Sitting of 23 February 1903

Preamble
The House met at Two of the Clock.
The Clerk at the Table informed the House of the unavoidable absence of the Chairman of Ways and Means.
PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.

  PRIVATE BILLS [LORDS].
  Mr. SPEAKER Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in respect of the Bills comprised in the List reported by the Chairman of Ways and Means as intended to originate in the House of Lords, the Standing Orders have been complied with in the following cases, viz.:—
  All Saints, Poplar (Rate Abolition).
  Antrim, Down, Armagh, and Belfast Electric Power.
  Aston Manor Improvement.
  Bangor Corporation.
  Barry Railway.
  Belfast Water.
  Birmingham Corporation.
  Bournemouth Corporation Tramways.
  Bournemouth Gas and Water.
  Bradford Corporation.
  Brighton Corporation.
  Bristol Corporation.
  British Gaslight Company (Norwich).
  Bury and District Joint Water Board.
  Cardiff Railway.
  Carmarthenshire Electric Power.
  Chard Corporation Gas and Electricity.
  Chatham and District Railways.
  Cleveland and Durham County Electric Power.
  Derby Gas.
  Didcot, Newbury, and Southampton Railway.
  Dudley, Stourbridge, and District Tramways.
  Exeter Corporation.
  Exeter Railway.
  Faversham Gas.
  Frinton-on-Sea Sea Defences.
  Harrogate Water.
  Harrow and Stanmore Gas.
  Hastings Harbour.
  Hastings Harbour District Railway.
  Hastings Harbour District Railway (Abandonment).
  Hastings Tramways (Extensions).
  Hexham Gas.
  India Rubber, Gutta Percha, and Telegraph Works Company.
  King's College, London.
  Knott End Railway (Extension of Time).
  Lima Railways.
  Liverpool University.
  London and North-Western Railway.
  London, Brighton and South Coast Railway.
  London County Asylums (Receiving Houses.)
  Manchester Corporation.
  Maryport Harbour.
  Mersey Docks and Harbour Board.
  Mid Yorkshire Tramways.
  Milford Docks.
  Nantwich Gas.
  Nantwich Urban District Council.
  North Cheshire Tramways.
  North-Western Electricity and Power Gas.
  North's Navigation Collieries,
  Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Tramways.
  Old Bridewell Burying Ground.
  Oldham Corporation.
  Pelican and British Empire Life Office.
  Plymouth and Stonehouse Gas.
  Pontypridd Urban District Council.
  Poole and District Electric Traction.
  Port Talbot Railway and Docks.
  Queensland Investment and Land Mortgage.
  Rickmansworth Gas.
  Rochester Corporation Tramways and Improvements.
  St. Philip's Chapel (Regent Street).
  Salford Corporation.
  Scunthorpe Urban District Water.
  Sheffield and South Yorkshire Navigation.
  Shropshire, Worcestershire and East Denbighshire Electric Power.
  Somerset and District Electric Power.
  Southampton Harbour.
  South-Eastern and London, Chatham and Dover Railways.
  South Wales Mineral Railway.
  South-Western and Isle of Wight Junction Railway.
  Staffordshire and Worcestershire Canal.
  Sutton Coldfield Corporation.
  Taff Vale Railway.
  Torquay Corporation Water.
  Wellington (Salop) Gas.
  West Bromwich Corporation.
  Western Trust.
  Willesden Urban District Council.
  Wirral Railway.
  Wisbech Canal (Abandonment).
  Worthing Corporation (Tramways).
  And that they have certified that the Standing Orders have not been complied with in the following cases, viz.:—
  Birmingham District Tramways.
  Hove, Worthing, and District Tramways.
  Macclesfield and District Electric Tramways.
  Shepshed Urban District Gas.
  South Lancashire Tramways.
  South Staffordshire Tramways.
  Tynemouth and District Electric Tramways.

  PRIVATE BILL PETITIONS [LORDS] (STANDING ORDERS NOT COMPLIED WITH.)
  Mr SPEAKER Mr SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the Petitions for the following Bills, originating in the Lords, the Standing Orders have not been complied with, viz.:—
  Birmingham District Tramways [Lords].
  Hove, Worthing, and District Tramways [Lords].
  Macclesfield and District Electric Tramways [Lords].
  Shepshed Urban District Gas [Lords].
  South Lancashire Tramways [Lords].
  South Staffordshire Tramways [Lords].
  Tynemouth and District Tramways [Lords].
  Ordered, That the Report be referred to the Select Committee on Standing Orders.

  PRIVATE BILL PETITIONS (STANDING ORDERS NOT COMPLIED WITH).
  Mr. SPEAKER Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the Petitions for the following Bills, the Standing Orders have not been complied with, viz.:—
  Croydon and District Electric Tramways.
  Harrow Road and Paddington Tramways.
  Metropolitan District Railway (Various Powers).
  Sheffield Corporation.
  Strabane and Letterkenny Railway.
  Thames River Steamboat Service.
  Wigan Corporation Tramways.
  Ordered, That the Report be referred to the Select Committee on Standing Orders.

  PRIVATE LEGISLATION PROCEDURE (SCOTLAND) ACT, 1899.
  The Deputy Chairman reported, That, after Conferring with the Chairman of Committees of the House of Lords, for the purpose of determining in which House of Parliament the respective Bills should be first considered, under The Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, they had determined that the Bills contained in the following List should originate in the House of Lords, viz.:—
  Fife Electric Power Company.
  Hamilton, Motherwell, and Wishaw Tramways (Part III).
  Life Association of Scotland.
  Scottish American Mortgage Company, Limited.

  BROADSTAIRS GAS.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. James Lowther and Mr. Kimber.
  CITY AND SOUTH LONDON RAILWAY.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Bond, Mr. Alban Gibbs, and Mr. David MacIver.
  CRYSTAL PALACE DISTRICT GAS.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Sir Fortescue Flannery and Mr. Kimber.
  DUBLIN IMPROVEMENT (BULL ALLEY AREA).
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Field, Mr. Harrington, Mr. M'Cann, and Mr. Nannetti.
  EAST HAM IMPROVEMENT.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. David Morgan and Mr. Louis Sinclair.
  GAS LIGHT AND COKE COMPANY'S ACTS AMENDMENT.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. John Burns, Mr. Alban Gibbs, and Sir Joseph Dimsdale.
  GREAT NORTHERN, PICCADILLY, AND BROMPTON RAILWAY (NEW LINES AND EXTENSIONS).
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Sir Henry Fowler, Mr. Alban Gibbs, and Mr. Whitmore.
  GREAT NORTHERN, PICCADILLY, AND BROMPTON RAILWAY (VARIOUS POWERS).
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Sir Henry Fowler, Mr. Alban Gibbs, and Mr. Whitmore.
  GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Fison and Sir Frederick Banbury.
  HAINAULT FOREST.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. David J. Morgan and Mr. John Burns.
  IPSWICH GAS.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Sir Charles Dalrymple and Mr. Goddard.
  KENT WATER BOARD.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Griffith Boscawen and Sir Barrington Simeon.
  LEIGH CORPORATION.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Scott and Mr. Cawley.
  LLANDRINDOD WELLS IMPROVEMENT.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Sir Alfred Thomas, Mr. Edwards, Lieutenant Colonel Pryce-Jones, and Mr. Charles Morley.
  LONDON BUILDING ACTS (AMENDMENT).
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. John Burns and Mr. Lough.
  LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS).
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. John Burns, Mr. Sydney Buxton, and Mr. Lough.
  LONDON, TILBURY, AND SOUTHEND RAILWAY.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Round and Major Banes.
  MAIDSTONE GAS.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Sir Francis Evans and Colonel Warde.
  METROPOLITAN DISTRICT RAILWAY (WORKS).
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Perks and Sir Charles Dalrymple.
  MULLINGAR, KELLS, AND DROGHEDA RAILWAY.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. T. M. Healy, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Nolan, Mr. Hayden, and Mr. Patrick White.
  NANTYGLO AND BLAINA WATER.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Sir William Harcourt and Mr. Charles Morley.
  NEW HUNSTANTON IMPROVEMENT.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. George White and Mr. Hare.
  STROUD DISTRICT AND CHELTENHAM TRAMWAYS.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Sir John Dorington and Mr. Charles Allen.
  WATFORD AND EDGWARE RAILWAY.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Halsey and Sir John Blundell Maple.
  WESTERN VALLEYS (MONMOUTHSHIRE) SEWERAGE BOARD.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. M'Kenna, Mr. Samuel Evans, and Mr. Abel Thomas.
  WEST SUSSEX WATER.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Emmott and Sir Joseph Leese.
  WOOD GREEN URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL.
  Petition, and Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Joseph Howard and Captain Balfour.
PETITIONS
  DETENTION OF POOR PERSONS (SCOTLAND) BILL.
  Petitions, in favour: from Cambuslang; Currie; Coldingham; and, Lauder; to lie upon the Table.
  SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS ON SUNDAY BILL.
  Petition from Holmfirth, in favour; to lie upon the Table.
  VACCINATION ACT, 1898.
  Petition from Haslingden, against alteration of the Law without an inquiry by a Select Committee; to lie upon the Table.
RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.
  POST OFFICE TELEGRAPHS.
  Copy ordered, "of Account showing the gross amount received and the gross amount expended in respect of the Telegraph Service, from the date of the transfer of the telegraphs to the State to the 31st day of March, 1902 (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 57, of Session 1902)".— (Mr. Austen Chamberlain.)
  WAGES AND EFFECTS OF DECEASED SEAMEN.
  Account presented, of the Sums received and paid in respect of the Wages and Effects of Deceased Seamen in the year ended 31st March 1902 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
  RAILWAYS.
  Copy presented, of Report on a visit to America, 9th September to 31st October, 1902, by Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Yorke, R.E., Chief Inspecting Officer of Railways, Board of Trade [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
  ALIEN IMMIGRATION.
  Return presented, relative thereto [ordered 19th February.—Mr. Gerald Balfour]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 25.]
  TRADE AND NAVIGATION.
  Return presented, relative thereto [ordered 19th February.—Mr. Gerald Balfour]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 26.]
  RAMSGATE HARBOUR.
  Copy presented, of Statement of the Receipts and Payments for the year ended 31st March, 1902, together with an Account of the Receipt and Issue of Stores [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 27.]
  Copy presented, of Correspondence respecting the Drought in Cyprus [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
  COLONIAL REPORTS (ANNUAL).
  Copy presented, of Colonial Report, No. 381 (Southern Nigeria, Annual Report for 1901) [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
  ARMY (MILITIA TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS.)
  Copy presented, of the Militia Training Return, 1902 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
  Copy presented, of State of the Six Army Corps Commands [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
  WOODS, FORESTS AND LAND REVENUES.
  Abstract Accounts presented, for the year ended 31st March 1902, together with the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General thereon [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 28.]
  ARMY (APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT).
  Copy presented, of the Appropriation Account for 1901–2, with the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General thereon, and upon the Store Accounts of the Army [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 29.]
  TRUSTEE SAVINGS BANKS.
  Copy presented, of Eleventh Annual Report of the Proceedings of the Inspection Committee for the year ended 20th November, 1902, with Appendices [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 30.]

  CANCER (IRELAND).
  Copy presented, of Special Report on Cancer in Ireland, being a Supplement to the Thirty-eighth Annual Report of

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  the Registrar-General of Marriages, Births, and Deaths in Ireland [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

  ARTHUR ALFRED LYNCH.
  Return of certified copies of the indictment, conviction, and sentence of the Court in the case of "The King against Arthur Alfred Lynch," tried in the King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice on the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd days of January, 1903, and of the order of the Court giving effect to the conditional pardon granted to the said Arthur Alfred Lynch; and also a certificate from the Governor of His Majesty's Prison, at Brixton, that the said Arthur Alfred Lynch is held in custody by him in pursuance of the said Order.
  COLONEL NOLAN: As an elector of the borough of Galway and the representative of a neighbouring constituency—
  *MR. SPEAKER: Order, order! This cannot be debated now. It is only a Motion for certain documents to be presented to the House as an unopposed Return. If any steps are taken on them, then will be the time to discuss the matter. This is merely an Order for certain documents to be laid so as to place the House in a position to take action.
  COLONEL NOLAN: Of course, Sir, if you rule that by no means I can say a word on this, I will sit down. My contention is that the documents asked for are incomplete, and that presented in this form they may do an injury.
  MR. SPEAKER: It will be open to the hon. and gallant Member to move for a further Return.
  COLONEL NOLAN: On another occasion?
  MR. SPEAKER: Yes.
  COLONEL NOLAN: Then I will ask if the Government will agree to have included in this Order copies of the certificates of the sentences passed on
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  the rebels at Natal and the Cape, and also similar certificates from the gaolers that these rebels are kept in custody.
  MR. SPEAKER: That clearly would be a case for a separate Return. It is an argumentative matter, not material to this particular Motion.
  COLONEL NOLAN: Then if that be your ruling, Sir, I will sit down.
  SIR GEORGE BARTLEY: Will due notice be given before the issue of the Writ is moved?
  *MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Member had better put that Question in the ordinary way.
  Motion for the Return was agreed to.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS CIRCULATED WITH THE VOTES.

  Workmen's Compensation Act—Master Potters' Scheme.
  SIR CHARLES DILKE: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he can give the House any information as to the working of the compensation scheme instituted by the master potters for injuries caused by lead, and alluded to in the arbitration on the Home Office rules; and whether His Majesty's Government have been informed by the Potters' Association of the progress of the scheme and of the extent to which masters and men have co-operated to make its advantages general.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Akers Douglas.) I am informed that seventy-two firms have joined the Potters' Assurance Association, and that three others are insured on the same lines in other ways. Most of these firms are of importance in the trade, and, as far as my information goes, the scheme appears to be working satisfactorily, with the exception that in eight factories, as I understand, the men have refused to submit to the medical examination which is an essential part of the scheme.

  South Africa — Native Labour in the Mines.
  MR. LEVY: To ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether the Government has given its assent to any scheme whereby, either by means of taxation or otherwise, Kaffirs are to be induced, by pressure from the Executive Government of the South African Colonies, to work in mines; whether the Government has given any assistance to the mine-owners in their efforts to procure Native labour from districts either within or without the area of His Majesty's dominions; whether, in either case, the Government has imposed on mine-owners any conditions of employment; if so, what those conditions are, and if they include a minimum rate of remuneration.
  (Answered by Mr. A. J. Balfour.) No assent has been given by His majesty's Government to any scheme enabling the Executive Government of the South African Colonies to put pressure upon Native labour; nor has any assistance been given to the mine-owners to procure Native labour, unless the Native Regulations are to be regarded in that light. For these Regulations I may refer the hon. Member to the Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 904.

  Official Recognition of Postal Employees Associations.
  MR. PATRICK O'BRIEN: To ask the Postmaster General whether, in view of the fact that successive Post-masters General have declared that postal employees have the right to form defensive organisations, he will state if members of the Postal Telegraph Service who are also members of the Postal Telegraph Clerks' Association have the right to obtain the assistance of the officials of that Union at the time or during the progress of a case between the individual telegraphist and his superior officer, on matters affecting his emoluments or conditions of service.
  (Answered by Mr. Austen Chamberlain.) There is no objection to such assistance being sought, provided that official documents are not made public.

  Elementary Education—Suggested Alteration in Physical Training.
  DR. MACNAMARA: To ask the Secretary to the Board of Education whether he will consider the desirableness of replacing the recently issued Model Course of Physical Drill for Children by a course more suited to the needs of young children than the present compilation, which is prepared from the Soldiers' Drill Book.
  (Answered by Sir William Anson.) The Board of Education have no present intention of replacing the Model Course of Physical Training. But they are considering the desirableness of issuing a kind of introduction to the Model Course, showing the steps by which the series of exercises in it may be progressively acquired. This will greatly assist the managers of the smaller schools in introducing it. I may remind the hon. Member that though the Board strongly advocate a uniformity of system, both in the interests of the teachers (on whom falls the burden of imparting the physical training) and in those of efficient instruction, they are prepared to consider (and have in many cases approved) alternative schemes having the same scope and aim as the Model Course.

  Local Municipal Constractors as Members of Education Committees.
  MR. REGINALD LUCAS: To ask the Secretary to the Board of Education whether it is the intention of the Department to issue any memorandum or instruction with regard to ex-officers and members of school boards whose services might be desired on the new education committees, but who hold contracts under local municipal authorities.
  (Answered by Sir William Anson.) The Board of Education does not think it necessary to draw up any memorandum or instruction on the subject of disqualification for membership of committees under Section 17 of the Education Act. The cases referred to in the Question are governed by Section 17 (5), and are not affected by Schedule II. (9).

  Indian Irrigation Commission Report.
  MR. WYLIE: To ask the Secretary of State for India if he will say when the Report of the Commission on Irrigation will be presented to the House.
  (Answered by Secretary Lord George Hamilton.) The Government of India have been asked to send home 1,500 copies of the Report of the Irrigation Commission when it is completed and printed, and copies will be distributed to hon. Members as soon as possible after arrival.

  French Bonds—Stamp Duties.
  MR. STUART SAMUEL: To ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the French Government will require a stamp of 1 per cent. to be affixed to the new 2½ Consol Bonds to Bearer held in France when exchanged next April for the existing 2¾ Bonds, even when these latter already bear the full French stamp; and whether he will take steps to secure that the stamp may be transferred from the old Bonds to the new at a reduced charge, as was accorded to the French Government by the Inland Revenue in similar circumstances connected with the recent conversion of French 3½ Rentes into 3 per cent.
  (Answered by Mr. Ritchie.) I am in communication with the Foreign Office on this matter.

  Licensing Act, 1902—Reduction of Licences.
  SIR THOMAS DEWAR: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, seeing that the new Licensing Act which lately came into force confers no new powers on magistrates in regard to the reduction in the number of licences in their districts, will he consider the advisability of intimating the present state of the law on the subject to licensing benches throughout the country.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Akers Douglas.) Before the new Act came into force I issued circulars showing what
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  changes it made in the law. It was clear that the powers long possessed by licensing justices in regard to the refusal to renew licences were not increased by the Act; and I do not think that there is any further communication on the matter which I can properly address to the justices at the present time.

  Ichthyological Committee—Recommendations.
  MR. LAYLAND-BARRATT): To ask the President of the Board of Trade whether he has taken into consideration the recommendations of the Ichthyological Committee; and, if so, what steps he proposes to take to carry them into effect.
  (Answered by Mr. Gerald Balfour.) The Report is still under consideration.

  Railway in Southern Persia.
  MR. JOSEPH WALTON: To ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will lay upon the Table the Treaty, Agreement, or Correspondence conferring on His Majesty's Government the right to construct a railway in the South of Persia when railways are constructed in the North of Persia.
  (Answered by Lord Cranborne.) An assurance to this effect was given to His Majesty's Government during the reign of the late Shah and has since been confirmed. It would not be desirable to present the correspondence.

  Ireland—Ancient Monuments—Hill of Tara.
  MR. BRYCE: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether any excavations are now going on upon the Hill of Tara in Ireland; whether the Hill, or part of it, is now being offered for sale; and whether His Majesty's Government, having regard to the historical and archaeological interest of the Hill of Tara, will endeavour to have it brought within the operation of the Ancient Monuments Act, or to take such other steps as may be within their power to prevent the mounds and other characteristic features of the surface from being obliterated.

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  (Answered by Mr. Wyndham.) I am informed that excavations have not been resumed at Tara. The tenant's interest in that portion of the Hill where excavations formerly took place has recently been sold. The landlord's interest has not been sold. The monuments on the Hill are at present within the operation of the Ancient Monuments Act of 1882, to this extent, that the Commissioners of Public Works have power to proceed against any person, other than the owner, who injures or defaces the mounds. To restrain the owner, the guardianship of the mounds should be vested in the Commissioners. The owner has declined to take this step, and there is no power to compel him to do so. The Commissioners are watching this matter very closely, and will use every means in their power to strengthen the popular forces at work in order to prevent any resumption of excavation.

  Crimes Act in Ireland—Case of Messrs. Lohan and Finnerty.
  MR. ROCHE: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether his attention has been drawn to the cases of Messrs. Lohan, County Councillor, and Finnerty, District Councillor, who are still confined in Galway Prison; and whether in view of the fact that they were imprisoned in consequence of their endorsement of a speech delivered by the Member for East Galway who has been released, will he reconsider their case.
  (Answered to Mr. Wyndham.) The persons named in the Question were not imprisoned for the reasons alleged. They were convicted (and the conviction was confirmed on appeal by the Recorder of Galway) of taking part in a criminal conspiracy. Their cases are under consideration.

  Census of Ireland—Cost of Printing.
  MR. M'KEAN: To ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the census printing for Ireland is now complete; and, if so, will he state what the cost of it has been.
  (Answered by Mr. Hayes Fisher.) The printing for the Irish census, although in
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  an advanced stage, is not yet complete, the "Typographical Index" being still in the press. I am not, therefore, as yet in a position to state the cost.

  Volunteers for South Africa—Gratuities.
  MR. MATTHEW RIDLEY: To ask the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that men belonging to Volunteer regiments volunteered for active service in South Africa on the distinct understanding, given in Army Order 29 of 1902, Paragraph 12, that they would receive a gratuity of £5; and whether he will reconsider his decision that Army Order 87 of 1901, to which no reference was made in the Order under which the men enlisted, deprives them of the right to this gratuity; and whether he has any information as to the effect this decision has had on recruiting for the Volunteer forces.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) All the men who volunteered for service under Army Order 29 of 1902 were granted the war gratuity, except those who had already completed a period of service in South Africa and received a gratuity. The condition of this grant was that it should not be given twice to any individual. It is not apparent how this decision could have any effect on recruiting for the Volunteer forces; but if my hon. friend can show that there has been any breach of faith I will consider the question.

  Service Dress for Volunteers—Government Grant.
  MR. ERNEST FLOWER: To ask the Secretary of State for War whether it is proposed to give any financial assistance to Volunteer Corps desirous of adopting the Service dress in addition to their present full dress.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) As the adoption of the Service dress is quite optional for the Volunteer Corps, there appears to be no sufficient reason for throwing any of the cost on the public funds.

  British Army—Publication of Preliminary and Annual General Return.
  SIR JOHN COLOMB: To ask the Secretary of State

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  for War whether the Preliminary Return of the British Army and the Annual General Return, the publications of which, since 1899, have been suspended, will not again be presented to the House; and, if so, whether he proposes, in some other form, to provide similar information necessary to enable the House to know, before discussing Army Estimates, what has been the distribution, state, and condition of the Army during the preceding year.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) The preliminary Return has been abolished. The general Return is being carefully compiled, but the difficulties of such compilation have proved considerable, and I fear no publication can be promised earlier than the beginning of April. The Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, which will before long be published, will supply a considerable amount of information.

  Garrison Regiments and Line Battalions—Relative Married Establishment.
  GENERAL LAURIE: To ask the Secretary of State for War whether he will state what is the married establishment of a battalion of the garrison regiment; and, if this is greater than the married establishment of a line battalion, what additional expense will this involve.
  (Answered by Mr. Secretary Brodrick.) The question of fixing the married establishment of the garrison battalions is at present receiving careful consideration, and it is not possible to state the cost, but it will naturally be considerably in excess of that of a line battalion.

QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE.

  Co-ordination of Imperial Defence.
  *SIR CHARLES DILKE: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he can arrange to give to the House any annual opportunity, in Supply or otherwise, of discussing such matters connected with the co-ordination of Imperial Defence as between the two Departments primarily charged with it as are not at present
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  the subject of any Vote; for example, the dwindling of the garrison of so important a coaling station of the Fleet as Thursday Island.
  THE PRIME MINISTER AND FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR,): We cannot, I think, question the motive of the right hon. Baronet's Question, and I have some hesitation in answering it in the affirmative. There are two reasons. First of all, there are technical difficulties in the way, for the discussion, to all intents and purposes, would be a discussion in Supply not relevant to the particular Vote; but that reason might be got over if we were quite clear as to the question of policy. But my hesitation on the question of policy arises because the right hon. Gentleman proposes, in effect, that there should be an annual debate on the strategic position of the British Empire and the various ways in which we ought to distribute our Army in view of a possible combination against us. I am not sure that a debate of that kind in the House is really very useful. It is not merely the right hon. Gentleman who will have to exercise the right of giving his views on all these rather delicate national questions, but he would force the Government to make a reply. If the reply was a complete reply, which would suit all sections of the House, the Government would be compelled, I am afraid, to go into details which I do not think it is much to our advantage that we should discuss in the House. If we, on the other hand, were to be content with a fragmentary reply, it might be urged that we were glossing over the difficulty, and I do not know that the general gain would be great. As at present advised, I am not ready to assent to the request of the right hon. Gentleman.
  MR. GIBSON BOWLESasked if, when the re-organisation was complete, Papers would be laid setting forth the nature of the new Committee of Defence.
  *Mr. SPEAKER: Order. order.! That does not arise out of the Question.

  South African War—Medals for Kaffirs.
  MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: To ask the Secretary of State for War on what grounds did Lord Kitchener base his request that 100,000 medals should be despatched to South Africa for presentation to kaffirs who were engaged in the British service during the late war; whether General Lyttelton, now Commander of the Forces in South Africa, has presented some of the medals to Kaffirs, or has directed them to be presented to Kaffirs; and, if so, how many of those medals were presented; how many Kaffirs during the late war drew pay from military funds, and for what services was that pay drawn; and, seeing that the War Office authorities gave assurances that natives took no part in the late war, will he state what was the precise character of the administrative services for which medals for the natives were requested by Lord Kitchener.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. BRODRICK,): I have no detailed information to enable me, in reply to the points raised by the hon. Member, to add to the information already given to him. The services on which the natives were employed were chiefly in connection with transport and supply, with intelligence work, and hospital services.
  MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: But why were so many medals sent out?
  MR. BRODRICK: The number of natives employed was very large.
  MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will send a sample of the medals into the tea room for inspection by Members.

  The Volunteer Force.
  SIR HOWARD VINCENT: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War what is the diminution in the strength of the Volunteer force upon 31st January, 1903 compared to 31st October, 1901; and what is the deficiency of officers at the present time.
  *MR. BRODRICK: The strength of the Volunteer force was, on the 31st October, 1901, 288,476; on 1st January, 1903, 250,990. The present deficiency of officers is 1,895. In estimating the
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  diminution in the Volunteer force it should be remembered that the strength in 1899, and for many years previous, was only about 225,000, and that an abnormal number of enrolments took place in 1899–1900 (113,000), whose period of three years service expired in October last. A large number of Volunteers, who would have left the service in ordinary times during these three years, have also waited to take their discharge till the close of the war.
  MR. ROBERT SPENCER: Is there any ground for the suggestion that the diminution occurred owing to the stringency of the new Regulations?
  MR. BRODRICK: There is no doubt that stringency may have had some effect; but I am equally certain, seeing the Volunteer force was maintained before the excitement of the war at about 225,000, that ultimately the strength will revert to some such figure.

  Cape Town—Alleged Military Scandal.
  MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he has made inquiries with reference to the incident at Nelson's Hotel, Cape Town, on Christmas Eve, 1901, brought under his notice on the 8th August, 1902 by the hon. Member for South Donegal; and, if so, what has been the result of these inquiries, and what punishment, if any, has been inflicted on the officers concerned.
  MR. BRODRICK: Yes, Sir, I have made full inquiries. The officers concerned were quartered in various parts of the world and had to be communicated with by letter, this not being a case in which explanations could be given by cable. The reports are as yet not all received, but the military authorities are losing no time in the investigation.

  Salutes to the Secretary for War.
  MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he will state in what capacity, whether civil or military, was he the recipient at Malta of a salute of seventeen guns; is there any precedent for the conferring of this mark of honour on any other Secretary of State for War; and on

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  whom does the responsibility rest for its bestowal.
  MR. BRODRICK: The Governor ordered the salute to be paid to the Secretary of State for War according to the established precedents. No other authority was needed or asked.
  MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: If the Prime Minister had gone under similar circumstances, how many guns would have been fired?

  Ministers as Company Directors.
  MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he proposes to take any steps with reference to the unauthorised use of his name by the agents of the Rock Assurance Company as a director of that company in a trade advertisement in a newspaper at Johannesburg.
  MR. BRODRICK: The necessary steps were taken as soon as my attention was drawn to the matter.
  MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: What action will the right hon. Gentleman take? Will he resign his directorship?
  No answer was given.

  Mr. Brodrick's Visit to Malta—Inspection of Troops.
  MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War in what capacity, civil or military, did he hold inspections of troops and review guards of honour at Malta; and whether he is aware that Colonel Stanley, who in 1878, as Secretary of State for War, inspected troops at Malta, had served in the Grenadier Guards, of which he was a captain, and was honorary Colonel of the King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment.
  MR. BRODRICK: I have already told the hon. Member that the inspection was held by the Governor. I have no information as to whether Colonel Stanley inspected the troops at Malta in 1878.

  Navy Ships' Stores.
  MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether officers in the Navy
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  are permitted to spend their own money on services connected with their ships.
  THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. ARNOLD-FORSTER,): It is the policy of the Admiralty to provide for the supply of all stores necessary for the maintenance, upkeep, and decoration of ships, and the regulations are framed with the object of giving effect to that policy. It is necessary from time to time to review the issues of stores referred to, and at the present time the question of whether the supply is in all cases adequate is under consideration. Officers are not prohibited from spending their own money on services connected with their ships, but the practice is not encouraged.

  Australasian Squadron.
  EDMUND ROBERTSON: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether the new agreement relating to the Australasian Squadron has yet been ratified by the Governments concerned.
  MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: The agreement cannot be ratified until it has been approved by the Federal Parliament of Australia and the Parliament of New Zealand, which are not yet in session.

  Alaskan Boundary Tribunal.
  MR. ROSE: I beg to ask the Postmaster General, as representing the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether, in the selection of members of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, care will be taken that the names of the gentlemen to be appointed by His Majesty's Government are submitted to and receive the approval of the Government of the Dominion of Canada.
  THE POSTMASTER GENERAL (Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN,, for Mr. J. CHAMBERLAIN): The British members of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal will be selected in consultation with the Dominion Government.

