Sitting of 25 June 1892

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Standing Order No. XXXIX. considered (according to order), and suspended for the remainder of the Session.

ACCUMULATIONS BILL.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord HALSBURY): My Lords, in moving the Motion that stands in my name I will venture to remind your Lordships of what took place at the last stage of the Bill in Committee. My noble and learned Friend (Lord Herschell) took an objection to the Bill which was not disposed of by taking a Division; but he suggested that the Bill was one that ought to be referred to the Standing Committee, and it was so referred in due course. The effect, however, of so referring it would be to negative the Bill, and I propose therefore upon the Third Reading to strike out the objectionable clause, Clause 2, which was the subject of debate, and to meet the noble and learned Lord's just criticisms of the first clause; and with these Amendments I hope your Lordships will pass the Bill. I have to move accordingly that Standing Order XLV. be dispensed with, so that the Bill may be considered in Committee.
Moved, "That Standing Order XLV. be dispensed with."—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD HERSCHELL: My Lords, I desire to call your Lordships' attention to the circumstances under which this Motion is made. This Accumulations Bill was brought up from the other House at a very late period of the Session; it belongs to a class of what may be denominated Law Bills, and it was introduced, when it came up from the other House, by my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack. I should like to say first that it is a Bill of such a character that it seems to me that it would have been much better brought in by my noble and learned Friend in this House at an earlier period of the Session, or, in
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fact, during any part of the Session except just now, when we should have had ample time to consider it and put it into shape. It is just one of those Bills upon which I should have thought your Lordships might have been usefully employed, and to which your Lordships could have paid that attention which could not be, and was not, given to it in the other House. My Lords, when the Bill came on, on the Motion to go into Committee, Lord Selborne, like myself, took exception to it, and he said—these are his very wrords—
"If ever there was a Bill in this House that ought to go to a Standing Committee and have its details carefully considered, this is the Bill."
Upon that my noble and learned Friend agreed that the Bill should go to the Standing Committee. That was some days ago; and now to day, on practically the last day of the Session, my noble and learned Friend moves to rescind the Order of this House that the Bill should go to the Standing Committee; and on the Third Reading, having been practically deprived of the opportunity of amending the Bill in Committee, by the course taken by my noble and learned Friend, we are asked to consider the provisions of the Bill. My Lords, if there were any urgency in the matter I should not stand in the way; if it could be shown that to delay this Bill would work the slightest possible mischief I should not seek to interpose delay; but my noble and learned Friend proposes to strike out Clause 2, which gives the Bill a retrospective operation, and, therefore, the Bill will only have a prospective operation. Can there be any public advantage in passing the first clause of this Bill, which will only deal with future dispositions in such a shape that, as Lord Selborne pointed out the other day, the object you have in view, if it is a good object, can be entirely defeated and evaded? Will it be creditable to the Legislature to pass the Bill in that form? My Lords, what the reason for insisting, at this last moment, upon dealing with a measure in this fashion can be I am at a loss to understand. If my noble and learned Friend had come to the conclusion that the Bill must pass this Session the Standing Committee might have been summoned

