Sitting of 28 March 1901

TOOK THE OATH.
One other Member took and subscribed the Oath.
PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.

  PRIVATE BILL PETITIONS (STANDING ORDERS NOT COMPLIED WITH).
  MR. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That in the case of the Petition for the following Bill, the Standing Orders have not been complied with, viz.:—
  Barry Railway.
  Ordered, That the Report be referred to the Select Committee on Standing Orders.

  PRIVATE BILL PETITIONS [LORDS] (STANDING ORDERS NOT COMPLIED WITH).
  MR. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the Petition for the following Bill, originating in the Lords, the Standing Orders have not been complied with, viz.:—
  Rodgers' Patent [Lords].
  Ordered, That the Report be referred to the Select Committee on Standing Orders.

  GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY BILL (BY ORDER).
  Read a second time, and committed.
  BARRY RAILWAY.
  Petition for Bill; referred to the Select Committee on Standing Orders.
  METROPOLITAN COMMON SCHEME (HAM) PROVISIONAL ORDER
  Bill to confirm a scheme relating to Ham Common, in the parish of Ham, in the county of Surrey, ordered to be brought in by Mr. Hanbury and Mr. Austen Chamberlain.
  METROPOLITAN COMMON SCHEME (HAM) PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
  "To confirm a Scheme relating to Ham Common, in the parish of Ham, in the county of Surrey," presented, and read the first time; to be referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, and to be printed. [Bill 126.]
  METROPOLITAN COMMON SCHEME (ORPINGTON) PROVISIONAL ORDER.
  Bill to confirm a Scheme relating to Broom Hill Common and other Commons in the parish of Orpington, in the county of Kent, ordered to be brought in by Mr. Hanbury and Mr. Austen Chamberlain.

  METROPOLITAN COMMON SCHEME (ORPINGTON) PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
  "To confirm a Scheme relating to Broom Hill Common and other Commons in the parish of Orpington, in the county of Kent," presented, and
  read the first time; to be referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, and to be printed. [Bill 127.]

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 1).
  Bill to confirm certain provisional Orders of the Local Government Board relating to Carlisle, Erith, Hornsey, Oxford, and Whitley and Monkseaton, ordered to be brought in by Mr. Grant Lawson and Mr. Austen Chamberlain.

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 1) BILL.
  "To confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board relating to Carlisle, Erith, Hornsey, Oxford, and Whitley and Monkseaton," presented,

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  and read the first time; to be referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, and to be printed. [Bill 128.]

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (POOR LAW).
  Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board relating to the parish of Saint Giles, Camberwell, the Southampton Incorporation, and the Stepney Union, ordered to be brought in by Mr. Grant Lawson and Mr. Austen Chamberlain.
  LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (POOR LAW) BILL.
  "To confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board relating to the parish of Saint Giles, Camberwell, the Southampton Incorporation, and the Stepney Union," presented, and read the first time; to be referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, and to be printed. [Bill 129.]
  THAMES PIERS AND RIVER SERVICE BILL.
  Reported [Preamble not proved]; Report to lie upon the Table.
  PRIVATE BILLS (GROUP A.).
  MR. Alexander Hargreaves Brown reported from the Committee on Group A of Private Bills, That, for the convenience of parties, they had adjourned till Tuesday, 23rd April, at Twelve of the clock; Report to lie upon the Table.

  METROPOLITAN POLICE PRO VISIONAL ORDER BILL.
  Reported, with Amendments [Provisional Order confirmed]; Report to lie upon the Table.
  Bill, as amended, to be considered to-morrow.

  PAISLEY GAS PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
  Reported, without Amendment [Provisional Order confirmed]; Report to lie upon the Table.
  Bill to be read the third time to-morrow.

  THAMES AND SEVERN PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
  Reported, with Amendments [Provisional Order confirmed]; Report to lie upon the Table.
  Bill, as amended, to be considered-to-morrow.

HONLEY URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL (GAS) BILL.
  GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY BILL.
  Reported, with Amendments; Reports to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
  NEATH HARBOUR BILL.
  Reported, with Amendments; Report to lie upon the Table.
BURY CORPORATION TRAMWAYS BILL.
  GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY BILL.
    TAPE VALE RAILWAY BILL.
    Reported, with Amendments; Reports to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
PETITIONS.
  BEER BILL.
  Petitions, in favour, from Knutsford; and Southern Division of Wilts; to lie upon the Table.
  COAL MINES (EMPLOYMENT) BILL.
  Petitions, in favour, from Kidsgrove; Buttlane; Birchinwood; Pack Moor; Morley Main; Swinton; Holbrook; Wharncliffe (No. 3); Audley; Pittshill; Madely and Leycett; Brown Edge; Halmer End; Bucknall; Golden. Hill; Milton; Harriseahead; Whitfield; Lochgelly; Chesterton; Newcastle-under-Lyme; Clanway; Cheadle; West Hallam; and Shipley Woodside Collieries; to lie upon the Table.
  LICENSING (SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS).
  Petition from Manchester for alteration of Law; to lie upon the Table.

  MINES (EIGHT HOURS) BILL.
  Petitions, in favour, from Swinton; Morley Main; Holbrook; Mow Cop Kidsgrove; Buttlane; Birchinwood; Pack Moor; Audley; West Hallam;

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  Wharncliffc; Silkstone; Pittshill; Madely and Leycett; Brown Edge Halmer End; Bucknall: Golden Hill Milton; Harriseahead; Cheadle; Whit field; Lochgelly; Chesterton; New-castle-under-Lyme; Knntton; Clanway and Woodside Collieries; to lie upon the Table.

  SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS ON SUNDAY (MONMOUTHSHIRE).
  Petition from Coedpoeth for alteration of Law; to lie upon the Table.
  SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS TO CHILDREN HILL.
  Petitions, in favour, from Norwich (two); Headley Hill (two); Balachulish; Cornsay Colliery (six); Levenshulme (two); Heaton Moor; South Cheriton; Dalton in Furness; Kilmaurs; Aluwick; Eorfar (three); Clitheroe; Burnley; East Ardsley; Mirfield; Sheffield; Edinburgh; Denbigh; Llangollen: Pendle-ton; and Rossett; to lie upon the Table.
  SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS TO CHILDREN (SCOTLAND) BILL.
  Petitions, in favour, from. Ardrossan; Stevenston: Stornoway: Fraserburgh; Montrose (three); Arbroath (two); Isch; Forfar; Ayr: Udny; Culsamond; Maxwelltown; and Rutherglen; to lie upon the Table.
  TROUT FISHING ANNUAL CLOSE TIME (SCOTLAND) BILL.
  Petition from Glasgow, in favour; to lie upon the Table.

  MONMOUTH BOROUGHS ELECTION PETITION (THOMAS EMBREY AND ANOTHER v. FREDERICK RUTHER FORD HARRIS).
  A Petition of Hollams, Sons, Coward, and Hawksley, solicitors, for leave to the proper officer of the House to attend a trial and produce documents and give evidence in the High Court of Justice.
  Leave to the proper officer to attend accordingly.

RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.
  PUBLIC ACCOUNTS (NAVY VOTES).
  Paper [presented 27th March] to be printed [No. 106.]
  ARMY (CLOTHING FACTORY).
  Annual Account presented of the Royal Army Clothing Factory for the year 1899–1900, with Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General thereon [by Act]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 107.]
  PUBLIC ACCOUNTS (ARMY VOTES).
  Copy presented, of Treasury Minute, dated 27th March, 1901, under the Appropriation Act, 1899, authorising the temporary application of Surpluses on certain Army Votes for the year 1899–1900 to meet excesses on certain other Army Votes for the same year [pursuant to Resolution of the House of 4th March, 1879]; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. [No. 108.]

  TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION ACT, 1889.
  Copies presented, of Minutes sanctioning the Subjects to be taught under Clause 8 of the Act for the following County Borough and County:—
  County Borough of South Shields (Fourth Minute), dated 6th March, 190]; County of Glamorgan (Tenth Minute), dated 8th March,
  1901
  [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

  TRADE REPORTS (ANNUAL SERIES).
  Copies presented, of Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Annual Series, Nos. 2566 and 2567 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
  PAPER LAID UPON THE TABLE BY THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE.
  Inquiry into Charities (Administrative County of Durham).—Further Return relative thereto [ordered 14th February, 1900; Mr. Grant Lawson]; to be printed. [No. 109.]
  SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES.
  Return ordered, "of the Additional and Supplementary Estimates voted in each of the years since 1890, distinguishing those due to active military operations."—(Sir Edgar Vincent.)

  REGISTRATION OF VOTERS (IRELAND).
  Return ordered, "showing, in respect to the Registration of Parliamentary

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  and Local Government Electors for each County and Borough during the year 1900, the salaries and travelling expenses of Revising Barristers; the inclusive salaries of the Assistants to Clerks of the Peace at Revision Sessions; the sums certified by the Treasury to be the Additional Cost recoverable from local bodies under Section 1 (4) of the Registration (Ireland) Act. 1898; the expenses of printing voters' lists, and all other expenses connected therewith. "—(Mr. M'Fadden.)

  PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS (EXPENSES).
  Address for "Return of Charges made to Candidates at the General Election of 1900 in Great Britain and Ireland by Returning Officers, specifying the total expenses of each Candidate (both exclusive and inclusive of Returning Officers' Charges) delivered to the Returning Officer pursuant to the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act, 188.3, and the number of Votes polled for each Candidate (in continuation of and in the same form as Parliamentary Paper, No. 145, of Session 1896). The totals of each column to be shown separately for England, Wales. Scotland, and Ireland, with a Summary showing the gross totals."—(Mr. Armine Wodehouse.)

  BREWERS' LICENCES.
  Return ordered. "of Accounts of the number of persons in each of the several Collections of the United Kingdom licensed as Brewers for sale,
  i.e., Common Brewers, Victuallers, Retailers of beer to be drunk on the premises, Retailers of beer not to be drunk on the premises, and Brewers of beer not for sale, particularising each class in each Collection; and stating also the quantities of malt, unmalted corn, rice. &c., and sugar, including its equivalent of syrups, &c., used by Brewers of beer for sale, and of malt and sugar used by Brewers not for sale, from the 1st day of October, 1899, to the 30th day of September, 1900.
  "Of the amount of Licence Duty paid and Beer Duty charged from the 1st day of October. 1899 to the 30th day of September, 1900, distinguishing Brewers for sale from other Brewers.
  "Of the number of Brewers for sale paying for Licences, from the 1st day of October, 1899, to the 30th day of September, 1900, separating them into classes, according to the number of barrels of beer brewed, namely, under 1,000 barrels, at 1½055 degrees gravity; 1,000 and under 10,000; 10,000 and under 20,000; 20,000 and under 30,000; 30,000 and under 50,000; 50,000 and under 100,000; 100,000 and under
  150,000; 150,000 and under 200,000; 200,000 and under 250,000; 250,000 and under 300,000; 300,000 and under 350,000; 350,000 and under
  400,000; 400,000 and under 450,000; 450,000 and under 500,000; 500,000 and under 600,000; 600,000 and under 700,000; 700,000 and under
  800,000; 800,000 and under 900,000; 900,000 and under 1,000,000; 1,000,000 and under 1,500,000; 1,500,000 and under 2,000,000; 2,000,000 barrels and over; showing separately, in each class, the quantities of malt, unmalted corn, rice, etc., and sugar, including its equivalent of syrups, etc., used; and stating also the amount of Licence Duty paid and Beer Duty charged in each class.
  "And of the number of barrels of beer exported from the United Kingdom, and the declared value thereof, and where exported to, from the 1st day of October, 1899, to the 30th day of September, 1900, distinguishing England, Scotland, and Ireland (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 69, of Session 1900)."—(Mr. Austen Chamberlain.)

QUESTIONS.

  SOUTH AFRICAN WAR—AFRIKANDER DELEGATES' PETITION TO BE HEARD AT THE BAR.
  SIR ROBERT REID: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury if the Government will propose to the House that Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer he heard upon the policy of the settlement in South Africa, pursuant to their petition.
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR,): The Government do not think that the course which the hon. and learned Member suggests would be a proper one.
  MR. FLYNN: Will the right hon. Gentleman consult the House on the question?
  [No reply was given.]

  LAWS OF WARFARE-HAGUE CONFERENCE.
  MR. HERBERT LEWIS: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether the Government now accept the laws and usages of war settled at the Hague Conference as forming the usages which distinguish civilised from barbarous warfare.
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: Of course this Government accepts the principle to which it gave its assent at the Hague Conference.
  MR. FLYNN: But not the practice.

  INQUIRY INTO THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
  MR. LAMBERT: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury if he can state what steps the Government have taken or propose to take to redeem their pledge of an inquiry into the causes of our failures during the South African War.
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I have more than once stated to the House that we do not propose that this Commission should begin its work until the war has finished, or very nearly reached its finish.

  PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENERAL BOTHA—SIR ALFRED MILNER.
  SIR JOHN LENG: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, in view of Commandant Botha's objection to negotiate with Sir Alfred Milner, he will consider the expediency whenever negotiations may he renewed of requesting the Premiers of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to act with Lord Kitchener as an advising council.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Mr. J. CHAMBERLAIN,): No, Sir; His Majesty's Government have no intention of superseding Sir Alfred Milner as suggested by the hon. Member.
  MR. C. P. SCOTT: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he can give any information as to the meaning of General Botha's statement, in his letter of 16th March, to the effect that Lord Kitchener would certainly not be surprised that he was unable to accept the terms offered, because they differed from those which had been discussed in the interview of 28th February, and if he can state in what respect they differed, and what were the points on which the negotiations consequently broke down.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: I have no information beyond what is contained in the published Papers.

  EXPULSION OF FOREIGNERS FROM SOUTH AFRICA—COMPENSATION CLAIMS.
  MR. HERBERT ROBERTS: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the negotiations between the German Foreign Office and the British Government as to the claims made for indemnity by Germans expelled from the Transvaal at the outbreak of the war have been concluded; and, if so, whether he is in a position to state what the financial arrangement arrived at is.
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Viscount CRANBORNE,): A Commission will shortly be appointed for the purpose of investigating the claims to compensation which have been made by the subjects of various friendly Powers in consequence of their expulsion from South Africa by the British military authorities.

  CAMPS OF DETENTION.
  MR. C. P. SCOTT: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he can state approximately the number of women and children at present confined in each of the detention camps in South Africa, and whether there is any reason why such of them as desire to return to their homes or to friends in Cape Colony who are willing to receive them should not be permitted to do so; whether he can state the number of children who have

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  been born in these camps since they were established, and the number who have died; and whether he has received, or will procure, full information as to the sanitary conditions of the camps, and as to the supply of food and clothing.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. BRODRICK,): Lord Kitchener has been requested to forward full information on these matters.

  DESPATCH OF REINFORCEMENTS.
  MR. JOHN ELLIS: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War how many of the reinforcement of 30,000 men last asked for by the War Office have been secured, and what number have been actually despatched to South Africa; whether any application, has been received by the Government from Lord Kitchener for reinforcements over and above the 30,000 men, and to what extent; and have the Government in, contemplation any further reinforcements over and above the 30,000 men.
  MR. BRODRICK: The number of 30,000 mounted troops which the Government undertook on 7th February last to send to South Africa has been exceeded. Up to date 28,560 men have been despatched, and 6,000 more are ready to embark as transports are provided. Of these, Regular Cavalry drafts are, 3,860; Mounted Infantry, 4,400; Imperial Yeomanry, 16,600; South African Constabulary, 4,700; Colonials, 5,000–34,560. Two battalions of Militia and thirty-eight Volunteer companies and some other drafts have been sent during the same period to relieve similar units at the front. Lord Kitchener has asked for drafts for certain battalions which are being prepared. No other application has been made to me by Lord Kitchener, and after the South African Constabulary is completed it is not at present proposed to raise any further force.

  DEFENCES OF CAPE TOWN.
  MR. LAMBERT: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if four new forts are to be erected for
  the better defence of Cape Town; whether the
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  Imperial Government will bear the cost; and, if so, what is the estimated amount.
  MR. BRODRICK: No, Sir. Nothing is known of the four new forts at Cape Town alluded to.

  PRESENT STRENGTH OF BOER FORCES.
  MR. LAMBERT: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he can state approximately the number of Boer prisoners of war, how many Boers capable of bearing arms are in the British laagers, and the number of fighting Boers still in arms against us in South Africa.
  MR. BRODRICK: The number of Boer prisoners of war is approximately 16,000. I do not know how many Boers capable of bearing arms are in the British laagers, or how many Boers are still in arms.
  MR. LAMBERT: Can you not give us the total approximately?
  MR. BRODRICK: I have no recent data.

  WARM CLOTHING FOR THE TROOPS.
  SIR HOWARD VINCENT: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if the military authorities are providing sufficient warm over and under clothing for all the troops, Regular, Militia, Volunteer, Yeomanry, Colonial, in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies during the coming winter, or if they are in any way dependent upon private supplies; and in respect of the latter, if there is a Government officer at Cape Town and Durban whose duty it is to be posted as far as possible as to the whereabouts of the several corps and companies in the field, or detached posts, or in garrison, and with power to forward parcels to them by any available means.
  MR. BRODRICK: The military authorities are providing warm underclothing, and the troops will receive the authorised issues; but special consignments of such things and other luxuries are

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  much appreciated. An Army Service Corps officer at Cape Town is in, charge of the distribution of parcels, and either has the latest information of the locality of the troops at his disposal, or can readily obtain it. The telegraphic address of the information bureau is, "Casualty, Cape Town."

  GOVERNMENT PENSION SCHEME.
  MR. SCHWANN: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to make any provision for the widows and orphans not on the establishment of the various classes of combatants who have fought and fallen, or who may fall, in the British ranks in South Africa.
  MR BRODRICK: His Majesty's Government can only deal with the claims or widows and orphans of men on the strength. Widows and families not on the strength will be assisted from the funds at the disposal of the Patriotic Fund Commissioners.

  PROVISION FOR RESERVISTS' FAMILIES—PRIVATE HASLER, 2ND SOMERSET LIGHT INFANTRY.
  MR. LOUIS SINCLAIR: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that the widow, married on the strength of the regiment, and two young children of Private Harry Hasler, Reservist, of the 2nd Somerset Light Infantry, who died of enteric fever at Kimberley on 9th November last, have been unable, in spite of repeated efforts, to obtain any pension or allowance from the War Office, and if it had not been for private assistance would have been compelled to enter the workhouse; and, seeing that unless some provision be made this soldier's widow and children will shortly have to apply for parish relief, will he instruct the proper authorities to make an immediate allowance, taking into consideration also the fact that nearly five months have passed without any grant being made.
  MR. BRODRICK: I am afraid that my hon. friend has been misinformed. As soon as Private Hasler's death was reported from South Africa, the case was
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  notified to the Patriotic Fund and the Daily Telegraph Fund. The former made an initial grant of £7, and a weekly allowance of eight shillings, and the latter fund made an initial grant of £26, and an annuity of £10. The widow will come under the new Government pension scheme, though some of the assistance referred to will possibly then cease. I must point out to my hon. friend that, as I have already stated, the new scheme will only come into effect on the 1st July, and that therefore the War Office was not in a position to make any grant from Government funds.
  MR. KEARLEY: And what is going to happen until the 1st July? Are these People to be left destitute?
  MR. BRODRICKwas understood to reply that no doubt assistance would be forthcoming from private funds.

  GARRISON REGIMENTS.
  CAPTAIN NORTON: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether, seeing the probable difficulty of obtaining a sufficient supply of men for the garrison regiments, he will consider the advisability of altering the conditions contained in Section 1 (a) of the Royal Warrant of 23rd February, 1901, so as to enable men eligible in all respects and under 40 years of age to serve, although more than 20 years have elapsed from the date of first attestation.
  MR. BRODRICK: The matter has been carefully considered, and it is not intended to make the alteration suggested. The Garrison regiments are not dependent on the enlistment from the Royal Reserve Regiments for their completion.

  IMPERIAL FORCES IN AUSTRALIA— DISTURBANCES.
  MR. CHARLES HOBHOUSE: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he has made inquiries into the disturbances among the Imperial representative forces at Brisbane and Melbourne, and what answer he has received.
  MR. BRODRICK: A Report has been called for, but has not yet been received.

  OFFICERS' BARRACK FURNITURE.
  MR. JEFFREYS: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether, on an officer joining the Army and receiving quarters in barracks, the only furniture supplied by the Government is one small table, two wooden chairs, and a coal scuttle; whether he is aware, that the cost of buying other furniture is a burden upon many young officers; and whether, seeing that on an officer changing his quarters this furniture has to be moved at considerable cost or stored at the officer's expense, he can arrange that in future all necessary furniture will be supplied by the Government to officers' rooms in barracks.
  THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY TO THE WAR OFFICE (Lord STANLEY,: The articles of furniture supplied to an officer's quarters are: Two chairs, one table, one poker, one shovel, one pair of tongs, one scuttle. The question of furnishing officers' quarters in future is under consideration.

  MEDITERRANEAN FLEET AND CHANNEL SQUADRON CRUISERS.
  SIR CHARLES DILKE: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty what is the number of cruisers at present attached to the Mediterranean Fleet and the Channel Squadron respectively, and what is the normal number supposed to be required in each case.
  THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. ARNOLD-FORSTER,): The number of cruisers belonging to the Mediterranean Fleet is ten, of which one second and one third class are temporarily employed on the Cape Station. The third class cruiser is about to be replaced by another ship. Six cruisers are attached to the Channel Squadron. There is no fixed establishment of cruisers for the two fleets in question.

  COST OF NEW ROYAL YACHT.
  MR. LABOUCHEREI beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury
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  what has been up to now the total cost of the new "Victoria and Albert" yacht, and what amount is estimated as still necessary to complete her.
  MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: The total net cost of the Royal Yacht, up to the present date is
  £433,637; the estimated amount required to complete the vessel is £32,146; to those amounts must be added a sum of
  £46,251, the estimated proportion of incidental charges upon the entire work. Making a total of
  £512,034.
  MR. WOLFF: What was the amount of the original estimate?
  MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: I have not the figures with me.
  MR. FLYNN: What has caused the great increase?
  MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: There are many causes. I cannot detail them in answer to a question.
  MR. JAMES LOWTHER: Has any estimate been formed of the cost of breaking her up?
  MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: No, Sir.

  TRAINING SHIP CRUISES IN THE NORTH.
  MR. WEIR: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, if arrangements will be made for H.M.S. "Northampton" to visit Invergordon during her summer cruise in the North.
  MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER: It is not proposed to send H.M.S. "Northampton" to Invergordon during her summer cruise. H.M.S. "Cleopatra" visited Invergordon last year, but I am unable to state whether she will repeat her visit during the coming year, as the programme of cruises for the training ships has not yet been finally settled.

  CAPE COAST COLONY AND ASHANTI —LABOUR LAWS.
  MR. LABOUCHERE: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will lay upon the Table of the House a Return of all ordinances, laws, and

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  regulations in force in the Cape Coast Colony and in the Ashanti Protectorate in respect to the labour of natives, including the forced labour ordinance in the former, and all laws, regulations, and ordinances in the colony and the Protectorate in respect to the terms and conditions affecting the ownership and working of mines and the taxes that are levied thereon.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes, we have had numerous applications for copies of some of these documents, and it will be convenient to print them in the form of a Blue-book. The compulsory labour ordinance to which the hon. Member refers expired in 1898, and has not been renewed.

  WEST INDIAN FRUIT INDUSTRY.
  MR. M'KENNA: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he can give any particulars as to the condition, packing, vendibility, and price realised of the first consignment of fruit from the West Indies by the new subsidised line of steamers.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: The only information which I have received on the subject referred to by the hon. Member beyond what has appeared in the press is in a letter from the contractors for the Imperial Direct Jamaica Service, in which they state as follows—
  "The fruit by the 'Port Morant' arrived in splendid order and the system of preserving fruit, so far as we can tell, will retain the temperature we require, irrespective of what the temperature may be In Jamaica or this country."

  CHINA—ANGLO-RUSSIAN DISPUTE AT TIENTSIN.
  SIR JOHN LENG: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether Mr. Kinder, the chief engineer of the Tientsin Railway, a British subject in the employment of the Chinese railway administration, was entitled to call upon General Barrow to interfere in the recent siding dispute: whether General Barrow had any authority to send the telegram ordering him to proceed with the work by force if necessary; and whether Mr. Kinder, having provoked a misunderstanding with Russia by a display of force, will be
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  permitted to take a similar course in the future on the supposition that he is countenanced by His Majesty's Government.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Lord G. HAMILTON,: The hon. Member appears to be under a misapprehension as to the facts of the case. The railway is at present under the control and management of the British military authorities, who are working it for the common benefit of the allied forces. It was Colonel MacDonald, R. E., not Mr. Kinder, who referred for instructions to General Gaselee when the dispute arose as to the ownership of the land upon which the siding was to be built. General Barrow did not at any time order the work to be continued by force.

  MURDER OF THE REV. JOSEPH STONEHOUSE.
  MR. HERBERT ROBERTS: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether lie has any information as to the murder of the Rev. Joseph Stonehouse, of the London Missionary Society, on Saturday last, on the Hun-ho river; whether at the time of the murder Mr. Stonehouse was distributing relief to starving villagers: whether any special reason is assigned for the murder; and whether the British authorities have taken prompt measures to discover the perpetrators of the crime.
  VISCOUNT CRANBOKNE: His Majesty's Minister at Peking has reported that Mr. Stonehouse was shot by Chinese on the 23rd instant, and died the same evening, but we have no further particulars. Sir E. Satow is no doubt taking the necessary action in the matter.

  RUSSIA AND MANCHURIA—ANGLO- GERMAN AGREEMENT.
  MR. WILLIAM REDMOND: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any information to the effect that the German Chancellor has expressed the view that the Anglo-German Agreement does not affect Manchuria; and whether he will inquire whether such statement was made.
  VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I will ask the hon. Member to allow me to deal with this question in debate later on in the evening.
  MR. CONOR O'KELLY: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to a statement by Count von Bülow denying explicitly that the Anglo-German Agreement applies to Manchuria; and whether His Majesty's Government agrees with the views of Count von Bülow.
  VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I would rather postpone my answer to this until I speak on the subject in the debate which I understand is to come on later in the evening.
  SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can, give the House any information as to the acceptance or rejection by the Chinese Government of the Russo-Chinese Agreement regarding Manchuria which the Russian Government has been pressing upon China.
  VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: No information has been received that an agreement between Russia and China has been either accepted or rejected.
  SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: Can the noble Lord state whether such an agreement has been or is being pressed upon the acceptance of His Majesty's Government?
  VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I have no doubt that my hon. friend will have an opportunity of addressing himself to that question later on.
  SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: That is not the point. May I ask—
  MR. SPEAKER: Order, order! The hon. Member's second question does not arise out of his first. It is quite a separate question.
  SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: Will you kindly read the last sentence of my question, Sir? Will the noble Lord be
  56
  kind enough to promise to give us the information this evening? I will promise to address myself to the question if only he will answer.
  [No answer was returned.]

  KOREA—DIRECTOR-GENERALSHIP OF CUSTOMS.
  MR. FLAVIN: On behalf of my hon. and learned and gallant friend [Laughter.] All the gallantry is not on the other side of the House. [More laughter.] Mr. Speaker, am I not entitled to designate my hon. friend as honourable, learned and gallant?
  MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Member must ask his question, and must not continually obstruct the business of the House in this way.
  MR. FLAVIN: Well, on behalf of my hon. and learned and gallant friend the Member for East Clare, I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether Mr. Brown, the Director of Customs, has been dismissed by the Korean Government; and, if so, whether His Majesty's Government are taking steps to secure his reinstatement.
  The following question also appeared on the Paper.
  MR. JOSEPH WALTON: To ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether Mr. McLeavy Brown has been dismissed from his position as Director General of Customs in Korea, and, if so, whether His Majesty's Government are taking steps to secure his reinstatement.
  VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: Mr. McLeavy Brown has not been dismissed. A difficulty arose with regard to Mr. McLeavy Brown's official residence, which is the property of the Korean Government, and which the latter desired that he should vacate. This led to a demand for his dismissal, but there are reasons for hoping that the matter will be satisfactorily arranged within a brief period.

  UGANDA RAILWAY.
  MR. BRYNMOR JONES: I beg to ask the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether he can state how many miles of the Uganda Railway have been constructed; and whether he can say when the undertaking will be completed.
  VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: The rails have been laid on 481 miles. The line is open for traffic for 448 miles. As soon as Colonel Gracey, R.E., who has recently returned from an inspecting of the line, has reported we shall be in a better position than now to form an idea as to the date when the undertaking will be completed.

  INDIAN POLITICAL AGENCIES.
  MR. HERBERT ROBERTS: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether he will state what was the number of troops stationed at the close of 1898 in the political agencies of Dir, Sivat, the Khyber, the Kurran, Tochi, and Wano, and what was their estimated cost; and whether he will say whether any reduction has been made in the number of these troops during the present Viceroy's period of office; if so, to what extent; and what is the estimated aggregate annual cost of these military and political outposts under the conditions of the new province.
  LORD G. HAMILTON: The number of troops stationed on the 1st December. 1898, in the districts referred to was: Malakand Agency, including Dir and Swat. 5,447; the Khyber Brigade. 3,211; the Kurrum, including Samana, 2,489; Tochi, 2,344; Wana, 1,094. The Khyber Brigade has been withdrawn, and the Khyber is now held by Afridi Militia. Half a squadron of Native Cavalry and a half battalion of Native Infantry, numbering about 500, have been transferred from the Kurrum Valley to Kohat. The cost of these several outposts cannot be given without reference to India; nor have I as yet, received any estimate of the cost of the new arrangements which are now contemplated.
  MR. HERBERT ROBERTS: Will the information be available before the discussion on the Indian Budget is taken?
  LORD G. HAMILTON: I doubt if I shall have it by then.

  COOPER'S HILL COLLEGE.
  MR. WALTER PALMER: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether, in view of the inquiry into the proposed dismissals at Cooper's Hill Engineering College which is being held, he will give an assurance that no professors or lecturers will be dismissed until Papers relating to the present inquiry have been laid before the House and an opportunity afforded for discussion.
  LORD G. HAMILTON: I undertook that, before effect was given to the proposed educational reforms at Cooper's Hill College, all the teaching staff affected should have a full opportunity of giving their reasons before the Board of Visitors against the proposed reorganisation, and that the Council of India would suspend their decision until they had received the evidence and the Report of the Visitors upon it. Further than this I cannot go. Papers on the subject will be circulated, I understand, on Monday.
  MR. WALTER PALMER: Will the noble Lord assure the House that no dismissal will take place until the new representatives of the Universities have taken their places on the Board of Visitors?
  LORD G. HAMILTON: No, I cannot.

  CANADIAN TARIFFS.
  SIR HOWARD VINCENT: I beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that in the Budget proposals of the Government of the Dominion of Canada the Minister of Finance maintained the preference of 33⅓ per cent. granted upon British goods in Canadian markets directly the colonies were freed from the restraining foreign treaties of 1862 and 1865; and can he state for how long he proposes to accept this arrangement without making any efforts to reciprocate towards Canadian products in the markets of the United Kingdom.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Sir M. HICKS BEACH,): I think my hon. friend is well aware that the Canadian tariff differs so completely from our own that, while the action of Canada was confined to a reduction of very high duties in our favour, what he calls reciprocity on our part would involve the imposition of duties by us on imports from other countries for the benefit of Canada. I am not prepared to propose this, and I feel certain that Canada does not expect it. We have shown our sense of the spirit in which the Dominion has acted by the help we give towards the steamship service between Canada and Japan, and the assistance we have promised towards the Pacific cable.

  INCOME TAX ABATEMENTS.
  SIR EDGAR VINCENT: I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can state the estimated financial losses, at the present rate, of the abatements of the Income Tax voted in 1894 and in 1899.
  SIR M. HICKS BEACH: It is estimated that at the present rate of Income Tax (1s. in the £) the total financial loss involved by the changes in the scale of abatements introduced by the Finance Acts of 1894 and 1898 amounts to £1,470,000.

  IMPORT DUTIES.
  MR. WALTER PALMER: I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, with a view to the provision of the increased revenue from taxation, which will be necessary, he will favourably consider the expediency of an ad valorem fiscal duty on certain imported manufactured articles amounting to more than one hundred millions of pounds in value, rather than any new duty on imported food products, whether used for actual food or manufacturing purposes.
  SIR M. HICKS BEACH: My hon. friend asks my opinion on a suggestion for a complete change in the fiscal policy which has been adopted by this country for many years. I feel that I cannot deal with such a matter in answer to a, question.

  MAINTENANCE OF ROYAL NAVY— PROPOSED TONNAGE TAX.
  MR. CONOR O'KELLY: I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will consider the advisability of raising the £30,000,000 asked for the maintenance of the Navy by a tonnage tax levied on all ships, native and foreign, entering British or Irish ports from oversea ports.
  SIR M. HICKS BEACH: The suggestion appears to be that the whole cost of the Navy should be paid by a tax which would mainly fall on the mercantile marine of this country in addition to other taxation to which it is now liable, and which would probably involve reprisals from foreign countries on our ships in foreign ports. I do not think this would be a feasible proposal.

  DISORDERLY HOUSES IN LONDON.
  SIR JOHN BRUNNER: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention has been called to the statement made by the prosecuting counsel on Thursday last at Clerken well Sessions, in the case of persons indicted for keeping a disorderly house, to the effect that for the tenth time at least he had to bring to the notice of the Court that Bouillon Fleet, Limited, and Heinekens Lager Brewery Company were connected with the house, and to the statement made by Mr. M'Connell, K.C., in giving judgment, that he regretted that the directors were not present, and that they were the responsible persons who would probably pay the fines; and whether he will ascertain the names of the directors of the two companies, and whether he proposes to take any action in the matter.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. RITCHIE,): My attention has not previously been called to this matter, but I will look into it and see whether any action is called for on my part.

  HORSE EXPORTS TO ROTTERDAM.
  MAJOR RASCH: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention has been called to a case at the

  61
  petty sessional court, Grays, Essex, in which Inspector Buckingham stated that a horse suffering badly from canker and with large sores had been sold and sent to Rotterdam for sausage meat, to be subsequently re-imported to England; and whether he can impose some limit on this description of traffic.
  MR. RITCHIE: From inquiry which I have caused to be made it appears to be true that a horse with canker in the foot and some sore places in the skin caused by harness was shipped to Rotterdam a few days ago. But I find no evidence that the carcase would afterwards be prepared for human food, or that, if it were, it would be re-imported to England. Nor have I any power to check the traffic indicated in the question.

  PREVENTION OF MINING ACCIDENTS —FRENCH METHODS.
  SIR WALTER FOSTER: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he has considered the report on the methods of preventing falls of roof adopted at the Courrieres collieries, in which it is shown that the death rate from falls of roof and sides per 1,000 persons employed below ground for the ten years 1890 to 1899 is only 0½15, and the death rate per million tons of coal raised is only 0·39, while for the United Kingdom the average death rates are 0·78 per 1,000 persons employed below ground and 2·05 per million tons of mineral raised for the five years ending 1899; and whether he has taken or will take steps to bring about in the collieries of this country the adoption of methods of preventing falls of roof and sides similar to those which have produced such results at the Courrieres collieries.
  MR. RITCHIE: As long ago as September last the Home Office communicated with all the coal-mine owners in this country with regard to the methods of preventing, falls of ground adopted at the Courrières collieries and called their attention to the figures quoted in the hon. Member's question. On receiving the further special report to which he refers, I sent a second circular letter to the owners, enclosing a copy and pressing upon them the importance of studying
  62
  the methods adopted in France. The Homo Office has long been in communication with the Mining Association with a view to steps being taken to reduce the number of accidents from falls of ground, and I have arranged for a conference next month between the inspectors of mines and the representatives of the association on the subject.
  MR. CAINE: Is this system applicable to mines generally?
  MR. RITCHIE: I think only to coal mines.

  POLICE AND SANITARY REGULATIONS BILLS—SELECT COMMITTEE.
  MR. M'KENNA: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he can state when he proposes to move for the appointment of a Select Committee on Police and Sanitary Regulation Bills.
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. JESSE COLLINGS,): It is not certain whether the motion for the appointment of this Committee will be made this session. The matter is under consideration, and a decision will be arrived at shortly.

  S.S. "ORONA"—ALLEGED INSUFFICIENT MANNING.
  MR. JOYCEI beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade, whether his attention has been directed to a complaint from one of the crew of the s.s. "Orona," who alleges that this vessel signed on eight able seamen, which provides an effective crew of four men for each watch, but that the captain of this vessel has by the system he has adopted reduced the number of men in each watch to two, namely, one man on the look-out and one man at the wheel, which is in contravention of the Board of Trade manning scale, which provides that there shall be three effective hands in each watch; whether, seeing that this may endanger the lives of the crew of this vessel, he will call the attention of the owners to the captain's conduct

  63
  and request that they will give instructions to stop this reduction of the effective number of hands in each watch; and whether he can state if this steamship has been engaged by the Admiralty for the conveyance of stores to His Majesty's troops in South Africa.
  THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE (Mr. GERALD BALFOUR,): Yes, Sir; my attention has been called to the complaint referred to in the question, and I have been in communication with the owners of the "Orona." I find that the vessel carried eight A.B.'s, besides a boatswain, a carpenter, and four deck officers. This was in excess of the requirements of the Board of Trade, and I am advised that the vessel was certainly not undermanned. The Department has no power to interfere, with the disposition of the hands by the master when at sea. I am informed that the
  "Orona" was engaged by the Admiralty, as stated in the question.

  HIGHLAND RAILWAY—MIXED TRAINS.
  MR. WEIR: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that on the 14th October last a cattle wagon without brake was detached at Munlochy from the passenger train leaving Muir of Ord at 8–38 a.m., and that on the 15th October a cattle wagon without brake was detached at Munlochy from the passenger train leaving Avoch at 9–26 a.m.; and, will he ascertain why the Highland Railway Company failed to provide these mixed trains with the continuous brake through-out, as required by the Board of Trade regulations.
  MR. GERALD BALFOUR: The railway company point out that the 14th October last was a Sunday, and that no trains are run on Sundays on the branch in question. They add that on the 15th October no cattle wagon was detached at Munlochy, but that one was attached there, and that it was fitted with a continuous vacuum brake pipe in conformity with the requirements of the Board of Trade.
  MR. WEIR: I am sorry I made a mistake in the date, but as this question
  64
  is based on my personal experiences, will the right hon. Gentleman inquire further?
  MR. GERALD BALFOURreplied in the negative.
  MR. WEIR: I will put another question.

