Sitting of 23 February 1905

Preamble
The House met at Two of the Clock.
PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.
  SUBSTITUTED BILLS [LORDS] (STANDING ORDERS COMPLIED WITH).
  Mr. SPEAKERlaid upon the Table Report from the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in respect of the following Bill, introduced pursuant to the provisions of The Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, and which the Chairman of Ways and Means had directed to originate in the House of Lords, they have certified that the Standing Orders have been complied with, viz.:-Clyde Navigation [Lords].
PETITIONS
  AGRICULTURAL RATES, CONGESTED DISTRICTS, AND BURGH LAND TAX RELIEF (SCOTLAND) ACT, 1896.
  Petition from Kincardineshire, for continuance; to lie upon the Table.
  JUVENILE SMOKING.
  Petition from Brighton, for legislation; to lie upon the Table.
RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.
  ARMY ADDITIONAL ESTIMATE, 1904-5).
  Estimate presented, of the amount required during the year ending 31st March, 1905, to meet expenditure on the military operations in Somaliland, for which no provision was made in the original Army Estimates for the year; also to authorise the appropriation of certain receipts, in excess of those included in the original Army Estimates for the year, to defray expenditure in excess of the sums therein provided for Army services other than the Somaliland operations [by Command]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 57.]
  LOCOMOTIVES ON HIGHWAYS ACT, 1896, AND MOTOR-CAR ACT, 1903.
  Copy presented, of General Order made by the Local Government Board for Ireland, entitled The Heavy Motor-Car (Ireland) Order, 1905 [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.
  RAILWAY, ETC., BILLS.
  Copy ordered, "of Report by the Board of Trade upon ail the Bills and Provisional Orders of Session 1905 relating to Railways, Canals, Tramways, Harbours, and Tidal Waters, and the supply of Electricity, Gas, and Water."-(Mr. Gerald Balfour).
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS CIRCULATED WITH THE VOTES.

  Separation of Judicial and Executive Functions in India.
  MR. HERBERT ROBERTS: To ask the Secretary of State for India whether he is aware that the Viceroy intimated in his Budget speech on March 25th, 1903, that the question of the separation of judicial and executive functions in India would be dealt with at an early date; and whether he is now in a position to state what steps have been taken by the Government of India to carry out this change.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) I have not received any information on the subject from the Government of India, but will ascertain from Lord Curzon how the matter stands.

  Reduction of Establishments of West Indian Colonies.
  MR. BUCHANAN: To ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies what is the extent of the reductions in the establishments in the West Indian Colonies and Bermuda, which, as he has announced, it is the intention of the Government to make at an early date.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Lyttelton.) The garrison of Bermuda will be reduced by a battalion of infantry. The company of Royal Garrison Artillery has already been withdrawn. The establishment of the remaining battalion will be reduced from 920 to 766 rank and file, and that of the two remaining companies of artillery and of engineers is under consideration. As regards the West Indies, St. Lucia will be abandoned as a defended station, and its garrison and that of Barbados will be withdrawn. The garrison of Jamaica is still under consideration.

  Vivisection of Cats.
  MR. TOMKINSON: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention has been called to the cases tried in Bedford Police Court on February 9th last, in which fines were imposed for the stealing of cats, and in which evidence
  1074
  was given that large consignments of cats had been sent by one of the defend ants to a house in a London suburb alleged to be visited by medical gentlemen; and whether he will order the publication of the address of the house in question and an investigation into the practices carried on in it.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Akers-Douglas.) Yes, Sir; and I have made inquiry into the matter. The name of the house in question (Brockwell Hall, Herne Hill) is given in the newspaper reports of the proceedings. The premises are registered as a place where experiments can be performed under the Act 39 and 40 Vic.. cap. 77, and are under inspection. The experiments there are carried on in strict conformity with the law. The director of these laboratories informs me that the cats were purchased in the ordinary way from a dealer in cats and dogs, and that neither he (the director) nor anyone else connected with the institution had the slightest suspicion that this dealer was other than a perfectly honest man. The director further informs me that on' reading the reports in the Press he communicated with the head constable of the Bedford police, and sent to him the cats which had been received from Bedford in order that they might be inspected by any persons who had lost cats. If animals are obtained in an improper manner the offenders are amenable to the ordinary law, and in the present case a conviction has been obtained.
  SIR FREDERICK BANBURY: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention has been called to the evidence given in the case at the Bedford Police Court on Thursday. the 9th inst., when three men were convicted of cat-stealing, to the effect that the animals stolen by these men were consigned to the Licensed Vivisectors' Laboratory at Herne Hill; and whether, in these circumstances, he will institute inquiries as to the sources from which animals are generally obtained by vivisectors for the purpose of experiments.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Akers-Douglas.) The facts of this matter are given in my Answer to the previous

  1075
  Question. As I there stated, persons who improperly obtain possession of animals can be dealt with by the ordinary law. It would be beyond the functions of the Secretary of State, under the Act 39 and 40 Vic., cap 77, to institute such general inquiries as are suggested by the hon. Baronet; but I am always ready, as in the present instance, to investigate any particular case in which alleged abuses are brought to my notice.

  Newcastle as Examination Centre for Naval Cadets.
  SIR WALTER PLUMMER: To ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, with reference to the approaching open competitive examination of candidates for entry as engineer cadets in His Majesty's Navy to be held in London, Edinburgh, Dublin, Devonport, and Portsmouth, if the Admiralty will consider whether Newcastle-on-Tyne, as the centre of the Tyneside engineering industry, might in future be added to the places where candidates are examined; and if the usual announcement of the date of such examinations could be inserted in one of the principal north country newspapers.
  (Answered by Mr. Pretyman.) The date fixed by the Civil Service Commissioners for the sending in of names by candidates, February 15th, has now been passed, so no change would be possible in regard to the forthcoming examination in March. Newcastle was one of the centres of examination until the year 1899, when it was omitted, together with three other centres (when the regulations were under revision), for the reasons that there was a difficulty in conducting an examination at the same time in so many centres, and the number of candidates who came forward there was so small (in 1898 four only) as to make it a very expensive matter in proportion to any possible advantages to the services. The Civil Service Commissioners will be asked to notify the date of the next examination in the north country newspapers.

  Education-Payment of Grants.
  MR. SOARES: To ask the Secretary to he Board of Education whether he is
  1076
  aware that inconvenience to local education authorities has been caused by the delay in paying the balance of annual and fee grants to those authorities whose school year ended October 31st last, such grants in some instances not having been paid until January last, and in some not yet paid; and, if so, whether any assurance can be given that the grants for the present year shall be paid at regular intervals.
  (Answered by Sir William Anson.) The Board regret that there should have been a delay in some cases in the payment of the annual grant and final instalment of fee grant, due for the school year ending October 31st last, and they are making special efforts at the present time to pay off all such cases with as little delay as possible. The delay, in so far as the Board are responsible for it, is largely due to special pressure some months ago in another department of the Board's work, of which the effect is only now being felt. The Board have every reason to hope that the delay will not again occur.

  Building By-Laws in Country Districts.
  MR. HENRY HOBHOUSE): To ask the President of the Local Government Board if he will lay before the House a Return of the building by-laws made by rural district councils which affect the construction of cottages; and if he proposes to have any inquiry into the subject.
  (Answered by Mr. Walter Long.) I am afraid that, looking to the differences in detail between various series of by-laws, it would scarcely be practicable to indicate by means of a Return the bylaws in force in each area. I am receiving representations from various quarters with respect to building by-laws in rural districts, and the whole question is engaging my attention. I have not at present arrived at a decision with regard to the course to be adopted in the matter.

  Railway Construction in the Neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf.
  MR:. REGINALD LUCAS: To ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether

  1077
  he can give any information as to the present prospect of railway construction in the neighbourhood of Bagdad and the Persian Gulf; whether any schemes are known to be now under consideration; and, if so, by whom they are promoted; and whether His Majesty's Government are exercising any influence in the matter.
  (Answered by Earl Percy.) His Majesty's Government are not aware that any steps have been taken for the construction of the Bagdad Railway beyond the Koniah-Eregli section, which was completed in October last, and paid for by a loan raised at Berlin; and they have no knowledge of any schemes for raising the funds necessary for the continuation of the line to the Persian Gulf.

  Income-Tax.
  MR. FIELD: To ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Treasury have suggested to their officials to press for the immediate collection of income-tax and issue threatening notices; and whether it has been hinted, especially in Ireland, that increased assessment on problematical anticipated profits is desirable.
  (Answered by Mr. Austen Chamberlain.) The Answer to both these Questions is in the negative.

  Suggested Import Duty on Diamonds and Gold from South Africa.
  MR. FIELD: To ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, in view of the outlay entailed by the Boer War and the failure of the mineowners to bear their promised share of the expenditure incurred, he will consider the advisability of introducing into the Budget a recommendation to impose an import duty on diamonds and gold received from South Africa.
  (Answered by Mr. Austen Chamberlain.) I cannot anticipate in any way the Budget Statement.

  Salt Tax in India.
  MR. WEIR: To ask the Secretary of State for India if he will consider the expediency of recommending
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  the Governor-General of India in Council to endeavour to arrange for the abolition or further reduction of the salt tax.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) I am confident that the question of the salt duty will be considered, together with other questions of taxation, by the Government of India in connection with the financial arrangements for the year, and as I have already been in communication with them on these subjects I do not think it necessary to make any recommendation to them.

  Indian Irrigation.
  MR. WEIR: To ask the Secretary of State for India if he will state the precise character of the irrigation scheme which is said to have been recently sanctioned, and when the work is expected to be commenced.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) The scheme presumably referred to by the hon. Member is the combined Upper Jhelum, Upper Chenab, and Lower Bari Doab Canal projects in the Punjab. The Upper Jhelum Canal, drawing its supply from the Jhelum, will irrigate the Upper Jech Doab, and will pass its surplus water into the Chenab River above the head of the existing Lower Chenab Canal. This will render an equal amount of water available for withdrawal from that river by the new Upper Chenab Canal, which will take off opposite Sialkote and irrigate the Upper Rechna Doab, then passing under the Ravi by a syphon fifteen miles south of Lahore, it will supply the water for the Lower Bari Doab Canal. The combined canals will have 225 miles of main canals. 293 miles of branch canals, and 2,714 miles of distributaries. They will command an area of 3,997,434 acres, of which 1,875,855 may be annually irrigated. The total estimated cost is Rs.7,82,38,925, on which the direct and indirect receipts are expected to give eventually a return of over 9 per cent. Sanction has been given to the immediate commencement of the work.

  Irish Education.
  MR. DILLON: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he proposes to introduce

  1079
  any legislation dealing with Irish education during the present session.
  (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) No, Sir.

  Publication of Report of Irish Poor Law Reform Commission.
  MR. SLOAN: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland if he can state when the Report of the Irish Poor Law Reform Commission will be laid upon the Table.
  CAPTAIN DONELAN: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Report of the Poor Law Reform Commission will be issued in time for action to be taken by Parliament, so that effect may be given to it at the forthcoming triennial elections for Poor Law guardians.
  (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) Inquiries have been held by the Commission in every county in Ireland except Cork. The Commissioners hope to complete their inquiries in that county early in April. It is not at present possible to state, even approximately, when their Report will be issued.

  Assimilation of Taxation Arrangements in Great Britain and Ireland.
  MR. FIELD: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether it is intended to assimilate the taxation arrangements and procedure in Ireland with that existing in Great Britain by appointing local authority assessment valuation committees.
  (Answered by Mr.Wyndham.) It is not proposed to introduce legislation of the character suggested.

  Distribution of Grazing Land on the Isadore Bourke Estate.
  MR. JOHN O'DONNELL: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that in the distribution of some grazing farms on the Isadore Bourke Estate, near Claremorris, county Mayo, the Congested Districts Board gave two large holdings to a grazier named Connaughton, who has already over 300
  1080
  acres of land on that and neighbouring estates; and, if so, whether steps will be taken to get back these holdings with a view to relieving congestion in the district.
  (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) The land (142 acres) to which reference is made had been in uninterrupted possession of Thomas Connaughton for many years. When the Board acquired the estate in 1902 the lands were partitioned into five holdings on which suitable dwellings were erected. One of these holdings (49 acres) was given to Connaughton by the Board. It is not proposed to disturb him in the occupation of the holding.

  Grazing Lands on the Nolan-Farrell Estate.
  MR. JOHN O'DONNELL: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that the tenants on the Nolan-Farrell Estate, situate at Logboy, near Ballyhaunis, county Mayo, have agreed to purchase their holdings from the Congested Districts Board at twenty and twenty-three years purchase; and, if so, whether, seeing that there are a number of grazing farms on this estate, some of which are held by parties who already hold substantial residential farms, the Congested Districts Board will refuse to sanction the giving of any of these ranches to any person other than the occupier of an uneconomic holding, or who has no land at present.
  (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) The Congested Districts Board has arranged for the purchase of the estate on the basis of twenty years for first-term and twenty-three years for second-term rental of permanent agricultural tenancies. The Board has also arranged for the purchase of the demesne and other lands let under temporary lettings and to obtain clear possession of these lands, which will be utilised for migration and the enlargement of small holdings on the estate.
  MR. JOHN O'DONNELL: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that two graziers on the Nolan-Farrell Estate, situate.at Logboy, near Ballyhaunis, county

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  Mayo, who hold portions of a grazing ranche on what is known as the Rockfield part of the estate, have applied for a grant to the Congested Districts Board to enable them to become owners of these grazing lands; and, if so, whether, in view of the number of uneconomic holdings on this estate, he will give instructions to the Board not to give any grant to these persons, but to take steps towards the dividing of all grazing farms on the estate, with a view to enlarging uneconomic and creating new holdings.
  (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) The grazing lands at Rockfield are held under early tenancies. When the Board acquire the ownership of the estate it will consider the question of obtaining possession of these lands.

  Appointment of a Maternity Nurse for Ballyhaunis Dispensary District.
  MR. JOHN O'DONNBLL: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that a copy of the evidence taken at the recent sworn inquiry at Claremorris regarding the appointment of a maternity nurse for Ballyhaunis Dispensary District has been applied for by a member of that board of guardians, and refused; and, if so, whether he will have one supplied to this gentleman at the earliest opportunity.
  (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) No such application has been received. A copy of the minutes of evidence has been before the board of guardians since December last, and it is open to any guardian to read the evidence contained in this document, which is the property of the guardians.
  MK. JOHN O'DONNELL: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that the Local Government Board has issued a sealed order compelling the Claremorris Board of Guardians to elect a trained maternity nurse for the Ballyhaunis Dispensary District, that the medical officer and other representative men from the district swore there was no necessity for the appointment of such a nurse, that
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  there are two medical doctors and two trained maternity nurses already practising in that district, and that the evidence of the relieving officer of the district showed there was an average of only three or four applications from the poor each year for assistance; that some of the parties whose names were put to a memorial praying for a nurse have repudiated all knowledge of the matter; and, if so, whether he will give instructions to have the sealed order withdrawn.
  (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) The evidence of the medical officer at the local inquiry was not to the effect alleged. His evidence clearly showed that no provision existed for the skilled nursing of midwifery cases amongst the poor, and that the appointment of a midwife for the purpose was essential. He stated that the births during the past three years averaged 282; that two deaths had occurred in the same period, one of which, in his opinion, was preventable if the services of a trained midwife had been available; and that there had been a number of still-births in the district attributable largely to the absence of a skilled attendant. The relieving officer stated he had been obliged to requisition the assistance of a midwife on four occasions during the year. It is understood that there is a midwife resident at Ballyhaunis, but she is not an officer of the union and her services are not, therefore, available for the poor free of charge. It is not proposed to withdraw the sealed order.

  Army Recruiting.
  MR. MARKS (Kent, Thanet): To ask the Secretary of State for War if he will state in detail the progress made in recruiting for the General Service Army on the new lengthened terms of enlistment, viz., nine years with the colours and three years with the Reserve, giving the number of recruits obtained, specifying those in the Metropolitan area and those in the provinces, together with the figures for November, and December, 1904, and January, 1905, and those for November and December, 1903, and January, 1904, when the short term of three years with the colours was the rule;

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  and whether he can say how far the long-term men now being obtained have made up for the deficit of last year in the drafts for India and the Colonies caused by the failure of the three-year men to re-engage.

  For three years Colour Service and nine years in the Reserve.

  Number raised.

  Number raised in London.

  Number raised in Provinces.

  November, 1903

  2,638

  287

  2,351

  December, 1903

  2,207

  200

  2,007

  January, 1904

  3,698

  432

  3,266

  8,543

  919

  7,624

  In reply to the second part of the Question there was no deficit in the drafts last year for India or the Colonies. Men who had failed to extend were sent out as drafts to obviate any possible deficiency.

  Officers Transferred to the Militia—Mess Subscriptions.
  DR. THOMPSON (Monaghan, N.): To ask the Secretary of State for War if he is aware of the regulation which compels an officer of His Majesty's Army who is obliged on resigning his commission to serve for a certain number of years in the Militia, to subscribe in full to the mess subscription of the particular regiment to which he is appointed; and if, considering that the officer so transferred has already paid to the mess of the Line regiment and may have only a few years to serve in the Militia to complete his term of service, he will direct that such officer shall only pay a mess subscription in proportion to the
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Arnold-Forster.) In reply to the first part of the Question, the numbers of infantry recruited for the periods mentioned are as follows:—
  further number of years he has to serve in the Militia.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Arnold-Forster.) The question of granting this concession has been already considered, and it was decided that it was not possible to make it. The officers referred to are in effect making use of the Militia in order to enable them to retire voluntarily from the Regular Forces, and it would not be fair upon the Militia unit concerned that these officers should be relieved of the payment of their full subscriptions.

  Sentences on Chinese Labourers.
  MR. HERBERT SAMUEL (Yorkshire, Cleveland): To ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will furnish a statement of all sentences which have been inflicted by Courts in the Transvaal upon Chinese labourers, showing what was the offence in each case, and, where the option of a fine was given, whether the

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  fine was paid or other punishment suffered.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Lyttelton.) I will furnish such a statement; but I do not expect to receive the information asked for in the last part of the Question under some weeks.

  Duty on Price Lists in Australia.
  MR. RUNCIMAN (Dewsbury): To ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether his attention has been drawn to the fact that price lists over a certain size are subjected to an import duty in Australia when sent from the United Kingdom; whether he has drawn attention to the amount of irritation which this has caused amongst English and Australian traders; and whether he is prepared to suggest to the Commonwealth Government the advisability of removing these restrictions.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Lyttelton.) I have received several communications drawing attention to the duty imposed in Australia on the importation of trade catalogues and price lists. These communications have been forwarded to the Government of the Commonwealth, and I have been informed by that Government that the primary object of the duty in question is not for the purpose of revenue, but for the encouragement of local printing, and that the Government has no present intention of altering the law in this connection.

  QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE.

    Naval Training Ships.
    MR. SWIFT MACNEILL (Donegal, S.): I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty what is the number of ships of the Royal Navy set apart for the training of boys and youths; and how many boys and youths are at present receiving instruction and under training in these ships.
    THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. PRETYMAN, Suffolk, Wood-bridge): Twelve ships, including three sea-going cruisers, are set apart for the training of boys and youths, of whom 4,193 are at present receiving instruction and under training in these ships. In
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    addition, 100 youths have been temporarily embarked in two other cruisers.

    Rosyth—Expenditure on Naval Station.
    MR. BRIGHT (Shropshire, Oswestry): I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty what has been the expenditure to date on the naval station at Rosyth, and what further expenditure is at present contemplated upon that station.
    THE CIVIL LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. ARTHUR LEE, Hampshire, Fareham): With regard to the first part of the Question, the expenditure to date amounts to £153,830. As regards the latter part of the Question, the matter will be dealt with when the Naval Works Loan Bill is introduced.
    MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON (Dundee): Has any estimate been arrived at of the total probable expenditure?
    MR. ARTHUR LEE: No. Sir.
    MR. EUGENE WASON (Clackmannan and Kinross): Does the £153,000 include the initial cost of the land?
    MR. ARTHUR LEE: Yes, Sir.

    Case of Colonel Morgan.
    MR. CHARLES HOBHOUSE: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether any, and, if so, what report was made by the General Officer Commanding in South Africa on the case of Colonel Morgan of the Army Service Corps; whether Colonel Morgan has brought any action against persons in connection with alleged improper sale of warlike stores in South Africa; if so, what has been the result of such action; what action has the Secretary of State taken in regard to Colonel Morgan's alleged relation to this matter.
    THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. ARNOLD-FORSTER, Belfast, W.): I have nothing to add to the reply which I gave the hon. Member on July 5th † last, with the exception that the case has not yet come into Court.
    MR. CHARLES HOBHOUSE: Is there any anticipation that the case will be brought into Court?
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: Yes, Sir, I believe it will very shortly.
    † See (4) Debates, exxxvii., 634.
    MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: Is it not the fact that the right hon. Gentleman, on behalf of the War Office, refused to put Colonel Morgan under an obligation to bring the action, and is it not likewise a fact that the Chief Justice of the Transvaal accused him of malversation of public funds?
    MR. SPEAKER: Order, order!
    MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: Yes, Sir, I think I am in order. May I read an Answer given by the right hon. Gentleman on this question on August 2nd—
    MR. SPEAKER: No, that would be very irregular. Notice must be given of any further Question.

    Waterford Artillery Horses—Outbreak of South African Disease.
    MR. POWER (Waterford, E.): I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been drawn to the fact that South African disease has broken out among the horses of the artillery stationed at Waterford, and to the fact that veterinary authorities consider this disease, though slow of development, highly infectious and incurable; if so, will he say when was the first case reported and when was the animal suffering from it destroyed: whether the Army veterinary surgeon recently stationed at Waterford reported that if the disease was to be stamped out all the horses then in barracks should be destroyed, and the stables thoroughly disinfected; and whether it is the intention of the War Office to have that recommendation carried out, or what steps do they intend taking to prevent the spread of this disease.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: Epizootic lymphangitis appeared at Waterford among horses of the Royal Artillery in November and December, 1903, in two instances, which were both cured, the last case was admitted in October, 1904, and at once destroyed, since when there have been no more cases. The veterinary authorities do not consider this disease to be absolutely incurable, although many cases have to be destroyed as a precautionary measure. There is no doubt as to its infectious character. The disease is now practically stamped out of the
    1088
    Army, only isolated cases being occasionally reported. The precautionary measures taken have therefore proved to be sufficient. The veterinary officer at Waterford had received instructions as to all precautionary measures to be taken to stamp out the disease, and we have no knowledge that he suggested that all horses in barracks should be destroyed.
    MR. POWER: Seeing that a case has appeared in county Waterford, will the right hon. Gentleman institute inquiries by competent people?
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: Yes, I can give a most positive assurance that any case will be carefully inquired into.

    South African Soldier Convicts.
    MR. PATRICK O'BRIEN (Kilkenny): I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War what were the offences for which the seven prisoners were convicted by Court-Martial in connection with the South African War, who were confined in Irish prisons and recently discharged; what were the grounds upon which they were discharged; and how much of their respective sentences had each served.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: The detailed statistics required are too long to read out to the House, but I will hand them to the hon. Member for his information.
    MR. PATRICK O'BRIEN: Cannot the right hon. Gentleman state the charges and how much of the sentences was served.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: There are two pages of details. I do not think the House would deem it convenient to have them read.
    MR. PATRICK O'BRIEN: I claim that the Answer ought to be read.
    MR. SPEAKER: The right hon. Gentleman can give any Answer he pleases.
    MR. PATRICK O'BRIEN: He has it in his hands. I think I have a right to have it read.
    MR. SPEAKER: It is not a question of right. It is for the right hon. Gentleman to exercise his judgment on the matter.
    Appended is the Answer referred to:—

    Name.

    Charges upon which Convicted.

    Sentence and Date.

    William Sherry

    (1) When on active service—drunkenness.

    5 years penal servitude on 12th February 1901.

    Released on 12th May, 1902, on completion of fifteen months of sentence, by order of the Commander-in-chief.

    (2) Shooting with intent to do grievous bodily harm.

    James Halvey

    (1) Striking superior officer on active service.

    7 years penal servitude on 27th May, 1901.

    Commuted by Commander-in-Chief two years hard labour in June, 1902; released on 13th October, 1902, on his embarkation for India after completeing sixteen and a half months.

    (2) Violence to superior officer on active service.

    Thomas Ryan

    (1) Releasing a prisoner from lawful custody.

    5 years penal servitude on 28th May, 1901.

    Commuted by Commander-in-Chief to eighteen months hard labour in June, 1902; sentence expired 27th November, 1902.

    (2) Insubordinate language to superior officer on active service.

    (3) Inciting mutiny

    Thomas Coughlan

    (1) Murder

    Death. 28th June, 1901.

    Commuted to penal servitude for life; released on 21st December, 1903, by Commander-in-Chief after completing two and a half years in prison, it being considered by the Judge Advocate-General that the case was one in which a verdict of manslaughter might properly have been found, there being an absence of motive.

    John McDonagh

    (1) Housebreaking (2 charges).

    3 years penal servitude on 18th April, 1902.

    Released on 17th October, 1903, on completion of eighteen months of sentence, by order of Commander-in-Chief,

    Martin Kavanagh

    (1) Receiving stolen goods (2 charges).

    3 years penal servitude on 19th April, 1902.

    Released on 17th October, 1903, on completion of one year of sentence, by order of the Commander-in-Chief.

    Charles Kavanagh

    (1) Insubordinate language and striking his superior officer.

    5 years penal servitude on 22nd November, 1902.

    Commuted to one and a half years hard labour on 11th February, 1903, by order of the Commander-in-Chief. Sentence expired 21st October, 1904.

    Artillery Armament Estimate.
    MR. BUCHANAN (Perthshire, E.): I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, when will the Supplementary Estimate for the new armament of the artillery be brought forward.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: No Supplementary Estimate in respect of the guns will be presented.
    MR. BUCHANAN: How, then, does the right hon. Gentleman propose to meet the charge?
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: In the ordinary way-in the Estimates.
    MR. BUCHANAN: But the expenditure in the current year?
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: The expenditure has been provided for.

    Military Depôt for Ross-shire Regiments.
    MR. WEIR (Ross and Cromarty): I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he is yet in a position to state whether, under the new scheme of Army Reorganisation, the depôt of all Ross-shire regiments will be established at Dingwall, the county town.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: If the hon. Member will kindly refer to the Special Army Order of January 6th last, he will find the details of the organisation of the Scottish Command; from which he will see that the depot of all Ross-shire regiments will not be established at Dingwall.

    Strength of the Auxiliary Forces.
    CAPTAIN ELLICE (St. Andrews Burghs): I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, what is the present nominal strength of the Militia; what is the actual strength; what is the present nominal strength of the Volunteer force; and what is the actual strength.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: The figures available are as follows:—Militia (United Kingdom only), all ranks, nominal strength (establishment), 131,582; actual strength on February 1st, 1905, 96,449. Volunteers (United Kingdom only), all ranks, nominal strength (establishment),
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    344,279; actual strength on January 1st, 1905, 245,359.

    Chinese Labour—Restriction of Importa- tion into the Transvaal.
    DR. MACNAMARA (Camberwell, N.): I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, having regard to the fact that over 27,000 Chinese coolies are now on the Rand, that 7,500 more have been already recruited, and that 50,000 in all are expected to be on the Rand by June, and to the fact that Sir George Farrar, in commending the introduction of the Chinese coolies to the people of the Transvaal, mentioned from 20,000 to 30,000 coolies as the limit of requirement, and to the fact that Lord Lansdowne, in another place, gave the assurance, on February 12th, 1904, that the proposal of the Government was to try the experiment of introducing Chinese coolies to the Transvaal on a limited scale, he will now put a limit to the further importation of Chinese coolies into the Transvaal.
    THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Mr. LYTTELTON, Warwick and Leamington): The hon. Member does not appear to have rightly quoted Sir George Farrar's statement to the Legislative Council. I am not prepared to set a limit as suggested, but I understand that the present requirements of the mines are for no more than 55,000 Chinese, and that after that number has been introduced the rates of increase, if increase there be, will be very moderate. The cost of recruiting and maintenance of the Chinese is very heavy in comparison with the Kaffir, and it is obvious that ordinary prudence will dictate that the introduction of Chinese should be limited to supplementing the deficiency between the number of Kaffirs who can be obtained and the total number of unskilled labourers which the mines may require. The experiment and all its consequences have received, and are receiving, the closest attention of the Transvaal Government and His Majesty's Government, and we have no doubt that the representative Government about to be introduced with even better opportunities for vigilance will scrupulously maintain that attitude.
    MAJOR SEELY (Isle of Wight): Is the House to understand that the Government propose to put no limit of any kind to the importation of Chinese?
    MR. LYTTELTON: I have already answered that Question. I cannot say more.

    Geldenhuis Deep Mine—Discharge of White Labour.
    MR. SHACKLETON (Lancashire, Clitheroe): On behalf of the hon., Member for Derby, I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the Geldenhuis Deep Mine is now employing 1,100 Chinese coolies; and whether the seventy-five unskilled white men working there in August last have been discharged?
    MR. LYTTELTONreplied that he was not in a position to answer that Question.
    MR. SHACKLETON: When will an Answer be given?
    MR. LYTTELTON: When the information arrives.

    Rose Deep Mine—Discharge of White Labour.
    MR. SHACKLETON: On behalf of the hon. Member for Derby, I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the Rose Deep Mine in the Transvaal is now employing 1,340 Chinese coolies; and whether the unskilled white labourers working there in August last have been discharged.
    MR. LYTTELTON: I have not the information which would enable me to answer this Question, but I will inquire as to the facts.
    MR. BAYLEY (Derbyshire, Chesterfield): Will the right hon. Gentleman cable for it?
    MR. LYTTELTON: No, Sir.

    Chinese Riots on the Simner and Jack Mine.
    MR. SHACKLETON: On behalf of the hon. Member for Derby, I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies
    1094
    whether he has any particulars of the riots which took place amongst the Chinese indentured coolies on the Sumner and Jock Mine on Saturday, January 21st last, when thirty-one coolies were arrested, and another coolie, in order to avoid arrest, jumped down No. 3 Shaft and was killed: and will he state what were the sentences inflicted on the prisoners.
    MR. LYTTELTON: I presume the hon. Member refers to the Simmer and Jack Mine. The local newspaper of January 23rd contains nothing about any disturbance, and I have received no reports of this occurrence, but I will make inquiry.

    Transvaal and Orange River Colonies Constitution.
    DR. MACNAMARA: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether the House will be afforded an opportunity of discussing the proposals for conferring local self-government upon the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies before those proposals become operative.
    The hon. Member also had the following Question on the Paper:—To ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he will afford the House an opportunity of discussing the Report and recommendations of the Physical Deterioration (1904) Committee.
    THE PRIME MINISTER AND FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR, Manchester, E.): With the permission of the hon. Member I will answer both his Questions together. I could not give a pledge as to finding facilities for discussing either of the topics to which he refers.
    DR. MACNAMARA: The right hon. Gentleman has not answered the first Question—namely, whether an opportunity will be afforded to the House of discussing the proposals for conferring self-government upon these colonies before such proposals come into operation.
    MR. SWIFT MACNEILLreminded the right hon. Gentleman that a similar form of government given to Cape Colony was given by statute by Parliament, and was at least considered by the House of

    1095
    Commons first of all. This was a most unheard-of thing.
    MR. A. J. BALFOUR: Well, it does not seem to me that the exact mode in which the new Constitution is established is at all relevant to the Question asked me. With regard to the Question asked me, I think I answered it. We certainly shall not postpone our policy with regard to the Transvaal in reference to any debates which may take place in this House. All I say in regard to the Question is that I am afraid I cannot undertake to give the House an opportunity of discussing the matter.
    MR. SYDNEY BUXTON (Tower Hamlets, Poplar): Does the right hon. Gentleman seriously mean to say that this House is not to have an opportunity of discussing this most important question in connection with the government of the Transvaal; that he can make no promise that some time during the session the House will have an opportunity of discussing it?
    MR. A. J. BALFOUR: No. The hon. Gentleman has made a strange mistake. In the first place, there has never been a precedent, so far as I know, in the many cases in which a Constitution has been granted to a colony, of a special day being allocated for discussing the provisions of the Constitution.
    MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: Annexation.
    MR. A. J. BALFOUR: Well, what is the difference?
    MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: A Constitution is given by statute.
    MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I think if you go through the history of the Colonies you will find that a larger proportion than are present to the mind of the hon. Gentleman have been obtained by annexation. There is no precedent at all. In the second place, it is obvious that the House will have an opportunity of challenging the course the Government have taken on the salary of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies.
    MR. BRYCE (Aberdeen, S.): Will the right hon. Gentleman undertake that the House shall have an opportunity of discussing this before and not afterwards? Will he not undertake that the scheme of government which it is proposed to introduce into the Transvaal shall be laid upon the Table of the House before it is enacted, and that a sufficient interval shall be left to the House to discuss it?
    MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I certainly am not in a position to give any such pledge. I am ready, of course, in deference to the right hon. Gentleman's wish, to consider the matter, but I cannot give a pledge.
    MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that every Constitution in which representative or responsible—certainly representative—Government has first been conferred on a colony has been given by statute of this House, which gives an ample opportunity of discussion?
    MR. SPEAKER: Order, order! That is a larger Question than that on the Paper.

    Cabul Mission.
    MR. GIBSON BOWLES (Lynn Regis): I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India, can he state what was the purpose and object of the Mission to the Amir of Afghanistan, Habibullah Khan, which was despatched from Peshawar to Cabul on November 27th last; and, generally, what instructions and what powers were given to its chief; what steps were taken to secure the safety of the Mission daring its journey to Cabul, its stay there, and its return to India; what news has since been received of the Mission; has it yet left Cabul on its return; and, if so, when; when is it expected to reach Peshawar; and when will Papers be laid giving an account of its proceedings.
    THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Mr. BRODRICK, Surrey, Guildford): The Mission is still at Cabul. The arrangements for its safety while in Afghan territory rest with the Amir, and while on the British side of the border with the Government of India. As I stated on the 16th † in reply to a Question
    † See page 307.

    1097
    from the hon. Member for West Denbigh it would not be in the public interest to make any statement at present as to the object of the negotiations, or to publish Papers on the subject.

    Mineral Deposits in India.
    SIR MANCHERJEE BHOWNAGGREE (Bethnal Green, N. E.): I be to ask the Secretary of State for India if he has any official information on the subject of recent discoveries of iron or and aluminium in the Central Provinces in India, and if claims are being staked out in the new fields, where it is alleged these materials are found in large quantities.
    MR. BRODRICK: The report on the mineral production of India which the Government of India have recently published contains the latest information as to the deposits of aluminium, manganese, and iron ores in the Central Provinces. I shall be glad to send my hon. friend a copy. During the year ending March 31st last twenty-one prospecting licences and mining leases were granted in the Provinces for various minerals.

    Catholic Army Chaplains in India.
    MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that a petition has been presented to Lord Kitchener, Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in India, on behalf of the Catholic chaplains in that Army, stating among other matters that some of them had served in India for periods of from twenty to forty years, and had not during the whole period of their divinity been granted leave of absence, while when through illness or other unavoidable cause they were compelled for a few days to relinquish their duties their stipends suffered a proportionate deduction, and that when Catholic chaplains become incapacitated through illness or old age they are dismissed without any pension, whereas Church of England and Presbyterian chaplains are entitled to an annual leave of two months without deduction of salary, and can claim pensions for life after fourteen years service; whether the War Office authorities have any and, if so, what explanation of this differentiation
    1098
    of treatment in the cases of Catholic chaplains and in the cases of Church of England and Presbyterian chaplains; on what ground have Catholic chaplains been placed in an inferior position to Protestant and Presbyterian chaplains; and what steps does the Government propose to take with reference to the granting of the prayer of the Catholic chaplains for equality of treatment and equal rights and privileges with Church of England and Presbyterian chaplains.
    MR. BRODRICK: I am not aware that a petition to the effect stated by the hon. Member has been presented to Lord Kitchener; an inquiry on this point will be addressed to the Government of India. The difference of treatment in the case of Roman Catholic chaplains and in the cases of Church of England and Presbyterian chaplains is due to the fact that the latter are appointed by Government, and form a branch of the public service, while the Roman Catholic chaplains are appointed and controlled by the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church in India, and are liable to be removed or exchanged by their Bishops without any formal reference to the Indian authorities.

    Infant Mortality in Egypt.
    MR. WEIR: I beg to ask the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that in Egypt one-third of the children of the native population die, within twelve months if birth, and that another third die before they reach five years of age; and will he consider the expediency of suggesting to the Government of Egypt that some inquiry should be made with a view to arrest this heavy infant mortality.
    THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Earl PERCY, Kensington, S.): No, Sir, we have no such information.

    North Sea Fisheries Arbitration.
    MR. JOHN ELLIS (Nottinghamshire, Rushcliffe): I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether Government have received any information as to the finding of the International Commission which was appointed to investigate the responsibility

    1099
    for the deaths of the fishermen in the North Sea last autumn; and, in that case, will he inform the House of its nature and terms.
    EARL PERCY: No, Sir; no information on the subject has been communicated to the Government.

    Post Office Savings Bank Deficiency.
    DR. MACNAMARA: I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it is the intention of the Government to omit the deficiency in the Post Office Savings Bank from the usual statement of contingent or nominal liabilities given in the Finance Accounts.
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, Worcestershire, E.): Yes, Sir, this course follows from the discontinuance of the annual valuation of assets, in pursuance of the recommendation of the Select Committee of 1902.
    MR. GIBSON BOWLES: Does the right hon. Gentleman remember that the omission of this sum this year—an amount of between £13,000,000 and £14,000,000, will entirely falsify the accounts?
    MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: That is a very argumentative question and is a matter for debate rather than for Question and Answer.

