arthur Paget. I think I am right in saying that that summary did not emanate from Sir Arthur Paget himself, but from a brigade major who, I presume, is obviously in a subordinate position to Sir Arthur Paget. Considering that so much turns on what actually passed at that interview is it not only fair to give instructions to General Sir Arthur Paget that he himself should give us an account in his own language of what passed?
The third point to which the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack alluded was this. He was very much annoyed that my noble friend Lord Lansdowne had in his remarks stated the belief, which in my opinion is shared by every one on this side of the House, that there had been something in the nature of a plot, or, if that is an invidious word, a plan to bring about what my noble friend described as a coup d'état in Ulster. The noble Viscount opposite. I think, used even stronger language. He spoke of it as being an hallucination of a sinister character, and he met this point by saying, "I can assure you I knew nothing about it," or words to that effect. That we entirely believe. But when the noble Viscount spoke for himself and for some of his colleagues, can it be quite certain that he was speaking for all? Is it not within the bounds of possibility that in the ample folds of the Cabinet there may be included some Minister full of confidence in his own strategical powers, gifted with inordinate self-confidence, regarding himself as thoroughly qualified to conduct military operations by land or by sea? Is it not conceivable, if there be such a

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statesman, that he may have found while looking about among his colleagues for a complacent dupe, one possibly situated in one of the highest offices in the land? Is it not conceivable that these two high officials may have contemplated, I will not say a plot or a plan, but an ingenious arrangement of a strategical nature which might in certain circumstances become useful to their own interests and plans? If evidence is wanted in favour of such an hypothesis, cannot you find it in what occurred at Bradford? Is it not the case that a Minister—it is not necessary to say who—did say that it might be necessary to put these grave matters to the proof; that the first attack on a soldier or sailor or a policeman would produce an explosion in all parts of the country? Is it not conceivable that that Minister might have been willing to provide an early fulfilment to his own prophecy? I do not wish to speak jokingly. This hypothesis cannot be dismissed, and I do venture to say that the noble Viscount, when he assures us that he knew nothing about it—which we thoroughly accept—will not eradicate from the minds of any of us the sure conviction that there was on the part of certain members of His Majesty's Government a design to put these grave matters to the proof, and if not to provoke to some foolish step which might place them in trouble, at any rate to leave Ulster in such a position that with the Army on land and the Navy by sea it might be able to subjugate them without striking a blow. That is the hypothesis I put to your Lordships, and I do not think that it is one which is altogether dismissed by the explanation given by the Lord Chancellor.
LORD RIBBLESDALE: My Lords, I rise only to ask a question. I should like, referring to page 3 of the White Paper, to ask who put the inverted commas to the terms "duty as ordered" and "active operations"? Was it General Gough himself; was it the person who revised the White Paper; or was it the printer? If it was General Gough himself, then it appears to me that those words being in inverted commas points to the fact that there had been previous written communications which had upset General Gough in which those terms occurred.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: My Lords, the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack told us with great solemnity
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that there was nothing of a military nature proposed. If the noble and learned Viscount was anxious to disprove that surely he would have done well to answer some of the questions which were asked of the Government and to which no reply apparently is going to be forthcoming in this House. We were told that four companies of troops had been moved. That is the case, no doubt. But if nothing in the nature of active operations was suggested or proposed—a phrase which officers present at that interview seem to agree was employed—how is it that orders were given to the Royal Engineers to move with pontoon bridges, and so forth? How is it that the whole of the Cavalry in Ireland were warned to be ready? How is it that to-day—probably the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack knows no more about it than the Lord President opposite—how is it that to-day and yesterday questions are being and were being asked the officers, not in Ireland but in England, as to whether they are prepared to undertake active operations against Ulster? They say that this movement of troops is merely to protect stores and property. Is that conceivable? You have a whole battalion of troops in a dirty tumbledown disused Militia barracks at Newry—barracks which have not been occupied for eight years—while barracks situated in the centre of Belfast which could be rushed in half-an-hour are left undefended.
And, above all, how does it come about that, if there was no indication or intention on the part of the Government to undertake active operations, we can get no reply to our questions about the movements of the Fleet? That question was put with unmistakable precision by the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition, and no answer is vouchsafed. Is any member of the Government in a position to say that no instructions were given to any portion of the Fleet to co-operate in this Irish business?—I do not say by the Board of Admiralty; I do not qualify my phrase; I say, Have any instructions whatever been given? The Fleet has already taken part. Soldiers were rushed in destroyers from Dublin to Carrickfergus, the excuse being that it was undesirable to take troops through Belfast. If anybody cares to look at the railway map he will find that it is quite possible to take troops from Dublin to Carrickfergus

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without taking them to Belfast at all. There is nothing in the speeches that have been delivered this afternoon to disprove what is generally believed, that the movement of troops which actually took place was a preliminary to a great demonstration for taking active operations.