  LIGHT RAILWAYS.
  MR. BILL: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether, considering the expiration at the end of the present year of the powers of the Light Railway Commissioners, he will grant a Return showing the number of applications for Orders and the number of Orders which have been passed by the Commissioners and confirmed by the Board of Trade in each year since the passing of the Light Railway Act, 1896; and also the number and amount of the loans which the Treasury has agreed to advance in each year under Section 4, and of the special advances under Section
  5.
  MR. GERALD BALFOUR: This information is contained in Reports presented annually to Parliament in accordance with Section 13 (5) of the Act referred to.

  BANKRUPTCY DELAYS.
  CAPTAIN NORTON: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether it has been brought to his notice that creditors in bankruptcy cases suffer loss through delay in dealing with these cases, seeing that the interest goes to the Government and not to the creditors; whether he is aware of a case where from £40,000 to £50,000 was received by the Official Receiver in January, February, and March of 1900, and that no dividend has as yet been paid to the creditors, who thus, in addition to the loss of their money, are kept out of what remains, and also out of what these sums have earned as interest; and whether he can see his way to ameliorating this state of affairs.
  MR. GERALD BALFOUR: I am not aware of any undue delay in the official administration of bankruptcy

  65
  cases resulting in loss to creditors. The investment of funds which cannot immediately be distributed is made pursuant to Section 76 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, and the dividends thus derived are applied solely to meeting the expenses of bankruptcy administration, and are taken into account in fixing the fees payable in respect of the bankruptcy proceedings. I cannot identify the case referred to, which I should probably have been able to do had it been in the hands of an official receiver.
  CAPTAIN NORTON: But will not the right hon. Gentleman take steps to ameliorate this state of things?
  MR. GERALD BALFOUR: I will have any specific cases inquired into.
  CAPTAIN NORTON: But I am raising the cases as a whole, of the long detention of these funds.

  PATENT LAWS.
  MR. HERBERT LEWIS: I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that British patents are taken out at the risk of the applicants, it being left to every person to protect his own rights, and that Great Britain is the only country which issues patents without satisfactory proof that the inventions described have not been previously patented, and without examining specifications before they are filed; and whether, in view of the importance to British trade of encouraging invention, the Government will take the necessary steps to place the British inventor in a more satisfactory position in this respect.
  MR. GERALD BALFOUR: I do not think the first paragraph of the hon. Member's question accurately states the position as regards the issue of patents, and certainly there are countries other than Great Britain which make no search for novelty. The subject of search among prior specifications has, however, engaged the attention of the Board of Trade, and I would refer the hon. Member to the Report of a Departmental Committee presented to Parliament this session. At present I am unable to make any statement as to legislative action on that Report.

  FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE—PRECAUTIONS AGAINST IMPORTATION FROM SOUTH AFRICA.
  MR. STEVENSON: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Agriculture whether, in view of the prevalence of foot-and-mouth disease in South Africa, adequate precautions have been and are being taken to prevent the disease from being conveyed from that country to the British Isles.
  THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF AGRICULTURE (Mr. HANBURY,): We have no confirmation of the statement that foot-and-mouth disease is prevalent in South Africa. Even if it were, there is the fact that no cattle, sheep, or swine have been imported from South Africa during the last three years, and we have no reason to believe that such importation is probable. The danger of infection by hides and skins is, as I explained the other day, very small, and is guarded against in the same way as in the case of similar imports from the Continent.
  MR. STEVENSON: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that the disease is easily conveyed with clothing?
  MR. HANBURY: Yes. I know that.

  CORN RETURNS.
  MR. LOYD: I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, beyond appointing officers of Inland Revenue, under Section 13 of the Corn Returns Act, 1882, to be inspectors of corn returns, the Commissioners of Inland Revenue exercise any supervision over such inspectors in the performance of their duties under that Act.
  SIR M. HICKS-BEACH: The Commissioners of Inland Revenue retain the sole control over Excise officers appointed to act as inspectors of corn returns. The inspectors are responsible to the Commissioners for their due attendance at the markets, for seeing that all the requirements of the Corn Returns Act are strictly complied with, and for the accuracy and punctuality of the returns and summaries which they send to the Board of Agriculture.
  MR. LOYD: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Agriculture whether any and what steps are from time to time taken by the Board of Agriculture to ascertain whether the inspectors of corn returns receive, under the Corn Returns Act, 1882, complete and accurate returns of the prices at which British corn is sold in each of the towns specified by Order in Council.
  MR. HANBURY: The inspectors of corn returns are, of course, directly responsible to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. But after the returns collected by them have been sent to the Board of Agriculture, they are examined at once, and if any point arises which seems to call for further explanation the inspector is at once consulted. Such points are the possible inclusion of foreign corn, or considerable variations in price from one week to another, or errors in calculation. Any complaints received from outside sources, as, for instance, complaints of the omission of particular sales, are referred to the Board of Inland Revenue for investigation.
  MR. LOYD: Is any distinction made in the Return between purchases from growers and purchases from dealers?
  MR. HANBURY: I think not.
  MR. LOYD: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade whether any, and what, steps are from time to time taken by the Board of Trade to ascertain whether the inspectors of corn returns, under the Corn Returns Act, 1882, receive complete and accurate returns of the prices at which British corn is sold in each of the towns specified by Order in Council; can he state how many convictions have taken place since the commencement of the Act, 1st January, 1883, for failure to make return, and for making a false return; and in how many instances has the Board of Trade caused a return, or any particular in a return, to be omitted in the computation of the average prices on the ground that the Board had reason to believe such return or particular to be incorrect.
  MR. HANBURY: The whole of the functions of the Board of Trade under
  68
  the Corn Returns Act have now been transferred to the Board of Agriculture. Twenty-three prosecutions and twenty-two convictions have taken place since the commencement of the Act for failure to make returns, but none for making a false return. Since 1892, when the Board of Agriculture took over the duty, there have been two or three cases in which returns or particulars in them have been omitted in the compilation of the averages.

  LONDON WATER QUESTION— GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS.
  DR. MACNAMARA: I beg to ask the President of the Local Government Board whether he will place the text of his proposals respecting London water before the House before the close of the present session, so that they may be duly considered by the people of London and the extra municipal areas affected during the Parliamentary recess.
  THE PRESIDENT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (Mr. WALTER LONG,): No, Sir; I am unable to assent to the suggestion.

  CHRIST'S HOSPITAL SITE.
  MR. KENYON: I beg to ask the hon. Member for Tunbridge, as representing the Charity Commission, whether the Bill now before the House of Lords for the sale of the site of Christ's Hospital has been sanctioned by the Commission: whether the Commissioners have suggested any restrictions on the sale of the site, and whether it is within the powers of the Governors to remove the ancient schoolrooms, including the dining-room and other historical buildings, pending the passage of their Bill through Parliament; whether the girls' day school and science school, contemplated in the Scheme of 1890, have been erected; and whether negotiations are still proceeding on the subject.
  THE PARLIAMENTARY CHARITY COMMISSIONER (Mr. GRIFFITH BOSCAWEN,): The Commissioners received from the Council of Almoners a copy of the Christ's Hospital Bill on 11th December, 1900, and informed them in reply on the 14th of that month that the Commissioners had no

  69
  objection to offer to the Bill as regards form or otherwise. They have not suggested that any part of the site should be excepted from sale. It is within the powers of the Governors, acting under the authority of the Commissioners, to remove at any time the buildings referred to or any part of them, but there could be no intention to remove them pending the passing of the Bill, as they are required for carrying on the school temporarily under Section 66 of the Scheme of 1890. No buildings for the girls' day school and day science school for boys have been erected. No negotiations on the subject of the Bill are proceeding.

  THE NEW CODE—SIR J. GORST'S ADDRESS TO SCHOOL INSPECTORS.
  MR. KENYON: I beg to ask the Vice-President of the Committee of Council on Education if he has any objection to lay upon the Table of the House a precis of the address he recently delivered to His Majesty's Inspectors of Schools.
  THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION (Sir J. GORST,): I am unable to do this. What I said was confidential, and no record of it has been kept.

  TRAINING COLLEGES FOR FEMALE TEACHERS.
  MR. GEORGE WHITEI beg to ask the Vice-President of the Committee of Council on Education whether his attention has been called to the lack of trained female teachers for elementary schools; and whether the Board of Education propose to take steps to provide for such deficiency by increased training college accommodation or by other measures.
  SIR J. GORST: I have repeatedly called the attention of the House to the matter, and the Board of Education are giving every encouragement in their power to the establishment of additional training colleges.

  LONDON SCHOOL BOARD RETURNS.
  MR. TALBOT: I beg to ask the
  Vice-President of the Committee of Council on Education
  70
  whether, in estimating deficiencies in school accommodation in the district of the London School Board, the population of each parish as ascertained by the Census of 1891 is taken as the basis of calculation, or whether any attempt is made to ascertain the actual population of the present day.
  SIR J. GORST: The basis of calculation is the census of children of the elementary school class taken in the spring of each year by the London School Board.

  BROMPTON CEMETERY.
  MR. KEARLEY: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether the Government some years ago purchased Brompton Cemetery with a view to its being closed; if so, why this has not been done, and whether the accounts and Papers connected with the matter will be granted if a Return is moved.
  THE FIRST COMMISSIONER OF WORKS (Mr. AKERS DOUGLAS, Kent,): Perhaps I may be allowed to reply to this question. It is not a fact that Brompton Cemetery was purchased by the Government with a view to its being closed, as the hon. Member will see by referring to 13 and 14 Vic. c. 52. The accounts and Papers covering nearly fifty years are very voluminous and of very little, if any, public interest, and I cannot agree to make such a Return as suggested.
  MR. KEARLEY: Will the right hon. Gentleman give us an account of the annual profit on this investment?
  MR. AKERS DOUGLAS: I must ask the hon. Member to give me notice of that question.

  KEW GARDENS—LABOURERS' WAGES.
  MR. YOXALL: I beg to ask the First Commissioner of Works whether he has seen his way to meet the application of the labourers at Kew Gardens for a reduction of hours of labour, and an arrangement as to overtime pay.
  MR. AKERS DOUGLAS: I am happy to say that arrangements have been made to give the labourers in Kew Gardens a half-holiday on Saturdays, so that their hours of labour will be practically the same as those employed in the neighbouring Royal parks at Richmond and Hampton Court; and when they are required to stay on some Saturday afternoons they will receive the usual overtime pay.

  INLAND REVENUE-RETIREMENT IN OUTDOOR SERVICE.
  MR. HEYWOOD JOHNSTONE: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury whether the Retirement Order of the Board of Inland Revenue, No. 10, of 1897 (18th June), is still partially suspended in the Taxes Branch (outdoor department); and, if so, whether the reasons stated by the Secretary to the Treasury on 24th March, 1899, for the retention in the service of officers who had then passed the age limit still exist and to the same extent; and how many officers are at present employed in the Taxes Branch who come within the limits of the Retirement Order, and of what rank in the service; and can he name an approximate date by which it will be possible for the Board to enforce the rule with the strictness and impartiality promised by the Secretary to the Treasury two years since.
  THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY TO THE TREASURY (Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN,): The Retirement Order referred to is still partially suspended in the Tax Surveying Branch of the Inland Revenue for the reason given by my predecessor. The Board, however, hope that within a year from the present time it may be practicable to bring the Order again into operation. It is to be observed that, notwithstanding the suspension of the Order, promotion in the Taxes Branch has been exceptionally rapid of recent years. Five officers are at present employed in the Taxes Branch who come within the limits of the Retirement Order.

  CUSTOMS EXAMINING OFFICERSHIPS.
  MR. MURPHY: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury whether
  72
  he is aware that the Customs General Order 25 of the 20th instant announces that the number of examining officer-ships will gradually be reduced by ninety-six, and that as a consequence the general body of assistants who entered from 1891 to 1895 will not receive the salaries of examining officers until their twelfth year's service; and whether, in view of the fact that before the reorganisation assistants were promoted to examining officerships after nine years service, he will guarantee that this limit shall not be exceeded for the remainder of those at present in the class.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: It is true that the number of examining officers will be gradually reduced by ninety-six, but steps have been taken which will have the effect of safeguarding the interests of the assistants who are near their turn for promotion. The general body of assistants will proceed as now in the assistants' scale until they reach the maximum of £105, but after spending a year at the maximum they will, if fully qualified in all respects, be paid on the scale of second-class examining officers, and will be ranked as such as vacancies occur in the class. The assistants who during the last few months have been promoted to the rank of examining officer, second class, have each had, at the time of their promotion, a service (as outdoor officer and assistant) of between nine and ten years. No guaranteed rate of promotion existed prior to the reorganisation, neither can any such guarantee be given for the future; but it is not expected that the interests of assistants generally will be materially affected.

  PARCELS POSTAGE—POSTMEN'S DELIVERY WEIGHTS.
  MR. SCHWANN: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, whether the rule laid down by Mr. Lewin Hill at the Tweedmouth Inquiry, in reply to Question 11,983, to the effect that four or five of the lighter and less bulky parcels per man, of a total weight of not more than eleven pounds, is still in force; and, if so, will he cause it to be included in the postmen's rule book and is he aware that when a postman complained lately

  73
  of having to carry twenty-two pounds it was ruled that he had no grounds for complaint.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: Such a rule was laid down some years ago for observance in London, but it has not been applied to the provinces. The present rule is that a postman delivering letters may also be called upon to deliver some of the lighter and less bulky parcels, provided the total weight of letters and parcels combined does not exceed thirty-five pounds, and it is not considered necessary to make any change. Inquiry will be made with regard to the particular case mentioned by the hon. Member if he will send particulars to the Postmaster General which will enable it to be identified.

  EASTBOURNE POSTMEN—CHRISTMAS OVERTIME PAY.
  MR. HOGG: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, if he can state why the Eastbourne postmen have been called upon to refund moneys duly earned by them respecting Christmas overtime; and whether he is aware that the times of attendance were altered by the acting postmaster, thus causing men to work considerably over their eight hours, and the suspension of one delivery subsequently causing a double delivery.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The claims for extra duty performed by the Eastbourne postmen to which the hon. Member refers appear to be those for 21st December. As the extra time claimed for was larger than the circumstances seemed to justify, the matter was reserved for special inquiry, and the postmen were called upon to refund provisionally the money paid. The inquiry is proceeding, and if the claims are substantiated they will be paid, including any extra duty owing to altered times of attendance.

  FEMALE POST OFFICE CLERKS— HOURS OF LABOUR.
  MR. YOXALL: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, if he will state the custom of the Department regarding the
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  hours of attendance for female sorting clerks and telegraphists, the earliest hour at which they are expected to attend, and up to what period of the evening they can be kept on duty.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: As a general rule female sorting clerks and telegraphists are not required to attend for duty before 6 a.m. or later than 10 p.m.; but where local conditions are favourable it is sometimes thought not necessary strictly to adhere to these hours.

  POSTAL TELEGRAPH SERVICE— EFFICIENCY BARRIER.
  MR. YOXALL: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, in view of the fact that a telegraphist having been kept at the efficiency barrier for one year and then being permitted to proceed suffers a loss of salary each year until he arrives at the maximum, whether the Postmaster General can state the reasons which led the Department to treat the stoppage of an increment at the efficiency barrier in an exceptional manner; and whether the Postmaster General will consider the advisability of placing it upon the same footing as an ordinary arrestment of increment.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: It is a fact that a telegraphist who has been stopped at the efficiency bar, and who is subsequently allowed to proceed when efficient, has every year, until he reaches his maximum, a less salary than he otherwise would have had. The increment which takes an officer over the efficiency bar is treated in a different manner from ordinary increments, because it was intended to mark the attainment of a definite standard of efficiency at a certain point in the officer's career. The efficiency bar was instituted in order to ensure that no one should proceed to the maximum of the telegraphist's scale of pay without substantial guarantee of his efficiency and of the excellence of his conduct. To pass the efficiency bar is, therefore, equivalent to promotion to a higher class, and a man who fails through his own fault to pass the bar in the first instance has no claim to be relieved of the consequences. It

  75
  is not in contemplation to alter the system which now prevails.

  FAWCETT ASSOCIATION—ELECTIONEERING MANIFESTOES IN RETIRING ROOMS AT MOUNT PLEASANT.
  MR. LOUGH: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, whether he can state for what reason the candidates seeking election to the executive of the Fawcett Association and to the Committee of the Refreshment Department at the General Post Office have been called upon to explain why manifestoes bearing their names have been distributed in and allowed to lie on the tables in the sorters' retiring rooms without permission having first been obtained, seeing that in the case of the election to the executive of the Fawcett Association permission had been sought and obtained for the ballot boxes to be placed in the said rooms, and that the election for the Refreshment Department Committee is being conducted by the department itself.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The fact that permission has been given for the election of the executive of the Fawcett Association and the election of the Refreshment Committee to be held in the General Post Office did not carry with it the permission to distribute bills in large numbers inside the building, and it is not desirable that such permission should be given.

  ISLAND OF SKYE MAILS.
  MR. JOHN DEWAR: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, whether he has received a copy of a resolution passed at a meeting of the inhabitants of the Island of Skye at Portree on the 20th February; and, in view of the anxiety therein expressed in regard to the mail steamer, can the Postmaster General say that he does not contemplate any alteration such as would render the mail service less convenient than at present; and is he in a position to say that, in the event of the mails being sent via Mallaig, efforts will be made to secure an improved postal and steamer service.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The Postmaster General has received a
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  copy of the resolution referred to by the hon. Member, passed by the inhabitants of Skye at Portree on the 20th February. He does not contemplate any alteration in the hours of the mail steamer running between Kyle and ports in Skye, or any change which would render the mail service less convenient than at present. Any steamer service to or from Mallaig must, in the first instance, be experimental in character, and the Postmaster General is not in a position to say what service, if any, may ultimately be provided from that port.

  PROTECTION OF TARBAT NESS AND ORD OF CAITHNESS FISHERIES.
  MK. LEVESON-GOWER: I beg to ask the Lord Advocate upon how many days between 20th January and 23rd February a Fishery Board cruiser or vessel patrolled the waters between Tarbat Ness and the Ord of Caithness, and on what days.
  THE LORD ADVOCATE (Mr. A. GRAHAM MURRAY,): I am informed by the Fishery Board that between the dates named the Fishery Board cruiser "Norna" patrolled the waters in question on seven days, namely, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 14th, and 18th February.

  ROYAL TITLE IN SCOTTISH WRITS.
  MR. BLACK: I beg to ask the Lord Advocate whether, in resolving to retain the words "the Seventh" as an addition to His Most Gracious Majesty's name in writs proceeding from the Crown in Scotland, he has consulted the precedents of the two Sovereigns bearing the name of James who have reigned since the Union of the Crowns, and the cases of William and Mary and William after Mary's death; and if he will inform the House of the practice in Scotland in these cases.
  MR. A. GRAHAM MURRAY: It is the fact that in the cases referred to by the hon. Member the writs passing the Signet in Scotland ran in the name of James, William and Mary, and William. But the present practice follows the more exact precedent under William

  77
  the Fourth, after the Union of the kingdoms, in whose reign the writs in Scotland ran in the name of William the Fourth; and for this and other reasons it is intended to adhere to it.
  MR. BLACK: Did not the Union take place in the reign of James?
  MR. A. GRAHAM MURRAY: The Union of the Crown then took place.
  MR. BLACK: And is it not because of the Treaty of Union that Scotland is still treated as a separate kingdom?
  [No answer was returned.]

  SCOTTISH FISHERY HARBOURS.
  MR. WEIR: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade if he will grant a Return (Fishery Harbours, Scotland) showing the name of each fishery harbour on the coast of Scotland, the name of the county in which it is situated, and the name of the proprietor or authority responsible for its upkeep.
  MR. A. GRAHAM MURRAY: I must refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him to a somewhat similar question on the 11th instant,† which also applies to this question.
  MR. WEIR: Is the Scottish Office unwilling or unable to give the names?
  [No answer was returned.]
  MR. WEIR: I shall raise the question on the Estimates.

  LADYSMTTH REJOICINGS AT LONDONDERRY.
  MR. O'DOHERTY: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether reports were furnished by the Londonderry Constabulary authorities to Dublin Castle with reference to the discharge of explosives from the city of Derry Walls into the house or yard of a man named M'Gowan on the occasion of the rejoicing over the relief of Lady-smith; whether the report contained the names of the parties who discharged
  † See Debates, Vol. xc, page 1116–7.
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  the explosives, and can he explain why the Castle authorities refused to allow the police in Londonderry to institute proceedings against these parties; and will he lay upon the Table of the House a copy of the correspondence between the Dublin Castle authorities and the Constabulary authorities, as well as a copy of the Order made thereon by the then Chief Secretary for Ireland.
  THE CHIEF SECRETARY FOR IRELAND (Mr. WYKDHAM,): The reports made by the police disclosed the names of two persons who were believed to have discharged rockets of a dangerous character. One of these rockets was found in the yard of John. McGowan. I have already stated that the organiser of the demonstration, who was unaware that rockets of this character had been used, expressed his regret at the occurrence. It was decided under the circumstances not to institute proceedings against the parties, but to warn them that upon a repetition of the offence proceedings would be taken. It would be contrary to practice to lay departmental correspondence on the Table of the House.
  MR. O'DOHERTY: Why did the Castle authorities prevent the Londonderry police from prosecuting for the discharge of firearms in a proclaimed district?
  MR. WYNDHAM: I have answered that question.

  INCOME TAX COLLECTORS' PENSIONS —CASE OF JOHN FEORE.
  MR. LUNDON: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware that John Feore, of Charleville, county Cork, who for forty-six years served as a collector of income tax, retired from his position some two years ago through old age and decrepitude; and, seeing that his petition to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue for a grant or allowance was refused, whether a grant or pension could be given to John Feore, who is now in his seventy-fifth year, and otherwise through no fault of his own devoid of means of subsistence.
  MR. WYNDHAM: I am informed by the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue that the facts are as stated, except that Mr. Feore retired, not two years ago, but in June last. The Board has no funds at its disposal out of which to award any grant, or pension, to collectors of taxes on their retirement.

  IRISH HERRING FISHERY.
  MR. O'DOHERTY: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the Irish Government have considered the necessity of applying to Ireland the Acts at present in force in Scotland with reference to the marking or branding of herrings; whether he is aware that the absence of any official brand for Irish-cured herrings militates against this Irish industry in the English and Continental markets, and gives to Scotch curers an advantage over their Irish brethren; and whether legislation will be introduced this session for the purpose of remedying this grievance.
  MR. WYNDHAM: The Department of Agriculture has no evidence that the fact is as alleged in the second paragraph. If the system of herring branding were re-established in Ireland its cost would presumably, as in Scotland, be a tax on the industry; and it is not clear that the imposition of such a tax in Ireland would be attended by any compensating benefits. The whole question is receiving the consideration of the Department. I cannot undertake to give any pledge in the matter of legislation.
  MR. O'DOHERTY: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Congested Districts Board has been already asked by the herring curers of Donegal to have the law in Ireland assimilated with what it is in Scotland in this
  regard?
  MR. WYNDHAM: That may be so, but I cannot form any opinion until I have looked into the question.

  CRIME IN COUNTY DONEGAL.
  MR. O'DOHERTY: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if his attention has been called to the charge delivered by Mr. Justice Madden to the Donegal grand jury at
  80
  the spring assizes, whereby he testified to the crimeless state of the county Donegal; and, if so, will the Irish Government give practical effect to his Lordship's utterance by revoking the proclamation under the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act, 1881, at present in force in that county.
  MR. WYNDHAM: The learned judge in his address to the grand jury referred to the immunity from serious crime of the county Donegal. In reply to the second query, I have nothing to add to my reply to the similar question the hon. Member addressed to me on the 19th February.†
  MR. O'DOHERTY: That being so, is the right hon. Gentleman still of opinion that the laws as administered in Ireland are the most just and liberal laws in any constitutionally governed country in the world?
  MR. SPEAKER: Order, order!

  DONEGAL MAGISTRACY.
  MR. O'DOHERTY: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether the name of Mr. Humphrey Sheils, of Ballyhiernan, in the county of Donegal, has been submitted to the Lord Lieutenant for the commission of the peace for the county of Donegal, and seeing that the district in which Mr. Sheils resides is practically exclusively Roman Catholic, and that all the magistrates in the district are Protestants, whether the Irish Government will act on the precedent set by Lord Chancellor Walker, in the event of the Lord Lieutenant of the county refusing to appoint Mr. Sheils to the commission, and will direct the Lord Chancellor to make the appointment.
  MR. WYNDHAM: It is not the intention of the Irish Government to act in the manner suggested in the question.

  IRISH MAGISTRACY—THE MEMBER FOR MID-TIPPERARY.
  MR. CULLINAN: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he is aware
  † See Debates, Vol. lxxxix., page 487.

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  that there were no reporters present at the meetings at which the lion. Member for Mid-Tipperary was reported to have made the speeches for which the Lord Chancellor of Ireland removed him from the commission of the peace in the county of Tipperary; will he explain by what authority the Lord Chancellor acted in calling upon the hon. Member to convict himself of the alleged offence by acknowledging that he had made the speeches as reported; and on what grounds the Lord Chancellor came to the conclusion that there was a difference in the case of the hon. Member for Mid-Tipperary and those of the hon. Member for South Sligo and the hon. Member for North Mayo, so that he refused to appoint the hon. Member for Mid-Tipperary on his re-election as chairman of the Tipperary District Council, but appointed the other two hon. Members on their re-election to their respective offices. I wish to point out that very important parts of the original question have been eliminated, and without them the question is useless.
  MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Member could have appealed to me if necessary. If he cares to postpone it I will consider if anything more should be admitted. I cannot deal with it now.
  MR. CULLINAN: No; I will put it as it is.
  MR. WYNDHAM: The Lord Chancellor is unable to say whether the fact is as stated in the first paragraph. But the speeches, as reported, were of a character entirely inconsistent with the position of a magistrate, and the hon. Member in question, when furnished by the Lord Chancellor with a report of his speeches, did not repudiate the language attributed to him. The Lord Chancellor considered it his duty, in the exercise of his undoubted disciplinary control over the magistracy, to remove the hon. Member from the commission. This control is extended to ex officio magistrates by Section 95 (2) of the Act of 1898. I replied on Monday to the last paragraph.†
  MR. WILLIAM JOHNSTON: May I ask if the hon. Member for
  † See preceding volume, page 1114.
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  Mid-Tipperary is the Mr. Kendal O'Brien who, when he became an ex officio magistrate, three times refused to take the oath of allegiance to Her late Majesty, and did not do so until he was compelled?
  MR. CULLINAN: Can the right hon. Gentleman give the House the phraseology of the speeches of which he complains?
  MR. WYNDHAMwas understood to decline to do that.
  MR. KENDAL O'BRIEN: Is it not a fact that the other Members mentioned in the question never apologised or withdrew their words?
  MR. CULLINAN: Are we to understand that a Member who is entitled to sit in this House and legislate for the Empire at largo is to be deprived of the privilege of sitting on a local bench of magistrates?
  [No answer was returned.]

  COMPENSATION FOR CRIMINAL INJURIES.
  MR. CLANCY: I beg to ask the
  Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether hit attention has been directed to the com merits of Sir Frederick Falkiner, Recorder of Dublin, on the working of the law relating to compensation for criminal injuries, especially in Dublin; and whether, seeing that Sir Frederick Falkiner has expressed the opinion that the law referred to ought to be altered, on the ground that it works injustice to the ratepayers, he will take into consideration the question of acting on Sir Frederick Falkiner's suggestions, and introduce a Bill to carry them out.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. ATKINSON,): Perhaps I may be permitted to answer this question. The reply to the first query is in the affirmative. The observations of the learned Recorder had, I understand, reference to the wanton breaking of plate-glass windows which had been insured by the owners, the application for compensation for which, though nominally made by the

  83
  owners, was in reality made in the interest of the insurance companies. It is doubtful whether any change in the law is necessary to correct this abuse, and it is not the intention of the Government to introduce legislation dealing with the whole subject of criminal injuries to property, which was discussed and considered at the passing of the Act of 1898 in both Houses of Parliament.

  IMPORTATION OF DOGS FROM IRELAND.
  MR. WOLFF: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Agriculture whether the regulation prohibiting the introduction of dogs from Ireland into Great Britain is still in force; if so, whether there is any prospect of its being rescinded at an early date; and, if not, what is the reason.
  MR. HANBURY: There is no prospect of the Order being rescinded so long as rabies unfortunately continues to exist in Ireland. A case of rabies was reported from county Westmeath less than a fortnight ago.
  MR. WOLFF: Was this only a solitary instance?
  MR. HANBURY: No, there have been several cases.

  IRISH ORDNANCE SURVEY—ALLEGED MISDESCRIPTIONS.
  MR. LUNDON: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether he will explain why or by whose orders the gentlemen having charge of the revision of the Ordnance Survey of Ireland have marked on their revised sheets a venerable Roman Catholic church in the village of Kilteely by the term chapel instead of church; and whether, in view of the fact that the principal place of worship in every parish is by canon law titled church not chapel, he will take steps that all such places of worship are designated as churches on the Ordnance maps.
  MR. HANBURY: There are as yet no published revision maps of the village of Kilteely. The Ordnance Survey is not, I presume, bound by the canon law, and they have hitherto followed
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  the name given to buildings by the inhabitants of the district. If the practice of the inhabitants in naming their buildings is in accordance with the canon law as stated by the hon. Member we shall be glad to designate Kilteely Church accordingly on the maps.

  POST OFFICE EXAMINATIONS IN IRELAND.
  MR. O'DOHERTY: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, whether he can state the number of candidates who presented themselves for examination at the last examinations held respectively in Belfast, Cork, and Dublin, for clerkships in the post offices in those cities, and the number of successful candidates respectively at said examinations; the number who were examined at the last examination held in the city of Londonderry for clerkships in the post office, the number who were successful, where was the examination held, and who conducted it; and whether steps will be taken to treat Deny similarly to every other Irish city in the way of throwing these examinations open to the general public.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The result of the competition for men learners held on the 26th ultimo is not yet known; but the numbers who competed at the July examination were as follows:—At Belfast, forty-six, of whom fifteen were successful; at Cork, forty-five, of whom ten were successful; and at Dublin, eighty-seven, of whom fifteen were successful. The numbers of female competitors were:—At Belfast, 122, of whom six were successful; at Cork, twenty-five, of whom one was successful; and at Dublin, eighty-six, of whom five were successful. The last competition for female learners at Londonderry was held in May, 1900:—Seven candidates were nominated by the Postmaster General, and two were successful. The last competition for a male learnership was held in July,
  1899; three candidates were nominated by the Postmaster-General, but one did not present himself for examination, and neither of the others obtained a qualifying number of marks. The examinations at Londonderry were conducted by the Civil Service

  85
  Commissioners, who made all arrangements in connection with the examinations. The system of recruiting the class of sorting clerks and telegraphists varies with the size and importance of the office concerned, and it is not proposed to introduce at Londonderry the system which exists at offices of the size and importance of Belfast, Cork, and Dublin.

  CASTLEISLAND (KERRY) MAIL SERVICE.
  MR. MURPHY: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, whether he is aware that owing to recent alterations in train service the mails which are due for delivery in Castleisland, county Kerry, at 8.10 a.m., are generally from an hour to an hour and a half late, and that, as the outgoing mail leaves at 10.5, the limited time allowed traders causes a loss of twenty-four hours often in replying to English letters, which delay means loss to persons engaged in the butter and egg trade; and whether he will make arrangements in future to suit the people of Castleisland in accordance with the representations made to the local postmaster on the subject.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The Postmaster General regrets that owing to loss of time by the mail train the morning mails have recently been somewhat unpunctual in arrival at Castle-island. Repeated representations on the subject have been made to the railway company, who have promised to effect an improvement in this respect, and it is hoped the service will be more regularly performed in the future.

  GLENCOLUMBKILLE SUB-POSTMASTER.
  MR. O'DOHERTY: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster General, whether he is aware that the present sub-postmaster at Glencolumbkille was at the date of his application and of his appointment as sub-postmaster a member of the Royal Irish Constabulary, was not either a resident or householder in the town of Glencolumbkille, and that he has not exclusive possession of the premises in which he purposes conducting the business
  86
  of the office; will he state what are the total emoluments per annum attached to this position; whether the head postmaster of the district recommended another applicant to the Postmaster General for the appointment; and upon what grounds did the Postmaster General refuse to act on the recommendation of the head postmaster of the district.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The present sub-postmaster of Glencolumbkille was at the time of his application for the appointment a member of the Royal Irish Constabulary. At the time of his appointment he had already retired from the Constabulary and had made arrangements to become the tenant of the premises in which the post office work is carried on and to provide sufficient accommodation. The total emoluments of the office are about £20 15s. a year. The head postmaster of the district is not called upon to make recommendations to the Postmaster General.
  MK. O'DOHERTY: Is it not the practice in the Post Office for the head postmaster to make the recommendation, and for the person so recommended to^ be appointed by the Postmaster General?
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: I have said it is not.
  MR. O'DOHERTY: Are we to understand that this man was appointed not for his efficiency, but for his political views?
  MR. SPEAKER: Order, order!
  MR. FLAVIN: What special qualification have the members of the Royal Irish Constabulary for these sub-post-masterships?
  MR. SPEAKER: Order, order!

  DERRY CENTRAL RAILWAY.
  MR. O'DOHERTY: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury upon what terms the Treasury have disposed of their interest in the Derry Central Railway to the working company, the Belfast and

  87
  Northern Counties Railway, Company; what was the total sum due to the Government for principal and interest at date of sale; what was the amount of capital subscribed by the shareholders; whether anything is to go to the shareholders out of the purchase money paid to the Treasury; and whether the Treasury have made any arrangements as part of the contract of sale for a more efficient train service upon this railway than that which has existed up to the present.
  MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: The Treasury have disposed of the line of the Belfast and Northern Counties Railway Company for £105,000, of which £20,000 goes to the Derry Central Railway Company for division among their shareholders and secretary. The total sum due to the Government at the date of the sale was £131,720 18s. 4d., of which
  £100,000 was principal and £31,720 18s. 4d. arrears of interest. The subscribed capital was £120,340. Of this
  £10,000 was subscribed by the purchasers, who are to receive nothing in respect of their shares. Besides stipulating that the public shall be afforded at least the same facilities as they at present enjoy, the Board of Works have arranged for a complete system of through rates and fares similar to that on the Belfast and Northern Counties line, and for a full and free flow of traffic of every description in connection with this railway.

  BUNCRANA BARRACKS, COUNTY DONEGAL.
  MK. O'DOHERTY: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if the War Department have determined to erect military barracks at Buncrana, county Donegal, in connection with the new forts erected on Lough Swilly, and if so, what are the obstacles, if any, in the way of the works being at once proceeded with.
  LORD STANLEY: Yes, Sir. The question of selecting a site is under consideration. As soon as a convenient site at a suitable price is secured, the barracks will be proceeded with.

  IRISH UNIVERSITIES COMMISSION.
  MR. ALFRED HUTTON: I beg to ask the First Lord
  88
  of the Treasury whether he can state the terms of reference to the Royal Commission to inquire into University Education in Ireland; and whether the inquiry is to cover the grievances of Roman Catholics; and, if so, whether it has been finally determined to exclude Trinity College from the scope of the inquiry, and to preclude the possibility of considering any suggested remedy for present grievances that might affect Trinity College.
  The following question also appeared on the Paper—
  MR. WILLIAM JOHNSTON: To ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether, in case the Government should advise His Majesty to issue a Royal Commission to inquire into and report upon questions connected with University Education in Ireland, they will extend the scope of the inquiry to the Royal College of Maynooth, in order to ascertain what facilities could be afforded at Maynooth for the education of Roman Catholic laymen.
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I have indicated, in answer to an appeal made by-the hon. Member for East Mayo, that the final settlement of the terms of reference will not be made until after the debate on the motion that the Speaker leave the Chair on the Civil Service Estimates.

  DEMISE OF THE CROWN BILL.
  MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: I beg to ask Mr. Attorney General whether he will, before the Second Reading of the Demise of the Crown Bill, circulate a memorandum explanatory of its provisions.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir ROBERT FINLAY,): No, Sir. I have already explained the provisions of the Bill.
  MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: May I ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether, considering the most important nature of this Bill, and the serious consequences which its rejection might have upon right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench, the motion for the Second Reading will be postponed until we have the official

  89
  report of the explanation of the Attorney General.
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I think the request of the hon. Gentleman is rather an unusual one. This is a short Bill, and hon. Members will be able to discuss it adequately.
  MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: Does the right hon. Gentleman understand that this Bill deals with the question whether he himself has not, by accepting re-appointment—
  MR. SPEAKER: Order, order! A discussion on the Bill cannot be allowed.

  QUESTIONS—PROPOSED LIMITATION OF NUMBERS.
  MR. RENWICK: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury if he will consider the advisability of amending the Standing Orders so that no Member shall be entitled to ask more than one question upon one day.
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I do not deny that the number of questions put down by individual Members sometimes amounts to an abuse, but I do not know that we have yet reached the point when it is desirable to adopt the suggestion of my hon. friend. There are other abuses which lead to a greater waste of time.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
MR. ASQUITH: Can the First Lord of the Treasury say what the business will be on Monday?
MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I propose to take as the first Order on Monday the Second Reading of the Demise of the Crown Bill, and as the second the Army (Annual) Bill.

CIVIL LIST.
Power given to the Select Committee to report their observations.
Report brought up and read.
Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed. (No. 110.)
Minutes of proceedings, with an appendix, to be printed. (No. 110.)

SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE.
MR. A. J. BALFOUR, in moving that the House meet to-morrow at eleven, explained that the meeting would be purely formal, and that the attendance of Members would not be necessary, a House would be made by Black Rod. The ordinary business would be taken as usual at three o'clock.
Motion made and Question proposed, "That this House do meet to-morrow at Eleven of the clock a.m."—(Mr. A. J. Balfour.)
MR. JOHN REDMOND: For my part, I do not quite understand the necessity for meeting at eleven o'clock. Why cannot this House go up at three o'clock to hear the Royal assent given to the Bill? Is it for the convenience of the Lords, and to save them the trouble of meeting again at three o'clock?
MR. A. J. BALFOUR: It will be absolutely necessary that the Royal Assent should be given to the Appropriation Bill at an early hour to-morrow.
MR. JOHN REDMOND: That is the point I do not understand. There may be some urgent necessity which I do not understand.
MR. A. J. BALFOUR: The hon. Member need not be brought here. There will be no business done. The early hour of meeting is in order to enable the Treasury to carry out the business entrusted to them before the end of the financial year. I hope the hon. Gentleman will accept that explanation. The proposal imposes no inconvenience on this House in any way.
Question put, and agreed to.