  Australian Sugar Bounties.
  MR. GIBSON BOWLES: I beg to ask the Postmaster General, as representing the Secretary of State for the Colonies,

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  can he state the effect of the law in the Australian Commonwealth with reference to public loans or guarantees relating to sugar manufactures or refineries, or to rebates on sugar grown within the Common wealth, and also with reference to fiscal advantages of any other kinds granted thereby to growers or manufacturers of sugar; and will he inquire as to the communication made by the Premier of New South Wales, protesting against New South Wales having to bear the cost of a rebate on sugar, and lay upon the Table the text of that communication.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLIN: The laws of Queensland and Victoria authorise the Governments of those States to make advances under clearly defined conditions to sugar manufacturers for establishing and improving sugar works. No other fiscal advantages are granted. Copies of the laws can be supplied to the hon. Member if he desires it. With regard to rebates on sugar grown within the Commonwealth, all such sugar, in the production of which only white labour is employed, is entitled to a rebate of 2s. per cwt. of the Excise duty, which is 3s. per cwt. I will inquire as to the communication made by the Premier of New South Wales, to which the hon. Member refers.

  Southern Nigeria.
  MR. EMMOTT: I beg to ask the Postmaster General, as representing the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether Sir Frederick Lugard intends to send a military expedition to Sokoto before the Delimitation Commission commences its work; and whether any military operations are in progress or in contemplation in Southern Nigeria at the present time; and, if so, for what purpose.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The British Commissioners met the French Commissioners at Junju on the 6th instant, and the Commission has now probably begun its work. The questions whether the force which has occupied Kano will proceed to Sokoto, and, if so, when, depend upon the local, political, and military situation, but Sir F. Lugard has authority to send a force to Katsena,
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  and, if necessary, to Sokoto. Beyond the patrolling of certain unsettled districts, no military operations are in progress or in contemplation in Southern Nigeria.
  MR. EMMOTT: Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the report in the Morning Post as to certain expeditions into Southern Nigeria? Is it correct?
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: I can give the hon. Gentleman no information beyond that I have just read.

  Brussels Sugar Convention.
  MR. GIBSON BOWLES: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, have His Majesty's Government, since the signature on 5th March, 1902, of the Brussels Sugar Convention, had any correspondence with, or received any communication from, any of the signatory Powers relative to Great Britain's obligation under Article IV. to impose countervailing duties on sugar-sweetened products imported from her self-governing Colonies, when such Colonies grant direct or indirect bounties on the production or exportation of those products; if so, from what Powers have communications been received; and when does he propose to lay them upon the Table of the House, or to state the effect of such verbal communications.
  THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Lord CRANBORNE,): I would, in the first place, refer my hon. friend to my answer on the 17th December last. On January 13th His Majesty's Government despatched a circular informing the Powers signatory to the Convention that they would not consent under any circumstances to be bound to penalise bounty fed sugar imported into the United Kingdom from any of the self-governing British Colonies, and that they were not prepared to accept any reference of this Question to the Permanent Commission. We have received official replies from the German and Austrian Governments only. The German Government differ from us and reserve their liberty of action, but consider that the difference of opinion has no practical significance. The Austrian Government have said that they pre-

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  sume that in practice the case contemplated will not arise, but that they reserve their full liberty of action. The Dutch Government have sent no reply. The Italian Government, we understand, do not dispute our view. The Belgian Government consider the point of no practical interest. The French Government have expressed no opinion on the subject. Our ratification has been deposited on the express condition that we shall not be bound to penalise bountyfed sugar from our self-governing Colonies. We have therefore incurred no treaty obligation to do so. Papers are being prepared and will shortly be laid upon the Table.

  The Dardanelles.
  MR. GIBSON BOWLES: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, do the treaties still exist of 13th March, 1871, and of 30th March, 1856, whereby the Great Powers of Europe affirmed and engaged to respect the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of the Turkish Empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for the ships of war of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus: have any, and, if so, how many, Russian torpedo destroyers or other ships of war recently entered and passed both those Straits, and when; were any, and, if so, what communications on the subject received by His Majesty's Government either from Russia or from Turkey before the passage of those ships; were any representations, verbal or written, made by His Majesty's Government; has any correspondence passed on the subject either before or after such passage; and, if so, when will he lay it upon the Table of the House.
  *LORD CRANBORNE: The provisions of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 relating to the Straits are still in force. His Majesty's Government have been informed that four Russian torpedoboats passed through the Straits on various dates between December 31st and January 30th last; they were to fly the commercial flag and they were not to carry cannon or war material. No communications on the subject were received by His Majesty's Govern-
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  ment from the Governments of Russia or Turkey before the passage of the vessels. In accordance with the course pursued on previous occasions His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on January 1st addressed a Note to the Porte in which he stated that the permission granted was in contravention of existing Treaty stipulations, and pointed out that, as these stipulations were applicable to all Powers alike, His Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the right to claim similar privileges in the future. No reply has been returned to this Note by the Turkish Government. It is not considered desirable to present Papers on the subject.

  American Claims against Venezuela.
  SIR CUTHBERT QUILTER: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether he has any official information showing that the claims of American citizens against Venezuela are to be paid in full forthwith in gold or its equivalent, while those of British subjects will have to wait the decision of the Hague Tribunal.
  LORD CRANBORNE: Our information is to the effect that the American claims will be dealt with by the Tribunal at the Hague.

  Russian Commercial Treaty with Persia.
  MR. GIBSON BOWLES: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether a Commercial Treaty has been recently concluded between Persia and Russia; whether, under the provisions of that Treaty, duties so high as to be practically prohibitive have been imposed on Indian teas imported into Persia; and what steps His Majesty's Government have taken to protect British trade in Persia.
  LORD CRANBORNE: The answer to the first Question is in the affirmative. Although, as I stated last night, this Commercial Treaty is likely to affect British trade injuriously in certain respects, we have no reason to believe that it will have anything like the effects which the hon. Gentleman suggests. A large part of the Indian tea

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  used in Persia is imported through Russia, and it is not likely that the tariff will prove to be prohibitive as regards this particular article. Great Britain is at present entitled only to "Most-Favoured-Nation" treatment in Persia, but His Majesty's Minister at Teheran has been instructed to obtain an arrangement with the Persian Government under which this country will, for the future, have a more influential voice in regard to alterations in the tariff affecting British trade. I hope shortly to be in a position to make a further statement on the subject.

  British Trade with Cuba.
  MR. GIBSON BOWLES: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any agreement or arrangements have been concluded between the Government of Cuba and of the United States regulating the conditions of commerce between the two States and the Customs duties thereon; if so, whether His Majesty's Government can state the effect of such agreement upon British commerce, and can lay upon the Table the text thereof; and have His Majesty's Government received any, and, if so, what representations on the subject form British trading interests.
  LORD CRANBORNE: A Convention between Cuba and the United States has been signed, but has not yet been ratified. It would therefore be premature to consider the question of laying it before Parliament. The Convention is a reciprocity Convention giving exclusive advantages to the trade between the two countries, and must necessarily be to some extent disadvantageous to the trade of other countries. His Majesty's Government have received representations as to the adverse effect which the Convention would produce upon British Commerce with the Island of Cuba.
  MR. GIBSON BOWLES: Is it not the fact that this Convention places British commerce at a disadvantage of from 25 per cent. to 30 per cent. in Cuba?
  LORD CRANBORNE: I do not think so, but if the hon. Member will put down a Question I will try and get the information.

  Foreign Trawlers in the Moray Firth.
  MR. WEIR: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the resolution which was carried at Christiania in 1901 to the effect that no trawlers should be allowed to operate in areas, such as the Moray Firth, which have been closed for scientific purposes; and will he consider the expediency of communicating with the Foreign Powers concerned, with a view to the Moray Firth, which is already closed against British trawlers, being also closed against foreign trawlers.
  The following Questions on the same subject also appeared on the Paper:—
  MR. BLACK: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he proposes to take diplomatic action in the direction indicated by the Reports of the Delegates from Great Britain to the International Council on Sea Fisheries in 1901 and 1902, for the purposes of protecting form foreign trawlers areas in British territorial waters, such as the Moray Firth, reserved for purposes of scientific experiment in the interest of fisheries.
  LORD CRANBORNE: I propose to answer both Questions together. I am quite aware that a resolution to the effect stated was passed at the Fishery Conference in question, but I fear that the time has not yet arrived when a proposal of the kind would meet with such general acceptance as would effectively exclude all trawlers, whatever flag they might fly, from visiting the Moray Firth. The Secretary of State is, however, now considering certain suggestions which may lead to a practical solution of the difficulties which form the chief subject of complaint.

  Export Duty on Coal—Patent Fuel.
  MR. D. A. THOMAS (Merthy Tydvil): I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, when it can be shown that small coal used in the manufacture of patent fuel contains nut coal of a value that would, if taken out, leave the remaining small of a value not exceeding 6s. per ton, the fuel is exempt from the export duty on coal; and, if

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  so, why the duty is imposed on similar small coal when exported in an unmanufactured state.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. RITCHIE,): It is not the fact that fuel is exempted from the export duty on coal if it is shown that the small coal used in its manufacture contains nut coal of a value that would, if taken out, leave the remaining small of a value not exceeding 6s. per ton. But if the nuts actually have been screened out of coal which originally exceeded 6s. per ton in value, and have been sold for a price which reduces the average value of the residue to 6s. per ton or less, rebate of duty is allowed on such residue, whether used in the manufacture of fuel which is exported, or exported separately.

  Export Duty on Coke.
  *MR. D. A. THOMAS: I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the export duty of one shilling per ton imposed on coke practically amounts to a duty of only three-fifths of a shilling on the coal used in its manufacture; and, if so, will he state the principle upon which coal used in the manufacture of other kinds of fuel is charged the full shilling duty.
  MR. RITCHIE: (1) By Section 3 (5) of the Finance Act, 1901, coke, culm, and cinders are included under coal, and are, therefore, charged with a duty of 1s. per ton on exportation, if exceeding 6s. a ton free on board, without any reference to quantity of coal used in their production. I cannot say whether, as implied in the Question, five tons of coal are, on the average, required to produce three tons of coke, as I am informed that the yield of coke from coal varies considerably. (2) The coal used in the manufacture of 'other kinds of fuel'—e.g,. patent fuel, is charged with duty when present in the fuel exported and exceeding 6s. a ton in fee on board value, because Section 7 of the above mentioned Act so directs. The hon. Member appears to suggest that duty ought to be charged on all the coal used in the manufacture of exported coke. I do not think this would be equitable, for the coke represents only
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  a by-product of the coal, the remainder having been extracted as gas. Both coke and patent fuel are dutied on the quantity of the dutiable article exported, and so far on the same principle.

  Income Tax Demands—P. O. Surcharges.
  SIR BARRINGTON SIMEON: I beg to ask the Postmaster General if he will explain why an application for Income Tax marked O.H.M.S. is surcharged 2d. when forwarded by post to an address other than that to which it was originally directed, considering that if it had been originally sent with a penny stamp, and without the letters O.H.M.S. on the envelope, it would have been redirected and forwarded without any such surcharge.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: I shall be glad if my hon. friend will send me the envelope so as to enable me to make further inquiry.

  Public House Licences.
  MR. JAMES LOWTHER: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether his attention has been called to the refusal by certain petty sessional courts to renew the licences of publicans against whom no complaint had been made of misconduct; and whether it is the intention of the Government to introduce legislation which will prevent such action taking effect until the question of compensation has been dealt with by Parliament.
  SIR THOMAS DEWAR: At the same time may I ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, having regard to the instances in the United Kingdom in which licensed victuallers who have spent considerable sums of money in the acquisition of their premises have been deprived of their licences through no fault of their own in either the conduct or management of their business, will he state whether he can see his way to introduce legislation such as will admit of compensation being granted in all cases in which the magistrates withhold the

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  renewal of a licence on the ground that a reduction in the number of licences in the district is desirable.
  *THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. AKERS DOUGLAS,): Though my attention has been called to this matter I have no information as to the actual results of the present licensing sessions, but assuming that the facts are as indicated in the Questions, I must point out that it has long been clear by well-known legal decisions that the renewal of a licence may be refused for reasons other than misconduct, e.g. for the reason that the justices in their discretion do not think that the licence is required. I can give my hon. friends the numbers refused for this reason in four years since 1890 if they so desire. That discretion must of course (to use the words of the Lord Chancellor in his judgment on the case of Sharp v. Wakefield) be exercised "judicially," and what has to be done must be done "according to the rules of reason and justice and not according to private opinion. It is to be not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular, and it must be exercised within the limit to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself." If it should appear that the justices are acting otherwise, it would certainly be a matter of gravity; but I do not think that we are yet in possession of sufficient information as to the facts to enable us to form an opinion. I will call for a full return directly the sessions are closed.
  MR. GIBSON BOWLES: Will the right hon. Gentleman send a circular to the magistrates, setting forth the admirable opinion of the Lord Chancellor as to their duties in the matter?
  *SIR THOMASDEWAR: Is the recent action of the magistrates in any way connected with the Licensing Act of last year?
  *MR. AKERS DOUGLAS: That Act confers no new powers on justices with respect to the refusal of licences.
  MR. JAMES LOWTHER: I suppose the right hon. Gentleman will obtain the information in sufficient time to enable appeals to be entered?
  *MR. AKERS DOUGLAS: It will be given as soon as the Brewster Sessions are over.
  MR FLOWER: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether the action of the licensing justices throughout the country in refusing, or in declaring their intention to refuse, the renewal of licences, is in consequence of any instructions issued by Government?
  *MR. AKERS DOUGLAS: No, Sir; the justices are acting in this matter, as they must do, on their own discretion; and the Government have no authority to issue instructions to them.

  Atlantic Shipping Combine.
  MR. GIBSON BOWLES: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade, in reference to the agreement proposed to be made by them with Mr. Pierpont Morgan's Shipping Trust, now Known as the International Mercantile Marine Company, will they afford this House any opportunity of expressing an opinion on that agreement before it is finally concluded.
  THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE (Mr. GERALD BALFOUR,): I must remind the hon. Member that the general lines of the agreement have been settled and accepted by both parties, and that the Government cannot treat them as open to re-consideration.
  MR GIBSON BOWLES: Who are the parties?
  MR. GERALD BALFOUR: The Government on the one hand and the Atlantic Combine on the other.
  MR. GIBSON BOWLES: Then will the House have no opportunity of considering the question?
  MR. GERALD BALFOUR: Oh yes, when the Papers are laid on the Table.

  Port of London—Inspection of Food Imports.
  MR. D. J. MORGAN: I beg to ask the President of the Local Government Board whether his attention has been called to the fact that articles of food imported into London, and landed at the wharves on the river side, are not subject to inspection by the officers of the Port Sanitary Authority of the Port of London; and whether he will consider the advisability of issuing an order giving to the Port Sanitary Authority jurisdiction over all wharves abutting upon the Port of London, whether on the River Thames or within the area of any dock.
  THE SECRETARY TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (Mr. GRANT LAWSON,): My attention has been called to the matter referred to, and I am now considering the issue of an Order dealing with it.

  Sergeant Hyde, Royal Irish Constabulary.
  MR. WILLIAM ABRAHAM: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if he can state whether an inquiry has yet been held into the charge made against Sergeant Hyde of supplying false information with regard to the action of the police at Glenville, on the 23rd of November, in preventing persons attending an ordinary meeting of the United Irish League, and imprisoning those who did attend by fastening the door of the League room; whether his attention has been directed to the proceedings taken against Sergeant Hyde before the magistrates at Rathcormac on the 23rd of December and their decision; and what is the result of any inquiry made into all the circumstances of this case.
  THE CHIEF SECRETARY FOR IRELAND (Mr. WYNDHAM,): Yes, Sir. The sergeant was reduced, as a result of the inquiry held, to the rank of constable. He was fined for assault at the Petty Sessions mentioned. He has since retired from the force.
  MR. SWIFT MACNEILL: Has this man a pension for his "deserving" services?
  MR. WYNDHAM: He has a pension.

  Land Purchase in Queen's County—Mr. Walker's Farm at Towlerton.
  MR. DELANY: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Land Commission considered they had sufficient security when sanctioning an advance for the purchase of Mr. John Walker's farm at Towlerton, Queen's County, by the occupier from the representatives of the late Mr. Edge; has the security depreciated since then; and, if not, will he explain on what grounds the Land Commission refuse to sanction sale of the occupiers' interest in the holding, and demand a fine of £50 from the purchaser.
  MR. WYNDHAM: I would refer the hon. Member to a reply to a Question put on this matter on the 18th December last. The application made to the Commissioners in this case was one in reference to which they exercised the discretion vested in them by Statute, upon a full knowledge of all the facts. It would be contrary to practice to discuss their decisions in the manner now suggested.

  Imprisonment for Contempt of Court—M'Elligott's Case.
  MR. MCGOVERN: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland is he aware that a man named M'Elligott from near Bawnboy, County Cavan, has been confined in Dundalk Gaol during the past nineteen months for refusing to give possession of his farm to the Irish Land Commission at £60 less than he could get from a solvent purchaser; and will the Government introduce a Bill to amend the law relating to contempt of court, in order to prevent people being confined for indefinite periods for offences of this description.
  MR. WYNDHAM: The nature of the contempt in respect of which this man was committed to prison by the Master of the Rolls, was stated in my answer to the hon. Member's similar Question of the

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  20th March last. The Executive has no power to interfere in such cases. The reply to the second part of the Question is in the negative.
  MR. McGOVERN: Does the right hon. Gentleman intend to keep this man permanently in prison?

  Irish Royal College of Science—Lecturer in Organic Chemistry.
  MR. McKEAN: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if his attention has been drawn to the circumstances under which a recent appointment has been made to a vacancy in the position of Lecturer in Organic Chemistry at the Royal College of Science in Ireland; whether he is aware that the Assistant Secretary to the Technical Instruction Department of the Board of Agriculture conferred the position on a gentleman who only became a candidate for it at the solicitation of the Department; and will he explain why another candidate, of at least equal qualifications, who is an Irishman residing in Ireland, a Roman Catholic, and graduate and Fellow of the Royal University of Ireland, and who was, in addition, recommended by the gentleman who obtained the appointment, was passed over.
  MR. WYNDHAM: The gentleman selected for this appointment, which was made by the Department, is an Irishman. He has had considerable experience as a lecturer.

  Rural Libraries (Ireland) Act.
  MR. BOLAND: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction or the Congested Districts Board propose to encourage the adoption of the Rural Libraries Act by a grant to those district councils which have already adopted, or may adopt, the Act in the future.
  MR. WYNDHAM: Both Departments afford aid to village and working-men's libraries in the purchase and selection of books. The Department of Agriculture has also at present under consideration further proposals framed with the view of promoting the adoption of the Act by rural district councils.

  Liscannar Harbour
  MR. WILLIAM REDMOND: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland when the improvement of Liscannar Harbour, as provided for in the Marine Works (Ireland) Act, is likely to be carried out.
  MR. WYNDHAM: In addition to this Question, I have received many communications from the hon. Member for West Clare, in whose constituency Liscannar is situate. The plans are now completed, and, after conferring with representatives of the County Council on the 28th inst., I trust that there may be no cause for delay.

  Irish Proclaimed Districts.
  MR. O'DOWD: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he will give the names of the counties and districts in Ireland which still remain proclaimed under the provisions of the Criminal Law and Procedure Act.
  MR. WYNDHAM: The counties of Cavan, Clare, Cork, Galway, King's, Leitrim, Limerick, Longford, Mayo, Queen's, Roscommon, Sligo, Tipperary, Waterford, and Westmeath, and the county boroughs of Cork, Dublin, Limerick and Waterford, are still subject to the provisions of the Act in respect of special juries and changes of venue. The summary jurisdiction clause of the Act has been withdrawn from portions of ten counties and from three county boroughs, and remains in force in portions of five counties—Clare, Limerick, Roscommon, Sligo and Tipperary.
  MR. DELANY: What is the reason for maintaining these proclamations?
  MR. WYNDHAM: The same as induced the original order, I presume.

  Religious Disturbances at Thurles.
  MR. SLOAN: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that, a short time ago, a Noconformist church in Thurles, County Tipperary, was broKen into, the harmonium smashed, bibles torn up, and

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  the whole church saturated with paraffin oil and set on fire; and if he will state how many arrests were made.
  MR. WYNDHAM: No arrests have yet been made in connection with this dastardly occurrence—none the less regrettable because it is most uncommon in Ireland.

  Irish Land Conference Report.
  MR. T. W. RUSSELL: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he will print and circulate the Report of the Irish Land Conference as a Parliamentary Paper.
  MR. WYNDHAM: I propose to lay Papers on some aspects of the land purchase question, including a Report on the present condition of past purchasers. I will consider the desirability of adding this Report, although, of course, it is in no sense an official document, and indeed derives its interest from that fact.

  Prosecution under the Crimes Act—Disqualified Councillors.
  MR. DELANY: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he can state the number of county rural district and urban councillors and Poor Law guardians respectively, who have been disqualified within the past twelve months in Ireland in consequence of sentences of imprisonment with hard labour having been passed upon them under the Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act; and whether he proposes to introduce legislation to remove such disqualification.
  MR. WYNDHAM: The number of cases of the kind mentioned was fourteen. In answer to the concluding inquiry I would refer to my reply to the similar Question addressed to me on the 22nd October last.

  Dr. Long.
  *MR. SLOAN: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that in Limerick on 14th January last the driver of a car refused to drive Dr. Long to attend a patient; and that he was stoned after
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  leaving divine service on Sunday 15th instant; and will he state what steps he proposes to take in the matter.
  MR WYNDHAM: The reply to first inquiry is in the affirmative. The police have no power to prosecute for the offence of refusing to drive a fare. With respect to the occurrence on the 15th instant, I am informed that a number of little boys were playing football, and that a stone was thrown from their direction in that of Dr. Long. He was not struck or otherwise stoned, nor do the police consider that there was any intention to strike him.

  Belfast Betting Prosecution.
  MR. SLOAN: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that a man named McDuff, who was convicted and fined in Belfast for keeping an illegal betting house, made application through his solicitor to have his books and papers, which were seized by the police, given back to him, which the magistrates refused; and will he explain by whose orders and on what grounds an order was sent from Dublin Castle to hand them back.
  MR. WYNDHAM: The magistrates made no order in respect to either the detention or return of these books and papers. There was no clause of forfeiture in the Statute and it would have been unjustifiable on the part of the police to have retained them. Directions for their return were consequently given.

  Dublin Post Office—Split Duty Grievance.
  MR. NANNETTI: I beg to ask the Postmaster General if he is aware that the nine clear hours at home recommended by the Tweedmouth Commission has not yet been carried into effect in Dublin; and whether, if there is no reasonable hope that it will be carried out, the Postmaster General could see his way to make some pecuniary grant to the Dublin staff in lieu thereof.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: I am sorry to find that there are still eight officers in the parcel office who have not

  509
  received the benefit of a clear nine hours' interval at home. I have given renewed stringent instructions on the subject.

  Dublin Post Office—Stamping Duties.
  MR. NANNETTI: I beg to ask the Postmaster General if he is aware that stamping is largely done by sorting clerks and telegraphists at Dublin, while in other large centres, such as Glasgow, stamping is entirely confined to postmen; and can he say whether stamping comes under the strict limit of a sorting clerk's duty, and, if not, will he see that it is done by the proper officers.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: It is not correct to say that the stamping of correspondence at Dublin is largely done by sorting clerks and telegraphists. The duty is mainly performed by postmen, but three sorting clerks and telegraphists are allotted to stamp the correspondence posted by Government Departments, and junior sorting clerks and telegraphists assist in the stamping of the ordinary correspondence when there is unusual pressure of work. Such work, although assigned to postmen, when the interests of the business require it is work which is also proper to sorting clerks and telegraphists and in which they have to qualify.

  Pay of Irish Telegraph Learners.
  MR. NANNETTI: I beg to ask the Postmaster General if he is aware that learners in many English post offices, such as Manchester, Leeds, and Sheffield, are paid at the rate of 8s. weekly, and on appointment get 16s. per week, and that the rates of pay throughout Ireland for persons holding the same rank are 6s. and 12s. respectively, and whether, seeing that the cost of living in the large towns in Ireland is at least as great as that in some of the English centres where the higher rate of pay is given, will he consider the advisability of granting the same wages in Ireland as he does under similar circumstances in England.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: Wages of 8s. a week for learners with 16s. a week on appointment as sorting clerk and telegraphist were introduced as a temporary measure at certain English offices where a difficulty was experienced
  510
  in obtaining the necessary number of candidates. The ordinary wages are found to be sufficient in Ireland to attract the required candidates; and it is not proposed to increase them.
  MR. NANNETTI: Will the right hon. Gentleman give me a copy of these answers?
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: Yes; but if the hon. Gentleman when he wishes for a copy of the reply will put down his Questions as unstarred that will serve his purpose, as copies are supplied with the Parliamentary Papers.

  Tory Island Cable.
  MR. HUGH LAW: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade if he can now state what decision has been arrived at with reference to the repair of the Tory Island Cable.
  MR. GERALD BALFOUR: I have been informed by my right hon. friend the Postmaster General that arrangements are being made by his Department for taking over the Tory Island Cable, and that it is intended to repair the cable as soon as circumstances admit.

  International Automobile Race.
  MR. JAMES O'CONNOR: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether, in view of the desire in Ireland that the International Automobile Race should be run in that country, and considering that the local councils through whose districts the cars will speed are prepared to take every precaution for the safety of life, he will introduce a Bill to enable the competitors to hold the race in Ireland.
  COLONEL SAUNDERSON: Before the right hon. Gentleman answers this Question, may I ask is His Majesty's Government aware that this is a rare occasion on which the whole of the Irish people are at one? Taking this fact into consideration, will His Majesty's Government give a favourable reply to the Question? (Laughter.)
  MR. WYNDHAM: I agree that my hon. and gallant friend is to-day speak-

  511
  ing for the whole of Ireland. I understand that a Bill has been drafted by the hon. Member for the New Forest Division of Hants. In view of the unanimous desire of all the local bodies representing districts through which the proposed course would run, and also, I believe, of all hon. Members of Irish constituencies, I venture to express the hope that such a Bill would pass as an unopposed measure.
  MR. PATRICK O'BRIENWill the Government make the Bill their own, and thus secure for it the advantages of such a measure?
  MR. WYNDHAM: I do not like to contemplate the possibility of other hon. Members opposing this measure when it is brought forward unanimously on the part of Ireland. I hope it will pass by consent.
  MR. PATRICK O'BRIEN: But there are other Bills in front of it.
  MR. WYNDHAM: Still, I hope it will pass by consent. No one can be opposed to it.

  Irish University Education Commission.
  MR. DILLON: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury when the final Report of the Royal Commission on University Education in Ireland will be presented to the House.
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I am informed by the Secretary of the Commission that the Report will be ready in the first week in March.

  Marine Insurance Bill.
  MR. CHARLES MCARTUR: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury if it is the intention of the Government to reintroduce the Marine Insurance Bill at an early date.
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: The Lord Chancellor hopes to reintroduce the Bill at an early date. I believe it is a measure that is much needed, and that it is practically agreed to by the important commercial interests concerned.

  Commissioners of Woods and Forests—Grants to Denominational Schools.
  MR. TREVELYAN: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether steps have yet been taken to discontinue the grants hitherto made by the Commissioners of Woods and Forests to 104 denominational schools; and whether he can yet inform the House whether there is any other national Department that contributes in the same manner to denominational schools.
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: These grants will be continued up to the appointed day. After the appointed day, the continuation of these grants will be limited to the question of repairs; and the basis of any contribution, if contribution is to be made, is a matter which cannot yet be determined. As to the last part of the Question, I have no information about other Departments, but there would be no objection to a Return if the hon. Member will move for it.

  DISTRIBUTION OF PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.
  MR. CHARLES HOBHOUSE: I beg to ask the Financial Secretary to the War Office why it is that the White Paper dealing with the distribution of the six Army Corps has been sent to the newspapers and not distributed to the Members of the House.
  THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY TO THE WAR OFFICE (Lord STANLEY,): I am afraid I cannot answer the Question, as I have been away for the last three days, and am not aware of the circumstances under which it was communicated to the newspapers.
  MR. GIBSON BOWLES: Does this come under the Betrayal of Official Secrets Act?
  No answer was returned.

NEW BILLS.

  SMALL HOLDERS (SCOTLAND) BILL.
  "To extend to tenants of small holdings the benefits of the Crofters (Scotland)

  513
  Acts," Presented by Mr. Black; supported by Dr. Farquharson, Mr. Crombie, Mr. Weir, Mr. John Dewar, Mr. Cathcart Wason, Mr. J. D. Hope, and Mr. Harmsworth; to be read a second time on Friday, 24th April, and to be printed. [Bill 39.]

  CONGESTED DISTRICTS (SCOTLAND) ACT (1897) AMENDMENT BILL.
  "To amend the Congested Districts (Scotland) Act, 1897, and to enlarge the powers conferred under that Act," presented by Mr. John Dewar; supported by Mr. Thomas Shaw, Mr. Weir, and Mr. Cathcart Wason; to be read a second time tomorrow, and to be printed. [Bill 40.]
  MEDICAL ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.
  "To amend the Medical Acts, 1858 to 1886," presented by Sir John Batty Tuke; supported by Sir John Gorst, Mr. James Campbell, Sir Richard Jebb, Mr. Talbot, and Sir Michael Foster; to be read a second time upon Friday, 24th April, and to be printed. [Bill 41.]
  LEASEHOLD ENFRANCHISEMENT BILL.
  "To enable certain Leaseholders to become Freeholders," presented by General Laurie; supported by Mr. Spear, Mr. Cohen, and Sir George Fardell; to be read a second time upon Friday, 3rd April, and to be printed. [Bill 42.]
  COLONIAL MARRIAGES BILL.
  "To legalise certain Colonial Marriages," presented by General Laurie; supported by Mr. Rothschild, Mr. Arthur Stanley, Sir Gilbert Parker, and Captain Jessel; to be read a second time upon Friday, 12th June, and to be printed. [Bill 43.]
  MEDICAL ACT (1858) AMENDMENT BILL.
  "To amend the Medical Act of 1858," presented by General Laurie; supported by Mr. Rothschild, Sir Howard Vincent, Mr. Middlemore, and Sir Mancherjee Bhownaggree; to be read a second time upon Friday, 20th March, and to be printed. [Bill 44.]

  MEDICAL ACT (1886) AMENDMENT BILL.
  "To amend the Medical Act of 1886," presented by General Laurie; supported
  514
  by Mr. Rothschild, Sir Howard Vincent, Mr. Middlemore, and Sir Mancherjee Bhownaggree; to be read a second time upon Friday, 20th March, and to be printed. [Bill 45.]