I ask the House to consider what the position of the War Office is now vis-à-vis these officers in Ireland. We were told that they had returned to duty unconditionally. The leading members of the Cabinet were themselves misled about this and thus misled the House and the public. The noble and learned Viscount said in one phrase of his speech—which was so intricate that I failed to follow it completely—that ordinary plain soldiers did not construe documents with the meticulous accuracy with which lawyers are accustomed to scan them. That is quite true. But these officers returned to their duties on the strength of the paragraphs which the Government have now disavowed. The noble and learned Viscount may explain that in legal language, but these plain men will look upon it as a breach of faith. There is no disguising the fact.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I said so. I said that they would take the document in that broad sense for which the noble Earl asks.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: I did not catch the noble and learned Viscount's answer. Does he agree that these officers would be entitled to look upon the withdrawal of the paragraphs, on the strength of which they returned to their duties, as a breach of faith?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: No. I said nothing of the kind. I said these so-called conditions were not to be looked upon in that light.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: The more seriously these conditions were taken the more weight these officers would put upon them, and therefore the more disaster in this provocative action of the Government, as I believe it to be, in withdrawing them at this stage. What do they expect has happened? It is upon the strength of these two paragraphs, and, still more, upon the strength of a written statement which is not published in this White Paper, that
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officers to the number of seventy or eighty —they are all detailed on page 4 of the White Paper—carrying with them, it must be remembered, officers in all other parts of the country and in all arms, as was made pretty clear in a significant letter which appeared in The Times this morning from Viscount Esher—it is on the strength of these two paragraphs and of the un-printed addendum that these officers have gone back to their duty. How can the War Office explain to them that these dominating conditions have been withdrawn without laying themselves open to the greatest rebuke which can be levied against an officer—namely, that the game has not been played? I think that the trouble which occurred three or four days ago was serious; but I think the trouble which has now been provoked is tenfold more serious. These officers have received no orders which they have broken. It is alleged in every Radical speech and in every Radical article that is printed that these officers are disobedient officers. It is clear upon the face of the skeleton explanation which the Government have given us that hypothetical questions were put to these officers, and that, rather than do what they considered to be wrong, they asked permission to send in their papers.
One further point in conclusion. There is no Army in Europe which pays less attention to politics and is less concerned with politics than the British Army; and though I am not a soldier, though I do not know one single soldier who is connected with this crisis, I know enough about the Army to say that they feel bitterly the attacks which are being made upon them now, as though they were throwing aside discipline and as though they were the appanage of the Tory or Aristocratic Party, as some one said yesterday. The Army, I am convinced, are anxious to do their duty; are going to do their duty; but when they see that they have been made part of a gigantic conspiracy—not, I believe, on the part of the Cabinet, but of a powerful section of the Cabinet—they will realise how great is the danger now threatening their noble profession and how necessary it will be in the future when orders are given to them to argue about the conditions attending those orders. That, I say, is a fresh crisis on the top of the crisis which we had hoped was closed, and one which, as I have said, is in my opinion tenfold more serious.
EARL STANHOPE: My Lords, I trust that your Lordships will not allow this question to rest where it is at the present moment. There is a great deal more yet to be cleared up, not only in the interests of the Army but in the interests of the nation as a whole. We have been told that there has been an "honest misunderstanding." We have been told that there have been hallucinations. May I be allowed to remind your Lordships what those honest misunderstandings have really involved? On Saturday last the General Officer Commanding the London District summoned his senior officers and informed them that they might have to be employed in Ulster, and he further informed them that no resignations would be accepted. I want to know—well, I do know—on whose authority that statement was made. General Lloyd was at once asked by one of the officers present whose authority he quoted in saying that no resignations would be accepted. The answer was that instructions had been given to General Officers Commanders-in-Chief at a conference. Where are those instructions in this White Paper? They do not appear. It is perfectly obvious that the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War is totally incomplete. The day before, General Paget prefaced his remarks by saying that he had "obtained the following concessions "; and then he went on to talk of officers domiciled in Ulster being allowed to "disappear." From whom did he get those concessions? Where is the authority for those concessions? Do they appear in this White Paper?
