Sitting of 17 March 1887

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—National Provident Insurance, Mr. Hoyle and Captain Fellowes added.
SUPPLY—considered in Committee—NAVY ESTIMATES, NUMBERS, Vote 1; SUPPLEMENTARY (NAVY SERVICES, 1886–7).
PUBLIC BILLS—Resolution in Committee—Ordered—First Reading—Isle of Man (Customs)* [199].
Second Reading—Merchandise Marks Law Consolidation and Amendment* [194], referred to the Select Committee on the Merchandise Marks Act (1862) Amendment.
Committee—Merchant Shipping Act (1854) Amendment (No. 2)* [184]—R. P.
Committee—Report—Merchant Shipping (Fishing Boats) Acts Amendment [168].
Third Reading—County Courts (Expenses) * [177], and passed.

QUESTIONS.

  ADMIRALTY—DOCK ACCOMMODATION AT BOMBAY FOR HER MAJESTY'S NAVY.
  ADMIRAL FIELDasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether the Lords Commissioners are willing to co-operate with the Indian Government, in providing suitable dock accommodation at Bombay for large ships of Her Majesty's Navy, by payment of a moiety of the cost of enlarging existing docks in the Government Dockyard at that port; whether different Admirals in command of the Indian Station have repeatedly urged the necessity of providing such docking facilities as aforesaid, especially in view of requirements in time of war; whether estimates have been submitted showing that the cost of such dock extension would not exceed £100,000, or thereabouts; and, whether, in January 1882, the Euryalus, late flagship on Indian Station, was compelled to be sent to Malta (distant 4,000 miles) to be docked for repairs, through the want of the necessary accommodation at Bombay? The hon. and gallant Gentleman also asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether the Government of India are prepared to co-operate with the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty in providing the necessary dock accommodation at Bombay for largo ships of Her Majesty's Navy, in accordance with the repeated recommendations of different Admirals in command of the Indian Station, to meet the urgent requirements of the Navy, especially in time of war; and, whether he is aware that the flagship on Indian Station, in January 1882, was obliged to proceed to Malta to be docked for repairs, for want of the necessary accommodation at Bom-

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  bay, whereby the said Station was deprived of the most efficient ship belonging thereto for a period of several months?
  THE FIRST LORD (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON): The Admirals in command of the East India Station have reported the insufficiency of the existing docking facilities at Bombay. A dock extension, costing £83,000, was formerly suggested; but it was found that this extension would not; make sufficient provision for docking first-class ships. It was, therefore, thought preferable to build a new dock altogether; and I understand that the Indian Government are taking stops to provide the accommodation. It is the case that the Euryalus had to proceed to Malta from Bombay to be docked.
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Sir JOHN GORST): The Government of India are now engaged in providing the necessary dock accommodation at Bombay for the largest type of ships in Her Majesty's Navy.

  EGYPT—THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION—DECORATIONS FOR THE TROOPS AT ASSOUAN.
  MR. SHIRLEYasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether it is the intention of the Government to grant any decoration or batta money to the troops who were quartered at Assouan during the hot season of 1886, on account of the appalling mortality and sickness which was rife there, in accordance with the procedent of 1885, when the Egyptian medal was granted on account of the excessive heat?
  THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY, WAR DEPARTMENT (Mr. BRODRICK)(who replied) said: The medal granted in 1885 was for the campaign in Egypt, towards which the troops at Assouan wore directly contributory. Excessive heat of the climate does not in itself constitute a claim to a medal or decoration. It would not be convenient that the pay of a soldier should be dependent on the climate in which he may be serving; but all troops in Egypt have advantages in rations which they would not have at home. The value to the individual soldier is about 4½d. a-day.

  LITERATURE, SCIENCE, AND ART—THE NATIONAL GALLERY—THE NEW ROOMS.
  MR. W. H. JAMESasked the First Commissioner of Works, How soon the new rooms of the National Gallery will be in readiness for the admission of the public?
  THE FIRST COMMISSIONER (Mr. PLUNKET): The new rooms and staircase will be completed, so far as this Department is concerned, by the end of May. There will, however, be some further time required to complete the hanging of the pictures, so that I do not think it likely that the rooms will be in readiness for the admission of the public before the end of June or the beginning of July.

  IRISH LAND COMMISSION.
  SIR JOSEPH M'KENNAasked Mr. Attorney General for Ireland, If he is aware that much dissatisfaction exists when the town in which land cases are to be heard is selected to meet the convenience of the landlord, to the cost and inconvenience of the tenants; and, whether Dundalk has been lately selected as the place of hearing for 43 cases arising in the Castleblayney Union, when Castleblayney itself, and other towns, would be much more convenient and easy of access for the tenants?
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. HOLMES), in reply, said, in selecting the place of hearing of land cases the convenience of the landlords was not consulted more than that of the tenants. With regard to the latter part of the Question, a number of cases were heard at Dundalk, and no complaint whatever was made as to that place being selected.

  FISHERIES (IRELAND)—BOARDS OF FISHERY CONSERVATORS.
  MR. W. ABRAHAMasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether ex officio members of the Board of Fishery Conservators must be magistrates, and, in addition, hold land abutting a river or lake in the district, and pay licence duty for the current year; whether certain magistrates attended meetings of the Board of Conservators of the Limerick

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  District on the 5th of August, 1886, 6th of January, 20th of January, and 4th of February, 1887, and took part in the proceedings without possessing the requisite qualifications; whether the Limerick Board met on the 5th of August, 1866, and proceeded to elect one of their number to the position of Inspector of Water Bailiffs, contrary to Act of Parliament; if the Inspectors of Irish Fisheries have remonstrated with the Limerick Board respecting this election, and declared the appointment, in their opinion, illegal; whether the Board still retains this member of their body in the position of Inspector as aforesaid, and have refused to hold a now election; and, whether the Irish Executive will inquire into these allegations; and, if proved to be true, will take the necessary steps to set matters right?
  THE CHIEF SECRETARY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR): I am advised that the law is as stated in the first paragraph. With regard to the alleged matters of fact about the election of Inspector of Water Bailiffs, the circumstances are understood to be as stated, though the hon. Member has not given any sufficient opportunity for inquiry on those points not already within the knowledge of the Inspector of Fisheries. The matter does not appear to be in a satisfactory state; and I understand that some questions connected with it are at present before the Law Officers, with the object of ascertaining whether, in the present state of the law, any action can be taken by the Executive.

  ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE—DELAY OF CAUSES—INSUFFICIENCY OF COURTS.
  MR. BAGGALLAYasked the First Commissioner of Works, Whether, looking at the facts that during the present and recent sittings of the High Court of Justice, the hearing of actions, particularly jury actions, has been delayed in consequence of the insufficient number of Courts at the Royal Courts of Justice, and that three Judges are sometimes unnecessarily sitting together in bane, because there is no Court for the third Judge to sit in—he will consider the desirability of providing further accommodation for the Judges to hold their Courts?
  THE FIRST COMMISSIONER (Mr. PLUNKET): The
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  facts referred to have not been brought to my notice. The question of further accommodation at the Royal Courts of Justice seems to be for the consideration, in the first instance, of the Lord Chancellor, rather than of the Office of Works. Of course, any suggestion coming from the Lord Chancellor would be immediately and carefully considered.

  RUSSIA—IMPRISONMENT OF J. W. ROBINSON, A BRITISH SUBJECT.
  DR. CAMERONasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether his attention has been called to the statement made by the Odessa Correspondent of The Daily News, regarding the case of John William Robinson, a British subject, stated to be undergoing the eleventh month of an imprisonment at Kieff, in connection with some passport offence; whether Robinson's offence was the non-possession of a passport, or the possession of a false passport; and, whether representations have been made to the Russian Government on the subject?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Sir JAMES FERGUSSON): Her Majesty's Consul General at Odessa reports that Robinson is stated by the Russian authorities at Kieff to have been condemned on the 4th of December last to four months' imprisonment for having resided in Russia under a false name with an Austrian passport. Robinson states that he was in prison about six months before being tried. Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh is inquiring into the case; but his report has not yet been received.

  AUSTRALIAN COLONIES—APPLICATION FOR GOVERNMENT LOANS—GREENWICH HOSPITAL FUNDS.
  SIR SAMUEL WILSONasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether he is aware that the Government loans in the leading Australian Colonies have been expended in railways and other reproductive works, which remain Government property, and which make a return of about 4 per cent in some cases, on the whole amount of the debt of those Colonies, and that the railways alone would sell for more than the whole debt, making such loans a perfectly safe investment; whether he will take this into consideration in the future re-investmet

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  of Greenwich Hospital Funds; and, whether he will endeavour to continue the payment of age pensions, without the conditions as to the ability to earn a portion of their sustenance, to seamen who have served their full time?
  MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT (A LORD of the ADMIRALTY)(who replied) said: I do not contest the accuracy of the facts mentioned in the first part of the Question of my hon. Friend; but, as already stated, arrangements have been made, or are in progress, for re-investing at home, on favourable terms, a large portion of the Three per Cent. Stock hitherto held on account of Greenwich Hospital, and it is anticipated that there will be no difficulty in similarly re-investing as much of the remainder of the Stock as may be considered advisable. In the Charter of Foundation it is stated that the benefits of Greenwich Hospital are intended for seamen who, by age, wounds, or other disabilities, shall be incapable of further service at sea, and be unable to maintain themselves. It seems proper, therefore, to take into account, when distributing the funds, the physical condition of the men as well us their age.

  MAGISTRACY (ENGLAND AND WALES)—THE WINCHESTER BENCH—"A JOB LOT."
  MR. MACNEILLasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether his attention has been directed to an article in The Daily News of the 14th March, entitled "A Job Lot," and having reference to the Magisterial Bench at Winchester; whether it is true, as stated in the article referred to, that there are at present 17 magistrates in Winchester and only 19 policemen; is it usual in English cities for judicial officials to be nearly equal in numbers to administrative officials; is it true, as stated in the article referred to, that the Lord Chancellor has sent down a list to the Town Council of Winchester of five other gentlemen, whom he intends to raise to the dignity of the Bench—so that in Winchester there will be 23 magistrates and only 19 policemen; and, whether the Town Council of Winchester have struck out four of the five names sent down by the Lord Chancellor, and have substituted others for his consideration?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. MATTHEWS): Yes, Sir; I have seen the article in question. The number of magistrates and police is accurately stated. I am informed that the late Lord Chancellor added four names to the list of Justices in 1881, making the total at that time 22. Since that date there have been five vacancies through death; and it is to fill those vacancies, and not to add to the total number of magistrates, that five gentlemen have been recently nominated by the Lord Chancellor. The Town Council have submitted to the Lord Chancellor the names of certain gentlemen from among whom they suggest that he should select four magistrates in lieu of four whom he had nominated, but for whoso rejection they assign no reason. The Town Council have thereby gone beyond their proper function.
  MR. CLANCY: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether all the magistrates recommended by the Lord Chancellor are Tories?
  MR. MATTHEWS: No, Sir; they are not.
  MR. CLANCY: May I ask how many are?
  [No reply.]

  POST OFFICE—DELIVERY OF THE IRISH MAILS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.
  MR. M'CARTAN(for Mr. FLYNN)asked the Postmaster General, If the Post Office Authorities can make such arrangements as will insure an earlier delivery of the Irish Mails in the House of Commons to Members representing Irish constituencies than that which at present obtain; and, if they can arrange such an alteration as will permit of Irish Members posting letters for the Irish night mail by special mail-bag, or otherwise, at a later hour than is at present necessary?
  THE POSTMASTER GENERAL (Mr. RAIKES): Before the Question of the hon. Member was placed upon the Notice Paper, arrangements had been made for accelerating the delivery in the House of the day mail letters from Ireland, and such letters can now be obtained at 7 p.m., or one hour earlier than before. As regards posting for the Irish night mail, letters can at present be posted up to

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  7.15 p.m. without late fee, and up to 7.30 p.m. with a fee of a halfpenny. It is proposed to extend the hour for posting letters with a late fee up to 8 p.m.; and this will apply not only to letters for Ireland, but also to letters for places in England, North Wales, and Scotland, served by the night mail train from Euston at 8.30 p.m.

  COURT OF BANKRUPTCY (IRELAND)—TRANSFER OF UNCLAIMED DIVIDENDS.
  MR. P. M'DONALDasked Mr. Attorney General for Ireland, Under what Statute, or by what authority, £35,000 of the Unclaimed Dividends of the Irish Court of Bankruptcy were transferred to the Commissioners of the National Debt; whether the transfer of the money of the unpaid creditors is contrary to, and in violation of, the sections 294, 295, 296, and 297 of "The Bankruptcy (Ireland) Act, 1857;" and whether it is a fact that, owing to the conduct of the Bankruptcy Court officials, dividend warrants are frequently returned by the Post Office, in consequence of wrong direction or address, and large sums are thereby allowed to accumulate, creditors not being permitted to examine the list for themselves?
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. HOLMES): The transfer referred to was made pursuant to the provisions of the 85th section of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act, 1877. Dividend warrants are often returned by the Post Office, in consequence of persons to whom they are addressed not being found; but I am not aware that this arises from the misconduct of the Bankruptcy Court officials, who are themselves often unable to discover the proper addresses. Creditors can see for themselves what are the unclaimed dividends in any particular estate; but a general examination of all the lists is not allowed.

  EGYPT—ARMY OF OCCUPATION—MAJOR MACDONALD.
  DR. TANNERasked the Secretary of State for War, If it is true that Major Macdonald is acting as military attaché to Sir Evelyn Baring, in Cairo; whether in consequence of their being an English Army of Occupation in
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  Egypt, the Egyptian Army being officered by English officers, Major Macdonald's extraordinary services to Sir Evelyn Baring will be dispensed with; and, whether the extra pay drawn by Major Macdonald is defrayed by the Egyptian or English Government?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. E. STANHOPE): Major Macdonald is attached to the British Agency in Egypt as a military attaché. His functions are on be-half of the British Government, who pay him, in connection with the presence of British troops in Egypt.

  LAW AND JUSTICE (IRELAND)—IRREGULAR CONVICTION AT NEW ROSS POLICE STATION.
  MR. J. E. REDMOND(for Mr. SEXTON)asked Mr. Attorney General for Ireland, Whether John Malone and Richard Magee, inmates of the New Ross Workhouse, arrested and lodged in New Ross Police Station on the night of the 21st ultimo, on a charge of insubordination, wore, on the following day, brought before a magistrate in a room of the said police station, and sentenced on conviction to three months' imprisonment; whether this private mode of trial was in accordance with the law; whether Mr. Hurson, the solicitor retained for the defence, was absent from the proceeding in the police station, not having received notice of it; and, what action will be taken upon the case?
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. HOLMES), in reply, said, the men named were arrested in New Ross Workhouse, and brought before the presiding magistrates, charged with insubordination. Bail could not be obtained, and on the arrival of another magistrate the case was heard in the police office, and the case being proved by three witnesses, they were sentenced to three months' imprisonment. The proceedings were taken under Geo. IV., c. 83. The Government did not intend to take any action in the matter.
  MR. J. E. REDMOND: I would ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman, whether it is a fact that no legal opportunity for legal defence was given to these men? My information is they had got a solicitor, and he never received any notice of the trial.
  MR. HOLMES: The men made no application whatever, or any statement whatever, that they had engaged a solicitor.
  MR. J. E. REDMOND: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that the statement is made by a solicitor who as a supporter of the right hon. and learned Gentleman?
  MR. SPEAKER: Order, order!
  MR. M'CARTAN: I should like to ask, whether an opportunity was given to the prisoners to obtain bail before they wore convicted?
  MR. HOLMES: Sir, I have already answered the Question on the Paper.

  RIVER THAMES POLLUTION—BYE-LAWS OF THE THAMES CONSERVATORS.
  COLONEL DAWNAYasked the President of the Local Government Board. Whether his attention had been called to the proposed new bye-laws of the Thames Conservators, by which
  "no direct action will be taken to put a stop to the insanitary nuisances caused by houseboats and steam launches; "
  and that,
  "although a bye-law provides against casting any sewage, rubbish, or other offensive matter into the River, this will not be taken to apply the shocking condition of things seen at places where the River is shamefully polluted by the sewage from house-boats;"
  whether he is aware that any objection or representation against the proposed new bye-laws must be made on or before the 28th instant; and, whether, in the interests of the millions of people who depend upon the Upper Thames for their water supply, he will compel the Thames Conservators to take immediate and efficient steps to free the River from its present and over-increasing state of pollution?
  THE PRESIDENT (Mr. RITCHIE): My attention has been called to the proposed new bye-law of the Thames Conservators. I have been in communication with the Conservators on the subject. I am informed that the hon. Member is incorrect in assuming what is stated in the first part of the Question. The Conservators state that the bye-law is intentionally drawn as wide as possible, to cover every possible mode of pollution of the river; and that it was
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  so prepared with the object of carrying into effect Section 4 of the Thames Preservation Act. 1885, which enacts that it shall be the duty of the Conservators to make special Regulations for pro-venting the pollution of the river by the sewage of any house-boat or steam launch. The Conservators believe that when the bye-law comes into operation, it will have the effect of preventing the nuisance which now arises from vessels moored in or navigating the river. If the hon. Member would wish to make any specific suggestion as to any additions to the proposed bye-law, and will communicate it to me, I shall be happy to forward his communication to the Conservators.
  COLONEL DAWNAYgave Notice that in consequence of the answer of the President of the Local Government Board he would call the attention of the House to the subject, and move to disallow the proposed bye-laws of the Thames Conservancy Board, in consequence of their neglecting to deal with the nuisance caused by house-boats and steam launches.
  MR. HENRY H. FOWLERasked, Whether the legal advisers of the Local Government Board were satisfied that the bye-laws would prohibit house-boats from discharging sewage into the Thames?
  MR. RITCHIEsaid, that he had not considered it necessary to consult the legal advisers of the Board on the subject; but, so far as he had been able to ascertain the opinion of the officials, he thought that the bye-laws would have that effect.

  INDIA—DISCONTENT IN MADRAS.
  MR. J. F. X. O'BRIENasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether he has any information to show that discontent has, within the past five years, been exhibited in Madras; and, if he will call for a Return showing the number of tenants evicted or otherwise proceeded against, by the Government of Sir M. E. Grant Duff?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Sir JOHN GORST): There has been no information of any special discontent in Madras. There is no eviction of Government tenants in Madras; but both land and personal property is liable to sale to realize

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  arrears of land revenue. The average annual number of landowners whose property is thus sold is 116,000 out of 4,500,000. No further Return appears to the Secretary of State to be necessary.

  POOR LAW (IRELAND)—ELECTION OF POOR LAW GUARDIANS TO THE MALLOW UNION.
  DR. TANNER(for Mr. J. O'CONNOR)asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether there are sufficient police in the Killavullen Police District to distribute the voting papers for the election of Poor Law Guardians to the Mallow Union; whether the Mouanimy Division was the only one so attended to at the last election, when the police did not allow sufficient time for the delivery of the post containing the votes of distant electors, and otherwise displayed negligence in the collection of votes by passing the houses of voters if their doors happened to be closed at the time of their calling; and, whether he will give instructions to the police to extend the time of collection until 10 p.m., as is done in other districts, and to exercise greater diligence in the collection of the voting papers from the residents in the locality?
  THE CHIEF SECRETARY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR): The Local Authorities of the Mallow Union have made their own arrangements for the distribution of the voting papers, and they have not reported to the Local Government Board what agents they are employing. I am not aware that any question as to the sufficiency of police has been raised. I am informed that, at the election last year, they were employed only in the Electoral Division named in the Question, and that they discharged the duty satisfactorily, so far as is known to the Local Government Board. One individual complaint with regard to the collection of a voting paper was made, but, on consideration, was not found to affect the vote. I see no reason arising out of these circumstances to give any special instructions to the police.
  DR. TANNER: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer that part of the Question which says the police did not allow time for posting the papers?
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: we have no ground for believing that the state of things ever occurred.

  CONVENTION OF PARIS, 1815—ENGLISH INDEBTEDNESS TO FRANCE.
  DR. TANNERasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether it is true that a sum of no less than one milliard of francs, or forty millions sterling, is duo to France by the English Government under Clause 9 of the private Convention, dated the 20th of November, 1815; if it is a fact that, by the Conventions signed in May, 1814, November, 1815, and April, 1818, a guaranteed fund of 6,500,000 francs of French Rentes, with a capital of 130,000,000 francs, was transferred to the British Government; whether M. Blandin, a Deputy, lately proposed to the Chamber that a Committee should be appointed for the purpose of asking the British Foreign Office for an account of these funds, and also for a return of the surplus, with the interest accruing thereon, to the French Treasury; whether the surplus, with the interest, is estimated to amount to one milliard of francs; and, whether a Committee has been appointed by the Chamber with M. Blandin as reporter?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Sir JAMES FERGUSSON): It is not true that the sum mentioned in the hon. Member's Question, or any other sum, is due to France by the British Government under the Convention of November 20, 1815. A statement of the matter was made to the House of Commons by the Secretary to the Treasury on the 8th of June, 1869; and a Return of the disposition of the funds received from the French Government is shown in a Paper (No. 239) presented to Parliament in 1872. There is no now feature to be considered. A report of a proposal made in the French Chamber of Deputies has been made in the French newspapers similar to that mentioned by the hon. Member; but Her Majesty's Government are not aware that a Committee has been appointed by the Chamber to inquire into the subject. The statetment in question is, no doubt, connected with the legend of the Baron de Bode, which haunted this House for a long period; but which,

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  after being investigated by a Select Committee, was laid to rest.

  EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—THE NEW CODE, 1887—"SPECIFIC SUBJECTS."
  MR. T. E. ELLISasked the Vice President of the Committee of Council on Education, Whether he can state what "specific subjects" have been sanctioned by the Education Department other than those mentioned in Article 15 of the Education Code?
  THE VICE PRESIDENT (Sir WILLIAM HART DYKE): The Returns for the last three years show that bookkeeping, theology, German, hygiene, navigation, physiography, social economy, and Welsh have been included in the subjects specially sanctioned by the Education Department.
  MR. W. ABRAHAMasked, whether instructions in Welsh would be definitely entered in the Code?
  SIR WILLIAM HART DYKEsaid, he thought that he had just shown that this was practically included.
  MR. W. ABRAHAM: All that we ask is that it should be included in the Code.

  ADMIRALTY—WILLIAM ROPER, AN ARTIZAN OF DEVONPORT DOCKYARD.
  MR. MAC NEILL(for Mr. CONYBEARE)asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether it is the fact that Mr. William Roper, who lately lost his life while working in the Government Dockyard at Devonport, was a skilled artizan whose character stood very high in the estimation of the Dockyard authorities; whether it is the fact that he lost his life under the following circumstances—namely, that after serving under the Government for some 30 years he was disentitled to any pension, because, through the difference of a few days in his age, he had never been put on the establishment; that at the age of 60 he might have retired and received a gratuity of about £60 which was then due to him; that he had the option of remaining on, if he passed the doctor, till he was 65; that he did so stay on, and left his gratuity of £60 to be taken up when he should have completed his extra five years; but that he met with his death a few weeks after while working overtime in December last; whether the
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  authorities have refused to pay over to the widow the gratuity to which her husband was entitled before his death, and why; and, whether he will, taking into account the deceased's long service and high character, and the fact that his widow is left with a family of six children, consider whether the above decision of the authorities should not be reversed?
  THE FIRST LORD (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON): It is true that William Roper was injured in the Devonport Yard when at his work; but his death was not attributed to such injury. He was 60 years of age, and was allowed to remain for his own benefit, and was entitled to a gratuity only as a hired man on completion of his service Such gratuity has hitherto only been paid to the man himself upon his discharge from the Service. Compensation is only given to the widows of civil employés when their husbands' death is directly attributable to the service in which they are engaged. My hon. Friend the Member for Devonport has already spoken to me concerning this man's case; and we are in correspondence with the Treasury on the subject.

  LANDLORD AND TENANT (IRELAND)—DECREES FOR RENT, CO. DONEGAL—WRONGFUL ACTION OF A BAILIFF.
  MR. O'DOHERTYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether the Sheriff of the County Donegal issued any warrant, special or otherwise, on foot of decrees for rent at suit of Mr. A. J. R. Stewart, of Ards, against John M'Cue, Manus M'Fadden, Mrs.—M'Cue, and James Magee, or any of them, during 1886, and especially to James Wason, the bailiff of the Stewart Estate, at Dunfanaghy, in said county; whether Wason collected the said decrees, with costs and Sheriff's fees, as if he had such warrants in the said year of 1886; whether, in the end of 1885, he extorted from widow Ellen M'Fadden, Magheramana, £3 11s., pretending that he had there a decree at suit of Samuel Fleming, of Letterkenny; whether he was compelled to refund this latter sum, having no decree at all then in his possession; whether there is any means of distinguishing between bailiffs duly authorized and those not; and, if the facts

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  are as alleged, what action the Government propose to take in the matter?
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. HOLMES)(who replied) said: the hon. Gentleman is, of course, aware that the only action that the Executive could take in reference to James Wason would be to prosecute him for a criminal offence, in case there was evidence to show that such an offence has been committed by him. I have caused inquiries to be made on this subject; and as the matter may come before a legal tribunal it is not expedient for me to make any further statement.

  WAR OFFICE—COMPULSORY RETIREMENT OF LIEUTENANT COLONELS—THE ROYAL WARRANT, 1887.
  MR. HENRY H. FOWLERasked the Secretary of State for War, What number of Lieutenant Colonels under 60 years of age will be compulsorily retired in July next, and what will be the annual amount of the half-pay of the officers so retired; and, whether he will lay upon the Table a Statement showing the financial effect of the recent Royal Warrant as to compulsory retirement?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. E. STANHOPE): From the present time to the end of July there will be no compulsory retirement of Lieutenant Colonels, although a certain number will vacate their regimental appointments on completing the term for which their appointments were made. While unemployed, these officers will be on half-pay at 11s. per day. A calculation was made last summer on the probable financial effect of the then intended Royal Warrant; but several important changes were made later in the conditions. The calculation does not, therefore, now hold, and a new one, showing the effect of the "Warrant as promulgated, is now being made. When completed, I will consider whether I can lay on the Table a statement of the financial effect of the Royal Warrant.

  POOR LAW—DEATH OF ELIZA RYAN IN ST. PANCRAS WORKHOUSE.
  MR. W. J. CORBETasked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether he has seen, in this morning's Daily News, a report of
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  an inquest held on the body of Eliza Ryan, aged 62, in the St. Pancras Workhouse; whether he will inquire if it is true, as stated in the report, that the woman was placed in solitary confinement for 12 hours on bread and water,
  "In a cell at the workhouse some nine or ten feet beneath the basement of the main building,"
  while suffering from inflammation of the lungs following on chronic bronchitis; whether he will inquire into the statement of the master that he ordered the confinement "as a punishment, in the exercise of his lawful authority," for offensive language to the matron; under what statute have masters of workhouses a power of summary jurisdiction in such cases; and, what steps will be taken in the matter if it is found death was hastened by the punishment?
  THE PRESIDENT (Mr. RITCHIE): I have made inquiry respecting this case. I am informed that it is not the fact that the woman was placed in solitary confinement as stated in the Question. The room in which she was placed was on the basement of the main building. Although the woman had occasionally been under medical treatment for chronic bronchitis during the past five years, she had not, prior to her last illness, been under any treatment during the past three months, and she was not placed in the punishment room until after she had been seen by the assistant medical officer. On the day following she was apparently in her ordinary state of health, and was at work in the needle-room. On the second day she left the workhouse to attend the funeral of her mother, and on her return she told one of the inmates that she had caught a chill while in the cemetery. She died six days afterwards; and both the medical officer and the assistant medical officer concur in the view that the commencement of the illness from which she died was the shivering and chill taken at the cemetery. At the inquest the verdict was that the death was duo to natural causes, and 11 of the 12 jurymen desired to add to their verdict that no blame attached to the workhouse officers. The woman, I am informed, was punished for being very drunk, violent in her conduct, and for using abusive and insolent language, and per-

  519
  sisting in doing so. The punishment was duly reported by the master in the punishment book, and was approved by the Workhouse Visiting Committee. The Rules as to the punishment of refractory paupers are contained in the Regulations of the Local Government Board as to the management of the workhouse.

  NAVY—PROMOTION OF CHIEF GUNNERS AND OTHER NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.
  MR. E. ROBERTSON(for Mr. LABOUCHERE)asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether Article 272 of the Queen's Regulations states—
  "Of the total number of Chief Gunners and Chief Boatswains, including Officers holding either rank by virtue of their appointments, one-half shall be composed of Chief Gunners;"
  whether The Navy List has, for a considerable time past, contained the names of 18 Chief Boatswains, and of 17 Chief Gunners; whether there were 18 Chief Gunners on the Active List before the retirement of Mr. Bechervaise; whether that officer, although retired, is at present doing duty at the Admiralty; and, whether he still draws full pay, and therefore keeps the number of Chief Gunners on the Active List at 17?
  THE FIRST LORD (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON): Promotion to the rank of Chief Gunner is not regulated by seniority alone; but is, as in the case of Chief Boatswains and Chief Carpenters, by selection of the most deserving officers. The selection of these officers is a matter of very careful consideration, and the claims of the various officers with regard to age, seniority, and service at sea are carefully compared. The promotions made are the result of these comparisons, and not, as the hon. Member appears to infer, in consequence of favouritism on the part of any individual member of the Board. There is no intention of altering the present practice of promotion in these ranks. There are on the list at the present time 31 Chief Gunners and Chief Boatswains; of these, 17 are Chief Gunners. In the present month's Navy List there appears 18 Chief Boatswains, there happening to be that number for a few days pending the pensioning of one of these officers. There were not 18 gunners on the Active List before Mr. Bechervaise's removal. Sir An-
  520
  thony Hoskins had personal cognizance of Mr. Lee's good service. Mr. Bechervaise is doing duty at the Admiralty; but his vacancy was duly filled up, and his retention in his present post in no way affects, nor has affected, the number of Chief Gunners.

  UNLICENSED HALLS, &c—"PUBLIC" BUILDINGS.
  MR. TATTON EGERTONasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether, taking into consideration that there is no power or authority to deal with buildings not licensed but used for public performances, he will advise Her Majesty's Government to bring in a Public Bill constituting an authority who shall have the same powers over unlicensed, but public, buildings as is at present exercised under the Act 41§ 42 Vict. s. 32, and to include a definition of the meaning of the word "public "building?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. MATTHEWS): I understand that this question is now engaging the attention of a Committee of the Metropolitan Board of Works, who are the constituted authority to carry the Metropolitan Management Act into effect. Any representation which they may address to me will receive my best attention; but I can hold out no prospect of Her Majesty's Government being able to legislate on the subject this Session.

  THE ROYAL GARDENS, KEW.
  MR. E. ROBERTSON(for Mr. LABOUCHERE)asked the First Commissioner of Works, Whether any record has been kept of the plants, seeds, and specimens received at the Royal Gardens, Kew, and of the work done in connection with them, and of the information received from abroad, no Report having been issued since that for the year 1882?
  THE FIRST COMMISSIONER (Mr. PLUNKET): A minute record is kept of everything received in the several Departments of Kew Gardens. Mainly owing to the protracted illness of the late Curator the work of compiling the Annual Reports has fallen into arrear; but materials for the series of 1883 to 1886 are in hand, and it is

  521
  hoped to issue them all this year. In response to the demands for the publication more speedily than in the Annual Report of information received from abroad, I have sanctioned the publication of a monthly bulletin, which can be purchased for a small sum.

  THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE LAND LAW (IRELAND) ACT, 1881, AND THE PURCHASE OF LAND (IRELAND), ACT 1885—THE SHORTHAND WRITERS' NOTES.
  MR. T. P. GILL(for Mr. CHANCE)asked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether he will make representations to the authority having custody of the shorthand writers' original notes and transcripts of the proceedings of the Cowper Commission, to insure facilities being accorded to Members of this House to inspect such notes and transcripts so far as the same record the evidence of witnesses?
  THE CHIEF SECRETARY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR): I know of no reason why I should take such an unusual course as is here suggested.

  INDIA—DISCONTENT IN MADRAS.
  MR. TUITEasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether last year there was a fresh outbreak of discontent, accompanied with violence, in the Rumpa Country, Madras, and to what extent?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY or STATE (Sir JOHN GORST): There has not been an outbreak of discontent in the Rumpa District. Last June or July 25 hillmen in the Gudem District burnt a police station and two bungalows. They were speedily dispersed and arrested.

  ARMY—MAJORS—THE ROYAL WARRANT. 1887.
  SIR HENRY TYLERasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether the Royal Warrant issued 1st January, 1887, has made an alteration of great importance to officers holding the rank of Major in Her Majesty's Service, who were promoted before the 1st January, 1887; whether it is the case that the pension of £300 a-year previously granted cannot now be obtained until the age of 48 has been
  522
  reached; and, whether the previous Warrant will be taken to apply to those who were promoted under it, especially as a considerable proportion of those now holding the rank of Major purchased their first Commissions, and can no longer expect to receive compensation for the money which they have so advanced?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. E. STANHOPE): It was not intended that the Royal Warrant of January 1, 1887, should diminish in any way the privileges as to retirement enjoyed by pro-warrant Majors; but, by a clerical error, in removing the obligation to retire after seven years' service in the rank, the right to retire at that period was taken away also. The mistake was at once discovered, and Her Majesty has signed a Warrant rectifying it. The Article will be corrected in its next issue.

  INDIA (MADRAS)—THE COVENANTED CIVIL SERVICE—LAND SPECULATIONS—MR. SULLIVAN.
  MR. BUCHANANasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether the late senior member of the Madras Civil Service and senior member of Council in the Government of Madras has been compelled to resign because he was unable to meet the charges brought against him, of having infringed the terms of the Civil Service Covenant forbidding the holding of land by Civil servants; whether other Madras Civil servants are known to be land-owners, or shareholders in Land Companies, or otherwise interested in land speculation within the Presidency, or in Native States under the Madras Government, all of which practices are forbidden by the Civil Service Covenant or the Orders of the Government of India; whether Civil servants who have notified these breaches of the covenant to the Madras Government have been subjected to most unfair treatment, that has been acknowledged by, and partially redressed by, the Secretary of State; and, whether the Secretary of State will order a general inquiry into the subject, or take such steps as are necessary for the cessation of these irregularities, the future strict observance of the covenant, and the full protection of those Civil servants who, in the discharge of their duty, are bound to inform the superior

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  authorities of eases of infringement of the covenant?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Sir JOHN GORST): Charges of the kind stated were brought against the gentleman referred to, and before any decision was arrived at he tendered his resignation, which was accepted. To the second and third Question my answer is, No. Such steps as are necessary to insure the future strict observation of the Regulation in question have already been taken by the Secretary of State.

  NAVY—LIEUTENANTS AND SUB-LIEUTENANTS.
  MR. DE LISLEasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether there are a sufficient number of Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants upon The Navy List, to carry on the duties of the service as watchkeepers, and to take command of torpedo and picket boats in time of war; and, if so, how it comes that in a time of peace their Lordships recently refused to accept the resignation of a Lieutenant who was able to give what have, until recently, been considered sufficient grounds to have such a request granted?
  THE FIRST LORD (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON): Exceptional measures would have to be taken in time of war to provide the number of Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants required for the duties specified, which could not be resorted to in time of peace. Owing to various causes there was at the latter part of last year an insufficient number of Lieutenants available to meet all the requirements at that time; so the Admiralty were, in consequence, compelled in the public interest to withhold their assent for the time to certain officers of that rank resigning their commissions.

  STATE OF IRELAND—DISTURBANCES AT YOUGHAL.
  MR. LANEasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether the following statements, which appeared in The Times of last Friday, are true:—That a determined effort was made on the previous night to burn the house of Inspector Kerin at Youghal; that the crowd broke the windows of the Protestant Schools and the Methodist
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  Church at Youghal; that children of 12 to 14 years of age were found drunk in the doorways, early on Thursday morning, in the streets of Youghal; and, whether any official Report, in reference to the above alleged outrages, was made by the local police officer to the authorities at Dublin Castle previous to this Question appearing on the Notice Paper?
  THE CHIEF SECRETARY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR): This Question was on the Paper for Tuesday without Notice. The hon. Member was then informed that local inquiry was necessary. He has put it down again without leaving time for the receipt of the reply in course of post, even assuming that the local officer could answer by return, and without making any inquiry. All I can say, therefore, is that no official Report had up to yesterday been received in Dublin as to the alleged occurrences.
  MR. LANE: I must ask the right hon. Gentleman if he is not aware that a contradiction of the report in The Times appeared in the London papers last Saturday?
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I have got no official Report yet.
  MR. J. REDMOND: Will the right hon. Gentleman permit me to ask——
  MR. SPEAKER: Order, order!

  NAVY—WIDOWS OF SEAMEN AND MARINES.
  CAPTAIN PRICEasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, What steps have been taken to carry out the recommendations of the Duke of Edinburgh's Committee as to making provision for the widows of seamen in the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines?
  THE FIRST LORD (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON): The Admiralty have not yet been able to take practical action on this Report; but if my hon. and gallant Friend would confer with me I could point out to him the nature of the difficulties we have to contend with.

  EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—GREENWICH HOSPITAL SCHOOL.
  CAPTAIN PRICEasked the Vice President of the Committee of Council on Education, Whether there is any reason why the usual Government

  525
  Grant should not be given to the Greenwich Hospital Schools, in the same way as to other schools of a similar nature?
  THE VICE PRESIDENT (Sir WILLIAM HART DYKE), in reply, said, no application had ever been made to the Department on behalf of the schools. Should such an application be made, he saw no reason why they should not deal with the case on its merits.

  PROSECUTION OF OFFENCES ACTS—THE REGULATIONS—RESULTS.
  MR. HENRY H. FOWLERasked the Secretary of State for the Homo Department, Whether he will instruct the Director of Public Prosecutions to make a Report showing the working of the Regulations made, in 1880, for carrying out the Prosecution of Offences Acts. 1879 and 1884, with statistics showing the number, nature, cost, and result of the proceedings instituted by the Director in accordance with those Regulations; and, whether he will lay such Report upon the Table before the Vote for Public Prosecutions is taken?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. MATTHEWS): I have consulted the Director of Public Prosecutions, and he tells me that he will be able to prepare such a Return as the right hon. Member asks for; and, provided the Vote for Public Prosecutions is not taken before Easter, the Return will be ready before then. There will be no objection to lay the Return on the Table of the House.

  INDIA (MADRAS)—SALE OF MUNICIPAL BUILDINGS IN OOTACAMUND.
  MR. TUITEasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether, in August, 1881, the Commissioner of the Nilgiri Hills, ex-officio President of the Municipality, ordered the local fund engineer to value certain municipal buildings in Ootacamund; whether the engineer reported their value to be Rs. 3200; whether, in spite of this valuation, these buildings were then sold privately to the senior member of the Madras Board of Revenue for Rs. 100 only; whether these facts were last year formally brought to public notice; and, whether, as the matter has been so severely commented on by the
  526
  Native and European Press in India, he will say whether these statements are true?
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Sir JOHN GORST): the statements alluded to in the Question have been made by one officer of the Madras Government, and denied by another. As no formal inquiry has been made into the accuracy of the statements, I am unable to say whether they are true or not.

  WAR OFFICE—COAST DEFENCES—MARTELLO TOWERS.
  MR. NORRISasked the Secretary of State for War, The number of Martello towers that are situate on the coast between Brighton and Dover, and if he can say for what purposes they are used; if the sites of these Martello towers could not be adapted, at a very small cost, to a "disappearing system" of fortifications, by substituting a pit in place of the tower and adopting the Moncrieff gun carriage; what, if any, fortifications exist on the South East Coast, from Pevensey Bay to Pett Level; and, whether the old Military Canal at the last-named place, now unused, could not be adapted to defensive purposes?
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON)(who replied) said: There are 43 Martello towers between Brighton and Dover, one of which is armed with a 7-inch rifled breech-loading gun. Nineteen carry smooth-bore ordnance; and the remainder are used as barracks, or let. the sites could be made use of for guns; but the towers themselves could not be adapted to "disappearing," or any other modern mounting for heavy guns. With the exception of 14 towers, all at Povensey, there arc no fortifications between Pevensey Bay and the Pelt Level at Winchelsea. The old Military Canal retains its value as an obstacle in the event of a hostile force landing in the neighbourhood.

  WAR OFFICE—ROMAN CATHOLIC ARMY CHAPLAIN'S.
  MR. W. J. CORBETasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether the services of the acting

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  Roman Catholic Army Chaplains at Portsmouth, Hilsea, Fareham, Dover, Shorncliffe, Colchester, and Cyprus are to be dispensed with; if it is the intention of the Authorities, on the retirement of the nest Roman Catholic Commissioned Chaplain, not to fill up the vacancy; and, if so, whether, in view of the number of Roman Catholics serving in the Army, the War Office will reconsider their determination relative to the dismissal of Roman Catholic Chaplains; and, if a corresponding induction is proposed to be made in the number of Church of England Army Chaplains?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. E. STANHOPE): the acting Roman Catholic Chaplains at Portsmouth, Chatham, and Colchester are to be relieved by commissioned Chaplains returning from Egypt on the reduction of the force there. The acting Chaplain at Cyprus was sent out specially on account of the invalids from Egypt; and as there is no longer an invalid depot there he has been brought homo, and sent to relieve the acting Chaplains at Hilsea and Fareham. It has also been decided to dispense with an acting Chaplain at Dover, as the work there is not considered to be more than sufficient for one Chaplain. No change is contemplated at Skorncliffe. There is no intention of reducing the number of Roman Catholic commissioned Chaplains. The Church of England acting Chaplains will also be reduced, as a consequence of troops coming home from Egypt.