NEW BILLS.

  FACTORY AND WORKSHOP ACTS AMENDMENT.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. RITCHIE,): I beg leave to introduce a Bill to amend the Factory and Workshop Acts. This Bill is drawn mainly on the lines of that of last year,

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  but the fact that there are some new provisions, while several of the former proposals are omitted, will, I think, secure approval and prevent a good deal of misapprehension on the part of hon. Members on both sides of the House. I consider that some of the former proposals are not of such a character as to make it desirable that I should reintroduce them. I will merely state for the convenience of the House what those provisions are. I propose to omit what was called the two-shift clause and the clause with reference to overtime in certain trades. There was also a clause repealing certain schedules as to overtime which were unsatisfactory in their working, and substituting the order of the Secretary of State for the schedules. I do not think it will at all damage the Bill if this proposal is left out. In regard to the important question of dangerous trades, the House knows that the present law may entail many arbitrations as regards the special rules proposed by the Secretary of State. That was proposed to be remedied by the Bill of my predecessor last year, who proposed that the regulations should be referred to a referee, and that the referee should come to a decision which would be binding on the Secretary of State. I am bound to say that I think there are strong objections to this principle of arbitration altogether. The effect of arbitration is really to place in the hands of an outsider the absolute power of rejecting, or otherwise, a proposal made by the Secretary of State. It is taking the responsibility off the shoulders of the Minister and placing it on the shoulders of an irresponsible outsider. For my own part, I do not think that is a satisfactory position either for one side or the other. I think the responsibility on such an important matter should rest upon the shoulders of the Secretary of State. I propose, therefore, in the new Bill that the Secretary of State should be responsible for making the rules for dangerous trades, subject to two conditions—first, that he should be
  bound to make the fullest inquiries and receive evidence in public, and, secondly, that the rules should lie on the Table of both Houses of Parliament for six weeks before they take effect. There is another important modification. The present state of the law
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  relating to laundries is unsatisfactory and confused. One of the proposals in last year's Bill was that the Secretary of State might by order apply the provisions of the Factory Acts to laundries. I propose now to deal with the matter by legislative action instead of by the action of the Secretary of State. I propose to apply the provisions of the Factory Acts to laundries, preserving, however, the existing latitude as to the daily distribution of hours of employment so long-as the statutory weekly total is not exceeded. It was proposed in last year's Bill to continue the exception in favour of any institution conducted in good faith for religious and charitable purposes. That exception, in my view, is indefensible. The laundries conducted by these institutions ought not to be worked on conditions other than those imposed on ordinary laundries with which they may be competing. If they are not so worked they have nothing to fear from the application of the Acts to them, but I propose to insert special
  provisions to meet the objections which have been expressed against the inspection of religious institutions by ordinary factory inspectors. In conclusion I may say that important powers as to sanitary matters are given to the local authorities, and there are other small amendments of the law with which I will not now trouble the House. I hope I have said sufficient to show what tin-main alterations in the Bill are, and I trust they may prove satisfactory to the House.
  MR. ASQUITH: I have no doubt the right hon. Gentleman could quote precedents in support of the course he has taken, but had it been otherwise I should have been disposed to protest against the introduction of so important a Bill under the provisions of what is called the ten minutes rule. I rise, in the first instance, for the purpose of expressing the satisfaction which I feel in common, I am sure, with a very large number of Members on both sides of the House, at the resolution which the hon. Gentleman has come to to omit some of the most objectionable provisions in the measure of last year. I am very glad that the right hon. Gentleman has deferred to the representations which

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  were made from all quarters, particularly with regard to the double shift clause, and I may express especial satisfaction that the Government are going to deal in a comprehensive and, as I think, thoroughly logical fashion with the difficulty which has hitherto arisen respecting the power of arbitration. I have over and over again expressed the opinion that those provisions were obsolete and unworkable, and that the only satisfactory
  way of dealing with them was to throw the responsibility on the Secretary of State, subject to Parliamentary supervision and control. I am very glad that the right hon. Gentleman has incorporated that provision in his Bill. Of course, as regards laundries one must reserve final judgment until one sees the provisions of the Bill. But there again I may say that it is with great satisfaction I find the right hon. Gentleman has been converted to the proposal I made in 1895 to bring laundries under the general operation of the Factory Acts, and which I was unable at that time to carry through from causes I shall not at the moment specify. I think the light hon. Gentleman's proposal is a substantial modification in the right direction of the existing law. Upon other points it is not possible at this stage to express an opinion, but I would suggest that in the interval, which I presume will be a reasonably long one, between now and when we shall be called upon to discuss the Second Reading, as this is a matter which affects a great many interests in this country, the right hon. Gentleman should circulate with the Bill a memorandum or explanatory statement, comparing the measure not only with the provisions of last year's Bill, but also with the existing state of the law.
  Bill to amend the Factory and Workshop Acts, ordered to be brought in by Mr. Secretary Ritchie and Mr. Jesse Collings.

  FACTORY AND WORKSHOP ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.
  "To amend the Factory and Workshop Acts," presented, and read the first time; to be read a second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 130.]

  FACTORY AND WORKSHOP ACTS CONSOLIDATION.
  MR. RITCHIE: I wish to ask the leave of the House to introduce a Bill to consolidate the Factory Acts. While it is quite clear that it is desirable to consolidate the law relating to various matters, it is more than ever desirable that laws relating to the working classes should be consolidated and made as simple as possible. It is sometimes said that the law ought to be consolidated before it is amended, or, on the other hand, that it ought to be amended and at some future time consolidated. Sometimes consolidation is promised after amendment, and a considerable period elapses before the consolidation takes place. I want both these processes to proceed pari passu. I hope that both Bills will be sent to a Committee upstairs, and that that Committee will do as it did with the Public Health (London) Bill and the Housing of the Working Classes Bill, namely, that it should take the amending Bill first in Committee, go through all the Amendments proposed in the Bill or which any member of the Committee desires to propose, on the understanding that when the Bill is amended it should be then returned along with the Consolidation Bill to the draftsman with instructions to amend the Consolidation Bill by the Amendments in the Amending Bill. The Bills would then go before the Grand Committee, and the clauses be gone through pro forma; they would then be returned to the House as one Bill, which the House would consider on Report. Therefore we may hope that in one session we should get both the Amendments and the consolidation of the existing law that we desire.
  Bill to consolidate the Factory and Workshop Act, ordered to be brought in by Mr. Secretary Ritchie and Mr. Jesse Collings.

  FACTORY AND WORKSHOP ACTS CONSOLIDATION BILL.
  "To consolidate the Factory and Workshop Acts," presented, and read the first time; to be read a second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 131.]

  CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 1) BILL.
  Order for Third Reading read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the third time."

  SOUTH AFRICAN WAR—PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.
  MR. UREsaid that the House and the country were surprised to learn that the negotiations for peace between General Botha and Lord Kitchener had come to nothing, and that the much-looked-for cessation of hostilities had not been brought about. On the 22nd of February Lord Kitchener received a letter from General Botha intimating his desire to treat for peace, and that letter was written after consultation between General Botha and his fellow generals, on the distinct understanding that the question of the independence of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony lay outside the region of discussion. Later on a prolonged interview took place between General Botha and Lord Kitchener at Middelburg, and at that interview Lord Kitchener said that General Botha showed good feeling and seemed very anxious to bring about peace, ten different topics being discussed. On the 6th of March Lord Kitchener was in possession of the Government's proposals, and on the afternoon of the 7th of March the letter from the Government was sent by special messenger to General Botha. This was followed by nine days' silence. At the end of that time there came a most startling letter from the Boer general, in which he intimated to Lord Kitchener that, after what had passed between them he should refuse to recommend for consideration the terms offered by the British Government. General Botha did not say that these terms had been discussed and afterwards refused; he stated no objection of any kind to them, but simply refused to submit them for consideration. That seemed to indicate that something had passed between the two generals on the 28th of February which must have made it plain to Lord Kitchener that the proposals of the British Government could not possibly have been accepted. What that something was the Papers
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  did not disclose, and he thought it was the general feeling of the House that the time had come when the Government, without any detriment to the public service, might make a full and frank disclosure of all they knew on the subject.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Mr. J. CHAMBERLAIN,): Surely the hon. Gentleman is aware that I have again and again said we have disclosed to the House all we know. There is nothing beyond what is in these Papers.
  MR. UREassumed that communications had taken place since the papers were laid.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: No.
  MR. UREsaid if that was the case he thought the right hon. Gentleman would agree that it was right they should turn to the proposals themselves in order that they might discover, if possible, where the mystery was. In turning to the proposals of the Government, he wished to say that he assumed that General Botha's desire for peace was honest and sincere. If his
  assumption was wrong, then there, was no mystery to reveal. It appeared to him that of the ten topics discussed on the 28th of February the treatment by His Majesty's Government of seven afforded no sort of ground or reason for the curt refusal on the part of General Botha even to entertain the proposals. His Majesty's Government offered the assurance that at the end of the war there would be no special war tax put upon the Boer farmers, and that assistance would be readily granted to those who were willing to take the Oath of allegiance to the King. No difficulty was raised about the return of the Boer prisoners from St. Helena and Ceylon. With regard to the Kaffir question, often burning and troublesome, all that General Botha seemed to be anxious about was that the Kaffirs should not have the franchise until representative government was conceded to the two colonies, and the British Government readily agreed to that. His Majesty's Government was prepared to grant complete amnesty for all bona fide acts of war,

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  and it was only in the case of colonials who desired to return to Natal or Cape Colony that the Government proposed that they should be relegated to the treason law of their own country. Lord Kitchener proposed that in the case of the colonials a recommendation should be made merely to disfranchise them; but he could not believe that an alteration of that kind was the rock on which these peace overtures were wrecked.
  He turned now to the remaining three topics discussed, which he admitted stood in a wholly different position from those to which he had hitherto adverted. There was, in the first place, the question of liability for the debts of the two republics. That was a topic on which Lord Kitchener told them that General Botha laid special stress. Botha's point was intelligible enough. He said that if they were taking over the assets of the two republics, why should they not also take over their legal debts? He referred to the notes, amounting to something less than £1,000,000 sterling, issued by the Boers during the campaign. He would not argue the legal point, because this seemed to him to be a question of policy, and of policy only. The proposal seemed to have commended itself to Lord Kitchener, but His Majesty's Government characterised the seemingly modest proposal suggested in his Lordship's draft letter as highly dangerous. His Majesty's Government seemed to suggest that there might be some feeling engendered on the part of the loyalists if money was paid to those who had assisted and supplied the enemy. All he wished to say was that concessions of this kind, if freely granted, would only expose them to the charge of undue generosity, and would not afford a foothold for further agitation. When they came to examine this closely they would find that it was not a concession at all, but a thing which in the end would turn out to their own benefit. There was no element of peril in it, and that was the reason why Lord Kitchener and Sir Alfred Milner were ready to grant this concession as a ready means of settlement.
  Then came, in the second place, the proposal to give assistance to the Boer farmers who had suffered loss during the course of the war. It was impossible to shut their eyes to the fact
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  that this was one of the most important topics discussed at the conference between Lord Kitchener and General Botha. But, though Lord Kitchener freely admitted that they should give some assistance, the Government said this proposal too was dangerous, and they made what, in his judgment, was a very vital and fatal change in the suggestions of the men on the spot, and one which, as he gathered, was deeply regretted by both Lord Kitchener and Sir Alfred Milner. They thought that the introduction of the words "by loan" would weaken the effect of the concession. The men on the spot entertained a strong objection to the introduction of those words. Lord Kitchener's reason for this was that in view of the suspicious nature of the Boers he thought this alteration would be regarded as an attempt to get the farmers into the clutches of the Government. Was there any hon. Member present who did not feel the force of that remark? The objection of the Government to this proposal seemed to be that they would he favouring enemies as against friends. He had every sympathy with the position of the loyalists, who, under very trying circumstances, had been true to the British connection, and they were entitled to every consideration and respect. He thought, however, that the House would be disposed to agree with the men on the spot, who were well able to judge of the circumstances under which they were negotiating. On the other hand, he should have thought that the interests of the loyalists were very safe in the hands of Sir Alfred Milner, because he did not think that the very worst enemy of that distinguished and capable public servant would suggest that he was at all likely to ride roughshod over the loyalists, or brush aside their feelings and sentiments.
  He would now turn to the last topic discussed at the Middelburg Conference—he alluded to the question of the future government of the
  two colonies. The Conference took place on the express understanding that the question of independence was to remain outside the negotiations altogether, and the Conference took place after General Botha had communicated with his fellow generals. Let the House consider the contrast between the proposals

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  of Lord Kitchener, on the one hand, and those of the Government, on the other, in order to see if they could discover the real cause of the failure of the negotiations. Lord Kitchener proposed that as soon as the surrender was complete military law should come to an end and that civil administration should take its place. The Government, on the other hand, proposed that as soon as practicable military administration—not
  military law—should cease that civil government in the form of Crown Colony government should take its place. He observed that in the draft letter reference to Crown Colony government was studiously kept out. Crown Colony government had a somewhat evil reputation in South Africa, which was not confined exclusively to the men of the Dutch race, but it was largely shared by many of those who were loyal to the British connection. He quite appreciated the reason given by the Government that it might be necessary afterwards to maintain military law, but surely the Governor appointed would be entitled to claim that at his own discretion. He should have placed in the very front the proposal that military administration should cease, and not military law. But there is a still much more important proposal. Lord Kitchener proposed that the new Government should consist of a Governor and a nominated Executive, "with or without" an advisory elected Assembly. That phrase was a little vague, and wanted explanation, but he thought, at all events, it would open up a hope that—and he thought it would become a certainty—from the outset there would be an element of representative government, through which they would be able to ascertain the wishes and desires of those who were to be governed. That door was shut at once by the alteration proposed by His Majesty's Government—namely, that the new Government should consist of a Governor, assisted by a nominated Executive and by a nominated advisory council, consisting of officials and some non-officials, who should be nominated by the Crown. He thought that was a most unfortunate change, for it at once precluded all hope of the representative element being present. He saw no danger whatever in allowing
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  this elected element to remain. As soon as circumstances permitted free representative government should be eon-ceded to the two colonies, but what His Majesty's Government put forward was that as soon as circumstances permitted a representative element should be introduced, and ultimately free representative government probably would be conceded. Those changes were made by the Government in the interests of precision and exact phraseology. He was bound to say that he could not congratulate the Government upon the phraseology employed. Who knew what a
  "representative element" meant? and where in the English language could they fin a word more vague and shadowy than "ultimately"? In their recent debate upon the terms of settlement he found it was often said that the time had come to substitute the statesman for the soldier. When he read those proposals he was inclined to think that that statement ought to be reversed. He preferred very much the proposals of Lord Kitchener to those which had been framed by the Government. He could scarcely conceive that such changes would have been made in phraseology which had been carefully framed by Lord Kitchener unless the Government attached importance to the change.
  He was sure that the House would welcome from the Government some further explanation in regard to the reasons for making such important changes in Lord Kitchener's despatch. It was said that General Botha entertained a strong objection to Sir Alfred Milner, but if that had been the cause; of the failure of the negotiations it was, inconceivable that it should not have found a place in the Papers laid before the House. He had failed to discover in the detailed statement of what had taken place at the Middelburg Conference the smallest hint or suggestion that there was anything in the personality of the High Commissioner to prevent the two generals from coming to terms. On the contrary, he found in every important particular in which the Government differed from Lord Kitchener Sir A. Milner was on the side of Lord Kitchener and against the Government. What was the reason why the statement was made by the right hon. the Colonial

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  Secretary on Saturday last?* He was wholly at a loss to comprehend what it could be. Since the ill-starred day of the publication of the Spion Kop despatches no more mischievous thing had been done by the Government than that statement of the right hon. Gentleman. He was told that the same plea would be put forward for making that statement as for the publication of the Spion Kop despatches—it was to feed the public appetite. But he thought they would all be in a chronic state of indigestion if that were the fare on which the Government proposed to nourish them.
  He was desirous that there should be no mistake whatever in regard to his views in this matter. He saw in the early part of the telegram of 1st March sent by Lord Kitchener to the right hon. gentleman the Secretary of State for War that at the outset of the discussions General Botha expressed a doubt as to whether he could bring about peace without independence. If there were any truth in that, if that doubt were realised, he, for his part, regretfully admitted that the campaign must be fought to the bitter end. Lord Kitchener added that at the beginning of the conference General Botha strove hard for some sort of independence, and General Kitchener at once refused to discuss the subject, and instantly dropped it. Here Lord Kitchener was unquestionably right. A claim for complete independence he thoroughly understood although he disagreed with it; a claim for all the rights and privileges of a self-governing British colony he also comprehended, and thoroughly agreed with it; but a claim for some sort of independence, or a modified form of independence, for some stunted thing, some debased image of the genuine article, he could not comprehend. He did not believe there was any man in that House who was honestly anxious for a lasting and enduring peace in South Africa who could for a moment think of suggesting it. Why, to give the Boers a modified form of independence would be to give them a stone wherewith to break their own heads, and to lay up a store of disaffection. Current criticism admitted that it was
  * See Preceding volume, p. 991.
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  here where was to be found the true secret of the failure of the negotiations. He could scarcely think so, because when General Botha entered into these negotiations he agreed—and that after consultation with his fellow-generals—to leave the question of independence outside; and he (the hon. Member) could not see why General Botha should have taken the extreme course of refusing absolutely to consider the proposals of the British Government merely because some modified form of independence was not offered. As to the proposals of the Government as a whole, he made no hostile attack on them. He had offered his criticism on the points which he thought were open to challenge; but that criticism had gone no further than the criticism of the civilian and the soldier on the spot who understood the circumstances under which they were negotiating. He would not utter a single word suggesting that the proposals as a whole were not fair and generous, or that would give His Majesty's Government any excuse for saying that Members on that side of the House were unreasonable persons; nor would he give the Government any excuse for receding from the position they had taken up, and falling back into the arms of the extremists, who would be only too ready to say to the Government, "You have already gone too far; your generosity has been unappreciated; never again." On the contrary, he would infinitely rather that the Government, if they did not adhere to their present position, should go to the length to which Lord Kitchener went. However, he did not suggest for a moment that they should reopen the negotiations. That was out of the question, after the curt refusal of General Botha even to consider the terms proposed. The overtures must come from the Boers; and if they did come he hoped that His Majesty's Government would stand firm in the position they had taken up, would go one short step further, and be prepared to agree to the terms which Lord Kitchener had suggested. He agreed with the statement in the papers, that never in the history of the world had such generous and fair terms been offered by the victors to the vanquished. [Cries

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  of "Oh, oh!" from the Irish Benches.] He defied any student of history to contradict that.
  MR. DILLON: They are the meanest terms ever offered.
  MR. UREsaid that, at all events, it was his opinion that the terms offered were fair and generous. They should, however, never forget that the case they had in hand was unique, and out of the common; for the belligerents in arms against us in the field were all men who might some day come to be subjects of His Majesty; the war-stricken country whose homesteads they were asked to restore was at present part of His Majesty's dominions; and the humble creditors whose claims we were asked to pay would, they hoped, soon pass under the benign sway of the British Crown. Under these circumstances they could afford to be generous. He thought the country might rest assured that the claims of the loyalists were perfectly safe when they had Sir A. Milnor to look after them; and the Government could afford, with Lord Kitchener at their back, to treat with the contempt they deserved the braggadocios who shouted that weakness and cowardice were the proper names for the lenity and magnanimity which the Government might display.
  MR. STROYANsaid that if he asked the indulgence of the House for a brief space it was based on the fact that he had had a connection for more than twenty years with South Africa, and that fifteen of these years were spent in that country. He was a South African colonist, in the proper sense of the term, before gold was discovered on the Rand, and before Britons were termed Uitlanders in the land which owed everything to their energy and enterprise. Although he had not been connected actively in business with South Africa for some years past, he had still investments in that country, and was determined to hold these investments. He went further, and said that it was his intention that his children should do something towards the development of that most important portion of His Majesty's dominions. He felt that he
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  voiced the views of every loyal South African when he said that the terms offered by Lord Kitchener to General Botha were generous in the extreme. He felt he spoke for every loyal South African when he said that he was heartily glad that those generous terms were offered; for it showed to the world, and to the Boers themselves, the good feelings entertained towards them by the people of this country. [Cries of "Oh, oh!"] Boer and Briton must live together in the future and work side by side for the prosperity of their common country. He was convinced, however, that the Government had gone as far in the direction of generosity as it would be safe to go. To offer better terms would simply mean to risk being seriously misunderstood by friend and foe alike. The first essential of a permanent settlement was that the terms should, besides being generous to the vanquished, be just and fair to our own loyal colonists; and, above all, it was essential that the terms should be dignified and incapable of being misunderstood. He entirely agreed with His Majesty's Government in the substitution of the term "assistance by way of loan" for the more vague promise of assistance contained in Lord Kitchener's proposed letter. Statesmen, in matters like this, must come to the assistance of the great soldier. They must be precise, if they would avoid misunderstanding. The alteration was, in his opinion, absolutely necessary. No-amount of generosity would have satisfied the Boers or would have been accepted by them as an adequate fulfilment of that undertaking. They would have misunderstood it. Besides, free gifts of money would have been misrepresented, and would have been looked upon as the purchase-price of peace. Peace under such conditions we could not have, and peace under such conditions would not have been lasting. He had, personally, implicit confidence in Sir A. Milner. He had watched his career since that distinguished Statesman first became connected with South Africa. For the first time, however, he could not see eye to eye with him. He could not agree with him in his preference of Lord Kitchener's proposals to those cabled by His Majesty's Government. They were told that General Botha

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  objected to Sir A. Milner. He could quite believe that, and he thought the House would agree with him that that was quite natural. He fancied that the great majority of the enemies of this country in South Africa, whether they were open or secret enemies, objected to Sir A. Milner. He had no doubt that these men equally objected to Lord Kitchener, General French, and a number of others of the most successful of our generals, and, that being so, they fell back on the rebel cries of abuse. Sir Alfred Milner's ability and fitness for the difficult and trying position to which he had been appointed had been amply demonstrated and conclusively proved by the fact that every known rebel and disloyal subject throughout South Africa objected to him and desired his recall, whilst, on the other hand, he had the confidence of the loyalists and the British to an extent unprecedented in the case of any official in South Africa, and to stultify or diminish his influence there would be a blow to British prestige. The interests of British supremacy and the Empire itself made his presence in the country necessary for the time being at least. In any terms of peace we must be just to our friends as well as generous to our enemies. He implored the Government not to lay themselves open to the reproach, which at the conclusion of the last Boer war was made with a considerable amount of justice, that "loyalty in South Africa does not pay." The much-abused British in South Africa were, after all, the same people as ourselves—willing, perhaps, to undergo more hardships and exercise more self-denial than, happily, we were called upon to in an old country like England—and many of them had been under arms for the Empire. It had been suggested that these men might be vindictive; brave men wore never vindictive. They had given Great Britain troop after troop; they gave the Imperial Light Horse, that magnificent body of men who fought shoulder to shoulder with the Gordons and rode in the van to the relief of Mafeking. Those who systematically and indiscriminately endeavoured to belittle and besmirch such a community were no friends of that closer union which was binding the colonies to the mother country, of which we bad heard so much
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  in recent years—that closer union which had stood the British Empire in such good stead during the present crisis, and which we should have to preserve if Great Britain was to last.
  MR. ROBSON: The hon. Member who has just sat down has devoted his time to uttering observations with which everyone will agree. I should like to draw attention to one point, which is indeed a matter of more general interest than the matter under discussion, but which will not, I hope, be overlooked, because it has great bearing upon it—that is, the policy of publishing despatches in which the local advisers of a Minister set forth their own views and opinions by way of assisting the Minister to form his judgment. I have little doubt that there are many cases where such a course might be convenient, but this particular case is one where it must be objectionable, and, I think, highly dangerous. I am not speaking of the negotiations between this country and the Boers; that is totally different to the matter of which I am now speaking. I am referring to the confidential difference of opinion between a Minister and his advisers. That is quite different to the information which the House is so eager to get. Knowing all that passes, the responsibility of the Colonial Secretary in a matter like this is something more than the average responsibility which Ministers are so fond of referring to. He is the actual person and the only person responsible for these negotiations, and the only person who ought to receive praise or blame, according to the view taken of them It is for him to answer, and I submit that he has no right—that a Minister has no right—to bring his confidential advisers within the range of parliamentary criticism at all. It is for him to deal with them and for Parliament to deal with him. But it is not only from the point of view of Ministerial responsibility that I invite attention to this matter; there are other points. It is impolitic to show to our enemies that there are differences of opinion between the Colonial Secretary and his advisers with regard to the terms of peace, especially when those terms had been rejected, and it is highly inexpedient that when this matter comes up again our enemies

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  should be able to speculate on the disposition of this or that adviser in their favour with respect to the terms. Whatever terms we present to them should carry with them the weight of absolutely undivided counsel. Now, I do not think that the terms we shall hereafter present to them will carry the weight of undivided counsels, but there are other objections more grave than that. My hon. friend has pointed out the difference between the terms suggested by Lord Kitchener and those suggested by Sir A. Milner. Lord Kitchener did not lay the same stress on political difficulties that Sir A. Milner felt. Sir Alfred Milner felt it his duty to point out that the Cape rebels in the Transvaal ought not to be treated better than the Cape rebels in the Cape; that was certainly a very reasonable suggestion, but was it right that Sir A. Milner's advice should be disclosed so that he has put upon him the opprobrium, such as it is; of attempting to exact worse terms than were suggested by the military authorities? That cannot fail to work against him in his ministerial authority. Was it wise to hold out to the Boers the fact that it is the military authority who is most eager to give them the best terms? Will not their suggestion be that it is not the Minister in England, or even his local adviser in South Africa, but the military authorities, who, recognising the difficulties of the campaign, are most anxious to offer the best terms? I am surprised that the Government should utter such things in the House.
  Now I come to the terms themselves, and I frankly admit not only that the terms are generous, but that the alterations and additions made in the terms add to their clearness and precision and to their freedom from minute controversy afterwards, and on the whole they are sound and substantial improvements on the terms suggested. With regard to the alterations, I cannot understand them coming into controversy at all. The stipulation made by the Colonial Secretary that these terms should be made conditional on the cessation of hostilities was reasonable enough, because it would not do to bring back 18,000 or 20,000 men and still find yourself fighting a hostile community; that, in my opinion, was a most reasonable stipulation. My hon. friend, by way of
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  emphasising his objection to these terms, laid great stress on the substitution of the word "loan" for the word "gift," and I should have been disposed to agree with him if I had thought that the alteration of those words had caused the rejection of peace. It was the terms as a whole that were rejected. If Botha, instead of rejecting the terms, had said that the terms were acceptable so far, but that he would rather have the word "gift" inserted instead of "loan," I do not think anybody would have stood in the way. That alteration was not of such a degree of importance as to induce us to suppose that it caused the rejection of the terms. The principal point connected with these proposals and their rejection is the introduction of the representative element. The introduction of representative government in the Transvaal seems to have produced a good deal of confusion of thought among many persons. Some have suggested that representative government in its fullest sense ought to be conferred upon the Boers immediately after the cessation of hostilities. I do not know whether that view is put forward by anyone now. [SEVERAL HON. MEMBERS: Yes, it is.] Then it appears that there are still some persons who hold the extraordinary view that representative government should be conferred upon this half-depopulated country immediately on the cessation of the war, and there are certainly some other Members who go extremely near it. The substitute for it is that the country should have representative government on the restoration of order. Well, that is a more elastic formula, and I do not know whether I could not get my own suggestion under cover of it if stretched far enough. It is not by any means a safe formula. Surely hon. Members, on reflection, will see that in the interest of peace there must be a resettlement of the country before you can have anything like a fair system of representative government. The-thousands of legal inhabitants of the Transvaal, who have been expelled because they are of British race, must be resettled in the country before you can give representative government to the Boers. It is not enough to talk of the cessation of hostilities. It is not enough to talk of the restoration of order. The fact is that those who desire representative

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  government without the resettlement of the country ignore the fact which, I think, has been at the root of their mistaken attitude throughout this controversy. They ignore the fact that, although the Boers conquered the Transvaal, their conquest was not complete. It was subject to the right of people of British race to settle, and live and labour in that country. The British Empire had a proprietary right in the Transvaal at all times under the Convention. The Briton was in the Transvaal by the same right as the Boer, and now the Boer has (spelled him, although his race represented a large proportion—some people say a majority—of the population. Are you going to confer representative government before he has returned? [An HON. MEMBER: "Nobody wants it."] I am very glad to hear that, because some people have wanted it. I cannot help observing from my own experience of this controversy that very often, because some little fault is found with England, it is always held to absolve the Boer. I think we should look at both sides of the question, and I hold it to be an unreasonable demand, the Boer having expelled so great a proportion of the population, that he should expect or desire anything like full representative government until there has been a reasonable settlement of the country. Personally I should prefer that the Government should make an estimate—by no means an impossible thing to do—of the time in which that resettlement may reasonably be expected, and having fixed that period, then by declaration in this House—although I would not make it part of the terms of peace—announce the intention of His Majesty's Government to give full representative government at that period, if in their discretion they may think it right, provided, of course, that hostilities shall have ceased, and that the country shall have resumed its normal industrial conditions. It should be open to them, if that condition is not fulfilled, to extend the period, and equally open to them to curtail the period if they thought it advisable to do so. The fixing of a certain period would be a guide to them, and an aid to any Government holding power in England at the time. I dare say it will be said that that is practically what the Government are doing
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  now, and that it is the discretion they have under the existing terms of peace. That is quite true, but nobody can predict what the temper of the Government a few years hence may be, but I hope the people of this country will see to it that representative government is not delayed.
  I have dwelt thus long upon the question of full representative government because the same reasons apply to, and have a direct bearing upon, the agreement in regard to the Advisory Council. No doubt an advisory council looks very tempting, but again you have to remember that your elective Advisory Council would represent only a small portion of the population. It would have this disadvantage. The Boers would, of course, first of all return to the country and be in a great majority, and this would be a source of possible danger and disturbance. We know perfectly well what would happen if their representative government were so full as to give them full legislative powers. We should undoubtedly have a repetition of the franchise and registration difficulties which we have already dealt with. Such a thing would be practically unconditional surrender to the Boers. An Advisory Council, while it would not have, so great an evil effect as that, would, nevertheless have an evil effect. If they sought to take advantage of their position by suggestions unfair to the still more or less absentee Uitlander population, they would be overruled by the executive authority. It is better to fix a provisional period, to let that provisional period be frankly stated, and not pretend it is anything else; and then, as soon as possible, to introduce the representative government which is shared by every white race under the British flag. We cannot; carry on our Imperial system as a great empire except upon the basis of local self-government. From their experience of the Cape Government the Boers know as well as we do that an essential part of our Imperial system is representative government in some form or other, and that, generally according to the distance from England, some extremely ample form is always granted, and the more they appreciate that fact the less difficulty we will have. I express satisfaction that His Majesty's Government are desirous of meeting the Boers on terms so fair.

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  There is, in my opinion, no reason to complain of the way in which they have treated the Boers or loyalists in regard to these negotiations.
  MR. ELLIOT: I wish to say a few words on the general position in which we find ourselves—that is, on the precise terms proposed in the negotiations. We talk, and we have a right to talk, of being generous in this matter. After all, generosity is the best policy for ourselves. I don't know that we can spend too much time in praising ourselves. After a sanguinary tussle with a brave enemy we are still able to go into negotiations with moderate minds, with just intentions, with a desire, having regard to our own interests, to deal fairly and generously if we can with our enemy. There is talk about representative institutions and so forth, as to the when, the where, and the how, they shall be introduced: hut, after all, the main thing which lies at the bottom of all is this, that neither in one way nor another shall we be able to make peace and quiet in South Africa until there is some sort of drawing together between the two races. (Opposition cheers.) Hon. Gentlemen cheer, and will not go any further. If by advancing further we shall be repaid a hundredfold in the good temper with which we are met, then it is foolish to say, in a spirit of defiance, that nothing will induce us to advance beyond these terms. It is a consolation, I should imagine, to every one that, notwithstanding the figure which the warlike operations have cost the country, General Botha and Lord Kitchener can come together. They seem, as far as we can judge from the only account that has come before us, to have been able to talk together almost like good friends in regard to the common object they have in view. Surely if these men, who have been doing their best to take each other's lives by their forces, are able to meet in that way, it is not for us at home to take another course? We will be generous, if you will, in order that we may pull together the two races in South Africa. I wish to say one word upon a rather delicate subject—the subject of Sir Alfred Milner. I am perfectly certain, from my personal
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  acquaintance and friendship with him, that he has been actuated throughout by the highest principles and the desire to serve the truest and best interests of his country. It would be absurd to recall Sir Alfred Milner. We must look at both sides—the British on the one side and the Africander section on the other—and do our best to steer a medium course, because in that course alone all safety lies. Sir Alfred Milner has undergone great trials since he went out to South Africa. Does any man really suppose in his heart that as time goes on Sir Alfred Milner will be the best able to pull together the two jarring races? I doubt it. I think the time will come—and the Government must know it as well as other people—for everything to settle down, whatever may be the rights and wrongs of the question. When the time comes for everything to settle down it is inevitable that things will be laid to his charge, and he will be in a position, no matter how great his abilities or how good his intentions, where he will not be able to do full justice to a difficult situation. [Cries of "No."] I do not say one word against Sir Alfred Milner but I venture to say that these are words of common sense. People may remember, after all, that the man who has been responsible for conquest will not be the best man to elicit the loyal feelings and the fraternal sentiments. If I may say so, of those who are opposed to him. These are disagreeable words for an Englishman to have to use. We have not been accustomed, and I hope it will be a long time in future before the English House of Commons has to contemplate it, to the making of British subjects against their will. It is a disagreeable task we have undertaken. Since the war began I have felt this, and I have stated it again and again. Since the war began it became, in my judgment, our absolute duty to conquer these two Republics. I do not wish to go back on the old story on this occasion. We have before tried the system of independent Republics, and it broke down in disaster and disgrace. If we had set up the Republics again their functions would have been differently interpreted by the two sides. The Republics would have claimed all

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  the rights of independence in the neighbourhood of a British colony where a large portion of the population are in close relationship to the people of the Republics. I think it would not have been a wise or politic thing. I think the war put an end to that state of things, and we have to find a solution in another way. I must say that, when we talk of the generous terms we are offering, we should try to look a little to the other side of the question. We are offering to pay debts, to pay sums to those who have been spending money against us. We have been offering to build the farms of those who have recently been engaged in the war. But what are we getting from General Botha? He is giving away what is of supreme importance—he is giving up the cause for which throughout a year and a half he has fought with great courage and vigour. I say, beyond all dispute, he is giving up that cause for which thousands of his friends and relations have sacrificed their lives. If he gives in he has to sacrifice all that. I say he is bound to do it for his own well-being, and he will best consult, no doubt, the interests of his country if he does so give way, but do not let us say as Englishmen that he is not called upon to make a gigantic sacrifice. He is as brave a man as any in the world. Let us do what we can to make things easy for those against whom we fought. When we see the Government taking the line they are taking now—a moderate medium course between the two extremes—let us strengthen them in the task, which I am perfectly certain they will find one of extreme difficulty. My right hon. friend the Colonial Secretary, speaking last December, said he looked forward to an early conclusion of the war. I saw the comment two or three days afterwards, "What was the use of being generous to people who did not understand it—that sort of thing would be done again." We have to be fair to all parties. We have to remember our own loyalists who have fought so well. We have to remember the great objects before us, and look them fairly in the face. What can be the future of South Africa? Are we to succeed in pouring an a British population which will ultimatley
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  by its numbers reduce to insignificance the minority of Dutchmen? That, so far as I can see, is impossible. What is it that causes distant countries to fill up with Englishmen? A country that abounds with cheap labour is not the country to which Englishmen will flock. They will go in twos and threes to the extent of a few hundreds to make fortunes by speculating at Johannesburg, but they will not go in the only way in which great masses of the population can ever be got into a new country. They will not go to take the place of labourers. I hope what can be done will be done to induce Englishmen to go out and take farms in South Africa, but I do not expect much of that kind of thing to occur. Look the thing fairly and squarely in the face. If we cannot change the character of the country districts of South Africa from Dutch districts into British districts, what have we to do? There is only one thing to be done, and only one possibility by which South Africa can be retained in the Empire, and that is by
  gradually enabling a good spirit to grow up between the Dutch and the English. They will come together, and I hope we shall have the Government of Cape Colony largely composed of Dutchmen. Personally, I find it difficult to improve the policy of the Government as sketched out by the Colonial Secretary last December. The differences between Downing Street and Sir Alfred Milner and Lord Kitchener are very small. The way in which the Government are now acting deserves the support of Members on both sides of the House.
  MR. BEYCE: I entirely agree with my hon. friend who has just sat down in the view that this debate affords a proper opportunity for reviewing the general position in which we now stand, and I agree also with the desire that we should endeavour to recall to the House the brighter aspects of the question, and to induce it to look at the matter with that dispassionate temper which is so eminently absent from some quarters, especially in South Africa, and which is so extremely necessary at the present moment. We are all agreed that the Government took an onward step when

