Sitting of 25 April 1892

QUESTIONS

  LAND PURCHASE (IRELAND) ACT, 1891.
  MR. J. E. ELLIS: I beg to ask the Attorney General for Ireland when the Returns prescribed by Section 33 of "The Land Purchase (Ireland) Act, 1891," will be distributed?
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. MADDEN,): I am informed by the Land Commissioners that they have collected materials for the preparation of this Return, and that they are now in communication with the Treasury as to the particular form the Return is to assume. It will be presented very shortly.
  MR. J. E. ELLIS: I may remind the right hon. Gentleman that similar information has been handed to a supporter of the Government on this side of the House, and it is important that we should all have the information in an official form.

  THE CLARE SLOB LANDS.
  MR. COX: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury whether the Board of Works engineer made an estimate as to the probable cost of repairing the damage done to the embankment of the River Fergus slob lands reclamation by the storm in October last year; was it acting on the advice of said engineer that the Treasury abandoned the works; and whether he will lay upon the; Table of the House the Report of the engineer, and the Correspondence between the Treasury and the Board of Works on the subject?
  THE SECRETARY TO THE TREASURY (Sir J. GORST,): The answer to the first paragraph of the question is in the affirmative; but with regard to the remainder of the question, I do not think it would be for the public interest to lay
  1298
  any Correspondence on the Table at the present time. The Treasury acted on their own responsibility in dealing with the matter.
  MR. COX: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman is it not the fact that these slob lands are at the present time advertised for sale by the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice and are estimated to produce a yearly rental of £3,666 4s.? If this is so, is the right hon. Gentleman prepared to modify the reply he gave me on the last occasion when I put a question on this subject when he said the money expended had been thrown away, and the Government refused to expend any more money in building up the embankment washed down by the floods?
  SIR J. GORST: I am aware that the land has been offered for sale by the Court of Chancery, and for that reason I think it undesirable to publish the Correspondence. The hon. Member puts into my mouth the statement that the expenditure had been thrown away, but I assented to his statement that undoubtedly there had been a large expenditure, and the Treasury are determined to spend no more.
  MR. COX: But is the right hon. Gentleman aware that of 1,242 acres there will be only 29 acres available, the remaining 1,213 acres being again submerged?
  SIR J. GORST: The hon. Member must give me notice of that question.
  MR. COX: I will do so.

  THE GRESHAM UNIVERSITY.
  SIR A. ROLLIT: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he is able to state the terms of the Reference to a Royal Commission on the question of University Education in London, and the names of the Commissioners?
  MR. BARTLEYhad notice also of the following question: To ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he is in a position to announce the names of the Royal Commissioners to whom the question of a teaching University for London (the Gresham University) will be referred?
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR,): In answer to this question and also to the question in the

  1299
  name of the hon. Member for North Islington, I have to say that the terms of Reference to the Commission as received at the Home Office are as follows:—
  "We, taking the premisses into consideration, do authorise the said Commissioners to consider, and if they think fit, to alter, amend, and extend the proposed charter remitted in compliance with an Address of the House of Commons so as to form and report to us a scheme for the establishment under charter of an efficient teaching University for London."
  These terms, as my hon. Friend will see, are so wide that they will cover all projects which may be thought worthy of consideration for including the existing London University in the scheme. The names of the Commissioners are as follows:—Earl Cowper, K.G. (chairman), Lord Reay, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Bishop Barry, the Right Hon. Sir Lyon Playfair, K.C.B., LL.D., Sir William Scovell Savory, Sir George Murray Humphry, M.D., LL.D., Mr. George G. Ramsay, LL.D., Rev. Canon Browne, B.D., Mr. Henry Sidgwick, Litt.D., Mr. John Scott Burdon Sanderson, M.A., Mr. James Anstie, Q.C., Mr. Ralph Charlton Palmer, and Mr. Gerald Henry Rendall, M.A.
  DR. FARQUHARSON: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman why the representation of the medical profession is restricted to the Surgical side of the profession, and whether he will take into consideration the desirability of adding a physician in active practice as representing the general body of medical practitioners in the United Kingdom?
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I will inquire from my noble Friend with whom the responsibility rests of submitting the list to Her Majesty. I will submit the suggestion of the hon. Member, but I rather think that a difficulty will be found in increasing the number of Commissioners, already considerable. I believe I am right in saying that Sir George Humphry is not merely a surgeon—he is a doctor of medicine.
  DR. FARQUHARSON: I rather think that it is exclusively in connection with the surgical profession he has made his reputation.

  THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS AND ISLANDS (SCOTLAND) WORKS ACT, 1891.
  DR. MACDONALD: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether the Secretary for Scotland has, in contravention of Section 2, Sub-section 4, of "The Western Highlands and Islands (Scotland) Works Act, 1891," refused to make inquiry into certain works proposed to be made under the said Act in Ross-shire till plans, specifications, &c, are laid before him as to the proposed works; and, if so, what remedy there is to compel the observance of the Act and procure an inquiry?
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: The Secretary for Scotland has requested the County Council interested to supply information, plans, and specifications, with a view to facilitate the preliminary inquiry he is entitled to make under Section 2 of the Act. Whether such plans are furnished or not the Secretary of State in no case has refused to make the necessary inquiry.
  DR. MACDONALD: May I ask whether it is not the fact that the plans and specifications are not to be supplied until after the inquiry is made?
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I will submit the suggestion of the hon. Member to the Scotch Office.

  HARBOUR OF REFUGE AT PORTNAGURAN.
  DR. MACDONALD: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury if the Government is now prepared to act on the recommendations of the Western Highlands and Islands Commission of 1890, to grant a sum of £30,000, or other sum of money required, for the construction of a harbour of refuge at Portnaguran, in the Island of Lewis, so as to enable the fishermen to prosecute their avocation with some degree of safety and success; and if there is any intention of giving a grant, as similarly recommended, for erecting a lighthouse on Thupman Head adjacent to Portnaguran?
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I shall be obliged if the hon. Member will put off this question until to-morrow or Thurs-

  1301
  day, and I will obtain full information from the Scotch Office on the subject.

  BEHRING SEA FISHERIES.
  MR. BRYCE: Seeing the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in his place, I beg to ask him a question of which I have given him private notice—whether he can inform the House what is the present state of the negotiations in reference to the Behring Sea Fisheries question—how far they have progressed towards arbitration?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. J. W. LOWTHER,): In reply to the hon. Gentleman, I have to say that complete accord has been arrived at between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States as to the modus vivendi pending a settlement by arbitration of the matters in dispute relating to Behring Sea Fisheries. The Convention has been signed at Washington, but the terms of it have not yet reached this country. I have, however, no reason to suppose that the document in the telegram from America which appeared a few days ago in the Times is in any respect inaccurate. Her Majesty's Government are taking steps to consult the Canadian Government in regard to the person whom they wish to recommend to Her Majesty's Government as one of the British arbitrators. The name of the gentleman who will arbitrate on behalf of Her Majesty's Government has not yet been definitely fixed.

  NEW WRIT.
  For County of Essex (Mid or Chelmsford Division) v. William James Beadel, esquire, deceased.—(Mr. Akers Douglas.)
ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  INDIAN COUNCILS ACT (1861) AMENDMENT BILL [Lords].—(No. 182.)
  COMMITTEE. [Progress 11th April.]
  Considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Clause 1.
  MR. SCHWANN: I do not propose in
  1302
  moving my Amendment to recapitulate all the arguments used on the Second Reading of the Bill; it is not necessary or desirable, and I should be trifling with the time of the Committee were I to attempt it. Yet I may be allowed to say that I think I was able on that occasion to prove pretty successfully that the elective principle is not at all new in India. I could even bring forward authorities to show that the very origin of the principle is from the East. But I do not wish to occupy time with a matter more or less of an academical character. I further showed that the elective principle is actually at work in Municipalities and Local Boards in India, and I think the number of these institutions which exist there is calculated to astonish some hon. Members. I was able to show from the evidence of Indian officials that the working of these Municipalities had been eminently successful and I also showed that the members of the Indian National Congress, which gives expression to an important section of Indian opinion, is an elective institution, the members being all elected in free and open meeting. Further, I was able to show that the elective principle has been recommended by a number of Viceroys who have rendered distinguished services to the Empire and to India. It was partially recommended to the Home Government by Lord Dufferin. Lord Northbrook accepted the principle with scarcely any qualification, and Lord Ripon, as we all know, has always been in favour of the principle, which has also the recommendation of Lord Reay, a distinguished Indian Governor. I was also able to show that a considerable number of Indian civil officials favoured the extension of the elective principle, Mr. H. J. Reynolds, C.I.E., Mr. Cotton, for 25 years a member of the Civil Service, and others. I am bound to say I think that all these authorities combined form a strong body of evidence, which ought to convince this Committee that it would be desirable to extend the elective principle in the formation of Indian Councils. I was rather amused by some of the comments in the English Press, which go far to prove that a great number of the writers did not even take the trouble to

  1303
  read the Debate on the Second Reading in extenso, for they ascribed to Indian reformers firstly the desire to destroy the actual mode of government in India by introducing full Parliamentary government into India; secondly, they impute to us the wish that the people of India, or their elected representatives, should have the complete power of the purse; thirdly, that the official body should be placed in a minority in the Councils of India. Now, these comments remind me of the definition of a crab as "a red fish which walks backwards;" a definition which is quite perfect as a definition were it not for the facts that a crab is not red, is not a fish, and does not walk backwards. So I may say of the arguments placed in the mouths of Indian reformers, who advocate the elective principle for members of the various Indian Councils: they would apply admirably but for the fact that we are not anxious to introduce Parliamentary government in India. To do so at the present time would be ridiculous and absurd. It never has been advocated by any politician taking a serious interest in Indian affairs. We have never dreamed of giving the elective body the power of the purse; but it is the object of Indian reformers, and their friends on this side of the House, so to extend the Bill now before us that it shall give to these Councils full liberty to discuss financial questions, and that is a point upon which we shall insist from these Benches. We think that greater facilities should be given, than the Bill now affords, for this purpose, and that it should be possible to take divisions on proposals before the Viceregal Council on financial matters; that members of the Council should be free to put questions and to call for papers, so as to enable enlightened criticism to be directed upon proposals in the Vice-Regal Council. We are not anxious to put the official element in a minority on these Councils; but, on the contrary it has always been suggested by the National Congress, that the elected members on the Indian Councils should not be more than one-half or less than one-third of the total number of the members of Council, so as to leave the Government of India always with a
  1304
  majority of votes. So all the arguments directed against our proposals fall pointless to the ground. It may be asked, "Why are you anxious for elected representation on the Indian Councils?" Why, Sir, for very much the same reasons which animated English reformers 60 years ago, when they advocated a large increase of the franchise. In those days of a narrow franchise and pocket boroughs it was asked by Tories, "If you give the franchise to a larger number of people, how will that affect the economic conditions of the working men—how will it increase the happiness of the labouring classes?" But since then we have seen the wonderful effect that has followed from the extension of the franchise in the United Kingdom. We have seen the Corn Laws abolished; we have seen the right of combination given to the labouring classes, the liberty of the Press established, the right of free meeting, free education, secured to the people, their economic position vastly improved. All these things, I believe, have flowed from the extension of the franchise in England; and it is just because we believe that the economic position of India requires more serious attention, and that its own inhabitants are more likely to drive home the arguments by which the requirements of India are supported, that we ask you to concede this extension of the elective principle. I am quite aware that Anglo-Indian opinion in India will be opposed to such an extension, as expressed by the Anglo-Indian Press. That Press, it seems to me, neglects, to a large extent, its duty in India, where it might do much noble work in diminishing the differences and smoothing the difficulties which must inevitably arise in such a country as India. The Anglo-Indian Press does all it can to increase those difficulties, and daily pours the virus of race hatred into the veins of the Anglo-Indian community. Deeply I regret that this should be so, and I hope the Press may in the future turn over a new leaf. There are various sections of Anglo-Indian society naturally opposed to the introduction of the elective principle by Indian reformers, whose watchwords are similar to those of reformers

  1305
  in England, "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform." The military classes are, speaking generally, opposed to peace; their interests are in the direction of active service and a "forward" policy—as they term it. The Civil Service is against retrenchment, because it might possibly happen that this retrenchment would take the form of a considerable curtailment of the salaries paid out of Indian Revenue. I believe one of my hon. Friends who spoke in the Second Reading Debate referred to the Return, issued on the Motion of the late Mr. John Bright, in which it was shown that out of 68,000 Europeans in India 25,000 were Government officials, who amongst them divided the sum of 13 millions sterling in salaries and emoluments, &c, annually. The commercial classes instinctively fear reforms and changes, the introduction of which may, and occasionally must, interfere with the natural flow of trade. Among this class are men who, having crossed the Indian Ocean with little means, have no sooner been in India for a few years, and put together a few lakhs of rupees, than they think it necessary to vilify and attack the people in whose country they have so advantageously improved their own position. Lawyers, too, dislike competition with the nimble-witted Baboo. I think the Indian Government will require all the assistance of this House to enable it to advance against the impediments which will be thrown in its way by interested classes, and against difficulties raised by Anglo-Indian prejudice. We are told that the elective principle is contained in the present Bill; but even with microscopical examination it is scarcely possible to find it. It is supposed to be contained in the 4th sub-section of this clause, which runs as follows:—
  "The Governor General in Council may from time to time on the approval of the Secretary of State in Council make regulations as to the conditions under which such nominations, or any of them, shall be made by the Governor General, Governors, and Lieutenant-Governors respectively, and prescribe the manner in which such regulations shall be carried into effect."
  Now, I am quite willing to believe it would be possible, under this sub-
  1306
  section, to introduce an arrangement to allow a certain number of men to be elected by large cities, or by various bodies, to the Legislative Councils; but it is equally evident that this section of the clause gives no distinct pledge to this House or the country. Mr. H. J. Reynolds, C.I.E., in a lecture delivered a short time ago, since the passing of the Second Reading, described these concessions as "utterly inadequate," and as having "aroused feelings of indignation and contempt." I am bound to say I think these feelings of indignation and contempt will be shared by a considerable number of the Indian people, and by my Amendments I propose to give the Government the opportunity of incorporating and including the elective principle formally in their Bill, and of giving proof of the sincerity of their intentions. Whatever may be the fate of my Amendments, I am glad to think that some assurances have been given both in this House and in another place which will, I trust, eventually lead to a large extension of the elective principle. We all know that the hon. Gentleman who has charge of the Bill in this House was not very re-assuring as to what the Government would do; but still he did give us to understand that to a large extent there was an intention to introduce the elective principle. Now, Lord Salisbury, too, in another place, has given a general assent, I believe, to the interpretation put by Lord Kimberley on some remarks of Lord Cross, which gave considerable latitude to the clause to which I have referred. The Marquess of Salisbury said—
  "I rise for the purpose of expressing my general assent to the language which has been used by the noble Lord (Lord Northbrook). I quite agree with him that the word 'representation' better represents the intention we have in view than the more narrow word 'election.' I desire to correct the idea that this extra representation in the Legislative Councils is to be necessarily confined, or even specifically confined, to Municipal Bodies. I do not in the least desire to narrow the language or elasticity of the Bill in the direction of discouraging such bodies; but I must demur to the idea that they must necessarily be the main bodies in India to whom this additional representation must be given."
  I quite agree with the Marquess of Salisbury, because it is quite evident

  1307
  that it would probably be very undesirable that the same people who were elected on the Municipal Bodies should be chosen to select in the large cities the persons who should be sent as representatives to either the Provincial or Legislative Councils. The municipal elections would be carried out with a different object in view—with the object of looking after the sanitary arrangements, &c, &c, of large towns, popular education, and matters of that kind; but these would be a different sort of men possibly from those who might be elected for the higher duties of taking part in the Provincial and Legislative Councils, In the case of many of the bodies in India—the Chambers of Commerce, for example, and the Universities—those who sit on them are nearly all nominate members themselves; and anything emanating from them would hardly be considered to emanate from the people themselves, or to constitute a true, or indeed any, representation of the people. There was a suggestion made by the hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham (Sir E. Temple) on the other side of the House. He thinks it advisable to select 16 large cities, and to take care that such cities should cover every possible variety of opinion, and that they should be instructed to send members to the Provincial and Legislative Councils. That is a suggestion which may or may not be carried out; but I believe that, to a certain extent, it would meet the views of many Indian reformers if such a step were taken. I am glad to think that Lord Salisbury, in the remarks which I have quoted, has, at any rate, made an advance on the position which he has taken up on former occasions with respect to Indian reform. I hope the "black man" controversy is closed, and that the noble Marquess will never again be heard to use words so calculated to wound the feelings of the great body of our fellow-citizens in India. I think he also stated before that the idea of election was entirely foreign to the Indian mind and to Indian institutions. If so, it would seem to me that his recent speech, and what he allowed to pass with his tacit approval in another
  1308
  place, show that he now takes, I hope, a broader view both of his own and our duties and responsibilities in India. I am glad to think that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian has also given us very clear indication as to what we may expect from any Government of which he may be at the head, by the terms in which he referred to the employment of the elective principle in India during the recent debate in this House. Although I do not wish to occupy the time of the House by reading many long extracts from what he said, I think I should put on record the pledges which he made to this House on that occasion. Speaking in the Debate on the Second Reading of this Bill the right hon. Gentleman said—
  "It is quite evident that the great question we have before us is the question of the introduction of the elective element into the Government of India. That question overshadows and absorbs everything else; it is a question of vital importance. While the language of the Bill cannot be said to embody the elective principle, it is very peculiar language, unless it is intended to pave the way for the adoption of that principle. I believe it was suggested by a nobleman in the House of Lords, who is friendly to the elective principle in India, that unless it had been intended to leave room for some peculiarities not yet introduced into the Indian system, in the appointment of the members of the Councils under this Bill, it would have been a very singular form of speech to provide not simply that the Governor-General might nominate, but that he might make regulations as to the conditions under which such nominations should be made, either by himself or by the Government in Council. It is plain, I think we must assume, that those who have adopted the language have in their view something beyond mere nomination. What I desire, above all, is not that there shall be produced at the moment an imposing and magnificent structure, but that there shall be the introduction of that which in itself is in real sympathy with the hearts and minds of the people of India. All these things induce us to look forward cheerfully to a great future for India, and to expect that a real success will attend the genuine application, even though it may be a limited one, of the elective principle to the Government of that vast and almost immeasurable community. My hon. Friend, in moving the Amendment, has pointed out authorities in favour of the elective principle, these including men who have been responsible for the actual administration of India. These men, notwithstanding that responsibility, have entirely exempted themselves from whatever prejudices administration may have entailed on them, and they have distinctly and deliberately sanctioned the introduction of this

