Sitting of 7 September 1887

MINUTES.
— SUPPLY—considered in Committee —NAVY ESTIMATES, Votes 10, 10A, 3 to 5.
PUBLIC BILLS—Considered as amended—Merchant Shipping (Miscellaneous) * [348].
Withdrawn—School Board for London (Pensions) * [29]; Stipendiary Magistrates (Pensions) * [116].

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES.
  SUPPLY—considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  (1.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
  " That a sum, not exceeding £1,207,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Expense of Naval Stores for Building, Repairing,

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  and Outfitting the Fleet and Coast Guard, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1888."
  MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: The Committee will recollect that when Vote 6 was under discussion I intimated my intention of moving the reduction of this Vote by the nominal sum of £5,000 with the view of raising the question of the expediency of appointing a Committee to inquire into the designs of vessels. I am raising it under great disadvantage in the absence of a number of hon. Members who agree with me as to the policy of such an inquiry, and I think it will be well if I were to state, as shortly as I can, why I think it would be wise, at the present juncture, to make such an inquiry. I do so in no spirit of hostility to the present Board of Admiralty, and although I propose to move the reduction of the Vote, I shall only do so in order to enable the discussion to be confined to this particular question, and I do not propose to divide upon it. At this moment, there is no proposal in the programme before us to lay down any new ironclads, and therefore there is no immediate subject of controversy. At the same time, I think I shall be able to show that that fact affords even more reason for undertaking the inquiry I suggest, because it can be entered into without any foregone conclusion on the part of the Government. I will, therefore, proceed at once to point out to the Committee why I think it is desirable that such an inquiry should be held.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: May I interrupt the right hon. Gentleman for a moment? I hope that the effect of his Motion will not be to shut me out from moving the reduction of the Vote, in Section 1, on account of stores for the Squadron on the Australian Station. I take it that the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman applies to Section 2.
  MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: No; I propose to move the reduction on Section 1.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: Is the Vote now under consideration Section 1?
  THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON) (): Section 2 relates to the hulls of ships; therefore, the
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  question of design ought to be discussed upon Section 1.
  MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: The Vote includes stores to be used in building ships in the dockyards, and therefore the discussion I propose to raise will come in appropriately. I intend to conclude with a Motion; but, having caught the Chairman's eye, I claim my right to proceed. The Committee would recollect that early in the Session a Motion was made by the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley) for the appointment of a Committee of this House to inquire into the designs of the vessels which have been built of late years. I could not myself support the hon. Member, because I considered, and I still consider, that it would be impossible to select a Committee of the House with sufficient technical information on the part of its members to be of real use and value in such an important inquiry. I therefore could not assent to such an inquiry. But it appeared, in the course of the discussion on that Motion, that there is in many parts of the House a desire for some inquiry of the kind. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed), who is a very high authority on the subject, made an important speech, in which he commented upon the types of the vessels which have been constructed during the last 15 years, and he commented severely on the designers.
  SIR EDWARD REED: No, not on the designers, but on the designs.
  MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: Then I will withdraw that statement. At all events, my hon. Friend commended severely on the types of the vessels. Later on the noble Lord the Member for South Paddington (Lord Randolph Churchill), in a very powerful speech at Wolverhampton, followed on the same lines. The noble Lord went the length of saying that £10,000,000 had been absolutely thrown away and wasted in building armoured vessels during the last 10 years, and he commented in very severe terms on the designer — Sir Nathaniel Barnaby. These statements, coming from these quarters, led to a great deal of controversy in the newspapers, and it is impossible to deny that there is at the present moment a good deal of uneasy feeling on the subject of many of our recent vessels. In my opinion, it is desirable

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  to take public opinion into account, and to institute some official inquiry. The question seems to me to be very much in the position in which it was in 1871. When hon. Members, who were Members of the House at that time, will recollect that there were great differences of opinion on the part of the public as to the vessels which had been recently constructed, and great doubts were expressed as to what type of vessels should be laid down in the future. A Royal Commission was then appointed, which was presided over by Lord Pufferin, and that Commission performed a very useful work and did immense good to the Naval Service in laying down principles for future guidance. As I have said, it appears to me that the position now is very much the same as it was then. There is the same difference of opinion among competent persons as to some of the vessels which have recently been laid down, and what the type of the future vessels should be. I think, therefore, it would be wise in the interests, not only of the public but of the Naval Service, to institute a new inquiry. It is quite true that in the immediate future there is no intention to lay down any of the largest class of iron-clads. The noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking a few days ago, said that, in his opinion, it was possible or probable that no more iron-clads of the largest class would be laid down. I was glad to hear the statement of the noble Lord, and I quite concur with him if he confines his statement to the largest class of iron-clads—vessels of from 10,000 to 12,000 tons —subject, always, to the possibility of other Powers following our example. But I should feel inclined to think that the noble Lord is over-sanguine if his remarks were intended to relate to the next class of vessels, vessels of 6,000 or 8,000 tons. It is highly probable that, before long, or possibly even next year, we may have to lay down some armoured vessels of that size, and there is quite as much difference of opinion as to these types as in respect of larger vessels. It is now three years since we laid down any such vessels; we have been properly engaged in completing those in course of construction. The time is now coming when those responsible for the Navy will have to consider whether it will be well to lay down any further vessels of that kind. The French
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  Government have been following our example. They have also been engaged during the last three or four years in completing vessels on which they have been engaged, and they have not laid down any fresh iron-clads of the class I am speaking of. These vessels are now near completion, and it is quite possible that before we meet next Session, France may have found it necessary to lay down more vessels of the class I have adverted to. If that be so, it might be necessary for the Board of Admiralty to follow suit, and I am afraid there is almost as much difference as to what the types of vessels of this class should be as there is in regard to the larger ironclads. The French Government have already laid down a vessel of 6,000 tons, called the Tage, in which they have abandoned the system of plating to the fullest degree. This vessel is of a very powerful description, with a speed of 19 knots, and she carries a very powerful armament. If the French Government lay down other vessels of the same type, it may be necessary in self protection for the Admiralty to be prepared, before bringing in next year's Estimates, with some well settled policy in regard to future policy. In that view it would be wise to utilize the time in considering the types of the vessels we should build, and in laying down the principles which should guide us in the future. With respect to the vessels which have been constructed during the past few years, or now being completed, I do not propose to enter into a full discussion of their merits or demerits; to do so would necessitate a much longer speech and discussion than I should be justified in inflicting on the Committee at the present moment, nor do I think it necessary to vindicate the reputation of Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, who is quite able to take care of himself with his pen. I will only say that I think it very wrong, and not very fair, to concentrate all the attacks on Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, and to hold him solely responsible for all the vessels which have been built during the last 10 or 15 years. I need hardly remind the Committee that Sir Nathaniel Barnaby served as Chief Constructor for something like 16 years under successive Boards of Admiralty presided over by men such as the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr.

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  Goschen), the late Mr. Ward Hunt, the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury (Mr. W. H. Smith), and Lord Northbrook, and with a succession of very distinguished Admirals as members of those Boards. No iron-clad, I believe, was ever laid down during that time without the fullest and most careful and most minute consideration of all its details, and without the approval of all the members of the Board responsible for the laying down of such vessels, and also of the Comptroller; and they were equally responsible with Sir Nathaniel Barnaby for the results, provided there was no mistake in calculations, which I do not believe to have been the case. If my experience goes for anything in such a matter, I undertake to say that no vessel has been laid down without each member of the Board, civilian and naval, alike having been consulted in reference to every important detail respecting such vessel, and without each taking upon himself an individual responsibility for it. I need hardly say that the successive Boards of Admiralty to which I have adverted have included among their ranks some of the most eminent men in the Admiralty, who were equally responsible with the Chief Constructor for the vessels laid down. It is probably true that in some cases Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, the Constructor, has not been altogether satisfied with the vessel he may have been officially compelled to design; but every armoured vessel must, to a great extent, be a compromise; it is impossible to obtain perfection, or to construct an ideal vessel; some qualities of great value are always sacrificed to others, which at the moment are considered more important and valuable. It may well be, and it is of the very nature of things, that a vessel having been once determined upon, and a compromise arrived at between the naval element and the scientific element of the Board, that the vessel agreed upon may not, perhaps, have succeeded in obtaining the entire and full approval either of the designer or of the naval members of the Board. In such matters there must in the nature of things be a compromise, and the vessel finally designed is the result of a mutual arrangement. As I have said, I do not propose to go in full detail into the character of the vessels which
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  have been built during the last 10 or 15 years. I believe that many of the vessels built during the last 15 years have not been exactly as Sir Nathaniel Barnaby desired, because he had to make concessions to the Board in re-respect of qualities which they thought more valuable. Apart, however, from exaggerated language which has been used on the subject of these vessels, it must be admitted that there have been two very distinct schools of naval construction applicable to the larger class of vessels, each of which has had very able and powerful advocates among constructors and among naval men; and both, I doubt not, actuated by the same sense of public duty. The one school is represented by the late—and, I believe, by the present—Chief Constructor, and the naval men who have been responsible of late years at the Admiralty, and the other by the hon. Member for Cardiff, and by high authorities also among naval men—that, I think, may include among them Sir Arthur Hood of the present Board of Admiralty. At all events, the very highest Naval Authorities and the highest constructive authorities among the designers of vessels are among the two schools. Starting a few years ago with the Devastation, a vessel of 10 or 12 inches of armour all round her hull at the water line, the last of that type of vessel built, the late Chief Constructor and those associated with him in the responsibility for the successive vessels which have been built since have endeavoured to meet the constantly increasing demand for thicker armour, to meet the heavier guns and their greater penetrating power by abandoning armour-plating over the extremities of vessels and concentrating it, as far as possible, over the vital portions of the vessel; and they have provided for the safety of the vessel by armoured decks below water, and by arrangements for utilizing the coal bunker and cellular spaces. The weight of armour has remained the same for vessels of the same size, but it has been restricted to certain parts of the vessel, and whatever weight could be economized has been devoted to engines of greater weight, and therefore to securing greater speed. On this principle successive types of vessels have been constructed, beginning with the Inflexible, the Ajax, the Agamemnon, the Colossus, and the Admiral class, and

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  going on to the Sanspareil. Other countries have been compelled to proceed in the same direction. The Italian Government have carried this policy to the fullest extreme, for they have been building six vessels with no less than 14,000 tons with 18 knots of speed, while they have practically abandoned armour-plating altogether, except as a protection to the engines and the guns. The French also have gone to some extent in the same direction. They have preserved armour-plating at the water line of their vessels, but have abandoned it largely as a protection to their crews and their guns when loaded, although they use it as a protection for the guns while loading, which is, of course, an important distinction. We may be said to have proceeded about half way between the policy of the Italian and the French Governments. I think I am justified in saying that the noble Lord when he came into Office in 1885 inclined to the other school; when, by the advice of Sir Arthur Hood, he laid down the Nile and the Trafalgar, in which armour-plating is used to a much greater extent than in the vessels I have referred to. It is recognized and admitted now that the designs of these vessels did not meet with the approval of either the late or the present Chief Constructor, who were of opinion that, although these vessels are very powerful and valuable for certain purposes, too much is sacrificed to this immense weight of armour, and that they are deficient in speed and in weight of armament as compared with the more recent vessels of the Admiral class. I have no desire to re-open the controversy in regard to these vessels, but I merely mention the fact as bearing upon the question I have to bring under the attention of the Committee. The noble Lord the Member for South Paddington said, in his speech at Wolverhampton, that the construction of these two vessels is conclusive condemnation of all the 18 built before them, and that the money spent on them has been thrown away. I may, perhaps, use the converse argument that, if the 18 other vessels were constructed on a right principle, the Nile and the Trafalgar are unnecessary, and that the £2,000,000 which they cost would have been better spent in other directions. For my part, however, though I objected last year to the construction
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  of these vessels, at all events, without the appointment of a previous Committee of Inquiry, believing them to be unnecessary, yet I have never denied, but, on the contrary, have always admitted, that they would be powerful and valuable vessels, though not so powerful as they might have been; and I think most reasonable men who belong to the other school will make the same admission with respect to the vessels built of late years of the other type. I believe that too much concession has been made to the principle of supplying armour on the sides, and that it would have been better if a higher rate of speed had been obtained. But, in fact, it is not necessary for either party to this controversy to accuse the other of gross negligence or ignorance, or to suggest that they are only concerned in an official ring who are laughing at the country. We must admit that there are these grave differences of opinion on the subject of the types of the vessels, and I cannot but think that it would be wise, in the present state of naval construction, and in view of the great controversy which has arisen, to refer the question to an independent Committee of Inquiry, on which some of the ablest men in the country should be invited to sit. The noble Lord stated, not long ago, as an argument against this course, that practical experience of ships would be better than any such inquiry; but I would remind him that the most important points for consideration are in respect of matters where there can be no trial except in case of war. With the exception of the Nile and Trafalgar, which will not be completed for two or three years, we have specimens of all the different types afloat at this moment. I believe, then, for the reasons I have placed before the Committee, that an inquiry such as I have suggested would be of the greatest value. We have reached a point where there is a very great difference of opinion, and when there is a certain full in the building of vessels of the largest type, and therefore an unusual opportunity is presented for a full and complete inquiry upon the subject. My own belief is that such an inquiry, whatever its results, would minimize or reduce the points of difference between the two schools of construction to which I have adverted. I have confidence that

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  it would lead to reassure the public as to the value of the vessels we have constructed of late years, and it would be of great value in laying down principles for the guidance of the Board of Admiralty whenever it may be considered necessary to lay down new vessels of a larger class. For these reasons I propose to formally move the reduction of the Vote by the sum of £5,000, in order to raise a discussion, and to give Her Majesty's Government an opportunity of expressing their views with regard to my suggestion. In conclusion, I desire to say that I entirely approve of the programme of new work which is proposed for the year, and which has been drawn up by the present Board of Admiralty, by which it is proposed to build a certain number of swift and heavily armed cruisers, with regard to which the principle of altogether abandoning armour-plating above water-line is to be carried into effect. They are, I understand, to be merely what are called "protected vessels," although vessels of considerable size. I also fully concur in the policy of the present Board in building some, at all events, of their new vessels by contract instead of building all of them in the Dockyards. I think it is most important, at all times, that some of the new vessels laid down should be built by contract, if only for the purpose of enabling a comparison to be constantly made between the work done in the Dockyards and by contract. I think the noble Lord has done well in resisting the pressure brought to bear upon him in certain quarters, to lay down all these vessels in the Dockyards; and I quite concur in his policy of building some of them by contract. I beg to move the reduction of the Vote by the sum of £5,000.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £1,202,000, be granted for the said Services."—(Mr. Shaw Lefevre.)
  SIR EDWARD REED: Nobody, I think, can doubt the fairness and the moderation of the speech to which we have just listened. I wish I had the same confidence in the views of my right hon. Friend as I have in the spirit with which he has given expression to them. My right hon. Friend seems to think that this is simply a question of unavoidable compromise, and
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  that particular designs could only have been improved by the sacrifice of other qualities. I think that my right hon. Friend has altogether mistaken the nature of the controversy that has existed and exists with regard to the different types of ships. What is it that my right hon. Friend says? He says that he is willing to allow that the Nile and Trafalgar, with their heavy belts of armour, are very good ships, and he asks that similar approval shall be extended to the partially-armoured ships which have been built during recent years. Now I have no hesitation in saying at once, that if the fault I have to find with Her Majesty's ships was only the excess of armour, I never should have found fault at all in this House, because I am of opinion that matters of that kind are not fit subjects of controversy in Parliament. While the right hon. Gentleman is willing to accept the Nile and Trafalgar, and while he gives them a certain amount of modified approval, he asks me and others to extend the same approval to the ships which we have condemned, not for any excess of protection, but because we believe they are deficient in protection, and that they are not worthy of the name of iron-clads at all. That is the nature and the basis of the controversy which has been going on for a number of years. It opened with the case of the Inflexible, and my right hon. Friend asks the House to assent now to the appointment of a Royal Commission. I suppose he would be quite satisfied with a departmental inquiry if the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton) would promise to constitute an independent Committee. But what happened in the case of the Inflexible? There was a Conservative Government in power at the time, and at length, and after repeated discussion, hon. Members taking an interest in the Navy, who were sitting on the Government side of the House, refused to support the Government in their resistance to all inquiry, and demanded a special and independent Committee. The present Lord Ravensworth put himself prominently forward in arguing that there should be an independent and impartial inquiry, and the late Sir Stafford North-cote ultimately rose in his place and promised that an inquiry should be conducted by men who were wholly inde-

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  pendent of the Admiralty, or Admiralty influence, while in "another place" the Duke of Richmond gave a specific pledge that nobody on the Committee should be in any way connected with the Admiralty. But how was the Committee composed? It consisted of an Admiral who, if I mistake not—although a very distinguished officer—had been Chairman of one or two whitewashing Committees; secondly, of a gentleman — Dr. Woolley — who had been Director of Admiralty education, a gentlemen of eminent qualifications, but who was in receipt of an Admiralty pension; thirdly, of a gentleman, the late Mr. Froude, who was receiving £1,500 a-year from the Admiralty for conducting experiments in his own private garden, and fourthly of one of the contractors for the ship. That was the Committee which was appointed to investigate the case of the Inflexible, and I wish to know whether it could be called an independent Committee? The Committee expended months over the subject, and if it had not been for the Questions which I and others—put to the Government, in all probability a longer delay would have occurred. The Report of the Committee was of little value. My right hon. Friend says he does not think a satisfactory Committee could be formed out of Parliament, but I am of an entirely contrary opinion, and I am ready to say that the only Committee I would ever consent to, or take the slightest trouble about, would be a Committee of Parliament, and for these reasons: in the first place, this House possesses half-a-dozen or even a dozen Members who are perfectly competent to sit on such a Committee; and, in the second place, it would be a more independent and satisfactory Committee than any other body of men nominated at the suggestion of any Minister whatever. My right hon. Friend, no doubt —and the whole of his speech showed it—labours under the impression that the questions at issue in this matter are purely technical questions, and no doubt it has been the game of the Admiralty, all the time, to impress everybody with that idea, in order to keep the responsible Minister altogether out of the controversy. But that is not the case at all. The question, which I for one have raised, has been one which appeals to the common sense and common judgment of
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  any intelligent men. I complain that the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary to the Admiralty, and other high Admiralty Officials, have been too much the servants and slaves of their own official advisers, whose first business has been to impress them with, the fact that the matter is a technical one, about which they do not, and cannot, know anything. I do not agree in the opinion which has been expressed by the Chief Constructor, and the late Chief Constructor in regard to the Nile and Trafalgar. They are ships which I myself would not have designed, because they have more armour than is necessary. That, however, is not, in my opinion, a matter with which to trouble this House. I have never brought a complaint against them on that account; but, on the contrary, I have given the Government a steady support, because I have felt that vessels of this kind must carry a considerable weight of armour. No Member of the House has a right to challenge the Government for constructing ships which have a little more defence than he would have given them. But, at all events, that will not detract from their power as fighting ships. What we are entitled to consider is whether the Government are constructing for its first line of defence line of battle ships which are incapable of fighting a battle? When that is so, I think we are bound to enter a protest, and to challenge the course which has been taken by successive Governments. My right hon. Friend said the Italian Government have gone a great way in his direction. My opinion is that the Italian Government have not gone any way in this direction, although they have entirely abandoned side armour for their ships. The Italian Government have constructed ships without side armour at all, and with only deck protection, because they believe themselves incapable of contending in line of battle with certain other Powers, and therefore they have designed vessels of extraordinary speed and extraordinary armament which they are prepared to use in the best way they can in the event of getting into a war. I should not think of complaining of that policy on the part of a nation like Italy, and if we were anything but Great Britain, I should feel perfectly indifferent whether the Government adopted ships like that of the Italian Navy, or not. But what