  WAR OFFICE—WOOLWICH CADETS—THE JUBILEE REVIEW AT ALDERSHOT.
  MR. E. R. RUSSELLasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether arrangements will be made to enable the Cadets of the Royal Military School at Woolwich to take part under their own officers in the Review which is to take place at Aldershot in honour of Her Majesty's Jubilee?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. E. STANHOPE): the arrangements for this Review are not yet complete, and I cannot, therefore, answer this Question at present. But I may say that the amount of money at my disposal is very limited.

  THE QUEEN'S JUBILEE CELEBRATION—A SPECIAL HOLIDAY.
  COLONEL ANSTRUTHERasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether, considering that Tuesday, the 21st of June, is to be observed as a public holiday, he can see his way to recommend that the Monday previous should, by Royal Proclamation or otherwise, be kept as a special Bank Holiday, so as to grant to Her Majesty's subjects three consecutive days in which to celebrate Her Jubilee?
  THE FIRST LORD (Mr. W. H. SMITH): I am sorry to say that I cannot hold out any prospect to my hon. and gallant Friend that Monday, the 20th of June, will be proclaimed as a national holiday, in addition to Tuesday, the 21st.

  COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE—THE HESSIAN FLY.
  MR. H. GARDNERasked the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Whether his attention has been called to the reported presence of chrysalide of the Hessian fly in the siftings of threshing machines in Hertfordshire and Essex; and, whether, in view of the urgency of the danger, he will take stops at once to publish official instructions on the subject?
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H. SMITH)(who replied) said: The attention of the Agricultural Department has been called to this matter, and specimens of both infested substances have been sent to the Department by Mr. Whitehead. A warning has been printed, and is about to be issued to all Local Authorities in Great Britain.

  INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, DUBLIN—APPOINTMENTS.
  MR. J. E. REDMONDasked the Secretary to the Treasury, If it is a fact that the principal posts in the Inland Revenue Department in Dublin are filled by Englishmen, and if the two important posts of Controller of Legacy Duty and Controller of Stamps were filled by transfers of minor Clerks from the London Office to these appointments, over the heads of competent Irishmen, of long experience, in the Irish Office in

  529
  Dublin; if it is a fact that a scheme of re-organization is at present being carried out by an official from London; if there is any rule in the Department which excludes Irishmen from promotion; and, if he will lay upon the Table the draft scheme of reorganization before it has been finally adopted?
  THE SECRETARY (Mr. JACKSON): I am informed that the answer to all the Questions of the hon. Member is no, Sir.

  STATE OF IRELAND—THE RIOTS AT YOUGHAL.
  MR. LANEasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether he has seen a copy of the following letter, which was addressed by Dr. Charles Ronayne, J.P. (the only magistrate living in the town of Youghal) to Mr. Kerin, the District Inspector of Youghal:—
  "Dear Sir,—I am just after coming from the death of a fine young man, who was stabbed by a policeman. I went to the barracks to see who was in charge of the police, and to inquire what circumstances produced the sad business. I found there a number of strange police, and a young officer, Mr. Somerville, who assumed the responsibility of having ordered the charge that caused this young man's death. Now, as I have taken great pains for the past 24 hours to preserve the peace in this usually quiet town, and as I am of opinion that there was not the least danger to apprehend any public disturbance, and as I am afraid 'that it was the advent of these new men led to this calamity, I desire to know from you, as the residing District Inspector, under what circumstances they were brought or sent here.—Yours faithfully,
  " 8th March 1887. CHARLES RONAYNE; "
  whether this magistrate had been taking a very active part for some days previously, in co-operation with the Catholic clergymen of Youghal, in allaying the excitement caused by the threatened arrest of the Reverend Father Keller; why the police authorities ignored him by not consulting him as to the necessity of bringing a force of strange police into Youghal; and, whether the preservation of the peace of Youghal has been transferred from the magistrates of Youghal to the police officer?
  THE CHIEF SECRETARY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR: This Question has been referred to the District Inspector for the local inquiries necessary. There has not been time for the receipt of his reply.
  MR. LANE: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman the number of days' Notice he will require to be given of a Question for the purpose of receiving an answer by telegraph from an official in Ireland?
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: It entirely depends upon the special circumstances of each case.

  LEGACY AND SUCCESSION—DUTIES—COPIES OF RESIDUARY ACCOUNTS.
  MR. FINCH-HATTONasked Mr. Attorney General, Whether repeated applications have been made by residuary legatees and others interested in the estates of deceased persons, to the Controller of Legacy and Succession Duties, for office copies of residuary accounts passed by executors; whether such applications are refused, unless upon an order of the executors or an order of one of Her Majesty's Judges of the Court of Chancery; and, whether persons interested are obliged to apply to the Court for an administration suit where executors refuse to render proper accounts to beneficiaries, and are thus put to unnecessary expense; and, if so, whether the present rule cannot be altered?
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir RICHARD WEBSTER): It is the fact that applications are at times made by persons for inspection of residuary accounts passed by executors, and that such applications are refused unless the written consent of the executors is obtained the documents are also produced in Court on subpœna. It is also the fact that when executors refuse to render accounts beneficiaries have to apply to the Court for an order for administration of the estate. The documents at the Inland Revenue Office are filed there merely for the purpose of the Revenue, and not for public inspection, and are treated as quasi-confidential documents. The Inland Revenue officials have no means of ascertaining whether persons making the application are, or are not, persons interested, or beneficiaries. It would, in my opinion, be detrimental to the Public Service if intending litigants were permitted to have access to the books and papers filed at Somerset House; as, in the circumstances, I do not see that the Rule can or ought to be altered.

  EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—OUTBREAK AT EXETER TRAINING COLLEGE.
  MR. SYDNEY BUXTONasked the Vice President of the Committee of Council on Education, Whether his attention has been called to the recent out break among the students at the Exeter Training College; and, whether it is his intention to institute any inquiry into the circumstances attending it, and into the complaints of the second year students in regard to the teaching staff?
  THE VICE PRESIDENT (Sir WILLIAM HART DYKE): A detailed statement of the circumstances attending the outbreak at the Exeter Training College has been placed in my hands by the Principal of the College, from which it appears that the students have now submitted to discipline, and expressed their regret for what occurred. No further inquiry on this point seems to be necessary; but I have thought it best to communicate with Her Majesty's Inspector of Training Colleges, who, at his next visit, will pay special attention to the qualifications of that member of the teaching staff in respect of whom complaint has been made.

  CONTAGIOUS DISEASES (ANIMALS) ACTS—IMPORTATION OF CATTLE FROM IRELAND INTO SCOTLAND.
  MR. O'DOHERTYasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether his attention has been called to the action of certain Local Authorities in Scotland with regard to forbidding the importation of cattle from Ireland generally; whether any distinction is made by these Authorities either as to the locality or port from which cattle are sent or as to the sort of cattle, whether store or dairy-cattle; whether any disease has been traced to any, and what, Irish port and what class of cattle was affected; whether he will call the attention of the Scottish Authorities to page 22 of the last Report of the Agricultural Department of the English Privy Council, where it is shown that 69 per cent of the cases of pleuro-pneumonia in Scotland are shown to be in the dairy stock of Glasgow and Edinburgh; whether he will make representations in the proper quarter in Scotland, so as to prevent
  532
  these powers of sanitary regulations from being an injury to the export trade of Ireland; whether it is a fact that two years ago some similar action was taken but afterwards modified, so far as the Ports of Derry and Belfast were concerned, on the protest of the Irish Authorities; and, whether he will take similar energetic action to have the same modifications made immediately?
  THE CHIEF SECRETARY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR): This subject is much too extensive and important to be dealt with satisfactorily within the limits of the answer to a Question. The Scottish Local Authorities have no power to prohibit generally the importation of cattle from Ireland. They have power to prohibit the movement of cattle into their districts from other districts in Great Britain; and the attention of the Veterinary Department in Ireland has recently been drawn to the manner in which this power has, in some cases, been exercised, as being calculated to interfere with the export trade in Ireland. This, I presume, is what the hon. Member refers to. With regard to the recent detection of disease at Irish ports, the facts are that pleuro-pneumonia has been detected in three dairy cattle at the Port of Dublin, and that one bullock shipped at Drogheda was also found to be similarly affected. With the exception of the Dublin District Ireland is, I am happy to say, entirely free from pleuro-pneumonia. So far as I have been able to ascertain, the circumstances of the present difficulty with the Scottish Authorities are not precisely similar to those of a former occasion to which the hon. Member refers, and they may possibly not be so easily arranged; but I shall give instructions to the Veterinary Department in Dublin to communicate at once to the Agricultural Department of the English Privy Council the representations already made, and also any further representations that may be received on the subject, and to request that Department to urge upon the Scottish Local Authorities to exercise their powers with as much consideration for the Irish export trade as is possible.

  DISTRESS IN THE METROPOLIS—THE CONFERENCE.
  CAPTAIN COLOMBasked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether the

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  attention of the Government has been directed to the proceedings of an important Conference held on the 21st January, to consider the question of the distress existing in London, at which a Resolution was passed calling upon the Government to institute an exhaustive inquiry into the extent, character, and causes of the distress existing in London; and, if so, whether it is contemplated that any steps should be taken to give effect to the views of the Conference?
  THE PRESIDENT (Mr. RITCHIE): Yes, Sir; the attention of Her Majesty's Government has been directed to the Conference in question, which was of an essentially representative character. The Resolution passed at such Conference was forwarded to the Prime Minister, who has conferred with me on the subject, with the result that the Government have determined to institute an inquiry as to the employment and earnings and other particulars with regard to the working classes in four typical districts in the Metropolis. The districts selected are in St. George's-in-the-East, Battersea, Deptford, and Hackney. Each district has a population of about 50,000 persons, and is chiefly populated by persons of the working classes. The information which it is sought to obtain is of an exhaustive character; and the inquiries will be made from house to house by enumerators acting under the Registrars of Births and Deaths in the several districts. The Registrar General, through the agency of his Department, will render all the assistance he can to secure accuracy in the Returns. The Returns will be tabulated in the General Register Office, and will afterwards be submitted to Parliament. The inquiry will, I hope, commence on Saturday.

  EGYPT (FINANCE, &c.)—THE "OCTROI" AT CAIRO.
  MR. PICTONasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If it is true, as stated in a letter from Cairo to The Times of Wednesday, that—
  "A poor man cannot bring his cow or buffalo into the town without paying 20 francs each time for the transit;"
  whether there is any truth in the assertion made in the same letter, that, in consequence of the heavy octroi—
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  "Whole loads of cabbages, &c, are actually often thrown away, because: the tax on their admission is more than the cultivator could hope to gain on the sale;"
  and, whether there is any reason to believe, as alleged, that—
  "The land, which ought to he one of the most fertile in the world, is made comparatively barren by these; oppressive exactions, which, added to a heavy Land Tax, become actually crushing?"
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (Sir JAMES FERGUSSON): The Octroi Duty in Egyptian towns is heavy, and a Bill was lately introduced into the Legislative Council to modify it in favour of the country people; but the Council did not pass it. Her Majesty's Government have no reason to believe, as alleged in the Question of the hon. Member, that the land is going out of cultivation on account of these and other burdens; on the contrary, though the Land Tax is still heavy, cultivation is extending itself, the indebtedness of the peasantry has diminished, and their material condition has improved.

  ROYAL IRISH CONSTABULARY—CO. TIPPERARY.
  MR. P. J. O'BRIENasked the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Whether it is a fact that the regular Constabulary Force for the North Riding of the County of Tipperary stands at 309 men; whether out of that number there are at present only 266 men in active service in the district; whether the sum of £1,000 is annually paid out of the Riding for what is termed extra police; whether, including the so-called extra police, the regular force is at present short to the number of 19; and, if so, whether he will fill up the regular Parliamentary quota, and relieve the ratepayers from this tax for extra police who are not in the district; whether, at the recent Spring Assizes at Nenagh, where the presentment for this extra police tax was opposed, the Pro-siding Judge, Baron Dowse, replying to the Traverser, made use of these words—
  "It is imperative on me to pass this presentment, otherwise I would be most happy to concede to the just application;"
  whether he will inform the House, or give a Return, as to the number of per-

  535
  sons who are at present under police protection, and the number of men employed in discharge of protection duty in North Tipperary; and, for what purpose, with the comparative absence of crime in the county, as stated by Baron Dowse, the ratepayers are burdened with this tax for extra police?
  THE CHIEF SECRETARY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR): Part of this Question I have already answered. It is renewed with some additions, and without Notice, and it cannot be fully answered without local inquiry on some points. I can at once say, however, that the entire free force is not 309 men, as stated by the hon. Member, but 266.
  DR. TANNER: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he will obtain exactly the number of extra police employed in police protection?
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I have just told the other hon. Member that I will cause inquiries to be made.

  LAW AND JUSTICE—THE KENTISH TOWN MURDER.
  MR. SHIRLEYasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is the intention of the Government to offer a reward for the apprehension of the perpetrators of the recent Kentish Town murder, as recommended by various members of the Coroner's Jury?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE (Mr. MATTHEWS): The question of offering a reward in the case of this murder is still under consideration; but, as the hon. Member may be aware, rewards are only offered by the Home Office under very exceptional circumstances.

  ARMY ESTIMATES—THE SELECT COMMITTEE.
  MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMANasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether he can inform the House when the Motion will be made for the appointment of a Select Committee to consider the Army Estimates?
  THE FIRST LORD (Mr. W. H. SMITH): It is the intention of the Government, so soon as the necessary Votes have been taken in the Navy Estimates, to move to refer the
  536
  Army and Navy Estimates to a Select Committee, to report their observations on the several Votes to the House.

  NAVY—THE DOCKYARD WORKS AT HAULBOWLINE—DISCHARGE OF WORKMEN.
  MR. HOOPERasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether he is aware that a notice to the following effect was posted yesterday at Haul-bowline Dockyard Works:—
  "On 1st June 80 men monthly to be discharged.—By order of Lords Commissioners of Admiralty;"
  whether, in the event of the Motion to be made as to the subject of the disappointing rate of progress which is being made with Haulbowline Works, he will direct all steps in pursuance of this official notice to be held in abeyance pending a full debate on this subject in the House?
  THE FIRST LORD (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON), in reply, said, he quite sympathized with the hon. Gentleman's object; but the fact was that the notice in question was given because the work on which the men were engaged was just approaching completion.

  METROPOLIS—MAGNITUDE OF THE DEBT.
  MR. WOOTTON ISAACSONasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether, in view of the growing magnitude of the Metropolitan debt secured on the rates, and the great burden thereby imposed on the ratepayers, the Government will consider the desirability of introducing a Bill to limit the total borrowing powers on this security?
  THE FIRST LORD (Mr. W. H. SMITH): The borrowing powers of the Metropolitan Board of Works are granted by an annual Act of Parliament. The Treasury require that the Bill for this purpose should have attached to it tables showing over a series of years the borrowing powers, the progress of the debt and of the sinking fund, and the amount of rate levied, in order that Metropolitan Members and others interested in the question may have the means of forming a judgment upon the general financial policy of the Board, and may be in a position to discuss the

  537
  whole question, or the particular provisions of the Bill, when it is before the House. It appears to me that it lies with the Metropolitan Members, rather than with Her Majesty's Government, to call the attention of the House to this question of Local Government, if they should consider that the indebtedness of the Metropolis is increasing at too great a rate.

  CRIME AND OUTRAGE (IRELAND)—THE RIOTS AT YOUGHAL—THE ATTACK ON THE POLICE.
  MR. LANE: I beg to ask the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland the following Question, of which I have given him private Notice:—Whether he has seen the report in to-day's London papers of the proceedings at the inquest of the fisherman O'Hanlon, killed by the police at Youghal, at which Mr. Somerville, the police officer, swore there was no truth in the Chief Secretary's statement that 21 out of 22 policemen were severely injured, and that he (Mr. Somerville) had not made any such report to the authorities; and, if so, whether the Chief Secretary will state to the House from what source he received the information he conveyed to the House on Tuesday?
  THE CHIEF SECRETARY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR): As the hon. Gentleman is aware, I made the statement in answer to a Question put to me without Notice by the hon. Member for the Scotland Division of Liverpool (Mr. T. P. O'Connor), and in making the statement I said I would not guarantee
  538
  its accuracy. What I stated was that 21 out of 22 policemen were injured. What appears to be the fact is that 21 out of the 22 were hit, that 15 of them were hurt, and three of them were severely hurt.
  Mr. LANE: Has the right hon. Gentleman since seen the statement, sworn to by Mr. Somerville, that there was no truth in the statement he made to the House on Tuesday night?
  MR. A. J. BALFOURsaid, so far as he could make out, the statement of District Inspector Somerville was correct.
  MR. CLANCY: Will the right hon. Gentleman state who first gave him his information?
  [No reply.]
  MR. LANE: I have given the right hon. Gentleman private Notice of the following Question:—Whether he is aware that at the inquest on O'Hanlon, now being held at Youghal, the Coroner has made frequent complaints about receiving no assistance from the police officer; whether the District Inspector refused to execute a warrant against a policeman who was committed for contempt of Court; and, whether he will telegraph orders to the police officer at Youghal to render the same assistance in this case as he would in a case in which the suspected culprit was not a member of the Constabulary?
  MR. A. J. BALFOUR: I have received no information to that effect; and, under the circumstances, I could not think of sending such a telegram.
  MR. LANE: The information is in this morning's papers.

STATEMENT EXPLANATORY OF THE NAVY ESTIMATES, 1887–88,
AND OF THE
POLICY EMBODIED THEREIN.

STATEMENT EXPLANATORY OF THE NAVY ESTIMATES, 1887–88,

  ALTERATIONS IN FORM OF ESTIMATES.
  IT will be observed that certain changes have been adopted in, and additions made to, the form in which the Appendices to the Estimates have hitherto been drawn up. The primary object of these alterations has been to place before the House in the simplest form the fullest possible information upon past and proposed future expenditure. Statements are also furnished in considerable detail of the capital stock of the nation in its Navy, Dockyards, and contents of the storehouses. These Statements will form the groundwork of a Capital Account which, it is hoped, may be presented in a more complete state next year.
  In the detailed programme * of works to be undertaken during the year will be found under a separate heading for each vessel building particulars of her type, tonnage, load-draught, speed at mean-load draught, coal capacity, and armament as designed and approved. In the same column are shown the original estimated cost, as well as the outlay as at present anticipated, also the amount of the expenditure on each vessel during past financial years, with the probable actual outlay during the year ending on 31st March, 1887.
  The total estimated cost of each vessel, including the estimated charge falling on Army as well as on Naval Votes, is also set out, thus affording information of the total outlay on the vessel complete for sea, exclusive of sea stores.
  Hitherto it has not been customary to tabulate, in much detail, the proposed expenditure on the refit and repairs of vessels, it being impossible to give this information with the same approximation as with vessels building. Frequently the Estimates are provisional. They are made prior to the arrival and full survey of the vessel, and often the necessity for outlay only develops during the progress of the work. At the same time, this class of expenditure forms so important an item in the Naval Budget that the fullest possible details are now given of the amount proposed to be allocated to each vessel. The value of such outlays depends largely upon the character of the ship and her probable efficiency after alteration and refit as a vessel of war. Information is, therefore, now furnished which will enable an opinion to be formed upon these points.
  *Appendix to Navy Estimates.
  The ordinary repairs and maintenance on the Channel and other squadrons and the estimated cost of miscellaneous Services are summarised separately. The Appendix also exhibits the proposed expenditure in the aggregate compared with the Votes.
  The Vote for dockyard labour is taken in the present Estimates as a whole, and is not allocated, as has been the practice in past years, to the several Yards. The object of this change is to afford the Controller of the Navy more latitude in the distribution of work, and of the classes of labour, in a manner which may promote greater efficiency and economy in carrying out the varying requirements of the Navy.
  The statement following the Appendices is the first of the series of Tables framed for the purpose of informing Parliament of the value of the property which the nation possesses in the Navy and the Establishments and Services connected therewith.
  In the Table showing the cost of the Navy will be found the name of each effective ship in the Navy, with the year of her completion, original cost of construction, and subsequent total expenditure upon alterations, refits, and maintenance. Vessels which have become inefficient, bat which remain on the list, or those not worth the cost of immediate repair, or which have become obsolete, are placed in a separate category in the Summary, as also is the cost of troop and harbour ships, as well as of yard and other craft belonging to the Service.
  The "Explanations of Differences," which have been previously printed as a separate Parliamentary Paper, are this year included, for the convenience of Members of the House, in the Navy Estimates.

PRESENT CONDITION OF NAVAL FINANCE.

  EXPENDITURE OF 1886–87 AS COMPARED WITH ESTIMATES 1887–88.
  The expenditure (including both Original and Supplementary Estimates) borne by Naval Votes for the year ending 31st March, 1887, is £13,270,100.
  The Estimate of Expenditure for the year ending 31st March, 1888, is £12,476,800, being a decrease of £793,300 compared with the expenditure of the preceding year. A reduction of expenditure generally implies a decrease of the effective strength of the Service with which it is connected. We are fortunate enough to be able to reverse this rule in the present instance. The reduced outlay during the ensuing financial year is accompanied by a material increase in the strength of the Navy, money being found for 62,600 officers and men in 1887℃88 as against 61,400 in the preceding year, whilst the number and power of ships in the 1st Reserve, and ready for commission on 1st April, 1888, will be much in excess of any similar provision for many years past.
  A diminution in the amount of liabilities for vessels and engines constructed by contract is another noticeable feature in the present Financial Statement.
  These liabilities stood at £2,680,000 in April, 1886, and are estimated to be £1,030,000 in April, 1887; yet at the end of the financial year 1887–88, including the cost of new ships and engines contracted for during that year, they will stand at the low figure of £431,000. An almost similar reduction of liability for ships building in the dockyards can be shown.
  The large augmentation in the fighting strength of the Navy which will have been effected simultaneously with a reduction of annual expenditure and incurred liabilities may be accepted as a proof that naval finance, so far as outlay and return are concerned, is now in a satisfactory condition, and that it will be possible, under a system of judicious management, to associate for some time to come a reduction of expenditure with an increase of efficiency.

  REVIEW OF THE LAST SIX YEARS' EXPENDITURE.
  These satisfactory results have been obtained partly by policy, partly by improved methods of administration; but a careful review of the expenditure of the past six years is necessary in order that the significance of our present position, and the causes at work in establishing it, may be understood by Parliament and the country.
  In the period between 1881 and 1885 every Naval Power in Europe, save England, largely increased its naval expenditure. The introduction of slow-burning powder, and the alterations in the design of heavy ordnance which it entailed, whilst giving increased velocity and accuracy to guns of all calibres, produced a corresponding development in the defensive power of armour-clads and protected vessels. Speed in the performance of naval tactics became an even more essential factor than before, and was so recognized abroad; and on vessels of comparatively small displacement successful efforts were made to realize, by engineering ingenuity, a speed wholly unknown to the smaller craft of a few years back.
  These developments of speed and power necessitated increased expense.
  England was the last Naval Power to recognize these now conditions. In 1885, under popular pressure, the Government of that day admitted the insufficiency of its previous arrangements, and, with the assent of all parties in the State, Lord Northbrook, the then First Lord of the Admiralty, proposed to expend, in addition to the ordinary shipbuilding programme, a sum of £3,100,000 in the building of ships by contract in private yards. An additional sum of £1,600,000 for guns was also proposed to be added to the Ordnance Votes of the Navy, which are included in the annual Estimates of expenditure) of the War Office
  The Chancellor of the Exchequer estimated that this outlay would be spread over five years, ending March 31, 1890, and form a portion of the expenditure of the country for that period.
  The work has been executed with such rapidity, that nearly the whole of this expenditure has fallen upon three, instead of five, years. Moreover, the sum of £3,100,000 was found to be insufficient to complete the work it began.
  The following Tables show the difference between the estimate of time and outlay made in 1885 and the actual expenditure of the past two years, and the probable disbursements in the ensuing year.

  NEW CONSTRUCTIONS.

  Special Programme.

  1885–86.

  1886–87

  1887–88

  1888–89

  1889–90

  Total

  £

  £

  £

  £

  £

  £

  Hulls and Engines (Contract Price)

  800,000

  800,000

  500,000

  500,000

  500,000

  3,100,000

  Memorandum.
  Lord Northbrook's special Shipbuilding Programme, as provided for in the Estimates 1885–86, included—

  2 Armour-clads

  6 Steel Torpedo Cruisers.

  5 Belted Cruisers.

  10 first-class Torpedo-boats (4 subsequently added.)

  The financial result of Lord Northbrook's special programme may be summarized thus:—

  1. An excess expenditure of £502,000 on the original Shipbuilding Estimate, which provided for hulls and engines only.

  2. An expenditure on account of ships building of £3,390,000 in three years, instead of an expenditure of £3,100,000 in five years.

  3. An extra expenditure (under Army Votes), roughly estimated at £500,000, for the ammunition and torpedoes necessary for these ships, and for which no special provision was made.

  VOTE OF CREDIT OF 1885.
  Soon after the proposals for this increase to our naval strength had been assented to in 1885, the prospect of a possible war compelled the Government to apply for a large Vote of Credit, of which £2,000,000* was appropriated to naval purposes. A large additional sum was also granted for the manufacture of naval ordnance, and included in the Vote of Credit allotted the War Department.
  *Exclusive of £500,000 for transport (Army Department).
  A considerable amount of orders and of work were given under these Votes of Credit, which were not covered by the sums allotted to them, and have since become a charge upon the annual Estimates.
  These are the causes of the exceptional expenditure of the past two years, for during that period Navy Votes have had to meet not only the ordinary wants and wastage of a great Service, but the accumulated arrears of an antecedent period of insufficient provision.

  AVERAGE EXPENDITURE OF 1881–85 COMPARED WITH 1885–87.
  The average annual expenditure upon the Navy (deducting the Transport Vote, which is for services rendered to the Army) of the four years ended 31st March, 1885, when all the Naval Powers in Europe, except England, were so busy, was—

  £

  Navy Expenditure

  10,628,000

  Gun Navy Expenditure † (Army Vote)

  738,000

  Total average annual expenditure for four years ending 1884–85

  11,360,000

  In 1885–86 Navy expenditure was

  14,724,000

  In 1885–86 Gun expenditure † (Army Vote)

  1,600,000

  Total, 1885–86

  16,324,000

  In 1886–87 Navy expenditure (estimated) was

  12,941,000

  In 1886–87Gun expenditure† (Army Vote)

  1,685,000

  Total, 1886–87

  14,626,000

  being a total excess during the two years of £8,218,000 over and above the average expenditure of the four preceding years.
  If this great sum had been spread over this period of six years more evenly, and if consideration and a continuous policy had attended its disbursement, the Navy at this moment would be far stronger than it is.
  On the other hand, the increase of strength which this sum will ultimately give would have been more economically attained if hurry and scare had not attended its outlay.
  The conclusion to be drawn will, I trust, not be lost sight of by subsequent Administrations and by Parliament.
  † Includes estimated value of services performed by War Office, beyond actual provision for Navy in original Army Estimates.

  SHIPBUILDING POLICY OF PRESENT BOARD.
  Although three successive Boards of Admiralty have been in office since 1885, the policy pursued, so far as shipbuilding and dockyard administration are concerned, has been uniform and continuous. The enormous liabilities and the great number of ships ordered in 1885 induced the Board of July, 1885, of which I was the Head, to concentrate their attention to bringing to as rapid a completion as was possible the programme of shipbuilding they found prescribed, without enlarging it; certain gaps in it were filled, and the vessels laid down for that purpose were in most instances of small displacement, and absolutely necessary to provide for the reliefs of the next and subsequent year.
  The following Statement shows the progress made both in the past and that contemplated in the forthcoming financial year.

  PROGRESS OF SHIP-BUILDING AS COMPARED WITH PROGRAMME 1886–87.
  Completed Ships.
  In the Estimates for 1886–87 (Appendix No. 37) it was anticipated that the following new vessels would be "passed into the 1st Reserve" during the financial year:—

  3

  armoured ships.

  1

  protected ship.

  13

  unprotected ships.

  According to the latest Reports, it appears that the actual figures for the ships named in Appendix No. 37, as to be completed in 1886–87, will stand at the end of March, 1887, at 1 armoured ship, 1 protected, 13 unprotected.
  Two armoured ships—"Rodney" and "Warspite"—have not been completed as was intended; the "Warspite" because of changes in rig and certain details, resulting from experience with "Impérieuse" at sea; the "Rodney" because of delays in supply of guns and gun-mountings.
  Three unprotected ships—"Fearless," "Lizard," and "Bramble"—have been delayed in delivery by contractors, and, consequently, have not been completed by the date they would have been had contract terms been kept.
  Besides the ships that have been completed, or will be finished in 1886–87, it is anticipated that thirty-five out of the fifty-five first-class boats of 125 feet to 150 feet in length will be completed in 1886–87; the remaining twenty torpedo-boats are complete in armament, and will be ready for service in June.
  Furthermore, it must be noted that out of the sixteen ships shown as to be passed into 1st Reserve in 1885–86 (Appendix 37, Navy Estimates for 1886–87), fully one-half (including 2 armoured, 3 partially-protected, 3 unprotected ships) had money spent upon their actual completion in 1886–87.
  The whole addition to the Fleet in 1886–87, excluding small craft, has therefore been:—

  3

  armoured ships.

  1

  protected ship.

  3

  partially-protected ships.

  13

  unprotected ships.

  Under the Orders issued by the present Board, every vessel when passed into the 1st Class Reserve is supposed to be ready for sea in forty-eight hours, and the officers of the respective yards are held responsible that all vessels so passed are maintained in that condition.
  Advancement of New Ships.
  The general character of the work done on new ships in 1886–87, besides the completion of those above named, may be best described as rapid advancement. For the dockyard work, the facts are set forth in the draft programme for 1887–88, the most notable examples of rapid progress being the "Trafalgar," "Nile,"
  *See p. 14.
  550

  551
  "Immortalité, "and" Aurora. "Results have amply justified the decision taken in framing the Estimates for 1886–87 to make liberal provision for the expenditure on labour on each of these vessels.
  Causes of Delay on New Ships.
  Some difficulties have arisen, as was anticipated, from the circumstance that so many of the armoured ships laid down previous to 1885 are very nearly in the same stage of advancement towards completion, requiring hydraulic machinery and gun-mountings simultaneously. Until the "Collingwood's" barbette-mountings had been actually tested, work on the corresponding mountings for other vessels of the "Admiral" class could not be taken in hand. When these trials were completed the orders given for other ships were of exceptional magnitude and urgency, greatly taxing the resources of the manufacturers.
  The great exertions which the contractors have made to improve their means of meeting these special demands render it improbable that there will be in future a recurrence of delay from ships being in advance of their gun-mountings.
  Delays in delivery of guns by the War Office have also affected the completion of some ships.
  Contract Work, 1886–87.
  The work on now ships building by contract has been pushed forward with great rapidity, and the sums earned have exceeded those provided in the Estimates for 1886–87.
  During the financial year there have been delivered:—

  6

  torpedo cruisers ("Archer" class).

  1

  torpedo cruiser ("Fearless").

  4

  composite gun-boats ("Battler" class).

  Four out of the five belted cruisers have been launched, and the fifth is to be launched on the 10th March. It is anticipated that the first of these vessels will be delivered early in 1887–88, and that all of them will be in the dockyards nest summer, and it is hoped that they will all be completed by April, 1888.
  The "Renown" and "Sanspareil" are also advancing rapidly. The former is to be launched in April, and the latter in May, 1887, two years from the date of signing the contract.
  The "Benbow" has been delivered by the contractors, has made her steam trials, and is now being completed at Chatham.
  The six torpedo cruisers of the "Archer" class recently delivered have given some trouble in their preliminary steam-trials, and their completion has consequently been delayed. It is hoped, however, that two of them will be practically completed this financial year, and the others advanced. It may be anticipated that their speed on the measured mile will be 17 knots.
  The "Fearless," sister ship to the "Scout," was delayed by a fire at the contractor's premises, otherwise she would have been completed this financial year.
  Torpedo Flotilla.
  Passing to the smaller vessels of the torpedo flotilla, the "Rattlesnake" has been delivered and tried, attaining a speed of 19½ knots, the estimated speed being 19 knots. It is probable that by changes in propellers a better performance will be obtained.
  This vessel is the first of the "torpedo gun-boat" class. She was practically completed at the works of the contractors, and will speedily be ready for her sea trials, which will furnish very important information.
  Now that her machinery trials are over, the other three vessels of the class building in the dockyards will be pushed on.
  Experimental Trials of Now Ships, 1886–87.
  During 1886–87 the sea trials of two important armoured ships, the "Colossus" and "Impérieuse," have been made. In the "Colossus" very few
  552

  553
  alterations have been suggested as the result of experience at sea. In the "Impérieuse," and following her, in the "Warspite," it has been decided to abolish the sails, and to depend entirely upon steam-power applied to twin screws.
  With the important exception of being more deeply immersed than was anticipated, the "Impérieuse" in her trials fully realized the expectations of her design. Notwithstanding her deep draught, she is now, taking the essentials of speed, armament, and armour into consideration, if not actually the most powerful, one of the most powerful iron-clad cruisers afloat of her tonnage.
  Sails have also been removed from the "Neptune" during her present refit, in order to increase her efficiency as a fighting machine.
  The protected cruiser "Mersey" has been completed and sent on experimental service to test systems of submarine torpedo discharge Her steam trials, and those of her sister vessels, "Severn" and "Thames," have shown the class to possess a smooth-water maximum speed of 18 knots.
  The first of the torpedo cruiser class, the "Scout," has also been completed and commissioned in 1886–87, as well as the torpedo gun-vessels "Curlew" and "Landrail." Both of these represent new classes in the Navy.

  TRIALS OF TORPEDO-BOATS.
  Some interesting trials have been made during 1886–87 with the various types of first-class torpedo-boats 125 feet in length. These trials led to a modification in the form of the bow and in the torpedo armament of twenty-five of the boats. Great exertions have been made to accelerate the completion of the boats, the work on the torpedo fittings being of a novel and delicate nature, and only twenty will, it is anticipated, be incomplete in small fittings at the end of March, the torpedo armaments of these being finished.
  The 150-feet boat purchased of Mr. White is practically completed, and the 130-feet boat, by Messrs. Yarrow, will be delivered in 1886–87. These examples of larger-dimensioned boats will furnish useful information when tried at sea, as to how far they will comply with the conditions of a sea-going torpedo-boat available for use in all weathers.

  DECISION OF THE BOARD UPON SEA-GOING TORPEDO-VESSELS AND SECOND CLASS TORPEDO-BOATS.
  The Board have carefully considered the types and dimensions of the torpedo-boats, which experience and experiment have shown to be best adapted for sea-service or harbour-defence. The practical tests during recent evolutions imposed upon first-class torpedo-boats, that is, boats intended for open-sea service, and upwards of 100 feet in length, have shown that they could not, in actual warfare, stand the strain of the daily wear and tear to which they might be exposed. The discomfort and hardships which their crews have to endure in rough weather, the loss of speed to which, after steaming a certain number of hours at full pressure, they are subject, owing to the tendency of their necessarily-contracted boiler tubes to choke, disqualify boats of these dimensions from taking the prominent part in warfare in the open sea which their adherents claimed for them. The Board have therefore decided in future to build for seagoing purposes vessels of larger dimensions, capable of acting both on the offensive and defensive in torpedo warfare in the open sea. These vessels to be of the "Rattlesnake" type, capable of maintaining for many hours the initial speed of the ordinary torpedo-boat, armed with quick-firing guns, and another gun of a larger calibre, and affording adequate accommodation and protection to the complement they carry for sea-going purposes.
  The Board have decided upon adopting a new type of second-class torpedo-boat, capable of being lifted on board ships of a certain displacement, and which would be carried by the ship for service in the place of the larger or first-class torpedo-boats which now are supposed to accompany a squadron.
  The 125-feet torpedo-boats now building or built have, in most instances, been allotted to the defence of the great military ports and coaling stations, where they will remain.
  Two improved boats of the second-class have been ordered from Messrs. Yarrow, and are to be completed in a short time.
  Important experiments have also been undertaken with a view to determine the most suitable torpedo-armament for boats.

  DEFENCE AGAINST TORPEDOES.
  During 1886–87, great attention has been given to the development of defence against torpedo attack. A Committee has been investigating net defences; several of our battle ships are already fitted with this system of torpedo defence, and further experimental fittings are being tried on the "Hercules" and "Collingwood."
  The torpedo experiments on the "Resistance" have also afforded valuable information as to the explosive power of the torpedo.

  ELECTRIC LIGHTING.
  Electric lighting, for search-lights and internal illumination, has also been greatly extended. A staff of skilled supervisors and fitters for electrical work has been organized in each dockyard.

  PROGRESS IN SHIPBUILDING IN 1887–88.
  The coming financial year will be very remarkable for the great number of ships which will be completed and added to the effective list. It may be anticipated that the following ships will be finished, and passed into the 1st Reserve, as ready for commission:—

  Armoured ships

  10

  3 of "Admiral" class—"Rodney," "Howe," "Benbow."

  "Warspite."

  "Hero."

  5 belted cruisers (contract-built)

  Protected ships

  2

  "Severn."

  "Thames."

  Torpedo cruisers

  7

  6 of "Archer" class.

  "Fearless."

  Torpedo gun-boats ("Rattlesnake" class)

  3

  Composite sloops & gun-boats ("Buzzard" & "Rattier" classes)

  3

  25

  At the end of 1887–88, another armoured ship, the "Campordown," will be nearly finished, and so will be the protected cruiser "Forth." The "Anson" will be approaching completion.
  The belted cruisers "Immortalité" and "Aurora" will be far advanced; the "Trafalgar" and "Nile" will be the great causes of further liability.
  The "Renown" and "Sanspareil" are to be delivered, according to contract, in October, 1888, and if no unforeseen hindrances arise, there is good reason to believe this date will be kept.
  Out of thirty-seven ships, building or incomplete, at the commencement of 1887–88, it is hoped twenty-six will be complete by the end of the year, leaving only nine out of the programme of 1885, and two other ships not belonging to this programme, to be finished in subsequent years.

  NEW SHIPS TO BE LAID DOWN IN 1887–88.
  The now programme of works proposed for 1887–88 includes the following:—

  20-knot steel-bottomed protected cruisers, at Chatham

  2

  19¾-knot copper-bottomed protected cruisers, 2 by contract and 1 at Portsmouth

  3

  Composite sloop ("Buzzard")

  1

  Composite gun-boats (improved "Rattlers")

  6

  "Grasshopper" class

  1

  13

  Of the "Rattlers" it need merely be said that they differ from the "Rattler" herself only in having a poop, being about 1 foot broader, and of about 40 tons greater displacement. The steam trials of "Rattler" and "Wasp" have been very satisfactory, speeds of 13½ to 13¾ knots having been attained.
  The new "Buzzards" are "repeats" of the "Buzzard" now building at Sheerness—speed on the measured mile, 15 knots.
  Both the "Rattlers" and "Buzzards" have a fair amount of sail, and coppered bottoms. Rattlers have single screws; Buzzards twin screws.
  To the ships included in the above programme should be added the "Daphne," composite sloop of the "Buzzard" class, which, although not forming part of the programme in the Estimates of 1886–87, has been already commenced at Sheerness. The preparations made in 1886–87, though involving small expense, will enable the work to be pushed on rapidly in 1887–88.

  POLICY TO BE PURSUED IN REGARD TO SMALL VESSELS.
  These gun-boats and sloops have been laid down to make provision for the relief of small vessels on different stations during the next two years. A careful inquiry into the composition of our squadrons abroad has made clear that too large a proportion of our naval strength is absorbed by small vessels, which, however well adapted for police purposes in time of peace, or for operations in shoal water and rivers in time of war, would be of comparatively little value for the protection of our commerce on the high seas in time of war. I believe that, in course of time, arrangements can be contrived with the Foreign and Colonial Offices by which a limited number of larger and more powerful vessels, moving from place to place on the station, can be made to efficiently perform the work of the more numerous but less movable flotilla now employed. All the vessels now laid down have a speed equal to, if not in excess of, any of their class elsewhere, and will therefore be a match for anything of like displacement which they might encounter, and the new 20-knot protected cruisers about to be commenced will be faster than any ocean war cruisers in the world at present completed, and, consequently, of the highest possible value for the protection of our commerce.

  DESCRIPTION OF 20-KNOT PROTECTED CRUISERS.
  The most notable vessels proposed to be laid down in 1887–88 are two 20-knot protected cruisers.
  Their dimensions are:—

  Length

  265 feet.

  Breadth

  41 feet.

  Displacement

  2,800 tons.