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  they allowed the peace negotiations to be entered into' and I think it is important to observe that not only Lord Kitchener but Sir Alfred Milner was persuaded that General Botha meant business. They thought General Botha was sincere in his wish for peace, and if you read Sir Alfred Milner's telegram you will see that Lord Kitchener was anxious to put the terms in the best way. He also thought there was a reasonable chance of peace being arranged. He thought the thing was within our grasp. Sir Alfred Milner was hopeful and Lord Kitchener was hopeful, and therefore, I trust the House will bear that in mind, because it is our justification in asking the House to look carefully at the difference between the terms Lord Kitchener stated in his interview and the terms which ultimately went to General Botha. There may have been many causes and forces at work which we do not know, which are not disclosed in these Papers, and which made the negotiations to be broken off; but we have to go on the basis of these Papers. General Botha and Lord Kitchener parted in the belief that peace was probable. A letter was received a few days afterwards in which General Botha says:—"You will not be surprised to hear that my answer is in the negative." What are the reasons for the use of the words
  "You will not be surprised"? One of two things must have happened—either Lord Kitchener heard from General Botha a great deal that we have not heard of, or else General Botha was so much struck by the difference between the terms Lord Kitchener had discussed and the terms received in the letter that he conceived a distrust of us altogether, and believed that the Government at home would not implement what Lord Kitchener had offered.
  I do not think we should look upon this as a question of generosity at all. I wish that the term generosity had been left out of the discussion. We shall never agree as to what is generous to the enemy, but what we may all agree upon is—What is business? I wish to look at the matter entirely from the point of view of what is best for us to offer in order to get peace. I am sure that that is the point of view in which Lord Kitchener approached it. No one accuses Lord Kitchener of being a soft or sentimental
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  man. He thought it was for the interest of this country that the war should come to an end now, and that it should come to an end on the terms he offered, and which I have no doubt he believed would receive the support of the Government.
  I want to trouble the House to go through these ten items. I think the Government were entitled to ask that the oath of allegiance should be taken, that they were entitled to insist upon the provision that all hostilities must cease if the terms took effect, and that they could not be answerable for the precise time when they would bring back the exiles. But there are three points in which there are substantial differences between the terms Lord Kitchener offered and the terms in the final letter. Lord Kitchener and General Botha appear to have come to an agreement upon that subject. The words Lord Kitchener reports are—
  "Amnesty to all at end of war. We spoke of colonials who joined Republics, and lie seemed not adverse to their being disfranchised."
  There is no objection on Botha's part to the disfranchisement of the Cape rebels, and Lord Kitchener does not convey any suggestion whatever of anything except disfranchisement. Therefore General Botha goes back to his own people, having a right to believe, so far as Lord Kitchener's inclinations went, that the Cape rebels would be entitled to go home, subject to the penalty of disfranchisement and nothing more. I cannot agree with the hon. Member for Linlithgow in looking upon that as an unimportant factor. With a military force such as that to which Botha submitted the proposals, there is nothing to which more importance would be attached than the treatment of their brothers in arms. It is a point of honour with a soldier that his fellow-soldiers are well treated. I can therefore conceive nothing more likely to turn back their pacific desires than the fact that instead of the Cape rebels having nothing but disfranchisement to fear they would be subjected to the penalties; of the Cape law of treason when they returned to the colony. [Ministerial cheers.] I am not arguing whether it is right or wrong. Hon. Members do not seem to appreciate the point of the argument at all. The question is what the

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  Boers would think. It was a most natural thing that they should be struck by the contrast between the terms Lord Kitchener appeared to offer and the terms contained in the letter, and it was just a point with regard to which men feeling for their comrades would be inclined to stand out. Of course we shall be told that you would displease the loyalists at the Cape if you did not exact all the penalties for treason. I hope that we shall never in this House consider it any part of our business to satisfy the vindictive feelings of people at the Cape. All legitimate feelings on their part are entitled to consideration, but feelings of revenge are not. Such feelings are illegitimate, and are the very worst counsellors you can have. The so-called loyalists at the Cape—[Cries of "So-called!" "Oh, oh!" and "Withdraw."]
  [The right hon. Gentleman essayed to continue his remarks, but was prevented by renewed cries of "Withdraw."]
  MR. SPEAKER: Order, order! If the right hon. Gentleman had exceeded the limits of Parliamentary debate I should have called him to order.
  MR. BRYCE: I am going to tell hon. Members why I use that expression. There are a great many people at the Cape—Dutchmen very largely as well as Englishmen—who are entirely, thoroughly, and heartily loyal to the British Crown, but who are not the faction that I describe as the "so-called loyalists." That name is given by the persons who telegraph and write home, purporting to represent them, to the extreme faction at the Cape who arrogate to themselves exclusively the name of "loyalists." but who are not
  a bit more loyal than a large number who do not share these vindictive feelings, but have a far better sense of the real gravity of the position and of the remedies which ought to be applied. There is a faction—I hope it is only a small faction—which is not thinking of ending the war or of the welfare of the colonies, but which simply wishes, in the words of the Old Testament. "to see its desire upon its enemies," to see severely vindictive punishment inflicted upon Cape rebels of every kind. I again repeat that we ought not to be guided by those vindictive feelings: they are dangerous
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  to the future of the Cape; they are the worst possible advisers at a crisis of this kind, and I earnestly hope that no appeal to the feelings of that faction will be made to dissuade us from what should appear to be the interests of Cape Colony in the way of terms. If you look at the experience of history you will find that the policy of amnesty has generally been the best policy, that the violent men who have desired to indulge their own feelings of vengeance have been very bad counsellors, and that when they have been overruled peace and loyalty have been more quickly restored. In Canada, after the rebellion of 1840, some of the men who had been rebels were within two years not only loyal subjects, but Ministers of the Crown. Many of us remember the outcry which arose at first in the United States at the end of the Civil War for severe punishment upon the leading rebels. The people of the North had the good sense to resist those vindictive passions. There never was a war after which so few punishments were inflicted, or a case in which the policy of leniency was so conspicuously successful; and if the South is now, and has been for many years, as loyal a member of the American Republic as any part of the North, it is very largely because the passion of vengeance was repressed and a practical amnesty given.
  I come now to the second point upon which there was a difference between Lord Kitchener's proposals and those which were conveyed by letter, namely, the question of aid to the farmers. That change was, as Sir Alfred Milner thought, a very important one, because it was not only a change calculated to arouse the suspicions of the Boers, but one which seemed to imply that help would be given in a very different spirit from that of a free gift. Whatever other question may arise with regard to the settlement of peace, surely the question of a small amount of money ought not to be allowed to destroy the good effect of the offer of terms. This war is costing us from £1,250,000 to £1,500,000 a week, and if we were able to shorten the war by a month it would be good policy to give not one but two millions to help the farmers to resume their position in the land. Even beyond that, when we are endeavouring to govern these countries

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  after peace has been restored it will surely be to your advantage to have a population with some hope, with some measure of prosperity, with something to lose, with what we call a stake in the country, rather than have an impoverished, half-starving, and miserable population, driven by its misery into discontent. Therefore any money which is given so as to be well applied to re-establish the people on the land, and to give them a chance of restoring prosperity to these devastated countries, will be money well invested for the future of the country and for our own security as governing that country.
  Then, lastly, there is the discrepancy between the terms offered at the interview and the terms offered in the letter with regard to the future government of the country. At the interview Lord Kitchener suggested—
  "that when hostilities ceased there should be Crown Colony administration, consisting of nominated executive, with elected Assembly to advise administration, to be followed after a period by representative government. He would have liked representative government at once, but seemed satisfied with above."
  I think it is not going too far to say that that is the most hopeful statement we have had. I should like myself, though we know that Lord Kitchener was forbidden to discuss the question, to know what proposal General Botha made with regard to modified independence. I have often said, and I say still, that it is quite possible it may turn out in the long run that some kind of modified independence, protection, will be a great deal easier for this country to work than a system of Crown Colony government. ["Oh, oh!"]. I may have some opportunity in years to come to ask hon. Members who say, "Oh, oh! "when they see what are the difficulties of other kinds of colonial government, whether they might not have preferred the modified independence. Lord Kitchener's proposal of an elected Assembly was a very important one. An elected Assembly to the Boers would mean what they call a Volksraad, a continuation to some extent of their old free constitution, an opportunity of meeting, of electing people, of expressing their views, and of bringing their collective opinion to bear upon the Executive Government. The hon. Member for
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  South Shields seemed to suppose that an Assembly of that kind would have no value. My hon. friend must have read history to little purpose if he thinks that such an Assembly, which furnishes a most valuable safety-valve for the expression of opinion, may not be a most valuable element in the government of a country. I rejoice to-day that Lord Kitchener should have found General Botha willing to see the value of such an institution, and to express himself satisfied with the proposal. When the final letter came that proposal was entirely changed. Instead of it we have only the suggestion that there should be Crown Colony government, consisting of a certain number of official Members, to whom a nominated unofficial element would be added. Strangely enough, Lord Kitchener does not appear to have adopted the suggestion from home of a nominated Legislative Council. I do not know that that made any difference, because clearly a nominated Legislative Council would be no satisfaction to the Boers, and I do not suppose that it had anything to do with their disappointment with the proposals they received. But I think the contrast between the elected Assembly which Lord Kitchener offered and the purely arbitrary and despotic system which the final letter conveyed must at once have struck the Boers as indicating the difference between the views the military man on the spot entertained and the proposals they had to expect from the Government at home. As we are obliged to seek in these discrepancies an explanation of the change in General Botha's attitude, I think we must attach great weight to the particular variation between these two proposals. Of course there are objections to the immediate granting of self-government. There are objections to every course you can suggest. In the position to which South Africa, has been reduced there is no course for the government of these Colonies to which grievous objection cannot be urged. What you have to do is to select the course open to the fewest objections and promising the fewest evils. I believe that the course of Crown Colony government, likely to be continued for a length of time, is of all the courses which have been suggested the very worst. It is said that what we are asking is the immediate and full

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  granting of representative and responsible government. We have never suggested that. We have admitted that, when the war comes to an end, you must necessarily have an intermediate period of provisional administration, whether military or civil. But there is all the difference between maintaining for a short time a provisional administration, and creating the whole apparatus of Crown Colony government, associated in the minds of the Boers with the days of Sir Owen Lanyon, and with the arbitrary government which prevails in our Crown colonies. "Oh, oh!"] Of course, it is arbitrary government. Perhaps hon. Gentlemen do not know what Crown Colony government is. It can be nothing else but arbitrary government. It cannot be said that the existence of nominated councils prevents the government being arbitrary, because the nominated members are bound to vote as they are directed by the Governor.
  I have only one word more to say about the causes of refusal. Those causes are very obscure. I cannot help thinking that Lord Kitchener might be able if he was asked to throw some light upon that remarkable expression in General Botha's letter—
  "But, after the mutual exchange of views at our interview at Middelburg on 28th February last, it will certainly not surprise your Excellency to know that I do not feel disposed to recommend that the terms of the said letter should have the earnest consideration of my Government."
  It has been said that the fact that the Boers make no counter proposals shows that they are in a perfectly obstinate frame of mind. That may or may not be so, but at any rate it is clear that it would be extremely difficult for the men assembled at Middelburg under General Botha to have formulated any terms, and therefore I do not take so hopeless a view of their refusal to formulate counter proposals as might otherwise have been the case. If there had been a regular Government expressing itself through its Foreign Office you might have expected counter proposals, but where you have this large mixed group of people it is quite clear that it would be difficult or impossible to formulate such counter proposals. Therefore, I do not think we ought to despair of the future acceptance of terms
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  merely because no counter proposals were made on this occasion. As to the causes of refusal, I think possibly Lord Kitchener could throw some light, but I do not think we here can. The Colonial Secretary told us, to my great surprise, on Saturday that, according to Lord Kitchener's private telegram, General Botha objected to Sir Alfred Milner. That was a most extraordinary statement, and it was made, in the first place, without producing the telegram. It gave us a very partial view of General Botha's mind. There may be others to whom General Botha objects just as much, but in this obscurity and complete uncertainty as to the causes which are acting on General Botha's mind I do not feel inclined to discuss his objection to Sir Alfred Milner. I do not think we have any occasion to bring Sir Alfred Milner into this discussion at all, and I should not be led into doing so either by personal statements of the Colonial Secretary or by the indiscreet phrase which is attributed to him in certain quarters. We have to deal with the Government; they are responsible for the conduct of these negotiations and the future of the country under some government or another.
  While I regret the failure of the recent negotiations, I earnestly hope the Government will resume communications when there is a chance of doing so, and whenever a fresh proposal comes from the Boers for negotiation. ["Hear, hear!"] Yes, but not only then, but when this country has gained another clear military advantage I think it will be to our own interests to propose that negotiations should be resumed. ["Oh, oh!"] Hon. Members seem to be under a strange delusion as to what our interests are. This is not a case in which whatever is given to the enemy is taken from ourselves. People seem to argue as if it was our interest to impose and exact a severe charge, as if every concession we made was so much taken from ourselves. ["No."] Well, a great deal of language has been used which seemed to imply that, and to suppose that the more severe the terms, the more they are to our advantage. That is not the case at all. On the contrary, I believe it is to our interest to offer liberal terms and to get rid of this war. Do hon. Members realise what the state of these countries is? Do they realise

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  the total devastation which prevails and which has reduced the two republics and parts of Cape Colony to a wilderness? Do they realise the total destruction of stock and farm buildings, the impoverishment of the people, the stoppage of all cultivation, the very serious risk of famine, and the possibility that before long we should have to feed a large starving population? In this state of things it is to our utmost possible interest that we should abridge the war if we can in any way do so, and do it upon terms which will make the fusion of the races easier. It is said that these are liberal terms to offer to the conquered. Who are the conquered? They are the people we desire to make good British subjects, whom we desire to be loyal, against whom we do not wish to be obliged to keep an enormous garrison at an enormous expense, and to whom even the Government express themselves as desirous of restoring free government at the earliest possible moment. If you want to make them loyal and contented subjects, the more liberal the terms the better it will be and the sooner that consummation will be realised. I therefore repeat once more that it ought to be our object, as it is our interest, to give the widest terms we can, and to settle this unhappy business on the basis, not of surrender, but of terms acceptable to the other side. I believe there are many on the Boer side who are animated by just the same vindictive feelings as those which prevail among a small section in Cape Colony; they do not desire that there should be a settlement, because, they want to be crushed, and they are afraid a section of their own fellow-countrymen will accept terms and endeavour to work them fairly and to become good British subjects. It should be our object to defeat that extreme section, to offer terms which will be acceptable, and bring about a settlement on the basis that a valiant enemy has been respected and an appeal made to the good feelings of these people to work out the terms upon which they have consented to come in and surrender, and to endeavour to let bygones be bygones, and to effect that fusion of the races upon which alone the prosperity and welfare of South Africa depend.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: We have listened to a very interesting debate,
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  interesting not merely because of the light thrown on the subject with which we are principally concerned, but also because of the light indirectly thrown upon the so-called unity of the Liberal party. We have had three speeches from hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House. In the first place, we had a speech from the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Linlithgow, a speech upon the moderation of which I cannot say too much, a speech of which I have certainly no right to complain since, although he indulged in some general criticisms, the
  hon. and learned Gentleman approved, on the whole, of the Government policy. His idea seemed to be that we had done well, and he encouraged us to continue in our well-doing. It is true that the hon. and learned Member did discover out of the ten points discussed by Lord Kitchener and General Botha three upon which we had not been so liberal as he thought we might have been, and upon that difference he ranged himself on the side of the local administrators. Then he was followed by the hon. and learned Member for South Shields, and if I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Linlithgow for his recognition of the services of the Government, their moderation and magnanimity, still more am I gratified, and I may say flattered, by the compliments of the hon. and learned Member for South Shields. He could find nothing to criticise in the ten proposals, and found that in the differences between ourselves and Lord Kitchener we were strongly justified in the attitude we adopted. But then came the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Aberdeen. [Cries of "No, Durham."] No; I am referring to the agreement to be found in speeches coming from the other side. I have nothing to say at present of the speech of my hon. friend the Member for Durham.
  The third speech from the other side came from the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, and he approached the question from a totally different point of view from that of the two hon. Gentlemen on his own side in his united party who preceded him. The right hon. Gentleman is still in favour of what he has called a modified independence, though I have never known

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  exactly what he meant, but I suppose he means that debased form of independence to which the hon. and learned Member for Linlithgow referred as a stone for the Boers to break their own heads with. Then the right hon. Gentleman went on to say that Crown Colony government is the worst of all possible solutions. I do not know whether he attaches importance to the word "solution." If the hon. Gentleman means that Crown Colony government is not a permanent solution, it is only what we have said scores of times. I understand him to say that it is the worst possible device
  that could be adopted at the present time. If he takes that view, his two hon. friends take an exactly contrary view, because they support the proposals of the Government, which constitute one form of Crown Colony government. Then the right hon. Gentleman is of opinion that the negotiations which have been twice initiated, and have twice failed, should be resumed by the Government at the first possible opportunity. But that is not our intention. I only notice for the moment those differences between the hon. Member and his hon. friends, and I shall proceed to deal with the other details afterwards.
  In the first place let me say something about the form in which these Papers have been produced. The right hon. Gentleman said that on Saturday last I made a surprising statement, and the hon. Gentleman behind him said we were introducing a precedent, to which he took exception, of allowing the expression of the views of our agents abroad to be introduced into parliamentary controversy. That rests upon two facts—in the first instance upon an answer I gave to a question on Saturday, and in the second place upon the terms of the despatches which are printed in the Paper presented. Now, take the last first. Does any hon. Gentleman on the other side suggest that we should have left out everything which expressed an opinion on the part either of Lord Kitchener or Sir Alfred Milner? If so there would be nothing to produce but the fact that Mrs. Botha had, at her husband's request, gone to see him, that Lord Kitchener allowed her to go, and the next thing would have been the letter that Lord Kitchener was instructed
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  to present to General Botha and the General's reply. Lord Kitchener's account of the interview with General Botha could not have been produced at all if we kept out all opinions on the part of Lord Kitchener. I do not agree with that doctrine at all. I do not think anyone would honestly believe that I am the man to shrink from any responsibility properly my due, and I make myself answerable for everything that is under my control, and for everyone as long as they remain in office. But, although that is the case, I had no idea whatever of throwing upon them responsibility even for their own actions when I have subsequently approved of them. I think the House and the country have a perfect light, when we are dealing with such authorities as Lord Kitchener and Sir Alfred Milner, to know anything that can be produced, without injury to the public interest,
  about their opinions. That is my answer.
  With regard to the Papers as they stand, I say we have not produced this information in order to shift our responsibility in the slightest, but we have produced it in order to give the fullest information in our power to the House. Suppose we had kept this information back. Suppose we had taken this belated advice and left this information out. What would have been the language of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite? We should have been accused of attempting to mislead the people and keep them in the dark. When the other day I simply refused to present a Report which I had not seen myself, and in regard to which further inquiries were being made from Sir Alfred Milner, because its production would have been contrary to the public interest and would have damaged the policy it recommended, for three hours or more we were kept debating the scandalous conduct of the Colonial Secretary, who was accused of having some ulterior, wicked, and un-avowable motive for keeping back that Report. So much for the form of Papers.
  Now I come to the statement I made on Saturday in answer to a question. I was asked by the hon. Member for Rushcliffe whether the Government had any other information besides what was contained in the Papers as to the attitude of General Botha. I was obliged to answer

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  in the affirmative and say, "Yes." Suppose I had had other information bearing on the attitude of General Botha and had refused to produce it, a week's discussion would not have been enough to exhaust the indignation of gentlemen opposite. Of course they would have suspected that the particular thing I kept back I kept back because it would have been dangerous to myself or the interests of the Government to produce it. The answer to the hon. Member for Rushcliffe was that General Botha had taken strong objection to Sir Alfred Milner's appointment as Governor of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. I do not suppose he has any personal objection to Sir Alfred Milner. He also objects to him in the capacity to which he has been appointed.
  MR. ASQUITH: When was the objection taken?
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: At the interview which we published telegrams from Lord Kitchener describing. But I was obliged to confess, in answer to the hon. Member for Rushcliffe, that there was a private telegram which accompanied it, in which this additional information was given. I attach no importance to the statement at all, because I have no reason to believe that Sir Alfred Milner's appointment had any effect on the mind of General Botha in regard to these terms. For my own part I do not think he would allow a personal question of that kind to interfere with his acceptance of the terms.
  Let me deal with the differences which it is said exist between the terms which Lord Kitchener appears to have discussed and the terms originally offered to the Boers. The right hon. Member for South Aberdeen, at the beginning of his speech, said this was a matter of business, and what he wanted the House to consider was how to get peace. I do not want to press this too far. But that is not the business of the House, and it is not the business upon which we are engaged. The business of the House is to get a peace which will be both honourable and lasting. This distinction is important. If you attach supreme importance
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  to peace by itself, of course you may be prepared to make concessions which would be quite wrong if you want the peace to be lasting and honourable. The right hon. Member for South Aberdeen referred to what he called the refusal to grant amnesty to rebels. What is the position? In the first place, who are these rebels? Who are these gentlemen for whom the right hon. Gentleman is willing to make such exceptional terms? They are, in the first place, those who had absolutely no grievance themselves—who have never pretended that they had any. They were subjects of Queen Victoria in a colony in which they and their compatriots ruled the roost, and had political predominance on the condition of extending equal civil rights to their British and other fellow-subjects. They had absolutely nothing to complain of themselves. It is said that they had a natural sentiment in favour of men of their own blood across the border. That may be, but that does not justify them in going into rebellion. If you like to find a sort of moral excuse for their action, that is all right, and well and good; but you cannot find a legal or a just and proper answer to the position of those who say that men who commit that offence must be punished in the interests of the rest of the community. You cannot afford to say once more that it pays better to be a rebel than a loyalist. The conduct of rebels in Cape Colony was, as a rule, worse than the conduct of the Boers; their treatment of their neighbours, their property, and persons was worse, speaking generally, than the treatment of the same people and things by the Boers themselves. And yet, Sir, according to the right hon. Gentleman, we ought to send them back, we ought to force them upon the colonies—because it is the colonies who have to deal with this matter—we ought to use our influence to impress upon the colonies the desirability and importance of sending these men back to the very places where there still remain the farms which they have burnt, the property which they have destroyed, and the people whom they have injured—we are to send them back there, without even putting them on their trial.
  MR. BRYCE: Perhaps I may be permitted to observe that all I said was that I was content with what was suggested by Lord Kitchener. Those were Lord Kitchener's terms.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: I cannot tell what Lord Kitchener had in his mind when he spoke of this
  "amnesty" in discussing the matter with General Botha. But Sir Alfred Milner, who knows a great deal more about the local political conditions, necessarily, by virtue of his position and his long residence in the country, was from the first opposed to it, and we were opposed to it. I cannot conceive anything more mischievous than this proposal, by whomsoever it was made—by Lord Kitchener, by Sir Alfred Milner, or by the right hon. Gentleman opposite—I say I cannot conceive anything more mischievous, more likely to lead to trouble in the future, than to lay down here, or in South Africa, that rebellion of the particular kind which we have under our consideration should go absolutely unscathed. The right hon. Gentleman said again and again, "Lord Kitchener's terms," "the terms that Lord Kitchener recommended." Where does he get that? He does not get it from these Papers. It is not in these Papers. It is not true to say, as the right hon. Gentleman has mistakenly said, that Lord Kitchener recommended an amnesty. He did not do anything of the kind. What he says in this Paper is this. General Botha asked him about an amnesty to all at the end of the war—
  "We spoke of colonials who joined the Republics, and he seemed not adverse to their being disfranchised."
  MR. SYDNEY BUXTON: That is in his letter.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes. In accordance with that conversation which he had with General Botha he, in a private letter which he sent us, says:—
  "His Majesty's Government is prepared at once to grant an amnesty in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony for all bona fide acts of war committed during the recent hostilities; as well as to move the Governments of Cape Colony and Natal to take similar action, but qualified by the disfranchisement of any British subjects implicated in the recent war."
  I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman will perceive the distinction,
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  but that is not a recommendation—it is a suggestion, if you like, but it is not a recommendation. [Opposition laughter] It is a suggestion, but it is not a recommendation; and if hon. Gentlemen cannot see the difference between these two words I must recommend them to look at one of the dictionaries which I have seen advertised. But if the right hon. Gentleman will look at the account of the interview he will find what Lord Kitchener was doing. He was not, of course, prepared beforehand, but what he was doing in that conversation was stating on his own personal authority what he fancied the Government at home were willing to do. It was not what he recommended; it was what he understood. For instance, take the first one. He says—
  "The nature of future government of the colonies asked about. He wanted more details than were given by Colonial Secretary, and I said that, subject to correction from home, I understood that when hostilities ceased military guard would be replaced by Crown Colony administration;"
  and so on. And, therefore, I want to point out to hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite that I think they are altogether exaggerating any difference that exists between either Lord Kitchener or Sir Alfred Milner and ourselves. It is one thing for Lord Kitchener to say, "I understood so and so as being your views"; it is another thing to say that he differed from our views when he understood them in their fulness.
  Let us see what these differences are. I have spoken about the question of amnesty to rebels; now I come to aid to farmers. What is the situation there? All that General Botha asked for was "assistance to farmers." All that we did was to define that "assistance." There was nothing to show in the question of General Botha that he meant that assistance to be by gift. But it was quite possible that he did mean that, and it became of importance, therefore, that we—unless we intended it should be by gift—should make it clear that it was to be by loan. In making it clear that it was to be by loan we did not, of course, preclude the possibility of there being certain cases of hardship in which a free gift
  might be made. Those cases would have to be dealt with at the time upon their merits, and no doubt could with perfect safety

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  be left in the hands of Sir Alfred Milner. But we did mean to say, as a principle, that we were not going to aid these men by free g ft. What an extraordinary proposal to make! We are, by actual gifts of money, to put back these men, whom we have been fighting, in their old position so that they should not suffer in any way by the fact that they have declared war upon us and have invaded His Majesty's possessions. I do not call that magnanimity; I call that folly. It is ail non-sense to make a proposal of that kind, and I should like to know how far the right hon. Gentleman proposes to go. I observed, as we have always observed in his speeches on this subject, that it is the Boers and the friends of the Boers in Cape Colony that he cares for. When he has to speak of the men who, to the extent now, I think, of something like 20,000, have risked their lives in His Majesty's service, when he has to speak of the men whose property has been serious y injured and, in some cases, destroyed, when he has to speak of the men who during the invasion of the Boers suffered every kind of insult and injury—then he calls them "these vindictive people, these so-called loyalists."
  MR. BRYCE: After I had expressly explained that I applied that term to a small faction of extremists, and said that I believed the large majority of the British and an enormous number of the Dutch were perfectly loyal, I did not expect that the right hon. Gentleman would again try to misrepresent me.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: I leave that to the House, who heard the right hon. Gentleman; and I say again that in no speech that the right hon. Gentleman has ever delivered upon this subject, in this House or out of it, has he ever done anything like justice, has he ever behaved fairly, towards the "so-called oyalists." Now, Sir, in dealing with this question of aid to farmers, he spoke is if only the Boers who have been in arms against us had been injured in this war. What of the loyalists.
  MR. BRYCE: Certainly.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: What of the loyalists whose farms have been
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  destroyed by the Boers? I am almost in doubt whether there are not quite as many farms that have been burnt by the Boers or more than there have been burnt by our troops. And what of the loyal British and the loyal Dutch who have been commandeered by the Boers, who have suffered in property or person? I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say that to them also he would make this gift.
  MR. BRYCE: The right hon. Gentleman does not seem to understand that I was discussing the terms of peace. The question as to what is to be done for the loyal Dutch does not arise on the terms of peace. Of course, I am entirely in favour of doing all we can for them; and my argument comes to that.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: The right hon. Gentleman says the case of the loyalists does not arise on the terms of peace. I say it does. That is where we differ. If he would think of the loyalists when he is talking of peace we should not be found so far apart. I say that that is the whole cause of the difference between us.
  MR. BRYCE: The right hon. Gentleman does not seem to understand that the whole of my argument was directed to criticising the difference between Lord Kitchener's proposals at the interview and the letter that was sent to General Botha. It is
  apropos of that that all these questions arose.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: I quite understand that; and the right hon. Gentleman would perhaps do better if he were to wait until I have concluded my argument. The difference was between "loan" and "gift." In objecting to "gift," I say you have not only to deal with the Boers whose property has been destroyed in the course of military operations by our soldiers or in other ways, but you have got to deal with loyalists whose property has been destroyed, and the right hon. Gentleman agrees to that. As I have pointed out—and I am perfectly justified in doing so—he never mentioned them in his speech. Now I go a step further. You have agreed to compensation by the Government

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  to the loyalists who have suffered in regard to the burning of farms. What about the mines? Are you going to compensate the capitalists?
  [Opposition cries of "No."
  MR. DILLON: They made the war.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: No. I think the hon. Member opposite has always said that I made the war.
  MR. DILLON: So I did, when the right hon. Gentleman agreed to obey Mr. Rhodes and the capitalists.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: That is an observation which is clearly impertinent, and which is absolutely without the shadow of a shade of foundation. Now, the House will see, and perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will see, what is the difference between a loan and a gift. The mines do not come to us for a loan; they are not likely to require that sort of assistance. But if once you lay it down as a principle that all the injury done by a war to your enemies is to be compensated by gift after the war, you cannot refuse to compensate by gift your friends, and I should like to see the bill that the House would have to pay in that case. Now I hope the right hon. Gentleman understands my argument. I say, then, that we believe, after carefully thinking over the matter, that, while, of course, there is perfect room left to deal with exceptional cases that may arise, it would be most dangerous to lay down as a principle that in every case gift, and not loan, should be the method by which the farmers should be assisted. I have a grievance, not against the right hon. Gentleman, but against those who take quite a different view, and who think that in the offer to put aside £1,000,000 in order to pay the debts incurred by the Transvaal Government we went a great deal too far. I admit that we went to the very extreme; but we have, I think, a justification for what we are doing. Not that there is any obligation upon us to compensate those who forced this war on us. Certainly we have no obligation whatever to them. What we do, if we do it at all, may be an act of grace to them, but ought to be an act of policy for us. It is solely as an act of policy that I recommend
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  that even by loan these men should be assisted. What I have felt for months past has been that when the hostilities came to an end our first object should be to restore the industries of the country—the great mining industry, of course, as it is from that industry that the greater part of the wealth of the country will always have to be derived, but the agricultural industry also, which must be developed by those who are in possession of the land—that is to say, by the Boer farmers who have been fighting against us. If they were to go back absolutely impecunious and unable to rebuild their homes and restock their farms, it might be years before the farming industry was restored; and I think it was in the interest of the Transvaal to make it part of our future policy that some assistance should be given to prevent such a contingency. I may say that long before this meeting with General Botha I had been in communication with Sir Alfred Milner on the subject. We entirely agreed on the matter, and that provision should be made, whenever the war is at an end, to deal with cases that may arise and to give such assistance as may be found desirable or necessary. The offer, which has not been contested at all to-night, actually to give £1,000,000 in order to pay the debts of the Transvaal is an offer which I feel to be an extremely dangerous one, or, at all events, one which requires to be carefully guarded. It is true that General Botha himself proposed that, in any case, such a grant should be limited to £1,000,000; but we have to take care, if we are to put money aside in that way, that it goes into the right pockets. We know that, in any country where it is stated publicly that there is £1,000,000 to be distributed, the claims have to be most carefully examined, and we should be perfectly justified in giving preference to the claims of loyalists. [Cries of "Oh!" from the Irish Benches.] Does somebody say "No"? I repeat that we should be justified in giving preference to the claims of loyalists. We should also have to take care that the debts are bona fide, and that we are not being asked to pay for goods which were not forcibly taken from their possessor, but willingly handed over as his contribution towards the progress of the war. Without being vindictive, it can hardly

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  be expected that we should actually reward our enemies.
  The only other point to which exception has been taken in the terms is as to the future government of the Transvaal. There has never been any change in our policy in regard to that matter. What we offered, and stated from the first that we offered and what we state now, and we are not to be moved one jot from our conclusion in that matter—what we propose is a gradual progress towards self-government. We propose that as soon as possible the military administration shall be done away with. We propose that there be substituted for that administration an Executive Council, together with a nominated, or partly nominated, Legislative Council. That is the second step in the progress. Probably the next step would be to give an elective element in the Legislative Assembly, and the last step would be absolute self-government. In the first place, what is the alternative? Lord Kitchener in his letter proposed that the Executive Council should be "with or without an elective Assembly." I am sure the House will be unanimous that we could not have done a worse thing than to accept those terms, because what does "with or without" mean? If they mean "with" we ought to say so, and if they mean "without," we certainly would be accused of breach of faith afterwards for not giving some representative element; and, as we never intended to give this representative element at the very beginning, we were quite right to point this out and make it perfectly clear that in our view it would not be an elective Assembly. Mow any man who knows anything of the situation can make such a preposterous proposal as that, and that we should commence with an elective Assembly, I cannot for the life of me understand. What are the facts? Before you can elect an Assembly you have to decide what the franchise is to be, who the electors are to be, what the electoral districts are to be, what the members returned for these are to be, and a whole heap of questions, all of which are of the greatest importance,
  and which it would necessarily take some time to consider and decide. But that is not all. The proposal of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Aberdeen
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  actually is that we should elect this Assembly at a time when all the British element has been expelled and will be absent from their homes; and he recommends it to our acceptance because he says it would give them an elective Assembly something in the nature of the old Volksraad. Well, Sir, we have had some experience of the old Volksraad, in which the British were not represented. The idea that after all this war, after all this loss of life and treasure, we should begin with installing the old Volksraad without practically any British representation in it, seems to me one beyond which the force of unreason could not possibly further go.
  MR. BRYCE: I only want to know whether the right hon. Gentleman intended to represent me as having said that; I said nothing of the kind. I said that, presumably, if there were an Assembly, it would be an Assembly in which everyone would have a vote.?
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: The right hon. Gentleman seems to have a singular incapacity for understanding what has been said. I have already pointed out to him that one section of the population would not be there. What is the good of everybody having a vote when half the population is away?
  MR. BRYCE: They will come back.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: Oh, yes; but we are to do it before they come back.
  MR. BRYCE: I néver said anything of the kind.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: I am sorry to differ from the right hon. Gentleman, but if he will say now that when he says "immediately" he does not mean "immediately." and if he will go further and say what time he thinks it would be right to give before the Crown Colony government is abolished in favour of one in which there is to be an elective Assembly, then we can understand what it is we are arguing. He did use the words, "an elective Assembly," to be like the old Volksraad, and he did say that to set up a Crown Colony government would be the worst possible solution Therefore he

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  could only have meant that immediately after military administration we were to set up an elective Assembly. I cannot twist his language into any other meaning. To any proposal of that kind I take the most absolute exception. As to the terms of difference between us, let us see what Sir Alfred Milner says. Sir Alfred Milner says that the suggestions we have made are many of them improvements. He still would prefer the omission of the words "by loan." but the context shows that he is evidently of opinion that by inserting the words we may not absolutely preclude the possibility of a gift, which, as I have said, was not our intention. I do not believe that when Sir A. Milner knows what we propose he will differ from us on that point. As regards Lord Kitchener, I do not think it would be proper for us to ask him for his opinion on these proposals of His Majesty's Government; but I would point out that in the interview with Botha, what Lord Kitchener said, with every qualification as to its being only a personal impression, was what he believed to be the opinion of His Majesty's Government. It does not follow that when he knew what the opinion of His Majesty's Government was he would not be equally agreeable to those terms. I think there is only one other matter to which I need call attention, and that is a remark which fell from my hon. friend the Member for Durham. Practically, with the whole of his speech I absolutely agree. It was a very moderate statement of the case. We ourselves have disclaimed over and over again anything in the nature of a vindictive feeling with regard to our foes. That does not enter into our policy, and never has done. We want to make it absolutely certain that the issue for which
  the war was undertaken shall be favourable to us; we want to make it absolutely certain that there shall be no recurrence of the war; but when we have taken the steps that we think necessary for that purpose, there certainly will remain no feeling whatever of a desire to punish or to be revenged upon those against whom we have been in arms.
  MR. ELLIOT: I hope it will be understood that I have brought no charge against the Government. My point was
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  that pressure might at some time be exercised by persons with more vindictive feelings than the right hon. Gentleman.
  MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN: So long as the present Government are in office I do not think it matters much what these imaginary or unknown vindictive persons may say or do. All I can say is that I do not know them. They do not appeal to me. Although I entirely agree with my hon. friend that he made no charge against the Government, unless he has some cause for uneasiness, or cause to believe that we shall be vindictive, unreasonable, and arbitrary, I do not understand why he gets up so often to impress those virtues upon us. A point in his speech to which I do take serious objection was that with regard to Sir Alfred Milner. He said his personal friendship for Sir Alfred Milner, which I know exists, would prevent him from under estimating the full importance of his services, or the great qualities of his character. But, in spite of Sir Alfred Milner's virtues, ability, and experience, my hon. friend went on to suggest that when the burden of the day is passed, a burden which has been entirely on Sir Alfred Milner's shoulders, then the credit of the settlement should devolve upon somebody else. This tribute to his friend, I must say, lacks something in the shape of generosity. I think I have dealt with all the points raised. I will only say in conclusion that I agree entirely with those who seek to impress upon us again and again the fact that after this war is over the two races must live together. That is a matter which is continuously present to us. But, as I have said before, the most important element in securing that good feeling between the two races is that we should be animated by mutual respect, and if we take any steps which would lead the Boers to suspect our firmness, resolution, and courage, and to believe that they are less than their own, the two races will never settle down in harmony, and I am convinced that the Boers would again attempt the policy which, I am happy to say, has failed on the present occasion.
  MR. HALDANE: The right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary has been revelling to-night

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  in his favourite element. There are many topics in regard to social legislation on which he might have dilated, but all these yielded when he had the chance of discoursing on the divisions in the Liberal party. That topic owes a great deal to the right hon. Gentleman. If there is, as I believe there is, a division on this subject of the present situation in South Africa, the person who has most advertised it and brought it before the mind of the country is the right hon. Gentleman. To-night the right hon. Gentleman had his opportunity, and he has reviewed the speeches which have been made in the course of the present discussion; but so keen was he to dwell on the differences amongst Liberals that he forgot altogether the differences on the Unionist side of the House. The right hon. Gentleman omitted to the last, and then only briefly, to take notice of the admirable speech made by the hon. Member for the city of Durham. That hon. Gentleman, in a tone which was full of a desire to be fair, made a proposition which many of us think to be well deserving of consideration. The hon. Gentleman then passed to another topic, and spoke of the answer which had been given by the right hon. the Secretary for the Colonies on Saturday morning to the question put by the hon. Member for Rushcliffe. In that answer the right hon. Gentleman invited the House to believe that they were in possession of all the facts of the case, and that he had no information as to what Lord Kitchener had said to General Botha. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to think that what we were reproaching him with was for not having suppressed the facts within his knowledge. Is it necessary for anyone on this side of the House to say that our purpose was not to convey anything of the kind? But we have a good cause for complaint that on Saturday morning we learned for the first time that it was the personality of Sir A. Milner which had led to the failure of the negotiations. For my part, I do not believe that the right hon. Gentleman should have given that answer without publishing the words of the telegram which contained such a grave suggestion, and which has caused so much confusion.
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  On the question of amnesty I think the right hon. Gentleman was well founded in his proposition that there were no serious differences between Lord Kitchener and General Botha. In the account of the interview between Lord Kitchener and General Botha, Sir A. Milner agreed with what Lord Kitchener had proposed, with the exception that, instead of the words "as well as to move the Governments of Cape Colony," etc., there should be read, "British subjects of Cape Colony or Natal, though they will not be compelled to return to those colonies, will if they do so be liable to be dealt with under the laws of those colonies specifically passed to meet the circumstances arising out of the present war, and which greatly mitigate the ordinary penalties of rebellion." I do not think that Sir A. Milner meant anything very different from what the right hon. Gentlemen meant. But the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary would have been well advised if he had acceded to the strong view expressed by Sir A. Milner in his despatch of 9th March, that the advances to the Boers should not be confined, in all cases, to advances by way of loan. I feel that there are strong grounds for what was urged by the hon. Member for Durham on this matter. I believe that the cheapest thing we can do will, in the end, be the most generous. I cannot believe that we can differentiate between the loyalists and those who have risen in rebellion. I do not believe that the advances should be in all cases by way of gift, but we should not be tied down in a hard and fast fashion to make the advances by way of loan.
  My right hon. friend the Member for South Aberdeen said there had been a good deal of indiscreet praise of Sir A. Milner. I think there has been a good deal of indiscreet blame of Sir A. Milner. I believe that, whether rightly or wrongly, Sir A. Milner is actuated by the highest motives, and is the very last person to allow himself to be made the tool of any faction at the Cape, or to support any ascendency of Briton over Boer, any more than Boer over Briton. We have got to realise and bear in mind the peculiar difficulties of the position. I believe that not only in

