Sitting of 21 February 1912

Preamble
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.
Ashborne Urban District Council (Gas) Bill,
Read a second time, and committed.
Bedwellty Urban District Council Bill,
Belfast Water Bill,
To be read a second time To-morrow.
Birmingham Corporation Bill,
Church Stretton Urban District Water Bill,
Read a second time, and committed.
Dover Corporation Bill,
To be read a second time To-morrow.
Egremont Urban District Water Bill,
Fylde Water Board Bill,
Read a second time, and committed.
Keighley Corporation Bill,
To be read a second time upon Wednesday next.
London County Council (Finance) Bill,
London County Council (General Powers) Bill,
Port of London Authority Bill,
Ramsbottom Urban District Railless Traction Bill,
Shipley Urban District Council Bill,
Tavistock Urban District Council Bill,
Read a second time, and committed.
West Ham Corporation Bill,
To be read a second time upon Wednesday next.

EDUCATION (ENGLAND AND WALES).
Return [presented 20th February] to be printed.
NATURALISATION OF FOREIGNERS IN PORTUGAL (MISCELLANEOUS, No. 3, 1912).
Copy presented of Despatches from His Majesty's Minister at Lisbon respecting the Naturalisation of Foreigners in Portugal [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
EXTRADITION ACTS, 1870 TO 1906.
Copy presented of Order in Council, dated 13th February, 1912, for giving effect to a Treaty of Extradition between the United Kingdom and Greece [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
FOREIGN JURISDICTION ACT, 1890.
Copy presented of Order in Council, dated 13th February, 1912, entitled "The Gold Coast and Dependencies Coinage Order, 1912" [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
NAVAL AND MARINE PAY AND PENSIONS ACT, 1865.
Copies presented of Three Orders in Council, dated 13th February, 1912, made under the Act [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
LICENSED PREMISES (SCOTLAND) (HOURS OF CLOSING, ETC.).
Return presented relative thereto [ordered 16th December, 1911; The Lord Advocate]; to lie upon the Table.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

  Loss of Submarine A3 (Pensions and Gratuities).
  Lord CHARLES BERESFORDasked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many of the petty officers and men who lost their lives in the accident to Submarine A3 were married; whether any of the married men had children; whether any of the single men had fathers or mothers dependent upon them for their support; and what rates of compassionate allowance will be paid to the widows, children, and parents?
  The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the BOARD of ADMIRALTY (Dr. Macnamara): So far as is known six of the men have left widows and four of them have left children. Two of the widows have been granted pensions of 5s. a week, and allowances of 1s. 6d. each for their children; two have been granted pensions of 9s. a week, and allowances of 2s. a week for their children; one has been granted a pension of 5s. a week; and the case of the sixth is tinder investigation. The circumstances of relatives (other than widows) of two men are being investigated with a view to the grant of gratuities, if they are found to have been dependent. In the cases of the remaining two men it is not yet known whether they have left widows or other relatives who would be eligible for pensions or gratuities.
  Lord C. BERESFORD: Will the right hon. Gentleman inquire and let me know privately later as to the remaining men?
  Dr. MACNAMARA: Yes.
  Mr. LEE: Can the right hon. Gentleman say the conditions under which these allowances are given?
  Dr. MACNAMARA: They are given under a scale. I do not know whether they would be withdrawn under any circumstances in the case of the mothers, but they are given generally in the case of the children up to fourteen years of age for boys, and up to sixteen years of age for girls.

  ROYAL NAVY.

    ENGINEER-COMMANDERS (PAY).
    Lord C. BERESFORDasked how many of the engineer-commanders promoted with seniority of 1st January, 1912, received pay at the rate of 18s. and 24s. a day respectively; and by what circular letter or Order in Council were these different rates of pay fixed, seeing that it is stated in Circular Letter No. 140, of December, 1902, that the rate of pay of 24s. a day was to apply to all engineer officers serving at that time when and if promoted to the rank of engineer-commander?
    Dr. MACNAMARA: Of the six engineer officers promoted to the rank of engineer-commander on 1st January, 1912, five received pay at 18s. a day and one at 24s. a day, having been specially promoted. As regards the second part of the question, I am afraid I cannot add to the replies given to the Noble Lord on 9th March, the 8th and 18th May, and the 1st November last.

    ALTERATIONS TO BATTLESHIPS.
    Lord C. BERESFORDasked whether His Majesty's Ship "Orion," or any other battleships or battle-cruisers of the latest type, has shown a tendency towards excessive rolling; whether such rolling has been so heavy on certain occasions that it has been found very difficult or impossible for the elevating gear of the heavy guns to keep pace with it; whether, in consequence, it is considered desirable to fit these ships with larger bilge keels; and whether the present dimensions of our dry docks will permit such alterations to be carried out to any substantial extent?
    The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Churchill): The "Orion" has rolled somewhat more deeply than the earlier ships of the type in company with her, and steps have been taken to increase substantially the area of her bilge keels. No difficulty in connection with docking her is anticipated.
    Lord C. BERESFORD: Does that mean that after the additions to the bilge keels there will be no difficulty in docking the ship?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: It is proposed to add to the bilge keel, and the additions contemplated will not interfere with the docking of the ship.

    H.M.S. "ACTIVE" (OPENING LETTERS).
    Mr. BURGOYNEasked the Postmaster-General if he is aware that the commanding officer of His Majesty's Ship "Active" has opened certain letters of his ship's company; and what steps he intends to take to put an end to such a practice?
    The POSTMASTER-GENERAL (Mr. Herbert Samuel): The letters in question appear to have been duly dealt with so far as the Post Office is concerned, and it is not within my province to take any action.
    Mr. BURGOYNEasked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he is aware that the commanding officer of His Majesty's Ship "Active" has opened certain letters of his ship's company; and if there is any regulation which empowers a naval captain to promote such a practice?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: The letters in question were opened under a misapprehension of the meaning of certain Admiralty orders that were issued in 1910, directing that betting circulars were to be for-
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    warded to the Admiralty. Instructions will be issued to prevent a similar misapprehension in future.

    H.M.S. "LION."
    Sir C. KINLOCH - COOKEasked whether there is anything wrong with His Majesty's Ship "Lion"; and, if so, what precisely is the matter with the ship, and what will be the estimated cost of the changes, if any, contemplated?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: I must refer the hon. Member to the statement I made on this subject yesterday.

    H.M.S. "PROMETHEUS."
    Mr. BURGOYNEasked whether complaints have been received of the inefficient condition of certain of His Majesty's Ships on the Australian station; whether the boiler-tubes of His Majesty's Ship "Prometheus" were so leaky that, during a voyage from Sydney to Thursday Island the vessel was forced to anchor whilst sufficient water was made to take her into Cairns; and whether, at the time of her sailing from Sydney on 15th November last, she was reported in all respects fit for sea?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: The "Prometheus" has been temporarily disabled under circumstances which are about to be the subject of a court of inquiry. Pending that inquiry, I am unable to make a statement on the subject. The "Prometheus" was selected for the service required by the Commander-in-Chief, who it may therefore be inferred, considered her fit for sea. Her boilers were retubed last year.

    FIRE-CONTROL POSITIONS OF "DREADNOUGHTS."
    Lord C. BERESFORDasked the First Lord of Admiralty, what time it will take to shift the fire-control positions in the latest ships of the "Dreadnought" type; how many ships are affected; whether it was ever pointed out to the Admiralty that the fire-control positions in these ships were untenable owing to the heat from their funnels; and whether he will state to the House the course, approximately, of shifting the fire-control positions in each ship?
    Mr. CHURCHILL: The only completed ship of this type from which an official report as to the heat trouble caused to fire-control positions has been received is the "Hercules," and in this ship the necessary instruments have been moved to another position for trial by the ship's staff, little or no cost being involved.

    Canada and British West Indies
    Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSONasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he can lay Papers giving particulars of the imports into the British West Indies of Canadian produce, and the exports to Canada of West Indian produce, during the years 1909, 1910, and 1911, respectively; and whether any means exist, or can be provided, by which the trade passing between Canada and the British West Indies by way of the United States can be identified?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for the COLONIES (Mr. Harcourt): The desired particulars in the case of the larger West Indian Colonies are already given annually in the Statistical Abstract issued by the Board of Trade, but the figures for 1911 are not yet available. The figures are also given for each Colony in the annual Blue Book Reports which are presented to Parliament, and full particulars are contained in the Annual Customs Reports published by the Canadian Government. Steps are being taken to secure that in the statistical statements issued for the West Indian Colonies imports may be classified according to the country of consignment, and exports according to the countries of ultimate destination. Some Canadian produce, however, reaches the West Indies through middlemen in New York and other American ports, and cannot be distinguished on arrival from produce of the United States. The Royal Commission on Trade Relations between Canada and the West Indies, who considered this point, doubted whether it was possible to estimate, with any approach to accuracy, the amount of the trade which passes in this manner.

    Bahamas, Barbados, and Bermuda.
    Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSONasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, with a view to prevent misunderstanding, he will state what the expression Crown Colony, as used in the Colonial Regulations with reference to the Bahamas, Barbados, and Bermuda, is intended to connote?
    Mr. HARCOURT: I would remind the hon. Member of the answer which I gave to a previous question by him on this subject on the 7th November. The first chapter of the Colonial Regulations, which deals with constitutions, points out that the British Colonies and Protectorates

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    may be divided into those which possess responsible government and those which do not, and it is observed that the latter are commonly known as Crown Colonies. In this connection the connotation is obviously the absence of responsible government.

    Northern and Southern Nigeria.
    Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSONasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether it is in contemplation to unite the Governments of Northern and Southern Nigeria under one administration; and, if so, whether he is in a position to make any statement regarding this proposal?
    Mr. HARCOURT: The uniting of the Governments of Northern and Southern Nigeria has been recognised for some years past as desirable in principle, and the present time is opportune for taking the first step towards the fulfilment of this object. His Majesty has approved of the appointment of Sir Frederick Lugard as Governor of Southern Nigeria as well as of Northern Nigeria, the administrations remaining for the present separate. It is hoped that this measure may enable Sir Frederick Lugard, when he has had experience of the conditions and requirements of both territories, to confer with me on a scheme for their amalgamation into a single administration.
    Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON: Are we to understand, so far as finance is concerned, the two Colonies are to remain separate at the present time?
    Mr. HARCOURT: They are to remain separate until Sir Frederick Lugard has made his inquiries and has reported to me.

    Colonial Regulations.
    Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSONasked what was the personnel of the Committee which revised the Colonial Regulations in 1908?
    Mr. HARCOURT: The Committee appointed by my predecessor the right hon. Gentleman the Member for St. George's, Hanover Square, consisted of the Legal Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir George O'Brien, ex-Governor of Fiji, Sir Ralph Moor, ex-High Commissioner for Southern Nigeria, and four members of the permanent staff of the Colonial Office. On the death of Sir George O'Brien, in 1906, Sir Edward Noel Walker, ex-Lieutenant Governor of Ceylon, was appointed by the Earl of Elgin as member of the Committee.

    Singapore Siamese Consulate.
    Mr. MacCALLUM SCOTTasked the Colonial Secretary whether, on 24th October, Captain Alexander Henderson Chalmers, senior boarding officer in the master attendant's office, Singapore, was fined fifty dollars by one of His Majesty's magistrates at Singapore, namely, Mr. A. de Mella, for assaulting Mr. A. W. Gooneratne, a Ceylon man who is chief clerk at the Siamese Consulate, Singapore; and whether the Colonial Office has taken any action with regard to the matter?
    Mr. HARCOURT: I regret that I have not yet received the report for which I asked the Governor.

    Cape of Good Hope University (Degree Day Address).
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKEasked the Colonial Secretary whether his attention has been called to the fact that Mr. Malan, Minister of Education in the Union Parliament of South Africa, delivered the principal address on the annual Degree Day at the University of the Cape of Good Hope in the Dutch language; whether there is any precedent for this address being delivered in any language other than English; and whether he will suggest to the Union Government the advisability of addresses of this kind not being delivered in a Foreign language?
    Mr. HARCOURT: Yes, Sir. I have seen a report to this effect. As the South Africa Act expressly provides that both English and Dutch shall be official languages and on a footing of equality, I am at a loss to understand on what ground I could address to the Union Government the gratuitously offensive suggestion made in the last part of the question.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Does the right hon. Gentleman still adhere to the statement made by himself and his colleagues that there is no analogy between a Union Parliament for South Africa and self-government for Ireland?

    Deportation from British Crown Colonies.
    Sir HILDRED CARLILEasked the Colonial Secretary whether he will publish any papers indicating under what conditions the prerogative of deportation is exercised regarding a British subject in a British Crown Colony?
    Mr. HARCOURT: I do not think that any useful purpose would be served by reprinting the various local ordinances which authorise deportation; but I shall be happy to give the; hon. Gentleman a reference to the laws of any Colonies which contain such a provision.

    Rhodesia (Trial by Jury).
    Sir HILDRED CARLILEasked the Colonial Secretary whether it has been brought to his notice that the Rhodesian Legislative Council has unanimously passed a resolution that the present system of trial by jury was unsuited to cases where Europeans were charged with serious crimes of violence against natives, or natives charged with similar crimes against Europeans, that some satisfactory system be substituted, and that the administration be requested to introduce legislation next Session giving effect to the Council's recommendation; and whether he proposes to take any action with regard to the matter?
    Mr. HARCOURT: Yes, Sir. A resolution to this effect was passed in December. The Legislative Council is meeting again before long, and I do not propose to take any steps pending their action.

  NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT.

    APPROVED SOCIETIES' OFFICIALS (SALARIES).
    Sir RANDOLF BAKERasked whether it is proposed that approved societies shall pay salaries to their secretaries, sick visitors, or inspectors out of funds raised under the operation of the Insurance Act from their members; whether societies will be allowed to institute a medical test for new members; and, if so, whether the fees for medical examination may be paid out of the administration expenses fund?
    The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Mr. Masterman): Approved societies are authorised by the Act, under Section 3, to pay such salaries, if any, as may be required to secure visitors or inspectors subject to the limitation of general administration expenses to be fixed by regulations of the Commissioners. The institution of a medical test is optional to the societies, and, if enforced, must be borne either by the individual concerned or out of the amount to be set aside for the administration expense fund of the society.

    LOCAL INSURANCE COMMITTEES (SALARIES).
    Sir RANDOLF BAKERasked whether it is proposed that local insurance committees
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    shall, under the National Insurance Act, pay the salaries and expenses of secretaries, clerks, inspectors, or other officials appointed by them, out of the funds raised for administration charges, or whether other money will be forthcoming for the purpose, and, if so, from what source?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: The expenses referred to will be met from the funds specifically contributed to Insurance Committees to meet the cost of administration under Sections 15 (6) and 61 (2) of the Act, together with whatever sums are allotted by regulation from the contributions of deposit contributors under Section 42 (c); and any further funds available under the Act for general purposes or otherwise under Sections 12 (2), 15 (7), and (8), 17 (2 and 3), and 61 (3).
    Sir R. BAKER: Will this money come out of the sum which is paid in respect of employed persons, whether by the employer, the employed, or the State?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: It will come under the conditions laid down in the Sections I have referred to.
    Sir R. BAKER: Is it the fact that not one penny of the payments towards officials will come out of the pockets of employed persons?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: If the hon. Gentleman will do me the honour to study the Sections to which I have referred him, he will see the answer.

    LECTURERS.
    Mr. ALAN SYKESasked (1) whether the Welsh Insurance Commissioners, when they invite the vicar of a Welsh town to convene a meeting to be addressed by one of their lecturers, also invite at the same time the ministers of any other denominations; and (2) on what principles the Welsh Insurance Commissioners select the gentleman in each locality to whom they send memorandum 51,517 Wt. 32370–1 5,000 1/12 A. and E. W., dated 23rd January, 1912, with the covering letter asking him to give them a choice of dates on which he would like a lecturer sent down to address a meeting to explain the National Insurance Act?
    Mr. CASSELasked (1) whether the National Health Insurance Commissioners of Wales invited a clergyman in Wales to arrange for a meeting in his district, with a thorough representative audience, to be addressed by a lecturer whose

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    services would be given free of all charge; and whether the remuneration for such services will be paid out of public funds; and (2) whether the National Health Insurance Commissioners for England, Wales, and Scotland, who are endowed with wide judicial functions under the National Insurance Act, 1911, are issuing explanatory leaflets prejudging many of the questions which may come before them for judicial decision?
    Sir A. GRIFFITH-BOSCAWENasked whether the Welsh Insurance Commissioners have issued a memorandum in which they state that they are desirous to afford all possible assistance and information in their power and to meet the general convenience of the Welsh people in Wales in every reasonable and practicable way; if so, what is meant by the expression "Welsh people in Wales"; whether the Commissioners are prepared to give any assistance to the English people in Wales; how many explanatory leaflets have been issued in English and Welsh respectively; and whether such leaflets would be paid for out of public funds?
    Mr. GEORGE FABERasked (1) whether, in view of the fact that a Liberal organisation, now known as the Liberal Insurance Committee, has been formed by the Patronage Secretary, and lecturers appointed by that organisation, in order to popularise the National Insurance Act, it is any longer desirable in the public interest that the National Insurance Commission, which is a Government Department, should employ lecturers paid by the State to explain the advantages of that Act, and where the line is drawn between the work done by the lecturers appointed by the committee and the Commission respectively; and (2) whether at the meeting at Millbank House on the 1st instant, organised by the Liberal organisation then known as the National Insurance Committee, at which the Chancellor of the Exchequer made a speech on party lines, there were present a number of lecturers who were salaried speakers of the National Insurance Commission, paid out of public funds, and why they were invited to a party meeting; and, in the case of any of them travelling from the country in order to be present, by whom their travelling expenses were or will be paid?
    Viscount WOLMERasked the names and addresses of the official lecturers appointed to expound the National Insurance
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    Act, and of all officials so far appointed in connection with that Act, the nature of their respective qualifications, by whom they were recommended, and by whom they were selected?
    Mr. GINNELLasked how many persons have been appointed to positions with salaries of £200 a year and more under the National Insurance Act in Ireland; how many of them had no previous experience in insurance or similar business; and on whose recommendation were these appointed?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: The Commissioners recognised from the first their duty to supply authentic information and advice to persons affected by the Insurance Act, especially in view of the most important decisions which over fourteen millions of insured persons must necessarily take before next July, unless they sink into the class of deposit contributors. In the absence of any permanent staff who in established Government Departments provide information, both by lectures and otherwise, concerning all new Acts of Parliament to persons affected, all four Commissions engaged persons for temporary assistance for this purpose. The engagements were, of course, entirely non-political. It may interest the hon. Gentlemen who honour me by their applause to know that they included two ex-Unionist candidates for Parliament, and that one of the two English organisers, who also arranged the general course of instruction, is the late secretary of the Unionist Insurance Committee. The English Commissioners, at meetings held at the Foreign Office, with representatives of friendly societies and trade unions, were strongly urged, in the first instance, to limit themselves to private conference with members of the various organisations concerned. A large number of very successful conferences have been held, and through such conferences they hope that the necessary information may be conveyed to the bulk of insured persons; but they recognise that, in the case of women and the remoter rural districts, some further methods will have to be devised. In Scotland, Ireland, and parts of Wales, where the ground is not covered by friendly societies, it has been found impossible to convey the required information through such organisations, and lectures and addresses are therefore being given, open to all who are interested in the Insurance Act. In Wales the Memorandum and covering letter referred to in Questions Nos. 20, 21

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    and 24 were issued to clergymen of the Church of England and Nonconformist ministers, and also to head teachers of schools, the clerks of local authorities, and the secretaries of friendly societies, and trade unions. All the conferences and lectures are non-political and uncontroversial in character; the lecturers are under instructions to make no political allusion, direct or indirect; to be careful not to dogmatise on any doubtful points of law, and to confine themselves to plain exposition of what is now the law of the land. Never at any time has there been any connection between the Government insurance organisation and the body now called the Liberal Insurance Committee, nor did any of the lecturers of the Commission attend the meeting of the Liberal lecturers addressed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 1st February. Leaflets explanatory of the Act are in preparation, and will shortly be issued. The enormous number of letters of inquiry received—quite beyond the possibility of treatment by the present staff of the Commissioners, has demonstrated at once the necessity for this work, and also the amazing misunderstanding which prevails concerning the details of the Act by which the interests of many persons affected by the Act would be seriously prejudiced. A Paper is in preparation detailing the work already done by the Commissioners to bring the Act into operation, which will include a full account of this preliminary work of exposition. I propose to add to that Paper a list of the permanent and temporary appointments (other than clerical) at present made by the National Insurance Commissions and the Joint Committee, and to lay it on the Table of the House.
    Mr. BRIDGEMAN: Have the Welsh Commissioners any authority to send out notices in Welsh to clergymen in Shropshire without being asked for them?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I do not know about the case referred to, but the Welsh Commissioners have, of course, authority to communicate information concerning the Act to all who may be affected by the Act.
    Mr. ALAN SYKES: Will the hon. Gentleman reply to the question whether the Welsh Commissioners, when they invited a Welsh clergyman to convene a meeting, also invited, at the same time, ministers of other denominations?
    Mr. SPEAKER: That question was answered.
    Mr. CASSEL: Will the hon. Gentleman answer the question whether the Commissioners will be able to decide judicially, having regard to their judicial powers, questions upon which they have already given a pronouncement prejudging them by these leaflets which they have issued, because I must—
    Mr. SPEAKER: This is not the time for argument.
    Mr. GEORGE FABER: Will the hon. Gentleman say where the line is drawn between the work done by lecturers appointed by the Committee and the Commissioners respectively?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I tried to answer that question. The lectures which are given by the Commissioners are purely non-political, and are expositions of the Act as it exists at the present time. I have no claim to speak for lectures given by the Liberal Committee. I gather they will be more of a political character.
    Mr. W. PEEL: Are these two ex-Conservative politicians the only exceptions to the general rule that all these lecturers are members of the Radical party, and what precedent is there for inquiring of people who are used for Civil Service purposes as to their political views?
    Captain CRAIG: Can the hon. Gentleman tell the House who is the lecturer at headquarters who lectures the lecturers who go lecturing in the country?
    Mr. J. WARD: Does not the hon. Gentleman think it is a most dangerous thing to appoint a man who has been the secretary of an organisation for denouncing the Act to explain it to the people?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I think the lecturers are of a character that they will abide by the instructions given by the Commissioners.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Has the hon. Gentleman given any instructions to these gentlemen to explain the extraordinary statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he is giving 9d. for 4d.?
    Mr. CASSEL: May I submit a point to you, Mr. Speaker? I think you said my question had been answered, but I did not catch the answer to it, my question being whether the Commissioners would be able to give judicial decisions if they had already prejudged them by explanatory leaflets?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I thought I had answered that question. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that no leaflets will be issued which will in any way prejudice the judicial functions of the Insurance Commissioners.
    Mr. ALAN SYKES: Will the hon. Gentleman say whether more than one person at a time in each Welsh town is invited to get together a meeting?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: I should like notice of that.
    Mr. TYSON WILSONasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has invited the secretaries of trade unions to accept the position of lecturer for the purpose of attending meetings to explain and support the Insurance Act; and, if so, whether he promised those that showed ability as lecturers positions as inspectors under the Act, and assured them that they would have a good position for life?
    The PRESIDENT of the BOARD OF TRADE (Mr. Buxton): The answer to both parts of the question is in the negative.

    COLLECTING SOCIETIES.
    Mr. GINNELLasked the Lord Advocate if the United National Friendly Assurance Collecting Society is correct in saying that he inquired fully into the working and management of that society, and pronounced it sound financially and legal in every form; will he say where a copy of that opinion can be seen, with the evidence on which it was based; and, if he disapproves of the use of that alleged opinion as a means of collecting money, what action he proposes to take in the matter?
    The LORD ADVOCATE (Mr. Ure): I have never had occasion to inquire into the working and management of the United National Friendly Assurance Collecting Society. A society called the National United Assurance Society, Limited—which I understand was under the same management as the Collecting Society—was reported to me last year as having contravened Section 2 of the Assurance Companies Act, 1909. After full inquiry, I came to the conclusion that there was no evidence to justify a prosecution under the Statute; and I issued instructions accordingly. I am informed that no statement to the effect set out in the hon. Member's question has been made to the knowledge of the management of either society. Such a statement would be incorrect.
    Mr. GINNELL: Has the right hon. Gentleman seen any such statement?
    Mr. URE: No, I have not.
    Mr. GINNELL: Will the right hon. Gentleman read it if sent to him?
    Mr. URE: Certainly.
    Mr. GINNELLasked whether the managing director of Ireland's Life Assurance Collecting Society is correct in assuring the public, as an inducement to join that society, that it is an approved society under the National Insurance Act; and, if not, will he be allowed to persist in giving that assurance?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: No societies have as yet been approved by any of the Insurance Commissions or by the Joint Committee, and any statement to the contrary is untrue.
    Mr. GINNELL: Will the hon. Gentleman answer the last part of the question, "Will he be allowed to persist in giving that assurance?"
    Mr. MASTERMAN: Perhaps the hon. Member will call my attention to the paper in which the statement has been made.

    OFFICIAL PRINTING (IRELAND).
    Mr. NANNETTIasked the President of the Board of Trade whether the Irish portion of the printing, etc., in connection with the working of Part II. of the Insurance Act will be executed in that country; and, if not, will he give orders to have it done?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: The printing, etc., in connection with the working in Ireland of Part II. of the Insurance Act will be executed, as far as practicable, in that country.

    London Licence Duties.
    Mr. HARRY LAWSONasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the public houses and beerhouses of the city and county of London contributed to the Revenue by way of increase over £530,000 for the year ending 30th Septembr, 1910, and £435,000 for the year ending 30th September, 1911; whether that contribution amounts, approximately, to one-third of the total revenue from that source; whether, before 1909, the sum amounted to £195,000, or, approximately, one-ninth of the total revenue; whether, on the basis of population, the share of London would be about one-tenth of the total; whether

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    the consumption of alcoholic liquor per head of the population is greater in London than elsewhere, and, if not, why the people of London are specially penalised by this tax; and whether it is intended in any way to relieve them?
    The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER (Mr. Lloyd George): The figures given in the first paragraph of the question as representing the increase in Liquor Licence Duty in respect of public-houses and beerhouses in London under the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, are substantially correct, though the figures for the year ended 30th September, 1911, are still subject to some adjustment. It is not clear from the wording of the second paragraph what is the exact comparison which the hon. Member has in mind. But I may state that the Licence Duty on public-houses and beerhouses in London amounted before the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, to one-ninth of the total revenue from that source in the United Kingdom, and for the year ended 30th September, 1910, to approximately one-fifth of such total revenue. For the year ended 30th September, 1911, so far as can be judged, the proportion will be something over one-sixth. The general question raised by the hon. Member is, I am afraid, too large to be dealt with within the compass of an answer to a question. The large proportion of revenue derived from London is, of course, due entirely to the high rateable value of London property.
    Mr. HARRY LAWSON: Does the right hon. Gentleman propose in any way to redress the balance?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman was present during the Debate we had on this very subject a few weeks ago. I do not know that I can add very much to what I then said, but I am in general sympathy with the object he has in view.

    Inhabited House Duty.
    Mr. LLOYDasked why collectors of Income Tax (A to E and Inhabited House Duty) are issuing seven days' demand notes for payment, failing payment in which period distraint is to be made?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: In cases where seven days demand notes for the payment of Income Tax and Inhabited House Duty have been received they have been preceded by previous notices. The duties are by law payable on or before 1st January,
    608
    and, considering the notices taxpayers have already had it is not unreasonable that the issue of final demand notes should now have begun.
    Mr. LLOYD: May I ask if in every case there were demands made previously to the seven days' demand note?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I should think so, but I should like notice of the question.
    Mr. LLOYD: If there were not, I presume the issue of the seven-day demand note was an error.
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I should like to make inquiry before answering the question.
    Sir FORTESCUE FLANNERY: Why are the present demands so much earlier this year than formerly?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I think the hon. Gentleman is labouring under a misapprehension. I do not think they are earlier at all. I am perfectly certain there has been no departure in policy.
    Sir FORTESCUE FLANNERY: Why is the pressure for payment so much earlier—at least six or eight weeks earlier than formerly?
    Mr. LLOYD: Is it not the fact that some time ago the right hon. Gentleman denied any intention of issuing seven-day demand notes?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: If the hon. Gentleman will remind me of the occasion I will refresh my memory. I have no recollection of it.

    Undeveloped Land Duty (Valuation).
    Mr. PRETYMANasked whether, where the valuation of a holding shows a minus agricultural value and also a minus assessable site value, Undeveloped Land Duty is being claimed on the sum of these two minus quantities?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Undeveloped Land Duty is certainly not payable, and I am not aware that it has been claimed, in circumstances such as those to which the hon. Member refers.
    Captain CRAIG: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it has been so claimed in my own individual case?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: If the hon. and gallant Gentleman will supply me with particulars I shall be glad to look into the matter.
    Captain CRAIG: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what sort of a miserable Act it is which gives rise to such cases?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I have invited the hon. Member to give me the facts, and I will look into them.
    Captain CRAIG: Will the right hon. Gentleman promise he will not tax in these circumstances?
    Mr. PRETYMAN: Can the right hon. Gentleman say how it is possible for such claims as these to be made without his knowledge?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: Does the hon. Gentleman really think that the Chancellor of the Exchequer knows every claim that is put in, not merely in respect of taxation in this country for Undeveloped Land Duty, but for every other tax?
    Mr. PRETYMAN: If I may answer that question—
    Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Gentleman had better ask the next question. Time is getting on.
    Mr. PRETYMANasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that owners of premises subject to a perpetual rent-charge are allowed to deduct the capital value of the charge in order to arrive at assessable site value, but that where the annual charge is a ground rent for 999 years or for 10,000 years no such deduction is allowed, with the result that Undeveloped Land Duty is charged against owners upon a wholly fictitious valuation; and can he say whether such claims will be enforced?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I am aware of the distinction which is drawn between a perpetual rent-charge and a ground rent, and I am considering whether any amendment of the law is desirable. In the meantime, Undeveloped Land Duty is being assessed and collected in accordance with the existing provisions of the law.

    Finance Act, 1910 (Dwelling-House Inspection).
    Mr. MORTONasked whether the Inland Revenue Commissioners can send representatives to inspect private dwelling-houses under the Finance Act, 1910, the forms having been duly filled up and returned; and, if so, whether at least a day or two's notice should be given to the householder of the proposed inspection
    610
    and, for the protection of the householder, some authority produced?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative; as regards the second part, every valuer is instructed to consult the convenience of householders in making his inspections, and unless he had given adequate notice he would not be justified in insisting upon his right to inspect if he were informed on visiting the premises that the time was inopportune. Valuers are also instructed to produce their authority on the demand of any person entitled to require its production. I may remind my hon. Friend that the power of entry to inspect private dwelling-houses in connection with revenue assessments is not an innovation introduced by the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910. It has long existed for the purpose of assessments to Income Tax Schedule A, Inhabited House Duty and the Death Duties, and also in certain cases in connection with Poor Law valuations.
    Mr. MORTON: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that improper uses are made of these inspections by bad characters for felonious purposes, and ought not female householders to be protected so far as possible?
    Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I told my hon. Friend that all they have to do is to demand production of the proper authority, and they can refuse admission to anyone who has not a proper authority, signed and sealed, by whoever is in command of the district.

    Census of Production.
    Mr. C. BATHURSTasked the President of the Board of Agriculture (1) when the Census of Production, so far as it affects agricultural produce and with special reference to the value of such produce, which was directed to be made in 1907, and in respect of which forms were circulated and filled up more than three years ago, will be issued by the Board; and (2) why in view of the fact that nine preliminary tables relating to mines, quarries, and factories have already been published by the Board of Trade in connection with the Census of Production inaugurated in 1907, no such tables relating to agricultural produce have yet been forthcoming?
    The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of AGRICULTURE (Mr. Runciman): The Report under the Census of Production Act relating to agricultural produce is in

    611

    the Press, and will be issued very shortly. I regret the delay, but, with the limited staff at the disposal of the Board, it has been impossible to complete the examination of the Returns and the preparation of the Report at an earlier date.

    Development Commissioners.
    Mr. STANIERasked the President of the Board of Agriculture if he can give the names of the twelve selected institutions which will receive Grants for the investigation of local agricultural problems from the Development Commissioners?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: I am not sure whether the hon. Member refers to the provision to be made for research work or for the supply of technical advice to farmers. In regard to both matters negotiations are proceeding, and I am not yet in a position to state the result. I hope to do so at an early date.
    Mr. C. BATHURSTasked whether any and, if any, what steps have been or are being taken by the Board, in conjunction with the Development Commissioners, to establish a State-controlled cattle-testing station, where British pedigree cattle prior to exportation may be subjected to reliable tests to ascertain their immunity from tuberculosis and other contagious diseases?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: The Board are in communication with the Development Commission on this subject, and they are making inquiries as to the extent to which our export trade with the Colonies and foreign countries would be assisted by the establishment of a testing and quarantine station. No decision, however, has yet been arrived at.
    Mr. C. BATHURST: Is it not a fact that the desirability of this station has already been established by the Report of the Departmental Commission presided over by Lord Strachey?
    Mr. RUNCIMAN: No, I do not think it has been fully established, but we are going into the matter. It is not being lost sight of.