Then I venture to call your Lordships' attention to the Memorandum of the interview of the Secretary of State as it appears in the White Paper. It states that if an officer tendered his resignation the Secretary of State would at once submit to the King that the officer should be removed. My Lords, was His Majesty consulted before the officers were called upon to send in their names for dismissal? It was not a question of the officers being asked to resign or of sending in their names for resignation. They were to send in their names and it was then stated they were to be dismissed from the Army. It is obvious that very clear instructions must have been already given to General Sir Arthur Paget to enable him to make that statement to the officers in his command. What was the nature of this misunderstanding? When Sir Arthur
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Paget discovered how large was the number of officers prepared to be dismissed from the Army who had sent in their names, he went to one Cavalry regiment and informed them that he would not call upon them to fire on the Ulstermen, but that all he required was that they should "scout and report the position of the enemy"—that was the phrase used—and, further, that they should protect his flanks. That is certainly not "measures of precaution." I am informed that he further stated that he had been told that the Navy would co-operate.
This misunderstanding that we have heard so much about was not confined to Ireland. A railway company was warned to be ready to move troops at short notice in England. I am well aware that no orders were given for trains to be ready, but, as is usual in such circumstances, the company was notified that they might be required at short notice. Now what do these misunderstandings amount to? Supposing this country had found itself in a critical situation in regard to a foreign Power; supposing that one of the Commanders-in-Chief of a military district in England had summoned his officers before him and had told them he might require some of them to guard his flanks and to scout for the enemy; supposing a portion of the Fleet steamed in the direction of the enemy's ports. I submit that that would have been taken undoubtedly by the foreign Power as a casusbelli. It is obvious that a misunderstanding of this kind is serious. It is a misunderstanding that we. cannot take the risk of having repeated. I submit to your Lordships that it is absolutely essential for the safety of this country that the cause of a misunderstanding of such a character should be traced to its source and removed so that it cannot recur. Now, who is the cause of this misunderstanding? Is it General Sir Arthur Paget? If General Sir Arthur Paget acted without definite instructions it is perfectly obvious that he is an officer not fitted to command a great district in this country. There are three noble Lords in the House at this moment who have held the post of Secretary of State for War, and I venture to ask them whether they would feel it possible to continue in his command an officer who had caused a misunderstanding of so grave a character as that. If it is Sir Arthur Paget, why has he not been removed? The answer is perfectly obvious. It is not Sir Arthur

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Paget; and the Government dare not remove him from his command for that reason. I again submit that it is absolutely necessary for the safety of this country that the cause of such a misunderstanding should be removed as soon as possible.
Now I come to the other side of the question, the Army side. We have heard in the other House so-called Labour Members of Parliament making analogies between the suppression of strife which amounts to civil war and the suppression of a strike. Personally, I am not very fond of analogies. They are seldom very accurate. But there is this analogy which I think at any rate might be made. This was not a strike of officers; it was a Government lock-out. When your Lordships consider how these officers were dismissed you will see the point. They were not ordered to do a certain thing and then refused. These officers were told that they might be required for a certain duty, and that they would be dismissed if they did not do it. I have always thought that the Government was supposed to be a model employer of labour. We now understand that Labour Members of Parliament are going down to their constituencies to tell their constituents that they thoroughly approve of employers of labour asking men to act against their consciences, and that, if they disapprove, they will be turned out of their employment and forfeit, not only their positions, but their pensions and even their unemployment insurance. That is an analogy which at any rate Labour Members might see fit to draw.
But, my Lords, the difference is in many particulars. As I have ventured already to say, these officers were not given a direct order. They were given a choice between being prepared to undertake active operations or dismissal from the Service. But that choice was accompanied by a bribe. It was put as a bribe that they should either undertake a certain service or that they should sacrifice their profession and their pension. I have yet to find any workingman—any average workingman, at any rate—in any particular trade, who, when given a choice accompanied by a bribe and by a threat, would not at once get his back up and refuse to undertake the duty. That is exactly what the officers of these regiments did. I have had the honour of serving under General Sir Arthur Paget, and I know that he is
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the very last man who Would have given an order, either to an officer or to a man under his command, accompanied by a bribe and a threat as in the case of these officers. Sir Arthur Paget quite obviously could not have invented these conditions. Who was it who did? It is necessary for the discipline of the Army, quite as much as for the safety of the country, that these misunderstandings should be traced to their source. I do not care what order is given to the Army, if it is accompanied by bribes and threats of that character that order will most certainly be liable to be disobeyed. It strikes at the very fountain of discipline, at the very foundation of obedience. Those who have met officers, as I have, who have had this alternative put to them, will realise how strongly they feel with regard to the conditions under which those suggestions were made.
