Sitting of 12 March 1888

MINUTES.
NEW WRIT ISSUED—For Glamorgan County (Western or Gower Division), v. Frank Ash Yeo, esquire, deceased.
PRIVATE BILL, (by Order)—Second Reading—Cork and Bandon Railway.
PUBLIC BILL—Resolution [March 9] reported Ordered—First Reading—National Debt (Conversion) * [164].
Ordered—First Reading—Westminster Abbey * [165]; County Courts (Ireland) * [166].
Second Reading—Timber Acts (Ireland) Amendment * [157]; Copyright (Musical Compositions) * [156].
Withdrawn—Friendly Societies Act (1875) Amendment (No. 2) * [73].

QUESTIONS.

  WAR OFFICE (AUXILIARY FORCES)—THE VOLUNTEERS—PURCHASE OF CONDEMNED ACCOUTREMENTS, &c.
  MR. BOORDasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether it is the fact that officers commanding-Volunteer Regiments are refused permission to purchase accoutrements and stores which, although condemned as unfit for the Regular Forces, are serviceable for the Volunteers; whether such accoutrements are sold by auction for a trifling sum, and are regularly bought up by certain Jewish firms to whom Volunteer Officers who inquire for them are referred; and, whether, by this means, the cost of such articles to Volunteers is raised by nearly 600 per cent?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. E. STANHOPE): Accoutrements returned by the troops are in a very bad state, as a rule, and they are not sold until those which are considered worth repairing are picked out for issue to the Militia. The remainder are sold in large lots, and realize very small prices. I doubt very much whether, even with the most careful picking out, any of them would be found to be of use to the Volunteers. But I will undertake to look into the matter.
  MR. BOORDasked, Whether it was not the case that Volunteer officers wishing to purchase such articles were referred to the dealers to whom they were sold?
  MR. E. STANHOPE: I am not so informed; but I will make inquiries.
  MR. HANBURYasked, Whether it was not true that a great deal of the clothing sold was actually new, and had never been used by the troops at all; whether the stores were not brought from the different depôts to Woolwich, instead of being offered for sale in the neighbourhood of the depôts, where probably a better price would be given; and, whether the stores were not all sold in one or two large contracts, so as to shut out competition?
  MR. E. STANHOPEasked for notice of the Question.
  MR. BOORDsaid, he would call attention to the matter in Committee of Supply.

  WAR OFFICE—THE WORKMEN AT ENFIELD AND WOOLWICH—SUPERANNUATION ACT, 1859.
  COLONEL HUGHESasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether between 1859 and 1870, about 1,300 workmen were entered at Enfield and in the arsenal at Woolwich; whether, on the recommendation of the War Department, the Treasury, under the Superannuation Act of 1873, did, on the 4th of March, 1874, declare by Schedule that 829 of these workmen were entitled to the benefit of "The Superannuation Act, 1859," but omitted the remainder of such workmen in consequence of a War Office Circular dated the 17th of December, 1861; whether General Dixon, the Superintendent at Enfield, has expressed his belief that such Circular was not made known to the workmen, nor even sent to Enfield, until 12 years after its date; whether, at Woolwich Arsenal Carriage Department, the said Circular was omitted from the bound book of Circulars and from the Index, but has been pasted therein subsequently; whether, in the printed Rules and Regulations under which workmen were engaged at Woolwich between 1861 and 1870, nothing is mentioned of the Circular of 1861, and that it was act until 1870 that any indication of its effect for the first time appeared; whether, on behalf of the men omitted from the Schedule, it is solemnly asserted that they did not know of any Circular of 1861 until 1870, and that they are prepared to testify upon oath to that effect; whether Her Majesty's Government will grant an inquiry by any Committee of this House, or by any other independent method, into this serious allegation of non-publication; and, whether, if notification to the workmen be not proved previously to 1870, the War Department will recommend to the Treasury that the said workmen (entered before the 4th June, 1870) be admitted to their just rights under the Act of 1873, as in other Government Departments?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. E. STANHOPE: Without pledging myself to exact numbers, no doubt many thousand workmen were entered at Enfield and Woolwich between 1859 and 1870. In answer to the second Question, when the Treasury in March, 1874, declared 790 of these
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  men entitled to the benefit of the Superannuation Act of 1859, their Lordships admitted all the claims which had been submitted to them. In answer to the third Question, there is no record in the War Office of any such statement as that referred to in the Question haying been made by Colonel Dixon. In answer to the fourth Question, the Circular of December, 1861, governed the cases of men appointed up to its date, and is not in the book of circulars; but the Circular of August, 1861, which is the regulation applicable to all subsequent appointments and which governs the cases referred to in these Questions, is in its place both in the bound book and in the index. In answer to the fifth Question, there were no such printed Rules and Regulations under which workmen were engaged in the Royal Laboratory until 1870, nor in the Royal Carriage Department until 1872. There were such Rules in the Royal Gun Factories from 1860, but they contained no reference to superannuations. In answer to the sixth Question, the men now claiming do make the assertion referred to. The claims advocated by my hon. and gallant Friend have been fully investigated by successive Secretaries of State, and all agreed that the applicants had no just claim against the public; but I notice that my hon. and gallant Friend will have an opportunity shortly of raising the question in this House.

  RIOTS, &c. (IRELAND)—DISTURBANCES AT MILTOWN MALBAY.
  MR. PAULTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If his attention has been drawn to the following report, published in The Daily News of 23rd February:—
  "An extraordinary demonstration was witnessed at Miltown Malbay yesterday, when the contents of 260 carts filled with turf, and a similar number containing potatoes, were distributed by the people of surrounding parishes to the families of the 11 men sentenced to a month's imprisonment under the Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act. Head Constable Bready, who was in charge of the police, ordered his men to draw their truncheons, and, presenting his revolver, ordered the crowds to disperse. The reason for this action is not reported. The people dispersed quietly. Several tons of potatoes were pitted;"
  and, whether the facts are correctly stated; and, if so, whether the action

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  of Head Constable Bready is approved by the Executive Government?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied) said: The Inspector General of Constabulary informs me that the demonstration consisted of several thousand persons, with 300 carts, headed by a band. The local band also began to play through the town, followed by a large crowd. The magistrates at Petty Sessions having ordered that no band should be allowed to play in the streets on the occasion of the demonstration, the Head Constable went up to the band and warned them not to continue. Thereupon the crowd rushed upon the police in a threatening manner. The Head Constable considered it necessary to order his men to draw their truncheons, and he drew his revolver and called upon the people to desist. The ringleaders in the disturbance are being prosecuted.
  MR. DILLON: Will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman say under what law are bands prohibited from playing through the streets?
  COLONEL KING-HARMAN: Under the law which gives power to the police to take any stops they think necessary to prevent anything likely to lead to a breach of the peace.

  CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (IRELAND) ACT—BOYCOTTING—CONVICTIONS AT ENNIS.
  MR. PAULTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether 11 men—namely, Morgan, M'Inerney, O'Gorman, Rourke, Toole, Donnellon, Simon Coghlan, Michael Coghlan, Costello, Kelly, and Meade, were sentenced at Ennis, on the 22nd of February, to terms of imprisonment varying from four months to two months, with hard labour, for refusing to sell turf to the police; whether all these men lived at a distance of about 15 miles from the district in which the police were quartered; and, if so, whether the police had any right to requisition their turf; and, whether any limit is placed on the authority and discretion of the Constabulary in such proceedings?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied)
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  said, the Inspector General of Constabulary had reported that the persons named in the Question had been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, from two to four months, tome of them for refusing to sell turf to the police, and others for endeavouring to induce others not to sell, the police being Boycotted. None of them lived a distance of 15 miles from the police. Three lived about five miles distant, and the remainder within a quarter to two miles. The police had every right to ask these men to sell them turf, as they had exhibited turf for sale in various parts of the district.
  MR. PAULTON: Is the right hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that all these persons had regular customers for their turf in Ennis whom they were in the habit of supplying, and that if they failed to supply these persons with turf, they would have suffered the loss of their custom, a very serious loss to them?
  COLONEL KING-HARMAN: I am informed that that is not the case.
  MR. COX: Will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman say whether the police ever asked these men to supply them with turf before, and whether the only object of the police in asking for the turf on this particular occasion was to initiate a prosecution?
  COLONEL KING-HARMAN: I do not know, and I do not think so.
  MR. T. M. HEALY: May I ask the right hon. and gallant Gentleman whether the police under the Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act have a right of pre-emption to the turf?
  COLONEL KING-HARMAN: No, Sir; they have only the regular right of everyone else.

  POST OFFICE—GREENWICH TIME SIGNALS.
  MR. BOORDasked the Postmaster General, Under what arrangement time signals are supplied by the Astronomer Royal from Greenwich; at what expense to his Department; and whether such arrangement is of a permanent character; and, what charges are made to the public for the supply of time signals; and what has been the amount annually received in respect of them by the Post Office since the arrangement was commenced?
  THE POSTMASTER GENERAL (Mr. RAIKES): In reply to the hon. Member, I have to state that the Astronomer Royal does not himself supply time signals to the public. What he does is to supply signals to the Post Office by means of wires and apparatus provided by the Department. The Post Office distributes the signals to various Public Bodies and private persons throughout the Kingdom, on the terms and conditions set forth at page 311 of the Post Office Guide. The minimum charge in London is £15, and in the country £12. The gross annual revenue at present is about £1,300; and the amount has varied from about £230 to about £1,400 a-year since the telegraphs were transferred to the State. The arrangement with the Astronomer Royal may, I think, be regarded as permanent.

  THE MAGISTRACY (IRELAND)—CO. CLARE—MR. HICKSON, Q.C., TEMPORARY COUNTY COURT JUDGE
  MR. DILLONasked Mr. Solicitor General for Ireland, Whether appeals from Resident Magistrates in County Clare have been decided by Mr. William Hickson, Q.C., a gentleman temporarily appointed to act in the absence of the County Court Judge; is he aware that Mr. Hickson is a member of the Dublin Constitutional Club, and that, since his confirmation of the sentences of Resident Magistrates, has attended a meeting of that Body; will the appeal, in the case of the hon. Member for East Clare (Mr. Cox), from a sentence by Resident Magistrates of four months' imprisonment, for a speech last October, be heard by Mr. Hickson; and, can arrangements be made by which coercion appeals shall be tried only by Judges not removable at the pleasure of the Executive?
  THE SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. MADDEN): The County Court Judge of Clare being during the last Session incapacitated from attending by reason of illness, the Lord Chancellor appointed Mr. Hickson, Q.C., as his locum tenens, and that gentleman accordingly discharged all the duties at the last Sessions, including, of course, the hearing of appeals from Resident Magistrates. The County Court Judge is now better, and he has not intimated to the
  848
  Lord Chancellor that he will be unable to discharge the duties of his office in person at the next Sessions. Mr. Hick-son is, I understand, a member of the Dublin Constitutional Club, and has attended its meetings. He is, I may add, an able and highly respected member of the Bar. In answer to the last paragraph of the Question, I have to state that it would not be possible to make any arrangements altering the statutory provisions as to appeals, which must in all cases of summary jurisdiction be made at the next Quarter Sessions called in the Division of the county in which the conviction has been made.
  MR. DILLON: If a County Court Judge is not able to resume his duties at the next Quarter Sessions, is it not open to the Government to adjourn the appeals to a subsequent Sessions?
  MR. MADDENsaid, it was provided by statute that the appeals must be heard at the next Quarter Sessions; and the only thing which could be done by the Government was for the Lord Chancellor, by another statute, to allow them to be heard by the gentleman who was acting for the County Court Judge, as in the present case.
  MR. T. M. HEALYasked, why the Government did not throw this duty on some other County Court Judge?
  MR. MADDEN: The effect would be to take another County Court Judge from his own county. That would not get on with the work better.

  COUNTY COURT ACTS—SUFFOLK.
  MR. F. S. STEVENSONasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether the inquiry by the Lord Chancellor into the arrangements connected with the holding of County Courts in Suffolk has been brought to a conclusion; and, if so, with what result; and, whether he is able to give an assurance that the provisions of 9 & 10 Vict., c. 95, ss. 5, 6, as to monthly Courts, shall in future be strictly observed, as also the provisions of the County Court Acts relating to the notices of fixtures?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. MATTHEWS): The Lord Chancellor has been unable to conclude his inquiries, as the Judge is at present away on a holiday. The

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  Lord Chancellor informs me that the assurance asked for in the second paragraph of the Question can certainly be given.

  ISLANDS OF THE PACIFIC—RAIATEA.
  MR. JOHNSTONasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any Report on the geographical position of Raiatea, and other Islands in the Pacific, whose independence, notwithstanding the Treaty of 1847, has been surrendered to the French, has been received from Admiral Fairfax; whether the said Islands are in the direct route to America, and contain splendid harbours; and, if he will lay any further Papers on the subject upon the Table of the House?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Sir JAMES FERGUSSON): No Report upon the Islands in question has been received from Rear Admiral Fairfax, and indeed they do not lie within the limits of his command, nor has any such Report been received of late years from any naval officer. Further Papers upon this subject are being prepared for Parliament.

  LAW AND POLICE (IRELAND)—POLICE BARRACKS AT BELLAGHY, CO. SLIGO.
  MR. KENNEDYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether he is aware of the police barracks at Bellaghy being changed to Charlestown, County Sligo; and, if so, would he explain for what reason; whether a Memorial has been sent to Dublin Castle, signed by the traders of Charlestown, against the change; whether he is aware that the barracks at Bellaghy was specially built for the purpose, at a cost of £400, the rent of which has been the principal support of the Widow Calleran since her husband's death; and, whether, under the circumstances, he will cause Bellaghy Barracks to be retained, it being quite close to Charlestown and equally as central?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied) said, the new barracks at Charlestown were more central and nearer the business part. No Memorial had been received against the change, which had been favourably regarded by the ma-
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  jority of the inhabitants. The Local Constabulary Authorities were not aware whether the barracks at Bellaghy were specially built for the purpose; but they represented that the present owner was not solely dependent upon the rent for her support, as she had other house property. The Government, while regretting that Mrs. Calleran should be put to inconvenience, did not feel justified in causing the present barracks to be retained.

  IRELAND—EJECTMENT IN CO. LONG- FORD.
  MR. T. M. HEALYasked the Parliamentary Under Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If the Government will give military or police assistance for the proposed ejectment of Widow Flood, of Forthill, County Longford, for arrears of a rent judicially reduced; has he seen The Westmeath Examiner of 21st January, containing the following report of the remarks of the County Court Judge, addressed to the agent at Ballymahon Quarter Sessions, in reference to the proceedings against this widow:—
  " A tenant whose rent was reduced last October from £15 8s. to £7, was sued for the rack-rent, which drew from the Judge the observation, ' Is it possible, Mr. Bole, that you are going on for the old rent after the Land Commissioners reducing it over 60 per cent? Surely you do not expect to recover these arrears from poor people.' Mr. Bole's reply was that he had no authority from his employer to wipe out any arrears;"
  will any remonstrance be directed by the Executive to the landlord in the case, following the precedent of the letter of the last Chief Secretary to the Marquess of Clanricarde; does he propose, on behalf of the Government, to take any steps in the case; and, can he say who is the woman's landlord?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN): As the hon. and learned Member is perfectly well aware, I am the landlord in the case in question. No application has been made to the Government for military or police in the matter, nor is there any intention to execute the ejectment decree at present. I have seen the newspaper report referred to. Mr. Bole, however, denies that he made the statement attributed to him; on the contrary, he said

  851
  that he would allow 20 per cent oft the arrear in respect of the old rent, which would have brought it below the Poor Law valuation. The amount in the decree contained half a-year at the old rent only, and two years judicial rent at £7 per annum. The Poor Law valuation of the farm is £12 15 s., and, accordingly, an appeal has been lodged against the rent fixed. The tenant, however, has, of course, only been asked to pay the judicial rent from the date it was fixed. The letter to which the hon. and learned Member refers dealt with a proposal for carrying out wholesale evictions; but the writer distinctly contemplated the necessity of resorting to this process when the tenant declined to fulfil Ms legal obligation. As there is no question in this case of wholesale eviction, and as it may be hoped that there will be no eviction at all, there seems to be no parallel between the circumstances under which my right hon. Friend wrote the letter and those to which the hon. and learned Member refers to in his Question.

  NEW SOUTH WALES—CELEBRATION OF THE CENTENNIAL.
  MR. JOHNSTONasked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, If he will lay upon the Table of the House the proceedings that took place in January last in Sydney, in celebration of the Centennial of New South Wales, including the united service held by the clergy and laity of the Church of England and the Presbyterian and Wesleyan Churches, and which was attended by His Excellency the Governor; and, whether he will take steps to secure a permament record of an event of so great interest?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Baron HENRY DE WORMS): All the Centennial proceedings in Sydney will, without doubt, be fully recorded in the local Press; and any special notice taken by Her Majesty's Government of a particular religious celebration by one or two Churches would be disapproved in the Colony as being inconsistent with the absolute impartiality maintained by Her Majesty's Government towards all religious communities without distinction.
  MR. JOHNSTON: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the service was
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  joined in by the Jews and the Roman Catholics?
  [No reply.]

  INLAND REVENUE—EXCISE—THE DUTY ON SPIRITS.
  SIR HENRY ROSCOEasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether his attention has been called to the fact that, owing to the present faulty system of charging the duty upon spirits, a loss to the Revenue estimated at from £60,000 to £80,000 per annum is incurred without any corresponding advantage to the trader; whether this defect is well known and acknowledged by the Inland Revenue Department; whether his attention has been directed, to a system proposed by Dr. Derham which, by substituting correct for incorrect tables, and a scientific and accurate instrument for an inexact one, will not only facilitate the work of the officials, but also, by yielding correct results at all temperatures, will give to the Revenue a sum equal to that mentioned above; and, whether, in view of the importance of this subject to the National Exchequer, he will consider the propriety of appointing a Departmental Committee to report on the method suggested by Dr. Derham?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. GOSCHEN): I am informed that it is not the fact that there is a loss to the Exchequer of £60,000 to £80,000 per annum, as suggested by the hon. Baronet, owing to the faulty system of charging the duty upon spirits. No practical defect in the system is acknowledged by the Inland Revenue Department. Dr. Derham's system has been brought to my notice, and the merits of the principle of his instrument are recognized; but his estimate of the increase which would accrue to the Revenue by the adoption of his system is based upon erroneous assumptions, Sikes's hydrometer, which is the legalized instrument for charging the duty on spirits, is not only used by the Customs and Inland Revenue officers, but by the whole of the trade; and I am told that it would be as great a revolution to introduce Dr. Derham's instrument in its place, as it would be to introduce the decimal system in the place of our present coinage. I am also informed that Dr. Derham's instrument

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  is of a delicate character, and not so well adapted as Sikes's hydrometer to be carried about on the rough journeys which the Revenue officers have to go through.

  CIVIL SERVICE—EXAMINATIONS FOR LOWER DIVISION CLERKSHIPS.
  MR.MAURICE HEALYasked the Secretary to the Treasury, Why the examinations for Lower Division clerkships in the Civil Service, usually held in or about January, May, and October, have been suspended; will these examinations be held in the future, as formerly, at regular intervals; when is it probable the next examination will be held; and, whether in consequence of the delay in holding such examinations, candidates who have been specially preparing for them, and who are now nearing the superior limit of age, will be disqualified if that limit be exceeded at the time of holding the next examination, and be thus deprived of their chance of entering the Public Service, through no fault of their own?
  THE SECRETARY (Mr. JACKSON): I answered a Question of the hon. Member for North Sligo (Mr. P. McDonald) to the same effect as this one on the 23rd ultimo; but I may repeat that these examinations are only held when required on account of vacancies which cannot be filled by means of transfers from other Departments, and that no date has been fixed for the next examination.

  THE MAGISTRACY (IRELAND)—MR. O'MARA, HIGH SHERIFF OF LIMERICK (CITY.)
  MR. KIMBERasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether his attention has been drawn to a statement in The Times of Monday last, alleging that a Mr. O'Mara, appearing to be High Sheriff of Limerick (City) and also President of the last meeting of the Limerick National League, is reported to have said to that meeting, in reference to the omission of his name from the Proclamation for holding the Limerick City Assizes, as follow:
  "He would tell the meeting what would he possible, and that was that he as High Sheriff could keep the Judge from the Court House because, though it might not be known, the
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  Court House and all round it was in the custody of the High Sheriff for the time being, and a wink from him could keep the Judges a long time rapping at the gates before they got in;"
  and, if the allegation be well founded, what steps the Government intend to take in view of such threats against the administration of justice by persons holding the honourable office of High Sheriff?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied) said: My attention has been drawn to the statement in the Question; but I am unable to say whether the allegation is well founded or otherwise. There has, however, as yet been no interference with the administration of justice, and the Government do not, therefore, at present contemplate taking any steps in the matter.

  METROPOLIS—THE RIVER THAMES—DEATHS FROM STARVATION, DROWNING, &c.
  MR. KILBRIDEasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If he will state the number of persons who were shown upon medical evidence before Coroners' Juries to have died from want and exposure during the year 1887 in London, and in the other parts of England; and, if he can state the number of persons whose bodies were found in the Thames in the same period, with regard to whom Coroners' Juries were unable to find whether they had met their deaths by murder, suicide, or accident?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. STUART-WORTLEY)(who replied) said, that a Return was now in course of preparation showing the number of deaths in the year 1887 in the Metropolitan District, upon which Coroners' Juries had returned verdicts that they were due to starvation or were deaths accelerated by privation. The Coroners' Returns would furnish the necessary information with regard to the other parts of England. As to bodies found in the Thames within the City of London and the Metropolitan District, there would be no objection on the part of the Government to furnish a Return.

  LAW AND JUSTICE (IRELAND)—GRATUITY TO DISCHARGED PRISONERS.
  MR. EDWARD HARRINGTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether four men from Balliferritter, named respectively Pat Keane, Michael Ferriter, John Devine, and James Higgins, when discharged from Tralee Gaol on the 16th of February, were only tendered 1s. 2½d. among them to defray the expenses of their journey home, over 45 miles of a snow covered road; why was not some more adequate sum offered to these men; and, what is the usual practice in such cases?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied) said: The prisoners named were released on the morning of the 16th February after breakfast. They were not tendered among them the amount alleged, but were each handed 4s. The Governor of the Tralee Prison states it is the practice there to send old men, women, and juveniles home by public conveyance when available; but that as the prisoners in question were all young men, and had voluntarily submitted themselves to imprisonment rather than give bail, he did not consider himself justified in adopting this course in their case.

  THE SWEATING SYSTEM.
  MR. HOWELLasked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether it will be possible for a Joint Committee of both Houses to be appointed to inquire into the Sweating System; and, if not, whether the Government will undertake that the Lords Report shall be communicated to the Commons?
  THE PRESIDENT (Sir MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH): I am much obliged to the hon. Member for calling my attention to the matter; but, on inquiry, I find that it is now too late to adopt his suggestion. I will, however, take care that the suggestion made in the latter part of the Question is given effect to.

  EMIGRATION—REMITTANCES FROM UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA.
  MR. HENNIKER HEATONasked the President of the Board
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  of Trade, in reference to the statement on page 18 of the Papers relating to Emigration (1887), wherein it is stated that the amount of money remitted by settlers in the United States and Canada to their Friends in the United Kingdom in each year from 1848 to 1887 amounted to £34,040,564, and from Australia from 1875 to 1887 amounted to £772,909, Does this amount include small postal and money orders; and, if so, is he aware that the poor and middle class people in Australia sent to their friends and relatives in this country during the past two years no less a sum than £700,000 in money orders, in value from 10 s. to £10; and, how he reconciles the statement in the Return with the last-earned fact?
  THE PRESIDENT (Sir MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH): The amount of money stated in the Return as remitted by settlers abroad or in the Colonies to their friends in the United Kingdom does not include sums remitted by small postal and money orders. The Post Office, on being applied to by the Board of Trade for the information for the year 1887, stated that they were unable to furnish it. In 1881 and 1882 Mr. Giffen stated, in his Report to the Board of Trade upon Emigration Statistics, that the data with regard to these remittances were necessarily so incomplete that it was doubtful whether it was ever worth while to publish the figures, or whether it was worth while any longer to continue them. I am obliged to the hon. Member for calling my attention to the matter. I think inaccurate statistics are only misleading, and propose to cease the publication of Tables VII. and VII.A in this Return, unless some good reason to the contrary can be shown.

  POST OFFICE—UNIFORM POSTAGE STAMP FOR GREAT BRITAIN AND HER COLONIES.
  MR. HENNIKER HEATONasked the Postmaster General, Has he taken into consideration the desirability of introducing a uniform post-age stamp for Great Britain and her Colonies, and, in fact, every part of the Empire?
  THE POSTMASTER GENERAL (Mr. RAIKES): I have considered the question referred to by the hon. Member, and I find that

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  a uniform postage stamp for the British Empire is not practicable, mainly because the revenues of the United Kingdom and of her Colonies being separate, most laborious accounts would be required properly to apportion the receipts. There are other objections which I could not conveniently explain within the limits of an answer to the hon. Member; but I may say that they were such as to convince Mr. Fawcett, when he held the Office which I now occupy, that a uniform postage stamp could not be adopted.

  IRELAND—THE LOAN FUND BOARD AT CASHEL.
  MR. J. O'CONNOR(for Mr. CONDON) (Tipperary, E.) asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether the printing for the Loan Fund Board at Cashel was formerly done by a local firm; whether by an Order of the Loan Fund Inspector the Cashel Board have been compelled to send their printing to the Dublin Castle printers; whether the work now costs about double the amount for which it was formerly done; and, whether, under these circumstances, he will order that the work be given to the local firm in the future?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied) said, some Members of the Local Loan Fund Board having provided themselves with forms which were not legal, and others which were not uniform, the Board considered it advisable to keep in stock documents, so as to secure that only those which were legal and uniform should be used. No compulsion was used on the Society in the matter; but they, in common with other similar Societies, seeing the advantage to be derived from it, voluntarily adopted the present system of having the printing done; but they were at perfect liberty to discontinue it, if they thought it desirable to do so. Whether the forms printed by the Dublin Castle printers cost more than those printed by local firms he was unable to say.

  LAW AND POLICE (IRELAND)—EXTRA POLICE IN DUBLIN COUNTY.
  MR. CLANCYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant for Ireland, Whether an extra police force of two men has recently
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  been stationed in each of three districts of the County of Dublin—namely, Rolestown, Ballyboghill, and Swords; if so, why has this addition been made to the already heavy burden of taxation borne by the people of those districts; and, whether in those districts of North Dublin there has been for years a single outrage, or attempted outrage, of any kind whatever?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied) said, the Inspector General reported that it was the case that the police force in the three places named had been recently increased by two men each; but it was not the case that any additional burden had been thrown on the people thereby. As regarded the last paragraph of the Question, he was informed that during the last seven years there had been six outrages in these districts.

  LABOURERS (IRELAND) ACT—THE CELBRIDGE UNION, CO. KILDARE.
  MR. CLANCY(for Mr. CAREW) (Kildare, N.) asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether his attention has been called to a Report in The Leinster Leader of the 25th of February last, wherein it is stated that in the case of the Celbridge Union, in the County of Kildare, the Privy Council granted every Petition lodged against the erection of labourers' cottages in that union; whether they heard the evidence of the objectors and decided thereon, without giving any notice to the Guardians of the Poor, or without giving them any opportunity of disproving the evidence of the objectors; and, whether, considering the difficulties thrown in the way of the erection of labourers' cottages, he will take steps to facilitate the Boards of Guardians in securing dwellings for the labourers?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied) said: I am informed that three Petitions against the erection of labourers' cottages in Celbridge Union were heard before the Privy Council on the 18th of February, who allowed the objections, after hearing fully counsel and witnesses on both sides. The Guardians had both full notice of the hearing, were represented at it by counsel, and their

  859
  witnesses were examined in the several cases. I cannot allow that any difficulties are thrown in the way of Boards of Guardians in securing dwellings for the labourers in any cases where a feasible and fair scheme is submitted to the authorities.

  LAW AND POLICE—THE SALVATION ARMY IN TORQUAY.
  MR. MALLOCKasked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether his attention had been called to a statement in The Times of the 9th of March, to the effect that 15 members of the Salvation Army in Torquay have been sentenced under a Local Act, entitled "The Torquay Harbour and District Act, 1886," to terms of imprisonment varying from a fortnight to one month, for taking part on the last four Sundays in street processions with instrumental music; and, whether he can inform him in what other places in England besides Torquay any Local Act is in force under which persons could be punished for similar proceedings?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. MATTHEWS)(who replied) said: Yes, Sir; my attention has been called to the facts stated in the Question. The Eastbourne Improvement Act, 1885, has a provision in terms similar to those of the Torquay Harbour and District Act. My hon. Friend will find provisions substantially the same in the Local Acts for Hastings and Carlisle.

  METROPOLITAN POLICE—POLICE CONSTABLE 98A.
  MR. BRADLAUGHasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether any, and which, police constable received pay in the Metropolis during any part of the month of November, 1887, under the letter and number 98A; and, whether any, and which, of the pay sheets of the A Division for the month of November contains any entry of pay to, and signed for by, any constable against such letter and number?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. MATTHEWS): I am informed by the Commissioners of Police that Sergeant Flood received pay under the letter and number 98A up to
  860
  November 20, 1887. The pay-sheets of the Criminal Investigation Department contain Flood's name up to November 20 under this number and letter. His signature is on a separate document, as he was abroad.

  CONTAGIOUS DISEASES (ANIMALS) ACTS—CASE OF COW DISEASE IN WILTSHIRE.
  MR. PICTONasked the Vice President of the Committee of Council on Agriculture, Whether a case of cow disease occurring in Wiltshire was investigated by Professor Crook-shank, of the Bacteriological Laboratory, at the request of the Agricultural Department of the Privy Council; whether he arrived at the conclusion that the disease was identical with the Hen-don outbreak, to which the Report of the Local Government Board for 1886 (pp. xiv. xv.) attributed the generation of scarlet fever among the consumers of the milk of the affected cows; whether he expressed a conviction that the disease was in both cases the true Jennerian cow-pox; and, whether he has identified certain micro-organisms (particularly streptococcus pyogenes) as occurring in both instances, and also in vaccine virus, in erysipelas, in pyæmia, and other infective diseases?
  SIR HERBERT MAXWELL (A LORD of the TREASURY)(who replied) said: Some months ago Professor Brown was instructed to make an inquiry as to the existence among cows of an eruptive disease of the teats which it was alleged in one case—the Hendon outbreak—had induced scarlatina in man by the agency of the milk. In the course of the inquiry he availed himself of Professor Crookshank's offered assistance in working out the micro-pathology of the affection. In regard to the outbreak in Wiltshire, Professsor Crookshank has stated that he considered the disease was the Jennerian cow-pox. Professor Crookshank has not yet furnished a Report on the micro-organism of the cow-disease. A Report on the whole subject is now being prepared, and will be issued as soon as possible by the Agricultural Department.

  VACCINATION—THE REV. T. MAINE, ASHTON-UNDER-LYNE.
  MR. PICTONasked the Secretary of State for the Home De-

  861
  partment, If his attention has been called to the case of the Rev. Thomas Maine, a Baptist minister of Ashton-under-Lyne, who, on the 9th of February, was summoned before the magistrates for neglect to have his child vaccinated; whether it is a fact that the summons was signed and issued by Dr. Cork, a public vaccinator for part of the borough of Ashton; and whether, when Mr. Maine appeared, Dr. Cork and also Mr. John Fletcher, a member of the prosecuting Board of Guardians, sat as magistrates on the Bench; whether Mr. Maine raised the objection that two interested persons were sitting in judgment on him; and whether this objection was ignored; and, whether, having regard to the decision of the Queen's Bench in 1879, on the case of "Betts and Co. v. Milledge, Robins, and others," Justices of Weymouth, he will take means to prevent in such cases the possibility of trial by a Bench partly composed of magistrates having a professional or official interest in the success of the prosecution?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. MATTHEWS): I have received a Report from the Justices as to the case of the Rev. T. Maine, of Ashton-under-Lyne. The summons was signed and issued by Dr. Cooke (not Dr. Cork); but he is not a public vaccinator for any part of the borough of Ashton, or for any other Place. Dr. Cooke and Mr. Fletcher (not Mr. John Fletcher, who was Chairman of the Board of Guardians when the order to prosecute was made) sat as magistrates on the Bench when the order to vaccinate the child was made. Mr. Fletcher is, I understand, a member of the Board. Mr. Maine did not raise the objection then. He did so on a subsequent occasion a month later, when he was fined for not complying with the order. On this latter occasion none of the magisstrates present were members of the Board of Guardians. Had he objected on the former occasion, I am informed by the Justices' clerk that Mr. Fletcher would, no doubt, have retired from the Bench. I have already called the attention of the Bench to the Question of the hon. Member and the case cited, and I do not think any further interference on my part is necessary.

  SOUTH AFRICA—THE TRANSVAAL GOVERNMENT.
  MR. DIXON-HARTLANDasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether there is an authorised or accredited Agent from the Transvaal Government resident in this country; and, if so, who is that Agent?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Sir JAMES FERGUSSON): The hon. Member for Caithness (Dr. Clark) is Consul General in Great Britain for the South African Republic.

  IRISH LAND COMMISSION—PERCENTAGE—REDUCTION OF JUDICIAL RENTS.
  MR. BLANEasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If the Irish Land Commission stated that the percentage of reduction granted by them to judicial tenants under "The Land Law (Ireland) Amendment Act, 1887," would only apply to the half-year ending the 1st of November, 1887; whether this opinion was also expressed by Mr. Kisbey, in giving judgment in "Lord Lurgan v. Heaney and others," at Lurgan Quarter Sessions in January last; and, whether Baron Dowse, on appeal from Mr. Kisbey's decision, reversed the judgment against Heaney, and gave the percentage of Land Commission reduction for the whole year ending November, 1887; and, if so, would the Government give proper publicity to the interpretation given by Baron Dowse to the Act of 1887, and have balances refunded to tenants who have only got a half-year's reduction?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied) said: The Land Commissioners, in a Minute which they prepared and circulated in connection with the alteration of rents prescribed by their Order of the 23rd of December, 1887, explained that the revision of rent provided for by the 29th section of the Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1887, and by the Order of the 23rd of December, 1887, refers only to the rent payable in respect of the year commencing from the gale day next before the 23rd of August, 1887, and does not

  863
  effect prior arrears of rent. Neither the Government nor the Land Commissioners are aware of the case referred to; and the Commissioners have not heard that a view contrary to what they have indicated was ever expressed by a judicial person. The hon. Member will probably find, upon inquiry, that the case he alludes to was one which can in no way affect the general principle laid down by the Commissioners, which is in accordance with the explicit terms of the statute.

  POOR LAW (ENGLAND AND WALES)—ELECTION OF GUARDIANS—QUESTION OF VOTING PAPERS.
  MR. J. ROWLANDSasked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether complaints have reached him that the overseers omitted to send voting papers to the occupiers in Cavendish Buildings, Clerkenwell Road, E.C., for the election of Guardians last year and the year before; whether the Local Government Board has received a request from one of the occupiers in Cavendish Buildings that they would take steps to prevent the recurrence of this omission for the future; whether they have taken such steps; and, if not, whether they will do so at once, before the next election, which will shortly take place; and, whether they will send a general Circular to the overseers in the Metropolis reminding them to send voting papers to all the occupiers in artizans' dwellings?
  THE PRESIDENT (Mr. RITCHIE): In November last one of the occupiers of Cavendish Buildings made inquiry why at the last election of Guardians, which took place more than six months previously, voting papers were not supplied to the occupiers of the buildings referred to. The Board are informed by the returning officer that, so far as he can ascertain, voting papers have always been sent to the occupiers of artizans' dwellings in the Holborn Union who are entitled to vote in the election of Guardians. No complaint in this matter has been made to him or to the overseers by any occupier of these buildings. There are at present no facts before me which show that there is any necessity for any such communication as is suggested.

  LAW AND JUSTICE—THE BADSWORTH POACHING AFFRAY.
  MR. SUMMERSasked the Secretary for State for the Home Department, Whether his attention has been called to the following statement, which appeared in the Leeds Mercury of Tuesday, 6th March:—
  "The brother of Edward George Copley states that the deceased had given him the following account of the Badsworth affray before he died: ' The poachers went away. Illingworth sent me one way, he went the other. When I came in sight of them again they were struggling together. The young fellow (Pilmore) placed the gun on the grass, and then went to assist his mate. When I got within a few yards of them the young fellow and I both made for the gun. He succeeded in getting to it first; and as I rushed at him the gun went off as he was picking it up, before I know where I was;'"
  and, whether he has any reason to believe the correctness or otherwise of the paragraph in question?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. MATTHEWS): The man has been respited. Had it been otherwise I should have been unable to answer this Question. It would be impossible for the Secretary of State to perform his duty in the consideration of these cases if, before his decision is announced, he is to be called upon to explain to the House what weight he attaches to this or that statement for or against the prisoner. In the present instance the statement was not evidence at all, but mere newspaper gossip, without any foundation in fact.

  BRITISH GUIANA—REPORT OF MR. MCTURK—THE BOUNDARY QUESTION.
  MR. WATTasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether he has received the Report of Mr. McTurk, with reference to his recent visit to the Yurnari, at the request of the Governor of British Guiana; and, whether the Government are now prepared to state what action they propose to take with reference to the territory in dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela?
  MR. HANBURY-TRACYalso had the following Question on the Paper:—To ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If it is true that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the American House of Representatives has reported,

  865
  and the House has adopted, the following Resolution:—
  "Whereas there are pending questions of disputed boundary between Venezuela and the Colony of British Guiana, and whereas it is alleged that the British Government has made claim for the said Colony to a considerable portion of valuable territory now and heretofore in the possession of Venezuela, and has refused to submit to arbitration the said questions of disputed boundary, it is resolved that the President be requested to send to the House, if not incompatible with the public interest, all documents and correspondence between our Government and Great Britain or Venezuela relating to the said questions of disputed boundary;"
  and, whether, Her Majesty's Government having stated that they are not opposed to the principle of arbitration, he will state what stops have been taken, or are about to be taken, to bring about a settlement of the dispute?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY of STATE (Sir JAMES FERGUSSON): I will, with the permission of the House, answer at the same time the Question of the hon. Member for the Montgomery Boroughs (Mr. Hanbury-Tracy.) Her Majesty's Government are not informed that the American House of Representatives has passed the Resolution referred to. The Report of Mr. McTurk upon his recent journey into the Yurnari District has been received; but I am not in a position to make any statement in regard to it, or upon the question of arbitration concerning the territory.

  IRISH LAND COMMISSION—SUB-COMMISSIONS IN WEXFORD.
  MR. T. M. HEALYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, What is the cause of the delay in appointing a day for the sitting of the Sub-Commission in the County Wexford to fix the fair rents; can he name a day for the next sitting; and, will the cases of all the tenants in County Wexford, whose originating notices were served before the 1st of November last, be fixed for the next sitting?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied) said, the Land Commissioners informed him that there had been no unusual delay respecting the sitting of the Sub-Commission for the County of Wexford. The Sub-Commission would commence their sittings in Waterford at Carrick-
  866
  on-Suir on the 4th of next month, and the date upon which they would open in New Ross would be fixed by their Chairman as soon after that date as possible. The Commissioners stated that it was not the practice, having regard to the length of the sittings in other districts, to fix the date of the next sitting in any other way. He was not aware that there was any unusual delay.
  MR. T. M. HEALY: Can the right hon. and gallant Gentleman say why there should be any delay? What is the unusual delay?
  COLONEL KING-HARMANsaid, that any delay that was unusual was rendered so by the unusual number of applications, which made it impossible to prevent the business falling into arrear.