  Sped on measured mile, with 400 tons of coal, and fully equipped

  20 knots

  Ocean speed

  17 to 18 knots

  Radius of action at 10-knot

  8,000 knots

  The vessels will have a protective steel-deck extending from stem to stern, and sheltering the boilers, magazines, steering-gear, &c.
  Vertical (inverted-cylinder) triple-expansion engines are to be fitted in the steel-bottomed ships, special arrangements of armoured-coamings being built for the protection of that portion of the cylinders.
  Above the protective steel-deck the space will be minutely sub-divided, coal-bunkers, coffer-dams, &c, being built as is usual in vessels of the "protected" class.
  A double-bottom on the cellular principle, adapted for water-ballast, will be fitted.
  The armament will include—

  6

  6-in. B.L.R. guns on centre-pivot mountings.

  9

  6-pr. rapid-firing guns. Machine-guns.

  6

  Torpedo-tubes (all under cover).

  The bow will be strengthened for ramming in the usual manner,
  In all respects the vessels will be made suitable for independent sea-service, and for being driven at high speed in rough water.
  They will have only fore and aft steadying sails, being dependent upon their steam-power and twin-screws for propulsion.

  THREE COPPER-SHEATHED 19¾-KKOT CRUISERS.
  It has been decided to vary the design in three of the vessels in the following particulars:—

  1. To wood-sheathe and copper the bottoms, so as to make the vessels capable of remaining afloat for long periods without serious fouling and consequent loss of speed.

  2. To adopt horizontal engines, placed entirely below the protective deck.

  These changes involve an increase in displacement and a slight decrease in maximum speed which are accepted in view of the special services for which the vessels are intended.
  In armament, protection, and all other qualities, the conditions are the same in these as in the steel-bottomed ships.
  The trials of these vessels will be made under the new regulations, with all weights aboard.

  CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SPEED TRIALS OF VESSELS ARE CONDUCTED.
  The speed and other trials of the ships recently built, together with the working of their engines and hydraulic mountings, have on the whole been satisfactory. In most instances the anticipations of the Constructors have been realized, although difficulties have occurred in some of the earlier trials in obtaining from certain of the engines the speed of the contract. In one important particular there is a discrepancy between the estimate of the original design and its result, which, in the case of the "Impérieuse," and her sister-vessel, the "Warspite," attracted some attention, and which is likely to recur in the case of the bolted cruisers, seven in number, the "Warspite," and the armoured vessels of the "Admiral" class.
  The following statement, though referring to the belted cruisers alone, is typical of all the vessels whose draught is deeper than was designed; and it will also record the Regulations as to design and trial which the present Board have made. (See Appendix I.)
  The designs for the belted cruisers wore prepared in 1884, and the sketch design received the final approval of the Board of Admiralty during that year.
  It was intended that, with all their legend weights on board, they should have a mean draught of 21 feet, and that 18 inches of the armour belt, which is 5 ft. 6 in. in width, should be above water.
  After the designs were approved, tenders for the construction of five vessels were invited. Some of these tenders provided for the substitution of triple expansion engines of 8,500 horse-power in place of the compound engines of 7,500 horse-power originally contemplated, and the advantages of the offer were so manifest that it was decided to adopt this type of engine for all five ships.
  To compensate for the increased weight entailed by these engines, and in view of the economy in fuel that would result from their adoption, it was decided to reduce the legend weight of coals to be carried by GO tons; this placed the legend weight of coals at 440 tons, in place of the 500 tons originally approved.
  The extra weight of the engines, of increased complements, and of armament, amounting in all to 186 tons, increased the draught of the ships by 7 inches, placing the top of the belt 11 inches out of the water.
  It appears to have been decided, although the bunkers of these ships were constructed to hold 900 tons of coal, that 500 tons (afterwards decreased to 440 tons) should be taken as the amount they were to carry under ordinary conditions—in other words, as their normal supply of fuel.
  It was calculated that this amount of coals would carry the ships about 4,500 knots at 10 knots an hour, and with this the Board of Admiralty at that time appear to have been satisfied.
  The present Board, however, are of opinion that it is far preferable that ships should carry to sea with them the largest amount of coal they are able to carry.
  If the whole of the 900 tons, with the additional weights alluded to, be placed on board, instead of 440 tons, the top of the belt will be, on the ships first going to sea, 6 inches below the water.
  Thus, although the position of the belt may have been correctly calculated for the weight of coals it was at the time decided to carry, and which was adopted as their deliberate policy by the then Board of Admiralty, the same is undesirably low if coals to the full stowage (which is the policy of the present Board) are put on board.
  Though the policy which placed the position of the bolt so low does not commend itself to the present Board, it is right to say that some claim for it certain compensating advantages, their contention being—

  (1.) That there would be above the armour belt, running along 140 foot of its length, when the full fuel supply is on board, a coal protection of 6½ feet in height and of 11 to 17 feet in depth.

  (2.) That the coal protection would not be disturbed until, by the consumption of coal in the lower bunkers, the ship had lightened, and the armour belt had risen above water.

  (3.) That a shot, which during a roll might have struck below the belt, would, in its present lower position, be deflected.

  From the only trial under steam which has yet taken place with one of these vessels, there is every reason to believe that the speed for which they were intended will be attained, with the ships fully equipped and the bunkers full.

  LEGEND WEIGHTS.
  The principle adopted by successive Boards of Admiralty since 1870 of selecting as their legend weight of coal, in new ships that they proposed to build, an amount considerably less than that which the bunkers were constructed to carry, originated when compound engines began to be used in Her Majesty's ships.
  The substitution of improved engines for the older types effected such an economy of fuel in relation to the engine-power developed, that a very much less quantity would carry a ship so fitted the same distance as a ship of identical form and size with the simple engines previously in use.
  This seems to have influenced the Admiralty to accept, when designing new ships, as the legend weight of fuel, a quantity which gave as great a radius of action which was possessed by earlier ships, though it was at the same time decided to provide for exceptional conditions by the construction of reserve bunkers.

  EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE IN DRAUGHT AND OF NEW REGULATIONS.
  The difference, therefore, between the draught of the vessels enumerated, with their coal-bunkers full, and with all weights on board, and that contemplated in their original design, arises from two causes:—

  1. Because it had been the practice that only a portion of the coal the vessel is capable of carrying should be on board at the time of her speed-trials. The present Board disapprove of this practice as misleading. The vessel in question ("Impérieuse") was officially stated to be capable of either steaming 2,000 knots at a rate of 17 knots per hour, or 8,000 knots at a lower speed. If all the coal were on board necessary to give the coal endurance for the longer distance, the higher speed could not be attained; if the coal were reduced to allow of the higher speed, the longer distance could not be covered. Directions have been given by which, in future, speed-trials will be for twenty-four hours with all weights aboard, in addition to the present trials of six hours with reduced weights.

  2. The other reason for increase of weight is that, at the time the design was passed, sufficient allowance was not made for the number of complement,
  562

  563
  weight of guns, machinery, and engines. If fuller consultation had taken place between the designer and the officers responsible for these weights and details before the ship was laid down a more accurate estimate could have been made, and the extra weights afterwards found necessary would have been anticipated. Regulations ensuring this co-operation have now been made, and will be found in Appendix I. attached.

  SUMMARY OF INCREASE TO FLEET, 1886–87 TO 1887–88.
  The number of vessels added during 1886–87, and the contemplated increase during 1887–88, are given in the following Table:—

  Cost of Ship or Vessel.

  1880–87.

  1887–88.

  Total.

  Number.

  Tons.*

  Number.

  Tons.*

  Number.

  Tons.*

  Armoured ships

  3

  25,690

  10

  67,990

  13

  93,680

  Protected ships

  1

  3,550

  2

  7,100

  3

  10,650

  Partially protected ships

  3

  11,250

  3

  11,250

  Unprotected ships

  16†

  16,130

  13

  14,980

  29

  31,110

  Total

  23

  56,620

  25

  90,070

  48

  146,690

  This addition to our Fleet is abnormally great; but the Fleet previous to this increase was abnormally weak. Having therefore brought up our naval strength, so far as iron-clads and cruisers are concerned, to what is generally admitted to be requisite, we have next to consider the annual expenditure (for depreciation or wastage) necessary for the maintenance of the Fleet in that state of efficiency.

  VALUE OF FLEET AND ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL EXPENDITURE NECESSARY FOR REPLACEMENT.
  The administration of the Navy cannot be satisfactory unless the approximate wastage or depreciation is so ascertained, as to afford reliable data upon which to predicate the extent of shipbuilding requisite in each year to maintain the Fleet at its present authorized strength. The advantages of such a knowledge, and of basing a continuous naval policy thereon, are manifest.
  One obstacle to securing economical results from the dockyards has been the spasmodic action in regard to the extent of new work. The Controller of the Navy, as a great employer of labour, has, in consequence, been unable satisfactorily to regulate the employment of men and the distribution of work to the different trades. If the extent of tonnage to be laid down at each yard from year to year were known with any degree of accuracy, the necessary men of the several trades connected with shipbuilding could be employed, and the vessels could be commenced, in such rotation, and at such intervals, as would permit the men of a certain trade to move from ship to ship, as their particular description of work was completed.
  The Table in the Appendix to the Navy Estimates which gives the cost and date of completion of each vessel affords a basis upon which to calculate the approximate annual percentage of depreciation on the value of the Fleet arising from decay or supersession, the latter being a most important factor.
  * Load displacement,
  † Includes "Hearty" (1,300 tons), "Jackal" (750 tons), and "Bann" (250 tons).
  It must be kept clearly in mind that this Table is drawn up so as to indicate the year of COMPLETION of each ship, and her cost is placed under that year, and is not distributed under the years in which the expenditure, as it progressed, was provided. This arrangement is necessary for the purpose of arriving at a proper conclusion, because a vessel cannot, as a rule, be regarded as subject to depreciation until she is complete for service. In calculating the depreciation, and the period for which it ought to be charged, regard must also be had to the value remaining in the vessel after the expiry of the given number of years of her probable life. Whenever a vessel is sold, her realized value should, therefore, be credited to Navy Votes in aid of new construction, in order to carry out the principle here advocated.
  Subject to the foregoing considerations, the following is a reasonable scale upon which to fix the annual depreciation for the different classes of vessels which form the Fleet, and to provide the minimum sum which should be invested annually in the production of new tonnage, viz.:—

  1. On armoured, protected, and partially-protected iron or steel vessels, for twenty-two years from date of completion, 4 per cent.

  2. On corvettes, sloops, torpedo-cruisers, gun-vessels, gun-boats, troop-ships, and other vessels, for fifteen years, 6 per cent.

  3. On torpedo-boats, steam launches, &c, for eleven years, 9 per cent.

  4. On small vessels, tugs, and yard craft, for eighteen years, 5 per cent.

  5. On guard, receiving, training, and harbour vessels, for twenty-two years, 4 per cent.

  An element in determining the amount upon which depreciation ought to be calculated is the normal standard of strength at which the Navy is to be maintained. The leading feature adopted in the following Table is the special programme decided upon by Lord Northbrook in 1884, as sanctioned by Parliament, and his ordinary programme for the year 1885–86. These were framed on the proposition that the Navy was then much below the requisite strength, having regard to the protection of British interests. Therefore, in ascertaining the capital cost of the Fleet on the 31st March, 1887, all the vessels completing, which were commenced by Lord Northbrook, are regarded, so far as depreciation for replacement is concerned, as if finished on that day. The "Nile" and "Trafalgar" are, however, excluded, as their completion is somewhat remote, and the expenditure upon them may be viewed as a part of the ordinary charges for shipbuilding required in subsequent years. These propositions appear the more reasonable as no new vessels were laid down in 1886–87, thus assisting more clearly to draw a line between expenditure to make up prior deficiencies, and that necessary to maintain the agreed standard of efficiency.
  Following the foregoing line of argument, and applying it to the cost of the Fleet, the following approximate results are obtained:—

  £

  £

  1. Armoured, protected, and partially protected iron or steel ships—

  At present on strength of the Navy, at first cost

  19,417,000

  Add cost of new ships not yet completed—

  Expenditure to March 31, 1887 (probable actual)

  6,240,000

  Remaining to complete (estimated)

  2,248,000

  Total

  27,905,000

  Deduct—

  £

  Cost of ships completed prior to 1865–66

  378,000

  *Estimated value of gun-mountings, & c, included in above figures

  1,300,000

  1,678,000

  Net total capital cost of armoured, & c, ships necessary to maintain the Fleet at normal strength

  26,227,000

  Proposed annual depreciation for replacement, say at 4 per cent. per annum on £26,227,000

  1,049,000

  2. Corvettes, sloops, torpedo-cruisers, gun-vessels, gun-boats, troop-ships, and oilier vessels—

  At present on strength of the Navy. at first cost

  7,386,000

  Add cost of new ships not yet completed—

  Expenditure to March 31, 1887 (probable actual)

  587, 000

  Remaining to complete (estimated)

  443,000

  Total

  8,416,000

  Deduct—

  £

  Cost of ships completed prior to 1872–73

  1,572,000

  *Estimated value of gun-mountings, &c, included in above figures

  200,000

  1,772,000

  Net total capital cost of corvettes, & c, necessary to maintain the Fleet at its authorized strength

  6,644,000

  Proposed annual depreciation for replacement, say at 6 per cent. per annum on £6,644,000

  399,000

  3.Torpedo boats, steam launches, & c.—

  At present on strength of Navy, at estimated first cost

  1,500,000

  *Gun-mountings, & c., are excluded from the above calculations, as provision has only of late years been taken for the greater part of them in the Navy Estimates, and is voted separately. If the cost is in future included in the cost of the ship, depreciation should be calculated thereon at the same rate as on the ship.

  £

  £

  Proposed annual depreciation for replacement, say at 9 per cent, per annum on £1,500,000

  135,000

  4. Small vessels, dockyard tugs, tanks, &c—

  At present in the Service, at first cost

  448,000

  Deduct cost of vessels completed prior to 1869–70

  202,000

  Net total capital cost of small vessels, tugs, &c, necessary to be maintained

  246,000

  Proposed annual depreciation for replacement, say at 5 per annum on £210,000

  12,000

  5. Receiving, training, guard, and harbour ships, &c.—

  At present in the Service, at first cost

  3,270,000

  Deduct cost of vessels built prior to 1865–66

  2,963,000

  Net total capital cost of vessels built since 1865–66

  307,000

  Proposed annual depreciation for replacement, say at 4 per cent, per annum on £ 307,000

  12,000

  6. First cost of ships completed since the commencement of the periods referred to for the several classes, which are at present laid up as obsolete, or for sale,* also of ships completed within those periods (excluding the older typos of armour-clads of wooden construction), which have been sold, lost, or otherwise disposed of

  4,359,000

  Proposed annual depreciation for replacement as if these ships still formed part of the strength of the Navy, say at an average of 4½ per cent, per annum on £4,359,000

  196,000

  GRAND TOTAL (ANNUAL DEPRECIATION FOR REPLACEMENT BY NEW CONSTRUCTION)

  1,803,000

  That this estimate of £1,803,000 as the minimum amount of now construction (exclusive of gun-mounting and special fittings) required to moot the annual depreciation or wastage of the Navy is fair and reasonable is confirmed by an examination of the data given in the Appendix before referred to.
  The aggregate expenditure on vessels added to the Navy from 1865–66, and upon those now in course of construction in completion of Lord Northbrook's programme, on which £1,186,000 remains to be expended, is £39,119,100, or an average of £1,778,000 per annum expended on new construction. This is exclusive of the cost of gun-mountings, &c, and of all expenditure upon the "Nile" and "Trafalgar," winch, although included in Lord Northbrook's programme, have, for reasons already explained, been omitted from the preceding calculations.
  In many of the years preceding the adoption of Lord Northbrook's special programme in 1884, the rate of construction was much below this average; consequently, provision to moot these deficits has mainly fallen upon the Estimates of the three succeeding years.†
  The Estimates for 1887–88 include the sum of £997,000 to be expended on account of the special programme undertaken, as already stated, to place the Fleet in a normal condition of strength, leaving a balance to be met in future years of £217,000. These sums will be thrown upon the taxpayer in excess of the amounts they would have been called upon to bear had previous Administra-
  *Of the vessels built during the period of this Return, a number have already been sold, lost, or laid aside as obsolete, not being worth the cost of alteration to suit modern requirements in regard to speed, armament, &c. In order, however, that the Depreciation Fund may be adequate to maintain the normal strength of the Navy, the amounts expended on construction of such vessel must also carry a depreciation for the period sot out in these Tables, even if, owing to exceptional circumstances, the vessels have been prematurely removed from the list.
  † See page 5,
  570

  571
  tions provided year by year all that was needed. The contemplated expenditure upon new vessels (including the "Nile" and "Trafalgar," but excluding £396,000 for gun-mountings, &c), beyond the sum of £997,000, amounts to £l,665,000, or £138,000 less than the annual requirement to meet wastage, as already explained.
  Considerations such as these prompted me last year to propose in Parliament that a certain portion of this exceptional expenditure should he converted into a terminable annuity, and spread over a period of years to afford some immediate relief to the taxpayer. The suggestion was not favourably received, the arguments directed against it being that during peace the income of each individual year must bear its own burden of expenditure. If this contention be sound, that no year is to be relieved of any portion of the expenditure properly debited against it, then Parliament, by enactment or otherwise, should insure the reverse of that proposition, that no year is to escape its fair annual share of the depreciation fund necessary to keep our Navy efficient. If this depreciation and wastage fund be fixed at the figure which, on the most careful analysis, is found to be by actuarial calculation necessary, and legally forms part of the annual charge upon the Exchequer, it would not be possible, hereafter, for the national capital invested in war ships to be deliberately reduced by a misappropriation or abandonment of the annual expenditure necessary to replenish it. A continuous and economical and efficient shipbuilding policy would be possible, and the waste and discredit, occasioned by periodical scares, would be avoided.

  DOCKYARD ADMINISTRATION.
  The alterations commenced in 1885 for the purpose of securing a more efficient management and control over the employment of labour and the appropriation of material in the yards have worked well, and have more than justified the anticipations formed of their ultimate utility. The appointment of a Director of Dockyards has strengthened from an executive, and that of an Inspector of Yard Accounts from a financial point of view, the control of the Admiralty over dockyard business and expenditure. Simultaneously with the creation of these offices, a system of improved local management has been inaugurated, whereby the Admiral Superintendents have been furnished with competent professional assistance in the management of the Dockyards. Arrangements have been made by which the professional officers are enabled to obtain rapidly, and, if necessary, direct from the contractors, the supplies they may require, and they will be made responsible for proper check and account of the outlay incurred under their superintendence. An improved and more accurate form of estimating repairs has been instituted, facilitating a detailed check over this class of expenditure. Substantial savings have been made in this annual outlay. Steps have been taken whereby the incidental expenditure, at one time forming almost a third of the outlay of the yards, will be regulated and classified; numerous obsolete but expensive Returns have been abolished, and an inquiry into the number of the clerical staff and those employed in writing duties has been instituted, which should lead to a considerable reduction of the present establishment. In the meantime, I have given directions that no vacancies in the Admiralty and dockyard clerical staffs should be filled, as there is reason to believe both are redundant.
  In the course of these inquiries it has been made clear that the number of workmen in the various yards are in excess of the work to be performed. The Board have therefore commenced to bring down the establishments to the necessary level; it is, however, satisfactory to know that though the number of empleyés has diminished, the output of work per man has increased, and the demand for, and consumption of, material used in proportion to the men employed, is on the increase.

  COST OF REPAIRS OF SHIPS.
  A considerable proportion of dockyard expenditure is absorbed in the periodical repairs of vessels in commission. A close scrutiny of the list of defects sent in by officers commanding ships, and forwarded for sanction to the Admiralty, showed that a certain amount of the work proposed to be done in the dockyards might have been performed by the carpenters and artificers forming part of the complement of the ship. In other cases, sufficient care had net been exercised in criticizing the list of defects before being sent to the Admiral Superintendent. The attention of officers has been directed to this practice by a Circular dealing specially with this subject, and which will be found in Appendix II.

  YARD ESTABLISHMENTS.
  At the close of the financial year 1887–88 the liabilities outstanding on new-construction will be small compared to those of recent years. Careful prevision will, therefore, be necessary as regards the programme of work for 1888–89 and subsequent years, and arrangements will be made to utilize, as far as is possible,
  the existing dockyard establishment, though the cessation of the building of armoured and protected vessels of large displacement will necessitate some ultimate reductions. Provision in the present Estimates is made for fifty-three instead of fifty-two weekly payments to all employés in receipt of weekly wages, as within the 366 days of the financial year such a number of weekly payments become due.

  NEW WORKS, &c.
  "Upon the average annual sums hitherto expended for the maintenance and extension of the buildings, basins, and graving docks of the home and foreign dockyards, a considerable reduction has been effected this year, the object of the Board being to secure the thorough utilization of all existing buildings before giving their sanction to an enlargement of the present accommodation.

  GRAVING DOCKS ABROAD.
  The policy of subsidizing Companies to build docks abroad capable of taking in and repairing men-of-war of large dimensions has been favoured of late years by successive Boards of Admiralty, and considerable sums have in this manner been spent in past years. The dock at Esquimalt, thus assisted, will this year be open and ready for use; at Hong Kong the final instalment for a similar purpose will this year be paid; and at Halifax arrangements have been made by which it is hoped like advantages will hereafter accrue, on the completion of the dock.
  The multiplication of graving docks in colonial territory in different parts of the world will greatly advantage the ships of the Navy, as it facilitates the execution of repairs and cleaning, which, if undone, might incapacitate a man-of-war from active service.
  The conditions under which Government assistance towards the construction of docks is given is that, when constructed, payment shall only be made for services of work rendered.

  NAVAL ORDNANCE.
  There is a large increase in that portion of the Estimates taken by the Army for the supply of Naval Ordnance for 1887–88. This is attributable to a necessary provision of ammunition for quick-firing guns, the amount being £313,429
  574

  575
  as against £42,150* in the approved Estimate of 1886–87. This increase is mainly duo to the provision of ammunition for quick-firing guns being reduced in last year's Estimates. By the postponement of this liability from last year the Navy has been compelled to make inconvenient demands this year upon Army Estimates, it being impossible to allow a large number of guns provided to be useless for want of ammunition; a large increase in the expenditure upon Naval Ordnance, and a consequent advance in the requirements of the Navy have, in the last two years, taken place, and the naval armaments of this country now compare very favourably with those of foreign countries. Until 1880 the muzzle-loaders of the British Navy were about equal in accuracy and penetration to breech-loading guns of foreign nations. Since then the development of slow-burning powder has necessitated the production of a breech-loader different in shape from, and far superior in the high velocity it imparts to the old breech-loader. The only breech-loaders in the British Service, with the exception of a few 40 and 20-prs., are of the most modern type; the great bulk of the breech-loaders in foreign Service are of the older type, and fairly comparable to the old muzzle-loader of similar calibre.
  The Table attached shows the yearly increase since 1886 in modern breech-loaders and quick-firing guns, and torpedoes available for service:—

  Date

  B.L. Guns

  6-pr. Q.F.G.

  3-pr. Q.F.G.

  Torpedoes

  April, 1886

  711

  1,224

  April 1887

  1,019

  315

  298

  1,514

  April 1888

  1,281

  342

  448

  1,818

  The question of transferring the cost of providing naval armaments from Army to Navy Votes has occupied the serious attention of both Departments during the past year. A Committee of the officers of both Departments carefully considered the bases of a transfer. Every information and assistance was given to the Admiralty by the War Office with the object of facilitating such a change So extensive a transfer involving the annual expenditure of upwards of a million and a-half of money ought not, in our opinion, to be made until the machinery for the administration and control of this outlay are so perfected at the Admiralty as to enable the assumption of this responsibility to be discharged without effect and without increased charge To place one Government Department towards another in the relation of purchaser and manufacturer is no easy matter. The proportion of establishment charges to be added to the cost of labour and material on different articles of manufacture varied from 10 to 40 per cent., according to the class of work performed. Any mistake in fixing prices between Woolwich and the Admiralty would affect all contract work done elsewhere, as Woolwich prices regulate the price of gun manufacture in this country. Further difficulties also arose in reference to the storage, issue, and testing of the stores proposed to be transferred. For these reasons we pressed upon the War Office the desirability of postponing the proposed change, until sufficient time had been afforded for the full consideration of the many complex details involved in this question.

  PERSONNEL OF THE NAVY.
  The reports of the efficiency of officers and men are satisfactory. The number of Courts-martial has diminished, whilst the amounts deposited and number of depositors in savings-banks have increased. The health and physique
  *A further sum of £100,000 for this service has been taken in the Supplementary Army-Estimates, 1886 –87.
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  577
  of the men have improved. By the Return of the wastage of men (blue-jackets, 19,000 in number), we find during the last four years a continuous decrease in the annual waste:—

  1882–83

  2,146

  l883–84

  2,368

  1884–85

  2,062

  l885–86

  1,942

  This diminished waste has upset the previously-accepted calculation?, by which provision, through the entry of a certain number of boys, in the training-ships, is made to keep the number of seamen up to the authorized strength. There is a certain excess over that number, but steps have been taken to reduce the number of boys entered for training.
  The Navy now seems to be a very popular Service. A high standard and restrictions on number of entries have been imposed to prevent an undue influx of boys, but the competition is, notwithstanding, considerable. It is worthy of note that, simultaneously with the growing popularity of the Navy with parents as a career for their sons, there is a dread of dismissal from the Service which previously did not exist. Mutilations and misconduct not unfrequently in the past wore deliberately adopted for the purpose of insuring dismissal, whereas the present tendency is in the opposite direction.
  During the last ton years, owing to the multiplication of engines and machinery in ships, a large increase has taken place in the artificer, engine-room, and stoker complements. Comparing the year 187G with 1886, it will be found that the combatant class has decreased, so that the proportion of non-combatants to combatants is much larger than before:—

  1876.

  1886.

  Difference.

  Officers, executive

  2,300

  2,120

  -180

  Officers, non-executive

  1,955

  1,718

  -237

  Warrant officers

  903

  952

  + 49

  Blue-jackets

  19,586

  18,667

  -919

  Artificers*

  2,420

  2,509

  + 149

  Engine-room staff

  4,279

  6,983

  + 2,704

  Others†

  4,474

  5,209

  + 795

  Steps have, therefore, been taken to have all stokers trained to the use of arms, the same reward being held out to them to become trained men as had been given to seamen and marines; arrangements have also been made to substitute marines for the civilian butchers, barbers, and lamp-trimmers now afloat; this will entail an increase of marines corresponding to the number of men they replace

  EDUCATION OF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS.
  The Report of the Committee on Education has been considered, but not accepted in its entirety. The age for entry in the "Britannia" has been advanced six months, and in a year's time will be advanced six months more.
  A Council of Education has been instituted to consider certain questions connected with this subject, and to recommend necessary alterations from time to time. It is intended to revise the seamanship examination, to bring it in accordance with the requirements of the present day, and to lay more stress on the acquirement of a knowledge of steam machinery, and of French and other modern languages. The education and training of a young officer lasts from his entrance into the "Britannia" to his passing out of the College at Greenwich, an interval on the average of about seven and a-half years. During a largo proportion of that time he is afloat, discharging responsible duties. The desire of the Board has been to insure, as far as is possible, continuity of instruction
  *In 1876 blue-jacket class included 500 masters-at-arms and ships' corporals, now included among "Others."
  †Masters-at-arms, ships' corporals, stewards and cooks, writers, sick-berth staff, &c.
  578

  579
  and training during the whole of this period, so that at no time it may be necessary for an officer to relearn that which he had acquired and forgotten.
  An improved curriculum of study and practical work has been passed for the Engineer Students at Portsmouth and Devonport.

  NAVAL RESERVES.
  The Regulations both for officers and men of the Royal Naval Reserve have been revised and consolidated. Provision has been made for bringing the Royal Naval Reserve into closer association with the Service by allowing officers and men to volunteer for service in the Navy, either in sea-going ships or for a course of instruction in the Gunnery and Torpedo Schools. The officers who undergo a year's training in a sea-going ship are to receive, while they remain on the Active List, an annual retaining foe of £20 to £25 a-year. Both officers and men are showing readiness to avail themselves of these opportunities, and in order to facilitate their doing so, it has been arranged that the Sub-Lieutenants, Royal Naval Reserve, who are of a certain age, shall, in order to enable them to mess with officers of similar age, be granted the temporary rank of Acting Lieutenant.
  An important alteration in the Regulations has been introduced, by which men can, in time of emergency, be allowed to volunteer for service without being called out by Royal Proclamation.
  The enrolment of stokers for the Royal Naval Reserve has not hitherto proved so successful as was anticipated, but this was owing, probably, to insufficient advertisement of the new scheme.
  Some alteration in the Regulations, combined with a fuller knowledge of the advantages held out, will, it is believed, lead to a great increase in the number of firemen coming forward to enter the Reserve, especially under the stimulating influence of the arrangements recently made with the White Star and Cunard Companies.

  DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT.
  Although many of the component and complementary parts of the Navy are in themselves satisfactory, it has long been felt by naval men of experience and foresight that in the event of war, unless an improved system of co-operation and preparation were devised, the nation would not obtain, in the earlier stages of such a contest, the full advantage of its great naval resources. This opinion was confirmed by the experience of 1885. Confidential reports of what then occurred proved that our power of naval mobilization was most defective. A rapid concentration of strength, and an immediate and effective use of the force thus brought together, have in recent years decided within a few weeks of the outbreak of war the ultimate issue of that war.
  Important as it may be for a great military nation to be thoroughly prepared for possible contingencies, the necessity for thorough preparation is even more incumbent upon a Power that is supreme at sea.
  A mobilization of land forces is local and territorial in its operation; the mobilization of naval resources must be concentrated at a few naval arsenals capable of fitting out and commissioning the ships of which they are the complement. A great Naval Power has no frontier; the limits of its operations are confined by the ocean alone, and the plan of campaign or of operations which it may have to carry out would differ in every quarter of the globe, according to the strength and geographical position of the enemy against which it was contending. On land, the plan of campaign or strategy to be adopted is regulated by the physical conditions of the country, which do not change, and by the fighting strength of a population, which does not shift. All well-organized Military Powers have derived infinite advantages from a properly-constituted Intelligence Department; but the need, as I have shown, for such an organiza
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  tion, is greater for naval than military purposes. This country has the largest fleet afloat, yet hitherto it had no central organization by which that fleet could be thoroughly utilized in emergency.
  The Board therefore determined to enlarge and extend the functions of the late Foreign Intelligence Committee, and place it upon a basis equal to the work which in future it will be required to perform.
  During the short period it has been in existence it has done good work. The Reserve and other subsidiary forces have been territorially mapped out, and each district has been assigned to one of the three great naval arsenals in the country. Much work, necessarily of a confidential character, has also been done, and although the continuance of such a Department will entail a certain increase of expenditure, there is no outlay connected with the Naval Votes which the nation or the Navy could less afford to dispense with than that which will enable the full strength of our naval resources to be put forth in as short a time as possible, and will give prompt and efficient co-operation to all the component parts of a Navy stationed in the necessary performance of its duty in all quarters of the globe.
  The Intelligence Department will bounder the personal superintendence and control of the First Naval Lord, but all questions will be referred to the other Naval Lords, which relate to, or affect the Departments for which they are respectively responsible.
  The Naval Lords will meet periodically to discuss and review what has been done, thus making themselves acquainted with the nature and extent of the enlarged duties, which, in an emergency, they and the Departments they administer would have at once to undertake.

  UTILIZATION OF AUXILIARY RESOURCES.
  The inquiries, which an Intelligence Department must needs make, brought before the Board in forcible contrast the great disproportion between the volume of floating commerce of the Empire to be protected and the force at present available to protect it, compared with the mercantile and war marine of foreign nations. To bring the British Navy and commerce into the same relative proportion as that which exists elsewhere in Europe is neither needed nor practicable. To carry out a plan which, at the approach of war, would immediately convert our fastest and most powerful merchant vessels into effective war-cruisers, and thus turn the assailed into assailants, seemed a natural solution of the difficulty; but there were various obstacles to its realization. The cost of retainers, the difficulty of providing crews and stokers, the delay in the alterations necessary, the contingency that when wanted the vessel might be at the other end of the world—these difficulties in combination deterred previous Boards from making the experiment.
  The enormous sums spent in taking up vessels in 1885, many of which never left harbour, and the long delay in getting the guns and fittings into the "Oregon," the only vessel thoroughly equipped of all those hired, impressed upon my Colleagues and myself the duty of taking some action in the matter. Exceptional speed and strength are the only desiderata of a mercantile cruiser. It occurred to us that the Post Office expenditure might be utilized, and that if we worked in combination, postal contracts could be associated with conditions by which the use of the vessels carrying the mails might under certain contingencies be economically secured to the State. The revision of the North American contract was a most favourable opportunity for a trial of the idea. The White Star Company, one of the tenderers, had, in August last, expressed their willingness to build two vessels to be approved by the Admiralty, of a speed and strength superior to any merchant-ship afloat, with engines and boilers below water, with fittings for guns built in during construction, and, when manned, with half crews of Naval Reserve men.
  In return for their use, the Company requested an annual subsidy which would recoup the owners a portion of the larger outlay the exceptional construction of the vessels required.
  The Cunard Company, another of the tenderers, has the fastest English ships afloat. A large portion of the officers and men in the employ of the Cunard Company are Naval Reserve men. Their ships are never more than eight days distant from Liverpool, and, therefore, always obtainable at short notice.
  The Admiralty, after full consultation with the Treasury and Post Office, commenced negotiations with these two Companies.
  They were influenced greatly by this consideration, that merchant-vessels, when armed, to be really serviceable, should have exceptional speed and coal capacity, enabling them to overhaul the weak and to escape from the strong.
  Such exceptional speed entails a primary cost in engines and boilers, and a consumption in coal that renders the remunerative employment of the vessel very difficult. Only a few of the richest and best-conducted passenger Lines can afford to build such vessels, and the profits derived from their employment in recent years has been small.
  Unless some inducement is given by the English Government to continue the building of such vessels, they must diminish in number, whereas abroad, by subsidies, their construction is directly encouraged. It is neither to the credit of the country, nor for the advantage of our Marino, that vessels of this class should mostly be under foreign flags.
  The arrangement made with the two Companies differs in detail, but is the same in principle.
  By the payment of an annual subsidy, reduced one-fourth so long as the mail contract lasts, the Government obtain from the Cunard Company the use of the "Aurania," "Etruria," and "Umbria," in time of emergency at a price fixed both as regards hire or sale. The necessary platforms and fittings for carrying guns are to be put in at once; the crews of the ships to be half Naval Reserve men; the owner to take charge of the gun-mountings required. Under this arrangement, it is believed that within a week all three vessels could be fitted, armed, stored, and manned as armed cruisers. The use, at fixed prices, of the remainder of the Fleet, if required, was a secondary condition of the contract.
  With the White Star the arrangement was practically the same, except that no payment was to be made till the two new ships to be built wore ready for sea.
  By this arrangement the Admiralty have obtained, at a moderate annual cost, the use for five years of the three fastest steamers afloat, and two even faster, when constructed.
  Negotiations with the Australian Colonies have for some time past been carried on, which, though not concluded, will, we hope, result in those countries contributing towards an extension of the Imperial Navy, and maintaining, as an integral part of the Fleet, an Australian Squadron, in addition to the force which has hitherto been stationed in those waters.

  CONCLUSION.
  The past year has been one of unusual activity. Many of the changes and reforms I have enumerated have been prompted and carried through by the personal interest taken in them by individual members of the Board. The Heads of the Departments have heartily co-operated with the Board in their endeavours to place naval administration on a more business-like and efficient footing.
  What has been done makes apparent how much still remains to be effected before the condition and organization of our Navy can be said to be thoroughly satisfactory. The completion of the large ironclads and cruisers mentioned
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  585
  before renders that portion of our Fleet more efficient, but by contrast makes still more apparent the obsolete and unserviceable condition of the great majority of our gun-boats and sloops.
  The very improvements that recent changes have made show how large a field for reform there still remains in parts of our naval system which have not yet been touched.
  GEORGE HAMILTON.
  February 28, 1887.

APPENDIX I.

  PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED WITH REGARD TO THE PREPARATION OF DESIGNS OF HER MAJESTY'S SHIPS.
  1. CASES having recently been brought to the notice of my Lords in which the immersion of a ship when complete for sea will be seriously and prejudicially affected by reason of introduction during construction of additions and alterations to the hull, machinery, complement, armament, &c, the procedure hereafter defined is to be strictly observed.

  2. When a design for a ship is required, the Controller will furnish the Board with a general idea of the class of vessel required.

  3. The Controller will, after conferring with the First Naval Lord, and obtaining his written approval as to the speed, armament, complement, and sail power, if any, instruct the Director of Naval Construction to prepare a sketch design for consideration embodying such features as may have been decided upon by the First Naval Lord and the Controller.

  4. The Director of Naval Construction, after conferring with and obtaining the opinion in writing of the Director of Naval Ordnance and the Engineer-in-Chief as to the armament and machinery respectively, is to prepare a sketch which shall be submitted to the Controller, who will bring the same before the Board.

  5. If the sketch design is generally approved by the Board, orders will be given by the Controller that the design is to he worked out in detail, or modified with a view to its ultimate adoption. (The sketch design will be prepared in accordance with the following Board Minute of the 21st September, 1886, relating to load draught).

  6. The Director of Naval Construction will, in consultation with the Director of Naval Ordnance, and the Engineer-in-Chief, complete the design, and submit it, with a full and careful description of the expected qualities and capabilities of the ship, for the concurrence of the Controller, by whom it will be sent to the Secretary for circulation to the several members of the Board, before being considered at a Board meeting.

  After a design has been approved by the Board, and has received the Board stamp, not any alteration or addition either in hull, machinery, armament, complement of men, boats, or stores, or other details, shall be permitted without the concurrence of the Board.
  7. The Controller shall be responsible that not any deviation from the designs approved by the Board shall take place which would in any way affect the immersion of the ship when completed for service.—(Board Minute, 15th February, 1887.)

  REVISED METHOD OF CALCULATING LOAD DRAUGHT OF SHIPS.
  The load draught of a ship is to be regarded as the draught at which she will float when laden with her full complement of sea stores, water, provisions, ammunition, coals, &c.
  The whole quantity of coals that may be decided to be necessary for all sea-going and fighting requirements, whether carried in the bunkers or in the
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  587
  form of coal protection, is to be included in the full complement at the load draught, and the particulars of a design as described in the ordinary legend form, or in any other manner, are always to be given for the load draught as thus defined.
  The full speed of a ship is to be estimated or obtained at measured mile, at the same draught, and the full speed at sea is to be determined by the average speed that can be maintained over a continuous run of four days at sea when the vessel is laden at her load draught at starting.
  The legend forms that are used for stating these particulars should be corrected so as to distinctly indicate that they apply to the fully-laden condition of a ship.—(Board Minute, 21st September, 1886.)

APPENDIX II.

  DEFECTS OF SHIPS IN COMMISSION.
  Admiralty, S.W., February 5, 1887.
  Sir,
  NUMEROUS instances having been recently brought to the notice of my Lords in which officers in command of Her Majesty's ships have sent to the Dockyards lists of defects to be made good which contained items of work that could and should have been undertaken by artificers of the ships; as well as proposals for alterations of a nature which, while not adding to efficiency, would fritter away money which might be more profitably applied, my Lords direct the attention of Commanding Officers to Article 1220, p. 392, of the Queen's Regulations, and impress upon them the necessity of a cessation of these practices, tending as they do to the performance of unnecessary work in the Dockyards which ought to be devoted to maintaining and strengthening the fighting efficiency of the Fleet.
  2. Having thus pointedly called attention to the matter, my Lords expect that Commanding Officers will realize the paramount importance of the ships under their command being kept as free from defects and ready for service as the means on board will permit, requisitioning from the Dockyard only for such repairs as are undoubtedly beyond their own resources.
  3. Attention is also called to the fact of ships' books having been supplied to Captains to inform them of the previous history of their ships, thus enabling them to watch and influence, as far as possible, expenditure on repairs.
  4. Any failure or neglect to comply with these directions will not be viewed with indifference by their Lordships, and will influence their decision as to the merits of officers and their fitness for the command of Her Majesty's ships.
  I am,
  Sir,
  Your obedient Servant,
  EVAN MACGREGOR.
  To the Commander-in-Chief
  on the Station.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

  SUPPLY—COMMITTEE.
  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

  SHIPS OF WAR (DESIGNS).