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for the next day. Certainly, when my noble and learned Friend agreed to that, I understood that he thought the Bill was one that ought to be considered by the Standing Committee, and that, unless that could be done in the ordinary way, it could wait until next Session. It does not seem to me that it is a desirable way of dealing with such a Bill as this when, on the representation of so experienced a Member of your Lordships' House as Lord Selborne upon such a question as this that the Bill ought not to pass in its present shape, and ought not to pass until it had been carefully considered by the Standing Committee, the House referred it to the Standing Committee, and then to-day the House rescinds that Order and proceeds, on the Third Reading, for the first time, to consider its details.
THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY): My Lords, I think the principle on which the noble and learned Lord is going is one which has produced more obstruction to legislation than any other, though it seems reasonable; it is the principle of objecting to piecemeal legislation, and insisting that you should not deal with the core of a subject unless you deal with the whole of it. The noble and learned Lord did not say that, but it lies at the base of his argument. It is impossible to deal with subjects in that entire fashion, though I quite agree that the principle, which I think the noble and learned Lord practically recommended, is a counsel of perfection, and that it would be much better if we never touched any bits of subjects, but always took them up in a large form. But, as the noble and learned Lord knows very well, directly a subject assumes a large form and you go deep into it, you are exposed to so many difficulties that it is only one or two strongly-pushed questions that can pass through Parliament in one Session. I think this is a case where the French proverb is true that: "The better is the enemy of the good." This is a small proposal—I know very little about it; but it seems to me so far as it goes (that is to say, Clause 1) a reasonable proposal, and I think it would be a mistake to put it
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off to next Session, simply because we might do the thing in a more abundant and wide-reaching fashion next year. I do not think any advantage would be gained by that process. With reference to the Standing Committee, it was a mistake no doubt to refer the Bill to the Standing Committee, when there was not any prospect of the Standing Committee being got together. We are in the unfortunate position that, while we have been belaboured without mercy in the Lower House for going too slowly, we are being belaboured in this House for going too fast. I regret very much that the Standing Committee could not be summoned; but, that being now essentially impossible to arrange, it appears to me a reasonable course to cut out the clause on which all the controversy would arise—for I understand nobody to object to Clause 1—and to pass Clause 1 as it stands. If the noble and learned Lord appeals to a Division I do not know whether we should not run foul of a Standing Order; that is for the noble and learned Lord to consider; but, without professing any exaggerated enthusiasm for the Bill, I think the wiser course would be to pass the first clause.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My Lords, I do not think the ingenious remarks of the noble Marquess have touched the point that my noble and learned Friend insisted upon, namely, that the House is not being fairly dealt with in the manner that this Bill comes before it. My noble and learned Friend pointed out that Lord Selborne, who is one of the highest authorities in matters of this kind—upon which I am no authority—said that this was a Bill that ought not to pass without being considered by the Standing Committee. That was a weighty objection of course, and, after he had made it, the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack appeared to entirely concur with that view, and moved that the Bill should be referred to the Standing Committee. And now, on the very last day of the Session, it is proposed to rescind that which was understood by us to be a matter already decided, in order to pass a Bill for which there can be no possible urgency. And as to the outcry, if you like, that has been made

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against this House for not proceeding sufficiently fast with Bills, that may be a perfectly just accusation, in the case of Bills that must be, passed; but here is a Bill for which there is no necessity. And, my Lords, it does not seem to me to be consistent with a due respect for this House that we should be forced on the very last day of the Session to push a Bill for which there, is no necessity, which so great an authority as Lord Selborne says is a most imperfect Bill, and which an authority which is very considerable, my noble and learned Friend behind me, also says, unless amended, would be a most unsatisfactory piece of legislation. If my noble and learned Friend divides the House I shall vote with him as a protest against what I consider an exceedingly wrong proceeding.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, as the Motion is mine I have a right to reply. I think two things might be somewhat obscured by the speeches that have been made. In the first place, when it is said that there was a specific Motion that the Bill should be referred to the Standing Committee, that is a mistake. That was simply to follow the ordinary course, as it would automatically have been referred to the Standing Committee if no Motion had been made. And in the second place there was no discussion—
LORD HERSCHELL: There was a discussion on the subject, because my noble and learned Friend said that the Standing Committee ought not to be negatived.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My noble and learned Friend has interrupted me, and has not heard me finish my sentence. I said that there was no discussion of there being a Standing Committee which could meet; but, at the end of the Session, I think rather the meaning was that those interested in having a Standing Committee were desirous of having an indirect mode of putting an end to the Bill altogether. My Lords, I recognise the force of the objection that has been made, as I think is clear by the fact that I have moved to omit Clause 2 altogether, upon the substance of which, in truth, the whole discussion proceeded; the objection made by my noble and learned Friend had reference simply to the drafting, which showed that unless
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the Bill was amended it would effect nothing; and I think he showed very effectively that, if the word "wholly" was left in, the Bill would not operate at all, because it might be evaded. My Lords, I felt that that was very true, and, accordingly, I have moved myself that the word "wholly" be omitted, and the words inserted "either in whole or in part," which seems to me to leave the Bill entirely free from objection to a degree that my noble and learned Friend himself recognised on the First Reading of the Bill; because he said it did not go far enough, and he, wished it went further, but that he welcomed it as an instalment (these were his own words). Accordingly I have stripped the Bill of everything that seems to me to be controversial; and, in asking your Lordships now to pass the Bill, I am doing what is quite possible because I gave notice last night; and therefore I hope your Lordships will proceed to consider the Bill.
LORD HERSCHELL: I may say that if I thought I could defeat the Bill in the way hinted at by the noble Marquess, by reason of lack of numbers, I would do so; but I am afraid I have ascertained that that is impossible.
Motion agreed to; Standing Order XLV. suspended.
House in Committee: Amendments made, and Bill read 3a.
Moved, "That the Bill do pass."—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD HERSCHELL: My Lords, upon the Motion that the Bill do pass I should like to say that my objection to it was not merely that it ought to go further, but that, for the purpose for which it professes to deal with the subject, it would be ineffectual. You have, no doubt said that no person should direct that his money should be accumulated for the purpose of being laid out in land; but there is nothing to prevent his leaving it to trustees with full power to do so; and the trustees may lay it out in land just as if he had directed it; and, further, if he had expressed any wish—I am not speaking of any wish in his will, but any desire that they should do so they would no doubt comply with that desire; and therefore, as Lord Selborne pointed out, they can