  IRISH LAND COMMISSION—FAIR RENTS—DELAYS.
  MR. T. M. HEALYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, What is the explanation of the delays in hearing fair rent cases in Ireland; is he aware that the landlords are taking advantage of this delay to serve eviction notices under Section 7 of last year's Act, for arrears accruing due since the originating notices were served, plus the previous half-year's rent, which destroys the tenant's right to go into the Land Court; can any steps be taken so that at least one Sub-Commission shall be appointed to operate in every county; will the Government compensate in any way tenants whose rights have been lost by these delays; have they seen the observations of Lord Chief Baron Palles, in a case of "Kilkelly v. Brennan," as to the complications that would arise unless the Executive took steps to expedite the hearing of land cases; and, how many fair rent notices have yet to be heard, and what is the average rate per month at which they are being disposed of? He would also ask what remedy the Government were going to apply?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied) said: The Land Commissioners inform me that there is no unnecessary delay in hearing fair rent cases, all the Sub-Commissioners being steadily at work in their various districts. They are not aware whether landlords are taking ad-

  867
  vantage, where fair rent applications are not disposed of, to serve eviction notices under Section 7 of last year's Act. But they apprehend that the service of such notice would not destroy the tenant's right to have a fair pent fixed if he should redeem. It is their practice not to dismiss an originating notice in cases where an eviction notice has been served, but to adjourn it pending the time for redemption. The Government are at present considering the question of increasing the number of Sub-Commissioners. They are not aware of any cases in which tenants have lost their rights through the non-hearing of their applications. They have not seen the observations attributed to the Lord Chief Baron. There are in all 58,839 fair rent applications now pending in the Court of the Land Commission, this number being mainly due to the Act of last Session admitting leaseholders and attracting a large accession of yearly tenants by reason of the provision which made the judicial rent run from the gale day after the application instead of after the order fixing the rent. The number of cases pending on August 1, 1887, was only 11,075. The average rate per month at which these cases are being disposed of is about 2,000.
  MR. T. M. HEALY: If that is the case, does it not follow that it will be a year and a-half before many of them are reached? I would like, under these circumstances, if the Land Commission have furnished the right hon. and gallant Gentleman with the information, an answer as to the relative number of Sub-Commissioners at present, and the number of cases as compared with what was done in 1884. Are there as many Sub-Commissioners now in operation as compared with 1881, when the Land Act was passed?
  COLONEL KING-HARMANrepeated that the Government were considering the question of appointing fresh Sub-Commissioners, and they were consulting with the Treasury on the subject. The matter would be disposed of as soon as possible.
  MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: How many new Sub-Commissioners have there been appointed since the Act of last year?
  COLONEL KING-HARMANsaid, he could not answer that Question.
  MR. SHAW LEFEVREsaid, he would ask a Question on the subject.
  MR. T. M. HEALYsaid, that as the Land Commissioners had denied that that they had absolutely dismissed any of these cases under Section 7, he begged to give Notice that on an early day, or on the consideration of the Vote—if it was taken at an early day—he would call attention to several cases, notably on the Mitchelstown Estate, and in the County of Louth, in which the Land Commission must be well aware that the fact of postponing the hearing of the fair rent applications has resulted in the tenants being evicted.
  MR. T. W. RUSSELL: May I ask the right hon. and gallant Gentleman how many such Commissions are working now?
  COLONEL KING-HARMAN: There are 12 such Commissions; I think I am right in saying 12.

  NATIONAL DEBT (CONVERSION) BILL—CONVERSION BY TRUSTEES.
  SIR JULIAN GOLDSMIDasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If he will inform the House what the special arrangements are which he proposes to make to meet the case of Trustees who may have to decide on the question of conversion of Trust Funds?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. GOSCHEN): The Bill enables the Treasury to make Rules prescribing the evidence to be required of a person being a Trustee, and authorizes the Bank to accept and act on the evidence so prescribed, and expressly declares that the Bank is not to be affected with notice of any Trust. This will, I hope, remove the difficulties foreseen by the hon. Baronet. The Bill will be in the hands of hon. Members to-morrow.

  COLONIZATION—THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S CIRCULAR.
  MR. KIMBERasked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether he will be good enough to telegraph or write to such of the Colonies as have not yet responded to the Secretary of State's Circular Despatch of September last on the subject of Colonization, and urge them to reply?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Baron HENRY DE WORMS): Replies have been received from all the Colonies addressed except Newfoundland, New South Wales, Victoria, and Tasmania; and these have been reminded by a despatch dated the 23rd ultimo.

  POST OFFICE (IRELAND)—EXPENSES OF SUB-POSTMASTERS.
  MR. D. SULLIVANasked the Postmaster General, Whether it is the case that Sub-Postmasters in Ireland have to provide the fittings of their offices out of their small salaries; and. whether it is the fact that they have also to provide the stationery, &c. required for their offices; and, if so, will any steps be taken to remedy this unfair treatment of the Sub-Postmasters?
  THE POSTMASTER GENERAL (Mr. RAIKES): Every Sub-Postmaster is required to provide an office, with such fittings as are necessary—usually costing very little—as a condition of his appointment, and Sub-Postmasters in Ireland hold their situations precisely upon the same terms in this respect, and are paid upon the same scale, as Sub-Postmasters in England and Scotland. I will make inquiry into the subject raised by the hon. Member's second Question, and shall be glad if I can relieve Sub-Postmasters from such payments in case they appear to amount to an appreciable sum.

  CHINA—THE CHEFOO CONVENTION—DETENTION OF A BRITISH STEAMER.
  SIR RICHARD TEMPLEasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether a British steamer has been detained by the Local Chinese Authorities at Tchang, near the rapids of the Yangtsze, contrary to the provisions of the Chefoo Convention, notwithstanding that the season for the vessel ascending the river is becoming urgent?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Sir JAMES FERGUSSON): The information that has readied the Foreign Office is not in accordance with the terms of my hon. Friend's Question. Her Majesty's Minister in China has lately been exerting himself strenuously to induce the
  870
  Chinese Government to sanction the projected voyage of a steamer to Chung King, to which the Government and the British Consul in that district state that there is strong opposition from the Local Authorities and population. Sir John Walsham will continue his endeavours to overcome the hesitation of the Chinese Government.

  MARGARINE ACT, 1887—FINES IN DUBLIN.
  MR. MURPHYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, If it is true, as reported in a Dublin newspaper, that the Lord Lieutenant, on Memorials, reduced two fines of £10 each, imposed by a Dublin police magistrate, for offences against the Margarine Act of last Session to £2 each?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied) said: It is the case that the Lord Lieutenant, on Memorials, reduced the fines in question as stated. The Act under which the fines were imposed had only come into force on the 1st of January; and having regard to the circumstances in these cases brought under the notice of his Excellency he considered that a substantial reduction of the penalties should be made, and in this the magistrate who tried the cases concurred.
  MR. MURPHYasked, would the right hon. and gallant Gentleman inform the House why, if those people had a right to appeal, they were not allowed to use that right; and why such a remedy as that described had been resorted to in lieu of the right of appeal?
  COLONEL KING-HARMANsaid, that the Act only came into operation this year.
  MR. T. M. HEALY: Might I ask why the same course was not taken when the new Law of Coercion came into operation?
  [No reply.]

  ARMY MEDICAL SERVICE—RELATIVE RANK.
  DR. FARQUHARSONasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he has received from, the British Medical Association a statement containing an analysis of the opinions of nearly 1,200 Army medical

  871
  officers, with reference to the recent abolition of relative rank; whether a wide-spread feeling of dissatisfaction has thus been shown to exist throughout the Department; and, whether, under these circumstances, he will bring on Vote IV. of the Army Estimates at a time which will admit of full discussion?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. E. STANHOPE): I have received a communication purporting to give the anonymous opinions of several hundred medical officers. These opinions must have been obtained and expressed in a manner altogether in contravention of military discipline. Medical officers, like other officers, have a proper channel through which they can be heard; and I am not prepared to accept any Civilian Association as their mouthpiece. On the general question of rank I can only repeat what I said several times last year—namely, that the status of medical officers is just as it was before; and that, as regards titular rank, they already hold professional titles for which the exchange to combatant titles, without combatant functions, would be a loss of personal influence.
  DR. FARQUHARSONsaid, he would draw attention to this subject on the Medical Vote.

  THE CONSTABULARY FORCES—SUPERANNUATION.
  MR. HOWARD VINCENTasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, When he will be able to fulfil the promises of his Predecessors in the submission of legislation on the superannuation of the Constabulary Forces?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. MATTHEWS): It is impossible to fix a time beforehand; but my hope is to introduce a Bill in the course of the present Session.

  NAVY—MERCHANT STEAMERS AS ARMED CRUISERS.
  MR. HENNIKER HEATONasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, What is the total amount of money to be paid this year for the mail steamers to America and Australia for the call on their services as armed cruisers; the number of vessels so under call; what steps, if any, are being taken
  872
  to train the officers and men of these steamers in naval warfare; and, have the Government taken into consideration, and with what result, the condition of the Mercantile Marine, with a view to its more complete utilization as a Reserve for the Royal Navy?
  THE FIRST LORD (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON): the anticipated payment in subventions for 1888–9 is £22,380. This payment is on six ships; but by an arrangement with the owners nine others are at the disposition of the Admiralty for purchase or hire when required. Unless they happen to belong to the Royal Naval Reserve no steps are taken for the training of the officers and men of these ships in naval warfare; but it has been arranged that at least half of the crews should belong to the Royal Naval Reserve in the steamers to America, and another arrangement has been made for the remaining steamers. The pick of the Mercantile Fleet is already on the Admiralty list, and can be requisitioned when required; and by means of the Royal Naval Reserve the services of such portion of its personnel as may be willing to serve in the Navy in the event of war are already at the disposal of the Admiralty. No further development of this principle is at present contemplated.

  CHURCH REVENUES—THE RETURN.
  MR. PICTONasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If he would be good enough to inform the House what progress has been made with the Return of Church Revenues granted last Session on the Motion of the Right honourable J. G. Hubbard (now Lord Addington), and when it may be expected to be completed?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. STUART-WORTLEY)(who replied) said: In my answer given on the 5th of March in this House to the hon. Member for East Northamptonshire (Mr. Channing) I explained the great magnitude of the work of preparing this Report, and declined to forecast the date of its completion. I have nothing to add to that reply.
  MR. PICTONasked, whether any steps had been taken to expedite the completion of this Return?
  MR. STUART-WORTLEY: Elaborate inquiries have been addressed to no less than 14,000 incumbents of benefices, and some 12,000 replies have been received. Many of the replies are imperfect.

  IRISH NEWSPAPERS—GOVERNMENT ADVERTISEMENTS.
  MR. T. P. GILLasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, with reference to the following Memorandum respecting Government advertisements in Ireland:—
  "The advocacy of particular opinions is not in itself a sufficient reason for giving or withholding Government advertisements; but the benefit of the doubt should always be given in favour of papers supporting law and order; the fact that a particular paper is Boycotted is strong ground for giving it Government advertisements, and a conclusive ground for not withdrawing them if already given; no Government advertisements must, under any circumstances, be given to any newspaper that violates the law,"
  Whether by newspapers not supporting law and order the Nationalist Press is meant; whether his attention has been called to the following statement of the Secretary to the Treasury, made in Committee of Supply last Session:—
  "He proposed to go through the list [of newspapers to which the Civil Service Commissioners gave advertisements], and if necessary insert National papers, and he must say at once that they ought to be given a share of the advertisements, so that those who read the newspapers in Ireland to a large extent should have an opportunity of seeing these advertisements;"
  and, whether, if the foregoing Memorandum has been issued, and the National newspapers be those to which the Chief Secretary refers, he will, in view of this statement of the Secretary to the Treasury, cause it to be withdrawn forthwith?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied) said: I do not fool called upon to answer any Question with regard to alleged Circulars which must either be forgeries or have been obtained through breach of confidence of some person to whom they were entrusted. In any case I fail to see any inconsistency between the alleged Circular and the statement made by the Financial Secretary.

  WAR OFFICE—WAR DEPARTMENT WORKS (IRELAND).
  MR. MURPHYasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether all the cement used for War Department Works in Ireland is imported from England; whether he is aware that cement is manufactured in the neighbourhood of Dublin and in Wexford, which is largely used, amongst others, by the Dublin Port and Docks Board and the Irish Board of Works; and, will directions be given to the Royal Engineer Department in Ireland to have tests of these cements made in the presence of the manufacturer's agents; and, if the tests are satisfactory and the price suitable, to favourably consider the use of the Irish material?
  THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY, WAR DEPARTMENT (Mr. BRODRICK)(who replied) said: It is not known where the cement comes from which is used in War Department works, as a contractor may get his cement in Ireland or elsewhere, provided it pass the specified tests.

  FRANCHISE ACT (IRELAND), 1884—REMUNERATION TO CLERKS OF UNIONS.
  MR. P. J. O'BRIENasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether he is aware that the Boards of Guardians of several Unions in Ireland have declined to provide any remuneration out of the rates for the compulsory services rendered by Clerks of Unions and Poor Rate Collectors under the Franchise Act of 1884, on the grounds that such remuneration should be provided from Imperial funds; and, if so, whether, under these circumstances, he will consider the justice and propriety of making provision in the Estimates for the payment to these public servants in respect of the duties in question, which they are called on, under penalty, to discharge?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied) said: The question of the remuneration of Poor Law officials in Ireland for their services under the Franchise Act has been for some time engaging the attention of the Government, and the Government intend at an early date to take steps in the matter. They cannot hope,

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  however, to undertake to ask Parliament to sanction remuneration to these officials as an extra charge on the Imperial funds.

  STATES AND COLONIES OF SOUTH AFRICA—THE RECENT CONFERENCE.
  SIR GEORGE BADEN-POWELLasked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether Her Majesty's Government intend to present to Parliament any account of the proceedings of the Conference recently held in Cape Town to determine on common action in reference to Customs Duties, Railway Extension, and other matters of common concern to the States and Colonies of South Africa; and, whether it is proposed that Basuto-land, Bechuanaland, and other portions of South Africa, still under Imperial control or administration, should take part in any common action that may result from the said Conference?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Baron HENRY DE WORMS): The Report of the proceedings at the Conference at Cape Town has not yet been received; but Her Majesty's Government are not aware of any reason why it should not be communicated to Parliament in due course. No proposals have come before Her Majesty's Government for the inclusion of Basutoland or Buchuanaland in any arrangements for common action that may be adopted; and it is not possible, without further information, to express an opinion upon the point raised in the hon. Member's Question.

  IRISH LAND COMMISSION—LEASEHOLDERS IN CASTLEDERG, COUNTY TYRONE.
  LORD ERNEST HAMILTONasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether he is aware that in the neighbourhood of Castlederg, County Tyrone, a great number of leaseholders are waiting to have their rents adjusted; and, whether he can give any information as to when a Land Court is likely to sit in that neighbourhood?
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY (Colonel KING-HARMAN)(who replied) said: The Land Commissioners inform me there are 202 tenants in the Castle-
  876
  derg Union waiting to have their applications heard, of which probably one-third, are leaseholders. A Sub-Commission will commence its sitting for County Tyrone on May 1. In answering the Question of the hon. Member for South Tyrone (Mr. T. W. Russell), as to the number of Sub-Commissions, I might have added that each Sub-Commission now comprises five members instead of three, as formerly.
  MR. T. M. HEALY: I would like to ask the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, whether it is not a fact that there is in the Estimates for this year a reduction in the amount for the Land Commission of £54,000 compared with last year, and that the number of Sub-Commissioners estimated for is 20 less than last year; while, at the same time, there is an extraordinary increase in the number of applications by tenants to have their rents fixed?
  MR. T. W. RUSSELL: Might I ask the right hon. and gallant Gentleman whether no Sub-Commission will commence to sit in Tyrone till the 1st of May?
  COLONEL KING-HARMAN: That is the date furnished to me by the Land Commissioners.
  MR. T. W. RUSSELL: Might I ask the Chief Secretary, whether he will give his personal attention to the position the tenants are placed in by the delay in hearing their applications?
  MR. T. M. HEALY: I beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury—for this is a most important question—whether in the Estimates for the coming year there is a reduction of £54,000, as compared with last year, in the amount for the Irish Land Commission; and whether there is provision made for the salaries of 20 Sub-Commissioners less than last year; and, whether that has been done by the Treasury in view of the fact that 113,000 leaseholders have entered applications to have their rents fixed?
  THE SECRETARY TO THE TREASURY (Mr. JACKSON): The answer to that Question is a very simple one. The Land Commission terminates, as hon. Members are aware, by law in August next, and we made provision only up to the date when the Commission would terminate. If the Commission is extended further than that time, of course provision will have to be made for the amount required.
  MR. T. M. HEALY: How does that account for the reduced number of Sub-Commissioners estimated for between this and August next?
  MR. JACKSON: I do not quite catch the Question.
  MR. T. M. HEALY: I wish to ask, whether the fact that the Land Commission, is by law terminated in August next necessitates a reduction in the number of Sub-Commissioners between this and August next?
  MR. JACKSON: I am not aware that there is any reduction in the number of Sub-Commissioners.
  MR. T. M. HEALY: There are 20 less than last year.
  MR. JACKSON: Twenty less than the estimated number, though there has been no reduction in the number of Sub-Commissioners are far as I am aware.
  MR. CHILDERS: Might I ask, whether or not it is the intention of the Irish Government to continue the Land Commission beyond the date at which it now by law concludes; also, whether that decision was not arrived at before the Estimates were framed; and. if so, whether the Estimates ought not to have been framed upon that decision?
  THE CHIEF SECRETARY FOR IRELAND (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR): I am not intimately acquainted with the practice of the Treasury in this matter; but I believe that it is not usual to put on the Estimates sums which require Parliamentary sanction before they could be voted. The Land Commission naturally expires on the 1st of August. Of course, before that date the Government will come down to Parliament and ask their views as to how the Land Commission should be dealt with in the future. But until Parliament has given its sanction to the proposals of the Government, or some other proposals, it would be improper to put on the Estimates the additional sums required.
  MR. CHILDERS: But when the Poor Law Commission had to be extended from year to year it was always the custom to ask in the Estimates for the full amount that was intended to be expended. There is a sound objection, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, to Supplementary Estimates, and I should
  878
  like to have the view of the First Lord of the Treasury upon that point.
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H. SMITH): It will be within the recollection of the right hon. Gentleman, I think, that the Charity Commission was continued from year to year. The Charity Commission was only provided for under Statute up to the period for which it was authorized by Statute; and for many years it was necessary for successive Governments to present Supplementary Estimates for the Charity Commission.
  MR. T. M. HEALYasked whether the right hon. Gentleman had not, in 1881, proposed a Motion to abolish the Land Commission, and to issue an irresponsible Commission to take its place; and, whether it was intended by the Government now to carry that into effect?
  MR. W. H. SMITH: I am sure the hon. and learned Gentleman will see that that is a Question which ought not to be asked. I could not answer it seriously without due Notice.

  CIVIL SERVICE WRITERS—COMPETITION FOR LOWER DIVISION CLERKSHIPS.
  MR. HOOPERasked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether he can state the number of Civil Service writers who, by reason of age, are able to take the benefit of the alleged concession with respect to age in competing for Lower Division clerkships; and, the number who have actually done so?
  THE SECRETARY (Mr. JACKSON): I am informed that there are 350 copyists on the Register who, being above 20 years of age, are yet eligible to compete for Lower Division clerkships under the special Rule to which, the hon. Member refers; and that at the last competition 31 did so compete.

  HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (CHANCERY DIVISION).
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked Mr. Attorney General, Whether there is any reason of a public nature why Motions in the Chancery Division should not be set down in a list as in the other Courts, and in the

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  Chancery Division itself, during the Long Vacation?
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir RICHARD WEBSTER): In reply to the hon. Member, I have to say that the matter referred to in his Question has often been considered by both the Judges and the Bar of the Chancery Division. There is power in the Court at the present time to make a list of Motions should it be considered necessary in the interests of the despatch of business to do so; but the present system, which enables urgent Motions to be taken at any time, and Motions to be continued from day to day if required, is, in the opinion of the Judges and the Bar, moist conducive to the despatch of business.

  HARES PRESERVATION BILL.
  COLONEL DAWNAYasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether, considering the anxiety on the part of the agricultural population to prevent the total extermination of hares, the Government is prepared to give facilities to pass the Hares Preservation Bill at the earliest possible date?
  MR. MUNRO-FERGUSONasked the right hon. Gentleman, whether it was not a fact that the ex-termination of hares was not now entirely in the hands of the agricultural population; and, whether the manner in which this Bill had been blocked was significant of the opinion of the House in the direction of restricting that control?
  MR. ANDERSONasked, whether the Government were in possession of any information to lead to the belief that, under the existing laws, the total extinction of hares was contemplated?
  THE FIRST LORD (Mr. W. H. SMITH)said, he did not intend to give a debating answer to the two hon. Gentlemen opposite. He could only answer the Question which his hon. and gallant Friend had put to him. He regretted that it had not been possible for his hon. and gallant Friend to obtain a second reading of his Bill. It was a subject that might very well be considered by that House. There were questions equally important that were raised by other hon. Gentlemen; and he was afraid it would not be in his
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  power to give special facilities for one Bill, however important it might be in the judgment of those who supported it.

  SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE—FRIDAY, MARCH 16.
  MR. OSBORNE MORGANasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether, in view of the fact that the Government have already appropriated nearly the whole time of the Session, and also in view of the fact that the first Notice of Motion which stands on the Order Book for Friday, March 16, involves a direct censure upon a Member of the Government, as well as a grave Constitutional question, the Government will re-consider their determination to take a Morning Sitting on that day?
  THE FIRST LORD (Mr. W. H. SMITH): I was not aware of the fact mentioned by the right hon. and learned Member that the Government have appropriated nearly the whole time of the Session. I am sure the right hon. and learned Gentleman will see that it is the duty of the Government to arrange the Business of the House, so far as it is in their power to do so, having regard to the relative importance of the Business which is before the House; and I think he will not be surprised to hear that the Government are of opinion that the important question relating to the reduction of interest on the National Debt is greater than that of the question to which the right hon. and learned Gentleman refers. It is a matter of the highest importance to the country at large that the question involved in the second reading of the Bill for the reduction of the interest on the National Debt should be disposed of without delay. Therefore, it is impossible for me to comply with the suggestion of the right hon. and learned Gentleman; but I hope ample time will be found to dispose of his Motion.
  MR. OSBORNE MORGANsaid, he did not desire to contest the view of the right hon. Gentleman; but he asked for an undertaking that the Government would do as they did for the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) onFriday last—namely, to make a House at the Evening Sitting.
  MR. W. H. SMITHsaid, the Government was bound to make a House at the Evening Sitting on Friday next.
  MR. DILLONasked, whether the Government would promise that at Morning Sittings at this early period of the Session Bills should not be sneaked through?
  MR. W. H. SMITHsaid, the Government was bound to make the best use of the time at their disposal. So long as sufficient Notice was given of the Business which the Government proposed to take, he thought the hon. Gentleman would see that he had no reason to complain if they availed themselves of every opportunity of forwarding Public Business.
  MR. DILLONinquired, whether the Government proposed to use the Morning Sitting on Friday for the purpose of passing the Parliamentary Under Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland Bill?
  MR. W. H. SMITHsaid, it was impossible to say at present.
  MR. DILLONsaid, they ought to have Notice not later than to-morrow morning.

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT (ENGLAND AND WALES) BILL.
  THE PRESIDENT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (Mr. RITCHIE): I think it is right that I should inform the House that I propose, on Monday next, to ask the leave of the House to introduce the Local Government Bill. It will be the first Order.
  VISCOUNT EBRINGTON: Can the right hon. Gentleman inform the House when it is likely the Bill will be printed and circulated?
  MR. RITCHIE: It is a very heavy Bill; and I think it probable that it will not be circulated for a week or 10 days after I have asked leave to introduce it.
  MR. W. E. GLADSTONE: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman, after the answer he has given, whether he will undertake, as I am quite sure he will, to expedite the planting of the Bill to the best of his ability? because I think I may say it is a very unusual thing for a Government Bill not to be laid on the Table until 10 days after the preliminary statement in moving for leave. The right hon. Gentleman will observe that the country will not be in a position to make itself master of the provisions of so complicated a measure, however able the statement
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  with regard to it may have been, until it is laid upon the Table of the House.
  MR. RITCHIE: The right hon. Gentleman will understand that Her Majesty's Government have quite realized the great desirability of letting the House have the Bill as speedily as possible after leave to introduce has been given, and I will do all in my power to see that the utmost speed is used in printing it, and I hope that it may be printed within a week at any rate.
  MR. T. P. O'CONNORasked, whether there was a single instance in which the circulation of a Bill of such importance, which had been so many months in preparation, had been so long delayed?
  MR. RITCHIE: I cannot answer the Question off-hand; but I am told that it is not unusual for the circulation of a Bill of this magnitude to be delayed for an equal length of time.
  MR. COBB: May we rely upon having the Bill circulated before the Easter Recess?
  MR. RITCHIE: Yes; certainly.

  WAYS AND MEANS—THE FINANCIAL STATEMENT.
  SIR JULIAN GOLDSMID: The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, the other day, that he would make his Budget Statement next Monday. Now we are told that the Local Government Bill is to be introduced on that day. When, then, will the Budget be taken?
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H. SMITH): On this day fortnight.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.
  NATIONAL DEBT (CONVERSION) BILL.

    FIRST READING.
    Resolutions [March 9] reported.
    SIR CHARLES LEWISasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer what is the estimated amount of the bonuses to be given to the holders of Consols and Reduced Threes; what is the estimated amount involved in the fee of 1s. 6d. in respect of agency; whether he is in a position, before the second reading, to state the number of each class of holders in each class of Stock of £1,000, £2,000, and £3,000 respectively; and, whether, having re-

    883
    gard to the fact that this is the largest conversion that has ever taken place of Government Stock, and the enormous number of persons who are interested in it, the Government think that Friday is not rather too soon for the second reading?
    THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. GOSCHEN): In regard to the estimated amount of bonus and agents' commission, it is, of course, utterly impossible to say to what extent the holders of Consols and Seduced Threes are likely to come in. There is one standard which, if he likes, the hon. Member can apply in order to get at the maximum, by assuming that the whole of the holders of Consols and Reduced Threes will be likely to come in. Of course, on the large amount of Stock; held by Government Departments, no agents' commission will be paid. With regard to the number of holders, if the hon. Member will repeat the Question, I will try to get the information. It will, I believe, be absolutely indispensable, and according to precedent, that the dissents should be required within a reasonable time. Indeed, the whole operation might be jeopardized by too extended an interval being given. I did not allude to it in my speech on Friday last, because I preferred to rely entirely on our own precedents; but in the case of a very large conversion recently undertaken in France, only 10 days was given to the dissentients to express their dissent. I shall hope to be supported by the House in pushing the Bill through as rapidly as possible, and, of course, every possible opportunity will be given to ventilate the conditions in the country.
    Resolutions agreed to.
    Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Courtney, Mr. William Henry Smith,
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    Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Jackson.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 164.]
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be read a second time upon Friday, at Two of the clock."
    MR. T. M. HEALYsaid, that this practically meant the settling of a Morning Sitting on which the Government might take any other Business besides the National Debt Bill. With a view to the scheme being considered on its merits last Friday, there was an absolute cessation of hostilities relating to the Parliamentary Under Secretary for Ireland, and the Government took advantage of that state of affairs to press on other Business. He, therefore, wanted to know whether it was intended next Friday to break up the truce by putting down controversial matters after the National Debt Bill?
    MR. SPEAKERsaid, the only question was, whether the second reading of the Bill should be set down for 2 o'clock on Friday, and it was not competent to enter into any other question.
    MR. T. M. HEALYsubmitted that the fixing of the National Debt Bill would afford the Government the opportunity of putting other Business down.
    MR. SPEAKERsaid, it did not follow that other Business would be set down.
    THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H. SMITH)said, he would endeavour so to arrange the Business for the early Sitting on Friday as not to provoke opposition.
    SIR ROBERT FOWLERsaid, he thought the hon. and learned Member might make himself quite easy, for the Government were not likely to have an opportunity of proceeding with other Business.
    Question put, and agreed to.

STATEMENT OF THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY,
EXPLANATORY OF THE
NAYY ESTIMATES, 1888–9.
(Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.)

STATEMENT OF THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY,

  NEW FORM OF ESTIMATES.
  WITH the view of showing the exact cost of the Army and Navy respectively, a transfer of those Votes which in past years provided for Army requirements, and were borne on Navy Estimates, has been made to the Army Estimates, and a similar transfer has been made from Military to Naval Votes. The same principle has been worked out in detail in the Navy Votes themselves, which have been so recast as to show the full cost, both direct and indirect, of every separate establishment or branch of the Navy.
  A Memorandum by the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, in fuller explanation of the main principle adopted, is attached to the Estimates.

  NAVAL FINANCE.

    EXPENDITURE OF 1887–88, AS COMPARED WITH 1888–89.
    The estimated expenditure for the year ending 31st March 1888 is £12,476,800, and for the year ending 31st March 1889 £13,082,800, showing an apparent increase of £606,000. Taking, however, into account the reciprocal transfer to Army Estimates of the Military Transport Vote and to Navy Estimates of the Vote for Naval Ordnance (a full explanation of which is given in the Estimates), the difference between the Estimates of the two years under comparison is a net Decrease to Naval Votes for the year 1888–89 of £905,581, sic.:—
    886

    887

    Transferred from Army Votes for Naval Armaments

    £1,717,561

    Less:—

    Transferred to Army Votes for Army Transport Service

    205,980

    £1,511,581

    Abate:—

    Apparent Increase above stated

    606,000

    Net Decrease in Navy Estimates, 1888–89

    £905,581

    In describing last year the then position of Naval Finance, I pointed out that, owing to the exceptionally large outlay of the last three years, it would be possible for some years to come to associate a reduction of expenditure with an increase of naval efficiency and strength. By April 1888 the great bulk of the outlay necessary to bring the matériel and personnel of our Fleet up to the higher standard of efficiency will have been incurred, but the benefits of that increased expenditure are now only beginning to fully operate.
    The financial policy of the present Board has been to wipe off, as rapidly as they could, the large liabilities for shipbuilding which had been incurred in 1885, and, until these had been reduced to a manageable shape, to postpone the commencement of an enlarged shipbuilding programme of their own. By adhering to this course they have now reduced to small dimensions their past liabilities, and completed with celerity the great bulk of the ships previously laid down, and known as Lord Northbrook's Special Programme.
    Another cause has, however, largely contributed to the reduction of the expenditure for the forthcoming year. The reforms in Dockyard administration, begun in the year 1885, are now producing most satisfactory results. Supplementary Estimates for building have practically vanished; the cost of repairs has much diminished, and much of the work done in the past year has been well within the Estimate sanctioned. The savings in labour and material during 1887–88 have been great; and, as prices showed a tendency to rise, and as much of the material of the ships building, upon which these economies had been effected, was still unbought, we were able to utilize a certain portion of the savings in the advantageous purchase of stores. Curtailment of past liabilities, closer supervision of proposed expenditure, and purchases of stores in advance, have all contributed towards a diminution of the estimated outlay of 1888–89. A synopsis of the work proposed to be done, of the shipbuilding programme to be commenced, and of the establishments of men to be maintained, will show that the strength and efficiency of the Navy will be in all respects developed, and not contracted, during the next twelve months.

    SPECIAL AUSTRALASIAN SQUADRON.
    At the Colonial Conference, held in London during 1887, a special agreement was entered into between the Home Government and the representatives of the Australasian Colonies, under which a joint financial responsibility was established between the contracting parties for the creation and maintenance of a sea-going squadron of ships of war to protect the commerce of the Empire in Australasian waters. The peculiarity of the arrangement consisted, not merely in the establishment of a financial partnership between England and Australasia for this specific purpose, but in the apportionment of the liability so incurred. The Mother Country engaged to bear the whole cost of building, arming, and equipping the squadron; on the other hand, the Colonies undertook, when the vessels were commissioned, to meet the whole cost of their maintenance and manning up to a maximum of £91,000 annually during time of peace, and to pay in addition a sum of £35,000 annually for ten years, as a contribution towards the original cost of construction. The type, size, and special qualities of the vessels to be built will be hereafter described, but they will cost, when complete, between £800,000 and £900,000. Special provision
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    will be made to meet this liability under Act of Parliament, the clauses of which will explain the financial arrangement proposed. It is estimated that £450,000 to £500,000 will be required to meet the cost of building these vessels during the financial year 1888–89, and a somewhat lesser sum during the following year 1889–90, to complete and render them ready for commission. The ships will be thus built and completed in two years. At the end of that time, the ships being in commission, an annual sum of £91,000 towards maintenance will be paid by the Colonies as an appropriation in aid of Navy Votes, and Naval Funds will for ten years subsequently receive this assistance; and in like manner the Imperial Exchequer will be credited for ten years with an annual payment of £35,000. By promptly performing our portion of the bargain, and paying for it in two years, the Navy will be augmented at the end of that period by seven efficient modern sea-going ships, and naval funds will then have a contribution for ten years to come in reduction of the sums annually voted by the Imperial Parliament. On the termination of the ten years the vessels will become the exclusive property of the British Government.

  SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMME.

    INCREASE TO FLEET, 1887–88.
    It was anticipated in February 1887 that during the financial year 1887–88, 25 ships, having an aggregate displacement tonnage of upwards of 90,000 tons, would be completed and passed into the First Reserve as ready for service in 48 hours. Of these ships 10 were armoured, 2 protected, and 13 unprotected.
    This Programme has been very nearly realized, and would have been actually carried out but for delays in the delivery of contract-built ships, the non-completion of guns by the promised dates, and the difficulties that have arisen in completing some of the contractors' steam trials.
    In the 10 armoured ships are included 5 belted cruisers, 3 of which, for the reasons given above, will have to be completed in the earlier months of the financial year 1888–89. Two vessels of the class, the first delivered, are practically complete; and one of these, the "Orlando," is to be the new flag-ship on the Australian Station.
    The "Rodney," "Benbow," and "Hero" are complete, except for gun-trials and certain modifications of torpedo not defence.
    The "Warspite" will be completed in all respects, her gun-trials having taken place.
    The "Howe" is practically complete, so far as Dockyard work is concerned, but waiting for her barbette guns, the delivery of which has been delayed, but which are now promised at an early date.
    Six armoured ships have, therefore, been completed; one completed except receiving her guns on board; and three have had their completion postponed for a few months.
    All the protected and unprotected vessels will be completed, as proposed, in 1887–88: the steam trials of two or three may have to be finished in April. These 15 vessels* include 2 protected 18-knot cruisers ("Mersey" class), 7 torpedo cruisers ("Archer" class and "Fearless") of 17 knots, 3 torpedo gunboats ("Rattlesnake" class) of 19 knots, 1 composite sloop, and 2 gunboats.
    All these vessels will be practically complete except two of the torpedo cruisers, whose steam trials have been delayed owing to the failure of the contractors for the engines to obtain in the earlier trials the necessary power.
    * The completion of the "Archer" had to he deferred to 1887–88,on account of steam trials, so that 16 vessels will be practically added in that financial year.

    ADVANCEMENT OF SHIPS INCOMPLETE IN 1887–88.
    In addition to the foregoing list of ships completed during 1887–88, reference must be made to the large amount of work done in advancing other new ships, as yet incomplete.
    Of the armoured ships the "Camperdown," "Anson," and "Immortalité," are rapidly approaching completion, and the further expenditure upon them will be comparatively small. The protected cruiser "Forth," the last of the "Mersey" class, has been pressed forward, and the "Aurora," the last of the belted cruisers, has had large sums spent upon her.
    The progress of the "Trafalgar" and "Nile" has been exceptionally rapid, the armour plating of the hull of the former being now complete. It is believed that the "Trafalgar" will be completed in the year 1889–90.

    ADVANCEMENT OF SHIPS LAID DOWN IN 1887–88.
    Good progress has also been made on the new vessels laid down in 1887–88 in the Dockyards. The two 20-knot protected cruisers building at Chatham have been pushed forward nearly to the stage of launching; the similar, but sheathed, cruiser at Portsmouth has been advanced considerably beyond what was contemplated in the Estimates for 1887–88. The two composite sloops ("Nymphe" and "Daphne") are almost ready for launching, and the 6 gunboats of the "Pheasant" class have been advanced as was intended.
    It was found to be advantageous for the economical employment and distribution of workmen that four ships, not contained in the Estimates of 1887–88, and additional to the authorized programme, should be laid down and commenced during that financial year. These vessels were required for special service and reliefs, and consisted of three gunboats (of the "Rattler" class modified) and a paddle steamer for surveying service. The three gunboats are building at Pembroke.

    CONTRACT WORK IN 1887–88.
    The work on ships building by contract in 1887–88 has very nearly kept pace with the programme; of the five belted cruisers, the "Orlando" and "Undaunted" were delivered within the contract time: the remaining vessels were not delivered until the contract dates had been exceeded.
    The "Victoria," formerly "Renown," but re-named in honour of Her Majesty's Jubilee, was launched early in April last year, and it is probable she will be delivered in April next, or three years from the date of the contract, and six months within the guaranteed period.
    The sister vessel "Sanspareil" was launched in May, 1887, and it is anticipated that her delivery will also take place some months within the period allowed by the contract.
    The completion of these two powerful iron-clads will bring to an end the Special Programme of 1885, originated by Lord Northbrook, so that it may be anticipated that the expenditure involved in carrying out that Programme will be almost concluded, during the year 1888–89. The actual date of completion of these two ships for service depends upon the dates of delivery of the 110-ton turret guns, and this may lead to some expenditure upon them in 1889–90.
    During 1887–88 the only new vessels ordered by contract were the sheathed protected cruisers "Magicienne" and "Marathon," which are being built by the Fairfield Company, Glasgow; the engines being supplied by Messrs. Hawthorn, Leslie, & Co. These vessels are being advanced very rapidly, and the contract provides for their delivery at the end of this year (1888).
    The work done by private firms in connection with the machinery of H.M. Ships during 1887–88 has been of remarkable magnitude and importance. Continual advances in the speed of war ships involve the construction of machinery of ever increasing power, and the introduction of successive improvements. In
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    893
    this continuous effort the professional officers of the Admiralty have had the advantage of the co-operation and assistance of the most eminent private firms of marine engineers who contract for the machinery. Some of the trials made during the year 1887–88 have been of exceptional interest; as for example those of the "Anson," the "Orlando," "Galatea," and "Rattlesnake." The decision to adopt triple expansion engines has been amply justified by the results so far attained. In not a few cases the engine power and speeds estimated in the stage of design have been considerably exceeded on trial.

    TORPEDO BOATS.
    During the year 1887–88 all the first class torpedo boats (20 in number, from 125 to 150 feet in length) have been completed, and a considerable amount of experience has been obtained with boats of the various types on actual service.
    At the close of 1887–88 we shall possess 80 first class torpedo boats and 63 second class boats, of which latter 12 are built of wood and 51 of steel.
    It is contemplated to order 6 first class torpedo boats, and 10 second class boats in 1888–89.
    The decision of the Board contained in my statement of last year, by which they determined to discontinue the building of torpedo boats for sea-going purposes and to substitute vessels of a much larger displacement, was amply justified by the experiments of the past year. A squadron of 24 first class boats was commissioned for purposes of exercise and tactics in the Channel. The cruise was of great value in testing the detailed fittings and equipment of the boats, comparing the different types, and in giving experience to officers and crews in the management of torpedo boats and their machinery; and the benefits arising there from were fully manifested when 33 torpedo boats were subsequently commissioned for service during the Naval Manœuvres of August 1887. These two cruises, however, confirmed the previous opinion of the Board, that this class of boat, although doubtless of great value for the protection of ports and their vicinity, are not well suited to accompany fleets at sea, and in bad weather would be a source of anxiety. The result of these experiments has been confirmed by the manœuvres elsewhere of torpedo boats of foreign nations.

    TORPEDO GUNBOATS.
    On the other hand, the Torpedo Gunboat, the "Rattlesnake," has been an undoubted success, for it has been actively employed during last year, taking part in the experimental cruise of the Torpedo Flotilla, and also in the Naval Manœuvres of August, 1887. On the whole her performances have been most satisfactory; and her power of maintaining a high rate of speed and thorough habitability under circumstances of wind and sea, which compel even the largest torpedo boats to slow down, has been conclusively established.
    In view of the ascertained qualities of the "Rattlesnake," and of what is being done by other Navies in the construction of similar vessels, a design has been approved for a larger and swifter vessel than the "Rattlesnake." the "Sharpshooter," provided, for the Estimates of 1887–8, has been commenced at Dovonport, and arrangements have been made for building sis other vessels of the type at Devonport and Chatham in 1888. These vessels have a displacement of 735 tons, as against the 590 tons of the "Rattlesnake," and this additional tonnage is associated with a speed of 21 knots, as against 19 knots of the smaller vessel. The armament is proportionately stronger. The completion of the vessels of this type, which are both building and about to be laid down, will give a total of 11 Torpedo Gunboats to the Navy.

    STEAMING TRIALS OF SHIPS IN COMMISSION.
    In order to test thoroughly the steaming capabilities of new ships, orders were given last year to make trials extending continuously over four days, the
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    machinery being worked by the ordinary complements of the ships. Trials such as these made on foreign stations, with the bottoms of the ships in various conditions and under different circumstances of wind and weather, are of value chiefly as indications of the power that can be developed continuously, and are not evidences of the speeds which the vessels can attain under the most favourable conditions. It is satisfactory to report that no less than 70 to 80 per cent of the contract horse-power developed on the measured mile or 6 hours' contractors' trials, has been developed under the severer conditions of 96 hours' continuous steaming.