  MINES EIGHT HOURS BILL.
  "To limit the hours of underground workers in Mines to Eight Hours per day from bank to bank," presented by Mr. Ellis Griffith; supported by Mr. William Abraham (Rhondda), Mr. Pickard, Mr. Joseph Walton, Mr. Thomas Bayley, Mr. Jacoby, Sir Charles Dilke, Mr. Hatch, Mr. William Jones, and Sir Albert Rollit; to be read a second time upon Friday, 24th April, and to be printed. [Bill 46.]
  LEASEHOLDERS (PURCHASE OF FEE SIMPLE) BILL.
  "To give facilities to Leaseholders for the purchase of the Fee Simple of their holdings," presented by Mr. Kearley; supported by Mr. Emmott, Sir William Holland, Mr. William M'Arthur, Mr. George Whiteley, and Mr. Field; to be read a second time upon Tuesday, 5th May, and to be printed. [Bill. 47.]
  BANKRUPTCY LAW AMENDMENT BILL.
  "To amend the Law of Bankruptcy," presented by Sir Albert Rollit; supported by Sir Henry Fowler; to be read a second time upon Friday, and to be printed. [Bill 48.]
  HOUSING OF THE WORKING CLASSES (LONDON) BILL.
  "To regulate the conditions under which displacements of persons of the Labouring Class may be made in London under statutory powers, and to require the provision of sufficient new Housing Accommodation," presented by Sir John Dickson Poynder: supported by Sir John Gorst, Mr. Claude Hay, Mr. Cust, and Major Evans-Gordon; to be read a second time upon Tuesday, 3rd March, and to be printed. [Bill 49.]

  KING'S SPEECH (MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS).
  Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Main Question [17th February]
  "That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, as followeth:—
  "Most Gracious Sovereign,
  "We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the Gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament."—(Mr. Gretton.)
  Question again proposed.

  ARMY ORGANISATION.
  *MR. BECKETTsaid that in moving the Amendment which stood in his name, he was giving expression to the opinion entertained not only by many members of that House, but by almost everybody outside. To every one who had followed the signs of the times it could not but be apparent that the policy of the War Office would be seriously challenged; and it was only right and fitting that this strong disapproval should find utterance in the House of Commons. It was not agreeable—indeed, it was intensely disagreeable—to find oneself in opposition to a Government which one desired to support, and he wished, therefore, to make it perfectly clear that he was attacking the policy, not of the Government, but of a Department; not the administration of affairs in general, but the administration of the Army in particular; and in doing this he ran counter to no Unionist principles whatever; he claimed to be as sound and loyal a Conservative as any hon. Member who might rise in the course of that debate to defend the system. His task was not rendered easier by the fact that the head of the Department attacked was a friend of over twenty years standing, for whom he had the warmest regard, and whose excellent and admirable qualities he held in the highest esteem. But when one saw a friend embarking on a course which must lead to disaster, it was the part of a friend to give warning of the danger, and to attempt to divert him into another course, at the end of which was to be found success. He appreciated the great difficulties with which his right hon. friend had had to deal, and the zeal and energy with which he had tried to cope with them. But the
  516
  measure of his difficulties had been the measure of his opportunities. No man had ever had greater opportunities, but he regretted to say that, from their point of view, those opportunities had been unhappily used or deplorably neglected; and, instead of putting the Army on a new and efficient basis, the right hon. Gentleman had produced a scheme unsound in priniciple and ruinous in practice.
  He would endeavour to make good his words without going into more detail than was absolutely necessary It was high time that the nation took stock of its position. They had made great efforts and great sacrifices, and they seriously needed a period of rest and recuperation. He remembered, just before the war broke out, attending a bankers' dinner at which Lord Salisbury was present, and addressed a serious warning to the nation, telling them they were in danger of doing what men of business called "trading beyond their capital"—that they were in danger of undertaking obligations they would not beable to meet, and assuming responsibilities greater than they were able to bear. If that warning was needed then, how much more was it needed now, when we had spent over £200,000,000 sterling in South Africa. The war was over, but the consequences remained, as they were unpleasantly reminded every time the tax-gatherer knocked at their doors. The taxpayer urgently required relief; but taxation could only be reduced if expenditure were reduced, and reduction of expenditure was naturally looked for where it had most largely increased, viz., on the Army. Every one would agree that if for two-thirds of the present cost the country could have a thoroughly efficient Army which would meet all the needs of the Empire, it was the duty of the Minister for War to provide such an Army. His proposition was that for twenty millions of money we could have an Army better suited than the one which now existed to meet all the needs of the Empire. Before he asked for thirty millions of money, it was the business of the Secretary of State for War to show to show that the present force was needed; that every man was absolutely necessary, and could not be dispensed with,

  517
  and he had never attempted to do that. The nation wanted to know what were the needs of the Empire, and what sort of Army was required for their defence. The nation was conscious of extravagant expenditure with inadequate results, and wanted sufficient security at a reasonable cost. They wanted to know what purposes the Army was intended to serve, and how much was to be spent on it. This information had been given to the authorities at Pall Mall, or it had not. If it had, then the nation which had to pay was entitled to be informed what it had to pay for, and why it had to pay so much. If it had not, then the military authorities had been organising in a haphazard fashion for an uncertain object, and no wonder, then, that the result had been something like chaos.
  There had been no authoritative statement as to the views of the authorities as to the requirements from the Army except that issued by Mr. Stanhope in a Memorandum issued in the year 1891. It was a rather interesting document, but he did not propose to read it to the House. He would content himself with reading a paragraph—
  "It will be distinctly understood that the employment of Army Corps in the field in any European war is sufficiently improbable to make it the primary duty of the military authorities to organise efficiently our forces for defence."
  Therefore, according to that Memorandum, our primary duty was to organise our forces efficiently for the defence of the country. The outcome of that view was this scheme of six Army Corps. He thought it would be rather interesting if they could ever find out what was the genesis and conception of the Six Army Corps scheme. How was it that the Secretary for War managed to hit on this scheme? Was it adopted after long consultation with the officials at the War Office? Was it subjected to careful examination and minute criticism? Were those responsible for the efficiency of the Army called into consultation, and did they pronounce a blessing upon it? He understood nothing of the kind took place. He understood that the War Office repudiated the paternity of this scheme. They always thought it a very remark-
  518
  able performance on the part of Jupiter when, after pains in the head, he produced from his brain Minerva, fully armed and equipped; but that performance sank into insignificance compared to that of the Secretary for War, who, after a few days' pains in his head, produced six Army Corps, armed and equipped, ready for everything except war.
  He had several objections to this Army Corps scheme. His first objection was that it was based on a wrong principle; his second was that it was not fitted for the real needs of the country; his third was that it was enormously costly; his fourth was that it did not remove the defects which the war in South Africa so clearly revealed; his fifth was that it was not adapted to the conditions of service in this country; and the sixth was that it had no real existence. He ventured to say that the defence of this country was the primary duty, first of the Navy and next of its citizens. Our history and our position alike indicated this policy to us. It was not for nothing that we were hemmed round by the inviolate sea, on which floated the most powerful Navy in the world. If our position compelled us to maintain our Navy at an overwhelming strength, it relieved us from the necessity of maintaining a large Army to guard our frontiers, for our frontiers were the sea, and these could only be properly guarded by the Navy. If the War Office contended, as he understood they did. that our Navy did not defend us efficiently, that was an argument for strengthening our Navy. not for strengthening our Army; and therefore he absolutely endorsed the words of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife, when he said that an Army organised for home defence was a costly, wasteful and foolish luxury. His right hon. friend the Secretary for War asked, if we lost temporary command of the sea, whether we should allow the country to be despoiled by our foes. This meant that we were asked to spend £30,000,000 annually because moments might occur, wnich, if they did not occur, would be absolutely thrown away. No wise nation will strain its resources, cripple its finances, and saddle itself with a huge burden of taxation merely to provide against a contingency that had

  519
  not occurred for a thousand years, and which was never likely to occur again. What did the temporary loss of the command of the sea mean? It meant that either the Navy was temporarily disabled or was lured away to other parts of the globe. Did any one imagine that under these circumstances any foreign foe would dare to land a force on these shores, which might be shut up and caught like rats in a trap? It was Moltke who said that, in such a contingency, he knew of twenty ways of getting into England, but not one of getting out. We need not, he thought, be afraid of a temporary raid.
  We ought to rely far more than the War Office had done hitherto on the citizens of this country. We had never appealed to the people of England in the right way; and if we did not appeal to them in the right way we could not expect them to do what we wanted them to do. He believed that if appealed to in the right way we should get such a response as would astonish the gentlemen at the War Office, and would show that the people of England were not so dead to their duty and interest as these gentlemen believed. We had the raw material for the finest and cheapest citizen Army that the world had ever seen, and, properly trained and organised, they could repel with ease any temporary raid, which, indeed, would never be attempted. It was common knowledge that the Volunteer force had been discouraged by the War Office; and that men had been driven out of that force because the War Office had laid down regulations with which it was impossible for Volunteer Officers to comply. The Volunteers might not be fully trained—as he would show that the Regular Army was not properly trained; but he maintained that an imperfectly trained Volunteer was a better man for defence of the country than a citizen not trained at all. It was not only on the Volunteers that the course pursued by the War Office had had a most pernicious effect, but also on the defence forces in the Colonies. He had a letter from a General in Australia who was in a position to know, and who said that—
  "The main obstacle to the organisation of the forces of the Colonies of Australia was the odium in which the War Office was held."
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  And here he would like to make a quotation from Lord Roberts who, in an article, said—
  "What are really required for England, are two Armies—a home Army, and a foreign service Army. The former should consist, I conceive, of some sort of Militia, and this should be our reserve. The latter should always be in the most perfect state of efficiency, ready to take the field in our distant possessions upon the shortest possible notice."
  A large Regular Army for home defence was not mentioned in that definition; and when the Commander-in-Chief talked of operations abroad he referred to our distant possessions. He never contemplated that our Regular Army should ever be employed on the Continent. He was not going to discuss the question of Canada. Of what use would two Army Corps be in America? If we had to contend with America, we would have to put the whole nation into the field. It might be said that a large Regular Army would be required on the Indian frontier. He knew something about our Indian frontier, and he thought that this idea of an invasion of India by Russia was a good deal of a bugbear. A Russian officer had said to him—
  "In the first place, no one contemplates invading India. It is true we bring pressure upon your Indian frontier when we want to get something out of you in other parts of the world. We do not seriously contemplate the invasion of India, because, in the first place, we do not want India, and in the second place, because it would be impossible."
  We knew that, armed as we were with modern weapons and smokeless powder, it would be impossible for an invading Army to get through the passes. Then we also knew that until Quetta, on whose fortification so much had been spent, was taken, it would be perfectly impossible for Russia to march on India. All that would be needed would be to strengthen the Indian garrison from home, and it would not require a great Army to do that. And here he would quote from what President Roosevelt, of the United States, had said only the other day, which exactly expresses our ideal of what the English Army ought to be—
  "The [American] Army is small, and it is not desirable that it should be other than small relatively to the population, but we have a right to expect that it shall represent for its size the very highest point of efficiency in the civilised world."

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  Whatever else could be said about it, the great increase in the expenditure on our Army was a fact, open, gross and palpable to the eyes and pockets of all men. He maintained that the Army was not only unsuited to our needs, but enormously costly. The increase of expenditure was very great. He would take the year 1880, in which he had a particular interest because the father of the present Financial Secretary to the War Office was then Secretary for War. At that time the total expenditure on the Army was £14,980,000, and that was just after the Zulu War and the Afghan War, and shortly before and after we were ready to go to war with Russia. In the year 1899 the expenditure was £20,617,000. That was the year before the Boer War. And now the expenditure had risen to £29,310,000—an expenditure which was out of all proportion to the increase of our population and to the increase of our trade. The Government said that that increase of expenditure was inevitable. Well, let them prove it to be inevitable. We had no evidence of the fact. There was a point beyond which expenditure could not go, for the simple reason that the taxpayers of the country would rebel against it. Moreover—and he strongly urged this consideration—it might be that in indulging in this inflated expenditure we were running the risk of provoking a reaction which might lead to a dangerous parsimony. He held that the distribution of expenditure upon the Army and Navy required reconsideration, though he need not dwell on that, because it was admitted by everybody that the predominant position of the Navy must be accepted, and that the Army should be supplemental to the Navy.
  His contention was that for such increased expenditure no adequate result had been obtained, although glaring defects had been revealed. Would those defects be removed under the scheme of the Secretary of State for War? When he called attention to defects in the Army he must be understood as making no reflection whatever on the officers and men, who did their duty so gallantly in the field. The defects to which he referred were mainly due to three causes—the lack of foresight, the lack of organisation, and the lack of training. Nothing had been thought out before the early disasters of the war in South Africa,
  522
  and no proper preparations had been made to meet what was called and "inevitable war." Recently the Prime Minister stated—and his announcement created a great deal of interest in the country—that the Council of Defence had been reconstituted. Of course the reconstitution was proof, if proof were needed, that the previous Council of Defence was a farce and a failure. Yet, they should remember that before the previous Council of Defence there was the prospect of an inevitable war which it would have been thought would have been a sufficient inducement and stimulus to bring the members of the Council together in order to deliberate and consult and prepare for the war. What assurance had the House of Commons that without any such stimulus or inducement the Council of Defence would rice to any higher conception of its duties. He sincerely hoped and believed that it would; but their good faith in the matter was of the substance of things hoped for, and based on the evidence of things unseen. He observed one deficiency in the composition of the Council. He thought that the Chancellor of the Exchequer ought to be a member of it. The members who composed it had one eye on the sea and one on shore, but they had to have their eyes constantly on the Exchequer. Therefore the Chancellor of the Exchequer ought to be a member of the Council in order to measure its schemes by the sound standard of pounds, shillings, and pence. He himself wanted to know what the Council of Defence thought of the present Army scheme, and he asked the Prime Minister if he would regard the scheme with an open mind. The Prime Minister replied that he regarded all questions with an open mind, in which he himself fully concurred. At the same time he wished to know whether his right hon. friend would regard the Army scheme in particular with an open mind, as it involved a large expenditure of money if the Army Corps were to be put on a more stable, or less unstable, foundation. Ministers would tell the House of Commons next year that the country was committed to the scheme, but they now wanted the Council of Defence to examine the scheme before the country was committed to it, and they desired an assurance from the Prime Minister that, if needs be, the six Army

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  Corps would be thrown into the melting pot. Were the politicians on the Council to dictate to the soldiers or sailors, or were the soldiers or sailors to dictate to the politicians? If the Cabinet wanted the plans of the soldiers or the sailors they could always have them; and the fact that the plans were submitted to the Council of Defence did not add any new feature to its composition, or give any new assurance of its effective working.
  After all, the Council of Defence could only examine and dispose of schemes of attack and defence on the intelligence supplied to it by the Intelligence Department, and the Intelligence Department could only supply intelligence if it were properly and efficiently manned. At the present moment the Intelligence Department of the War Office was very much undermanned, and it was practically impossible for it to discharge the work committed to it. When they read an official definition of the duties to be performed by one man over countries extending almost from China to Peru, and including preparations for attack in each country, plans for the defence of the colonies, the co-ordination and distribution of the military forces of the Crown, to imagine that they could be efficiently performed by one man was to imagine an absurdity. In America, the first thing they did was to create a well - paid staff. But then America believed in brains; they in England did not believe in brains. They believed in collecting specials, flat-foots, weedy boys and a whole host of undesirables, and paying them large sums of money, while they starved the brains department. Information was the last thing the War Office wanted, and all the information that came to them was suspect, unless it was tied up with red tape, and stamped with the official seal. In fact, it might have been written over the door of the War Office, "Information not wanted here." Then, lack of organisation would exist under the new scheme no less than under the old. They had it on the highest authority that at the outbreak of the war the Army was not organised for war. That was perfectly evident, because, when the Army was called upon, not one single battalion or battery was ready to take the field. What would have happened if the Boers had pushed on in South Africa, and if no Volunteers
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  were forthcoming, he shrank from contemplating. It would, however, have been a disaster of the first magnitude to the British Empire. The truth was that the Army was not organised, and would not be organised, for war, because the Army scheme was based on fallacy. It was entirely dependent on the exact maintenance of an equality between units at home and abroad, which was impossible. With reference to that, Lord Wolseley said:—
  "The moment that basis broke down the whole system is thrown out of gear, and it becomes impossible to maintain the system or organisation which was created and based on that principle."
  That was to say that when war broke out the system broke down. He would make a frank admission to the Secretary of State for War—that his Army Corps were as perfect as he doubtless would make them out to be, provided they were not asked to go anywhere or do anything. It was true that in spite of their lack of organisation they muddled through. A Minister of the Crown the other day said that it did not matter whether they muddled through as long as the British Empire came out uppermost. That was an unfortunate doctrine, and when a Minister of the Crown talked like that he was extremely ill-advised. For his part he said that the country was getting tired of a policy of mess, muddle, and make-believe. It wanted to see its work well, thoroughly and efficiently done. But it was hopeless to expect organisation in the Army until the War Office, which was the head and front of the offending, had been organised itself. Commissions sat again and again to examine into the defects of the War Office. They laid their fingers on the same defects and made pretty well the same recommendation, but the War Office went its way unheeding. If he might parody a well-known verse, he would say—
  "They hear Commissions thunder past
  In silent, deep disdain;
  They bow their heads before the blast,
  Then plunge in tape again."
  They had heard a good deal about decentralisation, which was a very good thing if they could get it; but inquiries in the Army Corps districts showed that there was no more decentralisation under the new scheme

  525
  than there was under the old. The War Office lay like a nightmare on the chest of the Army.
  A Commission had been appointed to inquire into the training of officers. He did not know whether its recommendations had been adopted; but if they had not, it was quite time they were. He did not blame the officers; it was perfectly obvious they could not train men unless they had men to train. Even from the battalions which had been referred to as "squeezed lemons" there were deductions for foreign drafts, special duties, employment in regimental workshops, etc. It was not surprising in such circumstances that there was a universal complaint that commanding officers never saw their battalions, or company officers their companies, because there were neither battalions nor companies to see. The depots were too few, and required instructors. They would have to be increased in number, and efficient instructors would have to be appointed. The men were taken away from the depots before they were properly trained; and, to quote a military officer of great experience, "to expect efficiency under such a system was to expect a miracle." Yet the nation was asked to expend £30,000,000 on expenditure from which to expect efficiency was to expect a miracle. The result of the system was that they could not carry on even a small war without calling out the Reserves to form part of the fighting line. One of the most urgent needs, as was undoubtedly and universally admitted, was that we should have a small expeditionary force that could be sent anywhere at a moment's notice, without mobilisation, and without calling Parliament together. The Army Corps system did not give this force, and could not give it so long as the system of linked battalions remained. With regard to the linked battalion system he would like to quote objections to which that was open. Lord Roberts said:—
  "As a rule, the battalion in which a man first makes his home is the one he will like best to the end of his service, and constant and compulsory change, or even a liability to such change, does more to make a soldier dislike the Army and kill the esprit de corps that used to exist than anything else."
  526
  The Army Corps were founded on this very system. Coming to the Army Corps themselves, what and where were these Army Corps? They were on a large piece of paper it was true, but were they anywhere else? He remembered when the Secretary of State for War, two years ago, came down, like the poet, "with his eye in fine frenzy rolling," to give to these six "airy nothings a local habitation and a name." He did not intend to quote figures—he could quote figures to any extent—but those figures would, no doubt, be objected to by the War Office, while any figures quoted by the War Office would be objected to by their critics. All that he would say was that if anybody wanted to satisfy himself as to whether these Army Corps existed, and in what state, that person had better go to the headquarters of the Army Corps and see for himself. One industrious journalist had gone about looking for a mission Army Corps. He reminded one of those patient, persevering savants who perambulated the globe in search of the missing ling. They might find a skull and a bone or two, but they never discovered the entireman, and he predicted that a similar failure would await any one who tried to discover an entire Army Corps. Even if an entire Army Corps were found, his arguments was not affected in the least; in fact it was, if anything, strengthened, because the more complete it was, the more money it would cost. And not only must the number of men in these Army Corps be considered, but also what proportion of them were efficient soldiers. The figures of the War Office were largely open to suspicion on this point; because, though the House was told at the commencement of the war in South Africa that we had 109, 000 men, it turned out subsequently, according to the statement of the Secretary of State for War, that 92,000 of them were not fit to take the field.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. BRODRICK,): That was contradicted by Lord Lansdowne, and entirely disproved.
  *MR. BECKETT: Excuse me, I can quote Lord Lansdowne's words.
  *MR. BRODRICK: I can also quote. Lord Lansdowne denied it, and said an interpretation was put upon his wouds that they did not bear.
  *MR. BECKETT: Of course, I know that the 92,000 were available later on, but not at that moment.
  *MR. BRODRICK: Lord Lansdowne showed that at that very moment more than half of them were available.
  *MR. BECKETT: That is quite enough for me, Sir. Continuing, the hon. Member said he did not object to the country being divided up into six districts, nor did he object to the Army for home defence being divided into Army Corps, but he strongly objected to Army Corps, whether complete or incomplete, for the reason that they were extremely costly; the work of the staff was extremely costly, the work which was now being dome by a general at £4,000 a year being that which in the past was done by a general at £800 a year. This Army Corps system also blocked the way to Army reform; they would never get Army reform until these Army Corps were swept away, root and branch. It increased the numbers of numbers of nominal soldiers without increasing the efficiency of the fighting units, and considering the fact that our military service was totally different from any continental system, he thought there was great danger in adopting continental systems. Continental nations had to defend a compact territory, whilst we had to defend widely-scattered dominions. They trusted for their defence to an Army; we trusted for our defence to a Navy. An Army Corps in England stretches from Dover to plymouth, from the Isle of Wight to Pembrokeshire, and, spread over so wide a country, it cannot be organised, manœuvered or trained as a fighting unit. The Army Corps system on the Continent was intended to facilitate the handling of large masses of men. We were not called upon to handle such numbers, and if the House considered the nature of our requirements and the probabilities of the future, they would see that not once in 100 times would an entire Army Corps be required. A great part of these Army Corps were composed of auxiliaries, which would be withdrawn from them at once if required to serve
  528
  outside this country; and even if the Army Corps were complete they could not be moved en masse to the frontiers; they would be broken up when they were put on board ship, and as each ship reached the other side the men would be marched to the front as they arrived, and an Army Corps would therefore never take the field, except in a fragmentary condition. There was only one place in which an Army Corps could be manœuvred, and that was South Africa, and if one were sent out there it might be a useful thing. If the Government sent out 20,000 men, as they proposed to do, to south Africa, they still had to keep the linked battalions at home; but if an Army Corps were sent out, and it were put on the home estabishment, they had not to provide linked battalions for it. As a matter of fact the whole thing hung upon the recruiting, and upon this he would quote what General Russell said:—
  "The recruiting difficulty is at the bottom of all our Army troubles and embarrassments; it is the principal cause of our great expenditure in proportion to results as compared with foreign armies. It hampers our Army training; it impairs our efficiency; it imposes endless trammels on the hands of our officials connected with Army administration, be they military or civilian, in that it is the great difficulty we have to solve, and until solved all so-called schemes of Army reform must be in the future, as they have been in the past, snares and delusions."
  The difficulty of the recruiting arose from the fact that they wanted more man than the country was willing to supply, and the War Office proposed to solve this difficulty by asking for more still. The normal amount of men available was 25,000, and when more then this number was required then the pay had to be increased, which was a good thing, and the standard had to be lowered, which was bad. He also thought that during the war the War Office lost a great opportunity. The one thing this war had shown was the value of intelligence and character and men of intelligence and character could only be attracted by improving the conditions of service and raising the pay, but we were still recruiting from the same class as before. Upon this point he would just quote the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting:—
  "Besides this, the annual net desertions—it is no use blinking the fact—amount to about 2,500; and the total wastage of men per annum

  529
  amounts to something like 50 per cent. of the annual contingent. Thus it is no exaggeration to say that of the 35,000 recruits who should annually arrive in fit physical condition to keep our Army up to its normal and sufficient strength, we only get about half the number of good men; the rest are mere expensive trash."
  The Government were packing their Army Corps with "expensive trash," and then come down to this House and boast of their success in raising recruits. He wished to point out the dilemma in which the War Office had landed themselves. The men enlisted for three years, with power to extend their service, in which case they would receive an extra sixpence. The idea was, he supposed, to pass as many men as possible into the Reserve many men as possible into the Reserve. But they could not pass men into the Reserve and provide men for the foreign drafts at the same time. If a sufficient number of men were not induced by this extra sixpence to extend their term of service the War Office would be absolutely unable to furnish their foreign drafts and the whole system came to the ground. It was a gamble on a sixpence; the whole fate of the British Empire turned upon a sixpence. Here he would mention a quotation from an article by Lord Roberts:—
  "We are sacrificing our Army to obtain a Reserve.… Any attempt to make the Foreign Service Army subservient to the Reserve must end in failure, and I confidently predict, in disgrace and disaster."
  AN HON. MEMBER: That was in 1884.
  MR. CHARLES HOBHOUSE: 1881.
  *MR. BECKETTsaid that in any case it was repeated on Lord Roberts' authority in 1900. But he might be asked—"What is your scheme? You propose to pull down; how do you propose to build up?" He submitted that in his diagnosis of the disease he had sufficiently indicated the nature of the remedy that he would suggest. In any case, it was not his present business to propound the remedy. Once the principle was accepted, the details Would fall into their proper places. If his right hon. friend did him the honour to consult him, he would give him a broad outline of the details of his scheme, but the present was not the time or place to produce them. That scheme had been
  530
  adopted after careful consideration of the circumstances, and the most severe criticism by skilled experts; its supporters did not trust to their own wisdom. He wished the question could be decided on its merits, unexposed to the undertow of Party currents. It was a national issue of the highest importance, and these were issues in which the crack of the Party whip ought not to be heard or, if heard, disregarded. No doubt the Prime Minister, in eloquent and moving terms, would make an appeal to his followers, and such was the charm the right hon. Gentleman invariably exercised, that he had no doubt that appeal would not be make in vain. He (the speaker), however, appealed not to Party, but to a principle—the principle that there were times when it was the duty of every Member of the House to let national interests over-ride Party obligations. There was not one of their trusted leaders, either past or present, who had not, at one or another period of his career, acted on that principle, and what had been right for them in the past could not be wrong for us in the present.
  He therefore asked the House to vote against the scheme of his right hon. friend on the following grounds: that it involved a huge expenditure without adequate result; that its cost, compared with that of the Navy, was altogether out of proportion to the national requirements from the two services; that it annually demanded a huge sum of money which ought either to be saved to the taxpayers or spent on the Navy; that its organisation was not adapted to the work it had to do, and would infallibly break down under the crucial test of war; that it did not provide an expeditionary force or a real reserve; that it was unsuited to hte protection of the Empire and was no safeguard against the invasion of this country; that it was too small to contend with the conscript armies of the Continent, and too large for expeditionary purposes in distant parts fo hte world; that it failed to remove the defects rendered apparent by the late war, and left untouched the great organisation in which those defects had their source and origin; that its numbers did not exist except on paper,

  531
  and could not be obtained except at an inordinate cost; in a word, that it was unsound in principle, ruinous in practice, and ought to be swept away, abandoned, and replaced by another scheme under which the country would have a force which would meet and fulfil the requirements of the Empire, without laying too great a burden on the resources of the nation.
  *MAJOR SEELY, in seconding the Amendment, said that Members on his side of the House fully realised the gravity of speaking and voting for this Amendment to the Address, but they were taking their present course because they believed the matter to be above and beyond all Party considerations. Their objections to the proposals of the Secretary of State were not as to details, but were fundamental, and ought not to be in any way affected by Party. He entirely dissociated himself from any personal attack upon any man, except in so far as that man was identified with the system embodying such faulty principles. The strong step of moving this Amendment, and carrying it to a division, was being taken because its supporters believed that the faulty principles to which he referred would end by landing the country in national disaster. They had not forgotten that only two and a half years ago that national disaster seemed very near, and they believed that the policy now being pursued, so far from leading towards a solution of the difficulties, was making it more likely that if troubles arose in future we should be even less prepared to meet them than in the past. As a humble student of military affairs, he supported the Amendment on four main grounds. The first was that the country was now committed to spending as much on the Army as on the Navy. In this year's Estimates the amount for the Army was slightly less than that for the Navy, but by the present scheme more would have to be spent on the Army than on the Navy.
  *THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. BRODRICK,)dissented.
  MAJOR SEELYthought the right hon. Gentleman would find that when he had all his forces complete, the cost would amount to more than was being spent on the Navy. In declaring this to be an unsound policy, he did not quite agree with the mover of the Amendment in saying that if the Navy were supreme we required no Army at all at home. He thought that that was not a sound thesis.
  *MR. BECKETT: I never said that.
  *MAJOR SEELYbelieved it would be a disastrous day for this country if such a view obtained. He understood his hon. friend's view to be that the defence of the country must be entrusted, not to a Regular Army, paid all the year round, but to a body of citizens who received only the few shillings that they were paid during the time they were training. Of that he would speak later. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean had always held that the rank and file of an army could be improvised at a moment's notice. We had had good reason to know that, given the initial skill with the weapon and the necessary patriotism, an army could be improvised in two small States to overcome which required a force of 250,000 men from England. But a fleet could not possibly be improvised; it took years to build; consequently he thought the general proposition might be laid down that as long as we lived on an island, with a widely scattered Empire, whatever was spent on the Navy, far less must be spent on the Army, Therefore, as a navy could not be improvised, while an army to a large extent could be, any scheme which proposed to spend as much on the Army as on the Navy was based on a wrong principle and would have to be abandoned.
  His second thesis was that the Government were endeavouring to create too large a Regular Army. It was too large because it was beyond the power of our purse. Taxation has reached the limit to which it was safe to go; therefore, disagreeable though it might be, the fact had to be faced.