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  Cape Colony and Natal, but in the two late Republics, the majority of the white inhabitants are not of British blood. If that be so, we have got to consider the point of view of the Afrikanders, and how we can conciliate the Boers as well as the people of British blood who take up a strong attitude on this matter. The business of His Majesty's Government is to hold the balance evenly between the two contending factions in South Africa, and to make it perfectly clear that there is to be no racial ascendency of Boer over Briton or Briton over Boer. The scale should be held at a perfect level, and it would be a mistake for the Government to lend themselves to any treatment which would differentiate the case of the loyalists from the case of the colonists who have thrown in their lot with the Boers. Therefore, on the question of amnesty, and on other matters, I feel myself in agreement with the course taken by Lord Kitchener and Sir A. Milner rather than with that adopted by His Majesty's Government.
  I wish to say a word upon the question of what is called Crown Colony administration. I think that is a most unfortunate term to have introduced into the matter, for it covers two or three sorts of administration. Crown Colony administration has peculiar associations in South Africa. It is identified with the rule of Sir Owen Lanyon, which was a great failure. It is also associated with the government of some of the small islands tinder British dominion, where it means the management of things from Downing Street. From the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary and the despatches I understand that the Crown Colony administration proposed to be set up in South Africa is something of a very different character from government from Downing Street. What the Government proposes, as I understand it, is to govern these colonies from South Africa, the Government here, being responsible, but delegating authority to somebody on the spot, who should form his own judgment, and base and frame the policy of the Government upon the knowledge he has acquired on the spot, telling them what course they ought to adopt. That is a very different thing
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  from Crown Colony government in the ordinary sense, and if it is put into the hands of a fit and proper man I can conceive nothing better as forming the initiatory stage from which by subsequent stages we may proceed to popular representative government. In this connection the extensive experience and knowledge of Sir A. Milner cannot fail to count for much, and I should regret very much if we were deprived of the services of the one man strong enough to hold down the British faction as he has held down the Dutch; who would keep them in their places and allow neither to get the upper hand. The House should give the Government every chance, believing that the Government knew better than they the circumstances and facts which ought to determine what the transition stages between this so-called Crown Colony government and popular representation should be. I do not believe that Botha rejected these terms on any small matter or any difference between the despatches sent from here and the proposals made by Lord Kitchener. I do not believe he declined to entertain peace on a question connected with the personality of Sir A. Milner. Botha is a man who has fought a brave fight, and a man for whom I have a profound respect. He is placed in a difficult position, and I believe it will be discovered when all the facts are known that he could not control those with whom he was associated.
  MR. LABOUCHERE: The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies made his speech an attack upon my right hon. friend the Member for South Aberdeen. I can assure the Secretary for the Colonies that my admiration for the Member f r South Aberdeen—and I think it is the feeling of many Members in this House—rises each time the right hon. Gentleman seizes upon his opportunity to attack him and sneer at him. The Secretary for the Colonies described his own speech pretty clearly when he said, speaking of the speech of the Member for South Aberdeen, "I cannot twist his language into any other meaning." The fact is, he spent half an hour trying to evolve meanings

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  which did not exist in my right hon. friend's speech.
  Attention called to the fact that forty Members were not present; House counted, and forty Members being found present—
  MR. LABOUCHERE: The right, hon. Gentleman then fell back on his old device. He deplored the differences on this side of the House. I trust there always will be differences on the Liberal side of the House. They are an independent party acting together for specific objects, but they preserve their independence on various matters. If I recollect rightly the right hon. Gentleman himself was accustomed to act in a very independent manner. I remember something about the "Unauthorised Programme," and he would have found then that a great many persons did not agree with him. We have had as yet three gentlemen on this side of the House addressing it. These three gentlemen are, I take it, "Liberal Imperialists." We are not all Liberal Imperialists on this side; in fact, the Liberal Imperialists are very few in number, and we who are not Liberal Imperialists represent the majority of the Liberal party. I may say that those gentlemen are always looking over the hedge and supporting the Conservative party. These three gentlemen are all members of the legal profession, and they tried the matter in a nisi prius sort of way. They took small, nagging objections, and as I was listening to them I could not help thinking of what Burke once said—that a lawyer knows as little about great political subjects as a mouse understands about the parturition of an elephant.
  I think it was the hon. Member for Linlithgow who went out of his way to say that the terms which were being offered to the Boers wore the most lenient and the most generous a victor has ever offered to his foe, and he challenged us to show the contrary. You cannot prove a negative. I would challenge the hon. Member, or any hon. Member of his way of thinking, perhaps, on the other side of the House, to tell me a case in which terms less lenient
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  were ever offered by a victor to the conquered. We burn their farms, depopulate the country, and deport a large number of them, and we then tell them that we are exceedingly lenient if we give them a small trifle as a loan, in order to help them to take back a few farms and build a few houses where their former homes were. We tell them that we are going to deprive them of their independence and their flag. If the French were to vanquish us, and if we were to be told, after being harried and having our houses all burned down, that we were to receive a little sum of money out of the French Treasury, and that we must thank God that we were going to have occasion to cease to be Englishmen to become Frenchmen, we would not consider the terms liberal. The terms we offer to the Boers are not liberal, and they are not lenient. I am one of those who have never concealed their opinions in regard to this war. I have always regarded it as a crime But we have to look at the facts as they are. The milk has been spilt, and the question for us is really what we should now best do in the interest of the Empire, and particularly of South Africa. Shall we continue this war? We know the death list published every week. We know what we are doing in South Africa, the misery and desolation we are producing there, and we know that it costs a somewhat large sum, £1,500,000 per week, or rather more, perhaps, to carry out this policy. For my part, I am not in favour of that. I do not regard that as a policy. I am not one of those who blame the Boers for resisting. I regard the Boers as brave men, and I would honour any man who resists no matter what force, when it is a question of the independence of his native land. I may regret that they do resist and do not submit to the inevitable. To say that we should regard them as base men whom we ought to despise because they are doing what we should do ourselves under similar circumstances is a preposterous doctrine.
  Up to just recently the only "terms" we had offered to the Boers were to surrender at discretion. If they gave up their arms and put them selves entirely into our hands we were ready to receive them.

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  That was altered on the occasion of the recent negotiations. I respect Lord Kitchener for having taken the line he did in those negotiations. Lord Kitchener is a soldier, and I believe a somewhat rough soldier. He does not hesitate in doing his utmost in order to achieve victory. But I do think that of all the three gentlemen who seem to have the destinies of South Africa in their hands—the Secretary for the Colonies. Sir Alfred Milner, and Lord Kitchener—Lord Kitchener has shown himself far more of a statesman than either of the other two. If anybody looks into the Blue-book given to us he will see that Lord Kitchener himself invited General Botha to meet him. He sent the request through Mrs. Botha. What does the right hon. Gentleman say in answer to Lord Kitchener's letter that this had taken place? He says. "I am glad to hear that General Botha desires to treat." It was Lord Kitchener who desired to treat, and General Botha was willing to hear the terms we were willing to submit to him, and if he thought them desirable terms, then to accept them. General Botha seemed to me to be anxious to bring about peace, and so far as minor details, if I may so call them, are concerned, I do not think there would have been any insuperable difficulty if the matter had been left to General Botha and Lord Kitchener. But at once Sir Alfred Milner interfered. Sir Alfred Milner would not go so far as Lord Kitchener in the matter of the amnesty. I was rather amused when the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies was speaking at the absolute mess he got into in regard to the recommendation of Lord Kitchener. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to imply that Lord Kitchener did not advise an amnesty, but it was shown to him that Lord Kitchener, in the letter he proposed to write to General Botha, had literally stated that one of the proposals that he, subject to the approval of this Government, would submit to General Botha was that there should be a full amnesty not only to the Transvaalers and the Orange Free Staters but also to the rebels from Cape Colony. All the limitation he made was that he was ready to accept their disfranchisement, and certainly that was not a matter of
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  serious importance. It was a matter that concerned the Cape Government itself. What did the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies say? He said it was a suggestion and not a recommendation. I really do not know what he meant. I hardly like to make a suggestion or recommendation to a gentleman who is so very able a debater as the Secretary of State for the Colonies, but if I might venture to do so, it is to stick to his own views and arguments which he intends to use, and not be led astray from them by something the Secretary of State for War says to him. He got into a mess through the Secretary for War, who was sitting near him.
  I shall not enter at any length into the question of the difference between "loan" and "gift." I do not think it is a matter of very great importance. But what is important is that Lord Kitchener did propose that there should be a gift. Sir Alfred Milner took his side, and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies interfered and said it must be a loan. Sir Alfred Milner said this would weaken the effect on the Boers, and Lord Kitchener was even stronger in his view than Sir Alfred Milner. Then the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies to-day showed how very right General Botha was to distrust the alteration made by the Secretary for the Colonies when he told us that the gift is to be limited to a certain sum, and that the loyalists would be considered first. If the loyalists are to be considered first, I should like to know what will remain for those in the Transvaal or Orange Free State who have taken the side of their respective countries.
  The real difference, so far as I can see, that separates Sir Alfred Milner or the Secretary of State for the Colonies from General Botha and his friends is the position that these men will occupy after the war. When the Secretary of State for the Colonies gave his consent to the meeting with General Botha he wrote—"I have already made clear the policy we intend to pursue as to government." The right hon. Gentleman did make it perfectly clear. He told us in the House that the Boers would not be allowed one single shred of independence. What did he mean by that? I do not gather that the Boers are claiming to be outside

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  the area of the British Empire. I remember that Sir Wilfrid Laurier lately said Canada was an independent nation, and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies echoed that sentiment. I would like to know what would be said in any one of the self-governing colonies if the Secretary for the Colonies were to declare that they did not possess one shred of independence. They would insist at once that they had independence. The question is not whether the Boers are to enter the area of the Empire, but what is to be the position they will occupy when they enter. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies even disputed the small amount of independence Lord Kitchener was prepared to grant to the Boers. Lord Kitchener says there will be a Crown Colony with an elective Assembly, followed by representative government. The Secretary for the Colonies says there will be a Crown Council, but the members will be nominated; he will then introduce the representative element, not representative government, and ultimately concede the privilege of self-government. We know perfectly well what "ultimately" means. We have heard of it from Lord Salisbury himself. I do not know whether the Secretary for the Colonies reads his speeches. Lord Salisbury said it might be generations before this self-government was granted to them. When talking about "ultimately" we must accept the view that it may be generations before we grant it. What does the right hon. Gentleman mean by the "privilege" of self-government? Self-government is not a privilege. It is a right, and I assert that every man so soon as he becomes a citizen of this Empire has that absolute right. It is not granted as a generous gift. He has a right to it precisely in the same way as we have a right to it in this country. It must be remembered when we talk of these generous terms what we are asking the Boers to do. We are calling on the Boers to surrender their national existence and flag, and yet when they were ready to accept this position and when they asked what their position would be in the Empire, practically the reply was that their position in the Empire, so far as political rights were concerned, would be little better than that of Kaffirs. So far as
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  ultimate self-government was concerned they were to put their faith in the Colonial Secretary. I do not put my faith in the Colonial Secretary, and I do not know why the Boers should do so. If they would take my advice it would be, "Put no faith in the Colonial Secretary." I would say also,
  "Put it all in black and white."
  I regret that these negotiations have ended so unfortunately, but I am in no way surprised that they have done so. We have lost a great opportunity to end the war and settle South Africa in the only way it is possible to settle it. It is very probable, and I think it is certain, considering the disparity of the forces, that peace won with the sword will be of no advantage to us. A dependency will be created in which racial feuds will go on, the minority will be placed over the majority, and the rule of the minority maintained by a huge British garrison. Our aim ought to be to make South Africa a strength, not a weakness, to the Empire; to obtain the assent of the people of South Africa to their country becoming a portion of the Empire; and to make South Africa not a dependency ruled by a garrison, but a Free State like Canada or Australia, which, together with us, should form the British Empire. Hon. Members should look a little at the facts. In South Africa there is a Dutch majority which will be perfectly certain to increase every decade, for the reason that the Dutch people in South Africa are exceedingly prolific. In order to meet that, what does the Colonial Secretary propose to do? He sent out a Commission to discover whether South Africa was a fitting place for English colonists. Probably anybody on this side of the House could have told, him that a more God-forsaken place for English colonists did not exist. He
  even carried his idea so far that we were to endeavour to increase the population by a sort of competition between the Dutch and the mythical colonists and the mythical women in the procreation of their species. It must also be remembered that the Dutch are agriculturists, and agriculturists are always the backbone of a country. What are the English in Cape Colony? They are middlemen and speculators; they are men who go out there not with the intention of remaining,

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  but simply to make if possible a certain amount of money and then come back to England. South Africa never will be a place for English working men, owing to their inability to compete with the abundant mass of cheap labour in that part of the world. The Afrikander in Cape Colony has certain racial sympathies with the Afrikander in the Orange State and the Transvaal. That is not the least surprising. These Afrikanders were formerly loyal to the Crown; they objected to the war, and some even went so far as to join the Boers. We may regret that, but let us reverse the position. Suppose Cape Colony had been in the hands of Holland, that these two small States had been English, and that Holland had attacked them. Do you mean to say that Englishmen living in Cape Colony would not have taken sides with the English? We know perfectly well that they would. When we complain of these men we are acting contrary to every principle we have ever professed. Surely you must make allowances for the Dutchmen who, carried away by their racial sympathies, joined their countrymen in defending themselves against our attacks. They were aggravated into this course before the war. We all remember the famous speech of Sir Alfred Milner in which he attacked them—
  SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: Which speech?
  MR. LABOUCHERE: I beg your pardon, it was not a speech; it was a despatch, in which he spoke of the Uitlanders being "helots," and expressed views as to the Dutch in Cape Colony in a way which was exceedingly uncomplimentary to their loyalty. The Afrikanders really believe that the war is to a certain extent only an excuse to enable the minority to obtain a majority in the Cape Assembly by a jerrymandering of the constitution, and by the disfranchisement of a large number of Afrikanders. During the war they have seen martial law prevailing in their country, administered not by English generals and officers, but in many cases by their political opponents, who never lose an opportunity of taking advantage of them. The Transvaal is an exceedingly poor country with the
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  exception of the gold. The Transvaal farmers live in a poor, rude manner which Englishmen will not accept. There came the rush for gold, and then happened that which happens everywhere. A great cosmopolitan crew of adventurers arrived there. About 1850 I was in California and saw what happened there. You can rule these camps only by a species of lynch law. You have a vigilance committee, and I, the respectable Englishman standing before the House to-day, have sat on a jury and comdemned a man to be hung by lynch law. ["Oh, oh!"] What would those gentlemen who say, "Oh, oh!" have done? The man had shot somebody, he was a ruffian; the vigilance committee was the only authority existing; a jury was called, and I had to act as a juryman. My duty as a juryman was to say whether or not the man was guilty. If he was innocent I should have said he was innocent, but if the case was made out I said "Guilty," and the sentence was undoubtedly unpleasant to the gentleman himself. I only cite that to show the difficulty these farmers must have had to get any sort of law recognised among these cosmopolitan adventurers. I do not particularly admire the Boers; there is a great deal too much of the conservative element in them. They have their virtues, and their faults; but if you judge between the Afrikanders of South Africa and the Englishmen who go there, recognising fully that amongst the English there are many highly respectable men, I think the Boers are the better men. Certainly so far as we are concerned, if we want to maintain our rule in South Africa the Boers are the safest men to be on good terms with. We must also take into account the increase every year in the black races, and also the advance of civilisation. Mr. Merriman, in his petition to be heard at the bar of the House, has pointed out how necessary it is that we should do everything to abate this racial feud between Afrikanders and Englishmen, and that otherwise we should be faced with this great increase of the black races. But the English and Dutch together would probably be able to hold their own against them.
  What are the Boers ready to do? As I read the correspondence they are ready to enter the area of the British Empire, but

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  only upon terms. Surely our problem is to find terms that are honourable to us, and to those brave men themselves, which will produce a state of things that will be of no danger to ourselves, but eventually lead to South Africa becoming one of the great commonwealths connected with the Empire, such as now exist in Canada and Australia. What are the terms I would suggest? First, a full and absolute amnesty. I cannot understand these arguments of vengeance or political supremacy. I am talking not of the question of justice, but of policy and expediency. Any country that has gone through a species of civil war—for that is what it comes to—if it is wise does not treat the conquered as conquered, but endeavours to make no distinction between the one side and the other. In Canada, in 1836, what happened in the Papineau Rebellion was that, although the six men who were already transported were for some reason excepted, the fullest amnesty was given to men who were unquestionably technically, and as matter of fact, rebels. Why we cannot follow in South Africa the policy which has been so successful in Canada I cannot understand. In regard to the Transvaal and the Orange State, I would make them, not in generations, but as soon as possible, self-governing colonies. What objection can you have to the Orange State becoming a self-governing colony? It has been regarded by all Englishmen who have written upon it as a model State, and was said to have the very best Government existing in South Africa. In the Transvaal I admit there is a difficulty. As soon as the Uitlanders came back the Dutch would be outvoted, and probably the Dutch would lose more than they gained. But that fact could be met in a very simple way. For the benefit of the Dutch themselves, and with their consent, separate the mining area, the Rand, from the Transvaal Colony, give the large area remaining, in which they would have a majority, to the Dutch, and you would be able to administer under a military Governor, if you like, the Rand. The absolute necessity of giving some sort of pecuniary aid to the Transvaalers would be easily met by giving them a reasonable rental for the district of which you deprive them. The
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  Colonial Secretary and others have always played upon the word "immediately." "Immediately" means not tomorrow, but as soon as possible. All we contend is that it would be undesirable to establish there a Crown Colony government, because it would mean a question of years before self-government could be instituted. Of course, it requires time. We, and I believe the Boers also, would be perfectly ready to agree that there should be a provisional government, let it be either military or civil. Personally I should prefer Lord Kitchener to Sir Alfred Milner. Let the provisional government be there simply to carry on affairs during the time we are arranging for the colony to be self-governing. As to Sir Alfred Milner, he really seems to me to be regarded as a sort of divine pro-consul, and if anybody ventures to say a word, not against his personal character or his intelligence in many walks of life, but against his being a fit man for South Africa at the present moment, hon. Members immediately say, "Oh, oh!" Sir Alfred Milner began as an Oxford don, and he became a valuable official in the Treasury. Both those circumstances are against him as a practical man in South African politics.
  SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: He is a Liberal.
  MR. LABOTTCHERE: I am not questioning his Liberalism, although I do not see much of it in South Africa. What I do object to is the claim of infallibility. He is the very worst man you could find for putting an end to racial feuds. The hon. Baronet the Member for Berwick at a Liberal Imperialist dinner, speaking of Sir Alfred Milner, said—
  "It is impossible to send any other man in his place who would not have the position made untenable by the British section."
  Those words prove my case. This gentleman is considered by the English section to be such a partisan that they literally would confederate, or
  possibly rebel, in order to make untenable the position of any other man who might replace him. Surely we are not to be tied down in that way. The very fact that he is looked upon as a partisan of the one side is a sufficient reason why, if

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  we want to bring the war to an end, and to get the people to be friendly together, we should substitute for him some other man. There are a dozen men on the other side of the House who would do the thing more efficiently if they were sent than Sir Alfred Milner. ["No."] Hon. Gentlemen are really too modest. ["Name."] I will not name anybody here, as it might be personal to others; but a man like Lord Dufferin in the other House would do more towards bringing peace than any of the military operations of our soldiers. We are told again and again that the Boers must be conquered, because there is something peculiar in the Boer in that he will not accept any argument that is not knocked into his head by physical force. But the very gentlemen who tell us that are those who have been wrong right throughout the entire war. It is perfect non-sense for for us on this point to believe either Ministers or the miserable press that supports them. What are the Boers after all? They are farmers, and a farmer, as a rule, does not look far beyond his own nose or his own fields. The Boers lived far distant from one another, and they hardly recognised the Government at Pretoria. You may say that the Transvaal was a confederation of divers districts paying a certain allegiance to Pretoria, but each separate district was practically independent of the other, and I believe they carried their independence so far as to refuse on several occasions to pay any taxes that went to Pretoria. These simple-minded men met once a week or month in a little town and passed most of their time in singing hymns. These men are as honourable as we are, and, unless they are very different from farmers and agriculturists in every other part of the world, I cannot suppose that they would say: "We are not going to cultivate our fields or look after our own interests; we are going to rebel against the Government." They would be perfectly satisfied if you gave them that local autonomy which really they did possess under the Boer Government itself.
  We are accused of being pro-Boers. I do not know what the term means, but, as far as I can understand, it applies to anyone who does not agree with the policy of the Government
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  in South Africa. Even admitting that the Government have a great deal of political wisdom, they have not a monopoly. We are so foolish as to think that a certain amount of political wisdom exists among the Liberal party. Let us agree that neither party has a monopoly of that element, and that one is not a wretch, a traitor, or a felon because he happens to disagree with the policy of the Government. We have the interests of the Empire as much at heart as hon. Gentlemen opposite, and it certainly required more courage while the war fever was raging for a Member of this House to risk his seat, his popularity, and his position in the country by going against the passion of the hour than to glide with the stream. Hon. Gentlemen opposite should not attack us and imply that we have acted dishonourably, because, believing honestly that this war was a mistake, we boldly stood up before our countrymen and said so. I am not influenced by the Rhodesian press, nor am I influenced at all by mere party considerations. If I were it would be in the interests of the Liberal party that I should allow the Government to continue to cook in their own juice.
  [An HON. MEMBER: "Stew."] Well, either "cook" or "stew," I will give you the choice. I think hon. Gentlemen opposite will admit that the war is not quite so popular now as it was in February last, and it will become more and more unpopular every day, and will end by ruining the Unionist party. It is an old dictum that the party which embarks upon a war in the end suffers by it, and if you go on with this war policy we shall have a majority of 150 at the next election. But I am not influenced by party considerations; I prefer my country to my party, and that is why I give to hon. Gentlemen opposite advice which is clearly not in the interests of the party of which I am a member. I want the war to cease, and I want it to cease in such a way that we shall not have a great disaffected dependency in South Africa. I want us to have a colony which will be a strength,' and not a weakness, to the Empire. This great and noble Empire was not built up in the fashion that hon. Gentlemen are trying to build it up now, and it will not be maintained in the way they are seeking

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  to maintain it. I do urge Ministers to act as statesmen instead of mere partisans. I urge them to emancipate themselves from the thraldom of the very worst elements in any party, of these Cape Town filibusters, of these cosmopolitan millionaires, of this Rhodesian press howling for blood and swaggering and boasting all over the world in a manner which renders them the laughing stock of all Europe.
  Have hon. Gentlemen opposite read yesterday a telegram that was received from the South African correspondent of The Times? I think that was a very remarkable telegram. Explaining the situation, The Times correspondent said that we did not want another 30,000 men, but we wanted 50,000 men, and he seemed to think the war would last two years, and he thought we should make it clear to the Boers that, although it would last two years, we were prepared to go on for ten years. We are spending £1,500,000 per week upon this war, and I will leave it to hon. Members opposite to calculate how much we shall have spent at that rate at the end of ten years. Sir Wilfrid Laurier said this was the most unfortunate war we have ever been engaged in. I do not think anyone can look with approval or admiration at the mode in which we are carrying on this war. This system of depopulating the country, destroying the farms, and reducing the whole place to a desert, is un-English. When we remember that we ourselves hope to conquer these colonies and get them into our hands, it seems to me to be sheer madness to pursue such a policy if by any other means we can come to a practical arrangement with the Boers. I protest against the policy now being carried on, for I believe it is against our own interest, contrary to humanity, contrary to every principle which ought to actuate an enlightened Government, and contrary to that principle of independence of nations that we have hitherto professed.
  MR. SEELY: At this hour of the evening I will not detain the House at any length, more particularly as I understand there is another important subject which the House wishes to discuss before parting with the Appropriation Bill. I should like to say
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  just a word or two upon the question before the House. I should like to add my word to the general approval which I think has come from all sides of the House as to the liberal and generous terms which His Majesty's Government offered to the Boers a fortnight or three weeks ago. I agree with the hon. Member for Haddington when he says that he does not believe that the smal differences between the terms suggested by Lord Kitchener and the letter which was ultimately sent out by the Government had much effect upon the ultimate result and refusal of those terms by the Boers. I cannot help thinking myself that the subject we are to discus in a short period from now may have had more to do with this refusal than any small differences as to the terms of peace. I hope that when the Boers see, as they must see by now, that the troubles in the East which occurred on the 12th and 14th March, before they sent their reply, have now come to an end, they will somewhat regret the attitude they took up in the middle of this month.
  I should like to press upon the Government two points in regard to these terms in case they should come up again. One is the question of the assistance to be given for the rebuilding of farms, as to whether it should be given by loan or in some other way. I quite understand the object of the Colonial Secretary in inserting the words "by loan," and I think all those who listened to his speech must agree that it was necessary to take some precaution of the nature he has pointed out. But I do hope the Government will interpret very liberally indeed those words, and let it be widely known that there are a considerable number of special and exceptional cases where the assistance could take the form of gifts. Undoubtedly many farms have been burned by mistake. I know of one case myself where the farm of a woman who had nursed our wounded was destroyed. [Cheers from the Irish benches.] Hon. Members opposite need not cheer me, for they are more responsible for this war and for the continuance of our troubles in South Africa than anybody else. [Nationalist interruptions.]
  MR. FLAVIN: Lecture your own friends.
  MK. SPEAKER: The hon. Member has not used any unparliamentary expression, and he has a right to say that in his opinion a particular party is responsible for the war. Hon. Members must not interrupt in this way.
  MR. SEELY: I thought that hon. Members opposite seemed to imply by their cheers that I was in sympathy with some of the speeches they had made on this subject. [An IRISH MEMBER: "Keep your sympathy."] I know of a case where a woman who had nursed our wounded, and had nursed them with great kindness and great devotion, and who had won the respect of every member of that company, had her farm afterwards burned, not by those men, but by another company of soldiers who knew nothing about this, and who destroyed the arm through some mistake. If that occurred in one case, similar things may have occurred in many other cases, and there must be many other instances where farms have been burned where, if there had been full time to consider the circumstances, they would have been spared. Therefore, I hope the Colonial Secretary will interpret these exceptions very liberally, and let it be known widely that he is willing to do so.
  There is one other matter, although it is with very great diffidence that one speaks about it, because it is a very difficult question—I refer to the question of amnesty for the colonial rebels. I see the difficulty in giving an amnesty to men who are undoubtedly rebels and who have fought against us with no grievance of their own, but I do think that those Boers who are fighting in the regular forces under such commanders as General Botha should be treated differently, because it is difficult for them to lay down their arms without some very clear understanding as to what they will be liable to. I do hope that when His Majesty's Government reopen negotiations they will consider that point very carefully. I have merely mentioned these two topics, not with the intention of disapproving of what His Majesty's Government have done or of criticising their action, but simply as suggesting two points on which I think it is desirable that they should act with even greater generosity and liberality
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  than they have acted in the terms offered. I hope that the liberality and generosity which they have shown towards the Boers will have its reward in influencing them to soon put an end to this most disastrous, and, to them, this most ruinous war.
  MR. THOMAS O'DONNELL: I approach this question not as an Englishman, whose mind for the time being is filled with thoughts of satisfaction, but with feelings of regret for the blood of my countrymen which has been spilt, and regret for the loss of money and prestige which my country has suffered. The right hon. Gentleman on the Front Opposition Bench who so courageously expressed his honest views upon this question, was taken very severely to task for his words by the Colonial Secretary, who misinterpreted and twisted the meaning of those words. I listened with great interest to the hon. Member for Northampton, who spoke of the courage which it required to come to this House and express honest convictions about the war and afterwards share the fate which those convictions had so often brought. I admire the man who has the courage to speak out plainly and fearlessly at what I consider is a very critical moment in our history. I approach this question with absolutely no bias or partiality. Ireland owes nothing to the Boers. We are not connected with them by ties of kindred or of religion. We are of a different creed, and an entirely different race. We have no memories of past services rendered by them towards our country or its people to urge us on to immoderate zeal or unreasonable demands on their behalf, and therefore are we qualified to speak on the subject now before the House with impartial minds, with minds unclouded by prejudice, by self interest, or by any of the other baser feelings that naturally arise within the breasts of those intimately I concerned or directly engaged in the quarrel.
  We Irishmen rise solely in the interests of justice and fair play. We have watched with horror and indignation the combat—if such it may be styled—which has now dragged on for over seventeen months. We expressed our disapproval of the causes which led to the

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  war at the beginning as unworthy of a great Empire, degrading to a Christian people, characteristic only of the looting ages, which we supposed had passed. From their position in this House Irishmen have time after time criticised severely, but with only too much truth and justice, the inhuman and barbarous manner in which you conducted this war, by which, ten against one, you still resort to the cruellest treatment of women and children—to the burning of homesteads, to exposure, hunger and forced exile to your camps—some of them dens of vice—in order that you might induce these people to piteously appeal to their fellow-countrymen to give up the struggle and volunteer a surrender which your might was unable to enforce. The Boers are of a different race and creed from the Irish, and as the latter owe nothing to them and are outside the quarrel, they are most competent to give an unprejudiced opinion upon it. You have a vast army, backed up by the richest treasury in the world and unlimited supplies, matched against 30,000 untrained farmers. Yet, in spite of such enormous odds on our side, you have to resort to methods which are not honourable, like the burning of farms and the throwing of women out on the veldt to starve and die.
  [A UNIONIST MEMBER: It is a falsehood.]
  MR. BURKEasked whether it was in order for an hon. Member opposite to apply the word "falsehood" to what was said by a Member on the Opposition benches.
  MR. SPEAKER: If any hon. Member used that expression regarding anything said by the hon. Member who is addressing the House, he should withdraw it. [Nationalist cheers and cries of "Brook-field."]
  MR. FLAVIN: I heard the hon. Member sitting on the front bench below the gangway use that expression. He said, "It is an impudent falsehood."
  COLONEL BROOKFIELD: In deference to your ruling, Sir, I beg to withdraw the expression.
  MR. THOMAS O'DONNELL: I repeat that women and children were thrown out on the veldt to die. All
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  these inhuman sights are ever present to the mind of the Boer, and surely they are not such as will tempt him to come in and willingly lay down his arms and trust himself to the care of the Government which caused all this trouble! We wish these inhuman and brutalising acts to cease. We Irishmen are for peace and for justice, and I think Englishmen on both sides of this House will admit that we ought to be ready and willing to sacrifice a great deal in order to bring about peace.
  I will turn to the correspondence which has recently been issued. In that correspondence hon. Gentlemen will note that the one point insisted upon by General Botha was some sort of independence. One point insisted upon by hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House is that we should refuse any form of independence. [Ministerial cheers.] I am sorry to hear hon. Gentlemen cheer that statement, but perhaps the time will come when charity and justice will demand this concession, and possibly they will then repent that they did not consider this question more carefully. It is useful to notice two very important changes in the attitude of the British Government, directly and solely attributable to Boer perseverance and success. The first is that it is the English who now first moved for peace, and the second is that they have come down considerably from the
  "unconditional surrender" attitude adopted on a previous occasion. These changes are important, and to thinking Englishmen ought to be instructive. Turning to the first telegram from Kitchener, he states that Botha agreed to discuss terms of peace on the express understanding that the independence of the Transvaal and the Orange Free Colony were not to be discussed. In a second telegram to Mr. Brodrick, Lord Kitchener, says "Botha showed very good feeling, and was anxious for peace; he tried very hard for some kind of independence." which of course was refused. It is certainly instructive, in reading the final revised telegram sent to Botha, to note the beautifully characteristic vagueness of its terms, all, of course with the object of being—
  "quite precise, in order to avoid any charge of breach of faith afterwards." "Amnesty will be given for bona fide acts of war."

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  The devil trying his case in his own court!—
  "At the earliest practicable date military administration will give place to Crown Colony government."
  Then—
  "As soon as circumstances permit a representative element will be introduced,"
  and, as if dealing with men who have neither spirit nor manhood in them the telegram proceeds—
  "Ultimately the privilege of self-government will be conceded."
  Is this the way to treat a brave people? Are these the prospects that will induce men who love liberty dearer than life, posterity dearer than self,** to come in and end this horrible and inhuman war? Is it any wonder, in the face of that telegram, that Botha, who was fighting for his home, his family, for freedom, for posterity, for his country, should have replied—
  "It will certainly not surprise your Excellency to know that I do not feel disposed to recommend that the terms of your letter should have the earnest consideration of my Government?"
  And now, when these bitter, inhuman sights are about to be ended, and prospects of peace appear on the horizon, we again appeal, for justice sake, on behalf of humanity, on behalf of the age which proclaims itself Christian, that you will listen to the voice of reason, and field to these brave men such terms as they can honourably accept—such terms as their unexampled bravery deserves. "Not unacquainted with sorrow, the sad we learn to befriend." We who have lived for years in slavery, whose country and people have been denied the blessings of free
  self-government for hundreds of years, can speak with authority, can speak from experience of the aimless existence, the living death endured by the human soul when its aspirations, its ideals, are checked by the cage of foreign government, by the loss of liberty; and therefore can we understand the apparent madness of the Boers in still continuing a hopeless contest, or rather what is termed a hopeless contest: for I deem it impossible that such heroic bravery, such dauntless perseverance in the cause of justice, in the fight for home and kindred,
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  should not, by God's aid, finally succeed. Have Englishmen no justice, no charity, no mercy in their breasts? Can they not look with unprejudiced eyes on the spectacle presented to the world in South Africa to-day? On one side you have, or rather you had seventeen months ago, 30,000 peasant farmers, with limited resources, with no means of supplying the places of those who fall in battle, giving their lives, dying to the last man, fighting against unheard-of odds, fighting with madness, with desperation, for the liberty and homes they love. You see the mother willingly send forth, never to be seen more, the husband and the sons she loves, with the old Roman words at parting. "Come back with your shield, or on it." On the other side—and I do not wish to say this in any offensive spirit—you have a trained and disciplined army of 300,000 men, with unlimited supplies of men, stores, arms, and ammunition to draw from, fighting, not for home, not for liberty, not for any great human cause, but rather for the basest of human motives—the acquisition of land whose gold made it too valuable to remain in the possession of a weak nation, the destruction of a race whose valour and patriotism wall resound through future ages as the one bright spot in the closing years of this commercial nineteenth century. Is this the way you intend to bring about peace? Have you brought peace to Ireland, where for hundreds of years the only treatment we have got has been government by coercion? You may exterminate us, you may crush us, but still we live and are prepared to fight for freedom and our homes. It was an English poet who wrote—
  "Slaves cannot breathe in England: if their lungs
  Receive our air, that moment they are free; They touch our country, and their shackles fall."
  I would like hon. Gentlemen opposite to take these words to heart, and try to understand that they are not upholding that tradition. Has the God of justice, of charity, but of retribution, been superseded in your mighty Empire, flushed as it is with the pride of success, by the god of iniquity and unrighteousness? Beware lest you are now disregarding an opportunity of retrieving your lost fame. Bewrare lest in your endeavour

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  to crush out disaffection in South Africa by cold-blooded murder you are sowing the seeds of another Ireland 7,000 miles away from your shores. I would also ask Englishmen to remember that they have not yet conquered, and that perhaps in the exigencies of the situation they may soon find sufficient employment for their bellicose tendencies in other lands. Ah, even at this slate hour, when your thirst for blood has been satisfied, will you not refrain from crushing, by pure weight of numbers, the brave remnant who are prepared to die to the last man before they surrender; will you continue to murder—for such I call it—the men who, despite your opportunities, were infinitely superior to you in the arts of war, and who undoubtedly have been the means of bringing radical changes in your Army, and thus perhaps saving you from that destruction which would have followed had you in your arrogance engaged in a European war before this. Is the spirit of justice, of fair-play, of charity, dead within the breasts of Englishmen? Do they seriously glory in the murder—for such it must be called—goiing on in their name in South Africa to-day? Are all appeals, except those of the leaden bullet, to be disregarded? Now, even now, we appeal for magnanimity, for justice. We ask you to send the angel of peace to those brave men dying for honour, for liberty, and for home. Shall the words of the poet still continue to apply to you—
  "Truth for ever on the scaffold, Wrong for ever on the throne,
  Yet that scaffold sways the future, and behind the dim unknown
  Standeth God within the shadow, keeping watch above His own."