  1309
  elective principle. It is there that we stand upon solid ground, and Her Majesty's Government ought to understand that it will be regarded as a most grave disappointment if, after all the assurances we have received that an attempt will be made to bring into operation this powerful engine of government, there should not be some result such as we anticipate from their action."
  And then he says—
  "I do not think there is on that (the Government) side of the House any jealousy of the introduction into India of that principle, which undoubtedly, if it did exist, would form a strong mark of difference between the Party who sit there and the Party who sit on this side of the House. In reality and in substance we have the same objects in view, and are prepared to recommend the employment of the same means."
  Well, I think that these extracts, though they are, perhaps, a little too long, seem to me to pledge the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian up to the hilt to effective action on this question. The Duke of Devonshire, then Lord Hartington, when replying to a deputation some years ago, also spoke in favour of the introduction of the elective principle into the Councils of India. I am led to believe, Sir, that the elective principle, is necessary; and I think it would be a great advantage to India if it were introduced with respect to the persons selected for the Provincial and Legislative Councils of India. There is one, other, last reason why I think this reform should be carried out. In the time of the East India Company Parliament was especially watchful of the Government of India; and on the renewal of the Charter every 30 years the most searching inquiry was made into all the abuses which could be alleged against the East India Company. I believe Burke said that it was the first duty of a Member of Parliament to be very jealous of the Executive Government; and I trust that the Members of this House will take a considerable interest in the affairs of India. They have been far too much neglected in past years. The Debate on the Indian Budget has always been postponed to the Dog Days; and it is high time that new methods and a new system should be introduced into this House. I have much pleasure in moving my Amendment.
  Amendment proposed, in page 1, line 5, after the word "Council," to insert the words "elected as hereinafter provided for, and."—(Mr. Schwann.)
  Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Mr. CURZON,): I observe that the hon. Member has devoted the greater part of his speech to a general discussion on the merits of the elective system in India and to other topics of Indian or Anglo-Indian interest rather than to a recommendation of the particular scheme of election, as I understand, which he desires to graft on this Bill. From the wording of his Amendment, which runs, "elected as hereinafter provided for," I should gather that the whole of his electoral scheme is comprehended in this Amendment; and supposing his Amendment, as I trust it will be, is rejected by the Committee, there will go at one sweep all the other Amendments which he proposes to introduce into the Bill, and which define the electoral system he here refers to in general terms. I think, therefore, it will be my duty, and I think it will be to the advantage of the Committee, if I take the elective system "as hereinafter provided for," which the hon. Member refers to, and state at once the reasons for which it is impossible for the Government to accept it, or to allow this Amendment to appear in the Bill. Now the hon. Member proposes by means of this Amendment to graft an injunction on to the Bill embodying an extensive electoral scheme. In the first place he proposes a large number of additional members on the Councils, of whom not less than one-third nor more than one-half is to be elected. It is not my duty to discuss that point now, because it obviously arises upon a later Amendment which the hon. Member may be perfectly willing to move, whether his views as to election are entertained or not. In the next place he leaves the nature of the constituency in his electoral scheme, and also the actual number of persons to be elected, to be determined by the Viceroy. He then refers to what he

  1311
  euphemistically describes as "the reasonable representation of minorities." Under his proposal election is to be by ballot, and the franchise is to be conferred on not less than two per cent. of the inhabitants of the territory under the Council in question. And, finally, those gentlemen who are elected to the Councils are to hold office for a period of three years. That, Sir, is the elaborate and complicated, but I think, also, the diffident and ambiguous, system of election which comes under the head of these words "elected as hereinafter provided for," and which the hon. Member wants to introduce into this Bill. Now I am placed in some difficulty in discussing these questions because the hon. Member, having, as I have said, devoted the whole of his speech to purely general considerations which appear to me only to touch the fringe of the subject, has failed altogether to give the Committee any information upon the nature of these proposals or upon the reasons which led him to make them. These proposals are not, so far as I know, the offspring of the hon. Member's own ingenuity. They are taken verbatim from the second of the two Indian Councils Bills, introduced into this House by the late hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh). Now, Sir, the Government are absolutely unable to accept this elaborate electoral scheme as being altogether outside what they consider the legitimate province of interference of this House with the Government of India, and as altogether outside the scope of this Bill. The object of the Government, and the object of this Bill, as I explained in the Debate on the Second Reading, is, in so far as the elective principle is capable of being introduced into India, to leave the manner, the date, and the mode of its introduction absolutely to the Viceroy. They are unwilling to interfere with his discretion in the matter. That is the intention of the Government, and that it is also a wise intention was recognised by no less an authority than the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian himself. The hon. Gentleman who has just spoken has quoted from that right hon. Gentleman; but he did not quote the most significant
  1312
  part of his speech; and from the extract which the hon. Member gave, if it stood alone, one might draw a totally different inference from that speech from what the right hon. Gentleman himself intended to convey by it. What did the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian say? He spoke as follows:—
  "I think I may fairly say that what the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary did embody in his speech was the elective principle in the only sense in which he could be expected to embody it. My construction of that speech is—and I do not think it admitted of two constructions, especially considering the reference the hon. Gentleman made to the speeches of Lord Kimberley—my construction of that speech is that it is the intention of the Government and the intention of the House of Lords, in which we are now invited to concur, that a serious effort shall be made to consider carefully those elements which India in its present condition may furnish for the introduction into the Councils of India of the elective principle. Now, Sir, if that effort is to be made, by whom is it to be made? I do not think it can be made by this House except through the medium of empowering provisions. I doubt if it would be well or wise on our part, with our imperfect knowledge, to proceed with the determination of the particulars of any plan. The best course we could take would be to commend to the authorities of India what is a clear indication of the principles on which we desire them to proceed. It is not our business to devise machinery for the purpose of Indian Government; it is our business to give to those who represent Her Majesty in India ample information as to what we believe to be sound principles of government; and it is, of course, the function of this House to comment upon any case in which we may think they have failed to give due effect to those principles. But in the discharge of their high administrative functions, or as to the choice of means, we should leave that in their hands."
  Well, these were the opinions of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian. I understood they were accepted on that side of the House, and undoubtedly it was in deference to these opinions that the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman himself was withdrawn. But I am bound to point out that if the Amendment which he is now moving were carried it would be absolutely fatal to this Bill, and it would be taking up an attitude wholly inconsistent with the attitude which he adopted two or three weeks ago. As regards the general disquisitions with which the hon. Member favoured us about the advantages of the electoral system to India, it is not my desire to

  1313
  repeat the reasons which I endeavoured to state before, why the Government believe that a general scheme of representative government is wholly impossible in that country. I endeavoured to point out then, and the hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham pointed out with much greater knowledge and ability than I can command, that the idea is essentially foreign to the Oriental mind, that there are many classes in India to whom it would be not only uncongenial but to whom it would be absolutely repugnant, that no scheme could be devised which would in any degree represent the people of India, and that it is very doubtful whether we have any right to speak of the people of India at all if any unity or homogeneousness is supposed to be predicated by such a title. I will not repeat those general considerations upon this occasion; I will only allude to one observation which fell from the hon. Member in his speech just now. He said that the elective principle was already actively at work in the Municipalities of India, and that the result showed that it had been eminently successful. But these elected bodies are still upon their trial; and the system has not been universally applied. In many cases the Government have had to make other arrangements because the system is not understood, and not appreciated, and not desired by the people. It has not been received with any enthusiasm in India. It has been found that the people are very apathetic about its adoption, and that they cannot assimilate the idea of election at all readily, that many of the best men—the traders and business men—have held aloof, that it is very difficult to get the best men to come forward if elected, and that in many cases obstacles are raised where there is any difference of religious opinion, as for instance in the cases of Hindoos and Mahomedans. Therefore, I think that argument is not one of very great value. Now as regards the scheme of the hon. Member itself. With regard to the question of additional members, as I have said, I shall leave that point for discussion upon a later Amendment. The hon. Member is prepared to leave the question of the constituencies entirely to the Viceroy. Well,
  1314
  that shows that he has a confidence in the Viceroy, which must no doubt be very complimentary to that statesman; but it also shows that he has a diffidence in himself which is highly significant; and all the more so when contrasted with the minute instructions on certain particulars that he has introduced into his scheme. The attitude of the hon. Member appears to me to be like that of a man giving an order for a church to an architect, who insists upon certain small details, such as the arrangement of the pews and the reredos, but leaves entirely to the judgment of the architect what the style of the architecture is to be, whether Gothic, or Palladian, or Romanesque. Then the hon. Gentleman asks for the reasonable representation of minorities. But what would be regarded as reasonable representation by a Hindoo would not be regarded as reasonable representation by a Mussulman, and what would be regarded as reasonable representation by a Brahmin would not be regarded as reasonable representation by a Parsee. Why, even in this country we have not yet succeeded in arriving at a reasonable scheme of representation of minorities. The next provision of the hon. Member's scheme is that the franchise is to be bestowed on not less than two per cent. of the inhabitants of the district in question. Has the hon. Gentleman any idea whatever of how that plan would work out in practice? We believe it to be utterly fantastic, and that it would be extending the franchise in India far below the lowest point which has ever yet been touched in England after the lapse of centuries. Take the case of the North-West Provinces, where already a Council exists. In that district the total number of persons who can read or write any of the elementary native tongues, including those who are under instruction at school, is under three per cent. I presume the hon. Member does not propose to extend the franchise to those who are at school. This proposal, therefore, would give every man in that country who can read or write the right to vote at an election. After the lapse of centuries we have not yet arrived at manhood suffrage in

  1315
  England; and yet the hon. Member coolly proposes to introduce a system into India which descends to an even lower point in the intellectual scale. The next item in the proposal is that the members of the elected body should hold office for three years, and that point will probably be dealt with when the hon. Member moves an Amendment on the subject later on. Without repeating my remarks on the general subject, but dealing with the scheme as it is adumbrated by the hon. Member, I hope I have shown that it is an ill-digested scheme, and, if carried into operation, would be found unworkable. If this particular Amendment were carried out it would be incompatible with the object of this Bill, and with the interpretation placed upon it by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian, and would be antagonistic to the cause of good government in India.
  MR. MORTON: I think it is the duty of the House to say how India shall be governed as it has done in the case of our other Colonies. We should bear in mind what the feelings of the people of India are upon this subject. So far as I have been able to gather, they ask to be allowed to elect at least one-half of the members of the Councils, and I cannot for the life of me understand why we cannot consent to the adoption of such a moderate request, especially bearing in mind that the Councils of India have not much to do with the government of the country. We are now educating, or we are attempting to educate, the people of India, and we are asking that they shall be given some small share in the government of their country. The people of India ask for it themselves through British residents in that country who understand it well, and who say that there are a sufficient number of people educated in India who might be safely entrusted with a more active share in the government of the country. There can be no doubt whatever that there are at the present time a large number of people in India who are demanding what is called Home Rule in that country, and the adoption of the elective principle is desired with the view of preventing a much larger and more unfortunate
  1316
  question arising by-and-by. The hon. Gentleman who moved this Amendment referred to the Local Boards, and he said that they are working satisfactorily and with considerable success. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for India denied that they are working well, but he failed to give a single case in support of his statement. I therefore take it that the assertion of the hon. Member is worth more than that of the Under Secretary for India. The people of India may rest assured that when the Radicals of this country come into power—as they will no doubt before long—they will do what is just and right towards them, and enable them to assist in governing their own country in a better manner than it is governed at the present time. Instead of India then being a source of weakness to this country it will be strong enough to protect itself against any outside foe. So far as we can see, the present Government are opposed to the adoption of the elective principle in India, although the people of that country are asking for it. I trust, however, that the people of India will go on asking for its adoption in the reasonable and temperate manner in which they have asked for it at their Conferences during the past five or six years, and that before long we shall be able, owing to their advanced state of education, to grant them their request.
  MR. BRYCE: I agree very warmly with the desire that the elective principle should be recognised, and that the Government should find some means of adopting it in India. Eminent English officials in that country say that one of the greatest difficulties that our Government have to encounter in that country is that of ascertaining what the feeling of the people really is. It is undoubtedly the opinion of the Government (as it is of the Viceroy) that the reforms proposed by this Bill will enable the Government of India to ascertain more fully and in a more authoritative way than before what the opinion of the population is, and what their wishes and feelings are with regard to the various questions affecting them which come before the Legislature. It is perfectly true—as has been said by

  1317
  the Under Secretary for India—that the feelings of the Oriental population with regard to this question of nomination and election are almost entirely opposite to the feelings of the people here, but it is also true that the elective principle has many advantages over the nominative principle. The elected member is above the feeling that he must conform to the wishes of those who appoint him. Those who know only a little about India must be aware that the nominated members of the Councils in India feel themselves bound to act in accordance with the wishes of those who appoint them. There have, of course, been some remarkable exceptions, but on the whole they feel a certain difficulty in opposing measures which the Government introduce, or in expressing themselves with the requisite freedom with regard to them. It is certainly, therefore, desirable that there should be an independent expression of opinion on the Councils, and I think that can only be obtained by adopting the elective principle. The value of an independent opinion would be very much diminished if the people of India did not believe that it sprung from the genuine feeling of those who represented them. For that reason, and for other reasons that I need not go into, I believe that there are many Members of this House—and I need not confine my remarks to this House alone—who desire to see the elective principle largely introduced into India, and who also feel a very strong and confident hope that it will be introduced into that country. We know that eminent officials hold such views, and we have no reason to believe that the opinion of the present Viceroy is at variance with them. I, for one, should be extremely glad if the House had the opportunity of asserting that principle. But how do we stand with regard to the question now? My hon. Friend the Member for Manchester comes before us with a series of Amendments, and some of the points he raises relates to matters which would require a great deal of debate.
  MR. CURZON: The hon. Member would commit the House to the adoption of the system of election.
  MR. BRYCE: I should hardly think that would be so. Possibly Mr. Courtney could tell us whether it would be so.
  THE CHAIRMAN (Mr. COURTNEY,): The Amendment indicates that something must be done, but it does not say what.
  MR. BRYCE: I should be sorry to tie the hands of the Indian Government by any specific Amendment, and to make them unwilling to do what they might otherwise be willing to do in a large and generous way. On the Motion for the Second Reading of this, Bill the Under Secretary for India said it would be competent for the Governor General in the interpretation of this Bill, if so advised, to introduce the elective principle. Therefore, although I feel as strongly as any Member on this question, I shall be unable to support the Amendment of the hon. Member, and I would ask him not to divide the Committee upon it.
  MR. SEYMOUR KEAY: If the hon. and learned Member who has just sat down (Mr. Bryce) had more personal knowledge than he possesses of the system under which our Indian bureaucracy now works, he would not entertain the hope which he has just expressed that there ever will be any practical application of the elective principle which is said to exist in theory in this Bill. The only clause which is supposed to contain such a principle, even in theory, is not to be put in force unless on the initiative of the Indian Government itself. Now, I am convinced from a very long personal experience in India, extending over 30 years, that the system of government in that country is such as would render imperfectly hopeless and impossible for any Government, however courageous it might be, to put such a principle in motion of its own accord. I desire to remind the Committee of a circumstance which I think is of great gravity, but which, I believe, has not been mentioned in the Debates upon this Bill. It is that the need for the introduction of the elective principle has greatly increased rather than lessened, as compared with 35 years ago. Her Majesty's Government and this House were then held to possess something of the