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  is our position? My right hon. Friend will excuse me for quoting a conversation I had with him, in which he admitted, speaking of some of the ships, that when the Admiralty put in a full coal supply, there would be little or nothing of the armour left out of the water, and they would, consequently, be at a great disadvantage if attacked after she left port fully loaded with coal. But he considered that their unfitness to fight on leaving our ports was not of great importance. Now, my answer is that that is precisely what we ought to be prepared for. I maintain that the moment a British man-of-war goes out of port with that on board which the Admiralty thinks necessary, if she is represented as a first-class ship, she ought to be capable of going alongside any enemy she may meet; and that is not what a protected ship with a full coal supply is capable of doing. That is the fundamental view I take. My right hon. Friend has given the Admiralty credit for building ships which he calls "protected vessels," the characteristic feature of which is that they are denuded of all protection. The Government can, if they please, protect vessels—that is to say the buoyancy and stability of vessels —by armour, and they can, as the French have done, and as my right hon. Friend truly said, having protected the life of the vessel, make sacrifices as to the further protection which they may extend to crews, guns, and machinery. The great complaint I make against our ships is that we have sacrificed the ship itself in what we call "protected vessels" when we know perfectly well that they have no protection at all. The armoured deck below water-line does, it is true, protect the boilers and engines to a certain extent, but the moment these ships are seriously wounded between wind and water, they are lost and gone, and can only be saved by such devices as may be resorted to by the officer in command. They are not fighting ships in any sense, and under certain circumstances, they must be run ashore, or much weaker vessels will be able to overpower them before any serious resistance could be offered. I do not condemn the Admiralty for building ships like that. I do not censure them at all. I do not care how many of what they call "protected ships" they may build, because in the Navy of this country
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  there is a use for every kind of fighting ship. I defy the Admiralty to build a ship which will not be found of some service in the wide field in which the British Navy is employed. I do not, therefore, make any complaint as to the building of various types of vessels; but what I do complain of is the abandonment of the elements of fighting qualities at close quarters, and under severe conditions. The right hon. Gentleman approves of the Board of Admiralty building second-class vessels, but he knows perfectly well that a second-class vessel of 6,000 tons must of necessity be a compromise, and a serious compromise. No naval architect or naval officer will deny that a vessel of 6,000 tons must be deficient in one or two important respects. The only conceivable chance which this country has of holding its own against any sudden contingency which may arise in Europe is by taking care that it has some vessels—we do not want many of them—which no gun, or any number of the enemy's torpedoes which may be brought against them could sink, and which, if it were thought desirable, might be grouped into a squadron, and sent into the ports of the enemy to do the work of destruction. The noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty has said that he does not intend to lay down any more first-class ships. His language was a little doubtful. I do not know if he meant to say that it was not in the present purview of the Board of Admiralty, looking at the state of the ships now in progress, to lay down any more first-class iron-clads, or whether he is prepared to say what my right hon. Friend attributed to him—that he does not intend to build any more first-class ironclads at all. If the noble Lord has arrived at that conclusion, and goes as far as that, he has given England up, because as soon as this country ceases to build first-class iron-clads, other countries will produce them; and I know, at the present moment, that the hope, expectation, and desire of certain Powers which are anxious to compete with us are that this determination to build no ships capable of fighting a battle shall continue to prevail in this country. For my part I hope it will not. I trust that the noble Lord who has now been some time in Office, will not maintain the doctrine that we are not to lay down ironclads but those

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  which an enemy could easily dispose of. If he does, he will have my determined opposition; but whatever he may say at public meetings, I am not in the least afraid that any First Lord of the Admiralty will be able to take such a step. My right hon. Friend has said—" You object to a Departmental Committee, and you object to a Royal Commission. Would you recognize as a fitting tribunal a Committee of this House? "Now, I say that the tribunal I want to see set up is the responsibility of the Minister. My complaint is that ships have been built without proper consideration, and that if Sir Nathaniel Barnaby had designed ships to be built bottom upwards, and had placed his designs before Lord Northbrook with powerful arguments in support of them, Lord Northbrook would have accepted them. My right hon. Friend has said that every ship built by Lord Northbrook underwent careful inquiry before it was laid down; and I recollect a Member of Lord Northbrook's Board, a Naval Lord, stating at a meeting of professional men, that if the Admiralty could have foreseen the introduction of small machine guns they would never have laid down ships of the Admiral class. But surely anyone ought to have foreseen that small guns would come in the moment you offered your ships to be destroyed by them. What has been the character of the ships built during the last 10 years? This is not a personal question. Years after I left the Admiralty I had not a fault to find with any of the ships that were designed. It was only when ships with diminished armour and weak arrangements were brought out that I became a critic of them. There is not a Naval Member of the Board of Admiralty of Lord Northbrook who will contend now that the ships which have been designed during the last 10 years are satisfactory. What is the principle which has been adopted? My right hon. Friend asks us to agree to give a general approval to the principle he supports, on the ground that he can give a general approval to ours. But my main difficulty is this. Take the case of the two latest ships— the Victoria and the Sanspareil—put before us as splendid vessels by Lord Brassey. It is proposed to send them to sea to fight the battles of the country as first-class iron-clads. Now, if they
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  are inclined to such an angle as would result from a careless consumption of coal, the armoured part, on the side towards which she is inclined, would be completely immersed, and these first-class British iron-clads would have ceased to be iron-clads at all. We are told that these ships would carry an abnormal supply of coal; but when they do so the armour is submerged. I cannot—I wish I could—go with my right right hon. Friend in the couleur de rose view he takes of the ships we have; but I confess that I have great anxiety in regard to them. As was stated by the noble Lord the Member for South Paddington (Lord Randolph Churchill), we are in the position of having spent many millions on ships condemned by the Naval Service as unfit, not for all purposes, but for maintaining the power and honour of this country, even in our own waters, against the possible enemies they may meet. My right hon. Friend is, in my opinion, mistaken in holding that this is a matter of unavoidable compromise. That is what the Admiralty designer has tried to persuade us. Take the two vessels I have mentioned —the Victoria and the Sanspareil. They have 1,200 or 1,400 tons of armour, which does not contribute at all—or, if it does, in a way which is not worth mentioning—to the armoured buoyancy and stability of the ship; and my contention has always been, and will always be, that we cannot afford one mass of armour and place it here, and another mass of armour and place it there, for a totally different purpose, but that we are bound, to the fullest extent, to make all the armour contribute to the safety of the ship, and of the men, as well as to the safety of the guns and the machinery. My right hon. Friend spoke of Lord Dufferin's Committee laying down principles. I agree that it did so. That Committee was not appointed, as my right hon. Friend supposes, because of a general distrust as to the number of our ships. The Committee of 1871 was appointed for this reason: The Admiralty had persisted in placing their confidence in a ship which capsized and drowned 500 or 600 of Her Majesty's seamen. It was then that the Admiralty thought that a good means of diverting public attention would be to set a Committee to work upon ships in regard to which nobody had cast any

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  doubt at all. They, therefore, placed the whole armour-clad Navy under the investigation of Lord Duflferin's Committee for no other purpose than that of screening and getting away from the catastrophe of the loss of the Captain. But that Committee did useful work and laid down certain principles, although those principles were set at nought, and to this day have never been adopted. No principles will ever be adopted that are worth anything until the Minister of the day is made responsible. If I, myself, believed that the Government were contemplating the construction of only unarmoured ships, I would move the reduction of £5,000, the salary of the noble Lord, and not a reduction in Vote 10. Sooner or later the House of Commons will have to make the Minister responsible. I do not believe in shifting the responsibility on to Committees. I am quite sure that we have not had, for many years past, a Minister—certainly not Lord Northbrook—who has not himself contributed to the evil, by putting himself so much in the power of his subordinates. We are told that the present Constructor and the late Constructor of the Navy constitute a school which is altogether hostile to that to which I am supposed to belong. Now, the present Chief Constructor of the Navy is the only person occupying the position of a Navy Constructor I ever encountered who has defended the ships I have condemned, and it is my belief that he would not have been Chief Constructor now if he had not defended Sir Nathaniel Barnaby's ships, and if he gets the chance he will give effect to some of the extraordinary views of his predecessor in Office. I look upon the authority he has with the Board of Admiralty as a ground of suspicion, and a ground for watchfulness. I am glad that my right hon. Friend withdrew his suggestion that I had attacked the designers of the ships. I think anyone who is acquainted with the question will bear me out when I say that I have done nothing of the kind. Of course, we all know that it is impossible to attack a series of ships without more or less—by implication— attacking the designers of those ships; but I maintain that I never attacked anybody personally except Lord Northbrook. He is the person I have systematically attacked, because I believe he had the power to prevent the evils which have
  1552
  occurred if he had chosen to exercise it. There is one thing I should like to say, not exactly in my defence, because I do not know whether there is any need for defending myself, but I desire to say that these questions are not questions that require Committees or Commissions, or bodies of that kind to inquire into them. I see in front of me the noble and gallant Lord the Member for East Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford), who is absolutely as competent as any man alive to give an opinion on the point I am about to mention. It is one which I am about to raise for the first time, and I do so because I am anxious to obtain an explanation. It is said that the Conqueror has been unable to fire her guns at sea when in a considerable seaway, because of the wash of the sea over her bows. Now, it is characteristic of several of the recently built and very large ships—ships of 10,000 or 12,000 tons—that they have bows which are not more than 11 feet in height. The Victoria and Sanspareil have been designed in that way; the total height of those ships out of the water forward being only 11 feet. Now, I believe that a very fast armoured ship with a bow only 11 feet high is perfectly incapable of chasing another ship in a heavy sea. I have reason to believe that the Collingwood, one of the Admiral class, the first time she came out of port at all was swamped forward by the sea. My opinion is that these ships are altogether incapable of performing the work of the country, and that they are incapable in a manner which cannot be alleged against any French ship of war of any great size. There is not a single ship I know of in the French Navy — speaking of the largest class of iron-clads—which is subjected to that defect. I am not dealing with this question in order to produce any alarm; but I believe that if the French were to send out their first-class iron-clads to-morrow, and we were to send out ours, we should find the French in a position to do what they liked and to fight their ships while steaming against a head-sea, whereas we could do nothing at all. That, I think, is a very serious matter. I am sorry to have found it necessary to occupy so much of the time of the Committee, particularly at this season of the year. My feeling is that if a Commission were appointed

  1553
  it would give a great deal of trouble to the Admiralty Department, and would possibly divert it from more useful purposes for a long time to come. It might also be a source of much, mischief in the matter of designs, and no good would come of it. I think that all we can do is to take the consequences of the mistakes we make, and to make the Admiralty feel their responsibility, and feel that such mistakes are not easily got over by persons who hold specious and hollow views. There is one thing I wish to mention, which I believe to be applicable to this Vote, and I want to save myself the necessity of addressing the Committee again. I have read in the papers that several of the new vessels built by contract have broken down in their machinery. Now, I am not surprised at that, and I will give the Committee an instance of what I saw myself. I inspected one of these vessels when she was nearly complete; it is not necessary that I should name her. I saw her in the private yard in which she was built. There was no sailing work to be done in her at all, but she was one series of machines from beginning to end. There was not a sail to set, and the only thing a naval officer could do was to navigate her. I am sure the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Charles Beresford) will admit that the most onerous and serious duties in these ships have to be performed by the engineers, for there are engines from one end to the other. I saw an engineering officer on board. I had asked for him.
  LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: Of what class?
  SIR EDWARD REED: I asked the chief engineer officer—" What is going to be your engineering complement; how many engineers are you going to carry?" Perhaps the Committee will scarcely believe it, but his answer was that he was going to carry himself alone, as far as he knew. Some time afterwards I saw it announced in The Times newspaper that there were to be in that vessel one engineer and four or five officers of the lieutenant class—that is to say, four or five executive officers with but little executive duty to be done, and one engineer for the whole management of the engines. That vessel ought to carry at least three engineers, in order that one of them might always be in charge
  1554
  of her machinery. No doubt, the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty will tell me that the engine room artificers are a very good class of men, and that they are entitled to be entrusted with a certain amount of responsibility; but I should like to know whether any shipowner would dream of putting one engineer only on board of a vessel of great power, and especially a ship whose efficiency and success depended on her engines? It would be absolutely necessary that the one engineer officer in charge would have to be out of the engine-room two-thirds of his time. I was not surprised to find that three or four of these ships broke down in their machinery department during the recent trials. I have alluded to the fact not with a view of calling attention to this incidental matter, but to point out what is going on. We are told that we have not enough engineers, but we are continually seeing extraordinary attempts to keep down the engineering class. This is a very serious matter, for this reason, that the engineering class is the class which will have to keep these ships efficient from top to bottom. In a time of battle the value of the ships will depend upon the efficiency and sufficiency of the engineering class. It is certainly most unsatisfactory to know that a ship of several thousand indicated horse power, with a number of small engines scattered all over the vessel, are left in the care of only one educated and responsible engineer. There is only one other remark I desire to make. My right hon. Friend has referred to the Tage, in which vessel— a vessel of great power—he told us that France had abandoned side armour. Now, the reason why side armour has been abandoned in the Tage, which is only a ship of 6,000 tons, is that she cannot carry side armour, because she carries such an enormous weight of engines and coal. She can, therefore, only afford to have armour to protect the machinery. I thank the Committee for the patience with which they have listened to the observations I have felt it my duty to address to them.
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON)): Perhaps it would be as well that I should reply at once to the two speeches which have just been addressed to the Committee. I quite

  1555
  agree with the observation which fell from the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed) that if any hon. Member has reason to find fault with the policy of the Board of Admiralty, the right course to take is to move the reduction of the salary of the First Lord. It is a much more efficacious method of attaching responsibility to anyone who occupies that position, than by moving the reduction of the Vote, which is absolutely necessary for the efficiency of the Naval Service. Just as the experienced naval officers of the Admiralty are responsible to the Board for their recommendations, so the First Lord should be personally responsible to the House of Commons for the designs adopted, and which he asks the House to sanction. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Central Bradford (Mr. Shaw Lefevre)—who moved the reduction of the Vote—in a fair, candid, and temperate speech, stated that he did so more for the purpose of eliciting from the Admiralty their views with regard to the future construction of iron-clads than for the purpose of enforcing by a Division the suggestions he has made. The right hon. Gentleman wishes that either a Committee or a Commission should be appointed to inquire into the designs of iron-clads. I think, however, the right hon. Gentleman himself and the hon. Member for Cardiff have given conclusive reasons against the appointment of such an Inquiry. We have first to deal with ships in commission and that are built; next with those which are being proceeded with, and which will shortly be completed; and eventually we may have to deal with ships which may hereafter be laid down. As to the past, the vessels of the Admiral class—which have been a source of so much criticism—are being rapidly completed. One is already in commission and will be employed for the next 15 months. We shall then be able to test their utility as far as it can be tested by practical experience. No Commission, therefore, which can be appointed can be of any advantage as far as these ships are concerned, and on them a large sum of money has been spent. The next class of ships referred to will be completed in two years. The right hon. Gentleman has raised objections to the Nile and Trafalgar, but the hon. Member for Cardiff has given them
  1556
  a qualified approval. Considering the great discrepancy of view which exists among designers as to the war ships of the future, I may say that no two ships which have been laid down have been so little criticized as the Nile and Trafalgar. Neither Sir Nathaniel Barnaby nor anyone of any sort of experience has condemned those vessels. It is therefore clear that a Commission cannot be of much advantage as regards those vessels. The only advantage which a Commission would confer would be in guiding the decisions of the Admiralty as to the future. I have stated on more than one occasion that so far as the present Board of Admiralty is concerned, it is not their intention at present to lay down any more ironclads. I use the word "iron-clads "in its proper sense— that is vessels clad in armour. The reasons why we do not propose to spend any large sum of money on this class of ship is, because we believe, after careful investigation as to the iron-clads in commission and in process of building by foreign nations, this country has established its supremacy in this particular class of vessel. I quite agree in the opinion that whichever Power has the strongest iron-clad fleet will command the sea, and therefore it is necessary, if we mean to protect our commerce, that we should have an ironclad fleet superior to that of any foreign nation. A short time ago, France undoubtedly had a certain number of ships which were individually, in their offensive and defensive power, superior to any individual ship in the British Navy; but a considerable change has taken place since then in French naval policy. France laid down two large iron-clads in 1885, but she has ceased to spend any further money on this class of vessel since 1885; of the two vessels constructed, one has been converted into a transport, and the other into a cruiser without side armour. Since that time, however, the Board of Admiralty have laid down four powerful iron-clads, and I hope that those vessels will be completed within a period of from two to two and a-half years. Therefore the condition of the Navies of France and Great Britain, as far as iron-clads are concerned, is this—that we are stronger now by four iron-clads than we were in 1885, and France is weaker by two ironclads. A careful examination into the

  1557
  strength of the iron-clad ships of the two respective nations shows conclusively that at no time since armour-clad vessels formed a main part of the Navies of the two countries has the relative superiority been so great as at the present time. It is our duty to maintain that supremacy; and if the Board saw any evidence on the part of foreign nations to spend large sums of money on this particular class of vessel, the Admiralty would have to reconsider their decision. I quite admit that the House ought to be consulted before any largo expenditure is incurred in laying down any fresh iron-clads. But there is no question on which there is such a wide difference of opinion among naval experts. The hon. Member for Cardiff' has always been an advocate for developing to a large extent the defensive power of iron-clads. Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, in his later designs, on the other hand, endeavoured to develop the offensive power of the ships, laying himself open to the criticism that, in endeavouring to attain that end, he was denuding the ship of the necessary protective power. As the Admiral class has been the subject of considerable criticism, I think it right to tell the Committee what the present condition of those vessels is. The hon. Member for Cardiff has always objected to the design of a narrow belt which does not go the whole length of the hull, and only protects the vitals of the ship. It is clear to anyone, that if the narrow belt is to be of real utility to a vessel, it is essential that the weight which the ship ought to carry should be most carefully considered, because the utility of the belt mainly depends on its being retained in a right position as regards the water line. Putting on one side the question of design as regards ships of the Admiral class, I admit that the business arrangements by which effect is given to that design are defective, because the weights which the ships have to carry are laid down and the armament decided upon after they have been begun. The consequence was that heavier guns were substituted for those originally designed, and they have been accompanied by an increase of weight which has made those vessels 18 inches deeper in the water than they were intended to be. In each case the top of the armour-belt is only from a foot to 18 inches above the water line, instead
  1558
  of 2 feet and 2 feet 6 inches, as originally intended. Profiting, therefore, by experience, the Admiralty have laid down rules providing that all the weights each vessel has to carry are to be most carefully considered and decided upon by the responsible officers, and that no alteration of those weights can afterwards take place except with the consent of the full Board of Admiralty. But we go further. In these days of rapid gunnery it is clear that no foresight can fully anticipate the extra weights which improvements may necessitate being added to the ship during the time of construction. The Admiralty have, therefore, recently passed a rule that, in the case of new ships laid down, a margin of 4 per cent shall be allowed, in order to prevent those miscalculations which have deprived these vessels of their full power and utility. Although this discussion has been free from personal observations, I cannot refrain from referring to a remark made the other day in a letter to The Times by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby. In speaking of his later designs, Sir Nathaniel Barnaby speaks of them as vessels under a cloud, which has been specially manufactured at Whitehall. I think it is a most improper observation for the late Chief Constructor of the Navy to make. The duty of every Board, whether personally responsible for the designs of the ships or not, is merely to give to the public what in their opinion is the value of the design. Both in the recent Minute, and in speeches in the House, I have endeavoured to place before Parliament the merits and the demerits of Sir Nathaniel Barnaby's past designs. So far from having specially manufactured objections against them, hon. Members have said that I have been too partial to those designs; and I strongly deprecate the idea that it is the business of any First Lord of the Admiralty to manufacture objections to any particular class of design. My business is to state fully and fairly what is the opinion of the professional advisers on the ships which are to be brought forward and added to the Navy, and the observations of the character which Sir Nathaniel Barnaby has made ought to be strongly condemned. I think I have now answered the questions which have been put to me by the right hon. Gentleman.