  CHINA—PRESENT POSITION AND POLICY.
  SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: I do not apologise for venturing to bring before the House a subject different from that which has interested hon. Members to-night hitherto. I mean the question of China and our relations with that country and the other Great Powers. I had the opportunity of listening to an important discussion which took place this afternoon in another place, and I found that the general view of the leaders of the party opposite was, that a debate on China was not only necessary but imperative. It was admitted that Parliament and the country had the right to the
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  fullest information on this vital question, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thanked his political opponents for their forbearance in postponing, to so late a date discussion upon it. Another reason I have for asking the attention of the House to the affairs of China at the present stage is that in the critical position which prevails in the far East at the present moment His Majesty's Government have an opportunity of acting with, I trust, permanent effect. There can be little doubt that the Russian Government is now pressing upon China a Convention which, if signed, would give our great rival in the Far East very important advantages over this country in regard to political power and commerce in the north-eastern portion of China. I hold that it is equally clear from all the facts that have come under our notice that His Majesty's Government at this moment hold the key of the position, and if they are prepared to assure China, of their support in resisting the most unreasonable demands of Russia, that Convention will not be signed, and a serious check will be offered to Russian aggression in the Far East. I venture to say that our position in China, and the encroachment of other Powers in that country, constitute at this moment a far graver crisis and are of infinitely more importance to this country than the South African question has ever presented. However great the mistakes that have been made in South Africa by the Government—and they have been truly colossal—there was always this satisfaction to those who desired the ultimate triumph of the Briton in South Africa—the position in that country was never out of our control. The war in South Africa has cost us five times as much money as was necessary, and ten times as many human lives as were necessary, but we have never lost control of the position; we have never been in the presence of force majeure. The same cannot be said in regard to the Far East. We are there in the presence of the greatest possible danger, and when hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House, and perhaps some on my own side, are disposed to accuse those who feel with me of exciting: a warlike feeling, and rousing irritation in other States, I would beg their attention to this fact, that if what we said tem

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  or fifteen years ago had been listened to in regard to South Africa, the troubles there would have been settled at a tenth of the cost now being expended.
  The present phase of the Chinese crisis is perhaps the last opportunity that will ever be offered to this country of dealing with this tremendous question victoriously for England. When Russia once obtains political and military control in Manchuria, and when the Trans-Siberian railway is completed, by which Russia can throw immense stores of munitions and hundreds of thousands of troops into Manchuria, we shall find ourselves in presence of that force majeure which it will be impossible to deal with. Therefore it is the bounden duty of those who wish to see the territorial integrity of China preserved, and British commerce there maintained and increased, to do what they can to bring pressure on the Government, and to rouse the country to the dangers that exist. Our trade in China amounts to 64 per cent. of the foreign trade of the country, and British shipping amounts to 84 per cent. of the foreign shipping which carries foreign commerce to China. That country, with its 400 millions of population and great natural wealth, offers boundless openings for British commerce in the future. It is not only the question of China that is at stake; it is the question of the future of Asia; and with Asia goes our Indian Empire. I would try to rivet the attention of the House on the danger of Russia obtaining control of even one province of China. If Russia gets possession of Manchuria, with its twelve millions of people, she would be able to form there a large, well-equipped, and well-drilled Chinese army, armed and disciplined, and led by Russian officers, which would enable her, step by step, to overrun absolutely the whole of China and threaten our possessions in India. Against such an army we would be perfectly powerless, and even the whole of Europe would be powerless.
  The history of the last seven years has, I regret to say, been one series of the most inconceivable blunders in regard to our policy in the Far East. First of all, we allowed the Japanese to be driven out of Port Arthur. That was a stupid and cowardly blunder. I believe
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  that Lord Rosebery was opposed to it, but was overborne by his colleagues in the Cabinet. The Japanese were our natural allies in the Far East, and so long as they were in the Lao Tung peninsula we had no reason to fear. Then we come to the year 1898, which brought disasters in every part of the globe to this country. Fortunately that policy has been reversed and we are now in a better position. The second great blunder in our Far Eastern policy was the withdrawal of our ships from Port Arthur by the Ministry now in power. That was not quite as bad as the first blunder, but it was pitiable beyond description. It will be seen that I am impartial in my criticism. I regret that the First Lord of the Treasury is not present, because I would have called his attention to that unfortunate speech of his at Manchester in which he invited Russia to occupy Port Arthur. That was one of the most mischievous observations ever made in this country. It is no secret that the Leader of the House has adopted a very Gallio-like attitude in regard to foreign affairs, though I am glad to know that he is getting rid of it. Then came the Boxer movement, which was undoubtedly stirred up by Russian agents. It was exceedingly like the agitations carried on in Bulgaria and Armenia. There was the working of a corrupt coterie in China in the supposed interests of the people. There were wholesale terrorising and brutal outrages of every kind. Then we come to the most extraordinary blunder of the Government, the Concert of Europe, which to me is the most preposterous fiction ever palmed off on an ignorant public. The idea that there can be a genuine Concert of Europe is to place far too great a strain on the imagination, of intelligent persons. To some, the Concert of Europe is a delightful sound, and I am prepared to admit that it has misled considerable numbers of the Members of this House. But the Concert of Europe as practised in China has been the most wicked, cruel, and disastrous failure that any Government has put before the country. It has resulted in losing our prestige in China, in weakening our power very seriously, and has led to squabbles and disputes of the most dangerous kind between the Great Powers. So serious were these,

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  that the whole time of the Governments of Europe, the Ambassadors, and the Commanders on, the spot, has been exhausted in trying to prevent the Concert from coming to blows within itself. In regard to China, this Concert of Europe has been practically a besom of destruction. The looting and massacring carried on by the troops of the so-called Concert is a disgrace to humanity and a scandal to civilisation. Nothing like it has been seen since the days of Attila and Genghis Khan—50,000, some say 100,000, Chinese were deliberately massacred by the Russian authorities in Manchuria. I have accounts of the most horrible character by persons who were eye-witnesses of these scenes. The great majority of the victims were not fighting men at all, but perfectly harmless men, women, and children. They were driven into the river or bayonetted on the bank and then cast into the river. The river was so choked that the steamers coming up the Amur had difficulty in forcing a passage through the great mass of human corpses. The scenes that occurred between Tientsin and Peking were in many cases not much more creditable to the European troops. I am glad to say that our own troops as well as the Americans and Germans are free from any serious complicity in the atrocities committed there. The Government for a long time tried to defend this fiction of theirs—it was not a fiction of theirs but of Mr. Gladstone's—the fiction of the Concert of Europe, but I fancy we shall not hear much more about it, because the Government have shown by their own action that the Concert of Europe is a farce. Having allowed or invited the Great Powers to go into China, they found the position so hopeless that they have now been obliged to do that which they ought to have done at first, make an alliance with a Power on which they could rely. The agreement with Germany is a conclusive condemnation of the Concert of Europe. By that agreement they bound themselves to preserve the integrity of China; others have joined them, notably Japan, in that policy. It was sensible and practical to ally ourselves with those Powers whose interests are identical with ours, and those Powers whose word we can trust. It was the policy of Lord Beaconsfield
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  in 1878, when he saved Constantinople and gratified Europe. It was followed in 1885, on the collapse of Mr. Gladstone's Government; it has been resuscitated in 1898, and has given us our South African Possessions; and if we use it properly we shall be able to settle the Chinese question. The Concert of Europe has for us been, disastrous in every respect. Our prestige has been lowered before the Chinese and our Indian troops, and I am afraid that one of the results will be that the Chinese will have an undying hatred of Europe and of this country, which has been allied with the forces which have inflicted such great cruelties upon them. Russia has been aggrandised and our prestige lowered. The Russians have marched at the head of the allied troops through Peking. We have had repeated insults levelled at our troops, our officers, and our flag; the seizure of railways in the most flagrant and unjustifiable way; the occupation of Niu-chwang in spite of the protests of every foreign consul; agreements with regard to Manchuria made behind our backs; the sudden evacuation of Peking proposed by Russia, and carried out by Russian troops in face of the so-called Concert of Europe; the refusal of the Russian Minister to demand the death punishment of local Chinese officials who had been guilty of such gross cruelty, and of the murder of our missionaries; and all this has been done with a motive, because the Russian Minister promised the Chinese Government that if they supported Russia with regard to Manchuria, he would abstain from demanding the death punishment of these Chinese criminals, and would even demand their release by the Great Powers. Those are the points on which we have had loss during the continuation of the recent policy in China.
  Now I come to the questions which are at this moment agitating China, and upon which our future position in China depends. I mean the agreement or agreements which are now being negotiated with regard to Manchuria and the adjoining provinces. Although I listened with great interest to the speech in another place of the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, I am bound to say I could not get any indication from his words as to what was the policy of the

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  Government. In one sentence he made a reassuring statement, and in the next statements of a most alarming character. I do not wish to pass any criticism upon Lord Lansdowne in this matter. He combines the quality of courtesy with that of backbone, winch is most necessary for dealing with this question, and it would be unfair to blame him for the present position of affairs. I do not wish to derive any dark conclusion from what he said. I desire to look at the facts as they are. One phrase of the noble Lord struck me very much. He said we must look to principles and not to details, and that we should be satisfied if we secured the principle even if the details went against us. That is exactly what we should not be satisfied with. It is the details which count in this matter. It is the practical, material position that is a force in China which counts for prestige in the future. We heard a good deal about principles in general two years ago. We were told of free trade in China. We see little of it now; but in its place we see Russia holding forts at Port Arthur, and controlling the whole of the province of Manchuria, throwing out railways in all directions—those are details. We heard a great deal about principles and the promise of China never to alienate the Yang-tsze Valley. Of course she will not do so if she can help it. If such a promise had been given by Russia or some other Great Power it might have been worth something, but given by China it is worth nothing, and we see ourselves losing our power and all our advantages in northern China, and having no compensating advantages in the Yangtsze Valley. Those are illustrations of the importance of detail. It is. I know, a favourite view upon the part of men who are indisposed to take action, that the question of Manchuria is hopeless; that Manchuria is lost. Manchuria is lost; Pechili is lost; Northern China is lost: the Yang-tsze Valley is lost: and Asia is lost, if the policy of the last seven years is followed by the Government. But the position is not hopeless; the position is full of encouragement if the Government will only recognise a policy of firm and consistent action. The right hon. Gentleman might rise in his place and say, "Do I want to put upon this country a Russian war on the top of the
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  war in South Africa?" But there is no necessity for any war in this case. We need not send a single soldier to the Far East. We have the game entirely in our own hands if we will only use the materials which lie before us. We have a natural and most valuable ally in the Far East, we have the great and rising nation of Japan, whose people bear the same relation to Asia as we do to Europe. A rising, brave, intelligent, and patriotic people, who are most anxious to be used, and we have only to use them, and we need fear nothing from the extremest exertion of Russian power.
  The time has come for plain speaking in this matter. Russia respects nothing but force. That has been proved by all the nations in the last four years, and if any hon. Member doubts it I invite him to read the Blue-book containing most interesting statements in regard to not only China, but the Russian policy upon the whole question of China—No. 1, 1888. C. 1114. Let anybody read about Port Arthur, how it was to be a port for winter occupation only, how within three months it was annexed, and he will find that Russia respects nothing but force. The time has come to show what this country can do. We have only to use Japan to be, master of the situation. We have only to promise Japan that we will hold the ring, and the whole matter is settled. There would be no war even between Russia and Japan, because Russia knows how to respect superior force, and she will recognise that she is in the power of a superior force, and there will be no disturbance of the equilibrium. I express that view to the Government. I do not expect them to tell us they are going to adopt any such policy. I do not expect them to tell us what the truth is with regard to the Convention which Russia is now trying to force from China. We know what that convention is from the disclosures made by the Peking correspondent of The Times, and discussion upon this subject would be incomplete without a tribute being paid to that intelligent and most capable gentleman for the inestimable services he has been able to render to us and to our Imperial interests abroad. We understand that the terms originally demanded have now, to a certain extent, been modified.

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  Russia has ceased to claim control over provinces like Mongolia and Turkestan, and some alterations have been accepted by the Government at St. Petersburg, but the basis of the objectionable proposals still remains intact. Russia is still to have control of all railways, customs, and concessions in Manchuria, and if that is once accepted by this country the fall of China and British commerce and British politics in the Far East is settled for all time.
  There is, in addition to the points I have mentioned one point worthy of the consideration and attention of the Government, and that is that this encroachment on the part of the Russian Government has raised a strong feeling of resentment among the intelligent masses, so far as there are intelligent masses, in China, Remarkable information has come to this country of late, to the effect that all the intelligent classes in Central and Southern China are uniting to impress on the Imperial Government resistance to and refusal of Russian demands. The Secretary of State to-night, in another place, paid a great tribute to the services which had been rendered to China, to British interests, and the cause of civilisation by those two eminent men, the Yang-tsze viceroys. It is impossible to speak too highly of them when we consider that through what they have urged they have earned the enmity not only of the Manchu officials, but of the Russian Government, because it must not be forgotten that Russia is perfectly well aware that her only hope of success in China is to maintain the Chinese Government in as corrupt a condition as possible, and to keep China in the same rotten condition for which Russia is responsible, as for the last thirty years the Ottoman Empire has been kept. That is a point worthy of notice.
  The Government will, it is to be hoped, maintain these viceroys in the position they have taken up, but they will find their work cut out for them unless they put a stop to this Agreement at Peking. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs made a statement to the effect that it is not the business of His Majesty's Government to support the cause of internal reform in China.
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  Every statement of that kind, that we are not deeply interested in the cause of reform in China, is a mistake. We, may not wish to support it, but we should not tell the world so; we should rather try and make the people believe we are willing and anxious to uphold their cause. But perhaps I may have taken the noble Lord's words too seriously. I trust the Government will not take a despairing view of their opportunities, and if in the future of Northern China or Manchuria there may be some difficulties with regard to the Anglo-German Agreement, they will not be more than can be easily overcome. Although Germany may not have included Manchuria in the scope of the Agreement, she is bound, as much as we are, to uphold the integrity of China, The situation is not hopeless, and if the Government grapple with it with a firm hand for a few months the position will be restored. Russia is engaged in a great game of bluff against this country, but right hon. Gentlemen on the Government Bench hold all the cards in their hands if they will only play them. There is no necessity for war, but there is great necessity for action being taken; and if it is known all over the world that we are prepared to take action, if we take the lead firmly and clearly, as we have a right to do, and as we are bound to do the great majority of the Powers will follow us. We shall have not only civilisation and humanity on our side, but, what is of more importance, force. Therefore I beg the Government not to temporise, but to act at once, and firmly press these tremendous British interests now at stake. The future of China, over 400,000,000 of people, will be assured if only the Government will act in a way worthy of the party and the great traditions it represents.
  MR. JOSEPH WALTON: did not think that there was any difference of opinion as to the policy which the Government ought to pursue in the present crisis in the Far East. That policy had been declared again and again to be the preservation of the integrity of the Chinese Empire and the equal opportunity for all nations to trade there. There was reason, he

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  thought, to complain of undue reticence on the part of the Government—they had not answered questions put in the House in as full and
  complete a manner as they ought to have done. It was to be regretted that the Government had not, having regard to the great public interest in this matter, done as was done by Count von Bülow and the President of the United States, both of whom had taken the opportunity of stating in the most definite manner the policy they intended to pursue in the Far East; but he hoped that what had taken place and the, statement the House would have that night from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would constitute an adequate departure from that policy of reticence. It was only reasonable, having regard to the state of affairs in China, that this opportunity should be taken to have a reasonable discussion, and the Government should state to the House the progress they were making in the settlement of the crisis and the success attending it. The various agreements entered into behind the back of the Chinese Government interfered with the settlement of the present crisis. In the Agreement with Russia, under which the railway rights north of the Great Wall were conceded to her whilst she conceded similar rights to us in the Yang-tsze Valley, we did not stipulate for British goods to be carried over those railways at equal rates of carriage. The
  Anglo-German Agreement stated distinctly that its object was the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China and of the open door for trade throughout the whole Chinese Empire. It stated that—
  "It is a matter of joint and permanent international interest that the ports on the rivers and littoral of China should remain free and open to trade, and to every other legitimate form of economic activity for the nations of all countries without distinction; and the two Governments agree on their part to uphold the same for all Chinese territory as far as they can exercise influence."
  But was Japan informed, when her consent was sought, that Germany declined to recognise the Agreement as applying to Manchuria, or were the other Powers of the Concert informed? A most emphatic statement had been made by Japan that she understood it to mean
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  what it said, and that it applied to the whole of the Chinese Empire. If the Agreement had any utility, the time had arrived when we, who initiated the Agreement, ought to ascertain what action the other Powers who were parties to the Agreement were prepared to take-in view of the serious infringement which was threatened by the new Manchurian Convention.
  What was the policy of Russia? In August she made a declaration of her policy, which was the maintenance of the former State organisation in China, the removal of all that could lead to a partition of the Chinese Empire, and the re-establishment of a Government able to preserve order and tranquillity in the country. And she further said that the measures taken by her were in no sense to be regarded as indicating an independent plan, which she affirmed was completely foreign to the policy of the Imperial Government. She also stated when giving a qualified assent to the Anglo-German Agreement that she had been the first to lay down the integrity of the Chinese Empire as a fundamental part of her policy. Therefore all the world had apparently agreed to preserve the international integrity of China. On the 28th February the Under Secretary stated
  "that His Majesty's Government had the assurance of the Russian Government that the guarantee that they would require from China in respect of Manchuria would not take the form of an acquisition of territory, or a virtual or actual protectorate in Manchuria." The right hon. Gentleman had further stated a few days previously in reply to a question that the Russian Government had repeatedly declared their intentions to respect the integrity of China, and that His Majesty's Government were not aware that they had infringed it; and that His Majesty's Government had been informed by the Russian Government that they had no intention of withdrawing their co-operation with the other Powers in the affairs of China. All those declarations were satisfactory on the face of them, and it would appear to be difficult to discover where danger underlay them, but when they turned to the terms of the new Russian Convention—which included the disbanding of the Chinese Army, the razing of fortifications,

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  the creation of an army without the consent of Russia forbidden; importation of arms and ammunition into Manchuria prohibited: refusal of advantages as to mines, railways, or other matters in the Russo-Chinese frontier provinces—Manchuria. Mongolia. Chinese Turkestan—including Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan, right down to the borders of Thibet to other Powers; the Chinese debarred from constructing their own railways without the consent of Russia, and the right of Russia to construct a railway from the Manchurian railway towards Peking and the Great Wall—His Majesty's Government admitted that if the reported version of that Convention was correct, it was derogatory to treaty rights, and extended far beyond Manchuria. It was incumbent on the Government, therefore, in view of the destruction of treaty rights in the great regions of Central Asia and in the interests of the commercial future of this country, to take care that no Agreement was sanctioned to our detriment and in violation of our treaty rights with China. We could not afford to have a great neutral market like China invaded by great protectionist Powers like Russia, Germany, and France, which would inevitably be followed by protective tariff's excluding to a large extent British goods. At this moment Russia, France, Germany, and Belgium were all engaged in laying down railways and occupying the Chinese Empire, and stipulating in all their contracts that the materials and rolling stock should be drawn exclusively from the country of the concessionaires to the exclusion of the British trader and manufacturer.
  The country was face to face probably with a cycle of trade depression, and therefore he wished to point out how very little attention the country had paid to the danger incurred in not upholding our commercial interests in the Far East. A great deal more attention would have to be given to them in the near future if British trade and commerce were to be maintained. Many hon. Members would have expected that the Government would have been able to give some information as to the terms of the new Chinese-Russian Convention, but apparently the Government had no positive information with regard to it. What
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  course did the Government propose to take? The only possible course to pursue was to put themselves, not individually, but collectively with the
  other Powers, into communication with the Chinese Government and bring about a practical agreement to preserve their mutual interests. Surely if the Great Powers of Europe stood together with the United States and Japan it would solve the question affecting China-There were other questions, some of which it was unnecessary to dwell upon, having regard to the lateness of the hour. There should be increased facilities for trade and the complete opening up of the immense waterways of China. There should be also a rearrangement of commercial treaties, and included in that arrangement should be the abolition of likin dues. But in addition to those there were other questions which ought to be the subject of friendly negotiation and settlement between this country and Russia. If a different policy had been adopted at an earlier stage the Tientsin incident might in all probability have been averted. The duty of the British forces, next to relieving the Legations in Peking, was that they should protect British property. He recognised the difficulties caused by having 200,000 men locked up in South Africa, but our naval forces in Chinese waters were for a long time only third in point of strength. If the railway from Tientsin to Neu-chwang, which was seized by Russia, had been occupied at various points by our blue-jackets it never need have passed under the control of Russia. What was the Tientsin incident? The allied troops had been victorious over the Chinese, and Russia yet said that she retained this ground by right of conquest. There was no right of conquest in the matter, and when that claim failed she said she had a concession signed by Li Hung Chang, but if that were so it was very doubtful if it had the sanction of the Chinese Government. That was a subject for negotiation, and he hoped in the settlement British interests would be fully upheld; but in the settlement of that question, why should not other questions be settled with Russia in a friendly way? Russia still retained possession of that part of the Northern Chinese railway from Shan-hai-Kwan to Neu-chwang. The earnings

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  of this railway had been allocated by the Chinese Government as security for British bondholders. He would like to know whether the assurances that the Russian occupation was temporary were written or verbal, and whether Russia might not be asked whether the time had not arrived when the military necessity that she should control the line had ceased to exist, and whether it ought not now to be given up to its rightful owners. There was the question of the administration of Niu-chwang. We had been told that there was no wish on the part of His Majesty's Government to exaggerate the importance of our interests in Manchuria or at Niu-chwang. We did, however, a trade of three millions sterling a year through Niu-chwang, and at the back of Niu-chwang there was the magnificent country of Manchuria—400,000 square miles. Manchuria had enormous possibilities of expansion and development. The maintenance of the just treaty rights of this country was a matter of importance. Referring to the objection raised by Russia to the expedition to the Elliott Islands, he urged that a claim put forth through such an extent of water would give Russia control over the entrance to the Gulf of Pechili, and he desired to have an assurance that the Government intended to resist the pretension of Russia to own those waters. There was also the dismissal of Mr. McLeavy Brown from his post in Korea. A similar tiling happened in
  1897, and he hoped the Government would do as they did in 1897—resist the demand which had been put forward.
  There was another matter to which he wished to refer, namely, the remodelling of our consular system. He had received from British consuls in the Far East great hospitality and great kindness, and he was very much disinclined to say one word which would be derogatory to them. But he was bound to say that the general impression he obtained after having come into contact with the consuls of the United States. Germany and Japan was that, while they made it their main work to push the trade of their respective countries. British consuls seemed to make their judicial and diplomatic functions their main work, and to consider the question of pushing British trade as somewhat
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  beneath them. If we were to hold our own in competition with other nations, who were competing with us more effectually than ever, it was absolutely necessary we should employ the same agencies in the shape of consuls, who would devote their energies to obtaining information and pushing trade as other consuls did. There was no doubt that the Chinese crisis, and especially the present phase of it, involved a problem of great importance to our country. They knew that the people of China were a most industrious commercial people. Commercially he believed they were the most honest people on the face of the earth. If China were developed in the next thirty years to the same extent as Japan had been developed during the last thirty years, there would he an increase in foreign trade of more than two hundred millions sterling a year, and if England only held anything approaching 60 per cent. of that increased trade, it would mean all the difference between commercial prosperity and commercial adversity. He hoped the House would have from the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs a full and definite statement regarding the present situation in China and the policy the Government intended to pursue, such as the House and the country had a right to expect, and which, he believed, it would be the noble Lord's pleasure to give.
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Viscount CRANBORNE,): When I understood the arrangement of the business for this evening I was inclined to congratulate myself that before I should have the honour of addressing the House a far abler tongue than mine would have given to the country the views of His Majesty's Government on all the departments of the Chinese question. I am not so sure that I congratulate myself now, because it appears from the speeches of my hon. friend and of the hon. Gentleman opposite that to some extent this debate is to-be looked upon as a continuance of a debate in another place, and that, without the presence of my noble friend who made he speech, and without having the report of his remarks before us, comments are to be made on his utterances. I do not know that that is a particularly convenient

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  arrangement, because it leads to considerable inaccuracy. My hon. friend, for instance, told the House just now that my noble friend in another place had declared against reform in China. I am confident he did no such thing.
  SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: I did not say that. I said the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had declared that the Government would not make it one of their principal policies in China.
  MR. JOSEPH WALTON: I may be allowed to say that I carefully refrained from referring to various points raised in another place, on the very ground that I thought it would be unfair to anticipate the statement of the noble Lord.
  VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman. I am sure his intentions were admirable, but I am not quite sure that he did not refer indirectly to some of the statements made in another place. But my hon. friend told the House that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had discouraged, as it were, reform in China.
  SIR CHARLES DILKE: Hear, hear!
  VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I do not think so, and if the right hon. Baronet will look to-morrow at the report he will see that my noble friend was speaking of reform in China in connection with the question of fiscal reform, to which that particular portion of his speech was devoted. He had pointed out that fiscal reform was one of the things which the Powers had to place in the Identic Note which had been presented to China, that is to say, that it formed part of the programme which the Powers were intent upon compelling China to adopt. Then he went on to distinguish our attitude and that of other Powers on fiscal reform, and reform generally, and it will be abundantly clear to the House that nothing would fee more rash than to have announced that part of the policy of the Government was that they intended to coerce China in the general reform of her administration,
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  as distinguished from fiscal reform, the latter being evidently of international importance, instead of national importance, as is the former.
  The speech of my hon. friend went back a long way into ancient history, into which he will not expect me to follow him. He discussed things which
  occurred many years ago, and he gradually worked his way down to the origin of the present crisis. To my hon. friend Russia is the author of all evil—nothing goes wrong in Europe or in the world but Russia is at the bottom of it. In my opinion, as far as my limited opportunity of acquainting myself with the subject extends, the Boxer movement cannot be said to have been due to Russia. The Boxer movement was a very remarkable one, because it took by surprise all those who knew China best. In its nature it consisted partly of a religious movement and partly of a national movement; and it suddenly grew, with quite unexpected force and vigour, and swept over the country. As far as the external action of the other Powers was concerned, I do not pretend that a certain aggressive spirit which had shown itself among European nations had not something to do with it, but I do not think it would be fair to assign that to Russia, or to any other one Power, but rather to a great many. When my hon. friend speaks of Russia I wonder he does not think of the danger of using generalities. Russia may mean anything, from the Russian Emperor, the Russian Government, the Russian representative in China, down to some obscure colonel in command of a small body of Russian troops in a remote province; and there can be no greater mistake in estimating the action of Russia than to confuse these very dissimilar units. Recent experience has gone a long way to bear out the truth of this. The hon. Gentleman opposite reminds us of the question of the Northern Railway, and that furnishes an example of how pacific but firm representation and an appeal to the justice of the Russian Government meet with their reward. It is known now that, with regard to a large part of that railway, not the whole, but a large part—that part that is inside the Great Wall—the Russian Government

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  have consented to surrender it, and have surrendered it to the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, who in turn handed it over to the British military authority. That is part of the railway, but I do not forget we have rights in the whole of the railway—rights founded on the fact that the railway was made by British enterprise and capital, under British management, and was solemnly secured in an international instrument as an addendum of the Anglo-Russian Convention. The rights we possess in that railway will not be forgotten by His Majesty's Government. The hon. Member opposite has asked me about the incident in reference to the Elliott Islands, and I do not know that I have anything to add to the answer I have given to this question. The incident occurred, as the hon. Member himself mentioned, owing to the fact that a British naval officer, detached to hunt down pirates in that part of the world, in the course of his duty put into one of the islands, and remonstrances were addressed to him, or rather I think to the Admiral Commanding-in-Chief, not by the Russian Government, but by the admiral on the spot. We have instructed our admiral that we know no reason why our treaty rights to enter any port in China should be disputed, and that, so far as we are concerned, no attention need be paid to the protest. The hon. Gentleman then addressed himself to the various conventions which exist between this country and other Powers in respect of China. I did not gather he objected to them. His objections consisted, as it seemed to mo, in his opinion that they hardly went far enough. He spoke of the Anglo-Russian Railway Convention, to which I have referred, and he said it was a pity that it did not extend south of the Great Wall as well as north—or so I understood him. But I am not quite sure that I share that view. I recognise that in so far as it went it made for tranquillity and the avoidance of friction as between one Power and another, and anything that makes for tranquillity in China is for the benefit of British interests. My hon. friend knows perfectly well that the Agreement is bi-lateral.
  SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: A most discreditable surrender.
  VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My hon. friend holds very strong opinions on this subject, I know, but I think I should get on with my speech better without his interjected observations. My hon. friend is aware the Agreement is bi-lateral in character. We recognise the geographical gravitation—that is the phrase used—which led to our abstention from interference with Russian railway enterprise south of the Wall, just as the same geographical gravitation led to Russian non-interference with our enterprise in the Yang-tsze basin. The Anglo-German Agreement has been referred to by the hon. Gentleman opposite. That Agreement consists of three clauses. The first embodies the principle of the open door, but is limited in the terms of the article to the rivers and littoral of China, and to that part of the Chinese Empire in which the particular Powers signing the Agreement have interests.
  MR. JOSEPH WALTON: The words are "to uphold the same for all Chinese territory."
  VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: That is not the interpretation put on the document by either of the contracting parties. The rivers and ports of China are the parts of China to which it extends, and the whole Empire of China so far as the influence of the Powers signing the document goes. I am asked how I explain the German Chancellor's speech in reference to that article. He said in the first place—I do not pretend for a moment to embrace all he said—that, as far as Germany is concerned, that article does not include Manchuria. I presume that the German Chancellor thinks that Manchuria is not a place where Germany has influence. But it is fair to say that, at the time that instrument was being negotiated, so far as Article 1 was concerned the German Government gave us to understand that they did not consider that, for the purposes of Germany, their influence extended to Manchuria. As to Clause 2, which binds the Powers to direct their policy towards maintaining the integrity of the Chinese Empire, that, as I said the other day in answer to a question, is, in our opinion, without qualification. Whatever the interpretation the German Government may have put on that

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  article, at any rate this can be said, that as a matter of fact they are pledged, and admit themselves pledged, and are glad they are pledged, to maintain the integrity of China by a hundred other documents besides the Anglo-German Agreement. The fact is, as the German Chancellor pointed out, the whole of China is a security for the money which the Chinese Government owes to the Powers of Europe, and in the opinion of His Majesty's Government and the German Government China has no right to part with a single acre of that which constitutes the security for so large a sum. With regard to Manchuria, as I have pointed out we fully recognise the obligations upon us which the great interests of this country impose. I have mentioned the railways; but there are other interests, trade interests, in different parts, to which we are bound to have regard. I am asked by the hon. Gentleman whether we are in a position to communicate the text of the alleged Agreement between Russia and China to the House. We are not in a position to do so. No one regrets more than His Majesty's Government the atmosphere of mystery which has been thrown round that Agreement. We think it a pity. It has the disadvantage that many versions, more or less accurate, reach us from many different quarters, and it is exceedingly difficult to say what may be the accurate or final form which it has assumed. One thing I can say, and that is that to the best of our information neither the account of it given by my hon. friend, nor the account given by the hon. Gentleman opposite is accurate, though that does not carry us very much further.
  SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: Will you support China in refusing to sign it?
  VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: The line we have adopted is to inform the Chinese Government that, in our opinion, any surrender of territory on her part under an agreement of the kind suggested between herself and anyone Powerduring the continuance of the present state of things in China would be a mistake dangerous to ourselves which we could not approve of. We have suggested that the proper course is to submit any such instrument to the representatives
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  of the Powers at Peking. That is the policy of His Majesty's Government. That is the policy not only of His Majesty's Government, but also, as we understand, of the German Government and of several other Governments; and I think it is quite as good a policy, indeed a far better one than that indicated in the reckless observation which has just been addressed to the House by my hon. friend. I know my hon. friend takes a very gloomy view of the future position of this country in Asia.
  SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: No, no.
  VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: He conceives that Russia is gradually absorbing everything, and I think he said that within three years she will have absorbed the whole of Mongolia and will have threatened India.
  SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: No; I said nothing of the sort.
  VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: Well, I think if Russia's capacity and desire to pursue such a policy was anything like that which is described by my hon. friend we might indeed despair; but I confess I form no such opinion of Russia's intentions, and no such opinion of our want of strength, supposing any such thing were possible, to resist a danger of that kind. He attributes all our misfortunes to the Concert of Europe. Sir, the Concert is not perfect as an international instrument. I do not think that any of us on this side of the House have ever pretended that it was. I do not say that it was the most perfect method of addressing ourselves to the solution of the Chinese crisis, but I say that it was essential, that there was no other means of solving the crisis. The injury which had been inflicted by China was an international injury—an injury to all the Powers alike by assailing them in the persons of their representatives—and, of course, it was a matter of common interest and common obligation to vindicate our honour there and to take the necessary steps to prevent any such catastrophe ever happening again. But I quite admit that the Concert is very slow, and that its success depends upon; the cordial working of it by all its members, and that it is in the power of

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  any of the members of the Concert to make its future progress very difficult, or, indeed, impossible. For my part, as I have already said, we are not prepared in any way to abandon it. Indeed, the very policy I have described, of suggesting to the Chinese Government the propriety of referring any agreement of the kind which is alleged to have been made to the representatives of the Powers, is another example of the working of the Powers in concert.
  I am not able to touch upon every point which has been raised by the two hon. Gentlemen who have addressed the House, but I hope it will not be thought that where I have not corrected them I have admitted the accuracy of all that has been said. I do not admit, for instance, that the
  "open door" has been in any way injured by Russia. I do not admit that insults have been hurled at our officers and soldiers, except, of course, in a few cases between private soldiers in China. Nor do I admit that in the action we have taken in regard to the port of Neu-chwang we have anything whatever to be ashamed of. It is quite true that Russia continues to occupy Neu-chwang and the railway that leads to Neu-chwang. But in the course of the pacification of China undoubtedly the Russian troops advanced from that direction and used that railway. That was her field of operation—Neu-chwang came within it, and it is not surprising that she occupied it. So long as that is a temporary occupation we have nothing to say against it and the attitude of our representative at Neu-chwang seems to have been a thoroughly proper one, which deserved and has received our full support. The fact is that I do not share the view of my hon. friend that the prestige of Great Britain in the East is a thing of the past, or that it has been seriously impaired. Depend upon it, prestige is not a matter of display and ostentation. Prestige really depends upon what is real and what is essential. What makes our power in the East is not that we are ostentatious, but the consciousness of those with whom we have to deal that there is a great power behind us. And there are also great moral qualities which make us powerful in the East—our tolerance, our fair dealing, our sense of justice, and our business capacity. All these things have told in
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  the past in China, and they remain as powerful as ever. For my part, having taken some trouble to inform myself on the matter, I do not believe in the least in this great degradation of British influence in China. So long as our countrymen retain those great qualities which have served them so well in so many different Oriental countries, so long shall I believe and continue to believe in the continuance of British power and British influence. I have done my best to answer the questions put to me, and I believe that in China, as elsewhere, the Government deserve and enjoy the confidence of the country and of the House of Commons.
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: I join in the debate at this hour, not at all with any desire to inflict a long speech on the House, but rather, if I may be allowed, to point out certain reasons which occur to me for thinking that a long debate on the details of the Chinese question to-night may not perhaps be considered altogether to be in place or to be very desirable. It is within our knowledge that a very important statement has been made in another place on the whole Chinese question, and I feel quite certain that I am expressing the view, not only of hon. Members who sit immediately near me, but of the House in general, when I say that whatever complaint there may have been the other day in regard to the action, or rather the silence, of the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, we are all agreed that he has to-night made a full statement, and that he has fully respected the rights of the House of Commons to be fully informed about foreign affairs. I think we must also feel that the noble Lord has been at some disadvantage
  to-night, because this discussion began at a very late hour, and he himself had to rise after others had addressed the House.
  Take first of all the speech of the hon. Member for the Ecclesall Division. I am bound to say that it seems to me that I have heard it as far back as
  1884. The hon. Member as usual told us that the great errer of all foreign policy has been that his advice has not been adopted, and that his advice to successive Governments has been that there should be an Anglo-German Alliance. He seems to

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  think that alliances are to be got simply and solely by saying that a particular alliance would be convenient to the country, and that, therefore, it could be at once entered upon. Has not the hon. Member ever heard of the able and interesting speech of the German Minister in the Prussian Parliament, in which he warned those whom he addressed that Germany was not going to enter into alliances for the goodwill, pleasure, and advantage of other countries, but only exactly as far as they suited German interests? The hon. Member is aware that an alliance with Germany cannot be made simply because we say it would be convenient to us. The hon. Member has now added to his own recommendation with regard to a German alliance by saying that we have simply to proclaim that we want a Japanese alliance and that the Japanese will say: "Of course; let us frame it." The hon. Member appears to be the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. Perhaps he would like to address the House from the bar as representing the Japanese Government. Then the hon. Member said: "Send the Fleet into Japanese and Chinese waters." He said that by sending the Fleet to the Gulf of Pechili—
  SIR F. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: I said nothing of the kind.
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: I must congratulate the hon. Member that he did not repeat his former declaration about sending the Fleet to the coast of Poland.
  SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: I never said that either. I may as well kill, I hope once for all, one of the most monstrous fables ever spread about an unfortunate Member of this House, by stating that the story which was circulated by the noble Lord and Members like him was inaccurately attributed to me by the late Mr. Gladstone. I never said anything of the sort.
  LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE: My recollection is that the hon. Member in former days did want to send the British fleet to the coast of Poland, and that when it was pointed out to him that Poland did not possess a coast he rushed into the columns of the press with the statement that Poland formerly had a sea coast, and that what he meant
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  was that the fleet should be sent into the Baltic. I congratulate the hon. Member that he has on this occasion made a recommendation which at any rate is within the range of physical possibility.
  It is pleasant to pass from the rather exaggerated views of the hon. Member on foreign policy, which he is never weary of inflicting on the House,
  to the clear and able statement, made from intimate knowledge of China, of my hon. friend the Member for Barnsley. My hon. friend pointed out to the House that the policy which this country ought to aim at in China was to maintain all our commercial rights. We have had in the statement of the noble Lord a very clear allusion to that part of the negotiations which have been going on. I think I may certainly say on behalf of hon. Members on this side that we shall approach everything that has fallen from the noble Lord and from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in another place in the spirit which at a grave moment like this they fully deserve. We desire that no single word shall fall from any of us which might complicate the position of the Government, which we all feel is one of very great difficulty in this matter. I would, however, venture to urge on the Government that there are two points on which we desire to be fully enlightened, namely, what the position is in regard to Manchuria, in respect, in the first place, to the maintenance of our general rights under existing treaties, and secondly, in respect to what I might call our particular rights in regard to the railway which has been more than once mentioned in the debate. Subject to that observation, I will only say that I believe the feeling on this side of the House is that the Government ought carefully to abstain from pursuing any policy which would appear to assume that it was a matter of grave danger to this country if certain rights were acquired by Russia in Manchuria. We have interests there—commercial interests, not military or political interests. We desire to maintain the policy of what is called the "open door," and if that can be maintained we will be the very first to acknowledge that the foreign policy of the Government has been successful, because, after all, on these matters, we desire to

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  support the Government of the country as far as we possibly can. We ought never to look upon these great questions of foreign affairs from the point of view of party, because these are essentially questions regarding which party considerations should as far as possible be put into the background. There is, however, another point which has been mentioned, and which I must distinguish from the question of Manchuria. I mean the question whether Russia has or has not obtained large rights in what is called Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan, which is a far larger area than Manchuria, although it may look small on maps of a certain scale.
  These are the points which I venture to place before the House, but I recur to the point from which I started, namely, that we are yet hardly in a position to enter on a detailed discussion of what has been said by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in another place, or to embark on those large views of foreign policy in which the hon. Member for the Ecclesall Division always rejoices. He says alliances are so simple, but I would remind him of what was said to Owen Glendower, according to Shakespeare, when he said he would call spirits from the vasty deep. Percy replied—I am struck by the fact that I now see a Percy sitting behind the hon. Member—"But will they come?" I would recommend the hon. Member to consult the noble Lord behind him, who has travelled experience, and ask him whether he thinks the hon. Member's views of foreign policy are possible, or whether the views of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in another place and of the Under Secretary in this House are not saner views to follow.
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR,): May I venture to appeal to the House now to bring this debate to a close? We have had two interesting debates on the Second and Third Readings of the Appropriation Bill, and I must also remind hon. Members that the Speaker
  and the officials of the House have to be here at an early hour to-morrow in order to get through the financial business within the legal period.
  MR. WILLIAM REDMOND: In view of the fact that for some time past I have put a number of questions to the noble Lord on the matter of Manchuria and the action of Russia without obtaining any direct answer, I think I am entitled to take this, the only opportunity I shall have, of repeating my questions and of emphasising, the indecision of the speech of the noble Lord upon the matter, It is another illustration of the disadvantage under which this House labours in not having the Foreign Secretary here, that we should be all aware that a speech has been delivered by that Minister in another place this afternoon upon this subject, of the substance of which we must remain in more or less ignorance until to-morrow. The noble Lord did not give us clearly to understand whether or not the German Government are in accord with the action of His Majesty's Government in Manchuria. He told us that the first article of the Anglo-German Agreement was understood to extend to Manchuria, but that the second article, which had reference to the Chinese Empire generally, would naturally include Manchuria. The House of Commons and the country have a right to know which it is. Is it a fact that the German Chancellor has strongly declared that no Agreement with this country binds Germany to object to the outrages of Russia in China? The noble Lord has put off replying to the question again and again, as though he is desirous of biding the fact that the German Chancellor has made that statement. There is something mysterious about the whole matter. The fact of the matter is that the Anglo-German Agreement does not include Manchuria, and the German Government are not prepared to take action with this country in opposition to Russia. That means that Russia is practically doing what she likes in China, The people of this country and of Europe generally want to know what is to be the attitude of the Government upon this question. With or without the support of Germany, are you or are you not going to take up an attitude of opposition to Russia's operations? The indecision displayed by the Government goes to show that you are friendless in the matter, and that you have been unable to prevail upon Germany to make

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  common cause with you against Russia. The speech of the noble Lord to-night was the weakest and lamest pronouncement the House of Commons has ever heard from an Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and it will be read to-morrow with amazement from one end of the country to the other. But the matter will not rest there. Sooner or later the Government and the people will have to face the question of whether Russia is to be allowed a free hand in Manchuria or not, and, if she is not, whether this country is prepared to take a strong stand in support of the integrity of the Chinese Empire. With regard to the general question, there is a growing feeling that the Governments of Europe are mainly responsible for the unfortunate development which has recently taken place. The Chinese people had been irritated and interfered with to an extent that no other people would have stood, and no grounds would have been given for the intervention of the allied Powers if the conduct of certain Europeans in China had not been of a thoroughly provocative character, which nobody could put up with. All this muddle is another illustration of the fact that it is dangerous and unjustifiable for Europeans to deal with
  the populations of Eastern countries upon the assumption that they are dealing with people who have European instincts, customs, and habits. There will never be a settlement in China until a different system is pursued, and Chinese customs and habits are respected.
  MR. BELL: The matter I wish to bring forward is one affecting a large number of railway men in the country, but in deference to the wishes of the First Lord of the Treasury, if the matter may be raised upon the Adjournment on Tuesday, I am prepared to defer my remarks until then.
  MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Member would be quite in order on that occasion.
  MR. BELL: Then I will reserve what I intended to say.
  MR. A. J. BALFOURrose in his place and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."
  Question put, "That the Question be now put."
  The House divided:—Ayes, 167; Noes, 65. (Division List No. 109.)