  533
  Apart from that, the Army was beyond our needs. What were the three Army Corps for foreign service for? For three Army Corps to attack any white nation was impossible. One evident lesson of the late war was that to attack any white people in the world would require, not three, but probably thirty, Army Corps. Three Army Corps were utterly inadequate to wage war on any foreign country, and to commence a struggle on that basis would infallibly end in failure. What else could they be for? Surely not for fighting against black races? It was not suggested that to meet the Mad Mullah, or any of the black races with whom this country was occasionally brought into conflict, would require so great a force as 100,000 men. It might be said that they were to keep this country from invasion. He would lay down a cardinal principle, and once this was adopted he believed all their difficulties would vanish, and that was that the force established for the defence of this country from invasion, whether that contingency was likely or unlikely, or whether they wanted, 1,000 men or 5,000,000, was not the affair of the Regular Army, but of the citizen Army of this country. Therefore he could not see himself what these three Army Corps for foreign service were for, still less could one see what the other three Army Corps were for. There could be no doubt of the great expense they would entail.
  There was another reason, for holding that they were asking for too large an Army, namely, that they were asking for numbers which went beyond the limits of voluntary recruiting. It must be apparent to every one conversant with recruiting that they were not getting the class of men they desired to enlist. Of the recruits obtained those who had the necessary physique to go through the arduous training to which they were subjected, and those who had the character to resist the many temptations of the soldier, had done them yeoman service in South Africa, and this he knew well, for he had served there, side by side with them. They were now obtaining a very large number of men who would never be able to take the field. He had not been able to
  534
  ascertain the precise number of men who proceeded to the late war from our home battalions, but he knew that little more than half of the full strength of the home battalions proceeded to the war in South Africa. That showed that they were keeping up a system of sham. It was no good pretending that they had a battalion when they had not got it; and they would find when war came and they had only got half of a battalion to go to the war, they would have to make some other arrangements, or else confess that they had only got the half, and not try to make out that they had got the Whole. He knew what was in the minds of many persons at the War Office and people elsewhere. They thought—and they were most patriotic persons—that if they set down this high standard of the number of troops required, and if at the same time they could, by imposing a rather rigid standard upon voluntary troops, get rid of them, that in a moment of trouble the nation would say: "We cannot get the men we require by voluntary means; let us resort to conscription." He would respectfully submit that that was the counsel of folly. To attempt to fill their foreign service Army, to garrison Madras or to fight the Mad Mullah; to allow the men to be severed altogether from their homes; and to say they were to attempt to obtain such an Army by conscription, was an attempt which was bound to fail, and it was a system which would not be accepted by any free country in the world, nor was it now accepted by any free country. He believed that the true path of safety of this country lay in every man being trained to arms, in whatever way was possible.
  Everyone who viewed what took place in South Africa, especially at the later stages of the war, must recognise the great danger of disregarding that first rule of national safety, the necessity of every man learning the use of his weapon, as every Englishman used to do in times gone by. Now our sense of responsibility and the need for self-sacrifice should be more than ever appreciated, but to suggest that you should fill up your foreign service Army by conscription did seem to him a counsel which was bound to end in complete failure. If they were to attempt to make an Army larger than voluntary enlistment would supply, then let them dispel altogether the idea that

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  there was this other way to get the men. Look the facts frankly in the face, and if they had only got 10,000 men fit for service call them a Division and not an Army Corps. He believed an hon. Member of that House once described bi-metallism as a principle by which they took a shilling and called it 1s. 6d. The present principle in regard to the Army Corps seemed to be to take a Division and call it an Army Corps, and it was claimed that by this principle they were immediately multiplying their force by three. He should have thought that probably that was not the case.
  The third ground on which they opposed this system was that not only were they spending too much money on their Army, but they were spending it in the wrong direction, because they had not got at the root of the trouble which cost them so much during the last war. They were spending more and more money on infantry battalions, upon men they obtained with difficulty, and which they obtained only by reducing the standard. They had not increased the Army in those essential things which bitter experience in South Africa had taught them was necessary. He accepted certain items of expenditure, for no doubt there were many things in which a great advance had been made. He should imagine that in the force to which he had the honour to belong an advance had been made, although the expenditure had been great. He accepted this case because it was only a small matter, and because the provision of mounted men in a country where people had practically ceased to ride, would always be a matter of the greatest difficulty and expense. He referred to that, because it seemed to him that a greater proportion of the Regular Army should be composed of mounted men, and the greater proportion should be composed of every sort and kind of men who had had special training which could not be given on the spur of the moment. But that was not all. They all knew that the War Office had been abused unfairly. They all knew very well that everything which had been laid at its door was not true. They knew perfectly well that the individuals at the War Office were endeavouring to do their best, but they also knew that a faulty system
  536
  existed there which wanted rooting out from the bottom to the top, and it was this system which prevented any man, however public spirited and determined he might be, from administering the affairs of the Army in a proper manner. A system prevailed there by which everyone meddled in everyone else's affairs, any by which officers who were specially directed to have control of certain affairs were constantly interfered with by others who had other duties to perform.
  *MR BRODRICK: Will my hon. friend give an instance?
  *MAJOR SEELYsaid he regretted that the right hon. Gentleman has asked for an instance, for he must give him a case which he was about to pass over. He was about to refer to the loss of Volunteers which had occurred in Great Britain, although they found that they did not get too many trained men for the late war. It struck them as curious that the same Minister who had been obliged to send men to South Africa who could not shoot to fight their battles should be the man who drove the few trained men they had from their ranks. He had been informed—and he awaited an explanation—of a certain Army Order which caused the bitterest offence amongst the Volunters of the country, and which was probably responsible for many resignations. The precise terms of this Order first became known to the officer principally concerned through the columns of the Press.
  *MR. BRODRICK: That is not so. That Army Order went through every channel, and had the opinion of every authority taken upon it before it got my signature.
  *MAJOR SEELYsaid if the right hon. Gentleman would make inquiries he thought he would find that he was in error in stating that the officers principally concerned were fully conversant with that Order.
  *MR. BRODRICK: I do not think these allegations should be made without giving us the facts. What officer principally

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  concerned was not aware of that Order before he saw it in the columns of the newspapers?
  *MAJOR SEELYsaid he thought he had explained that. He was alluding to the Inspector General of the Auxiliary Forces at the War Office. This was what he referred to when he said that there was a principle at the War Office by which everybody meddled in everybody else's business. They knew full well there were misunderstanding, and though the Order was understood. He was perfectly certain of his facts. It was obvious that this might have been a matter in which it was the precise phraseology employed which was unknown to the responsible officer, but it so happened that this phraseology had caused the whole trouble, and might cause further trouble in the future. He would not delay the House further on the matter of the lack of responsibility which rested upon individual officers. It existed in the field in South Africa, but by degrees that vicious system was eliminated whilst the men were on active service. At the beginning of the war their system of red tape hampered their movements, but by degrees a wiser system prevailed, and people were allowed, to use a vulgar phrase, to "run their own show" and the principle of "one man, one job" was adopted. He supposed that no one in the War Office would deny that that principle did not obtain there. Various Commissions had recommended that that principle should obtain at the War Office, and this country was determined that it should prevail.
  He had only one more word to say, and it was, to his mind, the chief objection to the present system that was before this House. They were confusing the functions of the foreign service Army with the functions of the home service Army. What were these six Army Corps composed of? Hon. members knew that they were composed, as to three of them, partly of Regular troops and partly of Volunteers. of Volunteers. That had most far-reaching results, and he believed it would cause more trouble to us than anything else. The foreign service Army, composed of Regular troops, had produced men who did us good service in time of war; our auxiliary Army had also produced men—who had done good service in time of war. It
  538
  had produced men not only from this country, but from every colony of the Empire, who had done good service, and their Regular brethren who had served with them side by side would admit that they were very similar to them in fighting capacity. The reason for this was not far to seek. It had been well pointed out that the qualities which the modern soldier required were courage, character, common-sense, and trust in his leader. They might obtain these essential qualities by different methods; one method was by taking a man when he was young, as was done in the Navy, and by training him in high ideals to withstand the awful ordeal of war. That it was an awful ordeal nobody would ever deny, because it could not be forgotten that nobody surrendered because he liked it. The auxiliary, by a totally different method, arrived at the same result, but it obviously was not an affair of whether there were to be five, or three, or two or four day's training. It was an affair of the sort of man he was, and whether he believed that his services were wanted, and whether he had the courage to offer them when the time came. But the Government were confusing two totally different things in these Army Corps. They seemed to say: "Our Regular troops need not be so rigidly disciplined as before; they can be a little bit more like the Volunteers, or the Volunteers must be made a little more like the Regulars." They were trying to convert the Volunteers into sham Regulars, and by a persistent policy of so doing they were alienating the sympathies of the Regular Army, who had reason to be annoyed that they should be placed in an Army Corps, having the same uniform and organisation with men who, though as good in time of war, yet only went to war in time of great national emergency, while the Regular soldier had to live in unhealthy countries and go to war fifty times for the auxiliary's once.
  See what effect it had on the auxiliary. The Volunteer was told, in the Order already referred to, that he had hitherto claimed to be taken seriously, and that, by implication, if he wanted to be taken seriously he must be something quite different from what he was before. Fresh regulations were laid down for him to make him appreciate in a greater or less degree what was required. What had been the result? They were losing

  539
  the very men they wished to retain. They were losing them by laying down a hard and fast standard of a certain number of days consecutive training. They were losing the very men of the character who had succeeded in civil life, and who were, therefore, most likely to succeed in war. If they were losing these men, what had they got in their place? It might be said that, after all, we did not want all these Volunteers. In fact he had heard it stated that we did not want as many Volunteers as we had got. It was a fact that the Volunteers were slowly dwindling form lack of sympathetic treatment. There could be no denying the fact that, if men who could not shoot had been sent to fight our battles in South Africa, it was madness to lose the trained men we had. When he returned with these facts burned deep into his mind, he went to every place in the constituency which he had the honour to represent and told the people that the unprepared state of the nation might land us in disaster. He suggested that skill in the use of the weapon was what every man should endeavour to attain. In a few months from that time there were formed eight rifle clubs, with 650 men.
  One argument which seemed to him very strong was that, if they approached the people sympathetically, there was nothing they would not do for the country. The hon. Member instanced the life-boat service, which he described as a singularly close parallel. There were always men ready to undertake that arduous and terrible work without any inducement except a few shillings. If that service were put under the Government at Pall Mall, he did not think the men would undertake the work for £60 a year. They would, he thought, want £100 every time they went out. If this was true of the men who were engaged in that service saving life, was it not possibly true also of those who would be willing to engage in saving the country from invasion or disaster? It seemed to him that they had been for a long series of years, which had only now culminated, pursuing a policy which was bound to lead us into disaster, simply because we would not trust in the people and make it easy for them to take up the burden they were anxious
  540
  to take up, and to fit themselves for whatever might be in store for them. Therefore he begged to second this Amendment. He urged hon. Members to regard this as a non-Party matter. If it were made a Party matter, it would be to him a cause of distress to vote against the Party to which he had given his support in its education policy, its South African policy, and in other ways; but still he asked the House to affirm that the Government had strayed from the straight path of national safety, that they must spend more upon the Navy, that they must reduce the Regular Army, and that in order to make the country safe they must appeal frankly to their countrymen to do their utmost to take up the burden which others had taken up. If the Government did so, he was convinced that they would not appeal to the people in vain, and that one day we should be the strongest nation in the world
  Amendment proposed, at the end of the Question, to add the words—
  "But we humbly regret that the organisation of the land forces is unsuited to the needs of the Empire, and that no proportionate gain in strength and efficiency has resulted from the recent increases in military expenditure."—(Mr. Beckett.)
  Question proposed, "That those words be there added."
  *SIR CHARLES DILKEsaid the Secretary of State for War at the present moment was perhaps a little badly treated by the House of Commons and the Press. He was going to admit that on the whole the right hon. Gentleman was an improving Secretary of State, but the improvement was sadly slow. Those who two or three years ago voted against the military scheme had no potion except to oppose it now. The real misfortune of the Secretary of State for War was that which had been told to the country by his former colleague the ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was a little hard on the Secretary of State that one who had collective responsibility for this scheme, which he supported two years ago by his vote, should nevertheless have entirely confirmed what was said by the opponents

  541
  of the scheme two years ago. The Chancellor of the Exchequer took the line that had been taken by the mover of the Amendment, and specifically stated that the Secretary of State had undertaken an impossible task. And in the verbatim report which appeared in the Western Daily Press—revised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer—he explained how this task was impossible. The right hon. Gentleman said:—
  "He (the Secretary for War) had to try to reform the administration of the Army and primarily of the War Office, and at the same time to conduct a great war. That could not be done."
  The experience of the last two years had entirely confirmed that view. He had made the admission that the Secretary for War was improving, as, for example, in adopting last year a greater elasticity in the conditions of service. Had the right hon. Gentleman not done so, where would have been his recruiting? If he was able to lay before the House an improvement in recruiting, it was due to his death-bed repentance of last year. The Secretary for War had not treated the House with fairness in regard to their knowledge of the present military position. They had not had the Preliminary Annual Return or the General Annual Return of the British Army since the year 1898, and these were the Returns on which all the official calculations were based, and, when pressed to give the House the facts before this debate, the right hon. Gentleman told them that he would give them in his speech.
  MR. BRODRICK: I had no knowledge that this debate was coming on until last Tuesday night, and I was only asked for the White Paper dealing with the position of the Army before the Army Estimates came on on Thursday. I have made every effort to comply with the wishes of the right hon. Gentleman.
  *SIR CHARLES DILKEsaid that he and others had taken great trouble to arrive at the facts relating to the Army, but they did not know them officially. Some of the military papers had published
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  what foreign nations called the order of battle, and others had published statements in regard to the First and Second Army Corps, and the number of men in the battalions.
  MR. BRODRICK: I deny that they are right.
  *SIR CHARLES DILKE: Well, they had made an estimate of the number of men at Aldershot and Salisbury Plain, but they should have had the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, and the Annual Return of the British Army, which had not been published since 1898. They should have had a Report of what number of men were trained, and what the proportion of them who were just-joined recruits. The Secretary of State said that these six Army Corps which he put before the House were real—as real as he said two years ago, when they were spoken of as phantom or paper corps. A late Secretary of State for War, who was still living, Mr. Gathorne Hardy, put before the House a scheme of eight Army Corps in 1876, and these figured in the Army List till 1881 as the official representation of what he called a Field Army, a part from garrisons. Almost the same phrase was used by the present Secretary for War. But these eight Army Corps were removed form the Army List in 1881, and declared to be phantoms. He would like to ask the Secretary for War how could he declare that the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Army Corps were any more real than the eight Army Corps or the later six Army Corps of Mr. Hardy's scheme, which were admittedly unreal? He believed the right hon. Gentleman would probably tell the House that some of the troops intended for these Army Corps were at present in South Africa, and that they would return in May. But even after these troops returned in May these Army Corps would still be what he had said in advance, two years ago, they would be. They would be no more real now than two years ago.
  The new Army reformers who had taken up the running, and, representing so many men sitting on the Benches opposite, had addressed the House with so much power, had adopted the

  543
  position that they desired to save money on the Army in order to spend more money on the fleet. In that position they came to the view of the old Army and Navy reformers represented by his hon. and gallant friend the Member for Great Yarmouth, who had never ceased to point out to the House that, considering the nature of our Empire, the House had spent too much money on passive defence. But when it was suggested that it was possible to save ten millions out of the Army Estimates, he had two observations to make. The one was that there was great risk that they might direct or tempt the Government to save in a wrong direction—such as in guns, armaments and stores. The other observation was that they would not be able to save that sum, or anything like it, except by revolutionary Army reform. His hon. friends opposite, perhaps, did themselves some injustice before the country in an under-statement of the cost to the British Empire of military and passive defence, on the cost of troops, and on the expenditure on the land forces as compared with the expenditure on the fleet. They had to remember the expenditure not only on the army in India, the Crown Colonies and the self-governed colonies, but the amount of the Civil Estimates under the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office for land forces. The War Office did everything they could to give colour to their view. They omitted from the figures submitted to the Colonial Conference the cost of the Indian Army and Navy—an omission so stupendous that he could not understand what defence could be offered for it.
  Another fact was that the War Office did not consult India on the changes they made last year, although the objections of the War Office to revolutionary Army reform had always been insisted upon, as it was, they declared, contrary to the interests of India, albeit India thought otherwise. Now, the normal peace cost from votes of Imperial defence—without any expenditure on expeditions or little wars of any kind, though such wars were always going on—was, without Supplementary Estimates, £60,845,000. There was a question whether they should or should not add the money spent from loans on military and naval works, so far as it was
  544
  additional to the annuities charged. That would amount to £2,500,000 for the Army, and £1,500,000 for the Navy, or a total of £4,000,000. Add the cost of the land military forces under the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office Votes in the Civil Estimates, now increased by the creation of the 3rd battalion of the West African Frontier Force, the expenditure on land forces in Crown colonies, in self-governed Colonies, and of the Navy in India and the Colonies, apart from the small Australasian and Cape grants for the Navy, which amounted to another £3,500,000, making in all £64,500,000 or £68,500,000, according to whether they did or did not include the loan money. The normal peace expenditure in India on land forces, according to the Report of the Indian Financial Commission, at the official rate of the rupee, was £17,000,000 more, but if they took the rupee as having, as the Treasury alleged, retained its spending value in India, then the charge on India would be £25,000,000 instead of £17,000,000. They thus attained to either £81,500,000, £85,500,000, £89,500,000 or £93,500,000, according to which way they settled the doubtful points. Out of this either about £31,000,000 or about £32,000,000 would be expenditure on the Navy, and the rest on land forces. Taking the smallest figures and the lowest possible computation, we spent £31,000,000 on the naval factor, primary in Imperial defence, and £50,500,000 on land forces. Some people seemed to think that the increase of the expenditure on the Army had ceased, that the increase on the Navy Estimates was more rapid than that on the Army Estimates, because the Navy Estimates had passed the figure of the Army. But if the increase of the last three years was looked at, it would be found that it had been vastly greater on the land forces than on the fleet. In all other countries, although called military empires, and although their Navy was not the first line of defence, the increase was taking place on the fleet. The expenditure on the Army in all these great military countries was a stationary expenditure; it was on the fleets that the increase was taking place. It was only in our case, although we called ourselves an Empire of the seas, where the greatest expenditure was re-

  545
  quired on the Navy, that our chief increase had been on the Army.
  Some people thought it was possible to obtain money from the colonies for the fleet, and that we must look forward to an expenditure we could not bear if we were not prepared to take strong measures to have contributions made up by the colonies. There was a chance of that when they expressed their readiness to do so a few years ago. But the opportunity which might then have been taken was lost and thrown away; and if there was still a chance of such a contribution being obtained on an adequate and effective scale, the way in which the Army and Navy told different stories at the Colonial Conference made it impossible of realisation. Without something like a revolutionary reform of the Army being undertaken, the present gigantic figures must be further swollen. The Army Corps scheme, as at present developed, had not had a full development. The expense would automatically increase year by year. At the present moment expense was being incurred in the conversion of the rifle, probably an unnecessary conversion; but, apart from such doubtful points of expenditure, there were points on which all men would agree that there must be a vast increase of expenditure under any scheme or in any circumstances. One had been already alluded to, namely the Intelligence Department. They had in the Military Intelligence Department twenty-three officers. The Germans had 250 officers in their Military Intelligence Departments. In the Army and Navy Intelligence Departments together—and the Navy required world-wide information—there were forty-one officers. That was a point on which expenditure would have to be increased.
  In the able series of articles which recently appeared in The Times—which he did not endorse in every particular, but with a great portion of which every Army reformer would agree—there was a proof of the weakness of our Intelligence Department which was the most striking he had ever read. The writer pointed out that England had an alliance with Japan. He was not concerned now to discuss the wisdom of that alliance, but they relied on Japan to supply naval and military forces in the event of operations in the extreme East. Would not any other Power which had such an alliance feel it incumbent
  546
  to have a number of officers in the Japanese Army and to receive Japanese officers in its own Army, which was the only way in which friction could be avoided? Yet there were only two or three British officers employed in Japan, and the Intelligence Department was so undermanned that it was impossible that it could be adequately represented in a matter of such vital interest. Besides such matters in which an increased expenditure much be incurred, whatever scheme was adopted, there would, he thought, be some further increase in pay, as, for instance, the pay of non-commissioned officers.
  Then there was the question of food. The Committee which considered the food of the Navy, which was better than the food of the Army, laid down the principle that it was not good enough, and that it should be improved. If the War Office wished to attract a desirable class of recruits to the Army it would have to provide better food; and it was even more desirable to make a man comfortable in that respect than to give higher pay. It was certain that there would have to be an increased expenditure on food. Then as to horses. Everyone would admit that the Army would have to keep up a larger number of horses. Although they had been so grotesquely extravagant, they were always striving to save money in the wrong direction. For example, they went into war without quick-firing guns. His hon. friend the Member for Islington was a great economist, and took an active part on the Committee which was moved for by the hon. Member for Oldham. Sir Ralph Knox, who had so great a part in the creation of the War Office as it was, it might be remembered, told the country that he prayed for the day when mobilisation would be ordered, as then the War Office would confound its enemies and accusers. Sir Ralph Knox, replying to his hon. friend, showed that the refusal of the War Office to accept the pressure of the House of Commons in connection with quick-firing guns had been due to opposition in the War Office itself. Colonel von Lindenau said, before the Military Society at Berlin, as an explanation of the early misfortunes of England in South Africa, that—
  "Great Britain discovered that the oldest weapons are the most expensive."

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  The whole matter had been brought home to the conscience of the nation and the House of Commons because of the increased, and rapidly increasing, cost of the present system, and also because the country and the House of Commons saw that whatever was done by individuals in gallant service in South Africa the Army did not fulfil the expectations entertained of it, and that the military system had practically broken down.
  The responsibility for change must rest on the Cabinet as a whole. A revolutionary reform of the Army could not be looked for to the War Office alone. If the House of Commons simply cut off the money, the War Office would not cut off expenditure in the manner desired. It was the Cabinet, as a whole, that could force the War Office into a better system. An hon. Member asked the Prime Minister the other day whether the observations of the Council of Defence—which the Prime Minister went out of his way to tell the country had been re-constituted two and a-half months ago—would be available in connection with the present year's Estimates, and whether there might be some result of the co-ordination of the two services, to which the House of Commons attached so much importance. The hon. Member and the House generally was disappointed when the right hon. Gentleman stated that the Estimates for the present year had been prepared before the re-organisation of the Council of Defence; and it would, therefore, be thirteen months before they saw on the Estimates any good results from the co-ordination of expenditure between the two services, which the House of Commons and the country so thoroughly desired. He himself was not disappointed in that part of the Prime Minister's reply in which he said that, of course, the Cabinet could not be responsible for the details of the Estimates. Of course it could not. They could not take the responsibility for the details away from the Financial Secretary to the War Office, or from the Secretary to the Admiralty; but what the Cabinet could do, and what the House of Commons expected it to do, was to lay down, as general principles, what he believed the majority of hon. Members were agreed upon; that the expenditure
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  on the Army was only a sign of the unfitness of the system of which they complained, and that the primacy of the Navy should be secured. Departments were rather apt to shuffle off responsibility from one to the other. Some of them thought that their responsibility was actually to the House of Commons itself. Before the Hartington Commission, in 1888, Sir George Tryon said—
  "The responsibility of the strength of the Navy rests with Parliament, and not with naval men."
  He himself thought that the responsibility rested with the Cabinet, for it was the Cabinet alone which had full knowledge before it, and which could accept the general guidance and direction of Parliament, which Parliament would try to give it. Before the Committee on National Expenditure there were allusions to "the limit" of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which was the oldfashioned system of telling the Army and the Navy that they must not exceed a certain figure. When Mr. Smith was Secretary of State for War he said that the Chancellor of the Exchequer informed him that he would have to take off half-a-million. That was not the way in which they wanted the Cabinet to proceed in the future. The general guidance of the House of Commons had now been pretty freely expressed, and the Cabinet should show that it had some notion where it was going, and of the principles which guided it. The late Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, he was afraid, was in the old rut on this question, declared that the Army should not be allowed to go beyond £30,000,000, and that he did not see why there should be an increase in the shipbuilding Vote. He did not think that that would suit the House of Commons at all.
  The old revolutionary reformers and the new reformers always recognised the primacy of the Navy in Imperial defence, and held that it was what the country could afford to spend on defence, over and above that which was necessary for the Navy, that must be allotted to the Army. It was held, too, that in the Army the preference in expenditure should be given to the active, striking forces, as compared with other arms who could not go abroad. He was

  549
  sure the country would never grudge expenditure on the Navy or on a small effective Army suited to the needs of India and our Empire. On these points there was, he believed, general concurrence, however Members might vote in the division, in the principles which had been put forward by the reformers in their recent speeches in the country. The War Office clung too strongly to a policy of which they had a large example in the course of the Colonial Conference, and a small example in the correspondence between the Secretary for War and the States of Jersey which was published in Jersey last Tuesday, the day on which the States met. The right hon. Gentleman told the States that unless they adopted the conscript Militia, of 1,800 men, they having offered 1,000, he should take away the garrison. The States having come over to his terms, the right hon. Gentleman wrote, under date February 13th, that the defence of Jersey would be recognised, and the present garrison would remain, conditionally on the new Militia Bill being accepted. The Secretary for War then, as in the document laid before the Colonial Conference, begged the whole question of the command of the sea. The question of invasion lay at the bottom of all the talk of conscription, and this question affected the number of Regulars at home, as it did also the linked battalion system. The linked battalion system, though beautiful in theory, had never worked in practice, and probably never would. The endeavour to have one battalion at home for every battalion abroad led to the Mediterranean being counted as being at home, and then Egypt, and now it was proposed to count South Africa. Perhaps some day India would be counted as being at home. The Secretary for War told them last year that in hit scheme he allowed for the permanens retention of twelve battalions, or 15,000 men, in South Africa; but now, in answer to a question, he said that 30,000 would remain there.
  MR. BRODRICK: I said temporarily.
  *SIR CHARLES DILKEsaid he did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman expected to reduce the
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  30,000 men to twelve battalions by March; if not his scheme would be further broken into. The working of the linked battalion system reminded him of The Times average of harvests in this country; every year The Times published as statement as to how much the harvest was above or below average, and if they looked back for fifty years they would find that the harvest had always been below average. The normal year of the system never came. He had no doubt the right hon. Gentleman would be able to tell them that recruiting had improved owing to the adoption of the the three years service. But he believed a year's service for our Regulars could be worked so as further to swell our Reserves in time of war. Some were afraid that such troops would be Militia; but it must be remembered that Frederick the Great fought battles with an infantry—always recongnised as among the finest that had ever fought—the overwhelming mass of whom were Prussian Militia with one year's service. Of course, the men must be sandwiched with men of greater experience, and there must be a professional type of officer such as we could and must create Mounted troops, of course, could not be too well trained, but, as regards infantry, a great deal could be done with short service with professional officers.
  A book had recently been published describing the training of officers at the military college of West Point. Comparing the Sandhurst system and Sandhurst results with the West Point, the results of the Sandhurst training contrasted unfavourably with those of the West Point Academy in regard to the professional nature of the officer. Our officers were gallant, and had often redeemed what might have been great disasters in South Africa, but no man could shut his eyes to the fact that our officers were not professional in the sense that they might easily be made out of the material we had in this country. The moral of this Motion was the country wanted to get what it paid for. It was willing to pay, as it did, and enormous amount of money provided that was assured. He did not see how the words of the Amendment could be denied; they were true. He

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  was convinced that for a remedy they must look, not to the energy or administrative ability of this or that general or statesman, but to the House of Commons, which could influence great politicians to take a vital interest in the question. He hoped the Prime Minister would rise to the height of the responsibility which the present attitude of the House of Commons threw upon him.
  *MR. BRODRICK: The right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down began his speech by referring to what appeared to him my misfortune in being made the subject of attack in many quarters on the question of the condition of the Army. If I had been free from such attacks, I should be different from every one of my predecessors, from Lord Cardwell downwards, who have ever attempted to do anything for the Army. The only possible way for a Minister standing in my place to stand absolved from severe criticism and attack is to leave things absolutely as they are, to allow the Army to drift, and to be content to leave it to those who come after him to fill up gaps which have arisen during his term of office. From the moment I took up the position in which I now am, I felt that, at whatever personal cost, that line was one which neither the duty I owed to this House nor the expectations of the country could allow a Minister to adopt at the present time. But I am fortunate in this that, at all events tonight, we are challenged by a direct vote on a direct issue of broad policy, and not one of small personal objections or of details on which so many debates in this House have proceeded — but on an issue going to the root of the matter. I say I am fortunate in that. And why? Because no two of my critics ever agree on any single proposition which is put forward in criticism before the House. My hon. friend the mover of the Amendment laid down as one of the foremost points of his argument, that with the existence of a powerful Navy we did not meed to provide specially for home defence. [Cries of "No."]
  *MR. BECKETT: Not by a Regular Army.
  *MR. BRODRICK: He went further than that, because my hon. friend the seconder took occasion to dissent from him.
  *MR. BECKETT: I corrected him.
  *MR. BRODRICK: All I can say is, I stand on the recollection of the House as to what my hon. friend said.
  *MAJOR SEELY: I accepted the correction.
  *MR. BRODRICK: His proposition in the first place was against the necessity of sending a Regular Army abroad; and secondly, he discussed the various positions that a regular army might occupy abroad; and then he came to another defence at home, and I imagine that he has only now joined the Member for the Isle of Wight if he says he is prepared to rely on citizen soldiers for that army. If that is his proposition, how does it square with the proposition of the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean, who, supporting the Amendment from an entirely different standpoint, said that for the defence at home he was afraid of cutting down?
  *SIR CHARLES DILKE: No.
  *MR. BRODRICK: He was afraid the Government would cut down exactly the force it was most necessary to maintain.
  *SIR CAHRLES DILKE: No, I said there might be a danger of cutting down that which ought not to be cut down—stores, guns, and horses. I did not mean the defence at home.
  *MR. BRODRICK: But stores, guns, and horses are exactly the items which make the increase in the Vote. What the right hon. Gentleman has always pressed on the House are the artillery of the Regular Army for defence in Great Britain. which my hon. friends the Member for Whitby and the Member for the Isle of Wight declare to be unnecessary. There is an absolute divergence between the two. The right hon. Baronet laughs at that.
  *SIR CHARLES DILKE: Yes, because I have urged an increase of field artillery, but never for the purpose of home defence.
  *MR. BRODRICK: I beg the right hon. Baronet's pardon. He, among many others, was urgent in pressing on the Government when our large force had gone to South Africa that we were left without home defence in artillery.
  *SIR CHARLES DILKE: I have pressed two things. I have pressed for an increase of field artillery, but not for home defence, and with regard to home defence I have suggested a mixed system of Volunteer field artillery—with some partially paid men.
  *MR. BRODRICK: In that case the right hon. Gentleman differs from those who have spoken to-day in that he does not think the field artillery of the three Army Corps that we have, and which we sent to South Africa, is sufficient, because he thinks a larger field artillery is necessary for striking purposes abroad. But that is exactly the proposition disputed by the hon. Member for Whitby, and also by the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight. ["No."] You cannot under any circumstances bring the opinions of any two critics into line with each other. Take those who have chiefly criticised the War Office scheme in the course of the last few months. We have heard to-night those who think that the Regular forces are too many. I remember many eloquent speeches of the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth who considers that our force for striking abroad is not too large, but, if anything, too small. That school of thought may not be popular at this moment, but there was a moment two years ago, as I will point out directly, when it was not only popular, but it was the only voice heard in this House. Then again, the hon. Member who addressed us so movingly about the Volunteers, told us we should depend on a citizen army. I was struck by those speeches, because I do not believe that any man of military training will get up and tell us that if this country is to be defended at all—of course if there is no question of defence, if the Navy can entirely preserve us, then it is immaterial to consider whether the 200,000 Volun-
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  teers are trained or not. But if we do contemplate any active resistance by Volunteers, then I say there is no man of military training who will stand up in this House and tell us that we can depend on a mass of Volunteers, not sufficiently equipped with artillery, not supported by regular cavalry, and not trained up to the point which the Commander-in-Chief, or any other military authority of weight, considers would entitle them to be put into the field to meet a foreign force, without that further training which my hon. friend the Member for the Isle of Wight denounced the Government for having tried to impose. You cannot have both propositions at once. I would remind the House that among our critics there is a very considerable school of thought who consider that we are asking too much of the Volunteers, and that we ought to replace that demand on the Volunteers by using the ballot for the Militia, and not merely place on the men who will serve an additional liability in order to compensate for those who will not. Those are propositions which it is not possible for a Minister of War to bring into line.
  Once more, we have heard a good deal about the recruiting difficulty. On that I should like to say a word, and give the fullest statistics to the House. Nearly every proposition which has been put forward entirely loses sight of the recruiting difficulty. An able writer in The Times has distributed the Army according to his taste and fancy. He has put a large number of men in South Africa, more in Australia, more in Canada, and more in India; but it does not seem to have occurred to him that out of 180,000 men he has planted 140,000 out of this country, so that every man the moment his recruit-drills are over would be spending the whole of his service outside the United Kingdom. I can only say I have to look at these matters, not from the point of view of some ideal scheme, but from the point of view of what you can do with a voluntary Army. If I were to rely on all the diverse exhortations and inconsistent advice I have received to-night, and on other occasions, I should have to declare that in a multitude of counsellors there is not wisdom, but chaos. What I cannot but feel is that I have a right to ask House to go