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do everything that they can do now, notwithstanding that the Bill is passed. That was the objection to Clause 1, and that objection still remains. And, as my noble and learned Friend has struck out Clause 2, I do not know quite what the effect now will be, because you do not make the transaction void; all you say is that no person shall so dispose of his property. In Clause 2 you made the transaction void, and said what should become of the property so disposed of, as is always done in Bills of this kind. Probably now the person would be indictable for a misdemeanour, but, inasmuch as these things are generally done by will and he would be dead, I do not think that much matters.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The objection with which the noble and learned Lord began was an objection of a much further reaching kind than, I think, he seems to remember. It is an objection to all the Mortmain Acts. You are always confronted with the possibility of a secret trust; but no one has ever thought that the Mortmain Acts were inexpedient because of the possibility of a secret trust. And a secret trust is possible here, but that does not make the Bill an undesirable Bill.
Motion agreed to; Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.

COMMITTEE.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee, read.
Moved, "That the House do now resolve itself into Committee upon the said Bill."—(The Lord Herschell.)
LORD MORRIS: My Lords, before this Bill goes into Committee I should like to make a few observations upon it. I was not present when it passed the Second Reading; but it appears to me to be a Bill of dangerous import, and liable to be used in a very mischievous direction. It has arisen, I understand, in consequence of circumstances which occurred in another place in which, for argument's sake, I will assume that the employer very harshly dismissed his employee. I say I will assume it—for I do not be-
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lieve it; but hard cases we all know make very bad law for asserting general principles. Now what is the principle asserted in this Bill? In the first place, the Bill does what I have a very strong objection to personally; and my noble and learned Friend opposite I am sure also has the same; it constitutes a new crime. This country has in many places had the constitution of new crimes very much commented on, particularly in a case in which it was not the constitution of a new crime, but only a new mode of dealing with an old crime. Now Clause 2 of this Bill says—
"Every person who commits any of the following acts, that is to say, who threatens, or in any way punishes, damnifies, or injures, or attempts to punish, damnify, or injure, any person for having given evidence upon any such inquiry, unless such evidence is shown to have been given in bad faith, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and be liable upon conviction thereof to a maximum penalty of one hundred pounds, or to a maximum imprisonment of three months."
My Lords, what the distinction is between "damnifies or injures" and "attempting to damnify or injure" I really cannot follow. The Bill goes to such an extent that a person who used the first syllable of the word "damnify" might very possibly be brought before the Court on the charge of having committed this new crime. Then, my Lords, what is an employer to do supposing he has an untrustworthy servant who has repeatedly been guilty of breaches of trust for which he ought to have been dismissed; but because this untrustworthy servant has given evidence before one of these inquiries the employer is simply precluded from dismissing him unless he finds that he has given false evidence. The Bill proposes that it shall be a mis-deameanour punishable by a penalty of £100 or imprisonment for three months; and it does so unless—the onus of proof is thrown upon him—he can show that such evidence is given in bad faith. Why is the onus not thrown upon the party, who wants to make his employer guilty of a new crime, to show that it was given in good faith? And, my Lords, those who are acquainted with Common Law practice know that it is difficult to decide what the law holds to be malice,