    METHOD OF PREPARING SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMME, 1888–89.
    The Programme of New Construction, to be undertaken in the coming financial year, has been most thoroughly considered and discussed by the Board. In framing it, full consideration has been bestowed upon the requirements of the Fleet, in relation to reliefs, the various special services required of H.M. ships on foreign stations, and the "waste" of the Navy resulting from ships becoming obsolete through age or the progress of invention. A careful examination was also made into the composition of the squadrons abroad, and a standard of strength was fixed both for reserves at home as well as for stations abroad, up to which the Fleet should always be maintained. The condition and character of the ships already in progress, as well as their state of advancement, have also been kept in view. Moreover, a careful examination has also been made of the Shipbuilding Policy now being pursued by Foreign Navies, the progress made on ships yet incomplete belonging to these Navies and the liabilities yet remaining to be discharged.
    In order that the necessary time might be given to the consideration of these complex conditions, the building programme was taken in hand early in the autumn of last year. As the Estimates of expenditure for the forthcoming year are always prepared in November, it was believed that if the number and size of the ships to be built could be definitely settled before the Votes for the material and labour to be required in the Dockyard were considered, considerable economy would result from the store and labour estimate being based on confirmed data, and not upon assumption and contingency. By placing before the Dockyard, officials and various purchasing departments of the Admiralty the exact amount of work and of stores they were expected to provide, the Estimates have been prepared with much greater accuracy and closeness than was possible when the conditions were reversed.

    NEW SHIPS TO BE BUILT.
    After completing the 7 armoured ships before alluded to, there will remain in hand the following armoured vessels when the next financial year closes:—

    "Victoria,"

    "Sanspareil,"

    "Aurora,"

    "Nile,"

    "Trafalgar,"

    and of these the first three will be approaching completion, while considerable expenditure will still have to be incurred on the "Nile" and "Trafalgar."
    The Board, therefore, decided not to lay down during 1888–9 any new ironclads. They propose, however, to re-engine the "Superb" and "Thunderer," and re-arm the latter, Provision for these purposes has been made in this year's Estimates.
    Excluding for the moment the special squadron for Australasian service, the following are the new vessels to be built is 1888–9:—

    9—Protected Ships:—

    First Class Cruisers

    2

    Torpedo Depôt Ship and Torpedo Boat Carrier

    1

    Third Class Cruisers

    Steel Bottomed

    2

    Sheathed and Coppered

    4

    14—Unprotected Ships:—

    Sloops ("Buzzard "type)

    2

    Gunboats * ("Rattler" type, improved)

    6

    Torpedo Gunboats ("Sharpshooter" type)

    6

    Sailing Brig (training boys)

    1

    24

    All these vessels, with the exception of one first-class and one third-class cruiser, and two composite gunboats, will be built in the Dockyards.
    The special squadron for service in Australasian waters is to consist of

    5

    Protected Cruisers (new design).

    2

    Torpedo Gunboats ("Sharpshooter" type).

    7

    It is proposed to construct these 7 vessels by contract.
    The total number of vessels to be laid down is 31, comprising an aggregate displacement of 60,000 tons.

    DESCRIPTION OF NEW DESIGNS.
    After fully considering all the vessels of the cruiser classes in existence, building, or proposed for Foreign Navies, and those completed or in progress for the Royal Navy, it has been decided to construct two vessels ("Blake" and "Blenheim") which shall surpass in speed, coal endurance, protection, and armament, anything hitherto attempted. Their dimensions are

    Length

    375 feet.

    Breadth

    65 feet.

    Displacement (about)

    9,000 tons.

    Speed (with full speed supply) on measured mile

    22 knots.

    At sea (continuous steaming)

    20 knots.

    Radius of action—

    Speed of 10 knots, about

    15,000 knots.

    Speed of 20 knots, about

    3,000 knots.

    The armament will be definitely determined when the trials of the larger natures of quick-firing guns, now in progress, have been completed. Provisionally it includes

    2

    9·2-in. (22-ton) bow and stern chasers,

    10

    6·in. (5-ton) quick-firers, broadside,

    18

    3·prs. quick-firers,

    4

    Torpedo tubes.

    The supply of ammunition to the quick-firing guns will be of very exceptional amount; and the weight assigned to the armament considerably in excess of that in any other cruiser.
    * This is independent of the 3 gunboats of this type ordered to he laid down at Pembroke in September, 1887, and not included in the original programme of that year.
    The protective steal deck will extend throughout the length, and over the machinery, boilers, &c.; will have a maximum thickness of 6 inches, and a minimum of 3 inches.
    This maximum thickness of 6 inches will afford the same protection from the direct blows of projectiles, as would a vertical plate of 12 inches in thickness.
    The coal-endurance, based upon the supply that is to be carried at the maximum speeds, is very nearly double that provided for in other cruisers; and compares even more favourably with the endurance of nearly all foreign cruisers; for the service intended this is a matter of primary importance.
    The propelling engines will be of the vertical triple expansion type, and many now features tending to the efficiency of the vessels when employed at speeds varying over the great range of 10 knots to 22 knots per hour will be introduced into the arrangements of engines, boilers, and coal stowage.
    The condition of steaming continuously for long periods and over great distances at the very high speed of 20 knots per hour has been made a ruling condition in the design; and with forced draught spurts of several hours' duration will be possible up to 22 knots.
    In the maintenance of these high speeds at sea, the great length (for a war-ship), and considerable size of the vessels, will obviously be of marked advantage.
    As compared with previous cruisers these vessels are of large displacement, but taking into account their qualities above mentioned—speed, armament, coal endurance, and strong protection—they are not large vessels; and as compared with the mercantile steamers having ocean speed of 16 to 20 knots per hour, built or building, the now cruisers are of small size.
    As protectors of commerce against regular or improvised cruisers these vessels will be most useful; and for many other services they will prove most valuable additions to the Fleet.
    It is proposed to push on their construction as rapidly as is possible.

    TORPEDO DEPÔT SHIP AND TORPEDO BOAT CARRIER "VULCAN."
    The value of the "Hecla" torpedo depôt ship as an adjunct to our principal squadrons has been most thoroughly demonstrated during the last ten years. The "Hecla," as is well known, was purchased from the Mercantile Marine and adapted as a torpedo depôt and store ship; she was also equipped for carrying a number of second-class torpedo boats. A careful study of the work done by the "Hecla," and the conditions now regarded as essential in a vessel capable of doing similar work, preceded the preparation of the design of the vessel about to be laid down at Portsmouth. This design is altogether novel in character, and has been worked out in the utmost detail during the last two years.
    The "Vulcan" may be briefly described as a swift protected cruiser, lightly armed, with a large coal endurance; fitted with special appliances for lifting and carrying a considerable number of the largest type of second-class torpedo boats; while, in addition, she will be equipped with laboratory, workshop, a powerful torpedo armament, a large supply of torpedoes, stores, submarine mines, and electrical appliances of all kinds. She will he capable of protecting herself against all except the largest class of cruisers; her speed will exceed that of most cruisers and all armoured vessels. She will be a base of operations for a torpedo boat flotilla or the torpedo boats of a Meet; have the means of repairing torpedoes, torpedo boats, and their machinery; be a practice ship for all kinds of torpedo work—submerged and above water—and will carry all the gear required for submarine mining operations on a large scale.

    The principal dimensions are:—

    Length

    350 feet.

    Breadth

    58 feet.

    Displacement (about)

    6,600 tons.

    Speed (with full coal supply)—

    On measured mile

    20 knots.

    At sea (continuous steaming)

    18 knots.

    Radius of action—

    Speed of 10 knots (about)

    12,000 knots.

    Speed of 18 knots (about)

    3,000 knots.

    Armament:—

    8 36-prs. (quick-firers).

    12 3-prs. (quick-firers).

    4 to 6 Torpedo-tubes.

    The protective steel deck will extend throughout the length, and over machinery, boilers, &c, will have a maximum thickness of 5 inches, and a minimum of 2½ inches.
    Hydraulic power is to be applied throughout the vessel on a large scale, for lifting the boats and doing all kinds of work.

    THIRD CLASS CRUISERS.
    Two types of these cruisers have been decided upon, identical in armament, rig, and protection, but differing in structure, propelling machinery, and boilers, speed and coal endurance.
    For distant service on stations where docking accommodation does not exist, or may not be available in time of war, it has been decided to build four vessels ("Blanche" class), having their steel hulls sheathed with wood, and coppered. These vessels will have only light fore-and-aft steadying sails. Their dimensions are—

    Length

    220 feet.

    Breadth

    35 feet.

    Displacement (about)

    1,600 tons.

    Speed (with full coal supply)—

    On measured mile

    16½ knots.

    At sea (continuous steaming)

    15 knots.

    Radius of action at 10 knots (about)

    3,500 knots.

    Armament:—

    6 36-prs. (quick-firers).

    4 3-prs. (quick-firers).

    2 Torpedo tubes.

    The protective steel deck will extend throughout the length, and have (over vitals) a maximum thickness of 2 inches, and a minimum of 1 inch.
    The engines will be of the vertical triple expansion type, and the boilers of the ordinary return tube marine type. Twin screws will be adopted as in all other modern cruisers.
    For service from a base, such as in the Channel Squadron, or the Mediterranean, it has been decided to construct two steel-bottomed third-class cruisers ("Bellona" class), which (as explained above) resemble the "Blanche" class in armament and protection, but have higher speed. In these vessels the modified locomotive type of boiler, which has achieved success in the torpedo gunboats, will be fitted. A maximum speed of 19½ knots will thus be secured; the vessels will be about 50 feet longer than the "Blanche" class, and of 200 tons greater displacement. Their coal endurance at 10 knots will be about 2,600 knots.

    TORPEDO GUNBOATS ("SHARPSHOOTER" TYPE).
    This is also a new design, the leading features of which have been already described. Its preparation completes a series of new designs for vessels of
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    altogether exceptional speed and armament, which have engaged the close attention of the Director of Naval Construction and his Department for more than a year, and have involved a very large amount of labour and discussion.
    Taking these new types in association with previous cruiser designs, it appears that there has been effected a virtual reconstruction of the cruiser classes, as will appear from the following summary:—

    —

    Tons.

    Maximum Speed.

    Knots.

    Protected.—"Blake" class

    9,000

    22

    Protected. "Vulcan" class (torpedo depôt ship)

    6,600

    20

    Armour Belted.—"Orlando" class

    5,600

    8·15

    Protected,—"Mersey" class

    4,000

    18

    Protected. "Medea" class

    2,080 to 3,000

    20 to 19¾

    Protected. For Australasian service

    2,500

    19

    Protected. "Bellona" class

    1,800

    19½

    Protected. "Blanche" class

    1,600

    16½

    Unprotected.—"Archer" class

    1,770

    17

    Unprotected. "Rattlesnake" class

    550

    18½ to 19

    Unprotected. "Sharpshooter"

    730

    21

    Of those new types all the designs have been prepared within the last two years, except those for "Orlando," "Mersey," "Archer," and "Rattlesnake" classes. The completion and trials of these vessels will be pressed forward with all possible despatch.

    SLOOPS, "BEAGLE" AND "BASILISK."
    These vessels are to be practically reproductions of the "Buzzard," and are specially intended for service on distant foreign stations. They are twin-screw unprotected sloops of about 1,150 tons displacement, and 14½ knots measured mile speed, with 160 tons of coal on board. Including the "Swallow," which has been in commission for some time, there are four vessels of the class built and building. The two new vessels are to be built with steel hulls, wood sheathed, and coppered; their predecessors are composite-built. They will have a fair amount of sail, but this is auxiliary only to their steam power.

    GUNBOATS ("MAGPIE" CLASS).
    The policy of the Board in regard to the smaller vessels of the Navy was last year fully explained, but it may be as well to briefly recapitulate.
    The magnitude and variety of our trade and commerce, and the overwhelming proportions of our sea-going tonnage as compared to that of any other country, impose upon the Navy of this country active duties abroad of a very exceptional character. The functions thus discharged by our Fleet are a national necessity, and the benefits derived from the adequate performance of this work are ubiquitous and shared in by foreign nations. Yet the dangers which threaten our commerce in war time so differ from those against which they are guarded during peace, that it is no easy matter to make the whole of our Navy equally available and efficient for the discharge of both duties. Vessels of light draught and small displacement can, to a certain extent, be utilized for both purposes, provided they are armed with the most effective of modern guns and have a certain speed. Their number must, however, be curtailed, otherwise too large a proportion of our naval expenditure will he absorbed in vessels whose employment and utility during war must be confined to a very limited sphere of action.
    The Board, finding it necessary to replace the obsolete gunboats and ships now serving abroad, determined to build a limited number of gunboats of an exceptionally powerfully type in order that they might be able to fulfil the conditions I have described.
    Nine additional gunboats have therefore been ordered. They are practically identical with the vessels of the "Pheasant" class; but in order to provide for the 4 per cent. "margin for contingencies" ordered by the Board, they have been made 1 foot broader and about 50 tons greater displacement than the "Pheasant."
    The Board's decision on this matter was arrived at in full view of the circumstances attending the sad loss of the "Wasp," so far as those circumstances can over be known. Having carefully reconsidered all the particulars of her design in comparison with the corresponding particulars for preceding classes of gunboats, whose performances during a period of 30 years have been found most satisfactory, the Board reached the conclusion that the "Wasp" was in all features affecting seaworthiness and safety far superior to the gunboats which preceded her; and that there was no reason for modifying the design of the "Pheasant" and "Magpie" classes.
    The opinion of the naval members of the Board, after a full and exhaustive inquiry into the subject, is recorded in the Appendix.
    These gunboats will be substituted for the various types and classes of gun vessels and gunboats now in commission, none of which it is proposed to reproduce.

    AUSTRALASIAN SQUADRON.
    Of the seven vessels to be built for this special service, five are to be protected cruisers and two torpedo gunboats.
    It has been decided that the latter shall be built from the "Sharpshooter" design.
    The protected cruisers will in their principal dimensions closely approximate to the "Medea" class of the Royal Navy, described on page 11 of last year's Statement. They will be of about 2,500 tons displacement, have a maximum speed of 19 knots, and be identical in protection with the "Medea" class.
    Their armament will include—

    8 36-prs. quick-firers.

    8 3-prs. quick-firers.

    4 Torpedo tubes.

    In the discussions which took place at the time of the Colonial Conference these vessels were described as "Improved Archers." The substantial character of the improvement will be seen from the statement that the new vessels will possess the following advantages over the "Archers":—

    2 knots higher speed.

    A strong protective deck.

    A more modern armament; about 10 per cent, heavier in its total weight.

    A radius of action about 30 per cent, greater.

    It is anticipated that all these vessels will be ready for service within two years from the date of order.

    ESTIMATED TONNAGE TO BE COMPLETED.
    It is estimated that the following is the amount of displacement tonnage which for the three years ending April 1890 will be passed into the fleet ready for commission:—

    1887–88.

    1888–89.

    1889–90.

    *75,000

    77,000

    †75,000

    Of this tonnage the following amount belongs to Lord Northbrook's Special Programme:—

    1887–88.

    1888–89.

    1889–90.

    21,800

    16,800

    21,500

    All vessels designed during the present year have a margin unappropriated for contingencies of 4 per cent, upon their displacement. The Board have
    * The reason for the difference between the amount estimated last year and that now estimated will be found on page 5.
    † Inclusive of Australasian Squadron.
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    907
    adopted this regulation to provide for unforeseen contingencies or weights added during construction, and to keep the vessel to the designed draught, and thus prevent the deeper immersion which the additional weights, for which no allowance has been made, must otherwise cause.

  DOOKYARD ADMINISTRATION.
  The various alterations and improvements made during the past year for the purpose of obtaining a firmer and more reliable hold over Dockyard Expenditure have begun to realize satisfactory results. The rapidity of construction shown in the advance of the iron-clad "Trafalgar" has rivalled, if not beaten, the best record in private shipbuilding yards, and other ships building are being pushed on with almost equal celerity. A great reduction has also been effected in the cost of building and repairs, and the incidental expenditure—that is, the annual outlay which hitherto has not been charged direct to any special service, has not only been curtailed, but under new forms of account, by which every item is brought to book, will continue to decrease.
  The reform of any great Government establishment, where the traditions and usages of many generations have established unwritten regulations not always in accord with the rules of the controlling authorities, must necessarily be a work of gradual development and attended with constant hostile criticism. Discharge of redundant establishments and abolition of useless offices and the introduction of stricter supervision and check over expenditure and work must annoy the personal interests so touched. But the general result of the operations during the past two and a-half years has been so remarkable and so encouraging that, even at the risk of going into tedious details, I feel it my duty to bring them out into clear relief. It is due to the Controller of the Navy and the officers who have unflinchingly adhered to the policy of reform which they themselves inaugurated, that the magnitude of the service they have rendered should be known.
  A large programme of work and advancement was last year estimated for in work and money. The programme has in work almost been realized, but in every case where the progress is below the estimate the delay has been entirely due either to the failure of private shipbuilders to keep to the dates promised for delivery of ships, to their inability to pass the specified steam trials, or to the non-delivery of promised guns.
  If the estimate of work has been maintained, except where outside causes interfered, the estimate of cost has been largely diminished.

  DOOKYARD ADMINISTRATION.

    SAVINGS UPON ORIGINAL ESTIMATES.
    The following tabular statement shows some of the cases of savings upon the original estimates for ships building; but this is not exhaustive by any means:—

    Name of Ship.

    Estimate submitted by Dockyard.

    Estimate as reduced.

    Actual cost of work, or Estimate to latest date.

    Remarks.

    £

    £

    £

    Trafalgar

    686,400

    646,400*

    —

    Exclusive of first fitting stores, gun mountings, and torpedo tubes.

    Nile

    686,400

    646,400*

    —

    Benbow

    37,300

    34,600

    31,100

    Howe

    485,500

    —

    472,000

    Hero

    315,000

    —

    300,000

    Immortalité

    203,000

    —

    187,000

    Severn

    140,400

    —

    133,400

    Tartar

    16,370

    —

    15,870

    Exclusive of first fitting stores.

    No. 81 Torpedo Boat

    7,730

    6,000

    5,750

    Includes first fitting stores but not gun mountings.

    Melpomene

    83,800

    80,980

    —

    Medea & Medusa (each)

    89,375

    76,633

    —

    Nymphe

    40,851

    38,511

    —

    * £40,000 reduction for labour alone.

    The following tabular statement, which also is not exhaustive, shows some of the savings that have been effected upon ships repaired and re-fitted:—

    Name of Ship.

    Estimate submitted by Dockyard.

    Estimate as reduced.

    Actual cost of work, or Estimate to latest date.

    Remarks.

    £

    £

    £

    Northumberland

    45,300

    24,300

    22,000

    The Dockyard Estimates were cut down before being submitted, by arrangement with Director of Dockyards.

    Algerine

    9,230

    9,230

    8,060

    Garnet

    34,950

    32,800

    25,500

    Griffon

    15,200

    15,200

    14,150

    Flamingo

    15,450

    15,450

    14,400

    Curacoa

    40,100

    33,300

    31,000

    These amounts are all exclusive of gun mountings and torpedo tubes.

    Cleopatra

    31,550

    29,900

    29,000

    Champion

    32,500

    30,000

    29,000

    Téméraire

    45,000

    4,250

    4,300

    This vessel came home for a thorough refit and for new boilers, hut it was found upon examination she could easily be made good for another commission, and this was done at the Email outlay shown; thus postponing the large refit for the term of another commission.

    Figures such as the above do not by any means represent the full effect exercised by the Controller's Department upon expenditure, because much of the effect shows itself, or is now showing itself, in the lowering of first estimates as compared with many that were formerly submitted by the Dockyards.
    It is noteworthy that hardly any recent estimate, which, after careful examination by the Controller's Officers, was reduced, has subsequently been exceeded by the Yards; but that, as a rule, there have been substantial savings even upon the reduced amounts. This proves that the Dockyard Officials are now heartily co-operating with the central authorities, and are watching carefully the working out of estimate and the cutting down of unnecessary expenditure.

    NEW FORM OF ESTIMATE FOR SHIPS TO BE BUILT.
    New forms of estimates for ships to be built, and of cost accounts arranged so as to admit of detailed comparison with the various items of the original estimates, have been in full operation during the present year. Too much importance cannot be attached to these detailed forms of estimates and to the cost accounts framed in agreement with them. Under these forms, when a ship is completed, it will be possible to compare the details of expenditure with the estimate, and to ascertain what department and what class of work is responsible for any excess that may occur.
    It will also be possible to closely compare the costs in detail of ships built in different dockyards, and that of dockyard-built ships with those obtained by contract.

    INDEPENDENT RECORDERS OF WORK.
    The establishment of independent recorders of work, who go round at intervals daily and note down in the diaries the employment of the men, has
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    been introduced. This change, as well as the new form of accounts, are closely assimilated to the methods and practice of the best managed private yards.
    Owing to want of time and the heavy pressure of work consequent upon these changes in the Home Yards, the Dockyards abroad have not yet been subjected to a similar supervision. A certain economy has however been effected, and during the coming year this will be further developed.

    ECONOMY IN EMPLOYMENT OF SHIP'S ARTIFICERS TO REMEDY DEFECTS.
    The orders issued early last year respecting the employment of Artificers in repairing defects, and preventing defects growing up in Ships in Commission, have already borne good fruit. The result is shown in smaller defect lists at Malta and other Foreign Stations, and also in reduced expenditure at the Home Yards upon casual work to this class of ships. The expenditure upon casual work is being gradually reduced all round, and I am confident that as a result of the orders above referred to, and of the close examination now made of the details of such work, considerably greater reductions will be made in the future. There will be a saving upon labour employed on casual work this year, after including nearly £10,000 (not provided for) for labour expended upon the Jubilee Review requirements.
    INCIDENTAL EXPENDITURE.
    The manner in which incidental expenditure has been scrutinized has led to a considerable saving being effected during 1887–88 and much larger additional reductions are being arranged for in 1888–89.

    EMPLOYMENT OF DOCKYARD HANDS UPON CASUAL WORK.
    The cost of shipbuilding has been increased in the past, and the progress of the work upon new construction much interfered with, by the practice that had grown up of taking hands off new ships or large repairs for casual work as it arose, or for dealing with any temporary emergency. The number of men employed in advancing new construction and large repairs has thus been subjected to all kinds of fluctuations. The system obviously interferes with progress, with methodical arrangement of work, and with cost.
    During 1887–88 large reductions (about 2,000 in all), through discharges, deaths, superannuations, &c.) have been made in the Dockyards, and these reductions have caused such hardship in the Dockyard Towns that I did not think it advisable to discharge, in addition, the full numbers that might have been spared in every case, during temporary slackness of casual work. Temporary relief has been afforded, whenever possible, by employing redundant men upon work extra to the Programme, when such work was proved to be necessary. The policy pursued during 1887–88 has been to discharge redundant hands as gradually as possible, and bring down the number upon the books to what is required as an average for the work of the year.
    Now that the numbers have been reduced to a fair average for 1888–89, it has been, decided to work, in future, upon the principle of keeping a proper number of hands upon new ships without interruption, and not to take them off whenever casual work or cases of emergency arise.
    Instructions have just been sent to the Superintendents to avoid such changes of employment of men as much as possible, in future, and to enter and discharge men as required for casual work when such men are not available in the Dockyard without disturbing the building programme. This class of entry is to be recognized as casual and temporary only, and this will be made clear to the men when entered.

    PROGRESS MADE TRUE TEST OF SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMME.
    Although a large reduction of men was necessary during 1887–88, the amount of work done was not practically affected by the reduction.
    Hitherto it has been the practice to estimate the amount of shipbuilding proposed by the amount of money devoted to that purpose, and to assume that as the amount in one of the two years under comparison was lessened so was shipbuilding curtailed. Such a comparison must necessarily be fallacious when it relates to two consecutive years, in one of which estimates were prepared under an old system, and in the other under new and more economical method. Although the aggregate amount of money proposed to be voted for labour in the Dockyards in 1888–89 is less than that voted for 1887–88, yet, by a more careful distribution of labour, the amount actually appropriated to new construction, and consequently the output of work, will be greater.
    From the statement relating to depreciation of the Fleet, appended to the Estimates, it will be seen that the sum of £2,070,000* is required to be expended to maintain the Fleet in its present efficiency. The sum devoted to New Construction this year is, exclusive of Australasian Squadron, £2,971,000.

    CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE PAST.
    The diagnosis which our inquiries have enabled us to make of the past working of the Dockyard system suggests the following remedies:—
    That when a ship is laid down it is essential, if cheap and rapid construction be required, that the largest amount of labour that can be economically employed should be put upon the ship and kept there without undue interference till complete.
    That no course can be more injudicious as regards the actual cost of building ships, or more likely to put their efficiency out of date when built, than to commence a large shipbuilding programme with insufficient funds.
    That to properly employ the various trades and classes of labour, it is necessary to lay down large ships at intervals, and not simultaneously in the same yards.
    That the more rigid the system of account, and the more items that are brought in as direct charges, the greater is the tendency of incidental expenditure to contract.
    That if real financial control is to be exercised over shipbuilding and dockyard expenditure, it is essential that the control should be in the hands of men who understand the nature of work they supervise and of the expenditure they check. No official, whatever may be his aptitude, who is a purely accounting officer, can with advantage undertake, or have imposed on him, such duties.
    By adherence to these simple rules in the future, to the efficiency of which the savings of 1887–88 testify, we hope to ultimately enable the Dockyards to compete successfully, both in cost and rapidity of construction, with the private yards of the country.
    The amount of labour imposed upon the department of the Controller of the Navy during the last eighteen months has been exceedingly heavy. The completion of the large ironclads, with their novel and multitudinous fittings and mountings, the number of new designs to be worked out, and the alterations both in account and administrative detail necessitated by the change in the Dockyards, tested the capacity of the department in everything relating to both the design and building of ships, and the management of great establishments. The departmental officers have proved themselves fully equal to the onerous task imposed on them, and I am glad to be able to point out that the State commands the services of officials who are able to meet all the modern requirements of the day, and capable of giving to the country a good return for the expenditure entrusted to them.
    * This sum now includes gun mountings and incidental expenditure, but excludes, as explained last year, expenditure upon "Nile" and "Trafalgar."

  NAVAL ORDNANCE.
  The recent re-organization of the War Office Department, under which a separation was made between the civil departments which manufacture, and the combatant branches which use the articles so manufactured, facilitated the transfer to the Navy estimates of the charge hitherto borne on Army votes for Naval Ordnance. Though the Board of Admiralty have assented to the change, they have done so with some hesitation. The information supplied to them, both as to existing stock and outstanding liabilities, is imperfect, from the difficulty the War Office has experienced in apportioning from stocks held in common, for both services, and contained in store-houses scattered over the world, the exact amount to be credited to the Navy. Until the Admiralty are in complete possession of such information, though ready to account for and explain the vote so transferred, they cannot make themselves responsible for its adequacy. The sum proposed to be taken is, judging from past experience, as much as can be earned by the existing gun factories in the country, and should be more than sufficient to meet the normal wants of the year. Whatever deficiency of stores may exist at the commencement of the financial year should therefore be diminished at its close, and the maintenance of the ordnance vote at its present high figures for a few years to come should bring up to the requisite standard the reserves of ammunition and stores. In the course of the year complete information on this point will be obtained, and the Board of Admiralty will regulate their action accordingly.
  During the year ending December 31st, 1887, 238 new Breech-Loading Guns have been issued to the Navy, including two 16¼-inch guns of 111 tons, and four 13½-inch guns of 69 tons.
  In addition to these 238 guns, 123 new guns, including one 16¼-inch and eleven 13½-inch guns, may be completed by the end of March 1888. This will still leave 254 guns under order, exclusive of fresh guns, to be obtained in 1888–89.
  Considerable delay has occurred in the delivery of guns at the dates previously promised. Several of the heavier ironclads are now awaiting their armament, and the programme of Dockyard work has been deranged, and the cost of completing ships has been increased by those delays. So few breech-loading guns of large calibre have hitherto been made in this country, that all concerned in their manufacture, whether they be private contractors or Woolwich factory, seem to have antedated the finish of their work and miscalculated the time necessary for its completion. As experience is gained it is to be hoped that punctuality of delivery will be associated with it, and that one of the main impediments now existing to the passing of ships rapidly into the First Reserve, as ready for service, will be removed.
  The "Edinburgh" and "Colossus," recently commissioned, have tested and tried the working of the new hydraulic machinery upon which are mounted the Breech-Loading Guns of large calibre, and the results have been satisfactory. A report of target practice from the "Colossus" has been received, in which it is stated that four successive rounds from one of the 43-ton guns were fired in six minutes (the ship steaming at high speed and at a distance of 1,500 yards from the target), and three hits were made.
  The mountings for the still heavier guns of 67 and 110 tons necessarily involve many important and novel features. The tests with these mountings have, up to the present, been quite satisfactory, and it is hoped that the ships armed with these guns will soon carry out full experiments of these armaments in which more experience will be gained.
  During the year important experiments have been undertaken with, the view of extending the system of metallic cartridge in use for the quick-firing 6-pounder and smaller guns, to guns up to and including 6 inches in calibre.
  These trials demonstrated the practicability of producing efficient metallic cartridges of a size hitherto unattempted, and exhibited the many advantages which would accrue from working ammunition in this form.
  In considering the results of this trial it became apparent that great benefit would result to the service if, in place of the 4-inch and 5-inch Breech-Loading Guns, at the present time mounted somewhat indiscriminately in ships of different classes, for the future a quick-firing gun could be substituted of intermediate size, with metallic cartridges carrying their own means of ignition.
  After trials and experiments, a gun firing a projectile of 36 lbs. was selected as combining certain advantages which either a lighter or heavier gun would fail to secure. It is the largest gun that can, with a sufficient supply of ammunition, be carried by the torpedo gunboats (the smallest ships in the service), and the heaviest which can be worked with a shoulder-piece for training, a great object in the delivery of a rapid and accurate fire against the attack of torpedo boats.
  Very greatly increased rapidity of fire has been obtained from this gun; with its special mounting and ammunition, 10 rounds can be fired in a minute, as compared with two rounds a minute, the limit of rapidity with the present 4 and 5-inch B.L. guns. This gun in future new ships will supersede the 4 and 5-inch gun.
  A 6-inch quick-firing gun to fire a projectile of 100 lbs. is under construction, and will soon be ready for trial; should this gun prove in all respects as satisfactory as the 36-pounder (which there is every reason for hoping), it will form a most valuable addition to naval armaments, without the disadvantage of introducing a gun of new calibre into the Naval Service.
  The importance of the development of rapid firing guns can only be fully appreciated when it is borne in mind that in consequence of the great speed of future fighting ships, the practice from slow firing guns must be most uncertain on account of the rapid alteration of distance. The system of mounting connected with these quick-firing guns allows the firer to keep his eye along the sights on the object while training or elevating the gun himself. The operation of loading is quite independent of the firer, and means have been found for the electric ignition of the charge, the primers being so fitted that the electric circuit cannot be completed till the breech of the gun is completely closed. The firer can, therefore, press the trigger whenever the sights are aligned on the object, knowing that the gun cannot fire unless safe, and his whole attention is thus concentrated on the object he is firing at, with the additional advantage of being able to rectify any miscalculation of distance in the preceding discharge. Under such conditions rapid firing should conduce to accurate, rather than to wild practice.
  It is intended for the future that the 36-pr. and the 6-inch 100-pr. quick-firing guns, together with the 9·2-inch 22-ton gun in the large unarmoured vessels, should be the main armament of Her Majesty's Navy for vessels other than armour-clads, supplemented in all cases by the light 3-pr. quick-firing gun.
  During the past year 131 torpedoes have been manufactured and issued ready for service, and a further number of 126 will will have been issued by the end of the present financial year 1887–88.
  It may be interesting to note the rapid growth of expenditure connected with. Naval Ordnance, which the following table illustrates:—

  Amount taken each year from 1881–82 in Army and Navy Estimates respectively for Naval Ordnance.

  Year.

  Army Votes.

  Navy Votes.

  TOTAL.

  £

  £

  £

  1881–82

  369,000

  49,329

  418,329

  1882–83

  616,033

  63,990

  680,023

  1883–81

  500,491

  161,905

  662,396

  1884–85

  500,000

  185,580

  685,580

  1885–86

  850,000

  308,900

  1,158,900

  1886–87

  1,000,000

  599,900

  1,599,900

  1887–88

  1,707,561

  593,700

  2,301,261

  1888–89

  —

  2,177,638

  2,177,638

  EXPERIMENTS IN 1887–88.
  Several important series of experiments have been conducted in 1887–88.
  Extensive trials have been made with various systems of torpedo ejecting apparatus, including both submerged broadside tubes and above-water tubes. From these trials important information has been obtained, which will influence future torpedo armaments.
  The experiments on "Resistance" have been continued for the purpose of ascertaining both the effect of torpedo explosions (either in contact with or at a distance from the hull), and the best mode of arranging net defences, booms, &c,
  A large amount of work has also been done in perfecting the net defences of H.M. ships.
  In view of the general introduction of steel armour-piercing projectiles and the great development of the steel manufacture in recent years, it has been decided to make a comprehensive series of trials on steel and steel-faced iron (or compound) armour plates. A modern breech-loading gun and the best projectiles (steel and chilled iron) will be used. All the leading English steel makers have given their support to the proposal, and -will supply experimental plates. The commencement of the trials has been delayed from various causes, but most of the armour plates have been made, and the firing will be proceeded with as soon as possible. The results will be of great importance both to the Royal Navy and to English manufacturers.

  NEW WORKS.
  The works vote is so compiled as to comprise contributions to subsidized docks and the cost of of all the establishments in connection with the Works Department at the Outports; and including these services, the amount asked for in 1888–89, compared with that granted in 1887–88, shows a reduction of £92,000. This decrease is due partly to no sums being required for the subsidy of Colonial docks, and partly to an adherence to the rule laid down last year by the Board, under which, it was decided to fully utilize existing accommodation before approval is given to an extension of buildings.
  The final payments to the dock companies at Esquimalt and Hong Kong, on the completion of their undertakings, have been made. The first will accommodate a vessel of the "Northampton" or "Nelson" type, and the second will dock any vessel in Her Majesty's Navy.
  Provision is made for the commencement of the erection of barracks on Whale Island, Portsmouth, which will replace the old hulks now occupied by the Gunnery Establishment.
  The necessary accommodation for torpedo boats at Portsmouth, Chatham, Malta, Esquimalt, Hong Kong, and Bermuda, is practically complete; that required at Gibraltar and the Cape is in course of construction.

  PERSONNEL OF THE NAVY.
  The efficiency of the officers and men, judging from the reports received, and from the tests imposed during the past year, is very satisfactory. The manœuvres carried out after the Naval Review at Spithead, and the evolutions of squadrons abroad, resulted in unanimous testimony from the officers commanding that the standard of physique and efficiency of the Navy is exceptionally high. The conduct has been good, and there is a substantial reduction in sickness, invaliding, and deaths, the ratio of each being lower than last year and less than the average ratio of the last ten years.
  The course of training and instruction, both physical and mental, through which the men pass seems to have most successfully attained its object; and the system of national and compulsory instruction, now in full operation, has so improved the education of the men that it has been found possible to curtail the number of schoolmasters afloat, and modify the educational arrangements on board sea-going ships.
  Owing to the great reduction in the annual wastage of the Navy, the numbers borne last year were considerably in excess of the number estimated. The entries of boys have, therefore, been diminished temporarily. It is believed that without any further addition to Vote 1, it will be possible to provide all the officers and men required for the manning of the Australasian Squadron.
  The mobilisation of the Fleet, by the commissioning of all available ships 1sat summer, was effected with no greater strain than that of suspending for the time being the educational classes in the gunnery and torpedo ships, and the employment of the Officers at the College during the Vacation, and when all the available ships were commissioned, there were still available a large number of coastguard men and marines, in addition to the naval reserves which were untouched.

  LIEUTENANTS' LIST.
  The condition of the lieutenants' lists, and the very slow promotion to the higher grades which an investigation revealed, induced the Board to consider what steps could be taken to ameliorate their prospects, without detriment to the service generally.
  Their present position is one of undoubted hardship. The number of lieutenants required to officer the ships in commission in peace, still more in the eventuality of war, is far in excess of the number required in the higher grades of commander and Captain. The number of each rank is fixed with a regard to the requirements of the service, and the intake into the rank of lieutenant must necessarily be far in excess of the outlet by promotion. It was calculated a
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  923
  short time back that seven out of every nine on the present lists will be retired for want of promotion. In 1875 the number of lieutenants of sixteen and twenty years' service as Commissioned Officers was twelve and three respectively; the relative numbers are now two hundred and eight and fifty-three. At every half-yearly promotion there are numbers of capable and promising officers who are left out for want of vacancies. If it is inadvisable that the establishments above the rank of lieutenant should be increased, and if the promotion of lieutenants is retarded on grounds of public policy, it seemed only just that after a certain length of service their pay should be increased. This proposal has been assented to, and from the 1st April 1888 all lieutenants of eight years' seniority, who have completed six years' service, three of which shall have been in a ship of war at sea, will receive an addition of 2s. a day; also all lieutenants of twelve years' seniority who have completed nine years' service, six of which shall have been in a ship of war at sea, will receive an addition of 2s. a day; and lieutenants, when in independent command of any ship or tender, 1s. a day in addition to the above.
  It has also been found necessary to increase the number of chief gunners, boatswains, and carpenters by ten, and of warrant officers by fifty, they being insufficient for the growth of work imposed on them; and with a view of encouraging a very deserving class, chief gunners and boatswains of three years' service will, on retirement, and at the discretion of the Admiralty, receive the retired rank of lieutenant, and the chief carpenter equivalent relative rank.
  The number and variety of the allowances and ratings authorised for officers and men had obtained such dimensions and complexity, that it seemed very advisable that they should be simplified and regulated. A Committee has reported upon the subject, and their recommendations contain much that is valuable. They are now under consideration.

  ROYAL MARINE FORCES.
  The recruits who have offered themselves for these corps, both Artillery and Infantry, have been of good stature and excellent physique, and their education and conduct promise that in due course a large proportion will be eligible for non-commissioned officers.
  The conduct of the men shows progressive improvement, and the reports of Inspections, including one by Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, Commanding-in-Chief, gave high praise both to officers and men for their efficiency in all the exercises through which they were put.

  EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.
  The various training and educational institutions connected with the naval, marine, and dockyard services have in the past been Scattered among different votes in the estimates, and were under no one responsible head at the Admiralty. With a view of ensuring uniformity and continuity in their administration, they have been placed under the Second Naval Lord who is responsible for the manning of the Navy. A number of changes and alterations have in consequence been made, of which the following are the chief.
  A Council of Naval Education has been established, of which the President of the Royal Naval College, the Director of Studies, and the Captain of the "Britannia," are permanent members, the Captains of "Excellent" and "Vernon," the Chief Instructor of Cadets, Chaplain of the Fleet, Deputy-Adjutant-General of Marines and Engineer-in-Chief, being associated for special purposes. Questions of naval education connected, with the "Britannia," Service Afloat, the College, Engineer and Training Establishments, Gunnery and Torpedo Schools will be referred to the Council for report.
  The examination, both in seamanship and at the College, for the rank of Lieutenant has been revised with the view of bringing it more into accord with the altered conditions of modern seamanship.
  It is contemplated to reduce the number of students at the Engineer Colleges supported by Naval Funds, and to admit a proportion of the Acting Assistant Engineers who go to Greenwich College for the conclusion of their training, direct to that College by open competition from outside the Service.
  The number of Engineers' Officers will hereafter be limited, but an increase will be made to the Chief Engine Room Artificers. The arrangements for this alteration are in progress towards completion.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FLEET.
In considering and settling the many subsidiary questions which arise in connection with the conversion of a peace establishment into one ready for war, the Intelligence Department has been most useful. The head of the Department has shown a remarkable aptitude for his work, and he has been well supported by the officers under him. The amount and nature of the information collated and distributed must necessarily be kept secret, but the work of the branch connected with the mobilization of the Fleet, and the utilization of Naval Reserves and resources, may roughly be sketched.
The main principle underlying the scheme has been to make each of the three great commands—Portsmouth, Devonport, and Sheerness—as far as possible self-supporting, by dividing the whole country into three districts, and sending all men from the same district to the same port. To arrange that, the various officers connected with the manning should man the ships under the superintendence of their respective Commanders-in-Chief, and to place these officers in direct communication with those in charge of the Reserves.
The men having been called out in the manner provided by law, each Commander-in-Chief becomes responsible for obtaining the men he requires for the ships in his port without reference to the Admiralty.
The complements for each ship have been drawn up, and a new classification of the ranks and ratings made, which Return will be issued quarterly.
These new arrangements have been tried experimentally at Portsmouth, and the Commander-in-Chief, in reporting the result, said—
"The officers of the various depôt ships have taken a great interest in carrying out the details of the scheme, and with a very satisfactory result. A signal was made at 1 p.m. on the 27th ult., and before 4 o'clock complete returns were rendered from each depôt ship of the appropriation of petty officers and men for all ships in and preparing for the First Class Steam Reserve, the torpedo boats, and armed merchant steamers. It will be observed that the crews are in each case practically complete, and there can be no doubt that a great advance has been made towards the speedy manning of the Fleet in case of sudden necessity."
"It must be remembered that in this instance the officers of the depôt ships have taken a strong personal interest in the scheme, being aware that it is novel and on its trial."
"So long as the executive officers will personally give the time and trouble necessary to work out the details, there will not be any difficulty with the present forms in manning all available ships in the course of 48 hours."
With the object of placing our Reserves of Officers on a satisfactory footing, the lists of retired officers have been carefully examined, and all eligible for employment have been asked if ready to serve in an emergency. Steps have also
926

927
been taken towards instituting a gunnery and torpedo course for retired officers, and for placing them, when called out for service, on the same footing as officers on the active list.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FLEET.
  ARMED MERCANTILE CRUISERS.
  Special provision has been made in this year's Estimates for the armament and clothing connected with the manning of these vessels, and arrangements are nearly complete for their rapid commissioning.