    Legacy Duty (W. Jackson, deceased).
    Mr. DENMANasked the Secretary to the Treasury whether his attention has been called to the demand for Legacy Duty which became payable in 1886, under the will of William Jackson, deceased,
    612
    and which is now demanded from a beneficiary under the will of W. Jackson's surviving trustee, also deceased; whether it is proposed now to insist on this payment, which was due a quarter of a century ago from wholly different persons; and whether his attention has been called to Section 13 of the Finance Act, 1907?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: In the case referred to by the hon. Member the duty should have been paid by the trustee when it fell due, and, not having been so paid, is a debt due from his estate, which is ample to provide it without hardship to the beneficiary. Under Section 13 of the Finance Act, 1907, the interest has been remitted, but in the circumstances of the case it is considered that there is no sufficient ground for further relief.

    Royal Engineers (Sorting Clerks and Telegraphists).
    Mr. MACKINDERasked the Secretary to the Treasury whether established sorting clerks and telegraphists who enlisted in the Royal Engineers under the conditions published in the Post Office Circulars No. 798, 1890, have to forfeit their pension rights for the period they served with the colours; whether he can state the grounds on which Mr. R. L. Kennedy, late established sorting clerk and telegraphist at Glasgow, who has been medically disqualified after having fourteen years' established service, five of these having been passed in the Royal Engineers, was granted a bonus instead of a pension; and whether any steps are being taken with a view to the periods served in the way indicated being included in the calculation of service rendered to the State for pension purposes?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: In the existing state of the law service with the colours cannot be counted for the purpose of civil superannuation. Mr. Kennedy's civil service did not amount to ten years, and he was accordingly granted a gratuity under Section 6 of the Superannuation Act, 1859. The answer to the last part of the question is in the negative.

    Supplementary Estimates.
    Captain TRYONasked what departments will present Supplementary Estimates before the close of the financial year?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: The Supplementary Estimates will be circulated in the course of the present week.

    Old Age Pensions.
    Mr. FELLasked what, according to the latest Returns available, are the numbers of persons in receipt of old age pensions in England, Scotland, and Ireland, respectively; and what are the sums payable in respect of each country for these pensions?
    Mr. MASTERMAN: The following figures show (a) the number of pensions payable on the last Friday in December, 1911, and (b) the sums which represent approximately a full year's payment in respect of these pensions. No later figures are yet available:—

    (a)

    (b)

    Numbers.

    £

    England and Wales

    …

    638,937

    8,096,300

    Scotland

    …

    94,243

    1,204,200

    Ireland

    …

    202,810

    2,588,600

    935,990

    11,889,100

    Land Value Duties.
    Mr. BRIDGEMANasked what are the several amounts in each year, and under each head of the Land Values Duties, which go to make the total of £901,000 stated to have been collected up to 14th February, 1912.
    Mr. MASTERMAN: As I stated in my reply yesterday to the hon. and gallant Member for the Hallam Division of Sheffield, I am unable to anticipate the financial statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

    Surgical Appointments (Irish and Scottish Surgeons).
    Mr. GINNELLasked the President of the Local Government Board whether he is aware of the exclusion of Irish and Scottish surgeons from some surgical appointments in England on the ground of an alleged inferiority of their degrees; if there is real professional inferiority, whether he will say in what it consists; and, if the allegation is unfounded, whether the Board will withhold its sanction of surgical appointments made subject to the exclusion complained of within the jurisdiction of the Board?
    The PRESIDENT of the LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (Mr. Burns): I am not sure to what appointments the hon. Member refers. Perhaps he will be good enough to communicate with me on the subject.
    Mr. LYNCH: Does the right hon. Gentleman not think that, in view of the great disparity of qualifications in the medical service, the time has come to institute, at least for State appointments, a uniform examination?
    Mr. BURNS: In my Department we take no notice of the religion of any of the applicants. On their merits only are they appointed.

    Home Rule Bill.
    Mr. GODFREY LOCKER - LAMPSONasked the Prime Minister whether the pledge of the First Lord of the Admiralty at Belfast that under Home Rule old age pensions would continue to be paid to Irish pensioners was authorised by the Cabinet; and, if so, whether the Government intend to meet any default by a Home Rule Government in respect of the payment of such pensions out of the Irish Customs receipts?
    The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith): The statement of the First Lord represents the intention of the Government in regard to the point referred to. It is not possible for me at this stage to make any statement in reference to the latter part of the question.
    Mr. G. LOCKER-LAMPSONasked the Prime Minister whether he will invite the views of the various local authorities in Ireland before the question of the reservation or delegation of the Irish Customs is finally decided by the Government?
    The PRIME MINISTER: No, Sir.

    Naval Prize Bill.
    Mr. W. PEELasked the Prime Minister if he proposes to reintroduce the Naval Prize Bill during the course of this Session?
    The PRIME MINISTER: Yes, but I cannot say at what time.

    Censorship of Plays.
    Mr. R. HARCOURTasked whether, in view of the criticism directed against the Lord Chamberlain for forbidding the performance of certain plays, the Government will propose the repeal of the Act of Parliament, now seventy years old, under which these duties are imposed on him and introduce alternative legislation, as recommended by the Joint Select Committee appointed on the Motion of the Government and presided over by the Postmaster-General?
    The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. McKenna): The Prime Minister has asked me to answer this question. I see no prospect of introducing legislation on this subject this Session.
    Mr. R. HARCOURT: Has the right hon. Gentleman's attention been directed to the reception last night of a comedy by His Majesty's Examiner of Plays?
    Mr. SPEAKER: It is not the duty of the Home Secretary to attend all first nights.

    Royal Commission on Civil Service.
    Sir HILDRED CARLILEasked the Prime Minister if he will say when he proposes to appoint the Royal Commission on the Civil Service?
    The PRIME MINISTER: The Commission is in course of being constituted, and I hope that the names will be soon announced.

    Committee on Irish Finance.
    Mr. GODFREY LOCKER-LAMPSONasked whether the members of the Committee on Irish Finance were selected on account of their general financial ability or their special knowledge of Irish conditions; and whether any member of the Financial Relations Commission, which reported in 1896, was invited to sit upon it?
    The PRIME MINISTER: All the members of the Committee were men of financial authority, and some of them had special Irish acknowledge. It would be contrary to practice to say who were and who were not invited to sit on the Committee.
    Mr. G. LOCKER-LAMPSON: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether Mr. Sexton was invited or not?
    The PRIME MINISTER: I have said it would be contrary to practice to say who were or who were not.
    Mr. GINNELL: Can the right hon. Gentleman inform the House which of the Commissioners has this special Irish knowledge?
    The PRIME MINISTER: That is a matter of opinion.
    Mr. WATT: Has a Committee been appointed to inquire into Scottish affairs?

    County Council Officials (Expenses).
    Mr. STANIERasked the President of the Local Government Board whether he
    616
    proposes to bring in a Bill this Session to make it legal for county council officials to be paid their expenses when they are sent to attend conferences?
    Mr. BURNS: I cannot promise to introduce legislation on this subject at the present time.
    Mr. STANIER: Has the right hon. Gentleman's attention been called to the fact that grave injustice is being done?
    Mr. BURNS: No, since the Debate which took place early last year, I do not think I have received any communication upon the matter.

    Emigration (New Zealand).
    Sir CLEMENT KINLOCH - COOKEasked the President of the Local Government Board whether he is aware of the recent experiment made by the New Zealand Government in placing town lads from the Motherland on Colonial farms; and whether he is prepared to assist in the extension of this work by a Grant-in-Aid from public funds?
    Mr. BURNS: My attention has been drawn to the experiment referred to. The hon. Member is no doubt aware of the powers of local authorities to assist emigration at the cost of the rates. I am not in a position to assist the work in question by a Grant out of public funds.
    Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Does the right hon. Gentleman know the views of most Members of the House in regard to boy labour?
    Mr. BURNS: Yes, I do, and they were dealt with by myself at the Imperial Conference and by Colonial Ministers. If my hon. Friend would like further information upon it I would refer him to a very sensible letter in a good newspaper, namely, the "Birmingham Daily Post," by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bordesley (Mr. Jesse Collings).

    Poor Law Guardians (Committee Meetings).
    Mr. JOHN WARDasked the President of the Local Government Board whether any order of his Department prevents the attendance of members of boards of guardians at committee meetings, even though the member attending takes no part in the proceedings of the committee nor even wishes to do so.
    Mr. BURNS: There is no order of the Local Government Board which prevents the attendance of members of boards of guardians at committee meetings; but boards of guardians are entitled to make regulations with respect to the management and transaction of their business.
    Mr. J. WARDasked the President of the Local Government Board whether his attention has been called to the prevalence in connection with boards of guardians of what are known as chairman's committees, usually composed of the chairman and officials, who decide what subjects shall come before the full board; and whether, in view of the effect of this practice on the public interest and proper administration, he proposes to take any action in the matter?
    Mr. BURNS: My attention has not been specially called to the procedure referred to.

    Trackless Tramways.
    Mr. PIRIEasked the President of the Board of Trade if the attention of the Government has been drawn to the growing necessities, especially in country districts, for an increase of facilities for the promotion of trackless tramways; if he can state the number of Bills and Provisional Orders, respectively, that have had to be promoted through the House of Commons for this purpose, and what is the total cost of such promotion; and if, in view of the fact that such tramways require no more erection than does the establishment of telegraph or telephone lines along the road which connection the telephone authorities were permitted to put up without having to come to this House, the Government would consider the desirability of leaving this matter within the hands of the local authorities by authorising direct communication with the Board of Trade in order to obtain the necessary sanction?
    Mr. BUXTON: During the last three Sessions twenty-four Bills or Orders were promoted for the purpose of authorising the running of cars on the trackless trolley system, and twelve Bills or Orders for the like purpose are being promoted this Session. Of the twenty-four schemes eight only have been sanctioned by Parliament. I have no information as to the total cost of promotion which has been incurred. The question of facilitating trackless trolley schemes has been under the consideration of the Board of Trade, and I hope to be able to introduce legislation on the subject.

    Railway Rates (Ireland).
    Mr. O'DOWDasked the President of the Board of Trade whether, whilst small traders in Ireland are charged prohibitive rates for the conveyance of their goods by Irish railway companies, manufacturers and wholesale merchants enjoy the privilege of specially reduced railway terms, which enable them to handicap the smaller business men; and, if so, can he state what steps, if any, will be taken to bring about an equalisation of rates?
    Mr. BUXTON: It is a recognised practice to charge a lower rate for large and frequent consignments of traffic than for small lots, but if the hon. Member will furnish me with particulars of any cases in which he thinks that the small trader in Ireland is unfairly handicapped, I shall be glad to look into the matter.

    Loss of Steamship "Dunsley."
    Mr. MARTINasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will state what steps, if any, he intends to take with regard to the steamship "Dunsley," lost at sea and over-insured to the extent of over £10,000; what other similar cases have been reported to the Board of Trade during the past two years; whether he has any official information showing that it is the common practice to over-insure vessels going to sea; and whether the Government intend to introduce legislation to make over-insurance of vessels criminal, in order to protect the lives of seamen?
    Mr. BUXTON: The report of the inquiry into the loss of the "Dunsley" is receiving the careful consideration of the Board of Trade, but, as application has been made for a re-hearing of the case, I cannot say at present what action may ultimately be taken. The question of over-insurance has been raised during the past two years in connection with inquiries into the loss of the following vessels: "Cadoxton," "Kingswell," "Selworthy," "British Standard," "Rowa," "George," "Ouse," "Everest," "Hasland," and "Cardiff Hall." I have no official information showing that it is the common practice to over-insure vessels going to sea. The whole subject, which is one of great intricacy and difficulty, is being carefully watched by the Board of Trade, and they have recently been in communication with representative underwriters with regard to it. I do not at present propose to introduce legislation on the subject.

    Post Office Savings Bank.
    Mr. CARR-GOMMasked the Postmaster-General whether he is in a position to state what were the total amounts of deposits and withdrawals in the Post Office Savings Bank in 1911; and whether he will show how these compare with the returns of previous years?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: The deposits were £50,144,900, and the withdrawals £46,616,300. Deposits exceed withdrawals by £3,528,600, and adding to this sum the interest which has accrued during the year (£4,095,000), the total increase in the amount standing to the credit of depositors is £7,623,600. I am glad to say that this is a greater increase than in respect of any year since 1897.
    Mr. CARR-GOMM: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he can issue a statement showing the growth of these figures during the past six years under Liberal Free Trade and during the previous six years?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: A table will be found in the appendix to the Postmaster-General's Report to be issued in the course of a few months.
    Captain CRAIG: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a great deal of the increase in Ireland occurred during the Unionist administration?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: We will look forward to a still greater increase in the future under a different state of things.
    Captain CRAIG: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that that will be a very far future?

    Polmont, Stirlingshire (Post Office).
    Dr. CHAPPLEasked the Postmaster-General whether he can state the amount of money estimated to be saved to the Post Office annually by the recent changes at Polmont, in Stirlingshire; and whether, in effecting this saving, the inconvenience imposed upon residents by the change was considered?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: I am having inquiry made upon the subject and will communicate the result to the hon. Member.

    Orslow (Salop), Postal Service.
    Mr. LLOYDasked the Postmaster-General whether he will make inquiries
    620
    into the insufficiency of the postal service at the village of Orslow, near Newport, Salop; and whether he can arrange for the convenience of its inhabitants that an earlier delivery of letters can be made than that at present existing?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: I am having inquiry made and I will communicate the result to the hon. Member.

    Telephone Service (Contributions in Lieu of Rates).
    Mr. ROBERT HARCOURTasked the Postmaster-General whether, in view of the fact that the telephone service is likely to increase in the future, he is, in fact, penalising the local authorities by adhering to the valuations as they stood on 30th June last for the purpose of paying contributions in lieu of rates?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: I cannot admit that the local authorities will be penalised under this arrangement. The valuations in force in Scotland on 30th June last are the latest made, and the authorities will suffer no loss in respect of any lines taken over from the company. Contributions in lieu of rates have not been and are not paid on any lines erected by the Post Office, whether such lines are in connection with the extensions either of the telegraph or of the telephone system.
    Mr. R. HARCOURT: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether they would not in fact be in a worse position in future in the event of the service increasing?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: They would be compared with the state of things that would have existed if the National Telephone Company had continued in existence, but if rates are to be paid on lines erected by the Post Office in future, it would be difficult to differentiate a claim for rates on lines erected by the Post Office in the past. No such claim could be entertained.
    Mr. PRETYMAN: Does that apply to buildings and premises as well as telephone lines?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: No, Sir, a contribution will be paid in lieu of rates on buildings.
    Mr. PIRIE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the opinion he has just expressed is in direct contradiction of the unanimous view of a meeting of municipal authorities assembled in Glasgow?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: I know there is a divergence of views between the rating authorities and the Treasury on the subject, but that is not surprising.
    Mr. PIRIE: Is it not likely that the Scottish local authorities should know more about this than an alien Postmaster-General?

    Post Office Money Order Department.
    Mr. LANSBURYasked the Postmaster-General if he is aware that dissatisfaction exists in the Post Office money order department at Holloway in consequence of the official statement with reference to the duties being performed by the new grade of assistant women clerks; that it is said that this official statement conveys erroneous information to the public; and whether, in order that the facts may be beyond dispute, he will inform the House what is the actual work both women clerks, girl clerks, and the new grade of assistant women clerks are called upon to perform?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: I am aware that the official description of a certain class of duties as "comparing amounts shown in two places to see that one entry corresponds with the other" is considered by the Women Clerks' Association to be misleading. The description of the simple duties in question is not exhaustive, but I cannot agree that it conveys erroneous information. A complete description of these and other duties of the classes mentioned by the hon. Member obviously cannot be given in answer to a question, but I shall be glad to furnish it to the Select Committee of this House which will shortly be appointed to consider the conditions of employment in the Post Office and before which, no doubt, this matter will be brought.
    Mr. LANSBURY: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he will circulate a memorandum on the subject to Members of the House? Is he aware that a large number of Members have received certain statements with reference to this matter giving a most definite contradiction to the statement which the right hon. Gentleman has just made? Would it not be made clear if he would circulate a memorandum?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: It would not be likely to remove controversy to circulate a memorandum containing statements which are themselves controverted. This is a matter more for the Select Committee which will shortly be appointed
    622
    than for the whole body of the House. It is exceedingly technical and detailed.
    Mr. LANSBURY: May I ask if the right hon. Gentleman will stop adding to the number of women clerks until the Select Committee has considered the whole matter?
    Mr. HERBERT SAMUEL: Vacancies will be filled up when they occur, but I am not contemplating a large addition to the staff until this matter has been reported upon by the Select Committee.

    Conviction of Mr. Ball.
    Mr. WALTER M'LARENasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will explain why Mrs. Ball was not informed of her husband's condition till 10th February, sixteen days after the first symptoms of mental derangement were noticeable; why she did not receive the letter that her husband was to be certified as a pauper lunatic till 12th February, the day on which his examination was to take place; why he was removed to a pauper lunatic asylum before she had time to reach the prison; and whether he will take steps to warn prison authorities to prevent the repetition of such treatment where the family of a prisoner can easily be communicated with?
    Mr. McKENNA: The circumstances attending the removal of this prisoner from prison to an asylum were fully explained in the reply I made to a question in this House on the Monday. It is not always possible, when the first symptoms of mental disturbance appear, for the medical officer to decide at once that a patient is insane and in need of asylum treatment, and in this case the medical officer for some time was in doubt as to whether there were any definite symptoms of insanity. As soon as this is clear, it is in most cases desirable that a patient should be removed to an asylum with as little delay as possible, and this course was pursued in the present case. I have no reason to think that the prison authorities in the discharge of their duty are in any way wanting in consideration for the feelings of the lunatic's relations. I have at present no ground for supposing that any general instructions are required in this matter, but I will consider the question further.
    Lord ROBERT CECIL: Can the right hon. Gentleman now reply to the question I put to him on Monday as to what was the cause of the prisoner becoming insane?
    Mr. McKENNA: No, Sir, I am afraid I cannot. The medical report does not imply that he became insane owing to treatment in prison. It suggests, rather, that his conduct before getting into prison was somewhat strange.
    Lord R. CECIL: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he will cause inquiry to be made through the medical adviser of his Department as to whether the man's treatment in prison had anything to do with his insanity?
    Mr. McKENNA: The medical officers have already reported that, in their opinion, the treatment in prison had nothing to do with the man becoming insane, but as the Noble Lord requests me I will cause further inquiry to be made.
    Mr. LYNCH: Is there any other instance known of a man received sane in prison and in two months being driven insane by kind and considerate treatment?
    Mr. McKENNA: It was not at all due to ill-treatment. Prisoners, like a great many other people, sometimes become insane at certain periods of their lives.

    Hard Labour Sentences.
    Mr. LANSBURYasked the Home Secretary if he has now been able to consider and determine on the advisability of so amending the prison rules as to enable prisoners sentenced to hard labour for political offences to be placed in the second division, or to, at least, receive the same kind of prison treatment as that granted by his predecessor to prisoners convicted of offences in connection with the suffrage agitation?
    Mr. McKENNA: The Court in every case where it passes sentence of imprisonment has discretion, if it thinks fit, to put the prisoner in the second division; and I have no power to control or regulate this discretion, nor have I any power to extend the rule made by my predecessor, to which the hon. Member alludes, so as to make it include prisoners sentenced to hard labour, because to do so would be to nullify altogether the sentence of hard labour. That could only be done by legislation. The limit of my power is to consider in any special case after sentence whether it is one in which the hard labour might properly be remitted. In any case in which this discretion was exercised the prisoner might then come under the terms of the rule made by my predecessor.
    Lord ROBERT CECIL: Is there anything in the rule made by the predecessor of the right hon. Gentleman which excludes prisoners sentenced to hard labour?
    Mr. McKENNA: The rule laid down by my predecessor applies only to prisoners who are sentenced in the second or third division, and there are certain conditions in that rule which would be inconsistent with a sentence of hard labour.
    Lord ROBERT CECIL: What are the conditions which are inconsistent with hard labour?
    Mr. McKENNA: I have not got them in mind, but I will refer the Noble Lord to the rules, and send him a copy.
    Mr. LANSBURY: Does the right hon. Gentleman consider it right for a magistrate to sentence a number of women, not to hard labour and a man to hard labour for identically the same offence?
    Mr. McKENNA: My hon. Friend will understand that I could not express any opinion on a case before sentence. After sentence if it is brought to my notice I shall consider it, but I should have to wait until the case was brought to my notice either by the prisoner or his friends on his behalf.

    Sureties.
    Mr. WEDGWOODasked the Home Secretary whether he will grant the Return standing in the name of the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme? [Statute 34 Edward 3, c. 1,—Address for Return showing the number of occasions during the last thirty years that the Act of 34 Edward 3 has been invoked by the magistracy to demand security from persons against whom no charge was laid, and the number of occasions on which persons have been committed to prison for default of finding such security.—[Mr. Wedgwood.]
    Mr. McKENNA: Up to 1910 the annual judicial statistics have not distinguished between orders to find sureties of the peace made by Courts of Summary Jurisdiction on complaint when no offence has been charged and those made when an offence having been charged the Court, instead of convicting, made an order for sureties. But in 1910 it appears there were 6,847 orders of the first description, of which 313 were enforced by imprisonment and 8,116 of the second description, of which 159 were enforced by imprisonment. I should add that I am advised that the authority of the magistrates to require sureties of the peace, though mentioned and recognised

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    in the Statute of Edward III., depends on the general powers vested in them by virtue of the Commission.
    Mr. WEDGWOOD: Is it not a fact that these people are not imprisoned under the Act of Edward III., but under some other Act?
    Mr. McKENNA: Magistrates have the power in the general powers of their Commission, but these general powers are recognised and referred to in the statute. They may, therefore, require sureties both under their general powers or under the statute.
    Mr. WEDGWOOD: Does not the right hon. Gentleman know that it is the statute which gives them their powers as justices of the peace?
    Mr. McKENNA: No. The statute only recognises powers which already exist.

NATIONAL COAL STRIKE.
Mr. BONAR LAW: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether it is possible for him to make any statement in regard to the position in the coal trade?
The PRIME MINISTER: I yesterday addressed a letter on behalf of His Majesty's Government to the representatives of both sides, inviting them to meet me in conference to-morrow at the Foreign Office to discuss the matter. I am glad to say that affirmative responses have been received from both bodies. Beyond that I am not able to make any statement.

LORDS LIEUTENANT AT ELECTIONS.
Mr. SWIFT MacNEILL: May I, Sir, direct your attention to a matter of practice and procedure and a manifest error in our Proceedings? On the first day of this Session, among the ordinary Sessional Orders, there was the Order in reference to Lords Lieutenant at elections. That Order was passed sub silentio without the knowledge of the House. On the first day of last Session I moved the recision of that Order and carried it by a majority of fifty or sixty, with the support of the Prime Minister. That Order, through some fault or error of memory, appears in the Sessional Orders. It was placed there by mere inadvertence. I would suggest to the Government, if they thought it worth while, that the Order should be rescinded, or, if that is not
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thought worth while, that we should have an undertaking from you that this Order which has been repealed should not appear again in the Standing Orders of the next Session, it having been decided at the beginning of last Session, after a regular Parliamentary Debate on the 6th February last year, it should not reappear. I ask whether a Motion passed in the House of Commons in one Session is not rescinded through inadvertence in the next Session? I ask your advice, Sir, whether it would not be in order for the Government as a matter of course, simply to rescind that Order; or, otherwise, can we have an expression of opinion from you, Sir, that it should not appear in the first day of next Session?
Mr. SPEAKER: The order was not passed sub silentio, because I read out the terms of it to the House. I take some responsibility upon myself for the inadvertence which occurred, and I think, if I had directed my attention a little more closely to it, I would have remembered that last Session that particular Order was struck out. But for the time being that slipped my memory, and, finding it on the Agenda Paper, I put it as a matter of course. I think probably the most convenient course would be not again to raise the question of this Order, but to let it stand over until next Session. Of course, if anything should arise under it, the House if it so desired need not proceed under the Order.

FINANCE ACT, 1911.
Mr. WEDGWOOD: I wish to ask you, Mr. Speaker, a question of which I have given private notice, namely, whether you can inform the House what are the reasons which led you to decide that the Finance Bill of last year was not a Money Bill?
Mr. SPEAKER: I do not know whether it would be a very convenient practice if I were to be called upon to go into all the reasons for my decisions. Let me say generally that the reason which guided me was because the Bill did not comply with Sub-section (2) of Clause (1), laying down the conditions which are necessary to make the Bill into a Money Bill.
Mr. WEDGWOOD: Arising out of that answer, Sir, may I ask whether you have left for the guidance of your successor any memoranda or minutes showing the special ground on which your decision was based?
Mr. SPEAKER: I am bound by the Statute, and I have to exercise the best of my judgment in the case. I do not think I ought to attempt to bind my successor in any way.

NOTICES OF MOTION.

  LOCAL RATING.
  To call attention to the inequity of the present rating system, and to move a Resolution.—[Mr. Wedgwood.]
  To call attention to the inequity of local rating, and to move a Resolution.—[Sir W. Byles.]

  To call attention to the anomalies arising under the Income Tax Act, and to move a Resolution.—[Mr. Fell.]
BILLS PRESENTED.
The following Bills were presented:—
BILLS PRESENTED.
  DOGS' PROTECTION BILL.
  "To prohibit experiments upon Dogs." Presented by Sir FREDERICK BANBURY; supported by Mr. George Greenwood and Mr. Field; to be read a second time upon Friday, 19th April, and to be printed. [Bill 34.]
  MEAT MARKING (IRELAND) BILL.
  "To provide for the Marking of Imported Meat in Ireland." Presented by Mr. FIELD; supported by Mr. Condon, Mr. Patrick O'Brien, Captain Donelan, Mr. Crumley, Mr. John O'Connor, Mr. Kilbride, and Mr. Devlin; to be read a second time upon Tuesday, 5th March, and to be printed. [Bill 35.]
  PAYMENT OF JURORS BILL.
  "To provide for the Expenses of Jurors attending assizes and quarter sessions." Presented by Mr. HAY MORGAN; supported by Mr. Agar-Robartes, Mr. Abel Thomas, Mr. Arthur Henderson, Mr. Salter, and Mr. Hamar Greenwood; to be read a second time upon Monday, 25th March, and to be printed. [Bill 36.]
  PLACES OF WORSHIP (SITES) BILL.
  "To give further facilities for the acquisition of Sites for Places of Worship." Presented by Mr. HAY MORGAN; supported by Sir Joseph Compton-Rickett, Sir Thomas Whittaker, Sir Albert Spicer, Sir George White, and Mr. Silvester Horne; to be read a second time upon Monday, 25th March, and to be printed. [Bill 37.]
  UNEMPLOYMENT BILL.
  "To establish a Minister of Labour; to make provision for the prevention and treatment of Unemployment; and for other purposes connected therewith." Presented by Mr. ROBERT HARCOURT; supported by Mr. Chiozza Money; to be read a second time upon Wednesday next, and to be printed. [Bill 38.]
HIS MAJESTY'S GRACIOUS SPEECH.

  DEBATE ON THE ADDRESS.— [Sixth Day.]
  Motion made, and Question proposed [14th February], "That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, as followeth:—
  Most Gracious Sovereign,
  We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the Gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament."—[Sir Harry Verney.]
  Question again proposed.
  Debate resumed.

  PERSIA. (ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT.)
  Mr. PONSONBY: I beg to move as an Amendment to the Address, to add at the end the words:—
  "But we humbly represent to Your Majesty that the failure of Your Majesty's Government to take effective steps to preserve the integrity and independence of Persia in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 constitutes a grave menace to Your Indian Empire and to the best interests of this Country."
  The condition of affairs in Persia is causing a good deal of apprehension in different parts of the country; it is also referred to in the Speech from the Throne, as occupying the serious attention of His Majesty's Government. For this reason I have placed on the Paper the Amendment which stands in my name, as I thought that it would afford an early and convenient opportunity to bring the question under the consideration of the House. It will also afford an opportunity to the Foreign Secretary to make a statement early in the Session. May I, before I come to my criticism, respectfully tender my warm congratulations to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign

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  Affairs upon the high distinction which has been conferred upon him. I have been a critic of his policy in the past, and I am a critic of certain points of his policy still; but that in no way interferes with my great appreciation, not only of his rare personal qualities, but also of his great sincerity and the high-minded and disinterested motives which have always guided him in public life. Before I come to the actual terms of my Amendment I want to say a general word with regard to the attitude I have taken up in this matter, and I think I may without presumption speak for certain of my hon. Friends on the back benches who have taken the same line. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary in a speech which he delivered in Northumberland on 20th January, dealing with his critics, made the following remarks:—
  "There is a certain section, I have no doubt, in the Liberal party, which thinks we do not interfere nearly enough, especially in certain parts of the world. The people who press upon me a different policy from that which is now being pursued, are, it seems to me, people who are really advocating as a Foreign policy the maximum of interference in the affairs of the world at large and the minimum of friendship."
  4.0 P.M.
  The right hon. Gentleman referred to the enormous weight of work upon him, and said, because of it he was unable to read or listen to the greater part of the criticisms upon his policy. I think it would have been fairer if he had not attributed to us a line of argument which I, and I certainly think my hon. Friends, have never adopted. On the contrary, our plea throughout has been non-interference. All we ask for is that Persia should be allowed to work out her salvation for herself without the interference of other Powers. That has been the point we have urged, not only on this question but on other foreign questions that have come before the House. We have strongly urged that we should not interfere in the internal affairs of another country. When we come to the Anglo-Russian Agreement, I have, in the terms of my Amendment, to complain of the failure of His Majesty's Government to take effective steps to preserve the integrity and independence of Persia. I want, first of all, to consider the various interpretations of the Anglo-Russian Convention, and I want them to examine whether that Convention has in fact been violated, and lastly to consider what the consequences of violation are likely to lead to. May I remind the House that before the Anglo-Russian Agreement was concluded in 1907 there were various engagments which we had made with Russia all
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  through the nineteenth century in which we had agreed to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, in 1834, 1839, 1873, 1888, and there are various expressions, used, such as "to maintain," "respect," and "promote" the independence and integrity of Persia. This further instrument, the Anglo-Russian Convention confirms, this idea still further, but, it having been already made clear that that was our intention, the Persian Government naturally supposed that this Convention that had been made with Russia threatened her independence, and really was a step towards partition. In order to allay the fears which the Persian Government naturally had in consequence of the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention, our Minister at Teheran in September, 1907, made a statement which was handed to the Foreign Minister giving a clear interpretation of the spirit of this Convention. This is an extremely important document; and really it is on this document that we found the greater part of our case. This document was quoted in speeches and in articles and in letters to the Press during the past twelvemonths, and yet on 14th December last, on the Debate which took place in the House, we were told that the Foreign Office had no knowledge of the existence of this document. On that occasion I promised the right hon. Gentleman that I would send him a copy of the document, a Persian copy, to show that we were basing our arguments on something that was authentic. I accordingly forwarded it, and I think now there is no longer the remotest doubt that this document is perfectly authentic, and the translation entirely correct. I want to quote to the House two passages in it:—
  "Sir Edward Grey informs me that he has explained to the Mushíru'l-Mulk that he and M. Isvolsky are completely in accord on two fundamental points. Firstly, neither of the two Powers will interfere in the affairs of Persia unless injury is inflicted on the persons or property of their subjects. Secondly, negotiations arising out of the Ango-Russian Agreement must not violate the integrity and independence of Persia."
  But it was the concluding passage that was really the most significant. The document went on to say:—
  "From the above statements, you will see how baseless and unfounded are those rumours which have lately prevailed in Persia, concerning the political ambitions of England and Russia in this country. The object of the two Powers in making this agreement is not in any way to attack, but rather to assure for ever the independence of Persia. Not only do they not wish to have at hand any excuse for intervention, but their object in these friendly negotiations was not to allow one another to intervene on the pretext of safeguarding their interests. The two Powers hope that in the future Persia will be for ever delivered from the fear of