    Income Tax Collection.
    MR. McCRAE (Edinburgh, E.): I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the recent instructions permitting further delay in the payment of income-tax apply equally to England and Scotland; and if he will grant a Return showing the amounts and percentages of income-tax recovered as at January 31st and February 28th for the years 1903–4 and 1904–5, in continuation of Return 129 (Revenue, Collection of Taxes) of April 19th, 1901.
    MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The recent instructions issued by me, under which the Board of Inland Revenue may, on receiving a definite promise to pay at a reasonably early date, grant delay
    1100
    where they are satisfied that the concession is required to prevent serious hardship, and is not likely to be abused, apply equally to England and Scotland. With regard to the second part of the hon. Member's Question, I am informed that the Return for which he asks can be given, but that it would not be possible to have it ready until well on in March. I would suggest that the hon. Member should include the year 1902–3 as well as the year 1903–4, as the latter year was exceptional in England and Wales owing to its being one of re-valuation for Schedules A and B.
    MR. FLYNN (Cork, N.): Will the instructions referred to in this Question also extend to Ireland?
    MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The instructions in the words I have read to the House apply to all parts of the United Kingdom.

    Vaccination Exemption Certificates.
    MR. WEIR: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that Mr. James Richards, of Tunbridge Wells, appeared on six different occasions before the local bench of magistrates before he could procure a certificate of exemption from vaccination for his infant child, and, seeing that on each occasion he based his objection on the same ground, will the Secretary of State consider the advisability of directing the attention of the bench of magistrates to the remarks made by the Lord Chief Justice on July 27th last, when addressing the Grand Jury at Birmingham relative to the principle on which the Act ought to be administered.
    THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. AKERS-DOUGLAS, Kent, St. Augustine's): I have no information respecting the case referred to by the hon. Member. The attention of magistrates has already been drawn, by a circular issued in September last to all justices' clerks, to the remarks made by the Lord Chief Justice at the Birmingham Summer Assizes on the subject of the principles which ought to guide

    1101
    magistrates in dealing with applications for certificates of exemption from vaccination.
    MR. GIBSON BOWLES: Has the right hon. Gentleman observed that the circular has had no effect whatever on the magistrates to whom it was addressed?
    MR. AKERS-DOUGLAS: I do not quite agree with that view. It may not have done so in this case, but in many cases it has been extremely useful.

    Poor Law Finance.
    MR. FLYNN: I beg to ask the President of the Local Government Board if he will state the date of the Order in which they have prescribed the system of forms and accounts for the Poor Law Unions in England and Wales.
    THE PRESIDENT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (Mr. WALTER LONG, Bristol, S.): The date of the General Order on the subject referred to, which is in force in most of the Poor Law Unions in England and Wales, is January 14th, 1867.

    Heavy Motor-Car Regulations.
    COLONEL LOCKWOOD (Essex, Epping): I beg to ask the President of the Local Government Board what steps he took before issuing the Heavy Motor-Car Regulations to ascertain whether the safety of the travelling public was adequately protected thereunder.
    MR. WALTER LONG: I appointed a Departmental Committee, of which my right hon. friend the Member for East Somersetshire was good enough to act as Chairman, to inquire and report with regard to any regulations which should be made on this subject. The Committee took evidence from persons representing a variety of interests, and the regulations which I have now issued are founded on the Report and recommendations of the Committee.
    COLONEL LOCKWOOD: May I ask if the Board of Trade concur in the view that the safety of the travelling public is adequately protected?
    MR. WALTER LONG: I am not quite sure what my hon. friend means by the travelling public. Is it people travelling by motor-cars or those on railways?
    COLONEL LOCKWOOD: Both.
    MR. WALTER LONG: As, far as travellers by motor-cars are concerned the Board of Trade have nothing on earth to do with them, and as to railway travellers their only concern is as to possible danger in crossing bridges over-railways. I have communicated with the Board of Trade on that subject.

    School Attendance Officers' Superannuation.
    MR. DUNCAN (Yorkshire, W.R., Otley): I beg to ask the President of the Local Government Board when he proposes to issue the regulations under which school attendance officers, who have contributed to a Poor Law Officers' Superannuation Fund, can continue their contributions and receive benefits as officers of the local education authority.
    MR. WALTER LONG: The Order modifying the provisions of the Poor Law Officers' Superannuation Act, 1896, is in preparation, and will, I hope, be issued at an early date.

    Local Authorities and the Maintenance of Public Clocks.
    SIR MANCHERJEE BHOWNAGGREE: I beg to ask the President of the Local Government Board if his attention has been called to the fact that a number of clocks in towers of churches and other buildings abutting on public thoroughfares are not kept going for want of the necessary funds; and that, as the borough councils and other local authorities do not possess the power of defraying the cost of winding them and keeping them in repair, will he consider the advisability of conferring upon them such power in cases in which they think fit to set the clocks going for the convenience of the public.
    MR. WALTER LONG: Outside London, the council of any borough or other urban district can, under the powers conferred by Section 165 of the Public Health Act, 1875, provide a public clock,

    1103
    and they can maintain a clock so provided. Further, they can, if they adopt Part III. of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act, 1890, pay the reasonable cost of repairing, maintaining, winding up, and lighting any public clock in their district, although it is not vested in them. A rural district council can, on application, be invested with these powers by an Order of the Local Government Board. As regards London, Section 65 of the London County Council (General Powers) Act, 1903, confers on every Metropolitan borough council powers similar to those possessed by borough councils outside London under the enactments above-mentioned.

    Skigersta Pier, Island of Lewis.
    MR. WEIR: I beg to ask the Lord-Advocate if he will state whether any progress has been made with the construction of a protecting wall for the Skigersta Pier, Island of Lewis.
    THE LORD-ADVOCATE (Mr. SCOTT DICKSON, Glasgow, Bridgton): I refer the hon. Member to the Answer given by Mr. Graham Murray to a similar Question on February 17th, 1904. † Since that date the Congested Districts Board have twice asked the county clerk—on July 14th, 1904, and January 11th, 1905—whether the county council propose to go on with the work, but no reply has been received to either inquiry.

    Island of Lewis—Report on Social Condition.
    MR. WEIR: I beg to ask the Lord-Advocate if the Secretary for Scotland will state when he proposes to deal with the recommendations contained in the Report on the Social Condition of the Island of Lewis published more than two years ago.
    MR. SCOTT DICKSON: Steps have already been taken to meet certain of the suggestions advanced in the Report of the Lewis Local Committee. If the Congested Districts Amendment Bill, which will be immediately introduced, is passed into law, the Secretary for Scotland will be enabled to give effect to further recommendations to which he attaches importance.
    † See (4) Debates, cxxx., 6.

    Skye Roads.
    MR. JOHN DEWAR (Inverness): I beg to ask the Lord-Advocate, as representing the Secretary for Scotland, whether he is aware that the Congested Districts Board promised the Skye District Committee that they would give a contribution of 75 per cent, towards the cost of the construction of a road to connect the town of Portree with the populous Staffin District, provided that the road was placed on the list of county highways, and maintained out of the public rates; and that, although the county council at their meeting in October last gave the requisite undertaking, and the district committee have guaranteed the balance of the cost of the road, the Congested Districts Board now fail to carry out their part of the arrangement; and, if so, will he communicate with the Board in order that the promised grant may be made.
    MR. SCOTT DICKSON: The hon. Member has been misinformed when he states that the Congested Districts Board promised that they would contribute to the cost of this road. They stated that an assurance as to the provision from local sources of the usual proportion of cost and as to maintenance by the statutory road authority were essential preliminaries to inquiry and consideration. The Congested Districts Board have now intimated that, in view of the state of their funds and the many claims on their resources, they do not see their way at present to consider, in the interests of those living in the congested districts, whether the large expenditure involved would be justified.

    Labour Disputes on Dublin Public Works.
    MR. NANNETTI (Dublin, College Green): I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that labouring men have been employed at painting work at Newry Bridewell, under the General Prisons Board, and at the Viceregal Lodge, Dublin, under the Board of Works; that remonstrances have been directed to both of these public departments on behalf of the regular painters, employers and employed, of the districts mentioned, claiming that the work done

    1105
    by these labouring men belongs to the painting trade; and, if so, whether, seeing that, the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland define painting work contrary to expert judgment, and in view of the replies received from the departments concerned, he will represent to, the General Prisons Board and the Board of Works the desirability of securing competent workmen to perform tradesmen's work in this trade in accordance with the terms of the Fair Wages Resolution.
    THE CHIEF SECRETARY FOR IRELAND (Mr. WYNDHAM, Dover): Complaints were made to the Prisons Board respecting the manner of the performance of the contract for work at Newry Bridewell. The matter engaged the attention of the Board, and instructions were issued with a view to avoid the recurrence of similar complaints. The remainder of the Question concerns the Board of Works, and I would ask the hon. Member to be good enough to address his inquiries to my hon. friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury.

    Land Purchase in County Tipperary—Mr. Delmege's Estate.
    MR. LUNDON (Limerick, E.): I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland if he is aware that for some time past negotiations for sale and purchase have been in progress between Mr. Stafford Delmege, of Bally-more, county Tipperary, and his tenants in the parishes of Knocklong and Glenbrohane, county Limerick; and, if so, will he say whether the Estates Commissioners have received any communications from either the landlord, the agents, Messrs. Saunders, of Charleville, or from the persons on the townlands of Glen-brohane, Ballingarry, and Garryspillane who are interested in the sale, with the view that the untenanted lands thereon may be purchased by the Estates Commissioners and divided among the labourers, small farmers, and evicted tenants.
    MR. WYNDHAM: Representations to the effect stated have been made by tenants and others in the neighbourhood. No originating application in respect to the sale of the estate has yet been lodged
    1106
    with the Commissioners, nor have they received any communication on the subject from the landlord or his agent.

    Land Purchase in County Limerick— Synan's Estate.
    MR. LUNDON: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, can he say whether the Estates Commissioners have received any communications in regard to the purchase by them of the untenanted lands in Carmane Fedamore, county Limerick, from any person connected with the Messrs. Synan, the owners of the property, from the receiver, or from any one of the mortgagees, so that the Estates Commissioners might purchase those lands and divide them among the inhabitants of this congested district.
    MR. WYNDHAM: The Estates Commissioners understand that the solicitors having carriage of this property hope to be able to arrange for its sale.

    Exchequer Contribution—Labourers' Cottages.
    MR. LUNDON: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland if he will lay upon the Table a Return showing the amount of the Exchequer Grant apportioned to each of the unions of Ireland; how much of it is now unexpended taken collectively, and how much separately for the various unions; and what do the Government propose to do with those unexpended moneys.
    MR. WYNDHAM: The published Report of the Local Government Board for the year ended March 31st, 1904, contains at pages 252–264 full information with respect to the application of the grant and the amount of the unissued balance. I am not yet in a position to recommend an allocation of this balance.

    Firearm Regulations in County Longford —Gillespie's Case.
    MR. J. P. FARRELL (Longford, N.): I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether any representations have been made to the Lord-Lieutenant by the County Court Judge of Longford on the subject of

    1107
    allowing a man named Gillespie to have and carry firearms in the parish of Mullinalaghta, county Longford; whether he is aware that at the October quarter sessions this man was convicted of firing at three young men, and bound over; and, if so, what action the Executive intend taking regarding his revolver.
    MR. WYNDHAM: This man's arms licence was revoked in November last. His revolver is in the possession of the police.

    Edgeworthstown Loan Fund Society.
    MR. J. P. FARRELL: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether any relief will be afforded by legislation or otherwise to those debenture-holders in the Edgeworthstown Loan Fund Society who lost their property in consequence of the default of a fraudulent secretary, who led them to believe that the society was under the control of the Loan Fund Board of Dublin Castle, which statement induced them to deposit their savings in the society.
    MR. WYNDHAM: With respect to the responsibility for losses sustained by the debenture-holders, I refer to my reply to the hon. Member's similar Question of July 26th last.† A Bill has been prepared on the lines of the Bill of last year, but with such Amendments as it is hoped will meet the views of all parties concerned. This Bill will be introduced at an early date.

    Youghal Auxiliary Lunatic Asylum.
    MR. SLOAN (Belfast, S.): I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland if he is aware that Dr. Kelly, Roman Catholic Bishop of Cloyne, has been permitted by the Lord-Lieutenant, and contrary to the advice and remonstrance of the inspectors of lunatic asylums, to detach 350 lunatics from the County Asylum in Cork and lodge them in an unused industrial school at Youghal, which he had prepared for this purpose, that the Bishop received a capitation grant for each patient, that there is no resident doctor to take charge of these patients, nor any qualified nurses in charge of them,
    † See (4) Debates, cxxxviii., 1214.
    1108
    that the hose, built and arranged for a doctor, has been handed over to the chaplain, and that the resident medical superintendent of the Cork Asylum has been refused permission to visit the auxiliary asylum; and, if so, will he say what steps, if any, does he intend taking in the matter.
    MR. WYNDHAM: In 1901 the Lord-Lieutenant, under Section 9 (4) of the Local Government (Ireland) Act, 1898, signified his approval of the plans for the conversion of an industrial school building at Youghal into an auxiliary asylum, established for about 400 patients under, the 76th Section of that Act. The plans, which were submitted in 1900 by the Cork District Asylum Committee, of which Dr. Kelly, Lord Bishop of Ross, is a member, were recommended for His Excellency's approval by the inspectors of lunatic asylums. A capitation grant 1of 2s. per week is payable for each patient in the auxiliary asylum under Sections 58 and 76 of the Act. There is no resident doctor, as the committee decided to appoint a visiting medical officer instead, but the consent of the Lord-Lieutenant to the appointment of a visiting medical officer has only been given as a tentative measure, which will be open to reconsideration in the event of the arrangement being found defective. The institution has been placed in charge of a community of nuns, who are assisted by ordinary asylum attendants. It is understood that only Catholic patients are to be sent to the auxiliary. The house, built for a doctor, has been handed over as a residence for the chaplain. The resident medical superintendent of the Cork Asylum has not been refused permission to visit the auxiliary asylum, but the committee of management have passed, resolutions taking away from the resident medical superintendent all responsibility for the discipline and domestic management of the auxiliary. The committee have been informed that these resolutions are illegal, and have been called upon to correct this illegality.
    MR. SLOANasked whether the nurses at this auxiliary asylum were fully qualified.
    MR. WYNDHAMsaid he did not think the hon. Member apprehended the fact of the case. These people were harmless lunatics who did not require special nurses. They were gathered out of work houses and off the hill-side, and were given a comfortable home, such as could not be secured for them in a regular asylum except at a cost to the rates that was prohibitive.
    CAPTAIN DONELAN (Cork, E.)asked if it was not the fact that the board of management of the Cork Lunatic Asylum recommended the establishment of the auxiliary asylum at Youghal in order to relieve the overcrowding. Had not the arrangement been productive of great public advantage, and had not the management of the auxiliary branch given satisfaction to everybody?
    MR. WYNDHAM: I have no further information to give to the House. It is a point on which controversy may centre, and I prefer not to answer any Question without having had an opportunity of looking into the matter.

    Dernageas Grazing Farm.
    MR. J. P. FARRELL: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Estates Commissioners have made any overtures to Mrs. Ledwith, the owner of the Dernageas grazing farm, for the purchase of this farm and its division amongst the tenants entitled to graze thereon; and, if not, will he now undertake to direct their attention to it.
    MR. WYNDHAM: The reply to the first inquiry is in the negative. I see no necessity for taking the course suggested. If the owner of the lands institutes proceedings for sale, the Commissioners will have due inquiries made.

    Sir Antony MacDonnell.
    MR. PIRTE (Aberdeen, N.)asked the First Lord of the Treasury a Question of which he had given private notice— namely, whether during the recent events connected with Ireland the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland had tendered his resignation.
    MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I did not receive the hon. Gentleman's private
    1110
    notice; but I think he will see that, if we are to admit the right of any Member of this House to cross-examine the Government as to any confidential communications passing between colleagues, as in the case of Lord Dudley—if I were to admit that right in the case of one colleague I should have to admit it in the case of all colleagues, and no Government has ever allowed such confidential communications to be made the subject of Question and Answer across the floor of the House.
    MR. PIRIE: Have the recent events any precedent in the history of Ireland?
    MR. DILLON (Mayo, E.): I wish to ask the Chief Secretary a Question of which I have given him private notice—namely, whether any change has been made in the conditions under which Sir Antony MacDonnell holds the office of Under-Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, and, if any change has been made, what is the nature of that change and how has it been carried into effect?
    MR. WYNDHAM: No, Sir, no change I has been made. I pointed out to Sir Antony MacDonnell that it would be necessary, in view of the criticism of my Department, to take into fuller account matters which might be made the subject of such criticism. This was not because my confidence in Sir Antony MacDonell had been in any way diminished, but because it appeared to be necessity of the constitutional position.
    MR. SLOAN: Are we to understand that the situation is exactly what it was before these debates took place?
    MR. WYNDHAM: No, I do not think that that is the inference to be drawn.
    MR. SLOAN: Then what is the situation?
    [No Answer was returned.]

    Irish Finance—The Post Office and Inland Revenue.
    MR. PATRICK O'BRIEN (Kilkenny): I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury if he will state what is the average amount to be adjusted annually between

    1111
    the Inland Revenue Department in Dublin and the Irish Post Office; why the adjustment is not made at once in Dublin between the Receiver-General of Inland Revenue for Ireland and the Irish Post Office; and what purpose is served by sending the postal and post office orders to London and again returning these papers to Dublin before adjustment is made.
    THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (Mr. VICTOR CAVENDISH, Derbyshire, W.): The sums annually adjusted between the two Departments referred to amount to about £207,000. £87,000 of this represents revenue collected by means of free money orders, and departmental convenience necessitates its adjustment in London; but this arrangement does not involve a two-fold transmission of papers between London and Dublin. The larger portion, viz., £120,000, is adjusted in Dublin.

    Dublin Post Office—Learners' Pay.
    MR. NANNETTI: I beg to ask the Postmaster-General if he is aware that although there are learners in the Dublin Post Office who cannot obtain more than 6s. per week, employment is found in the sorting office at a higher rate of remuneration for auxiliaries who have no claim whatever on the department; and, if so, will he see that this is remedied, and something done to enable the learners to increase the stipend of 6s. per week. I beg also to ask the Postmaster-General if he is aware that there are numbers of young men and young women acting in the capacity of learner in the Dublin Post Office for periods ranging from over one to more than two years, and that notwithstanding that they are fully qualified for some time cannot obtain more than 6s. and 5s. per week, respectively; and, if so, will he say whether he has received petitions from them asking for more pay; and if he is now in a position to state what steps he proposes to take to grant these learners increased pay.
    THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL (Lord STANLEY, Lancashire, Westhoughton): It will perhaps be convenient for me to reply to the two Questions together. I have received petitions from the Dublin
    1112
    learners for higher pay and am dealing with the matter in connection with the general question of the remuneration of learners. I hope to be able shortly to announce my decision on the subject. I should like to have some explanation of the words "employment is found in the sorting office at a higher rate of remuneration for auxiliaries, etc." I confess I do not understand that.

  NEW BILLS.
    SMALL HOLDINGS (No. 2) BILL.
    "To amend The Small Holdings Act, 1892," presented by Mr. Jesse Collings; supported by Colonel Long, Mr. Goulding, Sir Carne Rasch, Mr. Carlile, and Sir Edwin Durning-Lawrence; to be read a second time upon Friday, 10th March, and to be printed. [Bill 56.]
    NURSES REGISTRATION BILL.
    "To regulate the qualifications of trained Nurses, and to provide for their registration," presented by Mr. Munro Ferguson; supported by Dr. Farquharson, Mr. Haldane, Sir Thomas Wrightson, Sir James Joicey, Mr. Hugh Crawford Smith, Mr. Black, Mr. Eve, and Dr. Thompson; to be read a second time upon Friday, 17th March, and to be printed. [Bill 57.]
    PRIVATE BILL PROCEDURE (IRELAND) BILL.
    "To amend the Law relating to Private Bill Procedure in Ireland," presented by Mr. O'Doherty; supported by Mr. Hemphill, Mr. Field, Mr. Patrick Kennedy, and Dr. Thompson; to be read a second time upon Friday, 7th April, and to be printed. [Bill 58.]

    KING'S SPEECH (MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS).
    Order read, for resuming adjourned debate on Amendment [22nd February] to Main Question [14th February], "That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, as followeth:—
    "Most Gracious Sovereign,
    "We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the

    1113
    United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament."—(Mr. Mount).
    Which Amendment was—
    "At the end of the Question to add the words, But humbly to represent to Your Majesty that the continuous and continuing changes in the War Office are destructive of the best interests of Your Majesty's Army, have gravely disordered the system upon which the Regular Forces at home and abroad are raised and trained, have discouraged the Militia and Volunteers, and disclose negligence and mismanagement on the part of Your Majesty's Ministers, more particularly as to the armament of the artillery, whereby, in spite of the increased cost of the Army, its efficiency for the defence of the Empire has been diminished.' "—(Captain Norton.)
    Question again proposed, "That those words be there added."
    COLONEL WELBY (Taunton)said the hon. Member who moved the Amendment to the Address under discussion challenged the position of the Service Members on the Government side of the House, saying that were it not for Party ties they would vote for it. For himself he could only say that in no circumstances would he vote for it, because it would put him into the same illogical position as that in which it placed the hon. Member himself, and because it would defeat its own main object. The hon. Member gave them in the course of his speech a very interesting retrospect of Army changes under the present Government, but during all the time, thus covered he believed the hon. Gentleman had always been on the side of change. If he objected to the changes in progress, why did "he not set his objection forth in the Amendment; if he objected to "continuous and continuing" changes why had he, during the last ten years, constantly supported those changes, or at any rate the majority of them? The Amendment, as he had said, would defeat its own object. If it were carried it meant a vote of want of confidence in the Government, and then if a new Administration came in what policy was to be pursued? Unless they remained stationary they
    1114
    would either go back or go forward, either of which would be change. The Amendment was not one which Service Members could support. The hon. Member had said that the changes in the last ten years had been made in the interests of Party politics. He was sorry that he should try to make the Army so much a Party question. There was no question on which the Government had won less credit or saved themselves less criticism than that connected with the Army, and it was unreasonable to suggest that the changes were introduced for Party effect. He would very gladly see a continuous policy adopted, not only with regard to the Volunteers but with regard to the whole of our Army, and what he would particularly like to see at the present would be that the leaders of both sides should meet at a round table conference and work out a policy which they believed to be best for the country, working out the principles and leaving the details to be settled elsewhere, but pledging themselves to defend those principles so as to secure a thoroughly efficient service. He was, however, afraid that the day was far distant when they would see the Army treated as he was thankful to say the Navy was treated at the present time in being looked upon as a national question, the object aimed at being the general good of the nation. He had never feared to oppose, and even vote against, the policy put forward by the Government, but he could say with all confidence and pride that he had never criticised not opposed any change except where he saw a better plan, and as he was not in a position to produce a better plan than the scheme now pat forward by the Secretary for War, he was prepared to give it a hearty and thorough support. His only fear was that in view of the conditions of our military service it might be found almost impossible to carry the scheme out practically. He thought, therefore, he might fairly ask whether the right hon. Gentleman could put before the House any information showing that the great changes which he advocated were likely to be practicable and feasible. Was the scheme worked out by him in consultation with his military advisers; were a majority, of

    1115
    the members of the Army Council wholeheartedly in favour of it, and could he give more details? Had the striking force been thoroughly and satisfactorily organised; was it ready to be moved anywhere at a moment's notice, or were there young untrained men and horses in it?
    Then, again, with regard to the short-service Army, he would ask what the tendency of recruiting had been lately. He had always believed that it was well to see how much cloth was available before a coat was designed, and it must not be forgotten that whatever schemes of organisation were put forward the question always returned to recruiting. Recruiting was the root difficulty of the Army question. The conditions of modern life tended to make recruiting more expensive, and they would never get a satisfactory Army until the people of this country realised that they must pay heavily—either by their pockets or by personal service—for the defence of this country and for the maintenance of the Empire. Speeches had recently been delivered advocating a reduction of as much as £6,000,000 on the Army, but no clue had been given of how it was to be done and the Army kept efficient. The fact was that unknowingly those who delivered the speeches must be in favour of compulsory service. The Government had done their best to deal with the questions of pay, food, liberty, and comfort in barracks, but that was not enough to solve the recruiting difficulty. If the pay of recruits were doubled, even if it were increased to 5s. per day, he doubted whether the Government would be certain of getting men in the numbers and of the quality they required. Yet any such measure would add enormously to our expenditure on the Army. He had always been in favour of economy, but he did not see how it was proposed to maintain the efficiency of the Army and at the same time to avoid the expenditure which it would involve.
    Referring to criticisms on the action of the War Office with regard to the Volunteers, he said that hon. Members who were in favour of a great number of Volunteers, Militia, and Yeomanry, regardless of efficiency, were really doing more than anybody else to bring into people's minds
    1116
    the idea that compulsory service was the only solution of our difficulties. He believed that if we had a force of, say, 100,000 auxiliaries trained, organised, and equipped, on an equality with Continental soldiers, ready to repel invasion, no word would be heard of compulsory service. He viewed with the gravest anxiety the future of our military defence. When he saw the enormous number of highly-trained troops which Japan and Russia had put into the field, and realised how quickly the Russians could move down on the North-West Frontier, he thought the country ought to take the lesson which they were receiving to heart. It was of no use talking about economy when their Empire was at stake. Let everybody realise that we must do one of two things—either pay or serve. He hoped some national policy would be worked out for the Army on main principles on which both sides of the House could unite.
    SIR A. HAYTER (Walsall)said the House and the country generally must be very much indebted to the hon. and gallant Member for Newington for having initiated a very interesting debate, and the Secretary for War would surely welcome that opportunity to allay some of the anxiety which undoubtedly prevailed in every section of the community as to the condition of the Army at large. He had the duty of bringing before the House a subject which not only a Royal Commission, but the Secretary of State also, had declared to be vital to the organisation of the Army, and that was the scarcity of junior officers. He would only trouble the House with the condition of two branches of the service which were most popular and therefore most likely to be full; he meant the cavalry and the Guards. At the present moment there were no less than forty-four vacancies in the cavalry. That number made up pretty nearly the strength of two entire regiments in time of peace. That this scarcity was increasing was shown by the fact that in 1903 there were only twenty-three vacancies. A cavalry officer could not be taught in a day. He must be under drill and discipline pretty well eight months before he was fit to take his place in the ranks, and he hoped the

    1117
    right hon. Gentleman would have something reassuring to say as to the steps he was taking towards obtaining a proper supply of officers. As to the shortage in the Guards, in the Grenadier Guards there were fourteen vacancies, in the Coldstream Guards seven, in the Scots Guards fifteen, and in the Irish Guards four, or forty in the brigade. In 1903 the Grenadier Guards had over its full strength, the Coldstreams and the Irish Guards were full, and there were only five vacancies in the Scots Guards. He had also looked through a number of Line regiments and found a shortage in them also. Was there any better look-out in the Auxiliary Forces? In an article in The Times of February 21st it was shown that there was a deficiency of 951 combatant officers in the Militia and of 2,768 in the Volunteers. Thus, taking the Cavalry, Foot-Guards, Militia, and Volunteers together, there were 3,803 vacancies. Of course, he had his ideas as to the causes of this. A great deal was due to changes of plans and the uncertainty as to appointments and promotions, and there was no doubt that the duties in South Africa were very unpopular, while the threats to the Volunteers and Militia had had their effect. Then there was a great change in the daily duties of officers which had made them more harassing. Whatever the cause was it was a matter that should be probed to the bottom.
    As to the changes of plan of the right hon. Gentleman, he was perfectly at sea as to which had been carried out. Had the extra battalions created during the war in such regiments as the Northumberland Fusiliers been disestablished? He understood that large depôts were to be created in place of the linked battalions, but he had not seen anything of the change. Then, again, he did not know whether the disestablishment of the Militia was to be carried out. The right hon. Gentleman ought to tell then what plans he intended to carry out. Too much work was now thrown upon the Adjutant-General's Department and there was some ground for the complaint in connection with the Militia that officers in these regiments were never appointed to adjutancies, all those appointments being given to officers of the Regular Army. Surely it
    1118
    was a legitimate ambition of the young officers in a regiment to attain to the adjutancy. Yet that was refused them. It would have been better if the Auxiliary Forces and the recruiting were retained under separate direction. As regarded the rifle controversy, he was deeply interested in it, as two of the experts who had reported belonged to the regiment which he himself had commanded for nine years. The hon. Member for St. Helens, in his interesting speech, missed the principal point of the matter. The hon. Gentleman omitted to add that the experts unanimously reported that the rifle was badly balanced, because there was too much weight at the muzzle end. There was a "nose-cap," as it was called, of heavy metal, and also a wooden covering which threw the balance forward, while much wood had been taken out of the stock. Then the recoil was heavier; and that would make the recruit shy in firing, and make it more difficult to instruct him. The lengthening of the bayonet, as suggested by the hon. Member for St. Helens, would make the balance worse still. Another objection which had been brought to his notice by an officer instructed at Hythe, and who was now on full pay, was that the rifles were to have three different lengths of butt. In the case of a night surprise the rifles might get mixed, and a tall man might find himself with a short rifle or vice versa. There was a charger system of loading without a cut-off, so that, unless the catch were put up, the rifle, when charged, might shoot the man carrying it, because it had to be carried at full cock. The oil can and pull through were in a case attached to the waist belt, and not in the gun stock, and so might be lost. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would pause before pledging himself entirely to the adoption of this rifle. It had never been tried fully. Why not use it as a carbine, and issue it to a regiment of cavalry, and then have a report on it before going to the expense of £3,000,000. The short rifle should not be tried against the old rifle, but against the old rifles with the new improvements.
    COLONEL WILLIAMS (Dorsetshire, W.)said he wished to refer to the question of the Volunteers, because he believed

    1119
    that their number should not be reduced without due consideration. He bore full testimony to the care and attention which the right hon. Gentleman had given to the question; but he would join issue with, him as regarded the reduction of their numbers. It was said that mobilisation facilities could not be provided for more than 200,000 men at one time; but it should be remembered that even during an invasion a certain mount of work would have to be carried out in the country and it would not be necessary to mobilise the same number at the same time. The men might be able to change places, and serve for a week at a time if necessary. That was one of the lessons that was learned from the Boer War. Many of the Boers fought in the trenches, and then went back to work. He did not approve of the reduction of the Volunteers; and he believed that the right hon. Gentleman would easily obtain what he desired if he would make the grants conditional on the number of attendances in camp. He attached very great importance to attendances at camp; and he thought if the right hon. Gentleman would permit, two periods of four days each a great many more men would pass through camp. And in the case of town corps, where the week's camp was a difficulty some such system might be applied as was now in force in regard to public schools—four days camp on condition there were also at least three field days during the year. If some such alteration, were made it was possible that the old system of four day camps at Easter and Whitsun might be revived, which would be a great advantage. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would pause before he reduced the numbers of the Volunteers. He knew it was stated that the reduction of the numbers was the only way in which the increased grant could be afforded; but he thought the country would not grudge the expense. The scheme for the reduction of the Volunteers should not be hastily entered on. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would avoid every possible reduction in order that the country might preserve its natural reserve.
    MR. CHARLES HOBHOUSE (Bristol, E.)said that although the Amendment was general in its character, the debate had dealt almost exclusively with details—important in themselves, but still details—and he desired to bring the House back to the spirit of the Amendment, which, was a direct and deliberate attack upon the constant changes and chances in the administration of the War Office under the present régime. That régime had been defended in the debate by only three hon. Members, all of whom, extraordinary to relate, voted three years ago for a scheme the direct opposite of the system they were now supporting. It had already been pointed out with conclusive effect that whatever might be said for a policy of delay in re-arming the Army with the new gun, the artillery with which the Army was at present—be would not say armed—provided was in the face of any European force absolutely ineffective and obsolete; while every speech which had been made with regard to the new rifle showed that there was great reason for hesitating before the order therefore was finally given. If the offensive guns were obsolete and the defensive rifles doubtful, the Regular Forces were clearly not in a condition equal to that of any Continental force whatever. Therefore, as a member of the regular Opposition, not only was he justified, but it was his duty to call the attention of the House and the country to the extraordinary variation in the proposals which from time to time had been put forward. In 1902, extreme short service was proposed; the Secretary of State now proposed extreme long service. The scheme of the present Secretary of State for India proposed an enormous increase of the Reserve; the present Secretary of State as cutting the Reserve down to nothing, or at any rate reducing it considerably. The present scheme added enormously to the pay, cost of food, and cost of barracks, while, under the regulations of the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor, the discipline of the Army was considerably relaxed. Officers in the Army viewed this continual chopping and changing with the greatest alarm and distrust. They had drunk the cup of despair to its very dregs, and the deficiency in the numbers of the Army

    1121
    ought to be a warning not to continue in the path now pursued.
    The House of Commons had two duties with regard to military matters: one to the nation, concerning the state of Army finance, and the other to the Army itself, in the preservation of a continuity of policy with regard to the practical particulars of the service, discipline, pay, and numbers. That not unreasonable proposition had been honoured far more in the breach than in the observance during the last ten years. It was unnecessary to trace all this confusion back to the fountain head. It began with the refusal of the late Lord Salisbury's Government to make military preparations in time for the outbreak of hostilities in South Africa, but the military organisation was not to be blamed for a purely political fault, committed possibly with the best intentions. Reference had been made to the dangers of a military caste. The dangers of a military caste might be great, but far greater dangers flowed from civilians playing at being military experts. There was a tendency on the part of the present Government, not merely to direct the general policy of the Army, but to intervene—as they had intervened with fatal effect—in matters which really concerned soldiers alone. The result of this interference had been to render Army reform a war cry essential to the safety of the Government. It was essential in 1900 to bring them into power, and it had been played on since to keep them in power. By their various schemes they had eliminated from the War Office soldiers and Civil servants of merit. They were now attempting to carry out their new policy with a new staff, and the result so far had not been altogether satisfactory. The Secretary of State had, however, done good work by the appointment of the Esher Commission, the reorganisation of the work of the War Office itself, and especially by the formal constitution of the Army Council. But what was his position with regard to the Army Council? Was he working in harmony with, or in opposition to, it? If there were opposing sets of views, which were to prevail?
    Let the House contrast the two schemes which had been put forward
    1122
    and note the divergency, conflict, and confusion thereby expressed. Three years ago many hon. Gentlemen opposite voted for the Army Corps scheme, and the then Secretary of State declared that it held the field. But what it would not hold was water, and the whole scheme broke down immediately an attempt was made to put it into practice. The very Gentlemen who supported that scheme were now upholding the proposal to organise the Army on a divisional basis. In 1902 the three years enlistment was safe, judicious, and necessary; last year it was a danger to the Empire. The scheme of 1901–2 was built up on a small army, and an enormous Reserve; the present proposals cut the Reserve down by one-third, and yet was held to be the surest and safest scheme that could be put forward. As to the Auxiliary Forces, the earlier scheme maintained the Militia and created a Reserve; the 1904 proposals abolished the Militia, and did away with its reserve. Under the scheme of 1901 the Volunteers were encouraged to recruit as many men as possible, to have maxim guns and mounted infantry companies; the new proposals swept the whole thing away—except that the pressure of public opinion had induced the right hon. Gentleman to say he would further consider his plans. The same had happened with regard to the Imperial Yeomanry; recruiting had been stopped, and the number in the ranks cut down.
    THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. ARNOLD-FORSTER, Belfast, W.)said the number had not been cut down, but increased to a figure it had never before attained.
    MR. CHARLES HOBHOUSEsaid that under the scheme of the present Secretary of State for India the establishment of the Imperial Yeomanry was 35,000, whereas the right hon. Gentleman had now fixed it at 28,000, which surely was a decrease, not an increase.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: What I said was that the number of Imperial Yeomanry had reached a figure last year which they had never reached before.
    MR. CHARLES HOBHOUSEsaid that the result had been achieved, not under the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman, but under the scheme of his predecessor. In the past there had been no more violent critic of Conservative Secretaries of State for War than the right hon. Gentleman opposite, and his habit of criticism still remained. Therefore, the Secretary of State for War should not grumble when an humble Member like himself criticised his scheme, because in another place the Leader of the Upper Chamber spoke about his scheme as a mere collection of notes for the speech of the Secretary for War, and dismissed the question with that remark. This continual chopping and changing had reduced their military strength to a minimum; it had prevented any real improvement in the Army, had acted as a deterrent to good men coming into the Army, and an inducement to capable men leaving it. He could furnish many instances of distinguished young officers who were going out of the Army because as a career it was not good enough to stay in, the prospects of advancement being so bad. The right hon. Gentleman had divided the infantry into two classes, the home service Army and the foreign-going Army. One of the Secretary for War's objections when a private Member used to be that the Army was organised only for peace. They had a long-service infantry abroad and a short-service infantry at home, but the moment war broke out they would have to amalgamate those two armies to produce the regiments they would require. They had had examples in the past of the bad effects of such an amalgamation, and this would happen again with the short-service battalions if, unfortunately, the necessity of going to war arose. The new scheme seriously reduced the establishment of the general-service battalions in the Colonies and at home. That establishment had been the result of the experience of a great number of years and numberless campaigns, and although to make them up would make a smaller demand upon the Reserves, they would find that the establishment would have to be increased to meet war requirements as settled by long practice. [MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER dissented.] The right hon. Gentleman
    1124
    shook his head but he did not believe so much in practice as in theory.
    With regard to India the Secretary for War had sanctioned the reorganisation scheme of the Indian Army drawn up by Lord Kitchener, and that scheme could not have been undertaken without the consent of the Cabinet. That scheme provided for putting 150,000 men upon the frontier in case of necessity. He thought the military reforms of India were much better understood by the people conversant with military reforms than they used to be. The Indian frontier on the East had been rendered practically impregnable, but the western frontier could undoubtedly be turned by an enterprising foe. Ten years ago that frontier could be watched by a police force, but at the present moment that force had to be replaced by something like the strongest Army they possessed. To reinforce that Army, in case of necessity, by troops from this country must be provided for, and he wished to know how far the right hon. Gentleman's scheme met this necessity. The new scheme maintained in India fifty-two battalions at 1,037 men each, but how were the reserves which would be necessary for this force to be provided? They would have to be drawn either from the colours or from the reserves. The colour establishment could not provide any reasonable number of reserves for the Indian Army, and how about the Reserve itself? The right hon. Gentleman professed to be able to find 20,000 reserves for his long-service Army, but he would remind him that the real strength of the reserves provided by the long-service system was only about 7,000 or 8,000. The 20,000 men referred to were, based upon a wastage of 42 per cent., but the real wastage was 65 per cent, upon a nine years service. That fact he got from the Secretary of State for India in December, 1902. The consequence was that 13,000 men had to be deducted, which reduced the 20,000 down to about 7,000. Now would any hon. Gentleman opposite contend that 7,000 Reservists were enough to provide for the needs of India in case an emergency arose. The home service provided a large Reserve, but it provided only half the number of the present reserves. Instead of 80,000 it provided only 54,000.