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  back, first of all, to the circumstances under which the Army was re-organised, and to consider what has happened since then to cause so radical a change in the opinion which has been expressed this afternoon. I should never have thought that the experience of the Boer War, bitter as it was, could have been so speedily forgotten. I cannot say that I feel that in any one of the expressions which fell from my two hon. friends there appeared to be any recollection whatever of the straits to which we were put for Regular forces in 1899 and 1900. What was the impeachment of the Government? I was not then Secretary for War, but I believe I heard every word of every debate in this House, and certainly no one read more of what was published in the country. What was the impeachment of the Government—not from one side only, but from all sides? It was that we had no larger force of Regulars to send to South Africa, that we had not sufficient supplies for an army of 200,000 when we had never professed to send abroad more than 70,000; and, still more and constantly, that what forces were left at home were without artillery and without organisation, which the War Office ought to have provided even after the 200,000 men had gone abroad. No man voiced that general feeling of the country more eloquently, or more continuously than did Lord Rosebery. I hope the House will allow me by a few very brief quotations to support the views which have been so much forgotten this afternoon. Lord Rosebery, speaking on 15th February, 1900, used these words:—
  "I do not think the Government have the faintest notion of how in the country, in the streets, in any place where men congregate, the feeling of crisis, of over-burdening crisis, of constant danger, is present to the minds of men. I call for timely measures; this"—and he repeated it three times—"is a matter of life and death to the country."
  Contrast that with the language used tonight by my hon. friends the Member for Whitby, who read to us a quotation, I believe twenty years old, from Lord Roberts, saying that Lord Roberts never contemplated that the Regular Army would be sent in large numbers abroad; and my hon. friend thought, after our experience of two years ago and after that crisis, that an opinion expressed
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  twenty years ago, before many of these Transvaal questions had ever arisen or attained the position they finally did, governed the matter. Again, my hon. friend spoke of the Indian frontier as a bug-bear, and he cited, amidst the approving cheers of the Opposition, the statement of a Russian general who had spoken to him and who had treated it from that standpoint. I hardly think that those citations were worthy of the dignity of the rest of his speech. In any case I do not think that they can be conclusive to the House of Commons. It was not only Lord Rosebery who called us to account in this matter, and said that our forces were not sufficiently great. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, speaking on 12th, February 1900, said:—
  "We hear no complaint of the manner in which that Army of 180,000 men has been sent to the other end of the world without hitch or difficulty, an army well found, well fed, well armed, well hospitalled—if I may coin a word—with all that is required for them. All that can be said of the present Army is that it is not large enough for the task it is called upon to perform."
  At that moment we had either sent to South Africa, or there were leaving the country, 120,000 Regular soldiers, and before we concluded the war we had to send 130,000 more. Now I am impeached, and even by the right hon. Gentleman himself last year, for providing 120,000 men to go abroad in certain contingencies, and for being prepared to keep up the necessary drafts for them. Let those who doubt whether that represents the present feeling of the country recollect what occurred later in the war. When we had got on to the month of August, just before Parliament adjourned, a very serious speech was delivered by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Fife, who fell in with both the Leaders in the Upper House and in this House, and said that—
  "Although the Government had sent an enormous force, we wished to be assured that there would remain in the circle of military action, for the purpose of concluding the war, such a force of mobile and efficient troops as were adapted to the end in view."
  At that moment nearly 200,000 troops had left this country; and yet tonight 120,000 men are looked upon as a grandiose provision, got up by a Minister who is making a splash by providing

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  Army Corps which can never possibly be used. I go on four months further—to November, 1901. I was then responsible. I can remember that there was hardly a newspaper, certainly not a public speaker, who did not allude at that moment—when matters had not proceeded well for some months in the Transvaal—to the fact that we were come apparently to the end of our resources, and vehemently attack and impeach the Government for their supineness in not having provided a larger number of Regular troops. I was pressed at that time to go and make a speech in the City of London; and I remember perfectly well the effect created that next day when I was able to assure the country that we could still send, if necessary, 50,000 Regulars. And we did send between 30,000 and 40,000 more Regulars before the close of the war. I put this crucial question. My hon. friend the Member for Chester is going to invite the House to declare that the amount spent on the Army is excessive. I should like to know whether my hon. friend would have gone to his constituency in the election of 1900 and put that proposition before them. If he would, I will undertake to say I would have stood against him in his constituency and have turned him out by a large majority.
  *MR. YERBURGHsaid it was quite true that the proposition as put by his right hon. friend would not be accepted by the people of Chester; but the point they were making was, not that they were not to provide a large army in the course of conducting a great war, but that they were not entitled in times of peace to overload the country with taxation.
  *MR. BRODRICK: We are to have the men in time of war; we are not to provide them in time of peace. We are to declare in this House what we will do if we are attacked, but we are not to ask for supplies to make good our position. I am afraid my hon. friend would not convince his constituents if anybody who takes the view I do had an opportunity of expounding the other side of the question. What is the other side of the question? The reason why we are
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  impeached tonight is not because we have provided a large army abroad only, but because we have organised our forces at home. Now, there was nothing on which so strong a feeling was expressed two years ago as on our want of organisation at home. Every speaker who attacked the Government spoke in that sense from both sides of the House. Lord Rosebery complained: "How was the body of 409,000 men in this country composed and organised?" The right hon. Gentleman complained that all the staffs were "scratch" which had been sent out, and those who followed him complained that no staffs, "scratch" or otherwise, were left at home. My hon. friend the Secretary to the Admiralty, one of the severest critics of the Government in military matters for many years, said that the whole Army had gone out of the country, and the problem was to make an army to take its place. My hon. friend the Secretary to the Treasury said—what I am bound to repeat because I believe it represented the views of nearly everybody at that time—"What we want in the country now is an army, and not a mob." The proposal of my hon. friend the Member for the Isle of Wight, who has attacked us for having attempted to organise the Volunteers is that we should rely, not on an army, but on a mob. (Cries of "No.")
  *MAJOR SEELY: So gross a perversion of my words I must ask the House to be permitted to gainsay. I said that if you frankly approach the people of this country they will organise themselves, not into a mob, but into a most formidable force. I never suggested a mob.
  *MR. BRODRICK: They must be organised. If you are to organise you must allow the military authorities to have something to say to the organisation. Nobody denies that the Volunteers are a most valuable, a most self-denying, and a most important force in an organisation for home defence; but if the military authorities say you require something more than they can give, then we are told they are being discouraged. The attack my hon. friend made was on the system by which the Volunteers are asked to give some additional services, in order to form the first line of defence

  559
  side by side with the Regulars; and I join issue with him because he used an expression which I do not think is justified, either by the attitude of the Volunteers or of the Regulars. He said twice that the Regulars were annoyed at being joined by the Volunteers. I am quite certain of this — that those reflections are unjustified. We have had no difficulty whatever in getting the Volunteers who have joined the Field Army Corps to give the service which it is necessary for them to do in order to take their part in the organisation. We have had a difficulty to bring a body of Volunteers upon whom large demands have been made. We must discuss that question more at length than I can do it now. I can only say that in every respect sympathetic treatment will be given to the Volunteers. We cannot expect to keep their numbers up to the full numbers at which they arrived during the excitement of the war; but to suppose that anything will be done to prejudice or permanently to reduce the normal numbers of that great force is, I am quite sure, to misunderstand the desires of those who are now advising me.
  Now the position we are come to is this. We are attacked to-night for the large numbers we have sent abroad; we are also attacked for the organisation at home. The right hon. Gentleman told the House the other night that the Army Corps Scheme was a panic scheme. Well, Sir, I am quite certain the view which I represent to the House, the view that we were short of Regulars, the view that we were not organised at home, did not simply represent the panic of any Minister, but they were repeated over the whole year with so great a continuity and force that I am entitled to believe they represented, at all events at that time, the determined judgment of the nation; and I think the Government who have undertaken this task of Army reform are entitled to take the experience of 1899 and 1900, to some degree, with regard to the measures which they have now put before the House. Now, I want to clear away one fallacy. It is supposed that the great increase of expense, the great increase in numbers, is due to this Army Corps Scheme. That is not the case in the least. These Army Corps are only the organisation of the forces already existing. We filled
  560
  up the deficiencies of mounted troops; we filled up the supplies, the deficiency of which had been made apparent in 1900.
  But if there is anybody responsible for the considerable increases which have been made in the numbers of our military forces, it is those who in this House pressed upon the Government year after year, with great force, that the weakness of our home battalions prevented their efficiency; that their numbers had not grown with the work which they were called upon to perform abroad; that there was deficiency in field artillery, to which the right hon. Gentleman called attention time after time; that our cavalry regiments were not sufficiently strong in men or in horses; that the departmental corps had been starved. These propositions were brought forward by military Members of this House over and over again, and I acknowledged the force with which they pressed these considerations on the Government. Now, the action taken with regard to them was not dictated either by the Boer War, or by fear of the Boer War. Of the 54,000 men who have been added to the Regular troops since 1896, 6,000 were added in 1897; 17,000 in 1898, before there was any question of the Boer War; 25,000 were added in 1900—at that time there was, undoubtedly, a call by the country for a largely increased force, and a complaint was universally made that the number was not greater—and in 1901, when I introduced the Army Corps Scheme, there was an addition of 5,000 men. It is absolutely impossible to charge to the Army Corps Scheme more than 5,000 out of the 54,000 men added to the regular Army in the last six years.
  Now, Sir, I am afraid I must trespass for some little time on the House, but there are considerable questions of policy with which I have to deal. What was the object of the Army Corps Scheme? I cannot describe it any more clearly than I attempted to do when I first introduced it to the notice of the House. As regards the troops, it was not a scheme for adding enormously to the Army, but it was a scheme to establish a standard up to which we could work, and by which we could know what re-

  561
  mained to be done. When hon. Members see the white Paper which was circulated today, they can see that it will show in normal times—these are scarcely yet normal times—exactly what units are included in each Army Corps; and Parliament can at any moment say, "We are not prepared to vote so many corps. We do not need this amount." Nothing had been done, nothing has been prepared, which prevents the authority of Parliament from being exercised in that manner. The main portion of our business was to organise districts and to obtain a large measure of decentralisation. That, at all events, has been accomplished. If the troops have to be employed in war they will no longer be hastily gathered together under a number of different commands, and under officers whom they have never seen before. The men will come from the same command. The stores and clothing they require are with them, and they have not got to be sent for in a hurry from Woolwich and embarked, perhaps, on different ships. The proper proportion of various arms are being brought together in the various commands wherever we have to fight, except on very small expeditions; and this is the chief thing, if ever again we have to send a great force abroad, the organisation is now being established which will at least give us the nucleus of an organisation at home.
  Now I am asked to say how this business is proceeding, and I would ask the House in all fairness to recollect that this scheme only obtained the assent of Parliament twenty-one months ago. It is only in the last eight months that the war has been over. During the whole of that time, whatever view you may take of the War Office, you can hardly deny that it has been subjected to a strain such as no Department of this country has ever before undergone. Therefore, though I claim that the scheme is far advanced, I am the last man to say that that, or anything else connected with the Army, has yet become perfect. First let me say one word as to the term "Army Corps," on which so much language has been expended. I believe that term to be a convenient term, because, if you call a body of 30,000 troops a Division, When
  562
  it is four or five times the size of a Division you come to a nomenclature which is inappropriate. I believe the term is consonant with the collection of troops which we bring together under the name, but the actual term is itself unimportant as compared with the organisation which it represents—the gathering together of the proper number of each command under the same commander, and the giving to one man the power to overlook and oversee all the generals under him in his own district. Of course a great deal has been made of the term as a slavish imitation of foreign countries. I might say with regard to that, that in the introduction, and even in the debates, of this system, the whole question was tried by our own experience and our own requirements, and I am a little inclined to accept what fell from the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition the other day, when he stated that he did not think there was much to be gained in exchanging sneer for sneer with some of our foreign neighbours. I think, therefore, that one or two recent speeches, in which these Army Corps were jibed at on the ground that they were of German origin, might well have been omitted, the more especially as the smallest exploration of history would have satisfied anybody that, Army Corps were not of German origin, that all the commanders at the beginning of last century—including Wellington, who had two commanders of Army Corps at Waterloo—took their inspiration from the Emperor Napoleon, who, whatever else has been said of him, has never been alleged to have been a German. I can only say that I stand by all that we undertook in this matter, and I will give the House briefly the result so far as we have gone. These districts have been organised in three instances. We propose to put Lord Grenfell in charge of the fourth on the 1st of April. [Laughter]. That merriment is partially caused by the fact that an uninstructed speaker said the other day that Lord Grenfell would have nothing to command but himself, though, no doubt, he was a host in himself. Apart from other units, there are at this moment in the district to be commanded by Lord Grenfell no less than 90 battalions. Of course a large number

  563
  of them are Volunteers, but there is nothing in the world that we desire so much as to bring our highest military officers directly into contact and make them directly responsible for these large numbers of battalions of Volunteers. There is nothing we care so much for as the advice we have received from the commanders of the Army Corps as to the relative value of the auxiliary forces in their districts, and I am quite certain that the charge we are giving to Lord Grenfell would be considered worthy of the acceptance of a general of his position in any country.
  What is the result as it stands? We have organised these districts. The barracks are not yet complete in some of them. These barracks, however, I would remind the House, are not the wasteful expenditure which my hon. friend the hon. Member for Whit by represented. It is simply an expenditure to house troops already voted by Parliament. If Parliament reduces the number of troops, then the barracks will not be required. But as long as we have the troops we have a right to come to the House for barracks for them, and those barracks, as long as I have anything to do with the matter, will be placed where the different proportions of the different arms can be advantageously grouped together for common training. It is said that although we may organise these corps, we cannot keep up their strength by voluntary recruiting. I confess that the question of recruiting has given me, like every preceding Minister of War, the greatest anxiety at different times. Our normal recruiting used to be 35,000 a year. In 1900, under the stress of war, it went up to 45,000, and in 1901, it was about 46,000, in each case with a lowered standard. The larger numbers in those two years were probably prompted by the excitement at the moment, and the keenness of young men to offer their services during an emergency. I told the House last year that we required 50,000 men, not to carry out my scheme, but to secure the number of recruits necessary to keep up the number voted by Parliament in 1897, 1898, 1899 and 1900. I have seen it stated all over the country, that the Army is greatly below its number, and that it is almost at the vanishing point, that the Reserve has sunk from
  564
  80,000 to 30,000 men. The whole thing is a delusion. I do not know to what it is due that our recruiting has been so great. The net pay in 1896 was 7d. a day. By giving them mess allowance of 3d. we raised it to 10d. a day. The 2d. voted immediately last year brought it up to 1s., and on the 1st April next year, every soldier of two years service who re-engages to complete eight years will get 1s. 6d. a day. Surely those changes must make a considerable amount of difference. I think, too, something is due to the additional comforts given to the soldier, and something to his improved tone and status, to which no one has more contributed by his efforts than the present Commander in-Chief. A certain amount of extra recruiting may be due to the falling off of employment. But, be that as it may, not only are the results satisfactory, but all the calculations which we have formed as to the number of men who at the end of the war would be weary of the profession and buy themselves off, perhaps with the gratuity at their disposal, have been falsified. The result has been this, where as in previous years of peace we got about 35,000 recruits, and thought ourselves lucky if we went over that number, and took one-third as specials, last year was the biggest recruiting year we have ever had in this country. We took nearly 51,000 recruits, of whom about 16 per cent. were specials. The result of that is that, so far then from the Army being enormously under strength, excepting the infantry of the line, we are over strength in every single department of it. The household cavalry are a couple of hundred over strength; the cavalry of the line are 7,400 over strength; the field artillery, 3,000 over strength. but the infantry of the line are about 2,600 under strength. When you divide that, however, between sixty or seventy battalions at home, it is only an average of thirty or forty men per battalion. The Army Service Corps is 800, and the Royal Army Medical Corps 1,600 men above strength. For the first time in living memory, the Army, which had been raised by 54,000 men on the establishment since 1897, and which should stand with India at 259,600 men, now stands 271,800, or 12,000 men above the strength. That 12,000 will probably be reduced by

  565
  6,000 in the course of the next few weeks, owing to the return of time-expired men from India and their inclusion in the Reserve.
  That enables me to deal with the question of weakly recruits. I admit that during the war our lower standard brought in a certain number of men of this kind; but we have been enabled to raise the standard for the artillery by one inch, for the engineers by one inch, for the Army Service Corps by one inch, and to stop the recruiting altogether for the cavalry and all specials taken from the infantry. The Militia recruiting has been very brisk, and has enabled me to raise the Militia standard by one inch.
  MR. CHARLES HOBHOUSE: Will the right hon. Gentleman say what is the standard in the Army for the infantry at the present moment?
  MR. BRODRICK: The standard is 5 feet 3 inches, and there will be no specials taken. The standard for the Militia will be raised to 5 feet 3 inches. It has for a long time been 5 feet 2 inches. We are also endeavouring to make character an element in recruiting. Inquiries as to character have been instituted with considerable advantage in many districts. Quite apart from justifying the scheme which is the subject of debate, it would be very difficult with these figures before the House for my hon. friend to declare that there is no proportionate gain in strength or efficiency for the money we have been spending. My hon. friend spoke as if the Army was armed and equipped for anything except war and spoke of the Army Crops as if they existed only on paper. I can only say that the figures and facts I have given are a refutation of these assertions.
  And now, I want to ask the House to consider briefly what has been done in the way of decentralisation. We are told that the Army system is where it was two years ago; but it believe no army system has ever undergone so great a change as ours has during the last two years. Not only have we decentralised the responsibility of generals, but we have even decentralised the audit of accounts, which is now carried on in three of the districts
  566
  in close proximity to the general commanding the corps. No longer is it necessary for the general commanding an Army Corps to refer to the War Office about all trivial matters. He arranges for the training of recruits and only guides us as to their value. I cannot go into details, but I may say that delegation has not only begun, but it will in a few years be the keynote of our Army system. If I can claim to have changed a centralised system into a delegated system, I think I shall have made a change which has been pressed on this House, in season and out of season, for the last twenty years. With regard to the proportionate sum we are spending, the House gave us authority to raise eight garrison battalions. Six of these are already raised, comprising 6,000 men. I believe that no finer nor more useful battalions for their purpose ever left this country. We undertook to raise five Indian battalions. This force also is in working order. We undertook to raise the Yeomanry from 10,000 to 35,000, and to equip them as mounted troops for home defence. My hon. friend the Member for the Isle of Wight left this out of his contention just now. We had 10,000 and we expect to have 29,000 in the present year. We also undertook to deal with the question of military intelligence and mobilisation. Now, different speakers have assumed that this point has been neglected. My hon. friend said we were starving the brain of out Army. There is no foundation whatever for that statement. I quite admit I cannot go the pace—I do not believe the House would wish me to go the pace—of those who are urging that we should establish a general staff such as there is in Germany, which might cost as I see from some estimates £500,000 a year. We should need justification far beyond any which has ever been put before us for so reckless a change. One speaker said there was but one officer, and another hon. Member gave us credit for two. As a matter of fact, in 1896 there were eighteen officers in that department, drawing altogether £10,500 a year. This year the number has been increased to more than double, at more than double expense. A considerable number of extra clerks are employed, and a further development of the department is in contemplation.

  567
  What is far more important is that the head of that department, instead of being one of the subordinates of the other departments of the War Office, as he was, is now on a par with the highest officers in the War Office, except the Commander-in-Chief. He draws pay, which is one of the things that show his position, equal to that of the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General. Instead of living in Victoria Street he has been provided with accommodation at Winchester House, for immediate consultation with the War Office, which is constantly needed. I do not see why hon. Members should laugh. The best place for that is in close proximity to the War Office. Early last year when it was said that the head of the Intelligence Department was in a flat in Victoria Street there were roars of laughter. [An HON. MEMBER: "They are all flats."] At all events, pending the establishment of the new War Office, this important functionary has been brought into the closest possible touch with the War Office. What is more, he is a member of the Council of Defence, and as such now occupies perhaps the most important military position of any man except the Commander-in-Chief. Having said so much I hope it will not be contended that we have neglected the Intelligence Department.
  I will say one word as to the question of stores. One of the great complaints in 1900 was that we could not mobilise an army of 200,000 men for lack of the necessary stores, which had to be ordered in a hurry. We have taken account of all our requirements. A committee made large recommendations, which have been carried through, and the sum—2½ millions —which stands in the Estimates of the coming year, and which will be claimed from the House this year, will complete these stores, with the exception of a very small sum. We shall not have to incur that charge in future Estimates. That brings me to the question of cost. I will put it very briefly to the House. We have been told that £10,000,000 is an addition, and that we have for this extra expenditure got no sufficient addition of efficiency or strength. How has that £10,000,000 gone? You have had an increase of 54,000 men and 11,000 Colonial troops. Those 65,000 Regular troops have among them absorbed in pay, in the extra prices paid for food
  568
  and fuel for the whole Army, and in the improved scale of clothing for the whole Army, £5,000,000. Five millions out of ten have, therefore, gone in charges you can strike out by a stroke of the pen, if you decide to reduce your army in numbers. I want to make it perfectly clear that it is not a question of the War Office squandering money. You can put your hand on the charge and, if you can induce the Government to do it, you can reduce it. There is no difficulty about that. We have been told in past years that our horses were not sufficiently numerous. We have added 11,000 horses in all, including these required for seventy batteries of artillery. That is a charge of £450,000. The Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers have absorbed among them £1,250,000, and stores and clothing account for nearly £2,500,000. That is a charge which will mainly cease after the present year. The medical service absorbed £200,000, and manœuvres £170,000. There have been three charges over which we have no control—the interest on works loans, the subsidies to India with regard to Aden, which were adopted in this House and were finally placed on the War Office, and the non-effective charges due to the war—pensions to men and to officers—which have absorbed another £1,000,000. Those charges together represent the whole £10,000,000 of increase. I desire to put this statement before the House, because if it is determined to cut down the Army Estimates it will see where the operation is to begin. I wish also to state that we have not said our last word as to the cost of the Army by giving these figures. I have referred before to the consciousness I had, perhaps more than any man in this House, that the time would come when the House and the country would grudge this great expenditure and call for a reduction. The policy which I have asked the House to pursue—the policy of the three years system—was specially designed, among other things, to meet that difficulty. I was blamed the other day because I did not introduce the three years system in 1901. My conduct was treated as a death-bed repentance. The circumstance of adding to the soldiers' pay, from which you can never recede, and the reduction of the years of service, giving, as they do, so large a responsibility as to drafts for India, are things which I do not think

  569
  any man could be expected to undertake without the most careful consideration of the matter by all the authorities. I took fifteen months to think it over, and I trust the House will, therefore, wait a little longer to see the result. The main result is an economical result—the shortening of the service.
  What I think should be the aim of this country is to keep the minimum of soldiers with the colours, and a maximum of Reserves. The Reserve is our first line as much as are the soldiers with the colours. Of the Reserves all sorts of doubts have been expressed, but they have been resolved by the late war. Ninety-six per cent. of the men came up, showing that we can count upon their service. Regiments, we were told, when filled with 50 per cent. of Reservists would not be homogeneous, and would not be equal to other regiments. These regiments were sent to Natal, and I ask any man whether any regiments could have fought better? I say the principle of a Reserve having been once firmly established, this three years system will, if you choose to permit it, make your Reserve half as large again, or possibly even double as large, and will enable you to dispense with a considerable number of men on the active list. If you are willing to bear the burden of the additional men on the active list, and the full number of recruits for three years longer, you Reserves will mount up to 100,000 men, and then the Minister who may be in power can decide how many he will take at £60, and how many he will substitute for them at £9. I look forward to an improvement in the personnel of the Army, not so much to a reduction of the total number of the establishment, and by the realisation of the three years' system to the maintenance of a large Reserve with the minimum of numbers with the colours. Therefore, I hope the House, when it comes to review the Estimates for the year, will enable us to show not only what is the present charge, but what is the charge we may hope for in the future, the requirements and possible economies, and also the estimated cost to the country.
  Now a few words as to the position in regard to the Amendment. I do not challenge in the least the right of those
  570
  who are dissatisfied both with the number of troops we propose to send abroad and who consider our Army is dangerously strong, to vote against us. I do not challenge the same right of the right hon. Gentleman opposite who said last year that three Army Corps specially allotted and prepared for active service abroad were unnecessary, and he added politically undesirable; though I shall be prepared to show that the weaker your Army the greater your danger from foreign complications, and above all that the Army which is simply in numbers and not organised for fighting is the greatest embarrassment to your Foreign Minister, who may trade upon the numbers and not be aware that the organisation which is to make them good is incomplete. But I am asked, Where is this Army to be employed? A few years ago we should never have thought that we should send twice that number to South Africa. I decline to accept my hon. friend's statement that the North-West Frontier of India is nothing but a bugbear. I say that our preparations for the defence of our greatest dependency must be judged upon expert advice, and we should not forget that for a much smaller dependency we had to send double the number of troops. I hope that in the discussion the question of policy will prevail, and that prejudice against the War Office may be allowed for the moment to stand aside. I know how difficult it is to ask this; I know how great has been the unpopularity, the inevitable unpopularity, which those connected with the administration of an Army hastily improvised like ours for the Boer War—how great is the unpopularity they must incur. Let me take one point. There is not a day passes that I do not receive letters from officers who have gone out suddenly and obtained commissions and have done invaluable service with the Irregular Forces, and who have come home asking at least for employment in the Regular Army, if they can have no other recognition, that they may not go back and stand by the side of their fellows bearing no mark of what they have done in the war. We are now 600 or 700 officers above strength, and we have no Parliamentary power to commission a large number of men who have

  571
  come out after a few months' service, good though that has been. I can assure the House I have never had a sadder task than that of telling so many of these men that it is impossible for us to help them. About 9,000 or 10,000 officers have been mentioned in despatches, and we have given recognitions to 2,800 by honours or promotion, and it is impossible to submit further names to the King. Every man who comes in that way, and those around him, go away with germs of bitterness against the War Office for accepting their services and not being able sufficiently to recompense them. What is true of the officers is true also of the men. As the House knows, 80,000 men had to be discharged, and had a right to be discharged. We did everything we could for them; we pressed for employment for them, we offered them the right to go back, on such terms as had never before been offered to the Army, for a year, and with right to leave when they obtained employment. We get some 3,500 letters a day, and an enormous proportion of those are form men who have complaints that are out of the power of the War Office to meet, and that leave the writers with bitter feelings. Only within the last few days it has been put to me almost as a right that some 2,000 workmen employed at Woolwich during pressure of work should be retained in employment though the reason for it had ceased. Of course, it is out of our power. May I say, on the other hand, that no tact on the part of a Minister, no diplomacy, no administrative ability can possibly avoid the feelings that are excited by our impotence to help either officers or men who have suffered in consequence of the war? I ask the House to consider what is the effect of Army reform generally.
  Much has been said to-night about reforms which have not been made, and nothing about those that have been made. We have carried out to the full the proposal that officers should be selected for commands, and that commands should not go by seniority. Every officer you select for a command leaves nine or ten men disappointed. It is impossible to carry out the principle of selection and yet be popular. Only the other day, in the cavalry, Lord Roberts put forward three
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  or four men who had done remarkable service in the war, but they were all comparatively junior officers. I believe they were rightly placed, and I supported their appointment. We desired to case no slur on older officers who may have been passed over for these particular commands; none the less, one cannot help feeling that the Army Corps system has acted to the detriment of a good many of them. Remember, commands have been given, perhaps rightly given, in the past to men as reward for past services, and not in expectation of future service. Men who have passed long periods of their lives in the Army legitimately aspire to commands, and are from that standpoint disappointed when a command is given to a younger man likely to serve again in the field. In the same way with decentralisation. Men come to me with complaints in reference to re-enlistment, furlough, lodgings for married soldiers, and when referred to the general officers commanding, they say I am shirking my duties and laying them on somebody else. There is no more unpopular thing than decentralisation when it comes to details. In principle it is cheered, in detail it is odious. I was surprised the other night when an hon. Member who came to me on a case of this kind accepted my statement and applauded it. It was the first time it had happened. However we may deal with the Auxiliary Forces, which in a voluntary army are so important an element, any pressure, any change, any attempt to get more efficiency which presses hardly upon individuals causes an immediate outcry against the War Office which is voiced in this House. I ask the House to remember that these are not legitimate grounds on which the system or strength of the Army should be discussed. Nobody knew better than I did—and I spoke to the House about it two years ago—that reform of the Army, by whoever it was taken up, would probably prove to be so unpopular a task as to imperil the Minister who undertook it. I had no delusion on the subject. However famous, however distinguished a Commander-in-Chief under whose auspices such action is taken, the bulk of the responsibility and of the unpopularity must fall on the Minister who undertakes it. I do not