  1559
  Perhaps I ought to allude to what were the reasons which influenced the appointment of previous Committees upon designs of ships of war. Those Committees have been enumerated by the right hon. Gentleman. With one single exception —there was the Committee of which Lord Dufferin was the President—those Committees were all appointed specially to inquire into the designs of individual ships that were either building or proposed to be built, and it seems quite clear that no Committee could, with advantage, examine into the designs of ships that are already built, and I have given, the Committee an assurance that Parliament will be consulted before any large expenditure is incurred. I hope that assurance will get rid of the objections of the right hon. Gentleman. Now, the manœuvres which took place subsequent to the Review at Spithead, I think, on the whole, were satisfactory. No doubt, there have been certain defects shown in the machinery of certain vessels; but these manœuvres were held not for the purposes of mere show, but in order to ascertain weaknesses in our ships of war as well as in our system of organization. If next year the present Board of Admiralty are still in Office, they propose to continue these manœuvres; and I wish also to adopt the French practice of sending afloat at those manœuvres naval constructors and engineers, and the practical experience which they will thus gain, especially when, these more modern ships are driving at full-speed, will, I anticipate, be of the greatest benefit to the Service. The hon. Member for Cardiff has asked me for information in regard to the break down of the machinery of certain ships. I think that, with the exception of the Amphitryon, the breaks down were not of a serious character. As to the smallness of the supply of engineers, that I believe is a difficulty which is every year being got over. No doubt, the Amphitryon and the Leander did break down in the recent trials; but we are hopeful that with further practice we shall be able to maintain the fully-estimated speed of these vessels over considerable distances without risk of damage cither to boilers or engines. The hon. Gentleman asked me a question as to whether certain rumours are true that it has been found impossible to fire the turret guns of certain vessels in a heavy sea-
  1560
  way, and he wished to know if it was due to the depth of the vessel in the water. Now, the depth in the water of the Conqueror and the Hero is exactly the same as that of two other vessels—the Devastation and the Dreadnought—which have given great satisfaction to the Navy. The difficulty of firing the guns in a heavy seaway was the reason which induced Sir Nathaniel Barnaby to fix the barbettes in the Admiral class vessels some seven feet or eight feet higher than they are in the turret ships. I have not the full reports before me in reference to the Conqueror; but what I understand is that, in a seaway, the Conqueror did unquestionably roll considerably. I understand, however, that she could fire her guns. I am informed that the barbettes, which are much exposed, can be effectually used at all times. I think I have now answered all the questions that have been put to me. It only remains for me to assure the right hon. Gentleman that the present Board have every desire to meet the House fairly, and will undertake to put the House in full possession of any designs or any proposed expenditure which they may think it their duty afterwards to incur in reference to ironclad building, although, as at present advised, and certainly as regards the programme for the current year, they do not propose to devote any sum for that purpose.
  MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: I think I should consult the convenience of the House if I were now to withdraw the Motion, in order to enable other questions to be raised upon this Vote. I said when I moved it that I had no intention of dividing the Committee, and that I had merely introduced the subject for the purpose of raising a discussion. I hope that the discussion which has taken place will not be without benefit to the country. I must say that I take one exception to the statements of my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed) and of the noble Lord—namely, that the proper way to raise questions of this importance is to move a reduction of the salary of the First Lord. Now, I am of opinion myself that that is not the proper way of bringing questions in reference to naval construction before the House of Commons. I think the proper way is to move the reduction of the Vote for the

  1561
  vessels which are intended to be built. At the same time, I am bound to say that I do not think, as a general rule, that discussions in this House as to particular designs are of any great benefit. That is the result of my own experience and on that account I have always considered that when important controversies have arisen in this country as to what class of vessels is the best, the proper way of meeting the question is to appoint a Commission or a Committee. That is the course which was taken in 1871, with considerable advantage, and I am inclined to think, notwithstanding what the noble Lord has stated as to the present state of the controversy on this subject, that it would be wise to appoint a Royal Commission. I have been glad to hear from the noble Lord that he proposes to consult the House of Commons before he will undertake to lay down any new vessels of a larger class. That, at all events, will afford hon. Members an opportunity next Session of raising the question again. I am bound to say that the views I have presented to the Committee to-day are not merely my own views, but that they are shared by a considerable number of hon. Members, and still more by a large number of persons outside the House. There is only one point I wish to deal with, and it has reference to what the noble Lord said about the Admiral class. I am certainly not prepared to agree fully with all that he said. My impression is that when those ships were originally laid down, it was intended to put into them armaments of a certain weight. At a later period, it was thought well to increase the offensive and defensive power of the vessel by putting in her guns of a heavier kind, and it was thought desirable to do so even at the sacrifice of certain other qualities, and even at the risk of sending the vessel out of port somewhat more deeply sunk in the water than it was originally intended. No doubt, the decision was arrived at after careful consideration, and with full regard to the flotation of the vessel in the water. It was the deliberate policy of the Government that a vessel built to carry more powerful guns would be of more value than the ship it was originally intended to build, even if it resulted in the vessel sinking somewhat deeper in the water. Possibly that is a matter which, in future, may lead to some controversy.
  1562
  That is the change which occurred, and I do not believe that any miscalculation originally took place on this subject. I will content myself now with withdrawing the Motion.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  Original Question again proposed.
  MR. MASON: I rise for the purpose of moving to reduce the Vote by the sum of £1,000, as a protest against the waste and extravagance of the Admiralty in bringing coals all the way from Wales for the guardships at Queen's Ferry on the Forth and in the Clyde. The coal is brought round by lighters, I believe at a cost of 13 s. per ton, when Scotch coal can be had from within a few miles for 8s. or 8s. 3d. a-ton. In point of fact, this is an illustration of the old saying of "carrying coals to Newcastle." The Government say that Scotch coals are smoky, and waste the boilers of Her Majesty's ships, besides dirtying the flues, and all that sort of thing; but it is the fact that there is Scotch coal and Scotch coal, just as there is in Wales coal which is just as free from smoke as Welsh coal, if the Admiralty will only take the trouble to look for it. All I will say is that the wealthiest and most important and successful Trading Companies invariably coal in the Forth with Scotch coal, just as when in the Mersey they use Welsh coal, simply because in that case it is more profitable to buy Welsh coal. That, I think, is a complete answer to the allegation which is made by the Admiralty— namely, that these large and important trading concerns decline to waste their money. Their steamers are quite as good as those supplied by the Admiralty, and if they thought that the Scotch coal fouled their boilers they would undoubtedly prefer to use Welsh coal. They know better, however, and they save money by using Scotch coal. Foreign countries do not follow the example of the British Government in this respect. When they send their ships to the North Sea those ships go into the Forth and coal at Leith, and by so doing they are able to save the 50 per cent which the Admiralty throw away. I claim that this absurd system should be abandoned in the interest of the nation, and not merely of Scotland. I raise the question simply as a matter of national economy. The Admiralty think that

  1563
  they have been pestered by the Scottish people upon this question, and I think it is only right that they should be pestered until they consent to give way. This year they have intimated that if a vessel requires no more than 250 tons it may be supplied from Scotch coal, but that when a vessel requires a larger supply it should be obtained from Wales. Of course, the effect of this regulation is that the officers in command of Her Majesty's ships, only too anxious to obey the wishes of their masters, will invariably wait until they want 500 tons, in which case they will have to get it from Wales. That was the point I wanted to raise in connection with this Vote, and I hope I shall have a satisfactory answer to it. I do not wish to take up much of the Committee's time at this period of the Session; but with regard to Dockyard management, I should like to make one observation. I wish to give credit to the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty for what I think he has been right in doing. I see that a deputation from the Dockyards has waited upon him in reference to the discharge of men, and I am glad to see the manly stand that he has taken. I am glad to notice that he has not hesitated to tell these people that the Dockyards exist not for the men, but for the nation. I am glad to sea that he has taken care to economize and cut down expenditure where it is possible. I am quite sure that these men would do much better if they would trust to their own industry, and not look to the Dockyards to keep them there as a sort of charity. We have had bad trade in the North, and many men are idle on the Tyne and on the Clyde. These men do not come cringing to the Government, asking for relief; and I take it that the men in the Royal Dockyards should do as they do. I am glad of the remarks which the noble Lord made to these men, and I hope that the Government will continue to exercise that economy which is absolutely required in connection with the trade of the country. As to the Dockyards in the South of England, it is clear to any business man that the building of ships in that part of England cannot go on properly. The Yards are too far away from the source of supply, as far as the materials are concerned. Why did ship-building leave the Thames?
  THE CHAIRMAN: I must call the hon. Member's attention to the fact that the Dockyard Vote has been disposed of a long while ago.
  MR. MASON: I will not go into that point; but I thought that as contracts for ship-building, in connection with Vote, are going on now I might refer to them. I suppose I could criticize the contract for materials, which would come within the same line of argument; but I will say merely as to the materials that come under this Vote, that I should like to know why the Scotch makers of iron and steel are not in the list for the supply of these materials, and why they are far down in the list? I understand that everything connected with this matter is done by the Director of Contracts, who puts in the list whom he thinks proper, and takes off the list whom he thinks proper. I find that contracts are not given out—[Mr. FORWOOD dissented.] The hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood) shakes his head. But the hon. Gentleman the Member for Preston (Mr. Hanbury) the other day referred to the question of the Director of Contracts.
  THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. FORWOOD) (Lancashire, Ormskirk): That was under the Army Estimates.
  MR. MASON: Well, it is all the same. My point is, that none of the Scotch contractors, or very few of them, are in the lists. You must have respectable people on these lists, but you can extend the lists without deterioration in that respect. There are very few Scotch masters on the lists, and I know that they are capable of considerable extension. But I do not intend to detain the Committee further than to say that I consider this system of voting money by us here in the form of Estimates as simply a farce. You might just as well go to the corner of Parliament Street and call together 50 or 100 men to vote the money for the Services of the country, as call upon this House, in its present attenuated condition, to grant Supplies. How do we know what this money is to be voted for? What is the use of asking the House to come here and vote money unless we know what it is spent on? The sooner we stop the present system the better. I beg to move the reduction of the Vote by £1,000.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £1,206,000, be granted for the said Services."—(Mr. Mason.)
  LORD CHARLES BERESFORD (A LORD of the ADMIRALTY) (): The question of coal is so important that I should like to point out how it stands. The hon. Member for Mid Lanark is quite right in saying that ships at Leith can be supplied with Scotch coal at 8s. a-ton; but I would point out that that does not include the cost of putting it on board the vessels.
  MR. MASON: You could put it on board the vessels for 8s. 6d. a-ton at the very outside.
  LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: Not, I think, on vessels lying in the roads.
  MR. MASON: Yes; I beg to assure the noble and gallant Lord that that can be done.
  LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: Well, I will not argue the point.
  MR. MASON: No; for I know it.
  LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: I will tell the hon. Member that even if this Scotch coal could be supplied to us for 3s. a-ton, we should not use it in preference to Welsh coal. I have written down four or five reasons why we object to Scotch coal and prefer Welsh coal. In the first place, the evaporating power of Scotch coal is 20 per cent less than that of Welsh coal. In the second place, the Scotch coal is very smoky, a large portion of it going into ashes and clinkers, and the soot clogging the boiler tubes much more than that of Welsh coal. Thirdly, with Scotch coal the indicated horse-power is never so good, and full power cannot be so well maintained. More than that, there is a lot of heat lost in cleaning the fires and tubes. Then, notwithstanding the smaller cost per ton of the Scotch coal, in the long run it is much more expensive, in consequence of the larger quantity used, together with its quick-burning and small evaporating qualities. And I must point out that when we are compelled, as we are now-a-days, to use forced draught, the tubes have to be smaller, and, therefore, clog more quickly. These are very good reasons why we prefer Welsh to Scotch coal. But there is still another good reason. British men-of-war should always be ready for any emergency at a moment's notice, and it would not be possible for them to be so if we al-
  1566
  lowed Scotch coal to be used. Personally, I object to having any Scotch coal at all on board a man-of-war; but there is a Board of Admiralty, and they have declared that there may be 250 tons of Scotch coal allowed on board a man-of-war lying in a Scotch port as a First Reserve Ship; this Scotch coal would be used for culinary and other purposes. They have said, however, that not more than that amount can be taken on board, because they can get 300 tons of Welsh coal to a cargo. Though we put 300 tons on board at 13 s. 6d. a-ton, we consider that cheaper to the country and better than if we put on board Scotch coal, even if we could get it for 3s. a-ton. The hon. Member referred to another point relating to the question of contracts. The Director of Contracts, as a matter of fact, is not half as almighty as the hon. Member seems to suppose. There is an appeal from the Director of Contracts, and any man who tenders can appeal to the Superintendent Lord, whatever the article he is tendering for. I do not think that the hon. Gentleman mentioned anything else; but I should like to say one or two words in reference to what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Central Bradford (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) said. First of all, there is the question of laying down iron-clads. The right hon. Gentleman has pressed us before upon that point, but it would be a dangerous thing if the country were to think that any Board of Admiralty was not going to lay down iron-clads. My own opinion is that we are at least five iron-clads short of the number we ought to have in order to be thoroughly efficient, but the fact is that we have only a certain amount of money voted for the Navy, and we are obliged to do the best we can with it.
  THE CHAIRMAN: The noble and gallant Lord might have made these observations at an earlier period, but the item now under discussion is a specific one—namely, the charge for coal. Therefore the noble and gallant Lord's observations are out of Order.
  LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: I am very sorry to hear that, Mr. Courtney. At some other time, however, I shall be able to go into these matters.
  MR. MASON: With regard to the strength of Scotch coal, I have not the statistics with me at the present moment, but I am in a position to say, from my

  1567
  knowledge of this subject, that Scotch coal is stronger than Welsh coal as far as steam-raising power is concerned. [Cries of "Oh, oh! "] Well, I suppose the Board of Admiralty form their opinion of Scotch coal from having had a lot of trash sent up to them for testing. As I said before there is Scotch coal and Scotch coal—["hear, hear!"]—yes, of course there is, and if you get a bad sample of Scotch coal and compare it with a good sample of Welsh coal you will of course find a difference in favour of the Welsh coal. But I would remind the noble and gallant Lord that in the case of Scotch steamers which go from the Forth to Hamburg there is an acknowledged absence of smoke, as compared with those from Newcastle. In fact those steamers are known by their smoke-lessness. Does the noble and gallant Lord not think that such lines as the Anchor Line know exactly what they are about? Does he think that they would burden themselves with coal which was unfit for the service? Does he think that they would use such coal if it had the defects attributed to it by the noble and gallant Lord? The Anchor Line, I would inform him, coal not on the Mersey, but on the Clyde.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: I feel bound to say something on this subject, because my constituents probably export more Scotch coal than those of any other district to the Continent, This I will say in defence of Scotch coal, that foreigners come in crowds to buy it. They come to a new port which has only lately been opened, and they are quite satisfied with the coal they get there. Of course these people can choose their own price, but they find that it pays them to come for Scotch coal. If that is the case, I do not think it can be so very bad after all.
  SIR EDWARD REED: On behalf of Cardiff, I may say with perfect distinctness that if there is any question affecting the administration at the Admiralty, which has been over and over again discussed and which has been finally decided by experiment, it is this question of the quality of the different descriptions of coal. I really feel very strongly on behalf of nay constituents in this matter; but I think it is unnecessary to go further than to appeal to the official experience which abounds in the Department.
  COLONEL BLUNDELL: I am not a Scotchman, but I must say that there is nothing that requires more carefully checking than the manner in which coal is tested for public Departments.
  MR. MASON: I do not wish to divide the Committee on this matter, and therefore I will withdraw the Motion; but I trust that the remarks that I have made will not be without effect. Otherwise there will be great dissatisfaction felt in Scotland.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn
  Original Question again proposed.
  SIR JOHN PULESTON: I desire to draw the attention of the Committee to one item in this Vote— namely, that relating to the sale of useless stores. It is a considerable sum— amounting to nearly £55,000, and I hope my hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood) will give us some information upon the point. A great deal has been said on more than one occasion upon this question of selling off stores and about the Government having to replace them in times of emergency at enormous cost. I am sure that is not the case at the present moment; but still the presence on the Estimates of so large an item for unserviceable stores calls attention to the fact that stores must have been purchased without much judgment, or to the fact that they have ceased, for some reason or other, to be useful. At all events, it is a question upon which we should like some information. I do not wish to occupy the time of the Committee any longer, but I venture to hope that information will be given to us on the subject.
  THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. FORWOOD) (Lancashire, Ormskirk): The item put down here is £55,000, and I can assure my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport that this question of the sale of unserviceable stores is looked at exceedingly carefully, and that by far the bulk of the item is for the sale of worn-out stores and not of stores which have become obsolete without being used. There is comparatively a small amount of stores which, having been acquired in times gone by, have become obsolete, and therefore

  1569
  have to be cleared out. The great proportion of this sum is for the sale of returned stores from ships not worth repairing.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: I wish in Section 1 of this Vote to call attention to a very important subject—that is to say, what seems to me the strange and improper way in which this House has been treated in regard to the bargain which has been made with the Colonies on the subject of the Australian Squadron. The gist of what I complain of is this. According to the proceedings of the Colonial Conference, Vol. I., page 509, the first part of Article 9 says that the agreement shall become actually binding between the Imperial and the several Colonial Governments named as soon as the Colonial Legislatures shall have passed special appropriations on certain terms. The effect of that is, that as soon as the Colonies agree the agreement shall be binding both on them and on the Imperial Government.
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Read the last clause.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: That beginning "in time of peace two ships?"
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: No.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: "The several Colonies shall undertake—"
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: No. The part which says that the agreements are to be laid before Parliament.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: I understand that the agreement is to be laid before Parliament; but when it is laid before us the hands of Parliament will be tied if the consent of the Colonial Governments has been obtained. I put a Question on this matter in the House the other day; and the reply was that the Colonists would feel themselves aggrieved if next Session Parliament were to undo anything done on the faith of this agreement. Of course, the Government will be bound to come to Parliament for the Vote; but, it would lead to great trouble, if, after formal arrangements of this kind have been made, Parliament refuses to vote the money. But, Sir, I see that the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty seems to suggest that I am getting out of Order. Perhaps it would save trouble if I said one or two words on the bargain in regard to the building of ships; but
  1570
  I do not wish to dwell upon that point. What I complain of is that, by the bargain we have entered into, we are bound to maintain the present Australian Squadron in future, at our own expense, whether we like it or not, That is the part of the bargain which I most dislike being made without reference to Parliament. It binds this country hand and foot without any reference to Parliament. I conceive that to enter into a compact of that kind is not to treat Parliament properly. You should not enter into an agreement which is to be sanctioned by the Colonial Legislatures without coming at the same time to this Parliament and asking its sanction. Why, in these days, when there is so much difficulty in getting Acts through Parliament, Her Majesty's Government seem to think that Members of Parliament are slaves bound to the chariot wheels of the Conservative Party, and that they can do what they like without coming to this House and consulting the Representatives of the people if they only got the consent of the Colonial Legislatures. The bargain in part may be a good one, Sir; but my contention is that it should not have been entered into without putting this Parliament in the same position as the Colonial Parliaments, and giving them the power to decide whether or not the bargain should hold good. I do not wish to dwell upon the merits of the agreement; but I do think that an agreement by which we are bound not only to maintain the new ships in Australian waters partly at our own cost, but also to keep up the whole Squadron at our expense, is a bargain to which exception may be taken. Why I especially do not like it is for this reason—that it seems to me that over the distant parts of this Empire, over which the sun never sets, we have no control whatever. We are so much afraid of the Colonies that whenever we make a bargain the Colonists have their own views as to what the bargain should be, and they press it on us with pertinacity and force, with the inevitable result that we give in. The Colonies always seem to get their own way in the end. The original draft of the agreement drawn up by Her Majesty's Government was one in regard to which I should not have had very much objec-

  1571
  tion; but, at the instance of the Colonial Representatives at the Colonial Conference, it was altered to a form to which I do very much object. The first part of Article 5 was to the effect that, in consequence of the agreement for a joint individual force, no reduction should take place in the normal strength of Her Majesty's Naval Force employed on the Australian station, exclusive of the—
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: As a question of Order, I wish to ask, Sir, whether a point of this kind can be raised on this Vote? This is Vote 10, Section 1, the object of which is to provide stores for the Dockyards and for the repair of Her Majesty's ships. I desire to ask whether it is competent on a Vote like this to discuss proceedings which took place at the Colonial Conference, or to discuss what should be the collective strength of the Squadron of Her Majesty's Navy in different parts of the world?
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: I have almost done.
  THE CHAIRMAN: I understand that the hon. Member wishes to impeach certain negotiations which would bind this country to keep a certain naval force in the Australian seas. This Vote would in some way tend to keep up that force, and therefore I cannot say that the hon. Member is out of Order.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: As I say, I have almost done. I have referred to the part of the agreement, to which, I say, I do not think exception could be taken, but it is to the agreements as altered in the Conference that I object. What I have just stated to be the effect of part of the draft might be fair enough, but when we come to the agreement actually made we find the words "in consequence of the creation of a joint naval force no reduction shall take place" struck out, and we find these words inserted in their place, "notwithstanding the establishment of this joint naval force no reduction shall take place." The words "in consequence "might be all very fair, but by the new words we are bound not to reduce the old force under any circumstances. I do not like the alteration. I beg to move to reduce the Vote by £500 on account of the other point I mentioned.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £1,202,000,
  1572
  be granted for the said Services."— (Sir George Campbell.)
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: As the hon. Member has thought fit to make certain observations with regard to the strength of Her Majesty's Navy in Australian waters, it is perhaps only right that I should say a word or two respecting what has occurred. The hon. Member objects to the arrangement which has been made on the ground that it it is an unfair bargain for the Mother Country. All I can say is that the Representatives of the Government had some difficulty at the Colonial Conference in inducing the Colonial delegates and the Colonial Legislatures to assent to some of the proposals we made. The delegates, in fact, thought that those proposals pressed a little hardly upon the Colonies. Now, what will be the result of the agreement to which the hon. Member has referred, assuming that this House assents to it?—and it is completely in the power of the House to reject it—
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: When?
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Why, when the money is asked for. I say this in order to relieve the mind of the hon. Member — that Parliament can refuse to ratify the agreement when the money which will be required to carry it into effect is asked for. If the House assents to the agreement, what will be the result?—and that brings -me to the merits of the agreement. Those merits, I think, cannot be gainsaid. It is very essential in these times that we should maintain in Australian waters a peace establishment which shall be capable of developing automatically into a war establishment at very short notice. By this agreement we shall have a squadron in addition to our own squadron in Australian waters, and five per cent will be paid us on the original cost of construction. Our Australian and Colonial trade generally is rapidly increasing, and England and Australia have a common interest in protecting that trade. We have now, for the first time, entered into partnership for its protection. I shall never forget the farewell observations one of the delegates addressed to me. "I am glad," he said," that the Mother Country has not pressed us too hardly now. We are not so many now. We only number 4,000,000, but a few years hence we may number 50,000,000, and the Colony will