    1125
    He would like to draw attention to the opinion expressed by the Inspector-General of the German staff, which was published in The Times of November 28th last year. He said that the two-years system was a serious disadvantage compared with the three-years system, and caused an increased mental strain upon both the officers and the non-commissioned officers and men, and led to other evils previously unknown. What a commentary that was upon the three-years system which the right hon. Gentleman had attempted to introduce, and it showed them the danger of acquiescing in that system. The late Adjutant-General had re-echoed this warning before the War Commission. Consequently any step to introduce short service or relying upon it for an efficient Reserve for the foreign going Army ought to be entered upon with the greatest caution.
    The right hon. Gentleman's proposals had almost all been based on his previous theories and not on actual practice. It was because he misunderstood details that he misapplied principles, and he had committed himself to a scheme full of details which had never been properly digested by himself or those on whom he relied for advice. The right hon. Gentleman might answer, and it was a plausible answer, that other great Army reformers had experienced opposition to the reforms they had suggested. Mr. Cardwell, when he put his proposals before the House of Commons, was opposed by the old superannuated generals, but he was supported by the young generals and the whole of the Civil staff, Could the right hon. Gentleman quote any such authorities in support of his proposals? Was it not notorious that the whole staff of the War Office was opposed to his proposals, and was it not equally generally believed that a majority of his colleagues in the Cabinet were also opposed to his scheme? The right hon. Gentleman gave a pledge—the hon. Member supposed it was a pledge—to the Conservative Union at Edinburgh that if his scheme were kept in abeyance he would not remain longer in office. Was his scheme in abeyance or not? Was it alive and was it going to be presented to the House, or, as he hoped, was it going to be decently buried? Revolutions took place in South Ameri-
    1126
    can States but they were not found to be salutory because they became monotonous. Revolutions in the Army had become monotonous. They did not want to shoot the right hon. Gentleman as South American revolutionists shot their presidents, but they hoped he would transfer his ability to some other sphere of energy.
    SIR JOHN COLOMB (Great Yarmouth)said he always listened with interest and attention to the hon. Member for East Bristol. The hon. Member had to-day lifted the debate above the minor level at which it was started and maintained on the previous day. Some Members on his side of the House had been taunted with having supported the scheme of the present Secretary of State for India and with now supporting the scheme of the present Secretary of State for War. He was not open to that taunt because he opposed the scheme in speech and writing, and refused to vote for it. Therefore it was not from, the Party point of view, but on the broad aspects of the problem that he ventured to offer some observations to the House. Unlike previous speakers in the debate the hon. Member for East Bristol had looked abroad at the Empire as it was. He looked at the military danger as it presented itself to the Empire. Nearly every other speaker from the commencement of the debate had overlooked everything except the defence of this country.
    MAJOR SEELY (Isle of Wight): No, no!
    SIR JOHN COLOMBsaid the whole criticism of the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight in regard to men and efficiency was concentrated upon a demand for support to the Volunteer force. As the Volunteers were not liable to serve out of this country he could not in the least see why the hon. Member should say "No, no."
    MAJOR SEELYsaid that what he stated was that the Volunteer force should be regarded as a school of arms, because, in point of fact, they did go to war oversea.
    SIR JOHN COLOMBsaid he would come to that point presently. Since the introduction of the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India, a new body had been created to consider the question of the defence of the Empire as a whole—in its naval as well as its military aspects. It had declared, and necessarily declared, that the naval policy dominated the whole of our military policy. The scheme of that right hon. Gentleman contemplated the danger of invasion, though the real business of the Army was fighting oversea. That former scheme ignored that fact practically, though in words it did not. There was great talk of having an Army for fighting oversea, but when they came to the details it was the old, old story—our greatest military danger was the danger of invasion. After all the previous changes which had taken place in tinkering the Army, the broad fact remained that we had never considered what were the real requirements of the Empire, and that we had misconceived the military obligations which rested upon this nation. We were always trying to get an Army mainly to protect these islands from military invasion. Anybody listening to the debate yesterday would have supposed that the Navy did not exist. The re-arming of the artillery was a matter on which they were all agreed, but it was not germane to a debate on the Address when they knew positively that every effort was now being made to re-arm the artillery as fast as possible, so as to meet modern circumstances. Therefore, he could not see the the value of the criticism passed on that matter.
    On the question of Army reorganisation he was bound to say that he could not see how any practical good which could come from the Amendment on the Address. In a few days they would enter on the consideration of the Army Estimates when they would have the facts and figures before them, and a full statement from the Secretary of State for War as to the changes which were in progress, what point the changes had reached, and what still remained to be done. He thought they might have possessed their souls in patience for that better opportunity of full discussion. He was not exactly certain how far
    1128
    these changes had gone, and he thought the House ought to know. He wanted to deal with the feature which was most prominent in the debate yesterday—the ignoring of the question of economy. While continual references were made to the improvement of the Volunteers, and abstract references were made to economy, the only suggestions made were such as would largely increase the expenditure on the Volunteers.
    MR. GUEST (Plymouth)No, no!
    SIR JOHN COLOMBsaid the hon. Member who said "No, no" could not have attended to the debate.
    MR. GUESTremarked that what he said in the debate yesterday was that if economy were practised in connection with the Regular Army there would be money enough to spare for the Volunteers.
    SIR JOHN COLOMBsaid an hon. Member stated that he wanted £2,000,000 more. He would not go through the speeches of hon. Gentlemen on that point, but there was a general expression of opinion that if the Secretary of State for War would only spend more money on the Volunteers he would get their support. He was sorry to hear an insinuation from the hon. Member for Plymouth, that those who did not see eye to eye with them on the question of the Volunteers were actuated by some class prejudice against the Volunteers. He did not think it worth while to discuss such ideas. He never held them and repudiated them. The hon. Member himself had talked about the blue-water school having a contempt for the Volunteers.
    MR. GUESTsaid that what he had stated was that there was a professional contempt for the Volunteers, and he maintained that opinion still.
    SIR JOHN COLOMBsaid he understood that the hon. Member had referred to the blue-water school. It was not a question of the blue-water school's opinion, but of the military security of the Empire. They had to provide for military requirements according to some principle,

    1129
    knowing that their funds were exhaustible, and that they must not waste their money. Now, could they rely upon the Volunteer forces for providing those reserves of men who would be available to go where they would be wanted—to go oversea and stay there.
    MAJOR SEELY: Hear, hear!
    SIR JOHN COLOMB: Oh, the hon. and gallant Member thought they could. He did not, and he ventured to say that all experience was against that. He presumed they all agreed with the deliberate opinion of the Committee of Imperial Defence that what our military forces were required for was for fighting oversea. If so, the problem presented itself thus: taking the forces created for a totally different purpose, did these lend themselves to such adaptation as would meet the real necessities of the Imperial situation? They knew that the Regular Army was maintained for the special purpose of going anywhere where their services were required. They knew that the Militia was a service created and maintained originally for the purpose of defending these shores against military attack. They knew that the Volunteers created themselves by spontaneous action and patriotic enterprise, and they had now a large force whose patriotism was admitted, and against the individuals supporting that force not a word was to be said. But they had had a war oversea which afforded the opportunity of seeing how far these two forces could be relied on to give the men wanted for oversea service. He was not talking now of the efficiency of the men or their training, but simply of their numbers. If hon. Members consulted the Returns for 1902 they would find some visible, practical proof of the proportion of those forces they were likely to get for fighting oversea. On the outbreak of the war in South Africa the enrolled strength of the Militia was 116,582 officers and men, and of the Volunteers at the same time 231,624. Now, the number of the Regular Forces sent out to South Africa was 246,000: while the Militia of the United Kingdom furnished over 45,000, and the organised
    1130
    Volunteer force of the United Kingdom only sent under 20,000.
    MR. FULLER (Wiltshire, Westbury): Does the hon. and gallant Member include the Yeomanry?
    SIR JOHN COLOMB: No, certainly not; and for this reason, that if they looked at the figures it would be seen that it was the patriotism of those men who were called yeomanry which took them individually oversea. They had no connection with the Volunteers as an organised force.
    MAJOR SEELYsaid that the hon. and gallant Member had fallen into an extraordinary error in making deductions from the figures he had quoted. What the War Office authorities called for was mounted men, and the Auxiliary Forces in this country out of an establishment of 10,000 sent—if he might use an Irishism—50,000 men to the war. If it had been dismounted men that were asked for or required, 200,000 men could have been got.
    SIR JOHN COLOMBsaid he should be glad to agree if he could with the hon. and gallant Member, for it would be a solution of the whole problem. But what he was dealing with was the organised forces of the Militia and Volunteers as they appeared on the Estimates. Shortly stated, the Militia, out of an enrolled strength, gave 39 per cent., while the Volunteer force only gave 8·5 per cent.
    MAJOR SEELYsaid that that was all that was asked for. They might have got any amount more.
    SIR JOHN COLOMBsaid that he was not going into speculative figures as to whether the Militia and Volunteers could have done this or that. He was taking the three branches of the service—Regulars, Militia, and Volunteers—as they were trained, and as they appeared on the Estimates; and he held that the Militia gave 39 per cent., and the Volunteers only 8·5 per cent, of their enrolled strength. Of course, if he was wrong, he was wrong; but if he was wrong the Returns were wrong. The Returns showed the enrolled strength in each case, and the number which went to the war; and

    1131
    he was trying to make some deductions from the figures. And he did not see how his argument was to be met by being told, "Oh! If you had done something else, something else would have happened." He was dealing with the point that we could not risk our Empire by a reliance on forces not liable for service beyond the sea.
    MAJOR SEELYsaid that the hon. and gallant Gentleman's argument was wholly vitiated by the fact that all the men that were asked for were obtained; and the War Office could have obtained 30,000; more if they had been required.
    SIR JOHN COLOMBsaid he still preferred the Returns and the figures in the Estimates. He confessed that he might; have misapprehended hon. Members opposite when they said that we had only to spend more money on the Volunteers and treat them properly and the whole question of discharging the obligation of oversea service for the defence of the Empire would be met, because these men must be trained and ready and willing to, go oversea and remain there. He did not think, as regarded the point of remaining oversea, that the experience of the War Office established that. Take the very cream of the Volunteer force which went to the front—the C.I.V.'s—they were brought home while the war continued.
    MAJOR SEELY: They were ordered home.
    SIR JOHN COLOMB: At all events they were brought home. He knew he was not taking the popular side and he could not take it. It was not easy, really, to make a connected and clear speech if one was continually interrupted. He knew that if that was frequently done it was not easy to explain his position. Therefore, he could not see that if more money was spent on the Volunteers and their numbers enlarged how the power of discharging our obligation of oversea defence of the Empire was going to be discharged, or our military strength maintained. Consequently, he objected to spending more money on the Volunteer forces. No doubt the problem of the requirements of the military forces of
    1132
    the Empire was enormously complicated, and ought to be faced in a larger spirit than, it had been. This he would say, the problem was not to be solved by vague iterations against the changes that had taken place in the Army. Changes had been made under the influence of popular emotion, and it had to be remembered in considering this problem that neither popular feeling nor the opinion of this House would alter the military necessities of the Empire. It was the business of statesmen to look at that problem of the defence of the Empire as a whole, and until the last few months that had not been the business of statesmen. There had been no organised means of doing it. The Imperial Defence Committee had placed the obligation on Ministers to look after all these things and to decide how our military power was to be exercised oversea with success.
    MR. LAMBERT (Devonshire, South Molton)said that in voting for the Amendment of the hon. Member for West Newington those who sat on the Opposition side of the House did not in the least degree desire to make the Army a question of Party politics. That had been done by hon. Gentlemen opposite, who, where-ever they went in the country, had arrogated to themselves the title-role of the defenders of the Army. What the hon. Member who moved the Amendment did was to appeal for some continuity in Army politics. Nobody doubted the zeal of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State; they did not assail him, but they did and must assail the policy of the Government in regard to Army reform. During the past ten years there had been a procession of War Ministers, all of whom had advocated changes, all of which had been adopted in haste and abandoned in a hurry. As the hon. and gallant Admiral who had just sat down had said, the Government had been too responsive to public clamour. The War Office was being continually reformed, and the only tangible result was that after all these changes they had £29,000,000 on the Estimates for the year. They had preached economy until they had come to the conclusion that it was no use saying anything further about it; they were now face to face with an automatic

    1133
    increase in the Army Estimates, and what was the state of the Army to-day? In the words of the right hon. Gentleman himself, it was imperfectly prepared, wasteful in its methods, unsatisfactory in its results, and one of the most costly machines ever devised. The extravagance in the expenditure on the Army was sapping the greatest spring of our national strength. We did not come out of the Boer War victorious from any foresight of our own, but because we were able to last out longer than the Boers. Another point to which he would draw attention was that the Prime Minister had made himself the fond foster-mother of every struggling infant of the Secretary of State for War. The right hon. Gentleman had said the three great objects were to prepare an Army for service abroad if required, to keep a prepared Army at home if necessary, and to decentralise instead of centralising the control of the Army, and the right hon. Gentleman further said that that could best be done by the six Army Corps scheme. In order to bolster up the scheme recourse had to be had to the Imperial short-service system, in regard to which the Secretary of State for War had said that it did not appear that the Government's calculations had been sufficiently close, and that he had had to extend it. The fact of the matter was that the right hon. Gentleman had succeeded to a heritage of chaos and confusion, the result of nine years of office of the present Government.
    He confessed he was somewhat sceptical as to the scheme of the present Secretary of State. One would have thought the Government would have accumulated all the experience possible from men who had served in the late war and applied it to the re-organisation of the Army. Nothing of the kind First of all there came the six Army Corps scheme, and then the Esher Committee, in regard to which there was one point which struck everyone alike, which was that no member of that Committee had had any experience in the South African War, and if anything ought to have been brought to bear upon the re-organisation of the Army surely it should have been the experience gained in that war. What was the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman? Was the right hon. Gentleman going to carry
    1134
    out the scheme he had adumbrated in the House in the previous July? Was his scheme based on military experience and advice; on the best military judgment of the country? Last year very strong debates had taken place upon this question, and in another place the late Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, said—
    "There are many points in the scheme of the Secretary of State which commend themselves to me but there are others which do not, and which I believe will be detrimental to the interests of the Army."
    Were those portions of the scheme to be persevered in? The Government knew perfectly well that the Army Council did not agree with them as regarded the scheme. Neither the Army Council nor Lord Roberts agreed with the whole of the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman, and what he desired to know was, had the right hon. Gentleman modified his scheme so as to conform with the opinion of those two authorities? If not, it ought not to be proceeded with. Was the linked-battalion system to be done away with? Because there was the evidence of the Wantage Committee that the linked-battalion system was one which had done admirable service to the country in the past. He noticed that the right hon. Gentleman was going to start thirteen new depots at a cost of £3,500,000 in spite of the fact that the Wantage Committee expressed the opinion that the system of depots could not compare with that of the linked battalions so far as economy was concerned. Would the right hon. Gentleman say whether he intended to go on with his scheme of destroying the linked battalions? At the present moment we had a simple organisation for the Army, Militia, and Volunteers. It appeared to him that the right hon. Gentleman was going to considerably complicate the system. What was to be done with the Militia under the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman? Did he propose to merge the Militia in the regular-service Army? The right hon. Gentleman and those who thought with him had forgotten, apparently, the services done in South Africa by the Militia, but the old scheme was now to be put on one side and in its place they were to have they did not know what.

    1135
    According to the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman the Militia was going to be rendered fit for service at home or abroad. Did that mean that the Militia was to be merged in the Regular Forces? The decline of the Militia was, in the previous year, described by the right hon. Gentleman as being the inevitable consequence of the way in which that force had been treated. With that statement everyone agreed. Did the right hon. Gentleman intend to destroy or raise up the Militia? What had been the result of all this tinkering? It was that the Army Corps had been abandoned; that we had artillery unfit to meet anything in Europe, short rifles, hopeless confusion and wasteful extravagance. Was that what the Army existed for? He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would tell the House what the Army did exist for [An HON. MEMBER: For fighting.] Yes, but where? because an army fighting at home had to be differently organised to an army which had to fight abroad. In the previous year, when the Commission which had to inquire into the efficiency of our military forces was sitting, they asked how many men were required for the defence of this country? The Defence Committee had not then made up their mind upon that point. Had they now come to any decision as to the number of troops required for home defence? Had they made up their minds as to the number required to defend the frontier of India? In conclusion, he asked the right hon. Gentleman to consult the best military authorities and not allow his own theories to run away with him, lest there should be other schemes hastily prepared which would only result in costing the country an enormous amount and give nothing in return. All that the House wanted to see was that they were getting value for the money which was being spent.
    COLONEL PILKINGTON (Lancashire, Newton)said he did not propose to speak to-night from the higher level of the Government's general War Office policy, especially as he thought that, after all, it was with questions of detail that the matter to-day had to be chiefly considered. In his opinion the country was far less fitted for war oven than it was
    1136
    in 1899. He believed that the reserves were far less, and he much feared, moreover, that his hon. friend had gone astray in losing sight of the value of a large Reserve. The larger we could make our Reserve, the more effective we should be able to make our defence. What happened in the Boer War bore out the contention that we could not always wholly rely on the Regular Army. If we had had, at that time, to rely on the Regular Army alone we might conceivably have been defeated; and it must not be forgotten, in regard to that struggle, that a great proportion of the Imperial Yeomanry, who did so much to decide it, were drafted from the ranks of the Volunteers of England themselves. Personally, he did not see any reason why the present Volunteer system should be altered. For many years past it had been increasing both in efficiency—though slowly, perhaps—and certainly in numbers, and he wished to ask one or two Questions in regard to the Government proposals as to the Volunteers. Under the old system it was perfectly easy to send each Volunteer battalion attached to a Line regiment into its proper line. That led him to the Questions he was going to ask of the Secretary for War. He was sorry not to see him in his place, but he quite realised that he had sat through this debate for a very long time and, really, very patiently. It had been asked in the course of the debate, "Why do you not wait for the-Army Estimates?" The answer was simple—that this was a good time for eliciting information, and possibly also for paving the way in some degree for a revision of the proposals of last year. He should like to know, in the first place, whether the right hon. Gentleman proposed to abolish the present battalion system. Because, if he did so, we would at once throw into confusion not only the Line battalions but also the corresponding ones in the Militia and Volunteers. He wanted to ask another question, and it was based on his own experience. For a long time Volunteer corps had been under the supervision of brigadiers, who would, perhaps, be in charge of the brigade for seven, eight, or ten years, and would so get to know the corps under them. He had, he thought, been under three Regular officers as brigadiers,

    1137
    and from all those three officers had acquired some military knowledge. They were all good men, and the last, of them, under whom he now was, was not only an exceedingly good officer, but took a real interest in the work of the corps which constitute his brigade. He heard now that the present system was to be altered and that everything in the way of these appointments was to go by chance. He thought it was better for a brigadier to be in a position to take an interest for several consecutive years in a battalion under his charge, for they got to know him and he got to know them.
    Then they heard much of the desirability of giving encouragement to shooting. The battalion with which he was connected had hitherto done its shooting at Altcar, one of the best ranges in the North of England. How they were to do without that range he failed to see, but an intimation had come to them that they must not look to it as being available this year. On receipt of that notice they went to the officer in charge of the range, but he said he could give no orders, and that it seemed to be a question for the officer commanding the district. To that officer they went accordingly, but could get no satisfaction. This was but a detail, but it went to show what was happening and might happen in other cases. They spent, only a year or two ago, on this Altcar range, which the Government then said would be available to all Liverpool and West Lancashire regiments, £200 for the erection of a shooting pavilion for the use of officers and men, but, so far as he could see, they were not now going to have that range this season, and it looked, indeed, as if—he supposed in consequence of some dispute between the owner and the Government—it would be shut. If they could not have good shooting practice, for which a good practice ground was provided, it was of but little use to talk much of the need of inducing the young men of England to practise rifle-shooting. There was another question he desired to put, as to what the classification would be in future in regard to efficiency. For forty-four years past the Volunteer battalions had been built up into what was now, at least, real efficiency. Were they now going to have two classes of efficiency?
    1138
    Would the battalions all have one correct mark of efficiency, or would there be two classes? That was a very important question, as to which at the present moment no one knew anything. He did not doubt that the Volunteers would loyally accept any arrangement which the War Office might think necessary, but it did seem hard that they should be told in the House that 60,000 Volunteers were to be done away with, and that the force was to be cut down from 240,000 to 180,000. That, in itself, was sufficient to shake the force from end to end, and had, unfortunately, proved sufficient to discourage Volunteer officers from coming forward. What he asked from the right hon. Gentleman was that when he gave his decision, as he would within the next four weeks, he should be specially careful in regard to the facts which Volunteer officers had laid before him in that House in regard to the Volunteer forces. The case for the Militia and the Line had been ably put, and he had not a word to say in regard to that case, except that he endorsed almost every word that had been said. As to the Volunteers—if they could not be improved, then, at least, let them be left alone.
    SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN (Stirling Burghs): I do not get up to indicate any expression of a desire to bring the debate to a conclusion, but, merely to make a few observations and ask a few questions which the right hon. Gentleman later on will be able to reply to. I am not at all surprised, and no one can be surprised, that questions affecting the Volunteers have occupied so large a part of this debate. The Volunteers have been threatened and greatly injured by the threat, and what makes this the more annoying is that the threat was so ill-considered that we are now told that it is not going to be carried out. That haste and want of consideration are at the bottom of nearly all the errors that have been committed in this matter. But I wish to inquire how we stand on the big question of the organisation of the Army. Is there any policy at all with regard to the Army? We are willing to attack or defend the policy, but we want to know, first of all, whether there is a

    1139
    policy. We can at least be told that. Be it remembered that the Government have been in charge of the Army for ten years, I might even say for twenty years, with a short interruption; therefore the Army now is very much what they themselves have made it, and they have had ample time to make it what they wish it to be. Not only that, but it is four years since we had a definite promise and assurance that they would give us a new and vastly improved Army; it is about four years since the last general election when that was promised. It is one and a half years since the right hon. Gentleman himself came into office and told us he knew exactly what was wanted and exactly how to obtain what was wanted. Last year's Estimates were founded not upon any new ideas, but were nominal Estimates founded on what we were told was a doomed system. Then we had another fact in the creation of the Cabinet Committee of Defence, from which great expectations were formed. The next step was that from the War Office were summarily ejected all the old officers who had held positions there, whatever their experience had been; and new minds, we were told, had to be introduced in order to carry out the new ideas. Then the final stage was the laying before the House and the country last year of the scheme of the Secretary of State for War. Now we shall see, no doubt—at least I have formed no other expectation—in the new Estimates which will be laid on the Table as soon as Committee of Supply is set up, the result of the new Army system definitely announced on authority. The Government, we assume, by this time have either accepted or modified or altered the scheme of last year, and they not only will be able to tell us all about it, but they will have founded their Estimates for the coming year on that basis. That is what we expect, and I think it is a reasonable expectation.
    An answer will also be given to a question which has been put once or twice in the course of this debate as to what are the real military requirements of the country. Someone said, when this question was asked, that soldiers were wanted to fight; that is hardly what may be called a conclusive and comprehen-
    1140
    sive answer. We want to know what is the conception of the Government after all these deliberations, all these new organisations of control, and all that has been said, of what the real military requirements are, what the purpose of our Army and other warlike forces is, and what the particular description of force necessary to fulfil that object may be. We have received no information on the subject. A Royal Commission, appointed to inquire into whether the Militia and Volunteers were adequate for their duties, asked the not unreasonable question what these duties were, and they were unable to get an answer. They tried one source after another in the different departments, but as soon as an answer was given it was countermanded and withdrawn, and there the question ends. I think the House of Commons and the country are entitled to that information.
    But while we are expecting to hear a definite and absolutely decided and accepted plan in all these particulars, we were rather startled the night before last to hear a new cut-and-dried scheme for the Militia brought forward, totally at variance with all that we have been told before. The Militia, according to the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman last year, were to be obliterated altogether, or at any rate to be fundamentally altered in character, and to be reduced from the prominent position they have hitherto held. Now they are to be put into another form, and every man is to be enlisted with a liability for foreign service, a liability to which he has not been subject hitherto. The Militia has been used for foreign service, but always by volunteering when the necessity arose. There are a few questions I should like to ask, without pronouncing any opinion whether this enlistment for foreign service is advantageous or not. Has any consideration been given to the effect that such a change will have on recruiting? Many a man is quite ready to serve in the Militia under present conditions; but the moment you say he is thereby undertaking liability to be sent abroad whenever his regiment is embodied, and in the case of war, is there not a danger of his being afraid that that would come into conflict with his employer, or his wife, which is much more formidable? Has any estimate been made of

    1141
    the effect upon recruiting of adding the new, certainly serious, and almost terrible obligation to the enlistment of the Militia? The second question I would ask is this:—What effect will it have upon the Ballot Laws with regard to the Militia? Is the ballot to be still alive though never enforced for the Militia after you have made this stipulation? Compulsory service for the defence of the country we could understand. Compulsory service to take the place of the Regular Forces in the defence of certain foreign places we could also understand. But compulsory service, the power of sending a man abroad, in a wide sense has never been contemplated as likely to apply to this country. This is at least a complete change of front, because the Militia was going altogether to disappear, and now it is to be put in the forefront. Why was this very fragmentary reform brought forward m the way it was in Parliament? Why this hurry to introduce piecemeal legislation? Is this total alteration of the Militia to be introduced to fit in with some other scheme or not? What is that other scheme? To proceed to deal in that way with one branch of the service without reference to the effect on others is surely a strange thing. If you were building a house, would it be a wise thing to say, "We will at all events commence to build a wing, trusting that by-and-by we shall build a house which will fit in with our wing? "Suppose the War Office buildings had not been quite agreed upon, and we said, "Oh, let us make a beginning with the Quartermaster-General's department. We can easily fit on the general scheme." That is the way in which the new Army is being built. Hurry is the very worst counsellor you can have. It is to hurry we owe the Army Corps, the short rifle, and the Secretary of State's last year's scheme. How much better it would have been if he had taken another year, if he had said less about it, made fewer promises, gone into the work in a humbler spirit, and said, "I must really have time." Not a bit of it. Within a month or two he must produce a scheme, which, of course, being produced in a hurry, has broken down. These hurried schemes are not only unlikely to produce efficiency, but they are the cause of end-
    1142
    less expense. Look at the barracks which have been built on the Army Corps scheme. So also with regard to the rifle, what expense is incurred. The fundamental and fatal mistake has been that desire, first of all, of showing off and making a splash of finding new schemes, and secondly of making a splash in too great a hurry. That is all I have to say with regard to these successive schemes.
    We look forward that either to-night or on introducing the Estimates the right hon. Gentleman will be able to tell us exactly what the Committee of Defence have determined is necessary for the country. Recruiting is now going on for nine years, and short-service recruiting has been stopped, temporarily I presume, in order to redress the balance. Long service is destroying the Reserve without the compensating machinery which was suggested last year under the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman. Some men of the very new school and some of the very old may contend that they do not like the short service at all, and that there are great advantages in the long service; but, besides the fact that it is killing the Reserve, it is enormously expensive. The short service was introduced largely to save the expense of long service. If you have a man with his regiment for nine years you must have a large increase in your married service, and that hinders the Army by immobility and by charge in every direction. You have necessarily also the charge for pensions. You cannot keep a man all that time away from his ordinary life without pensioning him. After short service had been introduced, following on a ten-years system, the number of pensions came down to less than a third of the previous number. They were in the process of further reduction when these changes began to be made. This is a very important matter. We must, of course, furnish drafts for India, and we ought to do it in the most economical manner both for India and ourselves. The whole difficulty lies in how to reconcile these things. I venture to hope the right hon. Gentleman will tell us that these nine-years enlistments are only temporarily employed, and that he will soon find himself an opportunity of reverting in one form or another to a

    1143
    shorter service which will give us that system of reserves which we found an undoubted success the other day in the war in South Africa.
    SIR JOHN GORST (Cambridge University)said he should not attempt to answer the arguments of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, who had had a very wide experience in these matters. His sole reason for rising was because the mover of this Amendment had alluded to the difficulty of obtaining recruits and the very unsatisfactory condition of their physique. The complaint as to the difficulty of obtaining recruits and as to their quality was not at all a new question, for it had frequently been referred to in the House, and in public by some of the highest officers in the Army most qualified to speak upon it, and it was considered to be of such importance that His Majesty's Government a few years ago approved the appointment of a Departmental Committee to enquire into the alleged physical deterioration of the people. That Committee included some very high officers in the Army and men of great experience like the Inspector-General, and they made a unanimous Report. There had been a great error in regard to that Report for it did not find, as some people imagined, that there had been no physical deterioration. What was reported was that there was no evidence upon which that physical deterioration could be established. In regard to the recruits for the Army they came to this decision for two distinct reasons. In the first place, because no records had been kept which would enable a contrast to be made with the condition of recruits at the present time; and in the second place, evidence was given to show that the class from which recruits were drawn varied according to the amount of employment in the country at different times. When there was a great depression of trade in this country a great number of men of a superior order enlisted as recruits. When employment was common and everybody could get work, recruits were drawn from a lower class and their physique was decidedly inferior. The Committee also reported that there were a great number of causes, affecting chiefly the poorer paid classes of workmen in this country, which tended to
    1144
    physical deterioration. The Report contained a number of perfectly practical suggestions, some of which could be carried out by administrative action, and some of which required the assistance of this House in the reform of our laws. He was extraordinarily astonished to learn from answers recently given in the House that no kind of action was to be taken whatever on this Report, and that no legislation was to be submitted to Parliament on the subject. We were to go on exactly as before, notwithstanding the pregnant and important Report of the Committee. If we wanted strong, healthy, well developed men to serve in the Army—and it was the worst economy in the world to take men of inferior health and constitution—proper attention should be given to the conditions under which they were brought up. In India there were about 50 per cent, of the European soldiers constantly on the sick list, so that we had actually to incur the expense of sending out double the number of men required. We had to reckon that half of the number would always be in hospital on one ground or another. What could be more extravagant than a system of that kind if there was any possibility of preventing it?
    Evidence was given before the Committee that the degeneracy of the youth of the country was entirely preventable. If growing boys in the public elementary schools were watched and medically examined such measures could be taken as would secure that they would not grow up into men afflicted with rickets and diseases consequent on bad nutrition and bad conditions imposed upon them in childhood. This Amendment did not apply to women, and he would not refer to the training of girls beyond saying that it was also of importance that those who were to be the mothers of future generations should not grow up under bad conditions. Continental countries were more immediately dependent on soldiers for their safety than we were, and they took good care that their boys and girls were brought up under conditions which conduced to efficiency and health. They were more carefully looked after in the schools, and he did not attribute that to any greater humanity on the part of

    1145
    foreign nations, but to the fact that they were compelled from motives of self-preservation to look after matters which we allowed to drift as they liked. He would press this subject on the attention of the House at every opportunity. He would bring it up on the Irish Estimates, the Scotch Estimates, and the English Estimates, and he would entreat the Government for the sake of the nation, the Empire, and numerous other considerations not to neglect the recommendations of that Committee. The Committee consisted of officials of high rank, and they reported unanimously that the question was very urgent and that there were a great many things that ought to be done at once. It was necessary to have legislation to carry out the Report, and if the Government neglected altogether to consider the question they would incur a most tremendous responsibility. What was the good of having an Army if we could not get people who were fit to bear the burdens of military service? He hoped the Government would take these matters into consideration, and that they would not incur the responsibility of neglecting the duty which had been put before them on such high authority.
    MR. FULLER (Wiltshire, Westbury)said that those who knew the present condition of the Army must realise the importance of the remarks made by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Cambridge University. Some statements were made in the columns of a newspaper a few days ago, on the authority of Mr. Arnold White, drawing attention to the height and weight of our recruits. He hoped the Secretary of State for War would be able to contradict the figures, because if they were facts it was evident that the physical conditions of the recruits now being drawn into the Line regiments were such that the men could not under any circumstances be a credit to the service they joined. It was alleged that the minimum height was 5 feet 2 inches, and the minimum weight 8 stones 3 lbs. He would ask the right hon. Gentleman and the House whether it was worth while discussing the question of long and short rifles when the recruits who were joining the Army were not only not fit to carry a rifle, but not fit to carry a pop-gun. He
    1146
    wished to call attention to the wastage that was going on in the British Army owing not only to the physical condition of the men, but to other factors which were largely due to the policy of continuous change, for which the Government was responsible. In 1902 there were 50,753 recruits attested in the Army. During the same year there was in the United Kingdom an Army, roughly, of 100,000. The number who died was 3,896; there deserted, 7,162; there were invalided, 8,869; there were discharged for misconduct, 2,903; and there were discharged as inefficient, 1,653; making a total wastage under these heads of 24,483. It was one of the contentions of those who opposed the right hon. Gentleman's policy and supported the Amendment that the changes which were continually being made were bringing about discontent and interfering with the discipline of the Army. During twelve months the number of men in the British Army who were in prison was 21,943, or 22 per cent, of the whole of the soldiers in these islands. He thought these figures were alarming and that they should be carefully considered by the right hon. Gentleman.
    The hon. and gallant Member for Stepney had stated in reference to the Volunteer force that numbers did not necessarily mean military efficiency and the right hon. Gentleman cheered him. If the facts he had given as to the wastage that was going on in the Army were accurate, it might be said that numbers did not mean military strength. He believed that Members of the Tory Party wished to have a large Army, while Members on the Opposition side of the House desired a smaller but more efficient Army. In his opinion that was the difference between the two sides of the House. He believed that if, under the present system of voluntary enlistment, the Army were increased it would only be at the expense of efficiency. Earlier in the debate a controversy had arisen across the floor of the House, between the hon. and gallant Members for Yarmouth and the Isle of Wight, as to the number of Militia and Volunteers who went to South Africa. The point at issue was that the former asserted that in time of war the gaps and wastage of the Army in the

    1147
    field could not be filled up from the Militia and Volunteers, and the latter that they could be. He thought it would surprise the hon. and gallant Member for Yarmouth to know that there had been drawn from the Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry and sent to South Africa no fewer than 101,000 men, and it was common knowledge what excellent service they had performed and that without them the Regular Forces would not have been able to carry the war to a successful conclusion. The Secretary of State for War would, no doubt, when he came to reply, have no difficulty in answering the criticisms made in that quarter. The lines of attack on any policy, and particularly the military policy of a Government, and more particularly when they did not know exactly what that policy was, must be conflicting and divergent. He was certain the right hon. Gentleman must be aware that on both sides of the House, and in the country as a whole, reat uneasiness prevailed as to the ate of the Army. He did not say that that uneasiness would be necessarily developed in the division lobbies any more in regard to the position of the Army than in regard to other subjects of recent controversy.
    The hon. and gallant Member for Taunton told the House that they must cut their coat according to their cloth, but he ventured to think that the policy of both the present and late Secretary of State for War aimed at the creation and maintenance of a larger Army than this country under the present military and financial system could ever supply or support. Two days ago, in another place, the Under-Secretary for War, in discussing a question arising out of the present status of the Militia, said that it was a notable fact that only 250,000 troops out of a total of 605,000 men were ear-marked for service abroad. That was to say, that in the noble Lord's opinion 250,000 were insufficient for service abroad. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War himself was even more explicit, for at a dinner at Chelmsford he said in the course of a speech—
    "That in the case of India alone, if we are to keep up our Army for war purposes"
    1148
    He did not know for what else than war an army was kept up—
    "We did not want 133,000"
    —Let the House mark this—
    "But four times that number."
    That was to say, that in the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman, and, therefore, presumably in the opinion of the Government, we should require in the North-West of India a force of no less than 532,000 troops. He would remind the House that the North-West of India was not the only land frontier with which this Empire had to deal, and if there was danger there—he admitted that many able authorities said that there was problematical danger on the North-West frontier—the whole House would admit also that there was a problematical danger on the Canadian frontier. And if it was necessary to find over 500,000 men for the defence of India alone, what was the policy of the Government in regard to the whole Empire, and how far were they going on those lines sketched by the Secretary for War? He ventured to think that the maintenance of this enormous land Army was beyond the permanent possibilities both of the voluntary and financial systems under which the country at present existed. If we were to keep a land force fully equipped in all details, ready for active service in the field, on the lines suggested by the noble Lord and the right hon. Gentleman, the financial burden in itself would be greater than the people of this country could bear and we would have to adopt a protectionist policy, not for the purposes of protection but for the purpose of raising revenue to meet the expense. And if we asked the country to supply a sufficient number of recruits to feed an Army of the kind sketched, we would have to abandon the system of voluntary enlistment and adopt the Continental system of conscription. He thought it possible and probable that a good number of hon. Gentlemen opposite would not regret to see the adoption of protection for revenue purposes or of conscription for military purposes. Neither policy, he believed, was one, in the opinion of those on his side of the House, which would be of advantage to the country or the Empire. Therefore, if we were to keep our