  1319
  position of a Judge as to the doings of the Indian Company. The Board of Control, although it was not altogether efficient, still had considerable effect as a Court of Review, and Her Majesty's Government and this House also were inclined to view with jealousy the exercise of irresponsible power by the Government at Calcutta. In the days of the East India Company its proceedings were periodically reviewed in this country. Every 20 years the Charter had to be renewed, and on such occasions the Company was put more or less on its defence. But now all that is altered. The Board of Control has gone; there are no Charter renewals now; and Her Majesty's Government has meantime so changed its attitude that it has now practically become the advocate of the Government of India instead of, as formerly, its Judge. For this reason I say there is a strong official argument that the time has come when the voice of the people of India should be heard in the Legislative Council of India. I do not believe that the Secretary of State for India, as his office is at present constituted, is really aware how little information is afforded to Her Majesty's Government by what I may call the rank and file of the officials of the Government of India. I say there has grown up a system whereby all adverse Reports made by district officials are at this moment "burked" on their way to the Governors of the Presidencies, or, at all events, to the Governor General. At this moment, in provincial centres such as Commissionerships, there are pigeon-holes cram-full of documents which have been "burked" in the way I have mentioned, because of their pessimistic character. The reason is not far to seek. Under such a system as obtains in India the collection of Revenue is the end and aim of the existence of the Government; and that being so, it is perfectly natural that a district officer, impressed with the increasing poverty of the people, who writes a Report for the consideration of the Government, should be discouraged in every possible way from putting that document forward. Indeed, I have known instances where such an officer, impressed by the wants and even by the starvation of the people, has, when
  1320
  his Report has reached head-quarters, found that the writing of such Reports was not the best way of finding promotion in his service. That feeling has now got abroad, and the result is that fewer and fewer adverse Reports are written by Anglo-Indian officials every year. Hence it is perfectly clear that the necessity for hearing the views of the population by their own mouthpieces yearly increases. Can the right hon. Gentleman opposite explain why the Government of India, through its officers, is so extremely jealous of allowing the people to express their views in the manner proposed? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that at the present moment in the State of Mysore there is an elected body of cultivators which meets, discusses, and has published reports of its proceedings? I have often referred with the greatest pleasure and profit to the information which is thus supplied to the Native Ruler by the cultivators rising in their places and plainly declaring what are their real wants and woes. Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Secretary of State for India has any objection to a Motion whereby, if the elective principle be not directly applied to the Legislative Council, a proviso may be introduced authorising or directing an assemblage of the representative cultivators for the Provinces of British India similar to that which takes place in Mysore? If there still is, as in the past, a rooted objection on the part of the Government of India to sanction such a scheme, I venture to say that no intelligible reason can be stated for such an attitude, unless it be that our rulers fear rather than desire to know the truth. If such representative bodies are created, I believe that the information which will be supplied to their rulers will not only be most valuable, but will be such as to stagger the Government of India itself, and bring to it knowledge which it at present excludes from its consideration as only existing in the minds of certain members of the Indian Congress, of whose views it contemptuously takes no account. I could mention other States in which the representative principle has been accepted, and is working, although in

  1321
  a small degree, very happily. There is only one further point to which I want to refer, and that is the enormous difficulty at present existing as to anything like a true publication even of the official Reports such as they are. I adduce this also in support of the contention that the Government of India is not duly made aware of the wants of the people. I could point out instance after instance in which Reports of a melancholy or pessimistic nature have, when they came to be alluded to in the interesting volume called The Return of the Moral and Material Progress of India, had their character rendered the reverse of that which was intended when they were launched by those responsible for them. If I may venture to count my 30 years' experience as anything, I caution the Committee against refusing this Amendment; because if we refuse to give the people of India an outlet for the expression of their views and wants, I have no hesitation in saying that a crisis—nay, even a catastrophe—will occur in a very few years' time, not in consequence of race disaffection or anything of that kind, but from increasing poverty, decadence of the soil, absence of manure, the reduction of cattle, and the starvation of the people, which will necessarily subvert the very foundations of our enormously expensive Indian Government.
  MR. S. SMITH: I do not think the House possesses an experience of Indian affairs which will justify us in laying down a general scheme of election; but, at the same time, I consider that we should clearly urge the Government of India to introduce the elective principle in some form. I, for my part, should be satisfied if we had one single Amendment asking the Government of India to add to the Council a certain number of elected members, leaving that Government a free hand to devise the machinery by which members shall be elected. I think, too, we might also leave to them to fix the number. I feel strongly the truth of much that has fallen from the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, and agree that we must provide an outlet for the expression of the griev-
  1322
  ances of the people, which are deeper than this House is aware of. I also share in those dark forebodings, because I do believe that most of the people are suffering from excessive poverty, and I am convinced that India abounds with serious discontent, which will never find adequate expression until there is some application of the electoral principle. Therefore I hope the House will use this opportunity of instructing the Government of India to adopt the representative principle in some form or other, and especially so seeing that it may be many years before we have such an opportunity again. I think we shall be committing a great mistake, indeed a dereliction of duty, if we do not give definite intimation that it is the opinion of this House that there should now be an inception in India of the principle under discussion. I think that the Bill should be more explicit, knowing, as I do, the unwillingness of the Indian Government to have its prerogatives interfered with, and I very much doubt whether there will be any practical result in the absence of definite instructions.
  SIR R. TEMPLE: I had hoped that, after the judicious speech made by the hon. Gentleman opposite the Member for Aberdeen (Mr. Bryce), the hon. Member the Mover of this Amendment (Mr. Schwann) would have been brought once more to the judicious manner in which he acted on a similar occasion; but such, it seems, is not to be our fate. Hence it is necessary that someone on this side of the House should say a few words in support of the Government measure. In reference to what has just fallen from the hon. Member, I hope the Under Secretary of State will not say one word more than he has already said, for I venture to think that, according to the best opinion in India, as much has been said on the subject as can be said at the present time. As the House is kind enough to remember, I am rather in favour of the introduction of such a principle; but I am above all things a practical person; and I am very well aware of the extreme distrust and apprehension with which this measure is viewed by many,

  1323
  both at home and abroad, for whose opinion I have the greatest respect. In my opinion this Bill paves the way for the introduction of the principle, and it leaves matters to the resident Executive. That is just as it should be. One great difficulty in this matter—and remember I speak as a man who is somewhat in favour of the principle—is that nobody in India among the vast congeries of population, except one limited class, the Indian Congress, cares anything for the elective principle. That is a class for whom I have the highest respect and regard, and I shall not repeat all I have said during previous Debates in this House to show that it represents nothing but itself. The great defect of the Congress is that it never has succeeded in acquiring popularity from its own countrymen, or attaching to itself the confidence of the people of India. This Amendment would thoroughly commit the House to the very principle which was argued in the Debate on the Second Reading, and which we had hoped was laid to rest. According to the Bill the introduction of the elective principle was to be left to the Government of India, whereas this Amendment absolutely commits the Government to the principle. Why, if this Amendment were carried, the Government of India would have no option but to at once proceed to have elected members of the Council, and its effect would be to say the Council shall consist of elected members. Then, of course, there must be some sort of election, and I venture to say that the system which has been adumbrated is nothing more than the most shadowy outline of a possible electoral system for a vast country comprising the most indistinct terms. But, whatever it foreshadowed, it would commit the Governor General to a system of constituencies, and I confidently assert that no human wit can devise a system of constituencies for such a country. How is the House to send out to India a specific instruction to set up a system of which we have no idea whatever as to how it could be worked, or carried out, or even introduced? In this scheme there is one particular point to which the Under Secretary of State for India referred. It was this. The hon. Member proposes that not less
  1324
  than two per cent. of the population should be enfranchised. That proposal looks mild at first sight, but really it means a great deal. Take, for instance, the North-West Provinces. There two per cent. of the population would mean 620,000 electors, and I do not know where the Lieutenant-Governor of those Provinces would find them. Then take such a country as Bengal, where one would have to find 1,100,000 electors. I do not know where they could be found, and I, who have governed that country, assert that they could not be found. You would have to drag them from the highways and bye-ways, and when you got them would find it impossible for them to understand what the system meant. In the other Provinces there would be still greater difficulty. This is my main objection to the Amendment, but there are one or two points which seem to call for passing reference. The hon. Member for Manchester quoted the words of the European Press, and spoke disparagingly of them.
  MR. SCHWANN: Anglo-Indian.
  SIR R. TEMPLE: Yes; they are European though, just as much as we are. They are our countrymen, educated here and born here; and by what right, then, does the hon. Member speak of them as Anglo-Indians and not as Europeans? He said that they were opposed to the principle of the electoral system, and that they had failed to do their duty to the people of India because they refused to recommend the adoption of the electoral principle. I say their conduct demands our respect, because they are independent Englishmen, capable of judging and understanding the state of affairs, whose advice should be accepted by the House. They live in the country, and knowing the dangers and various pitfalls are not prepared to approve of what is proposed. Well, Sir, something has been said by more than one Member about his unwillingness to introduce the system of Parliamentary government. Hardly had the words escaped the hon. Member's lips when another hon. Member below the Gangway said he did wish to introduce that system or something like Home Rule. Now, it might be

  1325
  true that in the first instance the hon. Member for Manchester, who moved the Amendment, did not wish to introduce Parliamentary government. He knows very well that it would not do in India. Those who have to fight and defend the country are the people with whom the responsibility of government must rest, and those who know India best know that for valour and energy they must look principally to the European Administrators there. The hon. Member for Manchester must know all this. And, therefore, he may not be desirous to immediately introduce the Parliamentary system. But what he wishes to do is to prepare such a Council for the government of India as would be able to bring pressure to bear upon the Viceroy, who, although he alone was responsible for the safety and welfare of the country, would, nevertheless, be bound by bonds that would oblige him to regulate the Government by a Parliamentary system. The hon. Member also knows what that means. It is to gradually prepare the bonds which, although loose at first, would, if accepted by the European Samson, gradually be drawn tighter until at last he has become Samson Agonistes. How would it all end? It would end in the natives having all the power and the benefit of British rule, whilst we should alone have to bear the onerous burden of responsibility. Now, Sir, I will conclude by saying that you can no more speak of the people of India than of the people of Europe or of Asia. There is in India a vast congeries of population. It is a sort of colluvies gentium, of which no parallel is to be found on the European Continent. The fact is, India is made up of peoples of various nationalities and habits of thought, languages, and religious observances, which have no sympathy the one with the other. The delicate Bengalee differs from the sturdy yeoman of the North-Western Provinces. He again differs from the martial and loyal Sikh of the Punjab and from other races of the country. They are united in nothing except the golden bond of British rule and loyalty to the Queen-Empress of India.
  MR. SCHWANN: I do not wish to detain the Committee at any
  1326
  length, but I should like to reply to the remarks of the hon. Baronet so far as many Hindoo gentlemen are concerned. I maintain that during the Indian Mutiny there were wonderful examples of heroism shown by Indian gentlemen and officials, who, at the risk of their own lives, did much to defend and save the lives of others. I think it would be a shame to allow this opportunity to pass without defending them from the aspersions of the hon. Baronet in this House.
  SIR W. PLOWDEN: I rise to support the Amendment of the hon. Member for Manchester. I do not wish to say I agree with the arguments which the hon. Member for Manchester has brought forward; but if I were in doubt about the matter and were inclined to support his arguments the strongest confirmation that I should have received would have been drawn from the remarks which fell at the last moment from the hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham (Sir R. Temple). What did he say? He said, "You are not dealing in India with a people." I suppose he meant:—You are not dealing with one nationality; and then he went on to describe the extreme diversity which exists amongst the varied population of that country. I think that statement must have forced upon most of our minds the absolute necessity of getting, so far as the government of the country is concerned, an expression of public opinion from those various component parts. If you stand in India as an alien Government, and are administering the affairs of a vast population of people numbering 230 millions, it is absolutely essential to have a thorough expression of public opinion on the part of that population. I quite agree with my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India that this Amendment of my hon. Friend behind me is not a practicable Amendment on account of the conditions which surround it. But so far as the Amendment itself is concerned—and as it is not hampered by any conditions—I think we should have some response from the hon. Member opposite in charge of the Bill, to whom application

  1327
  has been made by several Members on this side of the House, asking him to introduce into it words which would make it plain to the authorities in India that the electoral principle is accepted by this House. I do not mean that he is to tell the authorities to adopt the principle at once or to make any arrangements which might appear to them to be undesirable or likely to produce danger and discontent, but to lay down, as a principle accepted by this House, that the electoral principle should be adopted in any future arrangements which are made for constituting the Legislative Bodies of India. I would ask the Under-Secretary to say if he could not accept in place of the present Amendment words providing that the additional members shall be eligible whether elected or nominated. I think if something of that sort were adopted by the Government much of the discussion now taking place would be found unnecessary. I understand my hon. Friend is inclined to withdraw his Amendment if the Amendment per se is accepted by the Government. Passing on I wish to make one remark with regard to another matter. The hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham said there were none in India who could replace in valour and intellect the men concerned in the administration. I am sure from his knowledge of India he does not mean by those terms to pass censure upon the great population of which so many deserve commendation for similar qualities. I am perfectly well aware of individual cases which show distinctly that amongst the native population there are men competent by valour and administrative ability to take the very places that the hon. Member says they cannot take. I have only just referred to this point because I feel sure it was not the intention of my hon. Friend to asperse the character of these people; but I could not listen to his remarks without saying a word in their defence.
  SIR R. TEMPLE: I meant no aspersion upon the spirit and character of our Indian fellow-subjects. I have reason to acknowledge that they possess those qualities. But what I meant to say and still say is that for valour and capacity and energy—which are

  1328
  necessary for crises of danger—they are not equal to, and cannot replace, Europeans.
  MR. SCHWANN: After the Debate which has taken place, and which I consider more or less satisfactory—although we have not been able to obtain a definite pledge from the Government—I think it would be desirable to withdraw my Amendment which with the permission of the House I now beg to do.
  MR. MACNEILL: I think the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India will consider it to be only fair on his part to make some response to the many appeals we have made to him as to whether he will incorporate in this Bill some express declaration admitting the electoral principle. Now we all know what took place on the Second Reading of this Bill. In reply to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian, on that occasion the Under Secretary of State for India admitted to the full that the electoral principle was involved in the Bill. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury admitted it too. Now, I ask would it not be better, as the Bill will be worked by friendly Viceroys, to remove all cause of contention and to satisfy the aspirations of the people of India—because many millions are watching the progress of the Bill with great attention—by incorporating in the Bill the electoral principle. At the same time I would guard against putting any pressure on any Viceroy to take advantage of that principle, but what I would do would be to give a free hand to the Viceroy and the Lieutenant Governors. The electoral principle can alone bring about that political training which every stable Government, like that of the British Government in India, must desire to see fostered. Public spirit cannot be created without entrusting people with certain privileges and a certain amount of political power. If that is done we shall not hear anything about Samson Agonistes. Now, I would ask the Under Secretary of State for India whether it looks well to allow the right hon. Member for Midlothian in the most express terms to say that the electoral principle is

  1329
  involved in this Bill—to allow it to remain doubtful, hidden away in the most remote corner of Sub-section 4—and yet not incorporate it in the Bill in an open way. If the hon. Member will forgive me, I may say that I do not think it is fair to place too much stress on my hon. Friend's Amendments "as hereafter provided." I do not think my hon. Friend would place—I know I would not—very much reliance on these details, though they come no doubt with some substantial authority, because my recollection is that these details are the very details endorsed by the Indian Congress. Defects can easily be found in details, but the principal question now before us is whether we cannot embody in the Bill the electoral principle. I, myself, would much prefer that the Viceroys should at their own discretion exercise the electoral principle and choose their own constituencies. But, however that may be, I am sure every English legislator will agree with me when I say that it is absolutely essential for the Viceroy to be surrounded by people who voice the feelings of the natives at large, and will be able to give him, not an opinion—he wants not the opinion of those prophets who prophesv—but the real and honest facts as to what are the wishes, wants, and feelings and prejudices of the people. That cannot be done in a society far less complex than that of India—an independent community like our own—if members are only nominees. What I want to see in the Legislative Bodies of India are men who can speak with authority. In order to accomplish that object, I want the electoral principle to be plainly incorporated in the Bill. When we come to the other Amendments I will undertake to prove that not one thing is conceded to the people of India by this Bill. It is a shame. These people are dependent on us, and we should treat them with generosity, and avoid all pretence and duplicity with them. I feel very keenly on this, and I have taken a long journey to be able to say my humble say on this matter. I will ask the Under Secretary of State for India to give us an expression of the electoral principle in the Bill that we can construe as such, at the same time
  1330
  providing for the discretionary power of those responsible. I think I am not unjustified in asking him to do this, as it will facilitate the operations of this Bill and make it successful in India.
  MR. CURZON: Out of courtesy to the hon. Member I cannot refuse to answer so direct an appeal; but, at the same time, I cannot undertake so far to adopt his suggestion as to add anything to this Bill to make more clear that which I think is already sufficiently clear. If I may quote from myself in the Debate on the Second Reading, when referring to the sub-section that has been alluded to, I used these words—
  "Undoubtedly the words of the clause were designedly introduced by the Government with ii clear apprehension of their meaning. I do not think there was any want of clearness in the terms in which I expressed the possible application of that clause at an earlier period of the evening. I endeavoured to give hon. Members to understand that it has been designed to give perfect latitude to the Viceroy in this matter, and that it will admit of the introduction of the principle of representation in India; whether the system be election, or selection or delegation, or whatever the precise method may be that recommends itself to the Government of the Viceroy."
  Those words expressed with perfect clearness both the intention of the Government in introducing the subsection and the probable interpretation that will be put upon it by the Viceroy, and I have nothing to add to what I said upon that occasion.
  MR. CONYBEARE: I put it to any Member of the House whether any Governor-General would not consider himself limited by the term "nomination" in this Bill for I do not find either the words "election" or "selection," and I ask the House whether any Governor-General or Lieutenant-Governor would consider himself entitled to go outside the meaning of the word "nomination," and apply the principle of election or even of selection in the most limited manner. I should be glad if the Under Secretary for India would in his answer state definitely whether that is so or not, but even that I apprehend would not be conclusive, because, if any difficulty arose upon the construction of this Bill it is perfectly obvious that the Judges who might have to interpret it