    MOTION FOR A SELECT COMMITTEE.
    MR.GOURLEY, in rising to move the following Resolution which stood in his name on the Paper:—
    "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the designs upon which ships of war are now being built, and how far they are in harmony with the transition in Naval construction and tactics, and also the necessity for an organized system of harbour and coast defence,"
    said, that on several occasions requests had been made for the appointment of a Committee upon the ship-building policy of the Admiralty. Lord Brassey, when in that House, had asked first for a Royal Commission, and subsequently for a Committee. Other Members had done the same thing, but the Government of the day had always refused. Three grounds had been put forward for their refusal—in the first place, that it would be impossible to find enough Members who would be able to deal with a subject so difficult; secondly, that such a Committee would delay Admiralty work; and, in the third place, that it would remove the responsibility from the proper shoulders. Now, he denied that the first of those objections applied at the present time, whom there was a larger number of Naval officers, Artillery officers, and Engineer officers in the House than over before; and also Members engaged in every kind of iron manufacture and shipbuilding—men who had built ironclads themselves. As to the second objection, would such a Committee, he asked, have delayed the progress of vessels like the Inflexible, which took eight years to build, and cost some hundreds of thousands of pounds more than the estimate; the Polyphemus, which took seven years to build; or the Colossus, which all last year lay in the waters of the Silent, a monument of Admiralty folly in regard to her guns? If there were a Royal Commission or a Committee of this
    590
    House to inquire into the policy of the Admiralty, it would not, he was confident, delay progress with regard to those largo types of vessels or any other type; but, on the contrary, promote efficiency and progress. In answer to the third objection, about removing responsibility from the officers connected with the Admiralty, he was bound to say that at the present moment, though there was every kind of official at the Admiralty, it was extremely difficult to fix responsibility when anything went wrong; in his opinion, all responsibility should attach to the first Lord. The objections hitherto raised by the Admiralty against his proposal, therefore, held no longer, as the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Government could easily find a sufficient number of hon. and gallant Members quite fit to deal with all the technical problems involved in designing and completing ships of war. The report of Lord Dufferin's Committee, appointed 12 or 13 years ago, after the capsizing of the Captain, was the only detailed Report the House possessed with regard to our designs of ships, with the exception of the Memorandum issued the other day by the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton). That Committee—which, by the way, was a Departmental Committee appointed to inquire into the line of policy pursued by the Admiralty itself—in other words, appointed by the Admiralty to sit in judgment on the Admiralty—considered that the Devastation was the strongest type of iron-clad then afloat; and is even yet—subject to slight additions to her bow armour—considered by experts to be the strongest type of iron-clad yet designed. But the question he would now like to ask was this—how far the policy recommended by Lord Dufferin's Committee with regard to iron-clad armour had been carried out by the Admiralty? Now, it appeared from the Report of the noble Lord that in the case of the Warspite and the belted cruisers, instead of the armour being, as recommended by Lord Dufferin's Committee—and endorsed by Parliament two years age—18 inches the water, it was actually (although designed to be 18 inches above the water) found, on completion of the ships with their complement of coal on board, six inches below the water. If there was no-

    591
    thing more than that against the designers of the Admiralty, he contended that he had made out a case for a Committee. What must be the consequence if these vessels went into action? The consequence must be that they would be in a worse plight than if they had been built without armour at all. What applied to the Warspite and to the belted cruisers applied also to the Admiral class. These vessels were built on the citadel principle, a largo part of the vessel fore and aft being entirely without armour. He could not help thinking that the millions of money expended on those ships had been spent on the wrong type of vessel altogether. If he was correct in his information, Herr Krupp had already invented a gun which could throw a shell live miles, and designed for the very purpose of destroying, if possible, these unarmoured iron-dads. The shell which would be thrown from the gun carried a very heavy charge of powder, and, being fitted with a sensitive fuse, was certain to be very destructive. He thought that, in regard to the differences of opinion regarding the Devastation and the Admiral class of ships, a case had been made out for inquiry; and he did not think that any hon. Member would hold the opinion that vessels of this class could now be considered fit for ocean fighting. They must be kept within the range of their coal supply. Only fancy a squadron of these vessels having to proceed to Now York; how could they reach that side of the Atlantic on an emergency, seeing that they only carry four or five days' fuel? Why, they would have to be conveyed with huge colliers or become targets for swift belted cruisers, provided with speed, coal endurance, and long-range Krupp shell guns. Another typo of ship to which Lord Dufferin's Committee referred was the Vanguard class, which was too weak in the lower structure. The Committee recommended that the lower structure of vessels of this class should be strengthened. What happened subsequently proved the correctness of the statement of the Committee, because the Vanguard was shortly afterwards sunk. Another type of vessels regarding which Lord Dufferin's Committee made inquiry was the Inconstant class, built for the purpose of cruising. But these vessels were built for ocean cruising; yet, strange to say, without any
    592
    coal endurance, and the Committee recommended that in future that type of ship should be smaller, and constructed with more power, with large heavy guns, and efficient coal endurance. How did the Admiralty rectify the defects which were pointed out in regard to the Inconstant class? They built two ships, the Iris and the Mercury, to steam 18 knots; but what was the result when they were completed? During the progress of the Egyptian war, the Peninsular and Oriental Company's fleet beat the Iris, which was engaged as a despatch vessel, by between 12 and 21 hours, and this at a time when the Iris was conveying Lord Wolseley on an emergency for the purpose of taking the command of the Army of the Nile; the truth being that those vessels cannot steam more than 14 knots in place of 18 as originally intended. The Board of Admiralty intended to build a number of quick vessels to steam 19 and 20 knots. Judging from past experience, he feared that when these vessels were completed they would find that the Admiralty had made mistakes with regard to these new vessels similar to those which they had made in the past in regard to other types of ships. Seeing that the Admiralty made such grievous mistakes between the inception of their designs and the completion of them, how could they expect the House to have confidence in the present system; he had no confidence in the present system; and, therefore, he asked for the appointment of a Committee, not for the purpose of thwarting the work of the Admiralty, but for the purpose of assisting and enabling it to come to right and proper conclusions with regard to the designs which they were preparing for the defence of the Empire. He also wished to know who was responsible for the defects which were said to exist with regard to the Agamemnon and the Ajax? Who was responsible for the present condition of our Channel Squadron? He believed that on the last occasion on which the Channel Squadron was manœuvred at sea, it was not possible to manœuvre it at more than six miles an hour. In the face of an efficient enemy, the squadron would have but a poor chance of escaping without injury at such a miserable speed as that. Without in any way depreciating our Navy, he believed that, owing to the numerous defects in our naval administration with

    593
    respect to ships and designs, in the event of war, our chance of success would have to rest mainly, if not entirely, on the bravery, ingenuity, and pluck of our seamen. The noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty and his practical coadjutor (Lord Charles Bores-ford), believed in grouping and in organization. He maintained that if they grouped the ships of all classes and all types, and exercised them in the game of war, there would be a much better chance of discovering the defects than by sending them on such cruises as was at present the practice. The Admiralty had a splendid opportunity of doing this at the present moment. They had the Channel Squadron at Gibraltar, and the Mediterranean Squadron in the Mediterranean. In his judgment, it would be a wise policy if the Admiralty enabled both squadrons to come together, in order to test both men and ships by exercising them in the game of war—a policy about to be illustrated by the French in a sham attack upon Gibraltar. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the Motion which stood in his name.
    Amendment proposed,
    To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add that words "a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the designs upon which ships of war are now being built, and how far they are in harmony with the transition in Naval construction and tactics, and also the necessity for an organized system of harbour and coast defence,"—(Mr. Gourley.)
    —instead thereof.
    Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
    MR. SHAW LEFEVREsaid, his hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley) had made a most interesting speech with regard to the vessels of the Fleet. He (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) did not intend to follow him at any great length; but he would shortly state to the House why he did not think it wise at the present moment to follow the advice of his hon. Friend and appoint a Committee to investigate the matters to which he had referred. If the hon. Member had moved for a Royal Commission to inquire into the subject there would have been a great deal more to be said for it at the proper time. A Committee of
    594
    that House would not at all be a good tribunal to enter into a subject of that kind. It would be altogether wanting in that technical knowledge which was so important, and he did not think its conclusions would carry weight with the country on a subject of such importance. But the question was whether the pro-sent was a good time for appointing such a Royal Commission. Nearly all the large vessels now building in the Royal Dockyards had reached a point of their construction when it was almost impossible to make alterations in them, and therefore such an inquiry could not have an effect on their construction. As to the vessels now proposed to be laid down in the programme contained in the Memorandum of the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton), there was no ironclads and no vessels of a very largo type. It was proposed to lay down five protected cruisers to steam at a rate of 20 knots. With regard to those cruiser vessels there would be no dispute generally that they would be very useful vessels, and, therefore, they might leave it to the constructors of the Admiralty to construct them. But if it had been intended to lay down any largo vessels or iron-clads and protected vessels he should have suggested that there should be a Committee of Inquiry appointed—not a Committee of that House, but one similar to Lord Dufferin's Committee. Such a Committee of Designs—always on the supposition that it was intended to lay down any new iron-clads—would be very useful and would be very advisable before laying down any such vessels of a large type. Last year he had recommended the appointment of a Committee on two vessels, the Nile and the Trafalgar, which had not then reached a point at which it was impossible to make an alteration in their design; and he had thought it was desirable that a Committee having technical knowledge and the highest skill should examine and report on the designs of the vessels which ought to be built of that type. He (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) desired to point out that they were to cost no less than £1,000,000 each—if not more—and he said that he had every reason to disbelieve that their designs were disapproved both by the then Constructor and the late Constructor of the Admiralty, and that all the Constructor's

    595
    staff had expressed doubts, if not disapproval, of the design of those two vessels. The late and the present Chief Constructor had joined in a Report to the Admiralty, stating that those vessels should not be built of that design, and that a Committee such as he suggested should be appointed to consider what the designs should be. Mr. Hibbert—late Secretary of the Admiralty—told him that there was no such Report as he had adverted to existing at the Admiralty, and the noble Lord who followed would not admit that any such Report existed. But since the debate on that occasion there had been a good deal of correspondence in the newspapers on the matter; and there appeared in one of them a Report purporting to be signed by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby and Mr. White on the subject, and as it was not contradicted he must suppose it was the Report he had referred to. How that Report got into the newspapers he knew not. Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, whom he had lately seen, assured him that he had sent no such Report to the newspapers, and for himself he could only suppose that Reports of that kind got into the newspapers in the same way as the noble Lord stated the other day was the case of another Report—namely, through the waste-paper basket, because that seems to be the channel through which communications were made from the Admiralty to the newspapers. Whether that was the origin of this Report reaching the newspapers he knew not. But the Report was an extremely interesting one, and having been made public and not being denied by the Admiralty, he thought he was justified in referring to it. Sir Nathaniel Barnaby and Mr. White began by saying—
    "Before any new first-class armour-clads are ordered it is desirable to appoint a new Committee on designs, of which the construction should resemble the Committee of 1871;"
    and they ended with a very remarkable paragraph to the effect that—
    "Should their Lordships decide to order the two vessels to be built we would suggest that the plans be signed by the Chief Constructors who have prepared them and marked by order of the Board."
    They declined altogether the responsibility for those two vessels. He (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) asked whether there had ever been such a thing before in the
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    history of the Admiralty as that two such vessels of such costly construction should have been decided upon by the Admiralty against the advice of their Naval Constructor. That Constructor altogether repudiated the responsibility. It would seem that that last paragraph had been acted upon, because in this year's Estimates a list of ships building was given, and it was stated that these vessels were not designed by the Chief Constructors, whether late or present, but by Mr. Barnes and Mr. Morgan; but the understood that both these gentlemen repudiated having given any approval of the designs, and that they morely obeyed orders in designing vessels. Shortly after the appearance of that Report, there also appeared a letter by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby in The Times stating at great length his reasons for objecting to those vessels, and in the course of that letter he said—
    "I should wish it to be understood that I think these two vessels to be badly conceived as designs, and therefore wasteful of money. I believe, moreover, that if there had been an inquiry by a good Committee these ships would not have been undertaken."
    It was a most serious matter that the money of the country should be spent on two vessels of such costly construction against the advice of men like Sir Nathaniel Barnaby and Mr. White. The question, however, which he wished to raise now was not whether those gentlemen were right or wrong. It was quite clear that there was a difference of opinion on the subject in the Admiralty If he might judge from the dates of the various letters and documents to which he had referred as having appeared in the newspapers, it would appear that those two vessels were ordered by the noble Lord the present First Lord of the Admiralty and his Board within a very few days of coming into Office in 1885. He had always thought the present First Lord of the Admiralty was remarkable for quickness and intelligence on questions of an official kind; but, quick and intelligent as he might be, he could not within a very few days master the highly technical subject of ship-building to an extent that would justify him in giving his own approval to vessels of that size and type against the advice of his own Naval Constructor, and therefore he must presume that the noble Lord had acted on

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    the advice of his First Naval Lord, who | it was known was the officer who gave his sanction to those two vessels. For all that he know the First Naval Lord might be right and the Chief Constructor wrong. But he said that where a great controversy of that kind had arisen in the Department between the naval authorities on the one hand and one of the highest scientific authorities on the other, it ought not to be decided offhand and at short notice without giving the House an opportunity of expressing an opinion upon it; but it should be referred to a Committee comprising the highest intellect of the country, which should consider and determine what was to be done in the case. He brought this question last year under the notice of the House; but, unfortunately, he was not then able to make use of the Report which he had now read to the House. On the former occasion he could only give a very vague statement in reference to it. He must say he thought the noble Lord assumed a very grave responsibility in withdrawing that document from the Admiralty and not treating it as an official document. It would appear that the noble Lord had treated it not as an official document but as a private one, and had withdrawn it from the cognizance of the Admiralty and his Successors. "When he (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) brought this subject forward last year, the discussion took place on the night when it was announced that there was to be a Dissolution of Parliament. He was not then able to carry the House with him; but it was his conviction that if he had been able to read the Report to the House it would have been impossible for the House to refuse a Committee of Inquiry such as he suggested. In the meantime great progress had been made with these two vessels. He was informed that more than one-fourth, and nearly one-third, of the whole cost had been already undertaken in material and labour, and that it would be impossible now to alter the designs without losing all the expenditure already incurred. Consequently he was not prepared to re-open the question to the extent of asking for a Committee of Inquiry into these vessels; but he did hope that if the noble Lord contemplated, between now and next year, recommending the construction of other large vessels, he would permit the
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    question of design to be referred to a Committee of Design similar to that which was presided over by Lord Dufferin. He desired now to advert to the remarks made by his hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland with reference to the Warspite and the Impérieuse. The designer of those vessels said it was never intended that they should have a coal-carrying power of more than 500 tons. It was true that bunkers were constructed for 900 tons, as in some circumstances it was desirable that they should carry a larger quantity of coal. The reason for this was, he believed, stated by his right hon. Friend (Mr., now Sir George, Trevelyan), who described those vessels in moving the Estimates five or six years ago. His right hon. Friend stated that they were only to have a coal-carrying capacity of 500 tons; and he believed the real reason for that was that French iron-clads of the same size had no greater coal-carrving capacity.
    MR. J. M. MACLEANsaid, the most novel and interesting feature in the statement laid before them by the First Lord of the Admiralty was that which had reference to the depreciation fund——
    MR. SPEAKERsaid, he must remind the hon. Member that the specific Amendment before the House related to the designs of ships. The hon. Member was not at liberty to go beyond that.
    MR. J. M. MACLEANsaid, in that case he would defer his remarks.
    SIR EDWARD REEDsaid, he had no expectation, nor had he any desire, to see the Motion of his hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley) carried, although he believed that one of the most beneficial things which could happen to this country in respect of its Navy would be the appointment of a Select Committee of the House; and he believed that such a Committee would do more good on behalf of the country and of the Navy than half-a-dozen Royal Commissions. And move than that, he believed that the condition of the Navy would never be thoroughly understood, and the interests of the Navy never be thoroughly protected, until a Committee of the House had sat and inquired, in the closest and most searching manner, into some of the facts which the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord

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    George Hamilton) had so frankly placed before the House. He thought, also, he might perhaps be allowed to say that they ought not to altogether lose sight of the public service rendered by the noble Lord the Member for South Paddington (Lord Randolph Churchill) in taking the step which had brought about the publication of the Paper which the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty had placed in their hands. The noble Lord the Member for South Paddington had done good, not only in causing such a Paper to be produced, but also because, apparently, some of the spirit animating him in making the suggestion had been infused into the document itself. He (Sir Edward Reed) remembered that on the last occasion he had an opportunity of speaking on the Estimates the right hon. Gentleman the present Leader of the House (Mr. W. H. Smith) fancied that he discerned something of a Party character in his observations. He, however, claimed never to have spoken in a Party sense on the Navy of the country. He thought the subject was vastly too important to be dealt with in that way. And the House would find that his observations on the present occasion would not be of a Party character, as he intended to speak very plainly as to some of the transactions of the Liberal Government in regard to the Navy. It was only duo to the present Board of Admiralty to say that in the short time it had been in existence the Members had taken general steps which, he believed, in the end would have the result of converting the Navy from an amateur force, played with by politicians, into a Public Service, existing and operating on behalf of the country. He was not satisfied, sitting on that Bench, with the part the Liberals had taken as a Party with regard to the Navy of the country; and he could hardly imagine what his right hon. Friend (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) had in view when he on an occasion like the present—which he (Sir Edward Reed) considered to be of the most serious character—made the kind of speech the right hon. Gentleman had just delivered. The right hon. Gentleman brought as an accusation against the Government that they did not allow a Committee to sit upon the designs of the Nile and the Trafalgar because Sir Nathaniel Barnaby and Mr. White had opposed those de-
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    signs. His right hon. Friend passed very lightly over the fact that gentlemen at the Admiralty—every whit as competent as those two gentlemen—had designed those two vessels, and he also passed very lightly over the fact that when those two gentlemen objected to the designs they gave the very strongest possible inducement to the Admiralty to go on with the vessels, because their own designs had been for years past a series of disgraceful failures, to the serious injury of the country. What sort of a state of things had they presented to them in that statement of the noble Lord? He felt rather strongly on the question of the belted cruisers, which had been referred to by the hon. Member for Sunderland. It was due, he believed, to his own action that those cruisers were built—seven of them had been built—and now they were told that they had been so designed and so built that when the coal supply was on board and they were equipped for sea they would either have no armour at all above the water line, or, when they had it, in an infinitesimal degree. Indeed, the noble Lord told them that when they had a proper cargo on board the armour would be six inches below the water. It was very meritorious on the part of the noble Lord to have said that; but he could not accept the explanation of the fact which was given. He would illustrate what had happened by relating what had occurred with regard to two other vessels—the Warspite and the Impérieuse. When those vessels were first projected Lord Northbrook desired Mr. Trevelyan—then Secretary to the Admiralty—to ask him (Sir Edward Rood) to go and look at the designs. He went and looked at them, and found, to his amazement, that they were intended to be fast armour-belted cruisers for service in the most distant seas, and that, instead of having a coal supply adapted to the objects for which they were to be called into existence, they had a coal supply of about half that which any and every other iron-clad vessel in the Navy possessed. One was inclined to distrust His eyes and his souses when he read that those armour-belted vessels were destined for distant seas and were of 8,000 horse-power, yet only were supplied with 500 tons of coal, he found, however, that the designers of those vessels had adopted an

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    ingenious, though, at the same time, a disingenuous, device for assigning to each of these vessels an additional supply of coals. They provided some more holds in which a further supply of coals could be placed. The position was this—That a ship with a capacity for carrying only 500 tons of coal was given a nominal supply of 900 tons. Mr. Trevelyan—when he was Secretary to the Navy—came clown to that House and stated that the coal supply of each of these vessels was 900 tons. That was to say, he gave the merely nominal or fictitious coal supply, and he stated that in a manner so as to lead to the belief that the speed of the ship and other peculiarities of her build would not be interfered with in consequence of this nominal coal supply. The House of Commons was quite deceived by the statement, and afterwards he (Sir Edward Reed) remembered an hon. Member speaking to him in the Dinner Room with regard to the matter. He said—"Did you ever hear of a vessel working up to 8,000 horse-power having only 900 tons of coal on board?" Rut he (Sir Edward Reed) replied—"But what will you think when you find that the 900 tons of coal are a fictitious estimate of what each vessel is to carry, and that she will not carry more than 500 tons of coal at her designed draught?" Afterwards he had something to say to Mr. Trevelyan on the subject, and what passed between them was not very pleasant. He informed Mr. Trevelyan that the Controller of the Navy should not have allowed the building of two such useless ships as the Impérieuse and the Warspite. Those who designed them were competent to design a good as well as a bad ship, and both the vessels ought to have been made efficient, which they wore not. Those two ships were built at a cost of £1,250,000 of public money, and Mr. Trevelyan should have known, Lord Northbrook ought to have known, and the Controller of the Navy must have known, that those ships would fail, as they had failed. The noble Lord (Lord George Hamilton) who now presided over the Admiralty had explained the serious failure of both vessels in the frankest and most honourable manner. There could be no doubt whatever that £1,260,000 of the public money had been deliberately and knowingly wasted. The right hon.
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    Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Gosehen) said that they could not make much saving on the Navy—that naval economy was a difficult thing to bring about. He said there were no means of saving money. First, he said there was the personnel which had to be kept up; there were the pay and the half-pay and the pension list, and, sure enough, they had enough of those who depended upon the Admiralty. It was a list long enough to almost justify the remark of a great and eloquent Member of that House—the senior Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright)—that one of the Services, at least, afforded a system of out-door relief for the aristocracy. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer went on to say that they could not save upon the material of the Navy, because one Government began the building of ships and another completed them. Men who spoke like that were ignorant of the economies possible in the Navy, and ignorant of that economy which the country wanted to see adopted. What he (Sir Edward Reed) should have liked to have seen was the £1,250,000 which was wasted upon the Impérieuse and the Warspite, and upon other cruisers, saved to the nation, and five useful vessels built instead of seven that were of no use to the country. For these seven now belted cruisers were simply traps in which to take officers and men to destruction, and traps in which to destroy the reputation and power of this country. Indeed, it would have been, vastly bettor for the Navy if those cruisers, the Impérieuse and the Warspite, and the other useless belted cruisers, had never been constructed, when they could not perform efficient service. The noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty had, no doubt, made out the best case that he could for the Department over which he presided, and even went so far as to indulge in apologetic remarks in regard to the Impérieuse and the Warspite. He also stated, after describing frankly enough the condition of the vessels, that while some authorities disapproved of the belted cruisers, yet others claimed a certain compensation for them, because they had a coal protection of 6½ feet. But this was an argument which would not stand examination. He might just as well say that a

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    floating water-tank of thin iron would keep afloat longer if filled with coal. The fact was, it would sink all the sooner. But this was, unfortunately, the sort of logic to which the Naval Service of the country was committed. The Government had been warned that some of these vessels would, if constructed, prove failures; but they had gone on with their construction after reasonable warning. Both vessels had proved signal failures, and the country had lost the money invested in them. But he could not understand the line taken by his right hon. Friend the Member for Central Bradford (Mr. Shaw Lefevre), when he attacked the only two ships being built that the Navy, and some people not in the Navy, were said to approve of, and this was the first time that difference of opinion had not existed on such a subject for several years. Well, it was the duty of hon. Members, no matter on what side of the House they sat, to consider, in dealing with the construction of vessels for the Navy, only the honour and well-being of the State. Led on by high officials, the Government had built vessels of the Admiral type against his (Sir Edward Reed's) protest, and the protest of others, from the first, and they were in the same condition as to the cruisers of which he had been speaking. The hon. Gentleman the Chairman of Committees (Mr. Courtney) had been making a great speech in another part of the country, in which he denied that there had been any decay of public spirit in this country. For his (Sir Edward Reed's) part, he thought that if there had not been an alarming decay of public spirit, those responsible for these failures, including the then First Lord of the Admiralty, would be brought to the bar of the House as, under the guidance of these gentlemen, the country had been brought into an exposed and dangerous condition, and had been paying for a Navy which it had not got. The First Lord of the Admiralty held out no hope that the defects of the ships would be remedied. He would like to ask the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty, did he intend to put British seamen into such ships as he had been describing? If he did so, it was certain that they must meet with disaster. The least that the Admiralty ought to do was to take the armour off these vessels,
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    so that they might become, at any rate, as efficient as unarmoured ships. Better still, perhaps, they might cut them in two, and lengthen thorn 60 feet or more. The noble Lord had said that a particular course was now pursued in designing vessels; and he (Sir Edward Reed) had always said that one of the great secrets of the failure of ships built for the Navy was that a great deal too much was placed upon the shoulders of the do-signer. That was the impression he formed when he was at the Admiralty himself. The Controller should receive from the Board instructions as to the qualities and construction of the vessels he was to design. But they had had Constructors who initiated things out of their own heads, and with the bad and unfortunate results which they had all soon. The Constructor, having designed his ship in his own fashion, generally found that it had to be altered, and this increased the expense and caused inefficiency; and in this matter he (Sir Edward Reed) thought that Parliament should assert its authority over the Admiralty. He should like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, whether he was not going to do something to remedy the disastrous and dangerous condition of the bolted cruisers? There was one question which, when he put it to the noble Lord, always caused him to get angry and excited in a peculiar degree, he generally got up and explained that what he (Sir Edward Reed) stated was true, but did not seem to see that there was anything bad in it. There had lately been a great scandal, and they had heard a great deal about Mr. Young Terry, who had sold some designs and tracings to some other State. But the Director of Naval Construction was connected with a private ship-building firm, and would remain so for a year or so to come, and that firm could point to Foreign Governments and say that the Chief Constructor of the British Navy belonged to their firm, and that he was in possession of the latest information as to the construction of vessels in the British Navy. The noble Lord said that he appointed Mr. White under these circumstances, because he was a most useful and valuable man. But he would tell the House why Mr. White was appointed. When the Conservative Government came into Office, in 1885, Sir Nathaniel Barnaby was told plainly that

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    many of his recent vessels were most objectionable, and Sir Nathaniel Barnaby being thon in very indifferent health, and very much harassed—and not unnaturally—with many things which had occurred, retired, from ill-health, upon his pension. Then the noble Lord asked Sir Nathaniel Barnaby who was the best person to succeed him?
    THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON): The statement is utterly devoid of a word of truth.
    SIR ED WAED REEDsaid, he thought he must challenge the noble Lord on this point. Would he say that he did not confer with Sir Nathaniel Barnaby about the appointment of his successor?
    LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Not until after he was appointed.
    SIR EDWARD REEDsaid, that almost made the matter worse. At any rate, there had been great discussion as to the ships designed by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby. There was an uprising in the Navy against these ships, and a resolve that they would have no more of them. There bad been only one man in the country to apologize for these ships in The Times, and that was Mr. White; so, while the Naval Lords were declaring in one room that they would not have such ships as Sir Nathaniel Barnaby designed; the noble Lord in another room was appointing the only apologist for these ships the Director of Naval Construction. He (Sir Edward Reed) had not a word to say against the professional competence of either Sir Nathaniel Barnaby or Mr. White, but both of them were off the rails in this matter. They persisted in designs which raised distrust in the Naval Service, and signally failed to command the confidence of the Navy; and so long as the principal constructing officer in the Navy was the private adviser of a private firm, he would not have the confidence of any member of the Naval Service either in the House or elsewhere. He had said just now that a great scandal had been created by someone at Chatham Dockyard having sold some drawings; but he believed that anyone could have bought the designs of Her Majesty's latest ships for a few pounds for years past. Certainly this could have been done with respect to all the ships built by contract, because, when the Admiralty wanted ships, they invited tenders from private firms, who sent
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    their draughtsmen to study the designs and specifications. Any impecunious draughtsman might obtain a knowledge of them, and in this way the designs of Her Majesty's ships had come into the hands of men who had no interest in the Naval Service, but were merely draughtsmen in the City of London. The hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood) had on one or two occasions claimed credit for having put a stop, in a largo degree, to the extravagant expenditure in many of Her Majesty's Dockyards upon the completion of ships. But he (Sir Edward Reed) thought he was right in saying that there did not exist at the present moment a complete specification of all the work to be done upon any ship in Her Majesty's Navy. What happened was this—that ships were built very often by contract, and then sent to a Dockyard to be finished, or sometimes even built in one Dockyard and then sent to another to be completed. They were sometimes sent to Yards where they lay for days and weeks without anyone in the Dockyard knowing what they were to be done with or what work was to be done upon them. When the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board (Mr. Ritchie) was at the Admiralty he saw that this state of things was not satisfactory, and thereupon he came down to the House and proposed that there should be a Director of Dockyards appointed to the Navy, with civil assistants under him at the Dockyards for purely Dockyard purposes. That was to say, they were to be employed in seeing that the work was done and that no waste was incurred in the money voted. Well, a few weeks ago he (Sir Edward Reed) went to Devonport Dockyard, where he saw three ships of the Archer class—the Archer herself and two built by a private firm on the Clyde. He looked at the Archer, and inquired what ship she was, and he was told that they were all the same class of ships. But when he looked at the Archer she seemed to be altogether different from the other two, and then he discovered that very much of the upper part of the Archer, built on the Clyde, had been pulled down and then built up again at the Dockyard. To such an extent had this been done that he did not know that the Archer was, or could be, a ship like the others. Thousands

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    of pounds were being expended in this way upon her. And then he discovered that the other two ships were to undergo the same transformation. That was to say:—Here we are in 1887 paying one sot of workmen on the Clyde to build ships up, and then we are paying a set of workmen at Devonport to pull them down. Then he asked where the civil assistant to the superintendent was—the superintendent's elbow adviser, to whom we were to look to see that those things were not done and to save waste? Well, he was told that this gentleman had not been at the Dockyard for weeks, and that he was not likely to be there for weeks to come, for he was away on the Clyde, seeing the ships building there, and finding out what was to be done to them when they came to the Dockyard. The Government certainly ought not to ask for that gentleman's salary in the present year, for it was obtained previously on false pretences, for the performance of necessary duties which he had left undone in consequence of his services being otherwise employed. There was gross inefficiency at the Admiralty Office. Surely before the Government asked that House for money they ought to know what ships they were going to produce. There ought to be a complete description of what was to be produced given to the contractor who was to build the ship and to the Dockyard which was to furnish it. When the proper Vote in Committee came on for discussion, he should ask for some assistance on this head. He should want to know what the Admiralty were now doing to prevent money being spent and wasted in the constant and expensive alteration of ships, and whether they were yet able to describe the ships they wanted? The present Hoard of Admiralty undertook on entering Office to make a great reform. They said—"We will separate the designing from the building department;" and he (Sir Edward Reed) approved the idea as one likely to make Dockyard building more economical. When he was at the Admiralty he could design a ship, and then could go to the Dockyard and alter it about as much as he pleased. Other Constructors would do the same, and in that way largo sums of money were spent which might be saved if the ship were in the first instance designed as she was to be built, and that design were adhered
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    to. The Conservatives promised to put an end to that state of things; but they had not carried the work out, for it was quite inconsistent with any good plan that a Dockyard official should be going about to do work on the Clyde, or that while the work of the Admiralty Constructors was neglected they themselves should be attending launches and making speeches there, and doing other things of the same kind. He (Sir Edward Rood) was losing all heart in this matter. He never felt so disheartened as he did to know that, although he had a seat in that House and had some knowledge of this question, his remonstrances and arguments were all in vain, and, in spite of the promises that were made by successive Governments, he was still obliged to witness the wholesale waste of public money that was going on. It was not satisfactory to know that the first change was duo to the noble Lord the Member for South Paddington. Why was it left to that noble Lord to initiate economy? The noble Lord did not, as he understood his speeches, mean to attack necessary expenditure. But the fact was that the noble Lord knew the things which were going on, and which he (Sir Edward Reed) had then indicated. He (Sir Edward Reed) believed that when the noble Lord made the speech to which he had referred he knew that this extravagance was going on, and that the time had come when a stop must and should be put to it. He hoped that in the course of the evening they would have some opinion from the Government on this point. At present it seemed as if, after spending £l,250,000 on the 1mpérieuse and the Warspite, and a larger sum on the belted cruisers, we were almost as badly off as we were before.
    THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. FORWOOD)said, he thought that many of the reflections of the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed) upon the mode in which the business had been done at the Admiralty were just. These reflections, he believed, arose from circumstances similar to those pointed out by the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley) in reference to defective designs. No one would gainsay the importance of the question raised by the hon. Member for Sunderland, nor would anyone deny the propriety of

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    bringing before the House the system under which our ships of war were designed. He did not intend, even if he were prepared, to defend the design of each and every vessel that had been adopted by the Admiralty. Mistakes had, no doubt, been made, and would continue to be made, in those designs; but when constructing fighting machines that had to be worked under so many and such varying conditions of service, he thought they wore yet a long way off making a perfect fighting ship. When he used the term "mistakes," he did not impute blame to anyone, or mean that the errors were errors that should have been apparent to the designers. They were not errors by the light of the information that the designers had at the time that they designed the ships. Experience and use daily developed alterations and changes in the type of vessel required. He could not do bettor than quote from the Report of the Committee of 1871—Lord Dufferin's Committee, viz.:—
    "A perfect ship of war is a desideratum which has never yet been attained, and is now further than ever removed from our reach. Any near approach to perfection in one direction inevitably brings with it disadvantages in another."
    As he understood the object of the hon. Member, it was not so much to raise questions as to the suitability of this or that vessel, but rather to consider whether the principles on which designs were prepared and adopted by the Admiralty were such as to enable the country to obtain the best form of battle ship. Naturally those who supported the formation of a Committee on Designs illustrated their arguments by reference to failures in vessels that had been constructed. But, to his mind, the real question to be determined was, not whether certain failures had occurred under the existing system, but whether, under any other arrangement, we should obtain, on the whole, a more serviceable Navy than the one we at present possessed. He believed that the general system adopted in regard to approving and designing of vessels by the Admiralty was good if worked out on plain, proper, sensible business lines. No doubt, in theory, a "Committee on Designs" sounded most attractive; but in practice he was inclined to believe that it would be found, not only unwork-
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    able, but prejudicial. What was required in a vessel, especially in a fighting vessel, was a homogeneous design. The scantlings, dimensions, displacement, power, armament, should all proceed upon one common basis. This uniformity could best be secured by intrusting the work to one competent and responsible designer. In no science was there greater room for differences of opinion than that of the naval architect, and two experts were but seldom found, to agree on any one point. Therefore, if a Committee of exports was called together, and that Committee was composed of men of strong minds, the probability was that each would have some special point in construction to which he attached importance; that he would force his particular hobby upon his colleagues, with the result that a patchwork ship would be designed, one that could not possibly fulfil in a satisfactory manner any one requirement. A design prepared under such a Committee would be no one man's production. There would be no individual responsible, and if it did not succeed there would be no on to whom blame could be personally attached. In his judgment the Admiralty system of preparing and approving designs was, as he had said, if conducted on business lines, a more satisfactory form of Committee with individual responsibility than could be devised by any plan of a Committee. No Navy in the world required such a variety of type of vessels as did England. In addition to the necessity of maintaining a powerful fighting fleet, provision had to be made for the naval police of the globe, and for a fleet to protect our extending and ever growing commerce. We required ships for deep sea service, for river service, and vessels that would keep the sea for a lengthened period without loss of speed, or the necessity of being frequently placed in dry dock. The depository of all this knowledge was the Admiralty. The information daily gained from the officers in command of our numerous stations was alone in the possession of the officials of the Admiralty. They alone were able to watch the performances of each and every type of cruiser, and by the vast experience thus gained they were in the best position to know their faults and defects, and to guard against similar errors in new vessels. The Admiralty possessed, in addition, a full

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    knowledge of the progress of naval construction of all other nations. This, combined with their own experience, placed the Department in a position that could not be attained by any Committee of experts composed of gentlemen not daily in touch with the naval operations. The Admiralty had a highly trained Constructive Department, presided over by a gentleman who had attained European note as a designer of war ships. It was at the earnest request of the noble Lord now at the head of the Admiralty that Mr. White was induced to leave the Elswick Works and place his services at the disposal of the Government. "When objection was raised last year to Mr. "White continuing to act as consulting engineer for a certain period to the Elswick Works he determined to cease his connection with them, and in September such connection terminated. During the period after Mr. White had left Elswick and come to the Admiralty, he believed that gentleman had never once been consulted by the Elswick firm as to work which they had had in hand; but it would not have been possible for the Admiralty to obtain his valuable services had not the First Lord allowed him to be consulting adviser to that firm for a short period. With regard to the general question, he had already stated that in his opinion the machinery and system of the Admiralty for providing efficient war vessels was good. He had qualified that statement by the stipulation that it must be carried out in a businesslike way, and he was bound to admit that this had not always been the case in times gone by. The Construction Department had brought forward designs and vessels had been ordered without the designs being properly referred to the officers responsible for the manning, arming, and machinery of the vessels. The Chief Constructor had stated on his designs his views on these matters, and had estimated the displacement of his vessel for a certain weight of armament and engines, and an estimated complement of crow. These conditions had not always been examined by the officers best acquainted with these details. Proposals had thus been accepted without being properly examined. Subsequently, from time to time after the vessel's construction had commenced, serious alterations had been made in these important details, adding largely to the weight to be
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    carried by the vessel beyond her original design. Vessels had also been kept an undue length of time under construction, and, as improvements developed in naval appliances, alterations and additions had been made to such ships incompatible with the ideas of those who designed them. In illustration of this absence of procedure on business lines, to which the mistakes were almost entirely duo, he might cite one or two examples from vessels included in the Estimates now before the House. The Mersey, for instance, was designed and partly constructed to be a flush-decked ship to carry 146-inch guns, four on her spar deck, and 10 on her between-docks. When, however, the vessel was completely framed, a change of idea had come over the Admiralty, and they had altered her from a flush-deck ship to a vessel with a poop and forecastle, and a deep open waist, Her armament was altered by placing one heavy 8-inch gun on board in lieu of two of the 6-inch guns. Her sea-going trim was quite altered, and the increased cost for completing this vessel had been £50,000. It had not infrequently happened that the Admiralty had allowed a ship to be commenced before they had finally determined the armament. The Benbow was an example of this. Her designer had proposed that she should carry two 63-ton guns in each of two barbettes; the Admiralty, instead of determining whether this armament was proper or not, contracted for the vessel at separate prices for the hull and barbettes, so that if they changed their mind as to the armament, they could more readily arrange with the builders the cost of such change; but the most important factor in the whole matter was overlooked—namely, that the lines of the hull were drawn to carry at a given displacement, and the question whether the vessel could carry at that displacement depended largely upon the weight of the armament to be put on board. What was the result? After the work on the ship had gone on for some time, there was no 63-ton gun ready, but there was a 110-ton gun completed which the Admiralty thought might be very well suited for the Benbow. Consequently, instead of the two barbettes being armed each with two 63-ton guns, it was determined to place 110-ton guns in each of the barbettes, rendering necessary serious alterations

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    in the size of the barbettes. They also increased her armament by four 6-inch guns and 12 six-pounders; so that by the time the Admiralty had made up their mind as to the armament of this vessel, she was called upon to carry something like 500 tons of extra dead weight, or equal to one foot extra displacement beyond that at which she was originally designed to float. In a similar way, 250 tons had been added to the weight of the belted cruisers now building beyond their designed capacity. Allusion had been made to the ridiculously small coal rapacity of the Impérieuse and the Warspite; but since these ships were designed, 430 tons of extra armament, machinery, and other things had been added to the weight after the lines of the hull had been determined upon. He gave these facts in order to bear out his contention that whatever fault there might be in connection with the designs of ships under construction, the blame did not lie with the system under which ships were designed, but was clue to a want of business aptitude in giving effect to that system. When every effort was made to minimize weights in the ship, and the designer worked to the nearest ton, the importance of what he had stated would be realized. These matters had engaged the attention of the present Board of Admiralty from the day they came into Office, as the Report laid before the House by the First Lord would show. The policy laid down by his noble Friend at the head of the Admiralty and his Board, was to require that before a vessel was commenced there should be obtained in writing from the Director of Naval Ordnance and Engineer-in-Chief their opinion on the armament and machinery proposed. Then, after the design had been considered by the Controller, and before going to the Board collectively, a paper should be sent to members individually, so as to give them an opportunity of criticising and considering the design before the order was given for the vessel. As the Board included a number of most distinguished and experienced naval officers, he was satisfied that those designs would be closely and sharply criticized from the Naval point of view, as they ought to be; and the faults and defects which he had endeavoured to point out would be remedied by those gentlemen in the
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    course of the careful examination they would give to the designs. Once passed by the Board, the order was most precise that no alteration or addition was to be allowed. When thus approved in every detail the designer could prepare the lines of the vessel, knowing exactly what she had to carry in weight, and what duties she was expected to perform. It would also be the policy of the Board not to be tempted to make alterations in vessels when once their construction was commenced, but to push on the work to completion, adhering to the original design. Such a policy would, he was satisfied, obviate the recurrence of many of the costly mistakes of the past, to which allusion had been made, and would be the best means of attaining the end which the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley) had so much at heart, and with whoso object the Board of Admiralty fully sympathized. The hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed) would be fully aware of the attempt made in 1871 to obtain the opinion of a Committee of Inquiry on the designs of vessels then being constructed. He would remember the variety of opinions expressed by Members of that Committee, and the difficulty of forming any reliable conclusion from their Report as to the best form of vessel to be built In looking through the evidence given before that inquiry he was much struck by one answer given by the hon. Member for Cardiff, who, on being pressed to express an opinion favourable to the introduction of compound engines into the Navy, said—
    "My feeling is that I prefer to get actual experience rather than evidence—which, even when given from the best authorities, is not always to be trusted—before I would tamper with vessels of that kind."
    Now, if a Committee were formed, it would have to deal with evidence. For his own part, he preferred the common-sense process recommended by the hon. Member for Cardiff—to be guided by actual experience rather than by evidence. Another point he should notice was that there had been more Committees upon these matters than the hon. Member for Sunderland was aware of. There was a Committee in 1805, the outcome of which was the construction of the Captain. In 1869 another Committee sat, and the Devastation and the Thunderer were produced; there was a

    615
    third in 1871, after the Captain was lost; and he thought that, broadly stated, the result of these various Committees was that there were about as many opinions as there were Members on the Committee. It was true the Motion did not suggest the appointment of a permanent Committee on Designs, but was limited to an inquiry into the designs adopted within recent years. Such a proposal would have even a more prejudicial effect on the Service than the appointment of a permanent Committee. The inquiry would occupy months; it would distract the attention of officers; rival schools of ship-building would be heard before the Committee, each with its own theory. If upon so contentious and thorny a subject the Committee should by chance come to a unanimous conclusion, the effect might be to cramp the inventive and suggestive faculties of our naval officers, and to stereotype in our Navy some one system or type of ship. Men in official positions were not over partial to accept responsibility, and he thought the temptation would be great to the designers to shelter their future work behind the recommendations of such a Committee. The result would be that for some time there would be a stereotyped typo of vessel, and the country would not keep up with that ever-growing progress which so marked the construction of our vessels in the last few years. It must not, however, before one moment supposed that the present Board of Admiralty considered themselves or their advisers to be infallible, or that they lived in regions above and beyond the reach of outside advice. They were always pleased to receive suggestions, and in the event of difficulty or doubt there would be no hesitation in seeking the counsel of those from the outside who might be qualified to give a reliable opinion. For the reasons, however, that he had endeavoured to lay before the House, the Government could not accept the Motion of the hon. Member—a Motion which, if carried, would make it compulsory upon the Board to appoint a Committee. They hoped by using the machinery they at present possessed, and giving effect to the existing system on business lines, to arrive at the result the hon. Member desired—namely, to provide from time to time the most efficient ships of war that could be produced. The hon. Member for Cardiff
    616
    had made allusion to his visit to Devonport the other day. What the hon. Member said he saw there was the outcome of the want of business aptitude in the past. The Admiralty at the time were in a great hurry to get the vessels referred to constructed, and he believed the Admiralty had not made up their minds as to the host form of the vessels when they ordered them. At the present time, however, the Admiralty had made up their minds, and they knew what they wanted in respect of the vessels they ordered from truck to keel, and he believed that was the only way to avoid the mistakes which had occurred in the past. There was no doubt that much of the trouble that had arisen in ships now under consideration, had arisen from the overpace at which the work was pushed on. A very large number of ships were put in hand at once, and he was afraid that that care and attention were not given to them which would have been given if the demand had not been so great and oppressive. He was afraid public opinion was somewhat to blame for that state of things. There had been some sweeping remarks by the hon. Member for Cardiff as regarded certain ships which he had named, and, although he had pointed out the differences between their designs and what they would be when they were completed; still he did not wish the House for one moment to suppose that those vessels would be anything but first-class men of war. They might have been better, but there was no hesitation on the part of naval officers of the Board in saying that they would prove good and efficient fighting ships; and if ever the time unfortunately came for their going into action they would be found as good and efficient fighting ships as a British seaman could desire.
    SIR JOHN COMMERELLsaid, what Naval men complained of was that the designers of ships were always in a hurry, but after being in such a hurry to lay vessels down they were not in the same haste to launch them. The speech they had just heard from the Secretary to the Admiralty amounted to this:—"We acknowledge there have been tremendous mistakes in the past, but we mean to do better for the future." What they complained of in the Navy was that they did not get value for their money.

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    They went clown to the Yard, and they saw the money wasted right and left, and he would tell them why. The Admiralty would not make up their minds, and would not send out proper specifications and proper information to the contractors and to the Dockyards before they commenced their work. They were aware that the Admiralty knew how to construct vessels, but what they complained of was that the Board would not make up their minds. He did not agree with the hon. Member for Sunderland, and thought the appointment of a Committee would be a great mistake. It would remove the responsibility from where it should rest—on the Board of Admiralty. What was wanted was that the outside world should be taken into confidence. Tenders should be invited for the construction of vessels from outside contractors, and then they would have designs from all parts of the country, which would result in England being put in a very much better position in respect of her Navy than she was at present. He had been rather averse to the Nile and Trafalgar being built, because he had come to the conclusion that it was like putting too many eggs into one basket, and that smaller vessels would have served the purpose, but still he believed they would be the two most powerful vessels in the world. The right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) was mistaken in what he had said, for Mr. Barnes and Mr. Morgan had both told him that they approved of these two vessels very highly.
    SIR CHARLES PALMER: I would not have risen to take part in the debate, but for the sweeping accusations which have been made respecting very estimable men by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed). I consider that the remarks of my hon. Friend have reference to the period when he was at the Admiralty, rather than to the present time. Personally I have some knowledge of these matters, the firm with which I am concerned having lately completed vessels of an important character. I am bound to say that the designs and specifications which were sent in before the tenders were made wore of a most complete and perfect character; indeed, they proceeded from the lines laid down and recommended
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    by the Committee of which I had the honour to be a Member, and over which Lord Ravens worth presided. That Committee recommended, amongst other things, that vessels should not be laid down before the designs and specifications were complete, and the result has been that vessels since built have been so with perfect satisfaction. Complete designs have been placed in the hands of the contractors, the work makes steady progress, and, instead of ships being behind time in delivery, I believe that, in almost every case, the time of delivery has been anticipated. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Peed) has asked me if the contractors have delivered the vessels complete? My answer is that the contractors have delivered them complete in all but armaments. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) has referred to the building of the Nile and the Trafalgar. The right hon. Gentleman is right, in my opinion, in bringing the question before the House, because as the action of the Government was of a somewhat extraordinary character, when you have men of such high intelligence and position as the Chief Constructors of the Navy sending out a protest against the building of certain ships, great attention should be paid to their representations, and a proper investigation should be made. I am myself opposed to Committees in such questions as a rule. I am opposed to the Resolution of the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley), because I feel that if we are to have a Board of Admiralty that Board should take upon itself the responsibility of conducting the affairs of the Navy, and experts should not be brought in from time to time, and Committees should not be appointed to supersede the Board and take the responsibility out of their bands. I am also of opinion that the Constructors Department ought to have more responsibility thrown upon it independent of what I may call the Naval Department. The Constructors Department ought to take the responsibility of designing and. building the ships which the Admiralty require, and the Naval Department ought not to interfere until the vessels are put into their hands for navigation. I am aware that naval officers fancy they can instruct the Naval Constructors; but such is not my opinion. But I rose chiefly to express my regret that sweeping con-

    619
    demnations should have been made against certain gentlemen, because I am satisfied the country owe a great deal to those gentlemen for having so efficiently earned out the construction of ships of war. The progress made year by year in ship-building and marine architecture is such that it is very difficult to keep pace with it; and I believe that these men have endeavoured to the best of their ability to do their duty.
    Question put, and agreed to.
    Main Question again proposed. "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair".

    ADMIRALTY EXPENDITURE—COST OF CONSULTATION—OBSERVATION.
    MR. J. M. MACLEAN: I think that the statement which the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton' has laid before the House is especially interesting and valuable, because it deals, not only with the Estimates for the coming financial year, but because it lays down the principle on which our future naval policy ought to be based for a number of years to come. The First Lord of the Admiralty and his Colleagues have made an effort which I think the country will highly commend, to ascertain what should he the amount set apart year by year, before he holds out to us, not only the possibility, but the probability that the policy he advocates will be carried into effect—namely, that we shall have a reduction of expenditure with an increase of efficiency. No doubt that is a very pleasant prospect to hold out, but I am anxious to consider how far the promise of the noble Lord is likely to be redeemed. When we turn to that part of the noble Lord's Statement in which the proposal is made to set apart a regular depreciation fund to meet wastage and the cost of construction of new ships from year to year, we find that a very novel but excellent idea has been brought forward by the Board of Admiralty. It is proposed that the capitalized value should be taken of the Fleet as it at present exists. The Board assumes that when the present programme is carried out—as it soon will be—when all money Voted by Parliament during the last few years to construct new ships has been spent—we shall have a Navy efficient for all purposes of offence and defence; and the
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    present proposal of the Admiralty is that a certain sum should be set apart every year to maintain the Navy as a Navy worthy of the Country, and the great interests it has to protect. What is the amount thus set apart? We find that a certain percentage is taken on the different ships constituting the Navy and the original outlay upon them, together with the annual waste, and the conclusion arrived at was that the annual amount to be set apart for depreciation was £1,803,000. It is said that such an amount is fair and reasonable to be set apart from year to year. Then, supposing that such a sum is sot apart, we have to consider whether it is likely that we shall have that reasonable reduction in the Navy Estimates which has been held out to us as a fair and reasonable prospect by the Board of Admiralty. Turning to the Navy Estimates for the year. I find at page 77 that the total amount set apart ill 1887–8 for the machinery and hulls of ships is £1,911,000; "that exceeds by just £100,000 the amount which the Admiralty proposes to set aside for these purposes in all coming years. Now, that seems to leave a very narrow margin indeed in which to effect a saving in the Navy Estimates. But it does not represent the whole state of the case, because of the whole of this sum of £1,911,000, which is to be devoted to this purpose in the coming year, we find that there is a sum of £530,000 set apart for gun fittings and special purposes of that kind. That is an amount expressly excluded from the depreciation fund of the Board of Admiralty; and if we are to deduct that sum from the total sum set apart for the construction of new ships and for wastage in the ensuing year, there is only £1,400,000 left; so that the amount the Admiralty say is to be set apart in future years exceeds by £.500,000 the amount really to be devoted to such purposes. We know that this year is to be the last of a series of years which has to be devoted to the special construction of new ships. The Estimates have been swollen in the last few years by the expenditure of £8,000,000 for special improvements in the Navy; and the taxpayers may naturally expect that when that work has been accomplished some reduction might be made in the annual demands upon the country. But if this policy is to be carried out, as

    621
    far as I can understand the Estimates, I we shall have to spend in the construction of new ships and machinery an | amount larger by £500,000 than what we propose to spend in the coining financial year. That is a point on which I should like to elicit some information from the Representative of the Admiralty in this House. But then there is another point in connection with this depreciation fund which I think deserves the consideration of the House. There is no doubt that the Admiralty, in proposing to set apart this fund, are acting upon the analogy of what is done by men carrying on a large private business, who set apart a certain sum every year for depreciation. We know that private firms do set aside certain sums every year for depreciation—for special emergencies that may occur from time to time. But what would occur if the House of Commons were to vote, say, £2,000,000 every year for the construction of new ships, with the understanding that that sum was not to be allocated to other purposes? Do hon. Members believe that that sum would not be spent every year, whether it was wanted or not? The Department would feel itself bound to spend it, and would take advantage of every occasion for doing so. I should like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, whether it is proposed that this fund should be a permanent fund or not? Whether in some way it would be funded or reserved for great occasions, and that it would not necessarily be spent every year? There could be no security against the panics which arise periodically, or that the Board of Admiralty would not be required to ask for millions more because some other Board, which had been in existence for a few years, had obtained great credit for economy at the cost of the efficiency of the Navy. We could have no security that in one Year all the money collected in this way from year to year would not be devoted to the purposes of the Navy in one single year. I do not intend to cast any reflection on the present Board of Admiralty; but this is how the matter stands. A new idea is set before the House, which is no doubt excellent in itself, but it is one on which we ought to have some clear and definite information as to the way in which this depreciation fund is to be employed, and we should also receive some clear assurance that
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    the mode in which the Estimate is taken is the correct one, and that we shall not be asked in future years to vote a much larger sum as a regular Navy expenditure on new ships, than we may be actually voting for the coming financial year.
    GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURsaid, he recognized the value of the information given by the First Lord of the Admiralty in his able Memorandum, but desired that they should be afforded further explanations as to the armament of guns that were still required for the Navy. The noble Lord knew that for many years he (Sir George Balfour) had strenuously urged the Admiralty to undertake the supply of its own guns, instead of depending on the War Office. He had known the most ridiculous proposals to be made by the Navy with regard to guns. He had known ships to be built without the slightest information as to the calibre or the weight required for the armament of these ships. The noble Lord (Lord George Hamilton), in his Statement, had given the House some information as to the breech loading guns already supplied by the War Office; but he had failed to give any information as to what the total guns for the Navy were to be. The noble Lord said 1,281 breech-loading guns was the number now available; but he failed to show how many more wore required. In his (Sir George Balfour's) opinion, 3,300 was the lowest number which would be required. At all events, the calculation of the noble Lord was as entirely misleading as when he gave the cost of the ships at £39,000,000, without inserting in the Estimate the full cost of the guns required to equip the vessels. The amount of money provided in the Army Estimates for the supply of ordnance for the Navy was totally inadequate, He regretted extremely that the War Office was to continue to supply the Navy with guns and stores. No arrangement could be more unfortunate, and lie hoped some understanding might be arrived at by which the War Office would be relieved of the task. If he were Secretary of State for War, he would not retain the post for a day without insisting on being relieved of such a responsibility. Another change he would like to see effected was that of the War Office having the duty imposed on it of providing its own trans-

    623
    port. He saw no difficulty in carrying out that change under the superintendence of a capable officer. If such a change were brought about, it would have most beneficial economical results, as economy was by no means studied by the War Office in the matter of transport when they knew the Admiralty had to pay the bills.
    MR. PULESTONsaid, he joined in the congratulations offered to the noble Lord on the very lucid and able Statement with regard to the Naval Estimates which he had placed in the hands of Members. No such Statement had ever been issued before; but, although it was clear and conclusive, it was not beyond criticism and explanation. At no time had the responsibility of the First Lord of the Admiralty been greater than it was at the present moment. Although some of the Representatives of Dockyard constituencies might, perhaps, feel for the time being the effect of the reforms that were made, they would all unite in giving the noble Lord full credit for doing that which in his judgment and in that of the present Board was best for the country; and it was gratifying to learn that the saving of so much money was compatible with efficiency. The fact that we had 62,500 officers and men, against last year's 61,400, with a saving of nearly£800,000, was, of itself, a very important consideration. The Admiralty being one of the great spending Departments, it was right, and also of great advantage, that the head of that Department should be a Member of that House; and he trusted there would be no departure) from that rule in future. Both the Statement of the noble Lord and the Navy Estimates bore clear testimony that there had been no extraordinary extravagance in the Dockyards, as was often assumed. Reference had been made to the ill effects of the changes made in ships while they were in course of construction, and in the Statement of the First Lord some importance was attached to the proposal that in future, when the building of a ship was ordered, the design should not be interfered with, He gladly admitted that that was a salutary decision for the Admiralty to come to; but, while in the past those changes might account for a largely increased expenditure in the case of various ships, on the other hand he
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    ventured to suggest that there might be some disadvantage if they drew too hard-and-fast a line against any alteration of a ship until it was finished. It was quite possible to carry this new idea to an extreme. He considered that it was one of the great advantages of building our ships in the Royal Dock yards that we were able, when really necessary, to alter the designs of ships when in process of building; for it must be admitted, considering the frequent changes which were being made in the science of shipbuilding, that it might be highly desirable to make some alteration in the design of a ship whilst she was being built. It was the stitch in time which saved nine, and a judicious alteration might prevent a much very larger outlay after the ship had been completed. They had seen some ships which had been finished with great rapidity in Private yards, and which it had been necessary afterwards to send to the Dockyards to be refitted or changed in several important particulars, involving much higher cost and outlay before she was perfected than would have been incurred had the change been made in her while the vessel was being built. It was well known that war ships became obsolete by reason of changes which were very rapid in the mode of construction, in speed, and in armament. There might, therefore, be times and occasions when it would be cheaper and bettor for I the Admiralty to make alterations during construction. He thought there was reason to hope, from this Memorandum of his noble Friend, that they had come to the end of the policy of fits and starts, which was so very expensive, and so detrimental to the real and permanent interests of the country. The policy of fits and starts was to do nothing in times of peace, and then, when there was a war scare on, to rush and buy every vessel we could lay our hands on, from every country and belonging to everybody, at an enormous outlay, and thereby getting possession of a large number of vessels which were practically useless to us, and spending millions of money which would be saved if we adopted the sound and sensible plan of maintaining our Royal Dockyards always in an efficient state, so as to be ready to turn out any quantity of work on an emergency. He hoped this Memorandum was the first practical recog-

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    nition of what was wanted to put our Navy in a state of thorough efficiency. He looked upon it rather as an earnest of what was to come, although in itself it was very good. Some hon. Members were always addressing themselves to the question of the disestablishment of the Royal Dockyards. the reforms and re-arrangements proposed by the Admiralty would, at all events, have this effect—that they would give no reason to those hon. Members to urge that plea in future. They would see that the alterations would facilitate the understanding of how and where the money went. It gave him great satisfaction to learn that it was intended to keep the plant and capital invested in the Dockyards employed, while giving them the greater part of the work instead of to the private yards. He knew it had become a confirmed opinion in some quarters that work could be done cheaper by giving it out to private yards; but he had made it his business to inquire into this matter, and he had succeeded in getting an illustration of the way in which the cheaper work sometimes done in private yards was brought about. It was said that the Acorn was built in a private yard for £10,000 less than it could have been built for in a Royal Dockyard. Well, he was assured, on the authority of the Secretary of the Company who built her, that the £10,000 saved to the Admiralty, comparing it with other ships of the same type, represented £10,000 lost to the Company, He contended that even if it cost more in the first instance, which he did not admit, to build ships in the Royal Dockyards, it would cost less in the long run, because they would be certain of the character of the work; they would be in a position to make any necessary alterations during the process of the work, if absolutely essential; and they would keep their Dockyards in a state of thorough efficiency, ready to execute work on any emergency, which might be of the very greatest importance to the safety of the nation at an important crisis. Nothing could be more opportune than the proposal as to the new Intelligence Department. It was a very good idea, and the cost, perhaps, was not too extravagant; though he understood a considerable sum would have to be added for retirement pay. No one, he believed, grudged officers and seamen any plums
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    which might fall to their share; but, nevertheless, he thought it well that economy in practice should not be confined to the bottom, but should also find its way to the top. He was assured that nothing in the recent discharges in the Dockyards, which had, to some extent, been recognized as necessary, had made them so unpopular as the fact that at the same time that these discharges were taking place now offices were created with very large salaries—salaries of £1,000 a-year or so. He thought it would be admitted that Members who had for years represented Dockyard constituencies would have some knowledge of matters connected with Dockyards, and that, in advocating the claims of persons employed there, they were actuated by higher motives than a desire to get votes. There was one point in the Statement which, perhaps, the noble Lord would be able to explain. It was not quite clear whether more discharges were contemplated. He did not ask for specific information on a subject of that kind, as he knew the Admiralty must be guided by the particular circumstances of the time. There was no more honest, straightforward, loyal body of men in existence, taking them as a whole, than those employed in our Dockyards. Coming to particular branches, he pleaded, in the first place, the claims of the shipwrights, and submitted that their case was one deserving of very serious consideration on the part of the Admiralty. It was not fair, he maintained, to apply the strict principles of supply and demand to their public servants. The law of supply and demand ought, not to influence their treatment of them; but, even as a question of supply and demand, he would not admit for a moment that they could get plenty of men to take the place of these most loyal and skilled workers in the Dockyards. He desired to see them have something like fixity of tenure. Then there were the engine room artificers, whoso cause he had advocated for years, in the face of considerable opposition. Their claims had been strongly presented, though the suggestions had not been adopted, because it would involve spending more money. Those engine-room artificers were, practically, in the same position now as they were in the days of wooden ships. Their position was much more important than in days gone

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    by, requiring more education and outlay, and he wished the Lords of the Admiralty would take that into consideration in dealing with their modest requests. The claims of the warrant officers were such as the Treasury could hardly refuse, because they involved almost no outlay, while to concede them would be to increase the efficiency of the Service. In the next plate he urged the importance of improving the position of naval schoolmasters, which, was below that of any other schoolmasters in the country, including oven their brethren in the Army. And, lastly, in a special way he called the attention of the Representatives of the Admiralty to the petition of the Dockyard men, not to a reduction of the working hours, but to such a re-adjustment of the hours as would enable them to take advantage of the long summer evenings for recreation and education—an object which could be attained by fixing the hour from 7 to 5 all the year round. He urged these things not merely as representing a Dockyard constituency, and, therefore, knowing something of their management, but because he sincerely believed that if these suggestions were carried out they would promote the great interests of the country.
    ADMIRAL MAYNE: I agree with the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Puleston) that thanks are due from every professional man to the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton) for the Statement which has been laid upon the Table, although there are some omissions in it. I only hope that the First Lord is right in saying that there will be a permanent change in the way of keeping the accounts. We have had so many changes, and there are so many difficulties in ascertaining what is going on with respect to work, whether under contract or in the Dockyards, that I am bound to say I have very little faith in any element of finality. We are told, practically, that the present Board of Admiralty have at last found out the one way in which all things are to be done aright. I trust that that may be so. Although I never had the honour of speaking on this subject in this House before, I think that anyone who has followed the manner in which the Estimates and the Accounts in regard to work done by contract and in
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    the Dockyards has been carried out must have seen that there is room for very great improvement, and that no commercial firm, with the business-like capacity of which the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood) has spoken, would keep their accounts in the way our Navy Accounts have been kept. The hon. Gentleman the senior Member for Devonport has spoken most truly, and most properly, in regard to the Dockyard establishments. It is quite impossible for the Navy to be maintained by private contracts. In a time of war wages go up rapidly, and we were taught by bitter experience in the Crimean War that private contracts were not fulfilled as they ought to have been—that the work itself was scamped; that prices were high; and that an enormous amount of money was spent in a way that was wholly unjustifiable, and can only be accounted for on the supposition that everybody was too much frightened at the notion of war to consider what was being done. I entirely endorse, also, the remarks of the hon. Member for Devonport as to the Petitions presented to the Admiralty from the shipwrights, the warrant officers, schoolmasters, artificers, and other classes; and I regret with the hon. Member that the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty has not seen his way to give a more hopeful answer than he has been pleased to give. These are times of great depression in Dockyard labour, and, as a Dockyard Member, I can bear testimony to the great distress and misery which have been caused by the discharges to which reference has been made, in the Dockyard I represent the distress has been especially great, because there is no other opening for work there; and I deeply regret that the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty has been unable to see his way to allow these men to die a natural death, so to speak, which would have been the case if they had been loft alone. In Pembroke Dockyard more than 100 men leave the Dockyard every year from age, sickness, &c, in the natural course of events. The hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty has been asked and has answered several Questions during the debate; but he has not told the House who is responsible for the designs and construction of such vessels as the Impérieuse, and other

    629
    vessels which have failed to meet the conditions as to speed, draught, and armour which were laid down for them? Why should ships be laid down and constructed in such an improper way without anyone having responsibility for them? Who is responsible for not adopting triple expansion engines in the Impérieuse and Warspite of 8,000, instead of compound, engines of 7,500, and for reducing the armour-belt protection from 18 inches above water to 6 inches below the water line '? Although the bunkers of these ships were constructed to hold 900 tons of coal, they are only able to carry 500 tons. It has been shown by the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed, that they will never be able properly to carry the amount of coal originally intended. One vessel—the Mercury—is only able to carry a supply of coal for three days and a-half, and for some mysterious reason that ship has never been commissioned except for a short trip across Bantry Bay as an experiment. In the first page of this Statement, credit seems to be taken for the fact that Dockyard labour is not allocated in the present year, as has been the practice in past years. But I think that that is a great mistake, because if the money is allocated as an Estimate it enables the Constructors of the Yards to forecast, to some extent, what they would have to do in the course of the Year, and thus to regulate their staff. I do not see why money should not be allocated in the Estimates, the Board of Admiralty having the power to change the allocation as the year goes on. That would enable them to do with Admiralty knowledge what commercial yards are able to do at this moment, and would show them what work they would have to turn out in the Dockyard in the course of the year. I am sorry to observe, in the shipbuilding policy of the Admiralty, that they propose to build ships calculated to steam only 13½ knots an hour. Under ordinary circumstances those vessels would not be able to keep up with the squadron, and they would only be competent, as was pointed out by Lord Ravensworth's Committee, to do the ordinary police work in a time of peace. Lord Ravensworth's Committee spoke of the construction of this kind of ship as a waste of the public money. I entirely concur in that opinion, be-
    630
    lieving that such vessels would be utterly useless for war purposes. The hon. Baronet the Member for Durham (Sir Charles Palmer) spoke at some length on the advantages of ships built by contract, and the hon. Gentleman the senior Member for Devonport mentioned the case of two small vessels, to show the advantage of Dockyard building as contrasted with contract building. In regard to the question as between Dockyard work and contract work there is no ground whatever for saying, if the accounts are kept in the same way in both cases, that ships can be built cheaper by contract, than in the Royal Dockyards. Instead of two small vessels spoken of by the hon. Member for Devonport, let me take three largo ships to illustrate this point—the Audacious, the Invincible, and the Iron Duke. The Iron Duke was built at Pembroke, and cost £208,000; the Audacious and Invincible were built by contract, and cost £256,000 and £249,000 respectively. In the one case there was an advantage of £48,000, and in the other of £41,000 in favour of the ship built at the Royal Dockyard at Pembroke I may mention two later instances; those of the Benbow and the Anton. The cost of building and completing the Anson, of 6,640 tons, was £500,908. The contract price of the hull and extras for the Benbow—a sister ship—at the Thames Armour Works was £525,765. A further sum of £40,000 was provided to be spent on the Benbow at Chatham, making a total cost—according to official documents—of £565,765, or £61,857 more than the Anson, or at least, taking the contract price alone, £24,827 in favour of the Dockyard built ship. I am unable to account for these facts, clearly shown in the Estimates, on any other hypothesis than that the Dockyard ship is more cheaply built. I believe that I might adduce many other instances to show that it is a great mistake to suppose that a ship can be built cheaper in a private yard than in a Dockyard. The hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty has pointed out a case of failure of contract—I think it was a case of extra repairs—but it was due to the failure of the contractor under the conditions now imposed in a time of peace; and if such shortcomings occur now, what must we expect in time of war? In regard to Dockyard administration there is a

    631
    defect in the existing practice which. I hope the Board of Admiralty will be able to remedy. I refer to the appointment of the Superintendents of the Dockyards for varying periods. They may servo for one or two years, or for six months only. But, as a matter of fact, in most cases they are not allowed to serve sufficiently long to master the details of the work before they are superseded. I believe I am right in saying that this custom is disapproved of by those who have the immediate control of the Dockyards, and that its continuance is duo to the Treasury's refusal to grant the requisite money. One would have thought that the Lords of the Admiralty would have had sufficient power to obtain what money the country requires for the Navy, and not allow any Lord of the Treasury or Chancellor of the Exchequer, who knows nothing of the details of the Service, to interpose a veto on its complete efficiency. I am afraid that is one of the methods by which the money of the country is wasted. It is altogether impossible to have the Dockyards properly regulated when the officers arc liable to be changed every six, 12, or 18 months, instead of being appointed for at least three, or, better still, five years. Those hon. Members of the House who have read the Report of Lord Ravensworth's Committee will be aware that it has been laid down by that Committee that only under special conditions can ships of war be repaired by contract advantageously, and yet I see in these Estimates a large item for repairing ships by contract. I regret to understand that something like £30,000, in addition, I suppose, to the £18,000 put down now, is to be expended on the Garnet, a ship which never exceeded 8 knots an hour, and which certainly ought not to be repaired at anything like such a cost. I think there are many other points which are worth looking into, and I trust that if a Committee is appointed to go through the Navy Estimates altogether, it will not be too late, when that Committee is nominated, to stop some of the expenditure, which seems manifestly a waste of money. There are only two other points on which I will touch tonight. One is the position of the Commanders-in-Chief at the Home Ports. In relation to that matter, those hon. Gentlemen who take the trouble to look into the Navy Estimates will probably per-
    632
    ceive with surprise that while the Estimates are presumably signed by the Lords of the Admiralty and the Secretary to the Admiralty, there is one signature which is conspicuous by its absence, and that is the signature of the only Naval Lord—the noble and gallant Member for East Marylebone—who sits in this House (Lord Charles Beresford). The noble Lord, who seems to be the itinerant exponent of the Admiralty views, has spoken on the question of shipbuilding at the Mansion House, and at public meetings elsewhere, and it is to be presumed that his views are more or less endorsed by the Board of Admiralty. I have been told that each Lord who signs the Estimates does not thereby take upon himself the responsibility of the whole of the Vote; but each is responsible for that particular Vote which it is the business of his own Department to look after. Now I think that such a practice is most misleading. The reason given is that it is impossible for each of the Lords to spare time to go through the whole of the Estimates; but that, in my humble opinion, is their own fault. Why have they not time; and why are my Lords so overworked? It is on account of the far too great centralization of work of all sorts and in great detail at the Admiralty, and that they will not allow anybody outside to do any work at all. There is a Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, another at Devonport, and another at Sheerness, who are senior usually to the officers in the Admiralty, and often have been Lords of the Admiralty themselves; but such is the present system of conducting the Service that these Commanders-in-Chief have no power whatever, and have to refer everything to the Admiralty. It seems strange that when a man gets into an office he ceases to be the same naval officer he was before; but, somehow or other, when a naval officer gets into the Admiralty, he loses all his former views, and, believing himself omniscient, he tries to be omnipresent, and signally fails. I well remember a Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth answering my expression of surprise that he could not give some small order without reference to the Admiralty by saying—"The Commander-in-Chief here was once a great man, but now he is only a big midshipman." Lord Ravensworth's Committee came to the conclusion that it is

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    detrimental to the interests of the Service that so much technical detail should be gone into at the Admiralty. They say—
    "There is too much centralization of detail at the Admiralty causing delay and unnecessary correspondence, much of which might he avoided if a larger discretion in technical and minor matters were allowed to the Dockyard officers."
    If more discretion were allowed to the Commanders-in-Chief I believe that much labour might be saved to the Lords of the Admiralty. I will add the hope that the Committee now inquiring into the Civil Departments will also inquire into the Civil Departments of the Admiralty—an inquiry which, was desired by Admiral Hornby. I think it would be well to employ some naval officers in those Civil Departments, in order to prevent the answers to Questions which are put in this House from being drawn up by civilians who do not know the meaning of the terms they write down. There is not a sufficient amount of technical information in the lower grades of the Admiralty, and a great saving both of money and time would be effected by employing officers on half-pay whose pay and pensions have at present to be provided by the country. I am certain there are half-pay officers whose employment at the Admiralty would supply that technical knowledge the lack of which is so often displayed by civilians receiving higher pay than need be given to the naval officers, already having half-pay of their rank and prospective pensions, and who would be glad of the employment. I have only one other point which I desire to bring before the House, and that is the question of naval education. I am afraid that I have already trespassed on the time of the House; but my excuse must be that this is the first time which I have trespassed upon its indulgence. I had hoped that hon. Members who have been in the House longer than I have would have spoken upon that subject, because it is one of considerable difficulty. The last Committee on Naval Education summed up all that has been done on the subject by two or three former Committees, and the result at which one arrives from reading carefully through the evidence is that naval officers are what they ought to be in spite of the system of education, and not on account of it. I know that great and useful changes have been made in
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    tho present system as it exists; and I hardly like, because I know I am going against the opinion of many officers who are better judges than I am—I hardly like to say I am absolutely in favour of those changes; but I should certainly like the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty to consider, among the improvements he desires to introduce, whether it would not be better to do away with the Britannia altogether. I feel very strongly that it would be better; and that, if we wish to get the very best material for the Navy, we should take that material from the great public schools of England—say, at the age of 15—and that we should then require the youths so selected to be restricted to an examination in what is taught at the schools, while special subjects should be studied afterwards. Admiral Ryder says cadets should be mainly drawn from the public schools, and that the subjects of examination should be those taught at the schools and no other, and he rightly lays great strength on physical qualities. I am sure that if the country wants, as it does want, officers with nerve sufficient to fight the enormous iron-clads of to-day as the ships of old were fought, it would be better to select youths of 14 or 15 from the public schools. Admiral Hornby says—
    "I object to competitive examination of hoys as adverse to true expansion and invigoration of intellectual faculties, because, to succeed in them, a boy 'hath need of much cunning to seem to know that he doth not. If the entry is bad the next step confirms the evil. They are set to work far above their true capacity, and the natural result is made manifest as soon as they go to sea. Nineteen out of twenty who go to sea are reported as ungrounded, and the Naval Instructor has to begin to relay that proper foundation, which was broken when the boy was taken from his first school, and have to be taught from the point which was broken when the boy was taken from his first school."
    I am afraid that this is the case with most of the young gentlemen who are now sent to sea from the Britannia. I am sure that if we take a boy from a public school, and then send him straight to sea, we should get a much bettor officer after he had been a few years at sea. We should then bring him home and send him to the Naval College, when at an age to understand the value of and necessity for serious study, and that his future prospects would depend upon the use he then made of his time and oppor-

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    tunities. Admiral Hornby—admittedly the best practical tactician in the Service—says further—
    "At present the country is burdened with a heavy expense, and the parent is relieved not only from that, but his natural responsibility of training his son. When once accepted, the training of these youths should commence as in the Scandinavian Navies—before the mast."
    I believe that a system of this sort would be far preferable to the present one, and in this opinion I am strongly supported by many distinguished naval officers.
    MR. R. W. DUFFsaid, he must congratulate the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty on being in a position to ask for decreased Estimates with increased efficiency, but he thought the noble Lord would admit that the present satisfactory position was due very much to the fact that the programme of Lord Northbrook had been faithfully adhered to. He was glad the noble Lord had not to come down to them for those large Estimates which had pressed upon them last year, and he also rejoiced that he had not found it necessary to ask them to raise money by resorting to Terminable Annuities. The Naval Lord (Lord Charles Beresford) last year told the House that £5,500,000 were necessary to put the Navy in a satisfactory position; but he was glad to find that the noble Lord, in a position of responsibility, did not feel called upon to make that large demand upon the taxpayers of the country. The reduction was mainly due to the Shipbuilding Vote; but the whole reduction was very considerable and very satisfactory. He could not, however, help expressing his regret that the noble Lord had allowed something of a Party character to enter into the very able Statement which had been issued. The noble Lord had said that—
    "In the period between 1881 and 1885 every Naval Power in Europe, except England, had largely increased its naval expenditure."
    Yes; but this led to one of two conclusions—that they never had a Navy at all before 1881, or else that it was kept up until 1881 and then suddenly allowed to run down. That was not correct, as the noble Lord would find if he carried his researches beyond 1881. The fact was that both sides had their scares; and after the Conservative scare
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    in 1877, when several additional ships wore added to the Navy, the supply of new vessels had been allowed to run down. From the years 1878–9 to 1880–1 inclusive, the expenditure on Votes 6 and 10 averaged £3,718,708. The then succeeding years of the Liberal Government 1881–2 to 1883–4 showed an average on these Votes of £1,166,850—being an increase of £118,119. He thought those figures sufficiently disproved the allegation in the noble Lord's (Lord George Hamilton's) Statement. He could not quite accept the noble Lord's statement as to the Ordnance Department. It was a difficult question. The old system was universally condemned, but it was difficult to decide on the plan to take its place. He was quite certain they must get their own guns, but there must be responsibility. The Admiralty ought to be in a position to say "We want a gun," and then, if it bursts, lay their hands on the right man and tell him—"You are responsible for this gun, and you must go." he should be very glad, therefore, to know from the First Lord of the Admiralty how he intended to carry out the change he contemplated, and also what was proposed to increase the facilities for the coaling of war ships at the home ports, these facilities not being at all satisfactory at the present time. With regard to the shipbuilding policy, he hoped that the vessels which the Admiralty were going to lay down would come up to the expected speed, and if they did, they would be very satisfactory vessels. He trusted, also, that the personnel of the Navy would not be neglected. The Report to which he proposed to direct attention was the result of the deliberations of a Committee appointed in 1885 by Lord Northbrook's Board of Admiralty. Dealing with the Report, he did not think it necessary to dwell upon the competency of the Committee to investigate the subject referred to them, because that would be universally admitted; but he might briefly remind the House that the Chairman, Admiral Luard, added to his other professional qualifications that of having occupied for a considerable time the responsible office of President of the Royal Naval College at Greenwich, and that he consequently enjoyed special facilities for forming an opinion on the working

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    of our present educational system by being brought in constant contact with young officers at a time when they had almost completed their professional studios. The same might be said of Mr. Niven, who, for a considerable period, had occupied, with great advantage to the Service, the important office of Director of Studies at the College at Greenwich. Lord Dalhousie, as those who were in the House in 1880 would remember by the able speech he then made on the subject, had long given his attention to this question; and, having served for two years as Commander of the Britannia, might also be said to have had special opportunities of acquiring a clear insight into the working of our existing educational system. If Members would look to the other names on the Committee, it would be admitted that they were all Gentlemen well qualified to deal with the subject both from a naval and a civilian point of view. The subject dealt with in the Report was by no means a novel one. It had been frequently discussed in this House, and by competent naval authorities elsewhere. He would best consult the convenience of the House if he addressed his remarks principally to the recommendations contained in the concluding chapter, under head (f)—
    "To consider and offer opinions on any suggestions for the improvement of the education of executive naval officers."'
    The evidence before the Committee all tended to prove that the Navy of to-day had entirely outgrown our system of training young officers; that the changes we had already made in our system were not commensurate with the rapid changes which had taken place in the Navy, and which necessitated a higher and more scientific education—he would not say than we had aimed at, but than our officers generally had hitherto attained. The two main defects in our system were—first, that we entered our cadets too young; and, secondly, that we endeavoured to combine school work with the teaching of the duties of our officers—two branches of education which, in the opinion of the Committee, ought to be kept separate. But before referring to the objection to the early age of entry mentioned by the Committee, he wished to revert to their objection to the present system of nomination to cadetships. At present the system was one of close nomi-
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    nation subject to a limited competition. If the present system was to be continued, much might be said in favour of the existing distribution of patronage; but if the age of entry was raised it would lead to a much better system, as the Admiralty would then be able to open the Service to public school competition. On this the Committee remarked—
    "That the system of nomination, however admirably worked, limits the choice of candidates, and places artificial difficulties in the way of getting into the Navy."
    He did not think that, while the officers of our Army and the Civil Service were selected by a system of open competition, the country would be satisfied while an equally popular branch of the Public Service was recruited by a system of nomination. So long as they continued their present system of entering boys between 12 and 13½, he was perfectly aware that open competition was impossible. Competitive examination at such an ago, as had already been proved, was no test of fitness. But lot them adopt the recommendations of the Committee—enter their cadets at the age of 15, and throw the competition open to the public schools of the country—and they would then got rid of the difficulty—some First Lords had oven called it the "nuisance"—of nominations, and they would have a far wider field from which to draw the material for their future naval officers. Let him briefly say what the course of a young officer's training was from the time of his obtaining his cadetship till he became a sub-lieutenant. He entered the Britannia between 12 and 13½, the average time of entry was 13. After two years, in passing out, he became a midshipman, in which capacity he had to serve five years in a sea-going ship, unless by special merit he had gained time in passing out of the Britannia. He was then examined in seamanship, and, passing, became an acting sublieutenant, went to Greenwich for six months, and was examined in navigation, if successful joined the Excellent for a three months' course of gunnery and torpedo instruction, followed by an examination, and then a two months' course of pilotage, also followed by an examination, completed the officer's education for a lieutenant's commission. It would thus be seen that the compulsory course of study was from seven to eight

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    years. Under favourable conditions this should be a long enough period to give us efficiently educated officers. But, in the opinion of the Committee, this object was not attained. One of the chief causes of failure was the early entry. On this point there seemed to be a general consensus of opinion, even among those who did not agree with all the recommendations of the Committee. Mr. Aldous, Chief Instructor of the Britannia, said—
    "After the rush through various subjects, by which a certain standard is attained, I do not think it possible that any but the most extraordinary young minds could have so learnt the subjects as to retain them for future use. Two conditions are required to produce a thorough knowledge of this course of study—advanced age in the pupil when entered and a longer time under instruction."
    If hon. Members would look at the examination required both for entering and passing out of the Britannia, given by Mr. Aldous, they would see that the standard, especially in mathematics, was a very high one indeed for boys at the ages of 13 and 15 respectively. But the opinion expressed by Mr. Aldous was entirely confirmed by the evidence of the young officers themselves. Lieutenant Wilson told the Committee—
    "That it is the general opinion of the Service that a cadet, on leaving the Britannia, passes a better examination than a sub-lieutenant entering Greenwich."
    A statement confirmed by the evidence of Lieutenants Burney and Evan Thomas. He would ask the House for a moment to consider the real significance of the opinion he had quoted—that a young officer, on going to Greenwich, knew less than one passing out of the Britannia. It was the severest possible condemnation of the present system, because it showed that the most important years for educational purposes—the years from 15 to 19 or 20—had been completely wasted for all purposes of scientific education; while, at the same time, owing to the altered conditions of the Service, there had been no advance in purely professional education which would in any degree compensate for the loss in scientific knowledge, and this at a time when it was universally admitted that science in almost every branch was revolutionizing our Navy. Ten sub-lieutenants out of 24 recently failed at Greenwich. Now, the early entry had an important bearing on this point, as it was maintained by the Committee
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    that if boys entered the Navy at a later age, when they had been well grounded in general education, they would be far bettor able, in after years, to retain the learning they received on board the Britannia than they were now. He wished now to refer briefly to the second main objection he had mentioned—namely, the attempt to combine school work with the teaching of our officers. The Committee said—
    "Each part of a naval officer's training ought to be given him under the most favourable circumstances possible, in order that when there is so much to learn there may be no want of force in learning it. Hence school work should be got over on shore, and seamanship and the detailed duties of our officers learnt afloat. It would be as great a waste of power to attempt to teach practical seamanship to school boys on shore as it is to teach elementary mathematics to officers afloat, and for the same reason."
    However desirable it might have been in past times to combine the two branches of education, in the present day it was impossible—first, because the scholastic education required was far more scientific; and, secondly, because there was not the same means of acquiring seamanship and general professional knowledge while serving afloat as there was 30 or even 20 years ago. Sailing vessels, especially small craft, where midshipmen frequently performed the duties intrusted to lieutenants in larger vessels, were very much reduced in number; consequently the same opportunities were not now afforded to midshipmen as formerly, when they often had charge of a watch, and were sent away for weeks together in charge of boats while suppressing the Slave Trade. All these duties, as, he might say, he knew from personal experience, 30 years ago gave a young officer a sense of responsibility. It gave him self-reliance and that readiness of decision so essential to a naval officer at a much earlier age than those qualities were to be acquired by a midshipman, the greater portion of whoso time was now spent on board an iron-clad, often in harbour. But, concurrently with losing many opportunities of acquiring seamanship and general professional know-ledge from actual service afloat, there came greater demands on the officer's scientific knowledge. The Committee reminded us that we were not living in an age when we could say, as Nelson could, that the only branches of know-

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    ledge indispensable to an officer were that "he should dance and speak French; all the rest would come by instinct." Steam, iron-clads, improved artillery, torpedoes, electricity, and complicated machinery of every description had sprung up since those times. Mr. Tims, Naval Instructor, gave us some of his experiences. Speaking of the time the midshipmen had for work, he said—
    "I consider 12 hours a-week a good average; owing to many interruptions it was often much less."
    Then, as to the conditions under which the instruction had to be given, Mr. Tims went on to say—
    "The great difficulty the Naval Instructor has to contend with is the want of a suitable place for study. Sometimes the captain will allow the use of his cabin; then matters go comparatively well. The only obstacles to study arc sea-sickness, heat, cold, and the thumping of the screw. But when relegated to the half-deck the school is held at a very insecure table, in a place about as private as an underground railway station. All noises and smells to which the ship is liable seem to be concentrated round that table.…. I have a very lively recollection of the torpedoes being charged with compressed air just ahead of our school, so that the copper tube from the air pump was led under our table among our feet. Under such circumstances privacy is impossible."
    In no Navy but our own was there an attempt to combine the school teaching with the professional duties of an officer. Lot him now turn to the recommendations of the Committee, suggested to remove some of the defects. First, with regard to admission to the Service, they recommended that our future naval officers be drawn from the public schools of the country; that a first selection of candidates at about the ago of 15 be made by means of the examination for lower certificates conducted by the Oxford and Cambridge School Examination Board; that the selected candidates be then specially educated; that at the age of 16 they be again examined by Civil Service Commissioners; that the final selection be determined by adding the marks gained at the first examination to those obtained at the second; that the successful candidates be appointed as cadets to the Britannia for one year; that the Britannia be moored in the Solent in the vicinity of Portsmouth, and that training brigs and one steamer be attached to her; that at the age of
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    17 the cadets join a sea-going ship as midshipmen for three years; that theoretical instruction now cease to be compulsory and be distinctly of a professional and practical character; that at the ago of 20 or 21 the midshipman, on passing in seamanship, become an acting sublieutenant, and go to Greenwich and to the Excellent much as at present. Our officers, in point of scientific education, were far behind the best educated officers in Foreign Navies. That might seem a strong statement to make, but it was one which was fully supported by the evidence of Captains Kane and Nicholson before the Committee. These officers had held appointments as naval attachés, and had, therefore, had the best possible opportunities of forming an opinion of the relative merits of our own and foreign officers. Captain Kane said—
    "In certain of the Foreign Navies the officers from 20 to 30—that is, the sub-lieutenants and the lieutenants—are better educated, and, I think, are better officers, taking them all round, than ours are. Do you think they are more efficient as officers?—Yes; I think they are more efficient as officers—that is to say, in certain Navies."
    While Captain Nicholson characterizes the state of education in the Navy as "deplorable," Professor Soley, in his Report to the Secretary of the United States Navy, said—
    "The high scientific and professional attainments of many English naval officers are not in consequence but in spite of their early education."
    A perusal of the evidence given by the lieutenants before the Committee certainly justified Professor Soley's opinion, for the system of education was, perhaps, more strongly condemned by them than by any other witnesses. He could not, however, refrain from reminding the House of the gallant manner in which those officers performed their duties while employed with the Naval Brigade during the Egyptian Campaign. He was sure the noble Lord opposite, his gallant Friend the Member for Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford), who himself took such an active and honourable part in those engagements, would bear him out when he said that the rate of mortality among the officers of the Naval Brigade was enormously high, and that this was due to the lieu-

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    tenants sticking to their guns against overwhelming odds, and that the manner in which they died at their posts was the best evidence that in their fighting qualities the rising generation of officers were well qualified to maintain the reputation of the Service. There was another point bearing on the general re-commendations of the Committee which the Admiralty would not be able to overlook—namely, that many of the vessels they were now building, such as the fast cruisers, as noticed in Captain Nicholson's evidence, had no accommodation for midshipmen; and they must, therefore, of necessity be educated elsewhere. The Service would gain by this change, for the duties midshipmen had frequently to perform were little use to them as an education. Those duties were chiefly confined to keeping watch, often walking the deck in harbour, to seeing the decks swept, to speaking down tubes, and to seeing the ashes thrown overboard. It seemed absurd to sacrifice an acquirement in scientific knowledge for the performance of trivial duties which could be equally well performed by petty officers. Exception had been taken by some high naval authorities to the recommendations of the Report on the ground that too much of the young officers' time would be taken up by study, and that their practical education in seamanship was going to be sacrificed to mathematics; but with training ships attached to the Britannia, and with three years afloat after the ago of 17, he thought there would be ample time to learn seamanship. Lieutenant Cecil Burney, in his Paper given in Appendix 3, pointed out that the age for entry of boys in our training ships was between 15 and 16½. Surely, if this were considered young enough to commence the training of our future seamen, who would not be drafted into regular sea-going ships till they were 19 or 20, and then have practical seamanship to learn, 17 was not too late to send our future officers regularly to sea. Another objection had been taken on the ground that the age was too advanced to obtain candidates, and that when obtained they would not take to a sea life. But on these grounds the Committee entertained no apprehensions. They pointed out that boys now entered the Navy at an age when they were
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    quite incompetent to select a profession for themselves—that many, when so entered, found out when it was too late that Nature never intended them for naval officers. On the other hand, there were many boys well qualified for a sea life who at the age of 14 were prevented from joining the Navy because they were too old. The Committee were satisfied that whatever might be lost by postponing the age of entry would be more than compensated for by securing increased intelligence, and they were confident that the popularity of the Navy as a profession would secure an ample number of candidates from our public schools. They reminded them that when sea life was far rougher than it was now many officers went to sea at a more advanced age than they now did, and became excellent officers. Perhaps the most conspicuous illustration of the success of a late entry into the Navy was to be found in that of the first Flag officer he served under—tho late Lord Dundonald—the brilliancy of whose naval career he believed stood second alone to that of Nelson. Yet we were told by Lord Dundonald in the Auto-biography of a Seaman that he originally entered the Army, and did not go to sea till he was 17½ years old. Yet so impressed was Lord Dundonald of the importance of education for the due performance of the duties of a naval officer, that we found him, eight years after he had entered the Navy, employing his time while on half-pay by studying at the Edinburgh University, where, along with the late Lord Palmerston and a brilliant group of men who subsequently became famous as statesmen and men of letters, he was a student of Dugald Stewart's. He thought the critics of the Committee's Report would do well to bear this illustration in mind before condemning the recommendations as pedantic. Before bringing his remarks to a close he desired to say a word on a subject constantly referred to by the witnesses examined before the Committee—namely, the desirability of continuing the Britannia at all. For his own part, he thought a College on shore at some naval port, with training vessels attached, would be far preferable to this old hulk. It would, undoubtedly, be healthier in every way. It would give greater facilities both for study and for

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    obtaining exercise. That was the opinion of Captain Bowden-Smith, the captain of the Britannia, and Mr. Aldous, the Chief Instructor, and of most of the other witnesses. The idea when the Britannia was established was that it was desirable to accustom cadets as early as possible to a sea life. But he had always failed to understand how sea life was to be acquired on board an old hulk moored head and stern, and with no rigging but an old jury mast. He considered the system pursued at Greenwich School, where many of our future seamen were educated—although, of course, the standard of education was much lower—to be healthier and better in many respects than that on board the Britannia. But he might remind the House that this question was decided by the Admiralty more than 12 years ago, when the late Mr. Ward Hunt announced, in introducing the Estimates, his intention of abolishing the Britannia and substituting for her a College on shore. That step was approved by his right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. Shaw Lefevre), who hold the Office of Secretary to the Admiralty in the Government which preceded Mr. Ward Hunt's, and who told the House that it was the intention of the First Lord of the Admiralty (the present Chancellor of the Exchequer) to abolish the Britannia had he remained at the Admiralty. He hoped that in his present Office his right hon. Friend would assist in carrying out this necessary reform. It only remained for him to assure hon. Members that he had only been induced to trespass on their patience because he was deeply impressed with the importance of the subject alike to the Naval Service and to the country. It was also a subject of deep interest to aspirants for naval cadetships, as well as to their parents and relatives. On these grounds he thought he was entitled to claim for it some share of public attention. There was abundant evidence that at no previous period of our history had the country been more deeply impressed than it now was with the necessity of maintaining unimpaired the efficiency of our Navy. It was because he believed that on the early solution of this question in the manner indicated by the Committee's Report much of that efficiency ultimately depended that he had ven-
    646
    tured to trouble the House with these observations.
    ADMIRAL FIELDsaid, he was desirous to add his humble meed of praise to the thanks already accorded to the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton) for his labours in the re-organization of the Department and for the changes he had brought about. Still, he was constrained by a sense of public duty to criticize in some degree the acts of the noble Lord and of some of his Predecessors. He thanked the noble Lord for the answer given to his Question about the want of deck accommodation at Bombay, and he hoped that that serious want would soon be supplied. It was a public scandal that the Indian Government and the Home Government should have a petty squabble as to which of them should pay for this work, which was so greatly needed. He would remind the House that there was no dock in which ships could be repaired nearer than Malta, a distance of 4,000 miles from that part of India. While at Bombay a few years ago he had closely examined this question, and all he could say was that it was a shame the work should have remained so long unexecuted. He also hoped that certain rumours which he had heard respecting the non-completion of Haulbowline Dock at Queenstown were not correct, for he was sure that naval men earnestly de-sired that that dock should be completed. Indeed, the work should have been carried out long ago. He could not pass by one or two observations which had fallen from the last speaker (Mr. Duff), He thought the contests between the two Front Benches about expenditure for naval and military requirements were very trivial indeed. The country did not complain about the amount of the money, but only wanted to get the money's worth for the money which was spent. He noticed that one or two hon. Members had argued in favour of the abolition of the Britannia training ship. For his own part he was strongly opposed to its abolition, and the substitution of a Naval College in its place; and he was also opposed to open competition for the Navy, as the present system of competition of three candidates for each vacancy was very good and useful; therefore, when it was found that

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    naval men in that House were divided on those burning questions, he hoped the Admiralty would take its own line and come to a compromise. In his opinion, the Memorandum of the First Lord of the Admiralty on the state of the Navy ought to he supplemented by a Report from each Naval Lord who was placed in charge of a particular Department. At present the Naval Lords were unable to make known to the public what their opinions were. If the present First Naval Lord, who was responsible for the personnel of the Navy and partly for the matériel, were to make a Report and tell all he knew, the eyes of the country would be opened, and salutary changes would soon be effected. Under the existing system the Naval Lords were muzzled, and compelled to confine their opinions within the four walls of the Admiralty. In 1881, at the time of the Russian scare, the condition of the Navy was such that naval men were really alarmed. He appealed to the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone, the Junior Naval Lord of the Admiralty (Lord Charles Beresford)—as a young naval officer—to say whether he was satisfied that England could have entered into that contest and come out of it satisfactorily; and if he did not share the doubts so freely expressed by older ones? The great evil in this country was the want of continuity in naval administration and policy. First Lords went in and out with one side or the other, and there was no continuity or system in our naval policy. Why, on a change of Ministry, should Naval Lords be sent about their business, perhaps just when they were becoming accustomed to their work? The Board of Admiralty was undermanned in respect of Naval Lords. It was still short by one Naval Lord of the number which Sir James Graham, the Duke of Somerset, and other distinguished men thought the right one, although the requirements of the Service were now much greater than they were in the Duke of Somerset's time. Every Naval Lord was now greatly overworked. This accounted in a measure for the blunders that had been committed. A First Naval Lord, he had heard, used to take a file of papers home from the Office and study them until I o'clock in the morning. It was true that an improvement had now been in-
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    troduced by the institution of a strong Intelligence Department. The Board would henceforth be compelled to think out a naval policy and to form plans of campaign—[Home Rule Cheers]—good plans of the right sort—he hoped, not bad ones—with the Plan of Campaign of hon. Gentlemen opposite he had no sympathy. The First and Second Sea Lords ought each to have the assistance of a Post Captain as secretary. In Franco, Germany, and Russia a rule of that kind prevailed. Fifty to 60 naval officers were employed at the French Admiralty, whilst our Service was starved for want of technical skill and intelligence. He regretted the re-constitution of the Board of Admiralty in 1869 by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Edinburgh (Mr. Childers). He had nothing but respect for the ability and strong will of the right hon. Gentleman, though, at the same time, he deplored the results of that strong will. But the right hon. Gentleman did not always follow up his own opinions. Before he left Office he told Sir Sydney Dacres that the first thing which ought to be done in certain events was to appoint another Naval Lord; but he did not do it. However, his Successor did, and, so far, there was something gained, though still the executive authority should be strengthened; whereas, by the unhappy Order in Council of 1869, it had been greatly weakened; before that date it was exorcised by six Lords and a Controller, but since then by only four Lords and a Controller, until 1872, when it was augmented to five Lords and a Controller. There was, moreover, this further drawback—that the Naval Lords were not responsible as formerly. The Board, whoso history dated back to the time of Henry VI., was re-constituted under an Act passed in the Reign of William and Mary, 1690, and being thus constituted by an Act of Parliament it ought not to have been made to undergo change by the operation of an Order in Council. What the right hon. Gentleman could not do directly he ought not to have done indirectly. The then existing Board of Admiralty was practically abolished by the right hon. Gentleman in 1869, and the First Sea Lord was reduced to the position of little better than a chief clerk's. This change was

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    in opposition to the views expressed by more than one. Parliamentary Committee, and notably to the views of Sir James Graham—the creator of the Board of Admiralty as it was known before 1869—who said, before a Committee of the House of Lords in 1872—
    "It is my opinion that the Board of Admiralty never could work, unless the First Lord were supreme, and docs exercise controlling authority.…I have made it my study to make myself master of the origin of the power exercised by the First Lord at the Board, the constitution of the Board, its powers, and its legal origin; the more I have investigated the matter the more I am satisfied that, like the Common Law in aid of the Statute Law, the power exercised by the Board of Admiralty and the different Members of it rests more upon usage than upon the Patents—uninterrupted usage from a very early period; and, my conviction being such as I have stated, I am led to view with increased apprehension any great change that will supersede that usage and prescription.….I am of opinion that there will be great danger in attempting to touch the Patents.…. I infinitely prefer, therefore, upon the whole, the maintenance of the existing Patents in concurrence with the established usage of centuries."
    His complaint was that at the present moment there was no Naval Board really acting as a Board of Admiralty. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Edinburgh abolished it when he introduced his Order in Council. There was no reason for abolishing it except the right hon. Gentleman's will. They admired men of strong will in the Navy. He admired a man with a strong back—in the Navy they did not care much for weak or limp men—but whereas in the Navy a man before he could be in a position to do any harm had to pass through 20 years' training, a politician could go to the Admiralty perfectly raw, and if he were a strong man of resolute will he was like a certain animal in a china shop. He challenged the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone to deny that he was speaking the sentiments of the Navy. The Naval Lords should be administrators de facto as well as de jure, or else they should abolish them altogether and rule the Navy entirely by civilians. All they asked in the Navy was that there should be a little modesty on the part of those distinguished men who came to rule over thorn, and who were ignorant of the feelings, the traditions, and he feared sometimes even
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    of the history of the Service. He (Admiral Field) would refer to the evidence of Sir Spencer Robinson to show that under the existing system the naval element was not sufficiently represented on the Board of Admiralty, and that under former systems matters wore better conducted. If each Sea Lord or Head of a Division of the Admiralty were obliged to make a Report, to be laid on the Table of the House of Commons, the public would see what the Naval Lords thought ought to be done, and he thought that the House would then insist on the requirements of the Navy being met. They had irresponsibility now, because that odious Order in Council had made the Sea Lords responsible only to the First Lord. That Order ought to be withdrawn, and the naval business of the country conducted upon the system under which our great naval battles were fought and won. What gave force and validity to the orders emanating from the Admiralty was the fact that they were supposed to embody the views of distinguished naval men, and not the views of a civilian First Lord. Naval men believed that in time of war the present system would break down and end in disaster. The Naval Lords ought to be made responsible for their own work, not to the First Lord, as to their master, but to the House and the country. The First Lord was supreme, and they did not deny that; but, in the name of all that was fair and just, they ought not to be treated in this way by ambitious politicians. The Chairman of Committees some time ago said—"When men enter this House they ought to try and imbibe something of its Parliamentary spirit." he would say when Civil First Lords, knowing nothing of the Service, were made the nominal head of it, they, too, might try and drink in something of the naval spirit. The present Chancellor of the Exchequer, when First Lord of the Admiralty, said that whoever was at the head of that Department ought to try and carry the naval opinion with him, and he did so, and the Service honoured him for it. The right hon. Member for South Edinburgh had abolished the office of Storekeeper of the Dockyards; but the present Chancellor of the Exchequer had felt bound to restore that office. The

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    right hon. Member for South Edinburgh had abolished the office of Captain of Steam Reserve at Sheerness Dockyard, and shortly afterwards the Megæra was lost. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer restored that office, and had also felt bound to replace the Naval Lords of the Admiralty whom the right hon. Member for South Edinburgh had swept away. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had reversed many other steps that the right hon. Member for South Edinburgh had taken. But he supposed that he did not like to hit his Predecessor too hard, and therefore he did not withdraw the Order in Council of 1869, but modified it by that of 1872. He wished it to be understood that he did not desire in any way to supersede or to interfere with the authority of the First Lord. All he asked was that there should be sufficient naval men at the Board to give the assistance and advice which was absolutely necessary if the Navy was to be maintained in a continuous state of efficiency. The First Lord of the Treasury and the First Lord of the Admiralty knew the feeling of the Navy upon this question as well as any men; find he said if his brother officers were worthy to be Naval Lords let them be Naval Lords de facto, and if they were not worthy let them be turned out altogether. There were no men in the country more capable or more loyal to authority than naval men. Sir James Graham said naval officers were the very best instruments of Governments; and Lord Palmerston once stated that if he had a difficult job to get done, and was in doubt as to who should carry it out, he always sent for a naval officer. Hon. Members might ask how it was that the Naval Lords sat tamely under that Order in Council? It was because the Naval Lords were loyal to the authorities which existed. They did not like the way in which they were treated; but, like the eels that were skinned, they made no complaint—because they could not help it. They were asked why they did not agitate outside the Admiralty. The fact was that discipline was the pivot upon which the whole Service turned, and naval men did not approve of discussing these naval questions out-of-doors; and it was un-seemly, improper, and contrary to the
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    Regulations for them to write to the newspapers. The only place in which naval opinion could legitimately make itself felt was in that House. He did not pretend to set himself up as the exponent of naval opinion in that House; but if he had made no impression upon any hon. Members in the speech he had just delivered he had been wasting the time of the House. He could assure hon. Members that nothing but the strongest, sense of duty would have induced him to speak upon that occasion. The point he desired to make clear to the House was that if the Admiralty, which was the central Departmental power of the Navy, was faulty, everything connected with the Navy would be faulty. The fact was that the Naval Lords had been unfairly treated. He was on the Retired List, and so was not speaking for himself, but was doing what he could for the good of the Profession. He was on the Retired List because of the Rules of the right hon. Member for Edinburgh. He (Admiral Field) did not bear the right hon. Gentleman any ill-will for that—the right hon. Gentleman did it with the best intentions for the good of the Service. Captains in the Navy had to retire at the age of 55, but politicians thought that they could be first-class politicians and statesmen right up to and over 70; but he ventured to say that a naval man of 55 had more nerve about him than a politician at 75, and would make a better public servant in any capacity. He could not be of any service in the Navy, because the turnpike bar had been thrown across his path; but he thought that he might be of some service to the Navy in that House. He knew that he could not be an Admiral on the Active List in the Navy by the time he was 55, so he took up politics—worse luck. [Laughter.] He said worse luck, because he would tell them frankly the Navy had no great respect for politicians. He, however, had a good deal of respect for a certain class of politicians, but not for all. But, humble individual as he was, having taken up this kind of life—he had been 13 years at it now—he had stood four contests and had been successful in two of them—having once got into that House he intended to remain there for years, and do what little good he could for the Naval Service in which it was the

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    greatest honour of his life to have served. He intended to do the best he could for his brother officers, who could not speak for themselves, and he would never rest until this burning injustice to his Profession was removed. The history of the Navy covered the most glorious epoch in our national life, and its opinions and susceptibilities ought not lightly to be set aside or disregarded by politicians. He hoped, therefore, the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty would attentively consider the evidence given by Sir James Graham, the Duke of Somerset, and the others which he had quoted, and would endeavour to bring the administration of the Navy into accord with naval sentiment.
    LORD CHARLES BERESFORD (A LORD of the ADMIRALTY): As one of the Naval Lords, perhaps the House will allow me to say a few words on the question which the hon. Gentleman (Mr. J. M. Maclean) has brought forward. There are other questions which I should also like to speak upon; but the hour is late, and this subject is of so much importance that I will confine my remarks to it. For a long time there has been a general feeling in the country that the system of organization in the Admiralty is not so good as it ought to be. I will endeavour to show how it has been brought about. It is the penalty we pay for Party government—a different policy is pursued by different Parties when they come into Office One Government may think it necessary to reduce the Estimates, and the next Government, on coming in, perhaps goes on with the Estimates for the moment; but when there is a possibility of war they consult naval experts as to what is requisite, and the result is that very large Supplementary Estimates are brought in. In other words, large Estimates are necessary to pay for what the country wants in consideration of receiving it in a time of panic. The system of the Admiralty has always been based on the principle of Party government, and seamen—experts—have really had nothing to do with the government of the Admiralty. Let me explain what I mean. Take the question of shipbuilding. The men who have to fight the ships know exactly what they want, and understand modern
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    requirements—what guns they ought to have, where they should be placed, what speed the vessels should have, what coal they should carry, what horse-power is required, and what complement of men is necessary to fight the ships and take them into action. But the seamen on the Board have very little to say to it. The scheme my noble Friend has brought in is, I think, as nearly perfect as it could be. The seamen are to say what is required for a ship, and each will put a Minute on the design that will be submitted to them by the Constructor, showing where the guns are to be placed, and the are of range they are to have, and the scheme will then be passed, on to the Controller, and so each individual will be individually responsible for the ships built. It would then be referred to the Board; they would order the vessel to be constructed, and by these means the country will have a proper fighting ship turned out quickly. The construction, of a ship in this way would take two years and five months, instead of seven years, like the Inflexible, and you will get it for a considerably less sum of money than under the old régime. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Admiral Field) has made one mistake as to the Order in Council made by the right hon. Gentleman opposite he will find that the wording of the Order is that it should be rescinded, and he is wrong in thinking that the Order of the right hon. Gentleman is in force at the present moment. My noble Friend the First Lord has gone further. He has added to the responsibility of each Member of the Board of Admiralty. Every Member of the Board will put a Minute on the Paper and sign it, so that each Member will be individually responsible, instead of there being the sort of haphazard system of organization that formerly prevailed. With respect to the question brought forward by the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Puleston), some people have been good enough to give me credit for the institution of the Intelligence Department. It would be better to give the credit to the Board. In my opinion, this Department will be of the utmost importance to the Admiralty. I will give my reasons. Ships are built, and seamen are paid that they may be ready

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    in time of war. War in these days is a question of electricity. In the old days there was no kind of organization whatever. I am not blaming our Predecessors, but the system. Time after time seamen have represented the necessity for a Department such as the Intelligence Department; but there has been nothing in tills country resembling the Naval Intelligence Departments in Germany, France, Russia, and other Continental countries. An organization was required which shall enable the Navy to be prepared for time of war. When war is declared, a country like England, with a vast Empire which can be assailed at so many points, requires a complete organization, and for that purpose the Intelligence Department is of the utmost importance. With reference to this question of Party government, I will mention one circumstance which will illustrate clearly its working. The discharges of Dockyard workmen which we have heard of were the result of Party government.] One Party said they could not turn the men off because of the Vote; but the State should not make the Dockyards a charitable institution. If you had a continuation of policy, you would not get rid of the Dockyard men as you do now. It is very hard on the men to be turned off suddenly; and if there were a continuity of policy in everything connected with the Naval Service, instead of the weathercock policy that now prevails, there would be no necessity for turning men off suddenly. During the course of the debate many remarks have been made, and no doubt many remarks of a similar description will be made, as to officers of the Navy wishing money to be spent. That is not the case at all. Officers in the Service do not wish to spend money. They wish so to organize the Service that the country may not have to spend more than is necessary. What occurs at present? When war looms on the horizon, Parliament says to the exports—and it is the same at the War Office—"What do you want?" the officers then represent what they do want, and they get the credit of asking for the money which is spent, as it often has been in times of scare, in a wrong way. I maintain that each individual in the Board should be allowed the right of expressing his opinion on the large
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    questions affecting the Navy. The hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward J. Reed) made a remark with reference to seamen and shipbuilding. I am delighted to hear the remark, because I remember a publication of the hon. Member's which appeared in Macmillan's Magazine, in which he said—"Seamen must bow their proud heads at the altar of science." I am disposed to remark on that, that "Seamen have often shaken their wise heads at the altar of doubt; "because many ships have been turned out without the opinion of Members of the Board having been obtained—without the opinion of men who have to use these ships for the benefit of the country. The hon. Member for Banffshire (Mr. R. W. Duff) taunted me regarding an expression of opinion to which I gave utterance last year in the House of Commons. The hon. Gentleman has not quite gathered my meaning. What I said was this—To put the Navy in the state of defence in which the taxpayers thought it was would require £5,000,000. I elaborated this view in detail. That was my opinion in order to reduce the danger to our trade, our floating wealth, our food supply, and the defence of our ports to a minimum. I adhere to every word which I uttered on that occasion. In time of war the country would be most severely hit during the first three weeks of the outbreak, and in order to reduce the danger to a minimum, I adhere to the view I previously took on the subject. Of course, the hon. Gentleman knows that when a Member of Parliament is in Office he cannot do all that he wished when out of Office. [Laughter.] My hon. Friends laugh; but the First Lord of the Admiralty will bear me out when I say that not only in private, but in public, I have persistently put forward my ideas with the view of strengthening the Navy, and placing it in that condition in which it ought to be placed. I therefore cannot agree with the hon. Gentleman opposite that it is all Party judgment.
    MR. E. W. DUFF: I referred to the statement which had been made as to the condition of the Navy from 1880 to 1884, and I pointed out that the Estimate's for 1881 had been omitted.
    LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: But from 1881 to 1884 and 1885 we were living on our capital. It is when

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    we come to a time of panic that we find so many stores which ought to have been replaced by the Estimates for the year are deficient. Recent occurrences in the Navy have been due to want of system, want of organization, and want of responsibility on the part of individual Members of the Board to the Board. An hon. Member has asked how it is that my name does not appear on the Estimates. The reason is, because the Estimates were brought to me too late. I told my noble Friend that I would not sign them. My noble Friend replied—"You must do what you think proper." And the reason why I did not sign the Estimates was because each name on the Estimates, I think, should mean that the individual is responsible for the whole Estimate, or if such individual is only responsible for his Vote, it should be clearly put in black and white for what he is responsible. Next year I shall probably get the Estimates in time to study them thoroughly, and then I will sign them. The object of the Board is to have a Fleet as efficient as it can be made, not to spend a shilling more than is necessary, and to lot the public know, as far as possible, how that money is spent. I believe in publicity. The new system which my noble Friend has inaugurated will be greatly for the benefit of the country and of the Service. It will enable the Navy to do what the taxpayer expects it to do for the money he pays—namely, to defend the country in time of war.
    MR. CHILDERS: I should not have risen to address the House had it not been for the remarks of the hon. and gallant Member for the Eastbourne Division of Sussex (Admiral Field), who referred to some action of mine 18 years ago. In the few remarks I intend to make I hope the House will grant me some indulgence, on the ground that I have not had time to look into matters which occurred in 1869, and have no power to refer to the Papers on the subject. With regard to the general subject before the House, I most heartily join in the approval expressed by all sections of the House as to the general construction of the Estimates, and especially of the Minute with which the First Lord of the Admiralty has prefaced them. I entirely endorse, with all the approval I can give, the improve-
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    ments which the First Lord of the Admiralty and his Colleagues have made, not only in the form of the Estimates and in the arrangement shown in the Estimates, but also in other matters which have been brought before the House by the Secretary to the Admiralty, whose speech to-night will be, I think, of great use. The hon. Gentleman has argued very forcibly on the advantage of making up year by year the waste of the Navy, and has spoken as to what that waste is and how it ought to be made up. When I was myself at the Admiralty in 1869, some figures were laid before me, and I urged on Parliament the necessity of constructing an even amount of tonnage from year to year, both of armour-clad, and unarmoured ships, and I pointed out that if we had constant changes from year to year, the effect would not only be bad for the Service generally, but also be bad economically. I am glad to find that the same idea is entertained by the present Board of Admiralty. I also entirely agree in what has been so well said as to the necessity of fixing on the type of the ships to be built after consultation, not only with naval officers and officers of gunnery, but with other officers, on whose advice, as well as that of the controller and the constructor, the design on which a ship is to be built should be determined. It is a cardinal feature of good construction in my mind, that those who have afterwards to be concerned both with the fighting and the sailing of the ship, through their representatives at the Admiralty, should be effectually consulted, and I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has enunciated that doctrine to-night as clearly as he has done. Therefore, as far as I am concerned—reserving the question of past expenditure, which I do not think worth carrying further at present—I cordially concur in what has been put forward by the First Lord in his Memorandum, and also by the Secretary to the Admiralty in his speech to-night. I turn next to the remarks of the hon. and gallant Member (Admiral Field), who has so much amused the House, and who has gone into the history of the Board of Admiralty and its methods of administration for a very long time past. I cannot carry my memory back, as far as reading is concerned, to the Reign of

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    Henry VII.; but I do know its history since the time when the system was so entirely changed by Sir James Graham under Lord Grey's Administration. Formerly, the whole affairs of the Admiralty were really carried on at Somerset House by different Boards, which managed respectively the shipbuilding, the victualling, the store-keeping the medical service, and other matters connected with the Navy. The great change which Sir James Graham effected was to get rid of those Boards, and to establish at Whitehall one single Board for the transaction of all that business. He divided the business in this way. The Departments remained at Somerset House; but each Member of the Board was called a Superintending Lord, and in his capacity of Superintending Lord the business of each Department was brought to him, and he then brought it to the Central Authority. In establishing that system, Sir James Graham was as strongly attacked in Parliament by the naval officers of that day, as the hon. and gallant Admiral has attacked tonight what I did in 1869. The cardinal point of Sir James Graham's defence was this—that the Board could only work well, under his arrangement, if it was made as unlike a Board as possible. That was the principle on which Sir James Graham attempted to reform the old system, and to substitute one Board for three Boards. I do not hesitate to say that the system established by Sir James Graham, although, perhaps, good enough for doing the very moderate amount of business under Lord Grey's Government, utterly broke down when the business of the Admiralty became greatly increased some 30 years later. I am afraid I am the only person in the House at the present time who was a Member of the Board of Admiralty in 1864. Then, the Board met for four or five times a-week, or almost daily. When the Board met, each of the Lords of the Admiralty who was concerned in a particular Department, brought to the Board the whole of its work—that is to say, the different papers coming from the different Departments and requiring the Board's sanction, excepting, of course, very small matters. At the end of the discussion the Board's stamp was put on them, and that, without any signature, or perhaps the signature of the
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    Secretary, carried the authority of the Board. Under that system, as I know to my cost, when a Junior Lord, I had three, four, or five hours' business to do in a Board room from day to day. Under the whole system a great deal of time was unnecessarily wasted, and it was absolutely impossible that a large amount of business could be transacted efficiently. The system was very bad; but the hon. and gallant Gentleman has not told the House anything about the condition in 1861. He spoke of the Committee of 1861, which collected a largo amount of contradictory evidence; but there was also a Royal Commission in 1861, which condemned the system, and unanimously expressed the hope that it might be entirely altered. I was very familiar with the Report of that Commission. I had been a junior Member of the Board of Admiralty, and was not, therefore, uninformed upon these questions. When it was my duty, in 1868, as First Lord, to make improvements in reference to the Admiralty, which had been strongly urged by the Royal Commission, and the necessity for which was strongly shown by the Committee in 1867, I determined to recommend to my Colleagues a plan to moot the objections which had been put forward by the Royal Commission, and which had been so often discussed in the House. We did, at the Admiralty, the sumo thing that was done at the War Office. We divided the administration under three heads:—the first of which dealt with the military administration; the second with questions of finance. We divided the responsibility between the three heads, laying down, most distincty, the, responsibilities assumed by each—both with regard to the Minister and to Parliament. The system thus started has been in operation ever since, although, in other respects, some slight alterations have been introduced. For instance, an additional Lord has been appointed, who is a post-captain attached to the First Lord, and the first officer appointed was Captain, now Admiral, Willes. He has ceased to act, and a Controller has been appointed; but the system followed is practically that which was established in 1869, and which, I will undertake to say, has worked well. One thing has been referred to almost ludicrously—namely,

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    the signatures to the Estimates, which are said to provide a certain security. Why, I established that system myself.
    Lord CHARLES BERESFORD: the right hon. Gentleman has misunderstood what I said. What I said was, that I objected to the signing of a document, which those who signed it did not understand, because they had not had time to examine it. It gives a false impression to the public, who are under the impression that the official by placing his name upon it has examined it, and is satisfied with it. I objected to any official signing a document unless the person signing it had thoroughly looked into everything to which he attached his name.
    MR. CHILDERS: I think that is exactly what the Lords of the Admiralty are bound to do; and, as I have said, it was 1, myself, who introduced the system. Now, Sir, I promised the House I would only speak for a few minutes, and I hope I have kept my promise. But there is one point to which the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Charles Beresford) referred, and upon which I should like to say a word. I was somewhat surprised to hear him speak of want of continuous employment of distinguished Admirals at the Admiralty by one Government and another, as a great vice of the now system, it is not a vice of my creating; because, when I was First Lord of the Admiralty. I offered the First Sea Lordship to the First Sea Lord of my Predecessor. He was, however, very anxious to go to sea: and, instead of so appointing him, I gave him the command of the Mediterranean Fleet; but then T offered the First Sea Lordship to the next Sea Lord of my Predecessor, for the express reason that I was anxious for the continuous character of the naval supervision. I think I have now answered the criticisms of the noble and gallant Lord. I have, I think, shown him that the change which has been made was a change rendered necessary by enquiries which had taken place in previous years. Then, when the noble and gallant Lord says—"Now that we are in a position, lot us sweep all this away," I think he will find that the Party to which he belongs was really in power from 1874 to 1880, and that they made no change in this direction. I do not think the
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    noble and gallant Lord's appeal is warranted by the facts; but I, on the other hand, appeal to both sides of the House to deal with this question in no Part}' sense, but as a matter of good administration. If any change is required, I do not object to it; because it is a change upon what I laid down in 1869. On the contrary, I shall never allow Party considerations in matters of this kind to influence me in the slightest degree.
    MR. CAINE: Mr. Speaker, I wish to address a few remarks to the House upon the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the system of Purchase and Contract in the Navy—a Report which has excited some comment in the public Press, and created great public interest. The object of this Committee, as stated in the Instruction to the Committee, was to inquire into the system adopted by the Admiralty in regard to the purchase, supply, and examination of stores, contracts for hulls and machinery, including the organization and functions of the Contract Department, and its relations with the Executive departments of the Admiralty, the Dockyards, Victualling Yards, and Medical Establishments at homo and abroad. The inquiry was called for, and I think that many of the recommendations of the Committee are extremely good; but I wish to take exception to one or two points in connection with the Report. First of all, I wish to take some exception to the Committee itself. The Committee consists of the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood); the Accountant General, Sir Gerald Fitzgerald, K.C.M.G.; Captain C. F. Hotham, R.N., C.B.: and the Members for Mid Armagh (Sir James Corry) and North Worcestershire (Mr. B. Hingley; and the Govan Division of Lanarkshire (Mr. Pearce;. It is to the appointment of the latter Gentleman as a Member of this Committee to inquire into the matter of contracts that I wish to take particular exception. I do not wish to dispute the fitness of the hon. Member himself to take part in this inquiry. We all know perfectly well he is at the head of one of the most distinguished shipbuilding firms in the world, and that his peculiar knowledge of the business which had to be inquired into fitted him very well indeed, other matters not intervening, to join in this inquiry;

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    but the reason I object to him having been placed on the Committee is, because he himself is a disappointed tenderer for many contracts. ["Oh, oh!"] I do not say that in any disrespectful manner. He was disappointed his tenders were not accepted; surely, there is no objection to an expression of that kind. He was a disappointed tenderer for those contracts which form a very considerable portion of the inquiry of this Committee. Now, Sir, it seems to me that it is most unfair to the other firms tendering and contracting, for an hon. Member of this House, a leading partner in a firm which is, to say the least, a most dangerous opponent to them, to have access to all their confidential documents, and the plans which have been submitted, with the view of securing the orders of the Admiralty. If hon. Members would take the trouble to read the evidence, I think many would agree with me that, during the inquiry, the hon. Member subjected both the late and present Advisers of the Board to a cross-examination very much more like what you would expect from the counsel of a prosecution than from one who was really in the position of a Judge. As I read the evidence, the inference to be drawn from the hon. Member's cross-examination certainly is that the Board's Advisors had been guilty of gross and wilful carelessness and neglect of the public interest. And, in my opinion, the only object of the cross-examination was to show that the firm of which he is a member—Messrs. Elder and Co.—had been unjustly set aside in favour of the contractors who received the Board's orders in question. It seems to me that it would have been the easiest thing in the world to have found some other Gentleman to have taken a position on the Committee in place of the hon. Member for the Govan Division of Lanarkshire. There was one gentleman in particular who gave valuable evidence before the Committee, and who was described by the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood) as a most distinguished engineer in his profession—I refer to Mr. William Wallace, the engineer-in-chief of Messrs. Allan and Co. I think if he had been placed on the Committee, and the hon. Member (Mr. Pearce) had been called as a witness, it would have been very much more
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    in accordance with the fitness of things than that which took place. It seems to me that the Report is virtually a severe censure on the whole shipbuilding and controlling departments of the Admiralty. It is proposed by the Committee to transfer to the Director of Contracts the duty of purchasing hulls and machinery, as well as contracting for all business in the Works Departments of the Admiralty. Now, I am glad to say that one of the Members of the Committee enters a strong protest against this recommendation. Captain Hotham, a very distinguished naval officer, concurs generally in the Report, with two important exceptions. He says—
    "I entirely dissent from the proposal to invest the Director of Contracts with any responsibility of making contracts for building or repairing ships and constructing engines. That official can have no knowledge whatever of the matter, nor can he be expected to understand the specifications on which contracts are based; and he must of necessity be guided by the opinion of the professional officers of the Controller's Department. The Controller is a Lord of the Admiralty, and he is provided with professional assistants, who may be considered, and who ought to be experts in their respective Departments; and I am of opinion that the Controller should make his own contracts (under the Board) for the supply of ships, and engines, and for repairs; otherwise delay will be caused, friction will arise between the Departments, and inefficiency will be the result. The same objection applies to the proposal to place contracts for works under the Director of Contracts."
    I must say, Sir, that if the recommendations of this Committee are carried out, I should expect the present distinguished Admiral, who is the Controller of the Navy, to send in his resignation at once. Just let us examine for one moment the proposal of the Committee; let us examine the mass of work which is already undertaken by that Director of Contracts. No one who knows anything of the present Director of Contracts can speak in any other way of him but in the highest possible terms. When I was at the Admiralty, I had the opportunity of watching the way in which he conducts his business, and I have no hesitation in saying that, under his management, the Admiralty buy their stores cheaper than anyone else in the world. Before I entered Parliament, I was largely engaged in buying exactly the same class of materials that is bought by the Director of Contracts,

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    and I can only say that, if I had had the services of the Director of Contracts, I should be a very much richer man than I am at the present moment. But what is the work which the Director of Contracts at present undertakes? He has to buy everything under Vote 2—Victualling and Clothing—which amounts to £1,278,000. He has to buy all naval stores under Vote 10, and these amount in value to £1,370,000. He has to buy medical stores under Vote 12, amounting to £75,000; indeed, this official has positively to see to the contracting and purchasing, examining and testing of goods to the value of £2,730,000 in the course of a year. Now, if that is not enough work for one man, I should like to know what is. Well, what is it that is proposed to be added to the work of this already overworked official? It is proposed he should purchase hulls and machinery; and, under Vote 10, the Government ask this House for hulls and machinery for nearly £2,000,000—£1,911,000; it is also proposed that he should look after the Contracts Works Department. Positively, under this head alone, it is proposed, by one blow, to add to his responsibility the expenditure of £2,464,000. But that is not all. There is now under consideration—at least I believe it is settled—that in future the Admiralty is to buy its own guns. If that is so, I suppose that that also, as a matter of course, will be added to the work of the Director of Contracts, a very serious business in itself. It will more than double his work, adding, as Captain Hotham says in his protest at the end of the Report, to his duties matters of which he can have no knowledge, nor can he be expected to understand the specifications on which contracts are based. But this will not be the end of the additional work placed on the Director of Contracts. It is recommended in this Report—and I entirely concur in the recommendation—that, in future, those things which are now manufactured in the Dockyards should be purchased outside. I have no doubt a very large saving, indeed, will be effected if that recommendation be carried out. It is proposed to give up ropemaking and sailmaking at the Dockyards. I understand it is also proposed to give up the manu-
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    facture of biscuits and so on. There are some 2,000 hands employed in these works; and the purchasing of these articles, amounting in value to £250,000 sterling, will also be thrown on the overburdened back of the Director of Contracts. But that is not even all; for in Clause 42 of the Committee's Report, there is a recommendation of fresh work for the Director of Contracts. Clause 42 says—
    "It is most desirable that the Director of Contracts be relieved, as much as possible, of office work, in order that he may have time, subject to the instructions of the Board, to visit manufacturing districts and the Dockyards, and to keep himself fully informed as to the best centres of production and in touch with the wants of the Services."
    It really seems to me that anything more ridiculous than these proposals I have never seen made in a Report presented to Parliament. A justification for the transfer of contracts under Vote 11, it is impossible to find from the evidence As Civil Lord, I had charge of this Department, and I can appeal to the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Ecclesall Division of Sheffield (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett), who succeeded me in that office, and who is now occupying it, as to whether Colonel Percy Smith, the Director of Contracts, is not himself capable of arranging for the various contracts under this particular Vote? Why on earth this duty is to be transferred to the Contract Department I altogether fail to discover. But, Sir, in regard to the proposal to transfer the buying of ships and machinery to the Contract Department, the Committee rest their recommendation almost entirely on the charge that in purchasing the two ships, the Renown and the Sanspareil, Lord Northbrook's Committee Board paid in the one case over £18,000 and in the other case over £17,000 more than if the work had been done by other firms tendering for the same work. I should point out to the House that these Estimates are based on the suggestion that the hulls and machinery had been purchased from separate firms, instead of under one contract. Now, what are the facts of the case? I will turn to Clause 23 of the Report, in which the Committee summarize what they think were the right proportions of the terms tendering. The Committee say that—

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    "Had the £S,000 proposed to be charged by the engine-makers for the additional indicated horse-power been abated by the professional officer from the accepted tenders, instead of their arbitrary valuation of £l5,000, the tenders in order of price would have stood as follows."
    So that the table which follows that remark is the table, as I understand it, which the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Norwood) considers ought to have been presented to the Board by the officials responsible for these contracts. Now, it shows that Messrs. Palmer and Co. tendered for hull and engines £587,854; that Messrs. Elder and Co. for each of two ships tendered £590,000; that the Thames Shipbuilding Co. tendered £593,000, and that Messrs. Armstrong and Co. tendered £590,000. So that, on the face of it, the contracts having been given to the Thames Shipbuilding Co. and Messrs. Armstrong and Co., the highest of these tenders, it does appear that the Board, of which I was a Member, had given too much money for these particular ships. But there is a great deal of suppression of the truth in these two statements. Let us examine the matter more carefully. Messrs. Palmer and Co. tendered for one ship £587,854, or in round figures £588,000: but they only tendered for a ship of 9,000 horse-power. Messrs. Elder and Co. tendered £590,000 for two ships. But if the Board had carried out the recommendation of the Report, and accepted, in the first instance, the lowest tender—that of Messrs. Palmer and Co.—there would have been one ship only for Messrs. Elder and Co., who tendered £594,500 for one ship. And yet the Committee report that Messrs. Elder and Co. tendered £3,000 less than the Thames Co., as if it were for one ship. Now, it is true that Messrs. Elder and Co. tendered for 10,000 horse-power; but they wanted, if they were to put 10,000 horsepower into the ship, to add 100 tons to the weight of the machinery, so taking away 100 tons from the rest of the carrying capacity of the ship. Now, the Thames Shipbuilding Co. tendered £593,000, and we got 10,000 horsepower guaranteed; we also got a knot extra speed in consequence. We secured the same conditions in the case of Messrs. Armstrong and Co' s tender of £596,000. I see many hon. and gallant Admirals on the opposite side of the House, and
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    I appeal, without the slightest hesitation, to any of them, whether, in order to secure an extra knot in the speed of the two iron-clads in question, it was not worth while to pay, in one instance, £3,000 more, and in the other £6,000 more, rather than accept the tender of Messrs. Elder and Co., who wanted to load the ship with an extra 100 tons of machinery; or of Messrs. Palmer and Co., who only offered 9,000 horse-power. But now let me trouble the House for a moment more in reference to the prices. I must remind the House of what some may have noticed in the public Press, that when these orders were given to the Thames Shipbuilding Co. and Messrs. Armstrong and Co., these firms contracted that if they failed to produce 10,000 horse-power, they would submit to a fine of £12 per horse-power for every one they fell short of that amount, so that I maintain that, whether we got eventually a 10,000 horsepower ship, or 8,500 horse-power ship, from these two contractors, we paid in hard cash very much less than we should have done if we employed Messrs Elder and Co., or Messrs Palmer and Co., or any other combination that it was possible to be tendering for engines and hulls. I will suppose that we got the full 10,000 horse-power from either of the three firms who wore able to supply it—Messrs. Elder and Co., the Thames Shipbuilding Co., and Messrs. Armstrong and Co. We should have paid £595,000 to Messrs. Elder and Co., for a 10,000 horse-power ship, plus 100 tons. Now, that 100 tons is an exceedingly valuable element. If you got rid of 100 tons in the engines, you can use it for coals, for armaments, for ammunition, or for a variety of other purposes, and I maintain that 100 tons space in any ship is worth an extra £5,000 or £10,000. The Thames Shipbuilding Co., were to get £601,000 for a ship of 10,000 indicated horse-power. The engines would have been 40 tons lighter than those tendered for by other firms; so that, as a matter of fact, the ship would have been 140 tons lighter or of less displacement than the ship which was tendered for by Messrs. Elder and Co., a fact which would have given a knot extra speed. There may be some comment made that Messrs. Armstrong and Co. wore £3,000 higher than the Thames

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    Shipbuilding Co. That £3,000 was required; because the engines were manufactured on the Thames, and the ship was built on the Tyne. Suppose the ships, when delivered, only turned out to be of 9,500 horse-power. The price paid to Messrs. Elder and Co. would have been the same, £595,000, and the price paid to the Thames Shipbuilding Co., on the terms of £12 per horse deduction, would have been precisely the same as to that paid to Messrs. Elder and Co; but the ship would have been minus 40 tons in the weight of the engines. Messrs. Armstrong, under the same conditions, would have been paid £598,000. Now, let us suppose the engineers had failed in their engagement to produce a full 10,000 horsepower, and had only given us 8,500 horse-power. It has been the contention of this Committee all through, that we ought to have considered, in giving out the orders, only the prices that were tendered for ships of 8,500 horse-power. the lowest tender for hull and machinery from two different contractors was £581,000. The Department object to buying the hull from one firm and the engines from another firm; and, therefore, they get one tender: That, in itself, was an objection to Messrs. Palmer and Co.'s tender of £587,000. But under the £12 fine, the Thames Shipbuilding Co. would only have been paid, if they had delivered a ship of 8,500 horsepower, £483,000, and the ship would still have been minus the 40 tons weight. Messrs. Armstrong and Co. would have been paid £486,000. So, taking these figures as you please, arranging them as you like, if you speak honestly, it is impossible to bring any charge against the Board of which I was a Member, to the effect that we did not purchase these vessels on the very lowest and best possible terms. There is a good deal in the Report of the Committee about the fancy value of a horse in a ship's engines. One authority places it at 30s.; another at £5 1s. 3d.; and another at £6 10.s. I confess I do not understand the value of a horse-power in these engines, or know how it can be arrived at; but I do understand, and every naval officer perfectly understands, the value of an extra 140 tons of space. Naval officers know perfectly well the value of a knot. It is quite possible that one knot might turn out to
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    be the value of a whole ship. I have no hesitation in saying that the charge brought by this Committee in their Report against the Board, of which I was a Member, that they bought ships at a higher price than they could obtain them for elsewhere, is absolutely without foundation. I strongly protest against the charge. If the Committee have no more basis for the charge than it has for taking away the contracting for ships from the Controller's Department, and adding it to the already overburdened Department of the Director of Contracts—if the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood) does not assure me that he; will not persevere with the carrying out! of the recommendation of the Committee, I shall be bound, at as early a date as possible, to ask the House to express its opinion in the Division Lobbies.
    MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR: Mr. Speaker, I regret the Forms of the House do not enable me to raise the issue which is involved in the terms of the Motion I have on the Paper—namely,
    "That this House will not proceed to the consideration of the proposed expenditure for the Navy without having first learnt what steps have been taken to improve the system of Admiralty Contracts."
    The particular Services to which the Motion I have read would direct the attention of the House are dispersed over a number of different Votes, and therefore it is impossible to discuss the question, except at this particular stage. This is a question of very great importance, and at the present time it is attracting a great deal of public attention. But were it not so, the fact of the amount of money involved under these Contract Services would secure for it considerable attention at the hands of, at any rate, a large section of the House. Now, Sir, on the present Estimates the amount under these Services is nothing like as great as it has been. On the Estimates now presented, the sum of £3.288,000 under one Vote alone will show the extent to which those charges go. But that is only under the original Estimate. The experience of the last year tells us this will probably be supplemented, as the original Estimate of last year was supplemented, by something which will raise the total considerably above the figure I have men-

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    tioned. Last year's figures will let the House see what the immense sums are which are covered by those Contract Services. In the 7th section of Vote 10, for the year 1885–6, on account of Machinery and Ships building by Contract, the original estimate was £2,126,000. The expenditure went up to £3,555,387. But the other section of the same Vote is hardly less involved, for the amount taken under it in Committee of Supply was £1,511,000. This is far from meeting the entire liability connected with timber, materials, coal, and other naval stores, which really amounts to £2,155,000. So that, on the whole, we have expended during a single year on this Vote £5,710,771. That includes £700,000 on account of the hire of armed cruisers and their appurtenances; but it does not include a still larger item on account of hired transports, which amountsto£ 1,113,000. This, with the sum I have mentioned, makes a total of £6,824,000 in round numbers. But oven that immense sum does not represent the entire expenditure on Contracts in a single year, because it is dispersed over a number of items, which go to swell this total to something over £7,000,000. Therefore, it will be seen that the question which my Motion will raise is one, not only covering a large sum of money, but affecting a number of Services under the control of the Naval Authorities. The very easy way in which the authorities at Whitehall deal with these contracts is exemplified in a comparatively small matter which occurred during the period to which the figures I have quoted refer. It will be in the recollection of the House that some time ago Her Majesty's Government took it into their heads to occupy Port Hamilton. It has since been ascertained that this place is in-capable of defence, except at a great expenditure, and that it is also of very little practical value as a coaling station. Under these circumstances, the Admiralty magnanimously resolved to surrender it to its rightful owners. But already a considerable expense had been incurred in connection with it. In view of the difficulty with the Russian Government on that and other accounts, it was thought necessary by the Admiralty to have telegraphic communication between Hong Kong and Port Hamilton
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    in the first place, and, in the second place, between England and Port Hamilton. When this little piece of contract work was made known by the Admiralty to the Treasury, the submarine requirements for the service had already been purchased, at a cost of £218,000; the cable to Port Hamilton had actually been laid to the place which was subsequently abandoned. The other cable, however, still lay on the premises of the contractors', coiled up, ready for orders as to what should be done with it. What was done with it? It was not used. I do not know whether the House will recollect it or not, but it was sold at the first favourable opportunity, and the proceeds went to diminish the net charge on the Vote of Credit. Now, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. E. Stanhope), standing at the Table the other night, emphasized what we had already read in the Statement relating to his Department, and declared to the House that the appropriating of the proceeds of sale to the reduction of Votes was a dangerous system, and one which ought to be discontinued. The same system which has obtained in the case of the Board of Admiralty has obtained under the War Office. The price obtained for the cable is lumped with the proceeds of other stores sold, one of the principal items of which is the coal furnished for use at foreign stations, and which, of course, at some time or other, will have to be replaced at considerable expense to the country. The next point to which I ask the attention of the House I take from the clever and interesting Memorandum issued to Members as explanatory of the Estimates which we are now asked to consider. It will be seen, at pages 5 and 6 of the Statement, that in 1885 the Government, recognizing the insufficiency of previous arrangements, entered upon an expenditure, in addition to that of the ordinaryship building programme, of no less a sum than £3,100,000 in the building of ships by contract in private yards. Besides this, £1,600,000 for guns was to be added to the Ordnance Vote, which is included in the annual Estimate of the expenditure for the War Office the Chancellor of the Exchequer, we are told, estimated that this outlay would be spread over five years,

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    ending on the 31st of March, 1890. The Expenditure for 1885 was to be £800,000; for 1886–7 it was likewise to be £800,000; while the balance was to be taken in 1887–8, 1888–9, and 1889–90, at the rate of £500,000 a-year, thus making up the £3,100,000. But what has really happened? In 1885, instead of £800,000," the Admiralty spent on this business over £1,000.000 sterling. In the year which is now within a fortnight of its close, instead of the second £800,000, they have spent £1,320,000: and instead of taking only £500,000 for the coming financial year, the First Lord tells us that he wants £997,336—or, in round numbers, another £1,000,000—and thus, before three years of the five years have expired, the Admiralty has expended more than £250,000 over and above the total sum stipulated for during the entire period. But, Sir, although the money has been spent, or will have been spent in a very short time, the work has not been done. Of the five belted cruisers included in the programme which the £3,100,000 was to cover, not one single cruiser has been delivered. The six steel torpedo cruisers included in the programme have been delivered; but we are informed that there has been some trouble in the preliminary steam trial, and their completion is, in consequence, delayed. Now, passing from that subject, I say that one of the points which must forcibly strike anyone attempting to elucidate the relations between the Admiralty and the fortunate contractors who happen to have dealings with them, is the very great indulgence which is sometimes extended to the contractors, especially when it suits the convenience of the naval authorities. For instance, we have it officially reported to the House that, last year, the contractors for some machinery had received advances to the amount of £38,140 beyond the sum which they were entitled to receive according to the strict terms of their contracts; and, in the same way, the contractors for shipbuilding had received, over and above what they were entitled to receive, the amount of £50,490. Similarly, Armstrong & Co. received £199,950 in respect of gun mountings for various ships in course of manufacture for the Admiralty, although, in the arrangement entered into with that firm, no
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    provision for such advance had been made; and the curious feature of that particular case is, that of the immense sum so improperly advanced, £67,000 was paid on the very last day of the financial year—namely, the 31st of March, 1886. Of course, it is very easy to see that by so accommodating the contractors, the Admiralty were enabled to dispose of a large sum of money which, if they had kept it over to the following morning, they would have been compelled, under the law, to surrender as an unexpended balance. Again, under the arrangement of April, 1885, Messrs. Whitehead & Co. contracted for the supply of 200 torpedoes, to be delivered free on board at Fiume for £300,000. Fifty of these were to be delivered within six months from the date of contract, and 25 during each succeeding month. According to the contract, they ought to have delivered, by the end of March, a total of 175 torpedoes; but, as a matter of fact, only 100 were delivered, and they were paid for. But, besides the £30,000 to which the contractors were entitled on account of the torpedoes which they had delivered, they were paid the sum of £21,000 more on account, although the torpedoes were not delivered according to contract, and the contractors were actually in arrear with the delivery. We may usefully contrast this treatment with that we find to be the conduct of the Admiralty in respect of contain other persons who do not happen to be so favourably regarded as the particular individuals I have referred to. In order that I may not be considered as speaking without book, I confine myself to what is reported by the Committee specially appointed to inquire into the Contract Business of the Admiralty. That Committee was presided over by-the hon. Member for the Govan Division of Lanark (Mr. Pearce), and his selection as Chairman was a very admirable one; because, at the time it was made, the Gentleman had not had time to allow all his good intentions to evaporate. The three Members of this House who were upon that Committee, whatever may be their professional occupations, are not only men of unquestionable ability, but men of unquestionable character; and I am bound to say that, although they sit on the other side

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    of the House, and are opposed to me in politics, as I am opposed to them, I should feel positively ashamed if I could think myself capable for one moment of alluding to one of them as "a disappointed tenderer." I heard, with a feeling of disgust, that expression applied to the hon. Member (Mr. Pearce), than whom, I am perfectly certain, there is no more straightforward, honest, and useful man in this House, and I tender my hon. Friend the expression of my personal respect, having had, on many occasions, opportunities of judging of his qualities as Chairman. This Committee reported, among other things, upon this particular point—that more expedition is requisite in passing contractors' claims for ships and engines, the delays in connection with payment being at present unreasonable That is the story, and it is a true story, with regard to the conduct of the Admiralty in certain cases. There is unreasonable and undue delay in certain cases; but in the case of other contractors, as I have shown to the House, there is no delay, but, on the contrary, they have given largo sums of money before payment of those sums was due. The Committee, unquestionably, found itself compelled to point out what they termed many and grave defects in the general administration and system pursued at the Admiralty with regard to the matters referred to their consideration. I will not dwell upon the blots indicated in regard to the administration, such as the want of cooperation between the different Members of the Board; neither will I venture to go into matters which, as a layman, I do not profess to understand, such as specifications being complete or incomplete, alternative designs, and so forth; but in this Report there are things which any man of ordinary intelligence can understand; and certainly, I am surprised to read, as I do in page 19, that notice is taken of the apparent absence of a thoroughly practical Engineering department, the result of which is that there is no one at the Admiralty competent to design engines, and to bring the latest engineering science to bear upon designs. Anyone can see that there must be something very unsatisfactory in the administrative system at Whitehall, when it can be reported that large
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    contracts were made in 1885, prior to the appointment of the present Controller of the Navy; that when a large number of contracts were concluded, in many cases the lowest offers were not accepted, and that designs were adopted quite at variance with the specifications sent out; that tenders were sent out for ordinary compound engines, and that designs had been accepted for those of treble expansion. We are told, further, that it has all through been the custom, after tenders have been received, to discriminate between the offers, on the ground of a supposed difference between the relative reputation and ability of the parties tendering; and when, presumably, they have only been invited to tender after the Admiralty had satisfied themselves of their capability for the work, elements of uncertainty have been introduced into the awards which have been based on personal feeling. That is rather a peculiar sentence to read; but, after the exhibition we have had to-night, there is probably some ground for it. "This, no doubt, is prejudicial in the minds of contractors and shipbuilders to the impartiality of the Admiralty." When such a system is adopted, it is no great wonder that the results obtained correspond with the system. One of the results is shown in the case of two vessels, the Renown and the Sanapareil. Tenders were invited in the early part of 1885 for hulls and engines to those vessels jointly, the holds to indicate 5,500 horse-power by natural draught, and 8,500 horse-power by forced draught, with a request for alternative designs. I will not read through the figures and details; but the end of it was that after some differences with regard to horse-power, and after several different firms had tendered, Messrs. Elder and Co. offered to provide this additional horse-power without extra charge; and Messrs. Palmer and Co. also proposed to increase the guaranteed power to 9,000 indicated horse-power free of cost. Ultimately, however, both by reason of the discussion with regard to horse-power, and the modification of the proposal originally put forth, and from the fact that the hulls and machinery were regarded separately, an offer was accepted from Sir William Armstrong, Mitchell and Co. for one

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    ship at £18,500, and another from the, Thames Iron Works Company for the other ship at £17,500, in excess of the proposals made by other firms for the same work. That is the way in which the money of the country is squandered. The further payments on account of the increased horse-power are put on page 11 of the Report. The Report, after speaking of the first contract for engines, goes on to say, that six months after it was concluded
    "Tenders were invited for engines of a facsimile character with boiler?, to produce the same power for the Nile and Trafalgar. The lowest offer was from Messrs. Harland and Wolff £78,234 for each ship, or equal to a reduction of £1G,500 for the two sets of engines from the prices above stated "
    The tender of Messrs. Harland and Wolff for these engines was not accepted, though in submitting a list of the firms to be invited to tender—amongst whom was this firm of Messrs. Harland and Wolff—the professional Advisers of the Admiralty remarked—
    "These are the principal engineering firms of the country, and comprise all to whom it would be, in our opinion, desirable to entrust the construction of such important machinery."
    The tenders were one for £94,000 and one for £78,215—the former being from the same firm who, in August obtained, by negotiation, £112,000 for that which in the February following they offered to competition at £94,000. I cannot understand why the contract was not given to Messrs. Harland and Wolff, who were willing to do the work for £78,000 odd. Having road the paragraph bearing on this matter, I thought it necessary to put myself into communication with a gentleman perfectly well acquainted with the firm, and a number of other firms throughout the country; and I enquired of him whether, as a matter of fact, there was any good reason why Messrs. Harland and Wolff should not have the contract, and whether they were really capable of performing the work. His answer was short and emphatic. "Most unquestionably," he said, "they were perfectly qualified to do the work." Under those circumstances, and looking at the matter from a public point of view, I cannot understand why, when a contractor has tendered to do certain work for £78,000—a contractor who has done work for the Government, and who is recognized
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    as thoroughly qualified for such work—the contract should be given not to him but to another firm paid £94,000 to do it. So we see how payments in advance are made, even though they are not due; while in other cases, there is blameworthy delay in meeting claims which have fairly been put forward for work actually done; and so we see, also, that firms perfectly competent to do the work are passed over, and the tenders of other contractors are accepted at a very unnecessary increase in the cost to the public. But, Sir, even when tenders are accepted, are contractors bound to the terms on which they tender? It would appear from paragraph 27 of this Report that they are not—or, at any rate, not always. The paragraph is this—
    "A serious discrepancy was shown by the evidence before us to exist in some cases between the terms arranged with the contractor for engines and the conditions eventually embodied in the contract in regard to penalties and payments for extra indicated horse-power."
    Well, Sir, this is the way in which the contract business of the Admiralty has been conducted in the past, and it is not a matter of wonder that the Committee report as they do in paragraph 39—
    "It is inexpedient that purchases amounting to something like £50,000 a-year should be negotiated by the Director of Contracts without superior authority."
    I will not enter into the question of whether the Director of Contracts ought to be the solo purchaser on behalf of the Admiralty, though, I believe, the system has worked well in respect of the Army Services—at any rate, so far as the Director of Army Contracts is concerned. I do not see why it should not work equally satisfactorily in the Naval Service. But, surely, when the Director of Contracts can purchase on his own authority to the extent of £50,000 a-year, there ought to be some kind of check upon him—there ought to be some kind of higher officer who ought to be competent, at any rate, to look at the details of these contracts both before and after they have been entered into. I do not, for a moment, pretend to think that the system of contracts ought to be curtailed or diminished. It is equally true of the Navy, as it is true of the Array, that the Admiralty authorities are not able from their own Establishments to supply the needs of the Service

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    even in time of peace. The War Office Establishments cannot supply in times of peace more than.30 per cent, of the requirements, and the Navy authorities, I suppose, find it difficult to provide even so high a proportion. It is, therefore, clear that the wants of these two great Services must be dependent to a large extent upon supplies by contract. And the more they are dependent on the contractors, I think, the better, because you cannot expect the contractors, if the sudden demands of war should come upon them, to be prepared to furnish what is required for such low charges and on such reasonable terms as they would if the demands regularly made on them during the time of peace were such as to make it profitable for them to keep efficient and sufficient machinery. Therefore I am by no means desirous of seeing the system of contracts curtailed; but I do say this, that there is evidence not only in this Report, but in the Reports of the Government itself, and in the Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, and in the Reports made by the Comptroller and Auditor General to this House, with regard to proceedings in connection with contracts in the past—there is abundant evidence to show that the whole system of contracts under the Admiralty authorities does require a very complete overhauling. That has been recognized, but I submit that the Minute that is placed at the beginning of this Report, and signed by the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty, is altogether short of the requirements of the case. What he says is—
    "Since 1885 new regulations have been adopted, and a series of reforms initiated in the Comptroller's Department, which will, I hope, go far towards attaining the objects the Committee have in view, and for the accomplishment of which they have made numerous and practical suggestions."
    That is all very well so far as it goes; but the House will probably wish to know how far it goes, and what does it mean? What are the regulations that have been adopted in order to prevent the blots and defects the Committee have pointed out, and how does the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty propose in the future to avoid these things which I have mentioned, and which certainly, in some cases, amount almost to a scandal?
    CAPTAIN PRICE: The discussion commenced by the hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Caine) and continued by the lion. Gentleman who has just sat down (Mr. A. O'Connor) is one of very great importance, and if it had been commenced at an earlier hour of the evening I should have felt justified in going at length into it. I am quite aware, however, that the noble Lord has to take the first Votes to-night, therefore I will confine my remarks to a very few minutes. I should like, however, to say that I entirely—or almost entirely—agree with the remarks that fell from the hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness, leaving, of course, out of consideration some rather personal remarks which fell from him, and which, I must say, I did not agree with. I endorse the opinions he expressed when he declared himself entirely opposed to the policy of leaving the giving of contracts to the Director of Contracts. I think it a most mischievous thing to overload these officials with such affairs. I quite agree with what has been said by Captain Hotham in this matter; but does not this discussion raise a very important question in our minds for consideration? Is it worth our while, or is it right, for us to go so largely into this system of contracts at all? Why is it that with our magnificent Dockyards, where we can produce everything required in the Navy, that we go so much into the open market and spend large sums of the public money on these contracts? Sir, I must protest, in the interests of economy, against the immense sums that are being squandered by the Government in this matter of contracts. It seems to me in the highest degree un-business-like that, having spent enormous sums on our Naval Dockyards, and having spent millions of money in setting up plant with which to build our ships, we should not make proper use of that plant, but should go to private yards to get work done which could be equally well done in our Royal Dockyards. I have only to turn to this Report of Contracts to find a useful illustration of what I am urging. We are told that in the case of certain iron clad ships certain tenders were given. Well, one tender is, I think, £18,000 lower than the tender that was actually accepted; and are we to suppose that no profit is made by the contractors who

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    build those ships for us? I know we are sometimes told so. I go into a shop sometimes to purchase an article. I complain of the price; and the shopkeeper tells me—"Oh, I can assure you we do not get any profit at all on this article; on the contrary, we are great losers by it." I would as soon believe a statement of that kind on the part of a shopkeeper, as the statement that the contractors who build our ships do not make a profit out of the work. Such statements are all nonsense. Of course, a profit, and a large profit, is made by the contractor. I do not suppose the owners of the shipbuilding yards who are called on to build the ships on which we spend £500,000, would attempt to go into such an extensive business as that without getting a profit of something like 10 per cent. Well, if you take the profit we may suppose to be made by such tenderers as Messrs. Harland and Wolff, and add to that £10,000 or £18,000, which we are giving to Messrs. Armstrong, Mitchell, and Co., we have a sum of something like £60,000 which we are giving away for the manufacture of these ships over and above what we might have given if the ships had been built in the Royal Dockyards. But this is not the only reason why I say it is mischievous and a mistake to build these ships so extensively in private yards. At the commencement of this evening's debate I remember an hon. Gentleman—I think the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed)—rather surprised us by stating that all our designs for ships that were being obtained from private dockyards were made public property—that is to say, that the designs for our ships, which, we do all we can to keep secret, and to keep from falling into the hands of Foreign Powers, in the case of ships built in private dockyards are made perfectly public property. Anyone can buy them for almost anything he likes. That is a serious consideration, and it is a thing which cannot happen in the case of ships which are built in Public Dockyards. Now, in the statement which the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton) has laid before us, he has told us the allowance which ought to be made for the depreciation of our stock in ships. I wish he had carried out the same principle as regards the value of our stores. I think it would be a very im-
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    portant thing, and a very excellent thing, if, in future, he was to give us some idea of the nature and value of our stock and stores in hand. We are told what is required to buy stores for the year; but we never have a valuation of all the stores in the Service—for instance, of the timber, metal, and so on. That item is a very large one; it is something like £500,000 or £600,000. I see there is a very largo decrease made this year in that item. I wonder why that is. Is it because the stores were depleted last year? In another item we find a corresponding increase, so we never know exactly whore we are. It has often been the case that Boards of Admiralty, finding that their shipbuilding is rather running down, and wanting to get more money from the House of Commons to make up for the deficiency, deplete the stores, and the House of Commons knows nothing about it. It is sometimes the case that the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty will come down and astonish the House by saying he has done more than his Predecessor in the way of increasing the Navy; but, at the same time, he hides from us the fact that the stores are depleted, and that if another Board of Admiralty came in they would have to spend a great deal of money in getting the stores up to the required amount, and that in consequence of having to do that they could not spend the necessary amount of money in building. I hope that in future the First Lord of the Admiralty will be able to give us some idea of what stock of stores we have in hand. Now, I should like to make a few remarks upon the personnel of the Navy; it is quite as important as matériel. At the commencement of the evening, I asked the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty what he intended to do as regards carrying out the recommendations of the Duke of Edinburgh's Committee concerning the pensions to the widows of our seamen. The Report of the Committee was sent in two years ago; but the recommendations it contained have not been acted upon. My noble Friend very courteously and kindly stated that if I would come to him he would tell me the reason why the Committee's recommendation had yet not been carried out; but this is not a matter which can wait. I think the noble Lord should have told

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    the House to-night, as I think I can tell them, what the reason is. I believe he will not deny the fact that the whole of the Board of Admiralty are unanimously of opinion that this recommendation should be carried out, but that they cannot got the small amount of money which is required from the Treasury. I believe that if the noble Lord were to ask the House of Commons to back him up in this matter—it is a small matter as far as the amount of money goes, but a very important matter to a great number of poor deserving people—the House of Commons will have no difficulty in providing the money which is necessary for these pensions. One word in regard to our warrant officers. Many years ago, during the time of the Crimean War, it was thought a great shame and a hardship that our warrant officers, that our seamen were the only seamen, in the world who were never able to got a commission, never able to rise to the rank of officers. That was felt to be a hardship, and an Order in Council was made that our seamen should be allowed, under circumstances of long servitude, or of bravery in action, or for other special services, to rise to the rank of officers. Now, will the House believe that from that time to this not one single seaman has ever been given the commission of an officer?—they rise to the rank of warrant officers, but beyond that they cannot go. The matter was fully discussed some years ago, and the then First Lord of the Admiralty—I am not sure it was not the right hon. Gentleman the present Member for South Edinburgh (Mr. Childers)—thought he would get over the difficulty in this way. He said, well, we will give some warrant officers commissions. Now, what are those commissions? Instead of being called gunner or boatswain or carpenter, they are called chief gunner, chief boatswain, and chief carpenter, and they are asked to believe they are commissioned officers; you may just as well tell a cabby that he is a coachman to Her Majesty the Queen. Well, that is the way the difficulty was got over. I think it is a great shame; and I submit to the House that it is a standing disgrace to this country that the Navy, which we always look upon as the finest Profession in the world, is the only profession where a common man before the mast cannot in course of time, if he shows himself
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    worthy of it, secure the uniform of an officer. There are supposed to be difficulties in the way; I do not see any difficulties at all. There are supposed to be social difficulties, but social difficulties should not exist; the warrant officers do not ask to be lieutenants and put in rooms with other lieutenants on a ship. There is no occasion for it. There are hundreds of appointments in the Navy where they need not come in contact, if they do not like it, with the other executive officers of the Service. There is the whole Coastguard open to them. There are appointments to gun-boats and the torpedo service, and many other services which I need not mention, where these officers might be very usefully employed as lieutenants. Again, they argue if that cannot be conceded to them, why should they not, after they have served their time in the Service and come on retirement, receive the rank of lieutenant on retirement. That looks a small matter, but it is not. It is one of great importance to them and to their families. These are the only few remarks I shall make with regard to the personnel of the Navy. The noble Lord, would do well to take this matter into consideration. If the noble Lord would do something towards offering commissions to our seamen, and also in helping our men to make provision for their widows, he would do a great deal more to perpetuate the Queen's Jubilee than is to be done in spending largo amounts of money on statues and the like.
    MR. HOOPER: At this late hour (1.10) I will not trespass very long upon the attention of the House. But what I wish to bring before the House is, in the words of the Motion, which I regret the Forms of the House will not permit me to move, that the Government should take more energetic steps to bring to completion the works at Haulbowline Dockyard in Cork Harbour, in order that the large expenditure already incurred there may at the earliest possible date bear useful results to the Navy and the Public Service. In order that I may correctly place before the House the usefulness of this work, I have to refer to the early history of the undertaking. It was preceded by a very long agitation, beginning, I believe, at the time of the Union, for the construction of this dock was one of the bribes held out to the Irish people to consent

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    to the Union of the two countries. But I shall begin with the year 1864, at which time a Committees was appointed, on the Motion, I think, of a predecessor of mine in this House, Mr. John Francis Maguire. That Committee was asked, on public grounds, and also on the ground that a fair share of the Imperial taxation should be expended in Ireland, to recommend the construction of a dock in Cork Harbour. I mention that fact lest the hon. Gentlemen who sit on the other side of the House should imagine my moving in this matter is entirely or mainly the result of any desire to obtain Imperial expenditure in my locality. A mass of evidence was produced before the House; and among others who gave evidence in favour of this project was the Duke of Somerset who has been already mentioned by—various speakers as closely allied with the Administration—Captain Godfrey Green, Captain Stuart, and Roar Admiral Mill. Rear Admiral Mill stated that—
    "Probably in time of war you would have ships disabled which might make for Cork, and it would be as well to have a dock there to meet cases of emergency, more especially at the present time."
    And then he gives his reason, to which I especially ask the attention of what I may call the non-professional Members of the House—
    "In consequence," he says, "of the introduction of machinery there are many little derangements which take place, so that ships require to he docked much oftener than they used to be formerly."
    The Committee also received evidence from Mr. Maguire, and he said that he had heard several naval men give their strong opinions in favour of the establishment of this dockyard. Sir George Sartorius stated before him the necessity of having a naval dockyard at Cork Harbour. Sir George Sartorius was of opinion that there should be a naval dockyard and arsenal on the West Const of Ireland, because it was very unwise to have the defences of the country intrusted entirely to the Dockyards in England. The Committee in their inquiry felt the full force of the advantage to the Fleet of a first-class dock at Cork, and they advised the immediate construction of a first-class dock in some convenient spot in the Harbour, and also, if practicable, the deepening of the existing docks for occasional naval re-
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    quirements. The Admiralty at that time acted on the Report, and they proposed to spend a sum of £150,000 in the construction of a dock in the course of six years. Well, Sir, for some reason or other that sum of £150,000 has been raised to something like £700,000 or £800,000. That large expenditure may seem to make the House a bit weary of this undertaking; but it is no detriment to my argument at present so far as there is practical result. This large sum is practically thrown into the sea, and therefore it behaves Parliament to see whether by some vigorous effort the dock cannot be turned to some useful account. But the work has been in abeyance for some time, owing, as it has been said, to the unfortunate circumstance that the Government cannot get a sufficient number of convicts for the work. Undoubtedly the proximity of convict labour at Spike Island was an inducement to enter into this enterprize; and while the convict establishment existed there and while convict labour, which cost the Government so little, was to be had, there might be some cause for dragging this work slowly along. But that state of things no longer exists, the convict establishment has been removed to Galway during the last two or two-and-a-half years; and now whatever money is to be spent—that is, if this dock is to be finished at all—and surely it ought to be finished when £700,000 or £800,000 has already been spent upon it—it will have to be completed by paid labour. I have quoted the reasons for which the dock was originally entered upon; and I ask any hon. Member of the House who is acquainted with the progress of affairs since that time to say whether those reasons have now less or more effect than they had at that time. I think it will be admitted that the reasons have greater effect now, for with the increased power of projectiles the chances are far greater that vessels in Her Majesty's Navy will require more docking, and will require to have more docks in which they can find refuge. I also call attention to the fact that the length of transport vessels has greatly increased since that time. The right hon. Gentleman was shocked to find that he could not take one of Her Majesty's ships into Malta; but what would happen if one of these splendid cruisers were to get damaged? If the arrangements at

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    Cork were complete, you would have a dock that you could take her to; and I may mention that Cork would be an excellent place from which to send troops. If one of the ships is disabled, how are you going to deal with her; is she to be brought to London for repair and then taken back again? I believe the whole history of naval administration shows that you use enormous sums of money which you might save if you had kept your Dockyards in an efficient state. In the time of the Crimean "War I think there was something like the worth of £1,000,000 in the work done in private dockyards, because the Government Dockyards were overworked, and if such a time were to come again. I say it would be of the greatest consequence to the country to have the dock at Cork in a working state. If Her Majesty's Government are wise they will take this work seriously in hand, and that soon, and for this reason among others, that I see, with the greatest regret, that the shipping industry of Cork Harbour has been declining for years past, and that the trade is almost threatened with extinction. There are still some first-rate workmen left there, and the sooner they are saved from extinction the better. Apart altogether from that, I suppose that Her Majesty's Government are not altogether free from the apprehension of war at no distant period. Franco is not at the moment on the very best terms with England; on the contrary, she is the close ally of Russia, and perhaps the alliance which exists may be more friendly hereafter at a time when the Irish Coasts might not be free from attack. Under these circumstances; I say it would be well for the Government to have a harbour at Cork with all the appliances necessary for docking ships. It is a very capacious Harbour; there are splendid forts there mounted with the best artillery, and altogether it is the best position in which Her Majesty's ships can be placed. I will now remark that after all the money spent in the last 27 years, a new stage has been reached, and we are told that 80 men per week are to be discharged in June next. I ask the noble Lord whether it is his intention to allow the £700,000 or £800,000 which has been spent to lie waste, and whether he will not give these men some other work, which he can do very easily? Finally, I thank the
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    House for the great courtesy they have shown during the time occupied by these remarks; and I ask the Government to consider carefully whether some now departure should not be taken to make this large sum of money immediately productive, and to provide, as soon as possible, on that part of the Coast a place in which Her Majesty's ships can be constructed and repaired alike in time of peace and war.
    MR. PEARCE: The speech of the hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Caine) seems to me to have had two points. In the first place, he vindicated a very pernicious system of contracting which had been going on for some years, especially during the term he was connected with the Admiralty; and, in the second place, he made a personal attack upon me, because I consented to act on the Committee of Contracts. He culls me a "disappointed tenderer. "I am not a "disappointed tenderer," because years ago I discovered that the partiality existing amongst the professional advisers of the Admiralty was of such a character that it was not to be expected that I should get a contract under any circumstances whatever. I have tendered because I wished to remain on what is known as the Admiralty List; if I were not on that List I should be precluded from tendering in foreign countries. That is the sole reason why I was on the List—it was not because I had an idea of getting contracts. The hon. Member has also referred to me as cross-examining a professional officer. I simply asked that officer eight questions, and I ask the hon. Member if, out of those questions, he can point to one which was indiscreet? He cannot do so. As a professional man, I was supposed to ask questions of a technical character. I was solicited to act on the Committee, and it was pointed out to me that my professional knowledge would be of great service to the Admiralty. I think, in a case of this kind, the hon. Member should not make a personal attack on any Member of this House for doing what he considered to be for the public good. Now, I may state that I was not prompted, nor was any Member of the Committee prompted, to inquire into the question of the Sanspareil and Renown, on account of the firm to which I belonged having tendered for

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    them. But the Committee were induced to inquire into the matter from the fact that the engines were given to a firm which has at the present time has 100,000 horse-power under construction. If the hon. Member tarns to the Appendix of the Estimates, he will find that this firm, has received orders for the engines for the Trafalgar, Anson, Howe, Rodney, Collingwood, Mersey, Severn, Renown, and Sanspareil. These represent 100,000 horse-power, and, roughly speaking, £1,000,000 sterling; it represents an amount of work greater than all the engineers in the country have in hand for the Government; and, that being so, we concluded that something was going on which it was desirable to find out. The hon. Member endeavoured to show that these two ships were obtained at a cheaper price by deducting the penalty which he said might be deducted if the engineers did not give the horse-power they had contracted for. But, as a matter of fact, in this contract there is no penalty at all. If the hon. Gentleman had read the evidence a little more carefully, he would not, I think, have made the rash statement which he did make, or have spoken about the suppression of the truth. Here is a suppression which he made in giving his version of the case to the House. With regard to the Belfast firm which offered to do the engines of the Nile and Trafalgar at a cost of £:M,000 less than the Government are now paying, there was no reason that we could discover why they should not have had the contract. We were told that they were thoroughly competent to have the contract, and, when we asked why the Admiralty had invited the firm to tender, we were told that at the time there was great talk about justice to Ireland. There has been a great deal said about giving the Director of Contracts a great amount of power. When the Director of Contracts came before us we asked him. Whether he had anything to do with the contracts on these ships, and he said he had had nothing whatever to do with them. Well, Sir, when we found that this pernicious system was going on, which has been backed up by the hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness. We considered that it would be desirable to have a man of commercial mind to elucidate the system of contracts. I
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    conclude that the hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness was formerly installed at the Admiralty on account of his commercial knowledge. I believe that the firm with which he was connected contracted with the Government for certain materials. [Mr. CAINE: Never.] Then I beg the hon. Member's pardon; I have been misinformed. But he has been in the habit of making contracts with large firms—my own firm, for instance—and I should have thought that he was a man of commercial mind. I have nothing further to add than this—that my opinion with respect to the system of contracting is embodied in the Report of the Committee.
    THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON): At this hour (1.40 A.M.), and at the close of a not unsatisfactory discussion on naval matters, I feel it is not necessary for me to inflict a speech on the House; but as a number of questions have been put to me relating to several matters which are not referred to in the Memorandum, it is, perhaps, desirable that I should say a few words in reply. The hon. Gentleman the Member for East Cork (Mr. Hooper) raised a question as to Haulbowline Dock, and seemed to be under the impression that there was an intention on the part of the Admiralty to postpone the operation of those works. I have not had the advantage of meeting the hon. Gentleman in connection with the subject. When I was over in Ireland I received a deputation of local gentlemen in regard to it, and I stated to the gentleman heading that deputation the course we intended to pursue. I told him that the amount of money we should spend in the succeeding year would be as much as we had spent the year before; but I added that, inasmuch as we should be completing a portion of the work, it would be necessary to discharge some of the workmen from time to time. In June next these discharges will have to commence; and, in arranging the time, we have been guided by a desire to get rid of the men at a period of the year when it will be the easiest for them to get other employment. It must always be remembered that we shall only be getting rid of the men because the work on which they have been engaged is being completed. As

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    to the dock, I hope it will be ready to receive vessels in the course of the year, and that it will be found as valuable for naval and commercial purposes as the hon. Member anticipates. There has been some discussion with reference to the Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the system of making contracts at the Admiralty. I regret very much that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Caine) introduced a personal element into that discussion, and I can assure the House that it is not my intention to imitate his example. What I would say on the subject is that, when last year it was suggested that a Committee should sit and investigate the question of the making of contracts at the Admiralty—a suggestion which originated with an Admiralty Departmental Committee—I asked the Secretary to the Admiralty to undertake the task to preside over the inquiry, and associate with himself, in the duties of investigation, three Members of Parliament in addition to other Admiralty officers. We were very anxious to have as a Member of that Committee some gentleman of commercial experience, who had a knowledge of that particular class of naval stores that the Admiralty were in the habit of contracting for. The proposition was made to the Member for the Govan Division of Lanarkshire (Mr. Pearce) that he should servo on the Committee, and he assented. I believed, at that time, as did the Secretary to the Admiralty, who had the management of the inquiry, that the question of contracts for engines and hulls only would not be investigated; but the old Chief Constructor of the Navy, Sir N. Barnaby, came up to give evidence as to the last contracts that had been made in reference to certain vessels and engines. In the course of his examination, Sir N. Barnaby stated the principle on which he had recommended certain tenders; and it became apparent to the Committee, as I say, that some error had been made. I have not had time to road all the evidence; but I have no doubt that a mistake was made by an Admiralty official, and I base my assertion on the fact that, in last year's Estimates, it will be found that engines were contracted for for the Nile and Trafalgar, both of which are larger and heavier vessels than the Sanspareil and
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    Renown, at a price lower by £10,000 and £12,000 than that paid for the last-mentioned vessels. It is clear, therefore, that the contracts made in the first case were much more beneficial to the contractor than those made in the second. So far as I can make out, the mistake, arose from the Admiralty officials knowing that a certain penalty was attached to every horse-power falling short of the required power. They assumed that that penalty was the price, and deducted that sum from the total amount of the tender, by which process they brought the tenders for the greater horse-power to a figure apparently lower than those for the higher. Those who read the evidence will see that one of the late chief officials admitted that he had made an error and an oversight. These contracts were completed under circumstances of great hurry, which is a fact which should not be lost sight of. It was in the year 1885, when it was considered not unlikely that we might be forced into collision with a great European Power. When the Report was presented and put on the Table of the House, a short Minute accompanied it, pointing out that the officials who now hold the position of Controller of the Navy and Chief Constructor were not those who were in Office at the time the contracts were made, and I pointed out that I believed that certain arrangements had since been made which wont in the direction of meeting certain of the suggestions made by the Committee; but, at the same time, I can undertake on behalf of the Admiralty, that we will do our best to give effect to the purport of the suggestions made by the Committee. There may, however, be some controversy as to the advisability of transferring the making of contracts from the official upon whom the duty now rests. There is a reference to the matter in the Blue Book published two days ago, and the Report speaks of those re-commendations. I believe we shall be able to arrive at some satisfactory conclusion which will prevent, in the future, any recurrence of what I believe to have been an error on the part of the technical officers of the Admiralty. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Devonport (Captain Price) asks me if we can give an estimate of what is the value of stores at the end of the year, and he pointed out that there is a decrease in the amount of timber. I would

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    say, in reply, that this decrease has been deliberately made, as we find we have enough timber on hand to last us three years. The House must boar in mind that in regard to this question of naval stores the circumstances of the country have greatly changed in recent years. The great storehouses in our Dockyards were established and set up at a time when the productive power of the country was comparatively small, and when railroads were not in existence. In those days it was necessary to accumulate large quantities of stores for cases of emergency; but nowadays, should an emergency arise, we should find no difficulty in procuring large supplies of stores such as the hon. and gallant Member refers to at very short notice. I have no doubt, thanks to the agencies of electricity and steam, that now, on the shortest notice, large quantities of stores would be obtained from outside, and laid alongside the ships more quickly than they could be taken from our storehouses. The hon. and gallant Gentleman put two other questions to mo—one, concerning the proposal to provide pensions for widows; and the other, in reference to the promotion of warrant officers to be executive officers. I must point out that, in this matter, you have to deal with the question of half-pay, and that warrant officers under the system proposed would find it difficult to live; and I have also to point out that no warrant officer could assume the position referred to without undergoing a certain prescribed examination which is an examination that I do not suppose many warrant officers would be able to pass. With regard to the pension fund, the question is a difficult one. My hon. and gallant Friend is aware that strong opposition has come from the men themselves, so much so that a certain portion of the proposals with regard to pensions we have been obliged to abandon. I have not been able to go thoroughly into the matter myself; but I think it will be necessary to substitute some other arrangement for that proposed by the Committee. Then, the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Eastbourne Division (Admiral Field) drew attention to certain Orders in Council which, he said, have inflicted great injury and wrong upon naval officers who form part of the Board of Admiralty. "Well, Sir, as was pointed out,
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    tho first Order in Council was repealed 15 years ago.
    ADMIRAL FIELD: I know that; I stated it. I do not want to be misunderstood. It is well known that a now Patent of the Board of Admiralty rescinds the previous one. The Order in Council of 1872, no doubt, rescinded the one of 1809; but the one of 18G9 is the parent of the one of 1872.
    LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Childers) wished to put the Board of Admiralty into the position of the Treasury Board, and he stated so. He desired to make the Naval Lords subordinates and assistants. That Order was rescinded, and the right hon. Gentleman the present Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Goschen) substituted another Order in Council, which put the Naval Lords of the Admiralty into their old position, making them Colleagues of the Board. What I have endeavoured to do, since I have held my present position, has been to increase as much as I could the individual power of the Naval Lords, and make them, as far as possible, responsible for their Departments, whilst, at the same time, giving them the opportunity of rendering themselves cognizant of the policy the Board as a body is pursuing. My noble and gallant Friend (Lord Charles Beresford) objected to attaching his name to the Estimates, because he had not had time to examine them. The desire is to make the Naval Lords share in the responsibility, and they accordingly feel it part of their duty to consider the Estimates, going carefully through them so that they may have no hesitation in attaching their signatures to them. Then, the question of naval education has been referred to. In two sentences, I will tell my hon. and gallant Friend who raised the point, how far we can agree with him, and how far we feel it impossible to agree with him. We are prepared to increase the ago of entrance, and we have made arrangements for rendering examinations as general as possible. We have appointed a Council of Education to consider the whole subject; but we are not prepared to assent to the proposal of the Committee by which the age would be raised from 12½ to 16 years, nor are we prepared to assent to the system of unlimited open competition. I am perfectly satisfied that the

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    proposals of the Committee in this respect are impracticable; and I am afraid they have made a mistake in the matter by drawing an analogy between the system in force in the Army and that that exists in the Navy. The proposal of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, if accepted, would have the effect of diminishing the amount of competition. The hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed) pointed out that, as my Minute stated, certain of our iron-clads were much more deeply immersed than had been anticipated; and he went so far as to say that, in consequence of this defect, the vessels in question were useless. I think he quoted a remark made by the hon. Member for Southampton last year, in which he expressed a very disparaging opinion as to the utility of the Impérieuse. Well, since the hon. Gentleman the Member for Southampton spoke, the Impérieuse has been thoroughly tested. The officer who went out in command of the vessel was the hon. and gallant Gentleman's own flag captain on the North American Station, and he gave a most favourable account of the ship. The statement I myself made I gave after consulting the naval technical advisers—namely, that, not with standing the deep immersion of this and other large vessels, though there has been some miscalculation as to their draught, are amongst the most powerful iron-clads afloat. As to the observations of my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham (Mr. Maclean)—who expressed some doubt as to whether, hereafter, there was to be any statement on the Navy Estimates, and who is doubtful as to the operation of the proposed depreciation fund—I would point out to him that, on page 16, there is a statement in about half-a-dozen lines—a summary of the present condition of naval finance. We are spending this year £ 1,000,000 of money more than we should spend in an ordinary year, to carry out the programme of Lord Northbrook; but we are spending £138,000 less than we ought to do to make good the annual depreciation fund. If you deduct £1,38,000 from £1,000,000, you will have £860,000, the difference which is the margin upon which I think hereafter reduction or retrenchment can be made. The depreciation fund will give an annual sum to be expended on new construction, which
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    will keep up the Fleet at the strength and efficiency it is estimated it should reach. [Mr. R. W. DUFF: How about the coaling stations?] There is an inquiry still going on as to them. There is no doubt that the facilities which we have for coaling are deficient, but experiments are being made. A certain apparatus was set up, which I have no doubt the hon. Member is aware of, which has been found quite inoperative; and until we are convinced as to what is the best method of shipping coal, we do not propose to incur large expenditure on this matter. Still, it is a question which must be attended to. I hope I have answered all the questions which have been put to me. It is satisfactory to find that the experiment of publishing a printed Statement has proved a success. This is shown by the fact that the discussion to-night has been much more germane to the subjects contained in the Estimates than previous discussions. I hope the Speaker will now be allowed to leave the Chair, so that the 1st Vote may be taken.
    MR. SHAW LEFEVRE: If we allow the Speaker to leave the Chair, and the first Vote to be taken, I trust the Government will permit the general discussion to take place on the Victualling Vote in the same way as is done in connection with the Army. I have been anxious to make several observations; but I have not been willing to interpose during the discussion on the special subjects with regard to which Notices of Motion were put upon the Paper. It would have been very inconvenient if I had interposed to-night. Therefore, I hope that if the Speaker leaves the Chair, there will be no objection to discussing the question of general policy on the Victualling Vote.
    LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Certainty; there will be no objection.
    MR. LANE: I do not wish to intrude myself for very long before the House. I have sat hero very patiently, for eight hours, for the purpose of supporting the Resolution which was put on the Notice Paper relating to the Haulbowline Dock. I am as deeply interested in the question as if I were the Representative of Queenstown; but I do not wish at this late hour (2 o'clock), to do more than merely tell the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton) that the Irish Members do

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    not intend to put forward their claim in regard to this dock in any ad misericordiam sense. We speak the unanimous opinion of the Irish Members, and we are determined to press this matter forward rather upon the basis that Queenstown Harbour is a most suitable site for a Royal Naval Dockyard, and that a Naval Dockyard is a necessity from our point of view; that we contribute upwards of £1,000,000 of the money spent on the Navy, and that some of that money ought to be returned to us in the way of expenditure in Ireland. Those are the two grounds upon which we make the claim that the original plan for the construction of docks at Haulbowline shall be carried out. I sincerely hope that before it is within our power to refer to this subject again, the First Lord of the Admiralty will see his way to modify the declaration he has made—that the Admiralty cannot at present proceed with the work. I am persuaded that, turning the matter over in his mind, the First Lord of the Admiralty will see that the Irish people have a very strong claim on the Admiralty for some portion of its expenditure. But it must not be supposed that we merely claim that this work shall be proceeded with in order that we can get back our money. We believe that money expended on a Royal Dockyard in Cork Harbour will be money wisely expended for the benefit of the Empire at large.
    Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.

    SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES.
    SUPPLY—considered in Committee.
    (In the Committee.)
    (1.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
    "That 62,500 men and boys be employed for the Sea and Coast Guard Services for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1888, including 12,900 Royal Marines."
    DR. CLARK: On this Vote I should like to say a word or two with regard to the use to which some of our gunboats and Marines have been put. At this early hour (2.5) I do not intend to say much; I only want to show how ridiculous it is to use gunboats and Marines as they have been used lately in the North of Scotland. The first time they were used there was about five
    698
    years ago. The Liberal Government sent a gunboat and a force of Marines to coerce half-a-dozen crofters who had allowed some stock to graze on certain hills where it was said they had no right to do so. The Marines could not arrest these unfortunate crofters; indeed, all the captain could do was to suggest to the men that they should go to Edinburgh to be arrested. One-half of these so-called criminals—a Royal Naval Re-servo man and others—went to Edinburgh, for the purpose of being arrested. I believe they had to wait a week bo-fore any of them were arrested. The circumstances attending the second employment of the Marines were pretty similar to those on the first occasion. A gunboat and Marines were sent to arrest a crofter. They arrested this crofter, kept him in prison for a week, and then turned him out without trying him. The man is now bringing an action in the Scotch Courts for damages. Now, our fishing districts have been the best nurseries for both Marines and bluejackets. In the district visited by these Marines we have a large number of Naval Reserve men; but if this course is persevered in, we shall lose the district as a recruiting ground. The men of the Highlands have a great contempt for the Commissioners of Supply in the county; but up to now they have had great respect for the Marines and bluejackets. They will soon lose this respect, if the Marines are sent often on such errands as I have described.
    MR. EDWARD HARRINGTON: Perhaps it will be regarded as an acceptable suggestion that we should now adjourn. I do not wish to make a Motion to that effect; but simply to suggest that the Committee may think it worth while to report Progress. No one seems inclined to answer the remarks of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Caithness (Dr. Clark). Perhaps, at the present moment, hon. Members are not possessed of facts to enable them to do so. [A laugh.] One of the hon. Gentleman's countrymen thinks it worth while to laugh, but not worth while to answer his speech. I think it is not unbecoming in me to suggest that we have gone far enough to-night, so far as talk is concerned. ["Hear!"] Well, I do not think the night has been marked by any serious effort at progressive legislation; but, so

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    far as talk has gone, we have a fair record from all sides of the House. Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen have talked to-night who have scarcely broken their ''duck" during the Session so far. This is supposed to be a festive night for men who recognize the nationality I claim; but I do not pretend to say it has been a very festive matter for us to listen to the wearisome debate which has taken place to-night. Nothing practical has been done, or can be done, and therefore I suggest, most respectfully, that the Chairman should now report Progress.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sitagain."—(Mr. Edward Harrington.)
    THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H. SMITH): I must confess I never hoard reasons less reasonable why we should report Progress. I hope the Committee will unanimously agree that we should proceed at once to the despatch of Business.
    COLONEL NOLAN: I should like to ask the First Lord of the Treasury (Mr. W. II. Smith) what are his intentions? If he gets the first Votes for money and men under the regular Naval Estimates, will he stop there, and not take the Naval Supplementary Estimates, or ask for the Vote on Account of the Civil Service?
    MR. DEASY: I understand that this Vote will be the only one taken to-night, and, in that case, I do not think my lion. Friend (Mr. Edward Harrington) would do well to press his Motion to a Division. I am quite sure he will accede to the general wish of Members of the House, and allow this Vote to be taken.
    COLONEL NOLAN: I should like to receive an answer from the Government before we proceed any further. If they get the Votes for money and men, will they agree to report Progress?
    MR. W. H. SMITH: I think the discussion has been such that would warrant us in taking the Supplementary Estimates, and it certainly would be convenient to the Committee that such a course should be adopted. We have been discussing the Naval Estimates the whole night, and if the Committee desire to postpone the Vote on Account of Civil
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    Services, I shall not object; but, at the same time, I think it would be a great waste of public time to do so.
    Question put, and negatived.
    Original Question again proposed.
    COLONEL NOLAN:I should like to know from the First Lord of the Treasury whether, if we give him the two regular Votes of these Naval Estimates, and the Supplementary Naval Estimate, he will not persevere with the Vote on Account?
    LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: That is what I understood the First Lord of the Treasury to say.
    COLONEL NOLAN: He said, if it was the wish of the Committee.
    MR. W. H. SMITH: I said distinctly that I should like to take the Votes for men and money, and the Supplementary Naval Estimates, and then, if it was the wish of the Committee to postpone the Vote on Account, I would postpone it until Monday; but I thought it would be a misfortune, looking at the pressure of Public Business.
    MR. R. W. DUFF: In the event of the Vote on Account being postponed, will the right hon. Gentleman bring the regular Civil Service Estimates on on Monday?
    MR. W. H. SMITH: I will say tomorrow what I will do on Monday.
    MR. CLANCY: I think we should save time if the First Lord of the Treasury would express his own opinion as to the postponement of the Vote on Account.
    MR. W. H. SMITH: I will not go on with it.
    Original Question put, and agreed to.
    (2.) £2, 940,700, Wages, &c. to Seamen and Marines.
    (3.) £277,000, Supplementary, Navy Services, 1886–7.
    Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.
    Committee to sit again To-morrow.

  MERCHANT SHIPPING (FISHING BOATS) ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.
  (Baron Henry De Worms, Mr. Jackson, Sir Herbert Maxwell.)
  MERCHANT SHIPPING (FISHING BOATS) ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.

    [BILL 168.] COMMITTEE.
    Order for Committee read.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(Baron Henry De Worms.)
    Motion agreed to
    Bill considered in Committee.
    (In the Committee.)
    Clauses 1 to 10, inclusive, agreed to.
    Clause 11 (Fees payable on engagements and discharges).
    MR. GROTRIAN: This clause provides that the Board of Trade may prescribe the fees to be paid by the owners of fishing boats in connection with the engagement and discharge of crows; and it goes on to say that the superintendents, clerks, and servants may refuse to proceed with any such engagement or discharge unless the fees have first been paid, and that the fees so paid shall be carried to the credit of the Mercantile Marino Fund. I ask, what is the intention of the Government with regard to these fees? because, on the face of the clause, it would be competent to the Board of Trade considerably to increase the fees payable under the Mercantile Marine Act of 1854. If the hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill would give a pledge that the fees to be levied under the clause will not exceed the fees chargeable under the Mercantile Marine Act of 1854, I should regard it as satisfactory. With regard to the Bill generally, there are one or two points on which I might have felt disposed to offer a few remarks; but, having regard to the fact that the Bill finds general acceptance on both sides of the House, I shall limit my observations to the question I have raised, and which my constituents regard as of considerable importance to them. I venture to hope that the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Board of Trade (Baron Henry Do Worms) will give the pledge I have asked for, and afford facilities, by deferring the next stage, in order to carry out his intention.
    THE SECRETARY TO THE BOARD OF TRADE (Baron HENRY DE WORMS): I can give the pledge which the hon. Gentleman asks for.
    Clause agreed to.
    Clause 12 (Power to hold inquiries in cases of loss of life from boats of fishing vessels).
    DR. CLARK: I rise to ask why this Bill is not to extend, as I
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    wish it to do, to Scotland? On what grounds is Scotland excluded?
    Amendment proposed, to leave out Section (2).—(Dr. Clark.)
    BARON HENRY DE WORMS: The hon. Member will be aware that a special Act was passed last year, dealing with the question of the Scotch Fisheries. It was quite understood in consequence that this Bill should not apply to Scotland, and when the hon. Member considers that I make that statement in accordance with the views of Scotch Members, I have no doubt he will not think it necessary to press his Amendment on the Committee
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
    Clause agreed to.
    Clause 13 agreed to.
    Preamble agreed to.
    Bill reported, without Amendment; to be read the third time upon Monday next.

  MOTIONS.

    ISLE OF MAN (CUSTOMS) BILL.
    Considered in Committee
    (In the Committee.)
    Resolved, That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Law respecting the Customs Duties of the Isle of.Man.
    Resolution reported:—Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Jackson and Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.
    Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 199.]

    NATIONAL PROVIDENT INSURANCE.
    Ordered, That the Select Committee on National Provident Insurance do consist of Nineteen Members.
    Ordered, That Mr. Hoyle and Captain Fellowes be added to the Committee.—[Sir Herbert Maxwell.]
    House adjourned at twenty minutes before Three o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Pharmacy Acts Amendment (28).
Committee—Report—Incumbents of Benefices Loans Extension Act (1886) Amendment* (39).
Report—Glebe Lands (41–45).
Third Reading—Lunacy Acts Amendment (40); Justices' Jurisdiction (24), and passed.
PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL—Third Reading—Local Government (Ireland) (Carrick-on-Suir) * (30), and passed.

PHARMACY ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.
(The Earl Milltown.)
(No. 28.) SECOND READING.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE EARL OF MILLTOWN, in rising to move that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that its object, though extremely simple, was one of considerable importance to the general public, It was framed with the object of enabling the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, which was formed in 1841, and received a Charter in 1843, to make adequate regulations for the education and curriculum to be followed by those who were enrolled among its members. Its purpose was to protect the public against the admission to practice of persons without the necessary training. Hitherto there had been great difficulties in the way of the Society dealing with that matter, the importance of which it was impossible to over-estimate, because the members had the exclusive right of dispensing and selling poisons. By the Pharmacy Act of 1852, it was made penal for any unauthorized person to assume the title of pharmaceutical chemist, and by the Act of 1868 it was made unlawful for any person not duly qualified to sell or dispense poisons, or to assume the title of chemist and druggist. Certain poisons of a particu-
492
larly dangerous character, the sale of which was placed under special restrictions, were contained in a Schedule to the Act. That Schedule could be added to by the Society, from time to time, with the consent of the Privy Council. The Society consisted of members, associates, and registered apprentices, each of whom had a separate qualification, and passed a separate examination. It was intended that the apprentices should pass a preliminary examination before admission, and after a three years' apprenticeship should pass a qualifying examination; but it had been found that, owing to the development of the extensive system of cramming that now prevailed, the gentlemen who were known as apprentices trusted entirely to passing the qualified examination, and did not devote themselves to acquiring the practical knowledge absolutely essential during apprenticeship, although all operations in pharmacy required to be maturely practised for the safety of the public. By the 6th clause of the Bill of 1868, the Examiners were bound to pass those who answered their questions, which might be answered by those who had no skilful training at all. The Society accordingly framed bye-laws for remedying those defects and establishing a sufficient curriculum of study; but the Privy Council, to whom all bye-laws had to be submitted, felt unable to confirm them, as it considered that the Statutes did not authorize the Society to frame them; and this Bill, which had the unanimous assent of the Council of the Pharmaceutical Society, had been introduced into their Lordships' House to remedy this defect. Subject to a slight amendment in the phraseology of one of the clauses, his noble Friend the Lord President of the Council (Viscount Cranbrook) did not object to the Bill. He might add that the 2nd clause gave this Society power to dispense with the three years' curriculum in the case of those who had obtained technical skill in any part of the United Kingdom or the Colonies, but not with the qualifying examination. In moving the second reading, he might say, in conclusion, that the Bill did not apply to Ireland, as the Irish Pharmacy Act of 1875 did not require similar amendment. The Bill would have the effect of making the practice in the matter uniform throughout the Kingdom.
Moved. "That the Bill be now read 2a"—(The Earl of Mtlltown.)
Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House To-morrow.

LUNACY ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.
(The Earl Chancellor.)
LUNACY ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.

  (No. 40.) THIRD READING.
  Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord HALSBURY), in moving that the Bill be now read the third time, said, that a question had been raised by the noble and learned Earl (the Earl of Selborne) on the new clause which he (Lord Halsbury) proposed to move to add to the Bill. The now clause provided that when a person had been received as a lunatic in any asylum under an order of a Judge of County Courts, magistrate, or justice, without having been previously seen or examined by him, he should have a right to be taken before a Judge, magistrate, or justice. It was provided by the clause that this jurisdiction should be exercised by "any Judge, magistrate, or justice other than" the one who made the order; and his noble and learned Friend desired that the same magistrate who made the order should have the personal interview with the alleged lunatic. If that were done, it would have the effect of making the magistrate practically hear an appeal from his own order. He could not take the responsibility of advising the House to adopt such an Amendment, and would leave the decision in their Lordships' hands.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 3a"—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 3a accordingly.
  On Question, "That the Bill do pass?"
  Amendment moved, after Clause 4 add a new clause:—
  "(1.) When a person has been received as a lunatic in an asylum hospital or licensed house or as a single patient, under an order of a judge of county courts magistrate or justice, without having been personally seen or examined by such judge magistrate or justice, the person shall (subject as herein-after mentioned) have the right to be taken before or visited by a judge magistrate or justice, other than the judge magistrate or justice under whose order he has been received, except so far as the medical superintendent of the asylum or hospital, or the
  494
  medical proprietor or attendant of the house, or he medical attendant of the single patient, within twenty-four hours after his reception, in a certificate signed and sent to the Commissioners (in the Form 3a in the First Schedule), shall state that the exercise of such right would be prejudicial to the person so received.
  "(2.) Subject to any such certificate, the superintendent or proprietor of the asylum hospital or house, or the person having charge of the single patient, shall, within twenty-four hours after reception, give to the person so received as a lunatic a notice in writing in the Form 3b. in the First Schedule, and shall ascertain whether he desires to exercise such right as aforesaid; and if he, within seven days after his reception, expresses his desire to exercise the right, such superintendent proprietor or person shall procure him to sign a notice in the Form 3c. in the First Schedule, and shall forthwith transmit it by post in a registered letter to the judge magistrate or justice, who shall thereupon arrange, as soon as conveniently may be, either to visit the person giving the notice or to have him brought before him by the superintendent proprietor or person as the judge magistrate or justice may think lit. After any such personal interview the judge magistrate or justice shall send by post to the Commissioners a report thereupon, and the Commissioners shall take such steps as may be necessary to give effect to the report.
  "(3.) For the purposes of this section the notice shall be sent to and the jurisdiction exercised by any judge magistrate or justice, other than the judge magistrate or justice who made the order for reception, then present within the petty sessional division or borough where the person received is, who shall be in such notice named by the person desiring the interview, or if no judge magistrate or justice is so named, any justice who shall, under arrangements which shall be for that purpose from time to time made amongst themselves by the justices in such division or borough, undertake such jurisdiction: and the notice shall, in such last mentioned case, be sent to the justices clerk of such division or borough for transmission to the justice.
  "(4) The judge magistrate or justice shall be entitled, if he desires so to do, before making his report, to see the medical certificates and any other documents upon the consideration of which the order for reception was made.
  "(5.) If any superintendent of an asylum or hospital, or any superintendent or proprietor of a licensed house, or any person having charge of a single patient, omits to perform any duty imposed upon him by this section, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour."—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE EARL OF SELBORNEsaid, he did not see why the magistrate making the order should necessarily be prejudiced against the patient. He would not very willingly propose an Amendment to the clause, because they were, all of one mind as to the general object and scope of Bill. He had a very strong opinion, however, that

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  the clause as it stood would have an effect which they did not intend it to have, and he would therefore move to amend the first sub-section by leaving out the words "any judge, magistrate, or justice other than. "He proposed to insert instead thereof, a provision that the examination of a lunatic should be made by the Judge, magistrate, or justice who made the order for reception—
  "If the person so received as a lunatic is still within the county or place in which such Judge, magistrate, or justice has jurisdiction, and in any other ease by any Judge, magistrate, or Justice."
  His object was that the magistrate who had made an order for detention should be the magistrate to personally see and examine the alleged lunatic, for having had all the materials before him, he was better able to form an opinion than any magistrate would be who knew nothing of the case. There was no reason for supposing that the magistrate who made the order would be prejudiced in the matter, whereas to call in another magistrate would be making him sit as a court of appeal from the first.
  Amendment moved,
  In the new clause to be added after Clause 4. by the Lord Chancellor, subsection (3.), lines 2 and 3, leave out ("any judge, magistrate, or justice, other than"); line 4, after ("reception") insert ("if the person so received as a lunatic is still within the county or place in which such judge, magistrate, or justice has jurisdiction; and in any other case by any judge, magistrate, or justice.")—(The Earl of Selborne.)
  On Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause?" Their Lordships divided:—Contents 40; Not-Contents 22: Majority 18.

  CONTENTS.

  Halsbury, L. (L. Chancellor.)

  Milltown, E.

  Northesk, E.

  Cranbrook, V. (L. President.)

  Onslow, E.

  Stanhope, E.

  Cadogan, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

  Wharancliffe, E.

  Yarborough, E.

  Mount Edgcumbe, E. (L. Steward.)

  Cross, V.

  Sidmouth, V.

  Lathom, E. (L. Chamberlain.)

  Ashbourne, L.

  Clarendon, E.

  Balfour of Burley, L.

  Feversham, E.

  Bateman, L.

  Harrowby, E.

  Brabourne, L.

  Ilchester, E.

  Bramwell, L.

  Jeresy, E.

  Brodrick, L. (V. Midleton.)

  Leven and Melville, E.

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  Chelmsford. L.

  Kintore, L. (E. Kintore.) [Teller.]

  Colchester, L.

  Colville of Culross, L.

  Norton, L.

  Ellenborough, L.

  Poltimore, L.

  Elphinstone, L.

  Saltersford, L. (E. Courtown.)

  Fermanagh, L. (E. Erne.)

  Shute, L. (V. Barrington.)

  Foxford, L; (E. Limerick) [Teller.]

  Stanley of Alderley, L.

  Kenry, L. (E. Dunraven and Mount-Earl)

  Wigan, L. (E. Crawford and Balcarres.)

  NOT-CONTENTS.

  Bedford, D.

  Foley, L.

  Grimthorpe, L.

  Ripon, M.

  Herschell, L.

  Kensington, L.

  Camperdown, E.

  Lingen, L.

  Ducie, E.

  Lyttleton, L.

  Granville, E.

  Romilly, L.

  Innes, E. (D. Roxburghe.)

  Stratheden and Campbell, L.

  Kimberley, E.

  Sudley, L. (E. Arran.)

  Selborne, E. [Teller.]

  Suffolk and Berkshire, E.

  Thring, L. [Teller.]

  Thurlow, L.

  Tweeddale, L. (M. Tweeddale.)

  Elgin, L. (E. Elgin and Kincardine.)

  Amendment disagreed to.
  LORD HERSCHELLsaid, he thought it objectionable and very prejudicial to the lunatic himself, that he should be enabled to name the particular Judge or magistrate before whom he should be taken, as it would give rise occasionally to considerable inconvenience. He, therefore, proposed to amend the clause so as to dispense with the necessity of the lunatic naming the particular magistrate who should visit him, and enabling the justices of the borough or county to choose, from time to time, the magistrate or justice who should investigate the case of the alleged lunatic.
  LORD HALSBURY,said he had no objection to the proposed Amendment.1
  Amendment agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, agreed to, and ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Further Amendments made.
  Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

GLEBE LANDS BILL.—(No. 41.)
(The Viscount Cross.)
GLEBE LANDS BILL.—(No. 41.)

  REPORT.
  Amendments reported (according to Order).
  Clause 3 (Sale of glebe by or with approval of Lord Chancellor).
  LORD NORTON LORD NORTON moved, as an Amendment, to insert, in line 21, before "bene-

  497
  fit" the words "permanent and prospective," and, in the same line, after "benefice" to insert "and without unfair prejudice to adjoining property." He remarked that, in Committee, it was moved that no globe should be sold without the Bishop's and patron's consent. The object of the Bill seemed to be to prevent the Bishops in the Ecclesiastical Commission vetoing all sales of Church real property. Such an inclination seemed to be erroneous, as late legislation had made real property no securer than Consols; and to prevent all sales of glebe would be a senseless loss, especially of minerals, which the clergy could not work at all, or interlying pieces of land they could not improve. On the other hand, the Land Commissioners might fool themselves unauthorized to refuse a poor incumbent's pressing application for premature sale for immediate benefit to the prospective detriment of the living. The noble Viscount in charge of the Bill had suggested in the debate the words "permanent benefit." He proposed to take the noble Viscount's words and to add "prospective," so that the Land Commission might feel it their duty to take probable improvement of value into their consideration in consenting to a sale. The other insertion would meet such a case as lately occurred, where glebe lying in the middle of the patron's park, the incumbent wanted to sell for villa building, the site being very attractive to a neighbouring manufacturing town. The patron, like most landlords, was too poor to outbid the market; but, fortunately, an exchange of land removed the difficulty. But it ought to be within the Land Commission's power, as the Act of Vict. I put it in that of the Ecclesiastical Commission, to save adjoining property from such injury by exchanges or other arrangements. Unfair advantage should not be taken of the patron's bequest to the Church.
  Amendment moved,
  In page 1, line 21, after the second ("the") insert ("permanent and prospective"); and after ("benefice") insert ("and without unfair prejudice to adjoining property").—(The Lord Norton.)
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Viscount CROSS)said, he would agree to the insertion of the word "permanent," as he had no objection to making it clear that the sale was to be
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  for the benefit of the benefice, and not for the immediate advantage of the incumbent. He could not, however, seeing that it might be looked upon as an Instruction to the Land Commissioners to look to prospective improvements by building or otherwise, assent to the insertion of the word "prospective," which, it seemed to him, would open up too remote contingencies, and, if the noble Lord would exclude it, he would not oppose the Amendment.
  LORD NORTONsaid, he feared he was unable to do otherwise than accept the suggested limitation of this Amendment.
  Amendment amended, and, as amended, agreed to.
  Amendment moved,
  In page 2, line 8, at the end of sub-section (2.) insert ("and if such objection be not removed the matter shall be referred to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, whose decision shall be final").—(The Earl of Feversham.)
  VISCOUNT CROSSsaid, that during the progress of the Bill in Committee, it was understood that the Land Commissioners were to be the arbitrators, and if the Ecclesiastical Commissioners were substituted, the title of the Bill might as well be altered, for instead of being one to facilitate the sale of glebe, it would rather be one to impede the sale. He regretted to oppose anything proposed by the noble Earl, but he could not accept the Amendment.
  Amendment negatived.
  On the Motion of The Viscount CROSS, Amendment made, in page 2, line 7, by leaving out ("and patron"), and inserting ("or patron, as the case may be").
  Clause, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 5 (Application and investment of purchase money).
  On the Motion of The Viscount CROSS, the following Amendment made:—At end of clause insert—
  "Any land purchased with money arising from a sale under this Act of the glebe land of any benefice shall be conveyed to the incumbent of that benefice, and shall be held by the incumbent for the time being as part of the glebe of the benefice, and the income arising from the land shall be paid or applied as the income of the land sold would have been payable or applicable if the sale had not taken place."
  Clause, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 6 (Restriction as to sales).
  On the Motion of The Viscount CROSS, the following Amendment made:—In page 4, line 16, after ("Act"), insert—
  ("but until such sum is fully recouped, nothing in this section shall discharge the incumbent from his liability to make good the said dilapidations.")
  On the Motion of The Viscount CROSS. THE following Amendment made:—Leave out Clause 7, and insert the following clause:—
  (Provision where land is subject to mortgage or other debt.)
  "(1.) Where any glebe land sold under this Act, or the benefice to which it belongs, is subject to any mortgage or other debt, the land shall be sold free from such mortgage or debt, but such mortgage or debt, if not discharged, shall attach to the purchase money of the land and to any securities or land in or in connexion with which such purchase money is invested, and the mortgagee or creditor shall have the like remedies as nearly as may be in relation to such purchase money, securities, and land as he would have had if the land had not been sold.
  "(2.) The prescribed notice of the proposal to sell any such glebe land shall be given to the mortgagee or creditor, and the mortgagee or creditor may, within the prescribed time after such notice, object to the sale on the ground that his security will be damnified by the sale, and before the Land Commissioners approve the sale or sell, they shall be satisfied that either such an objection to the sale has not been made by the mortgagee or creditor, or if an objection has been made that the mortgagee or creditor will not be damnified by the sale, and the Land Commissioners may, if it seems to them necessary, make provision either for securing the rights of the mortgagee or creditor, or for the discharge of the mortgage or other debt, so that nothing is done which will prejudice the future interest of the benefice.
  "(3.) The Land Commissioners may require the mortgagee or creditor to accept payment of the principal and interest due, together with such additional sum (if any) as seems necessary in order to dispense with any notice which would otherwise be required for such payment."
  VISCOUNT CROSSsaid, it had been represented to him that there were owners of globes who would wish to sell portions of them for the purpose of discharging debt incurred by assigning part of the income to new benefices in the original parish. The Rector of Wigan was in this position, having endowed new livings with part of his glebe. To meet such cases he would propose the insertion of a new clause.
  Moved, after Clause 7, insert the following clause:—
  (Provision as to annual charges on benefice.)
  " Where any glebe land sold under this Act, or the benefice to which it belongs, or any part of the endowment of such benefice, is subject to a permanent annual charge in favour of the incumbent of any other benefice, the land shall be sold free from such annual charge, but the annual charge shall attach to the purchase money, and to any securities or land in or in connexion with which such purchase money is invested, and the authority holding the securities in which such purchase money is invested, may, if they think fit, sot apart an adequate portion of such securities for the purpose of meeting such charge, or any part thereof, and shall thereupon discharge the said benefice and the endowment thereof from the liability to the annual charge or the said part thereof, and the securities so set apart shall be placed to a. separate account or otherwise set apart in such manner as the said authority may direct."—(The Viscount Cross.)
  Clause agreed to.
  Bill to be read 3a on Tuesday next; and to be printed as amended. (No. 45.)

IRELAND (CITY OF LIMERICK)—THE ASYLUM RATE.

  MOTION FOR PAPERS.
  THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN, in moving for the Correspondence inspecting the Limerick County Asylum rate, said, he should like to know what had recently transpired. He should be satisfied if he were informed the rate was levied, or about to be.
  Moved for—
  "Correspondence between the Irish Government and the May or of Limerick with reference to the rate ordered to be levied upon the City of Limerick for the maintenance of lunatics in the city and county asylum."—(The Earl of Camperdown.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR OF IRELAND (Lord ASHBOURNE)said, there would be no objection to give the Correspondence; and he might say that, when the noble Earl read it, he would find the attitude of the Government towards the Corporation of Limerick very clearly defined. The Government had required that the money should be paid, and the Corporation had admitted their liability.
  THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNsaid, he should like to know whether the Mayor of Limerick had announced the intention of the Corporation to levy a rate?
  LORD ASHBOURNEsaid, he did not know the exact form; but the liability had been acknowledged by the Corporation.
  THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: I am afraid that is a rather different matter.
  Motion agreed to; Correspondence ordered to be laid before the House.

  LORD ASHBOURNE AND HOME RULE.—OBSERVATIONS.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR OF IRELAND (Lord ASHBOURNE): My Lords, I should like to take this opportunity of saying one sentence in reference to a personal matter. My attention has been called, within the last hour before the meeting of the House, to a paragraph in The Daily News this morning, which, under the heading of "Lord Ashbourne and Home Rule," states as follows:—
  "The story goes that in a copy of Thom's Directory for 1885, which has come in due course out of his Lordship's residence, there has been discovered a memorandum of an Irish Home Parliament at least as extensive as Mr. Gladstone's, in the characteristic handwriting of his Lordship; but whether it is tentative or final, whether it correctly expresses Lord Ashbourne's sentiments, or whether it was written to order, there are no means of testing. After some curious adventures, the document, it is said, was purchased at a considerable price by a gentleman of the same politics and profession as his Lordship, and lithographed copies have passed into extensive, though private, circulation."
  My Lords, the first intimation I ever received of this romantic episode in my life was when I read that paragraph. There is not even the vestige of the shadow of a foundation for the story; and I have only to say that I shall be very much obliged to "the gentleman of the same politics and profession as myself" if he will only give me a private view of one of the "lithographed copies."
  House adjourned at a quarter before Six o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Ten o'clock.