    1149
    military forces within the financial abilities of the people of this country, and voluntary enlistment, it was high time that we cried "Stop" to military expenses and did something to show the country that, at any rate in the opinion of hon. Members on that side of the House, it was not necessary to maintain for the services of this country and the Empire even so large an Army as at present existed.
    CAPTAIN JESSEL (St. Pancras, S.)said he did not believe that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War or the noble Lord the Under-Secretary intended to advocate the extension of the standing Army to the very large body of men mentioned by the hon. Gentleman opposite. Their only wish was to draw attention to the elementary fact that it might be necessary to mobilise and recruit a very large body of men. Considering that in this country and the Colonies and dependencies we had over a million of men under arms in one shape or form, he did not think it was very wrong of the right hon. Gentleman and the noble Lord to point out that we could, under existing conditions, only send a quarter of a million of men for an oversea campaign. The recent campaign in Manchuria had shown us the probability of very large forces being employed. The North-West Frontier of India required a much larger Army than was thought possible before. It was the paramount duty of the War Office and those who advised the Secretary of State for War to be prepared with a sufficient number of men to meet any possible emergency. When it was remembered that the Undersecretary stated that we could only send across the sea 250,000 men, he did not think the War Office could be blamed for taking steps to make that number stronger if the occasion arose. The Amendment set forth—
    "That the continuous and continuing changes in the War Office are destructive of the best interests of His Majesty's Army."
    [OPPOSITION cries of "Hear, hear!"] He was somewhat surprised to hear that cheer from hon. Members opposite considering that year after year they had denounced the War Office and all connected with it. The recommendations of the Esher Com-
    1150
    mittee were approved of by every Member of the House with the exception of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, and now the Government was blamed for attempting to carry out the changes so urgently demanded. There was another very curious thing; the system of Army Corps initiated by the Secretary of State for India divided this country into various districts for the better organisation and decentralisation of the various troops in the different commands. This system was condemned, whereas administrative commands of the Esher Committee answering the same purpose were approved. He was sure the House would agree that the War Minister was wise in introducing changes which created a general staff. For many years complaints had been made that there was no general staff in the Army and the Intelligence Branch existed only as a sort of post office and the letters did not always reach the proper authorities. But they had now got a proper general staff. In his opinion it was not quite big enough, but he felt quite sure that they were now proceeding upon the right lines.
    He had listened very attentively to the debate yesterday, and what impressed him was that so many hon. Members spoke about the Volunteers. He believed in the efficiency of the Volunteer Auxiliary Forces, but it was rather hard when the War Office wished to make a change in their condition that so much comment should be made. The Volunteers had grown up in the past in a sort of haphazard fashion. In Scotland there were fourteen regiments of Volunteer artillery for which no possible place could be found upon mobilisation, and therefore it seemed to him that such corps must be redundant. He did not think the House would approve of spending money upon redundant units. He agreed, however, that they should keep up the Volunteers and make the most of them as a very useful reserve force. A most important announcement had been made in another place as regarded the conditions of service in the Militia. He thought that if the Militia were liable to be sent abroad without volunteering it would free the heads of the Army from a vast amount of anxiety in time of need. It seemed to

    1151
    him that this policy in regard to the Militia needed very careful inquiry, because it showed a somewhat remarkable change of front on the part of the War Minister. They would remember that last year the Militia was going to be ended and abolished, but now it was to be placed in the forefront, and he hoped that this would have the effect of creating a more useful force. The more troops they were able to send abroad and across the sea the better would be the forces of the British Empire.
    There was another point upon which a mistake seemed to him to have been made. They had increased the pay of the private soldier. The hon. Member who spoke last and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge University had called attention to the low physique of many of our recruits, and notwithstanding this they had increased the pay of the private soldier by nearly one-half. Was that a satisfactory state of affairs? He was not satisfied with the prevailing condition of things, because he had been told that by this increase of pay they had not attracted very many more men, and the money which the men got was of no benefit to them under the present system. The men got their money and they spent it in a way which did them no good at all. He would suggest that it would be a good plan if part of this money could be earmarked for an old-age pension, and this they would be able to hold out to the men as an extra inducement which would really help the soldier when he left the Army. It might be said that this principle had been tried before in the shape of deferred pay, but his idea was that this pension should not be paid in a lump sum but should be paid weekly or quarterly so that the soldier would have something to look forward to. It was a great pity, in his opinion, that money should be wasted in this way, and he did not think the War Office had shown the necessity of so very largely increasing the pay of the soldier. Attention had been drawn to the want of officers in the cavalry and the Guards, and he thought the question of the pay had something to do with that state of things; for they could not expect men under modern military conditions, where leave was not so readily obtained as it
    1152
    used to be, and when the duties were much heavier, to join the Army, where they had to work so hard, if they did not give them proper pay. There was no doubt a very sincere feeling that the expenses of an ordinary officer were much too high. He did not think, however, that in most regiments that was the case. No doubt a certain amount of economy could be practised, but, on the whole, the standard of life was not at all superior to what those officers enjoyed in their own homes. If they were going to have a professional Army they must pay the officers properly and in accordance with the same standard of pay which they would get in other walks of life. He did not think 5s. 3d. a day for a second lieutenant was sufficient for a man of twenty years of age to live and dress himself upon. He knew that in most professions men did not make sufficient money at the start to keep themselves, but the difference between what an officer in the Army got and what they would get in other professions was so marked that if the Government did not see their way to increase the pay of the officers and extend to them other advantages he was afraid they would still go on experiencing this scarcity of men in the commissioned ranks. Then, again, very little consideration was given to the officers or the men in regard to their movements. He knew an instance where, recently, a cavalry regiment was ordered for service abroad and where the officers sold their horses and the noncommissioned officers got rid of their furniture, and just before they should have left this country the order for them going abroad was cancelled. That sort of thing did not make soldiering popular. If any regiment were sent abroad earlier than was expected it threw out of order the arrangements of all the regiments on the roster, and placed them in very peculiar difficulties.
    The Leader of the Opposition had touched upon the terms of enlistment. The three - years system of enlistment had broken down because it was incapable of furnishing sufficient men for the foreign drafts. A great deal of abuse had been put upon the unfortunate head of the late Secretary of State for War because he had introduced this

    1153
    system. He remembered the Army debates which had taken place in this House, and if there was one question which had been pressed upon the attention of the Secretary of State for War in the past it had been the question of a short-service system. The Leader of the Opposition, when he talked about nine-years service, appeared to forget that in his time the ordinary period for any man serving abroad or in India was eight years; and therefore very little change was being made. It was true that the nominal period was seven years with the colours and five years with the Reserve. But if a man happened to be abroad during his seven years service he was detained for eight years. He agreed that sooner or later it would be possible to enlist men for the shorter service because of the importance of keeping up the Reserve. At the present time they were sending out men to India who had not served two years, and some who were under twenty years of age. With regard to the artillery they knew it was to be re-armed. It might be argued that the Secretary of State for War might have done this before, but he thought, when he gave his explanation, he would be able to furnish them with very good reasons why this re-armament of the artillery had not taken place before.
    There was only one other matter which he wished to refer to. He wished to ask what the meaning of reducing our garrison on the colonial stations was. In Egypt the cavalry regiments had been taken away and they had been replaced by a troop of military police. He should have thought that near a great town like Cairo would be a suitable place for mounted troops. In India they always kept a number of mounted troops near the large centres of population. He hoped that when the right hon. Gentleman considered the cost of the Army in Egypt he would be able to see his way to induce the Government of Egypt to contribute to the cost of the British force there. He wished to know for what reason the garrisons all over the British Colonies and Dependencies had been diminished. He was afraid that debates of this kind did not lead to very
    1154
    much except finding fault, because at the present juncture it was impossible to criticise the real military policy of the Government. Last year they had a plan sketched out at the end of the session, and they did not yet know what had been the effect of that plan, what progress had been made with it, or how they stood as regarded recruiting. They did not know what the real intentions of the Government in regard to the Volunteers, the Militia, and other branches of the service were. He was perfectly sure, however, that in the Secretary of State for War they had a man who had earnestly studied the various problems of Army reform, and they could rely upon him doing his best. He was sure that they would listen with a considerable amount of interest to the right hon. Gentleman's summing up of the various points which had been made in the debate.
    SIR MARK STEWART (Kirkcudbrightshire)said he spoke upon this question with some knowledge of the Volunteers, because he happened to have had the command of one of those fourteen Volunteer artillery regiments extending over the three southern counties of Scotland for which the hon. and gallant Member for South St. Pancras had stated there could not be found a place in any mobilisation scheme of the Army. He desired to make a few remarks upon this branch of Army reorganisation. In the first place he hoped that the number of men would not be reduced, and he trusted that some steps would be taken not only this year but in succeeding years to provide for their efficient maintenance. It was no doubt true that the older Volunteers might never be able to lie in a trench all night as was necessary on active service, but their presence in the corps gave stability to it, and induced the younger bloods to join. He should have no objection to a system under which there would be two standards of grants to Volunteers, one for the younger men who were fit and able, for war, and who ought to have a good capitation grant; while the grant to the older men need not be so high, but sufficient for men who were doing useful work in affording others a good example, and giving an air of respectability to the corps. In this way the Volunteers

    1155
    would take the bottom step in the Army ladder, and if called upon in time of war they would be able to give valuable help to the Regular Army. He thought that his suggestion in regard to two standards of capitation grants would encourage, the patriotism of the country, and induce the young and strong to join. With regard to camps, he spoke as a large employer of agricultural labour, and he knew how difficult it was to spare men to go to camp at certain periods of the year. In his district, however, they had got over the difficulty by having the camps in the early spring as well as in summer, which enabled certain hands who could not leave later in the season to go. They were very thankful to hear that no reduction was to be made this year, and he also hoped that no reduction would be made next year. He would like the right hon. Gentleman to explain in more detail the district barrack depôts of Militia which had been created at very great expense. A fear existed that these depôts were going to be done away with, but he hoped that in future they would continue to use them. What the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge University had said as to the physique of the men was very important, but they all knew that the Volunteers from the country were of better physique than those from the town, for they were stronger and better able to shoot. He hoped something would be done to encourage the young men in the country districts to join, because unless some further inducement was offered them they were apt to remain outside the force. He trusted that the capitation grant would not be reduced unless they were prepared to adopt more than one standard. He thought that was a very important matter. He also asked for information as to what changes were likely to take place with regard to University candidates for commissions in the Army. It was most important that they should do all they could to induce young men to join the Army straight from the University. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would recognise that it would be somewhat dangerous to reduce the strength of the Volunteers.
    CAPTAIN ELLICE (St. Andrews Burghs)thought the argument that we
    1156
    must either pay for our Army or serve was fallacious. The hon. Member for Taunton had asserted earlier in the debate that we must either pay or we must serve—either we must pay for our dinner or else we must cook it ourselves. No one objected to paying for a good dinner, but a sovereign was too high a price to pay for a mutton chop and a pint of ale. What he complained of was that we paid too much for the result attained. In 1896 the Militia establishment was 191,000 men, and those enrolled amounted to 117,000, whilst the expenditure was £500,000. In 1905 the establishment was the same, the number of enrolled men 96,000, and the expenditure £817,000. How was it that in 1905 we were spending nearly double what we spent in 1896, and were only getting 96,000 instead of 117,000? We were spending more on the Army every year and getting less for our money. That was one of the strongest reasons for attacking the Government on the inefficient way in which they had tackled this problem. With regard to the shortage of officers, no doubt on their return from the South African War our officers thought they were entitled to a period of rest, and that they could serve their country in a more peaceful way, but instead of there being a period of rest there had been a succession of changes; officers had no idea what was coming next; and the consequence was, instead of keeping our officers we lost them by retirement. There would be no reform in the Army until these constant changes ceased. He sincerely hoped the right hon. Gentleman would consult the convenience of the officers, and make them love the service instead of hating it as they did at the present time. He believed both the problems of the Militia and that of the scarcity of officers could and would be settled if the Secretary of State would himself take the matter in hand.
    MR. PEEL (Manchester, S.)drew attention to the fact that from both sides of the House there had been a considerable amount of criticism upon the schemes of reform that had been brought forward during the last five years, but he thought from what he had heard to-day and yesterday that, were

    1157
    any misfortune to happen to the present Government, the House would be faced with yet another scheme introduced by hon. Gentlemen opposite. Many hon. Members had congratulated the right hon. Gentleman on the way he had carried out the reorganisation of the War Office, and upon being able to carry out many of the recommendations of the Esher Commission, whilst other Members stated that owing to the many changes in it the War Office was in a state of chaos and confusion. In fact, anybody who talked about the War Office immediately plunged into almost Oriental exaggeration. What he himself wished to know was whether the change could now be considered complete, and whether the recommendations applying to the organisations of the different staffs both at the War Office and in the districts were being carried out, because those two things were complementary to each other. He would also like to know what the Secretary of State himself thought about the new arrangements for decentralization which were part and parcel of the reorganisation of the War Office. Was the right hon. Gentleman satisfied with the progress made? He hoped the observations of hon. Gentlemen opposite with regard to the recruits we were getting into the Army were exaggerated, because if, after all these changes as to pay and so forth had been made, we were getting no better men than before it seemed almost hopeless to improve the class of men who entered the British Army. A rumour was going about—whether true or false he did not know, but at any rate it was a disturbing rumour—that the Committee who considered the question of the new rifle had not absolute freedom of choice as to the best kind of rifle which could be obtained, and that they were limited, especially in respect to the length of the rifle—a most important limitation. He wished to know about that. It was stated that their anxiety was to produce a rifle that could be used lay the cavalry as well as the infantry. He was told by cavalry officers that they were pretty well satisfied with the rifle as a cavalry carbine, and that it was an improvement on the old carbine. In view of the criticisms of the new rifle, many of which came from
    1158
    expert sources, he wished to know whether the Committee had absolute freedom to select the best possible kind of rifle.
    Under the present scheme were we to rely entirely on the Volunteers and Yeomanry for home defence? In the previous scheme it was not so, but there was to be a stiffening of the Regulars to supplement the Volunteers and Yeomanry and to occupy, he supposed, the most difficult position. As to the reduction of the Volunteers, of course there were several ways in which that could be done, and the method by which it might be done was quite as important as the reduction itself. It was one thing to reduce the inefficient members of the Volunteers and to say that there should be a higher standard of drill attendance, or of physique, and another thing to reduce the number of corps into which the Volunteers were divided. If it was the first course, he thought the Secretary of State for War would find it far less difficult than if he were to reduce the number of corps. At what point of efficiency did the right hon. Gentleman actually aim? They knew from the Duke of Norfolk's Commission what were the changes and improvements to which the Volunteers as at present constituted might fairly be called upon to submit in order to fit themselves to fight foreign troops. What was the assumption of the Committee of Defence? Of course it was impossible to provide for everything in war, but there should be some hypothesis. Were they to go on the hypothesis that a certain time was to elapse before these troops would be actually called upon to take the field to meet a foreign army? If so, how many weeks or months were to be allowed to give a further polish to these troops? He quite understood that in producing his scheme the right hon. Gentleman was hampered a good deal by the legacy of his predecessor, and that it was very difficult to pay the death duties upon it. The figures had been given in another place as to the number of men who had been enlisted up to February 11th for service in India or long service on the nine-years system. He quite understood that until the Indian drafts were provided, and the security of India made perfect in that way, it

    1159
    was impossible for the Secretary for War to commence the new system at all. He wished to know how soon they might expect the Indian drafts to be provided for, so that they might know when the new system was likely to be ready.
    Perhaps the most important and vital matter in the scheme had reference to the Militia. The idea last year was to abolish the Militia, and now it was to so alter that force as to make it available for service abroad in case of necessity. That was a far-reaching change indeed, and they had to look to the effect which a change of that kind might have not only on the recruiting of men, but on the condition of the officers who would be put in a very different position from that which they occupied under the old system. He would like to have more information on that matter from the Secretary of State for War, because it bore on another important point, namely, the depletion of the Militia during the last few years through men passing from the Militia into the Line. If the Militia was to be made a foreign-service force it was quite clear that that temptation would no longer exist except for the purpose of attracting Militiamen to the Line long service battalions. That would have an immense effect on the position of the Army. It would be very convenient now if the right hon. Gentleman would give a little more information about his whole scheme. A most important point was the precise relations between the territorial Army and the foreign-service Army. How were they to be connected as regarded change of officers, non-commissioned officers, and grouping, because the proposed territorial regiments, the long-service battalions quartered at home were not for home defence, but for foreign service? They were only separate armies in time of peace. Would there not be a tendency in those separate armies for one to regard itself as superior to the other? The whole future of the Army depended on the connection and the training of those two armies; therefore it was most important to know the relation in which they were to stand to each other. He hoped the Secretary for War would very frankly explain these matters so as to enable the House to
    1160
    discuss, on the Estimates the new ideas as to the relationship between the territorial and the foreign-service armies.
    MR. LLEWELLYN (Somersetshire, N.)said he wished to devote his remarks to matters connected with the Militia. The hon. Gentleman who had last spoken had expressed his views in regard to the advisability of compelling men to enlist for foreign service in case of need. For a long time he had had an open mind on the matter, but he thought the weight of evidence was in favour of the proposal of the Secretary of State for War. It was somewhat dangerous to postpone the decision whether the battalion should go on foreign service or not till the emergency arose. During the late war nearly every regiment was only too willing to go, but there were others not willing, and pressure was put on them not to volunteer. He should prefer to have a small number of regiments enlisted for foreign service in case of necessity. The present uncertainty as regarded the future of the Militia service was very much against the efficiency of the regiments, and recruiting generally. It was perfectly true that the physique was not satisfactory. Mere boys came up for enlistment, and although they conformed to the requirements at the time, they were an unsatisfactory lot. However, what with the training at the depots, good food, and good housing their condition very soon greatly improved. He knew that a very large proportion of Militia recruits passed into the Army, and that was supposed to be unsatisfactory. From the point of view of officers commanding Militia battalions, it was not satisfactory that out of a hundred of their best recruits seventy passed into the Army. But it was good for the Army, as they went of their own free will and became admirable soldiers. He thought that the hon. and gallant Member for Sheffield and other Volunteer colonels were apt to take too narrow a view in connection with the position of the Volunteers. They should look at the usefulness of the force generally and not be content to count the noses under their own command. Occasionally great sympathy was expressed with the Volunteers, especially when an election was approaching. That, he thought, might

    1161
    have something to do with the criticisms of his hon. friends with reference to the reduction of the Volunteers. He himself did not hesitate to say that the Volunteer force might be reduced by one-half, and still be as valuable as it was at present. An hon. Gentleman opposite said that it was unnecessary to pay a soldier £10 a year when a Volunteer could be got for £6. There was, however, such a thing as having a Regular Army too cheap and a Volunteer force too dear. What was the present difficulty? It was that they were now taking into the Volunteers men who were not intended for that force at all; men who required to be paid; and who would be much better in the Regular Army or the Militia. The fact must be faced that at present patriotism was penalised. Why should one man give up his holidays for the good of the country, and another man do nothing? Why should one employer allow his employees to join the Volunteers and another not? That was a source of danger. He could not see how the Volunteers were treated badly. Last year an hon. and gallant friend of his stated in this House that he found the capitation grant sufficient for his expenses, and they all knew that his regiment when lie commanded it was one of the best. As to shortage of officers, was it not to be accounted for in the fact that amusements were now more general, and the facilities for attending them were greater than when the Volunteer force was established; and, also, Volunteer officers were now called upon to bear expenses which they ought not to be asked to defray.
    And, it being half-past Seven of the clock, the debate stood adjourned till this Evening's Sitting.

  EVENING SITTING.

    KING'S SPEECH (MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.
    Order read, for resuming adjourned debate on Amendment [February 22nd] to Main Question [February 14th], "That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, as followeth—
    "Most Gracious Sovereign,
    "We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the
    1162
    United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament."—(Mr. Mount.)
    Which Amendment was—
    "At the end of the Question, to add the words, But humbly to represent to Your Majesty that the continuous and continuing changes in the War Office are destructive of the best interests of Your Majesty's Army, have gravely disordered the system upon which the Regular Forces at home and abroad are raised and trained, have discouraged the Militia and Volunteers, and disclose negligence and mismanagement on the part of Your Majesty's Ministers, more particularly as to the armament of the artillery, whereby, in spite of the increased cost of the Army, its efficiency for the defence of the Empire has been diminished.' "—(Captain Norton.)
    Question again proposed, "That those words be there added."
    MR. HUNT (Shropshire, Ludlow)said it seemed to him that the new short rifle it was now endeavoured to force upon the infantry had been condemned, not only by experts outside the War Office, but by all who were fond of rifle-shooting and knew anything about it. Except that the new rifle was one and a half pounds lighter to carry, it had nothing to recommend it. For the last twenty years there had been no improvement in the shooting power of the rifle. When the new rifle was fired there was a very distinct flash to be seen, which was in itself a very great disadvantage, because it would point out to the enemy the exact place were the men who were firing were, and show them the way to get round their flank. The great horns which were put on as sight protectors must, in his opinion, of necessity interfere with the sight of the man who was looking down the barrel, one of them being large enough to obscure a man's head at 200 yards, and such a thing must militate against quick and correct shooting, for which the rifle was particularly designed. In fact, it was pretty generally acknowledged that the old rifle, in spite of the absence of the improvements which had been made in the new, was even now the better shooting weapon. However, they were told that the War Office knew best, so that all that they could do would be to take what the

    1163
    War Office gave, although it was not so many years ago that the War Office discovered that the rifle they were then manufacturing was absolutely useless after they had turned out 100,000. It might also be recalled that this same Department sent out rifles to South Africa sighted to shoot inaccurately, and bandoliers that shed their cartridges, directly the men began to trot and scattered them on the ground like shelled peas, which cartridges were picked up by the natives and sold to the Boers. He knew that the present Secretary for War was not responsible for these things or for the new weapon, as it had been decided on two years ago. Still, hon. Members on the Government side ought to intimate to the right hon. Gentleman that unless he could show that the new rifle had been fairly tested in all ways, they would feel unable to follow him into the same lobby on the Army Estimates. As the feeling of the country was dead against conscription, he thought boys should undergo a certain amount of military discipline and training for two or three years before they left school. They might also be taught shooting with an air-gun, which was practically the same thing as teaching them to shoot with a small rifle. He had tried the air-gun for boys at an elementary school, and he could say that the results were very satisfactory. He thought they should also teach boys the enormous extent of the British Empire and the sacrifices their forefathers had made to secure it, and the easiest way to do this would be to get Mr. Rudyard Kipling to write a history of the British Empire, somewhat in the style of the Jungle Book. He thought that with the encouragement of rifle and air-gun clubs they might get a million riflemen with a certain amount of training, and it need not cost more than 26s. per man per annum. If they had had a million good marksmen during the war they need not have sent to South Africa men who could not hit a galloping elephant at 100 yards. In conclusion, was it well that the men of this country should be encouraged to believe that it was neither their business to guard against starvation in time of war, nor their duty to defend their country in time of peril?
    MR. EUGENE WASON (Clackmannan and Kinross)hoped that none of them would ever live to see the blood tax of conscription adopted in this country. The hon. Member had suggested the use of the air-gun, but he did not know what use that would be against galloping elephants, although it was sometimes used against cats in the back garden. "He did not think it would require a Rudyard Kipling to inspire our youth to shoot either galloping elephants or tom-cats with an air-gun. As an old Volunteer officer, he associated himself with all that had been said as to the lamentable falling off in the Volunteers, and he thought something might be done to encourage that force. He called the right hon. Gentleman's attention to the tribute that was paid to the City Imperial Volunteers by Lord Roberts, and he only took the City Imperial Volunteers as an illustration, because what was said of them could be said of all the Volunteer force. Speaking; of the City Imperial Volunteers, the late Commander-in-Chief said they had done magnificently; that they were, clever fellows and that they got better as time went on; that he would like, to lead an army composed of such men. The Volunteer forces had now decreased by 50 per cent., and he thought they should be encouraged and not snubbed as they had been in the past. Was it fair that during the late War the Colonial Volunteers received 5s. a day, while our Volunteers only received 1s. a day? That was a colonial preference of which he did not think the late Colonial Secretary would approve. He suggested a medal for Volunteers of ten instead of twenty years standing, and possibly a bar for every extra five years, and a brighter ribbon. Everything should be done to encourage the force. As to the merits of the long and short rifle, it must be remembered that shooting was not the only thing for which the rifle was required. What chance would the man with the short rifle have if it came to the bayonet? He asked whether or not the inoculation against enteric had been found to be effective, and whether it was intended to make it compulsory?
    SIR ALBERT ROLLIT (Islington, S.)complained of the indiscriminate criticisms of the Volunteers made by the hon. Member for North Somerset, and said the measure of their value could be estimated from the assertion of the hon. Gentleman that Members of this House were prone to support the Volunteers in order to get their votes at elections. Upon a question of such vital importance surely no such consideration could apply, especially in the case of men a very large proportion of whom were young fellows without votes at all. Since the formation of the Volunteers in 1859, when he joined, he had had many opportunities of taking part in their work and of observing the progress of various corps, and he believed that as a general rule the Volunteers deserved well of the country. If the matter were put to the test there would doubtless be found throughout the land a volume, not of depreciation, but of appreciation, and a determination to maintain what was at once a cheap, and with ordinary encouragement might be made a most efficient, force. In 1859 the formation of the Volunteers probably deterred a contemplated attack on this country, while their conduct in the recent campaign, although the duty had been discharged under most invidious conditions as to comparative pay and so forth, was of the most patriotic character. It should never be forgotten that to the Volunteers was probably due that intense feeling in favour of national defence which their establishment evoked and which had since been retained, and also the escape of the country from conscription.
    The suggestion that the Volunteers should be reduced, on the plea of smaller numbers and greater efficiency, was curiously coincident with a depleted Exchequer, and he could not help thinking that probably the latter fact was a potent factor in the decision. He believed, however, that in this matter parsimony would not be economy, and that a reasonable expenditure might be made most productive to the country. Further consideration was to be given to the question, but he hoped the force would not be kept for a whole year in its present condition of uncertainty and suspense, which was doing vast injury, especially to metropolitan corps. People were apt
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    to forget the great sacrifices made by officers and men, and the debt due to them for their maintenance of the spirit of duty instead of the spirit of leisure and pleasure. The Volunteers had done their duty to the State; had the State done its duty to the Volunteers? Whatever had been achieved had been effected in the face of every form of sentimental and practical discouragement—obsolete guns, which made training unreal, lack of or inaccessible ranges, insufficient grants for transport and equipment which had to be supplemented by the officers and themselves, and so forth. The regulations of 1901, prefaced almost by an insult, showed an utter lack of knowledge of the country and a failure to realise local conditions on the part of the War Office. The real remedy was decentralisation and more trust in the officers commanding, who knew their men and the point of efficiency they had achieved. The real requirements in a Volunteer were a knowledge of shooting, ability to march twenty or thirty miles without undue fatigue, a spirit of discipline, and some drill, but by no means the amount of parade drill hitherto exacted. If those cardinal qualities were secured a force of excellent soldiers could be turned out in a comparatively short period equal to the discharge of the duties of home defence, in regard to which they had been unduly discouraged. If instead of wasting money in the many directions in which it could be shown to have been wasted, a little more liberality were shown with a view to preventing officers and men suffering actual out-of-pocket loss, much more good would be done than by the proposed reductions. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman, who had expressed sympathy with the force, would take into careful consideration all that had been said on this matter, and come to a wise and speedy conclusion, but if he underestimated public feeling in the matter public feeling might become a very potent factor in the solution of the question.
    He desired to ask the right hon. Gentleman what was intended with regard to the Militia submarine mining divisions, in one of which he was serving, the instructions for the continuance of training having been countermanded in the South of the

    1167
    country for this year. He also referred to what he thought was an inadvertent injustice inflicted on a class of University students who had served their country well, but who under the new regulations as to Army commissions were unfairly treated. The University of London had been reorganised, and now consisted of internal and external students, but according to the regulations only students in residential Universities were eligible for the commissions, the internal students being regarded as residential, which they were not. This, in a sense, made a distinction between the richer and the poorer classes, and he submitted that knowledge, wherever obtained, if it was able to secure the stamp of the University, ought not to have placed upon it a different value from that given to knowledge acquired by the more fortunate men who could afford to attend residential Universities.
    MR. OSMOND WILLIAMS (Merionethshire)said it was unnecessary for Members of the Opposition to condemn the Government for their management of the Army; their strongest critics came from their own ranks. After nine years of Unionist control the Secretary of State was able to inform the country that the Army in its present condition was unsuited for the requirements of the nation, unready for war, and unable, as regarded either composition or numbers, to satisfy the needs of the Empire. Our Army, imperfectly organised, wasteful in its methods, unsatisfactory in its results, was one of the most costly machines ever devised. The history of the last five years abundantly attested to the truth of the right hon. Gentleman's remarks, and they were borne out by the evidence of such authorities as Sir Ian Hamilton, Lord Roberts, Lord Wolseley, and Sir Frederick Treves. Here was the stewards' account of their stewardship, and yet the Prime Minister had asked at Glasgow, What had the Government done in regard to the defensive position of the country? What they had done was obvious. They had concealed at one and the same time the almost incredible confusion of their administrative ideas and the dangerous tendencies of their foreign policy, and were now claiming as a merit that they
    1168
    were re-arming the artillery, and that in two years time the Army would have a gun fit for modern use. After all these years they were commencing to reform the War Office and to provide suitable guns. These were, indeed, great performances, such as no other Government could hope to excel. The same condition of affairs prevailed with regard to the Navy. The country had recently been told that the Fleet was to be, disposed in the best strategic manner. The men who put that forward as a virtue had no claim on the approval of the country. Why had not the Navy always been disposed to the best advantage, and why should it ever be disposed in any other way? As to the claim that the War Office was now approaching the state of absolute perfection, it was an absolute delusion. In the opinion of experts the War Office and the Army had been changed for the worse by the Esher-Forster scheme, and he certainly did not think the nation could have any confidence in the critical sense of Ministers who had declared that the rejection of the discredited Brodrick system would be a crime against the country.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: I shall have a somewhat difficult task in addressing the House to-night. I feel in the position of Mr. Midshipman Easy in his triangular duel, with the boatswain on one side of the House, and the purser's mate on the other. I can only hope that, in spite of these difficulties, I shall escape unscathed this evening. The fact of the matter is that we are discussing not one Amendment, but three Amendments. I greatly regret, in view of the interest of the subjects, that these Amendments could not have been separated. I asked the hon. Gentleman the mover of this Amendment whether he could not adopt that arrangement, but he was unable to do so. I say that not by way of reproach, but to explain why it is that I find myself called upon to deal as best I may with three important, but dissimilar, subjects which have been attacked from very dissimilar points of view by the hon. Members who have spoken. I am very glad to have this opportunity of saying to the House what I have to say on all these questions. I have always been

    1169
    frank with the House, and I think if I have sometimes presented a doleful view, a discouraging view, of Army matters, I think they might take that as an earnest that I shall not mislead them, intentionally at any rate, if I represent some things as not being as bad as they would have us suppose, and if I give them some encouragement, which I am afraid very few of them have found for themselves.
    There have been two branches of attack. One has been general and the other, which again divides itself into two parts, has been specific. Let me remind the House what this attack is. We are told, in the words of the Amendment, that the policy of the Government has been "destructive of the best interests of His Majesty's Army, has gravely disordered the system upon which the Regular Forces at home and abroad are raised and trained, has discouraged the Militia and Volunteers, and discloses negligence and mismanagement on the part of His Majesty's Ministers, more particularly as to the armament of the artillery, whereby, in spite of the increased cost of the Army, its efficiency for the defence of the Empire has been diminished." I intend to traverse by a direct negative every one of those assertions. I propose to traverse them in general and in detail. I propose to assert and to prove, that not one of those propositions is correct.
    I will deal first with the general attack. We have been told that the Regular Army has been disordered, that the Auxiliary Forces have been discouraged, and that the efficiency of the Army for the defence of the Empire has been diminished. I am going to endeavour to prove to the House—and I think I shall prove—that the Regular Army is not disordered, that the Auxiliary Forces are not discouraged, and that the efficiency of the Army for the defence of the Empire is not diminished. I do not say now, I have never stated in this House, and I am not likely to say, that either the Army or the Auxiliary Forces are as efficient as they ought to be, or as efficient as we should desire to see them. The whole raison d' etre of my being here at all, as far as I know, is that I have done my best in the time that has been given to me to alter a
    1170
    state of things of which I, in common with most of the Members of this House, do not approve. My point is, and always has been, that our forces are not in the state of efficiency that they ought to be in; and my endeavour has been—and I think I shall show I have endeavoured with some success—with the aid of my colleagues on the Army Council, to make them more efficient than they were. Let hon. Members recall one small circumstance. I had not been long in the office I now occupy when, in July last, I was permitted to submit a proposal for the reorganisation of the Army, and much earlier for the reorganisation of the administration of the Army. Now I ask hon. Members whether seven months is a very long time wherein to perform a task of that kind? I ask hon. Members to remember when they charge me with being dilatory—for that is one charge, while another is that I have been too hasty—that up to this moment I have not been able to submit Estimates since I made my proposals to the House, and to remember that the whole of the Army and the Auxiliary Forces are serving under engagements, and that anything you can do to alter these must take a long time. The work of putting the Army on the basis on which we should like to see it will occupy the House and the country for many long years. The most I can hope to prove—and I have this hope—is that during these seven months I have been able to devote to the reorganisation of the Army I have not been idle, and that the comparatively longer time devoted to the reorganisation of the administration of the Army has been equally well occupied.
    I should like to say a word or two about the administration of the Army. We have been told that we have disorganised the whole system. Let me briefly recount what has taken place. At the beginning of last year the Esher Committee reported, and I was appointed to carry out the recommendations made. The Committee recommended the institution of an Army Council, and that Council has been formed; the appointment of an Inspector-General, with the

    1171
    subordinate officers necessary to carry out his duties, and these appointments have been made, the officers carrying out with satisfaction the duties entrusted to them: while a staff of Directors has been appointed, their functions defined, and they are now working harmoniously and successfully in their separate departments. The whole of the financial department, in pursuance of the Committee's recommendations, had to be reorganised and decentralised. I do not know whether hon. Members suppose this can be done in a day. I can assure them it was a laborious and complicated operation. These are early days, and I am not so sanguine as to prophesy that the system now instituted for the whole of the United Kingdom will work as successfully as we hope it will, but it has been a very difficult and elaborate piece of work which we have at length brought to a conclusion. The House has expressed a preference for a division of the Army not into Army Corps. I never personally attached so much importance to that system as others did, and my only objection was that the name was inaccurate, for the divisions did not correspond to what is known in military language as Army Corps. It has been the work of the War Office to replace this organisation by a divisional organisation more suited, as we believe, to the needs of the country. We were charged with the creation of a General Staff, and we have formulated the whole of the duties of the staff, their emoluments have been approved by the Treasury, and their duties defined. We have not made the whole of the appointments, for I think we could not make a graver mistake than to hasten in a matter of this kind. We must take care to get the best qualified men and to have a General Staff worthy of the name. The Intelligence Department has been practically doubled, and many new branches have been added. The Leader of the Opposition spoke of the heavy cost of barracks, but I may remind him that we have given effect to our promise, and have already stopped barrack-building to the extent of £1,500,000; we have created a new barrack-building organisation at the War Office, and we have put the business of barrack-building under the supervision of an experienced civilian,
    1172
    who has had the control of the erection of such buildings as the Rowton Houses in London and Birmingham. The experience he has had well qualifies him for devising barrack accommodation for the comfort and welfare of the soldier. The hon. Member for Ilkeston asked whether we have made any progress with the medical service. When I tell him that not only have careful observers made themselves acquainted with developments during the Russo-Japanese War, but we have at last commenced the erection of the medical college in which he is interested, I do not think there is altogether a bad record for the first half year of the work of the Army Council. I can assure the House these things take considerable time. I will not say more of the Army Council than that I believe it is destined to be of enormous value to the Army. I also believe that the Selection Board, which is part of the organisation, has given to officers and men of the Army an absolute assurance that recommendations for promotion will be influenced by no other considerations than the recommendations of the officers acquainted with the men who are serving under them.
    Now, we are told that the efficiency of the Army has been diminished and the cost increased, and I counter that by a denial, and will prove that the cost has not been increased but diminished, and that efficiency has been increased. Hon. Members have said there has been a great increase in cost since the period before the war, and that there has not been corresponding efficiency. Now let me deal with that. Is it true that there has been a large increase of cost since the war? A great deal has taken place since the war. We have learned a great deal, and hon. Members who deprecate any change seem to forget the charges brought by the War Commission in respect of nearly every branch of the Army. The expenditure before the war was £20,617,000; now it is £28,830,000. That, of course, is an increase in expenditure. But we are told that there is no increase of efficiency, and I will, therefore, point out what has been the increase in efficiency corresponding to this increase in expenditure. I am speaking of the period before the war. There has been added to the Royal Artillery, in