  COALING AND SUPPLIES OF COAL.
  Considerable advance has been made in this all-important matter. The supplies of coal required at home and foreign stations, and the best means of obtaining them, have been carefully considered.
  A number of lighters have been ordered for facilitating the coaling of our ships afloat both on the home and foreign stations, arrangements have been made for taking up cruiser colliers and coaling outfits to be used by colliers in company with a fleet will be stored at various places at home and abroad. We hope during the year to be able to make some progress with works at Portland for unloading sea-borne and railway-carried coal; but until the plans have been more carefully investigated and accurate estimates produced, I did not consider it advisable to sanction any premature expenditure.

CONCLUSION.
The experience gained since last year, and the opportunities afforded during that time of making close and minute comparison between the strength of the Navy of this country and that of foreign nations confirms my previous statement, that our relative superiority is undoubted, and that we shall, if the present expenditure be maintained, each year increase that superiority. Our organization for war has much improved during the last year, and satisfactory progress has been made in working out and fitting together the complementary parts of a scheme for the full utilization in time of emergency of the naval resources of the country. Looking, however, at the three main component parts of a fleet, ships, guns, and men, we have no reason to be dissatisfied with what we have got, if we take not an ideal standard, but that common to the Fleets of our neighbours. The ships recently completed and commissioned have fulfilled on the whole the undertaking of their designers, and although one or two casualties have occurred in the past in the manufacture of our larger guns, out of the great number issued during the last 18 months for service none have in any sense failed.
The determination of the Government to effectively arm the coaling" stations abroad and the home ports must largely increase our offensive naval power, for the bases of operation from which our Fleet can issue will require little or no naval defence.
But if it is permissible to speak with confidence of our superiority so far as actual fighting power is concerned, when we consider the defence and protection which our commerce may require, extreme caution and reserve must be exercised. The conditions of naval warfare have so changed, and are so changing from day to day, that nothing but actual experience could justify any confident prediction as to how a thoroughly effective protection can be given by any fleet to a commerce whose sea-going steam tonnage is double that of the rest of the world.
In the revision and preparation of our present Estimates we have made provision for all immediate requirements, and we have not hesitated in every direction to cut off extraneous and questionable expenditure. But new wants
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929
may more than counterbalance future economies, and it would, therefore, not he safe in our judgment to attempt hereafter to place at a lower total than the aggregate sums to be spent this year upon naval objects, the future annual expenditure of the Navy.
GEORGE HAMILTON.
28 th February, 1888.

SUPPLY.—COMMITTEE.
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF THE ADMIRALTY.—RESOLUTION".
LORD CHARLES BERESFORD, in rising to call attention to the system of administration at the Admiralty, and to move, "That the allocation of authority requires entire reform," said, he would fool grateful to the House if it would allow him to make a few remarks connected with his resignation as a Member of the Board of Admiralty; and also to make a few comments on the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton), made outside the House, relative to some observations he had made to his constituents on that resignation. He trusted that nothing he would say would be construed into an attack, covert or open, on the Government, or upon his late Colleagues. Neither did he wish it to be thought that he was impugning the administration or capacity of those Gentlemen who preceded the Board in Office; but he intended, to the best of his ability, to attack the system under which they worked with all the vigour and energy at his command. It was generally believed that his resignation was based on a question of £000. That was only in part true. What he really resigned on was the question of system which existed at the Admiralty—the question of system which allowed that reduction of salaries of the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty to be made in the manner it was made. The first day he sat on the Board of Admiralty he asked the First Lord whether, if he wrote any paper which he might consider necessary for the reform of any question connected with the Royal Navy, he would ever exercise the power which he possessed of not allowing that paper to be criticized by his Colleagues? The First Lord of the Admiralty said that he did not think that very likely, as he himself had instituted the right of protest. He (Lord Charles Beresford) also said, that as long as he sat at the Board, where there were men of so much greater experience, far higher in seniority, and far higher in rank than himself, he
932
treated them outside the Board with that courtesy and respect which that higher rank called for, but that on the Board he intended to have his say level with everybody else. He had also spoken publicly on this question of the right of the First Lord. When he was in Office he spoke in the country on it, and attributed to that right the inefficiency and unpreparedness of the Navy. Even in March last year in this House he again referred to the question of that right, and objected to it. He mentioned this in order to show that he did not resign in a hurry. In public he had stated that there was no "shred of a system of any sort for organization for war before the present Board was in Office." He intended to substantiate that statement. In doing so, he would refer to the recorded opinion of the First Lord himself, as stated in his Memorandum of last year—
"Although many of the component and complementary parts of the Navy are in themselves satisfactory, it has long been felt by naval men of experience and foresight that, in the event of war, unless an improved system of co-operation and preparation were devised, the nation would not obtain, in the earlier stages of such a contest, the full advantage of its great naval resources. This opinion was confirmed by the experience of 1885. Confidential reports of what then occurred proved that our power of naval mobilization was most defective. A rapid concentration of strength, and an immediate and effective use of the force thus brought together, have in recent years decided within a few weeks of the outbreak of war the ultimate issue of that war…‥All well-organized. Military Powers have derived infinite advantages from a properly-constituted Intelligence Department; but the need, as I have shown, for such an organization, is greater for naval than military purposes. This country has the largest fleet afloat, yet hitherto it had no central organization by which that fleet could be thoroughly utilized in emergency."
In his Statement he had stated that there was no scheme of organization for war in the Admiralty. There was a paper on mobilization, but it had never been sent to the Commanders-in-Chief; it had never been tried or thought out in order to see how it would act. The First Lord referred to the subject again in his recent Memorandum, where he stated that—
"New arrangements have been tried, experimentally at Portsmouth, and the Commander-in-Chief, in reporting the result, said—The officers of the various depôt ships have taken a great interest in carrying out the details of

933
the scheme, and with a very satisfactory result.… It must be remembered that in this instance the officers of the depôt ships have taken a strong personal interest in the scheme, being aware that it is novel and on its trial."
In his speech the First Lord said that, as far as the present Board was concerned, the other subjects connected with organization for war were scattered and distributed among the various branches of the office. He challenged his noble Friend to produce any plan of campaign for home or abroad, any plan for coaling the fleet, any plan for the protection of the mercantile marine, or any organization for war whatever except that paper on mobilization which he described as being moat defective. He could quite believe that the clerks in the Department told the First Lord that such plans existed; but he knew, at all events, that they did not exist, because he had tried, as much as possible, to find them before he wrote his Memorandum in 1886, just after joining the Board. The question of salaries was supposed by many persons to be the immediate cause of his resignation. After the question was all settled last May he noticed in the papers which were marked to every Member of the Board, a letter from the Treasury to the Admiralty relating to the Intelligence. Department salaries. He observed that those papers were not marked to three seamen who were on the original Committee appointed to find out and settle what the duties and the salaries of the now Department were to be. He called attention to the matter by a minute. Knowing what the finding of that Committee was, he wrote on the outside of the sheet a statement to the effect that, with great respect to the First Lord, if anything was done to affect the efficiency of this Department he should resign his position on the Board, His reason for taking this step was that, first of all, he was anxious to see nothing done which should at all hamper a Department on which, he believed, the safety of the country depended; and, secondly, he was quite satisfied that he was right in doing this, because the four Naval Lords were unanimous on the point, as well as the Permanent Secretary to the Admiralty. The Committee stated that they were unanimous in making the foregoing recommendations, and also in strongly urging the absolute necessity, in the interests of the country, of the
934
appointment of the staff proposed at once, in order that the much-needed plan of organization in preparation for war may be prepared with the least possible delay. The Committee also recommended the provision of £900, in order that the Naval Intelligence Department might begin work at once. This recommendation was signed by Sir A. Hood, Sir A. Hoskins, Sir W. Graham, Lord Charles Beresford, and Mr. Macgregor. Nothing could have been stronger than the recommendations of this document. He did not deny that it was possible his noble Friend might have had some conversation with those Sea Lords. He himself had had conversations with them, and they said that they were not at all sure that the salaries were not too high. He sent for the papers again, and called attention to the fact that there was some kind of doubt. One of the best officers belonging to the Department sent in his resignation after the Department had been made inferior to other Departments by the reduction of salaries.
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON): That was not the ground of his resignation.
LORD CHARLES BERESFORDsaid, he was aware that the officer in question sent in his resignation on the ground of ill-health; but that officer had told him that his resignation was due to the cause previously stated, and he was prepared to give evidence to that effect if a Royal Commission was granted to inquire into the administration of the Navy. This was in May. In November he again noticed some correspondence, and again called attention to the fact on the outside of the sheet that the Naval Lords were unanimous as far as he know. Matters went on ill this unsatisfactory state, until at last his noble Friend closed the correspondence, though he know that he would lose a Colleague, and though he saw that four Naval Lords were unanimous. He tried to re-open the question; but that was refused, and the only thing left to him was to carry out what he had put on Paper. That might be a minor point; but he said that it showed the system. The First Lord then ordered a letter to be sent to the Treasury, saying—"My Lords agree to the reduction of the salaries;"

935
but what possible responsibility had the Board of Admiralty in that matter? That was the method that was employed in far greater matters than that of the reduction of the salaries of the Intelligence Department. He confessed that that was the first time since he went to the Admiralty that his noble Friend the First Lord ever so used that power which he undoubtedly possessed. He had said the other day that there was no such thing as Treasury or Parliamentary control, and he maintained that there was not. He could not help thinking that if the Chancellor of the Exchequer had seen the evidence of the four seamen and had seen the First Lord before he changed his opinion, he would have agreed to what he (Lard Charles Beresford) held out for in regard to the salaries of the Intelligence Department. The salaries were only pro tem., and he only asked that they should be kept on pro tem, until the whole of the Admiralty was re-organized, in order that the Intelligence Department might not be made inferior to the other Departments of the Admiralty. The salaries might possibly have been too high; but it was wrong to treat the Intelligence Department as inferior to the other Departments. The Treasury could only exercise control on the occasion of new appointments or the reorganization of old. But since they had I reduced the salaries of the Intelligence Department the Treasury had granted to other appointments higher salaries. The Treasury could only go by what was an officer's rank and position. There were two officers of the Intelligence Department with the rank of post Captain; they were both assistants to the head of the Intelligence Department. After their salaries were reduced to £700 a-year there were two other officers, also of the rank of post Captains, and assistants to the heads of other Departments, who were appointed; but they got an increase of pay, and higher pay than that of the two officers whose pay he contended should not have been reduced, for one received £750 and the other £950. It was perfectly clear that one of those officers was worth £10,000 a-year, or anything they liked to pay him; but he wanted to know on what principle the Treasury had acted in those cases so differently?
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The First Lord of the Admiralty had said that every officer had undoubtedly the clearest intimation that his salary might be reduced. Such a notification as that depended entirely on the precise words used. The notification that the appointment was subject to possible future modification as to salary, and that a further communication would be made before the 31st of March next as to the tenure and terms of the office, would hardly lead any hon. Member to expect that 10 to 28 per cent would be the sort of reduction which had been made in those officers' salaries. The only notification they got was a notice from a banker telling them that they had to refund certain moneys. That was a pretty way of having business done. He thought that that one thing alone, feeling keenly about it as he did, would have justified his resigning, and since his resignation he observed that one of those marine officers had been given back £100 of the reduced pay. He would now refer to his noble Friend's Memorandum. As far as the Memorandum went, it was impossible that anything would be more clear, more practical, more able, or could give the Navy more satisfaction. It was an immense stop in the right direction, and he hoped that his noble Friend, after he had heard his speech, would make another advance in the same direction and go a great deal further. There were most important naval innovations in that Memorandum. He noticed that there was a document with his hon. Friend the Secretary of the Admiralty's name attached to it. It was a real step in the direction of reform, to make a man responsible to Parliament by putting his name at the bottom of a document of that kind. He would next advert to the document relative to the seaworthiness of the Wasp. It was on lines such as that that he and a great number of naval officers wanted to see the opinions of exports presented to Parliament. Those who were responsible for different Departments of the Admiralty ought to put their names down, as the Secretary to the Admiralty had done, and as the four seamen had done in regard to the Wasp. Then if anybody had done anything that was wrong he could be held practically responsible for it, which was not the case now. In his

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printed explanatory statement on the Estimates the Secretary of the Admiralty said—
"In an Imperial Service of the importance of the Navy, which has to maintain establishments not merely for current requirements but to meet possible national emergencies, there must of necessity be a large expenditure due to the special circumstances of a national establishment, and which cannot equitably be charged to the work performed thereat."
Now, the national emergencies there referred to depended of course on the policy of the Cabinet. No export wanted to interfere with the policy of the Cabinet; but the policy of the Cabinet might run them into one of those national emergencies within 24 hours, but you could not build a first class fighting ship under three years, and that might put them in the position of having to call upon the Fleet. They would be anxious as long as they did not know accurately what position their Meet might have to be in; that was to say, were they perfectly prepared for one of those occasions of national emergency? That was very much the line of debate which they took the other night when they asked to know how they stood. The seamen of the Fleet might be called upon to carry out some duty in such an emergency, and they knew perfectly well that under certain conditions they would not be prepared to do what was expected of them by the country. With regard to the Wasp, the First Lord know perfectly well that if he merely said that the Wasp was all right, his statement would be worthless; but the object of his Memorandum was to re-assure Parliament and the country and those officers and men who had to go to sea in sister ships, and therefore he got the four seamen's names to the document. He wanted to bring the same system as that which was exemplified in the statement about the Wasp right through the entire administration of the Admiralty, and through every Department which was supposed to be responsible, but which now was not really so. When all things went well under the present system the First Lord of the Admiralty spoke for the whole Navy and for every detail; but directly anything went wrong the responsibility was thrown on the seamen. All the information contained in his noble Friend's memo-
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randum was derived, not from his noble Friend himself, because he knew nothing about it—how could he know? He know a great deal, no doubt; but how would he know all the information that he put in his Memorandum, and that he was supposed to be responsible for? It was all given by somebody else—by the heads of departments. But he found fault with the present system because there was no real responsibility thrown on those who gave the First Lord that information; each of them could say or withhold just as much as he liked. How often had they seen Ministers responsible for the Navy get up and make a statement that the Navy was all right, and prepared to do any duty that might be required of it, thus painting everything in the most glowing colours, and yet within two years afterwards, because the silent members of the Board had not been allowed to show the country what were the real facts, everything was suddenly found to be all wrong, and scare and panic immediately followed? And what was the result? Scares and panic and the most wicked and scandalous waste. On page 22 of the First Lord's Memorandum the Noble Lord said—
"The experience gained since last year, and the opportunities afforded during that time of making close and minute comparison between the strength of the Navy of this country and that of foreign nations, confirms my previous statement that our relative superiority is undoubted."
Now, that was a very good statement so far as it went, but there was not a seaman in the Fleet who would put his name to it, because it might be read the wrong way. It represented what might be called the book-keeping way of measuring the strength of the Navy, simply adding up two columns of names in order to see whether we had more iron-clads than any other country. That was not the way to account for the Navy at all; the point to be considered was—What had our Navy got to do as compared with other Navies? The noble Lord went on to say—
"The conditions of naval warfare have so changed, and are so changing from day to day, that nothing but actual experience could justify any confident prediction as to how a thoroughly effective protection can be given by any Fleet to a commerce whose sea-going steam tonnage is double that of the rest of the world,"

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No seaman would put his name to that either, for it was equivalent to saying "Wait till you have lost your all, and then see what you ought to have had and what you ought to have done." Again, he wished to say that he did not blame his noble Friend, but he maintained that the sentences quoted conveyed a false impression to the country. That was his point. The country must know that the First Lord was totally ignorant of technical questions. [Laughter, and cheers from the Opposition.] Well, it was perfectly true, and he would go further and say that no soldier even understood those questions—the First Lord simply got his information from his experts—and what he wanted to see was men's names put down for what they were responsible, and then it would be seen whether the Minister was giving his own opinion or the opinion of his experts. He wanted to see the name of the responsible head of the Department at the bottom of every statement affecting the particular Department, instead of being vouched by the First Lord, and then, if anything went wrong in that Department, he would try the man responsible by court-martial. Nothing of the kind could be done now, because there was no responsibility. The First Lord had often referred to the difference of opinion among experts. Just as doctors differed as to where a leg ought to come off, or architects as to the style in which a house ought to be built, so, no doubt, naval experts differed as to how the efficiency of the Navy ought to be increased, but all agreed that the thing must be done. The experts could discuss the matter, and when they came together the First Lord could then use his power [Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: Hear, hear !.] But it was not done in that way. The reduction of the salaries of the Intelligence Department was done off the First Lord's own bat, and he had not, when he changed his mind, consulted his Board at all. He was not raking up these matters because he had resigned Office. He said and did the same things when in Office, and gave proof of his sincerity by declining to sign the Estimates last year. A clerk came to him in the office about 11 o'clock in the morning with some documents and a wet pen in his hand, and asked him to sign. He said—"What am I to sign?" '' he Estimates," was
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the reply. "I? Certainly not;" he said, "I have not seen them. If I put my name to those Estimates people will think I have read them, and studied them, and am satisfied with them; whereas I have neither read them nor studied them, and I am not at all sure that I should be satisfied with them." And so he did not put his name to them. He was afterwards told that it really did not signify very much whether he signed or not; it was all right. He said that was a very bad way of doing business. With regard to the amount of savings set forth in the Memorandum, he hoped a wrong impression would not get abroad about them. They had been effected by the most excellent administration on the part of the First Lord. The noble Lord had not saved the money out of the sums voted by Parliament last year, but by looking after the details of manufacture, dock-yard management, material, and so on; and he had actually got work and more value for the money voted, although he showed a saving. Nobody could give the First Lord too much credit for the way he had worked, but not one of the points dealt with had anything to do with organization for war—that was the great point. As the First Lord knew well, he had written several letters on the question of a war organization. He was much dissatisfied with it when at the Admiralty. He called attention to the subject again and again, and he was not at all sure whether he should not think it his duty (leaving out what was called the confidential parts of those letters) to take the public into his confidence by publishing them. He was glad that the Board had seen their way to grant some slight increase of pay to the lieutenants, who were the backbone of the services, and were splendid instances of patriotism and discipline. Although they had been in a hopeless position for years, they had never growled nor grumbled, but had loyally done their duty. He hailed with great pleasure, too, the loyalty of the Australian Colonies in coining to build and equip ships in order to help us quite as much as themselves. To return to the question of war organization. The table of the distribution of the business of the Admiralty was a most curious document. No foreigner would believe it. What first drew his attention to the subject was that in the Estimates there was not a

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single mention of war organization from top to bottom. It was not in it. It was nobody's duty to look after this important work; and, considering that war organization in every other country was, in fact, the War Office and the Admiralty themselves, the House could imagine his astonishment when he went to the Admiralty and found there was no kind of war organization on the paper at all. The present Controller of the Navy (Sir W. Graham) was a most able man, and to him was mainly duo the enormous reforms which had been carried out in the Dockyards, but it was utterly impossible for him, though he might work all day and most of the night, to perform the work he was responsible for. That being so, there could not be that efficiency in the Fleet which was necessary. The Controller had 17 subjects to look after, which was more than any one man could attend to. He had taken the Controller first because he was responsible for the money. He would take next the First Sea Lord. He had 19 subjects. His position was a most serious, a most responsible one, but he was encumbered with a number—an enormous mass—of frivolous matters and small details which ought to be removed from him altogether. The Second Sea Lord had 13 subjects, and a great deal of his work was frivolous. It might be done by a far smaller person than a Lord of the Admiralty, and he a distinguished Admiral. He had, for instance, to sign little pensions, which ought to be done by a paymaster under the Financial Secretary. Then the Junior Lord had 19 subjects to look after. For that he had received £1,200 a-year, but really he had very little to do at all. This was the position he (Lord Charles Beresford) held; but the duties with which he was charged were so trivial that he had very little to do at all, and that was why he thought the other Naval Lords, who were enormously overworked, ought to have his salary of £1,000 a-year divided between them. To show how the other three Naval Lords were overworked, he need only mention that although in March last the Director of the Naval Intelligence Department brought forward a most important paper relative to the organization of our Fleet in the Mediterranean waters, the matter had not yet been touched at all. The only reason for that was overwork and bad
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distribution of business. It was all very well to say as to some matters which had been delayed, as, for instance, War Organization, "Oh, it is all in the First Sea Lord's head." Why, if he had a head as big as a line of battle ship he could not hold it all. Then others said that they should wait to see what the enemy was going to do, but that would not answer in these days of steam. Therefore their system ought to be perfect in every detail. Their Channel Fleet, their Mediterranean Fleet, ought to be so organized—at least the Channel Fleet should be so organized—that they could concentrate without delay at Portsmouth or Plymouth or wherever it was desired. Until that was done it was idle to say that the plan of campaign or the organization was complete in somebody's head. He held that the present distribution of business was utterly unsuited to the modern requirements of the day. He should like—he should be greatly interested—to see Sir W. Graham produce one day's papers that he had to settle. He should also before the Royal Commission be interested in seeing what his Friend and very cordial Colleague Sir A. Hoskins would say if asked what would he have done in 1885 if the Fleet he was to have commanded had been ordered to assemble in the Downs and to go to the Baltic. He would, no doubt, tell them that they could not have left the Downs, because there was no organization—no coals, no ammunition, no gunboats, no torpedo-boats, or anything else necessary to enable them to fight. They would find at the end of the Estimates a list of the various Departments, and in each of these Departments they had what was only common sense, so many clerks and so many of a professional staff. But when they came to the office of the Administration of the First Lord of the Admiralty, which settled everything and determined the whole management of the Navy, they would find nothing of the sort. The only assistants there were clerks. Surely that was absurd. Surely they needed professional assistance there. No Government in the world could go on on such a system as this. He was not saying anything against the clerks individually; but they were in a wrong position. Why in the name of common sense should they not give the; Lords of the Admiralty competent men

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to carry out the management of the Service? If they had competent men—naval officers—they would come there for a short time. [Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: Hear, hear !] His noble Friend cheered that. That was so. It would enable them to carry on their work in a business-like style. There were 19 clerks with salaries of from £500 to £1,000 a-year. He said that was an enormous salary, and he said, further, that when the Royal Commission examined the salaries, and compared the salaries with the knowledge of the subjects they had to deal with and their responsibility, the comparison would be ruinous to the system. Let them have someone who knew how to give orders, and how fleets should be managed. The wonderful thing was how the Admiralty had gone on. He believed it was accounted for by the fact that so many able men had done their level best in spite of the system. If there had been a real test—the test of war—they would have broken down, and the country would have suffered disaster. He was afraid he was detaining the House. Then there was a question about signals at sea, and one clerk had to go into a naval Lord's room to ask what it all meant. A ship was lost south of the Line, and one of the men-of-war had been ordered to look after refugees on a certain island. There happened at that time to be another ship coming home, and one of the clerks suggested that this ship also should join in the search. According to the chart the island was only three or four inches out of the way of the latter ship. But the ship would have been taken 4,000 miles out of her course. He was not saying a word against these gentlemen, who were zealous public servants; the fault was that of the system. As long as they kept their system as it was, they would have the Navy as inefficient as they (the seamen) told them it was. Having found all these faults, he would make a few practical suggestions. A reform was wanted in the relations subsisting between the Navy and the Mercantile Marine. He would also like it to be impossible for the First Lord to rule the Navy without consulting the Board at all. It was quite possible now—though except on one occasion his noble Friend had never done so. Next, a total redistribution of business was wanted, especially in the Controller's
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Department. The head of the Intelligence Department should be an Admiral. Thirdly, an alteration was required in. the appointment of Sea Lords. The Controller should be there for five years and the others only for three years, and each year one should retire, quite irrespectively of Party considerations. The present system upset everything. Besides, by this arrangement fresh blood would always be pouring into the Admiralty—men straight from sea, who knew what they were talking about. They were all good men there at present, but under the system there might be men in command who knew nothing of modern requirements, and might never have even been in a torpedo boat. Fourthly, the secretarial department ought to be re-constructed entirely, in which there should be found commanders, lieutenants, or paymasters capable of understanding the orders they might have to frame for the Fleet. These also should only stay for three years and have permanent clerks under them. The result of this would not be to give more power to the experts, but to distribute responsibility and strengthen the hands of the First Lord. There was no real responsibility now. These reforms were connected with business, but other arrangements were wanted as soon as possible for war organization. There should be an amendment in the system of training seamen, and there should be a sea-going gunnery ship. Some reforms were no doubt being effected, but they would probably take years to complete under the present system. Changes, too, were needed in the non-combatant service, and in the signal department, which should be given a warrant rank. Greater latitude should also be given to Commanders-in-Chief, both at home and abroad; and a new system of signalling between the Navy and the mercantile marine, so that vessels might change their route in time of war. At present we were liable, in case of war, to lose hundreds and thousands of tons of shipping because this was not carried out. One Commander-in-Chief had written to him that he had to devise his own plan of campaign, and had received no information as to the assistance he might expect or as to his coal supplies. To a certain extent, no doubt, the system of war organization was improving, but that

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improvement was not going on half fast enough, and could not until the present Admiralty system was reformed. They must reform from the top, not from the bottom. Fifthly, coast defence ought to be thoroughly organized, and the second-class reserve men should be organized on the same lines as lifeboat crews at present were. Sixthly, arrangements should be made as to coaling at sea. Seventhly, there ought to be means of adding to the Admiralty in time of war. It was utterly impossible that with the present system the Admiralty could do what it would have to do in time of war. Further, the shipbuilding policy should depend on the necessities of defence without regard to Party or a popular Budget. The First Lord in one of his speeches had under-rated the value of the Intelligence Department; but his noble Friend, he maintained, was quite incapable of knowing the value of that department for organization for war. How should he? Why, even some of the officers of the Service could not always see what was necessary to win an action. How, then, should the First Lord know the value of such a department? In fact, the Intelligence Department ought to be the brains of the whole Service, and the best men ought to be in it. His noble Friend had said, that if there were any agitation or excitement it would be the sailors who would be turned out of the Admiralty and not the civilians; that was not a wise throat, or one likely to be carried out. There was a good deal of anxiety both in this country and the colonies as to the administration and efficiency of the Navy. What the country wanted was practical suggestions from the experts as to the organization of the Navy—men who knew what they were talking about. He had been asked why his colleagues did not resign with him. One reason was that they did not write M.P. after their names, The only way to get reform was by moving that House. His colleagues and naval men might write to The Times, or have their grumble in "Rule Britannia" after dinner speeches, and this they did sometimes because they were proud of the service; but that was not the same thing as addressing the House of Commons. For the first time an estimate had been produced which did give clear Parliamentary control over shipbuilding and manufacture, but it had
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nothing to do with the efficiency of the Float, and of that Parliament had no guarantee of any sort but what the First Lord of the Admiralty chose to tell them. He had said nothing in his speech which need provoke a scare. He had not asked for any extravagant outlay. All he had asked was that the administration of the Admiralty should be conducted on business principles. He had only asked for good organization and sound business principles. A squadron on a foreign station was more important to this country than an Army Corps was to Germany, because an Army Corps might be replaced, whereas if we lost a squadron we could not replace it until it wag too late, and had lost our mercantile interests on that station. He might observe that many of the papers which he wrote at the Admiralty calling attention principally to this question of war organization, were agreed to by his Colleagues, but nothing was done. With regard to his resignation, he felt genuine regret at leaving his Colleagues, especially his chief, who was an old personal friend of his. He felt, however, that all the trouble occasioned by his resignation would have served some useful purpose if, after hearing his statement, the House consented to the appointment of a special Royal Commission to investigate the matter he now complained of, and determine whether he was right or wrong. In conclusion, he begged to move the Motion which stood in his name.
MR. SPEAKER: the noble and gallant Gentleman should add at the end of his Resolution some such words as "In the administrative system of the Admiralty."
LORD CHARLES BERESFORDsaid, he was quite ready to make the addition suggested.
ADMIRAL MAYNEsaid, he rose for the purpose of seconding the Motion, and in doing so he wished to repudiate any desire of making a personal attack upon the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton), or on any of the Members, or of the Board of Admiralty of which the noble Lord was the head. He did this more particularly because he knew that it was said, even within the walls of that House, that this was an attack on the part of his noble and gallant Friend the Member for East Marylebone (Lord

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Charles Beresford) against his late Chief and his late Colleagues, and that it was part of a scheme for discrediting their administration. So far from that being the case, he begged to say, on his own behalf, and he believed he might say on behalf of the Service generally, that the noble Lord and his present Colleagues had done great things for the Navy, although he did not think that they had always done so either with that deliberation or that consideration for others which, they might have shown. He wished to show the House that it was impossible to govern the Navy under the present system, and that it had never been done properly, and that though the responsibility ought to rest with the First Lord—and was always supposed to have so rested—unfortunately, whenever a serious difficulty occurred, the First Lord showed no anxiety to take it upon himself. What he wanted to see was that the responsibility of the First Lord should not be a myth, but that it should be given in such a way that it would be impossible to escape it by those who ought to answer for the condition of the Fleet. The noble and gallant Lord had spoken of the Intelligence Department, and if the Admiralty had had the most remote conception of what that Department ought to be—and what it must be before long—there would not have been a quarrel over such a paltry matter as the pay of the Department. The Intelligence Department was copied from Germany, but it was a bad copy. As one small example of the wonderful system which he condemned, he would remind the House that none of the authorities could agree as to when intelligence was first shown at the Admiralty. We were told by some gallant officers that it had been in existence for 25 years. On the other hand, they were told by no less an officer than Sir Geoffrey Hornby in The Times, that it did not exist to any appreciable extent when, years after that, he wished to know, at the time the country was expected to go to war, about the coaling resources of the country we were about to go to war with. That gallant officer was unable to get any information from the Admiralty, and he had to go to the War Office in order to obtain the information he required. It would surprise the House to learn what had occurred at the
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time the right hon. Gentleman the present Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Goschen) was at the head of the Admiralty. It was found that there were no means of communicating by telegraph with any of our Admirals in command at foreign stations, because the private code books were only supplied to those officers who had the least need of them—namely, the Admirals in command of the home ports. The Commander-in-Chief in North America had found that he had no means of communicating privately with the Governor General of Canada. Sir Geoffrey Hornby strongly urged that the Intelligence Department should not be cramped in its first starting; but this was exactly what had been done, for though the scheme of salaries provided for an Admiral at the head of the Department, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would never agree to the increased amount when the First Lord admitted that a Captain was enough. He (Admiral Mayne) wished to show the House that the Admiralty had never been efficient, and that it had at no time satisfied the requirements of the country or of the Navy. When the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty talked of his taking responsibility, it was not an original notion. The noble Lord was not the first individual who had talked of the responsibility of the First Lord. Before the Special Committee of 1861 Sir James Graham claimed that he was responsible for all that went on at the Admiralty, and Sir Francis Baring, when asked if he agreed with Sir James Graham, said that he did. The Duke of Somerset being pressed to say whether he was responsible for such a detail as the selection of ships for reliefs of foreign stations, replied that he was. In the first instance, he said that the responsibility rested with him and the First Sea Lord, but that if he chose to interfere, it rested with the First Lord. That was the view which had been held by First Lords for a long time, and it was made more prominent by an Order in Council when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Edinburgh (Mr. Childers) was at the head of the Admiralty.
MR. CHILDERSsaid, he begged the hon. and gallant Member's pardon. What he did was precisely the reverse. He made the First Sea Lord responsible,
ADMIRAL MAYNEsaid, that the right hon. Gentleman, by an Order in Council, made the responsibility of the First Lord more definite and prominent.
MR. CHILDERSsaid, the special object of the Order in Council was to make each Naval Lord, and especially the First Sea Lord, responsible, instead of treating the Naval Lords as a small Committee.
ADMIRAL MAYNEsaid, his opinion and that of the right hon. Gentleman differed altogether as to the effect of that Order in Council. Although full responsibility was claimed in that House by the First Lord, in the event of disaster the blame was always allowed to rest elsewhere. He had no wish to go too far back, but the same system had been going on for more than 200 years, and he recollected no instance in which the First Lord had claimed the responsibility where there was any real danger. When Admiral Byng was tried at Plymouth, did the First Lord come forward and say that he was responsible for sending out that officer to relieve Minorca with 10 under-manned battle ships to stop a landing by the French in Minorca which had taken place before he could get there, under cover of 12 battle ships and a number of frigates? On the contrary, he allowed Admiral Byng to be tried. Why did not the First Lord say—"I was responsible, entirely responsible, for all that occurred," and save that unfortunate officer, whose gallantry was undeniable, from an unjust sentence? Then, in Nelson's time was the Admiralty satisfactory? He would not quote from the more fiery spirits then afloat, but from the courageous and noble but long suffering Collingwood. What was it that that gallant officer said? He wrote, after Trafalgar—
"I never hear from England The Admiralty seem to have so much business in other quarters that they cannot attend to me. If they could send me a few more ships I should not care, but I am very much pinched for force to spread over the extensive seas which I have to range. Nothing could have been more neglectful than the Admiralty had been."
Jumping over the next 50 years he came to the Crimean war, circumstances attending which were in the memory of many hon. Members. It was evident that even then the Admiralty did not satisfy
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the country or the Service. Sir James Graham was First Lord, and before the 1861 Committee claimed full responsibility and supremacy at the Admiralty; but when Admiral Sir Charles Napier came home from the Baltic, did Sir James Graham take the blame upon his own shoulders for the failure—as the country thought it—of that expedition? Did he say—" I did not give Sir Charles Napier a single gunboat which was able to get within several miles of the forts which he is blamed for not taking?" It was not until 1855 that 150 gunboats were commenced, and they were completed just in time to take part in the great Naval Review which followed the Declaration of Peace in 1850, not having fired a single shot in anger. Did the First Lord then say—"I am responsible?" No; he allowed the responsibility to fall on the Commander-in-Chief. Knowledge of such facts made the Service anxious to get vessels of the right quality and in the right quantity, because they knew that the blame would always fall upon the naval officers in command. The present system of managing our Navy which had gone on for so long a time was utterly rotten, and he hoped that the result of the Royal Commission would be to tear it up by the roots and to found a new one in its place. He felt strongly the necessity for inquiry into the system which he so condemned by a Royal Commission, and if he did not follow the noble and gallant Lord in submitting a stel it was not because he had not got one, but because he thought the time of the House of Commons should not be occupied in discussing details. He was not vain enough to think that his scheme might not be improved by a Committee or a Royal Commission; but he thought it had been pointed out by the noble and gallant Lord who had already addressed the House that an entirely new system was required. He had referred to what had occurred in 1854. At a later period a Committee sat in 1861. The Members of the Board of Admiralty were divided among themselves as to their respective duties and responsibilities, and there was no kind of continuity in the policy of the Board. Admiral Sir George Seymour was asked whether and to what extent he considered himself responsible for the advice he gave, and his answer was—

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"I do not consider myself in the least liable to be told to walls out of the Admiralty by the First Lord. I do not consider myself Lord Addington's nominee. I can never consider it depends on the First Lord to remove me."
He was asked—
"Do you consider that there really was, in point of fact, a supremacy of the First Lord?"
And he replied—
"His position as a Cabinet Minister gave him a weight which one in that position should have; but I do not admit his being supreme."
Sir John Pakington, speaking of himself as First Lord, said—
"I never did feel on the Admiralty that I had either the knowledge or the control or the responsibility which I think the Minister who is at the head of so great a Department ought to have."
He added—
"It was hardly possible to regard the First Lord as being supreme among his Colleagues, and," he said, "he considered it a very awkward and difficult arrangement for the First Lord to assume a responsibility."
With these differences it was not a matter of surprise that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Edinburgh when he came into Office, having read these conflicting opinions, should have said—"The best tiling I could do is to make the matter clear." But, then, what happened? One of the first things that occurred was the appointment of a Controller of the Navy, and that was another of the many instances of want of continuity at the Admiralty. The unfortunate Captain went down; but when that ship sunk did the First Lord of the Admiralty take the responsibility upon his own shoulders of the loss of that vessel? No; neither the First Lord, nor the First Sea Lord, nor the Second Sea Lord, took the responsibility; but the First Lord wrote a Minute relating to the loss of the Captain in November, 1870, which seriously affected the reputation of Sir Spencer Robinson, the Controller of the Navy. The Select Committee on the Board of Admiralty in 1871 reported that—
"The combination of the two Offices of Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty and Controller placed him in an anomalous position, since he was at once a member of the Board and also serving under the Board. This arrangement has not been altogether successful."
The Minute of the right hon. Member for South Edinburgh, in 1870 relating
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to the loss of the Captain was published without having been seen by the First Sea Lord or Sir Spencer Robinson. He called attention to the existence of this beautiful system which enabled the First Lord of the Admiralty to publish a Minute without having first shown it to the officer concerned or to the First Sea Lord, who were his primary Advisers, or, to speak more properly, his Colleagues. The Committee went on to remark in their Report—
"Such a proceeding is quite unprecedented; but it showed the great difficulty of exactly fixing the responsibility."
No doubt it did; but the same difficulty existed now as it did then.
MR. CHILDERS: What is the date of that Committee?
ADMIRAL MAYNEsaid, he was referring to the Report of the Committee of 1871 on the Board of Admiralty, which states that on the 30th of November, 1870, "Mr. Childers wrote a Minute relating to the loss of the Captain."
MR. CHILDERS: What was the nature of the Committee? I have read no Report of a Committee containing those words.
ADMIRAL MAYNEsaid, it was not a Departmental, but a Select Committee.
MR. CHILDERS: A Select Committee of which House, and upon what?
ADMIRAL MAYNEsaid, he could not state at that moment from memory; but it was a Committee known as the Select Committee of 1871, and he should be happy to show the Report to the right hon. Gentleman. He was quite certain as to his quotations, although he might not be strictly accurate as to the date. The Report went on to say—
"The First Lord being himself nominally responsible for sending the ship—the Captain—to sea, constituted himself a judge of the case, and, exempting himself from all blame, distributed censure amongst a number of persons, while he placed the chief weight on the Controller, who had been by a former Board especially released from this responsibility. So, again, as to the responsibility of the other Lords. The division, matériel and personnel, appeared on a superficial view to be precise and easily understood. Almost every witness gave his opinion that the union of a seat on the Board with the Office of Controller had been a mistake."
MR. CHILDERS: No such Report was ever made by a Select Committee.