  1331
  would not be bound by words of a Minister of State; they would be bound by the legal interpretation of the words of the Bill. The word "nomination" is in the Bill, the word "election" is not in the Bill, and there is so much difference of meaning between these two words that you will find it is the shadow and not the real thing which you are giving to the people of India.
  Amendment negatived.
  MR. SCHWANN: I regret, in reply to an appeal that has been made to me, that I am not able to withdraw all the subsequent Amendments standing in my name, but I regard some of them as very important, and it would be advisable for us to consider them. With respect to the Amendment which I am now about to move it cannot be doubted that the proposal made by the Government for the number of additional members of the Governor-General's Council is far too small. That proposal practically only adds four to the number of that Council. At present the number of members of this Council stands at not less than six and not more than twelve, and the Government propose to increase these numbers to a minimum of ten and a maximum of 16. That seems to me to be a very paltry and miserable addition to the numbers of this Council, and the Committee should not lose sight of the fact that only half the number of these additional members must be non-official. Therefore, even of the additional members only a very Small number are certain to be outsiders. This is a very unsatisfactory state in which to leave the question, and I venture to propose that where "ten" stands in the Bill the Committee should insert "forty." I venture to recommend this to the Committee because it is perfectly evident that so small a number in the Viceroy's Council could not practically give even a shadow of real representation to the Indian people. Many hon. Members who have not considered the various suggestions made in other quarters may consider that the number 40 is too large for the Viceregal Council. I can assure hon. Members that 40 is really rather a moderate number in comparison with other suggestions
  1332
  which have been made in recent years. Not very long ago the late Mr. Coleman Macaulay, C.S.I., Chief Secretary for a long time to the Governor of Bengal, laid before the Governor of India proposals for the re-construction both of the Provincial and Legislative Councils. I am sorry to say he died about a year and a half ago, and his death was a great loss to India. In his suggestion it was proposed that there should be 70 members for the Bengal Provincial Council, and it will be evident to the Committee that this number might give a reasonable representation to the people of India. A more recent suggestion has been made by Mr. H. J. Reynolds, to whom I have referred before, and I have no hesitation in laying his testimony before the Committee because he has had experience of both classes of Councils. He has been for six years a member of the Viceregal Council, and for twelve years in the Bengal Council, and it seems to me that the opinion of an official who has spent some of the best years of his life in India and is not an agitator—for he is the last man in the world to whom that name could be applied—is entitled to considerable respect. He has laid a scheme before the public lately in a brochure in which he proposes that the Viceregal Council shall number 104 members. Of these 40 are to be elected by the eight large Provinces of India, which shall have five representatives each. But while he would give to this Council 40 elected members, he would also give 40 members nominated by the Government, so that both the two systems which have been alluded to in the course of this Debate would find a place in such a Council. It is further proposed that there should be on the Council twelve officials and twelve Native Princes, not of independent States but of States under the control of the Government of India. These proposals are much greater than the suggestions which I have ventured to make to the Committee. Instead of 40 members, as I propose, you have in one case a suggestion of 70 and in the other of 104 members. I will venture to read a few words from Mr. Reynolds' brochure, because I think his remarks

  1333
  on this point are well worth the attention of the House. He says—
  "Enough has, I think, been said to show that these Councils, even the best of them, are Councils only in name, that they neither represent the public nor possess the public confidence."
  This, the Committee will remember, is from a man who has sat in both classes of Councils.
  "And that if they were established with any idea of giving the people some voice in the making of the laws under which they live they have signally failed in attaining that object. Then deficiences are due partly to the wording of the Act itself and partly to the vicious customs and rules of practice which have defaced and enfeebled the working of it. The objects of the former class with which we are at present concerned may be summarised as follows:—(1) The insufficiency of Councillors."
  The very first defect mentioned by Mr. Reynolds is the one we wish to remove by increasing the number of the Legislative and Provisional Councils.
  "(2) The overwhelming preponderance of official members."
  This we want to correct by the proposals we are making.
  "(3) The absence of any system of representative election; (4) The narrow limits to which the functions of the Councils are restricted; (5) The inability of the Local Councils to pass any law conflicting with an Act passed by the Council of the Governor General."
  These seem to me to be five very important points, and I venture to submit that my proposal increases to a very limited extent the number of additional members. If we look at this House we find 670 Members elected to represent the various sections of opinion in the United Kingdom. The object of having so large a number of Members is that on almost every subject there should be a number of Members who are practically experts; and it would be most valuable if the Viceroy in Council had the assistance of a number of experts who could give him an absolutely accurate picture of what is going on in the various Provinces they represent. It seems to me that we are asking no unreasonable thing in proposing a substantial addition to the number of the Legislative and Provincial Councils, and I move the Amendment which stands in my name.
  Amendment proposed, in page 1, line 8, to leave out the word "ten,"
  1334
  and insert the word "forty."—(Mr. Schwann.)
  Question proposed, "That the word 'ten' stand part of the Question."
  MR. JOHN ELLIS: I am very glad that the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Schwann) has raised his point in the way he has, for he has shown most clearly that what is proposed by the Bill would be no substantial addition to the number of these Councils. As a matter of fact, the increase resolves itself into the figure two, and I think it will be admitted that that is an infinitesimal addition. It is true that the proposal of the Government is to add four members, but two of these are to be nominated, and the elected members—if that principle be admitted—can, therefore, be increased only by two. As to whether 40 will be a judicious figure I am not prepared to say, and it may be shown that such a number of members would be more or less unworkable. But I believe the division will be taken on whether the word "ten" stands part of the clause, so we shall not be pledging ourselves precisely to the figure 40 if we vote against the proposal of the Government, which I shall do.
  MR. MACNEILL: I maintain that under this clause there is not expansion enough. There is no necessary addition to the number of members, and the only benefit derived from the Bill is in connection with the elective principle. The word "additional" does not mean that these additional members are re-inforcements of the body of members composing the original Council. The word "additional" is a generic term. It means any member who is not a member ex officio. Under the old system a Governor who exercised his power of nomination to the fullest extent could nominate two more men than a Governor under the new system need appoint unless he chose. It is not right to palm off on the people of India as a reform a proposal of this kind which is not a reform at all. I object to this proposal because it is a mere subterfuge and a juggle. It gives the people no real benefits while it professes to give them reform, and to my mind in some things the new system is worse than the old.
  SIR R. TEMPLE: The hon. Member is right so far. In round numbers I believe this Bill raises the old figures of from six to twelve additional Members to from ten to sixteen. I hope the Government will bear in mind that under existing circumstances it is very important to keep the number of additional members as low as is consistently possible because out of these additional members a certain number must be practically non-official, either European or native, most probably native. And if you have a large number of additional native members you must have something like a corresponding number of highly placed European official members. That I beg to inform the House is a practical necessity. Thus the result would be that you would have a number of highly placed and highly paid officials taken away at times from their employment, and their places would have to be taken by other officials, who would have to be highly paid for the work thrown upon them. Unnecessary places would have to be made and unnecessary expense incurred, and I hope the Under Secretary will bear this in mind before he makes any large concession such as is asked.
  MR. MACNEILL: I should like to ask the hon. Baronet who has just sat down whether my contention with respect to additional members is not correct?
  SIR R. TEMPLE: Yes, certainly you are correct. The word "additional" means the number of members who are additional to the Executive Council and are appointed for legislation only.
  MR. CURZON: The Amendment which has been proposed, only deals, as I understand, with the Supreme Council, but as there are other Amendments which propose a larger addition to the numbers of the Provincial Councils, it would, perhaps, be well if I were to deal with them all together. In the first place let the House clearly understand the position. At the present moment in the Supreme Council the number of additional members is a minimum of six and a maximum of twelve. We propose a minimum of ten and a maximum of 16. The hon. Member for Manchester proposes a minimum of 40
  1336
  but does not state a maximum. In the Madras and Bombay Councils the number of additional members at present is a minimum of four and a maximum of eight. We propose to raise those figures to eight and 20, and the hon. Member for Manchester proposes to raise the minimum to 30, but does not state a maximum. In Bengal, where the number is at present twelve, we propose 20, and the hon. Member for Manchester proposes a minimum of 30 and a maximum of 48. In the North-West Provinces, where the Council now numbers nine, we propose 15, and he proposes a minimum of 30 with a maximum of 36. The House will observe that the additions proposed by the Bill are very much smaller in the case of the Supreme Council than in the case of the Provincial Councils, and there is an essential difference between these two classes of Councils. The work they have to do and the consequent difference in the number of members required to do the work do not appear to have been properly appreciated. The hon. Member for the Rushcliffe Division (Mr. John Ellis) described our proposals as infinitesimal, but I must confess I do not see how he can apply this term to the proposals with respect to the Provincial Councils.
  MR. JOHN ELLIS: I was referring exclusively to the Supreme Council.
  MR. CURZON: Then with respect to the Amendment, I do not quite see the principle on which the hon. Gentleman has framed his own figures. Has he copied them straight from Mr. Bradlaugh's Bill? But Mr. Brad-laugh never had the opportunity of explaining his Bill to the House, and we are, therefore, in ignorance of the manner in which he arrived at his figures. First, with regard to the proposed addition of four members to the Supreme Council, I admit at once that that is a small addition; but I would remind Members of the House that the Government of India, who are certainly the best judges of the necessities of the Council, do not ask for any addition to the Supreme Council, and in my answer in the Debate on the Second Reading of this Bill, I gave very good reasons why a large increase in the

  1337
  numbers of the Supreme Council is not required. I also quoted a very strong opinion in the same sense expressed by Lord North-brook, who, it will be admitted, knows more about this subject than do hon. Members opposite, or than I do myself. But, in spite of the opinions of persons best qualified to judge, there is now a proposal to raise the number of members to as much as 47, and yet the hon. Member describes his proposal as rather moderate. From one point of view I admit the proposal is moderate, but from another point of view it is grossly excessive. If he wants to turn the Supreme Council of the Viceroy into a Parliamentary Body analogous to this House I quite agree that the proposed addition is moderate, but with a knowledge of the functions of that Body and of the work it has to perform, I think that the proposal is altogether excessive. Our figures both with respect to the Supreme and the Provincial Councils have not been lightly arrived at. They are the result of communications between the Home Government and the Central and Provincial Governments of India extending over a period of years. I have already stated that the Government of India expressed their opinion that any large addition to the Supreme Council would involve an increase of expenditure without any corresponding increase of efficiency. With respect to Bombay the Governor at that time approved of the increase, but the rest of his Council thought that no increase was necessary. The Madras Council accepted the figures in the Bill. I think I can give the House very good general reasons against any further extension. In the first place, there is the difficulty which I touched upon on a former occasion of finding good men who are unemployed and willing to devote that part of their time which is necessary to the purposes of these Councils. On that occasion the right hon. Member for North-East Manchester (Sir James Fergusson) pointed out that a large number of gentlemen gave their time to attend the sittings of the Indian National Congress, but that is a very different matter from giving their time to the work of these Councils, for the Congress meets but once a year and sits, I believe,
  1338
  for a very short time, whilst a seat upon the Councils would involve attendance for at least two or three months in the year. There is another point. The more members there are on these Councils the longer will be the time spent on the debates, and the expenses must necessarily be greater. As the hon. Member knows, travelling expenses are allowed to the members, and also the expenses of residence; therefore, each additional member would be a direct additional expense. I would also point out that if the number of non-official members were increased the number of official members would, in the same ratio, have to be increased, since it must be perfectly clear that the Government must be in a majority, and to increase the number of official members would be to take them away from important duties elsewhere. An increase of members, too, would tend to produce results which are inseparable from popular Assemblies; by that I mean more especially the creation of two Parties. You cannot have these Councils on the scale contemplated by the hon. Member without the formation of a Government Party and an Opposition Party, and such a position in India would not only result in friction, but in the dislocation of Government altogether. The right hon. Member for Midlothian has described Opposition as being a position of greater freedom and less responsibility. But in India the opposition would be all freedom and no responsibility. Responsibility arises from the obligation to accept the results of Opposition; but in India that obligation can never arise, and it would be in the highest degree undesirable to promote that friction and possible hostility between Parties in these Councils which does not at present exist, and which I hope this House will do nothing to create.
  Question put.
  (6.35.) The Committee divided:—Ayes 93; Noes 48.—(Div. List, No. 80.)
  MR. SCHWANN: I do not propose, Sir, to move the subsequent Amendments which stand in my name. I accept the Division as an indication of the feeling of the House.
  SIR W. PLOWDEN: The Amendment which stands in my name provides

  1339
  that where the Indian Councils Act is, under this Bill, extended to the Punjab, the number of nominated Councillors must be limited to a certain number, and so far, I think, merely carries out the proposals of the Government as applied to the localities where Councils already exist. Under the Act of 1861 power is taken to create a Council for the Punjab. However, I do not wish to press this part of the Amendment, as it is not a matter of great importance so far as the Punjab is concerned, as when the Act is extended the Government would naturally not give a higher nomination than in the other Councils. I move, Sir, the first part of my Amendment.
  Amendment proposed, in page 1, line 24, at end, add—
  "It shall be lawful for the Governor General in Council, when extending the provisions of the Indian Councils Act of 1861 to the territory known as the Punjab, to fix the number of councillors whom the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab may nominate for his assistance in making laws and regulations at not more than twelve."—(Sir W. Plowden.)
  MR. CURZON: The existing law already empowers the Governor General in Council at any time to extend its provisions to the Punjab, and to declare the numbers whom the Lieutenant Governor may nominate. There is, therefore, no object in putting these words into the Bill. The only object of the Amendment, if carried, would be to prevent the Lieutenant Governor from appointing more than twelve Councillors. But I think it would be hardly wise or statesmanlike to tie the hands of the Indian Government in advance, or to impose numerical restrictions upon a Council which is not yet called into existence, and the date of whose birth is not even approximately known. For these reasons I venture to ask the hon. Member not to press the Amendment.
  SIR W. PLOWDEN: I will not press the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  SIR W. PLOWDEN: The second part of my Amendment is intended to provide for applying the provisions of the Act of 1861 to the large Chief Commissionerships, which already exist in the Central Provinces and Burmah, neither of which are provided for in
  1340
  the Act of 1861, and the provisions of that Act can only be extended to those countries by an extremely expensive process—makingthem into Lieutenant Governorships—which is a course I do not think the Government would be at all inclined to adopt. It would create an additional demand on the Public Purse for which there is no necessity. I believe it would be a great advantage, especially with regard to the second case, if a Council were created at once. There is always a difficulty in passing Indian legislation through Parliament; and unless this step is taken now, we might have to wait a considerable number of years before what is admitted to be desirable could possibly be carried into effect. I hope the Government will not be carried away by the idea that they can make Lieutenant Governorships of these countries, and so extend the Act of 1861 in that way. That would be a course indicative of an extravagant spirit which would be sure to be resisted.
  Amendment proposed,
  In page 1, line 24, after the word "Oudh," to insert the words "The Governor General in Council may extend the provisions of 'The Indian Councils Act, 1861,' to any Chief Commissionership now in existence or subsequently created, provided that the number of councillors appointed in any such case shall not exceed one for each million of inhabitants in that territory."—(Sir W. Plowden.)
  Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."
  SIR R. TEMPLE: I cannot agree with the Amendment of my hon. Friend, and I hope the Government will not accept it. There are three Chief Commissionerships in contemplation. The first two are Burmah and Assam. These provinces are in a very crude condition and by no means fit for a Legislative Council, and such a measure is quite uncalled-for in their case. The third consists of the Central Provinces. I was myself the first Chief Commissioner there, and organized their Administration in its present shape. They have a large area no doubt; but they are in no wise desirous of anything of the kind, and the creation of a Legislative Council there might lead to embarrassing results.
  MR. CURZON: The Amendment of the hon. Gentleman consists of two parts: the first, referring to the possible creation of Councils for these districts which are now under Chief Commissioners; and the second, the ratio of the numbers of the Councils. Upon the first point the Government quite concur with the hon. Member for Evesham (Sir R. Temple); they think that none of these districts are at present fitted for a Council, and they are of opinion that the creation of such bodies might produce results which would be disappointing. As to the suggested ratio of the number of Councillors to the population, I think the hon. Member must see that that would be an unfortunate principle to adopt, because if you adopt it in one Province why not in another? and it certainly could not be applied, say, to Bengal. In fixing the ratio of members the interests to be represented and the classes which constitute the bulk of the people ought to be the determining factors rather than the population. It would be unwise to prescribe for Councils, the date of the creation of which we cannot determine, a particular method of creation or a ratio of numbers, both of which might subsequently be found to be very disadvantageous to the district.
  MR. BRYCE: The Amendment merely gives power and does not suggest the creation of a Council, and I think might have been accepted by the Government, and would from its very terms prevent that which the Under Secretary seems to fear. There is, doubtless, a difference between Assam and the Chief Commissionerships. I agree that Assam is not suited for a Council, but that would not apply to Burmah and the Central Provinces. No part of India has developed so rapidly as these Central Provinces, and it may be desirable in an appreciable time to extend the Act to these Chief Commissionerships, and it would be a pity for the Government to have to pass another Act to amend the Act of 1861. I should have thought the proposal of my hon. Friend was a harmless and safe one, and might have been acceded to. The Amendment does not make the ratio of members depend on the population, but says the number of mem-
  1342
  bers shall not exceed a certain ratio to the population.
  MR. MACNEILL: I regard the area of population as a matter of detail on which I say nothing. But everyone who has experience of this House knows the extreme difficulty of bringing in measures for amending the Indian Councils measure. The Indian Councils Act, which we are now endeavouring to modify, was passed no less than 30 years ago. This Bill, which is just now before the Committee, has been passing through the mill of the Lords to get to this House through three Sessions of Parliament. Now, the Government are stopping my hon. Friend who has moved this Amendment in order to keep anything like liberty from India and to prevent anything like the formation of public opinion in these Provinces. They are stopping him in reference to Burmah in order to prevent it in the future from having an Executive and Legislative Council, while at the present moment we are poisoning the people of Burmah with opium. Mr. Courtney, I beg to call your attention to the fact that the responsible Minister for India, who is in charge of this Bill, is not here; and I beg; to move that you report Progress.
  THE CHAIRMAN: The hon. Gentleman is inside the House.
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR,): Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will allow me to say that my hon. Colleague, who is in charge of this Bill, has only gone for one moment to consult an official under the Gallery, which is an ordinary and customary thing to do.
  MR. MACNEILL: I beg the right hon. Gentleman's and the hon. Gentleman's pardon. I did not know the Under Secretary was in the House. We are rather touchy on this subject, having regard to the systematic neglect with which India is treated in this House, and having regard to the fact that India still is, in the words of Mr. John Bright, simply a pasture land for smart young men. It is a great comfort that we have shorthand writers taking down what we say, and that what we say will be read in every bazaar and in every part of India.