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  suppose many men are conscious how much they are influenced with regard to the strength of the Army and the system of the Army by the treatment which they receive from the War Office in matters which concern them. I urge that we should deal with this subject on the highest plane. I approach this Army question solely from the point of view of Lord Rosebery when he stated that national defence was a question of life or death. I ask the House to reflect that it is not only an important, it is a complex and difficult Question. I earnestly believe that we have in our present Army system a sound and necessary policy. I know that the personnel is daily growing more efficient. I can show that the material of war of all the forces that have been organised is now provided, and we are setting up a standard which will never, I trust, be cast down. If we succeed in our object it may cost the existence of one Minister; but that Minister will not have suffered in vain. But I would urge that the House of Commons should look at what has been proved, and consider the shortness of time, and approach this subject from the point of view that it is easier to change the number to be provided, if you change the basis on which they are to be provided; but that if you proceed to upset the ground work of the system, you will not only temporarily weaken the forces of the Empire, but set back the clock of Army reform for ten or fifteen years. It is from that point of view, and because I believe no Minister who ever brought a scheme before the House, could show within two years so large an amount of success, and no scheme ever bore the fruit of expectation so soon as this, that I unhesitatingly submit my policy to the verdict of the House of Commons.
  *MR. YERBURGH,whose opening sentences did not reach the Gallery, was understood to say that the House would agree that his right hon. friend was heartily to be congratulated on the defence he had made. With one point, however, he could not agree. His right hon. friend had said the weaker our Army was, the more danger there was of foreign complications. He had always understood that the great factor in preserving European peace was the strength of the British Navy; he had never heard that the strength of the Army was to be
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  considered as the determining factor for defending this country. Everyone agreed with his right hon. friend in the view that what they wished to secure was the improvement in the material of which the Army was composed, but they did not agree that it was necessary to have so large a number of men with the colours as his right hon. friend had stated. Upon the broad policy which he wished the House to discuss, the right right hon. Gentleman found strong variations of opinion among those supporting the Amendment. With that statement he could not agree, because all who had spoken in favour of the Motion had stated that the great objection to be taken against the Army Corps system was that the defence of this country was in the first place to depend on the Navy; they also agreed that the Navy had first call upon the country; therefore, he did not think the Secretary of State for War was justified in saying there was no common ground in support of the Amendment. But his right hon. friend went further; he had endeavoured to make good that not only had they no common ground as to the Imperial aspect, but that they did not agree as to the details of the Amendment they presented. That was not the case, because both the mover and seconder committed themselves to the proposition that what was required was an effective and mobile army, not too large, to strike on the other side of the water to complete the work of the Navy, and beyond that a small army was required for the defence of this country in the temporary absence of the Fleet.
  His right hon. friend had apparently taken a different stand from that taken by the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland when he represented the War Office in this House, that the Government did not aspire to emulate the vast armies of Continental Powers, and "that it had intentions of increasing the Army in order to protect these islands from invasion by soldiers instead of by ships." So far as he could understand, the Minister for War considered in 1901 that the home Army should be strong enough to meet organised invasion from abroad, which was a very different thing; that the foreign service Army should be employed with the army of any country we might be allied to, and take part in military operations with them, and exercise

  575
  such functions as were exercised by military forces on the Continent. There was a distinct difference of principle between the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland, speaking for the Government in 1899, and his right hon. friend, speaking in 1901. On the one hand, we were to have a foreign army, not to compete with foreign nations, and a home army to defend this country form a raid. On the other hand, his right hon. friend considered our foreign army was to compete with continental armies, and our home army was to be such as to be able to resist an organised invasion of this country.
  *MR. BRODRICK: I never said a word suggesting that our Army should compete with continental armies, or contend with them. What I said was that it might be necessary to send a large force to protect our great dependencies, and that for home defence we were bound to depend on an efficient home force.
  *MR. YERBURGHpointed out that in March, 1901, in the debate on the Army Estimates, the right hon. Gentleman had stated that we had commitments with two continents besides Africa, that there were dangers of European entanglements, and had said that it stood to reason that if we had allies none of them would be prepared to turn out every man they could muster and allow ours to rest at home. Did his right hon. friend still contemplate having to defend this country against organised invasion?
  *MR. BRODRICK: I said we were bound to have an efficient defence for these islands in case of the temporary absence of the Fleet, and to that I stand.
  *MR. YERBURGHsaid that if he understood his right hon. friend to say he did not desire to employ this large army at home for the purpose of resisting an organised invasion from abroad—if that was the case, his proposition was altogether too excessive. Why build up so great an army if it was not intended to resist organised invasion? This was a most important point to be considered. If his right hon. friend reflected, he would see that so long as we had to contend for the supremacy of the sea, and so long as that was in
  576
  doubt, for so long must the Army remain at home. It could not be sent abroad until freedom of transport for the Army was secured.
  *Mr. BRODRICK: Why should not war have broken out when we were in South Africa?
  *MR. YERBURGHthanked his right hon. friend for the interruption. He would say why. Because we had the Navy to fall back upon. That showed that our strength was the Navy and the Navy alone, and that therefore we did not require this large force at home to repel an invasion that was not possible. His right hon. friend said that if he had gone down to his constituency and suggested that they had too many men that he would have found his own constituency against him. That, however, was not the point at issue. If they were engaged in a great European war they would have ample time, before the affairs of the Fleet were settled, to manufacture a defensive army. [MINISTERIAL laughter, and cries of "No, no!"] His hon. friends laughed at that statement, but did anyone suppose that they were going to decide a large naval quarrel, and dispose of a naval power like France within a short space of time? There would be ample time to manufacture an army before the Naval issue was decided. They had heard from various speakers that they could reply upon Volunteer effort, but he submitted that the true defence of this country was the Navy, and what they could spare after the Navy had been provided for should be spent upon the Army. They ought not to spend more upon the Army than was consistent with the efficiency of the Navy. The scheme proposed by his right hon. friend was too large in its character. They all agreed that they needed a mobile, effective Army, but their contention was that the Army provided by this scheme was far too large. The Army for home defence ought not to be too large; it should act completely by itself, and be composed of Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, and such an Army, properly officered and released from the control of the War Office to as large an extent as possible, should be placed under the authorities of the various counties, and that was the kind of force they require for home defence. Holding

  577
  those views, and holding them very strongly, it was impossible for him to vote against this Amendment.
  His right hon. friend's scheme, he believed, was radically unsound, and would saddle the country with a number of men far beyond their requirements. He believed this scheme would give them an army for foreign service largely composed of immature boys, and the right hon. Gentleman's proposals in regard to home defence did not go to the root of the matter. The right hon. Gentleman was, so to speak, tinkering with this question. His arrangements with regard to the Volunteers were admirable in design, but they would not work. The right hon. Gentleman's intention was to make them a better force, but he did not recognise that the root of the whole difficulty was not the want of patriotism, but the hard fact that Volunteers were unable to afford the money in order to obtain the necessary training. For those reasons he believed his right hon. friend's scheme was radically unsound, and although he was not prepared to vote for the Amendment under these circumstances, he certainly should not vote against it.
  MR. COURTENAY WARNERsaid he was pleased to hear the satisfactory returns which had been placed before them in regard to enlistments. All who spoke upon Army matters in the House foretold that the improvements of pay and the option given for the short term of enlistment would do much for recruiting, and he was pleased to see that it had turned out so well. He failed, however, to see where this great system had made any great alterations. They had a great deal more to pay, but it was perfectly useless to talk of Army reform unless the increased expenditure was met by more economical treatment of things which existed already. They had seen recently numerous cases in which the War Office and the Army were extravagant. They were penny wise and pound foolish, and kept a most strict account of such small matters as officers' cab fares, upon which they wasted a great deal of energy collecting.
  The new scheme meant an increase in the number of general officers and staff, and this staff would be purely ornamental. The Secretary of State told them that
  578
  there was nothing in the term "Army Corps" and that it was not borrowed from Germany. It certainly was not a German expression, but the Germans had made an Army Corps a fixed number of troops, and that was what was being done by this scheme. The extra officers would make a considerable difference when they came to pay them. How could they call anything a proper Army Corps which had as many as eighty battalions of Volunteers in it. They were told that each Army Corps was to have a fixed number of cavalry and infantry in proper proportions ready to move, and be mobile, with medical stores, but now they found that General Grenfell had just been appointed to an Army Corps which included 100 battalions of Volunteers. Could anything be more absurd than to call that an Army Corps? During the ordinary manœuvres they had an Army Corps for about a month, but what was the use of spending all this money upon a body which existed only in a concrete form for one or two months during manœuvres. He agreed that there would be a number of infantry battalions to make up the Army Corps, although even the First Army Corps did not seem complete yet. As for the Return which had been given them today he thought it was absolutely the vaguest ever issued anywhere. Take, for instance, the infantry of the First Army Corps. It said, "Required, twenty five battalions; available twenty-four." Some of the troops were now on their way home from South Africa, but where were the rest? What was the strength of them? It did not say one word about them, and the Press seemed to have much better information upon this question than the War Office. In the Sunday Times he found an accurate account of the state of the battalions in the First Army Corps, and apparently they could only muster about sixteen battalions out of twenty-five. He wished to know how many of those sixteen battalions were fit to take the field. A battalion might be perfectly useless unless the men were fit to take the field. If half of a battalion were recruits, and another 20 per cent. of them were unfit for various other reasons that made the battalion 50 per cent. below ware strength, and instead of having 800 or 1,000 men they might have only about 250 men in a battalion fit to

  579
  take the field. He was afraid that several of these battalions were in that condition. They had got absolutely nothing for their money, except an increased number of recruits and horses. That was not in his opinion a reorganisation of the Army, nor was it in any form a reform of the Army. It was mere change of names. He wished to say one word in regard to this decentralisation. He did not think the Secretary of State for War had gone very far in this direction. Take a place like Dover. If £5 or £10 were required for Army purposes the general was first asked about it, and then he had to get the sanction of the War Office. Now Dover had been decentralised, and before this money could be spent the general commanding at Dover had to be asked. He could give hundreds of these cases throughout the country.
  *THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY TO THE WAR OFFICE (Lord STANLEY,), asked whether the hon. Member would substantiate the case.
  MR. COURTENAY WARNERsaid it was best not to substantiate cases, because, if he did so, those who had given the War Office away would get into trouble. He had not come across a single case in which a matter had been hastened by the nominal decentralisation of the Secretary of State. He would like to see the right hon. Gentleman go on with his scheme and effect any story of Army reform, provided that increased economy accompanied increased expenditure, an essential of all reform, but one which had not been shown to have been achieved in any single department. The time had come when the nation would on longer spend the money it had been spending on the Army; retrenchment must come, and if it could not be managed where it ought to be, he was afraid essential parts of the Army would be taken away. When the House of Commons voted, as it probably would in a year or two, for a reduction of the Army Vote by so many millions, the Secretary of state would be unable to take away certain number of men, because to do so would upset the whole scheme or leave him absolutely with skeleton battalions. Therefore, if the House determined to
  580
  reduce the Army Estimates, some fresh scheme would have to be devised, unless the Secretary of State added to his present scheme something which would effect some economy and make it a real reform.
  *COLONEL LEGGEsaid he was unable to support the Amendment. He had listened very carefully to the speeches of the mover and seconder in the hope that they would give some indication of what the "needs of the Empire" really were Probably few Members other than Ministers or ex-Ministers had any idea of what those requirements might be, and it was not the business of Members to declare the organisation to be unsuitable when they did not know the nature of the requirements. The Council of Defence was being reorganised, and on those requirements being explained, it would be for them to issue advice upon which the necessary forces would be organised. They had been told that the scheme was extravagant, that Army Corps were unsuitable to the conditions of the country, and that "Army Corps" was an undesirable foreign term. But no alternative scheme had been put forward. Hitherto the Army had been divided into district commands—ten in England, one in Scotland, and four in Ireland—which varied in area and importance. Some were commanded by lieutenant-generals, some by major-generals; some had no cavalry, and some no artillery. There was no organisation whatever about those commands. One thing, if nothing else, could be said about an Army Corps, and that was that it was a complete unit in itself, every branch of the service being properly represented in the proportion declared by experts to be required for active service. An Army Corps comprised, roughly, 40,000 men, so that this scheme of six Army Corps provided for 24,000, of whom 120,000 were Regular troops and the remainder auxiliary forces. That, in his opinion, was not an excessive army to maintain. It was sometimes said that they might not require to send so much as an Army Corps abroad. But it was just as easy to divide an Army Corps as a regiment of cavalry, so that if 20,000 men were wanted half an Army Corps

  581
  could be sent, or if only 10,000 were necessary, a quarter of an Army Corps would be despatched.
  The second part of the Amendment declared that no proportionate gain in strength and efficiency had resulted from the recent increases in military expenditure. A comparison of the Estimates of the year before the war and those of last year showed that there had been a considerable increase, the figures for 1899–1900 being £20,617,000 against £29,310,000 last year. But there had also been a considerable increase in the different establishments. With regard to the Regular forces at home and in the colonies, the establishment had been raised from 176,000 to 209,000; the Reserve had been reduced by the late war and would take a certain time to regain its proper strength; the Militia had increased from 129,000 to 131,000; the Yeomanry from 11,000 to 35,000; and the Volunteers from 264,000 to 346,000. Since 1899 there had been an increase of about £4 per head in the cost, but in view of the improved conditions of the soldier and the increased pay that was likely to accrue, he did not think there was much to complain of on that point. Therefore, as in his opinion neither of the propositions of the Amendment could be upheld, he should consider it his duty, both as a supporter of the Government, and as a soldier of forty years standing, to vote against the Amendment.
  *MR. CLAUDE LOWTHERsaid that while not in agreement with every detail put forward by the hon. Member for Whitby, he certainly agreed with the principle of the Amendment. It had always been his belief that the safety of the Empire demanded a small but efficient Army, and a large world-embracing Navy, so that he was bound to express his disapproval of the policy of the Secretary of State for War. But, if the Amendment were pressed to a division, he and many other Members on that side would find it difficult to decide which way to vote. If the division were taken merely on the policy of the right hon. Gentleman, he was convinced there would be a large majority against it. But the division would involve the fate of the Government, so that two impossible alternatives were placed before him. If he voted against
  582
  the Amendment of his hon. friend he would be voting against his conviction. If, on the contrary, he voted for the Amendment he would be condemning to the best of his ability the policy of the right hon. Gentleman, it was true, but at what risk? At the risk of robbing the Empire of a Government which, although it did include the Secretary of State for War, the author of the scheme, included also the Prime Minister, in whom all on this side of the House had the greatest confidence, and the Colonial Secretary, on whose genius whole continents relied for their welfare and developments. Therefore he was unable to vote. If the Amendment was pressed to a division he would take no part in it.
  *MR. WYLIEsaid he desired to say a few words on the Volunteer aspect of the question. They constituted an important portion of the defensive forces of the Empire. He had given notice of an Amendment to the Address setting forth—
  "that longer and more arduous training of the Volunteer forces is now being demanded without corresponding augmentation of allowances and facilities, and without due regard to the conditions under which they have to carry on their civil occupations, which, as was anticipated, has seriously reduced these forces, whilst the growing necessities of the Empire require a large increase both of their numbers and efficiency, which should be secured by a substantial increase of capitation and other grants, and of facilities and convenient arrangements for drill and shooting."
  The Amendment now before the House was practically the same as that of which he gave notice last year, and which was unanimously adopted by eighty Volunteer colonels who came to London at that time to deal with the question of the crisis caused in the Volunteer force by the new regulations. At the desire of these colonels a strong requisition was made to the Prime Minister for the purpose of obtaining time to discuss this subject during the debate on the Address, and he very courteously arranged for this being done, but the exigencies of the Government in connection with the South African was prevented the debate from taking place. The most gloomy prognostications then made regarding the Volunteer force had been entirely fulfilled. In answer to the hon. Member for Sheffield the Secretary of State for War had stated that the decrease had been 38,000, and

  583
  the deficiency in officers 1,895. He found from other sources that the resignations during the Volunteer year at 1st November were 65,000, and these resignations had occurred in every part of the country and in every branch of the service. The following are examples out of an enormous list. In the Artillery branch in Forfar the resignations were 353, in Durham 326, and in Dorset 271; in the Engineers, they were in Devon and Somerset, 355, in Gloucester 259, and in Middlesex 240, in the Queen's Rifles, composed of several Midlothian Battalions, 752; in Leicester 536, in Stafford 519, Welsh 511, and the 1st Lanark 486. These figures showed a very serious reduction in the Volunteer force, and it was the more alarming when they came to recognise the fact that during the last quarter of 1902 the total resignations amounted to no less than 29,000—at that rate the resignations for the year would be 116,000.
  Under the new scheme it had been proposed to increase the Army to a very considerable extent, by increasing the pay of the ordinary soldier by about 40 per cent. It had been arranged to increase the Militia to the extent of 50 per cent., also by increased pay and allowances; and it was proposed to increase the Yeomanry by 250 per cent. by increased pay and allowances. He congratulated the Secretary of State for War on the very able speech he had made in defence of that policy, and its remarkably successful results. But very different indeed had been the action of the War Office towards the Volunteer force. Instead of having been encouraged and increased in numbers, they had been subjected to the most severe reflections by the War Office authorities—reflections which implied that they had never hitherto been considered as a serious part of the defensive forces of the country. Had the conduct of the Volunteer force in the field merited such severe strictures and such ungenerous treatment? He ventured to say it had been the very contrary. The Volunteer force in active service had received the warmest eulogium from every officer under whom they served. A very competent and of course disinterested continental critic had stated that the whole history of the war proved that they were possessed of the finest qualities of the Regulars, namely discipline
  584
  and courage, while they had much more intelligence, initiative, and endurance. Besides that they had fostered a manly and patriotic spirit in the country. They had elevated the common soldier in the public estimation, and this had greatly facilitated the recruiting for which the Secretary of State for War had taken so much credit. They had besides contributed a very large quota of troops direct to the front. They had contributed largly to the Regular Army, to the Militia and the Yeomanry. The Volunteer regiments of the county which he had the honour to represent, not only sent to the front a full quota of men direct, but they had contributed fifty-four Yeomanry, forty-one Militia, and 261 Regulars. If the whole of the Volunteer battalions throughout the country had contributed in the same proportion, and he thought it was probable that they did, then the whole contribution of the Volunteer force was no less than 70,000 men. Under these circumstances, the action of the War Office in connection with the Volunteers had been most inexplicable and most discouraging, and he held that in connection with the recruiting for the Regular Army it had been most short-sighted. They had discouraged the force which had added, and would add, enormously to the recruiting power of the Army. The policy of the War Office in connection with the Volunteers during the last three years had been of the most vacillating and inconsistent description. In the beginning of 1900, when it was considered, that mounted men were not required in South Africa, the War Office encouraged a large increase of the Volunteer force. They encouraged the Volunteers to go into camp in large numbers by giving them a grant of a little under £900,000. In 1901 there came an entire revolution in the feeling of the War Office, which caused the issue of the celebrated Order in Council on the Volunteer force. The Volunteers were, of course, mortified by this change of policy on the part of the Government, and this feeling very soon found expression throughout the country and in this House. Recognising that they had made a mistake, the War Office convened a meeting of a few representative Volunteer colonels and immediately made some modification of the regulations. These modifications were approved by some Volunteer colonels in this House, but

  585
  when they came under his observation he, on the first opportunity on the Estimates stated that they were utterly inadequate and had left things in statu quo. He was confident that when the War Office issued these regulations, they regarded a large reduction of the Volunteer force with equanimity.
  And, it being half-past Seven of the Clock, the debate stood adjourned till this evening's sitting.

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  KING'S SPEECH (MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS).

    ARMY ORGANISATION.
    Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment [23rd February] to Main Question [17th February], "That an humble address be presented to His Majesty, as followeth:—
    "Most Gracious Sovereign,
    "We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the Gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both. Houses of Parliament."—(Mr. Gretton.)
    Which Amendment was—
    "At the end of the Question, to add the words, 'But we humbly regret that the organisation of the land forces is unsuited to the needs of the Empire, and that no proportionate gain in strength and efficiency has resulted from the recent increases in Military expenditure.'"—(Mr. Beckett.)
    Question again proposed, "That those words be there added."
    *MR. WYLIE, continuing his remarks, said that with regard to the Volunteers the War Office fully realised that there would be a serious diminution in this valuable auxiliary force, because in an Order of Council they hadset out the fact that the new rules must affect a great many persons who would be prevented from joining, but he scarcely thought that they quite realised the fact that the enormous number of resignations would involve in many cases the extinction of the regiments.
    MR. SPEAKER: Order, order! The hon. Gentleman appears to be discussing not so much the question in the Amendment as the effect on the Volunteer forces of a particular regulation.
    *MR. WYLIEpointed out that inasmuch as these regulations seriously affected the defensive forces of the Empire, he thought perhaps he would be allowed to show how these forces had been reduced, and what measures should be taken to prevent such reduction.
    MR. SPEAKERthought the hon. Member would not be in order in continuing.
    *MR. WYLIEsaid he bowed to the ruling of the Chair. The Secretary of State for War had, he thought, done exceedingly well for the Army; he had given a greater increase of pay to the private soldiers than any of his predecessors had given, and he had done well with the Militia, and had been liberal with the Yeomanry. He strongly urged the right hon. Gentleman now to turn his attention to the Volunteers and to regard them with the same consideration that he had given to the other branches of the Army. The changes the right hon. Gentleman had made in
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    the Army, Yeomanry and Militia were extremely satisfactory, and had greatly disarmed the criticisms brought to bear against him in that House, but if he might make one remark. he would ask the right hon. Gentleman to restore to the Volunteers of this country those grants which had been taken away, and to increase the allowances and facilities for drill and shooting. If the right hon. Gentleman did that he would not only stop this diminution of the Volunteer forces, but bring them up to a state of efficiency which they had never before attained. He hoped this would only be the first step towards an enormous extension of these forces. The active force of the Volunteers should be brought up to 600,000 with a Reserve of 500,000, and a second Reserve of 1,500,000, and this could be done at an expense of probably six or seven millions, but certainly not more than £10,000,000. He was surprised at the criticisms of some of his hon. friends who sat on that side of the House as to the necessity of reducing the numbers of our Army. The size of our Army had been a matter of profound contempt among the officers of armies on the Continent. With an increased Volunteer force behind it, which could be effected with little expense because, as was well known, the Volunteer was the cheapest soldier in the world, the feeling of contempt would pass away. The Volunteers cost £6 a head. There was three times that expenditure in the case of the Militiaman and the Yeoman, and fourteen times as much in the case of the Regular. The expenditure on the whole Volunteer force was 30 per cent. less than the cost of two battleships, and about the same as that of 20,000 Regulars, and the value obtained from that expenditure was infinitely greater than would be obtained from adding two battleships to the Navy or 20,000 men to the Regular Army. Looking at the enormous expansion of the British Empire; to the great increase of Continental armies and navies; to the much greater contact we had with those countries in many parts of our dominions; and looking to the great lesson taught by the Boer War, namely, that those countries entertained the greatest jealousy and the bitterest hostility towards us, many military

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    experts of this country considered the proposed increase in the Regular Army, Militia and Yeomanry was not at all sufficient for the purpose of the defence of this colossal Empire. He strongly urged the Secretary of State to take into his friendly consideration not simply the reinstatement of the Volunteers to their old position, but to increase the numbers in the way he had indicated. War among civilised nations was generally the result of foregone investigations, which had caused a nation to believe that the army it was going to oppose was much less effective and efficient than its own. If this country had such a Volunteer forces as he had suggested, with the Navy we possessed, the Regular Army, and Yeomanry and Militia according to the forecast that had been made, we should regard any combination of the Continental Powers with comparative indifference. He hoped the Volunteer forces would receive from the right hon. Gentleman the consideration to which they were entitled.
    *MR. MUNRO FERGUSONsaid this subject had been raised by that side of the House on which he sat on more than one occasion, but had never received adequate support from the opposite Benches. There was no desire whatever in the present discussion to make this a Party question, or any desire to criticise unduly the efforts made by the Secretary of State for War or the Commander-in-Chief. Every one was convinced that both the right hon. Gentleman and the Commander-in-Chief had done all they could to remedy a great evil. A contradictory issue was raised by the Amendment. He agreed with the contention that they had not an efficient scheme for the Army in the scheme proposed by the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the difficulty of dealing with the claims of officers and others who had served their country well in South Africa. There must evidently be a good deal of discontent under these conditions. The Army at no time was an easy subject for civilians to deal with. It was not only a question of those who were unable to find employment, but he did not think the Army as a whole was at all content with the Six Army Corps Scheme; and he was satisfied that the country as a whole was
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    not content with it. And why? Because the public had realised how absolutely essential it was that we should have an invincible fleet, and it was convinced that more money would have to be spent on the fleet. The people also felt that taxation would have to be reduced, although the Chancellor of the Exchequer had given no encouragement that there would be such a reduction. Last September the late Chancellor of the Exchequer told them that, in his opinion, there should be a reduction on the Military Estimates of the the present year, and that there would be such a reduction if the War Office properly expended their money. The right hon. Gentleman had compared the cost of the operations of South Africa under the control of the War Office with that of the cost of the Soudan War under Lord Kitchener and Lord Cromer; and he added that there was something wrong with the military element in the War Office. If they were to deal with soldiers they needed a great organising soldier.
    The Secretary for War had spoken of the success he had met with in regard to recruiting. That was a very satisfactory part of his statement, but it would be dangerous to expect recruiting to be always so good as it was at the close of the war, in spite of the advantages which the right hon. Gentleman had offered to recruits. When the Six Army Corps Scheme was introduced, he thought that some form of conscription would have to be introduced as part of the scheme; but he did not believe that the public would ever agree to conscription until every effort had been made to meet the requirements of the Empire without conscription. Another difficulty in connection with the Six Army Corps Scheme was that of finding an adequate manœuvring ground. Many of them who had been at Aldershot knew that there was not sufficient ground there, and he believed that before long it would be found that the same remark might apply to Salisbury Plain. The right hon. Gentleman had gone to the South of Scotland for a manœuvring ground which he thought was better than anything they could obtain in the South of England. He, however, believed it was not possible to manœuvre these Army Corps in this island. He had read the scheme lately placed before them in The Times, and he did not think any one

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    of them could fail to be attracted by the proposal that the First Army Corps should be moved from Aldershot to South Africa. None of them who were soldiers but would prefer if they were to begin their professional career again to go to India, or some other country where they would have some real opportunity for manœuvring; and that was what they would gain by having an Army Corps in South Africa.
    Another point to which sufficient attention had not been given was the constitution of a great general staff. That he believed to be absolutely essential, and it would be cheap at half-a-million as compared with the expenditure of thirty millions without a general staff. He thought that a certain amount of the want of confidence which had arisen in the public minds was due to the fact that some of the recommendations in the Clinton-Dawkins Report which had attracted most attention had not been carried into effect. They had not one board but three boards, and anything more different from what came from the Clinton-Dawkins Report could not be imagined than the arrangement of the control of the Army by three boards instead of by one board, on the Admiralty model. So far as he knew the powers of delegation to be given to generals commanding districts, which had been recommended by the report, had not been distributed with a very lavish hand, although he understood that something had been done in that direction. President Roosevelt, in the speech which appeared in The Times of that day, had suggested a model of what the American army should be. He believed that that should be our model also that we should have a smaller army than that involved by the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman, that we should pay it more highly in order to obtain recruits, and that we should have a home army in different healthy portions of the Empire where it would be near the seat of danger. The scheme of the right hon. Gentleman as it stood was too costly for the country to bear, and would have to be modified.
    *LT.-COLONEL GEORGE KEMPsaid that in speaking in favour of the Amendment, he knew he took up a position he had never before occupied. He had supported the Govern-
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    ment hitherto, because he not only concurred with them in their Party politics, but because he believed that their general policy had been a benefit to the country and the Empire. But on this occasion he was obliged to part company with them. Feeling that this was a matter of great urgency, he conceived it his duty to vote, not with his Party, but for what he believed to be the best interests of the whole Empire. He would endeavour to point out to the House, in as few words as possible, how the first obligation of His Majesty's Government, the maintenance of the security of the Empire, had been imperilled and not advanced by the Army Scheme of the Secretary of State for War. It could not be said that the House had dealt in any niggardly spirit with the expenditure on the two forces, the Navy and the Army. Sixty millions, or £80,000,000 if the Indian Army was included, had been spent on the defence of the Empire; but the general principle raised by the Amendment was: Had this large sum been properly divided between the Army and the Navy? Seven years ago a Defence Committee was appointed to consider the relative needs of the two forces. They knew that that Committee allayed, for the moment, the apprehensions that were felt in every part of the country. Up to that time there had been no organised, no coordinated authority by which the relative forces of the Navy and Army should be considered. Had that Committee fulfilled the purpose for which it was appointed? The present Government was aware of the inadequacy of that Committee, because they had very rightly seen fit to reconstitute it, and strengthen it by the addition of naval and military experts. If that were the case, did it not follow that during the last few years, our position as an Empire had been imperilled by the inadequacy of that Committee? It was recommended by the Hartington Commission that that Committee should meet every year before the Estimates were prepared, so that the relative establishments of the two services might be considered.
    It was quite obvious that as the armaments of other nations increased, so the needs of our two forces would also vary from year to year. Had they not the spec-