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The hon. and gallant Gentleman is entirely mistaken.
ADMIRAL MAYNEsaid, yet when that question arose respecting the building of a new class of frigate the First Sea Lord said he considered this a question for himself rather than for the Lord of the Admiralty who was Controller of the Admiralty, and that the fancies of the Controller need not be considered. That showed again the utterly mixed condition into which the Board of Admiralty had got as to responsibility. He had spoken of the appointment of the Controller of the Navy, and had stated that the appointment gave rise to some difference of opinion at the Board of Admiralty itself. In 1869,an Order in Council merged the control of the Navy into a Third Lord—
"With the view of simplifying and facilitating the transaction of the business of the Department, and more effectually controlling; the naval expenditure."
But, in 1872, another Order in Council re-established the Controller of the Navy as an office "to be held for a fixed period by an officer not a Member of the Board." In 1882, it was considered desirable that the Controller should again be appointed Naval Lord, and an additional Civil Lord should be appointed "who should possess sufficient mechanical and engineering knowledge, as well as administrative experience," to assist the Controller. He mentioned these things to show that there had been no continuity whatever in the policy of the Board of Admiralty, although he was aware that the noble Lord at the head had spoken, at Baling, of the continuity of the Service being far better than that of the French Naval Service. During the 30 years following the last Lord High Admiral there had been no less than 103 changes in the Admiralty; consequently, the experience of the Lords of the Admiralty had averaged something like half a-year each. Since 1880, there had been three First Lords, seven Financial Secretaries, and 16 Lords. Taking an average, they would find that a First Lord with an average experience of two years, was financially advised by Secretaries with an average of one year experience, and in other matters by Lords of an average experience of six months. It was upon such limited experience as this that these
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officers undertook to prepare the Navy Estimates, and he would ask the House, or any man of experience, how it was possible to perform the work satisfactorily under a system like that? The noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty had himself condemned the system—as would be admitted by the House when he reminded them of the answer which the First Lord gave last year to the noble Lord the Member for South Paddington (Lord Randolph Churchill) when he attacked the Admiralty. The First Lord on that occasion admitted that the whole system had been bad from beginning to end, until he came into Office with a Board against which he (Admiral Mayne) had nothing to say. He would, however, remind the House that if it had not been for this wonderfully able Board, with the business experience of which they had heard so much of the Financial Secretary; if it had not been for the Heaven-born administration of the First Sea Lord, and the great mastery of details possessed by the Second Lord, and the abilities of the recusant Lord who last addressed the House, the affairs of the Admiralty might still have remained in a state of chaos in which the First Lord stated he had found them. When the question was raised about the ships, they were told by the First Lord that the money had been badly spent; that the contracts for the ships had not been properly looked into; that the Administrative Department had not been properly managed; and that adequate details had not been given, and they were assured that for the first time in our naval history the details had been given. It was said that the Admiralty had been re-organized; but it had been re-organized time after time. Every First; Lord who came into Office immediately declared that he was about to re-organize it, and that wonderful things were to be accomplished under his administration; so it had been from the first, and so it would be—unless the system, was altered—to the end of the chapter. In 1861, Sir James Graham announced the reforms which were only commenced to be made last year. Sir James Graham, giving evidence before the Committee of 1861, said that all the details of the individual cost of every ship not only could be given to the House of Commons, but that the time had arrived when it wag absolutely necessary that they should

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be so given. That was 25 years ago, and yet they were told that the reforms were only commenced last year. They were among the changes which the noble Lord the First Lord made so much of, and he thought, it showed that a system must be utterly rotten which could go on for 25 years and yet enable the present administration last year to take the first stop in building ships according to the Estimates, and spending money with advantage to the State. More than that, some of the improvements and reforms which the First Lord claimed to have effected were entirely opposed to the opinions of former First Lords, and would probably be altered immediately if, by an unfortunate turn of the wheel of fortune, hon. Gentlemen opposite should again be placed at the head of the Department. The noble Lord claimed that he had inaugurated a system by which the Lords of the Admiralty were able to minute their objections to any particular decision of the Board. But when the Committee sat on the loss of the Megœra, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Edinburgh was asked by Lord Lawrence if he approved of the system adopted by the Council of India. The right hon. Gentleman said he knew very little about it, whereupon Lord Lawrence explained it to him, and the right hon. Gentleman said that he took one fatal objection to the system. That objection was one for which the First Lord now took credit. Therefore the House might rest assured that this would be altered the moment the Board of Admiralty was changed, if the right hon. Gentleman came into Office again. The First Lord said that it was sheer nonsense to talk about supremacy of the permanent officials of the Admiralty; but in the name of common sense how could it be otherwise when the First Lord and the Financial Secretary and the Naval Lords were all liable to a clean sweep whenever a change of Government took place, and were replaced by others who could not possibly know anything of the business for several months at the least. In the inquiry into the loss of the Megœra, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Edinburgh made this statement—
"I said to Mr. Lushington this state of things ought to exist, that if the heads of the Office whose tenure depends upon considerations
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of political character were removed, you and your heads of branches ought to have such a grasp of the business that you can carry it on until the new heads of the Office are warm in their saddles."
How long it took to get warm in the saddle must, of course, depend a good deal on the pace at which they went; but evidently until that was so the permanent clerks must rule, and sometimes the Board again changed before they had had time to get warm in their saddles. Now, what had happened in the case of the present Board of Admiralty? A Naval Lord retired. Well, he had known 100 Naval Lords retire, but in this instance the First Lord considered it necessary to explain to his constituents why the noble and gallant Lord who had just addressed the House left Office, together with the differences which had existed between the noble and gallant Lord and himself. Surely, this fact showed the amount of confusion which existed in the Department. And while the noble Lord was telling one thing to his constituents at Baling, the hon. Gentleman the Financial Adviser of the First Lord was giving" quite another version to his constituents in another part of the Kingdom. The noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty evidently did not know the position of the Members of the Board of Admiralty, for in the same sentence he spoke of them as primary Advisers, Colleagues, and subordinates. The words of the noble Lord were—
"The difference between the War Office and the Admiralty is, first that the naval officers are my Colleagues and not Assistants; they act as my primary and not as secondary Advisers."
Further on, he says, speaking of the noble and gallant Lord the Member for East Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford)—
"If he had succeeded in forcing me to reverse my decision, not a shred of the authority of the head of the Department would have remained, and a precedent would have been established of the most mischievous character, that of the First Lord yielding to his naval subordinate on a financial question."
That naval subordinate was the noble and gallant Lord, a Member of the Board of Admiralty, and the primary Adviser of the First Lord. Consequently, they were told that the First Lord had a primary Adviser from whom he got as much advice as possible, but acted upon

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it as much or as little as he chose. It came to this, that so far as the position of primary Adviser to the First Lord was concerned, so long as there was an agreement between them, the primary Advisor was the First Lord's Colleague, but when they differed he became his subordinate. In his Ealing speech the First Lord had nothing but praise for his Board: but surely if it was competent for a First Lord to praise the acts of the Board, it was equally so for him to condemn them, and there was nothing except a sense of duty to prevent any other Naval Lord not a Member of this House from calling a meeting in Hyde Park in order to give his version of the mode in which the affairs of the Admiralty were conducted. The First Lord told the public that the present Controller of the Navy was so able and so capable that he had reduced the Dockyard expenditure by £200,000; but at the same time his financial Advisor was tolling his audience at Ormskirk that naval officers were quite unfit to control large establishments. As to the capabilities of naval officers for such positions, he would remind the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury that within a few days they had been told by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. B. Stanhope) that he had selected a naval officer for the command of the largest gun factory in England. The hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty had also said that the Report of the French Budget Committee showed that it was owing to the fact of the French having a naval officer at the head of the Navy that they had overrun their Estimates—[Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: Hear, hear !]—and that he had been superseded by a Civilian. The noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty said "Hear, hear !" but did he know that for the last 20 years the French had had naval officers at the head of their Admiralty, except for somewhat under two years in all, and that Admiral Krantz was at this moment in that position? If it was duo to this cause that the French had overrun their Estimates, how about our own Estimates? The Benbow cost £52,000, the Edinburgh £77,000, and the Warspite £71,000 above the original Estimates, and they were told that it was not until an entire novelty had been introduced into the
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Department by the present Administration that our ships were over built within the Estimates. In his judgment, many things might be advantageously copied by us from the French. So far from blaming Admiral Aube, the French Budget Committee told them that they had the good fortune to meet with the greatest assistance from the administration of the Navy, Admiral Aube having, from the time of his taking office, appointed a Committee to prepare now regulations conducive to economy. The head of the Admiralty was perfectly willing to work with that Committee, and the plan had worked well. When Admiral Aube reduced the French Naval Establishments, what did he do? He induced the Committee to grant a considerable sum of money in order to prevent a cruel discharge of a large number of men in the winter. Indeed there are many things which were done in France which might be advantageously copied in this country. He had little further to do than to point out that it was most wrong to say that naval officers were invariably in favour of expenditure. What they wanted was to be governed under a proper and intelligible system, and that the money should be spent for the real benefit of the Navy and country. Under the present system officers in the Navy were, during a period of three, four or five years, almost invariably kept on shore waiting for command, while in that time they might otherwise be gaining experience for the benefit of the Service. Naval officers did not want useless expenditure; their wish was to see in the Navy a sufficient number of ships of the highest and most efficient class. He wished, in conclusion, to put to the House and the noble Lord this Question, which was the real test—Was our system economical, and did it supply us with a proper Navy? As to economy, our Admiralty Vote dealt with 62,000 men; the French Admiralty Vote dealt with 45,000 men and 25,000 Marines and Marino Artillerymen, or 65,000 men. We employed at the Admiralty, for the purpose of administering this force, 500 persons; the French Government employed 250 persons only, or exactly half that number. Again, the monetary difference was far greater, our Vote for these persons amounting last year to £211,000. But calling it £200,000, the amount of the French Estimate was

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£51,000 only. This sum included everything properly attributable to the French Admiralty except the very slight difference between the full and extra pay of the French Admirals on the Council—3,000 francs each—and the result showed that our Board of Admiralty employed double the number of persons employed by the French, and that at four times the cost. He (Admiral Mayne) admitted that everything in England -was most costly in the matter of salaries, from the Secretary of State downwards, but even allowing for this country a charge double that of the French, the English system still cost £100,000 a-year in this Department more than the French. Then with regard to efficiency he defied the First Lord of the Admiralty, notwithstanding the post-prandial declarations of the First Sea Lord at the Engineers' Dinner the other night, to say that the Board of Admiralty were unanimous or that the majority of the Board would say that we had enough ships, either building or on the programme. He (Admiral Mayne) did not believe that the majority of the Board would say that they agreed with the policy which the First Lord had put into his Statement—namely, that of not laying down any more ironclads in 1888–9. He did not say that he had authority to state that the majority of the Board did not agree with the noble Lord; but could the noble Lord assure the House that his naval advisers who signed the Estimates of last year—he had not had time to examine the Estimate of the present year—agreed with him? The point was that the country was paying four times as much as the French were paying, bunt they certainly had not got one-third more ships, which every naval officer allowed they ought to have. It was well known that the French had four or five ships half-built, which they could complete sooner than, we could complete ours, which were not yet even designed, while, at the same time, shipbuilding in Russia was going forward. There was no naval officer who would come before a Commission and say that we had a sufficient number of ships for the defence of the Imperial interests. He must repeat that naval officers did not wish for unnecessary expenditure the feelings of the Navy were never better described than by Nelson, when writing
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to Collingwood enclosing him the plan of fighting the battle of Trafalgar. He said—
"You and I can have no petty jealousies; we have but one object in view, the annihilation of our enemies and to bring a glorious peace to England."
That was the object which he believed all naval officers at the present day had before them.
Amendment proposed,
To leave out from the word "That'' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "the allocation of authority in the administrative system of the Admiralty requires entire reform."—(Lord Charles Beresford.)
Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON): I think, Sir, it is due to my noble and gallant Friend (Lord Charles Beresford) that I should now intervene in the debate, and take notice of the observations which he made, as well as those of the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Admiral Mayne) who has just sat down I must at the outset protest against one remark made by my noble Friend and several remarks made by the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just spoken. They have no right to assume that the Admiralty is not actuated by motives as pure as their own. My noble Friend distinctly stated that if the other noble Lords did not resign, it was probably because they were not Members of Parliament, and my noble and gallant Friend and the last speaker have held up to ridicule the speech of the Senior Naval Lord (Admiral Acland Hood) made on Saturday last. They have pretended that there were certain Members of the Board who altogether differed from that speech and differed from my Memorandum.
LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: I never said anything of the kind.
ADMIRAL MAYNE: As to the wording of the Memorandum I have no authority for that. I said I defied the noble Lord to say they agreed that we had enough ships—the policy of not building more.
LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: The theory of my hon. Friends is that the First Lord of the Admiralty ought implicitly to rely on the advice of experts. When I asked for their authority for in-

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sinuating that the Naval Lords differ from me, my hon. and gallant Friend say she defies me to state that they agree with me. Well, they do agree. Every word of the Memorandum was sent to every Member of the Board who was responsible for any one Department, and it was because they agreed with me that I have laid it on the Table of this House. [Admiral MAYNE here made a remark.] I must object to its being intimated either by assertion or insinuation that there is a difference of opinion between the First Lord of the Admiralty and the experts on the Board which does not exist. I wish now to refer to the difference which arose between my noble and gallant Friend and myself as to the salaries of the Intelligence Department. The question is a very simple one. I have repeatedly explained it at great length, but I am afraid I must recapitulate it. Four Naval Lords in November, 1886, pressed strongly upon me the necessity of enlarging the existing Naval Intelligence Department and adding to it a mobilization side; and they stated to me that as the work was urgent the appointment of the officers ought to be made at once. I went and saw the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Goschen), and I got his assent to enlarging the establishment on the understanding that the numbers and the salaries of the Department so enlarged were subsequently to be subject to Treasury revision. That was the understanding, and on that understanding those officers were appointed, and the whole Board were consenting parties to that condition, and my noble and gallant Friend was one of the Members of the Board who consented. The salaries which were proposed by the Committee seemed to me to be high; but believing that the Naval Lords were unanimous and these salaries being strongly pressed upon me by the First Naval Lord, I sent them forward to the Treasury, somewhat contrary to my better judgment. It was never asserted that these salaries were necessary for insuring efficiency. My noble and gallant Friend did not assert it. They were based upon the status and comparative salaries of other officers of other Departments. The Treasury pressed for our arguments; the arguments that were put forward were demolished, as the Treasury pointed out that what should regulate
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the standard was not the comparative salaries of other officers, but the work that had to be done, and what was the amount necessary to get the best men to do it. They, moreover, pointed out to me—and it was an argument that came home to myself—that no revision and no reduction in any Department would be possible if those officers who came in afresh were to have their salaries fixed on the highest scale which existed. I looked most carefully into the matter, and gave to it, I believe, even more personal attention than my noble and gallant Friend did himself. I saw that the salaries which the Treasury proposed were almost identical with those that were enjoyed by the Intelligence Department at the War Office, and in every single instance they were considerably above the full pay that the officers would have received. Seeing, also, that the question at issue did affect the efficiency of the Department, that the controversy had gone on for nearly 10 months, that I had ascertained in the meantime that two Naval Lords did not adhere to the original salaries which had been fixed, but thought them too high, and, feeling as I did, that there could be no greater waste of time than by the prolongation of an inter-departmental dispute, I directed a letter to be written to the Treasury, and so anxious was I that every Naval Lord should know what I had done that before I sent it to the Treasury every Naval Lord saw it and initialed it. The noble and gallant Lord did not object to it, and that shows that he did not consider that the reduction would affect the permanent efficiency of the Department. I heard no more. The letter went to the Treasury. Six weeks afterwards my noble and gallant Friend sent in a Memorandum—written in the strongest Saxon at his command—telling me that unless I chose to reverse my decision he would resign.
LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: No; put the Memorandum on the Table, and let the House see the real truth.
LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: I should be glad to do whatever is consistent with the public interest; but whatever differences of opinion may arise on a point of this kind in a Department, obviously the Head of that Department must have some power at

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some time of settling the question, and if ever there was an instance in which a civilian head should exercise his authority it was surely on a matter of this sort. It was not a naval question, and if anybody at the Admiralty was competent to judge what was the salary that would command the pick of the talent available for these appointments, it was the First Lord of the Admiralty. [Mr. GOSCHEN: The First Naval Lord.] No, the First Lord of the Admiralty, because he has to make all appointments above a certain grade, both on shore and afloat; and although I regret that my noble and gallant Friend resigned on that ground, there have been since thon two vacancies in that Department, and there is a probability shortly of a vacancy through the head of the Department going to sea. In every single instance where there had been a vacancy we have been able to get the very men we want, and there has never been a word of protest against the salary. The question is a small one in itself, although it raises a very large principle—namely, whether a Junior Naval Lord was on such a matter to dictate to the whole of the Board of Admiralty. I feel satisfied myself that if I had been in my noble and gallant Friend's position, and he had been in mine, he would have dealt with me in such a case in a much more summary fashion than I dealt with him. My noble and gallant Friend has, however, occupied the greater portion of his speech in raising a question with which, if the House will allow me, I should like to come to close quarters. I confess for myself that I feel very conscious of the anomaly that a civilian like myself should be at the head of the Board of Admiralty, where there are so many distinguished admirals who have served their country. But when it is suggested that a military or a naval officer should be at the head of the War Office or at the head of the Admiralty, I want the House to reflect just for a moment what that means. If the House and the country could get over the objections which I am about to state and were willing to try the system of having a Naval Lord at the head of the Admiralty, I would willingly resign my present Office to-morrow in favour of the First Naval Lord. But the most cherished principle of the Constitution
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of this country is that when a Member of this House accepts Office he ceases to be a Member of the House of Commons and has to be re-elected. If naval and military officers were to become the heads of the great spending Departments, you would lay down the rule that when they are placed at the head of the War Department or of the Admiralty they are to be ipso facto Members of the Legislature. Is that a principle to which this House would like to assent? Suppose it did assent to it; let us pursue the matter a little further. The hon. and gallant Gentleman who spoke second to-night (Admiral Mayne) alluded to the evidence that was given by very distinguished men before two Committees. Some of the ablest administrators which this country has produced gave important evidence on this matter. Among them were Sir James Graham and the late Duke of Somerset; and they were both examined at a time of life when they were not likely again to hold Office. Both Sir James Graham and the Duke of Somerset took this strong objection to the suggestion that I am now considering—namely, that it would result in introducing politics into the Navy without bringing additional naval experience to the Admiralty. Naval officers would have to be chosen as much or even more for their politics as for their professional qualifications. I am not sure that in France the presence of a military officer at the head of the War Department or of a naval officer at the head of the Admiralty is a source of stability to that country. My hon. and gallant Friend alluded to the French Estimates. In February last, in France, a most able Report was made by a Committee, and no charges such as those made against the administration of the French Navy had been made against the administration of the British Navy. There is an absolute concensus of opinion that the result of appointing a distinguished expert at the head of the French Admiralty has been such a rash expenditure incurred without sufficiently testing the objects upon which it was made as very seriously to jeopardize naval finance in France. Unless this House and the country are prepared to upset old political and Constitutional principles, there seems no possible remedy that can be applied, and it seems doubtful if any good would result. Now

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such being the case, you must have a Parliamentarian at the head of affairs. If you have a Parliamentarian he must have some control over his own Office. My noble and gallant Friend is very anxious that the opinions of the exports should be laid before Parliament, so that responsibility should be concentrated on those who advise the First Lord. My noble and gallant Friend had certain Departments under him at the Admiralty, and he made very few suggestions with reference to them; but he did make a large number of suggestions in regard to the Departments of the other Naval Lords, and he proposed to make great alterations in Departments for which he was not responsible. But if those Naval Lords are to be held responsible for their opinions, and if they object to many of the proposals of my noble and gallant Friend, why are those proposals to be forced upon them? Does it not come back to this, that my noble and gallant Friend—because he happens to be in the House of Commons—is in a position to criticize the proceedings and the management of the Departments of the Naval Lords who are experts; and does it not show that as long as there are in this House men who are entitled as having special knowledge to express opinions on naval matters they will criticize statements made in the Estimates whether they come from the experts or from the First Lord, and who is to defend the exports' opinions if attacked? My noble and gallant Friend alleges that in the Memorandum I issued I made statements that no seaman would make. I utterly traverse and contradict that statement. I say that every statement in that Memorandum was carefully discussed with the Naval Lord whose Department it concerned, and the two concluding statements contained in the paragraph he quoted—and to which he took special exception—were discussed perhaps more than any others. My noble and gallant Friend says that by the present system misleading documents may be laid before Parliament; and that I, as a civilian, have come to conclusions altogether fallacious as to the naval supremacy of this country. I do not know by what means you can test the relative superiority of this country as compared with other countries, except by taking the number of ships,
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the number of men, and the number of guns, and comparing them with the number of ships, the number of men, and the number of guns which those respective nations have. It may interest the House if I give my data for the statements I advanced; but if the House thinks we are too weak, and will press the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give additional sums of money to the Navy, I will endeavour to do my best to spend it judiciously. In the statement I am about to read, I exclude all the iron-clads anterior to the Devastation—which, in the opinion of naval exports, is a vessel worth re-fitting and re-engining—and include the Admiral and the belted Cruiser class. On March 1, 1887, the number of iron-clads was 16, with an aggregate tonnage of 127,000 tons. In addition to this there were five ships in reserve, with 44,000 tons, making in all a total of 171,000 tons. France, at the same time, had 10 ships in commission and six ships in reserve, with an aggregate of 119,000 tons; Italy had two ships in commission and two in reserve, with an aggregate of 41,000 tons; while Russia had one ship in commission and four in reserve, with an aggregate of 25,000 tons. That was how we stood on March 1, 1887; but during the past year—that is to say, the present financial year ending April 1—there have been added to the reserve 46,000 tons, as compared with 14,300 for France and 13,000 for Italy. Next year—carrying out the programme now before Parliament—we shall pass 53,000 tons, as compared with 29,000 for Franco, 32,000 for Italy, and 26,000 for Russia. In the following year we shall pass 39,000 tons, as against 20,000 tons for France, 13,000 for Italy, and 20,000 for Russia. And the result is that, whereas on March 1, 1887, we had 171,000 tons, as against 119,000 for France, 41,000 for Italy, and 26,000 for Russia, we shall have, as at April, 1890, 311,000 tons, as against 184,000 for France, 100,000 for Italy, and 73,000 for Russia. Therefore, we shall have during those years largely increased, and are still increasing, our lead. What our superiority as compared with other nations should be is a matter of dispute, but I am well within the mark when I say that we are from 30 to 40 per cent above the next most powerful naval power. That being the condition of

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things—and we can build much faster than any foreign country—I believe our relative superiority, as far as fighting power is concerned, is established, and that if we continue upon our programme we shall continue to make a greater advance in superiority. Then my noble and gallant Friend criticized the statement in which I remarked that—
"When we consider the defence and protection which our commerce may require, extreme caution and reserve must be exorcised,"
and that—
"nothing but actual experience could justify any confident prediction as to how a thoroughly effective protection can be given by any fleet "
to our enormous Mercantile Marine. Will any single naval officer get up and answer how that can be done? I have the advantage as First Lord to come in contact with many distinguished officers going out to take commands and coming home; and I find the most extraordinary diversity of opinion as to how effective protection can be given to our enormous Mercantile Marine; and if that opinion does exist, why am I to be attacked for giving expression to it in the Memorandum? It is because there is this wide diversity of opinion that it is necessary to be careful at the present time. Then my noble Friend complains that we have not followed the French in the matter of melanite, which gave a remarkable exhibition of its power the other day in bursting in a gun, and blowing the gun to atoms. That it was a most sensitive explosive was proved by the recent fatal accident at Belfort.
LORD CHARLES BERESFORDsaid, he had complained that whilst the French had spent £1,000,000 on shells with high explosive bursting charges, we had not even made a trial with them.
LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: I know there is a rumour of £1,000,000 having been expended; but if those bursting charges of shells are to be fired from guns on board ships, it would be wiser to finish the ships first. As the French have not money enough to do the latter, I question whether they are spending any on the former. But even supposing that the Admiralty had been a little behindhand as regarded the introduction of a higher explosive, to whom was that due? In regard to expenditure of this character, so far as
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the Ordnance Department is concerned, my noble Friend is perfectly well aware experts are absolutely supreme; it is on their advice alone that action is taken, and it therefore seems strange that my noble Friend should find fault with us on the point. Wishes have been expressed that we should give greater authority to experts; but fault has been found because, on a question on which it would be right to be guided by the authority of experts, we have followed their lead. I believe that the principle for which the Seconder of the Motion contended is impossible. I admit that the system of civil control at the War Office and the Admiralty has been attempted to be carried on in this country for some years under almost impossible conditions. There has been an attempt, which has failed, at the War Office and partially at the Admiralty to make one branch of a Department responsible for economy and another for efficiency. I believe that to be a most baneful and unsatisfactory division; and I speak with a greater freedom because I think it has ceased to exist at the Admiralty; and the Secretary of State for War has, by the alterations he has made in Army organization, given far greater power and authority to military officers than they before possessed.
LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: Not financially.
LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Yes, in this respect, that they are to have control over the expenditure that is voted for the one Department of which they are the head. I say that the division was an impossible one. I believe it is to the previous want of such a system that a great many of these admitted defects and shortcomings are due. Year after year the same thing has happened; Army and Navy Estimates have been laid before Parliament involving expenditure which ought to have been cut out, as not leading to efficiency, and reductions which were short-sighted and unwise, and which ought to have been kept in; and this was due, to a certain extent, to the length of time that Parliament sits. The matter stands thus—Estimates, as a whole, are prepared in November; but the shipbuilding programme of the Navy is probably not settled until after both the Army and the Navy Estimates

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are, to a certain extent, matured. Assume that the First Lord of the Admiralty, when the expenditure is submitted to him, says that it is too high, and that it is to be reduced; assume that when he submits it to the Cabinet he is told that the total must be still further reduced, and that the Navy expenditure must be brought within a certain limit; if he obeys such injunctions, what can the officers of the Admiralty do under the conditions? There are only a few weeks before the Estimates must be laid on the Table in due form. If it comes to a reduction, it is now expenditure that must be struck out. There may, perhaps, be a number of old items that could be struck out; but to strike them out comes in contact with personal interests, perhaps with local prejudices; and it is perfectly well known that any large reduction cannot be effected in the time available, so from year to year a considerable amount of new expenditure has been cut out of the Navy Estimates, because that has been the only means of reducing them, while a certain amount has been retained which might have been struck out if there had been more time for the revision of the Estimates. If you place Navy officers in a position in which they can combine for the purpose of promoting both efficiency and economy, I am confident there will be the greatest possible inducement to effect any economies which their experience can suggest. Our Estimates are considerably lower than those of last year; but I think the amount of work we shall be able to got out of those lower Estimates will make as good—I think I may almost say better—provision for the wants of the Navy than has been made for a good many years past. This is due to the fact that the Lords of the Admiralty and my hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty have most scrupulously and rigorously overhauled during the past year the expenditure in every separate settled branch; and they have succeeded in cutting off a large amount of expenditure, without in any way affecting the amount of work to be done. If more authority is given to naval and and military experts, who to a large extent even now exercise authority at the Admiralty, I believe it is easy to reconcile the system of a civil headship of the Department, with the effective
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supervison and economical administration of expenditure. I sympathize a good deal with the criticisms which naval and military Friends make from year to year on the Estimates. They know that, under the system in force for some time past, we do not always get the best possible return for our money. If the Navy is to be made thoroughly efficient and to be able to cope with the demands of the future, we must be prepared, to a certain extent, to break with the past. As new wants are developed, and money is found to supply them, it is quite clear that old sources of expenditure, sanctioned by usage and tradition, but not required in modern days, must disappear. If naval and military Members of this House who possess special knowledge will give the Departments the benefit of their suggestions in that direction, they will strengthen the hands of the civil heads at the War Office and the Admiralty, because the mere fact of their recommending a reduction of expenditure which they view as unnecessary will make that reduction, when effected, far more valuable as well as palatable to the respective Services to which they belong. As to war organization I must differ with my noble Friend as to what he has stated in reference to the arrangements for adapting the Admiralty to the exigencies of a time of war. There is a most exhaustive Report at the Admiralty dealing with every single question that can arise in time of war. But little or no action had been taken upon it up to 1886. But a Naval Intelligence Department was established for collecting and piecing together scattered information; and, therefore, there is now, for the first time, a Department entrusted with the responsibility of seeing that everything that relates to the transition from a peace footing to a war footing is ready and in a proper condition. It would not be fair to those who have formerly held the Office of First Lord of the Admiralty to assume that this question had not been gravely considered and thought out. When my right hon. Friend the present First Lord of the Treasury was at the head of the Admiralty in 1878, and when we passed through a somewhat critical phase, arrangements were made by which we should, at very short notice, have been able to put the Fleet

971
on a war footing. As to the suggestion that naval officers should be employed as clerks instead of civilians, there seems to be insuperable objections to it. Naval officers forget their work afloat if they are very long ashore; and if you take a number of naval officers away from their primary duty for a long time they will deteriorate as officers of the Navy. Then, should a war break out, you will require every naval officer you can lay your hands on, and at a critical juncture their places will have to be taken by those who do not know the work. The suggestion, therefore, although plausible, is not practicable. But there are certain branches into which retired paymasters and men in similar positions may be introduced. I admit that the expenditure inside the Admiralty is increasing yearly, and I am considering means by which to reduce it. But this brings you face to face with the question of pensions. All officials, not only at the Admiralty, but to a certain extent in the Dockyards, have a right to pensions; the State cannot break faith with them and there is a great dislike, which I share, to running up non-effective charges. But you do not got rid of a non-effective charge by keeping men who do little work on salaries which increase every three years; on the contrary, when they retire their pensions are so much the higher. Then, again, if you bring naval assistants into the Admiralty, as my noble Friend suggests, what is to happen to the personal responsibility of heads of Departments? My noble Friend is also desirous that those naval assistants should be employed in drawing up instructions to Commanders-in-Chief afloat, and I think he referred to a sentiment which he said Admiral Hornby expressed—namely, that the Departments which drew up the orders were not able to understand what they were writing. I beg respectfully to traverse that statement, which, if true, would show a most mischievous state of things which ought at once to be remedied. The result of the suggestion of the noble Lord would mean that employing a number of junior naval officers at the Admiralty would be that they would either be superintending the operations of their seniors at the other end of the world during a campaign, or else at such a time would have to quit their
972
civil functions and return to their ships. Then my noble Friend objects to the power which the First Lord has in speaking in the name of the Board. But the correspondence must be carried on in somebody's name; and where there is no Board it is carried on in the name of the head of the Department. Nineteen-twentieths of the letters which are written in the Admiralty never come to me. Every Naval Lord conducts his own correspondence in the name of the Board; and if no individual is to be able to speak in the name of the Board, every Naval Lord will have to conduct his correspondence in the name of the First Lord, the only result of which will be that Naval Lords will be placed in a worse position than they are now. I think I have now dealt with most of the questions to which my noble Friend alluded. The work which we have in hand we shall push on and develop as fast as we can. The time of the Admiralty Board has been much taken up in altering the form of the accounts which are presented to Parliament, which are now not alone valuable to Members of Parliament, who desire to cross-examine Ministers in respect of them, but are equally valuable as a like test in the hands of the Naval First Lord in reference to these particular Departments. I am glad to find, if I can judge from personal expression of opinion, that they met with the approval of the House. The accounts for the first time clearly distribute and allocate to every particular service the number of men and the expenditure associated with the pay of those men. I am fully satisfied that if this form of account is adopted in the future, it must tend year by year to a more and more economical and effective administration. The alteration entails an enormous mass of work, and nothing but the indomitable energy of my hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty can have enabled him to overcome the almost superhuman obstacles which intervene between him and the accomplishment of his task. We attach great importance to accurate forms of account. We believe that by the steps we have thus taken, we shall insure continuity of policy and the continuous maintenance and strength of the Establishment. We have deliberately kept our programme well within our financial

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resources. Our difficulty, and I will be quite frank with the House, is not one of want of funds, or want of shipbuilding power; it is one of gun-producing power. The object which we have in view is to keep the non-effective expenditure of the Navy as small as possible, and to keep on an improved footing our organization for war, so "that every ship, either in commission or in reserve," shall have all its requirements thought out and prepared, so that the whole available force of the Navy may be ready and effective at any given moment that it may be required. We have endeavoured to associate with the Navy the most powerful of our Mercantile Fleet, and we believe that by this association of force being brought rapidly into operation we shall have time during which we can further develop and organize the untouched naval resources of the country. It is the policy of the Government to thoroughly equip and arm our coaling stations and our fortresses, and to co-operate with the Colonies in inducing them to fortify their forts and their stations, so that the whole effective force of the Navy may be ready to take an objective, and, if necessary, to assume an offensive attitude in whatever part of the world we may be required. We cannot pretend to have perfected our plan and settled all the questions relating to organization; but we have contrived to make very considerable progress in the matter, and I believe that the object which we have in view is now within a measurable distance. If I am not assenting to the course of my noble Friend, if I believe that a good many of his suggestions are impracticable—that they will come into collision with political usages and Constitutional traditions; on the other hand, the House can help the Government, and especially naval and military Members, and we ask them to co-operate with the Government. The Government believe that by referring these Estimates to a Select Committee we may make the Committee a repository of naval knowledge which may be most useful to First Lords of the Admiralty. The Government believe, moreover, that our Estimates give a large amount of information that was not formerly given to Members of Parliament; and if my noble Friend and those who think with him will co-operate with Her Majesty's
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Government on the lines I have mentioned, I believe we shall be able to secure a continuity of policy that will include the permanent maintenance both of establishment and stores and of those reserves which are essential to the efficiency of the Services, but, above all, to a Service like the Navy, upon the prompt and effective discharge of whose duties, in some unforeseen crisis, may depend the commercial interests and success of the Empire.
MR. PENROSE FITZGERALDsaid, he did not know what was the ultimate intention of this Resolution; but of one thing he was well satisfied—namely, that outside the professional circles which had been represented by the noble and gallant Lord the Member for East Marylebone (Lord Charles Bresford) and the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Pembroke and Haverford west (Admiral Mayne) there was in the country very great anxiety to ascertain whether the present naval armament of the country was or was not capable of doing that which was expected of it in time of war. He would like to put to the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty a very practical question. He did not desire to split hairs as to whether the noble Lord could state, or could not state, that his Naval Colleagues were in accord with him; but would the noble Lord tell the House that in the opinion of his Colleagues the Navy of England was at the present time in a position to do that which the country expected of them in the event of war breaking out? He (Mr. Penrose Fitzgerald) was well aware of the enormous difficulties in the way of gauging the relative powers of the Navies of various countries. And there were many diverse opinions as to what the country would expect in the event of war, but upon one point he believed there was no such difference. The country and the House expected from the Navy that it would ensure the arrival of food supplies from beyond seas; that it would protect our coasts from invasion; and, further, that it would, keep up the supply of raw material necessary to enable the artizans of this country to continue to earn their wages. That that was the opinion of the country he thought no one could gainsay. With regard to the question of coaling stations, hon. Members would be at least

975
aware that most of our coaling stations were not places at which, coal was found, but that they were stations to which we had to take coals for the purpose of supplying our ships.
MR. SPEAKER: I would remind the hon. Gentleman that there is a specific Amendment before the House. The remarks he now offers are more pertinent to the general question; they do not refer to the specific question of the administrative system of the Admiralty.
MR. PENROSE FITZGERALDsaid, he was on the point of coming to what the First Lord has said on this point.
MR. SPEAKER: I do not know what application that can have to the Amendment before the House.
MR. PENROSE FITZGERALDsaid, in that case he would defer his observations until the original question was before the House.
COMMANDER BETHELLsaid, he scarcely thought that the First Lord of the Admiralty had exactly met the difficulty indicated by the noble Lord the Member for East Marylebone, and that had been shadowed forth by his hon. and gallant Friend. The question at the root of the difficulty was whether the First Lord ought to have in general policy a distinct arbitration over the remaining Members of the Board of Admiralty. His noble Friend who introduced the Motion was inclined to the opinion that there should he some umpire or arbitrator external to the Board, so that the Government might have an opportunity of ascertaining the opinions of experts. He (Commander Bethell) did not agree with his noble Friend in that matter. He was inclined to think with him that there should be some arbitrator or umpire to settle these matters; but he considered that the experts should be internal and not external to the Board itself. The Board of Admiralty was generally understood, by people who were not very conversant with it, to be an administrative Board; the general opinion was that on a question of policy the majority of the Board defined, ruled, and decided the question, but he was bound to say that in reality the First Lord had the power of deciding what policy should be pursued, whatever might be the opinion of the remaining Members of the Board. He submitted that there was no reason why the Board should not be constituted
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on the lines he had indicated, and that there should be power of resignation on the part of Members of the Board, and, on the other hand, power of dismissal of elected Members. In that way on any particular line of policy on which the First Lord was agreed, he would dismiss those Members of the Board with whom he disagreed; and rightly, for if that policy did not recommend itself to the country, he in his turn would lose his position, nor would that have the effect of lessening his responsibility in that House. There was no reason that he knew of why the noble Lord should not be in that House the exponent of the policy on which he had decided, nor was there any reason that a censure passed on the noble Lord should not cast a stigma on the whole of the Board. He did not agree with the proposal of the noble Lord, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have the power of arbitrating on a particular question between the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty and his Colleagues. He (Commander Bethell) suggested that hon. Members should look back over the last 20 years and see whether all that had been done by the Admiralty in that time had been successful. He admitted that the country had every confidence in the noble Lord and the present Board, but it was in the knowledge of everyone that in times past there had been at the head of the Admiralty men who, however clever they might have been, had held some strong opinions with regard to the Navy which were quite out of harmony with the opinions of those conversant with naval matters. Under those circumstances it would be undoubtedly possible to force a line of policy on the remainder of the Board which would not commend itself to the Navy or the nation in general. If, on the other hand, a Gentleman at the head of the Board holding strong opinions were controlled by the remaining Members of the Board, he was inclined to think that they would have a security in future, which they had not had in the past, from many mistakes in policy which had undoubtedly occurred; so that although he differed to some extent from the noble Lord who introduced this Motion, yet it would be seen that he was going in the same direction with himself. He and his Colleagues desired that there should be

977
some means of arbitration or control in the Board of Admiralty; whereas his noble Friend was of opinion that those means of arbitration or control should be external to it. But whatever differences existed between the noble Lord and himself, they had arrived practically at the same conclusion, and he submitted to the First Lord that, however interesting his speech had been, he had not approached that part of the question which they as naval men felt to be the particular point in dispute.
Question put, and agreed to.
Main Question again proposed.
MR. PENROSE FITZGERALDsaid, he had remarked, just before the Amendment of the noble Lord the Member for East Marylebone was negatived, that there was one plain straightforward question which he hoped the First Lord of the Admiralty would answer. Would the noble Lord tell the House of Commons that he and his Colleagues, including such men as the heads of the Intelligence Department and the Director of Naval Ordnance—Admiral Hornby, Admiral Hewitt, and so forth, were agreed that at the present moment the forces of England were such as the people of this country would expect them to be when a war broke out. If the noble Lord could make that statement, it would do much to allay the uneasy feeling which existed not only in naval and military circles, but also to a large extent throughout the country. The three things which the country certainly demanded were that the Fleet should be sufficient for the protection of our shores against invasion, for the adequate security of our food supplies, and for the protection of convoys of ships conveying raw materials to be manufactured by the artizans of this country. Those he took to be the smallest duties expected by the House and the country to be performed by the Board of Admiralty. In old days convoys were protected by sailing ships, and the experience they had in navigating fleets when under sail, no doubt, added to the natural instinct of Englishmen, had made them bettor sailors. Although he did not, for one moment, say that the blue jackets, or rather the black jackets, of the Navy were one whit behind their
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predecessors, they would, however, have many great difficulties to deal with. It was formerly necessary sometimes to rig up jurymasts, or to do something to prevent a vessel from becoming a mere hulk upon the water. Now, unless our ships had coal they would be in a worse position than a dismasted sailing ship—perfectly helpless and unable to assist a convoy and prevent it falling an easy prey to the enemy, and he did not believe that even in the wildest flight of imagination, anyone in the future would be able to invent jury-coal, although he was quite aware that the noble Lord who introduced the Amendment had himself rigged up a jury-boiler under very difficult circumstances. The First Lord of the Admiralty had given them a calculation of his own, made in March, 1887, with regard to the Navies of England and France. Before the year 1860, it was possible to gauge the value of our Navy and the strength of our ships in a far easier mariner than now, because, when a line-of-battle ship was spoken of, it meant a line-of-battle ship, and nothing else. He did not mean to say they were all equal; but that by giving the number of them which belonged to each Power a fairly near estimate could be made of the naval strength of other nations and of our own. Of course, beside that, there was the question of the nationality of the crews, and we could, no doubt, claim some superiority on that head. But the position was all changed, and the ships of the Navy were of such various designs that the wit of man could not possibly gauge their relative values. It was very difficult to get more than two or three naval experts to agree as to the qualities which should be possessed by ships of war in respect of defensive power, coaling power, engine power, manœuvring power, and so forth. There had been various methods of computing the relative strength of the English and other Navies. One authority put down tonnage displacement as the first thing to be considered; another, coal-carrying power; a third, thickness of armour, irrespective of extent; and a fourth, speed and horsepower. To show how difficult it was for an expert to gauge the relative values of these qualities, he would first take the question of displacement. If hon. Members would refer to The Navy List of the present year, they would