    1173
    obedience, I believe, to the opinion of every military authority, sixty-six units of Artillery, batteries or companies, and twenty-two and a half troops to the Royal Engineers. There had been a deficiency in the technical departments of the Royal Engineers. New needs have caused new developments, and telegraph and bridging troops, post office and wireless telegraphy men, have all had to be added to the Army. The infantry has been increased by fourteen battalions, the Army Service Corps has been increased by 1,263 men and the Army Medical Corps by 462 officers and 1,210 men. Is that not some value for the money we have spent? We have added 35,000 men to the Army during that time; and when you put that result against the expenditure I think that it is not an unsatisfactory equivalent. But a great deal more has been done. An hon. Member spoke of a deficiency of stores. What has happened since the war? We have put the British Army in regard to stores in a position it has never been in since it was an Army. The whole of the Mowatt programme has been initiated and carried out to the last item. Is that no addition to the efficiency of the Army? What has happened in recent years? Has there been no reduction? The normal Estimates of 1903–4 were £29,800,000; last year they were £28,830,000, or a reduction of £970,000.
    I think, therefore, that I have proved to the satisfaction of the House that we have got value for the money we have expended. But I cannot prove that the expenditure as it now stands is the expenditure as it ought to be. I believe that, despite what has been said to-night and last night, when every speech delivered was one in favour of more expenditure. Last year I said that the first rule we have to lay down is that true economy consists in making a machine to do our work, that anything short of that was a waste of money, and anything in excess of it was extravagance. I by no means assert that our Army is perfectly adapted to our needs; and in so far as we are spending money oil things we do not want, we are wasting money. It is my desire to do everything I can to produce a state of things wherein the expenditure shall
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    be on the right thing and for the right purpose. I desire reduction of expenditure but you cannot make great changes in six months, or perhaps in six years. The whole of our Army is serving on engagements, and when suggestions are made for disbanding hon. Members must remember that any step of the kind would immediately mean an increased cost in the Estimates for the remuneration we have to give, to the men whose engagements are suddenly broken off. This process must be in all respects gradual and consistent. If we are to reduce the cost of the Army I think I can show that there is but one way, and that is to reduce the number of men in the Army. Until you make up your minds to do that there will be no serious reduction in the expenditure on the Army. It is said in the Amendment that the Army is inefficient. The strength of the Army now stands at 275,551 men. I believe that in every material particular, except one, our Army has never been more efficient than now. The Leader of the Opposition made a statement which, if it had been true, would have been serious. He said that we were sacrificing the Reserve for the Army. That is a misapprehension. I am positive that the present administration of the War Office would never have taken any step so fatal as that would be. What are the facts? In the last six months the Army Reserve has increased from 74,000 to 77,673 men; and during the coming year there will be an increase in the Army Reserve larger, I believe, than has ever been made to it in the same length of time. So far, therefore, from its being true that the Army Reserve is falling, I say that it is increasing by leaps and bounds, and bids fair to become the largest it has ever been.
    I do not, therefore, think the charge that the policy of the Government has rendered the Army inefficient has been established. But there is a point which is a weak one. It was thought necessary during the war to create a new species of enlistment. It was suited to the circumstances of the war, and it brought the men that we required. It carried us through the crisis. But the crisis has passed, and the need has gone for a system not suited to our present requirements. I mean the system

    1175
    of three years enlistment. The result of the three-years system has caused the War Office very grave anxiety, so grave that it has had a very marked effect upon the policy of the War Office. It is our primary business before we undertake any changes, even if they be improvements, to keep the Army fit for war; and if we had allowed the three-years enlistment to go on unchecked the Army would, have become totally unfit. What were the conditions to which some of the battalions were being reduced by the continuance of the three years system of enlistment? One battalion at home had 623 men under two years service and 42 per cent, of the men under twenty years of age. Another had 700 men under two years service and 44 per cent, under twenty years of age. Another had 77 per cent, under two years service and 55 per cent. under twenty years of age. Some of the battalions in the Colonies were in the same case. There was a battalion in South Africa which had, out of a total strength of 842 men, 391 under two years service and 233 under twenty years of age; another that had 38 per cent, under twenty years of age and 65 per cent. under two years service. So serious was the condition of things that when we came to arrange for the Indian drafts we found ourselves face to face with a condition which it was impossible to continue. There was a battalion that required 483 men for the Indian drafts, and had 78 men available to fill the drafts. Another required 263 men and had 25 available for the draft. It was necessary to take immediate steps to remedy this great deficiency. The Army Council took those steps. I was gravely warned that the step would be a failure, and would be productive of most serious consequences. But my anticipations were favourable, and they have been absolutely realised. We decided that as a temporary measure—and it is temporary only—we would have a system of nine years enlistment for the infantry. Hon. Members have spoken of that as a long term. As a matter of fact it is but one year longer than the ordinary term which it superseded. The seven-years term was, as regards two-thirds of the Army, and all the Army that went to India, in reality an eight-years term. But we have decided, for reasons which
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    I think I could show to be adequate, on a nine-years term, and what has been the result? We have already taken over 7,500 long-service men for the infantry, and in a few months we shall add 30,000 long-service men to the infantry; and I hear from every side that the quality of the recruits shows improvement. Were we not justified in taking that step? It has also had the incidental advantage of wiping out the serious deficiency in the Brigade of Guards. The Army is thus being strengthened and is being brought back after the war to a position to furnish all the Indian drafts, and the Brigade of Guards has been brought up to full strength. But this process has had one inevitable consequence. It has put off the commencement of short-service enlistment. That would have been a grave thing indeed, if it were not for the immense influx into the Reserve which has taken place and which is to be increased in the coming year. Because we shall have an unparalleled entry into the Reserve in the coming year, it has become not only safe, but most desirable, to continue this long-service recruiting; and we shall continue it until we have restored the full measure of the long-service element in the Army necessary to furnish the Indian drafts.
    A word about the Militia, the Leader of the Opposition commented upon the Bill which has been introduced in another place, and he asked whether the utilisation of the Militia, or the taking of powers to send the Militia abroad, would affect the ballot. No, Sir, that is not the case. Militia enlisted under the ballot are under a different Act from those enlisted for ordinary purposes. They are called the territorial Militia; and the possibility of recruiting men compulsorily for service abroad can never arise. I have been somewhat misrepresented with regard to this question of the Militia. It was stated by several hon. Members that I had proposed to get rid of the Militia. There is no foundation at all for that statement. I had expressed, and I have always entertained the view, that it would be far better to ally a portion of the Regular Army with the Militia as the territorial Army of this country; and I have little doubt that that will be the

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    ultimate solution of this problem. But I said last year that I was not in a position to make that proposal to the House. On the contrary, I said—
    "We must maintain the Militia; and we must endeavour to make it effective for its work. … In a great national force of that kind no Minister can effect a change like this unless he has the good will of Parliament and of the nation. … If it be the will of the House that we should maintain the Militia, then we must do it; but on one condition only—that the Militia must be made effective for the purpose of war."
    I also said, and I repeat—
    "We must cut off from the Militia those units whch are plainly redundant for our requirements."
    That was my intention then, and it is the intention of the Government now; and we have given an earnest that we do intend to make use of the Militia by introducing this Bill, which will add the Militia to the ranks of the Army for the purpose of fighting over-seas. We have given another earnest of our intention. We have raised the physical standard for the Militia. I do not myself think that these steps alone will be sufficient to make the Militia all that the Militia ought to be. I am inclined to agree with the hon. Member for Bristol when he said that even a two-years period was too short to make a soldier. That is an opinion which is entertained by the vast majority of soldiers; but if that be so, then I think we shall have to consider carefully whether a period so short as we now impose on the Militia is enough, under any conceivable circumstances, to qualify them for taking the field against a foreign enemy.
    I now come to the question which has really occupied the whole attention of the House during these two days. I have been astonished to find that two not unimportant parts of our military forces have been almost entirely left out of sight. I dimly realised from one or two references that were made that we had a Regular Army. I did not realise and I heard nothing to make me realise, that we had a Navy. [Mr. SEELY: This is an Army debate.] That is precisely the point. It is because we will persist in discussing the Army as if it had no connection with the Navy that so many of our mistakes have been made. I come now to the
    1178
    matter which has excited so much attention in the House—the Volunteers. I have had many counsels in regard to the Volunteers. My hon. friend the Member for the Isle of Wight told us that the Volunteers were not intended for the, defence of this country, but that they were to preserve the military spirit. They were to be a school of arms, and they were to be chiefly utilised for going across the sea in time of war. I do not quarrel with that application; but I confess that I do not exactly see at the present moment that the Volunteers are calculated to fulfil that particular purpose. I have a view from which I have never varied in regard to the Volunteers. If they do fulfil, and so far as they do fulfil, a real purpose, it is our business to make them as efficient as we can, and if they do not fulfil that purpose or are in excess of that purpose, we must face the fact. We have heard it stated on evidence, to which there is no contradiction that there is in the Volunteer force a large number of men who ought not to be in it, that the Volunteer force in its present condition is not fitted for war. Let us get it out of our heads at once that there is any distinction between war with a foreign enemy and war with any one else. If our troops fight any one it will be a foreign enemy, and if they do fight that enemy he will be under the best leadership and under the conditions most unfavourable to ourselves. If the Volunteers cannot undertake that task they are not fitted to perform service for this country. But I believe the verdict which has been pronounced upon the Volunteers is not a final verdict, or one which we ought to accept. I believe that we ought to deal with the Volunteers so that it will be impossible for any Commission to say in the future that they are not fit to face foreign troops; and it is the desire and intention of the Army Council so to deal with them that it shall be impossible to say in the future that they will be unfit to face foreign troops. I have had to face this problem from the point of view, not only of a person responsible for the Volunteers, but for the whole of the armed forces of the country, and also as a member of a Government and, indeed, of a House of Commons absolutely pledged to a reduction, or at any

    1179
    rate a curtailment, of the expenditure on the Army. I ask, is it really contended that we should reduce largely upon the Regular Army, that we should reduce expenditure upon the Navy, and on the Militia, and that the one purpose for which large additions are to be made to the Army Estimates is the Volunteers? I do not believe that that is a proposition which any one in his cooler moments will sustain. I believe that when this House comes to consider what are the needs of the Regular Army and the calls upon it, they will determine that those needs shall be filled in the first instance. They will insist upon economy and reduction, but they will not rob the Regular Army even for such a laudable idea as increasing the Volunteers. The hon. Member for Sheffield spoke of some words of mine with regret. I am sure no words of mine could bear the construction he put upon them. I was explaining to a gathering of Volunteer officers—and many Volunteer officers have given me their confidence—what I believe to be the real truth of the situation. I believe every Volunteer officer, with very few exceptions, who cares about the force, who understands its difficulties, and who is anxious about its future, agrees with me that it would be wise and well for the Volunteer force to consent to a reduction in its numbers in order to obtain an increase in efficiency.
    SIR HOWARD VINCENT (Sheffield, Central): No.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: At present you have a vicious system existing in the Volunteers under which the capitation grant is so allotted that it is absolutely the interest of the commanding officer to take in men independently of their merit or efficiency. Now that is a system which, I think, stands self-condemned. It is a system which we ought to alter. We ought to make it the duty and the interest of a commanding officer to make his battalion as good as it can be made, and at the same time to make him certain that by doing so he will not lose the money which is necessary for the purpose. That is what I believe we can do, and what I believe we ought to do. Here again I come to one of those direct traverses which I have had to
    1180
    make so often of what has been said. My hon. friend the Member for the Isle of Wight spoke of the Volunteers as dwindling away.
    MAJOR SEELY: I said the officers of the metropolitan force?
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: Well, I am glad to accept his limitation, and I am very glad it has been made. But I should like to point out that, so far from its being the fact that the Volunteers are dwindling away, the Volunteers, who have been so discredited and ill-used, have increased during the last year by no less than 4,000 men, and during that year the regulations which have been so trying have resulted in 175,000 men—a larger force by far than we have ever had before—going into camp. Now, Sir, there must be some slight exaggeration in the charges made in regard to the Volunteers.
    SIR HOWARD VINCENT: Does my right hon. friend not remember that the officers are 2,700 short?
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: Yes, I remember it well, and I am going to speak of it in a moment. That is the really serious question in regard to the Volunteers, not only in regard to the Volunteers, but in regard to the Army generally. But it is not correct to say that the Volunteers have dwindled or are dwindling. So far from that being the case, I have reports of increased enlistments in the force.
    SIR HOWARD VINCENT: No, no!
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: No one knows the Volunteer force, or at any rate a portion of it, better than my hon. friend does, and he has said that certain of the London Volunteer corps have suffered. He has spoken of what are known as the special corps, and ho has suggested that some special treatment should be applied to those corps. Well, I am not quite prepared to agree with that proposal, because I think that special treatment involves differentiation among the corps, which is very hard to frame, and which I think produces

    1181
    jealousies and difficulties. But I do believe that the object which the hon. Member has at heart can be obtained without classification of that kind. While I am speaking about classification I should like to say, for the comfort of those members of the Volunteer force who have so greatly disliked the idea of classification— which, by the way, exists now—that I do not desire or propose to press this plan of dividing Volunteers into two classes. I have taken the advice of Volunteer officers, and taken it all the more readily because I believe that we can arrange matters so to their entire satisfaction that this classification will take place of itself. Let me state my proposition. We cannot acid money to the Army Estimates. I do not believe this Government or any other Government can do it. We can, however, enormously add to the money available for the effective Volunteers. The Vote for next year is really a Vote in arrear, a Vote on account of the expenditure of last year. It is impossible to make any large changes during the coming year. Something we can do; something we intend to do. The hon. Member spoke of the difficulty of getting ranges. It is an enormous difficulty. If you cannot get the range to the men you must get the men to the range. We hope to make much larger provision than hitherto for assisting Volunteer corps to take men to the ranges. We hope to increase the grant to the Militia and Volunteer artillery. But those are small matters, and the large matters, the really important matters, can never come until there are ample funds available for granting those increases. I have taken a great deal of counsel with Volunteer officers; and I ask every one in this House whether I do not correctly interpret their views when I say that the present needs of the Volunteers are more officers, better trained officers, more ranges, more firing, both rifle and artillery firing, more training of non-commissioned officers, larger contributions towards the expenses of the officers in camp, a longer tune in camp, greater freedom as to going into camp and stopping out of it, and, at any rate, the embryo of a transport organisation and a divisional organisation. Those things, I believe, we could get if there
    1182
    is only reasonable co-operation on the part of the Volunteers, as I am persuaded there will be. We can get all those things, and more, if this reduction—not a large reduction, I speak of a moderate reduction—of the Volunteer force be effected. It will involve a change in the incidence of the grant. It will be impossible to continue the grant which brings in as a matter of finance a number of men who are not required in order to keep the force going. I think, and I hope we shall in the future—we cannot commence this year, the expenses are far too great—be able to get that liberty of going into camp for a fortnight which is now accorded to only a few special corps. We ought to give to men who go into camp a much larger allowance than a man can get for one week; and if this reduction be effected we can give the whole of that allowance, which comes to as much as £4, in addition to the capitation grant for a fortnight's camp. It will involve a sacrifice in respect of those men who do not go to camp at all; but I have gone very carefully into the case of nearly every Volunteer regiment, and I assure hon. Members that if this is accepted and put into operation there will be no loss to regiments which can fall in, with any reasonable closeness, with the duty which I think we are entitled to ask them to face.
    An hon. Member has spoken of then being some want of confidence between the Director of Auxiliary Forces and myself. That is a dream. It is perfectly true that the Director of Auxiliary Forces said he hoped all uncertainty with regard to the Volunteers might soon be swept away; but it was not in his power, or in my power, to forestall the decision with regard to questions of finance, over which he has no control, But to suppose that the Director of the Auxiliary Forces and myself are not in constant and confidential communication with regard to all matters concerning the Volunteers is an entire mistake. I have made a very short and imperfect statement about the Volunteers; and I should like to go into the matter more fully on the Volunteer Vote when we reach the Estimates. I maintain, however, that we are entitled to ask the Volunteers to submit to the same reduction we desire to enforce in other branches of the Army.

    1183
    If they submit to that reduction we can place at their disposal in a reasonable time all those advantages which will tend to make them what I know they all desire to be—a real contribution to the defence of the Empire. I must at the same time call attention to one view of the Volunteer force, with regard to the truth of which it would be unfortunate if the House were led astray. It has been suggested that the Volunteer force is by itself an immense contribution to the Army in the field. That is a delusion. I am not blaming the Volunteers, who have other calls and duties to meet. I would remind hon. Members what took place during the South African War. There were three calls for Volunteers. We obtained first 11,000 men, then we obtained 5,300. The war still went on and the whole Army Reserve was called out, and men were brought from every part of the world. We then obtained 2,580 Volunteers. What had happened in the meanwhile? The Volunteers had increased by 40,000 men. I do not blame the Volunteers for a moment; they are enlisted for work in this country; but it is an absolute delusion to suppose that they can be relied on for furnishing those great additions which war would certainly demand for the Regular Army.
    SIR HOWARD VINCENT: Does the right hon. Gentleman include the Volunteers who joined the Yeomanry to the number of many thousands and the number who joined the Regular Army?
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: I have not included those who joined the Yeomanry, because many joined merely for the purpose of going out at 5s. a day. The number who joined the Yeomanry was 6,209.
    I will summarise what I have said in regard to this part of the indictment. It is not true that while the Army has increased in cost it has diminished in efficiency. I deny that it is disordered, that it is less efficient for the defence of the Empire. But I must not forget that I have to meet not only one Amendment, but two or three Amendments.
    I must say something on two very important questions. The first is the question of field guns. No one can
    1184
    doubt the importance of this matter, but I do believe there has been an enormous amount of misconception in regard to it. What has taken place? It has been said that every other country in Europe has quick-firing guns and that we have not quick-firing guns. As a matter of fact, the United States of America have not quick-firing guns. Austria is supposed to have adopted a design, but it is not known that any guns are actually under manufacture. Belgium is still making trials. France and Denmark have a quick-firing equipment. Bulgaria has adopted a quick-firing gun, which is under manufacture. Germany recently armed with a gun that is not a true quick-firer, and that country is consequently in great difficulties, as expense prohibits re-arming again. It is now proposed to mount these guns on long recoil carriages and so convert them into quick-firing guns. Italy partially re-armed in 1901–2 with a gun which is not a true quick-firing gun. Portugal has adopted a gun, which is under manufacture. Russia obtained a gun in 1901–2 that is not quick-firing. In Switzerland and Turkey the gun is still under manufacture. Spain is still making trials. These facts do not quite bear out the statement that the whole of Europe except England is already armed with quick-firing guns. As far back as 1900 inquiries were begun as to whether a new gun should not be substituted for the old one. In January, 1901, a Committee was appointed and a Report was received on May 8th. In July, 1901, conditions were formulated and designs called for. In February and March, 1902, orders were given to the trade and Ordnance Factories for trial guns, in August arid September the guns were supplied, and in December, 1902, four experimental batteries were ordered. In September, 1903, the trials of the guns began, and in October a report was made that alterations were necessary owing to the weakness of some of the designs of the carriages. On March 30th, 1904, the equipment was finally recommended. It may be said that this experimental period was unduly prolonged. I will give the opinion of one of the most powerful and urgent critics of the Government—
    "It may seem that two-and-a-half years was an inordinate time for the Committee to have

    1185
    taken in submitting its recommendations, but only those who are acquainted with the minute details of modern equipment and the work involved in manufacturing a specimen gun of a new type can appreciate the difficulties of coming to a decision on the several points involved and the inevitable delay before the trial; could have taken place. It would undoubtedly have been a mistake if the War Office had at once come to a decision based on the sample guns at first produced. … There can be no doubt that the guns eventually recommended by the Committee are as good as any that can be produced at the present day, and are probably superior to those with which any other European army is equipped."
    The Report of the Committee was received in March last, and on May 5th an order was given for the manufacture of the guns. The preliminary processes are manufacture of the guns was proceeded with as rapidly as possible after the necessary preliminaries were completed. I said last year that we were going within the space of one year to produce 126 of these guns at a certain cost. We are going to produce 126 guns at a less cost. It appears to be supposed in some quarters that no order was given until late last year. That is an absolute delusion. An order was given for all that could be made, and I still think the factories may be unable to earn all the money we may be able to pay them within the time. We anticipate that by the end of the financial year we shall have 126 guns with almost all their wagons, by July another fifty, and that within thirty months of the first order we shall have nearly 1,000 guns with eighteen wagons per battery, 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun, all spare parts, and the harness. The idea that we are going to wait years to get these guns is an absolute myth. There has been, and there will be, no delay, and I think that if hon. Members who criticize the War Office would a little further they will find that the record we are making is not a bad one, when I say that in the United States the completion of the gun programme will have taken six years, and that the number of guns produced will be 160, and fifty of these made in Germany.
    Now, Sir, I come to the question of the rifle. Here, again, I do not think the whole of the facts are fully in the possession of the House. I trust the House will not think I am insensible to
    1186
    this important question. Within a fortnight of going to the War Office I wrote a memorandum to Sir Henry Brackenbury, and I put to him a whole series of questions with regard to the rifle. He answered them in a way entirely reassuring, and the rifle them decided upon was allowed to proceed; but it is impossible for any one to be insensible to the great variety to opinion on this question. I do not over-value, but I do value, the reports of experts; but I think that men who are firing with their own rifles and under all the Bisley conditions are not the best judges, perhaps, of the real military value of a rifle, and it would, perhaps, be more interesting if in that report we had had some details of the actual results arrived at. It is not the fact that this rifle was produced primarily as a cavalry rifle. It was originally designed in response to a request for a shorter and lighter rifle for the Army as a whole. The Committee recommended the rifle on that Committee came to an end on the outbreak of the South African War. During the war the Commander-in-chief, recognising that a short rifle was most desirable, requested that the work of the Committee might be taken up where it had been dropped, and a short rifle produced. And the short rifle was produced, and, with many improvements, it is now the rifle which is being issued. But I am as sensible as any Member of this House of the theoretical advantage of a long over a short rifle. Against that advantage you must put the advantages which are claimed by soldiers for short rifles. Hon. Members seem to suppose that no trial has been made, but we have issued large numbers to seven different regiments. We have had reports from the officers in command of the men who have those rifles, and in every instance, with only some exceptions as to technical details which always occur in such cases, their report has been most favourable to these rifles in the hands of the men. We have sent the rifle to India, and Lord Kitchener telegraphs—
    "As far as I have been able to test it the new rifle fulfils the requirements. In my opinion it is a better balanced, handier, as well as lighter, weapon, and more suitable for war on the Indian frontier than the long rifle."

    1187
    Another telegram from the commanding officer of the Seventh Division, dated February 22nd, says—
    "Practising daily with short rifle since 11th. All ranks speak highly of it. Other reports from regiments all favour it in comparison with the long rifle. With so short an experience can hardly express definite opinion. Its merits appear to be lightness, handiness, better sighting, balance, and pull off. Defects principally in cavalry, weak safety catch; bolt and rifle should be connected, lower band attachment insecure, these can all be easily rectified."
    In the face of that and of the universal recommendation of every military authority whom I have consulted it would be a rash act to accept the adverse view of the rifle expert; but I do not under-value the enormous importance of certainty in a matter of this kind; and I assure the House, that we intend to make the fullest and most exhaustive trial of this rifle in the hands of the troops before we commit the country or the Exchequer to the large expenditure which the adoption of the rifle would involve. We must adopt it for the mounted troops. We shall continue to manufacture rifles sufficient to supply the wants of the cavalry and artillery; and in the time that must elapse before these have been manufactured, we shall have carried out most exhaustive trials both at home and abroad which will put beyond a shadow of doubt all question as to the merits or demerits of this rifle. I do not believe the House of Commons can demand less; I do not think it could require more. Another feature is the cost of converting the long into the short rifle. It is possible it may be desirable, when the time comes for considering the conversion of the long rifle to a short rifle for the use of the Auxiliary Forces, it may be deemed better, as the Volunteer force would not be campaigning in foreign countries, to content ourselves with adding the charger-loading instead of converting the barrel as well. That, however, is not a matter which affects the immediate present, but the comparatively distant future. If the War Office is then as at present there will be no slackness in experiments which will leave no doubt whatever that we are taking the right course. I have tried to rebut as far as I was able the charges brought against His Majesty's Govern-
    1188
    ment. I said at the outset and now repeat that we have done something, but far less than must be done before we have reached anything like the position which we consider essential.
    If I were to put one question above all others which must occupy the attention of the Army Council it would be the question of officers. It is the question of the Army. We are doing our best to solve that question. It is not correct that the change in the Army is discouraging officers or is depriving us of a supply. In the Guards there is a lamentable shortage, due to causes easily explained. I hope we may be able in a few weeks to propound a plan by which this emergency may be met by what I may call emergency measures, and a proper number of officers found for the brigade of Guards. But as regards the Army generally, the difficulty is not reluctance of officers to come forward. It is an unfortunate fact that no fewer than 400 young men properly qualified could not be taken into the Army because the accommodation for them at Sandhurst and Woolwich is not adequate. That state of things we must remedy at an early date; and not only must we get more officers into the Army, but we must have a large reserve of officers, because the demand for officers when war comes will be enormous. We must, in preparing the Army for peace, contemplate the contingency of war. We have to keep up an Army on a basis on which no other nation in the world keeps up an Army—an Army which has to perform in peace the duties other armies perform in war—an Army serving abroad. We require a very large number of officers for the Army, and we shall require in war time an increase of officers which has to be counted by thousands. That is one of the points now engaging the attention of the Army Council. We have already arrived at a conclusion, and I shall make a proposal before long with regard to a reserve of officers for the cavalry. We have appointed a very well-manned and competent Committee to inquire how we can increase the reserve of officers we already possess for the Regular Army. We are fully alive to the need for getting more officers for the Volunteers; and the way we can get them is by making them feel they are wanted,

    1189
    by making their regiments efficient, by making them feel there is need for them in the military scheme of the country, and by relieving them of the cost they are now called upon to undertake.
    I have seen much criticism, and some of it, no doubt, has been just. A great deal of it, I think, has not been just. I have been asked whether I took military opinion with regard to the conclusions I have formed. I think, perhaps, I have been somewhat unjustly accused in that matter. I should like to read to the House the views of a military officer of distinction, who has a knowledge of the Army, and who has a knowledge of the War Office; and, speaking of the proposals I have the honour of laying before the House, and which have been so much criticised, he says—
    "The evils stated exist, one and all, and it has been long patent to anyone who would see, that the condition of matters in the Army have been going from bad to worse; and further, that nothing short, of very drastic measures, which it was not hitherto thought that any Minister or Government would have the courage to adopt, could give us a satisfactory Army, and one at all commensurate with the public money expended on it. Matters have gone from bad to worse ever since the Cardwell reforms with their unpractical and impossible schemes were set on foot, and all attempts at reform which have since been adopted have been at the best new patches put upon rotten cloth. The present scheme is a complete one as far as the infantry is concerned, the backbone of the Army, to whom the other arms are subsidiary. For years past most men who have thought much on Army matters have watched the decadence of the Army under the present system, and have come to the conclusion that our only chance of meeting our military requirements in a satisfactory manner lay in our having a long service and a short service Army, the former for general service at all times, the latter for home service, except in the case of serious war. This, I am convinced, would be the solution of our difficulties. The Militia question is far more difficult. No one can doubt but that sixty such battalions as proposed will be worth as a lighting force far and away more than the whole of the present Militia force, which by sundry means is being killed. The proposed system would change all this, and raise the status and efficiency of the Militia to a very high degree. The scheme appears to be quite sound, but the difficulties appear to be the abolition of a number of Militia units. On every occasion on which it has been proposed to disband a depleted Militia unit, or to amalgamate two weak ones, strong opposition has been raised, and, as a rule, the county influence, backed by a Member of Parliament,
    1190
    has been too strong, and the unit has been left. The plan of making the battalion a home for the men throughout their service is excellent. The establishment of the large depôts is the only sound way of feeding the battalions abroad. The territorial system has been, as stated, hitherto a sham; if it is to be otherwise, the county battalions should be as far as possible in their counties, and only away from them for manœuvres. The strength which would be attained under this proposed scheme is highly satisfactory, and no previous system has given anything like the number of men who have had so much training. The establishment of the ready or striking force has long been felt to be a necessity. No one has, however, hitherto attempted seriously to arrange it. I venture to consider the scheme as one perfectly adapted to fulfil the needs of our most difficult and complex system, and the only considerable difficulty I foresee is that of making clear to the public that sixty battalions of such Militia as proposed are infinitely preferable to the present force, which, out of an establishment of 3,400 officers, has a deficiency of over 800, and out of one of 123,510 Militiamen has a deficiency of over 31,000, to make good either of which under present conditions passeth the wit of man."
    [OPPOSITION cries of "Name.] The name was that of General Sir Alfred Turner.
    I apologise for keeping the House so long, but I have had to deal with a variety of subjects. I maintain that the position I have maintained from the first has been correct. I believe my crime, if I have committed one, is that I have attacked this matter too zealously. I do think that an Army which is not thoroughly serviceable is too expensive a luxury for this country to keep up. An hon. Member has said that Volunteers had ceased to have any fun, and, therefore, were going out of it. I do not believe that is the spirit of the Volunteers at all, and I think that is a very dangerous spirit in which to approach Army matters. I believe absolutely in two main propositions. We must, in the first place, have a reduction of expenditure, and, secondly, we must have greater efficiency; and I can see no way of arriving at these two conclusions other than by cutting down expenditure and by altering organisation. If the House is content with the state of things that existed after the war there will be no change; if they are content to pay a larger sum on the Army Estimates they will maintain the present organisation: but if they do believe that economy is essential we must at any rate have very clear ideas as to how that

    1191
    economy is to be obtained. Hon. Gentlemen who believe that a change is necessary and economy essential will be as struck as I have been during these debates by the want of any constructive plan of anything but criticism, of any proposal that could result in economy or contribute to the efficiency of the Army. I contend that every item of the indictment is incorrect—that we have not diminished the efficiency of the Army, that we have not disordered the Regular Forces at home or abroad, that we have not discouraged the Militia and Volunteers, that we have not been negligent in the matter of the re-armament of the artillery, that we have pursued a perfectly reasonable course in regard to the armament of the infantry; and on all these grounds I may truly say that the efficiency of the Army for the defence of the Empire has not been diminished, but has been increased.
    MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL (Oldham)said that the House would readily acknowledge the lucidity and the earnestness of the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, and he believed that from that side of the House there was a very sincere desire to spare him, as far as possible, unnecessary trouble and anxiety at a time when his physical strength caused some concern to his friends. He must submit to the House, however, that the right hon. Gentleman had not made any real reply to the main outlines of the charge contained in the Amendment, and in the speeches of the mover and seconder. The right hon. Gentleman had told a very fine and glowing tale of the multitudinous activities of the Department of which he was the head. He had given glowing accounts of almost every branch of the military service, and one would have thought from his language that the War Office was at the present moment a very near approach to a heaven upon earth. But if they were to judge from private accounts of the condition of the Army, very different language would have to be held. The right hon. Gentleman's tale was full of promises and of glorification, but they had heard this sort of thing more than once before in the course of the present Parliament. Almost every year when the time came round to discuss Army matters they were offered some-
    1192
    thing entirely new which occupied the attention of the War Office, but after a few short weeks these new proposals vanished into nebulous, but usually costly, obscurity. Those statements should always be judged not at the moment they were made or in detail, but by main results spread over a period of years. Four years ago, when the present Parliament was elected, military matters, were necessarily paramount, and the number of military men returned to the House was necessarily more numerous than on former occasions. He would point out the great power which had been bestowed on those gentlemen. The whole fortunes of the Army had been placed in their hands. Nothing they asked for had been refused; every scheme brought forward, however grotesque and costly, had been carried through by force of the Government's obedient majority. Well, as they had had all the power, so must they have all the responsibility.
    He should like to notice one or two main facts which seemed to him to derogate from the general statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War as to the efficiency and economy of the Army. There had been a great lack of continuity in our military policy during the last four or five years. Nothing was more important than continuity in the policy of the Army. It was not a limited liability company which could be recast or reconstructed in accordance with the state of the money market; and if subjected to frequent and violent changes very grave and grievous consequences might ensue, which it might take years to repair. He asked the House to notice one or two of these changes in policy. Of course there was the Army Corps scheme, with large staff organisation, barracks, and so on. All that had been swept into the past. Four years ago the late Secretary of State for War proposed to add the garrison battalions to the Army at a cost of half a million of money. These battalions were added, but where were they now? No sooner had they been created at great expense than they were swept away. Four years ago the late Secretary of State for War increased the Militia to a nominal strength of 450,000, increased the pay, and offered a bounty, which added to the cost of that force £200,000 a year. Now

    1193
    that increase had been knocked off, and the strength of the Militia reduced. Four years ago the late Secretary of State for War created a Militia Reserve, and the Prime Minister, in winding up the debate on the matter, spoke of the great Militia Reserve as the strength of the Army! Not a single man ever enlisted in that Reserve! Then there had been in the space of these four years two complete sweeps of the War Office from the highest official down to the messenger boys. He wondered if the new staff was an improvement on the old. He did not wish to say anything disrespectful of it, but he believed that it was not untrue to say that the present administration at the War Office was less representative of the ability and experience of the Army than any preceding administration.
    The vital foundation of any Army system was the period of enlistment. Foreign nations hardly ever changed the period of enlistment, but during the last four years it had been five times altered in this country. In 1901 we had seven years service with the colours, and five in the Reserve. It was altered in 1902 to three years with the colours and nine in the Reserve. Last year, at the end of the session, the present Secretary of State for War proposed a long period of enlistment for the foreign service Army, and two years with the colours for the home Army with six in the Reserve. After Parliament had risen he changed it to a uniform nine years service with the colours and three years with the Reserve; and there might yet be a departure from long service and a resumption of short service at some future date. Five separate changes within that brief period of time! Of course, it was quite true that during that period there were two different Secretaries of State for War and, they were naturally not responsible for each other's proposals and not bound to carry them out. But there had been only one Leader in the House of Commons, who was not there at present, and it was perfectly true to say of the right hon. Gentleman that he had consistently supported each and everyone of these inconsistent changes. The Prime Minister had been loyal to everybody and to every plan. When
    1194
    they remembered the exalted terms in which the Esher Committee spoke of the military talents of the Prime Minister, they could only regret that talents so distinguished and so rare had been so unhappily applied. One result of all this was the lack of continuity of policy as very fairly expressed in the terms of the Amendment. In fact, he thought that the Secretary of State for War should himself vote for the Amendment, and the only reason why he would not was probably because he was too modest. If the right hon. Gentleman had had the drafting of the Amendment he would have probably made it more violent, concluding with some such phrase as that the condition of the Army really constituted a very great danger to the existence of the Empire. He could not think that it was a very wise thing for the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to talk as he had done in the hearing of foreign nations about the demoralisation which the administration of his own Government Department had produced in the Army; that the Army was not suited to the requirements of the country or adapted for war. He might have added that it was an Army with no properly organized staff, equipped with obsolete artillery and with bad rifles. The right hon. Gentleman did not realise what a bitter reproach that was to his own colleagues.
    It could not be fairly urged against the taxpayers that they had grudged the money which was said to be necessary to put the land forces into a state of efficiency. We went into the South African War with a £20,000,000 Army. The country had now got a £30,000,000 Army. The £10,000,000 difference in the cost was a very big sum. It would make a difference in the comfort of every householder. For another thing, it would go a long way to enable the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham to redeem his pledges with regard to old-age pensions; or in adding to the Development Grant in Ireland. Two principal causes had led us into this deplorable administrative and financial catastrophe. First, we had tried to keep up too large an establishment in time of peace. There had been

    1195
    hitherto a reduction of the military establishment after every great war. Secondly, we had acted in much too great haste. It would have been much better for the cause of reform if in 1900 the right hon. Gentleman the present Secretary of State for India had said, as he could have said with perfect force' "I have got to finish the war; I cannot reform the Army until Lord Kitchener and other distinguished generals come home," and no Party in the House would have challenged that attitude. But the prudent counsels which the experience and precedents of the past might have suggested, and the circumstances of the moment almost dictated, were brushed aside by the Government. Expenditure was popular; the House of Commons was what the Prime Minister called "in a hot fit," a phrase which he thought rather revealed the Prime Minister's processes in regard to political principles. In order to satisfy this hot fit something had to be produced, and it was—the Army Corps scheme was produced. The Resolution of that Army Corps scheme was still on the books of the House, one of the most solemn, elaborate, and enduring mockeries that could be imagined. That Army Corps scheme had gone, and so completely that they were reproached for suggesting that it had ever existed. The Secretary for War alluded to it tonight as the "so-called Army Corps scheme," and last session the right hon. Gentleman said—
    "Why worry about a name? You might as well have called them Sunday-school districts."
    Yet it was only two years ago that some of them were vehemently asserting that the Army Corps were real Army Corps, and that the right hon. Member for Guildford, with great rhetorical skill, was strenuously asserting that they were, in fact, real Army Corps equipped for war. And the right hon. Gentleman published in support of his theory a White Paper which showed three Army Corps complete, horse, foot, and artillery, a force which he believed was to come into existence on April 1st. They were all gone now, the great organisation which the right hon. Gentleman devised, down to the Teutonic headgear which his fancy suggested. All the great officers who were concerned in preparing that scheme had been scattered far and wide over the
    1196
    surface of the globe, the right hon. Gentleman himself had been translated to another sphere, and that fertile imagination which used to call forth armies so easily was now condemned to a chilly exile in the frozen deserts of Tibet. That was another instance of the lack of continuity in Army policy.
    As to the remedy proposed by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, they had waited all last session to know what his plan was. At the end of the session he detailed an extensive and revolutionary scheme of Army reform, and embodied his proposals afterwards in a Memorandum. Was that scheme operative or not? The right hon. Gentleman had addressed the House at length on all sorts of subjects, but he was at a loss to know whether the scheme embodied in his Memorandum last autumn was an operative scheme at this moment. One word would clear up the mystery. If it were operative it proposed a complete revolution. It proposed to divide the Army into two armies, the home Army serving two years with the colours and six in the reserve, and the foreign Army serving nine years with the colours and three in the reserve; to disband nineteen battalions existing at present, and to add to the Army thirty-three battalions carved out of the Militia, thus making a net increase of fourteen battalions, or 175 battalions altogether, exclusive of Guards, as against 161, which we had at present. The right hon. Gentleman had made out the Estimates for the year, and must, therefore, know what was to be done. Last year he said he would not hold office unless he was able to carry his scheme. The scheme at first contemplated two kinds of Volunteers—that had been abandoned. It still contemplated two kinds of soldiers—fighting soldiers, who were to go abroad, and other soldiers. It also involved a great increase of skeleton cadres, which, he thought, should be avoided. The right hon. Gentleman added fourteen battalions, as the result of his economies, to the cadres of the Army. There was not-one single particular in which those battalions were not inferior to the battalions which the—he believed the word was "rotten"—Cardwellian system produced.
    What was the financial result of this extraordinary military revolution proposed

    1197
    by the right hon. Gentleman? The right hon. Gentleman had published a table in which he showed all the economies which his scheme would produce. Five of the items which he claimed as economies which his scheme would produce were economies which could be produced without any of the alterations which his scheme required—they could be effected under any scheme. The total net balance of economies, if we had this extraordinary military revolution, this turning of the Army upside down and inside out as it had never been turned before, was no more than £63,000. When they considered the results of the disastrous experiments in the past, he thought they had a right to ask the Government, for the sake of such a small economy, not to embark on such a surprising adventure.
    The right hon. Gentleman had stated that the statement contained in the Amendment that the Auxiliary Forces had been discouraged was not true. It was true, and if anything could prove it that debate had proved it. And if that were not sufficient he would point to the reduction of the strength of the Volunteers. In the period since this Parliament began the Volunteers had been enormously reduced. They were 288,000 men in 1900. They were less than 240,000 men to-day. And the officers which, as the hon. and gallant Member for Sheffield had pointed out, were deficient in 1898 by 1,300, were to-day deficient by 2,700 from the number properly required. If they poured buckets of cold water upon the Volunteers, as the right hon. Gentleman did in speech after speech, if they made their intention perfectly clear to boil them down into a sort of bastard infantry of the Line, without the intelligence of the Volunteers and without the cohesion of the Regulars, if they put them into a state of uncertainty, the natural, the inevitable effect was that they discouraged all those spontaneous forces of patriotism in the country which had led to the creation of what was a unique force, and one which contributed largely to the greatness and security of these realms.
    And what about the treatment of great officers under this Government?
    1198
    What had been the relations of the Government within the lifetime of this Parliament to the great officers of the Army? He did not remember the Wolsoley epoch, though he was told that the name of Lord Wolseley was one to conjure with when Ministers were in difficulties. Yet he had heard, in another place, Lord Lansdowne doing his best to demolish any reputation Lord Wolseley had achieved. Then came the Buller epoch. The Marquess of Salisbury once said that his confidence in the British Soldier was only equalled by his confidence in Sir Redvers Buller. He was not going to examine whether that confidence was misplaced or not. Sir Redvers Buller was not dismissed and disgraced because he lost battles. It was not until he made a silly speech that I the War Office came forward as severe disciplinarians who would not brook, I even in a popular hero, the smallest infraction of military etiquette. Then came the epoch of Lord Roberts. For two years the Government lived upon Lord Roberts. Every scheme, no matter how fantastic or doubtful, was commended to that House by the simple expedient of the Secretary of State's observing, "I may add that in all this His Majesty's Government have the support and concurrence of Lord Roberts." But there came a day when Lord Roberts had been made responsible for too many of these schemes, when he had been made the scapegoat of too many failures and misfortunes; and when he arrived at his office one morning he found a piece of blue paper on his table, which had been thoughtfully placed there by the right hon. Gentleman, directing him not to trouble to come back to the office on any following morning.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: That statement is absolutely without foundation.
    MR. WINSTON CHURCHILLsaid that at all events he was accurate in stating that Lord Roberts only heard of his dismissal on the day when that dismissal took place.
    MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: The hon. Government Gentleman is entirely misinformed.
    MR. WINSTON CHURCHILLsaid he would withdraw the piece of blue paper with the greatest satisfaction. The Government had by these various methods lost the confidence of the great officers of the Army, and they could not get any great military name in support of this new scheme. The right hon. Gentleman had been reduced to appealing to them to adopt his policy upon his own authority, and in the name of General Turner, whose victories he did not remember to have heard of, but who seemed to be very anxious to write polite letters to the right hon. Gentleman. Last year they recognised what was due to a Minister who had just taken office, and permitted the Army Estimates to pass through the House without adequate scrutiny. This year they would examine the Estimates with the closest and most unrelaxing attention. He would advise the right hon. Gentleman not to worry too much about details, because, after all, there would be an election some day, and when it came the waters of the boundless ocean would come in and all the castles on the sands
    would be washed completely away. The Opposition would take no responsibility for any of these new and extravagant schemes. They were under no obligation to put forward alternative proposals, because only Governments could put forward large constructive schemes. Five years of thrifty and unostentatious administration would be required before the injuries lately inflicted on the military system would be repaired. Even then there would be an abiding reminder of the extravagance which now existed in the shape of taxes burdensome to the masses of the people and to the, trade of the country. He did not deny that that was a partisan indictment. But even if the Government took credit to themselves for the highest motives and the best intentions, there would still remain a record of profusion and flagrant incapacity, on which the nation, and not the House of Commons, would finally have to decide.
    Question put.
    The House divided:—Ayes, 207: Noes, 254. (Division List No. 8.)