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which is only another name for things done in bad faith. But, my Lords, it does not stop there. This prosecution is to be instituted before a Court of Summary Jurisdiction under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, that is to say, before a Magistrate. It is true that either party is to have the option of having the case sent to Quarter Sessions or Assizes, where it would be tried before a jury—an option which, in the country that I am familiar with, I think parties would not very often be anxious to take. But it does not stop there; because it provides further that it may be lawful for this Magistrate, having sent the employer to gaol for three months, or fined him £100, then to award, under the name of compensation, any sum of money to the complainer—£10,000—I mention that as a round figure; and that amount, so ascertained, is, ipso facto, to become a judgment debt on his property. My Lords, I heard my noble and learned Friend a few minutes ago speak very strongly indeed, and I agree with very much that he said, about rushing Bills through this House on the last day of sitting of the House; but here is a Bill for which there is no urgent demand that I am aware of, considering that things in this country have gone on from time immemorial without the necessity for this Bill. My Lords, I have only called attention to these very striking portions of the Bill for the purpose of saying that it is a Bill, at all events, that should not be rushed through on the last day of the sittings of this House, but one which should either have been referred to the Standing Committee, as was so very ably put by my noble and learned Friend in the case of another Bill, or to the Law Committee, who would be able to deal with it. At present it stands thus: that for dismissing an untrustworthy servant you may be liable to be imprisoned or to be lined, to pay him any compensation, such as a jury might award, and, this being constituted a misdemeanour, the employer is statutorily disqualified from holding certain appointments. My Lords, I object to this Bill going into Committee without its being sent before the Standing Committee who could deal with it, or before a Law Committee, and because, at all events,
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there is no particular hurry for it now, when there is no opportunity of considering or amending it. I suggest that this is a case where the Bill should not go into Committee at all, but should be brought in again at a time when it can go before the Standing Committee.
Amendment moved, to leave out ("now") and add at the end of the Motion ("this day six months.")—(The Lord Morris.)
LORD WATSON: My Lords, I wish to ask the noble and learned Lord for an explanation on one or two points. In the first place, what is meant by giving evidence in bad faith? Does it mean perjury? And, if it does not mean perjury, I should like to be informed what it does mean? In the second place, I assume that the evidence is given in good faith, and that the employer believes it; but that it brings to his knowledge for the first time acts committed by the servant which in ordinary circumstances would warrant his dismissal. If I understand the Bill, if the master's suspicions are corroborated by the evidence of the servant, the result is that the doing of that by the master which any other master in the country would do, and which a Court of Law would consider proper, is by the Bill to become a misdemeanour warranting three months' imprisonment.
LORD HERSCHELL: My noble and learned Friend suggests that this is a Bill which needs looking into by the Standing Committee, and says that he had great sympathy with the observations that I made on the previous Bill. He did not exhibit that sympathy in any practical fashion. If he had got up and supported me on that occasion, which was a much grosser case than he can suggest this to be, I might have had more disposition to regard favourably any observations that he has made on that point on the present occasion. But, my Lords, my noble and learned Friend has said that this Bill creates a new offence, and that that is a bad thing. I do not agree with him at all. We are constantly creating new offences. What does the Legislature exist for but to create new punishments for acts, if those acts are proved to be pre-