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  foreign intervention, and will thus be perfectly free to manage her own affairs in her own way, whereby advantage will accrue both to herself and to the whole world."
  Nothing could have reassured the Persian Government more successfully, and nothing could be taken as a clearer interpretation of what our intentions were with regard to the integrity and independence of Persia. That is the first interpretation which I quote of the Anglo-Russian Convention. A few months afterwards, in a Debate in this House in 1908, the late Lord Percy, who was a very close and shrewd student of foreign affairs, speaking from the Front Opposition Bench, expressed his apprehensions as to this Convention. He said he thought it should be made clear as to the character and limits which the two Powers were to exercise in their respective spheres. Practically he foresaw very much what has happened. The Foreign Secretary, in answer to that point of his, replied:—
  "It never entered my head for a moment that that agreement, which confirms the integrity of Persia, could be turned into partition without consultation between the two Powers."
  At that time the right hon. Gentleman frankly acknowledged that the Anglo-Russian Convention confirmed the integrity and independence of Persia. Before I come to the other interpretations let me just pass to the events which succeeded. There was a revolution in Persia. Persia, like all progressive nations, was making an attempt to throw off the yoke of tyranny and oppression and the misgovernment and autocracy, and was going through the superhuman task of establishing the new form of constitutional government. We Western nations have been through revolutions of that kind, and the Oriental nations are now going through this process. At a moment of that sort there must be grave disorder and bloodshed and very hot feeling between the partisans of the two sides, the old regime and the new regime. Nations that are friendly to the country at that stage will show their friendship best by standing aside and not interfering with the internal affairs of that country. It was at that time that Russia first began to show its activity. After events had become very serious, but constitutional government had by a superhuman effort been established, and Persia was still struggling, and the situation appeared to some people rather hopeless, fresh hope was brought in the person of Mr. Shuster, who was chosen as Treasurer-General of
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  Persia. He was appointed, and he was sent there to rehabilitate the finance and the chaos which prevailed in the financial sphere, and which was responsible for absolute want of stable governmnet. Mr. Shuster went out and began his task, and, as we now know, if he had been given a fair chance there is not the slightest doubt that he would have succeeded in putting Persian finances in order. I have had the privilege of speaking to Mr. Shuster, and of hearing him speak. I expected, from all the accounts we had last year, to find a self-advertising, overbearing man, with impossible views and reckless in speech. On the contrary, I found myself listening to a man who made a most carefully balanced and moderate and temperate statement. He is evidently a fairminded man of high principle. His statement confirmed my very worst suspicion, not only with regard to the attitude of Russia towards Persia, but also with regard to the policy of humiliating doubt and acquiescence adopted by this country throughout. Mr. Shuster, in going out to Persia, acknowledged that he founded his interpretation of the Anglo-Russian Convention on the document which I have just quoted. He said, in his speech:—
  "I made the crass error of taking that Convention at its word; in fact, I could not take it in any other way, since there was little else to be taken. It said, amongst other things, that its object, which, so far as the Persian people are concerned, was the most important part, was to ensure for ever the integrity and independence of the Persian people, and it was principally my sincere belief in the good faith of those who signed and promulgated that document that finally decided me to go to Persia."
  Mr. Shuster was successful from the beginning, and when the Russians saw there was a chance of a strong Government in Persia they immediately made a set against him. I need not go over the events, which are quite familiar to those who have followed closely the state of affairs in Persia during the last six months. Sufficient to say that Mr. Shuster was hounded out of Persia by the Russians. The two charges finally made against him were that he appointed M. Lecaffre to a certain post, and that he had circulated in Persia a letter which he had written to the "Times" newspaper. All Mr. Shuster did was to transfer M. Lecaffre from one post to another. The charge of circulating the letter was untrue. On those flimsy pretexts Mr. Shuster was hounded out of Persia, and since then a successor has been appointed.—a M. Mornard. Here I would ask a specific question of the right hon. Gentleman. I should like to know, when he replies, whether he will tell us whether

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  M. Mornard's appointment is permanent, whether His Majesty's Government approve of M. Mornard, and whether His Majesty's Government have received from the Minister at Teheran any report as to the past reputation and competence of M. Mornard, and as to whether he is a suitable person for the post of Treasurer-General?
  Persia had now submitted to the Russian Government on the two occasions on which ultimatums had been issued, and therefore had grovelled in the dust before Russia. One would have thought, having humiliated herself to that extent, that Russia would have been satisfied. But what is the situation in Persia at this moment? Russian troops are occupying Northern Persia. It is very difficult to say how many there are; some estimate the number at 8,000, others at 14,000. I think the accurate figure is about 11,000. We do not know exactly how many have been withdrawn. I do not believe that any have been withdrawn from Persian territory. I notice that when the Prime Minister referred to this point on the opening day of the Session he hesitated very much to make any definite statement. He said:—
  "The situation at this moment is this, that some, I believe a not inconsiderable number, of the Russian troops have already been withdrawn from Kasvin, and we are given to understand that the withdrawal of the whole is not only in contemplation, but, barring accidents and misadventures, is in process of being carried out."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th February, 1912, col. 31.]
  We know exactly now the sort of accidents and misadventures which prevent the withdrawal of Russian troops from Persian territory. I do not believe that any have been withdrawn from Persian territory, though some may have been withdrawn from Kasvin. There are rumours that some have been withdrawn in one direction for use in another, where there is a prospect of the ex-Shah again showing some activity. The Foreign Secretary assured us that he would never tolerate the return of the ex-Shah to Persia, but we have no assurance from the Russian Government on that point. At any rate, the Russian Government have given no assurance to the Persian Government on the point. On the contrary, there is much ground for suspicion that the Russians still favour the return of the ex-Shah. Some of his prominent supporters have been appointed to high posts by the Russians, notably one of his notorious partisans, who has been made Commander-in-Chief of a part of the army. In addition to the occupation of Northern Persia, the Mejliss, which showed an extraordinary amount of
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  national spirit when it was confronted with the ultimatum which it refused to accept, has been swept away. Then we have the atrocious act in Tabriz of the hanging by Russians of one of the most prominent spiritual leaders in Persia, which was a grave offence against humanity as well as against justice. We have a strong censorship exercised over the Press; we have the national schools closed down; in fact, all attempts to stand up for freedom, constitutionalism, and patriotism, are being stamped out. This is what we call respecting the integrity and independence of Persia. The Foreign Secretary in one of his recent speeches said that the Russian Government did not intend to maintain a permanent occupation so long as there is tolerable order in that part of Persia, and it is sure that the Persian Government is friendly. It is really pushing diplomatic cynicism very far to suppose that the Persian Government can be friendly at this moment towards the Russian Government. The Russian troops enter Persia, create chaos and confusion, and then that is used as an excuse for their remaining there or for sending more troops into the country. With this state of affairs—an army of occupation, tyranny and oppression in all quarters, the shooting down of irregular troops, the hanging of leaders, and the other matters to which I have referred—I was very much surprised when I read these words in the speech of the Foreign Secretary at Manchester:—
  "That which we hoped to achieve by the Anglo-Russian Agreement has been achieved, and on both sides the Agreement has been absolutely kept."
  This then is the right hon. Gentleman's interpretation of the Anglo-Russian Convention. I can only say that I still adhere to the interpretation given by our Minister at Teheran. I do not think that the state of affairs which at present exists can be properly described in the language used by the right hon. Gentleman. Russian influence in Persia was damaged and put an end to for the moment by the Persians themselves in their revolution in 1909 when they got rid of the ex-Shah. We made no engagement to build up Russian influence, or to strengthen it in order that it might be, as it now is, far stronger than it was before. But that is what we are doing. I will now take the third interpretation of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, which certainly coincides more with the view of the right hon. Gentleman than the interpretation given by our Minister in 1907. This is the

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  popular Russian interpretation, and it is quoted from a well-known St. Petersburg newspaper, which is in close connection with the Court and the official world:—
  "Whatever may be the ultimate attitude of our diplomacy with regard to other questions, we have at any rate in Persia cast our die, and can no longer with-draw. There we have stepped forward as a Power which claims the extension of its political influence, and will not withdraw its troops until the whole of Northern Persia has become virtually its dependency. Whether Great Britain, or any other Power, likes the idea that the winding up of the Persian question has begun or not, we are bound to stand by the rights which we have acquired by the Convention of 1907."
  That is the Russian interpretation. I take my stand oh the first interpretation as being the just and right one, and the one that will appeal to any fair-minded British citizen. Taking the interpretation given by our Minister at Teheran, there can be no question that the Convention has been broken. In the matter of treaties there is no half way. Either a treaty is adhered to or it is broken. We cannot have the excuse brought forward that in all other respects the Anglo-Russian Convention has been adhered to, but that in this particular respect it has not. There is a clear-cut line. It is the definition of what integrity and independence mean. If you put before the fair-minded citizens of any country you like the present state of affairs in Persia, and ask whether that is respecting the independence and integrity of that country, I cannot believe there is a single soul living who would say that it is. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman will repudiate the document in which our Minister at Teheran interpreted the Anglo-Russian Convention; but unless he does, he will find it difficult to say that it has been carried out in the spirit. Meanwhile the Russian Government have acted perfectly consistently. Their attitude all along has been consistent, and entirely in accord with what their policy always has been, and always will be. When they entered into the Anglo-Russian Convention they were in very low water. The result of that Convention has been considerably to raise their prestige in the eyes of the world, to set them on their legs again, and at the same time to allow them to go on with their encroachments, disregarding any mild protests that we may have made. Thus, little by little, they are carrying out their policy of expansion. We are not only backing them up by remonstrating with Persia, but we are helping them to establish themselves as a first-class Power. Everything is being done by the Government to help
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  British capital to flow into Russia, for without money Russia would not be able to continue its activity.
  The right hon. Gentleman touched on the relations between this country and Russia. He said that they are perfectly good relations. There is no question about that. I have the greatest respect and admiration for the Russian people, and I believe that most of my countrymen have the same feeling. But when the right hon. Gentleman goes on to say that our good relations with Russia are assisted by these absurd visits, I fail to understand what he means. I think it is most disrespectful to the House of Commons to utilise this assembly as a pawn in the diplomatic game. The House of Commons ought not to be used in that way. Apparently the recent visit was got up in the recess in such a way as to keep outside any adverse opinion, and to bolster up once more the Russian Government which no more represents the Russian people—which, indeed, represents them less—than any Government in the world. It is not, I am sure, in that way that good feeling with Russia is going to be established. In yesterday's "Times" I saw that a Joint Note has been presented to the Persian Government. I do not know whether it is to be accompanied by any threat. I suppose it is. I suppose, if the Persian Government do not concede the four points in that Note they will be subjected to further pressure. At all events, all I can see in these four points means a further attack upon the integrity of Persia. Persia is asked to respect the Anglo-Russian Convention. If Sir Cecil Spring Rice's interpretation of that Convention is the correct one, there is no reason why they should not respect it; but if the interpretation of the right hon. Gentleman, or that given by the Russian people or the Russian Press is the right one, then I do not think that the Persian Government ought to respect it. Before I come to the loan, let me say that there appeared yesterday a clear demand for cutting down the present Persian army and establishing in its place an army under the control of Russia. That is, to my mind, a further attack on the independence of Persia. We are now told also of a loan that is to be offered to Persia. I consider that no loan should be accepted by Persia unless it is ratified by the Mejliss; that we ought to stand out for that, and for the reassembly of the Mejliss in order that they may ratify the loan which is offered to them.
  The case has so much material that it is very difficult to marshal the facts

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  effectively. I am painfully conscious of not putting the case really with its full force. I would submit to the right hon. Gentleman that this is not just a case of sentimental desire to see justice done. If it were, if we based our arguments upon sentiment, we would still have a very strong case. It is disagreeable, and it is rather worse than disagreeable, for men who have any far-reaching vision, and who realise what the general trend of events in the world is, to see an old civilisation that has given a great deal to humanity and to the world at large, being gradually crushed by two Powers who are bent upon expansion and aggression. We have very strong grounds on which we base our protest. Apart from sentiment—sentiment is only one thing—it is a question of our national honour. Our national honour is at stake. We gave a clear undertaking; we went to the pitch of interpreting at length and of explaining exactly the spirit upon which we entered upon that engagement, and now we are shifting our ground by denying the very document upon which we based our claims to respect the independence and integrity of Persia. Again, apart from honour, it is a question of expediency. It is a question of our commercial advantages in Persia. I hope some of my hon. Friends will put the commercial aspect of the case far more clearly than I possibly can do. There is no doubt that our trade in Persia is being very much damaged, and that the commercial world, who are affected, feel strongly on this point. Again, there is the very important point of strategy. Strategically we are undertaking a very foolish policy. Everyone knows that the most vulnerable point in the defences of our Indian Empire can be approached by an advance through Persia. We know also that our interests in the Persian Gulf are threatened. At the same time the massing of troops on the Turkish frontier which is going on—and nobody knows exactly how many troops there are on the Turkish frontier at Khuy—is a menace to Turkey, and may lead to further complications, in which we shall be very closely involved. There is the consideration of the peace of the world. I consider we are endangering the peace of the world by our policy. If it reaches the point of partition we shall have a long coterminous frontier with Russia, we shall have to ask for more money for armaments, and we shall be in a perpetual state of apprehension in that corner of the globe as to the intentions of further aggression on the part of Russia.
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  There is no question of fighting Russia. There is no question of hostility. Surely we can persuade Russia to adhere to an engagment without fighting. There is not the remotest desire on the part of Russia to fight us, not even on the part of the Russian Government. All that is required is a little stiffening on our part, some show of determination to see these engagements carried out. It is indeed difficult when one sees that sentiment, honour, justice, expediency, commerce, strategy, and the prestige of this country are all in one balance, to know what it is that the right hon. Gentleman puts in the other balance to outweigh them. I cannot understand. The country at present is puzzled. But I do not want to end on a pessimistic note. I think there may be hope, and I hope sincerely that the right hon. Gentleman, when he makes his statement, will give us grounds for it. I hope myself that the same influence which has operated towards raising our hopes for better relations with Germany can be taken advantage of in this connection. I believe our relations with Germany is at the bottom of this difficulty, as it is at the bottom of so many other difficulties The hope in that direction gives us hope in this. "Democracies," said the right hon. Gentleman in his speech the other day, "seek no quarrel; they desire to avoid quarrel." I was extremely glad to hear him express that view. On the other hand I think that that cannot be said of autocracies. Democracies, and this British democracy of ours more especially, stand for international justice, stand for respect of the rights of other nationalities. It has been the traditional Liberal policy to stand up against tyranny and misgovernment. May I conclude by making a plea that more of the fresh air and light of democratic opinion may be allowed to penetrate into the stuffy darknesses of diplomacy?
  Mr. MORRELL: Personally I am very sorry, in seconding this Amendment, that it has, by the conventions of this House, to be put in the form of an Amendment that means a want of confidence in the Government. I am sorry to appear in any way to attack the Government which I support, though I disagree from their policy in this particular. I am also sorry, because I am confident were it not that the Resolution is framed in this way—perhaps even in spite of the fact—that this Amendment, if taken to a division by my hon. Friend, would have a very considerable

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  amount of support on this side of the House. The Amendment, as I take it, is not based on any hostility to, or disagreement with, the Anglo-Russian Convention as such. We do not object to the Convention; we accept it as a fact. It is too late to go back upon it. I myself have never criticised it, and do not propose to do so now. What we object to is that the Convention, in our opinion, has not been fully and faithfully carried out. The right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in his speech the other day, said that his critics were apt to regard the Convention from the wrong point of view, from a point of view different from, and inconsistent with, that of those who made it. He said we have got out of focus; we looked at the matter in the wrong perspective.
  That criticism comes rather remarkably from the right hon. Gentleman. I will tell hon. Members why. The document, the only document, the only official explanation we have ever had, and the only interpretation of this Anglo-Russian Convention was, as my hon. Friend has shown, the document which., until a few days ago, was absolutely unknown to the right hon. Gentleman.
  The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir E. Grey): That is entirely wrong. I will deal with that document when I come to speak, but even taking the hon. Member's own view—which I do not admit—it is not the only document. The authorised interpretation is in a document issued by my instructions and set out in the Blue Book.
  Mr. MORRELL: I am very glad to hear my right hon. Friend say that the document I referred to is not unknown to him. I may say that on 14th December, when it was quoted in this House by, I think, my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, that the right hon. Gentleman got up and said, "My hon. Friend is quoting from a document which I have never seen."
  Sir E. GREY: Quite true.
  Mr. MORRELL: That is what I was attempting to say.
  Sir E. GREY: The hon. Gentleman said that the document which he had been quoting, and which I had not heard of before, and of which he has since sent me a copy, was the only official interpretation. I was pointing out that the official interpretation is actually in the Blue Book, and is not that document that he quoted.
  Mr. MORRELL: Now I understand it. At any rate—I think I am right in putting it now—until a few weeks ago this particular document was unknown to my right hon. Friend.
  Sir E. GREY: Yes.
  Mr. MORRELL: I would like to go into the history of this document which my right hon. Friend considers as unimportant. It is, at any rate, the principal document, and the principal interpretation, the longest official document, which we have interpreting the Anglo-Russian Convention, and I should have said, the most important.
  Mr. DILLONmade an inaudible observation.
  Mr. MORRELL: Yes, it was made on 4th December, 1907, four days after the Anglo-Russian Convention was signed. It was made on the definite instruction of the Foreign Office here. I say that because it is quite inconceivable that Sir Cecil Spring Rice could have quoted the Foreign Secretary in this document without having first acted on instructions. The document speaks in this manner: "Sir Edward Grey observes" … "both Ministers are entirely in accord as to the policy under the Convention," and so on. Therefore I think we may take it that Sir Cecil Spring Rice shows he was acting under instructions from the Government at home.
  Sir E. GREY: He was not acting under instructions from the Government at home. Instructions were sent him on 7th September, 1907, and they are in the Blue Book. These are the only instructions I sent, and these are the only instructions that are authentic.
  Mr. MORRELL: It is very important to know how it was that Sir Cecil Spring Rice obtained the information that is in this document. He is there quoting from conversations between the right hon. Gentleman and the Persian Minister in London. He not only quotes from these conversations, but he quotes long passages from the Persian Minister, and he must have had some instructions, for surely he would never invent this. There must have been some instructions. On 4th September he made this memorandum of the Persian Foreign Minister, and in a letter which I had from my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs he stated that the document was written in an unofficial form by Sir Cecil Spring Rice for the benefit of the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs to

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  allay certain apprehensions felt by certain provincial Anjumans. It was made known to them, but it was unofficial. I do not know how the Persian Government was to know that. It appears to be a perfectly official document, but it was made in an unofficial form. On 14th September it was published in the public Press of Persia in full. In January, 1909, it was published in England, and in 1910 it was republished; and in 1911, that is last year, it was quoted in this House, first, by the hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon). It was again quoted in two or three subsequent Debates, and ever since 1909 it is true to say that this document has been referred to in almost every letter written by the Persian Committee to the public Press in regard to Persian affairs.
  I go so far as to say that this Memorandum was known to every man in this country who was interested in or had any knowledge of Persian affairs except the right hon. Gentleman. I believe it is the most extraordinary instance of official ignorance that has ever come to my knowledge. In saying that, I, of course, do not make any charge against the right hon. Gentleman. I accept his word. He did not know about it. But I do think it is a very just cause of complaint against those who falied to inform him of the existence of this document, and I think we ought to know how it was that a document which concerned the honour of this country was not communicated to the Foreign Office of this country, and was not communicated to the House of Commons. However it may be as to whether this was official or unofficial, I am sure everyone will agree that, as it was made by the Minister Plenipotentiary in Teheran in the name of Great Britain, we cannot back out of it now—we are bound by it now. As it has not been repudiated for four years, I do not see how the right hon. Gentleman can repudiate it now. But, as a fact, as my hon. Friend has shown, this Memorandum of Sir Cecil Spring Rice contains no new departure whatever. It states the doctrine more clearly, explicitly, and fully than ever before. It states the policy which has been the policy of this country ever since 1834, which has been renewed again and again, and which has been part of the settled policy of this country. I think Lord Curzon said in 1892:—
  "The preservation of the independence and integrity of Persia must be regarded as a cardinal principle of our Imperial credit."
  We have entered into agreements again and again with Russia upon the subject.
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  My right hon. Friend says that on 7th September he telegraphed to Sir Cecil Spring Rice instructions to make official communication with the Persian Government. In that telegram Sir Cecil Spring Rice was instructed to say that in signing the agreement we had kept the fundamental principle in view that the independence and integrity of Persia should be respected absolutely. That is very much the same as what Sir Cecil Spring Rice stated in the unofficial communication. The only difference was that this was added that it was to be regarded as an unofficial document, but it was published in Persia.
  Sir E. GREYmade an observation which was inaudible in the Press Gallery.
  Mr. MORRELL: The other, at any rate, was published in England on 14th September. This one was not published; therefore the other document was regarded in Persia as the more important document of the two, and it was by the use of that document that Persian opinion has been guided. I think that anyone who reads the Convention and reads that declaration, which has taken two months, and a considerable correspondence between me and the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs before it was established; anyone who reads this document or the Memorandum of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, and asks himself whether the Convention is so interpreted, or has been absolutely kept, can only come to one conclusion. I ask the House to contrast the situation in Persia at the beginning of November last with the situation two months afterwards with the views which are now familiar in the first and second Memorandum. In November last the new Government had been established about two years. It was getting very firmly established, order was being better kept, the finances were recovering under Mr. Shuster, a man whose ability, zeal, and single-mindedness everyone admits, and a man who had entirely gained the confidence of the Persian people. In September the ex-Shah came back and made a fresh attack, and had been repulsed. Everyone who looks at Persian affairs in the beginning of last November will be entitled to consider that the Persian Government was doing well, that Persian independence was more secure than it had been, and the best friends of Persia were entitled to hope that Persian prosperity would grow and that its independence would be finally established. What happened?

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  There had been a little dispute about the collection of taxes on the property of the brother of the ex-Shah, who recently came to invade Persia. According to the law this property was confiscate. The gendarmerie were sent to confiscate it. A dispute occurred. What did the Russian Government do? They immediately sent an ultimatum asking for an apology and for the withdrawal of the troops. It was complied with after considerable delay. It was not complied with too late because no time limit had been fixed. Then five days from the compliance with that first ultimatum a second was delivered commanding the immediate dismissal of Mr. Shuster, second, a veto upon all official appointments, and third, the payment of an indemnity. That was complied with. The Mejliss had been destroyed by a coup d'état. Then almost within a few days of the compliance with the second ultimatum when Mr. Shuster had been dismissed, disorder broke out almost simultaneously in three different places. The disorder was entirely provoked by the Russian troops in these places, and the reason for thinking that is that the Persians were not sufficiently organised to have broken out simultaneously at three different places at the same time on the same day. At any rate, however that may be, these disorders were followed, as we know, at Tabriz by the most cruel measures of repression. People were executed on the most sacred day of the Persian year, which was an outrage against all civilisation. Sikat-ul-Islam, who was one of the most important figures in modern Persia, corresponding in position to the Archbishop of York, was executed. According to my information, and I have taken great care to inquire and to get reliable information, he was seized and asked to sign a document that would have had the effect of exonerating the Russian Government and incriminating his own countrymen. He refused, and was thereupon flogged and finally hanged in the public market square. If that is true, as I have no reason to doubt it is, it was an outrageous proceeding. I ask the House to remember that between the beginning of November and the middle of January things were going favourably. Persian finances were recovering. In the middle of January the Government were intimidated, the Constitution was destroyed, and two ultimatums were presented. The Shah, who had been driven out of
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  Persia twice, came back, resulting in severe disorder and civil war. Then followed cruelties and outrages upon all those who had taken the part of the people. I have only quoted the case of Sikat-ul-Islam, but he did not stand alone. As everyone knows many other men who had taken no part whatever in the disorders, but who were supporters of the constitutional movement, were taken in hand at Tabriz. Two boys of eighteen and twelve years of age were hanged in the square, and other victims were the editor of a newspaper known as "Shapah Dawn" and most of the staff of the newspaper. All schools were closed and houses were blown up, and the power was handed over to Samad Khan, one of the most abominable ruffians, who was a supporter of the ex-Shah, in order to wreak his vengeance on innocent inhabitants. All that has left an indelible impression on the Persian mind, and we in this country, through our Government, were accomplices, and we are jointly responsible for all that occurred in Northern Persia.
  The second ultimatum, out of which all this trouble occurred, was approved by the right hon. Gentleman before it was delivered. Before this, naturally, the Persians looked to England, after Sir Cecil Spring Rice's Memorandum, to stand by them. How do they regard England to-day? No wonder that feeling in Persia and in the Moslem world is strongly against us. I do not think anyone will wonder at this when we remember that we have given Russian action in Persia diplomatic support during the last few months. The speech of the Foreign Secretary in Manchester indicates that there is some chance of Persian independence being respected more than it has been during the last few months, and there is a slight improvement in the situation. I believe this is due largely to public interest taken in Persian affairs in this country by public meetings in London and Manchester, which have strengthened the hands of the right hon. Gentleman in his negotiations with the Russian Government. Public interest in Persia is not confined alone to this country, for meetings have been held in Paris protesting against Russian action. We find Maxim Ghorki, the distinguished Russian writer, protesting as emphatically as any man in this country could do against the action of the Russian Government in Persia. He says:—
  "The Russian Government is creating, by its senseless brutality, a new and irreconcilable enemy in Persia

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  for the Russian people. … The Russian Government now stands out in Europe as the only defender of the principle of the despotic power of the Government over the individual…. It is impossible to believe that Persia will reconcile herself to the enslavement which threatens her."
  That is the opinion held in Russia by a distinguished writer who is not alone in the opinion he has expressed in regard to the action of the Russian Government in Persia. I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman a few questions as to the improvement of which he spoke in his recent speech. First, as regards the withdrawal of the troops. I notice there is no mention of that matter in the Joint Note which has been presented recently to the Persian Government. What practical steps are being taken to withdraw the 11,000 troops from Persian territory? The troops have been withdrawn from Kazvin, but what of Tabriz? Will the British Government continue to acquiesce in its occupation by Russia? I think the Russian troops ought to be withdrawn gradually from the whole of Persia. I would like to know whether the right hon. Gentleman can give us any information upon that point? In the second place, I wish to ask a question about the pension to the ex-Shah. Everyone knows that the ex-Shah, by returning to Persia, absolutely forfeited his right to any pension whatever. I see now that England and Russia are to compel, or induce, the Persian Government to pay this pension, and I should like to know how much it is going to be? I want to know whether the Foreign Secretary can tell us that under no circumstances and under no conditions will he consent to recognise the ex-Shah again in Persia. In considering the amount of suffering and the amount of money which the ex-Shah's return to Persia has cost that country, I think that undertaking is the least we are entitled to expect. It should be remembered that but for the intervention of England and Russia this man would have been got rid of long ago. The Russian Government merely stated that they would take effective steps to prevent his return, and they have not done so. What is the attitude of the Foreign Secretary with regard to the ex-Shah? I also wish to know whether the appointment of M. Mornard is permanent, and whether the Persian Government have protested against the appointment?
  With regard to the indemnity, the right hon. Gentleman stated last December that he would not agree, or at any rate that he had made some protest, against the second ultimatum in regard to the payment
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  of an indemnity by Persia. Does that still hold good, or has the Russian Government waived the claim put forward in the second ultimatum for an indemnity from Persia. I wish to put a question also with regard to the dissolution of the Mejliss. Does he know whether there is any proposal that it should be called together again. I understand that this is the only constitutional means of Government in Persia at the present time. If the right hon. Gentleman is not going to call the Mejliss together again, what proposals do Russia and England make to establish a new Government in Persia. I hope we shall have some answer to these questions. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will make it plain that if the entente between Russia and Great Britain is to continue, it can only continue on a footing different to that which has existed during the last few months, and it can only continue to exist on terms which are more fair to the Persian people and more consonant with the honour of this country.
  Mr. MARK SYKES: I feel as a private Member, that it would be difficult to support the Motion that is before the House, no matter how one might sympathise with it in view of the fact that it would be hard to assume actually that the terms of the treaty had been broken. I submit that there is undoubtedly not sufficient evidence at present that the terms of the treaty have been broken at all. The fact that Russian officials and soldiers are in Persia at this moment, or that the Russian officials have punished certain persons in a very severe and, from our point of view, an inhuman manner, is no proof that those punishments were undeserved, and that the occupation was not necessary. Only the future can show whether those punishments were justly inflicted on the people, or whether that occupation has permanently come about. I think the present situation certainly contains the seeds of grave danger in the future, and perhaps in six or seven years from now it may be that if we do not take certain definite action we may have very grave cause for regretting not having taken decisive action at this moment. It is hardly my place to criticise the Foreign Secretary; but perhaps I may be allowed to draw his attention to a certain tendency in our policy not to touch the question of the Baghdad Railway at all. The tendency has been for the Foreign Office almost to ignore that very serious question, which must go side

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  by side with this treaty. At the present moment there remains the one overwhelming fact that two first-class Powers with whom we are on friendly terms, and with whom we always desire to be on friendly terms, are both, necessarily, apparently and inevitably, from an economic point of view, gravitating towards the Persian Gulf. Russia, with her enormous population and enormous resources, must seek an outlet, and she invariably seeks that outlet along what appear to be the lines of least resistance, although they often turn out to be the lines of most resistance. Russia, thrust as she is between two great physical Factors of ice on the North and deserts on the South, must inevitably go towards the nearest warm water by the easiest way she can possibly follow. Wherever a Russian occupation comes I am sure that that occupation must be permanent. When the English go to a place and leave it we generally leave it a bit better governed than it was, with perhaps a few roads; but the people are not changed. On the other hand, when the Russians go to a place, they generally stay for a long time. I believe Palgrave said "that if the English left India to-morrow there would be nothing left behind but some broken soda water bottles to show that we had been there," whereas if the Russians left you would find impressed upon the people something permanent. Consequently, now we have Russians coming into Azerbaijan; indeed, they came there three or four years ago. They are there now, and show no signs of going away. They will probably increase, and I do submit that Russian occupation wherever it comes is a permanent thing. When you have Russians in Azerbaijan, with the enormous influence behind in Russia itself, the way is being made good for the avalanche to slide down eventually to the Persian Gulf. That is one side.
  On the other side, there is Germany suffering from her increasing population and from her small seaboard, coming down towards Mesopotamia, if she can possibly do it. The Baghdad Railway is being obstructed by intrigues and odd finance, but it is being built, and within four or five years that line must be built, and we shall then be confronted with the fact that a poor country like India—because, despite all her tinsel and display of wealth, there is always behind the outward display the shadow of the fact that
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  India has great difficulty in meeting her Budgets—will suddenly have to face the concentration of two great Powers at the head of the Persian Gulf: one Power, which has been able to make the sacrifices necessary to build fortifications at Port Arthur, and another Power which has been able to make the sacrifices necessary to build the great German North Sea fleet. After all, these forces, which are suddenly concentrated at the head of the Persian Gulf, may arrive there simultaneously and on good terms of friendship. There need be no rivalry; the Persian Gulf is wide enough for the two. If that occurs, we shall certainly be faced with a very serious military and economic position, because behind it will not only be the independence and force of those two great Powers, but there will be the enormous resources of Mesopotamia itself, a country capable of bearing an enormous population. That will mean enormous financial power just at the top of the Persian Gulf. Opposite, at the other end, you have India in a state of poverty and hardly able at present to meet her military expenses. At present the Government, whatever party is in office, are always prepared to make enormous sacrifices in order to maintain the Navy in sufficient strength to keep the command of the sea; but, supposing the present tension which excites that building of ships in the North Sea dies down, it will be a very difficult thing to approach the English people and ask them to make further enormous sacrifices in order to meet further building which may take place at the head of the Persian Gulf. I submit that may be a very serious question.
  I know it may be objected I am looking too far ahead, and that one should not look so far ahead as that, but still I feel on fairly sure ground. One has to remember, first, the gigantic resources of Russia, and the fact that she is inevitably tending down in that direction; secondly, the enormous necessity of Germany for getting places for her people to work and in which to invest her money; and, thirdly, the fact that it is an undeveloped and enormously rich country into which they are both going to come. I therefore submit that the time has come to consider that eventual development very seriously indeed. I submit that it is possible to avert that danger, but we shall have to have a clear understanding with Germany as to our attitude towards the Baghdad Railway. Perhaps I may be allowed to make a suggestion of my own. I have been over the country, and I do hope

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  we shall participate in that railway, and participate to such an extent that we shall have a full say in how it is going to be built from Mosul down to Bussora. With regard to Russia, I hope the time may be taken now to have an understanding with Russia if possible, so that not only shall Russians leave that part of Azerbaijan in which they are in at present, but that even if the Persian Empire goes to pieces, and in its present distribution cannot be held together—I am not sufficiently informed to say whether it can or not—we shall see a strong, independent State established on that part of the northern part of the Persian Gulf which it is absolutely necessary to us should not be under the control of any Foreign Power or of ourselves either.
  Mr. DILLON: I do think the House of Commons is entitled to a clear explanation as to the document presented to the Persian Government in September, 1907, by Sir Cecil Spring Rice, which, to my amazement, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated in this House the other day, and has repeated here to-night, he never heard of until within the last few months. What is the history of this document? This was an official Note, according to my information, handed by the British Ambassador to the Persian Government under peculiar circumstances, because I understand it was handed by the British Ambassador to the Persian Government in response to a remonstrance of the Persian Government as to the nature of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. When the Anglo-Russian Agreement was made known to the Persian Government the Persian Government immediately remonstrated, and said they could not recognise the right of any neighbouring Powers to enter into such an Agreement, which they took to being tantamount to declaring that their country was to be divided into spheres of influence, and they regarded that as inconsistent with the integrity and independence of their ancient nation.
  The British Ambassador, seeing that the condition of public feeling in Persia was extremely disturbed, to case the situation handed this official document to the Persian Government, and, unlike what is usually done in the case of document's of this kind, which are generally kept confidential until published in Blue Books with the consent of the two Governments, it was allowed to be published in order to allay the anxiety of the Persian people. I
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  think I was the first to quote it in this House. After that publication, we are told to-night by the Secretary of State for the Foreign Office that he never heard of this document until about six weeks ago. That is really one of the most astounding things I have ever heard in the House of Commons, and I must say I do think the Persian people are entitled to a declaration from the Foreign Office of this country that the English Government do not repudiate that document. Surely it is more binding on the honour of England than even an ordinary official document, because it was handed, as I have said, to the Persian Government in response to a remonstance from the Persian Government and was communicated to the Persian people at a time of great popular disturbance in order to allay public anxiety. If people suffering so cruelly as the Persian people are now are to be told that a document handed to their Government at a time of stress like that is to be ignored, what will be said throughout the East and throughout the whole world as to the honour of England? I have only one fault with the Amendment. While the Amendment, as I think quite truly, states that "the failure of Your Majesty's Government to take effective steps to preserve the integrity and independence of Persia in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 constitutes a grave menace to Your Indian Empire and to the best interests of this country," there is nothing said about the interests of Persia or the honour of this country, and I think the failure to protect the independence of Persia not only affects the commercial interests of England and the strategic interests of India, but is really a great wound inflicted upon the honour of England, and is also a horrible injury inflicted upon the people of Persia themselves, to whom this country owes considerable obligations. Therefore I should have supported this Amendment far more heartily if it had been worded even more strongly than it is. I wish to point out how the whole treatment of this Persian question illustrates and bears out the complaint often made as to the too great secrecy of diplomacy as practised in modern times. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has protested again and again against this charge, but if anyone will go over the history of this Persian question since the Agreement was signed in 1907 I think he will see that charge does lie against the Foreign Office of this