979
find that there were certain vessels of the Royal Navy which had not been lengthened amidships, or by the stem or stern, and yet whose tonnage during the last three months had increased. That was a very remarkable fact, and he thought that it was one which required some explanation. If the explanation was that they could increase the power of the ships of the Navy by sinking them further in the water than was intended by the designers, he said that the people of this country would not be satisfied with that method of increasing the power of the British Navy. He knew that this had been advocated by an extremely able civilian in the Naval Reserve, who for a long time occupied a seat in that House, and who now sat in "another place." He (Mr. Penrose Fitzgerald) maintained that that was not a fair or just way of making a comparison between the Navy of England and the Navies of foreign countries, for by that means you might double the apparent strength of the Navy by sending it to the bottom. Whether the other modes of comparison with regard to speed, coaling power, &c., were better than that he know not. The matter was one for the decision of experts. But he mentioned this to show how difficult it was for this country to be satisfied that its Navy could do in time of need what was required of it, without the information of experts on the subject, and unless the First Lord came down to the House and declared that with that opinion of the experts he was satisfied. If it was difficult to gauge the value of British ships, it was still more difficult to do so with regard to the ships of the Navies of Euroue. It was generally considered by those who knew most on the subject that England, at the present time, stood first as regards naval power, France second, and very near to England, Italy third, and a good way behind, Russia fourth, Germany fifth, Austria sixth, Turkey last, and the other European countries nowhere. If that were correct, he would like to know in what way the relative values of the Navies of any two countries were measured, or how the relative value of any two ships was calculated. The calculation was that the English Navy was in the proportion of 100, while the Navies of other countries stood thus—France 90, Italy 50, Russia 45, Germany
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40, and Austria 31. He asked how the relative values of the vessels forming those Navies were guaged. Ships of the Benlow, Camperdown, and Collingwood class required to be taken largely on faith by outsiders like himself. He thought he was right in saying with regard to this class of vessels, that a skilled authority had declared that, if these vessels which were only to have their sides protected, had their un armoured ends shot away, although it was possible they might float, he absolutely declined to express an opinion as to which part would float uppermost.
SIR EDWARD REED: I said I did not think they would float at all.
MR. PENROSE FITZGERALD: That was the class of vessels by which the Navy had been increased, and it became all the more necessary on that account for the noble Lord to reply to the plain matter of fact question which he had put before him. Every country had sacrificed something in order to make some feature supreme. France had adopted great defensive power, having heavy guns mounted in ships with tremendous armour; she had sacrificed for enormous strength and weight, the coal-carrying power of her vessels. Italy, on the other hand, had sacrificed everything for speed, giving their vessels little protection, but high speed, and guns of great offensive power. England had adopted, as he gathered, the medium between what France and Italy had done; but there was one point with regard to England which did not so much enter into the calculations of other countries, and that was—the desperate handicapping of English ships with regard to the amount of coal-earning power necessary for them. He thought he was right in saying that France allowed about 7 per cent of coal-carrying power to line-of-battle ships; but English naval officers averred that, having regard to the duties which would be expected of the English Fleet, 14 per cent of coal-carrying power was necessary at the very least to enable the Navy of this country to do its work in any future war. That is to say, we had to allow to our enemy in, say a ship of 10,000 tons, 700 tons, which he might take out in guns, armour plates, or torpedoes. English vessels would thus be greatly handi-

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capped, for while for other countries it was of less importance, the tracts of ocean over which English vessels had to go made it necessary for them to have a larger coal-carrying power. If it was go difficult a subject for them to ascertain the relative fighting capacities of various countries in respect of their Navies, it pointed to the moral that they should allow a very large margin for possible failures. But the consequences of failure were not the same in all cases; to no other country would failure be of such desperate importance as to England. In other nations there were enormous Armies for their protection and for aggressive purposes; but England alone trusted to her Navy. The destruction of the Navy of France, Italy, or Germany, although inconvenient, would be to those countries no more than a small and temporary inconvenience, whereas the destruction of the Navy of England would be the downfall of the country, which, without her Navy, would be like a watch without the mainspring. She must stop short and suddenly in her career, as surely as an animal in whose veins the blood ceased to flow. She would be incapacitated, and unable to retain her position among the nations of the world. It was nothing short of madness that the House should consent to go on an hour longer without it being determined, once for all, by experts at the Admiralty, whether or not our Navy was sufficient to protect our coasts, and ensure the protection of the food supply from abroad and raw material for manufacturing purposes at home. He believed—and the House believed—and trusted that the British sailor of the future would not be inferior to the British sailor of the past. The superiority of the English as sailors in the old days was due to the fact that, being enormously superior in numbers to the enemy, they were enabled to keep the sea on all occasions, and, at the same time, keep the enemy's fleet in their ports. When a fleet was kept in port the seamen got no practice at sea in seamanship or gunnery, and hence one cause of our superiority in the last French War, when, while we blockaded the enemy's ports, we ourselves kept the sea, and gained experience and practice in respect of seamanship. Would it be possible for England to keep the sea and blockade
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the enemy's ports in the future as she had done in the past? One thing was perfectly certain—namely, that at the outbreak of the next war it would be necessary for England to take a definite and clear part, particularly with regard to the Mediterranean. If war were declared to-morrow, say with France, would the First Lord dare to take away from the Channel Squadron a single ship, and send it to the Mediterranean, or to any other part of the world where our Possessions or interests were attacked? Was the Mediterranean Fleet large enough to repel an enemy from Malta and Gibraltar, supposing no succour could be sent? If it were not, those two places must capitulate if they were attacked by a superior fleet, as we should not dare to detach a single vessel from the Channel Squadron; and no First Lord would be held guiltless if he did so. Besides this, in the event of a war such as he was considering, our Admirals would be sending from all parts of the world for supports. It was clear, in the first place, that Russia was steadily advancing on India of set purpose. It was perfectly clear also that if we desired to defend India, we could only do so by being in a position to attack Russia at some other point than Herat. That was to say, we must strike Russia somewhere else than at Herat if we wished to save Herat. If that were so, then the only means of striking such a blow at Russia was by European alliances; but was there any possibility of this country being taken into alliance by any other European Power? Was our Army or Navy of sufficient strength and usefulness to induce any European Power to enter into an alliance with us? He did not think so. If the state of things were otherwise—that was to say, if our Fleet was sufficiently strong for us to be of any use to other European Powers—he believed such alliances might be formed. He believed that all it would be necessary for this country to do in order to prove of essential service to a foreign ally would be to send a Fleet to the Baltic and another to the Mediterranean. Such fleets, it was estimated by competent authorities, would be worth 500,000 men to a central Power of Europe in the event of an alliance. As it was, however, we were not strong enough for any foreign Power to seek an alliance with

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us. We stood almost alone, and at the outbreak of war it would be necessary for this country to make up its mind to take one of the three proverbial courses. The first course would be to take our place again amongst the nations of Europe, and bear the burdens and reap the benefits of such a course, giving up the short-sighted policy of saying that we would fight only for English interests. What were English interests—where did they extend to? We heard sometimes that it would be better for us to stay at home and mind our own business; but where was our home? Did it not extend from Australia to Canada, from New Zealand to the Cape of Good Hope, from Gibraltar to India, from the British Channel right across both hemispheres? Was that not our home, and was it not our business to defend our home in every quart or of the globe? The first course, then, which this country could follow would be to take her place amongst the nations of Europe. The second course would be to declare boldly that England wanted no allies, and was prepared to fight by herself. In that case, it would be absolutely necessary to double our present Navy, and largely increase our Army, especially in India; then, if they liked, we might sit down and wait for Russia—Russia, perhaps, backed by France—whenever it was convenient for her to attack us. The only other course was one which would hardly commend itself to England—namely, to go drifting on, sacrificing our position in Europe bit by bit; until some war panic came and frightened the country into building something like a sufficiently powerful Navy for the defence of our shores, The country had acted under the influence of panic before, and that, too, in quite recent years. If it had not been for the Penjdeh incident we should not have had the belted cruiser class of vessels. He trusted the first of the three courses to which he had referred would be the one to commend itself to the House. He believed it would be the least expensive. It would be much less likely to give rise to jealousy than the course of doubling our Navy and saying—"We will only fight for English interests." It would be no menace. It would be, in his opinion, the most straightforward and Imperial policy that England could carry out. At all events,
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nothing could be more unfortunate than that we should have to rely for the strengthening of our Navy upon war scares and panics, at which times we had to pay largely increased prices for our ships and warlike stores. Our experiences in our last war with France, to which some reference had been made, were extremely valuable, and should be borne in mind at this time. Some people wanted altogether to break with the past; but, to his mind, they should learn from the past what would be useful to them in the present. Was it not a fact that in the last French War our Elect was nearly double that of France, although we had to defend a much smaller Empire than the one we now possessed? Was it not also a fact that though the English Navy was in those days double that of France and Spain put together, it was barely adequate to save our shores from invasion. At the commencement of the war in 1793 our Navy, as he had said, was certainly double that of France; at the peace of 1801 the proportion of the two Navies was as 6 to 1, and yet in the last year of that war we lost 3 per cent of our commerce, captured principally by French privateers, and that was a very remarkable thing when we came to compare the Navies of the two countries. Here was a still more striking circumstance. Between the commencement of the year 1793 and the end of the year 1795, when France alone was our enemy, we lost 3,000 vessels, or about 6 per cent of our whole Navy. Let the House remember these figures, and remember that our naval strength was double that of France. [An hon. MEMBER: Under sail.] Yes; but it would take proportionately quite as strong or even a stronger convoy of steam vessels of war to escort a convoy of steam merchantmen as it took sailing war ships to escort a fleet of merchantmen under sail in the old days. If what he had referred to had occurred when our Fleet was double as strong as that of its enemy at one time, and, at another time, six times as strong, he could enforce with some chance of success the question he had put to the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty. But he had another thing to say in reference to our last war with France. In 1805, we had three Fleets. Nelson had left Europe, and was hunting Villeneuve. He followed him to the West Indies,

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but never fell in with him. He hunted him back to Europe. When Villeneuve got back to Europe he fell in with Sir Robert Calder, who was in command of a second Fleet off Ushant, while, south of that squadron, was another in charge of Admiral Collingwood, of the Burlings at Lisbon. As it afterwards turned out, Nelson, who had succeeded in sailing up level with Villeneuve, but had never managed to get within sight of him, was in Gibraltar with his Fleet. And what happened? Vileneuve fought an action with Sir Robert Calder, who was subsequently tried by court - martial for not annihilating a fleet very nearly twice as strong as his own. At that very time, the country had two other Fleets for the protection of the Mediterranean, and the protection of our commerce. What chance were our Admirals going to have in the future, if they were to be dealt with like that unless we put them in as good a position in regard to ships and guns as our Admirals were in in former times? Well, he (Mr. Penrose Fitzgerald) thanked the House for having listened to him. There was just one point he desired to emphasize—he almost wished he had dealt with no other topic, so important did he conceive it to be. Would the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty—and he asked this with all respect, for he considered the noble Lord had done wonders already at the Admiralty, and he hoped he would continue in the same line—come down to the House, and tell the House, and through the House the people of the country, that the experts with him in office were satisfied that the present and prospective state of the Navy was such that it would be capable the moment a war broke out—if it should be at 9 o'clock to-morrow morning—of protecting our shores from invasion, and the lines of route by which raw material was brought for our artizans to work up, and food was necessary to be supplied to our people without which there would be a famine, the like of which, perhaps, was never seen? Would the noble Lord say that was the opinion of the experts? If he did not, it should be the signal for the breaking out of the people into a necessary and wise panic. They would be justified in viewing the present condition of things with alarm, and in demanding from the Government an answer to such a question.
MR. R. W. DUFFsaid, he rose to offer a few comments on the very able statement of the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty. But before he did so, he wished to say that when he remembered the brilliant services of the noble Lord the Member for East Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford), he could not help regretting that those services were no longer at the command of the Admiralty. It was always desirable to have at the Admiralty young officers who had themselves seen service; and that was particularly the case when the Navy was daily being revolutionized by science. It was not for him to say whether the noble Lord was justified or not in doing as he had; but he (Mr. Duff) had no doubt, however, that in resigning his noble Friend had acted purely from patriotic motives; and he would have loft the question there but for some observations made by his noble Friend, which appeared to reflect not only upon the present First Lord, but upon his Predecessors. The noble Lord had told them that when he went to the Admiralty he found to his utter astonishment that there was not a single shred or shadow of organization for war purposes. [Lord CHARLES BERESFORD: Hear, hear !] That was a very extreme statement, and one which reflected upon all who had been at the Admiralty; and he did not think that statement was justified by fact. The noble Lord said that the first thing he did, being a man of business, was to ask for the Papers bearing on the subject. He (Mr. Duff) also when he went to the Admiralty, as a man of business, asked for the Papers containing information on that point, and he was shown a set of Papers—he was not going to reveal confidential documents—which he did not think his noble Friend could have read. These Papers contained a complete organization for calling out the Coastguard and the Naval Reserves; and, so far from there not being a shred of organization for war purposes, he believed they could have called out the First Class Reserve in four days. That, at all events, was the opinion of his naval Colleagues. The noble Lord had stated that the Commanders-in-Chief of naval stations had had no information given to them of the number, character, and position of the foreign men-of-war on their respective stations. That statement was

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altogether inaccurate, because he (Mr. Duff) could positively assert that when he was in Office every Commander-in-Chief at every naval station had the fullest information supplied to him with regard to every foreign man-of-war, with their respective guns and men that were under their command on the station. If the noble Lord's statement were true, every First Lord of the Admiralty in recent years ought to have been impeached, and every Naval Lord cashiered. No doubt the intention of the noble Lord in making these statements was all that could be desired; nevertheless, it was certain that he had permitted his zeal to carry him too far. The noble Lord had done good service at the Admiralty; but any one who had listened to the noble Lord's speech would be led to believe that no one else had over effected any reforms at the Admiralty. Now he came to the speech of the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty. The noble Lord had doubtless made many useful suggestions; but he had not given them any practical plan for the reorganization of the Board of Admiralty. With many of the suggestions which the noble Lord had made, however, he (Mr. Duff) entirely agreed. For instance, he quite agreed that the Admiralty were in the habit of withholding information that might very properly be given to that House. Thus, in one case, the Admiralty had withheld the Report of a Committee appointed to consider the question of providing coal for our coaling stations. From what he had gathered from the speech of the noble Lord opposite (Lord Charles Beresford), he understood that the noble Lord had no objection to the First Lord of the Admiralty being supreme, provided he never used his own head, but always adopted the suggestions of the Naval Lords. A great deal, it was true, might be said against the theoretical working of the Admiralty; but he believed it worked well in this way, that no man who had intelligence to become a Cabinet Minister would be so intensely foolish as to go and interfere with his naval Advisers in technical matters; but, at the same time, it would not do for him, under our present Parliamentary system, to inform his Cabinet that they could not take a particular course on Imperial questions, because the Naval Lords had raised objections to it. In matters of
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Imperial concern, therefore, the First Lord must necessarily be supreme. The noble Lord opposite had claimed the credit of having created the Intelligence Department of the Navy; but if the noble Lord would refer to the Navy Estimates for 1886, he would find that the sum of £2,000 was put down for the expenses of that Department, which was then under the same officers as it was now. He did not desire to deprive the noble Lord of the credit of having greatly extended the operations of that Department; but, as a matter of fact, the Department was a considerable one 25 years ago. On the other hand, he freely admitted that whereas, at one time, it would have taken four or five days to have got out our First Reserve, it could now be done in 48 hours. The noble Lord the present First Lord of the Admiralty deserved the thanks of the House for the new form in which he had brought out the Estimates, which was a great improvement upon the old form. He did not, however, think that the remark which the noble Lord had made at the conclusion of his speech—that the country had no cause of complaint with regard to our ships, men, and guns, was borne out by the statements he himself had made in the course of his speech. No doubt, the noble Lord's statements with regard to ships and men were sufficiently accurate; but the noble Lord himself had said that there had been considerable delay in the delivery of guns for the Navy, the result of which was that many iron-clads were awaiting their armaments. He would, moreover, take the case of the Collingwood. After the accident to the guns on board that vessel, new guns were ordered to be placed on board her in May, 1886, and the War Office promised to supply her with new guns in October of that year. Would the House believe that guns of the same pattern as those which had burst some time ago were still on board that ship? He could not help asking the question, whether, in the comparison which had been made between our Navy and that of France, the Collingwood, which dare not fire one of her guns, had been included as forming part of the defensive force of the British Navy? The fact that we could not got now guns supplied in 15 months would be a very alarming one in the event of our going to war. He wished to know

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what was the exact position of the New Naval Ordnance Department? He had ascertained, by a Question which he had put to the Surveyor General of the Ordnance last year, that out of 22 new guns which had been ordered to be supplied during the 12 months, only 10 had been delivered. With regard to the conditions upon which we were to obtain our naval ordnance in the future, he should like to know whether the Admiralty were to be at liberty to go into the open market, and obtain them were they thought fit? He understood from the noble Lord, the First Lord, that one of the chief difficulties in the way of that plan being adopted was that of ascertaining the various amount of stock which was held by the Naval and Military Departments; but in his opinion the interests of the country ought not to be allowed to suffer in a matter of such supreme importance as the arming of our ships by reason of a financial question having arisen between the War Office and the Admiralty. He could not understand why the Admiralty should not go into the open market and get their guns as Foreign Governments did. They should follow the example of France in that respect, and do all they could to encourage private firms. With regard to the Ordnance Department, he did not like the divided responsibility. Admiral Hoskins, in his evidence before the Royal Commission, said that the only good plan was to have the supply of guns for the two Services separately provided. If the Admiralty had the courage to adopt that policy, he thought that naval ordnance would be placed upon a more satisfactory footing. He questioned very much the policy of putting these enormous 110-ton guns on board our ships, especially in view of the great development that had taken place in recent years in quick-firing guns. There were two of these guns on the Benbow; each of them cost £20,000 without the fittings, and the cost of each shot was £190, while the gun only fired once in 10 minutes. He could not find anybody who was in favour of these guns, and the evidence given before the Commission was to the effect that the result was hardly equal to the expenditure. He hoped the Admiralty would reconsider the determination to put these guns on board other vessels. He quite admitted that the present Board of Ad-
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miralty were not responsible for the guns; but he would point out that since the ships that were to receive them were designed, some five years ago, there had been, as he said, a remarkable development in quick-firing guns, and the position was now somewhat altered. He understood that the Admiralty had sufficient gunpowder to enable them to fire 15 rounds of the Benbow guns, and he congratulated them upon that fact. They were very much in want of guns for the land forts, and he suggested that the 110-guns should be used in that direction. If he might make a general criticism upon the Estimates, he would say that in his opinion the noble Lord had taken too much money for ships and not enough for guns. At the present moment they were ahead of their shipbuilding programme and very much behind with guns. Under those circumstances, he urged that they might very well postpone some of the vessels which they intended to build by contract, and employ the money in getting more guns. Then, with regard to ammunition, Admiral Hoskins stated to the Commission that they ought to have 85 service rounds for each gun and 150 rounds in reserve. Instead of that, the Admiral said they had not got a half of 85, and there were none whatever in reserve. It was no use spending money on ships if they had no guns and no ammunition. He hoped that serious attention would be given to this matter. In the First Lord's Memorandum he referred to the Council of Education. He (Mr. Duff) would like to ask the noble Lord whether the Admiralty intended to give effect to the recommendations of the Committee? In his Memorandum the First Lord of the Admiralty referred to the provision for coaling at home and foreign stations. He (Mr. Duff) failed to find in the Estimates, however, any provision for carrying out the reccommendations of the Committee. They ought not to entirely neglect this subject. He entirely approved the policy of the Admiralty in recognizing the claims of lieutenants, because he thought the position of those officers was a very hard one.
SIR JOHN COMMERELLsaid, there were one or two points on which he should like to say a word or two in regard to the present organization of the Board of Admiralty. He did not agree with everything his

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noble and gallant Friend the Member for East Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford) had said; but there were one or two points upon which he did agree with the noble and gallant Lord. As to the organization of the Board of Admiralty, he (Sir John Commerell) was one of those who believed he was expressing the opinion of a large body of naval officers when he said he was certainly against a naval officer being First Lord of the Admiralty. They wished to see the First Lord in his proper place, and they wished to see him a Cabinet Minister. At the same time, he believed that the Civil Department had an idea that naval officers as a body were opposed to the influence which they exercised at the Admiralty. He could assure the House that that was not the case. What they desired to see was that the First Lord should be thoroughly strengthened in his position, and holding unquestionably supreme power at the Admiralty. At the same time they desired that the opinion of the experts and Naval Lords should be taken, and, when taken, should be properly recorded. Now, so far as the Naval Lords were concerned, there was one great defect in the present system—and it applied to almost the whole Board. The great defect was that the Naval Lords were constantly going in and out. Since 1880 they had had four First Lords, one of them—the present First Lord—having been twice in Office, and, therefore, being counted as two. They had had 14 Sea Lords during that time, and seven Financial Secretaries. He certainly hoped that in any reorganization that might take place, so far as Naval Lords was concerned, there would be no question of politics brought to bear. It would be far better that the Naval Lords should be appointed for a certain time. He would not say for too long a time. He thought four years would be quite long enough. They should come in fresh from sea, and the system—which, he was sorry to say, had been too much practised in the past—of changing them from one home employment to another, should not be continued. What they wanted were naval officers fresh from sea—fresh from naval experience, and he was perfectly certain that some time in the future the system he advocated would be adopted. The naval officers did not for a single moment wish
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to interfere with questions of finance. They did not for a moment doubt the responsibility of the House. There was no doubt in the world that the House must have complete control more especially over the financial questions. But he would ask, could the finances at the Admiralty be conducted properly if they had seven Financial Secretaries in five years? Each of them, he had no doubt, came into Office with the most natural and laudable idea that he was "the only Joe," that he was the only man who ever knew anything about the subjects dealt with by the Departments, and that before he came in everything had been altogether wrong. He had no doubt that if he were to become Financial Secretary he should think exactly the same. The hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood) had been rather hard on naval officers the other day. He (Sir John Commerell) said it without the slightest ill-nature, but it certainly seemed to him that the hon. Member must have been reading Captain Marryat's novels, and that "the fool of the family" had had something to do with bringing the hon. Member to his present views in reference to the Navy. Matters had very greatly altered since the old days. The House might depend on it that naval officers from the earliest period of education were brought up to take command of large bodies of men. They were taught from the earliest days that discipline was the great thing, and it was their duty—a duty he believed they were perfectly capable of discharging—to teach discipline to those under them. Naval officers did not, as he had said, wish to interfere in the financial part of the business. They left that to the House of Commons and the Financial Secretary, and he had no hesitation in saying that under the present First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton) they had quite as much naval control as they ought to have; but they desired to guard the question for the future. He (Sir John Commerell) must say he looked on the Intelligence Department with a good deal of favour, although he thought the name altogether a misnomer. He thought they ought also to have joined with it the term "mobilization," because that was the first great point to which the Intelligence Department had to turn. No

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doubt, in time of war the Intelligence Department should communicate as rapidly as possible with the officers commanding stations; but he had no hesitation in saying that if he were Commander-in-Chief on any station when a war broke out he should carry out his own line of conduct oven at the risk of his commission, so long as he believed it was for the benefit of the country. They must not think that in the future they were going to carry out wars from the end of a telegraph wire. If they thought that they would be making the greatest mistake; but he hoped no such thing would be aimed at by the Intelligence Department. The noble Lord the Member for East Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford), when he stated that the Intelligence Department had not had a certain amount of influence in the past, was in error; but, at the same time, he had no hesitation in saying that he thought it had been very much improved. Two and a-half years ago, when he was Commander-in-Chief of the North American and West Indian Stations, when the Russian scare took place, as no plan of campaign had been communicated to him, he should have been left, to a considerable extent, to his own resources, and he should not have been sorry for it. When Commanders-in-Chief had received all the information which could be given to them, it was much better to leave the charge in their own hands. Officers had no right to be placed in command of stations if they could not be trusted, and when they trusted officers let them be truly trusted. There was one point on which he might congratulate the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Goschen). He had no doubt that, after the speech of the noble Lord to-night, they would be remarking a notice in the paper declaring that the Chancellor of the Exchequer acknowledged from some unknown donor £2,000 conscience money. He had been a Junior Naval Lord for some time, and he must say he found he had enough to do from half-past 10 o'clock in the morning until half-past 5 o'clock or 6 o'clock in the evening. Much of it was work which he did not very much care for, as it embraced too many small matters of detail and too much minutiæ, such as the settlement of small sums of money, things which it would have been much better
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not to have been left to the Naval Lords of the Admiralty. Their time, he maintained, would have been much better employed in going into larger questions of shipbuilding and armaments, which were the subjects naval officers who had attained a certain position should be called upon to deal with. Such work as was at present given to the Naval Lords prevented them doing that sort of work which they ought to do. He had much pleasure in congratulating the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty on the programme he had laid down, with one exception. He regretted to see that the noble Lord did not propose to lay down any more iron-clads. No doubt, it was easy to compare the Navies of the different Powers; but the question was as to the enormous amount of work we should have to do in the future as compared with the French or any other Navy. When note was taken of our Colonies, our enormous trade, our geographical position, and, above all, the Suez Canal, he thought it was perhaps an unfortunate thing that the First Lord had not determined to lay down, say, two more iron-clads. For himself, he had been always very strongly of opinion that we had not a sufficient number of fast, powerful cruisers; but he thought that now, in place of one or two fast cruisers and three or four small vessels, a commencement might have been made with one or two iron-clads other than the Nile and Trafalgar. We ought to take into consideration the number of iron-clads that were really passing out of use and which it was not worth while to repair, because they could never take their place in line of battle. The vessels which he alluded to as being out of the running were vessels of the Swiftsure class, which had never been perfectly good, which were excessively unstable without 200 or 300 tons of ballast in them, and which tumbled first to one side and then to the other, going by the name of "the naval wobble." They should remember that they had a quantity of these iron-clads which were of no use, and let them do their best to replace them as soon as possible. The rapidity with which vessels became obsolete showed that we ought to proceed with ships which were commenced and finish them as rapidly as possible, seeing that at the quickest it took no less than three years to finish

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one. For the reasons he had stated he should have been glad to have seen a couple of iron-clads laid down. And now to return to an old subject which had been dealt with once or twice already—namely, the question of the Warspite. He was sorry to see that that vessel had cost £632,000, which was an enormous sum when they compared it with the expenditure upon the Nile and Trafalgar, which were two of the most powerful vessels in the Navy, and when also they compared it with the Hero. Then, as to the vessels of the Porpoise class of which the Navy was to be provided with half-a-dozen. He did not agree with making a large number of the same class of vessel, for if a mistake were made it was repeated in all, and then all had to be altered. He believed a mistake had been made with the construction of the Porpoise to such an extent as to destroy one-half of her utility. With all her weights on board she would draw one foot seven inches more than was intended, and the result was that her lines had been altered. He was glad to see that an increase had been made in the pay of lieutenants; he was glad to see that this hard-working "silver coinage" of the Navy—as he might call it—had received attention at last. It was only just that something should be done for these men, considering the work they had to do and the number of years they had to serve in bad climates. When the House thought of the education these men had to pass through, and that only two out of nine could arrive at the rank of commanders, and of the early ago at which they had to retire—in many cases almost brokenhearted—hon. Members would agree that it was necessary that something should be done for them. The change which had been made in the case of the lieutenants was one which would be received with gratitude; but still it was heartrending to see how many old officers there were without the slightest hope of advancement. He thought the list of lieutenants, however, was utterly inadequate to the requirements of the Service. If a war were to break out and we had to mobilize to-morrow, and we found it necessary to have one or two squadrons, such as that we had in the Channel, he did not know where we should get our lieutenants from. He was told that in time of war we should
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have to reduce a ship's complement of lieutenants from four to three, and from five to four. It certainly appeared to him an extraordinary thing that, at a time when calling upon their vessels to do four times as much work as ordinarily, they should go and reduce the complement of lieutenants, who were really the men who had to do the beat part of the important work. He hoped the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty would take steps to increase the list of lieutenants, although he knew very well that it would not help lieutenants in the future, as in peace time there would be more men wanting employment and not getting it. It was the duty of Parliament, however, to consider the requirements of the Service, and place those immeasurably above those of a personal character.
SIR EDWARD REEDsaid, he did not think it was quite fair to the Government and to those who had only had the Navy Estimates in their hands for a few hours to attempt to discuss the Estimates to-night. He did not intend to discuss them, but desired to take the opportunity of making one or two observations. He thought that the present Board of Admiralty deserved a good deal at the hands of the House. In the first place, they had proved themselves the first Board of Admiralty that could ever be induced to perform the commonsense operation of going quickly on with the ships they commenced, and that was a business procedure which no Board ought to have been capable of neglecting, and which every Board had systematically neglected until 1885. He remembered very well that in 1874 Mr. Ward Hunt—who was then First Lord of the Admiralty—promised that during the term of office of the then Conservative Government they would take care that they did not give the country ships upon paper. That Government held Office for six years—during part of which time the right hon. Gentleman the present First Lord of the Treasury (Mr. W. H. Smith) was the First Lord of the Admiralty—but during those six years they never completed a single iron-clad. He (Sir Edward Reed) did not think that Liberal Administrations had been very much better. For another thing he thought they owed a great debt of gratitude to this Board. In 1885, practically the present Board of Ad-

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miralty took in hand the question of improving the condition of Dockyard labour. Under the old system a gentleman at Whitehall—namely, the Chief Constructor—had the power of altering ships just as much as he pleased, and nobody was there to call him to account. The present Board, or, at any rate, the Board of which the noble Lord the present First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton) and the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board (Mr. Ritchie) were the heads, took that question in hand, and they did a very wise thing. They took the whole management of the Dockyards out of the hands of the Chief Constructor, and put it in the hands of a highly qualified officer—(Professor Elgar)—upon whose appointment he heartily congratulated the Government. In his opinion the present Board deserved great praise for yet another thing. During a long course of years the Controllers and Constructors of the Navy took it into their heads—it might seem a strange thing to say, but it was nevertheless true—that the right way of protecting a ship was to put the armour inside of her. For a long course of years they pursued the abominable and foolish practice of putting about two-thirds of the armour-plating devoted to the protection of ships inside the ships, where it could not possibly be any protection to a ship at all. When they came into Office this Board took upon themselves the responsibility of utterly condemning that foolish system, and of putting a stop to it, and it was within his knowlege that one, at any rate, of the advisors of the First Lord said, in 1885, through the then Controller and Constructor of the Navy, that the ships which they had been completing for years were a disgrace to the British Navy, and unfit to put beneath the feet of British seamen. Why did he mention this? He mentioned it because the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty—apparently with no indication that he was doing anything unusual or open to exception—stated to the House that the only way to measure our naval strength was to count the number of armoured ships and the guns we possessed. He (Sir Edward Reed) asked if it was to be tolerated for a single moment that Governments should build as armoured ships ships which posi-
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tively had no armour at all above water? Fortunately the present Board was not responsible for the construction of any of these ships, and he was not making these observations in a hostile spirit to the Board at all. But there had been many indications in the country and in the House of what he had begun to discredit—namely, an anxiety about the naval strength of this country. There was certainly a disposition to appreciate our naval situation. Let him, therefore, point to the state of matters with regard to that class of vessels known as "belted cruisers," which had their armour wholly under the water when they had their coals on board. A very able and, he thought, an extremely interesting speech was made to-night by the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Penrose Fitzgerald), and in that speech the hon. Gentleman suggested some very important considerations touching the coal supply of ships; but he (Sir Edward Reed) hardly thought he need say that the men-of-war, with the limited coal supply which we allowed to them, must be viewed from the point of sea-going condition. What the country wanted to know was, what was the state of our men-of-war when they left our ports? He remembered a distinguished Member of a former Board of Admiralty, who—and he had too great respect for him to mention his name—once said to him—
"These ships are not armoured ships at all when they leave our ports with their coal on Board, but they burn their coal out when they get to sea, and is it necessary they should be fit to tight directly they get out of our own ports?"
It did seem to him (Sir Edward Reed) a most extraordinary proposition that our ships, the ships of Great Britain, the ships upon which we depended, were not to be expected to be fit to fight when they left our own shores. Last Saturday he was in Calais, and one hour afterwards he was in Dover—that illustrated the distance apart of the two countries. It appeared to him that one of the fundamental propositions as to which no reasonable man ought to admit of a doubt in his mind was that our ships must be the most prepared when they left our own ports and went out into the British Channel. That was the very first thing required. Would the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty be good

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enough, either to-night or on some later occasion, to explain to the House how it was that he was able to stand up, and with all his responsibility upon him reckon in his calculation of the armoured ships of this country the seven bolted cruisers which had not an ounce of armour at all above the water line, or within six inches of the water line when they had all their stores and coal on board? He could hardly see that there was any use in debating. If it be from any cause a matter of indifference whether an armoured ship had her armour wholly under water or not, why build armoured ships at all? He noticed that the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty stated, in response to a question which he (Sir Edward Reed) was perhaps rude enough to put to him during his speech, that this description of ship was included in those he was reckoning as iron-clads, and the noble Lord added that some Italian ships with side armour were also included. He (Sir Edward Reed) hoped that no one in the House would infer from the fact that the Italians had certain ships without the necessary armour that, therefore, it was a matter of indifference whether our ships had their armour under water or not. The Italians pursued a specific policy. Their probable enemy was France. France had a powerful Navy with which Italy could not hope to compete; and, therefore, she had to decide for herself by what means she could produce vessels which might give her, not the power of entering into close engagements with France, but of doing as much annoyance and injury as she possibly could to French vessels. And so Italy went to work and designed vessels which had for the period for which they were designed immense steam power and immense armaments. They confined themselves to as much protection from armour as would enable them to work the powerful guns on board, and to work their engines and boilers in comparative safety. There was not a shadow of doubt that the designer of these ships was perfectly well aware that he was not producing vessels such as were fit to take the discharge of any vessel's guns at close quarters. But was that our position? The very tiling we had to do was to hold the entrance to the British Channel, and to do that we must he there and be
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prepared to fight any enemy who might come against us; because to abandon the British Channel was to abandon the national life, and bring on this country a famine worse than had ever been known in the records of the world. He passed on to another class of vessels, and as he had ventured to ask the noble Lord to tell them how it happened he could count the so-called belted cruisers amongst armoured ships, so he should like to know how the noble Lord could reckon upon vessels of the Admiral class? He (Sir Edward Reed) was sorry to see that anyone who discussed this question laboured under the disadvantage of having a state of facts that were so extraordinary, that were so alarming, if accepted in a pure and simple character, that men's minds only turned from them and supposed there must be some explanation. Yet his right hon. Friend the Member for South Edinburgh (Mr. Childers) was sitting by his side, and he very well remembered what had happened in his period of Office. He was afraid the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for the Eastbourne Division of Sussex (Admiral Field) was about to make an attack on his right hon. Friend the Member for South Edinburgh (Mr. Childers) for his conduct as First Lord—was about to use him as an illustration of certain principles of Admiralty administration. Before he mentioned what occurred in the time of his right hon. Friend (Mr. Childers), he would desire to state what occurred in the days of the Duke of Somerset, because there was a great deal of talk now-a-days about a naval officer managing the Navy. In the first place, he (Sir Edward Reed) did not at all understand that the noble and gallant Lord the Member for East Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford) proposed or desired that there should be substituted for the responsible Cabinet Minister, who was a politician as well as First Lord, a naval officer. What he understood the noble and gallant Lord to mean, and what he entirely agreed with, was that there should be a re-arrangement of business at the Admiralty, and that there should be such a re-arrangement that when the First Lord had occasion to act against the judgment of his professional advisers, the latter's views should be made known to the country. In that he (Sir Edward Reed)

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most entirely agreed with the noble and gallant Lord, but he should disagree with him if his proposition was to displace the First Lord of the Admiralty by a naval officer. This was what happened under the Duke of Somerset—and he commended the fact to the attention of the hon. and gallant Admiral below the Gangway opposite (Admiral Field), because it occurred before that change in the Administration which the hon. and gallant Admiral so deplored. There was a meeting of the Board of Admiralty, attended by the whole Board, including himself. The Controller of the Navy was not then a Member of the Board. The meeting was to consider whether Her Majesty's ship Bellerophon should be built. The Duke of Somerset heard all the opinions of the Naval Lords, and afterwards put a series of questions to them, and then came to the conclusion that the objections of the Naval Lords were not well founded; that the ship, if built, would necessarily be in a large measure successful, and that it was, on the whole, to the advantage of the country to build the ship. The Duke of Somerset decided entirely against the judgment of all his Naval Advisors except the Naval Controller. The Naval Secretary to the Admiralty was against the ship, but the ship was built, with the result that there was a saving to the country of £106,000 on that single vessel, and a like saving on every other vessel of the same type that was built. Then came the question of the American monitors, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Edinburgh (Mr. Childers) was the First Lord of the Admiralty who decided to build the first ship of the mast-less type—namely, the Devastation. He was bound to say that with the exception of the Naval Controller, who was appointed by the First Lord as a Member of the Board—with the exception of the opinion of this gentleman the Devastation—a totally new type of ship, which had been since highly approved of—to a large extent was adopted by the then First Lord against the advice of his Naval Advisers. He (Sir Edward Reed) thought that he could show by other cases when there had been critical situations, and when an authoritative judgment was required, that if they had a political First Lord, who was a good man of business and a man
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of strong sense, he would certainly get all the opinions of his Naval Advisers, and would give them due weight; but it was often desirable in the public interest that such a man should decide against technical advice. He (Sir Edward Reed) wanted to say a little more about the state of the Navy, and he did it in no spirit hostile to the present Board of Admiralty. Of course, the time was now past when he had to fight an uphill battle in the House with respect to certain ships, because they now had in the Minutes of the noble Lord of last year the facts about these ships stated, and the only question upon which they were justified in calling the First Lord to account was, how it happened that he went on calling all these ships of the Admiral class iron-clad ships, and comparing them with ships of other Navies, when he must know that they had no more armour out of water than was represented by the height of a book upon the Table, and that only for about a third of their length; and when he must know that the slightest inclination on one side imperilled the lives of the seamen and officers on board of these ships. It would be most disgraceful treachery to send men on board these ships into battle, because they were not armoured ships at all. He desired to know why it was that the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty took upon himself the responsibility of fathering these ships, and of not giving an inquiry concerning them? It was a most singular circumstance about these vessels that an Administration had never been found which had been willing to make any experiments for the purpose of testing them. There were now experiments made to discover whether steel or compound armour was the better, and the House would remember that in the case of vessels of the Inflexible type they were told they were to be made safe by cork. Did they not know that when they let water into cork it got sodden and ceased to perform the functions of cork? There was now a suggestion about cellulose, and that was the point at which they had arrived. When the First Lord told them there was no necessity to lay down more iron-clads, it became his duty to give them fuller information about those ships. In the case of the Inflexible, there were indepen-

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dent men on the other side of the House—and he was pleased to see there were now—who would not be silenced in their demand for an inquiry, and statistics about the vessels were got out. He asked the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty to take some steps to ascertain the stability of these vessels and their action when wounded. If the noble Lord would do that he would relieve himself of a great responsibility. The noble Lord was not responsible for the design, but he was responsible if he did not give the House full information. He (Sir Edward Reed) did not speak without some reason. He was told that if this country became engaged in a war and the Admiralty intended to send the Admiral class of ship into action technical objection would be taken, and the First Lord would be prevented sending any of them into battle by the objections of technical men in his own employment. What were the figures about these vessels? There were five ships of this class which cost the country £3,750,000; there were seven ships of the belted cruiser class, which had no armour at all above the water line, which cost £2,000,000; then there were the Impérieuse and the Warspite, which were in pretty much the same predicament, which cost another £1,000,000 sterling; and there were four other vessels which were as dangerous—he referred to the Ajax class. When the Inflexible controversy was raging he received letters from men inside the Admiralty, from draftsmen employed on the vessel, asking him to got an inquiry, because there were defects in the vessels making them dangerous. They had spent £9,000,000 sterling on a series of ships which if they went into battle would be lost almost as readily as if they had no armour, and would be only saved by their engines and boilers. So far as their stability and power to keep afloat when injured was concerned they were just as if they had no armour at all, and he objected, as an Englishman and a Member of that House, to the First Lord getting up and jeopardizing the interests of this country by counting these among the armoured ships of the Navy. The Navy did not believe in these ships, and he heard a former Naval Member of the Board of Admiralty say publicly—
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"I quite agree with the objections that have been brought against these ships; and I am confident—I was a Member of the Board which ordered these ships—that no such ships would have been allowed if the Board had known of the coming in of the small quick-firing guns."
Mr. White had been quoted as saying that there was no disposition on the part of foreign Governments to use heavy guns. They did not need heavy guns to destroy vessels of the Admiral class; any gun was good enough to destroy them. He would like the House to consider that statement—with any limitations it pleased—and ask itself whether, under such circumstances, this country was safe? His right hon. Friend near him said the other evening that in France the Navy was as much complained about as was our own Navy. That was very true, and he must say that the position of this country would be very critical if it were not so. But the objections to the French Navy were not of that kind; they were founded on the slow progress of the ships, and that was the reason why they considered themselves weak. Those facts showed that some change in the allocation of the public duties—of some alteration in the performance of them—was very much needed. The hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood) had shown considerable interest in these and other technical matters, but the position of the House was this—that it had nothing but what the First Lord gave it about those matters. There was nothing in the Minutes of this year about the vessels of the Admiral class, and if he asked the proper persons about them he supposed the reply would be that it was ancient history. He felt unequal to discussing in any degree the Estimates for the year. He did not like to say anything in favour of their arrangement until he had studied it. But he did think it was rather a strong thing for a Government—even such a one as this, strong in strength not its own—to give the House Estimates on Thursday night with the view of discussing them on Monday night. Why should not the noble Lord give them some knowledge about those ships? Why were they to be kept in ignorance? He was told that on the Board of Admiralty the anxiety about those ships was even greater than that he had expressed. The apprehension of the water getting into the unarmoured parts of the vessel