  1573
  never forget the generous way in which the Mother Country has treated us."
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: I did not criticize that part of the arrangement which the noble Lord refers to. I do not dispute that that part of the bargain may be very good, but it is clear that the squadron we are to provide for Australian waters will not be wholly maintained by the Australian Government, but that we pay for it jointly. It must be borne in mind that we protect Australian trade in this quarter of the globe, and I think it is only fair that the Australians should protect it themselves on the other side. However, I do not object to the agreement, but I object to the form of agreement by which we are bound to maintain the old squadron in Australian waters whether we like it or not. I beg to withdraw the Motion.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  Original Question again proposed.
  DR. TANNER: I rise for the purpose of calling attention to a certain state of affairs existing in the port of Queenstown, in connection with the coaling item. I see here that £285,000 is paid for the provision of stores. If the Government provide stores in that extravagant way, I think they should avail themselves of the opportunity of placing them in those spots in Ireland as well as elsewhere where they are likely to be wanted. It is not so very long since—I believe it is only three or four years ago—that the Admiralty came to the conclusion that Haul-bowline should be fitted up for the storage of a sufficient quantity of coal for the use of Her Majesty's ships which might come there for it. But what has happened? There is another point I shall call attention to later on respecting the coaling quarters; but now I wish to deal with the coal itself. What happened? In consequence of the Admiralty not taking advantage of the facilities placed at their disposal, in consequence of their not buying a sufficient quantity of coal and storing it at Haul-bowline, what occurred? Why, some ships of the flying squadron came into Queenstown and there was no coal for them. Of course, they wanted coal, and the Commander gave orders for coal to be purchased of the local dealers. Well, for my own part, I do not object
  1574
  to the Admiralty spending their money at Queenstown, or elsewhere in the South, of Ireland—-on the contrary, I am very glad that they should do so—but, as a Member of this House, and as one whose duty it is to look into these Estimates and to endeavour to reduce the charge upon the taxpayers, I say that in this matter the Government have been notably lax. I can only call attention to one case of the kind; but I dare say that if these matters were looked into we should find that probably faults of a similar kind might be shown up in connection with many of the coaling stations. Practically speaking, the Admiralty officials do not purchase their coals in a cheap market, and do not store it up and look out for a rainy day. I felt it to be my duty to call attention to this fact. There are two or three other points under this Vote that I would just merely call attention to. There is, for instance, the question of the manufacture of jute and hemp, which is carried on very largely on the Eastern coast of Scotland. The Government have always neglected to make use of the opportunities which are afforded to them by these large manufactories in Scotland, and have given contracts and bought materials very largely—a great deal more extensively than they ought to do in times like the present — from abroad. They have brought into this country a large quantity of material of Russian and Indian manufacture, and have done this to the detriment of the Scottish producer. I speak on this question, of course, as an Irishman—but as an Irishman who knows how kind our Scottish Friends always are to us in this House. I undertook last year to speak about the question; I did so; and the First Lord of the Admiralty promised to devote a certain amount of "favourable consideration" to the matter. But, however, that resolution, like all those other good resolutions which the Admiralty Office is paved with, unfortunately fell to the ground. Then there is another point to which I would draw attention, and that is with regard to the manufacture of electric torpedoes and the acceptance of patents. I think there is a good deal too much favouritism in connection with this Department. It is not so very long since that a poor man who happened to be a master mariner, of the name of Atkins, invented a torpedo, and brought

  1575
  the invention before the Lords of the Admiralty. Well, after examining it in a superficial manner, the Admiralty snubbed him and sent him to the right about. I understand that within a very short time since then—within the last couple of weeks—this poor man has got an offer from some foreign Government for his invention. He would have been only too glad to have given the invention to the Government of this country, if the Admiralty had approved of it. There is, as I say, altogether too much favouritism in connection with this Department. When inventions are made by aristocrats and not by the sons of the people, or when they are made by both, the aristocrats get the preference. I maintain that this is not fair; and I certainly ask that the invention of this poor man, this Captain Atkins, should at any rate be inquired into, and that, if it is of use, it should be brought before the proper authorities. It was, as a matter of fact, simply brought before the noble Lord the Member for one of the Divisions of London. It was brought before the noble Lord, and he stated the belief that it was a very fair invention indeed. But, unfortunately, the noble Lord had too many important matters to occupy his attention just then, and I presume that he thought nothing more about it. At any rate, I now bring the case before this Committee. I think that a poor man, if he makes an invention, is just as much entitled to have it gone into as a rich man. There is another point, under Section 2, Sub-head N, about which I should like to say a word. I refer to the question of the reserve of merchant cruisers—
  THE CHAIRMAN: That does not come within Section 1.
  DR. TANNER: Very well, Sir. Then I hope that, at any rate, on the points to which I have referred, the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty will give us some indication of the policy the Government are going to pursue. First, in connection with the question of the storage of coal at Haul-bowline, and then with regard to the jute manufacturers on the East Coast of Scotland. On this latter question I desire to urge the Government, when they possibly can do so, in times of adversity, trial and trouble like the present, when all trades are suffering, in Scotland as well as in England, to
  1576
  give a certain amount of preference to home manufacturers. I do not ask them to give an undue preference, or to go in for extravagance, but merely to give an honest preference to home manufacturers, especially in regard to such manufactures—especially in regard to such matters as I have called attention to. And, finally, I would urge the noble Lord to give us an answer upon this question of the invention of torpedoes.
  MR. NOLAN: Before the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty or the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty rises I would ask them to be prepared to consider and answer a question which many people take an interest in. It has been stated, on good authority, that the Russian Navy is now using petroleum in preference to coal as fuel, and I should like to know if experiments have taken place in this country on the subject. I desire to know whether any specimens of petroleum have been used, and, if so, with what result; and, generally speaking, what is the view of the Admiralty with regard to the use of liquid fuel?
  MR. WOOTTON ISAACSON: Upon this Vote, I should like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty a question with regard to armour plates. The hon. Member for Mid Cork (Dr. Tanner) has said that we should, as far as possible, give a preference to articles of home manufacture. Well, armour plates are things which only two firms in this country are capable of competing for, and the result is that we are obliged to pay 30 s. a-ton more for these articles at home than we pay if we send our orders to foreign countries. I admit that it is a patriotic thing for the Government to obtain armour plates at home, and to show favouritism to home manufacturers; but I think that manufacturers should know that we cannot continue to give the whole of our orders to our own countrymen unless they show a larger spirit of enterprise, and lay down more extensive plant in order to compete more favourably with foreign nations. I trust that we shall have a very satisfactory answer on this point from the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood). I should be glad, of course, to see more jute of home manufacture consumed in the Navy.
  MR. FORWOOD: With regard to what has fallen from the hon. Member for Mid Cork (Dr. Tanner) respecting the storage of coal at Haulbowline, I have to state that we keep there a stock of 1,800 tons of coal, which is quite sufficient, in times of peace, for the steamships which occasionally want coal in those waters. As to the hon. Member's remarks about the late manœuvres, and the ships being short of coal, I would point out that coal for vessels engaged in the manœuvres was sent out in colliers, the Admiral giving orders to these vessels to meet the war ships at points which he indicated. It is possible that there may have been some delay on the part of the Admiralty in regard to ordering some one of these colliers to meet the vessels to which the hon. Member has referred. However, I assure him that special arrangements were made as to coaling the vessels during the manœuvres. With regard to manufactures of jute, and giving Scotch manufacturers a preference over Indian manufacturers, I may tell the hon. Member that we have every desire to purchase our goods in the home markets—and when I say the home markets I do not for a moment mean to assume that the Indian market is not a home market. We have a strict record kept of the relative usefulness of goods supplied from time to time by different firms. We are obliged to have regard to the use to which the goods are put and to the quality of the material; and we should not be justified in paying a high price for goods when we can got the same material at a lower price.
  DR. TANNER: Is it not a fact that the Scotch goods are of a better quality, and altogether of a better class, than the Indian goods?
  MR. FORWOOD: I can assure the hon. Member that these points are taken into account. As regards the electric torpedoes, we are constantly receiving proposals from inventors, as the hon. Member is doubtless aware. Scarcely a week goes by but some inventor or other produces something new and important, and whenever Her Majesty's Government think that there is an invention which gives a reasonable promise of value it is referred to their professional advisers for them to inquire into. Of course, it is impossible for the Government to take up all inventions; but,
  1578
  at the same time, we endeavour to give adequate attention to all the proposals brought before us. With regard to the use of petroleum in Her Majesty's ships, that matter has been watched. No doubt petroleum is largely used in Russian ships as fuel; but the reason is not far to seek, because coal is comparatively dearer with them than it is with us. The use of petroleum has been for a long time in an experimental stage; but a great many people think that there is risk of explosion connected with it. Its use is not in that state of development which would justify private individuals, much loss Her Majesty's Government, in having recourse to it. Then the hon. Member for the Stepney Division of the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Isaacson) made reference to the subject of the manufacture of armour plates. Unfortunately, there are only two firms in this country who manufacture armour plates, and no doubt they manage to adjust prices very cleverly between them. But we must remember that these firms have set up and maintain heavy and expensive plant for the manufacture of these 20-inch plates with three or four inches of steel on the face. The nature of the manufacture involves enormous expense, and these firms have to depend for their return very largely upon Government work. As has been pointed out, it is possible that the construction of armour-plated ships in the country may be for a time stationary. During that time the plant of these manufacturers will be comparatively idle. As to going abroad, there is grave objection to going to foreign countries for our armour plates, so long as we are treated with fairness at homo. It is essential that, if we have only two firms who make them, we should give those firms inducements to keep their plant in order, so that they may be able to make plates in times of emergency. It would be ridiculous to be obliged in times of emergency to go abroad for armour-plates, because we might find ourselves shut out of the markets. I hope that, after these explanations, we may be allowed to take the Vote.
  Original Question put, and agreed to.
  (2.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a sum, not exceeding £1,911,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Expense

  1579
  of Machinery and Ships built by Contract, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1888."
  CAPTAIN COLOMB: I really regret having to occupy the time of the Committee at the end of the Session; and I should not do so were it not for the fact that the item of which I am about to move the reduction is an indication of an entirely new departure in our naval policy with regard to the Admiralty arrangements in connection with the Mercantile Marine. I think it is so important that —much against my own personal inclination—I feel bound to trouble the Committee with these observations. Now, Sir, this is the last item in Section 2 of Vote 10; and it is an item which I am going to propose to reduce by the sum of £10,000, the "subvention for the right of pre-emption or hire of merchant vessels as armed cruisers or transports." This being a new policy, it would be well to ask what was the policy it is supposed to replace, and what are the aims and objects of the new policy? Now, I will not trouble the Committee upon one point, because we are all agreed upon it—we are all agreed in recognizing the enormous dangers to which our Mercantile Marine is exposed in time of war, owing to the vast extent of our commerce: and we are also all agreed upon the fact that our Mercantile Marine constitutes an enormous reserve of naval power, and that the only question is as to its utilization. It is to the initiation of a new policy for the utilization of our Mercantile Marine that this Vote refers. Well, now, Sir, what existed before this new system? I do not think that there was any policy at all. There was an idea at the Admiralty about utilizing the Mercantile Marine; but the only practical step taken towards the realization of that object, which I have ever been aware of, was to lay down certain Admiralty conditions with regard to the structural qualities of the ships, whilst the only inducement offered to the shipowners to adopt these structural qualities was that these ships should be placed on the Admiralty List for priority of employment when the Admiralty were in a position to give it. Well, that was then the condition, of things. After some years we had a small business
  1580
  in Egypt, and the Admiralty, following that policy, had to take up certain ships. They had to take up, and did take up, some 200, and at that very time they had on their list, as I make out, over 300 vessels, having an aggregate capacity of over 1,000,000 of tons. But, when the time came to apply that policy in obtaining transports, they did not apply it. A very large number of vessels on the Admiralty list were excluded by the Admiralty from acting as transports, and vessels were employed for that purpose which were not on the list at all. Thus the policy which had been adopted broke down when the time came to apply it. I think it is very important that we should be perfectly clear with regard to this item in the Vote. The words are—"For armed cruisers or transports," and I wish to be as distinct as possible with regard to those words. I will therefore first make a few observations with regard to transports, and then I shall come to the question of armed cruisers. Now, this £10,000 a-year is the beginning of an expenditure of which we cannot see the end, as I shall presently show from Admiralty evidence on the question. If we look at it as a means of providing transports, I think oar experience will show that the policy must fail. Takothe experience of the past few years. This £10,000 will secure us little more than two ships, and the right of employing them in time of war, at a previously fixed price. We are to pay the £10,000 a-year for reserving that right. But in the year 1883 the Admiralty hired three transports, and in 1884 they hired 26. In 1885, for a small expedition to Egypt, they hired as many as 150, and the whole cost was over £1,500,000. Now, it is quite evident that if, in carrying out a small expedition to Egypt, you require 150 transports, the number of vessels will swell enormously if you have to carry a larger force—say to Afghanistan—double the distance. Therefore, I cannot see that, in this matter of transports as a provision for war, the payment of £10,000 for a reserve of two ships will produce any result at all when it comes to the question of engaging a large number of transports. This policy will do one or other of two things, it will either utterly fail to provide us with efficient transports more than we have at present, or it will in-

  1581
  duce the Government to expand it to such exaggerated proportions as to form a very material proportion of the whole Naval Vote. We know by the Memorandum that it is proposed that this Vote at present shall not exceed £50,000, and that that will give us 10 ships. Well, I think that the right of pre-emption for the obtaining of transports is no way of grappling with the difficulty which even a small expedition requires us to face. I therefore will not say more than this—that the Subvention Vote cannot be said to be of any importance whatever as regards the item "Transports." Now, having cleared the ground, I come to the question simply of subvention, or the right of hiring merchant ships for cruisers. Now, hero, again, let us look at our experience. In 1885, by a Vote of Credit, we suddenly took up 16 ships, which cost us £600,000 in a few weeks, or an average of £37,500 each. Now, what did we get for our money? Why, the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty tells us in his Memorandum that many of these ships never left harbour, and that only one, the Oregon, was ever fully equipped. I think there was very long delay in doing that; but there is one thing we are not told, either under the old system or under the new, and it is very material to the question—namely, how and where are you going to employ these ships? Are they to act as part of the Fleet of the Royal Navy; are they to have a roving commission; or in what way, when you have taken them, are you going to use them? We do not know. All that we know with regard to these 16 ships is that the Admiralty took them up at a cost of over £500,000, and it is not clear what they intended to do with them. It seems certain that they did nothing at all with them. Well, now, that is the result of our experience. Now let me say a word as to the question of cost. The subvention, as stated in the Admiralty Letter to the Treasury, or rather the stipulated subvention to be paid for each vessel in peace, as stated in the Letter of the Admiralty to the Treasury, is £5,000 a-year. Now, I have said that in taking up 16 vessels under the old system, they cost us for fitting, taking up, and discharging when done with £37,500 each. Now, if you are going to pay £5,000
  1582
  a-year per vessel in time of peace for the right of pre-emption or hiring vessels in war time, if you have no war for seven and a-half years you will have paid at the end of that time as much as you did under the old system. Whereas under the old system at the date of the discharge of the vessels it had cost you £37,500, under the new system, having paid this much during seven and a-half years, you would commence to pay for the hire of the vessel afresh. Each vessel would start with a debt of £37,500 before we began to pay for actual services. I think that it is a financial matter requiring some considerable consideration. I think that if you have 10 vessels, for which you pay £5,000 a-piece per year for the right of pre-emption or hire in the event of emergency, you must remember that it adds £500,000 every five years to your Naval Expenditure. Now, the next point I wish to refer to is one upon which I am not at all clear, and is, therefore, one which I trust the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty will enlighten the Committee upon. It is not at all clear that the Admiralty took these 16 vessels in 1885 because they wanted them as armed cruisers, or thought they wanted them as armed, cruisers. I think I shall show that they took them up for a wholly different reason. We see in the Admiralty Letter to the Treasury of the 7th of February of this year that the Admiralty asked for the approval of the Treasury to a principle of subvention. They alluded, as a reason for the subvention, to the circumstances of 1885, and they told the Treasury that it was not so much a want of armed cruisers which made them bring forward the subject as the necessity of preventing these vessels falling into the hands of a foreign Government. They say—
  " It will be remembered that in 1885 a sum approximating to £600,000 was expended on retaining the services of certain fast steamers so as to prevent their being available for the service of any Power inimical to the interests of the United Kingdom."
  Therefore we must regard the Subvention Vote from the point of view of preventing the transfer of vessels to foreign Powers, to be used against us under a foreign flag on the outbreak of war. Now, I think that that is a matter which requires clear examina-

  1583
  tion. Let us look at it by the light of events in taking up these 16 cruisers is 1885. Not one half of those vessels had a seagoing speed of 16 knots. There were only five of them, so far as I can make out, that had, and would have been qualified for subvention under the new policy; therefore, supposing this new policy you now inaugurate by this Vote to have been in existence then, what would have been the effect? It would not have diminished the necessity for preventing all the other vessels of loss than 16 knots being transferred to a foreign flag. You would have paid for five in time of peace, but 11 others you would not have paid the subvention for, with the result that you would have had to pay all the same, not because you wanted armed cruisers, but because you could not allow them to fall into the hands of a foreign Power—out of the £600,000 you would have had to pay for 11 vessels £37,500 each just the same, not for use as armed cruisers, but because you were afraid of their falling into the hands of foreign Powers. Now, I for one do not believe that this fiddling with four or five ships, or even 10 ships, and paying so much a-year in the Naval Estimates is a proper way of grappling with the serious question of the transfer of the best of our mercantile steam ships to a foreign flag in case of war, and it is because I think you are delaying the facing of this question by temporizing with this small Vote that I object to it. You might say what pains and penalties can you put upon the shipowners who transfer their vessels to foreign Powers with whom we are on the brink of being at war. Are the interests of our country to be prejudiced by our own shipowners and shipbuilders assisting our enemies? I think if we cannot trust the patriotism of our countrymen we can, at any rate, meet the danger by another application of subventions, or by legislation to prevent vessels from falling into the hands of other Powers. I am sorry to detain the Committee so long, but really this matter is a very important one. What are the aims and objects of the development of this new policy with which we start in this Vote? I think they are stated in the Admiralty Letter to the Treasury, where it is said that we are is a very dangerous position. And there is another reason they have
  1584
  for pressing the Treasury to agree to the system of subventions. In the Letter to which I refer they say—
  " The retention of a fleet of Royal Naval Reserve cruisers must be obviously of great national advantage. In a pecuniary sense they would serve to limit the necessity felt by their Lordships for the construction of fast war vessels to protect the commerce of this country."
  Subventions therefore are to be regarded as opening a back door for future Admiralties to escape from the responsibility of creating an adequate force of war cruisers. Now I have the greatest confidence in the present Board of Admiralty. If it were permanent I should not be in the least afraid in this matter; but I confess, looking at what our experience has been of past Admiralties, and in view of their willingness to bring down to the level of a cry for a reduction of expenditure on our naval power, I fear this proposal really imperils the safety of the country—I am not pro-pared to say that future Admiralties, largely adopting the view of the statement I have just read, would not bring the country to a condition of danger. Therefore, I say that the Subvention Vote being put forward on the ground that it will save building more cruisers is a dangerous policy, and it is one which I protest against. Are we asked to adopt this policy of subvention in order to avoid our responsibilities with regard to the construction of more cruisers, and having made this arrangement with the owners of the mercantile vessels, are we to go on year after year allowing a deficiency in our armament, so far as fast cruisers are concerned, to continue? The next point is one which I think again arises in the Memorandum, and I must openly tell the noble Lord and the Board of Admiralty that I should have had more faith or belief in the policy of subventions if they had not given so many different reasons in support of it. Here is another reason given to us in the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty's Memorandum accompanying the Estimates. He says "unless some inducement is given to English Companies the building of fast steamers in this country must diminish, whereas abroad their building is encouraged by subsidies." Then he goes on to say, most properly, that "it is neither to the credit of the country nor for the advantage of our marine that fast steamers should be