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  country. What has been the history of that question? Papers have been published at long periods, once a year generally, bringing down the history of the question to not later than about six months before the Papers were published. It has been the consistent policy of the Foreign Office to give no information until as far as possible the transactions in regard to which information was given were completely closed. Then, when a Debate is attempted, we are always met with the statement, "Those are closed transactions; it is past history, and it is no use wasting time discussing it."
  Then I turn to statements made by the Foreign Secretary himself, statements made in this House and at Manchester the other day. I defy anybody who has made a careful study of this question to read those speeches and to say they give full and frank information as to the situation in connection with the Persian question. If you read them carefully you will find that they are mainly concerned with a broad, general statement of policy and with a defence and explanation of Russian action. In every single speech delivered by the Secretary of State there has been an attempt to justify and explain away the action of Russia in Persia, and anyone who goes in search of detailed information as to the actual facts of the situation there will have to go away entirely disappointed. There are two theories put forward by the Secretary of State which I wish to take this opportunity of repudiating. It is said that but for the interference of Russia in the siege of Tabriz the Nationalists of Persia would have been defeated. There never was a greater misrepresentation than is involved in that statement. As a matter of fact, had it not been for the interference of Russian troops in Teheran the revolution there would have been carried out with hardly any bloodshed. It was entirely due to the action of the Cossacks in Teheran that the revolution was broken up. It is a false representation of the whole course of the movement to say that that was due to the advance of the Russians on Tabriz.
  The assumption appears to be that England is under the heel of Russia so far as Russian policy in Persia is concerned. I believe that if England had remonstrated at the beginning, and had asked the Russian Government to observe strictly both the letter and the spirit of the Agreement of 1907, that would have been carried out, but the English Government, so far as we
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  can judge from the public declarations of the Secretary of State, never did so. This Persian difficulty did not begin yesterday; it has been going on for more than half a century, and during the whole of that time Russia has been working steadily to obtain control over affairs in Persia. The Secretary of State says that if the Agreement of 1907 had not been concluded there would have been an infinitely worse condition of affairs in Northern Persia than there is to-day, because Russia would have done as she liked. I entirely differ from that. I do not believe the condition of things in Persia would have been worse if the Agreement had not been signed, and I do believe that England was strong enough to maintain the independence of Persia without any such Agreement. What is the present situation and what is the policy of this Government?
  I listened with amazement to the statement of the last speaker when he said that this was not a time of special stress. We are told that a Joint Note has been presented within the last few days by Russia and England to the Persian Government. I think we should have some information from the Secretary of State on this point. The "Times" newspaper, which is exceedingly well-informed on these Foreign Office questions, gave on Tuesday last the main points of this Note, and I put it to any hon. Member of this House, What remains of the independence of a country which is compelled to swallow the terms of a Note of this character? I think it would be better to give up the sham pretence of independent government than to be compelled to maintain a position on such terms as those which are indicated in the Note. What is that position? First, the Government is to be compelled to act in conformity with the principles of the Anglo-Russian Convention, and the only interpretations I can put upon that is that they are to be asked to become the instruments of their own destruction.
  The second point raised was the dismissal from the army of the irregulars, and, according to the "Times," they were to be dismissed in order to make way for a reduction of the Russian army. Then there were the arrangements with the ex-Shah for his departure, and there was not a vestige of self-respect or independence remaining to Persia when they had to follow that. I should like to ask as to the honour of England in this matter, because Persia has turned round and England, to her shame, is told that she is a

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  party to this transaction. Is England maintaining the independence and integrity of Persia? I venture to say that every man who has any knowledge of the history of this question will not agree to the Note. I think it would be better for the Persian Government to refuse responsibility in this matter rather than to earn eternal infamy among their fellow countrymen by appending their signatures to such terms. That is not enough. In the "Times" we are informed there was a very gallant attempt, taking all the circumstances into account, to set up a democratic Government. But nobody who has followed the history of this matter can deny that the Government was a vast improvement on any Government that went before. The Mejliss has been broken up under the direct agency of Russia. By a coup de grâce it has been dispersed, and we are told by the "Times" that the revival of the Mejliss is exceedingly unlikely. Is England a party to that? Is the Mejliss not to be recalled, and is the Government to be turned again into an autocracy? The right hon. Gentleman said in the House the other day that he recognised, after the crisis was over, that it was the duty of the Russian and English Governments to set the Government of Persia once more upon its legs, and to keep it there. I do not know any Government in the whole world more disqualified to set the Government of another country on its legs than the Russian Government. If that is what the English Government are engaged upon now, I say they are enemies and not friends of Persian independence. What is to be the constitution of the new Government? Who is to draft that constitution? Is it to be drafted in St. Petersburg? A very nice place for constitutions to be made. If it is to be drafted there, is it to be forced upon the Persian people with the connivance and the support of England? Some of those who have opposed the policy of the Government in this matter have been denounced as enemies of the Russian people, and desirous of sowing enmity between the people of this country and the people of Russia. No, Sir, we are not enemies of the Russian people. I have been all my life a friend and admirer of the Russian people, but I am an enemy of the Russian Government, and I say that the Russian Government, as at present constituted, is an enemy of the Russian people, and that it would be a humiliation and mortification to every true Liberal and Nationalist in this House to see the honour
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  of the British House of Commons dragged in the dust, as I say it was, by that expedition to St. Petersburg. That is not the way to make friends of the Russian people. In spite of all the soft-sawder we read of in the "Daily Telegraph" and "The Times," if we look into the hearts of the people of Russia we shall find we have made no progress in their hearts as distinguished from the bankers, financiers, and officials.
  To complete the picture, Persia is going to get a loan. Having wasted all her resources by letting the ex-Shah loose upon her at a time when Mr. Shuster had restored her ability to pay for her own government, having drained the Persian Treasury in the attempt to put down the ex-Shah and his Turkomans, she is to get a loan. I should like to know whether part of that loan is to meet the claims of the ex-Shah, who claims an increased pension and £400,000 to pay off his followers. That loan is to be £200,000, half of which will be lent by this country, according to the "Times," at 7 per cent. We are, apparently, not above making an honest penny out of the distresses of Persia. What a superb specimen of generosity. I took up an influential evening paper the other day, and I read a passage pointing to the generosity of England, who is now coming forward to lend £100,000 to Persia, and then this evening paper goes on to say:—
  "Having lent £100,000 to Persia, he who pays the piper will call the tune."
  That is the end of the independence of this ancient people, a people who, with all their faults and troubles, have certainly had an illustrious history and contributed greatly to the art, civilisation, and literature of mankind, and it is a disgrace to this country that it should have acted a part in opposing the gallant efforts of this people to reform the government of their country and to set up a system of civilised government.
  Colonel YATE: I think the main object of the speeches of the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment was to advocate a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Persia. The Mover of the Amendment in various parts of his speech stated that Russian policy in Persia had been strongly consistent, that the result of this had been to raise considerably Russian prestige, and that what was required was a little stiffening on our part. In all those statements I honestly concur. The hon. Member asked that the matter

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  should be considered entirely apart from sentiment. I agree with him. We want to eliminate sentiment altogether. We come here to talk, not as idealists, but as practical men, and we have to look at the matter from a practical standpoint, namely, as to how present affairs in Persia affect ourselves. May I recall to the House what is the actual state of affairs in Persia at the present time, and the difference in the policies pursued in Persia by the two Governments who were parties to the Convention of 1907 since that date. Russia, we see, has insisted upon her interests being thoroughly respected. Her trade has increased, despite all the disturbances in Persia, and her legal claims in all the Persian Courts have been duly respected. The roads throughout Northern Persia have been safe, and have been kept safe, and the result has been that her trade has not only increased but that the transport owners in Southern Persia have shifted their animals largely up to the northern parts of Persia, much to the detriment of British trade. Persian revenues have been increased in Northern Persia by the safety which has been secured by the presence of Russian troops.
  Let us compare that with the conditions now prevailing in Southern Persia. Here we see that the roads are absolutely unsafe. We see British goods being robbed time after time. We see that the claims of British merchants, which now amount to thousands and thousands of pounds, have not been adjusted by the Courts, and that in fact nothing whatever has been done in response to those claims. In the south, not only has British trade been reduced to a standstill, but Persian revenues there have also suffered serious losses, while British commerce has been driven out of the country and Russian commerce has taken its place. There is the contrast between the policies of the two countries in Persia. British commerce has not received the protection to which it is lawfully entitled. We see that in Southern Persia there is a state of absolute disorder. The Persian Government is absolutely powerless to restore order without outside help. That cannot be denied by anyone. The independence of Persia at the present moment is a fiction. The Anglo-Russian Convention was entered into to preserve its integrity, and it is to the maintenance of that Convention that the independence and integrity of Persia will be due, if they are to be maintained at all.
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  In my opinion the intervention of the two Powers is to save Persia from being torn to pieces by contending factions; in fact, Russia and Great Britain at this moment, we may safely say, are absolutely protecting Persia against herself. The practical interests of Great Britain in Persia are commercial interests. Not only have all these losses been sustained by British commerce, by robbery and blackmail, but at the present moment there are quantities of goods held up at the various ports which cannot get into the interior because of the lack of security on the roads and the lack of transport. All these things tend to the loss of British merchants; they are going on day by day, and increasing year by year. The Persian Government some years ago refused the offer—you may call it a generous offer—made by the British Government to lend them British officers to organise a corps of road guards. Not only did they refuse that offer, but they ascribed most unworthy motives to the British Government for making it. Since then certain Swedish officers have been appointed to organise the gendarmerie. If that force does take charge of all the southern roads we should give it a fair trial, but if it fails or if it is not ready within a month no further delay should be permitted. I appeal to the right hon. Gentleman opposite to see to it that British and Indian commercial interests in Persia are thoroughly upheld in the way that they ought to be.
  6.0 P.M.
  Another point was raised by the hon. Members opposite, that is the question of the appointment of a Treasurer-General. It is essential at the present moment that no servant of the Persian Government employed during the late difficulties should be appointed as Treasurer-General. A man new to the scene and absolutely apart from all local politics is essential, in my opinion, to meet the requirements of the case. The appointment of any local man must necessarily mean friction in the future. It is necessary, from the point of view of international politics that both the direction and control of the Treasury and the Mint should be in strictly impartial hands. The interests of British commerce are closely bound up in this question. The Imperial Bank of Persia is the State Bank and is the only bank in Persia with a right to issue notes, and these notes have an enormous circulation all over the country. If there cannot be found any one man to take charge as Treasurer-General, then I think we should ask for the appointment of an independent

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  Treasury Board; but, at all events, let us have a perfectly independent authority established in Persia over the Treasury and the Mint. Then there is the question of railway construction in Persia. We have been told a concession has been applied for for a commercial line of railway up the Karun Valley from Muhamerah to Khuramabad. That railway will benefit the Persians largely, and it is urgently required. I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman when sanction for the railway will be given. It is a concession which is necessary for us and will benefit our commerce, and I trust it will be pushed through. There are other lines projected in Southern Persia, and I see no reason why the concession of these should not be obtained without any further delay. Then, finally, we have the proposal for a trans-Persian railway, and if that railway is ever constructed it is necessary that there should be a clear run for British and Indian goods from India, at any rate to Ispahan. If the Russian and Indian railways are to be joined, and there is to be a break of gauge anywhere, it is a necessity to enable the Indian and British goods to get up to Ispahan, which is the capital of the South of Persia and the great centre of British trade, that these goods should be able to go from India or the Gulf up to Ispahan without any break of gauge. If that break of gauge, or the junction of these two railways should occur anywhere to the east or the south of Ispahan British goods would be put to a great disadvantage as compared with Russian goods, and the only result would be that Russian goods would oust British goods altogether. I trust, therefore, that this question will be carefully kept in mind if the railway ever conies to be a question of practical politics.
  Mr. D. MASON: The Amendment, which I have great pleasure in supporting, states that, "We humbly represent to His Majesty that the failure of His Majesty's Government to take effective steps to preserve the integrity and independence of Persia." I think the House will agree that the many able speeches that we have heard have completed the case, and that there is no doubt in the minds of any of us as to the independence and integrity of Persia having disappeared for the moment. The Seconder of the Amendment referred to the interest that is being taken in this question in other countries, and he mentioned France. I have recently returned
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  from a visit to Washington, where there is very great interest indeed being taken in this question by Members of the Government as well as throughout the whole breadth of the United States. I think the feeling there is one of sorrow that Great Britain has not maintained her high tradition of supporting a nation struggling for freedom and for nationality, and the fact that her distinguished citizen, Mr. Shuster, was organising the finances has given her a personal interest beyond the broader one of justice and humanity. I had, when in Washington, placed in my hands by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee a copy of a resolution which was introduced in the House of Representatives, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed. It was a joint resolution requesting and empowering the President to communicate with Russia and Persia, and to urge them to refer differences between them to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. It went on to state that,
  "whereas a serious dispute has broken out between Russia and Persia which under certain circumstances might involve them in war, and the duty is therefore incumbent upon the United States as a contracting party to remind them that the Permanent Court is open, and the performance of such duty may only be regarded as a friendly act, therefore it is resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that, pursuant to the aforesaid treaty, to which Russia., Persia, and the United States are parties, and in the high interests of peace, the President of the United States be urged, requested and empowered as speedily as possible to communicate with both Russia and Persia, urging them to refer any differences between them to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, in accordance with the Convention to which the three nations are parties."
  I am assured by authorities in Washington that that resolution was only awaiting a time to be brought forward seriously in the House of Representatives and the Senate, when they were convinced that sufficient support would be forthcoming, both from Members here and from other responsible bodies. I believe every hon. Member would certainly be prepared to support any action which the House of Representatives or the Senate might take to urge their President to suggest this means of settling any outstanding differences which may exist between Russia and Persia, and thereby arrive at a satisfactory conclusion of this dispute, if any incentive is required. The first act in this drama was the invasion of Persian territory by Russian troops, and the second is the Anglo-Russian Note. It is of vital importance to Great Britain to maintain an independent State as a buffer for our Indian Empire. It is of the very essence

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  of the highest statesmanship for this country to throw the great weight which she can throw, backed up as I believe by the moral influence of the United States, into the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Persia. As Mr. Gladstone well said on a previous occasion, when there was talk of possible aggression, "there is no barrier" for this purpose "like the breast of free men."
  In the Anglo-Russian Note we see really the beginning of a new regime, and it is very pertinent to compare conditions now, when they have got rid of Mr. Shuster, with the state of affairs prior to his departure. The most convincing test of the different state of affairs is the difference in the credit of Persia now as compared with the state of affairs which existed under the regime of Mr. Shuster. I believe, before his departure, there was a proposal on the part of Persia to negotiate a loan. I believe it was to have been a 5 per cent. loan, and was to have been issued to the public at about 96½, and the probable cost to Persia of borrowing at that time would have been about 6 per cent. We all know that under the beneficent influence of the two great Powers which have gone into the pawnbroking business, as it has been described, we are prepared to show what an immense advantage it is to Persia that we should take charge of Persian finances by charging this little State 7 per cent. Here was Persia, before prepared to borrow in the market on negotiations of her own, which would have cost, at the most, 6 per cent., now compelled, almost at the point of the bayonet, to receive a trumpery £200,000 at 7 per cent.
  Reference has been made to the effect on our commerce. I agree that that should not influence us or enter into our recognition of justice or humanity, but it is only à propos and right that we should touch on the effect which would have resulted from the success of the earlier financial transactions. Had the original loan gone through, all of us who have had any experience in these matters know that it would have led to a very great increase of trade and commerce, and it would have meant a great influx probably of Manchester goods and other products into Persia. It would have stimulated and developed the trade of Persia. It would have given Persia credit had it been successful, as I believe it would have been, being properly handled by a responsible
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  House, and would have established Persia in the money markets of the world and stimulated and increased the trade of the rest of the world with Persia, all of which would of course have reflected and been reflected upon British trade and industry, and we should have seen as a result of that a great stimulus given to the trade of the Midlands and Manchester, which formerly did a large business with Persia. We see there, as we often see, that what is morally right is very seldom politically wrong. If we start out with the object of being true to our treaty obligations, we are also stimulating and helping our commercial interests.
  Allusion was also made to the security for the loan. I should like to ask the Secretary for Foreign Affairs if he is thoroughly convinced as to the absolute security of the loan which he now proposes to advance to Persia. I should also like to ask by what right and under what conditions, and under what statute he can make a loan on behalf of the British Government. Is it not necessary for him to come before Parliament? Can he use public money, even only to the extent of £100,000, and lend it out at seven per cent. to Persia or any other country without coming before the House? If that is the case it seems to me it is well worth the consideration of this House. We should inquire into the ways and means of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs entering on behalf of the Government into such a transaction. If he can do for hundreds of thousands, why not for hundreds of millions? If so, it seems to me that is another argument for more democratic control of foreign affairs, and control over the liabilities which may be incurred if the Foreign Minister has power to enter into such transactions. I feel in respect to this question what no doubt others feel. My hon. Friend the Mover of the Amendment referred to the need of greater democratic control over policy, and I should like to congratulate him on the admirable treatise he recently published on this question. It seems to me the necessity for it is made more apparent every day. We find that our diplomacy is fettered, and that we are crippled and not able to have that control over foreign affairs which we formerly enjoyed, because apparently of the reading into alliances and understandings of something which, I think, the country never anticipated when they were entered into. We find that we are really being dragged at the heels of Russia. It is not in accordance with the spirit of this country to be

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  a partner in such transactions, and I think it is entirely opposed to the spirit of freedom and to the spirit of independence which is, or ought to be, the very life blood of British foreign policy. I cannot better illustrate this than by quoting a statement made by the great Mr. Canning, who admirably described the function of Great Britain's foreign policy in words which seem to me to be just as applicable to-day as when they were uttered three-quarters of a century ago. He said:—
  "The function of England, in fact, in so far as her obligations to Europe were concerned, was to hold the balance between extreme principles, a function for which her constitution pre-eminently fitted her. But for the fulfilment of this function England had been impotent, because she had been entangled in the meshes of a system which hampered her free action. In the atmosphere of the alliance, her initiative had been stifled, because the whole spirit of continental statesmanship was alien to her genius."
  We are unable to make our voice heard because of certain alliances and understandings, and we cannot, somehow, make our protest of any value, because we are fettered and held down by these alliances, and understandings, which are alien to the spirit of British sentiment and feeling. What is, or what ought to be, the genius of British statesmanship to which Canning referred? Surely the genius of British policy ought to be and is the love of freedom. That, surely, is the genius which he contended was not expressed in Continental countries. We find that the Russian Government is quite away from the Russian people, and is not a lover of freedom in the same way as is the case in countries which have control over their Governments. Therefore it is impossible for the Russian Government to work in harmony with the British Government, which, after all, still is a freedom-loving Government as representing the British people. It is impossible to have a partnership without, sooner or later, in respect of the Agreement, either our having to give way to Russia or Russia having to give way to us. I say it is antagonistic to the spirit of Britain and her policy. That love of freedom which unquestionably has burned in the breast of every Irishman for centuries, that love of freedom which does not belong to any one party, and which found one of its best examples in Mr. Canning in the Tory party, and its highest expression in the immortal Gladstone in the Liberal party—that spirit is not dead to-day in England. I believe it exists in the people of England, and if the lamp of freedom is, perhaps, burning dimly in the hands of those who at present hold it, it does not
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  mean that it does not exist, and that we here are not anxious to see Great Britain resume her former place. It is in the hope that we will even at this late hour revert to our higher traditions, and stand out for justice and humanity to struggling nations, that I make a final appeal to the Government to stop before it is too late, and insist upon a reversal to that higher and nobler position.
  Mr. LLOYD: I think we all listened with a great deal of interest to the hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment. It was characterised by a great deal of knowledge and moderation, but we on this side looked for some criticism of the British Government, and we looked, also, under the terms of the Amendment for some information in regard to the safety of the British frontier in Southern Persia. We have not heard a word of criticism in regard to the action of the British Government itself, and we have heard scarcely a single word about British commercial or strategical interests. I, for one, rather deplore the fact that debates in this House on Foreign Affairs seem to say very little about British foreign affairs, while they discuss mainly the foreign affairs of other countries. The fact is, that the Mover of the Amendment really dealt with the attitude of Russia wth regard to Persia, and not with the attitude of the Government of this country with regard to Persia. If I read the Amendment aright, the hon. Member means to pass a Vote of Censure on the Agreement of 1907, which probably he supported in this House, while we on this side were criticising its terms. It was clear to many of us that the terms of that Agreement were very faulty. It always seemed to us it was incredible that anyone who had read history could fail to see that Persia is a country of first-class importance. Such at least we might have learned from our history, but as we have to take the 1907 treaty as the basis of argument, I fail to see that any hon. Member opposite could be able to point how Persia would have been one bit better off if the Agreement had not been concluded. From the political, apart from the commercial, point of view Persia is suffering nothing under the Agreement which she would not have suffered in ten-fold greater degree without the Agreement.
  If by chance there had been no such Agreement, and Russia had taken the action which the hon. Member imputes to her now, I can quite well conceive of hon. Members coming down to this House and

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  attempting to get our Government to negotiate with Russia to clear out of Northern Persia, while we should not have had a shadow of claim to interfere in the northern part of Persia. Now that we have an Agreement with Russia we can at least ask her to respect that Agreement—that is to say, if Russia and we keep closely to its terms, that Agreement is to the benefit of Persia. I frankly admit at once that the presence of Russian troops in Persia is unsatisfactory. Many Russians will admit that themselves, but I think sometimes we who are deeply interested in the commerce of Southern Persia should be a little more fair when attempting to come to an international agreement. It is of great importance that we should look at the affairs of Northern Persia from the Russian point of view before offering criticism. I believe that Southern Persia is vital to our Eastern policy. We should look at this question from the Russian point of view, and see that they have trade to safeguard in Northern Persia just as we have to do in Southern Persia. If our Manchester trade continues to be hampered for another six months or a year, I wonder if anyone would put difficulties in the way of roads being opened up in Southern Persia. What we have to ask is that the moment order is restored Russia will take her troops out of Persia and not interfere in the political affairs of Northern Persia.
  I think certain mistakes have been made on both sides, and I would like to ask the right hon Gentleman whether he really thinks the Government were wise in insisting upon foreign advisers being forced upon the Persian Government. I agree with what was said in another place that the terms on which we forced foreign advisers upon the Government of Persia were terms that practically destroyed the independent character of any Government. I think that is absolutely true. I also think that the compensation question as advanced by Russia was very unfortunate, and I should like to see the Government of this country make it very clear to Persia and to all interested in the Eastern question that we did not associate ourselves with any action that was taken in that aspect of the question. The same was true with regard to the ultimatum, and I very much deplore that we associated ourselves with any advice in regard to the ultimatum, which, after all, was an affair that did not concern our zone in Persia at all. If it did concern
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  anybody, it concerned the northern portion of Persia. Before I close I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman one or two questions, and to deal also with what the hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon) said in regard to the Persian loan. I think a little closer knowledge of Persian affairs would have prevented him from making quite such stringent observations on the percentage charged for loans. It is very well known to all who are acquainted with Persian affairs that loans command a higher rate of interest in Persia, Mesopotamia, and certain parts of Turkey than they do in Europe, and that a rate of 6 or 7 per cent. is by no means so high a rate of interest as might easily appear to people unacquainted with the circumstances. The hon. Member for Coventry (Mr. Mason) used two arguments which are mutually destructive. He referred to the very high price of the pawnbroking loan, and at the same time he went on to question the value of the security which we would then get. But one is the answer to the other. If your security is not very good, the price of your loan is likely to be high.
  Mr. DAVID MASON: What I meant was that I could not follow from the Anglo-Russian Convention where you would get the security.
  Mr. LLOYD: I hope I have not misinterpreted the speech of the hon. Member, but if you are going to have an additional charge for the same security it is very possible that the security may not be so good when it has got a second loan on it, and from that point of view it is always possible that a higher rate of interest may have to be charged. However, I hope the terms of the loan, when it is made, will not be so arduous for Persia as some of the previous loans which were made. I should like to ask the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether we may not have some more information with regard to the scheme generally known as the Trans-Persian Railway scheme. It has transpired that such a scheme is on foot at the present time. It is also said that capital of more than two nations is likely to be employed in that loan. It is said—I do not know whether correctly or not—that a third nation, and perhaps a fourth, will be introduced in the event of that railway being financed. Whether this railway be valuable for Great Britain or whether it is not — and I, for one, very much doubt whether Great Britain would derive much advantage from it in view of the fact that it would curtail our maritime subsidies in

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  favour of land subsidies over countries which are not British countries—however that may be, I would like to know from the right hon. Gentleman does he not think that the introduction of third and fourth Powers into so troubled a zone as the Persian zone is likely to add great friction in Persia at the present time, and that in introducing a scheme of finance we are only likely to get long, protracted and tiresome negotiations of very much the same character as have befallen the Baghdad Railway during the last ten years?
  I hope, personally, that this railway will not be made unless it is made in much more favourable conditions than any of those at present suggested. If it is to be made, I believe that it is of the highest importance that the railway should be entirely under dual control, with no third or fourth parties in it; and I hope that the Foreign Secretary may be able to give us some broad light on the matter, which is of such immense importance, and about which we have been left entirely in the dark during the many months over which the negotiations have been going on. I suppose that the hon. Member who moved this Amendment purposely put in the question of Indian defence. Of course, Persia is a vitally important matter as a buffer State to our Indian defence. But India is not defended alone along the Indian frontier. India is defended as much, or nearly as much, in the North Sea as in the Indian Ocean, and if political circumstances at the present time call for an entente, which I heartily welcome and believe to be of vital importance to this country, it is because our Fleet should be free to get to the maritime highways that lead to India; and unless you have an understanding, a triple entente firmly established, no frontier defence in India will make that country safe to us. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will give us some information in regard to the Trans-Persian Railway. I personally oppose this Amendment, because I believe that our relations with Russia in Persia, if patiently dealt with, are likely to be fruitful in nothing but good. I believe that Russia will, if we give her time, withdraw her troops and make good her word; but I believe that if this Amendment is sanctioned it will go far to damage the relations so happily instituted between ourselves and Russia after so long a period.
  Sir G. SCOTT ROBERTSON: To my mind both the Mover and the Seconder of
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  this Amendment have a distinct fallacy underlying all their argument. That fallacy is that North Persia ever was, say, during the last sixteen or seventeen years, in anything approaching an independent position. North Persia all that time has been absolutely in the grip of Russia, and what I have been very much interested in and should like very much to know, although I am quite sure that my question will not be answered, is how the Foreign Secretary contrived to persuade Russia to enter into the Agreement of 1907—it seems so entirely beneficial to us, while the advantages to her are not at all so apparent? This question has been looked upon almost entirely from the point of view of North Persia. But to get the friendliness and the co-operation of Russia in other parts of Asia was extremely valuable. For instance, if we look upon the North-West Frontier of India, certain parts of which I know personally, some Members of this House may remember a campaign was undertaken in a terrible time of the year, on what one might call a risky occasion, simply because of the absolute necessity there was to get to Hunza before the Russians were able to get there. That really was the reason of all those campaigns along that little frontier, about Chitral and beyond, and one of the great benefits which this Agreement of 1907 has given to us is that it has made those frontiers so that they are now perfectly easy to manage. There are no intrigues. Russian agents do not cross the barrier and we are altogether in a very much better and stronger position than we ever were in before.
  As an instance of the extraordinary and overwhelming power of Russia in North Persia—I am not speaking of later years, but of fifteen or twenty years ago—there was always an objection on the part of some officers when offered appointments in South Persia to go there. They felt that there was a terrible depression in always being a prominent actor in a losing game which they were not prepared temperamentally to undertake. Anyone who has read the Blue Books during the last two years on Persia must have been struck with the extraordinary state of chaos and anarchy in that country. I do not think that in history—I am not speaking as an expert on Persia: my knowledge is merely derived from Blue Books—but from reading these Blue Books, I think that there is nothing quite comparable to it in history, except

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  perhaps the break up of the Mogul Empire. All the chaos in South Persia, the terror and confusion, the stoppage of trade, and the rise in prices threatening starvation, are only comparable to that; and however democratic one's feelings, one was tempted to wish that some strong man of high character might come to bring peace to such a distracted country. I think that the Anglo-Russian Treaty is of enormous advantage. It is the only possible hope for the independence of Persia. Granted that the full independence of Persia at the present moment is very doubtful, it certainly is not less so than it has been for fifty years past, and I am more and more convinced that it is on a strict observance on our part of that Agreement that our hopes must rest.
  The inference, I suppose, is that we can in some extraordinary way or other than by tactful diplomatic methods induce Russia to do as we wish. It has been mentioned, and I think re-echoed with approval on the opposite side, that a certain stiffening in diplomatic methods might have that effect. I cannot believe that anything is more fallacious than that. Russia is not going to be, and could not possibly be, influenced by any stiffening of tone in diplomatic transactions. I think that her Government in St. Petersburg is bonâ fide anxious to keep her Agreement. We all know the difficulties that there are, and always must be in controlling local subordinates in distant countries. For instance, in North Persia the Russian subordinate has a position of very great prestige and dignity. A very admirably intentioned, well-wishing, able man, in the person of Mr. Shuster, appears on the scene, and inevitably friction occurs. I think myself that if Mr. Shuster had been trained more in diplomatic methods he might have been more conciliatory to Russia, at least he might have understood the position, which was this, that nothing could possibly be done in North Persia unless with the friendly help of Russia itself. I have a great admiration for him. I believe that he is perfectly straightforward, and in a speech of his which I read I was very much attracted by his candour. But I did not quite agree with his peroration when he said something to this effect—at any cost and at any price we should have so and so. Even if you were prepared to go to such an extent how you are going to enforce your opinions there?
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  I will only end, as I began, by expressing my congratulations to the Foreign Secretary, and my admiration of the fact that he was able at all to enter into this Agreement with Russia. I hope it will be maintained, and I believe by the tact and forbearance which he has shown as representing the Government in all the negotiations, that there is a good prospect of that Agreement being maintained. We are all, in every part of the House, anxious that Persia shall maintain her independence. We all respect her past history, her poetry, her literature, and all the romance that attaches to the very name of that country. I hope most fervently that the result of this Debate will not in any way imperil the excellent position we at present hold in connection with Russia in our joint and avowed determination to maintain the independence of that country.
  Mr. AUBREY HERBERT: A very little time ago the House gave me the kind indulgence which I believe it always extends to a new Member on his making his first speech. I was advised by an hon. Member of great Parliamentary experience that before making one's maiden effort it is wise to have at least five speeches prepared in case the ground has already been covered by others. In rising to speak on this occasion I feel that five speeches would have been quite inadequate, because in this Debate it is very difficult indeed, after what has been said, to advance anything new. First of all, perhaps, I may be allowed to say that some time ago I found myself much more in agreement with hon. Members opposite than I do today. I might have felt myself more in agreement with them, but perhaps from very different reasons. I should first like to allude to the peroration of the hon. Member for Stirling, in which he said that it was very essential that more air and light should came into the stuffy office of diplomacy. It seems to me that in every great department of life you need specialists. If those specialists go wrong, one hopes there is a controlling and supervising force. But it is not, I think, advisable to be perpetually on the alert. For instance, one would very much resent it if an engine-driver, carrying out his duty, was controlled or interfered with by people who knew nothing about engine driving. Again, suppose, you take the case of the manufacture of explosives. I think it would be even more unwise to have that under the control of people not

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  thoroughly acquainted with the process. Most of all, in the situation which you have at the present moment, when you have great tension abroad, when you have crisis after crisis, when foreign relations have been strained, then, I think, it is most unwise of all to call people to your counsel who cannot have a thorough and intimate knowledge of the facts. I maintain that it is utterly impossible for us to have a thorough and intimate knowledge of the events that have been happening during the last year, and I look forward to the fulfilment of the promise of the Government to lay that information before us before very long.
  But it seems to me that very often the doctrine of hon. Members opposite is that if you do not throw all your cards on the table it means that you are keeping cards up your sleeve. I do not think the two things go together in the very least, and I do not see why they should. The hon. Member on my left made a very vigorous defence of the principle of liberty. He said that we know the conditions of Persia to-day, that it is a country that has been trying to stir itself, and that it has not had the help that it might have expected from the Liberal Government of England. I think it is quite true that we do know the conditions of Persia to-day. If they have not altered since the days when I was there, then those conditions are not quite as admirable as hon. Members on the other side have led us to believe. I would ask the House to look at Persia not only to-day, but to look at it yesterday, and the day before yesterday, and to look at our relations with that country. I think that ever since the Gortschakoff Note, which, if my memory serves me aright, was in 1865, we have been fighting a kind of rearguard action with regard to Persia, and, like all actions of that kind, it has been very unsatisfactory. We have fought in conditions that were very often unprofitable to ourselves. We have fought it with unequal weapons, and, as a consequence, with poor results. I think, remembering all that, and seeing that a great many of those difficulties have now passed away, we must admit that even if our position is qualified, the policy of the Government has not been unsuccessful—this new policy has not been unsuccessful.
  If we ask ourselves why those difficulties occurred, I think that the answer is a very obvious one. It is that Persia is the neighbour of Russia; Persia is not and never can be the neighbour of England. She
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  may be the neighbour of British interests and of British possessions, but she can never be the neighbour of the British people as she is the neighbour of the Russian people. I very much question if any Gentleman who know that part of the world do not agree that, supposing His Majesty's Government had adopted a different policy, the disintegration of Persia would have been hurried. Not only would Persia have fallen to pieces earlier, but Russia would have penetrated to Teheran more quickly. And the last part of those consequences would have been that British interest would have suffered more than they have suffered already. I have said that I was not always in favour of the policy of the Government. In those days there were other reasons into which I think it is not necessary to enter tonight, because it would serve no useful purpose. What is said here is reported sometimes with very unnecessary emphasis abroad, and inferences are made from statements in this House that are not always justified. One of the last things I should like to say is this, that if I seem to speak unsympathetically from the point of view of hon. Members opposite, I should be misunderstood by them. I think it is a very fine thing that there is this feeling in the country of a desire that His Majesty's Government should have done more for the integrity and Constitution of Persia. I think that a very creditable thing to our country. I believe that there is a real spirit of chivalry in democracy, and that it is anxious to hold out its hand to any people that strive towards the idea of democracy through the gates of freedom and constitutionalism.
  But what I would say, and I would say it really quite impartially—I am not speaking in any way as a party man—that a Constitution in Europe and a Constitution in the East are very different things indeed. The very word itself I think is not understood in many countries in the East. The other day I was reading in a History of Russia that when in Russia they were cheering the heir to the Throne who was supposed to be in favour of reform, they said, "Long live Constantine, and long-live his wife Constitution." I would not say that the Persian people have not risen to a rather higher knowledge, but still one cannot say that as yet they are fully educated, or have any real knowledge of what the constitution means. I will go beyond that. You cannot alter the heart of a man by giving him a political ornament and calling it a constitution. You

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  cannot make the people of Persia any more perfect by giving them a constitution than you can relieve the misery in this country by breaking or suspending the Constitution here. If I may be allowed to say a word or two about the Persians themselves I would say that they are a people who for centuries have lived under what is the worst system of oppression that the world has ever known. They are a people, half of whom are fanatical religionists, and half of whom are extremely apathetic. It is quite impossible to bring home to a people like that what a complicated constitution means, or give them any affection for it. It seems to me that under no circumstances do we mean to fight for the improvement of Persia. Even supposing we did mean to fight we could only do so for one of two reasons. We might do it for the sake of Persia or for our own sake. Supposing we did it for our own sake. What would that mean? It would mean penalising the country by annexing it. We do not want to do that. Supposing we fought for the sake of Persia. What would that mean? It would mean that we should have to guarantee the constitutional experiment, and if we were to give the guarantee, then it would mean occupying the greater part of the country of Persia. I am absolutely certain that there is no hon. Member in this House who advocates so wild and so adventurous a policy as that.
  Sir E. GREY: I should like to begin by thanking my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling Burghs, who initiated this Debate, for his courteous reference to myself, and I can say with equal sincerity in regard to him that the purity of his motives in public life and the public spirit which animates the action which he takes is well known to us all. He seemed a little to resent some of the criticisms I have made upon criticisms made upon me in a speech which I delivered to my Constituents last month. My hon. Friend, I think, need not have been so sensitive about those criticisms. I was addressing my Constituents. I have nothing to say to my Constituents that I am not willing the whole world should know, and, therefore, I have not the least objection to speeches being reported. But speeches sometimes have a somewhat personal interest between myself and my Constituents, and therefore have a local rather than a general interest, and in this case
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  the criticisms I was dealing with were certain criticisms on my action which I had seen reported in the local papers in my own Constituency. They were extracts partly from articles which I had not seen before, and I explained that, having seen those extracts, and my Constituents having all read them, that I would deal with them, as I had not time to make research or see the whole of the articles from which they came. It was with those I was dealing. I knew my knowledge was partial. My hon. Friend the Member for Stirling has put on the cap, and I can only say unless he is the author of the extracts which I was criticising at the time he will not feel aggrieved about anything which I said.
  7.0 P.M.
  I come to matters which have been dealt with in the Debate. First of all, let me take the question of this document given by the British Minister at Teheran. That document was drawn up by the British Minister in an unofficial form. On the face of it you can see that it is in unofficial form. He regarded it as so unofficial that he did not send it home at the time, and that is why I never saw it. A few days after he drew it up, instructions were sent by me from the Foreign Office as to the explanation which was to be given to the Persian Government of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. Those instructions were the official authoritative explanation. They were given some days after that unofficial document. They were accepted by the Persian Government. They were regarded by me as the only authoritative official interpretation for which I was responsible, and I object entirely to that document which has been brought before the House while the official interpretation has been put on one side and entirely disregarded and this unofficial document referred to as the only official interpretation. That is not fair. I do not blame the British Minister for what he did, but I do resent it being supposed that it was done under special instructions as an official document. It is full of quotations from a Russian Foreign Minister, and that I should have had an official document drawn up basing myself on statements made by a Russian Foreign Minister, and that I should have quoted from them without their context, and without communication with the Russian Minister, and have them drawn up as an official document of course is not the case. It was given as an unofficial explanation, and the reason why I object to it being taken as official is this: In substance, in general substance, it does not differ from

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  the official interpretation except in regard to one sentence at the end, which states that their object (the British and Russian Governments) in these friendly negotiations "was not to allow one another to intervene." I believe the British Minister in drawing that up did not intend it to bear the construction which has been put upon it. But the construction which has been put upon it is that we undertook some obligation to guarantee in a way we had not done before the independence and integrity of Persia. That was not the construction which he intended. It is the construction which has been put upon the words, and which it may be contended the words naturally bear. It was not the construction he intended. It was an unofficial document, and it is not the intention or construction that ought to be put on the Anglo-Russian Agreement.
  I never regarded that Agreement, and I would not have made it if I had, as an extension of our responsibilities. I regarded it as a limitation of our action rather than an extension, and as a corresponding limitation on Russian action also. It was a mutual agreement limiting the action of the two Governments, the Russian and the English Governments respectively. That was the main object and purpose of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. Tonight what has been discussed in the House? The Anglo-Russian Agreement? Not as a whole. There has not been a word about the Afghanistan part or the Thibet part, and the whole thing hangs together. Have the Articles of it been discussed? Not one of the Articles. Has the Preamble of it been discussed? Yes, partly, but the first part of the Preamble, and the whole discussion, except one or two speeches which have been made and which have not been discussed, the Anglo-Russian Agreement specially, the whole of the attacks made on the Anglo-Russian Agreement have dealt solely with the first paragraph of the Preamble, the one-third part of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. That is what I mean by saying that the focus and perspective is distorted. We must look at the Agreement and at the Articles of the Agreements as a whole. When I said at Manchester the other day what the object of the Anglo-Russian Agreement was, I defined it as having been to secure (I forget now the exact words) that the British and Russian Governments respectively should not disturb their interests and their frontiers in Asia. What I said has been absolutely kept. That was the object to which I referred, and it has been
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  absolutely kept on both sides. The Russian Government have done nothing since that Agreement was made to disturb the Indian frontier, to intrigue so as to make disturbances on the Indian frontier, to push railways towards it, or to do any of those things which they undertook in the Agreement they would not do, and we in the same way have observed it. When I said that it had been absolutely kept it was to that, the main object of the Agreement, I was referring. That is absolutely true.
  My hon. Friend says that what has happened under the Anglo-Russian Agreement has damaged us strategically. If any of the Articles of the Agreement had been broken, if Article 2 had been broken, or any of the other Articles, then you would have had a case for saying that strategically our position was worse than it is. Those Articles have not been infringed in any way. The operative parts have not been infringed in any way. How have we been damaged strategically by the Anglo-Russian Agreement? The Indian frontier is not conscious of it. The Indian Government is not conscious of any strategic damage. There is, we are told, Russian influence in Northern Persia. Russian influence was there before the Anglo-Russian Agreement was made. The fact of Russian influence being dominant in Northern Persia is no new thing. It was there before the Anglo-Russian Agreement was made. Anyone who would take the trouble to look again at the speech in which I explained the Anglo-Russian Agreement to the House in 1908 will see that I assumed, as one of the premises on which the Anglo-Russian Agreement had been made, that the Russian influence in the North of Persia was already there and had been there for some twenty years, and that under successive British Governments not one of them had made it their policy or made an effort to prevent Russian influence from being dominant in the North of Persia. It was there before the Anglo-Russian Agreement, and it is there now. The question of whether we are strategically worse off depends on the use which was made of Russian influence in the North of Persia; and Russian influence in the North of Persia, whatever difficulties there may have been with regard to Persian internal affairs, whatever disputes there may have been, that influence has not been used in any way to make the Indian frontier strategically worse. It has not been used

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  as it would have been in the past to prejudice our strategical position. It has not been used in that way, and it is not being so used now. I do not mean to push that so far as to say that it should not be the subject of comment in the House that Russian troops are in Persia and have lately been largely increased in Persia. That, of course, is a matter of comment, and has been dealt with frequently.
  The presence of Russian troops in Northern Persia has been due to various causes, into which I need not now enter. The hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon) seems to resent my giving any explanation of anything which the Russians do in Northern Persia. Whenever I have given those explanations I have been strongly pressed to protest against something or other, but I have no desire to give explanation if it is not desired that explanations should be given. But I am, of course, bound to explain to the House what the position of Russian troops in Northern Persia is. Russian troops have been sent there owing to various disputes which have arisen, but they have not been sent there, as I have been informed, in order to effect a permanent occupation of the country. They have been sent there at various times during the last few years, and on one occasion, at any rate, they were withdrawn after they had been sent from Kazvin. In July, 1909, after the revolt of the Bakhtiari and Nationalists at Teheran, the Russian Government, in order to guard all nationalities at that time, landed a regiment of Cossacks, a battery, and so forth, which went to Kazvin. In November of that year we were told that 300 of those men were to return to Russia. In December, 1909, 600 or 700 were withdrawn leaving 1,000 there, and on 23rd February last year all those troops were withdrawn from Kazvin except the Consular guard of about fifty or 100 men. That was an instance of troops having been sent and then withdrawn. Anyone who has had experience of the sending of British troops to occupy places temporarily will realise how difficult it is to withdraw when they have been once sent to occupy them. The fact that troops were once sent and withdrawn ought, at any rate, to be noticed in this House as evidence that the sending of Russian troops into Northern Persia has not been from any premeditated design of permanent occupation of the country, but due to causes which we hope will be temporary. Again, troops have been sent to Kazvin.
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  My hon. Friend who initiated the Debate pointed out that Kazvin is the really important place, and that the other place did not threaten Teheran, the capital, nor the heart of Persia, but are comparatively close to the Russian frontier. Kazvin, no doubt, is on the direct route to Teheran. From Kazvin there were some of the troops withdrawn a little time ago, and we understand that the rest are soon to be withdrawn from Kazvin also.
  With regard to the other places, such as Tabriz, there is another factor to be borne in mind. The Russian troops are not the only foreign troops in Persia at the present time. There are Turkish troops over the frontier in Persia. They have been there for some time. The contention of the Russian Government has been that the troops are for the purpose of protecting their strategic interests, and nobody can deny that they are justified in putting forward that contention. The Turkish troops began going over the Russian frontier under the old regime as long ago as October, 1905. They have gradually advanced farther and farther, and no doubt, the subsequent presence of Russian troops in Northern Persia may have led to still further advances of Turkish troops and so forth. That is the situation at the present time. Turkish troops have advanced considerably farther in the direction of Tabriz, and Russian troops at some of the places in that region have no doubt been advanced as strategic movements, because the strategical position has been changed to the disadvantage of Russia by the presence of the Turkish troops. That is an element that has to be borne in mind. If the strategical position of Russia is threatened or likely to be prejudiced by the advance of Turkish troops, Russia is perfectly entitled to claim that she must be the judge of her own strategical interests, and of what measures are necessary to protect them. With regard to Persian independence, I noticed one very important admission by my hon. Friend who initiated this Debate. He admitted that there had been Russian influence in Northern Persia before the Anglo-Russian Convention. But he said that the Persian Revolution destroyed that influence. I have been told that from other sources. Does anybody who reads the Anglo-Russian Agreement consider that it would have been really consistent for us to take upon ourselves to support the Persian Government in the destruction of the Russian influence in the North of Persia which existed before the Anglo-Russian Agree-

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  ment was made? When you talk about the independence of Persia, you must bear in mind that it was already conditioned by Russian influence in the North of Persia at that time. Does anybody suppose that we could have worked the Anglo-Russian Agreement in this way—that we should have said to Russia, "The Persian Revolution has destroyed your influence in the North of Persia. You must not attempt to regain that influence, you must not make any move to re-establish the influence you have lost, but we on our side must maintain the absolute security of the Indian frontier, and so forth, which is guaranteed to us by the Anglo-Russian Agreement." You cannot work an agreement in that one-sided way. To say that diplomatic dispatches, representations, and so forth, based on that assumption, should be the ordinary course of events in the North of Persia is absolutely futile. It would put an end to the Anglo-Russian Agreement. That Russian influence in the North of Persia should be destroyed as a consequence of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, and that we should retain all the advantages guaranteed to us in regard to the Indian Frontier is an untenable position.
  I now come to the present situation, and I will take some of the points in detail. First of all, the ex-Shah. We ourselves have taken a strong line about the ex-Shah. We have said that we could not recognise him again. It has been very exasperating to us. I base that not on abstract considerations connected with the Persian Government, nor on anything connected with the Russian Government, but on our own interests. The ex-Shah went back into Persia. One consequence of his going back was that the forces—some of the Bakhtian forces, for example—which had been in the habit, though in an irregular way, of keeping order on the southern roads, were withdrawn to resist the ex-Shah. The Persian Government was crippled in its struggle with the ex-Shah, and our trade suffered because the roads were blocked. I regard that as sufficient justification for our saying that we would not recognise the ex-Shah, and that the first object of importance is to get the ex-Shah out of the country. Criticism has been made as to his pension for leaving the country. It will not be the first time in history that a pension has been given not on grounds of merit. He has to be got out of the country. If the Persian Government were strong enough to turn him out by themselves there would be no question of
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  pension or anything else. They would do it. But they are not strong enough to turn him out. How is he to be got out? I sometimes wonder how many people who take a strong line about Persian affairs have really studied the map of Persia. Northern Persia is absolutely out of our reach. We cannot send a force there to turn out the ex-Shah. Are we to go to the Russian Government and ask them to send a force to turn him out? Are we to be pressed at one moment to ask them to withdraw their troops, whom they have sent there to protect their trade routes or any interests which they consider endangered, and at another moment to ask them to send forces into Persia at their own expense to do something which suits our purposes? Of course we cannot. There is no means that I can see of getting the ex-Shah out of Persia unless he is got out on terms. He is out of our reach. I can only say that as far as we are concerned we have done what we could to discourage the ex-Shah by saying we will not recognise him, and a warning has now been given to him through the Russian Consul that his case is hopeless, and that he had better leave the country.
  But undoubtedly certain terms have been offered the ex-Shah to leave. In connection with this I had better give the provisions of the loan. I have not the actual Note about the loan. What I have got is a telegram saying that a Joint Note has been handed in on the lines of the telegram which I sent on 2nd February. As soon as I get the exact terms of the Note and the Persian reply, I shall be glad to communicate them to the House. The terms are, roughly, these. There is no threat in them at all. The British and Russian Governments will advance to meet immediate requirements the sum of £200,000 conjointly, the proceeds to be spent under the supervision of the Treasurer-General, and our share of £100,000 to be devoted as much as possible to gendarmérie in the south.
  Mr. DAVID MASON: At what rate?
  Sir E. GREY: It had to be at an agreed rate of 7 per cent. Somebody has said that the loan is small. Of course it is small. We do not want to undertake loans ourselves, but we want to see trade routes open in the south, and we have limited the loan to the smallest possible amount to meet immediate emergencies, and to enable a start to be made with the preservation of order on the southern

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  roads. It is not intended as a loan to finance the Persian Government as a whole. That we hope will be done by a larger loan through the ordinary financial channels as soon as it can be arranged. This advance is made as an exceptional thing. It is of a very limited amount to meet special emergencies, especially on the southern roads. As the two Governments are sharing in the loan it had to be made at an agreed rate of interest. Some hon. Members have asked me about the security in Persia. The loan to be useful ought to be made quickly, and we have not had time to go into the question of security very closely. But what we have said is that it is to be made on what security is available, and it is to be a first charge on the large loan which we hope Persia will be able to raise soon through the ordinary financial channels when the situation in Persia has improved. It is not a very serious liability in amount, but of course it will have to come before the House.
  The next point was to inform the Persian Government that the ex-Shah was requested to leave Persian territory, and that neither he nor his adherents will receive support from the Russian Government or ourselves. The text of the communication has been left to the representatives to draw up. The amount of the pension and the conditions on which it is to be granted are being arranged. The third point was that a general amnesty should be proclaimed, and that when the ex-Shah has left Persia the Russian Government should dismiss their irregular forces. The fourth point is that they should be ready to discuss a scheme for a small army. An hon. Member asked me whether that army is to be under Russian officers. It may be. I have said nothing in the telegram about Russian officers, but it may be that Russian officers will be employed under the Persian Government. That is no new thing. For years, long before the Anglo-Russian Agreement, Persian Consuls at Teheran were under Russian officers. That is one of the evidences of Russian influence in Northern Persia. Never for a moment would the Russian Government consent to see their officers who were employed under the Persian Government dismissed and officers of another nationality substituted for them at Teheran. The fifth point was that the Persian Government should be requested, in a form to be decided on, to engage to
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  conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian Convention. That is a very necessary provision, because if we and Russia agree that there are certain parts of Persia where we will not push our respective influence it is essential that the Persian Government should not upset that. One of the reasons which gave rise to the difficulties at Teheran was undoubtedly the appointment by the Treasurer-General of a British subject at Tabriz, which is only eighty miles from the Russian frontier, and well within the Russian sphere of influence. If the Persian Government is to continue its business undisturbed it is essential that it should conform to these Articles of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, and that it should not give concessions contrary to the spirit of that Agreement or make appointments of Russians in the British sphere or of British people in the Russian sphere. There is no harm or indignity whatever in asking the Persian Government to conform to that practice, which is stipulated for in the Anglo-Russian Agreement, and which prevents friction and difficulties between the British and Russian Governments. That is the end of the conditions about the small loan.
  As to trade. The hon. and gallant Member opposite made the perfectly true criticism that recently our trade has suffered more than Russian trade. That is quite true, because the Russians have themselves sent forces into the North of Persia to control routes. They are engaged in conducting caravans on some of the trade routes of Northern Persia now. We could have done the same in Southern Persia. The Russians would have made no objection to our doing for the trade routes in the South what they have done in the North, and it would have been entirely within our rights. I fully admit that the reason why our trade in the South has been impeded, obstructed, and even blocked to an extent, which has not been the case with Russian trade in the North, is that we have not taken in the South the measures which the Russians have taken in the North. I frankly say that I think we have done right in deciding not to take steps to patrol these trade routes. If we had we should have had to send at least between 1,000 and 2,000 men to begin with. As hon. Members know, what you send at the beginning in a case like this generally turns out to be far too small; but, having sent them, you are told, or you find, that unless you send a considerable number more the whole

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  object for which you sent these men will be sacrificed. Then you are told, further, that you must occupy a certain point or points to secure your object. Having occupied these points, you will find that your occupation is going to be of no use, and that its object will not be attained, unless you occupy some point further in, which, you are told, it is absolutely essential you should occupy. That is the very reason why we have been reluctant to undertake the patrol of roads in Southern Persia.
  It would have put on us, and on the Indian Government—because I suppose we should have had to share the expense—an expense that might have been very great, and might have been so great as to exceed, not the profits, but the gross value of the whole of the trade involved. Suppose we had let ourselves in for an occupation of Southern Persia, and to have undertaken the responsibility of providing for order. I admit the trade has suffered. But, on the whole, the Government have, I think rightly, hitherto decided not to send the force into Southern Persia to patrol the roads, but to do all we can to co-operate both with the Persian and the Russian Government in inducing the ex-Shah to leave the country. That will react most favourably on the southern roads. We believe, too, that in securing for Persia a small advance of money to devote to organising a gendarmerie for the southern roads, and in getting Swedish officers employed in organising that force, that we are doing the best we can for Persia. We hope that these measures, inconvenient though the interruption to trade may have been, if they succeed in a few weeks or a few months in restoring order to Southern Persia, will make it clear that the policy we have adopted has in the long run ensured our object with far less expense and far less risk than the occupation of the country.
  The hon. Gentleman the Member for Staffordshire asked me to say a word about railways in Persia. I can tell him very little about the Trans-Persian Railway scheme, which is still in this stage: certain financial groups on their own account are making a study of what the prospects of a railway would be, how it could be financed, and so forth. All we have said hitherto is that we are favourable in principle to a railway, provided certain conditions are eventually observed. Till the study of these groups has resulted in showing that some particular scheme is
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  favourable, there is really nothing to report. I think we are right in not opposing railway development in Persia, because sooner or later it must come. Indeed, you have no right simply for your own interest to pursue a policy of opposing railway development. In the long run you will not succeed. I think that our proper policy is not to discourage or to oppose schemes which may be put forward for the development of railways in Persia, but to give such encouragement and support ourselves to secure that if and when a Trans-Persian railway is made, it should be made under conditions as to breadth of gauge and as to routes which are satisfactory to the Indian Government, which is most concerned. We have been in close consultation with the Indian Government as to conditions. They have stipulated for certain primâ facie conditions if and when a group decides that a railway is feasible. I cannot say how much international capital may or may not be involved. That is a stage further ahead. But if and when a railway is pronounced feasible, we shall, of course, review the scheme in the light of the conditions stipulated by the Indian Government, and in consultation with them, with regard to the points I have mentioned.
  I was asked one important and definite question with reference to the terms of M. Mornard's appointment as Treasurer-General. The reports I have from our present Minister at Teheran are quite favourable to M. Mornard, and indeed it would be difficult to find anyone else at this moment who has the experience and knowledge of Persian affairs which it is necessary to have to transact the business of the post. I think to attempt, in the present state of affairs, to send anyone there with no knowledge or previous experience of the country would be to set that person a very hard task indeed. I think the experience M. Mornard has had is valuable in the present crisis, and will enable him to take hold of the business. The reports as to M. Mornard personally that we have from our Minister at Teheran is quite favourable. Of course, everything has had to be done in a hurry recently, and the appointment at present is temporary, the question of a definite appointment being kept in suspense.
  Mr. MORRELL: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell me whether the Persian Government protested against the appointment?
  Sir E. GREY: I would ask my hon. Friend to give mc notice of that question. The Persian Government, I think, do not at all grudge the appointment of M. Mornard at the present time, but whether they did at any stage make a protest or not, I cannot say without notice. The appointment, though temporary, may become permanent, and at any rate it is the best that can be done at the present time. I have no reason to suppose that it will turn out other than satisfactory.
  Now, generally, if we are to intervene in Persia, we must base our intervention on British interests. It is impossible for us, in different parts of the world, when disputes arise between other countries, to undertake to be the arbiters in those disputes, and pronounce judgment upon their merits. In this case of a dispute between Russia and Persia in the North of Persia, where admittedly we have acquiesced in the establishment of Russian influence in previous years, we cannot undertake — I cannot undertake—to be continually giving accounts of all that happens and pronouncing judgment upon what has taken place. I have not got information, in the first place, and we must, if we are to pursue a policy which is within our compass, a reasonable policy, base our intervention in Persia on British interests. I deprecate the constant attacks that are made in this House as to what has and is taking place in the North of Persia, which are based upon the absolute truth of every statement which is adverse to one side, and which ignores the statements which are adverse to the other side. I am not in a position very often to have any information in regard to some of the statements. Even if I had, I do not consider it is my business to investigate all the circumstances on each side, and then to say exactly what is true. I very often know one side, and some hon. Friend here knows the other side. But what I do deprecate is that everything that is adverse to Russian action should be accepted, and that everything which is evidence of provocation to Russian interests should be ignored. Russia in the North of Persia finds it necessary to take certain measures to protect her trade or her strategic interests. Those are not necessarily a breach of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. Look at the second paragraph of the Preamble, which begins:—
  "Considering that each of the Powers. Great Britain and Russia, has for geographical and economic reasons a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia.…"
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  With a Preamble like that you cannot say for a moment, when either country takes steps to intervene in a particular region in Persia, where it has been admitted by the Preamble to have special interests, and to take action to protect those interests it considers in danger, you cannot consider that as necessarily a breach of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. There are certain things in the Anglo-Russian Agreement which would be a distinct breach, and which would have to be taken up at once. Such a breach of Article 1 or Article 2 of the Agreement is, of course, a thing which would be taken up. A breach of Article 1 by us or a breach of Article 2 by Russia would be taken up at once by one or the other country. In all the criticism which has been offered in this House in respect to the Anglo-Russian Agreement, only once that I remember has there been any reference to the really operative articles of the Agreement or any allegation, at any rate, that any one of these had been broken. When that is the case, when one of these articles is broken, then, of course, strategic influence will be involved and must be protected.
  Mr. O'GRADY: Where do the Persian people come in to this case?
  Sir E. GREY: We have never undertaken the responsibility for the Persian people. Are we to make ourselves responsible for people in Central Asia?
  Mr. O'GRADY: If I understand aright, they are to be wiped out. Is that so?
  Sir E. GREY: No, no. That is a sort of statement that makes debate impossible. What is, in effect, being pressed upon us in Debate? I am pressed to take up questions on behalf of Persia in the North of Persia, and it amounts to this: that I am, in effect, being asked to prevent Russia from regaining and retaining that influence in Northern Persia which she had before the Anglo-Russian Agreement. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no."] The hon. Gentleman the Member for Stirling Burghs (Mr. Ponsonby) admitted that the Russian influence which existed at the time of the Anglo-Russian Agreement had been destroyed. Russia has to regain and retain that influence, and the criticism passed on me is that I have not prevented it. That is really what it comes to.
  Mr. PONSONBY: All our efforts since the time that Russian influence was

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  damaged in the North have been to help Russia to regain that influence and make it stronger than before.
  Sir E. GREY: I have been pressed to protest against certain things, to take action to prevent Russia doing certain things. The effective part of the attack is that I have not prevented Russian influence being regained and retained. I cannot prevent that influence being regained. That comes from the very quarter who, when this Government first came into power, would have been the very first to denounce the Government if they said that previous Governments had acquiesced in Russian influence in the North of Persia, and that we intended to do so no longer and were going to adopt a forward policy. Of course the permanent Russian occupation of Northern Persia and the overthrow of the Persian Government at Teheran would alter the situation; it would greatly offend Mahomedan feeling. The Russian occupation of Teheran and the overthrow of the Persian Government and the substitution for it of Russian Government at Teheran would, no doubt, alter the situation. But Russia, has assured us that is not her intention. In the first place, she has not sent troops to Teheran or attempted to occupy Teheran, and in the next place she has told us that when she sent troops into Persia they were sent for a special purpose, and will be withdrawn when that purpose is served and when the situation admits of it.
  Of course I do not say the situation as regards the future is free from difficulty with regard to Persia. It is not a very easy matter to keep the Persian Government on its feet and to get order re-established throughout Persia by Persian resources alone. That is what we wish to see done and what we are trying to do, and that is what, with patience, I think we shall succeed in doing. Without the Anglo-Russian Agreement there would be no chance of anything of the kind. Without the Anglo-Russian Agreement the same jealousy and suspicion of Russian action and British action respectively which existed in past years before the Agreement was made would lead to far worse consequences than at the present time. Whatever Russia has done in the North of Persia has been done with the sole regard to the effect of Persian action on affairs in Persia or her interests, and not for fear we should take advantage of the situation against them. If there had not been that confidence between the two
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  Governments the action would be very much more extensive, because in the old days each Government was working against the other at Teheran, not merely to protect its own interests, but to try and prevent the other taking advantage or supposed advantage of the situation, and if that motive still existed the interference would be on a much greater scale. What should we have done? We should have no security that we should not have found ourselves some day face to face with the fact that Russian influence in the North of Persia had led to concessions for a railway towards our frontier. How should we protect ourselves against that? We should have been driven, not because our own interests required it, but because we were afraid of a change in the situation to our disadvantage to assert our authority in those parts of Persia which it is specially necessary for us to watch in regard to our Indian frontier. Then you would really be on the way to a partition of Persia and a joint frontier.
  I trust anything of the kind will be avoided, that there will not be a partition of Persia, that we shall be able to keep intervention in internal Persian affairs within much narrower limits than we could have kept it if there was apprehension either on the Russian side that we were going to work against their interests in Persia, or on our side that they were going to work against us. We shall keep intervention within much narrower limits. If it were a fact that we were working against each other the intervention that would then take place would be very much greater.
  It is natural the House should expect Papers. I gave instructions some time ago before the House met, that Papers should be got ready, but it is necessary to send them to Teheran and to send certain parts to St. Petersburg to be examined in the Embassies and Legations there before they can be presented to Parliament. I am having that done as quickly as possible, and Papers which are being prepared will be laid I hope about the middle of next week. They will come down to a certain date, because I shall not be able to have Papers beyond that date by then, but I gave instructions that a further set of Papers should be prepared bringing events down to a later date. As I said in answer to a question the other day, I will have the Papers pushed on as fast as possible, and will have them laid before Parliament down to as late a date as possible.
  Mr. O'GRADY: I intervened in the Debate just now with the remark to which the right hon. Gentleman took exception. I simply asked, "What is to happen to the Persian people." I did not intend it to be controversial. We are a great Power, entering into this Convention to guarantee the integrity of Persia. I look to the Convention, and I do not find the word "guarantee" there at all. I think the words are "respect" the independence of Persia. I do not think we are respecting the independence of Persia at all. When the revolution was going on the Russians intervened very strongly. They did not do so merely to keep a ring, but for their own purposes. The right hon. Gentleman will remember that after the Nationalists captured Tabriz the precaution was taken of seizing the documents in the post office, and, I think, in these documents there was clear evidence of the fact that the Russians had supplied the Shah's troops with rifles and ammunition. The question was brought to the attention of this House, and it was not considered as a contravention of the Anglo-Russian Agreement with regard to Persia. I want to ask a few plain questions. I ask it as one of the men in the street who are supposed to rule this country by their votes. I will put it as low as that if you like. I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree that after all Russia has been very prominent in taking distinct action. She has taken very strong action with regard to the gentleman mentioned very frequently to-night, I mean Mr. Shuster. The right hon. Gentleman himself said that Mr. Shuster did not have sufficient tact, and was tactless in dealing with the circumstances and conditions that existed in Persia.
  The Russian officials did not want the intervention of an American clerk, as they called him. The general assumption was that he would not know anything at all about the Anglo-Russian Convention. I think, in the speech which Mr. Shuster delivered in London, he gave evidence to the fact that he is not only an expert financier, but that he is also a lawyer of some repute on international law. This gentleman took every care to try to thoroughly understand the Anglo-Russian Convention and to read the Blue Books in connection with it. He said he went to Persia to try to do a bit of honest work, to try to reconstruct the finances of Persia, and the experts among the Persian people themselves were so struck with his capacity for the work that it was
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  carried almost unanimously afterwards in the Mejliss. I think he even consulted our own Foreign Office, or some of the officials representative of it, with regard to the work he was going to carry out. I do not understand the attitude of our own Foreign Office with regard to the appointment of Major Stokes. Mr. Shuster and the Persian representative Chamber agreed that any reform brought about must be on the basis of financial reform. If they should make the roads safe, if they were going to get the country properly policed, or provide conditions that would make it possible to carry out the full terms of the Convention between ourselves and Russia, it was essential that money should be obtained, and that the finances of the country should be put in proper order. That could not be done unless you had police. The Treasurer-General, in order to put his financial loan into operation, selected Major Stokes, but before appointing him he consulted our own Foreign Office or their representatives. Major Stokes gave up his appointment at the Teheran Legation and went over, I understand, with the full consent and knowledge of our own officials there. Russia again intervened, and as a result the appointment of Major Stokes was cancelled, and he was sent about his business. I suggest that a powerful nation like ourselves should not agree to take up such a position as that. Then followed the entry of the ex-Shah into Persia as a rebel against the existing Government.
  8.0 P.M.
  One would have thought that the Persian people were perfectly entitled if they caught rebels red-handed, according to all the known laws of any country, to confiscate the property of the rebels. Everyone knows what happened when the ex-Shah went on this filibustering expedition—certainly with the aid of the Russian Government. If my information is correct they aided the ex-Shah, who was supposed to be in restraint at Odessa, point to point until he got landed on the Persian territory. At that time he was a rebel against his own country, and the constitution of the country, and if people went round with him in that rebellion certainly the Government were entitled to confiscate their property. I do not want to go over the whole story, but the sum and substance of it was this. A brother of the ex-Shah's property was under confiscation, and Persian gendarmes were put in to carry out the decree. It is common property that two Vice-Consuls of Russia, in full uniform, tried to provoke