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    tacle before them of a new factor in international affairs, a new naval power which had sprung up, and would continue to increase in strength? However genuine and sincere the friendship of the German Emperor might be for England, it was well known that the predominant feeling of the German people, combined with the increase in the naval power of that Empire, must be fraught with danger to this country, unless they were assured that steps were taken to meet any potential danger that might arise. What measures, then, had been taken? They had the famous declaration of 1896, when the Duke of Devonshire said that
    "The maintenance of sea supremacy had been assured as a means of Imperial defence against attacks from over-sea."
    But was this Army Corps Scheme drawn up in accordance with the policy propounded by that declaration? He maintained that so far as they could judge from the statement of the Secretary for War, not only had it not been drawn up in accordance with that declaration, but in direct violation of it, and that the Secretary for War seemed even unaware of the views of the President of the Defence Committee, or else he acted in direct defiance of them. The right hon. Gentleman had said in his Memorandum to the Colonial Premiers that the number of men he asked for was 640,000 in time of peace, and that these numbers were "not deemed too large by our military advisers in view of the possibility of our at any time losing the command of the sea." The Duke of Devonshire's statement was in agreement with that of the Admiralty, which scouted a land defence, and presumed that we would act on the offensive at sea.
    He had three questions to ask, and he wished an answer to them from the Secretary for War. First of all, had the right hon. Gentleman, before he brought his Estimates before the House each year, any directions or indications, based on the recommendations of the Committee of Defence, as to the scope of the duties of the Army; and secondly, if he had asked for these numbers and arranged for their general distribution in accordance with such directions. And thirdly, if he had not these directions, or any indication of their policy, on what basis had he formed the totality of his
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    scheme? They had been asked in the present year to spend £29,000,000 on the English Army, and only £31,000,000 on the Navy, which was the first line of defence. They knew from the statement of the Prime Minister that the Estimates for the current year had not, on account of the matter of time, been put before the re-constituted Defence Committee. They were to presume that these Estimates were in accordance with the deliberate decision of the Cabinet. Were they not, therefore, justified in asking for a statement from the Prime Minister as to what the general policy of the Cabinet had been which justified this particular allocation between the two forces of the Navy and Army? And if no statement of that kind was made, he thought they were not going beyond what was right in saying that the present Army policy of the Secretary for War was in direct contradiction to the policy of co-ordination between the two forces. The next point was this: What was the origin of the peculiar form of organisation by which the Army was divided into six Army Corps? It was well within the memory of the House that the Secretary of State for War had quoted Lord Roberts on what he would call comparatively minor details. That was a practice which personally he objected to, because it might give the impression to people outside the House that the Secretary of State for War, who was responsible for policy, had sheltered himself behind his subordinates. He did not say that in any invidious way, but he disapproved of the practice. He should like to know whether Lord Roberts had given his direct approval to this particular Army Corps scheme? That was not a question of details, but of national policy.
    *MR. BRODRICK: Most certainly.
    *LT.-COLONEL GEORGE KEMP: Very well, but was it not a very remarkable thing that the Commander-in-Chief never made use of this organisation in South Africa?
    AN HON. MEMBER: He never heard of it.
    *LT.-COLONEL GEORGE KEMPsaid he should like very much to know whether Lord Roberts had ever been in an Army Corps himself, and whether, in any speech or writing, his Lordship had ever pronounced himself in favour of this particular unit either for war in other countries, or for peace training at home? Had he ever done that? Let them have a reply from a representative of the Government. If the Secretary for War said that he had the approval of Lord Roberts for his scheme, when did Lord Roberts' conversion take place? Was it since his return from South Africa or was it at Madeira on his way home? He wanted to know the real origin of the Army Corps scheme, and whether it had the direct sanction and approval of the most eminent officers at the War Office. He had no acquaintance with these officers, but he should like to know whether any use had been made of the opinions of such men as Sir John Ardagh, Sir Evelyn Wood, or Sir Henry Brackenbury?
    *MR. BRODRICK: Yes.
    *LT.-COLONEL GEORGE KEMPsaid that they might then be satisfied, after the assurance which had been given, that this scheme had the direct sanction of military experts, and was not the product of a civilian. He was glad to hear from the speech of the Secretary of State for War that afternoon, that the introduction of this scheme was not the introduction of an article made in Germany, for if it had been, he must say that all articles made in Germany were not useful in Great Britain. He said that in no frivolous spirit; but he imagined that the success of the Army Corps system in the Germanic Empire must have been the reason for its introduction in England. He would point out, however, that the military necessities of Germany were quite different from those of England; the conditions of service were entirely different, and the analogy would tend to mislead the general public. But if it was said that this particular organisation was approved of by the military experts, where, he asked, was it possible in this country to manœuvre properly an Army Corps, as an army? Had it ever been done?
    *MR. BRODRICK: Yes.
    *LT.-COLONEL GEORGE KEMPsaid he believed it was tried in 1898, when Sir Redvers Buller commanded one corps, and the Duke of Connaught commanded another corps; but then it was more in name than in actual fact. Since the introduction of this scheme by the Secretary for War, could it be said that an Army Corps had been manœuvred against another Army Corps, so that the officers might be trained in the duties they would have to undertake in war? Could the Secretary of State tell them whether it was possible to manœuvre Army Corps in this country? If that were possible, as the Secretary of State said it was, he should like to know where?
    *MR. BRODRICK: It was done in 1872 and 1874.
    *LT.-COLONEL GEORGE KEMPsaid he would like to know where it was possible to manœuvre Army Corps in this country? One of the great arguments in favour of this system was that the general officers in particular would receive a training in their duties in case of war. He looked at the Army List for January, and he found that to the First Army Corps—which was the most advanced—only one brigadier had been appointed; yet he understood that the proper complement was to be six. If the contention was that their officers who commanded in peace should also command in their several capacities in war, how were they to reconcile it with the fact that divisional commanders were at the present time doing the work of the brigadiers? And if it were urged that the general officers were going to get extra training, he would like to know what kind of training they were now getting other than that given before the introduction of the scheme in 1891. He thought they also ought to know what was the difference in the work now being done at Aldershot and that prior to 1901. He was told—but perhaps he had been incorrectly informed—that the work going on there was exactly the same now as it was before the introduction of the scheme. If so, then he again asked, what was the advantage of the scheme so far as training of general officers was concerned? Next he came to the question of the men. They had been told that afternoon by the

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    Secretary for War that he had got more men than he actually wanted. How was it, then, that up till only a short time ago there were no men at all in the 3rd Division of the First Army Corps at Aldershot? The right hon. Gentleman's figures seemed to be very impressive, but where were the men?
    *MR. BRODRICK: My hon. friend must be aware that during the last few months large numbers of troops have been coming back from South Africa, and, of course, the men cannot be at Aldershot and at sea at one and the same time. All the men I have named will be at their stations within a reasonable period.
    *LIEUTENANT - COLONEL GEORGE KEMPsaid he would like to know if it would be contended that the First Army Corps could go out in a few months as an Army Corps as at present constituted.
    *MR. BRODRICK: Certainly, with the Reservists.
    *LIEUTENANT - COLONEL GEORGE KEMPsaid he must not be misunderstood to say that it could not go out as at present constituted because it had not got the Reservists, but what he wanted to know was whether, apart from the question of Reservists, it could go out, say, on the 31st March and engage in a war in any other country. His reply to that was that it could not, because it had not got the necessary brigadiers and other officers, while the men also were not there. Under this Army Corps system were we any more forward than under the old system in securing an expeditionary force that at a moment's notice could leave this country? He held that we were not, as not a single unit in any Army Corps could be sent from these shores without calling up the Reserves. The system would not enable us any more quickly than under the old plan to send out an expeditionary force. They had been told that afternoon that one of the great advantages of this system was that by it they got decentralisation. He quite understood that it might be easier to secure delegation of the business from the War Office by having larger districts than they had before the Army Corps districts were introduced, and that to that extent decentralisation might be accelerated.
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    The right hon. Gentleman had also informed them that the financial audits were not now held at the War Office but at Army Corps headquarters. But were not the references to the War Office as frequent now as they were before the financial clerks were sent down? It might be urged that the stores in these various Army Corps districts had been amassed. That, no doubt, was an advantage if the Army Corps was going out as an Army Corps; but if it were not, then there was no distinct advantage in having the stores amassed in their particular districts. Would it not have been possible to secure decentralisation to the extent they had done by districts instead of by Army Corps areas?
    Something had been said about training. He would like to ask whether the present distribution of troops was an inseparable factor of the Army Corps system. Take the case of Colchester. Were the troops stationed there so that they might conform to Army Corps organisation? He happened to be there the other day, and he found there were three battalions of infantry, three batteries of artillery, a cavalry regiment, and other details at that station. He asked an officer. "Where is your training ground?" It was pointed out to him, and it had very much the appearance of a good cricket ground. He inquired further of the officer how he was able to train his men in the various arts of war in such a place; how for instance, he could teach them to take cover, and the reply was that he told them to go behind some small ornamental trees on the fringe of the ground, and to pretend that the trees were bigger. That was the way in which they were taking advantage of the lessons learned in the South African War. Yet when they heard of men exposing themselves to the Boers as targets on the sky-line, with the result that regrettable incidents followed, they were at once asked what were the officers doing that they had not trained their men better. They might just as well go to Drury Lane Theatre and borrow a number of stage properties for use in training their troops as adopt the plan in vogue at Colchester. He was told that the only available ground for the

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    cavalry to learn scouting was on the public roads, and that the local authorities were making up a Bill against the Government for damage done to the thoroughfares. Now, he wanted to know, were all those things inseparable from the Army Corps system? They might be told that large sums of money had been spent on barracks, but, if they had not a good training ground what was the use of the latest thing in barracks? He would like to take another illustration with regard to training grounds. He happened to be at Aldershot last year, at the training of a regiment of Yeomanry for South Africa, and he found that in the widely extended formations necessary, even with a very small body of troops, it was almost impossible to carry out satisfactorily movements which approximated to those on active service without finding the ground occupied by other troops. If that were the case when only a few troops were in training, what would be the effect when they attempted to manœuvre an Army Corps?
    There was another question, which was still more important, and that was the cost. If the system were good, what was the cost of it? They were told it would amount to twenty-nine millions sterling. Whatever might be said about their having a sufficient number of men, he believed that at present they had only the skeleton formation without some of the vertebrae. But what would be the cost when the bones were fully clothed? It would undoubtedly be more than it was at the present time. When they were considering the vast question of expenditure they could not confine themselves to the needs of the Army and the Navy alone. The country was murmuring at the present time at the high taxation it had to bear. There were social reforms in urgent need of solution. There was the question of the housing of the working classes and of old age pensions, while on education they would have to spend increasingly large sums of money, and rightly so. Now, the proposition he wished to put was this: While these questions were calling for solution, while the country was demanding that they should be attended to, they could not possibly ask for enormous sums of money for the Army unless they could show that that money was urgently needed for
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    the requirements of the country, and that it was rightly and adequately expended. More than that, he was afraid that if this expenditure continued to increase as it was now increasing the people would get disgusted with it, and in future years it would be difficult for any Government to bring forward a scheme which would adequately meet the requirements of Imperial defence, because the public felt that the money already voted had not been properly spent, and they could not be certain how it would be expended.
    They were told by the right hon. Gentleman that he had got his men. He was prepared to accept that statement, although they did not know how the figures were arrived at, what they included, or what were the qualities of the men. But supposing the right hon. Gentleman had made that point good, supposing he had got his men, what were they for? Was it to engage in a Continental war? If so, he was perfectly certain that the people of this country would not tolerate that for one moment. Was it for home defence? If so, then it was in direct opposition to the policy enunciated by the President of the Defence Committee. If they were told it was to be prepared for wars like that in South Africa, if they were told that they wanted six Army Corps for that purpose, then he thought they ought to have a clear statement from a member of the Government of the policy which the Government was pursuing. It had been said that the policy of the Government was to maintain on the one hand an overwhelming Navy to meet the necessities inherent to the defence of these shores, and at the same time to maintain a large Army which would enable them to deal with a war such as that they had recently had in South Africa. If that were the policy of the Government, let Ministers say so clearly and frankly. They had heard a good deal that afternoon about recruiting; they had heard with great satisfaction that the results were very good. But he would like to ask whether, in the 50,000 recruits spoken of that afternoon, there were included the 5,000 yeomen who last year were enlisted under special conditions.
    *LORD STANLEY: No.
    *LIEUTENANT - COLONEL GEORGE KEMPsaid he was glad to hear

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    that. They had got the quantity of recruits, but what about the quality? In the last recruiting returns there was a statement which would lead one to believe that the quality of the recruits educationally had improved. If that was going to be argued by the right hon. Gentleman, he ventured to say it was in direct contradiction of what he had himself heard. He had the pleasure of talking to a recruiting officer a little while ago, an officer who had passed a large number of recruits, and who had taken the trouble to examine them as to their educational qualities. His experience was that at least 50 per cent. of them were illiterate. No doubt they had been to school, but in the years intervening between leaving school and enlisting in the Army they had not taken part in any intelligent employment, and had apparently forgotten all they were supposed to have learnt. He thought that, in regard to that matter, they ought to have an authoritative statement from the right hon. Gentleman, because, unless it could be shown that the quality of the recruits had not merely not deteriorated but had tremendously improved, they would have failed to take advantage of one of the chief lessons of the South African War, a lesson which taught them that what they wanted was a higher class of men and more individuality of character. Unless the right hon. Gentleman could tell them that they had a much superior class of men, he ventured to assert that this present scheme was extravagant, because under it they did not get a due return from each man for the trouble and expense incurred on his behalf.
    He had spoken rather longer than he intended, but there was one other point to which he could not omit drawing the attention of the House. The last and strangest feature of this scheme was that in the particular departments in which the Government ought to have been the least weak and the least niggardly, they had been the most niggardly. Where they ought to have spent money with a lavish hand they had absolutely stinted it. He referred particularly to the Intelligence Department. They had been told that afternoon that, two or three years before the Boer War broke out it would never have been anticipated that such a large number of men would be required. Why was it
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    never anticipated? It was because they had not a proper Intelligence Department. The war was known to be inevitable. It ought to have been known to be inevitable ever since 1884, and that being so, if they had had an Intelligence Department worthy of the name they would have been better prepared for it. He wondered if the right hon. Gentleman had ever calculated how many millions he might have saved this country if he had borne this in mind. What was done? Only a short time before the war took place, and when the situation was most acute, what did they do? They sent out a handful of officers to gather information which ought to have been collected ten years before. Those officers did admirable work, they did everything in their power, and they ran risks to which they ought not to have been exposed. They did magnificent work, and was it not a terrible condemnation of the Intelligence Department and of the War Office that they should have been obliged to send out, at the last moment, these few devoted men to find information which ought to have been in their possession long before. Now, he asked what had been done to remedy that defect. They had been informed that much had been done, and that the Director of Military Intelligence had been put into a very high and responsible post. They were glad to hear it. But what else had been done? He would like to ask what had become of the body of men so admirably trained by Colonel Henderson in South Africa. Colonel Henderson gathered together some 200 officers for the work of the Department, but no sooner had the war ended than their services were dispensed with. Was that the way in which the Department was trying to meet the necessities of the case? He spoke somewhat feelingly on this subject. He knew that the maps which they had in South Africa were, at any rate so far as the Orange River and Cape Colonies were concerned absolutely useless and inadequate. That was not merely his opinion, it was also the opinion of those responsible for drawing up the maps. In one instance there was an inscription, "This map is not to be taken as absolutely ac-

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    curate." There was no doubt a sombre humour in that, but that which might appear comic to the compiler was passing near tragic to the users. Some hon. Members had drawn a comparison between the Intelligence Departments of this country and Germany. Germany was practically surrounded by a ringed fence of armed nations, but the British Empire had to deal with problems of a unique character all the world over. If Germany met her needs by a large Intelligence Department, would this country not also adequately meet our needs by a correspondingly large Intelligence Department. It might be said that England had a small and Germany a big army, but was that going to be the measure by which they were going to determine what their Intelligence Department should be? It was because they had only a small army that they wanted an absolutely good Intelligence Department, so that an English force when it went abroad might be able to strike quickly and effectively.
    As to the Volunteers, when the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight spoke of the unsympathetic treatment they had received, he could not help bringing before the House the fact that in Natal they only had one-third of the Volunteers from the Orange River Colony. And why? Because of the unsympathetic treatment they received. This was the same kind of official red tape which lost us, long ago, America. That was the attitude in 1754, and they had the same attitude from the War Office in 1900. That was the attitude which was responsible for giving us so few Volunteers in Natal, where the men were so anxious and willing to serve us. Anyone who had been in South Africa knew that they could not go to any considerable town there without hearing complaints of the treatment of the Volunteers from the Imperial Government. To all those arguments that he had adduced there was only one answer. What alternative had they to offer? The Secretary for War said that all the critics disagreed, and could not make any constructive policy. But he had no right to ask them to form an alternative scheme until they had a definite and authoritative statement from a responsible Minister of the
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    relative needs of the Navy and the Army. Until this was done no one could propound an alternative scheme. They might indicate the general lines upon which they thought their policy should be carried out, but it was for the military experts to adumbrate the details of the scheme. They ought not to be asked for an alternative scheme until they knew what the respective requirements of the Army and Navy were. It was sufficient for him to know that they were face to face with a scheme which he felt that he had no alternative but to oppose with all the power he possessed. Holding those convictions he should be obliged to support them with his vote. He knew there were many people, both inside and outside of the House of Commons, who, upon this subject, would not openly oppose the Government, but he sincerely hoped that the time would not be long in coming when His Majesty's Government, whose high intentions and patriotism he admired as much as anybody, would realise that by the withdrawal of this wasteful and cumbrous policy they would best fulfil their obligations to the Empire and to the Crown.
    SIR EDWARD GREY: I do not rise for the purpose of occupying any great amount of time in this important debate, in which a great number of Members will be anxious to speak; but I think it is desirable that as many Members as possible should make it clear from what point of view they approach this question. The Secretary for War tried, I think not unnaturally, to rally his own supporters by presenting his view, which he undoubtedly sincerely holds, that those who are opposed to his Army scheme, and who are in favour of this Amendment, are not themselves agreed. Well, I do not believe that that is the case. The hon. Members who introduced this Amendment to the House stated emphatically that they did so for no Party reason, and that they desired that it should not be made a Party question. It is impossible, of course, for anyone on this side of the House to speak in support of it without giving any hon. Gentleman opposite occasion to say that we support it for a Party purpose. That is necessarily the case. But what I want to do, as

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    far as possible, is to make it clear that we are sincere in saying that we do not support it for a Party purpose. The reason why we support it is not any difference of opinion whatever, or any special point of view of our own, or any Party purpose which we have to serve; but we support it on exactly the same grounds as have been presented to the House from the other side. It is not as if we differed, either on Imperial or strategical questions, from the point of view which the mover and seconder have presented to the House, but it is because we agree with them that we support their Amendment. On the contrary, I have never heard an Amendment which I thought was better launched in debate than this Amendment. The ground is covered with exactly the arguments which I should wish to use. The right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary of State for War, welcomed the debate because he said it raised a challenge of principle which went to the very root of the matter. The right hon. Gentleman really did not argue the question on that ground. What was challenged by the mover and seconder of the Amendment was the right hon. Gentleman's scheme—challenged, not in detail, but in principle. What was his reply? His reply, in effect, was that this scheme was doing very well. I understand the argument of the supporters of the Amendment to be that the right hon. Gentleman's scheme is wasteful, because it is aiming at something which is not suited to the requirements of the country or the Empire, and that because it is wasteful it is dangerous. The right hon. Gentleman's reply is that the country should give him more time, and then he will establish his scheme, and the country may be sure of having to pay for it. That is why I do not want to go over the ground which the right hon. Gentleman took—that the recruits were coming in well. I do not dispute that for a moment, but that does not meet our point. Our point is that his scheme is one which, if well filled up, is not suited to the country, and which is dangerous because of the expense it would involve. The right hon. Gentleman says that recruits are coming in well for his large Army scheme. From where are they coming? From our population. But
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    the right hon. Gentleman is drawing from our population in the same way as the Navy. Has it ever occurred to the right hon. Gentleman what are likely to be the requirements of the Navy in future years? If he raises the terms for the Army, and makes it more attractive, and succeeds in getting more recruits for the Army, he is dipping into precisely the same bucket as the Navy. Really, the question which the House has to consider is how many men this country can spare to devote themselves to the profession of arms. That is the real point you have to consider—not how many men you want for the Army, but for the Army and Navy combined.
    When I hear that recruits are coming in well for the Army, I wonder why. Presently we shall have Estimates presented for the Navy based on this, that the Navy has been obliged to raise its terms. That brings us to the real point which, I think, underlies the apprehension and the anxiety which the House feels, and it is this: has the Government really considered any settled policy of national requirements? Is there a real controlling opinion which has settled the policy of national defence and decided what part the Navy must play and what part the Army must play? That has not been done by the Committee of Defence as established previously. If it is going to be done by the new Committee of Defence, it is a fact that this Army scheme has been produced without that body having had an opportunity of considering such points. The mover and seconder raised a real difference of principle—not so broad as this one I have laid down—with regard to the Army at home, and that was that even if you had to consider the military question without considering the great naval question which lies behind it, there ought to be a clear separation between the Imperial Army to be used for purposes abroad and the military forces which you have for defence at home. That was the idea that ran through the speeches of the mover and seconder of the Amendment, and it is one which has been developed with, I think, a most admirable attempt to apply a thinking mind to this question in a series of articles in The Times newspaper. These speeches

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    and those articles are really the first attempt we have had before this country to think the question out. They are the work, no doubt, of individual minds. We may all of us differ in certain details from the proposals which have been put forward. But they are a real attempt to think the question out; and we have not yet had from the Government any sign on their part that they have devoted their mind to thinking out this military problem in the light of the present needs of the Empire. What the right hon. Gentleman's scheme is going to give us, it seems to me, is the largest possible Regular force in Great Britain, where it will not be wanted for military operations and where it cannot be satisfactorily trained.
    Most of us in this House must speak as laymen; but nobody can have listened to the hon. and gallant Member who has just sat down on the subject of training alone without feeling what an unsatisfactory training-ground this country is for the sort of purposes for which the British Army is likely to be wanted in the Empire. The hon. and gallant Member who has just sat down laid great stress upon the necessity of having a better Intelligence Department. That is one of the points to which attention has been drawn—that we have not a proper staff organisation or an adequate Intelligence Department, and that the brains of the Army are being starved. What is the answer of the Secretary of State for War? He said: "Would you have a general staff like that of the German Army, costing some half-a-million a year?" Perhaps not; but what does he propose? He says he has increased our Intelligence Department at home, and it is now to cost something like £25,000 instead of £10,500. It has been more than doubled at rather more than double the expense. Is that really what is to be put against the general staff of the German Army costing half-a-million? Without going so far as half-a-million, there is a great difference between half-a-million and £25,000. I admit that the German Army is on a scale entirely different from our own, and that what the German Army may require is not necessarily any gauge of what we require for our Army; but I am not sure that in proportion to the size of our Army we do not require a larger
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    thinking department even than the German army. The problem of the Germans is a simpler one, though they have to deal with a much larger army. We have to consider a far larger part of the globe, and conditions differing far more widely than those which the German army is called upon to consider. The essence of our case is that we may be called upon to undertake military operations in widely different parts of the world, in widely different conditions, which ought not to require more than a comparatively small force, but, in order that they should be successfully carried out they require great knowledge and great preparation. Though our Army must always be infinitesimal in comparison with the great Continental armies, it does require in proportion, I think, even a larger thinking department, because of the variety and uncertainty of the conditions which we have to deal with.
    The mover of the Amendment made a very interesting suggestion that Army expenses might be very greatly reduced by considering the troops in South Africa as being on the home establishment. The right hon. Gentleman replies to that by saying if that were done we should never get recruits. Well, it is the experience of many of us that a great number of people are anxious to get to other parts of the Empire, at any rate, to see what openings there are there. I must say the advantages of South Africa as a training ground are obvious. Even if it proved to be the case that we could not get recruits for a large part of the Army if such a place as South Africa were regarded as upon the home establishment, at any rate the attempt should be made; for I am not at all sure that the right hon. Gentleman is right in saying that recruits would not be forthcoming if they knew they were to be sent to a part of the Empire where the climate is good, the country large, with great possibilities, opportunities for experience, and possible openings such as men would not come into contact with at home. At any rate, the suggestion of the mover of the Amendment is one well worthy of consideration, and one which it should be one of our objects to carry out, or at least to put to the test.
    Now take the Army for defence at home. What sort of defence are we likely to want? What sort of attack are we likely to have to meet? The

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    hon. Member for Chester pressed this home in his speech. We should like to know how much the command of the sea really guarantees to us in regard to home defence. If it is a mere question of meeting a temporary raid by a comparatively small number of men landed suddenly by surprise, then I am convinced that a citizen Army, such as the hon. Member opposite has advocated, would be amply sufficient to meet them. Anyone who has read the Army Memorandum and the Navy Memorandum will see that the question has not been thought out by the two Departments together. The two Departments take different views. But it is the duty of the Government to form and to carry out a policy, not to present the conflicting views of the Army and the Navy. Their policy should make one or the other view prevail. If it be the case that the command of the sea guarantees us from anything but a raid, then I think the case of the hon. Member has been amply made out, and we can rely upon a citizen Army for home defence. If the citizen Army is given to understand that that duty is laid upon them, they will be stimulated with a spirit of patriotism which would do more than anything else to make the Militia and Volunteer forces efficient.
    Our Militia and Volunteer forces in this country have never yet had a chance, they have never been given to understand that a definite duty was laid upon them: they have always been taught to regard themselves as auxiliaries to be used they did not quite know how, to be used as supernumeraries, and as possibly not to be required at all. But, if it is once understood that they were clearly separated from the Regular Army abroad, that they constituted a citizen Army for defence at home, then I am confident that our Volunteer and Militia forces will develop into a force upon which the country could rely for any purposes of home defence. The right hon. Gentleman claims that his scheme serves a good purpose by bringing the officers commanding Army Corps closely into touch with the auxiliary forces; but that could be done without maintaining a large Regular Army. You might have a staff from your Regular Army for the purpose of being in contact with and
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    for the training of the auxiliary force. You might have a staff to whom this duty should be specially allotted. And I believe if that were done, and if we had a clear separation between our Regular Army as such, and that were kept small, compact, but efficient, with a comparatively large staff available for the training of the auxiliary force at home—if that had been done we should have come through the last war crisis in South Africa much better than we did. The right hon. Gentleman has dwelt on the feelings that were aroused during the crisis of the war; he appealed to us to go back to what we felt and said at that time, always using that in support of his present Army scheme. Well, Sir, the crisis was severe enough, and none of us as long as we live will be likely to forget what we felt. The crisis was acute, but how did that crisis arise? The crisis arose, not because our Regular Army was not large enough, but because there were not enough troops on the spot at the time. I venture to say that if our Regular Army had been twice the size it was we should still have gone through the same crisis. The troops were not there, and no more would have been there. What was the crisis? In the first place we suddenly became alive to the fact that there was nothing to prevent the Boer Army from going straight to Cape Town. The next stage of the crisis was the investment of Ladysmith. What was the cause of that? We had troops enough to put our Colony into a state of defence. It was not the want of troops, but the fact that our troops were not on the spot. It was not the want of Army Corps. If we had had these six Army Corps all complete we should still have had no more men there at the time. We ought to have had more men on the spot, more preparation, more knowledge of the risk and danger we ran; then we should have been in a position to defend ourselves, and we could have taken aggressive action at leisure afterwards. We wanted men to volunteer who could shoot and ride; and so long as we had plenty of men of that kind we could have taken the war at our own time and have carried it through just as successfully as we have now done.
    But the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman is going to reduce the

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    number of men at home. The Volunteers have already been discouraged, and the number of men trained to shoot and ride is being actually reduced. What we want is a clear view of the possibilities abroad, for which a Regular Army may be needed. We know what was the position in South Africa; and I maintain that with a small Regular Army, but a larger and better trained citizen Army at home. We should have been in a better position to meet the difficulties there. In other parts of the world what questions are likely to arise requiring a large army for aggressive action? I put the American question aside; we have heard enough of the Monroe Doctrine lately to know what is the settled policy of the United States. The possibility of a great land war on that continent is for us unthinkable. Whatever our Army and Navy policy may be, we may leave the United States out of consideration. It would be out of our power to enter into rivalry with the United States on the American Continent, and it is outside our desire. Then comes the question of Asia. I agree entirely with the hon. Member opposite as to the Indian frontier. I believe it would be an infinitely more difficult task for Russia to place 200,000 men on the Indian frontier than it was for us to place 200,000 men in South Africa; and even if they were placed there, they would have to get through the frontier. If that be so, then I do not see where, in Asia, we could have need of a large Regular Army for aggressive action on land. As for Europe, if ever this country should, unfortunately. become embroiled in European complications, it is surely upon the Navy we should rely. If any Government were to be so foolish as to allow us to be drawn into a land conflict of any extent, they would be pursuing a policy the most dangerous possible. If that be so, and I think there is little question about it, it is to the Navy that we must look in any great conquest with the great Powers of the World.
    The right hon. Gentleman opposite, in the course of his speech, almost pleaded that it was rather surprising—that it was rather hard lines—that his scheme, which was assented to by the House of Commons less than two years ago,
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    should now be subjected to so much criticism. But why is it so? I quite admit that, when he produced his scheme originally, he had far less difficulty with it than he has now. Why is it? I think it is partly because Parliament feels that it was rushed into this scheme. It is true that from this side of the House, and from this Bench, a Motion very similar to that which has now been moved from the other side, was proposed to the House at that time. Perhaps the Opposition was too hasty in opposing the scheme. The right hon. Gentleman is entitled to say that if the House had not time to think out his scheme, neither had it time to think out the opposition to the scheme. But suppose the Opposition, instead of moving a direct negative, had declined to commit itself to such a scheme without more consideration, would that have been more acceptable to the House? It would have been regarded merely as a dilatory Amendment, brought forward for Party purposes. We should have been told that the Government policy held the field, that we had none of our own, and so forth. I fully admit that since that time the Opposition which originated on this side of the House has been given more definiteness and boldness by the criticisms from the other side. The articles in The Times, to Which I have alluded, and the speeches of hon. Members to-night, have gone in definiteness and scope beyond anything the Opposition had to say two years ago. The country has had time to consider this scheme at leisure. The House to-day is expressing, not a mere hasty prejudice, or some vague apprehension, but the result of its reflection, and it is precisely because two years ago the House had not had time to consider the scheme that to-day the right hon. Gentleman meets with an opposition more settled and determined than anything which arose originally. There is really no prejudice at the root of this opposition. In individual minds there may be prejudice against the War Office, but I am convinced that no one could have listened to the speeches with which generally their Amendment has been supported, and believed that mere petty prejudice against the War Office, or mere personal offence, was at the bottom of it. The cause of the feeling behind this Amendment, and the reason it is receiving an attention to-day which it