  1585
  mostly under foreign flags." Well, I am sure that everyone will endorse the view of the noble Lord and the Admiralty in that matter. I think there is growing up a feeling in this country, as knowledge is increasing, that our Mercantile Marine is not safe in the face of this foreign bounty system. There is a tendency to produce under foreign flags better lines of steamers even than some of our own. Foreign countries are building steamers much better than some of our own, and this is in consequence of the foreign bounty system. The noble Lord himself is my witness in the words I have just quoted. But I ask the Committee if the policy of foreign countries is really lowering our power to be the first and foremost in the world at sea in the power and speed and class of our ships—if foreign policy is doing that, is it to be thought that this Vote is sufficient to grapple with the question? I say no. This is not a question for the Admiralty Board, but for the Government as a Government to face—they must meet the action of foreign countries in this matter in a statesman-like way, and the people of this country will support them. We cannot afford to have our Mercantile Marine lowered in its capacity and character. I hold that we cannot in safety to our interests in peace, and that we cannot with safety to our Empire in war, allow the superiority of our Mercantile Marine at sea to be diminished. Now, bounties in foreign countries tend to diminish our power, and I say this country ought to face the matter boldly at once, and not by Votes like this in the Navy Estimates. I believe an easy way to do it would be to put 1d. a-ton on foreign ships entering and clearing British ports, which would bring us in about £120,000 a-year. That is a question I am not going to pursue on this Vote, as it would be out of Order, but I merely wish to bring out that I object to the subvention being placed on this ground as a way to meet foreign bounties. I think it is fiddling with the question and doing harm to the Navy and everyone concerned in this country. But there is another matter to which I should like to allude, and that is the limitation to which this policy is to be subjected. I find in the Subvention Papers the view of the Admiralty. They say "their Lordships have not expressed a definite view as to the num-
  1586
  ber of vessels which should be retained; but as such steamers are not likely to be constructed in any considerable numbers, it is thought that probably 10 would be the maximum number likely to be placed at the disposition of the Admiralty within the next five years." Now, the Admiralty have not in their own minds any definite limit to this power. I say that for the present Admiralty to establish this policy, and then to go out and leave another Admiralty in power without a limitation would be a very dangerous proceeding. I think it is extremely dangerous that even the existing Board of Admiralty should tell the Treasury that they have no definite view as to the number of vessels that should be retained, but the amount is to be charged on the Estimates, and the number of vessels is not to be decided by sea strategy What policy then are you going to pursue? The question does not seem to be—you shall take as many ships as you want, but the number shall depend upon what shipowners and shipbuilders choose, and that is another ground of my objection. I am just about to conclude, but I cannot sit down without bringing to the ears of the noble Lord one or two matters which I should like him to hear with regard to the utilization of the Mercantile Marine, especially with regard to these subventions. What is the practical result of this proposal as it bears on the utilization of our Mercantile Marine? Practically, the result is this—that you are to make arrangements during peace time, by which, at the outbreak of war, you will rob our main lines of communication of their very best ships. If you are not going to take these vessels off our lines, you need not pay for them. The reason it is found so expensive to obtain the services of these ships by subvention, is because you propose to take them from these lines, and that you have to put the lines to inconvenience to supply their places. You have to compensate them for this inconvenience and possible losses. You have to pay a heavy annual charge in peace for these ships to supplement our naval forces in time of war, and the consequence is that we shall have to put our commerce into slower vessels. To illustrate that, I would point out that we had recently announced to us that the Admiralty have agreed to give a subvention to the three

  1587
  best ships, two not yet built, of the Peninsular and Oriental Line, and that will cost us about £15,000 every year. We are to pay that in peace for the right of taking these ships off the Peninsular and Oriental Line when war occurs. As hon. Members know, the Peninsular and Oriental ships are on the main line to India and the East, and by taking these ships off that line, you will force all the commerce which these ships would otherwise carry with safety, owing to their speed, into slower vessels. I do not know whether our Colonies are parties to the sub-vention, but they are parties to the agreement under the Peninsular and Oriental contract. The understanding we have with the Colonies, and for which the Colonies pay, is that their mails shall run regularly under certain conditions. That is all very well in time of peace, but the moment war breaks out, you are going to break faith with the Colonies in that respect, and I think that in this matter there is a very grave danger. Further than this, you are going to subsidize these three fast ships so that you may have them at a certain rate when war breaks out, but when war does come the Suez Canal may be blocked, and to get to the Australian Colonies and to India, you may have to run around the Cape. When you have this long sea journey to face, that will be the very time when these three fast ships will be most wanted on their lines. If your mails have to be run around the Cape in time of war, that will be precisely the time when you will be in need of rapid vessels. Your mail service with the Colonies and with India will be in jeopardy just in proportion as the vessels which carry the mails are slow. Your policy, therefore, will have the effect of increasing the danger to our Mercantile Marine on the Indian and Eastern line. How are you going to prevent it? Are you going to take three vessels off the line, and send them say, to the Pacific or somewhere else, and then detach vessels of the Royal Navy to protect the Peninsular and Oriental steamers because they are all slow vessels, you yourselves at the Admiralty having taken all the fast ones? It certainly seems to me that this matter has not been thoroughly thought out. What did you do in the old wars in the matter of this line of Indian communication? What was the old East
  1588
  Indiaman? Why, it was a man-of-war. Every East Indiaman was an armed merchantman. Were they not vessels that ran on their lines in spite of the teeth of foreign nations; and did they not keep up communication with the East almost altogether independent of the Royal Navy? According to the system you are now adopting, in those days the Government would have given subventions to these Indiamen; so that when war broke out those armed vessels would have been sent somewhere else, and the trade to the East would have been obliged to depend for safety upon Her Majesty's ships. I think the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty will see the point of my observations in this respect at once. Were these three fast Peninsular and Oriental steamers left on the Indian line, the Peninsular and Oriental line will not require that subvention of £15,000 a-year. All they would want would be fittings and other similar arrangements, and a small annual payment; but they would not require this large subsidy—they would not require this large amount of money to be paid for them. Why, if they are armed and are left upon this line, what will they do? They will do the very thing you want—that is to say, patrol the line, and protect en route the line on which the slower ships which are performing the same journey. That is what they will do, and therefore I object to this subvention for taking them off their line as a matter of policy. Now, Sir, I imagine that with all this talk about the safety of the Mercantile Marine the matter has not been adequately grappled with. The Admiralty, I should say, are adhering too closely to the precedents set by previous Admiralties, and have not sufficiently thought out this question. If you are going to have subventions at all to merchant vessels, I maintain that the best policy would be to act upon the principle, not of taking these ships off the line, but of making the lines themselves independent of the protection of the Royal Navy, as far as possible. Where we should devote our attention to making our commerce as secure as possible by self-protection from attack are those places where the commerce at present is not sufficient to maintain that class of vessel adapted to the purpose, and which you are anxious to secure

  1589
  by your subsidy. You have now five great routes to maintain, the route by the Mediterranean to the East, the route by the Cape, the route to the West Indies, the route by Cape Horn, and the route to North America. Every one of these lines has at this moment the fastest and best steamers patrolling almost every hour, going from port to port throughout the British Empire. You can arm these vessels, and if you are prepared to arm them you need not pay a heavy subvention to them in order to take them off the line. Your policy ought to be, not to remove them, but to arm them and keep them where they now are; but where you want to take measures to guard the ordinary mercantile marine is in the Pacific, and, to my mind, this proposed £50,000 a-year would be much better applied in establishing a connection between Australia and Western Canada and between Western Canada and the East, including Hong Kong. In this way, also, you would be protecting the trade with Hong Kong. If you went to war to-morrow your subvention would apply to a few vessels on this side of the globe; but you would have no such ships in the Pacific, and yet it would be there that your danger would be greatest. You are making no adequate arrangement for its self-defence at all. I beg to move that this sum be reduced by the sum of £10,000, and I trust that, at all events, this will occur —namely, that the matter will be more carefully examined, and that the Government will not pledge themselves to a policy which will lead them they do not know where, and which, from the point of view that I have adopted, is, I am convinced, defective in every respect.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Item N—Royal Reserve of Merchant Cruisers,—be reduced by the sum of £10,000."—(Captain Colomb.)
  THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. FORWOOD) (): The hon. and gallant Gentleman has said that this is a new departure on the part of the Board of Admiralty, and he has very ably criticized it. I will endeavour to explain what are the objects of the Admiralty in initiating this new departure, and while doing so, I hope also to reply to the
  1590
  remarks of my hon. and gallant Friend. Though it is a new departure on the part of the Admiralty, this question of subvention to merchant vessels for use as armed cruisers in time of war is no new idea. It is an old idea; but a practical effect has never been given to it until the time of the present Board of Admiralty, although it has been favourably considered by previous Boards. At the outset, I may say that there is perfect unanimity on the part of the Board of Admiralty, including the Naval Members, as well as on the part of those Members having seats in this House upon this question. No doubt, what brought the scheme more prominently before our minds was what occurred in 1885. We all remember the great anxiety expressed in that year as to the disposition of the fast steamers of the British Mercantile Marine which were conducting our commercial operations in all parts of the world. There was no doubt great hurry on the part of the Admiralty to secure those vessels lest they should fall into the hands of foreign nations who might be inimical to us. My hon. and gallant Friend (Captain Colomb) has stated that this plan of the Admiralty is not the best plan to prevent such vessels from coming into the hands of foreign owners, and he hinted that there might be some law necessary to prevent vessels being transferred to hostile powers in times of emergency. I would point out to my hon. and gallant Friend that when times of emergency arrive, and there is an actual outbreak of hostilities, it would be difficult to pass any law which would operate only on the outbreak of hostilities. There are many owners who, though thoroughly patriotic men, might desire on the outbreak of a war, or if such a thing as hostilities were impending, to get rid of a number of their ships, and they might sell, not to a hostile power, but to shipowners belonging to a neutral nation, under the idea that they were placing these ships under a neutral flag, when, as a matter of fact, the vessels might be re-sold by the neutral shipowners to our enemies. Therefore, I do not think that any Act of Parliament which my hon. and gallant Friend could suggest would enable us successfully to guard against a transfer of ships into hostile hands. The Government think the agreement which they have entered into with the owners of

  1591
  these vessels will place them absolutely at our disposal. My hon. and gallant Friend has stated the amount of money paid for vessels in 1885, the actual sum the Government undertook to pay the owners was £534,000 for the hire of the steamships, but as the contingency was shorter than was expected, some of the vessels hired were discharged by a compromise before six months was up, and only a sum of £444,000 was paid. To secure these vessels at that time the Government had to undertake to pay them six months' hire, whether they were wanted or not. Under the agreement which we have made with the owners of of vessels, we are under no obligation whatever as to the length of time for which we are to take the vessels should emergency arise. We shall only take them for such time as may be suitable There is another point I should like to dwell on, and it is this, that though we did pay something approaching £600,000 in connection with these merchant cruisers, that figure does not represent the cost to the nation in consequence of the anxiety which prevailed at that time, and the alarm which spread through the mercantile community at the injury which would result to us from active hostilities, partly from the fear of fast armed merchant cruisers. I can speak from personal knowledge that very large war premiums were paid on British commerce then traversing over the seas. It is difficult to establish the precise outlay we were put to when we took over that large number of vessels which were not then fitted for the purpose for which they were required. By the proposed subvention, however, we shall obtain vessels which are fitted with gun platforms, and in which other provision has been made so that when guns are put on board they will be ready for service almost immediately—certainly within a week after the outbreak of hostilities. To give an illustration of the disadvantage of the old system, I may point out that we only had one ship which we took over completely fitted, and yet a long period elapsed—I think 42 days—from the time of our taking over the ship to when she was completely fitted with her armaments, and ready for service. It is needless to point out what danger might arise in the event of a pressing emergency if we
  1592
  had to wait for so long a time before we could get our fast cruisers fit for service. The greatest consideration which we shall have to bear in mind in the event of any future war will be the necessity of our being prepared to strike the first blow, and to be able to afford efficient protection to our commerce almost at a moment's notice, from whichever quarter of the world it may be threatened. The greatest amount of damage which we should sustain would be that occurring during the first month after the breaking out of hostilities. It is impossible to estimate what that damage would be, and to discuss in a niggardly spirit the question of this small amount of money payable year by year as an insurance against that risk is scarcely worthy of this House of Commons. We have only to regard the extent of British commerce, and to compare it with the commerce of the rest of the world, to appreciate the importance of this subject. It should always be borne in mind that British merchant shipping is 1,000,000 tons in excess of the tonnage of all the other nations of the globe put together. The question is how we are to meet this first great pressure. In the first place, it is far from the thoughts of the Board of Admiralty that these subsidized vessels will take the place of our naval cruisers. They are to supplement them. Of course we should make our cruisers and our line of battle ships our first line of defence, but they at the beginning of a war would undoubtedly have their attention largely engaged in watching the enemy's war cruisers. There will be a risk of suffering severe injury from marauding vessels, and the enemy's extemporized cruisers. They will have to be looked after, and in order to effectively took after them it is essential that we should have the best and fastest ships procurable in the world. No one suggests for a moment that our armed merchant cruisers could at all cope in a pitched battle with an armoured ship of war, but we do say this, that oven a fast merchant cruiser, provided that care is taken to select those of the highest speed, can be made extremely valuable as a scout for a fleet to keep touch with the enemy, to harass the enemy, and to give timely warning of the appearance of an enemy to our own vessels. The more important

  1593
  object of fast merchant cruisers will be to watch our trade routes, and to help us to establish protection for them. If we have a sufficient number of vessels for this purpose, and which are known to be on certain stations, they will be a great element of safety. Our Mercantile Marine will be able to traverse their routes with some degree of comfort and safety, knowing that there are fast cruisers watching the routes and keeping in touch one with the other over great tracts of ocean. For all these purposes speed and coal endurance are the two main elements, and our object has been to exercise the utmost care in selecting vessels to have regard to these two points. And another desirable point is that we should have vessels at our disposition in different parts of the world at once available for guns. For instance, a vessel of the Peninsular and Oriental Line may be in China, may be in the Suez Canal, or be at Malta, or many other places when war breaks out, whilst other vessels may be in Australia, and others in North America. We shall have ready for these vessels at different points armaments in order to protect our routes long before cruisers could be sent out from this country. The hon. and gallant Gentleman has spoken about vessels taken up on the last occasion as armed cruisers, and he has spoken with reference to the question of transport, and also with reference to the question of speed. It is this question of speed which I wish the Committee to have foremost in its mind, because, after all, speed is the great thing that we have to consider. Now, those unacquainted with the cost of obtaining speed in large steamships are very apt to speak casually about ships and their speed of 14, 15, or 16 knots an hour as if there was very little difference amongst them. There is nothing more delusive than the loose way in which people talk on this subject. I cannot better illustrate my point in this respect than in giving the House one or two figures as to what speed means and what it costs. An armoured vessel of 10,000 tons steaming 12 knots an hour will probably require 2,500 horse power to propel it. Raise the speed up to 16 knots, and you require 8,500 horse power, and if you want to get one knot more, or 17 knots, that 8,500 horsepower
  1594
  becomes 12,500. Or take another class of vessel—the lighter class of vessel calculated to steam up to 22 knots. In order to obtain 18 knots an hour you will require 7,000 horse power, to steam 20 knots 10,000 horse power; but to increase that 20 to 22 knots your power must be raised from 10,000 horse to 19,000 horse power. I quote these figures to indicate to the Committee that there is an immense difference between vessels commonly spoken of as 14 knots and the maximum speed of vessels of the class we have engaged. The Government have taken no vessels under the contract they have made with steam shipowners of less speed than 16 knots, and in taking these vessels it must be borne in mind that we have the advantage of having control over other vessels of the same fleet without charge. These vessels, it is true, may be only suitable for transport, but there is no doubt that in time of war the rate for the hire of transports runs up very much, and if you can secure a fixed rate in time of peace, it is much more prudent to make the bargain than to put it off until the outbreak of war. I do not claim that the rate of hire is unusually low by reason of the annual subvention. We have paid for the vessels probably the ordinary market value; but looking at the vessels we have obtained—looking at the high speed of these vessels, and the cost of that speed, I think we are paying a very reasonable price for the ships. We have by these contracts determined the rates of hire, and the rates of purchase if we decide to buy the vessels. The vessels will be fitted with gun platforms; the gun carriages and guns are stored where the ships usually come to be fitted; and in regard to most of the vessels we have a provision that a part of the crew shall be composed of Naval Reserve men. That is an important point. We are spending a large sum of money annually on our Naval Reserve, and I look upon these vessels as Naval Reserve ships in full training. Then I come to the question of pounds, shillings, and pence. After all pounds, shillings, and pence is a very considerable element, and I must say it forms a point of view from which I have looked at this subject. The sum for which we obtain 10 ships in all of the high speed will be £50,000 per annum —and I beg to say that my hon. and

  1595
  gallant Friend has placed too high a figure upon the number of these ships which are likely to be built. Taking the number 10, I am, perhaps, taking the present maximum number of vessels of this rate of speed which our shipowners are likely to produce. I do not mean to say that these 10 vessels will form a proper substitute for 10 cruisers; but the House may be able to form some estimate of the comparative cost of the 10 vessels which will always be under our finger and thumb, and always ready for service at our call. 10 Naval cruisers of the high speed to which I refer would cost something like £1,500,000. To maintain them would cost in men, victuals, coals, and repairs, £150,000 annually. The interest on money invested is worth, at any rate, 3 per cent per annum, and we know that our war ships depreciate at the rate of at least 6 per cent per annum. Interest and depreciation must be added to the £150,000, which brings the cost of these 10 cruisers of high speed for the protection of our commerce against extemporized war vessels of the enemy up to something like £285,000 a-year, and that would be an expenditure going on from year to year. Against that expenditure the subvention to 10 merchant cruisers, the use of which we can avail ourselves of whenever we want them, is only something like £50,000 per annum. It therefore appears to me that we have effected what I may call a considerable saving by the proposed arrangement. We save £235,000 a-year; and, putting the matter on a commercial basis, we are considerable gainers by the arrangements made for the hire of these vessels. The hon. and gallant Gentleman has ridiculed the idea of our influencing the type of ships by our subvention. He seems to think that the efficacy of our Mercantile Marine ought not to be kept up by a system of this kind, and that subventions will have very little influence on the manner in which ships will be built. In reply to the hon. and gallant Gentleman, I would call his attention to this fact that we have by this subvention induced one of the larger lines trading with New York—namely, the White Star Line, to lay down two vessels of a different type and character to what they would have laid down had it not been for this subvention. They have
  1596
  undertaken instead of building ordinary merchant ships, with machinery and boilers exposed to the enemy's shot and shell, to build two vessels of a type approved by our naval constructors. These ships will have engines, boilers, and steering apparatus below water, and will be propelled by twin screws, which is a great factor of safety in war vessels. We have succeeded by the subsidy in bringing about the building of these two vessels, and the arrangement will carry the right of pro-emption to five other ships. The vessels so taken can attain to great speed and have wonderful coal endurance. Those of the White Star Line can keep the sea for 60 days at 10 knots, and those we have taken from the Peninsular and Oriental Company can keep the sea for 50 days. These are exceedingly important elements regarding any future war that may arise. The Admiralty have practically taken up every British ship that can go 16 knots and over. I do not think that can be regarded as a fiddling policy. I regard it as a liberal and practical policy. Then my hon. and gallant Friend has called the subvention a back door for preventing the building of adequate and sufficient cruisers. I have already dealt with that point. I assure my hon. and gallant Friend these vessels will be regarded as a supplementary aid to the Navy, and will in no way relieve the Board of Admiralty of the responsibility of dealing with the necessities of the Navy by the periodical production of suitable naval vessels. Then he said our policy will be decided by the policy of private shipowners. It is quite true; we cannot take up more vessels than private shipowners choose to build. But if we take up the fastest ships of the country, we certainly shall remove them from the chance of falling into the hands of a country hostile to us, and to this extent we limit the number of our own cruisers to watch the enemy's cruisers. The alternative policy suggested by my right hon. and gallant Friend was that we should arm these ships and let them go on the mail routes. I should like to know who would care to go in an armed mail cruiser, or what sort of a crew we should have to put on these armed mail cruisers. We should have to provide war ships to protect the mail vessels so armed. I think the alternative proposal of my hon. and gallant