  1343
  I hope the people of India will note the manner in which the Government have dealt with this Amendment. My hon. Friend who has moved it desires to give the Governor General there power to extend the Councils in localities such as Assam, Burmah, and the Central Provinces. But the Governor General cannot be invested with this power now, and when public opinion is ripe enough to have Councils there we shall have to pass a measure for the purpose through the two Houses of Parliament. This Bill has been four years already before Parliament, from its inception to the Committee stage, and yet you strangle the suggestion that a Province of India should have a chance of getting a Council without four years of Parliamentary delay, in order to keep liberty from the people of India, and in order to outrage the people of India. I hope my hon. Friend will press his Amendment to a Division. It will show the true inwardness of the present Cabinet in passing this sham measure in regard to the people of India.
  MR. S. SMITH: I think the argument in favour of this Amendment and in favour of extending the Bill to Burmah is exceedingly strong. I see no reason whatever why Burmah should not enjoy the benefits of a Legislative Council. Burmah, as a whole, is a very large country; it is quite as large as many European countries, as Spain or France for instance, and has a very considerable population. We know that several of the Chief Commissioners of Burmah have very strongly reported in favour of the suppression of the opium trade; and it is perfectly well-known that the opinion of the native population is dead against permitting opium to be sold at all. The Indian Government have, notwithstanding, overruled again and again the recommendations of the Chief Commissioners on this subject. Now, if Burmah had possessed a Legislative Council, these recommendations could not have been ignored, but must have been acted upon. I cannot imagine why the Government should not give a discretion, at all events to the Governor General, to
  1344
  enable these Provinces to have the nucleus of a Legislative Body. I think it is a very discreditable thing to bar the door against it. I say we should not let this opportunity slip, and I hope my hon. Friend will go to a Division.
  MR. MORTON: I am sorry there is not more interest taken in this House in Indian affairs; but I do trust that the hon. Gentleman will go to a Division on this Amendment, because, after all, otherwise I cannot see much use in discussing it, unless the Government in some sort of way should explain the matter away. But the Government have done nothing of the sort. This Amendment does not ask the Government to give way much. It only asks them to do what very likely they themselves before long will desire to carry out. The hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham (Sir R. Temple) seems to think this proposal most objectionable because of his experience when he was the First Commissioner of one of the districts. But it is some years ago since he was there, and no doubt the place has greatly improved since then. The opium question is always with us, and will be always with us until we have taken some steps to put an end to it, and not to make a profit out of it ourselves. I trust, therefore, the hon. Member will go to a Division on this matter, unless the Government see their way to give way on this point, as I think they ought to do.
  MR. JOHN ELLIS: I am surprised that the Government cannot see their way to accept this Amendment, which has been moved by an hon. Member of great Indian official experience. The experience of the hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham is extremely high; but I am sure he will permit me, without discourtesy, to remind him that that experience is becoming a little antiquated. I am sure in another Parliament he will find that his utterances about India are not rated at the excessively high value that some hon. Members seem to attach to them. A great deal has happened since the Indian Councils Act (1861) was passed, and certainly there are districts now as ready to receive the

  1345
  benefit of the Amendment as these present Provinces were to receive those under that Act. Therefore, I hope my hon. Friend will take the sense of the House upon his Amendment if the Government do not see their way to accept it.
  MR. SEYMOUR KEAY: I cannot imagine any reason the hon. Gentleman who has charge of the Bill can have for opposing the Amendment now before the House, unless it is to be found in the remarks which he has made on a previous Amendment. I am not blaming him for this personally, because I think we must all recognise the distinguished ability which he has shown in the conduct of his new office up to the present time. But I am bound, for all that, to remind him that he has fallen only too speedily into the groove that has been all along occupied by his predecessors. The hon. Gentleman told us with reference to a previous Amendment that, if the number of the gentlemen nominated for the Councils became at all great, that fact could not fail to establish what he called an Opposition Party. In other words, such a distrust has the India Office of the natives of India as a whole that, not content with having knocked the elective principle out of this Bill, the hon. Gentleman also tells us that if members were even nominated by the Governor General himself in any considerable numbers, they could not help forming an Opposition which would criticise—and ably and severely criticise I have no doubt—many of the measures brought before the Council. I myself am very familiar with the real state of matters—not from the experience of 20 years ago, but from an experience dating up to the 30th of January last; and from my personal knowledge of the position in which the Chief Commissionerships stand, as compared with the Lieutenant Governorships, I must state—and I think I shall be supported by every really independent European who has an intimate knowledge of the subject—that there is actually no difference existing in the constitution or in the state of society under the Chief Commissionerships, as
  1346
  compared with those under the Governorships in India at this moment. I, therefore, am thoroughly surprised that the hon. Gentleman does not accept the present Amendment, unless, indeed, the Government are prepared plainly to say that they abhor the idea of establishing even nominated Councils throughout that country.
  MR. CONYBEARE: I am sorry we have not a better House to debate this question. The principle in the Amendment is to be found in the Constitution of the United States, whereby the territories were in due course developed into States. I do not admit that the Provinces of India are not sufficiently advanced to be dealt with as proposed. We say they are. It might be as well, so far as Burma is concerned, to wait until the country generally is more settled than it is at the present time; but the other Provinces are certainly advanced enough for the purpose. Assam may not be so far advanced as the Central Provinces; but when we consider the great tea-growing industries in Assam we must see that there is a strong argument for putting the machinery of the Act of 1861 into force. I shall support the Amendment of my hon. Friend because I consider it is a judicious one.
  MR. CURZON: The very power which hon. Members desire already exists under the Act of 1861.
  MR. CONYBEARE: What part?
  MR. CURZON: Section 46.
  MR. MACNEILL: Then why not accept the Amendment?
  MR. CURZON: The reason is that it is not the custom in Parliamentary procedure, when a matter has been adequately dealt with in one Act, to introduce another clause relating to the same subject in another Bill. Such a course would obviously tend to throw doubt on the interpretation of the first Act. The Amendment, in short, is superfluous.
  SIR W. PLOWDEN: I think the application of the Act of 1861 should be extended, and I hope my Amendment will be agreed to.
  Question put.
  (7.30.) The Committee divided:—Ayes 46; Noes 84.—(Div. List, No. 81.)
  MR. SCHWANN: I wish to propose the following Amendment:—
  In page 2, line 2, after the word "Council," to insert the words "and shall within eighteen months of the passing of this Act."
  I would point out that in the year 1870 an Act was passed in this House called "An Act to make better provision for making Laws and Regulations for certain parts of India," &c, &c. It took eight years to make rules under Clause 6 of this Act, yet only three-quarters of the appointments have ever been made, and the whole scheme was finally swept away by the action of the Secretary of State for India. Unless some such Amendment as that which I propose is adopted, it is very probable that a great length of time would elapse before we saw any practical results obtained from the carrying out of this measure.
  Amendment proposed, in page 2, line 2, after the word "Council," to insert the words "and shall within eighteen months of the passing of this Act."—(Mr. Schwann.)
  Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."
  MR. CURZON: I do not think that there is any likelihood of delay taking place in carrying out the provisions of this Bill; on the contrary, there is every reason to believe that the Government of India wish to take advantage of it to issue these regulations. At the same time, I think that it is extremely undesirable to limit the time within which action must be taken, because the carrying out of the enactment is a matter which would require a great deal of consideration in India itself. I can well conceive that in some Provinces prolonged consideration may be necessary to decide as to the best methods of carrying out the provisions of the Bill. I think, therefore, that it would be unwise to fetter the discretion or to hamper the initiative of the Viceroy in this matter.
  MR. BRYCE: I hope the Amendment will be accepted, or that
  1348
  some other limit will be suggested if 18 months is considered too short a time for the purpose. This proposal has been under consideration for three years, and it must, therefore, have been largely present in the minds of the Viceroy and his advisers. It ought to be possible to prepare regulations within a reasonable time. I am aware how slowly public business is transacted in India, but I should have thought the Amendment was one which the Government could have accepted. If, however, it is considered that 18 months is too short a time, no doubt my hon. Friend will be willing to move his Amendment in a different form, and to extend the period from 18 months to two years.
  MR. SEYMOUR KEAY: I think the Amendment is necessary in order to strengthen the hands of the Governor-General. The European officials in India would be certain to endeavour to delay the operation of the measure, and in order that their resistance might be overcome the Governor-General should be in the position to say, "I am bound to act within a given period," otherwise he will certainly be thwarted in his endeavours to put the clause in operation.
  MR. CONYBEARE: The argument put forward in support of this Amendment is certainly a very strong one, and I should like to ask why we should not introduce a limitation of time in this case as was done in regard to the County Councils Bills for this country? Surely we ought to do all we possibly can to strengthen the hands of the Governor-General, and to see that the measure is really one for the benefit of the people of India generally.
  Question put.
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 26; Noes 78.—(Div. List, No. 82.)
  DR. TANNER: I wish to inform you, Mr. Courtney, that both the hon. Member for Elgin and myself have been into the "Aye" Lobby with the intention of voting for the Amendment, but that our votes have not been counted.
  MR. MACLEAN: I would now move the following Amendment:—

  1349
  In page 2, line 2, after the words "in Council," to insert the words "and with the sanction of both Houses of Parliament,"
  The object of this proposal is to insure that no regulation framed under this clause should be enforced until the sanction of Parliament has been given to it. I regret that it should have been necessary for the Government to take the discussion of this Bill on the first day after the holiday, because many Members who are interested in it are unable to be present. One fallacy has been often repeated. It has been said, notably by the hon. Member for Manchester, that there is no such thing as public opinion in India, and that it is necessary to create that opinion by introducing some elective system. I maintain that there is at the present moment, and has been for many years, a real and strong public opinion in India, and that it is not at all necessary there should be representative Government in order that the opinion of the people may be expressed. They have freedom of the Press; they have the right of public meeting; and I can assure the hon. Gentleman, from a rather extensive knowledge of the way matters are discussed in India, that there is a great deal of freedom of criticism of any measure proposed by Government. I certainly claim that if I did not actually create, I, at all events, brought to maturity, in the great City of Bombay a public opinion as vigorous and wholesome, and at the same time as loyal, as any opinion which exists in any other part of the world. The fact is, that the Government now even take great pains to consult the opinion of various sections of the population of India. We are told that we ought to give the right of elective representation to Municipalities, Chambers of Commerce, Universities, and other institutions of the kind. These are the very institutions the Government consults before it passes any measure, and I never knew of a Government bringing forward a fresh measure affecting finance or the interests of its subjects without consulting these bodies. The fact is, these institutions and these great organisations have a great deal of power with the Government at the present time;
  1350
  so much power that they sometimes prevent the wishes of this House being carried into effect, as was illustrated last year when they started the resistance of the Government of India to the desire of the Secretary of State that they should pass a certain Factory Act in that country. What we really want to get at, and what is very difficult to get at, is the opinion of the hundreds of millions of poor people in India.
  THE CHAIRMAN: Order, order! I do not see how the remarks of the hon. Member relate to the Motion he is moving.
  MR. MACLEAN: I was only replying to remarks which had been made earlier in the evening, and which seemed to have no particular reference to the subject under discussion. However, it is now proposed that in order to give better expression to public-opinion in India we should have this elective system of Government, and in the present section, as finally explained by the Under Secretary for India, there is no doubt that the elective principle is to be introduced hereafter into the administration of India. That is distinctly stated to be the meaning and intention of the Government.
  MR. SCHWANN: Not in the Bill.
  MR. MACLEAN: It is not expressed in the Bill, but it is allowed by the Bill; and the explanation which the Under Secretary has given to it shows that it is the intention of the Government that it shall be carried into effect. My hon. Friend the Secretary of State for India has spoken in the most satisfactory terms of the great danger that would be caused by the introduction of a system of anything like Party Government into India. I was very much pleased by the observations he made on that subject, but I maintain that under the words of this section we shall be drifting towards the introduction of a regular system of Party Government. My hon. Friend does not see the full force of the concession he has made to the other side. My own belief is that if we once introduce the elective principle into India we do away with the logical basis of our rule of that country. We must be masters there or else we must leave India altogether. If we once admit that

  1351
  the natives of India are entitled to the same privileges of self-government we ourselves possess then we have no business in India at all. Thus, in view of this strong conviction of mine, I regret very much that the Government should have so far yielded to pressure as to have made this important concession. I do not understand that it was the original intention of the Government to do anything of the kind; but Lord Kimberley asked in the House of Lords whether a certain interpretation might be put upon this section, and Lord Cross, with that sprightly amiability which never fails him, said, "Happy thought. Let us take the elective principle and introduce it into our Bill." Thus we have this principle, and it is provided that the Secretary of State in Council, with the Governor General in Council, may make such regulations as they please as to the way in which this additional Members of Council shall be nominated. I would call attention to the very loose wording of the clause, which leaves it open to the Governor General to alter the constitution of India at any time with the approval of the Secretary of State in Council. In fact, any new Governor General may in his Gladstone bag take out a new constitution for India, and I think that this giving up of the power of control of this Parliament is really a most dangerous principle to adopt. I do not know that any responsible statesman, in proposing Home Rule for Ireland, has gone so far as to say that the control of Parliament over any future changes in the Legislature of Ireland shall be absolutely done away with, and yet we here have that new principle applied to India. It is to be left absolutely in the power of the Governor General to make as many changes in the constitution of that country as he may desire. I do not say that danger will always arise through the exercise of this authority, but, to use a Johnsonian phrase, the clause contains a potentiality of mischief beyond the dreams of the present generation of agitators. It is obvious that if you have a Governor General who is anxious to conciliate people out there he may yield one position after another. You are yielding to pressure
  1352
  now, and you are offering thereby an invitation to the people to whom you yield to employ fresh pressure until they obtain all they desire. The Under Secretary of State, in speaking of this clause, tried to make out that I was really attaching exaggerated importance to it. He said it was a very small matter indeed. It is a small matter to some people if you make a breach in the bank of a reservoir by taking away a stone or two; but you may in this way let loose a torrent which will lay desolate the whole of the valley below. I think it is a dangerous thing for the Government to have enlarged the scope of this Bill so as to give room for the introduction on a great scale of the electoral principle in India. The Under Secretary seems to be in the position of the confidential butler who holds the door open so that the burglars may come in and steal the family plate.
  MR. MACNEILL: Who are the burglars?
  MR. MACLEAN: The hon. Member knows more about them than I do, for they are friends of his. I have no doubt that so long as we have a Governor General of the stamp of Lord Dufferin and Lord Lansdowne we are not likely to have any abuse of the privileges of this clause. Something has been said about Municipalities in India and the way in which they work, and in this connection there were some remarkable observations made by Lord Lansdowne, who spoke a fortnight ago at the opening of the great waterworks at Bombay. They show that he has a clear apprehension of the difficulty of working electoral institutions in India. He said—
  "I have never disguised from myself that municipal government in India has special difficulties to contend with. It has been frequently and truly said by those who have made this subject their special study that, owing to the structure of society in India, the number of persons likely to take an interest in civic affairs is relatively much smaller here than it is in Western countries; and I have observed with regret that in some of our Municipalities there has prevailed a regrettable degree of indifference to the interests of the community—an indifference which sometimes takes the shape of leaving to a few willing workers the burden of exertion and responsibility which ought to be generally shared, and