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    would not have received two years ago, or even a year ago, is that the country and the House of Commons are becoming seriously alarmed with regard to the national expenditure. A great anxiety about national expenditure, a great anxiety for the future, is the force behind the present Amendment. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean gave some striking figures to the House. He stated that the land defence of the Empire, putting it at its lowest figure, now amounted to £81,500,000, against a Navy expenditure of £31,000,000.
    SIR CHARLES DILKE: £31,000,000 on the Navy, and £50,500.000 on the Army.
    SIR EDWARD GREY: That is £81,500,000 for both, £50,500,000 against £31,000,000. That is a perfectly fair comparison, because the Navy expenditure is the total of our Imperial expenditure, and if in this matter appeals are being made to the whole Empire to share in bearing its burden, against that it is fair to put the whole of the Army expenditure. The Navy expenditure we know, has not yet reached its sum. Everybody who has studied the Navy Estimates recently, and what is going on in the world, must be prepared for the possibility, at any rate, if not the probability, of a further increase in Navy expenditure. If we are to expend so much upon our Army that we are unable to deal freely with our Naval expenditure, then the Army is becoming a public danger. We have other expenses at home that we must meet. Many of us have fresh demands in regard to education, some, I believe, with regard to old age pensions, and many other matters. We may not all have set our hands to promises in these matters, but, at any rate, they are matters that we deem to be desirable, and some of them are pressing matters which no Government can resist Permanently. Therefore there is the certainty that our home expenditure, not on military matters at all, but on matters connected with education and so forth, must be further increased. If that be so, unless there is some control exercised, unless there is some settled policy controlling
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    our expenditure, you are getting near the day when the people of this country will say that the obligations of Empire are too great. If we are to deal with these matters as statesmen, it is necessary that we should consider what is really essential to the preservation of the Empire, and I think the right hon. Gentleman is launching us on a scheme which is not essential, and which is not suited to its purpose. It may be that in these comparatively good times, and for the present, the Government will succeed very well in meeting the expenditure they have in prospect. But it is the growing expenditure of the future that we have to look to. If in the future the day does come when this or any Government has to retrench its expenditure on the Navy, or on home matters, then certainly it will have brought the Empire within measurable distance of danger. If to-day the Imperial spirit of the country is such that it is prepared to meet all the obligations of Empire, we have to remember that the obligations now being laid on the country are getting exceedingly large, that they are bound to grow in the future, and that the duty does rest upon every one of us—When we see brought before the House a large scheme of this kind, entailing, as we consider, wasteful expenditur—to do everything in our power to prevent the country being saddled with something which we believe is not required, and which, because wasteful, will be dangerous.
    SIR CHARLES WELBYsaid that in considering the Amendment it was necessary to bear in mind that it contained two separate and distinct propositions. When a person was about to buy an article there were two questions which, consciously or unconsciously, he asked himself—first, whether the article was suited to its purpose, and, secondly, whether it was a good article in itself and worth the money demanded for it. In the Present instance, the article was the Army, and the Amendment declared it to be not only not suited to our purposes, but also not worth the price that was being paid. With the first of those propositions he had considerable sympathy, but to the second he unhesitatingly gave a negative

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    answer. He objected to the Amendment, not only because it conveyed a practical censure on all the Government had done in regard to Army matters during recent years, but also because its declaration could not be sustained by the facts of the case. The increased expenditure, Whether wise or unwise, was the result, not of a sudden new departure, but of the deliberate policy of strengthening and expanding the Army which the present Government had been steadily pursuing for the last seven years, and, for his part, granted that policy was a sound one, he believed the money had been well spent, and had resulted in a large increase of strength. A considerable proportion of the expenditure would have had to be incurred under any conceivable organisation, but it might be well to remind the House of some of the chief items of increased expenditure.
    In the first place, a large increase had taken place in the batteries of artillery, over seventy batteries having been added during the last few years. That, at any rate, was an item of expenditure which the House must realise had been much called for both by the nation and by Parliament, and for which the Government could hardly be blamed. Then there had been a very large increase in the infantry, a large portion of which had been in connection with the battalions on the home establishment, the weakness of which had, more than anything else connected with the Army, been the subject of criticism and condemnation in the House. Then there was the increased pay, the full effect of which it was as yet too soon to gauge, but no one could have listened to the statement of the Secretary of State without feeling that there was good reason to believe that it would produce the effects which were hoped from it, and result in not only a larger quantity but also a better quality of recruits being attracted to the Colours. Moreover, the weakness of the cavalry and artillery in the matter of horses had been the subject of much criticism in the past, and one of the items of increased expenditure was the addition of 11,000 horses to the strength. Then a very expensive force of Yeomanry had been created, and various minor services, such as the Army Service Corps, the Army Medical Corps, and all those minor branches without which an Army could not take the field—which in the past had been
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    more or less starved—had been brought up to the standard shown by war experience to be necessary. The protection of coaling stations and the replacing of obsolete arms had been steadily going on, and last, but not least, for some years past there had been a steady accumulation of war stores and munitions of all kinds.
    That was a feature of expenditure of which very little result appeared on the surface, but it was a most vital part of Army organisation. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean had strongly deprecated any cutting down with regard to horses, guns, or stores. That, if his views were accepted, certainly removed from the field a very large class in which economies could possibly be made. The increase of Army expenditure within the last few years by 50 per cent. was unquestionably a very serious increase. He was bound to say, with such knowledge of the state of things now as compared with the state of things some years ago, that he was entirely convinced that our Regular Army was quite as strong as it was. On the question whether our Army, in the words of the Amendment, "is unsuited to the needs of the Empire," the hon. Member said that unquestionably raised a very serious, difficult, and complicated problem. The problem was further complicated by the fact that the expression used in the Amendment was extremely vague and capable of many different interpretations. It appeared, from what had been said in the course of the debate, some people seemed to think that the organisation of the land forces was the beginning and the end of what was called the Army Corps Scheme. He would remind the House that, whether that scheme was good or bad, whether suited to our needs or not, at all events it was responsible for a very small part of the expenditure they had now under consideration. After all, the main organisation was for administrative purposes to divide the country into six large military districts, instead of, as formerly was the case, sixteen small districts. He was a member of the Committee which sat a year or two ago on War Office Organisation, and that Committee were unanimous in holding that it was absolutely essential as a preliminary to any satisfactory scheme of decentralisation

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    that the country should be mapped out in large districts instead of the small ones into which it was divided at that time.
    They had heard many jokes or sneers with regard to those Army Corps, or some of them, not being visible to the naked eye. It was not to be expected at this season that they should be visible to the naked eye, and he could only say that if the last three were visible he would join the crusade headed by some of his hon. friends below the Gangway against the excessive expenditure on the Army. The Army Corps Scheme must be put on one side of the argument as being, for good or evil, not a very large factor in the question of our military expenditure. There remained the question—What was it that was chiefly exercising the public mind at the present moment with regard to Army organisation? He thought the problem which was exercising their minds was whether it was necessary to maintain a large number of Regular troops in this country, and whether it was possible to organise the Imperial forces which must be maintained in such a way as to make it possible to reduce that number. He was one of those who had always felt very great doubts as to the necessity of maintaining a large Regular force in this country. He believed that everything that had taken place in the late war had gone rather to strengthen than to weaken that view in his mind, but unquestionably there were certain difficulties in the way of changing that policy which could not be ignored. It was impossible to forget that in 1890, when practically the whole of our Regular force had been sent out of the country, there was a considerable feeling of uneasiness in the public mind. It may or may not have been well founded. Under similar circumstances that feeling might exist again. and, whether right or wrong, it was a feeling which no Government having the responsibility for the forces of the country could neglect or ignore. Another consideration which could not be forgotten was that during all the time he was connected with the War Office—he did not know what the case might be at the present moment—the military authorities always stated clearly and categorically that they would not
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    be responsible for the safety of this country in time of war with a great Power unless we had Regulars here to defend us. That never commended itself to him, but at the same time he had profound respect for those who held that view. Among other reasons why he hailed the reconstitution of the Committee of Defence on more regular lines was the fact that the military authorities would in future have to convince, not only the Secretary of State, but their naval colleagues, and, above all, the Prime Minister, of the necessity of keeping so many regular troops in this country. But, even supposing it was agreed that it was unnecessary to do so, there was the question whether it was possible to maintain the Army we were obliged to maintain for Imperial purposes without keeping a large number of troops in this country to support them. We were obliged in normal times to keep 120,000 men in India and other foreign stations, and so long as these men were orgainsed on the short-service system it was absolutely necessary that there should be a force of something like, at all events, 60,000 at home, on a footing to support that force. As long as we kept our Army on the present footing we must have a Reserve at home. If we had a long foreign service Army we could do with a very small number of recruits, and in that way we might dispense very largely with our force at home. That would mean that we would sacrifice the Reserve and have no means of expanding the Army in time of war. That would be going back to the system which had broken down in the time of the Crimean War. In other words, it would be a course not of reform but of reaction, and it would be an alternative which he for one would refuse to have anything whatever to do with. An alternative which had been referred to was to keep a considerable part of the Army in South Africa on a home footing. While the suggestion had considerable attractions for him, he pitied the Government who, in a case of fresh disturbance in that country, might have to come to the House and say that the force in South Africa was on such a footing that it could not take the field without the addition of its Reserves, for the Reserves

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    would be 6,000 miles away form South Africa. That seemed to him one of the many difficulties in placing the Army on a home footing in that part of the world. He had not mentioned these difficulties for the sake of condemning any of the suggestions which had been put forward. Some of them, at all events, seemed to him to be well worthy of consideration. He earnestly hoped that they would receive the fullest possible consideration at the hands of the experts, and by experts he did not mean military experts alone. He meant that combination of military, naval, and political experts who were to from the newly-constituted Committee of Defence. Provided that the functions of the Committee were confined to those of a strictly advisory body, that their proceedings were confidential and were not allowed to conflict with the responsibility of the Cabinet, he looked forward with great hope to the results of their deliberations, particularly if they approached those problems with open minds. He would be very pleased if as the result of their deliberations they should see their way to reduce the heavy expenditure now incurred in regard to the Army without sacrificing or evading any of those Imperial responsibilities of which we could not divest ourselves even if we would.
    *MR. GUESTsaid the Secretary of State for War made an admirable speech, but he thought the House must have felt that he had a some what uphill task to perform. He regretted that the right hon. Gentleman had thought it necessary to draw attention to
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    the fact that an Amendment of this kind, if passed, might lead to his downfall. He was sure that no one on that side of the House who felt obliged to support the Amendment wished for such a result. They all recognised the honesty, the industry, and the versatility of the Secretary of State; and that it would be a great loss to the Party, not to say to the country, if he felt himself involved in the fate of his Army Scheme. He hoped that in any condemnation of that policy the Secretary of State would not think that any reflection was cast on the great services he had rendered to the State in the past. The right hon. Gentleman opened his speech by a rather unsuccessful attempt to detect divergencies of opinion in the three speakers who preceded him. There might be slight differences of opinion in matters of detail, but he thought an impartial listener would have detected a remarkable consensus of opinion in the three speakers. In the words of the Amendment, the scheme itself "is unsuited to the needs of the Empire." The right hon. Gentleman had quoted a great number of figures as to the success of recruiting during the past year. He had informed the House that the recruits raised in 1902 were no less than 51,000. He thought it was unfortunate that the House was not at the present moment in possession of the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting for 1902, for without it it was difficult to deal with figures like these which were thrown at the House at a moment's notice. He would call the

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    attention of the House to the remarkable fact that in the report on recruiting for 1901 it was stated that the percentage of rejections of the recruits who presented themselves, which in 1897 was thirty-eight, had fallen last year to twenty-nine. He should very much like to know whether that tendency for a less exacting standard of efficiency had been continued in 1902. If it had been continued the standard of efficiency was far less than in 1897, which they might regard as a normal year.
    There was another remarkable thing in the statement. The number of soldiers with the service of under one year or two years, who were never any value at all, increased from 997 in 1897 to no less than 3,825 in 1901. Then again, the percentage of waste from desertion was very much on the increase. In 1897 it was 5.97 per cent., whereas last year it was 10.6 per cent. The House would be glad to know whether those very bad tendencies, which affected very materially the calculations of his right hon. friend, were to be found in the Report which would be issued in the course of a few days. There was another consideration which he thought the Secretary of State for War had overlooked in his calculations. His right hon. friend required 50,000 troops per annum to complete his Six Army Corps Scheme. Had he taken into consideration the general waste on account of the causes which he had mentioned? For instance, the hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment said that the Inspector General of Recruiting had declared that nearly 50 per cent. of the recruits were pure waste, "trash "
    628
    he thought was the word used. His right hon. friend himself admitted that it was 47 per cent., and what the House wanted to know was what was the net gain in recruits per annum, and on what number could they really count as effective. They did not want a gross or paper calculation, which was easy to make and which was of so little value. Then the Secretary of State for War in his speech said the Army Corps scheme had not been responsible for the increase in the cost, and he further stated that of the 54,000 men who had been raised since 1897, only 5,000 were attributable to his own scheme. He would refer his right hon. friend to the speech he delivered on the 8th of March, 1901, in introducing the Army Corps Scheme. In that speech he distinctly stated that no less than 11,500 Regulars would be added to the Army Estimates by his scheme. That appeared to him to show a rather serious discrepancy as compared with his right hon. friend's statement that afternoon.
    *MR. BRODRICKsaid that three Line battalions were not required to be raised. He was correct in saying that only 5,000 men were added to the Army by the scheme.
    *MR. GUESTsaid that he then understood that the 11,500 men did not in fact represent what had occurred, and that the prediction of his right hon. friend had not been accomplished, because he intended to add 11,500 men to the Estimates, and had in fact only added 5,000 men. When his right hon. friend claimed that no additional expense had

    629
    been cast upon the country in pursuit of his Army Corps Scheme, he would again refer him to his speech of the 8th March, 1901, in which he said, with an expenditure of a little under £2,000,000 he would accomplish all that he now claimed to have accomplished. His right hon. friend could not have it both ways. Either the recruiting scheme did not come up to his expectations, or else the recruits cost more money. It was quite clear if the recruits were there they would cost more money; and if they were not there his right hon. friend's scheme had failed. He was not concerned so much with the speech of his right hon. friend, because it was delivered under a considerable amount of adverse criticism; but his right hon. friend exhibited a very different tone to what he did two years ago. He was more concerned with trying to discover what was the real feeling of the Secretary of State for War as to the military necessities of the country, and as to how, and at what cost, those necessities should be met. What was the idea of the Secretary of State for War? He asked the question, because if there was anything in the Amendment at all, it was a contention that the conception of the Secretary of State for War revealed a complete misapprehension of the military needs of the Empire, and the resources with which they might be met.
    The primary notion of the Secretary of State for War was that it was absolutely necessary for this country to have a large Army. In a speech he made to the Colonial Premiers he boasted that he had at his disposal no less than 250,000 men, and he boldly emphasised the fact that the necessities of the Empire entailed the service of at
    630
    least a quarter of million of men. But his right hon. friend was not content with that. Last session he was accused of trying to introduce a Bill which would destroy the Yeomanry forces of the country in order that he might add to his Regular forces in cases of emergency. In that speech also he emphasised the fact that it was necessary for this country in times of emergency to have a call on further troops, they being, of course, colonial troops, and he boldly asserted that he did not mean to accommodate his organisation to the existing resources of the country. At what cost was that large Army to be created and carried on? In the first place, it was to be carried on at the expense of that immunity from compulsory military service which the country enjoyed from time immemorial. The Secretary of State for War more than once declared that nothing would deter him from proposing compulsory military service except the consideration that he had not exhausted all possible means of supply. In spite of the very confident and sanguine statements of his right hon. friend that afternoon, he could not help thinking that the House would feel that the Secretary of State for War was exhausting if he had not already exhausted, all the available means of obtaining the necessary recruits; and that he would have to consider himself very pusillanimous if he did not make other proposals.
    So important was a large Army in the view of his right hon. friend that financial considerations did not weigh with him at all. He boasted that financial considerations were the business of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that in 1900–1 no less than£9,000,000 were added to the Army Estimates. But there was another

    631
    consideration which was much more remarkable, and that was the subordinate position to which his right hon. friend relegated the Navy. His right hon. friend thought the Army was a much more important asset than the Navy. It was true that he paid lip service to the Navy, and said that it was obvious that it was the country's first line of defence; but in the next sentence he made a proposal which was the most remarkable and startling made in the House of Commons within the memory of any hon. Member. He calmly proposed to take no less than 5,000 sea-going men from the personnel of the Fleet, which was none too large, and lock them up in coaling stations all over the world, in order to release for the purposes of his Army Corps Scheme five battalions of infantry. That fact alone showed that his right hon. friend regarded the Navy as a secondary, because a very doubtful, asset, as it might easily be defeated. He was constantly referring to the fact that the Navy might lose command of the sea, and then he said it would be necessary for his Army Corps to defend England from invasion. His right hon. friend's idea was that the Navy was by no means invincible. That was not his view.
    *MR. BRODRICKsaid he did not wish to interrupt the hon. Member, but he should not be taken as assenting to any of the hon. Member's propositions.
    *MR. GUESTsaid that with regard to the interruption, perhaps it would interest the House if he were to quote again from the speech delivered by the Secretary of State for War at the Colonial Conference. He said that large as the figures might sound, they were certainly not deemed too large by military officers in view of the possibility of the country at
    632
    any time losing command of the sea, and he reminded the Conference that what Great Britain did off her own bat was not limited to her power to send 120,000 men to any threatened position in case of emergency. But how would the Secretary of State for War be able to send 120,000 men to any threatened position if the Navy had lost command of the sea? That view of the right hon. Gentleman was a fundamental misconception of their strategic position. How was it possible for his right hon. friend to reconcile the defeat of the Navy with the safety of England. He admitted that against the world in arms three Army Corps were certainly not too many; the only question was whether they were not too few. He also admitted, of course, that 100,000 men were better than 50,000 men, other things being equal; but then other things were not equal. The expense of a large Army was not only double the expense of a small Army, but was more than double. The fact was that, under Providence, and with good diplomacy, there was no reason why they should contemplate having the whole of the civilised world banded against them. They had only to take into consideration the normal probable emergencies with which they might be brought face to face, and the normal risks which they might consider possible with a settled and consecutive policy. Now that the South African problem was solved, that country no longer presented the military danger it did three years ago.
    Then his right hon. friend referred to India, but the balance of opinion was that the invasion of India was a matter of such great difficulty that it was impossible to conceive its being accomplished under at least two years. He was, perhaps, the only Member of the House who

    633
    had had the advantage of travelling in Russian Central Asia, and who saw the Russian side of the problem. The only railway which connected Russian Central Asia with the main body of the Russian Empire was a railway running parallel to the frontier, and of hardly any value at all. When he travelled over it there was scarcely any rolling stock on it, it was laid down on foundations so uncertain that the train could only travel five or six miles an hour. The difficulty of collecting great masses of men and material could not be overcome in a short time, quite apart altogether from the difficulties of invasion. When he was in India twelve years ago he made the acquaintance of a very distinguished General, and his view was that there were in India as many white troops as could be put on the frontier, and that all that would be required would be volunteers to garrison the country behind and to maintain British prestige in India itself. If that was the case he could not see the justification for three Army Corps. With reference to Colonial Defence, there was only one colony, namely, Canada, which could be attacked from the land. The other Colonies could only be attacked by over-sea expeditions, and as long as they retained command of the sea that would be impossible. What was constantly in the mind of the right hon. Gentleman was the idea of the British Army being pitted against European troops. It could not be his right hon. friend's idea that British troops were to be set in battle array against a continental Army; and he was, therefore, driven to the conclusion that when his right hon. friend talked of European entanglements he contemplated England playing such a part in
    634
    European politics as she did at the beginning of the last century. Really, it was rather strange that his right hon. friend should not have appreciated how the proportion of things had changed since then. It was idle to imagine that with three Army Corps, the country could play any such part in the European game as she did 100 years ago.
    Where he and his hon. friends joined issue with the Secretary of State for War was, not that his scheme was a comparative failure, but because it was bad in itself and not suited to the needs of the country. Further his right hon. friend had involved the country in an enormous expenditure, which no one who cared at all for thrift or economy, or had any conception of the importance of keeping within their resources, could view without the gravest apprehension. It was quite unnecessary for him to draw attention to the enormous increase in national expenditure during the last ten or fifteen years; but he desired to draw the attention of the House to the fatal equality of the expenditure on the Army and the Navy. In 1900 the proportion spent on the Army was only 43 per cent.; in 1901 it was 45 per cent., and in 1902 it was 48 per cent.; and that excluded money spent on military works. Their position was that the scheme of the Secretary of State for War was quite unsuited to the need of the country, that it had entailed the expenditure of vast sums of money, and that they had not seen the end of the expenditure. The Amendment was not by any means a hostile attack on his right hon. friend, or on the Government, but was a protest and a remonstrance against the policy inaugurated by his right hon. friend two years ago, and which he sincerely hoped he would abandon.
    MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: I beg to move the adjournment of the Debate.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(Mr. Churchill.)
    Put and agreed to.
    Debate to be resumed Tomorrow.

    PARISHES (UNITED, DIVIDED, ETC.).
    Address for "Return of parishes divided and districts assigned to churches by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England, under the provisions of the Church Building Acts and The Parish of Manchester Division Act, 1850."
    "Of all districts and new parishes constituted by the same Commissioners under the New Parishes Acts"
    "Of all districts or parishes assigned or constituted by the same Commissioners under The St. Leonard and St. Mary Magdalen Church Districts Act, 1868, or any other local Act."
    "Of all the benefices, parishes, or parts of parishes united by Order in Council, and of all benefices or parishes disunited by Order in Council.
    "Of all chapelries, hamlets, and other parts of parishes severed from their mother parishes, and of extra-parochial places, constituted separate benefices by Order of the Council."
    "And of all chapelries, hamlets, or other parts of parishes severed from their mother parishes, and of extra-parochial places not constituted separate benefices but united to other parishes by Order of the Council."
    "And, of curacies and chapelries which have been erected into perpetual
    636
    curacies through the action of the governors of the bounty of Queen Anne, showing the full name of the chapel, and of the mother parish (if any), the county and diocese, and the date of first augmentation by the governors, and the statutes or statute under which such augmentation was made (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 302, of Session 1897)."—(Mr. Talbot.)

    CHURCHES (CITY OF LONDON).
    Address for "return of the number of churches in the city of London pulled down or condemned during the period from the 2nd day of August, 1894, to the 31st day of December, 1902, stating the gross sum realised by the sale of the site, the items of expenses such as solicitors' and auctioneers' charges, and the cost of removal of the dead buried within the church, and the net sum produced; what new churches have been built out of the proceeds in lieu of the churches pulled down, their situation, and cost; and what has been done with the parochial endowments (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 236, of Session 1895)."—(Mr Talbot.)
    CRUELTY TO ANIMALS.
    Bill to amend The Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876, ordered to be brought in by Sir Fredrick Banbury, Colonel Lockwood, and Mr. MacNeill.

    CRUELTY TO ANIMALS BILL.
    "To amend The Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876," presented accordingly, and read the first time; to be read a second time upon Friday, and to be printed. [Bill 50.]
    Adjourned at two minutes after Twelve o'clock.

The King's Answer to the Address of Tuesday last reported; and Address and Answer to be printed and published.

PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House that the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificates from the Examiners, that the Standing Orders applicable to the following Bills have been complied with:—
All Saints, Poplar (Rate Abolition).
Antrim, Down, Armagh, and Belfast Electric Power.
Aston Manor Improvement.
Baker Street and Waterloo Railway (Transfer).
Bangor Corporation.
Barnsley Corporation (Water).
Barry Railway.
Bath Corporation Water.
Beckenham Urban District Council.
Belfast Street Tramways.
Belfast Water.
Billingshurst and District Gas.
Birmingham Corporation.
Blackheath and Greenwich District Electric Light.
Bournemouth Corporation Tramways.
Bournemouth Gas and Water.
Bradford Corporation.
Bridgwater Gas.
Brighton Corporation.
Bristol Corporation.
Bristol, London, and Southern Counties Railway.
British Gas Light Company (Norwich).
Broadstairs Gas.
Burgess Hill and St. John's Common Gas.
Bury and District Joint Water Board.
Cardiff Railway.
Carmarthenshire Electric Power.
Castleblaney, Keady, and Armagh Railway (Extension of Time).
Central London Railway.
Chard Corporation Gas and Electricity.
Charing Cross, Euston, and Hampstead Railway.
Cheltenham Improvement.
Cheshire Lines Committee.
City and North-East Suburban Electric Railway.
City and South London Railway.
Clapham Junction and Marble Arch Railway (No. 1).
Cleveland and Durham County Electric Power.
Commercial Gas.
Cork Harbour.
Coventry and Arley Railway.
Coventry Electric Tramways.
Crystal Palace District Gas.
Derby Gas.
Didcot, Newbury, and Southampton Railway.
Dover Corporation.
Dublin Improvement (Bull Alley Area).
Dublin, Wicklow and Wexford Railway.
Dudley, Stourbridge and District Tramways.
East Ardsley Gas.
East Ham Improvement.
Ebbw Vale Water and Improvement.
Erith Tramways and Improvement.
Exeter Corporation.
Exeter Railway.
Faversham Gas.
Fishguard and Rosslare Railways and Harbours.
Frinton-on-Sea Sea Defences.
Gas Light and Coke Company.
Gas Light and Coke Company's Acts Amendment.
Gateshead Corporation.
Gorleston and Southtown Gas.
Great Central Railway.
Great Eastern Railway (No. 1).
Great Eastern Railway (No. 2).
Great Northern and City Railway.
Great Northern, Piccadilly, and Brompton Railway (New Lines and Extensions).
Great Northern, Piccadilly, and Brompton Railway (Various Powers).
Great Northern Railway.
Great Southern and Western Railway.
Great Western Railway.
Great Western Railway (Pension Fund).
Grindleford, Baslow, and Bakewell Railway.
Hainault Forest.
Hampton Court Gas.
Harrogate Water.
Harrow and Stanmore Gas.
Hastings Harbour.
Hastings Harbour District Railway.
Hastings Harbour District Railway (Abandonment).
Hastings Tramways (Extensions).
Hexham Gas.
Highland and Invergarry and Fort Augustus Railway Companies. (Substituted Bill.)
Humber Commercial Railway and Dock.
Hyde Corporation.
Indiarubber, Guttapercha, and Telegraph Works Company.
Ipswich Gas.
Kent Water Board.
King's College, London.
Kingston-upon-Hull Corporation.
Knott End Railway (Extension of Time).
Lancashire and Yorkshire and London and North-Western Railway (Steam Vessels).
Leigh Corporation.
Lima Railways.
Liverpool University.
Llandrindod Wells Improvement.
London and North-Western Railway.
London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway.
London Building Acts (Amendment.)
London County Asylums (Receiving Houses).
London County Council (Electric Supply).
London County Council (General Powers).
London Hydraulic Power.
London, Tilbury, and Southend Railway.
London United Tramways.
Maidstone Gas.
Manchester Corporation.
Market Drayton Gas.
Maryport Harbour.
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board.
Merthyr Tydfil Urban District Council.
Metropolitan District Railway (Works).
Middlesbrough Corporation.
Midland and Belfast and Northern Counties Railways.
Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland.
Midland Railway.
Milford Docks.
Mullingar, Kells, and Drogheda Railway.
Nantwich Gas.
Nantwich Urban District Council.
Nantyglo and Blaina Water.
Neath, Pontardawe, and Brynamman Railway.
Nelson Corporation.
New Hunstanton Improvement.
Newcastle-on-Tyne Electric Supply.
North Cheshire Tramways.
North-Eastern Railways.
North Middlesex Gas.
North-Western Electricity and Power Gas.
North-West London Railway.
North's Navigation Collieries.
Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Tramways.
Old Bridewell Burying Ground.
Oldham Corporation.
Pelican and British Empire Life Office.
Plymouth and Stonehouse Gas.
Plymouth Corporation.
Pontypridd Urban District Council.
Poole and District Electric Traction.
Port Talbot Railway and Docks.
Queensland Investment and Land Mortgage.
Rickmansworth Gas.
Rochester Corporation Tramways and Improvements.
St. Philip's Chapel (Regent Street).
Salford Corporation.
Scarborough Gas.
Scunthorpe Urban District Water.
Seaforth and Sefton Junction Railway.
Sheffield and South Yorkshire Navigation.
Shropshire, Worcestershire, and East Denbighshire Electric Power.
Sittingbourne District Gas.
Somerset and District Electric Power.
Southampton Harbour.
South-Eastern and London, Chatham and Dover Railways.
South Shields Corporation.
South Shields, Sunderland, and District Tramways.
South Wales Mineral Railway.
South Western and Isle of Wight Junction Railway.
South Yorkshire Joint Railways.
Staffordshire and Worcestershire Canal.
Stoke Newington Borough Council.
Stroud District and Cheltenham Tramways.
Sutton Coldfield Corporation.
Sutton District Water.
Taff Vale Railway.
Thames Conservancy.
Thames Steamboat Trust.
Torquay Corporation Water.
Ulster and Connaught Light Railways:
Walker and Wallsend Union Gas.
Watford and Edgware Railway.
Wellingborough and District Tramroads.
Wellington (Salop) Gas.
West Bromwich Corporation.
West Cumberland Electric Tramways.
Western Trust.
Western Valleys (Monmouthshire) Sewerage Board.
West Ham Corporation.
West Sussex Water.
Willesden Urban District Council.
Winchester Water and Gas.
Wirral Railway.
Wisbech Canal (Abandonment).
Wolverhampton and Cannock Chase Railway (Extension of Time).
Wood Green Urban District Council.
Woolwich Borough Council.
Worthing Corporation (Tramways).
And the Certificates that the Standing Orders applicable to the following Bills have not been complied with—
Birmingham District Tramways.
Chatham and District Light Railways.
Croydon and District Electric Tramways.
Harrow Road and Paddington Tramways.
Hove, Worthing and District Tramways.
Macclesfield and District Electric Tramways.
Metropolitan District Railway (Various Powers).
Mid Yorkshire Tramways.
Sheffield Corporation.
Shepshed Urban District Council Gas.
South Lancashire Tramways.
South Staffordshire Tramways.
Strabane and Letterkenny Railway.
Thames Steamboat Service.
Tynemouth and District Tramways.
Wigan Corporation Tramways.

RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.
  State of the Six Army Corps Commands.
  NAVY (MANœUVRES.)
  Narrative of the combined manœuvres by the Mediterranean, Channel, and Cruiser Squadrons, 1902.
  Correspondence respecting the drought in Cyprus.
  COLONIES (ANNUAL).
  No. 381 Southern Nigeria; Report for 1901.
  RAILWAYS
  Report on a visit to America, 19th September to 31st October 1902, by Lieut.-Colonel H. A. Yorke, R.E., Chief Inspecting Officer of Railways, Board of Trade.

  WAGES AND EFFECTS OF DECEASED SEAMEN.
  Account of the sums received and paid in respect of the wages and effects of deceased seamen, in the year ended 31st March 1902.
  Presented [by Command], and ordered to lie on the Table.

  RAMSGATE HARBOUR.
  Statement of the receipts and payments made by the Board of Trade for the year ended 31st March 1902; together with an account of the receipt and issue of stores.

  TRUSTEE SAVINGS BANK.
  Eleventh Annual Report of the Proceedings of the Inspection Committee of Trustee Savings Banks, for the year ended 20th November 1902; with appendices.
  Laid before the House (pursuant to Act), and ordered to lie on the Table.

  SHOPS (HOURS OF CLOSING) BILL [H.L.]
  To be read 2a on Tuesday the 3rd of March next.
  House adjourned at twenty-five minutes before Five o'clock. till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.