It has been said that these officers were actuated by political motives. I am one of those who, in one way at any rate, am rather glad that the last sentence in this White Paper has disappeared. I want it put in another form. I quite agree that the term "Home Rule" is a political term. I ventured on Monday last to point out to this House that a change in the Constitution was entirely different from a change of any other character; and I ventured further to point out that in no single part of the British Empire had a change of Constitution been imposed by force of arms. I fail to see why a change, of Constitution should be imposed by force of arms in England; and I, at any rate, would like to see some alteration made in the Army Act by which the Army should not be compelled to force acceptance of a change in the Constitution.
Your Lordships will realise the difference when I point out what might possibly happen. Up till recently we were entitled to think that a Government would not completely lose its head. We can say so no longer. It is possible—I do not think it is very probable—that the Tory Party might come into power anxious to limit the voting power of the working classes. They might be anxious to limit the franchise. I venture to suggest that when the great uprising took place, as it certainly would, it would be unjust to call on the Army to carry out such a change in the Constitution until the whole country

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had approved. Supposing, again, that the Labour Party—I will not call it the Labour Party, but the Socialist Party— came into power. Supposing that the Socialist Party decided to abolish the Crown. We know on the authority of the present Prime Minister that it is considered that the Royal Veto is as dead as Queen Anne. I do not agree with that statement, but there it is; it has been said by the present Prime Minister. Therefore the Crown itself would have no power of veto over the abolition of itself. In those circumstances the Army, which takes the oath of allegiance to the King, and not to any Secretary of State for War, would, according to the present idea, probably be called on to carry through a change in the Constitution for the abolition of the very individual to whom it had sworn allegiance. That obviously is an absurd situation, but it is one which] can be covered by what I venture to suggest. That, at any rate, is a wider question than the one which comes in under this particular discussion. I do venture to hope that your Lordships will insist that we shall have a fuller statement than we have had up to the present moment with regard to this misunderstanding, so that we may be able to trace it to its source and prevent such a misunderstanding arising again.
LORD AMPTHILL: My Lords, I only rise to reply to the challenge which was made to me by the Leader of the House; and when I rose to do so before I did not intend to stand in the way of the noble Marquess on the Front Bench, to whom I have made my apologies. All I have to say is that the noble Viscount gave a misleading version of what he said the other evening, and of what I said in reply. If I understood him rightly, when he made the remarks which I criticised he was not talking about Covenanters at all, either about the Covenanters in Ireland or about the British Covenanters. What it seemed to me he was implying was that we on I this side of the House had been interfering with the discipline of the Army and endeavouring to seduce Army officers from their allegiance. I said—and I am sure that all noble Lords on this side will agree with me—that that is a vile charge, because
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it is not true. We could not influence Army officers even if we wished to do so. Officers of the Army have consciences of their own and a sense of honour which is their own. They are the keepers of their own consciences and they are the sole judges I of their own honour. They would not accept dictation or suggestion from any man or body of men in a matter of conscience and honour, and that is what this question has been to them. We who understand the spirit of officers in the Army, and, indeed, of officers and gentlemen, would not dream of suggesting to them what line of conduct they should take; and that none of us have done so I am certain. The noble Viscount seemed, when he talked of aiding and abetting law breakers—and again I say that if I was not mistaken in my impression of his words he seemed to suggest that these officers of the Army were law-breakers—
VISCOUNT MORLEY: That is not so.
LORD AMPTHILL: If that is not the case I have made a mistake, but that is the impression it made upon me, and I resented it because there has been no question whatsoever of disobeying orders. If these officers have disobeyed orders, what orders have they disobeyed? The suggestion which has been made in so many quarters that they have been disobedient to orders is untrue and unfair and mischievous in every way. The noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack has laid down the rule that an officer should not bargain about his duties. Well, my Lords, we all agree to that. But it is surely a necessary corollary that those in authority should not invite or challenge him to bargain about his duties. That is what has happened in this case. The Government have said to these officers, "These are the conditions upon which we will continue to employ you in these special circumstances, and if you will not accept them you have the option of resigning." When that is put to any body of men it is impossible for them to get out of the difficulty—the cruel difficulty—in which they are thus placed.
House adjourned at half-past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, Two o'clock.