  1353
  sometimes that of obstruction, offered from motives of false or even selfish economy, to the progress of necessary schemes."
  I have no fear that a Viceroy who shows so clearly his conception of the difficulties of working a system of elective Municipalities in India, and is so well aware that these Municipalities are only on their trial, will make any great or rash experiment in the introduction of the elective principle into the Viceregal Council. But we have had experience of other Viceroys, and we shall probably have experience of them again, upon whom no such dependence may be placed. We know how Lord Ripon, with the assent of Mr. Ilbert, introduced a Bill into the Council of India which set the whole of India by the ears. I have been denounced by the newspapers for my brutal frankness in speaking of Lord Ripon in this manner and expressing a dread of what would happen if he were again appointed Governor-General of India; but I suppose we Members of Parliament come here to tell the truth to one another occasionally in spite of the demoralising effects of Party Government. I think it is better we should face the realities of the situation, and look to the probable effects of the legislation we are taking in hand, than that we should wrap ourselves in a cloud either of dishonest ambiguities or of humanitarian twaddle. If we had a weak or rash Viceroy appointed to India he would be able to do the greatest possible injury to our rule in that country. The hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham has spoken of introducing the elective principle, and I have sufficient confidence in the soundness of his judgment to know that if he were the Governor General of India the elective principle would not work badly, because he would exercise his own knowledge and determine who were the best men to appoint even after the election had been made. But has my hon. Friend considered that it is possible you might have a Viceroy and Secretary of State who were anxious to recognise the National Congress in India as a regular institution? And is not it possible for a Viceroy to go there and say, "We take this Congress as representative of the people of India,
  1354
  and we will select your leaders and nominate them to the Viceregal Council?" It seems to me any proposal of that kind should have the express assent of both Houses of Parliament before it can be carried into effect. The National Congress of India has really been on its last legs for some time; it would have died out and would have ceased to exist but for the stimulus which this Bill has given it. ("Oh!") The hon. Member says "Oh," but I will quote from a letter written by Mr. Hume, the Secretary of the Congress, and published the other day. He says they could not get any money with which to carry on the Congress; and I have no doubt that statement would be confirmed by Mr. Digby, the ex-Secretary of the National Liberal Club, if he were applied to. Mr. Hume said—
  "As a fact, however, but a small sum comparatively is provided—a wholly inadequate sum—and even that, though promised, is paid so tardily that thousands of letters, circulars, and reminders are needed to get in even this ineffectual contribution."

  The Congress was losing the support of the people of India, but now I am afraid it will be again set up in active existence. We know the hon. Member for Manchester speaks of what the Congress proposes to do, and we know that the Congress never meets or separates without giving three hearty cheers for the Queen. That is an easy thing to do; but they also pass resolutions which are really aimed at the complete overthrow of the English rule in India. ("No, no.") I expected that; but here is a specimen of the kind of language used by Mr. Hume, the Secretary of the Congress, which shows the real aim and character of this Congress. Mr. Hume actually incites the members of the Congress to rise against the Government, and points out the way in which they must do it effectually. He is a pensioned servant of the State.
  MR. SCHWANN: All these parties have been disowned.
  MR. MACLEAN: I say Mr. Hume is a pensioned servant of the State, and under any less mild rule than our own would have been hanged or shot as a traitor. Mr. Hume wrote—

  1355
  "Do not fancy that the Government will be able to protect you or itself. No earthly power can stem an universal agrarian rising in a country like this. My countrymen will be as men in the desert, vainly struggling, for a brief space, against the simoom. There will be no foe to meet in the field, but rail and road will become impassable, bridges will be wrecked, telegraphs cease to exist, supplies be arrested; thousands of the rioters may be killed, but to what avail, when there are millions on millions who have nothing to look forward to but death—nothing to hope for but vengeance? As for leaders—with the hour comes the man—be sure there will be no lack of leaders."
  Then he referred to what he himself had seen in the time of the Indian Mutiny—
  "A great many of you do not understand what a house of cards our grand Administration is. You have not seen, as I have, the entire Administration shrivel up like a parchment flung into the fire, in less than a month, in consequence of the mutiny of some 40,000 soldiers, and that, although at that time the entire population were with us, in most places actively, in all passively, if not actively."
  That is the style of language Mr. Hume indulges in. But I think the hon. Member said just now that he had dissolved connection with Mr. Hume.
  MR. SCHWANN: No; that the Congress had denied its connection with those words.
  MR. MACLEAN: The hon. Member is mistaken. I have read the correspondence published in the Indian papers. The Allahabad Standing Congress Committee at first objected to the language of Mr. Hume in these words, on the ground, it will be seen, of expediency alone:—
  "In fact, we are not only afraid of being misrepresented by our opponents, but we also think that a considerable number of men in our own ranks will feel nervous at the publication of the letter."
  But they gave way, and then comes the following telegram from the Secretary:—
  "The Committee have resolved to circulate your letter of the 16th February. It is being circulated."
  There the Committee identified themselves with the plan of Mr. Hume. The hon. Member has said a great deal about organising public meetings in London, such as that of a number of native Indian gentlemen who met to discuss some remarks of mine in this House, in which I showed them up in
  1356
  their true character. Why do not hon. Members opposite now call a public meeting of all the natives in London to repudiate Mr. Hume, to denounce him, and to show that they will have nothing to do with his wicked designs? I doubt if they dare do that, because they know he is supported by a large body of the members of the Congress in India itself. I have thought it right to call attention to these things, because it seems to me the House is going on in a happy-go-lucky sort of way to change the whole Constitution of India and to introduce the elective system, the end of which none of us can really foresee. There can be no doubt, if anything of the kind is to be done, that we ought to maintain a very strict Parliamentary control over the action of the Governor General and the Secretary of State. Hon. Members opposite profess to be afraid that the Governors General may not carry out fully and freely the intentions of Parliament in this matter; but I say that some of them may go far beyond the intention of Parliament, and I say we ought never to part with the immediate control of Parliament over the Government of India. I have no doubt that the Government will refuse to accept my Amendment, and I have no doubt also that they will be able to have their own way in the Division; but, at all events, I shall protest to the last, with all my energy, against what I regard as this first, this irrevocable, and this fatal step towards the overthrow of English influence and authority in India.
  Amendment proposed,
  In page 2, line 2, after the words "in Council," to insert the words "and with the sanction of both Houses of Parliament."—(Mr. Maclean.)
  Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."
  MR. CONYBEARE: With respect to the latter part of the speech of the hon. Member for Oldham, who quoted the sanguinary language of a Report from India, I should like to say at once, speaking for myself and for those on this side of the House, that we utterly repudiate any sympathy with such absurd and mischievous

  1357
  language. I have no hesitation in saying that I regard with much disgust and surprise the language contained in Mr. Hume's letter, proceeding as it does from a gentleman who has been labouring, and I believe sincerely, in the interests of the people of India. And I hope that the members of the Indian Congress, who are certainly not responsible for it, and who, up to the present time, probably have not had any opportunity of expressing their views with regard to it, will absolutely disavow and dissociate themselves from any language of the kind. I cannot conceive anything more calculated to throw back the movement which the Congress is endeavouring to push forward—that of securing to the people of India a voice in the management of their own affairs—than the dissemination of such language. I regard such language as highly mischievous, and the harm is incalculable that is caused by language such as the hon. Gentleman has lent himself to. He suggests that we cannot trust our fellow-subjects in India, and that it is impossible to concede a single inch of liberty for fear they should take many ells, and that will do more than anything else to estrange the people of India from our Government, and it will give them the idea that the expressions used by a single Member of this House are those generally held by the people of this country. During the short time I was in India I was impressed by the anxious desire of the people to have some sympathy extended to them by us, and the same feeling has been expressed by Professor Monier Williams and other able writers. The feeling of the people of India is very keen upon this point; that the improvement of steam navigation has made it possible for our civil servants to spend their short furloughs in this country instead of as formerly amongst the people, and the result has been to divorce the governing classes from the people. I think the hon. Gentleman, in opposing this Amendment, has shown extraordinary timidity. He is afraid that the Bill would introduce novel principles, but there is no new principle. The word "election" has been carefully eliminated from the Bill, and the
  1358
  authorities in India are not likely to trouble themselves to give any practical effect to that principle. Therefore, I think the Member for Oldham (Mr. Maclean) is too timorous when he talks about the floodgates being opened and so forth. If under this Bill the principle of election is available at all I confess I welcome it with the greatest satisfaction, because, if you insist on keeping a people down by force of bayonets without doing what you can to meet their political aspirations, you will merely breed discontent; but if you show them that sympathy for which I am pleading, you will remove one of the greatest incentives to anything like the agrarian rebellion which the hon. Gentleman mentioned. With respect to what the hon. Gentleman said about the organisation of the Indian National Congress and the fact that applications have been made for subscriptions on behalf of that body, I may remind him that such things are not unknown in the history of our own politics. I can refer the hon. Gentleman to a political organisation with which he is better acquainted than I am—the emblem of which is a primrose—which has sent out circulars asking for contributions, and these circulars have sometimes got into other hands than those for which they were intended. One reason why this should be the case in India is that people are aware that this question is now before the House, and they are disposed to wait before they act upon the result of our deliberations. The hon. Member for Oldham always speaks in an interesting manner on Indian subjects, and I wish he would speak more often, but I think this proposal of his nullifies the whole principle of this Bill. It appears to me that if this Amendment were carried, an Act of Parliament would be required to sanction any rules and regulations which were formulated by the Indian Government. The Under Secretary pointed out with respect to another Amendment that it expressed distrust of the Viceroy, and that, I think, is the spirit of this Amendment in an even greater degree. This Amendment would take the heart out of the Bill, and I trust the Government will not accept it.
  MR. JOHN ELLIS: The hon. Member for Oldham has delivered a very violent attack on the Indian National Congress. He quoted no resolution of the Congress to support his attack, but he contented himself in reading a paragraph from a letter written by Mr. Allan Hume, who was Secretary to the Indian National Congress. I do not know whether it is within the knowledge of the hon. Member that there appeared in the Times of the 2nd April an entire repudiation of this letter which had been cabled from India. There is in London a small informal Committee which represents to some extent the Indian National Congress in this country. They held a meeting on the 2nd of April at which they had the full text of this letter before them, and they unanimously passed this resolution—
  "This Committee, having before it the full text of a circular letter issued by Mr. Allan O. Hume, C.B., dated Calcutta, 16th February, the substance of which was cabled by the Times correspondent yesterday, express their deep regret that such a letter should have been circulated, and their entire repudiation of the wild language and the unjustifiable conclusions drawn by Mr. Hume."—W. S. Caine, W. S. B. McLaren, Chas. E. Schwann, John E. Ellis, and others.
  I can assure the Committee that we feel nothing could be too strong in the way of repudiation of the language—I might almost say the wicked language—used in that letter; but it must be borne in mind that Mr. Hume had been brooding for some time over the alleged grievances of India, and I think the same degree of culpability must not attach to Mr. Hume under the circumstances which would attach had he been in a condition of perfectly even temper.
  MR. MACLEAN: I am glad to hear this explanation, but I should like to point out that by the Bombay papers which have arrived to-day I see that a Committee of the Congress have circulated that letter throughout the whole of India.
  MR. JOHN ELLIS: I have not seen the Bombay papers, and this matter is not in the final stage. There may be something further to say about it, but I may say that the Chairman of one of the Standing Committees of the Con-
  1360
  gress was at our meeting. He signed the repudiation I have read, and I feel sure the letter would not receive the sanction of the Congress. We dissociate ourselves from the letter and from the circulation of it. Mr. Hume has rendered very great services to India, and in this matter I have no doubt he has been carried away in a way which I hope he now regrets. With respect to the Amendment, I cannot conceive anything more lamentable than that we should have a series of heated speeches on Indian subjects, such as the one we have listened to, and that would be the effect of the Amendment. The speech was saturated with distrust and jealousy of our Indian fellow-subjects, and I deprecate the constant bringing before this House of Indian subjects, as this Amendment would do, if that is the way in which they are to be discussed.
  MR. S. SMITH: I entirely concur with the last speaker in the view he takes of this letter.
  THE CHAIRMAN: Order, order! I think it would be better if the Committee would leave the matter of this letter and confine itself to the discussion of the Amendment.
  MR. CURZON: The hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Maclean) in his speech has given a not altogether fair account of the genesis of this clause. He seemed to think it had been introduced at the last moment in a haphazard kind of way, and had been accepted by the Government to save themselves from the difficulties of the situation; but I can assure him that it was well considered before it was included in the Bill. Moreover, it contains the views which have been consistently expressed in correspondence with the Government of India. It was with no uncertain knowledge of its purpose that it was proposed by Lord Northbrook, and accepted by the Government. The hon. Member for Oldham is anxious that these rules with regard to nomination and election should be submitted to both Houses of Parliament. I observed on the Paper a somewhat similar Amendment in the name of the hon. Member for North Manchester (Mr. Schwann); but that has been withdrawn in order that the hon.

  1361
  Member for Oldham might move his. I therefore looked with some anxiety as to what action Gentlemen on the other side would take. But what is my surprise when I find in those Gentlemen unexpected allies. But though both these Gentlemen (Mr. Maclean and Mr. Schwann) have put down a similar Amendment, I recognise a difference in their objects. The hon. Member for Manchester is looking to the House of Commons and to discussion in this House, whilst the Member for Oldham is looking to discussion in the House of Lords. The hon. Member for Manchester fears that the rules may not be liberal enough, and may require to be expanded by this House. The hon. Member for Oldham fears that the rules will be too liberal and will require to be contracted by the House of Lords. The hon. Member for Manchester wants this House to apply the spur to a Conservative Viceroy, and the hon. Member for Oldham wants the House of Lords to apply the curb to a Radical Viceroy. He made that clear in his speech on the Second Reading a few weeks ago. These two proposals each illustrate the danger of the other. I do not think we want the House of Commons to interfere with one class of Viceroy any more than we want the House of Lords to interfere with the other. Moreover, the fears underlying these two proposals are each the corrective of the other. The hon. Member for Manchester is afraid that the clause will be a dead letter. The hon. Member for Oldham thinks that it conceals a revolution. He seems to regard the proposal of the Government as of the most appalling character, and to fear that a full-blown electoral scheme will spring from this clause, like Athene from the head of Jupiter. I venture to think that while, on the one hand, the clause will not be a dead letter, on the other it will not have the far-reaching effects which the hon. Member anticipates. The hon. Member suggests that giving such power to the Viceroy will be an innovation; in my judgment the proposal of the hon. Member would itself be an innovation. I think that the further interference of Parliament with the
  1362
  Government of India is most undesirable, for when Parliament does meddle in Indian affairs it not uncommonly muddles; and if the Government of India is doomed at any time to end in failure or collapse, it will not be from the attack of foes from without, nor from internal disruption, but in consequence of the undue interference of Parliament. And if it be undesirable that this House should interfere in the government of India, it is still more undesirable that India should be made a bone of contention between the two Houses of Parliament, and yet I can conceive no other result than friction between the two Houses arising from the Amendment. There are already in the Bill sufficient safeguards, which, perhaps, my hon. Friend has not noticed. Before these rules come into operation they must be approved by the Governor-General in Council, which Council is composed of men of knowledge and experience, and not necessarily of the same political colour as himself. They have then to be approved by the Secretary of State in Council at home. The Council of the Secretary of State is composed of twelve men of great Indian experience who are not Party men, and in both bodies, therefore, they will be discussed quite apart from Party considerations. But supposing the Amendment were carried, and the Secretary of State in Council declined to accept the decision of the House of Commons, what power have we to control him? Under those circumstances, another Act of Parliament would be required to deprive the Secretary of State in Council of the powers conferred on him by the Act of 1858, so that the clause as amended would be inoperative unless the House were prepared to take that step. The Government are unable to admit the principle of further Parliamentary interference in the government of India than that which at present exists; and they are unwilling, in setting up this new scheme, to submit it to the risk of Parliamentary Divisions in this House. I think nothing would be more likely to retard the successful operation of this Act and of this clause than that it should be from time to time brought up for discussion in this