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and dashing about was very great indeed. Whatever were the defects of these vessels they were absolutely unnecessary, and might easily have been obviated. There had always been a wanton disposition to put the armour in the interior instead of outside. England was so safe with many of her principal ships with their armour under water, and with every facility for going to the bottom so soon as the enemy's light guns touched them, that the present Admiralty did not think it necessary to put down any more iron-clads. But they were going to put down two belted cruisers, laid down for no better reason than that they were part of the programme put before the United Service Institution by himself. He proposed, however, that these vessels should be of 7,000 tons, and steam 20 knots with a belt of armour. Instead of that the Admiralty made them of 5,000 tons, and of less speed, and so they had these ineffective and dangerous vessels. Now the Admiralty were going to lay down two cruisers of 9,000 tons, and to steam 20 knots; they were, however, refusing to make them bolted cruisers; the armour was to be put inside. The system of putting armour inside was very dangerous in the sense that the vessels did not require to be much injured to be certain of capsizing. He desired to give the present Board all the support he could because it had done, and was doing, thoroughly good service. In conclusion, he would say that if he were right in his views, and if hundreds—he was going to say thousands—of naval officers who agreed with him were right, this country was in great danger in the event of a naval war; if they were wrong it ought to be in the power of somebody to show that they were wrong.
THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. FORWOOD)said, he thought the present Board of Admiralty had not a word to raise of objection to the tone that this debate had assumed. He thought the general character of the speeches made in reference to the propositions of the Board had been of a most friendly tone, and had left little for him to answer. The hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed) had devoted the principal part of his speech to animadverting on a class of ships known as the Admiral class. He (Mr. Forwood) had very little to say
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in reply to that, except that it was another evidence of the maxim that the doctors did often differ. Those vessels of the Admiral class were laid down and constructed by the predecessors of the present Board, and he presumed that before the First Lord of that day accepted the design he had the Report of his Naval Colleagues and the naval designers at the Admiralty. He could not imagine that any person, be he layman or First Lord, would have laid down five or six cruisers of the belted class, unless he had been fully convinced by his Naval Colleagues and the designers as to the quality of the ships beforehand. There were competent naval officers who did maintain that those ships were powerful ships and useful ships. There were elements in their design intended to counteract the difficulties that might be encountered in the case of quick-firing guns above the water line. Those vessels had been built on the cellular principle, but no one could foretell the effect of the explosion of a shell inside. Again, he would say that those vessels were pronounced by competent naval authorities—he did not express an opinion himself—to be good, powerful ships, and at the recent naval manœuvres there were no ships which naval officers more preferred. This brought him to a point which was a little personal to this discussion. He had been twitted by several of his hon. and gallant Friends with regard to some remarks he had made as to experts. There was no one who had an higher opinion than himself of the Naval Service and of naval officers, but he had made some remarks in reference to the value to be set upon the opinion of experts, and he did so with the knowledge that men who were experts in any special department constantly differed largely from one another, and he could not better illustrate this than by referring to what they had heard in the course of the debate. The hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Penrose-Fitzgerald) had asked the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton) whether he would state that our Navy was sufficient for the protection of our coasts, our food supply, and our supply of raw material in time of war. He (Mr. Forwood) ventured to think it would be a bold thing for a naval man or a civilian to say what ex-

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tent of naval force was necessary to guard against all these contingencies; but this he would say—that the statements they had made were rather with regard to our position in relation to the force or combination of other nations. The information laid before the House by his noble Chief was information which he believed the House could thoroughly rely upon. It had been given on a careful analysis of the comparative strength of each vessel. From another Report which he himself had from Naval Authorities, he felt sure that the estimate of the relative proportion of the marine strength of England, as compared with other nations, fully confirmed the statement which the noble Lord had laid upon the Table of the House. The hon. Member for Cambridge had further confirmed the theory generally held as to the difficulty of getting experts to agree. The hon. Member said it was very difficult to get naval men to agree as to the relative values of armour, coaling, and manœuvring powers in the case of ships, and he (Mr. Forwood) felt that it would be very difficult to bring experts to hold any one opinion on those matters. They had to hear all sides of the case, and to determine on the course which they considered best for the country, to put it in a position to defend our ports and coasts. The hon. Member for Banffshire (Mr. Duff) had made some comments in reference to the coaling arrangements, particularly on the recommendation of the Coaling Committee with regard to Portland. He was not sorry to think that so little had been done with regard to Portland, for the money that had been spent had not been wisely expended. The coal shipping arrangements had been placed in a position at which vessels a great part of the year could not lie. The new hydraulic arrangements put up by Sir William Armstrong on the recommendation of the Committee were at such a part of the harbour as to be useless a great portion of the year. If that was a criterion of the value of the whole Report, he was of opinion that the House would be glad to hear that the Admiralty did not intend to spend much more money in this matter without a farther inquiry. Some inquiries were being made into the subject, and they hoped to prepare
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such plans this year for the coaling of vessels at Portland, and the other home stations, as would give satisfaction, and insure a proper supply of coal in times of emergency; but he could say that a large amount of money had been provided for barges, which were one of the best means for coaling vessels, as was shown by experience in the case of merchant vessels. Some 20 large barges and two steam barges were being built, capable each of carrying 150 tons of coal for home service, besides others in course of construction for our foreign stations. This, he thought, was an earnest of the desire of the present Board of Admiralty to improve the coaling arrangements for the Fleet. Then the hon. Member for Banffshire alluded to the question of the Board taking over the Armament Vote from the War Office, and he spoke of the divided responsibility. He (Mr. Forwood) would point out to the House what was the exact position of the Admiralty in regard to that Vote. They had not differed in the way which had been suggested with the War Office, as to the amount the Admiralty were to obtain from them on the transfer. They had simply asked the War Office to furnish the particulars of the stock and materials they had in hand—on shipboard and in reserve—so that they might form an opinion as to what it would be necessary to provide in future The War Office were preparing a list of these things, and when the next Estimates were before the House the Admiralty would be better able to state to the House what it would be necessary to be done to place the reserves of ammunition in the position in which they ought to be. But he wished to say, with reference to the further remarks of the hon. Gentleman, in which he suggested that they ought to take more money for guns and less for ships, that they had taken as much for guns as the manufactories of the country could turn out, and in proof of that he might say that the War Office would have to return to the Treasury a very large amount of the money which they had taken for naval armaments this year, and which they had been unable to spend. It would be, therefore, idle on the part of the Admiralty to take an excessive amount, knowing the difficulty there had been in expending the money asked for last year. Then, with regard

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to the 110-ton gun which the hon. Member had referred to, he (Mr. Forwood) believed the feeling at the Admiralty was against building any more of that class of gun. But in the ships laid down for the guns, all the important mechanical and hydraulic gear was provided; the mountings were ready, and the guns were being constructed, and to pull the ships to pieces and to undo all the work that had been accomplished would, in his opinion, and also, he thought, in that of the House, would be to go back to the system of waste which had been going on for so long at the Admiralty. As to the remark of the hon. and gallant Member as to not building more iron-clads, the First Lord promised the House last year that no more iron-clads should be laid down until he had laid the particulars before the House. He would have the House bear in mind that they had still in hand a considerable amount of iron-clad vessels to finish, and he would find in the Estimates this year that they were practically going to renew the Thunderer and the Superb. The vessels were to have new engines, and were being re-armed, the effect of which would be practically to make them almost as good as two additional iron-clads to the Fleet. The First Lord never stated that the Board were going to cease building iron-clads, but said that they would not lay down any more until the House was taken into their confidence. It was impossible for the Admiralty to meet all the demands made every year. Their programme this year provided for a large amount of fast cruisers to protect the commerce and the food supplies of the people, to which the hon. Member for Cambridge had alluded. Having, as he believed, dealt with all the points raised by hon. Members, he expressed a hope that the House would consent to the Motion now before it, seeing that there would be an opportunity for general discussion of details when the Committee stage of the Estimates was reached.
ADMIRAL FIELDsaid, he hoped he should not put the responsible Ministers to any inconvenience by intruding upon the kind attention of the House for a short period. If it were the wish of the Minister in charge of the Estimates that the debate should be now adjourned, he (Admiral Field) would be only too delighted. If
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not, he would beg to call the attention of the House to a few remarks in the able speech of the noble Lord the Member for South Paddington (Lord Randolph Churchill), when he pointed out that there were 178 officers in the House connected with the Services. That remark had been received by derisive cheers from the other side of the House, and he (Admiral Field) knew what those derisive cheers meant. He wished to point out to those who had raised the derisive cheers that out of these 178 officers only seven were connected with the Navy. He would ask the attention of the House and its forbearance, reminding it that he had not spoken once this Session, though they had had a military debate for two nights, and that only one naval officer had taken part in it. Judging from the debate which took place the other night, the impression amongst military men seemed to be that the Army was the first defence of the country. He had always been of opinion, and was still, and would continue to be until he became fit for a lunatic asylum, that the Navy was the first line of defence of our Empire. The safety of the country depended upon the Navy, and not upon the Army, for, with all its merits, the Army could not go and fight a battle for the country unless it was carried to the scene of action by the Navy. Now, they had the Navy Estimates, or rather the Memorandum of the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton), laid before them, and they had had interesting speeches from both sides of the House, some of which he agreed with, and others with which he disagreed. He assumed that the Naval Lords approved of all that was in the Memorandum, though he should have liked to have been assured of this by seeing their names at the bottom of that Memorandum. He thought that the names of the Naval Lords should appear on those documents, although it seemed that the First Lord entertained a contrary view. He would discuss that matter with the noble Lord later on. The noble Lord, in his Memorandum, had at last done tardy justice to a most admirable class of men—namely, the lieutenants of the Royal Navy. He had done what most of them thought ought to have been done years ago—that was to say, he had raised the scale of pay of lieutenants of eight

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years' standing 2s. a-day, and the same amounts to lieutenants of 12 years' standing. But the Admiralty had given with one hand and taken away with the other; and in making these remarks it must be remembered that he was not only speaking his own sentiments, but those of the branch of the Service interested, as a deputation of very old lieutenants had done him the honour to wait upon him on this question. The lieutenants were grateful for the concession which had been made; but, as he pointed out, the Admiralty had given with one hand and taken away with the other. They had given this 2s. a-day to men of 12 years' standing, but had coupled with it a condition which it was almost impossible to fulfil—namely, six years' service in a ship of war at sea. If the noble Lord would remember that formerly, when the 2s. for lieutenants of 10 years' service required only three years in a ship of war at sea, he would find that that would work out about one year's service in a ship of war at sea for each three years' standing. It was now three years in a ship of war at sea for lieutenants of eight years' standing. It should be four years in a ship of war at sea for lieutenants of 12 years' standing to work out a fair proportion. He was told that there were no less than 30 lieutenants on the list who would be excluded from the benefits of the scheme of the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty. It was not the fault of these lieutenants that they had not been six years in a ship of war at sea; many had been kept on half-pay when promoted, or appointed to Coastguard ships against their will, which did not count as sea time. He would, therefore, ask the noble Lord to give careful attention to this matter. It was only a small matter; but it seemed only fair that the order should not be made retrospective. One word in reply to the hon. Member for Banffshire (Mr. Duff). He (Admiral Field) had great regard for the hon. Member's criticism, and liked to see Estimates criticized from the Opposition as well as from the Ministerial side of the House. The question of these Estimates was not a Party question; and he was, therefore, glad to see the Estimates discussed from a non-Party point of view. Well, the hon. Member had criticized the transfer of the Ordnance Vote from the Army to
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the Navy Estimates. It would be remembered that he (Admiral Field) had associated with others in order to force this policy on the Government in the Session of 1886. Fortunately, they had found the Government willing to be forced, and the transfer was carried out. It was rather hard for the hon. Member for Banffshire to criticize the change, for when he was in power with his Board of Admiralty, and with his own intense interest in the question, he did absolutely nothing.
MR. R. W. DUFFsaid, he begged to acquaint the hon. and gallant Gentleman with the fact that the late Board of Admiralty, which was presided over by Lord Ripon, before it left Office prepared a Minute to the effect that the Admiralty ought in future to order their own guns, and ought to take over the whole responsibility of procuring the naval ordnance.
ADMIRAL FIELDsaid, he did not care twopence about Minutes. He preferred action to Minutes. The hon. Gentleman knew that he (Admiral Field) had spoken to him upon this question, and had got him to assist hon. Members in this matter. He would know that in 1885 he (Admiral Field) spoke as a young Member on this question, but received no response; and it was all very well to talk about Minutes, but what was wanted was to see the Admiralty do the work. And now a word as to what had fallen from the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed). The hon. Member advocated inquiry into the state of the Navy. He (Admiral Field) would deal with that later on. The hon. Member wanted further information, as did the House, and as they all did. The hon. Member spoke of ships which were dangerous for battle, and which cost £9,000,000 sterling. When a man of the reputation of the hon. Member spoke in that way—a man who had been Constructor of the Navy—his words required very serious attention, and those words might be used as an argument in favour of the proposed inquiry. He would now deal with the policy laid down in the noble Lord's Memorandum. As to the noble Lord's observations in that document, he said—
"That owing to the exceptionally large outlay in the past three years it was possible to associate a reduction of expenditure with an increase of naval efficiency and strength."

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It was a very funny thing to say that by a decrease of expenditure they could increase efficiency and strength, and he, therefore, wanted to know what the noble Lord's words meant? Did the noble Lord mean to tell them that he ignored the Vote of December, 1884, of £5,500,000 to be spent in five years, in addition to the ordinary Estimates—of which £3,100,000 were for new ships? He (Admiral Field) begged to tell the noble Lord, with all respect, that that Vote was not given to enable First Lords to reduce future Estimates. It was demanded by the country, and it was voted unanimously by the House, because past Administrations had not had the courage of their convictions. They knew what the Service required, but when they came to that House they did not ask for that amount which they knew was necessary to put the nation in a proper state of defence. It was only when the defences were reduced to a state of danger that this money was asked for and voted during the Russian scare; and now the noble Lord came down and told them that he was able to show a balance of £905,000, which, presumably, was to be handed over to the Treasury. He (Admiral Field) declared that he was not satisfied, and that no other naval man would be satisfied, to see this money handed over to the Treasury in reduction of expenditure. If the noble Lord had that balance it ought not to be paid back, but should be expended on more armoured cruisers—such as the noble Lord the Member for Marylobone (Lord Charles Beresford) had declared the Service required. All naval authorities agreed in the declaration that we wanted a large increase to our naval force in order to make the country safe. He knew it was always difficult in that House to advocate an increase in the expenditure; but naval men know what they were talking about in those matters. He would quote some authorities on the subject. Admiral Sir Cooper Key, who had lately passed away, in a letter written by him to The Times on 3rd February last, said he was far from being satisfied with the condition of the Navy, either as regards matériel, personnel, or organization, but he believed it to be superior in all respects to any other Navy, and that it was improving year by year. That was the opinion of a high authority; but he
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(Admiral Field) did not believe that the measure of our requirements was the requirements of any other country. The measure of our requirements were our necessities—the enormous commerce we had to protect, our food supply, our Colonies, and so on. Sir Cooper Key went on to say that disaster might result if the unanimous opinion of the Naval Members of the Board of Admiralty was overruled. On this subject of the reduction of expenditure by £905,000, he (Admiral Field) maintained that the noble Lord did not prove his case, and the highest naval authorities in the country would have the House to pause before they accepted such a policy. Naval men ought to have their arguments heard in that House, although they might not be so powerful in it as out of it. Well, Admiral Hornby, Admiral Symonds, and Sir George Elliott, as well as other able men, were all of his view in this matter; and he only mentioned that in order to back up the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed) and others, who had pointed out that the Navy was not up to the requirements of the Empire. If the noble Lord argued that we did not want any more belted cruisers or other ships built, how, in the name of common sense, could he justify his action in taking up merchant vessels and arming them? These ships might be valuable as auxiliaries in time of war, but they were not war vessels. They were simply egg-shells. Their engines were above the water-line, and a single shot from the enemy's cruisers would render them hors de combat if it struck them above the water-line. In one of the Secretary to the Admiralty's (Mr. Forwood's) able speeches—and the hon. Member made a good many speeches, some of them good and some of them bad, like that at Liverpool—he said we required £2,070,000 per annum to keep up the war strength of the Navy. If that were so, how was it possible that the sum of £905,000 could properly be paid back into the Treasury? The fact was an inquiry was required into all these matters. The Government had granted a kind of inquiry as to the system of organization, but he did not know what it meant. All that naval men wanted—and he believed soldiers wanted the same thing—was an inquiry as to whether or not our forces were sufficient for the country. If the statement of the hon.

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Member for Cardiff were true, that ships which had cost £9,000,000 sterling were unfit to go into battle, a case was at once made out for inquiry as to the state of the Navy. He (Admiral Field) was going to call some powerful witnesses in support of that view, and the first witness he would take would be the Colonial Conference. If hon. Members would study the Report of that Conference, they would find a remarkable statement in the second Report of the Commission on Coaling Stations. They would find it laid down in the Appendix that the question as to how far the Navy was able to discharge the duties alluded to in the Report was one which could only be answered by comparing the strength of our Navy with that of foreign Navies, and with the estimate of the relative fighting power of each ship. That was a vital point. Our insular position had freed us from the necessity of competing in large standing armies with other nations; but the efforts other nations were making to increase their strength at sea, in the opinion of this authority, called for a corresponding effort on our part to increase the fighting power of our Navy. The Commission on Coaling Stations was deeply impressed with the evidence which had been produced, and expressed the opinion that, looking at the action of other countries, the fighting strength of our Navy should be increased with as little delay as possible. That was a very strong opinion to come from the Colonial Conference. Then the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Goschen), when speaking on the subject of expenditure, said that some people might think that we were spending too much money on the Navy and the Army. He (Admiral Field) would say nothing about the Army. Some people thought that we could do without one, but he was not one of those people. If we had a land frontier, we should require a much larger standing Army than we had, and might have a Conscription; but as we had only the water around us, what we wanted was a powerful Navy to protect our commerce and our food supplies. What he wanted to point out was that in the case of a war now-a-days, the Commander of a Fleet would have ten times greater anxiety than Commanders had had in the days of Nelson. In the days of Nelson an Admiral in
1016
command of a Squadron might be led away from the Channel in chase of an enemy for a long distance, and would have been able to do it without feeling that the supplies of the country might be cut off at a moment's notice, and the people left to starve. Naval men had to face that danger nowadays. Well, what did the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer say last year in the speech to which he (Admiral Field) alluded? He said—
"He wished the House would make tip its mind once for all how much it would spend on the Services; if expenditure was excessive, let it be reduced to what was absolutely indispensable for the defence of the country.''
But how could they make up their minds on these questions unless they knew the facts? A powerful statement in support of a searching inquiry into the state of the Navy was made in a letter written by a right hon. Gentleman in 1884, and he (Admiral Field) did not know that the condition of things had very materially changed since that letter was written. The letter was dated the 23rd of September, 1884, and was written to The Times, and it referred to a Motion which had been made in the House by Admiral Sir John Hay, praying for an inquiry into the state of the Navy—and he (Admiral Field) might follow this up with the remark that the hon. Member for Cardiff had, from their own side of the House, pressed the Government to grant an inquiry into the state of the Navy. He (Admiral Field) had always blamed the hon. Gentleman for not pressing the matter home by a distinct Motion. In the letter to which he referred, the right hon. Gentleman said—
"Early last Session Sir John Hay asked the Government to grant a Committee of the House to inquire into the state of the Navy and its inadequacy to protect the interests of this country in the event of sudden war with a Maritime Power. Although I insisted on the complete and sole responsibility of the Government of the day for the defensive forces of the Empire, I strongly urged upon them the expediency of granting the inquiry, as, notwithstanding the repeated assurances of the Admiralty, there was a sense of insecurity in the public mind which could only be allayed by a full and impartial—not necessarily a prolonged—examination of the facts by a body independent of present and of past Governments, but whose verdict would carry with it the confidence and the respect of the nation. The controversy has continued and has increased, and the feeling of alarm and insecurity has widened and deepened, but the Representatives of the Government evade

1017
the real issue, and satisfy themselves by piling figures upon figures in order to prove that they have at least done as well as those who preceded them in Office. This is not, I venture to think, a question about which the public at large care anything at all. They want to know whether our own shores and our Colonial Possessions are safe; whether we have a fighting fleet which can dispose of any probable combination of forces which could be brought against it in battle; whether our food supplies, our trade, and our commerce are reasonably secure from interception by an enemy; whether, in point of fact, we are strong enough to make it in the highest degree improbable that an attack shall be made anywhere, and impossible that such an attack can be successful."
The writer was an ex-Cabinet Minister then, and he was a Cabinet Minister new.
"These are questions which are being asked on all sides, and with increasing frequency. They are not Party questions, for they are being urged with the greatest vehemence by warm supporters of the Government, as well as by Liberal organs—notably by The Pall Mall Gazette."
It was now as then—
"And unless they are dealt with exhaustively and immediately by such a Committee as I have indicated, disquiet and anxiety will increase and swell until some little incident will turn it into a panic."
It was only in 1884.
"There is an impression gaining ground that our system of Government by Party is not conducive to good administration, and the thoughts and energies of our statesmen are devoted rather to the game of checkmating their opponents than to the less sensational but more anxious and laborious duties of administration; but if it comes to pass that the vital interests of the country are sacrificed to the paltry exigencies of Party warfare the demand for a radical change in our system will become irresistible. It will, perhaps, be said that this alarm is most mischievous, and may tend to bring about the very evil against which we wish to guard; but it is imbecility to suggest that Foreign Powers do not know the condition of our forces of every kind at least as well as every Minister of our own Government, with the exception, perhaps, of the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty. If these Powers are our allies or our friends they will rejoice to see England awake to the duty of self-preservation, and if they are secretly hostile they will not be more disposed to attack us because we are placing ourselves in a condition of comparative security. Our neighbours take pains to acquaint themselves with the facts; our Ministers do not care to know more than is convenient on such a disagreeable subject." Will the Government give the inquiry when Parliament meets in October? "
He (Admiral Field) and his hon. and gallant Friends now asked if the Government would extend the scope of the
1018
inquiry which they had consented to grant?
"It might be conducted by a Committee of the House of Commons or a Joint Committee of both Houses; but means must be found to satisfy the country that in these days of restless ambition our Navy is strong enough, or will forthwith be made strong enough, to protect it from aggression and to secure to the Empire of Great Britain peace and tranquillity."
Who was the writer of the letter? The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House—the First Lord of the Treasury. He (Admiral Field) did not think he could bring forward more powerful argument in support of naval opinion in favour of a searching inquiry into the state of our Navy. The letter he had quoted was written in the Autumn of 1884. The Conservative Government came into power in June, 1885. They were turned out in January, 1886. Naturally enough nothing was done in that short interval of time—between June and January, six months—and one could not judge them harshly for that. Another Ministry assumed Office in January, 1886, but Parties again changed places in the following August, so that nothing could be done in 1886. But the Government which took Office in August, 1886, had been in power through 1887 up to the present time, and now, when an application was made for a searching inquiry into the condition of the defences of the country—military and naval—the applicants were met from the Front Bench, not with approval, not with assent to a searching inquiry or an inquiry wanted by naval and military men; but with the offer of an inquiry into the system, or organization, whatever that might be. He asserted that the offer of the Government would not satisfy the feeling of the country as expressed to-night by the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Penrose-Fitzgerald), the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed), and by many others. The country wanted to know that it was safe and secure; it could not feel safe and secure unless it knew its naval power was so great and powerful that no combination of other Naval Powers—such as France and Russia for instance—could possibly overpower us, or interfere with our food supply or hamper our commerce. The First Lord of the Admiralty had said tonight he found a diversity of opinion

1019
amongst naval men—that he had never yet been able to ascertain that anyone had proposed an effective method of dealing with the great question of how protection was to be given. That only went to show the great need for a searching inquiry. If the noble Lord could not find men to agree as to what the nature of the defence or protection of our commerce or food supply should be—how many squadrons we required, and what cruisers we should have—he had made out a case for a searching inquiry. The measure of our requirements was our own necessity. Now he came to allude to the noble and gallant Lord the Member for East Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford). He desired to express most sincerely his regret at the noble and gallant Lord's retirement. The noble and gallant Lord was a most valuable man at the Admiralty, because he was a Member of the House. Speaking for himself, he regretted they had no longer the connecting link between the House and the Admiralty which the noble and gallant Lord formed. He knew some persons argued that Naval Lords had no right to be Members of the House of Commons. He believed the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty shared that view. A very strong opinion against such a view was expressed by Sir James Graham in his evidence before the Duke of Somerset's Committee. As he (Admiral Field) had before said, owing to the noble and gallant Lord's resignation they had lost a valuable connecting link between Parliament and the Admiralty, and for that reason he regretted the resignation. He had no right to criticize the noble and gallant Lord's action; but he could not help saying he thought that in the interest of the Service the noble and gallant Lord made a great mistake in resigning, though, of course, he resigned for reasons highly honourable to himself. Now, he (Admiral Field) desired to allude to a remark or two made by the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty—in a speech he delivered at Ealing. He would not like to criticize unfavourably anything that he had said, because he was mindful that the noble Lord was compelled to speak to his constituents in reply to the noble and gallant Lord the Member for East Marylebone, and that probably he was led into saying things he would not otherwise have said about
1020
naval officers. He regretted that, although in some parts of his speech the First Lord of the Admiralty spoke in complimentary terms of his Naval Colleagues, in another part he spoke of them in a threatening tone. The noble Lord might, not have meant to threaten; but he certainly did, for he indicated that if there was a difference of opinion the Naval Lords would have to go. It was quite unnecessary to make that threat. It was quite unnecessary for one in such a high position as the noble Lord to offer a word of caution on a public platform upon that question, and especially as the Naval Lords of the Admiralty could not possibly reply to it. Discipline alone would prevent them criticizing the action of the First Lord. Certainly it would have been better if the First Lord had not criticized beforehand the possible action of his Naval Colleagues. At the same time he thanked the noble Lord for the compliments he paid his Naval Colleagues, and he would set off those compliments against the adverse criticisms of the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood) at Liverpool. The First Lord, speaking of the Naval Lords, said—
"The three great merits of the system are, first, by placing naval officers in positions of Executive responsibility as heads of departments, real power is conferred on them, and their habits and training specially and admirably qualify them for Executive administration."
But what did the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty say upon the point? He said—
"From a business point of view, it would be most unwise to hand the control of the Services to Admirals or Generals, who were called experts. An expert was usually a dangerous man; he was generally imbued with some special idea of his own, which conscientiously he considered it his duty to push."
He (Admiral Field) supposed an expert was right in pushing his idea if his conscience prompted him to push it.
"No two experts ever agreed upon a common plan, and in no profession, not even in the medical, was there greater divergence than among seamen and naval constructors as to the best type of war vessel."
So there was difference of opinion amongst architects. There was great difference of opinion in the House amongst politicians, and he did not think the Secretary to the Admiralty

1021
need be much surprised that naval men did not always agree upon nautical questions. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Forwood) went on to say—
"The Service regarded the Admiral as the expert, and no doubt he was in regard to navigation, drill, naval tactics, and gunnery; but he had no opportunity of studying the technicalities of shipbuilding, nor could he on a quarter-deck become an adept in the control of huge manufacturing establishments employing 25,000 workmen or more."
Of course, he could not when he was kept afloat; but he would when he was put ashore. The hon. Gentleman went on—
"The suggestion to hand over the Army and Navy to professional officers because they were supposed to be experts ''—
no one even proposed it—it was the hon. Gentleman's heated imagination which led him to think so—
"would fail to secure an effective Service or effective Parliamentary control."
No one even proposed it. The hon. Gentleman was raising up a phantom of his own creation to knock it down. The hon. Gentleman went on to say—
"The present system worked well."
What a lot the hon. Gentleman knew about it—
"Both State and Service had their due weight in administration."
That was the hon. Gentleman's opinion; it was not his (Admiral Field's) and his hon. Friends. Now he came to a delicious part of the hon. Gentleman's speech; it was really lovely. This hon. Gentleman, the Member for Ormskirk, the Secretary to the Admiralty, who certainly knew something about Steamship Companies and Steam Navigation Companies, expressed an opinion upon the French naval administration. He said—
"France had tried an Admiral at the head of her Marine, and had just replaced him by a civilian."
Then he went on to give what he thought was the reason—
"A reference to the Report of a Commission of Inquiry on the French Navy Estimates of 1887 did not show that an Admiral or expert was so very successful as an administrator that we ought to follow suit."
Well, that was complimentary to his (Admiral Field's) profession. Then the hon. Gentleman went on to say—
"In the one year's work it was found that the estimates for vessels laid before the French
1022
Chambers were wrong to the extent of over 10 per cent—that ships represented to cost £2,800,000 had their estimated cost increased after investigation to £4,100,000."
The hon. Gentleman argued that a civilian had been appointed because the estimates were exceeded, as if under our system Estimates had never been exceeded. In his speech last year upon naval matters, the noble Lord the Member for South Paddington (Lord Randolph Churchill) pointed out that the Estimates for four ships had been exceeded, in one case by £100,000, in another case by £200,000, in another case by £150,000, and in another case by £60,000; and yet this hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty spoke about the Estimates for the French building programme being exceeded because an Admiral, and not a civilian, was at the head of affairs. He (Admiral Field) drew a different conclusion. He believed the reason was that France was afflicted with extreme Radicals as we were in this country, and that Radicals in France squeezed the Government and endeavoured to displace naval men who knew their business and put in their place scheming politicians who know nothing about the business. That was the explanation of a civilian having displaced an Admiral as Minister of Marine. To show he was right in his contention, and that the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Forwood) was wrong, that there was not an atom of foundation for the hon. Gentleman's argument, he might say that within three days of the delivery of the hon. Gentleman's speech the Minister of Marine—a clever civilian—was turned out of Office and an Admiral put in his place. Yes; and he was a retired Admiral if they pleased. [Laughter.] He thought that would create a laugh. He (Admiral Field) was a retired Admiral too. The French Government thought more of retired Admirals than the Government of this country did. He hoped he had answered the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty; but he asked the First Lord of the Admiralty to utter one word of caution to his subordinate. It was as well that the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Forwood), when he made a speech in the country upon naval questions, should abstain from criticizing Admirals of whom his own Chief the First Lord of the Admiralty spoke in terms of praise. It was not

1023
seemly; it was not conducive to naval discipline that the Secretary to the Admiralty, who was the servant of the Board, should get up on a public platform, and before a popular audience lampoon naval officers who were his superiors and his masters. Now, he had put upon the Notice Paper an Amendment, and he regretted that by the Rules of the House he was precluded from moving it. He had desired to call attention to the executive administration of the Admiralty, and to show that the root of the evil of the present system was that the Orders in Council that were passed in 1869, again passed and issued in 1872, and again issued in 1882, were Orders which undermined the authority and impaired the responsibility of the Naval Lords of the Admiralty, and that those Orders in Council were in themselves mischievous, and should be cancelled.
Question put, and agreed to.
Main Question again proposed.
It being Midnight, the Debate stood adjourned.
THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H. SMITH)said, he would appeal to hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House to assist the Government in taking the Vote early on Thursday. It was absolutely necessary that the Vote should then be taken.
Debate to be resumed upon Thursday.

MOTIONS.
  PRIVATE BILL LEGISLATION.

    MOTION FOR A SELECT COMMITTEE.
    Motion made, and Question proposed
    "That a Committee of Six Members of this House be appointed to join with a Committee of the House of Lords to examine into the present system of Private Bill Legislation, and to report how far, and in what manner, without prejudice to public interests, that system may be modified, with a view to the interests of suitors, the economy of the time of Parliament, and the reduction of costs and charges."—(Mr. William Henry Smith.)
    MR. T. M. HEALYasked when the right hon. Gentleman proposed to submit the names of Members to compose this Committee? Would
    1024
    an Irish Member be included? He would suggest that the Motion should be postponed for a week, in order that the nomination might be proposed at the same time.
    THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H. SMITH)said, it was following the usual course to agree to the appointment of such a Committee first, following it up with the nomination after an interval, to allow of the arrangements being made. It would probably be found expedient to include the name of an hon. Member from Ireland.
    MR. MACDONALD CAMERONasked, would the right hon. Gentleman undertake that at least one Scotch Member should be nominated?
    MR. W. H. SMITHsaid, there was every intention of nominating a fairly representative Committee.
    Question put, and agreed to.
    Ordered, That a Message be sent to the Lords, to acquaint their Lordships, That this House hath appointed a Committee of Six Members to join with a Committee of the Lords to examine into the present system of Private Bill Legislation, and to report how far, and in what manner, without prejudice to public interests, that system may be modified; with a view to the interests of suitors, the economy of the time of Parliament, and the reduction of costs and charges.—(Mr. William Henry Smith.)

  WESTMINSTER ABBEY BILL.

    MOTION FOR LEAVE. FIRST READING.
    THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H. SMITH)said, if the House would allow the introduction of this Bill, having for its object the repair of Westminster Abbey, he proposed to defer a statement until the second reading stage. He would, however, just state for the information of hon. Members that the Bill would involve no charge upon the taxpayers.
    Motion made, and Question,
    "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make further provision for the restoration and repair of Westminster Abbey,"—(Mr. William Henry Smith,)
    —put, and agreed to.
    Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. William Henry Smith, Mr. Secretary Matthews, and Mr. Jackson.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 165.]

  EDUCATIONAL ENDOWMENTS (SCOTLAND) ACT 1882 (MADRAS COLLEGE).

    MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.
    MR. S. WILLIAMSONsaid, it might seem ungrateful to criticize any scheme in regard to the Educational Endowments of Scotland under this Act, seeing what good work the Commissioners had done. This acknowledgment would be endorsed by every Scotchman; but, at the same time, there were circumstances in regard to this particular case that seemed to call for protest. He had to point out several objectional features in the scheme, and first he had to refer to the objection urged by the School Board of St. Andrews, a popularly elected body. The scheme was divided into two parts—the governing part, and the financial part. The objection of the School Board was that the proposed Governing Body would not be sufficiently popular. It would be remembered that the founder of the school (Dr. Bell) left a large sum of money to carry out certain views he held in regard to education, and the school or college thereby established absorbed the parish school and the burgh or grammar school, taking over the buildings and other educational arrangements. In doing this Dr. Bell, who was not a Presbyterian, but Prebendary of St. Peter's, Westminster, naturally had to submit to the use and went of Scotland in regard to education at that time, which placed the control of it in the hands of the Established Church. But times had changed, and such control had been taken out of the hands of the Established Church. One of the objections of the people of St. Andrew's was that the scheme did, in some measure, perpetuate the power of the Established Church in regard to the appointment of Governors. Section 3 provided that a Governor should be elected by the Presbytery of St. Andrew's to the exclusion of the Free Church and the United Presbyterian; and the contention of the people was that it would be far more reasonable to allow a life Governor to be appointed by the ministers of religion in the city, not giving the power to one denomination merely. They also objected to the appointment of a Governor by the Sheriff of Fife. They not unreasonably wished that the Governing Body should be established on a wider and more popular basis. A graver ob-
    1026
    jection, perhaps, was that made to the financial position of the scheme. Madras College had swallowed up the parish school and the burgh school; and the ratepayers not unnaturally claimed that they should be relieved, to a certain extent, by the College endowments from the expense of building and of purchasing a site to meet the requirements of Scotch Educational Law. A very considerable sum of money was to be handed over to the Governors from the Bell residue fund. It might be said that the scheme would not make any enormous demand upon the rates; but St. Andrew's was a small and not a rich town, with only 6,000 inhabitants, who had been put to great expense recently by bringing water into the city, and. were, in fact, heavily taxed. It was, he thought, only reasonable that, out of the large educational endowments, they should receive some consideration; and he thought the House would see the justice of this. He also objected to Clause 39, in regard to scholarships. It was proposed to apply £90 a-year in bursaries, and this was to be distributed by the School Board in conjunction with the Governing Body. But the School Board came more in contact with the people, and it would be far better to hand this over entirely to the School Board, instead of to a joint committee of the School Board and the Madras College. He also had to object to Clause 42, which gave the option of giving the bursaries to scholars either for the University or Madras College; but the desire of the Founder, Dr. Bell, was that it should be given to those going to the University only, and not to those going to Madras College. He thought these were valid grounds for criticizing the scheme; and, while he considered the Education Commissioners had deserved well of the country, he urged those considerations in the interest of primary education in St. Andrew's, and hoped the House would view them with favour.
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    "That an humble Address he presented to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty to withhold Her consent from the Scheme for the Management of the Endowment in the Burgh of St. Andrew's and County of Fife, known as the Madras College, now lying upon the Table of the House."—(Mr. Stephen Williamson.)
    MR. J. A. CAMPBELLsaid, he was sorry his hon. Friend (Mr. S. William-

    1027
    son) had thought it necessary to trouble the House with any opposition to this scheme. The Endowment Commissioners found that this Madras Colledge was, to a considerable extent, doing the work that ought to have been done by the board schools of the town, and they, after full consideration, and hearing all that could be said, both by those who were interested and those who understood the circumstances, came to the conclusion that it was their duty to constitute Madras College a higher class school for more advanced tuition; and they had done so, availing themselves of the endowments of the College, and adding thereto a further contribution from another fund, left by the same founder—the Bell Residue Fund. He might mention that the endowment, although at one time of a good amount, was now considerably diminished owing to the circumstance that the investments were chiefly in landed property. The income of the College, at present, was £560 a-year, and by the contribution from the Bell Residue Fund the amount would be raised to £700, for the endowment of this higher class school. His hon. Friend objected to the constitution of the Governing Body; but he (Mr. Campbell) thought it could not be considered as not sufficiently popular. The Governors were to be 10 in number, and of these two would be elected by the Town Council of St. Andrew's, two by the School Board, two by the Senate of the University of St. Andrew's, one by the Lord Lieutenant of the County, one by the Sheriff of Fife, and two by the existing Bell Trustees. When vacancies occurred by the death of these life Governors, one would be elected by the Presbytery of St. Andrew's, and one by the rural School Board. He thought the House would consider that, after all, that was a rather popular body of trustees. His hon. Friend complained of power being conferred on the Established Church. Well, the Commissioners required to have regard to the constitution of existing trusts when forming new Governing Bodies, and it was because of the interest the Established Church had in Madras College as it was, they had introduced this very small element of one member out of 10 to be appointed by the Presbytery of St. Andrew's. His hon. Friend complained of the scheme of the Commissioners imposing a fresh burden on the
    1028
    school board of the town; but that was because the Commissioners found that the Bell Trustees had been relieving the school board of part of its duty. But in instituting the new scheme they had set apart £90, to be paid for the fees of children attending public schools in St. Andrew's. Twenty poor children would receive free scholarships in Madras College; and £100 a-year would be given in bursaries and scholarships, varying from £10 to £20, to children whose parents required assistance towards giving then a higher education. Altogether, he believed the scheme was by no means unwelcome to the people of St. Andrew's generally. The Commissioners were not aware that there were any objections to be brought against the scheme, and he believed that such were not brought forward during the time allowed for receipt of objections. On the whole, he hoped the House would not think of disturbing a scheme to which there had been no objection until his hon. Friend placed his Notice on the Paper.
    THE LORD ADVOCATE (Mr. J. H. A. MACDONALD)said, he must point out to the House the extreme inconvenience of the way in which this scheme had been dealt with. The scheme was passed by the Commissioners so far back as December, 1886, and the Scotch Education Department waited a considerable time to see if any objection was made to it. A small objection was urged on behalf of the University of St. Andrew's, which was stated in such a form as to indicate that they did not wish to press it, but only to have it considered. He presumed that that was what his hon. Friend (Mr. Williamson) had alluded to—the question of the bursaries being given partly to the University and partly to the College. But the objection was ultimately withdrawn. The Education Department waited an entire year, and only in December last approved of the scheme. Up to that time no such objections as those made that night by the hon. Member were suggested; they had been made now for the first time, and without notice given to the Education Department, that they might have the opportunity of considering whether the scheme should be referred back to the Commissioners for reconsideration. The House was now asked to deal with a matter in reference to which the proper course

    1029
    of representation for getting revision had not been taken. This fact bore very strongly on the question whether it was right and just that the House should be asked to review the decision of the Commissioners, when the ordinary and proper course of proceeding, by getting the scheme reviewed by the Education Department, had never been put into operation at all. His hon. Friend (Mr. Campbell) had fully explained the ground upon which the Commissioners proceeded in dealing with this endowment; and in disposing of this or any other educational scheme, it could not be expected that the Commissioners would please everybody by their decision. It appeared to him that, in this instance, the Commissioners had acted with a very wise disoretion, and he could not think that their decision had excited much public feeling, when during a whole year not the slightest objection was taken.
    MR. S. WILLIAMSONsaid, he would remind the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate that there were three schemes connected with Madras College, and that it was impossible to take action against one until the bearing of the whole of the schemes was ascertained. He would appeal to him to postpone the matter for another year.
    MR. J. H. A. MACDONALD: No, no!
    Question put, and negatived.

    COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS.
    Ordered, That the Committee of Public Accounts do consist of Twelve Members.
    Ordered, That the Committee have power to send for persons, papers, and records.—(Mr. Jackson.)

    COUNTY COURTS (IRELAND) BILL.
    On Motion of Mr. T. M. Healy, Bill to amend the County Courts (Ireland) Acts, and to improve the administration of the Law in Ireland, ordered to be brought in by Mr. T. M. Healy, Mr. Clancy, Mr. Chance, and Mr. Maurice Healy.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 166.]

    FRIENDLY SOCIETIES ACT (1875) AMENDMENT (NO. 2) BILL.
    Order for Second Reading upon Wednesday 18th April read, and discharged:—Bill withdrawn.
    Ordered, That leave be given to bring in a Bill, instead thereof, to amend "The Friendly Societies Act. 1875," and that Mr. Francis Stevenson, Mr. Picton, Mr. Channing, Mr. Burt, Mr. Caldwell, and Mr. Mason, do prepare and bring it in.
    House adjourned at half after Twelve o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Coroners * (36); Quarter Sessions * (37); Electric Lighting Act (1882) Amendment (No. 2) * (38); Land Charges Registration and Searches * (40).
Second Reading—Referred to Select Committee—Liability of Trustees * (24).
Committee—Report—Pluralities Acts Amendment Acts, 1885, Amendment * (26).
Report—Pharmacy Acts Amendment * (34–39).

SCIENCE AND ART (METROPOLIS)—CHARTER FOR A TEACHING UNIVERSITY.—QUESTION.
LORD HERSCHELLsaid, that in the absence of his noble Friend (Earl Granville) he desired to ask the Lord President of the Council, Whether he has made up his mind as to the manner in which he would deal with the application for a charter for a Teaching University in London and other like applications for charters; and whether he has come to a conclusion as to a Royal Commission on the subject?
THE LORD PRESIDENT (Viscount CRANBROOK), in reply, said, that he had come to the determination to recommend the issue of a Royal Commission to inquire into the subject, which was one dealing with a large number of interests. He thought the Commission need not be a large one, and then they would get through the work more speedily, and perhaps in time to report this Session.

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL DISTRESS.—RESOLUTION.
EARL DE LA WARR, in rising to move—
"That, in the opinion of this House, considering the depressed condition of agricultural and other industries in this country, and the consequent distress among the working classes, it is incumbent upon Her Majesty's Government to take into their serious consideration what measures can be adopted to avert the grave consequences which must otherwise ensue,"
said, that the country had long been waiting patiently in the hope that there might be some favourable change in the prospects of agriculture and other industries of the country. There had, indeed, been glimpses of improvement, and of a brighter day; but they had
818
faded almost as soon as they appeared, and though there might be a prospect of well-doing for some industries in the country, the prospects of agriculture at the present time were no better than they had been for some years past. Having quoted the testimony of the Prime Minister at Derby recently as to the depressed condition of agriculture, the noble Earl observed that it was far from his wish to say or do anything which might embarrass Her Majesty's Government; but it seemed to him that on a question of such vital importance to the country some intimation ought to be given of what the intentions of Her Majesty's Government were, especially after the words of Her Majesty's Speech. It might be useless to refer to statistics, as they were well known to most of their Lordships; but he might observe that it had been stated on trustworthy authority that the loss sustained by the owners and occupiers of land during the last 10 years amounted to £600,000,000. Sir James Caird gave evidence before the Agricultural Commission not very long ago to the effect that the average loss to growers of wheat alone in the last few years was £17,000,000 annually. In many places there were 40 or 50 per cent of the landowners not able to live in their houses, and it was further found, according to calculations believed to be as nearly as possible correct, that there were 900,000 of the working population who could not without the greatest difficulty find any employment. The wages in the agricultural districts were getting lower, and there was every prospect of their continuing to do so. We were further informed on trustworthy authority that there were 1,000,000 acres of corn-bearing land which had been either thrown out of cultivation or turned into pasture in England and Scotland, and over 1,000,000 in Ireland, and that 200,000 persons had been in consequence thrown out of employment. The result was a great migration into London and other large towns of persons who there found themselves in a worse condition of distress and destitution. He thought these facts justified him in bringing this question under their Lordships' notice. He did not wish to exaggerate in the least; his only object was that the attention of their Lordships and of Her Majesty's

819
Government should be drawn to the subject. The condition of agriculture was the matter with which he was best acquainted, but the remarks which applied to agriculture applied in a great measure, though, perhaps, not quite as much, to other industries of great importance to this country. What he wanted to bring under their Lordships' notice was that if those industries were failing the consequence must be that a large number of the working population must be thrown out of employment, and brought in many places to a state of great destitution. The question of the depression in the country was one which concerned not only landlords, but manufacturers, capitalists, and all other persons who had anything to do with the great industries of the country, and it was certain that the labouring population, who were already beginning to feel most acutely, would in time feel this distress more almost than any other class. It was impossible to walk through the streets of London without noticing the large number of shops filled with foreign goods. Foreign goods were taking the place in the most prominent manner of English goods. The silk industry was almost at an end. The last sugar manufactory in London was closed only a short time ago, and in the manufacture of hats, gloves, lace, and other such articles the French were driving English goods out of the market. German goods could, also, be seen everywhere. The iron industry had been supplanted by Belgian and German goods, and our swords and bayonets were made abroad, while thousands of Sheffield men were standing idle. While all this went on it must act severely on the labour market of this country, and therefore the question of foreign competition concerned the working classes of this country more, perhaps, than any other question. A man who is dependent upon labour for his very existence now finds foreign workmen doing in another country the work he ought to be doing here. This was no longer a time for theorizing on questions of political economy. Facts were daily brought home to the people of this country which compelled them to turn their attention seriously to the question of their failing industries, and to consider whether some protection ought not to be given to those en-
820
gaged in home industries. It was said that the question of protection of British industries against foreign competition was not within the range of practical politics. He was quite aware of the difficulties which surrounded the question, but he would remind their Lordships that the competition of the present day was quite different from what it was 40 years ago, in the day of Sir Robert Peel and Mr. Cobden. In their day steam and railways were almost in their infancy, but this country was brought into close contact both by land and sea with almost all the countries of the world. This competition was altogether unforeseen by Mr. Cobden, as might be gathered from his own words namely, "I do not anticipate that wheat will be reduced below 45 s. per quarter, even by Free Trade." Surely there was reason why some change on our part should be made. There might be other reasons besides those he had mentioned which had in some measure added to the great depression from which this country suffered, such as the currency question and the vast amount of capital which went abroad to be invested in manufacture, in railways, and also in agriculture. It was calculated that an income of £100,000,000 was produced out of British capital by foreign labour. In The Financier newspaper of the 25th of February there appeared a report of a meeting of the shareholders of the Northern Railway of Canada relative to the fusion of the great Canadian railways, and at which a letter was read from Mr. W. H. Smith, M.P., the largest shareholder of the Company, expressing himself in favour of the scheme. He mentioned this as an instance of what was taking place with regard to foreign investments of English capital, which might probably be added as one of the causes of the present industrial distress. In conclusion, he would add that, even if changes in local government and local taxation were made, he believed they would be found inadequate to afford relief to the working classes or to revive failing industries. The question which for some time past had almost paralyzed the energies of the country could only be solved, as it seemed to him, by adapting our own existing fiscal system to the changed circumstances of the time, and to the altered conditions of the commer-

821
cial relations of different countries of the world.
Moved to resolve,
"That, in the opinion of this House, considering the depressed condition of agricultural and other industries in this country and the consequent distress among the working classes, it is incumbent upon Her Majesty's Government to take into their serious consideration what measures can be adopted to avert the grave consequences which must otherwise ensue."—(The Earl De La Warr.)
THE MARQUESS OF HUNTLYsaid, he would confine himself to that branch of the subject with which he was connected—namely, the condition of agriculture. There could be no doubt as to the existence of agricultural distress; it was almost unparalleled. It had now passed beyond depression. Landlords, tenants, and labourers were all alike suffering. He had within the last few days seen villages in Hunts, Northants, and Cambridgeshire denuded of a mass of young labourers emigrating to Queensland. Why was this? Because neither owners nor tenants could find work for them. Many more would go, but their ago prevented them. Tenants spoke helplessly of their condition, and many were quite bankrupt. Their Lordships were quite aware how the crisis had affected landlords, so that he need not enlarge upon that; but the opinion was evidently held by some of the leaders of the people that the landlords alone were to blame for having exacted high rents, and that any remedial legislation would benefit the oligarchical class of landlords. He would mention one case known to him personally to show the hardships that had fallen on landlords. A gentleman succeeded to an estate 20 years ago. It was heavily burdened with charges and jointures, and the buildings and cottages on it were in a ruinous condition. He paid off half the mortgages, and spent the whole of the income from the estate in repairing the buildings, draining the land, and in other improvements. Up to 1874 things went well, but since then rents had fallen, and the rental was now 50 per cent lower than it was when he succeeded. The consequence was that he was now getting no income whatever out of the estate, although he paid off £30,000 of debt and spent over £40,000 in improvements. The fall in the values of agricultural produce ap-
822
peared to be the reason of the distress. He did not intend to enter into the great social question, and a great social question it was, whether this denudation of capital from the land in these Islands, the breakdown of the agricultural system, and the emigration of the rural population should be arrested or not. He proposed to confine himself entirely to the commercial question, and the point regarding the value of agricultural produce in so far as these Islands were affected by it. Thinking it would be interesting to learn the condition of those countries which competed with Great Britain in the agricultural market, he lately made a tour in India, Australia. New Zealand, Canada, and America, He found everywhere that the universal complaint was—no profit at present prices. As regarded India, there was no doubt the fall in the value of silver had been one of the chief causes—one, he said, because the extension of irrigation works and the bringing of more land into regular cultivation had been the means—of increasing the large exportation of wheat from that country. He should not enter into the silver question, because that subject was being fully inquired into before a Royal Commission; but he might say this—while the rupee went as far, or was taken at its original value, in India, and the merchant bought the wheat in the bazaars with it under the silver standard, he sold it in Europe, receiving payment under the gold standard. The difference in the rate of exchange enabled the merchant to give more money to the grower of corn in India, which, though a very good thing for him perhaps, acted as a bounty against the producer in England and other parts of the world. But even at Delhi and other wheat-growing centres of the North-West he found the fall in values was seriously affecting the position of the farmers, and complaint was universal. In Australia and New Zealand the opinion was unanimous that, with the price of wheat at 30 s. per quarter in England, they could not send it to us at a profit to themselves. In the great wheat-growing districts of the North-West of America and Canada he found rather different conditions existing. He was there just before the commencement of last year's harvest and the appearance of the crops was very good, but these crops could not be

823
relied on; many farmers told him that if they reaped the present crop without its being frosted it would be the first for four years that they had harvested and had not afterwards found half of it, sometimes two-thirds, spoilt by frost. He believed they got it all in good condition last year, but even then, deducting all costs and transport, it did not pay them to grow at 30 s. per quarter. Their Lordships might wonder why, then, they sent it, and continued to grow it. They were obliged to send it at whatever price they could get. The settler in the North-West loaded his waggon with corn and went to the nearest railway station, delivered it over to the elevator; the agent gave current price for it, and back the settler wandered for miles over the prairie with his money in his pocket; he could not pick and choose his market—he was obliged to take what he could get. Some deleterious action had resulted from the operation or management of many of the Mortgage Companies in America and the North-West. Men took blocks of land, borrowed money on them from the Companies on mortgage, farmed as long as they were solvent, then left and throw their lands upon the Companies' hands. These men had nothing to lose but a great deal to gain. Without capital of their own, they traded in the speculation with money advanced at high rates of interest, feeling no personal responsibility if they failed. The effect and the result of this inflated system had been disastrous. He had touched on these points to explain the position of corn and meat producers in other countries, and the result of his conclusions was that low prices were affecting them as much as they were affecting us. If the agriculturist were treated equally with other traders, he could grow cereals and meat in this country to yield him a profit at present prices as well as he could if he were in any other country in the world. He named the present prices of agricultural produce, because he did not think that we could look for any rise in their value. We could not hope for any diminution of supply, and there was no likelihood of prices rising materially. Foreign countries had the commodities and must find mouths to consume them. Low rates charged on large cargoes for long distances had equalized prices, and the earth's increase would come more
824
and more abundantly to us. Corn was being delivered in Liverpool from America at the freight rate of 6d. per quarter, while from Liverpool to most of the consuming centres of England the rate was about 3s. per quarter, The ridiculously low rate at which flour was being delivered in this country precluded all but the largest millers, with a long-established connection, from making any profit by milling, and the flour mills were being closed in all directions. On all sides our farmers said that they could not make both ends meet, that corn crops did not pay them, and that the breeding of stock had become unprofitable. He thought that most farmers omitted the valuation of their straw from their calculations, and did not take into consideration the produce of their farm as a whole. There could, however, be no doubt that the pinch was tremendous, and that the depression was great. Was any remedy to be found, one which would so revive agriculture as to give increased employment to the labouring classes? He did not think that Protection would be a remedy. If one industry were protected others must be protected alto. Some day, perhaps, the necessities of other traders of the country might require duties to be placed on foreign manufactured goods, and, if that day should come, agriculturists would be able to demand, with fairness, that duties should be levied on manufactured produce, such as flour and cheese. But, however hard it was on the one side to see the quartern loaf sold for 4d., to know that the English farmer could not grow the corn to pay him at that price, and on the other side to see hundreds starving from want of employment and unable to buy the quartern loaf, he did not believe in Protection. Agriculture was suffering almost as much from being unequally treated by the State as from low prices. Speaking on September 1, 1887, the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) said that the State might relieve the farmers of some part of the burden of taxation at present imposed upon them. That was the direction in which agriculturists ought to look for relief. The farmer was over-taxed, and not placed, as he ought to be, on the same footing with other traders. The present system of assessment for rateable purposes ought to be changed in accordance with the recommendation of the Select

825
Committee of 1870, and with several Resolutions agreed to in "another place." Other measures which would aid in bringing about an improved state of things were the abolition of preferential railway rates and the establishment of middle class or secondary schools for the teaching of agriculture and dairy farming. He ventured to press these points upon the Government, and cordially supported the Resolution of the noble Earl.
VISCOUNT TORRINGTON: Those who look with a light heart upon the present position of the country or who ignore the pressing difficulties of the industrial classes appear to be blind to two most remarkable features of comparatively recent growth in our national life. On the one hand, there is a prevailing demand among a section of philanthropists—who would improve the condition of the working classes—for national funds to export our unemployed people—a plan known under the name of "State-aided Emigration;" and, on the other hand, we find an increasing exodus of capital, transferred from this country to protected States, to enable our manufacturers to retain their old customers. The fact is notorious that many of our old-established manufacturers are being compelled to establish branches, if not to transfer all their works, to other countries, instead of employing home labour as in the past. These changed conditions of national life must—as Cardinal Manning truly said the other day in his letter to Mr. Wyndham—be faced; and the question for your Lordships, and indeed all the country, to consider is what we have to look to in order to replace the continually contracting markets for our labour. For it must not be lost sight of that, side by side with contracting markets in foreign States for British goods, the home market for the general industries of the country, other than agriculture, is also contracted to an oven greater degree. Before the late Royal Commission the annual decrease in the purchase power of the agricultural community was set down by Sir James Caird at £42,000,000. There is every reason to believe that since then the deficit of two years ago has been enormously aggravated. But consider only what it means for the working classes of the country to be deprived of original
826
customers to the extent of £42,000,000 a-year, these in their turn destroying the earnings, and therefore the purchase power, of hundreds of thousands of others. It seems to me that in these bare facts will be found the primary causes of the scarcity of continuous employment, and that if we are to seek for remedies we must recognize the causes. We, therefore, have to discover fresh markets abroad, and, if it be in our power, to restore vitality to our industrial markets at home. Have we, then, the means within our grasp to accomplish these ends? Few, I think, will deny that an undoubted element of political weakness exists on our reliance to so large an extent upon external food supplies. And it is a grave question whether the low prices of food stuffs of recent years have not been dearly bought at the cost of such weakness. And yet is it not possible that in this element of weakness lie the germs of national safety and renewed vitality to our industrial centres, if we would but turn it to advantage as any private trader would do in his own business? I say boldly that it is in our gigantic food custom alone may be found the solution of the great industrial problem of today. Are all your Lordships aware of the extent of that custom which we now fritter away without thought? Of our total food consumption of—in round numbers—£450,000,000 per annum, we import some £150,000,000. The greater portion of this enormous custom is absolutely withdrawn from our home producers, who, in their turn, would have spent every penny on other labour products, and is to-day given instead to at least to one foreign State, whose return trade in commodities is no more than 7s. in the pound for each sovereign's worth we buy of her—namehy, the United States. But use that enormous lever with wisdom, treat it as a bargaining power—the greatest any nation over possessed—and what great probabilities are before us. Divert, if we can, that national custom to our own land, and to the land of our Possessions scattered over the face of the world—and what must be the result? For such portion as is diverted homeward we have the assurance of the continual turnover and re-turnover of such earnings, and from our own Possessions we have the guarantee of experience that,

827
in spite of their Customs Duties, they take from us of our labour commodities in nearly full exchange of what we buy. Such diversion, indeed, cannot take place without creating an absolute preference in our markets for the products of our Empire, as against those of foreign States. It involved the full reconsideration of our fiscal system. It involved ceasing to give foreign products a preference in our market-places, by freeing them from the taxation which we all have to bear as producers, directly or indirectly. It meant looking to the home market for increased demand, and to our Possessions for such external supplies as our population needs. We shall be told, perhaps, that already the long-promised revival is at hand, and that the Board of Trade Returns show increased vitality. This latter is, of course, a fact, and yet not one on which we ought to rely too greatly. Such Returns are contrasted with two terribly bad years, and, so far as they go, only give evidence of an increased demand from abroad, where the purchase power, after depression, has already recovered. What new vitality is apparent does not, unhappily, arise out of an improved demand from home custom; and until that last feature comes into operation, it were idle to believe in, or to hope for, a return of prosperity.
LORD DENMANsaid, it could hardly be expected that the Government would give an opinion as to "Protection," since there was so strong an antipathy to it; and as the two leading statesmen of the day promised that some duty on corn should be continued, it might be feared that tie Ministry might equally forfeit any pledge that they might give. The great constituency of Sheffield had shown that they wished for Protection all round. He (Lord Denman) showed a cigar case, for which he had given only 1s. 6d.; a silversmith repaired it and charged 1s. 6d. He (Lord Denman) said it had cost that sum. The tradesman said it had cost and was worth much more. On inquiry of the vendor, he found that it had cost that small sum; and he left it with the silversmith, and intended to send him a new one, but, being foreign, no more were to be had, but the contents of it—tobacco—were taxed at least 15 per cent; and if this were better than "Sheffield silver"
828
it ought to handicapped. One noble Earl (the Earl of Wemyss) had said he would never tax the food of the people; but if 1s. were taken in taxes, that would buy bread, and thus the food of the people was taxed. In 1814 no wheat could be imported until the price had risen to 80 s. a-quarter. Mr. Baring tried in vain to reduce it to 75 s. A fixed duty was advocated by Sir James Graham in his Corn and Currency; as Free Trade, it admitted corn when cheap abroad, and a sliding scale only admitted it when corn was dear both at home and abroad. Corn might be in bond, but it would have had to pay warehouse room until, from the high price of corn, it could be admitted at a low duty. The father of the late Lord Denman, to whose training he was indebted for his eminence, saw the riots in 1814, and observed that it was a delusion to state that a tax on corn would starve the people, because, if sudden war or foreign famines occurred the people would then be starved. Land had gone out of cultivation in Suffolk and Hertfordshire. A living in Suffolk of £800 a-year had been reduced to £100. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) had been reported to have bought land near Bal-dock for £ 10 an acre; and while Hertfordshire white wheat might make as good flour as Austrian, it sold at very much less than Austrian flour. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) had lately headed a deputation praying that iron rails might pay market dues. The First Lord of the Treasury said that but for the railways these rails could never have reached the market; but the giving up dues reminded him of two Macaulays, who had two white uncles Tom (himself and Lord Macaulay); one lost his alpenstick in the sea; the other said—"If it will do you any good I will throw mine in after it;" but the offer was declined. When the Paper Duties had been abolished, Lord Brougham, at a Social Science Dinner, speaking of Members of the House of Lords, said they were "not only alive, but kicking." Mr. Huskisson had said—
"That mutual prohibitions were mutual nuisances; but, as between us and Prussia—applicable to all nations—we ought to have mutual facilities."
He (Lord Denman) would wish half the duty levied on all English produce abroad placed on imports. When

829
the Paper Duties were abolished, the late Duke of Rutland would not press the House to a Division, lest the result of it should be to throw the finances of the country into disorder; but we thus sacrificed £500,000 a-year, which was willingly paid by the purchasers of newspapers.
THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY): This debate has taken a somewhat discursive turn, and I hope I shall not be guilty of extreme brevity if I do not add many minutes to a discussion which has already lasted a considerable time. But I confess that, though the discussion concerns a matter on which we all feel as deeply as on any political question, it does not appear to me to be of a practical character, or likely to lead to any practical result. There is no doubt about the distress, and it is not necessary to prove it, as my noble Friend behind me did. We are all aware of it, and we are only too sensible that it exists. There is probably no public body of men in the Kingdom who are more sensible of the existence of agricultural depression than this Assembly. Nor is there any necessity to prove to us the great calamities which that depression has led to. But before we make it the subject of debate we must establish, in our own minds at all events, that there is some measure which it is within the reach of Parliament to adopt which will materially limit or mitigate the evils which we all deplore. There is great depression in a neighbouring country in the great wine-growing industry; but it would be of no use for them to discuss that depression, or bring it up as a matter of complaint against the Government, because it is dependent upon well-known natural causes which no Government or Parliament can remove. I fear that the depression in England, though not dependent upon such simple causes, is dependent equally upon great natural and economical causes, and the power of Parliaments or Governments to cope with it is very limited. Because I say this I shall not be supposed either to ignore its deep gravity, or wish to depreciate its extent. I am bound, however, to say that I cannot concur with one phrase which my noble Friend who introduced the subject brought forward, when he spoke of starving populations.
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We know, of course, that there is always a certain amount of misery in the country; but my noble Friend could hardly have listened the other night to the interesting speech of my noble Friend (Lord Balfour), who showed from the Poor Law Returns that the country is not, with respect to its most numerous class, in a most miserable condition. If I remember the figures, there is a smaller proportion of pauperism at this moment by nearly a half than there was some 20 years ago. It is impossible, therefore, to speak as though we were in the presence of a calamity deeply affecting the vast masses of the country. On the contrary, speaking of the poorest and most numerous class, in spite of all the calamities we have to face, I think we may congratulate ourselves that it has hit them more lightly than the less numerous classes. When we came to the remedy my noble Friends who have spoken were neither concordant nor very clear. Two of my noble Friends spoke for Protection. The noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Huntly) disclaimed any sympathy with these doctrines; but he seemed to indicate that some relief might be obtained from measures of a more limited character which it is in the power of the Government to adopt. Well, we have admitted that to a certain extent in the language of the Queen's Speech—we have admitted that there are measures which we can and ought to adopt. I am afraid it will be impossible for me to give a preliminary account of them, and I must ask my noble Friend to wait until the President of the Local Government Board and the Chancellor of the Exchequer have had an opportunity of addressing the other House upon the subject. But I fully admit that to all measures of that smaller and more limited kind it is the bounden duty of the Government to address itself, and to take every opportunity which that restricted field offers of mitigating the depression in the agricultural industry which exists. But my noble Friends are the first to say that it is not in that quarter that anything like a dissipation of the calamity can be looked for. It is a question which is too large, it rests upon bases too broad, it issues from natural laws too imperious, and there remains only one remedy—that which the noble Lord opposite disclaimed, but which my noble Friends behind me

831
(Earl De La Warr and Viscount Torrington) adopted—the remedy of Protection. I have simply to say with respect to the question of Protection that this country has adopted the opposite system after a controversy unexampled in its length, in its earnestness, and in the decision with which the ultimate issue was arrived at. If we are to undertake the re-examination of that question it must not be done incidentally, by insinuation, by allusion, by hints. You must firmly walk up to the fortress that you have to attack and lay siege to it in form. If my noble Friend wishes really to challenge the doctrine of Free Trade, and wishes really this country to retrace its steps, he must bring forward a definite Motion for the purpose of letting us hear the arguments on which he rests his case, and letting us discuss them formally and with a deliberation and care suited to the gravity of the subject. When he does so I shall be quite pre-pared to lay before him, and at length, the arguments which utterly prevent me from agreeing with any such proposition. In my belief, the economical arguments in favour of Free Trade are very strong; but they are not the strongest with which we have to deal. If he will look back upon the debates of 1846 and read the speech of Sir Robert Peel when introducing his great proposal, he will see that the political argument weighed more heavily than even the economical argument in his mind; and I believe that the political argument has lost none of its force. I utterly disbelieve that it is in your power to introduce Protection. If it were, I think it would be introducing a state of division among the classes of this country which, would differ very little from civil war. For such reasons, which on such an occasion as I am foreshadowing I should try to develop at greater length and support with stronger proofs—for reasons of that kind I cannot to any extent accept the remedy which, I am sure, quite sincerely and with an earnest desire for the good of this country, my noble Friend has laid before this House. It is a remedy which I am convinced Parliament will never accede to. If, then, you cannot have a return to Protection, we must look to the ordinary working of the economic laws, to the return to more healthy conditions which in the past have always followed periods of depres-
832
sion, and which we may hope will follow this period of depression again. We must trust also to the combined working of the industry and enterprize of the nation, which has lost in no degree those qualities which have led to its high position, its power, and wealth; we must look to those causes, and we may look to them confidently, to dissipate the calamities to which the noble Earl has referred and which we all deplore.
Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

METROPOLIS (STREET IMPROVEMENTS)—HYDE PARK CORNER.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  EARL FORTESCUE, in rising to ask Her Majesty's Government, When it is intended to commence the work of adorning the space between Constitution Hill and Hyde Park Corner, of which expectations were held out some time ago; also, whether there was any hope of the roadway being somewhat widened between the south end of Hamilton Place and Gloucester House, so as to diminish the constant block of the traffic in that part of Piccadilly and of Hamilton Place during the months of May, June, and July? said, that the undeniably valuable improvements at Hyde Park Corner were sadly marred by want of taste, and ignorance of the traffic requirements of the place. It would be within the recollection of their Lordships that a number of trees that had stood in the Green Park were thrown outside of it by the work of improving the access to Belgravia. Among those trees there had been a particularly graceful group nearly opposite Apsley House, and these trees had been suddenly and surreptitiously cut down and carted away one day before breakfast. Not only had the appearance of the spot been impaired by this act of Vandalism, but the numerous foot passengers were also deprived of most welcome shade. He could only suppose that Mr. Shaw Lefevre was emulous of his Chief in cutting down trees as well as in attacking institutions and legislating to authorize the breaking of contracts. Then, much inconvenience with regard to communications had resulted from the way in which these improvements had been carried out. The traffic along Hamilton

  833
  Place was peculiar. Practically, the whole of it from the North was to the South and West, and vice versâ any traffic for the East would certainly continue its course down the lower part of Park Lane. No provision was, therefore, necessary for traffic in Hamilton Place that had to go in any direction except South to Belgravia and West to Kensington; and, obviously, the convenient and natural course would have been to insure the continuance of the East and West traffic along Piccadilly uninterrupted, and provide for two lines of traffic up and down to and from Hamilton Place on the north side of Piccadilly from about Northampton House. He had been confirmed in this view by one of the policemen that regulated the traffic at the corner of Hamilton Place with so much good temper and tact, who told him that he and his mates had often talked the matter over, and agreed that that was the right remedy for the frequent obstruction there, as the traffic disentangled itself when it reached a wide Place. As at present arranged, the traffic from Hamilton Place had to come down a slope of wood pavement and cross traffic coming down a corresponding slope in Piccadilly. It was wonderful that more accidents did not happen; as it was, the constant blocking in the summer was notorious. If that part of Piccadilly east of Hamilton Place had been widened 18 feet, great inconvenience would have been saved. He had ventured, before the costly permanent railing was fixed, to make that suggestion to the authorities, and the answer he had got had been that the roadway had been opened so short a time that it was impossible to judge the result. That, in his opinion, was eminently characteristic of that sort of combination of habitual parsimony, with occasional spasms of extravagance, but never real economy, which characterized Mr. Gladstone's administration. The work of fixing the substantial railings was to go on, while experience was to say whether it was in its right place. Every carriage going down Hamilton Place to Knightsbridge had to cross one line of traffic and get to the other side, in order to make its way to Knightsbridge. He hoped that there was still a prospect of something being done.
  LORD LAMINGTONsaid, that the question which his noble Friend had
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  brought forward afforded another proof of the great mismanagement of the public works of the Metropolis by the Office of Works. It was nearly three years since the open space called Wellington Square was cleared, and it had been left in a most disgraceful state. The Office of Public Works seemed to have no system of management whatever. The only public works which had been creditably carried out were those which had been executed by the Metropolitan Board of Works. Without that body none of our new streets or embankments would have been made. He saw it stated the other day that the condition of Battersea Park was a disgrace to a civilized country, that there were two feet of filth in the water, and that no care had been bestowed upon it by the Office of Works. But now it had been made over to the Metropolitan Board of Works, and he hoped it would be looked after.
  THE EARL OF POWISobserved that it would be very desirable to throw back for three or four yards in width the fence of the Green Park, as from the end of Park Lane to the end of Hamilton Place the road was very much narrower than between Hamilton Place and Hyde Park Corner.
  LORD MAGHERAMORNE (CHAIRMAN of the METROPOLITAN BOARD of WORKS)said, that as to the condition of Battersea Park, he did not wish to say anything disagreeable against another public department, but so far as the state of that Park had been brought under his cognizance it was not at all satisfactory. However, now that the Park was in the hands of the Metropolitan Board of Works, they would endeavour, as soon as possible, to put it into a proper condition.
  LORD HENNIKERsaid, he did not think their Lordships would expect him to follow the noble Lord into the state of Battersea Park or the business of the Office of Works. He would confine himself to the Question put by the noble Earl on the Cross Benches. The adornment of Hyde Park Corner or Wellington Square was undertaken two or three years ago by a Committee presided over by the illustrious Prince his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, and the funds were provided by private subscription, to which were added £6,000 granted by Parliament. The Committee

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  had agreed to a scheme, the main feature of which was that an equestrian statue of the great Duke of Wellington should be erected opposite Apsley House The statue was being executed by Mr. Boehm, R.A., and it was hoped that it would be placed in its position next autumn. The Committee intended to spend any available balance of the fund in improving the surrounding spaces. This balance would not be so great as to allow very elaborate treatment, but his noble Friend would be glad to hear that it was the intention of the Committee to plant some trees around those spaces. He could not undertake to apologize for the cutting down of the large trees which had been referred to, or say anything about them, because his right hon. Friend now at the head of the Department had, he believed, nothing to do with the matter. The intention of the Committee was that the three plots of ground should be laid down with asphalte pavement, and that there should be an ornamental granite pedestal or platform on which the statue would be placed. It was hoped the whole of the improvement would be completed before the 1st of November next. With regard to the other Question, he would refer the noble Earl to the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works, because it was not a matter with which the Office of Works had anything to do. He admitted the importance of the question of the traffic, but as far as the Office of Works was concerned, they thought it was entirely for the Metropolitan Board of Works to deal with it, and they did not propose to take any steps in the matter.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE—STANDING ORDERS.—RESOLUTION.
LORD STRATHEDEN and CAMPBELL: My Lords, the experience of last Monday has led me to think that it is not desirable to bring on a further Standing Order at an hour when many noble Lords have left the House who are competent to offer an opinion on it. I will, therefore, with your permission, postpone the Notice, but so as to bring it on before the 19th of March, when we are to have the general debate to which these questions are subordinate.
LORD COLVILLE OF CULROSSsaid, he must protest against the course the noble Lord had pursued in this matter. The noble Lord had already postponed
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the same Motion on two previous occasions, and now proposed to do so again. He had had considerable experience in the matter of the Private Business of the House, having served many years on the Committee of Selection, and he had come down to the House every night when this proposal had appeared on the Paper, and he thought it was rather hard on noble Lords who took an interest in the subject that it should be postponed night after night.
LORD STRATHEDEN and CAMPBELL: If it is the wish of the House, or Her Majesty's Government, I am as well prepared to explain the further Standing Order now as I shall be at any other moment. It is unnecessary to repeat, except for those who were not here a week ago, that I have only ventured to approach the Standing Orders in view of and in reference to the larger changes by which the House of Lords is threatened. Since I spoke on Monday last, in "another place" 162 Members, including a great part of the late Government, have voted for a Resolution which, if carried out, would exclude from this Assembly every one in it beyond the Right Reverend Bench, those who sit on the Appellate Court, and those who have been made Peers for their extraordinary services. It is, therefore, clearly time to put an end to all unnecessary blemishes. The case I have now to bring before the House is irresistible, and I at once proceed to it in detail. In the absence of a compulsory system, the material we have is not adequate to make up Committees on Private Bills of five in number. I am forced to touch on what occurred to me in order to put that proposition beyond question. When the present Government was formed, after the General Election, I happened to remain in London during August, and was asked to servo on a Private Bill Committee. Having consented, I repaired, on the stated day and at the stated hour, to the House to find it thoroughly deserted. With much difficulty I ascertained from an official who seemed to be the only one upon the premises, that the Committee had broken down, because the number could not be completed. There is no reason to think it ever was completed. The same thing may always happen at that period. It could not be arranged, however, to have three in

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August and five during the remainder of the Session. The noble Duke the Chairman of Committees (the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos) must, I think, go with me upon this part of the subject. But I contend that three would be a superior tribunal as compared with five, having observed the latter much in both Houses of Parliament. It would be superior from the necessity of greater vigilance and more sustained attention which arises. On that point, however, men may differ, and I will not dwell, although much might be said, upon it. A Committee of three is far more attractive than one of five to those who sit upon it. There is less ennui and fatigue in proportion as more devolves on every individual. According to the late Sir Robert Peel, a Committee is a state of "intramural interment." But it is redeemed in some degree by the necessity of working in it. Setting aside the waste of men in supernumerary Members, there are not wanting noble Lords who would avoid a Committee of five if they could do so, and would be prepared to serve on one of three were it proposed to them. The facility of organizing Private Bill Committees would be thus increased not only because, arithmetically speaking, three is grasped more easily than five, but because a greater number is disposed to join the less than the more numerous tribunal. But there is something more essential. So long as five are requisite, there must be verbal application, as there is now in the House, to noble Lords upon the Benches; either from the Chairman of Committees, or those who manage the Divisions. The inconvenience of that system cannot be exaggerated. I have been witness day by day to the embarrassment it leads to. It is a constant struggle of importunity on one side and evasion on the other. Noble Lords are unable to engage themselves quite suddenly for a given day, and that without a certain limit, while they are unwilling to refuse the faintest service to the public. But there is a graver consequence to be ascribed to it. It is the powerful encouragement to non-attendance it occasions. When an Assembly of 500 habitually numbers about 50, sometimes being above that limit, but not unfrequently beneath it, there must be a cause for the phenomenon. The cause is quite sufficiently revealed if no Peer is able to attend the House
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without solicitation such as I have mentioned. It is a system framed to multiply the absent as well as harass those who may appear. I recommend this Standing Order, therefore, first as calculated to improve Committees; next, as rendering it much easier to grasp them; and, last, because it takes away, if not the source of non-attendance, at least by far too good a vindication of it. That three would be a proper number is an opinion I have formed by much discussion with an experienced and well-known Chairman of Private Bill Committees in the other House of Parliament. I engage Her Majesty's Government not to oppose this proposition; or if they do, at least not to reason as they did last Monday against one thing, when I have reasoned in favour of another. I appeal also to the noble Lords who concur with me as to the vicious practice of making up Committees in the House, and making them of an unnecessary size, to express themselves this evening. The noble Lord concluded by moving the Standing Order.
Moved, as a now Standing Order,
"That Private Bill Committees shall consist of three Members, and that all applications to Lords to serve upon them shall be addressed in writing to their residences."—(The Lord Stratheden and Campbell.)
LORD COLVILLE OF CULROSSsaid, that he had been a Member of the Committee of Selection for about 35 years, and believed that the present system of having five Members on Private Bill Committees had worked well. He thought that five Members were quite few enough, and hoped that their Lordships would refuse to alter the number. The noble Lord who brought this proposal forward had, he was informed, never served upon a Select Committee.
LORD STRATHEDEN and CAMPBELLsaid, the noble Lord had been wholly misinformed.
LORD COLVILLE OF CULROSSsaid, that last year the noble Lord very nearly served upon a Select Committee. He thought the suggested number of three was open to many disadvantages, one of which was that if one Member of the Committee was a weak man he would always side with the Chairman, who would be omnipotent. As regards the second part of the noble Lord's Motion, what he suggested was the

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course which was at present adopted by the Committee of Selection.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (The Duke of BUCKINGHAM and CHANDOS)said, he had expected that the noble Lord in bringing forward this Motion would have stated some facts to show that the Committees under the present system had failed to discharge their duties satisfactorily; but he had not done so. The number of five Members had now been established for a series of years, during which the decisions of the Committees of that House had been received with respect and satisfaction, and he saw no reason for any change. While occupying the position of Chairman of Committees he had found no difficulty in getting a sufficient number of Peers to constitute the required Committees. There had only been one instance where a Committee could not be got together, and that was at the end of the second Session of 1886, when it had been understood that no Private Bills would be proceeded with. As to the suggestion of the noble Lord, that applications to serve on Select Committees should only be made by letter, and that personal applications prevented Peers coming down to the House, he had to state that, in reply to written applications he often received answers saying that the matter had better be settled in conversation when the noble Lord addressed next visited the House. It would be highly inconvenient to settle these matters entirely by correspondence; for it was often impossible to constitute the Committee until the probable length that a Bill would take was settled, as otherwise it might not suit the noble Lord selected, and until its character was inquired into. For a noble Lord might, owing to the Bill being connected with his district, or for other reasons, be quite unsuitable. Under these circumstances, it was found most convenient to continue the present practice. Written applications would, however, continue to be sent out. He hoped the House would not accept the proposal to alter the Standing Order.
LORD GRIMTHORPEsaid, he agreed with the noble Lord (Lord Colville of Culross) that three was a very bad number for a Committee which had to decide upon evidence and not merely on points of law, like the Court of Appeal, where
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it is convenient for the Judges to be able to impart their views to each as the case goes on. He had had occasional experience of Committees accidentally reduced to three, and he had always found exactly the state of things indicated by Lord Colville of Culross—namely, the weakest Member of the Committee in a very short time obviously became a mere cypher to the Chairman. Even with the still larger but worse number of four, which the House of Commons had been led to adopt in 1865, the same thing happened; and as the Chairman has a easting vote, there the result was the Chairman with his cypher was able to overbear the possibly, if not probably, greater amount of sense possessed by the other two Members. That number was adopted by the House of Commons on statements that a sufficient number of Members could not be got for Committees of five. But after the Session a Parliamentary agent amused himself by calculating what number of the Members of the House of Commons had performed the whole Committee work of the Session, and he found that the number was no more than one-fifth of the House, the remaining four-fifths having impressed the Committee of Selection that they were so overburdened with work that they could not possibly serve. He mentioned this as a warning to their Lordships not to be tempted into making any reduction in the number for a Committee which he was sure from very long experience was the best.
LORD STRATHEDEN and CAMPBELL: My Lords, I wish to make a statement in answer to the personal reflection of the noble Earl who taunted me for wishing to postpone the Notice. The three Standing Orders I proposed were all put down for the 5th of March, the day previous to the intended Resolution of Lord Dunraven. The first of them came on, but it was too late to discuss the others. They stood for Thursday the 8th; a large amount of preliminary Business rendered it impossible to move them. They were adjourned until to-day, when I was quite ready to go on with them. There is no ground for any accusation. I shall not make a long reply to arguments adduced against the number of three for Private Bill Committees. I never doubted that Committees of five were able and efficient,

841
but only pointed to the inconveniences they bring upon your Lordships. As Her Majesty's Government have given no opinion to counteract that of the noble Duke the Chairman, I will not divide the House. If the Standing Order was adopted, it would be a gain. If it is not adopted, that circumstance will strengthen the reformers of the House with whom I am far from wholly disagreeing.
Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE—STANDING ORDERS.—RESOLUTION.
  CORONERS BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to amend the Coroners Act, 1887—Was presented by The Lord Chancellor; read 1a. (No. 36.)
  QUARTER SESSIONS BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill for amending the law with respect to the times of holding quarter sessions; and for other purposes connected therewith—Was presented by The Lord Chancellor; read 1a. (No. 37.)
  ELECTRIC LIGHTING ACT (1882) AMENDMENT (NO. 2) BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to amend the Electric Lighting Act, 1882—Was presented by The Lord Wigan (Earl of Crawford); read 1a. (No. 38.)

  LAND CHARGES REGISTRATION AND SEARCHES BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill for registering certain charges on land, and for facilitating searches for them in the central office—Was presented by The Lord Hobhouse; read 1a. (No. 40.)
  House adjourned at a quarter past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Ten o'clock.