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judicial to the community, and such as ought to be visited with punishment? Therefore the mere fact that you have created a now offence seems to me to amount to nothing. The question is whether there is an occasion for doing so. Then my noble and learned Friend said that hard cases make bad law. My Lords, I think that is a maxim which is frequently very much abused. Hard cases make bad law, no doubt, when you are dealing with a matter judicially, and you are tempted by a hard case to decide contrary to the law; but hard cases constantly make very good law, when you are dealing with a matter of legislation, because those hard cases call attention to an evil that needs to be met, and needs the Legislature to set it right. Now my noble and learned Friend says there is no demand for this Bill. I do not blame him for that; his time is no doubt much occupied, but obviously he does not read the proceedings that take place in the other House of Parliament; because he makes that statement in absolute disregard of all that has taken place there. This matter was considered so urgent and important that two Members of the other House, one on one side of the House and one on the other, introduced Bills on the subject, each of them backed by a number of Members. These two Bills, at the suggestion of the Government, and with their full assent, were referred to a Select Committee, who dealt with the two Bills, and the Bill now before your Lordships is the result, and was passed with the unanimous assent of the House of Commons, supported by the Government, because it was believed to be a measure that was desirable and necessary. And now your Lordships are asked to treat it in the summary fashion that my noble and learned Friend suggests when it comes before this House. My Lords, of course I should not be unwilling to consider any Amendments that may be proposed. And with regard to my noble and learned Friend's criticism, is it reasonable to make it an offence where on public grounds a person is summoned to give evidence because it is thought desirable in the public interest that the facts should be elicited? I would say is it not right that a man should have protection
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when he comes forward in obedience to that summons; is it not monstrously unfair that, having come forward in the public interest to give that evidence so summoned, he should be subjected to disabilities and injuries and pecuniary loss by reason of so doing? There can be but one answer to that question, and it is to meet that that this Bill was introduced and passed with common assent. With regard to the question put by my noble and learned Friend (Lord Watson), I cannot think that Clause 2 could be construed to apply to such a case as he has referred to. It is in respect of the nature, character, and quality of the evidence that is given, and not because of some act that a man has done. That does not prevent your dismissing him if he has committed such an act; you do not dismiss him because of the evidence, or the nature, character, and quality of the evidence; you dismiss him because he embezzles, or commits some other breach of trust. That does not seem to me to come within the words of Clause 2; but, if it is suggested that the clause should be put in better form, I shall be ready to meet the suggestion. But the Bill, in the form in which it comes before your Lordships for consideration, is the work of some of the ablest lawyers in the other House, and I think myself it would really not be possible reasonably to construe it to do any injustice.
LORD WATSON: I should like to ask my noble and learned Friend if he will refer to the words he has specially mentioned? I do not object to the Bill, or to its scope as explained by him; but I have difficulty in regard to the expression: "in respect of the nature, quality, or character of the evidence." I take it that, if a man made a disclosure, any punishment inflicted by his master would follow from the nature of the evidence that he gave, unless my noble and learned Friend can satisfy me that it is not so.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am bound to say that I myself entirely concur with what my noble and learned Friend (Lord Watson) has just said. I do not know either what is the meaning of giving evidence in bad faith. If it means false evidence, it is intelligible; but what is the meaning of giving

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evidence in bad faith? It seems to me rather to point to not being absolutely false, but to evidence given with the desire to injure the master. Would that be giving evidence in bad faith? Surely, if new offences are to be created without very minute examination of the language in which they are created, it may give rise to very considerable inconvenience.
LORD MORRIS: My noble and learned Friend must have misunderstood what I said about there being no demand for the Bill—I said it was going to be passed in a hurry. I did not say there was no demand for it. And a good deal of what my noble and learned Friend has said is applicable to a contention which I did not raise. I do not say that a Bill of this nature might not be a very proper Bill to go before a Committee, and eventually to pass into law; but I do object if at this stage we are to pass it without consideration, merely because it was submitted to a Committee in another place consisting of very distinguished lawyers. My Lords, this House, after all, is the Court of Appeal in all matters connected with the law of the country, and, if any prerogative of your Lordships' House is to remain, I should say, at all events, that it should be the privilege to consider all matters regarding legal positions.
On Question, whether ("now") shall stand part of the Motion.
Their Lordships divided:—Contents 10; Not-Contents 19.
It appearing that thirty Lords were not present,
THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid: My Lords, it is my duty under the Standing Order to declare that the question is not decided.
LORD HERSCHELL: My Lords, I beg to give notice that on Monday I shall again endeavour to proceed with the Bill.
Motion adjourned to Monday next.

LAND COMMISSIONERS (IRELAND) BILL.
THIRD READING.
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 3a."—(The Earl Cadogan.)
THE MARQUESS OF WATERFORD: I would remind the noble Lord that I asked him a question about this Bill yesterday, which I said I would put again to-day.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (Earl CADOGAN): My noble Friend asked why the date was fixed in one of these alternatives as the 1st of June, 1893. The reason is very simple. It is actually in the clause itself, if my noble Friend takes the trouble to read the clause:
"From and after the date at which the appeals mentioned in Sub-section 2 of Section 29 of the Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1891, shall have been disposed of."
And that sub-section of Section 29 runs as follows:
"Provided that the duty of sanctioning advances under the Land Purchase Acts and this Act shall be discharged exclusively by the Commissioners appointed under the Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1835, until the fair rent, appeals lodged on or before the first day of June one thousand eight hundred and ninety-one shall have been disposed of."
It was simply in order to make the two dates run together.
THE MARQUESS OF WATERFORD: I would draw my noble Friend's attention to this, that the one alternative deals with the Commissioners under the Act of 1881, and the other with the Commissioners under the Act of 1885; and it appears to me unfair that the Commissioners under the Act of 1885 are to wait to have their salaries increased until the work to be done by the Commissioners under the Act of 1881 shall have been finished.
EARL CADOGAN: My Lords, I do not represent the Treasury in this case. I have given the only answer that I have received from the Treasury, and I can do no more.
Motion agreed to.
Bill read 3a, and passed.

SALMON AND FRESHWATER FISHERIES BILL.
House in Committee (according to order): Bill reported without amendment: Standing Committee negatived: Then (Standing Order No. XXXIX. having been suspended) Bill read 3a, and passed.
BURGH POLICE (SCOTLAND) BILL.
Read 3a (according to order), with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
TELEGRAPHS BILL.
Read 3a (according to order), with the Amendment, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
ANCIENT MONUMENTS PROTECTION ACT (1882) AMENDMENT (IRELAND) BILL.
Read 3a (according to order), and passed.
CONTAGIOUS DISEASES (ANIMALS) BILL.
Read 3a (according to order), and passed.
EXPIRING LAWS CONTINUANCE BILL.
Read 3a (according to order): An Amendment made; Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.
PUBLIC WORKS LOANS BILL.
Amendments reported (according to order): Then (Standing Order No. XXXIX. having been suspended) Bill read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION (SCOTLAND) BILL.
Amendments reported (according to order): Then (Standing Order No. XXXIX. having been suspended) Bill read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
MAURITIUS LOAN BILL.
Read 3a (according to order), and passed.
BANKS OF ENGLAND AND IRELAND (PAYMENTS) BILL.
Read 3a (according to order), and passed.
SHOP HOURS BILL.
Read 3a (according to order): Amendments made; Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.
BRITISH COLUMBIA (LOAN) BILL.
House in Committee (according to order): Bill reported without amendment: Standing Committee negatived: Then (Standing Order No. XXXIX. having been suspended) Bill read 3a, and passed.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 10) BILL.
Read 2a (according to order), and committed: The Committee to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 8) BILL.
Read 3a (according to order), and passed.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 12) BILL.
Read 3a (according to order), with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 9) BILL.
Read 3a (according to order), and passed.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 11) BILL.
Read 3a (according to order), and passed.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDER (No. 14) BILL.
Read 3a (according to order): An Amendment made; Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (IRELAND) PROVISIONAL ORDER (No. 10) BILL.
Read 3a (according to order), and passed.

GENERAL POLICE AND IMPROVEMENT (SCOTLAND) PROVISIONAL ORDER (INVERNESS) BILL.
Read 3a (according to order), and passed.
House adjourned at One o'clock, to Monday next, a quarter before Eleven o'clock.