  1597
  Friend will not hold water alongside the practical policy adopted by the Government.
  SIR EDWARD REED: I do not propose to occupy the time of the Committe more than a minute, but I cannot let this Vote pass without a word. It cannot be doubted for a moment that the possession in the time of war of the fastest cruisers afloat is of the greatest moment to this country, and I am bound to say that, although I think the system which has been adopted by the Government admits of some improvement, they have as far as present conditions are concerned secured a very great advantage for the country. It cannot, I suppose, be doubted that in the fast mercantile steamers we get pretty nearly all that we have in fast unarmoured, unprotected cruisers. We get speed, which we want; we get a larger coal endurance than we get in the war ship, and, therefore, we get an enormous proportion of what we secure when we build an unarmed cruiser; and we get it, as I think the Admiralty have succeeded in getting it, on very moderate terms indeed. It may be, and I think it will be that this subject will from time to time engage the serious attention of Parliament; and I have no doubt that some of the points raised by my hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Captain Colomb) will weigh with the Administrators of the Navy in the future. I am glad the Government have taken the course they have taken. I say this for the reason that it so happens that on several occasions, when this country has been likely to enter upon war, I have myself been pressed, both directly and indirectly, to secure for foreign Powers some of our fastest mercantile vessels. I am glad I have never been associated with such a transaction. I know that great pressure of a similar kind has been brought to bear upon several individuals. With regard to putting penalties on shipowners if they allowed their vessels to pass into hostile hands in time of war, let me point out that it would be a very difficult matter indeed to frame an Act of Parliament to accomplish such an object, because the offer would never come directly from the Power which wanted the ship. The offer always comes through an indirect channel, and it would be impossible for Parliament to put a shipowner under Statu-
  1598
  tory obligations not to sell one of his own ships for his own advantage. I feel unable to support the Motion of my hon. and gallant Friend (Captain Colomb), and I am very pleased indeed to have to congratulate the country on having secured the right of availing itself in ease of emergency of these fast vessels.
  CAPTAIN COLOMB: I have no wish to delay Supply; but I am perfectly certain that when hon. Members come to consider the speech of the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood) they will arrive at the conclusion that it is a very strong speech on my side. It is well to bear in mind that these 10 merchant steamers have to protect 80,000 miles of trade lines; 8,000 miles of trade line have to be covered by each of these ships. Then the hon. Gentleman said that they were to act as scouts to the Fleet. How can they do both?
  MR. FORWOOD: I never said that these 10 steamers had to protect 80,000 miles of trade routes. All I said was that they would act as supplementary to naval forces.
  CAPTAIN COLOMB: I understood the hon. Gentleman to say they were to watch the trade routes. There are upwards of 80,000 miles of trade routes counting all the trunk lines. These 10 vessels are always to be at our command, and by the alternate proposal all the mail vessels would be at our command. The hon. Gentleman has asked what sort of passengers would agree to go in armed cruisers? I put it to the hon. Gentleman whether, if he were coming from Bombay in time of war, he would not prefer to sail in a 17-knot armed cruiser rather than in a 14-knot unarmed vessel? I am sure that the more you investigate the matter the more you will find the arguments of the hon. Gentleman go a long way to establish my case. I beg to withdraw my Motion.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  Original Question again proposed.
  MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: I should like to make a suggestion to the Government with the view of facilitating the course of Business. I know that the Government are anxious to get all the Estimates to-day with the view of saving a day. I think that

  1599
  might be effected if they would undertake to put the Report of the Army and Navy Estimates down first for to-morrow. I think that upon that understanding there would be no difficulty in obtaining the remaining Votes for the Army and Navy to-day.
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H. SMITH) (): The right hon. Gentleman was good enough to make the suggestion to me a few moments ago, and after conferring with the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton), and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War (Mr. E. Stanhope), I have no hesitation, if it is the wish of the House to agree to all the remaining Votes in the Army and Navy Estimates to-day, in putting the Report of Supply — that is, the Supply of this day—down on the Paper first to-morrow, so as to admit of any discussion which it may be thought necessary to raise. I venture, under these circumstances, to appeal to my hon. Friends behind me, who may have questions to raise deeply affecting them and their constituents, to be content to accept the engagement I am now prepared to enter into—that is, to allow all the Votes to go through this afternoon, and to take any discussion upon them to-morrow. I do not say this at all on the ground that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Central Bradford (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) suggested—namely, that it is for the convenience of the Government. The Government must be content to do their work; but I believe the House is weary and exhausted by the protracted Session, and the opportunity of saving a day is undoubtedly an opportunity which the Government ought to avail themselves of.
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR: In case the arrangement suggested is adopted, will the Indian Budget be taken on Friday?
  MR. W. H: SMITH: Under such circumstances the Indian Budget will not be taken to-morrow, but on Friday.
  Original Question put, and agreed to.
  (3.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a sum not exceeding £211,300, be granted to Her Majesty to defray the Expenses of the Admiralty Office, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1888."
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR: I desire to ask the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury (Mr. W. H. Smith) whether he can inform the House as to the course of the delay in the publication of the Report of the Royal Commission as far as it relates to the War and Admiralty Offices. The Report has, I believe, been sent to the printers, or has, at any rate, been drawn up for some time, and it would certainly have been of great convenience to the Committee if they had had the Report in their hands when the War Office Vote came on.
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord George HAMILTON) (): I am afraid I cannot answer the hon. Gentleman's question. The hon. Gentleman will remember that I stated to him in answer to a question put some time back, that I was anxiously awaiting the Report; because until we have got it, it is impossible for us to take any step in the direction of reducing the Admiralty staff. I understand the Report has been assented to and sent to the printers. Perhaps I may allude to another subject in which, I believe, the hon. Gentleman is interested, and that has reference to contracts. We have practically assented, with one exception, to the recommendations of the Contract Committee. I dare say it will meet the views of the hon. Gentleman that we should lay on the Table of the House a Paper showing the manner in which we propose to give effect to the Report, so that hereafter if the arrangements do not meet with the approval of the House he will be able to raise a discussion upon the matter.
  SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: In view of the arrangement which seems to have been arrived at in respect of the taking of all the Votes to-day, I should like to ask what is to be done with the Scotch Technical Education Bill?
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H. SMITH) (): I suppose we shall follow the usual course, and that is to take the Business as it stands on the Paper.
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR: The reason why I was anxious to obtain information as regards the publication of the Report on. The Royal Commission is, that without, indeed, divulging any secret, I may say as an ex-member of

  1601
  the Royal Commission, that we received evidence of a very explicit and positive kind that the Admiralty Authorities see their way to making a very great reduction in this Vote which is now before the Committee, especially in connection with the Department of the Accountant General. Under these circumstances, I think it would not be too much to ask the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty in charge of the Vote if he will now state shortly to the Committee what the amount of the reduction is expected to be, and whether it is to be carried into effect during the course of the present financial year?
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: I shall be happy to comply with the request made to me by the hon. Gentleman. Last year, in going through these Votes, I felt it my duty to counter-balance certain apparent increases by reductions in other establishments. The officials informed me that the Department which was capable of the largest reduction was that of the Accountant General. I have felt unable to take any action on my own initiative in the direction of reduction until the Commission, of which the hon. Gentleman was a Member, made their Report, as they gave their special attention to this subject. But I appointed a small Committee to investigate the work done by the different Departments, for the purpose of obtaining additional information enabling us to take action as soon as we got the Report of the Royal Commission. I cannot state in what direction that Report will go; but, assuming it will fall in with the views which the Board have formed, we hope to be able to effect very considerable reductions in the Admiralty. The reductions which should take place would be among the clerks of the higher division; but unless the Treasury will allow us to retire these clerks it will be almost impossible to effect the reduction. We had some communication with the Treasury some time back, and we were unable to come to a decision in the absence of the Report of the Royal Commission. I will undertake between now and next year that we will do our best to give effect to our views, and to those of the Royal Commission, and I think we ought to be able to effect considerable reductions. I will also undertake to lay on the Table a Paper show-
  1602
  ing the principles regulating the reductions.
  GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR: Will the noble Lord say what has been done with regard to the Navy taking over the responsibility of their own armaments?
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: We have made no final arrangement for guns this year; but we have entered into a preliminary arrangement which I hope will ultimately facilitate the taking over by the Navy of their own guns. There are a number of questions connected with the testing and steeling of guns which must be settled before the Admiralty can undertake the responsibility of providing their own armaments.
  DR. TANNER: Mr. Courtney, as economy is one of the cries of the day, I rise now for the purpose of expressing myself definitely about a specific object in connection with retrenchment. There are sinecures in connection with the Admiralty Offices which appear upon this Vote. We have all, no doubt, seen among the admirable sketches made by the late lamented John Leech the picture of a footman, in regard to whom the question was whether he was engaged for use or for ornament. Certainly, there appears to be one item under the Sub-Head "Salaries, Wages, and Allowances" which might be very properly struck out. Now, I do not like to say anything about any hon. Member in his absence; and, therefore, I am glad to see the hon. Gentleman the Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) in his place to-day. I do not see that there is any necessity whatsoever for the continuance of the Office of Civil Lord of the Admiralty, and therefore I suggest that the Office should cease to exist. I do not see that there is really any need of the Office at all. The right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland has lately had a Parliamentary Under Secretary — [Cries of "Order!"] I am merely drawing an analogy between the different Offices. The right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland has great functions to perform in and outside the House, and ha has appointed a Parliamentary assistant. Now, the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty has not only

  1603
  one assistant, but, as we have seen to-day, he has two. I have not yet heard the hon. Gentleman the Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Ashmead Bartlett) take any partin a discussion whatsoever, and, indeed, only on two occasions during the past two years has the hon. Member for the Ecclesall Division of Sheffield (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) spoken in this House upon Admiralty matters. If there is anything to do in connection with the Office, it certainly must be of a most diminutive and microscopical character. If the Civil Lord of the Admiralty has nothing to do, why not at once effect a saving, and got rid of him altogether? We hear about subordinate clerks being cut down, and about Dockyard hands being discharged, why not get rid of the Civil Lord? I am sure the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) will understand that I am doing this in a plain, straightforward, and open way—indeed, I never attack anyone behind his back. When the rage for economy exists even in the minds of some hon. Gentlemen opposite, and notably in the mind of the noble Lord the Member for South Paddington (Lord Randolph Churchill) — who, unfortunately, is not here to-day— I call upon Her Majesty's Government and upon the Committee to take a firm stand and strike off this sinecure Office of Civil Lord. It is very hard that while the working men are being discharged from our Dockyards hon. Members who have nothing to do but answer one or two Questions in the year should enjoy large sinecures. I shall move the reduction of the Vote as soon as I have finished; but I want to call the attention of the Committee to the fact that, although the Civil Lord of the Admiralty has nothing to do, he is allowed an allowance of £50 a-year for a private secretary to assist him in doing nothing. It must be conceded that this is a flagrant and gross abuse, and that the sooner it is swept away the better—the sooner there is a clean sweep made through these Augean stables of Admiralty finance the better. Mr. Courtney, I have no wish to take up the time of the Committee unnecessarily; all I wish to do is to put the matter in a plain and straightforward way. I want to receive some information as to the duties the hon. Gentleman the Civil Lord of the Admiralty performs. I want to know why he is employed at all? If he is engaged for
  1604
  ornament, well and good; let him be paid as an ornamental adjunct to the Admiralty. If he is engaged for use, I want to know what his use his? I beg to move the reduction of the Vote by £1,000, being the salary of the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett).
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Item A—Salaries—be reduced by £1,000."—(Dr. Tanner.)
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: The hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Cork (Dr. Tanner) is of opinion that my hon. Friend the Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) has nothing to do, and he has arrived at that conclusion from the fact that my hon. Friend has only spoken twice in this House upon Admiralty matters. The hon. Gentleman seems to imagine that the number of times a Member speaks in this House is an accurate gauge of the official duties he is called upon to perform. That is an altogether fallacious test. It not unfrequently happens that those officials who speak least do most work. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty has very important functions to perform. In the first place, my hon. Friend (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) is personally responsible for one of the largest Votes of the Navy —the Vote for Buildings. He has to watch over the expenditure connected with naval buildings, and he is responsible for the Estimate that is laid before Parliament. In the next place, my hon. Friend has personally to supervise the innumerable transactions which take place in reference to the Greenwich Hospital Schools and other establishments, and this entails a considerable amount of work. The last, and perhaps the most important, of my hon. Friend's duties is that he is responsible for all questions relating to pay, pensions, and superannuations. I assure the hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Cork that, so far from having nothing to do, my hon. Friend has a great deal more work than the average amount of work which falls to a Parliamentary official. Well, naturally, having this work, he requires a secretary to assist him in it, and the remuneration his secretary gets is £1 per week. I think hon. Gentlemen will admit that is a very moderate allowance, and that it is certainly not in excess of the work the secretary has to I discharge. The hon. Gentleman the

  1605
  Member for Mid Cork has said that the First Lord of the Admiralty has two secretaries. That is true; but they do not perform work which ordinarily devolves upon private secretaries. There is an office in which Admiralty business is transacted, and my hon. Friends are responsible for the proper conduct of the business of that office. I am quite as much in favour of abolishing sinecures as anybody, and if the hon. Gentleman will show me that a sinecure really exists he will find the present Board of Admiralty quite ready to grapple with it.
  MR. SEXTON: Of course we are willing to take the statement of the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty as to the duties performed by the hon. Gentleman the Civil Lord of the Admiralty. But we notice as a peculiar fact that, while it appears it is usually the duty of Ministers of the Crown to deal with the matters of their own Departments in debate, the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Ecclesall Division of Sheffield (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) has, since his assumption of Office, been restrained from taking part in debate, or, at any rate, he has not been since his assumption privileged in any debate to explain any of the numerous and important matters concerning the Department of the Admiralty. So far as we can discover, the public services which the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Ecclesall Division of Sheffield performs are those of an election agent. The hon. Gentleman does not often speak in the House, but he speaks very frequently in the country. I have paid some attention to his speeches in the country, and I find that they principally consist of imaginary attacks on the Irish people, and assaults upon the character and method of procedure of some of the Irish Members. These attacks and assaults he would not dare to utter in the presence of the hon. Members concerned. If services of this kind are to be performed, the people who consider them services ought to pay for them. I certainly object to services of this description being paid for out of the public Exchequer.
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR: I do not know whether my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Cork (Dr. Tanner) proposes to proceed to a Division; but I trust he does not. I am bound to say
  1606
  that I do not admire the administration of the present Advisers of Her Majesty in most things; but I think the investment of this £1,000 as salary for the hon. Gentleman the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, who used to represent the borough of Eye, and of whose performances in former years we have a lively recollection, is a very good investment indeed if silence on his part is one of the conditions of his appointment. Certainly, if silence is a condition, it is a very reasonable one, and has been very faithfully observed. Under these circumstances, I do not think the House has very much reason to complain of £ 1,000 being paid to the hon. Gentleman.
  DR. TANNER: I think the time has come when an end should be put to these sinecures, and as long as I remain in this House I shall do my utmost to cut them away. In doing so I know I shall be following in the footsteps of really good economists on this side of the House. I look at this matter in a very much more serious light than many hon. Members, and I maintain that the Office of Civil Lord of the Admiralty is absolutely a sinecure. Of course, the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty could do nothing else but what he has done—namely, stand up for his Friends and Colleagues. I receive every suggestion made by the noble Lord with respect; but I know that some points cannot be explained away. Take the case of the Greenwich Hospital. Now, the administration of Greenwich Hospital is amply provided for out of the funds. The hon. Gentleman the Civil Lord of the Admiralty is really a Parliamentary appendage—a sort of Parliamentary frontispiece for a portion of the Admiralty Department. He was at one time one of the most valuable and constant speakers in this House; now he is one of the most silent Members. What is the use, in the name of common sense, of retaining his Office, which is unquestionably a sinecure? I must —to use a nautical phrase—nail my colours to the mast, and protest emphatically against this needless and unnecessary expenditure.
  SIR EDWARD REED: I hope the hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Cork will not take a Division on this question. Of course, I am in no position to say anything about the manner

  1607
  in which the hon. Gentleman the present Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) performs his duty; but I am in a position to say, from a very considerable experience of the duties which ordinarily fall to the Civil Lord, that those duties are onerous and important. Some of the most distinguished men in this House have, in the capacity of Civil Lord of the Admiralty, performed public duties for the first time. It is a mistake for the hon. Member for Mid Cork to suppose that the Office is at all a sinecure; the Civil Lord of the Admiralty has a great deal of work to do. If the appointment of the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) has had the effect of securing his silence in this House, while allowing him to display his eloquence elsewhere, I think it is a very desirable appointment; and to abolish, the office of Civil Lord of the Admiralty would. I think, be a very unwise step.
  MR. SEXTON: The speech of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed) has undoubtedly converted me. There is no doubt it is a great public gain that the eloquence of the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Ecclesall Division of Sheffield (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) should be displayed on any other platform than that of the House of Commons.
  DR. TANNER: Of course, after the appeal made to me by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Cardiff and other hon. Friends I really can no longer persist in my opposition.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  Original Question again proposed.
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR: I beg leave to refer to the question I put a few moments ago with regard to the establishment of the Admiralty Department, and which the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton) very courteously answered. The noble Lord admits that very considerable reduction is to be made; but he says that, on the other hand, there will be an increase on the Pension Vote. I think the Government ought to very seriously consider the matter before committing themselves to any particular line of action. At the last re organization of the Admiralty Department an enormous amount of money was wasted on pensions, just as a
  1608
  large amount was wasted at the last re-organization of the War Office. Men were pensioned who ought never to have been pensioned; and the Pension List of every branch of the Service—Naval, Military, and Civil—has grown to dimensions never before contemplated. We are about to take another step in the matter of re-organization, and we learn from the noble Lord that it is contemplated to make further additions to the Pension List. I wish to put in, at the earliest moment, my protest against such a policy. I do not believe it is at all necessary; and I think it might easily be avoided. Some time ago the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Goschen), in replying to a query addressed to him by myself, recognized the expediency of utilizing, as far as possible, the services of men not required in the particular posts in the Civil Service they have hitherto filled in other Departments. I put it to the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty, whether it would not be perfectly practicable, in the case of the Admiralty Department, instead of putting men in the prime of life, many of them perfectly efficient, and good for many years' service still, on the Pension List, where they will have inadequate incomes compared with what they have had hitherto, and will have no chance of starting another career—I put it to him whether it would not be better to utilize these men in some other branch of the Public Service? With regard to the Accountant General's branch of the Admiralty, it is clear you have a duplication of work on a grand and perfectly unjustifiable scale. You have the accounts of the Admiralty audited by the Accountant General's branch, and you have also a large establishment of Departmental auditors going over the same ground. I freely admit it is necessary you should have something like an audit branch within the Admiralty itself for Departmental purposes; but you do not want that audit branch for any other reason than keeping the Minister informed, and keeping all his subordinates in charge of divisions informed, of the manner in which the Votes are being run off in the course of the financial year. But if you have an audit branch sufficiently large for the purpose of the Department, you do not want an enormous staff of auditors such as that which

  1609
  now composes the Department of the Accountant General. Surely the men employed in the Departmental audit branch could be utilized in the Office of the Accountant General, where they could do precisely the work they are doing now. I offer that as a suggestion, and I hope it may be practicable for the noble Lord to find the means of avoiding unnecessary increases of the Pension List.
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: I am glad to have listened to the remarks of the hon. Gentleman the Member for East Donegal (Mr. Arthur O'Connor), because they are precisely in the direction we are going. I have already given orders under which the Comptroller and Auditor General will audit the store account of the Dockyards. We propose to dispense, as far as we can, with the Departmental audit. The accounts will go to the Comptroller and Auditor General, and there will be the greatest inducement to the officials of the Admiralty to see that their accounts are perfectly accurate. We believe that by this system we shall get rid of the duplication of work to which the hon. Gentleman has called attention, and that we shall have a much more rapid and satisfactory system of accounting in the Departments.
  Original Question put, and agreed to.
  (4.) £204,900, for the Coast Guard Service and Royal Naval Reserves, &c.
  DR. TANNER: Perhaps the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty Lord George Hamilton) will be able now to give us some information on various points upon which, during the Session, I have endeavoured to obtain enlightenment, but with a complete want of success. I, for one, do not like to say anything against the Coast Guards. The Coast Guard Service is an excellent one, and I have often had opportunities of visiting the various stations—notably those on the Coast of Ireland—and I can truly say that the exemplary way in which the men behave themselves is worthy of all commendation and praise. But there are some few points in connection with the administration of the Service which demand some attention. During the course of last year I considered it a portion of my public duty to call attention
  1610
  to the existence of a very grave state of affairs at the Coast Guard Station at Rocket Point at the entrance to the Cove of Cork. I put Questions to the Government upon three different occasions with the object of remedying grievances which were borne witness to by the Coast Guards at this station, and grievances which were also testified to by naval officers stationed at Queenstown. Of course, I could not expect the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty to take notice of any representations I—a Nationalist Member—make; but I could not help believing that the noble Lord would look into the matter, or direct inquiries to be made, in face of the fact that the men at the station were practically moving in the matter. Now, Sir, what are the facts concerning this station? The Coast Guard Station at Rocket Point is inhabited by 51 persons. The Committee will see that the station, therefore, is one of paramount importance. It is a station at the entrance of our harbour, a harbour which is admitted by all authorities to be one of the finest, not only in Europe, but in the world. I am told that it is hardly inferior to the harbour of Rio Janeiro. A vast number of ships enter our port, and in consequence of this fact it becomes of paramount necessity that a large Coast Guard Service should be kept up in and about the station. There happens also to be another station at Crosshaven. Now, the Coast Guards at Rocket Point have no supply of water at all; and these men, who are placed upon this peninsular at the entrance to the Cork Harbour for the purpose, I presume, of visiting ships which pass either in or out of the port, and for the prevention of smuggling, have no means whereby they can launch their boats in heavy weather. The first question I have to put to the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty in connection with this Vote is one connected with the launching of boats in heavy weather. Now, let me say, without any desire to occupy the time of the Committee, that the station at Rocket Point is protected from the east and north winds; but, of course, everybody knows that on the South Coast of Ireland the prevailing winds for at least three portions of the year are westerly winds. This is patent to any visitor to our shores by the inclination of the trees. Practically, westerly winds are so prevalent