  1363
  House, and I hope the Committee will not give its adhesion to this proposal.
  MAJOR GENERAL GOLDSWORTHY: The Under Secretary says he does not see why the House should intervene in such matters. Surely, Sir, if small questions under the Charity Commission are laid before the House and debates of several hours take place upon them, it is the right of the House to control the Government of India. I was in the Indian Mutiny, and I saw some of the worst scenes which took place in it, and I saw some of the inciting letters to which the hon. Member for Oldham referred. I have no wish that there should be a chance of any more such scenes. India was won by the sword and must be kept by the sword; and not only the sword wielded by Englishmen, Irishmen, and Scotchmen, but by loyal natives with whom many of us who are soldiers have fought side by side. I think it is most injudicious to give this power, and hope that the rules will be brought under the cognisance of Parliament. I shall support the hon. Member for Oldham if he goes to a Division.
  DR. TANNER: I hope the hon. Gentleman will keep his Party in order and go to a Division. I shall be most happy to follow him into the Lobby against the Government, who are bringing in a Bill which neither they nor their supporters believe in. They are bringing it in simply to pose as philanthropists before the country. In the face of a near General Election these Committees are all humbug. I hope the supporters of the hon. Gentleman will nail their colours to the mast, and not let their courage ooze out at the toes of their boots, and will go to a Division.
  COLONEL NOLAN: I gather from the Under Secretary that his view is, that the English people, in the wider sense of the word, should not interfere through the House of Commons when the Governor General chooses to alter these rules. I must say I consider that a most extraordinary doctrine. The time may come when you may have an invasion of India, and then you will call
  1364
  upon the people of this country to come forward and hold India, and yet you will not let them interfere in the Government of India at all. The Governor General may set the whole of the Bill at defiance by the rules, and exclude all natives from the Council. You might have a Governor General not in harmony with the House of Commons, whom, however, it might be inconvenient to recall, and he might act in defiance of public opinion, and of the opinion of the House of Commons, by keeping out of the Council the very men whom the House of Commons think should be there. The Governor General should not have the right to make new rules without the House of Commons having some little right of interfering, if necessary. The hon. and gallant General is well acquainted with India, and he wants to limit the power of the Governor General, and I agree that the House of Commons should be able to interfere if the Governor General should make some injudicious alterations.
  (9.50.) Question put.
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 23; Noes 91.—(Div. List, No. 83.)
  SIR W. PLOWDEN: We have now arrived at the position that the Government have admitted the elective principle, but will not admit words into the Bill to give it effect, as they are content with the words in the Bill. I seek to recognise the claims of the Native Representative Assembly. In India the representative principle has been long acted upon, and I know no country in which since ancient times it has been so largely adopted. In my Amendment I have endeavoured to embrace in a constituent whole the existing circumstances connected with the ancient methods, and make them applicable to the Bill. I should have apologised to the Under Secretary for not giving notice of this Amendment but that we are all acquainted with the happy way in which he can deal at once with any Amendment which comes before him. At the end of Subsection 4 I propose to add these words—
  "In those provinces or territories where the ancient institutions of the country recog-

  1365
  nise the representative principle, such as the village punchayet, or the village council, regard shall be paid to such old custom in the nomination or appointment of the councillors to be created under these regulations."
  Inquiry has shown that these institutions existed long anterior to our rule in India. It has been recognised for many years past by many of our most distinguished administrators how advantageous it would be to India and to our administration if we could make use of those methods which have so long existed in that country. I do not think I could take a more useful instance of a distinguished administrator who has expressed that feeling than the case of Sir Bartle Frere, who 20 years ago read a paper before one of the Indian associations in this country, discussing the question how desirable it was that existing systems in India should be made use of as a means of representing the public voice of the country. He referred to the Village Councils which existed almost everywhere in their ancient form, and said—

  "The chief significance of the Village Councils in regard to ascertaining public opinion would be that they would form a body of real representatives to state the opinions of their fellow-villagers in the District Councils."
  That is exactly the point I want the Government to come to in their acceptance of this Amendment, or, at all events, in their method of dealing with the section to which my Amendment is appended. I have before the House a Bill which has not come to the Second Reading, and which deals at considerable length with the method of village representation, and carries it on to its logical result through the provincial representation and the Supreme Council. But now that the Government have accepted the possibility and probability of the Government of India making use of this power which they say is entirely given to them in the Sub-section to which this Amendment is appended, I hope they will also see their way to give some expression of their views as to the desirability of accepting any ancient system of representation existing in India, whereby this elective principle would be satisfactorily applied, because, as I understand, the great objection
  1366
  which has been raised to the elective principle in India has been the difficulty, and almost the impossibility of applying it. I believe that in these Village Councils is to be found an easy method of dealing with a very difficult and complicated subject, namely, that of adapting to Eastern countries Western principles of government. The ancient system of Village Councils is still strongly in force. Why, even in the ordinary procedure in our Courts of Justice half the decisions in small matters are the decisions really of the Village Councils. My Amendment is sufficiently broad and elastic to prevent its being said that any special form, any particular law, or any precise rule is laid down for the use of the Indian Administration in that country. It only specifies the desire of this House, which I believe is fully shared by all hon. Members on both sides, that where it is possible, and where the method is one which has its origin in old customs and in old systems, that method should be applied in carrying out the object of the Bill which the Under Secretary is conducting so ably. I venture to move my Amendment—
  Amendment proposed,
  In page 2, at the end of the Clause, to add the words:—"In those provinces or territories where the ancient institutions of the country recognise the representative principle, such as the village punchayet or the village council, regard shall be paid to such old custom in the nomination or appointment of the councillors to be created under these regulations."—(Sir William Plowden.)
  Question proposed, "That those words be there added."
  MR. CURZON: The hon. Member who has moved this Amendment is anxious that in the possible application of this clause to the Government of India the Indian Government shall not lose sight of old systems and old methods. There is no doubt that the existing system of the Village Council in India is a very ancient and valuable institution; but I think the hon. Member loses sight of the fact that the Village Council is not in itself a form of Council which can be said to be based on the elective principle at all. The members of the Council are chosen—but not by a system of election to which we should apply the term—on account of their

  1367
  personal status or qualifications by the consent of their fellow-villagers. These Councils are very valuable, and are excellently qualified for the discharge of the local business with which they have to deal; but I must point out to the hon. Gentleman that they have no legal status at all, and if this Amendment were carried out it would be necessary to give them a legal status. I must point out, in the second place, that the Village Council, as an electoral unit, is extremely small, and far too small to be made use of in such changes as we contemplate in this Bill. The hon. Gentleman has introduced a Bill in this House for the improvement of Indian Councils which commends itself to his judgment, and which is mainly based upon the Village Councils. I had occasion, in the discharge of my official duties, to study that Bill, and I shall say nothing about it now except what, I think, the hon. Gentleman himself will admit, namely that it is a very complex and difficult Bill—a Bill bristling with complexities and with contentious points. The main ground, however, on which I would ask the Committee not to accept this Amendment—indeed, I would ask the hon. Member himself to withdraw it—is not because of any inherent defect in the Village Council itself, but because of the general grounds upon which I have been advocating this Bill. We have consistently taken up the line of saying that whilst giving a broad indication to the Governor-General of the lines on which he might proceed, we do not desire to hamper him in the smallest particular by any suggestion, and much less by any command—and this Amendment amounts almost to a mandatory clause. I might fortify my position by again quoting from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian; but I will only repeat that the Government desire not to specify—not to particularise—but to leave ample discretion to the Viceroy. If Village Councils are to be mentioned, why not Municipalities, Local Boards, and other Bodies, which are representative of larger areas, and why not the Universities? The Committee will act wisely if it refrains from entering
  1368
  into those particulars, and if it leaves the application of the principles laid down to the Viceroy in Council.
  MR. SEYMOUR KEAY: It seems to me that with all his ability the hon. Gentleman who is in charge of this Bill has been able to find practically no answer except one to the representations which have been made to him from this side of the House. The burden of his reply is always to this effect: "Leave everything to the Viceroy." Now that is just the worst objection that we have to the Bill, or, at all events, to the only clause which is of value in it—namely, Sub-section 4. I have the very highest esteem both for the distinguished abilities and high character of the present Governor General. But I believe that no Governor General will be strong enough, however willing he may be, to take the initiative in this matter. The hon. Gentleman must admit that the answers he has given to the very mild Amendments moved on this side of the House have been hardly sufficient. He has not even attempted to reply to the assertion I have repeatedly made that the Governor General would not have the moral courage to put any part of this scheme in force unless he received some directions in regard to it. The Bill has been allowed to drop into nothing but a mere Party measure, to deceive England and not to benefit India. I might parallel it if I put it with the Small Holdings Bill, in regard to which the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Agriculture (Mr. Chaplin) has practically said, "Leave everything to the landlord." We all know that the landlords will not do anything. In like manner the Government now say, "Leave everything to the Viceroy," well knowing that the Viceroy will not and cannot do anything, unless he receive directions in the matter. Thus, both Bills have been introduced as nothing else than electioneering devices put forward in view of a more or less, early Dissolution.
  COLONEL NOLAN: This Amendment is not much understood by the Committee. I do not profess to say I understand it myself. I have always voted in this House against indirect

  1369
  systems of election, and I think the Radical Party have always been against it. I know very well what its effect has been in Ireland. It should be recollected that if it were introduced into India it might be re-introduced from there into this country, which would be a very dangerous thing. I am strongly inclined to vote against the Amendment.
  SIR R. TEMPLE: I do not wish to detain the Committee by discussing this system of election. I would only point out that, although the Indian name of Village Councils sounds pleasantly to Indian ears, still those Councils could not be utilised under this Bill. If a place partook of the character of a town, the chances are that it would have a Municipal Constitution, whose members would be elected. Places of less extent would be mere villages, and it would be difficult to devise any scheme by which they could co-operate in electing members of Council. Whilst fully admitting the value that attaches to ancient institutions in the villages, I hold that they are not suitable to the purposes of this Bill, and that, therefore, it is not practicable to introduce them.
  DR. CLARK: I think this Amendment is the most important proposed to night. It will embrace the class which pays all the taxes and bears all the burdens—men who know the wants of the agriculturists, and will be able to express them. If we are to introduce the system into India I think this is the best way of commencing. The hon. Member for Galway seemed to think that this is a new idea in India and in Europe, but the French Senate is elected by an analogous system to the one now proposed. Perhaps we were strongly against it in the old form as applied to the Board of Works; but I think it is the most suitable for Eastern countries, and will be more in consonance than any direct form of representation. We must remember that the rack-renter in India is the Government. What they have to do is not only to consider the question of legislation, but also of administration. This class is governed as autocratically and despotically as the Russians are governed. They have
  1370
  no voice, and very often when their rents are raised injustice is done. Seeing that they bear the burden, I consider that they should have some share in determining who are to represent them in the various Councils.
  MR. MORTON: I consider this Amendment, which proposes to utilise some of the old elected bodies in India, a step in the right direction, although a small one. While myself objecting to indirect election, I suppose, if we cannot have the direct system, that we had better accept the indirect, on the principle that half-a-loaf is better than none. There are some, however, who doom this system suitable for new countries, and it has, in some measure, been adopted in the United States. I have been struck to-night by the fact that whenever the hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham speaks after the Under Secretary, he says precisely what the latter has said, and that if the Under Secretary follows him he also says ditto. That is a nice family arrangement. No matter what the Amendment proposed may be, the Under Secretary has always two answers ready for us. One is a desire to leave everything to the Governor General, and the other is that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian has opposed it in a speech on the Second Reading, or has made a statement in some way opposed to the proposal. I am surprised the Under Secretary of State cannot supply us with any authority from his own side of the House. He has said nothing regarding Lord Salisbury's opinion of India, and nothing as to the opinion of his own Leader, the First Lord of the Treasury. Indeed, it seems to me that this matter is really left to the genius and talent of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian. I am glad to think, however, that the Tory Party are obliged to rely upon the right hon. Gentleman in this matter as in many others, although I should have been very much better pleased had they advanced reasons of their own. I do not think India will ever be governed properly until you interest the people, and as I believe this Amendment is a step in that direction I have pleasure in supporting it.
  DR. TANNER: If you are going to do anything for these people in India, should not they be allowed some voice as regards their own representation? Is it to be despotism or an approach to a form of representative government? We are told in connection with all these Bills, whether in relation to India or Ireland, that we must be governed by the sword; that we are worse than Hottentots. Here we have a proposal emanating from an hon. Member who knows a great deal about the condition of India, who shows that you have a system of government existing in these villages, and who makes a proposal to substantially recognise that fact, and so to incorporate that existing system as to create a form of government that will satify the people, and be for the benefit of the rulers and ruled. But everything is to be left to the former, and nothing to the latter. I believe the time has come when we should endeavour to undo some part of the miserable system which exists in India—something that will reconcile the natives of India to British rule, and something that will elevate the people of India as their cause deserves. I hope, therefore, that this reasonable proposition will be conceded by Her Majesty's Government. If not, we shall have the satisfaction of going to a Division and registering our opinion against a sham measure, introduced for the purpose of throwing dust into the eyes of the people.
  (10.45.) Question put.
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 47; Noes 94.—(Div. List, No. 84.)
  DR. TANNER: I propose now that the following words be added to Clause 2:—
  "Provided that any 20 taxpayers of a Presidency or Lieutenant Governorship may apply to the Governor General in Council for leave to petition the High Court for the removal of such Councillors on the ground of corruption, malversation, or oppression, or of persistent disobedience to the law, and the Governor General in Council, if of opinion, after hearing evidence, that there is a primâ facie case, may give such leave. The petition shall be presented to the said taxpayers within 21 days after leave is given, and shall be tried by two Judges of the said High Court; if the said Judges find such Councillors guilty of knowingly pursuing a course of corruption,
  1372
  malversation, oppression, or persistent disobedience to the law, they may order such Councillors to be removed; and the Governor General in Council shall nominate in their stead, as Councillors, such other persons as he shall think fit."
  The Committee will see that I have absolutely adopted a portion of a celebrated Government Code not yet passed into law, and I hope, therefore, that this Amendment will be accepted by Her Majesty's Government.
  THE CHAIRMAN: The hon. Member's Amendment is not in Order.
  Clause 1 agreed to.
  MR. SCHWANN: I will not move the whole of the Amendment which stands in my name on Clause 2, but I will go to the one which commences with line 26. Clause 2 seems to me to be one of the very best portions of the Bill, because it gives to the Legislative Council an opportunity of discussing the Budget every year. That is a very good point in itself, but there are some additions which I should like the Government to make. By this clause no member of the Council has power to submit or propose any Resolution, or to divide the Council, or to ask for papers on financial matters. I think those powers should be introduced, and I think the members should have power to record their votes, if they think proper, by way of protest against any principle which is adopted in the Budget. The Under Secretary, on the Second Reading, spoke of the benefit of increased publicity, and I quite agree with him; but I do not see why we should not go further and allow the members to divide the Council and record their votes. The financial question is practically the most important that can be considered in India. The present condition of the country is one of wide-spread poverty, and I do not see that it would be any good for members of the Viceregal Council to examine and discuss financial matters unless they are able to divide the Council upon them and put their votes in evidence on record. The poverty of India is phenomenal. In England the average earnings per head of the inhabitants is £41; in India it is £2, or about 28 rupees. The average surplus per individual remaining over in England is about £4 3s. 2¼d.;

  1373
  in India it is about 4½d. India, as we know, is an agricultural country; but in Australia, where there is a population of about 4,000,000, the value of the stock of horned cattle, sheep, pigs, horses, &c., is £113,500,000 sterling; whereas in India, with a population of 140,000,000, the live stock, such as oxen, buffaloes, horses, &c., &c., is valued at £90,250,000 only. Then the native trades of India have been affected by competition from this country, and this is a matter, surely, which ought to occupy the attention of the Financial Council in India. In India the agricultural industries represent 86 per cent. of the whole, other industries 12, and trade 2. In England the land stands at only 14 per cent., manufactures 30, and other occupations 55. But although India is represented so high in proportion in the matter of land, Sir James Caird some years ago said "that the quantity of land cultivated in proportion to the population was the smallest known." These are points which should occupy the attention of the Financial Council. Then there is the Salt Tax, the tax on spirits, opium, &c., which all need careful study and debate, with the view of relieving the burden of taxation and the miseries of a use of noxious drugs and drinks. In the United Kingdom, France, the United States and Germany there is an annual saving of £554,000,000; but in India, which has a population equal to all these four countries, there is only a saving of £3,500,000 per annum. I will not occupy the time of the Committee in pointing out how this poverty can be relieved; but I think it is little better than a farce to provide that while the financial statement should be produced the members cannot divide the Council upon the proposals it contains.
  Amendment proposed,
  In page 2, line 26, to leave out all after "declared" to "Act," in line 30, and insert "Provided the rules to be framed shall give power to any member of such meeting of the Council, when financial matters are under discussion, to submit or propose a resolution, and to divide the Council in respect of any such financial discussion; the rules shall also provide for the right of any member to enter a protest in writing, which protest shall be duly recorded in the proceedings of the Council for the day on which such protest is made. Provided, further, the rules to be framed shall give power to any member at any such meet-
  1374
  ing, of any such Council to submit or propose a resolution for the production of papers relating to any question, and to divide the Council in respect of any such resolution; any member may enter a protest of dissent from the decision of the majority, and such protest shall be duly entered upon the proceedings of the Council. Further."
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."
  MR. CURZON: I am afraid that the hon. Member has not shown any adequate appreciation of the magnitude of the proposal which he asks the House to accept. With respect to the protest in writing, I should like to point out that in the case of the financial discussion it would be superfluous. It would be in the power of any member to make a speech, and that speech would be reported, and the protests in writing would merely go to makeup a voluminous and preposterous record of the proceedings, and would give the Council in India powers which it has not been suggested should be given even to this House. With respect to questions, if the Amendment were carried you would destroy the object of this Bill. It is intended by the restrictions to reserve to the Government a certain amount of discretion in the matter and if you decline to allow a discussion on a certain subject, and yet permit the minority to protest, you are providing scope for a discussion, and that discussion of a one-sided character. With respect to the general character of the proposals made by the hon. Gentleman, they seem to me to be not less subversive of the character and scope of the Bill than those he tried to introduce with reference to election. I think, if I may say so with respect, the hon. Gentleman entirely misconceives the character of these Councils. They are deliberative bodies with special reference to the subject before them, and they must remain deliberative bodies. But the hon. Gentleman wishes to alter this, and to turn them into Parliamentary bodies more or less similar to this House. But is not this a hopeless confusion of ideas? We cannot have a Parliamentary system in India. I am sorry to repeat myself, but I am bound to do so when the same arguments are brought up again and again against the Bill.