  AYES.

  Acland-Hood, Capt. Sir A. F.

  Chapman, Edward

  Green, Walford D. (Wednesb'ry

  Anson, Sir William Reynell

  Charrington, Spencer

  Greene, Henry D. (Shrewsbury)

  Archdale, Edward Mervyn

  Cochrane, Hon. T. H. A. E.

  Grenfell, William Henry

  Arkwright, John Stanhope

  Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse

  Groves, James Grimble

  Arnold-Forster, Hugh O.

  Colomb, Sir John Chas. Ready

  Guthrie, Walter Murray

  Asher, Alexander

  Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow)

  Hamilton, Rt. Hn Lord G (Mid'x.

  Ashmead-Bartlett, Sir Ellis

  Cranborne, Viscount

  Hanbury, Rt. Hon. Robert Wm.

  Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John

  Dalrymple, Sir Charles

  Harris, F. Leverton (Tynem'th

  Austin, Sir John

  Dewar, J. A. (Inverness-sh.)

  Haslam, Sir Alfred S.

  Bain, Col. James Robert

  Dickson, Charles Scott

  Hay, Hon. Claude George

  Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J. (Manch'r

  Dimsdale, Sir Joseph Cockfield

  Heath, Arthur H. (Hanley)

  Balfour, Rt. Hon. G. W. (Leeds)

  Doughty, George

  Heath, James (Staffords, N. W.

  Banbury, Frederick George

  Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers-

  Heaton, John Henniker

  Beach, Rt. Hn. Sir M. H. (Bristol

  Durning-Lawrence, Sir Edwin

  Helme, Norval Watson

  Beaumont, Wentworth, C. B.

  Dyke, Rt. Hn. Sir William Hart

  Hickman, Sir Alfred

  Bell, Richard

  Fellowes, Hon. Ailwyn Edward

  Hope, J. F. (Sheffield, Brights'de

  Bignold, Arthur

  Fielden, Edward Brocklehurst

  Johnston, William (Belfast)

  Bill, Charles

  Finlay, Sir Robert Bannatyne

  Johnstone, Heywood (Sussex)

  Blundell, Col. Henry

  Firbank, Joseph Thomas

  Kenyon, James (Lancs., Bury)

  Bond, Edward

  Fisher, William Hayes

  Kenyon-Slaney Col. W. (Salop.

  Boscawen, Arthur Griffith-

  FitzGerald, Sir Robt. Penrose-

  Keswick, William

  Brassey, Albert

  Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond

  Knowles, Lees

  Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John

  Fitzroy, Hon. Edward A.

  Law, Andrew Bonar

  Bull, William James

  Fuller, J. M. F.

  Lawrence, William F.

  Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edw. H.

  Gladstone, Rt. Hn Herbert John

  Lawson, John Grant

  Cautley, Henry Strother

  Gordon, Hn. J. E. (Elgin & Nairn

  Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage

  Cavendish, V. C. W. (Derbyshire

  Gordon, Maj Evans-(T'rH'ml'ts

  Leigh-Bennett, Henry Currie

  Cecil, Lord Hugh (Greenwich)

  Gore, Hon. F. S. Ormsby-

  Leveson-Gower, Fred. N. S.

  Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J. (Birm.

  Goschen, Hon. Geo. Joachim

  Long, Col. Charles W. (Evesham

  Chamberlain, J. A. (Worc'r)

  Graham, Henry Robert

  Long, Rt. Hn. Walter (Bristol, S.

  Lucas, Col. Francis (Lowestoft)

  Pemberton, John S. G.

  Stirling-Maxwell, Sir John M.

  Lucas, Reginald J. (Portsmouth

  Penn, John

  Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)

  Lyttelton, Hon. Alfred

  Percy, Earl

  Talbot, Rt. Hn. J. G. (Oxf'd Univ.

  Macartney, Rt. Hn W. G Ellison

  Platt-Higgins, Frederick

  Taylor, Theodore Cooke

  Macdona, John Cumming

  Plummer, Walter R.

  Tomlinson, Wm. Edw. Murray

  M'Arthur, Charles (Liverpool)

  Powell, Sir Francis Sharp

  Tufnell, Lt.-Col. Edward

  M'Killop, James (Stirlingshire)

  Pretyman, Ernest George

  Valentia, Viscount

  Majendie, James A. H.

  Pryce-Jones, Lt.-Col. Edward

  Warde, Lt.-Col. C. E.

  Malcolm, Ian

  Purvis, Robert

  Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney)

  Manners, Lord Cecil

  Handles, John S.

  Webb, Col. William George

  Martin, Richard Biddulph

  Rankin, Sir James

  Whiteley, George (York, W. R.

  Massey-Mainwaring, Hn. W. F.

  Ratcliffe, R. F.

  Whiteley, H. (Ashton-u.-Lyne

  Maxwell, W. J. H. (Dumfriessh.

  Rea, Russell

  Whitley, J. H. (Halifax)

  Middlemore, J, Throgmorton

  Rentoul, James Alexander

  Whitmore, Charles Algernon

  Molesworth, Sir Lewis

  Renwick, George

  Williams, Colonel R. (Dorset)

  Montagu, G. (Huntingdon)

  Richards, Henry Charles

  Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.)

  Moon, Edward Robert Pacy

  Ritchie, Rt. Hn. Chas. Thomson

  Wilson, John (Falkirk)

  Moro, Robt. Jasper (Shropshire)

  Robertson, Herbert (Hackney)

  Wodehouse, Rt. Hn. E. R. (Bath)

  Morgan, D. J. (Walthamstow

  Royds, Clement Molyneux

  Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart-

  Morrell, George Herbert

  Rutherford, John

  Wrightson, Sir Thomas

  Morris, Hon. Martin Henry F.

  Sackville, Col. S. C. Stopford-

  Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George

  Morton, Arthur H. A. Deptford

  Sadler, Col. Samuel Alexander

  Young, Commander (Berks, E.)

  Mount, William Arthur

  Seely, Charles Hilton (Lincoln)

  Younger, William

  Murray, Rt. Hn A. Graham (Bute

  Shaw, Thomas (Hawick B.)

  Murray, Charles J. (Coventry)

  Smith, H C. (North'mb. Tyneside

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Sir William Walrond and Mr. Anstruther.

  Nicol, Donald Ninian

  Smith, James Parker (Lanarks.)

  Palmer, Walter (Salisbury)

  Spear, John Ward

  NOES.

  Abraham, William (Cork, N. E)

  Harwood, George

  O'Kelly, Jas. (Roscommon, N.)

  Abraham, William (Rhondda.

  Hayden, John Patrick

  O'Malley, William

  Ambrose, Robert

  Hayne, Rt. Hon. Chas. Seale-

  O'Mara, James

  Barry, E. (Cork, S.)

  Hobhouse, C. E. H. (Bristol, E.)

  O'Shaughnessy, P. J.

  Black, Alexander William

  Holland, William Henry

  Power, Patrick Joseph

  Poland, John

  Jones, William (Carnarvonsh.)

  Priestley, Arthur

  Boyle, James

  Joyce, Michael

  Reddy, M.

  Caldwell, James

  Leamy, Edmund

  Redmond J. E. (Waterford)

  Campbell, John (Armagh, S.)

  Leigh, Sir Joseph

  Redmond, William (Clare)

  Cogan, Denis J.

  Lundon, W.

  Rigg, Richard

  Condon, Thomas Joseph

  MacDonnell, Dr. Mark A.

  Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion)

  Crean, Eugene

  M'Fadden, Edward

  Roberts, John H. (Denbighs.)

  Cullinan, J.

  M'Killop, W. (Sligo, North)

  Sullivan, Donal

  Delany, William

  Mooney, John J.

  Thomas, J A (Glamorgan, Gow'r

  Doogan, P. C.

  Morton, E. J. C. (Devonport)

  Walton, John L. (Leeds, S.)

  Dully, William J.

  Murphy, J.

  Walton, Joseph (Barnsley)

  Duncan, James H.

  Nannetti, Joseph P.

  Weir, James Galloway

  Ffrench, Peter

  Nolan, Joseph (Louth, South)

  White, Patrick (Meath, N.)

  Flavin, Michael Joseph

  O'Brien, K. (Tipperary, Mid)

  Wilson, John (Durham, Mid)

  Flynn, James Christopher

  O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool)

  Gilhooly, James

  O'Doherty, William

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Captain Donelan and Mr. Patrick O'Brien.

  Goddard, Daniel Lord

  O'Donnell, T. (Kerry, W.)

  Griffith, Ellis J.

  O'Dowd, John

  Question put accordingly, "That the Bill be now read the third time."
  The House divided:—Ayes, 182; Noes, 47. (Division List No. 110.)

  AYES.

  Abraham, William (Rhondda)

  Beach, Rt. Hn. Sir M. H. (Bristol

  Cautley, Henry Strother

  Acland-Hood, Capt Sir Alex. F.

  Beaumont, Wentworth C. B.

  Cavendish, V. C. W. (Derbysh.

  Anson, Sir William Reynell

  Bignold, Arthur

  Cecil, Lord Hugh (Greenwich)

  Archdale, Edward Mervyn

  Bill, Charles

  Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J (Birm.

  Arkwright, John Stanhope

  Black, Alexander William

  Chamberlain J. Austen (Worc'r

  Arnold-Forster, Hugh O.

  Blundell, Colonel Henry

  Chapman, Edward

  Asher, Alexander

  Bond, Edward

  Charrington, Spencer

  Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John

  Boscawen, Arthur Griffith-

  Cochrane, Hon. Thos. H. A. E.

  Austin, Sir John

  Brassey, Albert

  Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse

  Bain, Colonel James Robert

  Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John

  Colomb, Sir John Chas. Ready

  Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J. (Manch'r

  Ball, William James

  Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow)

  Balfour, Rt. Hn Gerald W (Leeds

  Caldwell, James

  Cranborne, Viscount

  Banbury, Frederick George

  Carson, lit. Hon. Sir Edw. H.

  Dalrymple, Sir Charles

  Dewar, John A. (Inverness-sh.

  Keswick, William

  Randles, John S.

  Dickson, Charles Scott

  Knowles, Lees

  Rankin, Sir James

  Dimsdale, Sir Joseph Cockfield

  Law, Andrew Bonar

  Ratcliffe, R. F.

  Doughty, George

  Lawrence, William F.

  Rea, Russell

  Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers

  Lawson, John Grant

  Rentoul, James Alexander

  Duncan, James H.

  Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage

  Renwick, George

  Durning-Lawrence, Sir Edwin

  Leigh, Sir Joseph

  Richards, Henry Charles

  Dyke, Rt. Hon. Sir Wm. Hart

  Leigh-Bennett, Henry Currie

  Rigg, Richard

  Fellowes, Hon. Ailwyn Edward

  Leveson-Crower, Frederick N. S

  Ritchie, Rt. H n. Chas. Thomson

  Fielden, Edward Brocklehurst

  Long, Col Charles W. (Evesham

  Roberts, John H. (Denbighs.)

  Finlay, Sir Robert Bannatyne

  Long, Rt. Hn. Walter (Bristol, S

  Robertson, Herbert (Hackney)

  Firbank, Joseph Thomas

  Lucas, Col. Francis (Lowestoft)

  Royds, Clement Molyneux

  Fisher, William Hayes

  Lucas, R. J. (Portsmouth)

  Rutherford, John

  FitzGerald, Sir R. Penrose-

  Lyttelton, Hon. Alfred

  Sackville, Col. S. G. Stopford-

  Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond

  Macartney, Rt. Hn. W. (J. F.

  Sadler, Col Samuel Alex.

  Fitzroy, Hon. Edw. Algernon

  Macdona, John Gumming

  Seely, Charles Hilton (Lincoln)

  Fuller, J. M. F.

  M'Arthur, Charles (Liverpool)

  Shaw, Thomas (Hawick B.)

  Gladstone, Rt. Hon. Herbert J.

  M'Killop, James (Stirlingshire)

  Smith, H. C (N'rth'mb, Tynes'de

  Goddard, Daniel Ford

  Majendie, James A. H.

  Smith, James Parker (Lanarks)

  Cordon, Hn. J E. (Elgin & Nairn

  Malcolm, Ian

  Spear, John Ward

  Gordon, Maj Evans-(T'rH'ml'ts

  Manners, Lord Cecil

  Stirling-Maxwell, Sir J. M.

  Gore, Hon. F. S. Ormsby-

  Martin, Richard Biddulph

  Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)

  Goschen, Hon. George Joachim

  Massey-Mainwaring, Hn W. F.

  Talbot, Rt. Hn. J. G. (Oxfd Univ

  Graham, Henry Robert

  Maxwell, W. J. H. (Dumfriessh)

  Thomas, J. A. (Glam'rg'n, Gow'r

  Green, Walford D. (Wednesb'ry

  Middlemore, John Throgmort'n

  Tomlinson, William Edw. M.

  Greene, Henry D. (Shrewsbury)

  Molesworth, Sir Lewis

  Tufnell, Lieut.-Col. Edward

  Grenfell, William Henry

  Montagu, G. (Huntingdon)

  Valentia, Viscount

  Griffith, Ellis J.

  Moon, Edward Robert Pacy

  Walton, John Lawson (Leeds, S.

  Groves, James Grimble

  More, Robt. Jasper (Shropshire

  Walton, Joseph (Barnsley)

  Guthrie, Walter Murray

  Morgan, David J (Walthamst'w

  Warde, Lieut.-Col. C. E.

  Hamilton, Rt. Hn Lord G (Mid'x

  Morrell, George Herbert

  Wason, John C. (Orkney)

  Hanbury, Rt. Hon. Robert Wm.

  Morris, Hon. Martin Henry F.

  Webb, Col. William George

  Harris, F Leverton (Tynemouth

  Morton, Arthur H. A. (Deptford

  Weir, James Galloway

  Haslam, Sir Alfred S.

  Morton, Edw. J. G. (Devonport)

  Whiteley, H. (Ashton-u.-Lyne)

  Hay, Hon. Claude George

  Mount, William Arthur

  Whitmore, Charles Algernon

  Hayne, Rt. Hon Charles Seale-

  Murray, Rt. Hn A. Graham (Bute

  Williams, Col. it. (Dorset)

  Heath, Arthur Howard (Hanley

  Murray, Charles J. (Coventry

  Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.

  Heath, James (Staffords, N. W.

  Nicol, Donald Ninian

  Wilson, John (Durham, Mid)

  Heaton, John Henniker

  Palmer, Walter (Salisbury)

  Wilson, John (Falkirk)

  Helme, Norval Watson

  Pemberton, John S. G.

  Wodehouse, Rt. Hn. E. R. (Bath)

  Hickman, Sir Alfred

  Penn, John

  Wortley, Rt. Hn. C. B. Stuart-

  Hobhouse, C. E. H. (Bristol, E.)

  Percy, Earl

  Wrightson, Sir Thomas

  Holland, William Henry

  Platt-Higgins, Frederick

  Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George

  Hope, J. E (Sheffield, Brightside

  Plummer, Walter R.

  Young, Commander (Berks, E.)

  Johnston, William (Belfast)

  Powell, Sir Francis Sharp

  Younger, William

  Johnstone, Heywood (Sussex)

  Pretyman, Ernest George

  Jones, William (Carnarvons.)

  Priestley, Arthur

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Sir William Walrond and Mr. Anstruther.

  Kenyon, James (Lancs., Bury)

  Pryce Jones, Lt.-Col. Edward

  Kenyon-Slaney, Col. W. (Salop)

  Purvis, Robert

  NOES.

  Abraham, William (Cork, N. E.

  Hayden, John Patrick

  O'Malley, William

  Ambrose, Robert

  Joyce, Michael

  O'Mara, James

  Harry, F. (Cork, S.)

  Leamy, Edmund

  O'Shaughnessy, P. J.

  Boland, John

  Lundon

  Power, Patrick Joseph

  Boyle, James

  MacDonnell, Dr. Mark A.

  Reddy, M.

  Campbell, John (Armagh, S.)

  M'Fadden, Edward

  Redmond, John E. (Waterford)

  Cogan, Denis J.

  M'Killop, W. (Sligo, North)

  Redmond, William (Clare)

  Condon, Thomas Joseph

  Mooney, John J.

  Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion)

  Crean, Eugene

  Murphy, J.

  Sullivan, Donal

  Cullinan, J.

  Nannetti, Joseph P.

  Taylor, Theodore Cooke

  Delany, William

  Nolan, Joseph (Louth, South)

  White, George (Norfolk)

  Doogan, P. C.

  O'Brien, Kendal (T'pper'ry Mid

  White, Patrick (Meath, North

  Duffy, William J.

  O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool)

  Whitley, J. H. (Halifax)

  Ffrench, Peter

  O'Doherty, William

  Flavin, Michael Joseph

  O'Donnell, T. (Kerry, W.)

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Captain Donelan and Mr. Patrick O'Brien.

  Flynn, James Christopher

  O'Dowd, John

  Gilhooly, James

  O'Kelly, James (Roscommon, N

  Bill read the third time, and passed.

  Adjourned at ten minutes before One of the clock.

The Duke of Wellington sat first in Parliament after the death of his brother.
The Viscount Bangor took the Oath.

PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.
Private Bills, for petitions respecting, see page
The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House that the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificate from the Examiners that the further Standing Orders applicable to the following Bill have been complied with—Worcester Tramways [H.L.]; and also the Certificate that the Standing Orders applicable to the following Bills have not been complied with—Rodgers' Patent (Petition for Bill).
The same were ordered to lie on the Table.

SOUTH EASTERN AND LONDON, CHATHAM, AND DOVER RAILWAYS BILL [H.L.]
Petition for additional provision, of the South Eastern Railway Company, the London, Chatham and Dover Railway Company, and the South Eastern and Chatham Railway Companies Managing Committee; together with the proposed clauses and Amendments annexed thereto; read, and referred to the Examiners.
KING'S NORTON AND NORTHFIELD URBAN DISTRICT TRAMWAYS BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee with Amendments.
AIRE AND CALDER NAVIGATION BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee with Amendments.
SHIELDS BRIDGE BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee with Amendments.
CHRIST'S HOSPITAL (LONDON) BILL [H.L.]
  ALERETON CAS BILL [H.L.]
  Reported with Amendments.
OMAGH GAS BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee with Amendments.
BOURNEMOUTH CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee with Amendments.
BETHLEM HOSPITAL BILL [H.L.]
  BRIDEWELL HOSPITAL BILL [H.L.]
LOWESTOFT CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
Committed. The Committee to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.
ARLESEY GAS BILL [H.L.]
  NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE AND GATESHEAD GAS BILL [H.L.]
    FOLKESTONE CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
    Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
WARKWORTH HARBOUR BILL [H.L.]
  PORTMADOC, BEDDGELERT, AND SOUTH SNOWDON RAILWAY BILL [H.L.]

    NEWPORT (ISLE OF WIGHT) GAS BILL [H.L.]
    WISBECH WATER BILL [H.L.].
    HARPENDEN DISTRICT GAS BILL [H.L.].
    LONDON, BRIGHTON, AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY BILL [H.L.].
    SOUTH-EASTERN AND LONDON, CHATHAM, AND DOVER RAILWAYS BILL [H.L.].
    SOUTH-WESTERN AND ISLE OF WIGHT JUNCTION RAILWAY BILL [H.L.].
    LEEDS CORPORATION (GENERAL POWERS) BILL [H.L.].
    Report from the Committee of Selection, That the following Lords be proposed to the House to form the Select Committee for the consideration of the said Bills, viz.:—

    E. Albemarle,

    E. Lauderdale (chairman),

    E. Verulam,

    V. Hutchinson (E. Donoughmore),

    L. Lilford.

    Agreed to; and the said Lords appointed accordingly; the Committee to meet on Tuesday the 23rd of April next,
    4
    at Eleven of the clock; and all petitions referred to the Committee, with leave to the petitioners praying to be heard by counsel against the Bills to be heard as desired, as also counsel for the Bills.

MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR BOARD BILL [H.L.]
  MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR BOARD (CANADA DOCK WORKS, ETC.) BILL [H.L.]

    MANCHESTER CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
    MANCHESTER (MARKET STREET AREA) IMPROVEMENTS BILL [H.L.].
    MANCHESTER AND LIVERPOOL ELECTRIC EXPRESS RAILWAY BILL [H.L.].
    STOCKPORT CORPORATION WATER BILL [H.L.].
    Report from the Committee of Selection, That the following Lords be proposed to the House to form the Select Committee for the consideration of the said Bills, viz.:—

    E. Tankerville,

    V. Falkland (chairman),

    V. Bangor,

    V. Frankfort de Montmorency,

    L. Wrottesley.

    Agreed to; and the said Lords appointed accordingly; the Committee to meet on Tuesday the 23rd of April next, at Eleven of the clock; and all petitions referred to the Committee, with leave to the petitioners praying to be heard by counsel against the Bills to be heard as desired, as also counsel for the Bills.

WATFORD AND DISTRICT TRAMWAYS BILL.
Order of the day for the Second Reading, read.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Chairman of Committees).
LORD EBURY: My Lords, when this Bill was before the Standing Orders Committee, I understood my noble friend the Chairman of Committees to tell the promoters that in regard to a very material, and, from my point of view, a very objectionable part of the Bill, the Standing Order had not been complied with and it could not be dispensed with in their behalf. In the very brief epitome of the proceedings before the

5
Standing Orders Committee which was distributed to your Lordships, it seemed to me that that decision of my noble friends—in the absence of which, as he is aware, I should have felt it to be my duty to enter an emphatic protest against the Second Reading—was very inaccurately expressed. I have gathered incidentally that before this Bill goes to a Committee some of its most objectionable features will have to be expunged. Meanwhile, however, it comes before your Lordships in an unamended form, and if it were now read a second time without comment or explanation the inevitable result would be much local misunderstanding, much needless expense, and much prejudice to the case of those who, at a later stage of the present session, or in a future session, may desire to oppose the Bill. In these circumstances I have felt justified in troubling my noble friend with the question that stands in my name—namely, Whether he will state the circumstances under which it is proposed to read the Bill a second time. I shall be quite satisfied if he is able to tell me that that portion of the Bill, in regard to which the Standing Orders have not been complied with, will not be submitted during the present session to a Committee of your Lordships' House.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (The Earl of MORLEY): I think I can give my noble friend the assurance he desires. The tramway proposed in the Bill consisted of three parts. One part went through the urban district of Watford, another through the rural district of Watford, and the remaining mile-and-a-half through the urban district of Rickmansworth. The two urban districts had consented to the Bill, but the rural district of Watford, through which the longer length of the tramway was marked out, had not consented. The consequence was that under your Lordships' Standing Orders the Examiners reported a non-compliance. The promoters desired that the Standing Order should be dispensed with. The position I took up was that that portion of the tramway which went through the Watford rural district, and in respect of which the local authority had refused their consent, should be excluded altogether from the Bill; but I said that if the promoters thought it worth their while to proceed with the Bill including only the tramways going through the
6
districts that had given their consent I should not oppose it. They said, at the time, that probably it would not be worth while going on with the Bill, but I now see that they desire to do so. On the distinct understanding that the Bill should be amended I allowed it to proceed. These are the circumstances under which the Bill now comes before your Lordships for Second Reading.
LORD EBURY: I am quite satisfied with my noble friend's explanation.
On Question agreed to, Bill read 2a accordingly.

RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.

  TRADE REPORTS (ANNUAL SERIES).
  No. 2566. United States (Chicago and District).
  No. 2567. Chili (Coquimbo).

  BOARD OF EDUCATION.
  Code of regulations for Day Schools; with schedules and appendices.
  Presented (by command), and ordered to lie on the Table.

  PRIVATE LEGISLATION PROCEDURE (SCOTLAND) ACT, 1899.
  Amending General Order for the regulation of proceedings under and in pursuance of the Act.
  FACTORY AND WORKSHOP (MANU FACTURE OF EARTHENWARE AND CHINA).
  Amended special rules for the manufacture of earthenware and china.

  TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION ACTS.
  Minutes sanctioning the subjects to be taught under Clause 8 of the Technical Instruction Act, 1889, for the—

  1. County Borough of South Shields (4th minute);

  2. County of Glamorgan (10th minute).

  Laid before the House (pursuant to Act), and ordered to lie on the Table.

POLLING ARRANGEMENTS (PARLIAMENTARY BOROUGHS) BILL [H.L.]
[SECOND READING.]
Order of the day for the Second Reading, read.
LORD RIBBLESDALE: My Lords, the, object of this measure and of the Polling-Districts (County Councils) Bill, which is also down for Second Reading, is to remove certain anomalies which have arisen. Having regard to the constitutional severance of Peers from anything to do with elections or polling districts, I feel that in having a Bill of this nature entrusted to me I am rather in the position of a nun who had undertaken some alteration in the marriage laws. But I suppose I shall be allowed to move its Second Reading. Similar Bills were brought in in 1897, 1898, and 1899. In the latter year nothing was done, because it was expected that some provision would be inserted in the Local Government Act of last year, which would affect the question. Such, however, did not turn out to be the case. The Home Secretary, in reply to a communication from the London County Council, said he had no observations to offer with regard to the Bill, and we therefore assumed that his silence gave consent. As your Lordships are probably aware, the authorities who arrange the polling districts differ, and the effect of this Bill will be to make the county councils all over England the sole authority for settling the polling districts in Parliamentary electoral divisions just as they are in county council electoral divisions.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Ribblesdale.)
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (The Earl of HARDWICKE): In the absence of the noble Lord who represents the Home Office, I am asked to state that my right hon. friend Mr. Ritchie has no objection to offer to the Bill; but he wishes it to be clearly understood that he can give no guarantee to support it.
On Question, agreed to: Bill road 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

POLLING DISTRICTS (COUNTY COUNCILS) BILL [H.L.]
[SECOND READING.]
Order of the day for the Second Reading read.
LORD RIBBLESDALE: My Lords, this Bill hangs almost entirely on the
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previous one. As I explained a moment ago, the County Council polling districts are fixed by the County Council, but, in the opinion of Sir Edward Clarke and Sir Robert Finlay, when once they are fixed they cannot possibly be altered. This may lead to all sorts of difficulties, for a place which is very convenient at one cycle of years may become, owing to the circumstances of population, very inconvenient at another. The object of this Bill is to give county councils the power of altering any polling district from time to time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Ribblesdale.)
THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: This Bill concerns the Local Government Board as well as the Home Office, and I am asked to state that neither body offers any objection to the Bill, but they cannot give any pledge to support it.
LORD RIBBLESDALE: Are we to understand from that that they oppose it?
THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: At this stage they do not oppose it, but I do not know what they may see fit to do at a future stage.
On Question, agreed to, Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

TRANSVAAL CONCESSIONS COMMISSION.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: My Lords, I beg to ask whether the Report of the Transvaal Concessions Commission will be presented to Parliament; and, if not, to move for the production of that part of the Report which refers to the Transvaal railways. It will be in your Lordships' recollection that some months ago His Majesty's Government appointed a Commission to inquire into concessions in the Transvaal. That Commission has, I believe, concluded its labours, and either has reported or is on the point of reporting; and in the present condition of affairs in South Africa it is very important that Parliament should be possessed as soon as possible of the conclusions of this Commission. There are two classes of concessions in the Transvaal, the ordinary concessions, such as the dynamite

9
monopoly, and, secondly, the railways. The question of the railways is of special interest to this country at the present moment. A year ago I called your Lordships' attention to this subject, and I obtained certain Returns which showed the nature of the property of these railways. It was very clear, even at that time, that on the solution of the question of the railways would depend the solution of the most important points in the South African difficulty. That is much more evident now. In the early future we shall have to inquire very closely into the transactions of the Transvaal Railway Companies, and certain very important questions will have to be discussed, to which I have no doubt attention will be called in this House.
During the war we have had to contend with no less than three belligerents—the two Republics and also the Netherlands Railway Company. When I call the Netherlands Railway Company a belligerent I do so advisedly, for the injury which has been done by that railway, when it comes to be measured, will be found to be very great indeed. When I make such a bold statement as to call that railway a belligerent, I do so on unimpeachable authority that of the General Manager. All the letter books of the Netherlands Railway were supposed to have been destroyed, but, fortunately, the General Manager had written letters to his Board and to private persons, which came into the possession of the Commission. Writing on 28th April, 1900, to two of his co-directors in Holland, the General Manager said—
"Dear Sirs,—Your remarks with regard to the strict neutrality of the Netherlands South Africa Railway are not refreshing to me, especially as they come now that the chances have turned against the Boers. If it should come to the worst, and the English become masters here, I am afraid that we have hopelessly compromised ourselves, in deed, word, and writing. We have made cannon and ammunition; we have sold material to the Republic; we have blown up bridges on English territory, and have not discharged our staff on commando. We have assisted the Orange Free State with advice, and, indeed, with persons and material. There are in existence letters, telegrams, and living witnesses that we have strongly supported the Government in its defence. I have everything covered as much as possible by orders, but I have never yet attempted the appearance that we object to carrying out all of them. On the contrary, there are proofs that we have been only too willing to do everything that is in the interest of the Republic. How could it be
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otherwise? We have always sounded it—how we serve the interests of the State, and how the Government could always reckon on us in difficult circumstances. Yes; how we always were plus royal que le roi. Everybody knows that, and I can well understand that our Holland gang is not beloved in London."
It may be argued that they were asked under coercion and could not help themselves, as, under Article 22 of the Concession, the Government of the Transvaal had the power to make use of all the railways. But, later on in this letter, the General Manager says—
"We have, it is true, done things that we were not obliged to do according to the letter of the Concession. For instance, I might have said, 'Our workshops cannot make or repair cannon, we cannot shoe horses, make any tents, any ammunition, etc., we have no one who can work with dynamite.' We were not obliged to lend men to the Orange Free State. I could have said, 'We are not going to pay our men on commando.' We were not obliged to exploit railways outside the State, and our neutrality prohibits us from entering into agreements to that effect. I could have said, 'I have no material for this or that commando; our oil is finished, and now we cannot run,' etc. I would like to know how soon I would then have gone the way of the manager of the Pretoria-Pietersburg line, who was immediately put over the border when be tried to maintain his neutrality. I would also, then, have liked to hear your judgment—you who were proud of it when you heard of the Z.A.S.M. (Netherlands Railway) deed of heroism in the destruction of bridges, etc.—you who wished for further data in order to make mention in your yearly report of the active part we took in the defence of the country. The adversities of the Republics must have sorely touched you in order to make you all of a sudden so anxiously neutral."
Your Lordships will see that the General Manager clearly implicates himself. He not only implicates himself, but his board also. In a private letter, dated 13th February, he said—
"Confirming my telegram of even date, I must inform you that it is my intention to assist the Government of the Orange Free State as much as possible by exploiting the railways in Cape Colony, and that we must, therefore, provide Van Eelde, whom they have charged with it, with a good set of men."
Your Lordships must remember that this is a private railway in the Transvaal Republic, which turns itself into an active belligerent and takes part in the fighting in the Orange Free State. Writing on 28th February—the day of the relief of Ladysmith—the General Manager said—
"We have withdrawn our railway servants at Modder Spruit, and taken the rolling-stock

11
back to Glencoe. All cannon also brought over. All bridges and culverts between Modder Spruit and Elandslaagte have been destroyed. Westenberg
(one of the chief engineers), with his destruction staff, forms the rear guard."
That was, the rear guard of the Boor Army. All this has appeared in evidence, and it is clear that the board are implicated. They had attacked us in Natal, had blown up bridges in Natal, had fought against us in the Transvaal, had made cartridges and cannon for use against us, and had actively assisted the Boers in every way; and when finally our troops reached Standerton the Railway Company actively opposed us by destroying engines. Ultimately nearly the whole of the railway staff were driven from the Transvaal and exported from Delagoa Bay as undesirables. Is there such another instance in history where a private company has attacked a foreign Power with which it had nothing to do, not limiting itself to defending the country in which its property lay, but invading outside territory and doing all the damage possible? What we desire to know is the extent of the damage done by the company and the amount of the indemnity they will be required to pay. For that information it is essential to have the Report of the Commission, and I hope that it will be laid before Parliament with as little delay as possible. It may be said that there are innocent shareholders of the company in various parts of the world. The point we urge is that the shareholders have nothing whatever to do with the matter. The question is the responsibility and liability of the Board of Directors. Your Lordships will no doubt be troubled with the matter again, but for the present I will content myself by asking the question standing in my name.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (The Earl of ONSLOW): The noble Lord began his remarks by saying that the Report of the Commission either had been, or was about to be, presented. The latter is the correct recital of the facts. The Report has not yet been seen, even in draft, by the Secretary of State or myself, but within the last few moments I have obtained information from the Chairman of the Commission that the Report is in
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the printers' hands and likely to be ready for the Secretary of State in the course of a week or so. The noble Earl will agree with me that, as the Report has not yet been seen by the Secretary of State, it is impossible to say whether it can be presented to Parliament or not, but the remarks of the noble Earl, on which I do not propose to follow him, will, of course, engage the attention of the Secretary of State.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: I would suggest, as the Report will probably be of considerable length, that, if it should be decided to lay it before Parliament, it may be well to divide it into two parts, separating the Report upon the railway from other matters.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: The suggestion of the noble Earl shall receive consideration.

CHINA—PRESENT POSITION AND POLICY.
EARL SPENCER: My Lords, I beg to ask the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can communicate to the House the latest information as to our position in China, stating especially—

1. Whether military operations have been concluded, and if there is prospect of the Allies withdrawing their forces at an early date.

2. What is the present state of the negotiations with the Government of China, and whether the Powers are agreed in their demands.

3. Whether the Anglo-German agreement applies to Manchuria, and, if not, whether there was any understanding, verbal or otherwise, at the time of negotiation which excluded Manchuria from the agreement.

4. Whether, since Sir C. Scott's despatch of 6th February, 1901, there has been any convention between Russia and China, and, if so, whether the terms of such convention can be made known.

5. Whether the large interests held by British in the two railways from Shan-hai-Kwan to Neu-chwang, and from Shan-hai-Kwan to Tientsin, are being duly protected.

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6. Whether any further control of railways in Mongolia has been granted by the Chinese Government to Russia, and, if so, what attitude His Majesty's Government have taken in regard to this question.