    AYES.

    Abraham, William (Cork. N. E.)

    Buxton, Sydney Charles

    Doogan, P. C.

    Abraham, William (Rhondda)

    Caldwell, James

    Douglas, Charles M. (Lanark)

    Allen, Charles P.

    Campbell, John (Armagh, S.)

    Duffy, William J.

    Ambrose, Robert

    Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H.

    Duncan, J. Hastings

    Ashton, Thomas Gair

    Causton, Richard Knight

    Edwards, Frank

    Asquith, Rt. Hn. Herbert Henry

    Cawley, Frederick

    Ellice, Capt EC (S. Andrew's Bghs)

    Barlow, John Emmott

    Channing, Francis Allston

    Ellis, John Edward (Notts.)

    Barran, Rowland Hirst

    Cheetham, John Frederick

    Emmott, Alfred

    Barry, E. (Cork, S.)

    Churchill, Winston Spencer

    Esmonde, Sir Thomas

    Bayley, Thomas (Derbyshire)

    Cogan, Denis J.

    Evans, Sir Francis H. (Maidstone)

    Beaumont, Wentworth C. B.

    Condon, Thomas Joseph

    Eve, Harry Trelawney

    Bell, Richard

    Crean, Eugene

    Farrell, James Patrick

    Benn, John Williams

    Cremer, William Randal

    Fenwick, Charles

    Black, Alexander William

    Crombie, John William

    Ferguson, R. C. Munro (Leith)

    Bolton, Thomas Dolling

    Cullinan, J.

    Ffrench, Peter

    Brigg, John

    Daves, Alfred (Carmarthen)

    Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond

    Bright, Allan Heywood

    Daviies, M. Vaughan (Cardigan)

    Flavin, Michael Joseph

    Broadhurst, Henry

    Delany, William

    Flynn, James Christopher

    Brunner, Sir John Tomlinson

    Devlin, Chas. Ramsay (Galway)

    Foster, Sir Walter (Derby Co.)

    Bryce, Rt. Hon. James

    Dewar, John A. (Inverness-sh.)

    Fowler, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry

    Buchanan, Thomas Ryburn

    Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles

    Freeman-Thomas, Captain F.

    Burke, E. Haviland

    Dillon, John

    Fuller, J. M. F.

    Burns, John

    Donelan, Captain A.

    Gilhooly, James

    Gladstone, Rt. Hn. Herbert John

    M'Hugh, Patrick A.

    Russell, T. W.

    Goddard, Daniel Ford

    M'Kean, John

    Samuel, Herbert L. (Cleveland)

    Grant, Corrie

    M'Kenna, Reginald

    Scott, Chas. Prestwich (Leigh)

    Griffith, Ellis J.

    M'Killop, W. (Sligo, North)

    Shackleton, David James

    Guest, Hon. Ivor Churchill

    Markham, Arthur Basil

    Shaw, Thomas (Hawick, B.)

    Gurdon, Sir W. Brampton

    Mooney, John J.

    Sheehan, Daniel Daniel

    Haldane, Rt. Hn. Richard B.

    Morley,Rt.Hn.John (Montrose)

    Sheehy, David

    Hammond, John

    Murnaghan, George

    Shipman, Dr. John G.

    Hardie, J. Keir (MerthyrTydvil)

    Murphy, John

    Sinclair, John (Forfarshire)

    Harwood, George

    Nannetti, Joseph P.

    Slack, John Bamford

    Hayden, John Patrick

    Newnes, Sir George

    Smith, Samuel (Flint)

    Hayter, Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur D.

    Nolan, Col. John P. (Galway, N.)

    Soames, Arthur Wellesley

    Helme, Norval Watson

    Nolan, Joseph (Louth, South)

    Soares, Ernest J.

    Hemphill, Rt. Hon. Charles H.

    Norman, Henry

    Spencer,Rt.Hn.C.R.(Northants

    Henderson, Arthur (Durham)

    Nussey, Thomas Willans

    Stevenson, Francis S.

    Higham, John Sharpe

    O'Brien,Kendal (TipperaryMid

    Strachey, Sir Edward

    Hobhouse, C. E. H. (Bristol, E.)

    O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)

    Sullivan, Donal

    Hutchinson,Dr.Charles Fredk.

    O'Brien, P. J. (Tipperary, N.)

    Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)

    Hutton, Alfred E. (Morley)

    O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)

    Tennant, Harold John

    Isaacs, Rufus Daniel

    O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool)

    Thomas, Abel (Carmarthen, E.)

    Johnson, John

    O'Donnell, John (Mayo, S.)

    Thomas, Sir A. (Glamorgan, E.)

    Joicey, Sir James

    O'Dowd, John

    Thomas, David Alfred (Merthyr)

    Jones, David Brynmor (Swansea

    O'Kelly, Conor (Mayo, N.)

    Thomson, F. W. (York, W. R.)

    Jones, William (Carnarvonsh.)

    O'Kelly, James (Roscommon, N

    Tomkinson, James

    Joyce, Michael

    O'Malley, William

    Trevelyan, Charles Philips

    Kearley, Hudson E.

    O'Mara, James

    Ure, Alexander

    Kennedy, P. J. (Westmeath, N.)

    O'Shaughnessy, P. J.

    Waldron, Laurence Ambrose

    Kennedy, Vincent P. (Cavan,W

    O'Shee, James John

    Walton, Joseph (Barnsley)

    Kilbride, Denis

    Parrott, William

    Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.

    Kitson, Sir James

    Partington, Oswald

    Wason, Eugene (Clackmannan)

    Labouchere, Henry

    Paulton, James Mellor

    White, George (Norfolk)

    Lambert, George

    Pease, J. A. (Saffron Walden)

    White, Luke (York, E. R.)

    Law, Hugh Alex. (Donegal, W.)

    Pirie, Duncan V.

    Whiteley, George (York, W. R.)

    Lawson, Sir Wilfrid (Cornwall)

    Power, Patrick Joseph

    Whitley, J. H. (Halifax)

    Layland-Barratt, Francis

    Rea, Russell

    Whittaker, Thomas Palmer

    Leese,SirJosephF. (Accrington)

    Reckitt, Harold James

    Williams, Osmond (Merioneth)

    Levy, Maurice

    Reddy, M.

    Wills,ArthurWalters(NDorset)

    Lewis, John Herbert

    Redmond, John E.(Waterford)

    Wilson, Fred.W. (Norfolk,Mid.)

    Lloyd-George, David

    Reid,Sir R.Threshie(Dumfries)

    Wilson, John (Durham, Mid.)

    Lough, Thomas

    Richards,Thomas (W. Monm'th

    Woodhouse,Sir JT. (Huddersf'd)

    Lundon, W.

    Rickett, J. Compton

    Young, Samuel

    Lyell, Charles Henry

    Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion)

    Yoxall, James Henry

    Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J.

    Roberts, John H. (Denbighs.)

    MacNeill, John Gordon Swift

    Robson, William Snowdon

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES—

    MacVeagh, Jeremiah

    Roche, John

    Captain Norton and Major

    M'Arthur, William (Cornwall)

    Roe, Sir Thomas

    Seely.

    M'Crae, George

    Rose, Charles Day

    M'Fadden, Edward

    Runciman, Walter

    NOES.

    Agnew, Sir Andrew Noel

    Bigwood, James

    Cook, Sir Frederick Lucas

    Allhusen, AugustusHenryEden

    Blundell, Colonel Henry

    Corbett, T. L. (Down. North)

    Allsopp, Hon. George

    Bond, Edward

    Craig, Chas. Curtis (Antrim, S.

    Anson, Sir William Reynell

    Boscawen, Arthur Griffith

    Cross, Alexander (Glasgow)

    Arkwright, John Stanhope

    Bowles,Lt.-Col.H.F.(Middlesex

    Crossley, Rt. Hon. Sir Savile

    Arnold-Forster, Rt. Hn. Hugh O

    Bowles, T. Gibson (King'sLynn)

    Cubitt, Hon. Henry

    Arrol, Sir William

    Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John

    Cust, Henry John C.

    Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John

    Brymer, William Ernest

    Dalkeith, Earl of

    Aubrey-Fletcher,Rt.Hn. Sir H

    Bull, William James

    Dalrymple, Sir Charles

    Bagot, Capt. Josceline FitzRoy

    Burdett-Coutts, W.

    Davenport, William Bromley

    Bailey, James (Walworth)

    Butcher, John George

    Davies, Sir Horatio D(Chatham

    Bain, Colonel James Robert

    Campbell,J.H.M.(Dublin Univ.

    Denny, Colonel

    Baird, John George Alexander

    Cautley, Henry Strother

    Dickinson, Robert Edmond

    Balcarres, Lord

    Cavendish,V.C.W. (Derbyshire

    Dickson, Charles Scott

    Balfour, Rt. Hn. A. J. (Manch'r)

    Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)

    Dimsdale, Rt. Hn. Sir Joseph C.

    Balfour,Rt.Hn.GeraldW.(Leeds)

    Cecil, Lord Hugh (Greenwich)

    Disraeli, Coningsby Ralph

    Balfour, Kenneth R. (Christch.

    Chamberlain,RtHn.J.A.(Worc.

    Dorington, Rt. Hon. SirJohnE.

    Banbury, Sir Frederick George

    Chapman, Edward

    Doughty, Sir George

    Bartley, Sir George C. T.

    Coates, Edward Feetham

    Douglas, Rt. Hn. A. Akers

    Bathurst, Hon. Allen Benjamin

    Cochrane, Hn. Thos. H. A. E.

    Doxford, Sir WilliamTheodore

    Bentinck, Lord Henry C.

    Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse

    Duke, Henry Edward

    Bhownaggree, Sir M. M.

    Colomb, Rt. Hn. Sir John C. R.

    Dyke, Rt. Hn. Sir William Hart

    1202

    1203

    Egerton, Hon. A. de Tatton

    Lawson, John Grant(Yorks NR

    Reed, Sir Edw. James (Cardiff)

    Fardell, Sir T. George

    Lee,Arthur H(Hants. Fareham)

    Remnant, James Farquharson

    Fergusson,RtHn.SirJ.(Manc'r)

    Lees, Sir Elliott (Birkenhead)

    Ridley, S. Forde

    Fielden, Edward Brocklehurst

    Legge, Col. Hon Heneage

    Roberts, Samuel (Sheffield)

    Finch, Rt. Hon. George H.

    Leveson-Gower, Frederick N. S.

    Robertson, Herbert (Hackney)

    Finlay, Sir R. B. (Inv'rn'ssB'ghs)

    Llewellyn, Evan Henry

    Rolleston, Sir John F. L.

    Fisher, William Hayes

    Loder, Gerald Walter Erskine

    Rollit, Sir Albert Kaye

    Fison, Frederick William

    Long, Col. Chas. W. (Evesham

    Round, Rt. Hn. James

    FitzGeratld, Sir Robert Penrose

    Long, Rt. Hn. Walter (Bristol, S.

    Rutherford, John (Lancashire)

    Fitzroy, Hn. Edward Algernon

    Lonsdale, John Brownlee

    Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool)

    Flannery, Sir Fortescue

    Lowe, Francis William

    Sackville, Col. S. G. Stopford

    Flower, Sir Ernest

    Lowther, C. (Cumb., Eskdale

    Sadler, Col. Samuel Alexander

    Forster, Henry William

    Loyd, Archie Kirkman

    Samuel, Sir Harry S. (Limehouse

    Gardner, Ernest

    Lucas, Col. Francis(Lowestoft)

    Sandys, Lieut.-Col. Thos. Myles

    Garfit, William

    Lucas,Reginald J. (Portsmouth

    Sassoon, Sir Edward Albert

    Godson, Sir Augustus Fredk.

    Lyttelton, Rt. Hn. Alfred

    Seton-Karr, Sir Henry

    Gordon, Hn J. E. (Elgin & Nairn)

    Macdona, John Cumming

    Sharpe, William Edward T.

    Gordon, J. (Londonderry, S.)

    MacIver, David (Liverpool)

    Sinclair, Louis (Romford)

    Gordon, Maj Evans- (Tr H'mlets

    Maconochie, A. W.

    Skewes-Cox, Thomas

    Gore, Hon. S. F. Ormsby-

    M'Arthur, Charles (Liverpool)

    Sloan, Thomas Henry

    Goschen, Hon. G. Joachim

    M'Calmont, Colonel James

    Smith, Abel H. (Hertford, East

    Goulding, Edward Alfred

    M'Iver, Sir Lewis (EdinburghW

    Smith, H. C (North'mbTyneside

    Graham, Henry Robert

    Majendie, James A. H.

    Smith, Rt Hn J. Parker (Lanarks

    Gray, Ernest (West Ham)

    Malcolm, Ian

    Smith, Hn. W. F. D. (Strand)

    Greene, Sir EW(B'rySEdm'nds)

    Manners, Lord Cecil

    Spear, John Ward

    Greene, Henry D. (Shrewsbury

    Marks, Harry Hananel

    Stanley, Hn. Arthur (Ormskirk

    Greene, W. Raymond (Cambs.)

    Martin, Richard Biddulph

    Stanley, Rt. Hn. Lord (Lancs.)

    Grenfell, William Henry

    Maxwell, Rt. Hn. Sir H. E. (Wigt'n

    Stewart, Sir Mark J. M'Taggart

    Gretton, John

    Maxwell, W. J. H. (Dumfriesshire

    Stock, James Henry

    Greville, Hon. Ronald

    Mildmay, Francis Bingham

    Stone, Sir Benjamin

    Guthrie, Walter Murray

    Milner, Rt. Hn. Sir Frederick G

    Stroyan, John

    Hall, Edward Marshall

    Mitchell, Edw. (Fermanagh, N.

    Strutt, Hn. Charles Hedley

    Hambro, Charles Eric

    Molesworth, Sir Lewis

    Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)

    Hamilton, Marq. of (L'nd'nd'rry

    Montagu, G. (Huntingdon)

    Taylor, Austin (East Toxteth)

    Hardy, Laurence (Kent,Ashford

    Montagu, Hn. J. Scott (Hants.

    Thorburn, Sir Walter

    Hare, Thomas Leigh

    Moon, Edward Robert Pacy

    Thornton, Percy M.

    Harris, F. Leverton (Tynem'th)

    Moore, William

    Tollemache, Henry James

    Haslett, Sir James Horner

    Morgan, David J (Walthamstow

    Tomlinson, Sir Wm. Edw. M

    Heath, Sir. James (Staffords N.W

    Morpeth, Viscount

    Tritton, Charles Ernest

    Heaton, John Henniker

    Morrell, George Herbert

    Tuff, Charles

    Helder, Augustus

    Morrison, James Archibald

    Tufnell, Lieut.-Col. Edward

    Henderson, Sir A. (Stafford. W.

    Morton, Arthur H. Aylmer

    Tuke, Sir John Batty

    Hermon-Hodge, Sir Robert T.

    Mount, William Arthur

    Turnour, Viscount

    Hoare, Sir Samuel

    Mowbray, Sir Robert Gray C.

    Valentia, Viscount

    Hogg, Lindsay

    Murray, Charles J. (Coventry)

    Vincent, Sir Edgar (Exeter)

    Hope, J. F. (Sheffield Brightside

    Palmer, Sir Walter (Salisbury)

    Walrond, Rt. Hn Sir William H.

    Hoult, Joseph

    Parker, Sir Gilbert

    Wanklyn, James Leslie

    Houston, Robert Paterson

    Parkes, Ebenezer

    Warde, Colonel C. E.

    Hozier, Hn. James Henry Cecil

    Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington

    Welby, Lt.-Col. A. C. E. (Taunton

    Hunt, Rowland

    Peel, Hn. Wm. Robert Wellesley

    Welby, Sir Charles G. E. (Notts.)

    Hutton, John (Yorks. N.R.)

    Percy, Earl

    Whiteley, H. (Ashton und.Lyne

    Jeffreys, Rt. Hn. Arthur Fred.

    Pierpoint, Robert

    Willoughby de Eresby, Lord

    Jessel, Captain Herbert Merton

    Pilkington, Colonel Richard

    Wilson, A. Stanley (Yorks. E.R

    Kennaway, Rt. Hn. Sir John H

    Platt-Higgins, Frederick

    Wilson-Todd, Sir W. H. (Yorks.)

    Kenyon, Hn. Geo. T. (Denbigh)

    Plummer, Sir Walter R.

    Wolff, Gustav Wilhelm

    Kenyon-Slaney, Rt. Hn. Col. W.

    Powell, Sir Francis Sharp

    Wortley, Rt. Hn. C. B. Stuart

    Kerr, John

    Pretyman, Ernest George

    Wrightson, Sir Thomas

    Kimber, Sir Henry

    Pryce-Jones, Lt.-Col. Edward

    Wylie, Alexander

    Knowles, Sir Lees

    Purvis, Robert

    Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George

    Lambton, Hon. Frederick Wm.

    Pym, C. Guy

    Yerburgh, Robert Armstrong

    Laurie, Lieut.-General

    Quilter, Sir Cuthbert

    Law, Andrew Bonar (Glasgow)

    Randles, John S.

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Sir

    Lawrence, Wm. F. (Liverpool)

    Rankin, Sir James

    Alexander Acland-Hood and

    Lawson, Hn. H. L. W. (MileEnd

    Rasch, Sir Frederic Carne

    Mr. Ailwyn Fellowes.

    Main Question again proposed.
    And, it being after Midnight, the debate stood adjourned. Debate to be resumed To-morrow.
    Adjourned at five minutes after Twelve o'clock.

ADDRESS.
The King's Answer to the Address of Tuesday the 14th instant reported; and Address and Answer to be printed and published.

PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.
The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House, That the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificates from the Examiners that the further Standing Orders applicable to the following Bills have been complied with:—Cardiff Railway [H.L.]; Charing Cross and Strand Electricity Supply Corporation [H.L.]; City of London Electric Lighting Company [H.L.]; Cordoba and Rosario Railway [H.L.]; East Cowes Gas [H.L.]; Entre Rios Railways [H.L.]; Gosport and Fareham Tramways [H.L.]; Hastings Harbour District Railway (Abandonment) [H.L.]; Metropolitan Electric Supply Company (Acton District) [H.L.]; Metropolitan Electric Supply Company (Various Powers) [H.L.]; North Metropolitan Electric Power Supply [H.L.]; Truro Water [H.L.]; West Cumberland Electric Tramways (Extension of Time) [H.L.]; Workington Harbour and Dock [H.L.].
And also the Certificate that the Standing Orders applicable to the following Bill have been complied with:—Clyde Navigation.
The same were ordered to lie on the Table.
Clacton-on-Sea Commissioners Bill [H.L.]. Read 2a, and committed. The Committee to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.
Hastings Harbour Bill [H.L.]. Read 2a, and committed.
Mansfield Corporation Bill [H.L.]. Read 2a, and committed. The Committee to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.
Municipal Corporations (Merthyr Tydfil Scheme Confirmation) Bill [H.L.]. Referred to the Examiners.

RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.

  NAVY (ESTIMATES).
  Estimate for the year 1905–1906; with explanation of differences;
  Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1905–1906.

  HOUSE OF COMMONS (VENTILATION).
  Report and recommendation by Dr. M. H. Gordon.
  JUDICIAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES. 1903 (PART II. CIVIL JUDICIAL STATISTICS).
  Statistics relating to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the House of Lords, the Supreme Court of Judicature, County Courts and other Civil Courts, edited by Sir John Mac-Donnell, C.B., LL.D., a Master of the Supreme Court.

  COLONIES (GENERAL).
  Further Papers relating to the proposed adoption of a metric system of weights and measures for use within the Empire (in continuation of [Cd. 1940], February, 1904).
  Presented (by Command), and ordered to lie on the Table.

  MOTOR-CAR ACTS, 1896 AND 1903.
  General Order made by the Local Government Board for Ireland, entitled "The Heavy Motor-Car (Ireland) Order, 1905."

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (IRELAND) (GENERAL ORDERS.
  General Order entitled "The Union Accounts Order, 1905."
  Laid before the House (pursuant to Act), and ordered to lie on the Table.

  SERVICE OF MILITIAMEN BILL [H.L.]
  THE EARL OF WEMYSS: My Lords, I beg to give notice that on the Second Reading of the Militia Bill I shall move the following Motion, "That in the opinion of this House it is contrary to sound policy to tamper with the Militia forces, and alter, as is intended, its conditions and terms of service."

  SEAMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' FALSE CHARACTERS BILL [H.L.]
  House in Committee (according to Order).
  Bill passed through Committee and reported without Amendment to the House.
  THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (The Earl of DONOUGHMORE): My Lords, this Bill, excepting for one small drafting Amendment in Clause 3, is exactly the same as that which your Lordships passed last year, and I would, therefore, ask your Lordships to negative the Standing Committee.
  On Question, Standing Committee negatived, and Bill to be read 03a to-morrow.

  THE NEW SERVICE RIFLE.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH,who had given notice to call attention to the new service rifle and to move to resolve, "That in the opinion of this House whatever convenience a shortened rifle may afford to mounted troops it is inexpedient that the whole of His Majesty's Forces should be armed with the recently approved short rifle," said: My Lords, I feel that I am making a great demand upon your tolerance in referring to the subject of the new rifle now, I think, for the third time in the last ten months; but I asure your Lordships I do so because I am honestly convinced that a grave and costly blunder is about to be perpetrated, and I am really anxious that you should help me in, at any rate, causing the War Office to hold their hand before they finally adopt this weapon. Gutta cavat lapidem, and I do trust that the drip of my persistence may have some effect in wearing away the stony prejudice and rocky non possumus attitude that the War Office have adopted towards all the propositions that have been put forward by those, either soldiers or sportsmen, who have really some practical knowledge of what a rifle should be.
  The question of the rifles divides itself naturally and easily into three parts. First, there is the question of improvements that have been made in the rifle, improvements which are admitted by all,
  1020
  and which were not to be found in the long rifle as it was used in the South African War. Then there are a series of, as I think, defects, which are common to the two rifles. But, after all, I wish to impress upon you that it is not proposed to introduce a new rifle. To all intents and purposes you are simply going to continue the old rifle with a shortened barrel. Lastly, there are the series of considerations that arise from the adoption of the shortened barrel, and the arguments to be brought forward for and against that change.
  Now, taking the improvements first, I can deal with them in but a sentence or two. You have, in the first place, the new backsight. The new backsight is a very good backsight, and one that I think His Majesty's forces are very fortunate to have acquired. Some of my military friends say that it is too good a backsight, and that it is useless giving the soldier a wind-gauge on a good backsight because he will not know how to use it, and would, therefore, be much better without one. My answer to my military friends on that point is that the sooner they teach the soldiers to use the new backsight the better, and if they use the facilities given them for improving their shooting by this backsight we shall be very much benefited in any future war. Then there is the improvement introduced of loading the magazine from a charger, by which, at a single motion, five cartridges are introduced into the magazine. We who have criticised the magazine rifle from its introduction have always maintained that a magazine rifle should be loaded by a charger in that way, so, at any rate, that is one thing we have got after this fourteen years struggle. Lastly, there is what I think ought also to be regarded as an improvement, and which is really involved by the use of the charger, namely, the abandonment of what is known as the dust-cover, which was quite a superfluity and was no good for the purpose for which it was intended. These, I think, everybody admits to be improvements, but they do not involve any great expense. I imagine that these improvements could be applied to any one of the existing long rifles now used by His Majesty's forces for about, I should think, 7s.—3s. or 4s. for the backsight, and 3s. or 4s. for the alteration necessary

  1021
  to make the charger; at any rate, the cost of substituting the new backsight for the present one, and enabling the magazine to be loaded by a charger, would not be great, and would not involve any large amount of new manufacturing plant.
  Now, my Lords, I come to what I hold to be defects which have existed in the action and stock of the rifle from the very beginning, and which now, though you are by way of introducing a new weapon, you have deliberately determined to continue in that new weapon. In the first place, there is the weakness involved by the stock being in two parts. There is no other military rifle in the world which has this arrangement except the French Lebel rifle. I think most of you who are accustomed to using sporting rifles and guns would think it a very extraordinary thing to use a rifle the stock of which was in two parts fastened together with a screw going through the weakest part of the stock. The next thing I come to is the complicated bolt, with its very weak fastening. We have admittedly the most complicated bolt that is in use in military weapons, and the one that has the weakest fastenings. Go to any gunmaker you like and he will tell you it would not be safe to increase the strain thrown on the bolt of the British rifle, whereas the bolts of foreign rifles would certainly bear 25 per cent, more strain than that which could be borne by the British bolt. What is the reason for that? It is because the fastening of the British bolt is made at the end of the bolt, whereas in the foreign forms of bolt the main fastening is made at its head in the breech of the rifle itself. Two lugs fit in and lock the bolt tight at the place where the strain is greatest, namely, at the breech end of the barrel. Your great rifle-makers here in England are all now manufacturing magazine rifles of ·360 or ·375 bore, which take a heavier bullet and also a larger charge of explosive than is used in the ·303. Ask any one of them whether they would use the British rifle-action for such a weapon and they will tell you no. They will tell you that they will go to the Mannlicher or the Mauser for the pattern of the weapon. Then a small change has been made in the safety
  1022
  catch; but I invite any one of your Lordships to look at the new rifle with its present safety catch and tell me whether it is a comfortable one to use. I think the answer will be that it is a thumb-injuring and nail-breaking sort of article. I would ask you also to compare it with the safety catch to be found on the Mannlicher or Mauser rifle, which has a flap lying at the back of the bolt; it is moved from right to left easily, and certainly, however cold your fingers may be, it is evident at a glance whether it is on or off. Then, my Lords. I say we make another mistake in clinging to our clumsy, cumbrous, flimsy magazine. I think the British magazine is an excrescence and an eyesore on any rifle. I can quite understand, before you adopted the charger method of loading, that a big magazine was a good thing. The rifle was used with a cut off as a single firer, and the magazine was to be reserved for emergency. With the charger we have dropped that theory altogether. The rifle is fired straight from the magazine. You cannot load a magazine with ten cartridges from a single charger, and I say the size of the magazine ought to be measured by the number of cartridges you can put into it at a single motion. As it is now, if you want to fill your magazine with ten cartridges, you have to take, first, one little packet of five cartridges in the one charger, and press that into the magazine. You have to move the charger with your hand. You then have to take another little packet of cartridges in another charger and press that into your rifle, and then your magazine is full. I maintain that it is possible to keep up quite as rapid a fire if you have a magazine that holds only five cartridges. I am quite confident that there would be no loss in rapidity of firing by adopting that system, and then you could have your magazine safely stowed away in the forehand of the rifle, the same as in the Mauser, liable to no injury and offering no impediment to its handling.
  I think that, perhaps, the strongest argument against the perfection of the British type of rifle is the fact that no other nation has adopted it. All over the world nations are choosing rifles. The bigger nations have special patterns

  1023
  of their own. The less civilised and the smaller nations have to, and do, adopt the inventions of other countries. They naturally give great pains to the choice. They carry out many experiments before they adopt a particular weapon. You will find that of all these nations not one has adopted the British rifle. You may say, "Oh, well, after all, foreign nations do not know much about it." Then I say, go to the British gunmaker, the British marksman, and the British sportsman. A great deal of the sporting shooting is now done from these very magazine rifles; and I am sure you will find that for one sporting rifle that is made on the British pattern, twenty or twenty-five are made on the Mannlicher or Mauser pattern. In the same way, if you go to the great target marksmen, though I admit that some of the Lee-Enfield pattern are used for target work, I think you will find that the majority of the great British marksmen do use rifles made on the Mauser or Mannlicher patterns in preference to the British one. I think these are strong arguments in favour of my theory that even the action of the British rifle is not all that it might be and could be improved.
  Up to the present moment I have, of course, been dealing with matters which appertain to the notice I have put on the Paper, though they do not appertain to the Motion. My point is this, that you have decided to adopt a new weapon only to this extent, that you have taken your old weapon with a shortened barrel. All the faults, if there be faults, in the old system of magazine and in the old system of bolt are retained, and I do say if you are going to spend this large sum of money in re-arming the Army, you ought to have considered thy question whether you could not improve the rifle, not only in the barrel, but also in the stock and action. I leave that part, and come now to the question of the short barrel. What was the genesis of this short barrel? It had its origin in the place which has been the origin of many troubles to us in the past, and I am afraid may be also the cause of troubles in the future—South Africa. In South Africa it was found that the British mounted soldier armed with a carbine was absolutely unable to cope with a mounted Boer armed with a
  1024
  long Mauser rifle. That was not wonderful. A carbine, so far as it goes, is no doubt a very pretty little weapon, and up to 600 yards may be very good; but, of course, it could not compete with the long rifle in South Africa. So our cavalry adopted the long rifle and used it, and a way of carrying it on horseback was extemporised. It was carried rather after the fashion of a lance—the stock dropped into a small shoe, and the top part of the barrel fastened by a strap to the arm of the soldier. That, I believe, was successful, and I understand that the cavalry soldiers in South Africa were very well satisfied with their long rifle and with the way that it was carried. But, my Lords, it was decided that it was absolutely necessary, in order that the rifle should be carried comfortably by the cavalry, that it should be a short rifle. It was supposed that a convenient way of carrying the rifle could not be discovered unless it was a short one. I can quite understand that it is easier to carry a short rifle on horseback than a long one, but here is an extraordinary thing. This rifle has now been introduced for two years; it has been in the hands of a considerable body of troops for certainly eight or ten months, and yet at the present moment the method of carrying the rifle on horseback has not been discovered.
  THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (The Earl of DONOUGHMORE): Yes, it has.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: The noble Earl the Under-Secretary of State for War says it has. Well, is it to be carried in the new long bucket?
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I do not know whether we are thinking of the same bucket; but it is to be carried in a bucket which is different from the old one.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: The new long bucket, which is a big and clumsy contrivance, necessary on account of the length of the rifle, once more involves the rifle being attached to the saddle of the horse instead of to the man. Now, I do not care who disputes it, however

  1025
  great the authority, but for service purposes the rifle of the cavalry soldier should be attached to himself. When a man is thrown from his horse it is well that he should have some weapon with him—a sword is no use to a man on foot. If it is decided to carry the new rifle in a bucket attached to the saddle you will be very much injuring the effectiveness of the soldier to whom you give that rifle. We had some little discussion on this point in your Lordships' House last session. I think the noble and gallant Field-Marshal, Earl Roberts, whom I now see on the Cross Benches, told us, while, I think, expressing concurrence with our view that the rifle should be attached to the soldier, that his idea would be that the rifle should be carried one way in peace time, namely, in a bucket attached to the horse, and in another way in war time, namely, attached to the man. I know it is very audacious and impertinent of me to set any opinion of mine against that of the noble and gallant Earl, but I do appeal to you as impartial men to say whether it is not wise that soldiers should be accustomed to their accoutrements in peace time, whether the whole of the training of a soldier in peace time should not be to make him ready for war?
  I have carried many different rifles, in many parts of the world, on horseback, and you cannot make it a very comfortable or pleasant thing to carry a rifle a horse. It must mean a certain amount of discomfort and difficulty. That being admitted, surely it is desirable in ordinary training during peace time that you should accustom your cavalry soldier to that amount of discomfort which is to be inflicted on him in war. Therefore, I say that if once you admit that you have to carry your rifle in time of peace in a bucket for convenience or beauty's sake, whereas in war time you must carry it attached to the soldier, then I say you have condemned the bucket system altogether, and ought not to have considered it. As a matter of fact, by shortening the rifle you have made it impossible to carry it in the way in which it was carried in the South African War. The lance attachment method, as it was called, cannot be used with the short rifle because the rifle is too short, but there are methods of carrying it. I have
  1026
  seen one myself. I have no interest in this particular method, and I do not say it is perfect; but it seems to me there is a great deal to be said in favour of it, or in favour of an improvement by the adaptation of it. It is an attachment which has been invented by Colonel Patterson. With that attachment the rifle is carried in a sling at the left side of the man. Just below the cantel of the saddle a metal clip is placed. The rifle hangs on the soldier's left side, and when he mounts the horse he presses the small part of the stock into this clip. The whole weight of the rifle is thrown on to the clip. On the right side the sword is fixed to the saddle, so that the weight of the sword, on the one side is balanced by the weight of the rifle on the other. I have seen that equipment tried. I had a corporal of a cavalry regiment, in my own garden, and tried the equipment in every way that I could. He got off on the right side and also on the left side; he fell off on one side and then on the other; and he fell over his horse's tail. Noble Lords laugh. I would point out that he did it on purpose. So far as I could see, however the soldier might fall, the rifle always came away from the attachment on the saddle and left him perfectly free, the rifle itself remaining attached to the man. I know that attachment has been tried at various military centres in England, and I believe that, on the whole, the decision has been against it. It has been said to be weak in places and to damage the small part of the stock of the rifle round which the clip is fastened. Well, I should like to ask the noble Lord the Under-Secretary if he could give me the report which Lord Kitchener has made upon this equipment.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I have not got it here.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: Well, I may tell the noble Earl that this attachment has been already largely adopted in India, and that no less than 26,000 Patterson equipments have gone to India arid are in use there. I think that is a strong argument, I am not saying in favour of the Patterson equipment, but in favour of the view that it is possible to discover a method by which the rifle can be

