Sitting of 19 March 1908

Preamble
The House, met at a quarter before Three of the Clock.

PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.
Conway and Colwyn Bay Joint Water Board Bill.—As amended, considered; to be read the third time.
Rochdale Corporation Bill.—As amended considered; an Amendment made; Bill to be read the third time.
Dublin Corporation Bill (by Order).—Order for Second Reading read, and discharged.
Bill withdrawn.
Ards and Bangor Railways Bill.—"For making railways in the county of Down to be called the Ards and Bangor Railways; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
London United Tramways Bill.—"For conferring further powers on the London United Tramways, Limited; for constructing tramways, and widening and altering streets and roads; and for other purposes," presented, and read the first time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.
Dublin and South Eastern Railway Bill; City of Glasgow Bill—Reported, with Amendments; Reports to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
Seaham Harbour Dock Bill.—Reported, with Amendments; Report to lie upon the Table.
Bury and District Joint Water Board Bill; Blaydon and Ryton Water (Transfer) Bill.—Reported, with Amendments; Reports to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

PETITIONS.
  COAL MINES (EIGHT HOURS) (NO. 2) BILL.
  Petitions against: From Greenock; and Liverpool; to lie upon the Table.
  CONGO FREE STATE.
  Petition from Prestwich and White-field, for protection of the native races; to lie upon the Table.
  LICENSED PREMISES (EXCLUSION OF CHILDREN).
  Petition from Totnes, for legislation; to lie upon the Table.
  LICENSING BILL.
  Petitions against: From Ashby-de-la Zouch; Bishop Cannings; Chippenham; Devizes and District (two); and Pewsey; to lie upon the Table.
  LICENSING BILL.
  Petitions in favour: From Chelsea; Clydebank; and Rochdale; to lie upon the Table.
  MORAY FIRTH (ILLEGAL TRAWLING)
  Petition from Burghead, for prevention; to lie upon the Table.
  SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS ON SUNDAY BILL.
  Petition from Darlaston, in favour; to lie upon the Table.
  WOMEN'S ENFRANCHISEMENT BILL.
  Petition from Bury, in favour; to lie upon the Table.
RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.
  ELECTIONS (COLONIES).
  Copy presented, of Papers relating to the Machinery and Cost of Elections in certain British Colonies [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
  EDUCATION (SCOTLAND).
  Copy presented, of Return showing the Expenditure from the Grant for Public Education in Scotland in the year 1907, with Statistics [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
  LOAN FUND BOARD (IRELAND).
  Copy presented, of Seventieth Annual Report, 1907 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
  FOREIGN TRADE AND COMMERCE.
  Return ordered, "of Accounts relating to the Trade and Commerce of certain Foreign Countries and British Possessions."—(Mr. Lloyd-George.)
Oral Answers to Questions
  QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS CIRCULATED WITH THE VOTES.

    North of Scotland Mail Service.
    MR. R. L. HARMSWORTH: To ask the Postmaster-General if he is able to state whether his recent efforts to secure more punctual arrival of the mail trains to Caithness and the North of Scotland generally have met with success; and, if not, whether he will urge upon the railway companies the necessity for greater punctuality.
    (Answered by Mr. Sydney Buxton.) I am glad to be able to inform the hon. Member that the mail trains to the North of Scotland are at present working with fair punctuality. There is, therefore, no occasion for representations to the

    753
    railway companies on the subject. The remedial measures which have been urged upon the companies are principally intended to meet the difficulty experienced in maintaining punctuality during the tourist season, and their effect will not be fully apparent until later in the year.

    Heybridge Letter Deliveries.
    MR. T. R. BETHELL: To ask the Postmaster-General whether, having regard to the fact that Heybridge is contiguous to Maldon and in the same postal district, he can see his way to furthering the convenience of the residents of Heybridge by an extension of the evening delivery of letters.
    (Answered by Mr. Sydney Buxton.) I have called for a Report on this subject, and on its receipt I will communicate with the hon. Member.

    London Educational Endowments.
    MR. DICKINSON: To ask the President of the Board of Education, whether he can give the amount of the capital fund of endowments and the sums raised by way of mortgage of the school premises which the Board have sanctioned by schemes or orders under the Charitable Trusts Acts to be expended on repairs or alterations to voluntary schools in London since the Education (London) Act came into operation.
    (Answered by Mr. McKenna.) Statement showing (i.) the amount of the capital funds of endowments (including sums raised by charge of the charity estate, other than school buildings) and (ii.) the sums raised by way of mortgage of the school premises, which the Board of Education have sanctioned by schemes or orders under the Charitable Trusts Acts to be expended on repairs or alterations to voluntary schools in London since the Education (London) Act came into operation.

    (i.)

    £

    s.

    d.

    Church of England Schools

    16,326

    14

    9

    Roman Catholic Schools

    11,730

    4

    2

    Jewish Schools

    17,000

    0

    0

    45,056

    18

    11

    Refrigerating Machinery on Battleships.
    SIR BERKELEY SHEFFIELD: To ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, whether it is the intention of the Board to fit refrigerating machinery to the magazines of ships in special reserve, such as the eight battleships of the "Royal Sovereign" class, the "Renown," the two battleships of the "Centurion" class, and the "Nile" and "Trafalgar."
    (Answered by Mr. Edmund Robertson.) Provision has been made in the Estimates for 1908–9 for fitting the "Renown," but with this exception the reply is in the negative. If for any reason any of the ships named should be again brought forward for continuous active service in the Fleet, the question of fitting refrigerating machinery in them would be further considered.
    MR. BELLAIRS: To ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, whether the full amount of £200,000 or more will be spent under the current year's Estimates for refrigerating machinery of magazines of ships; and what are the chief items in the Votes on which savings are anticipated in the letter of application to the Treasury asking for their sanction to this new expenditure without presenting a Supplementary Estimate to the House.
    (Answered by Mr. Edmund Robertson.) So far as can be seen at present, it is anticipated that the expenditure in the

    755
    current financial year will not fall far short of £200,000. As regard? the second part of the Question, the Treasury was asked to sanction an expenditure of £200,000 on the understanding that a Supplementary Estimate would be presented if necessary. The expense, can, however, be defrayed from surpluses which have accrued on the provision for other services, principally under Votes 7, 8, Section III. 9, and 10.

    Use of Firearms in Ireland.
    MR. DUFFY: To ask Mr. Attorney - General for Ireland whether his attention has been drawn to the law proceedings at Gort, when Mr. F. Persse, J.P., was prosecuted for unlawfully discharging firearms on the public road; under what Act was the charge brought; and will he state why Mr. Brady, R.M., contrary to the expressed opinion of his brother magistrate who assisted on the occasion, marked the case dismissed, instead of, as is usual in all such cases, adjourned to next petty sessions.
    (Answered by Mr. Cherry.) The proceedings against Mr. F. Persse, J.P., were brought by the police under the Summary Jurisdiction (Ireland) Act,

    Year.

    Council Schools.

    Voluntary Schools.

    Total.

    Accommodation.

    Average attendance.

    Accommodation.

    Average attendance.

    Accommodation.

    Average attendance.

    1904–5

    7,605

    4,740

    37,878

    27,354

    45,483

    32,094

    1905–6

    7,887

    5,891

    37,831

    26,959

    45,718

    32,850

    1906–7

    7,987

    5,873

    38,100

    27,120

    46,087

    32,993

    Blacker-Douglas Estate.
    MR. FLAVIN: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether the untenanted land on the Blacker-Douglas estate at Tulahinal, about 400 acres, has been offered for sale by the landlord to the Estates Commissioners for the purpose of enlarging uneconomic holdings and giving plots of land to labourers; whether the land has been inspected; and, if so, when and how soon do the Estates
    1851. I am informed that one of the two magistrates was for a conviction and the other for an acquittal. In these circumstances it was open to the magistrates to make one or other of two orders, namely, to dismiss without prejudice to the complaint being renewed or to adjourn. The resident magistrate informs me that his fellow-magistrate expressed no desire to adjourn the case, and the usual procedure in that Court was therefore followed, that is to say, the case was dismissed without prejudice to the complaint being renewed if thought desirable.

    Hertfordshire Schools.
    MR. CLOUGH: To ask the President of the Board of Education what is the total number of school-places in the Hertfordshire provided and non-provided elementary schools; and what was the average attendance in these schools for the years 1904–5, 1905–6, and 1906–7.
    (Answered by Mr. McKenna.) The following table gives the accomodation and average attendance in council and voluntary schools in the area of the Hertfordshire County Council for the years 1904–5, 1905–6, and 1906–7:—
    Commissioners expect to acquire possession of the same
    (Answered by Mr. Birrell.) The untenanted land in question is being sold by the owner at prices which have been approved by the Estates Commissioners, who are at present preparing a scheme for the distribution of the land. The Commissioners are selecting the persons who are to receive shares of the land, but they are not yet in a position to

    757
    say when the selected persons can be put into possession.

    North Kerry Evicted Farms.
    MR. FLAVIN: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether T. W. Sands accepted on 8th May, 1907, the offer of the Estates Commissioners for the purchase of two evicted farms at Knockanure, North Kerry, from which C. O'Connor and Terence M'Mahon were evicted; whether the evicted tenants have since been reinstated; and, if not, will he say why this has not been done.
    (Answered by Mr. Birrell.) The vendor did not finally accept the Estates Commissioners' proposal to purchase until 28th September last. The evicted tenants referred to have been put in possession of the farms, and the Commissioners are now awaiting the receipt of undertakings to purchase signed by these men, whereupon the Commissioners will complete the purchase as from 28th September.

    Oliver Estate, Listowel.
    MR. FLAVIN: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that Thomas Hannan, of Bealkilla, Listowel, a tenant on the Oliver property, has been processed and decreed and also served with a writ for the current gale's rent because he would not sign a purchase agreement at, in his opinion, an exorbitant price; whether he is aware that Mr. Hannan, being a future tenant, is debarred from having a fair rent fixed by the Court, and has asked the agent, Mr. Vandeleur, of Mallow, to allow him to have a fair rent fixed, which request has been refused; and will he say what steps the Government will take to prevent Hannan, and tenants in a similar position who are future tenants, from being harassed by the land agent.
    (Answered by Mr. Birrell.) I have referred this Question to the Estates Commissioners, who inform me that no proceedings for the sale of the estate referred to have been instituted before them, and that they have no knowledge of the facts alleged in the Question. It
    758
    is, of course, the fact that future tenants are debarred from entering the Land Commission Courts to get a fair rent fixed. I have already stated that the question of admitting future tenants to the benefits of the rent-fixing clauses of the Irish Land Acts will be fully considered in connection with the legislation which it is intended to introduce for the purpose of amending those Acts. I cannot go jurther than this at present.

    S.S. "Egyptian" Crew's Complaint.
    MR. HAVELOCK WILSON: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the complaint of the crew of the steamer "Egyptian," who allege that whilst the vessel was at the port of Alexandria they were refused permission to go outside of the docks without a pass from the master of the vessel in their own time; and whether he can say what regulations there are in existence at Alexandria which makes it obligatory on the part of seamen to have a pass or order before they can have permission to go outside of the dock gates in their own time.
    (Answered by Secretary Sir Edward Grey.) I have received a Report on the subject, the substance of which I shall be happy to communicate to the hon Member.

    Chowkidari Tax in Bengal.
    MR. WEIR: To ask the Secretary of State for India whether the Government of India have yet approved of the proposals made by the Bengal Government to relieve the Bengal agriculturists of the inequalities of taxation to which they are at present subjected under the Chowkidari Tax.
    (Answered by Mr. Secretary Money.) The Government of India have informed me that the proposals of the Bengal Government deal not only with the subject of removing inequalities of assessment, but also with the improvement of the village system and village police, and involve large and extremely difficult questions that have to be dealt with as a whole, and are still under their consideration.

    Eastern Bengal Estate Schools.
    MR. WEIR: To ask the Secretary of State for India whether he has now received Captain Kennedy's Report on estate schools in Eastern Bengal and Assam; and, if so, will he consider the expediency of laying it upon the Table of the House.
    (Answered by Mr. Secretary Money.) I have received the Report. I think it will be sufficient to place a copy in the Library, and I will see that this is done.

    Trade Statistics.
    MR. DUNDAS WHITE: To ask the President of the Board of Trade if he can state what were

    United Kingdom.

    United States.

    France.

    Germany.

    Foreign trade:

    £

    £

    £

    £

    Imports for Home consumption

    553,932,000

    296,519,000

    241,906,000

    422,706,000

    Exports of domestic produce

    426,205,000

    394,859,000

    221,681,000

    337,722,000

    Total of above

    980,137,000

    691,378,000

    463,587,000

    760,428,000

    Number.

    Number.

    Number.

    Number.

    Estimated population in the middle of the year

    44,100,000

    85,817,000

    39,275,000

    62,156,000

    Foreign trade per head of the population:

    £

    s.

    d.

    £

    s.

    d.

    £

    s.

    d.

    £

    s.

    d.

    Imports for Home consumption

    12

    11

    3

    3

    9

    1

    6

    3

    2

    6

    16

    0

    Exports of domestic produce

    9

    13

    3

    4

    12

    0

    5

    12

    11

    5

    8

    8

    Total of above

    22

    4

    6

    8

    1

    1

    11

    16

    1

    12

    4

    8

    Notes.—(1) The imports for Home consumption are calculated, in the case of the United Kingdom and United States, by deducting the value of the re-exports from the gross value of the
    the imports for Home consumption and the exports of domestic produce and manufactures, together with the total of these, for the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Germany, respectively, for the year 1907; what was the estimated population of each of these countries, respectively, for that year, and what were the imports for Home consumption and the exports of domestic produce and manufactures, together with the total of these, per head of population in each of these countries, respectively, for that year.
    (Answered by Mr. Lloyd-George.) The following statement gives the particulars asked for by my hon. friend—
    imports in 1907. (2) The values of imports and exports stated in the German and French official accounts are for the most part computed on the basis of the ascertained average prices of 1906.

    Railway Tickets.
    MR. C. E. PRICE: To ask the President of the Board of Trade whether he will issue instructions to the various railway come panics in the United Kingdom to print the amount of the fare on each ticket issued, whether for single or the return journey.
    (Answered by Mr. Lloyd-George.) It is already provided by an Order issued by the Board of Trade upon the various railway companies, pursuant to Section 6 of the Regulation of Railways Act, 1889, that, subject to certain exceptions, every passenger ticket shall bear upon its face, printed or written in legible characters, the fare chargeable for the journey for which such ticket is issued. The exceptions are: (1) Excursion and tourist tickets where the fare is advertised; (2) tickets issued in accordance with public service warrants; (3) tickets issued by special arrangement at rates less than the ordinary fare for pleasure parties, etc.; (4) tickets at rates not exceeding the ordinary fares which, in addition, include a charge for admission to a show, etc.; and (5) packets of tickets sold at reduced fares in consideration of a minimum number being purchased.

    Bible Board's Clerk.
    MR. RIDSDALE: To ask the Secretary for Scotland what the duties are of the clerk to the Bible Board and the printer's reader to the same body; and what the provisional arrangement is under which the emoluments attaching to these offices are drawn.
    (Answered by Mr. Sinclair.) The clerk to the Bible Board acts as law agent and also discharges all the executive duties required by the Board. The reader reads and revises proofs of editions of the Bible published in Scotland. The expenses are provided with the sanction of the Treasury.

    Royal Household of Scotland.
    SIR JOHN TUKE: To ask the Secretary for Scotland if he proposes to fill up the office of Limner in the Royal
    762
    Household of Scotland, which has been vacant since the death of Sir Noel Paton seven years ago; and if he proposes to fill up the office of Historiographer in the same Royal Household, vacant since the death of Professor Masson.
    (Answered by Mr. Sinclair.) I have nothing to add to the reply given to the hon. Member for Ross and Cromarty on 16th March.

    Custom House Stamp Office, Dublin.
    MR. J. P. NANNETTI: To ask the Postmaster-General whether he is aware of the inconvenience caused to the commercial community of Dublin by the closing of the Stamp Office, Custom House, at the early hour of 3.45; and if he will take steps to have the office open for the sale of stamps to a later hour each day.
    (Answered by Mr. Runciman.) The Stamp Office, Custom House, Dublin, is open daily for the sale of stamps and receipt of duties until 4 o'clock, except on Saturday, when the closing hour is 1.30 o'clock. I may add that stamps are also on sale in the principal post offices in Dublin, and care is taken that the stock is sufficient for the public requirements.

    Marble Arch Improvement.
    MR. HORNIMAN: To ask the First Commissioner of Works whether, in view of the rapid progress now being made with the Marble Arch improvement, he can give an approximate date when the paving will be completed, and when the whole will be finished; whether the old iron railings and gateways are to be re-erected; what electric standards are to be used; and whether he will arrange for the drawings of the said new ironwork to be exhibited in the tea-room.
    (Answered by Mr. Harcourt.) The road-making will, I hope, be finished by 1st May. The re-erection of the lodge and lavatory will take somewhat longer. The old iron railings will be used again as far as possible. The electric standards will match those in the immediate neighbourhood. The gates will be new

    763
    and the drawing of them shall be placed in the tea-room.

    Grantham Education Disputes.
    MR. YOXALL: To ask the President of the Board of Education what is the present position of the difficulty which has arisen at Grantham between the Grantham Town Council, who wish the continued recognition of the secondary school attached to the Grantham Technical Institute, and the Kesteven local education authority and the Board of Education, who apparently wish to discontinue it.
    (Answered by Mr. McKenna.) There is not, and there never has been, a secondary school recognised by the Board under the regulations for secondary schools in connection with the Grantham Technical Institute. Day classes in science and art were recognised at the institute up to 31st July, 1905, under regulations which have now been superseded. The conditions under which these classes were conducted were not, either as regards premises, staff, or general organisation, such as would justify the Board in recognising a secondary school. There is need for a secondary school for girls in Grantham, and the Board offered, if such a school were provided in new premises, to consider the possibility of giving temporary recognition to a school in the institute until those buildings were ready. But they were not prepared to recognise a second school for boys in Grantham, since they were satisfied that the grammar school was sufficient to meet the needs of the locality. The Kesteven County Council and the Grantham Town Council were not prepared to accept the conditions laid down by the Board, and the application for recognition of a school in the institute was withdrawn on 2nd May, 1907. In August of the same year I had an interview with representatives of the county council and the town council, but the representations made did not satisfy me that I should be justified in altering the decision previously arrived at.

    Hours of Work in Mines.
    MR. D. A. THOMAS: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he can state generally
    764
    the nature and scope of the Amendments he now considers necessary to the Bill he recently introduced for regulating the hours of. work in mines.
    (Answered by Mr. Secretary Gladstone.) I am not yet in a position to make any statement although, as I have once or twice indicated, I think some Amendment will be necessary.

    Irish Police.
    MR. THOMAS O'DONNELL: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland what is the total number of officers in the police service in Ireland; the total salary; total allowances for man-servant, horse-lodging, stationery, office, fuel and light, total allowances for travelling and subsistence, etc., during the year ended December, 1907; and whether he will state details of the salary, allowances, travelling and subsistence expenses of the county and district inspectors of the counties of Kerry and Carlow, with the number of barracks and men in each county.
    (Answered by Mr. Birrell.) The total number of county and district inspectors for whom pay and allowances are provided in the Royal Irish Constabulary Estimate for the year ending 31st instant is 240, viz., 37 county inspectors and 203 district inspectors. The annual pay of these officers amounts to £58,912; servants' allowance, £10,800; forage allowance, £11,850; lodging, fuel, and light, £8,397; stationery, £939; and office, £707; giving a total for pay and allowances of £91,605. The accounts of the Constabulary Vote do not show the subsistence and travelling of the officers apart from those of the men. The total annual pay and allowances at 31st December last of the county inspector and the eight district inspectors in County Kerry was: For pay, £2,227; lodging, £355; servants, £405; office, £18 5s.; stationery, £34; and forage, £450. In County Carlow, for the county inspector and the two district inspectors, the amounts were: For pay, £1,055; lodging, £130; servants, £135; office, £18 5s.; stationery, £16; and forage, £150. The number of barracks in County Carlow is 15 and in County Kerry 60. The number of sergeants and constables

    765
    serving in County Carlow on 29th February, was 75, and in County Kerry, 325.

    Carrocuill Estate, County Roscommon.
    MR. JAMES O'KELLY: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether the estate of Carrocuill, situated in the parish of Kilmore, County Roscommon, the property of Thomas Whelan, Saville, Dalkey, County Dublin, has been offered for sale to the Estates Commissioners; and, if so, with what result.
    (Answered by Mr. Birrell.) The Estates Commissioners have had this estate inspected, and have made a provisional offer for it which the owner has intimated his willingness to accept. The Commissioners are now awaiting the institution by the owner of formal proceedings for the sale.

    Sub-Division of Irish Holdings.
    MR. HAYDEN: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland how many applications to the Land Commission by tenant farmers who have purchased their holdings for liberty to sub-divide the same for the purpose of sale or mortgage are now pending; between what dates have the same been received; what period of incubation has to elapse before the Land Commission consider the same; who is responsible for the delay in the department to which such applications are referred; and whether, seeing that it is a common practice to. consolidate several separate holdings in the one vesting order with the result that in any subsequent dealings with any one of such holdings the consent of the Land Commission has to be obtained, steps will be taken to have these sub-divisions expedited, and thus save farmers from the loss caused by the delay in obtaining the consent of the Land Commission.
    (Answered by Mr. Birrell.) The Land Commission inform me that about sixty cases are pending before them in which applications have been made for liberty to sub-divide holdings which are subject to land purchase annuities. Nearly all of these applications were received since 1st January last. The cases are in different stages of inquiry, and are dealt
    766
    with as rapidly as possible in order of priority. Delay is often caused by the manner in which the applications are presented, resulting in considerable correspondence and difficulty, and by the fact that in many cases local inspection is necessary.

    Irish Co-operative Trading Associations.
    SIR GEORGE SCOTT ROBERTSON: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, does the Government, through the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction, subsidise any co-operation trading associations to the detriment of the individual enterprise of town traders in Ireland.
    (Answered by Mr. Birrell.) The answer is in the negative.

    Enfield Small Arms Factory—West's Case
    MR. VERNEY: To ask the Secretary of State for War whether, in the case of West, lately employed at the Small Arms Factory, Enfield Lock, he was sent by the shops manager to the surgery to be medically examined; whether the medical examination revealed the fact that, owing to the injuries West had received in the service, he was rendered unable to do useful work; and whether he will call for a copy of such medical report, and, in the light of it, take the case into his favourable consideration, with a view to getting some allowance made.
    (Answered by Mr. Secretary Haldane.) This case is now under the consideration of the Treasury. Will my hon. friend kindly refer to the previous replies given by my hon. friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury to Questions put on this case on the 10th and 16th instant by the hon. Members for the Epping Division of Essex and Kilkenny, respectively.

    Royal Field Artillery.
    MR. YOUNGER: To ask the Secretary of State for War whether a limited number of commissions in the Royal Field Artillery will be offered for competition amongst subalterns who serve a probationary period in the Special Reserve, Royal Field

    767
    Artillery, on conditions approximating to those previously in force for officers of Garrison Artillery Militia.
    (Answered by Mr. Secretary Haldane.) The reply is in the affirmative.

    Franking Official Letters.
    MR. TILLETT: To ask the Secretary of State for War whether he will endeavour to obtain for the secretaries of the County Associations the privilege of franking all letters sent by them on official business connected with their Association.
    (Answered by Mr. Secretary Haldane.) Letters on official business addressed to the War Office or by the War Office may be sent without being prepaid. This is the only kind of franking accorded to the Army, and I am afraid it would be useless for me even to try and obtain this privilege for County Associations.

  QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE.

    Naval Artificer Engineers.
    MR. CURRAN: On behalf of the hon. Member for the Blackfriars Division of Glasgow, I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty how many artificer engineers are now carried on the engineering complements of cruisers and scouts.
    THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. EDMUND ROBERTSON,): Three artificer engineers are carried in the complement of all large modern cruisers, two in the older large cruisers, and one in other cruisers and scouts.

    Cadets and the Douglas Scheme.
    MR. CURRAN: On behalf of the hon. Member for the Blackfriars Division of Glasgow, I bog to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty what percentage of the whole number of cadets passing out have selected engineering under the Douglas scheme.
    MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: None of the new scheme cadets will reach the age of specialisation for some years to come.

    Petty Officers Training for Mechanician Rating.
    MR. CURRAN: On behalf of the hon. Member for the Blackfriars Division of Glasgow I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty what is the annual cost of the pay and victualling of the stoker petty officers undergoing a two years course of training for mechanician rating.
    MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: £14,000. approximately.
    MR. CURRAN: On behalf of the hon. Member for the Blackfriars Division of Glasgow, I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty what is the cost of officers, petty officers, and pensioned instructors; and what is the total value of the repairs executed by the stoker petty officer qualifying for mechanicians.
    MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: The first part of the Question was answered in a reply to the hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness on the 17th March. The answer to the second part of the Question is about £4,000 a year.

    Wages on Admiralty Contracts.
    MR. HUDSON: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty if he can now say whether inquiries have been made respecting the wages paid by Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth, and Company to employees on H.M.S. "Lord Nelson" at Jarrow and H.M.S. "Invincible" at the Elswick Works, Newcastle; and why the standard rata was departed from in the latter case.
    MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: The Admiralty are still in correspondence with the firm, and I will communicate with the hon. Gentleman as soon as a definite result is reached.

    Defective Cordite.
    MR. BELLAIRS: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty if he will state the quantity of cordite which has been destroyed since 1st January 1907, either because of deterioration or because of the presence of mercuric chloride; and whether £170 per ton would be a rough average value of this cordite, having regard to the greater cost of the larger sizes.
    MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: The Admiralty consider that it would not be in the interests of the public service to make any statement on this subject.
    MR. BELLAIRS: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware this information must be given to Parliament within eight or nine months in the Auditor-General's Report?
    MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: No, Sir, I am not.
    MR. ARTHUR LEE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that as the value, of this cordite was announced in an Answer to a Question the other day, it is quite possible for one knowing the price per ton to estimate the quantity.
    MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: I do not remember that answer.
    MR. ARTHUR LEE: It was £8,000.
    MR. ASHLEY: Have steps been taken to replace this cordite immediately?
    [No Answer was returned.]

    Rosyth Water Supply.
    MR. BELLAIRS: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether the Admiralty have yet paid their contribution to the scheme for supplying Rosyth with fresh water; and, if not, whether he can state when it is due and what it the total liability.
    MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: The new water scheme is not yet complete and no payment is due. The liability will be, approximately, £3,000 a year for forty years from the date when the supply begins.

    Chelsea Barracks School of Instruction.
    MR. COURTHOPE: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether income-tax is deducted from the pay and allowances paid to officers of the auxiliary forces attending the school of instruction at Chelsea Barracks or other places; and what steps should be taken to secure the repayment of such deductions in cases where the
    770
    officer concerned is wholly or partly exempt from the payment of income-tax.
    THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. HALDANE,): Income-tax is deducted in such cases from the pay and lodging allowances, unless the officers concerned claim exemption. Accountants supply them with a form of claim for the purpose. If they are not wholly exempt, the tax deducted is recoverable through the local surveyor of taxes, who deals with their income from other sources.

    Madras High Court Judgeship.
    DR. RUTHERFORD: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether, in view of the approaching retirement from the Madras High Court of Mr. Justice Bod-dam, a barrister judge of that Court, he will consider the advisability of appointing an Indian barrister in his place and thereby restoring to that Court a second Indian judge, and placing it in that respect on the same footing as the High Courts at Bombay and Allahabad.
    THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Mr. MORLBY,): In making recommendations for filling the vacancy to which my hon. friend refers, I shall consider all the circumstances of the case, including that which he mentions.

    Administration of Bengal.
    *SIR H. COTTON: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether it has been decided to separate the exercise of judicial and executive functions in selected districts of Bengal; and, if so, whether he can indicate the means of the districts and the character of the measures it is intended to take for this purpose.
    MR. MORLEY: A scheme of the nature described in the Question is under the consideration of the Government of India, but I have not as yet received definite proposals from them.

    Mymensingh Disturbances.
    *SIR H. COTTON: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been drawn to the report

    771
    of a detailed local inquiry conducted by the hon. Bhupendro Nath Bose and Lieutenant-Colonel Mukherjea, I.M.S. retired, into the complaints of maltreatment made by certain inhabitants of Mymensingh; and whether, looking to the evidence showing that houses and shops were broken into by the police, that persons were assaulted by them, and property plundered, he will cause an official inquiry to be made into the facts of the case.
    MR. MORLEY: As I stated in reply to a Question yesterday, the Local Government on hearing of the disturbances at once ordered an official inquiry.

    Bengalese Police and the Swadeshi Movement.
    SIR H. COTTON: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been drawn to the frequent appointment of punitive police in the province of Eastern Bengal; whether these punitive police are appointed to keep the peace or to suppress the growing strength of the Swadeshi or national movement; whether the villages in which these police are stationed are the strongholds of this movement; whether the Mahomedan inhabitants of these villages have been exempted generally from payment of a tax for the maintenance of these police; whether Hindus who are unsympathetic with the Swadeshi movement have been taxed lightly or altogether exempted; and whether he will inquire into the matter with a view of relieving what is represented to be a grievous burden on the people concerned.
    *MR. REES: Before the right hon. Gentleman answers this Question, may I ask whether the argumentative part is accepted as well as the interrogatory?
    MR. MOELEY: That needs a more elaborate examination of this question than I have yet given it. My hon. friend is no doubt aware that by the law of India (Police Act, 1861, section 15) it is necessary, before additional police can be quartered in any area at the cost of the inhabitants, that the local government shall declare, by proclamation in the Official Gazette, that "the area has been found to be in a disturbed or dangerous
    772
    state, or that, from the conduct of the inhabitants of such area or of any class or section of them, it is expedient to increase the number of police." I have no reason to suppose that the Local Government has failed in its duty, where it has ordered additional police to be quartered on any locality in Eastern Bengal; or that it has apportioned the cost upon any class or section of the inhabitants with reference to political movements and opinion. I do not propose to make any inquiry into the matter.
    *SIR H. COTTON: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in the Sherpore case, which was referred to yesterday, the only Hindu exempted is a gentleman well known for his antagonism to the national movement, whereas all the Mahomedans have been exempted? Will he inquire into that?
    MR. MOELEY: Yes, Sir. I will.

    Afghan Boundary.
    SIR H. COTTON: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether the boundary of the map of Afghanistan, which has been placed in the Library, is to be accepted as indicating that the external frontier of His Majesty's possessions in India is conterminous with that boundary; if so, from what date has the boundary of that external frontier been so laid down; and, seeing that the territory of the Zakka Khel lies within that frontier and is a portion of His Majesty's possessions in India within the meaning of Section 55 of the Act of 1858 for the better government of India, whether this fact implies that the Zakka Khel territory, as well as all the other frontier territory up to the Afghan boundary, is already within the possession or occupation of the Indian Government.
    MR. MORLEY: The boundary with Afghanistan shown on the map forms the external frontier of His Majesty's possessions in India. The boundary was laid down in the Agreement with the Amir of 12th November, 1893, well known as the Durand Agreement. The map shows how far the boundary has been defined by demarcation. All territories up to the boundary form part of His Majesty's British Possessions, but neither Zakka Khel territory, nor that of other tribes

    773
    on the North-west frontier is under direct British administration.

    Indian Immigration to Natal.
    MR. HAROLD COX: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been called to the Report of Mr. Harry Smith, Principal Immigration Restriction Officer of Natal, for the year 1907, proposing among other things that the Immigration Department should have power to nominate the European language which is to be used to test the fitness of Indians wishing to enter the Colony as free men; and whether the effect of giving such power to the Immigration Department would be to enable that Department to exclude from a British Colony British-Indians who are perfectly conversant with the English language but who failed to pass a test in German, Russian, or Yiddish.
    MR. MORLEY: The Report has not been seen either by myself or by my noble friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It has not been received at either office.

    Dinizulu—Natal Government Reply to Mr. Jellicoe.
    MR. LEHMANN: I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the Secretary of State for the Colonies has received any communication from the Government of Natal making any answer to the allegations made in Mr. Jellicoe's letter of 7th February to the Governor of Natal.
    THE UNDER - SECRETARY OF STATE FOR the COLONIES (Mr. CHRUCHILL,): Yes, Sir. The reply is contained in a telegram from the Governor as follows:—" 10th March. No 1. Ministers have requested that the following Minute should be telegraphed to your Lordship:—Ministers received on 7th March His Excellency's Minute of 6th March, forwarding for Ministers' information a letter by Mr Jellicoe to you dated 7th February, and which was received by His Excellency on 12th February, 1908. Ministers regret that such a letter should have been addressed to His Excellency by a gentleman who had become a member of the Natal Bar, more especially because of the sinister
    774
    attempt made in the first page of that letter to involve His Excellency in the first section of the libels therein contained. Ministers understand that His Excellency took steps through the medium of Reuter's Agency at an early date to disavow the association of 'common ground' claimed by Mr. Jellicoe with His Excellency, a step rendered the more necessary because the writer of this letter appears to have secured publication of his letter before the original could even have reached your hands. With reference to the remaining portion of that letter, comprising nine pages of type written foolscap, it consists in the main of a series of statements again so patently false as to make the letter too contemptible for notice by this Government, not with tanding that the writer held the position of an English barrister (as)? at the time he indited it and was retained in his professional capacity as alleged by him with the concurrence of the Colonial Office' for the defence of Dinizulu. There the comment of Ministers might end but for Mr. Jellicoe's allegation that he is sending a copy of his despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. So that the Secretary of State for the Colonies may not possibly be misled by statements which in this Colony require no refutation, Ministers would be glad if his Excellency would cable this Minute to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Now that Ministers have received this letter officially from his Excellency and also learn that it has been published in England, Ministers think it is their duty to send his Excellency the foregoing comments on the letter and to ask that this Minute should be given publicity at an early date." I should add that the Secretary of State's telegram of 19th December, published at page 180 of Cd. 3888, explains the attitude of the Colonial Office in regard to Mr. Jellicoe's visit to Natal.
    MR. BELLOC: May I ask whether the Colonial Office possesses, without having to create it, any machinery by which the Imperial Government could order an independent inquiry into these charges? They are widely believed in this country. I, for one, believe them.
    MR CHURCHILL: No. We do not possess any machinery, except that we can

    775
    ask a Colonial Government for specific answers to specific questions. I have been asked whether we have received a reply. I have read the reply. That is a matter of fact that I am bound to put before the House, but the House will see that the statement is of a general character, and we have asked for more specific answers to specific matters. I trust that the answers to these will be as conclusive and satisfactory as is the general one.
    *MR. REES: Is the Mr. Jellicoe mentioned in this Question the same learned gentleman who has just now prosecuted an appeal in the case of two Zulus convicted of sedition, in which case the Judicial Committee found that no in-injustice had been done by the Native High Court in Natal?
    MR. CHURCHILL: The life history of Mr. Jellicoe is not sufficiently known to me to enable me to answer that Question.

    Anglo-Siamese Treaty.
    MR. SMEATON: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether a treaty is now being negotiated between this country and Siam under which two tributary provinces of Lower Siam are to be ceded to Great Britain in consideration of the surrender by this country of certain extra-territorial rights; when the treaty is likely to be signed; and when it may be expected to be laid upon the Table of this House.
    THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir EDWARD GREY,): As I informed the hon. Member for West Bristol on the 16th instant, I cannot answer Questions on this subject till I have had an opportunity of considering the terms of the draft, which has not yet reached me.

    Workmen's Compensation—Medical Referees.
    MR. ARTHUR HENDERSON: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether any case has been considered by the medical referees appointed under the Workmen's Compensation Act; and, if so, in what trade and with what result.
    THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. GLADSTONE,): The total number of cases considered by medical referees in the six months from the 1st July, 1907, the date on which the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, came into force, up to the 31st December, 1907, after which date figures are not yet available, is 117. The mumbers in the respective branches of employment were as follows—

    Railways

    4

    Factories

    27

    Mines

    64

    Engineering

    2

    Building

    9

    Agriculture

    3

    Not stated

    8

    I cannot give the results as the reports of the referees are not made to the Home-Office, but to County Court Judges and other persons; such information as is furnished to the Home Office being principally required for the proper payment of the fees. I should like to add that I do not think any trustworthy inference as to the working of the provisions of the new Act can be drawn from, the results of the first six months of its operation.
    MR. WEDGWOOD: Are steps being taken to secure that the medical referees appointed have not previously been interested in the cases as certifying surgeons or in any other manner?
    MR. GLADSTONE: Yes, that is done.

    Convictions of Licensed Victuallers.
    MR. BOTTOMLEY: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he can state when the criminal statistics for 1907 will be issued; and whether, in the meantime, he can state the number of convictions against licensed victuallers during that year in respect of offences other than those referred to in the recently issued licensing statistics.
    MR. GLADSTONE: It is not expected that the criminal statistics for 1907 can be completed before the end of the present year. The offences by licensed persons shown in Table V. of the recently issued volume of licensing statistics include all offences by licensed

    777
    persons as such. As regards other offences there are no statistics differentiating between licensed persons and other members of the community.

    Coal Mines (Eight Hours) Bill.
    CAPTAIN CRAIG: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, if he intends to proceed with the Second Reading of the Coal Mines (Eight Hours) Bill; and if he is aware of the number of memorials against the measure being daily received by Members from all parts of Ireland.
    MR. GLADSTONE: The answer to the first part of the Question is in the affirmative. As to the second, I have received three memorials from Ireland, but I do not know how other hon. Members have fared.
    CAPTAIN CRAIG: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the grave inconvenience which is being caused and the difficulty of entering into contracts for future delivery while the Government are wobbling on this subject?
    MR. GLADSTONE: I am quite satisfied there is no inconvenience.
    CAPTAIN CRAIG: Will the right hon. Gentleman make inquiries in Ireland?
    MR. STANLEY WILSON: And in England, too?
    [No Answer was returned.]

    Metropolitan Police Stations.
    MR. MORTON: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether the Metropolitan police stations have yet been connected with the general telephone system; and, if so, what has been the effect?
    MR. GLADSTONE: Fifty-nine Metropolitan police stations out of a total of 192, or 30·7 per cent., are connected with the public telephone system. 123 stations, or 64 per cent., are connected by the police telephone system. The additional facilities of communication thus provided have proved an advantage to police work. I am just adding fifty-eight out-lying divisional stations to the number.

    Limited Liability Companies and the Franchise.
    MR. RICHARDSON: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that upon a man, for family reasons or otherwise, converting his business into a limited liability company he is at once disfranchised in respect to such premises; and if he will consider as to the practicability of so amending the law that a limited liability company by its directors, under its own seal, may appoint one representative who would thereupon be able to serve and vote in regard to such premises.
    THE PRESIDENT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (Mr. JOHN BURNS,): Perhaps I may answer this Question. I am aware that a company cannot exercise the franchise, notwithstanding that it owns or occupies premises, the ownership or occupation of which would in the case of an individual confer a right of voting; but I am not able to promise to introduce legislation on the subject.

    Traction Engines on Roads.
    MR. LYELL: I beg to ask the President of the Local Government Board whether his attention has been called by local authorities to the damage done to roads by traction engines and heavy locomotives, especially after the break up of a frost; and whether he will consider the advisability of giving, by legislation or otherwise, to local authorities power to regulate and at certain seasons to prohibit the use of traction engines.
    MR. JOHN BURNS: I have received some communications on this subject, and one has recently reached me from the Dorset County Council. The question is one of some difficulty. It was considered by the Departmental Committee on Highway Authorities and Administration. That Committee did not see their way to adopt a proposal that officials of the highway authority should be empowered to stop road-engines from using the roads on occasions when rendered unsuitable for passage by the state of the weather, and could only suggest that there should be a power for recovering from the owners of the engines damages for injury caused by their traversing the roads in unsuitable

    779
    weather. I cannot promise to undertake legislation on the subject, but I shall be happy to consider any suggestions that may be laid before me for meeting the difficulty.

    Farm Colonies.
    MR. COURTHOPE: I beg to ask the President of the Local Government Board from what sources the funds of the Hollesley Bay, Laindon, and South Ockenden settlements are derived.
    MR. JOHN BURNS: The cost of maintaining the farm colonies at Hollesley Bay and Ockenden is in the main defrayed by payments to the Central (Unemployed) Body for London and the West Ham Distress Committee, respectively, from the Parliamentary grant in aid of expenditure under the Unemployed Workmen Act 1905. The cost of maintaining the branch workhouse at Laindon is defrayed out of the common fund of the Poplar Union. In each case the value of the produce of the farm which is sold or consumed must be taken into account.

    Hertfordshire Schools.
    MR. CLOUGH: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Education what is the total number of school places in the Hertfordshire provided and non-provided elementary schools; and what was the average attendance in these schools for the years 1904–5, 1905–6, and 1906–7.
    THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION (Mr. MCKENNA,): If my hon. friend will allow me, I will circulate with the Votes a table giving the information he requires.
    *MR. CARLILE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that between the years 1902 and 1905 the non-provided schools referred to in the Question received voluntary donations from Churchmen in Hertfordshire amounting to £25,000?
    [No Answer was returned.]

    Hertfordshire Higher Education Rate.
    MR. CLOUGH: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Education
    780
    what proportion of the twopenny limit for higher education is levied by the Hertfordshire local education authority.
    MR. MCKENNA: The financial statement of the Hertfordshire County Council for the year 1906–7 has not yet been received, but I am informed that during the current year the local authority have raised or are raising £9,000 from the rates in respect of education other than elementary, which would be equivalent to a rate of about 1¼d. in the £.

    Hertfordshire Secondary Schools and Training Colleges.
    MR. CLOUGH: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Education how many secondary schools and training colleges there are in Hertfordshire; how many of them impose sectarian tests upon their teachers or students; and whether the sectarian secondary schools and training colleges are subsidised out of the rate that is levied for higher education.
    MR. MCKENNA: There are twelve secondary schools in Hertfordshire receiving grants from the Board, eleven of which are aided by the local education authority. In none of them are sectarian tests imposed on teachers or students. Seven other secondary schools, not on the Grant List, are known to the Board, but I have no complete information as to whether sectarian tests are imposed or rate-aid is given. There is one training college, imposing sectarian tests on teachers and students, which is not aided by the local authority.

    Kirkburton School.
    MR. LANE-FOX: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Education whether he has sanctioned any grant from the £100,000 allotted for the provision of provided schools in single-school areas for a new school at Kirkburton; and whether he is aware that the three existing schools at Kirkburton have been scheduled as unsatisfactory by the local education authority for some time previous to their application for assistance from this grant.
    MR. MCKENNA: No, Sir. No grant has yet been sanctioned. I understand

    781
    that the managers of the three existing schools have been required by the local education authority to execute certain improvements, which have not yet been carried out, and that the schools have therefore been scheduled by the authority as unsatisfactory.
    *MR. H. J. WILSON: Has the right hon. Gentleman received a numerously signed memorial from parents asking for a provided school?
    MR McKENNA: Yes, Sir. I am now considering it.
    MR. LANE-FOX: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Education whether the trustees of the existing Church school at Kirkburton have offered to build a school free of cost to the ratepayers, and to provide therein full facilities for Nonconformist religious teaching; and whether, under the circumstances, he will sanction the building of a new council school.
    MR. MCKENNA: There is a proposal before the Board on behalf of the trustees of the Kirkburton Church Schools to provide a new school with facilities for religious instruction of an undenominational character. As I stated on the 18th February, the questions involved are extremely complicated and the matter is still under consideration. I am not yet in a position to say whether the provision of a new council school will be sanctioned.

    School Places in the West Riding.
    MR. CARLILE: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Education if he will state the number of new school places already sanctioned by the West Riding County Council in enlargements and new schools in that riding; and whether there are 1,660 fewer children on the registers than on the appointed day.
    MR. MCKENNA: I cannot say how many new school places have been sanctioned by the West Riding County Council since the appointed day, but 18,552 school places have actually been provided in council schools. I have no statistics as to the number of children on the registers on the appointed day, which
    782
    was the 1st April, 1904, but the average attendance in the year 1906–7, the last year for which figures are available, was 3,222 greater than in the year 1904–5.
    MR. CARLILE: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer the Question as to the number of places already sanctioned by the West Riding authorities?
    MR. MCKENNA: I said 18,552 had been actually provided.
    MR. CARLILE: The right hon. Gentleman misunderstands the Question. I want to know the number sanctioned to be provided.
    MR. MCKENNA: I have not that information.
    MR. LANE-FOX: In view of the enormous excess of school places over average attendance in the West Riding, will the right hon. Gentleman use his influence to prevent this undue burden being thrown on the ratepayers?
    MR. MCKENNA: I have no figures before me which justify me in agreeing that there is an enormous excess of school places.
    MR. LANE-FOX: Do not the figures show an excess of 80,000?
    MR. MCKENNA: I am not aware of the basis on which they were reckoned.

    Barwick-in Elmet School.
    MR. CARLILE: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Education whether he is aware that the Church school at Barwick-in-Elmet is admittedly overcrowded, that the children from Scholes attend the Barwick-in-Elmet school and have to be conveyed from there by cart, and that the West Riding local education authority have applied for a grant from his £100,000 to build a provided school at Barwick; and whether he will require the new school to be built at Scholes.
    MR. MCKENNA: The Barwick-in-Elmet school is not at present technically overcrowded. On the 10 square feet basis there would be a slight deficiency in the accommodation available for older children. I understand that the children

    783
    from Scholes are conveyed to Barwick. The local authority have applied for a grant in aid of the provision of a new council school, and their application is now before the Board. The most convenient situation for the proposed school is, of course, one of the elements to be considered.
    MR. CARLILE: Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that the school will be built at Scholes?
    MR. MCKENNA: No, Sir; that would be giving a decision without hearing all the parties concerned.
    AN HON. MEMBER: What is the difference between overcrowding and technical overcrowding?
    MR. MCKENNA: There is usually an allowance of a certain percentage made beyond the actual average attendance. A school might have places enough for the actual average attendance, but not enough to cover the additional percentage. That would be technical overcrowding.
    SIR HENRY CRAIK: Does not this technical overcrowding involve the overcrowding of class-rooms on certain days when the average attendance is slightly exceeded, and does not the Board of Education consistently set its face against that?
    MR. MCKENNA: Yes, Sir; and the Board would gladly see that avoided, but it is very difficult to call on local authorities to supply new buildings at great expense in order to make special provision for every day in the year.

    Contracted-Out Schools in London.
    SIR EDWARD SASSOON: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Education whether he will favourably consider the question of an increased grant being given to contracted-out schools in London, in view of the greater cost per child in elementary schools in London as compared with the rest of England and Wales.
    MR. MCKENNA: I regret I can only renew the answer which I have previously given that questions of this nature can be more conveniently dealt with in
    784
    debate on the Bill, when discussion of the reply is possible.
    SIR EDWARD SASSOON: But will the right hon. Gentleman consider the advisability of fixing a definite proportion which will prevent the penalising of contracted-out schools in the Metropolis's
    MR. MCKENNA: I deprecate any question being addressed to me now. I will endeavour to deal with these points when the Bill is under discussion.

    The Zoological Gardens.
    MR. WHITEHEAD: I beg to ask the First Commissioner of Works how many acres of Regent's Park are being appropriated by the Zoological Society under the extension now in progress; whether the public using the Park have obtained any, and what, facilities in consideration of this diminution in the area available for their use; whether he will make arrangements to secure that the public may have an uninterrupted view through open fence work, and unobstructed by walls, shrubs, or buildings, into that part of the Park which is now being transferred to the Zoological Society; and on what terms this transfer of a portion of the public Park is being made to a private society.
    THE FIRST COMMISSIONER OF WORKS (Mr. HARCOURT,): Three acres have been appropriated to the Zoological Society from Regent's Park on an annual agreement for the nominal rent of £5 per annum. I made it a special consideration of this extension of the Gardens that there should always be a free show of animals towards the Park on a portion of the new site granted to the Society, and I am glad that I have thus been able to afford to the poorer children of the Parks a gratuitous addition to their rare pleasures.
    MR. CATHCART WASON: Will the right hon. Gentleman arrange for the erection of a double railing at this part of the boundary?
    MR. HARCOURT: I have already provided for a double railing in order to protect the animals, as well as to give pleasure to the children.
    MR. BYLES: Will the right hon. Gentleman take care that no public rights are parted with?
    MR. HARCOURT: No public rights can be parted with. The agreement is an annual one and is renewable at the pleasure of the Crown.

    North-east Coast Fishing Industry.
    MR. FENWICK: I beg to ask the hon. Member for South Somerset, as representing the President of the Board of Agriculture, whether he has received a memorial from the fishermen of New-biggin-by-the-Sea, asking for an inquiry into the condition of the fishing industry on the North-east Coast; whether he is aware of the poverty and distress existing among the line fishermen and their dependants along the North-east Coast; and, if so, can he state whether the Government intend to grant such an inquiry, or to take any steps to relieve the existing distress.
    MR. J. A. PEASE (: for Sir EDWARD STRACHEY): The Board have received from the Board of Trade a communication on the subject to which my hon. friend refers. Inquiry will be made into the matter without delay.

    Gooseberry Mildew.
    MR. RAPHAEL: I beg to ask the hon. Member for South Somerset, as representing the President of the Board of Agriculture, if he is aware that at Melbourne, in Derbyshire, instances have occurred that, two days after nurseries have been declared by the inspector of the Board of Agriculture to be clear of mildew, notice has been received declaring the same nurseries to be infected premises, thereby closing the nurseries against the removal of trees by sale or otherwise; is he aware that notice is given not for actual but for the supposed existence of mildew; and if he will give orders that undue restrictions be not placed upon an industry on which numbers of people depend for their livelihood.
    MR. J. A. PEASE (for Sir EDWARD STRACHEY): The Board are able, they believe, to identify the particular case to which my hon. friend refers. It was
    786
    detected in October last by an inspector of the Board and the local authority were duly informed, but owing to an oversight the formal notification of the existence of the disease was not served on the owner by the local authority until the 20th ulto. Some misunderstanding appears to have arisen as to the statements made by the inspector on again visiting the premises. He was satisfied that all visible evidence of disease had been removed from the bushes-in the main nursery in the manner contemplated by the American Gooseberry Mildew Order. But in view of the character of this disease, the Order requires that certain restrictions shall remain in force until the expiration of the year following that in which the disease was-last seen on the premises. The premature; removal of the restrictions from premises which contain bushes for sale would involve grave risks of spreading this serious disease. The inspector will again visit the premises and explain the nature of our requirements. The Answer to the concluding inquiry of my hon. friend is of course in the affirmative.

    Weighing Machines in Scottish Markets.
    MR. MORTON: I beg to ask the Secretary for Scotland whether in every market in Scotland for the sale of live stock a weighing machine must be provided; if so, will he say whose duty it is to see that a weighing machine is so-provided; whether the authorities are required to see, in the interests of public health, that in all markets where those' weighing machines are provided that all animals for sale should be inspected by the veterinary surgeon appointed by the-local authority in that district, and certified as to their fitness for human food; and whether he will issue instructions for the guidance of all local authorities in Scotland fixing a basis of inspection, so that there may be a uniform practice, and to prevent the confusion that now exists owing to there being different standards of inspection.
    THE SECRETARY FOR SCOTLAND (Mr. SINCLAIR,): There is no-provision requiring local authorities to see that animals exposed for sale in any market, whether provided with weighing; machines or not, are inspected by a, veterinary surgeon and certified as to

    787
    their fitness for human food. There is no power to fix a standard of inspection; but on the 19th October, 1899, the Local Government Board for Scotland issued a circular suggesting that in the inspection of tuberculous carcases of cattle the principles laid down in the Report of the Royal Commission on Tuberculosis of 1898 should be followed. There is no intention to recommend any standard for the inspection of living animals.

    Moray Firth Trawlers.
    SIR GEORGE DOUGHTYhad on the Paper the following Question: To ask the Secretary for Scotland whether he is aware that to carry out the decision of the High Court of Justiciary, Scotland, and prosecute all foreign trawlers fishing outside the three-mile limits in the Moray Firth would constitute a breach of International Law; whether he has been informed that that is the opinion of the Foreign Office; and whether he will immediately take steps to withdraw the British cruisers which at present protect these fishing grounds for the exclusive use and advantage of foreigners, and remove restrictions which prevent British fishermen from trawling in these waters.
    On being called upon to put the Question the hon. Member said: I have been requested by the right hon. Gentleman to postpone this, and I do so for one week, but I hope he will give me an assurance that in the interval he will not prosecute any of my constituents.
    [No Answer was returned.]

    Scottish Fishery Board "Spies"
    SIR GEORGE DOUGHTY: I beg to ask the Secretary for Scotland whether the Scottish Fishery Board have appointed spies at different points along the coast of Scotland to report British fishing vessels, and, if so, what is the qualification and what the remuneration for such work; whether Dr. James Maxwell, of Tobermory, Mull, Argyleshire, is one of them; and whether he is aware that the steam trawler "Crane" was wrecked on her homeward voyage from Iceland on the evening of 25th February, and that Maxwell sent a telegram to the fishery cruiser "Minna," causing her to steam several hours in order to catch the steam
    788
    trawler "Crane" at work fishing in forbidden waters.
    MR. SINCLAIR: So far as I am aware the reply to the three Questions put by the hon. Member is in the negative.

    Glasgow Cattle Sale Yards.
    MR. CATHCART WASON: I beg to ask the Secretary for Scotland if he can state how many inspectors employed to inspect cattle in public sale yards in Glasgow are qualified as veterinary surgeons; and whether he has any official information showing that cattle unfit for food in Dublin are sent to Glasgow to be consumed there.
    MR. SINCLAIR: I am informed that there are six qualified veterinary surgeons in Glasgow who act as inspectors for inspecting cattle in public sale yards. Three act under the Diseases of Animals Acts, and three under the Public Health Acts. None of these inspectors have any official information from Dublin that cattle unfit for human food are sent to Glasgow to be consumed there. In all such cases, however, the carcases of the animals are seized and destroyed.
    MR. CATHCART WASON: How many inspectors are there in Glasgow?
    MR. SINCLAIR: I must ask for notice. I have informed the House that a full Report on meat inspection in Scotland by the Local Government Board is being printed, and will be issued, and I suggest it would be useful if Questions on the subject were deferred till after its publication.

    Scottish Education Bill.
    SIR HENRY CRAIK: I beg to ask the Secretary for Scotland whether he can now state the intentions of the Government with regard to the introduction of an Education Bill for Scotland.
    MR. SINCLAIR: I am unable to make any further statement at present. I hope to do so before Easter.

    Skigersta Sea-Wall—Island of Lewis.
    MR. WEIR: I beg to ask the Secretary for Scotland whether he has received a copy of a resolution passed at a recent meeting at

    789
    Ness, Stornoway, Island of Lewis, representing 4,000 inhabitants of the Ness district, and pressing for the construction of a sea-wall and boat-shelter at Skigersta, Island of Lewis, in order that the people may be enabled to prosecute the deep sea line-fishing by means of the larger-sized decked boats, the in-shore line-fishing being no longer remunerative owing to the action of illegal trawlers.
    MR. SINCLAIR: Yes, Sir.
    MR. WEIR: Am I to get no further information than this? Does the right hon. Gentleman intend to do anything towards the construction of a sea-wall?
    MR. SINCLAIR: My hon. friend asked if I had received a copy of the resolution and I have said that I have.
    MR. WEIR: As the other half of the Question appears to have been quite lost sight of I will put another Question down.
    MR. SINCLAIR: My hon. friend may rely on it that all such requests are most carefully considered.

    Orkney and Shetland Water Supply.
    MR. CATHCART WASON: I beg to ask the Secretary for Scotland if he is aware of the fact that certain districts in Orkney and Shetland (while they have ample water for the normal population) are embarrassed by having to provide water for the population flocking in during the fishing season, and are unable to cope with the difficulties of the situation; and, in view of the general importance of the fishing industry, if he will abide by his original decision to grant such a sum to the said districts as will enable them to meet the special demand at certain times, provided the districts referred to will bear their fair share of any increased benefit they receive.
    MR. SINCLAIR: I am generally aware of the position described by my hon. friend, and the matter will be borne in mind. I am not aware that I have given any such decision as that referred to in the Question.

    Sea Fisheries Regulation (Scotland) Bill.
    MR. MORTON: I beg to ask the Secretary for Scotland whether he intends
    790
    to oppose the Sea Fisheries Regulation (Scotland) Bill.
    MR. SINCLAIR: Yes, Sir.
    MR. MORTON: Will the right hon. Gentleman say why he intends to oppose it?
    MR. SINCLAIR: This is a measure containing proposals which are, and, I have no doubt, are intended to be, of a drastic character. It is likely to be highly controversial, and therefore it is not possible for me to hold out to my hon. friend any hope of the Government's being able to extend to him facilities necessary to its consideration.
    MR. MORTON: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Sheriff in delivering judgment in a case at Campbelltown the other day said——
    *MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Member must give notice of that Question.
    MR. WEIR: Is it the intention of the Scottish Office to oppose the Bills of all private Members which are of a controversial character? That is a now method——[Cries of "Order, order!"]
    *MR. SPEAKER: That hardly arises out of the Question.
    MR. MORTON: Does the right hon. Gentleman intend to compel trawlers to obey the law?
    *MR. SPEAKER: That, too, hardly arises out of the Question.

    Irish Fisheries.
    MR. THOMAS O'DONNELL: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether any steps are being taken to develop the herring fishing along the coast of Kerry and Cork.
    THE CHIEF SECRETARY FOR IRELAND (Mr. BIRRELL,): The Congested Districts Board have made loans for boats and gear for the fisheries on the coasts of Kerry and Cork, and have provided materials to the value of £9,372 for local coopers to make barrels for cured mackerel and herring. The

    791
    Board have also paid for the instruction of coopers in barrel making, and have given instruction locally in the curing of herrings. They have also made provision for erecting lights in Kenmare River in the coming year, for the benefit of the herring fishery. I gather that one of the chief difficulties in respect of the development of the herring fishery on the coasts of Kerry and Cork is that the mackerel fishery is there looked upon as being of greater importance, and the fishermen are generally engaged in it at the time when herrings visit the coast.
    CAPTAIN CRAIG: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the State aid given to the fishing on the Cork and Kerry coasts interferes by competition with the fisheries on the County Down coast, which do not receive any Government grant?
    MR. BIRRELL: I have not heard that before.
    CAPTAIN CRAIG: Will you make inquiries?
    MR. BIRRELL: I am quite willing to do so.

    Maynooth College.
    CAPTAIN CRAIG: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether Maynooth Roman Catholic College is open to Protestants; whether he is aware that, under the original Bill of 1795, the college was restricted to Roman Catholics only, and that in 1817 all laity were excluded; and if it is the intention of the Government in any way to modify the status of Maynooth under the scheme at present under their consideration.
    MR. KILBRIDE: Will the right hon. Gentleman, in his proposed University Bill, make provision for completing the education of hon. Members from Ulster?
    MR. BIRRELL: Maynooth College is not now, and never has been, open to Protestants. In 1817 the lay college was closed, and Maynooth became a place of education for Catholic ecclesiastical students only. For the details of the Government's scheme for University education, I must ask the hon. and gallant
    792
    Member to wait for a week or two until the measure is introduced.

    Doon Untenanted Lands.
    MR. LUNDON: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland if he can say whether any communications have ever passed between the Estates Commissioners and Messrs. Maunsell, Dixon, and Chatterton about the sale of the untenanted lands on their estate in Lackanagoneeny, Doon, County Limerick, to the Estates Commissioners for the benefit of the poor tenants and labourers of the district; have the Estates Commissioners sent an inspector on the lands; and, if so, who was the inspector, and when did he come there; what was the result of the inquiry; and what is the cause of the delay in carrying out the sale.
    MR. BIRRELL: The Estates Commissioners have had an inspection made of the estate in question, and have made a provisional offer for the same which the owners have expressed their willingness to accept. The Commissioners are now preparing a scheme for the division of the untenanted lands on the estate, and as soon as this has been completed the purchase will be proceeded with.

    Irish Crown Jewels.
    CAPTAIN CRAIG: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he has any further information to give the House regarding the loss of the Crown and other jewels from Dublin Castle; whether they have been returned, or does he know where they are; and can he state the nature of the offence for which Sir Arthur Vicars was dismissed his office.
    MR. BIRRELL: I have no further information to give regarding the loss of the Crown jewels. They have not been returned, nor do I know where they are. Sir Arthur Vicars has been relieved of his office because he failed to exercise due vigilance and proper care as custodian of the Regalia of the Order of St. Patrick.

    English Land Valuation Bill.
    MR. HART-DAVIES: I beg to ask the Prime Minister whether the English Land Valuation Bill will be

    793
    introduced before or after the Easter vacation.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. ASQUITH,): The Bill will not be introduced until after Easter.

    Income-Tax.
    MR. WHITEHEAD: I beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether persons who gave notice before 30th September, 1907, of their intention to claim relief under Section 19 of The Finance Act, 1907, in the event of their income proving at the end of the financial year to be less than £2,000, will be treated as having made a claim under Sub-section 4 of that section and will be assessed accordingly; and, if not, whether he will this session amend The Finance Act so as to give relief to such persons.
    I beg also to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether persons engaged in business and making claim at the end of the financial year to repayment of income-tax, on the ground that the actual income from their business has proved to be less than the expectation based on an average of three years profits, will also be entitled to have the tax on their earned income assessed on the footing of 9d. in the £, if their total income falls below £2,000 by reason of their actual realised income from business having fallen below the statutory expectation.
    MR. ASQUITH: Where a person claims relief under Section 19 of The Finance Act, 1907, before 30th September in any year, but is unable at the time of lodging the claim to complete it by proving that his total income does not then exceed £2,000, he would be allowed, subsequently, to complete the claim and obtain relief in the event of his income for the year as finally ascertained falling within the prescribed limit. For the purposes of this section, however, income must be estimated according to the rules and directions of the Income Tax Acts. In the case of a business assessable on the average profits of the three years preceding the year of assessment, the income of the person who carries it on is reckoned on the basis of that average, not only for the purposes of the charge, but also for the purpose of ascertaining
    794
    his right to exemption, abatement, or relief to the 9d. rate. The actual profits of the year may exceed the average, or may fall short of it, but in neither alternative, except in a few special cases, is the liability or the right to exemption, abatement, or relief for that year affected.

    Budget Suggestions.
    MR. BOTTOMLEY: I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, what progress he has made in arriving at a definite conclusion in regard to the expediency of taxing advertisements, racing stakes, betting, titles, theatre tickets, share certificates, and imposing an employment tax and a graduated receipt tax.
    MR. ASQUITH: I can only say with regard to this and similar suggestions that my mind is still in a receptive state.

    Post Office Savings Bank.
    MR. HAROLD COX: I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the sum of £88,190 is estimated to be required to make good the deficiency in the Post Office Savings Bank in the year 1908–9; and whether he will consider what steps can be taken to relieve the taxpayer of the obligation to pay a subsidy to those persons who invest their savings in the Post Office rather than in some other form of investment.
    MR. ASQUITH: A Select Committee of this House in 1902 considered what steps should be taken to make good the deficiency on the Income Account of the Post Office Savings Banks Fund which would result from the reduction of the interest on Consols in 1903. They recommended that the rate of interest allowed to depositors should be reduced by one-eighth per cent. The late Government took the sense of the House of Commons on that proposal, and decided, with the general approval of the House, not to carry it into effect, because conditions had altered since the date of the Committee's inquiry in such a way as to increase the earning power of the National Debt Commissioners on new investments, and to hold out some prospect of the account being balanced without a reduction of interest. I see no sufficient reason at present for departing from that policy;

    795
    but the subject is one which requires to be, and is, kept steadily in view.

    Sessional Arrangements
    MR. EVELYN CECIL: I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Government intend to shorten the Easter and Whitsuntide holidays, to rise for the summer holidays early in July, and to hold an autumn session, or what information he can give to the House upon the subject.
    MR. ASQUITH: I am not yet in a position to make any statement.

    The Budget.
    MR. COURTHOPE: I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he proposes to introduce the Budget before Easter.
    MR. ASQUITH: No, Sir.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
MR. AKERS-DOUGLASasked as to the arrangements for business next week.
MR. ASQUITHsaid that the first business on Monday would be the Second Heading of the Consolidated Fund Bill, followed by the Second Beading of the Army Annual Bill. On Tuesday, the Second Beading of the Prosecution of Offences (Amendment) Bill, as it was necessary to pass that Bill before Easter with the view to the Criminal Appeal Act coming into effective operation. That Bill would be followed by the Second Beading of the Children's Bill and the Committee stage of the Consolidated Fund Bill. On Wednesday, the Committee stage of the Prosecution of Offences Bill, the Committee on the Army Annual Bill, and the Third Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill. On Thursday, the Government proposed to get the Speaker out of the Chair on the Civil Service Estimates.
MR. AKERS-DOUGLAS: Cannot the Army Annual Bill be taken in the afternoon on Wednesday so as to avoid an all-night sitting?
MR. ASQUITH: It is our intention to to take the Army Bill early; the Prose-
796
cution of Offences Bill is not contentious and will not excite discussion.
MR. BOTTOMLEY: When will the Licensing Bill be proceeded with?
MR. ASQUITH: The Second Reading will be taken before Easter.

SELECTION (STANDING COMMITTEES).
Sir WILLIAM BRAMPTON GURDON reported from the Committee of Selection; That they had discharged the following Members from Standing Committee A (in respect of the Agricultural Education in Elementary Schools Bill): Mr. Attorney-General, Mr. Secretary Gladstone, and Mr. Herbert Samuel; and had appointed in substitution (in respect of the Agricultural Education in Elementary Schools Bill): Mr. McKenna, Mr. Lough, and Sir Edward Strachey.
Sir WILLIAM BRAMPTON GURDON further reported from the Committee; That they had added to Standing Committee A the following Fifteen Members (in respect of the Agricultural Education in Elementary Schools Bill): Mr. Carlile, Mr. Jesse Collings, Mr. Butcher, Sir John Kennaway, Mr. Arkwright, Sir Francis Lowe, Mr. Hunt, Mr. Ben, Mr. Yoxall, Mr. Adkins, Mr. Winfrey, Mr. Montagu, Mr. John William Taylor, Mr. Dunn, and Mr. Nicholls.
Sir WILLIAM BRAMPTON GURDON further reported from the Committee; That they had added to Standing Committee A the following Fifteen Members (in respect of the Local Authorities (Admission of the Press) Bill: Mr. Arthur Henderson, Mr. Richardson, Mr. Summerbell, Mr. Charles Duncan, Mr. Lief Jones, Mr. Scott, Mr. Esslemont, Mr. Watt, Mr. Guinness, Sir Frederick Banbury, Sir Gilbert Parker, Mr. DuCros, Mr. George Roberts, Mr. Strauss, and Mr. Clement Edwards.
Sir WILLIAM BRAMPTON GURDON further reported from the Committee; That they had added the following Member to Standing Committee B: Mr. Charles Craig.
Reports to lie upon the Table.

MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS.
Poisons and Pharmacy Bill [Lords],—That they have appointed a Committee consisting of Five Lords to join with a Committee of this House to consider the Poisons and Pharmacy Bill, and they request this House to appoint an equal number of its Members to be joined with the said Lords.
That they propose that the said Joint Committee do meet in Committee Room A, on Tuesday next, at Three of the Clock.

NEW BILLS.
  BUXTON CHARITY BILL.
  "To confirm a Scheme of the Charity Commissioners relating to the Buxton (Congregational Chapel) Charity," presented by Mr. Trevelyan; to be read a second time upon Monday, 6th April, and to be printed. [Bill 164.]

  LONG ASHTON CHARITY BILL.
  "To confirm a Scheme of the Charity Commissioners relating to the Long
  Ashton (Congregational Chapel Schoolroom) Charity," presented by Mr. Trevelyan; to be read a second time upon Monday, 6th April, and to be printed. [Bill 165.]

  ABBOTS BROMLEY CHARITY BILL.
  "To confirm a Scheme of the Charity Commissioners relating to the Abbots Bromley (Congregational Chapel) Charity," presented by Mr. Trevelyan; to be read a second time upon Monday, 6th April, and to be printed. [Bill 166.]

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY).
Motion made, and Question put, "That the proceedings on the Business of Supply, if under discussion at Eleven o'clock this night, be not interrupted under the Standing Order (Sittings of the House), notwithstanding anything in Standing Order No. 15."—(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)
The House divided: Ayes, 273; Noes, 73. (Division List No. 49.)

AYES.

Abraham, William (Cork, N. E.)

Byles, William Pollard

Duckworth, James

Acland, Francis Dyke

Carr-Gomm, H. W.

Duffy, William J.

Agar-Robartes, Hon. T. C. R.

Causton, Rt. Hn. Richard Knight

Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness

Ainsworth, John Stirling

Cawley, Sir Frederick

Dunne, Major E. Martin (Walsall

Alden, Percy

Chance, Frederick William

Edwards, Clement (Denbigh)

Allen, A. Acland (Christchurch)

Cherry, Rt. Hon. R. R.

Edwards, Enoch (Hanley)

Ashton, Thomas Gair

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S.

Elibank, Master of

Asquith, Rt. Hn. Herbert Henry

Clancy, John Joseph

Ellis, Rt. Hon. John Edward

Astbury, John Meir

Cleland, J. W.

Erskine, David C.

Baker, Joseph A (Finsbury, E.

Clough, William

Essex, R. W.

Baring, Godfrey (Isle of Wight

Clynes, J. R.

Evans, Sir Samuel T.

Barker, John

Cobbold, Felix Thornley

Fenwick, Charles

Barlow, Sir John E. (Somerset)

Collins, Stephen (Lambeth)

Ferens, T. R.

Barlow, Percy (Bedford)

Collins, Sir Wm. J (S. Pancras, W

Ffrench, Peter

Barran, Rowland Hirst

Cooper, G. J.

Fowler, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry

Barry, E. (Cork, S.)

Corbett, CH (Sussex, E. Grinst'd

Fuller, John Michael F.

Beale, W. P.

Cornwall, Sir Edwin A.

Fullerton, Hugh

Beck, A. Cecil

Cotton, Sir H. J. S.

Furness, Sir Christopher

Bellairs, Carlyon

Cox, Harold

Gibb, James (Harrow)

Belloc, Hilaire Joseph Peter R.

Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth)

Gill, A. H.

Benn, Sir J. Williams (Devonp'rt

Crean, Eugene

Gladstone, Rt. Hn. Herbert John

Benn, W. (T'w'r Hamlets, S. Geo

Crooks, William

Glendinning, R. G.

Bennett, E. N.

Crosfield, A. H.

Gooch, George Peabody

Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine

Crossley, William J.

Grant, Corrie

Bottomley, Horatio

Curran, Peter Francis

Greenwood, G. (Peterborough)

Boulton, A. C. F.

Davies, David (Montgomery Co.

Griffith, Ellis J.

Bowerman, C. W.

Davies, Ellis William (Eifion

Guest, Hon. Ivor Churchill

Bramsdon, T. A.

Davies, M. Vaughan-(Cardigan

Gurdon, Rt Hn Sir W. Brampton

Branch, James

Davies, Timothy (Fulham)

Gwynn, Stephen Lucius

Bright, J. A.

Dolany, William

Haldane, Rt. Hon. Richard B.

Brocklehurst, W. B.

Dewar, Sir J. A. (Inverness-sh.)

Hall, Frederick

Brunner, J. F. L. (Lanes., Leigh)

Dickinson, W. H. St. Pancras, N.

Halpin, J.

Buchanan, Thomas Ryburn

Dickson-Poynder, Sir John P.

Harcourt, Rt. Hon. Lewis

Burke, E. Haviland

Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles

Hardy, George A. (Suffolk)

Burns, Rt. Hon. John

Dillon, John

Hart-Davies, T.

Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas

Donelan, Captain A.

Harvey, A. G. C. (Rochdale)

Harvey, W. E. (Derbyshire, N. E

M'Micking, Major G.

Rowlands, J.

Haslam, James (Derbyshire)

Maddison, Frederick

Runciman, Walter

Haworth, Arthur A.

Mallet, Charles E.

Rutherford, V. H. (Brentford)

Hayden, John Patrick

Marks, G. Croydon (Launceston

Samuel, Herbert L. (Cleveland)

Hazleton, Richard

Marnham, F. J.

Scott, A. H. (Ashton-under-Lyne

Hedges, A. Paget

Meagher, Michael

Sears, J. E.

Helme, Nerval Watson

Menzies, Walter

Seddon, J.

Henderson, Arthur (Durham)

Mond, A.

Shackleton, David James

Henry, Charles S.

Money, L. G. Chiozza

Shaw, Charles Edw. (Stafford)

Herbert, Col. Sir Ivor (Mon., S.)

Montagu, E. S.

Shipman, Dr. John G.

Herbert, T. Arnold (Wycombe)

Mooney, J. J.

Silcock, Thomas Ball

Higham, John Sharp

Morgan, J. Lloyd (Carmarthen

Sinclair, Rt. Hon. John

Hobart, Sir Robert

Morley, Rt. Hon. John

Smeaton, Donald Mackenzie

Hogan, Michael

Morrell, Philip

Soames, Arthur Wellesley

Holt, Richard Durning

Murray, James

Soares, Ernest J.

Horniman, Emslie John

Myer, Horatio

Stanley, Albert (Staffs, N. W.)

Howard, Hon. Geoffrey

Nannetti, Joseph P.

Stanley, Hn. A. Lyulph (Chesh.)

Hyde, Clarendon

Napier, T. B.

Straus, B. S. (Mile End)

Jackson, R. S.

Nicholls, George

Strauss, E. A (Abingdor)

Jacoby, Sir James Alfred

Nicholson, Charles N. (Doncast'r

Summerbell, T.

Johnson, John (Gateshead)

Norton, Capt. Cecil William

Taylor, John W. (Durham)

Jones, Sir D. Brynmor (Swansea

Nugent, Sir Walter Richard

Tennant, Sir Edward (Salisbury

Jones, Lief (Appleby)

Nussey, Thomas William

Tennant, H. J. (Berwickshire)

Jones, William (Carnarvonshire

O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)

Thomasson, Franklin

Jowett, F. W.

O'Brien, William (Cork)

Thompson, J. W. H (Somerset, E

Kavanagh, Walter M.

O'Donnell, T. (Kerry, W.)

Tomkinson, James

Kearley, Hudson F.

O'Dowd, John

Torrance, Sir A. M.

Kekewich, Sir George

O'Grady, J.

Toulmin, George

Kelley, George D.

O'Kelly, Conor (Mayo, N.)

Trevelyan, Charles Philips

Kennedy, Vincent Paul

O'Kelly, James (Roscommon, N

Verney, F. W.

Kilbride, Denis

O'Malley, William

Wadsworth, J.

King, Alfred John (Knutsford)

Parker, James (Halifax)

Waring, Walter

Lamb, Edmund G. (Leominster

Partington, Oswald

Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.

Lambert, George

Pearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek)

Wason, Rt. Hn. E (Clackmannan

Lardner, James Carrige Rushe

Pearce, William (Limehouse)

Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney)

Law, Hugh A. (Donegal, W.)

Perks, Robert William

Wedgwood, Josiah C.

Layland-Barratt, Francis

Pickersgill, Edward Hare

Weir, James Galloway

Leese, Sir Joseph F.(Accrington

Power, Patrick Joseph

Whitbread, Howard

Lehmann, R. C.

Pullar, Sir Robert

White, J. D. (Dumbartonshire)

Lewis, John Herbert

Radford, G. H.

White, Luke (York, E. R.)

Lough, Thomas

Raphael, Herbert H.

White, Patrick (Meath, North)

Lundon, W.

Rea, Russell (Gloucester)

Whitehead, Rowland

Lupton, Arnold

Redmond, John E. (Waterford

Whitley, John Henry (Halifax)

Luttrell, Hugh Fownes

Redmond, William (Clare)

Whittaker, Sir Thomas Palmer

Lyell, Charles Henry

Rees J. D.

Wiles, Thomas

Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)

Rendall, Athelstan

Williams, J. (Glamorgan)

Macdonald, J. M. (Falkirk B'ghs

Richards, T. F. (Wolverh'mpt'n

Williams, Osmond (Merioneth)

Mackarness, Frederic C.

Richardson, A.

Wilson, Henry J. (York, W. R.)

Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J.

Ridsdale, E. A.

Wilson, John (Durham, Mid)

Macpherson, J. T.

Roberts, G. H. (Norwich)

Wilson, J. W. (Worcestersh. N.)

MacVeigh, Charles (Donegal, E.)

Roberts, John H. (Denbighs.)

Wilson, P. W. (St. Pancras, S.)

M'Callum, John M.

Robertson, Rt. Hn. E. (Dundee)

Wood, T. M'Kinnon

M'Crae, George

Robertson, Sir G Scott (Bradf'rd

M'Kenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald

Robertson, J. M. (Tyneside)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Mr. Whiteley and Mr. J. A. Pease.

M'Laren, Sir C. B. (Leicester)

Robson, Sir William Snowdon

M'Laren, H. D. (Stafford, W.)

Rose, Charles Day

NOES.

Anson, Sir William Reynell

Carlile, E. Hildred

Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers

Ashley, W. W.

Cavendish, Rt. Hn. Victor C. W.

Du Cros, Arthur Philip

Aubrey-Fletcher, Rt. Hn. Sir H.

Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)

Duncan, Robert (Lanark, Govan

Balcarres, Lord

Cecil, Lord John P. Joicey

Fardell, Sir T. George

Baldwin, Stanley

Cecil, Lord R. (Marylebone, E.)

Fletcher, J. S.

Balfour, Rt Hn. A. J. (City Lond.)

Chamberlain, Rt Hn J. A. (Wore.

Gardner, Ernest

Banbury, Sir Frederick George

Clive, Percy Archer

Glover, Thomas

Baring, Capt. Hn. C (Winchester

Cochrane, Hon. Thos. H. A. E.

Goulding, Edward Alfred

Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.)

Corbett, T. L. (Down, North)

Gretton, John

Beckett, Hon. Gervase

Courthope, G. Loyd

Hamilton, Marquess of

Bignold, Sir Arthur

Craig, Captain James (Down, E.)

Harrison-Broadley, H. B.

Bridgeman, W. Clive

Craik, Sir Henry

Hill, Sir Clement

Campbell, Rt. Hon. J. H. M.

Cross, Alexander

Lambton, Hon. Frederick Wm.

800

801

Lane-Fox, G. R.

O'Neill, Hon. Robert Torrens

Thornton, Percy M.

Law, Andrew Bonar (Dulwich)

Percy, Earl

Tuke, Sir John Batty

Lee, Arthur H. (Hants, Fareham

Randles, Sir John Scurrah

Walker, Col. W. H. (Lancashire)

Lockwood, Rt. Hn. Lt.-Col. A. R.

Remnant, James Farquharson

Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.)

Lonsdale, John Brownlee

Roberts, S.(Sheffield, Ecclesall)

Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)

Lowe, Sir Francis William

Ronaldshay, Earl of

Winterton, Earl

Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred

Sassoon, Sir Edward Albert

Wolff, Gustav Wilhelm

M'Arthur, Charles

Sheffield, Sir Berkeley George D.

Wortley, Rt. Hn. C. B. Stuart

Magnus, Sir Philip

Sloan Thomas Henry

Mason, James F. (Windsor)

Starkey, John R.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Sir Alexander Acland-Hood and Mr. Forster.

Morpeth, Viscount

Stone, Sir Benjamin

Nicholson, Wm. G. (Petersfield)

Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)

Nield, Herbert

Thomson, W. Mitchell-(Lanark

Second Resolution considered, and agreed to.

SUPPLY [10TH MARCH] REPORT [4TH ALLOTTED DAY].
Second Resolution—Navy Estimates, 1908–9. "That a sum, not exceeding £2,306,700, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Works, Buildings, and Repairs, at Home and Abroad, including the cost of Superintendence, Purchase of Sites, Grants-in-Aid, and other Charges connected therewith which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1909."—read a second time.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution."
*MR. BELLAIRSsaid that this Vote, when in Committee, went through with about an hour and a half's discussion, and as it involved two very important new items it was very desirable that it should be discussed on the Report stage as well. The Vote itself used to have a great deal more discussion in previous Parliaments, but last year certainly there was very little debate, and there was all the more reason now, with the two new items of the lock at Portsmouth and the Rosyth scheme, that something should be said about the matter. It was a Vote with regard to which they had undergone great disillusionment. They had seen many schemes introduced to the House, paid for by Works Bills, and then abandoned. In the last four years, four dockyards and three coaling stations had been abandoned by the Government, and expenditure had been incurred on them right up till the last moment. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty told them last year that no less than five docks had been paid for in the Loans Bill, for which they would go on paying interest for twenty-five years to come, and those five docks would not take "Invincibles." There was the
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Dover expenditure of three and a half millions which was begun by the right hon. Gentleman the Financial Secretary for the Admiralty, who introduced the scheme thirteen years ago, and that harbour, on which they had spent a colossal sum, had never yet accommodated a single squadron or fleet, and he did not know when it was ever likely to. If the House would do as he had done, and read all the various Works Bills introduced, and the discussions on Vote 10, they would find that it had never been proved that such schemes were vital to the safety of the country. He would take as an example one of the ablest speeches delivered in that House in support of a Works Bill, by the Civil Lord of the Admiralty in 1899. He ranged ever the whole Vote, and came to Bermuda, and said that our Colonies and our trade were very great in that part of the world. That was held to be a justification for an expenditure of £600,000 on a dock which had never yet accommodated a single armoured ship unless in the last few months. He said that another place was Simon's Bay, whore a new dock was required, at a cost of £3,600,000, because the harbour there was so crowded. That had since been reduced to £3,100,000, and he had no doubt the present Government would like to have lowered the whole lot off. That work might easily have been brought about by subsidising a dock extension. At the same time, they incurred a small expenditure of £159,000 for a dock at Colombo by means of a subsidy. Whereas they were going to spend £3,600,000 to obtain the services of a dock and basin at Simon's Bay, they resorted to the method of a subsidy of the small sum of £159,000 at Colombo, and that was the method he would particularly commend to the attention of the House as preferable to any Rosyth scheme. Finally, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty got to Hong Kong, and

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said that our interests in the Far East were very great and increasing. Bang went £1,250,000. They had a magnificent private dock at Hong Kong. He himself was there when this expenditure was first proposed, and he knew that the private establishment was well able to cope with the work required. He had no doubt the Admiralty now regarded the dock accommodation provided at Hong Kong as a bit of a white elephant. He did not quarrel with the provision of more docks, but said we ought to have many more docks; it was perfectly obvious to everybody. In ten years we should have forty or fifty "Dreadnoughts" and "Invincibles" clamouring for dock accommodation, and he thought there were now six Government docks, including Haulbowline, and ten private docks, available for them. He was not quite sure of the figures, because if the Civil Lord would examine his speech he would find that he and the First Lord differed considerably in their statements as to the numbers of docks available for "Dreadnoughts" in May of last year. The contention had been advanced in the House that we had only one dock available in the North Sea, and that a private dock, with only 26½ feet over the sill, and that, since the "Dreadnought" drew two or three feet more water than she was designed to do, she would not be able to use that dock. It was obvious that as this Parliament got older they would never be satisfied with one dock at Rosyth. The demand would be for more, and in fact the scheme provided room for two more docks. It would be advanced that the Germans had seven docks built and building in the North Sea, and one projected, and if it were to be regarded that a dockyard on one side of the North Sea was an answer for a dockyard on the other side, it was certain that people would demand more on our Fast Coast. He did not agree with that contention, and it had proved to be utterly erroneous strategy. It was the sort of strategy that plunged us into the waste of money at Alderney when Parliament eventually stopped the works. What he contended was that the Government, in listening to their Naval advisers in reference to Rosyth, should not be content with being told that the Rosyth scheme would be useful. They should ask whether it was vital to the safety of the country, and he did not believe any expert
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could really get up to say that it was. The Civil Lord had not yet told them anything about the alternatives to the Rosyth scheme. He had not told them whether the Admiralty had tried to inquire amongst the shipping ports as to whether they were willing to provide docks if they were subsidised. There was Grimsby, and there was the Thames. If a dock was provided under the President of the Board of Trade's scheme for the Thames, they would obtain a few miles off the resources of the Thames shipbuilding works. The Government were not allowing the Thames works to tender for "Invincibles" and "Dreadnoughts," because there was no dock available on the Thames for ships of that size. Judging by the experience of Colombo, where for a small subsidy of £159,000 they obtained one dock, they ought to be able to obtain the services of four or five private docks round the coast, and three or four at any rate on the East Coast, by the subsidy method for a very small sum as compared with the Rosyth expenditure. That these docks would be catering for the mercantile marine was a positive advantage as it kept them in practice and extended their resources. His next point was that the Civil Lord of the Admiralty had told them nothing about floating docks. He believed one sufficient to accommodate a "Dreadnought" would cost about £200,000, but he did not know, and at any rate it was quite feasible for the Admiralty to station one at Sheerness, and one at Rosyth if they wanted one there, and at the latter place to build engineering workshops on shore, and then the expenditure would be one-seventh or one-eighth of what they proposed to incur now at Rosyth. Finally, there was the alternative of the old Chatham scheme. The late Civil Lord of the Admiralty, the hon. Member for Fareham, wanted to proceed with Chatham as well as Rosyth, he believed.
MR. ARTHUR LEE: A Chatham scheme.
MR. BELLAIRS: Yes. The only argument he had heard advanced against the Chatham scheme of docks was that the river wanted dredging. Finally, he found that four or five miles dredging of the Medway would be sufficient. When he found that the Thames was

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being dredged to the depth of 31 feet for a distance of twenty-one miles, at a cost of £200,000, and that the Medway had exactly the same nature of bottom and a less distance to carry the mud than in the case of the Thames, he could see no insuperable objection to adopt a scheme for Chatham. He recalled to mind that one of the best First Lords of the Admiralty, Lord Spencer, had said that it would be far better to incur double the expenditure on an old dockyard than to build a new one; and that in the long run, the expenditure would be less owing to the demands for equipment in the new dockyard. That criticism applied to Rosyth. Moreover, the cost of equipment, personnel, and forts, inevitably led to a much fuller expenditure beyond the estimates of the engineers. The Admiralty themselves acted on the principle of preferring an old dockyard to a new one, whenever anything happened to a ship abroad. They did so with the "Hood" who lost her rudder near Malta, where there was a very fine dockyard. They sent her home under convoy 2,500 mile; for repair past Gibraltar as well as Malta. The "Hibernia" was docked at Gibraltar and was strained in docking because they lacked experience in new dockyards, and so she was brought home afterwards for a thorough overhaul. The "Dominion" was docked, at Bermuda, but she was only patched up there, and subsequently brought to Chatham to be thoroughly done up. It was, therefore, perfectly evident that in order to get efficient repairs it was infinitely better to go a considerably greater distance to an old-established dockyard, as compared with a new one. He did not propose to go again into the history of Rosyth, but the hon. Member would admit that the forecast of the Berthing Committee of 1902 were not verified, but absolutely falsified. The terms of reference to the Committee were exceedingly limited. They never investigated the question of the bad administration of dockyards. They had improved the administration considerably of late years. They never investigated as to the number of obsolete ships that were in the dockyards, or the relief that could be afforded by building in the private dockyards. There was quite enough
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accommodation at Plymouth for shipbuilding to provide sufficient competition to keep down contracting expenses and so Portsmouth could spe ialise on repair work. The only dock available for the "Dreadnoughts," the two "Lord Nelson's" and the eight "King Edwards" at Portsmouth was occupied by to "Dreadnought" when building for 124 days in 1906. Did that arise from the system or policy? His main point was that the only evidence before the Berthing Committee was that on. 31st March, 1900, there was a congested state of the dockyards as regirds the berthing of ships. Now the whole of that congestion was gone, and it was only when their forecats proved utterly erroneous that the strategical argument was invented. Under that argument the assumption was that Rosyth was immediately opposite the German coast. It was at the end of a coast-line, lying at right angles away from the German coast, so that Wilhelmshaven was distant from it 450 miles, as compared with 230 miles to Sheerness, and therefore, a disabled ship running at 10 knots an hour, would find Rosyth eighteen hours steaming further off. The distance to Portsmouth from the German naval port of Wilhelm haven was exactly the same as to Rosyth. As regarded the strategical argument they would have in the case of Rosyth the main line of communication which presented a great broad front of open sea, whereas in the line for Plymouth, Portsmouth, Chatham, Sheerness, to the south, they had narrow seas, and an easily defended front which would be difficult to break through. Moreover, they had at Rosyth two lines of communication—from the Baltic as well as from Wilhelmshaven—which weakened concentration, and gave less ability to defend the line of communications to the base than was the case on the southern line. The way a line of communication, was defended was not by patrolling, but by blockading the enemy's coast; and generally speaking, a line of destroyers would be stretched across the channel, but the blockade in the front of the line of communication at Rosyth would be much wider owing to the greater stretch of open sea. Nobody could doubt that we should have to give as perfect a defence

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as we could devise to the southern line and all the vast trade to the Thames, and to add a northern line of communication stretching along 450 miles to Wilhelmshaven simply meant dispersion of effort and weakening of forces. His right hon. friend the Member for the Forest of Dean was very fond of referring to mines. There were four elements of luck to a German mining ship in order to drop mines in the tides off Portsmouth, which was his favourite instance. In the first place that ship would have to leave Wilhelmshaven on a dark night; on the second night it would have to break through the Straits of Dover; on the third night it would arrive at Ports mouth, because Portsmouth could not be approached in open day; and the fourth piece of coincident luck was to arrive when the tide suited in order that the mines might drift in with the tide. But if the Admiralty would only allow a sufficient number of cruisers and torpedo craft they would be able to stop these operations of an enemy's fleet. In addition, a great naval Power like ourselves, having full communications, could draw upon all the resources of the country, and it was a far simpler matter for us than for the Russians at Port Arthur to use ordinary trawling vessels to sweep channels clear of mines ahead of our warships. He was not one who believed in nursing a Navy; and most of the brick and mortar projects involved nursing and a provision of things behind the Navy. That was what occurred to the Russians at Port Arthur. He believed that they could demoralise a Navy just as easily by bricks and mortar and by going beyond the necessities of the case as they could demoralise a boy by too much nursing. There was a disease of over-cleverness. Why should they try to meet all the possible incidents of a war in advance? Such a policy had lost us many campaigns. The Russian Baltic Fleet was overloaded with coals and stores so as to take them 2,500 miles beyond Vladivostock. The Japanese did the opposite and stripped their ships for the day of battle of all superfluous gear. The result was that the armour belt of the Russian ships was under the water-line and the Japanese easily sunk them. He believed that over-cleverness was at the bottom of the
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Rosyth scheme, and that we were diverting money essentially required for the Navy to mere bricks and mortar which would avail nothing on the day of battle.
*MR. MACKARNESSsaid he would like to support the hon. Gentleman who had demanded fuller information on the subject of Rosyth. He had heard reasons against the Rosyth, scheme from a distinguished sailor outside the House similar to those urged by the hon. Member for Lynn Regis, who himself was an expert. He had heard the making use of private dockyards on points, on the East Coast advocated as far less costly than building a great dockyard at Rosyth, and he asked why that was an impossible solution of the problem. But. apart from all technical arguments, the fact that struck the ordinary layman was that this project was never thought of until the year 1904. ["Oh, yes."] He was not aware that it was ever advocated publicly either inside or outside the House until about the year 1904; and from 1904 to 1908 it had been allowed by successive Governments to remain in a state of suspended animation. Why should the Government have all of a sudden come to the conclusion that it was necessary to build as a matter of urgency this dockyard at Rosyth? He could think of no reason except it were the German scare. If Rosyth was to be taken in the nature of a threat to the German nation, he and his friends would protest again it. If there was any other reason he was sure his right hon. friend would tell them what it was. It had been suggested to them by naval experts, whose opinions were well worth listening to, that in the event of war, if we had a great naval base at Rosyth, the result would be that our Fleet would be divided, and in case of an engagement it would be necessary for the two divisions of the Fleet to unite, and that would not be a good thing in the face of a he stile fleet. He was not, however, competent to judge of these things as an expert, but from the common-sense view there seemed to be something in that. The Government were asking them to embark upon a project which would lead every year to what' was called an automatic increase, and his right hon. friend had warned them in almost brutally frank.

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language that they must be prepared next year for a larger Estimate in view of that automatic increase. Therefore, he thought if was desirable that they should be satisfied as to the necessity of this project, and he had ascertained by inquiry himself from many experts that they were by no means convinced upon that point.
*MR. W. PEARCEcalled attention to the necessity for deep water docks being provided on the Thames near London. The Board of Trade was chiefly concerned with this matter, but he would suggest that the Admiralty should join in order to find a solution of the problem. By general consent it was admitted that they wanted two new large docks on the Thames—one in the neighbourhood of Tilbury, and one nearer London, in the vicinity of the Victoria Docks. If the Thames had docks capable of accommodating large battleships, it would enable the Admiralty to make use of the great resources of the Thames Ironworks Company. This would then give another competitor with regard to shipbuilding. Lately, the Thames Ironworks Company had been precluded from tendering for battleships because there were no docks on the Thames large enough to receive battleships of modern type. He would, however, remind the Admiralty that in the past they had built some of the most famous battleships in the world, including several for the Japanese Navy. He was delighted that the hon. Member for King's Lynn had called attention to this matter, and urged that it should have the attention of the Admiralty.
*MR. NAPIERsaid that like his hon. friend the Member for Newbury he did not claim the attention of this House because he knew anything of the matter from the experts' point of view. He rose not for the purpose of criticism, but in order to elicit a little information from the Government. He represented a constituency which bordered the Midway, and they had always wondered why it was necessary to go so far north as Rosyth for the selection of a port of repair for the large new ships. He had little doubt that
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it was essential that there should be new docks in order to meet the new improvements in construction. He thought everyone was agreed that it was necessary to have docks for vessels of the "Dreadnought" and "Invincible" type, and it occurred to him that Sheerness might possibly be—he did not speak with certainty—a suitable place. As had been pointed out, Sheerness was not only very much nearer the German naval bass than Rosyth, but it was well protected by land defences, whereas in the case of Rosyth such defences would have to be constructed. It was generally admitted that the only possible danger to this country was a sudden raid. If that were to happen in the case of Sheerness, the fact that London was within short distance would be an advantage, which in the case of Rosyth was wholly lacking. There were always some 50,000 to 60,000 troops in the neighbourhood of the capital, whilst a regiment or two at the most was all the help Rosyth could look to in an emergency. He was told that it would be quite easy to deepen the channel so as to afford an entrance to Sheerness, and that to do so would not necessitate very extensive dredging. All that was required was to deepen the channel for about two and a half miles by, on an average, five or six feet. He believed that a channel 100 feet wide would probably be sufficient and dock accommodation would no doubt be necessary. If a graving dock were too expensive, probably a floating dock would answer the purpose. It was said that the dock at Rosyth would cost £3,000,000, and he could not think that the cost of deepening the channel of Sheerness to the necessary extent, together with the provision of a new floating dock (which would cost about £200,000) would exceed that sum, whilst it would adequately meet the needs of the situation. He hoped they should have some explanation as to why the Government had considered it necessary to adopt the Rosyth—and he was sure the more expensive—scheme.
MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: I need scarcely say that I do not rise to support the observations made by previous speakers. I entirely

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dissent on this occasion from the views expressed by the hon. Member for King's Lynn, and I have no desire and no expectation like that entertained by the last two speakers who have taken part in the debate, that if a dock is to be built I can get that dock in my own constituency.
MR. MACKARNESS: I have no site for a dock in my constituency.
MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The hon. Member is not one of the last two speakers.
MR. W. PEARCE: The dock which I pressed was not in my constituency.
MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: It is not in the hon. Member's immediate neighbourhood, but it is in what I may call his sphere of influence.
MR. W. PEARCE: My hope in intervening was that of getting some advantage for the whole of London, which I think is often neglected by this House.
MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: I suppose not excluding Limehouse. But we need not waste time about that. My view, of course, is the direct opposite to that of the hon. Member for King's Lynn. I believe that the creation of this establishment, at least the minimum establishment contemplated by the Government, at Rosyth to be a matter of the most urgent public importance. I think that there has been much too great a delay about it already, and my one desire is that now that they have decided to carry it out the work shall be executed as expeditiously as possible. I made a suggestion to the hon. Gentleman when the Vote was under discussion before, that in calling for tenders for the execution of the work the Admiralty should indicate to the contractors that they would take into consideration, not merely the amount of the tender, but the time within which the contractor would undertake to complete the work, and the hon. Gentleman was good enough to say that he would bring that suggestion before his colleagues on the Board of Admiralty, and I hope that he will be
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able to give us an exact account of the Admiralty's intentions when he speaks to-day. My reason for pressing this is, in the first place, that I believe this work to be one of peculiar urgency, and that we may have great need for this dock before, under any circumstances, it can now be completed. But even apart from that, it is of course obvious that when you are expending great capital sums like this it is more economical to proceed expeditiously than to dawdle over the work. The moment you begin to spend, your money is standing at a loss until you have the use of the work, and, therefore, the quicker you can complete the works the sooner you have the use of your money, and the more economical is the use of your expenditure. I am aware of what happened in another place yesterday. It was there stated that it is impossible for the Admiralty to spend more money or to make more progress than they have allowed for in the Estimates within the next financial year, because, it was stated, the Director of Works and his staff could not, until September, finish the plans which were necessary. I should like to inquire what exactly the meaning of that is. Does the making of the plans there alluded to mean the getting out of the quantities or not, because if you have only the plans finished by September then you have to get out the quantities. I am afraid the work will not be done till this next financial year, and I should very much hope that the work will be let out to tender in September at the very latest. I cannot set myself against the opinion of the present Director of Works as to the time that it will take him to complete his preparations. I know he is an admirable and indefatigable officer, and if he has the directions of the Admiralty he will proceed with all rapidity. But if that is so I regret the more the time that has been allowed to pass without this necessary preliminary having been carried out, and how much we have wasted during the last two years whilst the Government has been chewing the cud of this question over and over again. Now I come to the question of expediting the work, when you actually come to tendering and letting

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the contract. The other day it was stated in another place by the First Lord of the Admiralty that he hoped to get the work done in seven years—
"I believe, I hope, we shall be able to do the work, not in ten years, but in seven years. I want to make it quite clear that the small sum put down for Rosyth this year does not indicate any slackness on the part of the Admiralty in pushing the work forward. The Director of Works at the Admiralty has informed me that it will take the whole of his staff until September, working overtime, to finish the plans which are necessary. I am also advised that under the contract itself a clause which would suggest a higher rate of tender if the work is completed in a short time is not a desirable condition. We think a better plan is one I propose to adopt. I am going to propose that a bonus shall be given to the contractor who takes the work if he completes it within the time he tenders for. Something of this character I am advised is a better plan than the other."
Now I confess I do not understand what that means. What is the time which he will tender for? Is it the time named by the Government or will the contractors be allowed to say what is the earliest time in which they will be able to compete? I should hope the latter. I cannot see why that should not be. The practice in great industrial undertakings is to proceed in that way. In the case of a railway, for instance, where the company desire to earn dividends at the earliest possible moment or where the execution of the work interferes with the working of the line, it is a common thing to call attention to the fact that contractors who offer to do the work expeditiously will be favourably considered. If the Government are not going to do that, then I want to know what time the Government are going to indicate, and if it is to be as Lord Tweedmouth stated, seven years, does that mean for the completion of the whole of the work or only the completion of the dock and basin, so far as and in such a manner as to enable the Admiralty to use them in time of emergency. If it is for the completion of the whole work it is a very reasonable time, but if it means that the dock and basin will not be available for the use of the Admiralty until seven years are gone, then I cannot conceive why that should be so, except that there is a desire to spread the Estimate over a longer period.
*THE CIVIL LORD TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. LAMBERT,): The right hon. Gentleman asked, and I think quite legitimately, that we should expedite the work at Rosyth as much as possible, and with that I quite agree. He then asked whether we would give the contractors who would undertake to complete it in the shortest period of time, preference. We have carefully considered that question. I promised the other day to bring it before my colleagues and the result of my doing so is shown in the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty in another place yesterday. We were advised that to give preference to any contractor who promised to complete the work expeditiously would not be advisable, but that a reasonable time should be fixed by the Admiralty for the completion of the work, that the contractor should be penalised for all the time he took beyond that period to complete, but that if he completed before the time he should receive a bonus. I cannot promise that that will be done, but that is what we have in our minds. I hope the House will not bind me to that statement, because, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, it is desirable in these matters to keep the Government in a safe position. We believe that it is not an unreasonable condition that the works themselves should be completed in seven years, but I do not include in that the necessary workshops which will probably take a year longer or perhaps a year and-a-half. I think the right hon. Gentleman was a little harsh on the Admiralty when he complained that they had wasted time. I can assure him that the careful preliminary preparations that have gone on will, in the long run, save both time and money. Rosyth is of rather a peculiar formation. At one point you have rocks, and close to them you have 60 or 70 feet of mud. It has been used as an argument against Rosyth as a Naval base. But the Admiralty do not propose to build their lock and docks on the places where there is this 60 or 70 feet of mud, and the project could not have been carried out economically but for the preliminary borings. I am informed that some docks have had to have 15 or 16 feet of concrete on the bottom, but we do not think

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that will be necessary in this case, because the situation for the docks has been chosen where the rocks jut out and there will only be about 2½ feet of granolithic concrete required on the bottom. We hope the contract particulars will be got out about the time the right hon. Gentleman suggests.
MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: May I ask the hon. Gentleman one question before he passes away from this point? I presume that the Admiralty will consider the time not only for the completion of the whole, but for each item.
*MR. LAMBERT: It will be one contract, but I will bear that suggestion in mind. The hon. Member for King's Lynn went into the question of whether Rosyth was necessary for a naval base or not. Surely it is a little late in the day now to argue that question. But I think if hon. Members really look into the matter, and see how few docks we have on the East Coast they will recognise that it is necessary to provide some place at all events to accommodate these large ships of war. The hon. Member tells us we might with greater advantage have floating docks. Floating docks are all very well in places where there are no tides. But if there are tides the docks are apt to float with the tides. Moreover floating docks cannot be moored at sea; they must be in a basin somewhere. There was a suggestion that there should be a large scheme at Chatham or Sheerness as an alternative to Rosyth, but we have found that the cost of dredging necessary to convert Chatham into a naval base for these big ships would be prohibitive. Although we can dredge the Channel to the necessary depth the moment dredging takes place the mud silts in from the sides so that there would have to be continuous dredging. At Sheerness we are dredging to the depth of 26 feet at low water to enable ships of the "Dreadnought" class to get in end out at certain states of the tide. Then there is the question of sub idising private docks. The Admiralty would be glad to see built on the East Coast by private enterprise docks which would accommodate these big ships, but I would point out that a private dock has not the same advantages as a Government
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dock for battleships. It is in the first place built for commercial purposes and is not equipped in the same way. A battleship might require to have a new section of armour plate put in, and there are none of the appliances in a private dock necessary for such a purpose. More than that, it is in the time of peace that docks are wanted as well as in time of war, and if in a private dock you have a private ship it would be a difficult thing to say that the ship must come out in order that a battleship should go in. Of course that could be done in time of war, but not in time of peace. I have been informed that after careful investigation it has been decided that this policy of sub idising private docks would not be satisfactory because in the first place we could not have the first use of the docks and they have not the necessary appliances; and, secondly, we should have to pay large subsidies towards the building of these docks and probably large annual subsidies in addition for their use. There is another matter about private docks, that they have only about 20 feet 6 inches on the dock sill, while the dock and lock at Rosyth will have about 36 feet minimum. My hon. friend will see that these new Rosyth docks in times of emergency will accommodate ships of the new type which require more water than is available in a private dock.
MR. W. PEARCEpointed out that it was proposed to spend two to three millions at once on deep water docks, and asked whether anything could be done by the Admiralty joining with the Board of Trade in considering the provision of deep water docks on the Thames.
MR. MACKARNESSwas understood to ask whether there was any urgency for this year.
*MR. LAMBERT: We have been getting the plans ready, and we are prepared to go on. The late Chancellor of the Exchequer complains that we have not gone on fast enough, and I think I must leave the two critics to answer one another. As regards the question of my hon. friend the Member for Lime-house, I am not very well acquainted with the question of the Port of London,

817
but my right hon. friend is on the Committee which is dealing with this very point, and I am sure that if the Admiralty by any means in their power can get more dock accommodation in the neighbourhood of the East Coast, they will certainly bear in mind my hon. friend's suggestion. I confess I am not conversant with the question of the Port of London, but I can assure the hon. Gentleman that the suggestion made here this afternoon will be very sympathetically considered by the Admiralty having regard to the various interests concerned.
MR. ARTHUR LEE: The Civil Lord has dealt with the subject of Rosyth, but he made no reference to a work of almost equal importance and certainly equal urgency, and that is the new lock at Portsmouth. He has told us that special arrangements will be made under the contract for Rosyth by which to effect the completion of the work in the shortest possible time. The principle, not by any means a new one, is to be followed of offering bonuses to the contractors in the event of the time assigned by the Admiralty being shortened, and inflicting fines where it is exceeded. What I wish to ask is whether a similar practice will be followed in the case of Portsmouth lock. It is unnecessary to detain the House by again urging the immense importance of this work. The fact is that the only available dock for the "Dreadnought" is practically unapproachable at the present time, and will be until the new locks are completed. I venture to express the hope that the Admiralty will adopt the same policy with regard to the work at Portsmouth which they have adopted in reference to Rosyth. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will tell us whether that is the case; and whether he can give any answer to the question which I addressed to him on a previous occasion with regard to the two other docks at Rosyth which are marked out in the plans which he has placed in the Tea Room? I think it must be obvious to anyone who has studied this problem of docking, that long before the Rosyth works which are now sanctioned have been completed three extra docks will be a necessity.
818
asked the hon. Gentleman on a previous occasion whether he would not represent that matter to the Admiralty, in view of the fact that it is enormously cheaper to build docks all at one time rather than spread them over several contracts, or delay and hamper the use of the new docks while further docks are being built. I should like an answer to that point, and I certainly hope the Government will turn a deaf ear to the criticism of the hon. Member for Newbury, that there is no special urgency for this year. There is not only special urgency for this year, but there was special urgency for last year and the year before. The reason for urgency is that the present Government, of which the hon. Member is a supporter, has decided to maintain in the North Sea. a fleet of ships of the "Dreadnought" class. There is no docking accommodation for that fleet, and docking accommodation must be provided, in view of the fact that it takes quite as long to build a dock as to build a battleship. The fact that the Government has already decided to build those big ships makes the matter one of the utmost urgency. I think the urgency comes to be apparent to everyone, and I hope the Admiralty will not be in the least deflected from. their decision, but will proceed even now, at the eleventh hour, with all due speed, disregarding any representations of the hon. Member opposite.
*MR. LUPTONsaid, in reference to the answer given, by the Civil Lord of the Admiralty as to dock accommodation and the Admiralty's acting in conjunction with the Board of Trade, that the fact of the hon. Gentlemen's not fully understanding the question of the Port of London was a very good reason for further delay in proceeding with this matter, because it was one of the vexed questions whether the Thames or the-Forth was to be our great naval base. The Thames had been our chief naval base. Now it was proposed to remove it right away to the Forth. Surely one of the principal elements in that decision was the suitability of the Thames for deep-water docks. The Civil Lord said he really had not considered that question, and did not understand it. When

819
a man of his great capacity, with his knowledge and experience of the work of the Admiralty, said he did not fully understand all the work that would have to be done in the Thames in connection with this matter, then it was safe to say that nobody else did—that it was a matter still to be thoroughly studied, and one still subject to proper inquiry. He certainly thought, in these circumstances, that to proceed with the construction of a new naval base, before the suitability of the Thames had been thoroughly threshed out, would be taking a leap in the dark. He hoped that the Admiralty for another year or two would pursue the policy of reflection and con-sideration—that they would chew the cud, as an hon. Member had remarked, of wise and sober reflections for a year or so longer. The urgency of this change of base to the River Forth was not so great as it appeared. It was quite true that the right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Opposition Bench had given the Government the very friendly and patriotic advice to push on with this expenditure; but he could not help seeing that hon. Gentlemen opposite were exceedingly anxious, as far as possible, that this expenditure should be completed by this Government, so that they themselves, if they came into office, would not have to find the money. Hon. Gentlemen opposite thought it better that the present Chancellor of the Exchequer should find the money for this great expenditure, and that they should be relieved from finding several millions to deal with Rosyth. They would then be able to show the country how much better financiers they were than the present Government, and how they were able to avoid taxation. If the Government followed the advice of hon. Gentlemen opposite the expenditure would increase to probably £5,000,000. They had far better take advice from their own supporters, from those who would and could keep them in office for a very long time if they chose, than from gentlemen opposite who would turn them out at the first opportunity. It was proposed to place these new docks where there was alternating mud and rock. He had himself had some experience of mud and of rock. He could build on mud, and he could build
820
on rock, but he could not build on half mud and half rock, and the man who tried to do so would find that his building would come to grief. He thought the contractor would be very careful, if he was to be put under penalties and a time limit, to include in his contract a great many provisions for extras in case of the foundations subsiding, and he had to carry out the drawings submitted to him. This was a very small sum of £30,000, and if it were only that perhaps it would not be worth while to say 30,000 words about it. But if they let the contract and if they followed the advice of the Front Opposition Bench, they would stand committed to an expenditure of £3,000,000. He made the practical suggestion that they should not let the contract at all, but that the Admiralty should proceed with the work in the same way as works were proceeded with by the County Council in London, namely, under an official who would employ men and buy material as it was wanted. If difficulties arose when the work was started in the northern river they could stop it, and, with a little reflection, find whether the money could not be spent in other ways. They should not be in a hurry. If once they let the contract the would be in for it, and they would be actually voting £3,000,000, which he ventured to think would be a great misfortune. Perhaps they would get a white elephant, or worse than a white elephant. The hon. Member for Fareham had said the other day that there was to be a great dock at Rosyth, and one of the advantages of the situation was that it was not so far from Glasgow, and that it could be connected with that city by canal. Everybody who had heard anything of engineering had heard of a ship canal between the Forth and the Clyde all his life. It was a very ancient project, hardly revived but to be dismissed because of the immense cost. Anyone who knew the ground was aware that they had to cut through a level very nearly 160 feet above the sea. There were two types of canal, one with locks and the other on the sea level. The latter was the only suitable kind of canal to let the British Navy through—big ships and little ships. He did not think a lock canal would be a good thing.

821
How much less than £100,000,000 would a canal from Grangemouth to Glasgow cost? Rather than spend that in order to have the canal for possible problematic use at some future date would it not be better to have the interest on the money—say, £4,000,000 a year—spent on the Navy? They might dismiss that ship canal. The Royal Commission had a scheme for a lock canal, but it was only for merchant ships. If they had a lock canal to take "Dreadnoughts," the cost would approach £50,000,000. The Manchester Ship Canal was no longer, if as long, and had no great works, and yet it had cost nearly £25,000,000. If Rosyth was selected because it was a suitable place for connecting by canal with Glasgow, let the House pause before it entered on a scheme which was certain to cost before it was finished, £100,000,000. He thought he had suggested reasons why the First Lord of the Admiralty should pause before he took a step on the road to ruin. Surely on the East Coast facilities could be got at a much cheaper price than they were now proposing. The Great Central Railway Company were building a great dock at Grimsby. Had the Admiralty approached them and considered what the extra cost would be of making that dock suitable for "Dreadnoughts" and putting in one or two graving docks? They would find it very much cheaper than going up to the Forth. Then there was the Tyne. He understood there was a dock in the Tyne that would take a "Dreadnought." The object of special dock accommodation was to get a dock which would take a ship at all stages of the tide. Was it absolutely essential to spend all this money to get in ships at all stages of the tide? The only objection to Sheerness and the Medway was that ships could only be got in at a certain state of the tide. Quite apart from expense it would be a strategical mistake to move our Naval base from Chatham to Rosyth. London was really the heart of the Empire. So long as London was safe the country and the Empire were safe. They were going to move the Naval base away from London and close the establishments at Chatham and Sheerness—they were not going to keep establishments idle at great expense—for London was going to be protected from
822
Rosyth. London could be as well protected from Portsmouth as from Rosyth. They had to consider the moral effect on the nation. All these preparations were for the supremely unlikely event, which he believed would never occur, of some nation in the North Sea wishing to attack us. They were going to sail down and shell the City of London, and it would be said they could not do that because, there was a Fleet 500 miles away in Rosyth. Would that calm the public mind, or would the First Lord immediately telegraph to Rosyth to send the Fleet to the Thames because London was in a funk? London would naturally be in a funk if the great Fleet, for which it had paid so many millions, was not there. What would happen would be that the Fleet would be divided, just as in the Russo-Japanese War the Russian Fleet was destroyed because it was in four parts, one at Vladivostock, one at Port Arthur, one in the Black Sea, and the other at St. Petersburg. The Japanese Fleet destroyed them all in detail, one by one, though it was inferior to the whole Russian Navy if concentrated in one Fleet. That was very likely what would happen to us if a great part of our Fleet was moved away from Rosyth. A powerful, fierce, and clever foe, with the biggest ships and guns and the best men, would sail for the Forth and find our Fleet at Rosyth. It must either keep under the guns of the forts or go out and fight, and then it would meet the whole of the enemy's fleet in the Forth and, as the part was less than the whole, so our Fleet would be destroyed by this enormous German Fleet which was going to crush us, because the greater part of our Fleet was in the Thames, or at Portsmouth, or Plymouth, or in the Mediterranean or the Irish Channel. It seemed to him that they were just paving the way for destruction. Let them take the alternative and suppose the biggest part of the Fleet was at Rosyth and the rest at the Nore. Down came the German Fleet to attack us at the entrance of the Thames. He took it they would go out to fight. We had not learnt the lesson of cowardice yet. When they went out they would find the whole German Fleet coming upon

823
them. Could anything be more absurd or a more reckless waste of money than this partition of the Fleet by building a new base at Rosyth? He had listened with such ears as he possessed, but had found no argument in favour of this change of base. The only argument was that we were going to have more "Dreadnoughts" than docks, but that was no reason for changing the base. He had heard the suggestion from the Civil Lord that there was some difficulty in dredging the Medway. Was that all? He most solemnly and sincerely advised the Government as one of their friends, not one of those who wished to see them done for and ruined and turned out of office because they were extravagant when they had said they would be economical, to reconsider their decision. It was said that the Scottish came down south and got most of the good things, and now they were going to get the naval base. With regard to the dredging of the Medway, they might get reports and estimates from engineering firms, as to whether the running in of the sides of the dredged channel could be averted by making the slopes of the dredged channel a little more gentle. He did not pretend to possess the knowledge of an engineer who had specially studied the bearings of the question, and it might be that the right hon. Gentleman had other information on the subject, but he had looked at the map, and the appearance on the map was of a wide waterway where it would be possible to get a gradual slope, and they all knew that there was an angle at which most sorts of mud would not run. If they could dredge the channel they would save many millions of money by utilising the old docks and the old establishments, and what he thought was more important still, they would keep our forces more concentrated. They did not know that it was Germany—it might be France or a combination of Mediterranean Powers with France, that was going to attack us. How did they know? Yet they were going to send the Fleet right away to Rosyth to resist an invasion that might come from France. They knew very well that Germany had never attacked us. We had never been at war with Germany. She had always
824
been our ally. He himself, although for the sake of argument he had adopted the hypothesis of a mighty German fleet, did not believe in its existence either now or in ten years time. We wished to be friends with France, but we had not always been so, unfortunately, and we were far more likely to come into collision with France than with Germany. But it was proposed to establish a naval base at Rosyth, far away from the South Coast, because certain newspaper writers had tried to get up a scare. Let this expense be incurred, if at all, by people who honestly and sincerely believed, as Gentlemen opposite did, that the scheme was necessary for the Navy. Ministers, whilst they were going to do it, were doing it in a sort of half-hearted way. They thought it was a thing that had to be done, but were very sorry for it, and did not quite like it. But Gentlemen opposite would do it gaily and gladly. The more millions they spent the more they would be pleased, while the more the present Government spent, the worse their supporters would be pleased. He asked them, before they abandoned the Thames and the Medway, to let their supporters have the advantage of seeing some Reports on the question, by which they might know whether it was true or not—he had been told it was not true—that there was difficulty in making good waterways, and deep water docks, at all states of the tide. He earnestly hoped the right hon. Gentleman would not let the contract for Rosyth, but would hold his hand and obtain reports from civil engineers, and consider whether it was safe or not to divide the Fleet, because that could only be done on the hypothesis that we had a superabundant strength—more than enough for any reasonable purpose. If we had such superabundant strength, perhaps the right hon. Gentleman, before starting on Rosyth would alter his shipbuilding programme and reduce his other expenses to some reasonable limit. It had been said that Rosyth was adopted as a base for strategical reasons. How could they formulate a plan of strategy before they knew their enemy? He asked the right hon. Gentleman to hold his hand at least

825
for another year. If the Opposition next year abused him, he did not need to trouble, because they would abuse him whatever he did.
MR. MUNRO FERGUSONsaid he hoped the advice which had been given by the hon. Member for Sleaford would not carry weight on the Ministerial side of the House. It might be possible to save a million or two for some years by the postponement of these works, but that policy would be accompanied by a growing public danger. Not only expert opinion, but the country at large, had determined that a strategical port in the North Sea was necessary, and ought to be constructed without any undue delay. He was glad to hear that the time fixed for the execution of the works at Rosyth had been expedited, and that they were likely to be completed in seven years instead of ten. There was no part of Admiralty policy which required to be pushed forward so much as the completion of this undertaking at Rosyth. If London or the Empire was to be defended from the North Sea, it could only be done with a naval base on the East Coast. He cared very little where the site was, but it had now been settled and he hoped no further delay would arise in the carrying out of the works. In the past, investigations had been carried out at Rosyth in a somewhat leisurely fashion, but he understood that they had now been concluded. He felt sure that the Admiralty had been well advised in securing that the work should not be begun except under the most favourable conditions.
SIR F. BANBURYsaid the hon. Member for Sleaford had stated the Government had been extravagant, although they promised to be economical, and he quite agreed with him. The hon. Member had also advised the Admiralty to follow the example of the Works Department of the London County Council, and send down a certain number of men headed by an officer, who should buy materials and employ men, and after enough money had been spent the men were to do nothing.
MR. LUPTONsaid he did not say they were to do nothing. What he said
826
was that they should be set upon other work.
SIR F. BANBURYasked where would the other work be found? He had listened with interest to the speech of the hon. Member for King's Lynn, who had stated that in his opinion it was a mistake to spend money upon fortifications because the money would be better spent upon ships. He believed, however, that the balance of opinion was that these dockyards were necessary, and that they should be completed as soon as possible. To buy a site, spend money upon it, and then stop, could only result in obtaining no advantage for the money spent. That was a most uneconomical proceeding. He hoped matters would be so arranged that instead of taking seven years, the docks would be finished in four years. The remarks made by the hon. Member for Limehouse about London and the Thames appeared to have been misunderstood. His hon. friend was not suggesting large docks that would take a "Dreadnought," but merely advocating that certain work should be given to the Thames Shipbuilding Company, and that had nothing whatever to do with the completion of the work at Rosyth. He wished to ask whether the Government could give to the House any information about the docks at Gibraltar. Not many years ago, they used to have interesting discussions upon those docks, and the predecessor of the hon. Member for King's Lynn used to speak by the hour on them. They had heard nothing about them in this debate, and although Gibraltar appeared in the Estimates, nothing like full information was given. He would like to know whether those works had fulfilled the expectations of the Admiralty. He understood from what the hon. Member for King's Lynn said, that repairs could not be done at either Gibraltar or Malta.
MR. BELLAIRS: Large repairs.
SIR F. BANBURYsaid it seemed to him that the money which had been spent at Gibraltar had been wasted if the ships had to be brought home for large repairs. The idea of a dock at Malta was that it should be capable of taking the largest

827
vessels, and he would like to hear from the Admiralty what answer they had to give to the criticisms of the hon. Member for King's Lynn upon this point.
*MR. LAMBERT: I assume that the hon. Baronet opposite refers to the Loan works at Gibraltar. All that has been completed and there are only in this Vote small items such as dredging. There are two docks at Gibraltar capable of taking a vessel of the "Dreadnought" type. I understand that the point raised by the hon. Member for Lime-house was not an alternative to Rosyth, but something additional. I can promise him that his point will have the consideration of the Admiraity. As an alternative to Rosyth, what he suggested is impossible, because we could not get up the Thames. The hon. Member for Fareham asked me if the new lock at Portsmouth could be expedited. I can assure him that we realise very deeply the inconvenience that will be caused at Portsmouth while this lock is being made, and we shall take every means in our power to expedite the work. I may say that it is to the contractors' benefit to finish the work as soon as possible, because the Admiralty only pay for work completed. With regard to additional docks at Rosyth, we are now considering whether it is wise to put into the main contract a provision asking for alternative tenders, so that if required those docks could be carried out by the same contractor. I have been asked whether double docks long enough for two "Dreadnoughts" can be made at Rosyth. I am told that such a dock would necessitate having an entrance at both ends and that is impossible at Rosyth. Otherwise you have to take out the ship nearest the basin before the ship inside can be taken out. That might lead to considerable delay, and I am informed that this practice has not been adopted except in the case of very small ships. It is essential, if you put two ships in one dock, that you should have an entrance at both ends so that the ship which is ready should be able to come out at once. I would ask the House to let us have this Vote now.

SUPPLY [11TH MARCH] REPORT.
Resolution reported;
SUPPLY [11TH MARCH] REPORT.

  ARMY ESTIMATES, 1908–9.
  "That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 185,000, all ranks, be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland at Home and Abroad, excluding His Majesty's Indian Possessions, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1909."
  Resolution read a second time.
  MR. LUTTRELLsaid he would move to reduce the Vote by 10,000 men and thus afford an opportunity for speaking to those hon. Members who were not able to speak last week in Committee, amongst the number being no less a personage than the Secretary of State for War. He hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would be able to give a satisfactory answer on this subject. He himself, and others, felt that the Army was in excess of our requirements. If it were necessary to have an Army able to attack foreign countries it might be any size, but if it was only to be a defensive Army, it was far too large. Last week he had compared our Army of to-day with that of 1895–6 when we had not begun to make preparations for the war in South Africa. The Army in 1895 was looked upon as adequate for the defensive purposes of the Empire, and he could not imagine why a like force was not adequate now. He found that since the year 1895–6 there had been an increase of no fewer than 14,000 men in the Home Army. In 1895–6 the Home Army consisted of 116,153, and now it consisted of 130,148. That was an immense increase, and many hon. Members did not see any reason for it. We were to have a striking force of 160,000 men. He and his friends could not see what justification there was for putting the country to the expense of keeping such a large expeditionary force. The Secretary of State for War had stated that in these questions he was dependent upon the policy of the Government. The policy of the Government was a policy of peace. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and he thought he might say the

  829
  Secretary of State for India, judging from the speeches they had made, would all be in favour of a smaller expeditionary force than we had now. It was well know that the Prime Minister over and over again before the General Election made statements accusing the Conservative Government of putting the country to great expense. He could give several quotations from the right hon. Gentleman's speeches to that effect. The Foreign Secretary, speaking five years ago, laid it down that an expeditionary force of 80,000 would, in his opinion, be sufficient; he even went so far as to say that 40,000 would be sufficient. The Foreign Secretary was largely responsible for the foreign policy of the country. What had taken place in these five years to make it necessary to keep more than double the force which the right hon. Gentleman then thought would be sufficient? The Secretary of State for War might say that, although we had this force, it was not in reality one which was putting the country to any great expense, because under the Cardwell system if we had troops abroad we should have the same number at home. Why was it necessary to keep so many troops abroad? The right hon. Gentleman was bringing back from South Africa four battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry, and we should then have seventy-four battalions at home and seventy-four battalions abroad. He and his friends contended that seventy-four battalions abroad was too great a number. If we did not require them abroad, then we did not require a like number at home. The increase abroad as well as at home had been considerable. In 1895–6 there were in Africa, 4,888 men, not counting temporary contingents of 1,066 men in West Africa; to-day there were 20,173. He could not see why there should have been such an immense increase. It might be said that immediately before or after the Boer War such a force was necessary, but now that the people were settled there the taxpayers ought not to be put to the great expense involved. The bringing home of four battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry would only be a small saving. If we were keeping an excessive number of men in South Africa it was wasteful
  830
  extravagance. In Asia, exclusive of India, we had in 1895–6 6,300 men; to-day we had 9,735, an increase of 3,405. In the Mediterranean the number had decreased from 14,451 to 11,479, but in Egypt the number had increased from 4,267 to 5,771, an increase of 1,504. He thought we were keeping too many men in India. If during the Boer War we could protect India with 63,000, why not now? If ever there was a dangerous time in India it was the a. Our Army in India was not used for aggressive purposes. The words of the Secretary of State for War bore out that proposition. The right hon. Gentleman said the other day that the British Army in India was not an Army for aggressive purposes, but only for the purpose of maintaining internal order. What was the use of spending money in India on education and in improving railway communication, if we had to keep the people down with a larger number of troops than before? Our policy in India should have the effect of enabling us to reduce rather than increase the force. There had been an increase in India since 1895–6 from 73,168 to 76,155. Since 1895–6 there had been an increase in all of 29,466 men. He thought he was making a very moderate request when he asked the Government to knock off 10,000 men. He begged to move.
  MR. HART-DAVIESwho was indistinctly heard seconded the Amendment. He said he fully recognised that we ought to have a strong Navy because it was our all in all. The cost of the Navy was necessarily very considerable, but he thought we could hardly afford to have an overwhelming Army and an expensive Navy. He had no doubt that after a few years the Navy Estimates would be over £50,000,000. He asked the right hon. Gentleman whether he had ever seriously considered the question of solving the difficulty by reviving the long service system? He hoped the right hon. Gentleman had an altogether open mind and would approach the problem as itreally existed, and not with the eyes of people who had grown up under different circumstances than now existed A different system existed in Europe now as compared with years ago. The situation in India

  831
  had changed. There were railways all over that great continent now and stations where white men could live, and even in Beloochistan Colonies might be founded. He, therefore, could not see in the least why they should not go back to the old system and allow India to look after her own Army, to recruit her own Army, and to maintain and pay for it. The problem would be extremely simple, and they would be able to cut down the Army to a small highly-trained force which, with the Volunteers, would be sufficient to defend this country. In that way a saving of £13,000,000 or £14,000,000 might be effected. They would then be able to introduce such economies as would enable the Government to carry out those social reforms which were always dangled before the people but never carried out for want of money.
  Amendment proposed—
  "To leave out '185,000,' and insert '175,000,'—(Mr. Luttrell)—instead of."
  Question proposed, "That '185,000' stand part of the said Resolution."
  *MR. ARTHUR LEE: I do not rise to support the Motion proposed by the hon. Member for Tavistock, and seconded by the hon. Member for Hackney. Their desire is to reduce the strength of the Regular Army; I desire to prevent its being reduced. I believe that reduction has already gone too far. The hon. Member for Hackney says that we are being bled white by the expenditure on our defence forces, but I ask him what colour we would be bled if ever our country were successfully invaded, and we had not sufficient defences by sea and laud to resist such an invasion.
  MR. HART-DAVIES: I said nothing about the Navy.
  *MR. ARTHUR LEE: I know that the Navy is not on this Vote, and that it would not be in order to refer to it on this occasion. Therefore, I turn to other matters more strictly relevant to the Vote now under discussion. I wish to address my remarks almost entirely to the question of artillery, and to deal
  832
  with the contemplated reduction of the artillery of the Regular Army, and to the effect that would have on our whole, war efficiency. The right hon. Gentleman has told us that whilst he has not yet carried out the proposed reduction of the Royal Field Artillery by 2,400 men, he intended to reduce it by that number as soon as their places could be taken by the Special Reserve. He is going to take thirty-three batteries of the Royal Field Artillery and reduce them to a two-gun basis; that is, he is going largely to deplete their ranks, by some-thing like seventy men per battery. These batteries are then to be used for training depots and the places of the disbanded men are to be filled temporarily by Special Reservists, who are to be taken at the age of seventeen, and who may or may not have done six months service in those instructional batteries. What will be the effect of this proposal on our available artillery forces at home? We shall have left, apart from the artillery of the Territorial Force and of the expeditionary force, only forty-one batteries of Regular artillery. Eight of these batteries, will be horse batteries, and these the right hon. Gentleman does not propose to touch. But the remaining thirty-three batteries he is going to eviscerate in such a manner that their efficiency for the purposes of any serious warfare will be reduced to a vanishing point. His intention is to reduce those batteries to a two-gun basis, with only one-third or one-quarter of Regular troops. The Under-Secretary for War in another place last year gave an undertaking that—
  "We shall not reduce any Regular artillery before we have an adequate number of Special Reservists to take their place."
  He added this year—
  "We are living up to that undertaking."
  But whilst these 2,400 men have not yet been actually disbanded they are under suspended sentence of dismissal. But whether the right hon. Gentleman's plan is good or not, I say that these batteries can never be regarded as efficient by filling them up with lads of seventeen years of age and of no training. The right hon. Gentleman is merely wrecking the efficiency of the batteries

  833
  by attempting to carry out any such proposal. A very interesting speech was made two days ago by Lord Wynford, who had served in the Regular Artillery, and, therefore, had had practical experience, in the course of which his Lordship pointed out that four or five untrained men in a battery of artillery could not do the work of one trained man. So far as fighting efficiency is concerned the one man could not be replaced by a large number of men who did not know their duties. Therefore, I urge on the House that if the right hon. Gentleman decides on this plan of filling up the sixty-six batteries that are to form part of his expeditionary force, with these Special Reservists, well and good. He will have strengthened the available artillery for his expeditionary force if necessity arises; but as regards the batteries left behind which are to form the backbone of the defence of this country, let him retain the 2,400 trained men whom he proposes to get rid of, and divide them up amongst the instructional batteries so as to give them a more adequate stiffening of Regular gunners. Further, as a result of that, let him raise the peace establishment of the thirty-three home batteries to four guns each. If these batteries are raised to that strength and the proportion of Regular gunners is increased, I believe that, while not nearly as efficient as Regular batteries, they will be readily capable of being brought up to full strength and of becoming efficient fighting machines. I am not giving my own opinion merely. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War is aware of the advice which has been given by our greatest living soldier, who himself is an artilleryman and who has given the whole of his adult life to the study of war. The right hon. Gentleman smiles at Lord Roberts, but after all we attach more importance to the opinions of Lord Roberts than to the opinions of the right hon. Gentleman on military matters. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will not belittle the experience of the gallant Field-Marshal, or, as did one of his supporters the other day, impute to the gallant Field-Marshal any unworthy motive, political or otherwise. Lord
  834
  Roberts said that to eviscerate these thirty-three batteries in the manner proposed "was an extraordinary waste of good material" and he urged very strongly that the whole of the thirty-three batteries and the eight Horse Artillery batteries should be kept on a reduced peace footing, perhaps, but as Regular and efficient batteries to be used in the event of an invasion. I suppose it is useless to urge on the right hon. Gentleman to take thought again, because he told us that he was determined to go on with this scheme, which, I believe can only lead to disaster. But that after all is his affair. We believe, and I speak for all artillery officers whom I have been able to consult, that more Regular artillery is absolutely essential. We believe that the Austrians have, after all, got the right idea in this matter. I understand that in Austria, after careful consideration it has been decided that it is necessary to give nothing but Regular artillery to the second line Army. I believe that is a perfectly sound idea, and I think that although you can raise a home defence Army of both infantry and yeomanry with a small amount of training, you can never raise an effective artillery force by this method. Really when the right hon. Gentleman tells us—and this is the only reason he has put forward so far—that unless you do what he proposes you will create great discouragement in the ranks of the Territorial Force—in other words that this force will not consent to play at all unless they have a full box of toys, I think he is doing an injustice to the Territorial Army. The right hon. Gentleman himself in a very wise speech which he made some time ago before he committed himself to this scheme said:
  "We must have more artillery and nothing short of the best will do."
  That is what he preached, but it is not what he practises, and we would forgive him if he would only adapt his practice to his preaching and follow the policy of foreign nations who have far greater experience than we have in this matter. The right hon. Gentleman's remark is corroborated almost verbally by Lord Roberts, who said the other day in the House of Lords, that if we are not to have the best artillery it would be infinitely

  835
  better to have no artillery at all. I know it is now the fashion in this House to belittle expert advice. It is only necessary to say what the expert thinks is right in order to secure the ridicule of the right hon. Gentleman's supporters, but after all in a matter which is highly technical, such as this affecting the artillery, I think we are entitled to give more weight to the opinion of experts than the Party opposite are accustomed to do. What I ask the right hon. Gentleman is, and I hope that he will answer me because he has not done so yet, whether he can now relieve our minds a little by giving us the opinions of any eminent or practical soldiers who have seen war service, who are in favour of his proposal to reduce the regular artillery and put in its place untrained artillery. I think the right hon. Gentleman should tell us a little more in favour of that proposal than is contained in his own approval. We cannot attach much importance to the statement that the Army Council is in its favour. We all know that the Army Council has varied its opinions very much in the last few years, and we are entitled to know who are the artillery authorities who have given him the advice which has induced him to press forward this matter. I may say that the only military authority that I have heard supporting it has been the hon. and gallant Member for the Abercromby Division. He is the only military authority in politics or out of politics that I have been able to meet who has given his approval to the right hon. Gentleman's plan. No doubt the right hon. Gentleman will be able to give other authorities, but he has not done so yet and I hope he will be able to enlighten us this afternoon. There is another point which I wish to touch upon, with regard to the number of officers taken upon this Vote. The right hon. Gentleman very rightly bewails the shortage of officers, and we have ascertained from official documents that he has laid before us that there has been a large falling-off in the number of officers even since he assumed his present post. The right hon. Gentleman has issued in an Army Order this morning a statement of the scheme by which he proposes to meet that deficiency. I endeavoured to deal with this scheme
  836
  on a previous occasion and I do not intend to go into it again now, but it seems to me that further reductions—automatic reductions—of officers are inevitable owing to a variety of causes other than those for which the right hon. Gentleman is responsible. There is the aftermath of the South African War and the block of promotion which resulted from it, but the falling off is aggravated by his reduction of units and his bringing home of units and placing them on reduced establishments. There is one particularly bad case which I do rot apologise for bringing before the House, because it concerns my old regiment, and because I know it is creating very widespread interest. It affects the position of the Royal Garrison Artillery officer, because in addition to the causes which I have mentioned which have led to the blocking of promotion, the position of these officers has been seriously affected by what is called the bifurcation of the Regiment. The Regiment was split up into two branches, Garrison Artillery and Field Artillery, and I remember very well at the time, because I was myself affected, that we were assured by the War Office that the officers of the Garrison Artillery should suffer no detriment from the separation as compared with officers of the field branch. But what has taken place since, as far as the War Office is concerned? I have been examining the list, and I find that majors of my own standing have, in eleven years, lost four years as compared with their contemporaries in the Field Artillery. Senior captains head the list with over twenty years' service, which cannot make for Army efficiency, and there are 200 senior lieutenants at the head of the list with eight years' service, whilst promotions are only afforded at the rate of seventeen in a year. At this rate it will take twelve years to work off this batch of lieutenants, and the last of them will have twenty years service as subalterns. I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, his attention having been directed to this growing grievance, he will hold out any hopes to these officers of having their position ameliorated, or if he cannot, will he put them out of their misery at once. I have been told by many of

  837
  them that if nothing can be done for them, they would rather be told now so that they may retire before it is too late to seek another field of employment. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be able to use this material, the most valuable trained material in the British Army, officers of the highest technical training in the service. Surely he can find some use for them in these new great schemes which he is introducing. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will this afternoon give some answer to this point, and hold out to these officers the prospect of a better future, or else pronounce upon them a definite sentence. I do not wish to detain the House. I am aware that the ground is very narrow which we have to tread in debating this question, but I do wish in conclusion to repudiate what has been stated on the other side of the House and in another place, that we, in bringing forward these objections to any detail of the right hon. Gentleman's scheme, are actuated by party motives. Surely it is possible for us to differ from the right hon. Gentleman and the Government upon these highly debatable and technical matters without incurring that charge, and it is really absurd to suppose that because we do not slavishly agree with all the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman that, therefore, we are guilty of party bias. Really that line of argument will not do. It will not do for the Government to try to shelter themselves behind that bogey. The right hon. Gentleman can possibly belittle our opinions in the eyes of this House but I hope that he will attempt some answer to the arguments that have been addressed to him, not by politicians, but by professional soldiers of the highest possible repute, and that he will, in particular, reply to the contentions of Lord Roberts, whose speech in the House of Lords on this artillery question has caused so much uneasiness in the public mind. I hope at least he will attempt some answer that is reasoned and that does not impute to the professional critics any motives which are political or unworthy.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. HALDANE,): I think, Mr. Speaker, that it will be convenient
  838
  if I pass from the speech which has just been made to the Motion which has been proposed, but there is one observation which I should like to make at once. If all the speeches on Army reform had been made in the temperate and reasoned tone of the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just sat down, I do not think that complaint could be made. Indeed, I am not going to make a complaint in any matter but one, and it has nothing to do with the hon. and gallant Gentleman. But there have been things said, during the last few days which are very discouraging to the new Territorial Force. That force, after all, is a delicate plant. The sapling has only just begun to show above ground, and if you proceed to pull it up, and complain it is not yet an oak tree, all I say is that the prospect of progress is rather hopeless. Legitimate discussion, discussion of serious points, re useful and valuable. But to pour contempt upon the efforts to raise a Volunteer field artillery is only to discourage the many men—after all, whether they succeed or not, they are actuated by the most patriotic of motives—who, whether working in the County Associations or in commands in various parts of the country, have been sending us letters of complaint saying that their prospects have been rendered more doubtful by speeches of criticism made at this particular juncture.
  *MR. ARTHUR LEE: We have received letters also, but they are letters of congratulation.
  MR. HALDANE: But not from the same gentlemen.
  *MR. ARTHUR LEE: Of course not.
  MR. HALDANE: Not from the same gentlemen—the gentlemen who are endeavouring to get the Volunteers to fill the field batteries. But I do not want to pursue that subject. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that the position of the officers of the garrison artillery has been nude hard because of the reduction in that branch of the service, due to the change of policy. That policy was the result of a conference between the Admiralty and the War Office;

  839
  and it means that the defences in this country and the defences abroad are organised on a more mobile footing than they were on the old footing. We are no longer in the days when the enemy would be so kind as to bring ships within range of a fixed battery, and the changed conditions have given rise to a considerable reduction in garrison artillery. I can assure my hon. and gallant friend that what he has said to-day shall not remain unnoticed, nor shall I forget what has, indeed, been much in my mind in connection with the new military policy which is being carried out.
  Now I turn to what is the great question before us. We are discussing the Vote for the number of men, and the speech of the hon. and gallant Member has raised, quite legitimately from his point of view, the proposition that we are not taking in the Vote enough men for the artillery, if we are to have an adequate home defence force as well as an adequate Regular Force. That is the thesis which is very legitimately raised, and I am glad to have the opportunity of making some explanation about it, because I believe that under the argument which the hon. and gallant Member has addressed to the House there lies a very great fallacy. What is the size of the British Army to be? It is an Army consisting of something quite different from what Continental armies consist of. On the Continent, where your land frontier is conterminous with that of another country, where you have only an imaginary line of demarcation, your whole force must be in the first line. All outside can be but a reserve. You must get an Army mobilised and ready for war at short notice. But our island position, while it impose? on us the necessity of a great fleet at sea—and that is the real foundation of our military strategy—enables us to have a small Army for the defence of the country, and an Army fashioned on quite a different footing from all of the Continental armies. With us you can—and if consistent in your military policy you will—divide your force into two, a first line and a second line—a first line which must be ready for action just as a Continental army is ready
  840
  for action, and a second line, the purpose of which is upon the outbreak of war to prepare itself to come up as a second line for the relief of the first. The first may have to go oversea. The first may be worn out by wastage of war. Your second line is not designed to be ready on the outbreak of war in the same fashion as the first line is. It is rather a line in reserve, which in the early stages of a war will acquire strength and efficiency. That is a conception only possible on the footing that you have command of the sea; and it is on the footing that you have command of the sea, and a small Army for your first line, that the system is based. If that be true, your second line goes into its war training mobilisation, not for immediate fighting, but for its war training. You must organise it as closely as you can on the pattern of the first line; have your brigades, your divisions, and every thing ready, so that every man shall understand what his place may be, and what his functions arc. you must give to this second line—because it is a Volunteer Army on a Volunteer basis and you can only give it just so much training as Volunteers are able and willing to take—enough training so that when mobilised on the outbreak of hostilities for their war training they may harden and acquire efficiency as rapidly as circumstances and public spirit will allow. If that is so, the Territorial Army is designed to be as ready as it can be on the outbreak of hostilities and to mobilise to take war training. Six months is what we should like to get. You may have to do your best in great emergencies at the beginning of a war, but I never contemplated that the Territorial Army should be regarded as ready to meet with an equal force of highly-trained troops landing on these shores at the first outbreak of hostilities. In order to resist an invasion you have first the Fleet, secondly your Regular troops at home in the event of sudden or surprise attack. If you are sending your troops abroad, you must be careful not to send more than you can spare consistently with such defence as is to be maintained until the Territorial or second line hardens into efficiency. That is one reason why I do not think these 160,000 men of whom we have heard so

  841
  much is at all too large a force. You might have to send four divisions abroad within three weeks or a month. You would not be wise, unless you were perfectly sure that your naval dispositions were such as to make it absolutely certain that no blow could be struck at the heart of the Empire, to send more than that until the Territorial Force was considerably hardened. The Regular troops at home would be a formidable force for any invader to contemplate encountering, particularly as week by week would be producing the hardened men of the second line. That is why the Government invited the House of Commons to pass the Act of last session under which a Territorial or second line force could be automatically mobilised for its war training on the calling out of the Reserve. That is the structure of the whole scheme. On the outbreak of hostilities the second line force becomes mobilised, but mobilised to go into war training. The essence of the Act is that the automatic mobilisation is a mobilisation for war training.
  I have dealt with this subject, repeating what I have said ten times before, for a reason. I quite agree as to the great authority of Lord Roberts. He is our most brilliant commander of troops—perhaps the most brilliant commander of troops in the world at the present time; but I really cannot follow Lord Roberts's reasoning on the broad question of military organisation. He speaks of preparation for a surprise attack as if the plan was that the Territorial Army was organised to resist the surprise attack—as if we were contemplating a situation when all the Regular troops should be away, and as if we had no Navy which could resist invasion, and the Territorial Force was to be brought face to face with I know not how large a Continental force suddenly descending on these shores. If we relied on the Territorial Force to deal with that situation, I agree that we should rely on very little. I have never put that forward. In the case of such a bolt from the blue we should have, I hope, the whole expeditionary force, especially those actually serving with the colours, at our back. I have never for a moment contemplated that we should be left in such a situation
  842
  with no protection from the Navy and no protection from the Regular Army; and I am the more puzzled with Lord Roberts's speech because I cannot but remember that only three years ago, in 1905, he was a member of the Defence Committee which gave certain advice which the Leader of the Opposition gave to this House. I understand that his speech was based on calculations made by the Defence Committee—he told us so at the time—and the Defence Committee, of which Lord Roberts was a member, told us that only a raid of 5,000 men or two raids of 5,000 men were to be protected against. It really detracts from the authority of however eminent an expert, if views so totally and diametrically opposite are put forward, and the country asked to accept both of them within so short a period. I believe myself that the right hon. Gentleman opposite probably put the figure too low. I should not like to pin myself to the proposition that not more than 5,000 men could be landed. The sea is wide, accidents do happen, and for a matter of security you must make better provision than would be made by merely reducing the risk to that level. I agree with the principle that you should rely on naval protection against any large invasion, that you should rely on the old British policy of faith in transports and keep at home a second line force large enough to ensure that, if the enemy should bring his troops in sufficiently large numbers, he would require transports of such magnitude that the Navy would have a target to hit.
  Now that I have wholly parted company with Lord Roberts, and have admitted that, if the conception of immediate reliance on the Territorial Force in case of invasion was correct, the criticisms of our scheme would be well founded, but have shown what an entirely different basis underlies the Government plan, let me come to some points raised by the hon. and gallant Member which will appear in an entirely new light in view of the principles I have stated. I have always felt that our first duty is to make the Regular artillery of the expeditionary force efficient. For that purpose you require ammunition columns, and the cheapest method of doing that

  843
  is to get 15,000 efficiently trained men to supply the wastage of war. In the time of the South African war the bulk of the batteries were at home training drafts. There were, I think, forty-five in South Africa, and about sixty at home training drafts. Whether that is the real figure or not does not matter. You must always in any circumstances keep a number of batteries at home to supply your drafts. The necessity is now greater because of the large ammunition columns which are required for the quick-firing guns. The general calculation is that sixty-six batteries are sufficient for the Regular field force and thirty-three as training batteries. These batteries are put on a two-gun basis. I have not reduced the men. If the House wishes to be reassured as to the state of the artillery, I say I have never professed to reduce the artillery; I have reduced other things, but not the artillery, because the artillery was not efficient. I have recognised that I had not only to make economies, but to obtain efficiency; and the state of the artillery since I came into office is certainly no worse, and, I think, a great deal better than it was before. On 1st April, 1906, the establishment was 29,879 Horse and Field; on 1st April, 1907, 29,938; on 1st April, 1908, 30,159. That, of course, includes what we have provided for India, because we treat the Force as one for this purpose. There has, therefore, been no reduction in the Regular Artillery, and I pledge myself to this House not to reduce the Regular Artillery until I can provide for every man who goes off some four or five men who can take his place. If that is so, what would be the position? You would have your ammunition columns, which I regret you have not got at the present time. You would have your thirty-three batteries on a training footing, but they would have a certain amount of Regulars, and they would each have in addition, besides the two guns, four guns more. The guns are all there. Sixty-six batteries have large reserves of guns behind them, larger than was suggested by the Mowatt Committee. We also have four guns in addition to the two used for training for every training battery. Therefore, suppose you did run short of artillery, and suppose we
  844
  were reduced to extremities, you have a very substantial number of guns, of men, and batteries which can be put on a six gun basis, and if you have succeeded in training artillery and in enlarging the force of artillerists in this country, then you will have no difficulty in making use of these batteries in time of great emergency, but I like to look at these thirty-three batteries as fulfilling the legitimate function of training drafts for the Regular artillery, and of being that support which ought to be behind the Regular artillery in case it had to go abroad. The hon. and gallant Member opposite says that it is not enough, because you cannot rely upon the Volunteer field artillery which you are proposing to raise. I would admit the argument of the hon. and gallant Member if it was directed against the proposition to produce field artillery which was to be fit to take the field immediately on the declaration of hostilities. But I have pointed out that the organisation which we are making of the Volunteer field artillery, and the training we propose to give, is ample for the purpose of bringing together an organisation to take war training on the calling out of the Regular Reserves when mobilisation takes place.
  MR. ARTHUR LEEsaid that his objections, as far as he was personally concerned, applied with almost equal force to this artillery after it had been embodied for six months. He did not believe its efficiency would be materially increased.
  MR. HALDANE: I am glad the hon. and gallant Member has come to the real point. I would remind him that on this question of driving, which I think he has in mind, his authority would not be recognised as quite so great as that of those who realise the difference between garrison artillery and horse and field artillery. The hon. and gallant Member is what they call a sedentary artilleryman. The garrison artillery do not depend on driving, nor are they of the class of artillerymen whose opinions have to be directed to the question whether men should make efficient drivers or not. Between garrison artillery and horse and field artillery there is a great gulf fixed.

  845
  Their mysteries are totally different mysteries, and really the discussion of the last few weeks about the mysteries of the artillery are extremely confusing to the mind of the hon. Member who gives himself the trouble to distinguish between the various kinds of artillery. I said in a moment of irritation last summer that the mysteries made by artillerymen about their craft were almost as great as the mysteries made by the theologians; I apologise to the theologians. Why a skilled and highly-trained artisan should not learn the handling of a gun I do not know. [An HON. MEMBER: The riding of a horse.] Why a bank clerk in London should learn to ride a horse with the Honourable Artillery Company, and a bank clerk at Sheffield, Glasgow, or some other city should not learn it equally well, is a mystery I cannot fathom. The hon. and gallant Member said, quite justly, that I must not put forward my assertions against the assertions of Regular soldiers, and particularly against the assertions of soldiers as eminent as Lord Roberts. To this matter I have given a great deal of attention and consideration; I am always most reluctant to produce the opinions of experts who are advising me, and for that reason I thought it right to refuse to produce the Minutes of the Army Council and Reports of the Inspector-General, which contain all sorts of confidential things. But, in view of the appeal made to me, and repeated again to-day by the hon. and gallant Member, I have done this. I did not think it right to put any pressure or even specific questions, but I referred various eminent soldiers to the controversy which is taking place, and asked them whether they thought fit to express any opinion on the subject which I could read to the House of Commons. I have been furnished with replies by the Inspector-General of the Forces, Sir J. French, and also by the Army Council. The question I submitted to them was this—taking the conception of a second line which I have give a, the second line which is to be trained on mobilisation, on a war footing so as to harden it, could you get an efficient field artillery force? It is the very question which the hon. and gallant Member raised a few moments ago. This is what Sir J. French says to
  846
  me this morning. I will read it just as I have got it. It is a little long, but the Motion is so important that I think the House ought to have Sir J. French's own words. Sir J. French is not only Inspector-General of the Forces but Inspector-General of the Territorial Force that is to be, and it is his duty to be responsible for efficiency. This is what Sir J. French sent to me this morning and which he wrote under date of yesterday:—
  "Lord Roberts laid down in the House of Lords that artillery requires a much longer and far more intricate training than is afforded by the provisions of Mr. Haldane's scheme. He gave it as his fixed opinion that with so little training the Territorial batteries will prove, to be useless, and even a positive danger to their own side. The Field-Marshal went on to urge the Government to abandon all idea of Territorial artillery, and to spend the money so saved in raising a force of mounted riflemen. In the statement of his case Lord Roberts appears to entirely lose sight of the principle which lies at the very root of Mr. Haldane's scheme—namely, the six months training on mobilisation. His argument is altogether based on the fifteen days annual course, and he even fails to make allowance for the voluntary work and training which will undoubtedly be carried on, over and above the regulation fifteen days, in many divisions. It may be remarked that it is this kind of work which has raised the batteries of the Honourable Artillery Company and Lancashire to a state of efficiency which is universally acknowledged by experts. Allowing for such an amount of training, I cannot think that these Territorial batteries which have undergone it will be either useless or dangerous. It seems to me that such an idea is not borne out either by military history or peace experience. In the American Civil War and in the latter part of the Franco-German War batteries of field artillery did excellent service with just as little, and in many cases even less, previous training. It appears to be generally overlooked that this six months' training, which is to commence on mobilisation, will be carried on under exceptional circumstances. War will be actually in progress. National spirit and enthusiasm will be aroused to the highest pitch. Training will be conducted, and willingly undergone, morning, noon, and night. Every man will be throwing his utmost heart and endeavour into the work, and straining every nerve to shorten the period which must be passed before he can go to the help of his comrades who are falling every day. With efficient instructors more will be done in this six months than could be looked for in two or even three years of ordinary peace training. Our own experience of the early days of the South African war should have taught us this lesson. It was a constant saying of Napoleon that national feeling, great energy, skill, and perseverance had far more effect in converting raw material into soldiers than long spaces, of time. One great object which the scheme

  847
  has in view is to create reality out of what was little more than pretence. The first step towards this end is to lay down and work upon a thoroughly sound organisation, which shall be suitable to the demands of modern war. How can any organisation be sound or complete without its full quota of artillery? To leave out this, perhaps the most important of all arms, as Lord Roberts proposed, is simply inconceivable. Then, where are we to get it? Of course, all soldiers would prefer the highest trained artillery they could get, but the country insists on economy, and I assume no Regular artillery is available. This scheme, therefore, provides the only means available of getting what we require. In my humble opinion the prospects of securing a sufficiently trained force are quite good enough to fully warrant the experiment. I do not suggest that the Territorial artillery which may be called upon to take the field on completion of the six months training will be equal as regards efficiency, either in personnel or matérial, to the regular artillery of the first line. But what about our enemy? If our best forces are becoming exhausted and require expansion, so do his. Huge gaps will have been made in the ranks of his personnel, which must, of necessity, be filled up by less highly trained substitutes. As regards matérial, the life of the quick-firing gun is limited. Material will suffer to a much greater degree than formerly, and it is certain that after six months of war any enemy we may be fighting will have to put ordnance into the field which will be in no way superior to the converted gun to be issued to the Territorial Army. For these reasons I venture, with all deference, to differ entirely from the conclusions arrived at by Lord Roberts."
  I told the House that before venturing to put these plans before Parliament, or, for that matter, before my colleagues in the Cabinet, I had them very closely sifted. I submitted them to a Special Committee, the Committee of Imperial Defence, on which Sir J. French himself sat; and the six months plan was very largely the result of the suggestions of Sir J. French and Sir Neville Lyttelton, Chief of the General Staff. Sir Neville Lyttelton at one time was very critical of the notion of Volunteer field artillery, and he was critical because the plans that were put forward three years ago, and the plans put forward earlier, provided for no systematic training on a war footing of the proposed Volunteer field artillery. But the plan now embodied on the outbreak of hostilities would give them as much training as you could at that moment—it may be six months, it may be two months, or it may be one month, still they are progressively improving. It may be that that was one of the circumstances which
  848
  has made a great alteration in Sir Neville Lyttelton's view. The other is the inspection which he has made of the Volunteer field artillery actually at work since that time. As the hon. Member challenges me I will read the opinion of Sir Neville Lyttelton and the Army Council which I obtained the same day. I gave them the question, and what I am reading is their general pronouncement upon it. The only signature not attached to the document is that of the Adjutant-General, who was absent, but I can say from personal knowledge I have no reason to suppose that he dissents from the conclusions. They say—
  "The necessity of maintaining a second line Army on the basis of citizen service is generally admitted, and given this condition, its limitations as regards the amount of training that can be given in peace are self-evident, and for this reason no very high standard of efficiency can be looked for. This is very apparent in the case of field artillery. It is not in our power to give it the amount of training necessary to bring it up to the standard of Regulars or near it. All we can do is to lay down for it the highest scale of training it can accept, which will give them a reasonable standard of efficiency, and this I think can be done. Proposals were made three years ago to create Volunteer field batteries, but it was only contemplated to give them a month in camp and additional drills, and this I considered inadequate, though I did not object to an experiment on these lines being tried on a small scale. But the training proposed for the Territorial artillery of to-day is far more thorough, as, in addition to the annual camps and drills, on mobilisation it is to be embodied for as long as is thought fit, and the training it will then receive will certainly improve it to such an extent that no invader could ignore it. I am not arguing as to whether we shall get this breathing time or not. It is perhaps possible that we shall not, but I think we shall. Of course if we are attacked in a time of profound peace we shall not, but then the Regular artillery of the expeditionary force will be in the country. It is a question whether, viewing the nature of the greater part of England, 196 batteries are not too many, but that our second line Army should be denuded of all its artillery because it cannot be, brought in peace to a high standard of efficiency is to ignore the purpose for which that Army exists. I have shown this paper to Sir W. Nicholson and Major-General Hadden, and they are both in agreement with it. I may add that Sir James Wolfe Murray, the late Master-General of the Ordnance, was quite in favour of raising Volunteer field artillery."
  I think that these expert opinions are of interest, and if I am not wearying the House I should like to read the opinion of the Director of Military Training

  849
  who has worked out this scheme as one of the heads of the General Staff. He says not so much about the general thing as about what he has seen at work. Last summer we had some interesting manœuvres in Scotland, and we brought together cavalry and Yeomanry, as well as Regular and Volunteer artillery. We had field artillery batteries there, and it so happened that they were in camp with a large number of troops for a considerable time on my own small place in Perthshire. I had the opportunity of seeing them closely, and this is what General Haig refers to in his letter. He says to me—
  "You will no doubt remember that two batteries of the Lanarkshire Artillery Volunteers were turned out for special training last summer; and were brigaded with Regulars for about ten days at the Scottish manœuvres. The chief object of this was to enable us to form some opinion as to the standard of efficiency which Volunteer Artillery could reach under the conditions then existing. I attach a letter from Colonel May who as assistant director of training accompanied me specially to watch the work of this Artillery.
  I fully agree with what he writes, and am of opinion that what "as done by these sections of Volunteer Artillery was satisfactory proof that Volunteer Artillery can become mobile enough, even under the old system of training, to take part in field operations. I did not, however, see this Artillery at practice, but Colonel Wing's report on Allen's (Sheffield) Corps, 4th West Riding of Yorkshire, dated 9th August last, seems sufficient testimony on this head. His words are the practice was very satisfactory.' Wing is now Staff Officer for Royal Horse and Field Artillery to the Commander-in-Chief at Aldershot, and his opinion is that of an expert of to-day. Copy of Wing's report is attached.
  In discussing the question of the standard of efficiency to which Volunteer Artillery can be brought, it seems highly important to notice that very great changes are being made with the view of providing better means for training. Briefly put they amount to the following:—

  1. The Volunteer Authority is now to be organised as Field instead of Garrison—and will be formed into Artillery brigades with quick firing guns.

  2. A Divisional Artillery Commander and Stall' is provided to direct the training throughout the whole year.

  3. The training of officers and Non-Commissioned officers of the Territorial Artillery by means of the Regular Training Brigades.

  4. The methodical association of Volunteer Artillery with Regulars at training centres and camps.

  MR. WYNDHAM: These training brigades—the whole of their time and energy is not to be devoted to the Special Reserve as we understood the other day?
  MR. HALDANE: It is their primary function, but the officers and noncommissioned officers will be there to give instruction and help to the officers and non-commissioned officers of the field artillery force, who I have no doubt will go there and be present at the training and will gain great instruction from seeing the work done. It is done every day. You have your Yeomanry officers attached to cavalry regiments, and what can be done in the case of the Yeomanry can certainly be done in the association of Volunteer artillery with Regulars in training mps—
  Lastly, the General Staff Officer in each Division of the Territorial Army brings the General Staff at Army Headquarters into close touch with the Territorial Force, so that the results of what is being done will be closely watched and proposals for improvements in organisation or training will be carefully thought out, and put forward as necessity demands. For these reasons I deprecate any change in the policy of creating a 2nd Line Army complete in all arms and services.
  That is the Report of a Member of the General Staff, General Douglas Haig, one of the most modern soldiers in the Army, a man of great distinction and service in the field who deprecates what I have been asked to do, which is to get rid of the Volunteer field artillery. I am afraid I am wearying the House but there is one other Report by Colonel May on Colonel Grant's Lanarkshire batteries. He says this—
  "The strongest argument as to the efficiency of Grant's field artillery in Scotland is to be found in the fact that the day you first saw the batteries on the moors above Cloanden, I was riding with you and pointed them out as Volunteers; you would not believe me at first, and said they were Regulars."
  This is a very distinguished artillery officer riding with one of the most distinguished generals in the Army, and one of the heads of the General Staff, and if he at first sight took them for Regulars I suspect hon. Members opposite would also have taken them for regulars.
  "I rode into the battery and again inquired, and found that, as I said, they were Grant's people. You will remember that Major Shaw, commanding one of them, showed you and me

  851
  a bank which they had just driven over, and which a Regular battery had declined to negotiate."
  This shows the difficulty and danger of criticising field artillery.
  "Before I met you on that morning, a day of mist and rain, I was with the batteries in action, and I formed a good opinion of their fire discipline. Their officers had a satisfactory knowledge of ranging and fire discipline, and the guns were well served. The fire discipline was good, and the guns were well placed considering the difficulties of the terrain. I inquired of the officers of the Regular field battery, which was in action close to them, and who were during pauses in the course of the operations moving about amongst the Volunteer guns, what opinion they formed of the quality of the training displayed. They told me they were surprised at the degree of efficiency which had been reached. The batteries certainly had adequate mobility. The harness and equipment and accoutrements were well put on; the driving was good; and the rules of our training manual as regards fire discipline were complied with. The officers showed a good knowledge of the equipment, the packing of ammunition, etc., and knew their work. I reported this both to you and Mr. Haldane, but I was careful to tell the latter that Grant's corps was an exceptionally good one, trained very ably by an enthusiast, and that he could not expect to find the same efficiency in all Volunteer batteries. I also told him the guns were not shotted, and that until you actually fire shells you cannot tell whether fire discipline is as good as it looks or not. At the same time the efficiency of these particular batteries was illustrative of what might be done by Volunteers properly instructed. I should like to add that I saw Allen's West Yorkshire Artillery Volunteers in practice camp last summer, when I accompanied Sir N. Lyttcl-ton to Fleetwood. On that occasion I saw practice carried out by three batteries. The results were distinctly good. The umpires were Regular officers from the brigade at Sheffield. I made notes and got their reports, which were very satisfactory. I had these typed, and I believe Jeffcott could find them. At any rate I showed them to you, and to Mackinnon and Sir N. Lyttelton. Of course in this case it may be objected that Allen's is a special corps. But, again, if one corps can arrive at such good results, it furnishes an example of what others may do."
  That is what I say too. If the Volunteer field artillery in the face of the greatest discouragement, without anything like the organisation and equipment which we are giving them, have been able in the case of those two corps to rise to that pitch of excellence, there are other corps throughout the country that can rise to it also.
  MR. ARTHUR LEE: Do I understand that these Scottish batteries are
  852
  on the same basis of organisation as the Lancashire Field Artillery?
  *MR. HALDANE: Oh, no; the hon. and gallant Member is, I think, under a misapprehension. The Lancashire Field Artillery refers not to Colonel Allen's Sheffield Volunteer Field Artillery corps, training in Lancashire, but to the Lancashire Field Artillery. It is a pure Volunteer corps under Colonel Allen. I have quoted the General Staff, I have quoted artillery experts, and I have quoted the Army Council and the Inspector-General of the Forces, and I do not think I am. under the reproach of having no distinguished soldiers to back my opinion. But there are one or two other distinguished persons I wish to refer to. There are the opinions of eminent statesmen who have expressed their views on the proposition to re-arm the Volunteer field artillery with modern guns. I am in this position, that not mine adversary, but my predecessor in office has written a book about the Army. I will not say: "Oh, that mine adversary had written a book!" but I will say that the book contains a reproach against me for having stopped the good policy of the late Government, which was to produce a Volunteer field artillery. I was going very cautiously at that time. I had to arrest, as it seemed to me, the too rapid progress of a number of experiments. But it is true that this is no new idea of mine. Here I come back to 1900 to the Marquess of Lansdowne, then Secretary of State for War. On 12th February, 1900, he said—
  "It is our intention to re-arm the Volunteer artillery with modern guns. To those now using guns of position we propose to give the semi-mobile 4·7-in. guns…. In the hands of the rest we shall put modern field guns. They will be armed with modern 15-pounders of the latest and most modern type."
  I fear I can claim no credit in this matter. Now I come to Lord Midleton, who, speaking on 8th March, 1901, said—
  "Lord Roberts is willing to make a great and final step in advance and to agree that with certain training "—
  much less than we propose to give—
  "he will rely, from the experience of this war on Volunteer batteries, a certain proportion in each of the last three Army corps. The admirable practice made by the C. I. V. batteries in the Transvaal satisfied Lord Roberts that

  853
  that step could be taken without danger. Therefore in the last three Army corps while there will be a certain proportion of Regular troops, and in each fourteen batteries of Regular artillery, one-third of the Army corps—seven batteries—will be found in each of the last three Army corps by the Volunteers and Militia."
  The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Croydon has committed himself also extremely deeply about this. He Said in a letter to the Standard, on 17th June last—
  "In 1905 arrangements perfectly satisfactory to the Volunteers and most advantageous to the Regular Army had been made whereby two important brigades of Volunteers were to be supplied with a quick-firing field gun and specially trained as field artillery."
  Therefore, there are good reasons for making this experiment. I think I have shown beyond all possibility of contradiction that a large body of the most modern and experienced military opinion is in favour of this proposal of including Volunteer field artillery in the second line. We have preserved the Regular artillery intact and given it an organisation such as it never possessed before, and I think we shall do well, now that we have determined, on the Second Reading of the Bill last year, to create a Volunteer field artillery to be careful to do nothing in our speeches to discourage the officers who are working upon it, and who are doing their best to raise a force in the belief that they are rendering a good service to the country. For my part, I have confidence in their power and capacity and am prepared to back them. Hitherto I have been denounced in two directions—on the one hand, that I have been too niggardly in making reductions, and, on the other, that I have done too much. I think I have shown, with regard to the expeditionary force, that there is a great deal of misconception. What we are doing is to keep 68,000 men with the colours to supply drafts, and the reason is that we have to keep a certain number of troops in India, Egypt, and South Africa. As regards India, the Secretary of State for India is responsible for the establishment, and he decides what would be proper for the coming year. It is an establishment which does not merely exist for foreign purposes. It is an establishment which arises out of this, that we are responsible for the
  854
  safety and well-being of from 250,000,000 to 300,000,000 people in that country, and we have a certain number of white troops there because we are a white Government, and the establishment is that which the experts fix as the one which is consistent with our safety. Then I come to Egypt, where Lord Cromer and Sir Eldon Gorst are supported by a certain force, and on the question of the size and compositicn of that force I am largely guided by the requirements of the Foreign Office. The requirements of the Foreign Office will not admit of a diminution of that force. I wish to emphasise the fact that you have in Egypt the possibility of racial and religious conflict, and those are the considerations which fix the force at its present level. Anybody who argues that that force should be reduced must be prepared to deal with these considerations. We may be on the best terms with France, Germany, and all the European Powers, and yet there may be religious and racial questions in Egypt which involve that force. In South Africa, I agree, there is the possibility of reduction this year. This year I am going to bring home four battalions of infantry and a regiment of cavalry. Our real reduction during the period the Government have been in office is 21,700 men. We have brought the Army down close to where it was just before the war. The Infantry is rather less. That is a very substantial reduction. I have had to build up the Artillery, I have had to give medical service, transport, Army Service Corps, and generally to do what was necessary to provide a thoroughly organised force The reduction, therefore, is much larger than appears, but the result of the organisation has been that we have got a force smaller, but more efficient in the opinion of the military advisers than before, and that has been done at a cost of £5,000,000 less than was being spent before we came into officer I say solemnly to my hon. friends that they may make the greatest possible mistake in driving the War Minister in this matter. Far better let him go slowly, to proceed with a plan in his mind, and think and work it out cautiously. I took office on the pledge not only of economy but of efficiency, and I believe

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  that to be the wish of the Liberal Party. We have tried to make the Army more efficient. We believed we could reduce the number of the men and the cost of the Army, and we have done it. But the task is one of overwhelming difficulty, and it is the more difficult when you have two horses to ride at the seme time, and which I must ride. Under these circumstances I submit to the House of Commons that the rate of progress is one which is sufficiently rapid, and that nothing but reaction—reaction which would defeat the very purpose my hon. friends have in view—would result from pressing me to conclusions which I could not justify.
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: The right hon. Gentleman ended on a somewhat pathetic note, when he said he had two horses to ride and that he found the operation difficult. Even an artillery driver more experienced than those on a Volunteer basis, might find the operation beyond his powers. I do not propose to deal with the latter part of the subject, and would only say a few words upon the first horse. Now, Sir, it is not easy always to deal with this question in a non-controversial spirit in answer to the right hon. Gentleman, because he quite unnecessarily drags in controversial insinuations and makes personal attacks. I never in my life heard a speech less party in tone than that which was delivered by my hon. friend near me. How was he rewarded for the spirit in which he approached what is admittedly a most difficult problem? The right hon. Gentleman gets up and with his own profound knowledge of gunnery matters, informs my hon. friend that he did not belong to that branch of the service which would enable him to pronounce upon a question of field artillery. My hon. friend has a perfect right to debate the subject from his own experience, which is much greater than that of either the right hon. Gentleman or myself, neither of whom is either a horse-master or a gun-layer. In fact, my hon. friend did not base his criticisms simply upon his own experience, but upon the observations of those who are still artillerists and with whom he has been in conversation. My hon. friend has behind him a vast body of military opinion. It
  856
  is not merely a question of what Lord Roberts says, or what this particular general or that particular general says—there may be differences of opinion—but if you asked the experts of the Army what they thought of the Volunteer artillery they would not give a view substantially different from that given by my hon. friend. I think the right hon. Gentleman and I are agreed that at the outbreak of war, and when the whole of the Regular Forces normally in this island are still here, probably we need not have any alarm as to the adequacy of our home defence against any probable or even possible invasion. The second point on which we are agreed, I think, is that if the Volunteers were called upon to show their military capacity against trained Continental troops in the first few weeks after the outbreak of war, they would find themselves wholly unable to rise to the height of the situation. We are agreed that so long as the Regular troops are at home those troops and the Fleet together are adequate. I will put it differently. Those troops are sufficient to require any foreign nation desirous of invading us to make the attempt with so large a force that the Fleet would be amply sufficient to prevent such a force landing. We are agreed in the second place, that if such a force did land and there were not these Regular troops within our shores, the Territorial Force of the right hon. Gentleman, with or without its own artillery, would be quite unable to deal with the situation. The difficulty arises when we consider what may happen if a war has broken out when the expeditionary force has left these shores. If the House want really to get a clear idea where the precise difficulty of the situation lies, it lies there. There are two cases. The first case is that in which the Territorial Army has had its full opportunity of six months training. It is on the hypothesis that they have had a full opportunity of six months training that all the documents which the right hon. Gentleman has just read from his military advisers are based. That is the only hypothesis they take into account. Sir John French not only assumes that the Territorial Army has had its full six months training after the outbreak of war, but he assumes that the invading

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  force is exhausted by six months war. Sir John French lays it down that the invading force will have had to take refuge in an inferior gun with officers of inferior training, and that these hypothetical invaders will be from a nation already exhausted by six months of arduous hostilities. I cannot imagine what the right hon. Gentleman can have said in the question he put to Sir John French which should make that most distinguished officer suppose that the invading force must necessarily come from that nation against whom we had sent our expeditionary force. Sir John French had not before him or did not think it necessary to reply to what are the real difficulties which this country may have to face after war has broken out. I do not think we have a right to hope that if this country is exposed to invasion, the invasion will proceed from a nation already exhausted by having to resist our expeditionary force. I take it that the danger which may assail us and against which we have to guard is the danger that after we have been engaged in hostilities with a foreign country some new and unexhausted enemy will appear in the field. That peril never seems even to have occurred to Sir John French as something which had to be considered by the General Staff. Assuming that the Territorial Army has had six months training, the first question we have to ask is, what will be its degree of efficiency. I do not desire to undervalue it. I conceive that men of the stamp of our Volunteers and Yeomanry, subjected to the severe discipline which I daresay they would be ready and anxious to undergo in some great national emergency, would be far from a negligible quantity after six months training. But I do not think it possible to hope that six months training, even under the most strenuous conditions, would enable our infantry Volunteers or Yeomanry to reach the level of a great Continental army. In what condition would the Artillery be after six months training? I listened most carefully to the expert opinions which the right hon. Gentleman read out. They seemed singularly inconsistent with the opinions given by equally expert authorities only a few years ago, when a very similar question was raised under a Government of which
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  I was a member. These variations, I suppose, must be expected, and we need not be surprised even if the same officer should sometimes in different years give rather different views on highly technical military questions. [An HON. MEMBER: Even Lord Roberts.] Let us take the opinions on which the present Government act. They come to this, that these eminent advisers think that, after six months strenuous training, you may get a certain number of batteries as good as C. I. V. or the Honourable Artillery Company, or perhaps some other of the field artillery which is being created in this country, either on a Militia or a Volunteer basis. I am the last man to say that that degree of efficiency is negligible. On the contrary, there is ample testimony that the C. I. V. and the Honourable Artillery Company did excellent service in South Africa.
  COLONEL SEELY: And the Colonial forces.
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: Does the right hon. Gentleman really think he will get a sufficient number of corps of that quality to supply the whole of his Territorial Force with the necessary artillery? That is surely a question of fundamental importance on which no light is thrown by these documents. The right hon. Gentleman is relying wholly on this Volunteer artillery to supply the artillery for his Territorial Army. He has produced no evidence that he is going to get artillery up to the highest standard of Volunteer artillery in the past, which, I agree, is not a negligible standard. I do not believe that even at the end of six months it would be safe to rely on such artillery as could be supplied by that training. I believe it would be folly to rely upon them without some addition of those highly trained Regular batteries which can only be produced by long, arduous, and strenuous practice. How do you know you are going to get your six months training for your Territorial Army? The right hon. Gentleman only considers two hypotheses—the hypothesis of the Regular troops being here or the hypothesis of the expeditionary force being away and the Territorial Army having six months training. Is it a

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  law of nature, is it an immutable arrangement of Providence, that the Territorial Army is to have six months in which to train after the expeditionary force has gone? Supposing that you have sent your expeditionary force abroad in the first few weeks of the war, and that long before the six months training is concluded fresh complications arise and a fresh foe menances your shores. That is a situation with which the Government have not dealt. This is not contemplated by Sir John French, and I fail to see how it is met by the right hon. Gentleman with his first line and second line of defence. He says, truly enough, that if you foresaw these dangers you would keep the troops at home. But how can any Government engaged in hostilities with Power A be quite sure that six months will elapse before complications arise with Power B? It is just when you are in difficulties with one enemy that somebody who was your friend may think it convenient, useful, and profitable suddenly to become your enemy. That always seemed to me the fundamental difficulty of the right hon. Gentleman with his Territorial Army, and that is why we think that he is risking a great deal by his reduction of the Regular artillery. The right hon. Gentleman is always dwelling on the fact that he has provided the necessary ammunition for training and made the Regular artillery more efficient. What he has done is this. When he came into office he found the artillery on a three-years basis and rapidly creating its own Reserve of fully-trained men. He has now put it on a six-years basis, and not merely has he diminished by half the number of men who go to the Reserve, but he has diminished it immensely. The consequence is that while under the three-years system we were gradually getting into a position in which we should have an immense body of highly-trained artillery, adequate for the Regular Army and for the Home Army, the right hon. Gentleman has defeated that; and while I do not doubt that the artillery of the expeditionary force is quite adequate for any task it may be required to undertake, it seems to me that we should be far better situated for supplying the Home Army with the requisite artillery under the condition of things which the
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  right hon. Gentleman found when he came into office than under his own scheme.
  MR. HALDANE: Your batteries abroad were depleted under the three-years system. You could not find drafts to keep them going.
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: My recollection is that all our advisers, while they thought it absolutely necessary to revert from the three-years system to the seven and five-years system in order to provide drafts for the infantry, were unanimous in the opinion that the three-years system should be retained for the artillery, as it had the incomparable advantage of supplying us with a great reserve of artillery. If I may sum up the contentions I have ventured to lay before the House I put them thus. I am not concerned to discourage Volunteer artillery. I do not wish to disparage such highly trained batteries as the Glasgow battery, the Sheffield battery, or the Honourable Artillery Company. I think they are a very useful addition to our national defence. I am, however, sceptical as to whether a large number of Volunteer batteries can ever be got up to that degree of efficiency which is required; but, even if they could, you ought to supplement them for the purpose of home defence by a highly-trained Regular artillery, and therefore, my most earnest contention—the point I put with the greatest insistence to the Government—is this. Do not let them concentrate their gaze on two passible positions only. Do not let them contemplate only the period when our Regular troops are at home or, as an alternative, the period when they are abroad and the home army has received a long period of training. Other hypotheses must be considered, other situations may arise, and I attach no value to the highest expert opinion when I see that it is based, not on the many circumstances that may arise, but on two possibilities, and on two possibilities only, without taking into account the infinite number to which our national defence may be exposed. For these reasons I do most earnestly ask the Government, not to abolish the Volunteer artillery, not to discourage those who really are competent to turn out batteries of a very high degree of efficiency; but

  861
  at all events, to remember that to rely on these, and on these alone, is to fly in the face of the experience of all nations. Therefore, I ask them to supplement the efforts of our patriotic, admirable, useful, and excellent citizen soldiers by giving them that expert assistance which is the fruit, and only the fruit, of long, laborious, and painstaking training.
  *SIR CHARLES DILKEsaid the House was running two hire? at once, and he proposed to take part in that sport. Both the matters to which he wished to refer should be dealt with by the House with its eyes open. The larger was raised by the Amendment of the hon. Member who moved the reduction of the Army. Before he came to that, however, he wished to make a remark in regard to the other matter which had interested him throughout the whole of his Parliamentary life. The arguments they had heard that night were most familiar to many hon. Members, because they had not moved one bit for the last twenty years. Apart from party feeling, it must be admitted that everybody had endeavoured to try some experiment in the direction of a cheaper artillery for the second line. The great difference was between those who thought it wise to create a purely Volunteer artillery, and those who would try a mixed force. He thought it would be found that those batteries which had been so highly spoken of that evening were mixed batteries—batteries in which they had enlisted besides Volunteers a very considerable number of Regulars of long service. That fact had not been mentioned before. It would be remembered that years ago they were told, as they were toll again on this occasion, of the success of the American Field artillery in the Civil War. There was an element of truth in that, because in that war Volunteer artillery were engaged against artillery of the same description; they were trained to the high state of efficiency to which they attained on both sides simultaneously. They became highly trained by constant practice against one another, but neither side was good at first. The right hon. Gentleman had destroyed the Volunteer Force which had existed up to the present time.
  862
  They had pointed out that the right hon. Gentleman's scheme would draw the men in the towns, but that it would kill Volunteering in the rural districts. That is what had happened. In his own division, in his own county, the whole of the Volunteer infantry and Volunteer artillery had been disbanded, and not one man would be found in the Territorial Army. In fact, to use the words which he had just applied to his critics, the right hon. Gentleman was tearing up the Volunteer Force by the roots and killing it. The six months training had been thoroughly discussed; but when his right hon. friend first proposed his scheme, he stated in all his speeches what had not been heard that night, that there was to be an organisation of certain portions of the Territorial Force for the purpose of coast defence, and the repelling of raids, and field artillery was mentioned. His right hon. friend said that for the defence of river mouths and similar landing places, it was important now-a-days to have in addition to batteries of fixed guns field artillery. He confessed that he doubted the readiness, under the circumstances described that night, of a purely Territorial artillery for field work. He did not think it would be fitted even for the extraordinarily trying work of manning quick-firing guns for the defence of such positions as the Forth Bridge and Rosyth, or Newcastle-on-Tyne. In an attack on such repairing yards as these, it was a matter of seconds before the fast destroyer run ling in at night would be out of the zone of fire at short range. The artillerymen must, therefore, not only sleep at the guns in the event of a declaration of war, but in anticipation of war. His own belief was that the very high efficiency of Regular artillery was required in cases of that sort, and that we should not be able to deal with them on the Territorial plan. The next question was of much moment and had been often discussed before. Year after year his hon. friend the Member for Cardiff, when he was sitting on the Conservative side of the House, his hon. and gallant friend the Member for Abercromby, and Mr. Claud Lowther and others divided the House for a reduction in the Regular Army on the ground

  863
  taken that day by the mover and seconder of the Resolution, viz., that if the country could not otherwise bear the rapidly increasing scale of expenditure in the case of the Fleet a means of reduction might be afforded by a change of the system of the Regular Army. His right hon. friend had sustained his position with admirable words. As soon as he took office he told them that our coasts were completely defended by the Fleet. That was the Government theory, but they could not discuss the adequacy of the Fleet or the future scale of it upon that question. They all knew that it was a very costly defence to which the Government were committed deeply, the War Office as well as everyone else. It was said that our coasts were completely defended by the Fleet, and that the Army was wanted abroad oversea and must be of very high quality to strike at a distance, of limited dimensions, and capable of rapid transport. That was the theory, and in a few days his right hon. friend declared that for the first time he had created a really mobile and immediately transportable Army of this description. He had heard that statement too often, not only from his right hon. friend, but from Lord Midleton, and his predecessors, and he could not believe it to be new each time. The 167,000 men of his right hon. friend were very nearly the same as the 100,000 men of the noble Lord who, when Mr. Brodrick, said in this House that he was able to mobilise immediately and transport across the sea a striking and expeditionary force of 160,000. He admitted, however, that the artillery for that force was not complete. The artillery for two Army Corps was he said complete, and he was then completing the artillery for the third Army Corps. They gave him the money to do this, but then they were told that the force he had stated was on paper and did not exist, and that what they paid for did not exist. Was it any more than on paper now? It was no use to say that it ought not to be on paper and that we ought to get it, but under the system of linked-battalions the Home battalions were ridiculously beneath their strength. They all knew the difficulties which successive Governments had had in this
  864
  matter the fact being that they could not get the recruits.
  MR. HALDANE: Oh, yes; the recruiting was never better, and will improve as soon as I get rid of the disease of the three years system which at present it is suffering from.
  *SIR CHARLES DILKEreplied that Lord Portsmouth in the House of Lords a few days ago virtually pledged the War Office to re-introduce that system. He bed read the noble Lord's words with the greatest care and he had admitted that it would not be possible to keep up the Reserve without re - introducing some proportion of men on the system of short enlistment. [Mr. HALDANE dissented.] Well, if they did not do so the system would only break down all the sooner. He never professed to be an economist and he would desire a large expenditure on the most highly-trained branches of the Army, especially upon the cavalry and the artillery. But the Government were not doing this and were diminishing the number of horses for these services, even if they counted the ponies which had been taken back from the mounted infantry. He did not think the Secretary for War had shown them that he had created this expeditionary force which all his predecessors claimed to have created on the same scale and in the same fashion. He thought that the present system was extravagant and that they needed economies. It was too much to bear along with the increasing Fleet, and he, therefore, supported the Motion of his hon. and gallant friend.
  MR. WEDGWOODthought the unfortunate Volunteers had had a very bad time from the right hon. Gentleman on the benches opposite. The old Volunteers and the new Territorial Force had been treated in a somewhat cavalier fashion, and more particularly was that the case with the artillery branch. The whole of the argument on the other side was based on the expert opinion of officers of the Regular service. The Leader of the Opposition had said if they took a poll of all the officers of the Regular service he was quite confident that the majority

  865
  would say that no artillery trained on a Volunteer basis could be an efficient weapon. What would happen if they suggested that solicitors should do the work of barristers? Did anyone think that if one polled the barristers they would come to any other conclusion by an overwhelming majority than that the solicitors were not competent to do their work? Or if it was suggested that county councils should look after matters of Imperial importance, and one polled the members of the House of Commons as to whether the councils were capable of doing it, that House would be almost unanimous in reserving to themselves all matters of Imperial moment. Supposing the Colonial officers who were engaged in the late South African War were polled as to the relative values of the Colonial and Imperial troops engaged in the war; they would come to an almost unanimous opinion that the Colonial troops, although raised on a voluntary basis, were infinitely superior to the Regular troops engaged. Wherever one appealed to parties who were interested, who had a bias unconscious to themselves, for expert opinions, they would get opinions in favour of their own particular branch of the service and hostile to any possibility of anyone else doing the work which they had been specially trained to do. He did not attach any importance whatever to the judgment of Regular officers as to the possibility of Volunteers performing under exceptionally favourable circumstances the work that the Regulars had been accustomed to do. He supposed that he also was liable to bias in this matter, because he happened to have been a Volunteer officer of artillery who went out to the late war, who commanded Volunteer artillery in action, who marched 2,700 miles and was twenty-six times in action He did not claim to be an expert, but he claimed to know something about the services that Volunteer artillery could render, and about the difficulty of training Volunteer artillery. They were not mere position batteries, but were genuine field artillery, having ten horses to each gun with gunners mounted on unbroken ponies collected on the veldt. The opinion of the Regulars on the Elswick battery to which he belonged could be judged from the fact
  866
  that their guns were in such demand that they were split up and single guns were sent out with each column, because the commanders wanted so have an Elswick gun with their columns. That battery was raised very largely at the Elswick works. It was impossible, however, for any workman, even if he made a Impounder gun, to be intimately acquainted with its complicated mechanism, and these men, although they came from Elswick, were not skilled gunners. They certainly had a certan number of Regulars in the battery, but there were not more than one in six at the outside. He quite admitted that Volunteer artillery did require slightly more training than any other form of the Volunteer service, but what experience did he have? After they were embodied they had three weeks training at Newcastle, and all that time they were excessively busy getting harness, uniforms, etc., and did not have much time for drilling. Then they had three weeks at Aldershot, also a somewhat curious experience because the horses were unbroken, and it was a surprise to him that the casualties did not commence at Aldershot. They had no other training until they got to South Africa, where they had a fortnight in camp, and altogether they had two months training, then went straight to the front. The general impression was that their shooting was a good deal better, largely owing to their having a better gun. He maintained that the experience of the Elswick battery in South Africa showed that it was perfectly possible to train Volunteer artillery in a short time, in six months certainly to fully the equal of the average Regular. He thought hon. Members opposite made a great mistake in always comparing the Volunteer with the ideal soldier. The ideal Regular soldier did not exist except in the imagination. Perfection was not obtained in any regiment of the service, and yet it was the perfect soldier who was always compared with the Volunteer service. It was not a fair comparison, because many of the Regular soldiers in South Africa did worse than the Volunteers. He did not think it fair to compare the Volunteers with the ideal Regular soldier either under the old or under the new conditions, but the training would be superior to what it was in the old times.

  867
  The training of the Territorial Force was to be far more than that given to the old Artillery Volunteers. There used to be four or five mounted drills a year, and the men used to march up and down the Moor at Newcastle, go through a few evolutions, not of very great necessity from the point of view of real field practice, and return equally steadily and very carefully. That was all the training they had in field artillery work. Under the new conditions they would have mounted drills all the time they were in annual camp, and six months mounted drill before the Volunteer Artillery went into action in time of war. In the old times they never fired a single shell over a land range. Everyone knew it was impossible to judge of the effect of shrapnel except over a land range, and that the result of firing over a sea range was practically nil. So that with the new conditions of artillery firing over land ranges their artillery ought to be infinitely superior to the old and they had the prospect of having a thoroughly successful second line of defence. He hoped his friends in the country who were officers of the Field Artillery Volunteers, and who hoped to become officers of the new Territorial Field Artillery, would understand that all those who had seen artillery in the field, and those who could judge of it from intimate knowledge, were persuaded that the Volunteers with their energy, patriotism, and individuality had in them the making of a thoroughly sound force to defend the country.
  *MR. ASHLEYsaid that after the extremely illuminating and interesting speech of the right hon. Gentleman the senior Member for the City of London, he would not go into the question of field artillery. He would point out, however, to the Secretary of State for War that in quoting the American Civil War in support of his case for the Volunteer Artillery he did not quoted an instance of great value. In the first place, the artillery forces on both sides, the Volunteer artillery, were absolutely untrained, and, therefore, the experience gained from that war was of very little value. But if ton. Members read the life of Stonewall
  868
  Jackson, they would find that the South suffered very much in the beginning of the war owing to the Regular Artillery of the North being so superior to the Volunteer Artillery of the South. He was entirely with the right hon. Gentleman in his efforts to create some artillery for the new Territorial Force, which at the present moment had no artillery at all. It was surely better to have some than none, and though artillery on a Volunteer basis might not be so good as Regular Artillery they could confidently hope that within a given time—six months after the outbreak of war—it would make great strides towards efficiency. He therefore congratulated the right hon. Gentleman on having made some effort to give this force some artillery. Passing to the more general aspects of the case, the House was now discussing the number of men to be voted as the necessary number to defend the Empire. A reduction of 10,000 men had been moved by an hon. Member, one of whose statements was most surprising. The hon. Member had said that the Army could be reduced by 10,000 because the policy of the Government was a policy of peace. That was not only the policy of the Government, but of the Opposition and the country as well. But could the hon. Gentleman guarantee that that was also the policy of foreign nations? If he could, then we could reduce the Army by ten times 10,000 men. But to long as the hon. Member could not guarantee that the policy of foreign nations was a policy of peace we must have sufficient men to guarantee our Empire against invasion. The hon. Gentleman who seconded the reduction had suggested that we should go back to the old system of the long service Army—a system tried before the time of the Indian Mutiny and a dismal failure when the Mutiny broke out. At the present time men did not want to spend all their lives in the Army; and apart from the difficulty of obtaining men under the old long service system, was it likely that men who had spent twenty or twenty-five years in a tropical climate would be as physically fit as men of twenty-six or twenty-seven years of age, who had not

  869
  been for many years in an enervating climate and were in the prime of life? The Secretary of State for War in a very interesting Memorandum some time ago, had compared very accurately the state of the establishment of the Regular Forces in 1898, the year of the outbreak of the South African War, with the establishment at the present time, and had said we had now 4,000 less troops than then. We had in 1898, 166,000, and now we had 162,000 cavalry and infantry of the line. He did not agree with this reduction of 4,000 men, and he certainly disagreed with the reductions the right hon. Gentleman had made since he Came into office. On what ground could the right hon. Gentleman justify our having a smaller establishment than we possessed at the time of the outbreak of the South African War? Would he say we had too many troops then? We could not find many Regular troops in Great Britain to send out and had to raise troops hurriedly for that purpose, and if it had not been for the assistance rendered by our self-governing Colonies, we should have been in a worse fix than we were. Since then we had become responsible for the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal, which necessitated a garrison of 25,000 men, and we had become responsible for Egypt; we had put ourselves in the position of being the perpetual protectors of the Egyptian people and had had to increase our garrison there. Were these things a justification for reducing our establishment? Or could the right hon. Gentleman say that in exchange for that reduction he had a much larger second line to supplement the Regular Force? He did not think the right hon. Gentleman could, because, after all, these Special Reserves were only their old friends the Militia, under a new name. He did not think the right hon. Gentleman could say that he had a larger number of men to take the place of the Regular soldiers, whose number he had reduced compared with what it was before the oubreak of the war. Even the liability which the Special Reserve had taken upon itself to serve abroad did not help them in any way, because, as the House knew, whenever war broke out, the Militia, who were not liable to do so, always did go
  870
  abroad. It was very unfair, he often thought, that a man should be called upon to go abroad when he had not enlisted except for service in the United Kingdom, and so far as the country was concerned he did not see that they would be in any better position with the Special Reserve than they were with the Militia. If that were so, he could not admit that even a greater number of men, trained on the Militia basis, could compensate for the loss of a number of men trained in the regular orthodox way. A matt who had served a number of years in a battalion, who had been accustomed to discipline, who had got to know the work of his regiment and had the regimental feeling, was bound to be fat more efficient than any man who had trained either as a Special Reservist or Militiaman, or in any other way, only for a certain time during the year. Could the right hon. Gentleman justify the reduction of the Army which he had made because of the increase in the Army Reserve since the outbreak of the war? It was quite true that the present Army Reserve was very much greater than it was at the outbreak of the South African War, but. then they must remember that after all, this Reserve would very soon dwindle away again—it was purely temporary—and the men they were voting now were the men who would produce the Reserve eight or nine years hence, and not the Reserve at the present moment. It was impossible, therefore" when they were voting the men, to rely on the Reserve which was created under a former state of things; they must look to the Reserve which would be created in the future state of things. Looking at the number of men they were voting, one could not fail to look abroad through the Empire to see whether they had got enough to defend our great Dependencies and our coaling stations. Had they enough troops in India? It had been said that the regular number of battalions, some fifty-eight, had not varied very greatly in the last twenty or thirty years, but he thought all sides agreed that' that number was sufficient. But there was one branch of the service in India which he thought was dangerously inadequate, and that was the Artillery. There were in India at the present moment eleven

  871
  horse artillery batteries and forty-five batteries of field artillery. They were only enough to take the field with the English troops, but there was no artillery to take the field with the Indian native troops. Surely that was not a proper or satisfactory state of things. How could they expect the Indian native troops to take the field if they did not provide artillery to take with them? In that respect it was impossible to deny that the artillery force in India was dangerously inadequate. Hon. Members had complained as to the garrison kept in Egypt at the present moment. He could assure them that their view as to the size of the garrison was not held by any European in Egypt; in fact, it was rather thought, even since the increase of the garrison two years ago, it was still not sufficiently strong. He did not think the House quite realised that when two years ago there was a difficulty with Turkey, Egypt was on the eve of a serious rising, which if it had taken place might have made it impossible for Europeans in Upper Egypt to escape with their lives. Hon. Members might not remember that, but if they took the line, rightly or wrongly—rightly according to their ideas—that we must directly interfere with the Sultan in the government of his Macedonian dominion—he sympathised very much with that line—they could not expect that the Sultan of Turkey would help in keeping the Mahomedan inhabitants of countries under our sway in that obedience to our rule which he might otherwise do. Therefore, if our foreign policy was carried out in certain directions, they must be prepared to have sufficient troops in other parts of His Majesty's Dominions in order to counteract the effects of that policy which they themselves advocated. He left Egypt to take the case of Malta, whose garrison had been very greatly reduced since the present Government had come into office. When questioned as to this last year, the right hon. Gentleman sheltered himself behind the Commission which had made a Report as to the desirability and possibility of diminishing the garrison. Of course he had no means of knowing what evidence the Commission took, but he did know that when the proposition
  872
  was made that the infantry garrison should be reduced by one-half, certain night manœuvres were carried out to ascertain whether, in the opinion of the military authorities, a landing could be-effected at the back of the island, and whether the town could be taken if only defended by the present garrison, considered by the Government to be sufficient. That operation took place, and though the night was very rough, and there was great difficulty in landing, the umpires were unanimously of opinion that the-force supposed to represent the enemy, not only landed successfully, but succeeded in taking the town of Valetta and of course the dockyard there. It seemed to him that, in the face of this-very important operation, it was a most dangerous policy for His Majesty's Government to have reduced the infantry garrison and continued to keep it at a. low level. They had heard only that afternoon that large naval works had just been completed at Malta, where a new dock had been constructed. Surely, if it-was worth while to spend millions of money in building a dock, it seemed a penny wise a pound foolish, for the sake of a couple of regiments, to jeopardise our position at Malta, because if war broke out and the enemy landed at the back of the island, the present garrison would not be able to protect it. In the case-of Gibraltar, it was a matter of common knowledge that there was grave dissatisfaction at the absurd reductions of the garrison there. It was extremely hard that men should not get any time off at all, and the only result of these reductions was discontent in the service. It was a question where the men were going, to be found to work the big guns at Singapore, Aden, and other coaling stations. If it was worth while having these fortified places, surely it was not worth while, for the sake of 1,600 garrison, gunners, to seek to make a small saving by running the risk, when war broke out, of finding these important coaling stations in a position in which they could not offer an effective defence against the enemy. There was one other reason why he thought it very ill-advised to reduce the Regular Army, and that was the state of unemployment in the country. He saw, according to the trade unions report in the Labour Gazette that morning, that

  873
  last February 6·4 per cent. of the people were out of work as compared with 3·9 per cent. in February of last year. That was to say that in February of this year there were more people out of work than at any time in the corresponding month for the last ten years. He was the last person to say that they should make men soldiers simply to give them employment, but surely it was better to teach unemployed men to defend their country than to pay them full wages for doing nothing, as some hon. Members desired. In the present state of unemployment the Government ought to be very chary about reducing the Army and thus sending men into the Reserve, with the result that they would increase the number of those who were suffering from lack of employment. He had quoted the trade union figures, but members of trade unions were after all those who felt the pinch least. It was among the floating population, to which those figures did not apply, that unemployment existed most. He strongly objected to this reduction of 4,000 men, and he went further and said that he strongly objected to the reduction of 25,000 or 30,000 men made by the Government since they came into office. The only result of the reduction would be that in the not distant future a very large expenditure would have to be undertaken by the successors of the present Government to repair the damage they had done to His Majesty's Forces.
  *SIR H. COTTONsaid he proposed to confine himself strictly to the subject of the Motion. For that purpose he took as his text a sentence from the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War which accompanied the Army Estimates. When dealing with the question of effecting reductions in the Army, the right hon. Gentleman said—
  "Looking to the future, it is, I am convinced, impossible to make further reductions in Army Expenditure on a considerable scale unless we first of all reduce the number of troops serving abroad."
  He would have preferred the right hon. Gentleman to speak at the close of the debate when he would have been in a position to reply to the considerations which had been, and would be adduced
  874
  on this point. And he regretted that when he did speak he did not refer at all to a matter which he himself was convinced was the only way of effecting a reduction in the Army of this country. There was a very small reduction effected in South Africa, but he observed that practically it did not take financial effect during the current year. For some reason or other there was delay in communications with the Colonial Office, and no financial advantage would be gained from this reduction until next year. But at all events it was satisfactory to find that the War Office had been in communication with the Colonial Office in respect of the reduction of the Army abroad. He could find nothing in the Memorandum which showed that the Secretary for War had been in communication with the Secretary for India with the same object. He had addressed the House on more than one occasion on this question of the reduction of the Army in India as affecting the reduction of the Army in this country. This consequential reduction was due to the existence of the linked-battalion system, the Cardwell system as it was called. In this matter he entirely dissociated himself from the observations made by the hon. Gentleman who seconded the Resolution. He favoured the linked-battalion system because it enabled this country and the House to exercise some control over Army expenditure in India. If they abandoned that system and went in for an Indian Army such as existed in old times there would be simply no control which that House could exercise over unlimited expenditure in India. The Secretary for War knew that very well, and had pointed out in his Memorandum that if they did abandon the linked-battalion system the result would be a very heavy and undue burden on the Indian people. With that conclusion he entirely agreed. The Secretary for War had told them, and he had listened to his remarks with amazement—it was not the first time he had made them in that House—that there had been no change in the strength of the Indian Army, certainly for many years, and indeed he had gone so far as to say that that strength had been settled after the Mutiny, and

  875
  that we still retained the same Army in India as was sanctioned after the Mutiny. That was a complete misconception of the facts. After the Mutiny the strength of the British Army in India was not settled at all. All that was settled was the proportion which the British troops should bear to the natives. It was settled that the proportion should be one-third, or one-half, varying in the different Presidencies, and that there were to be no artillery among the native troops. He went to India forty-one years ago, not very long after the Mutiny. There were then 55,000 British troops in the Army. Lord Lawrence was then Viceroy, and he exerted himself to reduce the strength of the Indian Army. He reduced it by 7,000 men, and at an examination before a Committee of that House he gloried that he had done so. Subsequent Governor-Generals had done the same thing. In Lord Ripon's time the Army was about 50,000 men. At that time there was a Commission in India considering the strength of the Army, consisting of all the most distinguished officers in India, and after discussion with the War Office in this country it was decided that a maximum of 60,000 troops was ample. After some further discussion extending over a year or two more the number was increased to 61,000. And then what happened? There was a sudden panic in this country due to the Penjdeh incident. It was feared that war with Russia was imminent, and that India would be invaded. Lord Randolph Churchill was then Secretary of State for India, and the British Army in India was suddenly increased by 11,000 British, and about 20,000 native troops. This increase remained till the Boer War when the number of British troops was reduced to 63,000 in consequence of the drafts made upon India to supply men for South Africa. At no time during his life was England in a more anxious position than during that time. We were not friendly with some great Powers, and were waging a very costly war. At that time we were able to reduce our British Army in India to 63,000 men. It stood at 79,000 at this moment. These were the facts illustrating the oscillations and the changes which had taken place in the strength
  876
  of the British Army in India during the past fifty years, and they were completely different from the complacent statement made by the Secretary of State that practically there had been no change made in the strength of the Army since the Mutiny. The British Army in India had fluctuated according to the fluctuating policies which prevailed, and it stood this moment at a higher figure than ever before. What was our position now? We had just triumphantly concluded an Agreement with Russia. What was the importance of that Agreement—did it possess any importance at all, if it did not enable us to reduce a single soldier in that country? They were told it was of enormous strategic importance. He thought it was, and he also thought it was extremely desirable that we should have a treaty with Russia. We stood at peace with her and with the whole world. We had an alliance with Japan, there was the entente cordiale with France, and our position with the whole world was now more satisfactory, as during the Boer War it was more unsatisfactory, than in the course of his lifetime he could recollect. And so it was that they appealed to the Government to take advantage of this Agreement. Let the Secretary of State for War confer with the Secretary for India as he had done with the Colonial Secretary, and consider very seriously whether some reduction might not be made in the strength of the Indian Army in the face of the facts which he had brought to the notice of the House. The Government of the day under the influence of panic had lost no time in increasing the strength of the Indian Army and kept it permanently on the books. Now when we had concluded what was described as one of the most important Agreements in history we were not able to follow it up by the reduction of a single man in the Indian Army. What a satire all this was on our boasted diplomacy. These were the observations he desired to bring to the notice of the House in support of the Motion. It was the third time he had addressed the House on this subject, and he regretted that he had never had the good fortune of speaking in the presence of the Secretary of State for War. He trusted his hon.

  877
  friend the Financial Se rotary would represent to the Secretary for War the views he had put before the House and urge upon him the advisability of consulting the Secretary for India with a view to reducing the Indian Army.
  *MR. REESsaid the Secretary of State for War concluded his speech by appealing to hon. Members below the Gangway not to push him too far. That appeal was wholly unnecessary in his case, and personally he regarded with great apprehension the continual efforts made by some of his hon. friends upon the extreme Left to dig holes for the right hon. Gentleman to fall into. The hon. Member for East Nottingham's figures, like his facts, were somewhat erroneous. The hon. Member who moved the reduction had urged that this country could not go beyond a certain expenditure in maintaining the Army and Navy. That argument should not be pushed too far, and hon. Members should bear in mind that they could not leave out of account anythnig that might affect our sea power. Because they had a great Navy—and they were sure to have very heavy building programmes for the Navy for the next few years—it was no use arguing on that account that, they could let the Army down. Hon. Members spoke as if this country had no land frontier to protect, whereas, as a matter of fact they had a greater land frontier in various parts of the world than any other existing Power. He did not wish to enter into these general questions except to refute the doctrine of the hon. Member for New-eastle-under-Lyme that an untrained soldier was as good as a trained one. He had never met any persons taking part in military operations who agreed with that contention in any sense. The figures quoted with regard to the Indian Army had put an entirely false complexion upon this important question. It had not been mentioned to the House that whereas, before the Mutiny the Army in India consisted of upwards of 700,000 men, to-day it was only 228,000. It was quite true that the proportion of European troops was far greater now than it was before the Mutiny and he thanked
  878
  God for it, because as a matter of prudence, after that great disaster in India it was arranged that instead of the native troops remaining in the proportion of five to one as they were before the Mutiny they should never fall below three to one. The British soldier in India now was in the proportion of ·023 per cent. of the population whilst soldiers both British and native were in the proportion of ·07 per cent. of the population. Those pitifully small numbers were responsible for maintaining the peace and prosperity and welfare of 300,000,000 of inhabitants of India, as well as for the safety of the lives of our fellow-countrymen, and for the security of the hundreds of millions we had invested in India. He happened to be on the Indian frontier when the scare took place which brought them within an ace of war with Russia and the tune was different then. We had only 74,000 British troops in India now, but that was 6,000 short of what was considered necessary after the Mutiny. The hon. Member for Nottingham said that he did not object to the Cardwell system, although he had argued that they should go back to a long-service Army in India. After consultation with a great many authorities he maintained that a long-service Army in India would be far more expensive to the Indian Exchequer than the present system. Their experience in India showed that they could not raise a long-service Army there conveniently, if at all, at the present day. Under the linked-battalion system no doubt India had to pay a high price for her Army, but for every penny spent she got the flower of the British Army. If any one of those men fell sick he was sent home and another man was sent to take his place, and it was not bad finance if for paying a good price they got a good article. The burden of his hon. friend's speech was that now the Anglo-Russian Convention had been concluded that menace had gone, and therefore they ought to reduce the Army. He was surprised that an hon. Member, who had been in the East, should use such an argument as that. So far from Russia being weaker now through having been relieved of her responsibilities in the Far East, she was all the stronger especially in the Middle East, and therefore they

  879
  would he madmen in this country if they accepted such an argument. Had hon. Members read the latest evidence contained in Mr. Fraser's hook, which showed that new Russian railways were converging upon the Afghan frontier, by means of which enormous armies could be rapidly placed upon what was practically our Indian frontier? Nobody who knew the actual facts were even likely to come here and say that, because of the Anglo-Russian Convention, they were in a position to reduce the troops in India. He knew that in a book written by the hon. Member for East Nottingham, it was stated that they might remove the whole British Army from India and govern it safely under treaties made with foreign nations. The hon. Member actually thought they could abolish the Army, but he did not think there was a single person in the House who would agree with him, or that his fantastic notions of the sufficiency of treaties was likely to find support in any serious quarter. He had also said that at the present moment England was at peace with the world, but that was an ominous statement, and history proved that the world was often on the eve of an outbreak when such complacent reflections were made. He could not admit the argument that all the great Indian soldiers were opposed to the Cardwell system. Reference bad beer made to the ease with which the garrison could be reduced in Egypt. He was amazed that the same school of thought which would reduce our garrison in Egypt and in India was that very school which encouraged the Egyptians and the Indians to stand up against our rule, and was prepared to treat Macedonia as if it were an English county. The bon. Members who urged those views were the same men who so far from appreciating the peace and prosperity brought upon Egypt by Lord Cromer actually in this House refused to support the small pittance voted to his Lordship. the merest fraction of the money he had saved this country. With regard to South Africa, it could not be an easy thing to reduce the garrisons there, when they heard every day in the House their white brethren treated as if
  880
  they were unjust judges and oppressors of the native races. Only the year before last there was a serious rising which required the interference of troops. Hardly a day passed when the assumption was not made that humanity was peculiar to ourselves and that man who left this country to administer, or to assist in administering, a foreign country on behalf of Great Britain fell into the depths of inhumanity.
  SIR H. COTTON: All mankind are potential burglars.
  *MR. REESsaid he failed to see the point of the interruption. It did not appear to him to be pertinent. The hon. Member for Tyneside asked what crimes had we committed that anyone should attack us? Well, what crimes had a Bond Street jeweller committed, but he had to lock up his diamonds? The hon. Member for Tyneside asked who were our potential burglars? He replied, all other nations, so long as we had anything worth taking away from us, and we had all the best of the earth, or a good deal of it. The hon. Member for Blackpool had referred to the question of reduction from the labour point of view, and he was not going to argue the point which he raised, but he was bound to point out that during the debate the addition to the ranks of the unemployed of 10,000 soldiers was treated as a trifling matter. It did not appear to him that the representatives of the dockyard constituencies or the Labour Members really regarded the money spent by the State upon military establishments as unproductive expenditure or wasted money, for loud objections were raised when arsenals and salaries were reduced. Expenditure which produced the wherewithal to support industries and families was, in fact, productive expenditure. He hoped that for the benefit of those who were far away from this country serving us abroad it would not go forth to those who read these debates that the position taken up by his hon. friend the Member for East Nottingham was allowed to pass without being immediately challenged and refuted, both in regard to the facts and to the figures of which he made use. The army in India was far smaller than before the Mutiny, and above all, the European

  881
  troops were below the figure considered necessary after the Mutiny, not to resist Russian aggression, but to render India safe. Of course any hon. Member could take any view he liked as to the attitude of foreign Powers, and he might believe that they all desired the British nation to retain all the best things in the world simply for the love of the British and their ways, but he did not think that the attitude of hon. Members who were continually assuming that foreign nations were less humane than we were was likely to bring about that position in which we should be able to keep the best of everything without keeping our powder dry. He sincerely hoped in regard to the Indian Army that it would be distinctly understood that the greatest danger would attach to the reduction of the European troops below the present figure. He could not understand why they should be reduced when India paid for all she got, and was a great assistance to Britain in maintaining the Army in its all British aspect. The population and area of India had largely increased, the difficulty of governing it had certainly not decreased, and there was no case for reducing our insurance. He felt very strongly on this subject, and he was most anxious to say that the view placed before the House to-night that because a strategic convention had been established with Russia, important and valuable as he thought it, we could immediately reduce our troops and trust to the good feeling of that or any other nation, seemed to him to be a piece of positive—well, he did not know by what word to describe it consistently with the rules of Parliamentary order so he would resume his seat.
  *MR. J. M. ROBERTSONsaid the hon. Member for the Montgomery Boroughs had given the House an instructive illustration of the psychology of the militarist mind. He had urged the necessity of continuously increasing the armaments of the Empire.
  *MR. REES: Not at all, Sir.
  *MR. J. M. ROBERTSON: Well, he said he would be glad to increase them if he could.
  *MR. REES: Not at all, Sir.
  *MR. J. M. ROBERTSONsaid the hon. Member, while undertaking to correct the hon. Member for Nottingham, had not been at pains to get the latest figures on the subject; he had brought into the House figures two years old. They were the figures published in January, 1906. That was hardly the way to put correct statistics before the House. But he was not concerned so much with the figures, for that was a, matter of no great importance. He was concerned with what he might term the mental attitude of his hon. friend on this subject. The hon. Member's contention was that they were to maintain the strength of the Army in India at the present enormous figure after having made an agreement with Russia which had been acclaimed as the most advantageous diplomatic arrangement ever made in their time. The hon. Member assured them that this did not make the slightest difference. We might improve our position as much as we pleased, but we could not reduce the Army. If that was so, what was the use of the triumphs of diplomacy? Why should hon. Members be asked to spend their time considering diplomatic arrangements and to speak of them in terms of the highest eulogium when not a farthing of value came from them in the long run? From the point of view of the hon. Member for Montgomery Burghs, diplomatic treaties were futile indeed, because all the nations of the earth were in his view potential burglars.
  *MR. REESsaid the word was his hon. friend's, and he merely adopted it in debate.
  *MR. J. M. ROBERTSONsaid his hon. friend adopted the words and he could not run away from them now. He declared that all the Powers with which we had to deal to-day were potential burglars.
  *MR. REESagain dissented.
  *MR. J. M. ROBERTSONsaid "burglars" was the word used and he proposed to stick to it. His hon. friend did not seem to realise that the principle

  883
  which he had set forth made out that the British colonists, nay, that the members of the Indian Civil Service, were potential burglars, and that these potential burglars were members of the service to which he formerly belonged, although when such men belonged to another nation he would not accord to them a single good quality.
  *MR. REESsaid that the, on the contrary, credited foreign nations with as much humanity as ourselves, differing in that respect from the hon. Member.
  *MR. J. M. ROBERTSONsaid he had teen at a loss to know what good quality the hon. Member accorded to the people of any other State. His hon. friend was still exceedingly anxious to destroy as many of them at a moment's notice as he possibly could. What he wished to point out was the kind of temper, the state of mind, the political philosophy, that stood behind this demand to which they were always listening for the perpetual expansion, or at least the fullest possible maintenance, of the armed forces of the Empire. They were asked to take the authority of men whose conceptions of the relations of the States and peoples of the world were worthy of the ages of barbarism, and for whom a great deal less could be said than for those who held such views in the ages of barbarism. A number of hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition Benches shared those views. The hon. Member for Blackpool had referred to the position at Malta and Gibraltar, and he seemed to suggest that, notwithstanding the entente cordiale, and the improvement in foreign relations due to diplomatic arrangements, the Empire was more vulnerable and in greater danger than ever. The question was: Were they, or were those gentlemen, morally perverted in the conceptions they held as to the relations between us and foreign nations? An hon. Member had said that we had assumed new financial burdens and new military responsibility in respect of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. That was one of the arguments which came from the other side of the House. He ventured to say that the Transvaal and the Orange Free State would undertake to defend themselves with ease against any enemy that might come against them. As to
  884
  India, what rational word had the House heard to make them feel that the present figure, enormous relatively to the position of affairs, should be maintained there? He listened with interest to the speech of the Secretary of State for War on this subject, and he failed to discover any hint of a reason, save in one phrase in which he spoke of the experts. Their old friends the experts had declared that the number of the present force in India could not be reduced. The experts had said it, the fiat had gone forth, and that settled the question. He could assure the Government that if they failed to give any more intelligible reason than that for maintaining a force of 76,000 men in India, with Russia prostrate, and with Russia on terms of friendly arrangement with this country in regard to Persia, men of commonsense were forced to put the question: Were we bound to maintain that figure in terms of a secret agreement with Japan? He wished the Government to give an answer on that point. It might be a mistake to make that assumption, but if the Government did not give an explanation, he was bound to come to the conclusion which seemed to afford the only rational explanation for the maintenance of the present force in India. The Army in India was a monstrous burden on the very poorest of the population in that country. There was perpetual famine, the livestock was going down year by year, and there was growing discontent.
  MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: That question does not arise now. The question of the condition of India is only relative so far as the Army is concerned.
  *MR. J. M. ROBERTSONsaid he was only dealing with arguments used by his hon. friend the Member for the Montgomery Boroughs, who took up that very question. The present military burdens on India which he and his friends were seeking to reduce were part of the causation of the growing discontent in India. His hon. friend, who professed to speak with a knowledge of India, had never glanced at that aspect of the matter. The growing military burden of the Indian Army was apparently going to expand every

  885
  decade, and the experts would give the same answer. He and his friends on that side of the House regarded that as a truly dangerous state of things. They were referred to the lessons of history by gentlemen who seemed to feel about history like the undergraduate who said: "It's such a splendid subject, because it does not require any thinking." If there was any lesson to be learned from the history of the great Empires of the past it was that they died of the disease of militarism. Under the Roman Empire almost the whole resources of the State were spent in military enterprises; and the diseases under which that Empire broke down were generated by the military system. That was the very case in India. He was bound to repeat that mere deliverances on the part of experts should not be listened to in the House. Let the experts say when a war broke out how that war was to be conducted, but it did not lie in their knowledge or capacity to tell the House what amount of military expenditure this country was capable of bearing. That was for the House to determine, and they said that the burden militarism pressed upon the nation unduly.
  *MR. REESasked if the hon. Gentleman was under the impression that the Congress Party proposed to govern India without the British Army?
  *MR. J. M. ROBERTSONsaid that that was a most unnecessary interruption. The question before the House was whether the Army could not be reduced by 10,000 men. Surely they could debate such a plain issue. The proposition of his hon. friends was that no reason had been shown why the country should not reduce the Army by 10,000 men. The right hon. Baronet the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in a speech made by him in 1903 used the expression that a striking force of 80,000 men was all that was necessary.
  MR. LUTTRELL: Or even 40,000 men.
  *MR. J. M. ROBERTSON: Well, or even 40,000 men. That declaration was put forward by an eminent member of
  886
  the Government, who surely spoke with same sense of responsibility, and this was only three or four years ago. Could it be seriously stated that anything had happened since that time to necessitate a striking force of 160,000 men, especially when we were now on good terms with Russia? Would the right hon. Gentleman tell the House whether this figure of 160,000 men had been imposed upon us by some secret kind of understanding, and was this country to be tied down to that figure, or was it the final contention of Ministers that the opinion of experts must guide the House?
  CAPTAIN CRAIGsaid he had heard only a portion of the speech of the hon. Member and it occurred to him that in pressing still further on the House the reduction of the Army by 10,000 men, the hon. Member had transferred the vigorous appeal recently made for the reduction of the Navy to that of the Army. It would be a very grave move on the part of the country to acquiesce in the reduction of the present strength of the Army by 10,000 men, whilst the new scheme inaugurated by the Secretary for War was in a state of transition. No one could say, not even the Secretary for War, in what condition the Army, including the Territorial Force, stood at the present time. Much more, no one could prognosticate what the outcome of the right hon. Gentleman's scheme would be. He had listened for three quarters of an hour to the Secretary for War, and with equal attention to what had fallen from hon. Members on the Government benches, and although he did not pretend to know anything about the very important subjects touched upon, he was sure that nothing had been said which would justify their reducing the Army by a single artilleryman, cavalryman, or Volunteer, If the Government had been in power for ten or fifteen years and had had a settled Army policy laid down, there might have been some ground for moving that the Army should be reduced by 5,000 men, or increased by 150 men, but he was astounded that anyone should have the courage to stand up in the House of Commons and suggest that while the right hon. Gentleman was re-organising his forces they should turn

  887
  10,000 men of all ranks loose upon the country, who were at present necessary to save us against many an eventuality which no one could foresee. He remembered the Secretary for War when he introduced his Territorial Scheme last year turning to his supporters and saying that his was not a scheme which was going to appeal to the military spirit of the country—that that was the last thing which the Government were thinking of. But he had been refreshed that day to find a different tone in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, who hoped that the military spirit would be present in the minds of the people in times of national peril. Last year when the right hon. Gentleman catered for the support of Little Englanders, he was then of opinion as he was now, that at any time of national emergency the people of this country would come forward in their hundreds of thousands in support of any scheme which the Minister of the day proposed. The difficulty in this country was not to find men but to find a Minister for War who would take advantage of the services of those men who were prepared in a time of national peril to assist the country. His belief was that the right hon. Gentleman's scheme for a Territorial Army from the day it was introduced until now bad been obviously a failure. There was no more readiness for war to-day than there was ten or fifteen years ago. He would not go into the psychological question as to whether the Territorial Army Scheme existed now or not. The right hon. Gentleman had read the advice and the recommendations and opinions of a very large number of expert advisers. He thought that that was a sign of weakness. If the right hon. Gentleman, with the extraordinary ability which he had shown last year, had rested upon his own legs in this House—if he had been prepared to stand on his own foundation—[An HON. MEMBER: That's better]—on his own logical conclusions—[An HON. MEMBER: Better still]—in support of the Army scheme which he brought forward last year, it would hare been better. But what had happened? The right hon. Gentleman confessed that all his aspirations and his logical conclusions had broken down, and he had gone to the expert and
  888
  said: "Help me out of the trouble I have got into." He conscientiously believed that the Secretary for War had produced that afternoon those expert explanations and opinions in order to bolster up the statements he had made last year to the House of Commons. How was it that last year the right hon. Gentleman had not any document to exhibit to the House? Simply because he was able to produce his own scheme, which he believed to be the best in the interest of the country. Now he was showing great signs of weakness, although in the first instance they were hoping against hope that the country had at last found a Secretary for War who would rise above all party motives and solve the great Army problem. That afternoon those hopes had fallen shattered to the ground." The Secretary for War had on that occasion talked about the exact use to which the Territorial Force would be put, but if he remembered aright last year the right hon. Gentleman said that the Army which was created under his scheme would be entirely for Home defence. Since then, however, the Secretary for War had come to the conclusion that there was no fear of invasion, owing to the great strength of His Majesty's Fleet, and of what use could his Territorial Force be except to cross the seas in support of the Regular Army? Not one word, however, had come from the right hon. Gentleman to-day to show that the training which these forces would undergo would be a training for fighting overseas in support of the Regular Army. If however, they were to be ready only to repel an invasion which was not feared, the whole thing had been turned into a perfect farce. In one breath they were told that these men ought to be trained by going down a certain number of days to the coast—six weeks during the year—to repel invasion, and in the next that owing to the Reserves being so depleted they would still be in the Reserves for the next few years. That meant that in the event of war the right hon. Gentleman would have to call upon the patriotic spirit of the Territorial Army to go to the front, although in the first instance he said he would not call upon them to go out and assist the

  889
  Regular Army. Then what steps had the right hon. Gentleman taken in that event to train the Territorial Army for going abroad? None whatever. The Territorial Army, which included the Volunteers, the Yeomanry, and the Militia, if it was trained for service abroad would be better trained for service at home, whereas if they were trained for service at home they were practically useless for service abroad. These questions in connection with the Territorial Army gave rise to grave doubts in the minds of many who would like to see the scheme a thorough success. But not only had the right hon. Gentleman reduced the number of men, but he had shown a certain distrust in those who hitherto had been the backbone of this Army in supporting, and encouraging men to come forward and serve the country. The scheme also had a tendency to prove far more expensive to the country than any system that we had had before, and if the right hon. Gentleman had not already seen that it would be more expensive those who were acquainted with the country as it was before the introduction of the Territorial scheme would very soon enlighten him on the subject. The right hon. Gentleman in forming his Territorial scheme not only took over the whole forces of the Yeomanry, the great Militia battalions that existed, and also vast numbers of Volunteers throughout the country, but he took over their liabilities. He was sure that no one could tell what an immense amount of support was given to the Volunteer movement throughout the country. Large landowners in the North and South of England had assisted them by means of voluntary subscriptions, but now the right hon. Gentleman had taken these forces over he found and the country would find that the State would have to pay for them. That was the reason why this Territorial scheme had proved to expensive to the right hon. Gentlemen. They all knew by experience what generosity and patriotism would prompt a man to do.
  MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: What has this to do with the question before the House?
  CAPTAIN CRAIGsaid he was referring to some remarks about the Territorial
  890
  Army and the expense of it, but he would not pursue the subject; he only touched upon it because it was alluded to by some hon. Members below the gangway. If, however, he might conclude the sentence he would like to say that the right hon. Gentleman would find that the force had suffered financially and would suffer by having the personal interest which was taken in it by supporters of the movement in times past withdrawn. For himself he regretted that. As to the proposed reduction of 10,000 men at the present serious juncture, it was most remarkable because no details were gone into whatever, and he would like to ask the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean whether he could throw any light at all upon the question of how this reduction would affect Ireland. Ireland hitherto had been studiously kept out of the debates. It would seem to be rather a thorny subject, and many of the questions which he addressed to the right hon. Gentleman last year remained unanswered. He understood that Ireland was the best recruiting ground, and he was delighted to see that since last year matters had improved in that respect. When the Army Bill was then under discussion he had endeavoured to make some remarks, but the Chairman ruled him out of order, on the subject of the intimidation of recruits joining the Army. Since then a whole year had elapsed, and he was glad to say that things had greatly improved. He was glad to have an opportunity of saying that in the House where he had made the charge. If the Army was reduced what regiments in Ireland would be affected? What regiments in Ireland could be spared? It was a very pertinent question, because he, as an Irishman, would speak up for any Irish regiment, whether they were recruited in the North or South, whether they were the Dublin Fusiliers or any other corps. He would stick up for them as being superior to any regiment in England or Scotland, and what he asked was this, was it meant by this reduction to attack any Irish regiment? He thought that those who took the responsibility of moving or supporting such an Amendment should come straight out into the open and mention what

  891
  their intentions were. There had been in recent debates a great tendency on the part of movers of Resolutions to run away when it came to a division, and some of them on that side of the House were getting rather tired of those cowardly tactics. Hon. Gentlemen of this kind when the time for a division came asked the Speaker's permission to withdraw their proposals. Honour was satisfied as far as they were concerned. They had spread dissatisfaction and yet at the last moment they would not go into the lobby in respect of the pernicious Amendments had put upon the Paper. If there was a reduction of 10,000 men in the Army owing to this Amendment being carried by a combination of Radicals and Socialists, he would ask the mover of it to say what he was going to do with those 10,000 men. This question was raised on the Navy and it was very pertinent to the subject they were discussing. Supposing an Amendment was carried in the presence of the Secretary of State for War to the effect that they ought to turn 10,000 men out of the Army, had the mover or the seconder the faintest idea of what was to become of those men? Were those men to be pensioned or were they to be thrown upon the rates? Were they to be the oldest men in the Army or the latest recruits? Whatever view was taken of it it was a cruel thing to move an Amendment of this kind. If the hon. Member had come forward and said that in future years the standard of the Army ought not to be greater than a certain number there would not be so much brutality in it, as that standard could be provided for by ceasing to recruit more than a certain number year after year; but to come down and move that 10,000 men should be flung out of the Army without any notice was quite a different matter, especially when upon the responsibilty of the Army authorities the men so dealt with might have been recruited the day before or years before. Respectable men were invited to serve their country, and when they had become proficient in the performance of their duties in the cavalry, artillery, or infantry, and had mastered the intricacies of their profession, then it was suggested that the War Office should turn round
  892
  and say: "We recruited you for service at home and abroad, but now owing to the preponderance of Radical opinion in the House of Commons, and owing to the fact that we have to save money somewhere for social measures at home, we are sorry to say that you, poor Tommy Atkins, 10,000 of you, must go on the streets to-morrow." If such a course were persued it would be impossible to get efficiency, and it was difficult to estimate the wrong that would be done. It would be a cruel thing to reduce the Army by 10,000 men in order that money might be saved to support some particular fad of the supporters of the Government. After all was said and done, when the saving had been effected we might find ourselves engaged in a war which, in consequence of this reduction, would plunge the country into a far worse mess than they were in at the time of the South African War, and cost us considerably more than the saving effected. He did not think the House would listen for a moment to so miserable an Amendment, which had already received more consideration than it deserved.
  *MR. EVERETTsaid the Motion before the House was to reduce the armaments of this country, and surely hon. Members would agree that there was some necessity for that. What were the facts? During the ten years prior to the last general election, when hon. Gentlemen opposite were in power, the expenditure on armaments in this country actually doubled, a circumstance quite unprecedented in our history. Yet the British Empire, so far as he knew, was just as safe before those ten years of prodigal and extravagant expenditure as now. What Liberal Members were asking was, why could they not go back to the comparatively moderate Estimates of twelve years ago. The House was well aware that one of the brightest ornaments of the Conservative Party, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, now Lord St. Aldwyn, resigned his office as Chancellon of the Exchequer because he was not willing to be a party longer to the continual increase of expenditure which he could not get Parliament to reduce. It was not as though we had been forced into this expenditure by the action of other

  893
  countries which we were obliged to meet. The fact was that our increase of expenditure on armaments during the period to which he had referred more than equalled that of Italy, France, Germany, and Russia all put together. Such prodigal, extravagant, and insane expenditure was enough to make Mr. Gladstone and the old economists turn in their graves. He had stated what Lord St. Aldwyn thought of it. Since then the question had been referred to the country with the result that the Party opposite suffered an overwhelming defeat. One reason why the people of this country voted as they did was because they were tired of this constant piling up of expenditure on armaments, and of the increase of taxes and debt which it brought with it. The £40,000,000 a year by which our spending on armaments had been increased by the late Government would have given us old-age pensions nearly twice over. The people wished their money to be spent not on preparations for killing men but for blessing them. Radical Members beseeched the Liberal Ministry, therefore, to do something to reduce the wasteful extravagance in which this country had been encouraged by hon. Gentlemen opposite, so that next year they might have many millions to devote to the purposes of social reform. If hon. Gentlemen opposite would not help in that, they would have to help to pay for pensions out of a super tax on large incomes. He hoped they would like putting their hands in their pockets for that money.
  MR. WYNDHAM: I do not propose to follow the last speaker in his excursion into the maze of fiscal reform, but to confine my observations to the debate before the House. The debate to-day is sufficiently interesting without our casting our eyes ahead to see whence the revenue must be drawn in the future. It has been an interesting debate. "We have discussed the Motion of the hon. Member for the Tavistock Division for saving money by reducing the Army in order that we may properly maintain the Fleet, and we have also discussed the Artillery Vote raised on this occasion by the hon. Member for Fareham as it was raised in another place only the other day. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for
  894
  War dealt with both these questions in his speech, and in my few observations I propose to reverse the order in which he dealt with them. I hope the hon. Member who moved the reduction as well as the hon. Member who seconded it will not think I am disrespectful to them if I say that the importance of their Motion was much enhanced when they obtained the support of the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean. They did not, and certainly the hon. Member who spoke last did not, show how in any way the Home army is to be reduced. The right hon. Baronet to-night, as on previous occasions, had a plan of his own to effect economy by reducing the size of the Army. The seconder of the Motion also had a plan, which was that we should, in order to defend India, revert to the plan for India's defence which was in force previous to the Mutiny. The seconder of the Motion advocated a separate long service Army for India. If that was a plan we could adopt I agree it would carry with it a great diminution of the financial burden imposed on the Army. But is it reasonable at this time to consider that plan? The Mutiny might be attributed to that plan, and certainly the Royal Commission which sat after the Mutiny for all time ruled that plan out of the possible alternatives before us. Let hon. Members think of the climate of India. No man improves as a soldier in the ranks after six years, and no battalion or regiment improves after twelve years. It is going back too far to advocate a return to the idea of a separate Army for India. I claim that the verdict of sixty years ago and the experience of the last sixty years is against it. That is the only suggestion that has been made. The right hon. Baronet, though he has not developed his thesis to-night, has a view of his own, which is that we could have a long-service Army for India and the Colonies and a Force at home, but that we need not maintain a balance between the portion of that Army at home and the portion abroad, whether in India or the Colonies.
  *SIR CHARLES DILKE: My right hon. friend knows I drew a great distinction between the position of the Artillery and Cavalry on the one hand, and the Infantry on the other.
  MR. WYNDHAM: And so there would be a long service Army of which more than half, perhaps three-fifths or four-fifths, would be abroad, and less than half, perhaps two-fifths or one-fifth, at home. That is a plan which for my own part I think it sufficient to say will produce no Reserve of Regulars at all. We should be faced with the absence of any Reserve of Regulars; and, if we were faced with the absence of any Reserve of Regulars, no sane man would ask us to discuss the Territorial Army of the right hon. Gentleman. Everybody would say you must have a short service Army in addition to this long service Army, and every man would say that that short service Army ought to train for two years, eighteen months, fifteen months, or a year. Who would say it it ought to train for less than a year? Many would say you could not expect the splendid material in the Volunteers to go into that short service Army, you could not thus outrage the patriotism which animates many of our compatriots. And, taking a reasonable view of the future, the right hon. Baronet's plan would not save money. His long service Army would be an expensive Army though a small one, because every man in it would ultimately have to be a pensioner, thereby creating a large non-effective charge. His short service Army would be more expensive than the Volunteer Force, and he would have to have a Territorial Force as well. That is the argument against the only reasoned suggestion for making economies by cutting down your Regular Army. It is no good to come down to the House and say: "Ten years ago the Army Estimates stood at such and such a figure, and now they stand at a higher figure, whilst in the interim there has been a great deal of waste in the Army." Has there been a great deal of waste? I think it could be proved that there has not been. Ever since the days of Mr. Edward Stanhope, he and his successors have been trying to get better things for the money spent by improving the conditions of service. That leads to an automatic increase which no one, however keen for economy, can resist. When, by State intervention and by passing social legislation, you raise the standard of living of the working man, you cannot allow the soldier to live
  896
  under conditions which would be put down in civil life. He has to have a good house, better food and clothing, and to have a fair day's amenity for his fair day's work. We rightly insist on that; but it means an automatic increase in the price of your Regular Army. Your Regular Army, Cardwell system or no Cardwell system, is going to cost more than the Regular Army of the same size cost twenty years ago, just as your working man costs more. I do not think I need take up the time of the House any longer on this mere question of a reduction to be made anyhow. If it is made, it must be made somehow, and no plan has yet been brought forward which has stood examination either in the country or by military experts, or by those in this House who inquire into the financial aspects of the problem.
  MR. MACKARNESS: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman how his own Government managed to do with 25,000, less than we are asked for now?
  MR. WYNDHAM: Before the war we were working on an uphill track. We had succeeded in making the camps reasonable places in which to ask people to live and in adding to the Regular Army what are called, technically, the auxiliary forces. That does not mean what we popularly call the Auxiliary Forces. It means the transport, the Army Service Corps, the Medical Department, and the ammunition columns. It means a number of services which are as necessary as the Regular soldier if the Regular soldier is to be worth the money you pay for him. Prior to that time, which you may put as in the late seventies—I am not making a party speech—the country had been content to keep a certain number of Regular soldiers on the books, so to speak, in the full knowledge—at any rate, on the part of the experts—that they were not an Army and could not be made an Army without the expenditure of a great deal more money, and the men were not being treated as they ought to be treated. It began to be felt, after the Franco-German war, that that would not do. It was necessary for any man in a responsible position, for any Cabinet Minister, and not

  897
  only the Secretary of State for War, to face the necessity of making the Army on the books a real Army. Mr. Cardwell began it by dismissing the long service system and making some additions to these Auxiliary Forces. From his day until now, his successors have marched along that track, and no successors of Mr. Gardwell car. retrace those steps. Any successor driven to resignation by being asked to retrace those steps would carry the country with him against his colleagues when the country knew what they were being asked to do and not to do. It was the inspiration of all to limit military expenditure. We all know the Fleet costs us a great deal and is going to cost a great deal more. I believe we are at the very limits of the resources of this country under the existing fiscal system. We all feel we have got to do something, either violent in the direction of direct taxation or something not violent in the direction of broadening the basis of taxation. We are face to face with a financial problem to which no man can shut his eyes That being so, naturally it is necessary to see whether you can reduce the cost of the Regular Army by £5,000,000 or £10,000,000 a year. If you could, there is not a man on these benches who would not jump at the chance. Those on these benches, however, who have studied the question, know you cannot without sacrificing the work of thirty years and making it a waste of money to spend the money you do spend on an uncompleted Army. Some of those who support the reduction would answer to me that you really do not want an Army at all if you have a big enough Fleet. But you cannot have a war conducted by a Fleet alone. You have to defend the bases of the Fleet, you have to defend the arsenals and liberate the Fleet if it is to begin to fight. And you must be able to strike a blow if you are ever to end a war. You therefore want a Home Army. That leads me, not unnaturally, to the speech of the Secretary of State for War. I received from his speech to-night the clear impression that the size and shape of his Home Army is not solely dictated by the necessity of supplying drafts to the Army abroad; but, if I understood him, you do require
  898
  in this island an Army of about the size of his expeditionary force. If it could be a matter of agreement between the two sides of the House from one session to another and from one Parliament to another, that we do need about 160,000 or 170,000 men, in the proper proportion of the three arm?, and with all the accessories that are necessary in order to liberate the Fleet, then, I think, we should have got a standard for the Army comparable with the two-Power standard of the Navy, and have done a great deal for the efficiency of the Army, and something for economy. In every scheme, that has been about the size of the Home Force. It was so in the time of Mr. Edward Stanhope, it was so in the time of Lord Lans-downe, it was so in the time of Mr. Brodrick, and it was so in the time of the hon. Member for Croydon, and it is so now. It is now called an expeditionary force, but the thing of which we have been talking all this time consists of about the same number of battalions of infantry, regiments of cavalry, and batteries of artillery. If that is so, surely I may conclude that the logic of facts drives every man, whatever his theories, to say that it is a force of about the size and shape you want here in England and Ireland if you ever hope to let the Fleet go when you ought. If you try to do both with the same material, it is very much to the credit of economy; but-supposing there were no garrison in India to be reinforced, I say your naval preparations would be an illusion and a snare unless you had at least something between seventy and eighty battalions of infantry, eighteen regiments of cavalry, fifty-four field artillery and howitzer batteries and all their accessories ready at home. You could not liberate the Fleet in the face of popular opinion unless you had between 160,000 and 170,000 trained men here in this island as the tip to the spear, as we call it. That is only your first line. Behind that you require a second line; and, if that number of men, regularly trained, is necessary as the tip to the spear of your whole home defence, so, whatever you have behind it, is artillery the tip to the spear of that Regular Army, and of any Army. Our artillery is the point. It has been said that battles are won by big

  899
  battalions. They are lost by bad artillery. It is worse than the loss of a battery. It is demoralising to the nation if you cannot fight when you want to fight. Fighting an Army with inferior artillery is like a man with a 12-feet spear fighting a man with an 8-feet spear. The man with the shorter spear cannot fight and has to run away. Therefore, your artillery must be as good as any to which it will be opposed. The right hon. Gentleman in his speech criticised those who were discouraging the Territorial Forces. I do not know whether I was in his mind. I have not discouraged the Territorial Force. I am a member of it, and I am bound to say it would discourage me very much if I thought the guns behind the cavalry regiment in which I was could not compete in range with the guns which would be brought against them. If you want to encourage the Territorial Force give them a stiffening of Regular artillery. You cannot expect men to try to occupy the positions they ought to occupy unless they are backed up by artillery in which they have confidence. Do not let the right hon. Gentleman infer from that that I am opposed to his trying to create Territorial Artillery. I am not opposed to that, but I say he ought not to accompany that experiment, and it is an experiment, by diminishing the efficiency of a single battery of Regular artillery, and he ought to have batteries of Regular artillery to aid this Territorial artillery during its infancy. I take his account of the first line and of the second line—the first line with its Regular artillery, and the second line with no Regular artillery. I understand his plan is based upon command of the sea, and then when war breaks out the first line is mobilised by calling out the Reserve, and the Fleet if need be is liberated. Yes, but how is he going to arrange for these time intervals? Why is everything going to happen in the manner which would best suit his plan. Supposing you have to reinforce the garrison of India before you are at war at all, and that is a contingency. Supposing for Asiatic reasons the Government of India wants 100,000 men, and you have to send really the whole bulk of your expeditionary force, and then war breaks out,
  900
  your whole plan crumbles. These time intervals cease to exist. You would not be able to liberate the Fleet, and yet under those circumstances the power of liberating the Fleet might not only give the victory in war, but might prevent the war happening at all. The fact that your Fleet was on your shores might pacify the country, but would not otherwise occur if you were really free. We have to contemplate more contingencies than the right hon. Gentleman has taken into account. He may say that if you contemplate every contingency you kill the country by ruining its finances. We do not ask him to contemplate every contingency, but we do ask him to contemplate this fact—it is a fact and not a speculation—that if the contingencies are other and greater than those which he has contemplated, the safety of the whole position will depend upon there being a stiffening of Regular artillery for his Territorial Force. That is why the artillery is the point of the whole of this discussion. Do not reduce the Regular artillery. Keep up the number of batteries which are thought to be needed. Upon that point I should like more courteously to establish what I endeavoured to establish by way of interruption when the right hon. Gentleman was speaking. He cited Lord Midleton in favour of Territorial artillery. I am not attacking Territorial artillery. My case is that you want Regular artillery with the Territorial artillery. And what did he quote from Lord Midleton? He quoted the opinion that you might have a third of Territorial artillery in your second three Army Corps. You will, therefore, have nothing but Regular artillery in your first three Army Corps. That is precisely the plan of the right hon. Gentleman. Then Lord Midleton's idea of a second line was one formed both of Regulars, and of what we will call the Territorial Forces. For the artillery of that second line he said he wanted two-thirds Regular, and one-third Territorial. That is to say, he said he wanted ninety batteries, to put it in figures, and the right hon. Gentleman says he wants fifty-four. Which is right? We say that to have fifty-four batteries alone as the bare complement for your expeditionary force or your home force

  901
  is necessary to liberate the Fleet is a dangerous course to pursue. You want a margin over that. Lord Midleton asked for thirty-six batteries as a margin. You have thirty-three and you are not using them. You are turning them away from the first line and devoting them to training the second line. That we think to be a fundamental error of judgment. I am not putting the case that the Territorial artillery is a mistake, but that you ought not to divert these thirty-three batteries of Regular artillery form the purpose which they are fitted to fulfil. The right hon. Gentleman really has not met that point. He claims that he has made the artillery more efficient because he can now mobilise forty-two batteries. I hope he will not continue to use that argument. Let us compare plan with plan. Our plan was that there should be fifty-four batteries of field artillery without howitzers. That is the right hon. Gentleman's plan, and he maintains that he has achieved something remarkable by converting thirty-three batteries of field artillery, which are now existing, into training schools in order to make an ammunition column. You might as well take a design for a house of three storeys, and because you have not the fittings for the top storey, build a house of two storeys and a cottage and say you have effected a great economy. It is not an economy. It does not add to the artillery power of the Army in the least. The right hon. Gentleman must know that by other methods than those which he intends to pursue, it was the intention of his predecessor to get ammunition columns.
  MR. HALDANE: How? You used batteries to train during the war, and you would have had to use them to train even if you had carried out your plan.
  MR. WYNDHAM: Nobody is prepared to assert that we had as much artillery ready before the war as the war demanded. That is not really the question. The question is that after the war when we had been taught in the bitter school of experience we said: "You want ninety batteries of artillery," and the right hon. Gentleman says:" You do not. You want fifty-four,"
  902
  and he says: "Do not argue with me in that way, because I have enabled you to send out to war with ammunition columns far greater than was previously necessary, a larger number of batteries than you could at the beginning of the war." That is not a fair issue. If the right hon. Gentleman says he has not money enough to pay for it, and cannot get it we shall understand it, but if he says it is wrong to aim at the number of batteries you require, and right to have fewer than you require, because you can get your ammunition columns without spending more money he is really misleading the House altogether. He has got to tell the House whether it is wise only to have a Regular Field Artillery for his expeditionary force. He came down with a number of documents from a number of men whose opinion we shall be the first to respect, but as the Leader of the Opposition pointed out, not one of these witnesses whom he called expressed his opinion upon this point. The right hon. Gentleman being a lawyer knew very well how to put the question to the soldiers. His main question was, "Taking the constitution of a second line to be trained for six months, can you get an efficient Territorial Artillery?" That begs the whole question, and assumes all we are criticising. It assumes that you have to have his plan, and that having got his plan you are always going to have six months law to prepare the Territorial Force. If I had been asked that, and told I was to have no other artillery than he provides I should have said it was of more value than nothing at all. That is all Sir John French and the other experts have said. They said, to quote Sir John French's words—
  "All soldiers would like the best artillery. This is the only artillery you are going to give us and therefore we like that."
  It hangs together like a proposition of Euclid, but it does not touch the point which we make, and must continue to make, that it is dangerous now, after the war, to reduce your plan for Regular artillery to a limit which was proved to be utterly insufficient by the experience of the war. It does not touch the point that even if you get six months, you ought to stiffen your Territorial Force with Regular artillery, or the

  903
  point which we and Sir John French have made that perhaps you will not get your six months at all. And, therefore, we must now, before things go any further, beg him not to take refuge in dialectical points about the provision of ammunition columns, but think in his own mind whether or not it is wise to revert to the plan for Regular artillery which prevailed before the war, to take his chance of a six months respite, and to divert thirty-three batteries of Regular artillery now in existence to purposes which could be performed in other ways, and to divert them for purposes which can only be achieved in the opinion of every military expert by artillery which has been regularly trained.
  *MR. HAROLD COXsaid he wished to say a few words in support of the Motion of his hon. friend for reducing the Army. He could never support any reduction of the Navy beyond the point which the Admiralty considered was necessary. He regarded the Navy as absolutely vital to this country, and he supported the reduction of the Army because he had grave fears that, unless they reduced expenditure on the Army, they would be forced to cut down the Navy. He was only afraid that a few years hence they might be forced by international necessities to increase the Navy and he did not see where the money was to come from, unless they reduced the expenditure upon the force which was only of secondary importance to this country. Let the House consider for a moment what the Army was costing. Unfortunately, the real facts in regard to the cost of the Army were concealed by the form in which the Estimates were presented. The whole British Army was the Army in this country and the Army in India, including the native forces. That whole Army cost, not the sum in the Estimates, but about £52,500,000. The French Army cost £32,000,000, the German Army
  904
  £37,000,000, and the Russian Army, £40,000,000. While we did not pretend to be a great military Power, we were spending more on our Army than any one of these Continental nations. That was a very serious fact indeed. This country could not be supremely strong both on sea and land. We were paying £52,000,000 a year for an Army which was confessedly far inferior to the much cheaper Armies of Continental Powers. The difference in the cost of foreign Armies and ours was not accounted for wholly by the fact that they had conscription. There must be something fundamentally wrong, when we were spending £52,000,000 on our Army whilst Russia was only spending £40,000,000. This country virtually had only one frontier to defend, namely, the North West frontier. How many frontiers had Russia to defend? She had frontiers against Japan, China, India, Persia, Turkey, Roumanin, Austria, Germany and Sweden, and she defended all those frontiers with an Army expenditure less than four fifths of our expenditure for the defence of one frontier. That seemed to him a very serious point and he thought it was the duty of any Government to try and cut down our enormous expenditure. He had been informed by the Secretary of State for War that the cost of the British garrison in Egypt was £620,000, of which the Egyptian Government contributed only £150,000. That was an unjust arrangement. Our occupation of Egypt, which depended upon the presence of British troops, had enormously increased the wealth and happiness of the Egyptian people. Egypt ought to pay for those troops. Why should Egypt be treated differently from India? A point usually lost sight of, was the excessive pay of the common soldier as compared with the pay obtainable by civilians of the same class. In comparison with the work he did, and in comparison with the pay of the class from which he was usually drawn, the common soldier was the best paid

  905
  man in the United Kingdom. The ordinary private soldier of twenty years of age was fed and clothed, and even had amusements provided for him, and then in addition he got 12s. a week pocket money. He had opportunities in the service that were denied to men in civil life. If he married, he got a house and rations and 14s. a week: his pay was regular no matter whether the weather or trade was bad. If he served on for twenty years he would then get a pension of 7s. a week. There were many people belonging to the same class as that from which the common soldier was drawn who never got more than 15s. a week all their lives, and he thought the House would agree that the private soldier was extremely well paid and yet we did not get the men we wanted. He agreed that the linked battalion system was the best suited to our purposes, but why not link three battalions together instead of only two" then two battalions could be abroad to one at home. The home battalion would of course have to be large, but for the purposes of training that would be an advantage. This experiment might be tried slowly. During the recess, the Secretary for War made the extraordinary statement that the time might come when we could no longer rely upon the Navy, and that we would have to rely upon our Home Forces. That seemed to him to be a very dangerous doctrine indeed, for it ignored altogether the fact that the Navy had a double duty to perform. It had not only to defend our shores from invasion, but also our commerce from capture at sea. Even the right hon. Gentleman's Territorial Army could not perform the function of protecting our commerce upon the sea. Economy was not served by building up a Territorial Army instead of strengthening the Navy. The annual cost of the most modern battleship, allowing for everything, was less than £250,000. The Territorial Army would cost £3,000,000
  906
  —the equivalent of twelve first-class batteships in full commission. It was patent that our strength in the world would be enormously greater with twelve more battleships than with a Territorial Army, which must of necessity be ill-trained. Modern industrial conditions made it impossible to give Volunteers an efficient military training. We must rely on a professional Army in this country. He did not think the right hon. Gentleman had realised the social and industrial changes that had taken place, not only in this country, but in the whole world during the past 100 years. When the majority of mankind were occupied in agricultural pursuits it was comparatively easy to go away a bit and fight, but that was not an easy thing when men were working in mills or modern workshops. They could not take men out of a mill without disarranging the whole industrial organisation. That was the fundamental difference between an industrial and an agricultural community, and it was hopeless to continue to ignore that fact. Personally, he did not believe that they could ever rely to any appreciable extent upon a Terriorial Army. He went so far as to say that they ought never to attempt to build up an exclusively Home Service Army, for they only wanted soldiers who were prepared to fight abroad. The Leader of the Opposition had disposed of the only excuse for a Home Service Army, namely, the hypothesis that this country, while engaged with one enemy, might be attacked by another. The answer to that hypothesis was that the attack might come so soon that the Home Service Army would not have time for the training which it would admittedly require. Was it likely that the Territorial Army could take the field against the picked troops that would be sent over to fight against us? If an enemy invaded this country they would choose the best men, equipped with the best weapons. Therefore he had been driven to the conclusion that this country must

  907
  rely exclusively upon its Navy and upon a professional Army. The conditions of modem life compelled us to differentiate, specialise, and professionalise. Our necessities were primarily a Navy absolutely supreme which would make invasion impossible and a professional Army backed by a strong Reserve ready to strike abroad.
  MR. LUTTRELLsaid there had been a very full discussion of the subject, and hon. Members who did not speak when the Vote was in Committee had now had an opportunity of stating their views. He, therefore, asked leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Leave to withdraw being refused,
  Amendment put, and negatived.

SUPPLY [12TH MARCH] REPORT.
Resolutions reported:—
SUPPLY [12TH MARCH] REPORT.

  ARMY ESTIMATES, 1908–9.
  1. "That a sum, not exceeding £9,422,000, be granted to His Majesty to defray the Expense of the Pay, etc., of his Majesty's Army (including Army Reserve) at Home and Abroad (exclusive of India), which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1909."
  2. "That a sum, not exceeding £1,743,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Rewards; Half-Pay; Retired Pay; Widows' Pensions; and other Non-Effective Charges for Officers, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1909."
  3. "That a sum, not exceeding £1,782,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Chelsea and Kilmainham Hospitals; of Out-Pensions; Rewards for Distinguished Services; Widows' Pensions; and other Non
  908
  Effective Charges for Warrant Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Men, etc., which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1909."
  4. "That a sum, not exceeding £167,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Civil Superannuation, Compensation, Compassionate Allowances and Gratuities, and of Payments under the Workmen's Compensation Act, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1909."
  First Resolution:—
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution."
  MR. ASHLEYcalled attention to what he described as the miserably inadequate pay of the regimental officers and non-commissioned officers who constituted the backbone of the Regular Army. These were the men who did the real training and fitted the regiments and battalions for war. In the last fifty or sixty years the regimental officer had received practically no increase of pay whatever. He thought the pay of the private soldier compared most favourably with the wages received by his class in civil life, though he thought that, in order to attract recruits, the State should undertake to give a preference to the old soldier in the distribution of the civil employment it might have to give at the end of his service. At present the soldier felt that after he had served three or seven years he had nothing certain to look forward to. If the State would lay down the principle that, other things being equal, preference would be given to the old soldier, it would pay the State ten times over, because a better class of men would be attracted to the Army. As to the regimental officer, a young man of nineteen or twenty got £95 a year, and

  909
  he did not think that was much to give him in view of his education and the examinations he had to pass. The officer afterwards became a lieutenant with £118 a year, at which pay he remained until he was twenty-eight or twenty-nine, when he became a captain with £208 a year. By that time he had probably married and had a wife and family to provide for, and appearances to keep up. He would ask the House whether they considered that an adequate pay. When he was forty or forty-five he might become a lieutenant-colonel with £420 a year. Perhaps the Secretary of State for War might agree with the President of the Local Government Board that no man should have more than £500 a year, but he thought it was absurdly inadequate pay for a man of forty or forty-five who had served twenty years at his profession. The result was that the good men they ought to have as regimental officer did not remain with their regiments. They tried to get into the Egyptian Army, or to get appointments on the West Coast of Africa, or elsewhere, where they would get higher rates of pay. They did not do the work they were primarily enlisted to do. That was an important point which ought to be borne in mind. The present pay absolutely debarred men without money from going into the Army at all. Men did not now go into the Army as officers as they used to do, and that was largely because the pay was inadequate. They said that if they were to treat the Army as a serious profession they were entitled to the pay of a serious profession.
  MR. HALDANE: I have a great deal of sympathy with what the hon. Member for Blackpool has said about the pay of the officer. But there is this to be considered. I doubt whether the average pay of a general officer in the Army when he gets to the age of forty or forty-five does not compare very well with that of the average barrister. [An
  910
  HON. MEMBER: Oh!] I am speaking of the average.
  MR. ASHLEYpointed out that there was not the same danger attaching to the legal as to the military profession.
  MR. HALDANE: I do know that; there is at the Bar the danger of starvation, and the same may be said of other professions. It should be remembered that the pay of the higher branches of the Army is very good, and that there are great positions to be attained, for the chance of which people go into the Army. But a study of the Estimates will show that an endeavour is made, in respect of travelling expenses and other items, to improve the position of the officers, and that has been the policy of successive Governments. I cannot hold out the hope of our making any very material increase of the pay of the officer until the country takes a different view on the subject, but still something has been done. I hope we may now get this Vote, as we have also got to get the Navy Vote through in. order to introduce the Army Annual Bill.
  SIR F. BANBURYsaid the comparison of the position of an Army officer with that of a barrister was hardly a good one. The right hon. Gentleman said that the income of the average barrister was small, but he would point out that the barrister who did not earn fees was not doing any work. [An HON. MEMBER: He devils for others.] The barrister for whom, he devilled paid him. If they could get private soldiers on the three and seven years system for the Army these men should not be turned adrift without some opportunity of obtaining other occupations. He thought that the State which secured their services during the years which would have enabled them to learn a trade should provide them with occupation after they left the colours, when there, happened to be any vacancies in State

  911
  employment. With regard to the officers, he did not quite agree with his hon. friend. To a certain extent, he agreed with the right hon. Gentleman that if one could get a "devil" or an officer for nothing, why should one give him anything more? His hon. friend had said that we were short of 8,000 officers, and that we could not get proper men as officers at the present rates of pay. But did his hon. friend suppose that if the subaltern's pay was increased from £90 to £120 they would get any more men, or that that would make any appreciable difference in their manner of living? The subaltern would still require an allowance from his father, and no more officers would be obtained than at present. We had increased the pay of the private soldier, but we had not got any more men. He believed that if the scale of soldiers' pay had been left as it was, there would have been as many recruits to the Army as now, and a very considerable expense would have been saved to the nation. Hon. Gentlemen opposite were against spending money on the Army, and if the pay of officers was raised that would he taken as an excuse for reducing the Vote of men for the Army not by 10,000 men only, but by many more. He only wished that the right hon. Gentleman had said straight out that the State could not afford to give more pay. He hoped that his hon. friend would not press this matter, because it would not do any good, and might prevent them from obtaining the requisite number of men for the Army.
  SIR H. CRAIKsaid that he happened to occupy the office, of Chairman of the Qualifying Board for the examination of officers, and he knew that it was becoming more difficult to get the best candidates for the Army from the Universities. He knew that the existing rates of pay limited the choice to those whose fathers
  912
  could afford them a large allowance as officers in the Army. He was of opinion that a comparatively slight increase of pay would have a stimulating effect in drawing men from every class of the community to the Army from turning to more lucrative professions.
  CAPTAIN CRAIGsaid he quite agreed with the last speaker in regard to a slight increase of pay inducing many competent men to join the Army as officers; but at the same time the large shortage of officers at present was due to other causes than had been suggested. The difficulty of obtaining officers was created by the examinations which the young men had to undergo. It was not so much the question of pay but the extraordinary examinations that deterred them. There were boys in our public schools fit in every way to be officers as well as being physically fit and with the knowledge that most young Englishmen possessed of manly sport and all that young fellows were required to do in time of war. If a number of petty restrictions were removed, apart from any question of an extra £30 or £40, the Government would have a very much larger number of officers available. Anyone acquainted with the examinations would, he thought, admit that they were prohibitive in many cases, and prevented the cream of the really manly school boys from joining the Army. What prevented them from joining, although they were yearning to do so, was the fact that they would have to master foreign languages and some of the higher mathematics. This knowledge might, as they all knew, be necessary in some of the higher branches of the Army, but for Infantry of the Line or ordinary regimental duty it was not needed. It was only wanted in cases where in afterlife the officers had gone to the Staff College or got into prominent positions. If the Secretary for War would only use his great ability to make it more easy for some of these young fellows to get into the Army he would not only alleviate

  913
  their position, but perhaps save some of the money which the Radicals were so anxious to save on the Army, Navy, or any other Imperial object.

SUPPLY [9TH MARCH] REPORT.
Resolution reported.
SUPPLY [9TH MARCH] REPORT.

  NAVY ESTIMATES, 1908–9.
  "That 128,000 officers, seamen, and boys be employed for the Sea and Coast Guard Services for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1909, including 18,463 Royal Marines."
  Ordered, That leave be given to bring in a Bill to provide, during Twelve Months, for the Discipline and Regulation of the Army; and that Mr. Secretary Haldane, Mr. Edmund Robertson, and Mr. Buchanan, do prepare and bring it in.

  ARMY (ANNUAL) BILL.
  "To provide, during Twelve Months, for the Discipline and Regulation of the Army," presented accordingly, and read the first time; to be read a second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. Bill [167.]
SUPPLY [10TH MARCH] REPORT.
Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question—
SUPPLY [10TH MARCH] REPORT.

  NAVY ESTIMATES, 1908–9.
  1. "That a sum not exceeding £7,129,700, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expenses of Wages, etc., to Officers, Seamen, and Boys, Coast Guard, and Royal Marines, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1909."
  Question again proposed.
  MR. BARNESsaid he wished to call attention to the system of training naval officers, and especially the training of the engineer staff, but if it was convenient to the House he was willing to defer it till a later stage. Perhaps the Secretary to the Admiralty would take Vote 5 at an early day, and he could then bring the matter forward.
  MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: I think it would be most convenient to take the discussion on Vote 5 at an early day, and I will undertake that it shall be placed first on the Paper. I hope that will be satisfactory to the right hon. Gentleman.
  MR. BARNES: Quite, and I will defer the observations I desire to make until that occasion.
  SIR F. BANBURYsaid that in the Committee there were some effective speeches made on the question of the reduction of the Coastguard, but no satisfactory assurance was obtained from the Admiralty that they intended to alter their policy with regard to the decrease of the Coastguard. Last year the number of the Coastguard was 3,903. This year it is 3,540. Nobody would deny that the Coastguard were excellent men and did their work in the best possible way, and that it would be difficult to replace them. After all they numbered under 4,000 last year, and he could not see the necessity for this insane desire to make a small saving by this reduction. In fact, he did not know what the saving came to.
  MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: Nothing.
  SIR F. BANBURYsaid that under those circumstances he failed to see the reason for it. He had not a very high opinion of the administrative ability of

  915
  hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite before, but he had still less when he found this fine body of men were being reduced for no object whatever. He rose for the purpose of opposing this reduction, and he hoped before it was sanctioned good reason would be given for it.
  MR. EDMUND ROBERTSONreminded the hon. Baronet that he fully-explained in Committee the policy of the Admiralty on this matter. The reductions, which were being effected by natural wastage, would take place only on those stations where the men were serving no purpose—naval, life-saving, or rocket apparatus. There would be no financial saving, inasmuch as the places of these men, who were semi-active, would be taken by men on the active service list. The First Lord of the Admiralty had promised in another place to make public the Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the coastguard. The Admiralty would not adopt the Report—they were pursuing a totally different policy on this question—but it had been thought well that it should be made public.
  MR. FELLsaid that in the previous debate on this question it was stated that some of the smaller stations would be closed; that the cottages would be let and that the men would be replaced by naval men. What he wished to know was, was the patrolling of the coast going to be performed as it used to be by men who on previous occasions had proved most useful? He had known cases where people who had got into difficulties had been rescued simply becaue they had been seen when these men were patrolling the coast in the course of their duty. If the coast was to be patrolled as formerly, how was the patrol to be arranged when these stations were closed?

WAYS AND MEANS [17TH MARCH] REPORT
Ordered, That it be an Instruction to the Gentlemen appointed to bring in a Bill upon the Resolution reported from the Committee of Ways and Means on the 18th day of this instant March, and then agreed to by the House, that they do make provision therein pursuant to the said Resolution.
CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 1) BILL.
"To apply certain sums out of the Consolidated Fund to the service of the years ending on the thirty-first day of March, one thousand nine hundred and eight and one thousand nine hundred and nine," presented, and read the first time; to be read a second time upon Monday next.

DEBTORS (IMPRISONMENT).
Ordered, that a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the existing Law relating to the Imprisonment of Debtors, and to report whether any Amendments are desirable.
The Committee was accordingly nominated of,—Mr. Stopford Brooke, Mr. Byles, Mr. Charles Craig, Mr. Delany, Mr. Robert Duncan, Mr. Ferens, Mr. George Gibbs, Mr. Hodge, Mr. Keswick, Sir Charles M'Laren, Mr. John Phillips, Mr. Pickersgill, Mr. Rendall, Mr. Wads-worth and Mr. Wills.
Ordered, That the Committee have power to send for persons, papers, and records.
Ordered, That Five be the quorum.—(Mr. Whiteley.)
And, it being after half-past Eleven of the clock, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at twenty-five minutes before Twelve o'clock.

PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.
Wath-upon-Dearne Urban District Council District Gas Bill [H.L.].—Petition for additional provision of the Wath Urban District Council under their Common Seal, together with the proposed clauses and Amendments annexed thereto; read, and referred to the Examiners.
South Wales Electrical Power Distribution Bill [H.L.]; Metropolitan Electric Tramways Bill [H.L.].—Report from the Committee of Selection, That the Lord Saye and Sele and the Lord Wenlock be proposed to the House as Members of the Select Committee in the place of the Viscount Iveagh and the Lord Clinton, and that the Lord Wenlock be Chairman of the said Committee; read, and agreed to.
Camberwell and other Metropolitan Borough Councils (Superannuation) Bill [H.L.].—Reported, with Amendments.
Rhymney Railway Bill [H.L.].—Reported, with Amendments.
London County Council (Tramways; and Improvements) Bill [H.L.].—Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
Thames River Steamboat Service Act, 1904 (Amendment) Bill [H.L.].—Leave given to the Select Committee to adjourn, over to-morrow and not to sit on Monday; next until half-past Two o'clock.

PETITION.
  LAND VALUES (SCOTLAND) BILL.
  Petition against; of the Lord Provost, etc., of the City of Edinburgh; read, and ordered to lie on the Table.
RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.
  EDUCATION (SCOTLAND).
  Return showing the expenditure from the grant for public education in Scotland in the year 1907, with statistics.

  LOAN FUND BOARD OF IRELAND.
  Seventieth Annual Report, 1907.
  Presented (by command), and ordered to lie on the Table.

  POISONS AND PHARMACY BILL [H.L.]
  A message ordered to be sent to the Commons to propose that the Joint Committee do meet in. Committee Room A. on Tuesday next at Three o'clock.

  THE TERRITORIAL ARMY.
  *THE DUKE OF BEDFORD: My Lords, the list of Questions I have on the Paper is a long one, but they will not necessitate any lengthy explanation on my part. I desire to ask the noble Earl the Under-Secretary of State for War: (1.) Whether in the case of recruits, enlisting directly into the Special Reserve and of men reengaging from the Militia, Paragraph 15 of Attestation Paper, Army Reserve Special Reservists may be so amended as to read, "Are you willing to be attested to serve in the 3rd Reserve Battalion…Regiment, and to be transferred to any infantry battalion of the Line, when the reserves are called out." I believe that is exactly the form of service which His Majesty's Government require from the Special Infantry Reservists, and it is a form which the men themselves will very easily understand. I attach importance to the words "any infantry battalion of the Line," so as to limit the man's liability to service in the infantry and in the infantry only.
  I next ask: (2.) Whether, in view of the statement made by the Under-Secretary of State for War on 20th February last, in reference to the 3rd Special Reserve battalion, that "during the non-training period the battalion did not exist as such," the Special Reserve battalions which do not exist as such during the non-training period are identical with the battalions referred to in Paragraph 23 of the Army Order of 23rd December, which states "that the establishment of the regular officers and non-commissioned officers in the 3rd Reserve battalions is fixed on a scale which will allow of their being used as training centres for the officers

  735
  and non-commissioned officers of the Territorial Force. Thus they will become in the fullest sense training battalions."
  My third Question raises the responsibility of the officers commanding Special Reserve battalions in the non-training period. I desire to ask: (3.) Will the lieutenant-colonel commanding a Special Reserve battalion be held in any way responsible for any matters connected with his battalion during the non-training period, and will he conduct, and, if not, who will conduct all correspondnce relating to the Special Reserve battalions during the non-training period. This is very similar to the question that has already been raised as to the powers of Militia commanding officers in the non-training period, but I hops the noble Earl will not give me the answer that the commanding officer of a Special Reserve battalion will be in very much the same position as the Militia commanding officer in the past. That means responsibility, but absolutely no control at all, and that is not by any means a satisfactory form of administration.
  Next I ask: (4.) Will the lieutenant-colonel of a Special Reserve battalion be held responsible for the efficiency of the battalion in view of the facts that he has no control over the recruit training of his men, that he will not be consulted as to the appointment or removal of the Line major, officers, adjutant, and permanent staff, and that he is only in command of the battalion for twenty-one days of the year, and the Line major for the remaining 344? Also: (5) Will the Line major, who has been commanding officer during the non-training period, attend the annual training of a reserve battalion as senior major.
  It is not certain, under the Army Order of 23rd December, the exact amount of bounty which will be paid to the Special Reserve recruit to join the Line. I therefore ask: (6) What is the amount of the bounty which will be paid to the Special Reserve recruit to join the Line during or at the end of the six months preliminary training. Next I desire to know: (7) Is it the case that when a proclamation calling out the Reserve has been issued, and the Special Reservists have thereby become
  736
  soldiers of the Regular Army, these men will be prohibited from joining any named regiment of the Line owing to being required for general drafting purposes. That would seem to place the Special Reservist in a worse position than the "man in the street," or the man who had already joined the regiment which he prefers in the Regular Army.
  My next three Questions are: (8) Will the men of the disbanded Militia battalions, who are prohibited from training as Militiamen this year by the Army Order of 23rd December, 1907, be allowed to draw the non-training bounty up to February, 1909, which by the Army Order of 5th February, 1908, allows men of the Militia battalions training this year to draw, provided that they attend the training of Militia battalions this year? (9) The number of infantry officers attached to Line depots is at present, approximately, 425. The number of Regular officers to be posted to the 3rd Special Reserve Battalions, including the 425 now attached to the depots is, approximately, 740. Is it the intention to add about 315 officers, representing the difference between the number of officers now attached to the depots and the total number of Line officers required for the 3rd Special Reserve Battalions to the establishment of Line officers before the end of this summer? (10) In reference to the statement of the Under-Secretary of State for War that seventeen will be the minimum age of enlistment for recruits into the Special Reserve, what means will be taken to ensure that boys of less than seventeen years of age are not accepted? The noble Earl stated that seventeen would be the minimum age of enlistment in the Special Reserve. Though seventeen is the minimum age for the Militia and eighteen for the Line, a very large percentage of boys are taken below that age; and I should be glad to know what special means are going to be taken to prevent that with regard to the Special Reserve.
  Finally, I desire to ask: (11) If married men will be prohibited from enlisting directly into the Special Reserve engineers, artillery, and infantry, and if after direct enlistment a man proves

  737
  to be a married man, will he be discharged from the Special Reserve? The point of that is this, that the Special Reservist is trained for six months, and if you take a married man away from his wife and children for six months training in barracks, he cannot support his family during the period. Moreover, a married man would not, I presume, be encouraged to enlist in the Regular Army.
  THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (The Earl of PORTSMOUTH): My Lords, I think it will be for the convenience of my noble friend, if I answer his Questions seriatim. In reply to the first Question, I am afraid that the Army Council cannot agree to the amendment of the attestation paper suggested by my noble friend. The recruit is not attested for a particular battalion, but for a corps, and this is clearly explained in Paragraph 6 of the Notice Paper. In ordinary circumstances it is most improbable that a Special Reservist would be drafted outside his Territorial Regular battalions. To introduce an amendment worded in the manner suggested by my noble friend would indicate that his transfer to any infantry battalion of the Line would be a thing of ordinary occurrence. This is not the intention of the Army Council, and, as I have already indicated, it would only be in very exceptional circumstances that the drafting of Special Reservists outside the Territorial Regular battalions would be resorted to.
  In reply to my noble friend's second Question, my answer is that they are identical. When I stated on 20th February that during the non-training period a battalion does not exist as such I made that statement with special reference to a specific Question which had been put to me by Lord Hardinge regarding the command of the battalion during this period. The Special Reserve battalions during the non-training period will exist just as the battalions of the existing Militia may be said to exist during the non-training period.
  The noble Duke rather anticipated my reply to his third and fourth Questions. The position of the lieutenant-colonel commanding a Special Reserve battalion will be practically that of an
  738
  officer commanding a Militia battalion. He will be allowed to visit recruits at the depot during the non-training period. Regulations on this matter are in process of preparation, and if it is possible for us to devise any means by which we can increase the sense of responsibility, we shall be only too glad to consider the matter; and we should welcome any suggestions privately communicated on the subject.
  In regard to the fifth Question I may remind my noble friend of the Committee which has been appointed, under the chairmanship of Sir William Nicholson, to consider the difficult question of the relative rank of Line and Militia officers in the same battalion. On the decision eventually arrived at will depend whether the Line major will, as under existing Regulations, rank as the senior major, or whether he will take rank in accordance with the date of his appointment as major—that is to say, senior or junior to the majors of the Special Reserve according as their appointments date after or before his. In reply to my noble friend's sixth Question, a Special Reserve recruit who has completed three months drill and then goes to the Line is permitted to draw the will bounty of 30s. which he would have received on completing his six months recruits' drill. This is clearly laid down in Paragraph 8 of Appendix 10, Army Order, of 23rd December last.
  I now come to the noble Duke's seventh Question. I presume that what my noble friend wishes to ask is whether the proclamation calling out the Reserve practically makes the Special Reservists part of the Regular Army, and, therefore, whether it will be open to these men to join a Line regiment just as they would in peace time. If this is what my noble friend means, I have to inform him that the Special Reservists will not be allowed to join—that is to say, formally to enlist into—any of the Line regiments. When the Reserve is called out the Special Reservists automatically become part of the Reserve of the Regular Army. If my noble friend means to ask whether these Special Reservists are to have any choice as regards the regiment to which they will be sent, my answer is that, while reserving the right to draft them to any

  739
  regiment, we shall in all cases endeavour to send them to their Regular Territorial battalions.
  In reply to my noble friend's eighth Question, I may remind him of the answer I gave him on this matter on 20th February. The special Army Order of 5th February specifically lays down that those Militiamen who belong to disbanded battalions, even if they do not elect to join any of the Special Reserve battalions, will in all cases receive the non-training bounty up to February, 1909. The training bounty is the only bounty which they will not receive, and they will not receive that because they will not be called up for training.
  I would first like to point out, in reply to my noble friend's ninth Question. that the figures given by my noble friend are not quite accurate. The increase in Regular officers, exclusive of adjutants and quartermasters, which the establishments of the new Special Reserve battalions render necessary, is estimated at 261. Against this increase there must be set an estimated decrease of adjutants and quartermasters, which reduces the net increase to 220. It is not intended to add all these officers to the Special Reserve battalions this summer. The additions must be made gradually, but I understand that one captain will be added to the strength of each battalion this year. As to the tenth Question the minimum age of enlistment of seventeen years is already provided for in Regulations. This age is precisely the same as in the case of the Militia, and the ordinary means that have been hitherto taken to prevent boys of less than seventeen joining the Militia will also be taken in the case of the Special Reserve. I would refer my noble friend to Paragraph 102 (c) of the Recruiting Regulations. In reply to my noble friend's eleventh Question, I may say that there is nothing in the Regulations to prohibit a married man enlisting into the Special Reserve, whether engineers, artillery, or infantry. There is, therefore, no reason to discharge a man if after enlistment he proves to be a married man.
  THE DUKE OF BEDFORD: But what does the noble Earl propose to do with the man's starving wife and family?
  THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: We hope we shall not have cases of that kind.
  LORD ABINGER: I desire to say a word with regard to the answer to the noble Duke's third Question. In the case of Special Reserve battalions a Line major is to be brought in, and out of the training period this officer will, we understand, be responsible for the command. I do not think the noble Earl's answer made it quite clear as to who would be responsible during the training period—the lieutenant-colonel commanding the Special Reserve battalion or the Line officer brought in.
  THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: I thought I made it clear that the officer commanding would be responsible. His position will be practically that of an officer commanding a Militia battalion.
  THE EARL OF ALBEMARLErose to ask the Under-Secretary of State for War: (1) Whether the Army Council propose to extend the privilege of separation allowance to private soldiers; (2) Whether he will consider the advisability of increasing the allowance (per week) to Volunteers to 10s., which is the sum which most corps now pay; (3) Whether he will reconsider the imposition of the very heavy fines which it is now proposed to levy for non-attendance at camp; (4) Whether he will endeavour to make the attestation paper, generally more attractive than it is in its present form, having regard to the threat of imprisonment for false answers which it at present contains; (5) How he proposes to deal with members of the present Auxiliary Forces who from force of circumstances may in the future be precluded from joining amalgamated units; (6) How members of the permanent staff of a unit are to be dealt with when they cannot be absorbed on the disbandment of their unit.
  The noble Earl said: My Lords, before asking the Questions which stand in my name I should like to draw attention to a matter of which I have given the noble Earl private notice. It relates to a grievance—and, I think the noble Earl will admit, an injustice—which has been overlooked in the framing of the rules

  741
  for the County Associations. I have in my mind the case of a retired officer, enjoying a pension, who has been selected as secretary to a Territorial Association. As your Lordships are aware, the salary in most cases is very small at the best. Before the Secretary of State for War altered the conditions I heard of one county which was only able to pay a salary of £60 to the officer who was going to serve them as secretary, no doubt to the best of his ability. Since then I believe matters have been materially improved. The case to which I wish to call attention is that of a captain who has been appointed secretary of a Territorial Association at a salary of £200 a year, and who, we learned last week for the first time, will be required to resign his pension of £100 a year before he can accept the £200 a year from the association. I submit, my Lords, that this is not only a soldier's grievance, but a real injustice.
  My Questions are framed with the sole desire to carry out loyally the conditions imposed by His Majesty's Government. As regards the Volunteers, some noble Lords may know that I am interested in them and have been for many years. I have commanded them in peace and war, and know something about them. I hope, therefore, your Lordships will not think that I am unduly taking up your time. My first Question is whether the Army Council propose to extend the privilege of separation allowance to private soldiers. I anticipate that the answer to that will be, in the first place, that the training is so short that it is not worth while going into that matter; but, as noncommissioned officers will have separation allowance and draw Army pay during their training, surely the private soldier should be considered. Take the case of an artisan. He will have to leave his wife and family, and, in addition, make arrangements with his employer; and we who have had to do with Volunteers, know that the question of how long his employer will allow him to be away for the purpose of camp is a very difficult one. I do not think it is much to ask, especially as the time of training is so short, that the privilege of separation allowance should be extended to the private soldier.
  742
  Next, I ask the noble Earl whether he will consider the advisability of increasing the allowance per week to Volunteers to 10s. In most county corps it is the custom to give an allowance of 10s. a week during training; I think the Army Council proposed that it should be 8s. I hope the War Office will consider the advisabilty of increasing that allowance by 2s. That does not apply to London regiments, who now take the whole of the capitation grant and do not generally make an allowance to privates during camp. I then desire to ask the noble Earl whether he will reconsider the imposition of the very heavy fines which it is now proposed to levy for non-attendance at camp, and whether he will endeavour to make the attestation paper generally more attractive than it is in its present form, having regard to the threat of imprisonment for false answers which it at present contains. I should expect the noble Earl to say that the form was framed for bad characters, and for people who intentionally did wrong; but I do not like to see the British Volunteer, who has served the country so well in the past, placed in the position of being threatened with the Army Council's vengeance before even he is attested. I have in my hand Form E. 502, which, being interpreted, is the attestation paper.
  THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: Is that the old one?
  THE EARL OF ALBEMARLE: No, the new one; I believe it is only a few hours old. I see, at the end of the paper, in italics—the italics are so small that I can hardly read the passage—these words—
  "Under the provisions of Section 99 of the Army Act, if a person knowingly makes a false answer to any question contained in the attestation paper he renders himself liable to punishment "
  Many men who intend to join will no doubt read that, but very few, I venture to think, will refer to Section 99 of the Army Act. If they did I think a great many of them would cry off and not wish to join the Territorial Force. Section 99 (1) of the Army Act runs as follows:—
  "If a person knowingly makes a false answer to any question contained in the attestation paper which has been put to him by or by direction of the justice before whom he appears for the purpose of being attested, he shall be

  743
  liable on summary conviction to be imprisoned with or without hard labour for any period not exceeding three months."
  I venture to submit that it is going too far, when you invite a man as a Volunteer to serve you, to hold this threat over his head. We know that it is very difficult in some cases for a man who is not very literate, shall I say, to give absolutely correct answers to all the questions. Some men might unknowingly contra vene——
  LORD LUCAS: The section says "knowingly."
  THE EARL OF ALBEMARLE: But some men might unknowingly——
  LORD LUCAS: In that case they would not be liable for punishment.
  THE EARL OF ALBEMARLE: I would next ask the noble Earl how he proposes to deal with members of the present Auxiliary Forces who from force of circumstances may in the future be precluded from joining amalgamated units. I have a case in point in my own county, Norfolk. Along the border of Norfolk and Suffolk there are seven big towns which are centres for Volunteer Infantry recruiting, and by the recruiting area now drawn up to meet the new requirements by which we shall recruit artillery in a certain area, and infantry in another, some five companies of the 2nd battalion of the Norfolk regiment will be disbanded and will have long distances to go, and heavy travelling expenses to incur, before they can get anywhere near a unit to which they can be attached and with whom they can drill. I desire also to ask how Members of the permanent staff of a unit are to be dealt with when they cannot be absorbed on the disbandment of their unit. If there are two battalions and one is disbanded, it stands to reason that there will be a large number of permanent staff who will have no employment. I ask the noble Earl how he proposes to deal with these men in the future. I did hear that they were going to be allowed to wear their uniform, but what good that will do them, or when they will wear it, I do not know. Perhaps the noble Earl will allow me to ask a further question, of which I have not given him notice, concerning the much-valued Volunteer decoration.
  744
  Those officers who would be entitled to it soon after the ever-to-be-remembered 1st April may just miss getting it; and we should like to know whether they will be eligible. In this connection I do not see my late colonel, the noble and gallant Field-Marshal, in his place, but I should have liked to congratulate him on getting the Volunteer decoration by the skin of his teeth.
  THE EARL OF ERROLL: My Lords, before the noble Earl the Under-Secretary replies, I should like to draw attention for a moment to the first Question put to him by the noble Earl with reference to separation allowance. I hope that His Majesty's Government will see their way to alter their decision as to the separation allowance being given only to non-commissioned officers. I am told that there are about 20 per cent. of married men in the Volunteers, and that the colonels look upon them as some of the best men they have got. I was also informed yesterday by an officer commanding a brigade in the Midlands that by not giving the separation allowance to the privates the Territorial Army would be liable to lose some 20,000 men. He further said that a great many of the men could afford to lose one week's wages, but not two. It is of the greatest importance that as many men as possible should be got to train for two weeks, and I suggest, as a compromise, that separation allowance should at least be given to the men who come out for a fortnight's training. In this way you would greatly mitigate the hardship and ensure having a very much larger number of better trained men.
  LORD WENLOCK: My Lords, I should like to say, on this point, that my Association has sent up a strongly-worded Resolution urging upon the Secretary of State the importance of giving the separation allowance to privates. The information I obtained from officers commanding Volunteers in my county goes to show that, if privates are deprived of the separation allowance, the regiments are likely to lose a very large number of their most valuable men. I do not think any point has more impressed the Volunteers than the fact that privates are not to receive the separation allowance, whilst this privilege is to be given to

  745
  non-commissioned officers. The noncommissioned officers are generally the foremen in the works in which the men are employed, and earn higher wages. I hope, therefore, the question will be reconsidered. The men will be expected to come out for a fortnight's training instead of for seven days, as now, and I believe that if this concession is withheld we shall in our part of the country lose a very large number of the men we are particularly anxious to retain.
  LORD SAYE AND SELE: My Lords, I did not intend to take part in this discussion, but one of the points alluded to by Lord Albemarle particularly interests me. I refer to the uncertainty of the officers' position in regard to pensions. If we could get a definition of what an officer's pension is, I am sure it would be of great use; for in my humble opinion the dearth of officers is very closely bound up with this point. If you ask any officer in the British Army to define a pension you will only get one answer—namely, that it is a reward for past services, and I think your Lordships would return the same reply. Yet when it comes to an officer taking a position as secretary to a Territorial Association, or an appointment of that kind, his pension is invariably dragged in by the War Office, and it is said that he is getting so much pension, and therefore can do with less reward for his present services. I will give a concrete instance. At the commencement of the South African War there were two classes of officers—one receiving a pension and the other a gratuity. The pension was held on the security of promises; the gratuity, of course, was in the officer's pocket. When an officer was called back from the Reserve the Regulations took away his pension and put him on full pay. Therefore the pensioned officers, of whom I had the honour to be one, had their pension taken away; whereas the gratuity officers retained their gratuity intact. That was generally spoken of throughout the Army as a gross injustice, and I only quote it as one instance of the uncertainty that prevails. An officer never knows what exactly is his position, and this, I am sure, has a great bearing on the difficulty of getting officers and keeping them. I therefore ask whether some sort of definition of a pension could not be given which should hold good for all time.
  *THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I rise only for the purpose of expressing my thanks to my noble friend behind me for having called attention to a matter which seems to me of considerable importance—I mean the remuneration offered to the secretaries of these County Associations. I am constrained to say that in my view the War Office is making a great mistake in pushing its frugal principles too far, when it comes to deal with the emoluments of officers selected for this extremely important work. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that the success or failure of an Association will very often depend upon the manner in which it is served by its secretary. The presidents and chairmen of the Associations are as often as not men who have many other public duties to perform, and who must depend to a great extent, if not entirely, for all matters of routine upon their secretaries. The secretary will have to start this brand new machinery, sometimes in circumstances of very great difficulty, and surely it is worth while offering to those whom you desire to attract to these positions, salaries bearing at any rate some relation to the importance of the work which they have to do. I am personally aware of a case in which a County Association was able to secure the assistance of a gallant officer as to whose qualifications there could be no doubt, because his name was included on the War Office list of officers eligible for these secretary ships. He was ready to take the post at a salary of £200 a year, not surely a very exaggerated stipend. We received from the War Office, however, an intimation that £100 a year was all that could be allowed, and that if more was to be given it must be provided from other sources. Obviously those other sources could only be either the generosity of private individuals or the deflection of a part of the allowance made to the Association from some other useful purpose to supplement the salary given to the secretary. To my mind both those alternatives would have been very regrettable. My noble friend who introduced the subject told the House that he believed matters had materially improved in this respect. I hope they have, because there is room for improvement. I do very earnestly entreat the War Office not to jeopardise the success of this most important scheme by

  747
  an exaggerated parsimony in respect to this one particular.
  *THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: My Lords, a Liberal Government always finds itself in an unusually unhappy position in regard to the War Office administration. The Secretary of State is accused in the other House of spending too much money, and I am continually asked in your Lordship's House to spend a little more. I can assure the noble Marquess who has just spoken that I agree with him that the question of the remuneration of secretaries is an important and anxious one, and I entirely concur in the statement that the success of these Associations must, to a considerable extent, depend upon the ability and capacity of the secretary. I do not know whether the last word has been said on the subject, but I will bear in mind what the noble Marquess has said. Then the noble Lord behind me asked whether I would define what a pension is. I am almost nightly asked a series of conundrums by noble Lords opposite, and I do my best to reply, but the noble Lord must excuse me if I decline to attempt a definition on so difficult and debatable a point. As to the Question put to me by Lord Albemarle, I can assure the noble Earl that I will use all my influence to prevent an injustice being done to any gallant officer, and perhaps he will communicate to me privately the full facts of the case to which he referred. With regard to the Questions on the Paper, I listened with some concern to what was said by Lord Errol and Lord Wenlock, and I will see that the views they have put forward are brought before the proper quarter.
  In reply to the first Question that Lord Albemarle placed on the Paper, I have to say I am afraid there is no possibility of extending the privilege of separation allowance to private soldiers of the Territorial Force. The reasons for this decision of the Army Council I have already given in detail in reply to my noble friend Lord Ampthill, on the 13th of last month. In reply to my noble friend's second Question, there will be no allowance, as such, given to the men of the Territorial Force. The men will get the pay of their rank on the same lines as the Regulars. I may add that I am informed that my noble friend is
  748
  scarcely accurate in saying that most corps now pay 10s. weekly allowance to their men.
  Then I come to the third Question, and on that matter I do not think my noble friend need feel any great apprehension. It is not the intention of the Army Council that the maximum fine laid down under the Act for non-attendance at camp should be imposed when there is reasonable excuse for such non-attendance. The widest possible discretion is left to the General Officer Commanding - in - Chief to deal with individual cases on their merits as they arise, and to decide whether any action should be taken under Clause 21 of the Act. In reply to my noble friend's fourth Question, a new form of the attestation paper has recently been issued, from which several details which had been criticised as objectionable have been altogether omitted. The intimation that the giving of false answers renders the man liable to punishment is still retained. We consider it only fair that the man should be informed of his liability in this respect under Section 99 of the Army Act, and in the revised form of the attestation paper this fact is represented to the man in as moderate terms as possible.
  I may inform my noble friend in reply to his fifth Question, that an Army Order will be issued, I hope during this week, dealing with the whole question of the amalgamation of units. This Army Order will give detailed instructions as to how the members of the present Auxiliary Forces, to whom he refers, are to be dealt with. In reply to my noble friend's sixth Question, I have to inform him that this question of the permanent staff' of units is being considered, and detailed instructions regarding the various cases that arise will be issued. There was one other point to which the noble Earl referred, namely, the Volunteer decoration. I had a Question put to me a little while ago on this point, and I then said, and now repeat, that the matter is in a forward condition; but, of course, it would not be proper for me to make any statement regarding it before we have received the Royal approval.
  LORD HARRIS: I understood the noble Earl to say that it was not the intention of the Army Council to impose

  749
  very heavy fines in the case of men failing to attend camp.
  THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: Whenever there is reasonable excuse.
  LORD HARRIS: That is not the point. On making inquiries at the War Office, I understood that in all cases in which a man failed to earn all that he could earn, it would be necessary for the County Association to prosecute him in the Courts, when it would be for the justices to decide what fine should be imposed. Under the old system there was a code of rules which the man accepted as conditions of service, and attached to them was a schedule of fines, and if a man failed to earn any part of the contingent grant the commanding officer was able to recover such an amount as he failed to earn. Now the noble Earl says the War Office is going to impose the fine. My impression is that he is wrong there. Under the Act and the attestation form combined the liability of the Yeoman or the Volunteer, as the case may be, is laid down, and, if he fails fully to perform his liability, it is for the Association to decide whether they will endeavour to recover what he ought to have earned by going to the Courts. It will not lie with the commanding officer, the County Association, or the Army Council, to decide what fine he should pay; that will be for the Court to decide.
  THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: I do not think there is anything incorrect in what my noble friend says, but it does not, I think, militate against the answer I have given.
  LORD NEWTON: I should like to ask, to satisfy my curiosity, whether there is any guarantee that anybody will be fined at all.
  [No Answer was returned.]
  LORD NEWTON: Am I to have no answer.
  THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: I am afraid I cannot give a guarantee.
  LORD NEWTON: Then I will put a Question on the Paper.

  THE TERRITORIAL BATTERIES.
  LORD WENLOCK: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend, Lord Fortescue, I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for War whether, when the guns are issued to the Territorial Army, there will be issued with them a proper complement of the range finders, signalling apparatus, and other equipment necessary for the training and efficiency of the batteries; and, if not, will he inform County Associations how much of this necessary equipment they will have to provide for themselves.
  THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: As regards this matter, I have to inform my noble friend that all the necessary technical equipment will be provided by the War Office as soon as it is available.
  House adjourned at twenty-five minutes past Five o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.