I do not propose to do more than offer a few remarks as preface to the questions standing in my name; but I feel I ought to explain how it is I put these somewhat numerous questions to the noble Marquess. I shall not attempt to go into the whole question of our position in China, whore matters of a most momentous kind have happened within the last two years. I will only briefly refer to what has occurred since last summer. In the interval very grave events have happened. There have been serious conflicts between European and Chinese troops, not only with rebels called Boxers, but I fear it is almost clear that conflicts have occurred with troops of the Chinese Government. There has been a siege of the Legations at Peking, and an heroic defence of those Legations by those who were there with very few soldiers or Marines, the defenders showing an amount of resource, bravery, energy, and ability which will long remain on record as one of the most eventful sieges of the present era. Besides this, there have been severe conflicts on the Chinese frontier between Russian and Chinese forces; there have been murders of missionaries and others in various parts of the Chinese Empire and great destruction of private property belonging to British and other nations. Moreover, the Chinese Government has fled from Peking, and we have practically no Chinese Government to deal with at this moment. All these events have led to very serious political complications, and to great disturbances of the peaceful pursuance of commerce.
I need hardly say that the deepest anxiety has prevailed in this country with regard to all these matters on account of the very great and deep interest our people have in China. We have very little information in regard to these matters. No doubt, there are certain Blue-books, but these, if I am not mistaken, do not carry the history of these affairs beyond 30th September last. In this House we have not had a debate on these subjects since last summer. Some incidental remarks were made last autumn and at the opening of this
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session by the Prime Minister, but I am sure of this—that since the noble Marquess has held the seals of the Foreign Office he has not been asked a single question with regard to foreign affairs. We on this Bench have been reluctant to bring forward any question upon this difficult and tangled subject that might in any way embarrass His Majesty's Government. At the same time, there have been in another place questions asked and, in a certain degree, answered; and at Berlin the Minister for Foreign Affairs has, on one occasion if not more, made a long and serious speech in reference to China. We feel, therefore, we cannot remain without giving an opportunity to the noble Marquess of stating the most recent facts which he is able to state with regard to what is going on in China, and the policy of His Majesty's Government. I will go further and say that Parliament and the country have a right to the fullest information on this subject, upon which our interests are so gravely affected. I ought to say, perhaps, that there was one question asked last week with reference to incidents at Tientsin. I have put down a long string of questions. The noble Marquess, when I mentioned the subject to him, hoped I should be able to tell him the points on which I desired information, and I thought it better to be explicit, even if I ran into length, than to put a general question, and to amplify that general question in the course of my speech. This is the history of the somewhat lengthy questions of which I have given notice.
A few words on the general policy of the Government. First of all, His Majesty's Government desire to obtain redress for outrages committed upon British subjects at our Legation, and the punishment of those who so grossly violated international law. They also wish to obtain security for life and property in the future, but, so far as I know, the two paramount principles guiding His Majesty's Government are these:—To maintain un-diminished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire; that is the first point, and I am not quite sure that if we examine the events that have taken place we can say that His Majesty's Government have been altogether successful. But I do not stay to dilate on this. The other point is to see that the ports on the rivers and littoral of China remain open to international trade and legitimate purposes

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of commercial activity. These are, I think, the two cardinal supports upon which His Majesty's Government base their policy in China. I am quite aware that there are other questions affecting China to which some people attach even greater importance than those I have put on the Paper. There is the question of the yang-tsze Valley and our influence there, and the Peking-Hankow Railway; the questions of Canton and the West River, in which we have great interest. There is also the serious question of Korea and Japan, and what are the relations between Russia and Japan with regard to it. I only refer to these matters now in order that if the noble Marquess should make a comprehensive statement with regard to China he may be willing to give us some information, and if he is able to do so it will give great satisfaction to Parliament and the country. We on this Bench, and I believe every one in the country, trust that we shall hear that there is good feeling and co-operation among all the different Powers now operating and working together in China, and I sincerely trust the good feeling between Russia and this country, which apparently brought about the satisfactory conclusion of the incident of Tientsin which seemed at one time so dangerous, will be typical of the goodwill and good feeling which prevail among all the nations now engaged in China.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of LANSDOWNE): My Lords, I readily concede that the noble Earl has a perfect right to question His Majesty's Government upon this important subject, and I admit the forbearance which he has shown in postponing this discussion until the present time. I will endeavour to reply to the questions which he has put to me. The noble Earl asked in the first place whether military operations had been concluded, and if there were a prospect of the Allies withdrawing their forces from China at an early date. As he told your Lordships, the British forces went to China for the purpose of bringing about the relief of the Legations. I may be allowed to express my concurrence with what was said by the noble Earl as to the heroic character of that defence—a brilliant and ever memorable chapter in the history of this country. That purpose has fortunately been
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achieved, and at this moment, so far as I am aware, no military operations, no new movement of troops, are in progress or in contemplation.
Your Lordships are aware that from the first the Government have laid it down clearly that it was not their desire that British forces should be employed in military operations in the remoter parts of China, and to that policy we adhere. A short time ago we became aware that Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee had issued an order to the forces under his command to hold themselves ready for fresh operations. The scope of these operations was, very properly, not divulged. All it was necessary for us to do in those circumstances was to instruct General Gaselee that before taking part in thorn he should refer homo to His Majesty's Government. There is another purpose for which it seems to me that—for a time, at any rate—the presence of a British force in Northern China is indispensable. If your Lordships have carried in your minds the joint Note which was presented by the allies to China, you will remember that, at the conclusion of the document, it was stated that—
"Until the Chinese Government have complied with the above conditions to the satisfaction of the Powers the undersigned can hold out no expectation that the occupation of Peking and Pe-chi-li by the allied forces could be brought to a conclusion."
I think we are hardly yet in a position to say that the compliance of the Chinese Government has been of such a character as to justify the withdrawal of the allied forces. But I need not assure the House that it will be our earnest endeavour to press on the negotiations; and we have every hope that, before long, it may be possible for us to withdraw, or, at any rate, largely diminish the number of British troops now serving in that part of China.
My Lords, the noble Earl questioned me with regard to the progress of the negotiations. I am afraid we must admit that that progress has been slow. That is a matter for regret, but scarcely a matter for surprise. I do not suppose that, in the history of diplomacy, there have ever been negotiations carried on under conditions less calculated to bring about an expeditious settlement. I would ask your Lordships to consider what these conditions are. You have,

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on the one hand, China. The Chinese Government is used to methods of diplomacy which are not entirely in accord with those to which we are accustomed and which do not, perhaps, conduce greatly to rapid and satisfactory progress. But, at this moment, as the noble Earl told the House, China is, I will not say without a central Government, but her Government is a refugee Government established in a remote provincial town; and we have to negotiate as best we can—sometimes with that Government, sometimes with plenipotentiaries at Peking, sometimes through the medium of other high Chinese officials. On the other hand, you have, not a single Power, but no fewer than eleven Powers, with eleven representatives sitting in conference at Peking. It is surely not a matter for surprise that amongst those Governments and those representatives there should be room for divergences of opinion, which naturally tend to prolong the course of negotiations.
There is also to be considered the difficultly of the subjects which are under discussion at Peking. They are numerous and full of complexity. The representatives of the Powers have to deal with the reparation to be exacted from China; with the measures necessary to prevent the recurrence of these unfortunate events; with the indemnification of the Governments and private persons who have been put to expense and loss during the recent incidents; and last, but not least, with the financial measures which will be necessary in order to provide the revenues required for the satisfaction of the demands which will be made. When we consider the conditions I have described, I think we can scarcely be astonished that the negotiations should not have proceeded with very great rapidity. In these circumstances we may, at any rate, find some consolation in the reflection that on certain broad questions of policy there is practical unanimity among the Powers. Those principles are, I take it, that we are not at war with China; that we desire to derive no territorial advantages from these events; that we recognise as binding all existing treaty obligations; and with regard to commercial and economical questions, that we desire to observe what is commonly known as the policy of the open door, and that within those particular spheres where preferential rights have been accorded to certain
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Powers there should be equality of opportunity for all other Powers concerned.
With regard to the negotiations, the House will remember that in the last days of last year the Allies agreed to the joint Note which I quoted a moment ago. That Note was accepted by the Chinese Government, and we have since been negotiating with regard to the measures necessary in order to secure compliance with the conditions embodied in the Note. It would be quite impossible for me, in reply to the question of the noble Karl, to review those negotiations in detail. But I can give him some information with regard to a few of the more interesting points. There is, in the first place, the controversy that has arisen with regard to the punishment of certain highly-placed officials who wore responsible for the outrages committed at Peking and elsewhere. The Note places on record the view of the Powers that the severest punishment, in proportion to their crimes, is due to those persons. We should have preferred that the Note should have placed on record that these persons deserved not merely the severest punishment, but the death penalty; we believe that that, and that only, was the appropriate penalty in such eases. In deference, however, to the views of his colleagues, our representative accepted the formula I have just quoted, but, on the understanding that in the most flagrant cases "the severest punishment," in proportion to their crimes, meant the infliction of the death penalty.
Up to the present time, out of eleven persons who were referred to in the Note, I find that death sentences have been passed on three and carried out in two cases, that three other persons have been, in accordance with the custom of the country, permitted to put an end to their own existence, and that, in the case of three more, the sentence of punishment and degradation has been passed. I cannot, of course, say whether these latter sentences have been actually enforced. Then, my Lords, there is the clause with regard to the Legation guards and the occupation of certain posts to secure communication between Peking and the sea. As to that, considerable progress has been made. I do not detect any very material difference between the views which have been expressed by the representatives of the

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different Powers. Our instructions to our representative have been that he should be moderate in his demands: we have told him that it is not our desire that Peking should be turned into a sort of fortress or cantonment, but that we wish the strength of the Legation guards to be sufficient only for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the Legations in case of sudden emergency or disorder.
The question which, I think, is at this moment most engaging the attention of the Conference in Peking is the extremely difficult question of the indemnities. These, of course, fall under two heads. There are the national indemnities which the Powers will require in satisfaction of the expense to which they have been put by these military operations, and there are the private claims put forward by individuals, companies, associations, missionaries, and so on, who have suffered loss. We have to determine how much is to be claimed under these different heads. When we have ascertained that, we shall have to decide whether the whole or only a part of the demands is to be pressed. And then will arise the question of the sources from which China is to obtain the necessary revenue in order to satisfy the interest on any debt which she may be obliged to incur for the purpose of meeting the claims. I can only indicate in general terms the principles which we are endeavouring to follow. We think that in regard to the war indemnities our claims should be limited to the actual cost incurred in these operations, and in the case of the private claims we also desire to exclude what are usually described as indirect or consequential claims. The Committee of the Representatives in Peking have reported as to the principles upon which it is thought desirable to proceed, and their Report is under our consideration at this moment. There has also been a small committee appointed, under the immediate direction of the British Legation, to examine and classify the claims put forward by British subjects. We have expressed our opinion that, when these claims have been examined they should be presented to the Chinese Government, not by each Power individually, but by the Powers acting collectively.
With regard to the sources from which the Chinese Government might obtain the necessary increase of revenue for the
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purpose of meeting these indemnities, we have obtained a good deal of evidence from experts as to the possibility of tapping new sources of revenue. Here again I should like to say that our opinion is that we should avoid imposing upon China a burden which could properly be described as of a crushing or overwhelming nature. Our policy has been to respect the existence of China as a Power; and we think that we should be setting to work in a wrong way to give effect to that policy if we were to impose upon China a burden heavier than it was possible for her to bear. One of the sources of new revenue which has been most considered is the Maritime Customs. The Maritime Customs, imposed under the Treaty of Tientsin and the earlier Treaty of Nanking, contemplated a tariff of 5 per cent., ad valorem. These ad valorem duties have been converted, or at any rate largely converted, into specific duties, and at the present values the actual payment which is made represents not 5 per cent., but a very much smaller per centage. We think, therefore, that the duties might be readjusted so as to produce a real 5 per cent. instead of the smaller per centage which they actually yield. There are also, it appears, a considerable number of articles which pass duty free, and we see no reason why these should not be made subject to duty.
But, my Lords, when we attempt to go further, and consider whether the Customs tariff should be very largely increased in connection with the payment of the indemnities, we feel that we cannot proceed with too great caution. We have to bear in mind several considerations. In the first place we have to remember that of the whole external trade of China over 60 per cent. belongs to this country, while of the shipping which carries that trade 84 per cent. is British. Well, it is quite clear that if we were to agree to a very large increase in the Customs tariff we should, on the one hand, stand to gain a few millions in the shape of an increased indemnity, but we might do so at the risk of greatly crippling and interfering with the important British commerce that is now being carried on with the Chinese Empire. That is not all, because it is also evident that largely increased Customs duties might operate as a kind of protection for Chinese industries, and

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we should be face to face with this possibility—that new industries, using, no doubt, European machinery and managed by Europeans, but employing Chinese labour, might be established under the shelter of the new tariff in China, greatly to the detriment of, and most unfairly to, our own industries here.
There is a third consideration which seems to me, if possible, more important still, and it is this. In the 11th article of the joint Note it is provided that the Chinese Government is to negotiate in regard to amendments of the treaties of commerce and navigation considered useful by the Powers, and also as to other subjects connected with commercial relations with the object of facilitating them. We hope that when the time comes for giving effect to that clause we may find it possible to make alterations in our commercial relations with China which will be largely advantageous to the commerce of this country. We look forward in particular to relieving that commerce of some of those extremely irksome and corruptly administered inland duties which are familiar to your Lordships under the name of likin. Now, if likin is ever to be dealt with, that will mean that you will withdraw from the provincial administrations of China the greater part of the income on which they now depend. It is the income upon which they depend, not only for their civil, but for their naval and military administration; and it will therefore be necessary to put in the place of any provincial income that may be thus taken away from the provinces some other available source of revenue. We think that if the question of the Customs tariff is ever to be taken in hand on a large scale, it should certainly be in connection with a well-considered scheme of financial reform, and with a general revision of the commercial arrangements existing between us and China.
There is another observation which I should like to make in passing. It is that we do not desire to take advantage of this opportunity in order to impose upon China a number of internal or domestic reforms. We do not think that that is our business. It is sometimes suggested to us that we should require the wholesale dismissal of Chinese officials, and a general reorganisation of the internal government of the Empire My Lords, the regeneration of an empire numbering, I believe, over 300,000,000 of people, and covering
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about one-twelfth of the land surface of the globe, is not a task to be undertaken light-heartedly. At any rate, I should be very sorry to contemplate the idea of insisting upon such a reform and retaining British troops in China until such time as it has been carried out. At the same time, I should be sorry to have it understood that we despair of seeing reforms in China. I feel, personally, very confident that China is capable of better things. We sometimes hear the Chinaman spoken of as if he was either a Boxer and a barbarian, or the Chinaman with whom we are familiar on the stage or in the works of American humorists. Those who know Chinamen really, and have lived in China, will tell you that the Chinaman as a soldier, if he is properly led, is one of the most fearless soldiers in the world. They will tell you that as a merchant he keeps faith scrupulously, that as a workman he is laborious and frugal beyond anything to which our ideas can attain. And I think it is a remarkable feature in the present condition of China that throughout all these recent incidents, in spite of the disappearance of the central Government, the provincial Governments have maintained the even tenor of their way, and have apparently succeeded in administering their districts with success. That has been due in great measure to some of those more enlightened Chinamen like the two Yang-tsze Viceroys, whose steady influence has had such a salutary effect during the last few months, with whom we have been in not infrequent communication, and whom we desire to support and encourage to the best of our ability.
The noble Earl has asked me several questions with regard to international agreements in existence, or supposed to be in existence, between China and other Powers. I should like to say one word with regard to the manner in which agreements of this kind are to be construed and interpreted. I think we are rather too apt to talk about them as if they were Acts of Parliament or legal instruments drawn up in the Temple or Lincoln's Inn. Those agreements have not got the sanction of a Court of law behind them. They depend, not upon material guarantees, but upon the good faith of the parties who have contracted under them, and it does not shock me to find that in documents of this kind there should not be the same precision of language

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as that which you would expect to find in a statute or in a legal document.
There is, in the first place, the agreement entered into between this country and Russia in the year 1899. I mention that because it touches very closely the question of the Northern railways, of which the noble Earl spoke. My Lords, in that Anglo-Russian Agreement it was laid down that Great Britain would not seek on her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and was not to obstruct directly or indirectly applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the Russian Government. And there was a corresponding engagement that Russia should not interfere with British railway concessions in the basin of the Yang-tsze. That was a perfectly equal engagement as between the two Powers, but a somewhat important exception was made in favour of the Northern Chinese Railway, to which the noble Earl referred. Part of that railway lies beyond the Great Wall, and would consequently naturally fall within the Russian sphere; but it was expressly provided by a supplemental Note of the same date that the line north of the Great Wall, that is the line from Shan-hai-Kwan to Neu-chwang, was to remain a Chinese line under the control of the Chinese Government, and should not be mortgaged or alienated to a non-Chinese company. In December, 1898, the Tsung-li-Yamên had assured us that none of the lines then under contract were to be alienated to any foreign Power. Her Majesty's Government took note of that assurance as a binding engagement, and it was accordingly embodied in the supplemental Note which I quoted to your Lordships just now. We regard this engagement distinctly as being still in force, and we do not admit that the temporary disturbance of existing arrangements which has taken place in that part of China in any way modifies the binding nature of the agreement. The whole of the Northern line was, as the noble Earl will remember, occupied by Russian troops at the time when the disturbances were going on; but we have been distinctly assured by the Russian Government that that occupation was a temporary occupation and without prejudice to the proprietary and financial interests involved. That part of the line which lies inside the
24
Wall has been actually surrendered to Field Marshal Count von Waldersee, who has placed it in the hands of the British military authorities. The extra-mural portion still remains in Russian hands; but we have been assured that the occupation is to be regarded as a temporary measure justified by military exigencies. I hope I have convinced the noble Earl that we have not in any way derogated from our rights in the railways in question, and that the interests of British shareholders to which he especially referred have not been ignored.
Then the noble Earl asks me a question with regard to another agreement—that of October, 1900, commonly known as the Anglo-German Agreement. He asks me whether that agreement applies to Manchuria. I must ask your Lordships to consider, before I answer that question, the exact wording of the Anglo-Gorman Agreement. The first clause of that agreement recites that—
"it is a matter of joint and permanent international interest that the ports on the rivers and littoral of China should remain free and open to trade and to every other legitimate form of economic activity for the nationals of all countries without distinction, and the two Governments agree on their part to uphold the same for all Chinese territory so far as they can exercise influence."
Your Lordships will notice that in that clause there are two most important limitations. It applies, in the first place, only to the ports on the rivers and littoral of China, and to those ports only in so far as the contracting Powers have influence within them. I call your Lordships' particular attention to the expression "influence," because it is clear that "influence" is a somewhat elastic expression, and that influence can hardly be regarded as a constant factor in the consideration of such an agreement. I have made inquiries with regard to what took place when this agreement was under negotiation, and I am told that the German Government did give us to understand that in their view Manchuria was snot a place within which they considered that they had influence. I must say, however, that I do not think that that point is one which deserves too much attention, because the Anglo-German Agreement certainly did not in any way diminish the rights of the Powers to use any treaty port the use of which had previously been granted to them by the

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Treaty of Tientsin. The only two treaty ports which I am aware of in Manchuria are the important ports of Neu-chwang and Ta-lien-wan; and, in regard to Ta-lien-wan, we have been distinctly assured by Russia that she intends to keep that port open, while with regard to Neu-chwang, in the same way, there is no question of its being treated otherwise than an open port. The assurances of the Russian Government on that point are perfectly explicit.
When you come to the second clause of the Anglo-Gorman Agreement the language used is different, and there are not the same reservations. In that clause it is said that the two Governments agree not to "make use of the present complications to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions," and that they will "direct their policy towards maintaining unimpaired the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire." In our view, that clause applies to the whole of the Chinese Empire, and therefore to Manchuria, which forms a part of the Chinese Empire. I have seen it stated in the newspaper reports that a speech delivered by Count von Bülow in Germany suggests the idea that the German Government possibly interprets the second clause of the agreement in a different sense from that in which we interpret it. But here, again, I ask your Lordships to consider whether the point is really a very material one, because the whole of the Powers, including Germany, have repeatedly declared that their policy is that the integrity of the Chinese Empire shall be maintained. We know that the German Government has warned the Chinese Government against entering into separate treaties with other Powers affecting her possessions. It surely does not very much matter to us whether Germany has arrived at that conclusion by a consideration of the Anglo-German Agreement or whether she has been led to it by considerations of general policy.
The noble Earl has also referred to another agreement which is commonly spoken of as the Manchurian Agreement, with regard to which we hear so many conflicting rumours from day to day. The noble Earl asks me whether such a convention between Russia and China has been entered into.
I am afraid it is impossible for me to answer that question. We know that there have been
26
negotiations. We have seen a great many different versions of this alleged agreement, some of them apparently having the appearance of
authenticity. But we cannot take upon ourselves to say that any of these versions represent correctly, either the offer made by China, or the demand made by Russia; and therefore I am quite unable to pass any final opinion upon the matter. With regard to this question of Manchuria, I should like to say that we are very far from taking an exaggerated view of our interests in that part of the Chinese Empire. We have already entered into an agreement with Russia under which we recognise that, so far as railway enterprise is concerned, that part of China is within the Russian sphere, taking into consideration what is called the "gravitation" of certain parts of the Chinese Empire. We also know that in Manchuria there have been collisions between Russian and Chinese troops; that Russia has been obliged to occupy parts of that province in force; and it seems to us perfectly natural that Russia should insist, before withdrawing her troops, upon making conditions with regard to the terms upon which those troops should be withdrawn. Therefore, we should certainly not criticise in a carping or pedantic spirit the arrangement made about Manchuria between Russia and China, if it were clear that the arrangement was what it purported to be—that is a temporary arrangement of the kind usually described as a modus vivendi.
On the other hand, I am bound to admit that if some of the versions which have been published and which have come into our hands represent even approximately the provisions of the agreement, it would appear to contain covenants which are not limited to Manchuria, which are not of a temporary or provisional character, and some of which are apparently derogatory to our treaty rights in the Chinese Empire. It is suggested that these versions of the alleged agreement may be ballons d'essai launched by ambitious local officials, or, again, that they may be the inventions of evilly-disposed persons who desire to sow disunion between the Powers. I am perfectly content to assume that there may be something in either of these theories. But, my Lords, if that is so I have only to add that

27
nothing would give us greater pleasure than to take part in exposing so unworthy an artifice, and that if Russia would only, by communicating to us what the real text of this agreement is, enable us to put an end to these misconceptions, we should be delighted to co-operate with her for that purpose. What has militated against any such solution as this has been the mystery in which those negotiations have been shrouded.
Your Lordships are, of course, aware of the action which His Majesty's Government took with regard to this matter. We instructed our Ambassador at St. Petersburg to mention to Count Lamsdorff the difficulty in which we were placed by these apparently well-authenticated rumours. I do not think anything could be more correct or more satisfactory than the language with which Count Lamsdorff met the approaches of our Ambassador. He told us that it was the object of the Russian Government—
"to arrange with the local civil authorities the terms of a modus vivendi between them for the duration of the simultaneous presence of Russian and Chinese authorities in Southern Manchuria, the object being to prevent the recurrence of disturbances in the vicinity of the Russian frontier and to protect the railway from the Russian frontier to Port Arthur."
And he added that his Government had—
"no intention of seeking this guarantee in any acquisition of territory or of an actual or virtual protectorate over Manchuria."
All I can say is that, if the agreement really falls within the language used by Count Lamsdorff to Sir Charles Scott, we should certainly not object to it, and that we should freely admit that we could have no right to raise any objection to it. Nobody would be more relieved than His Majesty's Government if we could be satisfied that there was no occasion for apprehension on this point. But until these uncertainties have been removed we feel we cannot do otherwise than adhere to the view which we have expressed and which we have intimated to the Chinese Government—namely, that it is not desirable that China, at a time when she is negotiating with the whole of the Powers at Peking, should simultaneously enter into private and separate arrangements, involving her territorial and her financial condition, with any individual Power. That is the language we have used to the Chinese Government,
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and I am glad to say it is almost precisely the language that has been used by the German Government. Your Lordships will remember Count von Billow's speech in the Reichstag, in which he said—
"China is in the position of a debtor to the Powers, who owes them a very large sum, and she is a debtor who is arranging with her creditors, but has not yet got a settlement. The creditors have an interest in seeing that the debtor does not give away too much in fraudem creditorum."
That is exactly our position. Count von Billow proceeded to use these words—
"The German Government adhered to the principle of having all mutters affecting China decided by the concert of the Powers, and that not in the way of negotiation between Cabinet and Cabinet, but by the conference of their representatives in Peking."
He went on to say—
"The Government of His Majesty the German Emperor has, therefore, no intention of initiating any other form of treatment in the case of the question raised by the Chinese Minister, or of putting itself in the place of the concert of the Powers. The German Government accordingly recommends the Chinese Government to submit all its suggestions to the diplomatic conference at Peking."
That seems to us perfectly sound advice, and our advice to the Chinese Government has been couched in the same terms.
I think I have now dealt with all the points raised by the question. I have occupied the time of your Lordships so long that I will not attempt to travel into Korea, or into other matters not covered by the question of the noble Earl.
EARL SPENCER: There is one other point in the question—with reference to Mongolia.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: The noble Earl's question, I take it, is whether Mongolia, under the terms of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, falls within the Russian railway sphere.
EARL SPENCER: Whether there has been any arrangement between Russia and China with regard to railways in Mongolia.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: In some of the versions of the alleged agreement it was stated that the agreement had reference not only to Manchuria, but to Mongolia and Eastern Turkestan. We lave since heard that that clause has been

29
expunged from the text of the agreement. I cannot say whether the rumour is correct, but I hope it may be so. I have only to say, in conclusion, that we fully recognise the very great difficulties which confront us in China. We shall spare no pains to surmount them. We shall strive to uphold the interests of this country. We shall certainly be tenacious in matters of principle; but in matters of detail we recognise that we must not expect always to have our own way. We shall, at any rate, use our best endeavours to bring these negotiations to a close, and to terminate a situation which is certainly inconvenient, if not fraught with danger, to those who are concerned in the present negotiations.
LORD TWEEDMOUTH: My Lords, I am sure your Lordships have listened with great interest to the
full statement which the noble Marquess has given in answer to the question put to him by my noble friend behind me. My noble friend placed the question on the Paper, not for the purpose of embarrassing the Government, but for the bonâ fide purpose of eliciting information, and we have every reason to thank the noble Marquess for his reply. I will not go in detail into the delicate points which the noble Marquess has referred to, but I was extremely gratified to hear the language he used with regard to our relations with Russia. I am glad that the noble Marquess has not encouraged those who view Russia as a necessary bogey to us in Asia. I am glad that he has encouraged the idea that after all there is plenty of room for both Russia and us in Asia, and that we can arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the relations between us by friendly negotiations and representations, without the necessity for any more violent methods. I think that in that respect we have reason to congratulate ourselves on the manner in which the little storm at Tientsin has passed away. I am glad, too, that we are in the position of saying ditto to Count von Bülow with regard to his representations to China as to the undesirability at this moment of making territorial concessions to any of the Powers interested in China.
It appears to me that, until this question of indemnity has been cleared up, we have a right to demand that China shall hold her territory inviolate, so that we, as creditors, may have the greatest possible
30
security for whatever claims we may have to make. I think, too, it was very satisfactory to hear the views of the Government with regard to their reluctance to enter upon inland expeditions in China. We have had our experience of expeditions into wild, roadless countries during the last eighteen months, but the difficulties of expeditions in South Africa would be infinitely magnified if we proposed to make expeditions into the heart of China. For European Powers to enter upon expeditions into that country would seem to me most hazardous and undesirable. I think we have reason to be pleased that there is absolute unanimity among the Powers upon the four points mentioned by the noble Marquess. The policy of Europe in China has been well defined from an American source. It is laid down in that definition that it should be—
"to seek a solution which may bring permanent safety and peace to China, to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, to protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and to safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade in all parts of the Empire."
I think that aptly sums up a sound European policy towards the Empire of China. The only question is, how can that policy be best carried into effect? When we consider that question, we must also take into consideration the circumstances in which our present difficulties have arisen. We must consider whether the Powers have in any way contributed, either by acts of commission or omission, to the state of affairs which has prevailed in China for the last eighteen months, and in my opinion they cannot be freed from all blame in the matter. It seems to me that we were very slow indeed to act. In 1898 and 1899—particularly in 1899—we had sufficient proof of the unrest that existed in China. We had reports of the piratical outrages on the West River, the attacks on the missions in Central Se-chuen, the murders of native Christians in that province, the anti-foreign rioting at Kien-ning, the anti-foreign placards posted at Foo Chow, and the murder of Mr. Brooks in Shantung. There was the demand put forward by the Powers for the suppression of the Boxers, which was flatly refused by the Chinese; and after that flat refusal a proposal was put forward by the Powers

31
that a naval demonstration should take place, but that demonstration was vetoed by the noble Marquess the late Foreign Minister as being premature and unnecessary.
Then, again, we have to consider how far the action of the Powers themselves may have had influence in stirring up the Chinese to take violent action. I do not think it could have been very pleasant to Chinamen, whether in high or low position, to see the German occupation of Kow-Chow, the Russian occupation of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, our own occupation of Wei-hai-wei, the abandonment of the Province of Shantung to the Germans, the demands of the French in Southern China, and our own occupation of territory in the neighbourhood of Hong Kong. All these things, I think, must have done a great deal to exacerbate Chinese feeling towards the European Powers, and must have made the rulers in China only too anxious to grasp at any weapon that came near their hand by which the intruding foreigner might have his career checked. Some excuse may, therefore, be found for the original sympathy hold out by the Chinese Government to the Boxers and the insurrectionary forces that accompanied them. We should take these facts into consideration when we ask for the punishment of ringleaders and the payment of an indemnity.
I think, also, that some set-off to the crimes of the Chinese may be found in the conduct of some of the European troops during the recent operations. I do not know whether the noble Marquess can give any information about the conduct of our own troops. I think that the sufferings
that have been inflicted on the Chinese have to some extent wiped out some of the crimes which were committed by Chinamen themselves. I was glad to hear the noble Marquess say that the indemnities to be exacted were not to be of too crushing a character, and that they were to be collectively claimed by the Powers. The noble Marquess said there was no intention on the part of this country, or of the Powers, to insist on any internal reforms in China.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: I spoke entirely for myself. I have no right to commit the other Powers.
LORD TWEEDMOUTH: The noble Marquess said there was no intention on
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the part of this country to insist on any internal reforms in China. It seems to me, however, that if there is to be reform of likin it involves considerable reform of the administration of China itself. At present likin is exacted at every barrier on the waterways and highways of China, and it is too often exacted corruptly for the benefit of the local Mandarins, who are practically paid by the sums which they can thus improperly exact. It seems to me that there can be no reform of likin until you make some reform of the Mandarin administration in China. It will, I think, be necessary to see that the Mandarins no longer carry on their administration in a corrupt manner, and that they are sufficiently paid to enable them to maintain their position without having to resort to illegal practices. These are the principal points on which I rose to make a few observations. I would suggest that probably no better way of improving the trade relations between Europe and China can be discovered than by opening up the waterways of China. A great deal was thought to have been done in that direction in 1898, but owing to the manner in which the arrangements then made have been carried into operation in China, the advantages that would have been gained by the Agreement of 1898 have been greatly diminished. We were very glad to hear the statement the noble Marquess made, and I hope that the result of the policy which the Government is now entering upon will be to secure in China an early peace and the early withdrawal of our troops.
THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: My Lords I do not rise for the purpose of entering into the question of reforms in China, but as the Indian troops in China are under the instructions of my noble friend the Secretary of State for India, I would ask your Lordships' attention for a few moments while I deal with the troops, both of which subjects have been referred to. A convention was entered into by the German and Russian military authorities on 4th January, 1901, in abrogation of the previous convention of 13th October,
1900. This new convention contains in its first article the declaration that—
"The agreement has in view as sole object to regulate the military use of the line in the

33
interests of all the allied Powers, and in no way affects any proprietary claim."
On 22nd February Count von Waldersee handed over the line to the British military authorities. There has been some misunderstanding on that point. The line was not handed over to Mr. Kinder, the official of the railway company, but to the British military authorities, who employed Mr. Kinder to work the line under their instructions. When the line was handed over Major Bauer, the German railway representative, declared that the Russo-German transfer document, dated 18th January, showed that the Russians had no plan and were ignorant of the limits of the railway boundary. When Major Bauer took over the line the Russians had made no claim to the plot of land at Tientsin which has recently been in question, and had not put up certain flags and boundary marks which have since been the subject of discussion.
It was on 5th March that the Russian claim to land at Tientsin was heard of for the first time. A Russian named M. Batouieff claimed to have purchased from the Chinese the land required for the railway siding. It appears that eighteen acres of this land have been for many years in the possession of the railway, while another valuable piece of land four and a half acres in extent, with a frontage on the Peiho river, was bought by the railway a few years ago. The English officer in command at Tientsin, General Lorn Campbell, at once sent an officer to explain these facts to M. Batouieff, and the interview was apparently a friendly one, as M. Batouieff thanked him and explained that he had not been aware of the existence of any prior claim to the land. The title deeds, unfortunately, appear to have been mislaid during the Russian occupation of the railway system prior to the new convention. On 6th March Colonels Macdonald and Swan called upon General Wogack and discussed the matter with him. He declared that the question of the land claimed by M. Batouieff was one for the Russian Consul's consideration. Colonel Macdonald then pointed out the necessity of constructing, in the interests of the allied forces, an extra siding on the railway. General Wogack admitted the utility of such a siding, but adhered to his opinion that the question of its construction was not one for his decision. Colonels Macdonald
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and Swan, in order to make sure of the validity of the railway's title to the land claimed by M. Batouieff, in so far as that was possible in the unfortunate absence of the title deeds, called upon Mr. Campbell, His Majesty's Consul-General at Tientsin, and they were assured by him that the title was indisputable, as the land had been bought by the Chinese Government for the railway, and was therefore part of the mortgaged property. At Colonel Macdonald's request Mr. Campbell informed the Russian Consul-General that the land was railway property, and was required for the military service of the railway; and this notification was made in compliance with a previous Russian proclamation to the effect that claims to ownership of land at Tientsin should be put in by 7th March.
Apparently no further' negotiation on this question took place, and the matter in dispute was considered settled, as, all the facts having been reported to General Gaselee and orders having been received from him that the Madras sappers and pioneers were to commence work on the siding, no protest was raised by M. Batouieff, the Russian Consul, or the Russian General when the work was commenced on 7th March. Indeed, it is obvious that General Gaselee did not anticipate any friction, as on 11th March he left Peking on a tour of inspection of the British and Indian troops in China. At daybreak on 15th March a Russian guard appeared at the head of the siding, with the result that a continuance of the work was pre vented. General Barrow, who had remained at Peking, reported on 16th March the situation at Tientsin to Colonel Schwartzhoff, the German Chief of the Staff. He accepted a suggestion made by General Barrow that Count von Waldersee should request both parties to withdraw from the disputed ground. On the evening of 20th March, Count von Waldersee and General Wogack both arrived in Peking. Next day—the
21st—General Barrow met them in consultation, and an amicable settlement was reached. It was agreed that the work should not be continued until the question of ownership was settled, or a special arrangement made between the respective Governments. On 22nd March, at 5 a.m., the Russian and British sentries were simultaneously withdrawn. Before parting from this incident, I shall only be praising those to whom praise is due if I commend, in the warmest

35
manner, the tact and self-control displayed by the British officers on the spot.
With regard to the conduct and bearing of our troops in China, Sir Alfred Gaselee speaks in the highest terms of their discipline, and their humanity has been unquestionable. Hardly any outrage has been committed, and in proof of this he has pointed to the very few instances of courts-martial or of summary awards of punishment. He has referred to the friendly attitude of the native population to his men, who appear to have received a welcome wherever their duties have taken them. Many small detachments of troops have been sent to isolated districts, and the men have all been on friendly terms with the natives. Also, Sir Alfred Gaselee states that our patrols were never fired at. I think, my Lords, these facts speak for themselves, and there is no doubt that Sir Alfred Gaselee is proud of the conduct of all troops under his command. Though no orders, so far as I am aware, have been issued by the Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief, I understand that he has on more than one occasion expressed the highest admiration of their conduct and discipline.
As regards looting, about which there appears to have been some misapprehension, in the first instance it was absolutely prohibited by Sir Alfred Gaselee, but the temptation to the men was great, inasmuch as that which troops under his command were not allowed to loot was left to be looted by anyone choosing to take advantage of the opportunity. General Gaselee, in these circumstances, issued orders that looting under proper control might be permitted from abandoned and derelict houses within the areas allotted to British occupation; that is to say, the areas known in Peking and Tientsin as the British quarter; and he ordered that whatever was so collected should be sold by auction and the proceeds placed in a prize fund for the benefit of all his troops. I may add that articles of value belonging to the State have been kept in safe custody, with a view to restoration when a stable Chinese Government is re-established. Your Lordships may be interested to learn that the health of the troops has been remarkably good. The total deaths from all causes in this expedition up to the present time have been—British troops, 42; native troops,
163; followers, 108; total, 313; and the percentage of sick in
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hospital from all causes on 1st January, the date of the last Report received, was only 3·5. These figures sufficiently indicate the good health of the forces and the efficiency of the hospital arrangements.
LORD STANMORE: May I ask the noble Earl what is the meaning of "looting under proper control"? It is a phrase I have never heard before.
THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: I thought I explained it. Looting, in the ordinary sense of the word, was absolutely prohibited; but where houses had been abandoned and were empty, armed parties were allowed to go to those houses and remove property, which was afterwards put up for auction and the money divided among the troops.
THE EARL OF DUNMORE: Has the noble Earl any evidence that looting had taken place before then?
THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: General Gaselee issued this order because he saw that it was unfair not to allow our men to loot when that which they did not take was left to be looted by others.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Standing Order No. XXXIX. to be considered to-morrow, in order to its being suspended for that day's sitting.
WIDOWS AND ORPHANS OF SOLDIERS AND SAILORS.
Message from the Commons that they have appointed a Committee, to consist of five Members, to join with a Committee of this House to consider the various charitable agencies now in operation, and the funds available for relieving widows and orphans of soldiers and sailors, with a view to ensuring that the funds supplied by local and private benevolence are applied to the best advantage in supplementing a scheme of Government pensions for widows and orphans of soldiers and sailors who have lost their lives in war; and to request this House to appoint an equal number of Lords to be joined with the Members of their House; the said Message to be taken into consideration to-morrow.

PRESENCE OF THE SOVEREIGN IN PARLIAMEMT.
Message from the Commons that they have appointed a Committee, to consist of

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five Members, to join with a Committee of this House to consider the accommodation available in the House of Lords when the Sovereign is personally present in Parliament, and the advisability of substituting Westminster Hall on such an occasion for the House of Lords, and to request this House to appoint an equal number of Lords to be joined with the Members of their House; the said Message to be taken into consideration to-morrow.
House adjourned at twenty-five minutes before Seven of the clock, till to-morrow, half-past Ten of the cock.