  1375
  The Government must be in a majority in India, and the majority must be the Government; it cannot resign, because there is no Opposition to succeed it as in this country, and, in the case of an adverse vote or any other contingency arising, the minority would not be able to stop in and take the place of the Government. Does the hon. Gentleman see the logical corollary of a victorious Opposition? Does he mean that in these Provincial Councils the Government are to give way to a victorious Opposition? Unless he means that the discussion that he asks for would be purely academic, and the power to divide would merely emphasize the impotence of the minority. I believe, if these provisions were introduced, they would only generate friction between the official and non-official members of the Council; and no single proposal advocated to-night would do more to hamper and embarrass and dislocate and ruin our Government in India than the one I am now considering. As to the power of unrestricted discussion, I can imagine nothing more undesirable than unrestricted discussion of the financial arrangements between the Imperial and Provincial Governments, in which officials might be called upon to defend arrangements for which they might not be responsible, on which they had not been consulted, and which might have been arrived at by the Imperial Government without their knowledge, and even without their consent. The proposal of the hon. Gentleman might be a source of very great friction, not only in the Council itself, but in the settlement of the financial relations between the Provincial and Imperial Governments. The same holds good with regard to Divisions upon the right of interpellation. If you have no check you might have questions asked at a most critical juncture on the relations between the Provincial and Imperial Governments, and a Resolution might even be moved upon a question of Imperial policy on which a Provincial Government has no right to express an opinion. Lord Kimberley said that he believed it was the right thing to give the right of interpellation, but that it was not a light matter to give that right,
  1376
  which must be carefully guarded, or it might be a source of great embarrassment to the Government. If the power for motions, resolutions, and divisions which the hon. Member asks for were given, I believe it would result in a very grave and serious condition of things. The whole object of the Bill, in making these two concessions—the right of criticism of the Budget and of asking questions—is to facilitate the giving of useful criticism, and undoubtedly the Government hope by these means to give power of expression to representatives of public opinion and of the native communities in India which they have not hitherto possessed. But this advantage might be purchased at too great a cost, and the benefits would be altogether wiped out if we introduced these extensive privileges, which could only have results that would be perfectly disastrous. The Government cannot for a moment consent to accept the Amendment, and I do not think the hon. Member can have any adequate conception of the difference between the Councils in India and Parliamentary bodies in this country when he asks us to introduce it into the Bill.
  MR. MACNEILL: I am sorry the Government will not accept the Amendment of my hon. Friend, and I do not think the Under Secretary has put forward any powerful arguments against the right of protest. The right is already well known in Indian affairs, and in the Council of the Secretary of State for India at home protests are the order of the day. Protests are very useful; they give in short form the Constitutional history of a country, as is shown in the history by the late Professor Thorold Rogers. I do not think the power of division and motion for the further production of papers would be any use at all, but I do not see why the right of protest should be withheld. The mere fact of the existence of the necessities which urged my hon. Friend to move the Amendment ought to be sufficient to lead to its adoption. The hon. Gentleman must know that these are practically provisions which are incorporated in the very constitution of the Council of the Secretary of State, and I do not see why he should

  1377
  not allow these to be incorporated here. His remarks in opposition to the Amendment go to show that the power of interrogation will become ineffectual and a mere farce. Discussion of financial questions will be utterly impracticable, will be useless, if there can be no division, people will not be able to see, the light of public opinion cannot come in on various questions, and it will not be seen how opinion is accentuated when there is no power of division and interrogation. I very much regret that after 30 years of immobility as far as this question is concerned, we should have this sham measure proposed, and I make my earnest protest, though I am reluctant to prolong this discussion now. From first to last the hon. Gentleman has not made a single concession to Members who are endeavouring to fight the cause of the Indian people. With great ingenuity and readiness of resource the Indian Secretary has replied to our arguments on the spur of the moment; but throughout he has not shown the slightest conciliatory spirit or endeavour in this Bill to consult native public opinion. At the very outset of these discussions I said the Bill would not confer a single benefit on the people of India, and now at the close I am bound to say that opinion is intensified when I find that this Amendment is rejected which would make the power of interrogation effective. I can only express my deep regret and great disappointment.
  MR. SEYMOUR KEAY: In his last speech the Under Secretary has I think unintentionally somewhat misled the Committee when he said that these Councils are deliberative assemblies. I think the Committee would understand from that that they are at this moment very much of the character of those mere debating societies, to which the hon. Gentleman said they might be reduced under certain conditions. Now, he must be thoroughly aware, and many Members of the Committee must be aware, that these are Legislative Councils in every sense of the word, and that it is to them, and to them alone, that India is indebted or misindebted for legislation under which government for good or bad is at this
  1378
  moment carried on. In the Debate on the Second Reading of the Bill I ventured to point to clauses of certain enactments which I considered were of the most oppressive character, and which were all passed by these selfsame Legislative Assemblies, which the hon. Gentleman nevertheless calls deliberative. I will not at this hour go on to expatiate on details connected with the evil legislative work which has been done by the Councils; but I do say that the Amendment of my hon. Friend would go far towards rendering less farcical some of the pretended concessions of Clause 2. I do not hesitate to say that the clause as it stands pretends to make concessions, but really makes none. On financial questions, where the power of discussion would be most valuable, the concession given with one hand is withdrawn with the other, by conditions and restrictions which may be prescribed, and the same observation applies to the alleged concessions regarding divisions and interpellations. Therefore I say, without hesitation, that the people of India will declare, as we are bound in our places here to declare, that the clause as it stands is a sham, and that the Amendment of my hon. Friend would render the clause really effective, although I do not say that the reform he proposes, if carried, would even then be considered extremely valuable or important. Then, with regard to the objection of the hon. Gentleman to the recording of protests, I join with others who have spoken from this side of the House in expressing surprise that the hon. Gentleman, on the part of the Government, did not make a concession to this very moderate demand. The only reason I can imagine why he did not do so is connected with the whole tenour of the hon. Gentleman's speeches to-night. I think the Committee, and I think public opinion in India, when these Debates are read there, will read a strong lesson as to the opinion of Her Majesty's Government respecting the awful condition of biting poverty, and latent disaffection consequent thereon, in which India is. The hon. Gentleman must be convinced of this, for has he not come forward time after time in these discussions,

  1379
  and met our mild Amendments for the amplification of this Bill by the single declaration, "There is danger in everything you are proposing—danger of nothing less than the wreck and ruin of the Government of India"? Such alarmist language shows, I think, that the mind of the Government is at last alive to the awful state to which India has been reduced by a purely bureaucratic system of Government. The hon. Gentleman has alluded to the remarks of Lord Kimberley in another place, when the noble Lord said that the power of interpellation must be accompanied by considerable safeguards, amongst others the safeguard of an answer not being compelled when deemed inconsistent with the public interest. Well, I am not aware that my hon. Friend provides that Members of the Executive Government shall be compelled to answer dangerous or inconvenient questions. The same custom would, in fact, be recognised in the Legislative Council of the Governor General which is recognised in this House, where a Minister does not feel bound to answer at all times and seasons what he considers questions inimical to the public interest. That custom is well recognised, and I myself have had experience of it when the predecessor of the hon. Gentleman has told me—and I have not disputed his right to do so—that on behalf of the Government of India he must decline to answer certain questions as not being in consonance with the public interest. Then does that fact not render altogether meaningless the objection of the hon. Gentleman to this part of the Amendment? I am perfectly convinced that, when the people of India read these Debates, and especially when they read how this Amendment has been received by the Government, they will be confirmed in the impression that this Bill has been introduced for the purpose of throwing dust in the eyes of the English people. I do not suppose it is intended or even hoped to deceive—and it will certainly not deceive—the people of India. The Government are thinking not at all of the far-off 300,000,000 of the people in India, but of the 38,000,000 nearer to our doors in this country.
  MR. MORTON: I am sorry to find the Government persist in refusing this very mild Amendment. I gather from the speech of the Under Secretary for India, that not only is the Bill a sham, but that the Indian Councils are also a sham; for he tells us that everything must be left to the Governor General in Council, and beyond that he cannot go. I do not blame the hon. Gentleman; he but follows the determination of the Government to shove the Bill through without any Amendment. The last speech of the hon. Gentleman was, I think, incomplete, because he did not give us the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian on this point. Perhaps he will supply this omission. As the Bill stands, I confess I do not see what actual power the Councils will have when, in regard to financial proposals, members are debarred from moving resolutions and taking divisions—a most extraordinary proposal to be accepted by this House of Commons. How can the opinion of a Council be expressed without a division? Speeches may be made, and those speeches will be officially reported, and I suppose the Governor General may eliminate from the reports what he considers dangerous matter. Even then the speeches are not read in this country, if any of the Indian people read them. But what does it all amount to more than the mere talk of a tea meeting? Really, it is difficult to understand why the Government take up time in resisting this very sensible Amendment. Is there anything unreasonable in the suggestion that a minority on the Council should have the right to record a protest? The House of Lords claims and exercises the right for a minority to record a protest, be that minority ever so small, and I do not know that that has ever been considered an improper proceeding. Surely the Tory Party might allow a custom of their pet institution to be carried out in India. Or is it that they consider the House of Lords cannot long survive, and that it is not wise to carry any of its customs into another country? Have not Members of the Tory Party, and notably the late Leader of the House (Mr. W. H. Smith), argued in favour of

  1381
  the record of a minority protest in this House? Practically, we have the power of making a protest by the right to take a Division, and. I really cannot understand the fears of the Government which prevent them from conceding the right to the Indian Councils, nominated as the members will be, as men thoroughly to be depended upon by the Executive. If members were freely elected by the people I could understand the Tory fears of what the Council might do. For my own part, I am not at all afraid of the people. I am inclined to think, with regard to these Councils, that the more you take these people into confidence—the more you trust them—the better will be the Government of the country, the less will be the cause for alarm as to what may happen. To show the people we have some confidence in them the Government might well accept this Amendment as indicating we are not afraid to allow them a bonâ fide and actual share in the little matters of administration in which these Councils are concerned. I cannot say I hope the Government will make this concession; but at least we, the Radical section of this House, have endeavoured to show the people of India that we are anxious to do away with the necessity for holding that country by the sword. We would give the people some share in the government of their land, and the people of India may rest assured that the democracy of this country are anxious to do this justice.
  DR. TANNER: I think we might have expected from the Under Secretary some answer to the remarks of the hon. Member near me (Mr. S. Keay). The hon. Member has accused the Under Secretary of trying to mislead the Committee. I listened with that attention which is due to the remarks of a responsible Minister, but I failed to understand how the hon. Gentleman supported the statement that these are merely deliberative Councils, and not legislative assemblies in any sense?
  SIR R. TEMPLE: They are.
  DR. TANNER: Of course we are dealing with questions of taxation, where they have no legislative power; but in dealing with other matters we have been distinctly told that
  1382
  the Councils have power to make laws, they have the power to vote, and therefore the power of veto; and, if so, what becomes of that part of the speech of the Under Secretary, in which he spoke of the impossibility of allowing a defeat of the Executive Government?
  MR. CURZON: These Councils are legislative, with full power of speech, of moving Amendments, and of voting, but the suggestion of the hon. Member has reference to financial discussions and the right of questions thereon.
  DR. TANNER: That is the first clear explanation we have had, and if it had been given earlier we might have decided on the Amendment half-an-hour ago. We are not all experts on these Indian subjects, and have a right to expect plain business-like explanations on matters we are required to deal with from a paid Under Secretary of State. But I must say I think the hon. Gentleman has trifled with the time of the Committee.
  Amendment negatived.
  THE CHAIRMAN: Does the hon. Member (Mr. Schwann) move other Amendments?
  MR. MACNEILL: We propose to take a Division on the present Amendment.
  THE CHAIRMAN: A Division was not challenged.
  MR. MACNEILL: I beg pardon; it was, Mr. Courtney.
  THE CHAIRMAN: I put the Question that the words proposed to be left out stand part of the clause, and this was assented to.
  Motion made, and Question, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again,"—(Dr. Tanner,) put, and negatived.
  MR. SCHWANN: I wish to move the Amendment to the end of the clause in reference to the presentation of a record of the proceedings to Parliament. I do not think I need enter into any long explanation. The expense will not be large, and I hope the Under Secretary can accept this Amendment.
  Amendment proposed,
  In page 2, at the end of the Clause, to add the words, "A record of all proceedings at the meetings of the Viceroy's Council, as now published in the 'Gazette of India,' and of the Presidency and Provincial Councils, shall be published in separate volumes and presented yearly to Parliament."—(Mr. Schwann.)
  Question proposed, "That those words be there added."
  MR. CURZON: This, I think, is superfluous. A copy of these proceedings is always furnished to the Library of this House, where any Member can refer to it. I do not see that anything will be gained by introducing the Amendment.
  MR. SCHWANN: With the leave of the Committee I will withdraw the Amendment.
  DR. TANNER: But I think the hon. Member must have known that there is this copy available, and our view is that the reports of the proceedings are meagre and insufficient.
  It being Midnight, the Chairman left the Chair to make his report to the House.
  Committee report Progress; to sit again on Thursday.

  ROADS AND BRIDGES (SCOTLAND) ACTS AMENDMENT BILL [Lords.]— (No. 232.)

    CONSIDERATION.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill, as amended, be now considered."
    MR. CAMPBELL-BAN-NERMAN (: I am not going to move any Amendment, nor could I now do so; but I wish to give notice that I intend, on the Motion for Third Reading, to move that the Bill be re-committed in order that a provision may be inserted restraining road authorities from destroying or injuring places of public interest in Scotland under powers they at present possess.
    Motion agreed to.
    Bill, as amended, considered; to be read the third time upon Thursday.

  PLUMBERS REGISTRATION (Re-committed) BILL.—(No. 95.)
  Considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Clause 1.
  Committee report Progress; to sit again upon Wednesday, 29th June.

  NAVY (VICTUALLING YARD MANUFACTURING ACCOUNTS, 1890–91).
  Annual Accounts presented,—of the Cost of Manufacturing, Provisions,
  1384
  Victualling Stores, &c., at the Home Victualling Yards for 1890–91, with the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General thereon [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

  DUBLIN BARRACKS BILL.
  Ordered, That Mr. Barton, Mr. T. M. Healy, and Mr. Brodrick be Members of the Select Committee on Dublin Barracks Bill, with Two Members to be added by the Committee of Selection.—(Mr. Brodrick.)

  HOUSING OF THE WORKING CLASSES (SCOTLAND) BILL.
  On Motion of The Lord Advocate, Bill to amend "The Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890," as to Scotland, ordered to be brought in by The Lord Advocate and Mr. Solicitor General for Scotland.
  Bill presented, and read first time. [Bill 293.]

  HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY (SCOTLAND) BILL.
  On Motion of The Lord Advocate, Bill to regulate the Sittings of the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland, ordered to be brought in by The Lord Advocate and Mr. Solicitor General for Scotland.
  Bill presented, and read first time. [Bill 294.]

  ADJOURNMENT.
  (12.10.) Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I think it may be for the convenience of the House if I make a statement as to the Business for Thursday. On the Tuesday when we separated for the Easter Recess, I stated that on Thursday we proposed to take the discussion on the Budget; but I regret to say that I have just had a notification from my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he will not be able to be present in the House on Thursday, he being confined to his residence by sickness. The Business, therefore, for Thursday must be changed, and I propose to ask the House to take the Second Reading of the Clergy Discipline Bill. I do not make this an absolute arrangement, or give an absolute pledge that this will be the first Order; but I think it will be convenient to give the earliest notice of the change which will have to be made.
  Motion agreed to.
  House adjourned at ten minutes after Twelve o'clock.