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  the gendarmerie of Persia into some open and violent action. They did not succeed, but they made out a case, and the result was that an ultimatum was sent which insisted upon the dismissal of Mr. Shuster from his position and fourteen of the officials which he took with him from America to reconstitute the finances of the country, and many other matters. I want to know whether we have no concern at all for the people of Persia themselves. It is perfectly true that this Convention is in existence between two great Powers, but I should say that the result is that nothing has been done for the people of Persia; they are to be wiped out of the whole process; and whatever the right hon. Gentleman says to the contrary, it seems inevitable that partition will take place. Encroachment upon the Indian frontier, for instance, by Russia, might mean that you have got to protect 12,000 miles of frontier line in Asia, and this would lead to a large increase in the Army Estimates, and the Indian Government would have to pay their proportion of it. I know you cannot discuss this question without sentiment, and in spite of the fact that there are big commercial questions involved and big questions of diplomacy, I think England ought to be true to its own tradition of trying to assist small nations like the Persian people, who have struggled through centuries of oppression to establish a Constitution in accordance with the trend of things in the world generally, I should have thought we would have had some regard to that sentiment, and not discussed this Convention upon purely technical terms. Apparently, however, that is not to be the case, and I trust, in spite of all these things, that the Persian people will rise to the occasion and still insist, with all the power they possess, on a re-establishment of the Mejliss to start with, and that the old Constitution shall be put into operation again. Along that way lies the line of safety, and until that is done the Anglo-Russian Convention cannot be secure in all its terms as far as this country is concerned. I should think it is in the best interests of our Foreign Office to do what they can in this matter to help the restitution and restoration of the Mejliss and the old Constitution. I am glad this Motion has been brought before the House, if only to give some of us an opportunity of expressing our opinion upon this matter. I confess that I did not like the attitude of the right hon. Gentleman
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  to those of us who have tried to take an interest in this matter. Of course we may be wrong, but we are simply seeking information. I was a member of the Persian Committee, and I am a member of the Persian Society at the present moment. I am simply seeking for information, but the attitude of the right hon. Gentleman towards us seems to resent even the putting of questions.
  Sir EDWARD GREY: I think that is a little unfair. If I have given that impression it is an unfortunate manner of mine. I think if the hon. Member will consider the number of questions, including supplementary questions which I have answered, he will realise that if I have given the impression he complains of, it is not because I resent the putting of the questions, but because it would be embarrassing to our policy to answer them, in the difficulties which sometimes arise.
  Mr. O'GRADY: I am delighted to hear that statement. We do not wish to embarrass the right hon. Gentleman, and all we wish is to get proper information in reply to our questions. We claim to be democrats, and we consider it one of the greatest crimes we could be guilty of to allow a small nationality like Persia to be wiped out of existence. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman's convictions are much in the same direction as my own, but if anything can be done by suggestion with regard to the opening of the Mejliss and the restoration of the old Constitution I think in that way lies safety for ourselves, and along these lines we shall find greater security for carrying out the full terms of the existing Convention.
  Mr. NOEL BUXTON: There is one point on which I think another word or two might be said. I am glad to hear from the Foreign Secretary an expression of hope that so much can be done under the present circumstances and can in future be done to support Persian independence. It appears to me that the one thing for us to do now is to consider not what has happened in the past, but the possibilities of the future. The past is full of very regrettable incidents, and the history of the last three years in regard to Persia is not a happy one for any party to think over. It is quite clear, in spite of all that has been said that regarding Persia simply as a buffer state something has been lost. I have heard from Englishmen in Persia that it has been an extremely unpleasant

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  thing for Englishmen to realise the lowering of our prestige in the circles of Europeans who live in Persia. That opinion has not come from the representatives of Radicalism or sentimental people, but from persons whose names would command respect on all sides if I were at liberty to mention them.
  Let us turn our attention entirely to the future. The Foreign Secretary regards the entente as having been useful to the welfare of Persia. I have never been opposed to it, and I trust it will be continued, but is there not a distinction to be made here. The entente itself may have done no damage to Persian interests, but in the last two or three years it has amounted to a certain subservience to Russian wishes in regard to Persia. The utility of the entente does not at all disprove the contention that in future it may be possible to do more on account of another entente, or a least a detente, I mean the improvement in regard to Germany. Is it quite certain that the Foreign Office has really made up its mind that it is sincerely anxious for the welfare of Persia as an independent State? After all, it does not stand to reason that we should be pro-Persian in this sense. On what ground should we expect the Foreign Office to be pro-Persian? It is not honeycombed with Nationalist or Radical feeling. It could only be on the ground that Persia is useful to British interests as a buffer State. I think it is possible in the future for the Foreign Secretary to mould the policy of this country in the direction of a more sincere support of Persian independence than has been possible in the past. I think there are in the future possibilities much greater than we have realised in the past. The Persian history of the last three years has been merely a symptom of the Anglo-German situation, in fact it has been a sort of by-product of that situation. That fact has affected our policy in many other parts of the world. It has affected our policy in Turkey—in fact it has quite spoiled our policy towards Turkey from the point of view of British interests. I need not repeat the description given by the hon. Member for South Somerset of those days when demonstrations of the Turkish public took place continually before the British Embassy. What was the reason why we never took advantage of that absolutely unique opportunity in Turkey?
  Mr. SPEAKER: May I remind the hon. Member that we are not now discussing
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  Turkish affairs. This is not a general discussion on the Foreign Office, and the Amendment limits the Debate to Persia.
  Mr. NOEL BUXTON: I wish to make it clear that this has a bearing on the Persian question, because Persia and Turkey have intimate relations. Turkey has an extremely urgent interest in supporting the independence of Persia, and we have not been able, owing to the great International situation, to support Turkey in that policy. What has been the reason for that? In your presence, Mr. Speaker, knowing your interest in the present situation in Turkey, I should speak with embarrassment except for this fact: If there is any reason why we have not been active in Turkey, and supported Turkey in supporting Persia, it is not for want of activity which could have been exercised by His Majesty's Ambassador in Constantinople, but it has been for some greater reason which has profoundly affected our policy towards Persia. As a matter of fact, it has been our view that the primary consideration of our diplomacy has been to win friendship from Russia and other States as against Germany. That difficulty, let us hope, has been removed. Here we are bound to tread on dangerous ground, and we are bound to consider other reasons for backing up Persia. I think everybody realises the value of Persia to England as a buffer State. I would have liked to have asked the Foreign Secretary whether the policy lately pursued has had the support of the Indian Office.
  The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for INDIA (Mr. Montagu): I may say at once, Yes.
  Mr. NOEL BUXTON: I am glad to hear it, because the situation lately has reminded mo of the time when there were very few supporters of the idea of an Anglo-Russian entente. The scorn which was then poured upon the idea reminds mc of the qualms which come over a good many politicians in connection with Persian policy, qualms which suggest that possibly, after all, there may be such a divergence of interest between Great Britain and Russia that a close entente is not really a very statesmanlike thing. Undoubtedly, on the ground of the buffer State policy, we should have been more active in supporting Persia in the last few years. Let us hope we are going to be more active now. There is another consideration which I hope the Foreign Office

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  have in mind. No doubt my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for India has it very much in mind. It is really to the interest of Great Britain to support the independence and welfare of Mahomedan States. There are divergent views held whether it is to our interest, or to the interest of Europe at all, to endeavour to promote the welfare of such States as Turkey or Persia. If there is any Mahomedan State which is clearly worth supporting, it is Persia. You have a fairly homogeneous population, which you have not in the greater part of Turkey, and you have an immensely long and interesting history. After all, great military activity and the possibility of reform in Persia is not perhaps very much more remote than was the possibility oven in Japan some forty years ago. I should say even thirty years ago there were people who would have looked without any misgiving on a move of the Russian Government or of some other Government towards an occupation and domination of Japan. Yet, in spite of that, when the critical moment was passed, Japan became not only a great military Power, but a Power of interest from the ethnological point of view to the whole world.
  I trust the question whether Persia does not provide the finest opportunity for the development of a Mahomedan State is being adequately considered by the Foreign Office. There are strong reasons against such a policy, and there is a very influential party which urges, for instance, that this modern feature of a Mahomedan propaganda operating in many parts of the British Empire is a thing which has to be controlled and is somewhat encouraged by the existence of independent Mahomedan States. There are even those who, exaggerating the case, consider the British Government will some day have to consider obtaining possession of the holy places of Mecca itself. There is a very strong party urging in that direction in the Foreign Office and in other offices, and my hope is, our hope throughout this House is, that the Foreign Office will come to the conclusion that those considerations are not the overwhelming ones, and that it is to the interests of our own strategy as well as to the interests of the powers of civilisation at large that Mahomedan States, where they have an opportunity of existence as in Persia, should not be discouraged but should be promoted and assisted. After all, the view that no Mahomedan State is to be encouraged
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  would be Europeanism of a fanatical kind, only paralleled in the days of the Crusade, and there is an enemy there against which the representatives of an English Government will wish to contend I am sure with all their force.
  It is a very fair question which is put to us: What more is there to do? The right hon. Gentleman says, "We have done a great deal for the maintenance of Persia's independence, and we shall be able to do more, but," he says, "we could not have done more even if we had been quit of the Anglo-Russian entente." He says we should have done less. May I suggest one way in which definitely we may be able to do more? We have been debarred by our relations with Germany from friendship with Turkey. We have been prevented from encouraging Turkey to take up a strong line in regard to Persia, but undoubtedly, if the Turks are able and are encouraged to take an active line with regard to the independence of Persia, they can exert an influence, and I trust in the future we shall not be hampered from perfect freedom in regard to any encouragement we may give to Turkey in that direction. Subservience to Russian interests prevents us from taking a friendly line towards the Turks, but the time has come when perhaps we shall be freer than we have been in the past. Here is another point where I venture to think the right hon. Gentleman will agree we might have done more and may in the future do more. We shall be freer with regard to arrangements for loans. A great City house has been actively attempting to arrange a big loan for Persia now for two years past, and we, I believe, have not seen fit to actively encourage those negotiations. We have certain connections with the Imperial Bank of Persia, but possibly if we are quite free from any necessity to be very considerate and very tender towards Russian wishes, we shall be able to do more to help the Persian Government to utilise the advantages offered by that great City house.
  Clearly, this is not a party matter. Not long ago Lord Curzon made a great utterance, certainly the most Nationalist and Liberal utterance recently made with regard to Persia. He may be regarded on foreign affairs as the spokesman of the Conservative party. It appears he thinks there is a great deal more we might do with regard to Persia. I think probably, though the Foreign Secretary does not say so, he

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  himself thinks there is in the future, now there is an improved situation in the greater international world, much more that can be done. One is obliged to say things which, as the hon. Member for Somerset observed, our Ambassadors and our Ministers may regret, because they are liable to distortion and perversion in foreign countries. But I think a moral may be drawn. All these objections to free speech, which I am extremely conscious of in this House, would be removed if the Government adopted the suggestion of a Foreign Affairs Committee, and that would possibly have mitigated the situation in regard to Germany during the last two or three years and have left us freer in regard to the question of Persia. I should only like to suggest, in conclusion, that the proposal of a Foreign Affairs Committee, such as operates in France, is well worth the consideration of the Government.
  Mr. PONSONBY: I only introduced this Amendment with a view to getting a discussion on this specific question of Persia, and in that way, I think it has been useful. If I do not divide the House it is not because the right hon. Gentleman has satisfied me. I have been deeply disappointed with what he said. There were several points he did not touch upon, notably the re-institution of the Mejliss, and I regret that very much. He said he must regard the Persian question from the point of view of British interests. I maintain that the greatest British interest at the present time is the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Persia. There is no greater interest at present. I had hoped very much the right hon. Gentleman would have taken a still stronger line when he said we had a right to expect that Russia would withdraw her troops. It is a question which is engaging the attention of the whole country, and we shall have to watch events very carefully. I dare say we shall have an opportunity of another Debate, meanwhile I beg to ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Main Question again proposed.
  Motion made, and Question, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—[Mr. Saunders]—put, and agreed to.
  Debate to be resumed to-morrow (Thursday).

SUPERANNUATION.
Committee to consider of making further provision out of moneys provided by Parliament for superannuation, allowances, and gratuities [King's recommendation signified]. To-morrow (Thursday).—[Master of Elibank.]
Adjourned at Halt after Eight o'clock.

  Home-Made Spirits (Returns).
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NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT.
  TRAINING COLLEGES.
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EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
George Nathaniel Baron Curzon of Kedleston in the Peerage of Ireland, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., having been created Baron Ravensdale of Ravensdale, Viscount Scarsdale of Scarsdale, and Earl Curzon of Kedleston, all in the County of Derby, in the Peerage of the United Kingdom—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
CANVEY DEEP WATER WHARF AND RAILWAY BILL. [H.L.]
Presented, and read 1a.
NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY BILL. [H.L.]
Presented, read 1a; and referred to the Examiners.

INDIA.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON*EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON rose to call attention to the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to the removal of the capital of India to Delhi, and other connected matters; and to move for Papers.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, I think I had better begin by an apology for the unconscionable strain that I am afraid I shall place upon the patience of your Lordships. But it is not possible to deal briefly with every aspect of this great case. The decision which I am about to discuss is by far the most important that has been come to since the Government of India was taken over by the Crown. It is not merely a question of moving the capital from Calcutta to Delhi, or of redistributing boundaries of Provinces containing nearly 100 millions of people in the Eastern parts of India; it is a question raising great issues which must profoundly affect your rule in India for all time.
It was on December 12 last that the noble Viscount, Lord Morley, told us in this House of the new and far-reaching steps which had been announced that morning at Delhi by His Majesty the King,
138
and commended them to the consideration of this House. It is no secret, my Lords, that we were all taken by surprise. My noble friend Lord Lansdowne and myself had only heard of this fact a few hours in advance, and though he and I had been jointly responsible for the Government of India for a period of twelve years, though there were other ex-Viceroys in this country who had been similarly responsible for another ten years, though our joint knowledge of India, and our responsibility for its government in the highest place had thus covered a period of twenty-two years, I believe I am right in saying that not one of us had been consulted in advance or had the slightest inkling of what was going to be done. I make no complaint of that. His Majesty's Government are entitled to consult or not to consult whomever they please. But I think it should be known that this step was taken on the initiative of a Viceroy—I speak of him with respect because he is a personal friend—who had only been in India a few months, of a Secretary of State who had not enjoyed his great position for a longer period, and without any reference to those officers who had been responsible for the Government of India for a period of nearly a quarter of a century. Lord Lansdowne on that occasion described this departure as one of the utmost gravity. He said that we ought not hurriedly to pass judgment upon it, but that we retained our right of free criticism at a later date. Since then neither he nor I have said one word in public about this matter. While the King was in India it appeared unbecoming to us that any note of discord should mar the triumphant effect of His Majesty's progress.
Here may I say how cordially and respectfully I endorse what was said on this matter by the Leaders on both sides of the House in the debate on the Address a few days ago? I truly believe that no British Monarch ever rendered a greater service to India or any part of his Dominions than did His Majesty by the conception and execution of his tour. I say the conception, because everybody knows that the idea was His Majesty's own, to which he adhered in spite of the advice given him by many well qualified to pronounce; and I say the execution, because although the fullest credit ought to be given to those in India who were responsible for the detail and the ceremonial of

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a visit which appears to have passed off almost without a hitch, yet it is indisputable that the main success was due to the personality of their Majesties themselves, who succeeded in persuading the Princes and the peoples of India that they were not only paying their homage to their Sovereigns in a great and stately ceremonial, but that they were meeting those who felt for them a sincere and profound regard.
And if there is one point in His Majesty's tour to which I would beg leave to call passing attention, it is to the utterances of His Majesty himself. I do not believe that a series of speeches was ever made by a Monarch or by any British public man characterised by a deeper insight, a more balanced and felicitous choice of words, or a more genuine feeling. When His Majesty ended by that message of hope which he gave to the peoples of India as a sort of watchword for their future progress, he struck a note which vibrated in the heart of every man, not merely who heard it but who read it in any part of the Empire, and he expressed an aspiration that every one of us deeply trusts will be realised in the days that are to come. Nothing that I may say this afternoon about the announcement which was placed in the lips of the King can in the least degree affect my profound and respectful recognition of the service rendered by His Majesty in India to India and to the Empire.
The question, however, may be raised whether the action of the Sovereign, irrevocable as we have been told it is, should debar us from any criticism upon it. I am as alive as any man to the value of imagination in your Eastern policies, and to the importance of ruling the East, not by cut-and-dried formuhæ, but by an appeal to sentiment and to feeling. I know how moved Oriental Peoples are by a supreme manifestation of Royal power, and therefore I of all people am not blind to the spectacular and dramatic effects of such a scene as was witnessed at Delhi. And yet, my Lords, I have no doubt whatever as to the answer which ought to be given to my own question. It would not be right that even in India the personal authority of the Sovereign should be engaged to relieve his Ministers of the responsibility which is theirs, to supersede Parliament, which is the governing authority
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as regards India and every portion of His Majesty's Dominions, or to shut the mouths of public men. For surely it is clear that if you once accept the principle that great political and administrative changes can be introduced in India by the fiat of the Sovereign, even on the occasion of his Coronation, without challenge, you impair and weaken the Constitutional machinery which we have set up in this country and which we regard as the guarantee of our liberties. You set up an autocracy which is not the more tolerable, but the less tolerable because the Ministers who really exercise it shelter themselves behind the person of the Sovereign. You establish a precedent which might in the future be followed on occasions other than a Coronation. You might, indeed, tempt succeeding Sovereigns to go one better than their predecessors, or in the inverse case you might compel the Sovereign to desist from going to India to celebrate his Coronation at all because he had no dramatic or commanding boon to give. These results, I think, might ensue from our silent acceptance of what has been done. No doubt it would be much easier and much pleasanter for us on this side to say nothing at all, but if we held our peace we might be suspected of acquiescence in the course that has been adopted, and we might encourage its repetition in the future. That is the reason, my Lords, why we are compelled to raise this question to-day. Nothing that will be said here will be in any degree disrespectful to the action of the Sovereign. It is the action of his Ministers that is our concern. It is their advice to the Sovereign that we impugn. Indeed the King himself made it perfectly clear at Delhi, because he used the words that it was upon the advice of his Ministers that he was taking action.
What is the gravamen of our charge against Ministers? For the moment I say nothing about the policy itself. I speak only of its matter and its method. They decided upon a course the importance of which they would be the last to deny. It was a course involving the uprooting of traditions in India which had existed for 150 years. It involved not merely the shifting of the capital, but the creation of a new capital. It included the reversal, either entire or partial, of a great administrative act of their predecessors. It entailed the carving about of great Provinces in a part of India. All these steps

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were decided upon in secret without consultation with those whom you ordinarily consult in India, without any intimation to representative bodies or persons, without any consultation of public opinion, behind the back of Parliament. Then you give finality to this procedure, you invest it with a sacrosanct character by putting it into the mouth of the Sovereign—not in a King's Speech or in any manner with which we may be familiar in this country, but on an occasion when the King utters a solemn pledge, a pledge invested with almost sacramental solemnity, to the representatives of 300,000,000 of his people in India. Is it possible to imagine a procedure more contrary to the established usage of our Constitution, less consonant with our democratic practice?
Look at the results of your action. In the first place, you use your advantage to relieve yourselves of all opposition till it is too late, and of all criticism until it must necessarily be ineffective. Then you place us, the Opposition, in the embarrassing position of reviewing what is already an accomplished act. You institute what is a new procedure in the history of British rule in India. Hitherto no great change has taken place in the Government of India without full discussion in Parliament and the sanction of both Houses. This was the case with Pitt's Act in 1784, with the various Charter Acts of 1793, 1813, 1833, and 1853, with the Government of India Act under which the Crown took over the Government of India in 1858, and with Lord Beaconsfield's Royal Titles Act in 1876. Every one of those measures was debated at length in both Houses of Parliament. Some of us are old enough to remember that the Party opposite distinguished themselves by their frantic hostility to Mr. Disraeli's far-sighted measure giving to Queen Victoria the title of Empress of India. But Mr. Disraeli, as he then was, although he was an Imperial statesman, was also a Constitutional Minister. He did not make his announcement at a Durbar, although Lord Lytton, the then Viceroy, was commanded to hold a Durbar on that occasion. Even his Oriental imagination shrank from anything so startling, and he followed the procedure which has always been adopted on similar occasions of asking the sanction of Parliament. Now, for the first time, a great change is introduced into the Government of India which, whether for good or bad,
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is without the hall-mark of Parliamentary approval and has not had behind it the sanction of the representatives of the people.
The case is in one respect rendered worse, because you have utilised the authority of the Sovereign to settle in your own way an issue of the most acutely controversial character. I allude, of course, to the Partition of Bengal, upon which parties both in India and in this country are, and have been, sharply divided. This is, indeed, a very dangerous precedent, for if the King may be brought in to upset the decision of one party he may equally be brought in to reverse the policy of another. There is another and more insidious danger. If the policy which you have placed in the mouth of the Sovereign is a popular and successful policy—as we all hope it may be—then the credit will attach, in large measure, to the Sovereign. But supposing your policy is not so fortunate in its results. Then some portion of the blame can hardly fail to fall upon the innocent shoulders of the Sovereign himself.
These are the main reasons why we regard your conduct as unconstitutional. If any lawyer here were to ask me what I mean by the word "unconstitutional" in this case my reply might not be a legal one, but I think it would meet the circumstances of the case. By unconstitutional I mean contrary to the settled practice and the established usage of our Constitution. You have done in India what no British Government has ever done there before. You have done what you would not have dared to attempt in England, what if we had attempted to do either here or in India you would have made the heavens ring with your denunciations, and you have done it in a manner that saves you from retribution and screens you from attack. The Secretary of State may say in reply to me that he could not have done it in any other way. I should feel tempted to rejoin that if that were so it ought not to be done at all. If your proposals were so controversial that you could not rely upon the favourable judgment of the public then you ought not to have resorted to this device to carry them through. On the other hand, if your proposals were as reasonable and popular as I believe you claim them to be, then there ought to have been no hesitation in submitting them to public opinion in advance.
There is one defence which I hope the Secretary of State for India will not make. It is contained in an astonishing sentence in the speech of the Prime Minister the other evening in the House of Commons. The right hon. gentleman argued that the two policies of the Partition of Bengal in my time and the transfer of the capital of India and the reversal of Partition now are on all fours, because in the one case the policy was announced by the King and in the other case by Lord Curzon. Surely this is the flimsiest and most transparent of fallacies!In the one case, when the decision was announced in my time, it had been discussed in every Government and every newspaper in India, and after a Blue Book full of information had been for months in the possession of Parliament and public at home, whereas your policy was announced without consultation with anybody and without the publication of any Papers at all. In the second place, my policy could be reversed, as you have reversed it. Your policy cannot. I hope, therefore, that whatever defence you offer it may be something better than and different from this trumpery and shallow excuse which did service in the House of Commons.
There is one other feature of your policy to which I think it is my duty to call attention in passing, and that is the extreme secrecy and the almost indecent haste of your procedure. The Government of India has many virtues and I have no doubt some failings, but I have always thought its most admirable feature to be the extreme deliberation with which it prepares its cases and the frankness with which it takes the public into its counsels. No Government—certainly no Government that is often called despotic—lives so much in an atmosphere of public criticism as the Government of India. Before any new policy can be adopted there it is examined by the local Governments, referred to and after wards reported upon by local representative bodies and discussed in the Press. Only after it has gone through this ordeal is it sent home to the Secretary of State. Your policy was not referred to a single local Government; not a single Lieutenant-Governor was consulted. Even the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province most concerned only learnt of it the night before it was announced at Delhi. You cannot quote a single opinion of a representative body in India in favour of your policy—I mean
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given before the policy was announced. Only three years ago in this House was set up, on the initiative of Lord Morley, a great scheme of Legislative Councils in India, Imperial and provincial, and the noble Viscount was most eloquent about the manner in which those bodies would focus the intelligence, the sentiments, the aspirations of the Indian people. They were to constitute a sort of bridge between the Government and the people. Did you consult them? Is not the question of the capital of India of any interest to the representative bodies whom you have set up? Have they not their views about it? You said nothing to them at all on the subject. You may say that your policy was approved by the Viceroy and his Council. I cannot, of course, comment upon the conditions under which the Council of the Viceroy gave its assent in India. But I do know—I say it without any invidious intent—that that Council represents a shorter experience of India than any Council in modern times. If the Secretary of State goes on to tell me that his policy was approved by his Council at home, I shall be greatly surprised—I think I am speaking what is common knowledge—if those gentlemen were consulted under conditions that rendered independent examination and criticism, much less refusal, on their part at all possible. But that, my Lords, is the limit of the support which the Secretary of State can claim. I do not know if he congratulates himself on the manner in which it has been carried through, but I can assure him that there are great searchings of heart in many quarters as to the manner in which it has been done, and that those, at any rate, with whom I come in contact who are best acquainted with India think that a dangerous precedent has been set up which they earnestly hope may never again be followed in the future.
I pass from the manner and methods of your policy to its concrete form. I have to deal with that policy in relation to six matters. One, the removal of the capital from Calcutta; two, the reversal of the Partition of Bengal; three, the revival of the Chief Commissionership of Assam; four, the creation of the new Province of Behar; five, the placing of the capital at Delhi; and six, the question of finance. As regards Calcutta, I hope I shall not be tempted to overstate the case of Calcutta. I have a very warm feeling for Calcutta

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myself. It has always seemed to me to be a worthy capital and expression of British rule in India. It is English built, English commerce has made it the second city in the Empire, for so it is, in population and size, and from the offices of the Government in Calcutta English statesmen, administrators, and generals have built up to its present commanding height the fabric of British rule in India. Calcutta has had a splendid past, and whatever happens to it in the future nothing can alter that. Now what are the reasons in your Despatch for dethroning Calcutta? They are of very varying value. In the first place, the Government of India argue that geographically Calcutta is ill-adapted to be the capital because it is in a corner of India. I will not lay too much stress upon that. Capitals are seldom chosen for their central position. Neither St. Petersburg, Paris, nor Washington are in the centre of their respective countries, and I do not think that London is in the centre of the British Isles. Railway facilities are so great nowadays that geographical difficulties are overcome.
There is another extraordinary argument in the Despatch which I fail to understand, and that is the argument that the Imperial Legislative Council can do its work better in a more central position. You might just as well argue that the American Congress cannot do its duty well because the capital of Washington is in an eastern State. The second reason given in the Despatch is one upon which the Secretary of State has laid some stress, but which, if I may say so, seems to me to be very feeble. The Government of India say that it is a serious anomaly that the two Governments, Imperial and local, should exist side by side in the same city, and the Secretary of State goes on to advance the extraordinary proposition that the Governor-General in India thereby becomes saddled with the responsibility of the Bengal Government and that the local Government suffers from the loss of a sense of responsibility. I do not recognise that picture. I spent seven winters in Calcutta, a longer time than any ex-Viceroy living, and I was brought in contact with three Lieutenant-Governors of Bengal. No trouble occurred between the two Governments in my day. Most friendly relations prevailed between the individuals and the Governments. I constantly received assistance from them, and
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I believe the Government of Bengal welcomed the appearance of the Government of India with its highly-trained body of expert officials, because it widened their outlook and taught them other things, and certainly for my part I welcomed contact and association with the officials of the Government of Bengal. I challenge the noble Marquess to produce the evidence of a single Lieutenant-Governor, past or present, who will dispute what I have said on this subject. Then a bigger anomaly has been left untouched. For seven months of the year the Imperial Government and a Local Government exist side by side on the narrow ridge of Simla, a much more anomalous and difficult position than their juxtaposition for the remainder of the year in Calcutta. Every argument that the noble Marouess has used with regard to Calcutta applies with double force to Simla. I invite him to say, as he has turned the Government of India out of Calcutta, whether he is going to turn it out of Simla too.
The third reason given in the Despatch is, I venture to say, the real one, though it is wrapped up in somewhat euphemistic language. The Government of India say that they desire to withdraw the Government of India from its present provincial environment and from the influence of local opinion. I am indeed amused at a Liberal Government desiring to withdraw its representatives from contact with local opinion. How often have we been advised in this House that this is the ideal we ought to have in view, and how often did the noble Viscount (Lord Morley) reproach me in the old days with having carried my partition of Bengal without sufficient reference to local opinion? Well, I have no doubt that this represents the real feeling and desire of the Government of India. They desire to escape the somewhat heated atmosphere of Bengal and to say good-bye to the Bengali friends for whom they have just done so much. I have some sympathy with that feeling, but do not let us be hypocritical about it. If that is the reason why you are leaving Calcutta, do not attempt to assign other reasons which are of greatly inferior importance.
As to the future of Calcutta, I am not one of those who think that the removal of the Government will seriously or detrimentally affect it. The importance of Calcutta

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results from its position on the sea, from its proximity to the great sources of supply of jute and coal and tea in Eastern India, and from the enterprise of its merchants. I dare say there will be some displacement of trade, some depreciation of property, perhaps some loss of money to individual firms; but I have little doubt that the mercantile community in Calcutta will show the patriotism and public spirit which they have displayed all along, and that, sore as they are at the displacement of their metropolitan city, they will bend their backs to win for Calcutta in the future as great and famous a place as it has had in the past. Personally I think the removal of the Government from Calcutta much more injurious to the Government than it will be to Calcutta. Of course this displacement will be welcomed elsewhere in India. I have never been able to understand why it is that rival cities regard each other with a jealousy to which rival lovers and even rival politicians seldom attain. But so it is. Glasgow and Edinburgh, Manchester and Liverpool, Milan and Turin, Petersburg and Moscow—in none of these cases is there any great warmth of affection between the two cities or their inhabitants. And it is quite true that the supremacy of Calcutta has always excited very poignant emotions in the breasts of Madras and Bombay. Every year there is a sort of struggle when the Census figures come out to try and prove that Calcutta is or is not the premier city in India, and, though I do not wish to do my friends who have been Governors of Madras an injustice, I believe that at the bottom of their hearts there is a sort of sneaking satisfaction at the dethronement of Calcutta.
But you have not merely dethroned Calcutta; you have accompanied that act with the reversal of the so-called partition of Bengal. It is six and a-half years since that measure was carried. I use the phrase "partition" for brevity sake; I do not think it at all describes the fact. During that time I have seen the most extraordinary descriptions of the object of the Government of India which have made me sometimes rub my eyes and wonder whether I was living in a world of reality. Every one knows that that was an administrative measure which had been called for for years. I was not the man to start it. It had been discussed for twenty years before my day. I took it up because half way through my time in India I became
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acquainted with the scandalous maladministration which was going on in the Eastern Province of Bengal, and the shocking neglect of education and public works and all that goes to make the contented life of a people, and with the oppression of the Mahomedans by their neighbours. That was a blot upon the Government of India. It was due to the fact that you were trying to administer the affairs of eighty millions of people through one Government and one man, and the only way to remedy it was to divide the Province and duplicate the machinery of government. What was the particular line to be drawn when the division was made was a matter not for the Viceroy. The Viceroy does not settle such issues. The line was settled by consultation and discussion between the local Governments and officials, representative bodies, and so on. They agreed upon a line, and that line was based upon ethnical and geographical considerations, the importance of which could not be denied. I gladly accepted it. I knew the obloquy with which I should be overwhelmed, because I was aware that the line of division would run counter to the personal interests of journalists, pleaders, and landlords whose headquarters were Calcutta. But I was willing to run the risk. I decided to bear the brunt because I believed the decision to be right, and because I was certain that in the long run—I hoped in the short run—truth would prevail.
The Partition was promulgated in October, 1905. I came home the month after, and the Liberal Government came into office in December. They might have disowned my act, the act of my Government, and I should not have complained if they had done so. I might have regretted it, but I could not have complained. But no, they accepted it. The noble Viscount will bear me out that never on a single occasion, public or private, did I ever put any pressure upon him. I do not think I ever mentioned it to him. They decided on their own initiative to carry on that policy. The noble Viscount said he disapproved of the methods by which it had been carried. I never knew what he meant by that. But he said over and over again in this House and elsewhere that he and his colleagues regarded it as a settled fact. That reply was repeated over and over again by your officials in India. Now what happened? As time went on the Bengalis began to realise that their agitation was

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futile. The fruits of partition became manifest. The new Province advanced in education, in good government, in every mark of prosperity. Your officers there did the most admirable work in creating this new fabric, and over and over again, acting on your instructions, they repeated the assurance to the population that this was a settled fact and that the good faith of the British Government was pledged to its continuance. It is true that outside a fitful and sputtering agitation was kept up by the Bengali community, but that was done more for form than for anything else, and there was neither substance nor life in the agitation.
Your Lordships may think I am an interested party. Let me therefore give you the opinions, not of myself, but of important natives of India. There is a well-known Bengali writer, Mr. Mitra, who wrote in 1908 a book called "Indian Problems," and this is what he said—
"The cut-and-dried phrases of the professional agitator should not confuse the British public. It is clear that the partition does not make the Bengali a farthing the worse in person, reputation, or pocket. It was an admirable move, calculated to benefit millions."
Then there was a discussion in the Imperial Legislative Council. My noble friend Lord Minto was in the Chair and will recall what I am going to say. One of the most conspicuous Congress representatives had repeated the familiar charges against the Partition, and a native member for the Province got up and said (this was on March 30, 1910)—
"On the strength of the views of Lord MacDonnell the Partition of Bengal has been called a blunder, and your Excellency has been invited to undo it. I, on the other hand, knowing and realising full well the responsibility that attaches to a member of this Council, most emphatically assert that if the Government meddled with this beneficent measure it would be committing an act of supreme folly; it would be creating serious discontent and unrest where none exist now."
LORD MACDONNELL OF SWINFORD: Will the noble Earl mention the speaker's name?
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Yes. He was Mr. Magharul Hague, Mahomedan member for Eastern Bengal; and this gentleman was followed by Mr. Shamsul Huda, another native member, who said he had once signed a petition against
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Partition but had grown wiser as years rolled by, and he described the Partition as greatly beneficial to the Province. I should like to quote one other authority, that of the distinguished Correspondent of The Times. I quote this authority because The Times is, as I gather, one of the leading supporters of His Majesty's Government in this case, and it is interesting therefore to know what their Correspondent said when he was in India three years ago. He wrote—
"The agitation against Partition is dying, even in Bengal, and is almost unregarded in the other Provinces. The authorities are too firmly convinced of the administrative value of the division to attempt any modification now, and there is the further fact that any reversal of policy might have dangerous results. The eighteen millions of Mahomedans would bitterly resent any suggestion of the repeal of Partition. It stands in no need of renewed vindication, for it has been entirely justified by results."
The second passage is even stronger—this was written in Bengal on February 15, 1909—
"I have yet to meet anybody, English or Indian, who can tell me in what respect the Partition has injured a single living soul, while one has only to visit the Province, invigorated with new life and inspired by new aspirations, to realise the benefits which the severance has conferred upon millions of neglected people. To alter or to modify it now would be suicidal folly. It would be worse, for it would be a criminal blunder."
That is very strong language—it is not mine, it comes from an authority much greater than myself—and I leave His Majesty's Government to dispose of it as best they can. This is the moment, when this spurious and vexatious agitation has died down, when the benefits of Partition have been conclusively vindicated, when everything is going well in the new Province, that a new Viceroy appears on the scene and in a few weeks is enabled to inform the world that all of us have been entirely wrong.
The Government of India say in their Despatch that the bitterness of feeling engendered by the Partition of Bengal is very widespread, that the resentment among the Bengalis is as strong as ever though less vocal, and the Government of India make the astonishing discovery that the Partition has been responsible for the growing estrangement in many parts of the country between Mahomedans and Hindus. Finally, in comes the Secretary of State, also new to his Office, and he tells

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us that the Viceroy has depicted the consequences of Partition with accuracy and fairness. I deny every one of those propositions and I challenge the noble Marquess to produce any competent or reliable evidence in support of the assertions which he contends are characterised by accuracy and fairness. Can he quote the authority of a single Lieutenant-Governor who has served in Bengal in recent years? Can he quote the authority of the last or the present Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal? Can he name a single representative body or institution in India that will support his view? I have heard of none, and I am not aware that they exist. I think I can quote the highest authority of all, and that is the Secretary of State himself. If you look at the White Paper you will see that on November 1 the Secretary of State put his signature to the Despatch in which he congratulates the Government of India on the accuracy and fairness of their statement—this statement about the ill-feeling and unrest existing in Bengal about Partition. But on November 2 we had a debate in this House about some Indian matters, and the Secretary of State then used a different line of argument. He wanted to show how well things were going on, and he said—
"There is nothing now in the general temper, not merely of the people of India as a whole, but of any race or section of the people of India, which ought to cause anything which can be described by the word 'anxiety.'"
When the Secretary of State made that remark, which I believed to be true, I loudly cheered, and I should have cheered all the more had I known that he was cutting away the ground from his own statement of the day before, and that he was about so effectually to demolish his own case.
I dare say the Secretary of State will try to console me by saying that partition has not been revoked—that my Government divided Bengal into two Provinces, and that he has divided Bengal into three, and that therefore he is carrying further the principle which I adopted. In fact that is true. There is no reversion to the status quo ante. Nobody would be foolish or insane enough to propose such a thing. But to all intents and purposes the old partition has been reversed. For the Province I have described has ceased to exist, and the Mahomedans in it, who were
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for the first time given a chance of asserting their independent existence, are once again merged in a great Hindu province, the fortunes of which will be dictated from Calcutta. Perhaps the best judges of whether partition is reversed or not will be found in India herself. Directly after the announcement was made at Delhi the Congress Committee met and passed a vote of thanks to the Government for the fulfilment of their political aspirations; and subsequently, at the meeting of the Congress, the President spoke of the annulment of partition as a triumph in the most momentous Constitutional struggle in modern times. Not in any part of India is there any doubt that agitation has won the day. You may disclaim that that was your intention, but so it is universally regarded, and if so no one is really responsible but yourselves. If you declare a measure to be a settled fact and instruct your officials so to inform the people, and if then, six years later, you turn round and throw to the winds what you have said, can you be surprised that this is regarded on your part as an exhibition of weakness or that it is thought and said that agitation has won the day?
Now as regard the Mahomedans, what do they say? Do they agree that partition has not been reversed? My Lords, I think the position of the Mahomedans in Eastern Bengal is one of the saddest features of the present situation. For six years or more they have held aloof from agitation and have occupied themselves with building up their Province. Dacca, the capital, had started upon a new life; they looked forward to having a University and High Court there; over and over again they have been to the Government and have been assured by the officers of Government that the thing was a settled fact and was going to remain. Now that policy is reversed. No wonder they feel bitter!I speak from having seen letters from their leading men and from a knowledge of resolutions which have been passed in all their cities. It is a matter of common knowledge throughout India that their leading nobleman, when he was decorated the other day at Delhi, said—
"The ribbon which you hang round my neck is a halter with which I am to hang myself."
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: May I ask the noble Earl's authority for that singular statement?
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I can give the noble Marquess the authority privately. It has been constantly repeated and is well known to be the fact. All these resolutions speak of the Government having gone back on its word, and the face of Government as being blackened. If I were the Secretary of State handing an olive branch to India I confess that I should feel some pang of compunction at this sacrifice of Mahomedan interests. It is a bad thing for the Government of India when its word is broken. It is a bad thing for the prestige of Government. It is a bad thing for your officers, too. I wonder have you paused to think what are the sentiments of your officials in this Province who for years past have been assuring the people that you would be true to your word, and who now see—I will not say their work thrown away, because good work is never thrown away, but see the pledges which they have given with your authority broken.
The Government of India are, I know, conscious of this feeling, and they have sought in their Despatch to allay the fears of the Mahomedans. In their Despatch the Government of India say that the numbers of the Mahomedans will be about equal to those of the Bengalis in the new Province, and they will have special representation in the Council. I do not think there is much comfort to be derived from that. The Mahomedans in India know very well that they cannot compete with the Bengalis in organisation, in education, or in wealth. Influence in India is not a question of numbers; it is a question of ability and character and organisation. Nothing, I am afraid, can alter the fact that whereas up to December 12 last the Mahomedans of Eastern Bengal were the predominant element in the Province now the balance has swung round and once more they are under Calcutta.
The Government of India in their Despatch say that the new Governor of Bengal is to reside at Dacca from time to time, and the Secretary of State goes rather further and says that the Governor should regard Dacca as a second capital with a claim on his attention and residence for an appreciable part of the year. What does that mean? Is residence at Dacca to be optional? What in practice will happen? I know very well that in the winter mouths Calcutta will pull him in
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one direction, that in the summer months Darjeeling will pull him in another, and that Dacca stands the risk of being squeezed out between these two. I do not think the assurances in the Despatch are enough. There is a strong feeling in India that it would be well to place some statutory obligation upon the Governor of Bengal to spend a certain part of the year at Dacca. I do not give an opinion on that point, but I do say we ought to instruct him to spend at least three months of the year in Dacca, and if possible to take with him the Council and the whole machinery of Government. This is the only way in which you can derive any return for the enormous sums spent on establishing a capital at Dacca—between£500,000 and£1,000,000—and in which you can salve the wounded feelings of Mahomedans and give them some guarantee of fair treatment in future.
Before I pass away from Bengal there are two features of your policy there to which I can only allude in passing. The first is this. You are setting up government by a Governor in Council in Bengal. That is an old and much-debated question. It has been agitated for fifty years. The weight of authority has always been against the suggestion. Personally I am against government by a Governor in Council for Bengal. I do not think the situation in Bengal is likely best to be dealt with by a Governor from home, necessarily ignorant of India and likely to be in many cases a Party politician. I have always held that Bengal with its peculiar and complex problems demanded the very best man the Service of India can produce. I wonder if there is a single Lieutenant-Governor or ex-Lieutenant-Governor who shares your feelings. I rather think Lord MacDonnell, who acted for a short time as Governor, does.
LORD MAC DONNELL OF SWINFORD: In the new state of things—yes. But I agree in the old state of things with the noble Earl.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I have been brought in contact with four or five Lieutenant-Governors, and I have not found one who did not hold the views which I have just expressed. The second feature to which I must allude in passing is this, that the first price you have to pay for your reconstituted Bengal is the discontent of the Service. Your new Bengal will not possess a single healthy district,

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and it is not surprising, therefore, that the Civil Service should have unanimously petitioned to be transferred elsewhere. This is not a selfish or negligible attitude on their part. You cannot expect men to go on toiling in that climate from year's end to year's end without sometimes having a change from an unhealthy to a healthy district. You want your Service in Bengal to be the most efficient that India can provide, but if everyone shirks Bengal the Province will obtain not the best but the worst, and if your Civil Servants there become weakened in physical stamina or in spirit it must react on the administration. If you look at the scheme in the manner in which it affects Bengal, there is not much cause for satisfaction. You have yielded to a dying and, as I think, factitious agitation; you have bitterly offended the Mahomedans and taught them that the word of the British Raj can be broken; you have set up a Province which will be the most unpopular in India, and you have instituted a form of government which, in my judgment, is unsuitable for the Province and the people. So much for Bengal.
I must, at the risk of wearying your Lordships, say a word about two other ancillary arrangements which you contemplate in that part of India. The first of these is with regard to Assam. It is part of your plan that Assam should revert to government by a Chief Commissioner, and the reasons given in the Despatch for so doing are, first, that it is a frontier province which ought to be under the direct control of the Government of India; secondly, that it is a backward province; and, thirdly, that no one is very likely to object. I venture to say that these are very weak reasons. They are afterthoughts intended to justify a decision arrived at on other grounds. There is no analogy whatever between the North-East and North-West Frontiers of India. On the North-East frontier adjoining Assam you have to deal with hill tribes armed with bows and arrows; on the North-West you are confronted with the formidable Pathan organisation, and behind is the kingdom of Afghanistan. You say that Assam is a backward province. So it has been, and you now propose to stereotype it in its backwardness. It was precisely because it was backward that we took it up and made it part of a larger province in order to bring it into line with the best traditions of Indian rule. Another defect that you
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will reproduce by reverting to the old arrangement is that being a small province Assam had no Service or Commission of its own. It had to borrow its officers from Bengal, and to take, of course, what Bengal chose to give it, and, Assam being backward and unpopular, Bengal did not give the best, and at the end of five years when those officers had a right to revert the best of them went back. The consequence was that at each stage Assam got the worst of the bargain and the administration suffered all round. When we brought Assam into the heart of a bigger province these conditions were removed, and Assam got its chance. All these advantages are sacrificed by the proposal, and in their Despatch the Government of India do not seem even to be aware of their existence. Assam is treated as a petty pawn on the board which could be moved about without any regard to what it wanted or desired.
A word about the new province of Behar, Chota Nagpur, and Orissa. This Province is made up of the non-Bengali leavings on the west of your new Bengal, and it is justified in your Despatch on these grounds. The Government of India say that the Beharis do not like the Bengalis and would welcome separation. Very likely that is true. They say it is in accordance with popular sentiment in Orissa, which certainly it is not, and will be welcomed in Behar as giving Behar a seaboard. Of course, that is absolute nonsense. Calcutta is and always must remain the seaport of Behar, to which it is linked by two railways. What is the good of holding out the attraction to Behar of the possession of a sea coast with which there is no railway connection whatever and where there is no seaport? You might just as well tell colliery proprietors in Staffordshire that you propose to deprive them of their facilities for despatching coal to London, but that you will open up to them the ports of the Norfolk coast. This Province of yours has been drawn up without the slightest regard to the interests or views of the inhabitants and you violate there every principle you have adopted in respect to Bengal.
Take the Orissans. No one has paused to think what they want. You could not know because of your secrecy and because you consulted nobody in advance. They want the reunion of the Uriya-speaking people. They want to remain under

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Calcutta, to which they have been attached so long. What is the good of Orissa being tied to the tail of Behar, where there is no affinity of language or race, with which they have nothing in common, and from which they are separated by a great belt of mountains and rivers over which we have never been able to carry a railway. I venture to prophesy that this is a blunder that cannot remain permanent. If the Orissans were an agitating people, which they are not, they would soon make their protest heard. As it is, they have been sacrificed without compunction. The same might be said of Chota Nagpur, but I will not labour that point. The fact is, this new province of yours on the west of Bengal is a bundle of odds and ends which you have thrown together because you did not know what else to do with them. In Bengal you have united Bengalis, because they are all of the same race and language, but when you come to these other provinces you force into an unnatural union three peoples of different race and language. I shall pursue this aspect of the case no further, but I can truthfully say that none of my criticisms, though they may appear strong, are captious. They all rest upon information and, if I may say so, upon personal knowledge, and they are put forward, not in the least with the view of embarrassing His Majesty's Government, but of showing the results of their secrecy and of calling their attention to errors that must be put right before the settlement is made final.
My Lords, I pass to Delhi. Perhaps it may be said that all these anomalies, if they exist, are compensated by the transfer of the capital to Delhi, and we may be asked, "Is not this a great Imperial scheme?" I suppose all of us who have served in India have thought a great deal about Delhi. I had to decide whether to hold the Durbar at Delhi, and I decided unhesitatingly in the affirmative. I had to decide whether the site of the Victoria Memorial Hall should be at Delhi, and I decided in the negative. I had not considered the question of the capital at Delhi, although it was often in my mind. There are eloquent passages in these Despatches about the historical associations of Delhi, and the Secretary of State, in particular, has rather given the rein to his poetical imagination in talking about the old-time drama of Hindu history and of satisfying the historical sense of millions. I do not
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deny the glamour of the name of Delhi or the stories that cling about its dead and forgotten cities. But I venture to say this, that if we want to draw happy omens for the future the less we say about the history of Delhi the better. Modern Delhi is only 250 years old. It was only the capital of the Moguls in the expiring years of their régime, and it was only the capital of their effective rule for little more than 100 years. Of course, there were capitals there before it, but all have perished, one after another. We know that the whole environment of Delhi is a mass of deserted ruins and graves, and they present to the visitor, I think, the most sorrowful picture you can conceive of the mutability of human fortunes. You may say that the fate of India has been decided three times outside Delhi. So it has, and on each occasion it is the defenders who have been defeated. I venture to say that the less we talk about the history of Delhi the better, and that His Majesty's Government will be on much surer ground if instead of saying anything about the dead capitals of the past, they try to create a living capital in the future.
What is the case that they have made for the choice of Delhi as a capital? The points they name are that its situation is central, that it is the meeting place of many railways, that it is reasonably near to Simla, and that, therefore, there will be a saving in the cost of the annual migration, and that it is in close proximity to some, at any rate, of the great Princes of India. I desire to allow full value to these considerations for what they may be worth, although none of them appear to be vital. While, for instance, Delhi is more central to Bombay, it is much less central to Burma, to Madras, that great city, or to Mysore or Haidarabad, the Principalities of great Princes. Again, if it is so close to Simla why is it necessary to have two capitals with all their offices and paraphernalia within twelve hours of each other? When you refer to the loyalty of the Princes, which is one of the most splendid assets of India, I am not sure that it is at all desirable that they should be brought up from their States into constant residence in the capital of the Government. These may be on the whole minor points.
The points which I want to put before the Secretary of State are these, and I think they are major points. First, as to

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the healthiness of Delhi; second, as to its strategical position; third, as to the accessibility of the Government and the capital to public opinion. Above all I desire to ask what is the effect that the institution of your capital at Delhi will have on India and on British rule in India in the times that lie before us. These are real factors which no historical associations, no amount of sentimental glamour ought to be allowed to override. As to the healthiness of Delhi, the Despatch of the Government of India says that it possesses a good climate for seven months of the year and that the Government will live there from October 1 to May 1. Are you quite sure of that? I have been at Delhi in October and in April several times, and I know those are months of the year in which there is a good deal of fever and malaria, particularly after the rains. In former days the water supply of Delhi was very bad, but now it is obtained by filtered water from the river. Have you satisfied yourselves that you can from that or from other sources derive a water supply for a great capital city?
Take the question of site. The Government of India were in such haste that we are told in the papers that they settled on the site of the Durbar camps and they even invited His Majesty to lay the foundation-stone. May 1 tell your Lordships a little story? When I was in India I too held a Durbar on the same site and, when that Durbar was over, feeling that in some way or other the site which had witnessed the Proclamation of Queen Victoria's Imperial Title and also the Proclamation of the Coronation of the late King Edward the Seventh ought to be commemorated, I set about endeavouring to convert the arena and its surroundings into a beautiful and orderly garden so as to create a memorial that should be worthy of those great events. Lord pinto will bear in mind what I am going to refer to. These attempts went on for two years, and at the end of that time it was found that the soil was so impregnated with alkalis that nothing would grow. After the rains the whole expanse was inundated and was converted into a great marsh, the waters of which, when they receded, killed everything in the soil. There is only one village on the site, and that village is surrounded by high walls of mud in order to keep out the inundations which prevail for months every year. I have been informed that
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the Government of India have already abandoned the first site they selected and are looking somewhere else. I do not want to put any difficulties in the way of getting a site—how could I? I only want the Secretary of State to recognise that the question of site is of great importance, and it would, indeed, be a calamitous thing if you planted down your capital in a place where, in the future, you found Englishmen could not live.
I take the second point, a point with which it is rather difficult to deal but on which I must say a word—that is the security of the position of Delhi. 1 dare say noble Lords are familiar with the famous pronouncement of the Duke of Wellington. It is contained in Lord Stan-hope's "Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington at Walmer Castle" in 1844—
"I talked to the Duke on India. He has, I find, strong opinions against the idea of transferring the seat of Government from Calcutta to one of the cities higher up the country, as Agra. It is indispensable, he thinks, to the maintenance of our Indian Empire that our Indian capital should be in some situation where our naval superiority may, if necessary, be brought into play."
I am far from saying that the strategical position in India is the same now as in the days of the Duke of Wellington. India has been absolutely transformed since then. The strength of British power is immeasurably greater than it was; railway communication has spread everywhere throughout the country; firearms alone are entirely different from what they were in those days. But the physical facts of India are unalterable; they remain exactly the same. Look at it in this way. If the Government of India had been in Delhi at the time of the Mutiny would you have been satisfied with your position? I know many good authorities in India, not at all unprepared to accept the change of capital to Delhi, who are by no means convinced of the desirability of placing the seat of Government and the residence of the Viceroy in so advanced a position. And I know, further, that what I am saying at this Table is the view of the most expert military opinion and military authorities in India. I am not competent to offer an opinion on the matter myself. The matter lies outside my purview. I will only say this, that while I shall welcome any indication from the noble Marquess that the matter has been carefully considered by those who are qualified to advise, the

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situation, so far as I understand it, is one that must cause him some degree of anxiety.
But, my Lords, suppose all these doubts to be resolved, suppose you to get your site and drain it and to obtain your water supply, and to be perfectly satisfied as to the strategical security of your position (and I hope all this may be the case), when you have built your new capital, will it be a source of influence and of strength to your Government? Will it enable them better to understand the heart of India, and to grasp its problems? That is the real issue we have to have in mind. What is the great danger that attends the Government of India? It is this, and it is responsible for the agitation which has gone on for years against the movement to the hills. It is the danger that the Government of India may become aloof from public opinion, that it may be shut off from the main currents of public life, that it may become immersed in a sort of bureaucratic self-satisfaction. There was no fear of that when we went down to Calcutta. At Calcutta we were in the surge and movement of life. There was a mixed society there. You heard opinions of every variety awl form—opinions of merchants, hankers, traders, business men of every sort. There was the society of Judges and lawyers, both European and. native. There were the officials of the local Governments, there was a regular stream of travellers and visitors coming into Calcutta from all parts of the world. It was life, and when, after my long residence at Simla, I went, at the close of my tours in the country, to Calcutta, I felt once again life and movement throbbing around me. I say distinctly that our time at Calcutta was of enormous value to the Government. It brightened our minds, it widened our outlook, it brought us into the main stream of national existence.
There is serious danger that, when you have built your capital at Delhi, the Government will become more isolated, more bureaucratic, less in touch with public opinion than it is now. You are going to create a territorial enclave; you are also going to run the risk that your Government will become a political enclave. Delhi cannot be a great commercial city—it can only be a manufacturing city or a distributing centre on a small scale—for the trade of India must rest on the sea. There can be no trading community
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at Delhi on a large scale. There is to be no High Court there. There will be the people who will come up to do business with the Government from time to time; there will be nobody else. Your new city is to be placed outside the walls of a quite small native town of 200,000 people, and there the Government will live shut off, as I think, from the rest of India. If that be at all a correct anticipation, and I hope it may not be, do believe me that the isolation of your Government will have this effect. In the first place, it will diminish its prestige; in the second place, it will react upon the efficiency of administration; and, in the third place, it will shorten your rule in India. So strongly do you feel on that point that in one Despatch the Government of India or the Secretary of State speaks of the removal to Delhi as a proof of the unalterable determination to maintain British rule in India. Why it should be necessary to give any demonstration of that principle now I do not know. 1 should have thought it was the basic principle of British rule, and how the shifting of the capital from the English city with which it has been associated for 150 years to the dead capital of Mahomedan Kings can indicate a fixed determination to maintain your rule in India I cannot tell. And if you re-assert your determination to do so at the same time that you weaken the supports on which that determination rests you will not be better off, but worse off.
There only remains the question of finance, and this is in a sense the most important of all. What will this cost? The Government of India say—
"The cost of the transfer will be considerable, but we cannot conceive that a larger sum than£4,000,000 will be necessary, including the three years' interest on capital, while the works and buildings are being completed."
And against this they say must be set the rise in the value of Government land in Delhi, the sale of Government lands and buildings at Calcutta, and the utilisation of the Durbar works at Delhi. I ask, Is it conceivable that these works can be completed in three years? I tell you they will not be done in ten years. At Dacca, where we had to create a provincial capital, it is six years since we began the Government buildings and offices, and they are not complete yet. You are going to build, not a provincial capital, but a great capital

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for all India, in three years!The idea is ridiculous. Is it conceivable that your expenditure can be confined within £4,000,000? Just look at the items that have to be considered. In the first place there is the cost of the purchase of land. You will take that compulsorily and, therefore, no doubt, you will only pay the market value. Then there is the cost of the buildings you are going to place upon it—the new Government House, the new Council Chamber, the new Secretariat, new offices for every Department, or, at any rate, for a majority of the Departments of one of the most complex and elaborate systems of government in the world. It is not merely the cost of the land, but the cost of reclaiming and draining it, and of providing a water supply. Then there is the cost of the extra garrison which you must have to protect your Viceroy when von set him and the Government of India in the plains of Delhi.
I pass to Behar and the new province there. There is the cost of the new capital at Patna, the cost of a new summer station for that province and of the new High Court at Patna, for which there is already agitation. All these are initial charges only, but when they are satisfied there will be very heavy recurring charges. Then, I think, any accountant will tell you that you ought to include in the prime cost the loss on the official structures and buildings which you have set up in such profusion in Calcutta and which will either remain unoccupied or, if parted with, will only be parted with at a loss. Since that estimate was made, I have consulted many authorities much better able to give an opinion than I am, and I have not found a single one who has estimated the total cost of these proceedings at less than£8,000,000. The majority estimate the cost at£10,000,000, while there are others, to whom I myself belong, who think that the cost will not be less than£12,000,000.
And what is the moment at which you propose to place this charge on the revenues of India? You are confronted now with the imminent loss of your opium revenue to the extent of some millions per annum. Your Finance Minister in India has, in two successive years in his Budget speech, repeated these words—
"I am sure it is absolutely essential to introduce greater sobriety in our public expenditure if we are to avoid deficits and, consequently, enhanced taxation."
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It was only three month ago that we were discussing in this House the proposed abolition by the Government of India of a few administrative offices, saving a few thousands of rupees a year, and advocated by them mainly on the score of economy. Even now, almost immediately, you are going to send out a Commission to India in order to discuss whether you cannot, with a view to greater economy, reduce your Native Army in that country. Money is everywhere wanted in India at this moment for railways, irrigation, education, public works, and social reform in all its branches. This is the moment at which you propose to place on the Indian taxpayer this great burden, because although you raise the money by loan the Indian taxpayer has to pay the interest, and there will be less money available for other and much more necessary objects. I venture to say, my Lords, that, without further information than we have received at present, this seems one of the most rash commitments to which His Majesty's Government has ever yet set its hand. Even if your whole object is realised, it is not clear that it kill be worth the price, and if your Army is to be reduced and your administration stinted in order to provide for this purpose, 1 think it will be very doubtful how far your policy will deserve the name of a boon.
I would like the Secretary of State to answer one more question, if I may be allowed to ask it. There is one paragraph in the Despatch which has attracted little attention in this country, but which seems to me to be in a sense the most significant of all. It is Paragraph 3 of the Despatch of the Government of India, in which the Government of India light-heartedly, as if they were uttering a mere commonplace instead of putting forward what is, as I conceive, an entirely new form of Government in India, use these words—
"The only possible solution of the difficulty would be gradually giving the Provinces a larger measure of self-government until at last India would consist of a number of administrations, autonomous in all provincial affairs, with the Government of India above them all and possessing power to interfere in cases of misgovernment, but ordinarily restricting their functions to matters of Imperial concern."
My Lords, this picture of a federation of self-governing and quasi-independent States in India, with the Governor-General in Council existing at the top, interfering only in cases of mis-government—and we know

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how difficult that would be—and confining itself ordinarily to imperial matters, by which I suppose are meant the frontier and the Army, may be a good or a bad idea. In my view it is a bad one, but nobody can doubt that it represents a scheme or a sketch of the future Government of India wholly different from that which has hitherto prevailed. It is not by divided Governments that the Indian Empire has been built, but by the existence of a strong central authority, controlling and supervising all, which you have persuaded in times past the best of your statesmen and administrators to take up, and which they have taken up to the advantage of India and the credit of your country. But this is entirely different. It is true that as time has gone on there has been a delegation of powers to Local Governments, financial, administrative, legislative—an inevitable and proper process of which we have not yet reached the end. But if you are going to contemplate, as this Despatch indicates, a policy of separate States in India, a sort of Home Rule all round—Mr. John Bright's idea of an India divided into separate States, with separate Governments, separate armies, and so on—if you are going to abandon that uniformity in the main principles of government, in the guiding tenets of your administration, which you have hitherto observed, I venture to say the result can only be to lead through disruption to disaster. That is my fear. My fear about this establishment of the capital at Delhi is that your Central Government, instead of becoming stronger, will become weaker. My view is that you will become dissociated from the life and administration of India, and that gradually, as the Provinces follow the line you have laid down and demand increasing Home Rule, your Viceroy in Delhi will become a sort of puppet as the Moguls were towards the end of their regime, and India will break up into separate fragments, as it did in the expiring days of Aurungzebe and his successors. When trouble comes, as it may come some day in India, it will not be by separate Provinces acting on their own account that India will be saved, but by a strong Central Government exercising supervision and control over all.
My Lords, I have no time to develop that position. I have merely mentioned it in passing because I could not treat with absolute silence a pronouncement about the future Government of India which
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seemed to me so profoundly serious as that which I have just read. I apologise to the Secretary of State for the enormous range of the topics to which I have called his attention, and 1 apologise once again to the House for the intolerable call that I have made upon their patience. I wish I could have accepted this decision of His Majesty's Government in absolute silence and allowed the grave pronouncement at Delhi on that historic occasion to pass by without a word of criticism in this House. It would have been much easier and much more agreeable for me to have done that. But, my Lords, I could not do it, because those of us who have served in India have a sense of duty to that country, which we all of us love so well, and to the cause of British rule in India which we have served. Upon some of the features of the policy of His Majesty's Government I entertain serious doubts. I have ventured to place those doubts before your Lordships' House this afternoon. Those doubts are widely entertained by others much more competent to pronounce upon them than myself. In other cases I have ventured to indicate the precautions that may still be taken, mistakes that may, perhaps, be avoided; and my concluding defence, if one is needed, for detaining your Lordships so long is that this House world be of little use, and those of us inside this House who have served in India would be of little use in discharging our duties, if on an occasion fraught with such tremendous consequences as this we did not fearlessly state what we believe to be the truth.
Moved, That an humble Address he presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to the removal of the capital of India to Delhi, and other connected matters.—(Earl Curzon of Kedleston.)
TIIE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (THE MARQUESS OF CREWE): My Lords, I think I shall be best consulting the wishes of the House if I reply at once, without waiting for any intervening speeches, to the observations of the noble Earl. I am certain that it was altogether unnecessary for him to offer any apology, either to the House or to my humble self, for the length of those observations. We all of us at all times admire the eloquence of the noble Earl, and he has covered the vast field of inquiry over which he has travelled this afternoon with the most perfect lucidity, and 1 am quite certain

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without in any way wandering from the direct path. 1 did not expect that any of the five noble Lords, members of this House, who have held the office of Viceroy of India in the past, would be likely to start with any bias in favour of the proposals which His Majesty's Government and the Government of India have put forward. After all, my Lords, it is not in human nature for any man who has done a great work such as that which is carried on by the Viceroys of India and done that work with distinction, to begin by believing that the same work will be as adequately done by another man in entirely different conditions. The noble Earl himself has naturally countless recollections of the great public events, quorum pars magna fuit, when the Government of India was carried on at Calcutta and at Simla., and he possesses many delightful and sonic sacred memories of his home life there. It is inconceivable, therefore, that either he or any other of the noble Lords who have filled the same office could start with a bias in favour of so large a change. But that does not mean—and I hope the course of the debate will show it laterߞthat all these five noble Lords share the whole of the objections which the noble Earl has stated to our policy, both as a whole and in its details; or that some of them may not have found reason, as they have examined more closely into our proposals, to modify the objections which I admit they at first would be naturally likely to take.
My Lords, if I have anything to complain of in the speech of the noble Earl, it would be that throughout the whole of it his tone was that of a prosecuting counsel. I do not think he uttered, in the course of the whole of his long speech, one word in favour of any detail of any one of our suggestions. And I could not help observing, as I listened to his speech, continual instances of what I would venture to call the well-disciplined exaggeration of the practised advocate, who knows where to add a little colour at some points and how to deepen shadows at other points, when he was discussing those parts of our policy which he considered laid us particularly open to attack. The earlier part of the noble Earl's speech dealt, not with the general merits or with the details of our plan, but with the mode and time of its announcement. Like some other critics he has described our action in that regard as unconstitutional, using thereby a very
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hard-worked and sometimes ill-used word which seems to me to be almost degenerating into a term of general vituperation to which no special meaning necessarily need be attached. In this case, however, the noble Earl did towards the end of that part of his speech attach something of a definition to his use of the word, because he said that we had violated the settled practice of the Constitution and had screened ourselves from attack by the course we took. As 1 listened to him I could not help congratulating myself that we had screened ourselves from attack, because I do not know what his method of criticism would have been if we had not taken that particular precaution.
Now, my Lords, there are two separate lines on which apparently it is possible to accuse us of unconstitutional action. One is that before framing, and certainly before carrying out, this policy we ought to have obtained the sanction of Parliament; and the other line of attack is to say that even if it be granted that this action of ours is so purely executive that it was not necessary for us to obtain the previous sanction of Parliament, even then, that it was an improper thing that the announcement should be made by His Majesty at the Delhi Durbar. Of course, if the first of these charges could be sustained the second would be also sustained. Because if it had been necessary for us to obtain previous Parliamentary sanction either to the removal of the seat of Government from Calcutta to Delhi, or to the creation of a new Province, in that case it is obvious that the whole topic would have been one of public discussion, and therefore there would have been no possibility of its being announced for the first time at the Durbar.
I should like to say, first, as regards the origin of this policy, that there seems to have been some misapprehension in some quarters as to what that origin was. I have seen it described as though it had been imposed upon the Government of India from here by His Majesty's Government, in obedience to certain abstract principles which are conceived to be those of the Liberal Party. That is, of course, altogether untrue. The whole policy—I describe it so for convenience, although it is, of course, not in one sense a policy, but a series of Acts of Administration—the whole policy was worked out step by step between the Government of India and ourselves here, as a series, as I have already

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said, of problems of administration, in some degree interdependent, but distinct and separate in themselves. The noble Earl reminded us that even Lord Beaconsfield, with all the gorgeousness of his Oriental imagination. did not attempt to carry out the assumption of the title of Empress of India by Queen Victoria, without applying to Parliament. That is perfectly true. But then, the change in the Royal style was a matter which affected this country as much as it did India. The noble Earl and I. can both remember the agitation which was caused at that time, as to which I am disposed to agree with him that a great many of the members of the Party to which I belong then took a mistaken line in objecting to the assumption of the Imperial title, because events have proved that it was not merely harmless but was in itself desirable. But I would remind the noble Earl that the backbone of the protests which were then made against the assumption of the Imperial title was the belief that the imagination of Lord Beaconsfield, of which the noble Earl has spoken, would cause that title to be generally used here in substitution for and in replacement of the ancient title of King of England, and it was this fear, far more than anything else, which caused the somewhat heated agitation which at that time was raised against the assumption of the Imperial title for India.
Then the noble Earl went on to speak of what is still called the Partition of Bengal, and I am bound to say, speaking of the various circumstances connected with that partition, that the noble Earl used a tone which I did not quite recognise, remembering, as I did, the former debate of June 30, 1908. To-day the noble Earl told us that in bringing about that partition he knew what the opposition and criticism would be, and that he decided to bear the brunt of it. But when we go back to June, 1908, my recollection of that debate is—and I think it will be shared by all who recall it—that the various noble Lords who were, or might have been, concerned in the carrying out of that partition, including the noble Earl himself, were, if I may use a common expression, almost tumbling over each other in their readiness to deny that what they called the credit of it ought to be claimed by them. But at this moment we are mainly concerned with a comparison of the manner in which that great administrative change was brought
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about, with the manner in which this repartition of Bengal, which is, I think, perhaps the fairest way to describe it, has been brought about by us. Now the original partition was, and I think fairly, treated by the Government of India and by the then Secretary of State as an administrative act, not only not requiring the sanction of Parliament, but one of which Parliament need not even be previously informed.
I observe that on July 4, 1905, the noble Viscount, Lord Midleton, who was then Secretary of State, answered Mr. Herbert Roberts, who put a Question on the subject, in these words—
"The proposals of the Government of India reached me on the 18th of February, and I have communicated the decision of the Secretary of State in Council accepting them."
But he did not say what the proposals of the Government of India were. It was not at that time known what their terms were. Not only that, but in the same year when the noble Viscount—Mr. Brodrick, as he then was—made his speech on the Indian Budget, he never alluded to the subject of the Partition of Bengal at all, although that is an occasion on which all matters of importance to India are supposed to be discussed; and if I remember right, the only allusion to the topic that was made by anybody in that debate was made by my noble friend Lord Haldane in the course of a general speech on Indian affairs. Therefore I think that we can claim the action of the then Government here and in India as a precedent for not consulting Parliament previously upon these proposals of ours. We are all of us perfectly well aware that the ultimate control of Parliament over Indian matters cannot be disputed and is not disputed. The ultimate control of Parliament over all Indian affairs rests on the simple fact that Parliament can, at any time, get rid of those, whether they be members of the Indian Administration in India or of the Indian Government at home, who are responsible for the conduct of Indian affairs. But Parliament has never sought or wished to discuss the details of all the administrative acts of the Indian Government beforehand, though it, of course, reserves to itself the right of saying that those who carry out administrative acts, which they are entitled by law to carry out, must be subject to any penalty Parliament may think fit to inflict upon them if those acts are disapproved of.

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The noble Earl dwelt, I think with even more emphasis, upon the fact that we had not obtained sanction in India for our proposals than he did upon the fact that they were not previously presented to Parliament. And I confess that it seemed to me that, in taking the line he did, the noble Earl was walking on somewhat thin ice, because he spoke almost as though India were a country under a Parliamentary system. He spoke without reserve or explanation of the representative bodies whose approval ought to have been sought beforehand, and he seemed, although I am certain he meant nothing of the kind, to take up a position in that regard which some of those who are called in India very advanced politicians would, I think, hesitate to take up. It is, after all, idle to pretend that there is anything resembling a Parliamentary system in India. The functions of the various Legislative Councils are most carefully defined and are very well known. Do not for a moment let us minimise their importance. They are to advise the various Governments on matters of legislation.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON:Perhaps I might say that when I spoke about representative bodies in India I was not alluding to the Legislative Councils; I was alluding to the Chambers of Commerce and various associations in the country who have always been consulted by the Government before any legislative changes are adopted, and none of whom were referred to, as far as know, in the present case.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I am very glad to have the noble Earl's explanation, because I am afraid that others might have fallen into the same error as I did. He was using the term "representative" in its purely descriptive sense, whereas I was under the impression that he was speaking of the various processes of election through which members of the different representative councils have to pass. I shall deal a little later on with the point which, as I now understand, the noble Earl intended to raise. But, of course, the charge may still be levelled against us that, though we did not go to Parliament or bring the lines of our policy before official bodies in India, we ought to have thrown it on the table of the world at large for public discussion. To return for one moment to the earlier
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Partition of Bengal, it is quite true that that was to some extent discussed. If I remember aright, in the spring of 1904 the noble Earl himself attended some meetings in Eastern Bengal—that is to say, in that part of the proposed Province to which the change was likely to be particularly acceptable, in which he foreshadowed a wider scheme and a possible creation of a Lieutenant-Governorship.
I would ask the House to consider for a moment what would have been the result if we had adopted the course of throwing our scheme on the table for discussions in the Press. We could foresee, and 1 do not think we should have been wrong in a single instance, exactly who would be the particular parties who would take exception to particular parts of our scheme, the reasons for which they would make those objections, and the manner in which they would make them. It is, as we hold, one of the merits of the scheme that it does not represent the triumph of any one particular party or creed among the different parties and creeds involved, and there are therefore some features of it which almost every party or section, if they could get the rest of the scheme, would wish to see away. For instance, I have no doubt that many of the inhabitants of Bengal would have thought the scheme an infinitely better one if the Presidency of Bengal had been constituted just as we constituted it, but if at the same time Calcutta had been left as the capital. I have no doubt they would have preferred such a solution. On the other hand, the Mahomedan population of Eastern Bengal, speaking generally, would have preferred to maintain the great numerical preponderance which they were given under the noble Earl's scheme in Eastern Bengal. If they could have kept that, other things being equal, they would have welcomed on several different grounds the transference of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi.
Suppose, therefore, for the sake of argument, that we had made this question a subject of public controversy and discussion, announcing that it was an administrative act that we intended to carry out, that it was our definite policy, but that we should be glad to hear what various people had to say upon it. There would undoubtedly have been a marked and lively agitation in Calcutta among the English residents there,

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whose case has been so forcibly put by the noble Earl. I daresay the noble Earl would have led that part of that agitation which was going to be carried on in this country. It would have been, I think, a regrettable agitation. It might have led —and I myself should greatly have regretted the circumstance, but I should in no way have shrunk from it—it might have led to the application to some of the English papers in Calcutta of the extreme rigours of the Press Act, which, of course, might be applied to them as much as to vernacular papers. There would, no doubt, also have been a certain degree of agitation on the lines mentioned by the noble Earl among the Mahornedan inhabitants of Eastern Bengal, although, as I think I can show, the noble Earl in that instance put his colours on somewhat too thickly. Apart from those two communities I do not hesitate to say that all the rest of India would have supported us on the general merits of the scheme as a whole, just as they are supporting us now. I do not think that the opposition, unpleasant though it would have been from every point of view, would have been effective. I do not think it would have brought about the result which, if successful, it would have brought about—namely, the disappearance from the scene both of the Viceroy and of myself. But it would have been an agitation of some violence, possibly of some length, and it would have left a great deal of ill-feeling behind it. And I ask, What would have been gained by it? What would have been gained by it even in theory? In obedience to what theory was it necessary to embark on a Press agitation or an agitation by public meeting upon this series of purely administrative acts?
Then, my Lords, I come to the next half of the charge of unconstitutional action—namely, even supposing for the sake of argument that the noble Earl were to admit, which I am sure he does not, the force of what I have just said, that even then the announcement ought not to have been made at the Delhi Durbar by His Majesty in person. I do not draw any distinction for this purpose, and 1 do not think it is possible to draw any between any announcement made on such an occasion by His Majesty's own lips or made on his behalf and at his command by the Viceroy in his presence. So far as the effect of these two announcements is
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concerned, the former, of course, weighs more in grandeur and solemnity, but as regards the absolute necessity of carrying out the announcement thus made it would apply not less to an announcement made by the Viceroy at His Majesty's command. It seems, then, to come to this, that the opinion of the noble Earl and those who agree with him is that no announcement ought to be made at Delhi by or on behalf of His Majesty which could cause any difference of opinion in India. If that is so, it seems to me to come very near to saying that no announcement should be made at the Durbar at all, and some colour and support would be given to the views of those—I do not think there are many of them left, but there were a good many—who considered that His Majesty ought never to have gone to the Durbar at all. You can hardly suggest any form of announcement which could be made at the Durbar which might not be a subject of dispute and even of discontent to a certain number of people in India. Even the most crude, and in the old-fashioned sense the most Oriental form of announcement, that of mere largess, is open to the possible objection that its distribution may cause more discontent than it gives pleasure. The same would apply even more strongly to the remission of any tax, because your Lordships will readily recognise that the remission of one tax may easily cause at least as much discontent as the imposition of another.
The answer, surely, to the objection that it was not wise for this announcement to be made by His Majesty at the Durbar is the general gratification which was caused all over India by the fact that this important and, from some points of view, solemn announcement was made on the most solemn occasion that has occurred within the recent history of India. I am convinced that there would have been a feeling all over India of bitter disappointment if it had turned out that the Durbar was merely an occasion for a spectacle of pageantry, however unexampled and however magnificent, that no serious import was to be attached to the unique event of the King-Emperor's visit, and that the whole occasion was simply one of show and of parade. Therefore in our view the occasion and the subject, especially, of course, that of the transfer of the capital, were absolutely wedded together, and to have attempted to shirk the re-

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sponsibility of making this announcement on the particular occasion of the Durbar would simply have shown mere timidity on our part—a timidity of which I think we should have been fairly and justly accused if within a year or whatever the time might have been which the noble Earl would think a proper interval, we had introduced this policy simply as part of our ordinary administration of the government of India.
I pass to the actual question of the change of capital, which I think was the next with which the noble Earl dealt. In one sense, of course, there is no such place as the capital of India, because the seat of government in India is the place in which the Viceroy summons his Council together. But that might almost be described as a verbal quibble, because we have always spoken of Calcutta as the capital although it has been losing its political position in that regard gradually but very markedly during a period now extending over some years. The noble Earl has put forward the claims of Calcutta in glowing terms, and certainly I am not going, in replying to him, to say a word in depreciation of the merits or the historical associations of Calcutta. Still, to anyone who looks at the map of India, it does seem a somewhat singular fact that the Government of India should be carried on for a short period of the year at Calcutta and for the rest of the year at Simla. If one might venture to make an almost fanciful historical parallel it is rather as though, during the great days of the Holy Roman Empire, the government of all Europe had been carried on for about three months of the year from Barcelona and for the rest of the year from St. Moritz or some other village in the higher Alps. The arrangement is in itself a most strange one, and it cannot be disputed that in the minds of a great many educated Indians there is a feeling—I think it is a growing one—that the stay in the hills has become not merely a question of hot weather migration, but a regular settlement, and that this feeling does more to impress upon their minds the notion that British rule is an alien rule than almost any other feature connected with our Government in India. The noble Earl spoke of the Calcutta community in this regard. The commercial community of Calcutta is a most admirable society, but, like other prosperous and highly considered societies,
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it has perhaps fallen into the way of looking at matters only from its own point of view, and even has been sometimes tempted to forget that another point of view can exist. It is, of course, an important and a powerful society. When you talk of Calcutta opinion in India, nobody means the opinion of the Government; they mean the opinion of the mercantile community and the Chamber of Commerce. If you wish to indicate Government opinions or Government prejudices, it is as the opinions or the prejudices of Simla that they are described in ordinary parlance.
We were given to understand by the noble Earl that in making the change of the capital to Delhi the same objections which had been advanced in many quarters to the long stay of the Government at Simla—namely, its isolation from the main current of public life and thought in India—will apply to an equal extent. I can quite understand that that danger is one which ought to be guarded against, and no doubt the noble Earl's fear is shared in some quarters, although I think he stated his fear in somewhat exaggerated terms. But, after all, Delhi is not Simla. It is a large city, it is a great emporium of trade, and it is the most important railway junction in India. It is therefore hardly fair, I think, to compare it for this purpose with the charming but isolated settlement in the hills. It is true that it will become the duty of the Government of India, particularly of the Department of Commerce and Industry, to keep in close touch with the main current of Indian opinion, and in some respects it will be in a better position to do so than it has been if the past. The noble Earl knows quite well that it has been complained in other parts of India that in such matters the Government of India has always seen through Calcutta spectacles, and I cannot think that the physical difficulties of the position of Delhi are such that it will not easily be possible for the Government of India to keep well in touch, not merely with Calcutta opinion, to which it ought to continue, of course, to take due account, but also to the opinion of Bombay and of Karachi, to say nothing of the South, which it has been accused of ignoring to some extent in the past. The noble Earl, I think, was less disposed to charge us with ruining Calcutta in a commercial sense than some people have

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been. Indeed, that was almost the only point in which I did detect something like a tinge of agreement with what the Viceroy and I stated in our Despatches. I cannot believe for a moment that the commercial interests of Calcutta will suffer in anyway by the change, and I fancy that this is the opinion of the soundest heads in Calcutta itself—indeed, some of them are of opinion that their influence upon the new Presidency Government will be more marked, and that they will be able to put their case even more forcibly than they were before the Government of India—that, in fact, as the tendency to greater provincial independence, of which the noble Earl spoke at the conclusion of his speech, proceeds to grow, their independence must in some degree grow with it.
The noble Earl went on to speak of Delhi as the new seat of government. He described, he will forgive me for saying, in rather appalling terms the position of Delhi as a city of tombs in view of its past history. The only other important transfer of a capital that has taken place in the memory of anybody now alive was also one from a modern city to what may be described as a city of tombs in quite as full a sense as Delhi. Up to 1864 Turin was the capital of the House of Savoy and the State of Piedmont. In that year the transfer of the capital was made to Florence, and by general admission that was a step towards making Rome the capital whenever it became possible. Six years later it did become possible, and Rome, the city of the dead, like Delhi, strewn with the relics of decayed dynasties, became, with the common consent of all Italians, and remains, as we hope it will always remain, the capital of Italy. When the Government of Italy removed to Florence there was great agitation in Turin; there was even some violence. The crowd were fired on, and some loss of life took place. Then one of the most brilliant heroes of the Italian Liberation. General Cialdini, made a speech which has often been remembered from its eloquent appeal to the people of Italy not to set town against town in rivalry but to think of the interests of Italy as a whole. I am bound to say that the tone of that speech was very different from the tone which has been adopted by a great many of the interested advocates of the maintenance of Calcutta as the necessary and perpetual capital of
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the British Government in India, although I am glad to think that the untoward consequences which followed in Turin from the excitement of the crowd have been in no danger of being followed in Calcutta.
The noble Earl very fairly and properly drew attention to the care which would have to be taken in planning the new portion of Delhi with regard to sanitation and the like. I can assure him that we are most desirous to obtain the very best possible advice in that regard, but we shall not move in too great a hurry, although I hope we shall not waste any time, and certainly we shall not run any risk of setting apart for the new capital any part of the environs of Delhi which cannot be thoroughly drained or which is liable to flood, or to which any objection on sanitary grounds is thought to exist. I am in great hopes that we shall succeed in obtaining for the purposes of advice some of the best opinions that are to be found on questions of town engineering and town planning, arid that we shall be able to have those opinions before us before we take any steps of an irrevocable kind towards starting our new buildings. As to the question of water, I can venture to assure the noble Earl that there is no doubt whatever that a copious and good water supply will be certainly obtained for the new portion of Delhi.
I do not desire to dwell on the point touched upon by the noble Earl as to the strategical questions raised by the transfer. As he frankly admitted, the case is greatly altered since the Duke of Wellington spoke, when it had to be frankly admitted, even by that heroic personage, that it was necessary for the seat of Government to be somewhere quite close to the coast in order, if the worst came to the worst, that the Viceroy and all his surroundings might be safely packed on board a man-of-war. My Lords, we are a long way from that state of things, and I do not believe that the fears expressed by the noble Earl as to the risks to the Government of India by being so far inland are uniformly held. And when all is said and done the noble Earl will remember that, supposing a state of things were to arise in some form of emeute or some military difficulty which might threaten the Government of India, its position when poised on the hill at Simla would not be very strong,

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although, of course, both at Simla and at Delhi it would be in the neighbourhood of a strong force, if force had to be employed.
Now, my Lords, I pass on to the strictures of the noble Earl upon the separation of the Government of India from the Government of Bengal. He seemed to think that of the various reasons given in the published Despatches for desiring to divorce those two Governments there was only one of real meaning and substance—namely, that it was thought desirable to get the Government of India away from Bengali influence. The noble Earl somewhat challenged me on the particular point that the existing position is bad for the Government of India and the Government of Bengal. My Lords, 1 take up that challenge, and I do so quite deliberately, because in the joint framing of these proposals there was not one which had more influence on my mind than the importance of breaking the association between the Government of India and the Government of Bengal. It so happens that I have had official opportunities of watching the working of a great many different systems of government in the British Empire, all indeed that there are, ranging from the responsible government of the self-governing Dominions to the purely despotic government carried on by Departments in some parts of the Empire—despotic except, of course, for the final control of Parliament; and I say without hesitation that in no part of the Empire, and in no part of the world that I know of, can I recall a system which seems to me so ill adapted to stand the stress of a difficult period as the relation which has existed between the Government of India and the Government of Bengal. I say this without making the slightest imputation of a personal character. I have had the pleasure of discussing administrative questions with several of those who have filled at different times the office of Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and I certainly do not desire to convey the slightest imputation upon them, or still less upon anybody who has been responsible for the Government of India. But when times are difficult there is no fault that you can suggest in a system of government so dangerous as ill-defined responsibility, which is exactly what has occurred in this case.
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The noble Earl stated that he himself did not experience any inconvenience of this kind, but then I believe I am right in saying that during the whole period when he was in relations with Calcutta and Bengal a peaceful state of things existed, and that the great difficulties which have been found in the administration of Bengal had not occurred. Of course, defects of the kind I have stated only become marked and obvious when times are difficult, as they have been on several occasions during the last few years. In this connection I might quote from a Calcutta newspaper, which seems to me to put this part of the case as clearly as one could desire. I quote from the Statesman of January 3 this year. The Statesman, one of the principal Calcutta organs, did not take a favourable view of our proposals, but on reconsideration it modified its view, at any rate to some extent. It said this—
"There are strong arguments in favour of the change, as we pointed out when dealing with the question a fortnight ago. One of these arguments is the increasing difficulty under present-day conditions of retaining Calcutta as the headquarters both of the Imperial Government and of a great Provincial Government. Such an arrangement is bad for both Governments. It means that the Provincial Government is constantly hampered by the interference of the Imperial authorities, and it means that the Imperial Government has much of its time wasted over provincial details. So long as the Government of India and the Government of Bengal have a sort of dual control, provincial autonomy is impossible."
So that the noble Earl will admit that the Viceroy and I are by no means alone in the opinions we held, as the noble Earl seemed to suppose. And when he goes on to say that because the Punjab Government goes to another place for a portion of the year the same situation arises there, I can only say that so far as my knowledge goes that is not the case. None of the difficult questions with which the Bengal Government and the Government of India have often had to deal jointly, and sometimes, I think, without either side being quite aware into whose province a particular action most properly might fall, can occur or ever have occurred at Simla, and therefore I do not think that the comparison is one which possesses much value.
I will only deal briefly with the question of the probable cost of these changes, because this is a matter on which, of course, everybody is entitled to form his own opinion. When the noble Earl tells us that the calculations of cost

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instead of being£4,000,000, may rise to£10,000,000, and even up to£12,000,000, which, I understand, is the noble Earl's own figure, unless one could see a thoroughly detailed account of how these estimates have been reached it is very difficult to argue about them. It is only fair to point out that it would not be wise to treat the Delhi estimates in the manner which noble Lords opposite, from their long experience, would naturally be tempted to treat estimates of the kind made by Departments in India. It is, of course, true, and it is within the knowledge of all of us who have had anything to do with the Government of India that the practice of estimating has been in the past, and probably remains to sonic extent, open to no little criticism. The vice of under-estimation has, no doubt, been common, but these matters will not be subject to ordinary departmental control. The Government of India are quite determined to devote, not merely special initial attention, but special continuous control, to the care of the great works which will have to be carried out; and the whole of the works will, 1 hope, be so completely carried out in the light of day that the danger of under-estimation, or of any flagrant excess of cost during the process of construction, will be as far as possible avoided.
As the noble Earl pointed out, the taking up of the land is of itself a comparatively small part of the process. The Government of India have announced their intention of taking a very large amount of land in Delhi—I think something like 115,000 acres—and, owing to the provisions of the land laws of India, which might be found very shocking to many members of your Lordships' House, that land can be obtained for public purposes without any reference to a possible enhancement of its value by reason of the uses to which it or any other neighbouring land may be put. But, on the general question, the estimates of the Government of India do not, of course, profess to be exhaustive for reasons which your Lordships well know, and you are, if you like, entitled to put this down as a further indictment against the secrecy with which the proceedings were conducted in their early stages. But I have not heard anything either here or in India, when one comes to reckon up the class and number of buildings which will have to be erected, which justifies such a vast advance upon those estimates as the noble Earl tells
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us he himself would make and is made by others. 1 should myself venture to express the hope—although it is difficult to speak with certainty, because, as the noble Earl pointed out, although much may be done in three years it is impossible to suppose that all the works in connection with the new capital can be completed in three years—that the total result may not largely exceed the sum suggested by the Government of India.
I will deal briefly with the other points raised by the noble Earl. He is one of those, I gather, who think that there is something in the Constitution of Bengal or the Bengalis which causes it to differ from other parts of India, at any rate from Bombay and Madras, and makes it desirable therefore that the Bengalis should be ruled by members of the Indian Civil Service and not by a Governor from England as in the case of the other two Presidencies. I confess, my Lords, I do not entirely follow that contention. I quite see—of course, it is impossible not to see—the force of the argument that when the Viceroy was at Calcutta it would have been a most difficult business to place in Calcutta another Englishman of general experience to carry on a sort of rival Government. As we all know, up to 1853 the Governor-General was also the Governor of Bengal, and when the work was found too heavy for him to compass alone it was the natural course to place a Lieutenant-Governor there. But so far as I am able to gauge the general trend of India n opinion, the appointment of my noble friend Lord Carmichael rather than of some eminent member of the Civil Service has been greatly welcomed in Bengal itself and all over India, except in Madras, where they are exceedingly sorry to lose him owing to the excellent impression as a sensible and sympathetic Governor which he has created even during the short time he was there.
As regards Eastern Bengal, I could not help thinking that here again the noble Earl laid on his colours too thickly. It is quite clear that the Mahomedan population of Eastern Bengal cannot like the diminution of the enormous numerical advantage which they possessed in the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, and it is no doubt partly true that the fact pointed out by the Viceroy in his Despatch, that they will still claim a

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numerical proportion in the whole of the new Presidency, does not mean that they will thereby possess a preponderance of political influence. It has been suggested by some on their behalf that a number of elaborate special arrangements ought to be made by which they would secure preponderance on various public bodies throughout the Presidency, and others by which they would secure a distinct proportion of public offices. I consider, however, that the best way to set to work to correct the balance, so far as it exists, against the Mahomedans in any part of India is to give them, even though it may mean a considerable expenditure of funds, a chance of improving their position on equal terms with their Hindu fellow-subjects. That is best done, as I believe, by increasing their facilities for education. It is one of the most gratifying facts with regard to the Mahomedan community in India that so many of them, not merely a few picked representatives, are becoming alive to the advantages of increased educational facilities, and it would certainly be our earnest desire to bring these facilities within the reach of as ninny of the Mahomedan community as we possibly can. As regards this particular re-partition of Eastern Bengal, the Mahomedan community seem to me to have shown remarkable sense and remarkable self-restraint in the way in which they have taken it. As I have said, it is obvious that they could not like it in itself, but the most representative of them have refused to be alarmed by it, and have altogether refused to join in anything in the nature of an agitation hostile to the Government on the strength of it. The gentleman who was referred to by the noble Earl—the Nawab of Dacca, about whom the noble Earl repeated a story, which he will forgive me for describing as a story of gossip, which had not reached me before—I know for a fact expressed himself in the most loyal terms as being desirous of assisting the Government in explaining to his co-religionists in Eastern Bengal what the state of affairs really would be under the new arrangements, in order that they might not be inspired by exaggerated fears on the subject.
The noble Earl claimed apparently that the institution of the Lieutenant-Governorship of Eastern Bengal and Assam had been a complete and unqualified
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success. I should naturally desire to give, as he gave, the utmost credit to the able officers who worked that Province. As we know, in India all arrangements of such a character work satisfactorily under the guidance of the able men of different grades of the Service who superintend or look after the various districts, but it seems to me impossible to describe the Province as in itself constituting a great success. In the first place, the combination of Assam with Eastern Bengal has never been liked by Assam. They have never liked having to regard Dacca as their capital, and they have to an increasing extent begun to feel that they were overshadowed by Eastern Bengal, and that their identity was to some extent in danger of disappearing. I believe, therefore, that the re-erection of Assam into an independent Chief Commissionership will be thoroughly popular in Assam itself. I do not at all ignore the difficulty of the small cadre of service, to which the noble Earl drew attention. That, of course, will demand close attention.
As regards Eastern Bengal itself, the noble Earl spoke of the improvement which had taken place there as compared with former days when it formed part of a gigantic and overgrown Bengal Government. That is perfectly true. The conditions which obtained there in old days in the way of river piracy undoubtedly constituted a scandal of the first order, but it has been a discouraging feature since the Partition that although the statistics of crime in general will probably show an improvement owing to the multiplication and the greater efficiency of the police, yet as a direct result of the Partition there arose there a practice of gang robbery by land and water by gangs who sailed, so to speak, under the political flag, although there might be strong suspicions that in some cases the object of those who took part in those gangs was not political but mere ordinary robbery. Those gangs were largely composed of young men who belonged to what would he called in a social sense the respectable classes, and it has been impossible to avoid the conclusion that the feuds between Hindus and Mahomedans, of which they were the outcome, were founded upon the Partition of Bengal—that is to say, by the creation of Eastern Bengal into a Mahomedan Province—and it was found that this class of crime was most difficult to deal with and check. It has been to some extent dealt with and

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checked, but only at very great expense and with great difficulty. When speaking, therefore, of Eastern Bengal and Assam as a successfully administered Province, we must make the important qualification that this particular type of crime, at any rate to a very great extent, grew out of the state of things caused by the Partition. The noble Earl admitted that the creation of the new United Province would be a satisfaction to Behar.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Before the noble Marquess passes away, might I ask him if he has anything to say about Dacca and the residence of the Governor in future?
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: The noble Earl has reminded me of the question of the residence of the Governor of Bengal at Dacca. I think, if I remember rightly, he said that there were some who thought there ought to be a statutory obligation upon the Governor of Bengal to spend a certain time of the year at Dacca. I do not think myself that it would be possible to place an obligation of that kind upon the Governor. But of this I am quite certain, that the new Governor-General of Bengal and the Viceroy, with whom he will no doubt discuss the question of residence, will be convinced that it will be necessary in order to hold the proper balance between the different parts of the Province, and to avoid slipping back into the unfortunate state of things before the partition, to spend a certain part of the year at that place. I entirely agree that we ought to impress it upon the Governor of Bengal, as I am sure it will be impressed, and I have no doubt. it will be in full conformity with his own feelings, that, in spite of the magnet which may draw him on the one side to Calcutta and on the other, as the noble Earl said, to Darjeeling, his visits to Dacca should not be merely those of a flying kind but should show that he treats it as a second headquarters for his Presidency.
I need not dwell upon Behar. But the noble Earl somewhat surprised me by speaking of Orissa as likely to object strongly to the new arrangements. If the noble Earl had said that instead of creating a Lieutenant-Governorship at Behar and Orissa it would have been a more proper
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course to create two separate Commissioner-ships, one for Behar and one for Orissa, that would have been quite an arguable position, although I think the weight of argument would be in favour of creating a Lieutenant-Governorship, which to some extent falls in with the suggestion which was made by Sir George Campbell, a very eminent Indian official, some forty years ago. But when the noble Earl implies, as I think he did, that Orissa would rather remain tied up with Bengal than be tied up with Behar, I confess he caused me some surprise. I think that there may be some fear among the people of Orissa that their particular interests may not receive from the Lieutenant-Governor all the attention which those of Behar receive, and when the question of the second residence of the Lieutenant-Governor comes to be considered I have no doubt that the point will have to be carefully borne in mind. But I can assure the noble Earl that I have plenty of first-hand knowledge that the association of Orissa with Bengal had become from many points of view most unpalatable to Orissa. Since the publication of our scheme I had an opportunity of speaking to some of the most prominent men of Orissa, and although they expressed strong hopes that in the final arrangement Orissa would not be allowed to be overshadowed by Behar, with which I cordially agree, none of them expressed any regret at being severed from Bengal or from Calcutta, the influence of which, I think, like some of the other neighbouring peoples, as the noble Earl himself has told us, they had somewhat begun to dread.
In considering the merits, or, if you prefer so to regard them, the demerits of this scheme, it is necessary to regard it as a whole—to regard the balance of its different parts. The noble Earl seemed to give some colour to the belief, founded only, I think, on the dates of the two Despatches, that the whole matter had been carried out in a spirit of hurry, which he truly pointed out is foreign both to the Government of India and to the India Office. As a matter of fact, the consideration of the question began rather more than a year ago, and during the whole of that period in all its bearings it was the subject of the closest thought and of the freest consideration within the limited area of discussion to which it was intentionally kept. It is quite true, as I say, that the area of advice we obtained was

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a small one, but within those limits it was of a solid and thoroughly well informed character. All through, as it seemed to me, the main question that we had to ask, particularly when the discussion reached the point at which it became likely that we should suggest the announcement of the policy on the occasion of the Durbar, was cui malo. Who were the people that would have a right to say that their interests were in any degree compromised or injured by the new policy? It was quite possible, of course—and that is why it was necessary to consider the matter in all its bearings—that the injuries inflicted upon some classes of persons might be so grave, in the opinion of impartial observers, as to outweigh any benefits which could be obtained from the change. That I gather to be the opinion of the noble Earl. But I honestly believe that he will find himself a member of a very small minority, even in this country; and I am quite sure that if he were in India he would find himself a member of an almost infinitesimal minority, because I believe that the general reasons given in the two Despatches from the Government of India and the India Office are regarded by public opinion in India as conclusively showing that the benefits to be obtained from the change are greater than any damage either of substance or of sentiment which can be sustained by any class of people in the country. I therefore state without hesitation that, in spite of the powerful and well-directed attacks of the noble Earl, I remain entirely unrepentant both as to the general features of the scheme as described in the two Despatches and also as to the fact that the policy had the honour of being announced by His Majesty the King in Durbar at Delhi.
And since, after all, the opinion of India is what really matters in this as in most other matters with which the Indian Government is concerned, I desire to remind your Lordships of the very remarkable Message which was sent from India after His Majesty had left and which was published in the newspapers on the day on which His Majesty reached England. That Message was unique and unprecedented in the respect that it represented the spontaneous and joint action of the Indian Princes and of those who in one way or another are well entitled to speak for the educated opinion of British India. It was organised by some of the most power-
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ful and representative, and also, I think, some of the most conservative, among Indian rulers; and it was also authorised by some of those who are spoken of as the most representative among the advanced politicians in India, and the form of expression in which it reached us 1 believe was due to one of the latter class. Its sentiments are of a kind with which we should all heartily agree and which we all admire. I do not think it attracted the attention which it might have attracted in this country, because, very naturally and properly, it was sent through the Viceroy, and it was therefore supposed, I imagine, to possess something of an official colour, but as a matter of fact it had nothing whatever to do with the Viceroy or the Government of India. I conceive that the Viceroy did not even know of the movement or of the intention of the writers until the whole matter was settled and the public meetings were called. I think we are entitled to take that Message, sent in such unique circumstances, not as necessarily approving every detail of the policy which was announced at Delhi, but as expressing what I believe to be, and what I am prepared to say I know, is the general opinion of all classes in India, both in British India and in the native States—namely, that the making of this announcement by His Majesty at Delhi was one of the great and most notable features of the occasion; and that the kind of criticism which has been suggested by the noble Earl and by some others, namely, that in offering our advice to His Majesty to make this announcement on that occasion we were committing a breach of propriety, and, indeed, doing whatever may be meant by that somewhat vague word unconstitutional, has not entered the mind of the Indian people as a whole, or of those who, either in British India or in the native States, are entitled to speak as their representatives.
Moved, That the debate be adjourned.—(The Earl of Minto.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and the further debate adjourned To-morrow.
House adjourned at five minutes past Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, Four o' clock.