  1027
  carried comfortably, or fairly comfortably, on a horse by the soldier, and yet when he is thrown from his saddle the rifle shall remain attached to the man. That, it seems to me, is what we have to aim at if we wish to get the best possible weapon attached in the best possible way to a cavalry soldier. And I may say that with this particular form of attachment it does not in the least matter whether the rifle is a long or a short one.
  The next point put forward in favour of this rifle is that it is, on account of its shortness, much lighter than the existing one. The short rifle is one pound four ounces lighter than the old rifle, and really to hear the advocates of the new rifle speak you would imagine that this extra lightness had been obtained by the shortening of the rifle. I am going to give your Lordships the exact figures, as to the amount of lightness that has been obtained in that way. The thirty-inch Lee-Enfield barrel, ready for mounting, weighs two pounds twelve ounces. Five inches is taken off this barrel; that is to say, one-sixth. Well, one-sixth of forty-four ounces is just over seven ounces. Therefore, if you take a sixth off the barrel you save seven ounces in weight; but the part of the barrel that you are taking this off is the part near the muzzle, which is the lightest part; so that, as a matter of fact, the amount saved in weight by shortening the barrel is just six ounces, or three-eighths of the total lightening, which, apparently, is all set down to the shortened barrel. As a matter of fact, the greater I portion of the lightening of the rifle has been attained in a totally different way. The stock has been lightened by boring away the wood, the dust-cover has been done away with, and, as I understand, the rifle barrel itself has been pared down. Whether that is a very wise tiling to do I do not quite know. My point is that you have no right to claim that the lightening of the rifle is due to shortening the barrel, because that only accounts for six ounces out of one and a quarter pounds which the rifle has been lightened.
  Then it is said that this rifle makes an extraordinarily good weapon for snap-shooting, because it is short. In the first place, I would point out that when you
  1028
  come to snap-shooting for military purposes it means that you are shooting at, say, between 200 and 800 yards, and then you would find nobody standing up and shooting from their shoulder. They would all be taking the best cover they could possibly get, and in that way obtaining a rest for their weapon. I think you will all agree with me that the handiness of a weapon for snap-shooting does not depend on its length. It depends on its balance, and, whether it is a gun or a rifle, the handiness of it for snap-shooting does not depend primarily on the length, but on the general way in which it comes up and the general balance of it. I think any of you who will take up this rifle will say that it is not exactly what you would call a very well-balanced rifle. I think you will find, as those gentlemen who took it down on the 11th of this month to Bisley found, that there is considerably too much weight forward to make it in any sense a particularly well-balanced, handy weapon. The mere fact of shortness certainly does not make it better for snap-shooting, especially when you consider the form of the foresight, which is about as little adapted for the purposes of snap-shooting as the sight of any weapon could be.
  This brings me to the question of the sights. I have said that the backsight is a very good sight, but, my Lords, I look upon the foresight as being an extraordinarily bad sight. In the first place, you have arrived at a sort of crescent-shaped excrescence, which is there no doubt for the purpose of protecting the foresight. It certainly protects it from injury from outside, but also most successfully protects the foresight from the light falling upon it, and I defy any man in a bad or failing light to make good shooting with it; and when you come to the question of hurried shooting you would find a man apt enough to take one of these horns and use that as the foresight instead of the real foresight, which lies between the two. Again, you cannot get over the unanswerable criticism that by the reduction of the length of your barrel you bring your foresight and your backsight so close together that you infinitely increase the difficulty of shooting. You cannot bring back the backsight nearer the eye, because

  1029
  you would then get a blurred backsight. It is well known that the longer the radius you can get between the backsight and the foresight the more you reduce the variation of error caused by the unsteadiness of the man or the fault of his aim. For these reasons I cannot see that there is much to be said for the short rifle from the point of view of the man who has to aim with it.
  Again, there have been certain changes made in the rifling of the rifle in order to maintain the old velocity. There are two small changes. In the first place, the lead from the chamber into the grooving has been shortened. The result of that is naturally to cause the bullet to go with less ease into the grooves and so set up a greater expansion of gas behind it. I am certain that the result will be a greater amount of erosion in the first part of the barrel, and you will have more and quicker damage done to the rifling at the breech end of the rifle than you have at present. In the last fourteen inches of the barrel the rifling has been deepened from ·005 inch to ·0065 inch. I do not want to go into the question of what effect that may have on the ballistic qualities of the rifle. I think it will make it much more difficult to clean the rifle. Already it is difficult enough to clean one of these small bore rifles in which the new explosives are fired, and I think by deepening the groove towards the muzzle you will experience great difficulty in thoroughly cleaning the groove. A rifle should be always cleaned from the breech, and therefore whatever you push through the early part of the rifle from the breech will be very apt not to reach the bottom of the groove towards the muzzle, and you will find that that will have its effect also.
  Now I come to the ballistic qualities of this new barrel. There is no necessity for me to argue about it or to bring forward any proofs, because I have all the proof I want from what is said by those who are responsible for the rifle. All that is claimed for the rifle is that it has ballistic qualities equal to those of the rifle which it is replacing; that is to say, while the muzzle velocity in the Lee-Enfield barrel amounted to 2,000 foot-seconds, that
  1030
  same muzzle velocity is retained in this new rifle. It seems to me that that alone is sufficient condemnation for the adoption of the new rifle for the whole of the Army. Why should we stick to results which were attained fourteen years ago? Rifles in other countries are attaining velocities up to 2,800 foot-seconds. The last German result was 2,845 foot-seconds with a bullet of 156 grains. It is well known both in Germany and France that these great velocities have experimentally been obtained, and I say that before we adopt a new rifle for the whole of our Army we ought to go into full experiments to see whether we, too, cannot get these high velocities.
  I put the ballistic qualities of a perfect rifle for military purposes under four heads—(1) a low trajectory; (2) a long range; (3) force of impact; and (4) accuracy; and the reason why I put accuracy last is that any well-made rifle barrel will give you quite sufficient accuracy, and indeed more accuracy than any but very expert shots can get the benefit of. With regard to trajectory, every hundred yards that you can bring within the fixed sight distance increases the effective power of your troops, and makes it easier for your soldiers to shoot properly and straight. I gave the noble Earl last year some trajectory tables which bear out that now, certainly up to 600 yards, you do not get above the, level of the head of a man with the last new weapon, the last new explosive, and the last new bullet. That is a tremendous advance. That is the sort of thing we should aim at. Then I say extreme range is of the greatest importance. I know that at extreme range you cannot hope for accurate shooting. There is no question of firing at individual men or even at individual bodies of men. An army armed with a rifle that carries 300 or 400 yards further than that of its opponents would have a tremendous advantage. I will tell you why. It would have an advantage because it would be able to plant an enormous number of bullets into a particular area, the result being that it would by that means force the enemy to deploy very much sooner than he otherwise would. I think it is perfectly evident that the sooner you can force

  1031
  your enemy to deploy, the better it is for defence.
  I know it is said that in this; country it does not matter so much about our having these long-range weapons, because if we are attacked here we shall be attacked in a country which is full of small enclosures and in which, hedges abound. I believe it is just as important for us to have the long-range weapons as it is for anyone, because, after all, supposing that we are attacked we shall have to take up prepared defensive positions; all the obstacles will have to be cleared away in front of those prepared defensive positions, and therefore exactly the same conditions will obtain as in a more open country. It is evident from our experience in all our distant small wars that the longer range we can get the better it will be. I want to know something about these trials of which we have heard so much. Lately a report was put in from Hythe which gave the figure of merit obtained by the new rifle in competition with French, German, and Italian rifles and with the old long rifle. I want to know more details about how those trials were conducted. I want to know whether they were conducted with rifles fired from fixed rests; what sights the rifles were provided with; whether the new British sights were fixed to all the rifles, so that they were all fired under similar conditions, or whether each had the sight belonging to its own pattern; and, lastly, whether any trial was made with what I may call an improved long rifle, because that, I think, is also very important.
  If the trials were made from fixed rests I think they lose very much of their value, because in the case of rifles fired in that way the effect of the short distance between the backsight and foresight is greatly diminished. Again, for a practical military weapon you should have the trial from the shoulders of the man firing it. What you want is to see how the rifle is going to behave in the hands of an expert man. Rifles are very strange instruments, and they have little idiosyncrasies of their own, and those of us who have shot with a rifle well know how much one's shooting varies according to the rifle one is using. Therefore, I say that a trial from a fixed rest is not a sufficient trial. What you
  1032
  want is to try a rifle from the shoulders of the man, and under conditions such as would prevail in the field. That brings me to the trial which was reported in The Times newspaper on Monday. It seems to me to have been an extremely satisfactorily conducted trial by seven men, who would be admitted to be capable and expert shots. They used three of the new short rifles, they each used their own long rifles, and they used three of the old long rifles fitted with the Peddie wind-gauge sight. The result of these trials was that the long barrel fitted with the wind-gauge sight came out first; the long barrel as used without the above came out second, and the new short rifle came out third, and that was at ranges of 200, 600, and 800 yards. I should like to read your Lordships the heads of the conclusions arrived at by these gentlemen after the trial. They were as follows—

  1. "That the new rifle is badly balanced, the-weight being too much at the muzzle end.

  2. That far from being likely to prove a better snap-shooting arm, it would be easier to fire quickly with the long rifle at any given object because the sights of the short rifle are not adapted to quick-firing, the front sight being too small and greatly interfered with by the enormous protecting flanges on each side

  3. "That the recoil was considerably heavier than in the long-barrelled rifle, and would greatly add to the difficulties in teaching recruits on the range and render it more tiring.

  4. "That the accuracy of the rifle as a weapon of precision is appreciably diminished, for all experienced the same difficulty in keeping the series of shots within the small limits of angle obtainable with both the long-barrelled rifles employed.

  5. "The trials lasted nearly all day, and as evening approached (but before sundown) all noticed the great flash of flame from the short barrel, whereas with the long rifle no flash could be seen."

  I do not know whether that last conclusion was justified or not, and I am not going to found any very strong argument upon it. What I hold is, if it is true, that the fact of the flash in a bad light is certainly not advantageous to the man firing the rifle. It shows where he is. But there is this stronger point, that if there is a flash of that sort it shows there is a large amount of unconsumed gas being wasted, and, therefore, you are not getting the full benefit of the charge you are using, which seems to me a very strong argument against this particular

  1033
  rifle allow these conclusions to speak for themselves.
  Then there comes this further point that by cutting your rifle short you deteriorate your weapon when the bayonet is fixed. You lose five inches in length for the short rifle with the bayonet fixed to it is five or six inches shorter than that of any other rifle used by a military Power. I know it will be said that that is very easily got over. All you have to do is to lengthen the bayonet. I hope that is not a plan that will be adopted for dealing with this particular difficulty. In the first place, you will probably find yourselves again brought face to face with twisting and doubled up bayonets, and next you will find a great deal of deterioration in the shooting power of your weapons, because you cannot get over this fact, that directly you fix a bayonet on a rifle pro tanto a change is made in its shooting power and the conditions are altered, and the longer the bayonet the greater the variation.
  Now I come to the question of cost. This is going to be a most expensive amusement for our country. We have been told that these new rifles are to cost in Government factories £3 10s. and in private factories £4 10s. These are high prices for rifles, and surely they are high prices for a rifle which is not a new rifle, but an old one with a new barrel attached to it. We were told last year that the reason of this high price was that the manufacture of a new rifle involved a quantity of new machinery and apparatus. So far as the barrel is concerned, no doubt a certain amount of new apparatus is required, but with regard to the main part of the rifle, to three-fourths of the rifle, there is no new machinery required, because it is exactly the same weapon, manufactured under exactly the same conditions and to exactly the same pattern. It is said that it costs £2 5s. to convert a rifle, and that the total cost of re-arming His Majesty's Forces with this new weapon will be something like £3000,000. For this, as I say, you are not going to get new weapon; you are not going to get a weapon that is even going to fulfil the objects for which it is adopted, because I do not believe it will be any more convenient for the cavalry to carry
  1034
  than the old one. If you are to arm the cavalry with this new short rifle instead of with the carbine, I, for my own part, do not, raise any objection; but, because you are going to give the cavalry a better weapon, that is no reason why you should force the rest of His Majesty's Forces to have a weapon which I do not think is quite so good as, and which, at any rate, is not better than, the one they have got. I do hope your Lordships will support me in the Motion I have made. All I want you to do is to express an opinion which will check the issue of these rifles to our infantry and our Navy. A great many of them have been made. I admit that the position of the cavalry with this, rifle will be much better than with the old carbine. Let them have it. But it is unnecessary and inexpedient to throw a heavy charge on the nation to rearm His Majesty's Forces with a weapon which at the best, is no better than the one they now have. I beg to move the Motion standing in my name.
  Moved, That, in the opinion of this House, whatever convenience a shortened rifle may afford to mounted troops, it is inexpedient that the whole of His Majesty's Forces should be armed with the recently-approved short rifle.—(Lord Tweedmouth.)
  EARL ROBERTS: My Lords, I was under the impression when I came to this House that the question at, issue was whether the long or the short rifle was the most suitable for our Army. I did not know that the question was to be raised as to how that rifle was to be carried. As the noble Lord has mentioned that matter and has referred to me, I can on that point satisfy him that I am absolutely with him as to the necessity of the rifle being carried on the man's back, or, at any rate, attached to the man in some way or another. When I spoke last year I had tried in vain to get some arrangement by which the rifle could be attached to the man. Experiments had been tried over and over again at Aldershot, and one after another had condemned what I think the noble Lord calls the Patterson equipment. That, I believe, was due to some fault of the clip. But so anxious am I still

  1035
  that some arrangement should be found by which the rifle may be carried attached to the man in some way or another that I have been in communication with Lord Kitchener on the subject; and he tells me that, although the attachment is not absolutely satisfactory, he is convinced that it is the right way in which the rifle should be carried.
  I did at that time relate to your Lordships why I first became convinced that the man must have his rifle attached to him. It was in Afghanistan, where I found that when a horse was killed or fell and the man was therefore dismounted he was separated from the only weapon he could use on foot. I myself directed that a sling should be attached by which the carbine—which he had in those days;—should be carried at a man"s back. I am certain we must have some attachment by which the rifle can be carried, not in a bucket on the horse, but by the man. When the man is on horseback he uses his sword and when dismounted he uses his rifle, and it is essential he should have that rifle with him, or he will be without means of defence. I will give a short account of how and why the shortened rifle came into existence. The origin was not, as the noble Lord thinks, in South Africa. Poor South Africa answers for many shortcomings, but the short rifle was thought of many years before the war was contemplated.
  I am sure that all soldiers, and everyone interested in the efficiency of our Army, must be grateful to the noble Lord for bringing prominently to notice a matter on which that efficiency so materially depends. No one, if I may say so, has a better right than the noble Lord to initiate a discussion on this important subject, for not only is he himself an expert rifle shot, but he has on more than one occasion shown considerable knowledge of rifle manufacture. It was as Mr. Marjoribanks in the House of Commons that the noble Lord in 1890 brought forward a Motion criticising the proposed change from the Martini-Henry to the Lee-Enfield rifle. The noble Lord then based his objection to the new rifle on its cost, the smallness of its bore, its system of rifling for the peculiar kind of ammunition it had been decided should be used for it, its system of breech
  1036
  action, and its complexity and method of working. As a matter of fact, my Lords, the rifle in which the noble Lord found so many faults proved in practice to be a most admirable weapon, and when writing from South Africa in 1900 to the Marquess of Lansdowne, then Secretary of State for War, I expressed the following opinions with regard to its utility—
  "There is no need, 1 think, to be anxious as to the Lee-Metford rifle; our men arc quite satisfied with it, and the Boers show their appreciation of it by using it instead of their own Mauser whenever they get the chance. It can. however, I believe, be improved upon without in any way impairing its shooting power, by shortening, lightening, and adding a clip. The Lee-Metford has stood the test of war in a marvellous manner. It has been in the hands of Irregular troops who, in many instances, have not taken proper care of it, and yet, in no instance that I have heard of, has there been any complaint as to jamming, miss-fire, or inaccurate shooting."
  Nothing, my Lord", could, I think, be more gratifying or more encouraging to the members of the Small Arms Committee than to find that their labours had not been in vain, and that the rifle, on the construction of which they had devoted so much time and care, had proved eminently satisfactory on service.
  I trust that the noble Lord will excuse me if I express a hope that the objections he now raises to the shortened rifle may prove as groundless as those he pronounced against the introduction of the Lee - Metford rifle fifteen years ago. That rifle, indeed, underwent the same troubled course as the shortened rifle is now going through, and it was several years before any decision was arrived at as to whether the Martini-Henry rifle should be superseded. Several more years were then spent in perfecting the rifle. It underwent trial after trial to make certain that it was in all respects suitable for military purposes. Shortcomings were discovered and remedied, but finally an Army Order was issued doing away with the Martini-Henry rifle and adopting the Lee-Metford in its place. Then, my Lords, came the attack in another place to which I have just alluded.
  If I shall not be trespassing too long on your Lordships" patience I will explain to you as shortly as I am able how and why the shortened rifle has

  1037
  come into existence. The Lee-Metlord rifle was introduced in 1889. Six years afterwards the Chief Inspector of the Small Arms Factory proposed that a new pattern carbine with bayonet should be prepared to supersede the long rifle, on the grounds that, as the carbine then in the service fired the same ammunition as the rifle, was equal in accuracy, superior in handiness and portability, it would be a better arm than the rifle. The Army Board considered the proposal and refused it on the ground that the length of the barrel was insufficient to ensure the entire combustion of the charge.
  In 1898 the question was revived" and the then Commander-in-Chief (Lord Wolseley) stated that he was not prepared to entertain any proposition for shortening the rifle, although he would like to see it lightened. It was decided to try if this could be done, and the following arms were prepared: (a) Service long rifle reduced in weight from 9 lbs., viz., to 8 lbs. 5½ ozs.; (b) ditto reduced in weight to 8 lbs. 6 ozs.; (c) a short rifle, reduced in weight to 7 Ibs. 12½ ozs. and with the barrel shortened by 6¼ inches; (d) a short rifle the same length as the carbine, weight 8 Ibs. 7 ozs. These four rifles were submitted to a Committee, constituted as follows—viz.: President, Colonel Ian Hamilton; members, Col. The Hon. F. Stopford, and Col. W. N. Lockyer; Secretary, Captain Lloyd. This Committee was formed to consider and report upon the question as to the best practicable method of modifying the design of the present service magazine rifle so as to produce a lighter weapon.
  Of these four anus the Committee chose (c), namely, a short rifle reduced in weight to 71bs. 12ozs. and with the barrel shortened by 6¼ inches, and asked for another similar to this one, but still further lightened, for trial. Twelve of each pattern were ordered, but the outbreak of the South African War prevented the matter being further investigated, and nothing was done until the receipt of the following telegram from me, dated Pretoria, October 10th, 1900, to the Secretary of State for War—
  "As a large number of rifles will have to be made, I would suggest that they should be of the pattern recommended by the Committee of
  1038
  which Colonel Ian Hamilton was president, as I understand this pattern rifle is about to be adopted for the Native Army in India. The new rifle must certainly be loaded on the clip system, and the only question is whether the calibre might not be advantageously still further reduced."
  A new Small Arms Committee had, in the meantime, been formed, and had taken up the question of improving the long service rifle. In their Report, dated July, 1900, they raised the question, amongst others, whether in preparing a new pattern of rifle it should have a shorter barrel and longer bayonet in order to be suitable for all services. A decision on this Report was postponed for my return from South Africa, and the Committee continued experiments with a lighter form of long rifle with charger equipment and new sights.
  This rifle, together with one five inches shorter, was submitted by the Committee to the Director - General of Ordnance, who, in forwarding it on to the Adjutant-General on January 8th. 1901, minuted as follows—
  "Experiments at Hythe with the barrel shortened six inches have shown that the shortened rifle shoots equally well up to 1,000 yards. Lord Roberts telegraphed from South Africa that future rifles should be with shortened barrels. At the same time there was a general feeling among the cavalry in South Africa that they were handicapped by having the carbine, which has a barrel nine inches shorter than the service rifle, and the Inspector-General of Cavalry asked for a longer carbine. It is hoped that the rifle now submitted will meet the requirements of both cavalry and infantry, and thus enable them both in future to be armed with the same weapon. Longer and shorter bayonets were also submitted."
  The Adjutant-General chose the short rifle and short bayonet, and I concurred in the choice on January 10th. 1901. One thousand of the shortened rifles, as well as long and short bayonets, were then ordered for trial.
  This, my Lords, is the story of the shortened rifle up to the time it came to be selected as the one likely to prove most suitable for universal use in the Army, provided that its efficiency in all respects passed the proof of exhaustive trials. These trials were carried out during 1901, under the following instructions—
  All trials are to be carried out in comparison with service rifles. Volley firing will not be

  1039
  used. Every firer will be allotted a service rifle and a shortened rifle. Every practice will be executed first with the shortened rifle and at once afterwards with the service rifle (or vice versa), in order to secure similar conditions of light, wind, and atmosphere. Firers should not be changed during the trials unless unavoidable. The sub-heads of report are to be adhered to and numerical order kept. All firing trials will be reported on in such detail as may be necessary, but deductions from these trials should be embodied under the various sub-heads which apply to them. The sub-heads should be carefully studied, in order that all points to be reported on may be observed during each trial."
  "Although the magazine of the shortened rifle will hold ten cartridges, only five will be loaded into it at one time, except as directed in trial No. 8 (c).
  "Firers must be trained in charger loading with dummy cartridges before carrying out trials in rapid fire. The shortened rifle will be loaded by charger in all trials.
  "Rapid practice will not be carried out until all deliberate trials have been completed.
  "Reports to be on foolscap, typewritten if possible, and on one side of the paper only.
  "As many sighting shots as are needed should be allowed in trials where they may be required.

  TABLE OF FIRING TRIALS.
  "1. Deliberate fireat 200, 500, and 800 yards at regulation targets. Position—any. Seven shots per rifle at each distance. Results to be recorded as in annual course of musketry. Registers to be kept and retained for reference.
  "2. Snap-shooting practice under the same conditions as practice 10, Provisional Course of Musketry, Table B, 1902. Seven shots per rifle.
  "3. Vanishing practice under the same conditions as practice 9, Provisional Course of Musketry, Table B, 1902. Seven shots per rifle.
  "4. Moving practice under the same conditions as practice 14, Provisional Course of Musketry, Table B, 1902. Eight shots per rifle.
  "Trials 2, 3, and 4 to be carried out twice; each trial on a different day. Results to be shown as averages. Registers to be kept and retained for reference.
  "5. Fire at objects large and small, coloured to harmonise with background at varying distances up to extreme range obtainable locally, in bright and dull light, and in falling evening light. This trial is intended especially to afford comparison between the bead and the Service Barleycorn foresight, and to test hood sight protector. Results to be shown in any convenient form.
  "6. When range is obtainable, fire at about 2,000 yards at a prepared area of ground, either of close cut rolled turf, or sand, or at a large canvas screen laid horizontally, the area not to be less than fifty yards by fifty yards. A target for aiming purposes should be placed on
  1040
  the prepared area of ground or screen. Fifteen rounds per rifle. Results to be shown as percentages of hits to rounds fired. Dial sights to be used. Registers to be kept and retained for reference. Arrangements to be made locally.

  RAPID FIRE.
  7. Trial with fixed bayonet to test the method of bayonet attachment and the result on shooting. 2nd Class target at 200 yards. Thirty rounds rapid fire. Five selected firers. Applicable to shortened rifle only.
  "8. (a) Rapid fire for one and a half minutes at a 2nd Class target at 200 yards. (b) Rapid fire for three minutes at a 1st Class target at 600 yards, (c) Repeat (d), commencing with a full magazine in the shortened rifle and recharging it with ten cartridges.
  "Results shown as averages. Registers to be kept and retained for reference.
  "In these trials note especially if the hood interferes with rapid alignments of sights, especially when D sight is raised at 600 yards."
  In order, my Lords, to satisfy you that both in the construction of the shortened rifle and in the manner in which the trials were carried on the officers concerned were in no way trammelled by orders from the War Office, I must ask your leave to read extracts from a letter I received a day or two ago from the officer who was Commandant at Hythe and a member of the Small Arms Committee for the greater part of the time these duties were being carried out. Colonel Pennington writes—
  "The correspondence (The Times February 3rd) pictures the Committee as a body oppressed by instructions from the War Office which injuriously limited their field of action and tied them to a narrow issue. This is incorrect and misleading. During my first six months I was in doubt on certain points, and thought it my business to express my views to General Brackenbury. General Brackenbury entirely convinced me that we were dead on the right lines. Trials later on fully confirmed this. The Committee was in no way unreasonably tied down or limited. It was asked to deal with the whole question in the only manner which was practicably possible—The Committee would most certainly have condemned the short barrel had it not given complete satisfaction, and had they not considered it an improvement on the long barrel. The War Office is accused of conducting trials with a view to suit a foregone conclusion. This is almost too foolish to reply to. All trials were suggested by me personally and were amplified by suggestions made by the Committee, who, being nervous about the short barrel, suggested the widest possible trial. The scheme for trials was then accepted by the War Office not directed. My sole idea in framing the Hythe and Army trials was to leave nothing undone to discover defects. The Hythe Staff, as a body, commenced

  1041
  trials with a bias in favour of the long barrel. I believe no trials could be more thorough, more truly comparative, or more practical. The Committee could not have, taken up the question of a new type of rifle. It was urgent to deal with the defects in our rifle which the war had brought to light, the chief one being absence of charger loading. The short barrel came up in the connection and was eventually accepted on its merits."
  During these trials certain shortcomings were observed in the shortened rifle, and in December twelve more rifles, modified accordingly, were tested at Hythe in comparison with twelve Lee-Metford rifles. The Commandant at Hythe reports that these trials were conducted with rigid impartiality, the short and long rifles being fired alternately, so as to ensure absolutely similar conditions. These trials proved the shortened rifle to be equal to the service rifle in accuracy.
  As a further test, my Lords, and to ascertain the opinion of infantry soldiers, it was decided to issue 1,000. shortened rifles to the Army at home for trial, and on March 17th, 1902, a programme for these trials was approved. The trials were carried out at Aldershot, Dover, Portsmouth, and Curragh, Dublin, and Cork, by the various regiments stationed at those places, and by the Royal Navy, and in November of that year the Small Arms Committee reported that they did not regard any further trials as necessary, and that as a service weapon they considered the short rifle superior to the long rifle. My Lords, it was on receipt of this decided opinion, given by the War Office"s expert advisers, that I, as the Commander-in-Chief, recommended to the Secretary of State for War that the shortened rifle should be introduced into the service to replace both the Lee-Metford rifle and the carbine. In July, .1903, reports were received from Somaliland that the short rifle which had been issued for trial in that expedition had stood the test well. It was said that—
  "The men like it and shoot well with it."
  I have now explained to you, my Lords, the reasons for the proposed change, and I have enumerated the measures taken to enable us to arrive at a correct conclusion as to the fitness of the selected weapon for general use in the Army.
  Up to the time, my Lords, of the recent appearance of the correspondence in The Times dealing with deficiencies supposed to have been discovered in the new rifle, I had no idea that it had been thought to be in any degree faulty. Since the appearance of that correspondence, I have used every effort to discover whether there, are grounds for the objections brought forward by those who, for the most part, are experts as to the requirements of a match-shooting rifle rather than to those of a service weapon Lord Kitchener, to whom I telegraphed on the subject, replies—
  "As far as I have been able to test it, the new rifle fulfils requirements. In my opinion it is a better balanced, handier, as well as a lighter weapon, and more suitable for a man on the Indian frontier than the long rifle."
  And yesterday this further telegram was received from Lord Kitchener—
  "The 7th Division at Meerut has been practising with the new rifle since the 11th. and ail ranks speak highly of it."
  This testimony, my Lords, as far as it goes is satisfactory, but in view of the doubts raised in the minds of the public and the Army as to the value of the new weapon, and as it is essential that our soldiers should not be required to take the field armed with a rifle in which they do not entirely believe; and as 1 am at least as anxious as anyone can be that they should have the best rifle that can be procured, I most earnestly hope that His Majesty"s Government will consent to such further tests as will definitely solve the doubts which now exist.
  To this end, my Lords, I would suggest that a certain number of civilians (if possible, the very same gentlemen who so patriotically went to Bisley a few days ago to ascertain whether the theoretical complaints advanced against the new rifle were well founded), should shoot against a similar number of soldiers at Hythe, each party firing with the long and short rifle alternately up to a distance of 2,000 yards, and also a certain number of rounds of snap shots at short ranges. The programme must, of course, be prepared so that the trial may be carried on as far as it is practical under service conditions, in order that the qualities claimed for a short and light rifle may be practically illustrated. This, I think,

  1043
  could not fail to enable the country to arrive at a definite conclusion as to whether the long or the short rifle is the best weapon for military purposes.
  THE EARL OF ERROLL: My Lords, I do not share the very gloomy view taken by the noble Lord who introduced the Motion now before the House. I maintain that the superior lightness and handiness of the new rifle constitute a very great improvement on the old rifle, and I venture to say that this improvement has been acquired without any loss either of range or accuracy. It is admitted that it is the best weapon for the cavalry, and I venture to think it will prove a boon to the infantry soldier on service. The idea has got abroad that it is an unserviceable and an altogether bad weapon. This opinion has been fostered by the Press.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: I beg the noble Lord"s pardon; I have never said it was a bad rifle. I wish it to be quite understood that I have never said that.
  THE EARL OF ERROLL: I beg the noble Lord"s pardon. In the very temperate speech he made he did not condemn this rifle as a bad one. What I am referring to are the comments that have been made in the Press, and which seem to point out that this rifle is a really bad weapon, and that the Government has been accused of giving a weapon to the Army which places the soldier at a great disadvantage in comparison with soldiers of other countries. I do not hold this opinion at all. It is generally taken for granted in the Press that the cutting off of five inches from the rifle must necessarily reduce the accuracy and the range, and the alteration in the groove has been altogether ignored. In judging of a military rifle there is one point which I think we should never lose sight of, and that is the great difference there is between match shooting and service conditions. For shooting at Bisley a rifle has to be carried perhaps a few hundred yards, while on service men have to carry their rifles long marches and often make an attack immediately afterwards. It by no means follows that a rifle which is a good rifle for match shooting is necessarily a good rifle on
  1044
  service. The cardinal requirements of a rifle for service are handiness and lightness, consistent, of course, with sufficient accuracy to give the soldier confidence in his weapon. Target shooting at home under comfortable conditions is very apt to make us forget this fact. We do not want a match-shooting rifle. What we want is more of a sporting rifle, and I venture to think that if anybody picked up this rifle he would much rather take it out stalking than the long rifle which the infantry have at present.
  For these reasons I attach very little importance to the trial which took place a few days ago at Bisley. If these seven match-shooters had marched twelve or fourteen miles first, and had then made an attack across a heather and crawled up to the position from which they were to shoot, I think their opinions would carry much greater weight. Another reason why I think these conditions were not quite fair was that as far as one can see these gentlemen had never practised with a short rifle before, and I think that it is only just to the rifle that it should be tried by persons who have had considerable practice with it. Men always find the drag-pull-of a difficulty at first, though it is almost universally approved of when they have become accustomed to it. I was down at Windsor yesterday, and I questioned some of my old regiment on this new rifle, and they were all warm in its praise. Last year the Blues shot a match against the Coldstream Guards, the Blues using the short rifle and the Coldstream Guards the long rifle, and the Blues won the match. It is true that there was a return match afterwards which they did not win. I have not got the figures, but I was assured that there was very little in it one way or the other. This, I think, proves anyhow that the short rifle is not an unserviceable weapon.
  Turning to the statement of those gentlemen who shot at Bisley the other day that this rifle is badly balanced, I certainly cannot agree with them. I think if you take up the two rifles and put them to your shoulder you will find that the short rifle comes up very much better than the old one. The only way for your Lordships to judge of that is to try it yourselves. I wrote to a friend of

  1045
  mine who is in charge of an infantry battalion asking his opinion about this rifle. Whilst being unable to speak as to the shooting of the rifle in his own regiment, which has not been supplied with it, he says—
  "My officers who have been recently at Hythe are warm in praise of its use and accurate shooting. I have handled it and it is a most handy and simple weapon. I fancy the wood casing will require care for fear of damage by falls, and the backsight must also be put down or it will break off. It is extremely light, and I am in favour of it. I do not think the short distance between the backsight and the foresight will affect accuracy of shooting. I have one beside me now and I do not think there can be a better weapon."
  This is the expression of opinion of an officer who is at present in command of a battalion. He is a good sportsman, and has seen service in all parts of the world. With regard to snap-shooting, I rather agree with the noble Lord that the sights are a little difficult, but I think that could very easily be remedied. I notice that the noble Lord said nothing about the recoil. I think he admitted last year that the recoil was so small as to be absolutely no detriment to the rifle at all. As to the flash, I have no experience of that. I think the noble Earl the Under-Secretary of State for War will be able to explain it. There was something said in The Times the other day about Colonel Hutton, who had been on the Small Arms Committee, shooting with a long rifle. I have seen that rifle. It is very long and heavy, and I do not think that those gentlemen, if they had made the march that I have suggested, would have approved of it from its weight. Besides, it is in no sense a military weapon, because it has no sights on it at all. I venture to think the opinion of military experts, backed up by the trials which the noble and gallant Earl the late commander-in-Chief has told us of, and further confirmed by the experience of the rifle in Somaliland, should carry greater weight than the opinions of this self-constituted and irresponsible body of gentlemen who went down to Bisley and in one afternoon solved the whole problem, which, I think, we will all allow is very difficult and very complex.
  THE EARL OF LONSDALE: My Lords, we have heard many descriptions
  1046
  of the new rifle, and everybody seems to agree that it is a good one; but I understand that it is not a question whether the rifle is a good one, but whether it is a serviceable one, and I think it would be of very great benefit to the country if we knew to what extent the Government or the War Office are responsible for the new arm. I am sure no body of men are more anxious to benefit the country than the experts at the War Office. It may be the case that they have only under order enough rifles to supply the cavalry. If that be so, that is almost an answer to the noble Lord who moved the Motion now before the House, for surely it would be simple enough, if that be the case, to let the cavalry try the rifle and postpone the issue of the rifles to the infantry till a later date.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: My Lords, even had there been no debates raised on this subject last year by the noble Lord opposite, I should not have been surprised at a debate such as we have had this afternoon being raised at any time. All re-armaments bring into public notice with considerable prominence the views of two schools of thought. There is, first of all, the school of thought which I would venture to call the Army school—military opinion, which has its views as to what sort of weapon is required for the Army. Then there is the second school, the school which regards a weapon chiefly from a sporting point of view, from the point of view with which, I think, rather naturally, it would be regarded by the majority of your Lordships. This particular school has another wing attached to it consisting of those whom I should respectfully call target experts. Whenever rearmament has been proposed we have invariably seen a considerable contest between these two schools of thought. I was reading the other day a debate which took place in your Lordships" House on March 1st, 1867. It was initiated by the noble Marquess whom I see opposite. Lord Ripon. He asked certain questions with reference to what was then the new rifle—the Schneider—and the Under-Secretary quoted in his answer the military opinion which at the time was supplied to him by the then