  1611
  that there is a bend in the trees, even on forest lands, towards the east. [Cries of "Order, order ! "] I want to show that westerly winds are prevalent on the South Coast of Ireland, and that Socket Point is unprotected from westerly winds. I have landed there again and again in summer, and I have attempted to land there in winter; but I have had to go round. Well, now, if the Const Guards are at Rocket Point for the purpose of visiting vessels, surely they ought to have some means whereby they are able to launch their boats. I ask, in the first place, that a small boat harbour should be constructed at Rocket Point. I ask this in the interest of the Coast Guard Service. I may inform the noble Lord that if the espouse of constructing a harbour there will be greater than he can sanction, I believe the various Companies who have stations at Rocket Point will join in the cost of the erection of such a structure as I suggest. I have been told it would be very hard to build a boat harbour there; but I am confident, if any hon. Gentleman visited the place, he would admit at once that there was no difficulty whatever in the construction of such a harbour. If, however, a boat harbour cannot be constructed, I certainly think that a small pier or boat-slip might be made. I have been told, too, that the men have experienced no difficulty hitherto in launching their boats; but, on the other hand, the men themselves emphatically assert that they have great difficulty in launching their craft from this rough and rocky shore. On former occasions I put the matter as plainly as I possibly could; but the noble Lord did not seem to see it. As a medical man, I certainly consider that the sanitary aspect of the case is deserving of consideration. As I have said, there are 51 persons resident at the station. But there are a great many other people on the Point besides. Now, all these people are totally unprovided with water, except such as they can collect from the roofs of the houses, and naturally the water collected in barrels from the roofs—
  MR. AIRD: Mr. Courtney, I rise to Order. It does seem to me that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Cork (Dr. Tanner) is simply discussing questions about the weather and the difficulty of launching boats merely for the purpose of occupying
  1612
  time—certainly not with any desire to expedite the Business of the Committee. [Cries of "Order, order!"] You say "Order, order; "but I decline to listen to your—
  MR. SEXTON: I rise to Order, Sir. Is the hon. Gentleman entitled to make a speech on a point of Order?
  THE CHAIRMAN: The hon. Gentleman is explaining the grounds on which he rose to Order, and he is entitled to do that.
  MR. AIRD: I have no wish to make a speech. My desire in rising to Order is to ask your opinion, Mr. Courtney, as to whether the hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Cork is not going outside the scope of the particular Vote under discussion in elaborating, in the way he is doing, the particular remarks which it is his pleasure to make? I may say, speaking for myself, that instead of giving me pleasure his remarks give me pain.
  THE CHAIRMAN: Order, order ! the hon. Gentleman is now exceeding the proper limits of an explanation. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Cork is, no doubt, on the first view of the case, justified in opening up what he has entered into, because in this Vote there is provision made for the residences of Coast Guards; but, as a matter of fact, the houses and the accommodation for the Coast Guards in Ireland are provided by the Irish Board of Works, and it is under that Vote that the question should be raised, and not under this Vote.
  DR. TANNER: Of course, Sir, I shall act immediately upon any suggestion which comes from you. Well, Sir, I merely want to call attention to the absence of water supply, and I will do so in as few words as I possibly can.
  THE CHAIRMAN: Order, order ! I have pointed out that the question ought to be raised upon the Vote for Public Buildings in Ireland.
  DR. TANNER: Very well, Sir. Now, there are a couple of subsidiary points I should like to direct the attention of the Committee to. I have done with Rocket Point; but let me now say that Crosshaven, a place where there is also a Coast Guard Station, is a locality altogether out of the way. The men at Crosshaven are supposed to look after vessels coming into the Harbour of Cork;

  1613
  but, strange to say, their station is about three miles from the point where they are supposed to perform their duties. I maintain that this is a practical absurdity, and that it can, moreover, be easily remedied by consolidating the whole lot in one place.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (Lord JOHN MANNERS) (): The hon. Gentleman seems to me to be now referring; to a point which you, Sir, have ruled to be out of Order.
  MR. SEXTON: I submit to you, Sir, that my hon. Friend is arguing that the Coast Guards are placed in such a locality that they cannot efficiently perform their duty; and that, I apprehend, comes under this Vote.
  THE CHAIRMAN: No doubt, as I have already said, the question of buildings must be raised under the Public Works Vote; but the question of the allocation of the Coast Guards is, no doubt, one which can be fairly discussed upon this Vote.
  DR. TANNER: I am afraid I do not always put the case in the way I desire, and I trust that any shortcomings of mine will be forgiven by the Committee. I really do not want to inflict myself in any tedious way upon the Committee; but I desire to impress the fact upon the Committee that the Coast Guards at Crosshaven are unable, on account of their situation, to fulfil the duties which are allotted to them. You have got another Coast Guard Station at the other side of the Peninsular, and I cannot understand the use of scattering the force. In my opinion, it would be a great deal better if the Coast Guards at Rocket Point and at Crosshaven were amalgamated. There is a third point upon which I respectfully ask for information from the noble Lord. About 10 years ago the Coast Guards on the River Lee were entrusted with the conservancy of the lower waters of that river. It is extremely hard to preserve these waters. On a former occasion I asked the noble Lord to take into consideration whether, in view of the fact that the Coast Guards have very little to do, they might not again be entrusted with the conservancy of the Lee? The Coast Guards have steam launches and boats at their disposal, and I think they might be very usefully employed in preserving the Lee—a not unimportant
  1614
  duty. The Conservators of the river are anxious that the duty I have referred to should be once again entrusted to the Coast Guards. No constituents of mine have made this request; but, on the other hand, it is made by some personal friends of the noble Lord himself—by Lord Bandon and others. It is a very reasonable request, and I maintain that good will result to a large class of the community if it is acceded to, good will be done to the proprietors of the fisheries, and also to the many poor people who live by fishing. I trust the noble Lord will be able to sea his way to accede to the request. By so doing he will certainly confer a boon upon a great number of people.
  MR. JOHN O'CONNOR: Without any wish to protract the discussion, I desire to say a few words in support of the observations of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Cork (Dr. Tanner) respecting the Coast Guard Station on the Carrigaline River. No doubt the premises are very commodious and very comfortable, and one hesitates before suggesting that the men should be removed; but, at the same time, they are perfectly useless in times of emergency. First and foremost, in order to take observation they have to travel three miles over a hill and down into a hollow. They have no method of signalling, and they are quite useless in respect to the saving of life. I therefore desire to emphasize the representations my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Cork has made upon this question. He has very properly pointed out that on the other side of the water there is a very good Coast Guard Station, and to amalgamate the two bodies it would only be necessary to increase the accommodation at Rocket Point. At Rocket Point the Coast Guards are at the very mouth of the river; they are at the very spot where they can take observations both, to the east and west; they are close at hand if they are required to render assistance to distressed vessels, and I cannot understand why the Admiralty should not take every possible step to make the station efficient. I am quite satisfied the only intention my hon. Friend has in bringing this matter forward is to facilitate the saving of life, and the rendering of assistance to vessels which may be in distress. I think that the gratitude of the Admiralty ought to

  1615
  be extended to my hon. Friend for having called attention to this subject. I expect that they will recognize his good intentions in this matter, and also the justice of the case he has made. My hon Friend has pointed out that a Commission which reported upon the Coast Guards condemned this very station. I trust we shall get some satisfaction from the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty in this matter, and that when my hon. Friend goes back to Cork—as he will in a short time—and is sailing about the Bay, he will be able to tell his many friends living upon the banks of the river that he has been assured by the Admiralty that better provision will be made for the safety of life, and the rendering of assistance to vessels which may be in distress upon the Coast of Cork.
  DR. TANNER: I should like to say one word more. The noble Lord, in replying to a question concerning the water supply at Rocket Point, said—
  THE CHAIRMAN: Order, order ! I have told the hon. Member he cannot, on this Vote, enter upon a discussion as to the accommodation provided.
  DR. TANNER: It is not a question of accommodation, Sir. I de;-ire to point out to the noble Lord that he can bring pressure to hear to get certain provision made which is necessary for the people.
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Unless I have Notice of the intention of hon. Gentlemen to bring there matters forward, it is impossible for me to criticize observations founded on local knowledge. I quite agree with the hon. Gentleman that a Coast Guard Station ought to be made as useful as possible; and if he will put a Question upon the subject later on, when I shall have had time to obtain information, I shall be glad to answer it.
  DR. TANNER: Will he inquire from the people on the spot?
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: The hon. Gentleman has suggested that the Coast Guard should be entrusted with the duty of preserving the River Lee. Now, I have great objection to the Coast Guards being employed in any such duty. It must be recollected that in many parts of the United Kingdom them are constant conflicts between fishermen and owners of fisheries. These conflicts create considerable ill-feeling, and I think it is very undesirable that a
  1616
  permanent Service like the Coast Guards should be drawn into them. I cannot make an exception in the case of the Lee.
  Vote agreed to.
  (5.) £108,800, for the Scientific Branch.
  Resolutions to be reported.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a sum, not exceeding £553,300, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Expense of New Works, Buildings, Yard Machinery, and Repairs, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1888."
  DR. TANNER: Certainly, Sir, if there is any Vote which deserves consideration it is the Vote now proposed. My object in rising is to get some attention paid—some increased attention paid—to the new works in progress at the Alexander Yard, Haulbow-line. When I was endeavouring, during the discussion of the Supplementary Estimates early in the Session, to get attention paid to the proceedings at this Yard, I was made the victim of the clòture on the part of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury (Mr. W. H. Smith); and therefore I shall try, at the present time, to resume the thread of the argument which I was at that time trying—no doubt in a very feeble way, and very possibly in too prolix a way—to discuss. I called attention upon the Supplementary Estimates to the coaling wharf which is in course of construction at the present time, and for which money is paid under this very Vote. It is only about four years ago that a Commission recommended that a very large sum of money should be advanced in order to secure the completion of this work, a work which, in the opinion of the Committee, was of paramount importance, and of supreme urgency. Now, Sir, I think that anybody who knows the position which Queenstown occupies will admit that in time of war or emergency Queenstown will be a place of very great importance. There is no accommodation for filling the ships which may resort there with coal, and accordingly it was recommended that a large sum of money should be advanced for the purpose of constructing a coaling wharf. The Commission recommended an immediate outlay of £10,000 for the construction of a coaling wharf at Haul-bowline. The Government now ask for

  1617
  £3,000 for this wharf; but what else do they do? Although this is a matter of emergency, what do they do? They try to show the English people that they are saving money in connection with the administration of the Public Departments; but in order to do this they spread the payment of this miserable£10,000 over a number of years. I maintain that is wrong. It may be very plausible; but it is certainly very wrong. They are also discharging men at Haulbowline. I have called their attention to this again and again. They are discharging the men who are all-important in the construction of such a thing as a coaling wharf. Shipwrights are the men for such work; and I ask the noble Lord if he does not consider it right to continue the employment of the shipwrights at Haulbowline until this work is completed? Again, I desire to call the attention of the noble Lord to the works which are in course of construction at Haulbowline. I see by this Estimate that there is a large sum of money set down for new buildings at Haulbowline, for the extension of the yard. I ask the noble Lord if this is for the construction of a second dock? [Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: NO.] NOW, I know the place very well. I may say I know every foot of the ground. The present dock occupies the position of an island which was called Eat Island. Some time ago I asked the responsible authorities in connection with this work to direct their attention to two facts. The first point which I endeavoured to enforce upon their attention was that when they had an opportunity of taking a right step in the construction of a dock, somehow or other they blundered; they fell into the trap, for they built the dock in the wrong place. I will, in a few words, explain what I mean. There are two places where the dock could be built. The original plan was that there should be two graving docks; but the Admiralty chose to construct a deep-water dock with a small intervening partition of red sand-stone between the dry dock and the river. What has been the consequence? Why, it has been that they cannot keep the dock dry, and they have had to employ pumps and all sorts of appliances in order to make the dock waterproof; whereas had they chosen the other side of the river, which was on a mud bank, there would have been
  1618
  no leakage whatever; they would have saved a great deal of expense; and they would have made a very satisfactory job. At present it is merely a patch ed-up job, because the work is always liable to break down again. I ask the noble Lord to bear this fact in mind, and to bear in mind also the position of the Port of Queenstown, to bear in mind the fact that Queenstown, from its position, may very probably become a place of paramount importance in the event of a great war. I ask that a second dock be constructed. The original design contemplated two docks. I have taken several English Members over the works, and they have not all belonged to this side of the House. I have shown them the original design on which two docks are drawn. Why, in the name of common sense, if there is a deficiency in one dock, should you not go on with the other? By making a second dock you would only be carrying out the original design. The construction of a second dock would give rise to the employment of many of the distressed classes in Ireland; and I think it is our duty to insist upon the great spending Departments spending some amount of money in our country, from which they draw so much. I trust that the noble Lord will be able to give us some satisfactory assurances on this head.
  MR. JOHN O'CONNOR: I shall not detain the Committee many minutes; but I ask the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty to say whether it is the intention of his Department to carry out the original design, of the Haulbowline Docks? It has been pointed out by my hon. Friend and Colleague the Member for Mid Cork (Dr. Tanner) that the graving dock, which is now almost complete, has a very extensive leak in it—that it is only by the use of very powerful pumps that the graving dock is kept dry. It has been stated, in reply to several Questions on this subject, that the present graving dock is not large enough for the vessels which are now afloat. It was thought by the Admiralty that this graving dock might be used for the purpose of docking the large Transatlantic steamers. ["No, no ! "] One of the Junior Lords of the Admiralty contradicts me; but this dock was designed 20 years ago, and since that time a complete revolution has occurred in the construction of our

  1619
  vessels. Very well, the graving dock at Haulbowline is not as useful as it was supposed it would be. It is absolutely useless; it has been so stated by the First and Junior Lords of the Admiralty. Then, why not carry out the original design? There is material there—there is space there to make a dock sufficiently large to be useful for the purpose of repairing the largest of Her Majesty's ships. The request of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Cork is perfectly reasonable. The present graving dock is useless for the purpose for which it was contracted. Why not make a second? What is asked is most reasonable to my mind, and to the mind of any commonsense man. We have reason to suspect that there is no desire whatever on the part of the Admiralty to make any use whatever of this dock. We have every reason to suspect that the Admiralty want to keep these works dilly-dallying, because, if they were to complete them, they would be obliged to give out some work at Queenstown. If the shed for which money was voted two years ago were made, it would stand to reason that some work should be given out to be done in the shed. If some machinery were placed in the machine shed, it would be but reasonable that the machinery should be employed. They have not completed the engine shed; they have not put up any machinery; they have not used the money granted by this House for the purpose. We have a right to suspect that the Admiralty are only keeping on this work as a sham—that they wish to throw dust in our eyes, or otherwise the works would not be 20 years in the course of completion. What we want to do is to hasten the completion of the works. What we require is that a portion of the Admiralty work should be done in Queenstown. Instead of a few convicts being employed on these works, we want to see large numbers of the labouring population employed upon them. We want a due proportion of taxation spent in our country. Our desires have been frustrated by the procrastination of the Admiralty. It may be tedious to you, Sir, and to many other Members of the Committee, that we should stand up here over and over again to bring forward this question, to reiterate the statements we have made time after time fruitlessly, and to beg Members of the
  1620
  Admiralty to give us some satisfactory assurances in this matter, to complete these works, to carry out the beneficent intentions of Lord Spencer and those who took it into their head to construct this dock. We will not be put off by such replies as the noble Lord, the First Lord of the Admiralty has hitherto made to our Questions. It is not enough to say that this graving dock is insufficient for the purpose intended. We wish to have another dock there, and we shall continue to press our demand until the original design is carried out.
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON) (): I made a personal inpection of the Dock at Haulbowline last year and the year before. With respect to the supposed leakage, let me say that, though there was leakage through the fissures in the limestone when the dock was in course of construction, the dock has never leaked since it was finished.
  DR. TANNER: According to the Report, it leaked last November.
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: My information is that since the dock was finished there has been no leakage. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Cork asked me a question about the coaling wharf. The Commission to which the hon. Gentleman referred did propose that a certain amount of money should be spent. We propose to take £3,000 for the jetty; but we have not decided what is the best means of getting the coals on board. Experience shows that, as a rule, baskets and hand labour is the best. The hon. Gentleman the Member for South Tipperary (Mr. John O'Connor) alluded to the fact that originally there was some talk of constructing two graving docks. The Admiralty never assented to that proposal. The graving dock has, up to the present, cost £550,000, and it is big enough to take in the largest vessel of Her Majesty's Navy, though not the largest of the Atlantic liners, which have become bigger since the dock was designed. Considering the enormous sum which it would be necessary to spend in the building of a second dock, and considering all the difficulties which would have to be encountered in the construction of a dock to accommodate some of the huge vessels now afloat, I do not think we should be justified in entering upon the work. Moreover, I do not

  1621
  think the dock would be of the slightest benefit to the locality. I certainly cannot hold out any hope of a second dock being constructed at Haulbowline. I understand the suggestion has been made that we should try and get all the Votes before you leave the Chair. I hope that, in accordance with that suggestion, we may now pass the remaining Votes and take the Report to-morrow.
  DR. TANNER: Before the Vote is passed, I should like to point out to the noble Lord that if, in the event of war, a vessel broke down in the Atlantic, the first place of call would be Haulbowline. It would take two clays longer to bring the vessel to England, and entail considerable risk and expense. This dock would be all-important in the case of emergency. Now, there is a small and minor point I would like to enforce upon the attention of the noble Lord; and it is that now, when the graving dock is finished, you are going to commence excavations for the passage from the floating dock to the deep water. I asked a Question upon the subject last September. I am not an expert in these matters, but I have received considerable information from naval officers whose names, of course, it would not be right for me to mention. I am told that the dock is complete, with the exception of the entrance, which you are now only commencing to make. It is like building a house and not putting a door to it.
  SIR EDWARD REED: I appeal to hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway to allow the Votes to go through on the understanding arrived at.
  MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR: I should like to say I have never yet known these understandings result in anything but acrimonious wrangles. What is it we are asked to do? To vote away millions of money in as many minutes. I, for one, beg to say such a proceeding is exceedingly improper. As to an understanding, there must have been some interchange of opinion or wish between the two Front Benches; but it is not from the two Front Benches this country or this House can look for economy. Of course, I can only speak for myself; but I repudiate any responsibility for any declaration made from the Front Benches with respect to the discussion of the Estimates.
  SIR EDWARD REED: There was an understanding to which no one took exception.
  COLONEL NOLAN: There was an understanding as to another Vote; but that understanding was broken in the most deliberate manner by the Government last night.
  DR. TANNER: I have not received an answer sufficient to justify the action of the Admiralty in respect of the Haulbowline Dock; and, accordingly, without any qualm of conscience whatever, I beg to move the reduction of the Vote by £1,000.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Item A be reduced by the sum of £1.000, Works at Haulbowline."— (Dr. Tanner.)
  MR. SEXTON: I think that on questions of this kind there should be a little give and take; but, unfortunately, so far as the Government is concerned, it is all take and no give. We are asked to meet the convenience of the Government; but the Government seem to have no regard for the convenience of us or of our country. I should be disposed to yield to the appeal made to us but for the fact that the Government have allowed their supporters in "another place" to mutilate and destroy the Truck Bill.
  Question put.
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 24; Noes 94: Majority 70.—(Div. List, No. 464.) [5.40 P.M.]
  It being a quarter of an hour before Six of the clock, the Chairman left the Chair to report Progress.
  Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.
  Committee also report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.

TECHNICAL SCHOOLS (SCOTLAND)BILL.
MR. MASON: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether he can give us any assurance that the Scotch Technical Schools Bill will be taken to-morrow night? I may be allowed to add that the Scotch Members consider they have been very badly treated in being kept here night after night for the Bill, in the hope of its coming on.
THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H. SMITH) (): I think the Scotch Mem-

1623
bers have hardly any reason to complain of the manner in which they have been treated. It is Scotch Members who have objected to Scotch Business being brought forward, and not the Government, who were unwilling to bring Bills on. In the case of this Bill, the Government have been anxious to bring it forward, and the Scotch Members have objected to it. [Mr. MASON: Very few.] That may be; but they were sufficient to prevent the Bill being taken. I hope the Bill will be taken to-morrow night. However, I can state positively that it is the intention of the Government to pass the Bill this Session, whether or not it is necessary to keep the House sitting one, two, or three days longer for the purpose.
House adjourned at ten minutes before Six o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading— Coal Mines, &c. Regulation (251); Labourers Allotments (252); Charity Commissioners (Officers) * (254); Tramways (War Department)* (255).
Committee—Report—Metropolitan Police * (242).

COAL MINES, &c. REGULATION BILL.
(The Viscount Cross.)
(NO. 251.) SECOND READING.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Viscount CROSS),in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, he took that opportunity of tendering his own thanks, and those of the Government and the country, to the Royal Society for the trouble they had taken in the matter of coal mines. In the year 1879, he had the honour, as Home Secretary, to ask them whether they would join, or send some of their members to assist, the Royal Commission which was then appointed for the purpose of seeing how accidents in mines could best be prevented. The Royal Society met that appeal in the most handsome way, and several of their most distinguished members served on the Commission. The labours of the Commission lasted for a period of six years; they went minutely into a long series of experiments, and while he was quite sure the results of those experiments would tend greatly to the safety of life and the prevention of accidents, it was satisfactory to know that they had also added very much to their own scientific knowledge, because he believed the members of the Commission all candidly admitted that in the course of their investigations they made several discoveries about gases and other matters that were absolutely unknown to them before. The result had been that a great many of their recommendations had been embodied in that Bill. He would only mention two matters to show how necessary it was that an inquiry should take place. The first was that it seemed to have been discovered in the course of the inquiry that what miners had hitherto been in the habit of look-

1523
ing upon as one of the great sources of safety, was in reality one of the great sources of danger—namely, the safety lamp, which, in certain respects, had been rendered unsafe with the improved methods of ventilation, causing a greater current of air to run through the mines. Another discovery they made, which he believed also would have a great effect in the future safety of life—namely, that a great many accidents happened, under certain conditions, not so much from the gases which came from the coal, as from the dry coal dust that pervaded all parts of the mine. He did not think it would be wise or necessary to trouble their Lordships with any explanations in detail of the mere machinery for carrying on the work of the mines which were laid down in the Bill. He would only say that he believed the Act of 1872, which was passed by Lord Aberdare, had worked very great good, and was in itself an excellent Act; but an experience of 17 years had shown that it required amendment in various details, and where possible all those amendments were contained in the present Bill. He begged to move its second reading.
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a." —(The Viscount Cross.)
LORD BRAMWELLsaid, he did not rise for the purpose of objecting to the second reading, but he had received a letter which he felt bound to read. It was from the executors of Colonel Hargreaves, of Burnley, Habergham, and Marsden Collieries. It was as follows: —
" We trust your Lordship will excuse us calling your attention to a clause in the Coal Mines Regulation Bill now before the House of Lords, which, if passed into law, would most prejudicially affect the colliery proprietors of this district and also the colliers themselves, seeing that it would inevitably lead to a reduced output of coal. The Bill, as passed by the Commons, prohibits the payment of colliers by measure, and provides that henceforth they shall be paid by weight (except in the case of collieries employing only 30 men underground, when a Secretary of State may under certain circumstances grant exemption from weighing). The effect of this would be materially to reduce the output at large collieries, such as exist in the Burnley district. Under the existing Act of 1872, section 17, colliers are to be paid by weight, unless the mine is exempted by a Secretary of State. The whole of the collieries in this district are exempted, and the colliers are and always have been paid by measure. No disputes occur, there is no confiscation of tubs, and the best feeling exists between masters and
1524
men. The clause in the Bill appears to be the outcome of trade union agitation—"
he did not say it was any the worse for that—
" but, as the colliers in the Burnley district are non-unionists, the delegates have no right to interfere."
He need not trouble their Lordships with any more, except to say that the remaining part of the letter suggested that the clause should be altered so as to continue the exemptions which at present existed. This was a point on which their Lordships were legislating in the dark. When there was any interference with private contract a reason should be given, and at present their Lordships were destitute of any. It was, he submitted, a matter deserving of consideration, because it seemed a strange thing that where the employer, the employed, and the Secretary of State were all content with the arrangement, nevertheless it should not be allowed except where the employed were fewer than 20.
VISCOUNT CROSSsaid, he would convey to the Secretary of State for the Home Department what had fallen from the noble and learned Lord. He had an Amendment to propose to-morrow on that particular clause, and suggested that then would be the most convenient time to consider the point raised by the noble and learned Lord.
Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House To-morrow.

LABOURERS' ALLOTMENTS BILL.
(The Viscount Cross.)
(NO. 252.) SECOND READING.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Viscount Cross.)
EARL SPENCER,alluding to the very scanty appearance of their Lordships' House, there being only 13 noble Lords present, said, that fact was not very encouraging to anyone to rise to discuss a subject of great public importance; but nevertheless he thought it necessary to make some remarks on the subject of the Allotments Bill. And first of all, on the part of Members of their Lordships' House, he might complain not only of the period at which the Bill had been

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introduced, but of the exceedingly short Notice that had been given between the first and the second reading. It was only that very morning, when he happened to be in the country, that he saw the Bill had been read last night a first time. He was travelling up to London on other business, when he discovered that the second reading was to be taken this evening. Now, he did not think that such short Notice of an important measure of the sort was conducive to the convenience, or even the credit of their Lordships' House. He could quite understand the desire to bringing to a conclusion so prolonged and arduous a Session; but he thought Her Majesty's Government might be blamed in this matter. Ministers had evidently changed their minds in reference to the necessity of such a measure. The Bill excited great interest, not only in their Lordships' House, but elsewhere, and Questions were asked as to when the Government were going to introduce this measure, which he believed was one of the measures mentioned in Her Majesty's Gracious Speech from the Throne. On the 16th of May, in answer to a Question in "another place," the Leader of the House stated that the Government were anxious to bring in the Bill, and added that it would be introduced in "another place;" and, later in the same evening, the President of the Local Government Board intimated that the Bill would be brought in at once without delay. On the 16th of June, Lord Dun-raven introduced a measure on the subject, and he was met by the noble Lord (Lord Balfour) on the part of the Government, who said that the Government were anxious to see legislation dealing with allotments, and, if possible, to support it to a finality in this House. On that occasion, the Prime Minister (the Marquess of Salisbury) spoke, and stated that he rather deprecated the introduction of a measure by the Government on this subject. The noble Marquess on that occasion had criticized the method in which the noble Earl proposed to deal with the question of authority, and had said that if they took some Central Body not concerned in the matter, the County Quarter Sessions, it might possibly deal with it in a perfunctory spirit, and, on the other hand, if they took the Local Sanitary Board or the Board of Guardians, there might be
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danger of abuse and of disturbance of the public peace. The noble Marquess had also given as another reason for not bringing in a Bill, the argument that they should wait until proposals for a scheme of local government were before Parliament, and the question was in some fair way of being settled. What, however, had the Government done? On the 16th of July, after the noble Marquess had said that he did not think it desirable to introduce a Bill on the subject until a measure of local government had been introduced, a Bill was introduced in "another place." What had made that change in the opinions of the Government? There was certainly one fact which had occurred which might have had something to do with it— namely, a certain election which had taken place on the 6th of July. However that might be, the Government had certainly put the cart before the horse by introducing an Allotments Bill without having introduced a large measure of county government, contrary to the speech of the noble Marquess; and not only that, but they had introduced into it both the authorities to which the noble Marquess had taken exception. He (Earl Spencer) thought that some explanation was really necessary of the course which Her Majesty's Government had taken. Why had they been so late in introducing the Bill, and why had they changed the opinions which they had expressed? He had no intention of moving any Amendments to the Bill; but he wished to say one or two words with regard to the principle. He most heartily approved of the main principle of the Bill, and he thought that everybody was in favour of increasing the number of allotments for the poor people of the country. There was no doubt immense advantage was given to the labouring man if, in addition to what he obtained for his wages, he could have an allotment whereby to supply his private wants as regarded vegetables, and it might add to his luxuries. He was glad to see both parties agreed upon this question. Many, no doubt, would have preferred to leave the question to be settled in the open market; but they knew that unless some compulsory powers were given for the acquisition of allotments, where the owner was unwilling to grant them, the number of allotments required could not be given to the poor agricul-

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tural labourers. He rejoiced that Her Majesty's Government had gone as far as they had done in enabling allotments to be procured; but, at the same time, he thought that there was considerable objection to some of the provisions of the Bill. He did not think that the Boards of Guardians would be very suitable bodies, as he was afraid they would not be sufficiently sympathetic with the poor in connection with this matter, and he thought that some disappointment would be felt at the Bill not being put sufficiently into force as much as the requirements needed. At the same time, it was extremely difficult to create a representative body ad hoc, especially one dealing with allotments; and therefore, though he did not altogether like the authority proposed, he was ready to accept it. As the Bill, however, was introduced, he regretted it had not gone a little further. He was glad that Her Majesty's Government had resisted the Amendment moved in the other House limiting the size of an allotment to half-an-acre. Although he considered that a man in full work could not deal thoroughly with as much as an acre, yet there might be cases in which a man might do so, and therefore it would have been a great mistake if the size had been restricted to half-an-acre. He thought, however, that the Bill might have gone further, and provision might have been made for dealing with a matter upon which a great deal of ridicule had been thrown, but which he maintained was of the greatest importance—namely, what was known as "three acres and a cow." In many places the labourers were not desirous of having three acres for pasturage, as they were not able to find a cow; but in many places this was not the case, and in his opinion it was a pity that the Government had not gone further than they had done, and included the possibility of giving to the agricultural labourers the opportunity of getting the three acres and a cow where they desired it. No doubt, the Government had dealt with the question under the system of common pasturing, and in some places that system had been a great success, although, in other cases, it might have fallen into the hands of one or two of the bigger men. When a man had a cow and food for it during the summer, he was obliged to have some other land
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where he could grow hay for its food during the winter. What he wished to know was whether there was sufficient power in the Bill to enable the Local Authority to provide also sufficient land in order that enough hay might be produced for the keep of animals belonging to the tenants of the allotments for their cows during the winter? He had known cases where this had really been carried out, and where the poor of the parish had a field where they could keep their cows during the summer, also additional land where hay was made for the winter. This, he thought, was a very important matter, and he would like to see that the point was dealt with in the Bill. He thought that the whole question was one worthy of being discussed at an earlier period of the Session and in a fuller House; and he would again ask the Government to explain why this Bill only now appeared before them?
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (The Earl of ONSLOW)said, that the Government could not be expected to do more than pass a Bill into law in the course of the Session which they had announced in the Queen's Speech. As to the question of introducing it early or late in the Session, the Government must be guided in that by the state of Public Business as to when and in what House they should originate legislation. The noble Earl opposite (Earl Spencer) seemed to be of opinion that Her Majesty's Government had suddenly woke up to the possibility, as well as the advisability, of introducing an Allotments Bill. He would, however, call the attention of the noble Earl to the statement made by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer (Lord Randolph Churchill), in what was generally known as the Dartford speech, before the present Parliament. In that speech, the noble Lord had distinctly said that it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce such a Bill, and in answer to several Questions put in their Lordships' House by the noble Earls (the Earl of Dunraven and the Earl of Jersey), the Government had replied that they intended to introduce an Allotments Bill, but must be guided as to when by the state of Public Business. He noticed, also that while the Bill had been severely criticized by the Friends of the noble Earl in the other House, the objections did not appear to

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go so much to the provisions as they did to the names of the persons on the back of the measure, and who were responsible for its introduction. The noble Earl had stated that the Bill now before their Lordships provided an authority which the noble Marquess at the head of the Government had distinctly condemned. Speaking from recollection of that debate, he (the Earl of Onslow) ventured to think that the noble Earl was in error, and that the authority which the noble Marquess had condemned was the County Authority, as having too large an area, and not Boards of Guardians.
EARL SPENCERsaid, that he had spoken from the noble Marquess's own words.
THE EARL OF ONSLOWsaid, that no doubt the Government admitted that the authority provided was not a perfect one; but the difficulty was, where they had not got a duly constituted Local Authority before them to find one, and he thought that the choice made by the Government was, in the circumstances, a happy one. He had heard many objections to the Bill; but he did not think they were directed against any of its clauses. He confessed he infinitely preferred allotments provided by landlords voluntarily; and the Government had expressly and wisely kept the principle of the voluntary supply of allotments in the forefront of the Bill, which provided that the Local Authority should only have power to acquire allotments compulsorily when the landlords would not grant them voluntarily. In the rural districts of England there was no very large unsatisfied demand for allotments; but it was necessary to embody in the Bill, as a last resort, the principle of compulsion. Where the Bill would do most good was in the neighbourhood of towns, near which artizans often experienced the greatest difficulty in obtaining land, however good might be the terms that were offered. He rejoiced, therefore, that an Amendment had been introduced in the Bill in "another place" directing that land near a town should be let for allotments on the terms applicable to agricultural land in the district. The object of the Government had been to make the Bill what it was —an Allotments Bill—and not a Bill to provide small holdings. He had the
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greatest doubt as to the success of small holdings; but he had no doubt as to the success of this system of allotments. Of the authorities that might be chosen to administer the Bill, neither the parish nor the Court of Quarter Sessions could fulfil the duties which the measure imposed as efficiently as the Board of Guardians. The tendency of recent times had been to diminish, and not to increase, the authority of the Vestry; and the area under the control of the Court of Quarter Sessions was too wide to permit of its taking cognizance of all the demands for allotments in every parish of the county. He confessed the Board of Guardians was not so satisfactory an authority as he should desire; but the Bill must remain, to some extent, in embryo, until the Bill was passed into law for the appointment of a Constitutional and Electoral Authority. There were some points in the Bill to which it was desirable to draw attention. In the first place, it provided that the labourers themselves, if they should so desire, should have the management of the allotments. As the parish would have to bear a certain burden when the Bill was put into operation, it was only right that in the hands of the elected of the parish should be placed the management of the allotments. That was also a valuable provision which dissociated the rates and taxes from the rent, for it would give every holder of an allotment a personal interest in the rise or fall of the rates, which was a very important matter. He should object very strongly to any proposal for giving every labourer three acres and a cow. The noble Earl (Earl Spencer) had expressed great regret at the absence of that provision; but if a proposal had been put in the Bill to give three acres, it would have led to great misconception and disappointment to the labourers themselves. There could be no doubt that at onetime there existed in the minds of many labourers in England an impression that somehow or other by legislation each one of them would become possessed of three acres and a cow, and he was therefore particularly glad that these three acres had been kept out of the Bill. The area of an acre chosen by the Government he thought a very wise one; because, though in certain cases it might be too large, there was nothing in the Bill to compel the authority to

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give the whole acre, and if the Bill provided for more than an acre, he was convinced it would become not an Allotment Bill, but a Small Holdings Bill. A locality could not advantageously acquire enough land to make a plan of that kind feasible, and in the scheme would have to be included measures for the compulsory appropriation of farms. If ever there should exist means of appropriating large areas of pasture land, owners would find it very difficult indeed to let their farms. Then, the possession of a cow by every holder of a three-acre allotment would necessitate the erection of a cow shed and of costly fences by the Local Authority, who would practically be placed in the position of a landlord without his responsibilities. In the Bill, however, there was nothing to prevent a man from keeping a cow. The right of common pasture would exist, and in winter the labourer would be able to feed his cow on the produce of his acre allotment. There was nothing which tended more to make a peasantry happy and contented, and to secure their adhesion to the principle of property, than the ownership or occupancy of a small plot of land. Bearing that in mind, he looked upon this measure as likely to effect substantial good, and he asked their Lordships to read it a second time with equal confidence in its results.
LORD BRAMWELLsaid, that he heartily approved of the principle of the Bill, and believed that small allotments would add pleasure to the existence of many persons; that they would add to their means, and go some way to make them more contented. There was as much right to take land compulsorily at a fair price for that as for any other public purpose, and he believed that, with a wise discretion, the Government in framing it had not exceeded the limits of moderation and caution. He trusted that one result of the Bill would be to make the poor labourer feel that land did not exist only for the benefit of very rich and very great people. It was curious that although enterprise in this country had found many vents there was, as far as he knew, no record of the successful establishment of a Public Company for providing allotments; at all events, the cases were very few. This Bill made the ratepayers in certain districts, to some extent with their own
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consent, shareholders in this doubtful concern so far as the providing of land was concerned. Therefore the Government were most discreet in not going further than was at once safe and necessary in the provisions of the Bill.
LORD DENMANsaid, he preferred this Bill to that of the noble Earl (the Earl of Dunraven), which made the Bench of Magistrates decide on allotments. He felt certain that the greatest possible attention would be directed to each case as it arose before the Sanitary Committee, and afterwards before the Local Government Board. It must be borne in mind that on the Union principle of rating, the Board of Guardians had to consult the persons in the area of that Union, and therefore, in his judgment, nothing would be done rashly with respect to the allotments. He was glad to hear of the possibility that the Court of Quarter Sessions was not to be changed in its character. He feared that if the providing of allotments were added to the business of that body, it would turn it into a mere debating society, instead of keeping it, as in the past, the best business society in the county, which ought to be above suspicion.
VISCOUNT CROSSsaid, he was glad to find that the measure received such hearty support from their Lordships. In answer to the noble Earl (Earl Spencer) who complained as to the time when the Bill was brought forward, he did not say that it was owing to the lack of more speedy procedure in "another place" the measure had not been brought under their Lordships' attention before. But "better late than never," and he (Viscount Cross) was glad to see it even at that late period, for he believed that most beneficial results would ensue from its passing. He proposed to take the Committee stage to-morrow.
Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House To-morrow.
TRUCK BILL.
CONSIDERATION OF COMMONS' AMENDMENTS TO LORDS' AMENDMENTS.
Commons' Amendment to one of the Lords' Amendments, and reasons for disagreeing to certain of the Lords' Amendments and Commons' consequential Amendment, considered (according to Order).
Commons Amendment, disagreeing to the omission of Clause 4 (Weekly payment of wages in Ireland) and Clause 5 (Workmen in Scotch quarries to be paid fortnightly).
Moved, "That this House doth insist on the Amendment made by this House to which the Commons have disagreed." —(The Lord Clinton.)
Motion agreed to.
Commons' Amendments to Clauses 8, 9, and 12 agreed to.
Schedule.
Moved, "That this House doth not insist on the Amendment made by this House to which the Commons have disagreed."—(The Lord Clinton.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord HALSBURY),in commenting on the uncertainty surrounding the repeal of the Acts mentioned in the Schedule, pointed to it as an illustration of the loose mode of drafting Acts of Parliament, in regard to which they were unable to understand whether Acts or parts of them were repealed or not. A little more care ought to be bestowed on the arrangement of a repeal or amending Act before it was submitted to Parliament.
Motion agreed to.
Consequential Amendment made.
LORD BRAMWELLsaid, he wished to call attention to Clause 12 (Artificer to be paid in cash and not by way of barter for articles made by him). When the question was previously discussed, the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll), who understood the subject thoroughly, earnestly protested against the clause. It seemed to him (Lord Bramwell) to contain a most unreasonable proposition; and he, therefore, asked their Lordships to adhere to their Amendment striking out the clause. The clause was really an enactment that makers of Shetland goods should not be paid in goods, but in money. What was the justification for such a clause? None that he knew of. The people were commonly paid in this manner, and were not discontented with it. He could not find any justification at all for putting an end to a system which was convenient, and against which no valid objection had been brought.
Lord DENMANrose to speak, when—
VISCOUNT CROSS,intervening, pointed out that there was no Motion before the House.
LORD DENMANsaid, that, having missed his opportunity by inadvertence, by not having the reasons in their order, he might, at least, be allowed to speak by the indulgence of their Lordships.
LORD HALSBURYsaid, that, of course, there was no absolute rule; their Lordships could do as they pleased; but not only had the clause in question been formally passed and agreed to, but another clause had been passed since, and he did not think there was any precedent for the course proposed by the noble Lord.
A Committee appointed to prepare reasons to be offered to the Commons for the Lords insisting on certain of their Amendments; the Committee to meet forthwith.
Report from the Committee of the reasons to be offered to the Commons for the Lords insisting on certain of their Amendments; read, and agreed to; and a message sent to the Commons to return the said Bill with an Amendment and reasons.
House adjourned at half-past Five o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Four o'clock.