  1047
  Commander at Aldershot, Sir James Scarlett. Sir James Scarlett said—
  "I consider the present pattern an admirable weapon and perfectly efficient when well made and well handled."
  That is the same sort of answer that we have to give to-day, and it satisfies the critics no more than Sir James Scarlett's opinion did then, for I find that Lord Dalhousie, who followed, expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the rifle. I cannot help saying, by-the-by, that Sir James Scarlett was evidently a strong-minded soldier, who was not afraid of saying what he thought, for in the latter part of the extract quoted he said—
  "My only regret is that the correspondents who furnish information on military matters to the Press do not first make themselves acquainted with the subjects on which they write."
  In 1871 there was a similar discussion with reference to the Martini-Henri, which was then being introduced, and in 1891, when the Lee - Metford was brought forward, the same critics who are now so strongly criticising the new rifle expended considerable energy in criticising the Lee-Metford. The noble Lord opposite, Lord Tweedmouth—I daresay he remembers it—initiated a debate in the House of Commons which has already been referred to by the noble and gallant Field - Marshal, and he attacked the Lee-Metford up hill and down dale, if I may put it so, and expressed his love for the Mauser rifle, a love we know he strongly feels. He informed the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Stanhope, that he could obtain these for £3, and I think he even went so far as to recommend that we should adopt these rifles, and your Lordships will probably remember that last year the noble Lord mentioned Mausers again, and quoted the price at from £2 16s. to £2 18s.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: That was consistent.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: Yes, an excellent example of the growth of the evil of "dumping" into this country. Mr. Stanhope, in reply, quoted the Adjutant-General of the day, who stated that the Mark II. weapon was
  1048
  a thoroughly satisfactory one in every way, but the noble Lord was still not satisfied, and he raised the subject again in the following year. And now, my Lords, we have the same controversy. Why do these two schools always differ? I claim that their views are divergent because their needs are divergent. They regard the rifle from an entirely different point of view. What, my Lords, are the needs of the sportsman? A sportsman needs a rifle of supreme accuracy; an ordinarily accurate rifle does not suit him. It is not only necessary to hit your beast but you have to hit him in the right place. Weight does not matter to the sportsman very much. An extra pound more or less is immaterial, because he does not carry his rifle; he employs a man to carry it for him.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: That does not apply to me.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: Then I congratulate the noble Lord. He is a very exceptional Scotsman. It does not matter a bit to the sportsman whether or not the rifle is complicated. There is a comfortable gun room upon the hill, with all modern appliances for cleaning the weapon and carrying out all repairs that it may require. What, my Lords, are the needs of the target expert. It is again of primary importance to him that he should have an accurate weapon. A few inches in accuracy at a thousand yards may make all the difference between success and failure. A few extra pounds in weight one way or the other do not matter to him. He has only a few yards to walk to the firing point. It does not matter if the mechanism is complicated; he has the most skilful gunmakers in the world always at hand ready to carry out small repairs, which, of course, are far more frequent in a complicated weapon than in a simple one. It does not matter to him if the weapon is delicate, for he does not go out shooting in boisterous weather.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: Oh!
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: Well, does he?
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: Yes.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: Ah, Yes; but under an umbrella. How different his needs are from the needs of the soldier on active service. It is quite true that the soldier needs an accurate rifle. In this possibly I go further than the noble Lord, but I am ,quite prepared to take his admission that as long as it is a good accurate rifle it is good enough for the soldier. But, my Lords, he has other needs quite as great as the need for accuracy. First of all, there is the question of weight. I maintain that to the soldier a single pound is of cardinal importance. He has to carry his rifle for long marches, sometimes for forced marches, in all temperatures, in all climates, in Canada, in India, and in the Far East, and he has to carry at the same time a great many other things. I claim, therefore, that it is of cardinal importance that you should consider the weight of a rifle when selecting one for the soldier.
  Again, my Lords, a delicate rifle is of no use to the soldier. The Army needs a strong rifle that will stand knocking about from its master, who is, after all, rather a robust practitioner, not over skilful in mechanical niceties. He needs a handy weapon for snap-shooting, for shooting et moving objects, for a mêlée, for hand to hand conflicts such as you do not meet with upon the plains of Bisley. Therefore, I claim that there are cardinal necessities which must be considered in selecting a rifle for the Army that never come into the heads of Your sportsmen or your target experts, but which must be given full value by your Lordships in deciding such a matter as this. I might mention in passing that our late foes in South Africa, I am told, found the long rifle not quite so handy as they liked, for I believe many rifles which we had lost and which they had taken into use were found lying about, subsequently, and that almost invariably a great deal of the wood under the barrel had been cut away in order to increase the handiness of the rifle. I only mention this in passing as a testimony from those whom we are always having quoted to us as great rifle experts.
  I maintain, my Lords, that the only true test--and in this one can welcome the support of the noble and gallant
  1050
  Field-Marshal-of the rifle for the Army is one made under service conditions. We have had such conditions in Somaliland, and the fact that there is a practically unanimous voice in favour of this rifle and against the old rifle surely should be allowed to have considerable weight in this matter with your Lordships. The noble and gallant Field-Marshal has made it perfectly clear that the attack which has been made upon us of adopting this rifle for the cavalry and subordinating the interests of the infantry is an unfounded one. He has also made it perfectly clear that there was no doubt in the minds of the military authorities in 1901 when this rite was recommended for adoption, and I think it right to inform your Lordships that there is a similar absolute absence of doubt in the minds of our military advisers at the present moment. There is no hesitation in the mouths of my colleagues on the Army Council in saying that this is the rifle that they want for the Army.
  Now, my Lords, I come to some of the detailed criticisms which have been put forward by the noble Lord opposite, and I will do my best to follow such an expert as he is into the very minute details into which he has entered. I would only like to say one thing with reference to the policy of foreign nations. The noble Lord states that no one has adopted our rifle. That is true, but a foreign nation that has re-armed since we commenced re-arming has adopted, not only a short rifle, but a rifle shorter than our short rifle, I mean the Swiss. I admit that the Swiss have not a large army, but they are a nation of marksmen, and have always been held before us as such, and are we not permitted to say that this is perhaps a sign on the other side as to the way things may trend? There is also the United States. In 1898 the United States adopted a short rifle. It is quite true they have stopped the issue, but, if you read the extracts from the American newspapers, you will find that they have stopped the issue not because they are dissatisfied with their rifle, but because they are dissatisfied with their bayonet. As far as we know-of course we have no official reports; but as far as the American newspapers tell us-the United

  1051
  States have stopped issuing their short rifle because they are dissatisfied with their particular bayonet.
  Now, my Lords, the noble Lord, in the first sentence of his speech, spoke with considerable feeling, complaining that none of the improvements suggested had been adopted by the War Office. He did not use the word " pig-headed," but I think he considers us pig-headed because we have not adopted some of his improvements. But three minutes afterwards the noble Lord congratulated us on having adopted charger-loading, of which he has been an advocate for years past. Adopting his advocacy of charger-loading is a very bad way of refusing ever to adopt any improvements that are suggested to you. We are often told that second thoughts are best, and in this matter I prefer the noble Lord's second thought.
  Now with regard to the accuracy of this short rifle. The noble Lord asked about the trials. I was not present at the trials and I find a difficulty in answering all his minute questions. My impression is-I think I am informing the noble Lord rightly-that those trials were carried out not from a fixed rest-if I understand properly what a fixed rest is. I think they were carried out from the shoulder but on a tripod.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: With a rest.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: But they were not in a vice. But, my Lords, I would like to say one word with reference to the results of some further trials which were placed in my hands yesterday, and which I think will prove very satisfactory to your Lordships. I would make one remark with reference to this return, and that is that the comparison in it between the short rifle and the foreign rifle is a fair one because it is a trial of one rifle. We have great difficulties in carrying out trials with foreign rifles owing to the difficulty of getting ammunition. The comparison between the long rifle and the short rifle is not a fair one. The short rifle trial is a trial of one rifle, but the long rifle trial is the ordinary trial of twelve rifles. Therefore I do not think that that comparision is a fair one.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: Had the long rifle the new sights?
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I think not, but I shall be able to say something about that presently in another connection. I have here the results of a number of trials-some nineteen or twenty in all-which have recently been carried out in connection with experiments upon a different point, and therefore I may perhaps claim that they are less open to suspicion upon this point. They had been carried out with a number of different bullets with which we had been experimenting. They were all new rifles, very carefully selected, six of each sort-six against six. Of course, in the figures that I will quote to your Lordships, the same bullet and the same ammunition will have been used in each rifle where one is set up against the other. They were 20 shot diagrams at 600 yards. With the present bullet the long rifle gives a figure of merit of 93⅓ in. and the short rifle 7⅓ in., or 2 in. in favour of the short rifle; second trial, 9⅗ in. long rifle, 8 in. short rifle, a difference of 1⅗ in.; third trial, 81¾ in. long rifle, 8⅔ in. short rifle, which is practically the same, being a difference in favour of the short rifle of 1/12 in.
  LORD WENLOCK: Will the noble Earl say whether the sights were I identical?
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: Certainly not. I am quoting the old rifle against the new rifle as issued to the troops. I have seventeen or eighteen further trials with which I will not trouble your Lordships, but the total result is 8⅖ in. for the long rifle and 7⅘ in. for the short rifle, a difference of ⅗ in. in favour of the short rifle. I do not want to press that further than to say that these trials distinctly show that the short rifle is not worse than the long rifle, and that in the majority of cases it comes out better than the long rifle. Therefore it is not straining the result to say that the short rifle is not the worse of the two.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: But you cannot compare them unless you put the same sights on the rifles.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I think it is a perfectly fair comparison; it is comparing the rifle as issued to the troops, and I say that we will have a better rifle than the long rifle with which they went to South Africa. I do not want to put it further than that.
  THE EARL OF WEMYSS: May 1 ask as to the extreme range?
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I am coming to that; I was speaking only as to accuracy. Now, my Lords, I come to the recoil. I know the noble Lord opposite does not attack us on this point; he is my ally in this respect, and I am very glad of it. A great deal has been said about recoil, and I think it right that the proper figures should be mentioned. These are not War Office figures. The experiments were made by the Gun-makers Association of London. Whereas the recoil of the long rifle was 11.9 foot-pounds the short rifle was 13.4, so that the short rifle was about 1⅛ pounds more.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: You mean tons.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I think not; I copied the expression from the report. At any rate we will not discuss whether it is pounds or tons. The figures are 11.9 and 13.4. I wonder if your Lordships are aware of what is the recoil of the guns with which you yourselves go out shooting. The Gunmakers Association assure us that it is 24; therefore the short rifle with 13.4 is not a very serious thing as compared with your guns with 24, while the old Express rifle which your Lordships used before the small rifle came in was 45.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: I beg the noble Earl's pardon, but he was right and I was wrong. The recoil is pounds. I was confusing recoil with pressure. which is always given in tons.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I am glad to hear that I was correct. Now as regards the point raised in the letter which is being quoted from The Times of last Monday with regard to flash. I fully admit that flash so far as regards present ammunition. It is not a very grave defect,
  1054
  because though a flash enables you to see where your enemy is, you cannot tell how far oft he is. It is very difficult in the dark to tell how far off a flash is. However, I am glad to be able to inform your Lordships that for a long time we have been carrying out experiments with what is technically known as " M.D. cordite," which is the cordite used in big guns; we have been trying to adapt it to small arms, and our experiments are already sufficiently satisfactory to enable me to say that we have every hope of shortly being able to introduce the use of M.D. cordite into small arms. From a great number of experiments that we have carried out with the short rifle, and even with the Maxim gun, which is always a considerable offender in the matter of flash, we find that with M.D. cordite, there is no flash in the short rifle or in the Maxim; therefore this defect, I admit at once, can be easily met without altering the length or the rifle.
  Now, my Lords, as to muzzle velocity. The noble Lord stated that the muzzle velocity of the two rifles was the same. As a matter of fact the short rifle is 30 lbs. more.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: Feet, you mean.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I am sorry, but I have pounds down again.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: It is 30 foot-seconds.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: Anyhow, the figures are 2.000 and 2,030, or slightly in favour of the short rifle. Our present bullet we claim is capable of carrying a higher pressure than it does at present, but this higher pressure invariably raises complaints as to kick. But with the same bullet the trajectory is the same in the two rifles.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: I have not disputed it.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: No, the noble Lord has not disputed it, but lots of people have. If anything, that of the short rifle is a little flatter. There is one curious thing as regards muzzle velocity which I should like to mention.

  1055
  Experiments were carried out on the 21st of this month at Enfield, using a long barrel with rifling as for the short rifle, and the result was 21 foot-seconds more than the muzzle velocity of the short rifle. It is quite true that foreign rifles are getting a higher muzzle velocity, but they do it with a smaller bore, and also, I am informed, with a lighter bullet.
  Then as regards range, a question raised by my noble friend at the Table. Both our rifles were sighted to 2,800 yards, whereas few foreign rifles are over 2,200 and none over 2,400. I have all the figures here as to foreign rifles, but I do not wish to weary your Lordships with them, but it might be interesting to note that the Japanese rifle is sighted to 2,187 yards-that represents the equivalent in kilometres-and the Russian rifle to 2,096 yards. Therefore in sighting our short rifle to 800 yards farther, we are not very far behind foreign nations.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: I beg the noble Earl's pardon; the distance to which the rifle is sighted does not in the least guarantee or prove the distance the bullet will carry. We want to know how far the bullet will Larry, not the distance to which the rifle is sighted.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: But would not foreign nations sight their rifles to the distance they think necessary -as far as they want them to carry?
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: That is not the question I want answered. I want to know the absolute fact.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: We have had no experiments that I know of on that point, but if we have I should be very glad to place the results at the disposal of the noble Lord.
  THE EARL OF WEMYSS: Has the rifle been fired at 2,800 yards?
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I do not know, but again I should be very glad to ascertain. I should think it had, otherwise I do not think it would have been sighted for the distance. Now I come to the question of the sights. Before I deal with that, I may say that a paper has just been put into my hands stating
  1056
  that the rifle has been shot with good results at 2,800 yards. Now with regard to the foresight, I was wondering. whether the noble Lord would repeat his complaint of the foresight, because what did he, say in 1892? He then threw doubt upon the advisability of the foresight not being protected; he suggested to the Secretary of State in the House of Commons that it was liable to be knocked off. Now, when we have given the foresight protection and prevented it being knocked off, the noble Lord comes down upon us like a cartload of bricks and complains that we are throwing a shadow over it. I confess that in this matter I think the noble Lord is very difficult to please. Now, my Lords, I come to a more important point-the point of bayonet fighting. This is a matter which has caused considerable controversy. It is argued that this rifle being five inches shorter than the old rifle will place men at a considerable disadvantage as compared with the old rifle in a bayonet melee. Theoretically it is a very pleasant idea that the longer rifle and the longer bayonet give a man an advantage, but curiously enough our experience is all the other way. In 1888, when the short bayonet was originally adopted, very extensive trials were carried out. The method of procedure was as follows. Two of our best instructors were taken, one was given a long bayonet, and the other a short bayonet, and they were made to fight. After they had fought a certain number of times, they were made to change weapons, and fight again. The result was invariably that the short bayonet won twice out of three times. That is obviously because the shorter rifle is a more handy weapon, and that with a I short weapon you can move more quickly. There are also other points in favour of the short bayonet not in connection with the rifle, with which I will not trouble your Lordships. It is, however, a notable fact that at the present moment the Japanese rifle and bayonet together are three and a half inches shorter than the Russian rifle and bayonet, and, on the theory that the longer rifle and bayonet give you such a tremendous advantage, in almost every mêlée that has occurred during the present war the Russians ought to have killed every Japanese,

  1057
  and I hardly think that that is a sort of thing that the newspaper reports tell us has happened. The noble Lord admits that the argument against the short bayonet could be met by lengthening the bayonet, but as that matter is not now under discussion, I will not follow it further.
  Now I come to some of the minor criticisms of the noble Lord. He complains of the stock being in two parts-I hope I understand his criticism rightly-and that this will allow the screw to work loose, and that the accuracy of the rifle would thus be compromised. I would only suggest with great humility that the remedy is not to allow the screw to work loose, and to screw it up if it does work loose. Then with regard to his criticism of the bolt. He attacked the bolt twelve years ago, but it has since satisfactorily stood the strain of the Tirah campaign, of the Egyptian campaign, of the South African campaign, of the China campaign, and of Somaliland, and we see no reason to desert our old friend. The same argument applies to the noble Lord's criticism of the magazine. The noble Lord stated in 1892 that the magazine was one which was liable to break down when brought into actual service. It is, I believe, a maxim of life that you should never prophesy unless you know, and on this occasion I am afraid the noble Lord prophesied without knowing. There is also the undoubted fact that a 10-cartridge magazine does not empty so soon as a 5-cartridge magazine, and we adhere to the 10-cartridge magazine. We know that the Boers used invariably to load up their magazines after they had fired a few shots if they had an opportunity for so doing, and the same course of action is open to the British soldier. We have had no complaint that the rifle is difficult to clean.
  As regards the other small points, such as, for instance, the necessity of setting up new machinery, I am informed that a lot of new machinery has had to be set up, but I have not the details with me. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Lonsdale, it is quite true that our present contracts when completed would do little more than supply our mounted troops, for
  1058
  whom, I am sure the noble Lord opposite would agree, a short rifle is essential.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: It is better than the carbine.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: Very well, the noble Lord will not admit it. But long before these contracts are out we shall have received the result of extensive trials which are now in progress under service conditions, and I can assure your Lordship that if modifications are found to be necessary we shall not hesitate to say so and to recommend them to your Lordships. In connection with these trials I am prepared to make what perhaps I may call a sporting offer. If any of our friends the target experts would like to join in a trial I should be very glad to arrange it, and I would suggest something like the following conditions, viz., the trial to be carried out with a long rifle one day and a short rifle the next; the trial to consist of a twenty mile march in the most boisterous weather we can get, and to end with a half mile "double" over the shingle at Hythe (that is a very fair service condition); then the rifle to be shot, the number of rounds and the particular targets to be subsequently agreed on. I shall be interested to know whether after this march and this "double" those who participate in the trial still maintain that they like the long rifle better than the short, or that they prefer shooting with a long rifle to shooting with a short rifle. As a purely personal opinion, I should prefer that this offer were accepted by the seven marksmen whose trial is spoken of in the letter in The Times of last Monday.
  At present, on the reports that we have, and in the opinion of our military advisers, we have no justification for doing what the noble Lord by his Motion would have us do, namely, to stop existing contracts. The keynote of the whole matter is-and I hope your Lordships will remember it -that the best weapon for target work or sporting purposes is not necessarily the best weapon for the Army. Our military advisers had no hesitation in 1901; Somaliland has come since then, and our military advisers have no hesitation Low. Your

  1059
  Lordships have heard the telegram from Lord Kitchener which was read out by the noble and gallant Field-Marshal, and I am sure your Lordships will feel bound to give the strongest possible consideration to the words of the telegram that "the rifle is more suited for war on the Indian frontier than the long rifle." Operations have been frequent on the Indian frontier, and we are constantly being reminded that they are likely to occur there again. I earnestly hope that your Lordships will not take up the directly non possumus attitude suggested by the Motion of the noble Lord, and absolutely refuse to allow any progress to be made in the re-arming of the Army with a rifle which, after all, the Army has chosen for itself.
  THE EARL OF WEMYSS: Before my noble friend Lord Spencer addresses your Lordships I should like to say a word. The Under - Secretary of State for War said it was impossible to give a long rifle to the cavalry. Now, my Lords, why has the whole of this question arisen? We have had a very interesting discussion about sights and weights and everything else, but I would ask my noble friend whether, if it were not that at last the light has dawned on the War Office, after fighting against it for forty years, that the carbine is unsuited in the present day for cavalry, should we have ever had this new rifle? I very much doubt it. The point never arose until the question of the carbine for the cavalry being done away with came up, and that only arose because you sent our cavalry out to South Africa with a weapon absolutely useless as compared with that to which they were opposed; they were under fire for about 2,000 yards or 1,500 yards before they could return it. Their carbines would Shoot up to about 1,000 yards, while the weapons of their opponents would carry 2,500 yards, and some of them even up to 3,000 yards; therefore I am correct in saving that the cavalry were sent out with an absolutely useless weapon, and that much life was lost in consequence of their being, under fire for so long before they could return it. The result is that the carbine has been condemned and the cavalry are to be armed with a rifle; so that the question is what rifle should that
  1060
  be? My noble friend said just now that it was impossible for the cavalry to carry a long rifle. Why? Forty years ago the most perfectly mounted cavalry force ever seen—the Hampshire Mounted Horse under Colonel Bower—carried the rifle in a way which elicited from the late Commander-in-Chief these words. I may say that I last year produced photographs showing how the rifle was carried. The noble and gallant Field Marshal Earl Roberts then said—
  "I admit that the photograph shows a pleasant way of carrying a long rifle; moreover I think it is in that way it will have to be carried in peace time."
  That is to say, carried in a bucket, attached not to the man but absolutely to the horse. Carried in a way, which, instead of interfering with the man when riding, enables him to ride over fences or anywhere, without convenience, and that acts as a buck-jumping saddle and prevents his being kicked off if need be. My noble friend the late Commander-in-Chief also said—
  "It is an admirable way of carrying a rifle in peace time, but not in war."
  But what is war? He means in the face of the enemy. But when they are in face of the enemy the troops would take their rifles out of the bucket and carry them in a sling round their shoulders. There is no difficulty in that. The question, therefore, is reduced to this—whether it is a wise or necessary thing, putting aside the questions of accuracy and the improvement of the weapon, because you are going to give the rifle instead of the carbine to the cavalry, to arm the whole infantry and cavalry with a new rifle and spend at least £3,000,000 upon what I hold to be an unnecessary arm. I venture to think it would be more practical and more sensible to give the cavalry a long rifle and to carry it in the way I have suggested, than to spend £3,000,000 of money, and give every sort of abstract reason why this new rifle is better than the old rifle, when you would never have thought of having this new rifle at all had it not been for the question of substituting something for the carbine for the cavalry. I think we are indebted to my noble friend for bringing this question before the House, and on the broad issue—not on the question of sights or of weights, or

  1061
  of powder—but on the broad issue that the expenditure is unnecessary, I hope the Motion will be supported. You ought to give the cavalry a long rifle, and have it carried in a way which everybody who has seen it admits to be excellent. For years I have tried to get the authorities of the War Office to look at this method of carrying a rifle, but none of them have done so, and now they are adopting a newfangled idea by which the rifle is to be carried half on the men and half on the animal. I think the whole thing is a mistake, and therefore I shall heartily support my noble friend.
  EARL SPENCER: My Lords, I am quite aware that your Lordships are always surprised if a Member of this House rises to speak on a subject about which he is supposed to know very little. I venture, however, to address you to-night, not as a sporting shot with a rifle, not altogether as a target expert, but as one who has had at any rate some experience in this matter, and I will tell your Lordships what is that experience which justifies me in supporting the Motion of my noble friend. When President of the National Rifle Association in succession to my noble friend beside me, I was appointed by the War Office in 1867 and 1868 and served on an important Committee for nearly two years, on the subject of the new rifle for the Army. I had already had considerable experience of shooting, having been one of the first Volunteers to go to Hythe. Before going to Hythe I doubt whether I could have hit Buckingham Palace at fifty yards, so that I owed a good deal to the Hythe course of instruction. After that, I did a considerable amount of shooting with various Volunteer corps; I drilled Volunteers in rifle shooting myself, and during that time they were more successful at Wimbledon than they have ever been since. I shot in a great many matches, not with a sporting or match rifle, but with the old muzzle-loading Enfield rifle, then with the Schneider, and subsequently with other rifles, so that I can claim to have had considerable experience both of shooting personally and of teaching others to shoot. While serving on the Committee to which I have referred, I went through a long period of inquiry on the subject of these rifles; we had an enormous number of
  1062
  rifles before us, though I forget exactly how many. Two of the members of the Committee were connected with the Volunteers and rifle shooting, one besides myself being Mr. Edward Ross, whom your Lordships will doubtless remember and admire as a most distinguished shot. The other members were military men, Colonel Fletcher of the Scots Guards, who served as chairman, two other military men, and a Royal Artillery Secretary. I may say that a friend of mine who happens to live in Northamp-tonshire and I are now the only survivors of that Committee with which I worked. I quite admit that our work and recommendations on that Committee are now antiquated and out of date, for a rifle, like a ship, has a very short life and is soon over-ridden by new ideas, but I think that much information that I gained during that inquiry justifies me in criticising the action it is now proposed to take. I always feel proud of having been a member of the Committee which recommended the Martini-Henry rifle, because, although it has now been superseded for some fifteen years, it provided for the Army one of the very best arms then in existence, and for nearly twenty years that rifle was used with great success. That Committee was appointed also to consider the question of magazine rifles, but these rifles had advanced only such a very small way in 1867-8 that we practically did not go into that matter, so that I do not speak with any experience on that point. I must also admit that at that time I was strongly against the bolt system, preferring the block system. I had an experience which perhaps justified me in holding that view, because while I was carrying out an experiment for the Committee to see whether the rifles would bear the rough usage of war, one of the bolt rifles blew up on my shoulder, the whole of the bolt going by my head, and I suppose I was never nearer to sudden death than then. I believe that experiment and accident greatly influenced the Committee in recommending the block system. But I am not going to argue in favour of that system now. I am quite aware that the bolt system has been adopted, and I believe successfully, and that the dangers we felt then

  1063
  as attending its use have been overcome by practice, and that under war conditions, which is the greatest of all tests, the bolt system has not been found deficient.
  I want, my Lords, to refer to two points on which the noble Earl opposite has spoken. He seemed to throw a little doubt on the authority of men who came forward as sportsmen. But my noble friend does not urge that the experience of sportsmen completely exhausts the arguments in favour of one rifle or another. He does feel, however, and I agree, that the experience of sportsmen like himself with various rifles has an important bearing on rifle-shooting generally, whether in sport or with the Army. We often hear, too, some almost sneering remarks—I do not use the word offensively—with regard to Bisley and Wimbledon. I was closely connected with the meeting at Wimbledon, and I think that those who make such slighting references forget what those two great meetings for rifle-shooting have done for the Army and for the rifle in this country. If it had not been for the shooting at Wimbledon we should never have had so good an arm in the Army as we have had. That is a point that ought to be borne in mind.
  I am afraid the noble Earl has not had much experience of shooting. I have had rather more, for I once shot for the Queen's Prize at Wimbledon with a military rifle, so that I know very well the conditions under which shooting takes place. I do not for a moment say that those conditions would outweigh the actual service conditions in the Army, but still they are important. One of the most trying conditions in the great matches at Wimbledon and now at Bisley, is the requirement to shoot in the most violent storms. I certainly have never heard of shooting from under an umbrella. Anybody who has shot at Wimbledon would ridicule the suggestion of the noble Earl; in fact, the idea as to that being one of the conditions under which shooting is conducted is absolutely absurd.
  My Lords, we can quite admit that the noble and gallant Field Marshal has disposed of one argument which has been used in the course of the debate, namely,
  1064
  that the question of the short rifle was raised by the South African War. We will admit that. But speaking not as a sporting man—I have done very little deer-stalking myself—but as one with some experience of shooting with a military rifle in matches, I say there is nothing which makes a greater difference in rifle-shooting than the range between the backsight and the foresight. I have tried shooting with a short rifle, and it is-almost impossible to do so with great accuracy. The difference it makes is enormous, and I think that that consideration alone is of great importance. You may ridicule extreme accuracy, but I think that when you have in Your Army some of the best shots in the world you should seek to put into their hands a rifle which will enable them to make the most accurate shooting. Time aftertime, in South Africa and elsewhere, these experienced shots have done great service to the country by the marvellous accuracy of their shooting; therefore, I do not think you ought at all to minimise the importance of accuracy, and accuracy of shooting with all men, whether they are good or bad shots, is enormously affected by whether a long or a short rifle is used. The question of weight is one which need scarcely be considered when it is remembered that in this case the shortening of a long barrel to a short barrel only reduces the weight of the arm six ounces.
  I do not want to trouble your Lordships at great length to-night, but I should like to say that with regard to cartridges I can conceive that it would be of enormous importance not to have two kinds of cartridges used on service. If you have two kinds of cartridges the wrong kind may come up just at the moment when you are in need of ammunition. Therefore the question of cartridges is of vital importance—of far more importance, I should say, than having the same arm. I cannot see the force of the argument of the noble and gallant Field Marshal. If you have the same cartridge it will be an enormous advantage.
  Now, my Lords, we have to consider what the Government are doing. I understand that what the Government propose will cost about £3,000,000. That is a very large sum. But what will

  1065
  it effect? It will not give you a better arm than the long rifle. We do not say that the short rifle is a bad arm, but according to the arguments of the noble Earl the Under-Secretary of State and of the noble and gallant Field Marshal, the short rifle—though we admit it is better than the carbine—is not a better arm than the long rifle. Why, then, should you go to this enormous expenditure to put into the hands of the infantry an arm which many people think a worse arm than the present arm, and which, according to those who advocate the short rifle, is at any rate not a bit better than the rifle now in use? That, I think, is a point we ought to bear in mind.
  I do not dwell on the question of recoil. My noble friend, who knows so much about the subject, has admitted that recoil in this short rifle is a small matter. A heavy recoil is doubtless very serious, but we do not say that recoil is a serious point here. The question of flash is of more importance, because the very existence of flash shows that the whole power of the powder has not been developed and brought to bear on the bullet which is to be propelled. The point on which I wish to lay particular stress is that for this enormous expenditure you will not get a better rifle. We believe that with very slight changes the long rifle could be enormously improved and that it might be made very superior to the rifle now in the hands of other armies. We quite admit the desirability of putting this rifle into the hands of the cavalry, as there is no doubt that the present carbine is very deficient.
  Now, my Lords, I leave the case as it stands. I should have left it absolutely alone, but I thought that in a debate of this character I ought to make a few remarks. The case has been ably put by my noble friend, and I sincerely trust that your Lordships will not blindly follow the Secretary of State for War in sanctioning so enormous an expenditure for so small a gain.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPON: My Lords, I rise not for the purpose of continuing the debate, but simply with a view to pointing out a curious mistake made by the noble Earl in his reference to me.
  1066
  The noble Earl treated me as a critic of the Schneider rifle. If there is one thing in connection with my proceedings as the head of a public department with which I am well satisfied it is that I was the Secretary of State who introduced the breech-loading rifle into the British Army, and that I selected the Schneider rifle as the pattern to be used. I was shortly afterwards removed to the India Office. My noble friend the Duke of Devonshire succeeded me, and he it was who actually issued the rifles. My object was not to attack the Schneider rifle, which is, so to speak, my own rifle, but to elicit, what I did practically elicit, from His Majesty's Government, namely, the excellent practice which that rifle had always made.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I should perhaps have described the noble Marquess as a critic of the Government, not as a critic of the rifle.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPON: But I was not criticising anybody.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of LANSDOWNE): My Lords, we have had a most interesting and instructive discussion, and I do not think that anybody can complain of the manner in which the subject has been dealt with either by the noble Lord on the Front Bench opposite who introduced the Motion, or by my noble friend beside me who spoke on behalf of the War Office. I think we are indebted to them for the clearness with which they handled a difficult subject, although there were moments when we found ourselves in some doubt as to whether we were thinking in tons or in pounds or in that still more elusive quantity, foot-seconds of muzzle velocity. What we have now to consider is the course we can most conveniently adopt with regard to the Motion on the Paper. The Motion is of a very decided and peremptory character. if it is carried by the House it may be either operative or inoperative, if it is operative it will have the effect of interfering abruptly with the proceedings of the War Office, and of throwing upon this House and of taking away from the War Office the responsibility for dealing with the

  1067
  supply of rifles to the British Army. On the other hand if it should remain inoperative I am afraid the result would not be consonant with the dignity of your Lordships' House. I wish therefore to ask your Lordships whether we are really in a position to commit ourselves to the very decided and conclusive view expressed in the Motion of the noble Lord? Surely, my Lords, this is a question which can be decided by experts and only by experts, and although there are no doubt some Members of this House, and I certainly give a high place among them to the noble Lord who moved the Motion, who have a right to consider themselves experts, I take it that what I may call the rank and file of your Lordships' House do not pretend to have any expert knowledge of these matters. We come then to this, that the Secretary of State for War has behind him a very great weight of expert authority. No one could listen to the full statement of my noble friend, or to the observations of the noble and gallant Field-Marshal on the Cross Benches, without becoming aware that this question had been fully and repeatedly examined, and that the Secretary of State's advisers had formed a very strong opinion, to which they adhered. On the other hand, my Lords, there is no doubt a considerable body of public opinion- of expert opinion -which holds a different view, and I am certainly not going to under-rate the importance of such statements as those which have lately appeared in the public Press or have been made by the noble Lord opposite this evening.
  How, then, is it possible for your Lordships' House to take upon themselves to decide when these doctors disagree? No doubt there are some points upon which we are perfectly competent to form an opinion. For example, no one will deny, I think, that for a military rifle accuracy is not the all-in-all to be aimed at. There are other qualities for which we ought also to look. I think my noble friend was perfectly right when he argued that this subject should be considered not merely from the point of view of the sportsmen or marksmen. The military rifle will have to be put into the hands of soldiers, often of young soldiers, perhaps of
  1068
  soldiers who have not had a very lengthy training. It is surely of the utmost importance to give them a weapon which shall be simple and handy, and one which they themselves like to use. While I say that, I must protest against the statement of the noble Earl that my noble friend in his speech cast anything like a sneer upon those most valuable institutions, Wimbledon and Bisley. I am sure all of us agree with the noble Earl opposite in acknowledging the great debt which the country owes to those competitions, and the great obligation we are under to those who, like the noble Earl, were concerned in the original institution of those most valuable meetings.
  Then, my Lords, other things being equal, it is surely not unreasonable to say that the lighter weapon is obviously a more convenient weapon than the heavier. Again, we may take upon ourselves to say that a single weapon is better for the whole Army than two weapons, and that one cartridge-which I believe we have-is better than a variety of cartridges. But, my Lords, my noble friend claims on behalf of this new short rifle that it possesses these attributes, and, in addition, the merit of equal or even greater accuracy. My noble friend is certainly not open to the imputation of having under-rated the importance of accuracy. I thought he put accuracy rather higher than did the noble Lord who moved the Motion; for he, if I remember rightly, treated the quality of accuracy as fourth in rank of the four essentials which he enumerated.
  But, my Lords, my noble friend's statements, full and convincing as they were, are met by a distinct challenge, and it is scarcely for us to deliver judgment. What, then, is the reasonable course for us to adopt? Surely it is that which I understood my noble friend to suggest, namely, that this challenge should be taken up, that further trials-under conditions which will render those trials exhaustive and complete-should be made, and that if the result of those trials should throw any doubt upon the value of the short rifle the responsible department should govern itself accordingly. . No harm will be done in the meantime, because I understood my noble friend

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  to say that the whole of the short rifles now under order, or in process of manufacture, will be required for the mounted troops, or for the reserve of mounted troops. We may, therefore, with a clear conscience proceed with the completion of those orders which an now actually in existence. As to the conversion of the existing long rifles into short rifles, to which the noble Earl referred-a conversion which he truly says is an expensive operation-I understand that no conversions are at the present moment in progress; and that none are intended in the near future.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: In the very near future?
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: And that none are intended in the very near future. I maintain, therefore, that your Lordships may safely leave the matter where my noble friend has left it, without committing yourselves to a Resolution so binding upon the House, and so absolutely uncompromising as that which the noble Lord has moved.
  A NOBLE LORD: Can the noble Earl say whether the War Office Committee which recommended this rifle, were in any way tied down by instructions as to the length of rifle necessary, or had they quite a free hand?
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I .do not quite recognise to what date the noble Lord refers. It was made quite clear by the noble and gallant Field-Marshall that the idea of the short rifle was put forward in 1895 by the Chief Inspector of Small Arms.
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (The Earl of SELBORNE): I was asked what we were doing with regard to the Navy. The rifle is not a weapon for
  seamen at all; their weapon is the big gun; so that the question of the rifle is one of very second-rate importance to them, and we have not found it necessary to raise any question of a change of arms at present.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: My Lords, I am afraid some of Your Lordships will think me very unyielding, but I do not think that I can accept the offer that the noble Marquess has made. I do not see that I should be in any way advantaged by accepting it. If I withdraw this Motion, and leave the matter in the position that the Government are to go on as they like, on the understanding that there are to be further inquiries into the behaviour of the rifle, well and good; but if I press this Motion to a division, as I am thinking of doing, the Government will still be bound to do exactly the same thing. After the debate which has taken place to-night, and after the discussion in the Press, it is perfectly clear that the War Office and the Government would not think of continuing the manufacture of these weapons without taking further steps to reassure the public mind. If the noble Marquess were in a position to undertake, that in the meantime no further rifles should be manufactured except for the cavalry, and that any further issue of the rifles should be postponed for a considerable time, there might be something in it. I do not wish to put the Government or the War Office into any state of discomfort, nor could I do it if I wished; so that for my own satisfaction, and in order, at any rate, to record the opinions of a certain number of Members of this House, I shall be obliged to ask you Lordships to divide on this occasion.
  On Question, their Lordships divided:—Contents, 22; Not-Contents, 55.

  CONTENTS.

  Bedford, D.

  Portsmouth, E.

  Raglan, L.

  Somerset, D.

  Spencer, E.

  Reay, L.

  Sandhurst, L. [Teller.]

  Ripon, M.

  Gordon, V. (E. Aberdeen.)

  Stanley of Alderley, L.

  Tweedmouth, L.

  Chesterfield, E. [Teller]

  Brassey, L.

  Wandsworth, L.

  Dartrey, E.

  Burghclere, L.

  Welby, L.

  Ilchester, E.

  Chelmsford, L.

  Wemyss, L. (E Wemyss.)

  Kimberley, E.

  Monkswc11, L.

  Halsbury, E. (L. Chancellor.)

  Lathom, E.

  Abinger, L.

  Vane, E.. (M. Londonderry.) (L. President.)

  Lonsdale, E.

  Allerton, L.

  Mansfield, E.

  Belper, L.

  Salisbury, M. (L. Privy Seal.)

  Mar, E.

  Cheylesmore, L.

  Northesk, E.

  de Ros, L.

  Marlborough, D.

  Onslow, E.

  Dunboyne, L.

  Portland, D.

  Roberts, E.

  Estcourt, L.

  Selborne, E.

  Kenyon, L.

  Anesoury. M.

  Shaftesbury, E.

  Kilmarnock, L. (E. Erroll.)

  Bath, M.

  Stanhope, E.

  Lawrence, L.

  Lansdowne, M.

  Verulam, E.

  Muncaster, L.

  Winchester, M.

  Waldegrave, E. [Teller.]

  Oranmore and Browne, L.

  Westmeath, E.

  Ravensworth, L.

  Pembroke and Montgomery, E. (L. Steward.)

  Robertson, L.

  Rossmore, L.

  Clarendon, E. (L. Chamberlain)

  Churchill, V. [Teller.]

  Saltoun, L.

  Albemarle, E.

  Cross, V.

  Sinclair, L.

  Brownlow, E.

  Esher, V.

  Stewart of Garhes, L. (E. Galloway.)

  Dartmouth, E.

  Hill, V.

  Denbigh, E.

  Hutchinson,V.(E.Donoughmore

  Windsor, L.

  Hardwicke, E.

  Knutsford, V.

  Wolverton, L.

  House adjourned at half-past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock,